

VOLUME 321 JANUARY 1959

# THE ANNALS

*of* The American Academy *of* Political *and* Social Science

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*
RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Assistant Editor*




## CONTEMPORARY CHINA AND THE CHINESE

*Edited by*

HOWARD L. BOORMAN
*Director, Research Project on Men and Politics in Modern China*
*Columbia University*

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PHILADELPHIA
1959




*Issued bimonthly by The American Academy of Political and Social Science at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pennsylvania.*
*Editorial and Business Offices, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania.*

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# FOREWORD

> It is impossible that our merchants and our missionaries can course up and down the inland waters of this great region, and traffic in their cities and preach in their villages, without wearing at the crust of a Chinaman's stoical and skeptical conceit. The whole present system in China is a hollow thing, with a hard brittle surface: we try in vain to scratch it; but some day a happy blow will shiver it. It will all go together.[1]

As the China correspondent of England's most influential newspaper a century ago, Mr. Cooke wrote in those far-off, fortunate days when observers of Far Eastern affairs prepared their dispatches at leisure and sent them off by fast clipper ship clearing Shanghai or Canton every fortnight. His judgment that the "whole present system in China is a hollow thing, with a hard brittle surface" has lingering echoes today, though a "happy blow" which will "shiver" mainland China appears to be the least likely solution to the problem of Chinese Communism.

The present situation on the China coast is at once more complex, more refractory, and more explosive than any which existed in the nineteenth century. It has grown out of a half century of Chinese history and out of four specific developments in the Far East during the past decade:

First, the Chinese Communist Party has consolidated total political and military power on the mainland of China.

Second, Communist China has emerged as a major Asian power.

Third, the Sino-Soviet alliance has become a key factor in the structure of world politics.

Fourth, Nationalist China has been driven from the mainland to a new base in Taiwan.

As a result of these changes, the Chinese political landscape has altered drastically and decisively. This issue of THE ANNALS, designed to update the *Report on China* issue of September 1951 edited by Professor H. Arthur Steiner, presents the results of some current thinking and research on some of these alterations. The first three articles provide perspective: they review the trends in China during the 1900–1950 period, appraise the general dimensions of the present situation, and delineate the assumptions underlying current United States policy. The major portion of the volume is devoted to the domestic scene and to the international relations of Communist China, and the final papers deal specifically with Taiwan and with the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. While this volume appears at the beginning of 1959, all articles were of necessity completed in the autumn of 1958.

The overwhelmingly dominant segment of the China scene today is Communist China. During the past decade, the Chinese Communists have welded the mainland into a single political unit for the first time in the experience of living Chinese. They have established a unified structure of organizational control embracing roughly a quarter of the earth's population. And they have embarked upon a program of total mobilization of mainland China's energies and resources

[1] George Wingrove Cooke, *China: being "The Times" special correspondence from China in the years 1857–58* (London: G. Routledge and Company, 1858), p. v.





to attain their long-term domestic goals: modernization and industrialization. In the economic sphere, the Communist leaders in Peking are following, basically, the course taken by the Russians a generation ago. They aim at a high rate of national economic growth characterized by a high rate of net investment and by a pattern of investment allocation giving priority to heavy industry. Against this background of economic expansion, mainland China during 1958 launched another major political and social transformation through the establishment of large-scale "people's communes" designed to be the "primary unit" in the reorganization of Chinese society on collective terms. While the long-range implications of the new communal system are unclear, its immediate utility is apparent. The system provides Peking with a nationwide series of huge labor units, mobilized and regimented, to carry out state projects—agricultural, industrial, or military—as required.

The price of totalitarian advance toward the goal of maximum national power has unquestionably been high. Many frictions, inherent in the wrenching processes of political, economic, and social reorganization, have become apparent; an unknown quantity of discontent has accompanied the intensive changes pressed in both countryside and city. Yet the Communists retain a firm grasp upon the essential levers of control and upon the loyalties of substantial groups in the Chinese population, with the result that dissatisfaction and resentment have not burgeoned into active resistance sufficient to affect the viability of the regime.

The record of the past few years indicates that Communist China has, on balance, expanded its national capabilities at a more rapid pace than that attained by Russia during the comparable period after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. This coercive effort aimed at the accelerated development of a strong base for Chinese national power—industrial, technological, and military—has manifold international implications. Allied with the Soviet Union, Communist China is committed to maintaining the unity and increasing the strength of the Communist bloc. At the same time, the rulers in Peking are pursuing an active foreign policy aimed at consolidation of national security interests, at extension of Communist influence and authority in Asia, and at attainment of international status as a major power.

So far as the United States is concerned, the emergence of Communist China as a major factor in the politics of contemporary Asia has posed critical problems both of national policy and national understanding. Yet (outside the American government) the search for an adequate and expanding body of reasonably reliable data and for informed interpretation on contemporary China has been only intermittent and inadequate. In part, this lag has been due to a domestic milieu which tended to make China an issue for partisan controversy rather than a subject for detached appraisal. And, in the universities, serious work has been hindered by propinquity in time, by paucity in trained manpower, and, not least, by the fact that the study of China has traditionally been oriented toward historical and humanistic inquiry.

In this situation, the universities of the United States now have a unique opportunity to develop more empirical and analytic studies of current Chinese problems and to expand the application of the social science disciplines to a major and still relatively unexplored sector of the non-Western world. Since the Chinese Communist system promises a relatively high survival potential, the problem of understanding its present structure and of estimating its future course of devel-

opment constitutes one of the primary issues facing the United States today. The papers in this issue of THE ANNALS reflect both the strengths and the limitations of our present state of knowledge. While they provide no final answers to the dilemmas inherent in a subject at once contemporary and controversial, these articles suggest the range of problems remaining to be explored and indicate again the growing need for increased programs of training and research attuned to current as well as past perspectives in Asia.

HOWARD L. BOORMAN

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*Howard L. Boorman, New York City, is Director of the research project on Men and Politics in Modern China, Columbia University. He served for several years as an officer of the Foreign Service in Peiping, China (1947–50) and Hong Kong (1950–54). Mr. Boorman is co-author of Moscow-Peking Axis: Strengths and Strains (1957).*

# Modern China in Transition, 1900–1950

BY MARY C. WRIGHT

ABSTRACT: Contemporary China can only be understood in relation to its recent past. During the half century before 1950, Chinese history was marked both by the vigorous persistence of tradition and by the emergence of powerful revolutionary drives. With the final collapse of the imperial system, China sought meaningful values and effective institutions which could realistically link past, present, and future. Chinese nationalism, combined with traditional xenophobia, was a major impelling force during these years. Nationalism manifested itself in the widespread desire for political stability and for a strong central government capable of effective action both domestically and internationally. The struggle for modernization affected both countryside—where fundamental institutional changes were required to ameliorate the living standards of the peasant base of Chinese society—and city—where the process of social and economic change had drastically uneven results in human terms. The control of military power was a key element in Chinese politics throughout the republican period. The spreading of political awareness through broadened programs of public education brought with it a sharpened realization of how much more could be done to modernize China given a strong and efficient government. The trend toward democracy—in some senses of the word—was apparent in China; but neither of the major political movements, the nationalist or the communist, stressed two elements considered essential in the West—civil liberties and government by majority decision.

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*Mary C. Wright, Ph.D., Stanford, California, is Associate Professor and Curator of the Chinese Collection at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. She is the author of The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862–1874 (1957), has published a number of articles on modern and recent Chinese history in professional journals, and is an Editor of the Journal of Modern History. She spent seven years in study and research in the Far East.*

MOST Americans had little occasion to think seriously about China until Communist China began to emerge as a major power. Even those who were especially interested in China seldom gave systematic attention to the current scene. Scholars nearly all studied periods before—usually very long before —1900. Missionaries, government officials, businessmen, and military personnel were absorbed in pressing daily tasks. Most lacked the training, even if they had the time and inclination, to observe perceptively and to gauge accurately the momentous changes occurring around them. A handful of journalists made outstanding efforts to find out what was really happening, to set it in its epochal context, and to report it in readable English. Yet even among these, a working knowledge of the Chinese language and a familiarity with recent Chinese history were rarities. No one doubted that a grasp of the background was essential, but the background grasped was a strange blend of conflicting myths that have remained to block our comprehension of contemporary China.

## COLLAPSE OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM

Everywhere in the world the headlong changes that marked the first half of the twentieth century dwarfed the slower changes of earlier centuries; but nowhere did these changes so stagger the imagination as in China. The longest lived and most populous polity in world history had changed so slowly over millennia that sometimes it seemed not to have changed at all. Certainly there had been nothing remotely comparable to the steady and accelerating transformation of European life beginning in the late Middle Ages. Then suddenly and nearly simultaneously China was struck with equivalents of the Reformation, the French Revolution, and the Russian Revolution. Marx and Darwin were new, but no newer than Aristotle and Rousseau. Young Chinese discovered them all at the same time.

This unprecedented telescoping of history was at first obscured by the continued and obviously vigorous persistence of the many ancient ways that so delighted all visitors. In the midst of a living antiquity unparalleled in the modern world, the signs of the progressive stages of a great revolution were generally discounted. Our experience had not prepared us for a society marked both by strong tradition and by powerful revolutionary drives. The signs of tradition were plain to see and comforting. The signs of revolution could be dismissed as superficial. There were such very wide troughs between the waves that at the time we could not see that there was any cumulative build-up. Today in retrospect, the classic French and Russian sequence is clearly outlined. The Chinese timetable, however, was so different that by the time we began to suspect that we might be seeing the beginning of a great social revolution, the revolution was already far advanced.

The basic thread of Chinese history during the first half of the twentieth century was the search—sometimes ebullient, often heartbroken—for new institutions in every sphere of public and private life, institutions which would connect the pride in a great past to high hopes for a great future. In the tumultous controversies of fifty years, the Chinese centered their attention on one or another facet of a few great questions: What of the old is worth keeping? Can we keep it and survive in the modern world? What of the new is desirable? Must we take the undesirable too in order to survive? Or can China make a future for herself on lines not yet tried elsewhere? These questions were of mounting urgency, for the



Chinese state was prostrate and Chinese life seemed to be disintegrating.

## THE FORCE OF NATIONALISM

Because vigorous nationalism provides built-in incentives which a successful government can use to spur and control its people, the growth of nationalism was one of the most significant features of China's recent history. When the twentieth century opened, the power of the Chinese Empire was a very recent and live memory. Hence the shattering series of stunning defeats at the hands of the Western powers and Japan was especially galling. We did not give enough attention to the sharp and swift rise of fighting nationalism. Daily observation of the polite and humorous Chinese, plus a little dabbling in Chinese philosophy, led to the myth that the Chinese were only interested in their own families, that they had no conception of country. Everyone could tell a story to illustrate the point, from the embassy to the kitchen level. Opposite conclusions were drawn from this alleged basic characteristic of twentieth-century China: The Chinese were venal and lacking in decent feeling for the public good, or the Chinese were charming sages happily free of the lusts for power that had wrecked what had been European civilization until 1914. But in either case, the basic analysis was dreadfully faulty.

There was in fact a genuine groundswell of Chinese nationalism during the first half of the twentieth century, and for its element of xenophobia there were clear historic roots. So much has been written lately of Chinese popular good will toward foreigners until they were brain-washed en masse that at the risk of gross oversimplification, something should also be said of Chinese bitterness and hatred toward Americans and Europeans in recent decades. The crude fear of the white peril that the last imperial dynasty had been able to exploit in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 had been submerged but not overcome, and the expanding special privileges of foreigners were irritants in increasingly wide spheres of Chinese life. These fears and irritations provided a mass sounding board for what might otherwise have been rather arid denunciations of imperialists. It is well to remember that both Nationalists and Communists have struck this note; that Chiang Kai-shek and Lenin described the tangible effects of imperialism in remarkably similar terms.

## THE SEARCH FOR POLITICAL STABILITY

The increasingly patent ineffectiveness of political leadership and institutions was a no less important characteristic of twentieth-century China. This phenomenon was obvious to all, but it was misinterpreted because we did not attach enough importance to the fact that political decline was accompanied by repeated efforts to reconstitute a powerful central government. When government was weakest, the pressures for strong government were greatest, for it was then that both traditional culturalism and modern nationalism were most offended. The various movements and programs that expressed these pressures struck us as rather silly, and the myth grew that Chinese politics was horseplay among warlords with silver bullets. Warlordism was of course a fact, but we were wrong to conclude from this that the Chinese people opposed strong government, or that no central power could be effective throughout so vast and undeveloped a country. The imperial tradition of strong central government never died, and now in retrospect one is struck by how much authority the central government did in fact retain until 1917. Even the "warlord period," 1917–27, was no era of general collapse of cen-

tralized authority, for the warlords themselves operated effective political machines over substantial territories. More important, the major contenders for power aimed consistently at the reconstitution of a powerful central state. As external dangers and internal crises mounted, the population of the country did not remain as apathetic and cynical as was thought in Treaty Port circles. On the record of performance it is clear that increasingly wide sectors of the population were prepared to throw their support to whoever gave most promise of effective central government.

The terrible strains of the period notwithstanding, the country remained vigorous, and tremendous new potentials were created in spite of war and inadequate leadership. We were too given to pity for a suffering and downtrodden people, and the pity irked. Widespread suffering there was indeed, but at its lowest point twentieth-century China was no beaten and stagnant country. Rather it offered the world the remarkable spectacle of a people whose ancient institutions had retained great vigor and effectiveness until very recent times; a people with a well-justified pride in the record of a great and prosperous state as well as in their intellectual and artistic heritage; a people who were learning modern skills rapidly and well and yet who with all this promise felt themselves in danger of national extinction because they had found no way to mobilize this latent strength for defense against aggression and foreign special privilege, for raising the standard of living, for a cultural renascence.

## AGRARIAN CHINA: PEASANTS AND POLITICS

During the first half of the twentieth century, China remained an overwhelmingly agricultural country. Although the proportionate position of the agrarian sector of the economy declined somewhat, the peasant's produce remained the chief source of revenue and his tax burden increased steadily with the rising cost of more elaborate arms, proliferating government offices, and the service of foreign loans. The terms of rural credit were devastating and tenancy increased, especially in the vicinity of modernized cities. The increased acreage planted in cash crops undermined the traditional self-sufficiency of the village, and cottage industries, once an important source of supplementary income, either disappeared or were bought by merchants. The self-employed artisan all but disappeared, and there was little to mitigate the harsh consequences of the imbalance between the high market value of manufactured goods and the low market value of agricultural products.

No patriotic Chinese could remain insensitive to the plight of the peasant base of society, even if the interest was only theoretical. The programs of the warlords regularly mentioned the need for reforms. The Kuomintang, which came to power in 1927, also had an elaborate rural program; its implementation was unfortunately delayed until threats from the Chinese Communists and from Japan could be removed. Perhaps more important as a symptom of the same kind of guilty uneasiness that drove prerevolutionary Russian intellectuals into populist movements, there was a rash of local experiments in rural reconstruction, sparked mainly by liberals of the minor parties whose programs lay somewhere between the Kuomintang and Communist poles. These efforts were important signs of the times; yet the country was so vast that major accomplishment could not really have been expected without strong government support. They were obliterated in the holocaust of the Japanese invasion.

One barrier to the implementation of the Kuomintang land reform program was the landed wealth of its members. There were exceptions of course, especially among Kuomintang members from the modern business and professional classes. Even among these, however, there was fear that a land reform program, once launched, might gain too much momentum and turn against the Kuomintang. After 1937, with the loss to Japan of the modern cities these men represented, the Kuomintang became increasingly dependent upon the rural economy and thus upon the support of ultraconservative landlords in the hinterland.

Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party, founded in 1921, moved rather quickly away from the classic Marxian distrust of the peasantry. The party line shifted tortuously on this as on other points, yet within a few years Mao Tse-tung and others were demonstrating their skill in peasant agitation. Kuomintang realization that peasants when aroused would almost certainly swing to the Communists was a major cause of the breakup of the first Kuomintang-Communist united front and of the Kuomintang's swing to the right after 1927. Driven back into the countryside by the victorious Nationalist armies, the Communists began a long series of land reform experiments, varying according to circumstances from moderate rent reduction to wholesale confiscation. By degrees the Communist party learned how to mobilize peasant support. The Chinese peasant loved his land, but by the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century it could no longer keep him alive without radical changes, and only the Communists offered these.

During the civil war, 1946–49, the Communists succeeded in using land reform as a major political and military weapon. The national government, threatened on all sides, was not prepared to take any very drastic steps. The Chinese-American Joint Committee on Rural Reconstruction struggled manfully to improve agrarian technology in the hope that, with an increased harvest, the peasant's plight could be eased without damage to landlord interests. The conclusion of the outstanding Chinese official chiefly responsible for the effort was that nearly everywhere technological change proved impossible without fundamental institutional change; that indeed without social reform, the peasant could not take advantage of improved methods, and his position often actually deteriorated.

## URBAN DEVELOPMENTS

Before 1950, the modern sectors of the Chinese economy lagged so far behind the West, Japan, and even India that one did not usually notice how great the development had been between 1900 and 1950. Beginning in the 1890's, Chinese of a new type, scholar-officials who were also entrepreneurs, began to build substantial modern factories. Mining, railroads, and shipping developed rapidly. The physical plant, the labor force, the managers and technicians required for a modern economy began to appear in increasing numbers. The potential was there for anyone to see, and yet it could not be realized. To the Chinese, this was infuriating. The chief barriers seemed to be inept and predatory government, fragments of traditional social institutions, drainage from the country of the profits from the enormous foreign investment in China, and the special protection that the unequal treaties provided for foreign interests, often directly against Chinese interests. Many Chinese businessmen, who enjoyed a boom while privileged Western competition was deflected by World War I, became in a sense revolutionaries, precisely because they were

patriots and businessmen. They supported the Kuomintang in its bid for power, 1924–27, because of its program to abolish imperialism; to create an effective, modern, centralized government; and to campaign relentlessly against the shreds of the Confucian order.

During this period, strikes and other signs of labor unrest were widespread, especially in foreign-owned enterprises. The foreigners' customary retort that their labor was at all events much better paid than other Chinese labor was irrelevant. Chinese peasants coming to work in factories for the first time suddenly saw much greater gaps between poverty and wealth than they had ever seen before. The poverty, and it was still extreme poverty by any standards, was theirs; the wealth belonged to foreigners and to a few Chinese who could readily be labeled running dogs of the foreigners, and it was often displayed in a manner that could scarcely have been better calculated to offend.

This frustration was felt in many spheres of Chinese society. The professional diplomats of China, skilled though many of them were, made only limited and gradual progress toward abolishing the unequal international status that outraged Chinese of every political persuasion. The Japanese invasion of the mainland struck at the very core of China's national integrity, and the international complications of the war period left a tangled legacy of misapprehensions and misunderstanding. Western relinquishment of extraterritorial privileges during the war came far too late, and the continuing major role of the United States in the postwar period convinced many Chinese that the national government was incapable of independent action. To these Chinese, the situation seemed further proof that diplomatic resources, like economic resources, were useless to a weak government and that military power was essential to political effectiveness.

## The Key Role of Military Power

The new importance attached to military power was another major characteristic of modern Chinese history. Chinese had never been the pacifists that we often fondly imagined them to be, and it had been clear to them since their first contact with the military power of the West that only a country with strong armed forces could elect its own policies. For a century there was a steady sequence of military reorganization programs. Every program failed; never was the required fighting strength achieved; never was a war won. Yet what was accomplished in inadequate bits and pieces convinced nearly all Chinese that China need not forever be a pawn in world politics; that there were no insuperable obstacles to genuine great power status. Experience had shown that Chinese peasants could be trained to use modern weapons efficiently and that they could on occasion fight with unsurpassed valor. Why was the opposite so often the case? Experience had shown that the country had the natural resources and the technological aptitudes needed for a modern arms industry. Why had one not developed? China had a small number of skilled strategists and effective line officers. Why were they not better deployed, and why had not many times their number been trained? The popular feeling as defeat followed defeat was less one of despair than of anger at the waste of opportunity. To a desperate government, massive outside aid seemed the only answer. To many Chinese, so much foreign aid to so weak a government seemed bound to lead to spiraling dependence. The suggestion that this was the intention of the aid fell on ready ears.



## Education

Some observers insisted that the Chinese attitudes described above were limited to a tiny and powerless fraction of the population. They failed to note how rapidly political awareness was spreading through education and propaganda. It would be difficult to find any period in the history of any country where education was expected to work the miracles it was expected to work in twentieth-century China, and very nearly did. The dominant Chinese tradition, in marked contrast to Western tradition, had always held that men are by nature good and that although their talents vary, the variation has nothing to do with class. Hence education, on which an enormous value was placed, was theoretically as desirable for the lower classes as for the upper. It had always been gratifying rather than terrifying to see the son of a peasant attain a high education with all its consequent rewards. His chance to do this was slim indeed, but the barrier was economic only.

With the twentieth century, the peasant's chance at education began to improve rapidly. The missionary schools and the new government schools provided only a fraction of the facilities that would have been required for universal public education. Even so, they were closer to such a system than they were to the traditional system of tutors and academies. The way seemed open in the not too distant future for every Chinese to be given a basic education and for the ablest Chinese to be given the highest education. But to attain this end, vigorous government action was needed. Successive governments made some contribution, but only under heavy pressure from the leaders of public opinion. Education had a low priority on all budgets, and as new ideas mushroomed, some of those in power came to cherish an illiterate population. Mass education movements found contrived obstacles rather than the support they needed. Too many schools remained under foreign control, and it was humiliating to realize how dreadfully the foreign schools were needed. There was almost no field in which China offered full advanced training, this despite the world renown of many of her scholars, once they were trained abroad.

## The Chances for Democracy

Thus in education as in other fields, progress led not to stable satisfaction but to a sharpening awareness of how much more had to be done, and, it was believed, could be done, if China had an effective and efficient government. There were fifty years of controversy over the kind of government China had and the kind of government she needed. The trends were frequently confusing, for in China political characteristics that the West regarded as inevitably associated were often in conflict, and others that the West regarded as mutually incompatible were sometimes fused.

During the first half of the twentieth century, the trend toward democracy was strong in China—in some senses of the word. Legally privileged classes had already disappeared, and as the upper classes continued to expand rapidly in size, there were in China millions of families of some little importance rather than a few hundred very powerful ones. The open classes of the traditional society became highly fluid during a period of such rapid change. The country had since early times been culturally homogeneous, vertically as well as horizontally. Of course there were popular cultures, elite cultures, and subcultures, but nothing resembling the cultural cleavage between classes that until recently characterized much of Europe.

With the spread of modern public education, few cultural stigmata of class origin remained. Traditionally, popular opinion had been taken seriously by the government and after 1919 the media for its expression expanded like the burst of a Roman candle.

In all these meanings—and they are valid meanings—twentieth-century China was democratic, and increasingly democratic. Yet this trend toward democracy lacked two elements considered essential in the West. There was no trend toward the establishment of civil liberties and there was no trend toward government by majority decision.

Neither of the two major political movements—the nationalist and the communist—showed any real interest in civil liberties, or even comprehension of what they were. As in traditional China, whatever purported to be the interests of the group remained paramount. In the 1920's there were flurries of talk about civil liberties, mainly among intellectuals, but these were crushed from both left and right. In the 1930's and 1940's, internal crises and foreign aggression seemed to require unfettered action by a powerful government if there was to be a viable future for anyone Chinese. In such circumstances, it is not surprising that a demand for civil liberties came to seem a demand for a right to wilful self-indulgence. There was no thought that individual Chinese ought to be guaranteed some small but irreducible minimum of privacy and originality, an area that the state could never touch, however great the alleged public interest.

Nor was there any trend toward representative government in the first half of the twentieth century. In Chinese tradition there had never been any notion that the wisest decision could be reached by counting heads, even in a select group. Statesmanship had been the art of selecting, training, and indoctrinating a small corps of able men who could then be trusted to run every aspect of the public life of a vast empire. To secure popular assent to official decision was essential; to ask the people what the decision should be never remotely occurred to anyone. Within the official hierarchy there were intricate checks and balances, impeachments, conferences, and compromises, but no idea of majority decision. After 1912, the few efforts at a façade of parliamentary government were fiascos, and most Chinese of all political persuasions saw the main problem as the creation of a competent new political elite to fill the gap left by the collapse of the imperial system. The idea of military tutelage followed by political tutelage meant exercise of power on behalf of the people by a nonhereditary, authoritarian political corps. It was as basic to nationalist as to communist political thought. During the first half of the century, neither party relinquished its control to popular elections. In 1950, the promise of ultimate full democracy offered by either seemed remote.

# The China Problem Today

By JOHN M. H. LINDBECK

ABSTRACT: No change in the last decade rivals that which has taken place in the situation of China. The military victory of the Chinese Communist forces on the mainland in 1949–50 and the removal of the Nationalist government to Taiwan have created a radically different milieu in which the China problem must be viewed today. Four elements in this situation are of key importance: the direction of developments within Communist China as the Peking regime seeks to impose its coercive, high-speed program of modernization and social transformation on the Chinese people in an environment far different from that confronting the Bolsheviks in Russia in the 1920's; the benefits and liabilities derived from mainland China's special relationship to the Soviet Union; the changes and pressures in China's Asian environment; and the influence of American military and political power on Chinese developments. Russia and the United States both exercise immediate and direct influence on China's domestic and international position, but neither can fully control the evolving relations between China and her Asian neighbors. In this area, signs of flexibility and change have appeared during the past decade. Committed to its Russian connection and opposed to all signs of neutralism within the Communist orbit, Communist China has been unable to yield to the appeals of Asian neutralism but has sought to find some accommodation with it favorable to its own ends.

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*John M. H. Lindbeck, Ph.D., New York City, is Deputy Director of the researc project on Men and Politics in Modern China, Columbia University. From 1952 to 195 he served as Public Affairs Adviser on Chinese Affairs, Department of State, Washingto and before that was Assistant Professor of Far Eastern Studies at Yale University. H is the author of "Communist China and American Far Eastern Policy" in The Depar ment of State Bulletin (1955), China Missionaries and American Foreign Policy: Th Boxer Period to be published by Harvard University Press, and has contributed articl and reviews to the Review of Politics, Far Eastern Survey, American Historical Revie Air Force Quarterly, and other journals.*

CHINA, a decade ago the sick man of Asia, now looks like Asia's strong man. Problems of economic modernization, social change, and international relationships have replaced those of the establishment of domestic order and political unity and effectiveness. In 1948 China was racked by civil strife and suffering the agonies of economic and social disintegration and chaos. In 1958 the mainland of China is under the firm control of a powerful government, making rapid progress in industrializing key sectors of its economy, undergoing widespread social change under forced draft, and possessed of Asia's paramount military force. By the end of the same decade 10 million Chinese on China's Taiwan margin had moved out of postwar disorganization and neglect, were under effective political authority of the Republic of China and, proportionate to size and resources, were making equal or even greater economic progress under less stringent social conditions and maintaining well-trained and equipped defense forces of over a third of a million men.

The United States in 1948 was deeply involved in Chinese affairs on the mainland. On a hundred fronts Americans sought to assuage Chinese suffering. While still seeking to complete the removal of all vestiges of Japan's imperial intrusion in China and trying diplomatically to fend off Russian designs, the United States government at the same time was withdrawing from official involvement in China's domestic strife. By 1958 no trace of American influence was tolerated on the mainland of China, which was intimately and almost exclusively associated with the Soviet Union. In 1948 there was one Chinese government with international standing, albeit diminishing prestige; a decade later there were two effectively organized governments competing for international status and influence. Largely unaffected by the emerging cold war conflict in 1947 and 1948, each of the Chinese regimes in 1958 was militarily allied and in close partnership with one of the two major nuclear powers locked in cold war competition, each defended by but also subject to the restraints of the overriding global interests of its stronger ally.

The China of today is not the China of yesterday. What are some of the key facets of the present situation which are shaping the future?

In the course of a single decade, several interrelated forces have radically altered the Asian scene and China's situation—the resurgence of Chinese power, the development of Sino-Russian affinities, nationalism's re-creation of Asian states, the confrontation of Communist and Free World power in Asia, and the economic quandaries of all Asian nations urgently trying to meet needs for both more bread and more guns. For the first time Asian governments confront, not primarily a comity of Western powers, but Asian power and problems. Within the framework of these major forces, the particular issues embittering international relationshi and challenging national policies a being worked out: the issue of divid states and the future of the two China the regional countercurrents of neutra ism and anti-communism, China's pla and influence in the new world of Asi militarization and cold war tension economic development and trade r strictions, recognition and political pre sures, and anti-Westernism. Whatev the problems, the essential fact abo China, both to the Chinese people an to China's neighbors, is the rapid d velopment since 1949 of centralize Chinese power on the mainland.

## CHINA'S STRENGTH

China's great lethargic body has bee pared of many encumbrances and s into brisk motion by an exclusive, resolute, and implacable group of men. Their organization of Chinese capacities and forms of Chinese power reflects merciless determination and the rigid prescriptions of the operational code of technicians—specialists in conspiracy and revolution. They have already gone far to meet the essential requirements of Chinese nationalism: consolidating the power of the central government for decisive and effective action; asserting Chinese power and authority with other states; and setting the Chinese people again on the road to economic and social modernization. Within their widening grasp, China's metropolitan domain now stretches from the lofty reaches of Tibet to gun emplacements on islands off its seaward coasts. Possessed of a near monopoly of power on the mainland of China, the regime has made notable achievements in the areas of its leading priorities: military, political, and economic.

### *Military, political, and economic accomplishments*

Order and discipline have been im-osed on China's armed millions. Cenrally controlled Chinese armies man its rontiers. Its regular military forces, sia's largest and mightiest, said in 956 to number 2.7 million men, have een streamlined and reduced somehat in number. They are organized nto armies with over 160 divisions; into n air force with more than 2,400 Russian planes, about two-thirds of which re jets, including recent fighter and omber models; and into a small but rowing navy reported to have 17 ussian submarines in addition to its rface vessels. Tank, artillery, and echanized units, undergoing a connual process of modernization, impress hina's neighbors. The people within hina have seen an additional and chastening segment of Peking's military power—security forces of about 700,000 men, now being placed under the regular army, and local militia units with 10 to 12 million men giving effect to Peking's domestic mandate.

Political power is wielded, first of all, through a dominating party of more than 12.5 million members who control virtually all key administrative and governmental posts. In every institution and organization throughout the country—and no significant field of activity remains unorganized—the ubiquitous party members or their nonparty surrogates are present as the controlling elements. Whatever efforts have been made to instill some semblance of life into the minor parties which make up China's multiparty political façade, their voices merely echo that of the dominant party for, indeed, they have publicly "surrendered their hearts" to the Communist party.

Its sure hold on military and political power has enabled the Communist state to force the pace of economic development and social change. In those areas directly related to the creation of a base for modern industrial and military power, progress has been substantial. The single-mindedness with which Peking is now pursuing its programs of modernization suggests that China may be well on its way to becoming a world industrial power. Having achieved by 1957 an industrial plant exceeding Russia's in 1932, Peking, alert to Chinese aspirations and with a close eye on Asian sensitivities to propaganda appeals, now proclaims that its aim is to "catch up with and surpass Britain within fifteen years or less in the output of major industrial products." As an essential aspect of this process, China is being forced through a rapid social transformation in order to absorb as speedily as possible all the elements of modern technology.

*Basic problems*

Many problems and many precarious elements remain in the China mainland situation. Some, like the growing pressure of population and the lack or insufficiency of some natural resources, flow from the natural situation. Others relate to the nature and policies of the regime. The most sensitive problems appear to lie in four areas: its relations to the Chinese people, the character and utility of its association with the Soviet orbit, its place in relation to the emergent nations of Asia, and accommodations to American power. In each of these areas the vital interests of China are at stake no less than those of the ruling regime—namely, the consolidation and development of power on a national basis within China, the success of programs of economic and social modernization, national security, and China's status and influence on the world scene. If at these points the policies of the regime seriously jeopardized or failed to sustain China's interests, the pressures both within and outside of the party leadership for major policy changes might tend to make the regime vulnerable to assault from without or to division from within.

Within China, one overriding decision has been taken which affects all others. For the foreseeable future, the regime has committed itself not to leading but to driving the Chinese people by means of systems of organized pressure and persuasion to develop an industrial, political, and military base for Chinese power. As dedicated Communist totalitarians, the leaders of the regime, while showing occasional signs of wavering in the application of this policy, have never seriously considered any other course. Human needs, cultural traditions, and social preferences are subordinated to the regime's demands for maximum national power. So long as it makes progress in its programs of economic development and modernization and maintains administrative efficiency, the regime is likely to have the co-operation of key Chinese groups who benefit from the system or are willing to subordinate other values to China's modernization. There is no doubt, however, that the perpetual tension between the people and the party and the constant use of compulsion present the regime and the people with problems of the most dangerous and persistent kind.

In this context the existence of a rival Chinese authority on Taiwan has special meaning. If driven too far, the discontent of disenfranchised Chinese may find support and leadership from the government on Taiwan. While this possibility seems remote, Taiwan does increase the vulnerability of Peking in its reliance on pressures and force in its relations to the Chinese people. Another unexpected consequence of Peking's policy of compulsions is that it has re-created for its once discredited rivals a new political base of popular support, of unknown magnitude on the mainland and of visible proportions among Chinese elsewhere on Taiwan and overseas. Unable to destroy the Government of the Republic of China by force without going to war with the United States, Peking runs the risk that in areas outside its control and possibly on the mainland itself, it may, through its harsh policies, lose significant ground in political competition with its rival on Taiwan which seeks to penetrate the weaknesses of its political relationships with the Chinese people.

Thus, associated with the resurgence of Chinese power on the mainland, the totalitarian character of the controlling regime is a dominating feature of the Chinese situation.

## THE RUSSIAN AFFINITY

Developments within China during the past decade are intimately related to a major alteration in the Asian balance of power flowing from the creation of a special Sino-Soviet affinity. Defined and dramatized in the Sino-Soviet alliance, this relationship has far more meaning than a military partnership: it has placed its mark on virtually all the works of the new Chinese regime and drastically reduced the options open to Peking in fashioning new structures of authority, in seeking the recovery and extension of China's international influence and position, in developing economic and military strength, and in restyling the social and intellectual dimensions of Chinese life. In 1948 Russian power in Asia was limited essentially to its own Far Eastern provinces, Outer Mongolia, and the northern portion of Korea. Ten years later a vast extrusion of Soviet influence makes it impossible to consider any major aspect of China's internal or external situation apart from Russia.

The extension of Soviet influence over China came not through conquest by Russian armies, but as a result of the active policy of Chinese Communists who were desirous of the rewards and willing to pay the penalties of membership in Russia's "socialist camp." The advantages to Peking are clear. The Russian connection has provided: military support by a major power; an assured source of technical and economic assistance for its plans of industrialization; ideological reinforcement for maintaining and justifying its domestic and external actions; international support in pursuing policies of pressure and penetration among its neighbors; and support in efforts to expel and undercut United States and Western influence and co-operation in Asia.

*Strengthening of bloc ties*

Although China's growing power, vast size, and Asian affiliations would appear to permit a more flexible and independent Chinese policy, the connection with Russia has been strengthened, not slackened. Indeed, the Chinese seem to be leading proponents of closer integration within the Communist orbit, proclaiming the slogan of "unity and solidarity under the leadership of the USSR." Committed at this stage to the harsh programs of early Stalinism, Chinese Communist leaders appear to be the principal opponents of "revisionism" and the chief advocates of unity and orthodoxy within the bloc. Their experience with liberalizing and innovating tendencies or experiments in the world of communism apparently convinced them that their present interests and future objectives would be jeopardized should such movements continue and expand.

The unnerving consequences in Hungary and elsewhere of the move to desatellitize the minor members of the bloc, discords resulting from initial ventures along "various roads to socialism," disturbing cracks in Communist unity that appeared in the de-Stalinization movements, the revelation of anti-Communist hostility within China during the liberalization movement of "blooming flowers and contending thoughts" all threatened to bring major troubles down upon the Chinese Communists and to decrease the advantages they sought from membership in the Communist camp. These advantages are so important to them that in their own interests they seek to prevent the growth of disunity and to move toward closer integration with other countries in Russia's sphere.

In the economic field, the initial reorientation of China's trading and credit relations, which by 1957 directed 50 per cent of China's trade toward Russia and almost 80 per cent toward the bloc, is now leading to further co-ordination within the Sino-Soviet system. In long-range planning, the new effort is toward "specialization of production" by national economics, "taking into account

the interests of the whole socialist camp." Initial steps in this direction apparently have been taken under the aegis of the eight nation Council for Economic Mutual Assistance with which the Chinese and Asian Communist regimes have become affiliated.[1]

In the military field, the trend also appears to be toward greater Chinese co-ordination with Russia. Following the entrance of Communist China into the Korean conflict, Russia undertook to assist it in creating a powerful, conventionally modern Chinese military force. However, its capabilities and use for major war in this transitional period prior to the maturing of an industrial and technological base make it completely dependent on Russia at crucial points. China must look to Russia for continued supply of key military components and in its military policies must accept the restraints imposed by its Russian ally who cannot permit Chinese local interests to precipitate a lethal global war. The strengthening of political and military co-ordination between the Chinese and the Warsaw Pact organization by developing global appraisals and unified bloc strategy will discourage national Communist leaders from making the mistake of overemphasizing the importance of local interests.[2] However, this also enables the Chinese, as close partners, to influence the use of non-Chinese bloc power to their advantage. Impressed by the international advantages of Russia's thermonuclear and technological achievements, the Chinese, far from resisting this integration and co-ordination, are its active proponents and have given it their full endorsement.[3]

The political relationship of China with the other members of the bloc has been developed with the manifold completeness with which totalitarian systems seek to encompass all major areas of activity. Through the decade, corresponding national organizations—from noisy friendship associations and cultural bodies through conventional trade, educational, diplomatic, military and political agencies to scarcely detectable party and security organs—have developed channels of communications and areas of shared or parallel activity in China and the other bloc countries. Without losing their identity and organizational integrity, the Chinese Communists have pursued increasingly close identification with the Communist orbit and political unity with it.

### *China's interest in the Sino-Soviet partnership*

Underlying this association with Russia and reinforcing particular ideological, political, and economic considerations is a fundamental interest which the two partners hold in common: the reduction of Western, chiefly American, influence and power and the enlargement and less restrained exercise of Chinese and Russian power in the world. The common goal, to borrow Mao Tse-tung's phrase, is that the East Wind prevail over the West Wind, not the West Wind over the East Wind.[4]

This Sino-Russian affinity is clearly one of the major elements in the China situation. It may, however, present mainland China's rulers with their biggest problem. It is absolutely essential

[1] "Communique on Soviet Bloc Economic Meeting," *New York Times*, May 26, 1958. Editorials in *Ta Kung Pao* and *Jen-min jih-pao* of May 25 and 26 respectively present the Chinese view.

[2] The Communiqué and Declaration of the Warsaw Pact Meeting of May 24 (Moscow Radio, May 27, 1958).

[3] Resolution of the 2d Session of the 8th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, May 1958.

[4] See editorial entitled "The Great Revolutionary Declarations," in *Jen-min jih-pao*, November 25, 1957.



that the Russian relationship pay off for them and for China. Their present basic national interests depend upon this. As a result, they have given top priority to two objectives: strengthening the bloc and influencing its policies to better serve their own needs. Their current view seems to be that a closer knit "socialist camp" is essential to assure them of requisite assistance. Their own influence would be diminished and their interests minimized in a "socialist commonwealth" in which each of the partners sought, within the loose bonds of ideological and political affinities, its own ends within and outside the camp. Clearly they feel that too many novel developments within Russia's orbit would threaten to reduce the benefits of the relationship for Communist China.

The Sino-Soviet affiliation also introduces major problems into the relations between China and her Asian neighbors. These are distinct from those related to the resurgence of Chinese power in Asia. The cold war line of conflict has now moved into the center of Asia. It has become a major factor in the relations with China for all Pacific and Asian countries which, irrespective of their inclinations, are brought closer to the range of Soviet pressures and hostility, and to the necessary counteractions by Free World forces.

From whatever aspect it is viewed, the Sino-Soviet relationship is a salient and obtrusive feature of China's problems and of the problem of China for its neighbors.

## CHINA'S ASIAN ENVIRONMENT

Geography, history, culture, and national experience make China a part of Asia; the choice of its present rulers makes most of it a part of the Soviet world. What happens in Asia may in the long run be more important for China than what happens in Russia. But aside from such possibility, the transformation of China's Asian environment is a critical new element in China's situation. The resurgence of Chinese power and drive toward modernization is not an isolated development, but part of a much broader movement in Asia.

At the time when Communist victory on the China mainland dominated the Asian scene, new untried and feeble governments were rising from the debris of war and the loosening hold of Western empires in the surrounding countries. The tremendous shift of major areas of Asia from colonial to independent status reshaped the power contours of the continent. Accepted, reluctantly or applaudingly in the West, this change also forced itself upon the exclusive world of Communist powers. The new Asia was recognized, in effect, by the sharp alteration in policy of the Russian and Chinese Communists who after 1950 abandoned their earlier direct attacks on the new Asian states and their leaders and set out to find new accommodations with Asian nationalism in ways favorable to themselves and unfavorable to the Western powers.

In the arc from Afghanistan to Japan lie China's fifteen Asian neighbors, eleven of whom have achieved independence since 1947. Of Asia's one and a half billion people, over 650 million now live in new states, the largest, India, making the nearest approach to China's population with 400 million inhabitants. Of other neighbors, Japan is pre-eminent in economic capacities, ranking as Asia's only modern industrial power, and the world's fourth largest. Within a ten-year period substantial progress has been made in developing political stability under governments varyingly democratic in character, some employing wartime types of authoritarian controls and others less restrictive measures. Economic progress has been considerable and in some areas, such as Japan, Taiwan, and Malaya, notable. Except

for coal, over three-fourths of Asia's electric power, petroleum, steel, and cement, for example, are produced in non-Communist areas of Eastern Asia. India's economic plans rival those of China for the development of natural and human resources which are roughly on a par with those on the China mainland.

Asia's revolutionary leaders, reflecting the progress of Asia, have achieved political stature and world influence. Their words and actions have increasing bearing on China's interests and the future character of China's Asian environment. Within the area of traditional Indian influence, eight nations have sought in varying degrees to escape the embroilments of the cold war struggle and to use neutralist pressures in securing their own interests.

*Military forces*

In a world where military strength is a measure of national influence, the tremendous changes in the military situation in Asia mark both the direction and the distance which Asia's new states have traveled in the past decade. In 1949, when Chinese Communist military power became pre-eminent in China, there were no significant Asian armies in being to contest her might or to impede her direct or indirect military moves. Now there are major aggregations of military forces in Asia, about 1,800,000 linked with the United States almost as closely as mainland China's forces are with those of Russia. American power, sufficient to provide an immediate offset to Russian power based in northeastern Asia, has been restored to the Western Pacific. On the critical frontiers of Chinese power—Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam—about one million well-trained, well-equipped troops stand backed by two United States divisions in Korea, the 165,000-man Seventh Fleet in the South China Sea, and American sea, air, and land units in Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and American Pacific bases. On the Pacific perimeter also are lesser but growing forces in the Philippines and Japan, with about 285,000 men under arms. For the most part this aggregation of Asian and American forces in the Western Pacific is the result and embodiment of the cold war in Asia.

South of China there is another complex of military forces whose purposes are not focused directly on countering Chinese Communist power. Those in Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, as in the Philippines, had early missions to suppress local Communist rebellions and continuing indigenous disorders. Regional tensions, such as those between India and Pakistan, have given impetus to the organization of other forces.

Whatever their origin, the core of the growing body of military power in Asia south of China is in the armies of India and Pakistan. Pakistan's regular army of about 180,000, supplemented by over 60,000 state and security police, has eight divisions, with cadres for three more. India's army is about three times larger, with over 500,000 men, plus security and reserve elements. It is supported not only by modern jet planes, comparable to Pakistan's F-86 Sabrejet fighter planes, but also by the nucleus of a modern naval force. In the surrounding area are additional forces of lesser international capabilities: Indonesia's 190,000-man army and Burma's 65,000 troops, both now chiefly concerned with domestic insurrectionary threats. Smaller forces are in Afghanistan, about 50,000 men, and Nepal and Ceylon, each having about 20,000 men in their regular units. Although a large proportion of Asia's non-Communist military forces of about 2.7 million men are not co-ordinated in the way in which the 3 million Communist troops of North Korea, China, and North Vietnam are, nonetheless they symbolize the resurgence of Asian states and give measure to their weight in Asia.



In no country have national security interests been slighted. Indeed, in a region where all available resources are urgently needed for economic development, the burden of maintaining war establishments with about half the world's military manpower, almost six million men, is assumed despite the cost. In terms of the percentage of the national budget devoted to defense in 1957, the figures range from 14 per cent for Japan, 18 per cent for India, 28 per cent for Thailand, about 33 per cent for Pakistan and the Republic of Korea, and over 70 per cent for Taiwan. Peking reported its military costs as 48 per cent of expenditures in 1951 and about 20 per cent in 1956, although the total amount spent has probably declined little, if at all.

*China in Asia*

Clearly Asia has reached a point where it is not to be mastered without resistance by the force of China's arms nor by the superior weight of her industrial progress or political competence. From resources within and outside of Asia, resurgent Chinese power wedded to Russian strength has been paced and in some respects outmatched by its Asian neighbors and a new power equilibrium attained. Moreover, as Asia has grown in strength, more of its states have sought to work out their relationships with each other and with Communist China on their own Asian regional terms outside of the Western context in which they were long held. Often sharply aware that Communist China parted ways with the rest of Asia in embracing an explicitly totalitarian system of force and a primary connection with the Soviet world, yet seven of China's Asian neighbors, whether through fear or other reasons, have developed diplomatic relationships with Peking. These new relationships include mainland China within the regional fellowship of Asian states—a fact accepted by even hostile Asian-African states at the Bandung Conference of April 1955. If by the preference of her present rulers on the mainland, China now belongs in the Soviet world, she remains perforce a part of Asia—a member of two worlds with divergent yet insistent pulls upon her. Hence, the association of China with its Asian environment is changing and dynamic; it introduces new and ambiguous elements and problems into China's relations with the Soviet world as it tries to reconcile different aspects of its interests in the "socialist camp" and the Asian world.

Thus far China's adjustments with its Asian neighbors appear to have been shaped by the general contours of Soviet policy. The Communists of Russia and China have recognized that Asia was not to be taken by force without risks to themselves. Having exposed their aggressive character and having discovered the futility and danger of sponsoring openly a series of Communist insurrections in Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaya beginning in 1948 and Communist party-engineered assaults on order and authority in Japan, Hongkong, Singapore, and India which reached a climax in outright military aggression in Korea in 1950, the entire Communist approach to Asia was readjusted. Asian governments willing to put relations on conventional political, cultural, and economic bases were accepted, and the overt relations of the Communists of Russia and China to local Communist and revolutionary groups have been subordinated to interstate relations.

Now China and Russia are eagerly experimenting with political methods to gain influence and leverage over govern-

ments which, while often hostile to communism at home, are willing to work with and support the Soviet world abroad to achieve their own national interests. Acting together, they have a significant chance to affect the shifting forces at work in the transitional societies of Asia and Africa. Acting alone —China with economic handicaps and Russia with geographic and cultural remoteness—neither Moscow nor Peking could hope to achieve quickly the political and economic envelopment of these major and diverse regions. There is no doubt that the rulers of Russia and China have fixed their eyes on the reverberating awakenings in Asia and Africa. Their hope evidently is that if the twenty new nations of Asia and Africa with 700 million people now moving toward modernization can be brought under Soviet influence and into an effective working combination with the advancing technology of Russia and in lesser measure China, the structure of world power will be remade.

But within this framework there remain China's specific national interests centered in her immediate Asian environment which Russia has not been able, or perhaps with major preoccupations elsewhere even earnestly sought, to promote: normalization of relations with Japan and other nations; enlargement of trade, especially in certain strategic items, and other economic relations; reduction of United States and Western influence in the area; diminution and elimination of a rival regime on Taiwan; full international acceptance as an Asian power; influence and participation in regional developments; the shaping of political forces and institutions hospitable to her influence in neighboring countries. In these areas lie some of China's national interests which, if denied, will affect adversely the future well-being of mainland China and the interests of its ruling regime. One of the most dynamic factors, then, in the Chinese situation is the encounter of China and her Asian neighbors, for neither the Chinese people nor other Asians would deny that China's place is in Asia.

## China and American Power

But along the front where the cold war line divides the Chinese and their neighbors whose fear and hate of the Communist threat to their own national aspirations are now steeled by American arms, and in neutralist areas further to the south, the United States is involved in the Chinese situation. With the reduction of American cultural, social, and economic activities to the thin margins of China, political and military considerations have become paramount.

The American response to the Chinese Communist military alliance with Russia has been to develop, in the cold war context, a framework of alliances with six Asian governments and four governments in Australasia and Europe as the Asian part of a world-wide security program, involving collective defense arrangements with forty-two nations, to counter the military strength of the Sino-Soviet bloc. As in the divided states, this includes military guarantees and support for the non-Communist Chinese government. American military involvement in China is another manifestation of the response of the United States and other non-Communist countries reacting to the general threat of Communist hostility. In the Chinese case, however, United States forces alone, rather than in association with other non-Communist armies, are committed to stopping Communist forces from the military reunification of China. The problem of both Chinese regimes is that neither can take military action in disregard of the United States. Indeed, as a result of Asian and American apprehensions and determination to block any further extension of Sino-Russian power, Peking is confronted with American supported or encouraged military forces along much of its Asian boundaries.



No less important and far more complex is the bearing of the United States on China's political situation. As a result of Communist China's aggressive efforts to extend its power in Asia and to secure a dominant position in the region, the United States has, in effect, undertaken to counter the weight of China's mainland power by providing the government of China on Taiwan with the strength of American political support and international influence. What the government on Taiwan has lacked, the United States, within the limitations of the Chinese and international situation, has sought to provide.

This action has presented Peking with major problems, the most frustrating being its inability to secure the advantages of general international recognition and an uncontested place in world councils as China's spokesman. While Communist China's size, growing power, and the seniority of its party leadership have increased its standing in the Soviet sphere and in parts of Asia, its place on the world scene has been restricted by American power—reduced far below that of the USSR—through partial blockades, trade embargoes and controls, diplomatic isolation, travel restrictions, and exclusion from the United Nations and international bodies. For Free China, questions related to American policy and power are even more acute, for survival itself depends in large part on its American connection.

Politically, the critical aspect of United States policy for both Taipei and Peking is that China may be reduced by cold war priorities to a divided state. Any internationally underwritten cease fire between the opposing Chinese forces would bring the struggle for power in China to a halt and frustrate the political aims and hopes of both sides. Thus far, however, the United States has avoided a cold war stabilization of the Chinese political struggle which might reduce the political and international position of the government of Free China or decrease the pressures upon the Chinese Communists. Meanwhile, the United States remains involved in China's civil strife.

It is in this area that China remains a uniquely sensitive and difficult problem for the United States. A growing number of Free World countries and many of the closest allies of the United States seek to stabilize the front between Taiwan and the China mainland. The devices used at other points in the confrontation with Sino-Soviet power to achieve this—such as international conferences, cease-fire agreements, neutralized zones, international supervisory commissions—would certainly lead to a reduction in the position and claims of the Government of the Republic of China, for it is unlikely that any understandings could be reached with the Sino-Soviet bloc which left this government in a preferential position, enjoyed by no other claimant regime in the states divided by Communist power and ambition. Thus far the United States has not been able to bring sufficient pressure on the Chinese Communist regime by its own action, or through the now declining pressures of concerted Free World actions, to compel it to accept terms which would preserve the essential advantages of Free China's political and international position. But until there is some stabilization in the front between Taipei and Peking, China remains the dominant and most sensitive problem for the United States in Asia, governing and shaping all of its Far Eastern policies.

# United States China Policy

By Ralph N. Clough

Abstract: Communism has taken over much of East Asia and poses a grave military and subversive threat to the free countries of the area. United States policy is aimed at countering this threat by deterring military aggression through a series of security pacts and the development of indigenous Free World military strength; strengthening the economies and the internal security of the free nations; and opposing any action which would contribute to Chinese Communist power to conquer or subvert. Essential to the policy of limiting the external political effectiveness of the Peiping regime is our support of the Republic of China. United States China policy has been strongly supported by the American people, but there have been expressions of doubt as to the validity of the policy for the future. A "two-Chinas" concept has sometimes been proposed as an alternative. However, the concept is vehemently opposed by both Peiping and Taipei. Even if it were practicable, its presumed advantages are highly questionable and its adoption by the United States would seriously injure the Free World position in East Asia.

This article was written just prior to the renewal of the Chinese Communist artillery bombardment of Quemoy on August 23 and therefore does not reflect events which have taken place since then. However, it remains an authoritative exposition of United States policy towards China.

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*Ralph N. Clough, Counselor of the American Embassy at Bern, Switzerland, wa Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of State, from June 1957 to Jul 1958 and Deputy Director during the two preceding years. He served in China an Hong Kong from 1945 to 1954.*





THE BASIC premises which underlie the policy of the United States toward China are easily understood and generally accepted by the American people. They are: that the Soviet bloc, of which Communist China is a part, is engaged in a long-range struggle to destroy the way of life of the free countries of the world and bring about the global dominion of Communism; and that East Asia,[1] where eight of the eleven countries are newly independent since World War II, is peculiarly vulnerable to the Communist offensive.

## The Communist Threat

The Communist movement has taken full advantage of East Asia's vulnerability. Since 1945 it has seized control in territories where live 660,000,000 people, close to 70 per cent of the population of the area. Today Asian Communist armies totaling over 3,000,000 men, well equipped with Soviet weapons, many of their soldiers seasoned in battle in China, Korea or Vietnam, pose a constant threat to their weaker neighbors. Communists are active throughout the non-Communist countries of the region, ranging in importance from the legally sanctioned, rapidly growing Communist Party of Indonesia to the proscribed, isolated infiltrators who are discovered from time to time in Taiwan or the Republic of Korea. Armed Communist aggression has been halted since 1954. The free countries of the area have made progress in reducing the internal Communist threat. Yet the ominous shadow of Communist power remains. No statesman or politician can omit it from his daily calculations. The writings of Lenin, Stalin, and Mao on the Communization of Asia stand as a constant reminder to the free countries of Asia that the struggle to maintain their freedom may be long and grim.

The giants of Asian communism are the Chinese Communists. Rulers of 640,000,000 people and proud originators of the "classic type of revolution for colonial and semi-colonial countries," they lend encouragement, moral and material, to their sister Communist parties. Their policy is, as Mao Tse-tung has declared, to "give active support to the national independence and liberation movements in countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America."[2] This "active support" has manifested itself in the form of armed aggression in Korea, provision of arms and supplies in Indochina, and less overt means of assistance elsewhere.

The Chinese Communists' demonstrated military strength, underwritten by the still more powerful USSR, inspires both fear and respect. Reports —frequently inflated—of their rapid industrial development evoke admiration among those ignorant of or unconcerned with the cost in human lives. Chinese Communist propaganda blankets the area. Even where it is prohibited in written form, the ubiquitous radio broadcast in the local language gets through. Peiping's "peoples' diplomacy" brings thousands of influential Asians to Peiing annually for red carpet treatment. Offers of trade and economic aid have provided an effective means of gaining or expanding a political toehold. Where diplomatic relations exist, contacts are multiplied, encouragement of the local Communist and Communist-front opposition facilitated, and the use of Chinese financial institutions such as the Bank of China for subversive purposes made possible. Overseas Chinese communities then come under the domina-

[1] For the purpose of this article the term "East Asia" includes the following countries: China, Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia and Burma.

[2] Eighth Party Congress, Chinese Communist Party, September 15, 1956.

tion of pro-Communist elements. For, in the long run, the Chinese Communists are not interested in the development of good relations with existing governments and peoples. Their object is revolution and they promote it where and as it is possible without excessive risk, adapting their methods to local conditions. Their goal is to lead Asia to communism. As the Peiping *Peoples' Daily* declared on December 29, 1956, in an article prepared on specific instructions from the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo, "The issue is the future. However many twists and turns may await us on our forward journey, humanity will eventually reach its bright destiny—Communism. There is no force that can stop it."

An appreciation of the Chinese Communist revolutionary commitment is essential to an understanding of United States policy. There is ample evidence that we must deal, not with leaders whose aim is to promote the welfare of their people and live at peace with their neighbors, but with a group of men in power who are dedicated to extending revolution beyond their own borders, by force where necessary and feasible. As Liu Shao-ch'i phrased it in a book still regarded in Peiping as one of the Chinese Communist classics, "The most fundamental and common duty of Communist Party members is to establish Communism and transform the present world into a Communist world." [3] With mainland China now in their hands and with Communist allies in every country of East Asia, they are in a good position from which to promote what they consider to be the inevitable victory of communism.

## UNITED STATES POLICY

Our China policy has been, in part, a reaction to the hostile acts of the Peiping regime toward American citizens and American property. The American people have not forgotten the 142,000 casualties in Korea, the brutalities committed against American prisoners of war, the continued refusal to account for our personnel missing in Korea, the jailing and torture of American civilians in Communist China, the violation of the Chinese Communist commitment in September 1955 to release American civilians, four of whom are still held today, the confiscation of American property in China, and the indignities to which American officials were subjected. No other regime in modern times, not excepting other Communist countries, has demonstrated such violent, prolonged, and calculated hostility toward this country and its citizens. This grim record would, in itself, make it difficult to accept the Chinese Communist professions that they seek only "peaceful coexistence."

But the more fundamental reason why our policy has developed as it has lies in the threat, described above, of Chinese Communist aggression, direct and indirect, against its neighbors. United States policy in East Asia, as in other parts of the world, is aimed at promoting mutually beneficial progress in the free countries which can only take place so long as the Communist threat is neutralized. Therefore, our policy must, first, deter Communist military aggression; second, strengthen the economies and the internal security of the free nations; and, third, oppose any action which would contribute to the Chinese Communist power to conquer or subvert.

In order to deter Chinese Communist aggression, it is essential to maintain sizable ground forces in the immediately threatened areas: the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam. It would be risky to rely on nuclear retaliatory power alone to protect these areas. These countries gladly supply the soldiers and a portion of the other requirements for the forces necessary to defend themselves. But because Communist military power is so great, the forces must be far larger than the economies of the countries can support, and the United States makes up the difference. It is a co-operative and mutually advantageous arrangement. The East Asian countries achieve the self-respect derived from making the major contribution to their own defense, while the United States is relieved of the burden of maintaining equivalent forces for the defense of these territories and peoples, the conquest of which by Communist power would have serious implications for the security of the United States.

The Communists are deterred from military action not only by the United States-supported indigenous forces in the area, but also by the knowledge that the United States has entered into security commitments with most of the free nations of East Asia. They know that we would consider any attack upon one of these nations as endangering our own peace and safety and that we would respond accordingly.

Behind the collectively created military shield which protects the free nations of East Asia from aggression, political, economic, and social progress is taking place. The United States through its mutual security programs has encouraged such progress by helping to maintain economic stability and contributing to economic development. From 1949 through fiscal year 1957, $3,737,000,000 was expended for these purposes, most of the total necessarily going to the three countries with the heaviest defense burdens. American assistance to police forces has contributed to the improved internal security in most of the countries of East Asia and the diminished Communist capability for creating disorder within these countries.

The fact that the Chinese Communists, deterred from further employment of military force, have resorted to a complex program of political action to achieve their ends, makes it more essential than ever that the United States oppose any action which would increase their prestige and influence. Their program relies heavily on convincing the people of each country that the United States is an unreliable ally and that Communist triumph is inevitable. Their task would be greatly facilitated were the United States to agree to the seating of the Chinese Communist regime in the United Nations, or should the United States itself recognize the Peiping regime, trade with it, or enter into cultural exchanges with it.

### *United States support for the Republic of China*

An essential part of United States policy aimed at limiting the external political effectiveness of the Peiping regime is our continued support of the Government of the Republic of China as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people. This government, which is recognized as the government of China by 45 countries,[4] has diplomatic relations in East Asia with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Thailand. Communist China has diplomatic relations with only Burma, Indonesia, and Cambodia in the area.[5] The Government of the Republic of China occupies territory vital to the defense of the area—the loss of Taiwan to the Chinese Communists would gravely threaten the Philippines to the south and Okinawa

[3] *How to be a Good Communist* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1951).

[4] Communist China is recognized by 19 Free World countries, by Yugoslavia, and by the countries of the Communist bloc. Only six governments have recognized Communist China since 1950: Nepal, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Cambodia.

[5] Laos and Malaya do not maintain diplomatic relations with either the Republic of China or the Peiping regime.

to the north. It also stands as a symbol of freedom to the restive mainlanders under Communist dominion.

The accomplishments since 1950 on the island of Taiwan and the smaller islands administered by the government in Taipei are in many respects a model of Asian-American co-operation. The Chinese government—taking advantage of a higher proportion of experienced, capable administrators and technicians than are available in most East Asian countries, a largely literate population (93 per cent of children of primary school age are now in school), and the rich resources of Taiwan—has made effective use of United States military and economic aid to progress in many fields. The armed forces—some 600,000 men—bear little resemblance to the disorganized, demoralized units which managed to escape from the mainland in 1949. Since 1953, by means of a universal conscription system, the average age of the troops has been brought down to 26. About one-third of the forces is now composed of young Taiwanese draftees. The Republic of China's forces today, well equipped, highly trained, with the fourth largest jet air force in the Free World, and a small but efficient navy, are an important part of the Free World deterrent force in the Far East. On the economic side, gross national product increased 66 per cent between 1950 and 1956, agricultural production 32 per cent, and industrial production 132 per cent. One of the most successful land reforms in Asia has broadened the social base. The great extremes of wealth and poverty which existed on the mainland are not present in Taiwan, and the standard of living is higher than that of any East Asian country except Japan and Malaya.

In recent years the Republic of China has made vigorous efforts to maintain its international position in the face of heavy Communist assaults upon it. During 1957 free China's diplomats reached agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations with five countries with which it had previously not maintained diplomatic relations: Paraguay, Uruguay, Liberia, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Taipei has increasingly played host to Free World leaders such as the Shah of Iran, the Premier of Turkey, and the Prime Minister of Japan, as well as many parliamentary and trade delegations.

The progress which has been made on Taiwan is still relatively little known, but it is more and more coming to be recognized. That is not to say that no problems exist. The undiminished Communist threat, the heavy strain resulting from military expenditures, the rapid growth of the population, the scarcity of funds for capital investment, and the discouragement felt by many mainland Chinese at the continued domination of their homeland by communism all impose their limitations. Nevertheless, the dominant note is activity and progress. The United States is not simply helping to support a military bastion in Taiwan, but 10 million energetic, resourceful, resilient people, whose vigorous development and growing ties with the rest of the Free World make them increasingly effective contributors to our common objectives.

Our policy toward the Republic of China has a vital bearing on the influential overseas Chinese communities, some 10 million people scattered throughout Southeast Asia who are today divided in their allegiance and among whom there is continued strong resistance to efforts by pro-Communists to seize control. The Chinese Communists have directed their political activity particularly toward gaining control of overseas Chinese schools, newspapers, business organizations, and financial institutions. However, their failure to win general diplomatic recognition and oust the Republic of China from its international position has seriously hampered their efforts. Large numbers of business associations, banks, newspapers, and schools continue to look to Taipei as the temporary seat of the government of China and reject Peiping's efforts to assume that role. Particularly in the key field of education has Taipei scored striking successes, with more than 8,000 overseas Chinese studying in Taiwan's high schools and colleges as compared to fewer than 100 seven years ago. If the United States and its Asian associates were to deny the right of the Republic of China to represent Chinese abroad and were to acquiesce in the claim of the Communist regime to do so, the resistance to communism in the overseas Chinese communities could not long continue.



## ARE THERE ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVES?

United States policy toward China has received strong support from the American people. They have been willing to assume the heavy burdens necessary in order to prevent further Communist aggression in East Asia and to promote the peaceful development of the free countries. There has also been general support for opposing acts which would enhance the prestige and influence of Communist China.[6] Yet, there have been expressions of doubt as to the long-term validity of the policy. Critics do not usually attempt to prove that the policy to date has not served the interests of the United States reasonably well; they tend to concentrate on the alleged weaknesses of such a policy if continued into the indefinite future.

Of course, the future is obscure in East Asia, as it is in most of the rest of the world. It is not possible to predict with any degree of precision what the shape of the future will be if we continue generally along our present lines or, alternatively, if we should effect radical changes in our policy. However, when a given policy has been reasonably effective, the burden of proof must rest on the proponents of change that an acceptable alternative exists and that this alternative would be a better instrument for accomplishing our aims.

It is not feasible here to examine the many possible permutations of a policy toward China and their probable effects. One general category of proposal, probably the one which has attracted most attention, will be examined. This is the so-called "two-Chinas" concept. There are many variants of this concept, but in essence it is intended to provide a formula whereby the Chinese Communist regime would obtain general international recognition and seating in the United Nations as the representative of the Chinese people, while the Government of the Republic of China would be reduced to representing only the people of Taiwan and the Pescadores, either as a new independent state or under some form of United Nations trusteeship.

The "two-Chinas" concept is designed as a means of obtaining international sanction for the perpetuation of the present division of the Chinese people into two separate political units. One glaring flaw in the scheme, which invalidates the claim of "realism" advanced for it, is the fact that it has been vehemently denounced by both Peiping and Taipei. No Chinese leader on either side has given the slightest indication that it would be acceptable.

[6] For example, in 1956, Congress, by concurrent resolution of both houses without a single dissenting vote, expressed its opposition to the seating of Communist China in the United Nations.

*Two-Chinas concept vis-à-vis today's realities*

In the absence of any disposition on the part of the Chinese themselves to accept the "two-Chinas" concept, it becomes academic to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of applying the concept in practice. It becomes necessary to assume, at the very least, that the Chinese Communists would agree to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States, despite our continued maintenance of close relations with Taipei, and that they would join the United Nations, despite the continued presence of representatives from Taiwan. It is also necessary to assume that the United States would take this step over the vehement protests of its friend and ally, the Government of the Republic of China, and that we were willing to risk the consequences of what to that ally and other allies in the area would appear a betrayal for the sake of appeasing the Chinese Communists.

The fact that the requisite assumptions appear fanciful when held up against today's realities has not prevented advocates of the "two-Chinas" concept from discussing its advantages and disadvantages as if it were a practicable policy now or in the near future. Therefore, a brief commentary on the pros and cons may be in order here, bearing in mind that the essential conditions for placing such a policy into effect do not exist today.

The arguments for the "two-Chinas" concept fall generally into two categories: (1) that it is "realistic" to establish formal diplomatic relations with those in actual control of mainland China and that it is inevitable anyway, sooner or later; and (2) that there are definite advantages to be gained from such a step, such as reducing tension in the Far East, influencing the Chinese Communist leaders, driving a wedge between Moscow and Peiping or improving the relations between the United States and those Asian countries where a vocal element of the population is critical of present United States China policy.

Neither so-called realism nor alleged inevitability constitutes a persuasive argument for the "two-Chinas" concept. The final test must be whether the acceptance of such a concept would serve the enlightened self-interest of the United States. It is realistic to deal, when necessary, with those actually governing an area. We dealt with the Japanese administrators of Manchuria for years, but never recognized "Manchukuo." We have dealt with the Chinese Communists in Korea and have held eighty-three meetings with them in Geneva and Warsaw at the ambassadorial level, but we have not considered it necessary nor desirable to accord them the advantages which would accrue from diplomatic recognition. As to the inevitability argument, it smacks strongly of the Communists' own thesis that their system of government will endure forever and will inevitably take over the world. They may well consider recognition of the Peiping regime by the United States inevitable (and if they do, it would be naive to expect them to make any concessions in order to bring it about), but there is no need for the United States to succumb to this argument.

*Effects of diplomatic concessions to Communist China*

There remain the arguments that there are positive advantages to be gained from establishing our diplomats in Peiping and bringing Communist China into the United Nations.

Would recognition of Red China by the United States, under the conditions mentioned, lead to a reduction of tension in East Asia? Only if one were to make the unrealistic assumption that the Communists would thereupon give up their designs on the free countries of the area. It is certainly far more likely that the Chinese Communists would take advantage of the severe blow to the people of free China and the sudden enhancement of their own power and influence to redouble their subversive activities directed toward Taiwan and the other free peoples of East Asia. Communists and pro-Communists in each of these countries would exploit to the utmost this telling evidence that even the United States was bowing to the inevitable and recognizing communism as the wave of the future. As Communist power grew throughout the area, tension would rise, not decrease.

Would seating in the United Nations exert a beneficial effect on the Chinese Communists and make them easier to deal with? It would be disastrous to the United Nations system and to the role of the United Nations as a guardian of the collective security to seat a regime which stands condemned as an aggressor by that very institution, which defies the United Nations itself and refuses to admit its competence to play any part in Korea. For Red China to be seated under these circumstances would prove to the Chinese Communist leaders the effectiveness of their present strategy, rather than temper their hostile attitude toward the Free World.

Would recognition of the Peiping regime by the United States and its seating in the United Nations contribute to the weaning of Peiping from Moscow? There is no evidence that the bonds between the two chief Communist powers are so weak that a broadening of Chinese Communist diplomatic contacts with the Free World could have any perceptible effect on them. On the contrary, the evidence available to us since the Hungarian revolt indicates that the two powers' primary concern is to maintain the solidarity of the Communist bloc and that their ties today are probably as strong or stronger than they have ever been. They view the world through the same ideological frame and hold common objectives. So long as Communist China remains heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for its military strength and so long as Mao and his lieutenants remain satisfied that "the east wind is prevailing over the west wind," only the gravest sort of crisis between Peiping and Moscow could lead to significant alienation.

It is hard to conceive of any inducement the Free World could offer which would at this time attract Mao toward what he regards as the losing side in the world struggle. Only growing disillusionment at the top as a result of the failure of communism to make further headway in Free World areas, to resolve the problems of intrabloc relationships and to overcome internal problems in China could create the conditions favorable to such a shift. Far from promoting such disillusionment, recognition of Communist China by the United States or seating it in the United Nations would be much more likely to confirm to the Peiping leadership the correctness of their present course and the advantages of continued close cooperation with the USSR.

Would recognition of Red China by the United States and our support for its seating in the United Nations improve our relations with the neutralist countries of Asia? It is true that there are many advocates of such action in these countries. However, most such advocates would not be satisfied unless the United States also agreed to withdraw its support from the Republic of China and permitted the 10 million Chinese in Taiwan to be taken over by the Chinese Communists, a disastrous betrayal of a free people which few Americans would accept. Whether any significant improvement in our relations

with these countries would result from the lesser step of embracing the "two-Chinas" concept is questionable. United States policy is not a major issue affecting the state of our relations with the neutralist states. Whether these relations are good or bad depends far more upon other issues much closer to home than how the United States regards China. On the other hand, in such countries as the Philippines and Thailand, and even more so in Korea, Vietnam, and the Republic of China, under the immediate threat of Communist armed might, United States China policy is a vital issue. We could not adopt the "two-Chinas" concept without causing the most serious and far-reaching repercussions in these countries. We certainly have much more to lose by demoralizing our close allies, who live under the shadow of Communist guns and whose military strength is vital to the maintenance of the Free World position in East Asia, than we could possibly gain in the more distant areas where the China problem is not a matter of life and death to the people.

### THE FUTURE

Looking toward the future, the American people would like to see an early settlement of some kind, a relaxation of the tension between the Free World and the Communist world, so that the threat of war would be diminished and a larger share of our resources could be turned to the uses of peace. But in East Asia, as elsewhere, there is little prospect that this will happen so long as the Communist movement has the will and the power to seek further accessions to its empire. The Chinese Communists hope that we will tire of the continual struggle and the cost of supporting our friends of the Free World against their pressures. They hold that the United States will inevitably, sooner or later, give in. But there are currents within the Communist world which, far from sweeping communism on to inevitable victory, are sapping the strength of the Communist system. In time, if we hold steadfast, we can confidently look forward to a relaxation of the pressures. In the meantime, we must cleave staunchly to our friends and resist any move which would increase the ability of those hostile to us to do them harm.

Our China policy, although it has so far served us well, is not, of course, a perfect instrument. There are doubtless many improvements which can be made. The policy, like other policies, is under constant review to see where it could be improved. But proposed improvements must be able to meet the tests of practicability and realism and must clearly serve the long-term interest of the United States.

# Ideology and Politics in Communist China

By H. ARTHUR STEINER

ABSTRACT: The relationship of "ideology" to "politics" is an important question of general Marxist-Leninist thought which seeks to identify the two. The "party-line" is the practical, operational device for analyzing new or changing situations in Marxist-Leninist terms and for issuing pertinent policy (action) directives to party cadres and other administrators. Mao Tse-tung's views on the relationship of ideology and politics ("theory" and "practice") were developed in the 1920's and 1930's and strongly influence practice today. The recent completion of the processes of socialization in Communist China has created a new situation in which the Communist party is moving to identify and bring under control the "rightist" and "antisocialist" elements, and to undertake a "big leap" under the aegis of a new General Line of Socialist Construction. The current political and ideological discussions in Communist China, centering on the theme of "revisionism," are directed toward action against "bourgeois rightists" at home and abroad and are related to the attack on Titoism and the drive to develop greater "socialist solidarity." In this connection, the Politburo has defined five principal ingredients of "the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism" as a means for judging the correctness of action.

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*H. Arthur Steiner, Ph.D., has been Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Los Angeles since 1931 and was in China as a Fulbright Research Scholar during the year of the Communist takeover (1948–1949). He is the author of several articles and documentary collections relating to Chinese Communism and was Editor of "Report on China," THE ANNALS, Vol. 277 (November 1951).*

WHAT the Chinese Communists are after and how they go about getting it are actually our present themes, but "ideology" and "politics" have been in conscious interplay throughout the history of the Chinese Communist Party since 1921, and the relationship of the two must be seen in that light. Mao Tse-tung emerged as a leader of unquestioned authority in 1935 after a succession of ideological-political struggles in the 1920's and early 1930's, and his analyses of "ideology" and "politics" are required reading for all party cadres. Issues and attitudes of party concern became, with the conquest of power on the Chinese mainland in 1949, the principal determinants of state law and public policy for the world's most populous society. Other articles in this issue of THE ANNALS will deal with specific aspects of Chinese Communist policy; here, we are concerned with broad perspectives.

During 1956, the collectivization of agriculture, the establishment of "joint" state-private operation of capitalist industry and commerce, and the co-operative movement in other salients of national productive activity produced a substantial socialization of Chinese life. To create ideological and political "superstructures" corresponding to the new situation, the party leadership decided to "rectify thoughts" and "resolve contradictions" through gigantic mass movements that dominated Chinese public life in 1956–58. Almost simultaneously, an ideological ferment within the entire "socialist camp" had been unloosed by N. S. Khrushchev's denunciations of Stalinism early in 1956, by political difficulties and disorders in Poland and Hungary, and by Marshal Tito's particular challenge to "socialist solidarity." The Chinese Communist leadership grasped the situation to establish its ideological hegemony within the Communist world by laying down the ground rules for reconciling "national roads" to communism with the requirements of solidarity within the entire socialist camp.[1] The internal ideological-political struggle in China coalesced with the ideological-political struggle for basic unity within the Communist world when the Chinese Communists launched a far-reaching attack upon "revisionism" at home and abroad in May 1958.

The nature of the international Communist movement renders it unlikely that ideological-political issues raised in 1956–58 will be definitively settled in the immediate future. Meanwhile, the approaches taken toward these ideological-political questions in 1956–58 can be expected to dominate the ideological and political development of Communist China and the rest of the Communist world in 1959 and the several years following.

## DEFINING THE PROBLEM

Some of the mystery surrounding the tortuous problems of Communist ideology will be dispelled if we keep in mind three basic Communist attitudes: (1) "Ideology" = "Politics"; the twain are inseparable; (2) the sphere of political (state) action in emergent Marxist-Leninist societies is illimitable, which means that all state and social action ("politics") is colored by directional considerations ("ideology"); and (3) nothing in a Marxist-Leninist society simply "happens," everything must be induced (or, if something *has* "happened," it must be explained, brought under control, and induced to serve the objectives of the leadership). What we are actually dealing with, then, as we examine the relationship of "ideology" and "politics" in Communist China, is nothing less than the fundamental apparatus of the regime: its programmatic objectives, the range of its operations, and the methods and techniques of its leadership.

[1] H. A. Steiner, *The International Position of Communist China: Political and Ideological Directions of Foreign Policy* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958).



Despite the multiclass, multiparty structure of the "people's democratic dictatorship"—rendered equivalent to "the dictatorship of the proletariat" by official pronouncements in 1956[2]—the Chinese Communist Party has been in substantial control of the Chinese mainland since 1949. It has been extremely self-conscious of its leadership position and in its acceptance of responsibility for the course of policy and events. Any meaningful analysis of "ideology" and "politics" must therefore begin with an appreciation of the broad configurations of Chinese Communist policy since 1949, and especially since 1953.

Mao Tse-tung defined the "master plan" of the party in *On People's Democratic Dictatorship*, written to commemorate the 28th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (July 1, 1949):

> *Our present task* [1949] is to strengthen the apparatus of the people's state, which refers mainly to the people's army, the people's police and the people's courts, for the defense of the nation and the protection of the people's interests. *When this condition is met,* China will be enabled to advance steadily, under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party, from an agricultural to an industrial country, from a new democratic society to a socialist society and communist society, to abolish classes and to achieve world communism. (Emphasis supplied.)

The initial tasks of 1949, corresponding to the "minimum program" of the party, were reflected in the Common Program of September 29, 1949. They were considered to have been accomplished by 1953 when the First Five-Year Plan was announced and elections were called for the First National People's Congress to adopt a constitution for the Chinese People's Republic. At that time, the "establishment-consolidation" period of 1949–53 was formally designated as the first phase of a "period of transition to socialism" which was fitted to a concept of a "general line." Mao Tse-tung assertedly defined the "general line" in these terms: "The general line and the general mission of the state are the gradual realization, over a considerably long period of time, of the socialist industrialization of the state, and the gradual realization of the socialist reform by the state of agriculture, handicrafts, and private industry and commerce."[3] Such restatement in 1953 of the master plan of 1949 signified an acceleration of the "gradual" processes of socialist transformation;[4] and, almost immediately, increased pressures were exerted to socialize the "means of production." (We use the term "socialization" to describe the objective process of establishing complete state control, if not "ownership," of the "means of production," in displacement of private or capitalist control—without moral judgments, and with no implication that "socialization," as such, has necessarily succeeded in attaining stated production objectives.)

After 1953, the Communist leadership moved progressively and steadily toward the announced socialist objective—initially against such relatively small and selected targets as the "rich

[2] Developed by Liu Shao-ch'i in *The Political Report of the Central Committee . . .* (Sept. 15, 1956) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956), pp. 56–59.

[3] As quoted by Li Wei-han in an address of October 27, 1953, in American Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Current Background,* No. 267.

[4] *People's Daily* (Peking), October 1, 1953. For other relevant material, see *Current Background,* No. 285.

peasantry," but subsequently on a broad, total front. Mao Tse-tung could accurately sum up the result in his "contradictions" speech of February 27, 1957: "Socialist relations of production have been established." [5]

## THE "PARTY LINE"

In moving toward the socialist objective, the party high command signaled the various steps and phases in the spirit of a military operation by regular pronouncements of the "party line." The party line—any party line—is extremely significant for our purposes since it is the specific device by which "ideology" and "politics" are brought into harmony to meet a particular programmatic need. From this point of view, the "general line of the transition period" was a broad strategic directive calling upon party and state cadres and other activists to place themselves in a "state of readiness." Other party "lines" prescribed the time and manner of the attack on more specific, intermediate, or reinforcing targets.

Taking, now, a broad overview of the action of the party between 1953 and 1958, we are able to identify a succession of principal "party lines" bearing upon the socialist objective:

1. The "First Five-Year Plan of National Economic Construction," announced in general terms by Premier Chou En-lai in February 1953, given more specific definition in Li Fu-chün's report to the Central People's Government Council on September 15, 1953, and finally "adopted" by the National People's Congress on July 30, 1955.[6]

2. The forewarning by Li Wei-han to private industrialists and merchants of the impending application of the "general line" to their situations, October 27, 1953.[7]

3. Articles 4–10 of the Constitution of the Chinese People's Republic, adopted September 20, 1954, on the basis of Liu Shao-ch'i's report of September 15, recording the party's decisions on the "socialist" character of agricultural producers' co-operatives, announcing the doom of "rich peasant economy," and institutionalizing other related policies.[8]

4. Mao Tse-tung's call for a "high tide of socialization in the Chinese countryside" in his report of July 31, 1955, endorsed by the party Central Committee on October 11 and implemented with speed and thoroughness during the early months of 1956 by the establishment of "low" and "high" level co-operatives (collectives).[9]

5. The "voluntary transformation of private industry and commerce" by the device of "joint" state-private operation, January–February 1956.

6. The "ideological struggle against bourgeois idealism" directed to the reform of artistic, literary, and scientific workers under the ambiguous slogan: "Let Flowers of Many Kinds Blossom, Diverse Schools of Thought Contend!" —announced (unpublished) by Mao Tse-tung, May 2, 1956; elaborated in Lu Ting-yi's address of May 26, 1956, on the same subject; and further "clarified" in Mao Tse-tung's address on "The Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," February 27, 1957.

7. The nationwide "rectification movement" of 1957–58 against "bureaucracy, sectarianism, and subjectivism" called by the Central Committee directive of April 27, 1957, in support of Mao's address on "contradictions" and directed against "bourgeois rightists" and other "antisocialist" elements.

8. A movement to "strengthen international socialist solidarity" in the name of "antirevisionism"—nominally pointed against Tito, but capable of being applied against Khrushchev, as developed in the Politburo critique of December 29, 1956,[10] and amplified in the resolution adopted by the Eighth National Party Congress on May 23, 1958.[11]

9. The call to a new "general line of socialist construction" by Liu Shao-ch'i's report to the Eighth Party Congress on May 5, 1958,[12] developing the "big leap" toward socialism previously anticipated by the Central Committee's directive of March 3, 1958, against "waste and conservatism."

10. The Central Committee's directive of August 29, 1958, called for merging the rural collectives into "communes" as "the fundamental policy to guide the peasants in accelerating socialist construction," and predicted a new "upsurge" that would produce the complete "communization" of the countryside in another few years. The directive anticipated that the new communes would be "the best form of organization" for the transition to eventual communism, and that they would survive as the "basic social units in communist society"—supplanting the collectives of the transitional socialist period.[12a]

The foregoing list of "principal" party lines of the 1953–58 period may be supplemented by more specialized party lines relating to "rational adjustment of wages," "antilocal nationalism," "redness and expertness," "local industrialization," "language reform," "socialist education," and a dozen others. In addition, the harrassed party cadres—deliberately kept in a state of tension and excitation—could regularly find infinitely detailed interpretations of the party line in the leading editorials of *People's Daily*.

## CHARACTERISTICS AND SERVICES OF THE "PARTY LINE"

Even though we cannot explain each of these party lines in detail, their mere enumeration suffices to show that we are concerned with ideological and political operations of vast scope and significance. We may note, however, that such party lines as those just listed have several common characteristics: they deal with specific problems and issues which may be national, regional, or local in incidence; they give conscious expression of the purpose or intention of the leadership; they incorporate specific action directives to cadres, activists, and other personal elements of administration; they seek to maintain ideological compatibility between the several party lines in effect at a given time and to distinguish lines applicable at a particular "stage of the revolution" from lines enforced under other circumstances; [13]

[5] For English translations, see *New York Times*, June 19, 1957; *Current Background*, No. 458; and *People's China* (Peking), No. 13 (July 1, 1957), supplement.

[6] *First Five-Year Plan for Development of the National Economy of the People's Republic of China in 1953–1957* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956).

[7] Note 3, *Supra*.

[8] Liu Shao-ch'i, *Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1954); for commentary, see H. A. Steiner, "Constitutionalism in Communist China," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 49 (March 1955), pp. 1–21.

[9] Mao Tse-tung, *The Question of Agricultural Cooperation* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956); the Central Committee's decision is in *People's China*, December 1, 1955, supplement, pp. 5–15.

[10] "More on the Historical Experience of Proletarian Dictatorship," *People's China*, January 16, 1957, supplement; *Current Background*, No. 433.

[11] *Peking Review* (Peking), June 3, 1958, pp. 23–26.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 6–22.

[12a] Full text in *Peking Review*, September 16, 1958, pp. 21–23; see also, "Greet the Upsurge in Forming People's Communes," from *Hongqi*, No. 7 (September 1, 1958), as translated in *Peking Review*, September 2, 1958, pp. 6–7.

[13] In his "contradictions" address, February 27, 1957, Mao said: "Some people do not understand that our present policy fits the present situation and our past policy fitted the past situation." (Note 5, *Supra*.)

and, they usually enlarge rather than contract the scope of political and administrative action.

The technique of the party line assists the regime in the movement toward its general political goals in several ways: (1) a party line pronouncement may resolve differences that have arisen within the hierarchy, offers a yardstick to measure the "correctness" of administrative action, provides any needed standard of "orthodoxy," and tends to promote uniformity of administrative action; (2) the party line is a basis for formal indoctrination and discipline within the party, state, or other administrative apparatus; (3) it is an authoritative basis for indoctrination of the general population and provides direction and guidance for press, radio, and other communication media; for specialized propaganda agencies and operations; and for educational and training activities of different types; (4) the method assists the leadership to move toward objectives by step-by-step methods, revising targets in the light of experience or difficulties and maintaining effective surveillance over administration; and (5) the standardized party line technique, relating action to theory and insisting that all change occurs within a known framework of ideological objectives, assists to create the desired image of the all-seeing, all-wise, omnipotent, and infallible Leader, or Leadership, which seems so necessary for the maintenance of a totalitarian regime.

## THE RELATIONSHIP OF "IDEOLOGY" TO "POLITICS"

The characteristics and services of the party line show that we are not dealing with vague theoretical abstractions or rootless propaganda effusions, but with hard-core methods, techniques, and policies of daily government and administration. The party line is therefore a key to the problem of the rela tionship of "ideology" to "politics" i Communist China. The "party" i question, however, is a self-conscious self-perpetuating, and highly discipline elite with a special *mystique* derive from "the universal truths of Marxism Leninism." It sees itself, for example as a force organized to wage class war fare, as the "vanguard" of a proletaria which may not actually exist, and i declares that it has the suicidal purpos of "eliminating classes, state authority and party." [14] Necessarily, then, th party has a different relationship t government than the political parties o Western bourgeois societies and a differ ent concept of the relationship of "ideol ogy" (theory) to "politics" (practice) Aristotelian logic does not inform us o this relationship, which is actually one of the central substantive problems o Marxist-Leninist thought and one o the principal means for distinguishing Marxist-Leninists from other types o Marxists. For understanding, we must turn to the murky mists of dialectica materialism.

Mao Tse-tung once declared that an outstanding characteristic of Marxist philosophy—that is, dialectical materialism—was "its practicality: its emphasis on the dependence of theory on practice, emphasis on practice as the foundation of theory which in turn serves practice." [15] A theory standing in this relationship to practice is not a theory for academic pedants seeking knowledge of truth for its own sake but is an instrument for working revolutionaries. As Mao put it in 1937, the Marxist must be concerned "with actively changing the world by applying

[14] Mao Tse-tung, *On People's Democratic Dictatorship* (Peking: English Language Service, New China News Agency, 1949).

[15] "On Practice" (July 1937), in Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1954–1956), hereafter cited as "Mao," I, p. 284.



the knowledge of its objective laws." [16] In May 1941, he told his cadres in Yenan that they should "study the theory of Marxism-Leninism with . . . the [definite] aim of integrating it with the practical movement of the Chinese revolution and seeking from it a stand, a viewpoint and a method for solving the theoretical and tactical problems of the Chinese revolution." [17] Marxism-Leninism was the "arrow"; the revolution in China, the "target."

Mao decried "big talk" and "idle chatter" and insisted that all cadres engage in serious investigations and studies of practical situations; he ridiculed the "subjective" comrades who "can only quote words and phrases from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin" and "give all their heart to the dogmas, said to be eternally immutable, which their teachers have taught them." What the cadres needed to understand was "that the fundamental task of the leading bodies of the Communist Party lies in two important things, namely, to know the conditions and to grasp the policy; the former is what we call knowing the world, and the latter, changing the world." [18] Here Mao in effect defines "party line" as the term is used in contemporary China, including the analysis of a particular situation confronting the party leadership at a given time and the statement of the course of action prescribed to meet the theoretical requirements of the situation.

At the beginning of the first "rectification movement" (*cheng-feng*) in February 1942, Mao expressed the need for "theoreticians who, basing themselves on the stand, viewpoint and method of Marxism-Leninism, can correctly interpret . . . and give a scientific explanation and theoretical elucidation of China's various problems. . . ." [19] Only then could there be full "unity of theory and practice." He emphasized that "an aimless theory is useless, incorrect and should be thrown away. . . . We study Marxism-Leninism . . . because it is a science which will lead the proletarian revolution to victory." [20] Mao has reiterated this position endlessly; the theme was as dominant in the "rectification movement" of 1957–58 as it had been during its predecessors.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 292.

[17] "Reform Our Study" (May 1941), Mao, IV, p. 18.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[19] "Rectify the Party's Style in Work" (February 1, 1942), Mao, IV, p. 31.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 34, 36.

[21] "On Practice," Mao, I, p. 296.

## IDEOLOGICAL ADAPTATIONS TO NEW SITUATIONS

The notion that all social tasks and activities are subject to political-ideological considerations was incorporated in Liu Shao-ch'i's remark to the Eighth Party Congress on May 5, 1958, where he said: "Ideological and political work is always the soul and guide of every kind of work." To the daily work of revolutionizing society there must be brought the particular "stand, viewpoint and method" derived from "the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism."

But Marxism-Leninism is not a closed system of finite rules directly applicable to daily work. As Mao said in 1937: "Marxism-Leninism has in no way summed up all knowledge of truth, but is ceaselessly opening up, through practice, the road to the knowledge of truth." [21] The "true revolutionary leader" must therefore correct his "ideas, theories, plans or programs when they are found to be erroneous"; and, "when a certain objective process has already advanced and changed from one stage to another, [he must] be adept at making himself and all his fellow revolutionaries advance and revise their subjective ideas accordingly, that is to say, he must propose new revolutionary tasks and

new working programs corresponding to changes in the new situation." [22] The crew cannot rest on its oars; and the coxswain, once the race is won, must sustain the mood of tension and announce the next adversary.

In this spirit, Mao Tse-tung spoke of "the correct handling of contradictions" (February 27, 1957)[23] on the eve of the antirightist rectification movement of 1957. "Our socialist system," he said, "has just been set up; it is not yet fully established, nor yet fully consolidated." Evidently, before the "big leap" in socialist production could be ordered (in the form of 1958's new "general line of socialist construction"), the rightist elements must be identified as "enemies of the people" and brought to book. Mao therefore spoke of certain "contradictions" within the ranks of the people already socialized—such as contradictions between workers and peasants and between the working class and the national bourgeoisie—but explained that such "non-antagonistic contradictions" differed from "antagonistic" contradictions "between ourselves and our enemies." The antagonistic contradictions are to be resolved principally by "drawing a line between us and our enemies." On the other hand, the contradictions "among the people" (giving "people" the special meaning that the term has had in Communist China since 1949) could be resolved, basically, by discussion and education, and, as Mao saw it: "Socialist society grows more united and consolidated precisely through the ceaseless process of correctly dealing with and resolving contradictions." A similar position had been developed in *On Contradiction,* as early as August 1937,[24] when the revolutionary situation was entirely different; but it is remarkable how far certain basic ideological-political attitudes of the 1930's and 1940's have persisted down to the present day in Chinese Communist operations.

Mao argued in 1957 "the necessity of waging the struggle in the ideological field," while candidly declaring that "it will take a considerable time to decide the issue in the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism." Ideological struggle entailed debate and discussion, and Marxists were not to fear "right" (correct) criticism. The "poisonous weeds" sown by "revisionists, or right opportunists," should be fought "wherever they crop up." But discussions among the people under the slogans "let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend" could be turned to good account provided a distinction be made between "fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds." Therefore, in a revised edition of his February 27, 1957, address, Mao held that

words and actions can be judged right if they:

1. Help to unite the people of our various nationalities, and do not divide them;
2. Are beneficial, not harmful, to socialist transformation and socialist construction;
3. Help to consolidate, not undermine or weaken, the people's democratic dictatorship;
4. Help to consolidate, not undermine or weaken, democratic centralism;
5. Tend to strengthen, not to cast off or weaken, the leadership of the Communist Party;
6. Are beneficial, not harmful, to international socialist solidarity and the solidarity of the peace-loving peoples of the world.

Of these, Nos. 2 and 5 were called "the most important."

## IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS AS "SUPERSTRUCTURE"

From such statements as these, one sees clearly that ideological standards of judgment are really political standards.

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 295.
[23] Note 5, *Supra.*
[24] Mao, II, pp. 13–53.



The "ideology" in question is actually an operational device in precommunist society, employed by Marxist-Leninists to adapt the superstructure of the state to changes in the economic base and productive forces of society. From this point of view, the ideology and politics of a particular stage of economic development take on a transitory if not ephemeral character and occur during the process of realizing more fundamental "truths of Marxism-Leninism," which are not degraded to the level of mere "ideology." Mao Tse-tung must have had such a concept in mind when, in his "contradictions" speech, he declared that "our state institutions of people's democratic dictatorship and its laws, and socialist ideology under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism" formed a "superstructure" (*shang-tseng-chien-chu*) which "has played a positive role in facilitating the victory of socialist transformation and establishment of a socialist organization of labor" and which "is suited to the socialist economic base." He reasserted the Marxist position that "democracy is part of the superstructure and belongs to the category of politics." "Democracy" and "freedom" were both seen to be means serving the economic base of society rather than ends in themselves.

Recent reassertions by Chinese Communists of traditional Marxist doctrinal positions identifying ideology and politics as "superstructure" may be significant from several points of view. By reaffirming the doctrinal orthodoxy of the Chinese Communists, they lay a basis for condemning asserted Titoist departures from orthodox Marxist-Leninist views of the relationship of the state to society and the economic forces of production. Thus, Tito's "anti-Marxist-Leninist, out-and-out revisionist program" was condemned on the ground, among others, that "politically, it substitutes the reactionary theory of the state standing above classes for the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state. . . ." [25] The asserted Titoist deviation would have the effect of denying the eventual "withering away of the state," in contrast with Mao's views of the nonpermanent character of "our state institutions" and "socialist ideology." Mao's views received support from Lu Ting-yi, the Politburo member who is also Director of the Central Committee's Propaganda Department, who in March 1958 defined "ideology" to include "philosophy, social science [politics?], literature and the arts," held that it "is part of the superstructure," and asserted that "the superstructure must serve the economic foundations and the growth of productive forces." [26]

Mao's position is also related to the growing emphasis on solidarity and unity within "the socialist camp." It also suggests the possibility that as a large number of contiguous countries of Europe and Asia complete their several domestic processes of socialization, the need will be felt for a doctrinal clarification of the problem of transforming "socialism" to "communism" and for explanation of how the state is to "wither away." In any case, the distinction between "socialism" and "communism" is constantly made, and the "classes, state authority and party" which persist as the superstructure of socialist societies may play a different role in Communist society—if they are not entirely transformed. The question of "national roads" to communism there-

[25] *People's Daily* (Peking), editorial, May 5, 1958; *Peking Review,* May 13, 1958, pp. 6–8; American Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Survey of China Mainland Press,* No. 1767.

[26] Lu Ting-yi, "Let Us Be the Force That Promotes Progress," reprinted in *Hsin-hua pan-yüeh-k'an* [New China Fortnightly], No. 7 (1958), pp. 133–134, from *Kiang-hai Hsüeh-k'an,* No. 1 (1958), and translated in slightly different form than quoted above in *Survey of China Mainland Press,* No. 1740.

fore receives special attention. Each country may be permitted to achieve its own form of socialism in accordance with its special national conditions, with no requirement of uniformity. But in pursuing socialism as a "national road" to communism, the different Communist and workers' parties must not adopt methods or attitudes that would infringe upon or frustrate the Communist objective they share as the common goal. There may be "national roads" to communism; but there can be no "national communism"! Ideology and politics of the socialist phase of development may vary from country to country, China included; how far they may differ or vary in the Communist phase is an unanswered doctrinal question.

## National Roads to Communism

The problem of the relative autonomy of different national Communist parties was made a critical issue during the Eastern European crises of late 1956 and has remained alive during the ensuing struggles of Peking and Moscow with Marshal Tito. Ideological guidelines for resolving the issue were first laid down by the Chinese Communist Politburo in its analysis published December 29, 1956.[27] The basic positions were subsequently developed and clarified in the Moscow Declaration of the Communist and Workers' Parties (November 1957), in the resolution of the Eighth Chinese Communist Party Congress of May 23, 1958, in the *People's Daily* editorials and other documents of the Chinese Communist campaign against Tito's revisionism after May 5, 1958,[28] and were confirmed by the Mao-Khrushchev communiqué issued in Peking on August 3, 1958.

The Politburo statement started with the premise that "each state and nation has features different from those of others," from which it follows that "all nations pass through the class struggle, and will eventually arrive at communism, by roads that are the same in essence but different in their specific forms." Since the "universal truth of Marxism-Leninism" becomes concrete and operative "in real life only through the medium of specific national characteristics," each Communist party "must respect the national interests and sentiments of other [socialist] countries." Stalin erred by "being unmindful of the independent and equal status of the communist parties of various lands," exhibiting "great-nation chauvinistic tendencies" that must be overcome. (This portion of the analysis may have been calculated to impress on the Soviet Union the necessity of respecting the position of the Chinese People's Republic.) But even small countries (Hungary? Yugoslavia?) might display nationalist tendencies harmful to the "unity" Communist countries should seek with each other while maintaining their "respective independence." Therefore, "no matter whether their country is big or small, if communists counterpose the interests of their own country and nation to the general interests of the international proletarian movement, make this a pretext for opposing the general interests and not seriously to maintain international proletarian solidarity in actual practice but on the contrary to damage it, they will be committing a serious mistake of violating the principles of internationalism and Marxism-Leninism."

Following this principle, the autonomy of Gomulka's Polish Workers' Party was found compatible with "international proletarian solidarity," but the decision of Imre Nagy to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact on the pretext of Hungarian national interest was considered an act of "treachery" justifying armed suppression. Tito's employment of the Hungarian crisis to launch a further campaign against Stalinism was held not to be an internal affair for Yugoslavia but a matter of interference in the affairs of others, "creating conditions which the enemy can use to cause confusion and division in our own ranks." The "brotherly advice" offered to the "Yugoslav comrades" took the form of an extended essay on the dangers of a "revisionism" that contemplated the possibility of building socialism "without going through a proletarian revolution led by the party of the proletariat."

The Politburo returned to its analysis of the "fundamental experience" of the October Revolution, holding that while "each country has its own path of development," so far as "basic theory is concerned, the path of the October Revolution reflects the general laws of revolution" and is "the road which the proletariat of all countries must travel to gain victory." The "national roads" to communism must all adhere to the "universal truths of Marxism-Leninism which are generally applicable" and which the Politburo summarized as follows:

1. The advanced members of the proletariat organize themselves into a communist party which takes Marxism-Leninism as its guide to action, builds itself up along lines of democratic centralism, establishes close links with the masses, strives to become the core of the laboring masses and educates its party members and the masses of people in Marxism-Leninism.

2. The proletariat, under the leadership of the communist party, rallying all the laboring people, takes state power from the bourgeoisie by means of revolutionary struggle.

3. After the victory of the revolution, the proletariat, under the leadership of the communist party, rallying the broad mass of the people on the basis of a worker-peasant alliance, establishes a dictatorship of the proletariat over the landlord and capitalist classes, crushes the resistance of the counterrevolutionaries, and carries out the nationalization of industry and the step-by-step collectivization of agriculture, thereby eliminating the system of exploitation, private ownership of the means of production and classes.

4. The state, led by the proletariat and the communist party, leads the people in the planned development of socialist economy and culture, and on this basis gradually raises the people's living standards and actively prepares and works for the transition to communist society.

5. The state, led by the proletariat and the communist party, resolutely opposes imperialist aggression, recognizes the equality of all nations and defends world peace; firmly adheres to the principles of proletarian internationalism, strives to win the help of the laboring people of all countries, and at the same time strives to help them and all oppressed nations.

Such are the objectives animating the play of ideology and politics in contemporary Communist China and underlying its view of the external world.

[27] Note 10, *Supra.*

[28] Translations of the principal documents of this campaign, including *People's Daily* editorials and important articles by Ch'en Po-ta and Wang Chia-hsiang, are in several successive issues of *Peking Review*, Nos. 14–18 (June 3–July 1, 1958).

# Leadership in the Chinese Communist Party

By Chao Kuo-chün

Abstract: The central locus of political power in Communist China is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), now the largest single Communist organization in the world. Organizationally, the CCP is a pyramidal structure based on the National Party Congress which elects the Central Committee, which in turn elects the Political Bureau. The present Eighth Central Committee, elected in 1956 and expanded in May 1958, manifests both the stability of the party leadership and its adaptation to new circumstances. The core of decision-making power in the party structure is the Political Bureau and its seven-man Standing Committee. Analysis of the membership of the present Central Committee indicates that this elite group is relatively young, drawn largely from the interior provinces of China, well-educated by Chinese standards, and predominantly indigenous in background and training. Almost all have relatively long party membership. Several aspects of the Chinese Communist Party leadership are striking. First, it has demonstrated a higher level of political stability than that of any other major Communist party in the world. Second, it has developed notable organizational skills which greatly assist mobilization of the population and implementation of its major domestic programs. Third, it has demonstrated significant flexibility and realism in the handling of complex problems. Despite recurrent outside speculation about factionalism and schisms, the Chinese Communist Party leadership under Mao Tse-tung still appears to be both durable and determined.

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*Chao Kuo-chün is Visiting Lecturer at the Indian School of International Studies, University of Delhi. Between 1949 and 1958, he was at Harvard, M.I.T., and Cornell, doing research and instruction in the fields of Chinese and Indian studies. He is the author of Mass Organization in Mainland China (1953), Agrarian Policies of Mainland China, 1949–1956 (1957), and Economic Planning and Organization in China, 1949–1958, and has contributed articles to THE ANNALS, The American Political Science Review, Foreign Affairs, Current History, and journals in Hong Kong, India, and Japan.*





With the rapid economic development currently being achieved in mainland China and with Peking playing an increasingly prominent role in world politics, there is a growing need for more accurate understanding of the nature of the political structure of Communist China and for more critical evaluation of its political leadership. The year 1958 is an opportune time to assess the patterns of power in the Chinese Communist Party. Within the party, significant developments in the hierarchy were formalized at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth National Party Congress held in May 1958. And, at the national level, several basic programs have been announced by the party during the past twelve months: the "general line of socialist construction," the "big leap forward" in industry and agriculture, the decentralization of commerce and industry, and the "rectification" campaign against political and ideological unorthodoxy.

Many complex factors—political, economic, and social—are involved in the above developments. In this paper, however, attention is concentrated on the following points: first, the primary loci of power in the party; second, the composition and background of the present top-echelon leadership, as exemplified by the 97 regular members of the Central Committee (CC); and third, the major trends in the party leadership.

## The Power Structure of the Chinese Communist Party

The central locus of political power in Communist China is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), now the largest single Communist organization in the world. As the CCP is the prime mover behind both the domestic and international policies of Communist China, an appraisal of its power structure is of basic importance.

The Communist Party of China is the vanguard of the Chinese working class, the highest form of its class organization. The aim of the Party is the achievement of socialism and communism in China.

Thus the opening paragraph of the present party constitution adopted in 1956 sets forth, simply and starkly, the official view which the CCP has of itself. Organizationally, the CCP is built in accordance with the fundamental Leninist precepts of elitism, organization, and control. Rigid hierarchy, disciplined subordination of inferior to superior, obedience to authority, sustained control—such are the essential elements in the structure. At the top, the real leadership of the CCP consists of the smallest practicable group of veteran Communists of proven ability and reliability. Control is conveyed downward through a pyramidal organization to the party groups and individual party members at the lower levels. At the bottom, the party makes a continuing attempt to preserve its integrity through strict control of the gates of membership and through stern and unceasing discipline of its members. The entire organization is built on the principle of "democratic centralism," officially defined as "centralism on the basis of democracy and democracy under centralized leadership."

The organization of the party structure is based on the National Party Congress, which elects the Central Committee of the party, which in turn elects the Political Bureau.

According to the revised (1956) party constitution, the Central Committee is the supreme organ of the party during the intervals between meetings of the National Party Congress. Thus, through its group decisions, through the positions held by its individual members, and through the activities of its key central departments—Organization, Propaganda, Rural Work, and United

Front Work, for example—the Central Committee has a dominant influence upon the political, military, economic, and social life of the country. The present, Eighth, CC elected in the autumn of 1956 now includes 97 regular members and 96 alternates (the alternate membership was increased from 73 to 96 in May 1958), and is headed by Mao Tse-tung as Chairman and by five Vice Chairmen: Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch'en Yün, and Lin Piao. It includes virtually all members of the previous, Seventh, CC elected in 1945 (with the prominent exceptions of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, who were purged in 1954–55, and a few other individuals who had either died or slipped in importance) together with a greatly expanded group of second-level party leaders who have become important since 1949.

The enlargement of the CC membership in 1956 indicated both the relative stability of the party leadership and its adjustment to new circumstances. Yet membership in the CC is not ipso facto equivalent to a position of real authority. The present large size of the CC combined with the relative infrequency of its meetings has made it more and more difficult for that body to play a major role in the day-to-day decisions of the party.

*Power loci*

In practice, therefore, the Political Bureau is the central directing and decision-making organ of the party. The Political Bureau was enlarged at the Eighth Congress from 13 to 17 members and again to 20 members in May 1958. The apex of political power in Communist China today is the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau created at the Eighth Party Congress to take over the former functions of the Central Secretariat. The Secretariat is now in charge of top-level administrative work of the party under the direction of the Politburo and its Standing Committee, and the post of general secretary —held by Teng Hsiao-p'ing—remains a very strategic position in the party high command.

From this central core, Communist political power revolves outward through a series of concentric rings which link the party and the nation. Since the abolition of the regional administrative areas and the transfer of top regional party leaders to Peking in 1954, the important local centers of authority have come to be found in the secretariats responsible for provincial party affairs. At the Eighth Party Congress, Chou En-lai spoke of assigning "more powers to the local administrative organs and a better division of labor between the central and local authorities." (Report on the Second Five-Year Plan, September 16, 1956.)[1] The increased importance of local leadership could be noted in May 1958, when two of the three newly elected Politburo members were provincial party secretaries; at the same time, five provincial party secretaries were elected as alternate members of the Central Committee.

Other major loci of power in Communist China include the top military command and political commissar positions, major departments in the headquarters of the People's Liberation Army, and chairmanships of leading mass organizations such as the Young Communist League, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, and the All-China Women's Federation. Strictly speaking, these positions are not part of the party mechanism. Functionally, however, they are occupied by top party leaders and form an integral part of the

[1] Text of Chou's speech, together with other major documents, may be found in *Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1956), p. 328.



total power mosaic of the party. Changes in the leadership of these nonparty organs often suggest changes within the party itself. For example, the removal of Li Li-san from the chairmanship of the Federation of Trade Unions in 1953 indicated his political decline even though no formal party disciplinary action was taken against him.

THE TOP LEADERSHIP

The Standing Committee of the Politburo now consists of seven members: Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch'en Yün, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and Lin Piao (Lin was elected in May 1958). The most significant change at this top level of leadership is that registered by Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who has emerged during the past few years as a key figure.

The seven members of the Standing Committee are also the top-ranking members of the Politburo itself which is now constituted as follows: [2]

Members: Mao Tse-tung
Liu Shao-ch'i
Chou En-lai
Chu Teh
Ch'en Yün
Teng Hsiao-p'ing
Lin Piao
Lin Po-ch'ü
Tung Pi-wu
P'eng Chen
Lo Jung-huan
Ch'en Yi
Li Fu-ch'un
P'eng Te-huai
Liu Po-ch'eng
Ho Lung
Li Hsien-nien
K'o Ch'ing-shih
Li Ching-ch'üan
T'an Chen-lin

Alternate members: Ulanfu
Chang Wen-t'ien
Lu Ting-yi
Ch'en Po-ta
K'ang Sheng
Po I-po

The composition of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party indicates both continuity and expansion in leadership. Nine new names have been added to the regular membership of the Politburo during the past two years: Lo Jung-huan, Ch'en Yi, Liu Po-ch'eng, Ho Lung, Li Fu-ch'un, and Li Hsien-nien (all elected in September 1956), K'o Ch'ing-shih, Li Chiang-ch'üan, and T'an Chen-lin (elected in May 1958).

The increased weight of military leaders at the top levels of the party structure is suggested by the fact that four of the six members of the Politburo newly elected at the Eighth Congress and seven of the total of 20 members are Marshals of the People's Liberation Army. Yet the available evidence does not indicate that the military is now the dominant power group in Communist China. Five of the seven members of the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee are civilians, and Marshal Chu Teh, the fourth-ranking member, is now 72. The military still constitutes a minority in the Politburo, and none of the six alternate members of the Politburo is a military man. There are only two generals in the nine-man Central Secretariat. And, finally, the definition of a military leader in the Chinese Communist context is unique, for the Chinese Communist forces have for many years been developed on Mao Tse-tung's concepts which accord major weight to political as well as purely military elements in warfare. Almost all the key army personnel belong to the Kiangsi-Yenan group, and they appear to form a disciplined and cohesive group long associated with the Mao Tse-tung leadership. To date there has

[2] See American Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Current Background* No. 513 (revised), July 16, 1958, for complete listing of the central apparatus of the Chinese Communist Party.

TABLE 1—DATA ON THE REGULAR MEMBERS OF THE EIGHTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

| RANKING IN THE EIGHTH (CURRENT) CC (97 regular members) | NAME | RANKING IN THE SEVENTH CC* (43 regular and 27 alternate members) | AGE GROUP | NATIVE PROVINCE | EDUCATION | FOREIGN TRAINING | PARTY SENIORITY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 86 | An Tzu-wen | X | C | G | A | A | B? |
| 57 | Chang Chi-ch'un | A-11 | C | G | C | X | C |
| 28 | Chang Ting-ch'eng | R-34 | D | C | A | X | B |
| 67 | Chang Wen-t'ien | R-22 | E | K | A | A | B |
| 45 | Chang Yün-yi | R-17 | D | M | B | X | B |
| 81 | Chao Erh-lu | X | C | Q | B? | ? | ? |
| 25 | Ch'en Keng | A-23 | C | G | B | A | B |
| 11 | Ch'en Po-ta | R-42 | C | C | A | A | B |
| 71 | Ch'en Shao-min (f) | A-3 | B | R | C | X | C |
| 95 | Ch'en Shao-yü | R-39 | B | A | A | A | B |
| 21 | Ch'en Yi | R-19 | D | T | A | B | A |
| 59 | Ch'en Yü | A-18 | D | N | D? | X | B |
| 8 | Ch'en Yün | R-8 | D | K | D | X | A |
| 72 | Cheng Wei-san | R-21 | D | H | A | X | A |
| 58 | Ch'eng Tzu-hua | A-6 | B | Q | A | X | B |
| 82 | Chia T'o-fu | X | C | S | A | X | B |
| 63 | Ch'ien Ying (f) | X | ? | R | ? | X | B? |
| 6 | Chou En-lai | R-3 | D | K | A | B | A |
| 5 | Chu Teh | R-4 | F | T | B | D | A |
| 37 | Ho Lung | R-18 | E | G | E | X | B |
| 83 | Hsi Chung-hsün | A-25 | C | S | C | X | A |
| 33 | Hsiao Ching-kuang | A-26 | D | G | B | A | B |
| 79 | Hsiao Hua | X | C | G | C | X | C |
| 62 | Hsiao K'o | X | B | G | B | X | B |
| 85 | Hsieh Fu-chih | X | D | T | B | X | ? |
| 78 | Hsü Hai-tung | X | ? | S | E | X | B? |
| 18 | Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien | R-9 | C | Q | B | X | B |
| 73 | Hsü Kuang-ta | X | C | G | B | ? | ? |
| 15 | Hsü T'e-li | R-35 | F | G | A | B | B |
| 54 | Hu Ch'iao-mu | X | D | K | A | X | B? |
| 80 | Hu Yao-pang | X | A? | R? | A? | X | C? |
| 31 | Huang K'o-ch'eng | R-43 | D | G | B | X | B |
| 49 | K'ang Sheng | R-15 | D | R | A | A | B |
| 35 | K'o Ch'ing-shih | X | B | A | A? | X | C? |
| 89 | Li Ching-ch'üan | X | C | J | ? | X | B? |

LEGEND

Age Group: A stands for the age group Under 46; B, 46–50; C, 51–55; D, 56–60; E, 61–65; F, Above 65; and ?, Unknown.

Native Province: A represents Anhwei; B, Chekiang; C, Fukien; D, Heilungkiang; E, Honan; F, Hopei (including Peking and Tientsin); G, Hunan; H, Hupeh; I, Kansu; J, Kiangsi; K, Kiangsu (including Shanghai); L. Kirin; M, Kwangsi; N, Kwangtung; O, Kweichow; P, Liaoning; Q, Shansi R, Shantung; S, Shensi; T, Szechuan; U, Tsinghai; V, Yunnan; W, Inner Mongolia; X, Sinkiang Y, Tibet; and ?, Unknown.

Educational Background: A represents college, normal school, or professional institution; B military academy; C, middle school; D, primary school; E, little or no formal education; and ? Unknown.

Foreign Training: A, in USSR; B, in France; C, in Japan; D, in Germany; E, in USA; X, none and ?, Unknown.

Party Seniority (Time when the person obtained his Communist Party membership): A represents the period 1921–24; B, 1925–27; C, 1928–37; and ?, Unknown.

*X denotes "not in the 7th CC"; A, alternate member; and R, regular member.



TABLE 1—DATA ON THE REGULAR MEMBERS OF THE EIGHTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY—*Continued*

| RANKING IN THE EIGHTH (CURRENT) CC (97 regular members) | NAME | RANKING IN THE SEVENTH CC* (43 regular and 27 alternate members) | AGE GROUP | NATIVE PROVINCE | EDUCATION | FOREIGN TRAINING | PARTY SENIORITY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 13 | Li Fu-ch'un | R-11 | D | G | A | B | A |
| 24 | Li Hsien-nien | R-37 | C | T | B | X | C |
| 70 | Li Hsüeh-feng | X | C | Q | C? | X | C? |
| 41 | Li K'o-nung | X | C | A | C | A | C |
| 88 | Li Li-san | R-13 | D | G | A | A | A |
| 72 | Li Pao-hua | A-13 | B | F | A | X | C? |
| 47 | Li Wei-han | X | D | G | A | B | A |
| 23 | Liao Ch'eng-chih | R-40 | B | N | A | C | B |
| 27 | Lin Feng | R-32 | C | D | A | X | B |
| 9 | Lin Piao | R-6 | B | H | B | A | B |
| 3 | Lin Po-ch'ü | R-5 | F | G | A | C | A |
| 76 | Lin T'ieh | X | C | T | A | X | ? |
| 60 | Liu Ch'ang-sheng | A-7 | C | R | E | X | C |
| 46 | Liu Hsiao | A-4 | B | G | A | X | B |
| 84 | Liu Ko-p'ing | X | B? | F? | A? | X | C |
| 51 | Liu Lan-t'ao | A-27 | C | S | ? | X | C |
| 52 | Liu Ning-yi | X | B | F | A | A | A |
| 20 | Liu Po-ch'eng | R-20 | E | T | B | A | A |
| 2 | Liu Shao-ch'i | R-2 | D | G | A | A | A |
| 69 | Liu Ya-lou | X | B | C | B? | A | C? |
| 17 | Lo Jui-ch'ing | A-21 | C | T | B | X? | B |
| 14 | Lo Jung-huan | R-14 | C | G | A | X | B |
| 16 | Lu Ting-yi | R-25 | D | K | A | A | A |
| 91 | Lü Cheng-ts'ao | A-20 | C | P | B | X | C |
| 66 | Ma Ming-fang | A-19 | D | S | B | X | C |
| 1 | Mao Tse-tung | R-1 | E | G | A | X | A |
| 26 | Nieh Jung-chen | R-28 | D | T | A | B | A |
| 82 | Ou-yang Ch'in | X | C? | G | A? | C? | ? |
| 29 | P'eng Chen | R-16 | D | Q | C | X | B |
| 22 | P'eng Te-huai | R-29 | D | G | B | X | B |
| 53 | Po I-po | R-38 | B | Q | A | X | B |
| 56 | Shu T'ung | X | D | J | A | X | B? |
| 36 | Su Yü | A-8 | B | G | A | X | B? |
| 44 | Sung Jen-ch'iung | A-10 | C | G | B | X | B |
| 68 | T'an Chen-lin | R-36 | C | C | C | X | B |
| 34 | T'an Cheng | A-5 | C | G | C | X | B |
| 93 | T'ao Chu | X | B? | G | ? | X | C |
| 4 | Teng Hsiao-p'ing | R-24 | E | T | A | B | A |
| 65 | Teng Hua | X | B | G | B | X | B? |
| 40 | Teng Tzu-hui | R-30 | E | C | A | X | B |
| 19 | Teng Ying-ch'ao (f) | A-2 | C | E | A | A | B |
| 32 | T'eng Tai-yüan | R-33 | C | G | A | A | A |
| 12 | Ts'ai Ch'ang (f) | R-23 | D | G | A | B | A |
| 94 | Tseng Hsi-sheng | X | C? | G? | B | X | ? |
| 75 | Tseng Shan | R-26 | C? | J | E? | A? | C? |
| 7 | Tung Pi-wu | R-7 | F | H | A | C | A |
| 30 | Ulanfu | A-12 | C | W | A | A | B |
| 74 | Wang Chen | A-9 | B | G | D | X | B |
| 48 | Wang Chia-hsiang | R-41 | B | A | A | A | A |
| 97 | Wang En-mao | X | ? | J | ? | X | C? |
| 38 | Wang Shou-tao | A-1 | C | G | A | X | A |

TABLE 1—DATA ON THE REGULAR MEMBERS OF THE EIGHTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY—*Continued*

| RANKING IN THE EIGHTH (CURRENT) CC (97 regular members) | NAME | RANKING IN THE SEVENTH CC* (43 regular and 27 alternate members) | AGE GROUP | NATIVE PROVINCE | EDUCATION | FOREIGN TRAINING | PARTY SENIORITY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 92 | Wang Shu-sheng | X | C | H | E? | X | B |
| 64 | Wang Ts'ung-wu | A-24 | C | H | A? | A? | C |
| 39 | Wang Wei-chou | A-14 | D | T | C? | X | B |
| 90 | Wu Chih-p'u | X | C | E | ? | X | ? |
| 61 | Wu Hsiu-ch'üan | X | B | H | A | A | B |
| 10 | Wu Yü-chang | R-31 | F | T | A | C | A |
| 96 | Yang Hsien-chen | X | ? | H | A | A | C? |
| 55 | Yang Hsiu-feng | X | D | F | A | B | ? |
| 42 | Yang Shang-k'un | X | B | T | A | A | A |
| 50 | Yeh Chi-chuang | X | E | N | A | X | B |
| 43 | Yeh Chien-ying | R-27 | D | N | B | A | B |

been no reliable confirmation either of schisms between the party and the military or among the military leaders themselves.

While the current greatly expanded Central Committee of 97 regular and 96 alternate members is far less significant than the Politburo as a decision-making organ, a member's ranking within the Central Committee is still generally indicative of his political importance. In order to contribute to an understanding of the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the backgrounds of the 97 regular members of the Eighth Central Committee are analyzed below (see Table 1). Not every one of the current CC members may be considered a top leader, although all key party figures are on the CC. Due to incomplete or inexact information regarding a number of CCP leaders, observations drawn from this background analysis serve largely to indicate the general pattern in the leadership structure.

TABLE 2—BREAKDOWN OF THE AGE GROUP OF THE 97 MEMBERS OF THE EIGHTH CC, CCP

| AGE | NUMBER |
|---|---|
| Under 46 | 1 |
| 46–50 | 20 |
| 51–55 | 34 |
| 56–60 | 26 |
| 61–65 | 7 |
| Above 65 | 5 |
| Unknown | 4 |
| Total | 97 |

*Background*

As an elite group, the leaders of the CCP are relatively young. Of the 97 regular members of the present CC, about 80 per cent belong to the age group from 46 to 60, with the age group 51–55 constituting approximately 35 per cent; 56–60, about 26 per cent; and under 50, about 21 per cent (see Table 2 for groupings as of 1958).

Regarding their geographical origin, 30 (31 per cent) are from Hunan province; 12 (12.3 per cent) from Szechwan; 6 each from Hupeh and Shansi; 5 each from Fukien, Hopei, Kiangsu, Shantung, and Shensi; and 4 each from Anhwei, Kiangsi, and Kwangtung. The remaining 6 are distributed among five other provinces (including Inner Mongolia), while eight provinces or areas (including Sinkiang and Tibet) are unrepresented (see Table 3). A substantial portion of the CC membership thus comes from the interior provinces in the hinterland, from areas relatively removed from the Western influences of the port cities and coastal districts. This contrasts sharply with the membership of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang in the prewar period, when about 40 per cent of its membership came from six coastal provinces.[3]



In comparison with the great majority of the Chinese population, the members of the Chinese Communist hierarchy have had much better than average education (see Table 4). Of the 97 CC members, 51 probably received education in a college, normal school, or professional institution, while 22 were trained in military academies (here defined to include Communist military training schools in Juichin and Yenan). The high proportion of leaders with military training is a reflection of the military environment of modern Chinese politics and of the long years of "armed struggle" against both National Government armies and Japanese forces during the period between 1928 and 1949.

The indigenous roots of the present leadership are suggested by the fact that 56 out of 97 CC members are not known to have had any training outside China. Of the remainder, 25 received training in the USSR, 9 in France, 5 in Japan, and 1 in Germany (see Table 5).

TABLE 3—BREAKDOWN OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN OF THE 97 REGULAR MEMBERS OF THE EIGHTH CC, CCP

| NATIVE PROVINCES | NUMBER |
|---|---|
| Anhwei | 4 |
| Chekiang | 0 |
| Fukien | 5 |
| Heilungkiang | 1 |
| Honan | 2 |
| Hopei | 5 |
| Hunan | 30 |
| Hupeh | 6 |
| Kansu | 0 |
| Kiangsi | 4 |
| Kiangsu | 5 |
| Kirin | 0 |
| Kwangsi | 1 |
| Kwangtung | 4 |
| Kweichow | 0 |
| Liaoning | 1 |
| Shansi | 6 |
| Shantung | 5 |
| Shensi | 5 |
| Szechwan | 12 |
| Tsinghai | 0 |
| Yunnan | 0 |
| Inner Mongolia | 1 |
| Sinkiang | 0 |
| Tibet | 0 |
| Total | 97 |

[3] Robert C. North, *Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 62.

TABLE 4—EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE 97 REGULAR MEMBERS OF THE EIGHTH CC, CCP

| EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS | NUMBER |
|---|---|
| College, normal school, or professional institution | 51 |
| Military academy | 22 |
| Middle school | 10 |
| Primary school | 3 |
| Little or no formal education | 5 |
| Unknown | 6 |
| Total | 97 |

TABLE 5—TRAINING RECEIVED ABROAD BY THE 97 REGULAR MEMBERS OF THE EIGHTH CC, CCP*

| COUNTRY | NUMBER |
|---|---|
| USSR | 25 |
| France | 9 |
| Japan | 5 |
| Germany | 1 |
| No foreign training | 56 |
| Unknown | 1 |
| Total | 97 |

* To avoid duplication, only the name of the country where a member received his major training is included.

TABLE 6—PERIOD OF JOINING THE CCP OF THE 97 REGULAR MEMBERS OF THE EIGHTH CC, CCP

| YEAR | NUMBER |
|---|---|
| 1921–1924 | 24 |
| 1925–1927 | 45 |
| 1928–1937 | 20 |
| Unknown | 8 (probably all before 1938, with the possible exception of Yang Hsiu-feng) |
| Total | 97 |

Some, of course, visited more than one foreign country (two received brief training in the United States, for example), but in this computation only the country where the individual received his major training is counted.

Available data also indicate that almost all members of the present CC have relatively long party membership. About 70 per cent joined the party between 1921 and 1927; virtually all the rest appear to have joined before 1938 (see Table 6). It is almost certain that none of the 8 unknown, with one possible exception, acquired party membership later than 1937.

Other background factors, while significant, are not considered in this analysis because of lack of adequate information. For example, the social background of the majority of the CC members is not definitely known. Of the 40 per cent about whom there are some reports, the largest number comes from peasant families, followed by gentry-official, and working class families.

### *Characteristics*

Many characteristics of the Central Committee membership reflect those of the Chinese Communist Party as a whole. The party as a political organism is relatively young, and its origins are still predominantly rural. Data released at the time of the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956 stated that, of the (then) 10.7 million party members, 67.5 per cent were between 26 and 45 years old, while only 7.6 per cent were over the age of 46. As of 1956, peasants reportedly constituted 69.1 per cent of total party membership; workers, 14 per cent; intellectuals, 11.7 per cent; and others, 5.2 per cent. During the Sino-Japanese war period, 1937–45, over 90 per cent of the party membership consisted of peasants. Women appear to be underrepresented on the present Central Committee. While some 10 per cent of the party members are females, only four women—Ts'ai Ch'ang, Teng Ying-ch'ao, Ch'ien Ying, and Ch'en Shao-min—are among the 97 regular members of the CC and none appear on the Politburo.

The more prominent new names among the current CC members include the following: K'o Ch'ing-shih, Secretary of the Shanghai and Kiangsu Party Bureau and Mayor of Shanghai since November 1958; Li Ching-ch'üan, Party Secretary of Szechwan province and a new Politburo member; Lin T'ieh, Party Secretary and Chairman of Hopei province; and Hu Yao-pang, Chairman of the Young Communist League.

In general, however, despite the expansion of the top apparatus, the leadership of the CCP is still dominated by veterans of the pre-1949 struggle for power in the countryside of China. Despite recurrent outside speculation about factionalism within the CCP, virtually no concrete evidence exists with respect to the existence or the precise motivation of such factions. Mao Tse-tung still appears to be the undisputed leader of the party as he has been for over twenty years since the Tsunyi conference of January 1935. A Reuters dispatch from Peking of August 16, 1957, concludes that



his [Mao's] value in preserving the "unity of all patriotic Chinese," which the Communists have been stressing for the last year, is still immense, and it is unlikely that his colleagues would let him go, even if he wanted to go, or that they would want to see him go.[4]

Regionalism and provincialism do not appear to play a major role in the politics of Communist China as they did in the later decades of the Ch'ing dynasty and in the Republican period. Differences within the leadership appear to relate more to tactical issues—the proportion of investment allocated to capital goods and consumer goods, or the speed of collectivization, for example—than to the long-term strategy of the Chinese Communist regime.

## EVALUATION OF THE CCP POWER PATTERN AND LEADERSHIP

Although detailed analysis of the structure and manipulation of power within the Chinese Communist Party is extremely difficult, several salient features emerge from analysis of the data presented above and from examination of recent developments on the mainland.

The first striking aspect is the high degree of solidarity in the CCP leadership. Internally, the Chinese Communist Party leadership has demonstrated for the past twenty years a far higher level of political durability than that of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or any other major Communist party in the world. This stability is partly manifested by the high measure of continuity in membership between the Seventh (1945) and Eighth (1956) Central Committees. It is also manifested by the fact that the party leadership, after carrying through major programs of political, social, and economic reorganization during the years since 1949, has remained both cohesive and confident. (The purge of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih was, in a sense, the exception which proved the rule.)

A second important feature is the high organizational skill developed by the party. These organizational techniques enable the party to mobilize all sectors of the Chinese population to work actively on the programs of national construction planned by the party. At the grass-roots level, the leadership organizes and indoctrinates the masses both through the party apparatus and the Young Communist League and also through mass organizations such as the trade unions, the Women's Federation, and myriad others. Through these bodies, the party is able to absorb the most active and able elements into its own structure. With the assistance of modern mass media such as the broadcasting network, the party is able to explain its programs and to implement them throughout the mainland within a very short period of time. The organization process is assisted by a host of socio-psychological techniques: public criticism of government officials in "rectification" campaigns, study and self-criticism sessions, and the stimulation of nationalist sentiment in political and production drives—for example, the slogan "catch up with England in fifteen years." For the first time in Chinese history, the central political authority of the country has penetrated directly to the village, the family, and the individual without reliance on intermediate local elements—such as the landed gentry in the countryside during the pre-1949 period, for example. Popular sentiment and local problems are reflected through the frequent reports of cadres who work closely with the people and by periodic visits of national leaders to inspect basic-level organizations.

A third feature of the Peking leadership lies in the flexibility with which it has been able to co-ordinate political,

[4] *New York Times*, August 18, 1957, p. 34.

economic, and social programs. In the agricultural sector, for example, the party initiated the Chinese peasant into organized farming through a four-stage process: first, mutual-aid teams, then agricultural producer co-operatives, then collectives, and finally "people's communes." At the same time, the collectivization of Chinese agriculture has been closely co-ordinated with agro-technical improvements, rural marketing development, mass education, and political indoctrination. Thus the Communists have been able to accelerate the process of socialization in the countryside during the relatively brief period of nine years without serious disruption of the essential process of agricultural production. Another illustration of Peking's approach to national development problems is seen in the extensive decentralization of industrial and commercial activity in recent months. These moves have apparently been a major contributing factor to the increased production by local industries during 1958.

With comprehensive planning under a highly centralized regime, and with nationwide activities being undertaken at a very rapid tempo, problems and shortcomings are inevitable. One of the major problems confronting the CCP today stems from the simple fact of greatly accelerated growth in party membership during the past decade. To meet the pressing demand for trained and politically reliable personnel to deploy in the face of tremendously expanded problems, the party has had to admit millions of newcomers. From a membership of about 4.5 million in 1950, the party has continued to swell: to 10.7 million (September 1956) and to 12.7 million (September 1957). The conflict between quantity and quality of party membership remains a persisting problem. Recognizing that indecision, inefficiency, and erosion of morale are constant problems, the leadership is making regular efforts to maintain the present enormous party bureaucracy as an efficient and responsive political structure.

### POLITICAL TRENDS

Study of the prevailing power structure and leadership in China indicates that the Chinese Communist Party leadership under Mao Tse-tung continues to enjoy a high degree of cohesion. The growing stature of Mao as a major spokesman in the Communist camp has further enhanced his prestige in the eyes of the Chinese. The top leaders of the Politburo and the younger individuals—like K'o Ch'ing-shih, T'an Cheng, Ch'en Po-ta, and Hu Yao-pang —rising in the party hierarchy are all close associates of Mao. The unusually high continuity of leadership in the CCP suggests that the Peking regime will probably maintain its present basic policies in the foreseeable future.

Under the determined leadership of the CCP, Communist China has embarked upon an ambitious program of industrialization and technical-cultural revolution. The implications of this program are international as well as domestic, for the decisions of the Communist Party at Peking now affect a quarter of the world directly and almost all the earth's population indirectly. Thus an understanding of the power structure in mainland China is of critical importance in accurate assessment of many current world problems.

# Organization and Response in Communist China

By H. F. SCHURMANN

ABSTRACT: Communist China today is marked by two great processes: industrialization and organization. Organization is total, reaching from the top of society down to its lowest levels. Everyone is recruited into some group organized and controlled by the regime. At its lowest level, organization consists of numerous small groups, usually numbering no more than twenty people. These are the "study" and work groups. It is through these small groups that the masses are controlled and manipulated according to definite organizational principles uniformly applied throughout the society. These principles call for the development of strong internal solidarity in the small groups as well as disciplined obedience to orders from above (manipulability), both of which are to some extent mutually exclusive. Hence the Communists consistently and universally use certain mechanisms, mainly "study," to maintain a dynamic balance between the two. "Study" is the intensive application of group and self-criticism to individual group members. The considerable success of the Communists in eliciting "response" in the small groups is due not only to coercion but also, possibly, to a tradition in China of participation in small, tightly knit associations.

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*H. F. Schurmann, Ph.D., Harvard University, is Acting Assistant Professor in the Departments of Sociology and History, University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of The Economic Structure of the Yüan Dynasty (1956) and of articles on Chinese history and society in professional journals. The results of his ethnological work in Afghanistan will appear in a forthcoming volume, The Mongols of Afghanistan. During the summer of 1958 he visited Hong Kong to collect material on organizational problems of Communist China.*

THE LAST decade has seen the emergence in China of a new totalitarian state. Within the short space of ten years, the Communists have succeeded in unifying and organizing the vast expanses of the Chinese mainland in a manner unknown in all previous Chinese history.

In this process of political consolidation, the Communists have proceeded systematically and relentlessly, operating according to definite organizational principles. These principles are those which underlie the organization of the Communist party and which have now been extended to the entire society. Two of the most fundamental principles are what may be called: (1) co-ordinated leadership, and (2) the operational unit, or to use Communist terminology: the cadres (*kan-pu*), and the small group (*hsiao-tsu*). The cadres may be Communist or non-Communist; the small groups may be Communist or non-Communist. Yet, wherever there is organization today in China, there are cadres and small groups. Every individual in China is a member of some organized association brought into existence by the Communists themselves.[1] Such membership always involves participation in some "small group" (henceforth to be called SG and used in this specific Chinese Communist sense).[2] The nuclear group of every organization is the SG. Thus the party SG is the lowest unit of party organization; there may be several SG in a cell (*chih-pu*) or the SG may be identical with the cell itself. All SG's are led by a cadre. Party cadres are a special variety of the cadres in general. Every leader, whether he is in the party or not, is regarded as a cadre. The SG's and the cadres are the building blocks of Chinese Communist total organization. Without an understanding of these organizational nuclei, no understanding of contemporary China is possible.

No organization can become operative by coercion alone. To function, an organization must be able to elicit "response" from its members, that is to say, acceptance or commitment on the part of the members to the goals of the system as defined by its leaders and a willingness to participate in the activities necessary for the attainment of these goals. Though coercion is undoubtedly an important weapon in the Chinese Communist organizational arsenal, there are other, more important means of eliciting response. There is no question that ideology—the values and goals of Chinese Communism—is one of the chief means. But there also may be other factors involved, factors deriving from what may be called the traditional social structure of Chinese society. In this paper, I shall deal with some problems of nuclear organization in Communist China, and suggest some reasons for the apparently intensive response to organization by large segments of China's population.

## NATURE OF THE SMALL GROUP

The SG is not simply an abstract group used for purposes of registration or classification. Nor is it a "natural" group which existed before the coming of the Communists and was simply taken over by them for their own purposes. SG's were purposively organized by the Communists and universally centered around a principal activity, namely

[1] Marginal persons in the cities are at least involved in street group organization, and in the rural areas they are usually caught up in the "co-operatives" as "nonregular members."

[2] The information for this article was obtained largely from the collection of Chinese Communist materials in the Hoover Library, Stanford University. On membership in the SG, see *Kung-fei chung-yao tzu-liao hui-pien*, Vol. 3, p. 186. The material cited, though published in Formosa, is a convenient collection of Communist source material quoted verbatim.



"study" (*hsüeh-hsi*), the activity commonly referred to as "brainwashing."[3] Every person is a member of some study group (*hsüeh-hsi hsiao-tsu*) which meets regularly to "study." In some instances the members of the SG may also live and work together, in which case they are known as a "living small-group" (*sheng-huo hsiao-tsu*). These groups ideally consist of from seven to thirteen people, although an absolute size is not fixed. The criterion of size is ability to function effectively; but, in general, organizational handbooks advise against groups which are either smaller or larger than the limits given. As one source says, if the groups are too large there is enthusiasm but lack of control; if they are too small, there is control but lack of enthusiasm.[4] Attendance is compulsory. SG meetings usually take place from once in a week, during ordinary times, to long daily sessions, when a "movement" is in progress. The SG members almost always sit in a circle facing each other. The SG leader will usually launch the meeting, but during its course every one must rise and "express his opinions" (*fa-yen i-chien*). Discussion (*t'ao-lun*) ranges from broad political subjects to extremely personal matters affecting individual members. If some meetings are trite and routine, others are marked by intensive "struggle" (*tou-cheng*) in which some members may be severely attacked. SG's exist in the party, in factories, in schools, in village co-operatives, in the army—in short, within every formal organization in the country. Where people are not covered within formal organizations, neighborhood SG's, under the control of the street committees (*chü-min wei-yüan-hui*), are organized to make certain that the entire population is reached.

The main purposes of the SG are to function as a collective work or activities group, to induce collectivist attitudes in its members. The political aspects of the mechanism are basic, for the SG operates as an instrument for control and supervision and acts as a channel for communication from leadership to masses and from masses to leadership.

The specific nature of activities within an SG will vary according to the organization, but the general characteristics of all SG's are similar. The following account by a refugee author of SG life in a university gives an indication of the activities within an SG. In the university, SG's were formed according to school classes. Collective living and collective study were carried out within the framework of the SG. The SG leaders were in charge of class attendance; in military fashion, they called out names and marched the students to class. After class, the SG collectively went to the library for study and research; sometimes collective discussion followed class lectures. Collective pre-exam study was the rule. After exams, democratic criticism of exam results was carried out in which the SG performance rather than individual performance was the major criterion of judgment. Members of the SG also lived together, for which reason these SG's were also known as "living groups." In the morning, they had to wash collectively, to eat breakfast collectively. And, as this was in the early period after Communist victory, they had to dance the *yang-ko* collectively after a collective supper. Then there was collective viewing of films, collective singing. All this, needless to say, was compulsory. If anyone refused to participate, he was regarded as deviant, criticized as an individualist, and subject to severe "thought reform." Col-

[3] *Ibid.* On "brainwashing," see Robert J. Lifton, "Thought Reform of Chinese Intellectuals," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 16 (1956), pp. 75–88.

[4] *Kung-fei chung-yao tzu-liao hui-pien hsü-pien*, III, p. 27 ff.

lectivism (*chi-t'i chu-i*), as the author woefully remarks, truly means destruction of the individual.[5] Collective living may have been particularly intense in the university SG's, but similar activities go on in all SG's. The *Yangtze Daily* (September 11, 1951) reported that in some factories in Tientsin there were more than twenty-seven SG meetings within a single week. On road building projects and in labor camps, workers are also organized into small "living groups" and subjected to the same form of collective activity.[6] While it is impossible to get a complete picture of the actual workings of SG's in the different organizations, one fact is clear: one of the main purposes of the Small Group is to induce a high degree of collective living and collective attitudes in its members.

## THE CADRE

Every SG has a leader, the SG leader (*hsiao-tsu-chang*). The SG leader is a cadre, although in some cases of a very low level. Nevertheless, as the designated leader of the SG, he is in direct contact with the higher levels of the organization, whether party, union, collective, army, or other. Through the cadre, orders are transmitted to all levels of the organization, ultimately reaching the lowest level or SG. The SG leader is responsible for the eliciting of response from the group to orders from above.

It is also the responsibility of the SG leader to maintain the solidarity of the group. SG members are urged to form close ties with each other, to develop strong feelings of comradeship. They are urged to "get the feeling that the SG has the warmth of one big family."[7] They should "all be good sisters and brothers, good classmates, good comrades."[8] The leader too must remain closely identified with the SG, so that "on the surface one cannot see the difference between leaders and led, and only when he must function as leader does he then act as one."[9] As a leader, he must be aware of the personal problems of the members of the SG. If quarrels arise between members, he must act as arbiter.[10] All handbooks for cadres warn against excessive authoritarianism and indicate that the SG leaders must relate to the members as equals. All organizational literature of the Chinese Communists stresses the importance of maintaining true solidarity, true group spirit among the members of the SG. The members are urged to form strong informal ties of solidarity with each other, aside from their work or study relationships.

## MANIPULABILITY AND SOLIDARITY

Although Communist sources strongly emphasize the importance of solidarity in the SG, a more serious problem is what might be termed the manipulability of the SG. The basic purpose of the SG is not the fulfillment of the needs of the members of the group, but rather the regulation of their functions in terms of the goals set by the regime. To this end, the SG must remain responsive to commands from above and must be manipulable by its cadre leaders. Given natural human tendencies, the uncontrolled SG would either disperse or turn into a true primary group, bound together by close ties of solidarity but no longer amenable to outside direction or control.

[5] Sun Hsiao-lan, *Chung-kung nu-i hsüeh-sheng [Slave Student of the Chinese Communists]* (Hong Kong, 1951), pp. 12–15.

[6] Cheng Chu-yüan, *Chung-kung ti nu-kung chih-tu [Slave Labor System of the Chinese Communists]* (Hong Kong, 1952), p. 89.

[7] *Kung-fei chung-yao tzu-liao hui-pien,* III, p. 186.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] *Ibid.*



The problem of manipulability, whether in party, union, army, collective, school, or other organization, is expressed in the party literature as "maintaining discipline." For the most part, party literature shows more concern with the problem of discipline than with the problem of group solidarity. The recent (1957) statements of Mao Tse-tung on "internal contradictions among the people" reflect a growing awareness of the alienation of cadres from those whom they lead and a decline in small group solidarity at the lower levels of society. However, in both the earlier and present-day literature, discipline seems to be the main problem. During guerrilla days, centrifugal and particularistic tendencies were repeatedly denounced. The campaign against "mountainism" (*shan-t'ou chu-i*), for example, was aimed at the serious problem posed by decreasing coordination among the Communist party guerrilla armies, each on its own mountain top.[11] Related denunciations of "nativism" and "cliquism" can be found in all party literature since the Shensi border days, if not earlier.[12] In other words, the "natural" tendency toward small group formation, toward ingroupedness, with the implication of decreasing manipulability from the center, remained one of the main organizational problems of the party.

One means utilized within some SG's to maintain discipline is internal structuring, or formal organization within the SG itself. The more the SG is structured along formal lines, the more the formation of primary ties—hence ingroup ties—is inhibited. Thus, for example, in some of the labor union SG's (which seem to be larger than those of the party), people were appointed to take charge of specific tasks (*kan-shih*) such as production, study, writing of reports, culture and recreation, recruitment and organization, welfare, mutual aid, problems relating to women and youth.[13] The functions of labor unions in Communist China are similar to those in Russia, that is, the maintenance of labor discipline and the assurance of labor's response to the industrial tasks of the nation.[14] Similar structuring can be found in the SG's of the party, of street committees, of the youth league, and so forth.

### *Avoiding stagnation*

If internal structuring or formal organization within the SG's of the unions and other organizations be a means of holding the group together, there is also the danger of stagnation. The Chinese Communists are well aware of this danger, and their organizational literature constantly stresses ways of keeping the organization alive and responsive. A *People's Daily* editorial (August 19, 1953) warned against stagnation by calling for constant internal reorganization, minimal interference in the free time of workers, and the encouragement of SG activities so that "the opinions of the masses can be 'concentrated,' the power of the masses be manifested, and the union [not] become separated from the masses." Concern with what I have called the problems of solidarity and manipulability in the organizational structure is also expressed in a speech made by the Chinese Communist Party leader Teng Fa in 1944, at a time when the Communists did not yet face major problems of industrial organization. He outlined six ways to combat stagnation

[11] Liu Shao-ch'i, *Lun Tang [On the Party]* (Peking, 1950), p. 112 ff.

[12] Cf. *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung,* Vol. 2 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1954), p. 74.

[13] *Ta-chia pan kung-hui,* p. 3.

[14] Cf. *Labor Problems in Communist China (To February 1953)* (= HRRI Project, Research Memorandum No. 42) (Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, 1955), p. 82.

in the factories: constant internal reorganization; teaching workers "to regard the factory as their home"; aiding management in maintaining labor discipline; having party, union, and management pay attention to worker grievances; strict "study" to reform "bad tendencies"; and participation of cell secretaries in factory committee meetings, management operations, and production.[15] Liu Shao-ch'i, as quoted in a handbook for Communist party members, lists four ways of maintaining discipline in a cell: regular meetings; a report system where members report to the group on their work and the SG leader reports to the group; referring all major questions to higher party authorities; and strict criticism and self-criticism.[16] Needless to say the same system is employed in the SG's of unions and other organizations.

Another writer, Lung Ch'ien, first emphasizes the importance of solidarity in the SG, but then turns around and warns against weakening discipline:[17]

> [Too much talk is bad for solidarity], but another matter is when everyone lives together harmoniously, with no trouble. This sort of condition appears as the result of feudal type solidarity. All that is necessary is that you be loyal to somebody, that you can help him along. Why should one get mad at one another? Just get along with each other! In public you should not attack me, and I shall not attack you. In this way, we set up a wall over which we do not attack each other, and try to remain at peace. But in reality we talk behind his back, and at will spread around wild talk. In this type of familial atmosphere there is no way of criticizing performance. There is also no way for the leader to carry self-criticism. . . . Unless there is Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism, party discipline cannot really be firm!

In the Communist press, especially in the columns devoted to "party life," there is constant discussion on ways of maintaining SG activity. Cadres are criticized for bureaucratic tendencies, for alienating themselves from "the masses"—that is the ordinary members of the SG. SG's are criticized for not rotating leadership often enough, thus allowing "contradictions between the leaders and the led" to arise. There are criticisms of too many meetings which exhaust the members of the SG, and there are criticisms of too few meetings which produce indifference. There are criticisms of cadres who do not "penetrate into the masses," as well as criticisms of cadres who might be said to penetrate too deeply, as in the case of the recent denunciations of certain labor union leaders who allegedly fostered "revisionism" and trade union tendencies in their unions.[18] The maintenance of dynamic, responsive, and collective SG activity is one of the major organizational problems of the Communists in China, a problem which is constantly discussed in their mass publications.

## Organizational Problems

The Communists have created a vast structure of organization in China. It is clear that they are confronted with all the problems that large scale organization brings with it. Insights into the nature of some of these problems may be gained by looking at the workings of the organizational nuclei, the SG's. Every member of an organization is at the same time recruited into a study group whose members are supposed to develop close work and friendship relationships among themselves. One might go so far as to say that a certain degree of informal and primary solidarity among members is a requisite of the SG system. However, "excessive solidarity"—the tendency toward in-group formation—makes the group less responsive to orders from above and less oriented toward the general goals of the system. Communist writers, from Mao Tse-tung down, have repeatedly warned that the SG must not degenerate into a "feudal" club—that is, a traditional type friendship group. Nevertheless, the same writers also warn against excessive formalization of the SG, the lack of true ties of solidarity, the development of authoritarian tendencies on the part of the cadres. Though both solidarity and manipulability are functional requisites of the SG, "excessive" development of one has a deleterious effect on the other. The Communists have discovered from experience that the SG without some mechanism cannot remain both solidary and manipulable at the same time.

## Criticism and Self-Criticism

The most important mechanism developed by the Communists for maintaining the functions of the SG is "criticism and self-criticism." Though an old Leninist mechanism of control, "criticism and self-criticism" has become the universal mechanism for maintaining small group control in Communist China. "Criticism and self-criticism" is applied far more often and more thoroughly in Communist China than in the USSR. "Criticism and self-criticism" is the means through which "study" is implemented. The popularity of the term "brain washing"—never used by the Chinese Communists themselves—has given the impression that "indoctrination" is the main function of "study." While inculcation of specific doctrinal ideas is important in "study," its main purpose is the development of proper group attitudes. The mechanism for doing this is the application of "criticism and self-criticism," a painful psychological process which alternately evokes feelings of anxiety and security in the individual.[19]

These techniques are applied at all meetings, though not always with the same vehemence. Essentially, the technique consists in the usually temporary alienation of a single member from the group through the application of collective criticism. One member is singled out for criticism, either because of faulty ideological understanding, poor work performance, or some other deviance. He is not only subjected to a barrage of criticism from the members, but also joins in and begins to criticize himself. The avowed purpose of the procedure is to "correct" (*kai-tsao*) the individual. Under normal circumstances, the individual is "reintegrated" into the group after the "temporary alienation." The experience of temporary alienation by the one criticized and collective criticism by the group members is, in theory, supposed to have the general effect of maintaining the group's cohesion and effectiveness. Great fear exists on the part of those potentially criticizable that they may become victims of a more permanent alienation. Fear of such a permanent alienation serves to strengthen the bonds within the group. While the effectiveness of this technique cannot be judged accurately, the continuing and intensive practice of "study" in Communist China indicates that the Communists regard

[15] *Kung-ch'ang kuan-li yü ch'ün-chung kung-tso* [*Factory Management and Mass Action*], p. 17.

[16] *Kung-ch'an-tang-yüan k'o-pen* [*A Textbook for Communists*], p. 60.

[17] *Fa-yang tang-nei min-chu ho chia-ch'iang p'i-p'ing yü tzu-wo p'i-p'ing* [*To Spread Internal Party Democracy and Strengthen Criticism and Self-Criticism*], p. 18.

[18] A few random references on this type of discussion: *Canton Daily*, September 18, 1956; *Tsingtao Daily*, February 6, 1957, *Amoy Daily*, March 28, 1958. The *People's Daily* of August 12, 1958 denounces such labor leaders who "pretend to be concerned with the workers' welfare."

[19] Cf. Robert J. Lifton, "'Thought Reform' of Western Civilians in Communist Chinese Prisons," *Psychiatry*, Vol. 19 (1956), 173–95.

"study" as an important mechanism in organization. Impressionistic reports of observers would seem to indicate further that these tactics have had far greater success and elicited far greater response in China than in the USSR.[20]

The technique of alienation or isolation is also widely used in the labor camps. One refugee, P'ei Yu-ming, reports that in the Shensi camps the prisoners were divided into three groups: progressives, backward, and isolates. They were physically separated from each other and formed separate groups. The progressives were those who showed positive evidence of successful indoctrination. The backward were the over-all mass of unregenerates who still had to undergo indoctrination and become amenable to the new system. The isolates, however, were those who had regressed seriously from a former progressive position. They were subject to a form of punishment known as isolation. A board with the word "isolate" (*ku-li*) was hung around their necks. They were forced to eat in separate places, given poor food. No one was allowed to speak to them, and they were forbidden to speak to others. Isolates were not hopeless cases, but could only regenerate themselves through special effort.[21]

## Study, Incentive, and Piece-Work Techniques

Though the avowed purpose of "study" is indoctrination, its main function relates to the implementation of organization. The dynamic tensions released during "study" sessions, on the one hand, prevent the members of the group from sinking into lethargy and a quietistic sort of solidarity, and on the other serve to implement informal ties among members. "Study" sessions also avoid excessive formalization of the group. The tensions and conflicts which these sessions produce, far from endangering the workings of the system, are the very mechanisms by which it remains dynamic. If new work techniques are to be introduced, a "study" session is held. If social innovation is to be practiced, a "study" session is held. SG meetings take place in the evenings, after work hours, and though discussions almost always involve talk about everyday problems, a general atmosphere of doctrinal approach is maintained. Such and such is a Leninist way of thinking; such and such is not. Similarities to certain types of religious sect meetings are apparent.

The Chinese Communists also make use of other mechanisms for implementing organization and eliciting response. The use of incentive and piece-work systems to obtain greater work response is widespread. Encouragement of mobility through new recruitment or replacement of cadres is also an important social mechanism. Neither of these techniques, however, is primarily group oriented. In fact, they encourage alienation from the group and, in the long run, it might be inferred, could have disruptive effects on group solidarity. But it is the SG system with all of its ramifications which forms the basic building blocks of the Chinese Communist totalitarian system. Through the dynamic interplay of the conflicting tendencies toward solidarity and manipulability, controlled and guided by the mechanism of "study," the Chinese Communists have developed an organizational tool of tremendous power.

The organizational principles of the Chinese Communists—the cadres, small groups, study techniques, and so forth

[20] Robert Guillain, *600 Million Chinese* (New York: Criterion Books, 1957), p. 133.

[21] *Wo lai tzu tung-pei nu-kung-ying* [*I Came from a Manchurian Slave Labor Camp*] (Hong Kong, 1954), p. 66 ff.



—are basically those of Communist parties in all countries.[22] One may infer from the considerable organizational success of the Chinese Communists that these principles, though borrowed from a non-Chinese ideology, have served them well within Chinese society. Not only Communism's ideology but also its organization had an "appeal" which made large scale recruitment possible. The earliest period of Communism in China (early 1920's) is marked by the existence of study groups and cells.[23] The earliest nuclei of Communist organization were found, not among workers or the peasantry, but among the dissatisfied intellectuals. For these deviants—the "advanced" element of the population—the Marxist small group offered opportunities for human solidarity rarely found elsewhere. The uniqueness of the Marxist group lay precisely in the fact that social deviance—rejection of traditional values and a readiness to fight against traditional society —was a requisite for membership in the group. The group offered comradeship, the chance to establish primary relationships with other human beings who were in similar opposition to society. These were the forces which appealed to recruits and which made for solidarity in the conspiratorial group.

## Traditional Chinese Culture and Response to Communism

If response to the SG in Communist China may be partly explained by the "appeal" inherent in Chinese Communist organizational tactics, certain indigenous factors in Chinese culture have also been instrumental in eliciting response to Communism. The culture and social structure of traditional China had deep roots; during the millennium proceding the present century, both remained essentially unchanged. Despite great changes in Chinese society during the last half century, the old patterns of action have not entirely disappeared. Some traditional institutions remain, and many old habits of action continue to affect behavior. Though the Communists wage a ceaseless struggle against "the old"—as for example in their unrelenting attack on the family system—on "superstition," on regionalism, they have not failed to make use of certain basic behavior patterns well known to them as Chinese for implementing their plans. In some instances, the Communists have used traditional type groups for their own purposes. For example, in the villages, the Communists took over traditional amusement and storytelling groups and transformed them into vehicles for Communist indoctrination.[24] However, more significant is the fact that the Chinese Communists have also taken advantage of certain traditional behavior patterns, most important of which are the strong associative tendencies of the Chinese.

Studies of traditional Chinese social structure have emphasized the strong family and group orientation of the Chinese.[25] The internal solidarity of the Chinese family is well known. But group solidarity also manifested itself outside the family. China has for centuries been a society of clubs, guilds, and associations of various sorts. Generally speaking, these associations tended to take the shape of semiformal, semiinformal organizations: small, relatively compact, marked by a high degree of

[22] Cf. Philip Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1952), p. 17 ff.

[23] Benjamin Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 33 ff.

[24] *Kung-ch'ü nung-min chiao-yü* [*Peasant Education in Communist Areas*] (Hong Kong, 1952), p. 87.

[25] Cf., for example, Marion Levy, *The Family Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 164 ff.

interaction among members. This penchant for association may be observed in any overseas Chinese community today. Aside from the web of informal and primary relationships among members, these associations were characterized by fraternal and equalitarian solidarity. Though age-generation differences ranked "older" and "younger," a clearly defined leadership at the top was not particularly common. The elders "consulted" and made decisions through "consensus." Even in the family, "consensus" played its part in the making of decisions. In a household where the official head of the family was an older brother, important decisions affecting the family as a whole could only be made after consultation with the other members of the family.[26] The making of decisions in the villages was carried out through consensus, and not through command. In associations too, no individual necessarily played an indispensable role. Leadership positions were rotated, and new recruits for top positions were always found.[27] Witness the secret societies, which endured for hundreds of years without a clearly defined leadership and based themselves almost entirely on enduring fraternal solidarity. To state these observations somewhat more abstractly, in traditional Chinese society there were strong tendencies to respond to equalitarian group situations characterized by informal and primary type relationships.

Superficially, the Communist SG presents certain similarities to traditional Chinese associations. The SG is small, in theory highly solidary, and in theory highly equalitarian. Chinese Communist mass propaganda has consistently stressed themes of comradeliness and equality in the small groups. The same two themes are stressed today. Even if the SG's have an "appeal" which flows directly from their internal structure, the very fact that they bear certain strong resemblances to traditional Chinese group types is an important factor in eliciting response among the masses. That the SG is something quite different from a traditional club is probably clear to most Chinese by now. Yet, as indicated above, other nontraditional methods of control are now used to hold the SG together and keep it functioning.

[26] Cf. Niida Noboru, *Chûgoku no nôson kazoku* [*Peasant Family in China*] (Tokyo, 1952), p. 220 ff.

[27] Niida Noboru, *Chûgoku no shakai to girudo* [*Chinese Society and Guilds*] (Tokyo, 1951), p. 115.

## MORAL FORCE OF IDEOLOGY

The Communists confront the problem of group control and manipulation in a situation where group values are weakly, if at all, socialized. The group is new, its work new, and the goals proclaimed are expressed in strange language and require some novel action. It is through the SG that such control is exercised. An atmosphere of abstractness, of moral importance permeates the meeting. A work problem may be discussed, but it is often given the same abstract treatment as a problem of Marxist theory. Though utopian images are raised as in meetings of chiliastic sects, more important is the sense of participation in the bringing about of the new society. In China, participation of the masses in the "building of the New China" has always been stressed by Communist *agitprop*. Because a sense of active participation in a "great task" is stressed, exclusion or alienation from the group is one of the worst punishments which can befall a member.

Here ideology has a crucial function. Without the moral force of the ideology, neither "study" nor "criticism" would be effective. Only if the individual becomes deeply aware of his innermost signs of revolt against authority and purges himself through a violent emotional outburst has "study" become effective. Only if, in his temporary revolt, he feels his alienation from the group, does his rapid reintegration become meaningful. The Chinese situation reveals again the tremendous importance of ideologies with a strong moral force for organizing new type groups. Leaving aside the Communist examples, one need only mention the Puritan settlements of New England or the Zionist agricultural settlements in Palestine. But in these two cases, the organizations were self-contained and existed for the satisfaction of their members. The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, must construct and maintain a durable hierarchy of organization. Thus they require manipulability as well as solidarity, and mechanisms for maintaining both.

# Agriculture and Population in Relation to Economic Planning

By J. E. Spencer

Abstract: The initial agrarian reform program of distributing land to the landless won over the poorer rural masses that form the main Chinese population. By staged evolution of co-operative organization, land has now become state property, making almost all Chinese landless in the strict sense. The consolidation of farm land into co-operatively managed units permits policy control, taxation, agricultural public works programs, agricultural management, and crop collection to be more effectively handled than was formerly the case. Long-range major improvement programs actually are expanding the farm landscape, developing irrigation, reducing floods, and improving yields. An integral feature of economic planning is a new major birth control program which is just beginning to take effect. The population total now stands close to 640,000,000, with an annual increase of about 11,000,000 and death rates comparable to those in advanced countries. The essentially intensive agriculture is being further intensified. Some headway is being made and the Chinese population is a little better off in basic, essential needs than it formerly was. Mechanization and other features typical of agricultural improvement elsewhere are being pushed as long-term improvements which are just beginning to show results.

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*J. E. Spencer, Ph.D., Los Angeles, California, is Professor of Geography at the University of California, Los Angeles. He spent the years 1932–40 in the Salt Revenue Administration, Ministry of Finance, Chinese National Government. In 1944–45 he was in China with the United States Army engaged in intelligence work. He has traveled widely in many parts of southern and eastern Asia and during 1957–58 was Fulbright Lecturer at the University of Malaya, Singapore. Dr. Spencer is author of Land and People in the Philippines (1952), Asia, East by South: A Cultural Geography (1954), and numerous articles in professional journals.*





CAN Chinese agriculture under Communist control improve with sufficient speed to feed a growing population adequately and to continue to supply exports to pay for some of the imported equipment needed to turn China into an industrial state before that population grows too large to feed at all? If it can, then the industrial machine may help mechanize and further improve Chinese agriculture. If it cannot, mainland China faces further turmoil when the population reaches a critical hungry state.

Much of the literature dealing with Chinese agriculture and population in the last half century has stressed the intensive nature and the high productivity of agriculture and the proficiency of the Chinese farmer. Similarly it has stressed the omnipresence of people in the landscape, the high densities in the agricultural lowlands, the number and size of villages, and the relative smallness of the urban population. There has been uncertainty about the true productivity of agriculture, and no one has been able to say how many Chinese there really were. In recent years two general reactions have matured: that Chinese agriculture has been less productive than was earlier thought to be the case, and that the Chinese population was greater than the figure commonly listed.

Chinese agriculture has been traditionally maintained in a framework of private land ownership and tenancy patterns with minimal regional transfer of products, but with a number of Chinese monopoly crops which have entered foreign trade for nearly three hundred years. The primary use of human energy has been basic, animals have been subordinated to crops, tools and techniques have remained simple, and the intensity of cultivation has grown. The farm population has long comprised about 80 per cent of the total, and despite their having engaged in many auxiliary occupations, the rural level of living has been declining for over a century.

## How Many Chinese Are There?

Chinese have lived in every kind of local environment in large numbers. For many centuries China has been one of the more populous parts of the world. Historically, Chinese governments have made population counts in some detail for different purposes, but no true census was ever taken until 1953. Since the last Manchu imperial count of 1911 returned a figure of 374,000,000, many estimates have been made, ranging between 425,000,000 and 600,000,000, with most authorities choosing a figure close to 500,000,000. The Communist census of 1953 startled everyone interested in China, including the Communists themselves—it showed a total of 582,000,000. More startling items were the annual increase of almost 12,000,000 persons per year and the death rate of only 17 per thousand. The accuracy of the census was hotly debated abroad, but the Chinese use the data themselves, and its accuracy now is accepted as greater than that of previous tabulations and estimates. Some 505,000,000 of the 1953 total were rural residents, the percentage being just over 86 per cent. Recently the total of urban dwellers has been growing rapidly. It exceeds the opportunities for urban employment, and the government has repeatedly pushed urban residents back into the rural countrysides.

Table 1 shows possible populations from 1931 to 1958. It has two base points: a 1931 population that "seems about right" and the 1953 census total. Annual rates of natural increase have been picked with regard to many factors, only the most important of which are noted in the table. Chinese population growth responds to many factors, the constant, imperative drive for large

TABLE 1—POSSIBLE TOTAL CHINESE POPULATION AND ANNUAL INCREASES

| MID-YEAR DATE | TOTAL POPULATION IN 000's | PER/1000 INCREASE | ANNUAL INCREASE IN 000's | FACTORS AFFECTING INCREASE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1958 | 643,237 | ? | ? | ? |
| 1957 | 631,864 | 18.0 | 11,373 | Birth control program growing |
| 1956 | 619,475 | 20.0 | 12,389 | Birth control program began |
| 1955 | 606,734 | 21.0 | 12,741 | |
| 1954 | 594,255 | 21.0 | 12,479 | |
| 1953 | 582,555 | 20.0 | 11,652 | |
| 1952 | 571,132 | 20.0 | 11,423 | (Census = 582,603,000) |
| 1951 | 561,309 | 17.5 | 9,823 | Improving public health |
| 1950 | 553,267 | 14.5 | 8,022 | Improving public health |
| 1949 | 548,080 | 9.5 | 5,207 | Public health program renewed |
| 1948 | 543,730 | 8.0 | 4,350 | |
| 1947 | 539,148 | 8.5 | 4,582 | Breakdown of public health program |
| 1946 | 534,339 | 9.0 | 4,809 | Public health program deterioration |
| 1945 | 529,573 | 9.0 | 4,766 | |
| 1944 | 525,370 | 8.0 | 4,203 | |
| 1943 | 521,718 | 7.0 | 3,652 | |
| 1942 | 518,349 | 6.5 | 3,369 | |
| 1941 | 515,002 | 6.5 | 3,347 | |
| 1940 | 512,925 | 6.0 | 3,077 | |
| 1939 | 509,866 | 6.0 | 3,059 | |
| 1938 | 507,330 | 5.0 | 2,536 | Epidemics began decline |
| 1937 | 504,818 | 5.0 | 2,522 | War refugee epidemics serious |
| 1936 | 500,316 | 9.0 | 4,502 | War refugee epidemics began |
| 1935 | 495,854 | 9.0 | 4,462 | |
| 1934 | 491,820 | 8.0 | 4,034 | |
| 1933 | 488,887 | 6.0 | 2,933 | |
| 1932 | 486,940 | 4.0 | 1,947 | |
| 1931 | 485,000 | 4.0 | 1,940 | Post-flood poor health conditions<br>Major flood = poor public health |

families being somewhat fictional. This table is presented only as a possibility since there is some need for basic data from which to make even simple comparisons.

## BASIC AGRARIAN POLICY

The abolition of landlordism and the distribution of land to the tenants provided a majority pressure group which could be relied upon for steady support for further steps which would profit them more than other groups. "Poor peasants and hired laborers have always been the motive force of revolt in China. Today, they provide the main drive in the agrarian movement transforming the whole country." [1] Second, third, and fourth stage phases of the agrarian revolution all have moved toward further collectivization; toward land controlled more and more completely by the state; toward larger and larger group organization of primary production in which the individual progressively loses land, equipment, wealth, and freedom to act alternatively. Chinese Communist policy has remained Chinese, utilizing every possible historical analogy to keep the early stages of the revolution within a context familiar to the masses. Departure from classical Marxist theory, and from its Russian practice, has been frequent when an expedient was necessary to win the support of the poorer

[1] Chen Han-seng, "Land Reform Uproots Feudalism," originally published in *China Reconstructs* (May–June, 1952), reprinted and quoted from *China in Transition* (Peking, 1957), pp. 76–84, item from p. 78.



Chinese rural masses. Through the skilful manipulation of the lowest economic groups—first against the highest and then against the middle—the poorer segment of the population has been led to demand more and more changes in their favor, creating the illusion that the whole restructuring of agrarian economy has been by popular demand.

In the early and middle stages, the Communists relied upon the "middle peasants" to provide farming skills, local leadership, group management, and farm production until the lower levels could be trained in the new patterns. The old and strong tradition of local agrarian co-operation within the village community has been fully utilized in developing the whole co-operative structure of agriculture. The rural population has been kept busy at the familiar but useful chores of raising dike levels, planting trees on deforested hills, digging irrigation canals, and developing erosion-preventive works. The government has partly broken with the Chinese tradition of forced labor on public works by paying for all such labor when the laborers are members of co-operatives. However, it continues the old tradition of forced labor by putting dissenting elements through "reform through labor" brainwashing reorientation. An old device of remitting taxes to areas hit by flood or drought has been successfully revived. Efficient use has been made of the technique of dangling a carrot over the donkey's nose. Chinese implementation of this policy has used all the tricks employed in Russia, and new ones are devised regularly. Significantly, the tax burden has been shifted from a direct load upon the rural population to secondary forms of taxation so well arranged that statistics can demonstrate steady decline in taxation of the agricultural sector.

Later and recent moves in agrarian management have amalgamated the smaller co-operatives, infused young and thoroughly indoctrinated city people into rural co-operative groups, consolidated organizational gains, and catered further to non-Chinese populations in the marginal areas of China proper. There seems to be no basic policy change now in progress. However, breathing spells are being provided when the pace seems too great. Then a new set of moves are arranged to appear to spring "spontaneously" out of the countryside, or if pulse-feeling indicates it will be acceptable, the leadership takes a large step in further consolidation.

## CHANGING THE MECHANICS OF AGRICULTURE?

The distribution in 1950 of about 120,000,000 acres of land to about 60,000,000 families—some 40 per cent of the farm area to some 60 per cent of the agrarian population—fractured an already fragmented agrarian economy. This was what the landless had wanted; but when they found that it solved none of their basic problems, they were amenable to further changes previously planned by Communist policy.

The process towards collective work went stage by stage. First there were the mutual-aid teams for seasonal tasks. Then some of these became permanent. Then came the preliminary, semi-socialist form of agricultural co-op, in which members received interest on their landholdings as well as a share of the crop for work done. Finally, in the socialist co-op, or collective farm, the land and bigger farm implements became common property and work done was the sole source of income.[2]

Parallel with this process in densely settled areas, the mechanized farm, the state farm, and the tractor station appeared in increasing numbers in less

[2] Editorial commentary, "Two Revolutions for the Farm," *China in Transition* (Peking, 1957), p. 75.

heavily settled and more suitable areas.

Some new tools, chemical fertilizers, government agricultural loans at relatively low interest, and other pecuniary gains were granted families joining co-operatives, or were increasingly granted the full co-operatives. The growth of the full co-operative wiped out the newly secured leading position of the "middle peasants" and elevated further the relative status of the former lower economic groups. With the gains which could be received from joining the co-operatives, the pragmatic rural population recognized the possible advantages, or accepted the inevitability of the process of collectivization, according to their status; and, during 1956, the full co-operative movement spread much more rapidly than the Communist leadership had expected.

Until industrialization can drain off its proper share of the growing rural population and provide the mechanization of agriculture, the traditional intensive agriculture must continue. The dangling carrot of higher yields in one county is held up for all to emulate. The higher quotas, the mass campaigns on varied themes, and the pushing of urban population surpluses into the countryside all point toward further intensification of existing patterns of agriculture. In 1957 some 30,000,000 people with few modern tools worked at improving and extending the facilities for irrigation. For the second Five-Year Plan, 1958–62,

> Maximum effort will be concentrated on the increase of per-acre yields—for which China's manpower, climatic and other conditions are very favorable. The main direction for the development of Chinese agriculture is toward greater intensiveness, as in Japan or Western Germany. Extensive methods, like those used in the Soviet Union or the United States, do not in general suit China. . . . The actual nationwide steps being adopted to raise per-acre yields fall into three main categories: water conservancy, increased use of fertilizer, and improvement of farm tools.[3]

The term "water conservancy" as here used is threefold, involving irrigation, flood control, and field drainage.

## THE POPULATION POLICY SHIFTS

Early Chinese Communist theorizing decried all forms of population control as unnecessary for China and a device of decadent capitalism. It is evident that the publication of the 1953 census, in November, 1954—with its data on totals, annual increases, birth rates, and death rates—startled the theoreticians, for since that date the policy has been completely reversed. The upper ranks of the Communist leadership had been quietly using birth-control techniques for several years. More recently the practice has spread increasingly to the urban technical, professional, and skilled labor classes. Gradually it was realized that birth control could be a further weapon against the traditional Chinese family system, could promote social mobility of working groups, and could increase the economic productivity of the female population.

Policy implementation began slowly and carefully in 1955 with public statements on the need for family planning and related subjects. These increased during 1956, and in 1957 the popular educational program began. Public health posters advocating birth control now fully illustrate techniques, leave nothing to the imagination, and prepare the public for the future all-out campaign.[4] In May 1957, the Ministry of Public Health revised its regulations on abortion and sterilization as a final step to legitimize all forms of birth control.

The new policy derives part of its stimulus from the increasingly effective public health program which now is lowering death rates. It will be some years before the full run of modern medical facilities are available to the whole population; but epidemic control is within reach at the present time, and death rates are falling. Both the public health factor and the birth control policy make prediction of future population growth extremely difficult.

While population control now appears to be an integral part of Chinese Communist economic policy, it is also evident that no simple solution to the problem of too many people is immediately in sight. Attempted regulation of the abstraction labeled the "birth rate" necessarily requires practical interference with a network of human relations and responses, both personal and social. While the Communists recognize that overpopulation is a major problem, they still confront the fact that the pressure of population growth cannot realistically be solved by official fiat alone. To date, success in this sphere has been modest.

## THE BALANCE AND THE FUTURE

Almost all Chinese Communist data for the years since 1949 show improvement in agricultural production because during 1949 the Chinese economy was almost at a standstill. To demonstrate progress, total yields after 1949 are compared with those of some pre-Communist "peak year," often 1934, 1935, or 1936. Total yields in 1956 should have been much greater than total yields in any of the "peak years" because there were more acres in farms and more farmers to work them. This simple comparison only makes it clear that such a capable agricultural people as the Chinese can still carry on their careful, intensive, and productive agriculture under the Communists, and it does not support the wishful hope that the Chinese agrarian economy will soon collapse because of any changes that have been made by the Communists in its organizational structure. The assessment of nonstatistical descriptive reporting is more difficult.

No government of China has yet been able to control the Gods of Weather. Communist planning cannot really claim all the credit for two years of good agricultural weather and bountiful harvests that caused yields to exceed quotas (1952 and 1955), though it can properly claim credit during two years of quite poor weather (1954 and 1956) during which the resulting floods and droughts probably brought less human misery than that which accompanied such visitations during the last century.

By 1956 the best pre-Communist per acre yields had not been equaled for the major crops, though these yields were better than those of 1949 and 1950.[5] Constant turnover in labor on farms has the same output reducing effect as does heavy turnover in industry. The fact that the lower per acre yields continue may indicate, also, that the total averages still are reduced by the low returns derived from current expansion of cropping onto lands of marginal quality and onto frontier lands not yet fully developed. Hence, it may be expected that improvement in per acre yields will continue.

There is little direct evidence on per capita output on Chinese agriculture.

[3] S. Hua, "Agriculture Will Have a New Look," *China Reconstructs*, Vol. 7 (February 1958), pp. 2–5, items from page 3.

[4] Editorial comment in *Eastern Economist*, Vol. 30 (January 3, 1958), p. 38, and E. S. Kirby, "China's Population Problem," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol. 24 (April 24, 1958), pp. 513–17.

[5] "Peak year" yields and the 1955 "good year" yields were as follows, in pounds per acre: Rice 2,971 vs 2,387, wheat 1,022 vs 766, soy beans 848 vs 711, peanuts 1,606 vs 1,151, tubers 5,211 vs 1,677 (grain equivalent), rapeseed 848 vs 370, cotton 205 vs 234. The latter, along with sugar cane, both important minor crops, are the only ones to show per acre increases.

From indirect evidence, such as the continued Communist complaint over poor farming techniques, it is very unlikely that the per capita output of strictly farm labor has improved so far, despite the issue of tools. Current reports emphasize marked increases in total yields, and it seems probable that the greater total returns are almost entirely derived from the added crop acreage and from the added volume of rural labor now present. Providing rural stability, decreased labor turnover, and the attainment of a real degree of mechanization, the per capita output should rise. This development, however, is something for a future decade, and truly higher per capita incomes must also wait.

The agricultural landscape is being enlarged, both in the long and densely settled areas and on the margins, though many mistakes still occur.[6] On the dry margins of the northwest, there at last seems operative an effective program of river control which can permanently extend the agricultural frontier through water conservation and irrigation for a good many years before it reaches maximum development. Enlargement of the cultivated area in some densely settled areas was a one-time expansion which cannot be repeated until true mechanized cultivation can occur. True long-term water conservation through integrated flood control dam systems can expand flood plain farmland and reduce the almost annual flood losses on a considerable acreage. Further elevation of flood plain dikes in some areas can keep ahead of river-bed sedimentation and rising river levels for some decades. Expansion in some areas of marginal quality can still go on as an expedient to be afforded so long as there is an oversupply of farm labor. With proper experiment and long-term planning, both expansion and improvement of agriculture can go on in many upland areas. These measures of farmland expansion all require some degree of government assistance which the present government is thoroughly prepared to finance and supervise. Such expansion is actually taking place at present through the addition of acreages running close to 2,000,000 acres per year.

Enlargement of crop yields through such measures as extension of irrigation facilities on existing farmlands, substitution of higher yielding crops for existing crops on such lands as are irrigated, large field operation, better planting techniques, co-ordinated labor supply at peak periods, and the supply of even the simplest of tools and animal draft power in adequate amounts can be a continuing factor for some years before a saturation point is reached in any element.

Modern plant breeding and the regional perfection of agricultural ecology have not made much progress in China. Nor has the control over insect, bird or animal pests, or over epidemic diseases among crops and livestock developed real efficiency. Though the Chinese farmer has been the world's most skilled user of fertilizers in the past, the supplies have not equaled the need for at least a century. Communist programs in plant breeding and in pest and disease control are just beginning to show results which are not yet well reflected in the available data on crop yields. The northward movement of rice double-cropping; the appearance of longer staple, higher quality cotton; the decline of rinderpest and anthrax among cattle and water buffalo; and the growing distribution of cheap chemical fertilizers are but samples of a growing trend. No Chinese government in recent centuries has had either the power or the program to carry through improvements in the above aspects of agriculture whereas the present regime has both the power and the program.

[6] The total cultivated farm land "perhaps" was not far from 250,000,000 acres in 1936, was reported at 241,900,000 acres in 1949, and at 275,390,000 acres in 1955. The total crop acreage in 1936 was not far from 325,000,000, whereas in 1955 it was reported at 377,705,000. The food crop return in 1936 is thought to have been in the vicinity of 150,000,000 metric tons, and that of 1956 was reported at 194,400,000 metric tons.



### *Long-term investments in agriculture*

Government is now putting an increasing capital investment into long-term agricultural development projects. Major programs for flood control, irrigation, mechanization, fertilizer production, farmland expansion, crop improvement, and agricultural management exceed any investment in agriculture since the expansion under the Manchus in the last half of the seventeenth century. Since much of this is long-term planning, its effects do not yet show up clearly. Many parts of agricultural investment to date such as cheap loans to farmers and co-operatives, payment for large volumes of labor in low per capita output public works projects, price rigging on state purchases of farm produce for urban consumption and export, and lower agricultural taxation are really subsidies to the rural population to maintain their minimum levels of living pending the real improvement hoped for through the true capital investment in long-term projects. It is from the subsidy measures that most improvements in levels of living have resulted so far.

Now that virtually the whole of the farming population belongs to full co-operatives, farmers find themselves landless wage earners on government farms.[7] The concession to traditional feelings bestows the privilege of the private holding of a farm home, a few hand tools, a garden patch, a few pigs and chickens, and other minor appurtenances of economic value. An individual or a family now can derive its basic income only by working for the co-operative—either on the farm or at auxiliary employment arranged by the co-operative—each full day's labor counting so many "work points" toward the annual settlement total. The co-operative's taxes, investment capital, reserves, nonlabor operating costs, and other items are withdrawn from the yield prior to the annual settlement with members. A "work point" at settlement time is paid at an annually fixed rate, partly in produce and partly in cash. If a family works but little, few "work points" pile up in the ledger, and its annual income is small. Continuous work by all family members is the only way to a larger income. The greater the efficiency of the co-operative, the greater its member annual incomes may be; the greater the compliance and conformity of members to the guiding policy of the state, the more favored treatment results. Rural families have now become "wage point slaves" whose acceptance of Communist leadership is more surely guaranteed.

Comparison of numerical figure income achieves little, for the arbitrary work point, price, and monetary structure of Communist China do not convert in meaningful terms. A leveling process has spread the agricultural return to all rural groups in a way which increases the level of living of the majority, the former lower economic segment. Agricultural returns now are increasing faster than population, and per capita availability of basic foods seems slightly greater than during pre-Communist times. All the indices of agrarian economy point upward, even though the annual rises are slight.[8]

[7] Approximately 118,000,000 of the 122,000,000 farm households operative in 1957 were co-affiliated with one of the several forms of co-operative, by far the great majority of whom belonged to the 752,000 full co-operatives.

[8] On a 1936 index of agricultural production, 1936 being 100, 1949 was 76, 1950 was 86,

Communist planning, policy, and administration look well ahead, are flexible, and are sensitive to rural feeling. Protest and dissatisfaction are not ignored, but expedient mechanisms are devised to allay restive feelings and alter practices sufficiently to maintain the support of the rural masses.

The Communist party has won complete control of rural China. In the welter of claim and counterclaim about the changing countryside, two basic trends emerge. First, Chinese agriculture—despite mistakes, considerable rural distress, and continuing inefficiency—is able to feed the population better than it has been fed in the past. Second, agricultural production appears to be gaining headway over population increase. While little real improvement in rural living standards has appeared, the huge mass of poor peasants, which form the majority of rural Chinese, are, relatively speaking, better off than formerly.

Agriculture still forms the basis of the entire economy of mainland China. The Communist leaders at Peking require control of the maximum portion of agricultural output for general national development programs, while at the same time the Chinese peasant requires sufficient incentives to spur him to maintain and possibly to increase production. To the extent that Peking is able to sustain a realistic balance between the goals of the party and those of the peasant, it can view the future with confidence.

1951 was 93, 1952 was 113, and 1957 had climbed to 142. Taking the 1936 population at 100 as par (from the possible table given earlier), the population index for 1957 stood at 127. There are inefficiencies in this sort of crude comparison, but they are no greater than attend any other statistical comparison of China at various dates.

# China's Industrial Growth, 1953—1957*

By RONALD HSIA

ABSTRACT: Official data indicate a pattern of rapid industrial growth in Communist China during the First Five-Year Plan (1953–57). This growth varied considerably from year to year, largely because of industry's substantial dependence upon agriculture and because of uneven performance in the agricultural sector of the economy. The composition of mainland China's industrial output also changed significantly during this period. The nation's resources were primarily concentrated on development of heavy industry, and the annual rate of growth of production of capital goods was thus consistently above that of consumer goods. The tempo of industrial expansion should increase further during the Second Five-Year Plan (1958–62) as the regime continues maximum mobilization of material, financial, and human resources. New policy changes—including more attention to industries serving the agricultural sector, emphasis on smaller industrial units, and decentralization of industrial planning and administration—will affect future development. By 1962 the economy of mainland China should have completed the period of rapid industrial expansion known as the take-off and entered a new stage of sustained, self-generating growth.

*Ronald Hsia, Ph.D., Hong Kong, is Lecturer in Economics, University of Hong Kong, and Consultant, the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. He was formerly Research Associate, Committee on International and Regional Studies, Harvard University and the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the author of Price Control in Communist China (1953), Economic Planning in Communist China (1955), and various articles in professional journals.*

* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the Asia Foundation for enabling him to undertake a portion of the research for this paper.

AVAILABLE evidence indicates that the economy of mainland China has entered the relatively brief period of drastic and decisive transformation known as the take-off. After the take-off period, during which the single most striking phenomenon is the high rate of industrial expansion, economic growth tends to become a self-generating process.[1] This article is intended to describe and analyze this process in Communist China. Our concern is not only with the rate of industrial growth but also with changes in the composition of output. Throughout the paper the term "industry," unless otherwise specified, refers only to modern industry including, however, handicraft workshops.

## COMMENTS ON DATA

Quantitative data used here are either obtained or derived from official Chinese Communist statistics, the accuracy of which cannot be ascertained with precision. Data obtained from official or semiofficial publications are frequently incomplete, ambiguous, or inconsistent. Employment statistics may be cited as an example of incompleteness and ambiguity because of the lack of clearly defined identity for data presented. Inconsistency is also prevalent and may be found even in statistics released by the State Statistical Bureau and the National Economic Commission.[2]

Particularly pertinent to this study are official value output data given in "constant 1952 prices." The rate of industrial growth derived from such data tends to carry some upward bias, attributable mainly to the changing industrial structure and the concomitant policy and practice of pricing new products.[3] Unless on an annual basis the proportion of the value of new products to the total industrial value output assumes a constant ratio, statistical bias is unavoidable. Since the usual practice in a planned economy is to set the prices of new products unduly high and since the tendency in a developing economy is for the ratio of new products to total industrial output to increase through time, an upward bias would normally be the case. The lack of data on this ratio, unfortunately, rules out the feasibility of adjustment. Thus, in using official annual value output figures to derive the rate of growth, we are forced to assume a constant ratio of the value of new products to the total industrial value output for each of the years covered.

The official value statistics for industrial output are given in gross value rather than value-added. While the latter represents solely the value created by manufacturing processes, the former includes also the value of raw materials and intermediate products consumed in the production process. Thus changes in gross value may be brought about by variations in the combination of input factors. In addition, the use of gross value tends to exaggerate the rate of industrial growth if there is a splitting of producing units. If, on the other hand, an amalgamation process is going on, the rate of growth tends to be lower in terms of gross value than in terms of net value. This, as we shall see, was the case in mainland China during 1953–56 when the amalgamation of private firms into joint public-private enterprises was in progress.[4] This is understandably a short-run phenomenon. With the virtual disappearance of the private sector of the economy at the completion of the First Five-Year Plan and with the increase in the roundabout nature of the production process as a natural outcome of industrial development, the continued use of the gross value concept in Communist statistics will probably tend to reverse the trend noted in the relative behavior of the gross and net value output during 1953–56.

## GROSS INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT

In the period covered by the First Five-Year Plan, mainland China's gross industrial value output expressed in "constant 1952 prices" increased 132.4 per cent.[4a] The average annual rate of increase is calculated to be 18.4 per cent.[5] Although this rate of growth is considerably lower than that achieved by the Soviet economy during its First Five-Year Plan period,[6] it nevertheless marks a period of very rapid industrial growth in the economic history of China.

The rate of increase in industrial output during the quinquennium showed considerable variation from year to year. In 1953 and 1956, the increase was over 31 per cent; in 1955 and 1957, it was below 8 per cent. Data on the annual rate of growth are presented in Table 1 along with industrial value output figures. This wide variation in the

TABLE 1—GROSS INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT IN MAINLAND CHINA, 1953–57

(In million yüan new JMP at 1952 prices)

| YEAR | GROSS VALUE OUTPUT[a] | INCREASE OVER PRECEDING YEAR (per cent) |
|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) |
| 1953 | 35,577 | 31.7[b] |
| 1954 | 41,513 | 16.7 |
| 1955 | 44,748 | 7.8 |
| 1956 | 58,660 | 31.1 |
| 1957 | 62,810[c] | 7.0 |
| 1953–57 | 243,308 | 132.4[d] |

[a] Including the output of handicraft workshops, but excluding that of cooperative and individual handicrafts. [b] The 1952 output amounted to 27,014 million yüan new JMP. [c] Preliminary. [d] Increase over 1952.

Sources: *1955 Kung-pao*, p. 20; *Ta Kung Pao*, Peking, August 2, 1957; *Hsin-hua pan-yüeh-k'an* (New China Semi-monthly), Peking, March 10, 1958, p. 13.

[1] Cf. W. W. Rostow, "The Take-off into Sustained Growth," *The Economic Journal*, Vol. 66 (March 1956), pp. 25–48. Present indications are that the take-off period of the Chinese economy will probably be of shorter duration than that which Professor Rostow specifies for the advanced economies. This point will be discussed in the author's forthcoming monograph on "China's Industrial Development under Communist Planning."

[2] To illustrate the inconsistency in Communist statistics, we need cite only one instance. The increase in industrial labor productivity during 1956 was reported on July 1, 1957, by the National Economic Commission to be 26 per cent. Exactly one month later, it was reported by the State Statistical Bureau to be 18 per cent. *Ta Kung Pao*, Peking, July 2 and August 2, 1957.

[3] Strictly speaking, it is impossible to express any new products appearing in subsequent years in terms of constant 1952 prices as there were no such products in that year. New products can only be "priced in" to the value aggregates for the years in which they appear.

[4] The number of industrial enterprises decreased from 167,403 in 1952 to 125,474 in 1955. Cf. State Statistical Bureau, *Kuan-yü i-chiu-wu-wu nien-tu kuo-min ching-chi chi-hua chih-hsing chieh-kuo ti kung-pao* (Communiqué on the results of implementing the plan for the development of the national economy in 1955), Peking, 1956, p. 23. Hereafter referred to as *1955 Kung-pao*.

[4a] The increase in gross industrial value output during the first plan quinquennium when adjusted to population changes becomes much more modest. On a per capita basis it came to 108.2 per cent. The computation of this percentage is based on the official 1952 mid-year population figure given in *T'ung-chi kung-tso* (Statistical Work), Peking, semi-monthly, June 14, 1957, p. 25 and our estimated 1957 mid-year population extrapolated from official figures for 1952–56 given in the same source.

[5] Computed by the formula $y = xr^5$, where $y$ represents the 1957 value output, $x$ the 1952 output, and $r$ the average annual rate of growth. For the output figures used, see Table 1.

[6] According to Soviet official statistics which are also based on gross value output expressed in constant 1927/28 prices, the annual average rate of industrial growth during 1927/28–1932 amounted to nearly 24 per cent. Cf. I. A. Ioffe, *SSSR i kapitalisticheskie strany*. Moscow, 1939, p. 127.

annual rate of industrial growth may be attributed basically to agricultural production.[7] The causal relationship is based on the preponderant dependence of the industrial sector on the agricultural sector for the supply of raw materials. During 1953–56, 51.7 per cent of the gross industrial value output came from industries using raw materials from the agricultural sector. If 1956 alone is considered, the dependence was reduced only slightly.[8] This substantial direct dependence of industry on agriculture was increased by two indirect factors. First, China's need to import heavy equipment and certain basic materials for her industrial expansion had to be met chiefly by the export of agricultural commodities.[9] Second, the scale of industrial investment was, to a fairly large extent, determined by the performance of the agricultural sector in the preceding year inasmuch as agricultural surplus has constituted a major source of investment resources in the Chinese economy. Consequently, industries not depending on agriculture for raw materials would also feel these indirect effects. Thus the good harvests of 1952 and 1955 were followed by high rates of industrial growth in 1953 and 1956, while the poor harvests of 1954 and 1956, among other factors, resulted in much lower rates of industrial growth in 1955 and 1957.[10]

## NET INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT

Net value output may be estimated on the basis of official statistics on (1) the net national product (NNP),[11] (2) the share of "industrial output"[12] in the NNP, (3) the gross industrial output, and (4) the gross value output of individual and co-operative handicrafts. The fact that official statistics on the share of "industrial output" in the NNP are obtainable only for 1952 and 1956 limits our estimates of net industrial output also to these two years.

Mainland China's NNP has been reported to be 61,130 million yüan new IMP for 1952 and 88,750 million yüan for 1956. The aggregate output of the industrial sector and the individual and co-operative handicraft sector constituted 18.0 per cent of the NNP in 1952 and 26.4 per cent in 1956.[13] The net value output of these two sectors thus amounted to 11,003.4 million yüan in 1952 and 23,430 million yüan in 1956.

To obtain an adjusted figure for net industrial output, it is necessary to determine the ratio of the output of the individual and co-operative handicraft sector to the combined industrial and handicraft output. The lack of specific data forces us to assume the same degree of grossness in the value output of both sectors and to calculate this ratio on the basis of gross output. Data on gross industrial output have already been given in Table 1; the gross output of handicraft co-operatives and individual handicraftsmen has been reported officially to be 7,312 million yüan in 1952 and 11,700 million yüan in 1956.[14] From these data, we derive an output ratio of 213 : 1000 for 1952 and 166 : 1000 for 1956. With these ratios, we can exclude the output of the individual and co-operative handicraft sector from the above-given combined total. Thus adjusted, the net industrial output becomes 8,659.7 million yüan for 1952 and 19,540.6 million yüan for 1956.

The latter figure may be compared with the 1956 net industrial output of 19,567.1 million yüan estimated by Ma Yin-ch'u, the noted economist.[15] As his method of calculation is unknown, we assume that the discrepancy between the two estimates may be attributable either to his use of preliminary data released earlier by the State Statistical Bureau or to different rounding practices. At any rate, the difference is negligible in view of the present state of Chinese Communist statistics. The high correspondence between the estimated 1956 net industrial output made here and that of Ma Yin-ch'u may serve as an indication that the estimate for 1952 is reasonably accurate. The estimates of 1952 and 1956 net industrial output, together with Ma Yin-ch'u's estimate for 1953, are shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2—NET INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT IN MAINLAND CHINA, 1952, 1953 AND 1956

(In million yüan new JMP at 1952 prices)

| YEAR | NET VALUE OUTPUT[a] | RATIO OF NET TO GROSS OUTPUT[b] (per cent) |
|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) |
| 1952..... | 8,659.7[c] | 29.8 |
| 1953..... | 11,572.3[d] | 32.5 |
| 1956..... | 19,540.6[c] | 33.2 |

[a] Including the output of handicraft workshops, but excluding that of other handicrafts. [b] Calculated from data given in Column 1 of this table and Column 1 of Table 1. [c] Estimated by the author on the basis of official statistics. [d] Estimated by Ma Yin-ch'u in his article "Hsin jen-k'ou lun" (A new theory of population), *Jen-min jih-pao*, July 5, 1957.

On the basis of our estimates for 1952 and 1956, mainland China's net industrial output increased 124.8 per cent during the four years. This aggregate increase yields a cumulative rate of growth of 22.5 per cent per year. The exclusion of 1957 because of the lack of data on which to base any estimate for the net output of that year tends to exaggerate the average annual rate of increase, for in 1957 Chinese industry experienced the slowest growth during the first plan quinquennium (see Table 1). For comparative purposes, it is also necessary to shorten the period covering the gross industrial output to exclude 1957. During this four-year period, then, gross industrial output increased 102.2 per cent, or 19.3 per

[7] The annual maturation of capital construction projects in the industrial sector undoubtedly played an important role in determining the annual increases in output. Its importance, however, was minimized by the low rate of capacity utilization in those years in which industrial growth was relatively small. Cf. Ronald Hsia, "Growth Capability of the Chinese Economy as Envisaged in the Proposed Second Five-Year Plan," *Contemporary China*, Vol. 2, Hong Kong (1958), pp. 62–63.

[8] It became 48 per cent. Cf. Niu Chung-huang, *Wo-kuo kuo-min shou-ju ti chi-lei ho hsiao-fei* (Accumulation and consumption in China's national income), Peking, 1957, p. 86; Chi Ch'ung-wei, "Tsen-yang shih wo-kuo kung-yeh keng chün-yün-ti hsiang-ch'ien fa-chan" (How to improve the balance in China's industrial development), *Chi-hua ching-chi* (Planned Economy), monthly, Peking, July 1957, p. 5.

[9] Agricultural produce plus processed agricultural commodities constituted three-fourths of mainland China's exports. *Jen-min jih-pao* (People's Daily), Peking, July 13, 1956.

[10] The heavy dependence on the performance of the agricultural sector was the chief bottleneck in China's industrial development during the 1953–57 period. The Communist planning authorities tried to remedy this situation by increasing agricultural investment and by assigning high priorities to industries serving agriculture. Such measures have been incorporated in the Second Five-Year Plan, at least partly, to enhance the rate of industrial growth.

[11] Unlike the Western practice, the NNP is defined in Communist China to the exclusion of both personal and government services, that is, services not considered as part of production in the Marxist sense. This narrower definition, however, should not have any noticeable effect on the net industrial value output derived from the NNP thus defined.

[12] Including the output of handicraft co-operatives and individual handicraftsmen.

[13] Both NNP figures are given in constant 1952 prices. Niu Chung-huang, *op cit.* (note 8 *supra*), pp. 21, 23.

[14] *1955 Kung-pao*, p. 20; *Jen-min jih-pao*, January 6, 1958.

[15] *Jen-min jih-pao*, July 5, 1957.

cent per annum.[16] The latter figure is to be compared with the average annual increase of 22.5 per cent in net output.

This substantially higher rate of growth in net industrial output may be attributed largely to the low ratio of net to gross output in 1952 (See Column 2 of Table 1) which, in turn, was attributable to (1) the low labor-raw material input ratio and (2) excessive double counting in gross value output. Thus, if we further shorten the period to three years, using 1953 instead of 1952 as the base, the difference in the rate of growth is narrowed considerably. During 1954–56, the average annual rate of increase amounted to 18.1 per cent in terms of gross output and 19.0 per cent in terms of net output.

The higher rate of increase in net value output, as pointed out above, was due chiefly to the reduction of accounting units in connection with the amalgamation of private firms into joint public-private enterprises. It was also due, to some extent, to the gradual rise in the labor-raw material input ratio, attributable to (1) changes in product involving relatively more labor input, (2) economy or waste-reduction in raw material consumption, and (3) uneconomic increases in industrial labor. In addition, it is possible that wage increases affected the value output theoretically expressed in constant prices. Obviously such increases, if permitted to leak through, would boost net value output more than gross value output.

## Relative Growth of Heavy and Light Industry [17]

The principle of concentrating the nation's economic resources on the building of heavy industry was rigidly adhered to in the drafting and execution of the First Five-Year Plan.[18] This adherence was reflected in a substantially higher rate of projected increase, and a still higher rate of actual growth, in capital goods over consumer goods. The Plan envisaged a 126.5 per cent increase for the former and a 79.7 per cent increase for the latter during the quinquennium, both expressed in gross value at 1952 prices.[19] According to preliminary reports from mainland China, however, actual increases amounted to 204.2 per cent for capital goods and 85.1 per cent for consumer goods. The average annual rate of growth thus came to 24.9 per cent for capital goods and 13.2 per cent for consumer goods.

Annual output data from which the above rates of increase have been derived are shown in Table 3, from which some observations may be made. First, as in the case of gross industrial output, the rate of growth in both capital goods and consumer goods showed considerable year-to-year variation. Second, the fluctuations were much more violent with consumer goods production. This phenomenon illustrates the greater effect which the performance of the agricultural sector had on the output of consumer goods. While some 84 per cent of the value output of consumer goods came from industries using raw materials from agriculture,[20] the indirect effects of agricultural output on the scale of industrial investment and on the economy's export capacity were also felt by the consumer goods industries. The exceedingly low rates of increase in the output of consumer goods in 1955 and 1957 (see Column 4 of Table 3) can thus be correlated to the poor harvests of 1954 and 1956 respectively.

Finally, the annual rate of growth of capital goods was consistently above that of consumer goods throughout the period. The divergent rates of growth resulted in a notable change in the composition of China's industry. On the eve of the launching of the First Five-Year Plan, consumer goods were relatively more important than capital goods in terms of their gross value output. At the completion of the Plan, however, the relative importance was reversed. More concretely, the share of capital goods in gross industrial output stood at 39.7 in 1952 but at 51.9 per cent in 1957.

## Changes Affecting Future Industrial Growth

Changes in the policy of the Communist regime concerning China's industrial development were discernible as early as 1956, but wholesale reorientation appeared only with the launching of the Second Five-Year Plan. Policy changes affecting industrial growth in-

[16] Computed on the basis of data given in Table 1.

[17] Heavy and light industries are used in this article synonymously with capital goods and consumer goods industries.

[18] The adherence of the Chinese Communist regime to this pattern of industrial development has stemed from two sets of considerations. Subjectively, the regime is determined to build, within the shortest possible time, an integral industrial system with a high degree of self-sufficiency in basic materials and manufacturing industries, a modern defense industry, and a material and technical basis for large-scale mechanized farming. A few objective considerations may also be given. First, the concentration of the nation's economic resources on the building of heavy industry tends to shorten the duration of the take-off period. In other words, it tends to hasten the attainment of the point where industrial growth becomes a self-sustained process. Second, the development of heavy industry is less hampered by the more or less "unplannable" production of the agricultural sector on which light industry relies heavily. Third, greater advantage can be taken of the availability of Soviet technical aid and the general knowledge of Western industrial know-how by concentration on the development of heavy industry. Fourth, the marketing of heavy industry products poses no serious problem in a planned economy. Cf. Solomon Adler, *The Chinese Economy* (London: Routledge, 1957), pp. 61–63; Ronald Hsia, *Economic Planning in Communist China* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1955), pp. 27, 72.

[19] *Hsin-hua yüeh-pao* (New China Monthly), Peking, September 1955, p. 132.

[20] Niu Chung-huang, *op. cit.* (note 8 *supra*), p. 86.



TABLE 3—GROSS VALUE OUTPUT OF CAPITAL GOODS AND CONSUMER GOODS IN MAINLAND CHINA, 1953–57

(In million yüan new JMP at 1952 prices)

| YEAR | CAPITAL GOODS[a] | | CONSUMER GOODS | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | OUTPUT[b] | INCREASE OVER PRECEDING YEAR (per cent) | OUTPUT[b] | INCREASE OVER PRECEDING YEAR (per cent) |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| 1953 | 14,670 | 36.7[c] | 20,907 | 28.4[d] |
| 1954 | 17,570 | 19.8 | 23,935 | 14.5 |
| 1955 | 20,578 | 17.0 | 24,170 | 1.0 |
| 1956 | 29,170 | 41.8 | 29,490 | 22.0 |
| 1957 | 32,661[e] | 11.9 | 30,149[e] | 2.2 |
| 1953–57 | 114,649 | 204.2[f] | 128,651 | 85.1[f] |

[a] Same as "means of production" in Communist official statistics. [b] Including the output of handicraft workshops, but excluding that of other handicrafts. [c] The 1952 output amounted to 10,730 million yüan new JMP. [d] The 1952 output amounted to 16,284 million yüan new JMP. [e] Preliminary. [f] Increase over 1952.

Sources: *1955 Kung-pao*, p. 24; *Ta Kung Pao*, Peking, August 2, 1957; *Hsin-hua pan-yüeh-k'an*, Peking, March 10, 1958, p. 13; *1958 Jen-min shou-ts'e* (People's Handbook), Peking, 1958, p. 460.

clude (1) increased attention to industries serving the agricultural sector, (2) emphasis on small and medium-sized industrial units, (3) decentralization of industrial planning and administration, (4) greater emphasis on existing plant facilities in the coastal areas, (5) modernization of handicrafts, (6) promotion of native methods in mining and metallurgy, and (7) a new theory of "balanced" growth.

Although all these changes were aimed at heightening the tempo of industrial development, the relationship is more apparent in some cases than in others. For instance, the greater emphasis on industries serving agriculture is intended, through raising the level of agricultural output, to eliminate the bottleneck of raw materials supply and to widen the agricultural surplus for making possible a higher rate of industrial growth.

Also, the new concept of "balanced" growth needs some explanation. According to this theoretical formula, any balance is temporary and conditional, relative rather than absolute. To achieve this temporary balance between the various sectors of the economy, the advanced sectors should not be pulled back; instead the sectors lagging behind should be pushed ahead to catch up with them. Thus a new balance is achieved on a higher physical level. Reference may be made to the holding back of the machine-building industry in 1956–57 owing to the relatively slow development in certain types of steel; 20 per cent of the capacity of the plants under the First Ministry of Machine-building was not utilized during 1957.[21] According to the new theory the steel industry should catch up with the machine-building industry rather than the other way round. Thus attention is now to be focused on the lagging sectors of the economy.

[21] *Chi-hua ching-chi*, September 1957, p. 14.

The decentralization of industrial planning and administration should be viewed in conjunction with the emphasis on small and medium-sized plants, the modernization of handicrafts, and the promotion of native mining and processing methods. Without decentralization, the latter changes are almost certain to result in administrative inefficiency, waste, and confusion. The basic aim of these changes is to attain full mobilization of local financial, material, and human resources throughout the country for industrial development and to enable the central government to concentrate its investment resources on large-scale projects of key importance to the entire economy. This program tends to enhance industrial expansion; while at the same time it also has the economic advantage of meeting rural needs for consumer goods and simple farming implements and fertilizers locally.

In addition, the building of small or medium-sized plants in numerous localities can yield quick results with a relatively small amount of investment per industrial unit.[22] The First Five-Year Plan was focused on large-scale industrial units run by the central government ministries to the neglect of local industry. This overemphasis is to be corrected in the Second Five-Year Plan. At the same time, the industrial capacity and transport facilities [23] developed during the first plan quinquennium facilitate the building of local industry. For example, the fact that Chinese industry can now produce complete sets of thermo- and hydro-electric power-generating equipment makes possible the

[22] Economy in investment is expected to result from the use of locally available material and labor, and of standard designs drawn by central industrial ministries.

[23] 8,500 kilometers of railways and over 70,000 kilometers of highways were built during 1953-57. *Hsin-hua pan-yüeh-k'an*, January 10, 1958, p. 14.



construction of numerous local power stations. Also, the 260 per cent increase in technical personnel in industry [24] during the first plan period makes it possible for the central industrial ministries to provide technical assistance needed for the development of local industries.

All these changes will probably enhance industrial growth in the period of the Second Five-Year Plan. Recent reports from Communist China on the new industrial upsurge should, however, be examined in the light of the fact that 1957 had the lowest rate of growth in industrial output during the first plan quinquennium, and the fact that the target for 1958 industrial output was set at a relatively moderate figure of 14.6 per cent over 1957. Thus the reported overfulfillment of the production plan for the first quarter of 1958 and the reported industrial output during the first half of 1958 at 34 per cent higher and that for April, May and June respectively at 42, 46 and 55 per cent higher than the level achieved in the corresponding periods of 1957 [25] are not spectacular. The steadily increasing excess is, however, noteworthy.

A significant part of the program to increase local industrial production began in May 1958, with the launching of a new campaign known as the "technical revolution." While the long-range objective of this drive is to provide the economy of mainland China with the technological basis for modern, large-scale production, its immediate aim is the speedy modernization of handicrafts and the promotion of improved native methods in mining and manufacture. The progress of this movement, together with the expansion of local industries,[26] should definitely increase China's industrial growth capability within the second plan quinquennium.[27]

In addition, most of the remaining 109 out of the 156 major capital construction projects to be built with Soviet aid will be finished during the 1958–62 period.[28] The completion of these proj-

[24] *Peking Review*, weekly, Peking, March 25, 1958, p. 7.

[25] *Jen-min jih-pao*, August 3, 1958.

[26] It is reported that some 520,000 small and medium industrial units were built in China during January–May 1958. *Hung-ch'i* (Red Flag), semimonthly, Peking, July 1, 1958, p. 19.

[27] During its enlarged session held in the latter part of August 1958, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party reset the 1958 target for steel output at 10.7 million tons. According to the annual economic plan for 1958 adopted by the fifth session of the First National People's Congress in February 1958, the steel target was 6,248,000 tons. At the end of the first quarter it was revised upward to 7 million tons by the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry. Since this amount included only the output of the plants under the jurisdiction of the Ministry, we may deduce that the additional 3.7 million tons of steel are to be contributed by local industry. Although the output of the latter is quantitatively impressive, its quality is subject to serious question. The low-quality steel produced by local industry is valuable only in so far as it can release the higher quality steel for more important production purposes. From a long-range point of view, the local small and medium-sized steel plants are of more value in preparing a skilled labor force for future expansion of China's steel industry "proper." *Hsin-hua pan-yüeh-k'an*, March 10, 1958, p. 18; *Peking Review*, April 29, 1958, p. 11; *Jen-min jih-pao*, September 1 and October 1, 1958.

A similar trend boosting output is detectable in most other industries, as revealed in the revised 1958 targets given in the Appendix to this article.

[28] According to Li Fu-ch'un, 57 of the 156 projects were to be completed by the end of 1957. However, the report on the implementation of the 1958 plan during the first quarter reveals that "during 1958 work will begin, or continue, on 109 out of China's 156 major, backbone capital construction projects." Evidently, 10 of the 57 projects mentioned by Li Fu-ch'un were not completed as scheduled. No reports are obtainable on the progress of the additional 55 Soviet aid proj-

ects, especially if accompanied by improved performance in the agricultural sector, will further strengthen mainland China's industrial structure. By then the Chinese economy will have concluded its take-off and entered a new period of sustained growth.

ects arranged in April 1956. *Hsin-hua pan-yüeh-k'an*, January 10, 1958; *Peking Review*, April 29, 1958, p. 10.

## APPENDIX

GROWTH OF SELECTED INDUSTRIES IN MAINLAND CHINA, 1953–57

| INDUSTRY | UNIT | 1953 | | 1954 | | 1955 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | OUTPUT QUANTITY | INCREASE OVER PRECEDING YEAR (per cent) | OUTPUT QUANTITY | INCREASE OVER PRECEDING YEAR (per cent) | OUTPUT QUANTITY | INCREASE OVER PRECEDING YEAR (per cent) |
| Electric power | million KWH | 9,195 | 26.6 | 11,001 | 19.6 | 12,278 | 11.6 |
| Coal | thousand metric tons | 66,572 | 4.8 | 79,928 | 20.1 | 93,604 | 17.1 |
| Crude petroleum | thousand metric tons | 622 | 42.9 | 789 | 26.8 | 966 | 22.5 |
| Pig iron | thousand metric tons | 2,175 | 14.5 | 2,962 | 36.2 | 3,630 | 22.6 |
| Steel | thousand metric tons | 1,774 | 31.5 | 2,225 | 25.4 | 2,853 | 28.3 |
| Machine tools | number | 20,502 | 49.3 | 15,901 | −22.4 | 13,708 | −13.8 |
| Caustic soda (100% pure) | metric tons | 89,609 | 13.0 | 116,492 | 30.0 | [b] | — |
| Soda ash | metric tons | 222,720 | 16.0 | 309,580 | 39.0 | 405,000 | 30.8 |
| Ammonium sulphate | thousand metric tons | 226 | 24.5 | 298 | 32.0 | 324 | 8.8 |
| Cement | thousand metric tons | 3,877 | 35.5 | 4,600 | 18.6 | 4,503 | − 2.1 |
| Timber | thousand cubic metres | 16,700 | 67.0 | 21,042 | 26.0 | [b] | — |
| Cotton yarn | thousand bales | 4,104 | 13.4 | 4,598 | 12.0 | 3,968 | −13.7 |
| Cotton piece-goods | thousand bolts | 107,794 | 20.7 | 122,331 | 13.5 | 103,220 | −15.6 |
| Sugar | thousand metric tons | 298 | 19.6 | 347 | 16.5 | 410 | 18.2 |
| Paper, machine made | thousand metric tons | 427 | 14.9 | 556 | 30.2 | 589 | 5.9 |

| INDUSTRY | UNIT | 1956 | | 1957[a] | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | OUTPUT QUANTITY | INCREASE OVER PRECEDING YEAR (per cent) | OUTPUT QUANTITY | INCREASE OVER PRECEDING YEAR (per cent) | INCREASE OVER 1952 (per cent) |
| Electric power | million KWH | 16,590 | 35.1 | 19,340 | 16.6 | 166.4 |
| Coal | thousand metric tons | 105,922 | 13.2 | 130,730 | 23.4 | 105.8 |
| Crude petroleum | thousand metric tons | 1,163 | 20.3 | 1,458 | 25.4 | 234.4 |
| Pig iron | thousand metric tons | 4,777 | 31.6 | 5,940 | 24.3 | 212.6 |
| Steel | thousand metric tons | 4,465 | 56.5 | 5,350 | 19.8 | 296.6 |
| Machine tools | number | 26,000 | 89.7 | 37,192 | 43.0 | 170.8 |
| Caustic soda (100% pure) | metric tons | 156,415 | — | 178,000[c] | 13.8 | 94.0 |
| Soda ash | metric tons | [b] | — | 476,000[c] | — | 148.0 |
| Ammonium sulphate | thousand metric tons | 442 | 36.4 | 499[c] | 13.0 | 175.7 |
| Cement | thousand metric tons | 6,393 | 42.0 | 6,683 | 4.5 | 133.6 |
| Timber | thousand cubic metres | 25,000 | — | 29,000 | 16.0 | 190.0 |
| Cotton yarn | thousand bales | 5,246 | 32.2 | 4,650 | −11.4 | 28.5 |
| Cotton piece-goods | thousand bolts | 138,000 | 33.7 | 136,702 | − 0.9 | 53.1 |
| Sugar | thousand metric tons | 518 | 26.3 | 864 | 66.8 | 247.0 |
| Paper, machine made | thousand metric tons | 746 | 26.7 | 910 | 22.0 | 144.6 |

[a] Preliminary. [b] Not available. [c] Planned output.

Sources: *Ta Kung Pao*, Peking, July 2, 1957 and April 12, 1958; *Jen-min jih-pao*, October 1, 1958; *Hsin-hua pan-yüeh-k'an*, January 10, 1958, p. 14 and March 10, 1958, p. 13; State Statistical Bureau, *Kuan-yü i-chiu-wu-san nien-tu kuo-min ching-chi fa-chan ho kuo-chia chi-hua chih-hsing chieh-kuo ti kung pao* (Communiqué on the development of the national economy and the results of implementing the state plan during 1953), Peking, 1954, p. 4; *1954 kung-pao*, p. 4; *1955 kung-pao*, pp. 2, 26–27; and other sources.



REVISED OUTPUT TARGETS FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES, 1958

| INDUSTRY | UNIT | PLANNED OUTPUT | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | QUANTITY | INCREASE OVER 1957 (per cent) |
| Electric power | million KWH | 27,500 | 42 |
| Coal | thousand metric tons | 210,000 | 61 |
| Crude petroleum | thousand metric tons | 2,100 | 44 |
| Pig iron | thousand metric tons | 16,900[a] | 185 |
| Steel | thousand metric tons | 10,700[b] | 100 |
| Machine tools | number | 80,000 | 115 |
| Chemical fertilizers | thousand metric tons | 1,102[c] | — |
| Cement | thousand metric tons | 7,650 | 14 |
| Timber | million cubic meters | 32 | 10 |
| Cotton yarn | thousand bales | 6,320 | 36 |
| Cotton piece-goods | thousand bolts | 172,244 | 26 |
| Sugar | thousand metric tons | 1,300 | 50 |
| Paper | thousand metric tons | 1,800 | — |

[a] Including the output of native iron smelting furnaces. [b] Including the output of native converters. [c] Including 906 thousand tons of nitrogenous fertilizers (calculated in terms of ammonium sulphate) and 196 thousand tons of phosphate fertilizers.

Sources: *Jen-min jih-pao*, January 30, February 4, September 13 and October 1, 1958; *NCNA*, Peking, February 1, 1958; *Ta Kung Pao*, Peking, July 2, 1957; and other sources.

# The Thought Reform of Intellectuals

By Theodore Hsi-en Chen

Abstract: The Chinese Communists need the services of the Chinese intellectuals and yet distrust them as products of bourgeois society. Since 1949, the regime has adopted various measures to reform the intellectuals to make them acceptable and useful to the new Communist society. At first, comparatively mild forms of "study" and political indoctrination were used. Later, the intellectuals were asked to take part in various "revolutionary movements" and in "class struggle" in both countryside and city. By 1951 the pressure was intensified, and the intellectuals were organized to practice criticism and self-criticism and to make public confessions of past errors. Then, in an attempt to curb deviant ideas not compatible with Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology, the Communists launched successive campaigns against bourgeois and other "unproletarian" thinking. A new trend in the treatment of the intellectuals seemed to be appearing in 1956, when the intellectuals were offered new privileges, even a measure of freedom of thought. However, when the intellectuals took advantage of the liberalization and frankly expressed their criticism of the Communist program, they were branded as "rightists" and attacked again. Since 1957 there has been a further tightening of ideological controls on the mainland.

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*Theodore Hsi-en Chen, Ph.D., Los Angeles, California, is Professor of Asiatic Studi and Head of the Department of Asiatic Studies at the University of Southern Californ He served for a number of years as the Dean of the Faculty of Fukien Christian U versity in China and in 1946 returned to that university to serve as its Acting Preside for one year. In 1954, he went to Formosa to help establish Tunghai University und the auspices of the United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia. Among h publications are Developing Patterns of the College Curriculum in the U. S. (1940 Chinese Communism and the Proletarian-Socialist Revolution (1955), and many articl in journals such as Current History, Far Eastern Survey, Soviet Survey, American Journ of Sociology, Educational Record, and others.*





THE "problem of the intellectuals" has been one of the major issues confronting the Chinese Communists since their accession to power on the mainland. During the past decade, the attitude of the Peking regime toward the Chinese intellectuals has embraced two related dimensions: the urgent need to utilize their services and the continuing distrust of their ultimate loyalties.

The Communists, on the one hand, require the support of the intellectuals both because of their traditional importance as teachers and moulders of public opinion and because of their present importance in relation to the ambitious plans for industrialization and national development. On the other hand, they are basically distrustful of the "old-time intellectuals" whom they view as the misguided products of bourgeois society. The Chinese Communists have repeatedly declared that their long-term goal is to develop a new generation of "proletarian intelligentsia" firmly grounded in the ideas of Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung. For the present, however, the older intellectuals must be used, while at the same time they must be vigilantly watched and firmly constrained to reorient their thinking in officially approved channels.

This double-barreled policy of "absorbing" and "reforming" the intellectuals has been clearly defined in official Communist party statements for many years.[1] Even when confined to their Yenan base during the Japanese war, the Communists established a special university for the express purpose of re-educating intellectuals who had come to join them in the hinterland. After they came to power in 1949, the "thought reform" effort became a task of national scope and significance.

[1] See, for example, the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Absorption of Intellectual Elements," December 1, 1939, translated in C. Brandt and others, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 349–51.

## The "Study" Campaign

The Communists at once initiated a "study" (*hsüeh-hsi*) campaign to enlist the entire population in a program of political indoctrination. In the universities, they organized both students and faculties to study Marxist-Leninist theory and "the thought of Mao Tse-tung." One of the most important subjects for study was the class struggle. At home, this meant a call to the intellectuals to join a "bitter class war" against the landlords, the feudal elements, and other "class enemies" of the proletariat. Abroad, it meant a recognition of "imperialist America" as a mortal enemy and an appreciation of the Soviet Union as Communist China's best friend and teacher.

The Communist program for the "ideological remoulding" of the intellectuals was not only confined to theoretical "study"; it also demanded active participation in the campaigns through which Peking extended its controls through all levels of Chinese society. During the land reform movement beginning in 1950, the intellectuals were sent to the villages not only to acquire first-hand experience in the countryside but also to take an active role in the struggle against the landlords. Class consciousness was to be further developed by their participation in other political programs and campaigns—such as anti-American drives and the activities of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association—designed to convert the intellectuals to the new ideology.

## Tightening the Vise

In 1951 the Communists turned from milder forms of "study" to more coercive methods of thought reform. The outbreak of the Korean War and the campaign for the suppression of "counter-

revolutionaries" gave the government new opportunities to identify and eradicate centers of active opposition and to demand more complete compliance on the part of the entire population. Thus the pressure for thought reform of the intellectuals became more demanding.

In September 1951, more than 3,000 faculty members from twenty institutions of higher education in Peking and Tientsin were brought together for four months of intensive "reformative study" (*kai-tsao hsüeh-hsi*). This was followed by similar programs in other parts of China, and the drive was later expanded to embrace elementary and secondary school teachers as well as intellectuals in the fields of literature and art.

University presidents, deans, and senior professors, as well as young instructors and staff members, were assembled to "study" the required Communist texts. For hours, they listened to reports and exhortations from party and government officials. Under the watchful eyes of the cadres, they practiced "criticism and self-criticism" designed to destroy their established thought patterns and to replace them with the essential elements of the Communist ideology. They were led to examine their past careers to uncover specific "errors" and to submit the concrete results of their self-examination in autobiographies and confessions. The Communists intended that the process be humiliating, for thought reform required that the intellectuals should rid themselves of their traditional pride, recognize their inadequacies, and humble themselves at the feet of their new self-styled ideological superiors.

## Eradicating Deviant Ideologies

During the years since 1951 the Communists have steadily pressed their programs designed to eradicate deviant ideologies on the mainland. The rapid extension of socialist controls throughout the political and economic structure of China has been accompanied by repeated efforts to enforce more rigid ideological and cultural controls.

As the Peking regime had utilized its early agrarian reform program in large measure as a political struggle against the landlord class in the countryside, so it launched the "3-anti" and "5-anti" campaigns in 1952 to emasculate the urban bourgeoisie.[2] These drives set out to eliminate not only the "five evils" of the bourgeoisie but also "bourgeois ideology" itself, which was considered the root of all evils. Declaring that the schools and universities had been the repositories and the intellectuals the bearers of bourgeois ideology, the Communists called upon both educational institutions and individuals to purge themselves of all such unorthodox tendencies. "Bourgeois ideology," in the Chinese Communist usage, covers a wide variety of intellectual attitudes and assumptions which the Communists regard as antithetical to Marxism-Leninism. These range from "reformism" (the "vain hope" that society may be improved by gradual reform rather than violent revolution) through "individualism" (aversion to collective activity) to indifference to political study.

In 1954 the Communists took another step in their attack on "bourgeois" thought when they precipitated a sharp controversy over the great eighteenth-century novel, the *Hung Lou Meng* (Dream of the Red Chamber). The central issue involved an interpretation of the novel by a prominent Chinese scholar, Yü P'ing-po, who was a recognized authority on the work. The Communists alleged that his interpretation

[2] The "3-anti" drive was directed against corruption, waste, and bureaucratism; the "5-anti" campaign, against the five most common "crimes" of urban businessmen and industrialists (bribery, tax evasion, fraud, theft of state assets, and leakage of state economic secrets).



fell far short of the appropriate Marxist canons of criticism and that it neglected the social and historical background of the novel. They stated that this erroneous interpretation was the result of "bourgeois idealism," a misguided expression of the "art for art's sake" viewpoint which ignored the socio-political significance of literature and art. Intellectuals throughout the mainland were required to organize forums to discuss the *Hung Lou Meng* case, and the mounting pressure compelled Yü P'ing-po to engage in extended self-criticism and finally to confess his "erroneous ideology."

The pressure on the Chinese intellectuals continued when the Communists renewed earlier attacks on the "reactionary ideology" of Hu Shih.[3] Numerous articles in the mainland press and in official periodicals denounced Hu Shih's malevolent influence stemming from his "bourgeois ideology."

Even more striking was the Peking's denunciation of Hu Feng, a writer and editor who—though himself close to the Communists for many years—did not agree with the official policy in regard to literature and art. The campaign against Hu Feng, also nationwide in scope, was another stern warning that the Communists would brook no interference with their ideological program.

## A Fresh Look at the Problem

Despite these successive campaigns, the Communists were still concerned about the "problem of the intellectuals." They had good reason for their uneasiness, for the intellectuals—while they had attended "study" sessions and participated in the mass campaigns, shouted the approved slogans and signed the necessary confessions, denounced their contemporaries and their own bourgeois background—still were not giving the new regime the wholehearted support it required. While they met the official requirements, their attitude was distinctly unenthusiastic.

The Communists were thus confronted with a serious problem, for their ambitious national plans for socialization and industrialization required the active assistance of all available trained personnel. Faced with the need for the support of the intellectuals, Peking began to look for better methods to overcome the negative attitude of the intellectuals and to enlist and sustain their support.

In January 1956, the Communist party called a special conference to discuss the problem. At this meeting, Chou En-lai declared the intention of the party "to find a correct solution for the question of the intellectuals, to mobilize them more effectively, and to make fuller use of their abilities." The party, Chou said, had correctly pursued a policy of "uniting, educating, and remoulding the intellectuals," but he admitted that the program had been less than completely successful. Among China's higher intellectuals, he estimated, only 40 per cent could be considered as active supporters of the new order; of the rest, "40 per cent or so" were doing no more than what was required of them, 10 per cent were "backward intellectuals who oppose socialism," while the remaining 10 per cent were "counterrevolutionaries" who could not be reformed. Even among the active supporters, "a great many progressive intellectuals still display a greater or lesser degree of bourgeois idealism and individualism in their outlook and behavior." Admitting "shortcomings" in the treatment accorded to intellectuals, Chou promised remedial measures to improve their working and living conditions: better housing facilities,

[3] The prominent Chinese scholar often honored as the "Father of the Chinese Renaissance" in the years after World War I.

higher salaries, more rewards and incentives, increased appropriations for reference books and needed equipment. In the ensuing months, a number of such improvements were carried out.

## "LET A HUNDRED FLOWERS BLOSSOM"

Such measures were welcome, but they still failed to overcome the prevalent passivity of the intellectuals. While the intellectuals were appreciative of improved material conditions, they were also concerned with intangible matters. Many scholars—discouraged, disillusioned, frustrated, humiliated, or impatient—complained that true scholarly work was impossible under the rigid regimentation imposed by Marxist orthodoxy.

Realizing this, the Communist leaders moved to relax to some extent the severe limitations they had imposed on intellectual activity on the mainland. The result was the incongruous emergence of a well-known classical Chinese expression, "Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools (of thought) contend."[4] Mao Tse-tung himself first proposed this slogan in an unpublished address to the Supreme State Conference on May 2, 1956. Shortly thereafter, Lu Ting-yi, Director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the party, made the first complete public airing of the new policy.[5] While Lu used hyperbolic language to hail the new policy as ushering a new day of "freedom of independent thinking, freedom of debate, freedom of creative work, freedom to criticize, to express one's own views," he left no doubt that the fundamental policy of the thought reform of intellectuals would remain unchanged. He warned that there was no place in Communist China for the freedom of the capitalist countries or for the chaos of ancient China. He declared that there would be no let-up in the class struggle and that the freedom of "blossoming" or "contending" would be offered only to "the people," that is, to those who supported the Communist party and its program. The "ideological struggle," so much emphasized in the successive thought reform campaigns, would continue, but it would now be carried on by a new method.

Despite the invitation to free expression, the initial reaction of the intellectuals was wary. Some did take advantage of the opportunity to voice complaints, but their statements were moderate in tone and were largely concerned with practical questions of livelihood and work conditions rather than with larger issues of state or party policy.

## MAO SPEAKS AGAIN

On February 27, 1957, Mao Tse-tung made a speech which attracted international attention. The address, entitled "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People," contained a reaffirmation of the "hundred-flowers, hundred-schools" policy which he had enunciated the previous year.[6] It came at a time when the position of the intellectuals was still uncertain. Mao's earlier call for liberalization had met with little response, and some elements in the party had already voiced opposition to the new "freedom."[7] This opposition in turn accentuated the skepticism and uncertainties of the intellectuals who became even less inclined to respond to the new appeal.

At the same time, conditions both within China and abroad had alerted the Communist leaders to the danger of mounting popular discontent. Domestically, the restlessness of the intellectuals had spread to other segments of the population. Student recalcitrance, manifested in strikes and riots, had challenged the strict controls of the regime, and there were increasing signs of unrest among workers and peasants. Throughout the country, shortages of food and consumers' goods were causing increased dissatisfaction.

Internationally, the Chinese Communists were unquestionably alarmed by the Hungarian revolt of late 1956. More than once in his speech, Mao referred to the Hungarian outburst which, he said, "had caused some of our intellectuals to lose their balance." "Certain people in our country," he said, "were delighted when the Hungarian events took place. They hoped that something similar would happen in China." Realizing that pent-up discontent might lead to a sudden explosion, Mao apparently concluded that it would be wise to release some steam. "The lesson of the Hungarian events," he said, "deserves our attention."

With respect to the intellectuals, Mao underscored the need to enlist them in the "colossal task of socialist construction." At the same time, he reiterated the necessity for the intellectuals to "continue to remould themselves," while stating that this was now to be achieved by "painstaking reason" rather than by "coercive methods." Mao left no doubt, however, that the liberalization was only a tactical maneuver, a new means of gaining the same ultimate objective, namely, the thoroughgoing reform of the intellectuals to make them acceptable and useful to the new Communist society. In using the new freedom, he warned, people must realize that "they have to keep themselves within the bounds of socialist discipline." The intellectuals must still study Marxism-Leninism and learn to appreciate its superiority over all other ideologies.

It took more than two months for the cautious intellectuals to muster sufficient courage to speak out freely. The initial response was moderate and restrained, but by the beginning of May 1957, inhibitions were discarded. For one month, one bold critic after another voiced his dissatisfaction—even disgust—with the Communist regime.

In their attempt to win over the intellectuals, Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, and other Communist leaders had admitted that the Communist party and its cadres had not exercised their leadership wisely and that they were now willing to listen to suggestions for improvement. Instead of criticizing Communist methods, however, the intellectuals attacked basic Communist objectives and goals. They challenged the entire system of Communist control. They severely criticized the identification of the party with the state. They detailed the evil consequences of party control of education. They pointed out that the Communists had monopolized power and position and that non-Communists were given merely nominal positions to create the deceptive appearance of a "coalition government." They expressed resentment over the humiliation which they had suffered under the domination of immature cadres and in the course of successive thought reform campaigns. They quoted the old classical saying that scholars would prefer death to humiliation, implying that they could neither be forced nor intimidated to serve the Communist regime.

The critics even challenged the Communist claim of ideological superiority.

[4] Used in ancient China to describe the environment which permitted opposing schools of thought to express themselves freely.

[5] Published in Peking *Jen-min jih-pao,* June 13, 1956.

[6] Published in *Jen-min jih-pao,* June 19, 1957. The English translation appeared in *New York Times,* June 19, 1957; also in *People's China* (Peking), July 1, 1957, supplement, pp. 3–27.

[7] For statements attacking the new policy as dangerous to the cause of socialism, see articles in *Jen-min jih-pao,* January 7, 1957, and in *Hsüeh-hsi,* February 18, 1957.

They questioned the benefits of socialism. They boldly asserted that Marxism-Leninism could not be accepted as the infallible guide for China's development. A professor of history declared that the Marxist school had failed to develop any new understanding of human history and society since the death of Engels, thus virtually sweeping aside what the Chinese Communists have hailed to be the unique ideological contributions of Lenin and Stalin.[8]

During the month of genuine "blossoming" and "contending," the critics became bolder. One college professor declared that the Chinese people were prepared to overthrow the Communists or even rise to kill them.[9] An engineer stated that Communist rule was worse than Kuomintang rule.[10] Stunned and alarmed, the Communists finally took action to halt this dangerous trend: they launched a nationwide campaign against "rightists" extending through all strata of Chinese society. The short period of liberalization was abruptly ended, and all "blossoms" which did not suit the Communist taste were condemned as "poisonous weeds" to be uprooted.

## THOUGHT REFORM, NEW STYLE

A new phase in the continuing program of thought reform followed. In this most recent stage, a new wave of confessions and pledges swept the country. Intellectuals who had spoken out during the period of liberalization were forced to recant and to confess their need for further reform; those who had remained silent were made to repledge their support of socialism and their loyalty to the Communist party. Intellectuals, along with many other elements in the population, were marshalled to join in a new movement of political dedication requiring complete "surrender of heart" (*chiao-hsin*) to the Communist party. At the same time, the intellectuals were told that it was not enough that they be educated "experts"; they must be "both Red and expert," that is, both politically orthodox and technically competent.[11] No intellectual is allowed to be indifferent to politics.

The non-Communist political parties —for example, the Democratic League, the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, and others—were made another major target of "rectification" since some of the most scathing attacks on Communist rule had been made by members of these parties in forums sponsored by them. Each party was instructed to launch its own "rectification campaign," to denounce its erring members, and to ferret out "rightists" in its own ranks. As a result of the renewed internal dissension, the "democratic parties" became even more impotent than before.

Thus the brief period of relaxation of ideological controls in Communist China in the spring of 1957 ended abruptly. In some respects, the demands for political conformity are more pressing in 1958 than ever before, for the Communists have been able to identify and expose centers of resentment and resistance. Yet some gains at least have been registered by the intellectuals. In general, they are now accorded more favorable material treatment in terms of higher salaries and better housing.

[8] Statement of Lei Hai-tsung in *Jen-min jih-pao,* April 22, 1957.

[9] Statement by Ko P'ei-ch'i in *Jen-min jih-pao,* May 31, 1957.

[10] Cf. summary of the views of "rightists" in *Jen-min jih-pao,* June 12, 1958.

[11] The slogan, "Strive to be both Red and expert," is directed against intellectuals who attempt to remain aloof from politics. Another slogan, "Stress the present and slight the ancient" (*hou-chin po-ku*), is directed against those who seek refuge in the study of China's old culture and who thus "stress the ancient and slight the present" (*hou-ku po-chin*).



In particular, scientific and technical personnel enjoy a wider scope of activity than in the years prior to 1956. They now have access to foreign books and journals previously denied them, and have more and better equipment.

The long-range effects of the brief intellectual outburst in the spring of 1957 are unclear. Certainly it is significant that there were still individuals who had the courage to express sharp disagreement and dissatisfaction with many of the basic premises underlying Communist rule on the mainland of China. Both the extent of the opposition and the variety of the criticisms leveled by the Chinese scholars and intellectuals against Communist rule indicate the internal tensions which still exist beneath the surface of political and intellectual conformity which Peking consistently attempts to present to the outside world.

# Continuity and Change in Modern Chinese Literatur

By Tien-yi Li

Abstract: The Chinese Literary Revolution of 1917, originally concerned with the problem of replacing the classical language with the living language of the people as a medium for written communication, introduced a period of rapid change and experimentation in Chinese literature. During the 1920's and 1930's, political as well as literary issues were involved in the debates over literary theory and practice. Nationalism and realism were dominant themes, and left-wing influence grew steadily. The Chinese Communist approach to literature, specifically defined by Mao Tse-tung in 1942, was translated into a nationwide program for the writers with the Communist victory in 1949. Since then, "socialist realism" has been the guiding principle for all writing although Communist policy has selectively accepted certain segments of the Chinese literary heritage which meet their political criteria. While the widespread use of new forms, techniques, and emphases resulting from the Western impact on China has been a notable feature of modern literature, nevertheless the element of "realism" has definite historical antecedents in Chinese literary history. Thus both continuity and radical change have been present in the stream of modern Chinese literature.

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*Tien-yi Li, Ph.D., New Haven, Connecticut, is Assistant Professor of Chinese at Yal University. He formerly taught at National Southwest Associated University and Na tional Central University in China, and at Smith College. Since 1955 he has served o the editorial board of the Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies. He is the author o Woodrow Wilson's China Policy, 1913–1917 (1952) and various articles in professiona journals.*





In Chinese literature as in Chinese politics, the twentieth century has been a period of turmoil and dissension, an era in which the stabilizing forces of tradition have been repeatedly rocked by the new and aggressive forces of iconoclasm. What are the major problems which have confronted the Chinese literary world in recent decades? What are the key indicators of continuity; what are the significant signs of change? To answer these questions, it is necessary to survey some of the important trends in modern Chinese literature during the years since the Literary Revolution of 1917.

Many people tend to identify the Literary Revolution of 1917 with the Chinese Renaissance which is also called the New Culture Movement, the New Thought Movement, or the New Tide. Actually the two developments are interrelated but not identical. To be more explicit, the Literary Revolution represents only one phase of the larger movement usually termed the Chinese Renaissance.[1]

[1] In defining the Chinese Renaissance, Hu Shih, who played a leading role in the new movement, mentions three prominent features: "First, it was a conscious movement to promote a new literature in the living language of the people to take the place of the classical literature of old. Second, it was a movement of conscious protest against many of the ideas and institutions in the traditional culture, and of conscious emancipation of the individual man and woman from the bondage of the forces of tradition. It was a movement of reason versus tradition, freedom versus authority, and glorification of life and human values versus their suppression. And lastly, strange enough, this new movement was led by men who knew their cultural heritage and tried to study it with the new methodology of modern historical criticism and research. In that sense it was also a humanist movement." The first feature mentioned by Hu Shih is identical with the Literary Revolution as originally started. See Hu Shih, *The Chinese Renaissance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 44.

## Nationalism

The Literary Revolution was originally concerned with the problem of replacing the classical language with the living language of the people as a medium for written communication. As early as 1915, Hu Shih and his friend, Chao Yuen-ren, had discussed this question seriously. The latter was then thinking in the direction of alphabetizing the Chinese language and actually proposed certain details of procedure for alphabetization. While not opposed to Chao's idea, Hu Shih thought that some intermediate steps should be taken "to make the ideographic characters more teachable in the elementary schools"; and he also proposed certain details of reform. After more consideration, he concluded that "the future literature of China must be written in the living language of the people," and that "no dead language can produce a living literature."[2] In 1917 he formally launched a vigorous debate in the Chinese intellectual world by publishing an article entitled "Some Tentative Suggestions for the Reform of Literature"[3] in the liberal monthly, *The New Youth*. In this article, still written in the classical language which he was determined to overthrow, Hu Shih advised writers against artificial imitations, unhealthy pessimistic thinking, stereotyped clichés, irrelevant and abstruse allusions, and the conventional antithetic style as shown in parallel prose and regulated verse. He advocated a literature which should be characterized by an embodiment of true feelings and concrete thoughts, an emphasis on grammar, and a readiness to use colloquial words and expressions. He laid special emphasis on the last characteristic because he be-

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 50–51.

[3] "Wen-hsüeh kai-liang ch'u-i." See *The New Youth* (*Hsin ch'ing-nien*), Vol. 2, No. 5 (Jan. 1, 1917).

lieved that from an historical point of view vernacular literature, which was bound to flourish, should be the main literary product of the times.

In support of Hu Shih's proposals, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, editor of *The New Youth,* wrote a more startling essay entitled "On a Revolution in Literature." [4] A radical himself, Ch'en attached political and social significance to the new movement. In this essay, also written in the old literary style, he brought up the following three slogans:

1. To destroy the painted, powdered, and obsequious literature of the aristocratic few, and to create a plain, simple, and expressive literature of the people;
2. To destroy the stereotyped and monotonous literature of classicism, and to create a fresh and sincere literature of realism;
3. To destroy the pedantic, unintelligible, and obscurantist literature of the hermit and the recluse, and to create a plain-speaking and popular literature of a living society.[5]

The arguments of Hu Shih and Ch'en Tu-hsiu were well received by a group of professors and students in Peking. Ch'ien Hsüan-t'ung, Chou Tso-jen, Fu Ssu-nien, and Liu Fu, for example, were all in favor of adopting *pai-hua,* or the vernacular language, as a medium for literary expression; and the arguments they presented in support seem to have been equally effective. Soon the reformers themselves went one step further by abandoning the classical style in their own writings. Writing in the vernacular style became a vogue, and by 1919 hundreds of *pai-hua* newspapers and magazines were published. In the following year, the Chinese Ministry of Education ordered that, beginning in the fall of 1921, textbooks for the first two grades in the primary schools should be in the national language, that is, the vernacular tongue. In 1922 it was ordered that all elementary and secondary textbooks should be rewritten in the national language.

[4] "Wen-hsüeh ko-ming lun." See *The New Youth,* Vol. 2, No. 6 (Feb. 1, 1917).

[5] See Hu Shih, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), p. 54.

### REALISM

The problem of ideology, as well as that of language, also engaged the attention of the early reformers. Both Hu Shih and Ch'en Tu-hsiu, as well as many other leaders, expressed important views on this subject. Special mention should be made of the view presented by Chou Tso-jen in his essay entitled "Human Literature." [6] He saw the Chinese Renaissance largely as a movement for the emancipation of the individual from the feudal bondage of the past. In this new context, any action against human nature, individual interests, humanitarian principles, and fraternal love was to be condemned. The literature of the modern age should describe man's ideal life based on high morals. Negatively, it should reflect man's real life or expose its inhuman aspect with a view to improvement. In short, he favored the idea of art for life's sake.

The writers of the Literary Research Society—Mao Tun (Shen Yen-ping), Cheng Chen-to, and others—closely followed Chou Tso-jen's theory. Their central thought was realism. They were contemptuous of men of letters who buried themselves in the ivory tower, blind to the social evils and injustices around them. They made it their duty to foster a literature that would reflect the times, record actual happenings in society, pierce through the dark side of life, and—more important—point the way to progress and happiness. In one article, Cheng Chen-to even went so far as to maintain that all works of literature should be imbued with social color and revolutionary spirit. His interpretation of realism, then, was very close to that of the advocates of the so-called "revolutionary literature."

[6] "Jen te wen-hsüeh." See *The New Youth,* Vol. 5, No. 6 (Dec. 15, 1918).



Contemporary with the realists were the romanticists of the Creation Society. They opposed utilitarianism in literature. One of their leading theorists, Ch'eng Fang-wu, in his article, "The Mission of the New Literature," [7] defined their aim as the search for literary perfection and the realization of literary beauty. While they favored the principle of art for art's sake, they did not aim at an escape from the realities of life. Disgusted with existing conditions in China, they desired a better way of living. Soon they began to attach social value to literature. Even Yü Ta-fu, a decadent novelist with individualistic inclinations, began to advocate socialism in an essay entitled "Class Struggle in Literature." [8] Under the influence of the Chinese Revolution of 1925–27, these romanticists brought forth the slogan of "revolutionary literature." Kuo Mo-jo's article, "Revolution and Literature," [9] may be regarded as a manifesto formally announcing this change of attitude. As their representative, he made known their decision to abandon individualism and romanticism and to identify their interests with those of the proletariat.

### LEFT-WING MOVEMENT

Sensitive to the prevailing trend, disappointed with the political and social situation, and stimulated by his own indomitable spirit of revolt, Lu Hsün (Chou Shu-jen), the most outstanding author of that time, also converted himself to socialism. From 1928 until his death in 1936, he played a leading role in the leftist movement and had many promising young writers among his followers. With the founding of the League of Left-Wing Writers in 1930, the leadership of the literary movement gradually passed into the hands of the leftists. The chief aim of the leftist writers was to promote a popular literature which would deal with all problems from the viewpoint of the proletariat and would be written in a language comprehensible to the masses. The twin movements for the popularization of literature and for the Latinization of the Chinese language were both launched before the death of Lu Hsün.

The predominance of the leftist writers did not go unchallenged. The writers of the Crescent Moon Society, for example, strongly resented leftist literary theory, and their leading critic, Liang Shih-ch'iu, repeatedly challenged the validity of the term "revolutionary literature." Influenced by neohumanism and rationalism, he argued that literature should be based on human nature rather than on any specific political belief. A number of writers closely connected with the Kuomintang also opposed the leftists, and shortly after the appearance of the League of Left-Wing Writers, they launched a Chinese nationalist literary movement. They held that the highest principle of literature should be nationalism and denounced the leftists' theory of class struggle. Nationalism as a guiding principle was never totally discounted by the leftists themselves. However, they often interpreted it in terms of patriotism or anti-imperialism and always linked it with internationalism, proletarianism, or socialism. Besides the "crescenters" and the nationalists, there were also the neutralist writers, who bemoaned the fact that literature was being made a

[7] "Hsin wen-hsüeh chih shih-ming." See *The Creation Weekly* (*Ch'uang-tsao chou-pao*), No. 2 (May 20, 1923).

[8] "Wen-hsüeh shang te chieh-chi tou-cheng." See *The Creation Weekly,* No. 3 (May 27, 1923).

[9] "Ko-ming yü wen-hsüeh." See *The Creation Monthly* (*Ch'uang-tsao yüeh-k'an*), No. 3 (May 1, 1926).

"political loudspeaker" by both the leftists and the nationalists. Their slogan was simply freedom of expression.

In passing, mention should also be made of the Analects school, led by Lin Yutang. Humor was the prevailing tone of practically all the publications of this group. In the eyes of the leftists, however, the humorous literature of this school was entirely out of tune with the spirit of the times. Lu Hsün bitterly accused the humorists of attempting merely to turn "the cruelty of the butcher" into a laughing matter. After Lin Yutang left China for the United States, the Analects school, deprived of leadership, weakened and lost its importance on the Chinese literary scene.

During the Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), every patriotic writer, whether leftist, rightist, or nonpartisan, was conscious of his duty as a fighter for national existence. Literary critics all emphasized the role of men of letters in the war. They believed that all writing should directly or indirectly express the irresistible desire of the Chinese people for freedom and independence. The political, social, and didactic function of literature was stressed. Both the Nationalists and the Communists endeavored to use literature as an effective weapon for fighting the war, for winning popular support, and for strengthening their positions against internal and external enemies. During the war years, the leftists continued to play a predominant role in the field of literary theory and production, and the most active and productive writers of the period were found in the ranks of the leftists and their sympathizers.

## COMMUNIST APPROACH TO LITERATURE

In May 1942, Mao Tse-tung made a comprehensive redefinition of the function of literature in his "Talks at the Yenan Forum on Art and Literature."[10] The purpose of the Yenan forum, according to Mao, was

> to fit art and literature properly into the whole revolutionary machine as one of its component parts, to make them a powerful weapon for uniting and educating the people and for attacking and annihilating the enemy, and to help the people to fight the enemy with one heart and one mind.[11]

This program was closely connected with the Communists' current (1942) campaign for correcting various unorthodox political tendencies: subjectivism, sectarianism, and party formalism. Literature, as Mao understood it, should be intended for, and serve the needs of, the workers, the peasants, the soldiers, and the urban petty bourgeoisie with its intelligentsia. He laid great stress on the importance of popularization and elevation. By popularization he meant spreading literature among the masses; by elevation, raising the people's level of literary appreciation. Furthermore, there should be "unity of politics and art, of content and form, and of the revolutionary political content and the highest possible degree of perfection in artistic form."[12] The language to be used for literary creation should be rich, lively, and perfectly intelligible to the masses. With respect to the problem of China's past literary heritage, he favored accepting and assimilating the fine qualities of the literature of the past. While not opposed to using literature as a means for the exposure of the dark side of things, he thought that it was more important for writers to depict the positive side and

[10] "Tsai Yenan wen-i tso-t'an-hui shang te chiang-hua." For an authorized English translation of these talks, see *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954–56), Vol. IV (1956), pp. 63–93.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 86.



to eulogize "the proletariat, the Communist Party, New Democracy, and socialism."[13] The objects to be exposed, he argued, should always be the enemies of the people, never the people themselves. Mao admitted that his approach was utilitarian. But he explicitly stated that his utilitarianism was that of the proletariat, not that of the feudal, bourgeois, and petty-bourgeois classes. The leftist writers later identified this kind of proletarian utilitarianism with socialist realism, a term originally borrowed from the Soviet Union. Since 1942 the literary theories expounded by Mao in his Yenan talks have been the basic guiding principles for the leftist writers of China.

Mao's Yenan talks gave a fresh impetus to the creation of literature in the Communist areas. From 1942 to the establishment of the Central People's Government in 1949, a large volume of literary works appeared: novels, operas, plays, poems, folk songs, and reportage essays.[14] The favorite themes of the authors were the war of resistance against Japan, the civil war, land reform, industrial and agricultural production, the history of the Chinese Communist revolution, and other related topics. Three of the most popular works won Stalin prizes for literature in 1951. They were: *The Sun Shines over the Sangkan River,* a novel by Ting Ling; *The White-haired Girl,* a new type of opera by Ho Ching-chih and Ting Yi; and *The Hurricane,* a novel by Chou Li-po.[15] The period from 1942 to 1949 also witnessed the emergence of numerous young writers, among whom Chao Shu-li was considered outstanding. Chao's three works, *Hsiao Erh-hei's Marriage, Rhymes of Li Yu-ts'ai,* and *Changes in Li Village,* won him great fame as a novelist.[16] The Communist literary critics particularly acclaimed his skillful use of the everyday language of the common people.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 89.

[14] For information on the literary developments of this period, see Wang Yao, *A Draft History of China's New Literature (Chung-kuo hsin wen-hsüeh shih kao,* two volumes, 1951–53, Peking and Shanghai), II, pp. 205–445; Liu Shou-sung, *The First Draft for a History of China's New Literature (Chung-kuo hsin wen-hsüeh shih ch'u-kao,* two volumes, Peking, 1956), II, pp. 28–305; and Chou Yang, "The People's New Literature and Art" in his *China's New Literature and Art* (Peking, 1954), pp. 51–86.

## SOCIALIST REALISM

In July 1949, a conference of Chinese writers and artists met in Peking and established the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles. Under this federation, there were also formed several subordinate organizations including the All-China Association of Literary Workers. Four years later (September–October 1953), another national literary conference was held in Peking. It reviewed the past work of the federation, criticized some misunderstandings about the literary theory of Mao, and concretely defined the goal of socialist and realist literature. It also voted for the reorganization of the federation and its various subsidiaries, and as a result, the All-China Association of Literary Workers was reorganized as the Association of Chinese Writers.

During the years since 1949, socialist realism as a literary principle has been repeatedly stressed and expounded in

[15] All of these three works have been translated into English. See Yang Hsien-yi and Gladys Yang, Translators, *The Sun Shines over the Sangkan River* (Peking, 1954); Yang Hsien-yi and Gladys Yang, Translators, *The White-haired Girl* (Peking, 1954); and Hsü Meng-hsiung, Translator, *The Hurricane* (Peking, 1955).

[16] For English translations of these works, see Chao Shu-li, *Rhymes of Li Yu-ts'ai and Other Stories* (Peking, 1950), and Gladys Yang, Translator, *Changes in Li Village* (Peking, 1953). For an evaluation, see Chou Yang, "On the Works of Chao Shu-li" in his *China's New Literature and Art,* pp. 134–54.

the literary world of mainland China.[17] From the Communist point of view, a good piece of literature has to be both true to life and ideologically correct. Lack of socialist content will lead to "naturalism," while separation from reality will result in "conceptualization" and "generalization." Both extremes must be avoided. In the past two years, there has been a heated debate over the validity of the expression *"hsieh chen-shih"* or "depicting reality." According to the Chinese critics and writers with orthodox Marxist-Leninist views, this expression alone does not convey the total meaning of socialist realism. There must be a perfect unity of socialist thinking and realistic depiction in literature. The principle of depicting reality, applied in isolation, is invalid; it becomes valid only when it is unified with socialist ideology. In fact, the whole theory of socialist realism has been stressed repeatedly to warn those writers who, under the pretext of realistic depiction, have described only the negative aspects of things and have failed to eulogize communism.

A number of ideological remolding campaigns have been launched in China since 1949. The most extensive ones affecting literary and art circles have been the criticism of *The Story of Wu Hsün,*[18] the purge of Hu Feng, the attack upon Yü P'ing-po, and the denunciation of the antiparty clique of Feng Hsüeh-feng, Ting Ling, and Ch'en Ch'i-hsia. When the movement for "letting a hundred flowers blossom and letting a hundred schools of thought contend" was at its height in 1957, some observers felt that the Chinese Communists' policy of thought control had actually come to an end. Before long, however, the movement turned into another nationwide campaign against rightists and revisionists. The poisonous weeds, the Communists insisted, had to be uprooted from the people's flower garden.

## National Objectives as Literary Themes

During the past decade, the mainland of China has been the scene of a series of campaigns designed to mobilize the country for the achievement of major national objectives: the land reform, the Korean War, the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, the 3-anti and 5-anti drives against illegal practices in public and private enterprises, the movement for industrialization and agricultural collectivization, and the struggle against revisionism and rightist thought. Throughout this period, the Chinese writers have utilized the themes of these political campaigns as literary themes and have, in quantitative terms, published an impressive body of work.

[17] See, for example, Chou Yang, "Socialist Realism—The Road of Advance for Chinese Literature" in his *China's New Literature and Art,* pp. 87–102; Mao Tun, "New Realities and New Tasks," *Chinese Literature,* No. 1 (1954), pp. 1–23; Chou Yang, "Building a Socialist Literature," *Chinese Literature,* No. 4 (1956), pp. 198–222; and Chou Yang, "The Important Role of Art and Literature in the Building of Socialism," *Chinese Literature,* No. 1 (1957), pp. 179–88. For more information on post-1949 literary developments in China, see, among many others, Wang Yao, *A Draft History of China's New Literature,* Vol. II, pp. 446–543; Albert Borowitz, *Fiction in Communist China* (a monograph prepared for the Center for International Studies, M. I. T., Cambridge, 1954); Chao Chung, *The Communist Program for Literature and Art* (Hong Kong, 1955); Chou Yang, "For More and Better Literary and Artistic Creations!", in his *China's New Literature and Art,* pp. 1–50; Mao Tun, "The Key Problems in Art and Literature," *Chinese Literature,* No. 4 (1956), pp. 223–28; Mao Tun, "The Chinese Literature of Today," *Chinese Literature,* No. 2 (1957), pp. 205–14; and Mao Tun, "A Discussion of Recent Short Stories" ("T'an tsui-chin te tuan-p'ien hsiao-shuo"), *People's Literature (Jen-min wen-hsüeh),* No. 6 (June, 1958), pp. 4–8.

[18] This is a film dealing with the life of Wu Hsün, a beggar-educator of the nineteenth century.



Some of their best-known productions may be mentioned: in fiction, *Wall of Bronze* by Liu Ch'ing, *The Plains Are Ablaze* by Hsü Kuang-yao, *Flames Ahead* by Liu Pai-yü, and *A Thousand Miles of Lovely Land* by Yang Shuo; in drama, *Steeled in Battles* by Hu K'o, *Dragon Beard Ditch* by Lao She, and *The Long March* by Ch'en Ch'i-t'ung; in reportage, *Those Most To Be Loved* by Wei Wei; in children's literature, *Going to the Movies* by Chang T'ien-yi; in autobiographical literature, *Kao Yü-pao* by Kao Yü-pao.[19]

So far as technique is concerned, many of the literary works produced on the mainland in recent years are still far from satisfactory. The Chinese literary critics have complained that many works are unnecessarily long and verbose. In his speech, "Down with Foreign Formalism," [20] the veteran author Lao She scathingly attacked the kind of current writing which is wordy, clumsy, illogical, unintelligible. Brevity and conciseness in language are now emphatically advocated.

Practically all types of Chinese opera have undergone revision both in language and content in recent years. Some of the revised operas like *Liang Shan-po and Chu Ying-t'ai* and *The Story of the White Snake* [21] have won popular acclaim. Besides, many of the classical novels, dramas, and poems have been reedited and revaluated. *The Dream of the Red Chamber, The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, The Water Margin,* and *The Unofficial History of Officialdom,* for example, have appeared in new editions and have all been declared to be works of the finest quality. For the benefit of the younger generation, some classical works have been translated into modern vernacular. The extensive translation of Ch'ü Yüan's poems is particularly worthy of mention. Since 1949, a large number of Chinese classics have been republished. According to a recent report from Peking, a group of scholars have been officially appointed to work out detailed plans for republishing "all the great extant classics from the earliest times down to the eve of the May Fourth Movement of 1919." [22]

[19] Most of these works have been translated into English. See Sidney Shapiro, Translator, *Wall of Bronze* (Peking, 1954); Sidney Shapiro, Translator, *The Plains Are Ablaze* (Peking, 1955); Liu Pai-yü, *Flames Ahead* (Peking, 1954); Yüan Ko-chia, Translator, *A Thousand Miles of Lovely Land* (Peking, 1957); Tang Sheng, Translator, *Steeled in Battles* (Peking, 1955); Liao Hung-ying, Translator, *Dragon Beard Ditch* (Peking, 1956); Ch'en Ch'i-t'ung, *The Long March* (Peking, 1956).

[20] "Ta-tao yang-pa-ku." See *People's Literature,* No. 3 (March 1958), pp. 1–2.

[21] For English versions of these two revised operas, see Yang Hsien-yi and Gladys Yang, Translators, *Love under the Willows* (another name for *Liang Shan-po and Chu Ying-t'ai,* Peking, 1956) and *The White Snake* (Peking, 1957).

## Chinese Literary Heritage

The Chinese Communists have up to the present time adhered to the policy of preserving what they believe to be the best literary heritage of China. In the revaluation of China's literary traditions, they have rejected much but, at the same time, have also found some elements which they deem worthy of preservation. For example, all forms of traditional popular literature such as the Peking opera, the old type of novel, the story-teller's tale, the *yangko,* and the drum song have been identified as "national forms" for preservation. The recent antirightist campaign has brought forth a new theory: *"po-ku hou-chin,"* or "to slight the past and stress the present." Some observers feel that this theory may mark the beginning of an end to the policy of preserving China's literary legacy. But, as the Chinese Communists view it, increased emphasis

[22] See *Peking Review,* Vol. 1, No. 12 (May 20, 1958), p. 17.

upon the present does not mean a total negation of the past and therefore is not incompatible with their established policy regarding literary heritage. The key to an understanding of their attitude towards traditions is their favorite expression "critical acceptance." They will accept tradition only if it is found to be acceptable by their own criteria of evaluation. As long as the principle of critical acceptance can be applied, they will probably continue to advocate the preservation of China's literary heritage. In a lengthy article published in *The People's Daily* on February 28, 1958, Chou Yang, senior Chinese Communist literary arbiter, stated, "As socialist literature can only grow and flower on its own native soil, it must re-evaluate and carry forward the national tradition and evolve a national style." [28] This statement, which is in keeping with the thought of Mao Tse-tung, may be regarded as a summation of basic Communist policy with respect to China's literary heritage.

## WESTERN LITERARY THEORIES

During the past forty years, a host of literary theories from the West have invaded the Chinese literary world. While each of these theories has had some part in fostering a new literature in China, the major role was played by realism. The term "realism," as first understood by Chinese writers, merely meant an objective representation of life and society. Living in a period of turbulence and instability, most Chinese writers could not shut their eyes to the realities. It was only natural for them to attempt realistically to reflect the conditions of the times, to express their resentment against social evils, and to register their hopes and aspirations for improvement and reform. In the course of time, many Chinese writers began to associate realism with socialism and to produce works which tended to be predominantly didactic in tone. In mainland China, all minor currents of literature were easily detectable before 1949, but since that date they have gradually lost their identity in the major trend of socialist realism.

The adoption of new forms and techniques—again a product of the Western impact—is certainly one important feature of modern Chinese literature. In some cases, Western forms have been adopted with modification; in others, they have been borrowed wholesale. Dissatisfied with the stereotyped methods of traditional Chinese poetry, the new poets have tried practically all Western forms, including free verse and the sonnet. But as yet they have not achieved any remarkable success in their experimentation. So far as the drama is concerned, the new form is quite different from the old. Whereas the old drama is an operatic type filled with poetry, singing, dancing, and gesticulation, the new drama is purely a ***hua-chü*** or a spoken drama. It is either a one-act play or a play divided into a number of acts and scenes and, like Western plays, has full stage directions. As a popular theatrical entertainment, it has not yet surpassed the traditional Chinese opera. The essay has completely broken with traditional types and is now free of formal rules or restrictions with regard to length or subject matter. With this freedom, modern Chinese essayists have produced a substantial quantity of genuinely good writings. In the last two decades the so-called "reportage essay" has enjoyed great popularity in China. This type of essay, however, is more a journalistic report than a literary production. Under the influence of Western literature, many Chinese writers of fiction have rejected the traditional forms as represented by the "romantic" literary tale of the T'ang dynasty, the story-teller's tale of the Sung and Ming periods, and the popular language novel of Ming and Ch'ing times. In writing novels and short stories, they have in one way or another imitated Western types of fiction. On the whole their experimentation with Western forms and techniques has been relatively successful, and their works have proved to be the major literary accomplishment of modern China.

[28] See Chou Yang, "The Great Debate on the Literary Front," *Peking Review*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (March 25, 1958), p. 12.



## CONTINUITY

The element of change has been briefly discussed in the light of the Western impact. What of the element of continuity? Is traditionalism entirely gone? Certainly not. If not, can we detect any continuous trend in the light of Chinese historical development? In fact, according to Hu Shih, the whole New Culture Movement of the modern period was carried out in the spirit of the many renaissance periods from the T'ang down to the Ch'ing dynasty. In one sense, the *pai-hua* literature of the modern period is a departure from the literature written in the classical language; but in another sense it is largely a continuation of the popular language literature of earlier times.

The Chinese written language, as seen in the literature of modern China, has certainly been invaded by foreign words and grammar. But it has not undergone any complete change in its essential structure and will doubtless preserve its basic structure for the foreseeable future. The assimilation of foreign words and syntax will in the long run make the Chinese language richer and more flexible.

The term "realism" has loomed large in the minds of modern Chinese authors. Yet the type of realism which they have practiced is not entirely foreign to traditional Chinese literature. In re-evaluating the Chinese literary heritage, many Chinese scholars have described as excellent realistic productions a number of old masterpieces such as *The Dream of the Red Chamber, The Water Margin,* and *The Unofficial History of Officialdom.* Realism as interpreted in modern China thus represents an old Chinese literary tradition and is not merely an importation from the West.

While Western literature has certainly had a great influence in modern China, China's traditional literary forms have never vanished. In fact, they are still active and are still manifesting vigor and resilience. Since the 1930's, the leftists have constantly talked about the restoration of "national forms." Now it has become official Communist policy to encourage the use of "national forms" for literary work. In a sense, the Chinese Communists have discovered that it is not only possible but also advisable to put new wine in old bottles.

During the past few decades, China has experienced deep and widespread changes. Some observers have tended to interpret all forms of change in modern China in terms of "revolution." Yet the word "revolution," if it implies a total change, does not apply well in the field of literature where very few elements have been overthrown completely. The stream of modern Chinese literature has been broad enough to encompass not only the current of change, both gradual and rapid, but also the current of continuity, always latent and often active.

# Dynamics of the Moscow-Peking Axis

By Allen S. Whiting

Abstract: Alliance with Soviet Russia has served the military, economic, and political interests of Communist China. The dependency of Peking upon Moscow during the Stalin period compelled suppression of ideological differences on the part of Mao Tse-tung. Growing Chinese strength, however, afforded increased leverage upon the post-Stalin leadership. In 1956, the East European crisis prompted Peking to intervene in bloc affairs, promoting a formula which varied from the approach of Moscow. This formula called for relegation of bloc differences to secret bilateral discussions as well as for toleration of greater divergence in the domestic practices of bloc regimes. Chinese mediation between the Polish and Russian positions during 1956–57 appeared to smooth bloc relations throughout East Europe.

Abandonment of this formula at the November 1957 conference in Moscow coincided with a major shift by Mao Tse-tung on other aspects of Chinese foreign policy. This shift paralleled preconference signs from Khrushchev of a harsher line both on bloc affairs and toward the non-Communist world. Overtly the Sino-Soviet attack against "revisionism" applied to the Yugoslavs. Gomulka's position at the conference, however, as well as during the 1958 attack on Tito, suggested that Poland also felt pressure from the new line. The change in Peking's policy from 1956 to 1957 may have come from a reappraisal of Soviet strength resulting from intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and artificial satellite developments in the latter half of 1957. Such a reappraisal may explain the new harshness of Chinese foreign policy statements directed not only within the bloc but to other areas as well.

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*Allen S. Whiting, Ph.D., is a member of the Social Science Division of the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Previously he taught in the political science departments of Northwestern University and Michigan State University. As holder of a Ford Foundation fellowship, 1953–55, Dr. Whiting did research on Sino-Soviet relations in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Japan. His publications include Soviet Policies in China 1917–1924 (1954); Dynamics of International Relations (1956), co-authored with Dr Ernst B. Haas; and Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot? (1958), co-authored with General Sheng Shih-ts'ai.*





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TEN years ago, Mao Tse-tung declared, "Internationally we belong to the anti-imperialist front, headed by the Soviet Union." [1] Formal founding of the Sino-Soviet alliance in 1950 initiated military, economic, and political implementation of his words. Neither changes in the Kremlin nor turbulent events in East Europe have shaken Mao from his 1949 conviction that "the Chinese people must either incline toward the side of imperialism or toward that of socialism. There can be no exception to this rule. It is impossible to sit on the fence. There is no third road."

In the intervening years, the People's Republic of China has grown from a dependent Soviet satellite to a major partner in the Moscow-Peking axis. Particularly since the death of Stalin in 1953, this transformation in Peking's status, both inside the bloc and in the world at large, has seemed to justify Mao's abandonment of the traditional Chinese policy of "using barbarians against barbarians" in favor of "leaning to one side."

To be sure, Peking has paid for its gains. Approximately 2.4 billion dollars in Soviet credits consumed between 1950 and 1957 require payment with interest over the next decade.[2] Virtually all of the 211 industrial projects based on Soviet deliveries are covered by Chinese exports. Politically, by aligning with Moscow, Peking lessened its chances for recognition from the United States and thereby for admission to the United Nations. But without attempting to strike a comprehensive balance, certain observations strengthen the conviction that Peking's gains in the alliance far outweigh its losses.

## Gains from the Alliance

The strategic payoff in the military realm is impressive. No other policy could have provided Mao with the largest and most modern air force in Asia only ten years after seizing power. For a nation which produced its first automobile in 1958, the 1,800 jet fighters and bombers provide important proof of Soviet support. Nor could China's scant and scattered petroleum resources sustain this force without large fuel deliveries from the Soviet bloc.

On the ground, the process of re-equipping and modernizing with Russian tanks, artillery, and transport has drastically transformed the poorly trained and inadequately armed masses of Chinese infantry who fought in Korea. Even greater changes may lie in store as a consequence of the Soviet alliance. In 1958, Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi predicted, "We will have atomic weapons in the future." [3] Should Moscow open its nuclear stockpile to Peking, a new impetus might be afforded the drive toward Chinese Communist ascendancy in Asia.

The bedrock of Sino-Soviet military unity is the pledge of mutual assistance in case of outside attack. First enunciated in the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance Between the USSR and the People's Republic of China, signed on February 14, 1950, this guarantees that "in the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or States allied with it, and thus being involved in a state of war, the other High Contracting Party

[1] Mao Tse-tung, *On People's Democratic Dictatorship*, July 1, 1949, English edition (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1950).

[2] For detailed review of credit and trade relations, see Allen S. Whiting, "Contradictions in the Moscow-Peking Axis," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 20 (February, 1958), pp. 128–42.

[3] Interview of May 10, 1958, with correspondents of *Die Welt* and *Die Stuttgarter Zeitung*. *New York Times*, August 18, 1958 quoted Warsaw "sources" as reporting a Soviet agreement to provide China with atomic weapons, concluded during the Khrushchev-Mao talks of early August 1958.

will immediately render military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal." While not explicitly operative against the United States and United Nations forces in Korea, this guarantee undoubtedly deterred American strategists from striking at Peking's sanctuary in Manchuria when Chinese Communist "volunteers" hurled General MacArthur's troops back from the Yalu River to the thirty-eighth parallel.

On September 7, 1958, Nikita Khrushchev dropped the qualifications covering mutual assistance in the 1950 treaty and declared flatly, "An attack upon the People's Republic of China . . . is an attack upon the Soviet Union."[4] This unprecedented Soviet support for Peking came in a letter to President Dwight D. Eisenhower during the crisis over the Taiwan Strait. On September 19, 1958, Khrushchev amplified this pledge by threatening nuclear retaliation against any country which employed nuclear weapons against Communist China.[5] Thus the Sino-Soviet Alliance provides Peking both with minimal military security in case of war and with vital political leverage for atomic blackmail.

In the realm of economics, the alliance has also served Mao's interests. Credits, technical assistance, and imports from Moscow made possible the striking gains of the First Five-Year Plan indicated in Table 1.

With more than half of the original 211 industrial and construction projects "to be supplied from the Soviet Union" remaining in the Second Five-Year Plan, China's proclaimed goal of "overtaking Great Britain in fifteen years" clearly depends upon continuing Russian cooperation in trade, if not in aid. No Soviet credits have been announced since 1956. Moscow's share of Peking's foreign trade, however, exceeds 50 per

[4] *New York Times*, September 9, 1958.
[5] *Ibid.*, September 20, 1958.

TABLE 1—INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT OF MAINLAND CHINA, 1952–1957[6]

| PRODUCT | 1952 | 1957 |
|---|---|---|
| Coal (million tons) | 63.5 | 128.0 |
| Electric power (billion kilowatt-hours) | 7.3 | 19.0 |
| Iron (million tons) | 1.9 | 5.9 |
| Steel (million tons) | 1.4 | 5.2 |
| Cement (million tons) | 2.9 | 6.7 |

cent. This provides a valuable source of imports, as well as an outlet for exports. Outside the bloc, China's shortage in foreign exchange is matched by its lack of large marketable export surpluses. Furthermore, Peking has given politics priority over economics in determining its relations with capitalist countries. This has kept trade with Japan and Great Britain below the level otherwise possible. These constraints upon China's trade outside the bloc make the Moscow-Peking axis a valuable asset for Mao's program of industrialization.

Training of China's managerial and scientific cadres has also depended largely upon Russian resources. From 1950 to 1957, more than 7,000 Soviet advisers worked in China at various times.[7] While they appear insignificant against the population of 600 million, their impact was far out of proportion to their number. These Soviet specialists directed principal construction projects, such as the massive Yangtze River bridge. In addition, they supervised indigenous personnel in on-the-job training programs, especially in the burgeoning industrial base of Northeast China (Manchuria). Mass translation of Soviet technical journals, and intensive training programs for thousands of Chinese engineers, scientists, and skilled workers in the Soviet Union provide further impetus for the "leap forward" from agrarian backwardness to modern industrialization.

[6] Richard H. Moorsteen, "Economic Prospects for Communist China." (Publication 1298 of the Rand Corporation.) Delivered at the meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, New York, April 1–3, 1958.
[7] *Peking Review*, Vol. 1, No. 9 (May 29, 1958), p. 20.



Symbolic of this leap, as well as of Moscow's assistance in making it possible, was the revelation by Kuo Mo-jo, President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, that "Chinese scientists are determined to get China's artificial earth satellite into the sky at an early date. . . . The earlier that day comes, the better."[8] Kuo's statement, hailing Sputnik III, admonished Chinese scientists to "study" Soviet achievements closely. A Chinese satellite might answer nonparty criticism of "Marxist-Leninist science" prominent in the "rightist attack" of 1957. The political impact elsewhere in Asia might be even more significant, especially on Taiwan and among the overseas Chinese.

## THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY

Few of these gains could have been foreseen by Mao Tse-tung in 1949. His commitment to the Russian alliance was primarily ideological, albeit reinforced by his perception of American commitment to Chiang Kai-shek in the civil war. Whatever may have been the strains of negotiating with Stalin in 1950, or in mediating between "great power chauvinism" (Russian) and "narrow nationalism" (Polish) in 1956–57, the mystique of "socialist unity against the imperialist camp" undoubtedly dominates Peking's view of world affairs.

But while the ideological component preceded in time the military and economic interaction in the Moscow-Peking axis, it alone is insufficient to explain the ties that bind. In fact, "universal application of the fundamental laws of Marxism-Leninism," championed by both partners, has not prevented important divergencies on both domestic and foreign policy. Certain consistent ideological differences between the Soviet and Chinese Communists can be discerned over the past three decades. Yet the degree to which these differences have influenced the political interaction of the two elites varies sharply from time to time.

These differences have been described by Peking as

> contradictions between socialist countries, between communist parties [which are] not basic . . . not the result of a fundamental clash of interests between classes but of conflict between right and wrong opinions or of a partial contradiction of interests.[9]

The first decade of the Moscow-Peking axis suggests that, in this respect, relations between Communist partners resemble those between capitalist states in the existence of conflicting national interests. The degree to which Peking may succeed in pressing its interests against those of Moscow depends upon four variable factors: the relative stability of the two elites in terms of domestic opposition; the relative influence of the two elites within the Communist bloc; the degree of Chinese dependence upon Russian assistance; and the prevailing power relationship between the Communist bloc and the "imperialist camp" as seen from Moscow and Peking. Thus it is not ideology alone which conditions relations between Moscow and Peking. In fact, ideology may be subordinated to mili-

[8] *Chung Kuo Ch'ing Nien Pao*, May 16, 1958. New China News Agency reports of Kuo's interview described his target date as "in the near future." *New York Times*, August 18, 1958, quoted Warsaw reports of Soviet agreement to assist in launching a Chinese satellite, concluded at the Khrushchev-Mao meeting in Peking.
[9] *Jen Min Jih Pao*, "More on the Historical Experience of Proletarian Dictatorship," December 29, 1956.

tary and economic factors so far as the resolution of differences is concerned.

Brief comparison of Peking's policy and position of 1949–50 with that of 1956–57 illustrates this point. During the first period, Mao supported the expulsion of Tito from the Cominform, muted his own claims to ideological innovation, and paid homage to Stalin's unfailing genius. Close reading of Chinese Communist writings of the period, however, revealed implicit differences with Moscow. If too obvious, such differences frequently were suppressed in later editions.

Mao's disagreements arose in part from his independence of Stalin in winning control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the 1930's and of all China in the 1940's. Suppression of disagreement was a necessary result of his utter dependence upon Stalin to maintain power after 1949. Rebuilding the shattered Chinese economy and restraining "imperialist aggression and its running-dog Chiang Kai-shek" necessitated reliance upon Russia. If Stalin's personal price for assistance was complete acceptance of Moscow's views, at least on the public record, Mao's inferior power compelled acquiesence.

The emergence of differences after Stalin's death, notably in the East European crisis of 1956–57, followed changes in these critical factors. First, stability of the Soviet elite was uncertain following the Twentieth Party Congress, while no comparable struggle for power appeared in the Chinese Communist Party. Second, Khrushchev dealt Soviet bloc leadership a heavy blow in his de-Stalinization speech at the Congress. Third, China's dependence on Russian support had declined, especially in the economic realm, from the earlier years. Finally, no crisis threatened the bloc from without, and in some respects the Soviet military position was becoming increasingly favorable in comparison with that of the United States.

These developments offered Mao more political leverage against Russian policies than had been available during the Stalin period. This transformation of China from satellite to partner is reflected in the changing image of the Moscow-Peking axis found in Western analyses. In 1950, many observers believed that Chinese intervention in the Korean crisis was forced upon Mao by Stalin. In 1958, an equally substantial core of opinion believed Khrushchev's attack on Tito to have been forced by Mao.

Setting aside such speculation for the moment, one final observation on the role of ideology might be made. It was more than ideological conviction which caused Peking to intervene in the bloc dispute of 1956, in contrast with its position in 1948. Intervention served Chinese military, economic, and political interests. Any breach of bloc unity affects Chinese military security both in the encouragement it offers "the imperialist camp" and in the burdens it places upon Soviet military forces. While Peking and Moscow agree on the need for bloc unity, however, they have differed on the means of attaining this end.

Furthermore, China's economic progress depends in part upon the reliability of planned deliveries from East Europe. Increased Soviet commitments to tide over unstable regimes may also reduce the availability of Russian economic assistance for China. Finally, Peking's prestige at home and abroad is involved with bloc developments. To cite specific instances, in 1956 Chinese university students voiced "shock" and "dismay" over Soviet military intervention in Hungary. The consequent turmoil in intellectual circles posed problems for the Chinese Communist Party throughout the summer of 1957. Meanwhile in



the United Nations, Burmese denunciation of the Russian military move coincided with Chou En-lai's tour of Southeast Asia. Chou, who was then both Premier and Foreign Minister, was publicly and privately pressed to explain his support for the use of foreign troops to intervene in domestic affairs.

This indicates that ideology alone did not prompt Chinese participation in the struggle between East Europe and the Soviet Union in 1956. It further suggests that changes in the Chinese position on this problem in 1957–58 came from equally serious military, economic, and political considerations, especially since these changes were incompatible with past ideological expressions. A brief review of the 1957–58 developments, therefore, may indicate the nature of these considerations and thereby throw light on subsequent Chinese policy in other areas.

## CHINESE VIEWS ON BLOC RELATIONS

Although the Twentieth Party Congress of February 1956 proclaimed the possibility of "different paths to socialism," the Poznań crisis in July and the Polish and Hungarian ferment of September and October made the question of Soviet controls over satellite developments a central issue. Vacillation and division in Moscow between "hard" and "soft" lines contrasted with Peking's position which fell midway between the confederative and the unitary approach to bloc relations. Chinese comment attacked extreme champions of independence as "bourgeois nationalists," at the same time rejecting complete Soviet domination as "great-power chauvinism."

Three points appeared at issue: the limits of Soviet prerogative vis-à-vis other bloc countries; the limits of deviation from Soviet practice by other bloc countries; and the means of achieving unanimity or of maintaining differences within the bloc. In brief, the Chinese formula called for keeping dissent confidential within the bloc while tolerating divergent views. This approach had characterized the CCP's approach to past differences with Moscow over theoretical and practical issues. It was succinctly stated by Chou En-lai in March 1957, two months after his successful repairing of relations between Warsaw and Moscow:

> . . . All the socialist countries take Marxism-Leninism as their guiding philosophy, which constitutes the basis of our unanimity on questions of principle. Yet this does not mean that all socialist countries, while being unanimous on principles, have also identical views on all questions at all times. Compared with the main aspect of our unanimity on principles, our differences on certain questions are after all of secondary importance. Moreover, these differences can be resolved and, on the common basis of Marxism-Leninism, a unanimity can be reached gradually through comradely discussions and consultation. Even if no unanimity can be reached for the time being, it would also be normal to reserve the differences while upholding our solidarity.[10]

The consistency with which Peking promoted this policy despite varying reactions in Moscow was manifest in the authoritative reports of Mao's encouragement to Gomulka throughout 1956–57, contrasted with Khrushchev's personal opposition to Gomulka both before and after the Hungarian uprising.[11] It was evidenced in the more moderate criticism of Yugoslav statements on Hungary in *Jen Min Jih Pao*, compared with *Pravda*. Similarly Politburo mem-

[10] Chou En-lai, "Report on Visit to Eleven Countries in Asia and Europe," to the third session of the Second National Committee of the Chinese People's Political and Consultative Conference, March 5, 1957, NCNA, Peking, same date.

[11] For detailed review of this and the following points see Whiting, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), pp. 142–59. See also Richard F. Starr, "New Course In Poland," *ibid.*, pp. 64–88.

ber P'eng Chen's conciliatory visit to Belgrade came a few weeks before Soviet suspension of credits to Tito's government in February 1957. Only on the question of Hungary did Moscow and Peking present a unanimous front, established after differing domestic reports on the early stages of the revolt.

Formal enunciation of Sino-Soviet agreement on bloc relations, in the joint communiqué of January 19, 1957, asserted, "The socialist countries are independent and sovereign states and relations between them are based upon the Leninist principle of national equality." The statement reiterated the famous Panch Shila or "five principles" of the Sino-Indian agreement of 1954, "complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, independence, sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs." The last point in particular symbolized the nub of Polish-Soviet problems in 1956–57. The context of the statement, which was issued upon Chou En-lai's departure from Moscow, suggested that Chinese mediation had assured Gomulka's survival against internal and external "Stalinist" pressures.

Thus the need for intervention in bloc affairs coincided with Peking's ability to intervene, reflected in the previously discussed increase in military, economic, and political power. The results were favorable; Peking's mediation appeared to cement ties between Warsaw and Moscow. Soviet acquiescence in Gomulka's leadership, despite his appeasement of the Polish peasantry and the Catholic Church, was reciprocated by Gomulka's insistence upon party leadership and his careful, consistent attack against "revisionism." The consequent reduction of tensions within Poland, paralleled throughout East Europe in the spring and summer of 1957, furthered both Soviet and Chinese strategic and economic interests. Finally, acceptance of the Chinese formula for bloc relations elevated Peking's prestige both inside and outside the bloc, without impairing the basic unity of the Moscow alliance.

## THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 1957

Suddenly the Chinese formula was abandoned and pressure for conformity with Soviet policy reapplied throughout East Europe. In September, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union theses for the November celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution warned that "those who stress the national peculiarities of each country marching to socialism" were "fundamentally opposed to Marxism-Leninism." Resisting this pressure, Gomulka, writing in *Pravda* on November 5, restated his past argument for "a specifically Polish road to socialism that accorded with our own concrete conditions." The next day, Khrushchev and Mao, in that order, delivered parallel injunctions to the Supreme Soviet against "revisionism." The Soviet leader warned:

> The dream of the enemies of socialism is that communists should start looking for some completely new, artificial road to socialism for each individual country. . . . This is one of the chief dangers and we must wage the most resolute fight against it.

Mao followed, declaring, "At present, the urgent task is to oppose revisionist deviations." Gomulka, as third speaker, did not echo these remarks.

Gomulka's position was a curious one. Repeatedly in Poland he had already attacked "revisionism." His expressions on the need for bloc unity carried no less conviction than did those of other bloc leaders. Yet within the context of the November conference, he appeared unwilling to subscribe to the positions



enunciated by Khrushchev and Mao. The precise nature of the stakes for which he was playing remains obscure. However, his differences with the Sino-Soviet position, particularly in choice of emphasis, are apparent.

Gomulka's article in *Pravda* reiterated the 1956 formula for bloc relations, stressing "the Leninist principles of complete equality, mutual respect, independence, and sovereignty." Mao, however, signaled a major shift from the earlier Chinese position, making no reference to "equality" or "independence" for bloc members in his Moscow remarks. Dropping the 1956–57 term "socialist commonwealth of nations" with its confederative connotations, Mao evoked the more traditional image of "the socialist camp" in a militant defense of Soviet leadership:

> The socialist force has surpassed the imperialist force. Our socialist camp should have a leader, and this is the Soviet Union. The enemy also has a leader, and this is America. If there is no leader, the strength will be weakened.[12]

Mao's argument for Soviet leadership paralleled Khrushchev's attack against revisionism in the reference to external threat. Here, too, the Sino-Soviet partners differed from the Polish leader in their emphasis upon the danger of war. Gomulka nowhere at the conference attacked "U. S. imperialism," but claimed hope in "the strengthening of the peace-loving forces and in there being greater chances for the preservation of peace." He justified reduced Polish industrial investments and other deviations from Soviet practice in part because of the absence of "imperialist and civil wars . . . and the threat of intervention" which had faced the early Soviet regime. By implication, no such threats now faced the bloc.

Mao, however, warned of "imperialist wolves" who "put their hope in war." Threats from "U. S. imperialists" in Hungary, Syria, Egypt, and Taiwan won special attention. His address to the Supreme Soviet made no reference to "the broad peace area" or to "the contradictions within the imperialist camp." He did not repeat the theme of 1956–57 that "war is no longer inevitable" and did not echo the foreign policy analyses of Ch'en Yi and Chou En-lai of the same period which saw "the relaxation of tension" prevailing in international relations. Just as Mao followed the lead of the Soviet Communist party and Khrushchev in redefining bloc relations, so too he supported the bellicose Soviet posture during the recent Syrian crisis by focusing on the threat of war.

The November 1957 conference produced two documents. The first was a "declaration" signed by twelve bloc delegations, the Yugoslavs abstaining. The second, a "peace manifesto," won support from sixty-four Communist parties, including the Yugoslavs. The "declaration" was more important, its compromise nature manifested in its inclusion of essential elements from both the Polish and the Sino-Soviet positions. Postconference comment diluted the appearance of unanimity with each side stressing those aspects which reflected its original stand. Increased Soviet attention to "revisionism" after November suggested Belgrade as the obvious target, in view of Tito's refusal to attend the conference and Yugoslav failure to support the declaration. Gomulka's position, in retrospect, appears to have made Warsaw also subject to pressure from the new Sino-Soviet line.

To the knowledge of the writer, no anticipation of Mao's shift on the problems of bloc relations and revisionism

[12] Mao Tse-tung, speaking to Chinese students at Moscow University, November 17, 1957, reported by NCNA, Peking, November 20, 1957.

had appeared in the Chinese press, not even in the articles written for the November anniversary. Polish and Yugoslav sources subsequently claimed surprise at the extent of Sino-Soviet unanimity in supporting firmness within the bloc and harshness towards nonbloc countries, and offered no credible explanation for the phenomenon.[18]

To be sure, political tensions in China seemed explosive during June and July 1957, with open criticism of the party's domestic and foreign policy from influential government and intellectual spokesmen. Yet the "antirightist struggle" of August and September appeared to have suppressed opposition. Serious as was the damage to Mao's experiment in resolving "nonantagonistic contractions" through "blooming and contending," it seemed insufficient to cause so sudden and far-reaching a reversal of policy. Nor did Tito's refusal to attend the conference compel renewed pressure upon Gomulka. The Polish leader had shown no basic change in policy from the spring of 1957. At that time, Cyrankiewicz's visit to Peking had prompted an announcement from Mao of a return trip to Warsaw. Mao's unannounced cancellation of the visit was never explained, but at the time was not interpreted in Warsaw as evidence of displeasure.

### 1958 Attack on Yugoslav "Revisionism"

The import of the new Moscow-Peking line became apparent in 1958. In March, publication of the draft program for the Seventh Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists (LYC) reopened much of the controversy which had underlain the Moscow meeting.[14] The Soviet rebuttal in *Kommunist* in mid-April, though mild in tone, signaled a wide range of disagreement on important points of domestic and foreign policy. Bloc delegations boycotted the LYC Congress, despite some modification in the draft program. Following the adoption of the program, amidst pointed Yugoslav speeches bitterly referring to 1948, the bloc stepped up the attack. On May 5, *Jen Min Jih Pao* called the program "out and out revisionist" and went beyond previous Soviet comment in approving the 1948 Cominform resolution as "basically correct."

Space precludes a detailed review of the massive campaign which followed. The lines were consistent with those apparent in November, however. On the one hand, Sino-Soviet attacks pursued the themes of "unity of the socialist camp," "the danger of war," and "revisionism," in order to link Tito's acceptance of American aid with the idea that his position undermined the bloc. On the other hand, Polish comment belatedly and temperately criticized specific points of the LYC program but limited the area and means of the dispute. While Moscow suspended economic credits to Belgrade, Warsaw continued to negotiate economic exchange with the Yugoslavs. When Budapest linked Nagy's execution with alleged Yugoslav provocation of the Hungarian uprising, signs of Polish displeasure contrasted with official Chinese "joy" at the announcement. Khrushchev's personal attacks against Tito won belated response from Gomulka, with no Polish endorsement for "Soviet leadership" and with typical Polish emphasis upon "independence" and "equality" embodied in the "socialist commonwealth of nations."

Thus the 1956–57 political proximity between Warsaw and Peking against Moscow now changed into a Moscow-Peking union against Warsaw. This union was obscured by the staggered timing of the statements from the two capitals, as well as from apparent Chinese initiative in increasing the intensity of attack. It seems likely, however, that both these phenomena were prearranged, alternating the source of pressure upon Belgrade while gradually increasing it. The alternative image of Mao forcing Khrushchev's hand, even to the point of compelling suspension of Soviet credits to Tito, does not take account of the relative power of the two leaders, much less of the probable pattern of Chinese behavior in such circumstances.

### "East Wind Over West Wind"

This leaves unexplained the reason for Mao's major shift in November 1957. Conceivably he agreed to abandon the previous moderate policy in reaction against the combined pressures of domestic criticism from "bourgeois rightists" and of continued East European dissension from "revisionists." More than doctrine was at stake. At home the challenge to Chinese Communist leadership struck at the foundations of political power. In East Europe the challenge to Soviet leadership struck at the foundations of strategic power. Should Tito's wooing of Gomulka prompt the Poles to emulate the Yugoslavs and bargain between the United States and the Soviet Union without commitment to either side, China's strategic and economic interests in bloc unity would be jeopardized.

These interests appear, as in the past, to have played the more immediate role, making ideological concern a secondary, albeit contributing, factor. On November 17, 1957, Mao offered a new formulation proclaiming the strategic ascendancy of the socialist over the "imperialist" camp, "East Wind prevails over West Wind." His phrase, which keynoted Chinese propaganda throughout 1957–58, was linked with the Moscow conferences and Soviet earth satellite launchings as "proving" the superior strength of the Soviet bloc. *Jen Min Jih Pao,* on November 22, amplified Mao's words to include Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile accomplishments. Mao's proclamation of "a new turning point" in the relation of forces was reiterated in Chinese statements from this point forth.

To be sure, previous Chinese editorial comment had hailed both ICBM and Sputnik developments as marking the superiority of socialism over capitalism and the "smashing rebuff" to "hopes of imperialists who seek to start a new war." Yet it is possible to discern a difference between propagandistic reactions following closely on the heels of Soviet announcements, and authoritative analyses from high government spokesmen laying down major policy lines. In this regard, it is of interest that Mao's initial references in Moscow to the Sputnik hailed it in an exclusively scientific reference to "man's conquest of nature"; his strategic emphasis came only two weeks later. This shift brought Mao into line with the evaluation of Soviet weapons developments voiced by Soviet Air Marshall Vershinin and Premier Khrushchev during the Syrian crisis of September and October, 1957. In short, the evidence suggests a Chinese willingness to exploit Russian accomplishments for at least political propaganda, but that the final decision to do so at the highest level came only after consultation in Moscow.

One other development must be noted.

[18] *New York Times*, December 14, 1957 and January 4, 1958, reported that Gomulka's talks with Mao had aroused concern over the Chinese support for Soviet views. *Ibid.*, June 15, 1958 and July 15, 1958, gave conflicting accounts from Belgrade of Yugoslav explanations for events, but all reports agreed in the "unexpected" nature of Sino-Soviet unanimity.

[14] *Ibid.*, July 15, 1958, offers an interesting Yugoslav account of the connection between events in November 1957 and March–June 1958.

On November 5, a high level Chinese military mission suddenly departed from Peking for Moscow, too late to attend the Russian celebration. The group stayed in the Soviet Union for three weeks, reportedly attending reviews and inspecting military installations. Its composition, however, and the timing of its flight suggest that Mao required wider military assistance in problems under review than was afforded by the Minister of National Defense, Marshal P'eng Te-huai, who accompanied Mao initially.

Is it possible that Mao agreed to support Khrushchev politically on the question of bloc relations with the hope or expectation of sharing in the new Soviet acquisition of military strength? The image of such bargaining requires considerable refinement before serious consideration can be given this hypothesis. At the very least, however, it suggests that a new Soviet willingness to give political support for Chinese moves in Asia was agreed upon, perhaps including Soviet statements concerning the use of nuclear arms under certain contingencies as a deterrent to possible moves by the United States. From this minimal level of agreement which assumes only political moves by Moscow, Mao may have anticipated the sufficient possibility of a later expansion of Soviet support to have left the question of actual Sino-Soviet sharing of nuclear weapons to another time. Alternatively, increased Russian assistance in launching a Chinese satellite would have domestic as well as foreign benefits for Peking worthy of Mao's reciprocal political support against Khrushchev's "revisionist" opponents.

Such speculation answers no questions but may make more plausible the hypothesis of Chinese political leverage operating upon Russian policy within certain conditions and under certain limitations. The year following the November conference reinforced this possibility. In the change of policy towards East Europe, Mao Tse-tung appeared to gain nothing, while losing prestige not only within the bloc but among uncommitted non-Communist countries as well. Khrushchev, however, increased Russian bloc dominance in appearance, if not in reality.

The situation seemed reversed in the crisis in the Taiwan Strait. Here it was Khrushchev who steadily increased Russian commitment to a situation whose immediate benefits accrued only to China. The Soviet leader risked much of his "summit-conference" posture, and, in the last analysis, appeared to risk Soviet military involvement over a situation which had little direct bearing on Russian interests. Thus it is only in the general sense that Russian and Chinese interests converge in maximizing the pressures upon both bloc and non-bloc targets through exploitation of Soviet weapons. In specific instances, the divergence of interest is sufficiently great to compel the question: how has agreement been reached for co-ordinating policy?

The problem of plumbing Sino-Soviet secrecy was aptly demonstrated by the Khrushchev-Mao meeting in Peking of July 30 to August 3, 1958. First, the secrecy of the meeting was well kept, to judge by the surprised reaction of Western chancelleries, although its participants included not only the two chiefs of state but also Chou En-lai, Wang Chia-hsiang, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch'en Yi, and Minister of National Defense P'eng Te-huai on the Chinese side, with Soviet participants including Minister of Defense Marshal Rodin Y. Malinovsky, acting Minister of Foreign Affairs V. V. Kuznetsov, and B. N. Ponomarev. Secondly, the lengthy statement issued upon conclusion of the four-day conference consisted mostly of



propaganda themes current in Communist media on such issues as summit conferences, the Middle East crisis, and Yugoslav "revisionism." No mention was made of Taiwan or the offshore islands, although this problem was immediately to raise international tensions to heights unequaled since the early days of the Korean crisis.

Yet the abundance of published materials which flow from Peking and Moscow may provide clues as to the differences of policy between the two partners. By testing various hypotheses concerning these differences and their resolution against the course of succeeding events, we improve our understanding of the dynamics of the Moscow-Peking axis. The task of uncovering Russian and Chinese intentions separately is difficult enough. But the greater problem of determining the interaction of Russian and Chinese policy poses the basic challenge for those concerned with the fate of the Arab-Asian world which borders this formidable alliance.

# Peking's International Position and the Cold War

By Shen-yu Dai

Abstract: Chinese Communist foreign policy is a blend of three major ingredients: the cultural confidence of the imperial Chinese tradition, the psychological energy of modern Chinese nationalism, and the political aggressiveness of contemporary Chinese Communism. These elements combine to produce a pluralist mentality which is frequently evident in Peking's vigorous cold war diplomacy. Mainland China's pattern of foreign relations is complex but cohesive. Its basic aim is the attainment of recognized international status as a major power. Its instrumentalities vary widely: political, economic, cultural, and propaganda devices are all used regularly. During the past decade, Peking's "people's diplomacy" has helped Communist China to overcome the limitations imposed by its *de jure* position and to gain increased influence in Asian affairs. Recently Communist policy has manifested growing interest in the so-called "national independence forces" not only in Asia but also in the Middle East, Africa, and even Latin America. Both Chinese national interest and Communist ideology compel Communist China to attempt to extend its ties in these areas.

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*Shen-yu Dai, Ph.D., New York City, is a staff member of the research project on Men and Politics in Modern China, Columbia University. After graduate study at the University of Pennsylvania, he did research for the Center of International Studies (CENIS), Massachusetts Institute of Technology; the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania; and Human Relations Area Files, Yale University. Author of Peking, Moscow, and the Communist Parties of Colonial Asia (CENIS, 1954), he has contributed articles and reviews on China and Asia to Current History, Western Political Quarterly, and other journals.*





In the joint communiqué issued on August 3, 1958, at the conclusion of their meeting in Peking, Mao Tse-tung and Nikita S. Khrushchev declared that they were in full agreement on the importance of maintaining Sino-Soviet cooperation not only to "strengthen the solidarity of the socialist camp," but also to consolidate their ties with "all other peace-loving countries and peoples." [1] The statement outlines the dimensions of the present international ambitions of the People's Republic of China and suggests the desirability of renewed examination of some aspects of Peking's general program of foreign relations.

The eruption of reorganized national power on the mainland of China since 1949–50 has led to a drastic alteration in both Far Eastern and world politics. The international impact of Communist China is complex, for the Peking regime leads a double life in foreign affairs, acting simultaneously as a key source of influence in the Communist bloc and as a major power center in Asia. It is common but misleading to view Mao Tse-tung's China solely as the eastern terminus of the Moscow-Peking axis; such an approach tends to underestimate the international position of a country whose role is also in and of Asia. While Mao has bound his regime firmly to the USSR, he has avoided Russian control over the essential instruments of Chinese national power and has developed a vigorous foreign policy linking elements of continuity which are predominantly Chinese with new and radical elements which are uniquely Communist.

## The Pattern of Foreign Relations

While Peking's foreign policy blends many elements, it is primarily cold war diplomacy, geared to the realities of a divided world and driven by the deep impulse to extend Communist influence and authority. As a full member of the "socialist camp," Communist China is involved practically and politically with the Soviet Union in an unceasing conflict against the "imperialist" powers. In this conflict, diplomacy has the overriding purpose of winning allies or, at least, of neutralizing nations against alignment with the enemy. This type of cold war diplomacy has compelled Peking to conduct its foreign relations by many special means—by a program of "people's diplomacy" which, in essence, is political, economic, cultural, and psychological warfare in diplomatic dress. Designed to by-pass governments, it is aimed at the development of direct relations between official or state-controlled agencies in Communist China and unofficial groups and organizations abroad. In these relationships, Communist China has often been able to derive bargaining advantages which she would not have in formal diplomatic negotiations.

In an international environment characterized by tension and unrest, Peking's diplomacy attempts to make maximum use of the developed national power of Communist China in order to break down the barriers which now inhibit her international influence. The continued existence of a rival Chinese political authority in Taiwan and the continued lack of general international acceptance pose serious problems for Peking. Of the 60-odd Chinese diplomatic establishments outside the communist bloc, about 45 are in countries which maintain formal relations with the Republic of China and only 20 in countries which recognize the People's Republic of China. And in all United Nations forums, the representatives of Taipei rather than those of Peking speak for China.

Chinese Communist foreign policy has undergone many changes during the

[1] *New York Times*, August 4, 1958.

past decade. In the early period after the nationwide victory in 1949–50, policy was dominated by blunt aggressiveness and looked to the rapid spread of "people's revolutions" throughout the Far East. The Korean crisis (1950–53) brought Chinese Communist forces into direct action against non-Communist forces. During the period from the Korean truce of 1953, through the Geneva Conference and the proclamation of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" in 1954, to the Asian-African Conference at Bandung and the Geneva Conference of 1955, various factors contributed to the development of a more moderate posture in diplomacy.[2] In 1958, Peking's policies again showed harshness, both toward deviant tendencies within the Communist bloc and especially toward the United States.

## INGREDIENTS OF POLICY

Peking's foreign policy is a powerful mixture, for it blends the cultural confidence of the imperial Chinese tradition, the psychological energy of modern Chinese nationalism, and the political aggressiveness of contemporary Chinese communism. These elements are not necessarily harmonious, and may even be incompatible at times. But each has its influence on Peking's policy makers and on the methods and symbols which they employ in their foreign relations.

In the direction of foreign affairs, the Chinese Communist regime thus has a pluralist mentality in which three different self-images—Chinese tradition, modern nationalism, and revolutionary communism—are present and available for use under varying circumstances.[3]

Peking has, for example, frequently stressed its cultural affinity with the neutralist nations of Asia. It has, on the other hand, vowed its dedication to the cause of unity and solidarity with its Communist allies both in Asia and in Europe. And, in dealings with Western governments, it has manifested continuing concern with the punctilious observance of its status as a modern national state. The fact that Communist China has these three faces which she may utilize in her international dealings makes her a formidable opponent, for she can easily concentrate or juggle the façades in accordance with the target and the occasion.

Because of the ancient position of China as a major cultural force in East Asia, the leaders in Peking today are still influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by the hoary tradition of the Middle Kingdom. Mao Tse-tung himself has never considered his regime as divorced from China's historical past. He has said,

> Our nation has a history of several thousand years, a history which has its own characteristics and is full of treasures. . . . The China of today has developed from the China in history; as we are believers in the Marxist approach to history, we must not cut off our whole historical past. We must make a summing-up from Confucius down to Sun Yat-sen and inherit this precious legacy. This will help us much in directing the great movement of today.[4]

[2] Cf. A. Doak Barnett, "The United States and Communist China," in *The United States and the Far East* (New York, The American Assembly, Columbia University), 1956, pp. 152ff.

[3] For a typical example of the Peking regime's pluralist mentality in present-day diplomacy, see "Chou En-lai's Report on World Situation and Tour of Europe and Southeast Asia," in American Consulate General, Hongkong, *Current Background* (CB), No. 439 (March 8, 1957). Here Chou talks about "kinship" and "ancient ties" with respect to Cambodia, and so forth; about "comradely friendship" with respect to North Vietnam as well as Poland, and so forth; but about "normal relations" and other international issues involving the West with respect to Ceylon.

[4] Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1954), Vol. 2, pp. 259–60.



This sense of continuity, which carries with it cultural pride and a feeling of "manifest destiny," affects Peking's view of regions such as Korea and Vietnam—areas of primary concern to the Chinese Empire for centuries. It also affects the Chinese Communist regime's relations with and attitudes toward other countries in Asia which formerly bore tribute to the imperial authorities in China. And, not least, it affects Peking's (and Taipei's) constant opposition to the existence of "two Chinas," for the Middle Kingdom, while often divided in fact, always maintained the concept of Sinic unity as an ultimate ideal.

### *Nationalism and Communism*

A second major ingredient in Peking's foreign policy stems from modern Chinese nationalism, which developed between 1850 and 1950, a century of Chinese history notably different from earlier periods. During these decades many of the central assumptions underlying traditional Chinese civilization were steadily undermined in a world permeated with developing technological power. Bred of the humiliations suffered by the Middle Kingdom at the hands of the Western powers and Japan, Chinese nationalism was intensified by China's persisting weakness in the face of superior outside strength.

Today the Communists claim to uphold the "true" principles of Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Chinese Republic in 1912, and pose themselves as the new defenders of freedom, equality, and Chinese national interests. In theoretical terms, they condemn the "bourgeois nationalism" of the Kuomintang as sterile and superficial and proclaim, in juxtaposition with "proletarian internationalism," a new "patriotism" embodied in a "fervent love of one's fatherland and its people, language, culture, literature, and best traditions."[5] In practical terms, they aim not only at the exclusion of foreign privileges (as the Nationalists did before them) but also, more important, at the development of an integrated national state capable of gaining and holding a secure position in the modern world. In a sense, Mao Tse-tung has harnessed the deep-seated Chinese distrust of the West and Western "imperialism" and mobilized a formidable drive around one fundamental theme: the Middle Kingdom resurgent as a strong national state.

The third major ingredient in Peking's foreign policy today is communism. Firmly allied with the "socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union," Peking views the world through the lenses of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and consistently proclaims that its primary international obligation is to "enhance the strength and solidarity" of the bloc. The special position of the People's Republic of China as the newest major power in the Communist world creates a new factor in its foreign relations which never existed before in Chinese history. Peking's foreign policy today is directed by a compact professional Communist Party elite—the most stable in the bloc—who have had years of experience in China with the tools of political and psychological warfare which they are now utilizing at the international level in a constant effort to extend Chinese Communist influence and authority.

## TOOLS OF FOREIGN POLICY

In its drive to establish and maintain its international position, Peking has employed a wide variety of instrumentalities: diplomatic, political, economic, and cultural-propagandistic. In

[5] Liu Shao-ch'i, *Internationalism and Nationalism* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1952), p. 50.

TABLE 1—DE JURE RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA

| THE COMMUNIST BLOC | ASIA | EUROPE | THE MIDDLE EAST |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. USSR | 1. Afghanistan | 1. Denmark | 1. Egypt |
| 2. Albania | 2. Burma | 2. Finland | 2. Iraq |
| 3. Bulgaria | 3. Cambodia | 3. Great Britain[a] | 3. Israel[b] |
| 4. Czechoslovakia | 4. Ceylon | 4. The Netherlands[a] | 4. Syria |
| 5. East Germany | 5. India | 5. Norway | 5. Yemen |
| 6. Hungary | 6. Indonesia | 6. Sweden | 6. Sudan |
| 7. North Korea | 7. Nepal | 7. Switzerland | |
| 8. North Vietnam | 8. Pakistan | | |
| 9. Mongolian People's Republic | | | |
| 10. Poland | | | |
| 11. Rumania | | | |
| 12. Yugoslavia | | | |

[a] At the Chargé d'affaires level only.

[b] For political reasons, Israel's recognition of Peking (January 1950) has not been reciprocated.

this pattern, formal diplomatic exchange at the governmental level is only one—and often the least important—aspect of Peking's foreign relations. These tactical strands in Peking's foreign policy, in turn, are not isolated from one another but are interwoven, interacting, and mutually complementary. Taken together, they make the "people's diplomacy" of Communist China a far more intricate mechanism than most non-Communist observers realize.

In the diplomatic sphere the Peking regime has now been accorded *de jure* recognition by over thirty countries of the world. These include the entire bloc of twelve Communist governments in Asia and Eastern Europe, as well as thirteen non-Communist governments in Asia and Africa, and seven in Western Europe. For its part, Peking has also recognized several other governments in Asia and Africa (for example: Malaya, Ghana, Tunisia, Morocco, Guinea, and Algeria), even though the latter have not yet reciprocated. Table 1 shows the diplomatic position of the People's Republic of China as of November 1958.

By including nondiplomatic relations, Peking has concluded treaties and agreements linking it with more than forty other nations of the world.[6] While it has made consistent efforts to join international conferences and to gain membership in international organizations, Peking's policy of refusing to participate in any body which includes representatives of the Republic of China has excluded it from most non-Communist organizations and gatherings.

### *Liaison program and economic offensive*

In addition to its formal diplomatic relations, Peking has also developed a broad program of political liaison with both Communist and non-Communist organizations throughout the world. Its growing stature in the Communist bloc has provided increasing opportunities to influence Communist parties both inside and outside the bloc. And its quest for legitimacy and stature has also been supported by contacts with foreign political leaders and legislators. Countries having diplomatic relations with Peking have frequently sent parliamentary delegations to mainland China, and Peking in return has dispatched groups representing its National People's Congress abroad. The visit of the British Labor Party mission (August 1954) was noteworthy. Leading French politicians—Edgar Faure (May 1957) and Pierre Mendès-France (August 1958)—have been Peking's guests. Eager to increase her political support, Peking has also invited Latin American legislators to come to Communist China as government guests; more ominous have been the sojourns of Nepal's K. I. Singh and Thailand's Nai Pridi Phanomyong in Communist China, for this suggests the way in which Peking's diplomatic hospitality may be extended to include political asylum. The significance of this program, always well advertised, may be noted in the variety of foreign dignitaries who visited Communist China in late 1957 alone: Vice President Radhakrishnan of India; Prime Minister Daud of Afghanistan; former Vice President Hatta and Speaker of Parliament Sartono of Indonesia; Chief Justice U Myint Thein, Deputy Prime Ministers U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Nyein, and a Parliamentary delegation of Burma; and Deputy Prime Minister Crown Prince Mohammed El-Badr of Yemen—the first from an Arab state.[7]

Peking has also recognized the importance of economic tools in the implementation of its foreign policy, and its economic offensive has in many cases strengthened Chinese influence where Peking's political and diplomatic position has been poor. While nothing like the Russian program in magnitude, Peking's program has nevertheless been increasing. Despite the heavy demands of its domestic industrialization drive, Communist China has diverted part of its resources to foreign aid programs in both Communist and non-Communist areas in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Since 1953 she has granted economic and technical aid to North Korea (November 1953, January 1955), North Vietnam (July 1955, July 1957), and Outer Mongolia (August 1956), dispatching Chinese technicians and allocating Chinese goods and equipment to assist reconstruction and development activities. And the steady expansion of Chinese industrial and technological capacities has also had repercussions in non-Communist areas. Among those who now receive Peking's economic and technical aid are Cambodia (June 1956, US$22.4 million), Ceylon (September 1957, US$15.8 million), Nepal (October 1956, US$12.6 million), and Yemen (January 1958, US$16 million).[8] Some countries have received credit loans from Communist China, for example, Burma (December 1957, US$4.2 million); Indonesia (November 1956, US$16 million, also pending, US$20 million); Ceylon (March 1958, US$10.5 million); Hungary (May 1957, US$25 million); and so forth.[9]

### *Trading and cultural relations*

A broad trade offensive is another key element in Peking's foreign economic program. By 1958 Communist China claimed to have established trading relations with more than ninety countries and areas; with over half of these Peking had concluded formal trade treaties and/or contracts with unofficial trade organizations. These include countries in Asia: North Korea, North Vietnam, Outer Mongolia, Afghanistan, Malaya,

[6] For some details, consult *Die Verträge der Volksrepublik China mit Anderen Staaten* (Frankfurt/Main: Metzner, 1957). This volume is a useful calendar of bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements, together with selected texts, over the years 1950–57.

[7] See Chou En-lai, "The Present International Situation and China's Foreign Policy," CB, No. 492 (February 14, 1958).

[8] For details on the Yemen agreements, see American Consulate General, Hongkong, *Survey of China Mainland Press* (SCMP), No. 1691 (January 16, 1958), pp. 21–31.

[9] Consult U. S. Department of State, *The Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive in the Less Developed Countries*, Washington, D. C., 1958; also *Handbook on People's China*, Peking, 1957, pp. 129–39.

Singapore, Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Cambodia, Nepal, Pekistan, and Japan; the Middle East: Lebanon, Sudan, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia; Europe: USSR, all East European Communist regimes, Great Britain, France, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria; and Latin America: Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.[10] Peking now regularly takes part in international trade fairs in both Europe and Asia and sends trade representatives and delegations abroad. At the same time, it sponsors export commodities fairs and invites foreign industrialists, businessmen, and bankers to visit mainland China. Through these channels Peking seeks to evade the handicaps of its diplomatic weakness. Cambodia, for example, had concluded trade agreements with, and received aid from, China well before July 1958, when she recognized Peking. And in the case of Japan, both major trade pacts (four up to 1958) and lesser contracts have been concluded, nominally through "private" organizations, in the absence of either recognition or diplomatic relations and in the face of concurrent trading with Taiwan.

An active program of "cultural exchange" has also added a new and significant dimension to Chinese Communist diplomacy. This effort is exerted not only by government agencies but also by nearly two dozen major "people's organizations" in mainland China, such as the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, the China Committee for Commemoration of Great Figures in World Culture, and others.[11] A steady stream of individuals and group missions —ranging from scientists to football teams, from artists to philosophers, from journalists to religious leaders—flows to and from Peking.[12] Art exhibitions, scientific conferences, academic symposia, theatrical performances, athletic matches, and a host of other events garnish this "cultural diplomacy." Through these channels, Peking claims that it developed contacts with 63 countries in 1955 and 75 (including 63 non-Communist) nations in 1956.[13]

Blended with this cultural offensive is a constantly expanding program of propaganda designed to portray the People's Republic to the world in the best possible light. Here the Chinese Communists also make use of all available media. Radio Peking now broadcasts daily in Mandarin as well as several other Chinese dialects—including Cantonese, Chaochow, and Amoy—and also in more than a dozen foreign languages besides English—including Arabic, Burmese, Cambodian, French, Indonesian, Japanese, Korean, Laotian, Persian, Spanish, Thai, Turkish, and Vietnamese. Special programs are beamed toward critical areas of the world as events require; for example, toward the Middle East in Turkish, Arabic, and Persian in late 1957, in anticipation of the Cairo Conference on Asian and African People's Solidarity. The official New China News Agency (NCNA) now has 21 offices abroad as well as 30 in China, and its daily news file averages some 10,000 words in English alone.

[10] CB No. 438 lists most of these countries up to December 1956; others are added up to date by author.

[11] For a list with brief descriptions up to 1957, see *Handbook on People's China* (note 9 *supra*), pp. 163–78. The last mentioned was organized in April 1958 (see New China News Agency, or NCNA, Peking, April 23, 1958).

[12] Consult Richard L. Walker, "Guided Tourism in China," *Problems of Communism* (September–October, 1957), pp. 31–36.

[13] Shanghai, *Wen Hui Pao*, March 2, 1956, and Peking, *Jen Min Jih Pao* (People's Daily), January 21, 1957.



In the publications field, Communist China produces a mass of material in the Chinese language depicting the progress of "socialist construction" on the mainland for the overseas Chinese. The Foreign Language Press in Peking also prints books and periodicals for distribution abroad in English, Russian, French, German, Spanish, Japanese, Indonesian, Vietnamese, Burmese and other languages, and publishes several important journals for the Western reading public such as *People's China* (originally in English, now replaced by French and Indonesian editions), *China Pictorial* (published in 14 languages), *Chinese Literature* (English), *China Reconstructs* (English), and *Peking Review* (English, replacing the old edition of *People's China*). Movies prepared for showing abroad also make effective propaganda for the Peking regime in many parts of Asia and Africa, and now also at international film festivals.

## COMMUNIST CHINA'S POSITION IN ASIA

Through this comprehensive program of "people's diplomacy," Peking has been active and influential in an increasing number of areas of the world despite the restraints inherent in its *de jure* position. It has already gained and consolidated major status within the Communist bloc, and it has come to occupy a position of significant authority in Asia where China's traditional, modern, and current interests are naturally centered.

With respect to Outer Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam—the three Communist areas which adjoin it on the north, northeast, and south—Communist China has made maximum utilization of geographical, historical, cultural, and racial as well as ideological factors in order to expand her political and economic influence.

Among the West's allies in Asia, Japan remains the prime target of Peking's diplomacy of "neutralization," which has as its aim the disruption of Japan's present ties with the United States and the development of increasing friendship and co-operation between Tokyo and Peking.[14] Tough or tactful as circumstances require, the Peking regime has already made considerable headway in this direction.[15]

With regard to Taiwan, Peking is adamant in its militant view that it cannot in the long run tolerate the continued existence of an operating Chinese government which stands as an alternative to its own political pretensions as the sole regime competent to represent China internationally. Peking is only slightly less hostile toward the anti-Communist governments of Korea and Vietnam, which are shielded by American power and prevent it from obtaining the full benefit of having Communist buffers on these critical borders.

And, with respect to Southeast Asia, which she views as her predestined sphere of long-range interest, Communist China has in recent years developed a relatively moderate posture based largely on the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" enunciated jointly, first with India and then with Burma, in mid-1954.[16] While continuing to extend

[14] Harold S. Quigley, in "The Chinese-Japanese Courtship," *Current History* (December 1957), has posed the question as to whether, in view of the apparent advantage vis-à-vis the West, Tokyo and Peking would not now "turn from separation to co-operation" in the Far East (p. 357).

[15] Consult C. Martin Wilbur, "Japan and the Rise of Communist China," in Hugh Borton and others, *Japan Between East and West* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957). Cf. Shao-Chuan Leng, "Japanese Attitudes Toward Communist China," *Far Eastern Survey* (June 1958).

[16] These principles are: 1. mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; 2. mutual nonaggression; 3. mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs;

its "people's diplomacy," Peking has focused attention on the maintenance of normal political relations with Asian governments to the south, granting economic assistance to some areas: Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Indonesia, and Nepal.

## THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

While Communist China's major security interests still rest in the Communist bloc and in East Asia, its present and potential involvement with other areas is now virtually on a global basis. During the 1956–58 period, Communist China manifested increasing interest in developing relations with areas in the Middle East and in Africa. With formal and informal ties firmly established with such countries as the United Arab Republic and Yemen, Southwest Asia and Africa now actually represent a new dimension in Chinese Communist diplomacy. In Western Europe, seven governments have recognized Peking, and most other countries have developed trading or other relations on an informal basis. Even Latin America is coming under Chinese Communist pressures as Peking has begun to direct specific anti-United States propaganda to that area and to seek the establishment of informal ties with political groups there whenever possible.[17]

In the projection of this global network of contacts, the Peking regime, while consistently according highest priority to its political objectives, has demonstrated a relatively high level of flexibility and realism. If the development of this pattern is noteworthy today, its implications for the future are also significant.

Late in 1957, Mao Tse-tung journeyed to the Soviet Union to participate in the meetings marking the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. In a speech to Chinese students and trainees at Moscow University on November 17, he stated:

> The whole world now has a population of 2.7 billion, of which the various socialist countries have nearly one billion; the independent, former colonial countries, more than 700 million; the countries now struggling for independence or for complete independence, 600 million; and the imperialist camp, only about 400 million. . . . At present . . . it is not the West wind which is prevailing over the East wind, but the East wind over the West wind.[18]

Mao's statement reiterated the Communist awareness of the changes which have taken place in the political distribution of the peoples of the world as a result of the dislocations produced by World War II and by the ensuing period of violent nationalism and international strife. He estimated the population of the world at some 2.7 billion. Of this total, the population of the Communist countries—including Communist China's 640 million people—now includes about 1 billion; that of the Western ("imperialist") states, some 400 million. Thus the "East wind" is said to be prevailing over the "West wind."

The position of the remaining sector of the world's population—a total of 1.3 billion (700 million in newly independent states which were formerly colonial area and 600 million in areas "now struggling for independence or for complete independence")—is significant.

4. equality and mutual benefit; and 5. peaceful coexistence. See *Documents Concerning Premier Chou En-lai's Visit to India and Burma*, Supplement to *People's China*, July 16, 1954.

[17] Latin American Communists, for example, have already been utilized by Peking to voice its opposition to an alleged United States attempt to form a "South Atlantic Treaty Organization"; see NCNA, Peking, July 11, 1957.

[18] *Ibid.*, November 18, 1957.



Mao Tse-tung was delineating the new vital zone in world political geography which a later Peking *Ta Kung Pao* editorial (April 27, 1958) labeled the "national independence forces" (*min-tsu tu-li li-liang*). In numerical strength, these forces exceed either the Communist bloc or the non-Communist areas clearly aligned with the United States. The zone presumably includes all the new national states of Asia and Africa which have attained independence, the remaining areas still under colonial administration, and (apparently) portions of Latin America allegedly dominated by "Yankee imperialism." In a later speech, Chou En-lai again stressed Peking's sense of indentification with Afrika and Latin America, as well as Asia:

> . . . the people of the Latin American countries have something in common with the peoples of Asian and African countries. They have common aims: to oppose colonialism, to oppose imperialist aggression and intervention, to demand peace and oppose war, to press for independent development of the national economy and emergence from backwardness. In other words . . . the people of the countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa have common aspirations and demands.[19]

The non-Communist and non-Chinese world does not recognize the specific validity of this political-ideological gerrymandering. But its general significance remains.[20] During the period since the Soviet Twentieth Party Congress (1956), the Sino-Soviet offensive toward the "national independence forces" has grown steadily. Chinese background, Chinese national interest, and China's present position as the major nonwhite power of the "socialist camp"—all compel Peking to make increasing efforts to extend her existing ties in this Asian-African area.[21]

[19] SCMP, No. 1836 (August 20, 1958), p. 40.

[20] John F. Melby, in "The Chinese-Russian Partnership," *Current History* (December 1957) has observed, for instance, that "the period of bi-polarization may be about over" (p. 326).

[21] In this connection, E. H. Rawlings, in "Elementaries of China's Foreign Policy," *Eastern World* (London), October 1957, has observed that "It is only natural that the Chinese want to head the revival of Asia and Africa as they are potentially the strongest coloured power in the world" (p. 15).

# Taiwan's Development as Free China

By Richard L. Walker

Abstract: In nine years the Chinese Nationalists have made substantial strides in rebuilding their government, morale, and symbolic appeal. Many of the civilian accomplishments on Taiwan have received little notice in the outside world. In the grim period, 1949–50, the Nationalist cause appeared hopeless, but United States protection and support since the Communist aggression in Korea in June 1950 have facilitated positive achievements. 1951 and 1952 were years of reform, followed by a four-year (1953–56) period of adjustment and planning. During these years increased emphasis was placed on building Taiwan's symbolism as a repository of Chinese culture. In 1957 and 1958 the cumulative effect of domestic reforms and United States aid brought a burst of flowering in economic and cultural fields. Six areas of major achievement in Taiwan deserve special mention: the land reform program, internationally acclaimed as a model; the work of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction; improved living conditions which give Taiwan the highest standard of living in Southeast Asia; development of democratic and responsible local government; the expansion of public education and cultural activities; and the building of an efficient military force making a substantial contribution to Free-World defenses in Asia. But some problems persist: the inability of the Kuomintang to capture the imagination of the Chinese intellectuals and youth who remain outside Communist control, continued psychological tensions, and population pressure. A complete reorganization of the Kuomintang and the development in Taiwan of a new philosophy of democracy for China would be desirable; but these changes depend upon initiative from Chiang Kai-shek and seem difficult within the present crisis context. On balance, though, the Nationalists have succeeded to a point where their cause cannot be ignored.

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*Richard Louis Walker, Ph.D., is head of the Department of International Studies the University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina. He is the author of seve books and articles on China and the Far East including The Multi-State System of A cient China (1954) and China Under Communism: The First Five Years (1955). served with United States Army Intelligence in the Far East during World War II a has returned several times since. In 1954–55 Dr. Walker was a Visiting Professor National Taiwan University while carrying out research under a Rockefeller grant. 1957 he was a United States delegate and one of the principal speakers at the SEA seminar in the Philippines.*





When in August and September 1958, the Chinese Communists once again focused world attention on the island of Taiwan, ninety miles off the coast of Fukien, and warned that no force on earth could stop the "liberation" of the 13,936 square miles of territory and 10 million Chinese remaining under Nationalist rule, the situation was in marked contrast with that of nine years before when Mao Tse-tung's lieutenants organized their first attempt to "liberate" Taiwan.

In August 1949 the United States had published a "White Paper" which in effect attempted to extricate it from its China tangle. In September and October of that year, staff studies by all United States armed forces and the Department of State concluded that Taiwan could not be defended from Communist attack without large-scale active United States intervention and that neither the capability for nor the willingness to assume the risks involved in that intervention existed. Consequently on December 23, 1949, the Department of State sent to embassies abroad an information policy-guidance paper warning them to prepare for the fall of Taiwan to the Communists and to cushion the expected blow to United States prestige by stating that Taiwan bore no crucial relationship to United States security.[1] Subsequently on January 5, 1950, the day before the recognition of the Communist regime by Great Britain and following the extension of recognition by several other powers, President Harry S. Truman declared, "The United States will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil strife in China. Similarly the United States Government will not provide military aid and advice to the Chinese forces on Formosa."[2] Few people indeed held any hope that Taiwan would remain outside of Communist control for long.

Ironically, a key reason why in 1958 Taiwan was still in Nationalist hands and its security guaranteed by the firmest of United States commitments, could be attributed not to the United States initiative but to Stalin's military adventure in Korea. Following the Communist attack in Korea on June 25, 1950, President Truman moved rapidly to prevent the fall of Taiwan and on June 27 ordered the United States Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan area. The fleet was still there in 1958. But there were other reasons for the changed status and the far more formidable position of the Republic of China on Taiwan in 1958. These included the growing awareness of the threat posed by expansionist Communism under Peking direction in Eastern Asia, the increasing involvement of the United States in security matters in the Western Pacific area, and the growing realization that the Communist mainland regime did not merit or necessarily enjoy the support of many key groups under its control.

A most important reason for Taiwan's changed position in 1958, however, was the remarkable Nationalist record of achievement and regeneration in the intervening nine years. This record has received too little attention in the world, partly because of preponderant outside world interest in and concern over developments on the mainland under the Communist rule, but also because of the tendency to assume the permanent debility of the Nationalists on the basis of the sad performance in the immediate post-World War II years. There is a critical need for more adequate study and generally available information on

[1] For a discussion of background and outlook of United States policy toward China during this period see 82nd Congress, 1st Session, hearings on *The Military Situation in the Far East* (The MacArthur Hearings), esp. pp. 1667–72.

[2] *Department of State Bulletin*, January 16, 1950.

the achievements as well as the problems on Taiwan for the benefit of informed judgment in the outside world.[3]

## GRIM YEARS

Few governments have faced graver problems with dimmer prospects than the tattered remnants of the Chinese Nationalist administration who found their way to Taiwan as opposition to the Communists melted on the mainland during 1949. The years 1949 and 1950 were dismal indeed. The Kuomintang (KMT), the ruling party of the Republic of China, seemed hopelessly weak and its doctrine, organization, and methods had proved inadequate for meeting formidable problems on the mainland, let alone coping with efficient Communist organization and propaganda. There was, as many of its leaders admitted, ample reason why its cause had been written off by some of its staunchest friends.

A cool and even hostile reception greeted the more than 1,400,000 civilians and almost 600,000 military personnel who descended upon Taiwan. The behavior of Nationalist carpetbaggers who had taken over the island on October 25, 1945, under Governor Ch'en Yi (later executed in Taiwan under Chiang Kai-shek's orders) culminated in riots on February 28, 1947, which were put down with brutal repression. The result was a great chasm between the Chinese in Taiwan and the mainlanders, and the demands upon housing and other facilities occasioned by the move to Taiwan were not calculated to ease tensions which continued to run high.

In 1949 the economy of Taiwan was still in a state of dislocation. More than 300,000 Japanese had been sent back to Japan at the end of the war, and there were few Chinese qualified to fill the great gap in technical and administrative skill needed for posts the Japanese had reserved for themselves during their fifty-year rule. As on the mainland, the land tenure situation had created great peasant discontent. Further, the destruction caused by allied bombing during the war had resulted in economic dislocation more than halving production, and there seemed little likelihood that Taiwan could sustain its own population, let alone two million refugees.

The Nationalists did possess some assets when they moved the seat of their government to Taipei on December 7, 1949. One of these was determination bred of the realization that their whole future would depend upon their subsequent performance. Further, the move to the somewhat austere surroundings on Taiwan enabled them to shed many of the opportunists who bore much responsibility for the debacle on the mainland. The more than 1 million civilians —including many of the dedicated officials, the scholars, and the technicians whose talents were sorely needed—who moved to the island during 1949 and 1950 have been the key factor in subsequent achievement. They are all too frequently forgotten in the press accounts which have concentrated on the military or on the Chinese Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek.

[3] Three books published in the West dealing with postwar developments on Taiwan appeared in 1952—Joseph W. Ballantine, *Formosa, A Problem for United States Foreign Policy* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution); H. MacLear Bate, *Report from Formosa* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.); and Fred W. Riggs, *Formosa under Chinese Nationalist Rule* (New York: The Macmillan Co.)—but since then no such surveys have appeared. These works were published before the completion of the land reform discussed below and while the memory of the 1947 revolt was still vivid. In 1956 Han Lih-wu published a second revision of his 1951 *Taiwan Today* (Taipei: Hua Kuo Publishing Company) from which the other three authors borrowed freely, but this work is an inadequate substitute for a needed volume by an outside scholar. W. G. Goddard, *Formosa (Taiwan)*, Taipei, 1958, is an uncritical collection of lectures by an Australian admirer of the Nationalists. Statistics in the Provincial Government Information Department's *Taiwan, Ten Years of Progress*, Taipei, January 1956, are generally accurate, but coverage of problems is less than inadequate. Michael C. S. Tung's *Free China on the March* (Taipei: China Cultural Service, 1957) is sufficiently panegyrical to cast doubt even on its accurate statistics. See also: Michael Lindsay, "The Future of Formosa," *New Republic*, October 6, 1958.



## THE CONTRAST

The contrast between Taiwan's international position and internal conditions in 1958 and the grim years 1949 and 1950 represents a remarkable change. There were few spokesmen, even in neutralist countries, who in 1958 advocated turning Taiwan over to the Communists; and although there was grave division within the Free World over support for Nationalist positions on Quemoy and Matsu near the coast of Fukien, there was widespread agreement that Taiwan and the Pescadores should be defended militarily against Communist attack. With a show of real imagination and vigor the Nationalists had under Foreign Minister George K. C. Yeh, who resigned his post after nine years in the summer of 1958 and was named Ambassador to the United States, expanded their diplomatic and cultural activities. By 1958 they maintained 43 embassies and legations, 14 consulates-general and 7 consulates abroad; and a vote at the United Nations in September guaranteed that they would continue to represent China in that body for another year. Taipei maintained close liaison with other countries in the Western Pacific threatened by Communist expansion: Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines. And its achievements had gained attention in areas outside Asia. After a visit in 1957, Brian Crozier, Chief Foreign Editor of the *Economist*, wrote in the *Listener*, "I am no longer convinced that the Nationalist cause is hopeless; and I now think I was wrong to write off Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang Government as though they were discredited and of no account." [4]

The record of economic accomplishment in Taiwan during this period may be seen in Table 1. But while this table indicates the extent of World War II destruction and the contrast between 1949 and 1958 figures, it is still inadequate because it does not indicate production of many items formerly unknown in Taiwan: bicycles, plate glass, electric fans, plastics, aviation gasoline, and even jeeps.[5] By 1958 Taiwan, with climbing production and an increasingly

[4] Crozier's reports after returning from a visit to Taiwan had wide influence in Britain. His article in the *Listener* in February 1957 was reprinted in the British Commonwealth countries with equal impact. See also: "Aspects of a Myth," *The Economist*, London, February 9, 1957. The *Free China Review*, an English-language monthly published in Taipei, reprinted some reports by other visitors in booklet form, "Taiwan as Seen by Visitors," in 1958.

[5] Figures for the table have been gathered for the most part from the issues of *Industry of Free China*. This monthly publication (Chinese and English) of the Industrial Development Commission of the Economic Stabilization Board (hereafter ESB) is reliable, and its articles offer an eye-opening introduction to the manner in which economic development is being planned in the Republic of China. Agricultural statistics are to be found in the many publications of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (hereafter JCRR). The *Bulletin* of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (hereafter ECAFE), published in Bangkok, contains regular statistics and frequent articles on economic development on Taiwan. The United States International Co-operation Administration also publishes reports on Taiwan's development. See, for example, its January 1956 report, *Economic Development on Taiwan, 1951–1955*.

TABLE 1—PRODUCTION IN TAIWAN

| PRODUCT | UNIT | PEAK UNDER JAPANESE | 1946 | 1949 | 1951 | 1953 | 1955 | 1957 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rice | Metric tons (M/T) | 1,404,414 | 894,021 | 1,214,523 | 1,484,792 | 1,641,557 | 1,614,953 | 1,839,009 |
| Sugar | M/T | 1,419,000 | 626,297 | 626,297 | 356,165 | 901,000 | 747,992 | 866,000 |
| Pineapple | Canned case | 1,679,000 | 174,389 | 295,674 | 419,801 | 415,310 | 1,024,481 | 1,142,783 |
| Fish | M/T | 119,520 | 16,862 | 80,371 | 104,180 | 130,010 | 180,618 | 206,000 |
| Hogs | M/T | 1,873,000 | 577,861 | 1,362,159 | 2,262,000 | 2,820,000 | 2,799,369 | No available figure |
| Fertilizer | M/T | 34,000 | 4,843 | 45,840 | 111,810 | 165,707 | 169,887 | 215,000 |
| Cement | M/T | 303,438 | 97,269 | 291,170 | 389,033 | 519,676 | 589,833 | 603,933 |
| Cotton Cloth | Thousand sq. meters | 1,682 | 2,558 | 29,050 | 55,987 | 130,232 | 167,244 | 155,453 |
| Cotton Yarn | M/T | 540 | 410 | 1,805 | 7,255 | 19,546 | 25,111 | 27,899 |
| Coal | M/T | 2,853,832 | 1,049,071 | 1,614,127 | 1,656,858 | 2,392,704 | 2,359,316 | 2,916,084 |
| Electricity | Thousand Kwh | 1,195,327 | 357,033 | 854,300 | 1,285,104 | 1,564,341 | 1,966,358 | 2,555,187 |
| Paper | M/T | 18,404 | 2,952 | 6,393 | 20,554 | 27,897 | 38,560 | 59,634 |

diversified economy, was second only to Japan in standard of living in the Far East and Southeast Asia. Per capita consumption of food and other consumer goods had increased yearly since 1952, far outstripping the cost of living which, however, had continued to rise. In Taiwan there were less extremes in poverty and wealth than anywhere else in Asia as the regime displayed none of the ostentatiousness and corruption so closely associated with its last months on the mainland. The currency and economic situation were sufficiently stable to allow relaxation of foreign exchange regulations in 1958.[6]

In 1958, although tensions between the Chinese in Taiwan and those from the mainland still existed, they did not loom nearly as large in the over-all picture.[7] There was solid agreement that the Communist regime was not wanted by either group, an agreement regularly reinforced by the arrival of refugees from the mainland where the Communists were denouncing "freedom" as a "bourgeois fallacy." Taiwanese participated vigorously in local government and occupied key posts in the growing private industry which accounted for more than half of Taiwan's industrial output. Their participation and performance in institutions of higher learning and in teaching positions on the island helped to build one of the highest literacy rates in the world and to enhance Taiwan's symbolic value as a repository of the Chinese cultural tradition.

To appreciate the position of Taiwan in 1958, it is helpful to outline briefly the course of change following the movement of the Republic of China to the island. We will then examine some of the major achievements in more detail and point out persistent problems for Free China.

[6] See the statistics on per capita energy and calory consumption in numbers of the ECAFE *Bulletin* in 1958.

[7] Groups of Taiwanese in Japan and Hong Kong have kept their own hopes for Taiwan autonomy alive by calling attention to persisting problems between Chinese in Taiwan and those from the mainland. For views critical to the Nationalists see Khu Eng-han, "The Taiwan Problem and its Solution," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 16, 1958, pp. 67–70 and Li Thian-hok, "The China Impasse," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1958, both of which envisage eventual independence for Taiwan.

## THE COURSE OF CHANGE

### *The period of reform, mid-1950 through 1952*

Even before President Truman's decision in June 1950 to neutralize Taiwan, thus giving the Nationalists a breathing spell for reform and planning, they had begun to deal with major problems on the island. For example, the land reform had been started under Governor Ch'en Ch'eng in 1949, and a labor welfare and insurance program had been initiated in March 1950. More important perhaps was the reform program within the KMT. A party reform committee set up in 1950 functioned until the Seventh National Congress was held in October 1952, and it succeeded in breathing some new life into the organization and providing positions for some of the more liberal younger members. A manifesto and platform adopted at the October congress frankly admitted many past mistakes and warned, "What is gone is gone forever, but the future should not be allowed to slip through our fingers."[8] The KMT has continued to evidence some of the drawbacks of its Leninist-type organization, and many old party hacks still maintain positions of power. But the 1952 reforms were real, and they were carried into the government. By mid-1952 a qualified outside observer who had watched at first hand the last years on the mainland reported that "underpaid officials have made significant progress in reassembling the tattered ends of their government."[9]

With the entrance of the Chinese Communists into the war in Korea in October 1950, the United States moved to extend large-scale aid, both military and economic, to Taiwan.[10] A Military Assistance Advisory Group was set up in Taipei on May 1, 1951, and with its help the Nationalist armies were gradually re-equipped and reorganized into an effective fighting force. United States economic aid was reactivated in 1951, enabling more realistic planning for the island's future. In March 1951 the Economic Stabilization Board was established by the Legislative Yuan (one of the five branches of the Nationalist government) for planning, advising on, and co-ordinating all economic activities in Taiwan. This significant body has continued to work in close co-operation with American officials and advisors and has, from the outset, approached its task with vision and vigor.

These are just a few examples of many reforms carried out in the period following the outbreak of war in Korea. A solid basis was laid in all fields—education, health, land reform, political and economic responsibility—for building a viable government and economy.

[8] "The Kuomintang Manifesto and Platform Adopted by The Seventh National Convention," The Fourth Department, Central Committee, Kuomintang, Taipei, October 1952.

[9] Albert Ravenholt, "Formosa Today," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1952. On other aspects of this early KMT reform see Gung-hsing Wang, "Nationalist Government Policies, 1949–1951," THE ANNALS, Vol. 277 (September 1951), pp. 213–23.

[10] For a summary statement of United States aid to Taiwan, see the *New York Times* of September 7, 1958, which puts the figure at more than 1 billion dollars.

### *The period of adjustment, 1953 through 1956*

By the beginning of 1953, as Mao Tse-tung consolidated his control, it was becoming apparent—though never overtly admitted—that a return to the Chinese mainland was not as imminent as Chiang Kai-shek's frequent statements to the army and the KMT might indicate. A number of mainlanders began to recognize the real task for the future was to make Taiwan into a testing ground for democracy in Asia. The heavy double bureaucracy of a skeleton regime for the whole of the mainland plus a provincial government was maintained, but an increasing amount of energy and attention was devoted to the Taiwan area. Chinese leaders on Taiwan gave real weight to publications and education dealing with Chinese culture.

The adjustment to possible long-term

isolation of Taiwan was apparent in the First Four-Year Plan, completed in 1956. The plan involved industrial diversification with the establishment of sixteen substantial and scores of minor new industries involving more than 5,700 new factories. Between 1950 and 1956 the gross national product increased by 66 per cent—agriculture 32 per cent; industry 132 per cent. Transport and communications facilities were substantially developed, many large electrification projects completed, and other large projects such as the US-$40,000,000 Shihmen Reservoir and the cross-island highway started. All of these demanded increased attention and energy channeled into the Taiwan scene.[11]

This period of adjustment was made possible by an increasing United States commitment to the Republic of China. In December 1954 the United States and the Republic of China signed a Mutual Defense Treaty guaranteeing the military security of Taiwan and the Pescadores. United States economic assistance appropriations between 1951 and the end of 1956 totaled US-$643,664,000 exclusive of military aid for which figures remained unavailable.[12]

During this period of adjustment, the Nationalist government moved out more actively in the field of foreign affairs. A program for the education of overseas Chinese students from Southeast Asia was developed, and their number in Taiwan surpassed 5,000 by the end of 1956 (more than 7,000 in 1958). A big boost to morale was the arrival on January 23, 1954, of more than 14,000 former Chinese prisoners of war from Korea whose vote in favor of the Nationalist regime represented no small blow to the Communists on the mainland. A program for the resettlement of refugees from Hong Kong, aided by private assistance from the United States, brought an additional 138,000 persons to the already overcrowded island. Taiwan carried on an active program of aid for the continuing stream of refugees who were still coming from the mainland at a rate in excess of 5,000 per month in 1958, most of them settling in Hong Kong.[13]

### *The period of realization, 1957 and 1958*

By the end of 1956 sufficient lag time had elapsed for United States aid and the measures taken by the Nationalists to make themselves felt. In 1957 the Taiwan economy began to evidence a remarkable surge of productivity as the accumulated impact of reforms and outside assistance took effect. Prices tended to level off, and there was a gradual relaxation of various types of government control.[14] The stability and flowering of the Taiwan economy were also reflected in other developments such as increasing investment by private sources, especially overseas Chinese, and the fact that in view of growing foreign trade and export industries the Chinese were beginning to stress regional economic co-operation.[15]

Let us turn in more detail to some of the major Nationalist achievements which made the period of realization in 1957–58 possible. Six general areas of Chinese accomplishment on Taiwan may serve to highlight the story. In every case it must be emphasized that although United States assistance has been a prerequisite, the effective use of this aid has depended primarily upon the Chinese civilians. They have shown dedication and faith which have all too often been forgotten by those in the outside world who have tended to view the Taiwan crisis in strictly military terms.

[11] For a good summary of the results of the First Four-Year Plan, see T. C. Pan, "Accomplishments of the First Four-Year Plan," ESB, Taipei, 1957. Preston Schoyer, "Present Conditions on the Island," *The Reporter*, March 10, 1955, p. 18, in the midst of this period points out that "Quite a number of them [the mainlanders] realize that the time for liberating the mainland has passed, and that the task of the future is to make Formosa into a testing ground of Asian democracy." For a good illustrated article covering Taiwan at the end of this period see Frederick Simpich, Jr., "Changing Formosa, Green Island of Refuge," *Natianal Geographic*, March 1957, pp. 327–64. On the type of planning which went into the Shihmen Reservoir see the ECAFE *Bulletin*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (November 1957), pp. 54–55.

[12] Allen S. Whiting, "The United States and Taiwan," in *The United States and the Far East*, The American Assembly, Columbia University, December 1956, p. 183. Whiting's survey, while pointing out the accomplishments during this period, brings out clearly some of the major economic and political problems. Written before the combination of forces and the accumulated impact of economic aid led to the flowering of the two subsequent years, it tends to be somewhat gloomy in economic forecasting.

[13] In addition to summaries of this problem presented to the United Nations, see *The Annual Report* of the Free China Relief Association (March 1956–February 1957), Taipei, April 1957.

[14] On relaxation of government controls and the texts of specific acts see the issues of *Industry of Free China* for the first six months of 1958. A discussion of further economic development can be found in two articles by K. T. Li, "Taiwan's Economic Position and Prospects," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 3, 1958, and "A Review of Industrial Development in Taiwan," ESB, Taipei, February 1958 and S. C. Hsieh and T. H. Lee, "An Analytical Review of Agricultural Development in Taiwan," *Industry of Free China*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (July 1958).

[15] 85th Congress, 1st Session, *Foreign Aid Program*, Senate Document No. 52, pp. 1380–82, discusses the important role of investment from private sources. The trend toward thinking about regional economic co-operation is revealed, for example, in the speech by K. T. Li, "Characteristics and Trend of Industrial Development in Taiwan," in a panel discussion with members of the World Bank in Taipei, May 17, 1957, subsequently published by the Economic Stabilization Board.



## MAJOR AREAS OF ACHIEVEMENT

### *The land reform*

The land reform program carried out in Taiwan has been a high spot in the Nationalist program and has been internationally acclaimed as a model. In contrast with the mass executions and violence of the Communist approach to the land issue on the mainland, Taiwan's land reform was peaceful and orderly.[16] Whereas on the mainland, the Communist measures were intended only as a prelude to enforced collectivization, the "Land-to-the-Tiller" program in Taiwan guaranteed and encouraged permanent private ownership.

It is difficult accurately to condense the full and thorough approach made to the land problem in Taiwan. Fortunately a number of good accounts have been written.[17] Roughly, the program was carried out in three phases. On April 14, 1949, as a first phase, the provincial government decreed a rent reduction to a top limit of 37.5 per cent of the crop for the tenant farmers. More than 300,000 farmers and 45 per cent of all farm families benefited from this. Another part of this phase provided security of tenure for tenants by setting the minimum lease period at six years, prohibiting advance payments of rent, and requiring all subsequent leases to be registered with the provincial government.

The second phase of the reform involved the sale of about 400,000 acres

[16] On the Chinese Communist approach to the land problem see chapter VI of my *China Under Communism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955).

[17] By far the best and most comprehensive account is Hui-sun Tang, *Land Reform in Free China*, Taipei, JCRR, October 1954, 335 pp. Mr. Tang has also produced a summary, "Highlights of Land Reform in Taiwan," Taipei, JCRR, February 1957 on which this account is based.

of government-owned farmland to the farmers, with priority of purchase given to those actually tilling the land involved. The price for this public farm land was set at two and one-half times the value of the annual crop, the purchase price to be paid in semiannual installments, but no installment to exceed 37.5 per cent of the current crop yield. Four sales of these public lands were held from 1951 to 1953 and by the end of 1953, land had been purchased by 121,953 tenant families.

The third phase involved the required sale by landlords of lands in excess of fixed acreage depending upon the type of land involved. Before this phase, a thorough registration and classification of all lands (involving more than 6,000,000 index cards) was carried out in 1951 and 1952. The Land-to-the-Tiller Act which enabled the final phase of the land reform was passed by the legislature on January 20, 1953. Under the provisions which were carried out by January 1954, the government purchased lands in excess of about seven acres of paddy field or twice that much dry land at a price of two and one-half times the yearly yield. In payment for their land, the landlords received 70 per cent in "land bonds" bearing an annual interest of 4 per cent and redeemable in rice and sweet potatoes in 20 semiannual installments. The other 30 per cent was paid in stock certificates in four government industries which were thus turned into private capitalist ventures.

The execution and performance of the land reform program were successful beyond expectation. Three years after redistributing more than 26 per cent of Taiwan's cultivated land, authorities reported that less than 1 per cent of the farmers were delinquent in payment. One survey pointed out:

In the 6 years since land reform started, 39,000 farm families have built new homes and 87,000 have repaired their old ones. (There are approximately 650,000 farmers in Taiwan.) Eight per cent of the 317,000 farm families surveyed have purchased sewing machines, installed new lighting systems, or added lights. Eighty-eight thousand bought new bicycles. About half bought new farm implements or built new drying grounds or farm buildings. Eighteen hundred radio sets were purchased.[18]

### *The JCRR and raised living standards*

Closely connected with the land reform and an achievement in its own right has been the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), a model of successful co-operation in administering foreign rural assistance. JCRR was organized under the terms of the China Aid Act of 1948. In 1956 it had a technical and administrative staff of 230 Chinese and 11 Americans. In its first seven years in Taiwan it carried out 1,852 projects resulting in direct improvement in the lives of more than 90 per cent of the people.[19] For example, in co-operation with the World Health Organization (WHO), it established a rural health network of 368 health stations and 22 health centers which became self-supporting in three years. With its aid and encouragement the World Health Organization reported that by 1956 Taiwan was the healthiest place in Southeast Asia. Malaria had become a rarity and other dread diseases were nonexistent on the island. JCRR has established 4-H clubs, carried out pest control, aided the organization of farmers' associations, trained personnel, established experiment stations, and so forth. Most important, the JCRR has been a significant example of effective international co-operation in which most of the achievements relied on Chinese effort. As a Special United States Congressional Study Mission observed:

The JCRR's contributions should not be measured alone in cold statistics of increased production. More significant, although less frequently recognized, is the training in leadership and democratic processes it has produced among the farmers and also among officials. Such values are bound to be reflected in the political evolution of the country.[20]

As pointed out above, the industrialization and agricultural improvement have resulted in remarkably improved life for the people on Taiwan. ICA reported that per capita production in 1957 was 40 per cent greater than in 1950. Indicative of how people in general were benefiting from increased production was the report of the Taiwan Power Company that in 1957 it had more than 700,000 customers. Rural electrification has spread to practically every area of the island. By 1958 more than 450,000 were covered by the labor insurance program, and on August 1, 1958 another 175,000 government employees were brought within the framework of this program which carried medical, disability, and other insurance benefits. Although Taiwan has concentrated on planned economy, the Second Four-Year Plan, started in 1957 and involving almost three quarters of a billion United States dollars, has laid great stress on private investment. Further economic planning in Taiwan has been focused on the consumer.[21]

### *Local government, education, and culture*

Although the Nationalists have maintained the heavy burden of a government presumably for all of China, this skeleton administration has been subject to constant trimming as more attention has been devoted to local government. By 1958 the national bureaucracy was outnumbered four to one by civilian employees of the provincial and local authorities. The provincial budget increased from NT$366,319,487 in 1950 to NT$3,110,989,811 for 1959. This latter figure was more than twice the whole national budget of 1950. Although the KMT practically monopolizes party political life on the island, issues on the provincial and local level are openly debated and independent candidates are frequently elected. In 1957, for example, the mayor of Tainan was elected in opposition to the KMT candidate. Contests for the provincial assembly and for the magistracy of the sixteen counties and for mayors of the five special municipalities have been hotly contested. For an election of minor officials on January 19, 1958, more than 78 per cent of the eligible voters—all those over 20 years of age—turned out despite inclement weather. In terms of democratic participation, local responsibility, maintenance of stability and security, the program of local government on Taiwan has made steady progress.

Taiwan's system of public education is also a major achievement. In 1957, 93.82 per cent of children of primary

[18] JCRR, *General Report, VII, 1956*, p. 2. This report offers a balanced and clear exposition of achievements as well as problems on the rural scene.

[19] In addition to its valuable annual *General Reports*, JCRR has published many useful volumes of surveys and statistics for the researcher. Outstanding among these is Arthur F. Raper, *Rural Taiwan—Problem and Promise*, Taipei, July 1956. For a good summary of JCRR work, see Senyang Chou, "JCRR Program: An Effective Antidote Against Communism," *Free China Review*, Taipei, December 1957, pp. 11–14.

[20] House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Report* by Special Study Mission to the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and Pacific, 1956, p. 163. This report contains a brief outline of JCRR work.

[21] ESB, *Highlights of the Second Four-Year Plan for the Economic Development of Taiwan*, Taipei, August 1957. For statistics on the contrast in focus of planning in Taiwan with that on the mainland and elsewhere in Asia see ECAFE *Bulletin*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (November 1956), pp. 32–33.

school age were in school. The government started a systematic expansion of compulsory education from 6 to 9 years in the 1957–58 academic year. That year there were 1,471,706 students in elementary schools, 270,523 in secondary schools, and 21,259 in seventeen colleges and universities.[22] Admission to upper middle schools and colleges is on the basis of rigorous examination. Of great importance in terms of building the symbol of the Republic of China as a repository of Chinese culture has been the work of the thousands of top flight scholars and teachers who came from the mainland. Scholarly journals and books published in Taiwan set high standards. Over 19,000 new books were published between 1949 and 1957 in addition to the printing of old titles. Under the leadership of eminent scholars the Academia Sinica, the highest academic research organization, has continued the work for which it was famous on the mainland. On November 4, 1957, Dr. Hu Shih, Chinese Ambassador to the United States during World War II, was named its new president. The work of the many mainland refugee scholars finally flowered, like the economy, with substantial impact beginning in 1957. By 1958 it was possible for scholars in the outside world for the first time in two decades to build full library collections of Chinese classics, histories, and other basic works of the Chinese cultural tradition printed in Taiwan, many of them works burned or destroyed by the Communists on the mainland.[23] In 1958 Taiwan produced 28 newspapers and 498 journals and magazines. A highly literate population enjoyed opportunities for study of traditional Chinese culture at the newly built National Central Library in Taipei and among the mainland art treasures at the Joint National Palace Museum and National Central Museum in Taichung. And some of the most competent and promising young scholars in the Chinese tradition come from among the Chinese from Taiwan, many of whom have in recent years gained top honors in the college entrance examinations.

### *Military and other achievements*

The reorganization and regeneration of the Chinese Nationalist armed forces into one of the major military establishments in Eastern Asia represents another significant achievement.[24] These forces include 300,000 combat army troops, a navy of about 70 vessels, and an effective and well-trained air force. Much credit goes to the work of the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group and to military hardware from the United States. But the growing effectiveness of the Chinese Nationalist armed forces is also due to the Nationalist contribution to their own defense. The Chinese have provided salaries, food, and housing for the more than half million members of the armed forces, while United States military aid has been devoted almost exclusively to providing training and modern equipment.

As a part of keeping the armed forces fit, the Nationalists began drafting Chinese from Taiwan in 1954, and by 1958 more than 35 per cent of the armed forces were Taiwanese. It is worth noting that for the most part the Taiwanese have been relegated to the lower ranks. Under a jointly sponsored Sino-American plan more than 80,000 overage military personnel had been retired by 1958. Nine years after a disorganized and defeated military establishment found refuge in Taiwan, it had been converted into one of the strongest forces confronting further Communist expansion in Asia and was making a substantial contribution to United States and Free World defensive capability there.

The major areas of accomplishment listed above should not be taken as exclusive. Since arriving in Taiwan, the Chinese Nationalists have also made notable progress in other spheres as well: participation in international bodies, expansion of foreign relations, work among the overseas Chinese, building regional cultural exchanges in Eastern Asia, and developing concepts and programs of economic development for a free society.[25]

## MAJOR PROBLEMS AND FAILURES

All has not been success for the Republic of China. The Nationalists have been unable to eliminate some of the very factors which contributed heavily to their failure on the mainland.

A key problem lies in the nature of the Kuomintang (KMT) itself. After much soul-searching and admission of more than a decade of failure, Sun Yat-sen turned to the Russians in 1923 and adopted their Leninist party structure when the KMT was reorganized in 1924. The KMT still retains much of this structure, grossly unsuited to democratic development. Sun rejected Marxism, but the political doctrine he attempted to substitute has proved inadequate. Chiang Kai-shek and the top KMT have not moved to break with the past and create a new party and doctrine to make democracy meaningful for China today. The result has frequently been blind incantation of phrases of Sun Yat-sen by a group whose lives are given to making orthodoxy of thin intellectual fare. The combination of the party structure and *San Min Chu I* (Sun's Three Principles of the People) has brought all the drawbacks of authoritarianism—ideological weakness, attempts to impose uniformity, leader worship, political officers in the armed forces, insecurity, and defensive attitudes—without many of the compensations of the democracy Sun desired.[26] Despite remarkable economic achievements and social progress in Taiwan, the KMT has been generally unsuccessful in capturing the imagination and zeal of the youth either at home or among the overseas Chinese.[27]

Three decades of constant struggle with the Communists have encouraged an either-or, black-white approach to problems on the part of top KMT leaders who have been antagonistic and sensitive about criticism on most major issues and many minor ones.[28] This has resulted in undermining the sorely needed support among intellectuals in Taiwan, among refugees in Hong Kong,

[22] These statistics are later modifications of those published in the illustrated volume of the Ministry of Education, *Education in the Republic of China*, Taipei, 1958, 114 pp.

[23] Publication activities in Taiwan have come as good news for sinologists in the outside world. See Frederick W. Mote, "Recent Publications in Taiwan," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (August 1958), pp. 595–606.

[24] With the reopening of military activity in the Taiwan area in August 1958, a number of press accounts covering the Nationalist military establishment appeared. For earlier appraisals see Fred Sparks, "The Facts about Formosa," *Reader's Digest*, July 1955, pp. 83–88 and Allen S. Whiting, *op. cit.* (note 12 *supra*), pp. 177–79.

[25] On this last item see "Development Planning in Taiwan," *International Labour Review*, Vol. 76, No. 5 (November 1957), pp. 479–95.

[26] For a discussion of Nationalist political drawbacks see Whiting, *op cit.* (note 12 *supra*), pp. 184–89.

[27] Examples of criticism on this score are abundant. See, for example, Chao Kuo-chun, "China's Tunnel to Formosa," *Nation*, August 3, 1957, which tends to be critical and negative, and editorials in *Tsu-kuo Chou-k'an* (*China Weekly*) published by a group of young anti-Communist refugees in Hong Kong.

[28] For a strong critique of the KMT attitude that whoever is not 100 per cent for them must be against them and aids the Communists, see *China Weekly*, No. 271 (March 24, 1958), pp. 3–4.

and among the overseas Chinese. In turn, some KMT officials are distrustful, defensive, and security conscious and have blind spots on the ramifications of some of their actions. A case in point was the unnecessary restrictive revision of the Press Law pushed through a closed session of the legislature in June 1958, a move roundly denounced in Hong Kong and overseas Chinese circles and an occasion for great lament in Taiwan.[29] The jelling of attitudes has tended to prevent emergence of imaginative younger leaders at the top despite growth of intraparty democracy at the local level where Taiwanese now constitute more than half of the KMT membership. Although these local developments have been exerting pressure upward, the process has been slow.[30] In view of the challenge posed by Communist achievements in building military and industrial power on the mainland, it is doubtful whether anything short of drastic revision of the whole KMT structure and doctrine will erase blind spots and mutual distrust between the top KMT and the very people it needs and who, in turn, need a positive force around which to rally.

Such a radical departure would depend upon one man, President Chiang Kai-shek. But Chiang is inflexible and views the struggle with the Communists in overwhelmingly military perspective.[31] His magnificent courage, faith, and strength of will have proved valuable assets in dark days, but he has frequently placed personal loyalties ahead of issues; and many Chinese in Taiwan fear that so much emphasis has been placed on his personal role as "Savior of China" (as KMT billboards proclaim), that the normal constitutional process will be endangered on his death.[32] Fears are expressed that his eldest son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who heads the security police and is in charge of political training of the troops, is being groomed to succeed him. In 1958, Chiang moved to allay these fears by appointing his Vice-President, Ch'en Ch'eng, as Premier. Ch'en is respected by Taiwanese and mainlanders alike, and the cabinet he named on July 15 augured well for some future liberalization.

Many major problems on Taiwan stem from the continued civil war and the Nationalist determination to "fight back to the mainland." The faith in the return keeps hopes alive in Taiwan, but it also results in keeping up a costly double bureaucracy and the burden of large armed forces.[33] The state of civil

[29] *China Weekly*, No. 285 (June 23, 1958), pp. 3–4; and *Tzu-yu Chung-kuo* (*Free China*), Taipei, Vol. 18, No. 10 (May 16, 1958), pp. 305–306 and Vol. 18, No. 12 (June 16, 1958), pp. 369–70. It is worth noting that the latter two articles, criticizing the Press Law, were published in Taiwan. *Free China* remains the major item to be cited against those who maintain that even constructive criticism is not allowed in the Taiwan press, and there is a need for more such items.

[30] The Eighth Congress of the KMT which closed on October 23, 1957, for example, enlarged the central committee from 32 to 50, making way for some younger members, and made other moves of a minor nature toward liberalization, an indication that local tendencies are being felt at the top.

[31] This is clearly displayed in his book published in 1957, *Soviet Russia in China* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy). See the review by C. Martin Wilbur in the *New York Times Book Review*, June 23, 1957.

[32] For an appreciation of Chiang Kai-shek see the column of Joseph Alsop in the Washington *Post*, October 3, 1953; Richard Hughes, "Portrait of Chiang on His Mountaintop," *New York Times Magazine*, September 28, 1958; and J. L. Stuart, *Fifty Years in China* (New York: Random House), 1954. For typical examples of adulation of Chiang see Michael Tung, *Free China on the March* or the review of Chiang's book in the *Free China Review*, July 1957, entitled "Book of the Century"!

[33] "The Republic of China, with a present population of less than 11 million, maintains a military establishment of more than 600,000



ar is used to justify wartime surveilnce and the very control measures hich alienate potential supporters nong the overseas Chinese. It preents the emphasis on and dramatization civil rights necessary to make the epublic of China a more positive odel of a future free China on the olitical plane. But there is no easy scape from this dilemma for the leaders Taiwan, given the Communist pledge ad actions to destroy them and their wn pledge to create a non-Communist ainland. And given the crisis situaon, there has been far more political eedom than has been generally appreiated abroad.

The result is an attitude that all is emporary, and this has tended to preent mainlanders from settling into the aiwan scene in such a way as to overome persisting tensions between themelves and the Taiwanese who frequently eel they are denied adequate voice in heir own government. Chinese in Taian also react to the fact of their deendence on and subordination to the olicy decisions of the United States, nd the resultant frustration was appart in the riots against the American Embassy on May 24, 1957.[34]

A final major problem which deserves mention is the rate of increase in population on Taiwan, one of the highest in the world: 36 per 1,000. Taiwan is adding more people per year than inhabit the second largest city, Kaohsiung. The civilian population at the end of 1957 was 9,500,861; the population of Taipei, 777,467. Here too is a blind spot. The Nationalists have taken few measures to cope with burgeoning population, apparently feeling that to admit its existence would damage long-run faith in the return to the mainland.

## CONCLUSION

Despite such problems and failures, Nationalist achievements tilt the balance far in their favor. In nine years of exile they have done much to revive their own energy and will, and facing seemingly insuperable problems in the cold war, they have shown a truly indomitable faith in their cause and their culture. The balance is further tilted by the contrast between their approach to problems and the Communist actions on the mainland. Reform may be too slow to satisfy outside critics, but they refer mostly to attitude and outlook in the KMT, and many of them are ready to admit that but for Taiwan the hope for a free China and for Chinese civilization would have been extinguished long ago. This is, in turn, the reason for their deep concern that Taiwan continue in the direction of the past nine years. Certainly the record of those nine years indicates that Taiwan cannot be written off, but this only increases Communist determination to eliminate its symbolism. Thus it is difficult to foresee any easy solution to the resultant conflict and tension short of abject surrender. But the faith of those Chinese in Taiwan has already made this an impossible course.

nen. An equivalent figure for the United States would be nearly 10 million men under arms. The Chinese devote more than half of their total public revenues, national and provincial, to the support of their Armed Forces, thereby covering all but a minor part of recurring local currency requirements." American Embassy, Taipei, *Taiwan*, November 1957, pp. 41–42.

[34] In addition to press accounts, see the documentary collection published by the Government Information Office, *Report by Mr. O. K. Yui, President of the Executive Yuan, on Actions Taken by the Government Regarding the Incident on May 24, 1957, in Taipei*, Taipei, 1957.

# Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia

By G. William Skinner

Abstract: Approximately 10 million overseas Chinese reside in Southeast Asia where they have economic power and political significance out of all proportion to their numbers. Southeast Asian governments are determined to loosen the Chinese grip on their national economies, to achieve an unequivocal clarification of the citizenship status of resident Chinese, to end foreign political activity among and to proceed with educational and political integration of their citizens of Chinese descent. Prior to 1954, Communist China strove with equal determination to protect the special interests of overseas Chinese; to win their loyalty; and to profit materially, politically, and strategically from their patriotism. The growing importance of Southeast Asian goodwill to China's foreign policy, however, prompted a new line whereby overseas Chinese are encouraged to acquiesce to Southeast Asian nationalist aims without appealing to Peking for protection. In accord with the new policy, China appears willing to relinquish claims to the allegiance of several million persons of Chinese descent and even to forgo much of the overseas Chinese contribution to China's economy. Meanwhile several Southeast Asian governments have taken advantage of Peking's policy and Taipei's weakness to proceed with stringent, nationalistic solutions to their overseas Chinese problems.

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*G. William Skinner, Ph.D., New York City, is Assistant Professor of Sociology at C lumbia University where he serves on the staff of the East Asian Institute. He w Field Director of Cornell University's Southeast Asia Program from 1951 to 1956 a subsequently Research Fellow of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project. His experien abroad includes research in China as well as Southeast Asia. Dr. Skinner is author of Chinese Society in Thailand (1957), Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand (1958), and various articles on China and Southeast Asia in professional journals.*





Overseas Chinese pose a set of complex problems not only to scholars but also to men of affairs in and out of Asia. The very definition of a Chinese becomes intricate in the overseas context, for neither ancestry nor legal citizenship status is a realistic criterion of Chineseness in Southeast Asia. Millions of Chinese in this region neither claim nor exercise any prerogatives of Chinese citizenship and, because of widespread miscegenation and assimilation, untold thousands of persons descended from Chinese immigrants are identified completely as indigenous Southeast Asians. Nor can retention of Chinese cultural behavior serve as a reliable guide. Several million overseas Chinese can neither speak nor understand Chinese, and some groups among them are so un-Chinese as to prefer matrilocal marriage, to eat with spoon and fork rather than chopsticks, and to worship indigenous spirits or the Christian God in preference to Chinese deities.

In the last analysis, being a Chinese is, in Southeast Asia, essentially a matter of self-identification. Those who identify themselves as Chinese are almost without exception descended from Chinese immigrants through the male line and still use—at least in some form and in some circumstances—the surname inherited patrilineally from that ancestor. Overseas Chinese, then, comprise China-born Chinese residing abroad together with those patrilineal descendants of Chinese immigrants who still regard themselves personally and socially as Chinese. By this definition, their numbers in Southeast Asia today approach 10 millions. These are distributed among the major geographical units of the region as shown in Table 1.

Overseas Chinese are most strongly concentrated in the areas bordering the southernmost extension of the South China Sea: Their proportion of the total population reaches 44 per cent in Malaya and Singapore together, and lies between 27 per cent and 31 per cent in Sarawak, the northwest coastal districts of Indonesian Borneo, Bangka and Billiton and the Riouw Archipelago. They are most thinly distributed in the territories bordering China itself (North Vietnam, Laos, northern and northeastern Thailand, and northern Burma), where the Chinese constitute considerably less than 1 per cent of the total population. The countries with the largest numbers of overseas Chinese are Thailand, Malaya, and Indonesia—each with at least 2¼ million.

TABLE 1—Distribution of Overseas Chinese

| Country or Territory | Ethnic Chinese | Total Population | Per Cent Chinese |
|---|---|---|---|
| North Vietnam | 50,000 | 13,500,000 | 0.4 |
| South Vietnam | 780,000 | 12,000,000 | 6.2 |
| Cambodia | 230,000 | 4,200,000 | 5.5 |
| Laos | 10,000 | 1,750,000 | 0.6 |
| Thailand | 2,360,000 | 20,800,000 | 11.3 |
| Burma | 320,000 | 20,300,000 | 1.6 |
| Malaya | 2,365,000 | 6,250,000 | 37.8 |
| Singapore | 965,000 | 1,260,000 | 76.6 |
| British Borneo[a] | 270,000 | 1,000,000 | 27.0 |
| Indonesian Borneo | 320,000 | 3,500,000 | 9.1 |
| Java[a] | 1,100,000 | 55,000,000 | 2.1 |
| Sumatra[a] | 690,000 | 13,290,000 | 5.2 |
| East Indonesia[a] | 140,000 | 12,370,000 | 1.1 |
| Philippines | 270,000 | 22,280,000 | 1.2 |
| Total | 9,870,000 | 187,500,000 | 5.3 |

[a] British Borneo includes the colonies of North Borneo and Sarawak and the protectorate of Brunei; Java includes Madura; Sumatra includes Riouw, Bangka, Billiton and other offshore islands; East Indonesia includes the Celebes, Moluccas and Lesser Sundas. Portuguese Timor and New Guinea, with less than 4,000 Chinese each, are not included in the table.

## Historical Background

The large population movement implicit in these numbers had its origin in the early junk trade of Chinese merchants from the southeastern maritime provinces of Fukien and Kwangtung By the sixteenth century, Chinese trading communities were permanently established in several parts of Southeast Asia. The rising volume of Southeast Asian trade which followed Wester

stimulus and participation and the establishment of peace and order through consolidation of Western colonial rule encouraged migration on an increasing scale. Mass immigration, however, was a phenomeon of the century ending in 1950. In the early days, settled immigrants generally took indigenous wives, and with the exception of parts of Indonesia and Malaya complete assimilation with the indigenous peoples was the rule within a few generations.

During the past fifty years, however, the assimilation rate has slowed everywhere. This has followed the efflorescence of modern Chinese and Southeast Asian nationalisms, the steady increase during this century in the proportion of women among Chinese immigrants, and the development throughout Southeast Asia of systems of mass Chinese-language education. The quickening of Chinese patriotism among overseas Chinese, the growing preponderance of all-Chinese families, and the use of formal education to perpetuate Chinese culture and instill political loyalties have given the descendants of twentieth-century immigrants the cultural continuity and the persistence of national identity mistakenly thought to be universal attributes of overseas Chinese in earlier periods.

The immediate issues which give the overseas Chinese international importance took on urgency as nationalist movements brought political independence almost everywhere in Southeast Asia and as Communism was consolidated in China. They are rooted, however, in the peculiar position held by Chinese in colonial society and in the colonial economy. Partly by governmental design and partly through the play of divergent cultural systems, the Chinese in Southeast Asia achieved a social and economic position always distinctive and usually superior to that of the indigenes. Under these circumstances, Southeast Asian nationalism early developed an anti-Sinitic tradition which found more open expression as indigenous elites came to power. The overseas Chinese for their part brought to the postwar era feelings of superiority which at the very least are inappropriate to the new context.

Four of the overseas Chinese issues brought into sharpest relief by postwar developments will be dealt with on a country-to-country basis. These are (1) the economic role of overseas Chinese who dominate or control major segments of the nonagricultural economy throughout Southeast Asia; (2) the education of local-born Chinese children, over a million of whom by 1948 were enrolled in Chinese-language schools, alien in curriculum and influence; (3) determination of citizenship and problems of dual nationality arising from China's citizenship claims over all persons of Chinese descent; and (4) the political integration of overseas Chinese into the new national states of Southeast Asia. It is possible here to survey only the most significant of the recent developments relevant to these four issues and in only five of the major Southeast Asian countries.

It is no coincidence that the most drastic measures taken against overseas Chinese since the rise of Communist China were imposed by the three Southeast Asian protégés of the United States, each of which recognizes the Taipei regime as the only legitimate government of China. Thailand, the Philippines, and South Vietnam have resorted to stringent measures, however, not through encouragement from either Washington or Taipei—to the contrary, both governments opposed them—but because a protective American umbrella in effect shielded these countries from the impact of Peking's power and because the Chinese Nationalist regime was powerless after 1949 to provide any real protection to overseas Chinese.



## THAILAND

In independent Thailand, nationalism evolved rather than erupted, with the result that a gradual imposition of controls on overseas Chinese began over forty years ago. These reached a peak of severity during the first administration of Pibul Songram, and when Pibul returned to power in 1948, a new wave of restrictions was expected. The first moves concerned education. Within a month, all Chinese secondary schools were closed and a master plan was announced whereby the number of Chinese primary schools would be reduced from over 430 to an eventual figure of 152. From 1948 to 1955, the Ministry of Education waged an unremitting campaign to limit the financial base of Chinese schools, to Thai-ify their staffs and curricula, and to cleanse them of political influence. The campaign was largely successful. By 1955, the administrative and teaching staffs of Chinese schools were largely Thai, and with the exception of five and one-half hours per week of Chinese, all instruction was in the Thai language. The number of students attending these so-called Chinese schools fell in eight years from 175,000 to less than 50,000.[1]

The administration's efforts to Thai-ify the national economy were equally sweeping. Positive measures included a sharp increase in facilities for Thai vocational education and a massive expansion of governmental participation in industry, transport, commerce, and finance. Governmental agencies and semigovernmental Thai enterprises entered fields previously dominated by Chinese, and in the process of monopolizing others excluded Chinese citizens. New legislative restrictions were also imposed. Acts passed in 1949, 1951, and 1952 together reserved eighteen industrial and service occupations for Thai citizens. A law passed in 1956 provided that any class of businesses employing ten or more persons may be required by royal decree to employ up to 50 per cent Thai nationals. In consequence of this governmental effort, increasing numbers of Thai have acquired business interests, more often than not in co-operation with Chinese business skill and capital.[2]

With regard to the citizenship issue, the Thai government passed new legislation in 1953 which denied Thai citizenship by birth to children both of whose parents were Chinese citizens. At the peak of the government's anti-Sinitic campaign, it abandoned all attempts at integrating its citizens of Chinese extraction. The electoral law of 1951 required candidates for political office to have been born of a Thai father and placed stringent restrictions on the franchise of citizens born of an alien father. In 1952, the Ministry of Interior began discriminating against citizens of alien extraction in its land policy. In 1953 a new Military Service Act added "persons born of an alien father" to those who shall not be called into active service.[3]

In 1955, following the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, and Pibul's tour abroad, the Thai government relaxed its anti-Chinese campaign. Excesses have since been avoided with regard to the economic and education issues, although no basic change in policy can be expected. With regard to citizenship and political integration, however, a com-

[1] G. William Skinner, *Chinese Society in Thailand* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1957), pp. 365–72.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 353–62.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 320, 374.

plete reversal of policy has occurred since 1956, with new nationality, electoral and military-service legislation reaffirming the traditional Thai efforts to assimilate socially and integrate politically the descendants of Chinese immigrants.

## THE PHILIPPINES

In the Philippines, manifestations of economic nationalism came almost as early as in Thailand. The Constitutional Convention in 1935 approved a resolution declaring that "public interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade." Not until May 1954, however, did a bill to this end become law. By its provisions, aliens (Americans excepted) and partnerships and corporations the capital of which is not wholly owned by Philippine citizens are prohibited from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade. No new retail shops may be established by aliens, but existing enterprises are not required to liquidate prior to the death or retirement of the proprietor or prior to 1964 in the case of partnerships and corporations. This legislation affects between 15,000 and 20,000 Chinese retail establishments with gross sales in the neighborhood of 500 million pesos. Chinese business interests immediately challenged the constitutionality of the law, but in 1957 the Philippine Supreme Court rejected the appeal, taking the occasion to charge the alien retailer with "utter disregard for . . . the people on whom he makes his profit." A recent decree, as yet little enforced, requires retail enterprises owned by Philippine citizens to employ only Philippine citizens, thus promising the eventual nationalization of labor as well as of ownership.

The Philippines was the last Southeast Asian country to tolerate outright foreign control of Chinese education. Until recently, Chinese-language schools, which have a current enrollment of over 45,000, followed regulations of the Ministry of Education in Taipei and were supervised directly by the Chinese Embassy in Manila. In 1957, however, the Philippine Ministry of Education took over formal control; to date it has taken only moderate steps to Philippinize the Chinese schools.

## SOUTH VIETNAM

In the fall of 1956, South Vietnam launched an attack on the overseas Chinese problem fully comparable in its harshness to the Thai campaign of 1952–53 but with a long-range assimilationist purpose. Ordinance No. 48, promulgated by the President in August, granted Vietnamese citizenship automatically to all persons of Chinese extraction born in Vietnam. A few days earlier the authorities had ordered a registration of all Chinese born abroad, and in subsequent months the police began confiscating alien registration papers from local-born Chinese and compelling them to accept citizenship papers. This approach to the citizenship issue elicited strong reaction in Peking as well as Taipei and moved the theretofore local-born Chinese citizens—whose number may have exceeded half a million—to mass civil disobedience. The deadline for registration was extended to August 1957, at which time less than 100,000 had complied. The only alternative allowed by the government was repatriation to Taiwan, and even this was denied Chinese citizens born of a Vietnamese mother. Red tape and the abrupt closure of repatriation lists in June 1957 kept the number of those evacuated—by airlift—to a nominal 3,000. Conspicuously absent from this measure was any element of free choice. The effort to force assimilation is also seen in concurrent Vietnamese regulations requiring Vietnamese language instruction in Chinese schools and abolishing Chinese signs from shops, and in pressures on local-born Chinese to Vietnamize their names.



The Vietnamese citizenship ordinance was followed almost imediately (September 1956) by a decree barring Chinese nationals from eleven important categories of occupations. Aliens were required to liquidate or turn over to Vietnamese within one year their interests in rice milling, the cereals trade, all transport enterprises, and commission agencies. They were given only six months to vacate business operations in the remaining seven categories, including such traditionally Chinese occupations as butchering and retailing of articles of daily use. This decree, more sweeping than the Thai restrictions and more immediate in its effect than the Phillipine law of 1954, had by 1957 rather thoroughly disrupted the entire Vietnamese economy, forcing the government to retreat in almost every aspect of its interpretation and enforcement of the original decree.[4]

## INDONESIA

Indonesia's approach to overseas Chinese problems is of special importance not only because it is the largest country in Southeast Asia and the home of a quarter of the region's Chinese, but also because it maintains diplomatic relations with Peking. A major aim of all Indonesian administrations since the achievement of political sovereignty in 1949 has been the installation of indigenous Indonesians in the business life of the country. Ministerial regulations and decrees have effectively excluded alien Chinese and wholly alien corporations from importing large categories of goods; from establishing new banks, insurance companies, and most types of factories; and from owning rice mills and certain types of transport agencies. A 1957 regulation calling for the registration and relicensing of all foreign enterprises envisages the eventual extension of restrictions on aliens to every sector of the economy.

The Provisional Constitution, which enjoins authorities from discriminating against particular groups of the citizenry, would seem to preclude an extension of official economic discrimination to citizens of Chinese descent. Increasingly since 1950, however, the relevant governmental agencies have used their control over credit facilities, licenses, and foreign exchange to favor indigenous Indonesians as against other Indonesian citizens. While this policy has aroused protest from liberal Indonesian political groups, it has proved altogether too mild for the growing body of indigenous entrepreneurs traditionally rooted in a strong Islamic ethic. Early in 1956 these interests acquired a prestigeous and vigorous spokesman in the person of Assaat, former acting president of the Republic of Indonesia. The movement founded in his name rallied widespread nationalist support for a racist economic program favoring "pure" Indonesians as against "new" citizens of foreign descent. Despite opposition from the Communist Party and Assaat's defection to the rebel cause in 1958, his movement has strongly colored the continuing program of economic nationalism in Indonesia.

The Indonesian government's handling of the citizenship issue has attracted widespread interest throughout Southeast Asia. Under the terms of the agreements granting sovereignty to Indonesia, Dutch subjects of Chinese origin who did not specifically reject

[4] Bernard B. Fall, "Viet-Nam's Chinese Problem," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 27 (May 1958).

Indonesian citizenship by December 1951 automatically became citizens of the new country. Large bodies of Indonesian opinion, however, felt that this passive system provided little assurance that citizens of Chinese descent would give sole allegiance to Indonesia. Accordingly the Indonesian government negotiated an unprecedented nationality treaty with Communist China, signed in April 1955. The treaty, as supplemented by an exchange of notes, was ratified by the Indonesian Parliament only in December 1957, and has not yet been implemented. By its provisions, persons of Chinese descent who acquired Indonesian nationality under the earlier passive system (with the exception of "a certain group," not yet officially defined, considered by the Indonesian government to hold only Indonesian citizenship) must opt for Chinese or Indonesian citizenship within a two-year period. Persons of dual Chinese-Indonesian nationality who neglect to choose will automatically acquire only Chinese citizenship. In the future, children born in Indonesia of fathers holding Chinese citizenship will acquire only Chinese citizenship. The great significance of the treaty lies in the renunciation by China of all claims to the citizenship of Indonesian Chinese who choose to adopt Indonesian nationality. It will be noted that in the absence of additional legislation providing for easy voluntary naturalization, the descendants of foreign Chinese will remain Chinese citizens in perpetuity.[5]

### *Education and political integration*

In the field of education, recent Indonesian policy toward overseas Chinese is of great significance. In 1957, forced by the decisive action of military commanders, the Ministry of Education evolved a radical policy designed to ensure a national education for all citizens in the student population. Within a year, hundreds of Chinese-language schools were converted to Indonesian-language schools following the standard "national" curriculum, and some new schools for citizens of Chinese descent were established on the same "national" pattern. Students were redistributed so that virtually no Indonesian citizens remained in Chinese schools. According to new regulations, only the major cities and a handful of towns in each province are permitted to have foreign schools. As a result the number of Chinese schools has fallen from over a thousand to a few hundred.

With regard to political integration of its citizens of foreign descent, the Indonesian government has made notable strides. Registration for elections has involved remarkably little discrimination against those of Chinese descent. A wide range of parties included Chinese in their lists of candidates. The Provisional Constitution guarantees citizens of Chinese descent at least nine representatives in Parliament and eighteen in the Constituent Assembly; since only a few Chinese won election to these bodies in 1955, the government has subsequently appointed Chinese members to fill out the quota. Many Indonesian Chinese favor working solely through Indonesian parties to avoid the dangers of communalism, but most of the Chinese electorate has supported BAPERKI, which in many respects functions as a Chinese communal party. Concerned in the first instance with the elimination of discrimination among Indonesian citizens, BAPERKI appeals implicitly to pride in Communist China, gives all-out support to President Sukarno, and generally finds itself on the side of the Indonesian Communist Party in political debates.[6]

[5] Donald E. Willmott, *The National Status of the Chinese in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1956), pp. 32–47.



### MALAYA

In the case of Malaya, where the Chinese population approaches in size that of the Malays themselves, the issues concerning overseas Chinese assume wholly different proportions. The future of the country depends on a solution to the communal problem, and the issue of citizenship was hotly debated and soberly considered throughout the years of preparation for the independence achieved in August 1957. According to the compromise embodied in the 1957 Constitution, Chinese residing in the Federation on Independence Day may, on satisfying an eight-years' residence requirement, register as Malayan citizens, while all persons born in the Federation subsequent to independence are automatically citizens.[7] These surprisingly liberal provisions are not unopposed by militant and religious nationalists among the Malays, but if they remain in force, an increasingly large majority of all Chinese in the country will be eligible for Malayan citizenship.

The ten-year insurrection led by Chinese terrorists under the banner of the Malayan Communist Party has been a failure.[8] In its wake Malays are extremely wary of Chinese leftist tendencies, but a general consensus opposing Communism extends to all ethnic communities. Politics at this stage in Malaya's development inevitably has a communal base, but an auspicious beginning has been made toward political integration of the Chinese. The Malayan Chinese Association, the major Chinese political vehicle, represents primarily the more moderate, Malaya-oriented elements in the community; it elicits from Malay politicians remarkably full consideration of Chinese opinion, in part because of fears that Chinese leadership may pass to more radical hands. The Malayan Chinese Association has united with the chief Malay and Indian communal organizations to form the Alliance Party, which in 1955 won 51 of the 52 elective seats in the Legislative Council. The full council of 98, which serves as parliament of the Federation until the 1959 elections, includes fifteen elected and eleven appointed Chinese members. Only 11.2 per cent of the electorate for the 1955 elections were Chinese, but the Chinese proportion will have increased markedly by 1959.[9]

In its attempt to create a common Malayan nationalism, the government eschews both the Thai and the Indonesian approaches to the problem of Chinese education. It intends neither to reduce the number nor change the instruction medium of Chinese schools, whose 1957 enrollment exceeded 320,000. Rather, it aims to bring all vernacular schools into a national system of education with a Malayan orientation, unified primarily through common teacher training and common-content syllabuses. Instruction in Malay, the national language, is already well under way in almost all Chinese

[6] G. William Skinner, "The Chinese of Java," *Colloquium on Overseas Chinese*, edited by Morton H. Fried (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958).

[7] Frank H. K. King, *The New Malayan Nation* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957), pp. 16–17, 36. The acquisition of citizenship through registration is subject to review by the responsible Minister, who in practice is expected to exclude only those notoriously engaged in proforeign activities, that is, activists on behalf of Peking or Taipei.

[8] As of September 1958, only an estimated 600 terrorists remained at large, most of them deep in the jungles near the Thai border.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 15; Francis G. Carnell, "The Malayan Elections," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 28 (December 1955), pp. 320–21.

schools, and the retraining of Chinese teachers has begun.

To date, Malay politicians in the Alliance Party have kept economic nationalism within bounds. The Constitution forbids the enactment of legislation which discriminates against any citizen or class of citizens by reason only of religion, race, or place of birth. However, it also upholds the "special position" of the Malays by continuing for at least fifteen years the pre-independence, pro-Malay quotas, land reservations, and business and professional restrictions. In a sense, this provision postpones the issue of economic nationalism in the hope that preferential policies can in the meantime raise the business skills and opportunities of Malays to a level more nearly comparable to those of the Chinese. If only to forestall militant anti-Sinitic economic nationalism, many Chinese political leaders and the Malayan Chinese Association itself are committed to strengthening the Malay role in the national economy.

## CONCERN WITH PEKING'S ROLE

The issue of Communism pervades almost every facet of the overseas Chinese problem in Southeast Asia. Every nation of the region has pursued its overseas Chinese policy with an acute awareness of Peking's growing power. Each government has severely restricted the immigration of Chinese from mainland China; each opposes Communist infiltration of Chinese schools; each realizes that some of its resident Chinese are avowed Communists willing to conduct intelligence or subversive activities for Peking; and none of these governments is sanguine about the political integration of citizens of Chinese descent when these include many whose support will go to indigenous pro-Communist political groups. Many Southeast Asian politicians have felt that the mid-1950's may be their last opportunity to bring local Chinese Communists under control and to achieve nationalistic ends affecting the overseas Chinese before the growing weight of Peking's international influence can block these steps. This view, widespread in Thailand in 1952–54 and more recently in South Vietnam, is also encountered in the Philippines, Malaya, and even in Cambodia, which in 1955 moved to naturalize local-born Chinese and to ban a wide range of professions to Chinese aliens, but which in 1958 recognized the Peking regime.

Up to 1954, Peking's overseas Chinese policy did nothing to dispel mistrust in Southeast Asia or to suggest that the vigor of Peking's protection of overseas Chinese would not increase in proportion to its international power. All pronouncements of policy during the early years stressed the task of winning over the Chinese residing abroad and concentrated on campaigns to the immediate advantage of the Communist state. In its attempt to gain maximum loyalty and support from overseas Chinese, Communist China has utilized three major appeals: (1) its protection of the interests and welfare of Chinese overseas through diplomatic means and the deterrent effect of Communist power; (2) its right as the legitimate government of China to patriotic loyalty and its appeal to pride in China's new international stature and internal accomplishments; and (3) the special privileges, services, and amenities extended to overseas Chinese and their dependents in China.[10] The loyal goodwill won by these appeals has been the basis for subsequent indoctrination in the virtues and principles of Communism.

This propaganda effort has been carried on through a variety of channels

[10] The appeals used by the Chinese Nationalist regime anticipated and closely parallel those adopted by Peking.



including Chinese schools, the Chinese-owned press, extensive radio broadcasts beamed to Southeast Asia, expense-free visits to China, and cultural missions to Southeast Asia. This vigorous program serves the national interests of Communist China in many direct and significant ways. The effort maintains the flow of remittances to the dependents in China of overseas Chinese, a valuable source of foreign exchange and indirectly of revenue.[11] It facilitates successful appeals for the investment of overseas Chinese capital in reconstruction and development corporations. It has enabled Peking to attract to the mainland tens of thousands of young intellectuals educated abroad at no expense to China, willing to devote their lives to national reconstruction. It provides China with a corps of effective trade promoters and allies in its economic offensive abroad.

This effort is by no means over, but since 1954 it has run increasingly on momentum supplied by Communist partisans overseas, while Peking has shifted its emphasis to accord with changing foreign and domestic policies. Official pronouncements from Peking had by 1958 seriously jeopardized each of its major appeals to the overseas Chinese and circumscribed the immediately advantageous results of the earlier policy.

The appeal based on special privileges and concern for overseas Chinese inevitably ran afoul of Communist China's socialization program. In the China of 1957, characterized by mass austerity and engaged in a speedy transformation to full socialism, discipline and morale were sorely tried by continuing extravagance on the part of the overseas Chinese' dependents in China, by "capitalistic" abuses of the entry privileges accorded overseas Chinese, and by the elaborate provisions protecting overseas investments and guaranteeing profits. In the policy change effected that year, the economic integration of overseas Chinese' dependents was speeded up, duty-free entry of goods brought in by overseas Chinese was stopped, and attempts to increase incentives for overseas Chinese investors were condemned as capitalistic and unpatriotic.[12]

[11] Peking's ill-advised campaign in 1951 to extort remittances from overseas Chinese was, of course, a serious departure from a policy of attracting remittances by positive appeals. It was disavowed in 1952, however, and cadres in Kwangtung and Fukien were subsequently subjected to continual scoldings for failure to "protect" overseas remittances.

## FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The major determinant of China's shift in overseas Chinese policy, however, is Peking's growing reliance on the goodwill and active support of Asian governments in international relations. In 1949–50, Peking roundly denounced every Southeast Asian government, neutralist as well as pro-Western, and registered violent protests over all actions unfavorable to overseas Chinese. Gradually, however, as Communist China settled down to a sustained program for attaining general international recognition, its need for friends and benevolent supporters among the nations of Asia became of paramount importance.

In late 1953 there were already signs that this factor was conditioning Peking's policy, and on several occasions in 1954, Chou En-lai enunciated the regime's willingness to settle the ques-

[12] In June 1957, Ho Hsiang-ning, chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, indicated that special consideration of overseas Chinese' dependents would be limited to a "fixed period" and warned that it is "not right to make special accommodations for a few at the expense of the overall scheme that is nation-wide in scope." American Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Current Background*, No. 467 (July 15, 1957), p. 17.

tion of dual nationality and to urge overseas Chinese to be law-abiding residents of their countries of domicile.[13] Peking's current approach, gradually evolved since 1954, is embodied in the following statement by a major spokesman:

> We hold that overseas Chinese should be free to choose the nationality of the country in which they reside and should be loyal to that country and its people. As for those who wish to remain Chinese subjects, we ask them to continue to observe the policies, laws and regulations of their countries of residence and to respect the customs and habits of the local people. Overseas Chinese should be encouraged to invest commercial capital in local industries, and to cooperate with native capitalists to help develop the independent national economies of the countries in which they live. Children of overseas Chinese should study local languages, geography and history, and acquire certain skills so that they may enter higher schools or earn a living there.[14]

In short, Chinese overseas are advised to come to terms with Southeast Asian nationalists. They are to acquiesce in the efforts of the Southeast Asian countries to nationalize economic and educational systems, and they are to abandon Chinese citizenship when necessary. Peking's appeal to the patriotic loyalty of all persons of Chinese descent and its posture as grand protector of Chinese interests overseas are both seriously impaired. The earlier stress on remittances, investment in China, and promotion of China's foreign trade have been replaced by recommendations to invest locally and cooperate with indigenous businessmen. There is no mention of the vast program which attracted over 45,000 overseas Chinese students to the mainland between 1949 and 1957 but only of obtaining higher education overseas.

Is Peking sincere in its new overseas Chinese line? The record suggests that the mainland regime is in a better position today than during its first few years to forgo financial and other material help from Chinese overseas and that Peking is bending over backwards to avoid offending friendly Southeast Asian governments. It has pointedly refrained from holding elections among Chinese abroad.[15] Since 1955 the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta has been more scrupulous than the Indonesian government itself in distinguishing Chinese citizens from Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent. Indonesia provides still another indication of Peking's policy priorities. Recent decrees backed by the Indonesian Army have imposed an exorbitant tax on Chinese aliens (July 1957) and banned all Chinese-language publications (April 1958). These measures were risked on the assumption that China so valued Indonesia's international support that she would sacrifice her own sons. In fact, China's protest was so muted as to be inaudible outside the foreign ministries in Peking and Jakarta.[16]

[13] Peking's changing line forced the Nationalist regime in Taiwan to revise its attitude regarding citizenship in late 1954. Cf. Willmott, *op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), p. 33. In 1957, Taipei reaffirmed its respect for the principle of free choice in the matter of citizenship, this time in reference to Vietnam. *Free China Review*, Vol. 7 (May 1957), p. 48.

[14] From the speech delivered by Ho Hsiang-ning in February 1958 to the National People's Congress. *Jen-min Jih-pao*, February 7, 1958.

[15] The Constitution of 1954 reserves thirty seats in the National People's Congress for representatives of overseas Chinese. This provision would be innocuous in Southeast Asian eyes only if Peking defined overseas Chinese as residents abroad holding only Chinese citizenship.

[16] The Indonesian Army has issued another decree much to Peking's advantage, namely the ban on Kuomintang organizations imposed in September 1958, in retaliation for the support given Indonesian rebels by some KMT elements. It should also be noted that Peking's policy toward overseas Chinese in Indonesia is conditioned by a desire not to embarrass the Indonesian Communist Party, which has a mass indigenous following and is vulnerable to charges of excessive concern for the rights of resident Chinese.



On the face of it, Peking has sacrificed the immediate advantages of its earlier overseas Chinese policy to the abiding need for friends among the nations of Southeast Asia. Confident that she has already won majority support among the overseas Chinese of the region and strong enough to sustain a decline in material help from them, Communist China is now unwilling to permit their special interests to hinder her domestic program of political and economic transformation or, above all, her struggle for full international recognition. Most of Peking's Chinese partisans overseas are by now sufficiently disciplined to accept the new nonprotectionist line without demur.

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## *INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS*

THOMAS K. FINLETTER. *Foreign Policy: The Next Phase.* Pp. ix, 208. New York: Harper and Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1958. $3.50.

The launching of the two Russian satellites in the autumn of 1957 revealed that the Communists are now prepared militarily to challenge the United States and its allies in the struggle for world supremacy. On the political front their strategy is to weaken the western allies by promoting discord among them, and to win over to the Communist side the uncommitted peoples of Asia and Africa.

In the light of these circumstances, the author believes that the continuation of the defensive policy of containment, never very satisfactory, "promises a future of all loss and no gain" (p. 50). Therefore, although confining our military power to defense—to deter and resist aggression—we should take the offensive "in the areas of politics, economics and world opinion." Specifically, we should repair the damage to the Western Alliance resulting from the Suez crisis of 1956, and henceforth treat our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as partners whom we should consult, rather than as members of a hierarchy subject to our orders as the "leader."

With the uncommitted peoples of Asia we should seek to build a bridge of understanding on the foundation of the United Nations Charter and its principles of peace and human freedom, in which we both believe. China is for the present lost to communism, and "non-communist Asia needs our help as . . . it faces the massive military power of Russia and China" (p. 16). We likewise need Asia, "the next battleground in the cold war" (p. 17). But we must not proceed, as we have too often done, unilaterally in the manner of an imperialist power. Proposals which we may offer for common action in the fields of economics or politics, designed to prevent these peoples from being pulled into the Communist orbit, and to enable them to choose freedom, should be adequately discussed and freely accepted.

The foregoing considerations also apply to the solution of the problem of armaments. In the pre-atomic age statesmen had to formulate their policies on the assumption that war was not only possible but probable. Today, in an age of hydrogen weapons, they must strive with a sense of the greatest urgency completely to eliminate it. Therefore, the United States should "make the attack on war the central theme of all its foreign policy . . ." (p. 199). And, especially in view of the imminent danger that fission and hydrogen weapons may be scattered all over the globe unless an effort is made to get an agreement for the control of armaments, the emphasis on disarmament "as the most immediate line of attack on war" (p. 198) is indicated. But "no successful foreign policy directed toward peace can be successful unless it strikes on many fronts at once, all with the single purpose of eliminating war from the world scene" (p. 198).


FRANK M. RUSSELL

University of California






D. W. BOWETT. *Self-Defense in International Law.* Pp. xv, 294. New York: Frederick A. Praeger; Great Britain: Manchester University Press, 1958. $7.50.

G. I. A. D. DRAPER. *The Red Cross Conventions.* Pp. ix, 228. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. $6.00.

These two volumes, dealing with two of the most controversial aspects of international law, namely self-defense and the rules of warfare, represent genuine and needed contributions to legal literature. In his volume on *Self-Defense in International Law*, Dr. Bowett of the University of Manchester wades manfully through the quagmire of terminology involving distinctions between self-defense and self-preservation, self-help, reprisals, intervention, and sanctions, traces the historical background of these terms, and emerges with a definition of self-defense based on the premise that the right can only be exercised against conduct which is delictual and on the stipulations laid down in the famous "Caroline" case more than a century ago.

Many may differ with Dr. Bowett's definitions but there can be no doubt that his analysis of self-defense in practice, brought up to a date as recent as the Suez crisis of 1956, is extremely clear and helpful. After discussing the substantive rights for which self-defense is permissible, such as independence, territorial integrity, and protection of nationals, he proceeds to a detailed account of the relationship of self-defense to war and neutrality, and concludes with a careful dissection of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and with a study of the theory and practice of collective self-defense.

The author maintains that as a result of "the trend towards a prohibition of the state's unlimited right to resort to war" self-defense has become "legally meaningful" (p. 272), but he is quite correct in his conclusion that "the right of self-defense can only achieve full recognition" when the legal system "embodies the compulsory settlement of the question of legal responsibility on which the whole concept of self-defense depends" (p. 275).

In *The Red Cross Conventions*, Mr. Draper of King's College reviews briefly the various treaties dealing with the treatment of prisoners, civilians, and those wounded in warfare, beginning with the famous Geneva Convention of 1864, and extending through the Hague Conventions and the 1929 Geneva Conventions to the four newest Geneva Conventions of 1949. These four, which revise both the two 1929 treaties and the 1907 Hague Convention relating to the sick and wounded in naval warfare, and add an entirely new convention for the protection of civilians, are thoughtfully analyzed in the text and printed in full in the Appendix.

The author points out the changes in the former treaties and the additions to previous conventions which the newest Geneva agreements contain, showing how the experiences of World War II indicated the inadequacies of the earlier documents. He dwells at length upon the so-called "common articles" in all four conventions, namely Articles 1, 2, and 3 which he believes contain perhaps the most significant contributions to the rules applicable to armed strife (p. 95).

These three articles stipulate that the conventions are to be respected "in all circumstances," including situations in which a formal state of war may not be recognized or in which one of the states in conflict may not be a party to the treaty or in which the conflict may not be "of an international character." The "common Article 3" lays down a minimum code of humanitarian behavior in cases of "armed conflict not of an international character," thus extending to civil strife, for example, prohibitions against torture, the taking of hostages, and "outrages upon personal dignity," even if there is no formal belligerency.

In his conclusion, Mr. Draper states that as of the time of writing the four Geneva

Conventions, consisting of 427 articles, bind sixty-six states and "constitute more than one half of the total content of the law of war" (p. 114). He views them as a "unique contribution to the modern law of war" (p. 115) and hopefully suggests that these "humanitarian principles of justice and compassion must govern . . . the treatment of man by man if our civilization is to be worthy of the name" (p. 115). However, there is always the gnawing doubt as to the value of any rules of war in a nuclear age, or is the attempt to have some rules better than having none at all? Perhaps so!

PAYSON SIBLEY WILD
Vice President and Dean of Faculties
Northwestern University

JOHN GANGE. *University Research on International Affairs.* (Studies in Universities and World Affairs.) Pp. xvii, 147. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1958. $3.00.

This is the sixth of a series of reports, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, on Universities and World Affairs. Previous reports dealt with education about international affairs, foreign students, training of specialists, and so forth. The present report surveys the conditions in colleges and universities which restrict the amount and quality of research on international affairs.

This book is not addressed to the professional research scholar for he already knows the problems he faces. As the author says, "what is in the report came from the author's conversations with these scholars." However educational administrators, foundation officials, officers of voluntary organizations in the international field, and government policy makers may find this report some aid to understanding the conditions under which useful research concerning international affairs will derive from their academic colleagues.

Among the obstacles to research which Mr. Gange enumerates are the unsympathetic attitude of some college administrations, the competition of rival demands upon faculty members' time, shortages of funds, lack of contacts with professional confreres by researchers in smaller institutions, and restrictions on travel and on access to government documents.

Among the more suggestive discussions is that concerning barriers to communication in the world of scholarship. The author discusses the proclivity to secrecy on the part of the scholar himself as well as such external impediments as overclassification of documents, classification of contract research, and suspicion of American scholars by many foreign governments.

Gange notes the great concentration of research activity in a relatively few centers. He estimates that the major portion of campus-based research in international affairs is conducted in less than six per cent of the 763 member institutions in the Association of American Colleges. Quite properly Mr. Gange accounts for this concentration in terms of the institutional environment, not by the myth that all talent has gravitated to those few institutions. Yet even if there is much potential research talent in other institutions which has been turned in other directions by the demands of the environment, still it is not clear that the situation can be changed. Mr. Gange does not explore the question of how far it is in the nature of modern research in all fields to be a highly concentrated activity. The problem of whether this is a good thing, whether it is inevitable, and what to do about it if it is neither good nor inevitable is one which goes beyond the present study, although Gange touches on a number of the relevant considerations.

ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL
Professor of Political Science
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

ROBERT E. ASHER and others. *The United Nations and Promotion of the General Welfare.* Pp. xvi, 1216. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1957. $8.75.

Having now passed the first decade of United Nations history, our hopes of a more mature perspective on this complex organization are being realized by the publication of numerous studies. Few of these are as useful or impressive as those being undertaken by the Brookings Institution, of which this volume is one. The rewards to be gathered from this work are many, even if they are not easily won. Few books deserve the handicap of over a thousand pages of reading matter; perhaps this one would have benefited from more stern editing, but dogged pursuit—by both authors and readers—results in impact.

The work is essentially a survey and an accounting of the activities of the United Nations and related agencies in dealing with problems of international co-operation in economic and social affairs, in the promotion of human rights, in the advancement of dependent peoples, and in the efforts to harmonize conflicting national views in solving these problems. As is readily visible, there have been remarkable and even revolutionary changes in the last decade in most of these matters, but the issue here is one of discerning the role of the United Nations in all of this. The struggle of the authors in this pursuit can be described as valiant, responsible, informed, and, frankly, dogged. It is also imperiled by acute complexity, particularly in Part Two, which has to do with economic and social matters. But these things are complex, and they should be treated accordingly. Moreover, the authors are all well-equipped authorities, intimately knowledgeable in their fields.

As for the role of the United Nations, the reader may well be left with the lingering impression that in all of this maze of activity a rather inordinate amount of United Nations energy has been expended either in flogging dead horses or in trying to harness unharnessable ones. Further, there is the impression that the authors would all be far happier if somehow politics could be abolished. There is, moreover, a certain awe and perhaps hints of defeatism at the developing United Nations preoccupation with the problems of the underdeveloped countries.

There is little room for particular comment, and the reviewer will pass over the chapter on economic co-operation in Part Two with only the comment that it was by all odds the most difficult to follow—a comment offered more in sympathy with the author than with the reader. The chapter on UNESCO was developed with a sure touch of realistic understanding, and merits a high rating on the list of "recommended readings" regarding that badly-debated if properly-contentious agency. The chapter on "Problems of the Underdeveloped Countries" is also rewarding, sensitively written, and realistically treated. Part Three on Human Rights is an account of the United Nations in one of its less reassuring aspects, and deserves high marks for mature handling. Part Four on Dependent Peoples is excellent, not only for the breadth and depth of its coverage, but for bringing into adequate focus the little-known Committee on Information and the struggle with Article 73(e). Finally, the terminal evaluation is not only adequate and helpful, but commendably realistic.

To conclude, this reviewer survived the cautious realism of the survey and ended up with a far deeper appreciation of the necessity and worth of the United Nations. To bring order to a disordered world—when nearly half the world appears to have a vested interest in the continuation of disorder—is not a task we can afford to abandon. And we are learning as much from the failures as we are from the successes—rare as they may be—of the United Nations. This weighty work teaches one respect and humility, and it definitely offers guidance and better understanding.

ROSS N. BERKES
Director, School of International Relations
University of Southern California

EDWARD B. GLICK. *Latin America and the Palestine Problem.* Pp. viii, 199. New York: Theodor Herzl Foundation, 1958. $4.50 clothbound; $2.75 paperbound.

This study deals with the positions taken by Latin-American delegations to the United Nations on the questions laid before that body affecting Palestine and Israel. With the exception of a few minor excursions into more recent territory, 1952 is the terminal date of the study. The author finds that, during the period reviewed, the Latin Americans generally supported the

Israeli cause in the United Nations. He attributes this to the effectiveness of Jewish diplomacy, the existence of some philosophical principles held in common by Latin Americans and Israelis, and a distance between the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere great enough to permit the Latin Americans the luxury of voting their consciences, uncontaminated by considerations of national interest. Furthermore, the author believes that Latin-American endorsement in the United Nations has been of crucial importance to Israel. His reasons for this include the voting strength of the twenty states of Latin America, the personal influence of some of its delegates in obtaining the support of others in the United Nations, the fact that Latin Americans presided over five of the sessions of the General Assembly covered in the study, and the circumstance that three of the eleven members of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) were Latin Americans.

The book suffers from one serious defect. Largely due to his insufficient attention to problems of research design, the author is unclear—and, at some points, downright inconsistent—in his formulation of the research task he set for himself. Is this study an attempt to employ the Palestine question as a test of the overall success or failure of the United Nations? Is the book an analysis of the importance of the international organization, with emphasis on the Latin-American delegations within it, to Israel? Or is this a case study of the role of small states, as illustrated by Latin America, in an international organization? Passages can be found, in various chapters throughout the book, in which it is separately said that each one of these is the purpose of the study; at one curious point, the methodologically remarkable claim is made for all three in combination. In his reluctance to determine what is assumed and what is to be tested, which are constants and which are variables, the author seriously limited the type and significance of the findings awaiting him.

On other counts, it should be pointed out that Glick's style is quite readable, and that his sources are well documented. Many students will find the data assembled for the Appendices—particularly the voting tables on the Palestine question—extremely useful. But this reviewer cannot escape the conviction that the volume could have been far more significant had its central research problem been more sharply and clearly defined.

GEORGE I. BLANKSTEN
Professor of Political Science
Northwestern University

HENRY W. EHRMANN (Ed.) for the International Political Science Association. *Interest Groups on Four Continents*. Pp. xiv, 316. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958. $6.00.

This volume is the outgrowth of a round-table conference held by the International Political Science Association in Pittsburgh in 1957. About thirty professors from fourteen nations attended, listened to working papers, and discussed the implications and generalizations of these papers. About two-thirds of the book is devoted to the role, organization, and operation of interest groups in Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Sweden, United States, and Yugoslavia. These individual papers are filled with information never before brought together in a single volume. The Yugoslavian paper is of great interest, for it presents the political system of that nation in a far less critical light than do most works on Tito's state. Author Djordjevic writes, for example, "Yugoslavia never belonged to those countries where the Party constitutes the core and the sole motive force and directing power of the State mechanism and political process."

Following the analyses of the various countries, the book summarizes the proceedings of the round table. These include discussions of the identification, internal organization, and public relations of pressure groups, the consideration of interest groups' influence on political parties and the governmental process, and the over-all effects of groups on consensus and decision-making. This section brings to light many additional facts and concepts regarding groups in political societies throughout the world.

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The major appeal of this book will be to the student of government, but the lay reader can learn much from it if he has some background in government. For the political scientist, the volume demonstrates the value of a comparative study of pressure politics and the potential of round tables composed of political scientists from all parts of the world. American political writers have often asserted that pressure groups are more important in the United States than in those nations operating under a strong national party system. Readers of the volume are certain to feel that this assumption needs a drastic revaluation. Although the participants were cognizant of variations in different systems and countries, they were able to find certain uniformities. One of these is that the "pluralist interest group system" is found in one degree or another in both Western and non-Western countries.

Professor Henry W. Ehrmann deserves credit for a superb job as *rapporteur* and editor. A most useful Index has been included. All in all this book is a substantial contribution to the growing literature on pressure groups.

HUGH A. BONE
Professor of Political Science
University of Washington
Seattle

HAROLD ZINK and others. *Rural Government in Sweden, Italy and India: A Comparative Study.* Pp. xiii, 142. New York: Frederick A. Praeger under the auspices of The International Political Science Association, 1958. $4.25.

The International Political Science Association, under a UNESCO contract, assumed the responsibility for conducting this comparative study of rural local government in Sweden, Italy, and India. The responsibility was great, for accurate information on rural local government is scarce and a comparison of the three countries selected certainly has never been attempted before. Despite the uniqueness of the venture, one must conclude that the book is stronger in its separate parts than it is as a considered whole. The general reporter, Harold Zink, and the reporters for Sweden (Arne Wåhlstrand), Italy (Feliciano Benvenuti), and India (R. Bhaskaran) labored diligently, and their contributions are worth examining with care. But three more varied societies, with more differing aims and institutions of rural local government, could scarcely have been found had one especially looked for a group to contrast. Even the definition of "rural local government" called for comment all around, and each reporter necessarily wrote his contribution bearing in mind the nuances of the definition which suited his own case.

This is a case of a research basket of apples, oranges, and pears; the fact that summary statements at the end of each substantive chapter, plus some concluding comments, are added by the general editor only helps to identify the differences and contributes little towards the goal of constructing general propositions in political science which would be applicable to the field of local government. The case might have been different had three or more countries of more similar historical and cultural backgrounds been selected. It appears to have been premature to attempt the universal scale implied by the research design of this project.

The scattered sections by the reporters are scissored-and-pasted into functional chapters—scope, history, legal status, machinery, activities, intergovernmental relations, finance, citizen participation, and parties and interest groups. It was left to the ingenuity of the various reporters to expand here and there in the text enough to sketch in regional social histories which have been so intimately related to the form and function of local government everywhere. It would have been far more satisfactory had the country parts been presented as units, leaving the general editor free to formulate his own comparative statement at the end.

As one especially concerned with studies of India, I may add that the parts on India are excellent as far as they go. Regional—and even localized—variations are so complex and unexplored in India's federal system of government, however, that one sympathizes with several anguished reminders from the Indian reporter emphasizing the highly generalized nature of his

comments. A series of detailed reports on each of India's fourteen states will be needed before anything approaching adequate material will be available for generalizations embracing all of India. India, at this stage in the development of political science, is its own best arena for comparative studies.

The Index is helpful, but the selected Bibliography is sketchy.

RICHARD L. PARK
Assistant Professor of Political Science
University of California
Berkeley

## *ASIA AND AFRICA*

CHANG KIA-NGAU. *The Inflationary Spiral: The Experience in China, 1939–1950.* (Technology Press Books in the Social Sciences.) Pp. xvii, 394. New York: The Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall, 1958. $10.00.

There are few individuals better qualified to write on the economic and financial problems of China and the Chinese government in recent decades than Chang Kia-Ngau. He has been a Deputy Governor and Governor of the Bank of China, Cabinet Minister in the Ministry of Railways and the Ministry of Communications, Economic Adviser to the Nationalist Government, Director of the Central Bank of China, the Bank of China, and the Board of Joint Administration of Government Banks, and, in the post-war period, Chairman of the Manchurian Economic Mission. Bringing his knowledge and experience to bear on this subject is roughly equivalent to having Arthur F. Burns, Ewan Clague, and William McC. Martin, Jr. collaborate on a book dealing with the American economy, 1953–57.

The text reflects this special competence. It is comprehensive and filled with both facts and insight. Numerous statistical data give depth and professional flavor to the writing which is precise, analytical, and arresting. Chang's employment of the general equilibrium non-*ceteris paribus* type of analysis is refreshing as well as illuminating, coming as it does in the wake of the rise of econometrics. It is reassuring to learn that statistical data pertaining to such things as consumption, investment, and taxes are to be found and can be used in the real world as well as in the economic models.

The chief defect of the study is a pardonable one. The author is so totally immersed in his own subject that he sees it as the predominant issue of the period under consideration, as the central problem of the times around which all the others revolve. Most notably: "Many historical forces contributed to the collapse of the Nationalist government after World War II, but the direct and immediate cause which overshadowed all other factors was undoubtedly the inflation" (p. 363). With all due respect to Chang, it may be argued that the power of the Chinese Communist Army and the effectiveness of the Chinese Communist propaganda concerning the distribution of wealth and income in China had as much—if not more—to do with the Nationalist government's downfall as did the inflation. He observes that the Nationalist government did not possess "the wisdom and courage to undertake unpopular measures" (p. 365). Neither did it possess the common sense to undertake certain popular measures which would have at least retarded if not prevented its collapse—for example a land tenure reform program.

Despite the question of emphasis, the book is an outstanding one. It is strongly recommended if not required reading for all students of economic development.

SIDNEY KLEIN
Assistant Professor of Economics
Rutgers University

PAUL A. VARG. *Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats: The American Protestant Missionary Movement in China, 1890–1952.* Pp. xii, 335. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. $6.00.

Within the field of his special interest and professional competence, Professor Varg has produced what, on the whole, is an excellent book. With an engaging frankness he states that his primary interest is in Sino-American diplomatic relations. Through diligent research in pertinent sources, both printed and manuscript, he has covered the close inter-connection between Protestant missions in China and the policies and actions of the United States Government, especially, but not exclusively, in the years 1890–1952. Less successful but informing as an account by one who is confessedly "an outsider to the enterprise" (p. ix), is the account of the entire scope of American Protestant missions in China, with changing emphases in the Chinese program and shifting attitudes among the supporting constituencies in the United States. Here the author's lack of background is apparent, both in numerous but relatively minor mistakes of fact, and in a failure to see the story to which he has addressed himself in its setting in the history of Christian missions, from many nations and branches of the faith, not only in China but also elsewhere in the world. He rightly discerns a basic issue in the contrast between the triumph of Communism in China and the apparent debacle of Christian missions, with its seeming defeat of Christianity. But in ascribing the reason to the fashion in which Soviet ideology "was presented in terms of meeting the needs that the Chinese themselves felt" and suggesting that if "Christianity had been first and foremost an economic and political doctrine rather than a religion emphasizing the spiritual, it might have overcome the handicap of being foreign" (pp. 321–322) he oversimplifies the problem and neglects important factors—as do those who ascribe the failure of the Roman Catholic missions to win China in the eighteenth century to the refusal to follow the methods of accommodation to the culture of the empire which were formulated by Ricci and other Jesuits. In the area in which the author is a specialist there is the strange omission of the part which missionaries played in the return of a portion of the American Boxer indemnity. Also in the realm of politics, it is astonishing to read that the Taiping Rebellion was "a "Christian movement" (p. 7). That certain of its features were of Christian provenance and that its leader had been influenced by contact with Protestantism has long been recognized, but the accuracy of labelling as "Christian" the syncretistic amalgam of those elements with others of quite different origin is at least open to debate.

KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE
Sterling Professor of Missions and
Oriental History, Emeritus
Yale University

RYUSAKU TSUNODA, WM. THEODORE DE BARY, and DONALD KEENE (Eds.). *Sources of the Japanese Tradition.* (Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies, No. LIV, Introduction to Oriental Civilizations.) Pp. xxvi, 928. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. $7.50.

Teachers, students, and the wider public will welcome this first of three volumes which will provide edited selections from the traditions of Japan, India, and Pakistan, as well as China. Institutions with a limited budget for library accessions concerning Asia will find that such volumes of translated readings offer much for the investment. It is also evidence of the maturing of Japanese studies in America that this collection, an enriching companion to general histories of Japan, could be prepared.

This book stresses the intellectual traditions of Japan as expressed by writers. Of course many of the original authors were leaders of experience and action—monarchs, officials, courtiers, priests, philosophers, moralists, warriors, artists, and social reformers. The volume has been produced in connection with the Columbia College General Education Program in Oriental Studies.

The readings are organized into five parts according to historic periods: the Ancient (106 pp.), Heian (79 pp.), Medieval (117 pp.), Tokugawa (284 pp.), and Modern—or "Japan and the West"—(315 pp.) eras. Within sections there are, in all, twenty-nine topical chapters with documents grouped under sub-topics. Some inclusions are complete documents; others are compact portions, while from still others (as, for example, the Constitution of 1889) scattered passages or articles are quoted. Of course, more perspective was available for choosing materials from the

earlier periods. Specialists will be able to think of important writings, movements, and schools of thought which are not represented, but selection was imperative; on the whole it has been well done, although in a few cases the editors seem to have accepted the favorite pieces recommended by contributors, and in a few cases these were what the latter happened to have worked on in the recent past.

Selection must have been especially difficult for the modern period with all of its change and complexities. Certain of these readings rank with the most interesting, however. They include important arguments about national policy before and during Japan's expanding intercourse with maritime powers, political documents of the reformative Meiji era, examples of Japanese liberalism, revolutionary nationalism, militarism, socialism, religious pietism, and thinking since World War II about the role and special contributions of which Japan is capable.

Prior to this last section, it is mainly the Japanese cultural tradition which has been illustrated but in the division on Japan since about 1850 there is increased attention paid to political writings.

ALLAN B. COLE
Professor of East Asian Affairs
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Curator of Fellowships in East Asian Studies
Harvard University

IRENE B. TAEUBER. *The Population of Japan.* Pp. xv, 461. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. $15.00.

This major work, many years in preparation, is a survey of Japanese population history from the early legendary period onward, a guide to and critique of the official population data, and a detailed analysis of the demographic development from 1920 to 1955. It is largely based on the Japanese sources that are available to few western demographers; and for this reason, and also as a result of its extensive classified Bibliography, this volume promises to serve as the principal introduction to Japanese population materials for foreign scholars.

Japan has long been of particular interest to western demographers, to many of whom it has been the classic example of the population problem, but it has much more to offer to the student of population. The nation has a long political and demographic history that can be traced in outline and growing detail over a number of centuries, and it is unique among Oriental nations in the extent and quality of its modern population data. It also constitutes the outstanding example of the introduction of western industrialization and urbanization into an eastern society. Besides all this the demographic record spans the rise and fall of an empire, from the expansion in the Western Pacific and on the Asiatic mainland to final military disaster and return to the narrow limits of the home islands.

*The Population of Japan* traces the demographic correlates and consequences of this wide gamut of cultural, economic, and political change. Here two principal contributions of the study, apart from its substantive content, should be noted. One is the critique of the various source materials, with explanation of their limitations and how they are to be interpreted. The other is the provision of extensive notes on the environment of ancient and new values, of economic stability or change, of legal and political influences within which marriage, reproduction, migration, and mortality occurred. For all except the occasional specialist who wants highly detailed information on specific topics, such as age reporting phenomena or the accuracy of the reporting of causes of death, the work can serve as a guide to the interpretation of the official Japanese population data.

The wealth of material and topics covered can be only partly noted here. The introductory chapters summarize the political and demographic history of Japan through the Tokugawa Period, then describe the registration data and population movements to 1918. More detailed analyses then proceed on the basis of census and registration data from 1920 to 1955. Among the topics given particular attention are change in total population and its distribution, the labor force and its changing composition by industry, the internal redistribution of population, the expansion of the Japanese into the outlying possessions and dependencies, the patterns of marriage and fertility, the control of family size, and mortality. A final group of chapters deals with the demographic impact of war and with the outlook for the future.

In a broader sense this work is especially significant as the most detailed study we have of the demographic consequences of the introduction of western material culture into an eastern society. Several points emphasized by the author are especially worth noting in this connection. One is that the Japanese experience cannot safely be generalized because precedent for family limitation was already well established in Japan before the Meiji Restoration. Another is that Malthusian fears to the contrary, the great population increase since the Restoration has been accompanied by a rise in the level of living.

E. P. HUTCHINSON
Professor of Sociology
University of Pennsylvania

RUSSELL H. FIFIELD. *The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945–1958.* Pp. xv, 584. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. $7.50.

Seven of the eight states in Southeast Asia have assumed responsibility for their own foreign affairs in the past thirteen years. Professor Fifield has undertaken to survey the diplomatic conduct of these eight members of the international community, taking their changing status as his main theme. Unfortunately the details swell up to obscure the story at times.

But the author has sifted an extremely large amount of material to bring out the basic relevant facts and has done a remarkable job of compressing information into 500 pages. He begins with a brief review of the geographic, social, and economic setting; the course of events leading up to independence; and the administrative machinery for diplomacy in each state. A chapter is devoted then to the major elements of foreign policy and associated acts of diplomacy in The Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, the former Associated States of Indochina, and Malaya. Finally he discusses what little tangible evidence there is for any regionalism in the area and what the relations of the respective states have been to the United Nations. The comprehensive Bibliography of forty-four pages and Index of fifteen pages are noteworthy. The book is based on personal observation and inquiry as well as a careful examination of published sources.

Professor Fifield, perhaps to a fault, adheres to a country-by-country approach both in his general organization and within each chapter. Since he has considered the questions of regionalism and the United Nations sufficiently universal for separate treatment, one might complain at not finding unified discussions of such equally broad matters as neutralism, or relations with the United States and the People's Republic of China. This lack may be a part of the author's tendency to eschew judgments upon the validity, morality, or effectiveness of the manner in which these new states have conducted their foreign affairs. Moreover such restraint is consistent with his generally open-minded and sympathetic outlook, which permits considerable light to shine on the viewpoints of the Southeast Asian leaders themselves. *The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia* will be useful for information and reference to anyone interested in the area.

DAVID A. WILSON
Southeast Asia Program
Cornell University

WENDELL BLANCHARD in collaboration with HENRY C. AHALT and others. *Thailand: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture.* (Country Survey Series.) Pp. x, 528. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1958. Distributed by Taplinger Publishing Company. $6.50.

This survey of Thailand is the eighth volume in a series written by one of the interdisciplinary teams at the Washington, D. C., branch of the Human Relations Area Files. The disciplines represented are anthropology, international affairs, political science, economics, and history.

Such staff production is commonplace in government and I have been flooded with it

for seventeen years. It is usually of irregular merit and must be used cautiously. So I was not prepared to be impressed unduly by the volume under review. But I was impressed unduly—or duly, whichever you prefer. It is first class, and provides an enormous amount of specific and "knowing" information. It has a good feel from the beginning. I tried asking it questions, the hard test for a survey volume: Does it say what one needs to know? In general it does.

One of the great merits of this volume is that one is led to believe, early in the book, that real people live in Thailand. Considerable attention is given to the kind of human beings who made Thailand. This is especially valuable as people draw closer to each other. I wish I had had a book like this when I first went out in 1927.

Of course I might take exception to some things in the book: the official version of Taksin on page thirty-four, which was a partial fiction to make the Chakri beginnings more respectable, for instance. Or the dodging of the fact, on page 122, that Pibul had gently and decently elevated Prime Minister Phahon to the shelf of Senior Statesman and was not merely "the obvious choice for Premier." He chose himself. Or the implication on pages 123–124 that graft and corruption were products of the Pridi faction and decreased to tolerable limits under Pibul. Or the inadequate paragraphs on pages 239–240 on the settlement of Thailand's official state of war with the United Kingdom and France and the role of the United States in that settlement. Or the repeated theme in various contexts that the Thai are unoriginal and just absorb what they can from other cultures without expanding the frontiers of their knowledge, failing to recognize just what the Thai genius has done and can do with outside inspiration.

But these are incidental and perhaps I am prejudiced. The book is excellent, the Index is thorough, and the Bibliography is presented in such a way that further reading is encouraged.

KENNETH LANDON
Staff Assistant
Operations Coordinating Board
Washington, D. C.

MARTIN F. HERZ. *The Short History of Cambodia: From the Days of Angkor to the Present.* Pp. 141. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. $3.00.

Prompted by the availability of historical materials, Martin F. Herz, Foreign Service Officer by vocation and historian by avocation, gives in his *Short History of Cambodia* a charming picture of the high civilization of ancient Khmer Angkor Vat, and a frank, analytical, and yet appealing picture of Cambodia today. He binds the two pictures together rather tenuously, telling in a short chapter what little he feels we should know of the interlude between the eclipse of the great Cambodian Empire during the period of Marco Polo's visits to the East and the eclipse of the no less imposing French Empire only a few years ago. In both the episodes which he chooses to stress, his Cambodians occupy the stage of history brilliantly.

No one can live in South East Asia without falling under the spell of Angkor Vat and of the great neighboring city of ruins, Angkor Thom. The excavation and resurrection of these mighty testimonials to an imperial past must remain as the finest accomplishments of the French in their ill-starred venture into Indo-China. Foreign Officer Herz brings a stolid realism to his evaluation of the picturesque quotations about Angkor Vat with which he enriches the text. He is also a realistic judge of the various theories put forward by his predecessors to explain the sudden pause in temple building, the abrupt termination of carving and bas-relief, and the setting up of monumental steles to record a history which was becoming increasingly discouraging and tragic. It was not necessarily the shift from Mahayana to Hinayana Buddhism with its more austere disapproval of ornate art and temples, and it was not necessarily the revulsion against the old Brahminic religion and an exodus away from its temples and their priesthood so exigent in sacrifices, gifts and forced labor, but instead it was probably just the same weight of foreign influences which undermine modern states which finally toppled Angkor. In this interpretation Herz accepts only partially the explanations given by Leclère, by Louis Finot, and by Lawrence P. Briggs for the fall of the ancient Cambodian Empire, and realistically suggests that the overpopulation of Annam, which was alternately invaded and re-ruled by Chinese or relinquished and repelled by them, worked inevitably to push against and destroy the buffer state of Champa and then eventually to flow over and occupy underpopulated Eastern Cambodia. The process of history still continues, because as late as 1700 Saigon was still a Cambodian village, while the Chinese influence is now strong. Cambodia was caught between the rising tide of Annam and the "decapitating" influence of the powerful Thai state around Ayuthia, which gradually replaced the Cambodian elite with a Thai one. Caught between Annamite and Thai, Cambodia was less successful in playing off the one against the other than, in a later century, Thailand was in playing off the encroaching French in Cambodia and Laos against the encroaching British in Malaya and Burma.

Mr. Herz is authoritative, writing from personal observation and breaking new paths, as he takes up the fate of Cambodia under the French, and traces the tortuous route to independence. His recital of Narodom's maneuvers and success against the French, against the enticements of both East and West in the ideological war, and against offers of aid with suspected conditions attached, is as documented as if taken from official reports to the State Department. If anyone can make us grasp Cambodian neutralism, Mr. Herz can. His illuminating book performs in this a very useful service.

WILLIAM L. SMYSER
Professor of History
State Teachers College
East Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania

OSCAR LEWIS with the assistance of VICTOR BARNOUW. *Village Life in Northern India: Studies in a Delhi Village.* Pp. xiii, 384. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958. $7.50.

Professor Lewis and his staff of nine present here, mostly for the second time, some results of surveys conducted in a village near New Delhi. The surveys show the village of "Rampur" to be poor and short of land. The landed castes are said to exploit the landless through the inter-caste service system, while that system itself is beginning to crumble. Twelve "factions" are described as major particles in the molecular structure of local politics. Elaborate weddings continue today, and the twenty local festivals are said to go on with little change, without much pattern, and with slight reference to the higher traditions of Hinduism. Rampur village farmers express a this-worldly outlook, while Brahmins and others maintain more "traditional" other-worldly views. All are shown to hold unscientific ideas about disease and medicine. Finally, the great role of kinship in the social life of Rampur—by contrast with the Tepoztlan in Mexico—prompts Professor Lewis to warn against substituting a generalized notion of "peasant society" for particular facts about particular societies.

Although these survey papers were produced by inexperienced investigators during a brief term of field contact under strenuous administrative pressure, they are offered as models of anthropological work for India. The uneven quality of the results testifies rather to the severity of the handicaps. At many points, deficiencies of observation are filled in with quotations from previous studies made elsewhere by others; the effects are often confusing. At other points, as in the descriptions of weddings and ideas of disease, local data are presented with slight or mainly external analysis. Land tenure relationships are not disentangled from the inter-caste service system, while the statements about individual and caste status appear hypothetical. The claim to have discovered a distinctive, factional dimension of social structure seems based on the application of a novel terminology to aspects of patrilineal kinship which have been known from many previous studies. The possibly empirical derivation of the intricate factional sociograms is not demonstrated. Great historic waves of religious change— Vaishnavism, Shaivism, Islam, and so forth—appear to be left aside in the assertion of festival stability. Close inspection of Rampur religious behavior in its contexts may reveal more intimate connections, both with

local social patterns and with greater literate traditions. The equation of "otherworldly" with "traditional" seems not to take account of the worldly orientation of much ancient Hindu literature. And a positive general conception of peasant society still seems an invaluable guide to particular facts about peasant communities, whether in India or in Mexico.

It is to be hoped that these studies may some day be supplemented and completed under more favorable conditions so that they can be interpreted in relation to each other and to a larger view of cultural history.

McKIM MARRIOTT
Assistant Professor of Anthropology
and Social Sciences
University of Chicago

S. M. KEENY. *Half the World's Children: A Diary of UNICEF at Work in Asia.* Pp. xxvi, 254. New York: Association Press, 1957. $3.50.

The United Nations Children's Fund and its mission of mercy are known all over the world, including the more remote regions of Asia in which millions of children have been born and brought up in the past under conditions of squalor, disease, and misery which killed them off in huge numbers and left a large proportion of the remaining ones crippled for the rest of their lives. Such waste of human life and such untold suffering for those who are left behind need hardly continue if the resources of modern science and of organized community effort can be brought home to these suffering people. In his book *Half the World's Children*, Mr. Spurgeon M. Keeny unfolds the story of seven years of devoted service in extending UNICEF aid to the 200 million children of Asia, about eight per cent of the world's total population.

The story is told, in a simple and extremely readable form, of the remarkable achievements accomplished by this great organization, which is sedulously exploring ways and means to fight disease, to feed the undernourished, and to promote in many ways the entry of a ray of light and hope into countless homes of children, irrespective of their country, race, or creed. To give permanence to this campaign for child welfare, UNICEF rightly stresses the channeling of its activities through governments and utilizes the available social service agencies to make its ministration as broadly based as possible. The success of all forms of welfare work depends a great deal on the sympathy, understanding, and patience which the workers bring to bear on their respective tasks from day to day; it is heartening to read in Mr. Keeny's account of the UNICEF program a revealing story of devoted service, which local and foreign workers developed and sustained in spite of discouragement, personal discomfort, and various obstacles in the path of progress.

In this book of a continuing saga of high achievement the author reveals himself as a person endowed with the understanding and sympathy which enable him to penetrate beneath the squalor and misery he sees around him to the personality of the child and to the primary human reactions which make him as lovable as the child of a more happily endowed home. The reader secures for himself from the book something of the glow of satisfaction which Mr. Keeny must have felt as a sustaining force during his several years of participation in the successful organization of purposeful effort to promote health and happiness. He describes such programs as a campaign against ten million cases of yaws in Indonesia, the vaccination of fifty million persons against smallpox, flood relief, and various other tasks of an equally important and beneficent nature carried out in different countries and among various peoples of Asia and the Far East.

Children are the most precious assets of all nations; may we not hope that the great program of improving the life of children, to which UNICEF has dedicated itself and in the carrying out of which it seeks and secures the help of all nations, will make a growing contribution to the elimination of those stresses and strains that are at the bottom of all the troubles the world faces today.

K. C. K. E. RAJA
Director, Demographic Training and
Research Centre
Bombay



J. RUSSELL ANDRUS and AZIZALI F. MOHAMMED. *The Economy of Pakistan.* Pp. xvii, 517. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. $8.50.

Pakistan, the smaller and less well endowed of the two states emerging in 1957 from British India, has always been overshadowed in Western eyes by neighboring India. It is characteristic that *The Economy of Pakistan* is the first book available in the West on the economy of that country, the world's sixth largest in population. Andrus and Mohammed have filled the need for a book providing a compilation of the available factual material on Pakistan's economy. In its 500 pages one can find figures on the national income as well as the number of cubic feet of standing timber in state forests, on the balance of payments, as well as the receipts and expenditures of the Post Office. The coverage of other known facts or informed guesses is as comprehensive as that for statistical data.

The emphasis on complete coverage and detail is at the same time a serious weakness. Data are included which are of significance and interest only to the specialist in a particular field. The picture of the economy is blurred, since the reader has to decide at each step whether the discussion deals with a significant aspect or interesting trivia. Some statistics are presented without adequate indication of their reliability and occasionally there is no clear distinction between vague proposals, definite plans, projects under execution, and goals actually achieved. Current economic data in a book are inevitably somewhat dated by the time it appears, but this is particularly serious where statistics are heavily emphasized yet most series can go back only to 1948. A number of examples of all of these weaknesses could be cited. *The Economy of Pakistan* includes, for instance, a figure of annual "requirements" for meat production with no warning that it is a meaningless estimate. There is a relatively detailed discussion of the Six Year Plan and of measures to assist small scale industry, without indication that neither has had much practical significance.

Most disappointing is the scarcity of critical analysis. The economy of Pakistan is faced with a number of challenging problems and their analysis would be of considerable interest. But there is little discussion here of the economic relations between the two quite separate parts of the economy; no analysis of the strategy of development adopted by Pakistan; no consideration of the means adopted to divert resources to investment; little concern with the effect of government regulation on private investment—beyond an uncritical acceptance of claims that the government is doing all it can to encourage such investment. The few instances of analysis or policy recommendations are not without questionable conclusions. It is contended for instance that "a favorable balance of trade will remain a necessity for Pakistan" (p. 262). Yet an unfavorable trade balance is both likely and necessary in the foreseeable future if the economy is not to stagnate. Pakistan will not be able to earn the foreign exchange to pay for the imports required by both current consumption and any sizeable development program. She will have to continue to rely heavily on foreign loans, grants, and investments which implies an unfavorable, not a favorable balance of trade.

In view of the shortcomings of *The Economy of Pakistan* the First Five Year Plan of the Government of Pakistan will continue to be a satisfactory and cheaper introduction to the Pakistan economy for most readers. The Plan does lack some of the factual material incorporated in the book and for anyone interested in well-organized, easily accessible compilation of most of the available data on the Pakistan economy, this volume will be a good source. In this respect it fills an urgent need reasonably well, but as an attempt to provide a clear picture or analysis of an important economy it is disappointing.

GUSTAV F. PAPANEK
Lecturer and Research Associate
Harvard University

DANIEL LERNER with the collaboration of LUCILLE W. PEVSNER. *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East.* Pp. xiii, 466. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. $7.50.

For centuries much of the Middle East was a stagnating backwater, and even after the rest of the East had begun to undertake historic reforms, the region maintained its placid rhythm. It was only a few years ago that it shed its complacency and today nobody can know what may happen to it tomorrow. Books about it, published a short time ago, are already dated.

Professor Daniel Lerner's book is unlikely to share their fate. He deals with basic human problems within the Middle Eastern context, grounded in the separate histories and traditions of six nations. The project originated at Columbia University's Bureau of Applied Social Research in 1949 as a sample survey of six Middle Eastern countries. The interviewers performed their tasks, oriented mainly toward the effect of mass media. Dr. Lerner was then asked to analyze their findings. Five years later he followed up the original project with a set of re-interviews. He was greatly impressed by the rapid passing of traditional society in the region. He found, of course, that the rate of progress varied. Why was Lebanon changing while Iran faltered at modernization? Why did Turkey follow a straight line and Egypt a zigzag one? The difficulties of obtaining the material in an area unused to the interview technique were great. The interviewer was taken for a spy in Syria while in Iraq no sample survey could be taken at all. Then, too, how were secluded women to be interviewed and how was one to catch up with Jordan's nomads?

When finally taken, the interviews revealed many significant facts about the six countries and about the impact of the irradiation of western concepts. It was particularly instructive to learn how the different population strata reacted to the questions, as, for instance, the modern people, the transitionals and traditionals in Turkey.

Professor Lerner weaves the results of the interviews into the description of the six nations' social ways, against the background of the contemporary transformation of their modes of thought, their individual and group behavior patterns. He concludes that the general aim of modernization was to narrow the gap between the top and bottom social group by creating a substantial middle sector—increasing the number of "transitionals" who compose the living reality of transition. Since the manuscript of his book was completed, the Middle East has been convulsed by further changes, especially in Jordan and Lebanon. Yet the information conveyed in Professor Lerner's book has been neither contradicted nor weakened by events. In the light of quite recent events, his interviews, analysis, and background information are even more revealing.

In writing his book the author has eschewed the temptation to mix obscurity with profundity or substitute the former for the latter. In this book both the thoughts and style of writing are clear. Indeed, *The Passing of Traditional Society* is very good reading. In the ever-increasing literature about the Middle East, this large volume by Daniel Lerner, assisted by Lucille W. Pevsner, is bound to retain an honored place.

EMIL LENGYEL
Professor of Education
New York University

JAMES MORRIS. *Islam Inflamed: A Middle East Picture*. Pp. 326. New York: Pantheon Books, 1957. $5.00.

James Morris is a British correspondent who knows the Middle East well, having served in Palestine during World War II and visited there in a somewhat different capacity during the years which followed. During the Suez conflict of 1956, Mr. Morris was a special correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* in Israel. This is not, however, a book about that conflict, nor essentially about politics in the narrow sense of the term.

Published originally under the much more attractive and accurate title of *The Market of Seleukia, Islam Inflamed* is a picture of the Middle East as it appeared to the author at the time of the Suez crisis. It is an impression of the Muslim Middle East as it was "at a decisive moment of its history," when, in November 1956, the author stood beside a road in the Sinai desert with an Israeli colonel,



among Israeli troops, with the debris of a defeated enemy strewn about the landscape. This is his "picture of the region as it was that day, frozen for a moment in all its varied attitudes, before the hot breath of history melted the tableau." With a touch that is quick and easy—perhaps too much so—the author portrays the Egypt of Nasser, independent Sudan, Lebanon bickering over oil transit rights, Syria in effervescence, Iraq threatened by possible subversion, Jordan riddled with intrigue, Iran restless, Saudi Arabia in transition, and an emergent nationalism throughout the Arabian Peninsula.

The book is not a scholarly, well-documented study, and is not to be judged as such. It simply records the author's impressions, written with a facile and sometimes brilliant pen, of the peoples, the cities, the oases, the ports, the suks, the customs, the habits, and the outlook of a vast and varied region. While this is not a work of politics, the author includes reflections on British, American, and Soviet policy and interest in the Middle East, and characterizations of current Middle Eastern leaders. But he is much more interested in the people, the mosques, the bazars, the fellahin, and the Bedouin.

HARRY N. HOWARD
Beirut, Lebanon

ILENE BEATTY. *Arab and Jew in the Land of Canaan*. Pp. 108. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1957. $2.50.

This work, packed with the leitmotifs of Jewish guilt for the crucifixion and the noble Arab versus the materialistic Jew, is proof that the Jewish plot theory, developed to perfection by Hitler and used by the Communists and Nasser, still has some propaganda value in the West. The author finds the Zionists and Israeli guilty and the Arabs innocent on all counts. The common argument that the Jews terrorized a "million" Arab refugees into fleeing is not made more acceptable by the author's question: "Has any Arab army ever attempted to invade Israel?" Miss Beatty concludes that the "true" owners of Palestine are the ancient Canaanites, or their descendants, the Arabs, and that the Jews' sin against Jesus deprives them of any rights to the Holy Land. However, the ancestors of many of Palestine's Arabs have settled there during the past two centuries; some undoubtedly are of Jewish descent, and thus are partners in the rejection of Jesus, while many Jews are very likely descendants of assimilated Canaanites. The book abounds with reasoning which seems to be based not only on prejudice, but also on ignorance.

Miss Beatty proposes that the Holy Land should be set up as the "Palestine International Monument" of 10,429 square miles, a United Nations Agency on which no large nation should be represented and which should administer the land like an American national park. "The present residents should continue to reside wherever they are, Arab refugees should all be returned to their former habitations, with the Israelis to be resettled in new places, except in cases where the Arab houses have been destroyed and Jewish collective farms built instead. Those who cannot or do not wish to regain their former places, should be resettled or given jobs in the Park department as tree planters or tourist guides. The International Monument would be a mecca for tourists and thus would become a fabulously lucrative business."

She is sure of Arab approval of this solution by tourism. The author advises the Israelis to follow suit as the Jewish state cannot support itself anyway; "American-Jews," as good businessmen anxious to save their investments, are told to pressure Israel into accepting this solution.

The book, based on "independent" research, fails to take up the essentials of Zionism and Israel. These cannot be understood without comprehending the factors of an almost 2,000-year-old hope for restoration; doors closed to the persecuted; the Nazi murder of six million; the desire to survive as a people in one place where Hebraic culture is the primary one; not to speak of the desperate fear of the genocide threatened by Arab leaders. These factors form the background of modern Zionism and its realization in Israel. Internationalization of Palestine will not provide open doors for persecuted Jews, nor will it pre-

vent the Arabs from wanting to carry out their long proclaimed intentions of driving all the Jews in Israel into the sea. The book therefore cannot be taken as a serious solution to the problem.

ABRAHAM G. DUKER
President and Professor of
Social Studies
College of Jewish Studies
Chicago

DON PERETZ. *Israel and the Palestine Arabs*. Pp. xi, 264. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1958. $5.00.

This is the type of doctoral thesis which well deserves publication in book form for its usefulness to contemporary readers as well as future ones. It deals with the vitally important matter of the relationships between Arabs and Jews, between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs, both those within the Jewish Republic and along its frontiers in concentration camps.

There are few writers on these matters who are capable of achieving the objective point of view, devoid of propaganda and emotional bias, which is attained and maintained throughout the volume by Don Peretz.

After sketching briefly the background of the subject, the author in considerable detail discusses repatriation of the Arab refugees and its failure; compensation to the Palestinian Arabs for their heavy property losses resulting from the Arab-Jewish war; and the illegal seizure, destruction, and looting of Arab property which took place after the Arab hegira. These he neither condones nor condemns. Rather he tells what happened and presents with clarity the complex problems which were thrust upon the Israeli Government. He goes on to deal with the whole question of the expropriation of Arab property and the blocked bank accounts of the Palestinian Arabs in Israeli-controlled banks.

The book reveals the attitudes of the various Israeli political parties and groups toward the varied aspects of Israel's relationships with the Palestinian Arabs—the refugees and the Arab minority in Israel. In some ways the book arouses a sense of deep discouragement arising from a realization that among the Israeli few seem to have shown any deep compassion toward the Arab refugees or protested against the suffering imposed upon them in the name of security, military necessity, and expediency. Perhaps it is an illusion to think that people who have greatly suffered would have compassion for the suffering of others.

Don Peretz's book is essential reading for anyone who wishes to understand those phases of the Arab-Jewish conflict which are related to the Arab refugees and the Arab minority in Palestine. The book is a valuable contribution, but because it is most desirable that knowledge of this problem should become more widely known, it is to be regretted that *Israel and the Palestine Arabs* is heavy and tiresome reading. The mass of detailed information, though useful to the historian, is of little interest to the general reader.

WILLIAM YALE
Professor of History
Boston University

ERNEST W. LUTHER. *Ethiopia Today*. Pp. 158. Stanford: Stanford University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1958. $4.00.

Potentially one of the richest countries in Africa, Ethiopia still remains largely untouched by the economic and social upheavals that afflict the rest of Africa. From the bewildering array of Western techniques, Ethiopia's rulers assimilate only as much as the rickety medieval framework can stand. The Italian invasion brought with it the full impact of Western influence and when Ethiopia took her place alongside the other members of the United Nations she was committed to the policy of continuing that inflence through the medium of foreign aid and advice. But foreign advisers must operate through a system of monarchial centralism and it is the Emperor who sets the pace and determines the objectives to be pursued.

Mr. Ernest W. Luther's book, *Ethiopia Today*, provides an extremely useful and up-to-date commentary on the manner in which outside influences are working out within an archaic setting. As economist for the State Bank of Ethiopia, Mr. Luther was in an exceptionally good position to assess what has been happening, and as his many examples show, he has been a keen observer and is not, as so many are who write about Africa, prepared to base his generalizations on experiences gained solely in the capital city.

The main emphasis of the book is upon economic matters and here Mr. Luther writes with confidence and authority. Anomalies abound on all sides. "Estimates of revenue and expenditure usually made a year or more after the event by the Ministry of Finance are termed the 'budget'" (p. 62). Contrary to western practice, the Emperor's addresses to Parliament consist entirely of a review of past events; there are no exhortations to future legislative action. Mr. Luther puts his finger on a key difficulty in implementing measures of economic development. The peasant's "wants are so limited and the standards of living all around him so low, that the desire to accumulate manufactured products for use or for ostentatious display, both of which motives are important driving forces in economically advanced countries, seldom arises" (pp. 79–80). It is Mr. Luther's contention that the key to Ethiopia's future rests on an improved agricultural output.

Politically, the Emperor remains the mainspring of the whole system. The revised 1955 Constitution pays homage to many democratic ideals, but with no independent civil service or judiciary, the Ethiopian system is one of men and not of laws. The Emperor's greatest service to his people has been the setting up of an institutional framework which will facilitate the future political and economic advance of his country. At the moment however, behind the brave new facade of the 1955 Constitution, men are largely motivated by the old system of values and it is the great merit of Mr. Luther's book that he affords us so many glimpses of the conflict between the old and the new.

G. F. ENGHOLM
Lecturer in Political Science
Makerere College
The University College of East Africa



ERNEST BEAGLEHOLE. *Social Change in the South Pacific: Rarotonga and Aitutaki*. Pp. 268. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. $6.50.

Professor Beaglehole is chairman of the Department of Psychology at Victoria University College, Wellington, New Zealand. He is also one of the foremost authorities on Polynesia today. His anthropological and psychological studies on several islands constitute a valuable series of papers, distinguished for their significance to the two disciplines he serves and for their relevance to the practical affairs and administration of these island peoples. The present book is a highly commendable study in the same pattern, and should be of interest to administrators of dependent peoples, to missionaries, and to social and political scientists.

To the study of social change on Rarotonga and Aitutaki, two islands in the southern Cook group, Dr. Beaglehole has brought an approach heretofore little exploited by anthropologists—the use of historical documents. Demonstrating the validity of this method is itself an important accomplishment. The purpose of this study is "to take a self-sufficient non-literate community in which change has been initiated by stimulus from without and then trace the effects of this stimulus in the resulting changed cultural life of the people" (p. 4). Unlike many nonliterate peoples in the world, the Cook Islanders have an extensive record of the changes wrought on them during the first eighty years of European contact in the London Missionary Society archives. Since missionaries were the first and for a long time the most important agents of cultural change such records are without parallel. Supplementing the missionary archives—which commence in the early 1820's—are government reports and so forth for the latter part of the nineteenth century. Then, skipping fifty years, which is rather too bad, Beaglehole brings the study up to date by two months' field work in 1948–49. Most of the historical data pertain to Rarotonga, while the field work was done on Aitutaki.

After a brief introduction the book is

divided into four parts. Included in the first part is a summary—much too brief for the nonanthropological reader—of the aboriginal culture, followed by a description of the coming of the missionaries and the changes they effected up to 1857. The second part analyzes the events up to 1901. While Beaglehole summarizes the missionary material well, and has some extremely perceptive remarks to make about missionary acculturation, it would seem that he did not use these rich documents to their fullest potential. Perhaps a more functionally oriented conceptual scheme would have enabled him to utilize the material better. There seems little reason to fear, as he suggests in the Preface, that another conceptual framework would have intruded itself on his purposes any more than the one he uses.

Beaglehole attempts to explain almost all his cultural data with psychological concepts—for instance he states that the major function of warfare was the release of aggression—often ignoring social and other functions. His favorite psychological concept is learning theory, and while I would not quarrel with the utility of this theory for analyzing culture change, it does seem inadequate for this material.

The second half of the book is devoted to the contemporary scene. Part three considers everything from population to religion in modern life in a tantalizingly incomplete way. Part four deals with welfare, psychology, and social change. Two months' field work is, of course, a very short period of time in which to gain much more than a cursory knowledge of a society. More detailed field work and analyses would have given added authority to Beaglehole's statements on character structure, which rivals social change as the theme of the book.

Various professionals will find other faults: the use of "character structure," "basic personality type," and "social personality" as synonyms, for example. Without more evidence, few anthropologists will be willing to equate Rarotonga and Aitutaki culturally. Two serious faults are the lack of a map and a bibliography. Even a small-scale map of the Pacific would help orient the reader, and a bibliography should have been obligatory for the usefulness of fellow scholars.

Despite the above criticisms, the book remains a significant study in social change.

MARIANNE L. STOLLER
Fellow, Social Science Research Council
Department of Anthropology
University of Pennsylvania

## *WESTERN EUROPE*

DONALD READ. *Peterloo: the "Massacre" and Its Background.* Pp. ix, 234. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1958. $6.00.

On August 16, 1819, a crowd of 60,000 persons gathered on St. Peter's Field in Manchester to demonstrate for the reform of Parliament. Under the leadership of Henry Hunt, a demagogue of rare oratorical ability, the working people from the Lancashire textile mills were demanding political reforms, annual Parliaments, and universal suffrage as a means of improving their economic conditions. Although they marched to Manchester from neighboring towns in an orderly manner, unarmed, cheerful, and "dressed for the most part in their Sunday best," the Tory magistrates of the city, resentful of the demonstration and doubtful of its legality, made ample military preparation to maintain order and "to suppress all seditious meetings immediately as they assembled." As soon as Orator Hunt had begun to speak to the huge assembly, they ordered the Manchester Yeomanry to ride into the crowd toward the hustings to arrest him. This troop of cavalry, composed of local men stoutly Tory in politics and deeply suspicious of the reformers, were ill-suited for a job requiring discipline and moderation. Soon finding themselves in trouble with a hostile crowd, they forced their way forward striking wildly at any resistance. As panic seized the crowd, and sticks and stones began to fiy, the better trained troop of hussars rode into the confusion using the flats of their swords—and occasionally the edge—to disperse the terrified mob. In ten minutes the field had been cleared of people, leaving behind eleven dead and four hundred injured.



Thus St. Peter's Field became "Peterloo," an ironical inversion of Waterloo and a symbol of the folly and futility of repressing peaceful political demonstrations. Peterloo was henceforth a dead-end street for those Tories who had held power during the wars against France by smearing their opponents with the word Jacobin and by identifying domestic reforms with the hatred and fear of republican France. For Manchester and other industrial cities of the North, Peterloo was a political catalyst crystalizing opinion in favor of parliamentary reform.

This dramatic turning-point is so well known in political history that it hardly needs retelling. The justification for Donald Reed's new book is his penetrating analysis of the social and economic conditions which produced Peterloo. He describes the riots and disturbances in Manchester from the outbreak of the French Revolution to stress the perennial conflict between Church and Dissent and the increasing distress of the textile workers as their wages lagged behind rising prices. He also proves clearly the inability of the old Tory oligarchy, in sympathy with the landed gentry and aristocracy, to rule a rapidly growing industrial city. As a case study of political change in a major city during the early Industrial Revolution, this book has valuable instruction for the American student of political and social science.

R. G. COWHERD
Professor of History and Government
Lehigh University

PHILIP P. POIRIER. *The Advent of the British Labour Party.* Pp. 287. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. $4.50.

The British Labour party continues to attract the attention of American historians, and this doctoral dissertation is a good addition to the accounts of its origin. It is solidly based on official documents, private correspondence, diaries, newspapers, and party pamphlets. It deals with the revival of socialism in the 1880's, the Marxist-Fabian conflict, Keir Hardie and the Independent Labour party, relations with the Liberals and the "Lib-Labs," the winning of the trade unionists, the foundation in 1900 of the Labour Representation Committee, and the victories of 1906 that resulted in the formation of the Parliamentary Labour Party. The emphasis, however, is not always what one might expect. The author pays slight attention to the pioneer work of H. M. Hyndman's Social Democratic Federation and practically ignores H. H. Champion who for years persistently urged the workers to form their own political party in order to effect social change. The Fabians come off less well than in most accounts; the author corrects the impression sometimes given that they played the decisive role in the creation of the Labour party, but to the reviewer it seems that he writes off too easily their contribution to its gradualist and practical character. The leaders of the Independent Labour Party are given the deservedly prominent role in the forging of the socialist and trade unionist alliance that is still basic in the Labour party.

James Ramsay MacDonald is treated here without the "betrayal" of 1931 always in mind and his great services during the early years receive due credit. He emerges as one of the most astute politicians of the day. The political opportunism—sometimes close to deception—with which he sometimes furthered the interests of the new party throws light upon the man whose actions in 1931 nearly wrecked it. MacDonald's own papers for these years were not available, but the evidence for his political maneuvers and bargains is fully revealed in the correspondence of Herbert Gladstone, the Liberal Chief Whip, with whom in 1903 he made the electoral pact that paved the way for the great Liberal victory of 1906 and for the entry of twenty-nine Labour members into the House of Commons. The Liberals in charge of their party organization were jubilant over the agreement they thought justified by the immediate results; they ignored warnings of the danger of nursing an infant party that might supplant their own.

CARL F. BRAND
Professor of History Emeritus
Stanford University

GERDA RICHARDS CROSBY. *Disarmament and Peace in British Politics, 1914–1919.* (Harvard Historical Monographs, No. 32.) Pp. viii, 192. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. $4.00.

This small volume is a fine memorial to the competent scholarship of Mrs. Crosby, who unfortunately did not live to see her excellent study emerge as a book, or to extend her investigations into disarmament proposals and efforts in the decades after 1919. Here she has concerned herself with the greatest of problems, that of men thinking about and working for peace while caught in a war whose sufferings and sacrifices possessed their minds and filled their hearts with fear and hate. To the thoughts of men and women concerned with the 1958 debate on disarmament a third dimension of understanding will be added by this able analysis of the last generation's preoccupation with peace-making.

As the title makes clear, the author deals with British thinking on disarmament and peace. A sketchy account of British liberal thought on the matter in the nineteenth century precedes a thorough, detailed, and well documented analysis of the ideas and programs proposed and discussed in Britain during World War I. Obviously, the study could not be confined to British ideas alone when it came to the peace conference of 1919. Here Mrs. Crosby gives the essential thinking of Frenchmen and Americans about disarmament, ideas naturally affected by national interests and points of view. In that conference British views had to be reconciled with those of other nations to be transformed into the compromises of the treaty finally presented to Germany.

This reviewer believes that more consideration should have been given to American naval policy after 1916, particularly to the determination of the United States to have a navy second to none because of British views about "freedom of the seas" and because of a conviction in some naval circles that Great Britain and Japan were seeking a share of surrendered German warships in order to make themselves strong against the United States.

One wishes that a thorough examination could be made some time of the assumption that disarmament leads to peace. Certainly, as Mrs. Crosby rightly intimates, the century of relative peace and tranquillity which Europe enjoyed after 1815 is not to be explained by adherence to that principle. While the author does not state it explicitly, her book shows how peacemaking has suffered greatly from the belief of statesmen and politicians that it is possible to start with naive ideas as to the causes of war and from that point to work indirectly, backwards, and through a principle of opposites towards the thinking on which peace is to be established.

HARRY R. RUDIN
Colgate Professor of History
Yale University

T. G. W. POWELL. *The Celts.* (Ancient Peoples and Places Series, No. 6.) Pp. 282. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. $5.00.

This book, written by the head of the Department of Prehistoric Archaeology at the University of Liverpool, is a greatly needed and highly successful attempt at an up-to-date synthesis of what may be accepted as the results of specialized research regarding the ancient Celts and their culture. It is designed for the educated public, not for the specialist, although the interests of the latter are not altogether neglected. With a masterful touch which reveals a full command of the sources—both literary and archaeological—as well as of the pertinent recent literature, the author, while avoiding excessive details, fruitless controversy, and dogmatic conclusions, has given us a lucid and highly informative treatment of his subject.

The initial chapter traces the gradual formation of Celtic civilization and a Celtic nation in Central Europe from the close of the last Ice Age to the Hallstatt period (7th–5th centuries B.C.), and the subsequent diffusion of Celtic peoples and their civilization in the Hallstatt and following La Tene periods into the first century A.D. It also serves as an introduction to the sources of our knowledge regarding the Celts. Chapter two deals with Celtic physical types and temperament, Celtic social institutions, agricultural and pastoral life, arts and crafts, arms and warfare, settlements and fortresses. Chapter three introduces us to Celtic views of the supernatural world, their priestly class, their religious rites, their sacred places, and their burial practices. The fourth and last chapter traces the transformation, disappearance, or survival of certain western Celtic peoples, with their cultural legacy to Medieval Europe. Here we also find interesting discussions of some well known Celtic place and tribal names, such as Cimbri and Teutones, Germania and Germani, Welsh, Caledonians, Picts, Scots, and Gaels.

The volume is generously provided with figures throughout the text and a fine set of plates is appended, accompanied by useful explanatory notes. The marginal references to both figures and plates are very helpful to the reader. At the end of each chapter there are notes, chiefly bibliographic, directed to the more serious reader, and the author has also provided a list of the chief museums having notable collections of Celtic materials, a general Bibliography, and an Index.

In general, the presswork is excellent, but a few slips must be noted. The place name Aquae Sextiae appears as Aquae Sextia (p. 82) and again as Aqua Sextiae (p. 163). *Interpretatio Romano* on pages 128 and 136 should be *interpretatio Romana.* On page 183, "evidences" would be preferable to "evidence." And it is hard to see the pertinence of the references to Plate 26 on page 101, and to Plates 39–41 on page 128.

A. E. R. BOAK
Professor Emeritus of Ancient History
University of Michigan

WARREN C. BAUM. *The French Economy and the State.* (A Rand Corporation Research Study.) Pp. xvi, 391. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. $7.50.

The Fourth Republic sickened in Indochina and died in Algeria. Its malaise was inseparable from political *incivisme* and complex economic and social dilemmas at home. Students of French affairs will therefore turn eagerly to this Rand Corporation Study, with its ambitious title, hoping to find therein an analysis of the domestic diseases of political economy during the declining years of a regime now dead.

They will be disappointed. Mr. Baum, now with the Federal Communications Commission, set himself a far more limited, albeit difficult and useful task: that of setting forth, in full statistical detail, the policies of the late power-holders in Paris in their strivings to reconstruct, modernize, stabilize, finance, tax, and regulate French industry, commerce, and agriculture. His questions are: Why did government act? How did government act? What were the results of state intervention in the economy? His answers are richly factual, well-reasoned, and ably written. They provide a storehouse of data not readily available elsewhere. They will please those economists who see no relationship between "economics" and human behavior and those political scientists who see no relationship between politics and social structure. "The 'State' has (here) been treated as an entity separate from the people who compose it. The popular pressures giving rise to state action have not been systematically explored, nor has it been asked where the responsibility for the state's performance might lie . . ." (p. 343).

Mr. Baum is modest. Despite the utility and merit of his labors, he has, as Churchill once said of Attlee, very much to be modest about. He has skillfully sketched the skeleton of the relationships between government and business in the Fourth Republic. Someone else must put flesh on the bones and relate these relationships to parliamentary politics, interest groups, class warfare, and widespread civic irresponsibility in contemporary France. Let us hope that Mr. Baum, who has here made a beginning, will himself undertake the task.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN
Professor of Government
Williams College

GEORGE CLARK. *War and Society in the Seventeenth Century.* (The Wiles Lectures Given at the Queen's University, Belfast, 1956.) Pp. vii, 156. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958. $3.50.

ROBERT S. QUIMBY. *The Background of Napoleonic Warfare: The Theory of Military Tactics in Eighteenth-Century*

*France*. (Columbia Studies in the Social Sciences, No. 596.) Pp. viii, 385. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957. $6.75.

To conscientious historians and sociologists the close relationship throughout history between warfare and society, both as cause and consequence, has long been evident. In recent years, however, and particularly since August 1945, this field of study has been further investigated by ever-increasing numbers of responsible and intelligent citizens including statesmen, scientists, and military leaders. In our current nuclear and ballistic age with its steady stream of scientific discoveries and technological developments in industry, we might initially be inclined to attribute changes in the concept and technique of warfare to the introduction of new and deadlier weapons. On further reflection, it becomes quite apparent that in the final analysis weapons of warfare are no more potent than the men who design and operate them. Moreover, if we are to accept the tenet that a military organization cannot help but reflect the character of its commander, it is reasonable to conclude that an army is equally a reflection to a pronounced degree of the pattern of thought of the society and the age in which it exists.

This close kinship of war and society in Europe from the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War to the Napoleonic Campaigns has been meticulously analyzed and traced in a most scholarly and erudite manner by the authors of the two books under consideration. To this reviewer, their opinions in large part appear compatible with the contention of the eminent British psychologist, Havelock Ellis, that war is one of the youngest of human institutions, being an outgrowth of civilization rather than savagery.

Sir George Clark's lectures show us how war assisted materially in the formation and eventual emergence of modern European nations from hitherto geographically divided and ideologically opposed segments of population. He states that, in the seventeenth century, war was readily accepted as a part of the social order; moreover, it was regarded as a perfectly legitimate instrument of state protocol. The regent rather than the individual noble or the military adventurer finally won out as the supreme arbiter of state policy; for example, Louis XIV's rise to a position of prominence in international affairs could not have been achieved until domestic discord had been overcome through force of arms. Once the institution of war and its very technique became the sole prerogative of the state rather than of the individual, Europe took on the aspect of several competing international dynasties, each with military governing classes in control, and each equipped with relatively small professional armies to be used as the means to attain national objectives.

As Professor Quimby has so clearly portrayed, the intellectuals of the eighteenth century, far from restricting their theories exclusively to political and social problems, extended their interests to military affairs with particular emphasis on strategy and tactics. Herein we are given an extensive survey of the contrasting opinions of such military theorists as Saxe, Guibert, Bourcet, and Du Teil, all of whom were instrumental in formulating the size, composition, armament, and technique of maneuver of the French armies, and were to exert great influence on the mind of Napoleon. Their views were eventually incorporated into the basic drill book, the celebrated Ordinance of 1791, which although open to criticism nevertheless governed the soldiers who fought the battles of the Revolution as well as those of Napoleon.

Prior to the French Revolution, the common man throughout Europe in the eyes of his ruler was considered irresponsible not only as a citizen but also as a soldier. In neither role could he be trusted or treated as a human being. On the battlefield this was bluntly reflected by the tactical formations which utilized his services as a meticulously drilled, closely guarded, and barbarously disciplined element of expensive machinery in which the role of the individual was completely suppressed. Once the old social and political system, which afforded the foundation upon which rested the military hierarchy, was cast to the winds, commensurate changes and innovations in the technique of combat had to be introduced to meet the changed social status of the new citizen-soldier.

COLONEL ROGER WILLOCK

Princeton, New Jersey

*La Belgique et les Nations Unies*. (National Studies on International Organization.) Pp. xi, 372. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1958. Prepared by a Commission of l'Institut Royal des Relations Internationales for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. $3.00.

This is the tenth in the series of summary volumes on individual states and the United Nations sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Prepared by a commission of Belgium's Royal Institute of International Affairs under the direction of Paul de Visscher, the present volume shows a care, conciseness, and structure lacking in some of its predecessors and often missing in other joint enterprises.

The book divides into three sections and is prefaced by a short account of Belgium's international position before 1945. Section I is relatively short and reviews the formation of the United Nations in the light of Belgian viewpoints, both official and unofficial, from Dumbarton Oaks through the San Francisco meeting to the ratification of the Charter. Most of the material is old stuff to students of the United Nations.

Part II deals with the evolution of Belgium's attitude toward the United Nations to about 1952. There are chapters on Parliament, the fitting of the United Nations process into the foreign ministry, the delegations to the United Nations, and public opinion as sampled in the Belgian press, radio, and cinema. The charts dealing with votes and press opinions are of the type to gladden the hearts of all statistical political scientists and will also be of use to the layman. Although it is anything but comprehensive, the material in this section is not easily obtainable in this country and thus is perhaps of the most interest and use.

Part III, about half the book, treats Belgium and various United Nations problems and operations: there is a long section on problems of principle built around r gional ententes and new members; a surve of structural problems reviewing dissati faction with the veto and Charter revisio and three chapters on problems of comp tence. One of these, discussing trust terr tories and colonies, is of particular valu in view of Belgium's activities in the Cong and her attempt to reconcile colonialis with a world-wide "social solidarity." O this latter matter, a long chapter deals wit Belgian interests in United Nations socia cultural, and economic matters, and an other takes up the question of the Worl Court.

Like most of the volumes in this series the one on Belgium is a useful referenc work. It lacks a bibliography but has goo footnotes, a so-so Index, and excellen typography. Belgium's views are naturall sympathetically treated, but the entir work can stand out as a fine contributio to summary, but not essentially basic, re search literature on the United Nations.

R. T. TURNER

Professor of History and Political Science
Dean, College of Arts and Sciences
Montana State University

SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA. *Spain: A Modern History*. Pp. xiv, 736. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. $7.50.

This is a revealing and significant study of contemporary Spain, one of the few published since that country's civil war, but the title belies its true content. The book is more a collection of analytical and interpretive essays grouped about the common theme of Spain than it is a traditional history, for Madariaga's real contribution falls not so much in the area of chronological reporting of events or presenting exhaustive compilations of related facts, as in that of offering penetrating insights into the make-up of the value system that motivates the Spanish mind.

The publisher calls this book a biography of a country, but to my mind it is more nearly a biography of the author, in that the two major portions of the work reflect the two most important divisions in his intellectual life. Book One—some 370 pages—is a reworking of materials first

published in 1930, when Madariaga was Professor of Spanish Literature at Oxford; it presents an empirically oriented introduction to twentieth century Spain, stressing not only political but geographic, economic, social, and intellectual factors which obtained before the country embarked upon its tragic civil war in 1936. Of necessity so broad a survey makes no pretense at depth in every field, but it has a kind of Anglo-Saxon flavor of objectivity and impersonality which, given the writer's frankly-stated liberal centrist views, is anything but typically Spanish, especially in view of Madariaga's own often-repeated description of his countrymen's personalist and extremest proclivities. The only weakness in this part of the present volume lies in a tendency to carry over statistical and descriptive data from the 1930 version rather than to bring the material up to date, though this does little to weaken the validity of the general statements presented here.

Book Two—some 275 pages—on the other hand, covers The Republic, the Civil War and After, a period during part of which the author participated directly in Spanish politics. Despite his prefatory statement that this book "had to be written" because "an objective examination of the events of 1931–41 should be available, written with the inside knowledge that only consanguinity can provide," this section of the work is much less objective and a great deal more personal than the first part, underlining the Spanish side to Madariaga's personality. But for the very reason that Book Two grows out of personal observations and activities, loss in objectivity is more than balanced by providing hitherto unavailable information concerning the birth, life struggle, and death of the ill-fated Republican experiment in which the writer had so vital a role. Moreover, from his center position Madariaga lashes out with equal vehemence at the extremist forces of both right and left whose intransigence broke the back of the Republic, thereby providing at least a degree of balance in the allocation of onus for the civil war that is not found in most discussions of the conflict.

Unfortunately, Book Two also contains the least satisfactory portion of this study, the section dealing with the internal organization and activities of the Franco regime. Here it is that Madariaga's long separation from Spanish daily life is most apparent and most unfortunate, for the lack of detail and appreciation of the forces at work upon the "Command," as he terms it, is in sharp contrast to his earlier chapters. This is true also in the bibliographical resources he cites for this part of the book.

In addition to the two books, this work contains a twenty-five page Appendix containing the text of Stalin's letter to Largo Caballero and a personal memoir of Madariaga's concerning his activities for the Spanish Republic.

ROBERT E. SCOTT
Associate Professor of Political Science
University of Illinois

LAWRENCE FERNSWORTH. *Spain's Struggle for Freedom.* Pp. viii, 376. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. $6.00.

Drawing upon his experience as a correspondent in Spain for *The Times* of London and the *New York Times*, Mr. Fernsworth has added to the growing collection of analytical studies of modern Spain under the Franco regime.

The author is primarily concerned with giving the reader an appreciation of Spanish traditions and the historical events which still have a direct bearing upon the country. His bibliographical sources include the writings of many Spaniards in exile in England, the United States, and Mexico. It would have added somewhat to Mr. Fernsworth's arguments had he quoted and listed diplomatic sources, giving more cogency to the reasoning about the current status of Spain in modern diplomacy. This reviewer's opinion is not intended to detract from the validity of the presentation of material. In fact, the interviews with Spanish leaders in Spain prior to the Civil War in 1936 are very forceful, as well as revealing, in the delineation of Spanish thought on popular government.



Of particular interest is Mr. Fernsworth's interview with Don Manuel Azana, who had taken part in early Republican operations back in the summer of 1934 (p. 155). Mr. Azana was specifically asked by Mr. Fernsworth to give the reasons for the November 1933 defeat of the Republican coalition and the return to power of the hostile Right groups. "The factions of the Right," explained the Spanish leader, "spent money like water. They wished to undo the agrarian legislation and, above all, to recuperate their vast holdings and keep the people in servitude. They have again imposed starvation wages in Andalucia and Estremadura, undoing the work of the Republic. And the peasants are hungering. They have adopted extreme views, and speak of inciting revolution. This is a great mistake. The Republican cause can only be advanced by the united political action of all favorable parties." The events which followed now constitute history—internal conflicts, outside intervention, gross misinterpretation by certain sections of the press, and later, Spain's "neutrality" during World War II. In retrospect, it is not pleasant to read Mr. Fernsworth's careful detailing of events during the Spanish Civil War, but such a study is mandatory for the formation of any valid opinion.

Particular criticism is directed by the author towards the military pact of September 26, 1953, the "bases agreement" pact, between the United States and Spain. In general, the pact covered the installation of American air and naval bases, mutual military assistance, and economic assistance. Though Mr. Fernsworth does not point it out, subsequent economic assistance from the United States has taken the form of thermal power units, steel mill equipment, atomic research reactors, diesel locomotives, and power-generating units through almost fifty million dollars in grants from the Export-Import Bank of Washington. Lately, under Public Law No. 480 covering American "surplus" commodities, large volumes of agricultural commodities have been exported to Spain.

Quite logical is the author's argument against the use of expediency by some American diplomats who have favored Spain's "buffer state" position. He rightly warns against the formulation of policy which can be easily upset by treachery.

Mr. Fernsworth draws the conclusion that, paradoxically, a reconciliation of Spain's most irreconcilable elements—the Monarchists and the Republicans—"seems to be the answer to a renewed and stabilized Spain" (p. 344). Nevertheless, facts indicate that two elements are still diametrically opposed to each other's fundamental philosophy of government. Should there be a resolution of factional difficulties, there may be an end of the Spanish dictatorship and the ruthless suppression of all voluble opposition within Spain.

SAMUEL P. PERRY, JR.
Columnist
*Boston Chronicle*

LOUIS L. SNYDER (Ed.). *Documents of German History.* Pp. xxiii, 619. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958. $10.00.

This is a book of the basic documents of two thousand years of German history, edited by Dr. Louis L. Snyder, Professor of History at The City College of New York. The editor has assembled one hundred and sixty documents of German statesmen, politicians, military leaders, men of letters, artists, and philosophers. Some more or less important illustrative materials are included with the key documentation. This volume includes contemporary accounts of battles, texts of treaties, imperial laws, constitutions, decrees, proclamations, decisions of courts, letters of the makers of German history, speeches, narratives, war songs, poems, propaganda, contemporary newspaper articles, programs of political parties, excerpts from the works of scholars and men of letters, and other materials selected by Dr. Snyder to develop chronologically the history of Germany. The editor has thus included "items of political, economic, social, military, cultural, religious, intellectual, and psychological significance." All translations of these materials are, unless indicated in footnotes, by the editor. He has also prepared extensive introductory notes giving the historical setting as well as the import of the documents.

*Documents of German History* is divided into eight parts of which the first covers the history of Germany from the early Germans to the Reformation or from the battle of the Teutoberg Forest, A.D. 9, to the founding of the University of Heidelberg, 1386. Part Two extends from the Reformation through the rise of Prussia. Part Three is entitled the War of Liberation and the Revolution of 1848. Parts Four and Five analyze the history of Germany during the eras of Bismarck (1862–1890) and William II. Part Six, The Weimar Republic, contains six key documents and a "draft for a student composition on the Advantages of War, 1927." The National Socialist dictatorship from 1933 to 1945 is documented with twenty-five historical selections from the Nazi period. The last part brings together seven very important documents on Germany after World War II (1946–1957). An Appendix contains useful information on Germany, including a chronology and a reading list. A number of good political maps illustrate the text.

Two of the principal criticisms of documentary compilations by specialists are first the omission of historic documents which the reviewers regard as essential and second the inclusion of documents which, while important, are not basic to the development of an objective pattern. The most glaring omissions in this volume are, with a few exceptions, in the medieval part. There are also included in the volume minor documents and materials which are not only controversial but weaken the excellent pattern.

The scholarly introductory notes by Professor Snyder are worthy of the highest commendation. He has again and again made profound observations concerning the historical setting of many of his selections and advanced concise introductions to serious German problems. Moreover this documentary history of Germany is an achievement of American scholarship, and an invaluable study for the understanding of the German people as an integral part of the European community.

RALPH HASWELL LUTZ
Professor of History, Emeritus
Stanford University

HANS ROSENBERG. *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience 1660–1815.* (Harvard Historical Monograph, No. 34.) Pp. xi, 247. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. $5.00.

Hans Rosenberg, well known for his excellent studies on Prussia, has written an empirical monograph on the bureaucratization of Prussia, "the Sparta of the North," under the Old Regime from 1660 to 1815. Emphasizing an interdisciplinary point of view with special stress on sociological implications—surely the way of coming historiography—the author gives an intensive rather than extensive treatment of this important subject.

Dr. Rosenberg pieces together three coalescing lines of development, a triangular historical process: First, the formation of the new elite of Prussian bureaucratic governmental executives who made possible politico-administrative centralization and the building of absolute monarchy; second, the sociological aspects by which this bureaucratic professional class evolved into an aristocratic status group; and third, the status, outlook, and primary function of this bureaucracy as an authoritarian political group, the unfortunate result of which was a system of government cast in the image of the Prussian aristocracy.

Within this framework the author has produced an invaluable study which throws much light on the development of Prussia-Germany. The long range political outcome was vital for both Germany and the world. The results of Germany's tradition of obedience to authority and the placing of power in the hands of self-interested groups unwilling to play by the rules of democratic co-operation were tragic. "The conservative heirs of the absolute monarchy share the responsibility for the rise and victory of mass dictatorships and twentieth-century totalitarianism" (p. viii).

The Prussian conservatives managed to carry forward, into the age of industrialism, illiberal attitudes and aristocratic patterns of class, status, and political hierarchy, meanwhile skillfully using nationalism as a tactical weapon, perpetuating their peculiar combination of militaristic, bureaucratic, and authoritarian traditions, and hypnotizing the German people in the process. Later on, German philosophers and historians from Hegel and Ranke to Treitschke idolized *das alte Preussentum*, gave metaphysical sanction to the German state, and played a notable part in the corrosion of liberalism as a way of public life.

On only two counts, one general and one specific, would the present reviewer be inclined to differ with this first-rate study. It is difficult to accept the author's contention that the Prussian experience in bureaucratic, aristocratic, and autocratic rulership was "on the whole representative of general European trends." Notwithstanding the claims of area research, there is precious little parallel between the Prussian experience and that of the West. This is precisely the key to the tragedy—the yawning chasm between "the German Mind" and the Western European Enlightenment. Neither British nor French bureaucracy promoted the kind of autocracy that brought Germany to the brink of destruction. Germany became the stepchild of Europe precisely because Prussianism and Prussian bureaucracy were suffused with Eastern authoritarianism.

To Dr. Rosenberg's list of historians as "corroders of liberalism" this reviewer would venture to add the name of Friedrich Meinecke, whose reputation for "liberalism" is undeserved and who was an unconscious proponent, despite tortured rationalization, of that pernicious Prussianism which brought terrible consequences not only to Germany but to the world.

This is a superb study in research, organization, and writing; certainly one of the most penetrating books in English ever written on Prussia. It is to be hoped that Professor Rosenberg will extend the scope of his study through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with special attention to Hitler's berserk Third Reich.

LOUIS L. SNYDER
Professor of History
The City College of New York

JOHN FORD GOLAY. *The Founding of the Federal Republic of Germany.* Pp. xii, 299. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. $5.00.



The Germans are greatly impressed by their Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, which was drafted by a council composed of delegations of twenty-seven members each from the Christian Democratic Party and the Socialist Party, five from the Free Democratic Party, and two each from the German, Center, and Communist parties. It was ratified in May, 1949, by the legislatures of more than two thirds of the participating German states (*Laender*) and proclaimed by the Parliamentary Council, meeting in public session at Bonn on May 23, 1949. This democratic constitution of 146 articles with later amendments is to remain in force until a constitution is adopted in freedom by all Germans. Several promising young Germans have already written dissertations based upon various studies of the Basic Law.

Dr. Golay's essay is the first systematic analysis in English of the "present day problems as the Germans themselves see them." It is based upon the principal speeches of the party leaders, the published documents concerning the formation of Western Germany's Basic Law, and the materials in the archives of the Bundestag at Bonn. The author has also had access to the Allied documents. His exhaustive and scholarly Bibliography, footnotes, and explanatory notes are to be commended.

The first chapter covers the decisions of the western powers to establish a western German government. The second compares federalism in Germany and the United States. The third chapter is a brilliant study of both the tremendous impact of the tragic events which destroyed the Weimar Republic and the decision of 1948–49 to leave the fate of constitutional parliamentary government to the present political parties and to the electorate. The fourth reviews the attitudes of the parties toward the multiparty system. The author concludes that the decision to retain proportional representation was a sound one. The fifth is a profound discussion of basic rights which the author modestly calls a summary. The final chapter is a frank recognition by Dr. Golay of the political maturity of the German people in the present crisis.

Dr. Golay has written a timely and scholarly study of the founding of the Federal Republic. He has made objective selections from the constitutional speeches of party leaders, thus allowing the Germans to speak for themselves. The biographical notes concerning Adenauer, Brentano, Lehr, Schmid, Heuss, Seebohm, and others are of great value for the general reader. The Basic Law is included in the Appendix together with the first amendments.

The manuscript of this book was read and checked by the following scholars: Dr. G. Bernard Noble of the Department of State; Mr. James E. King, formerly executive secretary to the United States High Commissioner, Germany; and Professors Otto Wirth and Helmut Hirsch of Roosevelt University.

Since the text of this essay has been "cleared" for publication by the Historical Division of the Department of State, appropriate steps might be taken by Dr. Golay or a governmental agency to have a German translation of this study in the improvement of international understanding published in Germany. It would present the American viewpoint to general readers in Germany and other European countries.

RALPH HASWELL LUTZ
Professor of History, Emeritus
Stanford University

CLIFFORD R. BARNETT in collaboration with ROBERT J. FELDMAN and others. *Poland: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture.* (Survey of World Cultures.) Pp. 470. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1958. Distributed by Taplinger Publishing Company. $7.50.

Poland, with its growing industrial production, and its twenty-eight million inhabitants, is the largest and the most important country of East Central Europe, now under Soviet control. The October revolution of 1956, Gomulka's bid for a limited political and economic independence, has dramatized the key role of Warsaw. The success of the Polish experiment may have a profound influence on the fate of the Soviet Empire and affect the position of Russia in the world. For this reason, more attention should be paid to the affairs of this crucial country. A Western scholar studying the "Socialist bloc" is constantly faced with a shortage of basic reference books on Poland. It is praiseworthy, therefore, that "The Survey of World Cultures" published the present volume as one of the first of its series.

The focus of the book is Polish society as a whole; it deals with the interrelationship of problems usually studied in separate volumes. The approach is mostly sociological, with emphasis on the dynamics of the processes under consideration.

The book is divided into twenty-two chapters, the enumeration of which gives a good idea of the structure: "The Culture and Society," "Historical Setting," "Geography and Population," "Ethnic Groups and Languages," "Religions," "Dynamics of Political Behavior," "Legal and Theoretical Base of Government," "Structure of the Government," "Diffusion and Control of Information," "Foreign Relations," "Basic Features of Economy," "Organization and Use of Manpower," "Financial System," "Agricultural Development," "Industrial Development," "Domestic and Foreign Trade," "Public Health," "Formal Education," "Family," "Social Organization," "Art and Intellectual Expression," "Values and Attitudes." The concluding chapter represents a sort of synthesis; it is well balanced, penetrating, and illustrated with convincing examples. The book is provided with a Bibliography of additional reading, with thirty clear statistical tables, and with a good Index.

The book is on the whole fair and accurate; it is a pity that, although published in 1958, its statistical data on the whole do not go beyond 1955. The seventh and eighth chapters would benefit from a more detailed analysis of the role of the Communist party. In many ways the book supplements Professor Oscar Halecki's work, *Poland*, published last year by Praeger under the auspices of the Mid-European Studies Center. Together they serve as useful references for the expert, as well as for the non-specialist.

M. K. DZIEWANOWSKI
Associate Professor of History
Boston College



## *RUSSIA*

HOLLAND HUNTER. *Soviet Transportation Policy.* (The Russian Research Center Studies, No. 28.) Pp. xxiii, 416. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. $8.50.

This is an exceedingly competent description of the physical achievement of the Soviet railways from 1917 to 1955, and of the railway policy that lay behind it. As such it can hardly be bettered; Professor Hunter has fluent Russian, wide reading in obscure sources, deep technical knowledge of railways in general, and a great statistical flair.

Many things, however, are implied by the title yet not to be found in the book. First, the other carriers get only the treatment their statistical unimportance merits; a most unfortunate decision in that they are of extreme interest and their study throws a flood of light on the workings of the Soviet economy. Why was the Baltic-White Sea canal built? Why the subsequent canals? Why, oh why, the Northern Sea Route? Why do Communists dislike automobiles? Such questions are most inadequately discussed. Yet the canal story is an enthralling one: the predominant use of forced labor—not mentioned at all—the manifest unprofitability of the completed object, the belated attempt to tie in with irrigation, and the Grand Turkman canal interrupted in mid-construction on Stalin's death. By 1955 there was practically no motor traffic or main roads; does not this astonishing fact rate more than one page? Above all others the Sovietologist forgets at his peril the great principle of Sherlock Holmes—the importance of the Dog that Did Not Bark in the Night.

If the physical achievement of the non-railway carriers is neglected, so is the all-important topic of the resource allocation mechanism and the rationality of prices both as it affects inter-carrier relations and in regard to alternative railway policies. The short passage on this is the merest apology for what needs to be said, and indeed precisely by Professor Hunter, who has in fact studied the question deeply and spoken to many Soviet transport experts about it. Happily this gap will shortly be remedied by his contribution to the Berkeley symposium on the Soviet price mechanism. Both that contribution and scattered remarks in the present work reveal, however, far too much respect for the rationality of Soviet resource allocation, as if choices consistently made at vast expense simply could not be as silly as they look. Your reviewer is convinced that superficial appearances are correct.

Nevertheless this will remain for a long time the standard work on Soviet railways, which carry 80 per cent of all Soviet freight. It is doubly welcome for the excellent chapters on location policy and the geographical pattern of economic activity, which are so intimately connected with transport and so often neglected. Until something more extended appears these chapters too are easily the best on the subject with which they deal.

P. J. D. WILES
Fellow of New College
Oxford University

C. JAY SMITH, JR. *Finland and the Russian Revolution, 1917–1922.* Pp. x, 251. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1958. $4.50.

We are given in this book an all but day-by-day account of the progress of the revolution in Finland following the collapse of Tsarist Russia in 1917, and the long and intricate war that followed—partly civil war and partly a three, four, or five cornered fight that grew out of and fused with the war between the Entente and the Central Powers. An examination of the sources for this confused period has led to a careful tracing of the intricate threads that make up its history. No fault is to be found with the author in his narration of events, other than the slips that any author is liable to make. But any writer who goes beyond this and attempts to make sense or meaning out of these chaotic events ventures on a task that exposes him to disagreement and criticism.

The first thing that is to be noted is that it is questionable whether any sound view can be taken of Russo-Finnish relations apart from a general consideration of the whole question of Russia's attitude towards the national minorities in the period pre-

ceding the revolution. Here the author contents himself with a rapid summary of the events that brought Finland into the empire and the course of her relations towards it. This inevitably involves the policy of the Tsarist government towards minority groups through the centuries, and the growth, among Russians of all classes, of an attitude that was well expressed by the Emperor Nicholas I: "Wherever the Russian flag has once been raised, it must never be lowered." This could be translated to mean that no Russian, even the revolutionary, could view with enthusiasm the grant of autonomy to the subject nationalities, let alone the right of secession.

The second thing that this reviewer thinks has been ignored is the attitude of the Bolsheviks, especially Lenin, towards these national minorities. The latter's views were disclosed in 1913 in "Aesopian" language that was entirely equivocal; in a letter written to a friend to supplement and explain this pronouncement, it appears that Lenin had no intention of honoring a promise of independence unless these minorities supported Bolshevist aims. It is questionable, then, whether it is quite correct to say only that Lenin was guilty of an error in evaluating the situation in Finland in 1917. Any recognition of Finland's rights by the Bolsheviks was conditional on their lending themselves as Bolshevik tools in the class struggle; in case of failure to do so, the latter reserved the right to nullify recognition of independence in ways that have become familiar to us during the "cold war."

Some of the conclusions reached by the author in his summary are among the "might have beens" of history. The Russification policy of Nicholas II may have been the cause of Finland's hostility to the Russian regime, just as the refusal of Denikin, Kolchak, or any of the responsible White generals to recognize her independence doomed the chances of Finnish collaboration in the attack on Petrograd and sealed the fate of the White armies. But in the light of Russian history, it does not seem that any other outcome was possible.

STUART R. TOMPKINS
Research Professor of History, Emeritus
University of Oklahoma

GEORGE FISCHER. *Russian Liberalism: From Gentry to Intelligentsia.* (The Russian Research Center Studies, No. 30.) Pp. ix, 240. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. $4.50.

This analysis of Russian liberal thought from 1861 to 1905, the work of Professor George Fischer of Brandeis University, is a stimulating and absorbing study of a trend in Russian political thought and life in the second half of the nineteenth century, a subject which has been generally ignored. Professor Fischer carefully defines Russian liberalism as Western individualism: the seeking of a society in which the individual is self-governing and central and in which institutionalized liberties such as private property and the supremacy of law prevail. This began in the 1860's with the gentry, who were interested in taking advantage of the Great Reforms, particularly in the field of local government, and then became more radical and doctrinaire as the urban intelligentsia became prominent in the movement. This transformation from the conservative, moderate, and empirical to the radical and even revolutionary liberalism of Miliukov and the Kadets is clearly demonstrated. However, the transformation within the gentry, which Professor Fischer has to some degree neglected, may have been as important as the development of the progressive classes and their version of liberalism. Among Professor Fischer's most important achievements is his demonstration that many of the urban intelligentsia who became liberals around the turn of the century arrived at that position after having been Marxist or *narodnik* Socialists. This simple but vital point throws much light upon the failure of Russia's liberals.

This excellent study lacks the depth and insight of Professor Victor Leontovitsch's *Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland,* which places more emphasis than does Professor Fischer upon institutional developments and upon the ideas and the institutions fundamental to the rule of law, a basic liberal goal. The focus of Professor Leontovitsch's book is therefore more sound, particularly since Professor Fischer by beginning in 1861, ignores the earlier stirrings of Russian liberalism; and, by

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stopping short *in 1905, leaves* us at the brink of the period which provided Russian liberalism its greatest challenges and its greatest failures.

However, the book does make clear that the soil of Russia was not suited to liberalism at the turn of the century, *when* Russian economic development was by-passing the stage which produced economic and political liberalism in the West and *when* most thinking was more revolutionary and socialist than liberal.

Professor Fischer develops briefly some tantalizing comparisons between Russia of the second half of the nineteenth century and several currently under-developed countries. His recognition of the fact that what we call under-development today involves cultural, political, and psychological factors as well as economic ones reveals deeper insight into this subject than one generally finds today, and this reviewer, for one, hopes that he will in the future develop this theme in more detail.

ROBERT F. BYRNES
Indiana University

ALAN MOOREHEAD. *The Russian Revolution.* Pp. xiv, 301. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. $5.00.

The work gives an account of the Russian revolution in 1917 and the events that led up to it. It is based on books about the period, almost all published in the United States and England, but the main foundation was provided by Dr. Stephan T. Possony's *unpublished* study of the Russian revolution and in particular his recent research into the German Foreign Office files.

These files allow us to answer several questions of particular interest. Firstly, did the Germans in their contacts with the Bolshevists attach special importance to Lenin? Mr. Moorehad makes it clear that Lenin had from the summer of 1916 on no further dealings with Keskuela, one of the German agents (p. 126), but he suggests that Lenin "no doubt still wanted to keep contact" with the other German agent, Parvus. Mr. Moorehead thinks that for this reason Lenin pounced on an article published in 1915 by Parvus in his magazine *Die Glocke* "with surprising leniency" (p. 126). The fact is that Lenin publicly called Parvus a jester, boot licker, petty coward, and adventurer, describing Parvus's magazine as the organ of apostacy and filthy lackeyism, and a dunghill of German chauvinism (cf. Lenin's article in *Sozialdemokrat* of 20th November 1915). The break between the two was in reality complete—this is also borne out by Lenin's letter to Ganetsky of 30th March 1917 (cf. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XX, Bk. 1, p. 69). After relations between Germany and Lenin had been severed he does not seem to have figured more prominently in the German calculations than any other Russian revolutionary in Switzerland. Indeed, when the Germans, on March 25th, 1917, gave permission for the journey through Germany nobody on the German side knew or inquired whether Lenin would be among the travellers.

The book does not shed any new light on the second point of special interest, namely who in Germany made the final decision to ship the Bolshevists to Russia and whether General Ludendorff was the main culprit. Mr. Moorehead's assertion that one Sklarz who went to Switzerland for talks with Lenin was acting as agent for the German General Staff (p. 178) is to my mind wrong. He went there on March 27th, 1917, on a private mission for his employer, Parvus, who wanted to muscle in after the German Foreign Office had already instructed the Berne Legation to make the necessary arrangements for the journey. That no record for the Sklarz meeting with Lenin exists (p. 178) is not correct. Sklarz talked not to Lenin but to an intermediary and Lenin's version is given in Fritz Platten's *Die Reise Lenins durch Deutschland*, p. 40. Nor is it true to say that Parvus's proposals, submitted to the German Foreign Office in 1915, "became the blueprint for the German strategy for the Russian revolution" (p. 115); Jagow, the Secretary of State at the time, "rejected his (Parvus's) ideas out of hand" (Count Brockdorff's letter to Jagow's successor, dated 2nd April, 1917, *Hauptarchiv des Ausw. Amts, Der Weltkrieg*, 2, *Vermittlungsaktionen*, Vol. 31).

There are other statements and conclu-

sions which are contrary to my reading of the German files and more could have been said about German financial support to the Bolshevists. That Mr. Moorehead fails to give any specific references, by series of these files, subject matter, and volume number, is rather regrettable in a work of this kind.

All the same, the book is superbly written and a pleasure to read.

OTTO HEILBRUNN
Gerrards Cross
Bucks, England

Z. A. B. ZEMAN (Ed.). *Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915–1918.* Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry. Pp. xxiii, 157. London: Oxford University Press, 1958. $4.00.

The fateful events between 1915 and 1918 in Russia witnessed a paradoxical cordiality in the relations between certain leaders of Imperial Germany and the Russian Left Socialists. It led to the German aid which enabled eminent Bolshevik leaders to reach their homeland amidst war conditions. For this reason the Bolsheviks came to be labelled as "German agents" and "Berlin's hirelings." The severe verdict is quite comprehensible in view of the agitated sentiments and antagonism fanned by war and revolution. More than forty years have passed and the time has come when the historian is able to take a more objective view of this strange wedlock and cite reasons for this seemingly inexplicable solicitude on the part of Germany for the socialist cause.

Gathered before us are documents extracted from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry, ably edited by Mr. Zeman; these shed considerable light on the question. They show convincingly that Lenin had no direct contact with German officials, nor is there any indication to prove that he was fully aware of the extent to which his comrades had associated themselves with the Germans. The bare facts clearly demonstrate the peculiar quirk of fate: the interests of Berlin and of those who schemed "to transform the bourgeois revolution into a truly social revolution" in Russia coincided temporarily. For totally opposite reasons both sought the termination of war on the eastern front and the utilization of cessation of hostilities for their own ends.

The collection of evidence covers the period from the beginning of 1915 until the end of 1917. Throughout this time the German Foreign Office displayed a willingness to support both politically and financially not only the Bolsheviks but any other elements that might disrupt conditions in Russia. This was part of a gigantic gamble as alluring to some German leaders as it was distasteful to others. If some could envision only the demoralization and collapse of Russian efforts, resulting in termination of war in the east, others feared that the virus of Bolshevism might carry with it most dangerous political potentialities for Germany. The entire subject matter of this volume has been previously discussed in historical literature; now we have substantial evidence from the German side. It can only be hoped that similar historical evidence may be forthcoming from the Soviet side. Meanwhile the documents gathered by Zeman show sufficiently the German motivations in their political gamble. The editor has rendered considerable aid to the student of modern history in clarifying a heatedly discussed subject.

ANATOLE G. MAZOUR
Assistant Professor of History
Stanford University

OLIVER H. RADKEY. *The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism: Promise and Default of the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, February to October 1917.* (Studies of the Russian Institute.) Pp. xiv, 521. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. $8.50.

Professor Radkey's doctoral dissertation, entitled "The Party of the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Russian Revolution of 1917," was submitted and accepted at Harvard University in 1939. The present work is the first volume of a projected two-volume publication of that dissertation. It carries the story of the PSR, or Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, down to the October Revolution which brought the Bolsheviks to power. The second volume will follow the career of the party through the early days of the Communist regime to the party's demise through the exile of its leaders or their submersion in the Bolshevik flood.

This carefully, almost meticulously, done study is, however, much more than a doctoral dissertation. It is apparent that Professor Redkey has spent these last nineteen years not only in running down every last clue to his thesis and interviewing again and again the dwindling number of party leaders, but in rethinking earlier attitudes and arriving finally at a maturity of judgment that hasty publication a generation ago might have denied him. While his own understanding of his problem has deepened, the author has seen changes over the years in the attitudes of men like Chernov, Kerenski, Vishniak, and Zenzinov, all of whom he interviewed in the thirties and again a decade or two later. How extremely unfortunate it is that other scholars as sound and thorough as Dr. Radkey should not have made similar studies of the Mensheviks, the Kadets, and the Octobrists, whose leaders nearly all have gone. No such study of the Bolsheviks was ever possible, although the present work casts much light upon their actions in the period of the Provisional Government.

The subtitle of *The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism* is *Promise and Default of the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, February to October, 1917.* The story is one primarily of default rather than promise. Almost from the moment of the party's rebirth in 1918—the failure of the 1905 revolution had in effect destroyed the party—the PSR suffered from schism and rivalry and ineffective leadership to the point where there was not one party but several. Mr. Radkey distinguishes between rightist, right right centrist, right centrist, left centrist, left left centrist, and leftist splinters. Apart from the tragic refusal of the leaders to set aside differences in the interest of party unity, the party lost its popular support to the Bolsheviks because of its unwillingness to meet the soldiers' demand for peace by taking Russia out of the war and its hesitation to satisfy the peasants' appetite for land by breaking up the great estates. Lenin promised both, and the leftist SR's helped carry the masses into the Bolshevik camp by going along with him.

Many readers will not find it easy to follow the twistings and turnings of most of the PSR leaders, few of whom were as forthright and consistent as Natanson and Breshko-Breshkovskaia. Without the clear and pleasing style of Mr. Radkey's presentation, some might not think it worth the effort to try.

MELVIN C. WREN
Professor of History
Montana State University

WILLIAM BENTON. *This is the Challenge: The Benton Reports of 1956–1958 on the Nature of the Soviet Threat.* Edited by Edward W. Barrett. Pp. xv, 254. New York: Associated College Presses, 1958. $3.95.

The first 167 pages of this book consist of articles or addresses growing out of the author's observations during his prolonged visit to the USSR in 1955; the balance is an Appendix with very valuable documentation. The challenge, as Mr. Benton sees it, lies in Soviet education. In successive chapters he analyzes education in the schools, the organization of cultural life, the aims of education, and the role of the press. Every page is replete with facts and official explanations in regard to Soviet principles and practice in this field, together with the author's keen observations. He speaks of "the concentrated zeal of hundreds upon hundreds of earnest-looking students" in the Lenin Library, and of his astonishment at learning that these were not university students but "workers from the night shifts" in the factories.

It would have been well for the author, and for the American public, to have greater awareness of this tremendous urge for knowledge on the part of the Russian people. This is not a product of the Communist regime. It was characteristic of Russian youth before the Revolution. It is this which provides the fertile soil in which Soviet education and propaganda raises up scientists who are also propa-

gandists. Besides, Soviet youth is hard-working. In analyzing the difference between the schools in the USSR and those in the United States, Mr. Benton notes not only the heavier curriculum in the former, but the tendency toward an easier approach to education in the latter. This will have to be overcome if America is to retain its lead.

The clear-cut purpose of Communist education is made clear in a quotation from the Soviet Encyclopedia: "To develop in children's minds the Communist morality, ideology and Soviet patriotism; to inspire unshakable love toward the Soviet fatherland, the Communist party and its leaders; to propagate Bolshevik vigilance; to put an emphasis on atheist and internationalist education; to strengthen Bolshevik will power and character, as well as courage, capacity for resisting adversity and conquering obstacles; to develop self-discipline; and to encourage physical and esthetic culture."

One of the factors in the situation that struck Mr. Benton with great force was the high quality of top Soviet newspaper editors and educators, and the tremendous power in their hands. "They are experienced and sophisticated men, attractive men, manifestly able men, and because of these qualities they are potentially dangerous men to the US." The notes which Mr. Benton took on conversations with the Foreign Editor of *Pravda*, the Editors of *Izvestia*, the Managing Director of Tass, and the Minister of Higher Education constitute an important contribution to our knowledge of the interplay between Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the authentic elements of science and society.

Being an experienced and able man in public service, Mr. Benton finds it natural to take up the challenge. He recommends federal support for education at all levels, special measures for ensuring that gifted students may develop their full talents, and various methods for piercing the curtain. He is fully in accord with the plan for exchange of persons. He feels this to be of extreme importance, calling Soviet insulation the "sinister enemy." If we could make a dent in "communist saturation strategy," the people of the Soviet Union would respond with friendliness and join in the search for freedom and justice.

This is not a handbook on education in the Soviet Union, but puts the challenge of that education in a way that should be examined widely in the United States.

PAUL B. ANDERSON
Secretary of the International
Committee YMCA

ALEXANDER G. KOROL. *Soviet Education for Science and Technology.* (Technology Press Books in the Social Sciences Series.) Pp. xxv, 513. New York: Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall, 1957. $8.50.

At long last the American people have become interested in Soviet education—one of the great and inescapable realities of the present epoch of world history. Indeed, during the past year they have exhibited a measure of panic, and even hysteria in some quarters. The occasion of the concern, as we all know, was not the publication of the first scholarly accounts of Soviet education. Such accounts had appeared at intervals from the first decade of Soviet power. The occasion rather was the sudden rise of sputnik number one before the astonished gaze of mankind.

Although sputnik was not a product of the teaching of physics from the sixth grade, as many seem to think, the swift advance of Soviet science and technology cannot be understood apart from the tremendous development of a comprehensive system of education under the all-powerful leadership and direction of the party of Lenin and its Central Committee. The story of this development is told with clarity and force by Alexander Korol of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in a book more comprehensive than its title would suggest.

The first three chapters are devoted to the "Soviet system of mass education" and the program of the now famous "ten-year school," the institution that until recently was regarded as primarily responsible for the general education of the younger generation—intellectual, moral and political. The remainder of the book, except for the last chapter, gives a detailed and scholarly account of the entire program for the training of specialists of semi-professional and professional grade in all branches of economy and culture. Interesting and relevant comparisons are made throughout these chapters with American practices, standards, and achievements. No one who is interested in Soviet education or in the source of Soviet power and dynamism can afford to ignore this important book.

The final chapter, entitled "Comments and Reflections," is especially valuable for the American educator in the present crisis. Here the author raises the fundamental questions regarding the meaning of Soviet education for us. It is unfortunate that many of our citizens who seem to have been suggesting that we should adopt some of the basic patterns of Soviet education have not first read this chapter. Dr. Korol knows, as every competent student of comparative education knows, that education must always be relative to a given system of government and society. What is good for a dictatorship may be poison for a democracy.

The reader should know that, since this book was written, Soviet education seems to have entered a new period. At any rate, proposals for fairly radical reform of the entire system have been coming from time to time from Khrushchev and the Central Committee. Yet to anyone familiar with the history of the subject certain of these proposals and the very words employed are reminiscent of the past and even of the nineteen-twenties. The basic features of Soviet education are not likely to change until and unless the social system itself changes.

GEORGE S. COUNTS
Professor Emeritus
Teachers College
Columbia University

CHARLES JELAVICH. *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism: Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879–1886.* (Russian and East European Studies.) Pp. x, 304. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958. $4.50.

During the period of 1879–86, the Russian government, in spite of hopes to the contrary, was forced by the needs of her foreign policy—and especially the demands of military strategy—to question the policies of Bulgaria's government under Prince Alexander of Battenburg. In contrast, Russia's influence in Serbia was strengthened, for there King Milan's Austrophile tendencies and his generally unpopular actions served to draw the Serbian people closer to Serbia. Within this framework, Jelavich describes in considerable detail the specific issues in Russo-Bulgarian and Russo-Serbian relations: the controversy over the Russian-sponsored Bulgarian Constitution, the Bulgarian railroads, the control of the army, and the personal animosities between the Czar and the Prince; and, in Serbia, the ouster of Metropolitan Mihailo. Jelavich is especially interested in the dramatic culmination of the national struggle in Serbia and Bulgaria: the union of the two Bulgarias, the Serbo-Bulgarian war, and the kidnapping of Prince Alexander.

Based on material in the Public Record Office in London, in the *Haus- Hof-* and *Staatsarchiv* in Vienna, and on the unpublished private papers of Nikolai Karlovich Giers, Russian Foreign Minister during the period under discussion, the work is the most penetrating and systematic discussion of this historical period available. The author has gathered his sources from far and wide and in different languages. His erudition, as shown in the numberless footnotes and the Bibliography, is overwhelming.

There is only one minor point for which Jelavich can be criticized. With so many hardly known documents and sources noted throughout the work, the specialist would be thankful for having him include also the publishers, since most of this material appears to be inaccessible today.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK
Chairman, Departments of Political
Science and Sociology
University of Bridgeport
Bridgeport, Connecticut

## *AMERICAN HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT*

FORREST MCDONALD. *We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution.* Pp. x, 436. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. A Publication of the American History Research Center, Madison, Wisconsin. $7.00.

The rise and decline of Charles A. Beard's thesis about the Constitution provides an interesting study in intellectual history. When first formulated in 1913, so profane an approach to so sacred a document aroused resentment. Then in the debunking twenties and the crusading thirties Beard's economic interpretation won increasing support. By the forties it seemed to command general acceptance. But in the fifties it has been subjected to severe criticism, not now by outraged defenders of the household gods, but by scholars soberly bent on checking the facts. In 1956 Robert E. Brown raised searching questions concerning both Beard's method and substance. In 1958 Forrest McDonald in an independent work—he states in his preface that he has refrained from reading Brown's book—administers the *coup de grâce* to the Beard thesis.

Beard argued, of course, that the Constitution was sought by the capitalistic minority, that those who drafted it had an immediate financial stake in its adoption, and that ratification was put over on the small farmer and debtor majority by undemocratic methods. While Brown and McDonald have disagreements of their own—Brown can find only six delegates in the convention who had personal property in excess of their realty, while McDonald pronounces personalty interests "in a clear majority" by 31–24—both agree in rejecting the thesis that the personalty-realty cleavage explains the divisions either in the convention itself or in the debate over ratification. Both show convincingly that the question of personal financial advantage—always the weakest feature of Beard's argument—played little part in the broad picture; indeed, as McDonald points out, both the largest private creditor and the largest public creditor in the convention were opposed to the Constitution. As for the ratification process, Brown argues plausibly that Beard greatly overestimated the number of people excluded from the suffrage; and McDonald, in an impressive state-by-state analysis, presents the variety of forces and factors which entered into the final decision. It can now be accepted, I believe, that the Constitution was both desired and supported by a much wider representation of interests than the Beard thesis permitted.

All this does not mean a rejection of the idea of an economic interpretation. Both Brown and McDonald are wholly prepared to read the Constitution as a secular document, closely bound up with the concrete needs and interests of the day. But their researches argue the importance of what McDonald calls a "pluralistic study of the Constitution." Now that he has cleared away the Beard thesis, historians will look forward to two further volumes, promised by Mr. McDonald, setting forth his positive views about the making of the Constitution.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.
Professor of History
Harvard University

NORMAN COUSINS (Ed.). *'In God We Trust': The Religious Beliefs and Ideas of the American Founding Fathers.* Pp. viii, 464. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. $5.95.

From the list of founding fathers, Mr. Cousins has selected nine for comment. He devotes much more than one-half of the volume to Jefferson, Thomas Paine, and John Adams, and includes a special chapter given to the correspondence between Jefferson and Adams in the area of religion. James Madison, John Jay, George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, and Samuel Adams are covered in 146 pages all told.

Franklin's "thorough deism" did not exclude the existence of the deity. His trouble was with Calvinism's "ordination" which made prayer "useless and an absurdity." Franklin contributed a revision of the Lord's Prayer which substituted Heavenly Father for the traditional form, and asked that we be provided for this day, as thou hast hitherto daily done, and kept out of temptation, and delivered from evil. The doxology does not appear.

"Washington, like Jefferson and Franklin, was non-denominational in his spiritual views." His natural deism was increased by his high regard for the "morals and teachings of Jesus."

John Adams settled the matter himself, "I have been a church-going animal for seventy-six years. . . . And this has been alleged as one proof of my hypocrisy . . . ask me not whether I am a Catholic, Protestant, Calvinist or Arminian. *As far as they are Christians, I wish to be a fellow-disciple with them all.*" He was called a Puritan, Deist, Orthodox Christian, and Humanist. He described his religion as: "Allegiance to the Creator and Governor of the Milky-Way and the Nebulae, and benevolence to all his creatures."

When President, Jefferson refused to proclaim days of fasting and prayer. He defended the Quakers and Unitarians and criticized severely the "Athanasian paradox that one is three and three one. . . ." It was preposterous to say that "God from the beginning, elected certain individuals to be saved, and certain others to be damned; and that no crimes of the former can damn them; no virtues of the latter save." ". . . the genuine doctrine of one only God is reviving and I trust there is not a young man now living in the United States who will not die an Unitarian." "That this will, ere long, be the religion of the majority from north to south, I have no doubt" (pp. 161, 163, 237).

Jefferson reduced the inherited 773,000 words ascribed to Jesus to 25,000 in writing the *Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth* which the Fifty-seventh Congress published and distributed among its members.

On page 247 Adams asks Jefferson whether he has read J. W. Goethe's *Schriften*, and on page 257 Jefferson answers that he has not and until Adams raised the point the question had never occurred to him. There are at least five sets of Commandments. Protestantism except Lutheranism uses chapter 20 of Exodus while Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism employ Deuteronomy chapter 5, which lets the Sabbath originate at the time of the exodus rather than at the time of creation on the first seventh day. Adams gives Goethe's Tenth Commandment the form: "Thou shalt not boil the kid, *while it is yet sucking*!"

Cousins begins his fine discussion of Thomas Paine thus: "A man who was willing to travel anywhere in the world to combat atheism and to establish the proof of the existence of God can hardly be denounced as an atheist himself, but this is what happened to Thomas Paine. His crusade was based on the love of God and man, yet he was flayed as an infidel and enemy of religion."

And so the author gives fifty-five pages to Paine and twelve pages to Samuel Adams whose father helped establish the new South Church and also owned a brewery. The son "maintained connections with both."

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN
Professor of the History of Christianity, Emeritus
Colgate Rochester Divinity School

*The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, Vol. 14, 8 October 1788 to 26 March 1789. Edited by Julian P. Boyd. Pp. xliv, 708. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. $10.00.

The newest volume in this monumental series manifests the same painstaking scholarship and sustains the same high level of interest as its predecesors. The events that occurred in the six-month period under consideration are worthy of the men who were observing and commenting upon them. From the United States come letters to Jefferson with insight and information concerning the transition from the Articles to the Constitution. Jefferson makes his own position perfectly clear. He welcomes the new Union and, for the most part, approves and supports its fundamental law. But he objects to the indefinite re-eligibility of the President and is fearful of the absence of a bill of rights, although the addition of the latter appears assured by the time the Constitution is inaugurated.

A revealing exchange of views takes place between Madison and Jefferson on the subject of such a bill of rights. To

Jefferson, its insertion into a series of amendments is not only a political necessity to satisfy the opponents of federal power, but also an essential guarantee of individual freedoms. He sees the dangers of legislative, and eventually executive, power. The courts, therefore, can use a bill of rights to protect the individual. Madison, however, is not convinced by this argument. He places no reliance in "parchment barriers" and has little hope that they will suffice against the real threat —which is a government powerfully backed by a popular majority. One may well ponder this interchange in reflecting on the current crisis over desegregated schools and on the dilemma of a Supreme Court which faces a weak executive, a Congress that abdicates responsibility, and a rebellious state administration.

From his side of the ocean, Jefferson writes to his friends about developments in Europe. At the moment when the Constitution of the United States is going into effect, France is electing its Estates General and is preparing for reorganization of its government. What is rather odd is that Jefferson seems not to realize how close the country is to revolution. He reports the various procedural moves and the jockeying of groups for position. True, he is afraid that an assembly of twelve hundred men can become a mob. But in general he is optimistic and hopeful that France will right itself and reform its principal abuses. How drastic these "reforms" were going to be, how convulsive the next twenty-five years—of this he does not detect the signs, if signs there were to detect.

At the close of the volume, the European chapter almost ended, Jefferson was making ready for a "visit" home. His philosophy was soon to confront the tests of practice, as he wrestled with Hamilton and Adams—and later with Napoleon.

LESLIE LIPSON
Professor of Political Science
University of California
Berkeley

AMOS R. E. PINCHOT. *History of the Progressive Party, 1912–1916.* Pp. xii, 305. New York: New York University Press, 1958. $7.50.

"For all its legal status," wrote Amos Pinchot, "the Progressive party cannot really be said to have been a political party at all. Rather, it was a faction, a split-off fragment of its mother star, the Republican party, which, like a meteor, flamed momentarily across the sky, only to fall and cool on the earth of solid fact." This generation has seen two other parties called progressive thus rise and burn out; a history of the first of the three by a participant-observer is most welcome. It is welcome even though it was never completed, even though it is in places bitter. It is carefully edited by Helene Maxwell Hooker, who has written an eighty-five page biographical introduction, which gives a good account of the place of Amos Pinchot in the politics of the first two decades of the twentieth century.

Never as well known as his brother Gifford, Amos Pinchot (1873–1944) had a vast acquaintance among the influential people of New York and Washington. He wrote speeches, pamphlets, magazine articles—and many long letters. He was attracted to Senator Marion La Follette, Sr., as the leader for the opponents of big business, but like the others in the Progressive party, he was also attracted to Theodore Roosevelt as a leader who had a chance to win. But T. R., according to Pinchot, was not as much interested in program as in winning, and to win he had to have the financial support of wealthy men like George Perkins and Frank Munsey. He could not obtain this support without fatal compromises.

The *History* contains several vivid descriptions of Roosevelt, whom Pinchot knew well. For example: "He loved to be cronies with the great, the near-great, and the about-to-be great. He liked prize fighters, wrestlers, boxers, actors, emperors, anybody and everybody that was preeminent. . . . He liked the feeling of having a Gary or a Frick or a railroad president shake him by the hand and put his arm around him. . . . He had a boyish human quality of loving to be fooled, of yielding to the obsession of romantic illusions."

The Progressive party was too much Roosevelt and too little program, according to Pinchot, and when T. R. refused



to run in 1916, it died. Pinchot offers some interesting generalizations about how a new party should be started: "A party cannot be founded without a definite cause, or solely upon the personality of an individual. To survive the hardships of the early years, a new party must be a party of ideas, not of men. If the Progressive party had framed an issue that was at the same time clear and of large actual consequence, it would not have died upon the defection of its leader. . . . The party, however, had an aspiration instead of an issue. . . ." By contrast, an old party is not so dependent upon an issue: "It can go along by its own momentum, through the force of tradition, habit, and party loyalty. It can be dull and noncommittal."

We have too few men who like Pinchot can both take part in and write astutely about our politics.

DAYTON D. MCKEAN
Dean of the Graduate School
University of Colorado

GEORGE E. MOWRY. *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, 1900–1912.* (The New American Nation Series.) Pp. xvi, 330. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. $5.00.

Of many recent works related to the Progressive movement, Professor Mowry's addition, the latest of the New American Nation Series, has been especially awaited —for two particularly good reasons. One is that the author, Professor of History at the University of California, is one of the foremost scholars in the field (*Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement* and *California Progressives*, published respectively in 1946 and 1951), and secondly that the book is unparalleled in its analysis of the period. In addition, it manifests a sensible scheme of organization, discriminatory use of primary sources, a discerning synthesis of recent interpretations of the movement, and a pleasant readability.

The first several chapters set the stage for understanding Progressive America. Interpretations of economic, intellectual, political, and urban life at the turn of the century precede a fifth chapter, "The Progressive Profile." The Progressive mentality was a "compound of many curious elements. . . . One part of it looked backward to an intensely democratic small America; another looked forward to a highly centralized nationalistic state. And both elements contained a rather ugly strain of racism" (pp. 104–5).

The middle chapters on the Roosevelt presidency contain the heart of the work. Theodore Roosevelt's entry into the high office was a mark of ambivalence in which he emerged as a "skillful broker of the possible." Necessarily, the President inhibited many reforms in order to secure "any" legislation and, more importantly, his election in 1904. His agreement with Congress, "a compromise with power," did not, however, imply executive inaction. To this the Northern Securities affair and the famous coal strike of 1902 testified. In concise form the author continues his description and analysis of Roosevelt's tenure, moving into diplomacy and the full presidential term.

When applied to hemisphere diplomacy, the Progressive mission lost something of the ethics which premised its domestic policy. The non-hemispheric foreign policies also left much to be desired although they did contribute to the concept of arbitration.

The portion on the presidency concludes with "Roosevelt: The Final Years"—a chapter demonstrating positive political leadership. Illustrative were his successful maneuvers in handling the Hepburn Act, pure food and drug legislation, the meat inspection measure, the Employer's Liability Act, the Brownsville problem, and conservation of natural resources. Professor Mowry feels that the domestic program marked such liberal tendencies that "by the time Roosevelt left office a distinct cleavage had appeared in the Republican party" (p. 225).

In the latter chapters Taft is President but the ear is still Roosevelt's. In sound perspective the author poses the difficulty Taft had reconciling "his philosophical conservatism and his friendship with Roosevelt, his deep sense of loyalty of both a personal and party nature . . . his inclination to swim with the tide" (p. 236). Political ineptness made reconciliation impossible, resulting in a Progressive rebellion

of considerable magnitude—illustrated particularly by the Pinchot-Ballinger affair.

The author closes his work rather abruptly with a description of the Republican decline and Roosevelt's active re-entry on to the national political scene in 1912—firmly placing him in the liberal camp of the New Nationalism.

Professor Mowry has made an inestimable contribution to the Progressive literature. Although not definitive in its coverage of the whole movement, this book, combined with the author's *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement*, is thus far the closest thing to it.

MARTIN L. FAUSOLD
Professor of Social Studies
State Teachers College
Cortland, New York

THOMAS H. GREER. *What Roosevelt Thought: The Social and Political Ideas of Franklin D. Roosevelt.* Pp. xv, 244. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958. $5.00.

The title of this book would seem to indicate an extraordinarily ambitious project, one that would seem to be beyond the capacity of one person writing one monograph. Mr. Greer has not held himself to investigating one period of President Roosevelt's life or one phase of his activity, but rather has undertaken to penetrate the President's mind in a comprehensive way and to display his thinking processes at work. A reader could be forgiven for picking up such a work with some scepticism.

But as he reads, the scepticism vanishes and he realizes that the writer has been amazingly successful. As he ponders this success he realizes how much material the author had to go on; ample resources are available for one who will use them with industry. He realizes, also, that the undertaking was not after all quite so formidable as might at first be thought.

What Mr. Greer had to do—and what he did—was to study mostly what the President did, although due attention was also paid to what he said. The doing was most important. Here was a man who had a long experience of power. He was able to do many of the things most people say to themselves they would do if they had the chance. He was often frustrated; he often dissimulated; he often deferred to his political colleagues or to his own appraisal of public tolerance for what he wanted to do. But a two-term Governor and a more than three-term President could hardly conceal his views or his intentions. Voluminous papers are readily available, more so than those of almost any other public figure, and these have only to be studied. There emerges, if due precautions are taken, a view of the preconceptions that any such man must have, acquired through family life, education, associations, and the impact of events. This equipment can be seen in the process of modification. The occurrences of life cause such modifications; the personal adjustments necessary to the career he has chosen modify them. The mosaic is finally a very complex one, but not one which is impossible to understand.

The truth is that Roosevelt's background and his approach to life were not very mysterious if they are carefully studied. They lead on to his public work without hiatus. His political career, the process of achieving a position where he could express his ambitions for others—in the state, in the nation, and in the world—was an extremely skillful one. It must have been to have been so successful. No one could have had the good fortune to prevail so many times with the electorate if he had relied on good fortune alone.

Mr. Greer has been both industrious and penetrating, and the result is a study worthy of a place on the growing shelf of Rooseveltiana. I personally liked particularly his appraisal of the President as executive, so often spoken of disparagingly. The office of President is not the office of a tycoon. Its most important feature is a leadership not all of its occupants have furnished. Its manifold relationships with the electorate, with Congress, with the party, and the leaders of other nations give it a significance far beyond that usually encompassed in the word executive. Mr. Greer has understood this. But it is hardly fair to single out one phase of a rounded treatment such as this is. There are chapters dealing with such topics as the President's constitutional ideas, his relation to the political system, his view of the function of government, on good neighborliness in foreign affairs, and on the management of public relations.

This volume is to be recommended to students of Roosevelt, of the presidency in general, and of political ethics.

R. G. TUGWELL
Professor Emeritus of Political Science
University of Chicago



PAUL KECSKEMETI. *Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat.* Pp. ix, 287. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. $5.00.

Over eighty members of the United States Senate recently recorded their opposition to any federal expenditures for research suggesting that this country might consider the possibility of surrender in some future nuclear war. The stimulus for this demonstration of senatorial ostrich-mindedness was this challenging study of *Strategic Surrender* by Paul Kecskemeti. Prepared as part of a research program of the Rand Corporation under contract with the United States Air Force, it presents a searching scientific inquiry of what the author calls "the Politics of Victory and Defeat." In considerable detail he examines surrender both as a strategic and a political concept, noting the varying strategies of rout and attrition, tactical and strategic surrender, in total and non-total war.

Every nation involved in warfare, against whom the tide of battle has turned, must at some stage consider the cost of continuing the struggle or seeking to end it on the best possible terms. Nor is the cost to be measured solely in terms of material losses but also, and perhaps primarily, in terms of political and moral consequences. "The point to be emphasized," says author Kecskemeti, "is that the terms 'victory,' 'defeat,' and 'stalemate' when used to characterize the final outcome of wars rather than the outcome of military engagements, are not absolute, but relative concepts." To those who think of wars as religious crusades in which the forces of righteousness are arrayed against the minions of evil, such ideas will appear to be both cynical and sinful. And one can well imagine the sense of outrage with which such political Manichaeans will read the following: "It is possible to pay too much for victory and even for stalemate. One may safely say that the maxim 'in war there is no substitute for victory' is totally erroneous."

The only logical outcome for those to whom war is a holy crusade of good against evil is either total victory or unconditional surrender. Unfortunately, a policy of unconditional surrender not only prolongs the conflict but makes an orderly termination of hostilities almost impossible. It invites disaster and anarchy in the defeated state and increases the cost of victory to the victor. The account in this volume of the "unconditional" surrender of Italy and Germany in World War II outlines in painful detail the disastrous, indeed almost calamitous, consequences of this policy.

Even in the case of Japan, our stubborn insistence upon unconditional surrender not only prolonged the war but led to the tragic decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—a decision which seems in retrospect unnecessary if not wholly indefensible. Our stubborn refusal to negotiate a surrender by making the one concession which the Japanese asked us to make—the preservation of the imperial establishment—had disastrous consequences both for Japan and for us. For Japan it prolonged an admittedly hopeless struggle, strengthened the hand of the suicidal fanatics of the military caste, and led to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For us it was costly, not only in military and material, but in political terms. It made Russian participation in the Pacific inevitable, with political consequences adverse to us, the Chinese, and the Japanese. Moreover, the final surrender was not "unconditional" but almost exactly on the terms suggested by the earlier Japanese peace "feelers": that is, the preservation of the imperial establishment.

Instead of voting in blind and ignorant indignation against research on *Strategic Surrender*, our senators might do well to read and soberly reflect upon the lessons

which this book teaches. They might especially note and remember the words with which the author concludes:

"The major political implications of the new strategic situation brought about by the emergence of nuclear weapons may be formulated as follows: powers may seek to survive in the nuclear age, either by going to extremes of inhumanity and malevolence never imagined before, or by drastically limiting their expectations of gain from the application of armed power. . . . If the inhuman alternative . . . is excluded for us because of our nature, so much the better. . . . If we rule out the inhuman solution, then we must . . . revise some of our deeply rooted traditional attitudes, such as our rejection of compromise and our faith in extreme, ideal solutions when the chips are down. . . . In the past, these propensities served us well in some respects and played us nasty tricks in others. In the future, they can only render us impotent to deal with political reality and thus jeopardize our very survival."

PETER H. ODEGARD
Professor of Political Science
University of California
Berkeley

HANSON W. BALDWIN. *The Great Arms Race: A Comparison of U. S. and Soviet Power Today*. Pp. ix, 116. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. $2.95.

In this thought-provoking book, the well known military commentator of the *New York Times* has measured the strategic power of the United States and the Soviet Union. Mr. Baldwin's balance sheet has appraised the broad sources of military strength—economy, technology, education, and morale. The triad of big battalions, big factories, and big bangs has set the quantitative framework for this impressive comparison.

The author's intent was to produce an objective estimate of forces. He also attempted to avoid the trap of current hyper-self-criticism "initiated by the sputniks," which "has verged from hysterical excitement to self-satisfied complacency." In setting himself this goal, he could have foreclosed his objectivity if indeed post-sputnik concern about the American defense posture was hysterical and hence exaggerated. This reviewer, for one, is satisfied that Mr. Baldwin's objectivity has remained untarnished and that *grosso modo* his measurements are right.

Mr. Baldwin's conclusion is that the United States is "still the first military power of the world. If we do certain things, we can probably remain so, though we shall never again hold the unmatched power position that we formerly enjoyed at the end of World War II." Upon reflection, this well-documented and eminently sound finding is, perhaps, not too surprising. There is really not too much doubt that the United States will continue to rise to the occasion, probably with stage-fright and confusion, but performing well in the end. The belittling of American power—and will-power—is just that much foolishness.

Mr. Baldwin's sober optimism is free of complacency. There are many weaknesses in United States arms. It is unfortunate that "essentially, the military's faults and weaknesses are the faults and weaknesses of the government they serve, of the legislature that supports them, and of the body politic." These weaknesses include the following: inadequate appropriations, strategy by budget-making, a cumbersome command and decision-making structure, remoteness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the President and the National Security Council, poor implementation of decisions, faulty procurement policies, confused relationships between government and industry, weaknesses in the educational system as well as "lack of any real motivation, the absence of self-discipline, and the physical and moral 'softness' of many of the men who don the uniform. The bond of common service to the country, the sense of adventure, the desire for opportunity, and the quest for danger have been replaced in many of our youths by the urge for security—an urge that, paradoxically, could defeat itself."

There may or may not be deficiencies of similar magnitude in the Soviet system. We may speculate about the organizational, ideological, economic, moral, and strategic weaknesses of communism but we must not count on the persistence of shortcomings and mistakes which are subject to speedy correction.

Though formidable, Mr. Baldwin's list of American problems is incomplete: the author has underplayed United States shortcomings in strategic thinking and in non-military warfare. He does not criticize adequately American failure to understand and go all out in the technological race, which is perhaps more important than the "great arms race."

I fear, too, that Mr. Baldwin has not given due weight to the great military handicaps which in an age of nuclear surprise attack are placed upon the United States by its political ideals. The ideal that we never should attack first is, of course, excellent, but we should not forget its compelling and costly corollary: our strength must be kept at such a level of force and readiness that we can survive a surprise "first blow" and strike back effectively. We have not always been willing to pay the price of our idealism.

The author deserves much credit for an outstanding acomplishment. His research is meticulous, his judgment is realistic and balanced, his skill in compressing an enormously complicated material into a highly readable book of 116 short pages is truly enviable, and his message salutary. Hanson Baldwin has merited the praise of many grateful readers.

STEFAN T. POSSONY
Professor of International Politics
Graduate School
Georgetown University

DUNCAN MACRAE, JR. in collaboration with FRED H. GOLDNER. *Dimensions of Congressional Voting: A Statistical Study of the House of Representatives in the Eighty-First Congress*. (University of California Publications in Sociology and Social Institutions, Vol. I, No. 3.) Pp. v, 203–390. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958. $3.50.

This study bears the subtitle *A Statistical Study of the House of Representatives in the Eighty-First Congress* and the author, with collaborator Fred Goldner, has analyzed in great detail a number of key votes in the Congress elected in 1948. Though the material thus treated is ten years old, the method used and the findings developed are of real substance in the politics of 1958 and 1960.

While the use of roll-call votes admittedly has built-in handicaps in terms of legislators fighting hard against a popular measure during debate, then shifting over to be recorded as "right" on the last—and not necessarily decisive—vote, it is the only reliable method available for measuring opinion. Using these roll-calls, scales have been set up to measure "Fair Deal," "Race Relations," "Labor Relations," "Foreign Aid," and "Welfare State" attitude and votes. In addition a series of scales to evaluate votes on agricultural issues are included. These measures, for both parties, are outlined in detail in the first third of this study, then related to one another and to individual constituencies.

In the analysis of the voting in the 1948 Congress the study reveals no startling new information about patterns of Congressional behavior, but the detailed comparisons offered are most helpful in pinning down statistically things only generally described before. Thus, the data on race relation attitudes in North and South, the strong pro-cotton and pro-peanuts positions of Southern members, the naturally anti-oleomargarine views of dairy district Congressmen—all these are well enough known. Here we can find specifics on the expression of these views in Congressional voting and useful correlations of these patterns with others.

The author concludes his research with a commentary on the scale positions in terms of roles played by Congressmen in their political work and careers and a general enquiry into the uses of scale analysis for legislative processes. Included as an Appendix are procedure data, material on the Congressmen and their districts, and some general considerations on the uses of this special form of analysis in the treatment of legislative behavior.

Politics is an uncertain world at best and this work is modest in pointing out many of the limitations imposed on any concept of true measurement in dealing with politics; none the less this is a useful contri-

bution to a growing literature and should be helpful in stimulating new efforts to find the best possible yardstick for political action.

RICHARD M. SCAMMON
Director of Elections Research
Government Affairs Institute

BERNARD RUBIN. *Public Relations and the Empire State: A Case Study of New York State Administration, 1943–1954.* Pp. xiii, 357. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958. $7.50.

*Public Relations and the Empire State*, a pioneering work, examines the place of public relations in state government. It carefully evaluates public relations activities in New York State over a period of eleven years during the Dewey Administration, and on the basis of this examination appraises future trends in this new field.

Mr. Rubin displays a thorough knowledge of the literature of public relations and its practices. He has also studied the ephemera: speeches in mimeographed form and pamphlets, and has corresponded and talked with many of the knowledgeable men and momen in state government public relations. The book is well balanced, authoritative, and complete.

Mr. Rubin rightly deplores the ignorance among state officials of the function of public relations, and equally so the lack of agreement between public relations practitioners as to what public relations is and what it should do. Mr. Rubin urges an integrated approach to the public relations problem of state governments by top officials. He suggests that outside consultants might perform an important service in planning the field. He foresees that public opinion research and television will be much more effectively used by state governments in enlightening the people.

This book is recommended to state officials and, particularly, to public relations men in state work. For them it will provide a philosophic approach to their work as well as a working manual to aid them in their day-to-day duties. The book outlines programs and policies, discusses public relations and public responsibility, defines job qualifications for public relations personnel, and outlines methods to make public relations a more effective tool in the furtherance of democratic government.

If there is to be any criticism of the book at all, it is only the minor one that the author, to this reviewer at least, does not seem to give quite enough attention to the dangers inherent in public relations work by the government. Obviously it can carry with it the abuse of power, but that is true of other fields as well. The proliferation of the techniques and strategies for tyranny over men's minds can lead to grave abuses. Society must be aware of and protect itself against such abuses if public relations is to serve constructive goals.

EDWARD BERNAYS
New York City

RALPH A. STRAETZ. *PR Politics in Cincinnati: Thirty-Two Years of City Government Through Proportional Representation.* Pp. xvii, 312. New York: New York University Press, 1958. $5.00.

From 1926 to 1957 Cincinnati was governed by a city council of nine members elected from the city at large by the Hare system of proportional representation. During these three decades its city government enjoyed an outstanding reputation for integrity and efficiency—especially by contrast with its government from 1884 to 1926 when it was dominated by a powerful Republican party "machine." Despite this wide endorsement, the PR system was always controversial with Cincinnati's electorate and political leaders. In its thirty-two year life, it was five times challenged in referenda—winning in 1936 by 831 votes, in 1939 by 742, in 1947 by 7,602, in 1954 by 695, and ultimately losing in 1957 by 11,589. Professor Straetz examines the claims and counterclaims, the charges and countercharges, of PR opponents and proponents throughout these embattled years, providing the first systematic study of the PR system in a large American city.

His analysis begins with attention to "a typical PR repealer election" (1954) and continues through chapters devoted to Council composition and legislative activity, the mayoralty, political parties, the role of groups—the Negro, labor, religious, and civic groups—and four major election issues: the Communists, local government, "personalities and out-of-towners," and the city manager. He concludes with a discussion of "the mechanics of PR." On all these matters, the author finds both the charges of the opposition to PR and the claims of its proponents to be exaggerated. Maintaining on the whole an admirable objectivity, his conclusion in each instance is on net favorable to the PR system. Thus, for example, he holds that while PR gave the Negro a new and proper status in Cincinnati's government the system itself does not produce racial bloc voting; nor does it, in his view, have any special tendency toward religious or ethnic bloc voting. Instead, the strongest voting ties have been to party—to the Charter party and to the Republican party. Similarly, the author concludes that PR elections have produced hard-fought contests with specific alternatives presented forcefully to the electorate, "and this characteristic has existed in Cincinnati in this century only during the life of PR."

The conclusion which is least persuasive is that PR brought a two-party system to Cincinnati. The Charter group did bring an organized opposition to the Republican party—and may continue to do so without PR—but many of the elements of a two-party system were still missing. The Charter group is even more a coalition of disparate groups than is the usual political party, but its truncated character is even more significant: as a purely local organization, it cannot reach into the county government or into the state legislature, in each of which many decisions of crucial importance to Cincinnati are made. Of equal relevance to the claim of a two-party system is the fate of the Democratic party in Cincinnati under PR; no assertion can be made that it has been helped. A purely local opposition party is not an impressive substitute for the second party usually sought in the two-party system.

The council manager plan remains in Cincinnati after the abolition of PR. The future of that plan and its champion, the Charter party, will provide a test for some of Professor Straetz's conclusions about the PR system. Will the city manager's role be significantly modified by the changed electoral system? Will the character of the city council be altered? Will the Charter party hold its own in electoral strength under the new system? And what will be the effects upon the Democratic party, the Negro's political status, the role of labor and business groups? These are questions which the reviewer hopes the author will return to in the near future. His wealth of information about Cincinnati and his demonstrated competence in analyzing its politics make him the obvious choice for such an assignment.

WALLACE S. SAYRE
Professor of Public Administration
Columbia University

ROLAND N. MCKEAN. *Efficiency in Government Through Systems Analysis: With Emphasis on Water Resources Development.* (Operations Research Society of America, Publications in Operations Research No. 3.) Pp. x, 336. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; London: Chapman & Hall, 1958. $8.00.

This important book is an exciting venture in a relatively new field which has, for the most part, become barnacled with quasi-theories and both vague and ambiguous nomenclature. Systems analysis is virtually, though not completely, synonymous with "operations research" or "operational analysis." It is an empirical approach to solving any kind of problem that can be considered as part of the functioning of a system; it treats systems qua systems, seeking empirical generalizations that can be mathematically generalized and widely applied. Thus, for example, queueing "theory" deals with bottlenecks or waiting-time: the stacking of aircraft over a crowded field; checkout lines in supermarkets; traffic delays at toll gates; the "servicing" of random arrivals by a hospital's finite emergency facilities; or the relations between a nation's college facilities and the lengthening queue of freshman applicants. Likewise, various "programming" techniques are used to improve manufacturing schedules, to plan the blending of peroleum products at a refinery to meet consumer demands, or to control production of an entire industry, such as the

American oil industry. Research of this type is not a science, but an art using science as are medicine and engineering. The aim is to establish functional relations between a system's components, and then to measure the sizes of the components and their magnitudes and directions of change. The ultimate goal is to assign values—dollar values or others—within parameters to alternative courses of action. This is not automatically "the science of decision-making," but a generalization of the methods of handling the data upon which decisions are based. Military operations were the first to be operationally analyzed, and this is still a major activity. Today the art is also applied to a host of business problems; unfortunately, with rare exception, it has become the property, by right of conquest and by default of scholars in other fields, of the denizens of the schools of business administration. Dr. McKean is one of these rare exceptions.

Public programs consume an increasingly large percentage of the gross national product, and individual programs are increasing in size. All involve multi-level problems of choice, and it is essential that methods of quantitative analysis be available as aids in decision-making. Although Dr. McKean is concerned with the economics of these programs, he emphasizes the differences between the public and private sectors of the economy. He is fully sensitive to the elements of these choices that involve human values, our assumptions about the nature of a free society and about the status of the individual, and the ideas of group responsibility and public welfare. Though he rarely deals with these in detail, they underlie all aspects of his technical discussion and are frequently explicit.

Although his book is devoid of the mathematics of system analysis, it is by no means devoid of intellectual discipline and linguistic clarity. The first six chapters are a treatise on the general problems of systems analysis: formulating and testing criteria; dealing with non-quantifiable intangibles; risk and uncertainty; and the role of time in system performance. He offers a thorough examination of both the logical and empirical limitations of the art, and examines in detail the types of logical errors frequently made because of psychologisms which can insinuate themselves. Upon this foundation rests a discussion of the special problems connected with national water resource projects, illustrated by explicit analyses of the Green River Watershed project (Kentucky-Tennessee) and the Santa Maria Project (California). He concludes the book with more than fifty pages devoted to other potential uses of systems analysis in the government.

Dr. McKean is a writer of high literary merit, and his sense of humor includes a mastery of whimsical examples which leave the reader astounded at their aptness and validity—after he has stopped chuckling. In sum, Dr. McKean has performed a public service.

SAMUEL E. GLUCK
Rutgers University
Director of Research
Bonded Scale and Machine Company

O. J. FIRESTONE. *Canada's Economic Development, 1867–1953.* (International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, Series VII.) Pp. 384. London: Bowes & Bowes, 1958. 45*s*.

Any review of Canadian growth from 1867 to 1953 would attract the attention of American readers interested in economic development; this is especially true in a year when anti-United States sentiment appears to be expressed in some sections of the Canadian press. Dr. Firestone is the Economic Adviser to the Canadian Department of Trade and Commerce. He has written the last published installment of the co-operative enterprise in the study of economic growth of nations initiated by the International Association for Research in Income and Wealth in connection with its 1953 Conference. His volume fills a vital statistical gap in Canadian economic history by providing, for the first time, comparable long-term series for a number of key economic indicators, such as net family formation, national product and expenditure, and related price indexes.

The analysis and description of methods and sources are sufficiently scholarly to satisfy the technical expert on comparative economic growth. In addition, the study has been designed to meet the needs of a wider body of business men, investors, and potential immigrants who have a special interest in learning details of the expansion of the Canadian economy and its future prospects.



Over eight decades of growth are covered by this volume, starting from Canada's existence as a unified political entity, and covering the change from a rural and small scale economy to one in which the proportion of manufacturing and other large scale activity places it in the category of the most advanced countries. Canadian trends in population, national product, industrial structure, distribution between consumption and investment, the share of foreign trade, and the contribution of the state are discussed with a reasonably consistent statistical framework and with sufficient continuity over time to reveal the time pattern of the broad lines of development.

The primary aim of the author has been to relate the story of Canada's economic development in terms of national product and national wealth. He also wished to provide Canadian and overseas scholars with an opportunity to learn more about the rate of expansion and the changing structure of a young country—Canada—which has now attained the rank of one of the world's industrial leaders. Actually, Canada ranks sixth in the world in terms of national income originating in manufacturing.

A major problem confronting Dr. Firestone was the inadequacy of data for the early period of his study, as official estimates of national income and gross national product on modern lines are available only from 1926 to date. Another problem has been the absence of recent wealth estimates; the last official estimate was made for the year 1933, when the series was discontinued because of the inadequacy of basic data. Private estimates of national wealth are available for a few selected years back to 1930. These vary so much in quality and coverage, however, that they proved of little value to Dr. Firestone in analyzing economic growth.

Largely through the author's efforts, Canada now has a continuous series of aggregates and breakdowns for a period of more than eighty years, and an appraisal of Canada's long-term growth within the framework of the national accounts. Some of his estimates, admittedly, are tentative, and possibly may be revised at a later date. It is believed, however, that his basic findings will be changed only by addition and refinement rather than by alteration of his major conclusions. What he has done for his country will serve as the basis for future research there and as a pattern for studies of economic development abroad.

MARY E. MURPHY
Professor of Business Administration
Los Angeles State College of Applied Arts and Sciences

A. R. M. LOWER, F. R. SCOTT, J. A. CORRY, F. H. SOWARD, and ALEXANDER BRADY. *Evolving Canadian Federalism.* (Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center Publication No. 9.) Pp. xvi, 187. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center, 1958. $3.50.

This is the ninth of the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center publications. The contributors—a professor of law, two historians, and two political scientists—are all Canadian scholars of recognized ability and attainments. Each writes from knowledge and experience gained from years of study and research.

The book, however, is open to adverse criticism on two counts. In the first place, it gives inadequate attention to several significant aspects of Canadian federalism. For example, although Dominion-provincial financial relations are generally admitted to be the most important as well as the most vexing problem of Canadian federalism, only six to eight pages are devoted to this topic. In the second place, there is considerable duplication between the different papers. Thus each of the contributors comments on Quebec's long-continued fight to maintain its cultural and political autonomy and three of them recall that Sir John A. Macdonald was a strong advocate of centralized power.

As for the merits of the book, the essays provide penetrating insights into many aspects of Canadian federalism: how it has evolved; wherein it resembles, and wherein

it differs from that of the United States, Australia, and the British West Indies; and how and why certain problems have arisen as well as the attempts which have been made to deal with those problems. To be more specific, we are told that the Canadian federation had its origin in empirical considerations and fear of the United States; that the operation of Canadian federalism has been greatly complicated by Canada's biracial composition; and that the intentions of the Fathers of Confederation to establish a strong, centralized federation were long frustrated by provincial rights sentiment in Quebec and Ontario and by Privy Council interpretations of the Canadian Constitution which tended to enlarge the authority of the provinces at the expense of the Dominion. We are further advised that, although the powers of the central government have significantly increased since 1930, the government at Ottawa still does not have adequate authority to guarantee the preservation of civil liberties or to implement treaties relating to matters assigned by the British North America Act to the provinces. But, judging from the Canadian record, one may confidently predict that these and other problems will be tackled—and eventually resolved—in the traditional Canadian manner, with due regard for democratic procedures and traditions.

WILLIAM R. WILLOUGHBY
Professor of History and Political Science
St. Lawrence University

## *PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIOLOGY*

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY. *Veblenism: A New Critique*. Pp. xii, 409. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957. $6.00.

The subtitle of this volume claims "novelty" for a critique—or this particular one—of Veblen as a philosopher of society and history. Dobriansky's tone is destructive: not a particularly hard task. Moreover, it is one which could have been performed in a quarter of the space—400-odd pages, packed with pretentious wordage, often straining at the limits of the rhetorically allowable. Much erudition is displayed, and some significant insights are stated more or less clearly and agreeably. Unhappily, however, the standpoint and touchstone of comparison is a position as vulnerable in this writer's opinion as Veblenism itself. The crux of it is that Veblen was a Darwinian, and Darwinism, "as a naturalistic theory, offers no explanation of the origin of the universe" (p. 93). The reviewer cannot imagine more self-contradiction and sheer nonsense expressed in three words than is achieved in speaking of explaining the origin of the universe. Anyway, since such an aim was contrary to Veblen's intention, pretension, or performance, the objection is merely irrelevant.

Dobriansky's book is at once a critique of Veblenism and propaganda for the *philosophia perennis*—medieval theology, here called "Christian reflection" (p. 28). Practices obliquely referred to as "blemishes" on medieval civilization (p. 32), are in fact strictly implied by the "perennial philosophy"; compulsion to believe logically goes with absolutism, with any special claim to "the truth," notably from a source above open critical inquiry and discussion. But most especially it goes with "wishful thinking"—in this connection called "faith"—which will readily explain the origin of the universe, and answer any other question, whether it makes sense or not.

Space limits allow only a few observations on the author's demolition, or Veblenism, or the alternative put forward. All three, of course, have some truth along with their shortcomings, and the book is useful in clarifying opposed positions. The crux of Veblenism is perhaps the pretense to "colorless objectivity" when describing cultural history in terms of "cumulative change"; ridiculing "orthodox" economists for holding a "static" view of human nature; and denouncing or satirizing nearly everything. "Cumulative change" would mean laws of history, which would have to be found first of all, and then explained, rather than treating the formula as itself an explanation. Mr. Dobriansky pillories Veblen for admitting "activity" as an aspect of reality, but rejecting finalism.



What Veblen said—as here quoted (p. 108)—is that activity is imputed by our minds, not an observed fact. This raises the ancient puzzle, doubtless insoluble—except by "faith"—of what we find in phenomena as contrasted to what we read into them. The book seems to take no account of the paradoxes and antinomies of thinking that have been familiar in philosophy for centuries. Physical process clearly does not imply finalism while human conduct does—in the contrasting forms of purpose, subject desire (or opinion) and objective value-judgments which are presupposed in any discussion of a problem. Dobriansky constantly upbraids Veblen for his "dualism" of inert process and purposive action. The contrast is an elementary fact of experience; the defect is that, for interpreting human phenomena, dualism must be amplified into a complex pluralism of basic concepts.

This review has run beyond the assigned length, while directly—scantily—covering the second and third chapters of the book (pp. 25–122). Continuation would be chiefly "more of the same," except as regards the first chapter, which is biographical and seems quite good. The chapters treating Veblen's views on economics are less disapproving—not surprisingly, in view of the shared antipathy to "money-making."

FRANK H. KNIGHT
Professor Emeritus of Social Science and Philosophy
University of Chicago

MARK BLAUG. *Ricardian Economics: A Historical Study*. (Yale Studies in Economics: 8.) Pp. x, 269. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1958. $5.00.

When Ricardo published his *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* in 1817, he provided food for thought of two generations of economists. Until the 1860's, no English-speaking student of economics could afford to neglect a work whose analytical power stood above all previous systematizations. Just as is true with Keynes today, no economist then needed to be pro-Ricardian but few would have wanted to be labelled pre-Ricardians. Some writers turned out expositions and interpretations of the work of the great man; others attempted to develop and refine it. Again others used it as a basis for policy proposals or as a foundation for their own systems of thought. Still others prepared influential popularizations of Ricardo's terse and elliptic writings. And, last but not least, there were the opponents of Ricardo, whose work was inspired by that of the master just as much as was that of his most faithful disciples.

All these groups were integrated by their dependence on Ricardian thought. They include a number of writers of great originality as well as of diverse views, a diversity that was facilitated by Ricardo's abstractiveness. The work of the Ricardians is carefully reviewed in the present volume, the first to deal extensively and exclusively with the Ricardian school. After an introductory chapter devoted to an exposition of Ricardo's system, the author turns to the work of the two most faithful Ricardians, McCulloch and James Mill, to the vacillations of Colonel Torrens, and to Samuel Bailey's early critique. This is followed by chapters on employment, business cycles, population, and wages, in which Ricardo's position is compared with that of Marx, Keynes, Say, Malthus, John Stuart Mill, and other writers. The author then turns to Harriet Martineau and other popularizers, to the Ricardian socialists, to Richard Jones, the early exponent of historical economics, to Longfield, and to Senior. The three concluding chapters treat of John Stuart Mill, of matters of economic policy, and of Fawcett and Cairnes, the last of the "classics."

The work is remarkably erudite and well written. It brings to the fore a new scholar, who was barely twenty-eight years old when his doctoral dissertation, from which the present volume springs, was submitted to Columbia University in 1955. A promising beginning indeed, and one that attests to the fact that the history of economics contains grist for the mill worthy of the best minds. The work appears at the right time, when there is need for balanced judgment to offset the influence of

Schumpeter's posthumous work with its brilliant but often one-sided interpretations.

HENRY WILLIAM SPIEGEL
Professor of Economics
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

DENNIS H. ROBERTSON. *Lectures on Economic Principles*, Vol. II. Pp. 162. London: Staples Press, 1958. (Distributed by John de Graff.) $3.50.

This book is the second of three volumes which reprint the author's lectures at the University of Cambridge. It deals with the distribution of incomes between production factors. The approach is characteristic of the Cambridge school and the level of discussion is appropriate to upper-division undergraduate students in the United States. The treatment is very concise but the reader is likely to be surprised at how much is included in a small volume. At times the exposition becomes algebraic but a literary exposition in common-sense terms usually follows so that the nonmathematical reader can understand what is involved. Principles are stated, but illustrations of the various theoretical points are also given, comments are made on the views of others, and pertinent data are cited.

Robertson is no great admirer of the Keynesians and takes the opportunity to point out that Marshall, before Keynes, had recognized the interdependence of saving and income. He raises doubts as to whether, over time, increased income expands the volume of saving as much as the Keynesians have believed. He looks on individual saving with greater favor than did Keynes, pointing out that a fuller distribution of corporate profits in dividends would enable investors to exercise greater control over the direction of new investment. On the desire for security through bond investment, Robertson comments that "Society seems to protect itself—some would say over-protect itself—against this nuisance by organizing a secular robbery, through the depreciation of money, of those who have sought to keep their savings safe." Yet he says that " 'the euthanasia of the rentier' is not really a very sensible objective of policy."

Among other things, the book criticizes the Cambridge theory of labor exploitation and contains enlightening discussions of such aspects of British policy as the attempt in the post-war years to nationalize increments in land values, and the action on the part of the British government in the same period to keep interest rates low despite a continuing shortage of investment capital. Nevertheless, Robertson recognizes that, with capital as well as with labor, there can exist conditions in which a lower factor price enhances the factor supply.

Although closely reasoned throughout, the book is both clear and interesting; sometimes witty. It can be recommended warmly both to teachers and students in this country.

EDMUND WHITTAKER
Professor of Economics
Colorado State University

ABRAM L. HARRIS. *Economics and Social Reform*. Pp. xvi, 357. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. $5.00.

For a "practicing" social scientist the title of Dr. Harris' book raises false hopes and expectations. Perhaps such a person is not a suitable one to review the book when its substance rather than its title is considered. For the volume deals not with economics as a substantive science, but rather with the economic theories held by certain selected writers; nor does it deal with social reform as actions or events, but with the theories on social reform held by these same writers. The selected list under examination is varied enough: John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, Thorstein Veblen, John R. Commons, Werner Sombart, and for Catholic opinion, Heinrich Pesch. The unifying organizational framework for the analysis is supplied by the author, but in a loose and suggestive form, rather than as a consistent inclusive structure. It is stimulating, but there is very little of it—in the Introduction and in a few summaries.

The treatment in the main is encyclopedic and reflects tremendous erudition—too much, in fact, for this reviewer, and I fear too much for any but the initiated. The volume of references is overwhelming, to the point where a sense of direction is lost. It presupposes a vast detailed knowledge on the reader's part of the minutest components of the writings not only of those under review, but of the field as a whole. Of economic substance or of the facts of social reform there is little, even though the life span of the writers analyzed covers a century and a half of the most phenomenal changes in economic structure and activity in Western society. There is hardly a hint of the quantitative revolution in this period of production, consumption, transportation, or invention. And one misses the significance for social reform of these facts and of the related developments in the exploitation of natural resources, and in the fields of demography and public health.

With respect to social reform one would expect some reference to events in the complementary development through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of individual political freedom on the one hand and governmental responsibility for welfare on the other. The author's manner of analyzing the writings on his selected list without relation to such events does not provide for such a discussion. It even avoids the comparison of qualitative characteristics between, for example, the genius of Karl Marx in analyzing the social process while fomenting revolution at a safe distance, the incisive and lucid exposures of Veblen, and the yeoman's work of Commons in first-hand labors in the political economy. Of necessity, also, the author's treatment avoids the meaning for social reform of international economic competition and its social reflections in Mussolini's, Hitler's, and Stalin's impacts on social organization. It would seem that, on the whole, Dr. Harris has produced a reference book within self-imposed limits, rather than a discussion of economics and social reform.

PHILIP KLEIN
Resident Representative
United Nations Technical Assistance Administration
Jerusalem, Israel

FERDINAND A. HERMENS. *The Representative Republic*. (International Studies of the Committee on International Relations, University of Notre Dame.) Pp. xiv, 578. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1958. $7.50.

Professor Hermens has crowded—perhaps overcrowded—such a mass of material into the pages of his new book that a summary account becomes inevitably a distortion. However, we will not be too far off the main line if we accept it as an apology for constitutional, democratic, representative, republican government.

Professor Hermens doubly rejects political relativism. He will not agree that there is no normative choice among the various forms of government, that whatever the type "that which is best administered is best." Nor will he accept any reductionist doctrine which interprets political structure as a derivative by-product of economic or other non-political forces. The political realm is autonomous; the choices made among alternative political structures and procedures are morally as well as historically significant; the representative republic is not merely one form of government among numerous peers, but the best government and—if properly conceived—even the strongest.

These controlling ideas Professor Hermens develops by describing the representative republic in contrast to the other governmental forms—monarchy, aristocracy, authoritarian and totalitarian dictatorship—by a theoretical analysis of its anatomy, physiology, and pathology; and by examining its empirical manifestation in most major and many minor contemporary nations.

In the light of Professor Hermens' central theses it is somewhat puzzling to discover that satisfactory examples of the representative republic exist only in Great Britain and the older dominions (Canada, Australia, New Zealand), plus—though as a case "*sui generis* . . . which it would be impossible to transfer to other countries"—the United States. In spite of the theoretical autonomy of the political, it turns out that the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America—that is, most of the world—do not provide the developed "social matter" that is requisite to the republic. In eastern Europe outright tyranny has shoved the potential republic aside, as it

did between the wars in Germany and Italy. One or another lesion prevents the republic's healthy functioning in the other nations of the West, including present-day Germany and Italy.

Now if the political realm were indeed autonomous, and if among possible political types the representative republic were indeed both strongest and best, one might expect the republic to be doing a rather more impressive job in practice than Professor Hermens' own review of the record indicates. Professor Hermens' republic tends to drift off into the timeless world of the Platonic forms. Although this retreat leaves his general theory rather empty, the cogency of many of his specific discussions both theoretical and practical is not thereby diminished.

JAMES BURNHAM
Kent, Connecticut

WILLIAM MONTGOMERY MCGOVERN and DAVID S. COLLIER. *Radicals and Conservatives.* Pp. 174. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1957. $4.00.

William M. McGovern and David S. Collier write, in their small book, of radical and conservative "liberalism." They define liberalism as adherence to the two principles of democracy and liberalism, thus including the term to be defined in the definition. At any rate, it is the antithesis of totalitarianism, which is authoritarian and establishes statism. They also contrast liberalism with left-wing radicalism, as it has stood in sharp contrast with socialism, "at most times and places."

The radical liberals are the ones who emphasize an extreme form of democracy, objecting to hereditary monarchy and aristocracy in any form and property qualifications for voting; they favor universal manhood suffrage, women's suffrage, and lowering the voting age. Modern radicals, shifting from early radicals (Bentham, Jefferson, and Jackson), who were believers in laissez-faire, demand a very great measure of state regulation of all economic activity.

The conservative liberals are skeptical of legislative schemes to solve all of man's political, social, and economic difficulties. They believe ardently in checks and balances and the separation of powers, and are devout believers in the general principle of individualism. They accept Sydney Hook's distinction between heresy and conspiracy in interpreting civil liberties, and would deny protection to "conspirators." They oppose collectivism, but will admit the necessity of moderate change. They do not believe that democracy is an ideal for all times and all places.

The book ends with the injunction that "that government governs best which *balances* best." The authors fall, without doubt, into the classification of "conservative liberals." One gets the impression of dressed-up conservatism. They talk about duties before one has the privilege of rights. They misquote the well-known aphorism of Lord Acton on power. They say that most observers would attribute the difficulties of Weimar Germany and France under the Fourth Republic to Proportional Representation. They see the spread of Communism as usually having nothing to do with economic status or standard of living, and its success in China as related to the too rapid overthrow of the Confucian heritage. Presumably, also, the late Senator McCarthy was a "liberal."

DALE PONTIUS
Associate Professor of Political Science
Roosevelt University

DAVID W. NOBLE. *The Paradox of Progressive Thought.* Pp. viii, 272. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958. $6.00.

There are two major aspects to this book, one of which is easy to comment on because its contribution is clear and illuminating. In the chapters which discuss the ideas of men like J. M. Baldwin, C. H. Cooley, Simon Patten, and T. Veblen, Dr. Noble has succeeded in presenting the contributions of these men in a full and integrated fashion and has also shown the philosophic background in which they are anchored.

The second aspect deals with the central thought which holds these chapters together. All these men are viewed as creators of the climate of opinion which was characteristic of the United States between



1880 and 1920. They are called liberal and progressive. They are all presumed to have been involved in a paradox, but its essence is not clearly stated or defined. Noble's approach is based upon that which Carl Becker presented in his volume, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers.* In so far as Becker attempted to show that the *philosophes* "demolished the Heavenly City of St. Augustine only to rebuild it with more up to date materials" it can be said that Noble attempts to show that the liberals demolished the heavenly city of the *philosophes* only to rebuild it with even more up to date materials.

There is a paradox in this only if one assumes that the acceptance of the logic and method of science excludes beliefs in ideals and values, or that the acceptance of determinism precludes human creativity. In fact, men like Cooley and Baldwin, who stressed scientific rigor, were at the same time firmly convinced that it is in man's power to promote social progress; they themselves worked for social reforms.

Apart from the questionable use of the term "paradox," the book admirably succeeds in showing the profound philosophical basis of the leading social theorists. It might be said that they made significant contributions because of the philosophical implications of their theories. Indeed, in view of Noble's analysis, it is difficult to see how anything in the social sciences can be significant which does not throw light upon the controversial issues of social philosophy.

THEODORE ABEL
Chairman, Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Hunter College

*The Doctrine of Saint-Simon: An Exposition: First Year, 1828–1829.* Translated with notes and an introduction by Georg G. Iggers. (Beacon Series in the Sociology of Politics and Religion.) Pp. xlvii, 286. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. $4.95.

The title of this book may prove misleading to readers until they have perused the Preface by G. D. H. Cole and the Introduction by Professor George G. Iggers. The volume is not, except very incidentally and indirectly, an exposition of the doctrines of Henri, Comte de Saint-Simon. Rather, it is a translation by Professor Iggers of the first part of the *Exposition of the Doctrine of Saint-Simon,* delivered as lectures by leading followers of Saint-Simon in 1828 and 1829. It is based on the third, revised and enlarged edition, published in Paris in 1831. The *Exposition* was mainly the work of such disciples of Saint-Simon as Enfantin, Bazard, Buchez, and certain engineering students from the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris. In his Introduction, however, Professor Iggers does provide a good summary of the doctrines of Saint-Simon himself.

The Saint-Simonians, with whom this book is mainly concerned, differed from their "master" mainly in their ultimate rejection of his scientific positivism and of his faith in liberty and democracy. They did, however, retain his emphasis on the importance of religion as a main factor in social reorganization, although their Saint-Simonian "Church" was a much more rigorous and authoritarian institution than anything Saint-Simon had envisaged. They, like Saint-Simon, developed their doctrines through several well-defined stages of major emphasis.

In the first stage, about 1825–1826, they stressed the importance of a proper state of mind with which to approach social reform. This was to be based on an intelligent study of history which was supposed to reveal and encourage the reality of progress, the basic importance of positive science, and the reorganization of society through the teachings of social physics. The second stage, which gradually developed from 1826 through 1829, emphasized the possibility of social reorganization under a hierarchy of able leaders, whose fitness would be self-revealed through their superior intelligence and achievements. They would not be elected but would be publicly accepted on the basis of their recognized merits. In this period, the Saint-Simonians also stressed Saint-Simon's views about the importance of industry, especially banking, and introduced a novel interest in feminism, in some cases approaching free love. It is this phase or

stage of Saint-Simonian doctrine with which the volume under review is chiefly concerned.

Beginning late in 1829, the Saint-Simonians moved into a third stage in which "science and industry were clearly subordinated to politics and religion in the hierarchy." The main traits of their thinking and policy in this stage were the sanctification of the state, conservative humanitarianism, and a sort of secular Catholicism. They were deeply affected by the Catholic reactionaries of the time: Bonald, De Maistre, and their followers. They accepted much of the structure and authority of the Catholic Church but rejected its supernaturalism. The direction of society would be handed over to a secular priestly hierarchy, headed by a "general priest" who would preside over the lesser priests who looked after specialized duties and functions. The net result, so they hoped, would be the creation of a benign and efficient authoritarianism, which would not be "of the people" but would rule humanely for them.

Space does not permit detailed comment on this highly interesting complex of social, economic, and political theory. One can only close with the observation that the translation is excellent and that Professor Iggers' Introduction alone is easily worth the price of the book. It is a superb vignette in the field of the history of social, economic, and political theory.

Some will be repelled by a body of social theory which subscribes to authoritarianism. Yet, unless timely reforms are instituted in our present social, economic, and political order, we may be lucky a generation hence in the Western world to be enjoying authoritarianism of a "benign" type. We have all but wasted the time—more than a century—which has elapsed since the days of the Saint-Simonians.

HARRY ELMER BARNES

Malibu, California

A. H. M. JONES. *Athenian Democracy.* Pp. v, 198. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. $5.00.

Our concepts of the workings of Athenian democracy are primarily derived from the strictures of philosophers, publicists, and dramatists whose sympathies were oligarchic. These writers, according to Professor Jones, were not representative of Athenian citizenry, the great majority of whom were proud of their democratic institutions.

The contention that Athens remunerated citizens for the discharge of their civic responsibilities from income derived from the Empire is refuted, as is the oft-repeated charge that the Athenian democracy rested on a foundation of slavery. From two-thirds to three-fourths of the citizens had no slaves but were persons who "earned their own livings and whose political pay served only to compensate them in some measure for the loss of working time" (p. 18). Likewise, only a negligible portion of the government's income came from the exploitation of state-owned slaves. While Athenian citizens were not radical egalitarians, they insisted on equality before the law and in the formulation of public policy. Although there were a few ill-considered actions by the Assembly, particularly during the Peloponnesian War and its aftermath, democracy did not mean the ascendancy of the rabble. On the contrary, "the Athenian people were rather snobbish in their choice of leaders" (p. 49). The juries and even the assemblies were made up primarily of the wealthy and the middle class. It should also be remembered that the laws could not be altered by a simple decree of the Assembly, but by a prescribed review procedure which included safeguards against fickle proposals or ill-considered action.

The policy of Athens in dealing with the Empire is open to reproach, but it certainly was more enlightened than that of Sparta, and it was in accord with general Greek practice. It is dangerous to interpret the history of the Empire in terms of modern economic imperialism. There was no state effort to acquire markets or to support private ventures directed toward this end. The government's concern, rather, was to assure an uninterrupted flow of vital imports, such as grain, balanced primarily from the income from the silver mines.

This little volume comprising five previously published papers will interest all students of Greek antiquity. The material on economic conditions is particularly valuable, as is the description of the social structure. There is adequate documentation, and an Appendix dealing with the estimate of citizen population during the Peloponnesian War has virtually the stature of a sixth paper.

CHARLES EDWARD SMITH

Dean of the University
Louisiana State University



ERNEST H. KANTOROWICZ. *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology.* Pp. xiv, 567. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. $10.00.

Inspired by a conversation with the late Max Radin and provoked by Maitland's caustic study of the fiction of the king as corporation sole, Professor Kantorowicz was led to a painstaking and richly rewarding research into the originative elements of the theory of the King's Two Bodies which underlay the convenient legal device which seventeenth century English jurists contrived for the interests of the Crown.

The first clear elaboration of the King's Two Bodies appeared in Edmund Plowden's *Reports:*

"For the King has in him two Bodies, *viz.*, a Body natural, and a Body politic. His Body natural is . . . subject to all Infirmities that come by Nature or Accident. . . . But his Body politic is a Body that cannot be seen or handled, consisting of Policy and Government . . . and this Body is utterly void of . . . natural defects and Imbecilities, which the Body natural is subject to, and for this Cause, what the King does in his Body politic, cannot be invalidated or frustrated by any Disability in his natural Body."

The historical antecedents of this juridical distinction of the two bodies reach back into the political theologism of the early medieval theories of kingship. From Christology come the duality of natures and one divine person; from ecclesiology, the doctrine of the *corpus mysticum*; from sacramental theology, the objective validity of sacerdotal ordination and episcopal consecration, derived from the medieval practice of annointing kings and emperors. First the political theorists and then the jurists appropriated the elements which, *mutatis mutandis*, provided the basis for the perpetuity and transcending dignity of royal office and institution however mortal and defectible its human agency. Well might Maitland remark that the English jurists were compounding "a creed of royalty which shall take no shame if set beside the Athanasian symbol." In the twelfth century both canon law and civil law made possible a shift of emphasis from christological exemplarism to a new and more secular duality of king and law and, with the emerging distinction between private and public law, the contrast between the private and public personality of the royal ruler. The dualities of Bracton's king, above and below the law, the constitutional development of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and the gradual evolution of the English parliamentary institution conspired to the construction of a corporative theory of the state whereby the king became incorporated with his subjects and they with him. The sempiternity of the King's body politic in England was untouched by the decapitation of the natural body of Charles I whereas in France the dissolution was complete.

The titles of the five middle chapters outline this development: "Christ-Centered Kingship," "Law-Centered Kingship," "Polity-Centered Kingship: Corpus Mysticum," "On Continuity and Corporations," "The King Never Dies." Even the poets gave expression to this humanly created dualism. Shakespeare's Richard II reproaches himself for turning traitor to his own immortal body politic, and we are treated, in Dante, to a fascinating study of his expansive conception of *Humanitas* in his man-centered kingship as the perpetual actualization of all human—and royal—potencies.

Words cannot do justice to the vast erudition, scholarly precision, and masterful control of the author in the use of original sources—much of it not so easily accessible to medievalists—and of secondary literature. This carefully and richly documented study is graced by an excellent Bibliography and thirty-two plates which are pointedly illustrative of the arguments within the volume. There is just one

desideratum, reluctantly made. One had almost wished that the author's concentration on symbolism had allowed for a more evident appreciation of the practical utility of the fictions which the English jurists contrived for the daily and urgent business of securing private and public rights, privileges, and prerogatives in public law.

JOSEPH F. COSTANZO, S.J.
Professor of Political Philosophy and Historical Jurisprudence
Fordham University

NORMAN F. CANTOR. *Church, Kingship, and Lay Investiture in England 1089–1135.* (Princeton Studies in History, Vol. 10.) Pp. xiv, 349. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. $6.00.

Mr. Cantor has written an extremely important and valuable book based on both extensive research and careful analysis of documents and the ideas they contain. While its central theme is the history of the Investiture Controversy in England, Mr. Cantor has broadened his subject to include other aspects of the relations between church and state which were affected by the ideas of the church reformers who followed the leadership of Pope Gregory VII.

The most striking feature of Mr. Cantor's work is his skill in analyzing ideas and distinguishing between different ones. Thus he shows clearly that while the Cluniac movement was the chief force behind church reform in a general sense, the particular objectives of Gregory VII and his followers were not Cluniac. In his book the various shades of opinion stand out clearly. His account of the different suggestions advanced for settling the Investiture Controversy is particularly valuable. Thus he demonstrates conclusively that the ideas of Bishop Ivo of Chartres which many scholars have considered the basis for the final settlement in England and Germany were quite unlike those embodied in the agreements between the kings of these two states and the papacy.

Mr. Cantor's subject bristles with controversial questions many of which can never be completely solved because of lack of evidence. He argues persuasively that the series of tracts which are known to scholars under the title of "The Anonymous of York" were written by Gerard, archbishop of York. Although he has built up a strong case, it seems doubtful that it will end the controversy over these fascinating documents.

From the point of view of a scholarly monograph there is little to criticize in Mr. Cantor's work. While he makes some statements based on very feeble evidence, he shows clearly what the evidence is and the reader is free to accept or reject the conclusion. Once or twice he allows himself to forget his caution in handling ideas, as when he states that canon law forbade an archbishop to perform his functions before he received the *pallium*. The reformers were trying to make this a rule, but it was still vigorously opposed by such great canonists as Ivo of Chartres.

This is not a book for the general reader; it is a scholarly monograph written for other scholars. It should be read by every medievalist because the subjects it treats are of prime importance in the history of the Middle Ages as a whole and many of Mr. Cantor's ideas are both new and stimulating.

SIDNEY PAINTER
Professor of History
Johns Hopkins University

CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH. *The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective.* Pp. x, 252. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. $4.75.

One of the most sustained and often justified criticisms of the law is that its handmaidens, lawyers and judges alike, are singularly unconcerned with general philosophical considerations and are content to apply it without looking beyond the legal norms which mark its boundaries. According to Dr. Carl J. Friedrich, this attitude divorces the profession from reality and has prevented the development of a comprehensive philosophy of law in favor of artificial and contradictory rules which, in large measure, ignore the general experiences of mankind. This is the basic premise of his latest book, a German edition of which was first published some time ago.

This rather esoteric volume attempts first, in nineteen relatively short but pithy



essays, to trace the historical development of the law from its Old Testament origin to this century's so-called natural law revival. In this first segment, which is the major portion of his book, Dr. Friedrich's distillation of his source material is so effective that he has far outstripped this reader's absorption rate. His methodical straining coupled with his fiendish obsession for overlong sentences had me panting to stay at his heels. This is probably more a criticism of the reviewer than the writer but, at this point, I'm much too tired from running to care.

The second and, to me, the more interesting portion of the good professor's book is a self-styled "systematic analysis" of this historical development. It ends with what can best be characterized as a scholarly plea for world constitutional law. He sees in the development of national law and the treaty creating the European Coal and Steel Community ample precedent for such a logical possibility. If only reality would catch up to logic, Dr. Friedrich would, I am sure, gladly acknowledge that the law has, at long last, come of age. Until it does, he—and the rest of us—cannot afford to be uncritical.

WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER
Associate Professor of Law
New York Law School

DAVID L. SILLS. *The Volunteers.* Pp. xx, 320. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957. $6.00.

While it is stated on the jacket that this is "The story of the men and women who have banded together to conquer polio—and the remarkable organization they have created," the scope of the study is somewhat more limited. It is a report on the role of the local organizations and the volunteer workers who made such organizations possible, rather than a history of the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, or even a report on its well-known leaders who sparked the national movement.

With the focus of the study on local leaders in the "polio fund" drives, the study concentrates on a description of the volunteers, their recruitment, their functions, and, specifically, motivations which induced them to work for the organization. It is in this sense that Sills gives us one of the first clear pictures of the functioning of a volunteer organization as a case study in "institutional analysis." To achieve its purpose, the study is "oriented toward the problem of the influence of an organization's membership upon its fundamental character"; thus, the method throughout is a concentration on the working volunteers who made the well-known March of Dimes so successful throughout the years, culminating in the financing of the research which led to the discovery and application of the Salk vaccine.

The data for *The Volunteers* Sills obtained from various sources. First, a nationwide survey of public attitudes toward various diseases and public contributions to fund-raising campaigns was conducted by the American Institute of Public Opinion in February 1954, and a similar survey was undertaken in four cities in the same month by the Bureau of Applied Social Research of Columbia University. The attitudes and opinions of volunteer workers in the March of Dimes campaigns on the local community level and of the officers of county and state chapters of the Foundation for Infantile Paralysis were obtained from two surveys, one conducted in eighty-five counties by the American Institute of Public Opinion, and the other conducted in thirty-seven different counties by the Bureau of Applied Social Research. The detailed analysis comes primarily from the latter survey, in which interviews were conducted with 129 chapter volunteers and 105 March of Dimes volunteers. Data from the larger surveys were used to obtain a basic understanding of the American public who support the program.

Three chapters in the monograph should be of special interest to specialists interested in the creation and functioning of volunteer organizations; these are chapters three, "Recruiting Volunteers," four, "Raising Funds," and eight, "The Rewards of Volunteering." The Appendices contain two useful presentations concerning the samples studied and the construction of indices in the various surveys.

*The Volunteers* is of special interest to the reviewer who lives in a culture where

volunteer associations are not known, where all such programs as those encompassed by this Foundation are the concern of the government, and where there is only now beginning an effort to enlist public volunteer support in such national programs as the YMCA, Red Cross, and cancer. Social work is a new profession in large areas of the world and there, precisely, is where studies of this nature need to be publicized.

GEORGE W. HILL
Professor of Sociology
Universidad Central de Venezuela
Caracas, Venezuela

H. R. HAYS. *From Ape to Angel: An Informal History of Social Anthropology.* Pp. xxii, 440, xv. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958. $7.50.

Although not a member of the fraternity of those who study the human organism and its culture, H. R. Hays has written a unique and inviting history of anthropology. *From Ape to Angel* follows in the tradition of popularized research. The author did not glean his facts from other histories; his job demanded intensive research in primary materials. The personal touch was sought for and appears in interesting details like Bastian leaving Germany for South America on a cool April day without his overcoat. Occasionally suspense is added by a little fictionalizing. For example, Tylor, trying to improve on existing theories of the origin of religion, is pictured purposefully studying the nature of magic and the significance of dolls and other toys. The reviewer is not aware of any autobiographical records demonstrating that it happened so, but writing of the sort does no harm. No doubt it is much better suited for teaching—or selling books—than are footnotes.

Naturally the advanced student will find ground to quarrel with particular interpretations or emphases. Here and there Hays is a bit too free. It doesn't help Lévy-Bruhl's already sorely misunderstood contribution to define a collective representation this way: "When a savage looked at an object he saw it in terms of all the associations, superstitions, and prejudices of his group." Lévy-Bruhl said that collective representations are shared ideas possessing a strong element of feeling, acquired and renewed under vivid circumstances—during ceremonies, for instance—which serve to guide perception. But on the whole the section dealing with this scholar is quite good if a bit vague.

Arrangement of material is not wholly chronological. Names sometimes recur, indicating that the structural basis of the book is not so much the individual scholar as the themes he pursued. The first quarter of the volume covers the "classical evolutionists," including Darwin. Main attention, however, goes to men who sought to explain the evolution of culture. Appropriately enough, the next period is titled Critical Reaction. Then comes Diffusion and Sociology and, finally, what seems to be the contemporary era: Psychological Insight and Social Responsibility.

The significance of what modern anthropologists are doing and saying concerns the author. The book ends with these words: "Anthropology is shaping weapons to reduce the inhumanity, to lessen the ignorance of this world. It remains to be seen whether we are willing to use them."

JOHN J. HONIGMANN
University of North Carolina

ROBERT GLASER and others. *Current Trends in the Description and Analysis of Behavior.* (Nine lectures under the auspices of the Department of Psychology, University of Pittsburgh, delivered during March 11 and 12, 1955 and March 8 and 9, 1956.) Pp. 242. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958. $4.00.

This is the ninth annual volume of the University of Pittsburgh's Current Trends in Psychology series. It consists of nine lectures, eight by psychologists and one by a psychoanalyst, delivered under the auspices of the Department of Psychology at the University. Three of them were delivered during the 1955 Current Trends conference on March 11 and 12, 1955, and six of them on March 8 and 9, 1956.

The six later lectures had a specific purpose—the examination and assessment of recent advances and probable future developments in the description, analysis, and measurement of group and individual behavior—but the other three lecturers did not address themselves to these topics. Each participant was free to select his own title and to approach the topic in his own way. The result is a highly disparate set of chapters, a potpourri of theoretical critiques, attempts at conceptualization, interpretations of research trends, and some research findings. The reader who hopes to find a unified or coherent evaluation of present-day psychological methodology will be disappointed indeed.

Three of the lecturers—Zubin, Guetzkow, and Hamlin—attempt to deal with general methodological issues in the broad areas of psychopathology, and clinical and social psychology. Among these, Guetzkow's discussion of "The Interaction Between Methods and Models in Social Psychology" is the most thoughtful, stimulating, and informative. Although it is an interesting commentary on the basic problems in research in psychopathology, Zubin's paper, "A Biometric Model for Psychopathology," does not present a theoretical model for the field.

The other six papers focus on narrow areas of research and/or theory. While some of them are excellent—Lindsley's "Psychophysiology and Perception" for example—they tend to be highly technical, addressed primarily to specialists. Only a few of these will be of interest to the general reader or to the nonpsychological behavioral scientist.

Certainly a series of nine lectures cannot be expected to present a comprehensive or representative coverage of the field of psychological methodology. Nevertheless, it seems particularly unfortunate that research techniques in learning, motivation, and problem-solving were almost completely neglected. Analytic methods recently developed in these fields are making possible new discoveries and insights into behavior which may have vast and important implications for all the behavioral sciences.

Psychological techniques of measurement, description, and analysis often influence, and are influenced by, methodological and substantive progress in related disciplines. Few of the lecturers, however, have examined the relationships between their own techniques and/or findings and those of other behavioral scientists. More detailed consideration of such relationships would have made several of the papers more meaningful and useful to researchers in other fields.

In spite of the extreme heterogeneity and restricted scope of these papers, a number of important, vigorous, general trends in psychology emerge very clearly. Among these, the outstanding seem to be the continuous search for new and more refined techniques of observation, measurement, and analysis; and an ever-increasing emphasis on the use of theoretical models to order diverse data and to define areas in need of further investigation.

PAUL HENRY MUSSEN
Associate Professor of Psychology
University of California
Berkeley

ARTHUR S. MILLER. *Racial Discrimination and Private Education: A Legal Analysis.* Pp. ix, 136. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957. $3.50.

What about the private schools and colleges of the South and racial desegregation? Does the momentous Supreme Court decision of 1954 on desegregation in public schools, coupled with other recent judicial decisions, have any significance for schools which are owned and operated by private agencies, denominational and otherwise? What would happen to a private school in one of the southern states which by statute prohibits or penalizes racial integration in non-public education if it voluntarily attempted to enroll Negroes and whites together? What would be the result of an attempt by interested parties to have the 1954 ban on segregation in the public schools extended by judicial decision to private education? What is the legal status of racially restrictive bequests and grants made to private schools? These are the basic questions discussed largely, though not exclusively, from a legal viewpoint by Arthur S. Miller, Professor of

Law at Emory University, in this tightly reasoned little volume.

On the basis of existing trends of judicial decision and inherent logic, the author is reasonably confident that state sanctions —whether withholding of tax exemption privileges otherwise granted, or imposition of criminal penalties—in the South against voluntary integration by private schools, if and when tested, will be declared unconstitutional by virtue of the "equal protection of the laws" and "due process" provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. This does not mean, he is quick to add, that considerable harassment of such schools could not still ensue through over-meticulous enforcement of "housekeeping" rules and the operation of private pressure groups such as the White Citizens' Councils.

In contrast, the author feels that any attempt to have the desegregation principle extended mandatorily by judicial decision to the private schools of the South will legally fail, given the existing climate of public opinion by which he is convinced judicial ratiocination is considerably affected.

The recently litigated Girard College case is discussed in some detail in consideration of the status of racially restrictive bequests to private education. The key point thus far is seen to be the question of whether "state action" is involved in the operation of the school in question. No successful attack has yet been mounted on the power of the "dead hand" to restrict racially a legacy's beneficial use in purely private education.

On the whole this reviewer finds Professor Miller's analysis, both legal and sociological, persuasive. One would have wished, however, for another chapter which would discuss in detail the legality and operation thus far of state statutes of the type existing in several northern states, notably New York, proscribing racial discrimination in the admission policies of private schools. The author's discussion of these laws, which he considers constitutional, is perfunctory. Moreover, he is in error on the following legal point: The key argument in the Girard College case, with regard to the Fourteenth Amendment, was whether the Board of Directors of City Trusts' administration of the estate escaped the "state action" ban because it constituted "fiduciary" action by the city, not "proprietary," as he has it. These are minor points, however. This is a valuable book, which educators, lawyers, government officials, and social scientists with an interest in race relations and the sociology of law will find both useful and accessible.

MILTON M. GORDON

Russell Sage Foundation

JOHN S. BRUBACHER and WILLIS RUDY. *Higher Education in Transition: An American History: 1636–1956.* Pp. viii, 494. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. $6.50.

In these times when citizens in all walks of life make heated comments on higher education, it is refreshing to read a dispassionate and scholarly history of our colleges and universities from the Colonial era to the present. Certainly the authors assemble evidence adequate to prove to all critics that faculties and administrators have always been diligent in defining and re-defining the objectives and methods of the higher education of American youth. If our institutions of higher learning are not replicas of European—or Russian—models, this book shows that during scores of years of free debate in a free society, the concept of the university for the gifted few and trade schools for the rest has always been defeated.

With painstaking documentation and liberal reference to the writings of outstanding educational leaders, the authors portray higher education from the colonial college based on English antecedents through the church-founded or affiliated institutions of the early nineteenth century to the German-inspired university pattern of the late nineteenth century. The twentieth century expansion of the land grant colleges into great state universities and the still spreading community junior college movement are related to the special needs for diversity in a democracy committed to education beyond high school for an ever increasing proportion of its younger citizens.

For laymen or educators who believe they have hit upon panaceas for present deficiencies in higher education, this book should be a restraining influence. The search for the talented, admission with advanced standing, honors programs, release from classroom routines for independent study—all such devices had been discussed and tried in various institutions in pre-Dewey, pre-Hutchins, and even pre-Charles Eliot days.

In short, the authors have produced a well written, carefully annotated, interesting history of educational theory as it has developed at the college and university level. When it comes to their interpretation of the findings, however, one might question the seemingly wholehearted endorsement of Jacksonian egalitarianism in higher education. The reader, nevertheless, is given unbiased evidence from which to draw his own conclusions—even the conclusion that the Jeffersonian concept of true higher education only for the highly qualified and motivated may be a desirable trend for the future.

This timely book gives the perspective that should be grasped by all who would generalize about education beyond the high school.

SAMUEL S. STRATTON

President
Middlebury College

LOUIS SCHNEIDER and SANFORD M. DORNBUSCH. *Popular Religion: Inspirational Books in America.* Pp. xi, 173. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. $4.50.

The subtitle of this volume is more accurately descriptive than is the title. The authors analyze the contents of "forty-six best sellers of the literature . . . published over the years 1875–1955." Most of these were written by Americans, the others sold largely in this country. One has a Jewish author, a few are by Roman Catholics, the remainder were written by Protestants. The books were analyzed paragraph by paragraph, and code letters and numbers were assigned to indicate the item or point of view expressed. Ratios of frequencies of respective items were computed, and these were taken as indicative of the relative stress given them. Three Appendices contain the code and explain the methods of analysis and the statistical treatment. The text describes and comments on the results without cluttering the pages with percentages.

Catholics stress the afterlife more than do Protestants, and are less critical of dogma or ritual, but in most respects the messages are comparable. Trends are observable over the decades studied; the authors identify thirty-five items in which these are evident. In recent years there has been increasing emphasis on "attending and participating in church, reading the scriptures, and consulting a spiritual counselor." There has also been a trend toward secularization. Changes in emphasis or in subject matter occurred during, and immediately after, the depression of the 'thirties, and after each World War. Following the depression there was much less stress on the note that religion brings wealth. The increase in psychiatric treatment has been accompanied by increased emphasis, in this religious literature, on applying some of these principles to the religious life. Radio has suggested slogans such as "tune in with God," and the automobile age brings "high octane thinking means Power and Performance." Particularly in Bruce Barton, Jesus becomes the great advertiser and the successful business man; with the aid of only a few poor fishermen He built up the greatest organization the world has seen. It would be interesting to have, as a follow-up of this study, an account of the reactions of readers, with specified status and backgrounds. The authors deplore the fact that they were not able to undertake such an onerous task.

WILSON D. WALLIS

Professor of Sociology
Annhurst College

ELI GINZBERG. *Human Resources: The Wealth of a Nation.* Pp. 183. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958. $3.95.

Certain American economists are notable for their prodigious output of publications and among them Dr. Ginzberg must rank near the top. This is at least the thirteenth book bearing his name as author or co-author that has appeared in the last ten years. In addition to his professorship at Columbia University, he holds the

positions of Director of the Conservation of Human Resources Project at Columbia University and Director of Staff Studies of the National Manpower Council. In these latter positions he has been guiding research in the manpower field and the development of policy statements based on that research. The present little book, written for the general reader, is intended as a brief summary of the findings up to date. Three of the seven chapters are based on lectures delivered at the Berkeley Campus of the University of California.

The objective of the Columbia University project, in the author's words, has been to seek "to develop new and deeper understanding about the individual and social factors, and their interplay, which influence the way in which the human-resource potential of the American population is developed; and the extent to which people are in a position to make use of their potential to their own advantage and to the advantage of the society of which they are a part."

In the present popular summary, the results of this research have been distilled to a limited number of major points, presented in an informal style, and embellished with personal observations and anecdotes. A primary concern is that the waste of human resources in the United States is threatening our national security. Causes of waste include unemployment, underemployment, inadequate training, arbitrary barriers to employment of certain groups (Negroes, women), and under-utilization of skills. Further, a serious problem of malutilization arises because of the lack of balance of rewards in the business sector and in the government and voluntary or nonprofit sector. Talent is drawn away from teaching and public service because of this imbalance. After a review of factors affecting development of talent and superior performance, the author concludes that to acquire excellence a man must continuously seek opportunities for training and development, must refuse to be deflected by obstacles or temptations, and must enjoy a certain amount of luck. As life becomes generally easier, fewer people, it is feared, will cultivate excellence, and society may be the loser.

Work in the United States is no longer grinding and arduous, but has been so transformed over the past half century that most men are not unhappy toilers. Perhaps too few now find their work challenging or are willing to make an unlimited commitment to their job. But how to stimulate young people in a democracy and guide them into the right educational and vocational paths? Reforms are needed in our educational program—not an unexpected conclusion. Better advice—but not too much—should be provided by schools, by the government, and by professional agencies, to help in occupational choice.

Dr. Ginzberg's book will interest the citizen who has given little or no thought to our manpower resources, to vocational and professional guidance, or to the kinds of educational programs needed today. But for others, this reviewer recommends reference to the original studies of the Conservation of Human Resources Project and the reports of the National Manpower Council.

GERTRUDE BANCROFT
Special Assistant for Manpower Statistics
United States Bureau of the Census

MORRIS ROSENBERG, with the assistance of EDWARD A. SUCHMAN and ROSE K. GOLDSEN. *Occupations and Values*. Pp. ii, 158. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957. $4.00.

This is a report based upon two studies, one made in 1950, using a sample of 2,758 students, and a second in 1952, utilizing a sample of 4,585 "college students selected on a representative basis from eleven universities throughout the country. In the second study it proved possible to reinterview 944 Cornellians who had participated in the first investigation" (p. i).

How do various values relate to occupational choice? Rosenberg distinguishes, statistically, three value configurations: the "people-oriented" value complex, the "extrinsic-reward-oriented" complex, and the "self-expression-oriented" complex. These three types are utilized throughout the study. The top occupation choices of the "people-oriented" are *social work*, medicine, and teaching; of the "extrinsic-reward-oriented" are real estate, finance, hotel, food, and sales and promotion; of the "self-expression-oriented," architecture, journalism, drama, art.

The book then takes up careful, subtle relationships between such factors as "faith in people," "personality" factors—confidence, self-other conceptions, and aggression—social background, and occupational choices and success orientation.

The data on occupational values and changes in occupational choice (1950 to 1952) are especially significant for the validity of the author's typology presented above. For example, fifty-seven per cent of the "people-oriented" choosing teaching in 1950 continued in 1952, but only nineteen per cent of those choosing teaching but otherwise oriented adhered to their original choice. Numerous other relationships of this type are presented. The chapters on "ends and means" and "reluctance and resolution" are stimulating and suggestive. Finally the implications are assessed, and factors in the value complex which seem to facilitate and those which seem to impede "social contribution and individual satisfaction" are considered.

A few of the many findings and interpretations may help to gain a "feel" for this book: "the conflict of the college student does not seem to be a question of money versus security; rather . . . many people want money in order to have security"; in our emerging bureaucratic society "the occupational value of creativity and self-expression may lead to maladjustment in work," a wide range of occupational choice may impede personal satisfaction with occupation quite as much as facilitate it; almost three times as many would prefer to own their businesses or farms as expect to; and somewhat more expect to work in educational institutions and government bureaus than prefer to!

All in all this is a sophisticated study of the interactions among various values, occupational choices, and success expectations of the college population.

JOHN F. CUBER
Professor of Sociology
The Ohio State University



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**Notice of**

**ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING**

**of the members of**

**THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE**

In accordance with the Bylaws of the Academy, the Annual Business Meeting of the members will be held on Monday, January 26, 1959, at 2:00 P.M., at the offices of the Academy, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

The Annual Report of the Board of Directors will be presented, directors elected, and other important business transacted.

James C. Charlesworth
President



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VOLUME 322 MARCH 1959

# THE ANNALS

*of* The American Academy *of* Political *and* Social Science

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*
RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Assistant Editor*

## PREVENTION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

***Edited by***

HELEN L. WITMER
*Director, Division of Research*
*Children's Bureau*
*U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare*

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PHILADELPHIA
1959

*Issued bimonthly by The American Academy of Political and Social Science at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pennsylvania.*

*Editorial and Business Offices, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania.*

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# FOREWORD

Several years ago the United States Children's Bureau, as part of its program on juvenile delinquency, published a report about the effectiveness of measures in delinquency prevention.[1] The analysis was based on the research literature and covered evaluative studies conducted over the past twenty-five years or so.

The review led to the conclusion that, so far as formal research could document, programs for the prevention of juvenile delinquency had not been notably effective. This conclusion was tempered, however, by two facts. First, few programs, relatively speaking, had been evaluated, and most of those not adequately. Second, many of the evaluative studies were out of date since they dealt with programs and methods that today might not be considered the best. Moreover, there were hints—and in some cases more than hints—that good results had been achieved with certain types of delinquent children under certain circumstances. This was notably the case in child guidance work and was perhaps also true of the kind of neighborhood work that Clifford Shaw originated.

Some of the programs and methods newly entered upon seemed, however, to give promise of more favorable findings. Among those mentioned in the report were various devices for "reaching out" to youngsters and their parents with services they were unlikely to seek for themselves; for instance, group work with delinquent and predelinquent gangs, case work or group work with "resistant" families. These and other newly devised programs seemed to be taking up where older ones had failed and to be benefiting both from the experience of their predecessors and from recent advances in knowledge about human behavior and motivation.

In the present number of THE ANNALS the story of the measures of delinquency prevention and their effectiveness is continued. Here we have reports from practitioners and research workers who have been closely associated with these efforts. The range of programs is considerably expanded over that shown in the Children's Bureau monograph, and the caliber of the scientific evaluation, where undertaken, seems to have improved.

The most striking change, however, lies, it seems to me, in the level of sophistication exhibited in the reports. This is shown in the way the work with delinquent youngsters and their parents is carried on, in the psychological and sociological knowledge underlying the work, and in the methods employed in its evaluation. Much has been learned in all these areas in recent years. These articles show programs of delinquency prevention both benefiting from that advance and contributing to it.

To me perhaps the most important contribution of this series of articles lies in the picture it provides of the kinds of youngsters that are likely to become chronically delinquent and of the kinds of homes and neighborhoods they live in. The picture is not a new one but it is drawn in a way that reveals, more vividly than usual, the fears and the discouragement and, withal, the wish to be like other people that characterize these youngsters and their parents. The treatment measures described—both those that would improve the environment and those that

[1] Helen L. Witmer and Edith Tufts, *The Effectiveness of Delinquency Prevention Programs,* Children's Bureau Publication Number 350, 1954. (On sale by Government Printing Office.)


are directed toward the individuals—take their direction from this knowledge. The knowledge itself is rooted both in the social sciences and in psychology and demonstrates their interrelatedness.

The articles deal with small programs and, in part, short-lived efforts. Few of them report scientifically established results. Nevertheless, in their conception of what needs to be done and in their suggestions for some ways of doing it, they hold the hope that the problem of delinquency can be reduced if communities are willing to put the effort required into the work.

HELEN LELAND WITMER

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*Helen L. Witmer, Ph.D., Alexandria, Virginia, is Director, Division of Research, Children's Bureau, United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Until 1949, Dr. Witmer was Director of Research, School of Social Work, Smith College, and from 1949 to 1951, she was Professor of Social Welfare, University of California, Los Angeles. She was Director of Fact-finding for Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950. Among other books, she is the author of Social Work (1942) and Personality in the Making (1952) and co-author of An Experiment in the Prevention of Delinquency (1951).*



# Delinquency Prevention: The Size of the Problem

By I. RICHARD PERLMAN

ABSTRACT: The extent and nature of that ill-defined complex, juvenile delinquency, defy precise definition. Nevertheless, existing evidence indicates that delinquent behavior known to official agencies has increased in recent years, both absolutely and proportionally. Moreover, there is evidence that a great amount of law-violation among juveniles goes undetected. Because of the size and importance of the juvenile delinquency problem, its tremendous cost in dollars and in human wastage, and the prospect that it will increase still further, much more must be learned about its prevention, treatment, and basic causes. More and better research is needed to test hypotheses concerning causal factors, to evaluate current programs of prevention and treatment, and to try out and evaluate new methods. Research priorities must be carefully assessed and the finding of basic facts must be improved. We will then have an adequate base line for evaluating the problem and an adequate picture of the extent to which our treatment facilities are now applying what we do know.

---

*I. Richard Perlman, Washington, D. C., is Chief of Juvenile Delinquency Statistics of the Children's Bureau, United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare. For many years he has been particularly responsible for the collection of national statistics on juvenile delinquency and active in efforts towards improving the reliability of the data in this difficult area. He is the author of various articles on the statistical reporting of juvenile delinquency and other social welfare programs.*

IN ANY effort directed towards preventing or reducing delinquency, some idea of what is being prevented or reduced is essential. Just what is juvenile delinquency and what do we know about it?

Juvenile delinquency is a catch-all word; it means different things to different people. To some, the manner of attire—the mere wearing of bluejeans or a ducktail haircut—is sufficient to label a child a delinquent. To a home owner who strives hard to keep his lawn looking neat, a delinquent may be a youth who rides his bicycle across the lawn. To one who reads the lurid newspaper headlines about teen-agers, a delinquent conjures up a picture of a young hoodlum who robs, steals, and murders. These are popular conceptions of juvenile delinquents and they obviously vary widely.

Legally speaking, a juvenile delinquent is one who commits a delinquent act as defined by law and who is adjudicated as such by an appropriate court. But even laws which many think of as being absolute or definitive are not so regarding juvenile delinquency. Most juvenile court laws define as delinquent a juvenile who violates any state or local law or commits any act that would be considered a crime if committed by an adult. In addition, however, most statutes define as delinquency acts which are violations of laws only when committed by children: truancy, running away, incorrigibility, ungovernable behavior. In the latter categories, the law ceases to be definitive and becomes vague and subjective. For what actions of a child could not at some time or other be considered by someone to be malicious mischief, incorrigible, or beyond the control of his parents? This vagueness can also make one ask when is a child normally rebellious and when is he an incorrigible delinquent? When is he just socializing with the neighborhood children and when is he loitering? And why is smoking delinquent today and perfectly acceptable a week from today when a youth reaches his eighteenth birthday? Also why should the child who impulsively runs away because of a minor dispute with his parents share the appellation, delinquent, with the youngster who robs a filling station?

And even laws vary among different states. Just who is considered to be a child is different in different states. So are the types of misbehavior included under the broad term of delinquency. Thus, it is quite possible for a child to be considered a delinquent in one state and not one in another state.

With so diffuse a definition of delinquency, with much delinquent behavior going undetected or when detected, being handled by other than law-enforcement agencies, a clear-cut determination of the exact extent and nature of juvenile delinquency seems impossible. Much has been written on the difficulties of measuring and reporting on juvenile delinquency.[1] No attempt will be made to repeat those discussions here except to re-emphasize that good statistics are an indispensable base line for gauging preventive efforts. They require the active efforts of all in a position to provide the data. But we cannot afford to await perfect statistics before taking some action. With the limited information that is currently available we can learn something about juvenile delinquency and perhaps obtain some clues as to what more we need to know.

The best available evidence presents the following picture.


## TRENDS

Juvenile delinquency which comes to the attention of official law-enforcement agencies has risen in recent years. The

[1] See *NPPA Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (July 1957).



CHART 1—JUVENILE COURT DELINQUENCY CASES, 1940–1957




number of juvenile delinquency court cases reported to the Children's Bureau began to increase after 1948 and have continued to rise for nine consecutive years. They more then doubled between 1948 and 1957, as indicated in chart 1.

In 1957, more than 600,000 cases of delinquency were referred to juvenile courts. These involved an estimated ½ million different children or about 2.3 per cent of all children in the vulnerable age group—10 through 17—in the United States. This percentage represents the proportion of children involved in court delinquency cases in one year—1957, and it is frequently cited to show the size of the delinquency problem. A much better idea of the size of the problem can be gained by estimating the percentage of all children who will become involved in at least one court delinquency case during their adolescence. Generally this covers an eight-year period, from 10 through 17 years of age. Allowing for repeaters who are involved in about one-third of all delinquency cases, this percentage is roughly estimated to be as high as 12 per cent if the 1957 rate continues. Considering boys alone, it would be much higher, roughly 20 per cent. The percentage of delinquency cases for boys is high because they contribute about 5 times more to delinquency than do girls whereas the boy and girl distribution in the child population is about equal.[2]

Various other studies substantiate the belief that the size of the delinquency problem is greater than would appear from just looking at one year's figures.

[2] The data cited in this paragraph include traffic violations wherever the juvenile court has jurisdiction in such cases. Incomplete national data on traffic cases collected in 1957 for the first time since 1945 indicate that the number of such cases is sizable—somewhere around 30 per cent of all delinquency cases.

For example, S. E. Hathaway and E. D. Monachesi, in reporting on their work with the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, show that 22 per cent of all boys and 8 per cent of all girls in the ninth grade of the Minneapolis schools had appeared before the court, the police, or both within a period of two years.[3] Bernard Lander, in his study of juvenile delinquency in Baltimore, presents the following data: Approximately 40 per cent of the Negro boys aged 14 to 15 and 26 per cent of the Negro boys aged 10 to 13 were registered in the Baltimore Juvenile Court on delinquency petitions in the four-year period covered by the study. Of the white male population group, approximately 12 per cent of the 14 to 15 age category and 7 per cent of the 10 to 13 age group were in court as alleged delinquents.[4]

### THE POLICE AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS

A much greater number than come to the attention of juvenile courts—perhaps as much as 1.7 million children—are dealt with by the police for misbehavior. About three-quarters of these are not referred to juvenile courts but rather are handled directly by the police. In such cases the police officers take whatever steps they think might alter the delinquent behavior of the children. This means referring some of these boys and girls to social agencies for help.

Police arrests of children as reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation also show increases in recent years, following closely the pattern evidenced by the juvenile court delinquency cases. Table 1 shows the percentage of change from one year to the next in both series.

The increases are not limited to the large congested urban areas as is so often supposed. On the contrary, the increases seem to be greater in the smaller and rural areas. For example, the FBI reports that between 1956 and 1957 the increase in arrests of persons under 18 years of age was 16 per cent in cities with a population of under 25,000 while it was only 8 per cent in cities of 25,000 or more. Juvenile court statistics also show greater increases in rural and semiurban areas than in large urban areas. Even though increases have been somewhat greater in the smaller areas, juvenile delinquency is still primarily an urban problem. For it is in the large cities that most delinquency is concentrated.

### DESCRIPTION AND BEHAVIOR OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS

Most studies indicate that the juvenile delinquent who comes to the attention of juvenile courts is more likely to be a boy than a girl (chances are 5 to 1); he is generally about 14 or 15 years old when referred although he had exhibited behavior problems considerably earlier. His attitude is hostile, defiant, and suspicious. He is usually retarded in school work and in reading ability and shows a chronic history of truancy.

Delinquents, more frequently than nondelinquents, come from homes broken by death, divorce, or desertion or homes lacking in understanding, self-respect, stability, affection, and moral standards. Frequently their homes are economically as well as emotionally deprived. This is not to say that many nondelinquents do not emerge from these same social and emotional environments, but only that such factors tend to produce disproportionate numbers of delinquents.

Since the definition of delinquency is so broad, the reasons for which children are referred to juvenile courts are equally broad. They vary from the trivial to the most serious. Table 2 reveals that the majority of boys are referred to juvenile court for some type of stealing or some form of malicious mischief; most girls are referred for being ungovernable, for running away, or for having committed a sexual offense. These are the overt offenses for which children were referred to court. On the surface, they appear to be relatively minor. Behind the specific overt act, however, often lies a long history of recurring misbehavior or a basic behavior problem that requires court attention and treatment.

Table 2 is based on rather old data (1945) collected by the Children's Bureau. No recent national data on reasons for referral to court are available. It is likely that this distribution has not changed much since 1945. This belief is borne out by an examination of recent state juvenile court reports which show no substantial variation from the distribution shown in Table 2.

A review of the 1957 police arrest data from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports also confirms the fact that most arrests of juveniles under 18 years of age are for relatively minor offenses and that very few are for the really serious ones. For example, of all arrested persons who are under 18 years of age, 21 per cent were arrested for larcency—mostly with a value of under $50. An additional 27 per cent were arrested for violations of state or local laws—generally running away, truancy, curfew violations, and other delinquent behavior—not enumerated in the very complete listing of the Uniform Crime Reports Part I and Part II offenses. On the other hand, only 1 per cent were arrested for robbery; 1 per cent for aggravated assault; less than 1/10 of 1 per cent for criminal homicide.

A statistic frequently cited about juvenile offenses is one showing the preponderance of juveniles among arrests for burglary and auto theft. These offenses, however, are not a major cause of juvenile arrests. Eleven per cent of the juveniles arrested were charged with

TABLE 1—JUVENILE ARRESTS AND COURT CASES

| YEAR | PER CENT INCREASE OVER PRECEEDING YEAR | |
|---|---|---|
| | POLICE ARRESTS OF CHILDREN[a] | JUVENILE DELINQUENCY COURT CASES |
| 1949 | 4 | 7 |
| 1950 | 5 | 3 |
| 1951 | 8 | 6 |
| 1952 | [a] | 11 |
| 1953 | 8 | 13 |
| 1954 | 2 | 6 |
| 1955 | 11 | 9 |
| 1956 | 17 | 21 |
| 1957 | 10 | 16 |

[a] Police arrests of children up through 1951 are based on fingerprint arrest records; for 1952 and thereafter they were based on reports of all persons arrested whether fingerprinted or not and therefore are not comparable to the earlier data. Percentage changes are based on a varying number of cities participating each year, not on a comparable group throughout as in delinquency court cases.

TABLE 2—REASONS FOR REFERRAL TO JUVENILE COURT

| REASONS | PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | TOTAL | BOYS | GIRLS |
| All reasons, excluding traffic | *100%* | *100%* | *100%* |
| Stealing | 40 | 47 | 12 |
| Act of carelessness or mischief | 19 | 21 | 8 |
| Truancy | 8 | 7 | 13 |
| Running away | 9 | 7 | 19 |
| Ungovernable behavior | 10 | 7 | 22 |
| Sex offense | 6 | 3 | 18 |
| Injury to person | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| Other reasons | 5 | 5 | 6 |

[3] Starke R. Hathaway and Elio D. Monachesi, *Analyzing and Predicting Juvenile Delinquency with the MMPI* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1953), p. 109.

[4] Bernard Lander, *Towards an Understanding of Juvenile Delinquency* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), p. 20.

burglary and 8 per cent with theft of an automobile. It is often said that this latter offense has a different meaning for juveniles than for adults since it is largely concerned with joy-riding rather than with larceny for profit. Nevertheless, auto theft cannot be dismissed lightly since it does represent a complete disregard for other people's property, and it often involves the commitment of other serious offenses.

### TREATMENT OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS

Of the roughly 1.7 million boys and girls who came to the attention of the police for misbehavior in 1957, the cases of about 3 out of 4 were dealt with directly by the police and were not taken to the juvenile court. The remaining ¼ or about 428,000 cases were referred to court for care and treatment. This number plus an additional 175,000 delinquency cases referred to juvenile court by parents, teachers, social agencies, and others made up the slightly more than 600,000 delinquency cases handled by courts in 1957.

While awaiting the action of the court on their cases, the majority of the children, about 67 per cent of them, were not detained away from home. However, about 33 per cent were held overnight or placed in detention homes, police station houses, jails, or elsewhere. It is estimated that about 100,000 children are confined in jails each year by authority of the courts or other law-enforcement agencies to await official action on their cases. Many of these jails are unfit for even adult use, but what is even worse they expose children to close association with adult criminals.

In 1957, of the boys and girls referred to juvenile courts for delinquency, the cases of about half were dismissed, adjusted, or held open without further action. Of the remaining children, over 150,000 were placed on probation and about 52,000 were committed to training schools for delinquent children. The rest were either referred to other agencies or were handled in other ways. The average length of supervision on probation is estimated at about 10 months, and the average length of stay in a training school is estimted at about 9.5 months. Where aftercare supervision (parole) is provided, children released from the institutions are supervised for an additional average period of about 16 months.

### UNDETECTED DELINQUENCY

The facts presented thus far are for the most part based on detected delinquencies which come to the attention of the law-enforcement agencies. Another group of known delinquents is the group of children who are handled by community agencies without referral to the police or the juvenile courts. Several experiments in the use of central registration have indicated that the numbers of children handled in such a manner are quite sizeable. These two groups then make up the known delinquency problem—similar somewhat to that portion of an iceberg which shows above the water line.

The invisible part of the iceberg represents conceptually—and perhaps even in relative size—the delinquency problem which goes undetected. For if we think of as delinquent any misbehavior which might be dealt with under the law, whether detected or not, then undoubtedly a great many children escape the attention of the law-enforcement or other child-caring agencies. While the exact number of undetected delinquents probably will never be known, several studies reveal that it is substantial. For example, a study, published in 1947 by James S. Wallerstein and Clement J. Wyle,[5] summarized the admissions of some 1700 law-abiding men and women, overweighted with professional and businessmen of substantial standing, regarding their "delinquent" and "criminal" acts. Almost all these individuals confessed to having committed offenses under existing laws. Two-thirds of them engaged in behavior which under the laws of their state were felonies. A. L. Porterfield's work[6] followed the same pattern of study and found that a sample group of college students all acknowledged committing a considerable number of offenses similar to those found among youth brought into court. However, the offenses of these college students rarely appeared in any official statistics. Still another early survey by F. J. Murphy, M. H. Shirley, and H. L. Witmer[7] revealed that a large number of boys admitted to committing serious acts of delinquency which had never become a matter of court record. Not only do such studies show that the number of hidden delinquents is great, but they also reveal that the number of undetected delinquents is large among the middle- and higher-income groups—the groups which appear in strikingly small numbers in official statistics.

[5] James S. Wallerstein and Clement J. Wyle, "Our Law-abiding Law-Breakers," *Probation*, Vol. 25 (March–April 1947), pp. 107–12.



### RISE IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

From all this evidence one is inclined to conclude that the problem of juvenile delinquency is tremendous and that it has been rising in recent years. But has the rise been real? Much stormy discussion has centered around this question. Statements are often issued on the face of statistics that there has really been no real increase in delinquency. Rather, the statements imply, the statistics merely reflect better reporting procedures, more public awareness through publicity, and increased law enforcement. Some of these statements are hard to prove or disprove, but let us examine some of the evidence. Practically all agencies dealing with delinquents are reporting increases in offenders. Police are handling more children; courts are getting more cases involving children; detention homes are running to capacity; training school populations have been increasing and they, too, are operating at or above capacity. New facilities are being built. These are real children being dealt with, not paper increases. Similarly, some states and individual courts which have had stable reporting systems for many years are also reporting offense increases. With such strong evidences, it is unlikely that the increases are due wholly to better reporting. Perhaps some of it is but not all.

True, juvenile delinquency has been receiving much public attention and perhaps some of this public awareness has resulted in drives against juvenile delinquents. But adult crime, which has not received such disproportionate public attention, has also been increasing. Is it not more plausible to assume that some pervading social breakdown is causing real increases in both juvenile and adult crime than it is is to assume that the apparent increase in juvenile delinquency is really only a greater public awareness of the problem?

That more efficient law-enforcement accounts for the increase in arrests of juvenile delinquents is a cliché that one cannot seem to escape. It does not detract from the good work of law-enforcement agencies to say that the efficiency of law enforcement as a system is not limitless. The increases in delinquency have been occurring each year for the past nine years and here, as in other processes, the law of diminishing returns

[6] Austin L. Porterfield, *Youth in Trouble* (Forth Worth: Leo Potishman Foundation, 1946), pp. 37–51.

[7] Fred J. Murphy, Mary M. Shirley, and Helen L. Witmer, "The Incidence of Hidden Delinquency," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1946), pp. 686–96.

must certainly set in. And should delinquency happen to drop in the near future, this same argument might place us in the unfortunate position of attributing the decrease to laxity or inefficiency in law-enforcement.

The preponderance of statistical evidence, as well as discussions with persons actually dealing with delinquents, has convinced the writer that there has been a real rise in delinquency. It cannot be accounted for by better reporting or better law enforcement. It cannot be attributed solely to the recent increase in the child population, since the increases in both police arrests and court delinquency cases have far outstripped the increases in the child population. And the prospect for the future looks even worse. The Bureau of the Census predicts we shall have 35 per cent more boys and girls in the 10 through 17 age groups in 1965 and 48 per cent more in 1970 than we had in 1957. This is due to the large sustained birth rates that occurred during and after World War II. Should the number of delinquents increase only at the same pace as the child population increases, the problem will be much bigger than it is now. Should the number of delinquents increase at a faster pace—as it has been doing in recent years—then the problem may become staggering.

## THE PRICE OF DELINQUENCY

The costs of juvenile delinquency are staggering. The greatest damages—personal unhappiness, wasted and unproductive years, family distress, and many other related tribulations—cannot be estimated. However, the FBI estimates the current average cost of all crime in America to be somewhere around 20 billion dollars. Many studies indicate that the majority of adult criminals have graduated from the ranks of juvenile delinquents. Much of this cost, therefore, can be indirectly attributable to juvenile delinquency.

Even the direct costs of juvenile delinquency are large. Very conservatively, public services for delinquents—police, courts, detention facilities, and institutional care—are estimated at over 200 million dollars. The cost to the American public in property value stolen by juveniles has been estimated in a report of the United States Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency [8] to be about 115 million dollars. In addition to this is the unknown damage done through acts of vandalism.

## NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The limited statistics which are available are sufficient to paint a gloomy picture about the size of the delinquency problem and about its seriousness for the future. It is no wonder then that our attention should turn to means of preventing or reducing the problem.

Unfortunately the statistics do not tell us enough about the whys and wherefores of delinquency, the motives, the reasons—all very necessary for any good approach to prevention. For example, most statistics on delinquency indicate that a disproportionate number of delinquent children come from slum, economically deprived areas. Yet we know very little as to why some children brought up in the same type of environment go on to become well-respected successful citizens. Examination of statistics reveals that some children commit an offense for the first time and never commit another, while others repeat their offenses over and over again. We know very little as to why this occurs. Is it that the manner of dealing with children is successful for some but not with others? And

[8] Juvenile Delinquency, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate Made by Its Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency, Report No. 130 (Washington, 1957), p. 5.



why should this be? Or is it that some children, accidentally or impulsively involved in delinquency on one occasion, would probably never repeat their offenses again regardless of the services available? From the statistics we know that most children are likely to be about 14 or 15 years old when first referred to court for delinquency. If symptoms predisposing these youngsters to delinquency could have been discovered at an earlier age, as some researchers have recently been trying to do, could we have prevented these children from getting into difficulty?

Such questions, and many more, need answering in order to make any great impact in the prevention of delinquency. Some answers to them are being experimentally sought. Some new preventive methods of working with possibly delinquent children are being tried and tested. Several of these will be described in other papers in this volume. Such attempts are laudable, but they are too little and come very late. Research on a much grander scale is necessary. There also needs to be a more discriminate determination of what needs to be done and what will be productive in this illusory field. Even on a grand scale, the cost of research would be small in comparison with the cost of delinquency.

# Some Meanings of Aggressive Behavior in Children

By Eveoleen N. Rexford

Abstract: Overactivity and aggressive, destructive behavior in children are often regarded as precursors of juvenile delinquency. This symptomatology is nonspecific for diagnosis or causation. Review of typical cases shows the wide range of meanings such behavior may have and the varied backgrounds, in a causal sense, from which such children may come. If delinquency is to be reduced or prevented, more will have to be learned scientifically about this whole subject. Both clinical workers and the general public will have to revise their attitudes toward and their ways of dealing with aggressive children.

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*Eveoleen N. Rexford, M.D., Cambridge, Massachusetts, is Director of the Douglas A. Thom Clinic, Boston. From 1938 until 1942, Dr. Rexford served as a staff member at the Central Islip State Hospital, Central Islip, New York. In 1942–43, she was a Commonwealth Fellow in Child Psychiatry at the Judge Baker Guidance Center, Boston, and continued there as a staff member until 1948. From 1943 to 1949 she was on the staff of the James Jackson Putnam Children's Center and during the academic year 1944–45, she was College Psychiatrist at Wellesley College. Dr. Rexford also carries on private practice in psychoanalysis and holds appointments as Instructor at the Harvard Medical School and the Boston Psychoanalytic Institute. Dr. Rexford is a member of the American Psychoanalytic Association, the Boston Psychoanalytic Society and Institute, American Psychiatric Association, the Massachusetts Medical Society, American Academy of Child Psychiatry, and the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry; she is also a Fellow of the American Orthopsychiatric Association.*





During the past eleven years the Douglas A. Thom Clinic for Children, a child psychiatric facility in Boston, has carried out a series of studies of young, antisocial children. These children, mostly boys ranging from 6 to 12 years of age, have engaged our particular attention because of their potential for later serious adolescent or adult criminal careers. In each instance, their behavior has extended far beyond the minor outbreaks to which all young children may be subject in their struggles to attain controls and acceptable social patterns. Their misconduct has presented a serious problem in management for home, school, and neighborhood. We are aware that many juvenile offenders and adult criminals have histories of severe behavior disorders in their early years, but we know also that many individuals with such a history do not pursue a criminal career. In our investigations, we have moved from studies of the personality and treatment of the children to studies of the family milieu in which they are raised.

This research interest has led us to pay particular attention to the various types of children who are referred to a community child guidance clinic for "overaggressive behavior" and to sort out the different meanings to be attached to this complaint.

Young children and adolescents are frequently brought to a child guidance clinic with a complaint of overactivity and of aggressive, destructive behavior. This symptomatology, centering around the core idea of "aggressiveness," is about as nonspecific a complaint in the social sense as is headache in the physical realm. Upon investigation, we may find that one "overaggressive" child has developed a habit of talking back to a restrictive mother who could tolerate no deviation from her expectation of prompt obedience. Another child for the first time may be engaging in physical combat with his peers in a manner to be expected occasionally from a lively and energetic boy of 8 or 9. On the other hand, it may develop that the boy seems to live a life of persistent provocation and retaliation, constantly fighting and opposing any limits which may be set up for him. His mother, for example, may report that he sets fires, that he even set fire to baby's crib with his baby brother in it. In each instance, before we can make appropriate plans to help the child and his family, we must make a diagnostic study of the child and his family in order to understand the nature of the child's "aggressiveness" and to set his behavior in its proper perspective.

Clinical work with aggressive children is undoubtedly influenced in many ways by our cultural attitude towards aggression and aggressive activity. Despite the fact that competitiveness is a highly valued characteristic of our system of free enterprise, and the push to achieve and to succeed is considered a natural attribute of the American way of living, the current pressures toward conformity on both children and adults suggest society-wide conflicts about the acceptability of the aggressiveness implied in these activities. From our psychiatric work with children and adults, we become aware of how commonly hostile feelings and acts lead to anxiety and guilt in our patients, reactions which often interfere with their legitimate search for self-realization. Many of us seem inwardly convinced that whatever we regard as aggressiveness is bad, dangerous, and immoral. We may react to this inner conviction by developing a moralistic and punitive attitude toward the hostile wishes and behavior of others or by housing our inward rebellion beneath an outward conformity to authority and law. We may maintain a secret, childish delight in the mani-

festations of aggression in those about us or, more happily, we may attain a mature attitude toward our aggressive impulses which we are able to put to work for us in socially acceptable activities. Professional people whose task is to help those with emotional problems share the conflicts of others and must recognize and allow for their own personal attitudes toward aggressiveness if they are to be of assistance to their patients and clients.

In our scientific study of human behavior over the past fifty or sixty years, we have come to recognize that man is born into the world with a complement of strong primitive impulses which is the source of psychic energy making all adaptation and life itself possible. These primitive instinctual drives include self-preservative, reproductive, and aggressive urges. If we are brought up with a reasonable amount of affection and understanding, all of these psychic energies become more or less domesticated, transformed, and sublimated.

There are probably no human activities which do not require the investment of a core of aggressive, forward-propelling drives. As is true of all our primitive instincts and wishes, our aggressive impulses not only carry potentials for growth but can also propel us toward socially unacceptable and destructive goals. Each culture makes its own demands upon the members of a society in regard to acceptable expressions of the aggressive drives as with the other instinctual impulses. A child's mastery of his angry feelings and destructive urges arises from a complicated interplay among his earlier experiences in his own home, the attitude of his parents, the demands of his social group as he goes out into the community, and his own fantasies and modes of dealing with his aggressive wishes. It is not surprising, therefore, that many children today are referred to our clinics and casework agencies because of problems with aggression.

### CASE HISTORY: JOHN

These considerations are immediately relevant whenever we set out to study a child who has been referred to the clinic with this complaint. Eight-year-old John, for instance, was brought to the clinic by his 49-year-old mother, who was sorely troubled by her only son's temper tantrums which had developed during the past year. Her husband, a man in his early 60s, and she were both quiet people who preferred a regime of order, good manners, careful selection of companions, and a high standard of performance in school for their son. John had conformed to these demands surprisingly well until he was about seven years old; but as he became more mature, his boyish energies sought outlets in activity, noise, and an interest in sports which his parents could not understand nor accept. His temper tantrums consisted of verbal objections to his parents' restrictions, of tears, stamping of feet, and threats that when he grew up he would leave so that he could do what he wanted. John himself loved and respected his parents and was very much caught up in the conflict between his natural wishes and the demands which his parents put upon him. He had come to express his feelings of pent-up frustration and of anger in the temper tantrums of which the parents complained.

### CASE HISTORY: JIMMY

Jimmy was 5 years old when he was brought to the clinic because of repeated physical assaults on his younger brother and sister and upon his classmates in kindergarten. He was otherwise a charming, lovable, and bright little boy; and his busy, overworked parents found what they regarded as the



viciousness of his behavior very hard to understand. It was quite true that the abruptness and severity of his attacks on other children made them serious affairs. It was obvious also, as we came to know Jimmy, that he suffered a great deal from guilty feelings and was convinced that he was a very bad boy, to whom dreadful things would happen as punishment for his behavior.

When we first saw Jimmy's parents and discussed with them his past history, we learned that he had been born with bone malformation of one leg and had had to spend the first eighteen months of his life in a plaster cast from his waist down. Following the removal of the cast, he went regularly to the hospital for exercises, which were supplemented by a training routine carried out at home according to the doctor's instructions. Shortly after the cast was removed, a baby sister was born and, when Jimmy was 4, a baby brother arrived on the scene.

Although Jimmy was occasionally solicitous of the young brother and sister and made some attempts at helping his mother care for them, both parents were aware that, from the beginning, Jimmy regarded the babies as intruders and was very jealous of the care and attention which his mother and father gave to them. They realized that Jimmy had been very much hampered as a baby by his physical illness and that he was probably not yet ready to give up the infant's role.

When we saw Jimmy by himself, we noted that he ran around a great deal and that he found it extremely difficult to settle for any length of time on one toy or activity. He was imperious in his wishes and found it very hard to tolerate any delay in having them satisfied. He could not understand why he could not go into other rooms and take from the other children in the clinic any toys that caught his fancy. When he was frustrated in any way, he would launch an attack upon the toys and furniture in the playroom. When picked up and held by his doctor, he would suddenly settle down and cry like a much younger child.

It took many months of patient work to help Jimmy build a tolerance for frustration and to find more mature ways of mastering his impatience and the imperiousness of his wishes. However, by the time he reached second grade, his attention span had improved so that he could make good headway in learning to read and write, and he received great satisfaction from these new achievements. Although the parents were quite overburdened with supporting and raising their family, they were able to find a little more time to give Jimmy their exclusive attention and also to set limits for him when his controls were obviously tenuous. Nevertheless, it remained somewhat more difficult for Jimmy than for many children of his age and intelligence to withstand disappointment and to find alternate ways of getting what he wanted.

In our clinical work, we have noted repeatedly that children who have been greatly restricted physically in early infancy find it very difficult to develop as much patience and control of their wishes as most children of their age. Jimmy, however, was fortunate in having affectionate parents who cared a great deal about him and who were able, with assistance from the clinic, to find ways of helping him control himself. This in turn contributed to his own inner discipline.

### CASE HISTORIES: BOBBY AND BILL

Bobby was referred to the clinic when he was 9 years old because of spells of destructive behavior coupled with vicious attacks, apparently unprovoked upon both adults and children. Hi

teacher, who first called the clinic, reported that Bobby seemed to have "a persecution complex," but that he was very bright, read extremely well, and talked learnedly about many topics far advanced for a boy his age. He was greatly preoccupied with atom bombs and told long stories about bombings of cities, describing at great length the destruction and bloodshed.

Bobby was a curious-looking boy. He seemed to ignore any personal approaches but talked readily about his thoughts which were dominated by the conviction that he was surrounded by enemies and that, therefore, in self-defense he had to plan the most horrible retaliatory schemes to punish all the bad people who were angry with him and wished his death. The parents, both of whom were quiet, suspicious, and anxious, gave a guarded story of Bobby's development which minimized the seriousness of his mental symptoms. They attributed his aggressive outbursts to the fact that children did not like him because they envied his great brain power. After some time, we were able to gain the parents' confidence sufficiently so that they could admit their concern about Bobby. Eventually he was placed in a psychiatric treatment residence where he could have a therapeutic milieu twenty-four hours a day.

It is not uncommon for an adolescent boy to be unwillingly referred to a clinic because of aggressive outbursts of several months' duration. Bill, for instance, had matured physically very rapidly and was soon able to tell his doctor about many of the anxieties that his physical growth and sexual feelings engendered. He was very much aware that he had a flimsy control over himself and was frightened of his temper outbursts. It was his private conviction that he was going crazy, an idea which had been reinforced by some angry comments his father would make when Bill "blew up" so quickly over what seemed to his parents "the slightest thing."

Neither of the parents was very tolerant of the boy's adolescent turmoil but, with help from the clinic staff, they were able after a time to give more understanding and support to the boy while setting necessary limits to help reinforce his own tenuous controls. Bill's talks with the doctor about himself, the reassurance he gained in learning that many adolescents have similar feelings and fears, and his rapid identification with his doctor helped stabilize him, so that after a few months the aggressive outbursts diminished in both intensity and frequency.

These vignettes illustrate the fact that "a problem with aggression," which usually indicates some interference in the child's adaptation, may have very different meanings. In this connection, it should also be noted that children's difficulties in controlling their aggression may also lead to marked inhibition of activity, with fears of striving, passivity, learning blocks, or "overgoodness." The severity of a child's personality disorder in which "overaggressiveness" plays a part will determine the clinic's approach to the child and his family and influence both the techniques and the goals of management.

## HOME BACKGROUND OF DELINQUENT CHILDREN

There is one group of children of grade school and adolescent age who are often referred to clinics because of such behavior as assaults upon the person or possessions of others, firesetting, truancy, all the usual pattern of juvenile delinquent behavior. The life history of such boys, and indeed the history of their dissocial behavior, vary from instance to instance. In some cases, the history given by the parents indicates that the child was able to get along fairly well until some specific traumatic



event or series of events led him to react with anger, frustration, and loss of controls.

Careful recording of their history and collection of collateral information will often reveal that these children had long been unmanageable at home, in school, and in the neighborhood. They may even be well known to the police who have preferred no formal charges because of their youth. They may be bright but rarely have they performed well in school and often have marked learning blocks. They tend to be hostile, resentful, overactive individuals, often extremely skilled in their performance of antisocial acts, confident that all people lie, steal, and cheat whenever it is to their advantage. They may never have learned how to delay or otherwise manage their instinctual wishes except by doing, taking, or saying what they wished. They have a short attention span and find it hard to tolerate frustration of any kind. The parents usually report that they were difficult babies in relation to feeding, sleeping, and toilet training. They were never successfully disciplined; the parents usually tell of many punitive attempts to curb the child's behavior.

Over the past decades, many studies of such children have demonstrated the frequency of a history of broken homes, of criminal or psychotic parents, frequent separations of the child from the parents, particularly the mother, of illegitimate birth, and of considerable social and economic stress of all types. When such severe disruption has occurred in the early critical years of a child's life, the child's capacities for forming affectionate relationships, for controlling his instinctual wishes and for "reality testing" are apt to be slight and the therapeutic task presented is concomitantly a very difficult one. These children's life experiences have been so unrewarding and their primitive feelings and fantasies so little transformed and sublimated that they view the outside world as a hostile place, other people as their enemies, and themselves in the position of having to strike out before they are struck down. Although these children may come regularly to a clinic, they subject their therapists to a long and ingenious period of testing, seeking to prove by endless maneuvering that the therapist too lies, steals, or cheats when it is to his advantage to do so. They are extremely restless children and find it difficult to remain within the confines of the clinic walls.

Not all children who exhibit persistent antisocial behavior during the grade-school years come from these typical predelinquent homes. A certain number of antisocial young children are brought up in relatively intact homes where the parents are self-supporting, raise their children themselves, do not live with other relatives, and have not been separated from the children for any significant period of time. In such situations, more subtle factors must be sought to explain the limited instinctual controls and the persistent impulsive "acting-out" to which such children are prone.

Recently, in our clinic, we have begun to look more carefully at the intricacies of familial attitudes in such cases and to investigate how these children have been brought up, particularly in relation to gratification and controls. The earlier scientific contributors to the problems of delinquency pointed out the many defects in the family life of most delinquent children, so much so that it has become commonplace to assume that we have come to an understanding of the origins and perpetuation of the antisocial problem when we have elicited the familiar picture of the broken home, the frequent placements, and so forth. It is often forgotten that not all children

from such homes necessarily become delinquent, and that therefore there must be some specific influences or special circumstances which encourage that kind of adaptation in a particular child. The concentration on the child who does not come from the familiar pathological background permits us to focus on more subtle factors that may be involved in the perpetuation of the antisocial pattern. Investigation of the less disorganized families may throw some light on the means whereby the deficiencies in family life in the highly pathological setting promote and encourage the persistent impulsive "acting-out" of the young delinquent child.

*Parents' role*

There are probably many reasons for our knowing relatively little about the more minute, interpersonal transactions in the family with an antisocial child. Such parents are very reluctant to visit a clinic or casework agency. They will refer their child only if forced to do so by considerable community pressure. Once in the clinic, the parents are apt to make clear rather quickly their disinclination to use the kind of help psychotherapy or casework offers. Very few will consent to come for regular weekly interviews and, if they do, there is discouragingly little change in the parents' attitudes or ways of handling the child. Many of these families are in a state of chronic crisis, so that a great deal of the interview time is taken up with the immediate stress which the therapist is expected to help relieve.

It has been our experience that if a skillful and knowledgeable therapist works patiently over a period of many months with a young delinquent child, he will usually be able to establish a relationship with that child and make some headway in working with him on his many problems. However, if the parents are unable to support the change in the child, we are limited in what we can do to help him. We have the impression that the emotional climate of such homes does little to facilitate a child's growth or to provide an educational milieu in which he can gradually learn to control his wishes, delay his demands for gratification, and find more socially acceptable ways of satisfying his needs.

In some instances, there are rather clear indications that both parents get a strong, vicarious gratification from their children's rebellious and antisocial behavior. Many of these fathers make clear that they regard any kind of aggressive activity as desirable masculine self-assertion, not to be curbed in any way. They are apt to see the boy's difficulties as due to the mother's pressure and to assert that they can manage the boy with no trouble. In some instances, investigation may reveal that the father took very little regular responsibility for the child, or is quite passive and indulgent with him when he does associate with the boy, or is inconsistently punitive with the youngster. In others, it appears that the two males have a hostile alliance against the woman and that home life is a constant series of running battles. Although the mothers may have many emotional problems, they are apt to be the more adequate and responsible of the two parents. At the time they come to a clinic, however, they appear to be functioning less maturely than they did earlier in their lives and to have available fewer personal resources with which to meet their family problems.

## PREVENTING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

Since World War II, the increasing national concern about juvenile delinquency has brought a flood of opinions and recommendations in the press and forums. Many lay and professional statements blame the parents for the



delinquency of children and include a prescription which insists that the parents be made to take corrective action. It is, however, one thing to recognize that the origins and perpetuation of antisocial behavior probably lie within the child's early life with his family and another to assert that the solution for the problem is to demand that the parents change their ways and correct the child's behavior immediately. In the first place, since it is rare that the parents will do so, this demand does not provide a pragmatic solution to our problem. More important is the fact that the more we learn about these parents and their family life, the more we become aware that they are handicapped by basic attitudes that grew out of their own adaptation to life experiences and that they cannot change overnight at the behest of society. In most instances, a strengthening of family life and the creation of a more healthy emotional milieu for the young antisocial child cannot be attained without help from outside agencies and institutions.

The problem for casework and psychiatric agencies, which are often expected to give precisely this assistance, is that their traditional ways of helping people toward change are not acceptable or congenial to these families. A basic assumption of psychotherapy and casework is that an individual is willing and able to take responsibility to try to find out what the trouble is, to think about it, to try to change not only his actions but his attitudes. This approach, we find as we know these families better, is a devalued and intolerable mode of solving the problem to most of these people. As a group, therefore, they are to be found in such agency categories as "the hard to reach" or "the resistant" family.

It becomes increasingly clear that we clinical workers need to acquire far more scientific information about these families so that we can modify our clinical approaches to them. Then we may be able to offer help which they can use. The New York City Youth Board has encouraged an approach to families who will not come into agencies for help which they describe as "reaching the unreached." Psychiatric clinics and casework agencies in other communities are examining their clinical methods to see how their staff members can find ways of reaching such persons. We must remember that the professions of psychiatry and social casework are relatively young. Accordingly, when our traditional methods are not effective, we need not assume that a certain group of people cannot be helped by us. Rather, the logical conclusion is that clinical investigation is in order so that we can devise effective methods to deal with them. This is the challenge which the antisocial children and their families present to the clinical professions, a challenge which is being met today by both formal and informal research. Hopefully, these studies will put at our disposal data which will allow us to develop new or modified helping techniques.

We cannot emphasize too strongly the crucial importance of clinical research in the area of juvenile delinquency. There is a dismaying contrast between the resources made available for programs of delinquency prevention and those devoted to projects seeking a more basic understanding of the origins and perpetuation of antisocial behavior. The Witmer and Tufts pamphlet on the effectiveness of delinquency prevention measures, published by the United States Children's Bureau in 1954, illustrates how little we know about the effectiveness of the many preventive programs carried on for years by reputable organizations. The authors point out the difficulties in evaluating programs for prevention when there are

gross gaps in our scientific understanding of the whole area of delinquency and crime.

### THE COMMUNITY'S RESPONSIBILITY

The community at large, for its part, has an important responsibility to examine its collective attitudes and actions and to see how it can offer consistent support to all of our programs for curbing antisocial behavior. As long as our society does not present a united front concerning delinquency, our efforts to meet this great social and psychological problem will be severely handicapped. When a school teacher, probation officer, or neighbor alternates between condoning the dissocial acts of a young child as mischievous boyish pranks and demanding a punitive, authoritarian approach to him, our preventive and treatment programs suffer. Repeatedly we have found that the parents of antisocial children will seek help for the child only when community pressure persistently demands that they take this step.

The earlier comments in this paper about the nature of aggression and the many inconsistencies in our attitudes toward it have great pertinence to this question. We as adults and as members of community groups that carry the demands of our culture must make up our minds what we consider acceptable for children of varying ages, what we can tolerate, and what we cannot. We must adopt a kind but firm attitude toward the unacceptable and give consistent support to the community institutions that are charged with maintaining society's demands. We must recognize that crushing suppression of antisocial behavior under the law of the talion is not effective in combating delinquency and crime.

On the other hand, the failure to recognize the consequences of antisocial behavior for the youthful individual and for society and indulgence with and condoning of his dissocial acts will not be effective either. We have learned from our psychiatric experience that children need to find in their home environment both warm affection and control. There is evidence that the individual adapting to his society also requires a combination of kindly understanding and firmness from his fellow citizens. The clinical professions have a large and challenging task ahead of them in helping antisocial children and their families more effectively. Our society has an even more crucial task in providing a consistent background for the efforts of those who are dealing with individual delinquents. We must face the unpleasant reality that a society that condones income-tax evasion and political graft and admires the one who "gets away with it" is far from creating the atmosphere of respect for individual needs and for authority that is vital for the prevention and control of delinquency in the young.

# The Chicago Area Project—A 25-Year Assessment

By SOLOMON KOBRIN

ABSTRACT: The Area Project program is based on studies of the epidemiology of delinquency and of the social experience of children growing up in city neighborhoods with high rates of delinquents. Preventive effort is concentrated in such delinquency areas. The structure of the local society is regarded as deficient in its ability to reduce the normal alienation of the male adolescent and to restore and maintain adult controls. In most instances delinquency in this situation is viewed as a product of social learning. Procedures of the Area Project are based on the assumption that young people are responsive principally to the expectations of their intimate groups: family, peers, and neighbors. The major activity of the Area Project program is the development of youth welfare organizations among residents of delinquency areas and, within the structure of these groupings, direct work with predelinquent and delinquent individuals and groups. Neighborhood groups are encouraged to employ qualified local residents to carry on the work. Variation in the procedures in the organization of local groups and in the content of their programs reflects variety in patterns of integration of local social institutions. Area Project experience indicates that residents of delinquency areas are capable of action in relation to youth welfare problems. Such action has probably reduced delinquency in the program areas.

*Solomon Kobrin, Chicago, Illinois, has been a supervising sociologist on the staff of the Illinois Institute for Juvenile Research and the Chicago Area Project for the past eighteen years. In this capacity his assignments have included neighborhood organization, community surveys, and studies of juvenile delinquency and adult crime. In the period 1951–53 he was Project Director of an exhaustive examination of the problem of drug addiction among young persons in Chicago sponsored by the National Institute for Mental Health. He has taught sociology at Roosevelt University and the Illinois Masonic Hospital of Nursing Education and has contributed articles to professional journals.*

THE Chicago Area Project shares with other delinquency prevention programs the difficulty of measuring its success in a simple and direct manner. At bottom this difficulty rests on the fact that such programs, as efforts to intervene in the life of a person, a group, or a community, cannot by their very nature constitute more than a subsidiary element in changing the fundamental and sweeping forces which create the problems of groups and of persons or which shape human personality. Declines in rates of delinquents—the only conclusive way to evaluate a delinquency prevention—may reflect influences unconnected with those of organized programs and are difficult to define and measure.[1]

For two reasons the simple and satisfying laboratory model of the controlled experiment is difficult to achieve in measuring the effects of a program. First, it is virtually impossible to find groups which are identical in all major respects save that of participation in a given program. Second, there exists a widespread and understandable reluctance to deny to systematically selected segments of homogeneous groups the putative benefits of programs, a procedure which does produce an approximation to a control group.[2]

The present assessment of the Chicago Area Project will have to rest, therefore, on an appraisal of its experience in carrying out procedures assumed by its founders and supporters to be relevant to the reduction of delinquency. To this end, the theory of delinquency causation underlying the Area Project program will be presented. This will be followed by a description of the procedures regarded as essential to the modification of conditions which produce delinquency. Finally, the adaptations and modifications of these procedures will be described and evaluated.

## Conception of the Delinquency Problem

A distinctive feature of the Area Project program is that at its inception it attempted explicitly to relate its procedures in a logical manner to sociological postulates and to the findings of sociological research in delinquency. Under the leadership of the late Clifford R. Shaw, founder of the Area Project and its director during virtually all of its existence, a series of studies completed between 1929 and 1933 brought to the investigation of this problem two heretofore neglected viewpoints: the ecological and the socio-psychological. The first was concerned with the epidemiology of delinquency in the large city; the second with the social experience of the delinquent boy in the setting of his family, his play group, and his neighborhood.[3]

[1] For example, rates of delinquents among nationality groups whose children at one time figured prominently in juvenile court statistics declined as these groups improved their economic and social position and moved out of neighborhoods of high rates of delinquents. See Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), pp. 151–57.

[2] See Edwin Powers and Helen Witmer, *An Experiment in the Prevention of Delinquency* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), as a distinguished and solitary example of one program which, in the interest of advancing knowledge, denied hypothesized benefits of a program to a control group.

[3] Studies in the first category include Clifford R. Shaw and others, *Delinquency Areas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929); certain sections of Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, *Social Factors in Juvenile Delinquency* (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1931); and a final volume in which the geographic distribution of rates of delinquents in a number of American cities was analyzed in great detail, Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas*. While the last volume was published a decade after the earlier ones much of its data were available to the authors at the time of the founding of the Area Project. Studies of the social experience of delinquent boys include Clifford R. Shaw, *The Jack-roller* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930); Clifford R. Shaw, *The Natural History of a Delinquent Career* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931); and Clifford R. Shaw, Henry D. McKay, and James F. McDonald, *Brothers in Crime* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).



With respect to the first problem, it was found that certain areas of the large city produced a disproportionately large number of the delinquents. The high rate areas were characterized as "delinquency areas" and subsequently an effort was made to define their major social features. In the American city of the period, the populations of these communities were made up of predominantly recent migrants from the rural areas of the Old World. As a group they occupied the least desirable status in the economic, political, and social hierarchies of the metropolitan society and in many ways showed an acute awareness of their position. Their efforts to adapt their social institutions to the urban industrial order were at the most only partly successful. The generation of immigrants, in their colonies in the decaying heart of the city, adapted with moderate success only those institutions which preserved customary forms of religious practice, mutual aid, and sociability.

However, the immigrant generation was notably unable to preserve the authority of the old institutions, including the family, in the eyes of the rising generation and was quickly confronted with a problem of conflict with their children. Disruption of cross-generational control produced the conditions for the emergence of a variant species of youth subculture in these communities marked by a tradition of sophisticated delinquency. At the same time this tradition was sustained and fostered by the anonymity of much of the population of slum areas, by the presence of a young adult element which engaged in crime both as an occupation and a way of life, and by the extraordinary harshness of the competitive struggle which arises when the controls of social usage decay. The distribution of official delinquents pointed firmly to the conclusion that the high-rate areas constituted the locus of the city's delinquency problem, both as to number of delinquents and seriousness of offenses.

## The Delinquent as a Person

With respect to the second problem, these investigations suggested that, given the conditions of social life in the delinquency areas, delinquency in most cases was the product of the simple and direct processes of social learning. Where growing boys are alienated from the institutions of their parents and are confronted with a vital tradition of delinquency among their peers, they engage in delinquent activity as part of their groping for a place in the only social groups available to them. From investigations of the type reported in *The Jack-roller, Natural History of a Delinquent Career,* and *Brothers in Crime,* the conclusion was drawn that with significant frequency, delinquency in the slum areas of our cities reflects the strivings of boys in a social rather than an antisocial direction. These studies focused attention on the paradoxical fact that no matter how destructive or morally shocking, delinquency may often represent the efforts of the person to find and vindicate his status as a human being, rather than an abdication of his humanity or an intrinsic incapacity to experience human sentiment.

This view formed something of a contrast to notions of human nature and delinquency which were, and still are, somewhat more widely accepted. These beliefs, which generally represent delin-

quent conduct as a manifestation of pathology or malfunction of personality, rest implicitly on an image of man as quick to lose his distinctively human capacities under adverse conditions. The image implied in the Area Project conception of the delinquency problem is that man tends always to organize his behavior in the service of his human identity. To what extent this view is supported by the research of Shaw and his associates, and to what extent the research proceeded from this view is, of course, a difficult question to answer. The fact remains, however, that from the beginning the Area Project program rested on a conception of human nature which was optimistic concerning the prevention of delinquency and the rehabilitation of the delinquent. Delinquency was regarded as, for the most part, a reversible accident of the person's social experience.

Thus, the theory on which the Area Project program is based is that, taken in its most general aspect, delinquency as a problem in the modern metropolis is principally a product of the breakdown of the machinery of spontaneous social control. The breakdown is precipitated by the cataclysmic pace of social change to which migrants from a peasant or rural background are subjected when they enter the city. In its more specific aspects, delinquency was seen as adaptive behavior on the part of the male children of rural migrants acting as members of adolescent peer groups in their efforts to find their way to meaningful and respected adult roles essentially unaided by the older generation and under the influence of criminal models for whom the inner city areas furnish a haven.

## Socialization and Community Action

Research in the problem of delinquency formed one of two major sources of suggestion for the Area Project program. The second was furnished by what may best be regarded as a set of sociological postulates concerning, first, the processes by which persons come under the influence and control of social groups and take over their values; and, second, those affecting communal or collective action in the solution of social problems.

It is a commonplace of sociological observation that the source of control of conduct for the person lies in his natural social world. The rules and values having validity for the person are those which affect his daily nurturance, his place in primary groups, and his self-development. He is responsive as a person within the web of relationships in which his daily existence as a human being is embedded.

The inference seemed unavoidable, therefore, that to succeed delinquency prevention activities must somehow first become activities of the adults constituting the natural social world of the youngster. Or, put another way, a delinquency prevention program could hardly hope to be effective unless and until the aims of such a program became the aims of the local populations. Thus, an indispensable preliminary task of delinquency prevention is to discover effective methods of inducing residents of the disadvantaged city areas to take up the cause of prevention in a serious manner. The disposition of the founders of the Area Project was to regard this element of the program as so indispensable that if these populations proved unable to act in relation to the problem, the prevention of delinquency was a lost cause.

A second postulation concerned the problem of developing collective action toward delinquency. Here another commonplace of sociological observation suggested that people support and participate only in those enterprises in which they have a meaningful role. The organized activity of people everywhere flows in the channels of institutions and organizations indigenous to their cultural traditions and to the system of social relationships which defines their social groups. Consequently one could not expect people to devote their energies to enterprises which form part of the social systems of groups in which they have no membership. The relevance of this observation is that there had always existed an expectation that people residing in the high delinquency rate areas could somehow be induced to support the welfare agencies established there. A basic assumption of the Area Project program was that under prevailing conditions it was illusory to expect this to happen.

Thus, in view of the primacy of the local social life in the socialization and control of the young person, all effort, it was felt, should be devoted to helping residents of high delinquency rate areas to take constructive action toward the problem. The interest of the wider society in winning the rising generation of these communities to orderliness and conformity had first to become a vital interest of the local society.

## Organization of the Delinquency Area

A final assumption necessary to the rationale of the Area Project program had to do with the social and institutional organization of the high delinquency rate neighborhood and with the related issue of the capacity of residents of these areas to organize and administer local welfare programs. It was observed that despite the real disorder and confusion of the delinquency area, there existed a core of organized communal life centering mainly in religious, economic, and political activity. Because the function of the slum area is to house the flow of impoverished newcomers and to furnish a haven of residence for the multitudes who, for various reasons, live at the edge of respectability, the nucleus of institutional order actually present is sometimes difficult to discern. There seemed further to be strong evidence that the residents most active in these local institutions were, in terms of interest, motivation, and capacity, on their way up the social class ladder. With respect to these elements of the population it was assumed, therefore, that they represented forces of considerable strength for initiating delinquency prevention activities.[4] There being no evidence of a deficiency of intelligence among them, it was taken for granted that with proper guidance and encouragement they could learn how to organize and administer local welfare programs.

In summary it may be said, then, that the Area Project program regards as indispensable to the success of welfare activity in general and delinquency prevention in particular the participation of those who form a significant part of the social world of the recipients of help. This is seen not as a prescription or a panacea, but as a condition for progress in finding a solution. The program has remained experimental in the sense that it has continued to explore the question: What kind of participation is necessary on the part of which kinds of persons in terms of social role in the local society? But it has rested firmly and consistently on the conviction that no solution of a basic and lasting character is possible in the absence of such participation.

[4] It should be observed in passing that some of the economic and political leadership of these communities did not always fit phillistine specifications of respectability, and that on this score the Area Project program came under criticism during its early days.

### PROCEDURES IN NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATION

It follows that the basic procedure in the program is the development of local welfare organization among residents of high delinquency rate neighborhoods. This undertaking called for skill in the organizer in identifying the residents holding key positions of influence and the ability to arouse their interest in youth welfare activities. The first phase requires a knowledge of the local society; the second a capacity for sympathetic identification with the local resident. Knowledge of the local society implies familiarity with its culture and history, in the case of ethnic groups; with the local institutions; with the structure of power through which decisions are made and executed; and with the conflicts and cleavages which orient and align the population.

Initial organization in several of Chicago's delinquency areas was undertaken by sociologists employed jointly by the Behavior Research Fund, now dissolved, the Chicago Area Project, and the Illinois Institute for Juvenile Research. The Institute, an agency of state government, until recently has furnished a major share of the salaries of the staff engaged in this program.[5]

It became quickly evident, however, that, for cogent reasons, the employment of qualified local residents offered advantages in the establishment of such programs. In the first place the indigenous worker usually possessed a *natural* knowledge of the local society. Second, he was hampered by none of the barriers to communications with residents for whom the nonresident, especially those identified with "welfare" enterprise, tended to be an object of suspicion and hostility. Third, his employment was a demonstration of sincere confidence in the capacity of the area resident for work of this sort. Fourth, he was more likely than the nonresident to have access to the neighborhood's delinquent boys and therefore to be more effective in redirecting their conduct. Fifth, his employment represented a prime means of initiating the education of the local population in the mysteries of conducting the welfare enterprise. Hence, virtually from the first, one of the most distinctive features of Area Project procedure was the employment, in appropriate categories and under the tutelage of staff sociologists of the Institute, of local residents to aid in the organization of the approximately dozen community or civic "committees" which were established in Chicago over the course of two decades.[6]

A second major procedural feature of the Area Project program is represented by efforts to preserve the independence of the neighborhood groups after they become established as functioning units. This turned out to be mainly an exercise in self restraint, for the easier and in many ways more natural course would have been to maintain a close supervision and control of their activities. However, since it was the aim of the program to foster the development of knowledge and competence in the conduct of youth welfare activities and to encourage among residents of delinquency areas confidence in their own capacities to act with respect to their problems, the policy was followed of insisting upon a formal, structural autonomy of the organization. The problem in this connection was to maintain full support and help without rendering the independence of the group an empty formality.

[5] A recent reorganization of these services shifted much of this staff to the administrative jurisdiction of the Illinois Youth Commission.

[6] Sharp question has been raised by leaders of the social work profession regarding the competence of such persons, whose qualifications rested on assets of character and personal trait rather than on formal training and education. Leaders of the Area Project have always encouraged talented workers in this field to obtain as much training in the group work and social work fields as they could. However, they have regarded the talent for this work as the primary value.



### MAINTAINING AUTONOMY

Three devices were found to be useful in dealing with this problem. First, neighborhood groups either exercised the power of veto in the assignment of Area Project staff to function as their executives; or, more frequently, nominated a qualified local resident as their executive who was then employed as an Area Project staff member. Second, staff members were required to function as representatives and spokesmen of the local groups rather than as representatives of the Area Project central office or of the Sociology Department of the Institute for Juvenile Research. This served to foster an identification of the worker with the point of view and the needs of the local group. Third, policy decisions of neighborhood groups which appeared to Area Project staff to be unsound were nonetheless accepted and acted upon by them. Since staff members exercised much informal influence with the groups to which they were assigned, this problem arose infrequently. However, when it did arise, the autonomy of the neighborhood group was scrupulously respected.

These, then, are the procedural principles of the Area Project program: development of youth welfare organizations among residents of delinquency areas; employment of so-called indigenous workers wherever possible; and the fostering and preservation of the independence of these groups.

### TYPES OF NEIGHBORHOOD GROUPS

Before moving to an evaluation of the Area Project as a delinquency prevention program, some indication ought to be made of the specific activities and forms of organization found among these neighborhood groups. The founders of the Area Project were always mindful of variety in the forms of social life and of the necessity, therefore, of adapting the approach to problems of organization as well as the content of program to conditions existing in each work location. In consequence each neighborhood organization within the Area Project differs somewhat from the others in both these respects.

Generally these differences are related to the patterns of social organization existing in their areas of operation and to the degree of unity and co-ordination among local institutions. On this axis, delinquency areas may be classified as structured and stable, structured but unstable, and unstructured and unstable.[7]

In the structured and stable communities, Area Project neighborhood organizations reflect a direct expansion in interests and functions of established neighborhood institutions. In some cases in this category, the dominant local church sponsors the organization, encouraging influential lay leaders to assume responsibility in the development of its program. However, there are few urban neighborhoods in which a single institution exercises complete dominance of the life of the residents. The more usual case in this class is represented by the local organization in which a number of important neighborhood institutions participate. These may include one or more churches, local political bodies, businessmen's groups, and lodges and fraternal groups. However, the representation is always in-

[7] These terms are relative. From the vantage point of an orderly and integrated middle-class residential community the structured and stable delinquency area might appear to be both excessively disorderly in terms of delinquency, crime, and other social problems and excessively controlled and dominated by religious or political organizations.

formal, and membership belongs to participating persons as individuals. This informal mode of representation has come to be preferred, probably because it permits the inclusion of important groups which are not formally constituted. Such, for example, are extended kinship groups, friendship cliques, and aggregations of persons temporarily unified around specific problems or issues. In unstructured or unstable communities the member usually represents only himself.

### REASONS FOR JOINING GROUPS

Differences of this order among Area Project groups seem also to be accompanied by differences in motivation for participation. Members of all Area Project groups share a responsiveness to slogans of youth welfare. However, members of groups operating in the relatively well-organized neighborhoods tend to find in this activity a means for realizing their aspiration for upward mobility. A related need is served in those communities where the framework of institutional life fails to furnish a satisfactory place for certain age or sex groups. In these situations young adults and women, for example, may find in the Area Project neighborhood organization a means of gaining recognition.

The second major motivation is found most frequently in communities with few or no organizations (unstructured), and in those that have no fixed pattern of integration of the activities of organizations which may exist (unstable). Here the dominant motives for participation in the Area Project group are, first, a simple concern with the tragedies attending youthful law violation; and second, a desire to break down social isolation through organized contact with neighbors. These constitute the motivations most frequently sanctioned in official representations of Area Project doctrine because they are most apt to evoke a positive response to promotional appeals.

### VARIETY IN PROGRAM CONTENT

Area Project neighborhood organizations all include, with varying emphasis and elaboration, three elements in their programs. The first is the sponsorship of a standard kind of recreation program for the children of the neighborhood, including in some instances programs of summer camping of considerable scope. Such recreation programs are likely to have two distinctive features: the use of residents, usually active members of the Area Project group, as volunteers assisting in carrying on the recreation program; and the improvisation of store-front locations or unused space in churches, police stations, and even basements of homes for recreational use.

The second element of the program is represented by campaigns for community improvement. These are usually concerned with such issues as school improvement, sanitation, traffic safety, physical conservation, and law enforcement.

The third element of the program is reflected in the activity directed to the delinquent child, gangs of boys involved in delinquency, and, in some cases, adult offenders returning to the neighborhood from penal institutions. The activity includes helping police and juvenile court personnel develop plans for the supervision of delinquent youngsters; visiting boys committed to training schools and reformatories; working with boys' gangs in the informal settings of the neighborhood; and assisting adult parolees in their problems of returning to the community.

Specific program content in each of the local groups varies in relation to a number of factors. Among these are the facilities available for recreation or camping; the character and intensity of problems of safety, physical maintenance, or law enforcement in the area; and the staff's ability to arouse enthusiasm and effort from the leaders of the local organization in carrying on direct work with delinquents. Some groups are committed to an extensive program of recreation, including the development and operation of summer camps. Others, located in neighborhoods well equipped with such facilities, carry on no recreation work at all.[8] Some have labored strenuously in programs of neighborhood conservation; others have not concerned themselves with such issues. All have been continuously encouraged and helped by state employed Area Project staff to maintain direct work with delinquent children and with street gangs, and with virtually no exception all local groups have done so.



### ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE AREA PROJECT

The achievements of the Area Project may best be assessed in relation to its theory of delinquency causation in the social setting of the high-rate neighborhoods. In this theory, delinquency is regarded as a product of a local milieu (a) in which adult residents do little or nothing in an organized public way to mobilize their resources in behalf of the welfare of the youth of the area; (b) in which the relative isolation of the adolescent male group, common throughout urban society, becomes at its extreme an absolute isolation with a consequent absolute loss of adult control; and (c) in which the formal agencies of correction and reformation fail to enlist the collaboration of persons and groups influential in the local society. Leaders of the Area Project assume that progress in the prevention of delinquency cannot be expected until these three problems are well on their way to solution. Since progress in the solution of these problems comes only slowly, permanent declines in delinquency are not expected even after years of effort.

First among the accomplishments claimed by the Area Project is its demonstration of the feasibility of creating youth welfare organizations among residents of delinquency areas. Even in the most unlikely localities capable persons of good will have responded to the challenge of responsibility and have, with help and guidance, operated neighborhood programs. On the whole these organizations have exhibited vitality and stability and have come to represent centers of local opinion regarding issues which concern the welfare of the young. Above all, they have justified the assumption made by Clifford Shaw and his associates that persons residing in these localities have the capacity to take hold of such problems and contribute to their solution.

The Area Project has made an equally distinctive contribution respecting the problem of the isolation of the male adolescent in the delinquency area. From the beginning it called attention to the fact that the recreational and character-building agencies in these areas were unable, through their established programs, to modify the conduct of boys caught up in gang delinquency. In all probability the Area Project was the first organized program in the United States to use workers to establish direct and personal contact with the "unreached" boys to help them find their way back to acceptable norms of conduct. The adoption of this pattern in many cities during recent years may be regarded as in part, at least, a contribution of the Area Project to the development of working methods in the de-

[8] Contrary to popular impression those of our big city neighborhoods which have been centers of social problems, including delinquency, for many decades sometimes acquire more than a just share of recreational facilities. This has resulted, quite simply, from their long-time status as objects of society's solicitude and philanthropy.

linquency prevention field. At the same time, it should be indicated that from the viewpoint of Area Project assumptions and procedures such work, to be effective, must be carried on as an integral part of a more general program sponsored by residents of the locality.

Finally, the Area Project has pioneered in exploring the problem of tempering the impersonality of the machinery which an urban society erects to control and correct the wayward child. Leaders of the Area Project have tended to regard the procedures of juvenile courts, school systems, police departments, probation and parole systems, training schools, and reformatories as inescapably bureaucratic. That is, the procedures of these organizations tend to become set ways of dealing with persons as members of categories. While it is both rational and efficient as a way of processing human problems, of doing something about and hence disposing of cases, this mode of operating results in serious loss of control of the conduct of the young person. The young person in particular is regarded as responsive mainly to the expectations of his primary groups. Thus, to enhance the effectiveness of the corrective agencies of society, it is necessary to enlist the disciplining power of such groups. This is a difficult and complex undertaking, since the customary primary groups for the child, namely family and peers, are often, in the disorder of the delinquency area, unable or undisposed to exercise the needed discipline.

However, it has been found that in no area is the disorder so unmitigated as to be devoid of persons, whether residents or staff employees of the local organization or both, who staunchly represent the values of conformity, many of whom have or can gain the trust of the wayward. Such relationships capture the essential element of the primary group. The Area Project effort has been to discover an effective pattern through which the good offices of these persons may be used by teachers, police, social workers, and court officials to formulate and execute for the supervision of delinquent children jointly conceived plans designed to meet the specific problems and needs of the person. In this exploration the Area Project has found that there are natural primary relationships with delinquents which may be used effectively for delinquency prevention and that they are best utilized in collaboration with the agencies having formal responsibility for the welfare of the children and the protection of the community.

## CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

In all probability these achievements have reduced delinquency in the program areas, as any substantial improvement in the social climate of a community must. However, the extent of the reduction is not subject to precise measurement. The effects of improvement in the environment of children are diffuse, cumulative, and intertwined with trends and forces which have their origin outside of programs of this character. In the final analysis, therefore, the Area Project program must rest its case on logical and analytic grounds.

No assessment of this program can be complete without defining its historically unique character. The genius of its founder, Clifford Shaw, lay in his sharp perception of delinquency as human behavior and in his sense of the naturalness or inevitability of violative activity in the youngster who, whether singly or in groups, is neglected, despised, or ignored as a person. This is the spirit which has animated the Area Project program and which has made it distinctive among delinquency prevention programs. This image of the delinquent and this notion of the delinquency-making process have led to the program's insistence on centering the operation within the milieu directly productive of delinquency, upon drawing into the operation as many as possible of the persons involved in the basic socializing experiences of youngsters, and upon dealing with delinquents or incipient delinquents as persons worthy of consideration and respect.

Not uncommonly, programs of prevention, whatever their initial intention or resolve, understandably tend to move away from direct contact with the delinquent and his milieu. Distance is achieved by interposing institutional forms between workers and delinquents, as in programs of formal and official treatment, or by dealing with the delinquent as a person arbitrarily abstracted from his social environment, as in programs based on individual therapy. This kind of evolution is comprehensible in the former type of retreat because the delinquent arouses anger and resentment in the law-abiding person, who consequently is hard put to form a sympathetic identification with him. Retreat from the milieu of the delinquent is even more understandable, for nothing would seem more unrewarding than to attempt to put aright the social disorder of the delinquency area.

It may well be that in perspective the Area Project's distinctive contribution to delinquency prevention as a field of practice and technique will be seen in its development of a method designed to keep preventional work focused upon its proper object, the delinquent as a person in his milieu. Central to this method is not only a view of the problem which stubbornly refuses to uncouple the delinquent from the social world which has created him, but a set of procedures which have demonstrated a capacity to draw into the preventional process itself the inhabitants of this world.

# Co-ordination of Services as a Means of Delinquency Prevention

By Gisela Konopka

Abstract: The South Central Youth Project was based on the assumption that juvenile delinquency is part of the child-rearing problem of the whole community. Prevention therefore demands co-operation and co-ordination among all the organizations of the community related to youth and aimed at the creation of a healthy community climate. Accordingly, this Project did not consist in the establishment of a new agency but was rather a co-ordinated effort on the part of law-enforcement, health, and welfare agencies and of public schools in an area of high delinquency. The Project focused on detection of the beginning signs of delinquency and on finding concrete means to improve interagency communication and co-operative efforts. On the basis of its experience, the following suggestions for carrying on such work in the future were made: (1) Establish Practitioner Committees from sufficiently small geographic areas to meet regularly to make plans for cases needing concerted community effort. (2) Increase the flexibility of established agency structures and functions. (3) Realize the importance and difficulty of the "aggressive case work" and "street-corner group work" approaches and train selected practitioners for this task. (4) Increase the use of community education; co-ordinate the work of all agencies to change community culture. (5) Strengthen community efforts capable of early detection and attention to juvenile problems as for instance the services of school social workers and youth agencies using qualified professional personnel.

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*Gisela Konopka, D.S.W., Minneapolis, Minnesota, is Professor of Social Work at the University of Minnesota. She is a member of the Governor's Advisory Committee on Youth and has served on several national committees concerned with juvenile delinquency. In the summers of 1950, 1951, and 1956, she served as Child Welfare Consultant in Germany under the auspices of the United States State Department. Dr. Konopka is author of Therapeutic Group Work with Children (1949), Group Work in the Institution (1954), Eduard C. Lindeman and Social Work Philosophy (1958) and author and co-author of other books and various articles in professional journals.*





Those of us who live in Chicago are obliged to confess that last year there were arrested and brought into court fifteen thousand young people, under the age of twenty, who had failed even the common law of the land. Most of these young people had broken the law in their blundering efforts to find adventure. . . . It is said indeed that practically the whole machinery of the grand jury and of the criminal courts is maintained and operated for the benefit of youths between the ages of thirteen and twenty-five.[1]

THESE words were written almost fifty years ago. They show that the problem of juvenile delinquency is not a new one. Why then, will one ask, have we not found a way to combat it and perhaps wipe it out as we have succeeded with physical diseases? Why did we not find a vaccine to prevent it? With the physical and biological sciences as a pattern, much research has been done and "remedies" have been based on the assumption that juvenile delinquency is an entity like a physical disease and therefore *one* solution can be found. According to differing theories—or the tenor of the times—such a solution has been found in environmental manipulation ("good housing is the solution") or in psychological help ("we need more child guidance clinics") or in physical-educational approaches ("better sports, recreation!").

It is coming to be accepted today, however, that delinquency is part of the total problem and effort of child rearing, the hardest and most complicated effort of every society and culture. To prevent or reduce delinquency therefore involves not only individual human organisms or psyches. It also involves adult-child relationships, relationships among adults and of young people with each other, the whole community climate: economic circumstances and human reactions to them; race relations; ethical, religious, and political convictions and practices. A thorough and truly scientific attempt at prevention of juvenile delinquency would require a complete evaluation of all community practices relating to child rearing and youth culture and the establishment of new services based on these findings. Existing communities, however, cannot completely change their institutions. It might be worth while to try to make such a change in the newly created communities that are springing up in this country at a growing rate. Long-established communities are probably limited to a second-best approach.

The Welfare Council of Minneapolis, in establishing the South Central Youth Project, tried this second-best approach. It could not initiate a completely new community culture. It recognized, however, the complexity of the problem of delinquency and refrained from attacking it at just one point. It realized that community institutions, such as school, church, law-enforcing and social agencies, had grown in a certain way. Changes necessary because of increased knowledge or change in the form of delinquency could not be brought about by constantly creating new agencies; instead, the established structures had to be used to and had to be helped to learn new methods and ways of working together. This kind of approach was far less sensational than those that start with new agencies. Because of the ingrained separatism of existing agencies, it needed time and patience. The following account of the Project and its acomplishments is therefore not striking. Yet in retrospect, the Project seems one of the soundest approaches to the community problem of juvenile delinquency.

[1] Jane Addams, *The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1909), pp. 69–70.

### ORGANIZATION OF THE PROJECT

Minneapolis is a fortunate city with a high percentage of home owners; with lakes and parks within the city limits; and with highly developed schools, churches and all-round health, welfare, and youth services. It is also enhanced by the general alertness of conscientious citizens. Nevertheless, as all larger cities, it has its blighted areas and its social problems. One such geographical area was chosen for the South Central Youth Project. The area was chosen on the basis of a survey made by a faculty committee of one of the junior high schools. The survey showed that in the south-central area in 1950–51, 490 cases were referred to school social workers, this being by far the highest number in the city. Out of 1,120 pupils in this area, 10 per cent were placed on probation or committed to institutions during that school year.

The problems of the area were those usually found in such sections of a city: low-income families; broken homes; chronic health problems; much absence from school; a racially mixed population with thwarted movement of the minorities into other areas of the city, partially because of low economic status, but partially because of prejudice; high mobility; and no stable community leadership. Besides the school social workers, a large number of community agencies were active in this area. As in other surveys, it was found that the families of many of the youngsters presenting delinquency problems had received intermittent services from a large number of these health and welfare services over many years.

In 1954, a committee of the Community Welfare Council explored intensely the problems of this area and developed the plan for the Project. It was set up as a two-year experiment that would combine demonstration and research. The Project emphasized co-operation between existing agencies and the use of each agency's staff and the skill inherent in it. It also hoped to experiment with new techniques, if such could be found.

The financing of the Project was in itself an unusual example of joint community effort. The money came from local foundations: the Community Chest, Women's Clubs, the Junior Chamber of Commerce, and a group of women employees in one of the large industries of the city.

The Project was directed by a planning committee. This included executives of a large cross section of public and private social agencies, the chief of the Crime Prevention Bureau, representatives of the public school system, of the health services, several interested laymen active in civic organization, and one state legislator. This Committee met about bimonthly. It appointed a small steering committee, which met frequently and for many hours to attempt to solve the many interagency problems which arose and to evaluate the work being done.

The day-to-day work was done by individual staff members of agencies delegated to work with the Project. The agencies directly involved were: Big Brothers, Big Sisters, a church, three settlement houses, the Crime Prevention Bureau, Family and Children's Service, Department of Court Services, the Welfare Board, the city's public relief agency, and the Visiting Nurse Service. Those were the agencies active in the chosen area.

The staff members met regularly as the Practitioner Committee to discuss co-ordinated planning, work with particular cases and pertinent ways of referral from one to another, and to explore new techniques that might be of help to families in the Project. The Director of the Project, the only additional paid staff member, worked most closely with this Committee. He and the Chairman of the Project participated in all meetings of the Planning, Steering, and Research Committees.



### PROJECT PRACTICE

The kinds of cases the Project handled were those well known to everyone who works with juvenile delinquents: a gang of boys staging a drunken party and assaulting other youths; girls parading in new dresses acquired through shoplifting; a child found constantly truanting and his helpless mother who, fearful of her new environment after a horrible experience in a concentration camp, had made no contact with neighbors and distrusted every "official"; fathers abusing daughters; and so on. The 205 cases handled during the experimental period of the Project covered the range of such problems. It seems unnecessary to present case histories, for they are similar to many reported in other papers.

The techniques used were those of good case work and group work, with increased emphasis on work with the whole family and more "going out" to such families than is usual in conventional social work. There was also thoughtful and sensitive handling of difficult situations on the part of police handling juveniles, a longer than usual period of following up on acute situations, and an especially interesting and comparatively new way of working with parents of juvenile delinquents.

In this latter experiment parents, selected by the Juvenile Court, were invited by settlement house workers to informal group discussions. This approach combined authority and voluntary participation. Parents felt less singled out entering a settlement house than a court house. The experiment was not always successful, but it did succeed in reaching about half of these troubled and suspicious parents. The group-work approach not only proved helpful, it seemed the only one possible with such people.

The most promising aspect of the Project lay in the co-operation it developed among the various agencies and organizations involved. I shall therefore elaborate more on this aspect of the Project.

### PROBLEMS OF WORKING TOGETHER

The deepest insight gained from the Project was the fact that our helping institutions—schools, law-enforcement and social agencies—have at times become so separate and specialized that they stand in the way of a concerted effort to help the child. In a complex society, the major force that helps a child to feel stable and secure and helps him develop a capacity to cope with many demands and decisions is the family. When this natural force does not function adequately, the community must replace or, more frequently, supplement it by other institutions. Many of our social agencies are effective and manage, in spite of usually great staff shortages, to help children and young people with a complicated growing-up process. Yet their efforts are separated, at times duplicated, at times contradictory and, at least for the individual caught in the web, exceedingly confusing and frustrating. For instance, a desperate mother who tries to cope alone with the raising of a large family does not understand the intricacies of our social agencies, which force her to get economic help from one source, discuss problems of her oldest boy in a delinquency institution with another person, be called to the office of a third because of delinquent behavior of her daughter at home, be visited by a neighborhood worker who is concerned with the younger children, and each time be expected to talk, to be friendly, to "relate."

The separation of agencies often prevents true knowledge of a situation. For instance, one case worker in a family agency worked intensely with a marital problem in which the father presented the picture of a weak, fearful man who did not dare present any authority to his children. Only in discussions in the Practitioner Committee meetings was it found that this same father, when he attended a discussion group in a neighborhood house, took aggressive leadership and violently dominated his wife. Both the case worker and the group worker, in trying to help this family, had seen only one part of this man's personality. To help this family effectively, both of the roles the father played had to be understood.

We found that agencies usually worked together only when formal referrals were made, and that those often took far too long to become effective. Agency procedures—case acceptance and assignments—were slow. When the Project speeded up the process of referral, cases could be handled more to the satisfaction of the client and were more frequently productive of trust.

Workers from the various agencies often seemed strange to each other when the Project started and knew little of each other's work. At times there was actual distrust which interfered with working together for the best of the client. The Practitioner Committee meetings, which brought such feelings into the open, began to provide a new climate of feeling among those who served the area. The relationship between the Crime Prevention Bureau and the social agencies was an especially complicated one. It took over a year before this relationship could be discussed openly among the practitioners. They were too "polite" to approach the subject. Meanwhile, delinquencies were not reported to the police because social workers feared indiscreet handling and the loss of trust of their clients. The police on the other hand felt thwarted in doing a good preventive job by not knowing about these minor problems and therefore saw children drift into more serious situations. The face-to-face group created by the Project made it finally possible to speak frankly about these problems. Two full meetings were used to discuss frankly, not only grievances, but the ethics of each professional group and resulted in a better understanding of each other's practices.

## RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PROJECT

By bringing specific cases before the group, the diverse agencies not only pooled their knowledge but also decided on a concerted way of action. This meant more than the usual case conference between different agencies. By placing cases before the whole committee, agencies that usually would not have been involved were found to have frequent and valuable contacts with the youngsters or the family. By common decision, major responsibility was placed on one person, so that the clients were not confronted with too many different people working with them.

Based on this experience, one of the recommendations of the Project was the establishment of Practitioners Committees in sufficiently small geographic areas throughout the city. Such committees should meet regularly and discuss cases needing concerted community effort. Constant working together, it was found, increases mutual confidence and knowledge of each other's resources; it also helps to develop integrated plans of action, sometimes even beyond individual cases.

It was found that this kind of cooperative work presupposes flexibility in the administrative structure of agencies. For instance, on grounds of observations made during the Project period, the public welfare agency decided to assign to each family a case worker who would stay with them even if they moved to another district. This was done because it was found that most problem-ridden families constantly changed social workers and thus lost the trust and help they had gained.



The family agency, to give another example, considered having group meetings for clients on its waiting list and the setting of definite appointment dates because the indefinite "we will call you when we can take you" was found to be too frustrating and was preventing the best use of agency service. A school and a settlement house decided to let a group worker—who at times had the only "in" with angry youngsters—do some informal tutoring outside of the school office and in the settlement house where it was more acceptable to the youngsters. The excited and jubilant cry of a 15-year-old girl who had been truanting for years, "Boy, I got my first B in my life! This is fun!", was reward for this flexible use of agency staff.

This dimension of flexibility is considered one of the most important recommendations growing out of the Project. Surely agencies must keep largely to their own functions and use the specialized skills of their workers. Yet those policies must be "stretchable," if agencies are to work with the complicated phenomenon of delinquency. Sometimes agency workers said, during the period the Project was in operation, "Ordinarily we would not accept this case, but since it is a Project case we will." That means the client got a service he would not get otherwise. This must not be so. Flexibility must be a rule of agency practice.

The Project helped agencies rethink the question of private-public responsibility. Former distinctions (such as that the public agency should provide financial assistance while the private agency gives additional services, or that private agencies should pioneer in new efforts) not only did not hold true in actual practice, they also did not seem helpful in juvenile delinquency cases. For the sake of keeping citizen responsibility alive, a healthy community needs both public and private agencies, but their functions need not be sharply separated and the necessary flexibility can be applied by both.

The Project brought to the fore the importance of the individual as well as the group approach to youngsters, adults, and families. Every agency involved and every professional person needed some knowledge and skill in both techniques. It was obvious that particular agencies justifiably use predominantly one approach: schools and neighborhood houses the group approach; family agencies and public assistance agencies the individual one. Yet each was found to need the other technique at times. This finding pointed again toward the need for flexibility, this time in the use of techniques—especially toward the need for practitioners who have genuine appreciation, skill, and capacity to know which techniques to use.

As in several other attempts to prevent delinquency, the Project found the "reaching-out" technique in case and group work necessary and rewarding. By repeatedly going out and offering service to families who were hostile and distrustful of any helping effort, the practitioners learned that "hard to reach" did not always mean impossible to reach. They acquired much empathy for people who felt caught in a never-ending circle of hopelessness. They also learned much about the realistic limits of social work's knowledge and skill and became less discouraged or defensive when they did not succeed.

It was found that the "reaching-out"

approach calls for specially selected and trained people because it has the danger of leading to an attitude of "I always know better what is good for you." It involves extraordinary knowledge and diagnostic skill to introduce a social service that is not sought. It also asks of the practitioner much insight into his own motives and a true absence of conceit and power drive. This service is surgery in human relations. No one must be allowed to use a knife who too much enjoys the use of it, nor one who, with good will but little knowledge, might cut into the wrong place.

"Reaching out" also asks of the practitioner independent judgment and resourcefulness. A young caseworker, for instance, showed such imagination when she reached one of the distrustful, difficult mothers, not by using the usual interview method, but by letting this woman teach her a foreign language. This kind of case work, as well as its counterpart in group work, calls for retraining, even of the gifted people who want to do and are capable of doing this kind of work.

"Reaching out" should also mean early treatment and attention to incipient delinquency. The Project workers did not hold that social work should be limited to severely disturbed cases. The school social workers and the social group workers, in their contacts with "normal" youth, were recognized as key persons to detect and treat early signs of social disturbance.

The Project, we have said, included many kinds of social agencies and related them to specific cases of juvenile delinquency. It was realized that, beyond this, more community education should be carried on. To achieve a more healthy community climate—indispensable for genuine prevention of juvenile delinquency—more community forces should be involved. Neighborhood churches, for instance, played only a small part in the work done. They, as well as city-wide youth-serving agencies, should become part of the cooperative effort. Intensive work to achieve genuine acceptance of minority racial groups is needed. No indigenous leadership in the area was utilized, but all participants were convinced that it must exist and should have been found and encouraged. The skills of community organization and education were the ones least used and sorely missed by the Project.

## THE IMPACT OF THE PROJECT

Two years are too short to show great success with individual families. The impact of the South Central Youth Project lies in three areas:

A genuine rethinking of social agency practices; an increase in flexibility in each of them and a more active cooperation among them.

A clearer realization of what kinds of staff are needed to work with our most neglected, hurt, least verbal citizens who are prone to delinquency.

A deepening of the understanding that juvenile delinquency is a total community problem of child rearing and therefore calls for an attack on the whole community culture and cannot be solved by segmented institutions or individuals.

How can those lessons be put into practice?

It should be made clear to the public that delinquency is a child-rearing problem. That means it is not the problem of the police or the church or the home alone, but of the whole community and its institutions. A concerted effort at stressing this idea can do much to prevent the eternally repeated attempt at individual delinquency-prevention efforts, made with glamorous promises and then followed by cynical defeat. It can rally moral and financial support to existing agencies and institutions and work toward their improvement. It can raise the feeling of responsibility of the individual citizen.



Social agencies in new communities should not follow the traditional pattern but should be established according to increased knowledge of community problems. In older communities, agencies should be encouraged to work closely in small geographical areas and to increase their flexibility and their cooperation with other organizations.

The relevant professions should recognize that better understanding of delinquency requires the removal of some of the sharp boundaries between them. They should introduce into their training a wider range of skills and understanding in the area of human relations and an ability to use the skills of others. This applies particularly to teachers, social workers, nurses, and the police.

Communities should recognize that, in areas with high rates of delinquency, social services must be highly skilled and that social work can be done only slowly and over a long period of time. This is as costly as work with chronic diseases. If communities could seriously plan for such expenses—and plan sufficiently—the cost, over a period of about fifty years, may decrease. This is a realistic time span which is needed to work on such complex problems. New communities should plan ahead so that problems will not arise to so great an extent.

The public should realize that not all delinquency can be prevented or corrected, just as not all physical diseases can be cured.

Adults should move away from hostility toward the younger generation and accept the eternal responsibility of each older one for the coming one. In Jane Addams' words:

> We may either smother the divine fire of youth or we may feed it. We may either stand stupidly staring as it sinks into a murky fire of crime and flares into the intermittent blaze of folly or we may tend it into a lambent flame with power to make clean and bright our dingy city streets.[2]

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 161, 162.

# A Work Camp Program for Potential Delinquents

By Antoinette Fried

Abstract: Fuld Neighborhood House in Newark, New Jersey, has for the past two summers sponsored a Work Camp Project in an attempt to combat delinquent trends by offering teen-agers both paid work in accordance with their abilities and the guidance and leadership of trained social workers. The experiment has not been an unqualified success, but many good results have been obtained and many valuable lessons learned for future projects. Boys of the particular subculture involved equate success with the art of obtaining the greatest material reward for the least effort possible, an equation clearly indicated by their work habits. Their deep fear of being taken advantage of by society causes them to react violently to anything which they feel to be unfair, but at the same time they are extremely responsive to just treatment and anxious to maintain a close and friendly relationship with the social workers who serve as their leaders. The extension of the Work Camp Project into a year-round program could provide the continued leadership sorely needed by these young people and offer them an incentive to obtain the education and training necessary to enable them to become productive members of society.

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*Antoinette Fried, Ph.D., is Director of Group Work and Recreation at James Weldon Johnson Community Center in New York City. She was Executive Director of Fuld Neighborhood House in Newark, N. J., until the fall of 1958. At Fuld House, Dr. Fried initiated all-summer Country Day Camps for children, the first Street Club Worker Program offered in Newark, and the Work Camp Project for Teenage Boys. She was instrumental in setting up the Tenants' Organization in the Rev. William P. Hayes Homes Housing Project and in organizing services for mentally retarded children.*





It is necessary to state at the outset of this report that it deals with a subculture of American society, namely that of the teen-age youth of large cities where minority groups live in slums, severely blighted areas, or low-rent housing developments. All statements and suggestions in it are based on direct experiences with such youths, made in particular during the periods of the experimental Work Camp Project conducted during the summer months of 1957 and 1958 by the Fuld Neighborhood House, Newark, New Jersey, and carried out in co-operation with the Essex County Park Commission.

The participants in the Work Camp Project were Negro boys, 14 to 17 years old, some lean and long, six feet or more in height, some short and hard-muscled, members of the neighborhood Boxing Gym, competitors for the Golden Gloves. They dressed strictly according to the fashion of the moment—fiery red sweaters, rust-colored suede jackets, striped ivy league shirts. All of them wore hats and all of them smoked and drank. Clothes might be in bad need of repair, hatbands darkened by sweat, and one cigarette might have to be shared with several friends, but the style of living was unanimously maintained.

These external evidences are the surface of a code of behavior shared by those who live in the particular neighborhood and seldom revealed to outsiders. The boys who live by this code are governed by a tremendous desire to prove to a world which they experience as basically hostile that they are ready to accept the challenge. In order to do so, they need the financial means which will enable them to compete with a more fortunate part of society, and to demonstrate through external symbols—clothes, cars, alcohol—that they, too, are on the winning side. Simultaneous with their determination to prove their manliness is evidence of an equally great need for the guidance of adults who can be trusted.

The Work Camp Project was designed to offer the boys the experience of a nonhostile world by providing both leaders who would combine fairness with interest in every individual and an opportunity for the boys to meet their external needs by earning an income through constructive and socially approved work. After two Work Camp summers, the blueprint still seems to hold. The many unforeseen experiences which grew out of it are, however, in need of study and evaluation, a first attempt at which is made in this report.

## Work Camp, 1957

In the spring of 1957, the first Work Camp Project for Teenagers was set up by the Fuld Neighborhood House and the Essex County Park Commission in Newark, New Jersey. The Board of the Park Commission fully understood the experimental value of the Project and its potential meaning. It agreed to provide a location in the Eagle Rock Reservation in West Orange—work which could be performed by boys age 14½ to 17—a foreman to give necessary instruction, hand tools, and a salary of one dollar per hour during six weeks of work, Monday through Friday, seven hours a day. Fuld House was, in turn, responsible for providing a group of fifteen boys, well known to the agency, a professionally trained group worker as leader, and transportation by chartered bus. The boys' obligation was to obtain their working papers and to pay Fuld House fifty cents a day for transportation.

The boys were recruited from a club which had been active in the agency for over a year. It was known that they were unstable, emotionally highly volatile youngsters, most of them with police records for minor delinquencies such as

truancy or loitering, with an occasional assault charge. All were prone to delinquency and most of those over 16 years of age had quit school. Throughout the year, they had responded well to the leadership of a staff member, B.B., who had identified himself patiently and sincerely with their individual and group problems and had, in turn, received confidence and co-operation. Under his leadership they had developed from a rowdy delinquent group to a club which, within the confines of the agency, was able to function in a socially acceptable, satisfactory manner. It was felt that the Work Camp Project would offer a possibility for further development. B.B. left the agency at the end of the spring season with the promise to return in the fall and resume leadership of the group.

It was clear to the staff of the Camp Project that the change in leadership plus the adjustments demanded by work camp life would pose many problems. Even such simple obligations as the provision of working papers and regular payments of bus fare were new experiences for the boys. A large number of "drop-outs," iregular attendance, little accomplishment, and a considerable loss of money were expected by both sponsoring agencies.

These expectations proved largely incorrect. Only three boys dropped out and had to be replaced. Average daily attendance was twelve out of the group of fifteen. No one was ever late for work. After some attempts at cheating, which represented one way in which the boys "tested" the staff, bus fare was paid in full. While none of the boys were able to work a full seven hours, the group delivered a satisfactory job, achieving much more than had been foreseen. Several miles of trail were cleared and widened, underbrush and heavy growth of trees removed, and rain ditches dug. Staff and Park Commission were gratified and the boys were proud of their accomplishments. There was unanimous desire to work under a similar set-up throughout the year.

No one was prepared, however, for the after-effects of the project. When the boys returned after the four weeks of vacation, during which the House was closed, they had exploited to every possible degree the high status gained through the Work Project. They had become neighborhood models as well as neighborhood bullies. Every youngster within a radius of several blocks wanted to join the club and many claimed to have done so. Cocky behavior and minor delinquencies committed by real and by self-appointed members of the club had irritated adults, police, and school officials, and had caused much friction. When Fuld House opened for the fall season, the boys appeared in a body and expected to "take over" the agency. Under the renewed leadership of B.B., the House was going to be exclusively their and their friends' center. So convinced were they of their right to this status that they paid their membership fees without the customary struggle and bickering.

Then, suddenly, the fantasy of owning the agency broke down. B.B. was ill and unable to return. New staff members laid down rules to be respected by all alike, disregarding all claims to special privilege.

The club went wild. In a meeting with the staff, chairs were thrown, obscenities voiced, and the threat made that all new members trying to enter the House would be beaten. Under great protest, the whole club was then expelled from the agency and membership fees returned. The boys were told that they could return as individuals after their parents had been visited by staff members and informed of the breaking-up of the club.

This plan was carried out and eventually all members of the former club returned to the House. The situation was, however, not a happy one. The resentment at having been betrayed and deprived of status never died down. The new staff was unable to compensate for the loss of B.B. and to offer a program which would match the happy excitement of the summer weeks. However, each of the boys maintained a certain measure of loyalty to the House and confidence in individual staff members. A rule not to fight in or near the agency was made by the boys themselves and was obeyed. Help from staff members was still sought when any member of the group found himself in trouble. A process of disintegration had, nevertheless, set in and could not be stopped. The present status of the eighteen boys who participated in the 1957 Project is as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Not in trouble: working or in school (2 of these boys participated in the 1958 Project) | 8 |
| On probation,* employed | 1 |
| On probation,* unemployed, not in school (all of these boys tried to participate in the 1958 Project but failed to meet the requirements) | 6 |
| In jail** | 3 |

After this experience, it was clear to the staff that, in repeating the program, care would have to be taken to look more realistically at the relation between work done and remuneration received; to keep a closer check on the boys' emotional reactions; and to prepare for a follow-up program in the fall which would meet as much as possible the boys' personal needs and expectations.

## WORK CAMP, 1958

Despite its shortcomings, the Work Camp Project had aroused a great deal of positive interest. Throughout the winter, inquiries concerning participation were received from many teenagers, and in the early spring high school guidance personnel started to refer applicants. Since no more than twenty boys could be accommodated, only fifty applications were accepted. The applicants were informed that less than half of them could be enrolled and that the final selection would depend upon the fulfillment of certain requirements, such as attending weekly meetings, several weeks prior to the start of the Camp, to discuss the details of the Project, handing in completed working papers two weeks before Camp, and agreeing to pay bus fare regularly every morning.

Budgetary limitations made it impossible to carry out the recommendation made in 1957 to have one leader for each group of five to seven boys. It was, however, possible to increase leadership as well as the number of participants by having two leaders work with ten boys each. They were M.B., who had conducted the 1957 Project, and Fuld House's Detached Worker, W.R. It was felt that the latter's close contact with the boys would not only benefit the summer program but would also be of help in setting up a program for the fall. R's decision to carry out his usual evening activities in the streets, after the end of the camp day, was, furthermore, considered a stabilizing factor and one which would forestall the development of unrealistic ideas in the youngsters. These assumptions proved to be correct.

Less successful, however, was a major change in program, even though all the boys had agreed to it during the weekly discussions. Since a seven-hour work day had proved too strenuous, it was decided to divide the day into four hours of work and three hours of recreation. The leaders felt that paying a

* Loitering, suspicion of theft, assault.
** Auto theft, assault and battery, morals charge.

full salary for incomplete performance had contributed to the boys' lack of responsibility and dishonest tendencies. It was furthermore hoped that regular periods of recreation and friendly talk would contribute to the youngsters' inner development.

From the first day on, the leaders were told by the boys that the four-hour work day had been accepted only because, in a summer of business recession, jobs for teen-agers were practically unavailable. The recreation part of the program was never liked; it died down in the course of the six weeks. Swimming, the only type of recreation which the boys would have liked, could not be offered. Ball games in the heat of the early afternoon were of little appeal, and a quiet enjoyment of nature did not belong in the boys' sphere of inner life. They liked to rest and talk for an hour or so after lunch and did not mind a game of cards, chess, or checkers on the lawn, but basically they were anxious to do such things in the familiar streets of their lively neighborhood rather than in the isolation of the woods. This experience can be considered as one more piece of evidence that recreation for recreation's sake does not appeal to teenagers. It is enjoyed only as the self-chosen expression of an independent group's interest or temperamental need; it is better liked during the evening hours than in the day, when grown men of stature—whatever this stature may be—are at work.

*Reasons for lack of success*

The not-too-satisfactory work performance of this second summer is less easy to explain. Each one of the boys was physically well able to put in four hours of work in the morning. Nevertheless, they seldom delivered more than two hours of real effort and often had to be coaxed to do that. Part of this slackness can be attributed to the resentment over the curtailed income. A deeper-reaching reason, however, came to the fore when the leaders decided to report on the individual time sheets the exact amount of time put in by each boy. The weekly pay would reflect these reports.

A small revolt broke loose. Three boys threw down their tools and walked off. If one and a-half or two dollars was going to be their pay for "a whole day's work," they would rather not work at all. In discussing the situation with the remaining boys, it was found that almost every one of them knew of some adult who earned as much as $2.50 to $5.00 per hour for construction work and, according to the boys, spent most of his time "just standing around, smoking and talking"—the very behavior these boys exhibited on the job. These statements were made with great emphasis and conviction. They revealed one of the pictures of the successful man that the boys carried within them as a model: the man who is "smart" because he knows how to cheat and because he is able to earn much with little effort. The gambler, the "numbers-man," and the racketeer appeared as hero figures.

A deep-seated fear of being taken advantage of by a society in which one is a "second-class" member accounts for much of this attitude. This fear was shown clearly when, on the first pay day of the season, some technical difficulties arose and the Park Commission had to delay payment for more than a week. It took all the leaders' skill to prevent violent reactions to this announcement. When it then turned out that the Director of Fuld House would be able to meet the emergency by advancing funds sufficient to cover the pay checks, tremendous relief took over. All laughed heartily and only a few wanted to accept the offer. Some preferred to wait for the regular check; others asked merely for enough money to pay their daily bus fare.



Still another episode revealed the fear of unfairness and rejection together with quick awareness and acceptance of just settlement. On several successive days, lunch bags had been rifled. A sandwich, a few cookies, a piece of fruit were missing here and there. No one made an issue of the small disappearances until, one morning, two complete bags containing lunches, towels, and cigarettes were gone. A meeting was called, and the leaders informed the group that since the situation had outgrown the proportion of a joke, one dollar would be deducted from everybody's pay on this particular day. Should the incident recur, each member of the group would be fined a whole day's pay. The announcement elicited the expected uproar:

"An hour's pay?! Why man, that's es-tortion! Es-tortion, man! I'm going to call my lawyer!"

"A whole dollar out of that raggedy pay?"

"Yes, raggedy it is—and with my brother having T.B. and I'll have to buy him a casket. . . ."

"Out of my first pay check, too! I worked for that money, man, you can't take it from me!"

"Twenty dollars—say—that buys a whole week's food!"

"Where does the money go to? You keep it, Mr. B.?"

"Ah no, he don't—it goes to the Neighborhood House."

"Say, Mr. B., you goin' to keep our money?"

Quick side discussions revealed that the group would have little objection to paying the twenty dollars to the Neighborhood House, provided they would receive their checks and make the contributions voluntarily. Gradually the excitement subsided and the ring of true emotion went out of the words. Knives were flipped, somebody started to eat, and there were jokes and laughter although the manner was uneasy. At last, one voice came through:

"Mr. B.—you didn't give us any warning. You didn't do that when my plums were stolen—and his cake. It's only because it was their lunches. . . ."

Tense silence followed. "They" were the two white participants in the Project.

"All right," said B. after a pause. "We had not thought of that, but we'll straighten it out. Everyone who had anything taken from his lunch raise his hand!"

"Man," came a cry, "don't do it, man! He'll take a dollar for everyone who says he's lost something!"

This was exactly what B. had planned to do. After he made this clear and stressed the point that for lack of any clue even the two victims of the purloining were going to be fined, the deduction of pay was quietly accepted. No incident of this kind recurred during the remainder of the summer.

*Need for reassurance*

Invariably, episodes of this kind were followed by efforts on the part of the boys to make sure that they had not lost the leaders' affection. They would gather around B. and R. and tell stories, each one trying to receive attention, and if possible, praise. Space does not permit a full account of these tales, but the following provide a few examples.

Several boys related how they had devoted two years to raising pigeons. They gave a full account of the different species. Eyes sparkling with joy, they imitated voices, gait, and wing movements of the birds, described their coloring, shape of beaks and eyes, eating and mating habits. The perfectly

matched pairs were sold to trainers of homing pigeons. Only, they added, grinning, some of these birds had already been trained—they would return, and could be sold all over.

Another boy told how his severely injured father owed his life to a dog: the faithful animal had "sucked the gan-ge-rine right out of the infected leg." It died of the poison, but the father was saved.

When the dispatching of American troops to Lebanon was announced, talk of war and the army went on throughout the day. United States Marines overseas fired the imagination. Scenes of every war movie ever seen were reenacted in great detail. The movements of men attacking, falling, killing, or dying were realistically acted out, but no side was taken. Whoever was the winner in a good movie scene was the boys' hero, regardless of national or political allegiance. Leadership, prowess, and slyness were all that counted. The only derogatory remarks which, off and on, could be heard were anti-Communistic newspaper phrases. The prevailing sentiment was worship of leaders.

These experiences are related here because they offer insights into the lives of youths governed by emotion. The stories of the pigeons and the dog reveal their closeness to living things; the handling of the birds led to the absorption of data which, had it been presented to them in the classroom, would never have attracted their attention.

The story of the gangrene-sucking dog gives one pause over the failure of our educational system to break down old fears and superstitions. The emotions active in this particular incident are typical of a very low socio-economic class, related, probably, to an agrarian Southern background. They are, however, reminiscent of the widespread fear of insanity and psychiatrists found even in far more sophisticated groups. In the subculture discussed here, this latter fear is frequently encountered in parents who would rather see their delinquent children jailed than permit their referral to a mental health clinic. The old specter of the "crazy" man who is an outcast of society—the delinquent is no more than a misguided rebel—is as real to them as the dog who healed and died.

The discussion of war and the army laid bare the complete absence of historical and political information and the lack of any political conviction. The only positive feeling expressed was the desire to be either a leader or a strong leader's disciple.

## SUMMARY AND EVALUATION

The Work Camp Project was an attempt to meet the needs of young people at the crossroads where the decision between honest or delinquent, constructive or destructive life is to be made. It was found that the boys under study suffer from a lack of respect for most of their elders. Unstable, broken homes and overcrowded schools seldom provide the secure and responsive parent figures who can set limits and offer rewards. Deprived of respect and reliance, these children cannot develop any concept of right and wrong.

There is also a lack of respect for the ethics of society as they are preached. The boys absorb the facts of dishonesty and struggle for power on every level of national and international life and are equally sensitive to the discrepancies between ideals preached in churches and schools—the brotherhood of men, and racial and social equality—and the actual experiences of their families. As a result, they suffer from a distorted view of society. In their opinion, the man of status is the man who acquires a maximum of power and possession with a minimal output of energy.



The use of force and cheating are manifestations of strength and intelligence. Using influence to provide advantages for others—particularly employment and protection from the law—is friendship and, again, a proof of power. There is a deep-seated fear of being condemned to the role of underdog. Much delinquent activity is a self-protective reaction to this fear and to the desire for status.

All of these attitudes can be seen to be the result of the deficiencies of a system of education which fails to reach young people's true abilities, to help them find a constructive and satisfactory place in society, and to dispel their fears. The Work Camp Project was originally set up with the intent of meeting some of these needs—particularly by offering occupation instead of recreation, status through service and earning, and self-respect through status thus acquired.

The past two summers' experiences have shown that this basic idea does meet at least some of the needs of today's youth. Supported by many educators' findings,[1] we believe that the need for a purposeful place in society, for occcupation which affords appreciation and income, and for status based on respect and self-respect is shared by all young people. The specific recommendations made here have bearing on the subculture under study. We believe, however, that, despite experimental errors and shortcomings, the basic validity of the work camp idea is unquestioned and is in keeping with the needs and requests brought to us by young people from all levels of society. On the basis of these requests, as well as the experience of the two work camps, some general conclusions may be drawn about the opportunities which such programs should provide.

[1] See, for example: *New Ways to Reach Unreached Youth—a Challenge to New Jersey*, Third Annual Report and Recommendations of the State of New Jersey Youth Study Commission, June 1958, Alan S. Meyer, Research Director.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS

First of all, a successful youth project of this type must afford an environment in which agreements are carried out and limits set and respected. In a work camp situation, dual leadership seems to be necessary. Social workers are needed to offer help in all personal difficulties and guidance for individual and group development. These leaders must be men who can be trusted and can serve as an example to the group. Furthermore, groups should be small enough so that each leader will be able to give his attention to the often overwhelming personal problems of each member. Secondly, there must be foremen in charge of vocational instruction and the evaluation of the work performed. The young people's outspoken desire for firm direction and the objective justice of "give and take" is best met by a system in which personal growth and productivity on the job are handled separately.

The work experience should reflect actual employment conditions and the relation between work performed and remuneration received should be on a realistic level. The half-day work period as tried this year proved detrimental to incentive and morale; in its place a work day of normal length, remunerated by normal pay, would seem advisable. Alternating periods of work and relaxation in keeping with the physical potential of young boys would be useful, but no attempt should be made to combine this type of program with supervised recreation. The work project's basic value of giving status and independence suffers when linked to the outgrown practice of "organized fun."

Year-round activities in keeping with the needs of the specific community—agricultural work, conservation work, construction work, forestry or fishing—would help to maintain the gains made during the summer program and could also be used to awaken the desire to acquire vocational skill and to accept the schooling required. This could be furthered by the equivalent of the scholarship program presently available to gifted youth, in which funds would be provided making it possible for boys and girls not interested in a college education, but motivated to become useful members of society, to participate in a program combining vocational instruction with paid work.

Such a vocational merit system would counteract the fear of being unwanted and the resulting mistaken concepts of society and negative attitudes on the part of the young people involved, while establishing respect for leadership and learning. It would serve as an incentive to remain in school and acquire the kind of education necessary in today's civilization, providing in the long run a group of educated and purposeful citizens who feel secure in their world.

# The Effectiveness of a Boys' Club in Reducing Delinquency

By ROSCOE C. BROWN, JR. AND DAN W. DODSON

ABSTRACT: The delinquency rates for white boys in three areas of Louisville, Kentucky, were compared for the period 1944–1954. These areas were selected because they were similar in certain ecological characteristics. The delinquency rates decreased steadily over an eight-year period in the area where there was a Boys' Club. The delinquency rates in the two other areas with no youth-serving agencies increased over the same period of time. Some discussion is devoted to the limited nature of any conclusions that can be derived from a statistical study of this type in which several factors can not be controlled. The study indicates that the Boys' Club was probably one important factor in the decline in delinquency in an area of a city where delinquency was increasing in other sections.

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*Roscoe C. Brown, Jr., Ph.D., New York City, is Associate Professor of Education, New York University. Dr. Brown has completed several research studies in community health, education, and human relations. One of his most recent studies was in collaboration with Dr. Dodson on school integration in a New York suburban community. He has also participated in several school surveys as a school population specialist.*

*Dan W. Dodson, Ph.D., New York City, is Professor of Education and Director of the Center for Human Relations Studies, New York University. In 1944–48 Dr. Dodson was Chairman of the New York City Mayor's Committee for Unity. While Executive Director of the Mayor's Committee, he advised Branch Rickey as he broke the color line in baseball. Dr. Dodson is Editor of the Journal of Educational Sociology and author of numerous papers in professional journals.*

THE RISE of juvenile delinquency has prompted many youth-serving agencies to re-assess their role in the prevention of this most challenging problem. This article deals with an attempt to assess the impact of one of the 450 Boys' Clubs on the delinquency rates of the neighborhood it serves. The particular club involved in this report is the Louisville Red Shield Boys' Club of Louisville, Kentucky.

The National Boys' Clubs of America national staff selected this Club for evaluation for several reasons. First, its establishment was fairly recent, 1946; its operation is in an area where incomes are generally low and housing comparatively poor; the delinquency rate was high when the club began operation; and lastly, the Boys' Club was the only major youth-serving agency operating in the area in the interim studied.

Although periodic reports which had been prepared by the Louisville Division of Police tended to show that the delinquency rate in the club area had decreased sharply between 1946 and 1954, the Boys' Club officials wanted an impartial study of the change in the club area of Louisville as contrasted to comparable areas within the city and with the city as a whole. They wished to determine whether the pattern of decline was real, and if so, whether it was explainable on alternate bases to that of the impact of the youth-serving institution. The authors participated in the study as members of the staff of the New York University Center for Community and Field Services, the agency engaged to do the evaluation.

## SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Social scientists will readily recognize the pitfalls of studies of this type. The public is anxious to find the simple "pat" solution to the handling of youth. All youth-serving agencies would like to maintain that they have a role in the prevention of delinquency. In fact, many base a major portion of their fund-raising campaigns upon this type of claim. Yet respected social agencies have a right to come to universities and ask that they assist in evaluating the impact of a program on those they claim to serve. The research technician is caught in the dilemma of the limitations of his methods, which preclude definitive answers, and his desire to be useful. He is caught between the risks of having his limited findings used adversely against the agency, if they are not complimentary to it, and having his limited findings used as "endorsement of science" if they do turn out to be complimentary to the program.

The first methodological consideration involved establishing the usefulness of a statistical study in determining the effectiveness of the Boys' Club program in preventing delinquency. The staff of the Center pointed out that a statistical study could not provide definitive evidence on the Club's actual role in the prevention of delinquency. Even if the delinquency rate has declined, there are several factors other than the Boys' Club that might have brought about the changes. Since there is usually some feedback between happenings in a community, changes in a large-scale social phenomenon such as delinquency would probably be the result of the interaction of several factors. Further, since the study was of necessity an ex post facto design, it would be impossible to provide for the controls necessary for a true test. Nevertheless, the Boys' Club and the authors felt that knowledge of changes in the delinquency rate in the Club area and in other comparable areas of Louisville would be helpful in establishing a point of departure for future studies.



The next consideration was the definition of delinquency, and the legal concept of juvenile delinquency in Louisville was used. Thus, in this study, delinquency was considered as "those offenses defined by the Crime Prevention Bureau of the Louisville Division of Police as being delinquent acts." Children between 5 and 16, from 1944 to 1952, and between 5 and 17, since 1953, committing delinquent acts in Louisville were processed by the Crime Prevention Bureau if apprehended. Some of the types of offenses classified as delinquent acts were: auto thefts, destruction of property, unlawful entry of property, offenses against persons, larceny, and truancy. In all, sixteen different categories of delinquent acts were identified by the authors.

### *Selection of comparable areas*

Data on delinquency rates for a two-year period previous to the opening of the Boys' Club were collected so that a base line might be established. The data covered the period 1944–1954 inclusive. Then permission had to be obtained to utilize the Crime Prevention Bureau's records and to develop a method of computing delinquency-rate statistics. The Assistant Chief of Police, who was a leader in the Boys' Club movement in Louisville, was quite helpful in obtaining permission for us to gain access to their records. The only limitation was that the boys' names were not to be used. Since there were some delinquents who were repeaters, it was decided that the delinquent rates should be based on the number of individuals. Thus, the rates were based on the comparison of the number of boys committing delinquent acts in a given year to the total number of boys residing in the area during that year. It was necessary to use the 1950 United States Census data as a base and extrapolate back to 1944 and forward to 1954 because there were no accurate data on the number of boys in each age bracket dating back to 1944. Although this method was approximate, the data followed a pattern of changes in the number of boys in each age group which was consistent with the over-all population trend in Louisville.

The most significant methodological problem was the selection of similar areas of Louisville for comparison with the Boys' Club area. This selection was the most crucial phase of the study because of the ex post facto nature of the design. When such a design is used for making comparative judgments, it is assumed that all factors other than those being compared are equal. Therefore, it was necessary to identify some basic ecologic factors that could be used to select areas comparable to the Club area. The criteria of median income, median rental, median education, type of housing, percentage of nonwhite population, and absence of a youth-serving agency building were used to select areas. These data were obtained from the 1950 census and from reports of the Louisville Planning and Zoning Commission and Health and Welfare Council of the Community Chest. Fortunately, neighborhood areas had been identified by the Planning Commission so that it was possible to compare neighborhoods of which the Club area was one and to select two other areas that were most comparable to the Club area. Unfortunately, they were not similar on all the selection criteria.

A summary of the basic comparative data follows:

| AREA | MEDIAN INCOME | MEDIAN RENTAL | MEDIAN EDUCATION YEARS | POPULATION | PER CENT NONWHITE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Area A (Club Area) | $2703 | $23.82 | 8.5 | 28,044 | 1.7 |
| Area B | 2423 | 24.83 | 8.6 | 10,088 | 11.05 |
| Area C | 2743 | 33.44 | 8.7 | 31,703 | 9.27 |
| City of Louisville | $2723 | $33.22 | 8.9 | 319,077 | 15.7 |

These data are indicative of the difficulty of matching neighborhoods even in a community the size of Louisville. It is necessary that the findings of the type of study reported here be carefully evaluated in terms of the similarities or differences of the areas being compared.

## THE BOYS' CLUB PROGRAM

Since this study was primarily concerned with the comparison of the delinquency rates in areas that were comparable to the Club area, we did not study the Club program extensively. However, a brief description of the Boys' Club program is given so that the reader can see the type of emphasis the Club placed on various activities and the age groups of boys being served by them.

The program philosophy of the Boys' Club emphasizes an all-around program for boys working in small groups. Through working with each group, program activities that are most acceptable to the boys are developed. The program attempts to provide training in citizenship and to promote the development of the boys through constructive activity. Some of the activities included in the Club program were: clubs, athletics, woodwork, crafts, dramatics, swimming, Boy Scouts, and a summer camp program.

The Club began its activities in 1944 in an older area in the western section of Louisville. The Club was originally located in a two-story frame building until 1952 when a new, modern building was opened. The Club's activities were restricted to the white population of the area. It is interesting to note that 55 per cent, 1,540 out of 2,822, of the white boys in the Club area were members of the Club in 1954–55. Seventy-one per cent of the 10 to 14 age group were members of the Boys' Club. This is a significant fact because there was a large decline in the delinquency rate for this age group. Also, the Boys' Club philosophy places a great deal of emphasis on programs for this age group.

## THE ACTUAL FINDINGS

The delinquency rate for the Club area decreased rather steadily from 1 in 19 boys in 1946, when the Boys' Club opened, to 1 in 39 in 1954. The decrease in the delinquency rate in the Club area was in contrast to an increase in the rate for the City of Louisville from 1 in 29 boys in 1946 to 1 in 18 in 1954. The delinquency rates for the two other areas in Louisville also increased. The increase in area B was from 1 in 44 boys in 1946 to 1 in 16 in 1954; the increase in area C was from 1 in 28 to 1 in 21 in the same period. The complete findings are summarized in Table 1.

### *Delinquency pattern*

Such a clear difference in delinquency rate statistics between the Club area, other comparable areas in Louisville, and the city as a whole could easily lead to the conclusion that the Boys' Club



TABLE 1—DELINQUENCY RATES[a] FOR BOYS' CLUB AREA, AREA B, AREA C AND THE CITY OF LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY

| YEAR..... / AGE GROUP | '44 | '45 | '46 | '47 | '48 | '49 | '50 | '51 | '52 | '53 | '54 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **THE BOYS' CLUB AREA** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5–9 | 55 | 251 | 365 | 87 | 234 | 173 | 179 | 1347 | 143 | 779 | 0 |
| 10–14 | 7 | 10 | 15 | 17 | 27 | 21 | 19 | 27 | 23 | 31 | 42 |
| 15–17 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 11 |
| Total Area | 10 | 14 | 19 | 21 | 33 | 27 | 26 | 35 | 30 | 35 | 39 |
| **AREA B** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5–9 | 340 | 133 | 421 | 225 | 0 | 501 | 144 | 535 | 136 | 138 | 122 |
| 10–14 | 18 | 21 | 37 | 35 | 31 | 42 | 29 | 35 | 20 | 15 | 12 |
| 15–17 | 16 | 13 | 13 | 13 | 16 | 9 | 11 | 16 | 27 | 7 | 7 |
| Total Area | 40 | 30 | 44 | 42 | 48 | 30 | 26 | 50 | 36 | 18 | 16 |
| **AREA C** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5–9 | 93 | 133 | 424 | 892 | 156 | 119 | 205 | 536 | 399 | 321 | 342 |
| 10–14 | 34 | 23 | 21 | 34 | 23 | 20 | 32 | 34 | 35 | 18 | 20 |
| 15–17 | 13 | 12 | 13 | 22 | 16 | 17 | 15 | 9 | 9 | 6 | 6 |
| Total Area | 30 | 26 | 28 | 50 | 33 | 24 | 42 | 32 | 38 | 18 | 21 |
| **CITY OF LOUISVILLE** | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5–9 | Data not available | | 331 | 299 | 157 | 58 | 62 | 78 | 69 | 75 | 79 |
| 10–14 | | | 24 | 32 | 30 | 18 | 19 | 18 | 16 | 18 | 15 |
| 15–17 | | | 11 | 10 | 10 | 7 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 8 | 7 |
| Total | 16 | 21 | 29 | 35 | 33 | 21 | 22 | 21 | 19 | 21 | 18 |

[a] To be read as one of "x" boys as delinquent (e.g., 55 = 1:55).

was responsible for the decline of delinquency in one area of the city while delinquency was increasing in other similar areas. Since the study was not an experimental controlled study, it is necessary to look at other factors. The first step was to find what was different in the Club area when compared to other areas of the city. There are several factors, all of which were not studied, that might have influenced delinquency in the Club area: the leadership structure of each area, the influence of religious organizations, the type of family units, the relationship between the races, economic stability, and the effect of commercial expansion. For example, there was a difference in the number of industries in the areas studied. There were 30 in the Club Area, 50 in Area B and 65 in Area C.

A closer look at the actual delin-

quency pattern seems to indicate that while the Boys' Club probably had some influence on the delinquency problem, several other factors were also operating to produce social stability in the Club Area and social instability in the other areas. The delinquency pattern for both areas B and C fluctuated a great deal between 1944 and 1952 and then increased greatly in 1953 and 1954. This increase coincided with the inclusion of 17-year-olds in the delinquency statistics. In contrast to this pattern, the delinquency rate for the Club area declined sharply from 1946 to 1948 (1 in 19 to 1 in 33) and then remained rather stable until 1954. Thus, the rate in the Club area did not increase when the 17-year-olds were added to the delinquency statistics. The rather stable pattern of decline in delinquency statistics in the Club area despite the unstable pattern of increase in two other areas of Louisville might have been caused by the presence of the Boys' Club. Another interpretation, however, might be that the social forces in the community that led to the establishment and expansion of the Boys' Club were lacking in the other areas. The absence of such community-oriented social forces might then be associated with a general pattern of social disorganization which is conducive to delinquency. This analysis is similar to that of Bernard Lander in his discussions of the relationship of anomie to delinquency.

The results of this study should be comforting in one respect. Namely, the presence of an active, well-organized Boys' Club in an area where delinquency had been high and in a city where delinquency was increasing was associated with a decline in delinquency rate statistics while these rates were increasing in other areas of the city. Although specific cause and effect relationships cannot be determined, the results of this study indicate that in at least one major community in this country, the Boys' Club was a significant part of the community's arsenal in the battle against delinquency.

### CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The authors feel that this type of ex post facto study has some merit in establishing a base line from which further studies can begin. Although it is not possible to generalize from this study of one community to other communities, the design of this study provides evidence of the limitations of the statistical approach to studying the effectiveness of any procedure in preventing delinquency. There is a fairly general feeling among social scientists, which is shared by the authors, that studies to obtain definitive answers to the prevention of delinquency should involve both the study of community process and case studies of large numbers of delinquent and nondelinquent boys. Whereas a study of the type that is reported here is comforting in its confirmation that the program of an agency such as the Boys' Club contributes to the alleviation of the delinquency problem, it adds little to basic knowledge on the prevention of delinquency.

# Effects of a Revised School Program on Potential Delinquents

By PAUL HOOVER BOWMAN

ABSTRACT: The Quincy experiment is in the seventh of its ten-year program. It is concerned with a cross section of all youth in a small, midwestern city in Illinois and is attempting to prevent maladjustment and develop special talents of children. While not being specifically centered on delinquency, it does offer a picture of what the delinquent is like in this setting. Typically, he is a child of lower ability and lower economic status who has a difficult home situation, who finds school equally frustrating, and who has little contact with other community agencies. He usually leaves school as soon as legally possible and is unsuccessful in the work world. The first procedures tried by the Project to meet the needs of delinquent children had only moderate success. Later, a special program was developed to determine whether the school years could be made a profitable rather than a defeating experience for them. This study is still in progress. Findings to date suggest that at the junior high school level the interests, attitudes, and aggressive behavior of these children are more likely to be favorably influenced than are their academic achievement or personality patterns. There is a hint that similar programs instituted in the earlier grades might be effective in the latter two areas also.

*Paul Hoover Bowman, Ph.D., Quincy, Illinois, is Research Associate, University of Chicago and Chief Consultant, Community Youth Development Project, Quincy, Illinois. Previously Dr. Bowman was Foreign Relief Administrator (Europe), American Friends Service Committee, 1938–40; International Representative (South America), Brethren Service Committee, 1940–46; staff member, Counseling Center, University of Chicago, 1947–48; and Assistant Professor of Psychology and staff member, Psychological Services Center, University of Louisville. Professor Bowman is co-author of Men and Hunger (1946), Studying Children and Training Counselors (1953), and Mobilizing Community Resources for Youth (1956).*

THERE are two limitations inherent in writing about the Quincy project for a symposium on the prevention of delinquency. First, this project was not designed specifically as a study of delinquency, but rather as a study of the range of maladjustment and talent in children. Consequently, discussion of delinquency cannot be as pointed as might be desired. Second, the experiment is still in progress with much information still to be collected. There are, however, some trends and observations that can be reported at this time.

### PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

After conducting several observational studies of children in communities, the University of Chicago's Committee on Human Development wanted to study questions relating to the utilization of existing knowledge about children. Could the findings of social science be interpreted to the professional and lay people of an average community and utilized by them? If so, would it make any significant difference in the lives of the children?

To secure some answers a study was designed and initiated by Dr. Robert J. Havighurst of the University of Chicago faculty and was underwritten for ten years by the C. A. Moorman Foundation. The hypothesis was that the average American community can significantly improve the mental health and talent development of its children by utilizing scientific knowledge of child development. An experimental and a control group were given a battery of tests to select the potentially maladjusted and potentially talented children. Comparable records are to be kept on these two groups for a period of ten years, after which evaluations will be made of the adult life pattern of each child. During the ten years, the task of the project staff is to motivate the community to develop talents and prevent maladjustment among the children of the experimental group, and to measure the results objectively.

Thus the efforts of the project staff are aimed not directly at the children, but rather at the adults who are responsible for children in the community. The goal is to upgrade the community's services to its youth. The criteria of evaluation are the prevention of maladjustment and the development of talents in a cross section of the children in public school as compared with a control group. More detailed discussion of the over-all project and its progress through the past seven years can be found in print elsewhere.[1]

Two parts of this project are of particular interest to the present discussion. The first is a description of the kind of "delinquent" behavior that has been found in a cross section of youth from this small American city, and the second a description of special classes in the public schools which are aimed to meet more adequately the needs of certain maladjusted students.

### THE SEMIDELINQUENTS

The official crime rate of the city of Quincy is quite similar to that of other cities of this size in this region. The rates of the midwest region average 10 to 15 per cent below the national averages, according to the Uniform Crime Reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. However, two differences are noted for this city. Since 1952 the

[1] Robert J. Havighurst and others, *A Community Youth Development Program*, Supplementary Educational Monographs No. 75 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952); Paul H. Bowman and others, *Studying Children and Training Counselors in a Community Program*, Supplementary Educational Monographs No. 78 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), out of print; Paul H. Bowman and others, *Mobilizing Community Resources for Youth*, Supplementary Educational Monographs No. 85 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).



rates for both the nation and the region have increased gradually each year with the exception of 1955. During the same years, the trend for Quincy has been in the opposite direction, where the average rate has decreased gradually each year with the exception of 1956. The Quincy crime rates are consistently lower in every category except that of murder, and here the rate is about double that of other similar cities in this region. The rates quoted are for all crimes, both adult and juvenile.

Even though the over-all crime rate is lower, a number of children still come in contact with the police. For instance, from our control group of 508 children, 94 (18.5 per cent) have had contact with the police during the last seven years. This is perhaps a minimum figure since some children have moved to other communities and our records may be incomplete.

It is much too loose a definition of delinquency, however, to include all of these as juvenile delinquents. Of the 94 offenders, one third have had only one contact with the police in seven years, and these were for such minor offenses as speeding, faulty brakes, breaking windows or street lights, or truancy. Another third have had more than a single contact with the police, but the reasons for the contact were definitely of minor seriousness.

These 77 semidelinquents come from all socio-economic classes and areas of the city. When the traffic violators are excluded, almost all those remaining are from the lower social class areas. Why? It may well be that these minor offenses are behaviors that are more closely supervised and prohibited by parents in the middle-income brackets without calling in police help. In the lower-income areas there is less strict surveillance by parents, more freedom for children for longer periods, more patrolling from the police, and, thus, more official delinquent records for these children. Semidelinquent behavior, as described here, is interpreted as common to all social classes, and probably resulting from the general enthusiasms and boredoms of youth.

### THE DELINQUENTS

This leaves a total of 17 children of the 94 who have engaged in activities of a more serious nature and are here defined as delinquents. This represents 3 per cent of our sample youth of this community. While these are rated as more serious cases, there still have been no murders, no shootings or knifings, and no gang warfare. Two-thirds of the offenses have had to do with creating a disturbance and stealing. One fourth of this group are girls; their offenses are largely drunkenness and sex offenses.

Several case descriptions may give a more graphic picture of delinquency as seen in Quincy. For instance, Rex was a boy of low mentality (IQ 77) who hated school and was frequently truant. He came from a home where the father was a steady worker but would frequently get angry with the boy and beat him. At the age of thirteen the boy was picked up by the police and admitted stealing $20 from the pocket book of a lady in a store. His mother repaid the money and no charges were pressed. At fourteen he was arrested for an attempted break-in at a filling station. He was later declared delinquent by the county court, placed in a detention home, and later transferred to a foster home for a short period. He was given a medical examination but no pathology was found. At eighteen he was picked up several times for drunkenness, fined several times, and finally jailed. He is fast becoming an habitual drunkard.

Sue was first picked up at the age of fifteen for hanging around down town with a group of girls. A month later she

was reported by her father for being truant, not coming home nights, and being unmanageable. She was married at sixteen but was reported to the police shortly afterward by her neighbors who complained of the filthiness of the apartment and the neglect of a small baby. The police found her at that time in a tavern. Two months later she was brought in for soliciting men in a tavern. She continues to practice prostitution in her parents' home.

A rather complete record is available for most of the 17 delinquent children, including school records, community records, and testing and interview reports of this project. These records give the following description of them. Three out of four are boys. At the average age of 19 they have had an average of five contacts with the law. They have all engaged in at least one act of a more serious nature as defined above. Half of them have been declared delinquent by the county court, and one-third have been in prison at one time or another. Every one of this group comes from the "lower-lower" socio-economic group as measured by Warner's Index of Status Characteristics. They change residence only slightly more often than the average family in the United States and these moves are very frequently among relatives; that is, a child might live here with one parent, move to California for a year with another parent or relative, and return here the next year to the same address. Only one-third of the group have grown up with both parents actually in the home; one boy has had four different parent substitutes, all of whom have been taken from him by death, desertion, or divorce. Only one-third have been in town during the entire seven years of the project; the other two-thirds have been out of town at least half of the time.

Intellectually most of these delinquents are in the borderline range between the mentally handicapped and the average—IQ 75 to 90—but about one-fourth are in the handicapped range. Their aptitude scores are generally low, of course, but their lowest scores are in verbal ability. The delinquents were given consistently higher scores on aggressive maladjustment by both teachers and peers; scores on withdrawn maladjustment were somewhat lower but still surprisingly high (62 percentile average). Their scores on leadership and friendship were in the lowest 25 per cent.

All but one of the delinquents on whom we have records dropped out of school between the eighth and the tenth grade. One-third have spent sometime in a class room for the mentally retarded. All but one have repeated at least one grade during their school career, and one child has repeated three grades.

What kind of help have these children received from community agencies? On the records available at this point, only one-fourth of the delinquents have had any contact with a casework agency in this city, and of these only one had been seen for treatment. This boy has conferred with the Family Service Agency seven times about his vocational choice. With this one possible exception, no child has had propessional therapeutic help. A survey was made of all churches in the vicinity to determine the amount and kind of contact youth have had with religious institutions. Of the 17 delinquents one was listed as a church member but did not attend or participate, and one other was actively related to a church. The rest have had no contact with churches as far as can be determined.

There is nothing particularly new in these findings; they are in accord with other studies in other areas and in larger cities. Delinquency in the smaller city seems similar to that in larger cities except that the behavior is not as extreme and is not characterized by gangs. The delinquent usually comes from the lower socio-economic groups and is likely to be below average in intelligence. It is also obvious that these children are not getting the remedial or supportive help that they need from the community and its agencies.



### FIRST EFFORTS AT PREVENTION

With this picture of maladjustment obtained from the older control group, it became the task of the staff to try to prevent the occurrence of similar behavior in the younger experimental group. Even when dealing with a small community and a limited number of children, the task of prevention of maladjustment is still extremely complex. The staff not only needed to find effective prevention methods, they also needed to get them used by the community.

The first methods tried were those that had been used elsewhere and found to be helpful. Placement in foster homes was used wherever practicable, but our experience with this approach was not very rewarding. Foster homes were scarce, and the parents (with one exception) did not want to give up their children. Even the few good placements did not work out well, and we came to feel that foster home placement, at least at the ages of 12 to 14 years, was not profitable.

With a few cases, an attempt was made to use the "aggressive" casework approach. These experiences led to several observations. First, this method was extremely time consuming; one worker could not adequately work with more than ten to twelve families if he expected to do a good job, and no community agency was ready to take on such an extensive program at the time. Second, our experimental children were at an age where it was difficult to work with families; these junior high school boys and girls were ready to grow further away from the parents rather than closer. We did find, however, some measure of success with certain families, particularly those in which the parents were interested and concerned about their children. These interested families were found among all social classes; however, the delinquents tended to come from nonco-operative lower-class families. Lastly, we found certain problems of a general community nature that kept defeating certain groups of children almost in spite of their individual efforts for improvement. Problems such as lack of adequate employment for Negroes, lack of recreational programs for youth, inadequate school curricula—these made it difficult to rely on the individual case approach alone, even though aggressive casework looks promising with selected cases.

Another approach tried was recreational clubs. We soon discovered that it was not difficult to establish rapport with the children or to get co-operation from their parents. The leader soon found himself in a strategic position to help these families use the resources of other agencies because he was trusted by both parents and children. A number of children were given individual help in better adjustment to the school, in using public health nurses for chronic ill health, and in getting in touch with various cultural and welfare activities.

The clubs, however, were ultimately abandoned, primarily because no agency in the community was ready to take on this program. The Boy Scouts were interested in trying to adapt their program for these children and conferences were held with national office personnel, but to date there have been no additional local programs. A worker in the state welfare department, who had been closely associated with Clifford Shaw, has been concurrently organizing several

of the lower-class neighborhoods; however, he has chosen to work independently of other community agencies. Our own experience here would indicate that recreational programs should not be relied upon to change people, but can be used as effective points of contact between children and the various resources of a community.

These first efforts at prevention reached a few of the children successfully, but obviously many were not being reached. In searching for a new approach the staff looked for one that would bring a more intensive contact with the child over a longer period of time, as well as one that could conceivably be used by the average community. Only the school seemed to offer this possibility.

## POTENTIALITIES OF THE SCHOOL

By the time a maladjusted child enters school, much damage has usually been done by unfavorable home and community conditions. It would be desirable to work with children much earlier than five or six years of age. On the other hand, the school does have children for six hours a day for approximately ten years after the age of five or six. The schools have physical facilities, a trained professional staff, and a legal responsibility for all children. Is education most effectively utilizing these years to prepare these children for adulthood? The answer is no.

In studying the older control group it was discovered that one-third of all students dropped out of school before graduation. This one-third was usually below average in intelligence and in social advantages. A detailed study of these drop-outs is now in progress.[2] It is clear that they hate school and have had only difficulty with it. This hatred usually begins in the early grades. Teachers say that, with few exceptions, children of this sort are their greatest problems, the ones that make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to teach. At the junior high level, these children take up a disproportionally large amount of teacher time in disciplinary actions of various kinds, all with little effect. School personnel are discouraged about dealing with this group, but by law they are charged with responsibility for them.

From this study it is clear that students who leave school have had nothing but defeat throughout their school career—defeat in classes, defeat in extracurricular activities, defeat with other students and teachers. It is also clear they are ashamed of not being able to read or write or "figure"; they desperately want to have these skills but are not likely to put the effort in the usual school setting. They claim they are frequently ridiculed by other students and teachers for their ignorance. They cannot understand or keep up; consequently, they either sleep or misbehave. If these children are to be legally held in school, we have an obligation to find how to meet their needs more adequately.

Can an educational program be devised that would catch and hold the interest of these students? If so, could they learn basic skills that they had not learned during past years? Would this change their personal adjustment and behavior problems? To study these problems two experimental class rooms were set up two years ago at the ninth grade level.[3] This grade level was chosen purely because the children of the experimental group were at this age. Even though this study is still in progress, it will be described more in detail as being a somewhat different approach to maladjustment and delinquency.

[2] "A Study of the Motivations of Youth for Leaving School" performed pursuant to a contract with the U. S. Office of Education, Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare.

[3] This investigation was supported by a research grant, No. M-1319, from the National Institute of Mental Health, Public Health Service.



## CLASSES FOR SLOW LEARNERS

All children in the experimental group who were of below average ability and who were doing poorly in the eighth grade were selected for the study. Most of the sixty children thus selected were discipline problems at school; 41 per cent had police or court records. This group was then divided randomly into three equal groups. One of these continued in regular classes as a control group. The other two groups were placed in special classes. Two teachers for these special classes were selected from the regular teaching staff, not on the basis of any special training, but rather because of their interest in and sympathy with this kind of child.

The students in the special classes began their day as all other children in various home rooms. For the three morning hours, they met with their special teacher in one room. These periods were devoted to English, arithmetic, and a third hour of discussion and films on civics, general problems, and personal problems. During the fourth and fifth hour they returned to their special teachers for study hall, small discussion groups, hand work, and projects. Some of the children worked outside of school during the afternoon; others were out for such classes as chorus, band, art, and typing. During the sixth hour all of them were engaged in classes elsewhere in the school, such as home economics, gym, and industrial arts.

The school day for these pupils differed in three or four major ways. First of all, they spent from a half to three fourths of their day with one teacher who knew them well and was sympathetic with them. There was considerable variety in their learning experiences, such as films, field trips, work experiences, and projects. With a large block of time available, flexibility was possible in arranging schedules. Practical materials, such as newspapers, mail-order catalogues, and magazines, were used more than textbooks. Any reading materials that were used were carefully selected to appeal to their interests and to be at a reading level of the elementary grades. The children were not pushed to learn; the pace was slow. They did not have to compete with students of greater ability, since this has always increased their sense of defeat in the past. The efforts of the teachers were aimed at making school a pleasant experience; helping pupils learn the basic skills of reading, writing, and arithmetic; helping them learn the practical things they would use in their daily lives; and providing experiences in which they could find some success.

## EVALUATION

To what extent were these goals realized? The students were at first confused by these new experiences and spent considerable time during the first two months testing the teachers with extremes of misbehavior. This then subsided, but was present to some extent throughout the first year. This year was particularly trying for the teachers, who were working to gain the respect and confidence of the students.

Objections are frequently leveled at grouping slow students together because of the stigma that is involved. These students knew they were slow learners but felt that there was greater stigma in regular classrooms where they could not successfully compete. In the middle of the year they were given a chance to return to regular classes if they chose, but all decided to remain in the special class. One student was so emotionally disturbed that he was dropped from

school entirely and placed under psychiatric treatment. One other student was asked to leave the class because of misbehavior and was returned to the regular classrooms.

Written evaluations by the students seem to indicate clearly that the teachers were successful in providing a new kind of educational experience. One girl wrote, "I think myself that this is really a good idea, because with this kind of thing you can learn and say and tell if your not a brain. You can express yourself more freely. You can feel more at ease and not have to feel dumb and feel real bad and embarrassed in front of children who are real smart in almost all their studies and ideas. But most of all I think if you try your best and try to help the teacher get it in your head this isn't just a place to mess off and try to make it hard for her and everyone else, this would be a good place to start learning without just being passed on and on from one class to another getting dumber every year."

The few contacts that the teachers had with parents showed them also quite positive in their appraisal of the special classes. One father told the teacher that his boy had always hated school but now he and his wife were kept busy at supper time listening to the boy's stories of the many interesting things that were going on at school. He said that if there had been such things in school in his day, he might even have finished school.

The classes have proven of sufficient worth to the teachers and administrators of the schools that they have already been extended to each grade level of the junior and senior high school. In addition, an experimental classroom has been set up in one elementary school at the first grade level, because it is recognized that such a program to be most successful should begin early in the life of the child.

## RESEARCH DATA

Thus, the informal evidence would seem to place a positive evaluation on the results of these classes. The more careful evaluation by research evidence is not yet complete, but certain trends in the data can be reported.

Improvement in the basic academic skills has been only slight, with no differences between the experimental and control groups. Achievement tests show that the slow learners progressed at about one-third the normal rate during these two years. It is likely true that these children have reached their upper limit of academic achievement and cannot be expected to make further gains. Actually, however, the control group should have received greater academic impetus since they were theoretically engaged in academic type classes more of the time.

Personal adjustment shows the same kind of pattern, that is, some improvement during the two-year period for both control and experimental groups. It is rather surprising that this is true, since these years are usually very difficult ones for these children; on the other hand, it is probably true that children who are still in school at this age are somewhat a select group.

The data on the number of students dropping out of school are still incomplete, but at the present there are no significant differences between control students and those in the experimental classes. These classes have not succeeded in holding more students in school. However, it seems that the students from the experimental classes are having considerably greater success in their job experience, as measured by ratings of their employers and the length of time they hold their jobs. If this is substantiated by further data, it is evidence that practical learning has taken place.



The experimental pupils have shown greater interest in school than ever before, as measured by their attendance record. Absences for control group children increased from an average of 22 days in the eighth grade to 29½ days in the ninth grade. During the same period the absences for children in the experimental classes decreased from an average of 12 days to 11 days. This interpretation is supported by numerous oral and written expressions of the pupils.

A preliminary survey of delinquency statistics indicates a significant shift in delinquency rates for the control group during these two years. Previous to the beginning of these classes, the children in the experimental group happened to have had the greater number of contacts with the police and more serious offenses. During these two years, however, the trends in the two groups were exactly reversed. Using a rating scale developed in the Cambridge-Somerville study, it was found that the delinquency rate in the control group had more than tripled. This is not surprising since these years (16 to 18) are very crucial in the establishment of criminal patterns. However, during the same period the delinquency rate of the experimental group decreased more than one-third, and there were fewer serious offenses than in the other group of children. The numbers here are too small for generalization and the data are incomplete, but the trend is clear.

Data on the class of slow learners at the first grade level are even clearer. Eighteen children who had failed the first grade were selected for this special class. Many of them had relatives in the junior high classes. At the end of one year seven were able to enter third grade, thus regaining their lost grade status; six of these were able to read in the top group in a regular third-grade classroom. Scores of the total group on a personality test showed significant improvement. Again, interest was high and attitudes favorable.

The experiences of this project indicate the need for further experimentation in revising the school experience for children prone to delinquency and the promise of some positive results in the prevention of delinquency.

# The All-Day Neighborhood Schools

By Adele Franklin

Abstract: The All-Day Neighborhood Schools of the New York City Board of Education is a significant project. These are elementary schools in which additional staff are provided to help children during the schoolday and in an after school "club program" from three to five. The warm, personal relationship between teachers and children fuses home, school, and community into a sympathetic unit. Children of working parents who might otherwise be unsupervised in the empty after-school hours before the mother returns to the home, children needing help in learning processes, children with language and integration problems benefit from the program. Statistics show that there is a conspicuous lack of truancy and a minimum of vandalism in these schools and that the delinquency rate declines.

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*Adele Franklin, Ed.D., New York City, is Director and founder of the program of the All-Day Neighborhood Schools of the Board of Education of the City of New York. Dr. Franklin is a former teacher, social worker, and recreation leader. She is the author, with Agnes E. Benedict, of Play Centers for School Children (1943); The Happy Home (1948); and Your Best Friends Are Your Children (1951). She has also written numerous articles in professional and lay magazines and has frequently spoken to professional and lay groups.*



WHEN the new school opened, the 1,200 children who were admitted were overawed by its spaciousness and by the colorful rooms with moveable furniture. They tiptoed through the halls and spoke in whispers —all except Pedro. Pedro came with a reputation built up in his former school, and Pedro was not impressed. As usual, he talked incessantly and loudly. He immediately started picking fights with the other children in his fourth grade class. In the midst of a lesson he started his usual clowning which varied from making "funny faces" to trying to stand on his head. He would leave the classroom without permission and create a disturbance in the halls. He spent most of his time out of the classroom, either because of his illegal departure or because he was sent to the office with a message stating that his behavior distracted the entire class. The teachers were convinced he was normally intelligent, but his inability to settle down resulted in school work that was far below the average for his age. His grandmother sympathized with the teachers and predicted that Pedro would either be crazy or dead by the time he was twelve.

That was eight years ago. Pedro is now completing the course in the Machine Trades High School. When he graduated from junior high school, he was an honor student and was chosen out of a class of 300 students to read the Bible at the graduation exercises. He called our office the other day to tell us that he and one other boy had been selected to try out for the American Theatre Wing. He said, "I may not get it but it's a wonderful chance. I really like acting better than mechanics, but I can be sure of earning my living with mechanics."

How was Pedro transformed? How did this supposedly "hopeless" boy become a mature and reliable citizen at the age of 18? We believe that the answer is the special attention given him in the elementary school.

The new school in East Harlem with a population that is 96 per cent Puerto Rican was opened as an All-Day Neighborhood School. This meant that seven additional teachers and a psychiatric social worker from the Bureau of Child Guidance were assigned to the school in addition to the regular staff. These extra teachers, under the guidance of the Director of the program and the Principal of the school, assisted classroom teachers in developing curriculum suited to these children. They also helped in getting to know the needs of individual children and in exploring ways of meeting these needs.

In an All-Day Neighborhood School each of the six grades has an extra teacher called a group teacher, whose duties from 11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. include working with small groups of children from various classrooms. From 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. the group teacher provides an educationally sound recreation program for twenty-five selected children from the same grade. In charge of the six additional teachers is a seventh teacher called the Administrator. The continuity of guidance that is given to children through a program like this is of inestimable value. When the same person works with the child in the day school and in the after-school program, a fuller understanding of the child's personality results.

## Development of Pedro in School

The following year the group teacher assigned to Pedro's class helped the children get a better understanding of the social studies by having them dramatize the historical events they were studying. Having an opportunity to act out a part seemed to satisfy Pedro's need for acting the clown. His span of attention grew longer and his school

work improved. In addition, the classroom teacher, in conferences with the psychiatric social worker from the Bureau of Child Guidance, had learned to recognize an oncoming spell of restlessness in Pedro so that he could be sent to the office of the Administrator before the tension had reached the breaking point.

Participation in dramatics, dancing, and painting in the after school club enabled him to stay for longer periods, but on certain days he spent the afternoon helping the Administrator. On one such day the group teacher of the 6-year-olds was absent. Since no substitute was available, the Administrator took charge of the group. She assigned six of the children to Pedro. His gentleness and skill in handling these active little ones surprised her. Frequently after that he helped with the younger children. Their obvious fondness for him and their eagerness to have him with them gave a tremendous boost to Pedro's ego.

That summer, through the efforts of the Citizens' Committee and the Parents Association, funds were raised to supplement the summer program and the school was open for a summer play school run by the Community Education Division of the Board of Education. Pedro's group teacher was in charge of the summer program. Pedro spent a good deal of time in the school participating in some of the activities of his age group. He also helped in the office with supplies and assisted with the younger children at lunch and rest.

In spite of Pedro's gradual improvement both in studies and behavior, and in spite of his great love of dramatics, it was not until late in the sixth grade that he was able to give a performance in the assembly. The children themselves were puzzled over the fact that Pedro, who could act a part so ably with a small group, would go to pieces in the same part in a rehearsal in the assembly. The first indication of his gain in self-control was the success he achieved one day in actually taking a small part in an assembly program.

During his first two years in junior high school, Pedro came back to the school frequently. He spent some time with his former group teachers, but most often he came to talk with the Administrator and to help in the office. He was proud to report that he was doing well in his studies and was not getting into trouble. At his graduation from junior high school, to which he invited the Administrator, his Group Teacher and the Director, his grandmother and mother remarked tearfully, "We never thought it could happen."

Pedro continued his contact with us after graduation, but it became less frequent. At present he keeps in touch by a telephone call every few months.

If this were a single incident it would be interesting but not too significant. But Pedro is one of hundreds of elementary school children who, reached in the program of the All-Day Neighborhood Schools, have shown definite changes in behavior pattern. Principals, teachers, parents, and social workers point to overly aggressive or painfully withdrawn children who were helped by this program. These children have been able to make an adjustment and to maintain themselves in junior and senior high school.

## PHILOSOPHY OF THE ALL-DAY NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS

It is an interesting fact the the All-Day Neighborhood Schools were not started to prevent juvenile delinquency. The basic idea was that children could not be educated from 9 to 3 and recreated from 3 to 5. It was also our belief that children in low socio-economic areas, who often have limited cultural backgrounds and frequently come from broken homes, have emotional problems which make learning difficult. Many times the school is the only institution trying to meet the needs of such children. Dr. Virginia Moore, psychiatrist of the Bureau of Child Guidance, stated: "The same energies and needs which express themselves in vandalism are, in the All-Day Neighborhood Schools, being channeled into constructive activities."

In their studies on juvenile delinquency, Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck [1] have indicated the importance of an adult figure either in the school, in the settlement house, or in the recreation center, with whom the child can identify himself. Dr. David Abramson,[2] in his book, *Who Are the Guilty?*, again emphasizes the importance of the school in preventing juvenile delinquency. The burden on the conscientious teacher with classes of thirty or more children is great.

## HISTORY OF THE ALL-DAY NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS

The program now known as the All-Day Neighborhood Schools started as the Chelsea School Project under the auspices of the Public Education Association with the co-operation of the Board of Education. The Public Education Association, a voluntary organization of citizens interested in the improvement of public schools, took on this Project as a field demonstration. They wanted to discover what an extended school day and help to teachers during the school day could do for children. The WPA furnished the extra staff, who worked under the supervision of the Director, an experienced teacher with both recreational and social work training.

The Chelsea School, P.S. 33, located in Chelsea, had a mixed population of 33 nationalities. Housing was poor, infant mortality was high. Many families had been hit by the depression, and malnutrition was prevalent. We wondered if our program could reach children facing so many serious handicaps.

It was the Principal of the school, Miss Ruth Gillette Hardy, who first became aware of the changes in children's attitudes. Everyone was amazed to see that youngsters who were restless and unruly in the classroom stayed after school in the groups which they called their clubs. These same children were concentrating on painting or carpentry or even on dramatizing events in American History. Teachers who had been resistant to any innovation began to appreciate the work done by the group workers. They requested that it be extended to groups of children during the school day. Gradually there were changes in the approach to curriculum and also in teachers' attitudes towards children. Visitors were impressed by the general atmosphere of the school.

The Public Education Association asked the Board of Education to evaluate the program; as a result of this evaluation the Board of Education in 1942 decided to set up a three-year demonstration in the Chelsea School and in a school in West Harlem with an all Negro population. At this time the program was placed under the supervision of the Elementary Division of the Board of Education.

The Board of Education furnished six regularly licensed teachers for each school and one clerk for both schools. The Public Education Association continued to furnish the services of the Director and an Administrator for each school. It was our firm conviction that when teachers became better able to

[1] *Delinquents in the Making: Paths to Prevention* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952).

[2] *Who Are the Guilty?* (New York: Rinehart, 1952).

recognize children with problems they needed the help of a trained worker to confer with them about some children and to give special care to others who required it. Since the Board of Education would not supply a worker from the Bureau of Child Guidance, the Public Education Association engaged a qualified psychiatric social worker and a special arrangement was made for her to have supervision by the Bureau of Child Guidance. The Program was now designated as the All-Day Neighborhood Schools.

We soon realized that there was need for closer relationship with the community, and a community relations subcommittee was formed. It was necessary to have the community and the parents better acquainted with the school and its needs and to get the school to understand the community. It soon became evident that the problems in Chelsea and those in Harlem were so different that two separate committees would be more satisfactory. These local committees consisted of representatives of the Parents Association of the school and other individuals who were particularly interested in school-community relations. The committees served many functions. They brought volunteer helpers into the school; they publicized the program of the All-Day Neighborhood Schools in the local community; they raised money for additional supplies and for a summer program in the school. They worked with other community organizations to meet the needs of the neighborhood supporting such projects as rent clinics, public housing, extension of public library service, clean-up campaign, health examinations, and so on.

The work of the school in the community had its effect on the children. When they saw parents and other citizens coming into the school, helping them with their work or play, and showing an interest in their activities, it helped build up in them a feeling of pride and self-respect. Parents, children, and teachers worked together on common projects to improve the community.

### Evaluation of the Program

During the three-year demonstration period, an evaluation of the program was made by the staff of the Division of Reference and Research under Dr. J. Wayne Wrightstone. Members of the research team interviewed representatives of various social agencies with which these schools worked. They sent anonymous questionnaires to parents and to classroom teachers. They observed in the classrooms and in the group program. Because of the favorable findings, Dr. Wrightstone recommended the extension of the program.

Accordingly, in the fall of 1945, two schools in the Bronx were designated as All-Day Neighborhood Schools. The Board of Education now supplied seven teachers—one to serve as Administrator—and a clerk to each of the four schools. These clerks took care of the additional records and correspondence and ran off special mimeographed curriculum materials prepared by the teachers. They also kept records for the psychiatric social worker or psychologist. Three full-time social workers from the Bureau of Child Guidance were assigned to these schools. The Public Education Association continued to furnish the services of the Director until 1949, when, through the regular process of examination, the Director became a member of the staff of the Elementary Division and continued to develop the program.

In 1951 a new school in East Harlem was opened as an All-Day Neighborhood School. Within a short time it showed the effect that a community-centered school can have on a neighborhood. At



present there are nine All-Day Neighborhood Schools in four boroughs of New York City. They are operated under the Elementary Division under the supervision of Florence S. Beaumont, Associate Superintendent of the Board of Education.

Some years ago there was a general threat of a budget cut, particularly in the area of special services. Representatives of the Citizens Committees and the Parent Associations of the four All-Day Neighborhood Schools met together to plan a campaign to retain these schools in the education budget. The success the committee achieved in keeping the existing All-Day Neighborhood Schools pointed out the value of working together for a common goal. Out of this group was organized the City-Wide Citizens Committee for the All-Day Neighborhood Schools.

This Citizens Committee continues to co-operate actively with the Board of Education in promoting the growth and development of the All-Day Neighborhood Schools. They also raise funds to publicize the program. They have helped develop citizen, parent, and community interest in new schools as they were added.

The City-Wide Citizens, now known as the Citizens for All-Day Neighborhood Schools, have offices of their own at 450 Seventh Avenue, New York City. Through special grants they implement the program in the local schools. Since more children apply for the after school "clubs" than can be accommodated, they finance an additional teacher for an extra after school group in each school. Play equipment for roofs and playgrounds, as well as other needed materials, is furnished through funds raised by this committee. A special council has been organized at which representatives of the local Citizens' Committees and two members of the Board of the City-Wide organization meet with the President, Mrs. Milton K. Breslauer. Here they discuss mutual problems, exchange experiences, and make recommendations to the City-Wide group.

### Value of the All-Day Neighborhood Schools

In his article, "Therapy with Latchkey Children," [3] Dr. Joseph Rosner, former psychiatric social worker of the Bureau of Child Guidance, discusses the value of working with children in the school setting. He points out that the All-Day Neighborhood School makes the child accessible to treatment from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. "Since children can be seen in the school, they are available for treatment during periods of resistance, when they might otherwise avoid agency contact." Often it is possible to work with parent and child and avoid the shattering break that occurs when a child is removed from the family and community to receive institutional care. Also, the lack of specialized facilities often means that children waiting for placement go without care, whereas in an All-Day Neighborhood School, with a psychiatric social worker and additional staff, treatment can be carried on while the child is at home and attending school.

The problem of "reaching the unreached" has been much discussed in recent years. There is also much talk about an interdisciplinary approach to our problems. In the All-Day Neighborhood Schools we are reaching the unreached, as illustrated in the case of Pedro and as indicated in Dr. Rosner's article. We are combining the techniques of education, recreation, group work, social work, and sociology within the framework of the school. We are involving parents and citizens in working together to improve the social struc-

[3] "Therapy with Latchkey Children," *The American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April 1957), p. 412.

ture of the neighborhood in which they live. Not only does this bring about changes in the community; it also develops a feeling of self-respect in both parents and children.

The value of the close relationship made possible by the additional staff showed up plainly in its effect on Pedro. In general, the presence of the social worker in the school, giving guidance to the teacher when needed, helps lighten the teacher's burden and makes her better able to handle disturbed children.

It is certainly in the interest of economy and good planning to use school buildings fully. The facilities of these buildings have been used for community activities and for recreation and adult education. There is, of course, an additional cost when an All-Day Neighborhood School program is added to an elementary school. But the cost is far less than caring for a child in an institution or allowing a child to become a delinquent.

A statement by Dr. James E. Allen, Jr., New York State Commissioner of Education, sums up the value of such programs:

> The All-Day Neighborhood Schools have succeeded to a large extent in making up for the inadequate home. . . .
>
> They are unique in the educational structure of New York State. Located as they are in particularly overcrowded areas, they have done much to prevent truancy as the first step toward delinquency. . . .
>
> I should like very much to see your program extended and to have similar programs instituted in other large urban centers. You are carrying out a recommendation that has been made by almost every agency dealing with problems of truancy and delinquency for as long as I can remember. . . .
>
> Men live by admiration, hope and love, and children the more so. Without these things we would be lost, all of us.

# Delinquency Prevention Through Revitalizing Parent-Child Relations

By RUTH S. TEFFERTELLER

ABSTRACT: At the Henry Street Settlement, New York City, a project is under way to prevent the contagion of gang activity on younger children by detecting and working with the younger groups while there is still a good chance to influence them. Here we find that one of the most important steps in the corrective process lies in reaching the parents of these children and helping them reassert their own influence and authority. Even the flimsiest of parent-child relationship is a potential source of control, if help is given in time. Through this special project we are attempting to devise programs which place as much emphasis on encouraging parents to express their authority as on the intensive group work being done with the children. One of the most effective tools for achieving this has been through a constant effort to bring the parents of predelinquent gang members together at meetings so that their opinions and group influence can be felt by the children. Another has been through the close, informal relationships developed with individual parents around matters concerning their children and themselves. The partnership between home and Settlement is accepted and recognized by the children and, in most instances, is contributing towards revitalizing parent-child relationships. All combined, this approach seems to be having a positive effect on the behavior of the children in these young groups.

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*Ruth S. Tefferteller, New York City, is Director of the Pre-Delinquent Gang Project at Henry Street Settlement in New York City. She has been on the staff of Henry Street Settlement since 1946 in various capacities as Children's Division Supervisor, Program Director, and Director of Echo Hill Farm, the Settlement's summer camp for girls.*

JUVENILE delinquency can in large measure be prevented and controlled if it is identified and treated in its incipient stages. Symptoms can be detected long before blatant delinquency erupts in a dramatic way. The breakdown of respect for law and authority by 8 to 13-year-olds in gangs is one of the most obvious indicators of trouble ahead. Cohesiveness and exclusiveness are characteristic of children's groups in the 8 to 13 age range. This is the active period for gravitation into friendship peer groups, where a system of vigorous socialization through childhood society begins to grind and chip away at personality formation. In predelinquent gangs, the group pattern they have chosen to follow is a negative one.

From our recent experience at the Henry Street Settlement, we are convinced one of the ways to check juvenile delinquency in pregang stages is through programs which help these groups achieve status in socially acceptable ways and which reinstate parental and adult control by re-awakening parents' interest in what their children are doing. For two and a half years now we have been engaged in a special juvenile delinquency prevention project with several predelinquent groups. Our greatest emphasis has been placed upon dealing with preadolescent children who, with their companions, are experimenting with predelinquent behavior. Often the parents have no knowledge of their children's actions until the police officer knocks at the door, a neighbor complains, or a Settlement worker visits them. The Pre-Delinquent Gang Project was designed to prevent the development of new gangs in our neighborhood by first detecting the early symptoms of gang behavior in younger groups and then working intensively with them and their parents as groups in order to wean them away from the older gangs' influence. With teen-age gangs steadily on the increase in our neighborhood, it is inevitable that we also have a greater number of younger groups admiring and emulating them.

A settlement house, of course, is in a unique position to detect predelinquent group behavior in its early stages, because its staff see at first hand what goes on in the neighborhood. At Henry Street we have learned much about the evolution of gangs and have seen how well they can perpetuate themselves. Always, as one group grew up, going on into jobs, marriage, or jail, there was a younger one ready to step into their shoes, their reputation, their pattern of behavior, and even assuming the same name.

If the teen gang professes to be defending the block from Puerto Ricans, you can be sure the younger followers will say the same; if the teen gang sees fit to fight "dirty" by having the whole group jump a single opponent, the system of ganging up becomes wholly acceptable to the young admirers. The dynamics of growing up and identifying with heroes, who fire the imagination as well as any television thriller can, are rapidly at work here. Our challenge is to find ways of winning these children back to friendlier ties with adults who can control and redirect them. Young as they are, the group encasement can be a tough thing to break through. Because they are young, we feel we should be able to do this before antisocial patterns become hard and fixed and before familiar adult figures, such as parents, teachers, group workers, in fact the adult community as a whole, lose contact and the chance for wholesome influence.

All of the five predelinquent groups with whom we are presently working came to our attention through their disorganized and defiant behavior in the Settlement House. After voluntarily joining our after school program, they



were disrupting the regular recreation groups, resisting all ordinary attempts to bring them into club activities on the same terms as the other children. They did not reject the Settlement; they attempted to participate in the program. But their group behavior was so disturbed they could not tolerate the mild discipline of having to share facilities with others; of meeting in accordance with a schedule; of listening to adults in charge; of respecting property, supplies, and equipment. They were tightly knit, inseparable, defiant, adventuresome, often destructive, yet always at loose ends, seeking and creating trouble, never able to concentrate on any interests.

In all five groups, despite their great variety, the parents, and the family problems, we are seeing a gradual lessening of predelinquent activity following the assertion and insinuation of parental authority. Calling the parents together at the earliest signs of trouble and as frequently as possible has brought about marked changes in the groups worked with so far. Ganging up on other children, stealing, breaking windows, defying adult authority outside the home, helping teen gangs in street warfare have been noticeably reduced through our efforts to team up with the parents.

## GROUP SOLIDARITY

What these groups continually ask and clamor for is the privilege of having a club of their own, a chance to be a club in an official way, under Settlement auspices. Traditionally, as we all know, we have looked favorably upon such requests and acted accordingly. With these children, however, the approach we use and find successful is to hold up their application until we have a chance to let the parents know more about the group and until we enlist parent action in determining whether or not to sustain them as a group. What we try to make very plain to the children is that their group behavior thus far has been unacceptable and that steps must be taken to be sure the official recognition of them as a club will not contribute towards strengthening them as a gang. Needless to say, they want the club very much, and this waiting period produces a greater desire and an incentive to talk and negotiate with us about what they hope to do when they get their club.

This approach provides us with endless opportunities for stimulating discussion with the children about their predelinquent behavior and how this could impair the success of a club. Children of this age have a capacity for insight into their own behavior and can be helped to recognize the seriousness of what they are doing if approached in a nonthreatening manner. They understand the seriousness of the deprecations of teen-age gangs and, in more confidential moments, will tell us how wrong they know it is, but that they are afraid to withstand the pressures of the older ones upon them. Our approach has been to speak openly and frankly against gang behavior, and, unorthodox as it may sound, we go so far as to even set limits on their choice of club names. If, during the planning, they choose one of the local gang names, we say this will not be acceptable if they intend to be a Settlement Club. If they ask what is wrong in calling themselves "Midget Cyclops" or "Junior Cyclops" (Cyclops being the name of one of our local gangs) we say firmly it is a gang name, it stands for trouble, aggression, fighting, vandalism, stealing, and so on throughout the neighborhood, and this immediately labels them, too, as being identified with delinquency. This, we explain, cannot be tolerated, and the children seem to understand what we mean.

Therefore, as a first step we try to work with the group informally to help

them aspire towards a more constructive type of club with an adult leader, even though we do not allow them the privilege of functioning as a recognized club under Settlement auspices until we get acquainted with their parents. Then, simultaneously, we work to bring the parents into group meetings to help them understand the phenomenon of a natural, self-formed, juvenile antisocial group, and to what kinds of activities this leads. We feel that bringing all the parents together on a group basis affords the beginning of a home and Settlement approach to correct a problem which is basically group centered. We use a great deal of initiative in our meetings with the parents to introduce this problem of predelinquent group behavior and to explain how this differs from the problem of normal mischievous play.

### PARENTAL INTEREST AND AUTHORITY

Parents need help in understanding the difference between a constructive boys' club of the useful variety and one which is fast developing into a young gang. They need sympathy and time to grasp the many subtle symptoms which we describe as indicative of gang development. So often they say their children are well behaved at home and the trouble outside is due to the company they keep. One of the clues for trying the group technique with the parents actually arose from the failure we were experiencing in seeing them one at a time.

From experience we know many of these parents do not join traditional mothers' and fathers' clubs or other social groups on their own, nor do they respond to poster appeals to enroll in parent education courses. But with persistence, friendship and an outgoing approach on our part, we find most will respond to special attention and will team up with other parents on matters concerning their children.

Even the least adequate of the parents whose children are heading for trouble are usually grateful for aid in putting them in touch with other parents who have the same problems. Many are not aware of all that is going on in the street. It is almost inevitable that the majority of the children in these groups come from homes where there is a high preponderance of inadequate parent guidance or broken homes combined with other social and economic pressures. The proportion of problems and weaknesses in family life may differ in each case, but the combination of their circumstances has made the parents unable to deal successfully with their children.

Bringing parents together in groups this way mobilizes adult opinion against juvenile misbehavior. It helps many who are individually timid or defensive to subscribe to a standard and take a more forceful stand in the eyes of their children. Often these are adults who heretofore have not had the strength or interest to be very vocal about juvenile aggression.

One boy's mother admitted she had been tacitly rooting for the local teen gang during a series of gang fights. But since her new and lively association with the Settlement and since the parents' meetings and discussions, she gained more courage to criticize publicly the behavior of several teen-age gang members whom she observed causing disruption in the Settlement building. Out in the street she went after those boys and gave them a sound tongue lashing.

Such expression against bad behavior has not been forthcoming from many of our neighbors. This mother said that when her own boy, aged 12, and several of his companions overheard her, it made a marked impression on them. She could plainly see, she has said on numerous occasions, that when parents take an open stand against gang tactics, it can do much to bring the younger ones into line.



### SETTING LIMITS AND STANDARDS

Our emphasis has not only been on helping the parents understand the phenomenon of negative group control over their individual children, but in encouraging them to work with us in planning the kinds of programs and activities best suited for their children's needs. Parents are first asked whether they want their children to have a club at all or whether they might prefer to break it up. Invariably they answer that it is impossible to do the latter, because the children "cannot be locked in the house. They find each other in the street and it's hard to separate them. Better let them have the club, and we all try to keep an eye on them."

Once a club program is launched with the help of parents, there is a commitment—deeper from some parents than from others, that is a source of strength. Subsequent difficulties or new plans for activity receive attention far more quickly and effectively because the parents, either as a group or individually, are consulted promptly. Control and discipline seem to work much better when the parents themselves, in cooperation with the Settlement, decide on the best plan to follow. Similarly, joint planning and approval of new programs lend importance and prestige to the event at hand. With this age group, parent participation seems wholly acceptable, even in cases where this may be the first time the child has seen his parent come out for a meeting. As one parent expressed it at a joint meeting attended by parents, children, and the Settlement staff:

> We are going to do our best to help you have your club so you won't have to act so tough and show yourselves to be such wise guys. But you kids have to co-operate to show us you can stay out of trouble. If this doesn't work, none of you will be allowed to play with each other any more, because as far as this rough stuff is concerned, that has to stop, no matter what. So here is your chance.

This parent is stronger and more effective than some of the others, but in the group situation the weaker ones interact with the stronger, and learning and reinforcement take place.

The parent group meetings, therefore, are crucial to launching the club program properly, for through these a number of goals are achieved.

Individual parents seem less defensive when discussing the children's behavior on a group basis in concert with other parents. They involve themselves more freely both in acknowledging the existence of a predelinquent group problem and in making concrete suggestions for dealing with it.

The parents' group demonstrates immediately to the children an expression of parental authority and awareness of their wish to have a club. Parents united in the presence of their children establish their authority vividly, and this makes an impression on the children.

It provides an opportunity for parents to meet other parents of the children with whom their youngsters play.

It stimulates parents to think about the necessity of close supervision for 8 to 13 year old children's groups (despite their apparent readiness to do many things on their own) and to plan supervised programs with us.

It places direct responsibility upon the parent for giving permission to the children to have a club with an acceptable club name and the conditions under which it must operate. In other words, it helps to set an expectation level for behavior prescribed by the parents themselves.

It involves the parents in setting time limits upon attendance in the club and the hour the children are expected home.

Interest develops in having us keep in touch with them on a regular basis to give them progress reports on the children and the group.

New opportunities open up for giving social services to the parents themselves, apart from the children. We are having more and more experience with this, as we gain their confidence and as they feel our support in helping them control their children.

It conveys to the parents our interest in working with them, both as parents and as adults, and leads to much more sociability between them and the Settlement.

Lastly, the meetings provide splendid opportunity for expressing not only concern for the children but an acceptance on our part of the parents themselves.

### THE SETTLEMENT WORKER: A GENERIC PRACTITIONER

News that they may have their club is passed along to the children by the parents and is usually received with much cheering and delight. A special worker who is available almost daily is assigned to the group, and the formal club program is launched. Club meetings, trips, athletics, dramatics, camping, fishing, pet collections, and all sorts of special projects become the modus operandi for gaining a foothold with the group. Wider opportunities open up for studying the individuals involved and for learning more about their predelinquent activities. As relationships with children and families deepen through the steady contacts, our influence becomes stronger and more acceptable. All sorts of opportunities develop where social, ethical, and moral values of the group can be affected. It would be too soon to evaluate what basic changes, if any, are taking place with the adults, but we know that at least by gaining parent co-operation the effects of our own investment of leadership work are far greater. Indeed, we have come to feel that without this added dimension of parental involvement, the total result of our professional work would be infinitely less effective.

The active programs with the children, individually and as a group, take up most of the leader's time; but, in addition, he is in and out of the homes constantly—to leave messages concerning the time and place for a trip, to visit a sick boy, to clear up a misunderstanding with a child, to explain a new program or schedule. Often these visits have to do with difficulties arising from poor adjustment to school, settlement, home, or neighborhood and may already involve probation officers and Children's Court. Nothing can go ignored and with children nothing can wait. Individual problems must be followed through with child and parent and anyone else involved, hopefully to the understanding of everybody. These services are in addition to the individual services given by psychiatric case workers in our Mental Hygiene Clinic. As with hardened gangs, a fairly small percentage of these younger children are emotionally disturbed and require psychiatric or other treatment. But the steady, "on-the-spot" guidance to children and parents is given continuously by the Settlement worker.

It is important to mention we are conducting this special group work program within the heart of the regular and normal Settlement House program, which is located within the very community in which these children live. This means trying to effect change within the context of the children's everyday milieu and among other groups where they are known and will continue to live. This, we know, is not easy and is a slow process, but in the long run whatever improvement occurs should be more lasting.



The following case illustration from our recent annual report gives a picture of some of the progress we feel we have made with one very difficult group thus far:

### PROGRESS REPORT: THE RANGERS

"The Rangers vary in age from 11 to early 13. They now have 15 members: 5 Irish, 3 Jewish, 2 Italians, 3 Negroes, 1 Puerto Rican and 1 Polish boy. They live in a low cost Housing Project opposite the Settlement and in tenements on Henry Street, Madison Street and Grand Street. All, except one, have both parents living in the home. The exception is Benny Jones whose father is dead. Two have working mothers: Benny's mother, Mrs. Jones, a widow, is an office worker; Jimmy's mother, Mrs. McCarthy, works as a waitress. The husband is alcoholic and not employable. The working fathers are primarily employed as truck drivers, longshoremen, and factory workers. One father is a salesman; one is a shipping clerk foreman, one is assistant gardner. The number of children in each family ranges from one to eight; total number of persons per family range from two to ten. The average per family is 5.5 people.

"We are still working with The Rangers and can report at this time these children have improved remarkably as a group and as individuals. They were approximately nine to eleven years of age when we first began our intensive approach in 1956 and when they had ten members. Today they number fifteen, and it is most important to point out that the five new ones are positive, well adjusted children. No single development reflects the change of this group from its earlier days as a fighting group to a more normal, constructive club, than the acquisition of new members who are well-controlled, happy youngsters whose parents feel the behavior level and group activities of The Rangers are good enough for their children. Further, the increased membership reflects a good deal of improvement in attitude toward racial minorities compared to the time when these youngsters openly declared they had to be a good fighting club to keep the 'Portos' or 'Spics' off the block. For this they had already been heavily indoctrinated by the local teen gang who were involved in gang warfare with Puerto Ricans.

"Among the five new members they have two Negroes and one Puerto Rican. Wilfredo, the Puerto Rican boy, is a lovely child and is well liked by the others. He comes from a home where supervision and family life are very good and this shows readily in his cooperative attitude and ability to accept authority. Benny, the newest member of the group, is a Negro boy, who enjoys unusual popularity wherever he goes. He is a bright, eager friendly boy, very adequate, and most properly raised by his mother, a widow and office worker. She is interested in everything Benny does and keeps in close touch with his outside interests. Mrs. Jones has warmly endorsed her son's membership in The Rangers.

"In the Settlement House The Rangers are finally on much better terms with the entire staff. They are more relaxed, more co-operative, more patient, and less threatening to other children. They still need daily contact with their leader and a very full play schedule to maintain a level of consistently improved behavior; but they are far more capable of using our facilities constructively and beginning to be increasingly resourceful in developing their own plans and ideas. Their program includes basketball, various other gymnastic activities, games-

room, parties, trips, and special projects. They are a full-fledged basketball team now and busily engaged in playing other teams. Their 'Jack and the Beanstalk' puppet show created a whole series of gratifying experiences for them, and recognition and applause for their performances have been a constant by-product. They have put on shows to raise money for UNICEF, later carrying the $23.76 straight to UN headquarters. They performed at one of our big Christmas parties; the show has been done twice for school assemblies at PS 147 where many of the members attend and are well known to teachers and principal.

"Actually, the group is so full of plans these days the preparation and execution of programs literally take up all of their time. To our knowledge there have been no group fights or ganging up on individual children in over a year. The last time we heard of any incident of this type was last May (1957) when they chased three boys all the way to the other side of Delancy Street to beat them up. The club leader could not find the Rangers that afternoon, but when we finally met a few of them on the street in the early evening, they were ashamed to tell us what had happened. We sensed a feeling of guilt as the boys reported their whereabouts, even though they felt they had a good excuse because 'their basketball had been swiped by those others.' But their obvious display of conscience over 'The chase' was one of the most revealing signs of progress we had noted up to that point. Since that time on many occasions, they have said, "we used to be a fighting club but we hardly do that any more." We think a new system of values and self-awareness has been forming with these youngsters, and they seem definitely to be aligning themselves more and more with socially approved behavior and showing more respect for people and property.

"Our relationship with the parents and families has built successfully over the months and with all of them, except one, we feel partnership in supervising and controlling the children. Contacts with Jimmy McCarthy's family are scarcer and more difficult because the mother works long hours and the father, though at home, is usually drunk. Jimmy has received an enormous amount of individual attention from us, not only because he needs and craves it, but because we discovered he was the negative leader of The Rangers. He has improved a great deal, though more slowly than the others, due largely to the successful relationship with his club leader —a warm, sympathetic, young man who has a good understanding of the boy's needs. Against great odds, the leader is also trying to establish a relationship with the father in the hope we might interest him in a program of rehabilitation.

"There are also more signs of independent thinking and action on the part of the individual members in contrast to the marked loss of individuality noted in the early stages. Ed Sarnoff was promoted to an advanced grade for scholastic achievements and came to tell us at the Settlement before he even reached home! Several boys are engrossed in developing a 'rock and roll' singing group and meet in each other's homes in the evening to practice; the majority became active in the Boy Scout troop at the Settlement House last season and are doing well in this. Joey has been granted the privilege of one evening a week in the teen program because he wanted to join the photography club. Jimmy only recently joined a pottery class with Fred Whaley.

"We are now beginning our third year of work with The Rangers and feel safe in saying that if improvement continues at the rate we have seen it so far, there is every chance the group will not become a teen gang." [1]



### RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE PARENTS

The success of our work to date has depended upon employing intensive leadership for the children, combined with the mobilization of the parents of each group concerning their children's behavior. However, another important result of our close association with the parents is that it puts us in the position of trying to help them with many other family and individual problems.

Parents as well as children become the beneficiaries of this group work approach. For out of the joint experiences created by working firsthand on common problems, they derive not only fresh guidance for better understanding their children, but gain new strength and courage to proceed more confidently on their own, or feel easier about asking for help.

Mrs. Lanos, mother of one of the "Sabres," sought advice freely when she was worried about her status in the Housing Development. She described vividly the anxiety and the tension this produces in family life and what it feels like to live under the constant threat of being uprooted if there is the slightest increase in income over the maximum allowed. She did not know the new housing manager and hesitated to take her particular problem to her.

We interceded to explain this tenant's special problem to the new and socially minded manager. The manager found there had been an error somewhere along the line in that Mrs. Lanos had not even been notified she was officially reinstated and had nothing to worry over at present. When Mrs. Lanos ran into the Settlement that evening, she said she was so happy, she was going to put up new kitchen curtains!

When Mr. Bellio lost his job recently, his boy, a member of the "Hawks," urged him to go to the Settlement to see his leader. The boy took his father's lay-off hard, and that same evening Mr. Bellio came to see us. He had been clerking in a grocery on Madison Street. After four years he was told they could not keep him on. Mr. Bellio considered returning to his old job as a cab driver, but had difficulty in obtaining a permit due to a foot injury. Several steps were taken to help Mr. Bellio get clearance on this so he could have his permit if he wanted it. In addition we phoned for an appointment with an employment placement agency. We also made personal contacts with individual sources where we thought there might be job possibilities. Letters of recommendation were written. Though no jobs were found immediately, this parent got a great deal of comfort in knowing he could count on the Settlement. His boy's behavior had been improving right along; but this recent series of contacts between the father and the Settlement has created new thrusts of progress for us all.

Opportunities such as these for getting closer to the families of these children have been numerous and most fruitful. Each time we work through another problem with the parents, it adds depth and dimension to our work with the children. Certainly it becomes the clearest evidence to the children that the whole family is identified with the Settlement and the specific work with the individual child and the group gets carried further along.

### NEED FOR LOVE AND DISCIPLINE

As close relationships develop between families and the Settlement, and often between families themselves, the erratic,

[1] Ruth S. Tefferteller, "Pre-Delinquent Gang Project"—Annual Report to Henry Street Settlement (March 1958), pp. 6, 7, 8.

confused behavior of their children becomes more stabilized and settled. The children seem to thrive on the attention given them as the immediate adult community attempts to prescribe regularity and order. It would seem that when adults, particularly the parents, close ranks and stand together, the very ground these children travel from home to various parts of the neighborhood becomes more solid. Over and over again as we deal with these particular predelinquent groups, we find them increasingly more relaxed, more co-operative, and more accepting of adult authority. There is evidence of more purpose in the groups, new values in their thinking, and boasts about putting things over on adults begin to be replaced with plans for activities which will give them a good reputation and recognition from their families.

Here, we say, the key to checking predelinquency in preadolescent groups lies in helping to reinstate parental influence where it rightfully belongs and in building stronger bridges between children and their parents and between families and community before it is too late.

> . . . It was a strange thing that up to the age of seven children were noticeable in Catford Street: the babies in their well-kept perambulators and the little boys and girls in coat-and-legging sets were prominent, but after the age of seven the children seemed to disappear into anonymity, to be camouflaged by the stones and bricks they played in; as if they were really the sparrows the Miss Chesneys called them, they led a different life and scarcely anyone noticed them. At fourteen or fifteen they appeared again, the boys as big boys that had become somehow dangerous—or was it that there was too much about them in the papers?—the dirty little girls as smart young women with waved hair, bright coats, the same red nails and lipstick as the dancer in the bus queue; they wore slopping sling-back shoes and had shrill, ostentatious voices. The street prickled with the doings of these boys and girls, as it admired and petted the babies, but the children were unnoticed. . . .[2]

[2] Rumer Godden, *Episode of Sparrows* (New York: Viking Press, 1955), p. 23.

# An Experiment in Police and Social Agency Co-operation

By G. LEWIS PENNER

ABSTRACT: The Englewood Project was an experiment which focused attention on children who as a consequence of apprehension by the police have been identified as vulnerable to a career of delinquency and whose antisocial behavior has not yet progressed to the point of requiring referral to court. Since the police are a vital case-finding source, the Project sought first of all to develop ways of improving police and social agency communication, an essential step in efforts to help these children. It offered casework service to families referred by the police, and it also searched for other community resources to help meet the needs of the children and their families. Among the objectives of the Project were: to learn more about the work and problems of the juvenile officers; to learn more about this group of children—their basic problems and needs, and their home and neighborhood life; to determine what contribution casework can make toward a total community approach to the prevention of delinquency; and to determine the adequacy and availability of existing social service facilities in relation to the problems of these children.

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*G. Lewis Penner, Chicago, Illinois, has been the Executive Director of the Juvenile Protective Association of Chicago since 1952. From 1934 to 1948 he was associated with the Kansas State Social Welfare Department, both as a County Welfare Director and as a member of the state office staff, with responsibilities for staff development. From 1948 to 1952 he served with the American Red Cross in the Southwest as Home Service Field Consultant. In 1943–46 he was Secretary of the Kansas Council for Children. In 1946 he was President of the Kansas Society for Mental Hygiene. In 1950–51 he was Chairman of the organizing committee for the New Mexico Conference on Social Welfare. He is a Vice President of the Illinois Academy of Criminology, Secretary of the Illinois Child Labor Committee, and member of the Mayor's Advisory Committee on Youth Welfare, Chicago.*

THE interest of the Juvenile Protective Association of Chicago in the prevention of delinquency stems from decades of casework service in behalf of neglected or mistreated children. That the neglected, unwanted, uncared-for child often becomes the delinquent child is, of course, not surprising. Whoever observes at close range the children scarred by indifferent care and destructive parental handling sees additional jeopardy for them since, all too frequently, the community presents a different face to these children from the one it shows to the more fortunate ones. The city to them may consist of a collection of slums. School may be a place where they associate with an out group. Their parents, being themselves socially isolated, may never have used—nor taught their children how to use—the community centers, playgrounds, churches, and cultural facilities which the urban family needs as a pivot for its relationships with other families. They may live in an area of low social protection and prestige; and parental intervention, which normally serves as a foil for police intervention, is ineffective. There is, in whatever form it takes, a sad corollary between home neglect and community neglect.

It is generally accepted that the best time to identify behavior problems among this or any group of children and to offer help is when they are young—long before they have had a brush with the police. The schools do identify a remarkable number of them. But even if treatment resources were adequate, there would still remain some serious problems, since we have no reliable methods for predicting delinquency and there is no certainty that parents with problem children will avail themselves of help. Thus a community takes recourse to a second line of defense, a method of focusing on the teenager who actually has committed a delinquent act.

What is not sufficiently recognized is that police departments deal with thousands of children in what is often one of the most traumatic incidents in their young lives—the runaway girl, the boy caught in his first robbery, the hostile lad who has assaulted another boy in displaced rage against his father. Why not, then, take advantage of a crisis? The Englewood Project was premised in part on the desire to learn how the police incident could be used constructively as a starting point for treatment.

## STRUCTURE AND GOALS

By agreement between the Commissioner of Police and the Executive Director of the Juvenile Protective Association, an experiment was conducted over a three-year period—from August 1954 to August 1957—in the Englewood Police District of Chicago. The agreement stated in part:

> . . . It is considered sound procedure for the treatment agency to be separate from the Police Department, both administratively and in its location. The Juvenile Protective Association will maintain a small office near the police station and will accept referrals from the juvenile officers.[1] . . . The referrals will be from the group of children under seventeen who come to the attention of the juvenile officers for delinquent behavior, and whom the officers do not refer to court. The JPA representative will assist the Englewood district juvenile officers in developing methods of selecting cases for referral to the Juvenile Protective Association. Referrals will be made of children who indicate a need for social service beyond that which the juvenile officers or policewomen can appropriately give. All referrals by the police to the Juvenile Protective Association will be voluntary, and with the knowledge and consent of the family. Referrals will need to be limited to the number which the project staff can handle, either by acting as a channel for Social Service Exchange clearing and referral to other appropriate agencies, or for treatment themselves. The project staff will use casework service in treatment, with an emphasis on the characteristics of protective work—taking the initiative, reaching out to the family, attempting to overcome resistance, and operating more in the role of authority than is ordinarily done by social agencies. . . .

[1] Reference to juvenile officers also includes police women.



The Project followed fairly closely the description of method set forth in the above agreement except in one particular—referral to other treatment agencies. We soon discovered that it was almost impossible to effect such referrals, and the Project staff had to assume responsibility for treatment in nearly all cases.

A financial grant was secured from the Wieboldt Foundation, and a staff was employed consisting of two caseworkers, a half-time supervisor (who also carried some cases), a psychiatric consultant, and a research consultant. In the last year of operation three case readers were also engaged to help in a special study of selected cases.

In order to delineate what the Project should seek to accomplish, three goals were formally adopted:

- To determine the feasibility of police and social agency co-operation in the prevention of delinquency.
- To develop a modus operandi using casework skills in working with voluntary referrals from the police.
- To integrate and focus community resources for the treatment of children with developing patterns of delinquent behavior.

The police district selected for the Project is located about seven miles southwest of the Loop. It had, and still has, nearly the highest delinquency rate in the city. Since 1950 it has undergone a rapid population shift. At that time 10 per cent of its population was Negro. Today one-third of its 150,000 people are Negro. It is a crowded area containing some industry, a once very large but now declining shopping center, and residences which range from middle-class, one-family units to deteriorated slums. It is marked by a dearth of local social service resources. A number of its churches and synagogues, which once served a stable population, have been closed in the last decade because their congregations have moved away.

### *Feasibility of co-operation*

One of the Project's goals was to determine the feasibility of police and social agency co-operation in the prevention of delinquency. Since the Project was the first undertaking in Chicago in which a social agency, by formal plan, was to work on a professional level with a unit of the police department, it was important to examine factors which might act as barriers to communication between the two groups to which this was a new experience.

Both the juvenile officers and the Project workers were aware of the manner in which residuals of guilt and fear or hostility to authority are often stirred up in the public by contact with the police and how these feelings predispose people to expect venality and harsh treatment from the police. Both groups were also equally aware that social workers are often accused of being "ivory towerish" and depreciative of others who, without benefit of social work training, are active in the area of guiding human behavior. The frank recognition of these and other misunderstandings by both Project and police staff clarified the working relationship immeasurably and permitted both

groups to concentrate on their proper objective—the welfare of children in trouble.

One of the objectives of the caseworkers was to learn as much as possible about police work with children, a knowledge which brought with it an appreciation of police work as a specialty in much the same way as they regarded their own job, casework, to be a specialty. A metropolitan juvenile officer works under enormous pressure from sheer number of cases. In this welter of problems the officers attempt to individualize each child and to secure information regarding his home, background, and the circumstances surrounding the offense. Although their choices of disposition are generally limited to an adjustment at the station or referral to court, the responsibility both toward the welfare of the child and toward the community weighs heavily on them.

Referrals to the Project were to consist of the parents of those children whose offenses did not warrant referral to court but who, in the opinion of the police, were vulnerable and likely to get into further difficulty unless given help. To avoid burdening the police with paper work, a simple form supplemented their interviews with the family and their conversations with the Project staff. The following are typical examples:

Sophie Jones[2] (aged 15): "Runaway because she was afraid of punishment. Second time came into station at 1 a.m. and refused to live with mother. Child has been in numerous foster homes past three years. Mother separated from second husband."

Jean Kowalski (aged 12): "Left home 7 a.m. with her younger sister to see the Santa Claus parade. While down there, stole several articles from stores, took sister to friend's home in another neighborhood and stayed all night. Returned home next day and gave no good explanation of thefts or conduct. Seems to be a nervous child, has stolen from her mother on many occasions."

Jules Hilton (aged 16): "Chronic misbehavior outside of his home. Has been involved in numerous scrapes at school and in neighborhood. His uncle says boy is a chronic liar."

A review of all the cases showed that a high proportion of referrals, nine out of ten, had been appropriate.

[2] For obvious reasons all names of clients have been changed.

## THE FIRST SIX CASES

The second goal of the Project was the development of a method of working with families referred by the police. To give a picture of who the client was and what characterized the work, the first six cases referred by the police have been selected for brief review here. They are fairly representative of the types of problems encountered and of typical casework results:

A mother had taken her 15-year-old daughter Helen to the juvenile officer because "she would not obey" and was only interested in boys. This was a superficially conventional but emotionally disturbed family. Helen's impending birth had forced her parents' marriage. Helen's mother without conscious awareness was push-pulling Helen into sexual misbehavior and at the same time striving to force Helen farther up the social and education ladder than Helen could manage. The mother was seen about thirty times by a male worker, and later Helen was seen by a female worker. Some improvement in understanding between mother and daughter was noted. Ultimately Helen married. Although her mother had pushed her into marriage, the initial adjustment was fairly good despite some continued involvement in a hostile-dependent relationship with her mother. After the close of the Project, Helen, who had become pregnant, took the initiative to seek further casework help with a problem of marital discord.



Angeline, age 16, came from a grossly disturbed background. Violence among family members was known to have existed for three generations. For example, a grandmother was an invalid as a result of her husband's having hit her with an ax. Angeline's parents lived together off and on. There were times when the mother was highly restrictive and periods in which she provoked Angeline into stealing, drinking, and sexual misbehavior. The worker was unable to get the mother to focus on any problem. She finally retired voluntarily to a sanitarium. This necessitated a temporary foster home placement for Angeline. There she relaxed and did well. Angeline could not accept placement permanently, however, until after her mother had returned and proved her rejection unmistakably over and over again. By this time a foster home placement was no longer possible, and an eventual private institutional placement, backed up by order of the court, gave Angeline her chance for rehabilitation. Although there was no recurrence of delinquent behavior, Angeline obviously could have profited from a more therapeutically oriented institution than the one in which she finally found haven; the institution was, however, the best available.

Little was known of one boy because his mother refused all contact. The little that was known suggested few positive factors in the family.

Mark, aged 13, apprehended for suspected burglary, lived with his mother and stepfather. His own father had remarried also. Mark was painfully torn in his loyalties, especially when his mother kept using him to act out her anger at his father in court fights for support money, even though the stepfather would have liked to have treated Mark as his own. The casework goal, which was accomplished, was to resolve the mother's conflict in this area, to stop the futile court battles which kept terrifying Mark, and then to promote Mark's constructive identification with his stepfather.

George was a quiet, well-behaved 14 year old who, when caught exploring the glove compartment of a parked car, was carrying some ladies' underwear which he readily admitted stealing from a neighbor. Both parents wanted help for George, which may account for the remarkable progress he made in only fifteen interviews. The father occupied such a shadowy position in the family, compared to the mother, that the boy was having trouble finding out how to grow up to behave like a man himself. Although no one would presume that a neurosis involving fetishism can be resolved so quickly, it can be reported that George's symptoms disappeared, his self-confidence grew, and socially he showed real progress. A review of the material indicates George's future might well be easier had interviews continued over a longer period, especially since George would have liked to continue with them; nevertheless, he did well. The premature termination reflects the staff's early dilemma over the appropriate use of their time as between continued treatment and availability for new referrals.

Martin, a 13 year old boy, had come to the police's attention three times prior to the offense which occasioned referral to the Project. Martin was a compulsive neurotic of clinical proportions. He had a severe facial twitch. He had had no father since infancy. His mother and three older sisters were promiscuous. Martin had had a lifelong war with women, especially with the women in his family and with school

teachers. Our male worker tried vainly to establish a relationship with Martin, who came to the office five times, behaved politely and distantly, and ignored the "Y" membership he had said he wanted. Before we could do more, Martin was in trouble again for cursing a neighbor who had called his mother a prostitute. Released from the detention home, he quickly became involved in several thefts and burglaries. This unhappy boy was too far enmeshed in neurosis and delinquencies for outpatient help. In our recommendation to the court we stated our belief that Martin's only chance of rehabilitation lay in intensive psychotherapy in a controlled setting.

## REACHING THE CLIENT

An implicit assumption of the Project staff had been that the referred families would have little motivation to seek help and that simply to wait for them to appear at the Project office would not be satisfactory. Every effort was made to follow up promptly on the police referral and secure at least one interview. Although the referral focused on the behavior of a teen-age child, the cases repeatedly demonstrated that it was essential to work with the parents as well as the child. In fact, if a choice had to be made, it was in nearly all situations of infinitely more use to the child to engage the parent in treatment rather than to try to work with the child alone. A flexible appointment schedule was a necessity, especially for children, since they showed only a limited regard for time. They were likely to come early, or late, or miss appointments entirely.

The staff learned that "reaching out" to a client did not mean a tireless pursuit of the body, but rather the use of any method of reach him psychologically. It required directness and the ability to deal with resistance immediately—even by telephone if necessary. In the office setting we attempted to convey informality. Supplies of candy were always on hand, as were games and painting material. An object of special fascination was an old dictaphone through which some of the youngsters released a good deal of therapeutically meaningful material. Besides office interviews, the work included home visits, trips to court, baseball games, swimming, or whatever activity was indicated. In spite of explanations, clients feared that the Project was an extension of the police, and only experience convinced them that this was a voluntary and confidential process.

A total of 218 different children from 204 families were referred for service to the Project. Of these, 79 per cent were boys and 21 per cent girls; 59 per cent were Negro, 37 per cent white, and 4 per cent Mexican, Puerto Rican, and unknown. This distribution was similar to that of the total number of children seen by the police. About two-thirds of the children were between 12 and 15 years of age. The median for boys was 13½ years, and for girls it was 14 years, 2 months. More than half the children, 56 per cent, were retarded one or more years in school; nearly 41 per cent were in the appropriate grade for their age; and 1 per cent were in an advanced grade.

It certainly had not been expected that every family to whom the Project had been recommended by the police would use its services. Actually, 17 of the 204 families refused referral at the police station, and another 16 were found to be active with another agency—in most cases the Family Court. No effort was made to get in touch with them. Another 22 expressed acceptance of the referral but evaded all efforts by the Project to secure an interview. Contact was made with the remaining 149 families.



## STUDY OF SIXTY-SIX CASES

Sixty-six families out of these 149 were randomly selected for analysis of findings. The referral complaints for these sixty-six cases indicated that 52 per cent were classified as relating to property, 25 per cent to self, and 23 per cent to person. For the most part, complaints relating to "property" dealt with stealing—purse snatching, shoplifting, burglary, bicycle theft—or vandalism. Complaints which were classified as "self" dealt principally with runaways, truancy, curfew violation, incorrigibility, and a few incidents of exposure. The category of "person" was used for those complaints which indicated that there had been a physical abuse of another individual—fighting, assault, threatening a girl with a knife because she refused to be kissed.

The referral complaints ran the full gamut of behavior characteristic of children who get into difficulty. The fact that nothing more serious was reported was an artifact of the Project design. More serious offenses—as well as certain specific offenses like automobile theft or "rumbles"—were handled by the Family Court and thus were not referred to the Project.

The majority of children, almost two out of three, were not living with both their natural parents. This suggests the extent of psychological and social disruption which these children must have already experienced in their lives. The fact that a child lives with his natural parents does not insure him against psychological and social traumas. However, a child whose natural parents have been divorced, separated, committed to a state mental hospital, have deserted or died certainly has experienced a blow that probably affects his psychosocial development. All such children have problems, although they do not all manifest themselves in the form of antisocial or delinquent behavior. The recovery and further development of the child are related to his subsequent home life experiences. If a new stable home life is established in which the child's needs are met, there is every hope for normal growth and development. However, the vast majority of the families in this study never were able to establish a stable household after the initial breakdown. Furthermore, the low economic level of many of these families made it necessary for the mother to work on a full-time or part-time basis.

The basic problem for one-third of the families was economic and social. They simply had insufficient income to provide a decent minimal standard of living. These families were crowded into deteriorated tenements with inadequate sanitary and sleeping facilities and dangerous heating equipment.

In about half the families the problems were basically psychological in nature. In a third of these cases the parents themselves were psychologically inadequate; in another third the parents did not know how to rear children; and in the remainder the children were very much disturbed emotionally. The psychologically inadequate parents in this group were people who themselves were overwhelmed with problems, and whose energies were concentrated on maintaining themselves. These were parents who were infantile, extremely neurotic, psychotic, feeble-minded, or culturally maladjusted. They had nothing to give their children, and they themselves needed intensive clinical help. Treatment of their delinquent teen-agers often required placement away from home.

For the parents who were adequate psychologically, it was the developing adolescence of their children that had

created many problems with which they could not cope. They needed help in understanding and dealing with their growing children and in handling problems of discipline; they needed to know how to set limits, encourage healthy relationships with other children, and support their children emotionally when needed.

The eight children who were considered seriously disturbed displayed such behavior as running away repeatedly, violent fighting, retardation in school, stealing at home and in the community, fire setting, and incorrigibility. One child was epileptic, another used broken bottles to gash people, and all did poorly in school and played truant often.

Only about a tenth of the families showed no serious problems. For another tenth our contact was too brief to assess the existence of a specific problem.

The fact that nine families were without serious problems should not be surprising. Even children of adequate families get into trouble. Environmental factors in the community are recognized as strong motivating forces for good or bad. It is important to note, too, that five of the nine children whose families had no serious problems were not guilty of doing anything that warranted their being referred to the Project. The remaining four children in this group were accused of curfew violations, attempting to steal a wagon, damaging property by rolling stones, and—in the case of one boy—defending himself in a fight. These are acts in which every child is likely to be engaged. They have meaning only if coupled with other behavior or if measured against parental capacity to give guidance.

## FINDINGS

The Project was not a controlled research experiment but rather an exploration in a relatively new area with conventional casework skills. Since the staff was small and the undertaking was to cover a relatively brief period of time, it was decided at the outset not to attempt a scientific measurement of movement during treatment. Comparison with a control group was also ruled out for the same and other even more compelling reasons. It would have been impossible to isolate a control group with sufficient similarity of internal factors to give it validity. However, on the basis of internal evidence presented by the cases, the entire staff—caseworkers, case readers, and psychiatric consultant—concurred that a significant number of children and their families had been helped and that a voluntary agency can engage families referred by the police in a casework relationship. Out of 204 families referred, contact was made with 149 families; in about one-half of these (70 families) service went beyond the point of the intake study to varying degrees of successful treatment.

Police and social agency co-operation, a basic essential in a community's program for the prevention of delinquency, was found to be eminently feasible. Confidential interviews conducted with nine juvenile officers confirmed their appreciation of a treatment resource such as the Project. The people served could not, as a group, be described as "hard core" cases who have exhausted all the community's resources. They were, for the most part, a left out group of socially isolated, shy, discouraged and self-depreciating families whose response covered the spectrum of attitudes from complete resistance to grateful acceptance of help offered. Location of the office in the area where the client lives was amply justified. It accounted for the high proportion of office interviews.

Experience showed that the small size of the staff imposed severe limits on the



Project. It also revealed that a high degree of skill is imperative and that a treatment unit working with police referrals needs experienced as well as trained personnel. The Project also demonstrated that, for a variety of reasons, referral to other agencies is a wasteful process, often harmful to clients. In those cases where agencies accepted the referral, the client often could not sustain the impact of the transfer. A unit like the Englewood Project must be prepared to take responsibility for the treatment of its clients. The caseloads contained a number of families depending on public assistance and gave grim evidence of the extent to which the continuous grind of extreme poverty corrodes family morale when budgets are unrealistically restrictive.

Lastly, the Project revealed that a good many children prone to delinquency cannot be helped in their homes but can be helped if placed in residential treatment centers. These are the children whose parents, by devious methods, actually push them into delinquency, although they may be quite unaware that they are doing so.[3]

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Pursuant to the Project our agency made two specific recommendations.

One was the establishment of treatment centers. The family service and child guidance agencies of our city are presently taxed beyond their capacity by clients who are asking for their help. These agencies, without considerable expansion, are not in a position to seek out the youngster who is beginning to act antisocially. They are, of course, reaching a good many vulnerable children; but the combination of factors that motivates one family to seek out an agency and another to refrain from doing so bears little relationship to the delinquency potential of the child or to his treatability. The Englewood experiment clearly points up a need to establish treatment centers in the high delinquency areas of our city with the express purpose of accepting from the police and the schools referrals of families in which children are becoming behavior problems. Both the police and schools that find these cases must have a resource other than the court.

Since the centers would usually deal with more than surface problems, it is imperative that they be staffed by trained, experienced caseworkers. Provision for psychiatric consultation is of equal importance. Each center should have at least six workers, predominantly male, because they would be dealing mainly with male adolescents. The centers might well be staffed to provide both casework and street club work.

The location of these centers within the area to be served is vital. It is immeasurably simpler for both parents and children to visit a nearby office, and it is less threatening. For the staff, it enhances home visiting and co-operative work with other local institutions.

It is specifically recommended that six such centers be established by the city, to operate for a five-year period under close professional evaluation by a competent citizens committee. As they demonstrate their worth, the service should be expanded to other areas of Chicago.

The second recommendation was the expansion and strengthening of the Police Juvenile Bureau. The very presence of a juvenile officer in a neighborhood is a deterrent to juvenile misbehavior. The Juvenile Bureau of the Chicago Police Department should be greatly expanded and strengthened through in-service training. Further-

[3] See also Juvenile Protective Association of Chicago (816 South Halsted St., Chicago), *Report on the Englewood Project* (1958).

more, the organizational structure should be such as to permit the juvenile officer to make a career out of his job.

Intensive in-service training should be provided because the officers deal with children and parents in critical and emotionally charged situations. The manner in which this is handled may leave a lasting impression on the child. An officer who feels secure in his knowledge of procedure and law, who has some theoretical acquaintance with the psychological and social problems of youth, who knows something about the art of interviewing, and who is acquainted with the resources of the city, will, of course, find his work more gratifying and constructive. The police department has already taken some steps in this direction. These steps should be accelerated.

# A Follow-up Report on the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study

By JOAN AND WILLIAM MCCORD

ABSTRACT: The Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study was founded in 1935 with the double purpose of preventing delinquency and providing research in the area of delinquency prevention. 325 boys were selected to receive preventive treatment, and a carefully matched group of 325 boys were provided as a control group. The treatment program utilized many of the practices prevalent in welfare work: family guidance, medical and academic assistance, co-ordination of community agencies, and supplementary entertainment for the boys. This article traces into adulthood the lives of 253 of the "treatment" boys and their 253 matched mates in the control group. Although the boys were counseled for an average of five years, whatever benefits they may have received were not reflected in their criminal rates: As many treated boys as control boys had been convicted of crimes; they had committed approximately equal numbers of crimes and did not differ significantly in the ages when such crimes were committed. Nevertheless, evidence gleaned from this program suggests that early treatment and intensive contact with the boy may be an effective means toward crime prevention.

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*Joan McCord is a Research Associate in Sociology at Stanford University. She is co-author with William McCord of Psychopathy and Delinquency (1956), Origins of Crime (1959) and various articles in professional journals.*

*William McCord, Ph.D., is Assistant Professor of Sociology and Assistant Dean of Humanities and Sciences at Stanford University. Dr. McCord was formerly Instructor, Social Psychology and General Education at Harvard University.*

ONE of the most extensive attempts to prevent delinquency and crime was the famous Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study. Founded in 1935 by Richard Clark Cabot, a physician and social philosopher on the faculty of Harvard University, the project aimed at decreasing delinquency in two densely populated, factory dominated cities, Cambridge and Somerville, Massachusetts.

With the aid of a $500,000 grant, Dr. Cabot established a center for the project. After careful interviews, the staff selected subjects from among hundreds of boys referred by schools, welfare agencies, police, and churches as difficult children or as ones who were average in behavior and personality. Each boy was given medical and psychological examinations. Social workers consulted the families and reported on their homes. On the basis of this information, each boy was matched to another as closely similar in background and in personality as was possible. One in each pair was then selected, by toss of a coin, to receive the services of the Youth Study. Thus 325 boys were to be given friendly, regular attention from counselors, as well as whatever medical and educational service seemed needed. A matched set of 325 boys, a control group, was to be left to the usual services of the community.[1]

Beginning in 1939, for an average of five years, the "treatment boys" were given assistance ranging from academic tutoring to psychological counseling. The intensity and calibre of treatment varied from counselor to counselor and boy to boy. In some cases, as Dr. Cabot had hoped, treatment involved an intimate friendship between boy and counselor. In most cases, however, the treatment relationship was less close. Treatment had many aspects: talks between the boys and counselors, trips and other recreation for the children, and medical aid whenever it was required. In addition, many counselors, focusing on school problems, tutored their boys in reading and arithmetic. Others acted primarily as co-ordinators for welfare and family agencies, the YMCA, and summer camps. Large numbers of boys were encouraged to participate in shop classes or informal games at the project's center. Religion formed an important part of the treatment: Boys and their families were encouraged to attend church, and ministers and priests were alerted to their problems. Police departments, particularly the juvenile bureaus, kept in close touch with the project. Counselors often visited the boys' families to offer advice and general support.

The Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study differed from most social agencies in three ways: Its subjects were selected by the staff and were therefore, in a sense, "drafted" into the project. It tried to maintain contact with the boys and their families until the boys were about seventeen instead of "closing" cases after shorter treatment. Most importantly, it incorporated a control group of boys who could later be examined in an objective assessment of the effectiveness of the treatment program.

The first attempt to measure effectiveness was carried out while the program was in progress. Psychological tests, checks on school adjustment, and a review of court records failed to uncover significant differences between the treatment and the control groups.

In 1948, almost three years after the project had ended treatment, a second assessment was made by Edwin Powers, the project's Director, and Helen Witmer, a social scientist. At that time it was found that, according to juvenile court and criminal records, the treatment group had committed as many and approximately as serious offenses as had the control group. Dr. Witmer's ratings of the terminal adjustment of the boys also indicated few differences between the treatment and control groups. Since the conclusions of Powers and Witmer are fully presented in *An Experiment in the Prevention of Delinquency*,[2] we will not attempt to duplicate their report.

In 1956 the authors of this article received a grant from the Cabot Foundation to trace the lives of these boys now that they had reached manhood. We dropped from our study those who had died or who had received very little treatment; also, of course, we dropped their matched mates from the control group. We then secured criminal records for the remaining boys who had passed through Massachusetts or Federal courts. By 1948, 90 per cent of a random sample of 200 boys from the study were still living in the Boston area.

We had decided that the presence or absence of criminal behavior would be our criterion of success in treatment and that criminality would be determined through official court convictions. Objections can be made both to the criterion of success and to the method by which we measured it. We might, for example, have attempted to gauge the general mental health, adjustment, or character of the men. Yet since the major avowed aim of the project was the prevention of crime—and since other standards of success seemed relatively difficult to define or measure—we concluded that criminality should be the yardstick of success.

We recognize, of course, the many defects of official criminal records as a standard of criminality. An earlier study made by the Cambridge-Somerville staff revealed that many delinquent acts known to the counselors had gone undetected by the police. Admittedly, official records are incomplete and, in some cases, may reflect a variety of community biases. Nevertheless, no satisfactory substitute has yet been developed. Moreover, we believe that a confirmed criminal is unlikely to pass through the first thirty years of his life without being apprehended at least once. Furthermore, most of our subjects emerged from deteriorated neighborhoods; therefore the usual middle-class biases in court convictions would be equally applicable to all the boys. Thus, for a variety of reasons, court convictions appeared to be the most practical, objective standard of crime.[3]

The final group used for this assessment of treatment was made up of 506 men predominantly from lower-class and lower-middle-class backgrounds. Approximately half of these men, divided equally between the treatment and the control group, had been considered predelinquent. Their median I.Q. in child

[1] See Edwin Powers and Helen Witmer, *An Experiment in the Prevention of Delinquency* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950) for a detailed discussion of the original selection and the treatment of the subjects.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Social scientists have attempted to measure criminality through self-reports. Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, in *500 Criminal Careers* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930), reported interviews with criminals whom they had questioned on undetected crimes they had committed. A number of the subjects admitted additional crimes. Yet, using this method one is unable to dissociate bragging or dishonesty from the truth. Ivan Nye, more recently, in *Family Relationships and Delinquency* (New York: John Wiley, 1958), used a questionnaire administered to a group of high school students as a measure of crime. Yet Nye validated the "reported behavior" questionnaire by showing that it differentiated between incarcerated delinquents and non-institutionalized high school students—the standard which he attempted to eschew. (Incidentally, the questionnaire failed to tab as delinquent 14 per cent of the incarcerated subjects.)

hood was 98; their median age, when treatment began, was 11.

## COMPARISON OF TREATMENT GROUP AND CONTROL GROUP

When we compared the court records of the boys who had received treatment with those of the control group, we found that a slightly greater number of treatment boys had been convicted for at least one crime,[4] although their number of convictions was slightly lower. Neither of these differences, however, is statistically significant.

| | Number of Boys Convicted | Number of Convictions |
|---|---|---|
| Treatment group | 107 | 315 |
| Control group | 95 | 344 |

Both Professor Gordon Allport, in his foreword, and Edwin Powers had expressed the hope that the treatment boys would evidence better adjustment as they matured.[5] To check this possibility, we grouped the boys according to the age at which they committed crimes. We found that a slightly larger number of treatment boys had criminal records in each of three groups: those convicted only as juveniles, those convicted only after "maturation," and those convicted as both juvenile and as adult criminals. These differences, too, were not statistically significant.

| Age of Criminality | Number of Boys Convicted: Treatment Group | Control Group |
|---|---|---|
| Under 18 only | 34 | 29 |
| 18 or older only | 35 | 32 |
| Under and over 18 | 35 | 34 |

Nor was there a significant difference in the number of crimes committed during either the juvenile or the adult period.

[4] Twenty-seven treatment boys and 35 control boys had records only for traffic offenses. We did not consider these boys as criminal.

[5] Powers and Witmer, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*).

| Age of Boy | Number of Convictions: Treatment Group | Control Group |
|---|---|---|
| Under 18 | 152 | 157 |
| 18 and over | 163 | 186 |

Thus again we had failed to uncover evidence that the treatment had successfully deterred criminality.[6] We looked in another direction for such evidence. Although the treatment and control groups had been carefully matched before treatment began, we knew that much had been discovered since the 1930's about the causes of crime.[7] To control against erroneous matching, we held constant the affectional attitudes of the parents, their techniques of discipline, and the neighborhoods in which the subjects had been reared.[8] Nevertheless, we found no statistically significant differences in favor of the treatment group. Nor did we find differences in favor of the treatment group when we held constant the intelligence and the personalities of the boys.

[6] Another criterion of the effect of treatment could be commitment to reform schools, jails, and prisons. A number of biases affect whether a delinquent will go to an institution (judges sometimes consider the home situation or appearance in court). Consequently, we believe that incarceration is less satisfactory than conviction as a standard of criminality. However, the reader may be interested in this aspect of the analysis: Equal proportions of boys from the treatment and control groups were sent to reform schools and equally high proportions, upon release, were convicted for further crimes. Yet only half as many men from the treatment as from the control group were committed to jails and prisons ($X^2$ 5.7; $P < .02$). A number of possible interpretations of this finding are discussed in *Origins of Crime* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

[7] See, for example, Sheldon and Eleanor T. Glueck, *Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950).

[8] See William and Joan McCord, in collaboration with Irving Kenneth Zola, *Origins of Crime* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) for a complete description of this analysis.



result of these various analyses, re forced to conclude that the ent program, considered in its , had been ineffectual as a preve of crime.

## OMPARISON OF VARIATIONS IN TREATMENT

mparison of treatment and conoups failed to indicate that the nt, in general, had been bene- One possibility suggested itself haps being responsible for the During World War II, many ors had joined the armed forces, turnover in counselors had been . We thought these changes ccount for the over-all failure of nt. Yet when we compared l rates—per cent convicted of —we found that they did not ntly reflect this factor.

| R OF LORS | | Per Cent Convicted of Crimes |
|---|---|---|
| | (N: 72) | 43 |
| | (N: 88) | 30 |
| | (N: 47) | 53 |
| n three | (N: 46) | 48 |

te changes in counselors, the nselor could be expected to have of influence unmatched by his rs. One of the results of the in counselors was that few boys ed their relationships with their nselors for an extended period

We anticipated that the duratreatment by the first counselor nfluence criminal rates. Again, d no confirmation for this view.

| H OF ENT BY UNSELOR | | Per Cent Convicted of Crimes |
|---|---|---|
| two years | (N: 38) | 47 |
| | (N: 134) | 39 |
| 3 years | (N: 81) | 42 |

neither the number of counor the length of treatment by counselor seemed to be respon- the apparent failure of treatment in preventing criminality, we next considered the total duration of treatment. One could argue that programs utilizing the tactics of the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study must operate over extended periods of time. Length of treatment, to a considerable extent, reflected the staff's estimate of the seriousness of a case. Yet we found no support for the belief that lengthy treatment decreased criminality.

| Total Length of Treatment | | Per Cent Convicted of Crimes |
|---|---|---|
| Less than 4 years | (N: 82) | 35 |
| 4–6 years | (N: 65) | 29 |
| More than 6 years | (N: 106) | 53 |

In addition to variations in the duration of treatment, there was, of course, wide variation in the intensity of treatment. In almost every case, counselors devoted close attention to family problems. Nevertheless, there were considerable differences in the amount of interaction they had with the boys themselves. Using six months as the minimum time span, we divided the boys according to the greatest intensity of contact they had with any counselor.

| Greatest Intensity of Contact | | Per Cent Convicted of Crimes |
|---|---|---|
| Once a week | (N: 32) | 25 |
| Once in two weeks | (N: 84) | 51 |
| Once a month | (N: 47) | 43 |
| Less than once a month | (N: 82) | 33 |

If we assume that cases considered most serious were seen at least once in two weeks, then the comparison between the group seen every two weeks and those seen every week (for a minimum of six months) gives a measure of the efficacy of intensive treatment. When the criminal rates for these two groups are compared, we find that those seen every week had a significantly smaller incidence of criminality ($X^2$ 6.4; $P < .02$). This finding suggests that frequent contact between a boy and an adult counselor may deter criminality

and that sporadic contact has little effect.

Besides reflecting the intensity of treatment, the effectiveness of treatment was found to be related to the age of the boys when they first became participants in the program ($X^2$ 18.9; d.f. 4; $P < .001$).

| Age on Nearest Birthday | | Per Cent Convicted of Crimes |
|---|---|---|
| 5–8 | (N: 39) | 26 |
| 9 | (N: 35) | 29 |
| 10 | (N: 47) | 66 |
| 11 | (N: 56) | 45 |
| 12–13 | (N: 76) | 37 |

Clearly, early treatment appeared to have been most beneficial; possibly, the drop in crime rate for older boys—over 10 years old—was due to the fact that a higher proportion continued to have guidance through the difficult adolescent period.

We hypothesized that the sex of the counselors, too, might make a difference in the effectiveness of treatment. One might assume, on the one hand, that female counselors would best satisfy a rejected child's desire for maternal care —or, on the other hand, that male counselors would be most effective for they would furnish a masculine model for the boy. To check the relationship between the sex of the first counselor and treatment, we held the boy's age constant.

| | Sex of First Counselor | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Female | | Male | |
| Age of Boy | | Per Cent Convicted | | Per Cent Convicted |
| 5–9 | (N: 42) | 29 | (N: 32) | 25 |
| 10 | (N: 6) | 67 | (N: 41) | 66 |
| 11–13 | (N: 48) | 29 | (N: 84) | 46 |

The group of boys in the 11- to 13-year age group who had female counselors had a significantly lower crime rate than did those guided by male first counselors ($X^2$ 3.9; $P < .05$). This may be a reflection of independent variables which we were unable to measure, but it appears that female guidance may be more valuable than male guidance for adolescent boys. On the other hand, the very young boy seems to respond equally to male and female counseling. These findings would seem to recommend a reversal in programs which leave adolescent guidance to men and frequently discourage the treatment of very young children by males.

In summary, these comparisons point again to the general ineffectiveness of those forms of counseling which consisted in family assistance plus infrequent interaction with the boy. The analyses suggest, however, that frequent contact with the child—particularly if begun when the child is under 10 or by a female after the boy has reached adolescence—may effectively prevent criminality.

## A Controlled Test of Intensive Treatment

One of the greatest difficulties in testing the effects of treatment is the large number of independent factors which may be responsible for variations in results. Having discovered that intensive contact seemed beneficial while the more common "general guidance" approach seemed useless in crime prevention, we sought a controlled test of "the best" treatment offered by the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study.

Selecting cases which had received the most "intensive" therapy proved to be a rather tangled problem for standards of "good treatment" vary widely. Since the experiment had been initiated by Dr. Cabot, we decided to use his criteria as a basis for the assessment.

In almost every case, as we have noted, counselors worked with the families of their boys. Similarly, there was widespread attention paid to educational and medical handicaps of the boys. Naturally, "good treatment" involved the counselor's alertness to the needs of the family and acceptance by them.



In addition, we established four criteria for judging which boys had undergone the most intensive therapy—standards with which, we believe, Dr. Cabot would have agreed.

First, a counselor had to maintain a relationship with the child for an absolute minimum of two years.

Second, the counselor had to visit the child an average of once a week throughout the two year period.

Third, the counselor had to have a close relationship with the child. Only if the boy volunteered statements which seemed to indicate his regard and respect for the counselor did we judge their bond as an intimate one.

Fourth, the discussions between the boy and his counselor had, at some point, to touch on the child's basic personality problems: his relation with his parents; his sexual feelings; his attitudes toward authority and his peers; or his feelings of guilt, anxiety, aggression.

After combing the case records, we found, unfortunately, that only twelve cases satisfied these requirements. These boys were some of the most potentially delinquent cases in the project; they had been subjected to a variety of influences which research has shown to be productive of crime. In order to test the effects of treatment on this group, we needed to hold constant those factors which might have some influence on crime but were not directly related to treatment. Therefore each of the twelve boys who received intensive treatment was matched individually to another boy from the treatment group. We matched treated boy to treated boy because information on this group was so much more complete than on the control boys.

Each pair was equated on eight factors: the mother's attitude toward her son, the father's attitude toward his son, the child's personality, method of parental discipline, general home atmosphere, neighborhood, intelligence, and the delinquency prognosis score which had been assigned at the beginning of the experiment.

We were able to find boys who, on these factors, closely resembled the twelve boys who had received the Cambridge-Somerville project's most intensive care.[9] The mothers and the fathers of every pair resembled each other in their attitudes toward their sons. Each pair of boys was of the same general personality type. Except for one set, the pairs matched in terms of the parental discipline which they had received. Eleven of the twelve pairs had similar home atmosphere. Only one set differed by more than a single rating point in neighborhood. Using the Stanford-Binet intelligence scores, we were able to match the boys (within five points) in eight of the twelve pairs. Eight of the twelve pairs had been given a delinquency prognosis within one point on an eleven-point scale.

When we had finished this matching, two groups of remarkably similar boys could be compared with each other. One set of boys had received, for at least two years, the very best attention which the project offered; the other set received the less intensive, and, as we have seen, largely inadequate services of the program.

The results of the comparison are suggestive: While six of the boys who received the most intensive treatment committed at least one crime, eleven of their matched comrades became criminal ($X^2$ 3.9; $P < .05$).

Unfortunately, only a handful of boys underwent the intensive treatment. The small number of cases makes generalization difficult. Nevertheless, the results

[9] When difficulties occurred in the matching, we used a "preference" table which gave greater importance to those factors which research had shown to be the most important in delinquency causation. Naturally the matching was done without knowledge of the court records of any of the boys.

seem to indicate that intimate, long-term, "supportive" counseling may help to prevent criminality.


## SUMMARY

Three forms of analyses were used to check the efficacy of the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study in preventing crime. In the first form, we compared 253 boys who had received treatment with 253 boys, carefully matched in personality and family background, who had received no special treatment. In this comparison, we found that the general program—consisting in guidance for the family, medical and academic assistance for the boys, co-ordination of community agencies, and supplementary entertainment of the boys—had been no more effective in crime prevention than other community services: Approximately equal numbers of treated boys and control boys had committed approximately equal numbers of crimes in childhood and adulthood.

In the second form of analysis, we concentrated upon variations within the treatment group. Negatively, we found that neither the change in counselors nor the length of treatment—which, for many boys, was shorter than had been planned—could be held responsible for the failure. On the other hand, we found evidence that the program might have been more successful had a greater number of boys been seen at least once a week by their counselors and had treatment been started during the first decade of the boys' lives. In addition, we found that male counselors were apparently as effective as female counselors with very young boys, although they were less effective with adolescents.

As a final method for assessing the project, we focused upon twelve boys who had received intensive treatment. We matched each of these twelve boys to another who had similar parents, personality, discipline, home atmosphere, and intelligence, yet had received no intensive treatment. We concluded from this closely controlled comparison that intimate, long-term, "supportive" counseling may prevent crime.

Thus, using the standard of "official" criminal behavior, we must conclude that the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study was largely a failure. Some individuals undoubtedly benefited from the program; but the group, as a whole, did not. Yet even in its failure, the program must be regarded as a magnificent experiment, for its provision of a control group and its careful attention to research have produced a fund of information invaluable to future studies of the causation and prevention of crime.


# Preventive Work With Street-Corner Groups: Boston Delinquency Project

By WALTER B. MILLER

ABSTRACT: The corner-group method of attempting to prevent "gang" delinquency is in fairly wide use, but little substantial evidence as to its effectiveness is available. Research on the impact of the Boston Delinquency Project on law-violating behavior of adolescent corner groups utilized four major indexes to behavior change to "test" effectiveness. Preliminary findings indicate that worker activity resulted in a demonstrable impact on law-violating behavior of group members, involving an over-all reduction in incidence, with sharpest decreases during initial phases and increases during later phases; that correctional department commitment rates for residents of the Project area compared favorably with those of an immediately adjacent area and the state as a whole; that worker action resulted in different degrees of impact on different behavioral areas within the general pattern of group behavior; and that changes were effected in patterns of intergroup relationships both within the local community and among established youth-concerned organizations. Project termination produced locally supported plans for continuation which were not implemented on higher institutional levels. While the Project achieved limited but definite success in its major goal of inhibiting community delinquency, its "true" potential was not adequately tested because of factors hampering efficient execution of planned procedures.

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*Walter B. Miller, Ph.D., Cambridge, Massachusetts, is Director of the Research Program of the Boston Delinquency Project. He worked with the Fox Indian Applied Anthropology Project between 1948 and 1952, making a study of Fox Political Organization. Between 1953 and 1955, he was affiliated with the Harvard School of Public Health, collaborating with Dr. Benjamin D. Paul in editing Health, Culture, and Community, a case book in public health practice. He has published articles in the areas of political organization, American culture, and juvenile delinquency. He is currently on the faculty of the Graduate School of Education at Harvard University and is also associated with Boston University and Simmons College.*

THIS paper will report, in highly condensed and preliminary form, selected findings of research designed to assess the effectiveness of the corner-group-worker program of the Boston Delinquency Project, a privately financed demonstration project that functioned from 1954 to 1957.[1] A brief description of the Project's service and research procedures will be followed by data on four indexes of induced behavior change and a summary of the over-all impact of the Project's corner-group operations on law-violating behavior.

## OPERATING PHILOSOPHY AND SERVICE PROCEDURES

The operating methods of any project which aims to bring about changes in human behavior must derive from some set of conceptions as to what motivates behavior, even though such basic assumptions frequently remain implicit and unsystematized. The theoretical concepts of the Boston Project's corner-group work may be summarized in highly condensed form as follows.[2] During the age period from 12 to 19, the dominant set of influences on the behavior of members of lower-class adolescent groups derive from the group's conception of prestige-conferring behavior and valued objectives. At this age, intrafamily relations and standards of behavior set by parents have relatively little direct influence on the adolescent's day-to-day behavior. These factors, however, may have played a role in his becoming a corner-group member.

On the basis of this concept, the Project took as its principal target of change the value system of the group itself. The primary device for altering collective values consisted of the introduction or facilitation of changes in the form of group organization. Such changes in form—generally involving the restructuring of the corner group into a formally organized club—are initially perceived by group members in terms of simple facilitation of immediately desired ends: getting club jackets with money raised by putting on a dance. In time, however, the development of greater organizational formalization becomes an increasingly effective instrument for altering the bases of intragroup status and group status vis-à-vis the community. Effective co-ordination of joint enterprises requires the imposition of internal sanctions on "disruptive" behavior, and organized groups must maintain a "rep" for law-abiding behavior to facilitate necessary interaction with law-abiding community groups.

The process of inducing changes in the value configuration of the group is predicated on the existence of substantial support for the maintenance of law-abiding behavior within the value system of the lower-class community itself. Hence, shifting the group's values from an emphasis on law-violating behavior as a basis of prestige to an emphasis on law-abiding behavior entails increasing the availability of law-abiding avenues to valued ends already present in the group's own cultural milieu. The method thus aims to affect individual behavior by altering the value configuration of the group that exerts most immediate influence on external behavior. It does not aim directly at bringing about lasting changes in intrapsychic dynamics, although a measure of personality change may be a by-product of changes in group functioning.

[1] The service program was instituted and financed by the Greater Boston Council for Youth, a committee composed of representatives of Boston's major youth agencies and affiliated with United Community Services of Metropolitan Boston.

[2] See also David Austin (Service Program Director, 1954–56), "Goals for Gang Workers," *Social Work*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (October, 1957), pp. 43–50, and Walter Miller, "A Treatment Approach to 'Conforming' Delinquency"; paper presented at American Psychological Association Meetings, August, 1957.



The Boston Delinquency Project carried out its corner-group work during a three-year period. During this time seven workers, two women and five men, worked intensively with seven group units and less intensively with seven others. All workers but one had a master's degree in social work; they ranged in age from 25 to 45. In most cases, a worker devoted major attention to a single group unit; in several instances, to two units. The social class status of workers ranged from upper-lower to lower-upper; median status was lower-middle.

The corner groups represented, for the most part, subdivisions of established "gangs." All "hung out" within the same section of Boston—three neighborhoods (30,000 population) of a larger district (112,000 population). Of the seven intensive-service units, four were composed of white boys, predominantly Irish; one of white girls, predominantly Irish; one of Negro boys and one of Negro girls. Ages of unit members ranged from 12 to 18 years at the inception of service. Male units averaged about thirty members, female about nine. Groups ranged from highly delinquent—all members with official delinquency records—to slightly delinquent—12 per cent with official records. The total number of individuals in intensive-service groups was 193, of whom about a fourth had appeared in court prior to the advent of the Project worker.

## RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND METHODS

Seven months after the inception of the service program a concomitant research program was instituted.[3] Although research personnel maintained close contact with the service program, the research was organized as a semi-autonomous operation with a primary mandate to evaluate service effectiveness. The Research Director was a cultural anthropologist, and all research personnel were trained in social science rather than social work.

Development of a research method was contingent on recasting Project objectives as originally formulated so as to produce a "researchable" formulation, amenable to treatment within an appropriate theoretical frame of reference. To this end, the statement of service objectives was formulated as follows. The principal object of the corner-group program is to effect changes in the customary behavior patterns of the groups so that the occurrence of law-violating behavior is inhibited or reduced. The primary research question was then phrased: To what extent did changes occur in customary patterns of group behavior—actional, attitudinal, and perceptual—during the workers' term of service? This formulation made possible a direct but not exclusive focus on "law-violating" behavior as one subtype of "customary" behavior. It took as its principal form of base data "observed day-to-day behavior" rather than data derived from questionnaires, raters' impressions, psychological tests, or other methods of recording expressed attitudes or subjective states.

Four major indexes to behavior change were used.[4] It was assumed that the combined effect of the several measures would tend to correct for the particular limitations of each:

[3] The research program is financed through National Institutes of Health Grant M-1414, with funds administered through Boston University School of Social Work.

[4] A fifth planned index, "Court appearances of seven Project groups compared with seven matched 'control' groups," will probably not be employed due to difficulties involved in securing reliable "matching" data on key variables.

(1) Recorded court appearances of group members before, during, and after the Project.

(2) Official rates of juvenile crime for the Project area compared with rates for similar areas before, during and after the Project.

(3) Recorded incidence of group behavior patterns during worker's term of service: law-violating behavior; non-law-violating behavior.

(4) Developments in relationship patterns within Project groups, between adolescent community groups, and between groups and the larger adult community.

Analysis of the results secured on the basis of the different indexes is at varying stages of completion at present. The following sections will report on results obtained to date.

## TRENDS IN RECORDED LAW-VIOLATING ACTS

In evaluating the effectiveness of a program aiming to affect delinquency, three questions are of major significance:

Do changes or trends occur during the term of service which are reliably attributable to the presence and/or activities of the worker rather than other possible causative factors? This involves the question of adequately demonstrated cause-and-effect relationship.

Are demonstrated changes in patterns of law-violating behavior in a desired rather than an undesired direction? This involves the question of the relation of achieved results to stated objectives.

Are the magnitude and direction of desired change in patterns of law-violating behavior commensurate with the amount of effort and money necessary to produce them?

It is evident that unless prior questions can be answered "yes," answering subsequent questions is valueless. Before asking whether observed results are those desired and by whom, it is necessary to show first that changes did occur and, second, that these can, with reasonable certainty, be attributed to the workers' activity. A major function of the analysis of data on law-violating acts is to show that trends in such behavior occurred during the workers' term of service which could not be reasonably attributed to any set of causative variables except the presence and/or activities of the worker.

Because of space limitations, the method of processing the data and the tabular findings on these points must be omitted. The most striking finding was that the quarterly incidence trends of law-violating acts committed during a worker's term of service were remarkably similar in each group. Without exception, these rates dropped between the first and second quarter of the term and rose between the third and fourth. During the second quarter, there was a leveling off, with some downward tendency. For all but two groups, fourth-quarter rates were lower than first-quarter rates. This trend applied for younger and older, male and female, white and Negro, highly and moderately delinquent, and shorter and longer service groups.[5]

These findings establish a good probability of a cause-and-effect relation between worker activity and observed

[5] Breakdown tables comparing incidence trends for groups categorized by age, sex, ethnicity, and so on, and worker-related variables such as age, sex, contact frequency, and so on, as well as additional substantive and interpretive data, are contained in Walter Miller, "Trends in 'Delinquent Acts' Committed by Members of Seven Adolescent Corner Groups During Contact with Social Workers." Submitted to National Institute of Mental Health, March, 1958.



TABLE 1—CORRECTIONAL[a] INSTITUTION COMMITMENT RATES: PROJECT AREA COMPARED WITH REST OF DISTRICT[a]

| AREAS | ALL OFFENSES: BOTH SEXES | | ALL OFFENSES: BOYS | | "SERIOUS" OFFENSES: BOYS | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | BEFORE PROJECT | DURING PROJECT | BEFORE PROJECT | DURING PROJECT | BEFORE PROJECT | DURING PROJECT |
| Project Area | 6.8 | 7.5 | 10.4 | 10.7 | 7.8 | 6.7 |
| Rest of District | 6.8 | 9.8 | 10.7 | 17.5 | 8.4 | 12.3 |

[a] Figures represent number of commitments of individuals aged 13 to 17 divided by number of individuals 14 to 17 in each area. "Before Project" figures represent averaged rates for the years 1952 and 1953; "During Project," averaged rates for 1955 and 1956. 1954 is omitted because service operations were not started until June, and all workers were not in the field until late October. "Serious Offenses" comprise seven categories of offense; grand and petty larceny, theft, assault and battery, arson, murder and property destruction, eliminating categories such as "stubborn child," and so on.

Table 2 compares number of commitments in the Project District with statewide figures.

trends without the use of control groups. To attribute observed trends to any set of variables other than "worker presence"—for example, seasonal variations, police activity, school, agency or parental activity, natural "maturation"—one would have to assume the uniform operation of the postulated variables on each group during equivalent time periods. Two conditions make this assumption untenable. First, service terms for groups were not coterminous. Second, the durations of quarters differed, ranging from 2.5 months for one group to 8 months for another. Similarity of trends independent of time duration would imply that trends are a function of events relating to the initiation and the termination of a given condition. The advent and departure of the group's social worker are the one development which appears to meet these conditions. In addition, the possibility that group-related variables—sex, ethnicity, age level, delinquency level—could account for the trend is "controlled" by the form of the design.

Assuming that these data establish a reasonably high probability of a cause-and-effect relation between trends in law-violating behavior and worker activity, what do they show as to the effectiveness of this method in controlling delinquency? Very briefly, they indicate that a substantial reduction in the incidence of reported law-violating acts occurred subsequent to the arrival of the worker, presumably the result both of his presence and the nature of his activities. However, reported law violations increased during the period preceding the worker's announced departure. For four groups this increase did not reach the level of the first quarter; for two the fourth quarter rate was higher than the first; net change for all groups was a 25 per cent decline.

A basic limitation of these data is that they do not show either preworker or postworker trends. Postproject research would be necessary to determine whether the termination phase uptrends leveled off or declined.

## COMMITMENT RATES OF THE PROJECT AREA COMPARED TO OTHER AREAS

Indexes to incidence of law-violating acts based on records kept by official agencies must be interpreted with particular caution. Favorable results indicated by such statistics cannot be used as a reliable index of induced change;

TABLE 2—NUMBER OF COMMITMENTS TO CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS: PROJECT DISTRICT COMPARED TO STATE

| AREAS | 1954 | 1955 | 1956 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total for State..... | 642 | 817 (+27%) | 926 (+13%) |
| Project Area | 24 | 22 (−8%) | 19 (−14%) |
| Rest of District... | 34 | 43 (+26%) | 35 (−18%) |

State figures (raw numbers) are for ages 7 to 17; District figures, for ages 13 to 17. Percentage-change figures can be misleading when applied to small numbers.

however, grossly unfavorable statistics would greatly weaken any claims of impact.

At present the collection and processing of relevant official statistics are preliminary and incomplete. Only correctional institution commitments are available, and they apply only to the 13 to 17 age group to the end of 1956. Tables 1 and 2 show rates for the Project area compared to the rest of the district and to the state as a whole.[6]

The results shown here, while far from unambiguous, present no serious obstacle to a claim that trends in the occurrence of officially recorded law violation in the area of Project concentration compared favorably with other areas. Results presented in Table 1 appear to indicate the best showing for the type of delinquency taken as a top priority objective—serious crimes by male juveniles. Table 2 indicates that during a period when over-all rates in the state were rising steadily, rates in the Project area showed a slight decrease. A decrease is also indicated for the rest of the district between 1955 and 1956, but this can be seen as a possible normalizing of the very substantial increase between 1954 and 1955 when Project area figures were declining. In and of themselves, these trends do not provide a firm basis for claiming a favorable impact in the Project area but, taken in conjunction with other indexes, can contribute to a total impression of change in the direction of reduction or inhibition of law-violating behavior.

## DEVELOPMENTS IN GENERAL PATTERNS OF GROUP BEHAVIOR

On the assumption that law-violating behavior cannot be analyzed meaningfully in isolation from the general pattern of customary behavior, an analysis of some seventy types of group behavior is taken as the most important index to change and comprises the major research effort. The data-processing system utilized in this approach, which entails converting material from some 8,000 pages of written records into standardized data cards, is presently incomplete and few substantive results of the analysis are as yet available.[7]

[6] More detailed results of this analysis are contained in Walter Miller, "Juvenile Delinquency Trends in the Special Youth Program Area Compared to Other Areas: 1952 to 1956," February, 1957; on file with Special Youth Project. This paper includes additional breakdown tables, raw numbers, definitions of terms, census tract definitions of areas, discussion of methodological considerations, source of population statistics, and so on. Figures for the state are taken from Joseph Hozid, "Division of Youth Service Commitment Report I-MC-10," July, 1958.

[7] The principal limitation in the use of this index relates to the possibility that, in reporting behavior, workers will select or omit on the basis of interest or training, and that analyzed trends in reported behavior could be a partial function of trends in recording selectivity. This type of limitation remains inherent in the data but is compensated for to a considerable degree by several factors—including the tremendously detailed nature of the recorded material, differential selectivity by a range of observers, injunctions by the research director to record fully and objectively, and the fact that the processing system eliminates all evaluative or subjective statements. In addition, about 5% of the data represent either tape-recorded material or direct observation by the research director. These data appear essentially to confirm the reliability of the bulk of workers' recorded data.

[8] The mechanics of the coding system are complex and cannot be detailed here. The system is partially described in Walter Miller, "Research Procedures Used in Analyzing the Effectiveness of a Gang Delinquency Project"; prepared for N.I.M.H., March 1958.



### *Method*

In processing the data, graduate student research workers go through the detailed records and extract material from them relating to some seventy categories of observed behavior. These categories refer to a range of social and cultural "objects"—school, police, church, football, dancing, narcotics, theft, alcohol, sex, and so on. Each extracted behavior sequence involving these and other areas is recorded on a data card and categorized according to eight to twenty coding designations. Multiple copies of each card are made, so that all acts relating to each area of behavior can be filed chronologically for each group, thus producing a categorized "behavioral history" of that group.[8]

Filed and categorized data are then arranged for analysis so that data can be brought to bear separately on four questions for each behavioral area. (1) What was the general pattern of behavior of Group X in behavior area Y during a given time span? (2) What changes or trends occurred in this behavioral area? (3) What were the specific activities of the worker in reference to this behavioral area during this time? (4) To what extent are the observed trends attributable to the worker's actions?

Being able to isolate for separate consideration data bearing on questions 1 to 3 facilitates the difficult task of ascertaining cause-and-effect relationships. Four "logical" outcomes relating to "extent of change" and "density of worker action" are possible for each behavioral area—(1) Definite change noted: considerable worker action (assumption of "impact" tenable); (2) Little or no change noted: little or no worker activity (plausible to assume relationship between action and observed condition); (3) Definite change noted: little worker action (assume operation of an influence other than the worker); (4) Little or no change noted: considerable worker action (assume "resistant" area or inhibition of "expected" developments).

### *Results*

Very preliminary analysis of data, primarily from one group, shows a heterogeneous pattern of change. Definite changes were noted in reported behavior relating to the police and the business world; some change occurred in attitudes to and relations with white people; little or no change was noted in behavior relating to school, church, and drinking patterns. For the two areas in which definite change occurred, the direction was in line with the Project's stated aims.

For example, an analysis of thirteen types of "police-oriented" acts, both actional and attitudinal, shows (1) little change in manifestation of "positive" behavior towards police during the first three phases; (2) a concurrent but uneven diminution in overtly antagonistic behavior; and (3) a clear rise in "nonhostile" and a fall in "hostile" behavior for the last phase, reversing the situation of phase one. These trends may be attributed primarily to two factors: (1) The worker was particularly active in this area, manifesting strong motivation to alter attitudes to police, and working to weaken an initial perception of police as an institutionalized enemy. (2) The group became increasingly involved in collective enterprises (staging suppers, dances, etc.) which entailed direct interaction with police. As inter-

action increased, opportunity for "nonhostile orientation" increased, contributing, especially in the last phase, to the observed up-trend.[9]

Analysis of a limited number of behavioral areas for this one group seems to indicate that change was most likely to be great in those areas where worker activity was heaviest. For the "negligible change" areas ("church" and "alcohol") virtually no worker action was noted.

*Interpretation*

Findings referring to law-violating behavior appear to indicate that the broad trends in group behavior change were more a function of the continued presence of a worker than of differences among the workers in competence and procedural emphasis. Very preliminary analysis of data referring to all types of behavior indicates that different degrees of change in various behavioral areas within the over-all pattern can be related to interworker differences in approach and attributes. Determination of which behavioral areas appear to have greater and less change potential and delineation of factors which appear to induce or inhibit change in each area will be an objective in the further analysis of these voluminous data.

## DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNITY RELATIONAL SYSTEMS

Perhaps the most important criterion of the effectiveness of a program of the sort under consideration here is the extent to which it produces long-term impact on relationships among various community groups. Changes of this type, while difficult to measure quantitatively, nevertheless comprise a qualitative index of utmost importance. Since reports on changes of this type appear elsewhere, only a highly condensed summary of findings is presented.[10]

*Method*

A wide range of documents reporting relevant events—newspapers, committee minutes, worker reports, interviews with community adults, and so on—related to Project groups, neighborhood adults, community organizations, municipal departments, and so on were examined to ascertain intra- and inter-group relationships. Developments were recorded on chronological charts and trends delineated.

*Results*

Impact of varying types on established relations between the Project and a wide range of community groups was noted. Maximum impact was made on groups closest to the area of direct Project operations, with a widening circle of progressively lesser impact on groups farther removed. Within the primary target, the corner-group subunits, worker action tended to produce a series of factional splits as the center of gravity of the group shifted towards an increasing emphasis on law-abiding behavior as a major basis of intragroup status. Efforts by workers to keep law-abiding and law-violating factions within a single solidary unit were successful in some instances.

Relations between age-graded subunits within the larger corner group tended to weaken as the workers increasingly assumed a range of functions —instruction, advice, protection, and so on—formerly assumed by "brother" subunits for one another. Similarly, relational ties between groups and neighborhood adults, who customarily perform a range of functions for corner groups, were weakened as workers took over important parts of these functions.

A highly significant change occurred in the system of role definitions in the adolescent community. A new role, that of "corner-group social worker," became established and was added to the list of other recognized roles customarily filled by nonlocal adults: cop, pimp, pusher, queer, truant officer. The social worker was defined as someone who helps kids, can be trusted, and adds to the "rep" of groups which have one.

During initial stages, the Project's operations were regarded with considerable suspicion by community service and welfare agencies. As the program progressed, this suspicion diminished most rapidly among those groups closest to actual Project operations; during later stages, some agencies became strong supporters of the Project while others remained dubious or antagonistic. Local settlement houses in particular came to espouse Project methods, seeing in this approach a solution to their problems of coping with disruptive youngsters. Following the termination of the Project several local agencies instituted certain of the Project's methods —in particular, that of corner-group work. Although it is somewhat early to evaluate these measures, it appears very likely that their impact ranged from negligible to actual aggravation of conditions. The reason for this was that these programs were fragmentary, inadequately staffed, and lacked the degree of administrative sophistication and practice skill necessary to effective implementation.

On the municipal level, the Project's Central Administrative Committee, composed of representatives of the city's major youth agencies—police, courts, schools, churches, public recreation, state youth corrections, private welfare —became progressively dissatisfied with the Project. Conflicts between the Project's supporters and detractors resulted in angry resignations from the Committee, demands for censorship of all reports released by the Project, and friction with the Youth Corrections Department, which ordered several Department parolees not to participate in Project activities.

At the expiration of the Project's three-year demonstration period, strong pressure from the local community for service continuation resulted in a plan for instituting a city-wide delinquency prevention program under joint state and municipal auspices. This plan, lacking adequate support from the Central Committee, was not accepted by the Mayor and Governor and a subsequent scaled down proposal was defeated by legislative action. As of the present writing, no official action has been taken to implement the widely disseminated findings and recommendations of the Project.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The findings reported in prior sections may now be brought to bear on the major questions previously cited. Phrased in somewhat broader terms these are: Did Project activities produce a significant impact on patterns of law-violating behavior of target groups? To what extent were the observed changes those desired—that is, in the direction of the Project's stated aims? How lasting were these changes, and to what extent did observed impact extend beyond those groups which were the immediate object of action? To what extent was the nature, magnitude, and "permanence" of observed changes

[9] Additional analysis of change in this area as related to worker action, as well as analysis of change in the seventy behavioral areas for the seven groups, will be included in the final report on the Boston Delinquency Project, scheduled to appear in late 1959.

[10] Walter Miller, "The Impact of a Community Group Work Program on Delinquent Corner Groups," *Social Service Review*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (December 1957), pp. 390–406, and "Inter-institutional Conflict as a Major Impediment to Delinquency Prevention," *Human Organization*, Vol. 17, No. 2.

commensurate with the amount of effort and money necessary to produce them? Only preliminary and highly condensed answers can be given here; more detailed treatment will appear in the Project's final report.

Data presented here appear to lend substantial support to the conclusion that there was a definite and measurable impact on patterns of group behavior during the period of the Project's operations—an impact which entailed a reduction in existing rates of law-violating behavior and/or the inhibition of expected incidence of such behavior. Decrease in frequency of law-violating behavior appeared most marked during earlier phases of worker contact; during later phases an "equilibrium-restoring" effect, related in some degree to the worker's departure and developments involving groups outside the area of intensive operations, appeared to result in an increase in incidence, whose net effect, however, did not raise the final all-group incidence rates to the initial levels.

Unsystematic analysis of post-Project developments appears to indicate that the resurgence of delinquency constituted a fairly brief phase for some groups. Groups manifesting more lasting effects appeared to be those which had experienced longer periods of consistent contact and for whom worker efforts had furnished the most consistent image both of the feasibility and desirability of a law-abiding way of life.

Events in the larger community reflecting Project activity indicate several conclusions documented only indirectly by the data presented here. I would speculate that the degree of impact produced by the Boston Delinquency Project does not represent the true potential of this method and its developed operating rationale. Efficient implementation of planned operating methods was substantially restricted by a set of factors by no means extrinsic to the nature of of the operations, resulting primarily in limiting Project operations to a time period considerably shorter than that required for a fair test and in blocking or hampering the efficient execution of important implemental measures.

This would suggest an implication of fundamental importance for communities which are presently applying or considering applying this method. The corner-group method for inducing behavior change in adolescent groups has an excellent potential for controlling delinquency during the years of adolescence. But programs must be planned with great care and executed with a high degree of excellence. The application of this method, which operates in a dangerous and highly charged area and taps emotional forces of great intensity, has an explosive potential. If executed inefficiently and with limited perspectives, it may result, at best, in negligible impact and, at worst, in severe damage and an aggravation of the situation. Planning, then, must be extensive both in time and space and operations must be administered and executed by a staff of the highest personal competence and sophistication. This requires, of course, financing considerably in excess of what is generally allotted to such operations to make possible programs administered on a permanent basis by knowledgeable and enlightened executive bodies. To the extent to which these conditions are achieved, the method will realize its potential.

# Preventive Work With Street-Corner Groups: Hyde Park Youth Project, Chicago

By JOHN M. GANDY

ABSTRACT: Group work with predelinquent youths outside of building-centered programs is an aspect of delinquency prevention to which settlement houses, neighborhood centers, and youth-servicing agencies are increasingly giving attention. Such group work follows the same general pattern as work with delinquent gangs, but there are significant differences in the nature and intensity of the workers' relationships with parents and other adults which have to be observed. The Hyde Park Youth Project, described in this paper, selected groups of teen-age youths who were believed to have a high potential for delinquent behavior and provided them with intensive staff service for periods from six to eighteen months. A comparison of the frequency of individual antisocial behavior at the outset of the staff service and termination indicated that the youths who were participating in little or no antisocial behavior when staff service was first provided continued to avoid delinquency. The staff was least successful with youths who, at time of first contact, already had a history of antisocial behavior.

*John M. Gandy, Toronto, Canada, is Director of Research and Planning of the Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto. He was Assistant Director of Research, Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago from 1952 to 1954 and Director of Research, Hyde Park Youth Project, 1955 to 1958. Mr. Gandy has been a lecturer at the School of Social Work of the University of Chicago.*

THE Hyde Park Youth Project, financed through a grant from the Wieboldt Foundation, was established in 1955 by the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago. Its aim was to experiment with ways of developing "a co-ordinated community-centered juvenile delinquency prevention and control program." The over-all project plan provided for the following four interrelated program emphases: casefinding-diagnosis-referral; treatment; community organization; and work with street clubs.[1] Although the focus of the whole Project was prevention and control of juvenile delinquency through a co-ordinated approach, only that aspect of the Project's work with street clubs will be described here. A full report on the total Project will be published early in 1959.

## THE SETTING

Communication of the experiences of the Project in working with street clubs will have little value unless the reader has a picture of the community in which the service was provided, in this case that part of Chicago known as Hyde Park. This community is an area of about three square miles surrounding the University of Chicago. It has been described as an "old, socially descending neighborhood of diverse classes and values, struck with a recent acceleration of in-migration of people whose values are in contrast with the traditions of the area." [2]

In 1955 the area had an estimated population of 45,000 of which approximately one-third was Negro. Although the size of the population has changed little in recent years, there has been a marked change in the racial composition. In the five years, 1950–1955, the number of nonwhites (primarily Negroes) living in the area increased from 2,700 to 14,500—over 400 per cent. In the same period the white population decreased 30 per cent. In the three years of the Project's operation there was further increase in the nonwhite population but at a much lower rate. Accompanying the change in the racial composition was an increase in the number and proportion of low-income families in what had, heretofore, been a residential area for students and middle- and upper-middle-income families. The increase in low-income families was accelerated by the announcement of plans for a large redevelopment project. Middle-income families quickly moved out of buildings scheduled for destruction, and this void was filled by low-income families willing to accept the uncertainty of almost a month-to-month living arrangement.

In 1955 the rate of arrests of juveniles in Hyde Park was about six out of every hundred boys and girls of juvenile court age. When compared with the other police districts in the City of Chicago, the rate for this community was about in the middle range. As with other communities in the city, the ratio of arrests of boys to girls was about three to one.

Hyde Park was selected as the setting for the Project because the community seemed to have many of the characteristics of other urban areas in transition but, at the same time, had sufficient stability and resources to offer promise for the development of a delinquency prevention program limited to a three-year period.

An important aspect of Hyde Park was the large number of community groups concerned about, and working for, the improvement of the community. Among these were: The Hyde Park Neighborhood Club, a nonsectarian community center; The Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference, organized to build and maintain a "stable interracial community of high standards"; the South East Chicago Commission, whose activities include support of an active program of urban renewal and law enforcement; and several strong parent-teacher associations. These community groups received much support from academic and professional groups in the community and their membership drew heavily on them.

The community is dominated by the University of Chicago. This, coupled with the existence of concerned community groups, made Hyde Park different from many of the communities in which intensive work has been done with street gangs. Hyde Park, however, is similar to many older residential areas, in cities from Maine to California, where changing standards and physical deterioration provide an environment in which the incidence of both individual and group delinquency is the pattern. In many such communities, gangs have become a major cultural institution, whose values are in many ways opposed to those of a larger society about them. They express and teach a sort of warfare with conventional values and become major sources of hostile, aggressive behavior that represents a threat to the community, its citizens, and their property.[3]

In contrast with many other similar programs, the Project's work with street clubs was an extension of the program of an established social agency. Professional services were provided on a contractual basis by the Hyde Park Neighborhood Club, a long-established group work agency. The Neighborhood Club worked with the Project staff to design the plan for work with the street clubs and provided the professional supervision of the workers employed. The street-club workers maintained offices both at the Project and at the Neighborhood Club. Throughout the life of the Project these workers were considered staff members of the Club, although most of their work was with groups outside the building and with individual youths who were not members of the Club.

The Project's approach to the work with street clubs was based on the assumption—stated in one of its publications—that "youths with problems of social maladjustment who are not presently adequately served by the community agencies can be brought into positive involvement with community agencies and institutions through the efforts of a street club worker who is identified with a neighborhood-centered agency. This process will result in better group and individual adjustment." [4] These assumptions formed the base for the following specific goals: Cultivation of positive relationships between the street club and community institutions; Cultivation of positive relationships between street clubs and other youth and youth groups in the community; Reduction of antisocial behavior on the part of street clubs; Furthering acceptance, by the street clubs and their members,

[1] The term "street club" is used throughout this paper to describe the groupings of youths worked with primarily outside of the building-centered programs of the community agencies. The term is synonymous with street-corner groups, however, some "street clubs" would be too loosely organized to be considered a "gang."

[2] Ralph Fertig, Fritz Mosher and John Gandy, "An Examination and Analysis of Techniques Used by a Street Club Worker in Handling Anti-social Behavior of Youths Served in the Street Club Program and an Exploration of the Process of Referral of Street Club Members and Their Families for Casework Service." Mimeographed. (Chicago: May 1957), p. iii.

[3] For an excellent analysis of this process see: Albert Cohen, *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955).

[4] Ralph D. Fertig, "Reaching, Redirecting and Research with Youth." Mimeographed. (Chicago: November 1956), p. 1.

of the value system of the larger community; Assisting individual group members to understand and cope with personal problems affecting their adjustment to group and community life; and Assisting the street clubs to meet the needs of their members in a constructive manner.

As with most direct service programs, the Project was faced with the problem of setting some limits on the types of groups to be served. The following criteria for the provision of staff service to a street club were developed out of the Project's early experiences:

- The group selected for service must be either a group or a collection of individuals who share a meeting place or recreational or other interests in the Hyde Park area.
- The group must be one that has demonstrated antisocial tendencies or strong potential for antisocial tendencies.
- There must be community anxiety about the group.
- The over-all impact on the whole community which would probably result from working with the particular group must be considered.
- There must be a consideration of how effectively the group can be helped by the services of the street club worker.
- The group must be one not presently adequately served by community agencies and institutions.

### GROUPS SERVED

The 3 street club workers served a total of 11 street clubs in the three-year period. These clubs ranged in size from 9 to 36, with a combined membership in excess of 300. Three of the clubs were all Negro, 6 were all white, and in 2 clubs the membership was racially heterogeneous. One of the all-white clubs was co-ed.

In the main, the members of the clubs were from families that were among the least secure economically in the community and that had little formal education. The families of many of these boys were regarded by most people in the community as undesirable. The families themselves felt that the community was hoping to get rid of them through the redevelopment plan. In addition to the tensions created by such covert and overt hostility on the part of the larger community, tension was increased by the influx into the community of Negro teen-agers who competed with the resident boys and girls for recreational facilities.

Despite the tension and anxiety in the community, there had been only isolated instances of group conflict between the various street clubs at the time the Project began operation. Group antisocial activity consisted mainly of thefts, intraclub fights, and isolated assaults on individuals, many of whom were men students from the University. The behavior that was creating the most concern was loitering on corners, blocking of sidewalks, vandalism, profanity, and boisterousness. Such behavior on the part of youth was creating fear and hostility among adults, and this, in turn, tended to exacerbate the fears and anxieties of the teen-agers.

Local situations have often made it necessary to provide initial services to street clubs or gangs on the basis of meeting a series of emergency situations. In Hyde Park, however, the job was conceived as having a large component of prevention in it, due to the timing of the introduction of the service and the dynamics of the community. Nevertheless, this did not mean that the major goals and objectives were essentially different from what they would have been if the situation had been one of an emergent nature.



### NATURE OF STREET CLUB WORK

No attempt will be made here to report on the details of the staff's work with the eleven groups. Some emphases and approaches in that work will, however, be described. This seems indicated because, while there is an abundance of literature on work with delinquent gangs in very disorganized communities, little attention has been paid to work with marginal groups in urban areas in which there is some strength and vitality in the social fabric.

In establishing a working relationship with the street club members, the Project staff found that it was necessary to employ much the same techniques as those described by the New York City Youth Board and other agencies that work with gangs or street-corner groups —that is, "hanging around," gaining the group's confidence through concern for them, and so on. After the initial acceptance by the group the worker would try to establish himself as a representative of the community and its values, for it was held that the worker must play the role of an understanding and interested adult and one who is symbolic of the controls of the larger community. This did not mean that the worker would not try to help youths reach an adjustment with the police or the courts. He was consistent, however, in not giving them support in, or excuses for, antisocial behavior. Such a position puts many stresses on the relationship between club members and worker, but it was found that a consistent and "above-board" approach in this regard paid dividends.

Another dimension of the work that was found to be important but that has received little more than cursory attention in the literature is the role, "significant male." Many of the youths participating in the street clubs came from homes from which fathers were absent. In other homes the father was often dependent emotionally and/or financially on the mother, and this dependency was overlaid with considerable hostility. In many instances the father's hostility over his failure as head of the family and resulting dependence was directed toward the son when he reached adolescence. Youths from such families seek an adult man who will epitomize the strength and decisiveness that they do not find at home, and they frequently look to the social worker to fill such a role. It was recognized that a relationship of this sort is fraught with emotional dangers (for workers cannot really play the part of father), but these can be greatly reduced when the insight and training of the worker are such that he recognizes the difficulties or redefines the relationship when this is indicated.

In working with predelinquent youths, it was also found that successful relations and work with parents were possible. In all the groups, workers received many requests for help with the members' problems. Although many of these problems related to the group and its activities, there are other more personal problems, such as permits for jobs, school transfers, appearances in family court, and so on, in which it was necessary to contact the family. In some instances the worker was asked by the family for help with a problem; more frequently he was able to help the family understand the problems and needs of their teen-age child a little better. Here also, as in many of his other relationships, the worker had to have enough understanding of the dynamics of behavior, and particularly parent-child behavior, to use this relationship constructively. He also had to know community resources and their strengths and limitations.

Workers with predelinquent groups undoubtedly encounter less initial re-

sistance from their clients, but the demands on them for skill and understanding seem to be as great as, if not greater than, in work with groups that have a history of delinquency. Workers definitely need more than the ability to get acceptance, to show concern, and to manipulate situations. They must also understand both individual and group dynamics, the structure of the correctional and law-enforcement agencies, and the community's health and welfare services. Although the exact nature of the preparation for the job may lend itself to some differences of opinion, the demands are too great for the well-intentioned, dedicated, but untrained person to be successful at it.

### THE STREET CLUB AND THE ADULT COMMUNITY [5]

Little has been written about the nature and degree of the involvement of the adult community in work with street-corner groups. With well-organized groups, the antagonisms and conflict between them and adults and organized adult groups in the community may restrict the worker's role as a liaison person. In fact the worker is sometimes identified as a protector of the street-corner group in the face of demands for repressive and often punitive police action.

As was pointed out earlier, Hyde Park contained a number of groups concerned with the social problems of the neighborhood. The most promising of these with regard to the development of an understanding of the problems of the street clubs were the "block clubs" of the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference. These clubs also represented a channel for transmitting some of the concerns of the adult community to the youths. These groups were usually composed of from 10 to 20 adults who dealt with the problems of areas one or two blocks in size. They often included in their membership individuals who were willing to devote some time and effort to the problem.

From the outset, the staff gave much thought to the question of how best to use the block clubs in their work. As it developed, the workers served as liaison between the block clubs, individual adults, and the youths, seeking to achieve understanding and respect between them. They would arrange conferences between street-club members and representatives of the block club, would get the block club to finance projects such as weekend camping trips for the boys, and occasionally would get a few adults to meet the needs of the youths for specific things, such as after-school jobs. In order to reduce the tension between the adults and teenagers, the worker had to be prepared to spend much time with adults, both individually and in groups, and to create lines of communication between them and the street-corner clubs. In order to do this, the worker had to be identified by the youths and the adults as a representative of the adult community. To the youths he had also to be a representative who would not compromise their interests; at the same time he had to avoid overidentification with the youths in the eyes of the adults. It was found that in this role the worker had to expect and accept numerous setbacks. He also had to be able to handle problems of relationships quickly and decisively, for relationships of this sort deteriorate very quickly.

### SUCCESS OF THE PROGRAM

The reduction of antisocial behavior was selected as the goal of the Street Club Project that lent itself to some degree for objective measurement of the Project's results. It is believed that tools might have been developed to measure the changes in the relationships between the street clubs and the organized adult community and the changes in attitudes and behavior between peer groups if additional staff had been available. Both of these areas offer considerable promise for further research.

In selecting this measure of the success or failure of the Project's work with the Street Clubs, we were not unmindful of problems and limitations. The most apparent was the inaccuracy of police statistics on arrests as a measure of reduction in delinquency, for the majority of antisocial acts do not result in arrests. Another limitation was the variation in law-enforcement policy, particularly in the number and activity of police and, to a lesser extent, the relationship of the worker with the police. However, despite these limitations it was recognized that police statistics would have to represent the basic data on which to build any assessment of change in the volume of antisocial behavior.

To supplement data from the police and law-enforcement agencies, we decided to use two other sources of data to evaluate the level of antisocial behavior: The workers' contacts with schools, civic groups, merchants, other groups and prevention agencies; and The workers' own knowledge of delinquent incidents. With regard to the latter, it was found that the worker who had been with a street club for a long time had knowledge of both individual and group delinquency and was able to evaluate the information that came to him from the boys.

The three major sources of information—police and court statistics, reports from community institutions and agencies, and individual worker's impressions—were combined as an index of the extent of antisocial behavior of the individuals comprising the street clubs served by the Project. In defining antisocial behavior, only those acts that were actionable under the laws affecting juveniles in Illinois were included. This too was recognized as a limitation, but it was found to be impracticable to try to differentiate the type and quality of antisocial acts. In addition, it was not considered feasible to attempt to measure the amount of group antisocial behavior since very little antisocial behavior involved all or the majority of any group.

In addition to the frequency of occurrence of antisocial behavior, it was necessary to relate these acts to two dates: the time of the worker's initial contact with a group and the time of termination of contact. In order to compensate for the problems that would have been encountered in attempting to set a specific day on which to rate the youths, workers were given the following instructions:

> Each member of a group served by the street club workers is to be rated twice. The worker will use the arrest records on file at the Project office, his own personal knowledge, diary material, and other records available to him to determine the level of participation of each individual in antisocial activities. The rating made as of the beginning of contact should cover a four-month period—the three months immediately preceding the time when he took responsibility for working with the group or when an individual youth joined the group and a one-month period following the worker's acceptance of responsibility for the group. The rating made at termination of his contact with the group should cover the three-month period prior to termination or prior to an individual youth's leaving the group.

The frequency of participation in antisocial behavior at the beginning of the contact and at termination was

[5] For a full discussion of the points summarized here see: W. E. Watson and John Gandy, "An Analysis of The Dynamics of the Inter-Relationship of Agency, Group and Community in Providing Staff Service to a 'Street Club'," Hyde Park Youth Project, Chicago (Mimeographed) March, 1958.

measured along the following scale, which allows for five levels of participation and also includes two categories reflecting the inaccessibility of certain youths, either because they were no longer in the community or because they were in one of the state institutions for juvenile offenders.

### RANKING AND FREQUENCY OF DELINQUENCY

1. No known or suspected participation in antisocial activity.
2. Not verified but considerable suspected participation in antisocial activity. The boy's name did not occur on lists of police arrests and the worker did not have positive knowledge of antisocial acts on the boy's part, but it was generally understood by the other boys in the group and by the worker that participation in such acts was frequent.
3. Seldom participates in antisocial activity. The worker had knowledge of antisocial acts on the boy's part occurring once every six months or less.
4. Occasionally participates in antisocial activity. The worker had knowledge of antisocial acts occurring not more than once every two months or less than once every five months.
5. Frequently participates in antisocial activity. The worker had knowledge of antisocial acts occurring once a month or more.
6. Institutionalized at the time of rating.
7. Unable to classify.

Table 1 presents the rankings of the youths at the time of first contact by the workers and at the time of termination of contact. These ratings show the following:

There was some reduction in the frequency of antisocial behavior on the part of 151 (46 per cent) youths.

For 130 youths the ratings were the same at termination as they had been at the beginning. Seventy-three of these (more than half of this group) had no known or suspected participation in antisocial behavior at the outset or at the end. The other 57, who were at the same level of suspected or verified participation in antisocial activity at the termination as at the beginning of contact, accounted for 17 per cent of all youths served.

Thirty-four youths (10 per cent of the total) showed more delinquent behavior at termination than at the beginning of contact. This latter category included youths who were sentenced to an institution.

Of the 156 youths found not to be participating in antisocial activities at termination, almost half (73) were so classified at the beginning of the contact. Of the remaining 83 youths, 22 were only suspected of antisocial behavior at the outset. Therefore, for 95 of the 156 youths who showed the least frequency of antisocial behavior at termination, the worker had not been able to verify any antisocial behavior at the beginning of the contact.

Sixty-one youths with no known or suspected antisocial behavior at termination were found to be participants in antisocial behavior at the time of initial contact. With this group there had been a reduction in frequency, with the largest group moving from "seldom participating" to "no participation." Only 9 youths, however, moved from "frequent participation" to "no participation."

The Project enjoyed less success with the youths who had been "frequent participators" at the outset. Of the 83 in this group, 32 (more than one-third) were either in the same group or insti-



TABLE 1—FREQUENCY OF PARTICIPATION IN ANTISOCIAL ACTIVITIES OF MEMBERS OF STREET CLUBS SERVED BY THE HYDE PARK YOUTH PROJECT

| BEGINNING | TOTAL | TERMINATION | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | NO KNOWN OR SUSPECTED PARTICIPATION | NO VERIFIED BUT CONSIDERABLE SUSPECTED PARTICIPATION | SELDOM PARTICIPATED | OCCASIONAL PARTICIPATION | FREQUENT PARTICIPATION | INSTITUTIONALIZED AT TIME OF RATING | UNABLE TO CLASSIFY | UNKNOWN |
| TOTAL | 326 | 156 | 47 | 41 | 23 | 31 | 17 | 8 | 3 |
| No Known or Suspected Participation | 84 | 73 | 1 | 2 | 1 | | 5 | 2 | |
| No Verified but Considerable Suspected Participation | 46 | 22 | 17 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | |
| Seldom Participated | 56 | 32 | 5 | 13 | 3 | 2 | | 1 | |
| Occasional Participation | 54 | 20 | 10 | 14 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | |
| Frequent Participation | 83 | 9 | 14 | 11 | 14 | 24 | 8 | 3 | |
| Institutionalized at Time of Rating | | | | | | | | | |
| Unable to Classify | | | | | | | | | |
| Unknown | 3 | | | | | | | | 3 |

*tutionalized* at the time of termination. This compares with 9 out of 54 ranked as "occasional participators" at the outset who stayed in the same category or retrogressed, and 18 out of 56 in the category "seldom participated."

The maximum amount of reduction in frequency of antisocial behavior was made by only 9 youth, 11 per cent of those for whom such a reduction was possible. At the other end of the scale, only 5 youths retrogressed the maximum distance on the scale.

The total picture, then, was one of little increase and some decrease in the frequency of antisocial behavior by the youths when the two points in time were compared. The Project, however, enjoyed its greatest success with youths who had had little or no recent history of antisocial behavior at time of first contact. For a number of the youths who had a recent history of antisocial behavior at the beginning of the contact, there was some reduction in antisocial behavior, but few of them achieved the ranking of no known participation at time of termination.

The research design did not provide for an assessment of the contribution of the staff person to the reduction in the frequency of the individual antisocial behavior of the members of these street clubs. The Project staff, the police, and the community generally are in agreement, however, that the frequency of antisocial behavior was probably considerably less than the potential seemed to indicate at the outset of the Project.

The fact that a large proportion of the youths did not become chronic delinquents should not overshadow the high delinquency potential of these youths. These were children living in a changing and anxiety-ridden community, many were from broken and disorganized homes, and as a group they were in a hostile and unaccepting community. Most of the situations and circumstances that have been found to co-exist with the high incidence of antisocial behavior were present.

While claims of great success are not necessary or warranted, it is believed that the Project demonstrated that work with street clubs, or other groupings of youth with a high delinquency potential, is an effective approach to the prevention of delinquency. It is also believed that, as contrasted with work with delinquent groups, which is usually carried on outside the framework of community agencies, work with predelinquent groups can be done within the framework of existing community agencies. The experiences of the Project also suggest that group work and recreation agencies should seriously consider the assignment of a larger proportion of staff time to groupings of youths whose social adjustment is of concern to the community but who may not be ready to join a building-centered program.

# An Experiment in Reaching Asocial Adolescents Through Group Therapy

By MARION STRANAHAN AND CECILE SCHWARTZMAN

ABSTRACT: Many disturbed, potentially delinquent boys and girls by the time they are adolescent have become unreachable by all the ordinary means available in even a highly urbanized community with highly developed resources. This experiment was devised and developed in an effort to reach these adolescents in groups. To establish any measure of therapy required intensive work within the groups and later additionally in their community relationships. The attitude of the therapist that proved successful in setting up the right atmosphere with the members of the groups had to begin with the first contact. Boys' groups show clearer stages of evolution than the girls'. Certain trends in their behavior reveal the boys' maturation, for example, their behavior in the group concerning refreshments. The girls show dissimilar reactions but even more intense and complicated problems. For both boys and girls, once a certain amount of closeness and trust is established, show their need for and accept help outside the group and in their community contacts. Not only the therapist but a staff trained in special fields were needed to change these contacts to workable relationships. The degree of success is not easy to evaluate for the future, but to date there is a genuine basis for considering the experiment successful. The adolescents in the main seek out social relationships and have a greatly improved appreciation for education, work, and community authorities.

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*Marion Stranahan, M.D., New York City, is a psychiatrist and serves as Clinic Director of the Girls' Service League, Chief Psychiatrist of the Foster Home Bureau of Children's Aid Society and is in private practice.*

*Cecile Schwartzman, Psychiatric Social Worker, New York City, is Director of the Group Therapy Program of the Girls' Service League.*

THE Girls' Service League Group Psychotherapy Project was initiated in May 1951, under the auspices of the New York City Youth Board as a demonstration program. The purposes of this experiment were to develop techniques of group therapy which could be used with adolescents who were unsuitable for individual treatment and for whom there were no appropriate community resources. The adolescents referred to the Project had been chronically in trouble at school and in the community, and efforts by social agencies to reach them either through individual treatment or their families had been unsuccessful. The majority referred were Negro and Puerto Rican boys and girls, 13 to 15 years of age. All came from extremely deprived backgrounds, socially, economically, and emotionally.

The adolescents were predominantly selected on the relatively crude, practical basis of, first, being severe school problems because of their impulsive and destructive behavior. They were guilty, for example, of fighting, stealing, insubordination, and truancy. They also had marked learning difficulties and retarded reading capacity. The second basis on which they were chosen was their lack of response to the efforts of the social agencies and school to reach them. Likewise, their parents could not or would not respond to any guidance or social agency program.

Diagnostically these boys and girls appeared from their behavior and histories to be chiefly suffering from character disorders, with some having neurotic features and a few being borderline psychotics. A few of the group members were withdrawn and inhibited rather than the "acting-out" type. For example, one boy came to the group meetings but never spoke or actively participated until the end of the second year. Their extreme suspiciousness, anxiety, and lack of verbalization ruled out individual interviews, which could have given us a sharper clinical picture.

The boys' and girls' groups were set up with eight to ten members each; they met once a week for one hour and a half. The families of the majority were dependent on Department of Welfare assistance or had marginal incomes. Most homes were broken, and where there were fathers in the homes, it was rare to find one with employable skill. Many of the adolescents, on one or more occasions when younger, had been deserted or sent precipitately to reluctant relatives, some having gone from teeming Harlem to rural southern areas and back again.

## Establishing a Base for Psychotherapy

Although these boys and girls seemed to be extremely unpromising candidates for intensive psychotherapy, it still seemed valuable to examine some of the requirements for success in such therapy in order to determine to what extent these adolescents did or did not meet requirements. Whenever they did not, we would have to experiment until we had devised methods which might develop insight, control, and maturity. We believed the potential for such development did exist among these adolescents.

Successful intensive psychotherapy with adults requires, first, that the therapist be not only properly trained, but also capable of a genuine acceptance of and empathy for the patient with all his weaknesses and symptomatology as well as his potential or demonstrated strengths. Second, the efficacious therapeutic methods depend on the therapist's wisely timed interpretations regarding the patient's thoughts, attitudes, behavior and relationships. These interpretations illuminate for the patient how internal and external experiences that



occurred during his formative years still exercise power over him.

Third, the patient himself must have a certain capacity for insight, a degree of flexibility, and a desire for change and growth. To have these qualifications, the patient has to have had early in life some experience with people in authority who possessed some measure of steadiness, hopefulness, direction, and maturity. Desirably these authorities would be parents or substitute parents, but if not there must be, somewhere in the patient's developmental years, some individuals—teachers, relatives, physicians, members of the clergy, local leaders of all kinds, employers—who acted parentally toward him. These experiences permit potential trust, respect, and love for an authority figure such as the therapist represents, which makes psychotherapy possible. Furthermore, communication through verbalization must be a reasonably natural and important means of communication for the patient.

In considering adolescents for intensive therapy, we find that characteristically they have much less insight than adults; have a flexibility more sharply fluctuating, and goals for their own changes and growth that shift all too easily and suddenly. They may know where they have failed in the community, but they usually have little or no idea why.

The particular adolescents with whom our Project deals especially lack insight. They usually say they do not know why they were sent to the group and place all of the blame on "mean teachers." Their flexibility—that is, their capacity to adjust to new ideas and experiences, as compared with average adolescents—is unbelievably reduced. The absence of any goals as to their own changes is striking. They seem literally incapable of picturing any real betterment. Their experiences with good authorities have been and are distinctly more infrequent than is the case with adolescents usually seen in therapy. In fact, these experiences have been dangerously reduced and have been too fragmentary, not only at home but in the neighborhood, clinics, schools, playgrounds and churches with which they are more or less acquainted. These boys and girls have every reason to expect capricious, uncomprehending, selfish, exploitative, and frequently cruel or neglectful handling by adults.

Most of them have no ability to read and certainly no awareness of the intellectual life that uses and values good books. Lacking this, they have never learned of other kinds of people and ways of life. Therefore, their ego development is so attenuated that even the most casual contacts with them, not to mention the therapeutic, are difficult to make. Verbalization is not their main medium of communication. In fact, any pressure on them to verbalize intensifies their uncommunicativeness and reticence. Even under the most favorable circumstances, their verbalizing to an authority figure consists mainly of blanket denials and flagrant evasions.

To treat such adolescents, the therapist should have both the aforementioned skills and additional ones, as well as special personal traits and experience. The only methods of interpretation that we find the therapist can use are those relating strictly to the children's current reality. Even these interpretations cannot be given until the group members have a long enough experience with the therapist to accept him or her as being really on their side.

## Initial Contact Between Therapist and Adolescent

Treatment begins with a personal interview between therapist and the individual boy or girl, its aim being to

acquaint the boy or girl with the purpose of the group. At this time, the Youth Board Referral Unit has already furnished us with a case summary covering whatever family and social information has been obtainable.

To begin with the program of treatment in its most concrete form is outlined. We tell the adolescent we think the group meetings will help him get along better in school and with his peers and adults. Further, not only the leader but the group will help him overcome his problems. To show him respect, we tell him we will treat his confidences as such and not set in motion any action relating to him unless he so approves—for example, making a school or home visit.

From this first interview, we have in mind to introduce as much as—but only as much as—the individual can assimilate of an ego-building honesty, directness, and expressed acknowledgment of his actual problems.

Despite these precautions and what we judge the most appropriate handling of the initial interviews, only a little more than half the candidates reach the group meetings. To continue the ego and relationship building, we use a number of measures. One is to notify each member of each meeting by letter. Meeting places are chosen with the nearness of the adolescents' homes in mind. Another is to meet their realistic needs for carfare and to be excused from school to attend meetings. These are given with the knowledge and intent of providing them with the wherewithal an adequate parent normally supplies. Through food and play equipment provided at each meeting, we make available satisfactions needed by adolescents in social settings. Several times a year a trip is decided upon jointly to give further pleasure and a knowledge of an unknown part of the community. These devices provide both a structure for the group sessions and, more important, a positive experience in being "given to" by a parental figure. It is our belief that by giving these children a positive experience with an accepting adult we disturb the premise on which so much of their behavior and attitudes are based; namely, that all adults want to deprive them of pleasure.

What we assumed we found true. These boys and girls are too infantile in their character development, too poorly related to adults, and too conditioned to language as a source of criticism, abuse, or confusion to be reached through discussion or oral interpretation for a long time. Whatever communication they can establish has to be through "living-out" experiences with adults. They cannot enter into the rapport needed for the usual psychotherapy until they have had experiences that convince them there is an adult devoted and respectful of their needs for safety, protection, fun, and recognition whom they can trust and love. Then comes the transition to "give and take" which eventually means they can "belong" to the group. They find in the therapist the needed parental person to believe in and with whom to identify in their approaches to themselves, adult authorities, and their peers. The therapist's actions and emotions provide their first healthy model and help them develop positive feelings and attitudes within the group.

## Evolution of Boys' Groups Towards Real Group Formation

From the first group meeting, purposeful and fair reality limits are set regarding injury to one another and to property. This is the first standard of behavior set for them. In learning to adhere to it the adolescents take the first step toward their development as group members. The process of adjustment to this gradually provides opportunities to connect their behavior in the group setting to the behavior in the school room and the community. Group members gradually see, with help, the effect of their behavior on each other and the quality of the meeting. The leader's fairness, they gradually discover, can be emulated and applied by themselves. They begin to have some pride and satisfaction in feeling part of a real group. However, as will be seen, there are long phases before this goal is reached.



The reactions of the boys in the course of approximately three years of weekly meetings showed four discernable though variable phases in all groups. There is an initial brief period of "good" behavior for several weeks, during which the boys are an assembly of individuals, little interested in one another, superficially polite and restrained in their behavior, language, and use of equipment. They behave as they think adults expect them to, and their relationship to the therapist as an authoritative figure is often expressed in calling him "teacher."

The second phase of treatment is characterized by resumption of their customary behavior. They display insatiable demands, rivalries, and aggressions. The intragroup relationships resemble those of much younger children. Communication is primarily around the use of equipment. Within the group, alliances which are primarily temporary and transient are formed, and these serve chiefly for mutual support. Leadership roles change constantly. At this time the boy who is physically strongest is often accepted as the leader. The primary relationship of the group members is not to each other but to the therapist, with each individual group member trying to be "first"; each wanting the most carfare, most turns at games, most refreshments and, of course, the most attention. There is constant testing to see what the therapist will tolerate or limit. This is the most difficult period in which to apply the needed controls and to maintain an attitude of confidence that the boys can conform to reality limits.

In the third stage there is a growing favorable reaction to the therapist, often characterized by dependency regarding school problems, difficulties at home, and employment. For example, a boy will walk up hastily to the therapist and say, "My father left last night" and just as hastily walk away. For further information, the leader has to seek out the boy during or after the meeting as seems wisest.

Another boy may come up and say he's in trouble at school. By this time, the boys have learned that the therapist always offers to go to their schools, when they are either in disciplinary or academic trouble. There has never been any promise as to what can be acomplished. In fact, the therapist has often stated doubts about the efficacy of a school visit, but nevertheless he does go. The frequent success of these efforts in any one boy's behalf emboldens them to make the request for visits. Rivalry that was formerly only for cakes or equipment now extends to rivalry for remedial tutoring and school visits.

A beginning identification with the therapist's approach to situations arises in the group in this third phase. For instance, one boy clowns, disrupting the meeting. Another says, "That's probably what got you in trouble at school." In the instance of a very sick boy, a group's duplication of the leader's attitude, though they were unaware of it, was quite exact and complete. They had always recognized this boy as different, whom they had never involved in their aggressions. After months of his passive, silent behavior they would ask him if he would like to join in the

games and have fun. If he was unwilling, they would drop it and not put any further pressure on him, exactly as the leader had done.

There are periods of regression to more childish behavior, particularly when new members are introduced into the group, but acting out behavior diminishes. In general, confidences have been given to the therapist, requests for constructive help have been made, the standards of the therapist are being incorporated by the group, and the boys become individually important to each other.

During the fourth phase, group solidarity deepens and concern for one another develops. There is an expansion of identification with the therapist's standards of behavior. They are able to accept responsibility for group behavior, and the therapist can now be less active. Individual verbalization increases and group discussions about problems, life situations, and future planning supplant the games and the physical activity. They refer to their former behavior with the superiority of an adolescent for a grade-school child.

### Changing Maturity and Eating

The boys' use of refreshments gives a simple, clear indication of their growing maturity. Throughout, the therapist provides the cake. Group members take turns going to the store to buy soda, for which money is given them. This is important in itself as it demonstrates the confidence placed in them. The boys make repeated reference to this trust, showing how much it is valued. The member who gets the soda is responsible for cleaning up and returning the bottles, in compensation for which he keeps the deposit money. During the early stage of group treatment, group members will discuss their hope that few members will attend the meeting so that there will be more cake and refreshments for those present. After the division of the refreshments, they choose who is to have leftovers. This is usually accompanied by argument and calls for the supervision of the therapist. Turns for getting the soda are zealously guarded in a bookkeeping notebook set up by the boys, which they request the therapist to keep. Initially the boys spend much time deciding how to handle any boy's absence at the time of his turn. Further, they do not sit down as a group to eat together. Their anxiety about eating in the presence of the group and the leader, they originally hide by eating while they play ping pong or roam about.

The observable changes around the handling of refreshments are evident in the group's constant faith that there will be enough cake for all. Leftovers are divided fairly as a matter of routine now. They are confident also in being given fair turns at buying soda. The one group that went into the fourth year was even reluctant to go for soda lest they miss something or disrupt the comfort they were finding in the group meeting. Gradually refreshment time becomes a relaxed period following group discussion or play, in which they sit down together to eat. This is, for most of the boys, literally the first experience of participating in the equivalent of a family mealtime. At home their families have no traditional standard for this and actually possess neither the space, the furniture, nor the dishes which would permit a meal together. As with the changing reactions to refreshments, the evolution of the group can be noted in the use of carfare and behavior during trips.

### Outstanding Differences in Girls' Groups

To a large extent, the girls' groups follow the same pattern as that of the boys. There are, however, some basic differences which require us to modify techniques. Play equipment is used to foster interaction and to relieve emotional tension, but remains of less importance because the freedom to verbalize develops much more quickly with the girls than with the boys. While they obviously want refreshments, they conceal any rivalry and even gratifications about receiving food. The girls express and provoke aggression in more subtle ways: grimacing, teasing, whispering, forming cliques that persist—often along racial lines. Cultural and racial differences lead to more tension in the group and more suspicion directed toward one another and toward the therapist. The Puerto Rican girls talk in Spanish, simulating a nonexistent intimacy, to shut out the Negro girls. The latter in turn talk knowingly and secretively about boys, aware that the Puerto Rican girls are too restricted in their activities with boys to go on dates or unchaperoned to dances.

One group was particularly difficult because there was an equal number of highly overactive, unsupervised, rebellious Negro girls and overprotected, withdrawn, Spanish-speaking Puerto Rican girls. The two rival groups formed gradually tightening cliques that divided the group in two, except for one Puerto Rican girl, Carmen, whose background of neglect and lack of supervision resembled the Negro girls' background. When an explosion seemed in the making, there occurred two meetings. Only one clique was present at the first meeting, while at the second only the other was there. Carmen, the exception, was present at both. On the occasion of these separate meetings, the therapist discussed the feelings and misinterpretations of the group present regarding the other group and explained the feelings and misinterpretations of the latter for them and how naturally this had evolved. Also, how on the one hand the therapist had been shut out by the Spanish and on the other by the whispering. Carmen, a welcome member of both cliques and a natural leader, understood the situation very well. She spontaneously confirmed the leader's explanations not only in the separate groups but when they were together. She was of major assistance in dissolving the defensive defiance and developing their previously concealed desire to become a unified group. Jointly they discussed their mutual suffering from racial discrimination and faced up to the therapist's carefully timed challenge to prove they could know each other, not as members of a given race, but as individuals. Once they started to work toward this goal, they became a real group and continued to be one for two more years.

### Therapist's Work in the Community

The groups we have been describing are those which continued for over three years and ended through such natural means as employment, entering service, or marriage. There is no space here to indicate in any adequate detail the thought, effort, technical knowledge, and work that goes into maintaining these groups, not only within, but outside the group meetings. If any boy or girl's home or school situation becomes acute or his absence gives the signal that such a crisis has probably arisen, immediate action on the part of the therapist to reach the boy or girl directly is necessary. To delay doing so usually means the intensification of some realistic crisis to the point where extricating the adolescent is considerably more difficult.

No matter how acute the school, home, or community situation is, to do more than talk with the adolescent, unless he is really ready to accept any further action, will almost inevitably alienate him. To get the adolescent

ready for any intervention in his behalf, his fear that the therapist is going to be influenced by or combine with other authorities against him must be reduced to such proportions that he trusts the therapist to intervene. Once a home or school contact is made, the therapist may be sure a series of such contacts will be needed and must be made.

### NEED FOR SPECIALLY TRAINED STAFF

These adolescents have other problems whose solution calls for evaluation of their physical condition, intelligence, academic achievement, vocational aptitude, and remedial tutoring. These problems may or may not be known to them but almost without exception they will not ask for such help. Even with much preparation they can rarely face the usual community agencies that cover these fields. Almost as often these resources will not accept them either, because they do not consider them responsive and potentially successful clients. Particularly in relation to psychological testing and tutoring, which is so sharply identified with school failure by the group members, there is much less fear in going to see specialists they know to be part of the staff.

The Project therefore expanded its staff to include carefully selected and prepared experts. With this arrangement, the psychological evaluation can be completed and work can begin before the school situation is too critical or is lost altogether. Nevertheless, each group member has to be escorted by the therapist to the first appointment with any new specialist. To understand how essential and rational these arrangements are, one has to remember that so many people so often have evaluated these adolescents negatively. Only such experts as can appreciate the terror with which these adolescents expose themselves to evaluation by another and unknown authority and who, furthermore, have the essential conviction that working with them is valuable can succeed with them. These experts have to be both flexible and creative, not only to get the maximal results but to secure the adolescents' return and perseverance in coming for help. The feeling of confidence that enables the adolescent to meet the specialist is so highly precarious and tentative that this special staff must share information and co-ordinate closely with the therapist to preserve and build this confidence.

### INDICATIONS OF SUCCESS AS CURRENTLY EVALUATED

In trying to evaluate what degree of success this method and approach has had, we are well aware that only careful research can establish this clearly. Consuming demands in maintaining the current groups make it impossible to follow up systematically the groups that have terminated. We are aware that the prognosis, almost without exception, for the group members was originally poor. These boys and girls represent the most likely court, correctional, hospital (mental or chronic physical), and public relief cases of the future. At this point we can say that, with their changed attitudes and behavior, not more than 5 per cent have become known to correctional institutions. While many remained in school only so long as the law required and often truanted, nevertheless, even most of these secured employment and accepted the demands of their employers as reasonable. Perhaps three-fourths have reported back to us about having jobs, and they are surprisingly satisfied and dependable in their attitudes about work.

Approximately one fourth of the members of terminated groups have now graduated from high school and a few are in college. Certainly no one of these boys or girls would have entered college or been graduated from high school and very few even from junior high school without the group experience and the staff's tutoring and repeated intervention with, and guidance in, the school system. The preparation for and transfer to suitable school programs and schools that secured these graduations cannot be done by the boys and girls themselves, their parents, or their school advisors. Special knowledge not only of the adolescents but of the school system and much time-consuming work with teachers, tutors, school guidance counselors, and principals got these adolescents into the appropriate courses and right schools to permit their graduation. One of the most gratifying results has been that some group members who left school have returned to us for help in going to night school to continue their education.

Many of these boys and girls now belong to community centers and other recreational groups where they were not previously acceptable. The overwhelming proportion of inquiries from community agencies have been in relation to brothers and sisters and parents of the group members, with surprisingly few about the group members themselves.

When the natural reasons aforementioned for terminating the groups bring them to an end, most group members are ready for individual psychiatric treatment. Where the need is acute and time permits, the therapist continues seeing them individually. Without exception, all the other adolescents, no matter how much healthier and better functioning they are, still need individual therapy of a special character. To go on in their unhealthy, unaltered milieu with the increasing demands of maturity, they still need help to become independent, successful citizens. The pressures of providing adequate support or giving adequate care to their future families, meeting marital and domestic crises, handling problems of health and raising children are certain to provide stresses that many cannot handle unaided. The confidence and ease with which members of closed groups have returned encourage us to believe that a good percentage of these erstwhile unreachable adolescents will seek aid in their adult crises.

# A Group Dynamics Approach to the Treatment of Nonconformists in the Navy

By J. Douglas Grant and Marguerite Q. Grant

Abstract: In an attempt to bring about attitudinal and behavioral change in the nonconformist, confinees of a correctional institution for Navy and Marine offenders were placed in small closed communities. Men were selected for the research companies on the basis of fitting a certain level on a scale of interpersonal maturity. Groups were composed of high social maturity men, low maturity men, or half low maturity men and half high maturity men. Twenty confined men with three Marine supervisors lived in the same quarters; ate together; participated in competitions as a unit; and shared work, educational, and recreational experiences. The attempt was made to keep all interpersonal interactions within the group. It was hypothesized that forcing the delinquent to live with and face his interpersonal problems would bring about in him a challenging uncomfortableness which would lead to personality change. A follow-up report on each man was obtained six months after his return to military duty. The relationship between the man's interpersonal maturity level and his postinstitutional success is markedly affected by the nature of his supervision while confined.

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*J. Douglas Grant, Sacramento, California, is Chief of the Research Division of the Department of Corrections, State of California. Previously Mr. Grant was Research Assistant, Stanford University, 1941–42; USNR Classification Officer, 1942–46; V. A. Clinical Trainee, Stanford University, 1946–49; Chief Clinical Psychologist, USN Retraining Command, Camp Elliott, San Diego, 1949–57; and Principal Investigator, Rehabilitation Research under ONR Project 174-023.*

*Marguerite Q. Grant is Research Psychologist, USN Retraining Command, Camp Elliott. Formerly she was Research Assistant, Stanford University, 1946; Research Assistant, Institute of Child Welfare, University of California, 1947–49; and USPHS Clinical Training Fellow, 1949–51.*





Since 1952 the Navy has been conducting a research program [1] in the prediction and treatment of military delinquency. Three questions outline the aims of this program:

What are the personality characteristics of the recruit who will prove himself a nonconformist?

With men who demonstrate extreme nonconformity, what are the characteristics of those who will be able to modify their behavior sufficiently to adjust to the group aspects of military life?

What is the nature of the process that brings about attitudinal and behavioral change in the nonconformist so that he is able to meet the demands of military life?

This report deals with a study relevant to the second and third questions.

Camp Elliott, where the research was conducted, is a place of confinement and retraining for approximately 1000 sailors and marines who have been court-martialed. They are confined for offenses ranging from absence without leave (about 85 per cent) to murder. The average period of confinement is about four months. Between 55 and 60 per cent of the men are restored to military duty at the termination of their confinement.

It is often assumed that the man who has offended against a military law is not the same sort of person as the civilian delinquent. While it is true that the majority of military men are confined for absence offenses, which are not civilian crimes, there is considerable evidence that civilian and military delinquent groups of comparable age show similar attitudes and nonconformity patterns.[2]

[1] The opinions expressed are those of the authors. They are not to be construed as reflecting the views or endorsement of the Department of the Navy.

Currently sponsored by: Neuropsychiatric Branch, BuMed; Corrective Services Branch, BuPers; ONR Group Psychology Branch, under ONR contract Nonr 1535(00) with Family Relations Center, Berkeley, California, J. Douglas Grant, Principal Investigator.

## Frame of Reference

The frame of reference for this research program is a theory of sequential levels of interpersonal maturity. The case for an interpersonal relations approach to delinquency has been steadily gaining ground. Donald Bloch [3] has described delinquent behavior as an effort to handle interpersonal anxiety. Croft and Grygier [4] have been able to show that the social relationships of truants and juvenile delinquents vary markedly from those of their nontruant and nondelinquent classmates. Gough and Peterson [5] and Sarbin [6] have stressed the delinquent's inability to visualize himself in the role of another person. In studying military delinquents, Osborn [7] found the main difference between repeated absence offenders and matched nonoffenders to be an inadequacy in

[2] The following point to similarities in the two populations: Offenders in both populations have similar juvenile records; norms on a delinquency potential test are very similar for prisoners in the State of California institutions and Camp Elliott; a delinquent high school population showed test scores much more similar to the Camp Elliott population than to the nondelinquent high school population.

[3] D. A. Bloch, "The Delinquent Integration," *Psychiatry*, Vol. 15 (1952), pp. 297–303.

[4] I. J. Croft and T. G. Grygier, "Social Relationships of Truants and Juvenile Delinquents," *Human Relations*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1956).

[5] H. G. Gough and D. R. Peterson, "The Identification and Measurement of Predispositional Factors in Crime and Delinquency," *Journal of Consulting Psychology* (1952), p. 16.

[6] T. R. Sarbin, "A Preface to a Psychological Analysis of the Self," *Psychological Review* (1952), p. 59.

[7] H. G. Osborn, "Situational and Personal Variables in AWOL Behavior." Presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Psychological Association in Cleveland, 1953.

childhood and adolescent interpersonal relationships for the offender group. The Camp Elliott Delinquency Potential Scale,[8] which at the recruit stage predicts later military delinquency, contains many interpersonal items. Most of these items relate to what has been called social imperturbability—a tendency to deny any involvement with the relationships between one's self and others.

Although this frame of reference suggests that delinquent behavior results from interactions between individuals, the emphasis has been put on delinquency proneness and what it is within the individual that he takes with him into interpersonal relationships. This approach has recently received new emphasis from the methodological work of Cronbach.[9] He has stated that we need to know much more about the "sets" that people bring with them into interpersonal situations. More needs to be understood about the nature of the delinquency proneness, in terms of interpersonal "sets," before we can study the effect of interpersonal interactions in determining delinquent behavior. The maturity levels theory maintains that these "sets" are extremely important. It further suggests that there are interpersonal problems laden with anxiety which form the core of the individual's social understanding in his efforts to integrate what is happening between himself and others as well as between others.

[8] E. K. Gunderson, K. B. Ballard, and P. S. Huge, "The Relationship of Delinquency Potential Scale Scores of Naval Recruits to Later Military Performance." Ninth Technical Report, Rehabilitation Research, U. S. Naval Retraining Command, Camp Elliott, San Diego, 1958. Available in mimeographed form at Rehabilitation Research, U. S. Naval Retraining Command, Camp Elliott, San Diego 44, California.

[9] L. J. Cronbach, "Proposals Leading to Analytic Treatment of Social Perception Scores," in *Person, Perception and Interpersonal Behavior*, edited by R. Tagiuri and L. Petrullo (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 353–78.

### MATURITY LEVELS

This theory of interpersonal maturity has been described in detail elsewhere.[10] Seven successive stages of interpersonal maturity characterize psychological development. They range from the least mature, which resembles the interpersonal interactions of a newborn infant, to an ideal of social maturity which is seldom or never reached in our present culture. Each of the seven stages or levels is defined by a crucial interpersonal problem which must be solved before further progress toward maturity can occur. All persons do not necessarily work their way through each stage but may become fixed at a particular level. Not all who are described as immature along this scale will be delinquent, but it is contended that those who are immature are more likely to find themselves in difficulties and to be apprehended for delinquency than are others.

Almost all persons who have grown to adulthood and not progressed beyond the first maturity level are found in institutions where they have to be cared for much like infants. Such personalities have not been found in a military delinquent population. At the other end of the scale, maturity levels 6 and 7 are also not represented in the Camp Elliott population. The adjustive capacity inherent in these "stages" would almost preclude delinquent activity.

A brief description of the levels of interpersonal maturity which are found in the population of military delinquents follows:

Maturity Level 2: The individual whose interpersonal understanding and behavior are integrated at this level is primarily involved with demands that the world take care of him. He sees others solely as "givers" or "withholders" and has no conception of interpersonal refinement beyond this. He is unable to explain, understand, or predict the behavior or reactions of others. He is not interested in things outside himself except as a source of supply. He behaves impulsively, unaware of the effects of his behavior on others, and is apt to explode or run away when frustrated or thwarted.

[10] C. E. Sullivan, M. Q. Grant, and J. D. Grant, "The Development of Interpersonal Maturity: Applications to Delinquency," *Psychiatry*, Vol. 20 (1957), pp. 373–85.



Maturity Level 3: The individual who operates at this level is attempting to manipulate his environment in order to get what he wants. In contrast to level 2, he is at least aware that his own behavior has something to do with whether or not he gets what he wants. He still does not differentiate, however, among people except to the extent that they can or cannot be useful to him. He sees people only as objects to be manipulated in order to get what he wants. His manipulations may take the form either of conforming to the rules of whoever seems to have the power at the moment ("If you can't lick them, join them.") or of the type of maneuvering characteristic of a "confidence man" ("Make a sucker out of him before he makes a sucker out of you."). He tends to deny having any disturbing feelings or strong emotional involvement in his relationships with others.

Maturity Level 4: An individual whose understanding and behavior are integrated at this level has internalized a set of standards by which he judges his and others' behavior. He is aware of the influence of others on him and their expectations of him. To a certain extent, he is aware of the effects of his own behavior on others. He wants to be like the people he admires and may feel guilty about not measuring up to his internalized standards. The conflict produced by the feelings of inadequacy and guilt may be internalized with consequent neurotic symptoms or acted out in antisocial behavior. Because the individual at level 4 tends to be uncomfortable about himself and because he is able to internalize values, he appears more amenable to treatment than previously described maturity levels.

Maturity Level 5: A person who functions at this level is able to see patterns of behavior; he may see himself and others behaving in the same way in different situations or see a continuity in his past, present, and future. His perceptions of himself and others are more differentiated than before. He begins to see others as complex, flexible objects which cannot be dealt with on the basis of a few single rule-of-thumb procedures. He is aware of many points of view in the world around him and sees interwoven reasons for behavior. He is able to play different roles in different situations and is thus more flexible. He is more capable of establishing and carrying through long-range plans than persons at lower levels. Delinquency, for a person at this maturity level, is apt to be situationally determined.

### THEORY OF TREATMENT

A good deal of pessimism has been expressed regarding the possibility of curing delinquents with our traditional methods of treatment or psychotherapy. Traditionally, psychotherapy was aimed at helping the neurotic whose conflicts are internalized, who carries his guilt and anxiety with him. This kind of neurotic tends to know that he is upset or uncomfortable. He may, for example, feel afraid, have bad dreams, or not be able to speak in groups. In contrast, the acting-out personality tends to dissipate his anxiety before he feels it by running away, striking out at someone, or having an affair. Since the acting-out person periodically resolves

his uncomfortableness, he abates any felt need for personality change. Traditional psychotherapeutic methods then are not appropriate for this kind of personality, since he feels no need to change and since he most certainly would run away from any therapy relationship which made him feel anxious.

Since almost all delinquents are acting-out personalities, the task in treatment becomes one of putting the offender in a nonpanic-producing correctional situation, which keeps him concerned about and facing his problems, in an attempt to bring about personality change in him. Acceptance of a need to change or grow results from a challenging uncomfortableness. Since this prerequisite for personality change—this uncomfortableness—is absent or easily dissipated, it needs to be created or maintained for the acting-out person. However, intense anxiety leads to rigidifying panic where no personality change can occur. Therefore, the goal of the treatment program here described was an attempt to create in a correctional situation a program which would produce in the subjects a challenging uncomfortableness without rigidifying panic.

The Camp Elliott research subjects were placed for six or nine weeks in groups of twenty in small closed communities called Living Groups.[11] The twenty men, with three supervisors, lived together in the same barracks, ate together, worked on a farm as a unit, held classes together, participated as a team in recreational activities. The group was "closed," not only in the sense that no new members were admitted nor old members dismissed, but also in the sense that great effort was made to eliminate interpersonal dealings with anyone outside the group. The attempt was made to establish close, continuing interpersonal relationships within the group—with no way out. Ordinarily in confinement institutions there is much opportunity for running away even while staying within the fence by getting transferred from job to job or one living unit to another or running from therapist to therapist. To as great an extent as possible, all chances for this kind of acting-out or running away from anxiety were eliminated.

Many members of this population have been running away from close relationships all their lives. They may have run away from home, left school, held jobs for very short periods—and, for our military population—85 per cent of them have run away from the military service and have absence or deserter charges against them. They may never in their lives have worked through a single interpersonal relationship. They tend to leave any relationship before it is obvious to them that they have interpersonal problems.

*Supervisors and consultants*

The three supervisors assigned to each Living Group were Marine noncommissioned officers, all of whom had volunteered for the program. They were on a two day out of three duty schedule. Two of the three supervisors were with the men on the job for half of each day; they held discussion classes with the men for the other half day. During free time and evening hours, one of the three supervisors was in the barracks available to the men for individual or small group "bull sessions." A psychologist was assigned to each team of three supervisors to act as a consultant. The psychologist was available to the confinees and supervisors for individual conferences, although every effort was made to keep as much as possible of the interpersonal relationships for group discussion.

Each consultant's main function was to conduct 90 minute, 5 days a week group therapy sessions attended by the twenty men and the supervisors. These sessions were the heart of the attempt to encourage social maturing through "forced" working through of the anxiety provided by the close, continuing interpersonal relationships. The psychologist's job was to prevent the challenging uncomfortableness from turning into rigidifying panic, yet not to allow subjects to flee the group. The focus in the group discussions was the interpersonal interactions within the group. An attempt was made to create a self-study atmosphere in which group members were encouraged to notice some interpersonal dealing of self with others or among others—to notice this interaction and to bring it to the group for discussion.

For the reader familiar with methods of psychotherapy, six or nine weeks may seem an impossibly short time in which to bring about personality change. Without presenting these short periods as ideals, it is worth remembering that the "treatment" here was a twenty-four hour a day process, a much more intensive experience than is usual in psychotherapy.

The closed Living Groups may be seen as the primary family situation revisited. Group therapy has often been likened to a family constellation with the therapist representing a parent and other group members, the siblings. In the Camp Elliott Living Groups two additional factors were present which contribute to the analogy, the twenty-four hours a day together and the "closedness" of the group. One of the characteristics of the family situation for the young child is that it is a closed system—he is trapped in it—he has no other resources. In our closed Living Groups, the men also could not escape. There is the possibility that interpersonal problems which for some reason could not be worked out in the original closed group—the family—may be worked through on such a return trip, especially with a parent figure who is perhaps more able to be supportive.

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Over a two-year period, twenty-seven Living Groups were run. During most of that period three groups were running simultaneously, one handled by each of the three supervisory teams. Three aspects of the Living Group experience were systematically varied in order to measure the effect of each aspect on later success of subjects. First, the three supervisory teams were ranked in order of their predicted effectiveness in bringing about reduction in delinquency-prone attitude; this ranking of the teams was one of the variables in the experimental design.

A second aspect was the level of maturity of the group members. Six of the groups were composed only of individuals of maturity levels 4 and 5. For the discussion here, these subjects will be called high maturity subjects, keeping in mind that their maturity level is high only in relation to other confined men. Six of the groups included only maturity levels 2 and 3, here to be called the low maturity subjects. The remaining fifteen groups included maturity levels 2, 3, 4 and 5. Nine of these mixed maturity groups operated for six weeks rather than nine in order to handle scheduling difficulties.

A third aspect of the experimental design was the duration of the supervisor-group relationship. Eighteen of the groups had the same supervisory team for the entire research period, while the other nine changed supervisors and consultant every three weeks.

The Living Groups were described to

[11] "A Group Dynamics Approach to Treating Acting-Out Personalities." Presented at the Eighth V.A. Clinical Research Conference in Berkeley, November, 1953.

TABLE 1—PERCENTAGE RESTORATION SUCCESS BY MATURITY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LIVING-GROUP AND SUPERVISORY EFFECTIVENESS

| Supervisory Team | Predicted Supervisory Effectiveness | 9-Week High Maturity Only | | 9-Week Low Maturity Only | | 9-Week High Maturity Mixed | | 9-Week Low Maturity Mixed | | 6-Week High Maturity Mixed | | 6-Week Low Maturity Mixed | | Total High Maturity | | Total Low Maturity | | Total High and Low Maturity | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| T Co. | First | 19 | 68.0 | 18 | 39.0 | 9 | 78.0 | 9 | 56.0 | 42 | 69.0 | 17 | 35.0 | 70 | 70.0 | 44 | 41.0 | 114 | 59.0 |
| R Co. | Second | 19 | 68.0 | 17 | 41.0 | 8 | 88.0 | 12 | 67.0 | 38 | 71.0 | 18 | 61.0 | 65 | 72.0 | 47 | 55.0 | 112 | 65.0 |
| S Co. | Third | 18 | 67.0 | 13 | 77.0 | 10 | 50.0 | 10 | 40.0 | 33 | 61.0 | 25 | 60.0 | 61 | 61.0 | 48 | 60.0 | 109 | 61.0 |
| Subtotal | | 56 | 68.0 | 48 | 50.0 | 27 | 70.0 | 31 | 55.0 | 113 | 67.0 | 60 | 53.0 | 196 | 68.0 | 139 | 53.0 | 335 | 61.0 |
| RST Co's | Fourth | 20 | 65.0 | 20 | 70.0 | 10 | 60.0 | 10 | 60.0 | | | | | 30 | 63.0 | 30 | 67.0 | 60 | 65.0 |
| STR Co's | Fourth | 16 | 69.0 | 33 | 51.0 | 10 | 60.0 | 7 | 86.0 | | | | | 26 | 65.0 | 40 | 58.0 | 66 | 61.0 |
| TRS Co's | Fourth | 14 | 50.0 | 17 | 65.0 | 10 | 80.0 | 9 | 67.0 | | | | | 24 | 63.0 | 26 | 65.0 | 50 | 64.0 |
| Subtotal | | 50 | 62.0 | 70 | 60.0 | 30 | 67.0 | 26 | 69.0 | | | | | 80 | 64.0 | 96 | 63.0 | 176 | 63.0 |
| Totals | | 106 | 65.0 | 118 | 56.0 | 57 | 68.0 | 57 | 61.0 | 113 | 67.0 | 60 | 53.0 | 276 | 67.0 | 235 | 57.0 | 511 | 62.0 |

all incoming offenders at Camp Elliott, and 98 per cent of all the eligible men volunteered. In order to be eligible, the subject had to have a good chance of being restored to duty and have at least six months left on his enlistment time so that follow-up information would be available on him; and he had to have sufficient confinement time to be able to complete the research program. Eligible volunteers were tested on a battery of personality tests given routinely at Camp Elliott.[12] Two psychologists independently assessing the test profiles, made estimates of each volunteer's maturity level.[13] If the two psychologists agreed that the subject appeared to fit the maturity level of the group currently being formed, the subject was given a one-hour recorded interview. On the basis of this interview, the subjects were put into the appropriate group. No attempt was made to equalize our selection of Navy and Marine subjects, nor to have them represent their proportion in the service or in confinement.

Many interpersonal rating scales were built into the Living Group design.[14] Early and late in the research group experience, peer evaluations, supervisor-confinee, consultant-confinee, and consultant-supervisor evaluations were systematically obtained. In addition, at the completion of the research period, the subjects were again tested and interviewed to determine the effects of the program on them. This report, however, will discuss only the relationship of later duty success to (1) the individual subject's maturity level, (2) the maturity level characteristics of the group in which the subject was a member, (3) the duration of the supervisor-group relationship, (4) the predicted effectiveness of the supervisory team, and (5) the interaction of these variables.


[12] E. K. Gunderson, *Group Testing Diagnostic Manual*, First Revision, U. S. Naval Retraining Command, Camp Elliott, San Diego, 1956.

[13] Virgina Ives and M. Q. Grant, "Initial Steps in the Measurement of Interpersonal Maturity," Sixth Technical Report, Rehabilitation Research, U. S. Naval Retraining Command, Camp Elliott, San Diego, 1956.

[14] R. W. Carey, *Research Companies Procedures Manual.* Rehabilitation Research, U. S. Naval Retraining Command, Camp Elliott, San Diego, 1954.



TABLE 2—PERCENTAGE RESTORATION SUCCESS OF HIGH MATURITY SUBJECTS COMPARED WITH LOW MATURITY SUBJECTS OVER KINDS OF SUPERVISION




| | Predicted Best Supervision ("T" Co) | Predicted Next Best Supervision ("R" Co) | Predicted Worst Supervision ("S" Co) | Companies with Changing Supervision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Highs - Percent Success | 70 (N = 70) | 72 (N = 65) | 61 (N = 61) | 64 (N = 80) |
| Lows - Percent Success | 41 (N = 44) | 55 (N = 47) | 60 (N = 48) | 63 (N = 96) |
| C.R. (High-Low) | 2.89 | 1.67 | ---- | ---- |
| $r_{tet}$ (Maturity) ( vs ) (Success) | .45 | .29 | .01 | .01 |

T and R 3.35

## RESULTS

Tables 1 and 2 summarize these five relationships. (1) The high maturity subjects did significantly better ($P = .01$) on restoration to duty than low maturity subjects. (2) Success rate was

not affected by the maturity characteristics of the group; that is, high or low maturity subjects did as well following mixed maturity group experience as they did following groups composed of only low or only high maturity subjects. (3) Totaling results for all subjects over all conditions, the duration of the supervisor-group relationship did not affect the success rate. (4) Again, totaling over-all experimental conditions, no significant differences were found which can be attributed to predicted supervisory effectiveness. (5) However, the interaction between the predicted supervisory effectiveness and the maturity of the subject significantly (Analysis of variance, P = less than .05) affected restoration success. The relationship between the subject's maturity and restoration success varied markedly and consistently with the amount of exposure to the supervisory teams in the order of predicted effectiveness. For subjects spending time only with T company supervision, predicted most effective, the relationship between maturity of the subject and restoration success was high ($r_t = .45$; $N = 114$). For subjects supervised by R company only, predicted second most effective, the relationship was present but lower ($r_t = .29$; $N = 112$). For S company subjects, supervised by the predicted least effective team, the relationship vanished ($r_t = .01$; $N = 109$). If the Living Group experience was under supervision that changed every three weeks, there again was no relationship ($r_t = .01$; $N = 176$). Under conditions of changing supervision, only when the last six weeks were spent with the predicted most and next most effective teams did some relationship again emerge.

This interaction between the nature of supervision and the relationship between maturity and success was impressively consistent over several breakdowns of the data. The interaction holds for both Navy and Marine personnel, for both mixed and dichotomized maturity groups.

Another way of stating this interaction is that the over-all difference in success rate for high and low maturity subjects was found entirely under conditions of predicted effective supervision, T and R Company (C.R. = 3.35). The different success rate for high and lows failed to exist under predicted ineffective supervision (S Company) or under changing supervision. The maturity classification system appears valueless without an effectiveness of supervision classification, and an effectiveness of supervision classification appears valueless without a maturity classification.

Although further research needs to be done, these findings suggest that the cost of military recidivism could be reduced by installing a closed Living Group program with effective supervision for high maturity inmates. High maturity inmates have a high potential for improved restoration behavior but, unless subjected to an attitude-change program under effective supervision, this potential is not expressed in improved restoration behavior. This study does not support a closed Living Group program for low maturity inmates and, in fact, strongly suggests that at least aspects of an effective program for high maturity inmates can be detrimental to low maturity inmates.

Important as these applications are, the implications of these data for delinquency research in general are far greater. Correctional researchers have been finding it hard to demonstrate relationships between classification systems and postinstitutional behavior. They also have found it hard, if not impossible, to demostrate relationships between treatment situations and postinstitutional behavior. As long as the data of the Camp Elliott research are viewed as a study of single variables, its findings are comparable to earlier correctional studies; that is, no demonstratable situational (supervisory effectiveness) effect and only a low, though significant classification (maturity) effect. It is when the interaction of the situation and classification variables is considered that one finds productive relationships with restoration behavior. It now appears likely that, in many of our correctional studies, the classification and situation effects have been masking each other. Future studies need to consider all three factors: kinds of subjects, kinds of supervisors, kinds of programming. This study has demonstrated for delinquency research the point that Cronbach [15, 16] has been emphasizing for social research in general.



[15] L. J. Cronbach, "Two Disciplines of Scientific Psychology," *The American Psychologist*, Vol. 12 (1957), pp. 671–84.

[16] L. J. Cronbach and G. C. Gleser, *Psychological Tests and Personality Decisions* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1957).

# A Research-Based Proposal for a Community Program of Delinquency Prevention

By Eva Rosenfeld

Abstract: Delinquent behavior among juveniles is a response to a real difficulty in achieving commonly desired goals through conventional, law-abiding behavior; delinquency is also, especially among the more "sick," a way of handling inner strain and anxiety. A community program to reduce delinquency must provide encouragement and opportunities for legitimate success for those delinquents who can profit thereby. It must also locate and offer special support and treatment to those who are too sick to be able to abandon their delinquent way of life, even when such opportunities are made availabe. To be effective, such a program must provide all the vital opportunities and special services delinquency-prone youngsters need; make these easily accessible in the community in a co-ordinated fashion; and conduct ongoing evaluation designed to improve the manner of providing each service and to measure the total impact of the program.

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*Eva Rosenfeld, L.LM., Ph.D., New York City, is Associate Director of Research at the Central Research Unit of the Jewish Board of Guardians in New York City, where she is engaged in research on evaluation of effectiveness of psychotherapy in children. She was, from 1952 to 1957, a member of a research team conducting a series of studies on heroin use among juveniles at the Research Center for Human Relations, New York University. She is the author of various articles in professional journals.*





THIS paper presents the rationale for a community program [1] designed to control and reduce chronic delinquent behavior in all its manifestations that are common in high delinquency areas: violence, vandalism, crimes against persons and property, drug use and drug peddling, pimping, and prostitution.

The program is designed to improve the real life chances of teen-agers in the community by providing a variety of services and opportunities and by modifying the cultural climate in the area. These services and activities are to be provided in a co-ordinated fashion by a central authority connected with a university.

The rationale for the program is "research-based" in four ways. It is, first of all, based on research into what motivates and perpetuates a delinquent way of life. It is also based on research into successful techniques of social intervention and on research into the feasibility of such a program in the light of known and anticipated resistances—from within the delinquent community, from the inertia of the surrounding social system, from the covert sabotage or inadequate co-operation of those whose vested interests may appear to them to be threatened by the program. Finally, the program is "research-based" in the sense that it has been designed to include systematic self-evaluation in such a manner that either success or failure will lead to accumulation of knowledge.

This is not to imply that the status of existing knowledge—based on research or experience or theory—concerning these four aspects of the problem is satisfactory. In fact, our knowledge in this whole area is spotty and little of it is directly relevant to a community program. We simply gathered all of the relevant information that we could locate, evaluating evidence in terms of consistency of findings and relying heavily on our own knowledge accumulated in studies of sociogenic and psychogenic factors in one type of delinquent behavior: juvenile heroin use.[2]

[1] This program has been developed by Isidor Chein and Eva Rosenfeld at the Research Center for Human Relations, New York University, under a grant from the National Institute for Mental Health.

## Meaning of a Delinquent Way of Life

Delinquent behavior, as all deviant behavior, is functional to the individual in some, often crucially important ways. It is at the same time obviously maladaptive by bringing him into conflict with authority and by isolating him from the mainstream of conventional social intercourse and from realistic and societally approved opportunities to advance his status or to realize his potentialities.

In general, the various delinquent ways of life have been developed as a response not to a single instance of hurt or deprivation, but to a series of persistent and converging experiences undermining the individual's capacity and self-confidence in meeting the demands of the conventional society in conventional ways. The major source of these repetitive, persistent crippling experiences is the pathogenic family. Other sources lie in the discriminatory position of minority groups, in the interpersonally exploitative and poverty stricken street environment, in the inadequate school that does not meet the child's

[2] This knowledge has been accumulated over six years by an interdisciplinary team, under the general direction of Isidor Chein, consisting of three social psychologists: Isidor Chein, Robert S. Lee, and Daniel M. Wilner; a sociologist, Eva Rosenfeld; and a psychiatrist, Donald L. Gerard, who had studied juvenile heroin addicts before he joined the research team. Eight studies have been completed and will be referred to in the text as RCHR Reports I to VII.

learning needs. These factors all converge to lower the child's self-confidence in meeting normal challenges of learning, social interaction, and work and push him in a direction of trouble.

Within the high-delinquency areas of big cities, it may be possible to distinguish several major "styles" of delinquent ways of life: the antisocial, "acting-out" conflict gang, with their vandalism, their provoking and malicious behavior, and intergang conflict (bopping); the "detached" drug users, some homosexuals, and "loners"; and the smooth, "cool," nonviolent delinquency of the pleasure bound big or petty racketeer or conman, the drug pusher, the pimp.

Although, in the complex network of delinquencies that flourish in some neighborhoods, these various types often collaborate and mutually facilitate each other's interests, there is a basic incompatibility between the true representatives of each type. The habitual heroin user and the "bopper" exemplify such sharp incompatibility. "Bopping" gangs usually expel their addicted members or, if too many members become addicted, the character of gang activities changes drastically from violent, expressive acts to more utilitarian crimes.[3] The "cool," pseudo-bohemian delinquent expresses contemptuous disdain for the acting-out delinquent as well as for the drug addict.[4]

The differences among these subtypes of delinquents are reflected in their values, attitudes, and beliefs, as well as in the kind of delinquencies they prefer.[5] But there is a considerable body of evidence that a core cluster of these values and attitudes is apt to characterize the delinquents with whom this paper is concerned and is already discernible among the youngest teen-agers in high-delinquency areas: The rejection of conventional beliefs as "phony," untrue. Characteristically, delinquents reject the possibility that anyone—and especially official representatives of the society at large—really cares about them: "No one gives a damn." They also reject the possibility that reachable opportunities for maintaining one's self-esteem while "going straight" are available and that law-abiding effort pays. *"You can't win"* is their motto.

These beliefs are a reflection of past experience;[6] they are supported by the youths' current experiences in their disorganized, impoverished, discriminatory environments; they are further supported by the prevailing climate of values, attitudes, and beliefs in the high-delinquency areas.[7] While these beliefs,

[3] RCHR Report No. III, "Heroin Use and Street Gangs" (1954). This report is summarized in Wilner, Rosenfeld, Lee, Gerard and Chein, "Heroin Use and Street Gangs," the *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (November–December 1957), pp. 399–409.

[4] Kenneth Marshall, "The Evocative Functions of the Language Patterns of the Be-Bop Cult," unpublished M.A. essay, College of the City of New York (1951).

[5] A lively description of the varying life styles of "zoot-hipsters," "cool-hipsters," and "bop-hipsters" will be found in a doctoral dissertation in progress at New York University by Kenneth Marshall. Albert K. Cohen's study of *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955) focuses on the acting-out "conflict gang"; the violent, anti-utilitarian, malicious behavior he describes applies only to the "bop-hipsters." Drug users are neither violent, nor malicious, and their crimes against property are very much utilitarian; in fact, when incidence of drug use increases in a neighborhood, malicious crimes show a downward trend and crimes that can bring financial returns increase (RCHR Report No. 1-A, "Delinquency Trends," 1954).

[6] See S. A. Szurek, "Some Impressions from Clinical Experience with Delinquents," in Kurt R. Eissler (Ed.), *Searchlights on Delinquency* (New York: International University Press, 1949), p. 124.

[7] An investigation of values, attitudes, and beliefs among eighth-grade boys in three of the high-delinquency neighborhoods in New York City revealed, among others, a cluster of pessimistic, cynical, depressive attitudes, accompanied by a sense of futility and mistrust, a rejection of conventional values, and a positive attitude to experimentation with drugs (RCHR Report No. IV, "The Cultural Climate of Juvenile Drug Use," 1956).



in turn, serve to support, justify, and sanction a delinquent way of life and are, in this sense, rationalizations, no one could deny their reality-basis; for, indeed, in each delinquent's personal experience "no one really cares" and "you can't win." And these experiences are likely to continue. The delinquent has low self-esteem, his know-how of conventional ways is very limited, and, his image of the future being unreal and hopeless, he has little motivation to think about it and work towards it.

If our aim is to induce these youths to abandon their delinquent ways of life and become law abiding, we must be able to convince them that society cares about them, that there are reachable opportunities for obtaining what they need, including status, in legitimate ways, and that "you can win."

These opportunities and this help must be brought directly into the peer culture of the street, for that is the common reservoir of beliefs, myths, information; that is the terrain in which beliefs are reality-tested; that is the armory from which the youngsters select the weapons with which they will try to cope with life.

The first feature of the proposed program, accordingly, is directed at the community. It aims to make opportunities for legitimate success available and easily accessible, and to help delinquent youth develop self-confidence and "know-how" in the conventional world.

Specifically, the following services are recommended:

Vocational guidance for work choice and work adjustment;
Extension of presently available work opportunities;
A special program of leisure activities, including encouragement of self-expression, self-determination, and participation in community affairs by youth;
Provision of rewards for approved behavior (scholarships, contest prizes, public recognition);
Provision of a larger number of good models for imitation (more male teachers, more youth workers, appearances of local boys who made good, public recognition of local adults who contribute to the community's welfare).

This part of the program assumes a certain minimum of ability for testing beliefs and attitudes against reality. But the delinquent way of life is not wholly rational. And our concern over the sort of response one is likely to get in offering help and opportunity to the delinquent youths has to do with the irrational component in their behavior, which, in turn, depends on the degree to which they are "healthy" or "sick."

## THE "SICK" DELINQUENT

In an effort to classify delinquents along a health-sickness dimension, investigators have developed many types and categories. For a community program, however, a simple distinction will suffice between "basically healthy" delinquents, operationally defined as those who will respond positively to manifestly friendly and sincere offers of help, and "sick" ones who, in the face of such offers, will only intensify their delinquent way of life.

These are, naturally, only "ideal types." In fact, there is a wide range of more or less responsive, more or less nonresponsive delinquents in every group we mentioned above: the acting-out (bop-hipsters), the detached (cool-

hipsters), and the exploitative (zoot-hipsters). In every group there are "true" representatives and "peripherals" who join for protection, or because they had no alternative choices of association, because they are attracted by the sense of belonging and solidarity that the gang offers, or simply by chance. Often, one will find in a conflict gang some members who are not attracted by violence but who go along under group pressure; or, in a drug-using group, one will find youths who take the drug occasionally, but never develop an uncontrollable craving.

The difference between the "true" and the "peripheral" delinquent, or the "sick" and the "healthy," is in the extent to which the given mode of delinquent adaptation is necessary to satisfy the individual's unconscious needs either for rebellion and aggressiveness, or for immediate gratification of cravings, or for distance and detachment, or for control of others, or for degradation and outwitting of others. These and other such needs are an outgrowth of deep-seated conflicts and of the guilt and anxiety they generate. The particular mode of delinquent adaptation is designed to minimize these; the delinquent must maintain and perpetuate his delinquent interactions and hold on to his values and beliefs or face the intolerable pain of experiencing anxiety. He develops subsidiary "self-perpetuating" mechanisms which provoke others to rejecting or exploitative behavior so that he, in turn, is confirmed in his rationalizations that "no one cares," that "you can't win," that "everybody is out to screw you"—and that, consequently, "the wise one hits first" or "the wise one doesn't give a damn."

The sick delinquent is constantly engaged in "testing" his view of the world; but he makes sure that again and again he is proved right and the "squares" wrong, mean, unfair, dishonest, or stupid weaklings. Should the "square" who reaches out to the delinquent remain unseductable, incorruptible, and sincerely friendly through the repeated "tests" and provocations, the delinquent may resort to even more drastic mechanisms for reinstating his rationalizations and he may intensify his aggressive, manipulative, or seductive efforts to such an extent that he will ultimately succeed in frightening, antagonizing, or demoralizing the person who tries to help him. If this should fail, the truly "sick" delinquent will experience panic or depression. These pitfalls of interacting with delinquents are well known to clinicians, group workers, and institutional personnel working with delinquents.[8] Those working with gangs are exposed to even more drastic group testing and to often dangerously explosive group situations (though they may be helped along by some of the "healthy" gang members).

*Preparation for negative reactions*

Since the major focus of our program was designed precisely to break down the delinquent's core of beliefs and rationalizations, preparation for the anticipated negative reaction of the "sick" delinquents must be also a part of the program.[9] This preparation is threefold.

[8] For a description of the mechanisms used by delinquents in interacting with therapists see Donald A. Bloch, "Some Concepts in the Treatment of Delinquency," *Children*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1953); and, in general, the writings of S. A. Szurek, A. Aichhorn, F. Redl, D. Wineman, A. M. Johnson, B. Bettleheim, K. Eissler—to mention some of the most outstanding writers.

[9] The general strategy of the program is first to make available those opportunities that are likely to "reach the reachable," the responsive. The nonresponsive, the "sick," will be identified by their resistance and sifted out, with the understanding that special measures must be taken to help them. This expectation of the "sifting-out" process is based on the experience of detached group workers in various parts of the country. Cf. Walter B. Miller, "The Impact of a Community Group Work Program on Delinquent Corner Groups," *The Social Service Review*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (December 1957), pp. 390–406, and "How They Were Reached," *New York City Youth Board Monograph No. 2* (Nov. 1954).



First, there should be careful selection and training of personnel who are to work with the delinquents. These people must understand the meaning, the force, and the function to the delinquent of his testing and provoking behavior. They must know that one should not press the individual, or the gang, beyond the point of open anxiety. They must be aware of the "games," the tricks, and the subversive force of the delinquent interaction, to protect themselves from falling into traps and being subtly seduced into dishonesty or unfairness. All this means that personnel training is a second major part of the community program.

Unhappily, the aspect of training that has to do with insight into the explosive nature of personal interaction with delinquents is largely limited to psychotherapists and to psychiatrically oriented social workers. Our proposed program, therefore, provides for intensive training of group work personnel and establishment of a continuous, university-connected seminar-workshop to discuss, appraise, and constantly improve techniques of personal interaction with delinquents in the community.

Second, to be in readiness for anticipated negative reactions of the "sick" delinquents, the program should assure accessibility of treatment resources for those individuals who may break down or become isolated as the bulk of their peers become law abiding.

In recognition of the existing difficulties in securing prompt referral of cases for treatment; the duplication and bureaucratization of intake procedures; the distance of treatment centers from the "territory" of gang members; and the unpreparedness of many existing treatment centers for handling delinquents with the necessary understanding, we find it advisable to recommend establishment of local treatment facilities more accessible than most present agencies to delinquent youth and more efficient, personal, and capable of maintaining continuity of treatment in the community.

Third, the program should meet the special needs of the postinstitutionalized: parolees from reformatories, addicts released from hospitals after detoxification, the emotionally disturbed returning from residential treatment centers. These are probably the most neglected groups and yet most in need of sustained help. Their institutionalization is often a mark of the chronicity of their deviant behavior and of the pathology of their home environment. Release from institution or hospital seldom indicates a genuine improvement in the youth's capacity to manage in a nondelinquent fashion, and a return to the community is commonly followed by a return to the previous way of life. There is general consensus among experts that residential treatment effort is vitiated by lack of after-care, support, and special services in the community. The need for more half-way houses, work-training centers, residential clubs, and individual after-care contact is generally recognized by all treatment personnel.

These services are vital to the rehabilitation of the chronic delinquents. But they are also vital for the success of the whole program. For one thing, the postinstitutionalized delinquents are often the most effective carriers of the antisocial culture which the program aims at destroying. The program also aims at destroying the conviction that "no one gives a damn about us anyway"; continuing support to youths who

are blatantly antisocial is best proof that society cares.

We recommend, therefore, the provision of adequate services for postinstitutionalized youth. As with the other services, these, too, should be so located as to assure maximal benefit to local youth.

These services would include:

- A sheltered workshop for "work therapy" and as a terminal institution for those incapable of working in the open market
- Intensive after-care services for parolees and postaddicts
- A residential club for young adults
- A "youth house" for parolees, postaddicts, and postinstitutionalized individuals
- A "residence house" for inadequate young adults
- A program for the administration of low-cost morphine for "incurable" addicts.

### METHODS OF COMMUNITY INTERVENTION

It is a truism that community intervention must be based on community participation. Specifically, in our type of program, the staff must be alert to the interests, needs, feelings, and attitudes of the various segments of the community. For members of the community will be more likely to accept and use the services and opportunities offered them and their children if they are invited to participate and encouraged to discuss and help in carrying out the program. Furthermore, the adults in the area serve as models of behavior for the youngsters; in order to develop a more dignified and confident self-image among the young, one must also encourage more self-determination as a basis for a sense of dignity and confidence among the adults. Finally, in the effort to create a more unified climate of attitudes concerning the behavior of the youth, one must have the backing and help of the adults in the community.

All these are impelling reasons. But the involvement of the adults in the community in this, primarily youth-oriented program is also imperative for another kind of reason. Many, if not most, of the families of the severely disturbed youngsters function poorly and generate a great deal of tension. In some instances this tension is due to financial difficulties, in others, to primarily emotional conflicts; often both sources of strain co-exist. A community program obviously cannot hope to resolve the manifold problems of all these families, most of which are very "hard to reach." The resigned, unco-operative attitude of slum residents to suggestions for self-help is largely the result of many frustrating experiences, many efforts to no avail, years of ineffectual and protracted struggles to get landlords and city officials to provide and enforce the people's legal rights.[10]

These experiences, which parallel the experiences of the juvenile delinquent, must be countered in a similar fashion. To do so we suggest providing such services for the community in general as will lessen its sense of futility and failure in "getting to see some action" on general problems of housing, legal aid, rent control, and on the more specific problem of the "hard-core" families.

### ANTICIPATING SOURCES OF RESISTANCE TO THE PROGRAM

The program also calls for a considerable amount of co-ordination among the services of various city and social agencies and for a centralized administration of these services in the community. In our interviews with experts we were met with a common response: A program of this kind is precisely what is called for, but it is not feasible because social and city agencies will not co-operate. This opinion our experts based on their past experiences of failure in various efforts at co-ordination of services. In probing into the nature of this experience, we discovered several features of it that made it more easy for us to resist the overwhelming pessimism of the experts.

First, there has been no systematic effort to analyze the reasons for failure of past attempts at co-operation. The "wisdom of experience" was, in this case, purely impressionistic and personal.

Second, and that was to our mind crucial, the experiences of failure in previous efforts to enlist the co-operation of various agencies in combating juvenile delinquency were experiences of a different kind of efforts than envisaged in our program—much smaller in scope, much less carefully thought out; and from the outset characterized by manifest shortage of funds, personnel, and authority.

In all the bitter accounts of open defiance or subtle sabotage or "false" co-operation that was worse than stark refusal, we could detect little that seemed inevitable or inherent in the nature of the effort. Rather, what seemed at fault was the particular approach; or the manner of enlisting co-operation; or making demands that were perceived as incompatible with the main function of the agency ("turning policemen into social workers"); or failure to provide and maintain adequate material and social rewards to sustain and persevere in the program; or failure to provide solid support and auxiliary facilities to front line workers—and a host of other such factors.

Third, the pessimistic opinions of most experts were counterbalanced by a few accounts of successful attempts at bringing various agencies together. None of these was very spectacular or long lasting. They were usually initiated by people with a flare for trying what the more experienced claim is impossible.

We concluded that the "right" people using a "right" approach might possibly be somewhat more successful than sad, past experience would suggest. But what is "right" still remains an open question. This question can be answered only in the process of implementing the program. Our proposed strategy in this respect consists of several steps.

First, we propose to begin by investigating[11] the reservations and objections that various agencies which are expected to participate in the project may have, the difficulties and problems they can anticipate, and the conditions under which they are willing and able to participate.

Second, we propose to set our program up as a demonstration project in one area of the city. No agency would be totally involved in the program; rather, it would be invited to participate on an experimental basis, assigning some of its personnel as liaison representatives. The benefits to the existing agencies of participating in such an experimental project are substantial. Those of their staffs who will be working in the project area will provide a feed-back of experimental knowledge to their respective agencies. Each agency will have an opportunity to use the project area as a testing ground for new policies and methods which seem desirable but not sufficiently proven to warrant introduction in its over-all program. What will

[10] See, for instance, "The Neighborhood Center for Block Organization: An Experiment in Self-Help at the Neighborhood Level," in C. E. Murray, M. G. Bowens, and R. Hogrefe, *Group Work in Community Life* (New York: Association Press, 1954).

[11] This investigation is now under way, under the direction of Isidor Chein at the Research Center for Human Relations, New York University.

be asked of the co-operating agencies is, in fact, no more than that they continue to do their work in the project area in the best way they know, but under the most favorable circumstances and with an increased staff for whom the resources of a university will be enlisted to provide special training.

Third, we propose to carry on continuous ongoing evaluation (described below) of the success of interaction of personnel representing the various agencies and of the effectiveness of their services to the community. This type of evaluation examines both failures and successes as they occur and maintains a constant feed-back of corrective information aimed at avoiding the repetition of mistakes and constantly improving the functioning of the group.

This strategy is designed to maximize chances for success in enlisting the co-operation of the various agencies. It is also designed to salvage the learning value of failure, should the effort end in failure. At present, the pessimistic wisdom that "You can't get agencies to work together" is so amorphous and generalized that it can be used only to maintain inaction and to paralyze any renewed attempts to work together. It would be well worth any amount of effort to give this paralyzing myth a more factual, more specific form.

## EVALUATION

The nature of a program determines the kind of evaluation that can be made of its effectiveness. Since the proposed program is one of "saturation," its impact will be in a response to the total environmental change. It would therefore be impossible [12] to isolate the impact of any one feature of the program on the behavior of the youth in the area.

The evaluation would have two major aims: to assess the total impact of the project and to assess each service in terms of its own immediate objectives.

Evaluation of the total impact of the project would call for (a) the assessment of changes in the motives, interests, hopes, self-image, attitudes, self-confidence, and so on of a sample of delinquent youth (this represents the "intervening variable" which is seldom measured in evaluating this type of program) and (b) the recording of rates of symptomatic behavior in the area and in several control areas, such as, offenses against persons and against property, incidence of drug use, admission to mental hospitals from the area, crimes of pent-up energy.

Evaluation of individual services is predicated on the notion that we do not necessarily know the best way of carrying out the co-ordinating functions or of providing each of the numerous services. Experimentation with various techniques and approaches so as to provide the necessary services and fulfill the co-ordinating functions in the most effective way must, therefore, be a major aim of the program.

In other words, the program must be seen as an ongoing, continuous experiment, with evaluation directed to the main functions of the program: How to create and maintain genuine co-operation among agencies dealing with youth; how to create and maintain a more unified orientation to youth among the residents of the community and the workers of agencies that serve its youth; how to identify the best techniques for bringing each of the essential services to those youths who need them most and the most efficient methods for maintaining and making the best use of the services; and how to make all of this part of the psychological life space of the residents of the area, especially of the youth—or, in other words, how to make all of this evident in the community atmosphere.

The evaluation of the effectiveness of each group of services would, consequently, have to ascertain at any given stage of the development of the service (a) how the service is carried out and (b) how it is received by those for whom it is intended; that is, the manner in which the program's services are perceived, interpreted, and utilized by the residents in general and the various subgroups in it. If the manner in which the service is carried out, received, and used does not come up to the professed aims of the service, an effort would be made to discern what, in the way in which the service is being carried out, misfired. If the cause for the malfunctioning can be discerned, appropriate modifications can be made. This new method or approach would itself be evaluated, and so on until the end of the project.

It is thus hoped to evolve the best possible method for rendering each particular service. Evaluation, here, is a means for constant improvement rather than a basis for final judgment. In this part of the evaluation task, we would not be concerned with passing ultimate judgments in relation to the total objective of the program but with inventing, developing, testing better ways for doing the things we want to do.

The over-all success of the program at its conclusion would be judged against its two major aims: (a) stimulation of a habit of constant improvement in the services for young people in deprived areas; of a spirit of co-operation among agencies in pursuing their common aims; and of a greater consensus on problems of young people and the ways of answering their needs; (b) reduction of deviant behavior among young people in the area by making it easier for them to succeed in normal, legitimate channels.

## CONCLUSION

We have only indicated some of the major points in a proposed demonstration program. The main purpose of this paper was to elucidate some aspects of the rationale from which it has been derived; there was no room for describing the program itself. Even the rationale is presented in a highly curtailed, summary form and the mass of relevant evidence is largely omitted—also for lack of space.

For those who would like to test our rationale we would suggest this: Take a walk in a high-delinquency area of a big city and look at people's faces; spend a couple of hours in a "trouble clinic" of a settlement house; read one complete case history of a chronic delinquent. In other words, we feel that the rationale is self-evident to all who have been exposed at close hand to the conditions that breed and sustain delinquent behavior among juveniles, and that this rationale points to the program we envisage: A saturation program of *all* vital services which will be accessible to the youths in their natural habitat and co-ordinated to eliminate the shuffling of troubled youngsters from one intake worker to another, and to assure continuity of help as need for different services arises.

What is not self-evident is that it is possible to realize this type of program and that, should it be realized, it will indeed substantially lessen delinquent behavior. These questions can only be answered by trying to do in the best way we know the things we know are needed and by examining the fruits of our labor in an honest, self-critical manner, to learn how to do it better. It is the most we can do—and the least.

[12] Hypothetically, it would be possible to design such a project—by working with a large number of equated areas, one for no new service, one for each experimental service, one for every pair of experimental services, one for every combination of three services, and so on, to say nothing of replications; in practice, it would be an understatement to say that such a project would be impossible.

# Report of the Board of Directors to the Members of The American Academy of Political and Social Science for the Year 1958

(Presented by the President at the Annual Business Meeting of the Members, held at the Academy Offices, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, 26 January 1959.)

## Officers and Staff

NO changes were made in directors, officers, or editors during the year. One staff position was discontinued, pursuant to a consolidation of duties.

## Membership

Five hundred and seventy-nine more new members were enrolled in 1958 than in 1957, and 263 fewer members died or resigned, a total improvement of 842. After being concerned for a number of years over a decline in membership, we are pleased to report that the decline has been arrested and that we have moved ahead.

## Finances

The average annual deficit for the years 1949 to 1956, inclusive, was $5,474. In 1957 there was a slight surplus—$261. This was increased to $2,423 in 1958. But because we paid for one more issue of THE ANNALS in 1958 than in 1957, we should say that our financial position in 1958 was $8,400 better than in 1957. These figures are exclusive of the $10,000 donated by Senator Joseph S. Clark. Also, they do not reflect accretions in the market value of securities. Besides $28,202 in the bank, we have a portfolio of securities worth $277,392.37. Also, we own this building, a large inventory, and all of our equipment. We have no debts. I have advised our Treasurer to reduce our bank balance by $14,000 and add a corresponding amount to our portfolio of securities.

The totals in the Operations Report do not agree with those in the Auditor's Report. They should not agree, because the Auditor's Report reflects the value of inventory and equipment, whereas our Operations Report does not deal with these matters. The two reports have been completely reconciled in a conference between the Auditor and your President.





FINANCIAL STATEMENT ON OPERATIONS, JANUARY 1958 THROUGH DECEMBER 1958

| INCOME | 1957 | 1958 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dues and subscriptions | $ 81,919.16 | $ 87,241.20 | |
| Sales | 15,404.43 | 17,170.36 | |
| Advertising | 5,687.78 | 4,850.82 | |
| Interest on investments | 10,695.80 | 10,980.79 | |
| Personnel project | — | 10,000.00 | |
| Royalties and donations | 44.66 | 290.81 | |
| | $113,751.83 | $130,533.98 | |
| Less EXPENSES | | | Annual Budget |
| General office | $ 15,057.39 | $ 14,739.86 | $ 14,500.00 |
| Meetings | 6,294.85 | 7,160.01 | 6,000.00 |
| Accounts | 7,350.74 | 6,266.01 | 7,000.00 |
| New membership | 19,092.13 | 22,351.25 | 18,000.00 |
| ANNALS | 54,485.50 | 54,102.17 | 55,500.00 |
| Personnel project | — | 978.72 | — |
| Member records | 5,110.12 | 6,640.04 | 5,500.00 |
| Sales | 3,883.72 | 5,045.70 | 4,000.00 |
| Advertising | 2,215.90 | 1,806.60 | 2,500.00 |
| | $113,490.35 | $119,090.36 | $113,500.00 |
| NET FROM OPERATIONS | $ 261.48 | $ 11,443.62 | |
| Ledger balance end of month | | $ 14,445.76 | |
| Outstanding checks | | 3,756.66 | $ 18,202.42 |
| *Less* outstanding collection items | | | 00.00 |
| Balance agreeing with bank statement | | | $ 18,202.42 |
| On deposit in savings account | | | 10,000.00 |
| | | | $ 28,202.42 |

## REPORT OF AUDITORS

THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

STATEMENT OF INCOME AND EXPENSE

FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1958

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **REVENUE** | | | |
| Dues and subscriptions | | | |
| Regular—dues | | $54,703.38 | |
| Student—dues | | 3,459.10 | |
| Subscriptions | | 29,078.72 | $ 87,241.20 |
| Sales of publications | | 17,170.36 | |
| Advertising and royalties | | 5,141.63 | 22,311.99 |
| Interest and dividends | | | 10,644.34 |
| TOTAL REVENUE | | | $120,197.53 |
| **EXPENSE** | | | |
| Membership | | | |
| Records | $ 5,363.37 | | |
| Promotion | 22,351.15 | $27,714.52 | |
| ANNALS—Publishing costs | | 49,228.65 | |
| Sales costs | | 5,045.70 | |
| Accounting and Finance costs | | 6,266.01 | |
| Office operation | | 14,739.86 | |
| Philadelphia meeting | | 7,160.01 | |
| Advertising | | 1,806.60 | |
| Gift—Patton Scholarship | | 500.00 | |
| Personnel Manpower Project costs | | 978.72 | |
| TOTAL CASH EXPENSE | | | 113,440.07 |
| EXCESS OF CASH REVENUE OVER EXPENSES OF OPERATIONS | | | 6,757.46 |
| Less: Depreciation | | | |
| Buildings | | 330.00 | |
| Improvements | | 3,635.67 | |
| Office equipment | | 1,766.62 | 5,732.29 |
| NET PROFIT FROM OPERATIONS | | | 1,025.17 |
| OTHER REVENUE | | | |
| Profit on sale of investment | | | 1,744.52 |
| NET INCOME TRANSFERRED TO SURPLUS | | | $ 2,769.69 |

SAMUEL R. SAPIENZA
*Certified Public Accountant*



## PUBLICATIONS

During 1958, the six volumes of THE ANNALS dealt with the following problems:

| | |
|---|---|
| January | *Understanding Alcoholism,* edited by Selden D. Bacon, Director of The Center of Alcohol Studies, Yale University. |
| March | *A Crowding Hemisphere: Population Change in the Americas,* edited by Kingsley Davis, Professor of Sociology and Social Institutions, University of California, Berkeley. |
| May | *The Satellites in Eastern Europe,* edited by Henry L. Roberts, Director, Russian Institute and the Program on East Central Europe, Columbia University. |
| July | *Asia and Future World Leadership,* edited by James C. Charlesworth, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, and President, The American Academy of Political and Social Science. |
| September | *Unofficial Government: Pressure Groups and Lobbies,* edited by Donald C. Blaisdell, Professor of Government, The City College of New York. |
| November | *Highway Safety and Traffic Control,* edited by John W. Gibbons, Director, Publications Division, Automotive Safety Foundation. |

The publication program for 1959 includes, in addition to the January volume on China and the Overseas Chinese, edited by Howard L. Boorman, Director, Research Project on Men and Politics in Modern China, Columbia University, the following:

| | |
|---|---|
| March | *Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency,* edited by Helen L. Witmer, Director, Division of Research, Children's Bureau, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. |
| May | *Administration of Technical Cooperation Programs,* edited by Richard W. Gable, Associate Professor, School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, Los Angeles. |
| July | *Resolving the Russian-American Deadlock,* edited by James C. Charlesworth, President, American Academy of Political and Social Science. |
| September | *American Civilization and Its Leadership Needs: 1960–1990,* edited by James C. Charlesworth, President, American Academy of Political and Social Science. |
| November | *Perspectives on Government and Science,* edited by Norman Wengert, Professor of Government and Politics, University of Maryland. |

During 1958 the book department of THE ANNALS published 405 reviews. Most of these (311) were by college and university teachers or administrators in this country; 20 were by government officials or members of the Armed Forces, 25 by foreign experts, 17 by representatives of business or other (nonprofit) organizations, 6 by editors and journalists, and 26 by individuals with no particular affiliation listed. Foreign reviews were from Germany, Lebanon, Denmark, France, Switzerland, India, Australia, Canada, and Great Britain; the greatest number of these were from the last country named. Five hundred and twenty-two books were listed in the Other Books section.

One hundred and fourteen requests to reprint material from THE ANNALS were granted. Forty of these were to college or university personnel for use in books, 11 to government officials, nonprofit organizations, or private citizens for use in books, and 4 directly to the publishers of forthcoming volumes. Sixteen requests were granted for the reproduction and use of ANNALS material in college classrooms or adult extension courses; 4 to business or nonprofit organizations for reproduction and distribution. Twenty requests by government agencies were granted, 11 of which

were from government colleges. Several of the other government requests were from the United States Information Agency for distribution abroad. Eleven permissions to use ANNALS material in other magazines were given, 3 for use in articles where the future publisher is unknown, and 5 for use in microfilmed theses. Articles were translated into several foreign languages, including Japanese, Turkish, Italian, and Danish. Two entire volumes were recorded by the Talking Book section of the Cleveland Library for the use of blind scholars.

### MEETINGS

The 1958 Spring Meeting, organized around the general subject of "Asia and Future World Leadership," generated an unusual amount of interest on the part of the members and delegates. Attendance was the largest in the President's knowledge of Academy meetings, and participation by the audience was at times heated. Some of the Ambassadors on the program made surprisingly forthright remarks.

A special conference was held in November 1958, under the auspices of the Academy and Senator Joseph S. Clark, dealing with the subject of "American Civilization and Its Leadership Needs: 1960–1990." This conference, attended by twenty national leaders in science, government, education, and the arts, was the first phase of a far-reaching project. We hope to arrive at a set of valid value judgments as to whether our national cultural objectives are properly reflected in our vocational emphases. Which key occupations are over- and which under-supplied by new talent? The next phase of the project will be a volume of THE ANNALS and a brochure, which will be widely distributed. The third phase will be a bold attempt to obtain foundation support, to implement the recommendations of the study. You will hear more about this project later. (It was made possible by Senator Clark's grant of $10,000 to the Academy.)

The 1959 Spring Meeting will deal with the subject of "Resolving the Russian-American Deadlock." We hope that there will be a minimum amount of vituperation and contumely in the addresses, and that a sincere effort will be made by the participants (representing a number of different countries) to seek solutions, however modest, to some of the disputes with which we are so familiar.

Respectfully submitted,

THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

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## *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*

VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN (Bernard Law). *The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G.* Pp. 508. Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Company, 1958. $6.00.

Writing some two months after the publication of this book, one is tempted to review the reviews of it, rather than the book itself. For surely few books about World War II have made such a splash as this one—all the bigger and wetter, it almost seems, for coming thirteen years later, long after the Ingersolls, the Wilmots, most of Monty's fellow actors in the great drama, and even the official historians have had their say. It would all seem to show that for the reading public World War II is still, after all, sure fire.

My own guess is that the author, not his subject, is responsible for the splash. The Field Marshal was always a hard man with whom to live or work. He was arrogant, opinionated, self-centered, and vain. One hears that his troops adored him, but this testimony does not come from the troops. There is something naive and a little tiresome in his insistence that he fought all his battles according to plan, as though, even if it were true, this were a high virtue. Disciples often outdo their masters, but Montgomery's claim that he could have ended the war in 1944 by a concentrated thrust toward Berlin goes beyond those made on his own behalf by his three chief defenders, Wilmot, Moorehead, and de Guingand. Nevertheless, the man has a compelling quality. The arrogance and self-esteem appear genuine, not a mask for insecurity. His criticisms of others, even the devastating contempt with which he obliterates some of those who differed with him—such as Sir Frederick Morgan and the British airmen—somehow seem free of bitterness. For Eisenhower, whose "broad-front" strategy he believes responsible for prolonging the war, he expresses warm affection. Curiously enough, some of his more critical reviewers criticize him with a kind of sorrowful affection, as though he had let them down.

Yet, to those who have followed the controversies stirred up by Montgomery's war-time career, the memoirs will be disappointing. On all the ancient causes célèbres of World War II, he and his disciples had their say long ago. All we get here is a brief rehash, and on some episodes, notably the Ardennes crisis of December 1944, not even that. Especially frustrating is the chapter on the battles in Normandy in mid-July 1944. Was

Montgomery really trying for a breakthrough to the Seine when he hurled upon the city of Caen three armored divisions and an aerial bombardment of unprecedented weight? Or was this attack, as he insisted, simply a phase in the unfolding of the "master plan" he had devised months before D-day, by which German armor was to be pinned down by the British and Canadians on the left, so that the Americans on the right could make the decisive breakthrough—as they did a few days later? We don't know yet, and perhaps we never will. For Montgomery's own orders and correspondence can be, and have been, cited to support both sides, and it begins to look as though all the evidence is in.

A little more than a third of the book is devoted to the author's post-war career—as occupation zone commander, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Deputy Supreme Commander of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE). He concludes with some sober but not unhopeful advice on Western unity.

RICHARD M. LEIGHTON
Historian, Office of the Chief of Military History
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C.

NICHOLAS MANSERGH and others. *Commonwealth Perspectives*. Pp. viii, 214. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center; London: Cambridge University Press, 1958. $4.50.

In the spring of 1957 a Joint Seminar was held for social science graduate students under the auspices of the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center. The purpose was to introduce the Commonwealth, indicate some of its main problems, and outline the possibilities for research. The faculty contributions to this effort are now presented in this volume.

Professor Mansergh of Cambridge University traces, in his two essays, the constitutional evolution of the unique association of independent states known as the Commonwealth and views the course of the foreign policies of its members from 1945 to 1956. Most valuable is the account of how the multi-racial Commonwealth was achieved in 1948 by agreement on a formula which reconciled India's status as a republic with acceptance of "the king as the symbol of the free association of its independent member nations, and as such the Head of the Commonwealth." The constitutional evolution of the present Commonwealth has been a fascinating if not a logical process. And it has been well said of the final structure that "if it did not exist, you could not invent it." Professor Mansergh's essays go far in explaining the diversity within unity which is the chief hallmark of the Commonwealth.

Rightly an essay is devoted to the emergence of Ghana as the first African nation to achieve membership in the Commonwealth. Professor James L. Godfrey traces its development from crown colony to independent state and indicates some of the serious problems which now confront it. A stimulating contribution by Professor Joseph J. Spengler discusses the nature and implications of demographic trends in the Commonwealth. There is much to the view that in the final analysis the future character and fortunes of the Commonwealth will depend on the stork. Despite some tortuous prose and reliance upon social science jargon, this essay shows clearly the importance of population trends on the unity of the Commonwealth. What will happen if Britain ceases to be a source of population and capital to such states as Australia and New Zealand? And what will be the outcome if Britain and the older, and more industrially advanced, states in the Commonwealth are unable to provide significant amounts of capital to India, Pakistan, or Nigeria? These are questions that all students of the Commonwealth must follow closely.

The perspective on the Commonwealth is rounded out by a study by Professor Robert R. Wilson who examines rules of public law in relation to such subjects as nationality and the settlement of disputes between members. In addition to this valuable paper there is an essay on health and welfare programs in Australia and Canada by B. U. Ratchford, and one on the prospects for the Sterling Area by Brinley Thomas.

While necessarily not exhaustive, the essays in this volume constitute a valuable contribution to Commonwealth studies.

T. WALTER WALLBANK
Professor of History
University of Southern California
Los Angeles

J. S. FFORDE. *An International Trade in Managerial Skills*. Pp. 153. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957. 18s 6d.

In recent years, a great deal has been written about the economic problems of underdeveloped countries; surprising little has been said about the deficiencies existing in these countries relative to managerial and technical skills. Nuffield College, Oxford, of which the author of the present survey is a Fellow, accepted a grant from the World Bank in 1954 to cover an inquiry into British experience relating to the following questions: If the underdeveloped countries need to import managerial and technical services, how can they best acquire and use them? How can they attract them in correct quantity and quality but on terms that are also consistent with local social and political requirements?

Four main routes are discussed along which British managerial services may flow into underdeveloped countries. These are summarized below:

First, acquiring British staff on an individual basis, person by person, for an enterprise that is wholly owned by local nationals or by the overseas government. This is termed the "individual route."

Second, acquiring the necessary assistance and collaboration by establishing an active working partnership between a local business—privately owned or not—and a British concern, or group of concerns, which has specialized knowledge and experience. This is called the "joint venture."

Third, acquiring the necessary assistance from the same type of British business but without the active local partner. This route is titled that of "product-specialized foreign investment."

Fourth, acquiring the necessary services from a type of British business which could perhaps be squeezed into route three, but is best treated as a separate route. This route is that of the "trader-industrialist."

The factors affecting the choice of route are described at length by the author. These include the following: first, the actual or desired degree of active local control; second, the source of technological or other forms of progress specific to the industry concerned, and the extent to which general participation in such progress is one of the services required to be imported from abroad; third, the degree of process differentiation present in the producing and marketing of the goods concerned; fourth, the size of the local enterprise concerned and the number of foreigners required; and, fifth, the length of time of the proposed association with foreign individuals or a foreign business, and the degree to which the services to be imported change over time.

This is an important book and one of special significance to Americans who are concerned, on the governmental or private level, with aid to underdeveloped nations. Fforde's statement that "when we talk in general about helping [these nations] in a managerial and technical field, we must better inform ourselves of an active environment and begin examining the possible and appropriate" has relevance to the American approach to countries seeking assistance in the managerial field. Far too little has been written in the United States about the problems and challenges inherent in transferring our managerial "know-how" to undeveloped countries. Fforde's book points the way to a greater understanding of the subject. Someone in the United States who is a specialist in underdeveloped economies and the managerial sciences now must write a comparable study.

MARY E. MURPHY
Professor of Business Administration
Los Angeles State College of Applied Arts and Sciences

GERHARD VON GLAHN. *The Occupation of Enemy Territory: A Commentary on the*

*Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation.* Pp. xiii, 350. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957. $6.50.

At the cessation of hostilities at the end of World War II, a new concept of settling the peace emerged. Until this time, the treaty of peace was the customary means of terminating hostilities and restoring sovereignty to the vanquished. Following the treaty of Versailles, there was a limited occupation for the demilitarization of the Rhineland, but it took place after the treaty and for an extremely limited purpose. At the termination of hostilities after World War II, however, peace treaties were signed many years later and the intervening period was one of military occupation. This was a natural corollary of the phenomenon of total war which required the evocation of attitudinal and institutional changes in the defeated nation before it could be restored to its position among peaceful nations. The deliberate effort to induce change in the vanquished societies of Germany, Austria, Korea, Japan, and the Ryukyus was really a revolution in the conduct of foreign affairs.

The present volume surveys part of that effort. It is limited, however, to belligerent occupation which von Glahn defines as "the occupation of part or all of an enemy's territory in time of war." This means that it is concerned almost exclusively with the military occupation of Germany from the time of the invasion to the surrender in May 1945, which is the least significant portion of the total occupation. Japan and the Ryukyus and the German occupation following May 1945 are not analyzed because the author defines this as "hostile occupation . . . of the territory of a country which was surrendered completely and no longer maintains armed forces in the field." Korea and France are not discussed, because they come within a second category, also not dealt with, "occupation of neutral or allied teritory which usually takes place under a plea of military necessity but sometimes for purposes of liberation from an enemy."

Although the period thus analyzed in this volume is less significant than the subsequent period to the actual signing of the peace treaties, the limitation which the author sets is necessary for analytical purposes. It makes possible a thorough synthesis of practices allowed by international law during this period. The subject is divided into such traditional categories as proclamation, native inhabitants, neutral citizens, courts, currency, and property. Under the various headings the substance of the Hague Regulations, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and of numerous secondary sources are summarized and analyzed. The result is an extremely useful compendium of commentary on occupation during wartime. The extensive footnotes include citations to the occupations of the Ryukyus, Japan, and Korea, even though the text does not deal with these nations. An extremely helpful Appendix of pertinent documents and a comprehensive Bibliography add to the utility of this volume.

RALPH BRAIBANTI
Acting Director of Graduate Studies
in Political Science
Duke University

L. JOHN MARTIN. *International Propaganda: Its Legal and Diplomatic Control.* Pp. vii, 284. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958. $5.75.

Most recent studies of propaganda have been preoccupied with problems of technique or with questions of its interrelationship with ideology, policy, and action. They show less of the moralistic tone found in much of the shocked or defensive writing about propaganda before World War II. While many amateur counter-propagandists —some in high places—have yet to recognize the insufficiency of responding to the initiative in communications of their opponents by "exposing" their "propaganda," scholars are learning that the persistence and power of self-serving communication calls for a more incisive and inclusive analysis.

Yet concern over the contemporary instruments of control over tendentious communication properly persists. One contribution, as yet unique, is Martin's study of the available legal and diplomatic instruments. His best chapters pull together



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both the legal principles and the major applications arising from international and domestic law. He glances at the possibility of extraterritorial control of states over their citizens abroad. He recounts concisely the important recent incidents where diplomacy has come into play, especially in dealing with official propaganda agencies.

His conclusions are modest and sound. The central difficulties of control arise from problems of definition and evaluation of propaganda. Law deals mostly with acts, less with conspiracy and intention, and "propaganda cannot and should not be divorced from the act it attempts to promote" (206). Thus the controller is dealing with the state in its full sovereignty, and control through international law is a dim prospect indeed so long as sovereignty persists. Since World War I, states have both intensified their controls through municipal law—covering channels and media of communication—and have broadened their freedom of action as propagandists. "The control of propaganda will remain," he concludes, "in the municipal laws of states and the bargaining power of diplomacy" (207).

Martin dallies with definitions, sketchily deals with the historical background of propaganda today, and summarizes the propaganda organization of a few major states. Events have overtaken him here, however, and he omits such a major contender as Communist China. He skirts the continuing issues of freedom of speech which underlie problems of propaganda control—issues and values which create the most serious dilemmas for those who would both enjoy and perpetuate the maximum of freedom.

But his diligent scholarship has assembled the principles, the cases, and the comment that are essential preliminaries to such discussion, as well as to a just judgment of the probable effectiveness of legal control. For this, the community of specialists in communications and the wider community of political scientists will be grateful.

CHARLES A. H. THOMSON
Senior Staff Member
The Brookings Institution

### *EUROPE*

STANLEY MELLON. *The Political Uses of History: A Study of Historians in the French Restoration.* Pp. 226. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. $5.00.

Mr. Mellon has produced a book which no one interested in the history of the French Restoration or in the problems of historiography in general will be able to neglect. The industry with which he has studied the writings of scores of contemporary historians, politicians, theologians, lawyers, and journalists dabbling in history is impressive. The inventory of that tremendous output of historical views and arguments bearing on the politics of the day is something to be grateful for, especially since it is plentifully illustrated with quotations.

The contestants who, in times of party strife, belabor each other with antithetical interpretations of the national past are by no means unusual phenomena. I have observed and described similar battles as they occurred in the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth, and again in the eighteenth, centuries. The French debate on the French Revolution was by no means ended by the Revolution of 1830; it was carried into the twentieth century with unflagging vehemence and hardly diminished political significance.

This debate was not confined to the actual happenings of 1789 and the following years. Both parties, the Liberals and the Royalists, were concerned to show opposing beliefs—the one that the age-old tradition of liberty had long been encroached upon by the monarchy and in the end justified the outburst of the Revolution, the other that the monarchy had been the guardian not only of the social order and of religion, but of liberty as well. To point out how badly liberty fared when the monarchy was overthrown was not enough; the earlier record of the monarchy had to be vindicated. The rival interpretations of the *Charte*, too—was it a Liberal instrument, a codification of ancient liberties made inevitable by the Revolution, or was it merely an emanation of the beneficent spirit of traditional monarchical govern-

ment—led the rival polemists into scrutinizing the past. And this was no less true for the question of the Church.

Mr. Mellon has special chapters not only on Gallicanism and Ultramontanism, but on the particular question of the Jesuits. He brings out the fact that the terrific excitement about the return of the Jesuits was not due to any fresh misdeeds which could be imputed to the small number of their new establishments, but instead to what was industriously dug up out of the history of the order. And similarly, in order to make the papacy suspect, the names of sixteenth century Pius V, Gregory XIII, Sixtus V, Gregory XIV, and of seventeenth century Innocent XI had to do service as frequently as those of the contemporary heads of the Church.

In his Introduction Mr. Mellon quotes Fiévée, who wrote, in 1818, that "our century is singular in that . . . it makes politics with memories." I think that in his own treatment of the material he is inclined to adopt this view with too little qualification. I have hinted already that in other times and in other countries "the political uses of history" were not unknown. But moreover, in his particular case, Mr. Mellon unduly heightens the impression that politics turned on nothing else but history by giving attention to that aspect too exclusively; this is in spite of his statement that we must regard his book as a study not so much of historiography as of politics.

When he represents the Liberals after the Restoration as having no recourse but to history in order to maintain themselves, he overlooks a good many things. And in fact he has failed to delineate expressly and with any distinctness the political background against which these fascinating historical debates were staged. The compromise nature of the Restoration, the salvage of some of the social and administrative reforms of the Revalution, the importance of the class of the *acquéreurs*, the survival of a large portion of the personnel of the revolutionary or Napoleonic regimes, the continuing influence of the Enlightenment —there are references to most and perhaps all of these aspects in the course of the exposition, but they have not been gathered in one consistent whole. The author talks about "the Liberals" most of the time. It is only half way through the book that he indicates—and no more than indicates—a distinction between the Liberals and the radical Left. The chapter on "The Splitting of the Coalition," which comes towards the end of the book, makes the reader realize how little has been said about that "Coalition" before. The *Charte*, which ought to have been discussed at the outset, is brought up only in an account of what first the Liberals then the Conservatives thought of it. As a result the historical discussion seems to be carried on in a political vacuum; it seems as if there were no politics outside it, which is an illusion.

The scores of writers who are introduced to us by Mr. Mellon include, naturally, a number of famous names. On some of these, as for instance on Guizot or Montlosier or Lamennais, I found him enlightening; on others, as for instance on De Maistre and Mignet, disappointing. The full treatment of lesser-known or even obscure men is particularly rewarding. Mr. Mellon's reference to Augustin Cochin's formula, *thèse de circonstances*, (p. 18, footnote, and repeatedly afterwards) is based on a misinterpretation of Cochin's text.

PIETER GEYL
Professor of History
University of Utrecht
Netherlands

MERLE FAINSOD. *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule*. Pp. x, 484. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. $8.50.

Would you like a peep into secret Soviet archives? The German capture of part of the archives of Smolensk followed by the American capture of German files has provided the opportunity. Merle Fainsod has used his incomparable knowledge to weave a pattern of exposition and interpretation to throw light on nearly every aspect of Soviet life from 1917 to 1936, when the archives cease. No student of Soviet affairs can afford to miss this account. While it will rarely surprise him, it will implement his knowledge with a mass of detail. More than that, it will re-emphasize with remarkable evidence the extraordinary opposition Soviet authority met in the peasants.



Fainsod ponders Soviet success in the face of massive peasant opposition and concludes that neither terror, nor force, nor party organization, nor a tradition of servility to the center—strong as each of these was—held the regime together, but rather that the real cause was the buildup of a network of revolutionary beneficiaries with vested interests in the perpetuation of the new order. In short the revolution was popular with powerful forces, and the vast concentration camp system which the archives expose did not become the source of such unrest as most westerners have assumed it to have been, for it was outweighed by the satisfaction of still greater numbers who achieved promotion beyond their dreams.

The most striking of the new information revealed by the archives is the fact that the state farms were, until the purge of the mid-1930's, the refuge for outlawed elements: former *kulaks*, Tsarist officers, gendarmes, and prison officials. Another area enlightened by the archives is the known but not fully documented weakness of the party organization in the villages before 1933. The party had to rely on the state apparatus to achieve its ends, for it had no members in most collective farms. The drive for collectivization in the early 1930's is revealed as a mighty influence on class hostility even to the degeneration of courts to the point where judges were dismissed for falling under the influence of the legal line rather than holding strongly to class policy.

Throughout many documents, sometimes reproduced in photographs of the original, is to be seen the mighty role played by the party, although the security police are revealed finally to have dominated even the party. Fainsod concludes that the NKVD became Stalin's special instrument to watch the party.

This volume is not a substitute for generalized volumes on the Soviet system of government. It must be viewed more as a massive appendix in amplification of the usual texts, for one needs to know much about the Soviet Union to savor its offering fully. Yet with this caution it can be recommended enthusiastically as one of the most illuminating books on the Soviet system yet to appear.

JOHN N. HAZARD
Professor of Public Law
Columbia University

GEORGE L. KLINE (Ed.). *Soviet Education*. (Studies of the Research Program on the U.S.S.R., Vol. XVIII.) Pp. xi, 192. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957. $3.50.

This book is of value primarily to people interested in the history of Soviet education. It contains nine firsthand accounts by former Soviet citizens who have been both students and teachers in a variety of Soviet educational institutions. The period they most fully describe is the decade of the 'thirties, but the late 'twenties and early 'forties are included to some extent. The contributors write about such institutions as nurseries, the middle schools, universities, and teachers' colleges. In addition there are accounts of lesser known educational experiments such as the Faculties of Special Purpose created in 1931 by order of Stalin to raise the low educational level and technical competence of the managerial "class" which at that time consisted almost entirely of poorly qualified party members.

The contributors do not merely describe, they interpret and write with feeling about their personal experiences. The reader is afforded exceptional insights into the mood of the people, into the relations between students and teachers, and into the atmosphere pervading Soviet schools and universities.

Although the contributors confirm each other in many of their observations, there are certain differences in their general estimate of political opinion in the Soviet Union. One, for example, believes that young people are successfully resisting the Bolsheviks' efforts to control them completely. Others leave the impression that the majority accepted the Soviet realities already in the early 'thirties. Concerning students' life, one asserts that there is no friendship among the young people because even one's best friend may betray one; whereas another maintains that there are areas outside politics where comradeship

and gaiety find expression. The truth thus remains colored by personal experience and is hard to ascertain. Today's Soviet youth gave the writer of this review the impression of having accepted the realities of their society and at the same time of feeling freer than they did twenty years ago to express criticism and to live a private life within the limitations set them.

FREDERIC LILGE
Professor of Education
University of California
Berkeley

HENRY W. EHRMANN. *Organized Business in France.* Pp. xx, 514. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. $7.50.

This book deals with the organization, operation, and political significance of French trade associations. It is a comprehensive, penetrating, and well-organized study. An exceptional gift of exposition is necessary to describe the complex range of ideological and practical problems that the French businessman has had to face since the end of World War I, and to describe the unusual practices by which the joint interests of business groups are represented vis-a-vis government and public opinion. Ehrmann describes not only the practices of trade associations but also the underlying mentality and the policies of trade groups concerning actual social and political issues, including inflation. The social psychology of present-day France is well illustrated by the fact that in this period of inflationary pressures the hoarding of monetary gold by private persons—to escape the disadvantages of possible currency fluctuations—is permitted. The study is based on extensive documentary material, on current French literature and newspapers, and on many interviews with persons who had, and who did not have, an ax to grind.

The first part deals with the period between the end of World War I and the end of World War II. The discussion centers on the emergence of a strong, reorganized "employers' movement" from the defeat suffered by French industry in connection with the general strike in 1936; on the position of French big and small business during the twilight atmosphere preceding World War II; and on the political attitude of French entrepreneurs during the Vichy regime. Mr. Ehrmann briefly covers the period of the twenties and early thirties in which the cartel movement started in Western and Central Europe. It is the period when the French statesman Louis Loucheur used the World Economic Conference in 1927 as a forum to point out that the rivalry between the United States and Europe was the principal reason for the establishment of steel cartels, and when French statesmen of the stature of Edouard Herriot and Lucien Romier proclaimed in widely circulated books that cartels were necessary for the defense of European industry against American competition.

The second part is concerned with the present-day organization of business. The structure and operational scheme of the Central Organization of Business (*Conceil National du Patronat Français*) are analyzed along with the associations of particular business groups, large and small. In comparison with the political influence of pressure groups in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other European countries, the influence of the French business lobby is very strong and the methods of exercising that influence somewhat unusual. Mr. Ehrmann points to the dangers of these practices for democratic forms of government and effective public administration, and emphasizes that within France the abuses of private economic power are frequently criticized.

The third part contains attitudes and policies of organized business in regard to various domestic, social, and political issues and in regard to such international problems as unrestricted trade and the European Common Market. Data are supplied on slow industrial development, inflexible fiscal policy, and ineffective business methods.

The fourth part contains the conclusions of Mr. Ehrmann. "A political vacuum has resulted into which the interest groups have extended their activities and their intransigence, while the machinery of the state has veered uneasily between collaboration with and submission to the groups." He does not dare to predict the future of democracy in France in view of his findings.

Professor Ehrmann's book adds much constructive material to the discussion of French democracy and the operation of pressure groups in general. His views concerning the auspices of French democracy may be over-pessimistic. The book, however, rests upon a wealth of data not easily accessible. It deserves reading by students in all branches of social science.

ERVIN P. HEXNER
Pennsylvania State University



R. H. TAWNEY. *Business and Politics Under James I: Lionel Cranfield as Merchant and Minister.* Pp. xii, 324. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958. $7.50.

From the "storm over the gentry," the current phase of the controversy over the nature of social change before the Puritan Revolution, many a student of English history will turn with relief and satisfaction to this latest work by Professor Tawney. He initially stimulated that controversy and it is again he who enlarges our knowledge of the context in which all the changes of that epic period took place.

In his analysis of Cranfield as London merchant and as minister of the Crown, Professor Tawney provides us with a fascinating case study in the interrelation of economics and politics under James I and does so with that command of historical evidence and that felicity of phrase which have made him one of the great masters of his craft.

He sets the stage with a brilliant survey of the European commercial scene. A close study of Cranfield's varied interests during twenty years show us how he amassed a personal fortune as merchant, chiefly in textile trade with the Continent, as City banker "putting out money for gain," and as speculator in land and in customs-farming.

He entered royal service in 1613 as Surveyor-General of the Customs and advanced through various posts to that of Lord Treasurer in 1621. In an era of declining royal revenue and rising demands from a prodigal king his role promptly became that of reformer. He sought better management of ordinary income from crown estates, labored for retrenchment in Household expenditures, attacked the "jungle" of financial practice in the Navy, and greatly increased receipts in the Court of Wards and Liveries. He became Lord Treasurer and Earl of Middlesex just when a change in foreign policy—the proposal of a Spanish marriage for Prince Charles—brought on financial crisis. Policies of reform then proved his downfall, for his erstwhile patron, George Villiers, now Duke of Buckingham, allied with the Commons against him. The upshot was Cranfield's impeachment and conviction of "bribery, extortion, oppression, wrong and deceits," an episode treated with suitable irony by the author.

This career does not prompt Tawney to generalize. He has in mind the ultimate "erosion of traditional social systems by the pressure of new interests," but he makes no effort to see in Cranfield, either as merchant or as minister, traits of "an artificially constructed type." The book is no polemic in economic interpretation. Professor Tawney's interests are more catholic, his insights deeper, and his perspective far wider. Through him we both know more and understand more about the background of the Puritan Revolution and this work will still further enhance his reputation.

ALFRED F. HAVIGHURST
Professor of History
Amherst College

ROBERT L. KOEHL. *RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy 1939–1945: A History of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom.* (Harvard Historical Monographs, No. 31). Pp. xi, 263. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. $6.50.

The contents of this book—No. 31 of the Harvard Historical Monographs, under the editorship of Oscar Handlin—are described succinctly by its sub-title: *A History of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom—Reichskommisariat für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums* (RKFDV). The author concentrates primarily on the administrative and political history of the RKFDV and other government and party organizations which participated in the process of re-settling hundreds of thousands of Germans. Even

non-Germans were treated as those of German "racial stock" as the result of unscientific rationalizations and the same contorted logic which was applied to the race concepts in Nazi ideology. These apparent beneficiaries of the New Order were shifted mostly to conquered Eastern territories, especially to Poland, from their homes on the borders of the expanded Reich. Many were evacuated from areas which were later to remain under Soviet domination. In numerous cases the new sites were the former homes of Poles and Jews who had been removed for extermination or slave labor.

Although the book does not go into an analysis of the personal attitudes or post-war reactions of these pawns in the strategy of the Nazi policy-makers, it appears that a large number of them felt that the policies of the Third Reich would benefit them, even though they often did not receive title to their new land or were only resettled from their homesteads to camps and work in Germany, where they remained.

This book contributes to an understanding of the history of the Third Reich and its leaders by showing how their diseased *Weltanschauung* and their misinterpretations of history contributed to disaster also for their own favored sons. Himmler, whose neo-feudal concepts are recorded here, envisaged the creation of Eastern Europe as a German colony. Very likely these policies were determined by Hitler's ideas.

The student of the Nazi government will find again the familiar conflict of jurisdiction, inefficiency, the jockeying for position among the numerous groups assigned to carry out similar functions without proper co-ordination, and the competition to retain status or gain ascendancy over other persons.

The Appendix to this monograph contains a glossary of Nazi terminology, organizations, and persons, and some significant documents and decrees. One of the documents gives some statistics. A helpful Index is also included.

The major part of the source material used by Koehl was the huge mass of evidence presented at Nuremberg Trials Eight and Eleven, two of the "subsequent trials" held under United States auspices after the trial by the International Military Tribunal. It is commendable that the author also used sources not easily available, such as those coming from Poland.

No doubt this story of the manipulation of human beings and brutality will further contribute to an understanding of the political pathology of the leadership of the Third Reich. However, the book suggests avenues of research which it does not, unfortunately, explore—especially with regard to the demographic, economic, and social consequences of population movements. It is hoped, further, that this monograph will be complemented by an interpretative study of case histories, based on statements made by participants on all levels of operation. The historian of the recent past has the unique chance, for which he is rightly envied, of completing his research by interviewing the contemporaries of the events about which he writes. It is regrettable that the author did not or could not avail himself of such an opportunity.

ERIC H. BOEHM
Editor, *Historical Abstracts*
Munich, Germany

JACOB S. SIEGEL. *The Population of Hungary.* (International Population Statistics Reports Series P-90, No. 9.) Pp. vii, 186. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1958. (U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.) $1.00.

This is the latest addition to the excellent series of reports prepared by the Bureau of the Census on the population of foreign countries. The stated objective of the series is "the compilation and evaluation of population data and related information which are often available only in scattered sources or in languages other than English."

In regard to Hungary, this task is particularly complex and confusing. Account had to be taken of the demographic developments not of one state entity, but of four, widely differing in area and population: first, the pre-World War I Hungary; second, the post-war "Trianon Hungary" (1920–1938), which ceded about seven-tenths of her territory and two-thirds of her population to six neighboring countries; third, the post-Munich Hungary (1938–1945) which annexed from Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia 30,000 square miles of teritory with a population of 6 million; fourth, the post-World War II Hungary reduced to her Trianon boundaries.

The demographic picture of present-day Hungary emerging from the study is as follows.

With a population of 9.8 million on January 1, 1958, and a population density of 275 per square mile, Hungary is one of the smaller and more densely populated eastern European countries. Unlike the birth-rates of most countries of the West, Hungary's showed relatively little response to wartime and immediate post-war changes; no explanation is given for this phenomenon. Her population balance was substantially affected by losses suffered by her ethnic minorities: 260,000 expulsed Germans, 220,000 exterminated Jews—Eugene Duschinsky in *The Jews in the Soviet Satellites*, p. 396, puts the number at 257,356—and 41,000 Slovaks transferred to Czechoslovakia under an exchange agreement; in addition, 158,000 Hungarian citizens perished during the war and 60,000 fled the country as political refugees. As against these losses, 70,000 Magyars escaped from Rumania and 23,000 returned from Czechoslovakia. At present, Hungary is ethnically homogeneous—95 per cent Magyars—and denominationally predominantly Catholic or Greek Catholic. Ethnic minorities constitute less than 2 per cent: 220,000 Germans and less than 100,000 Jews. The growth of the population is likely to be only moderate in the next two decades. The growth of urban population is pronounced, prompted by the Communist policy of intensified industrialization. The labor force is increasing faster than the general population.

Numerous tables and seventeen figures enhance the value of the study. The method of referring to sources is unnecessarily complicated and makes their use difficult and tiresome.

JOSEPH B. SCHECHTMAN
New York City



*Sweden and the United Nations: Report by a Special Study Group of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.* (National Studies on International Organization.) Pp. x, 315. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956. $3.00.

This is one of the more comprehensive and informative National Studies on International Organization sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment. The product of a well-informed, six-man study group appointed by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, it covers more ground than is indicated by the title and is an excellent analysis of recent Swedish foreign policy and its conduct—with particular regard to Sweden's stand on the United Nations and international organization in general. It is a good picture of what lies behind the attitudes of the government, the political parties, and well-informed public opinion. Attention is paid to Sweden's interest in economic co-operation and, in the brief concluding chapter, Swedish views of the need for a reform of the United Nations Charter are outlined. One may be certain that the members of the study group have the co-operation of the Foreign Office in preparing the report.

The introductory chapter is a succinct presentation of Sweden's position since World War II and underlines that the policy of "freedom from alliances," combined with a comparatively strong national defense, is neither "a doctrinal faith in neutrality nor a lack of feeling for the basic fellowship among the Western democracies." Sweden has succeeded in "combining a consistent line of neutrality with active participation in general peace-time cooperation among those democratic nations bearing the Western cultural inheritance—an inheritance which Sweden shares."

The bulk of the book consists of Professor Elis Håstad's 154-page account of Sweden's attitude toward the United Nations and Professor Hilding Eek's 76-page story of Swedish policy in the United Nations. Håstad is a professor of political science who has recently been appointed governor of his native province. An exceeding versatile, long-time member of

Parliament, he has also been a member of the Swedish delegation to the United Nations. His long chapter is by far the best account of recent Swedish policy and its setting available in English. Eek, now a professor of law at Stockholm University, was a delegate to the Geneva Freedom of Information conference, has been a member of the United Nations Secretariat, and has participated in deliberations of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. His chapter is complete and well documented.

In adition to these long reports, Dr. Bo Kärre, a member of the Secretariat of the Council of Europe, contributed a 38-page chapter on Swedish policy with regard to international organization in the economic field, which emphasizes that in this area the Swedes—given their large trade and the composition and direction thereof—have gone the whole way in seeking "free multi-lateral trade, restored over as large an area as possible."

The conclusions emphasize that the Swedes regard the United Nations as a valuable instrument for international cooperation. Sweden considers it "almost an international obligation to take part in the work of the United Nations." The Swedish attitude is also positive toward both the specialized agencies of the United Nations, and international organizations outside the United Nations system. The Charter of the United Nations is not looked upon as an "international treaty to which the country adhered primarily in order to look after its own interests. It appears rather as a constitution still in the making; a constitution with the ultimate aim of a union of the nations of the world under legally binding forms." In short, the earlier experience, as well as the war-time experience, means to Sweden that "a necessary condition for achieving peace is international solidarity in cooperation for peace."

ERIC C. BELLQUIST
Professor of Political Science
University of California
Berkeley

CHARLES D'OLIVIER FARRAN. *Atlantic Democracy: A Comparison of the Constitutions of North Atlantic Treaty Organization Member States.* Pp. ix, 203. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. $5.50.

This book may be said to have grown out of the experience of its author who teaches public international law at Liverpool University as one of the first holders of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization research fellowship. It carries a foreword by Lord Ismay, the former Secretary-General of NATO. It is divided into two sections. Part One, Power Is from the People, deals with legislative branches, electoral systems, leadership of the state, ministers, cabinets and councils of state, distribution of power, and the meaning of democracy. Part Two, Freedom Under the Law, concerns itself with the judiciary and liberties of the subject.

Considering the modest length of the book, it is not surprising that the author has devoted himself primarily to the formal constitutions rather than to the broader constitutional systems. This has the advantage of a certain simplification, but it leaves the reader with a somewhat fragmentary if not superficial knowledge of the governments discussed. At times the reference to formal provisions is so brief as to be scarcely meaningful at all—for example (p. 62), where the French Council of the Republic is described as "not an exact replica of the Senate," but no additional information is given as to its role.

Any scholar in the field of comparative government is well aware of the difficulty if not utter impossibility of keeqing abreast of changes. Hence one can only express sympathy with the author as far as the sections relating to France are concerned. It would seem, however, that cognizance might have been taken of such items as the early shift from a sixty-forty to a fifty-fifty proportion in the number of members chosen by direct election and proportional representation in the West German Bundestag, the provision for life peers in the British House of Lords, and the like. Errors such as the statement (p. 69) that an American senator "must also reside in the district from which he is chosen"—it has already been noted that he must be an inhabitant of the state in which he stands—or that (p. 67) giving the number



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*Professor and Chairman, Department of Government, The City College of New York*

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of Lords Spiritual in Britain as twenty-four detract from the value of a handbook. Predictions such as the one (p. 144) that the vice-president of the United States will probably "become something akin to a deputy prime minister in European states" seem out of place in a book of this character. Altogether the book is a useful handbook for lay readers—the author states that "it is not intended to be a work of advanced scholarship."

HAROLD ZINK
Professor of Political Science
Ohio State University

MÁIRE and LIAM DE PAOR. *Early Christian Ireland.* (Ancient Peoples and Places.) Pp. 263. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. $5.00.

The topography of Ireland is such as to promote cultural unity, with a strong historic sense, pride of lineage, and a poetic concept of nationality that long antedated any degree of political integration. Ireland was never conquered by Rome, but politically yielded to Roman artistic and literary influences. The work of St. Patrick, "a combination of mystic and able administrator" (p. 30), represented the first major Christian establishment in a wholly barbarian environment. Cut off from further Continental influences by the Germanic invasions, Ireland, in the late fifth century, came under the influence of Western Britain. Irishmen, returning from centers of learning like Lindisfarne, brought back ascetic ideas easily adaptable to Irish society, with the monastic community under its abbot easily identifiable with the clan (*tuath*) and its chieftain (*ri*). With the spread of monasticism, Patrick's organization disintegrated, and monastic communities, within their walled enclosures (*crannochs*) representing Medieval Ireland's nearest approach to town life, took over the learned traditions of the Brehons and Druids. The monastery became the "milieu which produced that most remarkable spiritual, intelectual, and artistic movement of Dark Age Europe, the 'Celtic' Church" (p. 64).

The Viking raids beginning in 795 struck at the "moment when art, literature, and learning had reached their full flower under the patronage of the Church" (p. 131). Although Viking settlements, especially of Norse origin, were founded, Ireland as a whole was never conquered, and the victory of Brian Boru at Clontarf in 1014 finally broke the power of the invaders. Delivery from Viking attacks, however, merely ushered in an era of struggles for the high kingship which persisted with varying intensity until Elizabethan times. The Norse settlements, however, coupled with the Gregorian reforms of the eleventh century, finally brought the Irish Church into full communion with Rome as indicated by the Synod of Rath Bresail in 1110.

This work by highly trained devoted students of Irish archaeology will be indispensable to any student of Irish history or of early Medieval Europe. The profusely illustrated chapters on art are as informative as they are authoritative, although the absence of captions on the plates necessitates much cross reference which might well have been minimized. The quality of the plates is excellent, however, and the colored reproduction of a page from the Book of Durrow which serves as the frontispiece impels the reader to wish that an extensive use of color plates had been feasible.

CHARLES EDWARD SMITH
Dean of the University
Professor of History
Louisiana State University

RICHARD HOSTETTER. *The Italian Socialist Movement: I: Origins (1860–1882).* Pp. xii, 444. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1958. $6.50.

The beginning of multiple Socialist movements under the chief guidance of Nenni, Togliatti, Garibaldi, Mazzini, and others, coincided with the antithesis of the political aims of Cavour who ensured the unification of Italian states which had been formerly more or less independent. The United Kingdom assumed the responsibility for the social and political security of Crown and State. The terms social and political security were claimed by both Crown and

Labor. The dual use of these terms will be clarified in the analysis of the content to follow.

Chapter I deals with the social question and the making of Italy by way of national unity and the Party of Action, Cavour and the bourgeois alliance, the social revolution and patriotism. Chapter II covers Piedmontese and Mazzinian labor traditions, Piedmontese Societies of Mutual Aide, morality and social problems. Chapter III deals with Mazzini and the Italian labor movement and their concern with political actions by labor, and the Congresses of Florence, Parma, and Naples in 1861. In Chapters IV and V, Bakunin visits Italy in 1864–1867 presumably in the interest of the International Alliance of Socialist Democracy. Chapter VI describes the First International, the workers' societies, and international socialism. Chapters VII and VIII deal with the impact of the Paris Commune upon Mazzini, on Radical Republicans, Republican internationalism, the socialism of Garibaldi, and the Bakunin-Mazzini polemic. Chapter IX covers the Bakunin-Mazzini conflict and the Congress of Rome. Chapter X exhibits Italian socialism and "Authoritarian-Libertarian" dispute. Chapter XI describes the penetration of anarcho-socialism in the Romagna and the Garibaldian Congress Movement; XII pictures socialism in Turin, Milan, Florence, and Naples, as well as the Anarchist triumph. Chapter XIII reveals the conflict of anarcho-socialism *versus* the Italian State and society, the eclipse of Marxian influence, and the consolidation of Bakuninism. Chapters XIV and XV contain the Propaganda of Deeds, international and external Anarchist resources, Italian socialism and government of the Left, and the Congresses of Florence-Tosi and Bern. Chapter XVI covers the disintegration of the Anarchist International as organization and decapitation of the Italian International. The closing chapter XVII bares the shift to legalitarianism and "Obsequies" of the Italian Anarchist Movement.

The dreaded "Obsequies" of the anarchic movement of the early eighties were not fulfilled. But present-day Western civilization realizes the rising might of Russia and China as threats, which Khrushchev had in mind when he made his hilarious boast of forcing us within our own life span to come under the unthinkable but quite possible yoke of communist sway.

JOHANNES MATTERN
Associate Professor of Political Science, Emeritus
Johns Hopkins University

## *ASIA AND AFRICA*

JEROME B. COHEN. *Japan's Postwar Economy.* Pp. xvii, 262. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1958. $6.50.

Impartiality in political economy is not so easy, or even wise, as it is often presumed to be. In assessing the course of Japan's remarkable recovery of the past decade and venturing to give the outlook for the Japanese economy in his latest book, Professor Cohen is wisely partial. His brand of partiality may not be shared by many others, but it cannot be disputed that his arguments are built around a consistent framework. He does not see, or refuses to see, a dynamic future for Japan with the Socialist party in power, for he assumes, conveniently for his argument, that "their social expenditures, their lack of resistance to excessive wage demands and their unwillingness to pursue tight money or austerity programs" would conflict with the basic requirements for a viable Japan. It does not occur to him that a socialist party, mature enough to have the confidence of working people, may succeed far better in carrying out an austerity program than conservatives. The point is that an austerity program under a party for workers is a different thing from an austerity program under a party for rich people. Professor Cohen's bent towards the orthodox conservative position is further attested to by his inclination to give what I believe to be an excessive credit to the monetary policies in accounting for the recovery and also by his pessimistic attitude as regards the possible expansion of trade between China and Japan. His judgment that "the most important limiting factor in trade between the two countries is the probability that China does not have the means to pay for any large volume of imports from Japan" (183–4) suffers, to say the least, from a severe lack of imagination.

Consistently with his broad position in analyzing the past decade, Professor Cohen makes Japan's future hinge upon the expansion of world trade, specifically the trade among the so-called "free countries." Such expansion, no doubt, is a laudable objective which should gain wider support, especially on the American continent. But here Professor Cohen's sympathy with the objective carries his imagination a bit too far into a statistical error. He states: "In the nine-year period 1948–56 inclusive, world exports rose from $52.7 billion to $91.9 billion, a gain of 72 per cent. If we assume a similar gain over the next nine years, 1957–65 inclusive, the volume of world exports should reach $156.5 billion by 1965. If Japan does no better than maintain its 1956 share of world exports—2.7 per cent—its export volume in 1965 would be $4.2 billion. . . . If . . . Japan's share of world trade rises by 1965 to a modest 3.5 per cent, then Japanese exports in 1965 will amount to $5.4 billion" (pp. 134–5). This range—4.2 to 5.4 billion dollars—if achieved, appears to be more or less satisfactory in the light of the target of 5 billion dollars' worth of exports for 1965. But the trouble is that the 72 per cent gain in world exports between 1948 and 1956, even if it can be repeated, subsumes a price rise, whereas the 5 billion dollar Japanese target for 1965 is in terms of 1955 prices.

Aside from the points raised above, which are related generally to the question of future outlook and thus tend to be affected quite a bit by one's opinion and political position, I have nothing but a high praise for the most painstaking efforts of Professor Cohen in making his narrative of the recovery rich in statistical information and pertinent quotations. At several points I would differ with him in a matter of emphasis. For example, whereas he harps repeatedly on the theme of "the continued use of outmoded and obsolete machinery" in Japan, I would rather take note of big strides that have recently been made in various lines of industry. There are also a number of minor errors, such as the obtaining of 7.1 per cent annual growth rate of real per capita income in prewar Japan by simply dividing the difference in index numbers (526 minus 100) by sixty. But all these are, if I am to emulate Professor Cohen who has an apt Japanese phrase at the beginning of each chapter, what might be called *tama ni kizu*—slight flaws in a well-polished thing—that could be mended in the process of further polishing.

SHIGETO TSURU
Professor of Economics
Hitotsubashi University
Tokyo, Japan.

SOLOMON B. LEVINE. *Industrial Relations in Postwar Japan.* Pp. xiii, 200. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958. $4.25.

In the sense that industrial relations form an important facet in the socio-economic complex of a society, this study answers in part that continuing question: how democratic has Japan become? Its answer is a complex but not pessimistic one.

Professor Levine, a member of the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations at the University of Illinois with a command of Japanese and a year devoted to observations on this topic in Japan, tells us that a new set of decision-makers has grown up in industrial relations: the old triumvirate of the military, zaibatsu, and political bureaucracy has now been replaced by "the more democratic combination of professional management, organized labor, and representative government." In management, an industrial relations specialist has appeared and has come to play an important part in integrating the now organized workers into the community of enterprise, especially in the larger and more basic industries. Although he came into being when management was on the defensive, essentially to provide management with the ability to meet the requirements of the occupation reforms, he has retained his place after management's recovery of status. In the trade union movement, labor has gained on the local level the right to partial decision-making on job ten-

ure and wages and on the national level a voice in politics through the Socialists. The vocal upper level, engaged in political struggle, often obscures the more significant development of enterprise—rather than industry-wide—unionism below which is an indigenous growth containing potentialities in the opposing directions of independence or domination by the employer. Which way this develops will depend a good deal on the government, which is intruding into industrial relations in various ways, both in restricting union activity and providing increased state welfare benefits and social security.

Especially in the area of collective bargaining and labor disputes, Professor Levine provides new insights that will be of interest not only to scholars on Japan but those interested in comparative industrial relations—a field, incidentally, in which this work is a pioneer. In the final chapter on government regulation of industrial relations, Professor Levine presents a good deal of material on legal provisions but strongly hints at their lack of enforcement. This only serves to point up how much has yet to be done by way of specific on-the-spot studies. In the meantime, this careful, sound, and eminently successful attempt to frame a set of tentative overall conclusions on labor-management-government relations should serve both as a corrective to much of the superficial reporting on Japanese labor and as a guide for further research.

GEORGE O. TOTTEN
Assistant Professor of Political Science
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

NORMAN JACOBS. *The Origin of Modern Capitalism and Eastern Asia.* Pp. x, 243. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. $3.40.

In a paper submitted at the World Historical Congress at Rome in 1955, on the differential response of China and Japan to the impact of Western science and technology, J. K. Fairbank said that the person "who grasps the true secret of Japan's success in Westernization has a key to modern Far Eastern history." The book under review is concerned with this very topic, but it does, unfortunately, not provide that key. In fact, it is difficult to say that the book contributes anything to our understanding better the contrasting economic development of Japan and China in the last hundred years, except by bringing together an assiduously collected but not clearly related mass of statements on various aspects of Chinese and Japanese economic and social history.

The stated purpose of the book is to present a sociological explanation of the origins and development of capitalism through a comparative study of the social structures of China and Japan. The theoretical basis for this undertaking is said to be presented in the second chapter of the book. After a somewhat pretentious and largely irrelevant discussion of some methodological and theoretical problems in sociology, the author lists seven "key foci" and their related "institutions" and "functions," which are "significant for the conceptualization of the origin and development of modern capitalism." The remainder of the book is devoted to a discussion of each of these key foci, such as subsistence, power, biological relatedness, evaluation, and so forth. Any interconnections between these foci and their related institutions and functions are not indicated. It is not made clear how differences in any of the key variables are functionally related with differences in others, nor is any indication given of how changes in one variable impinge upon any of the others. The bulk of the book is filled with a large number of statements contrasting this or that aspect of the social and economic life and values of China and Japan. But the totality of these facts does not make for a theory, and certainly falls far short of providing an explanation for the difference in the economic evolution of the two countries.

The book suffers not only from lack of genuine theoretical underpinning, but also from bias in execution. One example must suffice. Almost all Japanese institutions, whether guilds or religious sects, whether systems of learning or systems of inheritance, are stated to have features "as in western Europe." In fact, one scarcely discovers any institution in Japan which differed from the corresponding institution in western Europe, and one finds not a single Chinese institution which is not in full contrast with the corresponding Japanese—and hence western—one. Three questions arise in this context: First, why did Japanese institutions, which have their origin in Chinese civilization, develop in so different a direction from the country whence they were borrowed? Second, why did Japan not develop a capitalist society independently? Third, and most important of all, why are Japanese institutions, after a century of close contact with the West, still so very different from those of western countries? By trying to prove his point too well, Jacobs has opened a host of new questions! Alas, they are only pseudo questions, for had Jacobs had a true "theory," and had he proceeded with somewhat more detachment, he would have discovered the trap of his own making in which he got caught. It is a pity that so much assiduous work should have yielded no more than a singularly disappointing book.

BERT F. HOSELITZ
Professor of Social Science
University of Chicago

CONRAD BRANDT. *Stalin's Failure in China, 1924–1927.* (Russian Research Center Studies 31.) Pp. xv, 226. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. $4.75.

The abortive Chinese revolution of 1924–27 was a crucial chapter in the history of China, Russia, and the international Communist movement. There is only a small literature on the subject and Mr. Brandt says that "not one of the books that deal at length with the 1920's in China gives a straightforward, comprehensive account of the history of the period." His own small book was evidently not designed to rectify this omission, although much material has become available and not a little has happened since to give us new perspective on these events.

Mr. Brandt seems to have examined this material at length in all the key languages, including—for the first time on the subject of China—the archive of Trotsky papers at Harvard. Out of all this he has fashioned a work that is rather more like a series of footnotes than a coherent history, a string of commentaries rather than any kind of consistent reinterpretation. It is not easy to see what the unprepared reader might get out of this, but for the small number of students of the period, Mr. Brandt comes up with some new facts and some new quotations that can be added to the record.

He is able, for example, to contradict the now-popular claim that Mao Tse-tung was the man who was right all the time in those early events, even when Stalin, Trotsky, and all the other Chinese Communists were wrong. Mr. Brandt's footnotes also add some bits and pieces to the story of the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to free itself from the smothering embrace of its Russian mentors.

To the issues of ideology and strategy as debated and as applied by the Russians in China at that time, Mr. Brandt does not make as much of an addition. Out of the Trotsky archive he does come up with one arrestingly new detail. He says that at a special Politbureau committee meeting in the spring of 1926, with Trotsky in the chair, it was decided to avert possible Japanese hostility by offering to assure Japan of Chinese guarantees of a deal over Manchuria, accepting Japanese control in South Manchuria and eventual "autonomy" in the whole region. Mr. Brandt unfortunately does not quote this report fully enough, but the historian interested in the interplay of pressures and motivations in the top Russian leadership will do well to pursue this particular footnote with greater interest than Mr. Brandt shows in it.

To the China issue as it became embroiled in Stalin's drive against the Trotsky Opposition, and in the Opposition's futile fight against Stalin, Mr. Brandt brings only a limited kind of discussion. His main point seems to be that the Marxist mystique about the role of the proletariat in the revolution crippled both Stalin and Trotsky in their appreciation of the Chinese situation. This is a view which merits the most serious and sophisticated examination, but neither this theme nor the whole intricate Russian-Chinese interplay that led the Chinese Communists into such a bloody catas-

trophe in China in 1927 is explored here with the needed depth or perception.

HAROLD ISAACS
Research Associate
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

KARL A. WITTFOGEL. *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power.* Pp. xix, 556. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957. $7.50.

Dr. Wittfogel's long-awaited study is a monumental essay in comparative sociology which will stimulate most readers but satisfy few. His diffuse and elaborate thesis is not easily summarized, but the gist is as follows: In potentially fertile areas with low rainfall but a major supply of surface water, the agricultural potential could be exploited only by extensive waterworks, requiring co-ordinated and disciplined mass labor. This effort involved an organizational web covering the whole agricultural area, and those controlling this network inevitably came to wield supreme political power. Managers of the waterworks became bureaucrats of a government which prevented the organizational consolidation of nongovernmental groups. The head of the state became a thoroughgoing despot because, in contrast to feudal Europe or Japan, the army was an integral part of the bureaucracy while the dominant religion was closely attached to the state. Dr. Wittfogel spells out an elaborate configuration of institutions as characteristic of this type of society, which he variously terms "hydraulic," "agromanagerial," "agrodespotic," or "Oriental." All or parts of this configuration have spread through diffusion beyond such hydraulic areas as north China, north India, and the Fertile Crescent. The agrodespotism of Tsarist Russia, for instance, was derived in large part from Russia's Mongol conquerors, who had been "hydraulicized" through contact with China.

Dr. Wittfogel has devoted decades of scholarship to a theoretical elaboration of Oriental despotism and to amassing relevant data from more than a score of agrarian societies. But all too often his logic is deficient, his presentation nonfunctional, and his methodology slack. Few of the component hypotheses are simply and specifically stated, and even when this is done evidence is usually selectively presented. Seldom is the attempt made to define a concept or variable in terms independent of what is being proved about it. Never is a hypothesis tested by comparing unbiased samples of hydraulic and nonhydraulic societies. Parts of the thesis are persuasive, parts of the book show brilliant insight, and certain sections are radiant with original thinking, but the whole is unconvincing. Is Communist despotism in the Soviet Union really linked in a causal chain to low rainfall in north China?

Dr. Wittfogel's thesis is part of a controversy which grew out of the Marxist tradition, and he is concerned, above all, with refuting certain Marxist tenets. Moreover, he sees his theory as a weapon in the struggle against Communism, and evidences of this political crusade strongly color his scholarly achievement. If these factors make for a difficult and exasperating book, they do not substantially dim the luster of its many illuminating insights and formulations, which command respectful attention.

G. WILLIAM SKINNER
Assistant Professor of Sociology
Columbia University

IBN KHALDÛN. *The Muquaddimah: An Introduction to History.* Translated by Franz Rosenthal. Vol. I, II, and III. Pp. cxv, 481; xiv, 463; xi, 481. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958. Bollingen Series XLIII. $18.50.

The author was a learned Mohammedan scholar whose ancestors had settled in Spain during the eighth century of our era. But Ibn Khaldûn himself was born in 1332 in Tunis, where his father provided him with excellent teachers. A few years later he went to live in Fez, and it was there that he completed his education. After a residence in Granada, Spain, from 1363 to 1365, he returned to northwest Africa, and there in 1377 he completed his book known as *The Muquaddimah*, the Introduction to an enormous work, *History of the World.*

The three volumes in English translation are a great credit to American scholarship, especially in their documentation. They clearly reveal the high level of scholarship attained by the Muslims in Spain and Northern Africa during the fourteenth century. It will no longer do to depreciate civilization during that century. On the other hand, it would be equally misleading to support A. J. Toynbee, who has been quoted by both translator and publisher as a reliable appraiser. Toynbee said: "*The Muquaddimah* is undoubtedly the greatest work of its kind that has ever been created by any mind in any time or place." The author made a splendid survey of Muslim civilization in nearly all of its aspects, for which he deserves much praise; but he failed to understand Greek, Roman, and West European cultures.

His map facing p. 110 in Vol. I is vastly inferior to similar maps produced about the year 1377 in Italy. Even the Iberian and Balkan peninsulas are way out of line. Rome is located on a gulf (I, 151), and England is an island rather than a part of one (I, 159), while Burgundy is a German country. Many of his assertions are equally erroneous. "It is noteworthy how civilization always collapsed in places the Arabs took over and conquered" (I, 304). That was too bad for Spain and Sicily! Mohammed and the Koran were the supreme sources of all laws and jurisprudence (III, 3). The section on medicine is also pathetic (III, 148–152). "The earth floats upon the elementary water" (I, 110). Oresme had by this time already announced at the University of Paris the heliocentric theory of the solar system. The Pope belongs to the Melchite Christians, who "have no significance" (I, 480). "Formerly, [people] were concerned with scholarly writings" (II, 391). All the great Christian scholars are obviously ignored.

ALBERT HYMA
Professor of History
University of Michigan

WILLIAM A. HANCE. *African Economic Development.* Pp. x, 307. New York: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1958. $4.95.

This is a most useful and interesting collection of papers on African economic features and problems. The common theme of all the essays is that of economic development, but whereas some of the chapters are pan-African, others are limited to specific topics or regions. Professor Hance's particular skill lies in the sharp focus with which he presents the detail of some single project or question while maintaining the reader's sense of perspective.

Perhaps the best examples of his technique are the chapters on the Gezira Scheme and the Volta River Project. Both of these projects are treated with the wealth of physical detail and an understanding of the African environment that make them outstanding contributions to discussions on planning projects. The Gezira Scheme, an agricultural one, demonstrates what can be done with even the most arid of African soil, given irrigation. It is also a classic example in the response of peasants in Africa to well-designed economic incentives. On both these counts it is essential reading for any student of African affairs.

The Volta River Project has an interest of quite a different kind, since it is still only a paper plan. Professor Hance's review of the available evidence indicates the existence of all the physical requirements for the success of the plan: the water power potentially available, the massive deposits of bauxite awaiting extraction and conversion to aluminum, the railway and port capacity already built or under construction, and the vast sums of capital available but not yet committed to the joint undertaking which has been proposed between the Ghana and British Governments on the one hand and the aluminum companies on the other. His analysis thus focuses on the more purely economic and political factors in the continuing hesitation. Here in a nutshell is the problem facing foreign investors in Africa. Here in the same nutshell is the problem facing African governments needing foreign capital and skill.

The other chapters in Professor Hance's collection are as full of meat but they have less interest to the economist in that they are regional studies rather than functional ones. The regions best covered are those in British—or once British—territories, and it is with British Africa that the

major part of the book is concerned. There is a most interesting account of Liberia, which poses a question but fails to answer it. There is also an essay on Madagascar, and throughout there are references to French, Belgian, and Portuguese experience but this does not give the same impression of first-hand knowledge. If the book has a fault it lies in this tendency to generalize from Anglo-Saxon attitudes, and one is left with the feeling that Professor Hance may have missed some of the more interesting experiments which are going on elsewhere in Africa.

PETER ADY
Fellow of St. Anne's College
University of Oxford

GWENDOLEN M. CARTER and WILLIAM O. BROWN (Eds.). *Transition in Africa: Studies in Political Adaptation.* (African Research Studies, No. 1.) Pp. 158. Boston: Boston University Press for the African Research and Studies Program, Boston University, 1958. $3.00.

*Transition in Africa* is the first of a series of African research studies currently being conducted by Boston University. The purpose of this first volume is to provide additional insights into the general problems of political adaptation which must always accompany a transfer of political power and to encourage and facilitate further study of such problems within specific countries and areas of Africa where the transfer of power is in process.

These studies are made possible through the helpful financing of the Carnegie, the Rockefeller, and the Ford Foundations. The findings were first presented in panel form to the American Political Science Association under the general heading of "Problems of Political Integration in Africa."

The particular countries studied in this volume are Ghana, by David E. Apter and Robert A. Lystad; Nigeria, by L. G. Cowan; Central Africa, including Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland, by E. P. Dvorin; and Kenya, by Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. In addition to the text of the study reports, a very comprehensive Bibliography for British Africa in general, British West Africa in particular, and the specific areas studied is included. This Bibliography covers thirty-two pages of the total text and is in itself an extremely valuable addition to the increasing amount of resource information available concerning Africa.

The editors, Gwendolen M. Carter and William O. Brown, point out that the whole process of transition in government is sharply and significantly brought to a focus in current equatorial Africa. Since World War II practically all of equatorial Africa has experienced varying degrees and stages of political transition. Nine countries have already achieved independence; others are preparing for it in the near future. Such transfer of government control involves massive planning. When the seat of political power is moved from outside the country or even outside the continent to internal instruments of government, the people of the territory involved need to do much rethinking and to prepare for many revisions. They need to decide whether they feel able to have a completely separate independent existence, or whether they will seek to adopt a new form of association with the former controlling power, such as is involved in commonwealth status.

The four studies made it quite clear that, whereas the problems in the four areas have great variations, there are numerous things which are common to all of them.

First, each of the countries is made up of numerous tribal groupings. Throughout the long years of their history each tribe has felt a stronger loyalty to its own group than it has to any overall area, or regional government. Thus it has been difficult to bind them together under one overall head. The new government must quickly discover ways to develop area loyalty without at the same time destroying valuable tribal controls.

Second, much as the tribal groupings desire to establish overall elected, representative forms of government, it is almost impossible for a tribe to believe that it could elect someone outside of its own tribal group who would safely represent its interests in an overall government. Broken down even further, it is difficult for an African village to believe that someone elected from another village would adequately represent their interests.

Third, the tradition of the past has been to accord to tribal chiefs a great deal of authority and respect. When a tribal group has opportunity to elect representatives to government they feel duty-bound to elect these tribal chieftains. If they do not, the chieftain suffers a great loss of dignity and status. On the other hand, he is often an older person, somewhat bound by tradition, and is not the best representative to sit in an elected legislative body.

Fourth, the constitutions which are at first drawn up by these newly independent states are often found to be inadequate. May temporary constitutions be put into operation which can be rewritten as experience dictates?

Fifth, can the people of the larger industrial centers who are rapidly becoming "westernized" satisfactorily sit in the same governmental groupings with the "bush people," who comprise a large part of the population?

In addition to these general problems which prevail in most of the African countries seeking independence each has its individual and specific problems. In Nigeria, the northern half of the country has for a long time been under Moslem rule. The southern part has been under separate tribal rule, animistic in beginnings, but recently tending toward a Christian culture. How can these operate without religious and social friction?

In Kenya, there is a much higher percentage of European settlement than in the other countries studied. There is also a higher percentage of Asian ownership and control. The African culture is likewise sharply divided into at least two divisions: those who are well educated and who are becoming wealthy, and those who, in the main, are still illiterate farming people. How can a form of government be established which will adequately represent all three or four of these groupings?

These studies sift out some of the problems and point out some of the progress and the explorations toward progress occurring in a changing Africa. Emphasized throughout the studies are the underlying sociological factors which enter into transition and adaptation in any country. Such research is to be commended.

D. W. BITTINGER
President
McPherson College



## *AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY*

DAVID FELLMAN. *The Defendant's Rights.* Pp. xvi, 356. New York: Rinehart & Company, 1958. $5.00.

Dust jackets are notoriously unreliable, but the one on this volume carries the statement of a very reliable man that this is "a superb piece of work" and just the kind of book long needed in the field. It is unnecessary to add that this testimony by Robert E. Cushman is thoroughly justified.

Mr. Fellman has succeeded admirably in giving a succinct and up-to-date account in nontechnical language of the legal rights of the defendants in criminal prosecutions and also of the position of those whom he calls the quasi-defendants. After showing that procedure is important he considers in turn the preliminaries of the criminal process—arrests, the preliminary examination, and bail; the defendant's right to notice and to a fair hearing; the writ of habeas corpus; trial by jury; the right to counsel; searches and seizures; self-incrimination; double jeopardy; and cruel and unusual punishments. Emphasis is placed upon the views of the Supreme Court of the United States, but there are also broad generalizations about the tendencies of state law.

An especially valuable part of the book is the last chapter on the quasi-defendants. Under this suggestive title he focuses attention upon these groups: the loyalty defendants, investigating committee defendants, alien defendants, and passport defendants. These are the people who in our times "get into about the same fix as defendants without enjoying" their rights. Of them the author says: "I have tried to point out in what respects the procedures available for them are deficient. These constitute one of the growing edges

of our law, and there is reason to believe that we are gradually becoming aware of the plight of the quasi-defendant." He is justified in his hope that he has made a contribution to sharpening that awareness.

More books of this sort should be written by men of Mr. Fellman's reputation in his specialty. For in this day of specialization the scholar in a different branch even of the same discipline shares with the educated layman the need for a short work which he can use with the assurance that it comes from the pen of a man who knows his subject.

The author has appended sixty-eight pages of notes, largely citations; a table of cases of almost twenty-three pages; and an Index.

JAMES HART
Professor of Political Science
University of Virginia

WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS. *The Right of the People.* Pp. 238. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1958. $4.00.

This book by Mr. Justice Douglas summarizes the philosophy, in the area of civil liberties, of one of the most resolute defenders in our time of the basic rights of the individual as against the authority of the state, and of the Supreme Court as the guardian of these rights.

Along with Mr. Justice Black, the author has for two decades been the most vigorous and consistent exponent on the Supreme Court of the view that some risks must be taken if the fundamental rights of the citizen—especially the right to speak and write freely, to associate and to travel—are to be protected against erosion. The author's philosophy would, therefore, be of interest at any time; his views take on a special importance at this juncture when one of the recurrent attacks on our supreme tribunal is under way and is yet to be decisively repulsed.

It is sometimes overlooked that what has become the most vital function of the Supreme Court—the guardianship of the individual's rights against undue or arbitrary restriction by government—is inherently an unpopular function, for the simple reasons that majority views and conduct require no judicial protection and that when the Supreme Court intervenes to nullify an excessive encroachment on the rights of the citizen, the intervention is almost certain to be on behalf of an unpopular minority and consequently subject to inevitable attack. It can even be said that the more faithfully the Court performs its duty in this field the more certain and severe will be the attacks upon it.

The saving grace lies in the deep and true instinct of our people which is now asserting itself in defense of the Court's independence and integrity. An example is the recent powerful defense of the Court by Dean Erwin N. Griswold of the Harvard Law School in which he refers to the ill-advised criticism of the Court by the Conference of State Chief Justices in the summer of 1958 as a statement which "will live in history as a symptom of the times and not because of its own power as a persuasive discussion of constitutional law." Other influential voices, including that of Chief Justice Jones of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, have also been raised in protest against hostile criticisms of the Court so evidently caused by the racial decisions and the general tension of the times.

With reasonable confidence, therefore, we can believe that this most recent assault on the Supreme Court's all-important function as the protector of our basic liberties has passed its height and that the Court will emerge with perhaps even greater prestige than before.

If this be the result, it will be in large measure due to the consistent and vigorous course followed by the stouthearted judge whose philosophy on the rights of the individual as against his government is expounded with clarity and eloquence in *The Right of the People.*

GRENVILLE CLARK
Dublin
New Hampshire

ALPHEUS T. MASON. *The Supreme Court From Taft To Warren.* Pp. xv, 250. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1958. $4.95.

The essays in this publication are "the outgrowth of three lectures given in the spring of 1957 at Louisiana State University." It should be said for the benefit of the lay reader that Professor Mason is an outstanding authority, a prolific writer, and a scholar who has the additional facility of addressing himself intelligently to the professionally uninitiated. This quality is admirably demonstrated in this little book.

These lectures attempt to present neither a history of the Supreme Court nor a digest of cases over the period under discussion. The author directs his attention exclusively to that controversial segment of the judicial process known as judicial review. After presenting the conventional doctrine of judicial self-restraint and demonstrating that self-restraint need not be very confining, the author discloses and appraises the Court's influence in the determination of public policy. He appears throughout to develop two parallel lines of reasoning or parallel lines of defense and attack: one, the line of self-restraint and judicial non-interference with the legislative process; the other, the line of reasoning taken by the critics of judicial lawmaking. The first position is documented largely from selected ruling opinions and the writings of "court apologists." The second position is documented largely and much more elaborately by reference to dissenting opinions supplemented from the writings of the "liberal school" of court detractors. In the end the scales are balanced heavily in favor of the attackers, partially because the authority of the author, like the proverbial butcher's thumb, adds weight throughout the discussion.

The volume will not be gleefully received by the admirers of Taft and, more especially, of Hughes. The liberal taint in Chief Justice Taft barely shows, and the "judicial statesmanship" of Hughes is presented as having added confusion and uncertainty to the judicial process rather than the contemplated stability. Professor Mason is perhaps too harsh on Hughes. Certainly the cross-section of cases presented does not characterize completely the Chief Justice's judicial temperament or contributions to American constitutional law.

These brilliant essays do not disclose unequivocally Professor Mason's personal attitude toward judicial review. They do reveal some doubt and some evidences of struggle. In any case, Professor Mason is convincing in supporting his conclusion that in declaring legislation unconstitutional the Court does more than measure the act against the language of the Constitution. These essays argue eloquently that Justices do become involved, and consciously so, in the legislative process—and perhaps in the political processes as well.

HAROLD M. DORR
Dean of State-Wide Education
Director of the Summer Session
Professor of Political Science
University of Michigan

LEO PFEFFER. *Creeds in Competition: A Creative Force in American Culture.* Pp. x, 176. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. $3.00.

As has lawyer Pfeffer of the American Jewish Congress, I have been involved with the American Civil Liberties Union for many years in warding off the intrusions of sectarian religion in government. I am for a wall of separation between church and State, as is he. But experience teaches how difficult it is to draw the lines sharply.

Some religious intrusion into politics is legitimate, as he rightly maintains, but not the legal imposition on the majority of sectarian standards. It was all right in our culture for Protestants to urge prohibition on the country; it was not all right for Catholics to urge public support of parochial schools. It is not right for public officials to base decisions on their religious beliefs.

Dr. Pfeffer shows that all three major communions, Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish, have offended principle by attempting to impose by law their own concepts of morality. The Supreme Court, where it has had the chance, has rebuffed them. But the pressures continue. Dr. Pfeffer concludes that the "most serious challenge to American cultural patterns and values fixed by a Protestant-humanist alliance [which dominates American life] comes from Roman Catholicism." But he predicts that the challenge will be successfully met. If it modifies the patterns, that is desirable as a creative force in the competition of creeds.

The interplay of religious forces in our democracy Dr. Pfeffer regards as healthy both for our culture and for the modifications forced on the churches, even the least responsive, the Catholic. His study touches every problem raised by the impact of religion on public life and in a spirit so objectively fair that no reasonable sectarian could take valid exception.

ROGER N. BALDWIN
International Affairs Adviser
American Civil Liberties Union
New York City

RAY GINGER. *Altgeld's America: The Lincoln Ideal Versus Changing Realities.* Pp. 376. New York: Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1958.

As I read this book, my mind flashed back to my college days when I learned about the existence of a manuscript, written in Latin by a medieval monk, entitled "About Everything in the World, and a Few Things Besides." In modern parlance, the author has sought to cover the waterfront, and no one does that successfully.

First of all, Dr. Ginger tries to squeeze out a relationship between Lincoln and John Peter Altgeld; even as he does so, you become aware that he himself senses how tenuous and how far-fetched the link turns out to be. There is no meaningful connection in time, motivation, or conduct between the Civil War president and a governor of Illinois during the Gay Nineties, whose one claim to fame was also the cause of his downfall. He pardoned the three Haymarket riot leaders who escaped hanging.

Altgeld was really a man of minor consequence. Even padded with a soupçon of Lincoln, the author cannot find in him the substance for a full-length biography. He tries to fill the gap by giving a picture of the Illinois, and especially the Chicago, of which Altgeld was a part. This can be quite a legitimate device, and to some extent Dr. Ginger has so used it. He is at his best when he is portraying the lustful economic, political, and social life of Chicago at the turn of the century.

But I feel he goes too far when he tries to claim Thorstein Veblen and John Dewey as part of the Chicago ethos. They lived and worked there but were in no sense part of the local community. It is somewhat like seeking to identify Jesus solely with Judea.

ALPHONSE B. MILLER
Associate Finance Secretary
American Friends Service Committee
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

ELMER PLISCHKE. *Summit Diplomacy: Personal Diplomacy of the President of the United States.* Pp. 125. College Park: Bureau of Governmental Research, College of Business and Public Administration, University of Maryland, 1958. $2.50.

In *Summit Diplomacy*, Elmer Plischke has produced an informative work, thrusting a scholarly plow into rich new soil. As indicated by its title, this is an exploration of personal diplomacy on the part of the President of the United States, and to the extent that this involves reciprocal relations with heads of other states or governments it becomes germane to the entire problem of the conduct of foreign relations.

Structurally the volume is broken into seven chapters including the introduction. The major sections deal with presidential policy formulation, enunciation, and formalization; presidential personal communications; presidential personal diplomatic representatives; state visits; and summit conferences. The concluding chapter is devoted to an appraisal of summit diplomacy.

This organizational pattern appears to be well conceived and well executed. Clarity is preserved throughout the volume in terms of essential communication; the style is effective and forceful and moves the presentation along its way without creating patches of turgidity or torpidity. The temptation to defile into inviting valleys of irrelevant material has been resisted and the work stays on the main road of discussion of summit diplomacy.

Professor Plischke holds that the increasing use of summit diplomacy, although fostered by a large number of factors, "has been rendered physically possible by improved communications and transporta-



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tion." Thus diplomatic contact at the highest governmental level or the summit tends today to become a regular and accepted phase of the conduct of international political affairs. Plischke recognizes various other factors which enter into the creation of the complex of summit diplomacy. These may range obviously from deep conviction and sense of mission upon the part of the participant to a feeling that, since the chief executive within a national government has to assume political responsibility for the results of diplomatic decisions, he might as well seek to make these decisions himself. Besides, there is the fascination which occasionally comes to a man of power possessed as it were of a new toy, and the alternatively near-pathological urge of some leaders to play literal Mohammed and force the mountain to come to them must be noted as implicit in the interplay of advantages and disadvantages, the goods and the ills of summit diplomacy.

The most lasting difficulty, worthy of deep consideration and appraisal, noted by Plischke, is the conflict between the summit caste—essentially amateurs—and the career professionals in diplomacy. On the whole this is a work of real worth, breaking new ground; a good book which will be read widely, let us hope.

CHARLES W. SHULL
Professor of Political Science
Wayne State University

DANIEL J. BOORSTIN. *The Americans: The Colonial Experience*. Pp. 434. New York: Random House, 1958. $6.00.

Dr. Boorstin is initiating an analysis of the American experience. This volume, covering the Colonial years, will presumably be followed by several others. The project is definitely worthwhile, since American historians in the past quarter-century have been increasingly concerned with the minutiae of our developments and have tended to ignore large-scale interpretation.

This book has four main divisions. An analysis of the period of settlement gives attention to the establishment of four colonies: Massachusetts Bay, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Virginia. Emphasizing that the Puritans were much less interested in theology itself than in the practical application of that theology to the problems of everyday life, the author finds it significant that they were able to resist the temptation of Utopia. That the Quakers of Pennsylvania did not have more influence on the shaping of our civilization may be traced to their rigidity and the fact that they "made a dogma of the absence of dogma."

It is pointed out that Georgia "became the victim of its benefactors." The specific plans made for the Georgia settlement were ill-suited for the New World and resulted in the failure of the experiment. In contrast, the author finds Virginia "an earthy effort to transplant institutions." Yet here he finds both weakness and transition, for "the virtues of 18th-century Virginia, when writ large, would seem to be vices. Localism would become sectionalism; the special interests of where a man lived would come to seem petty and disruptive."

The scond division deals with Viewpoints and Institutions. Here the author is concerned with the development of an American frame of mind. A section on Colonial medicine recounts the use of simple remedies and the appearance of a "striking emphasis—an interest in practical ways of treating particular diseases." This part concludes with a discussion of Colonial science.

A third section of the book is titled Language and the Printed Word. Here there is attention to what the author calls "The New Uniformity." Because there were thirteen colonies with no cultural capital—"never an American London or Paris"—American literary culture "began to acquire a varied responsiveness to local problems and to the manifold life of the continent." Many readers will find the section on the press very stimulating and provocative. The final division of the book contains four chapters on the role of war.

While there is no specific documentation, there is a two-column bibliographical essay running to nearly fifty pages and organized according to the divisions of the book. There is also an excellent Index. Most readers, whether intelligent laymen or trained historians, will find this a provoca-

tive volume. Certainly the author has made a fine beginning in his search for the roots of American culture and the mainsprings of our behavior.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN
Chairman, Social Studies Department
State University of New York
Teachers' College at Cortland

WILLIAM MULDER. *Homeward to Zion: The Mormon Migration from Scandinavia.* Pp. xii, 375. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957. $7.50.

*Homeward to Zion* is a remarkable book. The author has placed himself in the background, and has, in a rare manner, put the immigrant himself on the stage where he is permitted to tell his own story.

Thirty thousand Scandinavians, preponderantly Danes, proselytes to the Mormon faith from Denmark, Sweden, and to a minor degree from Norway, sought a better future in America, impelled by religious inspiration, and helped and directed in their great adventure by the missionary activities of the Mormon Church in Utah and by its various mission headquarters in Europe and particularly in Copenhagen.

There emerge here and there from the unfolding drama of the lives of tens of thousands of simple folk, largely poor peasants, some outstanding figures. But there are no giants among them. Yet there is a grand sweep about this story of plain people engaged in a vast co-operative effort. The social and community aspects of life on the Mormon frontier give significance to the story. The drama unfolds much more than a mere repetitious account of the humdrum details of individual efforts to make a modest living in the great desert. From this volume one obtains, however, only a scant picture of the psychological experiences and problems of individuals. Here and there one does get snapshot pictures of this aspect of pioneer living, but for the most part it is a social history.

The author's forty-four pages of fine print in the Appendix disclose a vast storehouse of documentary materials including letters written by immigrants, diaries, autobiographies, memoirs newspaper articles, and so forth. In reading the book one feels as though one is leafing through these rich sources, stopping frequently to read sentences and even whole paragraphs and for the rest getting from the author a summary statement, cast in the language of the documents, of the more significant details. This to me is the most remarkable feature of the book.

The author is director of the Institute of American Studies at the University of Utah. The picture he presents of the experiences, aspirations, and achievements of the Scandinavian immigrants to Mormon Utah, while preponderantly favorable and strongly sympathetic, nevertheless does not omit the story of the very considerable proportion of immigrants who became disillusioned and left Utah for their homeland or for Iowa, Nebraska, and other States.

Finally, it should be noted that one can obtain from this volume a fairly clear picture of social and economic conditions in the old countries, especially in Denmark, in the period 1850 to 1870. This is one of many interesting features of the book.

ALVIN H. HANSEN
Professor of Economics, Emeritus
Harvard University

KENNETH O. BJORK. *West of the Great Divide: Norwegian Migration to the Pacific Coast, 1847–1893.* Pp. viii, 671. Northfield, Minn.: Norwegian-American Historical Association, 1958. $7.50.

A work such as the above has a definite advantage over a general history; it is written not only from the viewpoint of the ordinary loyal American but in addition, with justifiable pride and interest, with the intent of exhibiting the contributions of a specific group—in this case the Norwegians—to American civilization. As a result, the research involved, which extended over ten years, has the earmarks of being more thorough than that of a more general history project.

The volume is written with commendable restraint and is based on local, contemporaneous, grass-root material, such as Norwegian-language newspapers, manuscripts, and immigrant letters. The Norwegian-American Historical Association has already published more than two score of its writings, and this large volume by Professor Bjork is the last. It is a real contribution.

We learn that the discovery of gold in California first made America well known in both Norway and the American Middle West—for the potential Norwegian settlers came from both places. As was true among other national groups, there were both successes and failures for the Norwegians. Many letters warned prospective emigrants against leaving their homes without both a special willingness and aptitude for hard work and capital enough to last for a few months. This applied not only to gold mining but to other occupations, such as farming, fishing, and boat building. And the Norwegians engaged in many other occupations; they became sailors, ship captains, miners, loggers, lumbermen, hard-working Mormons, and railroad builders. In so doing they often came in contact with other Scandinavians, who are mentioned in the book. Copious statistics are offered about the Norwegians everywhere and the prominent ones mentioned by name. *West of the Great Divide* thus becomes an excellent reference work on the subject.

Perhaps the most romantic and fascinating story among the Norwegians is that of so-called "Snowshoe" Thompson, who apparently, before the railroad to the Coast was completed, carried the mail on snowshoes over the mountains of the Northwest, never officially receiving any pay. Only occasionally, for a private emergency letter or message, did he receive a gratuity large enough to keep body and soul together. The rest of the time he carried on his task for sheer adventure and love of the thing.

Culture and religion were not neglected. The Norwegians built churches, published newspapers, and organized singing societies and social welfare groups. But they were an independent lot; there were dissensions, though in general all contributed to American democracy and culture.

Of course, Professor Bjork's volume is supplied with maps, bibliographical data in footnotes, and, naturally, an Index. It adds substantially to our knowledge of the development of the West and Northwest.

ADOLPH B. BENSON
Professor of German and
Scandinavian, Emeritus
Yale University

WILLIAM REYNOLDS BRAISTED. *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897–1909.* Pp. xii, 282. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958. $5.00.

The period from the eve of the Spanish American War through the second administration of Theodore Roosevelt, though brief in time, was full of significant developments. These years witnessed among other things the territorial expansion of the United States across the Pacific, the formulation of basic American foreign policies in the Far East, and the emergence of the United States as a major naval power in the Pacific.

This most interesting and exciting era has received considerable attention from several able historians. Professor Braisted contends, and with some justification, that while scholars have combed the records of the State Department, they have failed to examine systematically those of the Army and Navy Departments which relate to foreign affairs. This book seeks to remedy this defect and its major contribution is its attempt to evaluate the Navy's influence on American foreign policy during these formative years, most of which, so far as the United States were concerned, were years of peace.

The inter-relationship of naval and diplomatic policies is kept central as the major events of the period, such as the conquest of Hawaii and the Philippines, the Boxer Rebellion and the Open Door Policy in China, the Russo-Japanese War and the several episodes in relations between the United States and Japan, climaxed by the "Big Stick" Navy cruise, are carefully and ably developed.

In surveying his findings, Professor Braisted concludes that though naval men did not dictate American foreign policy during these years, naval considerations were often determining factors in the formulation of Far Eastern policy. American naval and diplomatic policies were usually

"joined in harmonious co-operation and mutual support," as in the Boxer Uprising and Russo-Japanese War. Only once were they in sharp conflict and that was when the Navy sought an advance base on the China coast during the partition threat but found the State Department opposed. On two occasions the limitations of the Navy's power "exercised a controlling influence over American diplomacy." A major interest of Roosevelt in seeking an early peace in the Russo-Japanese War was to preserve to some extent the delicate balance of power so vital to American security in the Far East; and a significant, if not determining, factor in the Root-Tahahira exchange was the weakness of the American navy. Professor Braisted concludes his study with these words: "In a constantly changing international political scene, the United States Navy provided the balance which kept American foreign policy on an even keel" (245).

The author has ably fulfilled his hope that his research "will help establish a more accurate understanding of the Navy's function as an arm of foreign policy" (viii), and we wish to encourage him in his plan to follow this study of Navy in the Pacific with an explanation of its more recent diplomatic role in the Far East.

WILLIAM E. LIVEZEY
Professor of History
Dean, College of Arts and Sciences
University of Oklahoma

WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG. *The Perils of Prosperity, 1914–1932.* (The Chicago History of American Civilization Series.) Pp. ix, 313. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. $3.50.

In this fine book, the latest volume in the Chicago History of American Civilization, Professor Leuchtenburg has fulfilled admirably a difficult task: to give in brief compass a lively and authoritative account of the complex forces which shaped America in the years between the outbreak of World War I and the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The first sixty-five pages deal with the war and the lost peace; the remainder concentrate primarily on the 1920's, a decade which has been undergoing some serious re-evaluation by the historians. Professor Leuchtenburg approaches the 1920's with neither the distaste which was so characteristic some twenty years ago nor the nostalgia so evident today, but with an open mind and a firm grasp of the latest historical scholarship. The result is a fresh view of a paradoxical era.

The author is particularly successful in relating the 1920's to the years which preceded and followed. By 1920, for the first time in American history, less than half the people lived in small villages and on farms, and this growing triumph of the city furnishes a key to much that happened. It largely provoked such rural counter-offensives as the Klan, anti-evolutionism, immigration restriction, and other aspects of "political fundamentalism," and it lent particular bitterness to the campaign against Al Smith in 1928. Meanwhile progressivism, leaderless and divided but far from dead, was shifting from the heavily middle-class reformism of the Theodore Roosevelt-Wilson era to the more inclusive mass-supported liberalism of the New Deal.

The "prosperity" of the 1920's brought many "perils," but perhaps the chief was the development of "single-interest government," that is, the total commitment of the Republican Party to the interests of business. It was this that led to those disastrous federal policies of the decade: tax policies increasing the maldistribution of wealth, monopoly policies adding to the rigidity of the market, farm policies encouraging an unbalanced economy, tariff policies hampering foreign trade. The Great Depression which climaxed the 1920's was the result of complex causes, and Professor Leuchtenburg does not oversimplify them, but to the concept of "single-interest government" he assigns a heavy share of the blame. His willingness to give us his critical judgment on men and measures adds to the value of a book which will prove rewarding whether the reader is a beginning student seeking an introduction to the period or a mature scholar revisiting his own experiences of the 1920's and the first depression years.

RANSOM E. NOBLE
Professor of History
Pratt Institute



LEON D. EPSTEIN. *Politics in Wisconsin.* Pp. xiv, 218. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958. $3.50.

This incisive and disciplined study of the politics of a single state presents a useful model of analysis for application to other states. Out of a series of such studies, each taking as its first concern not the uniqueness of the state but broad propositions about political behavior to be tested by comparative analysis, political scientists could develop more reliable generalizations about the American party system than those upon which we must now depend. The author has made this object his main purpose, and his analysis of Wisconsin politics is an exemplary demonstration of its feasibility and value.

The hypotheses of the study are developed from a familiar political model: a democratic political system supposed to function with two well-organized and well-defined political parties competing fairly evenly for state, as well as national, office. Within this general frame, an introductory chapter makes quite explicit the purpose, the methodology, and the limits of the study; following this, a second chapter presents concisely the relevant aspects of the Wisconsin setting—social and economic characteristics, and certain relatively fixed political institutions—while a third chapter makes a general appraisal of the party system of the state in terms of the two-party model. These chapters are followed by four of a more specialized character—size of place and the two-party vote, party organization, legislative membership, and legislative elections—while the final chapter, "Speculative Implications," returns to the author's interest in comparative politics. The presentation is throughout a model of clear statement of the propositions to be examined, careful handling of data, coherent analysis, and restrained summaries of findings.

Politics in Wisconsin during the postwar decade (1946–1956) are found to be moving steadily toward the two-party model. Democratic majorities are centered in metropolitan Milwaukee County and in urban places over 50,000; Republican majorities are anchored most firmly in areas under 10,000, and prevail also in the 10,000–50,000 class. Farm townships show the greatest fluctuation in voting behavior. Party organizations are largest and strongest in urban and suburban places; party officers have a state and national, rather than local, orientation; and party organization influence over nominations for statewide office is strongest. Legislative membership and elections reflect the persistence of some of Wisconsin's distinctive political traditions such as limited functions of party organizations and personalized campaigning. Population trends seem to favor the Democrats. These and other findings enrich our understanding of Wisconsin's politics, but the author's greater contribution is his successful development of a model for the comparative analysis of state politics and state party systems.

WALLACE S. SAYRE
Professor of Public Administration
Columbia University

STEPHEN B. SWEENEY (Ed.) with the assistance of THOMAS J. DAVY. *Education for Administrative Careers in Government Service.* (One of a Series Commemorating the 75th Anniversary of the Wharton School and the 20th Anniversary of the Fels Institute of Local and State Government, University of Pennsylvania.) Pp. 366. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958. $5.00.

This volume is a readable and timely treatment of the education now being offered, particularly by the graduate schools, for those seeking careers of administrative leadership in government service. The basis of *Education for Administrative Careers in Government Service* is the papers presented and the conclusions reached in several conferences and workshops as the participants attempted a "reconsideration of the fundamental assumptions and elements of education for the public service." Given the format of papers and discussion, there is necessarily an element of repetition, but there is compensation for the reader in the wide range of insights provided into the problem of education for the public service.

The student of public administration will not discover many new data, but he will

find a comprehensive and competent discussion of the problems and approaches to educating generalists in the public service. Curricula, teaching techniques, and the institutional setting for these programs are discussed, and there is an Appendix which reports on these in some detail. This reviewer is pleased that the approach is liberal, allowing a great deal of flexibility to the teacher in the utilization of teaching techniques and to the institution in formulating the curriculum. The importance of the role of the teacher is adequately emphasized.

A high point of this volume is the concise and penetrating paper by Wallace T. Sayre on "Trends in the Study and Teaching of Public Administration." Here is a very helpful summary analysis of the developments in the field in the last half century which recognizes the inescapable relationship of public administration to politics, political theory, and the culture of the polity. Happily the days when administration could be analyzed primarily in terms of objective principles are gone.

It is natural that attention should be paid to one of the greatest challenges and most vexing problems in education for the public service—the relationships between education for the generalist and for the functional specialist. Since this volume is concerned primarily with the education of generalists and since the public service still places far greater emphasis in recruiting on the functional specialist, this dilemma, if it be that, probably deserves even more consideration than it receives in these discussions. This study concludes that "the crux of the matter still lies in the preparation of functional specialists to assume adequately the administrative duties to which the most talented will be called," and that this is not likely "until there evolves a closer three-way partnership among professional schools, faculties of general public administration, and governmental employers."

Any extended discussion of such questions as the role, skills, responsibilities, and knowledge which are expected of the administrator is impossible here. Suffice it to say that they are covered in a scholarly and interesting manner.

The emphasis throughout is based on the sound thesis that "education and training for administrative policy-making careers is a matter of total career development." Thus administrators, colleges and universities, and governmental agencies have a joint and continuing responsibility in educating administrators who will be not only technically competent but also motivated by a well-rounded philosophy of government. Formal education and internships are only the initial stages of a continuing process.

As one puts down this volume, however, he cannot but be impressed by the caveat in the concluding paper by Stephen K. Bailey that "we had better spend at least as much time in discovering and recruiting leaders as in training them."

LAWRENCE L. PELLETIER
President
Allegheny College

MORRIS JANOWITZ, DEIL WRIGHT, and WILLIAM DELANY. *Public Administration and the Public—Perspectives toward Government in a Metropolitan Community.* (University of Michigan, Michigan Governmental Studies No. 36.) Pp. vii, 140. Ann Arbor: Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1958. No price.

Democracy is sometimes known as "government by consent." In a representative democracy the principal means of enforcing responsibility on public officeholders is the ballot. This helps explain why political scientists often concentrate their efforts on the electoral process.

In recent years there has been an increasing tendency to evaluate administrative processes as well. Most research in this area has been concerned with internal administrative problems and management procedures. As a result, the influence of public opinion on public administration has been almost overlooked. Lacking studies of this dynamic force, we have an incomplete picture of the administrative process, for public agencies are profoundly influenced by the prevailing climate of opinion. Not even a totalitarian state can ignore public opinion.

This sample survey, conducted by a training and research group of the University of Michigan, and known as the "Detroit Area" study, was designed to investigate this area. A basic premise on which it rests is the concept of "balanced" public administration. According to this theory, a bureaucracy which disregards public opinion—such as that of pre-war Germany—is despotic. If it truckles to special interest groups—as the municipal government of a company town—it is subservient. The purpose of this project was to examine the relationships between the public and the most visible line agencies in the Detroit metropolitan area, whether municipal, county, state, or national, and to ascertain how closely these relationships approached the ideal envisioned by the authors—a bureaucracy based on consent.

This investigation, which used carefully controlled sampling techniques, produced some interesting findings. On the favorable side, it indicated that most people in the area believed the public bureaucracy served their personal interests. There was no widespread conviction that public officials were corrupt. Indeed, the prestige of civil servants had risen over the years.

On the other hand most people in the area accepted "service" agencies passively because they were relatively uninformed about key welfare programs. The investigators also found evidence of "subservient imbalance" because the bureaucracy could not counter public ignorance about its operations, failed to arouse widespread and intelligent curiosity about its functions, and lacked sufficient prestige fully to achieve its goals. The fact that low socio-economic groups did not believe the public bureaucracy served their interests sufficiently was regarded as "despotic imbalance." These imbalances, they concluded, created strain and uncertainty in public administration. To remedy these conditions, they recommended that public agencies establish programs of public opinion research, like industry's "market research."

As these conclusions indicate, the monograph is highly theoretical in nature. It is intended for the specialist rather than the general public. Indeed, the director of the study frankly calls it "exploratory." It will be useful chiefly to political scientists interested in the interaction of public opinion and public bureaucracies.

FREDERICK SHAW
Research Associate
Board of Education of the City of
New York

MARQUIS CHILDS. *Eisenhower: Captive Hero: A Critical Study of the General and the President.* Pp. 310. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1958. $4.75.

This relatively brief book falls somewhere between a presidential-campaign panegyric and a comprehensive scholarly biography well documented with footnotes. The sub-title, *A Critical Study . . .*, belies the real character of the book, as it is almost wholly descriptive, anecdotal, and devoid of the author's conclusions or evaluations.

But for enjoyable light reading before the blazing fire on a long winter evening it can hardly be improved upon as an interesting narrative of the life of the President from boyhood through six years in the White House. It is written in the vivid, easy-flowing style of the skilled journalist that the author is, with the professional sense of news values and the facile pen to put the story on paper.

The narrative begins in the Abilene family home of the Eisenhowers, "on the south (wrong) side of the railway tracks." There David first gained that spirit of self-reliance and adaptability that was to carry him through the varied experiences of soldier and statesman. He is shown in his school fights with the town bully, in his violations of cadet regulations at West Point, in his disappointment over his failure to get overseas in World War I, and over irksome staff duty in Washington i the early months of World War II.

The reader goes to London with hi in 1942, then on the North African inv sion, and finally to headquarters as Co manding Officer of the Allied Expeditiona Forces. The hero of victory returns to a overwhelming New York City ticker-ta welcome and to a spectacular celebrati in Abilene befitting the American saga the legendary return of the home-town b

who had made good out in the, literally, big wide world.

He is shown in the hands of those who promoted him for the Republican nomination for the Presidency in 1952, in the intricate situations which arose in that campaign, in the conflicts with the Taft forces in the party, and in organizing his Washington "Team" for the first administration. His promotion of "modern Republicanism" in his second term and the new challenges of the school segregation issue bring the narrative to a close.

Mr. Childs places large emphasis throughout the narrative upon the simple virtues, the innate integrity, candor, and simplicity of the man, upon his humility and dedication to the service of his nation, alike in uniform and in mufti. He remains throughout his career unaffected by his high positions of authority and his exalted reputation. Asked in 1952 why he was going into politics, he replied, in honest candor, "because I feel that I should." He freely criticizes people and groups who are "thinking simply of themselves and not of the country." We are led to appreciate his "warmth of personality," "hearty geniality," "glow of idealism," and "the capacity and adaptability of the man."

The narrative is good reading in the best Horatio Alger tradition.

HAROLD R. BRUCE
Visiting Professor of Government
Pomona College

HARRY BARNARD. *Independent Man: The Life of Senator James Couzens.* Pp. viii, 376. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958. $5.95.

This is the very readable biography of a man who was successful in business and politics, but is here pictured as being so independent and blunt in both that one may wonder why he was successful. Perhaps the author, swept along by the development of a theme, over-emphasized this side of the Couzens character, but he also pictures a very industrious individual of great ability and character, and such characteristics sometimes enable men to move mountains.

James Couzens was a liberal in the era of Woodrow Wilson and was still a liberal in the age of Franklin D. Roosevelt. In between, in the days of Harding, Mellon, Coolidge, and Hoover, he was a hard thorn in the fat flesh of the Republican party. Like LaFollette and Norris and other progressives of the time, he was an incongruous Republican. This man who had made millions of dollars in business was also a thorn in the flesh of selfish and unscrupulous businessmen and financiers. The Detroit bankers, when the depression came and their banking structure was revealed as thoroughly rotten and unsubstantial, found him a very disagreeable man.

Aside from the value which this book has for the reader who is interested in the life story and the character of Couzens, it is chiefly interesting, perhaps, for its fascinating account of the beginning of the Ford Motor Company and the important part which Couzens played in it, for its information on the banking crisis in the depression, and for its evidence of the respect which Franklin D. Roosevelt and Couzens had for each other.

Furthermore, if anyone is inclined now to assume that the New Deal sprang forth full-blown after the election of Roosevelt this book may prove a reminder that the outlines of its great constructive measures had been drawn by advanced political leaders before that memorable event. While Hoover was still president, Couzens advocated unemployment insurance and old age pensions, and public works on a scale large enough to diminish unemployment.

CHARLES W. SMITH, JR.
Public Opinion Analyst
Arlington, Virginia

EARL LATHAM (Ed.). *The Philosophy and Policies of Woodrow Wilson.* Pp. xv, 266. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. $5.00.

With special acknowledgment to the Twentieth Century Fund and the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, the American Political Science Foundation has been able to present Wilson's controversial role in American political and intellectual life as viewed by fifteen authorities. The fifteen chapters include lectures delivered during the centennial celebration of the birth of Woodrow Wilson in 1956, as well as articles and chapters from books by historians and economists. The resulting volume, edited by Professor Earl Latham, Joseph B. Eastman Professor of Political Science at Amherst College, helps us to see Wilson in a fresh new light. All facets of the molder of the "New Freedom" are explored, and both his assets and liabilities are spelled out.

That Woodrow Wilson came to the presidency better prepared to face the problems of that great office than most of his predecessors has generally been accepted by all historians. The supreme irony of his administration was that his greatest challenge came in foreign affairs, the area where he was weakest. In the twelve years immediately preceding his coming to Washington he was either ignorant of, or completely unconcerned with, the elementary facts of American diplomacy. He perceived his own weakness when he remarked to a Princeton friend, "It would be the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs" (p. 147). He made his greatest contributions in this field because he applied the same techniques of leadership which he used with such success in domestic troubles.

Wilson was a strong executive and began immediately after March 4, 1913, to prove it. His extra-session call early in April, at which he appeared personally to present his program of tariff reform and banking and currency change, awakened the Congress and the public to what they could expect from the "scholar in politics." The President was not only strong in his convictions, but strong in the knowledge that what he was attempting would aid his determination to place the presidency in its proper perspective under the Constitution.

In appraising and recapitulating the work of the fourteen men who precede him in this volume, August Hechscher, president of the Twentieth Century Fund, has this to say:

He saved trivial things from seeming trivial; and in the greatest matters the sword he wielded seemed to carry the light of heaven upon its blade. . . . He went down a broken man. But the gods are not done, and the great issues—war or peace, life or death—continue to be the stakes for which they play (p. 258).

The reviewer believes this statement by Mr. Hechscher epitomizes the effort of Woodrow Wilson so ably presented in this volume. The varied contributions of the twenty-eighth President of the United States show his honored place in the mainstream of modern history.

JAMES J. FLYNN
Associate Professor of History
Fordham University

ELEANOR ROOSEVELT. *On My Own.* Pp. xiv, 241. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. $4.00.

*On My Own* is the third volume of a fascinating autobiography. Although the author was seventy-four years old in October, it seems strange to have her refer to being near the end of her active life. Her many friends all over the world will hope that she will continue to be active for many years to come.

Mrs. Roosevelt's husband died in April, 1945. It is of the intervening thirteen years since that tragic event that the author writes here.

Royalty and distinguished citizens of many countries have visited Hyde Park or have been hosts to Mrs. Roosevelt on her travels. Haile Selassie, Nehru, several members of England's royal family, Queen Juliana, Tito, the Sultan of Morocco, the Emperor and Empress of Japan, and Nikita Khrushchev have all been among this number.

Although no attempt has been made at chronology, the writer relates in some detail several of her most unusual experiences. Of significance was the visit with the English royal family and the unveiling of a statue of Franklin D. Roosevelt in Grosevenor Square in London. This monument was made possible by the English people. With perfect frankness the author states that she did not care for Winston Churchill.

With humility Mrs. Roosevelt tells of her appointment as a member of the United States delegation to the United Nations

General Assembly, of her role on Committee 3 for Human Rights, of her work to give war refugees the privilege of deciding where they would live, of her first speech before the United Nations General Assembly, and of her country's victory in this bitterly contested, highly emotional issue. Until 1953 Mrs. Roosevelt served as a delegate to the United Nations General Assembly and as a representative on the Human Rights Commission. As this commission's first chairman, this talented humanitarian worked toward the creating of better understanding among her fellow men. Her efforts culminated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Since retiring from the United Nations Assembly, the author of this book has traveled extensively. Not only has she been on several world tours but she has participated in a political campaign or two for good measure. After the 1956 presidential campaign, Mrs. Roosevelt's children urged her to "slow up" but she observed, "I could often keep going longer than they."

Several books have been written about America's most energetic lady—a title which certainly belongs to Mrs. Roosevelt—and doubtless many more will be written in the future. However, she is her best biographer. *This Is My Story*, *This I Remember* and *On My Own* constitute a notable contribution to American biographical writing.

GEORGE C. OSBORN
Professor of Social Sciences
University of Florida

## *SOCIOLOGY*

MARVIN E. WOLFGANG. *Patterns in Criminal Homicide*. Pp. xiv, 413. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1958. $8.00.

Between the prospecting clinicians' case studies of selected offenders in custody and the sociologists' broad-ranging explorations of regional and class differentials in crime there lies a promising territory, often traversed, but still only broadly charted and sparsely settled: the comprehensive and systematic study of specific types of crime. Wolfgang's examination of the cases of 588 victims and 621 offenders involved in criminal homicide in Philadelphia from January 1, 1948 through December 31, 1952 builds a solid foundation for the further development of knowledge in this area.

The records of the Philadelphia Police Department's Homicide Squad, which provided the basic information, have the advantage of being more comprehensive than other sources as well as being inclusive of evidence that could only be gathered at the time of the initial investigation. From these records Wolfgang has obtained data about significant attributes of both the victim and the offender in an effort to determine whether there are discernible regularities and patterns associated with criminal homicide and, if so, what they might be. To this end, differentials in race, age, sex, and previous arrests for both victims and offenders, as well as the temporal patterns of criminal homicide—months, days and hours of killings—were analyzed. The often-neglected relationship between the victim and the offender was examined as were also the special situations in which killers subsequently committed suicide or their crimes were unsolved. Although this is not intended to be a comparative study, useful cross references are made between the Philadelphia data and somewhat similar, but not exactly comparable, evidence gathered by other investigators.

Criminal homicides most commonly grow out of vaguely defined altercations, domestic quarrels, jealousy, arguments over money, and robberies. More than half of the criminal homicides here examined involved close friends or relatives. Males killed more frequently than females and Negroes more frequently than whites. In 94 per cent of the cases victims and offenders were of the same race. 26 per cent of the criminal homicides in Philadelphia were precipitated by the victim who was the first to resort to physical violence. 41 per cent of all women killed were killed by their husbands, but only 11 per cent of the men were slain by their wives. These and certain other relationships are already known, at least to those who have given some attention to criminal behavior, but the refinements of these basic facts are the special contribution of Wolfgang's study. For example, the assumption that the high Negro rate of criminal behavior reflects the larger proportion of Negroes in the poorer socio-economic levels must be set against Wolfgang's evidences that even assuming that all those, both white and Negro, who committed criminal homicide were in the occupational range from semi-skilled to unemployed, the male Negro rate by class in Philadelphia was still more than eight times that of the whites. This does not, of course, imply a biological explanation but rather the need for more careful research especially with reference to the socio-psychological differentials among subgroups on the poorer socio-economic levels.

Other studies differ in their implications about the past records of killers but they have frequently indicated that those who commit criminal homicide are not likely to have had previous convictions or commitments for other offenses. Wolfgang's examination of arrest records, however, shows that 64 per cent of his offenders and 47 per cent of their victims had previous arrests, most frequently for offenses against persons. The proportion of those who killed and subsequently committed suicide appears notably less than that reported in England; yet, even so, in Philadelphia as elsewhere, more killers die by suicide than by execution.

This is a sophisticated and workmanlike study whose richness of detail and carefully stated methodology preclude an adequate brief analysis. If ever criminology comes to maturity it is likely to be due chiefly to the increasing number of competent empirical researches in specific types of crime, of which Wolfgang's *Patterns in Criminal Homicide* is a most creditable example.

ALBERT MORRIS
Professor of Sociology
Boston University

RENSIS LIKERT and SAMUEL P. HAYES, JR. (Eds.). *Some Applications of Behavioural Research*. (Science and Society Series.) Pp. 333. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1957. $3.25.

This book is the second in a new Science and Society series recently instituted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization "to spread knowledge of the practical effects of discoveries made in the various branches of the social sciences."

For the most part it consists of reports on the results of seminars held during 1954 and 1955 under the auspices of the Foundation for Research in Human Behavior in Ann Arbor, Michigan. This foundation has as one of its main activities the holding of meetings which bring together representatives of business concerns and social scientists to discuss the bearing of social science research on problems of business and other complex organizations.

The participants in the seminars here reported were drawn mainly from the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research, business firms, and government agencies. Dr. Likert is the Director of the Institute and Dr. Hayes is the Director of the Foundation. The chapters reporting on the seminars are authored by Stanley E. Seashore, who served as rapporteur for the seminars on "Administration Leadership and Organizational Effectiveness" and "The Training of Leaders for Effective Human Relations"; Hollis W. Peter, who prepared the chapter on "Human Factors in Research Administration" and was co-author with Simon O. Lesser of the chapter on "Training Foreign Nationals in the United States"; Francis S. Bourne, who wrote the report on "Group Influences in Marketing and Public Relations"; and Irving Morrisett, who reported on the seminar on "Psychological Surveys in Business Forecasting." In addition, there is an introductory chapter on "Behavioural Research: A Guide for Effective Action" by Likert, and a final chapter "Relating Behavioural Research to the Problems of Organization" by Hayes.

It is quite difficult to evaluate a book made up of reports based on seminars. The fact that these meetings were focused on problems of consequence to representatives of business and government agencies

insured proper emphasis on the application of social science research to practical problems. Moreover, the fact that the participants had to communicate their ideas to each other resulted in a level of presentation that is comprehensible to the general reading public. However, the selection of topics for discussion was necessarily quite different, and I believe less fortunate, than it would have been had the selection been made without regard for the needs of the seminar program. In my opinion, considerably better examples exist of the practical effects of discoveries made in the social sciences than most of those reported in this book. In fact, the principal criticism that American social scientists are likely to make of the volume is that for the most part it is based on the social psychological approach of a single social science research center and consequently does not adequately represent the full range and variety of approaches and methodologies that social scientists are currently bringing to bear on a number of important practical problems.

WILLIAM H. SEWELL
Chairman, Department of Sociology
University of Wisconsin

MILTON M. GORDON. *Social Class in American Sociology.* (Duke University Press Sociological Series.) Pp. xiii, 281. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1958. $6.00.

This book combines an historical survey with a critical appraisal of the studies of class in American society which were published between the middle 1920's and the middle 1950's. Among the major works discussed at length by the author are Sorokin's pioneering volume on social mobility, the Lynds' two studies of Middletown, various publications of Warner and his associates, and Centers' study of class consciousness. A substantial number of other studies are summarized and evaluated more briefly. The critical reader will note a few unfortunate omissions, but by and large the coverage is good.

Gordon's appraisals of the various studies are developed in terms of five basic questions which are addressed to each study. First, how does a writer define the concept "class"? Second, how is the concept put into operation? Third, what are the correlates of class when so defined and used? Fourth, what does the writer have to say concerning social mobility? And finally, what does the writer have to say concerning ethnic stratification? Gordon gives far more attention to the first three of these questions than to either of the last two.

In keeping with the character of the era reviewed, methodological and conceptual problems figure prominently, while basic theoretical issues tend to be neglected. Thus, scholars with an interest in the many important theoretical issues raised by writers such as Marx, Mosca, Pareto, Veblen, Lasswell, and others of their kind will find but little of interest in this volume. However, if criticism is to be meted out because of this, such criticism should be directed at the men who have written the studies Gordon reviews more than at Gordon himself.

This reviewer is skeptical, however, that such criticism is warranted. While it is surely true that sociologists must continue to address themselves to basic theoretical issues if our understanding of stratification is to increase, it seems equally true that any satisfactory treatment of theoretical issues presumes a methodological and conceptual sophistication which did not exist in the early 1920's. Those who read this volume will discover that real advances have been made along these lines, especially in the last decade. Perhaps the most serious criticism that may be made of this very worthwhile book is that its author fails to provide his readers with a proper perspective on the era he describes. The reader is likely to come away unaware that this era represents a rather special phase in the development of the field, and that the work of the next thirty years may have a very different character from the work of the last thirty. Specifically, the next thirty years show promise of a return to the big theoretical issues, but a return which will be built on methodological and conceptual foundations laid in the era Gordon describes.

As with almost any book, there are certain specific features which prove annoying

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
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to reviewers. In the present instance, this reviewer was dissatisfied with Gordon's too neat separation of ethnicity and social status. Also, the very lengthy treatment of the ecological school of the 1920's seems unwarranted in view of their small contribution to our understanding of stratification. However, viewed as a whole, this volume affords a very useful critical survey of the last thirty years' work in one of the major subdivisions of contemporary American sociology.

GERHARD E. LENSKI
Assistant Professor of Sociology
University of Michigan

MELVIN M. TUMIN with the assistance of others. *Desegregation: Resistance and Readiness*. Pp. xvii, 270. Princeton University Press, 1958. $5.00.

This book is a report on the attitudes toward desegregation expressed by 287 white males, eighteen years or older, who are members of the labor force in Guilford County, North Carolina. The study began as a student project in methods of social research, and reports in detail the numerous steps in the research process. The dependent variable, expressed in a variety of questions, is the degree of "readiness for desegregation." The independent variables are largely the personal backgrounds of the respondents.

As the author remarks, in view of the findings of other earlier studies, "there are preciously few surprises or novelties to be found in this report." Findings mentioned as unexpected are first, that church attendance and rural-urban residence are not related to attitudes toward desegregation —the reviewer would question whether at least the latter finding is capable of generalization—and second, that childlessness is related to attitudes toward desegregation of schools.

The author seeks to support the conclusion about each correlation by holding other variables constant. From these cross tabulations, he draws numerous conclusions which are drawn together into "ten major findings." The sample is relatively homogeneous in its unfavorable image of the Negro. Every group in the sample had lower segregationist scores on its attitude toward the schools than on its image of the Negro. The differences between various groups in the sample on their image scores tend to be smaller and less significant than the differences in their scores on school desegregation. Among the major factors responsible for, or associated with, differences in attitudes between various segments of the sample are those which locate the individual on the ladders of property, power, and prestige. A crucial variable in addition to those which define class position is "exposure to mass media." The more exposure, the more favorable the image and the greater the readiness for desegregation. A significant difference among various groups, in the sample concerns the way in which and the degree to which their scores change as one goes from image of the Negro to the ideology of social relations, to sentiment structure, to general action set, and finally to specific action set. Only the most ready group, that which sits high on the various ladders of stratification, and which is highly exposed to news of the outside world, reaches that dividing point at which we can talk in positive and absolute terms of favorable attitudes toward the Negro and some genuine readiness for desegregation. The majority of the community are neither extreme segregationists nor extreme desegregationists. The principal advocacy of social change, as is implied in the term desegregation, comes from those who have the widest perspective on themselves and their communities, and the deepest sense of stake in the community-in-process. Three types of leaders are, first, the legitimate and respected leaders who oppose desegregation; second, the legitimate and respected leaders who either do not oppose or actively favor desegregation; and third, the non-legitimate, ordinarily disrespected leaders who emerge into positions of prominence whenever the legitimate leadership fails to make its voice heard and fails to take action.

ARNOLD M. ROSE
Chairman, Department of Sociology
University of Minnesota.

P. K. WHELPTON and CLYDE V. KISER (Eds.). *Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility*. Vol. V. Con-

cluding Reports and Summary of Chief Findings from the Indianapolis Study. Pp. 1088–1372. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1958. $1.00.

This is the fifth and final volume of papers reporting the findings of the fertility research popularly known as the Indianapolis Study. It contains nine papers, all of them previously published in the Milbank Memorial Fund *Quarterly*. Six of the papers analyze several of the specific causal hypotheses tested by the Indianapolis research. Two further papers apply scaling techniques and factor analysis in an attempt to test fertility prediction. In the last article, the editors present a summary of the whole series of thirty-three Indianapolis papers, highlighting the outstanding findings and discussing some of the methodological lessons and implications for future investigations.

The interviewing fieldwork of the Indianapolis Study was done in 1941, but World War II delayed the analysis of the data and the publication of the results. The study represented a pioneer attempt to go beyond the collection of primary population statistics of the census type in order to investigate some of the complex causal factors underlying reproductive behavior. It constituted the first large-scale field investigation of the extent and nature of contraceptive practices among a general population sample. It confirmed the findings of previous studies that group fertility differences are largely due to differences in the effectiveness of contraceptive practices and that these are inversely related to class position. It also corroborated the fact, increasingly evident in recent decades, that the spreading of birth control among all classes of the population is altering the traditional inverse relationship. As the lower classes become adept at contraceptive practice, the highest socio-economic groups no longer have the lowest fertility.

As the editors themselves point out, the study was less successful in its attempt to unravel the social and psychological variables that underlie these relationships. Due to a variety of weaknesses in conceptualization, limitations in the sample, and deficiencies in the data, most of the twenty-three causal hypotheses formulated prior to the interviewing were neither adequately confirmed nor decisively refuted.

The methodological lessons pointed up by the Indianapolis research have already profited several subsequent investigations of fertility behavior and the social and psychological factors which affect it. One study, "Growth of American Families," is already completed. Its findings are scheduled for publication in 1959. A second investigation, "Study of Social and Psychological Factors Affecting the Future Fertility of Two-Child Families," is currently under way. Building upon the groundwork laid by the Indianapolis Study, these researches will undoubtedly contribute new knowledge about the complex relationships between social factors and psychological motives affecting fertility behavior. A word of caution needs to be added, however. Field research in fertility behavior has definite limitations. It may reveal the shifts in attitudes and motivations which directly result in reproductive "fashion changes." Yet shifts in motivations and corresponding changes in fertility behavior are themselves but reflections and symbols of underlying long-term changes in the social structure and the economic system of whole societies. Such basic factors cannot be studied by interviewing methods; they require comprehensive analysis of social structure and cultural norms in historical depth.

KURT B. MAYER
Professor and Chairman
Department of Sociology
Brown University

*Selected Studies of Migration Since World War II.* (Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Conference of the Milbank Memorial Fund, October 1957, at the New York Academy of Medicine, Part III.) Pp. 244. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1958. No price.

The report on the Annual Conference of the Milbank Memorial Fund held in 1946 focused on the postwar problems of migration. Since that time, changes have occurred both in the particular problems of migration on which demographers have concentrated and in the techniques by which migration is measured and analyzed. These changes were the subject of one section of the thirty-fourth Annual Conference held in 1957. The papers presented and some of the discussion which they precipitated are presented in *Selected Studies of Migration Since World War II.*

The selections are grouped in three sections. The first, International Context, contains Dudley Kirk's comprehensive summary of the principal migratory movements since World War II. This discussion shows how the legacy of displaced persons and refugees caused by World War II has been successfully liquidated while new postwar forced migrations, especially in Asia, have not been as successfully resolved. On the whole, Dr. Kirk found that free international migration is less than in the past and that the most important migrations today are the internal migrations from rural to urban areas and within metropolitan areas. Irene B. Taeuber's paper on internal migration in Japan and Rupert B. Vance's paper on immigration policy illustrate Dr. Kirk's points. On the basis of her well-designed analysis of population change and movement, Dr. Taeuber shows the importance of internal migration to the industrialization of Japan's total economy and the urbanization of the regional population. Professor Vance examines the requirements that must be met if immigration is to be economically and socially sound; he emphasizes that if world migrations are to occur, they must be planned in the context of national policy.

The second section, Domestic Setting, contains four papers on migration within the United States. Included here is Ernest Rubin's evaluation of current laws regulating immigration to the United States and his arguments for a more flexible system. The papers of C. Horace Hamilton, Donald J. Bogue, and Everett S. Lee concern themselves with different aspects of the social and economic implications of migration—educational selectivity among rural-urban migrants, metropolitan development and the suburban movement, and the relationship between migration and mental disease. All of these suggest the strong need for continued research on migration. Especially worthy of consideration is Dr. Bogue's suggestion that the time has come to launch into the longitudinal study of migration following out the experience of real cohorts.

The final group of papers includes John K. Folger's discussion of the desirable characteristics of a new model to explain migration, Joseph J. Spengler's theoretical discussion of the economic effects of migration, and Simon Kuznets' and Dorothy S. Thomas' joint paper on the relation between economic growth and internal migration. This last paper illustrates the value of an interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of migration, points to the critical part that migration plays in demographic and economic development, and emphasizes the need for more refined data in order to permit more conclusive investigation of the relationship between population movement and economic opportunities.

Together, these selections attest to the progress in migration research during the last ten years; perhaps more important, they point to fruitful areas for further progress in the years ahead.

SIDNEY GOLDSTEIN
Assistant Professor of Sociology
Brown University

ARNOLD SCHRIER. *Ireland and the American Emigration, 1850–1900.* Pp. x, 210. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958. $4.50.

Irish immigrants to this country were estimated at one-sixth of the American population in 1775. They were a large contingent in the armies under Washington. Their continuous emigration is notable for its length of time and unique in that it included a larger proportion of the contributing population than did that of any other country. It was, in fact, an important factor in the decline of the Irish population by nearly one-half between 1841 and 1901. The exodus of about 4.8 millions, from 1820 to 1900, considerably exceeded the remaining Irish population in 1901. The total was exceeded only by the number of German emigrants of the period. About 85 per cent of the nineteenth century emigrants, mostly young persons equally divided between the sexes, came to this country. By 1860 one-sixth of all persons born in Ireland and still living were

in this country; by 1926 nearly one-third of all living natives of the Irish Free State were abroad. Nevertheless, Ireland has had a relatively low rate of natural increase since 1850. It is thus a demographic and economic anomaly among the nations of western Europe.

It is little wonder that emigration became an accepted fact of life for Irish youth and in due course had marked effects on local customs and life expectations. We have had numerous studies of the Irish in America and their influence on our military, economic, political, and religious history, but Schrier's work is one of a very short list devoted to the impact of the exodus on native life. While he contributes far less to one's understanding of the structure of Irish society as an integrated scheme of folkways, mores, and institutions than does Conrad Arensberg, he does give an intimate and revealing picture of the personal reactions to the inevitable and wholesale departure of sons and daughters to a promised land from which few would ever return. His study is as documented as a meticulous Ph.D. thesis, including nineteen tables and forty pages of notes, some of which are as interesting as the text.

The "push" factors, such as man-land ratio, land laws, size of holdings, and the miserable but static outlook, are scantily treated in comparison with the "lure of America." This lure was constantly reenforced by countless letters from overseas with their glowing accounts of a land where work was plenty and wages high, where one could wear good clothes and need not tip his hat to a supercilious upper class, but could instead acquire a sense of personal dignity and personal worth. Most of these letters seem to have been written after the sea voyages of the 1840's and early 1850's which cost thousands of lives. Moreover, there is but slight reference to the inhumane exploitation to which many were subjected after landing, often at the hands of their fellow countrymen.

Returning emigrants, called "returned Yanks," were few, but their elegant clothes and ready cash made each a temporary sensation and an alluring advertisement. Strong family ties led to a bountiful stream of funds—over $250,000,000 in the half-century—from America to be used for rent, family needs, fares for America, repair and building of churches, and Home Rule propaganda.

The author portrays well the futile protest of press and pulpit. He gives an impressive picture of the emotional conflicts aroused by the departure of kinfolk and friends and their expression in "the American wake," song, and poetry.

On the whole, this is a worthwhile addition to the literature of migration. The author is so immersed in the details of his study that he fails to give the reader any lively sense of the broader historical significance of the emigration. He seems to miss entirely the basic role of religious domination in Irish history. Though he repeats that the Church took no official position on the exodus, he gives evidences of the fears of local priests and the strong protests of higher officials. He notes the pre-famine school for training missionaries, of whom over 1000 have been sent to this country, and the preparation of guides for the emigrants by priests. Was it a mere historical accident that in spite of huge emigration and small fertility many countrymen still lived in mud huts and that the percentage of pauperism remained fairly steady for decades? Ireland, especially the area of the Irish Free State, missed the modernizing effects of the renaissance, the reformation, and the industrial revolution. One monsignor boasts that the Free State "is the only integral Catholic State in the world; a Catholic culture as it existed in the Middle Ages." But another Irish champion, Shane Leslie, has said: "Religion has been the underlying inspiration, consolation and it must be said the smouldering poison of Irish life."

FRANK H. HANKINS
Smith College

ORVILLE G. BRIM, JR. *Sociology and the Field of Education.* Prepared for the American Sociological Society. Pp. 93. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1958. $1.00.

This paper-backed publication is the third in a series of studies which aim to "channel the work of the investigator into the hands of those who are the practitioners." Previous volumes related to the fields of corrections and of mental health.

As the title implies, the purpose of this little volume is to point out the interrelation of sociology and education. It reviews basic educational studies in which the concepts and theories of sociology were employed and indicates those in which they have been neglected. The author concludes by pointing out the occupational opportunities in education which the sociologist has assumed as well as those he should assume if sociology is to make its maximum contribution to education.

Among the fields which have been studied the author lists, for example, the aims of education in terms of behavioral rather than subject-matter learning, demographic studies, relative educational opportunity based on racial differences, selection and education of atypical children, career patterns of teachers at various levels, and sociometry.

Some of the fields in which more research is suggested are the following: the aims of formal education in relation to the objectives of other community agencies; the influence of the school and especially the college upon student personality; the impact of different types—vocational, academic, and extracurricular—and different amounts of education on the individual's intellectual development and attitudes; and the role of various members of the educational galaxy: members of school and college boards, chief administrative officers, teachers, students, and service personnel.

The volume includes a selected bibliography covering research in each of the areas discussed in this study.

This little volume makes a significant contribution to the interrelationship of sociology and education by summarizing research now under way and by suggesting the areas omitted or in need of further research. The author concludes on an encouraging note: "In this field research funds are available; educators are willing, even enthusiastic, to give support; and some of the most fundamental problems of sociology are manifest in the educational process and await attention. There seems little more that the professional sociologist would want."

FRANCIS J. BROWN
Staff Associate
American Council on Education
Washington, D. C.

EMILE DURKHEIM. *Socialism and Saint-Simon.* Edited by Alvin W. Gouldner; translated by Charlotte Sattler. Pp. xxix, 240. Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1958. $5.00.

Emile Durkheim's eminence in sociology warrants making available in English this significant and previously untranslated work. A translator should not, as the editor properly notes, distort by modernizing, nor by creating stylistic elegance where the original lacked it. The present translation, however, including the translation of the introduction to the original French edition, done from a difficult manuscript by Marcel Mauss after Durkheim's death, is needlessly awkward as English prose, is sometimes obscure, and at other times simply distorts the original.

This specific work provides an opportunity, which the present editor has not utilized adequately, for a major interpretative essay on Durkheim's thought. At the start of his introduction Professor Gouldner takes too much for granted, and writes solely for the informed, without adequate context or setting. Subsequently, in an endeavor to correct too-simple interpretations by Talcott Parsons and others, he rather seriously distorts Durkheim's meaning and significance. He correctly states that Durkheim was not purely Comtean. But, having noted that Comte had been a disciple of Saint-Simon, he then stresses the later break as though it were purely idological, not very largely personal.

No doubt Professor Gouldner is correct in insisting that Durkheim was critical of Comte's view that moral consensus, as the basis of social solidarity, constituted the central condition for social survival. Essentially, Durkheim was pointing out the tendency for the dogmas and commitments which constitute such a consensus to suffer a cultural time lag and inhibit necessary

adaptation. In rapidly moving industrial society such adaptation is vital. Durkheim, in his search for its conditions and his analysis of the impediments thereto, was precisely loyal to the essence of Comtean positivism, and in search of the morality appropriate to the actualities of technological society.

Gouldner correctly notes the interdependence in Durkheim's analysis of concepts of solidarity, of division of labor, of anomie and suicide, and of socialism, as well as, less directly, of an attitude toward international relations and war. These constituted key points and critical issues in the search for an appropriate consensus, for an order and organization which, overcoming maladjustments, would allow men, fulfilling themselves in functional roles, to be effective members of society and happy persons.

The ideological rapprochement of Durkheim and Marx, which Gouldner duly stresses, did not, however, consist primarily in their common awareness of exploitation and its disruptive effects, where surely the differences as to implications and inevitabilities are vital. Rather, it resided in their common awareness that the industrial order, with its development and practical use of science, was the central concept of modern life, and the instrumentality which made a generalized pursuit of happiness a meaningful venture with a possibly favorable outcome. Yet on the conditions therefore, the means thereto, and the degree of likely attainment thereof, Durkheim was surely very far from Marx. And, one may add, much closer to, and the legitimate heir of, Auguste Comte.

THOMAS I. COOK
Professor of Political Science
Johns Hopkins University

JEROME HALL. *Studies in Jurisprudence and Criminal Theory*. Pp. vi, 300. New York: Oceana Publications, 1958. $6.00.

Professor Jerome Hall has for many years rightly been regarded as one of the most eminent American experts on criminal law and jurisprudence. His books *Theft, Law, and Society; General Principles of Criminal Law;* and *Readings in Jurisprudence* have become classics in their fields. The present collection of fifteen essays, which have been, with three exceptions, published previously, but to some extent brought up to date, deals in nearly equal parts with problems of jurisprudence and criminal law. In the first nine chapters such matters as "American Tendencies in Legal Philosophy and the Definition of 'Law'," "The Progress of American Jurisprudence, 1906–1956," and certain wider issues such as "Legal Theory and Jurisprudence," "Integrative Jurisprudence," and "Plato's Legal Philosophy" are discussed with the learning and acumen to be expected from the author; his knowledge not only of legal but also of philosophical literature is impressive. There is a certain amount of repetition and overlapping, difficult to avoid in collections of this kind, but what the author has to say, for example, on legal realism and legal positivism is good enough to be read twice. In these essays Professor Hall once more appears as the doughty fighter for the supremacy—or at least for the equal rights—of the law and legal theory against such rivals as, among others, political theory. On the other hand, he repeatedly stresses the need for close co-operation between law and sociology and for the admission of value judgments in jurisprudence—"the demand for a *wertfrei* social science falls short" (p. 123). Chapter VI on "Culture, Comparative Law and Jurisprudence," based on lectures given in Korea in 1954 and not previously published, is particularly significant in this respect.

The last six chapters are devoted to the theory of criminal law, and here, too, the author is most anxious to underline the need for proper legal safeguards of individual liberty against certain ideas of the school of "Social Defence." He insists on the strict interpretation of criminal statutes and regards "the moral quality of criminal law" as "the major issue of our times," which "permeates all the social disciplines" (p. 244). Criminal liability should be based only upon moral culpability, and in a sound theory of punishment all three elements—justice, deterrence, and reformation—are essential. In all these points, and many others which are equally fundamental, we can, with occasional reservations, accept the author's views; but here and there we would do so even more willingly if he would be less inclined to knock against open doors, to indulge in dangerous generalizations, or attack bogies which are largely of his own making, such as "criminologists' demands for wholly indeterminate sentences" (p. 273), or the handing over of the decision in criminal trials to the psychiatrists—as if they, as a body, had ever asked for it. Any generalization of this kind, whether it refers to "the" criminal or to "the" criminologist or "the" psychiatrist, should be avoided. Whereas Chapter XIV on the "Revision of Criminal Law—Objectives and Methods" is one of the best in the book and should be studied by every would-be legislator, the last Chapter XV, "Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility," with its well-known defense of the doomed McNaghten Rules, is probably the least convincing. It is to be regretted that the author has paid no attention to twentieth-century developments in the law and practice relating to mental disorder and crime on the European Continent; they are more helpful than even the most ingenious attempts to save the McNaghten Rules.

HERMANN MANNHEIM
Director, Criminological Research Unit
The London School of Economics
and Political Science
University of London



GRESHAM M. SYKES. *The Society of Captives: A Study of a Maximum Security Prison*. Pp. xx, 144. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. $3.75.

The author avows that he wrote this book about the New Jersey State Maximum Security Prison from a sociological point of view, without expressing a bias either for or against imprisonment. While he has not completely concealed his disapproval of prisons, he has turned out a fairly accurate description of the relationships among convicts and between convicts and their guards.

He remains on firm ground so long as he deals with the essential character of prison life and the nature of the interaction between the two main social groups of the prison—the guards and the inmates. He realizes, as few people do, that the psychological effect of certain aspects of modern prison life may actually be more brutal than the physical cruelty once commonly practiced in American prisons. In this respect the book has universal validity, and Sykes' description could be applied to almost any American prison.

It is when the author attempts to go beyond this point that his ground becomes less solid. His research method consisted chiefly of talking to convicts and guards, and while this seems fully satisfactory as a means of "getting the feel" of a prison, it does not provide the data needed for a truly scientific study. But Sykes tries anyway to force his material to assume form and to crystallize into a set of principles impressive enough to be set off in italics.

Sykes assigns an extended chapter to a discussion of prison argot and the roles reflected in this argot. Here he contributes to the romanticized picture of convict life so often drawn by non-practicing criminologists. Unquestionably there are words which have special meaning to the underworld and to prisoners, and some of the words used by Sykes have a wide currency. But the speech of American prisoners has become more and more like that of any other group of American males, and even the experienced and professional convict would be mystified by most of the words appearing in the glossaries of prison jargon which are so often appended to textbooks on criminology.

Sykes also betrays his ingenuousness when he asserts that the 1952 riot at the Trenton prison stemmed from the middle 1940's when prison officials began to reverse the institution's tendency to drift toward more complete inmate control. He denies that the weaknesses and deficiencies identified by the Governor's investigating committee—overcrowding, idleness, heavy turnover in the custodial force, archaic disciplinary practices, inadequacies of the physical plant, heterogeneity of the inmate population, indifferent rehabilitation program, careless work assignments, inadequate salaries for guards, shortage of necessities—together created a powderkeg

which might be set off by a spark. More likely Sykes has identified the spark, and the investigating committee the "root causes."

Yet he closes his book on a realistic note, recognizing that prisons will be with us for some years to come, that they must necessarily remain authoritarian, that they cannot be expected to rehabilitate all of their charges, and that their social systems represent the chief factor in the failure or success of their rehabilitation programs.

Sykes' book must be recognized as an unusually capable and thoughtful discussion of the American prison, and it should be read by the general public, practicing penologists, students, and professors.

JAMES V. BENNETT
Director, Bureau of Prisons
United States Department of Justice

G. H. S. BUSHNELL. *Peru.* (Ancient Peoples and Places Series.) Pp. 207. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. $5.00.

This is a volume of the new series of British publications, edited by Glyn Daniel, called Ancient Peoples and Places. The series is designed "to bring to life a specific people or place in the ancient world" for the interested public and the archaeologist who is not a specialist in the particular field concerned.

This volume is certainly the most readable treatment of pre-Columbian Peru that has appeared since Philip Means' *Ancient Civilization of the Andes*, which is now out of date in both its archaeological and historical treatments of early Peruvian life.

Bushnell follows one of the several current systems of classifying the stages of development of Peruvian Indian culture, starting with Early Hunters and ending with the Imperialist Period (the Inca Empire). The plates are excellent, although they run rather too much to pottery, to the detriment of an appreciation of architecture, textiles, metal work, and carving in wood, bone, and stone.

Nevertheless, for the person who contemplates a trip to the west coast of South America this book is to be highly recommended. For those who would like to supplement it with a more thorough treatment of the subject, with a larger bibliography, J. Alden Mason's *Ancient Civilizations of Peru* (Penguin) is a fine companion volume.

A. KIDDER, II
Associate Director
University Museum
University of Pennsylvania

## *ECONOMICS*

SIMON N. WHITNEY. *Antitrust Policies: American Experience in Twenty Industries.* (Vols. I & II). Pp. xxiii, 560; x, 541. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958. $10.00.

This study, initiated by the Twentieth Century Fund in 1950, was designed to answer the question "How effective have the antitrust acts actually been in curbing monopolies and restoring the conditions of competition? It consists of four principal parts: First, a set of brief descriptive essays on eight major industries averaging sixty-two pages in length. The industries thus covered are meat packing, petroleum, chemical manufactures, steel, paper, bituminous coal, automobiles, and cotton textiles. Second, there is a set of twenty much briefer—average length, twenty-eight pages—industry case studies focused around particularly important antitrust cases: namely cast iron pipe, tobacco products, anthracite, aluminum, shoe machinery, motion pictures, tin cans, farm machinery, corn refining, cement, pullman cars, and insurance; third, a twenty-seven page introduction to antitrust legislation, a forty-seven page summary of the case material presented in parts one and two above, a nine page evaluation of the antitrust laws; and fourth, an eight page review of the book by the Twentieth Century Fund Committee on Antitrust Policy, and fifty-six pages of comments on particular chapters by a variety of persons not connected with the Twentieth Century Fund.

Dr. Whitney came to this study from a background of government and academic service. At the time the study began he was a professor at New York University; at the completion of the study he was Director of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission. Dr. Whitney's approach to the question of the effectiveness of the antitrust acts is essentially that of the historian—for each industry the existing literature was carefully surveyed and summarized and tentative conclusions drawn. The resulting case studies then were checked and supplemented by persons intimately associated with the industries in question. For each industry, Dr. Whitney presents a terse description of products and firms, a history of antitrust suits, concise statements regarding competetive status and industry performance, a summary, and a thumbnail evaluation. As an example of these thumbnail evaluations, the one for petroleum reads as follows: "The antitrust laws, by breaking up the old monopoly and forbidding price agreements, while permitting free leasing of equipment, pooling of patents, and rounding out of integrated companies through mergers, have helped shape the structure and behavior of this outstandingly successful industry." For cotton textiles, Dr. Whitney reports, "The antitrust laws have had little influence on the cotton textile industry in view of its structure of many small firms; this same structure made it for a long time a 'sick industry,' but it improved after 1940 by discarding machinery and because of revived demand; and there is a good chance, though far from a certainty, that the integration movement will transform it into an industry like others in the United States today—progressive and profitable." While there will be disagreement with the tone of these evaluations, the case studies themselves collect in one place a large amount of information, are uniformly well done, and should prove most valuable.

At the close of his book—and perhaps before he started—Dr. Whitney is of the opinion that "The pure competition of small firms, each producing as much as it can . . . would not be dynamic or progressive." "While monopolies have been shown to possess grave defects . . . the *hope* of winning profits which certain kinds of monopolistic position provide is a driving force for both business firm and individual without which our economy might well stagnate." From this vantage point, the antitrust laws help maintain a balance between competition and monopoly and are "effect as well as cause of the competitive spirit in the United States."

As may already be guessed, this study will be of little use to analytically minded economists even though it presents a wealth of descriptive material. Few hypotheses are put forward or tested and careful definitions, for example, of "efficiency," "progressiveness," or "dynamics," are lacking. Little use is made of the models which have been constructed by analytic economists either as framework for description or for evaluation. But an approach such as these comments would suggest might not be appropriate in a book addressed to an audience of "intelligent laymen." On the other hand, Dr. Whitney has chosen to concentrate on United States experience alone rather than compare industrial performance in several countries in which various sorts of social-control schemes are employed. But perhaps it is unfair to criticize Dr. Whitney for not doing something he chose not to do. Given Dr. Whitney's approach and audience, the book is well done and useful.

JOHN A. BUTTRICK
Associate Professor of Economics
University of Minnesota

*An Appraisal of the 1950 Census Income Data.* (Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. XXIII by the Conference on Research in Income and Wealth.) A Report of the National Bureau of Economic Research, New York. Pp. x, 450. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. $10.00.

This book, Volume XXIII of Studies in Income and Wealth published by the National Bureau, presents the findings of the 1956 Conference on Research in Income and Wealth. It includes more than a dozen major papers contributed—with comments—by more than three dozen participants.

It deals with the nature, reliability, and utilization of income data included in the decennial census of 1950. This census asked separate questions on wages and salaries, income from self-employment, and income from other sources. Attempts were

made by the participants at the conference to conduct matching studies comparing census income data with income data from the Internal Revenue Service, the Survey of Consumer Finances, the records of the Bureau of Old Age and Survivor Insurance, the Current Population Survey, and so forth. In spite of the impracticability of such comparisons, some useful results were obtained. It appears that, due in large part to response variations, the census underreports income, particularly that from sources other than wages and salaries and from self-employment.

The conference pointed out that even had census income data been more accurate, we would still not have a clear picture of either the total compensation for productive services or of the total purchasing power of consumers. Money income is no longer indicative of either. Trends in collective bargaining contracts with various fringe benefits, in executive compensation with supplementary advantages, in tax-free income disguised as business expense, in investment policies of individuals which do not result in accurate disclosure of current income, and so forth, all tend to obscure rather than reveal total income.

So far as the utilization of census income data is concerned, the conference pointed out that the data received from Current Population Surveys, while not as extensive as that called for in the decennial census, are more commonly used. The reader gets the impression that perhaps the Statistical Commission of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations may have been correct in questioning whether the decennial census is the most logical vehicle for collecting income data.

Like many studies by the National Bureau, this book raises more questions than it answers. In so doing it helps to stimulate further study and research. Students of national income will find this book useful, although its technical nature will probably discourage the general reader.

H. E. HOAGLAND
Professor of Business Finance, Emeritus
Ohio State University

EDWARD H. CHAMBERLIN and others. *Labor Unions and Public Policy.* Pp. 177. Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Association, 1958. $4.50.

The four essays in this volume proceed from the shared assumption that labor unions have attained a dangerously powerful position in American society. As Professor Edward H. Chamberlin expresses it, "unions today in the United States unquestionably dominate the vital mass production industries, mining, construction, public utilities, communications, and rail and truck transportation."

Professor Chamberlin deals with a wide range of labor relations problems in his essay "The Economic Analysis of Labor Union Power." However, he is chiefly concerned with the economic effects of union monopoly power in the labor market, and he believes that ". . . if the public is to be protected from unreasonable monopoly power, a body of law *appropriate to the labor market* has an importance at least equal to that which [in the United States] is generally taken for granted in the product market." Such legal restraints would provide, he believes, an obvious and effective alternative to monetary and fiscal anti-inflationary measures since a decrease of labor's economic strength would reduce inflationary pressures at their presumed source.

An interesting, though hardly an intentional attack on Chamberlin's position is presented by Professor Philip D. Bradley who analyzes the case for and against union security provisions. His argument runs along the following lines: Most proponents of "involuntary unionism" base their case on the "free rider" argument, which rests chiefly on the proposition that unions create or obtain economic benefits through collective bargaining on behalf of the workers whom they represent. There is, however, no empirical evidence for such claims. Therefore, the union benefit doctrine is really an empty shell. Is it possible to concur with Chamberlin's analysis of the tremendous economic power amassed by trade unions and to agree, at the same time, with Bradley's argument that unions neither create nor obtain economic benefits?

Gerard D. Reilly is primarily concerned with the dual danger of growing federal jurisdiction to regulate labor relations at the expense of the states and the emergence of that strange zone called "no man's land" where federal power holds sway but is not asserted and where states may not seek to interpose their own powers in place of a passive federal government. To help solve the problem Mr. Reilly endorses the Smith-McClellan bill which provides that "in the absence of express language in a Congressional act purporting to occupy the field in which it operated, the act should not be construed as superseding state laws which are not 'in direct and positive conflict' with the Federal statute." The analysis is not particularly concerned with the possible consequences of the bill, if enacted into law, for a multitude of problems in labor-management relations and collective bargaining, administration, federal-state relations, and so forth.

Under the title "Legal Immunities of Labor Unions" Dean Roscoe Pound compares the legal position of labor unions in contemporary society with the position historically occupied before the law by kings and nobles, governments, clerics, landlords, soldiers and, of course, husbands. As a uniquely favored group—"uniquely" because the immunities of the others have long ago been voided or weakened—organized labor may with impunity commit acts and enforce policies which, in Dean Pound's view, would subject other organizations at the very least to crippling damage suits, or worse. There are, of course, very serious doubts relating to comparability.

The general viewpoint shared by the four studies seems so close to the known position of national business and industrial organizations as to be indistinguishable from it. The tone of the presentation and the teleological character of the arguments raise serious questions of objectivity. Certainly, Chamberlin is right in pleading that "one should abandon the clichés of 'pro-labor' and 'anti-labor' and make an earnest attempt to move on to a more fruitful level of thought," but if these studies claim to represent such an attempt, they do not quite reach their objective.

JOHN P. WINDMULLER
Associate Professor of Industrial
and Labor Relations
Cornell University



W. BRADDOCK HICKMAN. *Corporate Bond Quality and Investor Experience.* (National Bureau of Economic Research, Financial Research Program, Studies in Corporate Bond Financing, No. 2.) Pp. xxix, 536. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. $10.00.

This volume represents the second study in corporate bond financing undertaken under the Financial Research Program of the National Bureau. This follows an initial study by the same author on *The Volume of Corporate Bond Financing*, published in 1953. While the first study dealt, as the title indicates, with the total amount of corporate bond financing, the present volume is concerned with investor experience with bonds of different qualities. The study is confined to straight bonds—bonds with a definite maturity date and a stated coupon rate of interest—and the emphasis is on the larger issues of $5,000,000 or more.

The lay reader will find the presentation highly technical in spots and of little interest except for the Introduction and Summary (pp. 3–27) which precede the main body of the text. A list of fourteen conclusions at the end of this summary (pp. 25–27) pin-points the findings of the author and furnishes a good bit of interesting information.

Even the individual investor, who has considerable competence in investment techniques and analysis, will probably not find much that is helpful to him in the present study. On the other hand, it should prove very useful to those analysts, and others, who are responsible for the investment policies of financial institutions which are in a position to hold a large and varied portfolio of bond investments over relatively long periods of time.

The reason for the foregoing statement is that the conclusions reached in the study apply to the action of given classes of bonds in the aggregate and over a period of several decades, not to individual issues. For example, Mr. Hickman found that "life-span yields realized on the aggregate of bonds studied equaled yields promised at offering, so that the net loss rate, measured in current dollars, was zero" (p. 25). Obviously, although true of the aggregate

of issues studied, various individual issues would show losses, others gains, over the promised yield. It should be added that Mr. Hickman is at pains to call attention to this fact in connection with most of the conclusions arrived at in the study.

The statement that the volume under review does not have popular appeal is in no sense intended to be derogatory. It comprises the results of a careful and painstaking piece of research of the high standard that has come to be associated with National Bureau publications.

FREDERICK A. BRADFORD
Chairman, Department of Finance
Lehigh University

A. D. H. KAPLAN, JOEL B. DIRLAM, and ROBERT F. LANZILLOTTI. *Pricing in Big Business: A Case Approach.* Pp. xiv, 344. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1958. $5.00.

Product pricing, especially by big business corporations, has been a matter of keen public interest for a long time. Preconceptions interfere with objectivity in this area, and the inaccessibility of the needed information or the circumstances under which is has been obtained have more often than not strengthened the preconceptions.

Using interviews for the most part—the guiding questionnaire is described in the Appendix of the study—the authors of this volume sought pricing information from top management in a number of large-scale enterprises in the fields of primary production, manufacturing, and marketing. Among them were such companies as Swift & Company, United States Steel, General Motors, General Electric, Johns-Manville, and the Aluminum Company of America. The choice of corporations for interview was based on several factors: dominant size, accessibility, likelihood of co-operation, and the pertinence of their experience. The main objective was to get information about pricing policy, methods, and practices within the context of broad company policy concerning all phases of its activities.

The study is divided into the following parts and subdivisions: Part I deals with case materials which are treated under three headings—pricing selected products, company pricing policies, and pricing organization; Part II is concerned with analysis and interpretation in which consideration is given to the major influences on pricing policies. Here the influences of the character of the product, interdependence of the product mix, the influence of the antitrust laws, and the role of price leadership, size, and pricing authority are discussed.

To reduce the diversities between companies and their policies to some order the authors used the following policy classifications: pricing to receive a target return on investment; stabilization of price and margin; pricing to maintain or improve market position; pricing to meet or follow competition; and pricing subordinated to product differentiation. The authors are careful to point out that all price-making by any one company is not ruled by a single policy. This is particularly the case where there is considerable variation in the product mix.

This is a useful study in the field of pricing and price policies in big business. Some readers will be disappointed with it, however, if they expect that it will reveal a fully ordered business behavior in arriving at pricing decisions. Apparently the investigators rarely found such evidence. Intuitive judgments concerning what the customers and competitors may do, together with various cost approximations, seem to be the rule in formulating price policies. And profit maximization in the short run is often subordinated to other more dominant factors.

WILLIAM A. CARTER
Professor of Economics
Dartmouth College

## *RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY*

GERALD HOLTON (Ed.). *Science and the Modern Mind: A Symposium.* Pp. ix, 110. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. $3.95.

This volume consists of nine essays which were presented at a Conference of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in honor of Professors P. W. Bridgman and Philipp Frank on the occasion of their retirement from teaching at Harvard University. Edited by Gerald Holton, the symposium was designed to focus attention on what each "specialist" may contribute toward fruitful communication between scholars and literate laymen engaged in public affairs.

The first three essays, by Henry Guerlac, Harcourt Brown, and Giorgio de Santillana, sketch the historical backgrounds of modern science as these have affected our views of the universe within, such as Freud's image of man, or without, such as Einstein's relativity model. The next three contributors, Philipp Frank, Robert Oppenheimer, and Jerome S. Brunner, focus on the concepts of science which have set up conflicts between new and old views. In the remaining three articles P. W. Bridgman, Charles Morris, and Howard Mumford Jones turn toward the future. While dubious of any master-plan for organizing our diverse fields of learning, the authors do converge toward the conclusion that there is no overall conflict between the sciences and the humanities and find common ground in the devotion to the ideals of the world of scholarship. Here the sciences and the humanities emerge as "complementary activities" with no "spite fences." But as Howard Mumford Jones points out in the concluding essay, it still remains for the humanist to match the scientist in semantic skill, thus cultivating in "the more thoughtful part of the American people right notions of the sciences and the humanities as modes of knowledge and of experience." Certainly the present book provides a model for the manner in which this may be achieved. It is skillfully assembled, gracefully written, and beautifully printed; the "specialists" here collaborating successfully harmonize their separate disciplines and lift them out of academic privacy into the forum of universality.

OLIVER L. REISER
Professor of Philosophy
University of Pittsburgh

HANS JONAS. *The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings of Christianity.* Pp. xviii, 302. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. $6.00.

In a brief notice it is utterly impossible to do more than to recommend this book as a very useful—in English, unique—introduction to and survey of the swampy morass which is commonly styled Gnosticism. Professor Jonas is no newcomer or enthusiastic amateur in this field. His earlier work, *Gnosis und spätantiker Geist* (Vol. I, 1934; Vol. II, 1954), has long been prized by specialists. The present volume, while of necessity surveying much the same field, contains some distinct amplification and is intended for the general student, not the specialized expert. It will make him stretch even though it is clearly written, at times with an understanding and almost passionate appreciation of notions and sects long dismissed as "fables and endless genealogies" and "oppositions of the knowledge which is falsely so called," by hostile Christian fathers whose attacks were long our only sources of knowledge.

Jonas has made effective use of the ever-broadening amount of source materials, sources in some cases produced by the Gnostics themselves. Thus the *Apocryphon of John*, long known to be existing in Berlin, and occasionally referred to, published now after sixty years (1955); the sensational find of a whole library of Gnostic materials in Coptic—thirteen codices, containing forty-four different treatises—made at Chenoboskion in Upper Egypt (1945–46); and the recent (1956) publication of one of its principal tracts, the *Gospel of Truth*, not inconceivably the writing of none other than Valentinus himself—these are used to a modest degree, together with many others, in the present study.

Firmly convinced that Harnack's famous description of Gnosticism as "the acute Hellenization of Christianity" is wrong, and that recent attempts to see this religion as a derivative of Judaism are only more fruitful failures, Jonas sees it in essence as the protest of the East, long held under the throttling domination of the West, against the latter's unlimited veneration of the cosmos, of which God was essentially the culmination. Instead, for these iconoclastic rebels, God is not merely extra- and supra-mundane, he is actually

contra-mundane, utterly unknown and "altogether other," to a degree which even Karl Barth might despair devising.

The volume begins with a very illuminating background study of "East and West in Hellenism," which every historian will want to weigh, and a very useful survey of the semantic elements found in common in all Gnostic thought—the discovery of the hidden principle of the terrestrial man and his heavenly original, and his supreme concern about his destiny in which three elements bulk large: the reminder of the heavenly origin and transcendent history of man, the promise of redemption, with the role of the heaven-sent redeemer, and the instruction as to how to live henceforth in this evil, demon-ridden world in preparation for his final ascent. After this introduction Jonas turns to a consideration of representative systems: Simon Magus, the "Hymn of the Pearl," the teaching of Marcion, the "Poimandres" of Hermes Trismegistus, Valentinus, and the teachings of Mani; the latter two being in Jonas' eye the culmination of the two basic forms of Gnosticism, which he styles, respectively, "Syrian-Egyptian" and "Iranian." The last main section of the book is a very thought-producing and pointed discussion of "Gnosticism and the Classical Mind," in which he climaxes his basic thesis of East *vs.* West: had Gnosticism not found itself confronted with the hostility it did, it would never have reached the height it achieved.

It is a pleasure to recomend with little reserve a book which is a real contribution to the mapping-out of a most forbidding *arcana*, in which most of us find very welcome a guide who knows the terrain and languages.

MORTON S. ENSLIN
Professor of Biblical Languages
and Literature
The Theological School
St. Lawrence University

JOHN HERMAN RANDALL, JR. *The Role of Knowledge in Western Religion.* Pp. x, 147. Boston: Star King Press, 1958. $3.50.

Many theologians have taught that the Christian religion requires a kind of knowledge accessible only by belief or religious experience or revelation. Others have denied this. Thus diverse and contradictory claims have arisen concerning knowledge in religion. Professor Randall traces the history of this struggle with the problem of religious knowledge which has occurred through the centuries since Plato.

At present, says the author, the prevailing view denies that religious belief and doctrine involve knowledge. The affirmations of faith are symbols, so it is claimed, not in the sense of giving any information, but in the sense of producing states of mind such as "the courage to be." There is no God other than the psychological function of belief in God. This belief produces the needed change in a man's life and does whatever is required in the practice of religion. "Religion is a way of feeling and acting, not a way of understanding and explaining. Religious beliefs are tools to be employed in the practice of religion" (p. 12).

Up to the last pages the author seems to agree with this claim. But in a postscript he seems to reverse himself. Here he insists that we must know God to the end that we may distinguish the supreme values which organize our lives and give them significance (p. 141).

The apparent contradiction between the body of the book and this postscript may be resolved if we note certain distinctions which I believe the author intends to make. The primary function of religion is not to provide knowledge but to change man's life from the evil to the good. To do this intelligently one must have knowledge of what produces this change and also knowledge distinguishing the good from the evil. This knowledge must be obtained by the same principles and methods used in getting secular knowledge. It cannot be had simply by accepting religious belief or undergoing religious experience. Yet it is religious knowledge because it is sought with the religious motive to solve the problem which is the distinctive concern of religion. It is knowledge of God because God is whatever in truth produces the change and provides the values sought by way of religious commitment.



Contrary to the author's claim, Wieman does not identify God with an abstract principle.

All who are concerned about religion in our time should read this book.

HENRY NELSON WIEMAN
Visiting Professor of Philosophy
Southern Illinois University

MICHAEL POLANYI. *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy.* Pp. xiv, 428. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. $6.75.

"The purpose of this book," writes Michael Polanyi, "is to show that complete objectivity as usually attributed to the exact sciences is a delusion and is in fact a false ideal." Polanyi, who held the Chair of Physical Chemistry at Manchester University, where he was also Professor of Social Studies, has based *Personal Knowledge* on his Gifford Lectures of 1951–52. He writes well, and has constructed a powerful argument. Even where the reader might not agree, he is sure to learn.

It is believed widely that science, unlike any other human pursuit, attains objective, impersonal knowledge, and that it accepts ideas only when the empirical evidence is sufficient. Polanyi answers that in the 148 years between Copernicus' *De Revolutionibus* and Newton's *Principia* there was no decisive evidence in favor of Copernicus' belief that the earth went around the sun. Yet, more and more, scientists accepted it. Einstein's theory of relativity was completely accepted before empirical evidence was found. Why? Because, Polanyi says, empirical evidence for any large-scale theory is a complex and delicate matter. We are rarely sure what we are proving. But scientists have always, in the end, accepted theories which have intellectual beauty, the beauty of rational structure, of order. "We recognize intellectual beauty as a guide to discovery and as a mark of truth." Polanyi approves a remark attributed to Gauss: "I have had my solutions for a long time but I do not yet know how I am to arrive at them."

For Polanyi, science is not just a convenient summary of experience, as Mach held. Its statements are about a reality beyond experience, and express a "commitment" by the scientist that they are true. Just so, the scientist is committed to the practice and principles of science, as he would be to any faith. Commitment to values and acceptance of the internal evidence of beauty are of the very essence of scientific research, which is not itself science, but art. Man is man and not a calculating machine, in science as in art. And man is devoted to science, not just because its results are true, but because of its history and traditions as part of our civilization.

Neo-Darwinism has been accepted as true, according to Polanyi, only because it fits the prejudices of those with a mechanistic conception of the universe. A man is a conscious, responsible "person" and no purely mechanistic argument is adequate to explain him. It is more likely to deny both consciousness and responsibility. "Darwinism," Polanyi thinks, "has diverted attention for a century from the descent of man by investigating the *conditions* of evolution and overlooking its *action*. Evolution can be understood only as a feat of emergence."

RALPH ROSS
Professor of Humanities
University of Minnesota

MORTIMER J. ADLER. *The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical Examination of the Conceptions of Freedom.* Pp. xxvii, 689. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company for The Institute for Philosophical Research, 1958. $7.50.

In effect, this book seems to be a sort of *dictionnaire raisonée* of the philosophical usage of the word "freedom" from the days of the Greeks to the present. The author and his helpers maintain that the varieties of usage by philosophers presage a single species and their diverse disagreements a "single minimal agreement" which must be the ground of their disagreements, the matrix of their differences, and "indispensable to the controversy" between them. This book purports to elicit a single concept—almost a Platonic ideal—of freedom. Mr. Adler presents the attempt to "identify" this one idea which the many

of freedom exemplify and express as the first product of an undertaking. A second volume is to lay bare "the genuine disagreements," presumably as against the false and mistaken ones which the present work exposes.

The two works together are to consummate the researches of some twenty members of an Institute for Philosophical Research, financed from Ford monies, which Mr. Adler directs. Their labors on the present volume involved restating and transmuting into "neutral" terms the expression of more than one hundred discussants of freedom, chosen from the much greater multitude who have argued about it during the last two and one-half millennia. The result is first a classification of the diversities into three major and two minor groups. The major ones are "freedom of self-realization," "freedom of self-perfection," and "freedom of self-determination," and are determined by whether the "freedom" is related to outer circumstance, personal acquisition, or is inward to the nature of the self. The minor ones are "political liberty"—presented as a diversification of "self-realization"—and "collective freedom"—presented as a variant on "self-perfection." All the classes are identified finally as a single freedom which is, for any man, the "ability or power whereby he can make what he does his own action and what he achieves his property."

The process of reduction by which this identity is produced and disclosed Mr. Adler calls "dialectic"—according to its subtitle, his book is *A Dialectical Examination of the Conceptions of Freedom*. He manifests an invincible faith that dialectic can disclose "the objective truth" about freedom as it also can about law, justice, knowledge, and what have you—perhaps even God. He has been an eager missionary of its rites and rotes ever since 1927 when he set down his first gospel of it in a bright book entitled *Dialectic*. Fully a sixth of the present work consists of an exposition of this mode of discourse, as it looks to Mr. Adler *circa* 1958. He does concede that other methods are in use, but seems sure that the way to the certainties of "objective truth" is dialectic. It is needless to say that persons aware of the record of discourse and the alternatives among methods are little likely to share Mr. Adler's faith, or that their scepticism would include also his imaginative dialectical reconstructions and identifications of the idea of freedom, and of their "neutrality."

H. M. KALLEN
Research Professor in Social Philosophy
New School for Social Research

MILTON R. KONVITZ and CLINTON ROSSITER (Eds.). *Aspects of Liberty: Essays Presented to Robert E. Cushman*. Pp. viii, 355. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958. $5.50.

Those who have known Robert E. Cushman are delighted, of course, that so fine an offering in appreciation of his services to the study of politics has been made. It is a volume of distinguished contributors, and it covers a wide range of issues in the field of civil liberty, although it does not treat all of the questions that have been argued during the past several years.

In contrast with many works on civil liberty, the contributors to this volume have attempted to face the issue of a philosophy of rights and freedom. The most difficult task is assumed by Profesor Rossiter who undertakes to define liberty. Rossiter notes that he does "not mean to question the splendid doctrine of inherent, inalienable, even God-given rights" (p. 19), and Professor Catlin says that "the moral basis (and limitation) for the claims of civil liberties lies in their being not only stated as 'civil' by positive law, but also in their being reasonable in Natural Law" (p. 72). Can we not say, indeed, that this volume indicates a future trend in serious analysis of this problem, when it is not motivated primarily by the analysis of court interpretations?

This volume covers the use of material from the behavioral social sciences in civil rights cases and the historical aspects of our tradition, including the court presided over by John Marshall; it treats most effectively of the international aspects of the protection of civil rights; it compares civil liberty in America and in England and on the Continent since the war; and finally it considers the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal system, and due process of law. One is particularly grateful for the candid treatment of civil liberty in England. Professor Carr writes: "The English soapbox orator may not speak wherever his fancy dictates, for English law does not recognize any general right to hold public meetings in streets and parks. Instead, he must go to one of those relatively few spots, such as Hyde Park, that have been set aside for this purpose" (p. 243).

In criticism, one may say there is in this volume what amounts to a self-conscious avoidance of the issue of communism. Many thoughtful people have been concerned with the civil rights of subversives, the defense and criticism of the security programs, the right of Congress to look in Communist infiltration of government or the professions, and whether, indeed, there is a similarity of issue between domestic and international communism. These items seem to be too carefully avoided.

FRANCIS G. WILSON
Professor of Political Science
University of Illinois

MICHEL VILLEY. *Leçons d'histoire de la philosophie du droit*. Pp. 437. Paris: Dalloz, 1957. No price.

The history of the philosophy of law, presently enjoying scholarly interest in other parts of the world, would have been left rather on the sidelines in France if Michel Villey had not made it the object of his studies. No one is more qualified in many respects than he for such a task, which requires the qualifications of the jurist and historian as well as those of the philosopher. To his other abilities, Mr. Villey adds the great clarity and elegance of a personal and commanding style.

More than one hundred pages of introduction trace the history of the philosophies which, since antiquity, have influenced the diverse juridical systems of our civilization. Other philosophies and other civilizations have necessarily been omitted —notably, those of the Far East. Greek philosophy and its influence on Roman law are mentioned briefly, as are Christian theology as the source of a theocracy under which, in the Middle Ages, our Occident lived for about six centuries; the ideological sources of our present juridical system; and science and scientism and the crisis of law in the nineteenth century. There is a conclusion dealing with the twentieth century. The whole, provided with a valuable Bibliography, constitutes a richer outline than Friedman's, except for the portion dealing with the nineteenth century.

The second part, the most substantial in size (pp. 119–379), includes "fourteen essays on the relationship of law and philosophy." Essays? M. Villey is modest, because these are dense, vigorous, and original studies. The first, "Two Concepts of Natural Law in Antiquity," in which Aristotle and the Stoics are contrasted, is of particular value. M. Villey skillfully considers the difficult problem of Aristotle's influence on Roman law—perhaps only an indirect influence, but nevertheless considerable. As for the Stoics, they adhere to Plato's idealistic concept of natural law, which, through Cicero, utilizing chiefly Panetius, "errupts in Roman Law." In the "Logic of Aristotle and Roman Law," Villey, extending previous studies on didactic literature in Roman law, shows how this logic, reflecting a true concept of science in antiquity, has impregnated the background and the framework of the solutions of numerous didactic works in Roman law, as well as the works on natural law by Gratien and St. Thomas.

We must also bring to attention two studies (Chap. XI and Chap. XIV) on the notion of subjective law, which Villey believes to be outside of ancient civilization and Roman law, and which belongs to the scope of modern philosophy since the time of Duns Scotus and William of Occam. This notion will perhaps be criticized, but it could not be ignored, and the discussion which will result will probably be very fruitful. All these studies of the second part have the same stamp and are witnesses to the same care in seeking to determine the relationship between doctrines and institutions and to reveal the incidence of various doctrines. They lead to this

essential result: a renewed concept of natural law that needs today perhaps to be reconciled with the contributions of sociology and historical science.

A third part, much shorter (pp. 381–437), under the title of History and Law, has to do with the influence of history on our present-day juridical thought. Villey shows what weight the historic movement of the nineteenth century bears upon contemporary opinion. He comments on the ideas of Vico, Comte, Hegel, and Marx, and, in the footsteps of Dilthey and Raymond Aron, with reference to Toynbee—to whom about fifteen dense pages are devoted—criticizes their postulate of fatalistic progress.

This part of the book closes with several quite bold pages on the "conception of history." This is a reconsideration of an old theme, but one that is not without continuing interest. Must not the historian be interested in what others besides himself think of his discipline? An attitude of unawareness may lead to an isolation from which utility would suffer. Has not H. Marrou understood this? The historian should be aware of working in agreement with the reality of the present. But that does not prevent history from being scientific; certain imperatives are always imposed: to see the texts—all the texts—to criticize them, and to judge them without bias. History "does constitute a scientific genre" in so far as the historian follows certain rules. As for its usefulness, history can be indeed in part a function of the present and it is not amiss, for example, that in a given country in which a particular period brings up certain constitutional problems, studies be undertaken on the history of political structure. Villey has not said the contrary, but should one go to the point of writing with him "History is the science of the present" (p. 431)?

These reservations can only underline the interest and the strong appeal of a book thoughtfully conceived and richly original, which ought to be read by historians, philosophers, jurists and, indeed, by all interested individuals.

J. F. LEMARIGNIER
Professor of the University of Paris

## ERRATUM

In describing lobbying activities in the State of Nebraska, in an article I wrote for the September 1958 issue of THE ANNALS, I used incorrect figures. This statement reads: ". . . (in 1957) in Nebraska where 779 lobbyists registered and 731 of their employers." These figures should refer not to the number of registered lobbyists and their employers but *to the number of expense statements filed by lobbyists and their employers* in 1957.

As reported to me, by the office of the Secretary of State of Nebraska, for the year 1957, 140 lobbyists and 173 of their employers registered while 779 expense statements were filed by lobbyists totalling expenses of $117,703 and employers filed 731 expense statements totalling $155,576.

I regret this misstatement.

BELLE ZELLER
*Professor of Political Science*
Brooklyn College

## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

November 23, 1958

Dear Sir:

The review of *Czechoslovakia*, edited by Vratislav Busek and Nicolas Spulber, which appeared in your March, 1958, issue contains some harsh words which, in my humble opinion, are not justified.

The reviewer cites a few words from Duchacek's chapter on education to support his charge that the book contains "numerous misconceptions in the interpretation of Czechoslovakian history" and "considerable evidence . . . that some authors, writing rather hastily, are even unacquainted with some important historical facts, or ignore them." The author had stressed the "imperial and Western origin" of Charles University, "founded by the Roman Emperor and King of Bohemia Charles IV in 1348," against attempts by Czech Communists to disassociate it from Western culture and the past of Bohemia as part of the Holy Roman Empire. The reviewer presents these words as evidence of the author's alleged support for the theory of his German political enemies in the dispute over the "national" origin of Charles University—Mr. Duchacek is a former chairman of the foreign relations committee of the Czechoslovak National Assembly.

The reviewer states that Charles University was founded as a "Czech institution in 1348." In the fourteenth century institutions of learning were international, open to scholars of all countries united within the Catholic Church. At Charles University they were then grouped into four "nations" on a territorial, not ethnological, basis. The "Bohemian" nation comprised Czech, German, and Hungarian subjects of the King of Bohemia. It was not until 1882 that Charles University was divided into a Czech and a German university.

The dispute as to which of these was the true successor of ancient Charles University did not at all concern Charles' title of "Emperor" or his coronation in Rome in 1355. Elected German kings, called "Kings of the Romans," claimed a legal right to become Roman "Emperors," which title was used after their coronation with the imperial crown; except for the empty title, this coronation had lost all real significance and their prerogatives were recognized from the time of their election and coronation as "Roman Kings." The dispute really involved the question of whether Charles had founded Charles University in his capacity as King of Bohemia—he succeeded his father in August, 1346; crowned September, 1347—or in his capacity as "King of the Romans"—elected July, 1346; crowned November, 1346. The document establishing Charles University was issued under the Golden Bull of the Roman Kings by *Karolus dei gratia Romanorum rex semper augustus et Boemie rex.* Despite this, Czech historians developed strong arguments in favor of the former theory, which is obviously supported by Duchacek, listing (the Czech) Charles University as founded in 1348, next to "German University (1882)," on p. 158.

Charging that Charles "became" Holy Roman Emperor "seven years later, in 1355," the reviewer confuses the more or less meaningless formality of the Roman coronation as emperor with Charles' succession to the throne of the "King of the Romans," by his election in 1346, which was the true source of his imperial powers. Like Duchacek, other reputable historians take the "short cut" of referring to the founder of Charles University as "Emperor" even as of 1348. For example, see Vol. 6, *Cambridge Medieval History*, p. 596 or Vol. I of Watts, *A History of Western Civilization*, p. 293.

Limitations of space prevent me from dealing in detail with some of the other charges. Although pre-war problems of Czechoslovakia, Tiso's Slovak puppet state, and the cession to Russia in 1945 of Ruthenia, all predate the topic of the book—Czechoslovakia under the Communists, i.e., after 1948—there are numerous references to these matters throughout the book, to the extent necessary to show the historical background of the period with which it deals. Questions as to the reasons for the necessity of using "official" Czechoslovakian sources, and a lack of "critical analysis," could have found their answers in the explanatory remarks in the book's Foreword.

Very truly yours,
JOHN G. LEXA
*Lecturer on Comparative Law*
New York University Law School

December 5, 1958

Dear Sir:

I am sorry to report that, regarding the founding of Charles University as a "Czech institution in 1348," both Mr. Lexa and the author of the original chapter seem to be unacquainted with the several academic volumes, published in 1948 on the 600th anniversary of the founding of this institution, and supporting my point—although Lexa hints that there were "Czech historians [who] developed strong arguments in favor of the former theory. . . ." Permit me to cite just one of these works, authored by Professor Otakar Odložilík, now of the University of Pennsylvania, *The Caroline University 1348–1948* (Prague: Orbis, 1948), wherein Odložilík refers to Charles IV as King (see pp. 13–14) and quotes the Foundation Charter of Charles, who "hoped that the ranks of educated

people in the nation would be increased by such as could not afford to go to distant places for study" (p. 15), and thus established the University "to the end that the loyal inhabitants of our land . . . ." (p. 14). Mr. Lexa, as well as the responsible editors of this volume, has evidently failed to survey and utilize all the relevant academic literature, especially where relevance is not only defined a priori but also emerges in the course of the research itself. It is true that all research information seldom appears in neatly packaged form for the researcher; but this, in turn, obligates every serious scholar to seek it out and find it in the most unlikely places. In fact, after analyzing Lexa's objections to my "harsh words which . . . are not justified," I am sorry to report that, after re-examining his claims and after re-reading the book in question, I am now really convinced that I was not harsh enough when evaluating the work in my original review. My apologies for that!

Since Mr. Lexa is a Lecturer in Comparative Law, he should know better than to charge me with confusing "the more or less *meaningless formality* of the Roman coronation as emperor . . ."—Italics are mine. To learn that "meaningless formality" has no legal effect is quite an exciting legalistic novelty in itself.

Regarding Lexa's claim that there are "numerous references" to Tiso's Slovak puppet state, and the cession of Ruthenia to Russia in 1945, unnoticed by me, let me quote what I did say: "As for the name of Josef Tiso, Slovakia's President under Hitler, or of his Prime Minister, Bela Tuka, they are not even listed in the Index. And what about the problem of Carpathian Russia (Ruthenia) since it was the first territorial acquisition of Czechoslovakia's territory?" Maybe the editors did not deem Tiso and Tuka worthy of noticing in their index—but since these stooges of Hitler even had their state declare, officially, war on the United States, the reviewer is convinced that they should have been listed. Equally strong is my conviction that Carpathian Ruthenia deserves more consideration than mere passing references in the book (pp. 3, 5, 7, 11, 17, 130).

Lexa misquotes Editor Robert F. Byrnes when claiming that "Questions as to the reasons for the necessity of using 'official' Czechoslovakian sources, and a lack of 'critical analysis,' could have found their answers in the explanatory remarks in the book's Foreword." This is what Byrnes states: ". . . little analysis has been made anywhere in the world of recent developments in East-Central Europe. . . . In a sense, each chapter of each volume . . . represents pioneer research . . ." (p. vi). If the work under review is a good example of "pioneer research," then the results are indeed meager, if not downright pitiful in some instances.

Sincerely yours,
JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

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VOLUME 323 MAY 1959

# THE ANNALS

*of* The American Academy *of* Political *and* Social Science

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*
RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Assistant Editor*







# PARTNERSHIP FOR PROGRESS: INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

*Edited by*

RICHARD W. GABLE
*Associate Professor*
*School of Public Administration*
*University of Southern California*

69630
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PHILADELPHIA
1959



*Issued bimonthly by The American Academy of Political and Social Science at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pennsylvania.*

*Editorial and Business Offices, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania.*

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# FOREWORD

The acceleration of interest and activity in the process of "helping people help themselves" is one of the most exciting developments in international affairs and holds out more promise for lasting solutions of many of the world's problems than do other more costly and dramatic programs. Technical co-operation, technical assistance, Point Four, the Expanded Program are various terms applied to the basic process of people aiding people.

The co-operative exchange of scientific and technical knowledge and skill has been carried on in almost all of the fundamental fields of human activity: health, agriculture, education, public administration, industry, mining, fisheries, transportation, engineering, communication, community development, and so forth.

The process of sharing has taken many forms. Oldest are the private programs conducted by religious agencies, foundations, and business firms. Public programs have been both bilateral and multilateral. The Point Four program of the United States and the agreements entered into between Soviet bloc nations and certain less-developed countries are examples of the former. The multilateral approach encompasses the programs of international organizations, like the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Monetary Fund, as well as regional programs, such as those of the Organization of American States and the Colombo Plan for South and Southeast Asia. In addition, a number of programs have involved both public and private agencies, as in the case of the International Co-operation Administration-university contracts to provide assistance abroad, or a public agency in one country aiding a private organization in another.

The motivation behind all technical co-operation efforts varies widely according to the sponsoring agency and the expressed needs of the recipient. Humanitarian objectives underlie most co-operative programs, but the motive seems to be especially prominent in the work of religious and private foundations. The desire to accomplish economic development pervades many of the multilateral programs while the enhancement of national interests, either directly or indirectly, dominates the bilateral programs. Elements of each motivation run through all programs.

The accumulating experience with technical co-operation reveals that its success depends as much, perhaps more, on the effectiveness of its administration as it does on the worth-whileness of the objectives, the amount of money spent, the nature of the assisting agency, or the zeal of the recipient. With good reason administration has been called the slow boat in the convoy of technical co-operation.

The critical importance of administration, first of all, is related to the serious shortage of the resources needed to acomplish long-run social and economic development. Money, materiel, and qualified personnel are never abundant; they are particularly scarce in this field. Administration, then, is vital because of the pressing need to make the most of resources and opportunities which are in short supply.[1]

Futhermore, technical co-operation may have long-run consequences beyond or apart from the success or failure of the immediate project. This phenomenon

[1] Edwin A. Bock, *Fifty Years of Technical Assistance* (Chicago: Public Administration Clearing House, 1954), p. x.

was elaborated on at length in the book edited by Margaret Mead, *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change*.[2] Thus, in the administration of technical co-operation the desired objectives must be achieved without at the same time causing more lasting and harmful effects on the social, moral, or political lives of the people. In the process effective administration may serve as demonstration which encourages honest and efficient administration in the host country. In countless cases technical assistance has stumbled on the inability of the host country to administer the project it needs and undertakes.

Yet, relatively little attention has been given to the administrative side of technical assistance although the literature in the general field is rapidly expanding. Philip Glick, in the Preface to one of the few thorough studies of administration of technical assistance to date, puts the matter bluntly: ". . . bad administration can destroy a good idea and . . . international technical assistance is a very good idea indeed and worth the most careful nurture."[3]

This volume examines technical co-operation from the perspective of its administration: its forms, problems, and illustrative cases. A notable omission is an article by a recipient of technical assistance. Efforts to solicit such an article met repeated failure. One prominent government official of a Middle Eastern country responded: "I do not consider it politically wise to undertake this task because I could only criticize very strongly the program and this, under present circumstances, would not be very wise, not only for me but for our relationship with the U.S. Government as well."

The feeling that critical analysis should be avoided is encountered all too often. One is admonished: "Don't rock the boat." Objective evaluation of limited aspects of a program is sometimes interpreted as wholesale castigation of the total program. Political considerations, the fear that any criticism is dangerous, the lofty ideals being sought, and the genuine good will of the participants are among the justifications for avoiding criticism. Yet, responsible, intelligent, and constructive evaluation should be encouraged in a field which is so new and experimental and where the possibility of making mistakes is so great. It is essential for sound policy development and evaluation. It is necessary to improve the means of carrying on technical co-operation and to avoid repeating mistakes.

There is a need for a frame of reference within which the administration of technical co-operation can be systematically evaluated. Standards and criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of technical assistance must be developed. Answers must be sought for such questions as, How can the results of technical co-operation be measured in meaningful terms? How can the direct effects be determined? Improvement of living standards is an objective criterion, but what values do different cultures attach to the various aspects of living standards? Does the program suit the actual needs of the country? How do you evaluate a program which appears to achieve its immediate objectives but has adverse repercussions—or fails to achieve the long-run objectives while accomplishing immedite benefits? How can one measure the change in human feeling from despair to hope?

Many other questions need to be answered in the specific cases of hundreds of on-going programs and projects. How does one know what is the best organizational form for technical co-operation. Does the technical expert have a respon-

[2] (New York: The New World Library of World Literature, 1955).

[3] *The Administration of Technical Assistance: Growth in the Americas* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. xi.



sibility for helping to identify needs and propose projects? How are the various multilateral and bilateral programs being co-ordinated? Should the expert be an adviser, participant, employee, or supervisor? Should he engage in the building of support for his project? How do we know what to transfer and how is transfer accomplished? Are we transmitting weaknesses and defects along with the good?

Since technical assistance is worth doing it is worth doing well. Conscious attention to the problems of administration and systematic evaluation are required. The luxury of criticism from the sanctuary of fiction is not adequate to the task. There is another face to *The Ugly American*[4] which is worthy of more realistic analysis. Technical experts are real people facing new and difficult tasks, not stereotypes of "good guys" and "bad guys." The problems with which they wrestle daily are more fundamental than the amount of vermouth to put in a martini. While it is true that we need a "force of well-trained, well-chosen, hard-working and dedicated professionals," it is not necessary nor desirable that they be willing to "risk their health" in the pursuit of their objective.

This issue has been prepared as an introduction to the problems of administration of technical assistance in the hope that constructive evaluation will result and that the process of helping people help themselves will constantly be improved.

RICHARD W. GABLE

*Richard W. Gable, Ph.D., Los Angeles, California, is Associate Professor in the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California. From 1955 to 1957 he taught in the Institute for Administrative Affairs, University of Tehran, Iran, as a part of a project in technical assistance which USC has been conducting under a contract with the International Cooperation Administration. Currently he is serving as a consultant to an Executive Development Project USC is conducting for civil servants of Pakistan under an ICA contract. He has also taught at Stanford University, Ohio State University, and the University of California at Los Angeles. His publications include Public Control of Economic Enterprise (1956), co-authored with Harold Koontz, and articles in scholarly journals.*

[4] William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1958).

# An American Aid Mission Director's View of Technical Co-operation

By Alvin Roseman

Abstract: Economic development is now a prime national imperative in the less-advanced countries of the world. Technical co-operation—the organized international transfer of technical knowledge and skills—is one of the ways in which the more developed countries can aid less advanced ones to achieve their aspirations. The principal requirements for economic growth are a development climate, capital, and modern technology. The creation of an environment conducive to progress is a task for indigenous political leadership. Once that leadership faces up to its responsibilities, technical co-operation can contribute substantially to the country's economic growth—especially in assistance in economic planning; in introducing new techniques in agriculture, industry, and the public services; in the development of extension methods for spreading technical knowledge; and in the training of professional and technical manpower. A key characteristic of the United States' technical co-operation program is its emphasis upon mutuality with the participating country. This type of collaborative relationship sometimes may be immediately less effective than the direct operational methods employed by the Soviet bloc aid programs. However, it provides a sounder basis for strengthening the capacity of less-developed countries to meet their own problems. The success of United States technical aid depends very largely upon the capability of American administrators and technicians in the field of human relations and upon their understanding of the role of their technical specialties in the larger problems of economic and social advancement.

---

*Alvin Roseman is Director of the American Economic Aid Mission to Cambodia. His previous positions overseas include assignments as United States Representative to the United Nations organizations at Geneva, Switzerland; as Deputy Director of the American Mission for Aid to Greece; and as Deputy Chief of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration's Missions to the Middle East and Balkans. He has also served as Chief of the International Activities Division of the United States Bureau of the Budget and as a member of the United States Delegation at various United Nations and other international conferences. The views expressed in this article are personal.*

SOME months ago I happened to be chatting with a Cabinet Member of a newly developing country—not the one where I am presently assigned—in which both the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are providing large amounts of economic aid. The Minister was commenting upon the difference in approach in the aid programs of the two major powers.

> When the Russians agree to give us something under their program, they show us the design, tell us where they would like the site, bring in their architects, engineers, foremen and skilled workmen and materials, and proceed to construct the building. You Americans, on the other hand, want us to determine the plan, want us to select the location, want us to contract with a construction firm and, while you are always willing to give us technical advice and help in these matters—and in the case of my country, are also willing to bear most of the costs of the project—you always compel us to make the difficult decisions.

My Minister friend undoubtedly exaggerated the differences in the administration of Soviet and American aid. Moreover, his own country, and the reluctance of his government to make decisions, are somewhat atypical. But his contrast between the direct Russian operations and the technical advisory methods traditional in the United States economic aid program points up the question of whether or not our American approach is still sound in these days of Soviet bloc challenge to the United States in assistance to less-developed nations.

Throughout the less advanced countries of the world, economic development has now become a national imperative second only to the maintenance of sovereignty and of public order. As a matter of enlightened self-interest, the United States recognizes that aiding these nations towards the fulfillment of their hopes for economic advance is one of the keys to a peaceful and prosperous world.

The obstacles which the less-developed countries face in their efforts to achieve economic progress are manifold, but they usually fall into three principal categories. There is almost universal desire for economic improvement but hesitation—and in some cases, resistance—in coping with the changes in the traditional political, economic, and social way of doing things that such progress inevitably requires. There is a paucity of local capital for investment in productive enterprises and an insufficient amount of governmental revenue to support the public services required for economic advance. And there is a dearth of indigenous personnel with the experience required for planning, organizing, and operating an effective program of economic development.

## Technical Co-operation and Economic Development

To what extent can technical co-operation—the international transfer of technical knowledge and skills—help these countries to surmount these obstacles?

Even the most massive foreign aid program provides only a small fraction of a country's economic effort. External assistance may be able to supply the critical extra margin which enables a nation to break through the barriers which impede its progress. But it is an elementary fact, though one which often needs repetition, that the fundamental basis of economic development is the more effective use of the country's own resources and the increased productivity of its labor force.

The creation of a development climate —a combination of political, economic, and social factors conducive to progress —is a prerequisite to national economic growth. The establishment of such an environment is a task for indigenous political leadership. In most countries it means a more stable government, sufficiently rooted in popular support to enable the leadership to overcome traditional inertia, cultural resistances to innovation, and the opposition of groups benefiting excessively from a semifeudal economic and social order. It may mean a political struggle for a better system of land tenure or for a reversal of the obsession that any foreign investment can only be another aspect of colonialism. Such a climate requires public confidence in governmental integrity and purpose and belief that a better standard of living is realizable in the not-too-distant future. Accompanying it usually is the emergence of an entrepreneurial middle class which looks ahead to the possibility of economic progress and the accumulation of capital.

With the establishment of an atmosphere conducive to growth, a country may begin to make real advance in a second major requirement for economic development—the capital necessary for investment. A few very fortunate nations have natural resources, such as oil, which provide a ready source of capital for other aspects of development. For most less-developed countries the process of capital formation is slower and more difficult. They are characteristically agricultural societies. Their production may be increased by the introduction of new agricultural techniques, but the export of their farm products is subject to the vagaries of international raw-material prices. Nevertheless, it is primarily through greater agricultural productivity, diversification of single crop economies, improved marketing, and similar measures that these countries can begin to accumulate a surplus above consumption requirements for investment in light industries, in transportation, and in other forms of economic advancement.

Technical co-operation can contribute both to the creation of a development climate and to the formation of capital. The necessary political leadership must come from within the country. The willingness and ability of that leadership to maintain steady progress against domestic obstacles cannot be created by external aid. But by making available information concerning present-day technology; by counseling national officials in the introduction of improved methods in agriculture, industry, and public services; and by helping them disseminate innovations, technical co-operation can provide some of the supporting sinews for a program of modernization. Through advice on economic planning and economic policy, it may be able to assist a country to avoid attractive pitfalls and delusions and help in the mobilization of domestic capital and in the attraction of foreign investment. It can aid in the improvement of public administration and in the encouragement and training of an emerging entrepreneurial class. Through assistance in education and public health, it can aid in developing the literate, skilled, and healthy labor force necessary for increased productivity. And by providing key national officials with opportunities to study the economic development experience of other countries, technical co-operation can help them enlarge their horizons and better equip themselves to deal with the problems of economic growth.

## Technical Co-operation in Planning Economic Development

Assisting a country to formulate clear and practicable ideas about its own economic development may, in the long run, be the most significant function of technical co-operation. In today's aspiring world, a national economic plan is almost as much an attribute of sovereignty as a national flag. Nor is such a plan necessarily an indication of a

commitment to some form of statism. Every nation is confronted with competitive claimants for limited governmental resources. Even if no formal plan is established, the government's own budget reflects a series of decisions concerning the use of public funds for economic growth. Some measure of economic planning, expressed or not, is inherent in the country's monetary and credit policy, its tax system, and the measures it takes to encourage or to regulate domestic and foreign commerce.

The extent and nature of the American participation in the formulation of the country's development plans often is determined, not by any thoroughly considered doctrine as to the function of foreign advisers, but rather by the personal relations which exist between members of the American group and key national officials. Countries which have only recently gained their independence are hypersensitive about national sovereignty. Their leaders do not wish to appear to substitute a new group of foreign advisers for the recently departed colonial representatives. At the same time they are usually aware of the limitations of their own knowledge and desire the inconspicuous counsel of those who are familiar with other countries' experience.

The United States regards nations receiving American aid not as satellites or dependencies, but as sovereign equals who are voluntarily collaborating in a joint effort. American advisers who appreciate the conflicts which confront national officials, and who are skilled in dealing with their sensitivities, usually find ways in which they can make contributions to national planning. Even when there is resistance to official formal participation by American experts, the American mission may sometimes have its most significant influence in national planning through the mutual confidence which develops between the American technicians in specialized fields of agriculture, transportation, education and the like, and second or third echelon officials of the government, who in turn advise their own ministerial superiors.

## THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY

The use of the term "technical co-operation" rather than "technical assistance" as the official name of the American technical aid program is more than mere semantics or diplomatic politeness. Close collaboration between the recipient government and the United States in the formulation and execution of the activities to be undertaken is inherent in the concept.

Representatives of the two governments must agree about what is to be done under the program; where and for how long the activities are to be carried out; and how much each country will contribute in manpower, money, and material for the joint undertaking. The process of reaching agreement with national officials on those aspects of the country's total development effort which will receive United States assistance is ordinarily one of give-and-take discussion. In some instances, the government has well-formulated ideas; in others, its plans are vague and it may look to the United States representatives to advance specific proposals.

Out of a negotiation of this character, the American Aid Mission seeks to achieve a mutually agreed plan of collaborative activities which represents the optimum use of the funds and personnel resources at its disposal. The Mission is bound, of course, by certain general policies of the United States Government and by the specific laws and regulations governing the American aid program. Certain of the government's proposals may appear to it to be inappropriate for United States aid, because they seem unsound (whatever their local sponsors may think of them); or they are of relatively low priority; or they require funds, personnel, or equipment beyond what the United States is willing or able to supply. While the Mission is well aware that its basic work is with the governmental services of the country, rather than directly with the local population, it also attempts to include some projects which provide opportunities to make evident to the people of the country that the United States shares their own government's concern about their welfare.



This concept of "jointness" as a fundamental method of operation is one of the basic differences between American economic aid—not only in technical co-operation, but also in more massive forms of economic assistance—and the aid programs of the Soviet bloc. Through the partnership relationship with their indigenous opposite numbers, which the Americans seek to establish in every phase of program formulation and program execution, there is a continuous exchange of information and experience. The educative process is a constant, collaborative, and often almost unconscious one which grows out of mutual identification in a common purpose.

As the Cabinet Minister whose complaint was cited at the beginning of this paper indicated, this concept of mutuality may, in the short run, be less effective than a direct arrangement under which the United States accepted more complete responsibility. It might be more expeditious for the Americans to adopt the Soviet technique of a "packaged job," in which almost all the work is done by foreign technicians and the local officials are relieved of responsibility and worry. But the objective of the American program is to help the less-developed country to increase the knowledge of its own people in fields important to economic development and to improve their skills in applying that knowledge to the nation's economic needs. If, as Americans generally believe, people learn best by doing, the direct operational approach would not achieve this basic United States' goal.

Activities planned and carried out primarily by foreign technicians are not likely to establish a foundation for continued economic growth. Sooner or later the foreigners leave and, when they do, they have not prepared the country to deal with its own problems. The technical co-operation program places its emphasis upon the creation or strengthening of indigenous institutions and services which will carry on under their own impetus after American technicians and other American aid have been withdrawn. The development of these institutions—economic planning organizations, agricultural extension services, systems of public health administration, educational facilities suited to the country's needs, credit banks, and industrial development centers—and the training of competent personnel to operate them, take time and patience. But the result is a solid, rooted growth rather than a fragile transplantation.

## FINANCING TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

The American Mission usually also seeks those activities which promise, over a period of several years, to involve an increasing financial contribution by the indigenous government and a decrease in the relative proportion of financing by the United States. The principle that the host government should bear a part of the cost of the joint undertaking is an important one; it assures that the government regards the activity as of sufficient importance to justify the expenditure of its own funds. In the initial stages the national authorities' ability to assume a substantial proportion of the total cost may be limited, but if the activity is soundly conceived and developed, their

share should increase. If, after a period of demonstration, the government does not consider the project of sufficient importance to justify a larger financial contribution, the Mission may well question whether the activity should be continued.

The internal budgetary resources of some newly developing countries are so limited that the government may not be able to carry the local currency costs of technical co-operation without curtailing other essential public services. The paucity of revenues may be so severe that the national authorities may consider it impossible for them to pay the salaries of the additional local personnel required, for example, to begin an agricultural extension service. United States legislation does not permit the funds appropriated for technical co-operation to be used for this type of expense.

The American Mission's response to this type of situation usually is to suggest a re-examination of the government's other expenditures to determine whether economies may not be made which would furnish the funds for these local costs. If this does not provide the requisite funds, the joint program may have to be curtailed. In extraordinary circumstances, in countries in which the United States is providing other forms of economic aid which result in the generation of "counterpart" local currency through the sales of American-financed imported commodities, it may be possible for the Mission temporarily to supplement the national government's resources through the use of such counterpart funds. This type of budgetary subvention may be justified as an emergency measure to assist a newly developing country to inaugurate the initial and most urgent steps towards economic growth. Like all subsidies, however, it is difficult to curtail. As the government's revenues improve, the financing of the salaries and other operational expenses of local technicians is ordinarily the first reduction sought in the American program.

### TYPES OF AMERICAN AID

Technical co-operation is only one of the types of economic aid the United States provides to less developed areas. A number of countries receive large-scale defense support aid to enable them to carry the extraordinary military burdens they have undertaken to protect their own independence and as part of the mutual defense of the Free World. Other nations are granted special economic assistance to help them meet critical economic needs. The sale of United States surplus agricultural commodities for local currencies provides funds which are used for certain types of economic development activity. American assistance for major capital needs, such as industrial plants, irrigation, electric power, roads and ports, is increasingly being furnished through long-term loans under the recently established Development Loan Fund. The Export-Import Bank also makes loans for certain types of economic development projects.

Each of these types of assistance involves an element of technical aid. For capital projects, reconnaissance surveys must be undertaken, detailed engineering and economic studies must be made, and complex applications for loans must be prepared. Technical training of local personnel is usually required to equip them for work in the construction phase and in the management of the completed project. Some aspects of this technical assistance may be provided as part of the capital financing; increasingly, however, assistance in the preliminary phases is being supplied as part of the technical co-operation program. Technical co-operation thus provides the "make ready" aspects of major capital undertakings.



### CO-ORDINATION WITH OTHER AID PROGRAMS

The United States is not the only nation which supplies economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. Almost every major Free World power carries on some activity of this character on a direct bilateral basis or through the Colombo Plan or other regional arrangements. The Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist regime, and several of the Soviet satellites provide both economic aid and technical assistance. In addition, the United Nations and its specialized agencies and the Organization of American States have far-flung programs of mutilateral technical aid.

The assistance programs of other Free World countries and of the multilateral agencies basically have a similarity of interest with those of the United States. While some aid-giving countries have special political or economic interests in certain less-developed areas, which the United States may not share, the identity of viewpoints are much greater than are the differences. Thus the relationships between the American program and the technical co-operation activities of other like-minded nations and of international agencies are usually matters which can be dealt with through local administrative co-ordination.

Ideally, the host government itself should provide the co-ordinative mechanism. The national government is the source of requests for assistance, and it is to its own interest that each available source of aid is used in the most effective manner and that duplication of effort is avoided. In some countries, the national authorities have established such a co-ordinating device, usually as part of the Ministry of Plan or as an inter-Ministerial committee. In others, especially those in which the government itself is still relatively weak and inexperienced, the task of working out mutually satisfactory relationships among the Free World aid sources must often be undertaken informally by the various resident aid missions. In either case, information concerning prospective programs and current operations is informally exchanged and potential conflicts are avoided. The needs of most developing countries are so great that the basic problem is that of how best to use all available sources of help.

A more complex problem exists in those countries which are accepting aid both from the Free World and from the Soviet bloc. Americans are convinced that the long-range objectives of the Soviet bloc aid programs are to establish Communist political and economic domination, but this viewpoint is not necessarily shared by the recipient nations. The United States has not withdrawn its aid program from these nations merely because the country has accepted Soviet bloc aid. Rather it has continued its activities in the expectation that the host government would learn from its experience about the true motivation of Soviet activity.

Since there can be no real identity of interest between Soviet bloc aid programs and American ones, the American aid mission does not co-ordinate its efforts with those of its Communist competitors. Instead, it works out with the government procedures to avoid any commingling of American funds, personnel, or equipment with those supplied by the Soviets. It attempts to demonstrate the advantages of American aid by its own superior performance and its scrupulous avoidance of objectionable political activity.

### THE HUMAN RELATIONSHIP

Many foreign students of the American scene have remarked that the economic progress of the United States is attributable as much to success in

achieving co-operation and mutual tolerance among the diverse sectors of our society as it is to the natural resources with which we have been endowed. Every American is well aware that racial and social tensions are still one of our domestic problems. And yet those who have objectively observed the work of United States technicians in less-developed countries are often struck with the success with which many Americans have established sound relationships with their indigenous opposite numbers. Many of these technicians have been gravely deficient in knowledge of local languages and local customs; some of them have committed serious errors; but, on the whole, their record of performance has probably been more productive than that of personnel provided by European or Asian countries under other technical assistance programs.

Part of this success may reflect the outgoing "frontier" democracy which characterizes so many Americans. Part of it may also be the consequence of our well-known desire to be liked, which, in spite of its frequent awkwardness, often creates a reciprocal attitude on the part of those with whom Americans work. Part of it may grow out of increasing recognition that most Americans have accepted overseas assignments because of a basic desire to perform a useful service, rather than out of any absence of economic opportunity in their own country.

The most conspicuous element in American success, however, has been the willingness of United States technicians to get their hands dirty. In the status societies of many newly developing countries, local officials, who have traditionally regarded the purpose of education as that of relief from the necessity of manual labor, have not always initially welcomed the American technician's enthusiasm for showing a farmer how to manure a field or an equipment operator how to grease a piece of machinery, instead of describing the process or directing a laborer who does the physical work. But once the local technician overcomes his fear of losing status, he usually begins to appreciate the efficacy of his American colleague's methods. The American's conviction that all work is dignified communicates itself to others and forms the foundation for a sense of common effort.

In many parts of the world, Americans have learned that our own technology is not necessarily superior to that of other nations which are also providing technical aid to less-developed areas. Some of our normal practices are too complex or too expensive for these countries. Our technicians have often had to re-learn the methods used in their own grandfathers' times and use them rather than those employed in the United States today. But technical co-operation in essence is an interpersonal activity, and in the art or human relationships we have an overriding advantage over our totalitarian competitors. If we can staff our missions overseas with American technicians and administrators who have both professional competence and personal skill in building mutuality in every aspect of their work, and who also understand the relationship between their technical specialties and the larger problems of economic and social changes, we can expect increasing success in our assistance programs. We can also look forward to progress in achieving the larger United States objectives of aiding newly developing countries to maintain their independence and to strengthen their participation in the Free World community.

# A Resident Representative's View of Technical Co-operation

By HARRY L. SPENCE, JR.

ABSTRACT: The Technical Assistance Board, composed of a central secretariat and a network of Resident Representatives' field offices, plays a significant part in the planning, co-ordinating, and servicing of the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. The success of the Program is evidenced by the almost unanimous support given it by both the receiving and contributing countries. The need and desire of improving the Program's impact upon the economic and social development of the world, requires constant evaluation studies and administrative adjustments to meet the realistic conditions determined from operation experience. The Resident Representative, functioning at the country level, witnesses the technical assistance operation from the closest point and, therefore, holds a key position in guiding the administration of the Program.

*Harry L. Spence, Jr. is Resident Representative of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board in Pakistan. He served as Resident Representative in Afghanistan during 1952–54 and in Libya from 1955 until his assignment to Pakistan in October 1958. From 1929 to 1941 he was a member of the University of Idaho, Agricultural Extension Service, as Agronomist and later as Assistant Director of the Extension Service. From 1942 to 1952 he operated a large livestock and fruit producing and processing enterprise in Idaho.*

IN undertaking to record one's views and experience with the administration of the United Nations Technical Assistance Program (ETAP) from the observation point of a Resident Representative, it is important that the reader understands that extreme variations, country to country, in the environmental conditions, the program's composition, national considerations and long established customs, plus the personality of the individual Resident Representative, may all contribute to rather marked differences in the problems which are faced and the approach taken in conducting the duties of a Resident Representative in any one country. It is with this criterion that an attempt is made to record *one* Resident Representative's personal observations, problems experienced, and appraisals as well as suggestions which are based on over six years' experience serving the UN family in three countries.

## A DEFINITION

I have been asked to present some of the problems which confront a Resident Representative: Surely one of the first of these is to achieve an understanding of the functions of the job in their proper perspective in relation to the Technical Assistance Program.

Elsewhere in this publication, Mr. David Owen has described the structure of the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance—probably the most fully multilateral source of economic aid currently in existence. Mr. Owen is Executive Chairman of the Technical Assistance Board, which is the co-ordinating and executive body of the Program, operating out of United Nations Headquarters in New York. The Resident Representatives of the Board are its field arms, scattered to such points as Kabul, Khartoum, Phnom Penh, La Paz, Bengasi, and Accra. They are the Board's means of direct contact with experts, with governments, non-UN agencies, and all the other individuals and organizations which are concerned with technical aid.

The Resident Representative is generally assigned to one country for a period of one to three or four years. Although he establishes himself in an office provided by the government in the capital city, he also visits the outlying towns and districts where a good deal of the Program is being carried out. Officially, the Resident Representative is a point of reference between the government to which he is accredited and the various international organizations which make up the operating bodies of the United Nations technical assistance program. In practice, he tries to be—at one and the same time—an executive, an administrator, a diplomat, an economist, and a public relations officer.

It can well be seen then that the Resident Representative's terms of reference are broad in principle but rather vague in positive definition. This is perhaps due to the extreme variation in the requirements of each country office and to the fact that the job has grown slowly and haltingly parallel to the growth of a completely new and unique structure for aid. At any rate, the lack of a definitive job description often places the Resident Representative in a position where improvisation is the rule and flexibility an absolute necessity.

## FUNCTIONS

As field co-ordinator of the UN and agency program, the Resident Representative assists in the planning, the execution, and, later, the evaluation of the country's program. He keeps in close touch with the work of experts and helps to smooth out some of the inevitable problems that come up in the course of their work. He is responsible for maintaining liaison with representatives of other technical assistance programs within the country to prevent overlapping or duplication of efforts. He assists experts by maintaining secretarial, transportation, and general administrative services—including the obtaining of visas and passport renewals, the making of travel arrangements, and dealing with currency conversion problems. The Resident Representative maintains central files on all technical assistance projects. He frequently assists government and UN agencies with the selection and preparation of fellows who will be sent abroad for training by the international organizations; later, it is his job to follow up the results of this training to see if it is being used as originally planned. In practice, Resident Representatives are often considered by governments as senior representatives of the United Nations and are usually accorded a rank equivalent to that of an ambassador or minister.

The life and work of a Resident Representative are shaped to a large extent by his position at the center of a fairly large group of individual technical experts. At one time during my service in Libya, our technical assistance group numbered eighty-seven experts representing thirty-six different nationalities. I was there to help them carry out their work as effectively as possible and to give each one the feeling of belonging to a team, especially where he or she might not, by virtue of background or assignment, be integrated with the group. Working with a diverse group of knowledgeable people is certainly one of the great rewards of the post of Resident Representative, but it presents its share of problems. Unfortunately, the international civil service has not yet matured to the point where there are commonly accepted codes and philosophies that can be applied uniformly by experts.

Of the 8,000 experts recruited and sent on missions during the past eight and one-half years, the greatest number were individuals accepting their first overseas assignment. A completely strange environment can often have strange effects on an individual's behavior. Any person should be entitled to live his private personal life in accordance with his own set codes and standards, but he must have great tolerance for other people's ways of life and not attempt to force others to accept his own. He must accept living and working conditions which will vary greatly from those to which he is accustomed and must be able to adjust his way of life as closely as possible to that of nationals in similar positions with whom he works.

These are not easy adjustments for many people to make, and they often bring about family problems and attitudes which affect the professional performance of the individual. It is natural that being in a different land without close friends, the members of the mission often call upon the Resident Representative to assist in solving their personal problems. The Resident Representative thus finds it necessary and advisable to accept a degree of responsibility for both the expert and his dependents' happiness and welfare.

As further illustrations of the rather wide divergence of problems which arise in administering a technical assistance program within a country, a few examples might be listed: personal negotiation for the release of a technical assistance expert held by a tribal group as the result of an unfortunate traffic accident; negotiations for an exit visa for an expert and his family held in the country because of a case for damages which had been filed in a religious court; diplomatic settlement of a territorial violation innocently incurred by an expert carrying out his job. These examples, though perhaps of minor im-

portance, are recorded to illustrate the rather complex nature of the administration of a technical assistance mission in the host country.

### CO-ORDINATION

In the majority of countries, the United Nations technical assistance program is but one segment of the technical assistance offered. A number of nations are offering technical assistance programs either on a straight bilateral basis or through a combination of countries, such as the Colombo Plan. In addition there are numerous foundations and independent or private groups assisting governments of the less-developed countries in their economic and social development. Few of the receiving countries are yet equipped with personnel or organization capable of full co-ordination of these total resources to a point where the maximum use or ideal effectiveness is obtained. Too often, the aid-giving agencies themselves have not been able to achieve the most fully effective co-ordination of their activities in the same country.

While a real effort has been made to develop an exchange of information and agreements between programs at a high level, experience has shown that the country level is the most important and effective point of co-ordination; there, it is largely the result of personal relations brought about by daily contact and understanding among those responsible for the administration of the various technical assistance programs.

It must also be remembered that while a closely co-ordinated relationship between the various aid-giving services is always encouraged and sought by receiving governments, activities do not always entirely reflect that policy. While cases of overlapping, if not duplication, still exist, there has been a vast improvement during the past few years. It is, however, important that continued attention be given towards developing a uniform procedure to assure total co-ordination of all technical assistance programs since an *ad hoc* arrangement depends too greatly on the personalities concerned, a rather unreliable factor when multinationalities are involved.

### PROGRAM PLANNING

Effective planning is and will remain the key to the success of any technical assistance program. During the first five years the United Nations technical assistance program was administered by dividing the total resources available for any one year on a fixed percentage basis between the various participating UN organizations. In turn the organizations through consultations with the various governments developed their program for each country.

In 1956 the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) adopted what has become known as the Country Planning Procedure. As Mr. Owen has noted in his article, under the latter system the fixed percentage formula was abolished and the total funds were divided to give each country a target figure under which it has full freedom to develop its program to best fit its needs.[1] While there is still a division of opinion among participating agencies as to the workability of country planning, experience at the country level would confirm its soundness. Unfortunately the plan has not always been given a full opportunity to function because of the very human tendency of government ministries and UN agencies themselves to believe that their work is of the greatest priority. A minister of agriculture, for example, may be primarily interested in obtaining all of the support possible which will further the agricultural program in his country, when agriculture is of

[1] See also Arthur Goldschmidt's discussion of country programing procedures, this issue of THE ANNALS, pp. 54–55.



course only one segment of an over-all development program, and the program must be properly balanced for the best promotion of a sound economic and social structure.

It is therefore relatively easy for these considerations to upset the true theory of country planning. A successful technical assistance program must be measured to the specific needs of the country—and these vary widely—country to country. Fortunately there has been a steady buildup of planning and co-ordinating machinery in many of the less-developed countries, in many cases through the aid of the technical assistance program itself. Gradually, definite goals towards economic and social development are being established, and they will help to ensure that funds are employed in the proper ratios.

The Resident Representative during the planning period works closely with the technical representatives of the agencies in consultation with the responsible government officials to develop the program. Representing, as he does, the entire UN family and the interests of the government, he is able to advise and assist in the over-all co-ordination of the planning process.

### EVALUATION

During the early stages of the United Nations technical assistance program little time or thought could be, or was, directed to evaluating the results of what had already been done. It is strongly felt that we have now reached a point where evaluation must be constantly applied if the program is to be virile and efficiently operated. Mistakes and shortfalls in efficiency during the early years can be readily understood when one considers the broad scope of the program and the total lack of experience in administering an international program of its nature and size. Program evaluation is a most important and necessary exercise yet extremely difficult due to the lack of a criterion which lends itself to a uniform application for vastly differing projects. Nevertheless, future increase in the effectiveness of the technical assistance program depends largely upon the frank recognition of weaknesses and mistakes which have been experienced during these early years and the application of corrective measures which will increase the delivered quality of the program to its maximum.

The Resident Representative, in the past three years, has taken a leading role in the evaluation process—always in consultation with governments. During the early years of operations, governments did not have effective facilities for program evaluations. This is no longer the case, and governments are much more carefully studying and appraising the results of the technical assistance program.

Looking at international technical assistance from the vantage point of a field representative, and drawing on the experience that I have already had with evaluation, I might point out some of the ways in which technical assistance could be made to yield even greater results: First of all, technical aid must be recognized as the partnership arrangement which it is—with the host government and the aid-giving organization bearing an equal responsibility.

Many of the project failures or low efficiency experienced are due principally to lack of proper interest or servicing by governments. In nearly all cases, the receiving government is responsible for all supplies and personnel which can be obtained locally, plus office, secretarial, transportation, and general service required by the project. Therefore, before a project is begun and the expert arrives, full assurance of the availability of necessary servicing must be ascertained. These principles are spelled

out in the Basic Agreement signed by all governments. However, conditions in most countries are such that the different divisions of government are not fully cognizant of their responsibilities, and as a result an expert might spend several months in obtaining the facilities and support which largely determine the success or failure of his project. Greater attention at the time of programing, to the clear definition of each party's obligations, and before sending the expert to the country, would without question result in greater effectiveness of the technical assistance program.

## THE EXPERT

The contribution made by the United Nations Expanded Program of technical assistance is almost entirely dependent upon the performance of the experts, as only a relatively small percentage of the funds are used for equipment, and none for capital outlay. This is a significant difference when compared with the bilateral approach to technical assistance. It is therefore imperative that the standard of experts be held at a high level, and a project may be seriously delayed until the right man is found. One of the known obstacles to recruitment is the fact that the vast majority of contracts offered are of one year duration. While it is true that the majority of such contracts are extended from year to year, as the work requires, there is a lack of security of tenure which many qualified experts hesitate to accept. As a result it has been difficult to build up a pool of technicians who might be developed into an international career service. Many of the present experts accept appointments only because they are able to obtain a leave of absence from their established positions to which they can return after one or two years. A solution to this problem which would offer a career service for international trained technicians would greatly strengthen the program.

A second problem arises after the expert's arrival in his country of assignment. It is a relatively easy matter to judge a person's academic and professional qualifications from a curriculum vitae, but a much more difficult task to judge his personality and his ability to adjust to new environmental conditions. Usually, inability to adjust to the working and living environment will be evident after three to four months, and early transfer of the expert who obviously cannot adjust would be the wise solution. Such an expert might upon transfer to new conditions perform an outstanding job.

From my own experience with the needs of experts, it would certainly seem that every man and woman selected for a foreign technical assistance assignment should be thoroughly briefed in the history and background of the people and country of his assignment, as well as in the wide objectives of the United Nations. There is, of course, in addition, the need to be aware of the living conditions available to foreign experts, necessary supplies and equipment which must be taken to the country, medical and health facilities available, as well as churches and schools resources available. Every agency does attempt to brief its experts and a large share of the responsibility falls upon the Resident Representatives, as it should, following the expert's arrival in the country. However, there are numerous opportunities of improving and adopting uniform procedures.

## TRAINING

For an expert to be successful, he must have certain minimum services such as office or laboratory facilities and supplies, secretarial help, and transportation. These services are normally a responsibility of the receiving government. Many countries in which the technical assistance program operates are virtually unable to fulfil these obligations because of shortage of foreign exchange and almost complete lack of trained people. The Office of the Resident Representative of TAB assists the experts by furnishing such services within a very limited field office budget. Comparisons will confirm that the expenditure for administration of the UN technical assistance program at the field level is by far the lowest among the technical aid-giving organizations.

The shortage of trained personnel in the less-developed countries becomes even more critical when it is reflected in the lack of national counterparts to work along with international experts. At least one counterpart should be provided for every expert, so that he can take over when the UN help is withdrawn. To help governments intensify the training program for their own people, a large part of technical assistance funds have been devoted to fellowships for training abroad, clerical and technical training within the country, regional institutes and training centers, as well as seminars and study tours in nearly every field.

There are two common problems experienced in the fellowship training program to which additional attention should be given. First, the development of a system which assures the selection of candidates solely on merit. Political as well as family pressures must be guarded against. Second, assurances must be obtained that the candidates will be given the opportunity to utilize fully the training on the completion of studies. Effective co-ordination of the training program between the aid-giving organizations operating in the country must also be perfected to maintain proper balance between the fields of training. In addition to assisting with the co-ordination, selection, briefing, and administrative arrangements for travel of the trainees, the Resident Representative maintains records on all training programs and follows up each candidate's activities after his return to his country to assure maximum utilization of his or her services. In the past some criticism has been directed at the UN and agencies for not devoting a larger percentage of funds to the fellowships and training phases of the technical assistance program. However, experience to date would indicate that the number of fellowships awarded closely parallels the availability of qualified candidates in most countries. As primary and secondary systems of education turn out a greater number of students, there will be greater need for advanced and specialized study. At present the training of workers who have established positions in government produces the maximum immediate benefits.

Experience with the fellowships program would also lead one to the conviction that training should be carried out in places where conditions are closely similar to the trainee's home environment. A fellow who studies for an extended period of time in the more advanced countries often has difficulties in adjusting to working conditions existing in his home country. The UN family is in an excellent position to place each fellow in the most appropriate country of study since it has established a network of facilities all over the world.

## CONCLUSION

An attempt at frank but constructive appraisal of the administration of the United Nations ETAP program, based upon the experience of one Resident Representative who has actively observed the program in but three of the ninety odd countries and territories where technical assistance is being fur-

nished, cannot be taken as representing a majority's views. The United Nations ETAP program, however, born without previous experience or tradition, is now nearing maturity. To guarantee that the program continues to be viable, energetic, and keyed to ever-changing conditions, constant review and evaluation is imperative together with the flexibility necessary to permit acceptance of needed adjustments.

Any attempt at documenting the observations, experiences, and personal conclusions of the administration of a program as vast and varying as that of the United Nations technical assistance, regardless of how objectively it might be made, could create some questions in the minds of the laymen as to its effectiveness in assisting the less-developed countries of the world in raising the living standards of their people. The almost total acceptance and support given the program by the countries of the world should still any doubt of its outstanding contribution. To one who has spent nearly seven years in the less-developed countries participating in the administration of the United Nations technical assistance program, no small question or doubt remains on the wisdom of those who created the technical assistance program or upon the amazing record of accomplishments made during the past eight and one-half years of operation. Its total beneficial impact upon the lives of millions of human beings and upon the stability of many governments cannot be fully or accurately measured. The program must continue to grow, but sound growth can occur only by benefiting from the lessons of the past and putting forth every effort to bring the program to maximum effectiveness.

# A Congressman's View of Technical Co-operation

By PORTER HARDY, JR.

ABSTRACT: According to the Act of International Development of 1950, technical co-operation programs are "Programs for the international interchange of technical knowledge and skills designed to contribute to the integrated development of the economic resources and productive capacities of economically underdeveloped areas." To carry out this program the United States sends technicians to host countries, brings host countries personnel to the United States for training, and contributes to the joint support of bureaus in the host country. Since technical co-operation is primarily a program of education, the emphasis is on the transfer of skills and know-how. Before a program can be successful, three elements must be present. The initial demand must come from the host country —because the idea of self-help is inherent in technical co-operation, it must believe in and want the project. Further the host country must be willing to contribute its own funds to the project. When a program or project has been agreed upon, there must be proper planning. A realistic estimate must be made of the type and amount of knowledge and skill which can be supplied by us and of the time required to provide this education. It is also important to be aware of how much can be absorbed by the host country, keeping in mind the difference in culture between the host country and our own. When these elements are not present in the technical co-operation program or project, failures will result. Failures which have occurred so far have been ones of administration. —Ed.

*Porter Hardy, Jr., LL.D., Washington, D. C., has been a Member of Congress from the 2d Virginia District since 1947. During the Eighty-fourth Congress, he was Chairman of the subcommittee on international operations and Chairman of the select committee on survivor benefits. He is the author of Servicemen's and Veteran Survivors Benefit legislation, PL 881 and is a member of the committees on Armed Services and Government Operations. In 1951, Mr. Hardy was named First Citizen of Portsmouth, Virginia.*

ADVOCATES of particular points of view commonly characterize as opponents those who are not enthusiastic supporters. For example, if a Congressman makes a speech or writes an article criticizing the conduct of a particular government program, he is forthwith considered as against it. When, as is often the case, he couples with his criticisms a pledge of support for the program he is apt to be accused, as politicians sometimes are, of talking out of both sides of his mouth at once, doubtless with an eye on the next election.

More careful observers recognize constructive criticism. They know that the adverse comments which Congressmen make about given activities of government do not always have ulterior motives. Instead, critical observations by Congressmen may often arise out of a sincere belief in and a profound concern for the very things being criticized. It is out of a concern for the success of our technical co-operation programs that I find myself in the role of critic.

We in the Congress have listened carefully year after year to the reports of performance and claims of accomplishment for these programs which are sent up by the International Cooperation Administration and the Department of State. Along with most of my colleagues from both sides of the aisle I have consistently voted funds for their continuance. But, as chairman of a House subcommittee charged with the duty of studying United States international operations, I have also had some special opportunities to observe their day-to-day conduct, and I have not always been gratified by what I saw. It is out of the experience of the past four years, in which I have studied at close hand technical co-operation programs from Iran to Uruguay, and from Cambodia to Mexico, that my judgments have been formed.

## AIMS AND PHILOSOPHY OF PROGRAM

The objectives of this program are most inspiring and unselfish, particularly for an activity undertaken by one government on behalf of another. The technical co-operation program is founded in hope and optimism. It envisions a future in which, through the sharing of technical knowledge and skills, a better life can be created for millions of people in other lands—people for whom over the centuries tomorrow has always been bleak.

It is by no means accidental that the United States has led the way in this bold and imaginative undertaking. The stoic acceptance of life as it is has never been an American characteristic. We have always considered ourselves masters of our fate. Coupled with this confidence is a deep humanitarian urge which impels Americans into action whenever they see human misery caused by poverty, starvation, disease, and ignorance.

Moreover, when such conditions exist in lands with untapped resources, to an American it appears that what is needed is the application of American know-how to make the stubborn earth yield its stored abundance, to push back the ancient enemy of disease, to feed and clothe and house the people and give them the hope for tomorrow which seems so tragically lacking.

This is the central objective of the technical co-operation program. This is the valid element which finds a response in the heart of every American. This is why Congress so consistently supports this effort.

A praiseworthy objective, however, does not by itself assure success. Good intentions must be matched by wise



actions. It is from this standpoint that it becomes the duty of even the most ardent supporters of technical co-operation programs carefully and coolly to examine the nature of these activities and the way they are carried out.

Section 418(a) of the Act for International Development of 1950 defines technical co-operation programs as

> . . . Programs for the international interchange of technical knowledge and skills designed to contribute to the balanced and integrated development of the economic resources and productive capacities of economically underdeveloped areas.

The United States contributes to this effort in three ways: by sending United States technicians to work in the host countries, by bringing host country personnel to the United States for training, and by contributing to the support of special joint bureaus set up within the host governments to carry out technical assistance programs. The emphasis throughout is intended to be upon the transfer of skills and know-how. Any expenditure for capital equipment is supposed to be limited to that needed for demonstration purposes only. It is, in other words, intended to be a program of education, not of economic aid.

The implications of this form of foreign aid are worth noting. One of the presuppositions of technical co-operation programs is that there are human and physical resources in the host country which will be employed as soon as the necessary know-how is made available. Another presupposition is that the host country can and will initiate, or take over and continue on its own, a given activity once the method of doing it has been adequately demonstrated. Finally, the concept presupposes that technical co-operation funds will not be employed to continue a given activity after know-how has been acquired by the host country. If additional United States dollars are necessary, they should either be provided through private sources or through other categories of the Mutual Security Program.

Out of a total of nearly 4 billion dollars of the President's budget request for the fiscal year 1959 mutual security program, 164 million dollars—about 4 per cent—was for technical co-operation. Thus the technical co-operation programs do not involve large sums of money when compared to the billions which we spend each year on other foreign aid activities. A portion of this amount represented United States contributions to technical co-operation programs carried out through international organizations like the United Nations and the Organization of American States. Of the total, however, 142 million dollars was for bilateral programs set up by agreement between the United States and individual host countries. The following comments relate principally to the bilateral programs.

I have already expressed myself as being impressed with the inspirational aspects of technical co-operation. It provides "people to people" contact—an element which should be supplied but is generally lacking in other aspects of our foreign aid program. Military assistance programs all over the world serve to protect the freedom of countries and their citizens—but the impact of such programs is not felt directly by the people. Military hardware does not fill empty stomachs. Economic assistance dollars too often are used for monumental projects such as dams and roads —projects which are primarily dedications to national pride. Although over a long period of time they contribute to an improved economy, they have little or no significance in the here and now for the ordinary man. The only programs that immediately encourage

and directly help the individual are those embraced under the Point Four concept—that is, technical co-operation. Through these programs, individuals are helped to better health, to useful and enlightening education, to a more adequate diet, and to improved sanitation and housing.

In the current year over 3,000 American technicians are working abroad in some 50 countries. Most of these technicians are working with their counterparts overseas in the fields of food production, public health, and education. These are basic areas for the improvement of living standards. Some programs have been broadened, in response to changing needs, to help solve problems of transportation, housing, industrial management, public administration, and community development.

### AGRICULTURE

In many countries technical co-operation programs have shown the way to better methods of cultivation, improved plant varieties and breeds of farm animals. Through these and the application of fertilizer to crops, improved tools and implements, control of plant diseases and insect pests, the production of food for hungry and growing populations has been vastly increased.

Even slightly improved tools or better methods of cultivation often make immediate and striking improvement. In Iran, a demonstration of the advantages of using a moldboard plow instead of a pointed stick in sugar beet cultivation resulted in three times the yield. In Ethiopia, a simple change to row planting of corn instead of broadcast planting increased production from 18 bushels an acre to 30 bushels.

Agricultural vocational schools and colleges have been opened in a dozen countries as a result of technical co-operation. Through agricultural extension activities, additional channels have been opened through which a continuous supply of scientific information flows to the farmers themselves in a form which they can understand and apply.

### HEALTH AND EDUCATION

The original activity of technical co-operation in Venezuela was in malaria control. In three years, malaria dropped from third place to sixth among causes of death. In the Philippines, malaria incidence fell 68 per cent as a result of DDT spraying. The malaria control program, in addition to its striking accomplishments toward better health, had the important side effect of tremendous expansion in food production—particularly in Indonesia and Iran. Mosquito control restored to cultivation much highly productive land which previously had been abandoned because of malaria.

The surge of interest in education in all newly developing countries is a phenomenon of the present era. In 1946–47 in Cambodia there were 38,000 children in primary schools; in 1955–56 attendance was 241,000. In Iran, since the United States technical co-operation program began in that country, school enrollment has increased from 20,000 in 1948 to 45,000 in 1955. The great need everywhere is for trained teachers, and technical co-operation projects in education have concentrated on filling this need, helping to give preservice training to more than 17,000 teachers and in-service training to more than 46,000.

I have given only a few examples to illustrate the operation of this program and the benefits it has produced.

Let us consider in more detail another example of accomplishment, in order to discuss the criteria applicable to a technical co-operation activity. In Chile, the government had sought over many years to establish a satisfactory program of preventive medicine. As part of the United States technical co-operation program in the field of health, during the period from 1943 to 1953, five health centers were established and operated in strategic locations. These centers have since been turned over to the Chilean government, which continues to operate them today. More important, using these original centers as a pattern, the Chilean government has constructed ten additional health centers in Santiago Province alone and has made such centers the basic field unit in a reorganization of the Chilean National Health Service.

All the elements of a successful technical cooperation project were present in this case: (1) The project dealt with a problem which had been of concern to the host government; (2) it involved a demonstration of a method of solving the problem; (3) it resulted not only in an activity which could be and was turned over to the host government, but it stimulated expanded and continuing action by the host government in this particular field.

We have, as a matter of United States policy, sought to insure the presence of these elements by stipulating three conditions to be met in carrying out a technical co-operation activity. First, the host country must request it. Second, the host country must pay a fair share of its cost. Third, it must be related to efforts being made by the host country itself.

### HOST COUNTRY REQUEST

These are wise provisions which, if adhered to with reasonable consistency, would guarantee that every program and project was a truly co-operative undertaking. If we conduct only those programs which the host country requests we can be sure that we are responding to a genuinely felt need; by the contribution of host country funds, local interest in a program's success can be both measured and sustained; and by establishing a relationship with other activities and plans of the host country not only can we contribute to balanced progress and development but the encouraging effect of our help can spread beyond the individual programs.

Unfortunately, in altogether too many instances, these sensible rules have been broken. Investigations by our Subcommittee disclosed that some projects were being implemented where host country approval had been obtained through insistence by United States representatives rather than as a result of a bona fide interest on the part of the host government. To be sure, a formal request by the host government was on file, but it was little more than a piece of paper drawn up to meet technical requirements. Sometimes these projects originated simply because particular United States specialists were available and wanted to undertake them. In other instances, pressure from Washington was put upon United States field personnel to get certain types of projects under way. Almost invariably, as might be expected, such projects ultimately were financed almost entirely with United States funds. The interest of the host countries was as small as their contributions.

### HOST COUNTRY CONTRIBUTION

The second requirement, that the host country contribute a fair share to the support of projects, has also been applied very unevenly. In one country we found that the United States has been paying over 1 million dollars a year to support an agricultural program on the basis, not that the host country could not support it, but that it would not. In another, our technical co-operation funds were being used not to supply know-how but to underwrite a routine government activity, which is not in the spirit of the technical co-operation legislation. In a third coun-

try, a major agricultural project was of such little interest to the host country that when the time came to put in its contribution it refused to do so, even though we had allocated more than three-quarters of a million United States dollars to it.

The proportion of local support for individual programs and projects varies widely even within a single country. What appears to emerge is that host country contributions have been made to some projects and not to others, depending on the extent of host country interest in them. This, of course, is why the "fair share" requirement was instituted in the first place, but it has not been fully or adequately adhered to by United States administrators.

The importance of the level of host country contributions cannot be overemphasized. It is not a matter of specific amounts of money, for these might vary considerably from country to country and even from time to time within a given country, depending on the local financial situation. What is crucial is that the most reliable index of a host country's interest in a program or project is not how much it is willing to have the United States invest in it, but how much the country itself is willing to contribute.

The heart of technical co-operation is the idea of self-help. There is little to be gained by imposing on others plans and ideas in which they have no interest. These programs are intended to be co-operative efforts. Unless the recipient country wants and believes in a project or program, enough to put its own funds into it at whatever level it can afford, the co-operation aspect is lost.

In this connection, reports given to the Congress on the extent of host country contributions have been more than a little misleading. These are usually expressed for comparative purposes in terms of equivalent dollars. Yet, by the use of par-value exchange rates which have no current significance, the contributions of some countries have been greatly exaggerated. We found, for example, one country where local contributions as presented to Congress had been magnified in this way by a factor of twenty. In other instances, under a category called "contributions in kind," a dollar value had been placed on a number of intangibles and everything conceivable has been counted as a host country contribution, including duties they had waived collecting on imports for the program. Most ridiculous of all was reporting, as a host country cash contribution, the local currency obtained by the sale of United States commodities we had given them.

As I have pointed out earlier, local contributions, when account is taken of the general financial situation of the host country, can be most revealing about local acceptance of programs and projects. I therefore believe that more effort must be made to adhere to the "fair share" rule than is now the case. I make this observation out of a conviction that the planning of programs, their day-to-day conduct, and their chance of achieving their ultimate goals will be improved thereby.

### PROJECT PLANNING

The third requirement, that programs be related to efforts being made by the host country itself, brings up the question of planning. What seems to be absent in most cases is a realistic estimate of the situation. Projects are often initiated with only the most hazy idea of how extensive a problem is involved, without determining in advance the availability of the technical personnel who will be needed, and without fixing a goal by which progress toward completion can be measured. Few projects are based on the kind of preliminary survey and analysis which would determine how much of what kind of technical knowledge or skill needs to be and can be supplied over what period of time. In place of careful planning, the tendency is simply to initiate and to expand programs, in the words of one overseas United States program officer, "to provide facilities which haven't been provided heretofore."

It is this approach which leads to pressures from Washington and even from officials in the field to get projects under way, not so much because they are relevant to local needs, but because a similar activity is under way in some adjacent country. This is hardly a sound basis for relating programs to activities of the host country, and it has accounted for a number of notable failures. Fits and starts in other cases have occurred because the problem of recruiting technical personnel to carry out the work was not adequately considered. In Uruguay, for example, a program in health was delayed for more than a year after the chief of the program arrived because four or five technicians could not be supplied.

### CONCLUSION

Reviewing these observations, it is clear that most of the faults in technical co-operation programs are matters of administration. Yet, paradoxically, some of them are at the same time tributes to the good intentions and zeal of the administrators who have been activated by a strong desire to obtain tangible results and impatient in their haste to reach ultimate goals. One can applaud enthusiasm—but not when it initiates action with inadequate planning and results in wasteful errors caused by hasty judgments.

A basic trouble, I am coming to believe, lies in a failure to appreciate the fact that there are significant limits to the rate at which technical knowledge and skill can be absorbed by an underdeveloped economy. As Americans we are attuned to a dynamic and open society in which technological change is rapidly assimilated. We must keep in mind the fact that the differing societies of many underdeveloped lands cannot now make use of all the skills we can offer them. First, some far-reaching changes must take place in the nature of the societies themselves. What I am referring to, of course, is the problem generally called "cultural lag." For example, it may be possible in a given country to suggest improved methods of agriculture and yet have few of them adopted because to do so may require a revision of age-old traditions of land tenure and ownership and perhaps even of family relationships. Similarly, technical improvements in tax administration may require a totally different view of the role of government within a given culture. Such changes do not come about quickly nor do they result from the availability of technical knowledge. The need for improved skills may be apparent now, but the demand for them may require cultural changes which time alone can bring.

No one is better fitted to take such considerations into account than host country officials who, of necessity, are representative of their own culture. This is why the participation of the host government in planning and carrying out technical co-operation programs is of such paramount importance. This is why unilateral judgments by United States officials of what projects are to be undertaken should be discouraged.

It can, of course, be argued that adhering strictly to the rules might result in a reduction in the number and scope of activities now under way. This, indeed, might prove to be the case and in some instances it might be wise. It is also possible that sounder programs might result. In addition, there is a

real possibility that when full account is taken of the limits imposed by cultural lag, to say nothing of administrative matters like the recruitment of adequate numbers and kinds of United States technical personnel, the seemingly modest level at which these activities are operating may turn out to be very nearly the maximum which is currently feasible.

I have not commented on the relationship of these programs to our more costly undertakings in the fields of outright economic assistance and military aid. Obviously they are related, since improved economies and greater military strength require added technical knowledge and skills. Conversely, the full use of such knowledge and skills may depend upon the addition of considerable amounts of physical capital.

Technical co-operation is basically education, and it is as an educational activity that it must be assessed. In my view, its fundamental concept is sound. The broad policy guides which have been set up for its conduct are inherently wise. If to the good intentions of the United States officials administering these programs there can be added sounder judgment and a greater degree of common sense, I believe we will more fully accomplish our purpose.

For its part, Congress, I am sure, will continue to give this activity its strong support. It is to be expected, however, that a careful Congressional eye will be kept on technical co-operation operations and that the sharpest criticisms will still come from those members of Congress who most devoutly want these programs to succeed.

# The United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance—A Multilateral Approach

By DAVID OWEN

ABSTRACT: The United Nations and its family of agencies are only one of many sources of technical assistance in an era which has come to understand and to put into wide practice the concept of sharing economic skill and knowledge. In keeping with the nature of the Organization, the United Nations has organized a Program that gives every country the opportunity of being a partner in economic development. The word "multilateral" has come into its own as a description of this new kind of assistance, but it cannot do justice to the unique blending of the experience of almost every country in the world. The United Nations Charter pledges that the Organization will "promote higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and development. . . ." Through the Technical Assistance Program, the UN has come a long way towards fulfilling this mandate.

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*David Owen, LL.D., is Executive Chairman of the Technical Assistance Board of the United Nations. He has held several academic and research appointments in England before World War II. During the war he became Personal Assistant to Sir Stafford Cripps and accompanied him on his historic mission to India in 1942. He remained with Sir Stafford as his Personal Assistant in the Office of the Lord Privy Seal and the Ministry of Aircraft Production. Later Mr. Owen became Officer-in-Charge of League of Nations Affairs in the British Foreign Office, and he was a member of the British Delegation to the San Francisco Conference. Following the signing of the Charter of the United Nations Mr. Owen was appointed Deputy Executive Secretary to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations and as such he opened the first office of the Organization in London. In April 1946, Mr. Owen was appointed Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Economic Affairs.*

IN THE eight-and-a-half years during which I have had the privilege of serving as Executive Chairman of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board, I have been able to visit many of the economically less-developed countries of the world. I have seen for myself what the United Nations family and the other sources of economic aid and technical assistance have been accomplishing, and to measure this against the need which still exists. As our experience has broadened over the years, two main conclusions have emerged more and more clearly. First, it has become evident that the international organizations which take part in the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance provide a "most acceptable" —frequently *the* most acceptable—form of outside assistance. This aid is acceptable because it comes from an indisputably impartial source, because it offers a partnership approach to development and—most important of all—because it has proved itself effective in actual operation. The second conclusion—and this has been made clear in exchanges of views with government officials—is that international assistance is being provided on all too small a scale.

The technical assistance programs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies are, at one and the same time, modest and far-reaching. They are modest in financial resources and in comparison with the expressed needs of over half the countries of the world. They are far-reaching in the area they cover, in the extent of participation of different peoples and agencies, and in the complexity of their operations. The administration of the Program, therefore, requires us to take advantage of an almost limitless range of facilities within the very definite limit of funds. The operation of the Program as it applies to the process of initiating and guiding projects and to procedures of financial management and administrative "housekeeping" is based on fairly explicit directives of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the General Assembly of the United Nations. These directives, however, and the Program itself have changed perceptibly from year to year as the international organizations have responded to the changing requirements of governments and to the practical lessons of experience in the field.

## ORIGINS OF THE PROGRAM

Internationally organized or multinational technical assistance predates the United Nations by many years. The International Labor Organization (ILO), which came into being in 1919 in association with the League of Nations, was sending out "advisers" at the request of some of its Member Governments between the World Wars, and it continued this practice after it became a specialized agency of the United Nations. Other specialized agencies—notably the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)—found soon after their creation that Member States sought out technical advice in their respective fields of competence. This advice was given in the form of survey missions, fellowship awards, and assignment of regular staff members for technical consultations. Later, when requests became so numerous as to deplete the regular staffs of the organizations concerned, the agencies hired experts for this purpose.

Some of the most important aspects of economic and social development, however, did not fall within the competence of any specialized agency; and the United Nations soon found that the facilities of its own Department of Economic and Social Affairs were being called upon when Member Governments wanted guidance on such matters as the setting up of a public administration institute, the drafting of an economic development plan, the institution of social welfare services, improvement of transport and communications and allied fields.



These advisory services by the United Nations and the agencies were financed by drawing on the regular budgets of the organizations concerned, and a portion of the budgets of the United Nations and several of the agencies is still used to provide technical aid. It became clear, however, as the years brought an ever-greater volume of requests from more and more governments, that the regular resources of the international organizations could no longer meet what was obviously a growing demand for multilateral assistance. As far as the United Nations itself is concerned, an historic step was taken at the third session of the General Assembly, held in Paris in 1948, when a resolution provided for a modest sum of $300,000 to be put aside by the UN each year, specifically to give technical assistance for economic development. Soon after, at the beginning of 1949, President Truman gave his renowned inaugural address proposing, as Point Four, a United States economic development and technical co-operation program. At that time, feeling in favor of a similar program under United Nations auspices began to crystallize among delegations to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly.

## AN EXPANDED PROGRAM

By the middle of 1949, the eighteen members of the United Nations Economic and Social Council had drafted a resolution, with the aim of establishing a joint UN and agency program, which would be financed from a special technical assistance account voluntarily contributed by governments. Resolution 222 (IX) of the Council received General Assembly sanction at the end of the year, and the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance for the Economic Development of Less-Developed Countries came into existence.

Participating in the Program and sharing in the special account are the United Nations itself and eight other members of the UN family: the International Labor Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Health Organization, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The last-named agency is, of course, new to the Program and is giving technical assistance for the first time in 1959. The fields of each of the agencies are apparent from their respective titles. Together with the UN, they are prepared to help governments meet almost any kind of economic or social problem conceivable, from the most basic question such as the use of the hoe to the more sophisticated and modern use of radio isotopes.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (Fund)—two other specialized agencies whose services to governments do not quite fall within the definition of technical assistance, but are closely related —co-ordinate their work with the Expanded Program, as do such agencies as United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the UN Korean Reconstruction Agency, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

### SOURCE OF FUNDS

For 1959, some eighty-five governments, members of the UN or one of the specialized agencies, are expected to contribute over $30,000,000 so that we may continue our work this year. This total represents a significant increase over the $20,000,000 pledged by fifty-four governments in 1950–51, but it is still considerably short of the amount which the Technical Assistance Board (TAB) estimates as necessary to meet the most immediate needs presented to the Program.

At a Conference held for the purpose, generally in October of each year, governments make known the sums they are ready to pledge for the following twelve months. The fact that financial support must be renewed on an annual basis and the uncertainty of the amount which will be available from one year to the next accounted for some of the earliest and most acute management problems which faced the Program. The step taken by several governments to announce their pledges for several years in advance and the steady increase in financial support have alleviated the problem somewhat, but year-to-year financing remains inconsistent with the long-term nature of technical assistance.

Funds for field activities are used to the extent of 70 per cent to provide governments with the services of internationally recruited experts. Their assignments vary from a few months to several years. Because of the financial problem which I have just noted, experts' contracts are usually given for only one year and are renewed as their work requires it—and if funds are available. About 20 per cent of the Program's resources are used to provide fellowships for study abroad by nationals of the economically less-developed countries. The remaining 10 or 11 per cent goes for the purchase of a limited quantity of equipment, which is used by experts for demonstration purposes. In general, governments have regarded as most urgent the supply of expert services and fellowship study facilities. What funds remain after these most pressing needs have been met are not sufficient to provide equipment on an adequate scale. The lack of enough equipment has proved a drawback in quite a number of projects.

### GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Although the methods employed in the administrative management and the field operations of the Expanded Program have been modified over the years, in the light of experience, the guiding principles remain the same as the ones set down in our basic resolution: Assistance is given only at the specific request of a government; governments undertake specific obligations in regard to the payment of local costs in connection with the aid they are receiving, and they are further obliged to provide counterpart personnel and facilities so that the work of international experts will be perpetuated after they have finished their assignments; every request for assistance must be justified on the grounds that it will have a direct bearing on the economic development of the country; and, needless to say, the aid given is free of any political consideration.

If there is any doubt of the force which a United Nations resolution can have, it may be well to recapitulate the statistical results nine years after adoption of resolution 222 (IX). The United Nations and the specialized agencies have been able to give at least some assistance to a total of 135 countries. Between mid-1950, when the Program actually started operations, and 1958, over 8,000 men and women have served in the field as experts. In the same period, some 16,000 trainees from the less-developed countries have studied abroad under fellowship awards, with placement facilities arranged by the international organizations.



### ADMINISTRATION AND CO-ORDINATION

Since the Expanded Program was to operate from the outset through the individual facilities of the UN and several specialized agencies, a co-ordinating and executive body was created along with the Program itself. This body—the Technical Assistance Board—consists of a representative of each of the participating organizations, and an Executive Chairman, aided by a small secretariat located at UN Headquarters in New York. The Board itself meets three times a year in New York or Geneva.

The Board ensures that the activities of its individual member organizations, insofar as technical assistance is concerned, are co-ordinated into one comprehensive program. Where the execution of the program calls for common methods of operation, it draws up uniform management procedures for the various organizations to follow; and in matters of concern to all member organizations of the Board, it serves as a central point of contact for governments and for the many programs in and outside of the UN whose interests are closely related: for example, the United States Technical Assistance Program, the Colombo Plan, the Bank, the Fund, and UNICEF.

The creation of the TAB facilitated the solution of many co-ordination problems from the outset. It became clear, however, from the earliest months of operation, that a far more comprehensive system of co-ordination would be necessary if the needs of governments were to have adequate attention.

At first the means was a modest network of field offices of the TAB in those countries where the size of the Program required some immediate means of co-ordination. Each office is headed by a Resident Representative [1] or a TAB liaison officer who may have a deputy but who is most often aided only by a small clerical staff provided by the host government. The Resident Representative serves as a point of contact between the different experts and between the experts and government ministries. He acts on behalf of the Board and of the individual organizations which comprise the Board. He helps to evaluate the effectiveness of the Program in his area and maintains contact with the representatives of other aid programs.

Perhaps his most important function is the role which he plays in helping the government to decide on, and submit, its yearly list of requests for aid. This year, there are thirty-nine TAB field offices spread through Africa, South and Southeast Asia, the Far East and the Middle East, and Latin America. Two of them, in El Salvador and Thailand, are regional in scope. The system can still be called modest in point of the number of Resident Representatives and other field staff involved, but it has grown appreciably in area covered and in stature. I believe that the Resident Representatives have played an essential part in the effective organization of the Program, helping us to respond to the special needs of different countries and helping the governments themselves to make the best use of the aid available.

### PROGRAM PLANNING AND APPROACH

During the course of 1959, our plans call for an expenditure of some $33,000,000 to meet requests which have been received from more than 100 countries and territories. The process by which the Program is planned differs considerably from the practice in the first five years of operation, when

[1] See also Arthur Goldschmidt for a discussion of the role of the Resident Representative, this issue of THE ANNALS, pp. 55–56.

the international organizations and the Board allocated priorities among the flood of requests which came in throughout the year. Now the responsibility for fixing priorities is solely in the province of the requesting government. The Board's task is to decide upon the total amount, out of the annual resources, which can be made available for the provision of technical assistance to each government.

At this date in 1959, the Board has already estimated the total amount for each country for 1960, and governments are deciding on the projects which can be accommodated within the funds expected to be available for 1960. The governments are receiving technical advice from officials and experts of the UN and the specialized agencies and assistance from the TAB Resident Representatives, but the choice clearly rests with the governments themselves. From this emphasis in recent years upon planning and decision by the governments concerned has sprung an increasing awareness of the need for national development plans. Frequently, Expanded Program specialists have been called in to help in the formulation of such plans, particularly in such newly independent countries as Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia.

The number of countries from which expert services, study facilities, and financial resources are drawn provides perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Expanded Program. Experts have been recruited from over seventy countries, largely from Western Europe and North America. At the same time, the contribution in technical knowledge and experience of experts from many of the economically less-developed countries themselves has proved to be an invaluable asset. Frequently, a problem will yield more readily to the attack of an expert informed by experience and understanding of life in a country whose circumstances are not dissimilar.

There are occasions when it is inappropriate to send an expert from, or to place a fellow in, an economically advanced country. Several community development experts have been recruited from India, where self-help work in the village has progressed to a point where a corps of practically trained community development workers and leaders has been built up, some of whom can be freed to assist in other countries. Several years ago the Government of Paraguay asked for the services of a postal administration expert who could help national authorities with the complete reorganization of the postal service. The expert provided under the Expanded Program was a former Director of the Postal Services of Colombia. He had the advantages of speaking a language common to Paraguay and of being familiar with many of the problems which had come earlier to his own country. The expert's successful and productive four-year stay in Paraguay demonstrated the benefit of applying the experience of one less-developed country to another.

The system of fellowship placement also takes advantage of the world-wide network of facilities. Industrial workers from Turkey and Yugoslavia have been trained in factories in England, Germany, and France; young scientists have taken advantage of excellent technological institutes in India; aviation ground crews from Latin American countries have been sent to Mexico by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which has sponsored a civil aviation training center adjoining the Mexico City Airport.

Curiously enough, so telling a use of such a wide range of facilities sprang, in part, from a financial problem which in the early years seemed to threaten the effective execution of the program. In making their financial contributions,



most governments indicated that they were to be in nonconvertible national currencies. Since each currency restricted in this way could not be spent outside the contributing country, the United Nations and the specialized agencies of necessity had to undertake a thorough development of the resources that were available through contributions in more than sixty national currencies. The results have exceeded our best expectations.

### THE HUMAN ELEMENT

Such success as the United Nations Technical Assistance Program has achieved has been due primarily, I believe, to the recruitment of exceptionally able and devoted men and women who have had the patience to apply themselves diligently, yet with imagination, to tasks which are often humble in themselves but which are nevertheless part of a grand design.

It is not difficult to list the qualities that make a good technical assistance expert, but the process of selecting human beings who possess them is far from easy. The mobilization of thousands of experts in almost all the major branches of contemporary knowledge has compelled the UN family of organizations to develop an intricate network of lines of information, extending throughout the world, by means of which the best qualified people can be found. University faculties, professional associations, government departments, the expert knowledge within the specialized agencies themselves, all are pressed into service. So varied and urgent are the requests, that in Europe —which supplies more than half of the total number of experts—many countries have set up central bodies to advise and assist in the search for suitable candidates. When a qualified candidate has been found, he is asked to free himself from other commitments to take on what is most frequently a temporar job, at a possible reduction in his cus tomary salary, in conditions which migh be very strange to him. Given thes considerations, we can be most gratefu for the missionary spirit which makes UN field job attractive to many com fortably placed people.

It is difficult to single out, among th thousands of men and women who hav already taken part in this Program, ex amples of exceptional talent for givin technical assistance. I would certainl have to include a whole team of expert who are living in the scattered village of the Andean Range of South America Living and working at altitudes o 10,000 feet and higher, these me have organized village clinics, carpentr shops, and schools for people who hav rarely before known kindness from out siders. I can also think of the Belgia agricultural economist who was aske by the Government of Haiti to advis on the establishment of credit institu tions and who became the guiding spiri of an entire community. By showin the people how they could market thei crops advantageously, he gave them th added income to improve their way o life—but more than that, he gave them the will and the impetus to do so.

Perhaps the greater number of ou field staff work under conditions whic are considerably less colorful and les adaptable to "story-telling": Nonethe less, from their offices in governmen ministries and research institutes, an from their work in factories and labo ratories they have contributed just a dramatically to the economic growth o the less-developed countries. I have i mind a team of experts from the Unite States, India, Belgium, and the Nether lands who helped the Government o Egypt to establish and operate a pub lic administration institute, where aca demic and practical training is bein provided to Egypt's future civil serv

ants. Another team in the Philippines initiated the idea for, and helped to create, a center for the training of statisticians. Also in the Philippines, a new Forest Products Research Institute, a branch of the University of the Philippines, is training specialists who will know how to take better advantage of their country's forest wealth. International experts, again, were involved in the planning and establishment of the Institute.

These are not undertakings that show immediate measurable results, but other projects do. In Yugoslavia, for example, many thousands of dollars have been saved in dozens of factories and industrial establishments because the management, foremen, or workers picked up suggestions from technical assistance experts or because they brought back new ideas from fellowship training in other countries. In Morocco and Tunisia, more than a million children have been treated for the dreaded eye disease, trachoma, in a five-year campaign directed by the World Health Organization. It is a well-known fact that many millions of children and adults all over the world have benefitted from WHO's work in malaria control, which is part of the technical assistance program.

### DIFFERENT LEVELS OF AID

It is a long step from the average rural village to the inside of a government ministry, but UN experts can be found in both places. Although not foreseen in the first design for a multilateral aid program, a further method of giving assistance was soon developed. Soon after the program was launched, the Government of Bolivia asked for experts who would serve essentially as temporary government officials, helping to formulate policy in such matters as customs and tariffs, banking and credit, acting as executives rather than advisers. The competence of the team members selected, and their impartiality, stimulated interest in other countries. Beginning in 1959, a modest fund has been set aside so that additional help of this kind can be given to several countries which have asked for it. The fund will provide an Operational and Executive Personnel Service. The creation of the Service is one of several recent signs that the United Nations Technical Assistance Program is not resting on its early successes.

Indeed, the results of the first nine years of multilateral aid have stimulated the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council to consider other ways in which present services and facilities can be extended to the peoples of the world. In doing so, both bodies have given expression to the feeling that the capacity of the international organizations to meet the basic needs of many countries is limited chiefly by meager resources and the continuing uncertainty over what funds will be available from one year to the next.

One outcome of this feeling has been the recent establishment of a new UN economic program. The Special Fund, as it is called, will begin this year to provide systematic and sustained assistance in fields essential to the integrated economic and social development of the less-developed countries, and it will work very closely with the Expanded Program. The Special Fund has been designed to undertake a smaller number of projects, but to concentrate greater resources on each, and to commit the resources over a greater period of time than the Expanded Program is able to do. Special Fund projects may take the form of surveys, research, and training institutions; demonstration centers; and pilot projects.

It would be a valuable help to governments in preparing the way for capital investment projects in many different fields.

# The United States Point Four Program—A Bilateral Approach

By ROLLIN S. ATWOOD

ABSTRACT: Bilateral technical co-operation programs are being carried out by the International Cooperation Administration and the governments of approximately sixty-five underdeveloped countries of the world. These are countries which have requested assistance from the United States Government in those activities which are felt to be fundamental to their economic and social development. Programs in these countries are jointly planned, staffed, and financed. The International Cooperation Administration operates through the medium of a United States Overseas Mission, the Director of which reports to the United States Ambassador in the particular country. Programs are designed to demonstrate techniques and train local technicians and administrators. As soon as these objectives have been accomplished, negotiations are initiated to have the projects absorbed as normal functions of the country in question or to be terminated.

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*Rollin S. Atwood, Ph.D., Washington, D. C., is Regional Director for Latin America of the International Cooperation Administration. He has served with the Department of State since 1942. From 1928 to 1942 he was a member of the faculty of the University of Florida. He was elected Honorary Fellow of the Swedish Anthropology and Geography Society in 1937 and was the recipient of the Cervantes Metal of the Instituto de las Españas in 1942. Dr. Atwood is the author of The Localization of the Cotton Industry in Lancashire, England (1930) and co-author of Workbooks in Geography.*

BILATERAL technical co-operation is a concept with roots deep in history. It has been recognized as an integral part of relations between the nations of this hemisphere from the day of their independence. In fact, co-operation played an extremely important role in the achievement, and has characterized the successful maintenance of that precious independence whenever, however, and wherever it has been threatened. For more than fifty years religious organizations of the United States have been sending missionaries to Latin America. The efforts of these people have been largely in the fields of education, health, agriculture, and social and religious services. Many other organizations such as industrial firms, foundations, universities, and the United States Department of Agriculture have conducted projects of technical assistance.

During the period 1939-50, which was the ten year period prior to the launching of the Point Four Program, the United States Government conducted two programs within Latin America. The first of these was known as the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation. This was the first organized and systematic intergovernmental technical co-operation program in Latin America. More than twenty-five government bureaus were members of this Committee and the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs was its Chairman. The Committee began operations in 1940 with a budget of $370,500. This budget increased to about $4,000,000 per year during its last three years, 1948–50. The second program which came into being during this 1939–50 period was the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. The Institute was organized as a government-owned corporation in 1942 and is still in existence today as an integral part of the administrative structure of the International Cooperation Administration.

The present period in the history of technical co-operation began with the President Truman inaugural address of January 1949 which culminated in the Point Four Program a year and half later when Congress passed the Act for International Development. This was the point at which the concept of technical assistance was extended to underdeveloped countries throughout the world. From the inception of Point Four until the present time, the United States technical co-operation program has undergone a number of organizational changes.[1] In October of 1950 the Technical Cooperation Administration was established within the Department of State. In October of 1951 the Mutual Security Act of 1951 was enacted. Under this Act the Office of the Director of Mutual Security was established to co-ordinate military, economic, and technical assistance. In August of 1953 the Foreign Operations Administration was established. The functions of the Mutual Security Agency and the Technical Cooperation Administration were transferred to the Foreign Operations Administration. In July of 1955 the International Cooperation Administration was established within the Department of State. The Foreign Operations Administration was abolished.

The technical co-operation program in Latin America has gradually increased over the years and has embraced new fields of economic and social development. In the early years it was concentrated in the fields of agriculture, health, and education. Today it is operating in additional fields such as transportation, marketing, industry, administrative and management training, labor, housing, community development, and economic

[1] See Philip M. Glick, *The Administration of Technical Assistance* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957).



planning. Over the years it has increased from a program that represented expenditures in the nature of 10 or 12 million dollars, with the United States supplying 90 per cent of the funds, to a program today which calls for the expenditure of slightly less than 90 million dollars, with the United States supplying approximately one-third of this amount. In 1942 the technical co-operation program in Latin America was made up almost entirely of United States technicians. Today it is a program with a total of 28,363 employees of which approximately 1,000 are United States nationals.

## How a Typical Bilateral Program is Developed

The first step is that of a country indicating that it desires United States co-operation in helping to carry out a program to solve its economic and social problems. The International Cooperation Administration staff in the country concerned must first of all evaluate on a continuing basis all aspects of the economic and social development of that country. Special attention is given to the trends which can be recognized in the economic development and the extent to which this development is balanced or out of balance. This is done day by day and week by week and involves daily and weekly staff meetings which include International Cooperation Administration personnel, economic and political officers of the Embassy, and specialized attachés such as Treasury, Agriculture, Minerals, Labor. It also involves close working relations with representatives of international agencies, such as the International Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and specialized agencies of the United Nations. It also includes discussions with business and labor leaders and officials of host government departments and agencies. A running account is kept of the strengths and weaknesses in the economic balance sheet of the country. Emerging problems both long-term and short-term are discussed frankly and fully with responsible officials of the host governments. As the plan and programs of the host government are developed to cope with their national problems, the character and scope of the external assistance required to solve these problems are fully considered. The part which will presumably be played by private enterprise and the external financing by private and public banks or institutions are all carefully evaluated. Following this, a mutual decision is reached as to the type of United States government co-operation required. The national interests and policy objectives of both countries must be accommodated before a joint program is approved. Naturally this type of economic and technical co-operation requires a maximum degree of flexibility and the ability to make long-term commitments. On the basis of the discussions, review and evaluation of the host country's project proposals and additional screening by International Cooperation Administration offices in Washington, a decision is made to implement the projects. New projects are worked into the existing pattern of operations to provide the maximum economic benefits based on mutually agreed upon objectives.

### *Social revolution in less-developed nations*

The underdeveloped countries of the world have been experiencing an extremely rapid economic and social revolution. There are, of course, sharp differences in the scope and rate country by country. The overriding fact however is that economic development is taking place at a rate far beyond the capacity of a majority of the people to understand. As it touches the lives of

more and more people, as it is bound to do, the reactions are personal and perfectly human. People resent the things they do not understand. Economic and industrial development must be accompanied by an understanding of the technical components, but of even greater importance, there must be developed an intelligent understanding and sympathetic appreciation of the human consequences of economic development. People must be able to adjust to the changing environment. They must be able to take part in the process that is going on around them. They must realize that they can achieve their most cherished objectives of a better life without losing freedom, independence, or dignity of the individual. They must come to appreciate through results, not promises, that personal initiative combined with technical skills and hard work will bring better homes, better farms and industries, better education, better health for them and for their children. They must discover that they can do it themselves if the determination and the right tools are available.

For the people of a country to have a feeling of achievement with regard to economic and social development, the country must have a balanced development program. If not, only one group, one segment, or one region will benefit, often at the expense of another.

The growing pains associated with rapid industrialization have served to intensify the zeal of most Latin American governments as well as of most governments in underdeveloped countries in other parts of the world. To expand their own activities, to satisfy the extremely vocal popular demand, the cries of the people have been for more housing, more schools, potable water supplies, and more roads. All too often, however, local budgets have been augmented to build public monuments, to keep up with the Joneses, in terms of tanks and jet planes and to provide liberal financing for facilities which would better have been left to private enterprise. Thus there has been, and will continue to be for some years, a serious shortage of local capital available on a long- and medium-term basis to finance those aspects of the economic and social development which have been seriously neglected.

Technical co-operation which helps to bring about balance in the economic development of a country will be of increasing importance as the industrialization of underdeveloped countries surges forward. An increasing portion of the transfer of strictly technical skills, especially in the fields of industry and mining is being supplied by private enterprise. Training in public administration, management and the accompanying experience in labor management relations is being considered in the bilateral program. We are also working directly with private industry in this important field and an increasing portion of this aspect of technical co-operation is being assumed by industry itself. Continued training and demonstration will be necessary for some time in the fields of health and sanitation, education, agriculture, transportation, and marketing. Those concerned with technical co-operation are giving more attention to improving the training capabilities within each of the host countries. We are also making increased use of trained local personnel throughout the entire program.

On the basis of experience, we should consider as a supplement to technical co-operation long-term loans to finance development in the neglected economic and social fields. The effective results of the total program could be multiplied many fold. It is probably safe to assume that over the next ten years private investment will continue to increase and that more funds will be available for the type of economic development



financed by the Export-Import Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, and the Development Loan Fund.

## ORGANIZATION: FIELD LEVEL

Basic differences between countries as far as desires and needs are concerned give rise to somewhat different patterns of organization and operation throughout the International Cooperation Administration program when looked at on a world-wide basis. In general, however, International Cooperation Administration activities are operated through the medium of what is known as a United States Operations Mission (USOM). The Mission Director in any country operates under the over-all supervision of the United States Ambassador in that country. Within the structure of the Mission, the amount of money available, the number of personnel and the exact operating pattern are determined primarily on the basis of requirements as established in the program planning carried out in co-operation with the government officials of the country in question. If one of the problems being tackled in a particular country is that of agricultural development, there will be an agricultural division in the USOM. This agricultural division will be staffed with those United States specialists and local technicians deemed necessary to deal effectively with the problem. In some instances problems are dealt with which, by and large, are considered of short duration. Where this is the case, instead of having a division set up and staffed to work on the problem, the Mission may have simply a number of specialists in pertinent fields who are brought into the country to work on particular problems. In general, these specialists would work within the framework of the Mission but in very close collaboration with the personnel of the host government agencies involved in the particular problem.

### *The Servicio*

The Institute of Inter-American Affairs worked out a unique system of co-ordination with government officials of a host country. This device was known as the "Servicio." It is probably the most interesting mechanism for international technical co-operation that has as yet been devised. The "Servicio" is a government entity, specifically established by the host government within one of its ministries to administer jointly with United States technicians a group of projects in a major functional field, such as agriculture or public health. The purpose of the "Servicio" is to create a program that will be jointly operated, the two partners being the ministry within which the "Servicio" has been established and the technical mission sent by the United States to work with that ministry. There are great differences in the pattern of operations between "Servicios" in the various countries. Their particular method of operation must of necessity be molded by local conditions, local laws, and the personalities who operate them. The common denominator, however, for "Servicios" in all countries in which this device is used is that of joint operations. The mechanisms or mechanics of getting the job done vary from country to country. However, the underlying concept of joint operations remains the same.

The director of the "Servicio" is at the same time head of the corresponding division within the United States Operations Mission. He is an American and reports administratively to the International Cooperation Administration Mission Director for the country. The "Servicio" would also have a co-director who would be a national of the host country. Personnel within the "Servicio" would be largely nationals with only those

United States technicians needed because of their special skills in training and demonstration activities. The financing of the "Servicio" is handled jointly by the ministry in the host country and the United States Government. Approximately 80 per cent of the costs of operating the "Servicio" are borne by the host government and 20 per cent borne by the United States. At the time a "Servicio" is established there is an agreement between the host country and the International Cooperation Administration Mission. This agreement provides for the type of program to be operated by the "Servicio," the financial arrangement between the host government and the United States Government, and also provides for joint approval of all personnel to be hired by the "Servicio." After a project has been in operation for sufficient time to have accomplished its objectives or to operate "on its own," every effort is made to have that particular project taken over by the appropriate agency of the government of the host country. In other words, when sufficient demonstration work has been done and there are enough local people trained in a particular activity, discussions are entered into between the appropriate ministry of the host government and the USOM to determine just how and when the activity will be absorbed by the host government as a normal part of its operations.

During the years of technical cooperation programs in Latin America there has been a wide variety of projects undertaken and terminated successfully. The manner in which the project has been continued in each country varies with the type of project and the economic and financial conditions in the country. Private enterprise has taken over such projects as could be put on a sound commercial basis. In some cases it is a governmental unit which continues the work. Local governments have initiated the development of local water supply or sewage systems once the techniques have been demonstrated. Vocational school or area health programs are most often taken over by the central government. Agricultural programs are generally taken over by the Ministry of Agriculture. More than 2,000 individual and readily identifiable projects have been turned over or terminated since the Latin American technical co-operation program began in 1942.

## ORGANIZATION: WASHINGTON LEVEL

The International Cooperation Administration is a semiautonomous agency within the Department of State. The operating part of the program is divided into four regional offices: Office of Latin America; Office of Far East; Office of Near East and South Asia; and Office of Africa and Europe. There is a Deputy Director for Operations to whom each of the four Regional Directors report. Within each regional office there are area directors and desk officers. Each area director is responsible for operations within a specific geographical area. His staff is made up of desk officers who are responsible for one or more countries. The desk officer is a key man in the organization in that he must have his finger on the pulse of everything that is happening within the country to which he is assigned. He serves as the connecting link between the Mission Director in the field and the Washington organization. In addition to working on problems which must be dealt with within the International Cooperation Administration organization, the desk officer must maintain close contact with the appropriate offices in the Department of State and with such agencies as the Development Loan Fund, Export-Import Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.



Apart from the operating arm of ICA's Washington organization there are offices for program and planning, technical services, congressional relations, and management. Each of these offices operates under the direction of a Deputy Director who reports to the Director of the International Cooperation Administration, who in turn reports to the Secretary of State.

Co-ordination of the program within ICA is accomplished through the medium of staff meetings. Co-ordination and supervision of field programs is accomplished through correspondence, cables, field travel, and meetings with field people.

## PROBLEMS

The problems with which the International Cooperation Administration has to deal are not all unique to this organization. Many of them are very similar to those faced by most other government agencies and many private corporations. Those problems which are rather unique to the International Cooperation Administration are generated by the complexity of the program.

The ability to attract and hold competent personnel is probably one of the most serious problems. Working effectively in foreign countries requires a degree of competence and a set of personal characteristics not normally required for work within the United States. A technician must have outstanding technical skills, outstanding personal qualities, language ability, unwavering loyalty to the United States Government and its policies, and something of a missionary spirit if he or she is to be effective in a foreign situation. The International Cooperation Administration is constantly trying to attract better qualified people and is intensifying its efforts to up-grade present employees.

Another major problem facing the organization has to do with understanding: on the part of the United States taxpayer, of the people in countries who are not receiving technical assistance but are nevertheless watching what the United States is doing, and of the people in those countries who are recipients of technical and financial assistance. The International Cooperation Administration is constantly striving to improve its methods and techniques and trying to further activities within the underdeveloped countries which will improve the lot of the average citizen. While problems will continue to exist there is much evidence indicating that substantial progress is being made and that in the over-all the bilateral approach to the situation in underdeveloped countries is making substantial inroads on poverty and attitudes.

The community of basic beliefs and common goals which characterize the inter-American family of nations is the strongest asset this hemisphere has. The religious and spiritual foundations which support our political, economic, and social objectives and guide us in the achievement of our common goals—are the surest guarantee of the freedom and happiness of our peoples and the star of hope for millions who seek that freedom and happiness.

# Sino-Soviet Bloc Technical Assistance—Another Bilateral Approach

By Waldemar A. Nielsen and Zoran S. Hodjera

Abstract: Beginning in 1953 after the death of Stalin, the Soviet bloc broke out of its economic isolationism and began a program of aid, trade, and technical assistance directed primarily at the less-developed countries on the periphery of the Communist bloc. This program is moving steadily forward. The bloc technical assistance program is almost entirely on a credit basis, is geographically concentrated in a few key countries, and is smaller in world-wide scale than that of the United States. The organizational and co-ordinating arrangements seem adequate and effective. The methods used in negotiating with recipient governments are skillful and flexible. The bloc is also expanding its program of scholarships for students from non-Communist countries. The general economic effects of bloc aid and technical assistance cannot yet be judged. The psychological effects are more apparent, and this aspect has clearly been give careful attention in the planning and administration of the whole program. The political effects, which are the real objective of the program, are mixed: Growing prestige of the Soviets in some areas, growing skepticism about their purposes in others. But the long run political benefits from a Soviet point of view may yet be considerable.

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*Waldemar A. Nielsen, New York City, economist and political scientist, is Associate Director of the International Affairs Program of the Ford Foundation. He did social science research in the United States Department of Agriculture (1940–43) and in the State Department (1946–47). Mr. Nielsen was Special Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce (1947–48), European Director of Information for the Marshall Plan (1948–52), Deputy Director of the Behavioral Sciences Program of the Ford Foundation (1953), and Assistant to the President of the Foundation (1954–56). He is a Rhodes Scholar and a contributor to national magazines.*

*Zoran S. Hodjera is an economist completing his doctoral studies in economics of underdeveloped areas at Columbia University, New York. He has done graduate work in the Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, and in 1951–52 he was associated with the European office of the United Nations, Geneva.*





During 1958, the program of the Sino-Soviet bloc countries to enlarge and deepen their economic relations with the less-developed Free World countries moved steadily forward.[1] In the twelve month period, 601 million dollars of new credits and grants were extended for industrial equipment and technical assistance. The expansion of trading relationships proceeded in parallel. Trade and payments agreements with non-Communist countries increased from 149 with 28 countries at the end of 1957 to 177 with 31 countries at the end of 1958. Bloc trade promotion delegations were active, particularly in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and well-financed exhibitions of bloc products were to be seen at trade fairs in many countries. Bloc trade with the less-developed countries increased steadily from 1953 through 1957. In the first half of 1958 bloc exports to the less-developed countries continued to rise at a significant rate, but imports showed a decline, reflecting in part the drop in world prices of some of the major commodity components.

An integral element of Soviet bloc credit agreements is the provision of technical assistance, and this aspect has shown a particularly sharp growth during 1958. In the latter half of 1957, 1,585 bloc technicians worked for one month or more on economic assignment in less-developed countries outside of the Soviet sphere. In the last six months of 1958, this total rose to 2,800.[2] Table 1 shows the breakdown by various countries and regions.

[1] Because of the extent to which their economic and technical assistance efforts are co-ordinated as well as because of the political ties which bind them together, the bloc countries in this analysis are considered as a unit.

[2] Totals exclude bloc personnel engaged purely in trade promotion, regular members of embassy staffs, and the considerable number of technicians engaged in military assistance projects; inclusion of the latter would raise the total by another 50 per cent.

TABLE 1—Estimates of Soviet Bloc Economic Aid Personnel in Selected Countries July–December 1957 and July–December 1958[a]

| Countries | Second Half 1957 | Second Half 1958 |
|---|---|---|
| Middle East and Africa | 555 | 1,105 |
| Egypt | 360 | 535 |
| Ethiopia | 0 | 25 |
| Iran | 5 | 10 |
| Syria | 110 | 275 |
| Turkey | 15 | 60 |
| Yemen | 55 | 200 |
| Sudan | 10 | 0 |
| South and Southeast Asia | 915 | 1,635 |
| Afghanistan | 455 | 600 |
| Burma | 60 | 120 |
| Cambodia | 30 | 50 |
| Ceylon | 5 | 40 |
| India | 260 | 555 |
| Indonesia | 105 | 265 |
| Pakistan | 0 | 5 |
| Latin America | 55 | 45 |
| Argentina | 50 | 45 |
| Brazil, Chile, Mexico | 5 | 0 |
| Europe | 60 | 15 |
| Yugoslavia | 50 | 10 |
| Greece | 10 | 5 |
| Total[b] | 1,585 | 2,800 |

[a] Data are based on unclassified information, unpublished as of February 1959, collected by United States Government agencies.

[b] Figures, which are rounded to nearest 5, include only bloc personnel on economic assignment for one month or more during the six-month period.

## Technical Assistance: Soviet Style

As used by the bloc countries, the term technical assistance means essentially the provision of experts or training for compensation from a contracting government, often in conjunction with credit sales of equipment. This type of training and expert assistance resembles

that of Western private firms in connection with construction contracts and the sale of industrial equipment abroad. In the United States technical assistance is normally understood to mean expert advice and training given by one country to another—over and above the ordinary flow of technicians and training growing out of commercial trade and contracts.

In discussing Soviet bloc technical assistance, because of the fundamentally different character of Communist economic conceptions, we are obliged to warp further the meaning of an already somewhat unclear term. In all comparisons of bloc and Western technical assistance it must be remembered that the Western total, to be comparable with bloc figures, should include not only government-financed activity but also that of private foundations and voluntary organizations, plus a very large amount of privately organized commercial exchange.

Because bloc technical assistance arrangements are embedded in the credit agreements between bloc countries and the less-developed Free World countries, the content and characteristics of these agreements must be reviewed in some detail.

Typically, Soviet credits are for a period of twelve years and bear an interest rate of 2½ per cent, which is considerably below that charged by the World Bank and the United States Export-Import Bank. Satellite credits are sometimes for shorter periods and carry interest rates higher than those of the USSR. There is commonly a grace period before repayment begins, and repayment can often be made in goods or in local currency. World market prices are used generally as a yardstick for setting the value of bloc equipment to be delivered, but in the case of services the cost to the recipient country of bloc technicians is considerably below the going rate for comparable experts from the Western countries.

The bloc has concentrated its economic efforts in the Middle East, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia. Within these areas it has been further concentrated: Egypt, Syria, Yemen have received 97 per cent of the economic aid to the Middle East and Africa; Afghanistan, India, and Indonesia have received 82 per cent of the aid to South and Southeast Asia. Although numerous cultural delegations have gone to the countries south of the Sahara in Africa and despite various aid offers, no major assistance agreements in this region have yet been concluded.[3] In Latin America, there have been a number of offers of technical assistance and credit, but until recently activity has been very limited. However, one of the major developments of 1958 was the signing of the first major agreement in the Western Hemisphere, a 100 million dollar credit to Argentina. In Europe, Yugoslavia was involved in a web of economic arrangements with the other Communist countries while a member of the bloc. In 1948, however, the Soviets broke all assistance agreements. In 1956 new credits were extended totalling 464 million dollars of which 300 million dollars have subsequently been indefinitely postponed, canceled, or allowed to expire.

In general, bloc credits have been focused on the financing of specific development projects, particularly in basic industries such as steel and textiles and in overhead investments like irrigation works, power, roads, and communications. To a much smaller extent they have involved equipment for the production of consumer goods and for agricultural development. Table 2 indicates the type and range of projects financed in three selected countries.

[3] Subsequent to the time of preparation of this article, February 1959, important bloc credits to Iraq and Guinea have been reported.



## TYPES OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

In the large majority of bloc credit agreements, provision is made for Soviet style technical assistance, that is the hiring of specialized services by the contracting country. Most commonly, experts are used to assist in preliminary

TABLE 2—SOVIET BLOC CREDIT AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECTS IN THREE SELECTED FREE WORLD COUNTRIES[a]

| RECIPIENT FREE WORLD COUNTRY | SUPPLYING BLOC COUNTRY | PROJECT |
|---|---|---|
| EGYPT | EAST GERMANY | High-tension line |
| | HUNGARY | El Tabbin power station |
| | | Nile River bridge |
| | | Small revolving bridges (3) |
| | POLAND | Oil storage tanks (21) |
| | | Swing bridges |
| | USSR | Atomic energy laboratory |
| | | Oil research plant |
| | | Textile factories (3) |
| | CZECHOSLOVAKIA | Ceramics factory |
| | | Water filtration plant |
| | | Shoe factory |
| | | Cement plant |
| | | Bridges (9) |
| | | Bicycle factory |
| AFGHANISTAN | USSR | Silos, flour mill, and bakery |
| | | Road paving, Kabul |
| | | Asphalt factory, Kabul |
| | | Salang Pass road |
| | | Bagram airfield |
| | | Jungalot machine shop complex |
| | | Physics and chemical laboratory |
| | | Naghlu hydroelectric project |
| | | Pul-i-Khumri II hydroelectric project |
| | | Kabul fertilizer plant |
| | | Herat and Pul-i-Khumri vehicle repair shops |
| | | Mazar-i-Sharif glass factory |
| | | Kabul airport |
| | | Darunta irrigation project |
| | | Sardeh, Palto. and Kharwar irrigation dams |
| | | Oil storage tanks (3) |
| | | Port of Qizil Qala |
| | | Petroleum exploration |
| | CZECHOSLOVAKIA | Jabal-us-Seraj cement plant |
| | | Pul-i-Khumri cement plant |
| | | Kabul brick and tile kiln |
| | | Kandahar fruit cannery |
| | | Kabul and Herat tanneries |
| | | Kabul shoe factory |
| | | Baghlan cheese factory |
| | | Coal mining equipment |

TABLE 2—*Continued*

| RECIPIENT FREE WORLD COUNTRY | SUPPLYING BLOC COUNTRY | PROJECT |
|---|---|---|
| INDIA | USSR | Bhilai steel plant |
| | | Heavy machine building plant |
| | | Powerplant for lignite project |
| | | Korba coalfield development |
| | | Optical glass factory |
| | | Petroleum exploration |
| | | Bombay Technological Institute (partly UN, partly bilateral) |
| | | Oil drilling |
| | CZECHOSLOVAKIA | Sugar refinery, Panipat |
| | | Sugar mill, Assam |
| | | Cement plant, Assam |
| | | Sugar refinery, Madras |
| | | Thermal power station |
| | | Foundry forge project |
| | POLAND | Sugar refinery, Tanjore |
| | | Equipment for manufacture of electric motors |
| | EAST GERMANY | Textile machinery |
| | | Raw film factory |
| | RUMANIA | Petroleum refinery |
| | | Oil drilling |

[a] Source: Unclassified data, unpublished as of February, 1959, collected by official United States agencies.

engineering surveys, to supervise construction, and to direct the installation of equipment. Agreements have sometimes provided for basic resource surveys, the training of operating personnel either in the Free World country or in the bloc countries, economic advisory services, and mineral prospecting.

Scientific and educational facilities have been financed as special projects in a few cases. Among the more important examples are an atomic energy laboratory and an oil research plant in Egypt and an institution for advanced technical training in India. In Burma, the Soviets agreed to build and equip a complete scientific institute. According to a Russian announcement, the project would provide living accommodations for 1,000 students, apartments for the faculty and staff, a 500-seat assembly hall, a 100,000-volume library, reading rooms, restaurant, sports grounds, swimming pool, and 18 fully equipped laboratories.[4]

Because the available data are fragmentary, and because of definitional problems, estimates of the value of bloc technical assistance are necessarily crude. In mid-1958 Joseph Berliner judged the cumulative total, 1953–58, to be in the order of magnitude of 5 to

[4] Izvestia, February 19, 1956, quoted in *Soviet Technical Assistance*, Staff Study No. 7, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, D. C., July 12, 1956.



10 million dollars.[5] Since some forty technical assistance missions had then been identified, he assumed a total of 80 to avoid underestimating, assumed the cost of each to be $100,000, and arrived at a rough figure of 8 million dollars as a basis for his estimate.

If one were to add the value of scientific apparatus and training facilities, the cumulative total would increase by some 3 or 4 million dollars.

A quite different approach would be to calculate the current rate of technical assistance by taking the number of personnel and imputing a value to their services. The figures in Table 1 do not include technicians who worked abroad for less than one month nor do they give extra weight to those working for periods longer than one month. A monthly average of 600 for the most recent period in which data are available would therefore be a conservative estimate. Assuming a minimum direct cost of $500 per month for salary, maintenance and travel, the current monthly rate would approximate $300,000, or $3,600,000 per year. Assuming a monthly value of services at the approximate cost of maintaining an American technician abroad, namely $1,250, the current monthly value of bloc technical assistance would be $750,000 or an annual rate of $9,000,000. The actual cost of these services in local currency to the recipient less-developed countries is probably somewhere between these two extremes.

In summary, the bloc economic assistance effort has clear differences in scope and content from that of the United States government: In world-wide terms, the bloc program is much smaller; it is highly concentrated geographically in contrast to the widely dispersed United States program; it is almost entirely on a credit basis whereas the United States program is on a grant basis; and it is focused on individual industrial projects whereas the United States effort supports general development programs and agricultural development as well.

Important as these differences are, there are other and even more fundamental contrasts in organization, technique, and objectives.

## ORGANIZATION AND OVER-ALL CO-ORDINATION

Since 1953, the Soviet Union has repeatedly reorganized its system for administering foreign aid and technical assistance, each time raising the responsible agency to higher status and more comprehensive authority. At the present time, and since July 1957, such programs are directed by the State Committee for External Economic Relations of the Soviet Council of Ministers.[6] The Committee, which reports directly to the Council of Ministers, includes top level officials and is not a subordinate element of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor of any of the economic ministries. Its operating staff is organized on both a geographic and a functional basis. It probably administers military as well as economic assistance; it has sections for scientific and technical co-operation; it includes several foreign trade agencies which have been transferred to it from the Ministry for Foreign Trade.

In the past, such co-ordination as has been required within the bloc has apparently been handled directly between Moscow and the various agencies of the satellite countries dealing with foreign economic and technical matters. In recent months, however, it appears that plans have been laid for a greater degree of co-ordinated bloc economic policy and operations for the seven-year period, 1959–65. From meetings of the Coun-

[5] Joseph S. Berliner, *Soviet Economic Aid* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p. 46.

[6] *The Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive in the Less Developed Countries*, United States Department of State, May 1958, p. 27.

cil on Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) in Warsaw in late 1958, there emerged reports of extensive discussion of means of creating a single, unified economy in the area,[7] including the concentration of research and development activities and of training activities for scientists and specialists from all countries. Apparently, consideration has also been given to the co-ordination of plans in the several bloc countries in bidding for major contracts for new factories and installations in the less-developed countries.

Although many details of the structure and procedure for planning, co-ordinating, and administering bloc economic assistance are not known, it is clear that essential co-ordination has been achieved and that the arrangements have functioned adequately. The bureaucracy in the USSR and the bloc has been able to act with speed, flexibility, and on occasion, finesse. Co-operation and participation by the satellites has been achieved and political, military, propaganda, and economic policies have been successfully orchestrated.

### TECHNIQUES OF NEGOTIATION

In economic dealings with the non-Communist less-developed countries, the Soviets have largely cast aside traditional methods of diplomacy. Preparatory contacts have taken a variety of informal channels—offers contained in speeches by delegates to the United Nations, in official newspaper articles, in propaganda broadcasts, in interviews at diplomatic receptions, in public letters from Soviet leaders, and so forth. With a fine sense of theatre, the basic negotiations have often been conducted by top Communist officials on state visits abroad. Such visits have often been timed at a moment of emergency in the economy or foreign policy of the recipient country. And in the old tradition of oriental potentates, handsome gifts have frequently been distributed to sweeten the general atmosphere of negotiations—a sports stadium to Burma, autobuses to Afghanistan, tractors to India, jet airliners to Syria and Egypt.

Once preliminary negotiations have been completed, concrete steps to implement the agreement are taken promptly. For example, Bulganin and Khrushchev visited Afghanistan in mid-December 1955 and a general aid and technical assistance agreement was concluded in three days, the Soviet Union pledging a loan of 100 million dollars. By the first of March 1956 the implementing agreement was signed specifying the individual projects to be financed. In May, the first equipment and experts began to arrive.

During the same period, incidentally, Afghanistan decided to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China, began trade negotiations with Czechoslovakia, and joined the Soviet Union in a declaration calling for general disarmament and a ban on atomic weapons.

### LOCAL ADMINISTRATION OF BLOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

In the local administration of aid and technical assistance, the bloc countries follow methods and conceptions radically different from those commonly employed by the American government. First, the assistance is provided on a project-by-project basis. The recipient country is not required to develop a general plan or framework for development in terms of which specific projects have to be justified. Second, bloc negotiators tend to confine their action to the acceptance or rejection of individual project proposals from the recipient country, whereas United States operations missions typically become involved in the whole development planning process. Third, bloc technicians and experts as required are brought in for a specific project and in the great majority of cases remain only for a few weeks. Fourth, they usually live as a group in a location near the project and have little direct contact with their embassy in the country. Fifth, the bloc embassies do not maintain resident staffs of economists and development experts as is the case with American embassies in less-developed countries. Finally, it appears that the bloc countries do not require detailed accounting of the use of funds and comprehensive progress reports.

[7] Fritz Schenk and Richard Lowenthal, "Economic Integration," *New Leader*, January 19, 1959.



### COMPETENCE AND BEHAVIOR OF BLOC TECHNICIANS

From various kinds of evidence—newspaper reports, impressions of American technicians who have worked in the underdeveloped areas, official American reports, estimates of United Nations officials dealing with technical assistance, and statements by representatives of recipient countries—it seems clear that bloc technicians who go abroad are fully qualified in their particular specialties. Here and there, as in the case of a sugar refinery project in Indonesia, there seems to have been some mismanagement. But generally their performance seems to be equal to that of their Western counterparts.

Contrary to some widely circulated reports,[8] bloc technicians on the whole do not seem to have superior linguistic skills. There are exceptions, as in Afghanistan where apparently a high proportion of the Soviet technicians were brought from Turkestan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where languages related to those in Afghanistan are spoken. But ordinarily Soviet technicians are not specially trained in the language of the countries to which they are sent. They generally rely on interpreters and frequently use the Western language which is best known in the foreign locality.[9]

In personal behavior, they have impressed people in the recipient countries as hardworking and serious, even to the point of being dull and wooden in personal relationships. On the whole, there appears to be little contact between the bloc specialists and the citizens of the less-developed countries apart from the work situation.

The evidence available is not conclusive that Soviet technicians have been used for espionage or agitation. On the contrary, although they have probably been expected to prepare the kind of economic intelligence reports which most countries expect of their experts who travel abroad, it seems that the Soviets prefer to leave delicate political functions to professionals.

### SCHOLARSHIP AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES

From a political as well as economic point of view, one of the interesting elements of bloc technical assistance has been the training of nationals from the less-developed countries in schools in the Communist bloc. In part this exchange is related to projects built with bloc credits, as in the case of several hundred Indian engineers and technicians being trained in the Soviet Union for work at the huge Bhilai steel plant. And in part it is based on bilateral educational exchange agreements administered separately from the technical assistance programs.

Since 1954, scholarships in increasing numbers have been offered by the Soviet

[8] E.g., William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, *The Ugly American* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1958), p. 274.

[9] *Soviet Language and Area Programs for Asia and Africa*, Division of Research and Analysis for USSR and Eastern Europe, United States Department of State, unclassified, Aug. 5, 1958.

Union and the other Communist nations. Although there was a generally hesitant reaction when such offers were first made, the rate of acceptance has increased and the number of students from Free World countries going to the bloc for training in 1958 was double that for 1957.[10] By Free World standards, however, the total volume remains small. Foreign students in the Soviet Union in 1958, including those from bloc countries, totaled 15,000, or a little more than ⅓ of the 43,391 foreign students in the United States during the period.[11] Of the Soviet total, it is reported that some 2,000 were from less-developed countries, principally Africa, the Middle East, and Asia; of the United States total, 27,000 came from Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and Africa.

A noteworthy aspect of bloc educational exchanges is the concerted effort made in a few selected countries. The United Arab Republic, where the USSR, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany all made special scholarship offers in 1958, is one focus of attention. Another is Algeria, from which students have traditionally gone to French universities for advanced training. They have experienced progressively greater difficulties as the Algerian war has intensified and the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Communist China have all come forth in recent months with attractive scholarship offers for study in the East.

## Economic, Psychological, and Political Results

Bloc aid programs are only five years old. The bloc countries are still evolving their policies and experimenting with techniques. It is thus much too early to make any definitive assessment of results; but some tentative conclusions can be ventured.

From an economic viewpoint, a few of the projects financed, such as the paving of streets in Kabul, seem to have little more than propagandistic justification. But the great bulk of the assistance has gone for overhead investment and basic industrial projects, which are the economic sectors where the most serious bottlenecks to development frequently are found. These are at the same time the sectors which yield the greatest external economies over the long run and which make possible the most marked increases in productivity. On the whole, the list of bloc financed projects is creditable, and economic benefits to the recipient countries are undeniable. Moreover, given the relatively minor scale of bloc assistance, there is probably not much lost by operating on a project-by-project basis without attempting to fit each action into an overall development plan.

However, because of the enormous needs of Asia and the Middle East for development capital, needs which are compounded by rapid population growth, bloc assistance on the present scale cannot have decisive economic effect. On the other hand, the psychological and political consequences may be considerable. By the very act of providing assistance the Soviet Union and the bloc countries have neutralized the criticism of being indifferent to the needs of impoverished areas of the world, an awkward posture in which their refusal to provide aid prior to 1953 had placed them. Also, at a time of growing Soviet prestige because of industrial advance and military and scientific achievement, foreign economic assistance has added an appearance of respectability and responsibility to the naked fact of power.

[10] *Soviet Bloc Student Exchanges, 1958–59*, Division of Research and Analysis for USSR and Eastern Europe, United States Department of State, unclassified, Nov. 21, 1958.

[11] *Open Doors, 1958* (New York: Institute of International Education, June 1958).



At every step the bloc countries have been alert to the propaganda possibilities of economic assistance and have tailored the terms of agreements to fit local sensibilities and situations.[12] Administrative methods as well have been designed to minimize frictions with the recipient country and to reenforce the theme of "aid without strings." Through extensive publicity, concentration on visible and sometimes spectacular projects, and high geographical concentration in key countries, widespread popular awareness and approval has been created.

Whether more sophisticated leadership elements in the less-developed countries have been equally well impressed is another matter. Within the past year there have been two cases, Yugoslavia and Finland, in which the Soviet Union in headlong fashion attempted to exploit trade and aid relationships for political purposes. Perhaps as a consequence, public figures in a number of the countries which are major recipients of aid have indicated uneasiness about the aims and methods of Soviet policy. In Indonesia, in 1957, parliamentary doubts about the wisdom of accepting further bloc assistance delayed ratification of Soviet aid agreement. Nehru in 1958 for the first time publicly expressed fundamental concern and disagreement with the philosophy of Communism. Nasser in the United Arab Republic in early 1959 began a vigorous roundup of Communist elements.

But such signs of possibly increasing resistance far from cancel the long-range and subtle political gains which the Communist countries may reap. Their aid has been useful in stirring anti-Western sentiment in the Middle East, in embarrassing and diminishing the prestige of pro-Western governments, and in encouraging others to take a more neutral position in the East-West conflict. Their programs are spreading consciousness of Soviet strength and capability, familiarity with bloc equipment, and use of the ruble as an international currency. Hundreds of technicians trained in the bloc countries are returning home each year having acquired in addition to new skills a new ideological perspective. Bloc financed industrial projects in recipient countries have given local Communist party organizations new talking points, new encouragement, new prestige.

The patience of Communist leaders in awaiting long-range rewards is reenforced by deep doctrinal convictions. They believe the present governments in the less-developed countries eventually will be overwhelmed and are convinced that nothing less than Communist regimes with totalitarian methods of rigid planning and compulsory sacrifice by the populations can succeed in producing a rapid rate of development. Second, imbued as they are with Marxist conceptions of the social and political effects of industrialization, they undoubtedly attach importance to the concentration of assistance in the industrial sector in order to encourage the growth of a labor class and trade unions in the less-developed countries which in turn, they are confident, will generate revolutionary pressures.

Given the continuing vulnerability of the less-developed Free World countries, the mixed but still considerable success of bloc aid to date, and the clear capacity of the bloc to extend the scale of such activity in the future, it is likely that the economic front may become more active and important in the next phase of the cold war.

[12] Cf. Waldemar A. Nielsen, "Why We Are Losing the Ruble War," *Harper's Magazine*, September, 1958.

# Program Planning and Development

By Arthur Goldschmidt

Abstract: Program planning and development of technical assistance must take place at the level of the recipient country. Once the resources for technical assistance available to a country are determined, the government itself must identify its needs and establish its priorities—whether the assistance is to come from local, international, or bilateral sources. The "country programing" procedures under which the United Nations Expanded Program for Technical Assistance is established annually have helped to strengthen the program planning machinery of recipient countries. The single purpose, voluntary nature, and multilateral management of the United Nations program make it peculiarly acceptable as an instrument for assisting in creating and strengthening local institutions including ministries and other bodies responsible for planning and programing. The Expanded Program has also been successful in undertaking projects involving several recipient countries in major joint programs. While the United Nations program has an important place in technical assistance, its financing has not kept pace with growing bilateral programs of the United States, the USSR, and other countries. It may therefore be desirable to emphasize the possible role of the United Nations program in the process of development and co-ordination of other technical assistance activities.

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*Arthur Goldschmidt, United Nations, New York, is Director of the Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations, which has succeeded the Technical Assistance Administration of the United Nations. He came to the Administration in 1950 where he was initially Director of Co-ordination and Planning. He recently completed a year's assignment in Iran. Prior to his service in the United Nations, Mr. Goldschmidt had eighteen years of service with the United States Government primarily in the Public Works Administration and the Department of the Interior where he was Director of the Division of Power. He was on the Preparatory Committee and member of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources; a member of the United States Interdepartmental Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy and the Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance; an adviser to the United States Delegation to the Economic and Social Council in 1950.*





## Resources and Requirements

THE * principal resources of technical and professional skills available to the governments of the developing countries are in their own trained nationals. The technical assistance programs, bilateral and multilateral, can only fill the gaps or broaden the base of these indigenous resources, or help to energize and support them. Outsiders can and do create and operate new services or institutions quite separate from any local initiative; but such superimposed interventions are not technical assistance, however useful they may be to the development of a country. Technical assistance consists of helping countries to help themselves.

Because the technical assistance programs provide only a fraction of the technical and professional resources of the developing countries, they cannot be a ready-made import, but must be locally tailored to meet the differing requirements of recipient countries. The programing of technical assistance cannot therefore be a global process of the agencies providing it, but must be an intimate local process of the governments and the institutions receiving it.

There is great variety in the technical assistance from abroad that is available to interested governments. Those that can pay for it can secure the services of a growing number of individuals, consulting firms, and business institutions experienced in providing assistance. Geographically limited multilateral programs such as the Colombo Plan and the program of the Organization of American States are available to their member governments. An increasing number of bilateral programs, variously limited geographically or as to technical or professional fields, are coming into being in addition to the relatively large United States program of technical co-operation. From these resources, and from the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, potential recipients may secure the foreign component of their requirements for technical skills.

The needs for technical assistance in the developing countries are equally varied. The process of economic development is complex and its components are so diverse and interrelated that there are few technical and professional skills not required in some measure by countries seeking to guide or accelerate that process. In each sector of the economy, in each ministry and agency, at various levels in both central and local governments, the development process shows up the need for new skills and new institutions. The process of programing technical assistance, multilateral or bilateral, is the matching of available technical resources to those needs and the identification of priorities in the use of those resources.

In the first ten years of intergovernmental technical assistance to less-developed countries this programing process has occupied much of the attention both of the agencies providing technical assistance and the recipient governments. The United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance has made major contribution to the initiation c strengthening of that process in man of the countries that it has served. Th further extension, development, and in stitutionalization of the work of pro graming technical assistance by recipien countries present the most importan possibility for improving the effective ness of technical assistance, bilateral an multilateral alike. More than this, i can aid in establishing an institutiona mechanism in the developing countrie

* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the United Nations or other members of its secretariat.

for planning and the making of decisions in other areas of their administration of economic development.

### THE PRINCIPLE OF COUNTRY PROGRAMING

It is a basic principle of the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance that the recipient countries themselves determine the scope and shape of the technical assistance provided to them by the nine international participating organizations.[1] This principle is buttressed by three interrelated characteristics of the program: its single purpose, its voluntary nature, and its multilateral management.

The single purpose of the Expanded Program is to help governments help themselves in their efforts at economic and social development. It does not seek to change their political and social institutions; its experts must be chosen "not only for their technical competence, but also for their sympathetic understanding of the cultural backgrounds and specific needs of the countries to be assisted."[2] No expert may engage in political activities. The technical assistance "shall not be a means of foreign economic and political interference in the internal affairs" of the recipient countries. The donor government has no voice in determining how its individual contribution may be spent: "Contributions shall be made without limitation as to use by a specific agency or in a specific country or for a specific project."

The voluntary nature of the program is reflected both in its financing as well as in the expenditure of its funds. The 200 million dollars that governments have made available to the program since 1949 were contributed in amounts and currencies that each donor decided in light of its own estimates of its abilities. Governments also have a voice in determining the availability of any of their nationals as experts or of the use of their facilities for training individuals in their institutions. No assistance is provided to any government except upon its specific request. Within the confines of the amounts available and subject to the limitation imposed by commitments on continuing projects, each government determines each year the scope, shape, and content of its own program. The recipient government, moreover, describes the precise jobs to be done and has a voice in the selection of the experts to do them; it nominates its candidates for fellowships for training and observation abroad; it determines its own participation in any joint activity such as a seminar, study tour, or training center. All assistance to a recipient country must be provided "as far as possible in the form which that country desires."

The multilateral management of the program is perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of the United Nations Expanded Program. While the pledging of funds is undertaken by a special conference called by the 82-member General Assembly of the United Nations, contributions are not confined to Member Governments. Voluntary contributions have been received from eighty-eight governments. Any government that is a member of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies may participate as a recipient.

Governments exercise their responsibility for policy determination and program approval through the 24-member Technical Assistance Committee (TAC), consisting of the 18 members of the Economic and Social Council augmented by 6 members who may be from any other Government Member of the United Nations or one of the specialized agencies "having an important interest in the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance."[3] This Committee is representative of both donor and recipient governments and of all parts of the world concerned with the program.

The members of the staffs of the participating organizations that carry out the program are appointed with due regard to geographical representation. This applies also to the staff of the Technical Assistance Board (TAB), on which each of the participating organizations is represented. There are few countries not represented on the staffs of one or more of these agencies. At this time, the heads of the nine organizations represent seven different nationalities (there is currently one vacancy).

The program itself is fully multilateral in its operations: In 1957 the roster of experts included sixty-seven nationalities, and fellows studied in ninety-three countries and territories. Of the twenty-five hundred experts in the program in 1957 about 24 per cent came from the less-developed areas of the world—Asia and the Far East, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Similarly, study opportunities for more than 2,000 fellowship holders were equally widely distributed; more than 28 per cent of the host facilities were supplied by areas other than Europe, Canada, and the United States.

The strength of the multilateral approach has largely been in this use of the world's resources of profesional skills and training opportunities. It permits a closer alignment of the expert's qualifications to the needs of the country being assisted. But more than this, it involves the recipient countries as donors of assistance as well, making the program a truly co-operative one of sharing the blessedness of giving.

### ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

The principle of country programing makes the United Nations Expanded Program simply a sum of its parts: The various programs that governments themselves determine to be necessary to their economic and social development. But before the recipient governments can establish their programs, the available resources must be divided among them. This is done each year by the participating agencies and their joint body, the Technical Assistance Board, with the approval of the Technical Assistance Committee. Based upon an assumption of the amount of funds likely to be available for the following year, the Board establishes a "planning share" for each of the participating agencies, proportionate to the agency's share of the previous year's program.

Each agency divides its planning shares among the requesting countries. This division is based upon requests received, programs under way, or indications of need. The agency proposals are reviewed by the Board and fitted together to establish targets for each recipient country. The countries are informed of their targets for the following calendar year in May of each year and are expected to plan their programs within the target figure. These programs are transmitted to the Board and the participating organizations by July 1. The country programs are reviewed by the agencies and the Board and consolidated in a global program submitted to the Technical Assistance Committee after the Pledging Conference has established the amount of funds that can be expected to be available. The Committee reviews and approves the program and authorizes allocation of funds to the participating organizations in proportion to their shares of the approved over-all program.

This program exercise provides the

[1] The participating organizations are listed in David Owen's article, this issue of THE ANNALS, p. 27.

[2] This and the following quotations in this and the next paragraph are from Resolution 222 (IX) of the Economic and Social Council.

[3] Resolution 647 (XXIII) of the Economic and Social Council.

basis for initial co-ordination among the participating organizations and for supervision by the Technical Assistance Committee of the fairness of the allocation of resources.

### COUNTRY PROGRAMING PROCEDURES

The recipient governments are assisted in developing their programs by the Resident Representatives of the Technical Assistance Board, the experts, and the mission chiefs or country representatives of the participating organizations in the field, often augmented during the May-June programing period by staff from the headquarters or regional offices of the agencies. Except that they must honor commitments of the agencies continuing from the previous year's programs, the governments may utilize the target figures supplied by the Board without reference to the proposed agency subtotals. A government may utilize all the funds made available to it for one field of assistance and it may ask for experts only or utilize its entire target figure for fellowship opportunities. The participating organizations can and do propose programs, but the government itself disposes.

This procedure, giving the recipient governments unhampered freedom to establish the content of their own programs, grew out of dissatisfaction with the original arrangement under which there was an *a priori* division of resources among the six agencies then engaged in the program.[4]

The original plan of dividing the funds among the agencies was not solely a scheme for meeting the needs of the participating organizations: in part it reflected an earlier assumption—not wholly unwarranted—that balanced development would have to be injected into the program of each country from the outside; that governments of less-developed countries were themselves less-developed and would not always have the capacity to identify their own needs effectively; and that agencies experienced with the problems of development in similar countries would be able more readily to propose practical programs and establish priorities. It was then believed that the fresh view of an objective outsider would be clearer than that of custom-ridden, inexperienced local officials caught in the myopia of their own culture.

There were, however, three basic weaknesses in this view:

The international agencies were themselves too new and their staffs too inexperienced to guide effectively the programs of the countries to be aided.

The recipient countries were often extremely sensitive to outside interference, were not fully convinced of the objectivity of foreign advisers, and were unwilling to agree to programs masterminded from a distance. Paul Hoffman recognized this attitude in his dictum that technical assistance cannot be exported, it can only be imported.

And finally, the processes of development and economic growth are too uncertainly known, the circumstances are too variable and the resources that must be brought into play are too varied to establish precise prefabricated formulae for each country to be assisted.

Paradoxically, it has been largely since the reins of programing were firmly turned over to the recipient countries that the influence of the agencies has been more fully felt. In part, this has been because the agencies are now more effective instruments for program planning: They have nearly ten years of

[4] See the discussion of financing the Expanded Program operations in Rowland Egger's article, this issue of THE ANNALS, pp. 82–83.



experience behind them. Their staffs have worked intimately with their counterparts in many countries. Similiarly, the officials of recipient countries have become accustomed to technical assistance and are more at home with the foreign expert and willing to work with him; they know his values and his limitations. The technical assistance programs, multilateral and bilateral, have made it possible for many of these officials to travel abroad and see their own problems being dealt with in other ways. The program has established a "consumer acceptance" that makes possible a greater degree of agency participation in planning than could be assumed in its early phases. The participating organizations can now transmit successful projects from one country to another for adaptation and can help to avoid initiation of undertakings that have failed elsewhere.

### ROLE OF THE RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE

With "country programming" has come an increase in the number and effectiveness of the Resident Representatives—officials of the Technical Assistance Board whose duties are to represent the Board with the recipient governments and provide co-ordination in the planning and execution of the program. These officials, who are generally assigned to a country for two or more years, become familiar with the workings of the government as well as with the experts and agency representatives. They frequently become key advisers on programs and are an important means of co-ordination between government agencies, with bilateral programs, and between the participating organizations. Their precise role has never been fully defined except in connection with the annual country programing procedure, and indeed it depends in large measure on the individual and upon the relationship that he establishes with the officials of the government.

Resident Representatives of the Technical Assistance Board have been appointed for twenty-eight countries. In addition, regional representatives provide similar services in Southeast Asia and in Central America. The size of the country program and the willingness of the recipient government to provide facilities for the Resident Representatives determine their appointment.

Resident Representatives, unlike the Country Directors of the United States Operations Mission, do not have large staffs working under their direction. At best they may have an internationally recruited deputy and secretary and a small locally recruited staff of clerical and maintenance workers. They do not head a mission to the government, for the experts in the Expanded Program are not considered a mission. The office of the Resident Representative is generally more nearly an extraordinary extension of the government. Although the Resident Representatives are usually included in the diplomatic lists, they are not diplomats; their governmental contacts generally reach to areas of government far below and beyond those usually touched upon by diplomats.

In their day-to-day operations, Resident Representatives may have the close co-operation of agency representatives in the country. Such agency representatives have been appointed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in some countries to provide a measure of local oversight and co-ordination of the programs of these agencies. The Resident Representatives are also in touch with the experts assigned to the country, but they are not generally in the chain of command over such experts. They may furnish experts

with office facilities, stenographic services, or transport where these are meagre in the government departments, but in general the experts under the Expanded Program are scattered among the government agencies and working with their local counterparts in government offices.

The key aspect of the Resident Representative's assignment comes in the programing of the expanded program funds available to the government. The country programs must be drawn up by the requesting government "in consultation with the resident representatives." [5] Here he assists in resolving the conflicts between government departments and between participating organizations. He must assist in seeing that the limited resources available to the government are used in a manner to meet the most urgent needs and to assure that all interests concerned with technical assistance are given a hearing in determining priorities. Agency representatives and experts may become partisans of the departments of governments with which they work or of fields of interest with which they are concerned; the Resident Representative is expected to remain the impartial referee.

### GOVERNMENTAL MACHINERY

The most far-reaching consequence of country programing has been its role in the development within recipient governments themselves of the necessary mechanisms for channelling and screening their requirements and establishing priorities. Departments of governments can no longer apply directly to the participating organizations for the assistance they want, but are required to put forward their requests as part of the country program. This calls for a measure of consultation and co-ordination that is rare in most governments, developed and underdeveloped alike. While early in the program recipient governments sought to develop some organized approach to channelling technical assistance requests, country programing has resulted in the strengthening of this process and in broadening the scope of the governmental units to which it is assigned. In a recent review [6] of this aspect of the program, central planning and co-ordination units of thirty-eight of the recipient governments were studied in some detail. Twenty-three of these had been merged with the highest economic policy-making bodies of the government, either interministerial committees or the Prime Minister's office or special ministries for economics, planning, or finance that are responsible for over-all economic planning.

Country programing has not necessarily created the central planning and co-ordinating units, but there is little doubt that it has greatly strengthened them. In fact, some of the governments themselves have credited the program with this result by stressing that the "country programming procedure stimulates closer cooperation and teamwork among their own ministries in promoting national development activities." Moreover, experts provided by the Technical Assistance Program have been used to strengthen these and other central planning and co-ordinating units. The Program has assisted nearly forty governments in the process of planning or programing economic development—in a majority of cases in creating or developing the agencies or institutions necessary to the process.

### PROGRAM CO-ORDINATION

Of the thirty-eight central programing units for channelling and co-ordinating requests for assistance from the Expanded Program studied, twenty-four were also responsible for reviewing and formulating requests involving other technical assistance programs. This is perhaps the most significant development in co-ordination of the multilateral and bilateral programs. Since the inception of the Expanded Program, which coincided with the beginning of the Point Four program of the United States, the importance of co-ordination has been emphasized. But complete exchanges of information between the multilateral program and the United States and Colombo Plan programs, supplemented by frequent consultations, could not prevent duplication and overlapping in these country-oriented programs. Co-ordination, like program planning, cannot be achieved effectively anywhere except at the level of the recipient government.

As additional governments have taken up the task of providing assistance on a bilateral basis, co-ordination and consultation become more difficult as well as more essential. The geographical scope of bilateral technical assistance has been significantly increased in recent years. While world-wide interest has been centered on the initiative of the USSR in technical assistance, the Norwegian, French, West German, Italian, Israeli, Japanese, and other efforts are relatively unknown. This increase in the opportunities for help from bilateral sources over those available ten years ago makes it increasingly important, from the standpoint of donor governments as well as recipients, that the co-ordinating mechanisms and procedures be strengthened to provide a prudent and orderly use of available resources.

The experience of the multilateral program in the creation and strengthening of the governmental agencies necessary for program development and co-ordination suggests a possible role for the United Nations program in meeting the growing problem of providing more effective co-ordination of technical assistance programs generally. The Expanded Program operates in substantially all of the countries concerned with technical assistance. Its limited resources as well as its terms of reference make it no competitive threat to the large United States and USSR programs or those of the many other governments providing bilateral technical assistance programs. Because it is operated and managed on a truly multilateral basis, and controlled by an international body consisting of donor and recipient governments alike, it enjoys a special status. This is reflected in its use by recipient governments for projects of a nature not often considered for bilateral handling. Economic planning and programing, organization of government agencies, customs matters, and other projects touching on the sovereignty of governments have been successfully prosecuted under the United Nations program. Complex intergovernmental projects have also been undertaken effectively. The program for instance has brought the five Central American governments together for planning their economic and industrial development: This has involved working on joint problems of transport, industrialization, public administration training, and the problem of a common market with the help of United Nations experts.

The use of the international agencies in the planning and co-ordination of a program involving bilateral assistance has had an auspicious beginning in the joint project for planning the development of the Lower Mekong River in Southeast Asia. Here the governments of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, through which the Mekong flows, with the guidance of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, have turned to the United Nations and the specialized agencies to assist in assuring that the bilateral assistance that has

[5] Resolution 542 (XVIII) of the Economic and Social Council.

[6] Annual Report of the Technical Assistance Board for 1957, E/3080 (New York: United Nations, 1958).

been offered by the United States, French, Japanese, New Zealand, Canadian, and other governments would be put to use under a plan and schedule worked out by experts supplied under the Expanded Program. This plan was initiated by an international mission headed by Lt. General Wheeler, former head of the United States Corps of Engineers, together with engineering colleagues from Canada, France, Japan and India, who outlined the work needed to be done effectively to plan the development of the Mekong. Further international studies will fill out the plan. Meanwhile, however, bilateral agreements have been negotiated to undertake various phases of the plan. An American engineering team is undertaking the basic hydrologic studies of the main channel. Japanese engineers are studying the principal tributaries. French equipment and New Zealand boats are being furnished under their respective contributions.

It was originally assumed by its founders that the Expanded Program would grow to become the major resource of technical assistance for the less-developed countries. United States policy, based upon that assumption, has considered its bilateral program to be a temporary one to be eliminated as the international program grew. But the multilateral program has not grown as fast as bilateral programs, even with the addition of the Special Projects Fund, which will greatly increase the multilateral resources available in 1959. It may well be that a more realistic view of the future role of the multilateral program may be found in emphasizing its experience in the process of program development and co-ordination, as a means of assisting the recipient governments in establishing priorities and utilizing the great bilateral resources available to them. Such an additional responsibility should not diminish the use of the multilateral program for direct technical assistance, especially for those assignments for which multilateral aid is singularly suited. The increased use of the Expanded Program in program development and co-ordination would necessarily have to grow out of a broadened awareness on the part of the recipient governments of the important role of assistance in the very process of receiving assistance. It would also depend upon the willingness of governments providing bilateral assistance to accept fully the practice as well as the principle of co-ordination.

# The Choice of Instruments for Technical Co-operation

By PHILIP M. GLICK

ABSTRACT: The choice of suitable instruments for giving technical and economic assistance is crucial to the success of the bilateral and multilateral programs. Here, choice is controlled not alone by the needs of the immediate task but also by the characteristics of public administration in less-developed countries and by the current status of agriculture, industry, health, and education. In the last eighteen years the programs have developed eleven instruments. Classified by principal function, these are: (a) preparation for program planning—the economic survey; (b) advice and instruction within the host country—the advisory mission; the visiting professor; seminars, conferences, and workshops; the training center; (c) fellowships for study and training abroad; and (d) joint operations—the Servicio; the operating mission; the university contract; other private contracts; the proposed international administrative service. The instruments for joint operation must form the backbone of the co-operative programs because technical assistance, to be effective, must go beyond advice and demonstration. Only in joint operations can the introduction and the administration of the new technology be adequately taught. Even without joint operations the programs can perform many useful tasks—but that is to fall short of the announced goal: Aiding the host countries to develop economies of self-sustaining growth.

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*Philip M. Glick, J.D., Washington, D. C., is a member of the law firm of Dorfman and Glick. During 1948–53 he was General Counsel of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs and the Technical Co-operation Administration, United States Department of State, which then administered the United States bilateral technical assistance program. Earlier, he served as Assistant Solicitor, United States Department of Agriculture, and then as General Counsel, successively, of the War Relocation Authority and the Public Housing Administration. In 1953–55 he was Visiting Professor of Economic Development and Cultural Change at the University of Chicago. He is the author of The Administration of Technical Assistance (1957).*

## THE PROBLEM OF CHOICE

NO manufacturer would attempt to fasten the aluminum plates of an aircraft with needle and thread. The devising of instruments suitable to their compound tasks is equally important in the bilateral and multilateral programs for assisting the less-developed countries to build national economies of self-sustaining growth.

For this purpose, the choice of instruments is controlled not only by the nature of the immediate task to be performed but also by certain environmental factors, such as the basic conditions of life and economic activity; the current status of agriculture, industry, health, and education; and the characteristics of public administration.

The average life expectancy is little over thirty years in the countries now generally described as underdeveloped. The incidence of preventable diseases is high. The average working life of those who do attain the productive ages is low because high death rates and disease hamper productivity. The average food supply for each individual is only 350 calories per day above the life-sustaining minimum.

The average annual per-capita income is less than $150. The levels of industrial investment are low, and only small amounts of mechanical energy are available to supplement the energy of human arm and back. Transportation and communication systems are gravely inadequate.

Agricultural income and crop yields are low. Planting, tillage, and harvesting practices of hundreds of years ago still largely prevail. Until recently many of these countries have had only rudimentary beginnings of national public health programs. Rural schools in these primarily agricultural countries have suffered from neglect. Three-fourths of the population ten years of age and over are illiterate.

The governments in these countries, with scattered exceptions, are unstable and highly centralized; political democracy is weak; there is a serious shortage of trained administrative personnel; government officers work part time, at low salaries, and little is expected of them. Governmental appointments scarcely pay lip service to merit principles; petty corruption in government office is frequent, and major corruption not rare; distrust of government officers has developed monumental complexities in paper work and procedural formality; and both academic and in-service training in administration is new, abstract, fumbling.

These facts mean more than that the poor countries are very poor. They mean that the instruments selected as the means to assist governments and peoples living and functioning in such social and economic environments to "move into the twentieth century," to develop strong and sufficient growing national economies, must be adequate to solve a problem of that nature, scale, and complexity.

Clearly, the task is not just to provide additional capital for investment because there are few enterprises to receive it, few skilled people to make the management decisions, few trained and healthy workers. New institutions must be created, new processes started, the basic "social capital" of schools and hospitals, transportation and communication, governmental skill in maintaining law and order, must itself be developed. Only against such frank definition of the problem to be solved can we properly measure the adequacy of the instruments to be employed.

Moreover, each of the country to be aided has its own history, traditions, and values, its own culture pattern. The ability of the visiting technician or administrator to work successfully with his counterparts in the host government will depend upon his understanding sympathetically the society in which he has agreed to work; its attitudes toward work and leisure; the nature of its belief in progress; its belief or disbelief in the dignity of manual labor; its conception of the importance of machines and creature comforts; its notion of the proper role of government; and its social definition of the proper spheres and activities for its racial minorities, white-collar workers, women, and children. The myriad relationships among these beliefs, practices, and values, despite their many internal inconsistencies, give them a tough, coherent pattern. Change is not easily introduced or happily welcomed.



## THE AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS

In the years since 1940, the bilateral and multilateral programs have developed, between them, ten useful instruments, and the Secretary General of the United Nations has recently proposed an eleventh. The fashioning of eleven instruments in eighteen years is a good record. In fact, referring to each as an instrument is oversimplification; each is a method followed with variations. This section will attempt to describe these instruments. An evaluation of their comparative effectiveness will follow. Having made this the subject of a chapter in a book,[1] I need give no more here than a short summary.

### *The broad economic survey*

The United Nations introduced the survey report as the basis for formulating a national program of economic development in 1949, in Haiti, and later prepared similar reports for Bolivia and El Salvador. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development adopted the device in publishing such a survey for Colombia in 1950. By common consent such reports are now made only by the Bank, which carefully includes representatives of the bilateral and multilateral programs on the survey teams. The Bank reports now serve to guide not only action on loan applications but also the planning activities for technical and economic assistance.

An economic survey, by its nature, cannot do any of the things that need to be done to stimulate economic growth. Its purpose is to establish a reliable basis for enabling host country and co-operating agency to determine what technical and economic assistance the country requires and is ready to use and what tasks should be given priority. For example, the Bank's report on Colombia discussed the standard of living, national income and product, capital formation, agriculture, industry, fuels, transport, health and welfare, electric power, housing, education, public finance, monetary policy, and organization for planning and administration.

When a survey has been made, the ones who have learned most from it are the members of the survey team. This has led to the growing practice of including in these teams leading officers of the government for whose primary benefit the survey is made.

### *Technical missions: advisory and operating*

The best known instrument, one used in all the programs, is the technical mission. There are two broad types, the advisory and the operating mission; each has had a quite different history and is likely to have a quite different future.

At first, advisory missions took the form of a group of men who studied, say, a government department and sub-

[1] *The Administration of Technical Assistance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), Chap. II, p. 51.

mitted a report with recommendations. Several years of the frustrating experience that such reports tended to be profoundly ignored has created a shift within the technique of the advisory mission from the preparation of studious reports to the assignment of advisers who confer frequently with those to be advised, so that recommendations may be given in small doses, in varying degrees of formality, over a period of time. (There is little excuse for the fact that the United Nations program after eight years of such frustration still not infrequently sends an advisory mission to prepare a lengthy report.)

Even when permitted to advise in continuous small doses, the adviser has little organizational maneuverability. He finds it difficult to establish an effective base from which to secure access to the controlling facts and influence the taking of the necessary action at the proper time. It is folk wisdom that it is not easy to give or take advice. There is a high incidence of discouragement among members of advisory missions. A surprisingly large number take refuge in bitter criticism of the host governments.

And so, although no one ever formulated the notion of an operating mission that would be free of such defects and would supersede the advisory mission, many missions took on operating responsibilities, sometimes at the urgent request of the host government, sometimes by almost imperceptible development out of the mission's advisory work. The essence of the distinction is that the operating mission joins with the host government in the direct performance of the defined task.

### *The advice and instruction tool*

The visiting professors, training centers, seminars, and conference techniques are an application to international co-operation of long established educational methods. The procedure takes several forms but consists essentially of sending people who neither advise nor join in operations, but teach. They may teach as a visiting professor in a university or research center, or participate in seminars or "workshops" to which government personnel and others go for intensive periods of study. Or they may serve for short or long periods as faculty members in a specially organized training center.

These methods are little used in the United States bilateral program but are frequent in those of both the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS). The regional training center is the major instrument in the OAS program.

### *Joint operation through a Servicio*

The great bulk of the work performed in the bilateral program in Latin America (and in a few countries in the Eastern Hemisphere) is done through the Servicio. This is a new type of public agency, invented by the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (US) and the Latin American Governments. It is used by none of the multilateral agencies.

The Servicio is an entity specially created by the host government within one of its ministries, by statute or executive decree, to administer jointly with foreign technicians a group of projects in a major functional field, such as agriculture or public health. Its essential purpose is to bring into existence a program that will be jointly operated, the two partners being the ministry and the technical mission. Behavioristic in their educational psychology, the creators of the Servicio believed they could effectively teach and demonstrate only by working with their hosts daily, over a long period, in the same organization, on tasks they could share. Less than that, they believed—advising them, showing them how, but not doing it with them in a joint enterprise—would be to "plow the sea."



Some forty-two Servicios are at work in Latin America alone. They differ greatly in their pattern of operations, being necessarily molded by local conditions, local laws, and chiefly by the personalities who operate them. There is a long distance, which the Servicio tries to bridge, between the formulation of a good idea and its translation into a living institution in which a trained body of men perform tasks they understand, with suitable tools, on a practical time schedule, to reach objectives agreed upon.

The theory of the Servicio, from which, in practice, many Servicio directors frequently fall away, calls for joint operations from beginning to end. To promote such union, the technical mission relies upon two requirements: Each project in the program must be agreed upon by the host minister and the head of the United States mission, and all projects are to be financed out of a joint fund made up of local currency contributed by the ministry and dollars contributed by the mission. The right to exercise a joint voice in administering all activities is almost literally "purchased"—by each partner.

To promote the freedom of action which the Servicio must enjoy to enable it to introduce new administrative patterns, the intergovernmental agreement to create each Servicio specifically provides that it shall not be bound by the rules and procedures of the parent ministry, but shall establish such arrangements and controls as the minister and the Servicio director (nearly always the head of the United States technical mission) shall jointly devise. This freedom carries a correlative danger; it opens the door to so extreme a degree of autonomy for the Servicio that the ministry may be unable to learn anything from Servicio operations. It also opens the door, where the members of the mission are impatient for results and forget that theirs is not to do but to teach by doing jointly, to the Servicio's becoming a competitor of its own parent ministry.

Successful operation of so daring and subtle an administrative instrument requires broad delegation of authority from the Washington headquarters to the top United States officers of the Servicio. Such delegation has in fact been alternately granted and recalled, and yet the Servicio cannot achieve true mutuality without it.

As soon as competent national officers are available to serve as co-directors of Servicios with their United States counterparts, such co-directorships should (I believe; but the point is in controversy among students of the Servicio) be established. The experience of Servicio Especial de Saude Publica (SESP) in Brazil demonstrates this, and the case is strengthened by the less happy experience of the public health Servicios in Mexico and Uruguay which failed to appoint co-directors when the situation became ripe.

### *The university and other private contracts*

Three types of university contracts can be identified. The earliest ones did little more than "borrow" university personnel for duty overseas. A second type is a contract under which the university assumes responsibility for the administration of a defined segment of a country program, not always an educational activity. The third type, which carries exceptional promise for the future, establishes a university-to-university relationship under which a United States university undertakes to work directly with a university in the host country to improve research and educational practice.

The late Dr. Henry G. Bennett, first Administrator of the Technical Coopera-

tion Administration, was the father of the interuniversity contract. He saw in it an instrument through which the Land-Grant Colleges, in particular, could assist universities in the less-developed countries in the trilogy of functions that has become characteristic for our Land-Grant Colleges: agricultural education, experiment stations, and extension.

Some troublesome problems are emerging. The universities tend to confuse the three types of contracts described and wish to believe that they are merely receiving a grant from the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) to finance educational work overseas. ICA today probably attempts too much supervision of the university-to-university contracts and too little of the other varieties of college contracts. In turn, the universities too frequently assume these difficult responsibilities casually, fail to see the vast difference between campus activities and international technical assistance, and fail to make the whole set of institutional resources available to support the faculty members sent abroad.

The International Cooperation Administration (US) makes many contracts with individuals or firms to enable them to provide new technical, engineering, or management services for a fee. The multilateral agencies almost never use this instrument. These contracts sometimes cost more than the alternative of recruiting government personnel, but they give the program additional administrative resources. Skilled persons may sometimes be employed by contract who would refuse government employment. Many private firms can initiate operations more rapidly than the government. And there are places where technical assistance from a private source, even when financed by the United States, is more acceptable than direct United States Government participation, as in some of the dependent territories. The same preference has been shown in certain sensitive operations, as in helping a government to formulate currency-exchange regulations or to administer supervised agricultural credit.

*Overseas fellowships*

Fellowships for training and study overseas is the oldest of the instruments, and yet the least developed of them all, and the least well used. Training is, of course, the overriding objective of all technical assistance activities, whether in making surveys, in technical missions, in Servicios, or under private contracts. The local training in many cases, however, needs supplementation from a fellowship for study abroad.

Bilateral and multilateral agencies alike use this technique and alike are struggling with the problems of selecting fellows who can make specific contributions to developmental needs, of devising solutions to the difficulties raised by language and cultural differences, of finding instructors who can translate the technology of a rich country into forms assimilable in a poor country, of persuading the mother countries to make suitable use of the trainee's new skills on his return.

*An international administrative service*

In May 1956, Secretary-General Hammarskjold made his first plea for creation of a new international civil service of officers who could serve as "public officials integrated in the national administrations of [the less-developed] countries while maintaining their international status." The suggestion has since been detailed and was approved by the General Assembly late in 1958. It will provide specialists to perform duties of an "executive or operational" character within the service of the government of a less-developed country. They will be more than advisers, they will exercise authority and carry responsibility.



## THE CHOICE OF PROPER TOOLS

The available instruments can be classified in various ways. The following fourfold grouping emphasizes the purposes for which they are suitable: (a) preparation for program planning—the economic survey; (b) advice and instruction within the host country—the advisory mission; the visiting professor; seminars, conferences, and workshops; the training center; (c) fellowships for study and training abroad; and (d) joint operations—the Servicio; the operating mission; the university contract; other private contracts; the proposed international administrative service.

In many countries the programs are sufficiently large and varied to call into play all these instruments. Those who ponder the organization of technical co-operation within a country should understudy the orchestra conductor. They will need to control both volume and balance, and they must be able sometimes to call on the string instruments and sometimes on the brass.

But they must not procrusteanize. The authors of a new project need to cast it into a form molded around the specific needs being addressed—as these are shaped by the characteristics of country and locale—and not simply into the form of one or another of the devices already developed. The emphasis should not be on uniformity; the needs are diverse.

One way to stimulate the invention of better methods is to see the comparative advantages and disadvantages of those in use.

Advice and teaching, both within the host country and abroad, through classes and a variety of informal ways, are both indispensable and insufficient. Technical co-operation must go beyond advice and instruction. It must, through various methods of joint operation, build new institutions that actually use the new technology for economic development. The four or five instruments through which such operations may be carried on must be seen, then, as the backbone of a technical co-operation program. They are the instruments that must be relied upon to do most of the work.

A number of persons can be exposed to the new technology through advisory missions, training grants, visiting professors, and training centers. But the purpose of technical co-operation is broader than that. It is comforting to contemplate how many villages have been given their first medical center in these programs, how many plows have been introduced, how many individuals have had their horizons broadened. Yet, such serendipity is self-deceptive. The responsibility these programs have assumed is not just to scatter good works in isolated places, however intrinsically worth-while, but to spark and fuel the growth to vigor of entire national economies.

If, under the prevailing conditions already described, the programs are to succeed in introducing technological change, they must release the capacities of the more competent national personnel by lifting the smothering effect of the prevailing environment. This will take more than teaching and advice.

The budding science of government administration may borrow knowledge here from physics and biology. They have developed the concept of "the critical point," defined as the point at which nature takes on new patterns of behavior. The critical point at which water ceases to behave as a liquid and begins to behave as a gas is reached only at a given temperature under given barometric conditions. It is not too much to say that the history of the

technical co-operation programs has already demonstrated that government and other institutions in an underdeveloped society may be brought, through advice and demonstration, to approach the critical point at which they will undergo institutional change, but they can be brought to arrive at it only through our joining in conducting with them operations in the course of which new ways of practice become habitual through frequent performance.

*The Servicio: assets and liabilities*

Thus far, the Servicio has proved the strongest of the operating instruments. It assumes responsibility for getting a number of things done, and in the process it demonstrates and trains. It can use the services of both specialists and generalists, technicians and administrators, and many junior officers. It can establish its own regulations for personnel, fiscal, and other transactions and thereby demonstrate what improved public administration can contribute to economic development. It can combine long-range planning with short-term adjustments to emerging problems. It can induce increased expenditures for desirable purposes by the host government. It creates an administrative environment in which good work habits rub off onto all who are associated in the enterprise.

On the other hand, the Servicio has a built-in tendency to become dominated by the foreign technicians, to by-pass the ministry of which it is a part, and to become an enterprise competitive with the ministry. Only continuous vigilance and a strong sense of its purpose can protect it against these pitfalls. Some governments are reluctant to establish new Servicios (in a few cases, to continue some now operating) because of this built-in tendency and in part because the Servicio necessarily gives the visiting technician so much of a responsible voice in administration. In many situations, therefore, an operating mission will be acceptable where a Servicio may be unwelcome. Where the government already has substantial programs under way, it may be impossible to establish a Servicio without creating antagonisms and administrative complexity. The Servicio is never suitable for small or short-term projects alone. It is appropriate only where a broad operating program is required. Similarly, it is never suitable for regulatory or police programs. It is not true, however, as some maintain, that the Servicio is suitable only in very backward countries. One of the most successful Servicios is Brazil's public health Servicio, SESP. In fact, where the country is so backward that it has few competent nationals who can share the higher responsibilities with their visitor counterparts, the Servicio tends to become too much of a United States directed operation. It will function much better where nationals can gradually take over the more responsible positions, including the directorship.

The operating technical mission is a simpler device than the Servicio, suitable for less complex operations. It has less tendency to degenerate into a purely United States operation. It can be adapted to the performance of many necessary tasks even where the host is already doing much on its own. It has, however, less financial and procedural freedom and less power to induce host government financial contributions. It is less suitable for large operations, can less readily find a place for junior foreign technicians, and is more at the mercy of instability in the host government. The Servicio is a specialized form of the operating mission.

The greatest value of the university contract is in the establishment of a university-to-university relationship in which it can help improve the research and teaching practices of foreign universities. These relationships also broaden United States popular understanding of foreign countries and improve the training facilities within the United States that can serve foreign trainees. Some university contracts, however, have called upon educational institutions to give direct assistance to other governments on problems wholly outside the experience and skills of an educational institution. An operating mission or a Servicio would have been a better instrument in many such cases.

Similarly, other government-financed private contracts can supplement government personnel with skills not otherwise obtainable. In many cases a host government will prefer a contract with a private firm, because of the prestige many of them enjoy, or because of the activity's sensitivity.

All these instruments are likely to work more effectively if at least one Servicio is functioning in the country. Acting on behalf of the country director, it can give administrative service to all the visiting technicians, short-term and long-term. The country program can thus enjoy a hard core of competent continuous administration on which all personnel can lean.

The United Nations program does not use the Servicio device, but it can. That a multinational team can administer an operating program is proved by every specialized agency. The crux here is the shortage of UN economic aid funds; without joint financing there is no hope of winning acceptance of joint administrative control. But the new Special Fund and the proposed International Development Association promise to make such funds available. There is, however, no need for the United Nations to copy the Servicio; the kernel is the idea of joint operation, and the United Nations may well be able to devise a more successful technique for that purpose.

Concerning the new international administrative service, one must wait and see. It differs sufficiently from the only partially successful earlier United Nations experiment in Bolivia to carry a warm promise of achievement.

## CONCLUSION

We have been talking of the methods of organizing the flow of technical and economic assistance as the instruments of such aid. In a larger sense, the entire program is but an instrument. In emphasizing the importance of the choice of proper tools, we must avoid the fallacy of making that choice seem to be the only, or even the most important, decision to be made. International technical co-operation cannot succeed without adequate program planning, without appropriate administrative organization in headquarters and field offices, without adequate funds—including large doses of investment capital timely applied—without highly competent culture-adaptable personnel. But even if these other fundamental needs are met, the program's administrators must choose operating instruments that carry a cutting edge.

# The Government Contract as an Administrative Device

By Henry Reining, Jr.

Abstract: A considerable fraction of the United States technical assistance program is carried out by contract. Profit contracts are traditional with the government. Contracts with voluntary organizations are rooted in religious missions and war relief. University contracts are new but have quickly reached considerable proportions. The typical university contract is for a term of three years and is related directly to an institution in the host country with the United States Government acting as a third party. There have been many problems with these contracts but many adjustments have been made by the International Cooperation Administration. An Office of Contract Relations has been created, policies adopted, a manual and an illustrative contract published. Within that Office, a basic division has been made in the handling of profit and nonprofit contracts. Security clearance, an unsympathetic Congress, understaffing within the ICA itself, and inadequate opportunity for preparation to enter upon contracts and once in, to study and plan prior to commencing operations, are among the remaining problems. The universities on the whole have done well, but there have been failures. Co-ordination of contract and Mission efforts in the field has been a continuing problem, but have been considerably ameliorated recently. The balance sheet shows that there has been profit for all concerned. Finally there are presented ten operating assumptions for the newcomer to the field.

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*Henry Reining, Jr., Los Angeles, California, is an experienced contractor with ICA. He is currently managing two contracts at the University of Southern California as Dean of its School of Public Administration. This past summer he completed a survey for ICA as to management education programs in Brazil, where he acted as a member of the first UN professor-consultant team to help establish the Brazilian School of Public Administration, 1951–52. Other foreign assignments have included working with the University of Michigan contract at the University of the Philippines in 1954. He was for ten years Educational Director of the National Institute of Public Affairs in Washington, D. C. He has been with an industrial consulting firm in New York and has acted as a top staff member of the Port of New York Authority. A number of local, state, and national consulting assignments have included a survey of Boulder City, Nevada, on the basis of which a municipality has been created separate from the Hoover Dam operations. He is President of the Mangore Corporation.*





One third to one half the total technical assistance program of the United States is carried on by contract. Strangely enough, little has been said in the literature of foreign aid on the contract as a device. There has been only one study specifically on the subject.[1] Yet the contract as a device to give aid overseas apparently falls within the anticipation of the policy makers who wrote the enabling legislation. They instructed that ". . . the participation of private agencies and persons shall be sought to the greatest extent possible."[2]

## Advantages of the Contract Device

Theoretically, the use of the contract has several advantages as a device of technical assistance. The ability to command otherwise unobtainable talent and services is an important advantage. The government does not need to dislodge the technical expert from his regular employment when he is "hired" by contract rather than directly. He remains employed by the corporation or firm, the university or voluntary service organization where he is making his career. His retirement arrangements are not disrupted; his promotion prospects are not dimmed.

The government theoretically gets more than a technician when it contracts with private organizations: It also gets the support-in-depth that such organizations—especially the universities, church-affiliated, and foundation groups—are capable of because of their other resources. In short, the government can invoke the force of the whole institution. Universities, for instance, have veritable networks of contacts and associations—professional, institutional, social and personal—which can be solicited into the enterprise.

Dr. Henry G. Bennett who, as first Director of the Technical Cooperation Administraton, is given the credit for inventing the university contract,[3] apparently had these things in mind when he created the device. Originally thinking of the land-grant colleges,[4] Dr. Bennett conceived of a directness of relationship between the United States and host country technicians that was impossible to achieve at the diplomatic level. Contract personnel could work with host country personnel without regard to the difference of government affiliation or national origin. They could come together on a professional or technical, indeed, on a grass-roots level.

Educational, religious, and commercial organizations also have a freedom of action, whether at home or abroad, that is denied to government agencies.

[1] Jerome Jacobson Associates, *The Use of Private Contractors in Foreign Aid Programs.* A Study Prepared at the Request of the Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, U. S. Senate, 85th Congress, 1st Session (Washington D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957). Incidentally, this study points out that if one were to compare the number of technicians on contract with those on direct hire, the proportion would favor the former by 2 to 1. These are admittedly rough estimates. Philip M. Glick in his National Planning Association study, *The Administration of Technical Assistance: Growth in the Americas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), estimates the ratio of contract to direct U. S. hire employees as between 30 and 40%. The Department of State publication, *The Mutual Security Program Fiscal Year 1958: A Summary Presentation* (Washington, D. C., June 1957), p. 58, speaks of 1500 of the "4600 U. S. technicians working overseas" as being contract employees.

[2] Mutual Security Act, as amended, sec. 413a.

[3] According to John A. Hannah, President, Michigan State University and himself deeply involved in the same development. See his talk, American Council on Education, *University Projects Abroad.* Papers presented at the Conference on University Contracts Abroad, East Lansing, November 17–18, 1955 (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1956), p. 51.

[4] Glick, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), p. 92.

They are not under bureaucratic restraints, at least not those of a governmental nature. They can operate on an interinstitutional basis without always worrying about clearing with the Washington office or about meeting pertinent government protocol.

A final advantage, especially in the use of nonprofit contractors, is that it becomes possible for the government to get into certain countries, such as the neutralist ones, which would refuse aid or co-operation if offered directly by our governmental agencies. The contractor can operate within the government, even on the governmental process itself as in the case of public administration programs, without any interference with the sovereignty of the host country.

### TYPES OF CONTRACTORS

The contracts the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) enters into can be divided into the profit and the nonprofit ones. There is nothing new about government contracts with profit-making commercial firms. Through such contracts the government can draw into overseas work highly skilled talent not otherwise available and obtain other essential services.

The nonprofit contracts can be divided into those with voluntary groups and those with universities. Fifty-six voluntary, nonprofit groups were under contract in the field of technical assistance as of April 1958. These included such well-known foundations as Rockefeller, Ford, and Carnegie; special-area interest groups such as the American Korean Foundation, the Asia Foundation, and the Near-East Foundation; and a number of religious groups, such as the American Friends Service Committee, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Catholic Relief Services, and Lutheran World Relief. These groups had 10 million dollars worth of contracts in eighteen different countries, involving several times that many agencies in the host countries.

It seems quite clear even from the foregoing brief analysis that the United States Government gains immeasurably through this co-operation with the voluntary agencies. The government enlists the support and activity of this three score of dedicated groups who were already at work on the very objectives for which government funds themselves are appropriate. These groups with their established programs made it profitable for the United States Government to enter into the contracts to expand their activities and diversify them much more cheaply and effectively than the government could have done starting afresh. Finally these voluntary agencies can operate in a humanitarian atmosphere of good will which would not be possible for a government agency regardless of the nature of the service rendered.[5]

That all is not perfect with such contracts is equally clear. The most troublesome problem is with the religious groups. With them, there is the risk for the government of seeming to prefer one denomination over another, then there is the risk of religious proselyting or the appearance of it even when not present.[6] None of these difficulties has

[5] The following studies are illuminating: Edwin G. Bock, *Fifty Years of Technical Assistance: Some Administrative Experiences of United States Voluntary Agencies* (Chicago: Public Administration Clearing House, 1954); American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, *The Role of Voluntary Agencies in Technical Assistance* (New York: The Council, 1953); James G. Maddox, *Technical Assistance by Religious Agencies in Latin America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Merle Curti and Kendall Birr, *Prelude to Point Four: American Technical Missions Overseas* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1954).

[6] All this was recognized by these groups themselves from the outset. American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Inc., *op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), p. 132.



proved to be insurmountable; the voluntary groups have gotten approval in the Congressional inspections which have been made.

In numbers and dollars committed, the voluntary group contracts have not been as important as either the contracts-for-a-fee or with the universities. However, in terms of total impact, including their own funds expended, their history, and their promise for indefinite continuity, contracts with these agencies have been important indeed.

The first university contract dates from 1951, but once the device was inaugurated the number of contracts increased rapidly. A high point was reached in 1954. Then the pace slackened somewhat. By July of 1956, fifty-two universities were operating eighty-one contracts in thirty-eight countries. Currently there are fifty-three universities with seventy-nine contracts in thirty-two countries.[7]

### NATURE OF THE UNIVERSITY CONTRACT

What are these contracts like? Usually their duration has been for a term of three years, although many have been extended beyond that period. The contracts set up a relationship between the United States university and a university in the host country, with a ministry of that country or directly with the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) itself. The purpose may be broad and general or narrow and specific. The variety just about runs the gamut of possibility: The establishment of instructional programs such as colleges of agriculture, medicine, public and business administration; the inception of research programs in these and other fields; the provision of specific services such as agricultural extension, industrial development, educational films. One purpose is uniformly present, namely the education and training of host country personnel, both academic and technical, both within the host country and at the United States university itself.

The activities engaged in by the contracting university correspond to these objectives—class room and in-service instruction and advice as to courses and curricula; the stocking of libraries; the establishment of research facilities; the provision of audio-visual and other instructional materials; advice on teaching, research, and other methods; and help to the host institution as to the qualifications and selection of participants in training programs. It is indeed a broad scope of activity.

The fields of work which have received the most attention under university contracts are agriculture and education. For the first five years of universities' contracts (1951–56) the larger number of contracts were for these fields, 54.4 million dollars out of a 68 million dollar total. Public and business administration was a poor third accounting for about 5½ million dollars. Public health and engineering ranked next. Labor, information, and community development received attention as well. Incidentally, this corresponds quite well with the major objects of expenditure for technical co-operation as a whole.[8]

With what countries are these contracts established? The clue is provided by major United States foreign policy efforts. Just as the Near East and the Orient have received other attention, so

[7] A number of contracts had of course expired by this time; International Cooperation Administration, *Quarterly Summary Statements, ICA-Financed University Contracts in Operation as of December 31, 1958* (Mimeographed, Washington, D. C., 1958).

[8] According to the 1958 U. S. Budget; see p. 59, The Department of State, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*) except that public administration, public health and engineering, respectively, reversed their order on the list.

do they have the greater number of university contracts, 56 out of the 79 which are currently in operation. Latin America has 16; Africa, 6 and Europe 1.

*Nature of participating universities*

What universities hold these contracts? As one might suspect from the origins of the program and their predispositions toward agriculture, engineering, and education, the state and the Agricultural and Mechanical universities have participated most actively in these contracts abroad. Their dominance is all the more emphasized by the fact that whereas twenty-one institutions hold two or more contracts, of these only four are independent or private universities. Only one independent university holds three contracts; thirteen state institutions hold three or more contracts. And two state universities hold four contracts each.[9]

There are no particular conclusions to be drawn from this distribution of contracts other than those already alluded to. It does raise the question, however, as to how the selection is made of the university with which to contract when a certain country asks for assistance. Apparently just about every conceivable method has been utilized. Host countries have had a voice in the selection process. Mission directors and other top United States personnel abroad have made suggestions. Currently, the trend seems to be for the ICA program staff to feel out those institutions of higher learning which seem qualified to carry out the project contemplated, to get expressions of interest from those who respond affirmatively, and to proceed to a contract by a process of elimination and negotiation. It is difficult to conceive how it could be done differently.[10] The question as to how well the ICA has done in its selections is impossible to answer; it probably never will be answered, given all the intangibles of such situations and the factors over which the ICA cannot be expected to have had any control.

## PROBLEMS WITH THE UNIVERSITY CONTRACT

Fault has no doubt lain on both sides. There certainly have been many problems. One has been delay. It has not been unusual for a year to transpire between the initial contacts and the final approval of a contract. The same length of time or longer has frequently been necessary to secure an amendment to an existing contract. Delays have been particularly destructive in university contracts because the academic time schedule itself requires long, lead time for faculty assignments, and so forth.

To be sure, delay is inherent and unavoidable in the complex environment of foreign aid. There are involved many divisions and several levels of the ICA itself, the meeting of the multitudinous rules and regulations common to the federal government, the many agencies and persons of the host country involved. At the level of the contracting university itself there is time spent dealing with the department of instruction concerned and academic and business officials. This necessary time allowance everyone has been willing to concede. But for a long time, there was in the ICA no common point of reference for contract work. Contracts were everybody's business in that agency and consequently nobody's in terms of definite responsibility. The contracting university felt that evasive tactics were

[9] American Council on Education, Office of Institutional Projects Abroad, *University Campus Coordinators* (Mimeographed, Washington, D. C., October 20, 1958).

[10] See the ICA Manual and Illustrative Contract; Jerome Jacobson Associates, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), pp. 7–8, 30–34; American Council on Voluntary Agencies, *op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), pp. 126–33.



being used. This situation fortunately has been corrected. An office of contract relations was established on March 3, 1956—after five years of university contract experience!

Another common complaint was that every contract was a "new voyage to the Indies, only to discover America." Great time was consumed because there was no policy, no standard, no common terms for contracts. Each one had to be drawn from scratch. The situation got so bad that the Universities in Conference Assembled demanded an end to the contract and the substitution of the foundation grant type of financing. This the ICA found unable to do, but it did publish an illustrative contract with standard paragraphs; it produced a manual for contractors; and it made some important policy decisions as guidelines for contracting with the universities. Perhaps even more important, all these things were done co-operatively involving a working group of five university representatives named by the Office of Institutional Projects Abroad.

*Restrictive measures*

One of the common complaints during the early years was that the government contracts with universities were unnecessarily restrictive. The government insisted on all sorts of precautions and required certain financial risks which might be appropriate to the profit-making contract but were completely inappropriate to nonprofit institutions—especially to universities. The universities insisted that profit and nonprofit contracts should be handled in a different way and indeed, be different. The ICA has met much of this difficulty by creating within the Office of Contract Relations two basic divisions to work on the two different kinds of contracts. This has helped greatly, in the opinion of contractors. Also, the ICA removed as many mandatory orders as possible and gave to the universities greater discretion as to the hiring, maintenance, and salaries of overseas-serving personnel, attaching these actions to the established procedures and practices of the contractor rather than to more complex government regulations.

Security clearance for contract employees has been and continues, in a lessening measure, to be a problem creating delay. For a time there was no consistency in its application. Then an attempt was made, after ICA came into the picture, to apply the clearance rule universally. Such alleviation as has been gained has resulted because of the ICA's relenting on security checks for on-campus personnel and because security officers began to give a fairly quick tentative clearance on university faculty proposed for overseas service, based on a check of the files, and to complete the full field investigation only when derogatory information was discovered. On the whole, the situation has been improved; the delays due to security clearance have been lessened.

In all fairness, it should be added that ICA has had to contend in such matters with a waspish Congress. It was fair game in those days, and still is to some extent, for Congressmen who were defeated in their efforts to cut or drastically reduce foreign aid appropriations, to harass the agency of such aid. The harboring of Communist sympathizers and homosexuals was all too ready a charge for such legislators to make. Unfortunately, it must be added further that the Congressmen succeeded with some members of the ICA and did scare them into a mental state of insistence that the security door be barred and bolted as well as locked. Such Congressional onslaughts plus the general reluctance of the United States public to recognize foreign aid as a continuing obligation of the nation drove many fine people out of the ICA too. Small

wonder there were delays. Small wonder that the ICA has seemed slow to learn from the contracting experiences of other federal agencies, indeed from past technical assistance experience itself. Small wonder that there has been so little effort made to capture and record our foreign efforts, let alone to evaluate those efforts for the purpose of improvement.

*Proper preparation*

The fault has by no means been one-sided. A most frequent failure has been the reluctance, refusal, or inability of the universities to make a proper assessment of the situation; to plan adequately and prepare both personnel and facilities to do the new job in a strange land, using a foreign language; to install an unknown service or institution in a cultural context which has not of itself produced such a service and which therefore can be counted upon to have many built-in resistances to the new venture. There have been two parts to this common failure: First, an inadequate survey preceding the contract negotiations; second, an inadequate opportunity or inclination for the contracting university to "tool up" for its contract obligations.

If a complete preliminary survey is not made, then chances are that the project will not be satisfactorily described and that as a consequence the contract itself will be faulty. It is indeed amazing how many contracts have been rushed into without a full description of the program and of the respective roles of the contracting parties and their personnel, even without adequate financing. Overseas efforts at best are difficult and demanding. Yet seldom is the preliminary, that is, precontract survey longer than a few weeks. Some have taken only a few days. A number of contracts have been entered into without the contracting institution or any of its representatives ever having set foot in the host country. Can such preliminaries possibly be adequate, leaving aside entirely the quality of the survey?

Even after the contract has been established, proper preparation remains a problem. There is great pressure to "get started" once the contract has been signed. This is natural especially since almost inevitably some months, maybe a year or more have elapsed since the host country first brought its need to the attention of the United States Operations Mission (USOM) in that country. But such hurry does not give the opportunity to answer the question, "Get started with what, how, when, where?"

Furthermore, there is not one university contractor who feels he has been given half a chance to prepare his staff for their overseas duties before their dispatch and after their arrival there. Contract personnel are usually totally ignorant of the history, religion, and culture of the host country. Only last year, 1958, after the ICA itself received funds for training its own personnel, did it start to make any concessions to the preparation of contract personnel. And these concessions are still far from being adequate.

Is it surprising then that we Americans keep on trying to do overseas exactly as we do at home, even when it is foredoomed to failure? We have not taken, or been permitted to take, the steps to find out what is foredoomed and what is not. Nor have our faculty members been permitted to learn better, either beforehand or on the job.

The universities should at least get credit for the fact that from the first they have rung the changes on this complaint. One of the very earliest formal presentations made to the ICA by the Committee on Institutional Projects Overseas involved this point.

It must be admitted that universities have not always done their best as contractors. Some have acted as though they were willing to try anything as long as they secured the contract. A number of universities have accepted contracts not at all related to research and education or anything else with which they have been familiar. Others have entered into contracts despite the absence of facilities, especially expert personnel to carry out the obligations of the contract.



Some have simply not met their obligations. They have recruited staff from elsewhere and have not sent their own faculty overseas, or if they have, have not sent their best. They have not recognized or have refused to admit the inherent difficulty of the new task. They have not "shifted gears" into cross-cultural activity. Overseas projects have been regarded as secondary rather than as primary obligations. The need to change programs and procedures, to meet the new demands in new ways has not been met. Students and scholars have been admitted into graduate programs, for example, without the addition of facilities and staff to meet the special problems of foreign participants; nor has accommodation been made in traditional curricula to permit the foreign scholar to prepare to meet the problems he will encounter when he returns home. In short, in some cases the universities have belied the premise on which contracts have been let, namely, that they will bring their total resources to bear in helping the host country institution help itself. Fortunately, in the main, the promise has been kept. The total effect has been beneficial, so far as we know, and the United States universities themselves have benefited greatly.

*Field co-ordination*

The field relationship of contractor staff and Mission staff has been a problem from the outset. Part of this was because some of the universities accepting contracts in the early days acted as though they were getting a grant to do something on their own, only to find that they had contracted to carry out part of an ICA program, under ICA supervision.

The American Council on Education, Office of Institutional Projects Abroad, published a statement concerning the working relationships between the, then, Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) and college project staffs in the field. The statement called for "well-planned educational activities, under the guidance of professional staff, on the one hand and on the other, upon their development within the broad framework of public policy," as interpreted by the country director of the United States Operations Mission. In other words, the contract chief and the Mission Director were to keep each other informed currently, were to keep out of each other's jurisdictions, and were to work together in terms of broad objectives of foreign aid, guided by United States public policy. The diplomatic guidance of the United States Ambassador was also acknowledged. This statement, in the main, was accepted by the FOA, and this acceptance helped a great deal to clear the air and in time to secure the kind of co-ordination and separation of function which was required for effective contract operations.

Another thing that helped was the recognition that the better form of university contract was the so-called third-party, rather than the direct university-to-ICA kind. As time went on more and more contracts were written to relate the United States university directly to the host university or institution, with the United States acting as an interested party, but nevertheless the third party. With the contractor directly related to the host institution, the Mission staff's relationship became more general in character and less apt to

cause trouble, at least of a day-to-day variety.[11] Again the problem of field co-ordination has not been entirely solved, but it has been considerably ameliorated.

*Other problems*

There is not space in this article for a full discussion of the problems attending the university contract as a device of technical assistance. Let us simply list a few more:

The term of most contracts has been too short to match the normally long period of time required to develop teaching and research institutions and to install and get acceptance for new services related to such institutions. Three years has been standard. The result has been that many contracts have had to be extended, some more than once. Others have expired prior to real assurance of continuation of the "investment."[12]

There probably has been insufficient evaluation by ICA of program accomplishment in most contracts. Part of this is due to a "means orientation" rather than an "ends orientation" on the part of ICA staff—the apparent domination of the ICA administration, from time to time, by the lawyer and the auditor rather than by the program division chief. The greater part of this fault is probably due to the starvation rations on which Congress has kept ICA staffs. ICA and its predecessor agencies have never had enough money for administrative purposes, never enough staff to give surveillance to contracts, let alone evaluate their results.

[11] National Planning Association, Special Policy Committee on Technical Cooperation, *Technical Cooperation in Latin America: Recommendations for the Future*, pp. 104–105 (Washington, D. C., 1956).

[12] Paul Beckett called the present system "fit and jerk" programming, *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 1958), p. 440.

The establishment of overhead rates on university contracts remains a problem. The present effort to separate overhead rates for off-campus from those for on-campus activities is not tenable; the rate attached to personal services only is not logical; the whole effort of ICA to cut down on universities' overhead rates is much more appropriate to the profit than it is to the nonprofit contracts. The same kind of problem attaches to other financing, as well. In few contracts has enough money been permitted for so-called indirect costs. For example, seldom is the work of overall supervision of a contract, as at the dean's level, adequately recognized or reimbursed. There is one phase which is not repaid at all and that is the precontract negotiations. Many man-hours may go into travel, discussions with ICA, drafting of documents, for which absolutely no monetary allowance is ever made. For profit contracts, this kind of risk-taking may be all right. It does not fit the atmosphere of a university, especially of the smaller institution which must subsist on private financing.

The illustrative contract will not solve all contracting problems. A great deal of tailoring will still be necessary to each individual project, to local needs both at the host institution and at the home campus and to specialized objectives and activities, as well. Policies and standards will help a great deal but there is still need for intelligent and sympathetic negotiating, on both sides of the bargaining table. In the language of diplomacy, what is needed here is a cessation of "individual treaties" in such contracts, and the adoption of the policy of "most favored nation" treatment—that is, a new benefit to one is added for all.

Has ICA almost exhausted the number of interested and qualified universities with which to contract? In fact, as suggested above, some contracts may well have been entered into with institutions who were not qualified. Yet the needs continue to grow. Is there need for some kind of "conditioning contract" whereby Uncle Sam would pay for a university to brief and orient its staff and to adapt its facilities to the contracted task?

Finally, is ICA making maximum utilization out of strengths it itself has helped create and develop in the universities? For example, at the present time ICA has been given funds for training of its own staff. Can ICA do this itself successfully? Can the Foreign Service Institute? How about bringing all interested parties—not just the ICA but also the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the foundations—together into a scheme to create centers for overseas education and training? Courses and curricula for government personnel and for contractors'; predeparture briefing and orientation; continued training for experienced personnel; perhaps even debriefing experiences and sabbatical spending for both government and academic personnel, not to mention contract research, especially of the evaluation kind—all this and more could be done at a number of centers. This should be not only in terms of language and of regional and national culture, but should also include role identification, considering how different the role of almost every technician who goes overseas is from the one he is accustomed to playing at home. The shift of role from "operator" to "adviser" is illustrative and most common.

## THE BALANCE: PROFIT OR LOSS?

This article may be considered by some as full of criticism which it is. The criticism is offered, however, with the motivation to be constructive.

What then is the balance? How has the contract worked as a device of foreign aid? It has worked. There have been mistakes and failures. But the net has been considerable gain.

The government of the United States has gained along the lines already suggested and now that there is more of an attitude of partnership on both parts, the gains should increase considerably.

The universities have gained a great deal as well. The faculty members who have been overseas have, in the main, returned refreshed and refurbished intellectually, with many new ideas for teaching and research. The students and faculty on the home campus have also gained both from direct contact with students and scholars from other countries and from the innovations and improvements made in courses and curricula for the accommodation of those scholars. The kind of soul searching and review which the cross-cultural contacts force upon the academic body is a salutary influence.

Broadened intellectual horizons have in turn been provided for the local communities which have played host to foreign scholars and educators and to the professional societies, service clubs, and other groups, which have sponsored, entertained, heard speeches from, and seen the exhibits of those scholars and educators.

It is impossible to quantify many of these gains. Some are so intangible as to resist definition. It would certainly be shortchanging the equation to measure results only in terms of new area and language programs.

Overseas, results can be quantified in terms of new institutions and services installed by contract and enduring for the indefinite future. Furthermore, and perhaps even more important have been the lasting influences of the impact of United States educational ideas and attitudes on the whole educational system of host countries. The attitude of the university as a service institution

wherein a highly trained faculty helps the community to solve its problems instead of as an ivory tower into which the intellectual elite retire from the mundane; the seminar, the work shop, the conference, and the discussion group as substitutes for the formal lecture as the exclusive teaching device; the participation of the student through such instructional devices and by independent use of the library, the laboratory, and the field survey—these and many other academic changes have been left behind in the host countries albeit many have been unconsciously acquired and indirectly inspired.

The people of the United States have gained too in that the contractors who are now experienced in the foreign aid business—especially the universities and voluntary service agencies—constitute an anchor to windward for public policy and a protection against political storms and abrupt administrative changes within the government itself. Poetic? Perhaps, but let us remember that the United States foreign aid program has had even more directors than name changes! Steadying influences are indeed necessary, outside as well as inside.

## OPERATING ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE NEWCOMER

And how should you who is considering this contract business for the first time, look upon it all? To enter or not to enter?

Do enter, but as you do, bear certain assumptions in mind.

You will gain from an overseas contract albeit not financially, since you will put more into it than you will get out, in money.

You will find it hard-going: One of the most challenging tasks you have ever faced. Be prepared to contemplate change in everything and everybody involved including yourself. United States higher education, you will find is heavily "culture-bound," and so are you.

You will put in what will appear to be endless hours of contract consideration and negotiation—it is a time-consuming process, and you will not be paid for most of it nor will your expenses direct and indirect be reimbursed.

You will not have enough time for the precontract survey; even if you had a year—you will likely have three weeks—it would not be enough.

You will not have enough time, money, or facility to give your overseas faculty and staff the language, culture, and role training they require either prior to departure or after arrival at their post of duty. Again, a whole year would be inadequate, given the dimensions of the need.

You will have "trouble" with the ICA, both in the contract negotiations and afterwards, both in Washington and in the host country. The academic and the bureaucratic worlds are two different planets, one inhabited by a breed of men accustomed to academic freedom, the other by a race accustomed to hierarchical restraints. But the chances are you will surmount these troubles. You will emerge from the fray thanking God for your brothers, the program men in ICA, be they from the Agriculture, Education, Industry, Public Administration or some other Division.

You will have "trouble" with the host country institutions. You may have what you consider to be a complete set of commitments spelled out for your host; but your host will not meet those commitments fully and expeditiously. Why? Not because he does not want to but because he cannot and because he does not know how. Be prepared to help him, even with his commitments to you, and you will win him in an "arena" of co-operation in which he will be particularly appreciative. The key struggle will be to get him to accept, really accept, the total responsibility for whatever you turn over to him.



You will have "trouble" with your own university to bring into play all the resources you should command for your overseas contract. Better make sure you have firm topside support before you sign that contract! Otherwise you will find the Business Office and the Curriculum Committee and the Graduate Dean and the other instructional departments—even your own will cause you concern—resisting your requests for help and for change in heretofore well-established practices, desperately needed though you may argue these are. Your colleagues will not understand until they in turn have been cross-culturally baptized.

The term of your contract will not be long enough for you to accomplish completely what should be done, even if your contract is extended once or twice during its life. Getting acceptance for cultural change—and that is involved in every trial of foreign aid— is a long, long task; you will be through before you are ready unless you are one of the lucky ones and secure foundation and other private support so as to be able to continue American influence and "conscience" on the spot. The conflict arises out of the fact that cultural change is measureable only in generations; government contracts are measured in years, and Congressional appropriations are made a year at a time.

You will not be sure after you are all done whether your efforts have been a success or a failure. You will feel good about some things and badly about others. You will wish there were standards of performance against which to measure yours. You will probably come away from your overseas contract experience feeling that, all things considered, you have gotten more than you gave.

# Financing Technical Co-operation

By Rowland Egger

Abstract: The major problems of financing both multilateral and bilateral technical co-operation derive from the precarious year-to-year underwriting of the programs and from the organizational and administrative separation of technical and economic co-operation, including investment. Congressional attitudes toward continuing commitment to the United Nations Expanded Program, plus annual reauthorization of the bilateral program, create uncertainties which prevent technical co-operation staff from going forward with the recipient countries in the formulation of long-term national economic and social development programs. The lack of such long-term programs, moreover, prevents the development of bench marks and priorities for the proper planning and budgeting of both technical and economic assistance. Technical co-operation is in consequence largely occupied with a string of accidental, *ad hoc*, opportunistically undertaken projects, few of which relate themselves effectively to major ongoing influences in general economic and social change. This situation is exacerbated by the complete separation of technical and economic co-operation in the United Nations system and the substantial separation of technical and economic co-operation in a large part of the Mutual Security Program. The financing problems of technical co-operation will not be solved apart from the solution of the larger problem of financing economic development and until it is properly reintegrated into multilateral and bilateral programs of economic assistance.

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*Rowland Egger, Ph.D., Charlottesville, Virginia, is Chairman of the Departments of Political Science and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, where he has been a member of the faculty since 1931. He was Director of the Budget of the Commonwealth of Virginia, 1939–42; General Manager and Director of the Bolivian Development Corporation, 1942–47; Vice-President of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1949–51; Associate Director of Public Administration Clearing House, 1950–53; Administrative Adviser to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, 1953; and Near East Representative of the Ford Foundation, 1954–56.*





TECHNICAL co-operation has become one of the blessed words of the English language. During the decade since the gentleman from Independence enunciated the principle of Point Four, it has been incorporated into the public and official vocabulary and is currently used as though it had precision, content, and limitation. In fact, it has none of these characteristics.

It has never been possible to distinguish satisfactorily between technical and economic assistance in the bilateral programs—and for that matter, some military assistance partakes strongly of the nature of technical and economic co-operation, and vice versa. In the multilateral context, the distinction between regular and Expanded Program activities is a purely artificial accounting device, and the difference between economic and technical aid on the part of the lending agencies is sometimes hard to define. This inevitable vagueness has perplexed and irritated the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Congressional appropriations subcommittees, the United Nations General Assembly, and Committee Five for a long time.

It must be expected, therefore, that the semantic obscurity of "technical co-operation," which is only slightly less uncategorical than "underdeveloped country," should sometimes be evident in any discussion of its financial foundations. Perhaps the prudent approach to the problem is to deal only with the major institutionalized governmental programs specifically identified as technical co-operation. As *The Ugly American* suggests, this may result in the omission of some of the more colorful, and possibly the more significant, forays into social and economic change; however, it at least keeps the discussion within identifiable limits.

## Multilateral Technical Co-operation

Multilateral technical co-operation is currently managed through six international agencies: the United Nations, the Colombo Plan, the Organization of American States, the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara, the Caribbean Commission, and the South Pacific Commission. The budgets of the three latter agencies are so small that they need not concern us. As has been suggested, some technical and economic co-operation is afforded by agencies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and others, but these activities are not identified as technical co-operation and will not be considered here.

Technical co-operation in the United Nations rests upon bifurcated financial pediments.[1] First, the "regular" programs of technical assistance undertaken by the United Nations and the specialized agencies, which in many cases antedate the establishment of the Expanded Program in 1950, are financed from the assessed budgets of the organizations. Second, the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, actually administered by the United Nations and the specialized agencies, is financed through voluntary contributions to a sort of international community chest on the part of Member States and other well-wishers of multilateral technical co-operation.

Operationally, the distinction is hardly worth drawing. Projects have been moved from regular to expanded programs and back again, and sometimes

[1] Walter R. Sharp, *International Technical Assistance* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1952), pp. 8–14 and 59–106, summarizes the regular program activities as of the time of the establishment of the Expanded Program.

it is difficult to ascertain where the project belongs until the final accounting is made. This is as it should be, and rigidity with respect to project financing on the basis of the derivation of funds would immeasurably complicate an already difficult and perplexing administrative problem. On the other hand, the fact that the organizations are engaged in the same kinds of activities supported by Expanded Program funds from their regular budgets and are engaged in surveys and research under their regular programs which by the most ephemeral psychological accommodation on the part of the accountants could be transformed into projects eligible for Expanded Program financing, militates strongly against effective control by the Technical Assistance Board (TAB) of even Expanded Program activities.

## UN Regular Program Operations

As the report of the Technical Assistance Board for 1957 points out:

> The amount of technical assistance provided under the Regular Programmes varies widely as between one Participating Organization and another. For example, in the Regular Programmes of ICAO and ITU there is at present virtually no provision for technical assistance of the kind given under the Expanded Programme. The regular budget of the ILO provides only small sums specifically earmarked for technical assistance, and that of FAO none at all. On the other hand, UNTAA, UNESCO and, more especially WHO, provide a substantial volume of technical assistance under their Regular Programmes, even though each of them handles a much larger volume of assistance under the Expanded Programme.[2]

Technical co-operation financed from the regular budgets of participating organizations is paid for, of course, by the annual assessments made by the organizations upon the Member States for the total expenses of the organization. The percentage rates of assessment against the United States for 1958 were as follows: United Nations 32.51; Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 32.51; International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 33.33; International Labor Organization (ILO) 25.00; International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 4.88; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 31.30; Universal Postal Union (UPU) 2.71; World Health Organization (WHO) 32.38; World Meteorological Organization (WMO) 15.19; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 33.33.[3]

It should be noted that neither the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development nor the International Monetary Fund participate in the Expanded Program so that all of their technical assistance operations are, in effect, Regular Program. The Bank spent in 1958, $639,347 for services to Member Countries, largely technical assistance.[4] The Fund does not separately designate technical co-operation in its administrative budget, but its activities in the field are substantial.[5] The administrative budgets of both organizations are sustained, of course, from earnings on their capital and are not assessed against Member States.

## Expanded Program Operations

The Expanded Program of the United Nations is financed from voluntary contributions made annually at a pledging conference usually held toward the end of the session of the General Assembly. From the inception of the Expanded Program in 1950 until the programing of 1956 operations, the money secured by the pledging conferences was distributed according to a percentage formula set up by the General Assembly as follows: United Nations 23; ILO 11; FAO 29; UNESCO 14; ICAO 1, WHO 22.[6] This purely arbitrary pie cutting was unsatisfactory to many of the national delegations, and largely under the leadership of France, the Economic and Social Council in 1954 took certain limited steps toward the integration of operations carried on with the voluntary contributions. It required the development of projects on the basis of country programs formulated by the requesting governments in consultation with resident representatives of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board and the allocation of funds to organizations in accordance with approved projects. However, a stop-loss order was included, which prevents any organization from receiving less than 85 per cent of the amount received the previous year.[7]

The Technical Assistance Board, which is the co-ordinating mechanism of the Expanded Program, except for its independent chairman is composed of the executive heads of the specialized agencies participating in Expanded Program funds. The heads of the technical co-operation programs in the several agencies normally sit for their principals in the Board. In other words, the co-ordinators are the same as the co-ordinated. In these circumstances it is understandable that the status quo ante in respect to the allocation of voluntary contributions to the participating agencies has been maintained with some rigor and that, except for very minor variations, the money is apportioned in about the same relative amounts provided for in the original formula.

In 1958 total pledges by 84 governments for the support of the Expanded Program were $32,317,900. The United States pledged $15,500,000 or 45 per cent of total contributions, whichever was the smaller. Total contributions of $34,444,445 would have been required to collect the maximum United States pledge; the actual United States contribution is approximately $14,543,000. Eleven other governments, including the Federal Republic of Germany which is not a member of the United Nations, account with the United States for about 83 per cent of all pledges. These are: Australia $625,000; Brazil $832,400; Canada $2,000,000; Denmark $579,100; France $1,542,900; Federal Republic of Germany $952,400; India $525,000; Netherlands $1,092,500; Sweden $792,600; USSR $1,000,000; United Kingdom $2,240,000.[8]

The USSR contribution, which with the pledges of the rest of the Communist bloc came to $1,349,600 in 1958, is far from an unmixed blessing.[9] The contributions are in the main in nonconvertible rubles, zlotys, and others. The USSR, moreover, has refused to permit

[2] E/3080 (United Nations, 1958), p. 50.

[3] *United States Contributions to International Organizations*, House Document No. 360, 85th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, 1958), pp. 52–65.

[4] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Thirteenth Annual Report 1957–1958* (Washington, 1958), p. 57.

[5] International Monetary Fund, *Annual Report 1958* (Washington, 1958), pp. 11, 16, 31.

[6] *United Nations Technical Assistance Conference: Resolutions and Final Act* (United Nations, 1950), E/CONF. 10/11.

[7] Economic and Social Council Resolution 542 B (IX). The scheme is described in detail in the *Report of the Technical Assistance Board 1955* (United Nations, 1956), E/2842, paragraphs 32–33 and 393–400. See also Goldschmidt's discussion of country programing procedures, this issue of THE ANNALS, pp. 54–55.

[8] *United States Contributions to International Organizations* (note 3, *supra*) pp. 76–77. Total adjusted in accordance with additional pledges reported by TAB in *Annual Report of the Technical Assistance Board for 1957* (United Nations, 1958), pp. 93–94.

[9] See Robert L. Allen, "United Nations Technical Assistance: Soviet and East European Participation," *International Organization*, Vol. 11, No. 615 (Autumn 1957).

more than 25 per cent of its contribution to be converted into other currencies, and then only for projects which it approves. To be sure, other countries make contributions in nonconvertible currencies or currencies of limited convertibility to the Expanded Program; but while the British pound has until very recently been nonconvertible, there has always been a brisk demand for British pounds in connection with projects undertaken under the Expanded Program. The same demand for Iron Curtain currencies does not exist. In effect the UN administers two programs of technical co-operation—one for countries in which it can utilize Soviet bloc currencies and another for other countries requesting assistance. Much of the Soviet bloc contribution can, as a practical matter, be used only for supplies and equipment from the Iron Curtain countries since few Soviet experts come to the multilateral programs and no experts go to the Soviet. The net effect of Soviet policies is to subvert the multilateral program of the UN and to make it in some places, such as India, a mere appendage of Soviet export operations. As a practical matter, the Expanded Program would be substantially better off if the Communist bloc would keep their pledges, like their money, at home.

Allocational data for 1958 have not yet been published, but there is little reason to think that they will differ substantially from 1957. Total regular earmarkings for 1957 were $31,321,327, of which the percentages attributable to the various participating organizations and the TAB were as follows: United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (UNTAA) 21; ILO 11; FAO 25; UNESCO 14; ICAO 4; WHO 17; ITO 1; WMO 1; TAB 6.[10] Bearing in mind that the total has been required to accommodate the TAB overhead, plus participation by ITU and WMO not provided for in the original formula, it seems clear that disturbances in the financing patterns of the participating agencies under the new dispensation have been held to a minimum.

[10] *Op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*) p. 60.

## THE COLOMBO PLAN

The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia, which is neither an organization nor an operation, grew out of the meeting of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers in Ceylon in January 1950.[11] This meeting was concerned with the problem of raising living standards in the countries of South and Southeast Asia. The Consultative Committee created by the meeting of Foreign Ministers met in Sydney in May 1950. It recommended: (1) that each of the countries in South and Southeast Asia draw up a broadly based six-year plan of economic development to cover the period July 1, 1951 to June 30, 1957; (2) that members of the Consultative Committee pledge themselves to a program of technical assistance amounting to a maximum of 8 millions over a period of three years from July 1, 1950. These pledges have from time to time been expanded and renewed.

The only central machinery established by the Colombo Plan is a small secretariat at Ceylon which expedites bilateral negotiations; however, the Consultative Committee continues to meet regularly. The Plan itself provides no experts, offers no fellowships or study grants, manages no investments. When a country in the area requires a foreign technician, it makes a request to Ceylon, which in turn puts the requesting government in touch with a government having available the kind of help required. From that point on, negotiations are bilateral. If an expert is sent, the cost is charged to the sending country's pledge to the total technical co-operation expenditure.

[11] A good summary of Colombo Plan operations is contained in *Technical Assistance*, Senate Report No. 139, 85th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1957), pp. 211–14.



The Colombo Plan is mainly significant for its emphasis on national economic planning as the foundation for economic development; the importance which it has given to training; its success in combining technical and economic aid. This does not mean that the Colombo Plan has been any more successful than other schemes of technical co-operation. Some of the national plans of economic development drawn up for the initial six-year period were no better than those which have been cobbled together in response to the Expanded Program of the United Nations. Pakistan's first six-year plan, as its prime architect, Chaudri Mohammed Ali, freely admitted, was little more than a string of projects which collapsed completely after the cessation of hostilities in Korea depressed the world jute market. India, on the other hand, had done a considerable amount of work even before Partition on establishing a scheme of priorities for national economic development. The Tata Plan and the Five-Year Plan had produced a body of fairly competent technicians and no little economic and political sophistication in respect to purposeful social and economic change. While its current six-year plan shows some signs of disorientation, in contrast to the remarkable achievements of Pakistan and the Littauer School during the past four years, economic planning at least on the subcontinent is still a going concern.

The Colombo Plan has also put much more emphasis on training than has either the United Nations or the United States bilateral programs. The United Nations ratio of trainees to experts, under both regular and expanded programs, is about 0.9 trainees to 1 expert. The United States ratio is about 1.3 trainees to 1 expert. Colombo Plan trainees number about 7 to each expert.

The combination of technical and economic aid in the same project, which has been carried to an advanced stage in many projects engineered under the auspices of the Colombo Plan, is also highly instructive. This has permitted and fostered the maintenance of a close reciprocal relationship between co-operation and economic and social development which has sometimes become attenuated in programs such as those of the United Nations and the United States, where the authority and responsibility for technical co-operation and for economic assistance have become rather widely separated. Technical co-operation that is not directly and visibly related to economic development is not very different from the kind of mere "do-good" for which the nations striving for economic change have little need or desire in these parlous times. On the other hand, foreign investment and domestic economic change that is not built upon solid foundations of economic and social knowledge can readily defeat the objectives of development programs and hinder, rather than aid, the process of orderly social improvement. In addition, as every knowledgeable civil servant knows, it is much easier to finance the cost of adequate technical preparation as a part of the cost of getting the work done than as an independent undertaking that must be justified separately from the end product itself.

## THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

The Organization of American States and its associated specialized agencies conduct technical assistance activities in a pattern somewhat similar to that of the United Nations and raise some of

the same problems of interorganizational relationships.[12]

First, it should be noted that the specialized agencies associated with the Organization of American States have for some time engaged in certain technical assistance activities and financed these operations from their regular assessed budgets. The activities of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau in the promotion of public health, for example, antedated by many years the formal establishment of the OAS at Bogotá in 1948. Other specialized agencies, such as the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences and the Inter-American Statistical Institute have similarly carried on technical assistance work as a part of their regular operations, as has the Pan American Union. The percentages of the regular budgets of these organizations currently assessed against the United States are as follows: OAS 66; Inter-American Children's Institute 40; Inter-American Indian Institute 17.39; Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences 67.23; Pan American Institute of Geography and History 39.02; Pan American Sanitary Bureau 66.[13] The budget of the Statistical Institute is provided by OAS.

However, shortly after President Truman's 1949 inaugural address, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council established a Committee on Technical Co-operation to develop a special technical assistance program for OAS. This was done, and a Coordinating Committee on Technical Assistance, composed of the executive heads of the participating agencies or their representatives, was established generally to manage and supervise the program. The participating agencies are: The American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood, the Inter-American Indian Institute, the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences, the Inter-American Statistical Institute, the Inter-American Institute of Geography and History, the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau, and the Pan American Union, which is the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States.

The annual work programs developed by the Coordinating Committee, reviewed by the Committee on Technical Assistance, and finally approved by the Economic and Social Council, are financed by voluntary pledges from the 21 republics. Total pledges for 1957 were $1,787,587, of which the United States pledged 70 per cent, or $1,251,311.[14]

The special technical co-operation program financed by voluntary contributions supplies no direct technical assistance. Direct technical assistance is provided by the regular programs of the participating organizations. The special program is centered entirely in a series of regional training operations desired by member governments and sponsored by the participating organizations, sometimes in collaboration with national governmental agencies. As in the UN Expanded Program, money must be apportioned to participating agencies. But OAS fortunately avoided the UN experience and started out with specific projects as the center of fiscal and administrative gravity. Hence the allocation of funds to a participating organization in the OAS program is in fact an incident of project authorization. In the UN it is only in theory an incident of project authorization; the converse is more likely to be true. The Pan American Union, moreover, started out with a firmer hand on the special program and has maintained more control than the United Nations secretariat has ever been able to exercise. The kind of work undertaken under the OAS special program, being essentially institutional in character, perhaps lends itself better to integrated management than the scattered techniques of the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

Despite the generally favorable recognition accorded to the regional training approach to technical assistance, for which Alberto Lleras is primarily responsible, the special OAS program is criticized for some of the same shortcomings of the UN program—inadequate articulation of technical and economic assistance and inadequate national economic planning as a foundation for purposeful social and economic change.

## Bilateral Technical Co-operation

Bilateral technical co-operation constitutes about 4.66 per cent of the total Mutual Security Program. Of the total Mutual Security Agency (MSA) new funds appropriated for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1958 in the amount of 2,769 million dollars, technical co-operation received 130 million dollars. The bigger portion goes for other purposes—military assistance 1,340 million dollars, defense support 689 million dollars, the development loan fund 300 million dollars, special assistance 225 million dollars, and special multilateral and other programs 85 million dollars.[15] All this comes from direct appropriations from the United States Treasury and is financed by tax and other revenues of the United States Government.

These technical co-operation funds go primarily to maintain some 4,500 United States nationals, more or less expert, in about 65 countries and overseas possessions of other countries in which technical co-operation agreements are operative and to finance fellowships for 5,300-odd persons from countries receiving technical assistance for study and training in the United States. Of the technicians abroad, approximately 40 per cent are in the Far East, 31 per cent in the Near East and South Asia, 20 per cent in Latin America, 7 per cent in Africa, and 2 per cent in Europe. Some of the larger missions include Korea with over 400 technicians; Thailand with more than 350; Vietnam with about 300; Iran with almost 300; Pakistan with 250; and Turkey, India, and Cambodia with about 200 each. Of the trainees, about 30 per cent are from the Far East, 13 per cent from the Near East, 25 per cent from Europe, 31 per cent from Latin America, and 1 per cent from Africa.[16]

Although the general bilateral program of technical co-operation will soon be ten years old, and although the regional program inaugurated by the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs began almost a decade earlier, the political mythology of the Congress insists upon regarding technical co-operation as a transient phenomenon. The Mutual Security Act annually extends for one year the program of technical co-operation and authorizes, also for one year, appropriations from which funds for the support of the program are allocated. This one-year-at-a-time program authorization is despite a report of the same committee which considers the Mutual Security Act to the effect that: [17]

> It cannot be too strongly emphasized nor too often reiterated that technical assistance is a long-range program in which continuity of effort is at least as important as magnitude of effort. A basic project can hardly be well-started in a year, much less com-

[12] See Philip M. Glick's excellent chapter on the OAS program in his *The Administration of Technical Assistance: Growth in the Americas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 318–37. This is the best analysis in depth of technical assistance administration that has so far been made.

[13] *Op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), pp. 66–69.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 46 and 71.

[15] International Cooperation Administration, *Operations Report: Data as of June 30, 1957* (Washington, 1957), inside cover.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 47–52.

[17] *Op. cit.* (note 11 *supra*), p. 27.

pleted in that time. The subcommittee has seen projects operated by private agencies which turned out to be highly successful, but which had to be carried on for as long as 6 or 7 years before they began to take hold.

In American politics it is understandable that a Congressional committee should at times ignore the request of the President, as the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has, for more realistic enabling legislation for mutual security. It is understandable that one Congressional committee should ignore the advice of another. But for a committee to ignore pointedly the advice of its own subcommittee emphasizes the extent to which the mutual security program has become the tool of personal power politics amongst Congressional committee chairmen.[18]

Some of the reluctance of Congress to provide authorization and financing of technical co-operation on a continuing basis may be attributable to the shaky programmatic foundations of technical co-operation budgeting. Presentations by the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress are based upon "illustrative" project budgets rather than anything resembling firm work programs. To a limited extent this is inevitable, since ICA does not initiate technical co-operation projects, and it is difficult to forecast the demands of receiving governments for technical co-operation. On the other hand, one of the major factors contributing to the planless and wholly *ad hoc* basis of project formulation is the failure of technical co-operation to develop the kind of systematic planning for economic development in countries receiving technical assistance that would provide criteria for the judgment of project priorities. An astute observer of bilateral technical co-operation in Latin America where technical co-operation has had the longest history and where administrative arrangements should be the best developed, has written: [19]

> The habits of independent operation which IIAA's field missions had enjoyed since 1942 were reluctantly yielded and in some countries not surrendered at all. Where the country director and the heads of the principal technical missions had themselves come to realize the need for broader planning, they welcomed the new structure and it worked reasonably well. In other countries it was difficult, as late as 1955, to see evidence that program planning for economic development was seriously pursued.

On the other hand, Congress has been little more willing to give long-term authorization for military assistance, which is planned and budgeted on a fairly comprehensive country-program basis. This suggests that something besides the adequacy of program and budgetary mechanics underlies the unwillingness of Congress to concede that technical co-operation is a continuing function of the United States Government.

## Unsolved Financing Problems

Obviously, the major unsolved problems of both multilateral and bilateral technical co-operation are their precarious financial underwriting. The annual pledging conferences of the United Nations and the Organization of American States and the annual renewal of authority and funds for the bilateral program of the United States Government provide no adequate foundations upon which a planned and systematic attack on problems of economic development can be based. Even the loose-knit Colombo Plan, which established no elaborate central administrative machinery, started off with technical co-operation support pledged for a three-year period. There has never been a time when either the United Nations Expanded Program or the United States Point Four program could look that far ahead.

This does not mean that the programs have been starved. On the contrary, there are strong reasons for thinking that the Senate committee was correct in its estimate that the present levels of technical co-operation represent about the optimum capacity of the recipient countries to absorb technical assistance and use the kind of technical training the programs provide.[20] The problem is not the inadequacy of funds available for technical co-operation but the uncertainty under which the organizers of technical co-operation must operate. This is, of course, primarily a psychological matter. But United States Congressional policy seems to have been carefully calculated to maximize the uncertainty and to prevent any reassuring conclusions from being drawn from the fact that we have actually pledged and paid our part of the United Nations Expanded Program each year or from the fact that we have extended the authorization and appropriated substantial funds for the bilateral program in each session of Congress.

There is no real assurance, either at the UN or in Washington, that technical co-operation will be continued. This means, as has been pointed out, that: [21]

> At the present time our overseas operations are gravely burdened by the necessity of coping with ten- and twenty-year problems with four- or five-year projects manned by one- or two-year personnel.... We cannot keep repeating the first year of our programs; sometime we have got to get on to the second and third and tenth and twentieth year.

This very precariousness of financial underwriting, on the other hand, militates against the kind of technical assistance capable of stimulating and co-operating in the formulation of soundly based national plans of economic development that would get technical co-operation off its present *ad hoc* and largely opportunistic basis into the main stream of national and international affairs. For example, although only nine of the thirty-eight countries included in the TAB evaluation review in 1957 had anything resembling adequate plans of economic development, the Expanded Program was devoting only 14 per cent of total field program expenditures to national planning development and the improvement of public administration.[22] Although it is not possible to make a meaningful comparison with the United States bilateral program, its contribution to the furtherance of planning for national economic development is largely imperceptible.

Furthermore, although ICA makes a considerable point of the increase in "project-type" assistance, in which the bilateral program supplies technical "know-how" and equipment for specific projects, the fact remains that the project program is still only a little more than half of the total program.[23] This is a substantial improvement, however, over 1953 and 1954, when the project program was about one-sixth of the total. Since the United Nations program of technical co-operation is not accompanied by defense support, development assistance, and other economic aid, none of its work is "project-type" assistance in the ICA sense of the term.

On the other hand, the complete sepa-

[18] See H. Field Haviland, Jr., "Foreign Aid and the Policy Process 1957," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 52, No. 689 (September 1958).

[19] Glick, *op. cit.* (note 12 *supra*), p. 118.

[20] *Op. cit.* (note 11 *supra*), pp. 25 and 272–73.

[21] Harland Cleveland and Gerard J. Mangone (Eds.), *The Art of Overseasmanship* (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1957), p. 150.

[22] *Op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), pp. 16 and 74.

[23] *Op. cit.* (note 15 *supra*), p. 7.

ration of Expanded Program technical co-operation from the activities of the Bank, the Fund, and the International Finance Corporation has tended further to shunt the Expanded Program out of the main stream of economic development activities. It is of some significance that the over-all surveys which in several countries have provided the basic data for national economic development planning have been made under the auspices of the Bank itself; the Expanded Program has had little or no part in them.

This separation of general technical co-operation and investment and economic assistance, most pronounced in the United Nations program and the OAS program, not only tends to establish a low ceiling for technical co-operation financing, but divides economic development activities which should never be permitted to pull apart. No ILO technical assistance mission, for example, should go into a country to establish or revise its labor and social security legislation and administration without understanding fully the ramifications of its work in respect of investments, production costs, and profits. No International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Finance Corporation mission should go into a country with funds for investment in industrial or commercial development without understanding fully the implications of its investment with respect to wages, conditions of labor, social security, education, health, and the public welfare. No social worker or public health expert should go into a country without understanding that his business is fundamentally economic development, and no industrial or transportation adviser should go in without understanding that his business is fundamentally the improvement of living conditions. The supreme business of all of them, of course, is to help in the building of indigenous institutions for the management and development of a democratic polity and economy.

# The Role of the Technical Expert

By LYNTON K. CALDWELL

ABSTRACT: Insofar as we can realistically speak of an expert's "role" it is shaped by four principal elements, only one of which can be relied upon to approximate constancy. These elements are the technical co-operation agency, the expert himself, the requirements of the task to be fulfilled, and the host government. Each of these elements is subject to variations and contradictions that make it improbable that a generally satisfactory definition of the expert's role will be discovered accidentally. The great variety of technical co-operation tasks and the individual differences among experts make generalizations concerning the role of experts of questionable validity. Insofar as clarity of purpose regarding objectives is shared by the technical co-operation agency, its expert, and the host government, clarification of the expert's role becomes more nearly possible. Responsibility for the clarification necessarily rests primarily with the co-operation agency. It is in the planning of the project and in the selection and briefing of the expert that the shared objectives of the project are brought to focus on the particular task to which the expert is assigned and hence on the role which he is to play.

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*Lynton K. Caldwell, Ph.D., Bloomington, Indiana, is Professor of Government and Director of the Institute of Training for Public Service at Indiana University. He has served on the faculties of the University of Chicago, Syracuse University and the University of California (Berkeley). He has undertaken a number of technical co-operation assignments abroad in the field of public administration principally in Colombia, Philippines, Turkey, Thailand and Indonesia. He is the author of The Administrative Theories of Hamilton and Jefferson (1944), The Government and Administration of New York (1954), and numerous articles relating to government and public administration.*

THE ROLE of the expert is compounded of a number of elements, principal among which are: definition of his task by the agency employing him; his own view of his role; the knowledge, skills, and action that his task requires; and receptivity in the host country where he is to work. When related in a mutually consistent manner, these elements provide a basis for clarity of decision as to what the expert should do—when, where, and how. But when these elements are inconsistent, or in conflict one with another, the expert will at best experience frustration and at worst he will experience failure.

To the degree that communication and comprehension are refined and perfected, the operating problems of the expert are minimized. Unfortunately for the expert, the processes of human communication and of understanding are grossly imperfect. Technical co-operation is therefore much less "technical" than the term might suggest.

The environment of the expert is characterized by relativity and uncertainty. It is rarely definable in extremes of black and white, but rather in an infinity of grays that vary in scope and intensity with change of time and circumstance. There is no attaining absolute harmony among the elements that determine his role. Thus the expert works in an environment in which operating problems, being inevitable, should be anticipated. Only through correctly appraising the problems with which he is confronted can he discover how most effectively to play the role for which he has been cast.

The role of the expert in technical co-operation does not really differ in principle from many other occupational roles in society. The elements of: definition of the job by the employer, employee self-image, employee's knowledge and skills, and expectations of clientele combine to form the roles of the members of any administrative organization. What is distinctive about the role of the expert in international technical co-operation is the degree to which disparities exist among these elements and hence the multiplication of points at which misunderstanding and conflict may occur.

Cultural differences underlie most of the operating problems encountered in technical co-operation. Where recognized and understood, differences in values, attitudes, and customs may be taken into account and possibly dealt with successfully. Misunderstanding and conflict are more likely to occur when deep-seated cultural values indirectly and unobtrusively influence policies and attitudes in the institutional framework within which the expert works. The expert may fail to interpret these policies and attitudes correctly because he has not perceived the cultural forces that make them intelligible.

Where cultural differences within national boundaries are pronounced, many of the difficulties which confront the expert in the international environment emerge. Efforts of the government of the United States to influence and assist the American Indians provide numerous illustrations. In the international context, the experiences of various missionary ventures and of colonial administrations are instructive. What they teach is that the factors which determine the success of the technically qualified expert are, broadly speaking, cultural.

Cultural differences, including psychological differences, condition human relations in whatever context they occur. Only through realistic appraisal of the influence of these cultural factors upon the task before him can the technical co-operation expert discover how to play his role effectively. This appraisal may be intuitive as well as conscious and systematic; it will in some measure unavoidably be subjective. If the expert is to play a constructive role, the "sizing-up" of his job must be somewhere near correct. To the extent that he is unable to appraise the conditioning circumstances correctly, constructive accomplishment on his part is largely a matter of chance.



## AGENCY CONCEPT OF THE JOB

Initial determination of the role of the expert is begun by the government that requests technical co-operation, but the formal definition of that role is principally a responsibility of the agency that supplies it. The agency may be any of several types. It may be an international organization, such as the United Nations; it may be an agency established by a national government, as for example the United States International Cooperation Administration; or it may be a nongovernmental philanthropic foundation or consulting firm. The agencies that initially define the expert's job obviously set the conditions that influence the choice of individuals to fill the job, and the subsequent development of the expert's role in relation to the job.

The fewer the commitments of the technical co-operation agency, the simpler and easier will be the definition of its mission and, to this extent, of the expert's role. As the number of voices seeking to define the mission of the agency increases, the chances for a consistent, generally acceptable definition diminish. Thus private consulting firms and foundations are ostensibly better able to develop a clear concept of the technical co-operation job than is the governmental or international agency that must try to reconcile larger and more complex differences of viewpoint, interest, and objective.

When the newly recruited technical co-operation expert first attempts to find out just what his agency expects of him, his introduction to the frustrations of his assignment begins. He discovers, but not always as readily as he should, that his employing agency is an abstraction. The reality is the officials, line, and staff, who negotiate agreements, draft contracts, write policy directives, control expenditures and enforce personnel rules. The expert may discover that the executive officer who must authorize his transportation and housing in the field does not necessarily have the same concept of his role as the program officer who prepared the specifications for his assignment. He may learn to his dismay that the concept of his job held by agency representatives in the field is not necessarily the one he understood to be held at agency headquarters.

As he moves to implement his assignment in action, he may find himself pulled up short by budget or personnel officers who are proceeding along lines of reasoning quite dissimilar from those that are uppermost in his mind. Technical co-operation operations abroad tend to exaggerate the already existing differences between line and staff responsibilities. The staff continues to function within the confines of its own culture or administrative milieu whereas the line, to which the expert belongs, must adapt to conditions in the host country.

### *Defining the task*

In the course of time, the expert discovers that the agency concept of his role is a composite of diverse objectives assumptions, and attitudes. Idiosyncracies of agency administrators, the various regulations and procedures of the agency, the prevailing political situation in Congress or in Committee Five, the relative temperature of the cold war—all are random examples of the types of factors that may influence the agency concept of the expert's job.

It is not in the nature of the situation for anyone in his agency to be able to tell him fully or exactly what his

role is intended to be. And, in any event, the capacity of the employing agency to define his role is limited by the specific nature of the work to be done and circumstances in the host country which influence the shaping of his role regardless of intentions in his employing agency.

In brief, the expert needs to understand at an early stage in his work that his agency cannot, indeed should not, provide him with a complete or wholly consistent definition of his task. This is not necessarily an undesirable state of affairs, particularly when, as often happens, the expert is engaged in an exploratory or pioneering venture. But the expert does need agency support in identifying the forces and factors that shape his job in order to avoid embarrassment to himself and disaster to his program. He needs to know the apparent limits of the possible and the permissible so that if these boundaries present obstacles to his assignment, he may prepare himself to cope with them.

Certainly the agency can increase the possibilities for successful technical cooperation insofar as it can achieve clarity and consistency in its purposes and operations. Effective executive leadership at the top levels of technical cooperation agencies is an essential condition for the formulation and propagation of agency concepts that give unity and drive to agency programs. Where top policy leadership falters, subsidiary influences in the agency—notably legal, fiscal, and careerist—gain in relative strength. Lacking guidance from the top, they proceed to affect agency policy in their own respective ways, sometimes in a manner inconsistent with agency program objectives. The agency cannot and should not attempt to define completely the expert's role; but to the extent that the agency heads are unclear or indecisive regarding goals and objectives, the agency cannot provide the guidance and support that the expert may rightfully expect from it.

## SELF-IMAGE OF THE EXPERT

Even if circumstances did not compel the expert to play a large part in the definition of his role, his behavior would in any case be influenced by his concept of himself in relation to his concept of the task.

There is an obvious relationship between the expert's self-image and the reasons he entered international technical co-operation work. The reasons are usually mixed. They are not necessarily consistent, and they are always personalized beyond any possibility of categorical analysis. Among the reasons that motivate experts, the following may be identified as fairly common: urge to help people in need of his expertise, desire for change and adventure, professional challenge of the assignment, improved living standard, sense of obligation to his employer, and escape from some of life's insoluable complications.

The motives of the expert may therefore be influenced by factors unrelated to his actual assignment in the field. Dissatisfaction with his job at home, difficult domestic relations, desire to enhance his professional reputation, or merely to earn more money may be the decisive factors in his decision to accept an assignment abroad. These self-serving factors may, but do not of necessity, preclude the expert's giving his best to his field assignment. If theoretically "appropriate" motives were an exclusive basis for determining which experts engaged in international technical cooperation work, their numbers would indeed be few. Selfless motivation offers no assurance of an expert's effectiveness.

The self-image of the expert in relation to his task involves also his assumptions regarding the people with whom he is to work, particularly the nationals of the host country. What he thinks



the host country people think of him, what he wants them to think of him will also influence his appraisal of the total situation and his role in it. Casual observation, insofar as it can be relied upon, indicates that the American technical expert characteristically differs from his European or Asian counterpart in his greater concern for being liked and his lesser sophistication in relations with host country peoples. As a result, the behavior of some American experts abroad is puzzling to host country associates. Their apparent disregard of national values and sensitivities does not seem to square with protestations of friendliness. Nevertheless, the open friendliness of many American experts has often won friends where the status-conscious reserve of certain experts from older cultures has imposed an additional barrier between the expert and the host country people.

There is a myth pervasive among large numbers of Americans that, beneath superficial dissimilarities, people everywhere are fundamentally the same. In a rigorously limited sense the belief may be valid; in the broad generalizing sense in which it is often used, it is untrue and misleading. The myth makes mischief when the American expert convinces himself that people everywhere really want to be like Americans and that present dissimilarities are largely the consequence of "regressive" forces such as economic underprivilege, colonialism, tradition-bound authoritarianism, communalism, and "immorality."

A misconception of this sort can seriously prejudice the ability of the expert to play a constructive role abroad. He may in effect become a missionary more concerned with the cultural transformation of the host country than with the specific problem for which his assistance has been sought. In host country eyes, he may well be an egregious meddler who must be tolerated if he cannot be dismissed. Non-Western peoples in particular have developed immunities to gratuitous interference by well-meaning representatives of more "advanced" cultures. The expert is permitted to keep himself busy in relatively harmless ways while host country officials employ tactics of procrastination, deliberation, and delay until his tour of duty ends.

In brief, the self-image of the expert may be neither more nor less realistic than those of people in other walks of life. It is the effect of his self-image on the situation in which he operates that makes it important. For in his situation, human relations assume a problematic character that is much greater than he would ordinarily experience in his own country or among his own people.

## REQUIREMENTS OF THE TASK

The tasks for which technical cooperation is sought are not abstract technical problems; they involve factors of time, place, and people. The interrelations between these factors and the particular need for which the knowledge and skills of the expert are sought are seldom understood and interpreted in the same way by all of the parties concerned. Top leadership in the technical co-operation agencies, and frequently also in host countries, tends to appraise the task of the expert in political terms whereas the expert and sometimes his host country counterparts tend to think in technical or professional terms. Technical co-operation administrators, having ideas of their own about what is good for the host country, may not be altogether frank with host country officials about what they intend that the expert accomplish. And there are circumstances, some of which will presently be detailed, under which host country officials cannot or will not define the technical co-operation task in realistic terms. National pride, political insecurity, lack

of information or understanding are among the more apparent reasons for an inapt projection of the task by host country officials.

The expert arrives on the scene of action to begin his work. How will his task shape his role? Particularly if he is inexperienced in international technical co-operation, the factors in the task that in the beginning will appear most important are the demands made upon his particular brand of expertise, upon his professional knowledge and skills, as for example engineering, medicine, agriculture, or accounting. These technical requirements of the task are important and do shape the expert's role; but they also entail factors of place and people. If, for example, the expert's task involves improving potato culture in the Peruvian Andes, he may have to consider how to obtain changes in agriculture as practiced by the Andean Indian whose culture belongs more to the sixteenth than to the twentieth century and who notoriously lacks enthusiasm for "improvement." Time, climate, and culture make potato growing in Peru a problem somewhat different from potato culture in Maine, even though the botanical behavior of potatoes may be roughly the same.

The professional badge that the expert wears cannot therefore adequately identify his role. The role follows partly from the profession in relation to the task, but the task invariably imposes additional requirements upon the human relations skills of the expert with particular emphasis on ability to communicate.

Effective communication may require the expert to know the language of the country in which he works—a knowledge of several languages and dialects may be required. But the expert must be able to communicate in his own language and this is not only a matter of linguistics but also a matter of mental attitude. Ability to listen, awareness of nuances of meaning and emotion, sensitivity to the situation—these also are part of the process of communication.

Perhaps the only universal and constant requirement that all technical co-operation tasks impose on the expert is gaining the confidence of those with whom he must work. Confidence in this sense does not necessarily mean affection, friendship, or trust in all instances. It does entail respect for and trust in the integrity and judgment of the expert insofar as his expertise is concerned. Experts have sometimes aroused the hostility of host country officials when their technical advice or service inadvertently interfered with cherished political schemes or ambitions. Nevertheless, these same experts have often been highly regarded as objective and accurate advisers even though their advice was distasteful and perhaps unacceptable. If the expert loses the confidence of the host country officials, his usefulness ends, no matter how right he may be. He can no longer successfully perform the technical aspects of his task because the human relations requirements of his work are no longer met. The task of the expert cannot therefore adequately be understood in wholly technical terms.

## RECEPTIVITY IN THE HOST COUNTRY

Regardless of how the expert or his agency defines his role, circumstances in the host country will have a great deal to do with how the role may be played. There are at least three factors, quite independent of the personality or formalized assignment of the expert, that shape his task and exert a general influence on the situation in which he works.

The first of these is the receptivity of the host country to technical co-operation from abroad in principle and from the expert's country in particular. Guaging the expectations and receptivity of host country officials is seldom easy. The officials do not always fully reveal their purposes in requests for technical co-operation. They may be persuaded to accept co-operation that they do not fully understand or desire. Moreover, the individuals filling public offices may change. Those who negotiated a technical co-operation agreement may be out of office when the expert arrives and discovers that the original enthusiasm and support for his program has disappeared.



The newly developing countries that are the principal recipients of international technical co-operation vary considerably in their receptivity to foreign expertise. They also vary in the types of programs that they welcome. Where public officials are highly sensitized to the possibility of foreign interference in their domestic affairs (as in countries formerly under colonial administration), the expert may be constrained to play a more cautious role than in countries in which no excessive fears of foreign intervention are nourished.

A second factor is the attitude of host country officials concerning the need for the expert's services. Where demand for the service is great and technological skills are weak, the expert may find himself pressed to engage in operational duties—to perform services that the host country has no personnel of its own to provide.

It is often easy for the expert to enter into the operational role. He may know better how to perform the particular service than anyone in the host country. He may indeed have been recruited for an operating assignment and this may be the role in which he can make the greatest immediate contribution. However, he may be tempted into an operating role under less appropriate circumstances. In default of host country support, he may assume operating responsibilities in order to attain the appearance of having achieved technical co-operation objectives. In so doing he risks defeating what may have been his original purpose—to help the host country help itself through developing new capacities in its nationals. Unfortunately, host country officials may be willing to permit him to act as a substitute for one of their own nationals if thereby they obtain the semblance of a successful program and a service with minimal cost to their national budget. The results may superficially appear successful to the expert's superiors at home. But the more fundamental objectives of international technical co-operation are seldom realized in this manner.

### *Readiness of host country to use new knowledge*

A closely related third factor is the readiness of the country to respond to or to support the particular brand of knowledge that the expert represents. Careful program planning should have ascertained the ability of the host country to attain the level of personnel skills and financial support needed to complement and to sustain the work of the expert. But the expert needs to understand that the concern of the host government for his particular services will almost necessarily be sporadic and will be placed (sometimes lost) in a broad, politically colored context. If the expert understands this, he may better overcome feelings of neglect and ingratitude, and he may be better prepared to cope with the delays and false starts that must be reckoned with in technical co-operation work.

The enthusiasm and ambition of host country officials sometimes make them overly optimistic regarding their ability to utilize the level of technical service that they seek. They may, for example, prepare to establish new universities

when by any objective appraisal of need, attention to elementary and secondary schools should claim priority. Another illustration may be drawn from a South American country, where experts arrived to install expensive therapeutic equipment for a hospital only to discover that no technicians had been trained to the point of readiness to receive instruction in the operation of the equipment. If the expert's assignment is inadequately programed in relation to host country readiness to play its role in the co-operative venture, difficulties and disappointments can be safely predicted.

As with American states receiving federal grants, there is sometimes an understandable tendency among nations receiving international technical assistance to obtain such aid as may be available with a minimum of commitment. At worst this may lead to acceptance of programs for which the government in question has no real understanding or enthusiasm and of experts for which it has little use. Under these circumstances it may be impossible to formulate any workable role for the expert.

For example, some years ago a Middle Eastern government requested international technical co-operation to establish machinery for advice on matters of high-level economic policy. A distinguished team of experts was assembled in the country prepared to begin work. Meanwhile, however, the heads of the government changed their minds about the desirability of providing machinery for advice that they had reason to believe might prove annoying or embarrassing. But they were not prepared to admit that they had made a mistake. In consequence, the experts were required week after week to cool their heels in the capital city. They were not permitted to proceed with their assignment; neither were they permitted to abandon it. After several months of frustrating negotiations, this abortive mission was terminated, but with deplorable cost in wasted funds and human resources.

Misguided enthusiasm, national pride, and political importunities among host country officials unfortunately give rise to circumstances in which the expert may find himself confronted with a script quite different from that for the role which he expected to play. When he arrives in the host country it is too late to call off the assignment except under most exceptional circumstances. Realistic and timely appraisal of the expectations and capacities of the host government by the assisting agency and its expert therefore becomes an essential stage in the definition of the role of the expert.

## CLARIFYING THE ROLE OF THE EXPERT

Of the four principal elements that influence the expert's role, the agency concept of his task is the one most susceptible of modification. The greatest opportunity for substantial clarification of the expert's role rests with the agency that extends technical co-operation and employs the expert. For reasons already detailed, the three other elements that shape his role are less amenable to change.

The requirements of the task, technical and behavioral, are fixed by the very nature of the things to be done. They can be changed only insofar as other factors change; for example, the way in which host country officials interpret the task. But it is not realistic to rely altogether upon host country officials for clarifying the expert's role. They must, of course, be involved in the clarification, but we have noted numerous reasons why they cannot assume full responsibility for it. Nor can the expert himself be fully trusted to define his own role even though he will inevitaby shape its development. The expert brings not only knowledge and skills to his task but also a self-image and a complex of personal, sometimes contradictory, motives. In the absence of institutional guidance and direction, these personal factors could seriously distort the role required of him if the purposes of technical co-operation are to be fulfilled.

We are thus ultimately forced back upon the fundamental question regarding the role of the technical expert: What is the purpose of the technical co-operation assignment for which his services are enlisted? Definition of purpose is the inescapable responsibility of the agency that extends assistance and provides the expertise in technical co-operation projects. To the extent that those who formulate and execute the policies at top levels in technical co-operation agencies are unable to achieve clarity or consistency of purpose, it is futile to seek objective clarification of the expert's role in other places.

# Personnel Management for Technical Co-operation

By Ronald W. Jones

Abstract: Since technical co-operation is achieved primarily through people, personnel management assumes particular importance in the effective administration of the programs. While many of the problems are common to domestic activities, many others arise out of the unique nature of this type of program. Requirements are primarily for technical specialists having sufficient experience and maturity to serve as advisers to newly developing countries. Therefore most of those entering this field necessarily do so at mid career without the benefit of specialized preparatory training or experience. Few will have had previous overseas work experience, still fewer in an activity in which the entire family plays a significant role in achieving the objectives of the program for which the father is employed. Until recently, the United States had little experience in building a continuing overseas staff of technicians, ranging from health educators to economists, to agronomists, to tax experts, and others. Over the past few years, however, the International Cooperation Administration has undertaken a fundamental reorientation of its overseas personnel system to better meet the longer range as well as the immediate needs of co-operative programs with sixty-odd newly developing countries. In this review of major problems of personnel management for international technical co-operation, the approaches which ICA is finding practicable are presented as illustrative of principles and techniques which may have broader applicability.

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*Ronald W. Jones, Washington, D. C., has been Chief of the Career Development Division, Office of Personnel, International Cooperation Administration since this division was established in April 1957. He has served in various capacities with ICA and predecessor agencies since 1950 except for 1952–55, when he was Ford Foundation Consultant on Program Evaluation to the Government of India. During this period, he also carried out similiar consultant assignments with the Governments of Burma and Pakistan, respectively.*





That personnel management is accorded separate treatment in this compendium suggests there must be something fundamentally unique about the personnel requirements of technical co-operation programs. There is. The staff member new to this type of activity finds himself, first of all, "away from his home," perhaps for the first time. He and his family must learn how to adjust effectively to a completely new cultural, social, and even physical environment. They must learn how to gain acceptance as "foreigners" and by their acts and attitudes reflect credit upon their organization and their country. Few will have had previous experience of the entire family's playing a significant role in achieving the total objectives of the program in which the father is employed. And every one of them must play this role "in a goldfish bowl," so to speak, twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year.

On the professional side, the employee also typically finds himself in a new role: That of an adviser, a demonstrator, a stimulator in a technical field in which his whole prior experience probably has been as a "doer." To elaborate the qualifications necessary to perform this essential function effectively would carry us far beyond our present purpose. Suffice it to say that technicians engaged in technical co-operation programs obviously must have the expertise which newly developing countries so sorely need to achieve progressive development and internal stability. More importantly, they also must have the ability to put their knowledge to work on practical problems in a way which will help develop the capabilities of co-operating country technicians to cope effectively with similar problems in the future.

On another front, the very nature of technical co-operation programs necessitates unique approaches to personnel programing and management. Being co-operative programs, it is as necessary as it is reasonable that the host government be a full partner in deciding both the program content and the number and qualifications of "outside" technicians needed to carry it out. Unless the means as well as the purpose of foreign assistance is acceptable to the receiving country, how can they be effective in furthering mutual objectives? From an operating standpoint, however, the time required for this step is an additional factor in planning both recruitment and reassignments; hence, in the timely filling of positions.

While many of the problems of personnel management for technical co-operation are broadly common to all public and private organizations engaged in this type of activity, each organization necessarily must approach them in light of its own particular situation. About three years ago, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) began a fundamental reorientation of its overseas personnel system to better meet the longer range as well as the immediate needs of the Mutual Security Program. Toward making the succeeding review of a few of the broad personnel management problems confronting most organizations conducting technical co-operation programs more specific, we shall illustrate briefly these ICA approaches to meeting these respective problems.

## Personnel Programing

What does any organization have reason to expect from its personnel system? Basically: A staff of the quality, composition, and size required to carry out its program in an efficient and timely manner. Personnel programing must, therefore, be geared in the first instance to translating the substantive program into specific personnel requirements and relating them to probable availability of

staff to meet them. Secondly, and more importantly, it must be geared to meeting dynamic personnel requirements at the time and place planned throughout the program implementation stage. The mechanism, therefore, must provide for advance time scheduling of a multiplicity of interrelated actions. Finally, in a continuing technical co-operation activity, the system for personnel programing must make adequate provision for furthering simultaneously other desirable personnel management practices—for example, balanced staffing in the sense of teaming complementary skills and experience, periodic transfer, selective assignments to broaden the experience and develop the capabilities of individual staff members, enhance retention of qualified staff.

In meeting this combination of overall and specific personnel programing requirements, ICA employs three primary tools:

Staffing Patterns (tables of organization) as the primary bases for advance planning of the number and type of staff required to carry out an approved country program, combined with the Personnel Roster reflecting the most pertinent information for each incumbent—for example, time at present post, home leave eligibility date, expected continuity in program.

An Assignment Board which co-ordinates the planning of all assignments and insures not only proper matching of the employee's qualifications and the duties he is to perform, but also that his capabilities are best utilized and developed.

A Completion of Tour Report submitted by the employee and his Mission six months prior to completion of a regular two-year tour of duty which brings their respective recommendations on the employee's immediate future systematically into Assignment Board consideration at the very outset.

## KNOWING THE STAFF: THE KEYSTONE TO PURPOSIVE PERSONNEL DECISIONS

Seldom is the adage "to act wisely one first must know the facts" more applicable than in the field of personnel management. The hopes, aspirations, and basic satisfactions of people are involved as well as efficiency in achievement of program objectives. And, it is not enough that the system provide top management with the knowledge about the staff which it needs for informed personnel decisions. The individual staff members must have confidence that decisions are arrived at objectively in full consideration of their particular capabilities in comparison with those of all others throughout the organization.

Without necessarily arguing that the same approach is equally applicable to all organizations engaged in international technical co-operation programs, experience has demonstrated that for ICA centralized control of assignments, promotions, and related major personnel actions best meets the needs. We should hasten to add, however, that each Mission Director is delegated sufficient flexibility in use of staff assigned to him to best meet current program requirements. Put another way, there is flexibility in the use of staff during a given tour of duty so long as it does not basically affect future use of this employee elsewhere in the total program.

Accurate, comprehensive records on employee performance and professional potential are vital prerequisites to well-informed personnel decisions in this type of situation. Fully as important is the use of this information in such a way as to insure objectivity and fairness to every individual employee. For these purposes, ICA uses four primary interrelated techniques:

Employee Appraisal (Efficiency Report) covering not only an evaluation of the employee's performance of present duties but also that of a wide range of personal and related qualities indicative of strengths and weaknesses for future assignments. In addition to a comprehensive factor rating, this periodic evaluation also includes a narrative discussion of various aspects of the individual's performance and potential.



The Completion of Tour Report, discussed in the previous section, provides the Mission's current evaluation of the employee and recommendation for his next assignment.

An Employee Career Appraisal is designed to elicit the individual's judgment of his best longer range role in the program and the kind of assignments—including training—which will best prepare him for reaching this goal.

Evaluation Panels have been introduced to synthesize all of the above and other relevant—and documented—knowledge about individual employees in making a comparative evaluation of the capabilities of each employee who has completed two or more years in the ICA service overseas. These comparative evaluations, covering an employee's entire professional career, focus primarily upon his future potential and how best to use and develop it. All major personnel decisions—assignments, promotions, terminations, training, commitments with respect to security of employment—are guided by the results of these comprehensive, competitive annual reviews by Evaluation Panels. The second round of these annual Evaluation Panel reviews is now in progress. They are proving invaluable as means for making knowledge about staff an effective tool for purposive personnel management.

## PERSONAL RANK AND FLEXIBILITY

To achieve the essential flexibility in use of staff to best meet dynamic program needs, ICA has adopted a "personal rank" system for setting the grade and salary for the level of officer (Foreign Service Reserve) staff. Each employee's grade and salary is established competitively on the basis of his qualifications and potential value in the ICA program overseas. Entrance grade and salary for a new employee are set by a Selection Panel. This Panel considers his qualifications—both technical and personal—in relation to those of other candidates and of present employees in the same occupational field. Personal Ranks for in-service staff were established on the basis of Evaluation Panel reviews.

Under this system, the individual's Personal Rank—grade and salary—remain fixed until changed as a result of competitive evaluation by an Evaluation Panel. While assignments normally are made to positions classified at the same level, they may be to positions carried on the Staffing Pattern at higher or lower grades if program needs warrant. In either event the employee's salary grade remains at that of his Personal Rank.

The advantages of this flexibility in meeting current priority requirements are fairly apparent. In addition, ability to use qualified staff elsewhere in the program, when they finish their assignments in a particular country, without necessarily waiting for an opening at exactly the same grade level, helps materially to reduce time loss in transfers and also complete loss of individuals needed in the program. The flexibility provided by a Personal Rank system also contributes significantly to security of employment for those who are qualified for and desirous of continuing in the program.

## THE LANGUAGE REQUIREMENT

Ideally every man, woman, and child going abroad for service in technical

co-operation programs should be able to converse fluently in the language of the country in which they will be living and working. Not only would the employee's technical effectiveness be higher. He and his entire family would find adjustment to their new environment much easier, their contacts with the people of their new community mutually more interesting and reassuring. Realities, however, strew the path to this "ideal" with well-nigh insurmountable obstacles. The sixty-odd countries in which ICA operates, for example, comprise considerably more than a hundred different language-dialect areas. Many of these languages are exceedingly difficult to master. Gaining a working proficiency of even the easiest ones requires months of intensive instruction; the more difficult ones up to several years. Transfers to best meet program needs frequently mean starting over with a new language. Basing selection for assignment primarily upon language competence would be to sacrifice unduly technical qualifications in most instances. Keeping a person for long periods in the same country merely because he knows the language would also be to sacrifice other priority objectives of over-all sound personnel management.

About a year ago, in initiating a substantially expanded and intensified program of language instruction for its overseas personnel, ICA adopted a selective job-related approach as being best suited to its immediate needs. Like those of the entire new personnel system, of which language training is an integral part, the policies underlying this program are aimed toward meeting the longer range as well as the immediate needs of the Mutual Security Program. To identify priorities, the importance of language to effective total performance of each position in each country was established at the outset, primarily on the basis of judgment of the Mission to that country. At the same time, each employee reported his best estimate of his own proficiency in foreign languages. Between them the two provide a basis for establishing individual language training needs.

The importance of language to job effectiveness is but one side of the equation. On the other are the practical considerations of feasibility of equipping an incumbent with the proficiency needed. These necessitated varying the approach to different language areas to take account of the difficulty of the language, its transferability to positions in other co-operating countries, and so on. Also consideration had to be taken of the feasibility and comparative advantages, in different situations, of providing language training away from the post and at the post, respectively. Here the time flow of numbers to be trained and the amount and intensity of instruction to be given assume particular importance.

Out of these considerations have evolved five basic patterns of language instruction each tailored to the needs and the feasibility of meeting them in the near future in different situations. In carrying out this language training program, ICA utilizes primarily the language instruction facilities of the Foreign Service Institute in providing the actual training. Shared use of these facilities by ICA, the Department of State, and the United States Information Agency makes it possible to provide, at minimum cost, the quality of instruction and technical linguistic supervision so essential to efficient language training.

This effort to make language a positive tool for enhancing the effectiveness of technical co-operation is yet in its infancy. Many operational problems are still to be fully resolved. And, at best, meeting the language requirements of a diverse and dynamic technical co-operation program is a continuing and long range undertaking. The objectives, nonetheless, are well worth the effort toward achievement.



## DEVELOPING THE PERSONNEL RESOURCE

A comprehensive exploration of the unique character of the employee development "problem" in technical co-operation programs, and the opportunities for and experience of various organizations in increasing the effectiveness of staff performance through planned approaches to employee development would require a separate book in itself. Such a book needs to be written some day. A number of individuals and institutions already have done or have under way exceedingly promising research on various aspects of this problem. But, for the present, let us consider only a few of the major areas.

### *Orientation*

How effectively a person performs in any new position depends in large measure upon how well he understands what is to be done and the total environment in which the activity takes place. Orientation as a planned and systematic activity of the respective organization aims toward facilitating and expediting this essential learning and adjustment process.

How long would be required to adequately prepare a family for their first overseas assignment in a technical co-operation program is hard to say. Certainly longer than ICA, and no doubt most other organizations, can practicably devote to it. In any event, prearrival orientation can never meet the total need. A foreign culture remains an abstraction until a person is in it and has a chance to see and feel the contrasts with his accustomed surroundings.

All ICA employees new to the overseas service participate in a fairly comprehensive three-week orientation program preparatory to departure for their respective missions. In content this program focuses upon the purpose and objectives of the Mutual Security Program; the organization and methods for achieving these objectives; and the sensitizing of the employee to major cultural, social, economic, and political factors in adjustment to a foreign environment. This predeparture orientation is extended and particularized to the respective country by systematic programs conducted at each mission.

### *Career development planning*

Purposive assignment—in the sense of best utilizing and developing an individual's capabilities—necessarily must aim toward some concept of that person's best use in the program at some time in the future. Unless all concerned with the assignment aim toward the same goal, there can but be disagreement and compromise. If the employee's own expectations are inconsistent with the longer range plans conceived by those responsible for his assignment, he is likely to be dissatisfied with the intermediate steps. And, unless the basic facts regarding his potential are adequate and accurately analyzed, achieving his actual best use over time may be purely accidental.

Systematic career development planning is basically a research job. It cannot be done satisfactorily amidst the pressures surrounding individual assignments. Conversely, however, no plan, regardless how carefully prepared, can be more than a guide in the actual assignment process. But, used as guides, and changed as new evidence warrants, individual career plans based upon comprehensive knowledgeable evaluations and discussion with the employee have a real contribution to make to efficient personnel management for technical co-operation as well as for other types of programs.

The International Cooperation Ad-

ministration is moving progressively toward such a system of career planning for selected employees. The annual comparative appraisals made by Evaluation Panels together with the materials from which they are derived—including Employee Career Appraisals—provide an excellent basis for systematic forward planning. Experience of the Department of State and the United States Information Agency has demonstrated such an approach to be feasible in an international service. While the process will be more complex, there is no apparent reason why the basic concept cannot also be adapted to the international technical co-operation field.

*Staff development training*

Training needs in technical co-operation are of two broad types. One is that common to all organizations: Developmental training aimed toward expanding a particular kind or level of competence for which there is a special need or/and the employee's capabilities for higher responsibility. The second broad type is essentially peculiar to technical co-operation personnel. This is the need for periodically updating and revitalizing the technician's knowledge and skills which literally increases with continuity of a technician's service. This is inherent in the technician's role of transporting and adapting technical expertise from a technologically more advanced economy to one which is less developed. The longer the technician works continuously with one project, the farther out of date his own contribution becomes. Thus, periodic training assignments, designed to keep his technical competence fresh and vigorous, can make significant contributions to efficiency of performance.

Beginning in fiscal year 1958, ICA launched—as an integral part of its reoriented overseas personnel system—a comprehensive program of staff development training focusing upon the complex needs outlined above. Operationally, the approach to evaluation of individual training needs is a three-step process: The agency's interest in the man, that is, his potential for future service; how training would enhance his contribution to furthering the Mutual Security Program; and finally the prospective returns in relation to costs including other requirements for his services at a particular time. Training, where given, therefore, must, and does, take a variety of forms. In each respective case the content, method, and duration are tailored to the needs of that particular situation.

In meeting its training needs, ICA utilizes existing facilities of other agencies, universities, colleges, business firms, and others to the fullest extent. In some cases, however, special training programs have to be developed to meet needs unique to this agency. For example, the programing of technical and economic assistance to newly developing countries requires a kind of specialized competence which neither regular academic courses nor work experience in the United States adequately provides. To meet the particular needs in this area, an Institute on ICA Development Programing has been developed and is being conducted for ICA by the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

In addition to these staff development training activities, ICA also has in operation two companion training programs. Both are designed to bring into the program a number of carefully selected younger staff members who have the potential for growing with experience in the program. Prior to initial assignment to regular duty positions, they are given the kind of broad-based work/training experience in the techniques and methods of technical co-operation with newly developing countries which will prepare them for assuming positions of higher responsibility. This type of training program provides a means for at least partially meeting the problem of filling positions from below which is especially difficult in technical co-operation programs where needs are predominantly for staff sufficiently experienced and mature to serve as technical advisers to co-operating countries. They also provide opportunities for well-qualified, but less experienced, persons interested in technical co-operation as a career to follow before they get too settled in other occupations.



## SELECTIVITY IN EMPLOYMENT

Few will seriously question that employment for service in international technical co-operation programs must be highly selective. Precisely how to select the "right" people and avoid sending any who may fail, however, is a different matter. True, there are some guidelines. For example, experience has demonstrated that evidences of inflexibility, emotional instability, a dominating personality, alcoholism, domestic strife, fear of living abroad, and a number of related factors are danger signals. While the converse of these negative characteristics usually tend to be on the plus side, there is no guarantee that this will be true in the individual case. Fortunately, factors affecting success and failure of Americans in technical co-operation and other types of public and private activities overseas are receiving increasing attention by institutions and individual scholars as a field for significant action-oriented research.

The national research project on the Education and Training of Americans for Overseas Service being conducted by the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, for example, is producing a wealth of valuable insights into what to look and watch out for in selecting new employees for assignments abroad.

From research studies of this type and operating experience of organizations engaged in technical co-operation activities, three broad conclusions appear quite clear. First, that personal qualifications are, if anything, more important to success abroad than is pure technical competence. Second, adaptability of the employee's wife and children to a foreign environment warrants fully as much consideration as that of the employee.[1] Behavior of a wife and/or children can more than undo an excellent technician's contribution. Conversely the family can and does make a highly significant contribution toward achievement of over-all objectives of the program when its attitude is positive and its conduct exemplary. Finally, successful performance at home is no guarantee of success abroad.

More definitive knowledge about factors in success and failure and their relative importance would be very helpful. In actual practice, however, the selection problem is less one of knowing what to look for than of identifying positive and negative characteristics prior to employment. The technical competence side is fairly easy; personality traits and family adaptability to a foreign environment very difficult. Despite these handicaps, ICA experience over the years has been quite good. The number sent overseas who, in retrospect, should not have gone has been gratifyingly small. The vast majority have performed as well or better than could be expected, many with distinction under very trying circumstances.

Even so, practicable means have continually been sought for learning more about the prospective employee and

[1] For example see Harlan Cleveland, "The Pretty Americans," *Harper's Magazine* (March 1959).

evaluating this information more critically before an offer of employment is made. At present, these include a record of the individual's work experience and performance, education and other professional qualifications; his credit history; comprehensive reference checks covering both technical and personal qualifications; security investigation; and medical examination. In addition, the prospective employee and his family are interviewed in their home by a person knowledgeable about the personal and family qualifications required in the ICA program overseas. To economize both time and funds, these interviews are conducted by ICA consultants located throughout the country who are employed on a part-time basis. This feature was introduced only a few months ago, and early results strongly commend its continued use.

Evaluation of each candidate's qualifications—both technical and personal—for service in the ICA program overseas is by a Selection Panel. For those judged to be of the caliber needed, these Panels recommend the grade and salary appropriate to the individual's qualifications and potential value to the program. Thus systematic group judgment is applied both to selection and to determination of the Personal Rank with which the individual enters the ICA overseas service.

### MEETING REQUIREMENT NEEDS

Some no doubt will wonder why recruitment comes at the end instead of the beginning of this discussion of personnel management. Obviously a staff has to be recruited before it can be managed. And it is equally self-evident that regardless of its effectiveness in utilizing and developing the staff once employed, a personnel system's success depends largely on its ability to fully staff the program it services. Dropping individuals whose performance, while not unsatisfactory, is below the high quality needed is difficult when the alternative is a lengthy vacancy. Selectivity of employees inevitably varies directly with the number of candidates available. Holding staff members out of regular duty positions for fuller orientation, language training, or substantive training which clearly would be a good investment in the long run must be weighed in relation to immediate program needs.

In short, all of the other aspects of personnel management discussed earlier affect or are affected by the organization's ability to provide enough staff members of the right kind at the time and place needed. To these aspects must be added the fact that in technical co-operation programs, requirements are primarily for specialists sufficiently mature and experienced to serve as advisers to co-operating countries and be so accepted by that country and its own technicians. This requires recruitment, for the most part, of persons already settled in a domestic career. Furthermore, the recruits usually have children of an age where educational facilities and related considerations assume particular significance.

In meeting its recruitment needs, ICA employs a variety of techniques and facilities. Primary emphasis must be upon "pin point recruitment" for specialties needed. Active co-operation of other agencies and the colleges and universities is invaluable. Recently this agency has experimented with paid advertisements in professional journals. Results have been highly encouraging. Effective contacts at professional society meetings also pay dividends.

To facilitate personalized recruitment —always the most effective in meeting specialized requirements—ICA uses a number of consultants on an "as needed" basis. For economy, these consultants are persons located throughout the country who are highly knowledgable of ICA needs in their respective subject matter specialties. Selected overseas staff also are given specific recruitment assignments in conjunction with their home leave. Means such as these are proving valuable supplements to the direct recruitment efforts of the headquarters staff.



In addition to recruitment, as such, two management devices are built into the overseas personnel system to facilitate meeting program needs. These are the Employment and Reassignment Complements: Positions established in ICA in Washington and used on a revolving basis for temporary assignment of selected overseas personnel. The Employment Complement makes it possible to employ a well-qualified candidate at the time he is available without waiting for all the details of co-operating country clearance to be completed. In addition to those actually employed temporarily on this Complement, its availability enables recruitment in general to be positive from the outset, thus helping to reduce declinations during the processing period which seldom can be less than several weeks.

The Reassignment Complement serves to reduce the recruitment load. This Complement makes possible the retention in temporary duty status of overseas staff members the agency definitely needs to meet future program requirements but for whom a specific job assignment cannot be made when they complete their home leave. Most frequently, the need to use this facility arises out of positions being abolished or from delay in effecting country clearance. It also is used in those cases where a temporary medical disability precludes immediate reassignment to an overseas post. Since it was established in October 1956, upward of 200 well-qualified persons have been retained temporarily on this Complement. Many of these no doubt would have been lost to the agency had their only alternative been an indefinite period of leave without pay. Not only would this have required recruitment of replacements; these replacements usually could not have brought with them that added and invaluable qualification of proven capability to perform effectively in technical co-operation overseas.

### IS TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION A CAREER FIELD?

To give a flat yes or no answer to the general question of career opportunities in technical co-operation would be foolhardy at best and misleading at the worst. Too much depends upon the field and breadth of the individual's specialty. If he is a nuclear physicist, for example, the prospects would be pretty slim. Conversely, if his field were teacher training or agricultural extension or one of the other broad fields in which most newly developing countries need and request assistance, the outlook would be quite different.

In short, technical and personal qualifications vis-à-vis the volume of comparable requirements are the paramount determinants. For the person who has that combination of education, experience, interest, adaptability, and flexibility in large demand in technical co-operation programs, there is every reason for him to expect to find a challenging and professionally rewarding career in the technical co-operation field.

As has been indicated throughout the earlier sections of this paper, the ICA overseas personnel system is designed to meet the longer range as well as the immediate personnel requirements of the technical and economic co-operation programs with sixty-odd newly developing countries which this agency has responsibility for administering. It has evolved out of experience with operating this type of program since 1942. It is

concerned with the management of an overseas staff some 95 per cent of which is engaged in the technical co-operation phase of the Mutual Security Program. It is premised upon the assumption that the responsibilities which the United States has newly assumed for technical and economic co-operation with developing countries will require sustained effort for a considerable period ahead. The fundamentals of this system were presented to, and concurred in, by the Congress in 1957 and progress toward getting it installed reviewed in 1958. More significantly, on its own initiative, the Congress increased the appropriation for fiscal year 1959 requested by the Executive branch for bilateral technical co-operation by 8 million dollars ". . . primarily for personnel improvement." This not only lent added confidence in the objectives sought but very materially speeded up progress toward their achievement.

While not a career service in a formal sense, the ICA overseas personnel system embodies the principal desirable features of such a service. It therefore provides a useful case study of the adaptation of basic personnel management principles and practices to the unique requirements of technical co-operation activities. Progress and results thus far have been most encouraging.

# Technical Co-operation for Administrative Improvement

By GEORGE W. LAWSON, JR.

ABSTRACT: The program providing aid in administrative improvements in governments is extensive. Need for improvement is found in all levels and branches of government. Approaches to management improvement include the individual expert or adviser, the contract, and the development of local institutions. Problems in this field are those arising from the formerly dependent status of a country; those resulting from the new independent status; and administrative problems of developing countries. The United States adviser should not try to transplant our methods of management to the host country, but should try to find solutions adaptable to the culture of a particular nation. He usually trains host government personnel and looks for promising trainees. The mature leading officials prefer on-the-job training, and in-service programs have been instituted in many countries. Academic training is effective at the junior level only. A better known aspect of technical co-operation is that of training foreign officials and students in the United States; it is also an important part of technical co-operation in management. Training grants may involve academic training, observation, organized experience, or a combination of these. Observation tours are usually combined with other forms of training. There have been some outstanding accomplishments in the management improvement program of technical assistance, however, there is need for further activity in this field.—Ed.

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*George W. Lawson, Jr., Washington, D. C., is Chief of the Public Administration Division of The International Cooperation Administration. He served previously, from 1952 to 1955, with ICA and predecessor agencies in Korea as Special Assistant for programs and operations and in Washington as Budget Director. He was in the International Activities Branch of the United States Bureau of the Budget from 1945 to 1952; the last two years he served as Chief of the Branch. During this period Mr. Lawson participated in the United States delegation to the preparatory commission for the IRO on the problems of refugees. IN 1944–45 he served briefly with UNRRA. He spent the years 1943–45 in the Office of the Administrator, National Housing Agency.*

NEARLY all technical co-operation involves administrative improvement in one way or another. The malaria eradication project may be bogged down because the wrong kind of insecticide was ordered by the purchasing office. The vocational education program may be lagging because the ministry of finance is slow in paying contractors engaged in putting up the needed buildings. The irrigation project may be stalled while needed equipment is rusting on the docks because the shipping papers have been lost. Unfortunately, all too often the need for administrative improvement is recognized only after projects have slowed to a walk, or ground to a halt.

Assisting governments accomplish administrative improvement has become big business. In 1958 the United Nations and the United States Government applied over 11 million dollars directly to technical co-operation in public administration.

Frequently, projects in administrative improvement result from a discovery that an administrative shortcoming is general rather than peculiar to the ministry in which it first appeared. Examples are weaknesses in supply management, record keeping, and statistics.

The need for improvement has been found at all levels of government—in the offices of presidents and prime ministers, in the ministries, the provinces, the states, the districts, the barrios, and the villages. Management improvement has been pursued in the executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches and in government enterprises—railroads, post offices, and electric power systems.

There have been a number of surveys of the need for management improvement. In 1953, John Blandford surveyed twenty Latin American countries, found much activity in progress, much still to be done. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in its economic surveys frequently discovers the need to improve administration. The Bell Mission to the Philippines in 1950 sparked a large co-operative effort to achieve management improvement that has produced impressive results. The economic debacle following the Mossadegh regime brought to Iran a realization of need for management improvement in government.

## APPROACHES TO MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT

A number of approaches are being used in the solution of management problems through technical co-operation. I will attempt to describe the more important. There is first the individual expert. He may be a member of a co-operative agriculture or other field party, he may be attached to a management team—either a firm engaged for this purpose or a Public Administration Division in a United States Operation Mission—or he may be a lone management adviser. The management expert may be a "direct-hire" employee, on the payroll, of the International Co-operation Administration (ICA) or a United Nations specialized agency. He may have a contract with the assisting agency to provide his services to the host country. Or he may have a contract with the host country, financed by the assisting agency. The management adviser who is an integral part of a joint field party in health, for example, has some distinct advantages. He tends to have the support and confidence of the other members of the field party. He can concentrate his efforts in one ministry. However, many of his management problems will have their solution in other ministries—finance, civil service, supply.

The adviser who is a member of a public administration division of a United States mission will have other



experts upon whom to draw for the solution of various facets of management problems. The Public Administration Division will normally have an entrée into several ministries—thus increasing the opportunity to solve interministerial problems, and will normally have a "backstop office" to provide specialized information or other assistance. One of the possible disadvantages of this approach is that a public administration adviser may be regarded as an interloper by other technicians in other disciplines in the same ministry. In addition, he may be so highly specialized in the techniques of "management" that he fails to see the forest for the trees.

The lone adviser may be in the country to survey the need for additional management assistance. He may have come to help solve a particular problem. He may be required to oversee the work of one or more contractors. His success will depend upon his task being clearly defined and of manageable proportions. It will depend upon the degree of support his work receives from the host country officials as well as the way he fulfills his role, his professional and personal qualities, and the cultural barriers he encounters.

### *The contract and development of local institutes*

Management firms under contract either to the assisting agency, the host country, or both have also been used. Universities on occasion have the furnishing of management advice and research into management problems as a part of their contracts with assisting agencies.

The contract has certain distinct advantages in providing technical assistance where management improvement is needed in very complex situations. A contractor can usually be found who has had extensive experience in solving the various types of management problems encountered in the host country. A successful firm will normally have available a sizable number of capable people who can be dispatched fairly quickly. If the firm is large, it will have a highly desirable degree of flexibility in assigning specialists for short periods to do particular jobs. Good firms provide competent leadership.

Contractors are best used where the management problem is one of clearly definable size and scope, where a team can go in, make a study, recommend a course of action, and to the extent that their recommendations are accepted, install the system or procedure and train host government personnel to carry on. In some cases the contract is more acceptable to the host country, which may not wish to appear to be taking management advice from officers of a foreign government.

There have been some highly successful management firm contracts especially where the contractor can provide a team which has worked together before on similar problems, where they have some language facility and previous foreign experience. One of the disadvantages is that contracts are more expensive man-for-man than "direct hire" personnel.

A longer run approach to the improvement of administration has been through the development of local institutions to train personnel in both business and public administration. Typically, public administration institutes are attached to an existing university although in a few instances they are located in a ministry or a staff agency of the host government.

Locally created institutes are being equipped to provide a wide range of training from typing to input-output analysis. Some offer graduate level work, others undergraduate work, still others offer both. Some offer training only for government employees, others limit

themselves to pre-entry programs. In a number of instances the institutes are inaugurating research programs and consulting services in order to develop teaching materials and to train both faculty and students.

## EXAMPLES OF MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS

In 1958 the United States Government was co-operating in one hundred projects in public administration designed to contribute to the solution of such problems as the lack of management know-how; antiquated tax, customs, and fiscal systems; inefficiently organized government services; complex, burdensome controls on business.

In the Philippines an International Cooperation Administration financed contractor working with a Philippine Reorganization Commission concluded a government reorganization project which produced some forty-one reorganization plans. It also trained the Filipino staff in a newly established Management Services Division of the Budget Commission to put the plans into operation. The Budget Commission, assisted by another ICA financed contractor, completed the installation of performance budgeting for the entire government. Improvements in tax collection have nearly doubled revenues in four years without changes in either tax rates or base.

In Iran a unique institution has been established with the technical assistance of ICA advisers. The High Council for Administrative Improvement—composed of permanent Administrative Under Secretaries—has met weekly for over a year to obtain government-wide consideration of problems between ministries. The "permanent" under secretary concept has so far weathered nearly all ministerial changes, including that of prime minister.

In the Philippines through a contract with the University of Michigan (terminated in 1955) an Institute of Public Administration has been firmly established and is now under Philippine leadership. The Rockefeller Foundation is supporting one American professor at the Institute to assist in its continued development. The Institute was instrumental in founding EROPA, the Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration, and is conducting "third-country training" for government employees from neighboring countries.

In Italy, with assistance provided through an ICA financed contract with the University of California, there has been developed at the University of Bologna a School of Public Administration (now assisted by the Ford Foundation) designed to prepare students for service in the Italian Government. The Ministry of Treasury has pledged five years' support to the school in the form of funds and the annual assignment of thirty to forty civil servants for advanced training in public administration.

The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania is helping the University of Karachi develop an Institute of Business and Public Administration. The Institute now has a student body of approximately 650 students, including evening school and special students, and has generated great interest and support in the business community.

### *Programs in Latin America*

In the Central Bank of Paraguay the work of two short-term consultants resulted in the establishment of an audit unit, the reconciliation of all figures on the balance sheet, a change in the system of unsecured loans from a commercial bank, and a drastic reduction in the number of governmental accounts.

In São Paulo, Brazil, the Michigan State University has helped the Brazilians establish a school of business administration that is winning support from the business community in the form of scholarships; an active market for graduates; and demand for expansion of research, consulting services, and management seminars.

In Peru a "Working Guide for Elementary Training in Records Management" growing out of his field experience was prepared in Spanish by an ICA technician. It has been reproduced and distributed throughout Latin America.

In Panama, the first codification of the nation's 2,600 laws and 7,000 executive decrees enacted since the nation's founding in 1903 was produced. As a result of the project, the business man or lawyer can find a law or decree if he knows its subject, date of enactment, or the ministry to which it applied. A staff of Panamanian law students trained under this project had, at the time this paper was written, almost completed a study to determine which of the laws are now in effect.

In Costa Rica an ICA technician helped to draft and install one of the best personnel systems in Central America. Costa Ricans are now advising their neighbors on improved personnel practices.

## PROBLEMS IN ACCOMPLISHING IMPROVEMENT

What sort of problems does the American technician encounter as he sets about to help promote administrative improvement in a developing country? An ICA public administration adviser recently summarized several years of field observation of the problems that may face the management technician newly arrived in a developing country.[1] The problems he found fall into three general categories: Those arising from the formerly dependent status of the country; those resulting from new independent status; administrative problems of developing countries generally.

The formerly dependent status of a number of the developing countries presents the United States management technician with administrative systems of whose origins he may be only slightly, if at all, familiar. They may be British, French, Dutch, or sometimes once removed, as in Iraq where institutions essentially French in origin were introduced during the Turkish regime. He will encounter holdover administrators, now titled advisers, but actually directors behind the scenes. These advisers frequently resist change and may be at the very least unfriendly to the newly arrived technical assistant. Frequently there will be a scarcity of native administrators; the colonial powers too often neglected to train such people for supervisory and administrative positions.

There may be well-established business relations and subtle cultural and social ties to the former mother country that will have implications both favorable and unfavorable for administrative improvement.

New independent status will have created problems which the management technician must understand. There will be a pressing need to man the new government for a long time after it emerges from the exciting first months of independence. Good people will be in demand as legislators, as policy makers, as administrators. Some posts will be filled by persons who are not prepared for them. Frequent changes in personnel, including cabinet ministers, cause difficulties of uncertainty concerning policies, programs, and staff responsibilities. Able men will be called upon to do double or triple duty. Excessive nationalism may create suspicion of for-

[1] Joseph R. Starr, "Inaugurating Country Programs in Public Administration," unpublished manuscript.

eign advisers, even when their help has been requested by the new independent government. Just when the new administration has begun to settle down, a coup or a revolution may push some of the ablest men aside.

There will be great demand for new state services, in education, and social welfare. Plans, promises, and expectation will far outstrip manpower resources. The new government, for one reason or another, will probably be in charge of a high percentage of major enterprises in the nation. It is then compelled to attempt the resolution of manifold and complex administrative problems.

The management technician will certainly encounter at least some of the ordinary administrative difficulties found in most developing countries. A partial list would include a general shortage of qualified personnel; low professional standards of government employees; no tradition of public service; inadequate salaries of civil servants; overcentralization and inadequate delegation of authority; cumbersome governmental procedures; bad working conditions; poor records systems—with antiquated filing systems; poor budget and accounting systems; lack of training facilities at all levels—secretarial, in-service, university, business, and public administration; weak general housekeeping services; absence of training materials—textbooks, manuals, training films, audio-visual aids; ignorance of staff work, with the need for co-ordination between agencies unrecognized or quite inadequate; improper distribution of functions—some ministers take their favorite functions with them as they change ministries.

## METHODS OF IMPROVING MANAGEMENT

How does the technician go about helping to improve management in the host country? The successful management adviser does not attempt to transplant the methods of his own country. He avoids frequent reference to "the way we do it in the United States." He studies the problem to be solved, develops a number of alternative solutions, lets the host government official select the best solution offered—or stimulates him to develop a new one better suited to the local culture and environment.

While pursuing his advisory activities the alert technician is constantly looking for opportunities to improve management through the training of host government personnel. He is constantly on the lookout for promising trainees. Their training may take a number of forms—in-service, conference, seminar, workshop, academic, observation, on-the-job. The training may be obtained in the host country, in the United States, or in a third country.

As a general rule, the mature official of high caliber does not take kindly to academic training. For him, training must be of the on-the-job character—such as is implicit in the relationship between such officials and the foreign adviser—or it must take the form of a round-table conference with his peers—perhaps under the guidance of an outside expert.

Management officials at the middle level, too, are loathe to "go back to school." In most foreign countries, it is not the custom for a man to continue with formal study once he has begun his career. Hence the need for seminars, conferences, observation tours.[2]

Academic training is effective primarily with junior officials who are selected on the basis of their future potential.

[2] These observations often apply to public officials in the United States except that "going back to school" does not carry the stigma in this country that prevails in many of the less-developed countries in which public administration programs are going forward.



In-service training has been initiated in a number of countries under technical co-operation programs. Projects have ranged from secretarial courses in Guatemala to organization and methods in Iran. Courses are normally run in government quarters during working hours.

A good many of these courses have been highly successful—besides improving basic skills they have opened up opportunities for major administrative improvements. Sometimes the foreign technicians have done too much of the training themselves; they have not developed local teachers. The idea of "training trainers" is being increasingly stressed.

Some of those engaged in technical assistance in management believe that the effort with the best chance of producing lasting benefit will be the management training institutions being established in the developing countries. The technical co-operation objectives here are generally to train a staff of competent teachers, either in the host country or abroad, to construct a curriculum designed to meet the most pressing management needs in the country, to introduce improved teaching methods and standards of scholarship. Research and management service to local government of business are frequently subsidiary purposes.

The college contract has been used most frequently by the ICA in helping to build management training institutions. The UN has generally used its own experts. The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations have also supported the development of institutions which give management training—usually with the assistance of American universities.

## TRAINING OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED STATES

Perhaps the best known aspect of technical co-operation is that which brings foreign officials and students to the United States for training. It is an important part of technical co-operation in management. In 1958, the ICA alone brought 881 men and women to the United States for such training. The UN, the foundations, the trainee's own governments, individual benefactors, and businesses send additional people abroad for management training every year.

The people coming from abroad to be trained are called variously, participants, scholars, fellows, associates, and visitors. The training grant may involve academic training, observation, organized experience, or a combination of two or more of these.

Each of the devices has its advantages and disadvantages. Where a university has developed courses specifically for foreign students—as in taxation at Harvard, local government at Wayne State, economic development at Vanderbilt—the student can gain much from the experience. But regular graduate and undergraduate courses may contain considerable material of no particular relevance for the foreign student and may be presented at too rapid a pace. From the university's point of view, the special course requires extra effort and expense because of the need for especially prepared materials and more personal consultation with individual students.

A few courses are being offered in a foreign language at American colleges and it may be expected that there will be more of this in the future. Believing that facility with English is important to the success of foreign students enrolled in American universities, the ICA requires a minimum score of 70 in written and oral categories on the American Language Center test. If he needs it, the trainee is also given intensive language training after his arrival in the United States.

Observation tours are usually combined with some other form of training.

The observation tour will normally involve visits ranging from a few hours to several weeks at installations, projects, government offices, business firms, industrial plants, and universities. The tours may last as little as a month or may run for as much as six months, depending on the level and scope of the visitor's interests, the length of time he can be spared from his work at home, and the availability of suitable things for him to see. Occasionally high-ranking visitors or groups with the same general interests from the same country will be accompanied by interpreters. Government officials, business firms, educational institutions, local and national associations have been generous in providing the foreign trainees with time, information, and social activities. It has not been a one-way street. Many of the hosts have learned much about the world around them from these charming visitors.

When they arrive, the visitors want to see as many places as possible; when they leave they often complain that they were scheduled at a nightmarish pace, that did not stay in any one place long enough to really learn very much. It is difficult for their advisers to find the golden mean.

Organized experiences have taken several forms. An executive development scheme for members of Pakistan's Superior Civil Service is bringing to the United States for management seminars and workshops at the University of Southern California and on-the-job associations with local, state, and federal officials, two groups of fifteen to twenty of these top Pakistani officials each year for three years. This training of the leading civil servants is expected to prepare the ground for further efforts to introduce modern management concepts in Pakistan.

The ICA has developed workshops in personnel, organization and methods, supply management, budgeting, and accounting. The workshops utilize role-playing, case studies, lectures, group projects, carefully planned and conducted observation tours. These workshops frequently are timed to allow the participant to obtain some academic training as well. Increasing use is being made of assignments of trainees to actual survey parties or as members of staff in state, local, and quasi-governmental agencies. This device is highly regarded but is difficult to arrange for large numbers of trainees.

Every study so far made of public administration trainees, whether trained in the United States, in a third country, or in their own country, has shown that a substantial majority of the people's skills and knowledge are effectively utilized after receiving training under technical co-operation projects. The test here, however, is not whether the returned trainee is found back in the public service—the real test is that the returnee displays a change of attitude toward his work. Has he learned the problem-solving approach, the search for available facts as a basis for finding the answer to a problem? Has he abandoned the practice of attempting to solve problems by intuition? Does he now appreciate the necessity and feasibility of delegation of authority, of reaching decisions through consultation, of group work, of co-ordination? Has he discovered that the administrative problems of his country or agency are not unique and that the experiences of other countries or agencies may contribute to the solution of problems confronting him?

It is difficult to say which method of training is more effective, just as it is difficult to say which of the several ways of technical co-operation in administration is the most effective. There is naturally some slippage due to faulty selection and to changes in the situation at home which is beyond the control of the trainee or the training agency.

The people concerned with providing technical assistance in management improvement can point to a number of outstanding accomplishments, but there is no room for complacency. They see a continuing need for administrative improvement if the people of the developing countries are to realize their aspirations for economic, political, and social improvement.

# The Cultural Curtain

By Dorothy Lee

Abstract: The introduction of technical change into non-Western cultures has, in the past, been done rather haphazardly. Even when the motivation for such efforts has been completely humanitarian, the effects are frequently unfortunate. At times it is impossible to introduce changes because of cultural resistance; on other occasions an "improvement" in a culture has had disastrous ramifications because neither the values of the culture nor the relationship of the environment were considered. It is possible, however, to overcome the difficulties presented by cultural differences. Careful study of a culture is needed; this must include a consideration of motivations, values, the symbolic significance of even seemingly unimportant acts, and a consideration also of all of the dangers inherent in the disturbance of the delicate balance between a culture and its local environment. Such study can result in the introduction of technological improvement which neither destroys the culture it is designed to improve nor opens up a Pandora's box of dangerous secondary results.—Ed.

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*Dorothy Lee, Ph.D., Detroit, Michigan, has been on the staff of The Merrill-Palmer School since 1953. She taught Anthropology at Vassar College, 1940–1953. She has written articles on the conceptual and value aspects of culture for professional journals. She wrote the major portion of Cultural Patterns and Technical Change (1953) edited by Margaret Mead.*





PROGRAMS of induced change are being initiated with increasing concern for the requirements of organization and planning, as well as for the technical training and selection of workers. Yet, throughout the years, their success or failure cannot be explained solely on the basis of these factors. Proposed changes which were clearly necessary and beneficial have often been summarily rejected by the people concerned, or have met with apathy and indifference. Programs have been launched successfully only to fail in the long run. Worse than this, the change itself has sometimes been readily accepted, but has brought unpremeditated results in its wake—destruction of the fabric of the society, loss of the meaning of life, and other unimaginable hardships.

## The Factor of Culture

In such cases, the factor which has been overlooked, the factor which has made for difficulties of communication, is that of culture. Perhaps a proposed program runs completely counter to the religious tenets of a people. For example, it is reported that the Girl Scout manuals which were recently sent from the United States to a school in Indonesia were thrown away unused. The people to whom they were sent are Mohammedans, and they explained that as Moslems they found it abominable to have human beings equated with bears, beavers, and wolves, and to have girls urged to name themselves after animals.[1] Sometimes no account is taken of social groupings. In this country, when Navahos were resettled on irrigated farmland, the arrangements went counter to their established groupings. They were established as individual families of parents and children, far from their relatives, despite the fact that they had been used to working their fields co-operatively in larger units, along extended kinship lines. For these and similar reasons, the project did not prosper.[2]

Most of all, we have often been unaware of the importance of the totality of a way of life. Students of culture are coming to realize that any practice or concept is linked to, as well as supports, many other practices and beliefs which eventually constitute the whole cultural framework; and that it has a special function within this framework. A person from a different culture often finds it difficult to discover or recognize this function; it is easy to see the trait as merely a queer custom. So, in our ignorance, we have tampered with one trait, not realizing that thus we were actually tampering with the whole.

Until recent years, changes were introduced, whenever they appeared obviously necessary or desirable, by traders, missionaries, or colonial governments in a piecemeal or even haphazard fashion. Though some such changes were introduced through the rapacity of traders or the exigencies of colonization, many stemmed from humanitarian motives, and were clearly indicated at least in the eyes of the Western agents.

It was clear to workers in South Africa, for example, that when infants nursed until they were two or more they exhausted their mothers physically and interfered with their work. Bottle feeding was introduced. Soon the mothers were even more exhausted, because they began to bear children every year. The taboo on intercourse during lactation no longer worked to space their children at intervals of three or four years. Again, it was clear to colonial governments and missionaries that infanticide and head-hunting, as well as the poor sanitation attending childbirth, were evils to be

[1] Arthur Goodfriend, *Rice Roots* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), p. 47.

[2] Tom Sasaki and John Adair's article in *Human Problems in Technological Change*, edited by Edward H. Spicer (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1952), pp. 97–111.

eradicated. Yet they never considered the results of such an eradication and were unprepared for the enormous increase in population in areas where population and food resources had previously been kept in balance. The consequence of their humanitarianism was overcrowding, malnutrition, and a sentence of emigration for people deeply attached to their homeland.

What went wrong here? The change had obviously been effectively introduced; it had been accepted by the people, or at any rate it had not been rejected. In fact, it had probably been welcomed. But this was not enough. The agents literally had not known what they were doing. They knew nothing of the cultural framework of the society with which they were dealing, and they tampered in ignorance with one of its sustaining parts. They knew nothing of the ecological relationship with the habitat which the culture helped maintain. This is not to say that, knowing this, they would have refrained from acting to save lives and abolish fear; but rather that they would have taken account of the function of the traits which they were changing or displacing, and then would have acted accordingly.

## Recognition of Total Pattern

We have learned since then that, in taking account of the cultural factor, we have to consider not only the function which the trait serves within the whole cultural framework, but also the role the trait plays in relating man to his habitat. Man adjusts to his environment by means of his culture. When he moves to a cold climate, he does not grow fur. He builds an igloo and lives warmly in it, grouped closely with his family; or he invents central heating and makes possible the comfort and privacy which he values; or, like the Sioux, he teaches himself physical endurance, he exalts the virtue of hardihood and learns to take the cold in his stride proudly. But each society does this in its own way, meets its environment through its own particular culture, through a patterned constellation of traits. Sometimes the cultural adjustment works hardship on the members of the society and its neighbors, or is an out-and-out evil from the point of view of Western culture, as for example, infanticide and ritual murder. Sometimes, we merely regard a practice as wrong, or as based on ignorance and move in to help without considering the whole picture. So progressive Turkish farmers were persuaded by Western-educated Village Institute workers to remove from their fields the stones which served to keep the moisture in through the long dry weeks of the summer; as a result their crops withered, while those of the conservative farmers prospered.

In addition, we have learned to take into consideration the function of each trait as an integral part of the whole. We have learned that no trait is too small or unimportant to be manipulated safely, without repercussion. For instance, earlier in this century, an apparently slight and insignificant change was introduced among the Australian Yir Yoront. A Mission was established among them and the missionaries gave steel axes as gifts to adult men and women, and to young people of both sexes. The axe was not new to the Yir Yoront; they already had stone axes. Yet this one friendly gesture, according to Lauriston Sharp, is probably responsible for the eventual destruction of the entire internal social structure of the group as well as of its intertribal relationships.

The ownership of an axe had been, up to then, a badge of adult masculinity. Traditionally, only adult men could own them. Axes were loaned by an adult man to a younger man, and by a man to a woman; and along these established lines of axe-borrowing fell the relations between man and wife, older brother and younger brother, father and son. Now axes were owned by women and young men, and the established relations became confused. The symbol of authority was lost and authority itself became unclear; this gave rise to confusion, and to the insecurity of uncertainty. In addition, the stone for the axes was quarried far to the south, and was traded north along a route of trade partners, who also participated in the ceremonials of one another's groups. All these relations, all this participation in the rich life of the ceremonials of other groups, was now lost. The small and obviously desirable change from stone to steel axes turned out to be neither insignificant nor beneficial.[8]

## Culture Taken into Account

To balance such unfortunate occurrences, we have many cases where change has been introduced with happy results, by agents who have had knowledge and understanding of the culture of the group with which they were dealing. Such is the work of the British Health Centre in Natal, which was established in 1940. These workers studied the ramifications of the entire culture, as well as the history of the Zulu group with which they were dealing. According to the report written in 1953, the comprehensive health program they proposed to institute suggested the introduction of change in three areas: in food habits, in the treatment of tuberculosis, and in practices which led to erosion. The first of these was definitely successful; the second only partially so; and the third was not attempted because investigation showed that if it could have been effectively introduced, it would have taken away from the people practices which were of great value to them.

The first undertaking was of a kind which is usually very difficult to carry out. The effect of malnutrition is not directly demonstrable; it is difficult to explain to people why a change in their food habits is necessary. Why interfere with them? What harm do they do? An attempt to change them usually meets, in addition, obstacles stemming from the emotional and symbolic significance of food. Among the Zulu, general resistance stemmed from their close tie to their ancestors. This, they said, had been the diet of the ancestors; it was the sanctioned diet. The ancestors, who were concerned with the daily affairs of the people, would be angered if the diet was changed. The team, however, armed with history, showed the people that the diet had in fact been richer and more varied in ancestral times, before the coming of the Whites.

There were additional difficulties when it came to the attempt to increase the consumption of milk, particularly among women of childbearing age. These came from a taboo protecting the cattle, which represented perhaps the greatest value to the Zulu. Women, in any reproductive capacity, while pregnant or lactating or lochial or while menstruating, were dangerous to the cattle, and should therefore avoid all contact with them; to consume milk was to come into such contact. To prevent all possibility of error, girls after pubescence were forbidden milk at all times. In addition, people could consume the milk only of the right cattle; these were the cattle owned by the head of the household to whose kinship group they belonged. This meant that, if they were away from the appropriate cattle, they could not include milk in their diet.

The team of workers recognized and respected the strength of the religious beliefs that supported these customs.

[8] Lauriston Sharp's article in *ibid.*, pp. 69–90.

They did not attempt to tamper with them. Instead, they hit upon a simple solution. They introduced powdered milk. Though the nature of this was known, it could not be associated, either symbolically or emotionally, with cattle.

In their attack on tuberculosis, the team of workers again met resistance. For people who found deep satisfaction in eating out of a common dish and living in close contact with friends and relatives, the concept of isolation was thoroughly unacceptable. To go to a hospital a hundred miles away, to be long ill away from all loved ones, to face the probability of dying away from home and the protection of the ancestors, was a terrifying prospect. Besides, the Zulu had no reason to doubt the efficacy of their curative methods. These stemmed logically from a set of premises which the Western workers could not prove to be wrong, although they knew them to be so. Through a consistent effort at understanding and responding to the cultural roots of the resistance, the workers finally did make some progress in changing methods of treatment. However, they had to abandon their plan to enlighten the people as to how tuberculosis was spread because, to these Zulu, any disease associated with labored breathing or pains in the chest was due to the machinations of an ill-wisher. Therefore to tell a father that his daughter had brought tuberculosis into the family would be to accuse her of being an evil witch. If they had insisted on keeping their Western plan of a "good" attack on tuberculosis, they would have endangered their entire tuberculosis program.

When the team came to consider the question of erosion, they found out that the pressing need was for the reduction of the herds of cattle. Yet the meaning of life for the Zulu man was bound up with the lives of his cattle. He saw in them the link between himself and his ancestors. With them he validated his marriages, and created and strengthened all affinal bonds. He knew and loved each one of his cattle, each detail of their personal appearance and each idiosyncracy. To ask these people to reduce their herds would have been tantamount to asking them to destroy a loved family member or the strength of their social bonds, or to give up an important part of the value of life. So the team abandoned this part of their program, at least temporarily; they wisely decided to refrain from destroying value.[4] In fact, the people's values would probably have defeated all attempts to institute voluntary reduction of herds.

## VALUES AND CHANGE

The factor of values is often responsible for the rejection of a proposed change. For instance, the Baiga of Central India refused to be persuaded to change from a digging stick to a plough in the cultivation of their fields. The earth for them was a generous, loved, and kindly mother. With a stick they could help her gently to bring forth fruit for them; they could not bring themselves to cut her "with knives."[5]

In fact, when attempts at mechanization, or even at the introduction of an iron plough to replace the light wooden plough, have necessitated the consolidation of scattered holdings into one continuous field, they have sometimes been defeated by this factor of value. People have not wanted to part with one small plot in exchange for another contiguous to their other holdings because, as Dube says of the village his group studied, "The earth occupies a mother's position, and parting with any fragment of it is nearly tantamount to separation from the Mother."[6]

Fertilization of arable land has also been widely rejected on the basis of value, in this case of the value of what we might call autonomy—the autonomy of land and plants. So Cambodian farmers have generally rejected fertilization as interference.[7] And in Ettawah, a village leader saw green manuring as an act of violence against the living plant: "Green manuring involves a very cruel act of plowing under the sanhemp leaf and stalk before they are ripe. This act involves violence."[8]

If we manage to change the practices of such people without understanding the function they serve we may be taking away from them sources of deep emotional satisfaction and security. If what they see us urging them to do is a violation of the rights of land and nature in general, we are also forfeiting their respect, and our claims to democratic principles will accordingly be considered hypocritical.

However, a profound knowledge of the culture may help the worker to rest his proposed change upon the basis of the cultural values, and even to enlist these in his work. This has been done by perceptive agents of change. In Ettawa, for instance, when the worker suggested green manuring as a means for greater agricultural production, the leader countered rejecting all improvement: "Our culture teaches us not to be too greedy or anxious for more economic production. Remember that Kabir, the saint poet, prayed to God, 'Give me only so much wealth that my family may meet its average needs, that I may not remain hungry, and that the saints or mendicants may not go away from my door hungry.'" The worker, versed in the principles of Brahmanism, argued convincingly that it was important to increase production, since most villagers found themselves unable to meet these sacred obligations to the family, the religious mendicants, and themselves.[9]

## CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION

There is more to effective cross-cultural relations, however, than the recognition of the integrity of culture and a respect for cultural values. The entire structure of premises and assumptions differs from culture to culture. The background of concepts and categories and expectations which shapes our perceptions differs; and the symbolic meaning of an act differs according to cultural background.

I see a Cretan woman, for instance, meticulously picking up every breadcrumb which has fallen on the floor.[10] What I see is a house-proud woman, keeping her floor unlittered, neat and clean. Someone else sees a hungry woman, saving every scrap of food. But the Cretan woman is neither. She is not performing a utilitarian act; to her it has a religious significance. She is fulfilling a sacred duty to bread, the sacred food. If she leaves it on the floor, she may be responsible for an act of sacrilege; someone might step on it and thus desecrate it. Therefore, it is imperative for me not only to observe this act, but to perceive it in terms of the framework in which it finds its motivation and derives its meaning. Other-

[4] John Cassel's article in *Health, Culture and Community*, edited by Benjamin David Paul (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1955), pp. 15–41.

[5] Verrier Elwin, *The Baiga* (London: J. Murray, 1939), pp. 106–107.

[6] Shyama Charan Dube, *Indian Village* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955), p. 75–76.

[7] David J. Steinberg and others, *Cambodia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture* (New Haven, Conn.: HRAF Press, 1957), p. 201.

[8] Albert Mayer and others, *Pilot Project, India* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958), p. 209.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 208–209.

[10] Leland G. Allbaugh, *A Case Study of an Underdeveloped Area* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 104.

wise I might be tempted to give the woman food, or a broom, in an irrelevant and possibly insulting attempt to help.

The woman's act conveyed reverence; it was a meaningful rather than a utilitarian act. And the meaning of an act is hard for the foreign agent to discover. Yet to overlook symbolic or religious meaning is often disastrous. We have made such mistakes, as when, to combat Communism, we made posters showing pictures of great religious figures contrasted to pictures of Stalin and Lenin; to the Moslem Indonesians a pictured Mohammed was anathema.[11]

It is also a mistake to assume that our own symbols are universal. Thus, for me to seat a guest on my right is to show him public honor; my Chinese guest would view this as a slight since for him the left is the place of honor. To me, a room of my own means coveted privacy and convenience, as well as prestige. If my firm gives me a desk in an office shared with others, or my hostess offers the only guest room to another friend and expects me to double up with the children, I shall probably feel slighted. To people of another culture, a room of one's own may spell rejection or deprivation.

At best, to be blind to the symbolism of the culture with which we are dealing may mean that we cannot communicate effectively. And we cannot depend on our own inventiveness, or our knowledge of so-called human nature. We have to discover the symbols of the people with whom we are dealing. I know that it would never have occurred to me to teach reading with the imagery which Nahuatl teachers were advised by the Mexican government to use: Introducing the words as friends, urging the child to search for his new friend in the population of the page, and later in other such "communities."[12] Yet symbolic meaning can be discovered; the examples I have given so far have all been reported by perceptive people coming from outside the cultural group they were observing.

Another obstacle to cross-cultural communication is the difference in perception between people of different cultural backgrounds. Here the foreign agent of change labors under a double handicap. He perceives according to his own familiar categories, and he is perceived according to unfamiliar categories. The anthropologist, Malinowski, working with South Sea islanders forty years ago, was asked what kind of magic he used to grow yams in England. This question assumed fallaciously that Malinowski farmed, that when he farmed he naturally grew yams, and that he worked magic over his yams. Our questions must often be as irrelevant when we deal with people in cross-cultural situations, but the assumptions behind them are usually held unconsciously and are therefore hard to eradicate. A young Hopi schoolboy, the Christian son of a Christian mother who had herself attended a white mission school, recently asked a white visitor to what clan she belonged. Many anthropologists return from field trips unaware of having made equivalent mistakes.

An occurrence is often perceived as a fact according to the precepts of the culture. The Hopi Talayesua, for example, knowing four to be the valid number, perceives that cocks crow four times before daybreak.[13] We observe the unhurried pace of others and perceive them as lazy or inefficient, yet Jane Belo, who describes the sauntering

[11] Goodfriend, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), p. 18.

[12] W. D. Preston, "Reviews," *International Journal of American Linguistics,* Vol. 16 (January 1950), p. 58.

[13] Leo W. Simmons, *Sun Chief, The Autobiography of a Hopi Indian* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1942), p. 62.



of the Balinese, goes on to speak of her neighbors in Bali, who—a family with two children of eight and ten—"sauntered" fifty miles to a temple and back in less than twelve hours.[14]

And so our own acts, our own motivations, are usually perceived not as we see them but according to the cultural framework of those who see us. It is enlightening to read how the Sioux chief, Sitting Bull, perceived the achievements of civilization in the eighteen seventies: "They claim this mother of ours, the Earth, for their own use, and fence their neighbors away from her, and deface her with their buildings and their refuse. They compel her to produce out of season, and when sterile she is made to take medicine in order to produce again. All this is sacrilege."[15]

Throughout the world, we have offered material aid to groups of people who recognize responsibility only to their families and their relatives, and cannot understand why anyone should want to help complete strangers. We saw ourselves as generous, or as laudable for recognizing our responsibility; they often saw us as naive, perhaps stupid; or they could explain our queer act only as an attempt at a form of bribery.

## LOGICAL TENETS

In Western culture, we have the notion of opposites which are mutually exclusive. This notion shapes our thinking as well as our acts, and has made for much difficulty in our attempts to introduce change among people who do not have this notion. Among most societies of my own knowledge this notion does not exist. What we call opposites do not oppose, nor do they exclude each other. A test which was recently given to Zuni children based on pairs of opposites failed because "good" and "bad," for example, were not opposites for the Zuni.

In China, our mutually exclusive opposites enclose a complementary whole. In Japan, they set limits for the "in-between path of moderation." In such societies we have not "either-or" but "either-and." Our Western workers have to introduce change to people who can hold two contradictory stands simultaneously, and who cannot see why we insist that they give up the old while accepting the new.

The co-existence of either-or is in fact very common throughout the world. Chinese Communist leaders made use of it, as the yin-yang principle, in presenting thought control and decentralization to the people as complementary. In the United States, the Navaho see no difficulty in considering their divine beings as simultaneously good and bad, and a sick man, in becoming identified with such a being during the curing process, asks to become both good and bad.

We take it for granted that certain conclusions follow from certain premises. We learn, for instance, that the Cambodians are not attached to their land and are ready to leave it and acquire another piece. So we conclude from this that they are therefore ready to contemplate study in a foreign country or to emigrate. But we are wrong. In fact, it seems that most Cambodians would rather be executed than leave their homeland since, if Cambodians die elsewhere, their souls may be unable to find their way back to be reborn as Cambodian. Their constitution outlaws punishment by exile as too harsh a sentence.[16]

[14] Jane Belo, in *Personal Character and Cultural Milieu,* edited by Douglas G. Haring (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1956), pp. 158–159.

[15] Quoted in Charles A. Eastman, *Indian Heroes and Great Chieftains* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1927), p. 120.

[16] Steinberg, *op. cit.* (note 7 *supra*), pp. 42 and 36.

### PROGRESS AND ASPIRATIONS

Many of us in Western society assume that progress is good and is naturally recognized as such by all. But in many other societies progress is not a goal, nor a desired good beckoning to action. We can possibly introduce change to these people as the eradication of ills, but not in the name of the "bigger and better," or even of the new. We have assumed that, if people had a higher income, they would spend it in the interests of what is in our own view a higher standard of living; we have found to our confusion that this is not necessarily so. From the Middle East, from the Far East, from Africa come reports that when the price of agricultural products or the level of wages is raised, people work less since they can maintain their known and tried way of life with less effort. We have learned that people have to be helped to recognize their wants and aspirations. And beyond this, we have helped them to see that it is possible to achieve what they want, to translate their dreams into plans. Occasionally, we have interfered to the extent of creating aspirations where none seemed to be present.

The obstacles presented by cultural differences have often been overcome. Many cases such as that of the comprehensive health program among the Zulu, carefully and reflectively undertaken, have been reported in recent years. Planned change is also being brought about by people working in their own countries who know the culture they are dealing with, its symbolism, its values, and its pattern of perception. So Ibn Saud quoted the Koran over the radio and the telephone when inaugurating these systems,[17] Chinese Communists reinterpreted Confucianism in support of Communist ethics,[18] and Japanese architects used their understanding of native notions of space and family relations to achieve the miracle of housing families in a net space of 380 feet square.[19] In this country, we are studying profitably the introduction of these changes. To this, and to our increasing awareness of the factor of culture in experience and communication, we can add what we already have as our heritage—an understanding of the technology we are introducing within the cultural framework of which it is a part.

[17] Carl C. Taylor and others, *Experience with Human Factors in Agricultural Areas in the World*, United States Department of Agriculture, Extension Service, No. 1018, 1949, p. 19 (Multigraphed). See also Najmeh Najafi, *Reveille for a Persian Village* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958) and Ernestine Friedl, "Hospital Care in Greece," *Human Organization*, Vol. 16 (Winter 1958), pp. 24–27.

[18] David S. Nivison, *Communist Ethics and Chinese Tradition* (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1954), pp. 18–20 (Mimeographed).

[19] Saburo Asaba, "Housing Design Problems for Japan Housing Corporation," *Papers of The Sixth International Conference of Design* at Aspen, Colorado, June, 1956.

# The United Nations Program in Brazil

By MICHAEL H. H. LOUW

ABSTRACT: Brazil is on the threshold of a great economic development and social change and needs large numbers of skilled administrators and technicians in all fields to carry through the necessary programs for using its vast natural and human resources. The role played by the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance in this development has been most significant because first, it was timely, and second, it focussed public attention on key areas where developments could be expected to have widespread effect. This is especially true for the projects associated with regional development, such as that of the Amazon Valley, the San Francisco Valley, and the Northeast. Two national projects: the Brazilian School of Public Administration and the Educational Reform Program have also made important contributions in the formulation of future policies in the fields of administration and education.

On these various projects a large number of specialists from many fields, specialized agencies, and nationalities, served together as teams or groups; and in the process, they in turn, learned the art of effective personal and interdisciplinary co-operation, not only among themselves but also with their Brazilian colleagues.

*Michael H. H. Louw, Ph.D., New York City, is consultant in Public Administration in the United Nations. He has been associated with the Brazilian School of Public Administration, the Northeast Bank of Brazil and with the United Nations Headquarters on various projects in public administration training. He was formerly senior lecturer in Political Science at the University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa.*

IN geographical size and in population Brazil is the second largest country on the American continent. But, in spite of vast natural resources and tracts of valuable agricultural land, the standard of living of the majority of its people is relatively low, and Brazil cannot provide for many of its food and industrial needs. In a very special sense, however, Brazil is the land of tomorrow: Its society is dynamic and mobile, its people forward-looking and confident of the future. The realization that a vast job of reconstruction and development has just begun has made the Brazilian people and its government particularly receptive to modern ideas and techniques of economic and social development. The association of the United Nations and its specialized agencies with this extensive social and industrial revolution of Brazil is therefore, in spite of its relatively small scale, of special significance.

Brazil has long been a forceful advocate as well as a recipient of international technical aid. It has sponsored a number of UN resolutions on technical assistance, notably in the field of public administration. Brazil is one of the two countries (the other is Denmark) which has established its own national fund (Catalogue of Services), out of which fellowships for students from other countries studying at its institutions are financed. It was also one of the first countries to establish a National Committee for the Coordination of UN Technical Assistance which ensures an orderly and systematic annual country program of United Nations aid to its various requesting agencies.

However, the very fact that Brazil is on the threshold of a period of great economic development and social change points up some of the country's serious deficiencies in skilled manpower to carry through this development, especially in the technical, managerial, and administrative fields. Its government administration and its business system are not yet extensive or specialized enough to fulfil all the necessary basic functions which are necessary in large-scale economic development. In spite of its vast national resources, many still unsurveyed, Brazil lacks the necessary investment capital to exploit them, and such investment is further complicated by the existence of a serious inflationary trend.

Since the resources of the United Nations Expanded Program are too limited to embark on many or on large-scale programs, the projects for which technical assistance was provided had to be chosen on the basis of their relatively small cost and their potential significance in stimulating further development within the country. This policy is in agreement with the general view of the United Nations Technical Assistance Expanded Program—that is, that individual assistance programs should not be too large in order to allow a distribution of resources over a number of different types of programs, and that projects should have a "multiplier effect," that is, they should have a wide stimulating effect by arousing public interest or further government action. The major projects in Brazil undoubtedly satisfy these two requirements—the Brazilian School of Public Administration has had a tremendous impact in creating public and governmental interest in improved public administration, not only in Brazil, but throughout South America; the Amazon Valley, the San Francisco Valley, and the Northeast Brazil projects have demonstrated the possibilities of regional development; the Educational Reform project has generated extensive public interest and debate; and the International Labor Organization (ILO) assistance to vocational training has met with appreciative response from the business community.



The specialized agencies and the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (Participating Organizations) work jointly through a Technical Assistance Board to determine the overall program and the target figures for each recipient country within it. The following projects, in many of which a number of Participating Organizations took part, are described.

## THE UNITED NATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION

The United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (UNTAA), which was established as a department of the United Nations Secretariat in 1950, is a Participating Organization in the Expanded Program and is responsible for technical assistance in the fields of economic development, social welfare, and public administration. It was also given the additional responsibility of providing aid in areas of activity not specifically or inferentially covered by the other specialized agencies, and technical assistance projects of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) are administratively supported by UNTAA.

UNTAA has provided technical assistance in the following projects:

### *The economic development of Northeast Brazil*

This vast area, with a population of 18 million inhabitants, is often afflicted by serious droughts which cause great hardship and migration to the south. Its per capita income is less than half of that of the national average. For many years the federal as well as state governments have been concerned with improvements in the economic and social conditions of this depressed area and particularly with measures, such as the construction of dams and irrigation works, to counteract the effects of droughts.

As a major step to stimulate economic development in this area, in 1953 the government established a regional development bank—Banco do Nordeste do Brasil—in Fortaleza, capital of the state of Ceará, to finance private and public enterprize. This bank has since become a focal point in development programs in Northeast Brazil, and a number of UN experts have been associated with it.

The first expert from UNTAA arrived in 1954 to advise the bank on general economic survey work in the region, to prepare plans for an economic program, and to help the bank in the establishment of an effective research unit and the training of some of its research personnel. In co-operation with the Northeast Association for Rural Assistance and Credit (ANCAR) and the bank, in 1955 a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) expert arrived to assist in the development of a system of supervised agricultural credit covering eight states in the northeast. He also advised and served these institutions in the organization and training of field supervisors and in the operation of a supervised credit program. Another FAO expert prepared a report for the bank on the feasibility of an agricultural development program for the region with special reference to its indigenous resources, such as vegetable oils and waxes, animal husbandry, and fibres. He was followed by another expert in 1958 to give advice on the marketing of agricultural products.

It became increasingly evident that some co-ordination of the various development programs of the different federal and state agencies was essential, and in 1957 a Working Group was established

by presidential decree. A number of UN experts were assigned to work directly with this Group or through the bank, which was designated as the central activating agency for the Group. A senior public administration expert, the former Chief of Personnel of the Tennessee Valley Authority, was designated by UNTAA to co-ordinate the work of the UNTAA team assigned to work with the Group. The team included a development economist, a minerals expert, a transport economist, and three public administration experts: budget, personnel, and training. With the exception of the team co-ordinator, who was stationed in Rio, all these experts were attached to the Northeast Bank in Fortaleza and worked in close co-operation with the bank's officials in drafting short- and long-term programs. The United States Government, through its International Cooperation Administration, also provided the bank with an expert in loans to public authorities, and he worked in close and effective relationship with the UN team.

In 1957 an International Labor Organization (ILO) expert in manpower problems was assigned to the bank to assist in surveying the manpower situation in the northeast area. His work covers labor supply and demand, occupational distribution of the labor force, and the analysis of the occupational requirements of industry and agriculture. In addition, two short-term United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) experts assisted in planning and developing an educational survey of the northeast. The UNESCO team of two hydrogeologists was also reassigned to the Working Group in the northeast to train hydraulic engineers for work in that area. Their work included the establishment of a hydrogeological laboratory and a postgraduate course in applied geology at the University of Recife.

### *Escola Brasileira de Administraçao Publica (EBAP)*

In 1951 the Brazilian Government, acting through the nonprofit, government-supported Getulio Vargas Foundation and in collaboration with UNTAA, established the first training center in public administration in Latin America. The initial phase of this joint project consisted of a pilot course held November 1951 to March 1952 for about 60 senior officials from Brazil and various other Latin-American countries and of an international seminar on the "Organization, direction and functioning of the auxiliary services and staff agencies" held in February 1952. The documentation prepared for this seminar and experience gained from the pioneering pilot course proved to be most useful in the subsequent formal establishment of the school in April 1952. Under a supplementary agreement covering a period of five years, UNTAA provided the services of one project officer and four experts in public administration and assistance for twenty-one fellowship years. UNESCO provided the services of one expert in comparative administration.

These experts were succeeded by others in the same fields and in the fields of public relations and municipal administration until the end of 1956 when the agreement expired and only the provision of unused fellowship years remained. During these five years, eighteen experts—ten from the United States, two from the United Kingdom, one each from Brazil, Venezuela, France, Sweden, South Africa, and Puerto Rico—taught and advised at the School, and 1369 students—of which 1130 came from Brazil and 239 from other countries in Latin America—received training in specialized courses in public administration. Of the twenty-two Brazilians who went overseas for advanced studies, twelve received UN fellowships and ten received fellowships under the Institute of Inter-American Affairs.

The School has become one of the two most important centers of training and research in public administration in Latin America—the other also being a UN-assisted project, the Advanced School of Public Administration in Central America, at San José, Costa Rica—and has made a significant contribution to the improvement of public administration, not only in Brazil but (through some of its alumni) also in other countries in the region.

### *Other projects*

The training project in economic development is an extension to Brazil of the intensive eight-month training program in economic development initiated by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in 1952 at Santiago and later repeated in Colombia. The course, with some modifications, was started in Brazil in 1956 with 55 students and was repeated in 1957 with 66 students. The project's main purpose is to train economists and senior public officials in the principles of economic development. It embraces courses given by UNTAA expert lecturers and Brazilian specialists in social accounts, programing economic development, preparation of economic development projects, financing, and administration. Special lectures on Brazilian economic problems were also provided.

The government has expressed its satisfaction with the project and requested that it be established in the form of a permanent training center in 1958.

Since 1957 UNTAA has provided the Institute for the Rehabilitation of the Physically Handicapped in São Paulo with the services of three experts: a general adviser, a physical therapist, and a prosthetic technician. The general adviser is primarily concerned with the development of administrative procedures. In 1958 an ILO expert on vocational rehabilitation was assigned to the Center to advise on programs for vocational training and guidance of the physically handicapped.

Two World Meteorological Organization (WMO) experts were appointed, one to make a survey of general meteorological requirements and another to train radiosonde observers and direct the installation of equipment.

## FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which has a regional office in Latin America, has long taken a keen interest in the special problems of food, forestry, and agriculture in Brazil. Its work has therefore been mainly associated with regional projects.

The exceptional opportunities of the San Francisco River for rational exploitation of its hydroelectric and irrigation resources led the Brazilian Government to establish two commissions: the Hydroelectric Commission of the San Francisco (CHESF) and the Commission of the San Francisco Valley. The latter Commission was especially concerned with the provision of a settlement area to alleviate overpopulation in the northeast region.

In 1953, FAO initiated its assistance to this Commission by providing five experts to advise on different aspects of land and water development, soil productivity, colonization, land tenure, farm management, and irrigation. Their work entailed the making of soil surveys; the training of sixty-three students in soil morphology and classification; the determination of the optimum farm unit for resettlement; and advice on the planning of irrigation and drainage

works, on land settlement policies and programs, on farm organization, planning and financial arrangements for the purchase of new land, and on water use policies.

A number of fellowships for overseas study in these specialized fields were also awarded to Brazilians, mostly from the region.

To accelerate the exploitation of the vast timber resources of the Amazon basin and to improve the relatively low living standards of its inhabitants, the Brazilian Government decided to establish a special body for the development of this region: the Superintendency of the Plan for Economic Development of Amazonia (SPVEA).

The first FAO team of experts in 1952 studied forestry development possibilities in the area and reported that it would be feasible to increase forest production threefold during the next ten years. These experts also advised on forest policy, saw-milling, logging, and forest inventories. They also participated actively in the setting up of a logging demonstration center at Benjamin Constant and a training center for saw-milling at Santarém.

In 1953 the team was joined by a forest inventory expert, who through the newly developed technique of photogrammetry by 1956 completed an inventory map of all timber species in an area of two million hectares. This sample inventory will provide a basis for future policies of forest exploitation. In 1955 a sylviculturist initiated a program of tropical forest research—including the establishment of demonstration plots and nurseries—and of a research plan at the Amazonian Research Institute at Manaus in forest botany, ecology, forest soils, and wood technology.

In 1957 the logging center was closed down and all its equipment and facilities transferred to Santarém. Here was built a large-scale training center under three FAO experts, two in logging and one in sawmilling.

*Geology, agricultural practices, fisheries, and animal husbandry programs*

In 1955 UNESCO provided two experts in geology to work with the FAO team and with SPVEA in making geological surveys of selected areas. These surveys produced important information on mineral deposits in the soil and subsoil in the area and provided a basis for future exploitation. But the lack of suitably trained local staff to work with the UN experts hampered further survey efforts, and this fact was repeatedly brought to the attention of the authorities, especially its relation to a long-term survey program. Although a number of geologists received some training through the UNESCO mission in Recife, this was not enough. Difficulties in recruiting local counterpart personnel eventually prevented UNESCO from continuing assistance on this project in 1957, but the project was revived in 1958.

In 1955 an agronomist was assigned to the team to advise on crop production in small colonies along the banks of the Amazon and on the development of selected settlement areas. In 1956 a pasture expert was added to advise on the development of the grazing and fodder resources of the Amazon Valley. An agricultural economist joined the team in 1958 to advise on the economic aspects of proposed projects and to evaluate their financial implications.

In 1956 a fisheries expert explored the Amazon and its more important tributaries to determine the possibilities of improving fishing gear and of increasing productivity. He was later joined by a fish preservation research specialist. A third expert on fish processing prepared a handbook on methods of fish salting and drying for the Amazon region and outlined designs for fish processing demonstration centers.

Since 1956 three veterinarians have been advising on methods for increasing the output and raising the efficiency of animal production in the Amazon region. In 1958 a dairy production expert arrived to advise on improved methods of milk production, dairy herd management, and on the organization of milk quality control measures.

*Other FAO assistance*

Besides the two major regional projects, FAO also provided a number of other experts in specialized fields.

In 1951–52 a fishery economist advised the government on the general state of the fishing industry. He was followed by two marine fisheries biologists—one surveyed the available data on resources and initiated a system for the collection of statistics of fishing operations and catches and the other made some echo-sounding and hydrographic surveys and began with an assessment of the marine fishery resources of the central Brazilian coast.

A fishery engineer associated with this project later started an experimental fishing program for the yellow tuna catch in the northeast and advised on the most suitable equipment to be used for this purpose. In 1955 a fish processing technologist began a program of advising the federal and state governments as well as private enterprises on fish processing technology which resulted in the establishment of a research laboratory in Rio Grande do Sul. Two fish marketing specialists surveyed facilities for fish distribution and initiated schemes to promote fish marketing and consumption which resulted in such improvements in distribution and marketing methods that they have also been introduced in the states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.

In 1953 two FAO veterinarians assisted local technicians in investigating causes of the principal diseases affecting cattle in Brazil, and another expert helped set up a diagnostic laboratory and advised on methods of vaccine production. A field veterinarian advised on problems of livestock management.

In 1950 FAO assigned an expert to the Rural University near Rio de Janeiro to recommend measures and deliver a series of lectures to strengthen social science work at that institution.

In 1957, FAO provided an expert in agricultural institutions and services.

## UNESCO

UNESCO has had a number of projects in Brazil, the most important of which is the one associated with educational reform.

A major development in Brazilian education in recent years has been the widespread movement towards reform and modernization of the educational system. This has resulted in the official establishment of a special agency, the Campaign for the Training of Senior Educational Personnel (CAPES) to survey and analyze the educational system and to formulate plans for a basic reorganization of the primary, secondary and technical education systems. UNESCO has been associated with this center since the planning stage and has provided experts in various fields related to educational reform: a sociologist, stationed in São Paulo to undertake a pilot research project on social mobility, two anthropologists, and a social psychologist to assist in preparing a long-range plan. In 1956 an expert was appointed for a long term to act as co-director of the center and to assist in implementing the first phase of practical reforms. The program covered a project for school decentralization in the state of Goiaz and a plan, promoted by the federal government, for extending primary schooling from four to six years.

Extensive research on social mobility and on school-neighborhood relationships is being carried on by these UNESCO experts and by Brazilian personnel. They also helped to initiate a public inquiry into the educational reform program and to establish a postgraduate course in social science research methods.

As a result of recommendations made by a geological survey mission in 1954, an expert in hydrogeology was assigned to the University of Recife, where he has taught special courses in hydrogeology to about 250 students from government and public organizations concerned with soil conservation and engineering. A second expert joined him in 1956, and they concentrated on plans for the establishment of adequate and permanent training facilities for geologists. These plans were later approved by the government and the necessary budgetary appropriations made for the creation of four regional geology training institutes in different parts of the country. The team was also entrusted with the task of undertaking a geological study of a number of dams, among them the dam to be constructed for the new federal capital, Brasilia.

In 1955 an ecologist was appointed to collaborate with the National Museum in planning a pilot project for the study of the general problem of migration, including the effects that physical environment and natural resources have on the movements of people. The program was subsequently modified, and the expert prepared a manual on Brazilian ecology for publication by the government.

### INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION

The ILO has concerned itself particularly with industrial training, for which the fast-rising industrialization in Brazil is in such need. The major agency concerned with such training is the semiautonomous National Service of Industrial Apprenticeship (SENAI) to which ILO had been giving assistance since 1952. In that year, a team of thirteen ILO experts and instructors initiated extensive programs for the training of instructors in shop organization, general mechanics, cabinet making, auto mechanics, photolithography, heat treatment of metals, audio-visual aids, job analysis, diesel mechanics, and automobile body work. The SENAI, which is financed by contributions from businessmen and maintains relatively high standards in its training, is the outstanding institution of its kind in Brazil.

An extensive program of science teaching methods was also carried out through seminars in different towns of Brazil to train SENAI science teachers, and to establish an over-all plan for science teaching in SENAI schools. Another expert was assigned to the newly organized Center of Personnel Training (CAP) for which he prepared plans for training SENAI staff at all levels and organized a training course for instructors and for directors of technical schools from SENAI schools, as well as from other countries in Latin America.

### WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

The regional office of WHO in Latin America—the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau (PASB)—has a field office in Rio.

One of the most difficult problems in providing medical services to the people in Brazil has always been the acute shortage of trained nurses. The Ministry of Health has been making a survey, financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, of existing needs and training facilities. A WHO nurse educator has collaborated in planning a nursing program based on its findings.

Trachoma is an endemic disease in several regions in Brazil, but it is particularly concentrated in the States of Ceará, São Paulo, and Rio Grande do Sul. The number of cases is estimated at 750,000. The government initiated a pilot program in 1957 to determine more accurately the areas of infection and to find an economical and useful method of control to be applied in a nationwide program to reduce the incidence of the disease. In 1958, WHO provided a consultant to work on this project.

For a number of years the sporadic outbreaks of sylvatic plague have led to uncertainty about its seriousness and incidence. Control measures could only be taken on the basis of systematic investigation, and in 1957 WHO provided a consultant to work with a Brazilian field team in a survey of the distribution and presence of the disease.

Two medical officers and some equipment were provided in 1957 to assist in organizing a national campaign against yaws in order to eradicate the disease.

### FELLOWSHIPS

In addition to the provision of experts, and to a small extent, equipment, the United Nations and the specialized agencies provided fellowships which enabled Brazilian technicians to go overseas for advanced studies and observation. These have been in the fields of public administration, economic development, tariffs and trade, housing and building, soil mechanics, industrial administration, road transport and highway construction, social security, land and water use, fisheries technology, nutrition, agricultural administration, hydrogeology, education, epidemiology, and trachoma. The countries in which they studied included the United States, England, the Netherlands, France, Morocco, Spain, Switzerland, Italy, and Australia. On their return, a number of these fellows have been appointed to senior posts in the organizations within which the assistance projects were located—an ex-UN fellow became head of the geology section of the National Department of Anti-Drought Measures (DNOCS), a number of ex-UN fellows in public administration have been appointed as professors at the Brazilian School of Public Administration.

### ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF THE UN PROGRAM

The central figure in the administration of UN technical assistance in Brazil is the Resident Representative of the Technical Assistance Board (TAB), who since 6 March 1953 has been Mr. Henri Laurentie, a former senior French civil servant. His main function is to assist the National Technical Assistance Commission in the co-ordination of the annual program within the limits of the target figure laid down by TAB. In 1957 this figure was $615,088, in 1958 $526,300, and for 1959 the figure recommended is $566,887. This is always a most difficult operation because many government agencies press strongly for their particular project proposals on the National Commission. The Resident Representative has played a very important role in making informal contacts with these agencies and smoothing over some of the differences there might have been between them. A system of priorities has also been introduced in the country program: Category I list contains those projects which are to be carried out during the year and Category II list contains those which will only be implemented if funds become available through savings elsewhere.

In Brazil the Resident Representative is also the agent of all the Participating Organizations and has to look after the projects and interests of each of them. He receives and briefs experts when they arrive, and his office performs a whole range of services for these

experts: travel arrangements and the payment of their salaries and allowances. He has also made a point of personally visiting the experts wherever they may be, talking with them and with national officials about the progress of their work. This has enabled him to get first-hand information on the projects and to maintain the personal contacts with UN experts and national officials which are so valuable in the pioneering work of technical assistance. He has also consistently encouraged informal consultations and social contacts between experts in different fields to see how far they can be of help to one another. Finally, he has maintained regular and co-operative relationships with the Director of the American ICA program in Brazil.

Four methods of financing technical assistance are used in Brazil.

The Expanded Program contains a list of all the projects for the next year and their costs, the total of which cannot exceed the "target figure" laid down by TAB for that year. This program is financed from the voluntary contributions of member, as well as nonmember, nations of the UN at an annual pledging conference in New York.

The Regular Program has contained a small number of projects, financed by some of the Participating Organizations out of their own budgets.

Funds-in-Trust are funds provided by the Brazilian Government to the United Nations and specifically earmarked for the payment of the salaries of such experts as are recruited on the government's behalf by the United Nations through its world-wide contacts.

The Catalogue of Services contains a listing of funds and facilities which the Brazilian Government makes available to non-Brazilian users—stipends to Latin-American fellows who come to Brazil for training in such institutions as the Brazilian School for Public Administration, the National Steel Company and others. As these funds are used they are counted as part of the Brazilian contribution to the Expanded Program.

## CONCLUSION

In spite of the relatively short time it has been in operation, the United Nations program in Brazil has worked well and has made some significant contributions. Co-operation with the government, through its National Commission and the various government agencies, has generally been very good in spite of a number of changes in government and many ministerial changes. There seems to be, especially among government officials, a general understanding of and receptivity towards UN technical assistance. UN assistance is appreciated mainly because, being international, it does not have political overtones as is sometimes the case in bilateral assistance. It also makes available experts from many national backgrounds and adds to the range of national technical practices from which Brazilian technicians may choose their own solutions.

Most observers agree that the major contribution of the UN program in Brazil is the national interest it has aroused in regional development. Like many other newly developing countries, Brazil suffers from the unhealthy effects of having a metropolitan center (in this case there are actually two, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo) which dominate its political, economic, and social life. Because these cities drain away most of the available investment capital and skilled manpower, the vast interior is left in economic apathy. Most Brazilians agree that this trend can only be reversed by large-scale programs of regional development. The government has created a number of regional development agencies, but their work has been seriously hampered by a lack of basic regional studies of resources and by the lack of qualified personnel to make them. The UN program has not only resulted in some significant resource surveys, for example, the forest inventory of the Amazon region, but also in the training of a large number of Brazilian officials who can carry on with such technical tasks.

An important feature of the Brazilian program, and especially of the regional projects, is the extent to which specialists from different fields, different specialized agencies, and different nationalities have worked together on joint or interdisciplinary problems. The members of the various teams realized that they were faced with challenges for which their individual specializations could provide only partial answers, and that economic development, whether of a region or a country, involves purposeful action in many interrelated sectors and, therefore, co-operation between the specialists in those sectors. This has resulted in a new understanding and intellectual enrichment on the part of most experts.

Interest in the UN program in Brazil may be expected to increase in the future. Numerous new projects have been proposed which could be carried out as funds become available from the tapering off of existing programs. Within some programs too, there is often a broadening of the range of specialists—a general economist may be followed by an industrial specialist or an agricultural economist by a marketing specialist and an agricultural extension specialist. Technical assistance in one area, therefore, often stimulates it in another, and new projects are often born out of previous ones. As Brazil enters in an era of internal expansion and development, so dramatically symbolized by the construction of its new capital, Brasilia, in the interior, its need for technical assistance will increase, mainly for the purpose of stimulating and guiding the development of its own, already impressive, national technical resources.

# The United States Operations Mission in Iraq

By Henry Wiens

Abstract: The program of technical co-operation in Iraq, prior to the Revolution of 1958, was frequently cited as an example of the ideal Point Four program. The overthrow of the established government led naturally to questions concerning the "failure" of American technical assistance in that country. A close examination of the efforts of the United States Operations Mission (USOM) in Iraq indicates, however, both that there were some severe obstacles faced by the mission and that, despite these, the success achieved was considerable. Under the direction of the Iraq Development Board, an agency of the Iraqi Government, three kinds of aid were provided: United States technicians advised or worked with the Iraqi Government; supplies and equipment were provided for demonstration purposes; and Iraqi personnel were sent to the United States or third countries for observation or training programs. The bulk of assistance was directed towards improving agricultural methods, but much also was achieved in such areas as preventive medicine, education, and administrative improvement. To consider the Revolution as proof of failure is to misunderstand both the purposes and potential achievements of the Point Four program. Economic improvement can be made to serve political ends but is not political in itself. Also, it is a mistake to consider technical assistance as a means to support the status quo; the aim of the Point Four program is to promote the combined growth of economic improvement and political freedom.—Ed.

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*Henry Wiens, Ph.D., Washington, D. C., is a member of the staff of the Assistant t the Director for Evaluation of the International Cooperation Administration, havin recently completed a comprehensive evaluation of the Guatemala program. He serve as Chief of that agency's Near East Division (1956–57), headed a Technical Surve Mission to the Yemen (1957), served as Regional Economist and Special Assistant t the Director of the Near East and South Asia Region (1958). He was the Directo of the United States Operations Mission (USOM) to Iraq (1954–56); the Deput Director and Program Officer of the USOM in Turkey (1948–53); Tax Advisor, America Mission for Aid to Greece (1947–48); Financial Advisor to the Government of Ira (1943–47); Special Representative, American Red Cross, Tehran (1942–43). He taugh at the University of California in Santa Barbara. A frequent lecturer to academic o professional organizations, he has also been a contributor to various learned journals.*





This case study in technical co-operation describes and analyzes the historically significant features of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) program in Iraq prior to the Revolution of July 14, 1958. It also attempts to evaluate what "went wrong" with Iraq's development program which had frequently been cited as a model capital investment program.

The ICA program in Iraq, which was limited to technical co-operation,[1] typified the Point Four ideal espoused by the late Dr. Henry G. Bennett, first Director of the Technical Cooperation Administration. Under this concept, the United States helps newly developing nations acquire technical "know-how" needed for promoting economic growth. Even some of the sterner critics of "foreign aid" conceded that the results of this program in Iraq were impressive.

## Objectives

The primary objective of the program was to promote the economic development of Iraq. As defined in the bilateral agreement of April 10, 1951, it was "to contribute to the balanced and integrated development of the economic resources and productive capacities of Iraq." This wording paralleled closely that employed in the bilateral agreements with other countries desiring Point Four programs. It was in harmony with the definition and objectives of Title III of the Mutual Security Act of 1954,[2] which adds the further purposes of improving the working and living conditions of the people in the country involved.

Underlying these stated objectives were the more basic United States foreign policy objectives such as helping Iraq to build her economic strength in order to help her maintain her independence, to provide a base upon which orderly political development might occur, to enable her to contribute toward world prosperity as a growing trading partner within the Free World, and to enable her to participate more effectively as a sovereign and equal partner in the community of nations.

It will be noted that these objectives contribute directly to the maintenance of the security and prosperity of the United States as repeatedly defined by the President.

## Iraq's Development Efforts

The establishment of the Iraq Development Board and the reservation of 70 per cent of the country's vast oil revenues gave proof of the Government's intention to carry out the objectives set forth in the Technical Cooperation Agreement. The semiautonomous Development Board exercised vast powers within the framework of general multiple-year programs approved by the *Majlis* (parliament). Consisting of ten members, the Board included three ex-officio members—the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Finance and Development—who served for the duration of any given Cabinet, and seven permanent members. Of the permanent members five were senior Iraqis—ex-Prime Ministers or ex-Cabinet members—appointed for five years, and two were foreign members nominated by the British and United States governments, respectively, but appointed by the Government of Iraq.

The substantive work of the Board was executed by technical sections: irri-

[1] Some economic aid was provided on a one-time basis under the Eisenhower Doctrine in a commitment made by the Richards Mission to the Middle East in 1957, but even here the funds were used essentially in support of the technical co-operation effort.

[2] This authorizing act is subject to annual renewal by the Congress. Title III derives largely from the Act for International Development of 1950, the original legislation setting up the technical assistance program.

gation and power, public buildings and roads, industry, agriculture, and public housing, plus a semiautonomous land settlement administration (*Miri Sirf*). These sections were staffed by senior foreign and Iraqi technicians. The Board undertook most investment programs through these technical divisions, but later also made financing available for projects to be undertaken by the regular ministries. Consulting engineering firms of international repute provided much of the vast amount of technical assistance required for large construction projects. These firms were retained to make surveys, formulate projects, develop detailed specifications, advise on the letting of contracts, and supervise construction. This essentially American technique enabled the Board to get many projects under way expeditiously.

The magnitude of the funds available to the Board may be judged from the fact that the 140 million dollars it received in 1955 was roughly equivalent to the entire normal governmental budget.[3]

## THE ICA PROGRAM

The technical co-operation program in Iraq, as in most other countries, provided aid of three types. First, United States technicians were detailed to advise or work with the various branches of the Government in response to specific requests for their services. Since over three-fourths of the available funds were used for this purpose, this feature will receive the most attention in this article. During the past four years, an average of well over 100 technicians were supplied. The staff of the Iraq Mission was large when compared on a world-wide basis with other countries. Eager to have a maximum number of technicians, the Iraqi government paid a larger share of their expenses than did many other countries. Technicians usually remained for two years at a time, after which they took home leave and might return to post if so desired by the host government. A number of consultants and short-term technicians were also provided.

Second, limited amounts of supplies and equipment were provided for demonstration purposes. These were used largely by United States technicians to demonstrate the effectiveness of new techniques. Since host government officials did not always understand these new techniques, they frequently could not see the reason for providing funds for purchasing the necessary equipment. In some countries, budgetary difficulties also stood in the way. In Iraq, a minimum of United States funds was provided for this purpose, as the Government usually made provision within its own budget for such needs. One instance in which ICA funds were thus used in Iraq was for the purchase of land-levelling equipment to permit our technicians to demonstrate the value of levelling irrigated farms for the conservation of water and soil and for increasing production.

Third, Iraqi officials, technicians, and students were sent to the United States or third countries for programs of observation or training. Originally this was largely limited to mid- and early-career training for government employees and technicians. But later it was broadened to include university training, including summer or short courses, for students and technicians. The American University of Beirut under a special contractual arrangement with ICA carried on a large and growing regional program for all countries of the Middle East. ICA progressively emphasized the idea that training programs should be undertaken in nearby countries where appropriate facilities were available. The costs were substantially less than sending persons to the United States and conditions more nearly approximated those in the host country.

[3] 1955 is used as the pipelines were destroyed during the Suez crisis of 1956 and annual oil exports were not fully restored until 1958.



The magnitude of the ICA Program did not vary greatly from year to year. It averaged approximately 2.5 million dollars annually. Toward the end of the period under consideration, the total of United States personnel was about 140, of which about 115 were hired directly, and about 25 were contract employees.

## FIELDS OF ACTIVITIES

Since 75 per cent of the population derive their livelihood from the soil, agriculture quite properly constituted the most important area of United States Operations Mission (USOM) activity and accounted for well over half of all technicians supplied to Iraq. Agricultural technicians were supplied to five different branches of the government: the Ministry of Agriculture, the Irrigation Directorate, the Land Settlement Administration (*Miri Sirf*), the Development Board, and the Agricultural College at Abu Ghraib. The principal emphasis was on the well-known triumvirate of the American land grant college system—research, education and a country-wide extension service.

In public health, the USOM emphasized preventive medicine, since in Iraq as in most other underdeveloped countries preventive medicine was not practiced as much as was curative medicine. This probably derives from the fact that curative medicine produces dramatic results for individuals whereas prevention, by its nature, does not personalize its results. It is the old story of the effectiveness of articulated demands—more importance is usually attached to the cries of a single sick baby than to the well-being of 100 babies who escape illness as a result of preventive measures.

In education, emphasis was placed on technical training. Advisers were provided for a number of special technical schools which were in the process of being established. Technical advisers were also provided to assist the ministry in its efforts to place greater emphasis on agricultural and technical work in the public schools. A substantial effort was made in helping to establish an audio-visual training center, an obvious need in a country where illiteracy is high.

The public administration program as such got off to a slow start although in a larger sense most ICA efforts were toward improving public administration. Surveys were made in several fields such as personnel, finance, records management, and so forth. More recently a public administration training program was established as well as a public safety training program.

The community development program planned the establishment of a nation-wide system of multipurpose village-level workers who were to seek means for getting villagers to improve their own lot. A generalist in various technical subjects, this worker was trained in techniques for stimulating local initiative and co-operative community action. In transportation, the USOM supplied under contract a group of engineers to help the Ministry of Works and Communications develop a highway department. Emphasis was placed on maintenance.

## ICA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The United States Operations Mission was organized largely as in most other countries. Headed by a Director,[4] and

[4] Dr. Lewis H. Rohrbaugh served from 1951 to December 1953; the writer from January 1954 to August 1956; Ben Hill Brown from September 1956 to November 1958. Mr. Brown also served as Field Co-ordinator for Baghdad Pact projects during the latter part of his tour.

later also a Deputy Director, the Mission had a small central staff to provide supervision and administrative services. It consisted of a program officer, a controller, an executive officer, a training officer, and their United States and local employee subordinates. This staff was housed in a building near the American Embassy.

The vast bulk of the mission was made up of the technicians assigned to the various branches of the government. They were actually housed in the regular governmental office buildings. From a mission viewpoint, they reported to the directors of their respective divisions, such as agriculture, health, or education. While the directors served as advisers to their respective ministries, they were also administratively responsible to the USOM Director and were given office space in the Mission building as a convenience to transact their necessary Mission business.

From an Iraqi viewpoint, these United States technicians were given formal appointments within the governmental hierarchy, and they worked side by side with their Iraqi associates. Most ICA technicians served as advisers in line with standard ICA policy. However, the Iraqis frequently desired to have these technicians assume full administrative responsibilities. This was sometimes permitted temporarily, but only when the USOM was convinced that training objectives would be better served by these means. Technicians were constantly reminded that their success would be measured by how quickly they could work themselves out of jobs.

The position of the United States member of the Development Board deserves special mention. Nominated by the United States Government, he was detailed to the Government of Iraq, which formally appointed him with all of the prerogatives of other members of the Development Board. He was forbidden to reveal confidential matters to the United States Government, and the United States Government did not attempt to influence his decision on matters before the Board. It was believed that the Government of Iraq could benefit most from his considerable technical and managerial abilities if it had complete confidence in his objectivity. The importance which the Government of the United States attached to this arrangement was demonstrated by the caliber of the two officials who held this position.

## PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

Ideally, the program of technical co-operation to be undertaken in any country should be truly responsive to the desires of the host government, and the details of the program should be formulated co-operatively. Since the economic objectives of the two governments involved were essentially in harmony, this ideal appeared to be easily obtainable in Iraq. But certain difficulties emerged in practice.

From the Iraqi side, the chief problem resided in that government's failure to co-ordinate its requests for technical assistance. This in turn grew out of the general problem of program co-ordination. While the Iraqi Development Board constituted an excellent vehicle for the formulation and execution of programs, no effective arrangements were made to provide for co-ordination of the Board's activities with those of other branches of the Iraqi Government. This was a serious and constantly growing problem to which successive cabinets addressed themselves without effective result. It was even referred to so eminent a foreign consultant as Lord Salter.[5]

No adequate procedures were set up to establish government-wide priorities for the use of foreign technical assistance. There was no central office with which the USOM, or other foreign missions engaged in providing technical assistance to Iraq, could enter into negotiations. A liaison office for technical assistance was established within the Foreign Office, but it was used chiefly as a channel for formal communications and was virtually devoid of actual authority. This imposed on USOM the necessity to determine priorities as between requests of the various branches of the Iraqi Government, a role hardly appropriate to the spirit of a truly co-operative program.

[5] Better known to Americans as Sir Arthur Salter, the British economist and statesman.



## FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

The problem also presented obstacles on the United States side. Almost a year before the beginning of a fiscal year, the ICA in Washington began collecting information about the technical assistance requirements of all the countries concerned as a basis for preparing the request to Congress for the next year's funds. Requests to Missions for information had to be timed carefully to avoid interfering with other important deadlines. Of necessity, therefore, they had to be issued on an urgency basis which ill afforded time for adequate consultations with the host government.

Moreover, until recently consultations had to be conducted in an extremely guarded manner, as ICA was reluctant to reveal the illustrative figures for each country to be submitted to the Congress. Bitter experience had taught the agency that some countries considered such figures as firm commitments; if the amount of aid subsequently granted that country was less, the result sometimes created serious misunderstandings. Yet this prohibition to discuss a potential aid figure made it patently difficult to discuss meaningfully the program contemplated.

The problem was renewed after the funds were finally appropriated by Congress, a process which usually occurred during August, the second month after the beginning of the fiscal year. A number of programing steps had to be undertaken in Washington before allocating to the various countries the funds appropriated—almost invariably smaller than the amount requested. The USOMs had to be consulted about how the reduced amount should be programed. But since the fiscal year was already well advanced, the time factor again made adequate negotiations difficult. Yet this was, in fact, the first occasion on which the Mission could reveal the actual aid figure to the host government. The system of annual appropriation of funds thus made programing on a mutual basis with the host government extremely difficult to achieve. The saving grace was that most technical co-operation programs were of a continuing nature so that relatively few projects were actually of great importance in this annual programing process. Moreover, the Mission Director and his principal officers attempted to discuss future technical assistance requirements on a year-round basis so that they would better understand the country's requirements on the next occasion when Washington had to have a quick answer.

In the process of program justification, the USOM in Iraq pioneered in the formulation of a total country policy statement in which the ICA projects were directly related to over-all and subordinate Iraqi and United States objectives. The program office developed a comprehensive diagrammatic chart illustrating the relationship of over-all objectives to the means whereby these were to be sought and the specific steps to be taken for their achievement.

### CO-ORDINATION

Co-ordination of USOM activities was achieved by a variety of means. Internal co-ordination between the various divisions was achieved principally through weekly staff meetings and by supervision of the Director. Division directors and technicians were encouraged to co-ordinate their activities directly, raising problems higher only as required or if a wider significance were at issue. Frequently, USOM interdivision problems reflected greater Iraqi interministerial problems. These were brought to the attention of their various ministries.

*Co-ordination with the Embassy* and all other elements of the United States official family was achieved under the leadership of the Ambassador, pursuant to Executive Order 10575 of November 6, 1954 and related orders. These orders definitively established the authority of the Ambassador, as the representative of the President, to co-ordinate all United States Government activities within any given country. The Mission Director regularly attended weekly Embassy staff meetings and periodic meetings of the Country Team consisting of the Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission (the Counselor of Embassy), the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), and the Chief of the United States Information Service (USIS).

Co-ordination with the United Nations was achieved through frequent informal meetings and telephone calls between the USOM Director and the UN Resident Representative. Field co-ordination between UN and ICA was in line with repeated identical instructions issued by the UN and the ICA. But despite mutual efforts, certain types of problems persisted. The natural tendency of technicians toward professional jealousy and technical differences was accentuated by national differences and their association with different organizations. With the best intentions of the respective leaders, it was not always possible to eliminate all innate competitive tendencies.

### EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ICA PROGRAM

The question naturally arises as to how effective was United States technical assistance in Iraq. Without purporting to answer this question fully, the following comments may be suggestive.

First, from an over-all operational standpoint, the efforts appeared effective. A significant contribution was made by USOM technicians toward getting the general development program under way in Iraq. The program was clearly advanced beyond what it might have been without United States assistance and encouragement. Its content, direction, and tempo were obviously influenced.

From a narrower viewpoint, there was a considerable transfer of skills, particularly in the fields where ICA had the most technicians. Point Four was responsible for a number of remarkable technological advances in Iraq. ICA training objectives were thus being realized as well.

The influence of the USOM was most effective in areas where the interests of the Iraqi ruling group were not in conflict with the basic developmental objectives of the bilateral agreement. This covered a large area of activities. But USOM influence was relatively small whenever the interests of the ruling class appeared to them to be in jeopardy, although such problems could be and were discussed with entire candor with members of the government. Arguments for accelerating the benefits to the general population, for expediting the *Miri Sirf* land settlement program, for supporting a genuine village self-improvement program on an urgent basis, and many more such proposals were applauded in principle but failed to get adequate support.

While the planning of construction projects proceeded quite well—indeed remarkably well for a country with so little previous experience—there was little response to the urging that planning and budgeting be undertaken for the development of Iraq's human resources. There was, for example, urgent need for a manpower survey, the results to be correlated with the skills needed for implementing the development program. The deficiencies thus revealed and projected into the future could have served as a basis for instituting training programs. Suggestions for the co-ordination of other more sophisticated aspects of planning, for instance the co-ordination of various programs of different types such as agriculture, public health, and education, found relatively little response until quite recently.

Casting up such a trial balance raises questions as to the basic effectiveness of a "pure" technical assistance approach where vested interests are involved. Could more rapid results have been achieved with a few demonstration projects, perhaps employing some devices such as the joint fund technique so widely used in Latin America? Is technical co-operation more effective when used jointly with U. S. economic aid funds? Clearly, this last alternative could hardly have been justified in Iraq in view of her own financial resources.

While it is too early to determine what the future holds for the co-operative program in Iraq, one fact is clear: United States technicians will occupy only advisory roles. The position of the American member of the Development Board has been abolished, as was the British position somewhat earlier. Other Americans occupying administrative positions in various agencies of the Iraqi Government have been relieved of such responsibilities. While this is a striking change, it is neither surprising nor out of harmony with the policies of ICA.



### THE IRAQI PROGRAM IN RETROSPECT

Many questions are being asked by thoughtful people about the Iraq Development Program. For example, why did it not succeed in creating conditions which would have obviated the Revolution? What went wrong?

While this is not the place to analyze the causes underlying the Revolution, a few comments on it appear relevant to this discussion. These comments are offered with the realization that issues become much clearer in retrospect. As one who worked closely with the former regime, the writer approaches this task of looking backward with reticence and a sense of personal humility.

Judged exclusively in operational terms, the Iraq Development Program did not fail; the planning job was done with reasonable effectiveness, projects were undertaken quite expeditiously, an impressive number of projects were completed, and there was visible evidence of economic change and improvement.

This Revolution, like so many others, illustrates again the "primacy of politics." While there were contributing economic factors, the political factors were clearly controlling. For example, the *ancién regime* failed to appreciate the intensity and extent of popular support for the new Arab nationalism. It chose not to align itself with this force and even gave the appearance of opposing it. As the founders of the older Arab nationalist movement, the Iraqi leaders appeared baffled by the turn which this newer movement was taking.

From the point of view of political

impact on its own people, the Iraq Government's development program overstressed long-range capital investments. The dream of recreating a Garden of Eden from the sun-baked deserts of Mesopotamia so enthralled many Iraqis in high places that they failed to see the urgency of alleviating the sufferings of the general populace. An articulate segment of Iraqi officialdom pleaded for earlier popular benefits, an approach which also had the full support of the ICA mission in line with official United States policy. Eventually this view gained considerable acceptance in the Iraqi Government but it was another case of "too late and too little."

The old regime appeared genuinely puzzled and hurt that paternalistic efforts were not appreciated by the people. The late Crown Prince was quoted as saying that if only the Iraqi people could be put to sleep for five years, they would wake up with deep gratitude to their government! Such a "father knows best" attitude assumes that people are satisfied by having things done for them rather than with them, or better still, doing the things themselves. The success of community development programs in India, Pakistan, Burma, or the Philippines, and of the agricultural extension programs being sponsored in many countries by ICA indicates the vitality of the idea of involving people in their own destinies. But the leitmotiv of the Iraqi development effort was that an all-wise, bountiful government was doing things which the people ought to recognize and appreciate as being good for them. Neither Americans nor Iraqis respond favorably to such an approach.

The failure of the government to take some effective steps toward land reform constituted an issue of critical importance. Land reform could not be permanently ignored without serious political consequences. The government was, to be sure, working on a number of approaches on a long-term basis, but this was hardly known outside a small coterie. On the other hand, the domination of the Parliament by the landowning sheikhs was so complete that any significant relief appeared hopeless within the foreseeable future.

## LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

Some general lessons might be learned from this experience in Iraq. These are not new, but simply tend to confirm conclusions reached from experiences elsewhere.

First, it is usually a mistake to expect that political problems can be solved exclusively by economic means. As one wag puts it, "It's like trying to saw a board with a hammer." But economic measures can often be used effectively in support of political measures. If this principle were clearly understood, it might eliminate much confusion in thinking about foreign policy.

Second, economic development does not necessarily promote political stability. Indeed, the opposite may frequently be the result. While political stability is sometimes cited as a goal of American foreign policy, this probably arises from a lack of careful thinking. Such a static concept is hardly appropriate in a changing world where the strong desires for greater freedom and growing popular participation in government are well-nigh universal. The promotion of the orderly political development of these countries, combined with increasing popular participation and a trend towards liberty, is more nearly the United States philosophy. While rapid economic growth may not always promote such political development, it appears safe to say that, given the intensity and universality of rising expectations, this type of orderly political development is no longer possible without substantial economic growth. On this point, political leaders the world over have agreed with striking unanimity since World War II.

Third, the popular assumption that economic development leads naturally and inevitably toward greater freedom and democracy is demonstrably false. For reasons suggested above, it certainly did not prove to be the case in Iraq. The concomitants of economic development—its guiding policies and the climate within which it is carried on—are important, as elucidated by Eugene Staley.[6] In sponsoring economic development programs the world around, the United States Government and the American people must understand this point clearly.

[6] *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954).

# The Ford Foundation Program in Pakistan

by George F. Gant

Abstract: At Independence, in 1947, Pakistan suffered not only a severe shortage of trained personnel needed for its development but also a dearth of institutions for the training of personnel. The Ford Foundation has made grants since 1951 to help Pakistan establish and strengthen key institutions to produce competence. Grants are made for projects which are within the framework of Pakistan's Five Year Plan, the interests of the Foundation in key research and educational institutions, and the gaps in other foreign assistance programs. Foundation funds are made available for such assistance as training of institutional staff abroad, foreign advisers, and the dollars needed for the import of equipment and material. Pakistan pays the local currency expenditures for construction, equipment, and staff—the larger share—on the basis of development "schemes" often prepared with the assistance of consultants financed by the Foundation. Foreign advisers, consultative and research services, and training facilities included in a grant are provided by such universities as Harvard, Oklahoma State, Chicago, and Michigan State. The evolution of the Foundation's grant for Education Extension Centers is described for purposes of illustration. Since it takes a long time to develop a new institution, the Foundation has elected to assist with only a few in order to permit the length and depth of aid which is required. New projects will be taken up as older ones mature. Future emphasis of the Foundation program, together with the co-operating American universities, will be to improve the methodology of technical co-operation and the implementation of grants.

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*George F. Gant, Ph.D., New York City, is Director of the South and Southeast Asia Program of the Ford Foundation. Immediately before coming to his present post, he was Ford Foundation Representative in Pakistan, July 1, 1955–June 30, 1958, and was Consultant on Education to the Government of Pakistan Planning Board the first six months of 1955. He was successively Assistant Chief and Chief of Training and Education Relations, Assistant Director and Director of Personnel, and General Manager of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 1934–51; and was Consultant on Graduate Education, Southern Regional Education Board, 1951–54. Dr. Gant has written professional articles on administration and education.*





PAKISTAN is unusual among nations in two major respects—its chief unifying force is religion, Islam, and its two wings, East and West, are a thousand miles apart, separated by India. The acts by which India and Pakistan achieved independence from Great Britain in 1947 at the same time partitioned the subcontinent. East Pakistan, essentially the deltas of the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna Rivers, is a wet country heavily overpopulated by 45 million Bengalis of whom over three-quarters are Muslim and one-fifth Hindu. West Pakistan is primarily a dry and comparatively sparsely populated area of 35 million Sindhi, Punjabi, Pushtu, and Baluchi speaking peoples, over 90 per cent of whom are Muslim. The economic factor common to both wings in 1947 was that they represented the outlying and least developed areas of the underdeveloped subcontinent of India. Although it has large reserves of natural gas, prospects of oil have not been realized and mineral deposits have not been found or exploited in any significant quantities. Pakistan's resources are chiefly agricultural. It exports jute, cotton, tea, and skins and hides, but in most years it has had to import rice and wheat for food.

## Need for Trained Personnel

At Partition and Independence, Pakistan and India engaged in what was perhaps the largest exchange of populations known to history. Probably 12 million people migrated from one country to the other. The influx of 7 million refugees into Pakistan added one more burden to the new nation already occupied in establishing a government, a currency, and international connections. Perhaps more seriously, Pakistan lost most of the trained professional leaders and staff from its government departments, banking and commerce, and universities and schools. Before 1947 these positions had been held preponderantly by Hindus, almost all of whom moved to India. Most of the immigrating Muslims were farmers and artisans. Furthermore, since most of the subcontinent's research and specialized training institutions were in the area that became India, Pakistan came into being with a critical shortage not only of trained leadership and manpower, but also of the institutions to produce the scientists, engineers, teachers, entrepreneurs, civil servants, and other professional and skilled personnel necessary to its survival and development. Not without reason did the Pakistan Planning Board identify the trained manpower shortage as a major barrier in fulfilling its Five Year Plan—a barrier as formidable as the shortage of economic resources and foreign exchange.

## The Ford Foundation's Role

The Ford Foundation established its Overseas Development program in 1951 on the basis of recommendations made by some of its officers after an exploratory trip to South and Southeast Asia and to the Middle East. The largest part of this program has been expressed in South and Southeast Asia; Representatives are stationed in Burma, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan. Grants have been made to institutions in several countries of the Near East and the program is now being extended gradually to Africa and to Latin America.

In Pakistan the question considered by the Foundation in 1951 was whether a private philanthropy could make any contribution to a country receiving technical and economic assistance from the United States Government at the rate of over $100,000,000 per year, from the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia under the Colombo Plan at the rate of over $20,000,000 per year, and from

the United Nations and its affiliates. The answer was clearly affirmative, from the point of view of both Pakistan and the Foundation. Most aid from the United States and from the Colombo countries is economic, it went for physical development—for the construction of dams, fertilizer plants, roads—or for underwriting the general economy. Only a comparatively minor portion is for technical assistance in developing research and training institutions. Assistance from United Nations agencies, on the other hand, is chiefly for consultants who can help make development plans but who do not have the funds needed to carry them out. Also, the policy and procedural limits of the programs of these governmental and international agencies fall short of some of Pakistan's major needs.

It takes a long time to create new institutions anywhere in the world. The process is particularly complex in a country like Pakistan where teaching and research skills in many new fields must be started from scratch. Annually budgeted programs of assistance, especially when designed to meet immediate economic urgencies, do not lend themselves well to institutional development. The Foundation and the Government of Pakistan agreed that they could fruitfully co-operate in the establishment or strengthening of institutions vital to Pakistan's long-range development. In addition, the Foundation could assist Pakistan in sensitive fields in which Pakistan might be reluctant to receive assistance from a foreign government. Above all, the Foundation's interest in Pakistan would symbolize the private, nongovernmental concern of Americans for the welfare of humanity everywhere. This effort to increase the ability of the peoples of the new nations to deal effectively with their problems reflects the spirit of the Foundation's Overseas Development program.

## First Foundation Projects

The Foundation's first grants, in 1952, were designed to help establish three polytechnic institutes and a college (later increased to three colleges) of home economics. The polytechnic institutes offer a three-year post-high school course to fill the gap between trade schools and apprenticeships on the one hand and engineering colleges on the other. The home economics colleges will be key points in Pakistan's expanded and enriched education program for girls and women. The Foundation has financed the costs of foreign advisers, staff training abroad, and the foreign exchange requirements for equipment and construction. Oklahoma State University has provided the advisory and training services in both fields.

A few months after the first grants, others were made to assist the Village Agricultural and Industrial Development Program and the Government of Pakistan Planning Board. The V-AID program was designed to encourage and assist villagers to organize themselves to deal locally with as many of their problems and opportunities as they could in agriculture, small industry, co-operatives, education, and health and sanitation, and to tap more effectively the technical assistance of the government's nation-building departments in carrying out their plans. To encourage local self-government and to marshall the villagers' interests and energies behind the nation's development program, Pakistan gave V-AID first priority. The International Cooperation Administration provided the foreign advisers and much of the equipment for village-worker training centers, and the Foundation provided funds to help Pakistan set up the training centers more rapidly than its budget would otherwise permit. There are now nine centers, training over 1,200 village workers a year.



One of the most difficult problems faced by a new nation is to plan its program of development so that the priorities it selects fit realistically the available resources. Aware that priorities had to be selected to make the most of limited money and manpower, Pakistan established a Planning Board in 1953 to draft a five year plan. Since then, planning organizations have been set up in each of the two Provinces, and the Planning Board has been made a permanent organization. The Ford Foundation made a series of grants that enabled the Planning Board to obtain advisers from Harvard University. Harvard's major assistance at this stage is to help the Planning Board strengthen its staff and its procedures and techniques of planning toward the day when foreign advisers will not be needed. The Harvard-Planning Board Project is noteworthy in two respects. First, in a sensitive and intimate function of government Pakistan has benefited from assistance it would have been reluctant to accept from another government. Second, the Harvard experts have worked as advisers so anonymously and effectively that there has never been criticism of their role although such criticism, in so controversial a process as planning, could certainly have been expected.

## Exploring and Selecting New Projects

For several years the four areas mentioned above—polytechnic education, home economics, V-AID, and the Planning Board—attracted the major grants of the Foundation in Pakistan. In late 1955 and in 1956, however, the Foundation's Representative initiated a process of exploration which culminated in several new projects. The framework of the exploration consisted of the priorities of Pakistan's Five Year Plan, the interests of the Foundation in key institutions—chiefly educational—and the gaps in other foreign assistance programs. Within these limits and the limits of Foundation funds available to Pakistan, a wide range of opportunities remained. This range was narrowed in conferences with the Central and Provincial Ministries and with many heads and staff members of universities, colleges and government departments and agencies. The selection process was guided by the suggestions of the Chairman of the Planning Board and by the Secretary of Economic Affairs who coordinates foreign aid. The possibilities emerging from this process were discussed in detail with the officers and staff of the Foundation in New York. Several were selected for fuller exploration.

Pakistan's development program, within the general framework of the Five Year Plan, consists of many "schemes." A scheme, which does not have an exact counterpart in American administration, is a detailed plan for a new project—a new college, say, or a dam, or an expanded agency program. It includes detailed statements of justification, method, recurring and nonrecurring expenditure, and sources of support. A scheme must follow a slow and tortuous process of review and approval, after which, if it is included in Provincial and Central budgets, it provides the authority for implementation and expenditure. Changes of any consequence in the plan or expenditure of an approved scheme must, before approval, follow the same review procedure as a new scheme. A scheme usually originates in a Provincial department, and it must be reviewed and approved by the Provincial Departments of Planning and Finance before transmittal to the Central government. Any schemes of consequence are required to be approved by the Central government because most of them require central

financial assistance or foreign aid, or both. In any case, central review assures co-ordination with the national Five Year Plan.

In the Central government, the scheme must be reviewed and approved by the appropriate ministry (for example, a proposal for a new teacher training college would go to the Ministry of Education), by the Planning Board, by the Finance Ministry and, if foreign aid is involved, by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Any of these steps of review may involve referrals to the point of origin for clarification; hence approval of a scheme takes at least six months and, often, from one to two years. By that time the scheme has acquired an almost statutory status. However, the end is not yet. Before it goes into operation, the scheme must receive financial sanction. This means that it must be included in both the Provincial and Central budgets.

*Approval of schemes*

Any foreign aided project that involves Pakistan's funds must be through the slow but thorough process involved in the preparation, consideration, approval, and financial sanction of a scheme. This elaborate procedure is a major factor in the administration and effectiveness of foreign assistance. It means that schemes must be carefully drafted and that Pakistan's financial and administrative participation cannot be assured until the process is complete. If this fact is not taken into account, foreign contributions of expert personnel and equipment will be premature and frustrated. Much misunderstanding and unhappiness about foreign assistance in Pakistan is due to unfamiliarity on the part of aid-giving agencies with Pakistan's system of administration. Many a foreign expert has sat out his two-year term helplessly because he arrived in Pakistan before his scheme had been approved or given financial sanction. And much equipment has rusted on the docks or in storage bins.

Having failed in the early years to understand and then to follow Pakistan's system of planning and budgeting, the Ford Foundation made grants which also languished. It has since learned to relate its process of project exploration and assistance to that of Pakistan. The first and most important consideration is the quality of a scheme. When Pakistan and the Foundation have explored an idea for a new project to a point which warrants the project's translation into a scheme, the Foundation, at Pakistan's request, often provides consultants to collaborate with Pakistani officers in drafting the details. Consultants are sought particularly in connection with projects that involve institutions or skills not yet available in Pakistan. After the scheme is drafted, the consultants leave Pakistan during the six to eighteen months period it takes to move the scheme to approval and financial sanction. In the meantime the scheme provides the Ford Foundation with a full and detailed statement upon which to judge its own potential contribution. Also, the Foundation's Representative, in his advisory capacity, consults with the several Pakistani departments and ministries as they consider the scheme.

A major factor in Foundation consideration of projects is their priority in Pakistan's program of development. The Foundation does not have a kitful of projects it is urging upon Pakistan. Rather, it selects from among the many suggested that also coincide with the Foundation's area of interest. The clearest evidence of Pakistan's intent about a project is not only its inclusion in the Five Year Plan, but also its inclusion in the budget on the basis of an approved scheme. The Foundation's path is clear once Pakistan decides to



devote to a project such local currencies and skills as are needed. The Foundation can then make a grant to supplement Pakistan's investment with foreign exchange and specialized advice and training.

Before the Five Year Plan was approved and the annual development budget system was established, there was a tendency for well-wishing aid-giving agencies to press upon Pakistan projects that were not related in time, and in terms of Pakistan's ability to operate or maintain them, to a more rational plan of development. Pakistan's needs are great and many projects are "good," but it was a disservice to Pakistan to encourage the commitment of a large part of its future budgets to projects which were taken up not because they fitted into the sequence of Pakistan's requirements but because some foreign aid was available.

## METHODOLOGY OF ASSISTANCE: USE OF GRANT FUNDS

The Foundation's Overseas Development program constantly faces the challenge of making the best use of available funds to assist projects once they have been selected. This problem has four aspects:

- How many institutions of the same type in one country should the Foundation assist?
- To what uses should grant funds be put to assist an approved project?
- Under what arrangements should foreign advisers be provided?
- Should foreign experts establish, administer and staff a new institution at the outset, or should nationals?

Because the Foundation's resources are limited, it confines its assistance to amounts necessary to help a country to set up and test new kinds of institutions or programs. The Foundation's aid is further limited to those cases needed to demonstrate the validity and effectiveness of new undertakings. Pakistan's program for polytechnic institutes, for example, calls for a series of such institutes throughout the country, but the Foundation is assisting with only the first three; perhaps two would have been sufficient to give Pakistan the "know-how" to establish others on its own. It is true that Pakistan needs economic assistance in constructing and equipping additional institutes, but neither the nature nor the resources of a private philanthropy are adapted to these purely economic needs.

The Foundation has evolved a pattern of assistance in Pakistan that is broad enough to cover all the foreign-aid needs of its projects but narrow enough to rely on Pakistan for local funds and staff. In this way, the Foundation can devote its resources to meeting each project's total dollar requirements—construction, equipment, foreign advisers, and foreign training of staff. Some other aid-giving agencies can provide only part of the foreign aid needed and sometimes must help find supplementary assistance from one or more other foreign agencies. More than one foreign-aided project has failed because all the components were not available or, if available from several sources, became hopelessly entangled in procedural confusion and conflicts in policy and methodology.

The Foundation assists Pakistan with projects which Pakistan intends to support but for which foreign technical help is needed. In most cases this means that Foundation funds provide foreign advisers; scholarships for the foreign training of staff members; and import of equipment, books, and construction materials. In Pakistan, it is still necessary to import steel, glass, and some fixtures for building construction—all of which comprise about 20 per cent of the total building costs. Pakistan's foreign

exchange is so tight that new buildings for educational purposes take a lower priority than those for industrial and agricultural production. When new buildings are an essential element in a project in which the Foundation expresses an interest, therefore, the foreign exchange costs are often included in the grant.

## METHODOLOGY OF ASSISTANCE: FOREIGN EXPERTS

The essence of foreign assistance is the quality of the foreign advisers. If competent and understanding foreign advisers are not available, it is far better not to undertake a project than to provide second raters and misfits. The simplest and most direct method of tapping and holding the interest of outstanding advisers would be for Pakistan, under a Foundation grant, to recruit, select, and employ the foreign personnel it needed for a project. This method is not feasible, however, partly because Pakistan does not have the facilities which make either the recruitment or the employment practicable, but mainly because the length of employment on a single project does not provide a continuity of career sufficiently attractive to the kinds of experts needed. Nor can the Foundation, although it has the facilities to recruit and employ expert advisers on behalf of Pakistan, assure tenure of employment. The Ford Foundation does not have continuing overseas programs in Pakistan or elsewhere. Rather, the Foundation makes grants to assist Pakistan and certain other countries with their own diverse programs and projects. Furthermore, the Foundation is not an operating organization, like ICA, or like the Rockefeller Foundation in connection with its agricultural research in Latin America and South and Southeast Asia.

The problem of recruiting qualified experts for Pakistan has been solved through arrangements with interested and competent American universities and other appropriate institutions to provide the consultation, advisers, and foreign training needed. The universities can assure advisers of career and professional continuity as well as opportunity for unique experience. Of far greater importance, the universities can provide outstanding direction to consultative and advisory and other services through their major faculty members, adding both stature and depth to the quality of leadership devoted to institutional development. In other words, the Foundation's assistance to Pakistan is broadened enormously by supplementing the Representative's efforts with those of some of America's leaders in education, development economics, technical education, agriculture, home economics, and development administration. Dividends of this method are the enrichment and strengthening of the American universities' own educational programs through the experience of their staff members in foreign assistance. Harvard's program in development economics and Chicago's program in comparative education exemplify the fruitful two-way benefits that accrue from university contribution to projects in Pakistan.

Consequently, while the Foundation has a Representative, with a small staff, who confers with the government of Pakistan about new projects and helps to monitor grants, the burden of technical assistance falls upon American universities and institutions under agreements financed by Foundation grants. The typical agreement calls for general consultation, recruitment, and provision of foreign advisers, and training of Pakistani staff members in the United States or elsewhere abroad. Foreign experts and advisers, although recruited and employed by American universities, are



selected only with the approval of the Pakistan agencies concerned. Once employed and located in Pakistan, foreign advisers work with and for the heads of the institutions or agencies to which they are assigned. Their offices are located at the Pakistan institutions and not at the Ford Foundation or separate offices established by the American universities.

### *Adviser-agency relationship*

Neither an adviser nor the agency receiving his advice has an easy role. The best relations are rooted in a clear and commonly held understanding of the agency's purpose and methods. In establishing a new institution, the basic question often is whether the institution should be set up, administered, and staffed at the outset by foreign experts and then turned over later to the local staff, or whether the national agency should have full charge from the beginning with only advisory assistance from the foreign experts. Foundation-assisted institutions in Pakistan are developing under the second formula. Although the first method of foreign responsibility may produce more results more quickly, the Foundation believes that the second method achieves the best results in the long run. To take again a polytechnic institute as the illustration, Oklahoma State University might have constructed and equipped an institute and produced technicians faster than Pakistan did. But the objective was not to produce technicians in a hurry; that could have been done by sending young men to technical institutes abroad. Rather, the objective was to help Pakistan learn to establish and operate polytechnic institutes within its framework of educational administration and policy. Although much more needs to be learned about the art and science of foreign-national co-operation in institution building, the Foundation's experience in Pakistan leads it to believe that the be basis of relationship is for the Pakist authorities to be in charge and doi the work from the outset.

## CASE STUDY OF A GRANT: EDUCATION EXTENSION CENTERS

The evolution of the Foundation relations with Pakistan's Education E tension Centers and pilot schools secondary education illustrates the sp cifics of institutional planning. Majo educational objectives of Pakistan's Fiv Year Plan are to broaden and enrich it secondary schools, which have bee heavily literary in emphasis, and to im prove teaching methods. The Plan call for five education extension centers fo the reorientation and in-service trainin of school inspectors, headmasters, an teachers as a primary means of accom plishing this objective. It also calls fo the experimental and demonstration us in forty secondary schools of new cur ricula, with emphasis on science an vocational subjects, and new teachin and examination methods. In the fal of 1956 it was suggested to the Foun dation's Representative that the Foun dation might assist these projects. Discussion and exploration over several weeks convinced both Pakistan and the Foundation that the Foundation could be helpful, but that detailed schemes were needed upon which both could make firmer judgments. The Government of Pakistan asked the Foundation to provide consultants to assist in preparing schemes.

Anticipating that, if the schemes were well drawn and approved, the Foundation would be asked to arrange advisory services from an American university to help implement them, the Foundation asked the University of Chicago to provide the initial consultants. The University, by participating in the planning stage could form its own judgment about a continuing advisory role later. Uni-

versity of Chicago consultants studied Pakistan's education situation for three months in the spring of 1957. They formed a team with a group of Pakistani educators which, during the summer of 1957, studied in-service teacher training and secondary education in the Near East, Europe, and the United States. Then the joint team drafted schemes for two education extension centers and the pilot secondary schools to suit Pakistan's particular needs and education system. The Ford Foundation financed the dollar cost of this process of study and planning.

In the fall of 1957 the schemes were started on the long process of review and consideration in the Provincial and Central governments. In the meantime, the Foundation considered how it might assist with the projects, if requested, and the University of Chicago considered whether it would provide advisory services. The schemes were approved in the spring of 1958, early enough to be included in the budget year beginning April 1. Pakistan asked the Ford Foundation for funds to finance consultation and foreign advisers from the University of Chicago, the training of key extension center staff, and the import of equipment and construction materials. Pakistan indicated its intent by sanctioning the schemes and by budgeting local costs of construction, equipment, and operation. The University of Chicago accepted Pakistan's invitation and the Foundation made two grants—one to finance the services of the University of Chicago and one to finance the dollar cost of equipment and construction.

## FOUNDATION ASSISTED PROJECTS IN PAKISTAN

Much the same process of exploration and grant making has been followed in other major projects—with Oklahoma State University in the fields of home economics and polytechnics, with Harvard University for the Planning Board, and with Michigan State University for the establishment of two Academies of Development Administration. Other projects include assistance to Teacher-Student Centers at the Universities of Dacca and Punjab, the President's Commission on Education, the Inter-University Board, a new College of Agriculture at the University of Peshawar, and an Institute of Personnel Training. Under exploration now is a major project of research and demonstration in rural industry; schemes are being drafted with the assistance of the Stanford Research Institute.

It takes years to get a new institution on its feet, especially in a country where the subject is new and key staff has to be trained abroad. The Foundation has decided to assist with a relatively small number of such institutions in Pakistan so that it can help each to the extent and for the duration necessary. It is now in its sixth year of assistance to the Planning Board and in its seventh year of assistance in home economics and polytechnic education. The Foundation has been making grants for projects in Pakistan at the rate of 2.5 million dollars a year. These funds support the Foundation's contributions to the projects already in hand; they can assist new major projects only as older ones mature and no longer require the Foundation's assistance.

## IMPLEMENTATION AND PERSPECTIVE

The Foundation has completed much of its program planning in Pakistan, although planning must continue in phasing out assistance to maturing institutions and exploring a limited number of new projects. The most demanding task now for the Foundation's Representative is the effective implementation of grants. This task consists chiefly of encouraging and assisting the American universities able and willing to provide the services Pakistan needs.

Considerable help and information can be given foreign advisers and their families in connection with the local living conditions—housing, health, schools, and others—that plague the newcomer to any environment. The answers for more basic problems of implementation, however, are more difficult to provide, although experience is fast accumulating. Little is known about the methodology of technical co-operation: What works and what does not, particularly over a span of time? The Foundation and the co-operating universities plan evaluating specific Pakistan projects to shed more light on this question and perhaps to suggest some answers to it.

Since this review was first drafted, Pakistan has passed through a bloodless revolution and is now operating under what is called the "new regime." The Constitution was abrogated, and political parties were abolished. Pakistan is technically under martial law, although the civil servants and the regular officers of the government departments remain in immediate charge of law and order, collection and disbursement of revenues, and the development program. Although deploring the failure of its first efforts at constitutional government, perhaps most people in Pakistan welcome the new regime for its immediately successful efforts in halting corruption, slowing and perhaps reversing the serious economic decline, and improving the morale and efficiency of government. The first effect of the "new regime" was to improve the environment for development. The lasting effects will depend, of course, on whether repressive methods of control are instituted or whether sound foundations and processes for representative government are laid.

The Foundation has received many indications that the institutions it is assisting, not only in Pakistan but in other new nations, are well regarded by changing political forces except the Communists who are its continuing critics. Projects which receive Foundation aid are not political in nature. They are devoted to the long-time development of competence through which people will become more and more able to shape, control, and stabilize their political, economic, and social forms. The Foundation's assistance at this level of development, rather than at the level of current political and economic pressures, makes it welcome and free of suspicion as an expression of its pervading purpose—to advance human welfare.

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## *ASIA AND AFRICA*

ALBERT MAYER and associates in collaboration with MCKIM MARRIOTT and RICHARD L. PARK. *Pilot Project, India: The Story of Rural Development at Etawah, Uttar Pradesh.* Pp. xxiv, 367. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958. $5.50.

This is a unique book about the problems and the execution of an outstanding program of rural development. Albert Mayer is, rightly, the central figure in the story. Captivated and deeply moved by the capacities and predicament of India and the Indians, and receiving from Indians in high positions and low a most unusual degree of respect and affection, Mr. Mayer was much more than "Advisor" to the program.

Perhaps the most important technical qualification which Mr. Mayer brought to his task was his competence as a planner. Too many rural development projects, amply fueled by enthusiasm, have foundered on the rocks of unrealistic targets of achievement or of inadequate organization, or both. Mr. Mayer did not lack enthusiasm for the task, but realistic planning and execution were his technical tools and he knew how to use them. While references to this are to be found all through the book, a substantial portion of Chapter 4 (pp. 143–59) is devoted specifically to this phase of the work.

Programs for rural development differ widely in two respects. First, nearly all of the emphasis in some programs is on increase in physical production, while in other programs the major emphasis is on the development of rural human resources. Second, some programs place major reliance on organization and operational techniques, while others emphasize the concern and love of the staff for rural people.

Part of the genius of the Etawah Project has been that it cuts across these classifications. As for the first, as stated on page 131, "In the long run, there need be no conflict between the two central aims of rural development: a maximizing of material production can proceed along with an expansion of personal and village-organizational resources."

As for the second, Mr. Mayer sought a synthesis at two points. Within the Project, he put major effort into molding the attitudes of members of the staff toward both the village people and their co-workers. To this process he gave the name of "inner democratization." Meanwhile, he kept hammering away at the need for a new relationship between superior and subordinate officers and a decentralization of powers throughout the governmental framework within which the Project had to operate. Mr. Mayer came to see the Project as a young plant growing in a fissure of the rock of governmental administrative practices (pp. 67–70); either the rock would dwarf the plant or the plant, if it were to grow, would have to split the rock. He gave equal attention to strengthening the plant and to modifying the rock.

Richard L. Park and McKim Marriott have done well a difficult editing job.


ARTHUR T. MOSHER
Executive Director
The Council on Economic and Cultural Affairs, Inc.
New York City




ROSS N. BERKES and MOHINDER S. BEDI. *The Diplomacy of India: Indian Foreign Policy in the United Nations.* Pp. x, 221. London: Oxford University Press; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. $5.00.

In 1953 Professor Ross N. Berkes offered a graduate seminar at the University of Southern California on the subject of India's role in the United Nations. From that seminar has emerged a detailed study of Indian diplomacy which carefully documents the country's position on most of the important questions to come before the United Nations during its first twelve sessions. In their opening chapter, Berkes and Bedi show how India conceives the United Nations to be two things: "an instrument through which the needs and wants of a heretofore voiceless world can seek remedies," and "an instrument of negotiation, and of the reconciliation of interests." Two dominant psychological factors govern India's conduct in the United Nations. The first is Nehru's notion that war can be avoided only if the climate of war—of fear and suspicion—is dissipated. The second is the Indian identification with movements aimed at the overthrow of colonial rule and the elimination of racial discrimination. By means of copious quotations from the speeches of Indian delegates, the authors show how these factors influence Indian diplomacy and account for many apparent inconsistencies. India takes a firm stand on moral grounds against violations of human rights in colonial areas but fails to "stand and be counted" regarding "communist outrages in the field of human rights." The authors draw attention to this apparent double standard with tact and ample documentation.

Despite the obvious care and thoroughness with which United Nations sources have been used, there are several parts of the book which might have been given greater depth by interviews with some of the Indians discussed. Even as a product of library research the work suffers from an almost exclusive reliance on official United Nations documents. The only Indian source used is the flimsy bulletin of the information service in Washington which is responsible for the authors' saying that "no text of Nehru's November 9 speech seems to have been preserved in the usual places." One of the "usual places" for most students of Indian affairs is the Madras *Hindu* whose issue of November 11, 1956 carries the text of the speech in question. This narrow approach gives an air of superficiality to the treatment of India's role in the Korean war and the Hungarian crisis. On the Korean war one may certainly question the unargued assumption "that the United Nations Command had no alternative but to proceed beyond the 38th parallel." This view has caused the authors to ignore the political consequences in the United Nations of the fait accompli occasioned by MacArthur's premature and unsanctioned crossing. In trying to explain Indian behavior on the Hungarian question in theoretical terms they fail to note the key role played by President Tito in advising Nehru, and the possibility that Krishna Menon and New Delhi were not in agreement. Both subjects received considerable official and journalistic comment in India.

Nevertheless, when someone finally sits down to write the definitive diplomatic history for India's first ten years of independence, this book will be a valuable guide to the intricacies of her behavior in the United Nations.


MARSHALL WINDMILLER
Research Fellow
Center for South Asia Studies
University of California
Berkeley


BRYCE RYAN in collaboration with L. D. JAYASENA and D. C. R. WICKREMESINGHE. *Sinhalese Village.* Pp. x, 229. Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1958. $3.95.

Admirable for its brevity and clarity, this book offers a penetrating study of the most important aspects of life in a Low Country Sinhalese Village. Moreover, it not only shows the inter-relations between these aspects, but shows how the village as a whole interacts with the surrounding society in the general process of social transition. The research procedure is adequately described and there are both explanatory notes and a Bibliography, which could well have been extended.

The first part is mainly descriptive, but includes much valuable analysis. After describing the village and its economics, attention is turned to the family, the kin, and the marriage system—with these could have been put more conveniently the chapter on social stratification. There can be no understanding of Sinhalese society, from almost any aspect, without an adequate understanding of these basic structures and processes; and there is no better guide to them than this book.

Two intercalary chapters on Buddhism and the supernatural world provide a thoughtful analysis of relationships which, although widely separated, have become closely fused in the mind of the villager. From this intricately interwoven web of theology, myth, and magic spring many of the value systems and motivations which are so baffling to the foreigner, but of which Ryan gives a clear though condensed picture.

The last four chapters deal with secularization processes by defining their channels, analyzing their effects on community organization and the culture value systems, and finally by providing a sensitive and perceptive analysis of the general pattern of secularization as a total process.

While this case study of a single village will appeal mostly to the student of rural sociology, it should find a warm welcome elsewhere, especially among those who, under both national and international agencies, are engaged in "development" work among rural societies. In particular it should help them to understand the relationship of cultural barriers to induced social change, the difficulties involved in transplanting democracy to societies with multi-dimensioned hierarchic bases, the factors which underlie interpersonal tensions, and the mechanisms involved in the social breakdowns so characteristic of Sinhalese society and which have become so much more marked since the protocol data were collected for this volume.

Many recent events in Ceylon, ranging from court litigation through municipal and committee suspension to rural reactions and land reform legislation as well as other political moves, provide validation of Professor Ryan's analysis, which so nicely balances the descriptive approach with the analytical and the objective with the subjective and which also demonstrates the value of collaboration with Sinhalese coworkers, one of whom was a native of the village studied.

T. L. GREEN
Chief of Mission
UNESCO
Colombo, Ceylon

LAWRENCE H. BATTISTINI. *The Postwar Student Struggle in Japan.* Pp. xiii, 167. Rutland, Vt.: The Charles E. Tuttle Company in co-operation with The Gotham Foundation of New York, 1958. No price.

This is a singularly badly written book about an important subject. Mr. Battistini sets out to give us a detailed picture of the postwar student movement in Japan. In part he succeeds, if only because of the great volume of names, dates, and organizations which are listed. But he gives the reader a hard time in doing so.

One's dominant impression is that Mr. Battistini has hastily assembled several reports originally prepared for the American Occupation, added some later post-Occupation information, and published them without serious editing or thought. One result of this kind of unevaluated "documentation" in the governmental mode is a peculiar disjunction between language and political judgment. On the one hand Mr. Battistini seems to have fallen complete victim to leftist language—he accepts the jargon of his "documents" uncritically. His descriptions sound like a leftist thesaurus: "social movements," "mass elements," "struggles," "unification," "tasks," "sectors," and so forth. Without tongue in



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cheek or quotation marks, he states flatly that "A principal general aim of *Zengakuren* was to oppose war and fascism" and speaks like the leftist he is not, of "the baneful effects of disunity in the private-university sector." On the other hand, his political comments leave no doubt of his opposition to the leftists.

The reader, however determined in his interest, seethes with questions on every page. At no time can he be sure whether "self-governing student societies" means student societies which govern themselves —as distinct from being governed by the university administration—or societies for the self-government of students. Nor will he be sure of what some of the outstanding issues were all about. For example, the author speaks frequently of the "struggles" for the "rehabilitation of education"; but nowhere is it explained what this means. Or we read that a large student meeting in 1948 passed a resolution against the American Occupation-sponsored Local Board of Education Act, but we are left to wonder whether this was because the students were against decentralization or because they wanted "more democratic" boards.

The style of documentation is equally puzzling. Mr. Battistini seems to have secured much of his information through personal interviews. Now while this is a very satisfactory way to get secret or "inside" information, or to explore the activities and attitudes of individuals, it is an odd way to document general trends or matters of public knowledge. Certain events, like the date of the establishment of organizations, the dates of national conventions, and so on, seem more appropriately documented by news sources. The fact that the Communist Party adopted its "lovable party" policy in 1952 is so generally known that there is something strange in documenting it on the basis of "Talks with Seiichi Okamoto, Chief of the Student Bureau, Doshisho University, Mar. 26, 1953." Similarly, the authority for a statement about a Molotov-cocktail bombing of the home of a police official in Kyoto on July 14, 1952—surely a matter of public knowledge—is given as "Talks with Hajime Yamayoshi, Head of the Student Section, Osaka University, Mar. 31, 1953." And why does Mr. Battistini cite *Sekai* magazine, surely a very inappropriate source—it is one of Japan's leading leftist journals —as authority for the very important judgment that "Despite the prominence of students in this incident [the Imperial Plaza demonstration of May Day 1952] only a small part of the total number who had assembled at Meiji Park were involved in the acts of violence."

A reviewer can only regret having to write a review like this. But poor preparation obtrudes itself at every point between the reader and the materials, interesting as they often are. If the Tuttle Company, which I count among my friends, had exercised a little more editorial authority, this might have been a valuable reference work. As it is, it falls sadly short of the mark.

HERBERT PASSIN
Research Associate
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
The Ohio State University

ALLEN S. WHITING and SHENG SHIH-TS'AI. *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?* Pp. xxii, 314. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958. $5.00.

This book describes Soviet strategy in Sinkiang from 1933 to 1949 and seeks to analyze power shifts which took place there as the Russians, the Japanese, the Chinese Nationalists, the Chinese Communists, and General Sheng Shih-ts'ai himself pursued their devious purposes.

In broad fashion, the volume falls into two parts: an analysis of Soviet strategy by Allen Whiting of the RAND Corporation, and a translation of Sheng Shih-ts'ai's memoirs for the period when he ruled Sinkiang—first in collaboration with the Russians and with the Chinese Communists from 1933 to 1942 and, later, under the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek.

The memoirs reveal Sheng Shih-ts'ai both as an unscrupulous leader and as a complex and intriguing personality. Dr. Whiting's part of the book presents an astute analysis of little-known and perplexing networks of political, economic, and military interrelationships.

It becomes evident, for example, that

Stalin's chief objective here was to secure Sinkiang as a closed sphere of Soviet Russian political and economic influence. The so-called "Tin Mines Agreement" signed between Sheng and Soviet representatives in 1940 "granted Moscow privileges in Sinkiang so extensive as to constitute a state within a state. . . ." And nine years later, as Chinese Communist troops were marching into nearby Kansu province, the Soviet consul general in Urumchi proposed to a Nationalist general that Sinkiang should be declared independent on the precedent of Outer Mongolia. "If you do this," the Soviet consul general declared, "we will order the Chinese Communists not to continue their advance into Sinkiang."

Once more we perceive that Stalin seldom allowed ideological ties with the Chinese Communists to stand in the way of Soviet national interests. It also appears, however, that Mao Tse-tung was usually quite aware of this, and quite aware also of Chinese national interests.

In view of Sinkiang's alleged mineral deposits—not excluding uranium—we might do well to keep in mind that in this particular region of the world Chinese and Russian interests are not much more compatible today, with the Communist Chinese in control of Sinkiang, than they were in the days when Sheng collaborated with the Russians—or later, when he switched his allegiance to the Chinese Nationalists.

Whether Sinkiang is a pawn or pivot seems to depend very largely upon one's particular frame of reference and one's assessment of the power balance at any given moment. In any case, the book fills some important gaps in our knowledge about a region that is remote, from our point of view, but by no means inconsequential.

ROBERT C. NORTH
Associate Professor of Political Science
Stanford University

NATHANIEL PEFFER. *The Far East: A Modern History.* (University of Michigan History of the Modern World.) Pp. vi, 499, xii. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958. $7.50.

Intended as one volume of the University of Michigan's History of the Modern World series, this book is sensibly and sensitively written for college students who want a quick and comprehensive view of what has happened in the Far East. It is based largely on the few standard but solid texts mentioned in the bibliography. Very little if anything new has been added. Occasionally we get an indication of the author's own feelings and courage in the first part of the book when, with reference to the missionary movement, he writes "But to go out to a race of high culture and long tradition with philosophical, ethical and religious systems antedating Christianity and to go avowedly to save its people from damnation as dwellers in heathen darkness . . . was something not only spiritually limited but almost grotesque" (p. 118). However, to ape the television program "To Tell The Truth," the real, real Professor Peffer does not reveal himself until we come to the chapter on "Russia's Part in the Chinese Nationalist Movement" which is three-fifths of the way through the book. He then begins to present more of his own views and his own analysis of events. He so rightly says that the Communists did not win China but rather that the Nationalists lost it. Even though all essential facts are related, one feels that the story is just too briefly told and encompassed in too small a volume—a Readers Digest of Far Eastern history. For example, in connection with the problems of South East Asia, the story of Thailand is given in fourteen lines and that of South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in ten! Occasionally the style becomes just a little too journalistic as when discussing Japan's decision to surrender and the Emperor's part therein, the author says "Those around the table bowed assent and burst into sobs" (p. 418). His concluding remark is that "East and West will now interact in international politics instead of the East being pulled by the magnetic attraction of the West" (p. 481).

Merely to say that this book is a "fine addition to the literature on the subject" would be to damn it with faint praise; this is not a high enough appraisal, especially when consideration is given to the audience for which it was designed. Just as there was a race between the Soviet Union and the United States to get the first Sputnik into the air, it almost seems as if there has been a race with Professor Clyde to get out the first up-to-date textbook on the Far East. The difference lies in the fact that whereas the two countries do not benefit much from each other's experience, these two books can very well supplement each other, and both are excellent for classroom purposes.

ALBERT E. KANE
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Department of Interior
Washington, D. C.

GEORGE H. KERR. *Okinawa: The History of an Island People.* Pp. xviii, 542. Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1958. $6.75.

This book will undoubtedly remain the standard history of Okinawa in the English language for some time. It will do so deservedly. Attractively published, it is well written and supplemented with a valuable Bibliography and Appendix on reference materials. It ably introduces the beginner to its subject and at the same time serves readers who have professional and scholarly interests.

Given Okinawa's importance in Far Eastern history, the destruction of the ancient archives of the former kingdom in 1945 was a disaster. "Students must now rely upon materials surviving in Japan and upon the works of Japanese scholars who had access to original documents before 1945" (p. xiv). This is what Kerr has had to do for the earlier periods.

His work is a product of the program of Scientific Investigations of the Ryukyu Islands (SIRI), inaugurated by the Pacific Science Board of the National Research Council under authorization by the Department of the Army. Kerr's original report in 1953, entitled *Ryukyu: Kingdom and Province before 1945*, was translated into Japanese as *Ryukyu Rekishi* (*Ryukyuan History*) in 1956. The earlier text was then expanded "to bring forward the story of European and American interest in the Ryukyu Islands in the 19th century, and to note (by way of introduction) the manner in which the United States government established a legal basis for the present occupation" (p. xv).

Okinawan history begins to emerge from the mists of legend in the thirteenth century, when writing was introduced from Japan. In the fourteenth century formal diplomatic and trade relations were established with China. Shortly thereafter Okinawa became a united kingdom. For two centuries she prospered as a maritime nation whose ships were the principal carriers in the trade between China, Indonesia, and Siam on the one hand and Korea and Japan on the other. Invaded from Japan in 1609, the Ryukyus came under political control of the Satsuma clan of Kyushu. By indirect rule Satsuma completely controlled Okinawan trade relations in her own interests. Okinawa was progressively impoverished from then on, but the fiction of her independence was carefully maintained for diplomatic reasons until 1879, when the kingdom was terminated and the Ryukyus were formally annexed by Japan.

Strongly influenced by China, her nominal overlord, Okinawa developed a distinctive and attractive civilization in her prosperous days. Even in her decline, visiting Europeans found in Okinawans a highly cultivated people whom they greatly admired. The tendency in more recent times to regard them as barely emerging from a primitive condition of life is most unfortunate. The publisher's own reference to Okinawans on the dust jacket of this book as a "childlike people" underscores the problem we have in overcoming our idiotic stereotypes of alien folk. The people to whom Kerr introduces us suffer no such shabby treatment from him. In his hands Okinawan history is an epic of kindness, patience, and humane living in the face of extremely trying circumstances. His book should be required reading for all Americans who have a voice in policies and decisions affecting Okinawa today.

WARD H. GOODENOUGH
Associate Professor of Anthropology
University of Pennsylvania

HOWARD A. SCARROW. *The Higher Public Service of the Commonwealth of Australia.* (Duke University Commonwealth—Studies Center Publications, No. 5.)

Pp. xi, 180. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1957. $3.50.

It is a fortunate scholar who finds a significant field of study without text or conspectus and also knows how to write them both. As Dr. Scarrow's dissertation provided the conspectus, so this book gives the text. Here is everything that the student needs to know of the development, composition, and role of the senior ranks in the Australian Commonwealth Public Service. Kept to 158 pages of text, and thus to a smaller price, the book nevertheless is but the second full-scale consideration of its subject. And it is the first since 1942 when R. S. Parker's invaluable *Public Service Recruitment in Australia* appeared. Parker's work, despite its modest title, presented the landscape prior to the flood of war, welfare, and the interventionist state.

Anyone who wishes to compare Australian civil service structure, methods, and problems with those in like countries will be well served by the organization of the book and, in particular, by the clarity of its last three chapters. The reader must be prepared to be his own Duverger, however, for Dr. Scarrow is as careful not to stray beyond his ordered series of pros and cons as if he were an official advising a "tetchy" minister of the opposite political persuasion. He shows us what has been and what is, but cautiously refers most of what ought to be to a future Royal Commission with wide terms of reference.

The author's own terms of reference were set more narrowly around the senior administrators. He cannot direct the reader to an account of the Public Service as a whole and therefore has had to sketch the mountain in order to describe the doings above the snowline. After a brief survey of the Australian political background—which probably could have been dispensed with in a short, specialized work—he deals at length with the conceptual foundations and machinery of the Service.

The pressure to state it all quickly and exactly has squeezed this section rather dry but interest quickens with the freer use of example and comment in the three principal chapters. There is still no indulgence for those who like to muse on the individual experience. The excellent percentage tables have had to exclude the vignettes of personality.

Perhaps there is a fault here, a fault of overly-rigorous economy in whoever chose this size for the book. The literature about Australian public administration is fairly inaccessible. For those students who have access to the relevant articles and reports, the well-chosen references will illuminate the text. The others may wonder why the only book on the subject does not incorporate more at least of the argument of some very articulate and knowledgeable civil servants and political scientists. Since Dr. Scarrow is one of those rare Fulbright scholars who found mentors, material, and money enough to enable him to produce an authoritative dissertation, it is a pity to see him having to pare so much away at the final stage of publication. Fortunately there is no skimping of Bibliography or Index and the footnotes are where they ought to be, at the bottom of their pages.

The author is to be thanked for a closely-packed, orderly, and balanced survey of a worthwhile subject.

ROBERT CHAPMAN
Senior Lecturer in History
University of Auckland
New Zealand

DAVID H. FINNIE. *Desert Enterprise: The Middle East Oil Industry in its Local Environment.* (Harvard Middle Eastern Studies.) Pp. x, 224. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. $5.00.

Mr. Finnie's brief and lucid study inaugurates the Harvard Middle Eastern Studies, a series of monographs sponsored by the Harvard University Center for Middle Eastern Studies, established in 1954. It is a very fitting introduction, for the volume deals with one of the basic sources of wealth in the Middle East and some of the fundamental problems attendant thereto. Moreover, as Sir Hamilton Gibbs writes in his foreword, the book is concerned with "the major American involvement in the Middle East—major not only in terms of business enterprise, but also in respect of the political, social, and economic repercussions with the areas of operation of the oil companies."



As the title itself indicates, *Desert Enterprise* treats of something more than the structure of the oil industry in the Middle East, although the first three chapters adequately summarize the companies, the concessions and the ground rules, and the oil operations, and tell this somewhat familiar—if very complicated—story. But the book is particularly interesting because of its concentration, in very concise form, on the "local environment," on the impact of the oil industry in the Middle East on the politics of the area, on the people involved, whether directly or indirectly, and on the ramifications of the oil industry within the economies of the area. There is also an excellent chapter which deals with "the dilemma of public relations," with all the nuances involved in this particular field of human relations.

Mr. Finnie is well qualified for his task, for he was the recipient of a two-year Foreign Research and Study Fellowship from the Ford Foundation (1954–1956) and completed his project as a research Fellow at the Harvard Center. Now associated with an oil company as an attorney, the author shows a distinct awareness of the falls and pitfalls in the Middle East, although the sections of his work dealing with Iraq are now definitely dated in the light of the events of July 1958. He feels that the oil companies operating along the Middle Eastern crossroads have been in the area for a sufficiently long period of time to "become acquainted with its proud and mercurial spirit," and that, having been "badly jarred once" at Abadan, they are determined not to be so jarred again. In his view, the lesson of adaptability has been well learned. Perhaps only time and circumstance may tell that story.

The work is replete with tables and maps, and is well annotated as to source material, which contains the essence of its Bibliography. The book is to be especially commended for the lucidity with which the author examines the human, as well as the social and economic, impact of the oil industry in the deserts of the Middle East. It should have a wide reading.

HARRY N. HOWARD
Beirut, Lebanon

WALTER Z. LAQUEUR (Ed.). *The Middle East in Transition: Studies in Contemporary History.* Pp. xix, 513. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. $8.75.

When thirty-five authors from eight countries—including the United States, Britain, Israel, Syria, and Russia—join to discuss a region as varied and changeable as the Middle East, the skeptical reader may fear that the presentation will be superficial, the argument inconsistent, and the conclusions soon to be left behind by events. *The Middle East in Transition* is by no means free of such faults. There are occasional lapses into cliché and even bombast: "a region where legend becomes history and history legend before the sun has set on an eventful day"; misleading or downright inaccurate statements: "No Arab has yet analysed the meaning of Arab culture to Arabs themselves"; the Soviets' "refusal to assist the separatist movements of Azerbaijan or . . . Mahabâd"; "the course of events within Egypt has seldom been palpably affected by the existence of Israel"; and disagreements among the authors such as Sir Hamilton Gibbs' and Mr. Kedourie's opposite views on pan-Arabism. Moreover, despite its inclusive title, the volume deals almost entirely with the Arab countries from the Nile to the Tigris: the chapters on Turkey, Iran, and Israel by Messrs. Mango, Kazemzadeh, and Sir Isaiah Berlin are among the best in the book but lack organic connection with the rest.

Far more remarkable than these and other predictable shortcomings is the fact that the volume does have a coherent theme, and that it rather consistently addresses itself not to ephemeral events but to their underlying causes. The dual thesis of the volume, elucidated from numerous perspectives, is the absence in today's Arab society of any well-organized, experienced, and responsible group of political, administrative, and managerial leaders (Part One); and Soviet Russia's attempt, by capitalizing on anti-Western resentment among such leaders as there are, and on newly aroused social and political aspirations among the masses, to harness both to its imperialist designs (Part Two). "The Arab world,"

states Professor Berger, "is not likely to become industrialized (if at all) through the efforts of a local entrepreneurial class" (p. 61), and Professor Mills adds that aside from entrepreneurs "the middle leadership on which top leaders have to rely to execute their policies" constitutes a crucial "missing link" (p. 73). The founders of the Iraqi kingdom, says Mr. Kedourie, "came to politics not through consideration of concrete difficulties or the grind of pressing affairs or daily responsibility, but by way of a doctrine"; and British policy "gave them suddenly a country to govern" (p. 101). In pre-1952 Egypt, Mr. Baer finds, "None of the parties . . . ever had a clearly defined social or economic programme" (p. 85). "While the rootless intellectual is deplored as an exception in the West," Mr. Tütsch "gets the impression that in the Arab world he is the rule" (p. 15). "The weakness of the political leadership," Professor Gibb holds, "forced it to distract public resentment into anti-Western channels . . ." (p. 9). While Professor Issawi perceptively examines the "Economic and Social Foundations of Democracy" in the Middle East (pp. 33 ff.)—or rather their absence—Dr. Laqueur warns that "there seems to be no facile correlation between economic development and political progress" (p. 326). And Mr. Bennigsen reminds us that "the aim of [current] Soviet policy is precisely to modify . . . the social structures of the Middle East, and thereby to bring about the 'objective conditions' required for their overthrow" (p. 361). Professors Bernard Lewis and N. A. Faris examine the relationship between Islam and Communism as ideological systems, and the latter concludes, rather floridly, that Arab Muslims today are tempted "to make league even with the devil, especially when the devil has donned a turban, has partly concealed his hammer and sickle under his newly acquired burnous to make it look more like a crescent —and finally has started to quote the Qur'an!" (p. 359).

By far the most absorbing chapters for this reveiwer were those dealing with the intense Soviet controversy over the correct evaluation of the mid-nineteenth century Muslim resistance movement to Czarist expansion in the Caucasus (Paul Henze, "The Shamil Problem," pp. 415–444), and other tergiversations in official Soviet attitudes toward the Near East since 1917. A better appreciation of the historical and intellectual evolution of Soviet Near Eastern policy may do much to dispel the widespread and fatalistic notion of the Kremlin's diabolic infallibility and thus help us solve a problem barely touched upon by Dr. Laqueur and his associates—that of devising an effective counter-strategy.

DANKWART A. RUSTOW
Associate Professor of Politics
Princeton University

WILLIAM YALE. *The Near East: A Modern History.* (University of Michigan History of the Modern World.) Pp. xi, 485, xix. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958. $7.50.

While there is no prefatory note to set forth his purpose, Professor Yale pretty clearly intended his volume to serve primarily as a college textbook. For such use, the book is made up into thirty chapters and equipped with a brief list of books for extended reference, a number of illustrative sketch maps and charts, a few appended documentary texts, and pertinent chapter notes.

In an over-all sense, the most striking feature of the book is its concentration on the latter stages in the history of the Ottoman Empire and on the political readjustments made in consequence of the dissolution of that empire during and after World War I. Events in what the author prefers to call the "Near" East during World War II are sketched in a single chapter, and situations arising in the Arab countries—including Egypt—in the contemporary period receive attention in hardly more than three of the final chapters. This proportional arrangement is the more readily appreciated in consideration of the author's personal experiences in parts of the Near East at the close of World War I. These have enabled him to throw interesting sidelights from his own observation on events in peculiarly formative years, while it may be that this same background has contributed to a certain subjectivity in attitude which shows up every now and then.



This is a noteworthy book and readable withal. It discloses at once an extensive knowledge of the factors that have produced characteristic trends in the development of the Near East and a concern for the response to these trends on the part of the West. At the same time, the numerous virtues of the book do not quite atone for its blemishes, such as repetitive passages, occasional use of decidedly inelegant expressions, and implications in a number of passages that cannot be accepted without question or qualification. The author unhesitatingly speaks frankly on any topic of interest to him, let the obiter dicta fall where they may. Yet his observations usually are cogent. Relative to the Palestinian Arab refugees, he notes, for example: "Truman's proposal to solve the problem of 100,000 Jews in the camps for displaced persons in Europe a few years later resulted in there being several hundred thousand displaced persons in Asia." He considers that there can hardly be peace in the Near East "as long as American politicians believe they can win votes by doing justice to one group at the expense of injustice to another."

HALFORD L. HOSKINS
Senior Specialist in International Relations
Legislative Reference Service
Library of Congress

JEAN and SIMONNE LACOUTURE. *Egypt in Transition.* Translated by Francis Scarfe. Pp. 532. New York: Criterion Books, 1958. $7.50.

This is a timely book on a country to whom many nations in Asia and Africa now look for leadership. Although the authors of the book begin their story of how Egypt attained this position with Napoleon's invasion in 1798, the bulk of the book is devoted to a study of the Egyptian Revolution. This is perhaps the most detailed account that I know of on the background of the Revolution, its leaders and achievements; and it is written by two journalists who gathered their material directly from the authors of the Revolution and other public men.

The book is divided into five parts. Part One deals with a survey of Egyptian history from the advent of Napoleon in Egypt in 1798 to the burning of Cairo in January 1952. There is nothing new in this part, and the authors often make generalizations not always acceptable to the student of Egyptian history. Parts Two and Three give an excellent background on the Egyptian Revolution and its achievements, and deal sympathetically with such personalities as Naguib, the Ikhwan, and some of the Wafd leaders. They are not unsympathetic to Nasser, praising him for his competence and achievements, but reproaching him for his dictatorship and authoritarian rule and questioning his judgment on several of the stands he has taken on some national and international issues. The last part of the book deals with the Suez crisis and the creation of the United Arab Republic. As French citizens, the authors criticize Nasser for the steps he has taken to cancel the concession of a foreign company which has contributed greatly to Egypt's international position, but they pay tribute to him and his men for their efficiency in operating the Canal at a time when many foreign observers predicted the collapse of Nasser's venture.

The book is neither written by professional historians nor intended to be scholarly, but it is written with such precision that it will certainly benefit scholars as well as delight the general reader. The authors are to be congratulated for painting a precise and fascinating picture of the rulers and people of the leading Arab country.

MAJID KHADDURI
School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University

L. F. RUSHBROOK WILLIAMS. *The State of Israel.* Pp. 229. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. $4.50.

The most unusual feature of the volume by Mr. Williams is its calm tone when discussing a subject about which calmness, or even moderation, is rare. Mr. Williams chooses to describe rather than argue. Not until the very last part of the book does he enter upon a discussion of the international situation which lies behind the tensions between Israel and its neighbors. At that point the taking of sides is un-

avoidable; but before this he limits himself to detailing the facts of life inside Israel. What the book loses in interest it gains in authority.

The book opens with a very brief survey of Jewish history and the events leading up to the establishment of the state in 1948. It then describes the little country as a part of Europe transferred to Asia. Israel's rapid mechanization and the vigor of its population contrast sharply with the more leisurely tempo of the rest of the Near East. The efforts to create unity out of the diversity of Israel's population next holds the author's interest. Coming from seventy-four different countries and from five continents, the Jewish immigrants constitute a sociological problem heretofore faced by no other country. Moreover, the immigrants have presented an economic problem of vast proportions, since most of them have had to learn new occupations. The soil, too, has had to be reclaimed, and Mr. Williams devotes a chapter to this baffling problem, which has been intensified by the active opposition of Israel's neighbors. The author provides an illuminating survey of Israel's agricultural colonies, their successes and failures.

Israel is a welfare state. Mr. Williams makes no effort to explain this fact as other than the necessary result of conditions. Though more could, in fact, be said on this subject, the explanation is sufficient. Most interesting in this connection is the description of Israel's educational organization and the growing number of Israel's Arabs—even the girls—who attend school. The chapter on public affairs portrays the government in operation.

The final chapters deal with the Arabs in and outside of Israel. The last events mentioned are those connected with the five-day war against Egypt in 1956. Mr. Williams retains his calm here, too. The blame for the situation is clearly attributable to the cold war and the West's need for oil. But for these factors, Arab and Jew would long ago have arrived at a modus vivendi, to the mutual benefit of both.

Mr. Williams writes clearly and simply. There are more interesting books on the
ct of Israel and its unusual problems; but few are more factual and, therefore, more persuasive.

SOLOMON GRAYZEL
Editor, The Jewish Publication
Society of America
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

KAROL JÓZEF KRÓTKI. *21 Facts about the Sudanese: First Population Census of Sudan, 1955/56.* Pp. 49. Sudan: Ministry for Social Affairs, Population Census Office, 1958. No price.

*The Population of Sudan.* (Report on the Sixth Annual Conference.) Pp. 110. Khartoum: Philosophical Society of Sudan in conjunction with the Department of Statistics, Government of the Republic of Sudan, 1958. No price.

These are two reports on the first population census of the Sudan, designed to arouse interest in the census results by drawing attention to the most important findings and presenting them in two attractive and easy-to-read books. Krótki, who was Controller of the Census, concentrates on the most important statistical findings, while the papers of the Philosophical Society cover a variety of subjects including the purpose of the census, the labor force, political statistics, and tribal nomadic movements. A study is also being made of national income during the census year, and when this comes out the minimum basic data will be available to make possible intelligent development planning in the Sudan.

Roughly, what the census found in the Sudan is a largely African population in process of natural Arabization. Members of Arab tribes are in a minority, 39 per cent of the total population, and will become increasingly so since the rates of increase of the Southern African tribes are greater than theirs. Fifty-one per cent of the population, however, already speak Arabic as their home language and with the increasing influx of the Southerners into the North the latter are increasingly exposed to it.

As is rather typical in Africa, this first census found many more Sudanese than the government had previously guessed were present: 1.5 million more in fact. The census population of 10.3 million in January 1956 was also found to have one of the fastest rates of population growth in the world—around 3 per cent per year. As this is in spite of a high death rate of around 20 per 1,000, the probability is that the rate of population growth may accelerate as the death rate drops.

While the Sudan still has plenty of room and available resources to absorb more people, it takes little imagination to realize the problems the existing rate of natural increase poses. One important one is educating the large number of children. The census discovered that even on a broad definition of literacy less than 5 per cent of the population are literate. The future is hardly going to be better; only 7 per cent of the children of school-going age are now in school. One of the Philosophical Society papers calculated that to get 100 per cent attendance it would be necessary to spend on education alone one and one-half times the present total budget. Just to build the school buildings necessary for 100 per cent attendance would take 24 times the present total net capital investment of the whole Sudan. At the present rate of building schools, it would take 500 years to provide schools for the present lot of children.

The discussion in the two books and especially the photographs give one a sense of the difficulties encountered and the thorough planning and execution it took to carry out the census in so large and primitive a country as the Sudan. A taste of the field problem is found in the census instructions: "A household is defined as a group of persons who regularly share the same cooking-pot for their main meals." An amusing example of the difficulties in the processing of the raw data is given in Krótki's paper. He warns that the figures on illegitimacy are too low: "A very respectable, capable, and reliable Government pensioner was in charge of checking this aspect of the analysis work . . . he got it into his stubborn head that a woman with a child must of course be married. He thereupon proceeded to change all single mothers into married mothers as they must have been wrongly recorded due to an enumeration mistake. Being otherwise so reliable, his work was checked less than the work of other members of the Analysis Wing, until it was too late to re-do his work without very considerable additional expenditure."

In sum, the two books achieve their purpose of being a good introduction to the first population census of the Sudan and, in fact, succeed in being a good introduction to the Sudan itself.

ANDREW M. KAMARCK
Lecturer on African Affairs
Johns Hopkins University

JAMES S. COLEMAN. *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism.* Pp. xiv, 510. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958. $7.50.

This is both a timely and significant book: timely, because it is an illuminating study of an important African country soon to become a sovereign member of the British Commonwealth of Nations; significant, because as a scholarly and systematic case analysis of the background, context, and features of nationalism in Nigeria, it provides clues to the understanding of nationalism generally, particularly the varieties which have emerged under conditions of alien rule.

While Professor Coleman is acutely aware that nationalism in Nigeria is merely one manifestation of a fundamental and historic phenomenon, his primary concern is to provide a thoroughly documented study of the Nigerian case. With this aim in mind, he gives a careful survey of what he terms the "relevant features" of the physical, ethnic, cultural, and historical setting of Nigeria; an analysis of the emergence of Nigerian nationalism, in terms of its relation to Western economic forces, Christianity and the missionary enterprise, Western education and the rise of a westernized elite; the story of the nationalist movement, from the earliest traditional resistance movement to the Western impact to the end of World War II; and a detailed analysis of the postwar developments in the nationalist movement up to 1952, the terminal point of the study. Fortunately for the general reader, he provides a supplementary chapter which covers the important developments from 1952 to 1957. By 1957, it was clear that not later than

1960 the Federation of Nigeria would be a sovereign member of the Commonwealth of Nations.

In a final chapter, "Critique and Conclusions," Professor Coleman points to some of the general implications emerging from the study and calls attention to certain special features of Nigerian nationalism. The value of the book is enhanced by its excellent Bibliography, carefully formulated documentary notes, and the useful Appendix, "A Note on Concepts and Terms."

While a number of studies have been made of nationalism as it emerges in its varied forms under conditions of alien rule, more needs to be done in this field, particularly in Africa. This empirical study by Professor Coleman—which he modestly regards as exploratory—should provide both stimulus and guidance to present and future scholars who investigate this fascinating and important phenomenon.

WILLIAM O. BROWN
Director, African Research and Studies Program
Boston University

KENNETH INGHAM. *The Making of Modern Uganda.* Pp. 303. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958. Distributed by The Macmillan Company. $5.75.

This is a useful introduction to the history of modern Uganda and its present day problems. The book covers a wide span since it starts with an account of the Uganda of 1862—the year of Speke's visit—and ends with a description of recent constitutional developments and the growth of African political parties during the years 1949 to 1956. The work is also most comprehensive in scope. Most of the tribes in Uganda are mentioned and the book deals not only with the history of British administration in the territory during the last 50 to 60 years but also with the economic development of the area, with educational and missionary activities, and Uganda's contribution to two world wars.

The history of Buganda, the most famous of the African kingdoms in this region, is now comparatively well documented, but the author has had access to government files not available in England and he gives us some new facts on the pacification of Toro and Bunyoro, on the conclusion of the Protectorate Government's agreement with Ankole, and on the early administration of Eastern Uganda under the rule of Kakunguru, a well-known Ganda chief. Ingham's summary of the events which led to the deportation of the Kabaka, or traditional ruler of Buganda, in 1953, and his return to sign a new agreement with the Protectorate Government in 1955, should be of wide general interest and is commendably objective. The chapter on tribal history is less satisfactory, since it contains inaccuracies and omits any reference to recent anthropological work such as that of Fallers on the Soga, of Southall on the Alur, or Beattie on the Nyoro. Otherwise the Bibliography is full and useful and the list of government publications and government papers will be found very helpful.

The author follows a strictly chronological order, apparently based largely on the sequence of the government papers he examined. His chapters are devoted to periods of time such as 1900–1914 or 1914–1930, rather than to the specific problems facing the administration. Each chapter therefore deals with a number of separate issues and it may be somewhat difficult for the political scientist to pick out points of theoretical interest to a student of comparative colonial administration. The number of names of Uganda personalities which occur in the last chapters may also make it hard to see the wood for the trees. Those familiar with the area will, however, recognize at once that some of the major issues confronting present-day Uganda were quite apparent in the early years of British administration. For instance the Buganda of 1958 wants a separate existence or a dominant position over the other tribes of Uganda. Her Government has refused to elect representatives to the central Legislative Council and has petitioned the Queen for recognition as a separate state. This unwillingness to be treated as a province of Uganda was evidently voiced in 1898 when Buganda's ministers tried to claim rule over neighboring tribes. So also the idea of a federal as distinct from a unitary Uganda which has attracted a good deal of support from present-day African politicians was mooted and then abandoned in 1899. The proposal to unite Uganda with Kenya and Tanganyika which was one of the causes of the recent clash between the Kabaka and the Protectorate Government is also shown in some interesting references to be at least as old as 1900.

A. I. RICHARDS
Research Fellow
Newnham College
Cambridge, England

## *EUROPE*

CHARLES B. MCLANE. *Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931–1946.* (Studies of the Russian Institute, Columbia University.) Pp. viii, 310. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. $5.50.

This book is a welcome addition to the growing list of monographs which improve our understanding of the relationship between Moscow and the Chinese Communists. Professor McLane has surveyed virtually all of the Russian sources available in this country for the period 1931–1946 in order to reconstruct Soviet strategy in China, its impact upon the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the consequent co-operation or conflict between Soviet policy and the CCP. While recognizing the hazards of working from open Soviet materials, the author has combined diligent research with sophisticated speculation so as to offer a highly plausible and stimulating account of a most elusive subject.

Professor McLane concludes, "There is no clear evidence that the Russians made any strenuous efforts during this period to intervene in the internal political affairs of the CCP in support of one faction over another. . . . Second, there is no good evidence that the Chinese Communists, for their part, ever used their independence either to evade Soviet policies . . . or to refute formulations in Marxism-Leninism. . . . Third, there is no occasion after the the Fourth Plenum of the CCP, held in January, 1931, when the Russians are known to have expressed their disapproval of Chinese Communist policies" (pp. 261-62).

The author cautions that these findings may be qualified by additional research in Chinese sources which he was not able to employ. He believes CCP policy was wholly compatible with that of Moscow during the 1936 Sian crisis. However, Edgar Snow's *Random Notes on Red China, 1936–1945* (Harvard, 1957), offers important, albeit hearsay, evidence of Comintern orders which forced the CCP to acquiesce in Chiang Kai-shek's release and in his subsequent incarceration of Chang Hsüeh-liang. Similarly Professor McLane's picture of the inner struggles of the CCP during the Long March may be modified by the forthcoming memoirs of Chang Kuo-t'ao, a key participant in these events. Finally, the complex period of the war and its aftermath still obscures critical issues, among them the degree to which Stalin looked favorably upon Mao Tse-tung's creation of "a Chinese or Asiatic form of Marxism," described by Liu Shao-ch'i to Anna Louise Strong in 1946.

Even Chinese sources, however, are unlikely to alter the main outlines of Professor McLane's study. Particularly interesting is his tracing of Soviet references to CCP leaders during the early nineteen-thirties, wherein Mao Tse-tung was praised as head of the Chinese Soviet government but not of the Chinese Communist Party (p. 32). Only in 1934 did Russian writers grant him fuller recognition, apparently after realizing that the conflict for power among rival CCP groups in Kiangsi, Shanghai, and possibly in the Moscow headquarters of the Comintern, had been resolved in Mao's favor.

Similarly McLane finds the handling of Chiang Kai-shek in the Russian press a valuable clue to the willingness of Stalin to shelve the CCP, at least temporarily, when it suited Soviet foreign policy. In September 1936, a leading Soviet specialist on China, Voitinskii, did an abrupt about-face in offering a favorable estimate of Chiang, a view which was to prevail in Russian commentaries until after World War II. This is only one of many instances where the value of this book goes

beyond the specialist in Chinese communism. For those concerned with Soviet foreign policy as well as with Far Eastern international relations in general, Professor McLane's study will be a standard reference.

ALLEN S. WHITING
The RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, California

W. G. F. JACKSON. *Seven Roads to Moscow*. Pp. x, 334. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. $7.50.

Lieutenant Colonel W. G. F. Jackson, a former instructor at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, undertakes in this volume to discuss from the point of view of the military historian the principal invasions of the Russian lands. These "seven roads" refer in fact to the incursions of the Varangians, the Tatars, the Poles, the Swedes, and the French under Napoleon, as well as the two Germanic onslaughts of this century.

The author contends that the Varangians alone were permanently successful; the others only achieved temporary gains, however dazzling. In Mr. Jackson's own words, "From the military point of view, the Varangian invasion is unique in Russian history. It was the first and only invasion which has been lastingly successful. Moreover, it was the only invasion, with the exception of the momentary passage of the Goths, which came down the River Road. All subsequent invasions have come from east or west, and have succumbed to the natural genius of the Russian People and to the defensive strength of the Russian Lands. Only the seafaring Norsemen of Rurik succeeded in establishing themselves permanently in the Russian Lands, because they provided constructive services which the inhabitants needed, and because they advanced by a route which turns the defensive strength of the Russian river lines and which in itself is a natural line of communication. . . . The Vikings conquered or occupied a clearly defined domain, the River Road, but all other invaders have been drawn on to their doom in the unlimited spaces of the Russian interior."

On the face of it, the arguments here advanced—with the corollary that he who may attempt to invade Russia in future, following "the Swedish, French, and German roads . . . must fail,"—are certainly open to question. For one example, Mr. Jackson, in describing the campaigns of Charles XII, lucidly demonstrates that despite the recklessness, even folly, of the young Swedish daredevil, he almost won at Poltava. The author's geographical determinism is shunted to the background in the detailing of the Swedish invasion.

The historical sources utilized are mainly standard secondary ones in English such as Pares, Sumner, and Vernadsky. Thus, as might be expected, background Russian history is treated in quite a conventional way, with many a slip as far as factual detail is concerned.

The value of the work lies in its analytic discussion of campaigns and battles, and of the strategy and tactics involved in the military invasions of Russia, especially those of modern times. The clarity of the text at these points is greatly heightened by various sketch maps.

DAVID HECHT
Lecturer in History
The City College of New York

RICHARD HOUGH. *The Fleet That Had to Die*. Pp. xi, 212. New York: Viking Press, 1958. $3.95.

In October 1904, the Imperial Russian Baltic armada—poorly supervised and ineptly manned by conscripts, reservists, and a number of restive revolutionaries—set sail from Revel. What resulted was a magnificent and yet hopeless attempt to salvage a foolishly provoked war and "take vengeance on the insolent Japanese who had troubled the peace of Holy Russia; and to maintain the glory of the Russian Navy."

Thus begins an extraordinary and popular version of the great naval debacle, Tsushima, which gave evidence of Tsarist Russia's inability to fight a major war successfully. It is at once keyed to a high sense of the dramatic, vivid, and grimly tragi-comical. Mr. Hough, a British editor of children's books, deftly paints a picture of that doomed fleet, inanely ordered to sail around Europe and Africa, past Madagascar, across the vast stretches of the



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# Thorstein Veblen:
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*Edited by* DOUGLAS F. DOWD, *Cornell University*

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*By* W. PAUL STRASSMANN, *Michigan State University*

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Indian Ocean and East Asian waters to relieve the beleaguered Port Arthur garrison and, finally, to an ocean grave expertly prepared by the splendid tactics and "breathtaking rashness" of Admiral Heihachiro Togo.

The entire astonishing incident is here, from the first incompetent debarkation to the firing upon unarmed British fishing trawlers in the North Sea in the fantastic notion that they were Japanese torpedo boats. Included also are the stream of impossible communiques from St. Petersburg and the general monotony and demoralization that was endemic among officers and crew. The fleet, moreover, had no coaling stations and the Hamburg-Amerika Line had to be commissioned to meet the fleet with colliers at designated points in order to replenish the ships' coal supplies. Wisely, most of the events aboard ship are drawn from Novikoff-Priboy's classic eyewitness account of the journey and the battle.

Who was to blame for this madness? Was it Russian Admiral Zinovi Petrovitch Rozhestvensky who displayed a crushing lack of imagination and initiative in battle? Mr. Hough writes of "the momentary hesitancy of a tired and wasted admiral" who failed to take advantage of the one opportunity for victory afforded him by Togo during the clash (p. 163). Nevertheless, something should be said for Rozhestvensky's remarkable shepherding of the motley fleet across 20,000 miles of inhospitable oceans, harassed by the British and his own naval ministry; his ships obsolete, his crew balky, his supply lines tenuous. Looking backward, neither Rozhestvensky—including for that matter, executed subordinates Nebogatoff and Clapier de Colongue—nor his officers and crew were guilty. The real culprits could only have been those representatives of the Imperial Government who sent their fellow Russians to disaster for next to nothing.

MURRAY POLNER

Lecturer in History
Brooklyn College

M. G. SAUNDERS (Ed.). *The Soviet Navy*. Pp. ix, 340. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. $7.50.

The formidable Russian Navy created by Peter the Great could at the end of his reign have turned the Black Sea into a Russian lake. Peter, devoted to his fleet, commissioned himself a Vice Admiral, and in his *Table of Ranks*, he ennobled all commissioned naval officers. Stalin commenced early a program of naval expansion that continues under Khrushchev, and to a degree that today the Soviet Navy is second "in immediately available offensive and defensive power." Where and how Soviet seapower may be used is commented on together with its strength and weaknesses in this well-edited, first authoritative account of the Soviet Navy today.

Will there be a war? Commander M. G. Saunders, RN, editor of this informative work, points out that there are "incompatible elements" in the character of the Russian people—"a carelessness that derives from the *nichevo* of fatalism, combined with an uninhibited determination to assert themselves against other nations." Saunders considers Russia a country of extremes where anything may happen; and therefore urges that "we not shrink from the burden of preserving the freedom of the seas, without which the world cannot prosper." Because of its factual, professional flavor the book should be of great value to all serious students of geopolitics, global strategy, and sea power in particular.

The presentation is well balanced and comprehensive. One interesting feature is the appraisals of the Russian Navy in two World Wars, written by German and British experts. In fact, the book has eighteen contributors including British, American, French, and German authorities.

After a solid introduction by Commander Saunders, Part One: Retrospect, then presents in four chapters excellent background for Part Two: The Elements of Sea Power. This latter division of 194 pages commences with *Strategic Background, 1958*, by Hanson Baldwin, and concludes after nine chapters on the modern Soviet Navy with a final text: *Implications of Soviet Seapower*, by Rear Admiral E. M. Eller, USN. A few illustrations, an Index, and an Appendix that gives biographical detail about the contributors enhance the book. Five simple but interesting maps assist the

reader in understanding the maritime defense problems and probable sea strategy of the Red Empire. It seems to be a foregone conclusion that whether it be armed conflict or "cold war" containment, sea power will play an important role both for the Soviets and the Free World.

LELAND P. LOVETTE
Vice Admiral
United States Navy (Ret.)

FRIEDA WUNDERLICH. *Farmer and Farm Labor in the Soviet Zone of Germany.* (Bookman Monograph Series for Historical and Political Science Studies.) Pp. 162. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1958. $4.00.

Studies on the Soviet Zone of Germany, one of Russia's satellite states, have a different import than studies on other satellites behind the Iron Curtain that are more or less sealed off from the West. East Germany, through various leaks and windows in its prison walls, is accessible to western eyes. The refugee stream from the Soviet Zone, chiefly through West Berlin, provides a fifth of a million witnesses annually, each of whose story contributes to our knowledge of the Sovietization process going on in the lands east of the Elbe. Because of the light which this sheds on the analogous process that went on in other satellites, and even in the Soviet Union itself, such studies on East Germany have a special significance. And since agriculture is still one of the great unsolved problems in the whole Soviet bloc, including Red China, and might well prove to be the Achilles heel of Communism's planned economy, it is well to take a close look at what is happening to agriculture and farmers in East Germany.

The present study by a German-born expert who has taught at the New School for Social Research for many years is based on all available published sources, including East German government and party documents, newspapers and magazines, official reports of the Soviet and Allied military administrations, as well as West German documents, newspapers, and scholarly studies. Of particular importance were the numerous monographs on "Central Germany"—the official West German designation for the Soviet Zone—published by the West German Ministry for All-German Questions, the *Bonner Berichte aus Mittel-und Ostdeutschland.* Of the latter, the excellent study by Matthias Kramer, *Die Landwirtschaft in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone* (Bonn, 1953; a revised, much enlarged edition, with copious Annex, appeared in 1957), proved particularly valuable. These reports are based on East and West German official sources as well as on interviews with refugees. In addition to these valuable official publications, there are the reports, surveys, and periodicals of a great number of West German and West Berlin organizations, research institutes, and political parties, all of whom draw heavily on refugees and underground contacts in the Soviet Zone.

Miss Wunderlich's study is an admirably objective report, packed with facts and figures documenting the depressing story of forced, doctrinaire collectivization in accordance with the Soviet model. Of course the Communist bosses of the Ulbricht regime—still the most Stalinist of all—encountered obstacles and resistance—the June Revolt of 1953 marked the high point of this resistance—and were obliged to make tactical concessions at times. But the meaning of the various stages of agricultural policy—expropriation and breakup of large estates, formation of collectives and machine-tractor stations (MTS), and the imposition of planned production and deliveries—is clear: the Communist masters are determined to convert East German agriculture to the Soviet type, and the final elimination of the independent farmer is only a matter of time.

Of course, no analytical statistical study can tell the whole story, which is in this case not one merely of economic change and deterioration—East Germany was once self-supporting and the grain chamber of Germany—but one of total change affecting every person in the Soviet Zone and wrought with incalculable human tragedy. The vigorous, sympathetic Foreword by Alvin Johnson summarizes the historic and worldwide implications of this process of agrarian sovietization as well as the unique value of this study in an admirable manner.

CARL G. ANTHON
Executive Secretary
Fulbright Commission for the
German Federal Republic
Bad Godesberg, Germany



KONSTANTYN KONONENKO. *Ukraine and Russia: A History of the Economic Relations Between Ukraine and Russia (1654–1917).* (Marquette Slavic Studies, IV.) Pp. xvi, 257. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1958. $6.50 paperbound; $7.50 clothbound.

The problem posed in this study is this: with respect to soil, climate, precipitation, and mineral resources, the Ukraine is one of the richest and most diversified regions in Europe; it is strategically located with respect to Central Europe, the Middle East, and the Caucasus, and has access to the ice-free waters of the Black and Oziv Seas; yet neither agricultural nor industrial development of the region has matched that attained by less favored areas. Why?

Kononenko asserts that the Ukraine was already at a relatively high stage of commercial development when it came under Russian sovereignty, but that it was never unified economically with Russia; instead, ". . . Russian economic policy always aimed at differentiating Ukraine from Russia, and of keeping Ukraine in the status of a colony" (p. 32).

Although the analysis is limited to the period from the abolition of serfdom, which took place in 1861, to 1917, one chapter of thirty-two pages is devoted to developments from 1648 to 1861. Major attention is given to agrarian developments from 1861 to 1917 (67 pp.), to industrial developments, with detailed examination of the sugar, coal and metallurgical industries (56 pp.); and to conditions in banking and "finance capital" (37 pp.).

In his analysis, Kononenko uses official government statistics, state papers, letters of government officials, and numerous studies made by Russian scholars. His conclusion is clear cut: from the beginning, "The aim of Russian policy was not merely to shield their industry and commerce from dangerous Ukrainian competition but also the transformation of Ukraine into a source of raw material and a market absorbing their production" (p. 108).

A variety of tools was used to accomplish these goals. Railroads were located to serve industries in Moscow and Petersburg, and the freight rates imposed were discriminatory both as to commodities and direction of traffic; a tax system was constructed which not only channeled revenues into Russia without corresponding expenditures in the Ukraine but which also raised prices of Ukrainian products to the point of discouraging domestic consumption, thus forcing the goods into export trade which helped provide a favorable balance of trade. In other cases, export of Ukrainian raw materials was prohibited in order to channel them, at low prices, into Russian factories. At one time, we are told, erection of certain factories was prohibited by law, and some Ukrainian plants were dismantled and rebuilt in Russia. Extensive use was made of customs duties, both internal and foreign, always to the disadvantage, we are told, of Ukrainian interests.

Developments in the field of banking and foreign investments were both more complex and more subtle; but the end result was the same: the earnings and capital accumulation arising from such Ukranian industry as was permitted were channeled out of the Ukraine into the hands of Russian capitalists or the imperial treasury.

At times the economic reasoning is difficult to follow. It is especially difficult to believe that all phases of economic relationships between the two regions were so carefully planned and so successfully administered as to work always to the disadvantage of this particular territory.

The numerous tables throughout the study usually carry no headings; actual contents must be discovered from the text itself. A Bibliography of six pages is appended, and a four-page Index.

CHARLES P. WHITE
Professor of Finance
University of Tennessee

RICHARD MANSFIELD HAYWOOD. *The Myth of Rome's Fall.* Pp. 178. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1958. $3.50.

The "myth" which this book seeks to explode is that the Roman Empire in the West fell because of internal weaknesses which made its fall "inevitable," rather than because of external attacks. As an introduction to his argument, the author has given a masterly survey of the rise of the Roman Empire, its salient characteristics at the time of its height in the second Christian century, and the various calamities which befell it in the third century. He then devotes several chapters to the fourth century, discussing the recovery initiated by Diocletian, the economic and social problems and how they were met, cultural conditions, and the significance of the transition from paganism to Christianity. He concludes with an account of the "fall" in the fifth century and a short chapter on the changing culture of the epoch.

This is a very scholarly work that is a pleasure to read. With most of it the reviewer is in full agreement. Where he differs is in the emphasis to be placed on certain phenomena of the fourth century. For the author, the Empire at this time was politically stable, administratively reasonably efficient, economically reasonably sound, culturally creative, and militarily competent. For the reviewer, this is too favorable an appraisal. Granted that the attacks of the barbarians in the fifth century were needed to topple the imperial structure in the West, we must still ask, with Aymard, why a state of its size, population, and resources could not ward off peoples vastly inferior in numbers, wealth, and culture, and possessed of no superior weapons or military skill.

The only answer can be internal weakness—the inability to muster resources effectively for defense. Symptomatic of this weakness were the Empire's military dependence upon barbarians, the lack of the will to resist among its civilian population, civil war and rebellion, treachery in high places, and above all the inability to assimilate the barbarians recruited for its service or settled within its borders. Aymard seems to be right in holding that the recovery begun in 284 lost its momentum by the mid-fourth century after which stagnation and some deterioration set in. As E. Stein pointed out, the disaster at Adrianople marks "the beginning of the end" of the Roman Empire as the Mediterranean world empire. Christianity contributed little to the fall in the West, but there it failed to provide the basis of loyalty which it later gave to the Byzantine Empire. Nor can we ignore the fateful division of the Empire in 395, and the hostility of the East to the West. As for the East, it barely escaped a like fate. The break-up of the Hun Empire, a sounder economy, a stronger population, more astute military policy, and more effective diplomacy were the main factors in its survival.

A. E. R. BOAK
Professor of History, Emeritus
University of Michigan

RICHARD HERR. *The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain.* Pp. xii, 484. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. $7.50.

In this significant study Professor Herr establishes the validity of his central thesis —that "on the fundamental questions of the form of government and religion there was no cleavage of any depth in Spain before the outbreak of the French Revolution," and that "the French Revolution . . . provided the irritants that transformed into cancerous growths the hitherto innocuous discords brought on by the Enlightenment and economic expansion."

The pursuit of the complex events behind his analysis led the author into thorough examination of secondary works and wide use of primary sources. The narrative is divided into two parts, entitled The Enlightenment and The Revolution, and ranges through such chapters as "Land Boom and Land Hunger," "French Propaganda Campaigns," "Godoy and the Revival of Enlightenment," and the—renewed —"Jansenist Offensive."

The most useful and original part of the book deals with the impact on Spain of the events which occurred between 1792 and 1802—the execution of the French monarch, war and peace with France, and war with England. Here the author contributes to the knowledge of many aspects of Spanish history; yet it is precisely here that he has difficulty in fully demonstrating the accuracy of the second part of his thesis. This is true not because of any defect in the extent, accuracy, or organization of his material, which is first rate throughout the book, but because "the cancerous growths" appear in later years with which the book does not deal, and there is no visible connection between these unseen events and those which continue to resemble, in the decade after 1792, the "innocuous discords" of earlier years. There is also the fact that Spanish history reflects the peculiar obduracy of the Spanish people to conform to the causal forces of Western society. One must ask whether Spanish liberalism would ever have become morbid to the body politic without Napoleon's destruction of the monarchy. Would not the people—Jovellanos and all—have gone on suffering in the Spanish manner their innocuous, or not so innocuous, discords? One hopes that Mr. Herr will pursue such fundamental continuities in future studies of Spanish history.

The shadow of Jean Sarrailh's distinguished study *L'Espagne éclairée de la seconde moitié du XVIII^e siècle* (1954) falls across Professor Herr's book, as the latter acknowledges in his frank and modest preface. Yet Herr has achieved a different focus than that of Sarrailh and adduced sufficient material to cause his book to be a worthy complement to that of the French scholar.

Prof. Herr is to be congratulated on this handsome and important contribution to a field so carefully avoided by United States historians.

THOMAS F. MCGANN
Associate Professor of History
University of Texas

W. J. M. MACKENZIE and J. W. GROVE. *Central Administration in Britain.* Pp. xvi, 487. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1958. $6.00.

The authors have made a praiseworthy attempt to distil the juice from a large and well-compiled bibliography, and it is no disparagement of their efforts to say that they have only partially succeeded.

To compress into 465 pages a comprehensive description of the structure, organization, and working of the British Civil Service, including its relations with Parliament, the Courts of Law, local authorities, and the nationalized industries involves the jettisoning of some material; in order to enable them to describe how the machine works, the authors have deliberately rejected any idea of describing what the machine does. Their justification of this will not convince everyone.

As regards the central administration itself, they argue that, because books about individualized departments have failed to give an adequate account of what they do, it would be absurd for a general survey to attempt even to outline what the central administration does. The authors have therefore adopted the alternative of describing, in some detail, the structure and organization of six departments selected "somewhat at random." If, however, there is not room in a book to describe what an organization does, is it worthwhile to attempt to explain how it does it?

When they turn to describe the relations between the central administration and other "spheres of action," such as local government and the nationalized industries, the authors adopt a different argument and justify their failure to attempt any explanation of the latter by the assumption that the reader knows enough about them. Would it not be safer to assume that, if in fact any reader has put himself to the trouble of acquiring a sufficient knowledge of the work of parliament, the courts of law, local government, and national industries, he has also put himself to the trouble of digging out, from the same sources as the authors, the factual information about the central administration which is contained in this book?

Though there is some good and useful writing on organizational detail, there are other major defects besides these in the book, of which the most serious is the failure to give any adequate account of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility.

The general impression with which one is left is that the authors have not gone for advice in the Civil Service to anyone who had reached a high enough rank to absorb the spirit of the Service. There is hardly

a chapter which would not benefit from such advice.

ARTHUR HUTCHINSON
Deputy Under Secretary of State,
Retired
The Home Office
London

A. J. P. TAYLOR. *The Trouble Makers: Dissent over Foreign Policy, 1792–1939.* Pp. 207. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1958. $3.50.

It would be unfortunate if anyone were misled by the dust jacket of Mr. Taylor's Ford Lectures into believing them to be "history on a grand scale." For this is, in fact although not in tone, a very modest volume. The author sets out to examine the ideas and behavior of "the Dissenters," those radical critics of their country's foreign policy who have ever been the despair of foreign secretaries and whom, as Mr. Taylor points out, historians have rather too often brushed aside as "merely dogmatic theorists, who knew nothing of the real world." It is a labor of love for him; as he says, the book "deals with the Englishmen whom I most revere." He takes understandable pleasure in showing that today's ideas about foreign policy have usually been borrowed from the unpopular pronouncements of yesterday's Dissenters.

With author and subject so well matched, it is a pity that this often perceptive and amusing book is repeatedly marred by carelessness, exaggeration, and a straining for paradoxical effect. From the fact that Radicals and Imperialists, far from being opposites, were often the same people, Mr. Taylor concludes flatly that "Imperialism was a product of Radical enthusiasm," and somehow manages to convert Milner, Cromer, and Kipling into Radicals for the occasion (pp. 90–91). He is capable of contradicting himself in successive sentences—concerning the Church of England hierarchy and opposition to the Government (p. 77), for example. His love of superlatives is positively American: Cobden was "the most powerful reasoner who has ever applied himself to practical politics"; the Don Pacifico debate was "perhaps the greatest debate on the principles of foreign policy in our parliamentary records"; Bright's speeches on the Crimean War were "perhaps the greatest ever delivered in a parliamentary assembly"; and so on. He has a weakness for the facile elevation of a single factor to explain complicated developments—for instance, Gladstone's Egyptian intervention "ruined Radicalism for more than a generation." In fact, Gladstone comes off quite badly in this book, presumably because of his having so often forsaken dissent to assume power; the author's main charge against him appears to be that he was guilty of taking the interests of the Liberal Party into account—not such a heinous sin, considering that he was its leader. Mr. Tayor is at his best on some of the lesser figures, notably the Turkophil, David Urquhart. This is, in short, a stimulating, provocative, but uneven and unreliable book.

RICHARD W. LYMAN
Associate Professor of History
Stanford University

J. L. MCCRACKEN. *Representative Government in Ireland: A Study of Dáil Éireann 1919–48.* Pp. viii, 229. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. $4.80.

The subtitle of this book indicates its precise focus, while the main title indicates its broader significance. Professor McCracken has made a detailed study of the elective house of the Irish parliament from its origin in the revolutionary climate of 1918–19 until Ireland became a republic and severed its last formal connections with the Commonwealth in 1948–49.

Although the Dáil Éireann was described by one head of the Irish government as "the most important institution of the state," it never really achieved that status. Instead of developing into a genuine legislative and deliberative body it was actually the main instrument and support of governmental policy at a time when Irish politics was dominated by two parties which were not far apart on fundamentals, and by two men, Cosgrave and de Valera, the only prime ministers Ireland had between 1922 and 1948. Strong government was needed in Ireland, "first to meet the republican challenge to the state, then to direct the politico-economic struggle with Britain, and then to preserve neutrality during the World War" (p. 166).

Until 1922 the Dáil led a precarious existence— it was in fact suppressed by the British authorities in September 1919—and it remained a kind of rump parliament until 1927, when the anti-treaty party, led by de Valera, finally decided to participate in its deliberations. Nevertheless the Dáil functioned with remarkable vigor throughout the entire period from the signing of the Anglo-Irish treaty in 1921 until the Republic of Ireland Act became effective in 1949.

Among the broader questions which Professor McCracken considers are the following: the place of the Dáil in the Irish political system; the changes in its composition and functions as a result of the major political developments in the period 1919–48, including constitutional changes and elections—no fewer than eleven general elections were held between 1922 and 1948; the problem of creating a suitable second chamber of the Irish parliament; the effects of the system of proportional representation—contrary to the usual experience elsewhere, it did not lead to a multiplicity of parties or instability of governments; the nature and evolution of political parties, especially the Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil; the role of leaders, notably Cosgrave and de Valera; and the influence of the successful efforts of "the reluctant dominion" to loosen Commonwealth ties and to contribute to "a new conception of Commonwealth relations" (p. vii).

With respect to two objectives on which the two major parties were agreed—namely the establishment of Gaelic as a national language and the ending of partition—the Dáil made singularly little contribution. Very few members of the Dáil could speak Gaelic and those who could not usually resented any attempt to use it in a major debate. Partition was a much-discussed theme in Dáil debates, but the main agitation against it was carried on outside of the chambers of the parliament. Discussions of this subject in the Dáil reflected the same air of unreality and over-simplification which continue to surround this problem. There is in fact considerable point to an observation by Paul Johnson in a recent issue of *The New Statesman* that "in a very real sense partition has become a psychological crutch for the Irish Nation."

This monograph achieves its major purpose of contributing "to the understanding of representative government by making a detailed study of a single institution" (p. vii). It is therefore of interest not only to students of Irish history and institutions but to all who are concerned with the workings of representative institutions in the modern world.

NORMAN D. PALMER
Professor of Political Science
University of Pennsylvania

HADLEY CANTRIL. *The Politics of Despair.* Pp. xv, 269. New York: Basic Books, 1958. $5.00.

"Politics of despair" are the political attitudes of French and Italian voters who cast "protest" ballots for Communist candidates, even though these voters are non-Communist. In the French elections of January 1956, over five and one-half million votes, or 25 per cent of the total, were Communist, although party membership was less than ten per cent of this figure. In the June 1953 elections in Italy over six million voted Communist—23 per cent of the total—although party membership was less than a third of this. Dr. Cantril reports on a series of interviews which were made in an attempt to explain this voting behavior in terms of certain concepts in social psychology. It is doubtful, however, that this book contains any new insights, even though it does remind us of some important generalities. Dr. Cantril finds that the "protest" is a personal and private one: individuals are dissatisfied with their own personal lot, and although they may make references to the "working class" in contrast to other groups, there is no real sense of class conflict or of international solidarity on the working-class level. Even more important, the protest voters of France and Italy are not protesting only against economic conditions, even though

many of their problems are specifically economic. As individuals, they are aware of various constraints upon their opportunities, upon their freedom of choice in many areas, and upon their participation in the social and economic decisions that affect them. Whether or not they are as eloquent or sophisticated as the author makes them out to be, the Europeans interviewed are aware that there is more than material comfort involved. This is why most of them are not "really" Communists—they know the Communist record of despotism and oppression. Now, all this is very well and good; we all too often rely on material arguments in our attempts to influence world opinion, but we knew this before.

In France 1,656 people were interviewed, and 605 were interviewed in Italy. Although the technical difficulties of surveys of this type are readily acknowledged by the author, the validity of this extremely small sample is never clearly established, and neither is the method of selection. Most of those interviewed were manual laborers and although others are included, the statistics are based on the former group. The respondents are referred to as "important industrialists," "experienced professional people," "well placed" manual workers, shop stewards, and others; and they are described as being known beforehand as politically well informed. How this was determined is not clear, and the relations of the samples to the total populations are not explicated. At least a third of the book consists of quotations from the interviews, and much is made of their necessary inclusion—anticipating the criticism that they are there only for flavoring. They allow us, the author writes, "to avoid the error which we know intellectually we should avoid . . . of looking at the other fellow from our point of view." The study is characterized as "a first person view, as contrasted with the view of an 'outside,' 'objective' observer. For if we take the point of view of the 'outside' or 'scientific' observer, we shall fail to sense the real nature of an individual's experience *as he experiences it*: . . . the priorities of the values *he* is striving for and weighing in *his* decision-making processes." The logic of this statement is hard to fathom, especially in the context of what is presumably empirical social research.

This reviewer has the feeling that most of the organizational effort of this study went into the statistics and not into the prior problem of determining the conceptual framework of the inquiry. There are two excellent but all too brief chapters on the "reality world" of the worker. These sections sketch the differences between American and European capitalism and the relative positions of organized labor, but they should have been greatly expanded as a background for the general reader for whom the book is obviously intended. Another defect is that the complaints of the individuals interviewed are rarely pushed so as to yield any positive "non-despairing" statements. Respondents were tested on their attitudes toward certain "abstractions"—the standard democratic arsenal of "freedom," "personal integrity," "self-determination," and the idea of the perfect society and how to best achieve it. But the method of testing, not original but ingenious, does not control whether the respondent is expressing his opinion about generalities or about genuine abstract concepts of which he has some grasp.

In sum, the subject is important, this is one way of going about getting some vital information, and the book has its distinct merits; but at this stage of the reporting, it could have been compacted into a lengthy article.

SAMUEL E. GLUCK
Department of Philosophy
Rutgers University
Director of Research
Bonded Scale and Machine Co.

CONSTANTIN MELNIK and NATHAN LEITES. *The House Without Windows: France Selects a President*. Translated by Ralph Manheim. Pp. 358. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Company, 1958. $5.50.

A remarkable fact about modern political science is the variety of approaches used in studying the political process. The present volume is a striking instance of novelty, and of innovation that succeeds. No one can read this report of the election of the second President of the Fourth French Republic without reaching a new level of insight into the circumstances that led to the re-emergence of General de Gaulle.

The authors made an hour-by-hour investigation of the behavior of French political leaders and the strategies relied upon. All practicable sources of information were exploited to describe the perspectives and the actual operations performed by the "Congress of the Parliament" when the two chambers of the French Parliament convened at Versailles. The press was examined to give evidence of what went on at the Congress, to reveal the behavior of the newspapers themselves, and to assess the participation of "outsiders" in the Versailles proceedings. Interviews with representative figures chosen from the principal parties and groups supplemented the picture.

The result is one of the most dependable and detailed accounts of a political decision ever made. From the balcony we are able to look down upon the amalgamated National Assemblymen and Councillors of the Republic as they meet in formal conclave. We follow them into the corridors and the "smoke filled rooms." The searchlight plays upon the members as they go and come, enabling us to trace the intricate maneuvers by which shifting alignments eventally crystallize into the ultimate outcome. The material is presented chronologically, and the text is supplemented by tables and a valuable guide to the "Rules of the Game" (pp. 339–350).

We have long known that in a large-scale democracy the professional politicians tend to build a special arena in which and with which they become intensely preoccupied. It is to the advantage of each to reduce his vulnerability by assuming as little responsibility as he can. When constitutional arrangements make it possible for elected representatives to keep responsibility at a minimum, the proclivity to reduce risk is the dominating trait of the political process. Hence the "prolonged agony" of Republican institutions in France.

It was not within the scope of this book to probe for fundamental explanations or even to register approval or disapproval. It is a masterful report of naturalists who have voyaged in a *Beagle* no farther than Versailles, but with rich results.

HAROLD D. LASSWELL
Professor of Law
Yale School of Law
Yale University

ROBERT ARON in collaboration with GEORGETTE ELGEY. *The Vichy Regime, 1940–44*. Translated by Humphrey Hare. Pp. vi, 536. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. $7.50.

In *The Vichy Regime, 1940–44* we have the 1958 translation and abridgement of the original French edition of 1955. This volume is well indexed for persons and places but not for ideas and movements. Its unannotated Bibliography of three pages, listing only books in French, is a rigorous abridgement of the original bibliography of eleven pages. It is indeed frustrating to read or review 517 closely packed pages without being able to validate any statements, for there are no authenticating footnotes. Although the style improves as the book progresses, Aron displays little flare for making vivid and exciting the dramas and traumas of the Petain interlude.

In this seriously needed political narrative, diplomacy and ideologies play a supporting role. This is a detailed account with few roots in the past; only when Aron discusses the ideology of the National Revolution does he show much appreciation for historical background. His chapter on "The National Revolution-Doctrine" is his best.

Aron hews firmly to the thesis that DeGaulle, Laval, Darlan, and Petain each followed a separate code of values. No one, not even Laval, is a real scoundrel—his patriotism was "authentic but wayward" (p. 242). Nowhere does he clearly thrash out the issue of whether loyalty to France involves perforce loyalty to republican and democratic values. To be sure, objective history requires impartiality, but with Aron objectivity becomes humanitarianism.

Starting with the military defeat of 1940, Aron details the controversy and confusion leading to the armistice. Here Premier Reynaud comes off rather well. The narrative of the scuttling of the Third Republic reveals Petain's affection for authori-

tarianism and Aron's appreciation of Laval's skill and energy in destroying the Republic. Aron handles well the North African invasion. Believing that democracy and the democracies were done for, Laval and Darlan looked to a large place for France in a new Europe, certainly to be directed from the Wilhelmstrasse and patterned after *Mein Kampf*. They and Petain resisted German demands at times and with some successes, but the impression steadily mounts that Laval collaborated too readily. We are fortunate to have this sorry story told so fully so that we may know the works of the Lavals and the courage of such men as Lucien Romier who worked with Vichy without ceasing to be republican and anti-German in outlook.

GARLAND DOWNUM
Professor of History
Arizona State College

## *AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY*

CORNEL LENGYEL. *Four Days in July: The Story Behind the Declaration of Independence*. Pp. 360. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1958. $4.95.

This represents an attempt to reconstruct the small bones of the history which surrounds the agreement on the text of the Declaration of Independence. Although this event is of tremendous importance in the history of political thought, documentary records of it are not numerous. Many of the best sources were written from memory by participants in those historic sessions of the Continental Congress. It is indeed unfortunate that the Congress did not have a James Madison among its members.

Soaking himself in the literature of the Revolution, Cornel Lengyel, a recognized master of dramatic poetry, has sought to do for the fathers of the Revolution what Carl Sandburg did so magnificently for Abraham Lincoln. The result is thoroughly successful, even though it falls far short of the Sandburg masterpiece. The principal shortcoming of the Lengyel interpretation is that it remains too consistently at the political level, too much enslaved by the figures whom he is motivating, and too little concerned with the sources of their thinking.

The author is not interested in debunking history. The traditionally recognized leaders remain undisturbed in the places to which historians have assigned them. Jefferson, the Adamses, Franklin, Washington, and Hancock are the chief characters in this national drama. Dickinson, Rush, Tom Paine, and Sherman are supporting characters. These ten figures stand out from the Rutledges, Carrolls, and others in the background. Of course George III and Lord North are the chief villains. Curiously, Edmund Burke is not mentioned, even though the Elder Pitt and Fox appear briefly. Vergennes and Beaumarchais are the most important Frenchmen in the drama.

The author forcefully presents the chief ideological division present during consideration of the Jefferson draft of the declaration. Even though the war was already fifteen months old, there were those, under the leadership of John Dickinson, who hoped that negotiations might bring further concessions from the British government and a restoration of peace. New England was practically unanimous for independence, and in this view she received support from divided delegations from New Jersey, Virginia, Delaware, Maryland, and the three southernmost colonies. Conservative members regarded Jefferson's classic condemnation of monarchy in general, and of George III in particular, as unnecessarily impolitic, in that it might prevent further growth of pro-American sentiment in Britain and France. And except for the dissent of the South Carolina and Georgia delegations, slavery was universally condemned. Unanimity for the declaration was achieved only through the deletion of the Jefferson proposal for abolition of slavery. How the course of American history might have been changed but for that deletion!

This is an excellent interpretative study of American history.

CORTEZ A. M. EWING
Research Professor of Government
University of Oklahoma



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HUGH A. BONE. *Party Committees and National Politics.* Pp. xv, 256. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958. $4.50.

The author of this work warns us that it is "an impressionistic product, an attempt to sift contradictions, to weave together confirmations, and, to a considerable degree, to evaluate hearsay and judgments of those who work within the agencies." No reviewer with respect for the diligence of a colleague would be so ungracious as to ignore this warning and to indulge in any carping criticism. Nevertheless, if I may be pardoned a few adverse comments of a trifling nature, I should like to note a few omissions and inaccuracies.

Professor Bone indicates that the period when Stephen Mitchell was chairman of the Democratic National Committee is included in his survey. It seems to me that he cannot adequately evaluate Mitchell's contributions without giving Frank McKinney credit for the fine organization he had developed before Governor Stevenson's nomination and Mr. Mitchell's assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee. McKinney's Research Director, Dr. Bertram Gross, is mentioned (p. 118) but without comment on the excellent collection of research materials he bequeathed to his successor. There is no comment on this gentleman, who is a Negro economist. Dr. Franklin's selection for this important post was of some significance in the campaign—although the results did not appear to justify the expectations. Wilson Wyatt of Louisville, who was supposed to be "brain-trusting" Stevenson's 1952 campaign from Springfield, Illinois while Mitchell was cooling his heels in the Mayflower Hotel in Washington is also not mentioned. The "Iklopedia" (p. 74) was compiled and published long before Butler was made chairman. Finally, Mr. Wesley Roberts, whose shenanigans were in all the papers, might have had a little more notice (p. 39). True, Roberts preceded Hall, and by the author's plan did not come within the scope of this book—but I do not see how Hall can be evaluated fairly without some reference to the mess he inherited.

These are really picayune objections to a very well-written and authentic historical account. Unlike so many recent studies of political institutions which try to achieve precision by using new terms and abstruse methods of measurement and comparison, Dr. Bone's study gives us a quite satisfactory survey of recent activities on the part of both major party committee structures. There is no need for a further study of this type. But it is to be hoped that Messrs. Alcorn, Butler, Hall, and Mitchell, as well as scores of others who have participated in committee work, will write short autobiographical sketches filling in the gaps. What they add, however, will not invalidate Bone's conclusions. I suppose it is fair to say that his most important one is that our present-day party committees do about as well as can be expected in a democracy such as ours, encumbered by federalism, checks and balances, and a widespread distrust of politicians.

ROY V. PEEL
Chairman, Department of Political Science
University of Utah

JAMES F. BYRNES. *All in One Lifetime.* Pp. x, 432. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. $5.00.

Several years ago, upon resigning as President Truman's Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes wrote his first book, *Speaking Frankly*, an account of his service in the ranking cabinet position. *All in One Lifetime* is the author's second book. Not only is this narrative interestingly related, but Jimmie Byrnes has an unusual story to tell. Indeed no other South Carolinian, with the exception of the illustrious John C. Calhoun, has served so brilliantly in so many high offices as Byrnes.

Born a half-orphan of a poor mother, Byrnes had very little formal education, but managed to learn shorthand and became a court reporter. Admitted to the bar in 1904, he was elected Solicitor in 1908 and to Congress in 1910, where he served for fourteen years. Byrnes recalls vividly some incidents of Wilson's administration. Most interesting, perhaps, was a talk that Wilson gave a Congressional group urging passage of the Federal Reserve Banking Act.

Defeated in his first attempt to go to the Senate by Cole Blease, Byrnes practiced law for six years and then turned the tables on his adversary. In 1931 he began a ten-year span in the United States Senate. Byrnes did much spade work for Franklin Roosevelt before the New Yorker's nomination, during the pre-election campaign, and thereafter. Widely heralded as one of F.D.R.'s most trusted lieutenants, Senator Byrnes never called himself a New Deal Democrat but a Democratic moderate. Generally speaking, F.D.R. could count on Byrnes' loyalty, but not so during Roosevelt's attempted purge, in 1938, of Southern conservative Democratic senators. Byrnes might well be criticized for opposing the President's attempt to make the Democratic party liberal and thereby give the voter a real choice in our two-party system.

Although Byrnes did much to defeat Roosevelt's attempted purge in 1938, he worked hard to help F.D.R. break the third term precedent in 1940. The President expressed a desire for Byrnes' nomination as vice president but took Henry Wallace instead. In 1941 Roosevelt named Byrnes to the Supreme Court. One of the most fascinating parts of this memoir is that section dealing with its author's tenure on the Supreme Court. The reader is taken behind the heavy curtains and is permitted to see conditions among the judges as they existed during Byrnes' tenure on the bench.

When war was declared Justice Byrnes volunteered his services to F.D.R. Dissatisfied as an interpreter of the law, Byrnes resigned from the bench to become "Assistant" President with almost complete powers on the home front. Again, F.D.R. declared that he wanted Byrnes as his running mate but could not clear it with Sidney Hillman. Eventually Roosevelt accepted Harry Truman. As the war ended, and as F.D.R. approached death, Byrnes resigned from his position in the White House.

Within days after Truman became President, Byrnes was named Secretary of State. In this capacity he attended the Potsdam Conference with the President. Subsequently, Byrnes matched wits with Molotov in conferences of the Council of Foreign Ministers at London, Moscow, Paris, and so forth. Byrnes was influential in having Wallace fired as Secretary of Commerce for a speech the latter made on foreign policy. Soon thereafter Byrnes retired from the Cabinet.

Back in South Carolina, Byrnes writes that he yielded to popular demand to become a candidate for Governor. Elected easily he banished the Ku Klux Klan, levied a sales tax, borrowed money to build hospitals, and started a veritable educational revolution, especially for Negroes. As was stated at Yale when he was presented with an honorary degree, "James F. Byrnes has shattered the tradition that all energy ends at the Mason-Dixon Line."

This book quite naturally is pro-author, as autobiographies are, but it makes good reading. It should be widely read by Americans everywhere. Other accounts will correct Byrnes' understandable bias.

GEORGE C. OSBORN
Professor of Social Sciences
University of Florida

DAVID LOWENTHAL. *George Perkins Marsh: Versatile Vermonter.* Pp. xii, 442. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. $6.50.

In 1862 George Perkins Marsh wrote *Man and Nature; or Physical Geography as Modified by Human Action.* He issued revised editions in 1874 and 1885. Its last printing was on the eve of Theodore Roosevelt's White House Governors' Conference on conservation in 1907, for which it was, so to speak, the theme-song. A generation later Lewis Mumford reminded us that it was "the fountain-head of the conservation movement." In 1956, an international symposium on *Man's Role in Changing the Face of the Earth* took place—"eighty scholars from a score of sciences engaged in a 'Marsh Festival'" (p. 274). In an era when the universe was viewed as created for man's use and man was viewed as the creature endowed to improve nature, Marsh struck a new note: "Man is everywhere a disturbing agent. Wherever he plants his foot, the harmonies of nature are turned to discords." It is natural that Mr. Lowenthal, research associate of the American Geographical Society, should be attracted by the author of "the most important and original American geographical work of the nineteenth century."



But Marsh was sixty-one years old when he wrote this book. He was then United States Minister to Italy, a post which he held for twenty-one years—the longest tenure in the United States Foreign Service. His international scholarly reputation at the time was in an entirely different field. He was American Secretary of the London Philological Society, author of a grammar of Icelandic, and consultant to dictionary-makers on etymologies "using Old Catalan, Hispano-Latin, Old Dutch and Old Scandinavian sources 'in great part new to English etymology'" (p. 201).

Marsh had represented Vermont in Congress for six years, where he was influential in shaping the program of the new Smithsonian Institution as an organ of basic research, not merely a practical extension service. As a relief from private debts incurred in business ventures, he had then obtained an appointment as Minister to Turkey—patronage for the literati—which served as springboard for camel trips in Arabia, leading to a book in 1856 urging the introduction of the camel to the U. S. Southwest, prescribing its care and nurture.

In one year of respite in Vermont in 1857, he served as Railroad Commissioner and wrote as report an essay in political economy painting the corrupting influence of railroad stock-companies on public morality and demanding their regulation; he served as commissioner for the design and construction of a new State House; and as Fish Commissioner he wrote a forty-five page pioneer report on the artificial propagation of fish. Later he wrote on *Irrigation: Its Evils, the Remedies and Compensations,* five years before Major Powell's famous *Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States.* If, as Schlesinger says, "Omnicompetence has been a marked trait of the American from the start," Marsh, "Versatile Vermonter," was an engaging, indeed a breath-taking, specimen who well deserves this first full-length biography.

Mr. Lowenthal's book is engagingly written and in its own way a tour de force. He has ransacked collections of family letters, court records, and unpublished papers galore. He has followed Marsh down each of his paths—some far from geography—and mastered enough of the Congressional politics of the day, the factionalisms of the Italian *risorgimento,* to offer balanced judgments of Marsh's role. And he has placed Marsh's view of man and nature in its philosophic setting of New England Transcendentalism. Altogether, this is an admirable work.

CHARLES S. ASCHER
Professor of Political Science
Brooklyn College

*The Army Air Forces in World War II,* Vol. VII: *Services Around the World.* Prepared under the editorship of Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate by the USAF Historical Division. Pp. lii, 666. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. $8.50.

With this volume the official history of the Air Forces comes to a conclusion. Dealing with the various non-combat Services that made victory possible, it is in many respects the most valuable volume of the series.

The account of the accomplishments of the Air Transport Command (ATC) is particularly useful. For example, ATC ferried overseas 267,000 planes; it airlifted over the Hump from India to China alone about 650,000 tons of gasoline and other supplies—a volume equivalent to the capacity of 6,500 American freight cars. It transported over 300,000 wounded and sick from battle areas to the rear and thus saved thousands of lives. Within five months after hostilities ended, more than 160,000 passengers were flown across the Atlantic to the United States without a single fatality. The efficiency with which the Command carried out such a stupendous task was not only essential to victory but also proved conclusively that vast quantities of cargo and passengers could be delivered quickly anywhere in the world even under unfavorable conditions. This proof of the potential of air transport paved the way for the later airlift into Berlin.

As always in time of war, medicine made significant progress. Two outstanding con-

tributions made by Air Force surgeons in treatment were the early ambulation of post-surgical patients and the aggressive rehabilitation of sick and wounded. The Weather Service made invaluable permanent contributions to the science of meteorology. The chapters on morale and demobilization also provide an important guide for the future.

While this volume contains much that can be helpful in future planning, the first six volumes of the history, it now seems, present merely an interesting and reasonably accurate history of the Air Forces' role in World War II. For, contrary to expectations when the project was launched, the operational history offers few, if any, lessons for the future. Recent developments in very long range weapons will certainly alter tactics and even strategy so greatly that any general conflict will be waged on lines for which there are no historical precedents. Only if we have to fight a "limited" war will the first six volumes on operations be of practical value.

Now that the task is finished, high praise is due to Professors W. F. Craven of Princeton, and J. L. Cate of Chicago for the masterly manner in which they have supervised the work of the numerous contributors to this important history.

ARTHUR P. WATTS
Associate Professor of History
University of Pennsylvania

PAUL P. VAN RIPER. *History of the United States Civil Service.* Pp. xvii, 588. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Company, 1958. $7.50.

The growth of the Civil Service of the United States from a few hundred employees under Washington to a complex and powerful army of more than two and a quarter millions has been one of the most significant developments of our national history. This volume, which contains a full and accurate account of this growth, is based on thorough research and shows keen insight into the political, economic, and social factors that have shaped our administrative service.

After a survey of the beginnings of the service under the Federalists and Jeffersonians, and the development of the spoils system under Jackson and his successors, the author devotes some five hundred pages to an account of the evolution of the merit system under the provisions of the Pendleton Act of 1883.

Advocated first as a great moral reform to eliminate corruption, then as a move for economy and efficiency in government, and finally as a necessary prerequisite for enlisting personnel adequately equipped to carry on the technical functions of an increasingly complicated governmental organization, the merit principle has been widely extended throughout the federal service. Most presidents since 1883 have added additional classes to the system. Their successors have on occasion recalled some of them from the classified service but such retreats have usually been less extensive than the advances. Today approximately 90 per cent of all civilian employees of the national government are within the merit system. They are selected for the most part on the basis of competitive examinations, they are reasonably protected from partisan removals, and they are probably more fully representative of the population they serve than are the government employees in other countries.

In the author's opinion, however, there are serious defects in the present civil service system. Although many of the recruitment, training, and classification functions are presently administered by the operating agencies, he thinks there is still too much centralization, and too much emphasis on rigid controls and police surveillance. Agreeing with the recommendations of the President's Committee on Administrative Management and the Hoover Commissions, he would intrust most personnel functions to the executive agencies as an essential part of line management and have the central commission serve chiefly as a staff agency for advising the president. Whether the merit system has been firmly enough established to permit such an arrangement without inviting the return of the spoils system is a question about which authorities disagree.

Since presidential patronage has often been a useful means for obtaining congressional approval for national programs, how far can the merit system be pushed into the higher ranges of the administrative heirarchy without unduly weakening the presidency? What are the advantages and disadvantages of limiting entry into the classified service to the bottom levels? Does the rule of three too greatly restrict the discretion of appointing authorities? Is the classification system too rigid? Have too many restrictions been placed on the removal power? Can a career system be reconciled with the maintenance of a reasonably representative bureaucracy? How seriously have loyalty investigations undermined employee morale? What has been the effect of veterans' preference? The author lays no claim to definitive solutions for problems such as these. But he considers alternative solutions with fairness and sound judgment.

This in an important book. It is interesting, thought-provoking, and authoritative, and should serve as a useful guide to personnel officers as well as to students of public administration. The summary chapter is a model of its kind.

ELMER D. GRAPER
Professor of Political Science, Emeritus
University of Pittsburgh

HARRY HOWE RANSOM. *Central Intelligence and National Security.* Pp. xiv, 287. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. $4.75.

It was a Frenchman who described the old League of Nations as "impossible and indispensable." And the thoughtful reader of Mr. Ransom's thorough, compact, and well-organized book is likely to conclude that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is both undesirable and inevitable. It also appears to be extravagant and immature, yet already muffled in a toga of smug exclusiveness.

On the Washington scene and in the name of national security, the CIA can do no wrong. The spoiled only child whose whims must not be thwarted is racing into the holier-than-thou adult whose necessities may never be questioned. This has resulted in few if any dazzling secret intelligence coups; it has produced an aggravated case of occupational elephantiasis.

Mr. Ransom, an industrious researcher and gentle faultfinder, makes it clear that the CIA is not only vast but is also a vast improvement in the field of American intelligence. Through two world wars, and the turbulences of the years in between, our intelligence "community" remained a scattering of largely independent villages, competitive, mutually mistrustful, and lost among dreary wastes of disparagement and neglect.

Even politicians saw that unification was imperative. Yet our numberless intelligence agencies resisted reform and the manifest destiny of amalgamation with all the vigor and suspicion of the thirteen original Colonies. Some are still resisting.

Mr. Ransom writes discreetly. His study is important, entertaining, enlivened with some excellent anecdotes. He reminds us, for example, that "in order to protect the famed 'Magic' system of cryptanalysis" the alerting of Pearl Harbor was delayed. So "Magic" was protected and the battle fleet was plastered.

The skipper of the doomed *Main* "praised" our consul general in Havana (1898) for his "helpful 'spying' activity.' Presumably Captain Sigsbee praised Fitzhugh Lee a few days before the battleship was blown up.

A nation which has been naive and consciously reluctant about wartime espionage and secret service is bound to abominate the "peace-time" growing pains now thrust upon it. Mr. Ransom quotes those who suspect "all secret intelligence operators" because they are inclined "to use their secret information as a weapon to influence" men and policies, on the proven "principle that knowledge is power."

Intelligence, grudged its pittances in the past, is today granted unaudited billions to spend, or squander; but the problem of personnel remains, and even the most dedicated CIA director must surmount it at his own, and our, peril.

RICHARD WILMER ROWAN
Jersey City, New Jersey

JORGE CASTANEDA. *Mexico and the United Nations.* (National Studies on International Organization.) Prepared for el Colegio de México and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Pp.

xi, 244. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1958. $3.00.

AURELIANO AGUIRRE. *Uruguay and the United Nations.* (National Studies on International Organization.) Prepared under the Auspices of the Uruguayan Institute of International Law for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Pp. xi, 129. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1958. $3.00.

These are the twelfth and thirteenth volumes to be published in a series of studies, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, of the relations between individual national governments—selected from various regions of the world—and the United Nations. When completed, the series is expected to embrace twenty-four studies, of which the last two are to be devoted to over-all summaries and analyses.

While the general arrangements for the series permit of independence of treatment in the individual studies, the Mexican and Uruguayan volumes were prepared in essentially the same manner. In each case, the primary responsibility for the writing of the manuscript was entrusted to a single author—an official of the Mexican Foreign Office in one case; and an editor of *El País*, a Montevideo newspaper, in the other—who was assisted by a study group composed of remarkably distinguished public figures. Thus nine people, seven of them current or former government officials, took part in the Mexican project, and twelve, of whom nine were current or former public officers, participated in the Uruguayan. In the latter, but not the Mexican, case, the final draft of the manuscript was approved by the study group before publication.

Both books are significantly authoritative statements of the topics selected for discussion. These deal with the foreign policy objectives of Mexico and Uruguay, and the positions taken by their delegations to the United Nations in pursuit of those objectives. This reviewer would be hard-pressed to name more authoritative books on these subjects than these two. Moreover, while they differ somewhat in approach—the Uruguayan volume is more historically oriented than the Mexican—they share a sufficiently common formulation of the problems to permit them to be regarded as essentially comparable. The social scientist should not overlook the positive value of this circumstance. In an area of study frequently characterized by widely disparate interests and approaches, it is often difficult for a scholar to use or build on the earlier research done by others. In the two books under review, however, the generally common treatment of the same subject matter is sufficiently structured to permit later students interested in these questions to find these two volumes of considerable utility.

It should be pointed out that the subject matter of both studies is heavily formal and legalistic in character. There are two minor exceptions to this: the Mexican book, interestingly enough, contains a brief section on public opinion, and the Carnegie Endowment has added to the Uruguayan volume an Appendix on the political parties and newspapers of that country. But in the main both projects are devoted to formal doctrine and legal questions. Neither work discusses the administrative organization of its foreign office, the mechanisms for its interaction with its delegates at the United Nations, or the degree of autonomy those delegates may exercise, let alone the dynamic processes by which the two countries' foreign policy decisions are made.

Most of the Mexicans and Uruguayans who conducted these studies are current or former government officials, but theoretically they contributed to these books in the capacity of private citizens of their countries. It has been observed that when a man wears two hats he looks funny. Thus, although these volumes are not official statements of the policies of the Mexican and Uruguayan governments in the strict or technical sense, the books do exhibit some of the characteristics of official pronouncements. Both works, for example, tend to be defenses of, or apologies for, the two countries' roles in the United Nations, rather than objective analyses of these roles. Essentially, the basic correctness of Mexican and Uruguayan policies is the assumption upon which these volumes are based rather than an hypothesis to be tested by the studies. Accordingly, the coins of the two countries almost always come down heads and almost never tails, and Aguirre has no difficulty in stating flatly in his final chapter that "full and loyal support of the United Nations may, in conclusion, be considered the basic rule of Uruguay's foreign policy" (p. 95).

GEORGE I. BLANKSTEN
Professor of Political Science
Northwestern University



J. FRED RIPPY. *Latin America: A Modern History.* (University of Michigan History of the Modern World.) Pp. xiv, 579, xx. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958. $10.00.

To begin with, two comments may be made about Dr. Rippy's book: it is not just another textbook on Latin American history, and it is the most recent and up to date one. However, some readers may wonder why Professor Rippy devoted his time and energy to a new college text instead of continuing to prepare special studies of greater value to the average student. His volume does not have all of the characteristics of a textbook. Chapters are subdivided but there are no paragraph headings. Notes are located in the back of the book. Reading lists are not always well selected. There are only fourteen maps in the text and several of these, although they are copied exactly from other sources, have no credit line. The Index is not a textbook Index and leaves much to be desired. However, the publishers rather than the author can be blamed for many of these characteristics. In any case, the true test of a text is in the teaching, and each instructor will weigh the book in the balance of classroom use.

As may be expected by those who know Dr. Rippy's previous works, this one contains considerable emphasis on the international relations of the Latin American countries both with the United States and with other parts of the world. Also he has emphasized the economic aspects of their national and international life. The book is divided into three sections: The Colonial Period (pp. 1–172); The Early National Period (pp. 173–386); and The Recent Period (pp. 387–543). The chronological dividing line between the last two sections is about 1900. Dr. Rippy, like all teachers of this subject, is concerned—if not perplexed—with the periodization of Latin American history, especially since the end of the Wars of Independence. Consequently, some teachers will radically disagree with his 1900 dividing date. However, as much can be said in favor of this date as for 1870 or 1918 or 1930, or other years advocated by various Latin Americanists.

Dr. Rippy has a writing style all his own. It is interesting and often subtly witty, frequently sly, and sometimes lecturing in tone. He is keen to point out mistakes—especially mistakes of the United States government made by its various branches. Latin Americans are delightfully characterized and criticized, and so are individuals and organizations in the United States. Do-gooders are castigated and those who do good are praised. Some heroes are cut down to size. The book is interpretative to a greater extent than other college textbooks. This fact may or may not please some readers, but students will like it. And so does this reviewer.

A. CURTIS WILGUS
Director, School of Inter-American Studies
University of Florida

JOHN J. JOHNSON. *Political Change in Latin America: The Emergence of the Middle Sectors.* Pp. x, 272. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. $5.00.

This study's thesis is that Latin American "urban middle groups are vitally, if not decisively, important in an area where one still commonly hears and reads that there is 'no middle class to speak of.' . . ." The author concludes that the future, also, "holds considerable promise for them," for "middle sectors" now have increasing economic power, political knowledge, and "cultural experience," as well as the sympathy of foreign governments. The Latin American republics analyzed in depth are Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil, the author's contention being that the developmental patterns of these five will impose themselves on the remaining fifteen states.

Despite the deviousness and incompleteness of the various current theories of

social structure, to write an entire book based on premises concerning classlike entities and to propound neither explicit theory nor adequate definition is unfortunate. Although Professor Johnson has thus—somewhat unnecessarily—condemned himself to an impressionistic survey, the results are good if not optimal. Let us take an example. The author argues that what cohesiveness his "middle sectors" have is based on their being predominantly urban, having above average education and believing in public education, in their being obsessed with industrialization, nationalistic, in favor of state interventionism, and inclined to use the party instead of the family as the extra-governmental instrument of political activity. This list is a descriptively useful one but it is theoretically slipshod, for it does not take into account the inherent comparability or the level of generality of each factor, a serious fault when one or more points may have to be subsumed under another, as in the case of nationalism and the secularization of public life. A statement of the degree to which each point may be pertinent is also necessary, for certainly some middle class groups oppose state interventionism, certainly the family continues to cushion political shocks for these persons despite their intellectual desires for impersonal institutionalization, and just as certainly there are other basic factors making for cohesion, such as the occupational labeling imposed on individuals very often by law as well as custom, an identification which has much to do with self-conception and hierarchical placement and thus political behavior.

This book is easy to criticize adversely because the author has entered fields where sociologists, political scientists, and cultural anthropologists should have preceded him. His analysis must suffer because of the neglect of his fellow academicians. This work should serve as an honest challenge, and since it is invariably insightful, intelligent, and ingenious, it is also likely to give long service as a breeding ground of hypotheses.

The 60-page Bibliography is most impressive, especially for sources in English. Unfortunately, key books on social class in Uruguay—a Sociological Study of the family in Montevideo and Carlos Rama's *Sociologiá Uruguaya*—and Chile—*Cuentas Nacionales,* a Chilean Development Corporation study vital to occupational analysis—are missing. A paucity of footnotes is also regrettable, especially so in a pioneer work of this kind where possible replication is highly desirable.

A most charming characteristic of the book, and one which adds to its reliability and general value, is that Professor Johnson knows of what he speaks with his head as well as with a splendid sense of "feel" for the area.

K. H. SILVERT
Staff Member, American Universities Field Staff
Associate Professor of Political Science
Tulane University

## *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*

PETER GROTHE. *To Win the Minds of Men: The Story of the Communist Propaganda War in East Germany.* Pp. xi, 241. Palo Alto, Calif.: Pacific Books, 1958. $5.50.

Peter Grothe, special features editor of *Stars and Stripes* in Berlin, and presently studying political science at Stanford University, made good use of his talent and off-duty time to observe, study, and collect material on the current Communist propaganda war in East Germany. Berlin was an unrivaled base of operations. Information from the Eastern Zone and the knowledge of experts were available to him; he interviewed over one hundred refugees and made numerous visits to East Berlin as well as single journeys to Potsdam, Leipzig, and Dresden. He interviewed German church officials and a number of Communist personages including Gerhart Eisler.

As a journalist and student of political behavior, the author believes that "Winning people's minds is the most important business of the twentieth century," that the results of Communist propaganda among a captive people can best be studied in East Germany, and that the success or failure of the indoctrination program may decide the East-West struggle.



An opening chapter, illustrated from interviews, newspaper excerpts, and personal observations, presents a summary sketch of political and economic conditions in the German Democratic Republic (DDR). The purpose and major tasks of the directors of the propaganda effort are then described and the principal campaign themes presented. Separate chapters follow on the propaganda of terror, the press, radio and television, the arts, direct agitation, and the most significant and successful bid to win East German youth through the educational system and the Communist youth organizations. The two final chapters describe the agencies and programs of the counter-propaganda which emanates from West Berlin. Well deserved praise is accorded Radio in the American Sector (RIAS), the America House, the American Memorial Library, and the Investigating Committee of Free Jurists—certainly not a "big team" compared with the opposition. After describing the resistance of the Christian churches to Red pressure and persuasion, the author concludes with a reasoned statement of the significance of the worldwide propaganda war and the inadequacy of the United States effort. Getting down to specific cases he pleads for a bigger budget for the United States Information Service and the doubling, at least, of the effort in East Germany by the American agencies.

The author set himself a restricted task and this he has accomplished well. His book is essentially a report and not a study in depth. To the non-specialist in German and Central European affairs it will be highly informative, but to the initiated the terrain will be quite familiar. Moreover, the underlying assumption that the biggest and most aggressive propaganda is going to win unless equally big and aggressive counterpunches are delivered is a debatable hypothesis.

ORON JAMES HALE
Professor of History
University of Virginia

MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI. *Fonction publique internationale et influences nationales.* Pp. xviii, 674. New York: Frederick A. Praeger under the Auspices of The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, European Center, 1958. $12.50.

It is singularly appropriate for a scholar trained in the French legal tradition to turn his attention to an emerging international administrative law, as Bedjaoui does here. This book is his doctoral dissertation, which in 1956 won him first prize in the annual competition which the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace holds in Europe to encourage studies of international organization.

Mr. Bedjaoui starts from the incontestable premises that states do carry on business through international organizations and that these organizations employ administrators. He asserts that if "international officials" are to accomplish the aims of the institutions which employ them, they must be completely free from all national authority. Proceeding deductively, he posits the sine qua non of an international civil service in recruiting, setting salary and leave practices, establishing privileges and immunities, terminating contracts, and arranging for employee representation, and then contrasts the desiderata with actual practice.

Although many of M. Bedjaoui's facts are familiar, he ranges far more widely than the authors of most international administrative studies. He writes not only about the United Nations, but also about the earliest international public unions, the specialized agencies, and regional bodies. The notes and bibliography, citing many European source materials, are especially valuable.

Because his legal norms are high, M. Bedjaoui's commentary shows how far states are from achieving optimal conditions for an international civil service. He diligently notes the influence, usually deleterious, of nation states—including the United States, through the late Senator McCarthy's committee—on international administration. Sometimes M. Bedjaoui exaggerates these influences, however, as when he implies that governmental pressure, rather than administrative ineptitude, constituted the most significant obstacle to reorganizing the United Nations Secretariat. Certainly one cannot reshuffle high international officials without taking na-

tional sensibilities into account, but external governmental pressures should not blind us to either the faults of particular international administrators or the weaknesses of some ways of administering international organizations. Although as M. Bedjaoui notes, it did take several years to reorganize the Secretariat, Mr. Hammarskjold showed in 1954—and has continued to show since—how a Secretary-General can make significant and wide-ranging administrative changes. M. Bedjaoui refers to them only in a footnote, however, almost as if the facts were getting in the way of his theory. In this instance at least, M. Bedjaoui's pessimistic references to the inherent weakness of the heads of international organizations arise less from the facts than from the contrast between the facts and his values.

Not surprisingly, M. Bedjaoui concludes that the international civil service today reflects the imperfections of international co-operation. As he sees it, a stronger international civil service will in turn help promote international co-operation. His book may well serve to catalyze this process, if not immediately, perhaps at some time in the future.

RICHARD N. SWIFT
Associate Professor of Government
New York University

*British Interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East.* A Report by a Chatham House Study Group. Pp. vi, 123. Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1958. $2.00.

This is a tract for the times, and the time is of British and Western political deflation. Early in 1956 the Council of Chatham House established a study group to examine British interests and policies in the Middle East. Then came the Suez nationalization, the Anglo-French convulsive reaction, and the Western retreat. The tragedy and shame of it all sank deeply into the bones of the eminent scholars, diplomatists, soldiers, and men of affairs who were members of the study group. They examined the historical evolution of Britain's traditional claims to paramount and even exclusive interests in this bridge land, the protection of which was the function of British power and arms. But they found that Britain can no longer assume this task. "The difference between the British position in the Middle East in 1945 and in 1957 is so great as to make it clear that Britain has suffered a defeat of major dimensions."

Britain's special interests are now reduced to the treaty obligations assumed in the last century to protect the Persion Gulf sheikhdoms; for the rest, they are shared with the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and indeed with the non-Soviet world at large. The two principal interests are the supply of oil and the free passage of trade, and those are of course world interests. "The scope for the individual use of force by Britain has dwindled. . . . Its desirability, moreover, has also almost disappeared. At Aden and in the Persian Gulf we still have private obligations and may be forced to act alone. But we ought to welcome any chance to share these obligations. . . . Our chief difficulty is going to be to persuade our allies to share the burden and the responsibility."

Consequently, traditional policies, attitudes, and techniques have to be fundamentally changed. In the political sphere the scope for British action is thought to be very limited—"and the arguments for inactivity are undoubtedly cogent." No longer masterly inactivity, but just plain inactivity. In social and economic spheres Britain must co-operate with the young, revolutionary forces. One of the supreme tasks is the maintenance of Britain's cultural position and the reputation of British goods and services. Information services, export of technicians, trade union co-operation, exchange of students, trade fairs—in these ways we shall demonstrate our unity, washed of all taints of bloody imperialism and dry cleaned of residues of ill-gotten materialistic gains. Perhaps in a few centuries Britain might even succeed in wiping out the debt of the horrible past.

ALBERT VITON
Food and Agricultural Organization
of the United Nations
Rome



NICHOLAS MANSERGH. *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Wartime Co-operation and Post-War Change 1939–1952.* Pp. xvi, 469. New York: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1958. $10.00.

This outstanding volume gives descriptions, profuse illustrations, and adequate interpretations of how the British dominions deal with their senior partner and with one another. The book is well proportioned, half of it being allotted to the intricate problems of military and political co-operation during World War II. One-fourth of the space covers the post-war changes of status for India, Burma, Ceylon, and Ireland. The last fourth of the book discusses international and inter-Commonwealth relations.

In discussing the wartime concert of effort, the author's theme is to demonstrate the capacity of the Commonwealth system to achieve unity of purpose and effort among several governments and peoples—whether in the bleak days of 1940 when, without major allies, Britain and the Commonwealth faced Germany and Italy, or later, down to the complete victory of a world-girdling coalition against the Axis dictators.

In the second segment, the post-war transformations of several dominions into republics is detailed. The changes reveal a process and an adaptability to meet change—without confusion or war. Both the process and the adaptability are still transforming the Commonwealth. It is to be hoped that the author will extend the account of these changes for the period after 1952, using his same writing techniques.

The third segment of the book stresses international politics, demonstrating the ability of several members of the Commonwealth to preserve their cohesion with the changing world political conditions that produced a new balance of power. The interposition of the United States as a military ally of Canada, Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand apparently does not disturb the sense of loyalty and co-operation among the several Commonwealth partners themselves. Moreover, all Commonwealth dominions and republics widened their world horizons through active participation in the United Nations. Already a miniature league of nations, broader opportunities have thereby been found for the Commonwealth states to pursue the common objectives of security, peace, and progress.

Interesting glimpses are given of the political personalities to be found playing decisive parts. If Winston Churchill exercised abundant power in London in the conduct of Britain's part in the war, the dominion prime ministers nonetheless always retained their freedom to act independently. That they generally co-operated in the war effort is testimony of the binding spirit of the Commonwealth.

Appendices list, for 1931–1952, the principal Commonwealth officers and the Commonwealth representatives within the Commonwealth and in foreign countries.

This volume is one of a series. It follows immediately upon a volume by the same author discussing *Problems of External Policy, 1931–1939.* Two companion volumes, *Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931–1952*, include important source material for the period as a whole.

VERNON J. PURYEAR
Professor of Political Science
University of California
Davis

SIGMUND SKARD. *American Studies in Europe:* Vol. I & II: *Their History and Present Organization.* (A Publication of The American Institute, University of Oslo in co-operation with the Department of American Civilization, University of Pennsylvania.) Pp. 357; 364–735. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958. $10.00.

This study-survey must already have commanded the favorable interest of teachers and scholars in international relations, diplomacy, other social sciences, literature, European and American history, as well as of those in the relatively new interdisciplinary programs in American studies.

For some the volumes will constitute a

work of reference on curricular developments and present outlooks in Europe. For others, the concise historical backgrounds will be usefully informative.

The distinctive aspect of the chapters is that they weave general history into the histories of organized education. The reception in Europe of the fact and idea of the United States, not infrequently put as "the 'impact' of America on," has been treated here and abroad—see "List of Sources" in volume II; nevertheless, the field may still be regarded as an underdeveloped one. *American Studies in Europe* is a unique addition to this literature. No other study has put together such information covering the whole of Europe. Twenty-five countries get into the picture by way of their educational curriculums from the secondary school to the university, with major attention given to higher education.

According to Mr. Skard, "The term 'American studies' in this book means the study of the Civilization, past and present, of the United States of America, principally the study of those aspects that are fundamental to all national civilizations: human and cultural geography, political, economic, social, religious, and intellectual developments, laws and institutions, language, literature, and the arts" (p. 8). As Mr. Skard asserts, there are other conceptions of American studies, but for the most part they are consonant with the one just quoted. Although he properly does not single it out for analysis here, he is intimately ecquainted with the relatively new academic handling of American studies in the United States, which became in a sense an official though quite flexible doctrine with the establishment of the American Studies Association in 1950. This homeland situation is pertinent to the work being commented upon for several reasons. First, many readers of the work will be caught up by learning of the late arrival of instruction about America in some European countries and institutions, and the early arrival in other places, whatever the nature and duration of the instruction. Why, for example, were American subjects so late to arrive in Italy and Ireland, when their people in such large numbers had arrived in the United States to stay and reproduce? Answers to this are given. Second, several European American studies programs have been influenced by current programs in this country (pp. 655 ff). Under United States government scholar-exchange operations the European demand for American studies specialists has become so great as to require special administrative attention. Third, after the Parliament of Norway, in 1946, set up at the University of Oslo a chair of "Literature, especially American," Mr. Skard, who received that professorship and then became as well director of Oslo's American Institute, which opened in January, 1948, visited the United States to study current American studies programs. He has subsequently been a teacher and lecturer here, and the influences of these experiences is apparent in his volumes.

The birth of American studies in this country is short of being contemporaneous with the signing of the Declaration of Independence. The present systems—and they are not one—had their beginnings in the 1930's, granted a few extra years if interpretation requires them. *American Studies* by the late Tremaine McDowell, and *American Studies in the United States* by Robert Harris Walker both take up this question.

Earlier, instruction in the United States about the United States was ordinarily offered through history or literature, neither of which had too easy a time of it, as European traditions and cultural accumulations were accorded dominance. In fact, those who encouraged or took the first doctorates in American literature displayed a certain occupational courage, although once taken, the gamble did pay off. The present American studies program at its broadest may enlist the co-operation of half a dozen departments; in smaller institutions history and literature usually predominate. The basic objective is to give to the student an integrated knowledge of American civilization. This is Mr. Skard's hope for Europe.

Mr. Skard deserves a hearty vote of appreciation. He has not only acquired American as a second language: he has also, in spirit, adopted the United States as a second country.

D. H. DAUGHERTY
American Council of Learned Societies
New York



C. WILFRED JENKS. *The Common Law of Mankind.* (The Library of World Affairs, No. 41.) Pp. xxvi, 456. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, under the auspices of The London Institute of World Affairs, 1958. No price.

MOSES MOSKOWITZ. *Human Rights and World Order: The Struggle for Human Rights in the United Nations.* Pp. xii, 239. New York: Oceana Publications, 1958. $3.95.

"The common law of mankind" and the term "international law" are identical in the sections of Jenks' volume entitled Preface, Contents, and Text—pages xvii–xxvi cover a collection of cases, legislation, treaties, and other "international instruments."

The Introduction covers the transition from ancient and medieval to modern times. "Can we," the author asks, "deduce a sufficient consensus of general principles from legal systems as varied as the civil law with its multifarious European, Latin-American, and . . . the common law with its own varients of the Islamic law, Hindu law, Jewish law, Chinese law, Japanese law, African law in its varied forms, and Soviet law to give us the basic foundation of a universal system of international law?" In condensed form the answers to the queries implied are offered in ten chapters.

The volume by Moses Moskowitz is concerned with political reality which takes us back to the time "when the pater familias claimed the right of life and death over his children . . . as well as over his slaves—and to 1933, when Goebbels invoked before the League of Nations the old adage about a man's home being his castle to deny the outside world the right to concern itself with the treatment the Nazis meted out to members of minorities. . . ."

The Foreword offers high appreciation for "human rights and world order."

The two authors defend with conviction the reality, functioning, and effectiveness of the United Nations—inevitably disappointed, the hapless reviewer must confess to unavoidable omissions and inevitable regrets.

JOHANNES MATTERN
Associate Professor of Political Science, Emeritus
Johns Hopkins University

## *ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY*

CHARLES WOLF, JR., and SIDNEY C. SUFRIN. *Capital Formation and Foreign Investment in Underdeveloped Areas.* (Maxwell School Series.) Pp. x, 170. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1958. $3.00.

This study is concerned with only one important aspect of economic development—capital formation and foreign investment. The authors have prepared an inventory of research work recently completed or under progress in this field, and used it as a basis for the analysis and evaluation of additional research needs and suggestions for action programs, particularly for South and South East Asia and the Near East. Three main problem areas are specially selected: entrepreneurship and the demand for capital; technological alternatives and optimum use of capital; and foreign investment and capital formation.

The authors believe that one of the early obstacles to economic development is the lack of demand for capital. In spite of the limited size of the market, there are many profitable opportunities for investment in backward areas. Savings or potential savings are also ready at hand, in the form of idle cash balances, capital held abroad, gold hoardings, unemployed or underemployed labor, and a high proportion of national resources diverted into unproductive channels such as ceremonials, tobacco, and so forth. These, however, remain untapped because of a dearth of entrepreneurs. If favorable grounds were created for the stimulation and successful operation of enterprise, these sources could supply the necessary savings. An inquiry into how the local islands of entrepreneur-

ship spring up in underdeveloped areas, and how they can be multiplied and their effects diffused through various devices such as centralized distribution agencies and easy credit terms would, therefore, constitute a useful field of research. Wider research work into the inevitability of historical abuses connected with the growth of entrepreneurship, the role of out-groups in economic growth, the volume and pattern of savings and investment, and the classification and ordering of significant social, economic, political, cultural, and resource factors in relation to countries and regions would also be welcome.

It is widely conceded that the most up-to-date techniques adopted in developed countries are not necessarily likely to be the best techniques for underdeveloped countries with their different factor endowments, different natural resources, and different social structures and organizations. Hitherto, however, because the economists took techniques as given and the engineers were only familiar with recent methods, this fact has not received its due attention. An intensive study of the techniques adopted in countries with different backgrounds—for instance, the United States, a Scandinavian country, and Japan—under convenient headings such as capital/output ratio, the location of the industry, the scale of the plant, the skilled labor requirements, and management and organizational techniques, may greatly pay. The strategic role played by certain sectors in the economic histories of different countries may also be investigated to find out where developmental efforts could first begin with great advantage.

In the field of foreign capital, valuable research work could be done by finding out the capital-multiplier effects of foreign investment and the tax-elasticity of such investment. Contracts involving only foreign management and technique without capital aid may also be evaluated, and five or six profitable opportunities for foreign capital should be specified for each country.

Assuming the field limitation of the authors, there are still a few important questions that remain unmentioned. There is no doubt that inadequate entrepreneurship and consequent lack of demand for capital are important obstacles to growth, but there is no reason to believe that their removal will in itself activate idle funds, mobilize gold hoardings, and stop unproductive consumption. Each of these maladies is the result of varied persistent causes and not easily amenable to any single remedy, much less to the growth of entrepreneurship alone. The millions of disguised and not-so-disguised unemployed can only be put to productive work through tremendous efforts and organization, probably involving some compulsion, and requiring a great change in atmosphere and attitudes. The question of the adoption of optimum techniques is well made, but on the action front it is necessary to distinguish between the most profitable technique from the individual entrepreneur's viewpoint and the optimum technique from the national viewpoint. Because of wage regulation and interest fixation by law or custom, the two may violently differ, and it may require action by the state to make the individual adopt the optimum technique. To devise techniques specifically suited to the resources and circumstances of underdeveloped areas may need research laboratories as well as a detailed and careful glance through the techniques adopted in different countries at different times.

The book will be very interesting and useful to students of economic development and will provide much material for research students intending to work on developmental topics.

D. T. LAKDAWALA
Professor of Economics
University of Bombay
India

*Income Tax Differentials.* Symposium Conducted by the Tax Institute, November 21–22, 1957. Pp. vi, 258. Princeton: Tax Institute, 1958. $6.00.

This is one of the series of annual symposiums "conducted by the Tax Institute to focus attention on a major problem of taxation by affording an opportunity for discussion by informed participants representing different points of view."

In this case the participants included university professors of law, finance, and economics; accountants, especially those in income tax practice; representatives of various kinds of business, and of business and labor organizations; business management and investment advisers; government officials; and even representatives of authors, artists, and inventors.

Various kinds of differentiation were discussed, such as those effected by tax rates, deductions, exemptions, administration, and so forth. Nearly all attention was given to the United States income tax; scarcely any to state or local, although one paper by a former British tax official compared United States, Canadian, and British differentials.

Special sessions of the symposium were devoted to tax differentials in compensation; the effects of differentials upon investment; the double taxation of dividends; and how taxes should be reduced. As would be expected, these sessions included controversial discussions of high and low rates, both personal and corporate; percentage depreciation for oils and other minerals; special rates on capital gains; various questionable manipulations in defining capital gains; failure to allow adequate credit for capital losses; reorganization; mergers with loss concerns; favors to executives through pension, deferred pay, and option plans.

Attention was called to the great variation in percentages of income reported for taxation by different classes—for example, by wage and salary receivers on the one hand and by farmers and dividend receivers on the other. Severe criticisms were made, also, of the exemption of interest from state and municipal bonds; the deduction of interest and taxes that are really personal in nature; and the omission of imputed income such as the rental value of owner-occupied dwellings.

The cumulative effect of this symposium is to impress the reader with the vast conglomeration of differentials in law, rulings, and administration, and the political difficulties of remedying the situation instead of complicating it further by additional favors to others who feel that they are discriminated against. What can the average ordinary individual do in the face of well-established practices, large determined pressure groups, and the fear of most politicians to antagonize voters? How can a business organize or conduct its business without the expensive advice of legal experts as to the intricacies of the tax law and its administration? How can anyone with other than the simplest small income afford not to employ expert advice even to fill out his tax returns? It is hoped that readers of this volume and others will not be benumbed into hopelessness but rather will be jolted and galvanized into effective action which will bring substantial corrections.

ROY G. BLAKEY
Professor of Economics, Emeritus
University of Minnesota

DRAGOSLAV AVRAMOVIC assisted by RAVI GULHATI. *Debt Servicing Capacity and Postwar Growth in International Indebtedness.* Pp. xvi, 228. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. $5.00.

The Great Depression of the 'thirties had a deep impact on the financial institutions in virtually all countries of the world. The reason was that, in the post-World War I period, many countries had borrowed large amounts of funds, and the debtor countries were unable to service this international debt when their export shrank in quantity and value as a result of the curtailment of production in the creditor countries, particularly in the United States.

The rapid rebuilding of a new set of international indebtedness and of international obligations of debt service within a ten-year period after the war is the topic of this study.

In 1955 fifty-two debter countries had a public external debt of 22.9 billion dollars, or dollar equivalent, outstanding, and a service on this public debt of 2 billion dollars per year. To this has to be added external debts in private account which required payments or accruals of about 3.2 billion dollars or dollar equivalent. About four-fifths of this indebtedness is the result of capital movements in the first post-World War II decade.

The study has been carried out by staff members of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It is quite understandable that the Bank wanted to know if these international obligations were in line with the development of the

economic capacity of the debtor countries to pay and if their capacity to pay could be endangered by possible unfavorable developments in the world markets for their export products.

Carefully presented, the report offers a treasure of information on the development of external debt, debt service, international trade, production, government revenues, and gold and foreign exchange reserves of the various countries during the first post-World War II decade. Where data were available comparisons with previous periods were made.

The result of the study is reassuring as far as Western Europe in general is concerned. The reconstruction, aided by a 40 billion dollar inflow of public funds—grants and loans—from 1946 to 1955, brought such an increase in production, exports, government revenues, domestic savings, and gold and exchange reserves that the ability to service the debt cannot be doubted.

The result looks less reassuring for countries in Asia and Latin America. These sweeping generalizations, it should be noted, are those of the reviewer; the book carefully points to country-by-country differences and makes needed qualifications concerning the nature of the estimates. With respect to a number of countries in these areas the book concludes that maintaining their present economic goals may endanger the discharge of their debt service obligation.

The author did not raise the question of the possible consequences if transfer difficulties should force these countries to lower their goals of economic expansion. In some cases such lowering may mean merely abandoning overly ambitious plans and promises. In other cases it may mean that the rate of population growth could exceed that of production, a fact which may lead to despair and the discrediting of the current leadership.

If the lowering of goals leads to undesirable economic, social, and political consequences, ways should be explored for promoting economic growth in underdeveloped countries in a manner which takes account of the limited capacity of these countries to transfer rising debt service payments—for example, by a flexible debt service which would be related to the country's debt service capacity. The author did not explore these questions and as a staff member of the International Bank probably could not explore them. Thus, the study is limited to assembling and analyzing statistical estimates in an excellent manner, but other questions need to be discussed before accepting the general conclusion that these countries must face the choice of lowering their economic goals or defaulting on their obligations.

GERHARD COLM
Chief Economist
National Planning Association
Washington, D. C.

LESTER V. CHANDLER. *Benjamin Strong, Central Banker.* Pp. x, 495. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1958. $6.00.

Well-written biography has the great virtue of presenting history in human terms. Professor Chandler's biography is well written, and his subject is worth the effort. Altogether he has provided a wholly sympathetic but nonetheless objective treatment of one of the leading creators of our American central banking system. The book shows the reader how the Federal Reserve System came into its own despite the war climate into which it was born; how it first established itself as a useful agency of government through its help in the sale of government bonds; how its objectives were left only vaguely defined by the act creating the System; and how the instruments of monetary policy, especially open market operations, had to be discovered by trial and error during the years 1921–24.

In all of this evolution one man, large in vision, capacity, and personality, stood out above his fellows. Governor Strong brought to his post as head of the New York Federal Reserve Bank many talents together with experience in banking. His experience in the trust field had led him by 1904 to the secretaryship of the newly-formed but important Bankers Trust Company. When drafted to head the Federal Reserve Bank, he had already achieved a considerable reputation and had broad contacts in the nation's financial capital.

It was, however, in the rebuilding of a world wounded deeply by World War I that Strong and Governor Montagu Norman of the Bank of England learned and passed on to us the lessons of restoring financial and trade relations. They were the best physicians which the sick world had at a time when effective international agencies for dealing with these problems were lacking.

Especially valuable to anyone interested in central banking is the analysis of the great debates incident to the structure of the Federal Reserve System and the determination of the powers vested in the Board of Governors and in the several banks, especially that in New York. The compromise that eventually resulted is unique. It consists of a central banking system rather than a central bank—a system that is partly governmental, partly private. Its design is intended to provide an agency which will guard the public interest and still be sensitive to practical realities.

It is in reporting and analyzing the policy mistakes of the past that Professor Chandler makes his most timely contribution. For example, the avid desire of Strong and Norman to have England return to the gold standard at the previously established rate seems now to have been a mistake of judgment. Strong saw coming the stock market inflation that culminated in 1929. On August 3, 1928, he relayed his fears to Walter Stewart, but was too ill to lead or even participate in a campaign to curb the ill-fated flow of credit into Wall Street through the call-money market. By October 15 of that year he had died. One cannot but wonder what leadership he might have given the system had he lived. Of still greater interest is what he would recommend to solve today's monetary and fiscal problems were he still alive.

C. CANBY BALDERSTON
Vice Chairman
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Washington, D. C.

E. GARTLY JACO (Ed.). *Patients, Physicians and Illness: Sourcebook in Behavioral Science and Medicine.* Pp. viii, 600. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. $7.50.

An extraordinary amount of research is going forward these days in "medical economics," "medical care," "public health," "medical sociology," and, as Professor Jaco chooses to name his delineation of interest, "behavioral science and medicine." It would take an uncommon amount of self-assurance to lay out the independent limits of these territories with any dogmatism. The editor of this important compilation says that the behavioral sciences eventually will constitute a basic science for all branches of medicine, and he names these sciences as "sociology, cultural anthropology, and social psychology."

Maybe so, maybe not. Anyway, this book is a sometimes exciting and nearly always interesting accumulation of miscellaneous essays, over a third of them published for the first time. They often rest on surveys, arithmetical procedures, knowledge of psychology, awareness of the realities of earning a living and clinging to happiness, and discriminating use of the research findings of others. But is this grouping of recent studies by sixty-three contributors a definable area with an organized body of knowledge, something that can be studied and taught? The editor thinks so. Despite much reflection, this reviewer remains to be persuaded. Somehow, most of the authors write like plain old sociologists, physicians, statisticians, administrators, journalists, social workers, and anthropologists, and one wonders if calling them or their work by a common label really changes anything.

The editor has made a clever and useful selection from the rapidly expanding literature that discusses morbidity, mortality, medical education and practice, attitudes of patients, and the meaning of sickness and health to society. Physicians and specialists ought to read most of it. Certainly it would be a pity if the original essays included here without prior publication in scholarly journals failed to have their day in court.

This unsophisticated reader took pleasure in the narratives on the fate of idealism in medical school, the problems of the fa-

cially deformed, the Christian Scientist as a "problem patient," and the osteopathic student as jealous rival of the medical student. Nose counting reaches a new low in several essays—how many times do nurses wear their caps in a Veterans Administration hospital—yet important results surprisingly flow from some of the least promising of these. The racy magazine *Medical Economics* gets some items printed here, although the original studies by scholarly researchers might better have been included in two cases. Robert Albright's advice to physicians on "Economics of Doctor-Patient Relations" strikes this layman as a sound companion of similar warnings issued repeatedly by units of organized medicine but taken somewhat lightly by a fair number of doctors down the street. Henry D. Lederer says, "The experience of illness is a complex psychological situation," and he urges that the convalescent be accorded "graded 'successes'" on the road back.

Harold Wolff suggests that "disease is indeed related to our attitudes, our individual and group actions, our goals, and the conflicts they engender." What this does to the economic determinist arguments of the essays which open this book is not clear. Bernhard J. Stern could write in 1951 that cardio-vascular diseases are to a large extent community products, judging, "It will require the resources of all community agencies to conquer them" (p. 30). In the light of medical accomplishment by individual practitioners in this century, aided mightily by health education activities and government public health work, one doubts so sweeping a statement.

VAUGHN D. BORNET
Glen Ellyn, Illinois

THEODORE CAPLOW and REECE J. MCGEE. *The Academic Marketplace*. Pp. x, 262. New York: Basic Books, 1958. $4.95.

This interesting and well-written report by two sociologists continues the analysis of the occupational life of the university professor begun in Logan Wilson's *The Academic Man* some fifteen years ago and continued by Lloyd Woodburne in his study, *Faculty Personnel Policies in Higher Education*.

This report is based on data obtained from a sample of the faculties at ten major public and private universities in this country. The focus of the research is the occurrence of vacancies and the addition of new personnel in academic departments during a two-year period. A large amount of data obtained through interview and questionnaire are correlated with various aspects of personnel turnover. The type of university and of academic position are related to the direction of mobility and to rates of turnover. These relationships are grouped into topical chapters describing the occurrence of vacancies, procedures in recruitment, the distribution of power over personnel changes in universities, and the relative value of teaching and research in academic mobility. A final chapter of the book presents recommendations for changes in university procedures aimed at reducing conflicts in the role of the university teacher.

This volume will appeal to at least three audiences. First, the lay audience or the nonacademic man. A few in this group may view this volume as an exposé of the university professor; most will find proof of what they suspected—that professors, not unlike themselves, also pursue wealth, power, and prestige, but after their own fashion. A second audience will be the professional sociologist who will read this as a research study of an occupation, or of a major social institution. For this audience, however, and notwithstanding the fact that the author is one of the leading sociologists studying occupations, this report generates little or no theory in the sociology of work or in comparative institutional analysis. The definitive social science analysis of the university remains to be made. A third audience will be the university teacher himself. He will find some facts which are familiar to him. Other findings will confirm hypotheses he has had for years about the workings of departments and universities. A third group of results will come as novelties. Among the findings: one's prestige and potential mobility are determined by the time one is in his thirties; the lower the position, probably the more staff time spent in choosing a candidate; a university might, out of good faith, meet one outside offer a professor receives but will not feel it has to match all such offers. This latter audience, because of both professional and personal concern with the results, will find this book of much interest.

ORVILLE G. BRIM, JR.
Russell Sage Foundation
New York City



C. W. W. GREENIDGE. *Slavery*. Pp. 235. The Macmillan Company, 1958. $4.75.

Mr. C. W. W. Greenidge, Director of the Anti-Slavery Society, has written a short but useful book on slavery today. This is divided into two parts—The Facts and The Fight, the latter including a final chapter on "What Remains to be Done." Under The Facts he describes slavery as it exists today in Arabia and has chapters on debt bondage, particularly in India; serfdom or peonage, with illustrations from a number of Latin American states; the sale of women in marriage; and the sham adoption of children. There is a valuable chapter on the attitude of Islam which states with cogency the view that the Quran by no means sanctions slavery as a permanent institution. The most controversial chapter in this part of the book refers to African marriage customs. Mr. Greenidge describes the bride price system as analogous to slavery, making little distinction between different forms of the practice and writing as though it were uniform among different tribes. Broadly speaking, a high *Lobola*, stable marriage, and a clearly defined authority of the father go together, though it would be crude to regard one of these factors as a cause of the others, and this, like every other social institution, is today affected by the Industrial Revolution through which Africa is passing. To regard *Lobola* as a form of slavery and to attempt to abolish it at one stroke is surely superficial.

Mr. Greenidge's account of the fight against the slave trade and slavery is necessarily short but within these limits is admirable. The final chapter outlines with wisdom the action which needs to be taken. In Arabia, chattel slavery is still a recognized part of the social order; Mr. Greenidge makes the sensible suggestion that other Islamic countries should give the Arab states a lead in this matter. He believes that the trade from Africa is more flourishing today than thirty years ago when the Royal Navy still patrolled for slave-carrying vessels and the Treaty of Brussels was still enforced. He suggests that the United States and the United Kingdom should together convene the signatories to the Treaty of Brussels and revive its provisions. Mr. Greenidge also sees value in the setting up of a permanent anti-slavery committee of the United Nations. Here he is probably right, though surely it would be better to leave the question of marriage to a committee concerned with human rights; one may believe that the limit of age for marriage should be raised and the levirate made a matter of consent without talking about slavery. With this one exception regarding marriage, this is a wise and useful little book.

PHILIP MASON
Institute of Race Relations
London, England

GEORGE Z. F. BEREDAY and LUIGI VOLPICELLI (Eds.). *Public Education in America: A New Interpretation of Purpose and Practice*. Pp. x, 212. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. $4.00.

This symposium was written by a number of well-known American educators under the editorship of a professor in the University of Rome and of an American of Polish birth. It was originally designed to enable foreign students to understand American education—the assumptions upon which it has been built, and the social forces that have sustained and developed it. As the writing of the volume progressed, it was discovered that, with some additional effort, it could be adapted to the needs of both American and foreign readers. By the combination of American authorship and foreign editorship, it was hoped to present an adequate analysis and appraisal of the basic current issues in American education. On the whole this purpose has been successfully achieved although some readers will not accept as adequate all of the analyses or proposed solutions of issues.

The first three chapters are devoted to general aspects of American education—its basic features, the significant concepts and philosophical theories that have influenced its development, the purposes and issues that are likely to be faced in the future.

Each of the fourteen chapters that follow the first three deals with some particular problem or aspect of American education: the private school, the college and its problems, the educational implications of social class, racial integration in the schools, current attacks on the curriculum in the public schools, local pressures on the school superintendent, manpower problems, federal control of education, school and community relations, audio-visual instruction, the teaching of international relations, and change and continuity in American education.

This volume is characterized by its balanced emphasis on historical development, current issues, and future prospects. It will serve three very useful purposes. The specialist will find little that is new in it, but he will find it a clearly organized source of information on practically all issues in American education. The volume will make its greatest appeal to laymen and beginning students in professional education. They will find it a stimulating account of the purposes, achievements, and future prospects of American education. And finally, the book will serve admirably its original purpose of explaining American education to foreign audiences.

NEWTON EDWARDS
Professor, School of Education
University of South Carolina

SIDNEY GOLDSTEIN. *Patterns of Mobility, 1910–1950: The Norristown Study.* Pp. xxii, 254. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958. $7.50.

As a member of the seminar on technological change and social adjustment led by Dorothy Thomas and Thomas Cochran at the University of Pennsylvania, Mr. Goldstein undertook to analyze the horizontal and vertical mobility of the population of Norristown, Pennsylvania in the forty years between 1910 and 1950. The primary sources of demographic data—decennial censuses of population, and birth and death records—while yielding measures of the net changes resulting from inward and outward migration and occupational shifts, do not reveal the great volume of compensatory inward and outward migration and changes in individuals' occupational status. The fact that more than three out of five present inhabitants of the city were born elsewhere, and that migration has accounted for four-fifths of the net growth of the city's population since 1910, give no indication of the total amount of circulation. A house-to-house survey of the city conducted by members of the seminar provided migration and occupational histories of the present residents, but obviously excluded previous residents who had died or moved away.

Mr. Goldstein turned therefore to the city directories which had been compiled and published biennially under commercial auspices throughout the past century. Drawing a 10 per cent sample of males listed in the directory in decennial years, he sought to trace each individual through the preceding and succeeding biennial issues. Public school records and registries of births and deaths were also consulted. From the resulting data on individuals, Mr. Goldstein has estimated, for males over eighteen years of age, their moves into and out of Norristown, changes of place of residence within the city, and shifts from one broad occupational category to another in each of the four decades. Females and boys under eighteen are excluded because the city directories do not give adequate information about them. The accuracy of the results is impressively demonstrated by comparing estimates of the occupational composition of the population in a given year, projected by these procedures from the composition a decade earlier, with the United States Census figures for the year.

Mr. Goldstein points out some of the consequences of mobility for the social organization of the community, noting for example that despite the great amount of mobility there has remained a substantial stable core of persons who change neither their places of residence nor their occupations. It remains for him or other sociologists to explore more deeply the implications of his findings. He has placed demographers and sociologists very much in his debt for his painstaking development and validation of a method for measuring migration and occupational mobility. As Professor Thomas observes in her Foreword to the book, it is to be hoped that his methods will be applied in studies of numerous other American communities.

ELBRIDGE SIBLEY
Social Science Research Council
New York



## *PHILOSOPHY*

JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET. *Man and Crisis.* Translated by Mildred Adams. Pp. 217. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 1958. $4.50.

*Man and Crisis* is a worthy companion of the author's well-known *The Revolt of the Masses.* Both works are marked by the brilliancy, originality, and depth of the author's interpretation of the crisis of our age and of the basic historical processes. Both volumes belong to the significant books of our time in the field of psychosocial sciences. The particular importance of *Man and Crisis* lies in the fact that it gives a more systematic development of Ortega y Gasset's conception of "the science of history" and of his "reading" of historical facts than is given in any of his other works.

The book opens with a criticism of the traditional conception of the science of history as a mere chronological recital of so-called historical facts and events. The author correctly challenges L. von Ranke's famous contention that through a mere chronological description of these facts the "science of history can find out *wie es eigentlich gewesen ist*—'how things actually happened'." José Ortega y Gasset rightly indicates that science is not a mere collection of raw facts and data but "correct interpretation of facts" for the purposes of adequate comprehension of reality.

"By themselves, facts [like hieroglyphics] do not give us reality; on the contrary, they hide it, which is to say that they present us with the problem of reality. If there were no facts, there would be no problem, no enigma, there would be nothing hidden which is necessary to de-hide, to dis-cover. . . . Facts cover up reality; while we are in the midst of their innumerable swarmings we are in chaos and confusion. In order to discover reality we must for a moment lay aside the facts that surge around us, and remain alone with our minds." Then, like all great scientists do, we must build a postulational hypothesis or "an imaginary reality, a pure invention of our own." After thinking through all the facts of this imaginary reality—that is, after deduction of all the consequences of our postulational hypothesis—we must compare them "with the facts which surround us. If they mate happily with one another, this means that we deciphered the hieroglyph, that we have discovered the reality which the facts covered and kept secret. That labor is what science is."

In accordance with this understanding of the science of history, the author gives to us his theory of the historical crises, particularly his analysis of "what, how and why" of the crisis of our age, and of the long-time fluctuations of the basic types of culture and the ways of historical life. In a very inadequate form, the gist of his ideas can be glimmered from the following quotations.

"There are many reasons for surmising that European man is lifting his tent from off that modern soil where he has camped these three hundred years and is beginning a new exodus toward another historic ambit, another manner of existence. This would mean that the ground of the modern age which begins beneath the feet of Galileo is coming to an end beneath our own. Our feet have already moved away from it. . . . [For this reason] it becomes very important for us first, to understand precisely just what is the system of life which we are abandoning; second, to know what it means to live in the midst of an historic crisis; third, to inquire how an historic crisis comes to an end and how we enter into a new age."

The volume unfolds the author's answers to these problems. These answers place his theories among the most significant

"social philosophies" of our time. Among other things, the author's theories are very similar to the reviewer's interpretations of the crisis of our age and of the dynamics of historical processes.

PITIRIM A. SOROKIN
Director of Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism
Chairman and Professor of Sociology, Emeritus
Harvard University

ROGER BROWN. *Words and Things.* Pp. xvi, 398. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. $6.75.

Descriptive linguistics began about fifty years ago with the work of the French scholar Ferdinand de Saussure. In this country, two pioneers in the field were Edward Sapir and Leonard Bloomfield, whose researches laid the groundwork for modern American linguistics. Despite this brief history, descriptive linguistics has considerably influenced the social sciences, particularly cultural anthropology and social psychology. According to Professor Brown, modern linguistics has provided the social scientist with a wholly new view of language and this in turn has made possible a new and potentially fruitful approach to a psychology of language.

In his introduction and first three chapters, Brown supplies a metalanguage and applies this to the analysis of speech, writing, and meaning. Linguistic forms—words, phrases, and so forth—and their referents, or meanings, are viewed not as unique events, but as categories with definable criterial attributes. Communication by language then becomes "the coordinate recurrence of categories, one a linguistic form, the other not" (p. 9).

With this analytic tool, Brown examines six problems which have long troubled scholars concerned with language: the nature of meaning, the language of animals, the relation between language and thought, the character of primitive language, the possibility of phonetic symbolism, and the techniques of persuasion through language. While Brown does not neglect the work of previous scholars, he quite properly emphasizes current studies in the psychology of language. Recent studies, he says, have provided "a lot of new evidence" on these questions, "evidence derived from psychology, descriptive linguistics, and anthropology. The questions are alive and moving toward solution in the behavioral sciences" (p. 16).

Brown's conclusions are not easily summarized in a brief review; his own summary requires nearly six pages. A few points may be noted, however. First, there is evidence of primary phonetic symbolism, particularly in onomatopoeic words referring to sounds. Second, animals do not share in human language; their responses to categories are different in kind from those evidenced in speech. Third, first language learning is an important guide to a child's "cognitive socialization." Fourth, reference categories may not be equally "codable" in different languages, which means in effect that peoples of different cultures or sub-cultures may differently classify their kin, personality types, or even "the basic classes of sensation, such as colors, tastes, and smells" (p. 375). Fifth, since grammatical categories, such as parts of speech, tend to have semantic implications, it is possible that "languages having different semantic distinctions among their parts of speech teach a different metaphysics" (p. 375). Sixth, language is expressive—"speech is treated as an expression whenever we use it to categorize a speaker" (pp. 375–76). This fact "is the great cognitive check on the power of propaganda and advertising" (p. 376). Seventh, children and pre-literates, apparently able to operate with very general categories, have relatively few general terms, since such terms "are less useful for the purposes of children and primitive societies than are terms on a more concrete level" (p. 376).

Some of these points are obviously subject to debate. In general, however, Brown's discussions and conclusions are well balanced and reveal an admirable command of the pertinent literature in linguistics, anthropology, and psychology. *Words and Things* is an original and provocative treatment of language which should help to bridge the gulf that has long existed between the several behavioral sciences concerned in part with language.

HARRY HOIJER
Professor of Anthropology
University of California
Los Angeles



DOUGLAS F. DOWD (Ed.). *Thorstein Veblen: A Critical Reappraisal.* Lectures and Essays Commemorating the Hundredth Anniversary of Veblen's Birth. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958. $5.00.

The hundredth anniversary of the birth of Thorstein Veblen, America's greatest social thinker, occurred in 1957. The occasion has not been widely commemorated in a nation herded into hothouse conformity by cold-war pressures. This volume of seventeen essays is a notable exception. Moreover, it is one of the best secondary works on Veblen ever published. Although the book contains a wide variety of viewpoints, its general tone is sympathetic to Veblen. Yet it is no sense uncritical. Indeed, it happily recalls the generous and searching spirit of the earlier commentaries on Veblen by Homan, Mitchell, and Hobson.

Like all symposia, this one is somewhat uneven in quality. Among the better essays, we should surely mention Dorfman's "The Source and Impact of Veblen's Thought." However we may disagree with some of his interpretations, probably no one has a broader basis for evaluating Veblen than Dorfman, the author of a classic biography of Veblen.

C. E. Ayres presents a stimulating discussion of Veblen's theory of instincts, although we can hardly agree that this was Veblen's most important contribution. M. A. Copeland succinctly describes Veblen's ideas—and some of his own—on the scope and method of economic science. We believe that he errs, however, when he more or less dismisses Veblen's last essays. These papers, written mostly in the early 1920's, still offer more insight into American domestic and foreign policies, especially cold-war politics, than almost any other analysis of the last generation.

The relation of Veblen to Marx is a much debated issue. F. G. Hill's paper on this subject probably underestimates Veblen's debt to Marx, but it is nonetheless an able comparison of those two giants. More justice is done to this matter in P. M. Sweezy's essay. Sweezy sees Veblen's analysis of American capitalism as basically Marxian with some original Veblenian additions.

There is an informative summary by Leslie Fishman of the ideas of Veblen's student, Robert Hoxie, on American labor. Philip Morrison pushes Veblen's famous thesis on the engineers a step or two further. Carter Goodrich critically examines the extent to which Veblenian insights can be applied to Latin America, New Zealand, and Australia. Douglas Dowd does the same for the Soviet Union. Although superior to most contemporary American analyses of the USSR, Dowd's effort seems to be a watered-down version of Isaac Deutscher's brilliant interpretation of Russian social development.

In summary, this volume shows the continuing vitality of Veblen's ideas, not only for his own time, but also for ours.

ARTHUR K. DAVIS
Chief Research Officer
Center for Community Studies
University of Saskatchewan

CARL L. BECKER. *Detachment and the Writing of History: Essays and Letters of Carl L. Becker.* Edited by Phil L. Snyder. Pp. xvi, 240. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958. $3.50.

Carl Becker's deserved reputation as a historian far outran his printed output. Hence it is important that everything of value which he wrote—essentially all that he published—should be made permanently available between covers. In this, the latest and obviously the last collection of Becker articles, essays, reviews, and literary fragments, Professor Snyder, an admirer but not a student of Becker's, has placed us in his debt by assembling a number of the most valuable scholarly and literary remains of one of the more fertile, illuminating, and witty minds among American historians. It is well edited, and the only defect of the volume is the lack of an index.

Each article and essay in the volume, as

well as some of the reviews, is so suggestive that it would warrent comment extending beyond the space assigned to this review, which must necessarily be highly selective. The most permanently valuable material is the article on "Detachment and the Writing of History," published in 1910 and largely forgotten even by Becker enthusiasts, and the paper on "What Are Historical Facts?" delivered before the American Historical Association in December, 1925, which most conventional American historians have understandably avoided. In retrospect it even seemed to upset Becker himself.

In the article on detachment, Becker pretty well disposes of a fundamental dogma of traditional historical "science," that is the idea that a historian can rather completely divorce himself from all emotional concern with the significance of the events about which he is assembling the historical record. Even if he could, the result would be likely to be of little utility in illuminating the historical past. Becker essentially agrees with his teacher, James Harvey Robinson, that "objective history," if actually achieved, is all too likely to be "history without an object."

Becker proceeds from this disconcerting conclusion to an examination of the real nature of historical facts, and his observations on this subject constitute the most important single contribution to so-called historical science since Leopold von Ranke, a century and a quarter ago, asserted that historians must gather and narrate the facts about the past as they actually happened—*wie es eigentlich gewesen ist.* Indeed, it is the only fundamental advance in this field since Von Ranke's day. In only a few pages of cogent and witty example and analysis, Becker amply demonstrated that no historian, however learned, well equipped, and painstaking, can ever reconstruct the past as it actually happened. He thus torpedoed for all time what had been the veritable cornerstone of traditional historical science.

This paper deserves to rank in the history of historiography with Werner Heisenberg's law of indeterminacy in the history of physics, and is as upsetting to basic historical premises as Heisenberg's law is to the traditional cause-and-effect dogmas of classical physics. It is far more devastating than all the many and turgid volumes devoted to so-called "historicism" with which Charles Austin Beard wrestled not too successfully in order to arrive at much the same conclusions which Becker reached with such brevity and lucidity. The implications of Becker's paper seemed to frighten even him, for he resisted pressure to publish it and rather sought to laugh it off. It remained all but forgotten until Professor Snyder finally had it published in the *Western Political Quarterly* in September, 1955. In the light of the above comments, it is hardly necessary to observe that this paper alone is adequate justification for the publication of the whole volume.

The third item to be stressed is the lecture on "The Art of Writing," for in addition to his keen insight and ready wit, the outstanding feature of Becker's historical writings was the great care he took in preparing all that he published and the felicity of expression in the resulting products. Their quality far exceeded and transcended their quantity.

Becker's comments on education, drawn from his professorial experience, are a welcome and inspiring relief from the "stuffed shirt" variety of academic pontifications. His discussions of the origins of liberalism and democracy, as illustrated by the writings of Jefferson and De Tocqueville, have an intellectual affinity with his famous little book on *The Declartion of Independence.* His brilliant and penetrating article on "The Dilemma of the Liberals" has even more relevance today than it had when written in 1932.

Becker lost much of his "detachment," at least temporarily, in the propaganda of World War II, but his record for "objectivity" was much superior, on the whole, to that of most of his colleagues during the half-century in which he lived and wrote.

HARRY ELMER BARNES
Malibu, California

CHRISTIAN BAY. *The Structure of Freedom.* Pp. xii, 419. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. $7.50.

Research into political and social behavior, in recent years, has flourished like the Biblical green bay tree. Roughly, two main schools have emerged. One consists of the vote-counters and opinion-samplers perhaps best represented by Angus Campbell and his disciples of the Survey Research Center at Ann Arbor, Michigan. The other comprises researchers who ground their conclusions on the data contributed by anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists; and to some extent, also, on the speculations of political theorists. This second school has a major institutional embodiment in the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University.

The author of the book under review, who now teaches at the University of California at Berkeley, was a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in 1954–55. His book bears all the hallmarks of extensive erudition and penetrating analysis characteristic of the school. But the author is also a political philosopher. Despite the title he gives to his book, his main purpose is to expound the value of freedom, rather than to describe its structure. Though he proffers little that is new, he defends the best that has ever been said on the subject with a virtuosity rarely equaled. He champions the viewpoints of humanism; of cultural and social pluralism; of democracy, in the Jeffersonian sense; of individualism, in the Thoreauist sense that the sovereignty of conscience confers the right to disobey a bad law; and of liberalism, in the Kantian sense that the individual must always be treated as an end and not as a means.

*The Structure of Freedom* is so admirable in content and purpose that this reviewer is loath to disparage it. Nevertheless, it has its deficiencies. The style is difficult in places, and the organization is amateurish. The author has neglected to remove the scaffolding after he finished the house. Some weaknesses in analysis also appear. In summarizing the data from psychology, Dr. Bay should have taken a closer and more critical look at the causes of politically oriented neuroses and the remedies for them. He seems also to lapse into dubious reasoning with respect to freedom of expression. He asserts that even "possible" results of great harm to society justify restrictions on freedom of speech, and that "incitements" to unlawful acts may, in certain circumstances, be punished. Apparently he forgets the admonition of Justice Holmes that "every idea is an incitement."

EDWARD MCN. BURNS
Chairman, Department of Political Science
Rutgers University

BARRINGTON MOORE, JR. *Political Power and Social Theory: Six Studies.* Pp. xi, 215. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. $4.50.

The key chapter in this collection of essays deals with "Strategy in the Social Sciences." In it Moore criticizes contemporary sociological theory and compares it unfavorably with the preoccupations of theorists in the nineteenth century. In Moore's opinion these theorists, such as Durkheim and Weber, made significant contributions to the understanding of society by dealing with issues in historical perspective. They were influential also because they boldly engaged in social criticism, as did Marx and Mosca. Modern social theorists are at pains to be ahistorical and stress abstract principles and formal analysis. Consequently, sociology today "has less to say about society than it did fifty years ago" (p. 123), is imbued with a static bias, and tends to deal with trivial matters.

Moore attributes these weaknesses to the neglect by Parsons, Lazarsfeld, and others of the special character of social science material. He holds, for example, that there are strong reasons "for suspecting that we have so few universal propositions in the social sciences because such propositions frequently do not give us the kind of knowledge we really seek" (p. 129). Therefore, a strategy that aims at the establishment of abstract, quasi-mathematical formulae about human society is out of place. Instead Moore advocates the resumption of studies oriented around the concept of social evolution. Such studies would deal with what is historically unique. However, they would seek for the general in unique situations in order to find principles of change and contribute to the assessment

of the range of possible alternatives of effective human actions.

Most of the essays in the book can be taken as demonstrations of the new strategy. For example, the process of generalizing from the historically unique is illustrated by two essays, one dealing with "The Process of Acquiring Power," the other with "Totalitarian Elements in Preindustrial Societies." Both of these essays make a genuine contribution to the understanding of important social issues and of historical factors that have influenced them. The treatment of the problem of social change is illustrated in two other essays, one relating to conformity in industrial society, the other to the family. Both are speculative. However, although in the first essay Moore uses valid sociological data for his prognosis of a continued need for conformity, his essay on the family lacks factual and theoretical support. Moore holds that the family is "obsolete" and "barbaric" and "a repressive survival under conditions of advanced technology" (pp. 163–64). He envisages decentralized arrangements for rearing children by a device of which the "Skinner box" is a prototype. Clearly, Moore's new strategy, like any other, is not a safeguard against personal bias in interpretation.

THEODORE ABEL
Professor of Sociology
Hunter College

FELIKS GROSS. *The Seizure of Political Power in a Century of Revolutions*. Pp. xxvii, 398. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. No price.

This book, as the author makes clear in his Introduction, is a study of how revolutions are made rather than of why they are made. Professor Gross makes a primary distinction between revolution from above, such as the great French and Russian revolutions, and revolutions from below, such as the old-fashioned "Latin-American" revolutions. But his sociologist's training and conscience oblige him to qualify this apparent dualism by setting up subtypes such as the "combined seizure," which contains elements of both the revolution from above and that from below, and the palace revolution, a transfer of power within a super-elite, rather than an acquisition of power by genuine outsiders. In the rest of the book he qualifies and fills out these first definitions very fully.

In the body of the book, Professor Gross is concerned mainly with the history of the development of Russian revolutionary strategy and tactics from 1825 to 1917, in which he works out broadly and yet in some detail the various strands of the Russian political movements which were aimed at change by acquisition of power. He follows this set of case histories by a series of others, focused first on the Communist strategy and tactics in their effort to expand from their Russian base—among these he includes the difficulties of "inside revolts" behind the Iron Curtain—and then on the "struggle against seized power," a section concerned chiefly with the events since 1945. Professor Gross, trained at Cracow, is particularly good on the experience of contemporary Polish political émigrés.

Professor Gross has clearly grown up in the climate of opinion of social democracy; his sympathies are well left of center. But he is a conscientious and well-trained scholar, and has, as one would expect from a man who has gone through so much, no naive expectation that we shall all become as lambs once a few predatory human animals have been done away with. He has read widely in sociology and in history. The subject he has approached in this book is an enormous one, and Professor Gross himself would be the first to admit that he has no more than sampled some of its difficulties, but it is a good suggestive sampling. A final chapter on "Democracy and Violent Change" sets in brief compass one of the master problems of our age.

CRANE BRINTON
Professor of History
Harvard University

KENNETH W. MORGAN (Ed.). *Islam: The Straight Path: Islam Interpreted by Muslims*. Pp. x, 453. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1958. $6.00.

This book is the third in a series edited by Professor Morgan and supported by grants from the Edward W. Hazen Foundation. As are the former two volumes on Hinduism and Buddhism, it is an effort to present a non-Western religion to a Western audience through the writings of followers of that religion. The book contains eleven chapters dealing with Muslim beliefs and practices, the history of the Muslim community, sects and divisions of the community, and the peculiarities of Muslim culture of various areas. Each chapter was written by a distinguished Muslim scholar whom Professor Morgan chose for the task after consulting with other prominent Muslims in different parts of the world. It was hoped that the method of allowing Muslims to speak for themselves would give the book an authenticity and a flavor that second-hand descriptions of religions often lack. Islam, in particular, has seldom been presented to Western readers in a manner that reveals either its religious depths or its warm appeal to the millions who find their spiritual guidance in it. Compilation of this volume was an invitation and a challenge to its Muslim contributors to present their faith in a compelling and sympathetic way.

Unfortunately the book fails badly to achieve the understanding and appreciation for Islamic piety that were its aims. It fails even to make its presentation interesting. The fault lies partly with the very broad plan of the volume, but must be charged largely against the account of most of its contributors. Not only do they fall short of answering the questions uppermost in the minds of their intended readers, but their writing generally lacks depth of approach and the fire of conviction. Only in some of its historical sections is this weakness overcome.

Although this book is far from a good introduction to Islam, it is instructive as an example of modern Muslim thought about Islam. Its pages illustrate the major trends of Muslim modernism and its principal shortcomings. For example, the selective and uncritical use of historical evidence to build a case for the virtues of Islam is abundantly evident. Despite the editor's disavowal of apologetics as a purpose for the volume, in both tone and content, much of it is an apology in the tradition of *Amīr Alī*. Also, as other modernist writings, it does not reveal an effort to grapple with the religious problems thrown up by the modern age. What is worse, the contributors often do not seem aware of the existence or nature of those problems. Even the outsider cannot resist the judgment that they have dealt superficially with their great religious heritage and is left to wonder why Muslims experience such difficulty in expressing the meaning of their faith.

CHARLES J. ADAMS
Assistant Professor
Institute of Islamic Studies
McGill University

C. A. O. VAN NIEUWENHUIJZE. *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia: Five Essays*. Pp. xii, 248. The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958. Distributed by the Institute of Pacific Relations, New York. $5.00.

HARRY J. BENDA. *The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942–1945*. Pp. xiv, 320. The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958. Distributed by the Institute of Pacific Relations, New York. No price.

Many of us in recent years have become interested in Indonesia but many doubtless like this reviewer cannot read either Dutch or Indonesian. We have been faced, as a result, by a stringent paucity of material on the area. This fact in itself testifies to our long neglect of this part of the world—a neglect that must make a scholar pause and blush before the political innuendoes of such a situation. It is nowadays no longer necessary to argue for the political significance of this large, turbulent, and obviously problematic nation. Students of Islam, however, by and large have still to come to any vivid recognition of the major significance of the Indonesian sector of the contemporary Muslim world. Statistics elude those who debate whether it or Pakistan is the largest Muslim national community today. In any case one may note that over 60 per cent of the world's Muslims live east of Karachi, and one must consider that the Indian ocean as well as the Mediterranean may be the locus of Islamic history in the future.

If the role of Indonesia in modern Islam is yet to be assessed, conversely that of Islam in modern Indonesia is also in need of accurate appreciation. The 1957–58 troubles made it evident that that role is important, even for political developments. But it was evident also that for outside

observers a good deal more understanding of the subtle situation was required.

One cannot but be grateful, therefore, that these two books are offered for our enlightenment, and doubly grateful that they are written in English by men for whom this is not the mother tongue. What a courtesy to us! They are not merely timely contributions, but very solid ones which will last. The Benda monograph is a careful documentation and analysis of a short but crucial period in political-social history—the Japanese occupation—preceded by a long and useful historical introduction. The van Nieuwenhuijze essays are highly illuminating and provocative interpretations that dig deep into the subtlest issues involved and challenge one's thinking to a new flexibility that may prove adequate to these new situations.

The van Nieuwenhuijze volume is to be strongly recommended not only to students of Indonesian affairs but to all students of modern Islamic developments anywhere. The insights and interpretations put forward by the author to make understandable what has been happening in Java are, this reviewer found, not merely intriguing in themselves as pieces of sociological-religious theory, and not merely informative for South East Asian history, but strikingly helpful in clarifying Islamic processes in other countries such as Pakistan and Egypt, with which he is more familiar. Presumably this is some test of their validity.

The volume consists of five substantial essays. The first discusses the "background to Islam in Indonesia: . . . the 'closed' community" and the second, contemporary Islamic "tendencies and possibilities." Both are highly theoretical. They rest on the postulate, not always palatable, but strongly corroborated by our own studies, and on whose importance we would vigorously insist, that Western man must with careful delicacy modify his own thinking and strain his intellect to encompass new and alien presuppositions if he would at all adequately understand a religion or civilization other than his own, as well as the behavior of its members. Anthropologists have long urged something comparable to this for little communities, but there it is relatively easy; great traditions demand a self-searching that is not easy at all. In their case the observer has not only to construct new concepts but to revise old ones. These chapters are difficult, but will greatly repay any reader who is willing to make the exacting intellectual effort needed to avoid distorting what he observes by analyzing it in terms of his own familiar concepts. There is a brilliant treatment of "freedom" and its meaning for an Indonesian Muslim, and similarly for the state, for what Westerners are wont to regard as "acculturation," for the expectation of religious "crisis," and so forth. The next two chapters are more factual, being descriptive presentations of Japanese policy towards Islam in Java during the military occupation, and of the Dāru-l-Islām movement in West Java from 1945 until 1949. The final essay interlaces factual description with the theoretical analysis, in an interpretation of, as it were, the Muslimness of Indonesian secularism.

The Benda work is an expanded doctoral thesis. It accordingly presents a mass of painstakingly gathered and scrutinized material on the period covered, which it weaves into a connected story of the Japanese formulation of a policy towards Islam after the occupation (1942), the consolidation of this in 1943, and the rise of the Masjumi the following year, followed by the accelerating new developments that intertwined towards the end of Japanese rule and emerged into the 1945 independence. This is a much more detailed and elaborate enlargement of the third van Nieuwenhuijze essay. However, the title of the book must not distract one from the fact that all this constitutes only one-half of the text. The last one hundred pages of the book are what used to be called footnotes, the middle hundred portray the developments in question, but the first hundred—"Part One: The Colonial Legacy"—constitute a summary not otherwise available in English of the history of Islam in Indonesia from the fifteenth century.

It is a joy to review such unusually valuable works.

WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH
Professor of Comparative Religion
Director, Institute of Islamic Studies
McGill University



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VOLUME 324 JULY 1959

# THE ANNALS

*of* The American Academy *of* Political *and* Social Science

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*
RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Assistant Editor*

## RESOLVING THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN DEADLOCK

*Special Editor of this Volume*

JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH
*Professor of Political Science*
*University of Pennsylvania*
*President, The American Academy of Political and Social Science*

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PHILADELPHIA
1959

*Issued bimonthly by The American Academy of Political and Social Science at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pennsylvania.*

*Editorial and Business Offices, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania.*

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## FOREWORD

The papers in this volume, with the exception of the article by Dr. Denna F. Fleming, are the addresses presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academy, April 10–11, 1959, at the Warwick Hotel, Philadelphia.

The attendance at this series of sessions was the largest, and the interest displayed the greatest, of any within the experience of your president. There were delegates from 18 embassies; 11 United Nations missions; 132 universities and colleges; 143 civic, cultural, and scientific organizations; and a number of cities and states. The list of registrants included 359 delegates, 410 members of the Academy without specific additional affiliation, and 124 guests. Registered delegates have increased in number from 235 in 1955 to the 359 cited for 1959.

In keeping with Academy practice, many of the delegates and members spoke extemporaneously from the floor. Some of the questions and answers in these exchanges are appended to the pertinent article in this volume. One of these statements was made by Minister Hsu of the Embassy of the Republic of China (the government headed by President Chiang Kai-shek). In making arrangements for the presentation of his statement, I explained to him that I believed that a large majority of the members and delegates at the meeting approved of the policy toward China followed by the United States State Department and that our audience would be interested in a sober, scholarly expression of the opposed position. Consequently, we accorded Mr. Snow, the author of the article on "Recognition of the People's Republic of China," the time usually allotted to our platform speakers, whereas Mr. Hsu's statement was much briefer.

United States Undersecretary of State C. Douglas Dillon accepted an invitation to appear on our platform, but was called away to a SEATO conference. He was to have read a paper on "Implications of Russia's Economic Expansion."

After examining the table of contents, the reader will immediately wonder why, in a volume entitled "Resolving the Russian-American Deadlock," there is no article from the pen of a prominent diplomatic spokesman for the Soviet Union. A note from the final printed program explains this lack:

> The Soviet Embassy had agreed that Ambassador Mikhail A. Menshikov (or, in his absence from the Embassy, Counselor Mikhail N. Smirnovsky) would make an official Soviet statement within the general theme of these meetings. A communication from the Embassy, received April 4th, state that the emergent nature of their duties would prevent either Soviet spokesman from appearing on our program.
>
> Arrangements perhaps could have been made for another speaker for the sixth session, but since none would be available to represent the Soviet Union, and since the theme of the evening meetings called for the parallel presentation of American and Soviet views, your Academy officers reluctantly decided to suspend the sixth session.

JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH



# Communist Politics in the Western World

By DAVID J. DALLIN

ABSTRACT: There is no easy solution to the East-West conflict. The post-World War II period has brought both successes and failures to communism. Events following Stalin's death indicated the disintegration of world communism. But since 1956 the various Communist parties have realized that centralized leadership is necessary to their progress and success—Soviet guidance has now been recognized. The cold war is not a contest between two economic systems—it is a political contest. At the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, Mr. Khrushchev set aside the old Communist principle of the inevitability of war. This proclamation, however, did not imply a new Soviet course—it meant that war could be avoided because "the imperialists" would not fight; the superiority of communism has been recognized, and the West would retreat. The Berlin crisis is a use of this strategy. Russia has remained a continent-bound great power, and to her the number one political issue is Germany. Caution is necessary in any plan of disengagement in Central Europe, for a weak Germany would permit the expansion of Russian power over Germany and France. Confederation is proposed in lieu of the unification of Germany. Russia's long-range aim however is the extension of Communism in West Germany. On the solution of the German question depends the future of Europe. It is necessary for the West to assume a courageous and dignified posture in this crisis.—Ed.

---

*David J. Dallin, Dr. rerum politicarum, New York City, is an author and univers :turer. He was forced to leave Russia in 1921 and has lived in Germany and Fra ior to coming to the United States in 1940. Among his works are: Russia and r East (1948), The Rise of Russia in Asia (1949), The Changing World of Sov ıssia (1956).*

I SHALL not be able, I am afraid, to prescribe a quick remedy for allaying the tensions between East and West. There will be no easy peace either today or tomorrow. There will be a long period during which world tensions will periodically flare up, quiet down, and break out again. Even if the West accepted all the demands of the Communists and reneged on its own principles, this would not mean an end to the conflict. We must look at the dramatic developments of our days as stages in a prolonged historical contest in which, however, the political skill of the West will continue to be a factor of major importance.

In the postwar history of communism, ups and downs have alternated. There was only a year between Czechoslovakia's surrender and Stalin's failure in the Berlin blockade. The Berlin episode was followed by the great victory of communism in China. Then followed another failure in the conflicts with Tito; nor was the war in Korea a Communist success.

The first four years after Stalin's death were filled with rumblings and crises in world communism. The years 1953 to the end of 1956 were years of unrest, difficult negotiations with Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito, and attempts by some of the satellites to achieve independence. With the reins of centralized control weakening, there were popular uprisings in 1953 and 1956, dissident movements within the Communist family, and a rapid rise of so-called "national communism." In the international field, armed conflicts, as, for instance, in Korea, were settled without gain for the Communist side. It seemed to many that the world Communist family was disintegrating, and doubts prevailed as to whether Russian leadership of it would continue for long. There were many experts who predicted that, with Russia's role becoming weaker, China's Mao Tse-tung would assume leadership of world communism, while others believed that there would no longer be any firm international leadership at all and that the lack of a general staff would dispel the belligerency of the Communist movement. The crisis in international communism reached its peak at the end of 1956, when the uprising in Hungary and the Soviet-Polish conflict seemed to prove that communism, as both an ideology and a military power, was on the downgrade.

Whatever our attitude was at the time, we must now recognize that in the last two years world communism has made a significant recovery. It has gathered new vigor and renewed its dynamism. Facts have proved to national Communist parties that progress and success are possible only by means of integration and centralized guidance. Full independence of national Communist parties, on the other hand, means weakness, disintegration, retreat. Since the Moscow conferences of 64 Communist parties in November 1957, Soviet guidance has not only been recognized by all of them (with the exception of Yugoslavia), but use of the formula "under the leadership of the Soviet Union" has been made obligatory. In the internal economic systems of the satellite countries and China this recovery has meant a new advance in collectivized farming; in the Soviet Union the trend is now toward the abolition of the last remnants of private property and single-cow ownership which had been granted the peasant in the 1930's.

Much has changed of course since Stalin's time; the role of French and Italian communism has decreased, and the role of Asia has become greater. Also, the role of the state, and especially the military power of the state, has increased. The rigidity of the police systems in some of the satellite countries, which implied terrorism and purge



trials, has been relaxed (although not in Hungary). On the whole, however, the recovery of "Communist internationalism" has been rapid and significant.

In the foreign policies of the so-called "socialist camp" this recovery brought new dynamism and greater self-confidence; this became especially evident in the case of the largest and most strategic of the satellites, Poland. The indications had been that Gomulka would go the way of Tito, but unlike the regime in Yugoslavia, the Communist regime in Poland was tied to Moscow by an important factor—Germany. With any drive against Germany in prospect, a Warsaw-Moscow bloc would grow stronger. To build up the new Communist International, Poland was needed, and to win Poland over, a vigorous operation in Germany had to be inaugurated.

*Noblesse oblige!* For the Soviet Union to reassume leadership of world communism and then do nothing would have brought about a new crisis. It was obvious that the new consolidation was tantamount to a new drive, and that whatever dangers were inherent in a new drive would have to be taken in stride.

"Brinkmanship," a strategy later attributed to United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had actually been Stalin's postwar strategy. Stalin used to take the initial risks, advance to the very edge, and then retreat if the threat of war became serious. "Brinkmanship" was not a product of Stalin's viciousness; it was genuine Leninism-Stalinism practiced in the international arena. To advance to the limit is the sacred duty of a leader of a great Communist government. He would be an unworthy leader who overlooked or shirked this duty. Expansion of socialism requires that dangerous situations be met. It was here that Stalin's personal ambition, Russia's traditional imperial trends, and the requirements of global communism coincided.

The new self-confidence and the new dynamic course of communism were augmented by two other events of the year 1957: the removal of the so-called antiparty group from all leading posts in the Soviet Communist party and the consolidation of power in the hands of the highest ranking leader, and the launching by the Soviet Union of the first artificial earth satellite.

Even sober heads in Russia were turned when the first Sputnik was sent up. World-wide admiration and acclaim contributed to the further growth of an already inflated self-confidence. Russians really began to believe that the Soviet Union was leading the world in science and technology. They began to forget that artificial planets are basically a product of war industry and that the general progress of a nation is not measured by progress in production of weapons. They began to believe that the balance of power had so changed that Russia was now stronger than the rest of the world. It is amazing how far Soviet expectations and self-assurance went. All this was another stimulus to activity, to boldness.

## THE MYTH ABOUT CAPITALISM VS. SOCIALISM

Recently, on a trip to Europe, I had an opportunity to discuss the international situation with a number of political figures and diplomats, most of whom were being plagued with the questions: What kind of concessions can we make to Moscow without losing prestige, dignity, and West Berlin? How can we lean over backward while appearing to stand erect? In other words, how make an omelet without breaking eggs?

Actually, there are roads toward real conciliation, although they do not follow the absurd thesis that the present-day

cold war is the product of a struggle between capitalism and socialism.

The standard Soviet contention that the roots of the world-wide "contradictions" and the source of the conflicts lie in the antagonism between socialism and capitalism is wrong. Capitalism is an economic system, socialism (or communism) is another. It would be a great mistake to believe that the West opposes the Soviet Union because the latter has established an economic system that is different from the economic systems of the countries of the West.

True, at least 90 per cent of Americans seriously doubt that the economic system which prevails in Russia is rational and progressive. They would not adopt this system for their own country. But who in the West would start a crusade abroad in favor of this or that economic system? Have nations ever fought wars about the economic systems of other countries? Has not the principle of coexistence, today preached from all rooftops in Moscow as a new slogan, actually prevailed for centuries? Is it not true that wars of the past have in the main been wars over political and not economic or social issues? We opposed the Japanese and the Germans, although their economic systems were "capitalistic," when their governments were striving for forceful aggrandizement of their empires. On the other hand, no American would say that because the Chinese have introduced an absurd system of communes, we should go to war with China. As private citizens we criticize much of what is going on in other countries; as a nation, however, the United States does not care about their economic systems.

The United States has good relations with Communist Yugoslavia. There is no reason why a conflict should arise between Belgrade and Washington unless Belgrade joins the political—political, not economic—system of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union lives in a very precarious kind of peace with Yugoslavia, although both countries recognize their economic systems as socialism.

Western antagonism toward the Soviet Union is rooted in the fear of a great power which threatens the independence of other nations, and this is a political, not an economic, reason.

The West objects to political domination by one great power over other nations. The Soviet press and the Soviet government pretend to know that our program for East Germany would mean simply a restoration of capitalism. This is wrong. This is neither our program nor the program of the Bonn government of Western Germany. We object to the political role of East Germany as a component of an imperialistic power, not to the economic set-up of East Germany. Moscow says that its aim is to maintain the economic and "social achievements" which "the toilers" have attained in East Germany. If this were her only aim, or her chief aim, the real achievements might be maintained. But Moscow would reject any economic concessions because Moscow is interested in a political satellite rather than in this or that system of economic organization.

Secondly, proceeding on the same wrong assumption that the present world-wide conflict is a conflict between capitalism and socialism, Moscow believes that the West is unhappy about the economic progress in the Soviet Union and must try to slow it down as far as possible. This is wrong. The West has no reason to be unhappy if the standard of life of the Russian peasants and workers, the lowest among the large nations of the old world, is raised. The West is apprehensive about the tremendous development of war industries in Russia, but as far as nonmilitary industries and agriculture are concerned, progress in them—which has been slow—would be greeted by everyone.



Recently the Soviet Premier and his Minister, Mr. Mikoyan, sounded out the United States about credits and loans. Now, if a political agreement with Russia could be reached, if the Russian power ocean would return to its natural confines, if the nations of Eastern Europe could regain their independence, there is no reason why the United States should not assist in the economic development of Russia or of those countries which until then had belonged to the satellite world.

Other concessions and offers, for instance in the area of trade, could be made, but it is probably idle to prepare a menu of dishes that we could serve the men of the Kremlin. They have their own tastes. After the lamentable spectacle that the West has presented in the last few months, they will not retreat. On the contrary, and even though they want to avoid a war, they will systematically increase the tension until —and they are so sure it will—the West gives in.

### WARS ARE NOT INEVITABLE

Among the Communist tenets abrogated in the post-Stalin era was that of the "inevitable war." In the thirty-five-year history of the Soviet Union under Lenin and Stalin, the "inevitable war" had been an immutable principle, a main point in the indictment of capitalism; its political implications have been many and far-reaching. In his report to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in February 1956, Mr. Khrushchev set aside this old principle. "Wars," he said, "are no longer inevitable." The new thesis was promptly accepted and hailed by all Communist parties. The non-Communist nations, and their governments and peoples, were elated by what was viewed as an important turn in Soviet foreign politics; it was assumed that the new course signified a disposition on the part of the Soviet to enter the path of peaceful negotiations and that Moscow would abstain from unilateral actions. Facts proved that these expectations were erroneous.

Khrushchev's dictum that wars can be avoided did not imply a new Soviet course. Wars can be avoided because the "imperialists" will be sensible enough to abstain from military operations. Not that the Soviet Union will abstain from vigorously assisting "anti-imperialist" and Communist movements abroad or the territorial expansion of "socialist nations," but that the opponents, recognizing the superior power of the Soviets, will retreat and give in.

"Peace through strength," Mr. Khrushchev proclaimed at the start of his new career in 1954. "The capitalists," he said, "will not fight." The Suez affair of 1956 has been repeatedly cited as an illustration: The "warmongers" retreated because they realized the hopelessness of fighting against the Soviet Union; and the anti-Western camp won out.

The new offensive, in which Berlin and Germany are the goal, is another experiment in the use of the same strategy. The Soviet government expects to be able to augment the "socialist" realm without a war because the adversaries, being sensible men, are aware of their inferiority. They will not even try to face the Soviet ground forces, which are several times larger than their own; and they will not use atomic weapons, if only because this would solve nothing, in Berlin or elsewhere.

Communism is superior to capitalism, Mr. Khrushchev frankly told the Canadian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, because "Communists are tougher and more patient." They can stand up to sacrifice better than the Westerners, he asserted. The West "will not accept

the sacrifices that prolonged defense preparations involve."

In his speech in Leipzig on March 7, 1959, Mr. Khrushchev commented on the war and peace issue:

> Proceeding from the Marxist-Leninist analysis of contemporary capitalism, we now consider that war is not inevitable. Not because the imperialists have become more clever or kinder, but because they have become weaker, because the camp of peace has become more powerful than ever before. . . . The appetite of the imperialists has not diminished, but the situation in the world is now different. It could be stated approximately thus: the imperialists would like to destroy the Socialist countries, as a hungry wolf would like to destroy a lion. But the trouble is, the stomach of the wolf is small and the teeth are not the same—they have become dull and are worn down.[1]

## THE SOVIET UNION AND GERMANY

Despite her own progress in naval and air power and in atomic and nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has remained a continent-bound great power, its political ideology maintaining the traditional Russian continental outlook under Communist gilding, and its military plans and blueprints remaining a continental strategy amended but not abrogated by technical innovations. The United States and Britain, although a great menace, appear to Moscow less dangerous in a way than a well-armed and well-equipped European military force. In the West it was assumed that a rehabilitated France, heir to great military glory, would become the continental bastion against all aggression. Moscow takes a dim view of France; it does not believe in France's power of resistance. To Moscow, it is Germany that is the threat and the hope—Germany is the pivot. To Moscow, Germany is the number one political issue of the world.

It is an illusion to believe that we shall be able permanently to keep a country like Germany from arming to the degree necessary for her self-defense. Attempts to limit to a minimum the military forces of a defeated large nation have been made more than once in the course of European history; they have proved futile. The attempt to keep France permanently disarmed after Napoleon's defeat proved a failure. The Versailles Treaty of 1919 left Germany with a small army, but it was only a short time before she rearmed. The issue before the world today is not whether Germany shall have a modern armed force, but only whether she will achieve this goal in concert and agreement with the West or will again rearm by means of breaking treaties.

The withdrawal of all occupation forces from Germany, East and West, is another point in the Soviet program. If we could be sure that having once pulled out, the Soviet armies would not return to their occupation areas, we might consider a far-reaching settlement with Moscow that would embrace the Allied forces in the West and the Soviet forces in Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. An earlier Soviet document on this subject, however, contained the following provision:

> The powers which at present are exercising occupation functions in Germany shall [after the withdrawal] have the right to move in their forces in case the security of either part of Germany is threatened; the U.S.S.R. in regard to Eastern Germany, the U.S.A., the United Kingdom and France in regard to Western Germany.

This means that in case of popular movements in the satellites, such as those that occurred in 1953 and 1956, the Soviet army would have the right to return. In such case the Western powers could do nothing in that part of the "unified" country; nor could the Bonn government oppose the Soviet move. Even if Moscow were to sign a pledge never to return, could we really take a chance on building our policy on such a promise?

This is also the reason why we have to approach the different plans for so-called disengagement in Central Europe with caution and skepticism. These plans would leave West Germany very weak in the shadow of the strongest of the Old World military powers and leave the continent of Europe at the mercy of its biggest nation. This would mean that at an opportune time, when the world situation appears favorable, the Soviet Union could achieve one of the greatest goals of its policy—the extension of its sphere of influence over the whole of Germany, and France as well.

Another point in the disengagement program proposes a so-called confederation of the two Germanies as a substitute for their unification. The intention, however, is not to bring together the governments of Walter Ulbricht, the Communist, and Konrad Adenauer, the pro-Western Christian Democrat. To suggest a confederation of these two regimes is like suggesting a confederation of fire and water. What Mr. Khrushchev wants is to maintain the partition of Germany until an extension of the Ulbricht regime over West Germany is possible.

In the narrow sense of the word, the Soviet concern in regard to Germany at the present time is to conserve Eastern Germany as a member of the Soviet bloc, not give away an inch of the territory, and keep Western Germany impotent. From the long-range view, however, its concern is to extend the German Democratic Republic to the other areas of Germany. Nothing has happened in the last decade to discourage the Soviet government in its plans for Germany. On the contrary, it is convinced that eventually the last barrier to Communist control of the old continent can and must be removed.

Because the issue of Germany has this paramount significance for the Soviet Union, because on the solution of the German question depends the fate of Europe for years or decades, the sad picture of Western disunity is depressing, as is the inability of certain governments to draw the logical conclusions from our experience of the last years.

Pessimists tell us that the only lesson history teaches is that nobody really learns from history. Is this true? Is it as hopeless as that? I believe not. I believe that we have learned, that we have gained clearer insight. And I believe that with this clearer insight, as free men in a free world, we can, in the prospective crisis, assume a posture of courage and of national dignity inspired by the great ideas of liberty, independence, and the equality of all nations of the world, large and small.

[1] *Pravda*, March 27, 1959.

# The Unification of Germany

By Wilhelm G. Grewe

Abstract: No fundamental change is expected in the German foreign policy on the basic issue of the reunification of Germany. New aspects of the German problem are: the Soviet threat re Berlin, the Soviet proposal for a draft peace treaty for Germany, the May 1959 East-West conference of foreign ministers and conditional arrangement for a summit meeting. Although the Soviets have now defined their policy more clearly and frankly, the Western powers already knew that the two Germanies cannot "be reunited in freedom." There is no real support in Western Germany for the prolonged division of the country. The Western Allies and the Federal Republic of Germany have declared that "an essential aim of their common policy [is] a peace settlement for the whole of Germany." Members of the Atlantic Alliance have also adopted this view. The presence of Western forces in Berlin is justified by the right of occupation of the belligerent powers, and new treaties concerning the city can only worsen the situation. The United Nations does not have the machinery to guarantee the security of Berlin. Recognition of the East German government is too high a price for a new treaty arrangement. Soon other concessions would have to be made, and Berlin and the Western community may have to be sacrificed. Peace and security in Europe cannot be had by appeasing the Soviet Union since Communist expansion will surely thaw any "frozen" status quo.—Ed.

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*His Excellency, Wilhelm G. Grewe is Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United States. He is Professor of Law at Freiburg University. Previously he was Chief of the Legal and Political Division of the Foreign Office. Mr. Grewe is the author of a number of publications dealing with political and legal affairs.*





I HAVE been asked to write on "The Unification of Germany"—or, as we in Germany say, the "Reunification" of our country.

This is, unfortunately, a subject which has been treated very often in the course of the last decade, and it is not very easy to say anything which might be new to you, and to avoid repetition.

Nevertheless, the political picture of the world changes every day, and together with these general changes, every day, every single subject looks a little bit different than it did before.

This is also true of the problem of German reunification. I do not wish to speculate about possible consequences of Dr. Adenauer's decision to switch from the Federal Chancellery to the Presidency of the Federal Republic. In his message to the nation on April 8, he tried to explain that it was the idea of his decision to safeguard the continuity of German politics for another series of years. I think that this comment should be taken at face value.

As a matter of fact, I do not expect any fundamental change in our foreign policy, and in one respect, I am absolutely sure: there will be no weakening of the basic importance of the reunification issue for German foreign policy.

## Aspects of the German Problem

Leaving aside this personal aspect of the reunification issue, there are some other elements which throw new light on the German problem. There is the Soviet threat with regard to Berlin (November 27, 1958); there is the Soviet proposal with respect to a draft peace treaty for Germany (January 10, 1959); there is an arrangement for an East-West conference of foreign ministers on May 11, 1959 in Geneva and a conditional arrangement for a summit meeting in the forthcoming summer.

It is impossible to deal with all these in this article. Therefore, I should like to pick up a few aspects of the present situation which have been discussed by a well-known American columnist recently.

Let me summarize some of the points which have been made in this discussion:

1. Since last November, Western Governments have come to know that the two Germanies cannot be "reunited in freedom." There are now two German states, and every responsible European statesman realizes that they cannot be united within any foreseeable future and under any conditions which are now conceivable.
2. The prolonged division of Germany, it is said, has very wide support all over Europe, both East and West, and also within Germany itself.
3. Because reunification is not now practical politics, Berlin has become a new and special problem. The future of West Berlin cannot be secured adequately by a determination to stand firm on a policy of standing pat. The "right of conquest" is a very poor legal and moral basis and should better be replaced by a new negotiated statute put in trust with the United Nations.
4. Such a statute, regulating in detail the right of access, the conditions of coexistence, the relations between the two Berlins and the two Germanies, and the presence of Allied and United Nations token military forces would be a better guarantee for the physical security of the West Berlin community than the presently existing guarantees.
5. The Soviets, on their side, would get a provisional but durable acceptance of the fact that there are two Germanies. Since a United Nations statute would have to be agreed to both by the Soviet Union and by the Pankow government, they would get a *de facto* recognition of the East Berlin state by the UN. This might mean much to them, in that it would help to stabilize their situation in Eastern Europe.

6. This sort of general recognition of the status quo of two separate German states and Berlin is recommended as the best policy for the West, at least as long as an East-West agreement on Germany seems to be impossible. It is described as the "British" point of view—as distinguished from the French and the West German (and American?) viewpoints. The substance of the so-called British position is described as accepting the facts as they are and acknowledging that there is no point in pretending that the East German state does not exist. The French-German position is defined as refusing to recognize the facts on the theory that some day and somehow the facts will change for the better.

I regret that I must say I disagree with almost every one of these arguments, which I just tried to summarize as fairly as I could.

Starting with the first point:

### Two Germanies

1. It is not only since November of last year that we have been acquainted with the Soviet policy of having two German states and of perpetuating the division of Germany. There is only a small difference in comparison with former Soviet announcements: the Soviets now spell out more clearly and frankly what they really have in mind with regard to Germany. We knew that before, and I think Western statesmen did not need this ultimate clarification to realize what the Soviet policy was and is. Western policy during the last years was not based on any illusions as to the preparedness of the Soviets to negotiate an acceptable solution of the German issue. The contrary is true.

### West German Support of Divided Germany

2. The assumption that the prolonged division of Germany finds widespread sympathy in Western Germany is wrong. Of course, I cannot testify that there are not some individuals, even politicians and officials, who are prepared to accept the division for a long time. But I can assure you that the majority of the West German population and the majority of politicians and responsible people do not feel this way. The reason that they do not is not nationalism. It is the fundamental conviction that a nation which would be prepared to abandon its own parents or children, its brothers or sisters in a state of brutal slavery, in order to safeguard its own prosperity and security, would be contemptible. I do not like to say too much about the notion of "honor" in politics; but here, I feel, it must be said: Such a nation would lose its honor. And I doubt very much whether that nation would be regarded by its own allies as a reliable partner.

As to the attitude of our Western allies, there was a solemn treaty signed in 1954—a portion of the Paris Treaties (or, more specifically, the Bonn Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic)—in which the signatories declared, "an essential aim of their common policy" [to be] a peace settlement for the whole of Germany," and pending such a peace settlement, their willingness to co-operate in order to achieve, by peaceful means, their common aim of a reunified Germany.

In addition to this treaty provision, all the members of the Atlantic Alliance have associated themselves with a solemn declaration of the three Western Powers issued during the London Nine-Power Conference 1954: "They [the signatories] consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs."

My government has been very heavily attacked by the opposition because of this treaty. If the Western governments would abandon the common policy agreed upon in 1954, they would give strong support to the arguments against the Bonn Convention. For the time being, I think it would be an offense to our allies to cast any doubt on the sincerity of their contractual pledges and on their loyal determination to uphold this policy.



### Unique Problem of Berlin

3. If Berlin has become a new and special problem, this is exclusively due to the fact that Khrushchev decided to stir up trouble on Berlin. Nothing else happened with Berlin. In all other respects its situation is exactly the same as it had been in previous years.

I agree that the "right of conquest" is a bad expression for a good thing. Besides, it is juridically not correct. The presence of the Western forces is legally based on the right of belligerent occupation, not on the "right of conquest." The right of conquest has been outruled by the common declaration of the victorious allies that they did not intend the annexation of Germany (Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany, June 5, 1945).

The presence of the Western forces in Berlin is fully and solidly justified by the right of occupation of the belligerent powers. In 1945, the Soviets participated in discussions on a long-term duration of the occupation. Whether or not these discussions were realistic I leave to your judgment; but there can be no doubt that there is no specific deadline for the termination of ocupation rights. In 1954, the Federal Republic accepted (politically) a number of reserved occupation rights of the four Occupation Powers. We accepted these reserved rights, which included the maintenance of the occupation statute in Berlin, on the assumption that they were rights as well as responsibilities.

Does a new legal basis and a new statute for West Berlin offer better security, lesser risks, and an improved overall situation for Berlin? I think it would be a fundamental mistake for the West to believe in such improvement.

Every new treaty arrangement on Berlin can only worsen the situation. Why?

(*a*) If you negotiate a new treaty basis with the Soviets for Western presence in and Western access to Berlin, you concede, first of all, that it is within the power of the Soviet Union to grant such rights to the West. It would be a great and perhaps fatal retreat of the West to concede such powers to the Soviets. The existing agreements of 1944, 1945, and 1949 did not rest on this assumption. They were based on the principle that Western presence in and Western access to Berlin were justified, not by a contractual grant from the Soviets, but by the right of belligerent occupation, which does not depend on the will of the Soviet government; and further on the assumption that it is only the exercise of this right which was the subject of contractual arrangements.

(*b*) Every treaty arrangement affecting the present legal basis of the Western position in Berlin must be weaker, because every treaty is subject to interpretation, denunciation, or cancellation for special reasons. For instance: alleged violation of treaty provisions by the other side or basic change of circumstances (*clausula rebus sic stantibus*).

(*c*) What is still more important: the guarantee of the North Atlantic Treaty requires the presence of Western occupation forces. See Article 6 of the treaty:

> For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the

territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in the area of any of the Parties.

The same implication characterizes the Three-Power Declaration, London 1954. (Point 5):

> The security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the Three Powers there are regarded by the Three Powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation. Accordingly, they will maintain armed forces within the territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it. They therefore reaffirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves.

### NEW GUARANTEES FOR BERLIN

4. Furthermore, the United Nations are incapable of giving an effective guarantee to Berlin. Even military contingents of United Nations forces in Berlin, if the Soviets would be prepared to admit them, could not afford the minimum security guarantee which is needed to avoid intimidation and demoralization of the population in West Berlin. If it is said that the West Berliners cannot go on for years waiting to hear what the Pentagon will say about going to war whenever an East German official harasses them, there can be only one answer: the West Berliners definitely prefer to look to the decisions of the Pentagon (or, more correctly, to the decisions of the President of the United States) if the alternative would be to look to the shifting majorities in the United Nations General Assembly.

5. There is no reason to believe that the Soviets would be prepared to accept a new treaty arrangement for Berlin on the basis of improved conditions for Western access, unless the West would be prepared to pay a very high price. I think the recognition of the East German regime would be a very high price. It would be understood as the sanctification of the status quo, and, insofar, a major political defeat of the West. It would destroy the spirit of resistance not only in East Germany but in the whole of Eastern Europe; it would be a heavy blow to the spirit of loyalty and mutual confidence within the Atlantic Alliance; and it would encourage the Soviets to new threats and intimidations and would be far from having a stabilizing effect on the over-all situation.

There is no difference whether the price would be full *"de jure recognition"* or something less, called *"de facto recognition."* In international law as well as in practical politics and in the mind of the public, there is no major difference between those two categories of recognition.

### GERMAN QUESTION IN THE EAST-WEST CONFERENCE

6. Coming to the last point, we find ourselves in the center of the discussion of the Western position for a forthcoming East-West conference.

The writer to whom I referred above advises us to accept the facts and to recognize the existence of a second German state. That is what he calls the "Macmillan Policy"—confronted with a policy of nonrecognition, which he calls the "Adenauer Policy." Up to now there is no clear proof that the interpretation given to Prime Minister Macmillan's policy is correct. What is the argument for the so-called "Macmillan Policy"? It is a two-fold argument which runs as follows:

> It is our best chance to arrange for an orderly evolution in Germany. If we could get an international charter for Berlin, we could greatly reduce the risks of dangerous incidents caused by misunderstanding, by the recklessness or carelessness of subordinate officers and officials, or by mischievous provocation. If we could bring the two German States into a legal relationship with each other, there would be a chance that the movement for German unity, which is certain to grow, would be open and visible rather than clandestine and conspiratorial.



It is not only from the viewpoint of German foreign policy that I am definitely not convinced by these arguments. I think they are weak from the viewpoint of the common interests of the West. A so-called international charter for Berlin cannot stabilize the situation in Germany. There is not the slightest indication that the Soviets would be prepared to pay greater respect to such a charter than they have to the existing agreements on Berlin. The contrary is highly probable. Once the West yielded to the Soviet threat and acquiesced in a new treaty guarantee; once (as a necessary consequence) the NATO-guarantee for Berlin faded away, we would very soon witness the next step and would be confronted with the complete subjugation of West Berlin to Communist rule. Instead of gaining stability, we would be faced with a new mortal crisis. Once more the Western world would then have to decide: Are we prepared to resist, whatever the risk may be? Or are we prepared to lose Berlin; and then, what will be the next Western community to be sacrificed?

As to the second above-mentioned argument, I must say that I do not precisely understand what it means. If we recognize the legal existence of the so-called German Democratic Republic as a second German state, there will be no movement toward German unity—neither open and visible nor clandestine and conspiratorial. If it was the meaning of this argument to point to the potential dangers of a future German nationalism, only one conclusion would be the logical one: that a reversal of the present common policy of reunification by the Western governments and the acceptance of the status quo would be the shortest and most effective way to stir up nationalistic resentments.

As far as the suspected Soviet aims are concerned, we are told that the existence of a free West Berlin is not the decisive point of Soviet motivation. The Soviets, we are told, try to accomplish two larger objectives. "One is to stabilize the East German State and the satellite orbit by extinguishing the hope of adherents to the West. The other is to confound and confuse Mr. Adenauer's West German State by a spectacular demonstration that his policy is at a dead end and that it has led to the partition of the German Reich."

If this is a correct analysis of the Soviet aims, I frankly do not understand how the Western answer can possibly be: let us accept the facts. In other words, let us help the Soviets in stabilizing communism in East Germany and in the whole satellite orbit; let us help to extinguish the hopes of the enslaved populations; let us help to disintegrate the political structure of West Germany. I do not consider such a policy to be sound and reasonable.

### SOME CONCEPTS FOR WESTERN POLICY

You will ask me the question: What is your alternative? What could be the concept of Western policy for the conferences which are ahead of us?

I cannot reveal any concrete ideas for the forthcoming negotiations. I can only offer some general remarks: Do we really believe that we can buy peace and security by satisfying the Soviet demands for the sanctification of their satellite empire and by giving away unilateral concessions in the area of our security, without equivalent counter-concessions?

I sincerely hope we do not. At least my government does not; and that is the reason why we are not prepared to accept limited security zones in Central Europe, zones in which a system of limitation of forces and armaments would be established together with a system of inspection and control without a solution of any of the pending political questions. Even if such a proposal would not directly amount to a "disengagement," it would in the long run necessarily lead to this result. "Thinning out" with respect to certain weapons is unavoidable in a zone of inspection and control. The preservation of the status quo in Berlin, vital as it is from our viewpoint, is not an equivalent counterconcession in this respect. If the West would be prepared to pay with concessions in the field of European security for the mere preservation of the status quo in Berlin, the blackmailing would be repeated time and again.

If the Soviets demand a summit conference with the only purpose of pressing for their own proposals, it would be foolish for the Western side to feel committed to alter its own position and to offer new concessions. If "flexibility" means yielding to an uncompromising Soviet attitude, I am not in favor of "flexibility." If it means preparedness for a diplomatic offensive, for new arguments, new strategic movements, new methods to pursue and protect our permanent principles, then I am in favor of flexibility although it is not easy in an alliance of 15 sovereign democratic nations to execute a policy of flexibility.

If the Soviets decline to negotiate reunification, if they ask for a peace treaty with two German states, if they stick to the idea of a German confederation—then the prospect of failure should not induce us to accept dangerous proposals.

The Germans no longer have any illusions about the prospects of reunification in the near future. We must have patience. We know the hard facts of reality. But we do not intend to resign and we simply cannot resign. It would be wise for the Atlantic Alliance to realize this situation.

The policy of nonrecognition is difficult and often precarious. But this policy is inevitable and effective. Its background is not a legalistic dogmatism but very practical considerations. The Soviets and the Communists in East Berlin have very good reasons to struggle so intensively against this policy. Should we relieve them of this burden?

The advocates of a policy based on the acceptance of the status quo seem to believe, in their way, in the possibility of a peaceful coexistence of East and West. There is no time here to give a detailed analysis of the Leninist conception of coexistence, which Mr. Khrushchev has revived. It may be sufficient to remind you of an interpretation of Khrushchev's idea of the status quo given by the same columnist whom I mentioned at the beginning. In Khrushchev's mind, he says,

> the social and economic revolution now in progress in Russia, China, and elsewhere in Asia and Africa is the status quo, and he wants us to recognize it as such. In his mind, opposition to this revolution is an attempt to change the status quo. Whereas we think of the status quo as the situation as it exists at the moment, he thinks of it as the process of revolutionary change which is in progress. He wants us to recognize the revolution not only as it is but as it is going to be.

This is probably a correct description of the Soviet leader's idea of the status quo. Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that he is willing to exclude the status quo in Europe from this overall concept. In Khrushchev's mind there may be special conditions in Europe and probably appropriate methods to be applied. But the concept is fundamentally the same. Therefore it seems to me to be an illusion to believe that peace and security in Europe could be established by concept of "freezing" a status quo, which is unfreezable as far as Communist expansion is concerned.



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## QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: I would like to ask a question of His Excellency. At the beginning of his talk he said that in Germany they referred to the reunification of Germany rather than to the unification as stated in the title of his address. Does the Federal Republic of Germany in considering the reunification of Germany mean just the consolidation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, or is she thinking of the reacquisition of those areas taken away from Germany in 1945?

A: I think it has become accepted terminology during the legal sessions of the last years that the term "reunification" means the merging of the Federal Republic, Berlin, and the present so-called German Democratic Republic. That is an accepted term. That does not mean, of course, that another problem does not exist, which has to be faced and which has to be solved. I think the solution of this problem should be found within direct bilateral negotiations between a future all-German government and the Polish government. The sacrifices which have to be made should not be the result of a dictate, but they should be the result of negotiations whose purpose is the creation of good relations with our eastern neighbors. I am certain that that is the desire of all the German people.

Q: I would like to direct a very short question to His Excellency. The German Ambassador, speaking of the presence of the Allied troops in West Berlin, quoted Walter Lippmann as speaking of the right of conquest. He himself spoke of the right of occupation of the belligerent powers. I wonder whether we should not add another concept—that of the free expressed will of the people directly concerned, the West German people. Should not a plebiscite take place in West Berlin expressing the desires of the people for the presence of our troops there? That would strengthen our hand and might also add to the concept of a plebiscite of the Free World.

A: Well, if this remark intends to add an additional justification to the presence of the Western forces, I entirely agree that it would be a very good thing to have it. A plebiscite was held in West Berlin some months ago, and the result was, I think, 97 per cent in favor of the free West Berlin government. The pity is that if you request such a plebiscite in the whole of Berlin, you have to assure the freedom of the plebiscite in East Berlin. That means that you have to first remove the secret police and the Soviet forces there; if they were prepared to do that, I would be very happy with this proposal.

# The Central European Crisis: A Proposal for Western Initiative

By James P. Warburg

Abstract: There can be no yielding to force on the question of Berlin; but, before eventual force is met with force, any interference with Western access to West Berlin should be laid before the court of world opinion in the United Nations. There can be no satisfactory solution to the problem of a divided Berlin except in the broader context of a solution to the problems of a partitioned Germany and a divided Europe. The first steps toward such a solution consist of military and political disengagement in Central Europe. Military disengagement means the gradual, carefully controlled withdrawal of foreign forces, a limitation of indigenous armaments within the evacuated area and the debarment of any state or states within the evacuated zone from military alliance with East or West. Political disengagement means an East-West hands-off agreement—that is, a renunciation by the Western powers and the Soviet bloc of any interference in the political or economic future of the militarily neutralized states. Without such military and political disengagement there can be no reunification of Germany and no gradual liberation of Eastern Europe from coercive domination. The process envisaged will necessarily be slow, with each step tested by experience. The important thing is to get it started.

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*James P. Warburg, New York City, is a writer and lecturer on international affair and domestic politics and economics. During World War II, he was Deputy Directo of OWI Overseas, Europe. He is the author of Germany—Key to Peace (1953), Th United States in a Changing World (1954), Turning Point Toward Peace (1955), Dange and Opportunity (1956), Agenda for Action Toward Peace Through Disengagemen (1957), and The West in Crisis (1959).*





In these days, history moves so rapidly that we tend to forget even the recent past, or at least that part of the past which does not fit readily into our pet theories as to the present.

This is all the more true because the present is a time of deep anxiety in which it is perhaps natural that each side in a divided world should seek escape from frustration by heaping blame upon the other for the existence of a state of affairs which neither side knows how to remedy. Thus, we find Moscow distorting history, conveniently forgetting its own sins and holding the West solely responsible for the cold war, while the West somewhat less crudely indulges in similarly one-sided interpretations of the past.

There is little profit and much danger in this practice. There is little profit, because reciprocal recrimination tends to cloud clear vision and calm judgment on both sides. There is danger because this sort of interchange only tends further to exacerbate tension and resentment.

Before discussing the explosive situation which now exists in Central Europe, it may perhaps be useful to recall a few facts as to its origin and to deflate a few of the propaganda balloons which are more or less continuously hovering in the turbulent atmosphere between Moscow and the Western capitals.

## Historical Background

The situation which now exists in Central and Eastern Europe has deep roots in the past. We tend to forget that Finnish tribes once inhabited the forests of the Ural region; that, in 1809, Finland, then a part of Sweden, was annexed by Russia; that at one time Lithuania and Poland occupied most of what is now Byelorussia and the Ukraine. Later, Lithuania was conquered by Russia, and Poland was three times partitioned by Russia, Austria and Prussia. Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania were for centuries Turkish provinces.

It is not so long ago that there were no independent states in Central and Eastern Europe. Even when I first learned geography, there were only Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, and Bulgaria, all recently freed from Turkish rule. Finland, Poland, and the Baltic States belonged to the Tsar. The Austrian Emperor ruled Austria-Hungary as well as Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia (now Czechoslovakia); Herzogovina and Slovenia (now integrated with Serbia and Montenegro in Yugoslavia); and a part of now Rumanian Transylvania.

After World War I, the liberation of Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States and the break-up of the Austrian empire created an entirely new map of Europe. I venture to recall these well-known facts only to emphasize how recently created is the Central and East European *status quo ante bellum* which we are now so anxiously seeking to restore, as if it enjoyed some sort of claim to unquestionable historical legitimacy. To say this is not to justify or legitimize recent Soviet intrusion.

It is equally relevant to recall that in the period between the two great wars there was scarcely any development of democracy, scarcely any tradition of individual freedom in Eastern Europe, except in Finland and Czechoslovakia. Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria were, in their days of independence, ruled by feudal squirearchies. There is probably a greater desire for individual freedom in Hungary and Poland today than there was before Hitler; and then Stalin became their overlords.

After World War I, the countries of Eastern Europe were on the whole oriented toward the Western nations which had liberated them. Ancient resentment

against Tsarist Russia combined with fear of Bolshevism to strengthen this Western orientation. Poland, supported by France, fought a war against the Soviet Union and conquered the disputed territory east of the Curzon Line. Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia openly allied themselves with France in the so-called Little Entente. Among the European nations, only Bulgaria and Weimar Germany entertained a friendly attitude toward the Soviet Union; and, in the case of Weimar Germany, this was more a case of expediency than friendship.

Great Britain, France and—to a limited and reluctant extent, the United States—had tried unsuccessfully in 1918–19 to overthrow the Bolshevik regime. These three major Western powers were just beginning to accept the permanence of the Russian revolution and to establish normal relations with the Soviet government when the rise of Hitler introduced a wholly new element into the European scene. It was in dealing with this new and dangerous element that the seeds of our present trouble were sown.

*World War II*

The failure of the Western powers to understand and meet the threat of aggressive fascism—the failure to halt Japan in Manchuria, Mussolini in Ethiopia, Mussolini and Hitler in Spain and, finally, Hitler in Austria and Czechoslovakia resulted, among other things, in cutting loose Central Europe from its Western moorings. The betrayal of Czechoslovakia at Munich, in October 1938, in effect surrendered Central and Eastern Europe first to Hitler and then, after Hitler's defeat, to Stalin.

The Iron Curtain may not have clanged down for all to see and hear until years later, but the fixtures upon which it was eventually to be hung were erected at Munich.

It is worth recalling that in those anguished days, when Litvinov was urging collective action to save Czechoslovakia, both the Polish and Rumanian governments refused the right of transit to Soviet troops. They, like the Western powers, were more afraid of Stalin than of Hitler.

Munich was the turning point.

Had the West not betrayed Czechoslovakia—had the by then inevitable war begun in 1938 instead of a year later, Hitler would almost certainly have been crushed with far less sacrifice and without a war that would bring the Soviet Union into the heart of Europe. Hitler was not ready for war in 1938. The Czech army alone was relatively stronger and in a better defensive position than the whole of our NATO forces in Europe are today. France, Britain, and Czechoslovakia would have needed little more than a diversionary Russo-Polish attack on Germany to stop Hitler in his tracks. Once stopped, it is my view that Hitler might well have been overthrown. Neither the German people nor the German army had as yet given him their full confidence.

That is what might have happened.

Instead, Hitler marched into Prague and, a few months later, into Poland. By this time the Wehrmacht was ready, and the German people as well as the German generals were willing to follow the Fuehrer from triumph to triumph.

Cynically, Stalin turned his back upon the West and attacked Poland from the rear, at the same time gobbling up the Baltic States and then attacking Finland. Had it not been for a falling out among thieves, two years later, all of Europe would have become part of a Nazi-Communist empire. Hitler's attack upon Russia and Japan's attack upon the United States saved Western Europe's independence, but not the independence of Central and Eastern Europe.



Given the circumstances, it was probably inevitable that the course of World War II should have run more or less as it did, with the Western Allies liberating Western Europe and the Red Army driving through Eastern Europe to meet the Western forces somewhere in a defeated Germany. I say "more or less inevitable" because I believe that, even given the circumstances, a somewhat different result might have been attained, if the United States had fought the war in Europe for a clearly envisaged political objective, instead of sacrificing all else to military expediency. Had Churchill had his way, the West might have gone too far in subordinating military to political objectives. But, if Churchill could have directed the last stages of the war in Germany, I think it is a reasonable guess that Western forces rather than Soviet forces would have liberated Prague and that Western forces would have been the first to reach Berlin. Had the West liberated Czechoslovakia, I doubt very much whether a Communist coup in that country would have succeeded three years later. Had Western forces driven on to Berlin, this too would, I think, have made a considerable difference, just as it would have made quite a difference if President Truman had followed Winston Churchill's advice not to withdraw from Thuringia until Stalin had given evidence of greater willingness to carry out his part of the Yalta bargain.

All this is speculative. The important fact is that the Yalta agreement was wholly unrealistic. I thought at the time and still think that it was naïve to suppose that, without any inducement such as massive aid toward reconstruction, Stalin could be brought by diplomatic skill to establish free governments—in the Western sense of the phrase—in countries over which he had gained absolute physical control. So far as it concerned Eastern Europe, the Yalta agreement was an attempt on the part of the West to undo by a stroke of the pen the results of the whole appeasement policy as well as the consequences of the strategic conduct of the war. If there was ever the slightest chance that such an effort could be successful, that chance was lost when the United States dismantled its great military power in Europe before a satisfactory peace settlement had been achieved.

*The Four-power German policy*

As for Germany, the postsurrender policy of the four victorious powers can be described only as a series of tragic errors.

The anti-Axis powers had committed themselves to the Atlantic Charter pledges against annexation of territory or territorial changes undertaken without the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. Yet, at Yalta, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed that the Soviet Union should take the upper half of East Prussia, to which it had not the shadow of a legal claim, as well as the Polish territory east of the Curzon Line to which it was held that Poland had never been properly entitled. Then to compensate Poland, if you please, for territory considered never to have been rightfully hers, it was agreed that Poland should be awarded German territories inhabited by some ten million Germans, including the southern half of East Prussia, Upper Silesia, and parts of Lower Silesia and Pomerania.

That is how the tragedy began. The Yalta agreement was stretched at Potsdam to cover even more German territory than originally contemplated, for no other reason than that the Russian army had by this time taken possession of it.

Having made this wholly immoral real estate deal in the East and thus stimulated French demands for annexations in the West, the Potsdam conferees then

signed an agreement for the four-power government of Germany by which each occupying power, including France, was given a zone to administer and a veto in the over-all Allied Control Council at Berlin. Berlin itself, though situated 100 miles within the Soviet zone, was divided into four sectors with no fixed agreement covering Allied access to the Western parts of the city. In addition, the Potsdam agreement was in many respects inconsistent and self-contradictory, containing, among other things, remnants of the truly nonsensical Morgenthau Plan.

The result was just what might have been expected. Since there was no consensus among the four powers as to what reforms would remake Germany into a "peace-loving democracy," each conqueror set out to make over his part of Germany in his own image. Four-power government of Germany as a whole never materialized, at first because of French obstruction[1] and, later, because of Soviet intransigence.

Each side has since accused the other of wrecking the Potsdam agreement. The truth is that each of the four powers violated it. This seems to me less important than the fact that the Potsdam agreement, even if scrupulously carried out, could not possibly have led to a just and lasting peace settlement. Both the Yalta and Potsdam agreements were not only unjust and unrealistic; they were inconsistent and, above all, ambiguous, especially in the matter of reparations. For this, each participant must bear a part of the responsibility.

The result of the failure of joint government was that each side tried to wrest control of all Germany from the other. When a truly absurd competitive wooing of the Germans failed to swing the whole country one way or the other, each side began to build up its piece of Germany, hoping that success would act as a magnet of attraction. The three Western powers merged their zones of occupation into a new West German state which they proceeded to subsidize and nourish. Moscow replied by creating an East German puppet state and, quite predictably, took the position that there was no longer any reason to preserve the fiction of four-power government or for maintaining the four-power status of Berlin. This resulted in 1948–1949 in the Soviet blockade of the Western sectors, eventually broken by the Allied air-lift and counterblockade.

Since 1949, the deadlock has persisted. For ten years, the Western powers have insisted that a Germany reunified by free elections must have the right to join the anti-Communist NATO alliance. For ten years, the Russians have insisted that, in one way or another, the East German Communist apparatus with its 17,000,000 subjects should enjoy equal rights with the freely elected government of 52,000,000 citizens in the Federal Republic of (West) Germany.

Each position has been wholly unrealistic. Each side has demanded, as the price of a European peace settlement, the unconditional surrender of the other. To make matters worse, each side has rearmed its Germans, claiming that the other had begun this dangerous game.

The present crisis over Berlin has long been as inevitable as was the crisis over Quemoy last autumn—as inevitable as is another crisis in the Taiwan Strait unless the deadlock there is resolved.

But the Berlin crisis is by far the more dangerous, because it exists at the most sensitive point of direct confrontation between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the deadlock over Germany is the key log in the cold-war log-jam. What happens in Germany will affect the whole of Central Europe. It will promote or retard world peace.

[1] France refused to permit the agreement to function unless she were permitted to annex the Saar and part of the Rhineland.



## DISENGAGEMENT

My view of this central problem of a European peace settlement has changed very little in the course of the last ten years. If I am not mistaken, the annals of this Academy's proceedings will show that, as long ago as 1948, I advocated from this hospitable platform what is now called a policy of disengagement in Central Europe.

This policy rests upon the assumption that there can be no peace in Europe with a partitioned Germany ticking like a time-bomb at its center; and that there can be no reunification of Germany except through an East-West agreement to neutralize it militarily as between the two rival power blocs.

Originally, such a settlement could have been imposed by the victorious powers. Germany could have been kept in a demilitarized state—not forever, but for a period of years during which a general European security agreement might have been sought, providing for the limitation of all European armaments and for the gradual withdrawal of all foreign armed forces. Admittedly, the problem is now more difficult, but no less urgent.

We now have two German states, widely disparate in social, economic, and political structure, each conventionally armed and standing at the threshold of becoming a nuclear power. East Germany is incorporated in the Communist Warsaw Pact; West Germany has become the keystone of the anti-Communist NATO alliance. It is no longer a simple matter to defuse the German time-bomb, nor to reunify the two German states. Yet, simple or complicated, the task must be faced.

How shall we approach it?

### *Military and political aspects*

As I see it, the first step must be to deal with the ever more explosive military situation. That is to say, the first step must be to prevent the nuclear armament of the two German states, to bring about a reduction of the conventional armaments on both sides of the Iron Curtain and a gradual withdrawal of foreign armed forces.

But disengagement must be political as well as military.

The second step must be an East-West agreement to refrain from any sort of interference in the process by which the two German states, freed of foreign troops, find their own way toward reunification. This process cannot even begin so long as Soviet coercive power remains in East Germany.

The plan put forward by the Polish foreign minister, Adam Rapacki, in October 1957 and revised a year later, seems to me to offer the best presently available point of departure for accomplishing the first objective. As you know, the revised Rapacki Plan proposes to create a militarily neutralized zone comprising the two German states, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. I could imagine that it might well be extended to include Hungary and Denmark.

The plan consists of two stages, each to be subject to "suitable controls," which, I take it, means United Nations or other neutral supervision.

The first stage provides for two things: a standstill in the nuclear armament of the states comprised in the zone, and East-West negotiation of an agreement for the gradual withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the zone and for the reduction and limitation of the indigenous conventional forces.

The second stage provides for the permanent denuclearization of the zone and for putting into effect the agreements for withdrawal and arms limita-

tion negotiated during the first-stage nuclear freeze.

It is difficult to understand why the Western powers have not seized upon this Polish initiative—difficult, that is, if one assumes that the Western powers are sincere in their professed desire to reunify Germany and to "liberate" the countries of Eastern Europe from Soviet occupation.

Quite apart from the obvious merit of the Rapacki Plan as a point of departure, it has seemed to me extremely unwise to treat any Polish initiative with cavalier indifference, if not contempt. The Poles are not, in my opinion, fronting for Moscow in putting forward this plan. They have a very definite interest of their own in getting Soviet forces out of Germany and out of their own country. This seems to me far more certain than that Moscow is enthusiastic about the proposal. In fact, I would hazard the guess that, in giving the Rapacki Plan its apparent blessing, the Kremlin was actually gambling on the likelihood that the Western powers would reject it.

## SOLUTION OF THE GERMAN PROBLEM

Let us now optimistically assume that the Rapacki Plan, or something like it, is taken as a point of departure in the forthcoming negotiations and that an agreement is reached for the step-by-step withdrawal of British, American, French, and Soviet forces from Germany.

What other agreements regarding Berlin, German reunification, and an eventual peace treaty are then necessary?

In my judgment, the Western powers are right in saying that there can be no solution of the Berlin problem except in the context of a broader settlement. I do not think it makes very much difference whether or not the Russians turn over East Berlin to the East German government. so long as they accept responsibility for continuing free Western access to West Berlin. I do not think it matters whether papers are examined by a Soviet soldier or by an East German *Vopo*. The issue is that the Western powers have a responsibility toward the people of West Berlin, that Western garrisons have the right to remain in West Berlin, whether or not the Russians withdraw, and that the Western powers have the right of access to these garrisons. On this there can be no retreat, except in the context of a broader agreement.

It has been suggested that the Western powers might turn over West Berlin to the Bonn government and that a West German garrison might take over the British, French, and American sectors. This seems to me extremely unwise and dangerous, since it would create a situation in which we might become involved in a major war through the rash action of either East or West Germans.

It has also been suggested that all of Berlin be made into a free city under United Nations guardianship, instead of just the Western sectors as the Russians have proposed. This suggestion evokes unhappy memories of Danzig under the League of Nations. In my judgment this idea might have merit at a later stage—at a stage when all foreign troops except the Berlin garrisons have been withdrawn from Germany but when the two German states have not yet merged into one, permitting Berlin once more to become the all-German capital.

How can one picture the process of unification?

Given the withdrawal of Soviet troops, I think one may assume that the present East German regime would not last very long. It does not follow, however, that it would immediately be supplanted by a freely elected parliamentary government. Nor is it likely that the East German economic structure would quickly transform itself from state capi-



talism into a Western-style free enterprise economy. It seems more probable that it will take a number of years before the two Germanies attain a sufficient degree of political and economic homogeneity to make a full organic union practicable. The process would begin with the free movement of people and of trade. It would probably continue through economic rapprochement toward political union, quite likely by way of a period of loose confederation.

Eventually, as I see it, the two perhaps loosely confederated German republics would in all probability find their way into complete organic union. Only then would an all-German government come into being through free all-German elections.

(There is, be it noted here, a vast difference between confederation in such circumstances and the kind of permanent confederation the Russians propose; namely, a confederation on terms of equality between a free West German state of 52,000,000 and a Soviet-controlled and Soviet-occupied East Germany with a population of 17,000,000.)

The agreement to be sought with the Soviet Union is, therefore, one which provides that, after the withdrawal of foreign forces, there shall be no interference of any sort by either side in the process by which the two German states come together, including specifically nonintervention in the eventual all-German elections.

It is fortunate, I think, that Mr. Dulles at long last realized that free all-German elections cannot be a condition precedent to German reunification that they can come about only as the final act in a gradual process. One must hope that this realization has penetrated also the obdurate mind of Chancellor Adenauer.

A further agreement to be sought with the Soviet Union concerns the peace treaty to be signed with an eventual all-German government. Here I would emphasize only two major points:

1. It should be agreed that a reunited Germany shall, with its own consent, be debarred from entering into military alliance with either the Western powers or the Soviet bloc. This would not debar Germany from participating in a general European security agreement, nor would it prevent Germany—or Poland, Czechoslovakia, or any other country, similarly neutralized—from entering into nonmilitary association with East or West European countries. Germany could, for example, continue its association with the European Coal and Steel Community, with the Common Market or with Euratom. Poland and Czechoslovakia could, if they so desired, continue to integrate their economies with the Soviet bloc. Eventually, one might hope that nonmilitary associations of this sort might expand across the Iron Curtain.

2. The German peace treaty with the Western powers and the Soviet Union should explicitly leave the final determination of Germany's eastern frontier to direct negotiation between an all-German government and the government of Poland. Whether the present Oder-Neisse Line is allowed to stand or whether it is slightly modified is less important than that both sides should freely and unreservedly accept whatever agreement is reached. This would imply the need for a German coalition government through which both major political parties would be committed.

That is the sort of Central European settlement which, in my judgment, should be the aim of the Western powers.

## OBJECTIONS TO PLAN

Let me now deal briefly with certain objections.

1. It is said that the Russians would never agree to such a settlement.

No one knows whether they would,

because no one has ever tried to find out. We do know that the present situation is unsatisfactory to the Kremlin, and not only as to Berlin. We do know that the Soviet position in Eastern Europe is precarious; that revolts have taken place in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary; and that Eastern Europe has become somewhat less of an economic asset to the Soviet Union than it was before 1956. We do know, because they have said so, that the Russians would withdraw behind their own frontiers if the United States and Britain would withdraw altogether from the European continent. What we do not know is whether the Kremlin is ready to enter upon a step-by-step procedure in that direction, with each step carefully tested and supervised by the United Nations or other neutral authority. And finally, what we do not know is whether the Kremlin is seriously interested in any kind of a European settlement at the present time. There is only one way to find out and that is to make the proposal. It is high time for the West to take the initiative.

2. President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles were quoted last January as saying that "to isolate, segregate, neutralize and demilitarize the vigorous and vital German people would make them into a restless, dangerous force which could breed another Hitler." The *New York Times*, endorsing this remark, warned editorially against "repeating the folly of Versailles."

This objection is wholly irrelevant to the proposal under discussion. No one is talking about isolating, segregating, or even demilitarizing the German people. No one is talking about an imposed treaty. We are discussing an East-West agreement, concurred in by the German people, under which Germany, along with some of its neighbors, would be neutralized only in the sense that it would be debarred from military alliance. Germany would be demilitarized only to the extent that its armaments would be subject to the same limitations as those applying to other states in the neutralized zone. It would not be excluded from nonmilitary affiliation nor from participation in a general European Security agreement.

I suggest that this sort of arrangement is far less likely to drive the Germans into the wilderness than the continued partition of their country. A West Germany rearmed and possessing nuclear weapons is much more likely to become a "restless and dangerous force" than a militarily neutralized reunited Germany.

3. It is claimed that dropping Germany out of NATO would ring the death-knell of the Western alliance. This argument assumes that the Western alliance is and can be nothing more than a military coalition—an assumption which I would seriously question.

The objection also assumes the validity of a contention which I have questioned for the past ten years; namely, that Western Europe cannot be defended against Soviet invasion without German participation in the Western alliance, clearly implying that Western Europe can be defended if German troops participate in NATO.

The truth, as I see it, is that Western Europe cannot be defended with or without a German participation, once a Soviet invasion is launched. The truth is that the only way to defend Western Europe is to prevent the outbreak of a war which will destroy Western Europe, no matter how or by whom it is defended.

Not being a military expert, I may be wrong about this. But surely, if I am wrong, then our whole European policy has made no sense. If it is really true that we cannot afford to give up the West German military contribution to Western defense, then what sense does it make to talk about reunification? What sense does it make to talk about liberating even the East Germans, let alone the rest of Eastern Europe?

I think his Excellency, the West German Ambassador, will agree that even many of the most loyal followers of Chancellor Adenauer now recognize that there is a painful but inescapable choice to be made between reunification and membership in NATO, though not between Germany's reunification and nonmilitary close association with the West. One can argue for either choice, but it seems to me the height of folly to pretend that the necessity to choose does not exist.

Without military and political disengagement there can be no reunification of Germany and no gradual liberation of Eastern Europe from coercive domination. The process envisaged will necessarily be slow, with each step tested by experience. The important thing is to get the process started.

For a number of reasons, I am hopeful. It seems to me that, in spite of his bluster, Nikita Khrushchev is seeking a relaxation of tensions in Europe. The British and American governments appear at long last to be moving toward a sincere attempt at give-and-take negotiation. The great question is, of course, whether the Kremlin is prepared to give as well as take. There is only one way to find the answer to this question and that is for the West to take the initiative in making fair and constructive proposals.

The blackest clouds on the horizon seem to me to hover over Paris and Bonn, where President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer appear, for wholly different and largely disparate reasons, to face any change in the European status quo with extreme reluctance.

One must hope that the ideas of Washington and London will prevail over Franco-German intransigence, permitting the West as a whole to take a constructive attitude at the forthcoming conferences. Should this not be the case, I, for one, would reluctantly consider Western unity less important than a development by the United States and Britain—if necessary, alone—of a new, creative approach to European peace.



* * *

## COMMENTS

### HIS EXCELLENCY, WILHELM G. GREWE

I think the field of disagreement with Mr. Warburg can be reduced to very few and simple points. I am to a great extent in agreement with his remarks on Berlin and also with his criticism of the proposal that perhaps West German forces should replace the Western forces in Berlin. I think that is no solution. The NATO guarantee would disappear, and it would not lessen the tensions in Berlin. It would probably increase the tensions there, because after all, the German forces would not have any legal title for access to West Berlin unless negotiated with East Germany.

I think the crucial point of disagreement is the question of whether or not the neutralization of Germany is feasible. My first remark is that we do not consider the neutralization of Germany as a discrimination—that is not our point. I think at the present time people are quite happy to be relieved

from the burden of heavy armaments, and I can assure you that in Germany the problem of rearming was psychologically a very difficult task, which has not yet been completely solved. The crucial point is whether or not neutralization is a safe device for the security of a free Germany and of a free Western Europe.

If I understood correctly, Mr. Warburg said that he does not agree with the proposal to withdraw Western forces from Europe, from the European continent. Well, then the question is a very short and simple one. The Rapacki plan is a first step in the withdrawal of Western forces from West Germany because this proposal is aimed at preventing Western Germany from having nuclear weapons. It also affects the nuclear armament of the Western forces there. I do not expect that the American military authorities will agree to leave a big American armed force in Germany which would not be equipped with modern armaments; that is entirely unconceivable. That means that we have to check whether or not it might be possible to withdraw Western forces from West Germany and to station them anywhere in Europe outside of Germany. Nobody has an answer to this question at the present. I think that is the crucial question, and it cannot be answered because there is no other place. The space in Europe is a very narrow space strategically seen, and it is a very big and probably unsolvable task to deploy the Western forces in any other European country. I do not see a solution for the time being. I agree that it is very difficult to envision the reunification of Germany without some sort of disengagement. But for the time being I do not see how it could be done without sacrificing our own security and the security of Western Europe.

I do not like the expression, negotiating from a position of strength. I think it is a very bad expression, and it has been misinterpreted to a great extent. I agree entirely with Mr. Warburg's views that you cannot force an agreement on a world power like the Soviet Union since it would be quite useless. That has never been the meaning of our policy. I agree that if we cannot have any contractual arrangement with the Soviet, then there will be no solution for world problems. I think the only possibility is to try to get agreements with the Soviet Union—and I quote a term which has been used by Secretary Dulles—by so-called "self-enforcing agreements." By self-enforcing agreements, I mean agreements based not on mere promises and contractual pledges but accompanied by factual dispositions of military power in Europe in a way which would assure our security. And that is the point at which the question is at present and which has not been evaluated up to now. I regret to say that for the time being I do not see a solution.

## QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: I would like to have Mr. Warburg's opinion as to whether or not he can foresee any circumstances in which the Communist party of East Berlin might yield its power, even if the elections were 99.44 per cent against them.

A: Your question is a circular one because you ask: Can I see any way in which they would yield up power if the vote were 99 per cent against them? If there were a free vote, the Communists would not be in power any more. Actually, does your question relate to the proposal I made?



Q: It relates to the good faith of the people with whom we are negotiating. How did the free elections go in Bulgaria?

A: I think it is a foregone conclusion that if you get the Soviet troops out of East Germany, Mr. Ulbricht will be hanging from a lamppost in a very short time, and I will not be among the mourners. So, it is not a question of whether or not the East German Communists will carry out their obligations; they are presumably gone. The question then becomes: Will the Soviet Union itself carry out its agreement not to interfere in what happens in the evacuated zone? I think this is the question you meant to ask.

Q: Yes, but I want to point to the danger there. There is little likelihood that they will act in good faith, and that in turn will force us to use undesirable means.

A: Well, you raised a very good question which is inherent in all these discussions, and that is: Is there any sense in trying to reach any agreement with a Communist dictatorship? In other words, can you trust them? Well, there are two answers. One is a rather brutal one, and that is: if you believe that there is no sense in trying to reach an agreement because it will not get you anywhere, then we were absolute idiots not to have dropped the A Bomb on them before 1949. Now this is not the answer that you or I would give. The other answer is: no nation makes a treaty or agreement with any other nation relying on its good faith. This is a figment of Mr. Dulles' imagination What nations rely on is the other fellow's common-sense understanding of his national interest. No treaty and no agreement will hold—you quoted Bismarck—unless *rebus sic stantibus*. In other words, as long as the conditions in which the agreement was made continued to exist, and if the agreement was not made under duress by either side, then you can reasonably hope for a maintenance of that agreement. When conditions change, all nations break their treaties. I would also like to mention the now bankrupt Acheson-Adenauer-Dulles line: negotiating from a position of strength. If we had been able to bargain from a position of strength, we would have reached the very kind of agreement that is most likely to be broken. Any agreement which is negotiated from strength on one side and under duress on the other is the kind of agreement which is sure to be broken. The only kind of agreement which has any chance of survival is a fair agreement reached between people who treat each other on terms of equality.

Q: My first question deals with Mr. Warburg's criticisms of the two sides for excessive rigidity. I would like to ask Mr. Warburg what motives would the Soviet Union have to soften its stand, to become more flexible, when its rigid policy has paid very handsome dividends lately? I would like to ask why the Soviet Union does not even have to go as far as to sit down at a table and negotiate with the West? The West yields before it sits down at a conference table to establish a Western position. The West is giving up its position. It is softening and weakening its position step by step to the point that whenever it really comes to negotiate with the Russians I wonder what

further concession it will be able to make without committing suicide.

A: The first question was: What reason is there to suppose that the Russians would agree to anything which involves their retreating from the satellite empire? Whatever else the Russian leadership is, it is not stupid. Now I think Mr. Khrushchev must realize that ultimately Russia is in an untenable position in Eastern Europe. My own proposal in 1957 suggested a mixed package whereby you got a disproportionate Soviet withdrawal from Europe balanced by a disproportionate Western withdrawal from the Middle East. I believe that we should stick to what our ultimate aims are in a negotiation, whether they are attainable or not. I think this is the position we should take. I think we would have world opinion with us if we take it. I do not think we will have much opinion with us if we hold on to a bankrupt position; that is all we have done.

Now your last question, if I understood it correctly, was: Why make all these concessions before you negotiate? I am not making any concessions; I am suggesting that we take a position which is not a concession at all but a give-and-take bargain. What is happening is that we are gradually being pushed back into seeking nothing more than a modus vivendi in Berlin. That means as I said before that you go to the conference table with nothing but your minimum objective, and that is no way to negotiate.

Q: The second question deals with disengagement. You referred a moment ago to *rebus sic stantibus,* and you stated that an agreement is expected to be honored as long as the conditions which have prevailed at the time of its signature continued to exist. Now, in your disengagement scheme, this is precisely the problem because you set in motion developments which automatically weaken the already too weak position of Western Europe. Who will enforce that agreement because automatically the *rebus* will not be *sic stantibus?*

A: What your question amounts to is: What reason is there to suppose that if the Russians do evacuate a zone they will not march in again if things become difficult? Is that correct?

Q: No, if somewhere there are strengths and the will to compel them to observe that agreement, from where will that force and that will come? Because essentially the proposition is aimed at further weakening Western Europe. At a time, when, according to every military expert, the main means of defense of the Western world, the American retaliatory capacity, is a diminishing factor, what will be the enforcement factor of the West?

A: What you mean is: Suppose you evacuate a zone, what guarantees do we have that if there is an anti-Communist revolution—let us say in Czechoslovakia —the Russians will not move in again? Why will they not do the same thing they did in Hungary? The answer is, because in Hungary they knew perfectly well they were not running the slightest risk of a general war.

Q: Who told them that about Hungary?

A: It was obvious to everybody except to the American Radio Free Europe.



Q: They were assured; they were not sure of it. This is precisely the point.

A: The point I am trying to make is this: they did not risk a general war by going back into Hungary. Now they know perfectly well if they make this agreement, and if it is supervised and enforced by the United Nations, that a violation of the agreement is a *casus belli.* You may say that retaliatory power is a diminishing thing, and so i is, thank heaven; but if it is any goo now it is just as good on the other ba sis. There is no more reason to be lieve that the threat of retaliation wil not stop them from going back into Ger many than it is to assume that it keep them from going into West Germany now. I can see you are not satisfied.

A: No.

# Soviet Foreign Trade Channels

By Vladimir S. Alkhimov

Abstract: Trade and contacts among nations can help prevent war. A characteristic of the present Soviet trade is its high rate of development—today she holds the sixth place in world trade volume. Another feature is the change in the commodity composition of the exports and imports of the country. The number of states carrying on trade with the Soviet Union has increased from forty between World War I and II to seventy at the present. Trade with socialist countries is planned ahead by several years. Trade with the West has increased and in 1958 amounted to 2,250 million dollars. Among other countries, trade relations have been established with France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Italy, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and Greece. The Soviet Union has shifted from a debtor to a creditor country after World War II. During the past ten years Soviet-American trade has been reduced to almost nothing; in spite of this Russia is developing its industry, agriculture, and trade yearly. Since both the Soviet Union and the United States have expressed a desire to trade, it is hoped that "sooner or later the Soviet-American trade will be normalized." Future development of Soviet trade will depend on the development of its industry. The development of the Union's economy and trade is not meant to be a threat to other countries. It is hoped that difficulties preventing trade between the Soviet Union and the United States will soon be overcome.—Ed.

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*Vladimir S. Alkhimov is the Commercial Counselor of the Washington Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Formerly he was Deputy-President of the Market Research Institute of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade which advises Soviet foreign trade organizations on price and marketing conditions throughout the world. Mr Alkhimov is the author of several works on foreign trade.*





IT IS well-known that the so-called international division of labor finds practical expression in foreign trade in the economic co-operation of different countries. In one country, for example, available raw materials, the level of development of industry, and the skill and traditions of the workers make it profitable to produce one kind of goods; in another country, another kind.

Thus, we believe that under certain circumstances international trade helps all countries to raise the standard of living of their peoples. And we pay very close attention to this problem. But this is of course only one aspect. In our opinion, there is another one which is also very important.

I think you will agree with me that at the present time, when science and technology are so highly developed, the most important thing for the Americans and the Russians and for all other peoples is to preserve peace and to have peaceful coexistence. Both trade and contacts can be an antidote to war.

We believe that,

> Foreign trade is the sound and stable foundation on which the peaceful coexistence of states with different social and economic systems can successfully develop. Moreover, economic relations provide good prerequisites for the strengthening of political relations. The extensive development of trade would play a large part in strengthening confidence among nations, in easing international tension.

This was said by Soviet Premier Khrushchev at the Leipzig reception on the 6th of March 1959, and we fully agree with this.

These are the reasons why the Soviet people are in favor of trade with all countries, why we are great believers in international economic co-operation. Therefore, my country has always practiced foreign trade with all countries on the principle of respect for national sovereignty, recognition of complete equality on both sides, and mutual advantage.

## Characteristic Features of Today's Soviet Foreign Trade

First one should emphasize the high rate of development of Soviet foreign trade. In 1957 the turnover in this trade totaled, in world prices, over 8 billion 300 million dollars. It means that in quantity, the volume of our trade has increased more than six-fold as compared with the level attained in 1938. Whereas in 1938 the Soviet Union occupied the sixteenth place in world trade volume, today it holds the sixth place.

The second important feature of Soviet foreign trade is connected with the changes in commodity structure or in commodity composition. It is well-known that Russia before the Revolution was an economically backward country with a semiliterate population. As a result, it fully depended on machinery and equipment imported from the United States, Britain, and other countries.

During the period between the two world wars the Soviet Union was transformed into an industrially developed country. And this has, of course, resulted in a significant change in the commodity composition of our exports.

In the postwar period side by side with traditional items of Soviet export trade, such as timber, grain, furs and oil products, many new items, primarily machines, industrial equipment and metals, have acquired great significance. In 1958, manufactured goods accounted for more than 60 per cent of the Soviet Union's total export, including 18 per cent for machines and equipment; this is characteristic of industrially advanced countries. Our exports of machinery and equipment are growing from year to year.

Important changes have taken place in the commodity structure of our im-

ports after the war. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union is still one of the world's biggest importers of machinery and equipment. We purchase large quantities of metal-cutting machine tools, forge-and-press equipment, mining machinery, equipment for the iron, steel, and chemical industry (including equipment for the manufacture of artificial fibers and plastics), equipment for housing construction which has been widely developed in the USSR in recent years.

Soviet railway transport is switching now to diesel and electric engines. In connection with the introduction of natural gas into many of our towns, during the next seven years we have to build more than 16,000 miles of gas mains in 1959–65. Consequently, we are buying diesel, electric locomotives, and gas pipes in large quantities.

But we do not limit our imports only to the means of production. As distinguished from the prewar period, the Soviet Union purchases a variety of consumer goods abroad. We also import raw materials for their production.

## DIRECTION OF SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE

First of all it is necessary to note a considerable increase in the number of countries conducting trade with the Soviet Union. Between World War I and II, about forty countries traded regularly with the USSR. At the present time the Soviet Union maintains commercial relations with more than seventy countries. It has trade agreements with more than forty-five countries.

As a rule Soviet trade with socialist countries is planned for several years in advance in order to secure the stability of their economic development. All this and many other factors create good conditions for the rapid progress in trade between the USSR and other socialist countries. At present the share of these countries is equal to about three-fourths of the whole volume of Soviet foreign trade. Soviet exports and imports to and from socialist countries include thousands of varieties of goods. There has been an especially rapid rise in the deliveries of complete enterprises, which are stepping up the process of industrialization in these countries. The Soviet Union is delivering 478 complete plants to the socialist countries, including 211 plants to the People's Republic of China. While exporting to these countries the most modern of equipment, the Soviet Union is rendering them expert technical assistance at the most favorable prices, and it is giving them licenses and furnishing patents and production technology or know-how free of charge.

Our trade turnover with countries of the West has grown as compared with the level achieved in 1938, in comparable prices, more than two-fold, and in 1958 it amounted to 2,250 million dollars.

If we take the past five years alone, we shall see that during this period the Soviet Union has concluded long-term agreements on mutual deliveries of goods with many West European countries. The Soviet Union has such agreements with France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Greece, and other countries. All West European countries account for nearly two thirds, of our trade with capitalist countries as a whole.

Rapid progress has been made in recent years in our trade with France, with whom the first long-term agreement on reciprocal commodity deliveries was concluded, at our initiative, in the year 1957. In 1958, at the initiative of the French, we concluded a new three-year agreement for the period 1960 to 1962. Soviet trade with France has more than quadrupled in the past five years. The new agreement provides for its further considerable increase. French firms buy our goods willingly and receive large Soviet orders for equipment of various types and for other commodities.



Our trade with the Federal Republic of Germany has been growing since the establishment of diplomatic and trade relations. On the basis of the recently concluded three-year agreement, reciprocal commodity deliveries in the current year will be nearly double last year's volume.

We have good commercial relations with many concerns in the Federal Republic of Germany. Let us take, for instance, Mannesmann, the West German firm with which our foreign trade organizations have transacted business for a long time. This year alone it has sold us 37,000 tons of large-diameter pipe and is now preparing an offer of a large tube welding plant with an annual capacity of one million tons of tubes of large diameter.

Or take another firm, Salzgitter, also in the Federal Republic of Germany. Our foreign trade organizations have concluded contracts with this concern for the delivery of equipment for two chemical plants and are negotiating the purchase of equipment of other types.

Trade with Italy has increased two-and-a-half fold in the past five years. We have concluded a four-year agreement on reciprocal commodity deliveries. In 1959 the volume of Soviet-Italian trade is expected to more than double that of last year. It can be noted with satisfaction that Italian firms show an interest in trading with us, while our economic organizations are ready to extend co-operation with them. For example, we have placed in Italy an order for equipment for the manufacture of high quality cord yarn. It amounts to some 19 million dollars. Soviet foreign trade organizations are negotiating the purchase from the Italian firm Snia Viscosa of equipment for the manufacture of synthetic fiber, while another company, Triulzzi, is filling our orders for various machine tools.

In the past few years our trade with Great Britain has become more brisk. In 1957 the volume of this trade exceeded 380 million dollars—the highest level in the postwar period. We have placed large orders with British firms; among them an order for complete equipment for a tire factory, valued at about 40 million dollars. We have also ordered equipment for an acetate plant valued at more than 11 million dollars.

Perhaps I have quoted too many figures. But I think you will agree with me that it is very difficult to describe the trade of any country without the mention of figures. At any rate, I shall cite now only some of the most essential data to help you arrive at a clearer understanding of how our trade is developing.

### *Credits*

To conclude with the general picture of our trade I'd like to mention the question of credits. The most important fact here is that from a former debtor country relying on credits granted by the Western countries, the USSR has become a creditor country after the war.

In the postwar period the Soviet Union advanced credits to other countries in the amount of more than 30 billion rubles (7 billion dollars). This amount is several times as large as all the credits received by the USSR in the period between the two world wars and after World War II.

Speaking of the steady development of trade between the Soviet Union and the Western countries, one should not, however, forget that this development would have been considerably more successful had it not been hampered by artificial obstacles set up by certain Western countries in the form of various

embargoes and restrictions on export to the USSR of a great number of products traditional in international trade. For instance, one cannot regard the present state of Soviet-American trade as satisfactory.

## POSSIBILITIES OF DEVELOPING SOVIET-AMERICAN TRADE

Our own position is well known. We believe every possibility exists for the extension of Soviet-American trade relations. And we know, too, such relations would be mutually advantageous to both our countries. If we have trade agreements with France, Great Britain, Western Germany, Italy and other Western countries, why can't we have a trade agreement with the United States? If our trade with all those countries is growing, why can't we have the same situation in trade relations between the United States and the Soviet Union?

Trade between the United States and the Soviet Union is not a new and untried venture. I could mention, for instance, that in 1931 the Soviet Union purchased about 40 per cent of all exported American machinery and industrial equipment. And for a short time after the war, trade between the two countries also reached a high level.

Unfortunately, during the past ten years American-Soviet trade has been reduced almost to the vanishing point. If the total turnover of Soviet trade in 1957 increased more than fifteen-fold in current world prices as compared with 1938, our trade with you was reduced ten times. And that is not the fault of the Soviet Union. The truth is that various restrictions were introduced in the United States in its trade with the Soviet Union. In 1951 the Soviet-American trade agreement was abrogated by the United States. As a result, today the United States is the only great power with which the Soviet Union has no trade agreement. As a result of this, American import duties on some of our goods were greatly increased as compared with the duties for similar goods imported from other countries. Thus, the custom duties on our manganese ore increased fourfold, on ferrochromium and ferromangenese—threefold, on some sawn timber materials—fourfold, on birch plywood—threefold, on tobacco—twofold, on liquor (including vodka)—fourfold, on canned salmon—almost twofold as compared with the duties on the same goods imported from other countries.

In addition, the import of some goods was prohibited altogether. Let us take, for instance, Soviet furs, which have earned a world-wide reputation and are an important article of our export. The United States banned the import of some varieties of our furs in 1951. At the same time, the Americans banned the import of our canned crabmeat, alleging that the canned goods were made by Japanese prisoners of war and Soviet detainees. It is obvious to everyone that there is, of course, no truth in this allegation.

There are also many obstacles in the way of exporting American goods to the Soviet Union. You may be aware, for instance, of the fact that in addition to complete, direct bans on exports of certain goods to the Soviet Union, American firms are required to obtain individual licenses on many other commodities, though their export from the United States is not formally prohibited. In this way, the American authorities actually ban their export also. Thus, our organizations have conducted talks with several United States companies on orders for the delivery of chemical equipment and plants. These concerns agreed to accept our orders but declared that they must have the permission of the United States authorities. Much time has passed, but neither consent nor refusal has been given to these companies by the authorities. Obviously this is a form of refusal.



By introducing such a policy, some people hoped to slow down the economic development of the Soviet Union. But what was its actual effect? The Soviet Union is developing its industry, agriculture and trade from year to year, without any crises, depressions or unemployment. But the barriers and discriminations cause great damage both to the economies of the countries which introduced such measures, and to the development of international co-operation. So life itself prompts the need for doing away with all obstacles in order to pave the way for mutually beneficial trade between our two countries.

As to ourselves, we are ready to do our best to find a mutually acceptable basis for the development of Soviet-American trade. We think what we need now are not polemics along cold-war lines, polemics which prevent us from finding a reasonable approach to the solution of questions related to the development of Soviet-American trade—both sides must search for a mutually acceptable solution of this problem.

The Soviet Union has declared time and again that it is prepared to place large orders with American firms. We are willing to confer with the Americans and to agree in a businesslike manner on a specific program for reciprocal deliveries for three, five or even seven years on terms of normal trade if, of course, the United States government consents to this.

To confirm this idea, I would like to refer to the message of Soviet Premier Khrushchev to President Eisenhower on the 2nd of June, 1958. You may know that Khrushchev's appeal clearly indicated the possible ways for developing Soviet-American trade and economic relations, including Soviet purchases of industrial plants and goods in the United States to the sum of several billion dollars over the next few years, greater exports of Soviet goods to the United States, the creation of normal, contractual, and legal bases.

It should be noted that our proposals do not contain anything extraordinary, anything different from what we have in our commercial relations with the other Western states.

As to payment for large purchases, the Soviet Union can pay with deliveries of raw materials and manufactured goods of interest to American industry. However, since American firms are more concerned at the present time with selling rather than buying, the Soviet Union is prepared, for the first few years, to buy more than it will sell, if the United States agrees to the usual longterm credit and installment payment arrangements normal in international trade.

As you know, President Eisenhower's answer to the Soviet Premier's letter says that "the United States favors the expansion of peaceful trade with the Soviet Union" and that the President is asking "the Department of State to examine the specific proposals" contained in the Soviet Premier's letter. So as we understand it, sooner or later Soviet-American trade must be normalized, because the United States is no less interested than the Soviet Union. And we can only add: "The sooner the better."

## PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET TRADE AS A WHOLE

They depend, first of all, on the development of our economy. You may know that the enormous program of peaceful economic construction in the next seven years, adopted by the Twenty-first Congress of the CPSU, provides for great advance in the Soviet Union's national economy. We hope to fulfill and overfulfill our seven-year plan with our own forces. This in no way

means that we are not interested in increasing trade with other countries. We have always stood and continue to stand for a broad development of trade, for the development of business relations with capitalist countries, with firms in those countries, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Thus, the seven-year plan opens up broad prospects for the further development of all economic relations with foreign countries. It was pointed out at the Congress of the CPSU that in the next seven years the Soviet Union would develop economic contacts with all countries and would be able to increase the volume of its foreign trade by at least 100 per cent. This, of course, will mean that from sixth place, which the Soviet Union now occupies in regard to the total volume of world trade, it will move up much closer to the top positions.

We shall be able to sell more and will have to buy more. But we have no intention of threatening anybody in spite of the fact that some statesmen of the West are trying to present the growth of our trade as a kind of threat or challenge to the United States and West European countries.

The development of our economy and trade is aimed solely at the objective—to satisfy ever-growing requirements of the population of the Soviet Union. The Soviet state, thanks to the planned character of its economy, can, without harm for itself, plan the production of only those goods and in those quantities which are requested. In this way we can trade without creating any obstacles to the foreign trade for other countries and carrying on our trade on a healthy competitive basis.

I think there is no threat to America's prosperity or security when the Soviet citizens get, for example, some rice from Burma, cotton from the United Arab Republic, or coffee from Latin America. This trade is profitable to the countries concerned and it seems to us that everybody should be at ease.

No danger is created by any means, when the Soviet Union renders economic assistance to anybody, if this assistance is requested. It is really very strange to hear about a supposed economic penetration by the USSR, and some people even talk about an "economic war" allegedly waged by the Soviet Union, when the essence of the matter is just that the USSR renders the aid which has been requested from the Soviet Union, the more so because some countries cannot get such assistance so vital for them from the Western powers.

Standing for the development of international trade and co-operation, the Soviet Union does not seek any privileges for itself and does not pursue the aim of competing on the world markets. It runs counter to the nature of our state and the economic basis of the Soviet Union.

In conclusion let me express the hope that the existing difficulties in the relations between the USSR and the United States will be overcome, and our great nations will live as good neighbors extending trade and co-operation which will correspond to the interests of the peoples of our countries and the peoples of the whole world.

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## QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: What percentage of the credits extended since World War II for trade purposes have been extended to the socialist countries and what percentage to capitalist countries?

Secondly, according to Mr. Khrushchev's proposal, how much credit is the Soviet Union seeking from the United States for the purpose of trade?

A: As to the first question, concerning what amounts of credit we have granted to other countries, I think they were granted mainly to the socialist countries, with some to the so-called underdeveloped countries. If you need some figures I can give them to you. I have a leaflet here.

The second question is more difficult, I would say, because we thought we could buy large amounts of American goods, equipment, and even consumer goods; but in order to buy in large quantities, we of course have to sell, and as I mentioned in my speech we have difficulties in selling because of many obstacles.

We think that it is necessary to eliminate those obstacles so that we can sell much more than we are selling now. We would like to buy in exchange for those goods we could sell to the United States, but American companies just now would like to sell more than we can buy, therefore, it was mentioned in the message of Mr. Khrushchev to your President that we would like to have credits if it is possible. It was mentioned in the letter that we could agree to purchase goods for several years, I think for five years, to the amount of several billions. If we deduct our export to the United States from what we buy, the rest will be credits. We think that both countries could profit from this business.

You are a rich country. Our country is not so rich as yours; we want to be richer. At first, we want to be as rich as you are now, then we want to be richer than you are. We want to work for it and if it is possible we want to sell our goods to buy yours. If it is possible we want to get credits—it is the usual thing. I know that the United States was granted credits many years ago, so it is the usual thing.

Q: I have a question about the term socialist country. I imagine that you mean only those countries controlled by the Communist dictatorship in Moscow; or was Yugoslavia or Israel included among the socialist countries?

A: By socialist countries, I mean all the countries which have the so-called socialist system. It is impossible to dominate, for instance, China, and she is included in the term. As to Israel, she is not included because she has no socialist system.

Q: I would like Mr. Alkhimov to explain to us, if he will please, in detail how our obstacles failed. Did they spur Moscow to develop her own economy and compensate to a degree greater than the imposed obstacles?

A: I think it is very difficult to create obstacles in the way of the development of such a big country as Russia. We have tremendous resources; we have more than 200 million people. But we would like not to have to develop everything. We think it is much better to develop only that equipment in which we have greater experience, for instance, so we could sell something to the United States, and we could also buy something from the United States. When your obstacles were created, they forced us to develop many things because we could not buy them on developed markets. For instance, let us take tin or some other nonferrous metals. Selling it to us was prohibited, so we had to develop our own nonferrous production. Let us take such goods as diamonds. They were also prohibited and we could not buy them on developed markets, so our people started thinking: Where could we find diamonds? Then they

remembered, although it was a risk, that one teacher about forty years ago sent a letter to Moscow saying that he had discovered big resources of diamonds in Siberia. So they went to Siberia and discovered tremendous resources of diamonds in Yakutsk. It helped us to work better, but I think both countries could profit if they had trade relations.

Q: Mr. Alkhimov, you mentioned the division of labor as being the basis for foreign trade. Now the USSR is certainly highly efficient in certain branches of heavy industry. The United States on the other hand is most efficient in the production of consumer goods. Now my question is this: If we trade with the Soviet Union in nonstrategic goods, of course, could not Soviet resources be diverted even more from the less efficient Soviet consumer industry to the more efficient Soviet heavy industry, perhaps the Soviet armament industry?

A: First of all, we think that we shall live as good neighbors; in spite of all contradictions, it is my belief that we will. Then if we buy something from the United States we will be able to pay for those goods, and you can buy from the Soviet Union any goods you want—that is we have no prohibition, no restriction as to exports to Western countries. If you examine the list of goods which are prohibited to us you will laugh, it seems to me, because you will find a lot of things there which we produce in big quantities. Let us take equipment for power stations for instance—we are building these stations, and they are very great; you can visit Russia and see them yourself. If you look at the list, actually, almost everything is prohibited. So if we buy consumer goods from the United States, I think it will not help us very much to develop our heavy industry. We are going to satisfy our people; we want them to live better. Russia was once a very backward country. We have had to build our country for the past forty years and now we think that our people ought to live better. They suffered so much before and during the war, and they suffered very much after the war because we have had to rebuild our cities and our plants. We want to live better; we want to have more consumer goods; and we do not want to threaten anybody. We do not want to invest our capital in war industry or in heavy industry which is connected just with war industry. We cannot live without heavy industry because in order to produce something in big quantities you have to have your heavy industry. I accompanied Mr. Mikoyan when he made his trip here in your country, and I saw that you have tremendous heavy industry; you are right I think, it is something we must have in order to live well.

## COMMENTS

LOUIS FISCHER

May I say something on the matter of Russian trade. The question was raised that if we were to sell Russia certain types of goods she would perhaps be able to concentrate on heavy industry and armaments. Does not one judge the efficacy of a policy by its results? Is not the Soviet Union a very great military power, has not she launched Sputniks, does she not have jet planes and missiles, do we not complain that she is perhaps superior to the United States, and has she not done all this in spite of our trade policy? How effective, therefore, has our trade policy been?

# The Soviet-American Antagonism: How Will It End?

By LOUIS FISCHER

ABSTRACT: In view of the retaliatory power of both Russia and the United States a third world war is most unlikely. In every instance in recent years when armed conflict could have erupted one side or the other has avoided the fatal step. The inevitable result is cold war, and a realistic look at the situation must include the fact that ideology is only "a smoke screen or a fig leaf to hide a naked struggle for power supremacy." When the Russian position is seen as "nineteenth century colonialism in a red dress," the reasons for the Berlin crisis become apparent. The Soviets cannot continue to tolerate the example of free Berlin in their midst nor can they allow the stream of escapees from the Eastern zone to drain their skilled manpower and poke such visible holes in their propaganda. In dealing with Moscow in the future, Washington must realize the limitations on both our power and theirs. We cannot remake the world in our image, and we run the risk of offending the powerful force of nationalism when we attempt to do so, but neither can Russia and China turn it to Marxism. We must realize that we are unable to do harm by refusing trade to Russia or recognition to China. Disengagement—both political and military—is the only course for the future, but it can come only after we have proved to Khrushchev that we are not going to allow him to disengage the West from West Berlin.—Ed.

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*Louis Fischer, New York City, is a writer and lecturer specializing in Soviet Republic and world politics. He is author of Gandhi and Stalin (1952), The Life and Death of Stalin (1952), Russia Revisited (1957), and The Story of Indonesia (1959); editor of Thirteen Who Fled (1949); and contributor of The God That Failed (1950) and the Life of Mahatma Gandhi (1950).*

I SHALL first deal with politics and have a sentence on trade later on. I begin with some samples of missile rattling. Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations of the United States, told a Congressional committee in testimony released in March 1959, that "What we have is the capability to destroy Russia no matter what she does"; and he added, "I think we have too much retaliatory power." "If Russia began a war," he said, the United States "could break her back." Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell D. Taylor, spoke before the same committee with equal assurance.

In similar terms, Soviet political leaders and Soviet marshals have declared publicly that they possess the weapons and the weapon deliverers to destroy the United States. Unofficial experts agree. All this makes war unprofitable and a third world war unlikely. There is no sense in waging war in order to be pulverized and irradiated along with the enemy. Nor does a surprise attack refute this "no war" thesis. The Soviet Union is so big, the United States and its allies so vast, their navies and bases so dispersed that no surprise attack could be so effective as to prevent the death-dealing response.

For this reason, I think that any consideration of Soviet-American relations or Soviet-West relations or world affairs should begin with the proposition that a world war is unlikely. If you look back at the record, you will see that in all instances since 1945 where a war might have occurred—when Western planes were shot down by the Soviet Union, when Soviet planes were shot down by Western countries, and in the case of the Berlin air-lift, of the Korean crisis, of the Hungarian revolution—where there was a prospect, that, with one great power involved, the second might precipitate a world war if it participated, the second refrained from action.

### RUSSIA IS NOT AFRAID

If it is true, as Soviet military spokesmen have said repeatedly, that in a war no spot in the United States would be safe from missiles, this is all the more true of Western Germany which is nearer, smaller, and more vulnerable. Talk about a revival of German militarism is effective propaganda in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union which have suffered so much from German depredations. In the West, too, this makes good propaganda. But I do not see that there is any reality in the supposed Soviet fear of German rearmament. There were periods in the 1920's and 1930's when the Soviet Union was afraid of foreign attack; in those years Soviet diplomacy was cautious, conciliatory, and courting. It does not have those characteristics today. It is assertive in substance and aggressive in tone. When Stalin feared Hitler he groveled. On all the evidence, there is no reason to believe that the Soviet Union is afraid of armed attack by Germany, or the United States, or both, or anybody. In view of her great armed strength, it would be foolish for her to be afraid.

However, in this age when Western imperialisms hold only a few remaining territorial dots in Asia and are being kicked around, and soon perhaps kicked out of, Africa, no imperialism can feel safe in Europe. A new imperialism has established itself in Europe since 1939. I am referring of course to the belt of Soviet satellites in Eastern and Central Europe—and it has created an area of danger. Lenin said imperialism contains the seed of war. In the nuclear-jet age which has made war impossible—unprofitable and therefore impossible—we have a substitute for the periodic wars that took place in history to redress the balance of power. We now have the cold war which, for the time being at least, is a sensible substitute; an attempt to redress the balance of power throughout the world without shooting. And as imperialism created hot wars when wars were profitable and possible, so the new Soviet imperialism has created the cold war; and this does implant fear in the Soviet leaders, fear of losing their empire.



### THE BERLIN CRISIS

The German uprising in June 1953, the October and November revolutions in Poland and Hungary in 1956 are proof that the position of Russia in the satellite countries is not secure. I believe it is here that we must seek the origins of the present Berlin crisis. What would have prompted Mr. Khrushchev to say that on May 27, 1959, Western troops must abandon West Berlin which would then become a "free city"? The Western troops in West Berlin have harmed nobody. There have been no incidents. If there were a war, the 11,000 American, French, and British troops in West Berlin could be wiped out in a flicker by the vast Soviet and East German garrisons surrounding West Berlin. Why then did Khrushchev create the crisis? The answer is at hand.

In the last ten years a million East Germans have escaped into West Berlin. During 1958 alone 240,000 East Germans fled into West Berlin. We know the figures because when they come into West Berlin they report for relief and for transportation to West Germany, and they are counted. Of the 1958 fugitives, 200 were university professors; 3,100 were school teachers; and 1,200 were physicians, dentists, and veterinarians. It is reported that East Germany has been recruiting Czech and Polish physicians for their hospitals. The exodus from East Germany via West Berlin is continuing at the rate of 20,000 a month.

This river of human talent is not only a serious drain on East Germany with its 17 million inhabitants, it is the worst kind of propaganda mark for communism everywhere in the world. It disrupts the stability of the East German regime. The freedom to escape is a freedom; and a totalitarian regime cannot tolerate such a freedom.

That is why Khrushchev wishes to close the escape hatch; to sew up this rent in the Iron Curtain. I believe no matter how the summit conference ends the East German government, supported by Moscow, will attempt to shut off the damaging flow of refugees from the East to the West.

The Kremlin may have other motives in raising the issue of Berlin. When Stalin leaned across the table at Yalta and asked how long the United States was likely to keep its troops in Europe, President Roosevelt replied, "I am lucky if I can keep them there for two years after the war." I can imagine Stalin saying to himself, "If that is the case, I will have Europe." Ever since then it has been the purpose of the Soviet government to oust American defense forces from the European continent.

### THE ROLE OF NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the defense not only of West Berlin, of Western Europe, and of the United States; it is the defense of Asia; it is the defense of Yugoslavia. If American troops were not stationed on the European continent, Russia and China could roam through Euro-Asia as they wished. The surrender of West Berlin would be a crippling blow at the defenses of Europe, Asia, and Africa. The surrender of West Berlin would be only a beginning. Moscow ought to know from its own experience of appeasing Hitler, as the West should know

from its appeasement of Hitler, that a concession to an expanding nation invokes another demand and makes necessary another concession.

The West is not going to withdraw from West Berlin. Some are frightened by this prospect. But it is well not to panic. Stalin tried to take West Berlin in 1948; and when he was stopped by the Western air-lift, he did nothing. The Chinese Communists have tried to take Quemoy and Matsu, to which I think they are entitled; but when they met opposition, they stopped. Khrushchev, in February 1958, created a Turkish-Syrian crisis in his experimental laboratory; but when nobody flinched, he did nothing. At the time of the Suez crisis, Moscow threatened to fire missiles at Great Britain. Go back to the time of that threat, the actual date and the circumstances; I think it was a bluff. In any case, when the Americans actually landed in Lebanon, there was no Soviet countermove.

There are no madmen in Moscow now nor in Washington. Nobody is going to press a button lightheartedly and start another war. Soviet leaders love their country; the people love their country; they do not want to be immolated or destroyed. Sitting tight may not be a bad policy for the West in the Berlin situation. I cannot think of any *quid pro quo* for the surrender of Berlin. To give up that half city would only catapult us into a repetition of the 1930's when the necessity for one act of appeasement was immediately followed by a similar necessity.

### THE POWER STRUGGLE

At the same time it is good that the great powers are going to a summit conference. Even when apparently intransigent adversaries meet, something of value may emerge. People who have studied diplomatic history know this. The story of the Austrian Treaty is one example where there were more than 200 conferences about the withdrawal of foreign troops from Austria with no apparent results; and finally Austria was liberated. There are no analogies in politics or in life, but it is good to talk. The best result, and for me the most valuable result, of conversations at the summit or in general of diplomatic relations between the great powers, would be a realization by the United States and the Soviet Union that neither can alter the existing balance of power in the world by sudden unilateral action of a military or political nature.

Here I enter into a general consideration of the nature of the struggle between America and Russia. It is a rivalry in which ideology is used as a smoke screen or fig leaf to hide a naked struggle for power supremacy. The suppression of the East German revolt, of the Hungarian revolution, of the Tibetan revolt, Russia's dominations of her European satellites, Moscow's continued antagonism to Communist Yugoslavia, have nothing in common with Marxism or socialism. They are nineteenth century imperialism in a red dress. Equally, American talk about the free world and the fight for democracy sounds empty to many ears as long as the free world includes Franco Spain, Latin-American dictatorships, Syngman Rhee's repressive regime, Chiang Kai-shek's rule over Formosa, and Turkey, where opposition members of parliament, journalists, and editors have been arrested by the score for mere criticism of a government minister.

What Americans are worried about is the possibility that the Soviet Union will be first, first not only in military strength but even in industry and science. Russia is still far from first in these fields. Yet some of our citizens burn with envy without doing very much to accelerate their own country's progress except in the consumption of ornate automobiles, tobacco, and alcoholic beverages.



Let us therefore brush aside the ideological camouflage and look at the facts. The United States gave Stalin's Communist dictatorship 11 billion dollars worth of lend-lease during World War II, though Stalin's treatment of his subjects was much more ruthless than Khrushchev's today. We did that out of power considerations as we then conceived them. We made a choice between despotisms because one of them threatened to defeat our Western friends and rule Europe. A similar threat has turned America against the Soviet Union. But the present power struggle is subject to adjustment, because a war now would lead to the destruction of mankind. I think that both sides are aware of the need of accommodation, and we are probably moving into an era—and I do not know how long it will last, years probably—in which there will be an accommodation between the Soviet Union and its allies and the West. Basic to such an accommodation must be the realization by the United States and Russia that although they are very powerful, their power is often limited and sometimes powerless. They cannot do as they please. Stalin thought he could take South Korea in two weeks; he failed. He failed to take Berlin by blockade. Khrushchev has failed to either intimidate or win Tito by courting. Mao might have won Quemoy and Matsu by negotiating; he failed to take them by force. Above all, Russia has failed to win popular support in satellite Eastern Europe.

### LIABILITIES OF EMPIRES

Here I would like to interpolate a remark on what was said in earlier articles. I agree that some day Russia will get rid of her empire. Empires do not pay—the British learned it; the Dutch learned it; the French are learning it at great expense too slowly. Empires are headaches. Some day the Soviet Union will realize that it will have happier and friendlier neighbors and happier relations with the West if it gets rid of its satellites, which are becoming an economic liability as well as a political and military liability. Soviet imperialism is the chief reason for the great expense of armaments in the Soviet Union. It hurts me because I love the Soviet people. I lived among them for fourteen years. They are wonderful talented people. They are paying for the armaments; they are paying for the satellites; and they are paying for aid to China. I wish there could be an agreement between us and them so that the standard of living in Russia, which is rising, would rise much faster. The key to it is imperialism. The Marxists and Communists should go back to their Lenin and their Marx and understand the true nature of imperialism and its inevitable result. Some day there will be freedom from imperialism in the Soviet Union. It will be brought about by the Soviet people, not by revolution, but by a gradual realization, first at the top and trickling downward, that imperialism costs too much—in goods, in spirit, in peace. If the Soviet leaders want peace, let them make an arrangement to give up their empire—give it up not to us—we have no right to Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Rumania. If those countries want to remain socialist or Communist they may do so, but not under Russian domination.

The United States, too, must understand that it cannot shape or reshape the world in its own image. Nor can American policy always prevail. The United States in 1956 probably saved Nasser from Israel, France, and Britain. In 1958, the Eisenhower Administration landed troops in Lebanon to save Iraq from Nasser. Now it seems that Iraq

is going its own way, and the Eisenhower Doctrine is a forgotten scrap of paper.

### AMERICAN-RUSSIAN TRADE AND POLITICAL RELATIONS

On another level—here I agree completely with Mr. Alkhimov—Washington must see that it cannot by restricting trade with the Soviet Union appreciably damage her economy or war potential; this is pure nonsense. What Russia cannot buy from America she will buy elsewhere or produce at home. It is likewise a pathological fantasy to suppose that the United States government can, by withholding diplomatic recognition from Red China and barring it from the United Nations, alter the Communist regime from within or in any way influence the course of events in Southeast Asia; I spent last summer in Southeast Asia.

Washington and Moscow should make a more sober appraisal of what they can and cannot achieve. It seems unlikely that Russia will extend her power in Europe or Asia—with the exception of perhaps the Middle East—and that also is doubtful. Russian expansion in Europe has been blocked by NATO, and in Asia by China. The United States cannot extend its power except through an intelligent peaceful partnership with nations of like interest. Nobody wants to be led, and therefore everybody resents leadership and talk of leadership. There will soon be 100 independent nations on the earth; and the strongest public passion, whether we like it or not, and I do not, is nationalism. We offend them if we seek to diminish it. It is better not to meddle.

It would also help not to be muddle-headed about communism. America could not have saved China from communism; only the Chinese could have done that, and they did not. Hence we did not lose China. Defense Secretary McElroy in a statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee released on April 4, 1959, admitted that we thought Indonesia was lost to communism, but he added, "We were wrong"; and he added, "We may be wrong about Iraq." Emotions and ignorance spoil policy. So does panic. The Soviet Union and China cannot make the world Communist. Neither could the United States save the world from going Communist if that were the way it was tending. Khrushchev cannot bury us and we cannot bury him.

The recognition of this truth would bring about the kind of disengagement that must precede all its other forms. Military disengagement can only follow political withdrawal, otherwise each side will suspect the other of wishing to fill the vacuum. Above all, no disengagement is thinkable as long as Moscow intends to disengage the West from West Berlin. To abandon 2½ million West Berliners to Soviet power would be an atrocity which humanity and history could never forgive. It would only invite new Russian pressures. West Berlin is the pass, and we cannot surrender it. Strange that Mr. Khrushchev does not see this. When he becomes fully aware of it, when he is convinced, moreover, that the West will not appease him, the nations can move forward toward a peaceful settlement based on the principle of live and let live.

Although I do not think that in the short run any appreciable progress will be made towards an East-West settlement, there are a number of issues on which we might negotiate with profit and perhaps with some result in the long run. I will enumerate:

We could try working toward a guarantee by the four great powers of all national frontiers in the Middle East which would give recognition to Russia's status as a power with rightful interests in the Middle East, just as rightful as ours are; and an embargo on armed shipment into the Middle East. If Russia wants compensation it might be in the form of the abandonment or nullification of the Baghdad Pact which events in Baghdad and unilateral treaties have rendered worthless.

Second, the unification of both parts of the city of Berlin and a confederal East-West German council with its seat in Berlin to regulate trade, travel, cultural relations and other activities between the two Germanies, which, at least in the next period, would remain as they are today.

Third, West German diplomatic recognition of Poland (this may seem a small matter, but it is vital to the whole East-West relationship) and a pledge by West Germany and the Western powers not to attempt to alter the German-Polish boundary by force.

Fourth, from a dot in Berlin draw a circle with a radius of 110 miles from which all great-power and small-power and all German troops and para-military forces and arms are withdrawn. That area would then be policed and inspected by the United Nations.

Fifth, the formation of an international agency to channel the aid of all nations to the less-developed countries of Asia and Africa; and in connection with that, the fixing of far higher priority for economic and technical aid and a far lower priority for military aid to underdeveloped countries and their dictators.

Sixth, the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. At present, the position is that the United States is dictating to the rest of the world; if it were not for the United States, China would be a member of the United Nations. A United Nations trusteeship for Formosa and the relinquishment of Quemoy and Matsu to China.

Diplomacy is the art of unfreeze. Given the recognition by Russia and the United States that they cannot extend their power, it should not be difficult in the resulting relaxation to find means of diminishing tensions and then proceed towards further disengagement and disarmament.

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## QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: I fully agree with your concept that ideological orientation today forms a smokescreen which clouds international relationships. However I would like to know what concrete steps you would suggest to resolve this difficulty for us without sacrificing areas like Quemoy and Matsu which we are ideologically compelled to protect, especially on the level of American popular opinion; in other words how do we get out of this impasse?

A: That is a big order, and the first thing is to clear away the cobwebs in our own minds. I do not think there is any Marxism or socialism or communism in the Soviet Union. It is a form of state capitalism; it is a super nationalism; it is an imperialism—if we were to call it that we would have more friends in Asia and Africa. Instead, we say we are fighting communism. Asians and Africans do not know what it means, and they think it is something new and that it is revolutionary. They want revolution, and so they say: therefore we will go with Russia because she is a revolutionary country. Russia is a counterrevolutionary country; we

are the revolutionary country. There has been a social revolution in this country; you all have lived through it; we all benefit from it. This is a middle-class country. A revolution is a change in the relationships among classes. We used to have sharp demarcations between upper, middle, and lower classes; we are now a middle-class country. This is the social revolution which we have lived through peacefully. If we proclaim that to Asia and Africa instead of talking against communism, we would have friends in Asia and Africa. This is the way: we should not misrepresent ourselves. I will tell you why this is the policy of the USIA. Those of my friends who are abroad with the United States government—would they dare to say that America is a revolutionary country? Their heads would be eaten off by their Congressmen. Would they dare to say that this is not a capitalist country, but a mixed economy with socialism and capitalism mixed? They would not. We misrepresent ourselves and therefore we smooth the path for Communist propaganda. I am not afraid of the Communists. I was in Indonesia last year. As McElroy said, the Pentagon and the State Department not only thought that Indonesia was going Communist but took measures to prevent it. There is not the slightest possibility of it happening. We are too much in panic about communism, and in a way, you know, a strange situation has developed in the world. Khrushchev keeps saying: We want to catch up with America; we want to produce as much milk and butter and cheese and steel as America. Every time he says that he pays a compliment to the United States, which presumably he wants to destroy and never can. Every time we say the world is going Communist, we pay a compliment to communism which it does not deserve.

Q: I would like to carry that thought a little bit further—I should like to ask whether in negotiation the logic of the dialectic precludes the transmission of accurate ideas to the non-Marxist participants? You cannot say that it does not exist, can you—the logic of the dialectic as against that of democratic thought?

A: In whose mind? I do not quite understand. In the mind of the negotiator? Are you saying negotiatiors are dialecticians? No, they do not know what it is.

Q: What I mean is that behind the logic of the Soviet negotiator lies a dialectic thinking and behind that of the democratic negotiator democratic thinking, and the two seem to preclude agreement because they do not use the same terminology.

A: I think this is part of the cobwebs. I think when our negotiators get down to business they do, or at least they should, talk practical politics. I do not think that Mr. Khrushchev thinks in terms of dialectics when he is talking at a conference; he is thinking in terms of power. This is a power struggle and the people who are involved in it and negotiate it realize the fact.

Q: Do you think then that if the Russians are not revolutionary, it would help the situation if they renounced their Manifesto, that then we would have some faith in them?

A: You say the Russians. I try never to say Russians; I try to say the Soviet government. Should the Soviet government renounce the Communist Manifesto of 1848? Let them have it. Most of Europe has moved away from it. I think events in Asia are such that there will be enlightenment about that too. I have talked to Nehru in the last year and spent days with President Sukarno of Indonesia, U Nu, the Prime Minister of Burma, and various other people and thinkers in Asia. Marxism used to be a vogue in the 1930's when the present leaders of Asia developed their ideological wings; you had to be a Marxist or else you were a Fascist. But U Nu on January 29, 1958, made a four and one-half hour speech to the Congress of his party in Burma denouncing Marxism, communism, and state capitalism. They are moving away from it; in Europe they have already. Marx said that under capitalism the rich grow richer and the poor grow poorer. If that had been true, the world today would be Communist or socialist. It was not true and therefore the world is not socialist or Communist. I think as the people of Russia become richer, as I think and hope they will, they too will abjure their communism and stop thinking in terms of 1848.

Q: Dr. Fischer, you expressed confidence that war will not come and you stated strong support for NATO. Since, as the German Ambassador stated this morning, NATO now depends on West German arms, where do you stand on nuclear arms for West Germany? Would West German possession of nuclear arms shake your confidence that war will not come?

A: No, it would not. In the first place, if I may say something personal, I have no reason to be pro-German. Certainly I was anti-Nazi from the very beginning and also anti-imperialist. I think, however, that there have been far-reaching psychological changes in the German mind, may be not complete, but there have been vast changes in the German mentality. If it were not for American pressure, Germany would never have rearmed. They learned a lesson, and they know that if there is a third world war they will be the battlefield, and they will be pulverized. Now I do not see why if we have nuclear weapons in Europe, if the French are going to have them, the British have them, the Russians have them, I do not see what difference it would make if the Germans would have them.

I think rather that if Germany is in NATO there is a control over her. You could neutralize Germany, so to speak; you remember the speakers this morning said she would be neutralized but not disarmed; you could not disarm Germany if she were outside of NATO. Just think of a Germany, united or not united, outside of NATO, between those two colossi—Russia and the West—not knowing what is going to happen. The Germans would arm to the teeth; you could not stop them. I think, therefore, that any German rearmament within NATO makes Germany and Europe safer than rearmament by Germany outside of an international organization. To me the real problem of Germany transcends your question. The tragedy of Europe has been in World War I and World War II; Germany did not know where she belonged—was she East or West? If you want to return to a philosophic judgment of history, you will find that this puzzle about the position of Germany and world affairs was the central issue in both world wars. Now, fortunately, we know that Germany belongs to the West. This is the great achievement of Adenauer. He has taken Germany into the West. Now I do not think there is

going to be a war, therefore, the question of armaments is not very important, not very germane. It is far more important to Russia to know where Germany stands. A Germany outside of NATO nevertheless will be in a Europe, an international Europe, which is emerging. The most creative thing in the world today is the rise of internationalism in Europe. It will take twenty years or more, it will be zig-zaggy, but this is history. Europe is graduating from nationalism into internationalism. If the French situation were developing better and she did not have Algeria, we would have internationalism already perhaps. But Germany is making a very important contribution to the unification of Europe and this is history; this is to be welcomed.

# Narrowing the Gap

By YOU CHAN YANG

ABSTRACT: Two sources of ideas on international affairs are the scholars and newspapermen, and the diplomats. The former offer judgments which are arrived at freely and objectively; the latter test the practicality of an idea or solution. There should be a balance between the ideal and the practical. In order to avoid war, we should try to find ways to bridge the gap between the Communists and the Free World; but we should also be aware of the dangers inherent in compromises and conciliations. The ways of free people cannot be sacrificed. Korea exemplifies in a practical way the gap which divides the world today. The reunification of the country is a vital problem; and the right to free elections is the inalienable right of all Koreans—North or South. The Communist fear of encirclement is not a valid one since in all its long history Korea has never been an aggressor. To narrow the gap in the world today, we must determine "which side represents a tolerable way of life." The West cannot sacrifice its principles of freedom for "to do so would be to eliminate the gap by being swallowed up in it."—Ed.

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*His Excellency You Chan Yang, M.D., LL.D., L.H.D., Washington, D. C., is Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the United States. He was a practicing physician and surgeon in Honolulu for nearly three decades. Every year since his appointment as Ambassador in 1951, Dr. Yang has represented his country at the United Nations Assemblies. In 1952, Dr. Yang headed the Korean Delegation to the Bilateral Conference between Korea and Japan. The Ambassador has made two Good Will Missions for his country as Special Representative of President Syngman Rhee—the first to twenty Latin American countries in 1956 and the second to Europe and Turkey in 1957. He is presently a member of the Advisory Board of Dong Ji Hoi; a trustee and executive member of Kokokahi, and Vice President of the Pan-Pacific Union.*

THERE are two sources from which ideas on international affairs are readily available. One such source is safely sequestered from responsibility for action, ranging from the quietude of the campus libraries to the noisier bustle of the great newspaper press rooms. Both the university scholars and the newspaper commentators have one treasured factor in common, namely, they are uncommitted. Their minds and their wills are free to roam unfettered over all aspects of the subject under their examination. By the nature of their positions they can arrive at judgments that are purely objective and unprejudiced. To put the matter bluntly, as they themselves are sometimes prone to do, their intelligence is not cramped by the necessity of supporting official governmental policy lines. Like a boy chasing a butterfly, they can pursue truth wherever it may lead, regardless of how erratic its course may sometimes be. Unquestionably, this is one of the great advantages of the uncommitted observer, scholar and analyst.

The other source from which ideas on internationalism are often expressed is the one which I represent: official spokesmen, whose primary business it is to explain governmental policies.

Now, it has been my observation that the officers of the American Academy of Political and Social Science have been rather careful to draw upon both these types of sources, as the years have passed, and perhaps with some degree of equality. In my own view, they are very wise to do so.

For, if the detached scholars and commentators have a great advantage of objectivity and lack of commitment in their own search for truth, they also have the rather dangerous and sometimes dubious quality of irresponsibility. That is, not being office holders, they can freely recommend courses of action without too much concern for their practicality. Under the circumstances, it is only natural that they should tend to be more interested in the history of questions than in the probable outcome of specific courses of action. To put the matter still another way, they may tend to be rather more idealistic than practical. These comments are not meant to be critical, for the characteristics to which I refer are all rather attractive and appealing.

But I think it should be borne in mind that there is actually great wisdom in balancing the ideal and the practical. There is really nothing unworthy in confronting any idea to ask, "Will it work?" and if so, "What will be its effects?"

## THE DANGER OF COMPROMISE AND CONCILIATION

It has seemed to me advisable to approach the question that has been posed for us in this session with something of the wariness I have expressed. At first blush there should be nothing but enthusiasm for an examination of the question of "How to Narrow the Gap Between the Positions of the Free World and the Communist Nations." It is always appealing to look for means of accommodating differences and of mitigating disagreements. But also, and perhaps more than we sometimes realize, there is also a very real danger in this point of view.

If we may look backward for a few years to the time when Hitler was murdering five million Jews, and was ruthlessly taking over his neighboring states, we see very plainly that compromise and conciliation were not the ideal methods of dealing with his type of brutality and aggression. There is a time when right is right, justice is justice, and security rests only in strength.

The question immediately before us in this session is what we in the Free World can and should do to try to ameliorate the hard and dangerous conditions of the cold war.



There is no question that a wide and threatening gap exists between the two systems of the world that are known loosely as the Communist and Free World areas. Right at this very moment, as on many previous occasions, this wide divergence of views is subject to active negotiation. Now, as on many other occasions, there is a threatening crisis hanging over our heads. The voice of all humanity may be heard crying out, "What can I do to be saved?" And there is not one of us here that is not earnestly seeking an answer to that cry.

How can we narrow the gap? How can we lessen the bitter disagreements that are the chief characteristics of our times? What can we do to help solve the issues? What must we avoid doing to prevent the problems from becoming worse and worse?

I can assure you that as a practicing diplomat my whole training and responsibility is to look for ways of mitigating international differences. When a war breaks out, diplomacy has failed. The whole profession of diplomacy is to find means of narrowing or of bridging gaps. This is our reason for existing. It is the measure of the worth of whatever contribution we are able to make.

At the same time, a diplomat also always stands for something. He represents a government, a set of beliefs, a way of life. It is my profession and also my great good fortune to represent the great civilizing forces of freedom and democracy. This is the primary charge that is laid upon all who have the privilege and bear the brunt of being spokesmen for the nations enrolled in the Free World alliance.

We want to narrow the gap between the Communist and non-Communist governments. We want to avoid war and preserve the peace. A constant charge that is laid upon us is to find means of reducing tensions, of lessening disagreements, of narrowing or eliminating areas of conflict or of possible conflict. These are high responsibilities.

Even so, they are not the first or the primary duties of diplomacy. First and above all there is the unshakable dedication to the principles of the people and of the governments being represented.

You, yourselves, have the absolute right to trust utterly that your own chosen representatives will be pledged in every sense to the maintenance of what you know as "the American way of life." My people in Korea, similarly, have every right to expect that their own governmental representatives will stand immovably for their freedom, for their democracy, and for the independence of their nation. No spokesman has a right to betray the sacred trust that is placed in his integrity.

Now, with these few words of reminder, let us look as clearly and dispassionately as we can at the problem that is before us. What can we do, how can we speak and act, to accomplish everything that lies within our power to narrow the gap that cuts this one world into two parts?

## NATURE OF WEST-COMMUNIST CHASM

First of all, I think, the question we must settle is the nature of the gap that exists. What is it that divides the world in two?

Once upon a time it was the difference between colonialism and freedom, and perhaps in a somewhat different way, that remains the self-same question today.

In the years since the close of World War II, the nations of the West confronted the impossibility of maintaining longer their old colonial empires. Very rapidly these empires have been and are being dissolved. Already the Western nations have freely granted independ-

ence to more than 600 millions of human beings.

On the vast continents of Asia and Africa, more than a dozen newly independent nations have arisen out of former colonial territories. This process of liberation and liberalization is still continuing with astonishing rapidity. Month after month, the ordinary newspaper reader sees emblazoned the names of areas he did not know existed, once territories, now independent nations with their own flags, their own governments, their own freedoms.

When the United Nations was organized in 1945, it consisted of fifty-one member nations. Today the number is eighty-one, and when the next session of the United Nations is held next fall, the number will still further expand. Year after year, freedom is burgeoning and more millions of men and women are rising from a crouch to stand upon their own feet and call no man master any more.

This is one of the great characteristics of our age, but, sadly, it is only one. For at the same time, a contrary movement is also under way.

Call the roll, if you will, of nations that were once free, and now in just a decade and a half have lost their liberties. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, East Germany, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Hungary, and in our part of the world, northern Korea, China, Tibet, Mongolia, and still others that we forbear to name because their status, in diplomatic terms, is not clearly defined.

Now, let us think once more of narrowing the gap. It is perhaps not helpful to call names, to speak of despoiler, and aggressor, and imperialist, and dictator. It is less than helpful, some would say, to recall even the most recent of history. For all that has happened is water over the dam. "Let the dead past bury its dead." Let us cast no reproaches on any nation or on any system. This is what some idealists would say. Let us not try to place the blame for what has happened, even though we always labor under the difficulty that those who will not learn from history must suffer from repeating it.

Instead of calling names or uttering reproaches, let us look to the basic tenets of our treasured civilization.

### VALUES OF FREE PEOPLE

What is it that, for our kind of people, and perhaps for all humanity, makes life worth living?

Would we not spell it out in very simple terms—national freedom, personal liberty, the great fact of untrammeled human dignity?

"Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," that is the way one great historic document spelled out the "inalienable rights" of every human being.

Equality—the equality of opportunity—freedom to do all that does not infringe upon the liberties of others: this is another way in which the "inalienable rights" have been defined.

Now, unless I am mistaken, the perspective of the task we have set for ourselves begins to become clear. The problem is more nearly in focus. "The time is out of joint," as Hamlet long ago, and with much less reason, declared. And why is it out of joint?

The simplest answer, it seems to me, is that some great forces are in action to widen, to deepen, to purify the streams of freedom; whereas, other great forces are in operation to narrow, to limit, and to muddy those same streams of normal and proper human aspiration.

### REUNIFICATION OF KOREA

My own invitation to this platform is owing to the fact that the nation I represent, Korea, is caught squarely in the midst of the gap which we have met to examine. Ours is a land that is half-free and half-occupied through the power of a foreign invader.



The problem that is posed by Korea is a very practical one. What can we do, what should we do, to narrow the gap?

Negotiations for the reunification of Korea proceeded for five years, from 1945 to 1950. The problem would not seem to have been so terribly difficult. Our nation is one that has existed for more than four thousand years. In 1910 it was unilaterally swallowed up by the imperialism of Japan. Then, in 1942, the so-called Great Powers of China, Great Britain, and the United States met at Cairo and resolved that the Korean nation should once more be restored to its ancient independence. In 1945 Russia joined in this pledge. But, as we all know, the pledge was not kept, and we all know what nation it was that refused to negotiate, that refused to keep its own pledged word, that insisted upon flouting the will of both the Korean people and the United Nations.

Then came a three-year war, a war aggravated by unprovoked and surprise attack; then by a second unprovoked and surprise entrance into it by still another aggressor, and a war that was fought by our side under self-imposed conditions of limitation which doomed it to futility.

After that war was suspended in an inconclusive truce, valiant efforts have been made by our government and by the United Nations to settle its issue and to reunite the Korean nation on a very clear and simple principle, namely, the principle that the Korean people shall have the fundamental human right of deciding for themselves upon their own government.

But still the problem remains. The gap has not been narrowed. The division of my country, symbolic of the division of the world, still remains. And what we all devoutly wish, what we labor for and if need be will sacrifice still further to achieve, is the solution of this problem, a solution if possible in peace with justice.

Diplomats, we are told, are supposed to be flexible. We should be ready to advance new ideas, new approaches, to solve whatever impasse may occur. We must not remain devoted to old formulas that do not work.

### FREE ELECTIONS IN KOREA

What, then, should the spokesmen for the Republic of Korea suggest?

In some quarters it has been suggested that we ought not to insist upon imposing our own republican form of government upon the north merely because we represent three-fourths of our total Korean population—a diversity, by the way, that exists in large part because of the more than 3 millions of northern refugees who are in our midst in the South, and further because of the heavy mortality and enforced emigration or resettlement of our patriot brethren in the North. But whatever the causes may be, we are sometimes told that we should not expect the Communists to agree to any election that would be certain in advance to impose upon their minority our majority will.

Well, there are many ways of looking at this interesting question. The Korean people themselves never have been divided. It is only our territory that is sliced in half—not our ancient loyalties or our basic unity as a people. Nothing that has happened has destroyed this fundamental oneness of the Korean people.

Why may not our brethren in the northern part of Korea have the same right as we in the South to free and unfettered elections?

So far as I know, there is only one barrier to this development. We in the Republic of Korea are preparing already for our next presidential election, to

be held in May of 1960—an election that, like all our others, will be held under the close observation of United Nations observer teams. In this election free political parties will put up rival candidates, with rival platforms—and the campaign will be vigorous and far-ranging.

Why cannot our people in the northern part of Korea enjoy this same basic right? We have held open a proportionate number of seats in our National Assembly to be filled from our northern provinces—just as soon as elections can be held there under United Nations supervision—to insure that such balloting will be fair and without coercion. How can any honest government or people object to such a solution of the so-called Korean problem? It is as simple as justice is simple—as right as democracy is right.

If any nation or any group of nations is determined to prevent such a nation-wide freedom of election in Korea, it is not the Republic of Korea. It is not the Free World alliance. It is not the United Nations.

But let us examine the question a bit further. The Communists, it has been said, are afraid of encirclement. They are suspicious of the establishment of another Free World bastion in the whole of the Korean peninsula. The great military and geographical powers of Red China and Russia, some would hint, are afraid, actually afraid, of permitting the reunion of north and south Korea. Is there anything we can do to allay such fears as these?

Well, as a matter of fact, there is a most unusual record to be cited in this respect. The Korean nation actually extends backward in time for a span of more than forty-four centuries, longer than almost any other nation on earth. And during all that long span of time our record in one respect is unique, for never have we gone beyond the borders of our own country to wage a war. We have always fought like free men for the defense of our own homeland. But we never have attacked any neighboring state. This is the record, and it is a record that speaks for itself.

## KOREA'S PRESENT POSITION

I have come to this session in a spirit of sober responsibility. The urgent desire to find a means of settling the cold war is a very real one. I might say that no people on earth long more ardently for a resolution of the current world difficulties than do we Koreans. As a result of them, we lost two million casualties, plus the virtual desolation of our nation. We still remain divided and half occupied, a victim as well as a symbol of the world's disunity.

If anything I could say, or if anything my government could do, would have the slightest effect in resolving the difficulties that exist, believe me, we should be most happy to say or to do whatever would be needful.

We were invaded, and all we and our allies did was to fight back to the approximate position from which the attack was launched. We were attacked most viciously from foreign bases, and in the interest of world peace those foreign bases of aggression were held inviolate from bombardment. We have negotiated, over and over again, all to the aim of just one thing, to reclaim the mere right of our own people to be themselves, inoffensively and without threat to anyone.

This is where the position stands today. The southern half of our peninsula is freely open to the newsmen, the private travelers, and the government officials of the outside world. The government of the free Korean people, the Republic of Korea, always has and still does co-operate wholly and fully with the aims and the methods of the United Nations. We have forborne thus far to pursue any unilateral course. We have fought by every means to keep wide open the door for a just settlement, for a restoration of our ancient independence as a united people. This is all we ever have asked. It is all we ask today.

If there were much point in generalizing, I could point to other areas of the world where similar conditions exist. But the general facts of the world situation are well known. There is no need for elaboration.

It is true that there is a vast gap cut like a ghastly notch through the center of the world. On neither side of this gap is there absolute evil; and on neither side is there wholly untarnished good, for the people themselves, all over the world, are very much alike.

Nevertheless, governments are instituted among men—governments with varied purposes. Some of them stand for international responsibility and for collective security under law. Some others stand for imperialism and subversion, with a stated aim of world conquest.

Some governments stand for free elections and for domestic justice, with democratic disagreement and discussion as the means of settling whatever issues may arise. Others stand for a single party system, with dictatorial controls. These are facts, and no desire for harmony can wipe them away.

My own best advice for narrowing the gap is that we first of all determine which side of the gap represents a tolerable way of life. If democracy and freedom is our commitment, we have no real choice except to stand for it. We can only work and hope for a change in the condition on the other side. We cannot sacrifice the very fundamental principles for which as free peoples we must stand. For to do so would be to eliminate the gap by being swallowed up in it.

Freedom is a light that casts its beams across the widest gap that ever tyranny has dug. It is our task to keep it alight, to keep its beams strong. This, it seems to me, is the best contribution that the Free World can make to our common humanity. We owe this to our captive brethren on the other side, just as we owe it to ourselves.

# The Propaganda Battle in India and Burma

By Frank N. Trager

Abstract: Critically significant in any understanding of the responses of Southern Asia to external propagandas, to political pressures, is the fact of the newly won independence (since World War II) of most of the nations of this area. Western governments and Western peoples have not as yet given either the nationalist struggles or the independence of the area sufficient weight in their deliberations and, perhaps even more, in their fundamental attitudes about the area. India and Burma will always be found, both at home and abroad, ranged against the theory and practice of imperialism. They are both engaged in major efforts to upgrade their economies through large-scale economic development programs for which they have been willing to accept aid "without strings" from any quarter. India and Burma have set themselves a great task, but one which can lead to victory over the many problems they face, if we in the United States and in the West would make a supreme effort to understand these countries within their own frame of reference and supply them, "without strings," with the needed goods and services. Then it could be predicted that India and Burma and, in like fashion, the other nations of Southern Asia, would strongly undergird and defend that arc of free Asia from the Pamirs to the Pacific—newly come on independence and freedom.

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*Frank N. Trager, Ph.D., New York University, is Acting Director of the Center for International Affairs and Development at New York University. He served as Point IV Director in Burma from 1951–53 and had brief Point IV assignments in India and Japan. He revisited Burma and Southeast Asia in 1956 for the Rand Corporation and in 1958 for the Council on Foreign Relations of which he is a member. Dr. Trager is co-author and editor of Burma (1956), Annotated Bibliography of Burma (1956), Burma's Role in the United Nations, 1948–1955 (1956); author of Building a Welfare State in Burma, 1948–1956 (1954, 1957), of a forthcoming study on Marxism and Southeast Asia, and of various articles and chapters in professional journals and studies. Dr. Trager is Professor of International Relations at New York University.*





THE general theme for our discussion concerns political pressures in South and Southeast Asia, which I interpret to mean both Western and Sino-Soviet. There are articles in this issue by the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea and the Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia. That leaves me a considerable area to talk about, for all of which I do not claim equal competence.

Permit me in the first instance to offer some observations which will serve as a frame of reference for our discussion. We are talking about a part of the world which stretches from the Pamir Mountains on the West to the Pacific Ocean on the East containing approximately one quarter of the world's population. If the Islands of Indonesia, to mention only one of the twelve nations in Southern Asia, were stretched across the map of the United States, its western and eastern boundaries would easily stretch well into the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, respectively. Our flat maps, which usually show the Western Hemisphere in the center of a world, do not do justice to the mere size of this area.

But size alone is not important. What is of critical significance in any understanding of Southern Asia is the fact that except for Afghanistan and Thailand, countries which alone managed to preserve their independence through the forward march of eighteenth- and nineteenth century Western imperialism, all other nations in the area—India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Nepal, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, the Republic of Vietnam, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines—have newly come upon independence, that is, since the end of World War II. This is a hard fact to assimilate since we have enjoyed our independence since 1776 and all too infrequently think upon its deepening and priceless character. It is virtually only yesterday that Malaya, for example, joined this new concert of free nations as a member of the British Commonwealth.

## New Asian Independence and Answer to Foreign Pressure

If we are to understand the responses of Southern Asia to external propagandas, to political pressures, then we must understand that this fact of newly won independence is absolutely central in the thinking and in the value system of the élites and the masses who compose the people of Southern Asia. They rid themselves by one means or another of Western domination: English, French, Dutch, and before these three, Spanish and Portuguese. They entered the twentieth century engaged in what I have elsewhere called the "Four-fold Revolt" against this Western domination: against Western political domination, against Western economic domination, against Western religious and cultural domination, and against Western racial domination. Their nationalist struggles, inspired and conditioned in no small measure by their ancient religious and cultural traditions, had been fortified prior to independence by this cement of the negative, the fight against Western domination. If we in the West fail to take this central fact conditioning Southern Asia's independence into all our considerations about and in the area, we will continue to overlook the major well-spring of the socio-economic and political life of the governments and people of the area.

I do not mean to suggest that Washington, London, Paris, the Hague, and others, the capitals of the former metropolitan powers, are either unfamiliar or unknowing of this segment of history—quite the contrary. What I do mean to suggest is that Western governments and Western peoples seem to me at any rate not yet to have given either the nationalist struggles or the independence of the

area sufficient weight in their deliberations and, perhaps even more, in their fundamental attitudes about the area. Is it not all the more remarkable that these countries of Southern Asia which have thrown off Western domination have none the less in varying ways deliberately chosen to accept, if not yet fully to exemplify, the fundamental democratic values and institutions which we of the West have in principle adopted? Although they wanted to be rid of the domination of power, they have not erected any intellectual or other barrier between themselves and the values and ideals of the West.

It is easy to say that democracy as we describe it in the West has not firmly rooted itself in Southern Asia. Pakistan, for example, has taken on an avowed though presumably temporary military dictatorship. A military junta has been in control of Thailand since the coup of 1932 dispossessed the absolute power of the Thai Kings. Burma has constitutionally turned over power to a caretaker cabinet headed by the Chief of Defence Services—pending the elections of late 1959 or 1960. Indonesia contemplates if not already practices an experiment in "guided democracy." Though these facts are relatively well known it seems to me that the discussion which we see in Western print about them leaves much to be desired. There is a too easy assumption that these facts spell the doom of democracy in the area. There is little of what the Burmese Buddhists call "sympathetic understanding" of the conditions and the problems and the possible solutions behind these surface manifestations.

It is altogether proper for us to recognize that independence in Southern Asia has not yet brought ease, comfort and well-being automatically to the peoples of the area. They have had to meet the enormous tasks of designing or adapting political institutions, of catapulting themselves out of backward and primitive economies into the technological and industrial revolutions of the twentieth century. They have had to learn how to build and staff schools, hospitals, roads, factories, yes, even modern farms though they are predominantly rural people. They inherited mainly a desire to raise their standards of living somewhat so that they at long last might be free from poverty and disease, from illiteracy and hopelessness.

### PROGRESS SINCE INDEPENDENCE

For all this and more which I have left unsaid but which you can readily understand, they have had but a longish decade in which to work. Conceivably they would have been able to make more progress by their own sweat if they might have lived in a peaceful world—but as we well know this is a world of tension and of "limited" conflicts since the end of World War II. When the leaders of these to-be-independent nations gathered at the First Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi from March 23 to April 2, 1947, they were filled with great optimism. Gandhi was there and Nehru set the tone of the Conference in an opening speech in which he said:

> We live in a tremendous age of transition and already the next stage takes shape when Asia takes her rightful place with the other continents. It is at this great moment that we meet here and it is the pride and privilege of the people of India to welcome their fellow Asians from other countries, to confer with them about the present and the future, and lay the foundation of our mutual progress, well-being and friendship. . . . The old imperialisms are fading away. . . . This Conference itself is significant as an expression of that deeper urge of the mind and spirit of Asia which has persisted in spite of the isolationism which grew up during the years of European domination. As the domination goes, the walls that surrounded us fall down and we look at each other again and meet as old friends long parted. . . . There is a new vitality and powerful creative impulse in all the peoples of Asia. The masses are awake and demand their heritage. . . . Let us have faith in these great new forces and the things which are taking shape.



Nehru was right in saying the old imperialisms were fading away. The United States had, in a law passed before World War II, already set the timetable for the independence of the Philippines after World War II. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Attlee the British Labor Party led England into a graceful exit from South Asia and Burma and was willing to project her exit from Malaya. Significantly all but Burma among these nations remained within the British Commonwealth. Though the imperialists were fading away, Holland and France did not easily accept this inevitability. Indonesia had to fight for her freedom, and it was only through the completely unexpected and amazing leadership of President Ngo Dinh Diem that Vietnam, after Geneva, 1954, has been able to preserve its independence below the seventeenth parallel. Despite these last two items, it is still true to say, as Nehru did, that Western imperialism was fading away from Southern Asia.

### COMMUNISM IN ASIA

However the people and the countries there were not given the opportunity of building their futures in peace for they were threatened by a force which they had not yet reckoned with and from which they did not expect deep-seated, unyielding if occasionally disguised opposition: communism. Now it is easy for us in the West, at least since the end of World War II, to say that we understand the Communist threat, pressure, and propaganda and therefore to be impatient with what was an actual and presumed lack of such understanding of communism on the part of our Asian friends. Western efforts to counteract this threat embrace a variety of policies, strategies, and defenses—some good and some not so good. When some Asian nations, for example, accept and join SEATO—a defense pact—or the Baghdad Pact, we are inclined to say bravo! Those nations understand! When others, particularly India, Burma, Indonesia, and to a lesser extent Ceylon, and perhaps even Cambodia adopt a point of view (neutralism) flowing from different policies, strategies, and defenses, we express everything from anger to disappointment for their alleged failure to comprehend the Communist threat. Now, I do not here wish to be drawn into a debate on the superior merits and demerits of neutralism versus defense pacts as the better method of counteraction or defense. I merely wish to draw your attention to the terms of the debate and add that, in more recent years, we in the West have displayed or expressed much less temper and perhaps a little more understanding of Asians who do not agree with Western policies of counteraction. And here, I do wish to draw your attention to and analyze the fact that the newly independent countries of Southern Asia had not originally regarded the threat of communism with the same seriousness as some of us did in the West even before World War II. For reasons which I shall make clear this is no longer the case.

Soviet communism or "Marxism" came to Asia as a consequence of Lenin's "turn to the East" first announced at the Second Meeting of the Comintern, July–August 1920. It made progress in Asia, especially in the periods between 1920 and 1927 and after the 1935 Seventh meeting of the Comintern, when it followed what has since come to be called the "Right Strategy"—that is, attempting to win leadership and mass following in "united fronts" fighting

against imperialism, fascism, feudalism, and war. Many Asian nationalists found satisfaction and intellectual rationalization for their anti-imperialism in the Leninist version of history. Also they increasingly regarded the Soviet Union as a land which had thrown off the shackles of Tsarism and which, despite the zigs and zags of policy, was presumably attempting to upgrade the lives of its people. Asian nationalist and non-Communist Marxist leaderships were therefore not unwilling to accept Communist support for their anti-imperialist struggles—and they believed that they received such questionable support, other than in the period of 1928–34, the so-called "Third period" of "left" Communist strategy and tactics.

*"Left strategy"*

During the first two postwar years, Southern Asian nationalist leaders maintained friendly relations with representatives of the Soviet Union and Communist party. Then came the revival of the Cominform in September of 1947; the secret meetings of the Indian Communist Party Executive Committee in Bombay, November–December 1947, and the public International Conferences sparked by Moscow in Calcutta, February–March 1948. As in 1928–34, so once again the Soviet Communist movement, this time overtly endorsed by Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communists, took the turn to the "Left" and sought by revolution to overthrow their erstwhile friends now in power as the leaders of the newly independent nations. Communist revolutions in India, Burma, Vietnam, Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia broke out successively on signal from Moscow.

Nehru in India, and Sukarno and Hatta in Indonesia, were quickly successful in suppressing these Communist rebellions. Vietnam was divided in 1954 between the Communist North and free South. The Philippines gradually liquidated the Huks. But independent Burma and British Malaya were to struggle throughout the decade, first in preserving central power and then in gradually wearing down the guerilla type warfare unremittingly conducted by the waning Communist movement. There is no doubt, and there should have been none in the West, that the leadership of Southern Asia, even in those nations which formerly had not been unfriendly to the Soviet Union and its Comintern and Cominform, had become acutely aware of and opposed to the political deviltry and armed danger of the respective Communist parties. This too is another story not always appreciated in the West which had not unduly exerted itself—except in Malaya, the Philippines, and in Vietnam—to assist the new nations of India, Burma, and Indonesia in their struggles against communism.

These Asian nationalist leaderships also became gradually aware that, in the writings of the Soviet Union, in the *Large Encyclopedia* and in other publications, in the speeches of Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi who had come to power in the fall of 1949, they were the targets of a vilifying propaganda campaign. The Sino-Soviet world, at least through March 1953, Stalin's death, was still carrying out the "left" strategy, still publicly seeking to "liberate" India, Burma, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines from the indigenous nationalist governments and leadership.

It is therefore in the light of the Asian experience with two types of pressures: the early Western imperialism on the one hand and the implacable revolutionary and imperialist enmity of the indigenous and foreign Communist parties on the other that the Southern Asian nations developed the two basic international policies which have, for the most part, divided them in their own



councils and in their relations to the rest of the world. India, Burma, and Indonesia led the way in the formulation and advancement of a neutralist policy by which they sought to be friendly to all nations as a means of preserving their own security; while Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines joined Western defense pacts in their search for security. The other nations of Southern Asia to a greater or lesser extent adopted one or another of these two policies.

This may be a slightly oversimplified version of the postindependence history of Southern Asia, but in its main outlines I believe it will suffice for present purposes.

## DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES OF BURMA AND INDIA

If now we look more closely at the propaganda battle in India and Burma, we may be in a position better to understand their present international and domestic policies. India and Burma will always be found, both at home and abroad, ranged against the theory and practice of imperialism. If anything, Burma has more overtly expressed her hostility to both Western and Communist forms of imperialism. A member of the government, one of the four or five most influential leaders in Burma, U Kyaw Nyein, in 1954 characterized Soviet imperialism as "even more ruthless" than Western imperialism; and a Prime Minister of Burma, U Ba Swe, at a meeting of the Second Asian Socialist Conference in Bombay in November 1956, was more vigorously outspoken on the Soviet Union's role in Hungary than his counterparts in India (and Indonesia). Before these two events, in 1950, Burma had voted with the majority on the major United Nations resolution to come to the support of Korea. However, these acts of the Burmese government and its leaders indicate variations, not conflict, in the application of neutralist Asian anti-imperialist policy. We have certainly recently been sympathetically aware of the stand taken by Prime Minister Nehru and India on the ruthless Chinese Communist treatment of Tibet to which it had, by agreement with India, guaranteed autonomy in domestic affairs. India, the ancient home of Gotama, the Buddha, has overwhelmingly reacted in sympathy with the Buddhist spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet, the Dalai Lama—obviously at the risk of a serious argument, if not worse, with Peking.

India and Burma actively participate in the Afro-Asian bloc within the United Nations and in the group known as the Colombo Powers which sponsored the Bandung Conference in April, 1955. In such groupings, India and Burma usually take a common stance on political and economic questions, although each does not hesitate to modify this concert of views in the light of other interests. For example, Burma has been neutral as between India and Pakistan and has vainly tried to mediate the issue of Kashmir. Again Burma, unlike India, has firmly established diplomatic relations with another newly independent nation, Israel, despite the expressed opposition to this policy by the Islamic members of the Afro-Asian bloc. These, too, are variations in a policy, shared by both India and Burma, a policy which seeks to maintain some balance in and out of the United Nations by co-operative effort with the ex-colonial world of Afro-Asia.

*Economic development*

Thirdly, India and Burma are both engaged in major efforts to upgrade their economies through large-scale development programs for which they have been willing to accept aid "without strings" from any quarter. In this respect India's

First and Second Five Year Plans have made more progress than those of Burma. Her allocations of resources have been wiser, her targets have been the more realized. Her achievements are, by any standard within a free system, extraordinary. India has the greater problem. Unlike Burma she is not self-sufficient in food; her ratio of population to land and her population growth present as yet unconquered difficulties. Burma, on the other hand, has a low density of population and is an exporter of food. Her plans have been set back from time to time by ten years of the Communist rebellion, by wide-scale fluctuations in the price of exportable rice, the major foreign exchange earner, and by difficulties created on the one hand by the shortage of trained personnel at all levels and on the other by the effect of the more recent split in her political leadership.

Both India and Burma in the years since independence have strongly committed themselves to solving the tensions and difficulties created by their determination to achieve some kind of economic improvement and to satisfy at least in part the restiveness of an awakening population. They are determined to have a few more, though still not many, of the goods of life. Neither Burma nor India has been left unaided in this effort. United States aid to Southern Asia began in 1950 and, excepting an interruption in Burma occasioned primarily by the difficulties over the Chinese Nationalist troops, has continued in both countries ever since. United States aid has been followed by aid from the Colombo Plan in which both Burma and India are members, by the United Nations, and in no small measure by the Ford, Rockefeller, and Asia Foundations. But, the Sino-Soviet bloc has also made available their version of economic assistance. It is less than that of the U. S. and the West generally but is still of considerable size. The giving, receiving, and utilization of aid obviously cannot be handled in this space, but each aspect of it—the giving, the receiving, and the utilization—creates its own difficulties as well as helps to solve some of the problems to which it is directed.

## CULTURE AND INSTITUTIONS IN BURMA AND INDIA

Thus far I have said little about the significant cultural and institutional setting of Southern Asia in general and of India and Burma in particular in which or across which these issues range. Obviously, this is too big a subject for this article. But, certain facts of it need to be noticed. India is the second most populous nation in the world. It is made up of 14 states and 6 federal territories. The states are largely linguistic divisions evidencing wide and not always congenial diversity. The major language of India, Hindi, is spoken by only one third of the population. Though India is overwhelmingly Hindu—up to 85 per cent—it is still a country of a large Muslem minority and other smaller religious minorities. The men who have borne the brunt of the battle for Indian independence who, like Nehru, suffered jail on numerous occasions, are aging. Their successors are still not too well known either in or outside India. But they, and their successors, will have to continue to face the problems inherent in this cultural and institutional diversity; in this insistent and unremitting task of converting a country of poverty, illiteracy, and ill health into a socially and economically healthier nation. They will have to solve not only the tensions created by these internal problems of culture, economy, and polity but also of maintaining a stance in the international arena which will preserve India's security, integrity, and national self-image as a growing, great nation. This is no small task.



Burma, with its 20 millions, faces some of these and other problems. She has made a start but has not yet fully integrated into the Union the several states which make up the federal constitution. She has not yet liquidated completely the problem of insurgency; but the end, barring accidents, is within sight. However, for five years she has sought unsuccessfully to achieve a boundary settlement with Communist China even though this settlement would cost her some Burmese land. This is her main danger spot and has been not unconnected to the problem of insurgency just mentioned. Culturally Burma is overwhelmingly Buddhist in character, and this is a nation-making support. Burmese as a language is spoken by 85 to 90 per cent of the people though it is the first language of approximately 70 per cent. Burma is, as I have pointed out, relatively underpopulated and food exporting. But it has not had, as India has, a large reservoir of trained personnel upon whom to draw for carrying out its manifold tasks, and it has sorely been beset by the political divorce of its ruling élite which has necessitated an intervening solution with some military overtones.

## CONCLUSION

Despite these difficulties it appears to me that the efforts necessary for viability, solvency and, yes, democratic growth in India and Burma have had a dynamism of their own. This dynamism came out of the incentive of the nationalist struggle. It has matured to a considerable degree in the domestic and international trials since independence. It can lead to genuine victory over the many problems which these countries face—short of world war III—but not without generous help. If we in the United States and in the West would make a supreme effort to understand these countries from within their own frame of reference; if we, by an exercise of imagination and will and practical common sense, would make the effort to supply them with the goods and services "without strings" which would aid them shorten the span of their leap into the twentieth century, help them guarantee the safety and surety of the leap: if we were to do this, then it could be predicted that India and Burma and, in like fashion, the other nations of Southern Asia, would strongly undergird and defend that arc of free Asia from the Pamirs to the Pacific—newly come on independence and freedom.

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## QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: Mr. Trager, you mentioned that there were three aspects of foreign aid: giving, receiving, and utilization. Would you evaluate for us the criticisms of the United States administration of foreign aid in Southeast Asia.

A: Let me begin by saying that I think *The Ugly American* is a very bad book. I think it has done much harm because it comes in the guise of fiction: fiction cannot be answered since by definition it is unrelated to truth, and yet it pretends to be truthful. Having said that I think *The Ugly American* is a very bad book, I do not want to let you believe that the giving, the utilizing, or the receiving of aid is al-

ways an easy job. Having been a participant myself, I feel very strongly about this question.

Ambassador Moekarto has said for example that this business of the annual appropriation—he did not use the word "appropriation," but he meant the annual giving of aid—creates hardships. I think he is 100 per cent right. I do not know of a single professional who has been involved in the aid program since 1948 who has not said that the United States ought not to regard aid as an annual business of haggling in Congress, but should make up its mind that aid is a regular part of our foreign policy. Therefore, it ought to be put on a more or less continuing basis so that one can plan for it, handle it, and not go through the ordinary business of selling it each year on the Hill. On the other hand, the Hill, our Legislators, those whom we elect, have a proper concern over the power of the purse. They, therefore, do not wish to give up annual appropriations which let the Congress have its own say, as it should, in the matter of aid. It seems to me that on the issue of giving, an act of American statesmanship would be to plan some kind of program which would harmonize proper Congressional authorization and interest with long-range or longer-range planning; so much for the giving.

On the receiving, we did this as a crash program from March 1950 in Asia as we did it in Europe. Asia needed the aid; it was not always ready to receive it. There were all kinds of institutional problems across which we ran afoul. Asia lacked the trained manpower and the economic set ups to fully absorb the foreign aid program. But there was an aspiration for it; there was a need for it. Perhaps if we had proceeded at a slower pace and more cautiously at the beginning, there would have been fewer mistakes. For example, in 1952 one cabinet fell in Indonesia on the issue of receiving aid. But this was because of the requirements of the Mutual Security legislative enactment, not because of the actual operations of the aid program itself.

Now on the utilization of aid, in any of these countries—it has to be conceived in terms of long-range planning, mostly in the hands of the government. This is not always congenial to Americans who are primarily dedicated to having most of their economy in private hands. We have to become accustomed to the need for governmental planning in Asia. We have to become accustomed to the need of helping the governments, when they want it, to plan on a long-range basis. We have to be able to say no when we are asked for steel mills, if steel mills are not economically justified, and be able to say yes when we are asked for the upgrading of raw materials in order to meet a market situation. We have to be able to say yes and no on the basis of objective evidence, and we have to work with Asians in these areas so that they learn and acquire the skills necessary for the greater utilization of the aid that they absolutely need.

Q: I have just come back from an extensive tour around the world, and I have met many intellectuals in the countries of the areas we are now discussing. They do not seem to differentiate between Western colonialism and Soviet colonialism. What explanation can be given for the fact that the leaders or representatives of some of the governments who call themselves neutral have so much to say against Western colonialism, so much to say against so-called American imperialism, when we know that America has not appropriated one inch of land; that they have so little to say about Soviet colonialism which has enslaved one hundred million people in Central-Eastern Europe alone?



A: There is a greater sense among the intellectuals in Southern Asia or Eastern Asia about their own experiences. Remember that they were the ones who went to jail: Hatta, Sukarno, Nehru, and U Nu were in jail. They were put there originally by the Western colonial powers; they remember that as much as they remember anything else in their experience. They also remember their treatment by Westerners. For example, even when I went to Burma the first time in 1951, after Burma was independent, there was a swimming pool that had been deeded by the outgoing British to which the Burmese, in their own land, were not admitted because they were people of color. These are the slings and arrows which are well remembered by this generation.

There was a time when Asian leaders felt more called upon to mention, criticize, and attack Western imperialism with much more venom, much more outgoing expression than they did Soviet imperialism. You recall, however, I said that about 1954 one begins to find some changes. I should go back earlier, to 1953, when some of the Asian Socialists gathered in Rangoon; they began talking about this issue then. (In fact, this issue split the Indian Socialist party.) At the Colombo Powers meeting, the first one, in 1954, the participants forced among themselves a statement which would put Communist imperialism at the same level as Western imperialism. This was again debated in April 1955 at Bandung. I think more recently one finds even in India, where there is a model of decorum in some of the upper reaches of parliamentary discussion, a willingness to speak out much more vigorously on any form of imperialism, Sino-Soviet or Western. In brief, what was true of the Asians in their earlier days of independence—namely, a one-sided attitude toward imperialism—has now broadened to a condemnation of this pernicious practice wherever it may be and of whoever practices it.

# The Confrontation of Influences in Indonesia

By Moekarto Notowidigdo

Abstract: Indonesian society as it exists today is the result of many diverse influences: Hinduism and Islam have both been absorbed in a way which is uniquely Indonesian. The result, until the Dutch conquest, was a country where the basic values were those of co-operation, tolerance, and the avoidance of strife. Under the Dutch, Western culture arrived, but it arrived in the form of economic exploitation for the vast majority of Indonesians; education in the Western heritage was possible only to a few Indonesians in the latter part of Dutch rule. With the coming of independence Indonesia faces many problems, problems which are complicated by the cold war. As a young and growing nation, she has no desire to make any military alliance, but this does not mean that she is predominantly Communist or unsympathetic to Western ideas. In the future, the best possible thing for both Indonesia and the United States would be an exchange of students. The future leaders of Indonesia must be given the time in this country to learn about America as a state of mind as well as about American medicine and engineering. In return, American scholars are welcomed in Indonesia in the hope that they will gain a similar understanding of the Indonesian culture. Indonesia cannot be expected to absorb all of Western culture, but she can gain much by assimilating those parts which she finds most valuable.—Ed.

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*His Excellency Moekarto Notowidigdo, LL.D., Washington, D. C., has been Ambassador of Indonesia to the United States since 1953. He was an official of the Department of Finance during Dutch occupation. A leader of the Indonesian Nationalist Party, he was formerly Inspector General of the Indonesian Foreign Service. He served as Deputy Chief Delegate to the United Nations in 1950 and was Foreign Minister in the Wilopo Cabinet, 1952. He is the author of numerous articles in Indonesian periodicals.*





THE successive waves of culture which have swept across Indonesia have touched all our people. They have permeated throughout our islands, and left a lasting imprint on our social life. Indonesia today is a product of the adaptation, acceptance, and assimilation of these influences. Today the effect of their impact can be seen and felt throughout our islands. The temples of Borobudur and Prambanan, and the many Mosques throughout the country, are evidence that contact with these societies has not been transitory.

## A Period of Peace and Progress

Almost two thousand years ago Indonesia was brought into contact with India and the comparatively sophisticated Hindu religion. This contact influenced Indonesia profoundly. Mighty kingdoms arose which were Hindu-Indonesian in custom and extended over large areas. With the rise of the Crivijaya empire in the seventh century A. D., Buddhism reached its peak. In the thirteenth century A. D., the Madjapahit Empire, a Hindu-Indonesian empire, gained supremacy of the entire archipelago. With the growing concentration of political power over large areas, the majority of the Indonesian people were gradually converted to Brahamanism or Buddhism, or to a synthesis of the two.

But we must note that the Hindu religions and philosophies did not completely displace the more ancient indigenous religious culture. Rather, a process of assimilation and integration took place, a process which produced a highly individual Indonesian-Hindu civilization. Many elements of this civilization are evident today. Indeed, the ancient Javanese drama *Arjunavivaha*, or *The Marriage of Arjuna*, is based on Hindu legends imported from India. During this period Indonesian literature was born and a lively intercourse was stimulated between Indonesia and overseas communities.

## Islamic Period

The thirteenth century brought a fresh cultural invasion of Indonesia—that of Islam. It was first introduced by Moslem traders from India; initiating in northern Sumatra and the coastal cities in northeastern Java, the new religion gradually spread throughout the islands. The first Islamic kingdom arose in central Java in the fifteenth century, coinciding with the decline of the Madjapahit Empire. The appeal of Islam to the Indonesian people was in harmony with their traditional concepts—brotherly love, equality of all men, forbearance, humility, and honesty. So, with the conversion of many of the population, the caste system of the Hindu religion was superseded by Islamic concepts. Once again the process of adaptation, assimilation, and acceptance took place.

It is interesting to note that the Moslem teachers in Indonesia accepted local practices and that the architecture of Indonesian mosques indicates our tradition rather than the Moslem one. Also many concepts from the earlier ancestor worship and from the Hindu beliefs are retained in Moslem religious ceremonies.

Here I would like to stress that tolerance is characteristic of the Indonesian outlook. As a people, we are very receptive to new ideas; we welcome them as factors sustaining and contributing to a dynamic way of life. We are open minded, and do not reject new ideas through fear or lack of understanding. Rather, they are examined and tested and those concepts which are acceptable to us become a part of our traditions and life. This, of course, does not mean that any one system is

incorporated in its entirety; we assimilate only those portions which are in harmony with our fundamental traditions, improving and perhaps tempering them in some aspects. This process of adaptation may be called a continuing one, affecting all of the Indonesian culture.

Another point I would like to emphasize is the phenomenon of acceptance by the Indonesian people. As Toynbee has noted, Indonesian history has been remarkably devoid of the strife and bloodshed common to religious conflicts waged in the past by other countries. Indonesians accept and welcome discussions of problems. We seek compromise, continually striving for harmony in life and endeavoring to avoid conflict. This does not mean, let me say, that we will not fight for our fundamental beliefs. But to us conflict is an ultimate and profoundly regrettable last resort, and one to be shunned.

The traditional social pattern of Indonesian communities has been one of co-operation. To this day neighbors co-operate one with another in the heavy work of the villages. The village meetings—which may be compared to New England town meetings— are the focal point of the village organization. Here the needs of the community are discussed and resolved. Consultation, compromise, collective decisions, and co-operation are the foundation stones of village life in Indonesia, reflecting how deeply this modus vivendi is ingrained in our character and philosophy. This can be well illustrated by our village education of today, with the village communities building the schools and providing equipment, while the government provides the teachers.

We had then, at the turn of the seventeenth century, an Indonesia composed of many elements and yet it was an Indonesia which was in essence harmonious. We had the traditional communal life of the villages which I have just mentioned. The early forms of religion, art, drama, and culture were modified by overtones of the Hindu and Islamic religions. And the influences of these religious and cultural impacts has remained with our people. They pervade all aspects of life, and, necessarily, our attitudes, actions, and reactions.

## A PERIOD OF STRIFE

The end of the sixteenth century saw the arrival of the first Dutch traders in our land. Dutch rule was extended over large areas of the country during the next two centuries. When the Dutch first arrived in Indonesia, the disintegration of the Islamic kingdom was under way. Their arrival was timely, and—for them—at an opportune moment. The old order was giving way, and the new order had not been established.

The Dutch occupation of our country was characterized by war and bloodshed. The Java war between the Dutch and Prince Diponegoro lasted five years. More strife broke out in the Acheh War which ravaged Sumatra for twenty-five years. By the end of the nineteenth century, Java and most of the islands of the archipelago had been subjugated. And with military subjugation was to come an equally disastrous event—economic subjugation.

Industrial developments in the West had motivated the search for raw materials; in Indonesia was to be found a rainbow's end of such materials. Coffee, tea, sugar, rubber, copra, tobacco and petroleum—the islands were a literal paradise for exploitation. Such exploitation meant huge profits for the Dutch. So, inevitably, the economy of Indonesia became oriented towards the West. Our people were forced to plant crops calculated to bring attractive prices in world markets. The Indonesian farmer



was totally unprepared for this drastic change. His resentment was deep and long lasting—and with good reason. Not only did the imposed system upset village tradition, but colonial exploitation reduced him to abject poverty. Not only this, but economic penetration also took on another guise. With the continuing industrialization of the West, a market was needed for cheap, ready-made goods. What better market than the colony? So manufactured goods, especially cotton goods, were exported to Indonesia to displace the traditional native products.

The economic picture of our country during this period was far from encouraging. Nor was the educational picture a bright one. The Dutch took little interest in the education of the Indonesian population. So it is not surprising that, until the end of the nineteenth century, there were few schools in Indonesia. At the beginning of the twentieth century the Dutch government adopted the so-called "ethical policy." The alleged aim of this policy was the development of the colony, not only for the sake of profit, but also for the sake of the population. This led to the establishment of a few schools; a few faculties formed the nucleus of a university. But even this improved system had many serious drawbacks. Most students able to attend the available schools received their education in the villages. However, a mastery of the Dutch language was a prerequisite for attending secondary and higher schools. This rigid qualification excluded the great majority of aspirants.

In the period prior to World War II only about 6 per cent of the population could take advantage of advanced, or even secondary, education. In consequence, the religion and culture of most Indonesians was unaffected by the Dutch occupation, whereas the economic life of the average Indonesian was vastly affected. Only the fortunate few w obtained higher education came in co tact with Western culture. This mea that only a handful of Indonesians we made aware of the political and soc philosophies and practices of the We

In summarizing the period of histo before Indonesian independence, we c say that Indonesia was the product many influences. The Hindu and Mc lem religions and cultures had be modified and absorbed. These religio and cultures had been spread by peac ful contact. But this had been chang by the Dutch invasion; rule by t sword had come to Indonesia. The was no understanding, among the m jority of our people, of the underlyi culture and philosophy of the newcome Only a few of our people were priv leged to receive education in the Wes ern systems, and among those fe were the leaders of the nation at t time of independence.

But these leaders could rely on o vital factor. That was the basic desi for conciliation and harmony which pe meated the entire social structure of t country. The leaders during that tim were men who held a variety of politic views. Some favored free enterprise the ideal form of society, some libera ism, some socialism, and some commu nism. The one uniting factor was t desire for independence. And thes leaders hoped that prosperity, educa tion, and an improved living standar for the people would follow indepen ence. The ultimate aim was a fre society dominated by neither one factio nor another.

## INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN LEADERS

During the struggle for independenc the people of Indonesia had been in pressed by such great leaders as Wash ington, Jefferson, and Lincoln. The words and actions had been an inspira

tion during these dark hours. The principles for which they fought were regarded as principles for Indonesia, and the fact that these principles were not easily achieved only emphasized their fundamental worth. We recognized them to be precious and worthy of great sacrifice. Indeed, you may find a parallel in the *Pantja-Sila* or Five Principles of our Constitution.

Actually, at the time of Independence, Indonesia was tremendously influenced by the West. The country was oriented towards the West and ripe for the acceptance of Western ideas and inspiration. As a people, we looked to the West for guidance—to the West for ideals, concepts, and patterns which might help to mold the nation of the future.

But the development of a free society demands, above all, a peaceful environment. A peaceful environment is essential to any truly creative endeavor, and we of Indonesia needed to devote all our energies to tackling our problems. Try to picture, if you will, the economic chaos, the dislocation of communications, the food shortage, the upheaval attendant upon our fight for independence. But you, as Americans, certainly appreciate the birth-pangs of liberty. To cope with this situation, we too had only a handful of trained personnel. We had practically no experience in the higher administration of our own country. Important posts in Indonesia had always been saved for the Dutch, both in business and government. In addition, the Dutch imposed restrictive agreements on our new nation as the price of freedom—agreements as burdensome as those forced upon the newborn American Republic. Thus, in achieving our goals, we were faced with staggering problems, problems which demanded not only the utmost determination and back-breaking effort on our part but also the assistance and understanding of other free nations.

## THE COLD WAR

But what was the international climate existing at that time? The phrase, "cold war," needs no elaboration here. Moreover we have often seen manifestations of the hot side of the cold war. We have a picture of almost unlimited armament by both sides. Accusations and recriminations have become daily occurrences. Any pronouncement or move by one of the major powers has a profound effect on all nations. The overshadowing presence of the cold war absorbs the attention and efforts of many peoples, often to the exclusion of the needs and wants of the less influential nations—nations struggling to survive and make their own way, peaceably and with the ultimate welfare of their people at heart. Indonesia is one of these.

One unfortunate aspect of the cold war is that nations are expected to align themselves on one side or the other. So-called uncommitted nations are often regarded with suspicion; their independent policies are viewed with distrust. They are termed unreliable. Because they do not wish to be involved in a military alliance, they are charged—to use a colloquialism—with playing both ends against the middle.

But this does a grave injustice to many of the young nations of the world. Freedom and independence have been won at great cost, and once they have been won they must be cherished and guarded. Our national actions must be directed to this end. I maintain that each new nation is entitled to pursue its ideals, shape its society, and achieve its own destiny. Every nation has its own national identity. Is this too much to ask of the great powers of the world today?



Our foreign policy is directed to achieve just this objective. And our foreign policy is profoundly influenced by the *Pantja-Sila*—the philosophy of the Five Principles which I mentioned before. These principles constitute, in effect, our Indonesian Bill of Rights. They, together with our tradition of conciliation and harmony in life, motivate our desire to establish good relations with other nations. We define our foreign policy as an "active independent foreign policy." We do not wish to align with any military bloc, but this does not mean that our policy is without contribution to the family of nations. Our wholehearted participation in the United Nations, the Colombo Plan, and other international organizations belies this. I think I can say that we can be counted on to support actively any international organization which aims at improving relations between nations and the living standards of mankind. Therefore, in simple terms, Indonesia is working for peace because only through peace can our national aspirations be achieved. To us peace is not a luxury, an unattainable ideal, but a necessity.

## COMMUNISM IN INDONESIA

This brings me to a point of concern in the United States—the unfounded belief that Communist influence is growing in Indonesia. In Indonesia, as in many other countries, the Communist party is legal. Participation by the Communist party in the general election in 1955 was a matter of course. And the basis of its freedom of activities is the same as for other political parties. That is, it may operate within the framework of the law and the constitution. In 1948 the Communist party attempted to flout the constitution and overthrow the newly established government by force. The government, under President Sukarno and Prime Minister Hatta, crushed the rebellion within two months.

In the election of 1955 the Communist party obtained 39 out of 267 seats in Parliament. The Communist party received about 15 per cent of the total votes. But this is not extraordinary when it is compared to the percentages prevailing in Italy and France. Remember that the Communist party in Indonesia is only fourth after the Nationalist party, the Moslem Masjumi party, and the Moslem Nahdatul Ulama. About six million votes were cast for the Communist party, but by far the vast majority of votes were cast for other parties.

In 1957 the Communist party made some gains in provincial elections. Various factors contributed to this situation. Perhaps the dominant one was the apathy on the part of leaders of other parties, an apathy born of complacency, of a lack of determined programming, and of an underestimation of the force and drive of the Communist campaigning. Adverse economic conditions in some parts of Java played a large part as well. Another factor was the political offensive and the dynamic economic drive of the Communist bloc. But you must also realize that our leaders were influenced by the attitude of the West, not only towards Indonesia, but also towards nations struggling for their independence—nations striving to break the bonds of colonialism. We had seen the Western powers support the colonial powers when anticolonial issues arose. The same was true of racial issues; the Western statesmen talked in terms of a free world, self-determination, equal rights, and at the same time they acquiesced in, or even supported, the suppression of independence movements and the suppression of human rights in South Africa. Can you wonder that Indonesian leaders were baffled and dis-

appointed by such insincerity? How else could they interpret this paradox? We had looked to the West for guidance when we were fighting for independence. Now we felt mentally isolated from the West. We could not reconcile these contradictions: they were totally alien to our concept of Western ideals, and yet they stood before us as factors we could not ignore.

The impact of these factors was one of the reasons which moved our leaders to search for a new formula, one which would give them fresh idealism and inspiration to build a just and prosperous society—a society built on freedom. This new kind of democracy was called "democracy with leadership," and was based on Indonesian culture and experience.

The 1955 election results have also had a good effect on our country. They have made leaders of other parties aware of the need for dynamic action and of the fact that elections cannot be won by mere repetition of phrases. There is no substitute for vital leadership, reaching down to the very roots of the electorate.

## THE FUTURE

With this background in mind, I wish to make a few remarks about the future. I have outlined the hopes and aspirations of Indonesia and the climate we believe essential for the attainment of these hopes. I have explained our traditional way of discussion, compromise, and conciliation, and pointed out the need of our country for understanding. Along with the need to develop the economic and industrial life of Indonesia must come the development of the social and political systems. Our course is unalterably set towards a free society. Our need is to cultivate and nourish in our people this state of mind so that all Indonesians will have a true appreciation of the immeasurable benefits, and also the obligations, of such a society. In this our friends in the West can be of great help.

Today we hear much of investment in capital goods in foreign lands—the building of factories, the exploration for oil, the modernization and mechanization of agriculture. All of these go a long way towards improving living standards. But is there not a need for intellectual and spiritual investment too? Capital goods, the so-called hardware, wear out and can be replaced. But the good will and understanding engendered by intellectual and spiritual investment last. Our young people, the future leaders of our country, must also be shown the concepts, philosophy, and way of life of other countries. Surely investment in such understanding will reap the greatest profits in time to come. Educating young people in the free institutions of the West, their historical background, traditions, and purposes, must inevitably lead to a greater understanding between our peoples. And it is for such understanding that we are striving today. This is what I mean by intellectual and spiritual investment.

You may remember that when President Sukarno came to this country in 1956 he said he wanted to learn from America, not merely as a nation, "but America as a state of mind, America as the center of an idea." Besides the education of our people in engineering, medicine, and science, should we not also strive for education in a state of mind?

How to achieve this? I strongly believe that students should be afforded sufficient time for such study, time to meditate on, and fully comprehend, the free society of America. You must remember that the men and women who come as students from my country are stepping into surroundings almost totally strange to them. They have a certain facility with the language, but naturally their knowledge is not complete. And we all know from experience how confusing colloquialisms can be. The pace of Western life is new to them, the climate is different, even the American hot dog baffles the inexperienced digestion. So, for the first few months of their stay they have an almost full-time job in orienting themselves to the everyday things of life. And apart from the physical orientation, there is the mental orientation—the understanding of attitudes, concepts, and philosophies, the realization that many of the ideals we are still striving for in Indonesia are already taken for granted in your country, the evaluation of the way of life and the state of mind.

This cannot be achieved in the space of a few months. These are basic elements of life which cannot be absorbed in so short a time. I say we should give our young people four years, or more, to live in your country, to get to know your hopes and aspirations, your doubts and troubles, your motives and reasoning. Then, indeed, they will take with them a truer understanding of the American state of mind. They will gain a sympathy for your attitudes and actions and a realization of the deepest meaning of the American way of life. I believe that this can be achieved. It should be achieved. It is of the utmost importance. No effort is too great on the part of all of us to attain such a goal. A technical assistance program, by its very nature, is a long-term program; it is not a program to be governed by caprice. Year-to-year changes defeat its purpose; they cast doubt on its basic philosophy and thereby undermine its very foundations. But apart from instilling technical know-how, can we not have a long-term program of intellectual and spiritual education? I truly believe that this type of program could become the most effective instrument of your foreign policy.

Our people are receptive; they come to this country with an open mind. They are eager to learn more than merely the techniques of industry. They want to know people, and when they return home, they want to put their new-found knowledge into practice. So we must not limit their knowledge to one aspect alone. We must have faith in these future leaders. We must respect their discernment and judgment, their ability to seek out the truth, and their eagerness to impart to others the insight they have gained. To make such an investment in our young people is, I believe, one of the most rewarding and meaningful steps which can be taken. Not to invest means to prolong the status quo, it means that understanding is still something we talk about in abstract terms, as if we desire it but do not hope to achieve it. I believe it can be achieved. We have the means at our disposal and I am convinced that the day of achievement is on the horizon.

Now, here I would caution you. You cannot expect Indonesians to accept completely everything that is good for America. We have our own national identity, our own traditions, our own way of life. No one political and social system can be absolutely integrated with the Indonesian political and social system. But what is important is the creation of a solid basis for understanding and appreciation. We Indonesians, on our part, open our doors to your scholars, educators, and students. We welcome them as students of our history, our culture, our language, and our way of life. In this way your evaluation of Indonesia will be based not merely on biased articles appearing in newspapers, or on fantastic intelligence reports. Rather, your judgment will be based on profound, perceptive knowl-

edge of Indonesia and of Indonesia as a state of mind.

In Indonesia we have a saying—"*Insja Allah*"—which means "God willing. . . ." Must we not prove that we are willing too?

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## QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: I remember when the problem of human rights was discussed at the United Nations, Indonesia and many other uncommitted representatives abstained from supporting the recognition of human rights for the subjected people of Europe. Why did Indonesia and and countries abstain when the Hungarian question was discussed at the United Nations?

A: Indonesia abstained on that special case as has been mentioned. There must have been some technical reason for this; I think they did not abstain on the fundamental issue. I have had experience in the United Nations, and I know that you cannot always vote for resolutions which you favor because you cannot agree with the way a resolution is formulated. We abstained on the Hungarian resolution for technical reasons.

# Recognition of the People's Republic of China

By EDGAR SNOW

ABSTRACT: The United States alliance with the Nationalist regime on Taiwan is a form of armed intervention in the internal affairs of China. Today it is clear that the aims of that policy cannot be realized in the visible future. The costs of maintaining Chiang Kai-shek far exceed the American investment in nonmilitary help to other Asian lands; preoccupation with armed answers to the challenge of poverty obscures American understanding of the real needs of all underdeveloped countries. State Department justifications for continued nonrecognition of China are threadbare; defining functional alternatives is not easy. Outstanding Sino-American issues are negotiable, given the will on both sides. The future of Taiwan most likely would be settled, once serious "recognition talks" began, by compromise between Peking and the Taiwan successors to Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Recognition by the United States and the United Nations would greatly enhance the international prestige of the People's Republic of China. It would mean serious modifications in the cold war and acceptance of the implications of a prolonged period of competitive co-existence. Recognition, therefore, is not something to be lightly undertaken without a clear alternative program and dynamic concepts and means of winning the "battle" of competitive co-existence. Continuation of our present policy will, however, lose that battle to the Communist bloc by default.

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*Edgar Snow, an American Foreign Correspondent in Asia and Europe for more than twenty years, published the first interviews ever given by Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, and other Chinese Communist leaders, in 1936–37. He covered the Sino-Japanese War (1931–33 and 1937–41); returned to the United States in 1941 and was assigned overseas to Africa, India, Iran, China, Soviet Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Austria. Mr. Snow was an Associate Editor of the Saturday Evening Post from 1943 to 1953. Among other books, he is the author of The Battle for Asia (1941) and Pattern of Soviet Power (1945). He was a Research Consultant of Harvard University (1956–57), which published his Random Notes on Red China (1957).*

IN THE days of Chinese provincial warlords it used to be said that "China is only a geographical expression." To fit the current paradox the cliché would have to read: "China is only a political expression." Various powers define China to suit their convenience. In United States official semantics the refugee Nationalist regime on Taiwan Island is synonymous with China despite the fact that it exercises no power over more than 98 per cent of the Chinese population.

In order to simplify and avoid confusion the word China is here taken to mean the subcontinent or mainland territory historically known by that name. It is used interchangeably with "political expressions" such as the People's Government of China, the Chinese Communist regime, the Chinese People's Republic and the Peking regime. The word Taiwan is used interchangeably with "political expressions" such as Nationalist China, the National government, and the Nationalist regime.

What is the origin of United States policy of nonrecognition of the People's Republic? What are the official reasons for continuance of that policy? Has it worked in the "enlightened self-interest" of the American people, as the late John Foster Dulles contended,[1] and if so, how? Some critics believe that it costs more than it is worth both in treasure expended to support it and in the jeopardy imposed by it on more important considerations than it serves. What are the alternatives to that policy? What might be the terms of settlement making diplomatic recognition possible? What would be the effects on American interests? What would we and the world stand to lose or gain by meeting some of China's needs in order to break the present stalemate—or dead end, as some see it—in our policy?

In the eyes of most of Asia, and in the candid appraisal of many Americans, current United States policy is one of intervention in the internal affairs of China. On and around Taiwan our armed forces defend an alliance with the deposed Kuomintang, or Nationalist, leader, Chiang Kai-shek, and his followers in exile from mainland China. We hold the regime in Taiwan—which retains the name National Government of China—to be the only legitimate all-China authority. Officially, we insist that this view corresponds to the interests of some 670 million Chinese. The will of the people in this respect, however, has never been tested by plebiscite even among the 8 million Taiwanese—over whom Chinese Nationalist power was established, after World War II, by the use of force, including the suppression of an incipient autonomous movement which cost the lives of between 5,000 and 20,000 natives.[2]

"The United States holds the view that it [the People's Republic of China] will one day pass," said Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in defense of American policy. "By withholding diplomatic recognition from Peiping it seeks to hasten that passing."[3] That nonrecognition and the Taiwan alliance are regarded as offensive weapons against China was further indicated when Mr. Dulles declared: "We owe it to ourselves, our allies, and the Chinese people, to do all that we can to contribute to that passing."[4]

The United States has intervened in China before, but only in concert with other powers. Today we have alliances, with forty-four states other than Taiwan, any one of which might involve us in war; but none is obliged to support our alliance with Chiang. Our intervention is unilateral and in effect makes Taiwan an American protectorate.

[1] *Our Policies Toward Communism in China.* U. S. Department of State, Bulletin, 37-91-95 (July 15, 1957), p. 93.

[2] Jack Belden, *China Shakes the World*, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), p. 395.

[3] *Op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), p. 30.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 94.



## ORIGIN OF US POLICY

American intervention in China began more or less accidentally during World War II. From Pearl Harbor onward China was heavily dependent on American military and economic aid given exclusively to the central government at Chungking, a one-party structure under the Kuomintang, or Nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek. The only other armed political party in China was organized by the Communists. They had no political legality inside Nationalist held areas, but they had retained their own stronghold in Northwest China as a condition of the truce which, in 1937, ended the first decade-long Nationalist-Communist civil war in a united front against Japan. During the eight years of anti-Japanese war the Communists greatly enlarged their influence and numbers by means of guerrilla warfare behind the Japanese lines. By 1945 native forces led by the Communists had proved so effective at utilizing war conditions to expand, that they were able to offer a major challenge to Chiang Kai-shek when he attempted to take over control of Manchuria and Eastern China after Japan's surrender.

Repeated efforts were made to avoid open civil war by changing the Nationalist government into a coalition giving representation to the Communists. In 1945 President Truman sent General George C. Marshall to China to try to mediate in the formation of such a coalition. His mission was a failure. In the subsequent great civil war Chiang Kai-shek's armies of some 2½ million men virtually dissolved. Besides having a modern air force and the transport assistance of the United States air and naval forces, Chiang possessed, as the core of his strength, some 39 divisions of supposedly crack troops well armed, supplied, and trained by Americans. Those divisions were almost totally disarmed in the North, and the Communists used the captured American equipment, plus some Japanese arms seized in Manchuria (when Soviet troops looked the other way), to complete their conquest.

In 1949, when the Communist dominated government was set up in Peking, it invited diplomatic relations with powers ready to treat China "on a basis of equality." Another condition was, of course, that the powers sever connections with the Nationalists who had fled to Taiwan with the help of American ships and the Chinese navy, which remained loyal to the old regime. American military advice and aid to Chiang Kai-shek had run into the billions; undoubtedly that was held against the United States by the Communists; their victory cost them more than two million dead. However, the new regime did not exclude the United States from its offer of diplomatic relations. Sixteen powers, including Great Britain, promptly recognized the *de facto* situation. The United States did not. In protest against mistreatment of Americans who remained in China, the United States soon withdrew all its officials and closed its embassy and consulates.

Then for a time the American policy was one of "letting the dust settle." By late spring of 1950, there were indications that the United States would not oppose the seating of China in the United Nations and might not long insist on the legitimacy of the rump regime in Taiwan or deny China's claims to sovereignty there.[5] The outbreak of hostilities in Korea on June 25, 1950, changed everything and has profoundly

[5] *United States Relations With China*, State Department, 1949.

affected America's whole policy in Asia ever since.

### EFFECT OF KOREAN CRISIS ON US POLICY

The Sino-American conflict of wills over the fate of Korea understandably provoked highly emotional and hysterical reactions on both sides. In China it hardened the dogmatic conviction that the United States had replaced all the imperialist and colonial powers defeated or compelled to withdraw after World War II and had become China's implacable enemy No. 1. In America this hysteria was exploited to the point of irrationality by the late Senator Joseph McCarthy, who alleged that our humiliation in Asia was due to traitors in the State Department who had "sold China to the Russians." Many aspects of fantasy in our China policy trace to this period and still dominate much of our policy.

President Truman, simultaneously with his commitment of American troops in support of South Korea, unilaterally interposed the navy in the Taiwan Strait to "neutralize" that area and protect Taiwan from possible attack. During the Korean conflict and particularly after China intervened to save North Korea from complete defeat by the United Nations forces, we renewed large-scale aid to Chiang Kai-shek and began to retrain and rearm his troops. We now upheld the view that Taiwan had the only legitimate China government. In 1953 President Eisenhower accepted a truce with the Chinese forces to end hostilities in Korea—on terms which President Truman had rejected—but soon afterward he compensated for that compromise by entering into a formal alliance with the Nationalists on Taiwan. He then "unleashed" the Generalissimo, leaving him free to recover the mainland when opportune.

During the past five years, however, it has become abundantly clear that the Generalissimo's dream cannot be fulfilled in the near future, if ever. He himself has lately indicated that his plan would be feasible only if fully backed by a large-scale American war against China. Since Premier Khrushchev has officially declared that an attack on the People's Republic would be considered an attack on the USSR,[6] and since a Soviet-American war would mean nuclear catastrophe and world destruction, the Generalissimo's aspiration cannot be considered a practical possibility today.

United States policy of "wait and see" has thus metamorphosed into one of "wait for a miracle." And yet as seen from the mainland it is still a policy of provocation aimed at doing "all we can to contribute" to the overthrow of the Peking government. The United States forbids the People's Republic access to Taiwan, the return of which was pledged to China—not to Chiang Kai-shek personally— by the Big Three during World War II.[7] Since 1950 it has imposed a total trade embargo against the mainland which has been a severe economic handicap. Our Taiwan allies, using American weapons, have variously blockaded, harassed, and attacked China's shipping and aircraft; they boast of having landed spies, saboteurs, and armed bands on the China coast. At least partly because of such activities the United States has twice been brought to the brink of war.

In August 1958, when China began shelling Quemoy, President Eisenhower had the embarrassing task of trying to convince the nation and the world that we would be morally justified in going to war in order to keep Generalissimo Chiang's troops in possession of that

[6] *New York Times*, September 9, 1958.

[7] The promise was first made in the Cairo declaration in 1943, the terms of which were confirmed by the Potsdam agreement in 1945.



small remote island, which is unquestionably a territorial part of China. That crisis passed, but it can be revived again whenever it suits China's convenience.

### RESULTS OF US POLICY

Aside from the foregoing, what has our policy accomplished? It has temporarily kept China out of the United Nations. It has also influenced some allied nations to withhold recognition. It has thus deprived China of the full prestige of a great power and given her some moral justification for carrying on a political offensive against the United States on a wide front in Asia and Africa.

The costs to the United States of these results cannot be assessed in the fullest sense for some time, but the mere financial burden is known to be formidable. Defense and other support given to the Nationalists since 1950 begins to approach 3 billion dollars and now runs in the neighborhood of 600 millions annually.[8] That figure does not cover the cost of maintaining the Ninth Fleet or of keeping American air force and ground force personnel in Taiwan to man missile bases and train Chiang's aging troops. Consider just one such item. During the last Quemoy crisis, Admiral Burke had to go before a Congressional appropriations committee to ask for a special supplementary allowance to pay for convoying Nationalist ships. The amount required for that operation alone was 1 billion dollars.[9]

Our policy in the rest of Asia now rests upon the underlying assumptions of the Taiwan alliance. The some 2 billion dollars a year we spend in defense support just for South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam amounts to by far the greater part of all American aid to Asia. Nonrecognition also necessitates heavy expenditures and masked subsidies in Japan justified in part as compensation for the China trade Japan loses by supporting American policy.

The embargo gave China no choice but heavy dependence on Russia for industrial equipment which has geared her to Soviet machine patterns for the future. It has totally cut off American trade exchange with an economy now probably expanding at a faster rate than any in the world. The costliest long-range item chargeable to our attempt to hasten the collapse of the People's Republic may prove to be the complete loss of communications with one fourth of mankind in a period when it has been undergoing the most dramatic and agonizing revolutionary planned change in history.

### REASONS FOR US POLICY

Continued adherence to the alliance policy clearly must be justified by political considerations beyond values measurable in terms of military necessity, economics, or human communications. What are they? The State Department's answer appeared in a release issued in August 1958, which asserted that our policy is based primarily on two aims: [10]

1. Opposition to the Communist bloc's plan to destroy the way of life of the non-Communist countries and dominate the world.

2. Opposition to the Chinese Communists' ambitions to carry the Communist revolution to the rest of Asia and later to the entire world.

The first point is contradicted by the fact that we recognize most other coun-

[8] James P. Warburg, *United States Postwar Policy in Asia* (New York: Current Affairs Press, 1958), p. 15.

[9] Demaree Bess, "The Russians Go for Broke," *Saturday Evening Post* (March 21, 1959).

[10] "U.S. Policy Statement on Non-Recognition of the Communist Regime in China," *New York Times*, August 10, 1958, p. 30.

tries under Communist domination and currently extend such relations—as instanced by the restoration of ties with Bulgaria as recently as April 1959. Is there, then, some special reason why relations with China must be an exception? The late Mr. Dulles replied:

> Internationally, the Chinese Communist regime does not conform to the practices of civilized nations; does not live up to its international obligations; has not been peaceful in the past and gives no evidence of being peaceful in the future. Its foreign policies are hostile to us and our Asian allies. Under these circumstances it would be folly for us to establish relations . . ." [11]

Mr. Dulles on various occasions offered other explanations. Last August these were summarized in a policy statement sent last year to all American diplomats abroad, which argued that recognition of China would:

(1) Deprive mainland Chinese of hope of liberation; (2) dishonor us and betray our allies on Taiwan; (3) probably mean seating China in the United Nations against both United States and United Nations interests; (4) imply a resumption of trade, which China would use "to develop as rapidly as possible a formidable military establishment and a heavy industry to support it"; (5) reopen wide cultural interchanges which would endanger China's "close neighbors" by pressure of "additional intense subversive activities." [12]

The first, third, fourth, and fifth points listed could, if generally applied, lead to withdrawal of recognition from all countries ruled by Communists and probably to the break-up of the United Nations. The State Department brief also ignored the facts that India, Burma, and Pakistan, countries which border China's territory and together hold the bulk of Asia's non-Communist population, already recognize Peking; that those powers, as well as five other Asian states which recognize China, have long been exposed to, without succumbing to, the evils of cultural exchange; and that our own embargo in no demonstrable way has prevented China's development as a military power nor the recent increase in her foreign trade.

Elsewhere Mr. Dulles asserted that the People's government "does not represent the true will or aspiration of the Chinese people." [13] To him it was therefore irrelevant that that regime holds *de facto* power over all continental China and is a stable government in the view of 33 states which have recognized it and more than 40 states with which it has made treaties and agreements.[14] Mr. Dulles also held that American recognition could in no significant way modify, change, or influence China's dependence on Russia, and that the "two-Chinas" solution—interim dual recognition of the Peking and Taiwan governments—is unworkable because it would be "bitterly resented by the Chinese people as an attempt to split their country" and neither regime would accept it.[15]

Of these contentions the first and second were, again, merely one man's arbitrary opinion concerning internal conditions in a country on which he scarcely qualifies as an expert. The last point may be misleading, also, because Mr. Dulles did not define which of many variants discussed under the "two-Chinas" heading he had in mind, and because none has actually been tested in serious bilateral conversations.

None of the State Department's explanations has realistically examined the extent of our failure to bring about the

[11] *Op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), p. 94.

[12] U. S. Policy Statement, *Op. cit.* (note 10 *supra*).

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] *Contemporary China and the Chinese,* by Dai Shen-yu, THE ANNALS (January 1959), p. 116.

[15] U. S. Policy Statement, *Op. cit.* (note 10 *supra*).



downfall of the Peking government in relation to the costs of the attempt, as already mentioned. None has assessed the reasons for its failure to prevent the phenomenal internal growth of China or the rapid extension of China's economic, cultural, and political influence throughout Asia and the Middle East. None has taken cognizance of the basic disharmony of our Taiwan policy with Asian sentiment as a whole. None seems to perceive that any kind of Western intervention is bound to be looked upon by Asians as a recrudescence of colonial dominance diametrically opposed to principles on which all Asians are today in fundamental agreement: Asia for Asians, national self-determination, freedom of internal exchange, and development without Western interference. Official explanations have glossed over the awkward handicaps which our rigid Taiwan policy entails in relations with both Western and Eastern friendly nations which disagree with it, and of the consequences of a possible war in which nearly all Asia's sympathies would lie with China.

Operating outside the fact that China is now (in terms of gross national product) the fourth power in the world certainly does not facilitate the making or enforcement of any agreements to ease international tension, toward controls over nuclear tests, toward general arms limitations, and the bare faint beginnings of some kind of sane mutual accommodation whereby competitive coexistence might continue without the current world waste of about 100 billion dollars a year.

## ALTERNATIVES

It is one thing to demonstrate the unsatisfactory results of nonrecognition. To define functional alternatives is not so easy. The United States is by now far too deeply entangled for us merely to say to Peking, "We recognize you." The logic of such a step certainly does imply at least some of the consequences pointed out by Mr. Dulles.

Recognition would indeed mean withdrawal of United States opposition to seating China in the United Nations. Recognition would also mean resumption of trade and cultural relations. It would mean abandonment of the position that the People's Republic does not represent China. No doubt that would mean that Thailand, Malaya, Japan, the Philippines—as well as some South American countries—would eventually recognize Peking also. Viable formulae would have to be worked out to secure the withdrawal of both Chinese and American troops from Korea and Indochina, to guarantee existing frontiers of those divided countries, and in so far as feasible to neutralize them in a disengagement operation. If one assumes representation for China in the United Nations, that kind of agreement need not be regarded as impossible.

The legal status of Taiwan might finally have to be set inside the United Nations, but America need not unilaterally attempt to plan its future. If China's suzerainty over Taiwan were recognized in principle, in exchange for a pledge by China not to use force to annex it for a given period while the issue were placed before the United Nations, many things could happen. Almost certainly Chiang Kai-shek would resign, along with most of his staff, soon after serious recognition talks began between China and the United States. A coalition representative of the Taiwan natives and the Nationalist immigrants would probably succeed him and seek direct negotiations with Peking. Quite possibly they would reach an intramural agreement and bypass the United Nations.

Such changes would, of course, repre-

sent important gains in international prestige and influence for the Peking regime. Would they necessarily be against the "enlightened self-interest" of the American people?

Would it be in the American interest or against it to be able to test the stability of the People's Republic through observers on the spot? To our advantage or disadvantage to meet China directly when disputes arose between us? Would it be "good" or "bad" to be able to hold China's representatives to account before a world council in cases endangering world peace or for China to remain, as now, legally unbound by decisions of the United Nations organization which excludes it? Is China so wise, so powerful, or so dreadful that we must fear exposure to her ideas and her culture, to her propaganda, her trade, the look of her people face to face, more than they fear us or we fear the USSR? Is it more to China's advantage than it is to the United States' advantage to seek some disengagement on frontiers where America's armed forces stand, five thousand miles from home, daily exposed to risks hard to define as vital to the strategic security of American shores? Would it be better—a foremost consideration in the eyes of most of the world—to take mutual steps to reduce the risks of "accidental war" rather than to increase them?

Certainly it would be foolishly illusory today to expect Moscow ever to repeat, in China, the mistake whereby Stalin forced Yugoslavia down an independent road to socialism. But is there factual proof that China might not eventually respond, in a salutary way, to American initiative to help ease the heavy burdens imposed by China's vast constructive effort to lift herself by her own bootstraps out of the centuries of mud and onto a higher level of modern civilization? Edgar Faure, the former Premier of France, had this answer to make after he recently spent months visiting China.

> It is necessary [he wrote] to free and to develop relations of every kind, economic and cultural, with China. I regret that on this point I am in contradiction with a statesman for whom I have the greatest respect. [Mr. Dulles]. Our attitude of resistance and refusal produces a result quite the contrary to what we wish to obtain.
>
> China must be aided in the immense effort which her people are making to get out of the rut of backwardness that has existed for several centuries. She must be helped to accomplish her modernization, for only that modernization can bring her closer to us, economically and politically.[16]

## COMMUNIST CHINA'S "MORAL DEBT"

One often hears it said that the "real" explanation of American policy is "sentimental": it lies in deep feelings of injury to our national *amour propre*. The United States cannot forgive China for its unexpectedly fierce and effective armed resistance during the Korean conflict and the humiliations inflicted on our own American forces. China was condemned by the United Nations as an "aggressor" for her role in North Korea, and it is chiefly the United States which has contended that it must "purge" itself (in some manner not defined) before being admitted to the United Nations—despite the exclusion of the People's Republic from the United Nations both before and after that war.

All non-Communist governments abhor Communist dictatorship's suppression of individual freedom of choice and the methods whereby it has imposed its economic, political, and social ideas on the Chinese people. They equally resent the arrogant manner in which foreign priests and missionaries have been abused, foreign business men expropriated, and captured American and other foreign civilians and soldiers mistreated. Approval of the moral behavior of another government is not implied by, or necessary for, either recognition or membership in the United Nations, however. Mr. Dulles once conceded as much, specifically in the case of Communist China,[17] while he nowhere went so far as to claim that nonrecognition had or could bring about repentance or reform in any government.

[16] Edgar Faure, *The Serpent and the Tortoise: Problems of the New China* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958), p. 204.



If, officially, this Administration has rejected recognition, it may be asked whether the Peking regime is today equally uninterested. One answer may lie in the following statement by Premier Chou En-lai:

> In the Sino-American ambassadorial talks which started in August, 1955, the Chinese side has time and again proposed that the two parties should, in accordance with the principles of mutual respect and sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, issue a statement declaring their intention to settle the dispute between China and the United States in the Taiwan area through peaceful negotiations and without resorting to the threat or use of force against each other.[18]

Mr. Dulles having opposed that demand with the old counterdemand that the government of the Chinese People's Republic renounce its right to the use of force to overthrow the Nationalists anywhere, it now appears that the Chinese People's Republic prefers a continuation of the armed stalemate rather than to make any concession which might becloud its clear title to all Chinese territory. Chou En-lai probably considers the American role as intervener in Taiwan and Quemoy as of greater value for purposes of internal propaganda and the enlistment of sympathy among Asian, African, and even European countries than any advantage which might be bought by compromise. Peking believes that sooner or later Taiwan will be united with China; terms of a settlement conceivable five years ago would not now attract it. The truth is that the People's Republic has been getting stronger, not weaker, and gaining wider influence among her neighbors. With Soviet nuclear power behind it, Peking now has good reason to feel that time is on its side.

Today it is obvious that China is much less interested in United States recognition than in early admission to the United Nations, and in that forum seizing the initiative to demand a showdown with the United States over Taiwan and other issues. The possibility that the United States may be outflanked and outvoted on the question of China representation even as early as the next meeting of the General Assembly is now a very real one. Meanwhile, the Peking regime enjoys advantages of maneuver, such as freedom to support colonial independence and revolutionary movements—as in Algeria and Iran—in an open way which legal accountability to the United Nations might embarrass or restrict.

## INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF THE PRC

China's international position has steadily improved in recent years as it has acquired skill and flexibility in the conduct of foreign affairs. Since 1949, Peking's foreign policy has gone through three distinct phases. At first inexperienced and flushed with victory, Peking overestimated the readiness of other

[17] John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1950), p. 190.

[18] As broadcast in English by Peking radio, September 6, 1958, from *Current History*, (December 1958), p. 364. Repeated use of the ambiguous phrase "Taiwan area" and emphasis on Quemoy and Matsu in the Statement opened the possibility that negotiations could have been held to apply to the offshore islands alone, at this time.

Asian states for social revolution led by Communists and underestimated the opposition. From 1950 to 1953, China learned the hard facts of Asian and United Nations resistance to Communist expansion by force and in 1954 changed its approach. In the words of H. Arthur Steiner it adopted "a more sophisticated and less parochial policy."[19] It recognized differences in national conditions and sought "Union with All" (against foreign imperialism) on the basis of the "Five Principles" enunciated in the Sino-Indian agreement, namely: mutual respect for each nation's territorial integrity and sovereignty; nonaggression; noninterference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence between different political systems. When these principles were endorsed at the Bandung Conference in 1955 as a common basis for all Asian and African countries united against renewed or continued Western dominance, it was a triumph for China's new diplomacy.

Since then China and the rest of the Communist bloc have repeatedly affirmed, both in theory and in policy practice, that in their long-range objective of world victory for communism they will increasingly depend upon vigorous economic, trade, propaganda, and political offensives rather than war. It is this offensive rather than danger of military attack, which constitutes what Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has called the greatest threat the United States has faced in history. On April 8, 1959, Allen Dulles reiterated that view when he said that Mr. Khrushchev is "convinced that final victory of communism can be achieved mainly by non-military means."[20] China's foreign policy is closely co-ordinated with Russia's; we need not doubt that on this point Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai agree with Mr. Khrushchev.

During his visit to Moscow in 1957 Mao Tse-tung made the following significant statement:

> The whole world now has a population of 2.7 billion, of which the various socialist countries have nearly one billion; the independent, former colonial countries, more than 700 million; the countries now struggling for independence or for complete independence, 600 million; and the imperialist camp only about 400 million. . . . At present . . . it is not the West wind that is prevailing over the East wind but the East wind over the West wind.[21]

People in countries held by Communists number more than one billion. The Communists aim to outflank and encircle the United States not by force of arms but by a combined economic-political offensive, while holding onto a military equilibrium. Their target is the 700 million people in the newly independent states and the 600 million in areas "now struggling for independence or complete independence," including those now dominated by "Yankee imperialism" in Latin America, as Dr. Dai Shen-yu pointed out.[22] It is a sector of the world where the average per capita income is less than one hundred dollars per annum, but where people are fully waking to the possibilities of a better life and reaching for the quickest means to attain it.

### THE WEST'S REAL CHALLENGE

It is not overt Chinese Communist military aggression but the poverty, ignorance, backwardness, and inequality of that vast underdeveloped world which constitutes the major challenge to the United States and its allies. By convincing that world that communism offers the quickest means of liberation and growth, the Soviet bloc seeks to win to its side the balance of world power. The basic weakness of United States policy toward China may lie in its exaggerated emphasis on armed resistance as an answer to human needs, upon immense concentrations of the wrong weapons in the wrong places in preparation for a war perhaps already lost, while the preliminary skirmishes are already being won elsewhere in Asia and Africa in that other war where the last decision will be made.

U Thant, Burma's permanent representative to the United Nations, recently made this simple but true observation:

> There is one major flaw [he said] in all Western aid to underdeveloped countries that makes it appear that the West is giving help for its own cold war purposes and not because the West shares Asian and African purposes of giving them a more abundant life. . . . If the West is to get any lasting benefit out of its aid programs in the form of good relations with the recipients it must re-think and re-state its motives.[23]

In the long run, the greatest benefit likely to accrue from recognizing the giant fact of China might be to compel the United States to do just that: to re-think and re-state its motives and aims in foreign policy. For we should not be deceived about one thing. Recognizing the People's Republic of China would inevitably mean admission of the failure of a policy of nonrecognition to bring about its downfall. It would also mean acceptance of the status quo imposed by revolutionary change on a wide scale following World War II. It would mean serious modification of the terms of the cold war by and candid acceptance of that challenge thrown down to us for a war by other means—the means of competitive co-existence. It would mean, as surely as would any disengagement move in Europe, abandonment of the belief that we can roll back history by dictating settlements from positions of superior armed strength.

Recognition, therefore, is not something lightly to be undertaken without a clearly thought out alternative world policy, as well as a China policy, and means of making them effective. This will not be found merely by reacting to the new Communist offensive on its own terms. Only something better than the pattern of the challenge can provide an adequate answer. Indications are that the "something better" will have to be a policy heavily depended for its success on far vaster economic aid programs involving large-scale international planning, financing, and fulfillment of a partnership between the advanced nations and the underdeveloped areas of the world—from Southeast Asia, through India, the Middle East and Africa, and South America.

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## COMMENTS

SHAO-CHANG HSU

Mr. Chairman, with the limited time given me, of course, I know better than to tangle with Mr. Snow. The important thing, I believe, for all of us here, in this country, and everywhere in the Free World is to remember that freedom, the concept of freedom, is still something that counts. I was very glad

[19] H. Arthur Steiner, "Mainsprings of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 44 (January 1950), p. 71.

[20] *New York Times*, April 9, 1959, p. 80.

[21] New China News Agency, November 18, 1957; q. by Dai Shen-yu, *Op. cit.* (note 14 *supra*), p. 120.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

[23] *New York Times*, April 7, 1959.

this noon to have listened to Governor Meyner when he framed the question in such a way that it became an issue between freedom and servitude. I have been sitting down here quietly listening to many speakers including Mr. Snow. I have gained a rather strange feeling, that somehow, with few exceptions, our speakers do not place any emphasis on the importance of freedom—that is, the important part freedom has been playing and is playing now, today, everywhere in the world. When I listened to some of the speeches it gave me the strange feeling that we are trying to play chess. It is almost as if when Russia and the United States sit down across a conference table, all the rest of the helpless allies of the United States could be moved or sacrificed in order to accommodate the Communist world. One of the speakers used the term, "accommodation." Of course, I am prejudiced, but I do not believe I am more prejudiced than Mr. Snow.

The important thing, if you have listened carefully to what Mr. Snow said, is this: in all his review of the past decade of American foreign policy in regard to China, he has found that at every turn, and at every step, the United States was at fault. I do not know whether Mr. Snow purposely refrained from saying anything about any possible mistakes the Chinese Communists might have made. As I have already said, I am not going to debate with Mr. Snow because I have only been given five minutes. But at least let me say this: with the people in Tibet fighting, against heavy odds, for their freedom; with the people in the Kwangtung Province, trying to liberate themselves from Communist oppression; with the people in Korea and Vietnam fighting for freedom; with all these people fighting for freedom, supposedly as allies of the United States, supposedly as members of the Free World; I think before the United States government changed its policy it should take into consideration the consequences of such a change.

I remember this morning when the Ambassador of Indonesia mentioned the influence which American ideals have had on the revolution for independence in Indonesia, I was touched because as a Chinese I, too, feel that the ideals which the American people hold dear are ideals which many Asian countries also hold dear. Please, may I beg our American friends, do not underestimate the influence of American ideals, American moral principles in the present international relations.

A: In answer to Dr. Hsu Shao-chang: I do not think that if he reads my account in THE ANNALS, he will discover that I found America making nothing but mistakes for the past decade, and making all the mistakes. I tried to trace how we got into a position which I consider fundamentally a mistake today. And I said that this could be traced largely to American intervention in China which came about accidentally as a result of our being allies; that on rethinking the position following the civil war, it was likely that the United States would have recognized China, and the controversy over the ownership of Taiwan would not have arisen. Our hysterical, emotional reaction to Korea, I said, was mutual. In many ways China has made more profound mistakes than America. I take that for granted. I am afraid that I expect America to behave with more sense of responsibility and stability, being a nation with a government that has been here for 160 years, if my arithmetic is correct, in a situation like this than a nation like China which has gone through agonizing experiences for the past fifty years and has passed through a revolutionary movement accompanied by all the cares and lack of balance in stability that follow in so far as foreign and internal policies are concerned. I spoke too long as it was. If I begin to tell you what I think China's mistakes were, that would take another hour; there were plenty of them, and they continue.

As for the question of freedom, that is always a popular word from where I come. I know the meaning of freedom and have known it since childhood, and I know how much of it there was in China before the revolution and how much there is in Taiwan today. We have made many mistakes in this country because of emotions evoked by the use of these trigger words, and I think that we will have to discuss them more in terms of fact. If we get down to facts, and see how Chiang Kai-shek happened to be in Taiwan, we would find it a little more complicated than the use of the word freedom.



## QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: Although I am a citizen of the United Kingdom, a country which has recognized Red China, I still should like to ask Mr. Snow how his policy of recognition would change in any way the Chinese Communist policy of expansion and aggression, not only in Tibet, but also indirectly through influence in all Southeast Asia? Does he think that mere recognition would change Communist China's attitude, or would it change the Chinese and make them leave their theory of state revolution and ultimate world revolution?

Secondly, with the punishment of war criminals at Nuremberg as an example, should not crimes against humanity be considered before one recognizes a regime or a country? I feel that if Hitler's Germany would not have been recognized by the Western powers, maybe, there might never have been a Munich.

A: Now to answer your question as to whether or not I think the admission of China to the United Nations is going to reform China or change its strategy, aims, and purposes. I thought I made that clear too. I do not. I think that the Communist strategy is to continue carrying on toward their aim of communist world domination. The fact that Russia and the other Communist countries are in the United Nations has not changed that aim. It is not going to change it if China gets in there. China's admission to the United Nations has several advantages. One, as I say, China can be held accountable as Russia has been, on occasions successfully, and as other Communist countries have been on occasions. Two, although on this point as on number of others, he can be found on either side of the fence, Mr. Dulles, himself, in his book on foreign policy said that admission to the United Nations was not—and I have to paraphrase—was not a sign of a moral approval. Recently he has said that the United Nations is not a reformatory; but that was an afterthought. But in any case, he is right in both things. The second statement does not eliminate the argument that China held accountable before a world body is more tractable certainly than a China outside of the United Nations.

As for the question of the crimes committed by the Communists both in carrying through the revolution and in participating in the Korean conflict, the assumption is that unless they repent and are made to admit their guilt, or their government can be overthrown, they are not absolved from these crimes. I presume this because we have established amicable relations with Japan much faster than we have in the case

of China, and we have done so with our other enemies—with Germany, for instance. The fact that China was outside the United Nations at the time of the Korean crisis would seem actually to have made her not legally responsible to the United Nation's opinion in this respect. I do not think the Korean conflict was exactly the same as an international war against China would have been. Suppose we had become involved beyond the Yohe River in a real war with China, then I would say it would have had to be war to the finish or we would not have been able to sit down at the same table together. I do not think we can insist upon punishing war criminals in China, so-called, any more than other nations can; other nations are not demanding that.

Secondly, I do not think we can insist upon doing it in China any more than in other nations where crimes of that kind also occur. We disagree with the regime of General Franco where tens of thousands of people were shot, whose ideas were no more dangerous than Governor Stassen's, and yet we are not going to insist on hauling Franco and his followers up for trial. It does not seem to me that the legal or the moral foundation exists. I would still insist that the questions I ask have to be considered very seriously in terms of the gains for China as counterbalanced by the gains for ourselves. Basically I agree with Governor Stassen that the most important thing in the world today is do something to create an atmosphere where mutual destruction is less likely.

Q: My question is to Mr. Snow. A few years ago, I think it is a little over three years ago, Assistant Secretary of State Robertson, in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said that America's policy toward China is to hold a threat against China until it disintegrates. Those are his words. Evidently that still is the policy of the United States. I would like to learn from Mr. Snow what effect that type of policy would have on the uncommitted nations of Asia today.

A: If I understand correctly, you mean if we succeeded in destroying the government in China, what would the effect be?

As I said our policy seems to me to be a form of intervention in the internal affairs of China. It is something that, a policy that, we have not followed in other cases where changes have been brought about by force. It seems to be mainly directed against that regime. But certainly the response of the Bandung Conference seems to be the answer to that. No, they do not want any more interference in Asian affairs; they themselves want to decide disputes that are essentially between Asians. I would like to say one more thing: It is perfectly obvious, that Japan, an Asian power herself, went into China in 1937 with the slogan of eradicating communism in East Asia. As a result of that policy the biggest country in Asia ended in the hands of the Communists. I do not think that expansion of communism would be the result today if the United States went in with Chiang-kai-shek to attempt to overthrow the Communists. I do not think we are going to do it because the result this time would probably be the obliteration of the United States and Asia.

# Abatement of the Arms Race

By HAROLD E. STASSEN

ABSTRACT: In order to meet the challenge of the coming decade, America must evolve a new foreign policy. The basis for this must be not "enlightened self-interest," but an extension of the religious principles on which this country was founded to apply to the citizens of every country in the world. By making the well-being of other nations and peoples our primary goal, we will benefit ourselves as well in a way which is not possible when a narrower view of world affairs is taken. This policy would mean a settlement of the German problem which is negotiated with the chief aim of benefiting all people concerned; it would mean a revision of our attitudes towards the Near East so that the good of the citizens of those countries becomes more important than the power benefits to be gained from control of their oil; it would mean the formation of strong co-operative bonds with our neighbors in South America; it would mean the establishment of an agreement to cease nuclear testing. No nation in the past has ever attempted such a policy, but it is the experience of history that those who have tried to maintain power and wealth through force have failed miserably. Our own experience shows that the more altruistic have been our motives, the more successful have been our actions. Surely this will be even more true when our entire foreign policy is based, as it should be, firmly upon the Christian-Judean ethic.—Ed.

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*Harold E. Stassen, LL.D., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, was formerly Special Assistant to President Eisenhower, with cabinet rank, to direct studies of United States and world disarmament, including control of nuclear weapons. He served as Governor of Minnesota from 1939 to 1943, when he resigned to serve with the United States Navy. He was cited for outstanding performance of duty in the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea. He was Mutual Security Administrator during 1953, and Director of the Foreign Operations Administration from 1953 to 1955. He was the United States deputy representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and a delegate to the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations. From 1948 to 1953 he served as President of the University of Pennsylvania.*

A MEETING of President Eisenhower, Chairman Khrushchev, and other heads of government of major states during 1959 now appears quite certain. I have long urged that such a session should be held; I believe it holds the best prospects for opening the way to an agreement for the limitation and inspection of armaments and for improving the prospects for a durable peace.

Obviously such a session will not easily or automatically result in solutions or agreements. But I believe it can and should open the way for mutually advantageous steps which would decrease the danger of the catastrophic loss which would result from a modern world war. In preparation for the United States participation in such negotiations, I believe we should begin at home to think through and talk through a new American foreign policy.

## FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 60'S

It is evident to all that the 1960's will be a decade of tremendous change. It will be the first full ten years of the space-atomic age. It will be quite certainly the span of time in which men here and men elsewhere will personally reach out into space. It will be a period of testing and of challenge to our way of life. What should our American foreign policy be for this decade of the 60's? It is my view that the basic great decision which our country should make in 1959 is that America needs a new and more advanced foreign policy for the 1960's. It should be based upon the fundamental values on which our nation was founded, and it should be new. It should be established with an alert awareness of the evils and the ruthlessness of communism.

Let me be specific. But before doing so, let me emphasize that the search for the answers to such a new American foreign policy for the 1960's should proceed through a method which is in itself very important. There should be a vigorous and open discussion, but it should be on the premise that the members of both of our great political parties in this country are patriots, both want peace with freedom and justice, both detest war, and neither political party has a monopoly on virtue. Neither one is a socialist party. Neither one harbors enemies of our free America. The debates should be constructive and should not be carried on with the smear and dodge techniques of the demagogue. From a forthright consideration there should arise gradually a new American foreign policy supported overwhelmingly by the people of both our political parties—by the citizens of America as a whole. It is for the purpose of contributing toward opening up and stimulating this process that I advance certain premises and advocate in a somewhat provocative manner certain parts of such a program.

## APPLICATION OF THE CHRISTIAN-JUDEAN ETHIC

It is my view that the time has come when we must relate the basic concept and philosophy of our religious beliefs in America to our foreign policy toward all nations. Our approach toward all peoples must be the approach of the founding fathers of our country, that all men are "endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights." The concept of human dignity and the spiritual worth of the individual needs to be applied in our approach toward other nations, even as it has been applied historically to internal American questions. The Christian and Judean answer to the question "Am I my brother's keeper?" must be relevant not only within our own nation, but also in relationship to other peoples. Such an application would mean that we would state the prime objective for American foreign policy in terms such as these: to facilitate progress in the fullness of life of all peoples in all nations, including our own, but not centered solely on our own.



For decades the secretaries of state of the United States have expressed the foremost goal of the foreign policy of the United States as a design to protect and promote the interests of the United States in the international field. If we relate such a statement of national policy to the concept of an individual's relationship to his fellow men, its error of emphasis becomes very apparent. If an individual states as his foremost goal the protection and promotion of his individual interests in his relations with his fellow men, we all recognize the misplaced emphasis and the narrow approach which the individual harbors.

Sometimes this statement of American foreign policy objective is slightly modified to stress the promotion of "enlightened self-interest." This is likewise not adequate as a reflection of the Christian-Judean philosophy of our nation. A fundamental change in emphasis, to a concern for the future well-being of all peoples, including our own, but not narrowly centered on our own, would not mean the neglect of the well-being of the American people. Even as an individual Christian or Judean's concern for his fellow men does not mean that he should be careless or unconcerned about his own health or his own well-being or the security and happiness of his own family.

I have a deep and abiding faith that if our great nation lifts its foreign policy to such a concept, and thinks in terms of "this world under God" as well as "this nation under God," we can come through these opening decades of the space-atomic age successfully without the tragedy of a holocaustic war. We would enter into a decade of world-wide competition between fundamental ways of life, with our way of freedom of mankind under God opposed to the materialistic emphasis and domination of the individual under communism. I am confident that freedom of men under God would win through in such a competition over an historic period.

Such a new American foreign policy would bring about a change in emphasis in each of the sharp issues affecting our international relations today, and would bring about important changes in a concrete way in many of the specific issues. If the fundamental change is agreed, then the thoughtful and prayerful application to the specific issues and programs should proceed. No one individual can or should ever claim to have the final answers to such an application. Even as the answer in individual lives to the requirements of the religious ethic is the subject of continuous study and discussion and deliberation, so would it likewise be a continuous search for answers for a foreign policy. Furthermore, even as there is a final element of individual conscience, there would be an element of national conscience.

## SPECIFIC ISSUES

Perhaps the furtherance of this underlying consideration of our American foreign policy could best be served at this time by raising a few direct applications. The first step in the control of modern armaments should be the controlled and inspected cessation of nuclear testing. The agreement to do this is within reach if both sides will explore the remaining points of disagreement and agree in the middle ground between the positions. Outstanding scientists from both sides have agreed on the inspection system with

inspection posts within the territory of both sides. The thorny issue of the right to make on-the-spot inspections whenever the scientific instruments indicate a probable violation, with the sensitive concern on the one hand about excessive observation and on the other hand about frustration of essential checkups, should be settled by a provision expressly giving the right to either side to terminate the treaty if inspection is prevented or abused. With such a first step of control, a parallel step for the establishment of a United Nations police force with moderate atomic capability should be taken. This could be the key to obtaining the agreement of other states to join with the United States, United Kingdom, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the cessation of nuclear tests.

*Germany*

The most serious unresolved problem with a direct relationship to armament control centers in Germany. In this situation neither side has at any time advanced a proposal which the other side could reasonably be expected to accept. Each side bargains in such an extreme and tough manner that no progress is made toward settlement, and a potential danger of triggering a war remains acute.

The new American foreign policy of which I speak, would take an affirmative initiative toward the settlement of the German problem. It would be a settlement which seeks the mutual interest of the people concerned. I would like to present an outline for such a settlement of the German situation in the hope of contributing in some degree toward opening up real negotiations. The solution must seek the area of mutual interest between the people of Germany, the people of Russia, the people of America, and the people of all other countries concerned. Where does this mutual interest center? I submit the following interlocked and inseparable points:

1. A united Germany to be formed by adding the territory of the Russian zone to the present Federal Republic of Germany.
2. Such a united Germany to be a part of a wide central European zone, including a small portion of France and a small portion of Russia, in which all armaments and armed forces are limited under United Nations inspection and in which nuclear weapons are prohibited on both sides. Russians and Americans in small numbers to be included in such a United Nations inspection service.
3. Such a zone to be considered as a beginning for the establishment of other zones of limitation and control of armaments through future negotiations.
4. The united Germany to agree to its present borders and to release any claims to territory beyond its borders.
5. All of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations, including the united Germany, to enter into a nonaggression and respect-for-borders pact with all of the Warsaw group of nations.
6. The united Germany to agree that for ten years those of its industries which are socialized shall remain socialized, and those which are private shall remain private.
7. The united Germany to pay a portion of the expense of relocating the armed forces and the defensive lines of Russia, United States, France, and Britain, now located in Germany.
8. The united Germany to be received as a member of the United Nations.

These proposals are in the main rather provocative. But I submit that if the entire package is thought through carefully, it will be recognized as being in the mutual interest of all peoples to reach such a settlement. Above all it would improve the prospects of a lasting peace. Failure to agree will increase the danger of a future war in which all peoples, Germans, Russians, Americans, and others, would suffer devastation beyond adequate verbal description.

*The Near East and South America*

A third major problem centers in the Near East. Would not the change of emphasis of the new American foreign policy which I propose require that our policy should place a higher value on the well-being of the peoples in the Near East and be less "oil centered"? Should we not take an initiative toward the establishment of river development areas in the Near East? Should we not take the lead in greater application of oil revenues for the benefit of the people and less in excessive luxury for current rulers of oil territories? The true philosophy of America must be applied to our foreign policy in the Near East. A narrow, selfish foreign policy will prove to be a rear-guard action on a slippery road to ruin.

Should we not take a new approach toward our neighbor states in South America, meeting with them regularly as equals around conference tables in action programs devoted to progress in the economic problems which center in commodity markets, developments, capital, trade, and payments? Should we not help form strong regional economic associations of other peoples for their own progress in trade and production, even though in the process they become less dependent on American economic and financial leadership?

I recognize, of course, that I am raising a very far-reaching question. But I have a firm conviction that a narrow foreign policy centered on selfish national aims will fail. A narrow foreign policy did not pose such an acute question at a time in history when other nations were not near neighbors but were remote regions. The attitude of one man toward another is not so important if they seldom have any contact with each other. But the advances of science and the direct consequences of modern communication, modern mass-production, and modern methods of life all bring into sharp focus the question of the relation of Christian and Judean ethics to American foreign policy.

Does it not further appear that in those instances in history when our nation has moved in its foreign policy in the direction of the religious ethic, such as the Marshall plan, the "Atoms for Peace" project, the Hoover European Relief Program, and the independence of the Philippines, America has been most successful? Contrarywise, when narrow self-interest of the United States has been stressed, such as in the refusal to join the League of Nations, the power plays in the Near East, and the pre-Korean crisis act of drawing a restricted line of national interest, our country has experienced failure.

## FUTURE OBJECTIVES

Thus I am proposing that our new American foreign policy for the 1960's should aim high. It should have objectives such as these: that this world under God shall have a new advance of freedom; that men, women and children everywhere, beyond our borders and within our borders, inside Russia and China and outside, shall make prog-

ress in their well-being and their happiness; that armaments and armed forces shall be reciprocally pulled back and that United Nations inspectors shall move forward, while powerful strength be maintained in an alert posture; that we take the initiative to open for patient and persistent negotiation the difficult dangers spots for war; that we bring about meetings of heads of governments on both sides of major issues, and follow these meetings with working groups to implement agreements; that peace shall be made more just, more lasting, and more secure through a United Nations police force.

You will realize that I am suggesting that our new American foreign policy set a mission for America in relation to the world that is unprecedented. But America itself is unprecedented. The modern world situation is unprecedented. The long sweep of history is filled with chapters reporting the fall of great nations when they tried to retain their power and wealth through the domination of other people through force, or through economic subjugation of other men, or through political control of colonies or through war.

No great nation has ever failed when it directed its policy toward the well-being of all mankind under God. In fact, no great nation ever adopted such a policy! I believe we should. I have a firm confidence that if we do, we will succeed. I do believe that our founding fathers were right in their emphasis upon the changeless value of man and of God. These values have been proven over and over again in individual lives and in institutions and programs of great moment. I have a deep and abiding faith that these values will prove right if our great nation founds its new foreign policy upon these values as our President enters into the important meetings of 1959.

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## COMMENTS

EDGAR SNOW

I would like to paraphrase Mr. Voltaire, and answer Governor Stassen's remark concerning his disagreement with my views. I would like to say that I agree with everything Governor Stassen said, and I would defend with my life his right to disagree with what I said.

## QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: Mr. Stassen told us so many things, I could not quite catch all of them. His sixth point, I believe, was that Germany should pay part of the expense of part of the procedures he recommended. I wish he would state a little more clearly what expenses he thinks Germany should pay.

A: If you pull back the forces that are now so closely confronting each other in the center of Germany, and you realign the defense lines, with the Russian line going back into the Ukraine and the Western line moving back further into Western Germany and France, that is quite an expensive move; in other words, it involves air fields and installations. If as a part of that process you have a united Germany, that united Germany could well afford to pay, and should pay, a part of the cost of such a move. For example, in the uniting of Austria, Austria made a payment to the Soviet Union. You could have argued against such a payment at such a time, but it was one of the elements that finally resolved the Austrian problem and brought about a free and independent Austria with no foreign troops within its border. Since Germany has had a tremendous economic success without the burden of defense, which had been provided in such large measures by the Western countries, I think one of the elements of the unification settlement should be a payment by Germany for the cost of relocating the defense lines.

# Israel and the New Nation States of Asia and Africa

By Y. Leo Kohn

Abstract: A lack of awareness of the facts of Jewish history on the part of many Asians has made it possible for many Asian countries to believe that the Jewish national revival was the work of imperialist intruders. Recently, however, their antagonism towards Israel has undergone a profound change. Beginning with the significant agreement between the Burmese and Israel delegations at the Asian Socialist Conference, a steady growth of co-operation between Israel and many Asian and African countries has been taking place. This has taken three chief forms: the placing of Israel experts at the disposal of other governments; the training of foreign personnel within Israel; and the foundation of joint economic enterprise. Such countries as Burma, Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, India, Ceylon, South Vietnam, and the Philippines have been finding increasingly that both the experience of the Israel technician and the example of the Israel democracy are applicable to their own problems. Israel provides for them both an example of the possibilities open to a young and poor nation and a source of technical aid which involves no deep commitment to a great industrial power. To young countries afraid of the West because of its recent identification with colonialism and equally afraid of following the Russian model, such a contribution is a vital one.

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*Leo Kohn, J.U.D. is Weizmann Professor of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He headed the Israel Delegation to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine in June, 1948. He subsequently served as a member of the Israel Delegation to the Fifth General Assembly of the United Nations and as Chairman of the Israel Delegation to the UNESCO General Conference held in Florence in May 1950. He is the author of a treatise on The Constitution of the Irish Free State (1932), of the Draft Constitution for Israel (issued as a State Paper at Hakirya, Tel Aviv, in 1949), and of various articles on constitutional and political subjects.*





THE national revival of the Jewish people in Palestine has coincided with the rise of the Asian liberation movement which swept the ancient continent during the past three decades and brought sovereign independence to most of its peoples. Israel is one of the ancient nations of Asia. It was the victim of the most powerful imperialism of antiquity, that of Imperial Rome. In the struggle for its national freedom and spiritual heritage, Israel lost, not merely its freedom, like so many other nations of Asia, but its very land. After the destruction of the second Hebrew Commonwealth and its national sanctuary by the legions of Titus, and after the failure of the last Jewish revolt against Roman rule in the days of Hadrian, the Jewish people were driven out of their ancient land. There began an exile of nineteen centuries which has no parallel in the recorded history of man. This long detachment from the cradle of its national life has created a gap between Israel and the nations of Asia.

## Historical Background

Many of them, to whom the Bible is not a book of sacred record, know little of the spiritual and political history of the Jewish people in the land of its origin. Moreover, inasmuch as the tragic story of the Jews since their dispersion was enacted for the most part in the Western world, the peoples of Asia were not conscious of the existence of the acute problem of Jewish insecurity. In Asia itself there were only a few Jewish communities. The largest were those of Iraq, Yemen, and Iran, of whom the two former have now been almost liquidated by emigration to Israel. In India the number of Jews was so small that most Indians were hardly aware of their presence. "Anti-Semitism" in the Western sense was practically unknown in Asia.

For all these reasons the two principal causes of the reconstitution of the Commonwealth of Israel in its ancient land—the spiritual and historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and its unsettled and insecure condition in the Diaspora—were *terra incognita* to most peoples of Asia. This unawareness has enabled Arab propaganda to spread the notion among them that the Jewish national revival in Palestine and the emergence of the State of Israel were the work of imperialist intruders, aggressive agents of the hated West. The fact that the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, which supported the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, originated from Great Britain and that the Palestine Mandate was subsequently entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations to the British government, appeared to lend weight to these suspicions. The prolonged tensions between the Jews of Palestine and the Mandatory Power and the acute struggle between them and the British government during the latter phase of British rule, apparently made little impression in Asia. When, in the end, Great Britain referred the question of Palestine to the United Nations, and the General Assembly in November, 1947 passed a Resolution in favor of the partition of Palestine and the establishment there of a Jewish and an Arab state, most of the Asian countries then represented in the Assembly voted against it.

As a result of this attitude, the Asian states were also hesitant to recognize the State of Israel when it was established in May 1948. The first Asian state to accord recognition to Israel was the Philippines, which had voted in favor of the United Nations resolution. It was followed by China, Burma, Ceylon and, subsequently, India and Thailand. Diplomatic relations with Israel were first established by Japan and, shortly afterwards, by Burma. The lat-

ter was the result of a significant rapprochement between the Burmese and Israel delegations—both representing preeminently labor governments—at the Asian Socialist Conference which met at Rangoon in 1953. After that, diplomatic and consular relations with Israel were set up by Ceylon, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand. The Moslem states of Asia, of course, were opposed to the establishment of such relations, and their influence in this matter prevailed also in other Asian states having considerable Moslem minorities, notably India. India was also concerned not to take any step that might alienate from her the sympathies of the Arab states on whom she depended for support in the United Nations, particularly in the Kashmir dispute.

## THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE

In April 1954 five of the leading states of the new Asia convened what came to be known as an "Asian-African" Conference at Bandung in Indonesia. Twenty-nine states participated. Israel was not among them, for under the pressure of the Arab states, who formed one-third of the participants, she had not been invited. That absence, of course, did not prevent the representatives of the Arab states from indulging in vehement attacks against Israel. When the Conference reached its closing stage a "Joint Communiqué" was adopted which contained also a section on Palestine. It read as follows:

> In view of the existing tension in the Middle East caused by the situation in Palestine, and of the danger of that tension to world peace, the Asian-African Conference declared its support of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and called for the implementation of the United Nations' resolutions on Palestine and the achievement of the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.

The resolution was clearly inspired by the Arab agitation and completely ignored the rights of the Jewish people. The original draft proposed by the Arabs was even more outspoken. It was a concession to the moderates in the Conference that the resolution pleaded for "a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question." Few of those who voted for the resolution were aware of the complexities of the Palestine problem. By forestalling Israel's invitation, the Arab states had effectively prevented any hearing being given to the other side.[1]

## THE NEW TREND

In the four years which have elapsed since the Bandung Conference, a radical change has taken place in the relations of several of the new states of Asia to Israel. The first step in this direction was the rapprochement between Israel and Burma at the Asian Socialist Conference at Rangoon, followed by the conclusion in 1956 of an agreement between the two countries which created a framework for their close co-operation in the spheres of agricultural, industrial, and educational development. Even before that, Israel had, in response to an invitation from the Burmese government, sent out there a number of agricultural, technical, medical, and financial experts and advisers. This was followed by visits to Israel of leading members of the Burmese government

[1] "The reference to the United Nations resolutions on Palestine," writes Mr. Walter Eytan, "must be understood as a *terminus technicus*. In the political vocabulary of the Arab states it means only those resolutions which they consider favorable to themselves. It does not include the General Assembly's resolution calling for the establishment of a Jewish state, nor the Security Council's order to Egypt to stop interfering with Israel shipping in the Suez Canal." (*The First Ten Years,* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958.)



and Civil Service and by the development of trade relations between the two countries.[2] The example of Burma was followed by other states of Southeast Asia. Several of these have also invited Israel experts as advisers in their development schemes, and have, for their part, sent out economists, technicians, and civil servants to study the new forms of agricultural co-operativism and industrial development evolved in Israel.

Since the emergence of new independent states in Central Africa, there has been a similar development of co-operation between them and Israel in the spheres of agricultural, technical, and educational development. Ghana, Liberia, Guinea, and Abyssinia were the first Central African states to establish diplomatic, consular, and trade relations with Israel. In these new states, too, these relations arose from the fact that Israel was seen to present a significant example of economic and social reconstruction for these new nation states.

## TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

The co-operation between Israel and the new polities of Southeast Asia and Central Africa has assumed three different forms. In the first place, Israel has placed at the disposal of the governments of these states the services of technicians and specialists in a variety of fields. Burma, to give a characteristic example, has invited some seventy Israel specialists on contracts ranging from one to three years—engineers, town planners, agricultural technicians, veterinarians, aircraft maintenance personnel, and others. Some of them have assisted in the planning and execution of water drilling and irrigation projects in the country's dry zone. Ghana, too, employs a wide range of Israel specialists. They include several of the organizers and teachers of Ghana's newly established Nautical College, financial advisers who have assisted in the establishment of its Cooperative Bank, and instructors in mechanical farming. Smaller numbers of Israel technicians have rendered service in Nigeria, Liberia, the French Sudan, India, Ceylon, South Vietnam, and the Philippines. With the exception of a few cases in which Israel experts went out under the auspices of a UN specialized agency—such as the World Health Organization or the Food and Agriculture Organization—arrangements were made bilaterally, the country concerned paying both the traveling expenses and the salaries of the Israel advisers. In a comprehensive analysis of the various forms of "Foreign Aid" to underdeveloped countries which appeared in the January issue of *International Affairs,* Mr. Hugh Tinker, after describing the several types of technical advisers working in these areas, observed:

> Perhaps the most sympathetic figure among these rival experts is the Israeli, sunburnt, stripped for action; he too comes from a poor land which is making itself richer by sweat and ingenuity. Many in Asia and Africa would prefer to go into partnership with Israel, whose problems are more nearly related, and who, therefore, sees solutions in more realistic terms.

### *Trainees*

The second form of this co-operation has been the training in Israel of Asian and African students and civil servants. It was soon realized that the mere sending out of Israel specialists was not sufficient and that suitably qualified administrators from these countries, fully acquainted with local conditions, would have to be given a specialized training and facilities for observing Israel methods. In pursuance of this aim, a significant number of Asian and African trainees have come to Israel, both in

[2] Industrial exports from Israel to Burma aggregated in 1957 $1,000,000, exports from Burma to Israel $900,000.

groups and as individuals. During the winter of 1958–59 these included two outstanding delegations. The first was a mixed African and Asian group, consisting of sixty men and women from some seventeen countries, many of them possessed of high personal and technical qualifications. They came to take part in a three-month seminar on co-operativism held in Tel-Aviv under the auspices of the Israel Federation of Labor. They hailed both from independent states and dependent territories: Japan, India, Burma, Ceylon, Thailand, Abyssinia, Kenya, Rhodesia, Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, Senegal, Dahomey, Chad, and the Republic of Sudan. The seminar was conducted in two languages, English for the benefit of the Asian students and French for those hailing from Africa. Many of them had received their training in French, British, and American universities and technical colleges. Most of them also possessed practical experience in government service and in agricultural or industrial enterprise. The instruction took the form of theoretical lectures on the various aspects of co-operativism and its application in Israel and were delivered by professors of the Jerusalem University, Israel civil servants, trade union leaders, and in a few cases also members of the Cabinet. These lectures were followed by lengthy discussions, simultaneous translation solving the language problem. After this, there were visits to the various types of agricultural settlements and co-operative enterprises in industry, banking, building, marketing, transport, and health services, as well as consumers' co-operatives. About the same time, there arrived in Israel a study group of thirty Burmese government officials with their wives and children who had been sent by their government for a prolonged stay in the Israel co-operative villages. Burma plans to establish a number of such co-operative settlements, and these trainees took their wives and children with them in order that they might gain first-hand experience of the place of women in the Israel settlements and of the methods of education adopted by their schools.

In addition to these two special groups, there are at present in Israel a considerable number of students and trainees from Asia and Africa, ranging from Japanese scientists doing advanced research at the Weizmann Institute of Science to research fellows in Jewish and Oriental history and religion at the Hebrew University, postgraduate students of mathematics, medicine, architecture, and economics, as well as veterinary surgeons, poultry farmers, and village instructors.

### *Joint economic enterprises*

The third form of co-operation between Israel and these new states has been the establishment of joint economic enterprises. The most important of these is the Black Star Line, a joint Israel-Ghana shipping company, established in 1957 by the Government of Ghana with the co-operation of the Zim Navigation Company, Israel's leading shipping company. The company, which has a paid-up capital of $840,000, owns three vessels and has several others under charter. During the first five years, the Israel partner is the managing agent of the new venture. The agreement provides that subsequently the Government of Ghana may take over and buy out the Israel financial interests. A further significant venture is the Ghana National Construction Company which was established in March 1958 with the co-operation of Solel Boneh, the great industrial development company of the Israel Federation of Labor. It has a capital, all paid in, of $560,000. In all these cases, the Israel organization does more than provide merely managerial experts. It fully participates in the work, provides technical training for the local personnel, and contributes a substantial share of the capital. It is worthy of note that in all these joint ventures the majority of the shares are held by local interests. In the Black Star Line, 60 per cent of the ownership is vested in the Government of Ghana and 40 per cent in the Zim Company. Similarly 60 per cent of the shares of the Ghana National Construction Company are owned by a Ghana government corporation—the Ghana Industrial Development Corporation—and 40 per cent by Solel Boneh. Negotiations are now proceeding for the establishment of additional joint enterprises in the canning and pharmaceutical factories, in the lumber trade, and other branches. The training of local personnel to enable the management to be taken over by Ghana after a number of years, forms an integral part of all these schemes of co-operation.



## ISRAEL AS A "PILOT PLANT" AND A "MIDDLE WAY"

The motives underlying the current trend in these new countries are very diverse. The basic reason, of course, is the need for development. As one of their spokesmen put it:

> Asia and Africa are in urgent need of rapid economic and social reconstruction, both for purely economic purposes and in order to make their newly gained *political* sovereignty real and valid by the attainment of *economic* independence.

Most of these new nation states have sought and frequently obtained financial and technical assistance from wealthy and highly developed countries. Yet, understandably enough, some of them do not wish to tie themselves exclusively to the Great Powers. They look for additional partners whose intentions—because of their relative smallness and economic weakness—could not be suspect in the eyes of their people. Israel is to them such a country. It possesses a significant reservoir of skill and experience such as is generally to be found only among highly developed and powerful nations. The fact that Israel is a small country is of significance not merely from the political, but also from the technical angle. These new countries find it very difficult to adopt the working methods and standards of the highly developed states of Europe and America. They require these superior techniques to be translated for them into coin which they can handle. To quote Mr. Kermit Lansner, General Editor of *Newsweek*, in a recent issue of that magazine:

> Frightened by the ruthless planning of a Soviet society, bewildered by the prodigal improvisation of many Western countries, a growing number of Afro-Asians are quietly exploring a middle way to a planned, democratic life—the way of Israel. The director of South Vietnam's Public Works Department, Pham Minh Dvong, put it like this: "I spent two months in the United States on a study tour. I went to many towns. At the end they asked me what I thought of America and I answered that it was Wonderful! Fabulous! Fantastic! Then they asked me what I had learned and I said: Nothing. You see, America is too big for us. The smallest project I saw cost millions. Israel is closer to the problems we're up against."[3]

Israel is [illegible] them a model in adaptation of technical achievements of the West to the needs of small countries, not blessed with rich natural resources and financial means. It is for them a "pilot plant," an instructive example in the difficult art of improvisation. There are, in addition, important psychological and political considerations which induce them to seek help and counsel from Israel. Israel is not tainted, in their eyes, with the hated spirit of colonialism. In Israel, which has become the home of

[3] *Newsweek*, March 23, 1959.

men and women hailing from widely diverse countries and cultural levels, they find peaceful co-operation between all groups, no discrimination, and no condescension. They have discovered that the Jews, too, are "underdogs." Moreover, Israel has shown to them that technical and social progress can be attained without having to sacrifice human freedom and democratic modes of government. An African official from Senegal, winding up a tour of Israel, told Mr. Lansner:

> Naturally many of us are overawed by the Soviet experiment. It's a very tempting road to rapid modernization for an underdeveloped country. But we couldn't stomach the forced labor that goes with it. We don't think parliamentary democracy as it is practiced in certain Western countries can work in Africa, yet most of us are anxious to retain the basic principles of a democratic society. In Israel we see a whole nation working hard for the same goals under a democratic system of government.

An African participant in the recent Tel-Aviv seminar on co-operativism put the same idea in slightly different language. He explained that these new countries "could not trust the colonialist powers who had only recently left them." On the other hand, they were afraid of following the Russian model. In this situation, they had found in Israel an alternative—"the only valid alternative for us," as he put it: "You have achieved," he said, "'outstanding social and technical progress without sacrificing human values." The significance of Israel's effort of national reconstruction for the brave new world of Africa and Asia has perhaps never been summarized more aptly than in these telling words.

Asia and Africa are undergoing a great social transformation. They are faced with an acute dilemma. They must overcome the material stagnation and cultural backwardness of their countries. Yet, in striking out on new lines, they are deeply concerned not to lose their spiritual traditions and their hard-gained freedom. Toward the solution of this basic problem, the people of Israel, by virtue of its heritage of the spirit and its heritage of suffering, may perhaps be able to make a not unworthy contribution.

# Arab Nationalism and Soviet-American Relations

By FAYEZ SAYEGH

ABSTRACT: Arab nationalism has reacted against Western policies which affected adversely their national interests; Arab attitude in the cold war has been affected by its conflict with the West over colonialism and Zionism; in its policies toward the Arab world, the West has shown a lack of awareness and respect for Arab sovereignty and nationalism. These are the reasons that in the cold war conflict the Arab countries have viewed the cause of the West with distrust. They explain the evolution of Arab policy from unconcern and indifference, to passive negative nonalignment, to active and positive neutrality. They also explain the deterioration of the Western position and the improvement of the Soviet position in the Arab world since 1955. There are signs that a more favorable Arab attitude toward the West may emerge in the future. However, the initiative for this transformation must come from the West, and there are factors inviting such initiative. The Arabs have shown that they are not willing to submit to Soviet intervention in their affairs, and Arab nationalism has proved a bulwark against communism in the Arab world. If in its negotiations the West respects the sovereignty and legitimate aspirations of Arab countries, it will find the Arab world more ready to join the side of the West in the East-West conflict.—Ed.

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*Dr. Fayez Sayegh is Counselor for the Arab League, with offices in the Arab States Delegation headquarters, New York City. He is the author of Arab Unity: Hope and Fulfillment.*

ANY * consideration of Arab nationalism as related to Soviet-American relations implies two fundamentals which have a direct bearing on the subject, but which have been often overlooked by political analysts and policy makers alike.

In the first place, there is an implicit recognition that the Arabs place their own aspirations and interests over the aspirations and interests of either party to the East-West conflict. On the surface it may appear obvious to say that the Arabs give primacy to their kindred urges for freedom from foreign domination; for a better life through political, social, and economic development; and for increased unity. Nonetheless, the point is more than purely academic for the Arab attitude toward West and East has been determined largely by the fact that West and East have entertained diverging attitudes toward Arab nationalism.

Unfortunately, Western observers as a rule have focused so much attention on their own interests, ideals, and strategy in the encounter with the Soviet bloc that they have failed to see the Arab world as a real being with interests, ideals, and a will of its own. Much of the American-Arab misunderstanding in recent years may be attributed to this practice of viewing Arab nationalism primarily from the angle of the East-West conflict and sometimes expecting the Arabs to subordinate many of their vital interests to the exigencies of the West. Conversely the Soviet Union, at least since 1955, has professed a readiness to separate the national interests of the Arab peoples from the immediate demands of the Soviet struggle with the West. Moreover, the Soviets have put such professions into practice by offering to aid any requesting Arab country without demanding that the country subordinate its policies to those of the Soviet bloc or to align itself with Russia in the East-West conflict.

A second fundamental for understanding the position of Arab nationalism in the cold war is the distinction between America and the West and, therefore, between American-Soviet relations and the West-East struggle. The significance of this distinction rests in the realization that the West as a party to the cold war embraces, in addition to the United States, certain European powers with whom Arab nationalism had been involved in life and death struggles for many many years prior to the inauguration of the cold war and over issues entirely unrelated to the cold war. Beginning with the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798 and culminating in the post-World War I settlement, virtually every piece of Arab territory was brought under the domination of England and France, and to a lesser extent, Spain and Italy. Even the Arab revolt of 1916, which had been launched against the Ottomans in alliance with Britain and had ended in the liberation of the Fertile Crescent and parts of the Arabian peninsula from Ottoman rule, was soon brought to naught by the European powers who arbitrarily dismembered the region and placed it under the rule of England and France.

The fact that these colonial powers have been identified with America, in the cause of the West, in the East-West conflict, has obstructed the rallying of the Arab peoples to the cause espoused by the United States. For the Arabs, as indeed many other Asian and African people, do not experience the cold war primarily as a clash between American democracy and Soviet communism, but as a conflict between two organic totalities—two power blocs—one of which includes the very colonial powers against which the Asian and African peoples have struggled or are now struggling to emancipate themselves.

* Dr. Sayegh's paper was read by Mr. Sam Salem of the Case Institute of Technology.



## EVALUATION OF ARAB ATTITUDE TO THE COLD WAR

The forcefulness of these two factors centering around the primacy of Arab nationalism and the Arab mind and the association of European colonialism with the cause of the West, has been instrumental in determining the evolution of the Arab attitude to the cold war. This attitude has passed through four stages since the close of World War II, with the years 1947, 1951, and 1955 serving as demarcation points.

### *First phase*

The first phase unfolded between 1945 and 1947, when as we know the cold war was certainly in the making, but before its form and ramification had been clearly defined. During these years the attitude of Arab nationalism toward this approaching East-West conflict was decisively affected by vivid recollections of a predatory colonialism centered in Western Europe. In fact, the struggle against this colonialism was not over, for only partial emancipation in some Arab lands had been obtained by the end of World War II. As we know, America was a conspicuous nonparticipant in this process of alienation between Arab nationalism and West European colonialism. A century of Arab-American friendship generated by American educators, missionaries, and philanthropists and nourished by Wilsonian idealism was extended into the interwar decades as a result of America's anticolonial diplomacy. But soon after the close of World War II, America plunged headlong into Middle East politics when it became heir to England's policy of supporting Zionism. Ignoring the recommendations of the 1946 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, the United States overzealously intervened in the United Nations deliberations over the Palestine problem and played an instrumental role in the establishment of Israel. By this policy, America became an accomplice to an encroachment on Arab national rights which many Arabs feared and felt was more deadly than colonialism. Thus, even before the cold war had become a paramount fact of international life, the Western powers had incurred the suspicion, hostility, and active opposition of Arab nationalism by virtue of the colonial policies of England and France and the pro-Zionist policies of England and the United States.

### *Second phase*

The open outbreak of the cold war did not alter the situation fundamentally, for in its early years the cold war did not extend to the Middle East, and, therefore, the Arab national movement viewed it with apathy and indifference, while continuing to be hostile to the West for reasons not connected with the cold war.

In this second phase of its evolution extending from 1947 to 1951, the Arab nationalist attitude toward the cold war was influenced by four main factors. In the first place, clashes between East and West were taking place outside the Arab world: the re-establishment of the Cominform, the coup d'état in Czechoslovakia, the first Berlin crisis, the triumph of Communism in China, and the invasion of South Korea—all these events were relatively remote from the daily consciousness of Arabs. The Arabs were far more concerned with problems of their own, such as the efforts to liquidate the British base in Suez, the renegotiation of the Anglo-

Iraqi Treaty, the first postwar Algerian insurrection, and finally and above all the Palestine War.

Secondly, during these years one party to the cold war, the Soviet Union, was totally absent and physically remote from the Arab scene.

Thirdly, the other party to the cold war, the West, was present and real in the Arab situation, and its presence, to say the least, was unwelcome. For as late as 1951 the Western colonial powers were still ruling in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, and in the southern and eastern fringes of the Arabian peninsula; a Western-oriented Zionist state had been created in most of Palestine, at Arab expense; and Western forces were still stationed in the then independent countries of Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan.

Fourthly, the ideological issue, at least said to be the core of the East-West trouble, was not alive in the Arab mind. Communism, as a doctrine and as a system of social economic organization had won few adherents in Arab society. It was an alien ideology, incompatible with the religious persuasions, the individualistic bent, the nationalistic compulsions, and the basic cultural traditions of the Arab world. Thus, lacking involvement in the ideological issues and removed from the political issues, Arab nationalism was largely indifferent to the cold war from 1947 to 1951. The two touched one another at best only tangentially, and the only point of contact was that one party to the East-West conflict, the West, was also in conflict with the rising nationalism of the Arab people through its colonial pro-Zionist policy.

*Third phase*

The transition to the third phase in the Arab attitude, from 1951 to 1955, was prompted by the Western proposal regarding the establishment of the Middle East defense organization in the fall of 1951. It will be recalled that in accordance with the Western strategy of containment of the Soviet bloc, collective security organizations were established in Europe and the Far East in the first few years of the cold war, notably NATO and ANZUS. Until 1951, however, the Asiatic and African sectors of the Middle East were the only region adjacent to Soviet territory which had remained unattached to Western security collective systems. This hiatus in the structure of containment was occasioned by the fact that the West was already present in many Arab lands, via British occupation forces and military bases. In 1951, however, having become cognizant of the increasing precariousness of Britain's position in the Arab world, the West made its first bid to Arab nationalism. On October 13 of that year Egypt was invited to enter into a relationship with the Western powers, in terms of which, the Suez base was to be de-Anglicized and simultaneously internationalized under an inter-Western command.

What was the Arab response to this overture? At the outset it should be observed that Western statesmen would have been incredibly naive to have expected the Arabs to rush eagerly into the cold war before any Western corrective action was taken to ameliorate existing conditions. Entirely apart from this general mood, however, the first Western effort to bring the Arab world into the containment system was doomed to failure because of its timing, method, and other specifics. For the Western proposal struck Arab leadership as a mere strategy for maintaining in a new guise Western military bases and occupation forces on Arab territory at the same time that nationalist zeal was call-



g for unconditional evacuation. Once ore, then, Arab preoccupation with ıe national colonial struggle militated gainst Arab association with the West a party to the cold war.

But the aloofness from the East-West nflict expressed until 1951 in terms relative unconcern came now to ex-ess itself in terms of a diplomacy of ninvolvement, nonalignment, or non-mmitment, the same policy already lvocated in other parts of Asia and frica and even in Europe. Moreover, nce the Western proposal on Suez had sumed the character of perpetuating welcome foreign presence on Arab il, Arab nationalists began to view eir efforts to remain uncommitted in e cold war as a continuation of their rlier struggle for liberation. There-re, when Western diplomacy persisted its efforts to involve Arab nationalism the cold war, the originally nebulous ncept of nonalignment jelled into a rmal doctrine. What had originated a somewhat vague idea stimulated by periences unrelated to the cold war on developed into a principle of for-gn policy bearing direct relevance to ıe cold war. As one Middle Eastern untry after another placed itself or und itself placed on the Western side the fence through the Balkan Pact of 53, the Pakistani-Turkish agreement 1954, and the Iraqi-United States greement of 1954, Arab nationalists w the shadow of the cold war elbow-g its way ominously to the very door-eps of their homeland. If indifference the cold war was no longer possible, ıd if an attitude had to be adopted, ıen the very issues which had gener-ted the initial indifference, namely olonialism and Zionism, demanded that ıe new attitude be one of rejection, sting on the principle of nonalignment. o the either or put forward by the Vest, Arab nationalists responded with firm neither nor.

*Fourth phase*

In the meantime, Western diplomacy was evincing little sympathy with Arab resistance to involvement in the cold war. At the same time that the idea of involvement was becoming a nationalist heresy in the Arab world, the Western powers were straining every muscle to drag some Arab country into a Western alliance. Having failed with Egypt in 1951, they at last succeeded with Iraq in 1955 when the Iraqi government heedless of the intra-Arab treaty of joint defense became a founding member of the Bagdad Pact. This event brought the cold war from the outskirts and into the Arab world. It was promptly followed in rapid succession by a wide variety of other events, the joint impact of which was to herald a new phase, the fourth and final phase in the evolution of the attitude of Arab nationalism towards the East-West conflict.

Ushered in, in 1955, this new phase witnessed a transformation of the passive negative principle of nonalignment into an active and positive policy of neutrality. The diplomacy of nonalignment was passive and negative in the sense that it was animated by the refusal to become involved in a network of existing relations with any outside party which might possibly spell Arab dependence and subservience. But the animating idea of the new diplomacy, which emerged in 1955, was active and positive. Arab Nationalists now began to feel that it was not enough merely to safeguard sovereignty against actual or potential encroachment, it was imperative to consolidate it. As with the principle of nonalignment, Arab Nationalists tended to equate the policy of neutrality with their long-standing ideal of independence.

But they also began to associate the new diplomacy with the second basic

principle of the rising Arab nationalist movement, namely the desire by the Arabs for a better life through social and economic development. It was because of this dual motivation that the policy of active positive neutrality came to rest on the conviction that new relations had to be established on new foundations with Arab national interest uppermost in mind. Trade and industry had to be expanded and diversified, agriculture modernized, natural resources harnessed and utilized. Arms had to be obtained; wider markets for Arab products, new sources for capital, technical knowledge, raw materials, all had to be found. Furthermore, the Arabs felt that as long as these new relations were freely negotiated and freely entered into, and as long as they did not entail encroachment on national sovereignty, such relations could be established with any outside power regardless of the ideological position espoused, or the side of the cold-war fence it stood on.

## WESTERN REACTION TO ARAB-SOVIET RELATIONS

If Arab nonalignment had shocked the West, then the new Arab readiness to establish and cultivate commercial, financial, and cultural relations with Soviet bloc members prompted rash and hysterical reaction. It was viewed as an unprecedented air of policy which threatened to give the Soviet Union access to an area which the Western powers looked upon as their immediate preserve. But Arab Nationalists saw their new policy in an entirely different light. They contended that the decision of a sovereign state to initiate or expand peaceful relations with other powers was an elemental prerogative of sovereignty, and they charged that if some Western powers still believed that they were entitled to prevent sovereign Arab states from trading with other countries, it was only because they had not yet reconciled themselves to the reality that Arab sovereignty was a fact and that Arab nationalism was there, and there indeed, to stay. Moreover, Arab Nationalists argued that it was the West and the West alone that had precipitated this new development. For it was the West that had brought the cold war into the Arab world through the Bagdad Pact against the known will of all Arabs, including the Iraqi people; and it was the West that had made commercial and other relations an instrument of bribery, inducement, or intimidation in order to pressure some Arab government into joining Western sponsored pacts and alliances. When some Arab governments, notably Egypt, Syria, and Yemen, had endeavored to adhere to their chosen policy of nonalignment they found themselves subjected to economic sanctions and exposed to punitive measures.

These had been the broad trends which had occasioned Egypt's successful efforts in 1955 to pierce through the cordon of economic sanctions within which it had found itself enclosed. But other specific events had accelerated the process by making it both unavoidable and feasible for Egypt to purchase arms from the Soviet bloc in mid-1955. Among these events was the Bandung Conference of April 1955, which strongly urged its members to expand trade with countries outside the region without regard to their position in the cold war. Another set of events pertained to the steady deterioration of Arab-Western relations in 1954 and 55 due to concurrent struggles in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia against France and in Oman and Aden against England. To these developments must be added the revival of the Israeli activism early in 1955. The return of David Ben-Gurion to public life in February of that year



was followed by the inauguration of a new policy of government-sponsored border raids, probably to satisfy strong Israeli activist sentiment in preparation for the national elections in July. Finally, there was the initiation of a new Soviet strategy in 1955 with respect to the underdeveloped countries into the cold war in general. The Kremlin's reappraisal of Stalinist strategy in that year culminated in the adoption of new approaches to the Asian-African community into the West. While offering diplomatic, economic, and military assistance to the embattled national liberation movement and to the underdeveloped countries, the Soviet Union simultaneously appeared desirous of diminishing East-West tensions through the Geneva Summit Conference of mid-1955.

The joint impact of these events was to render Egypt's need for arms and economic aid more pressing, and at the same time that the Soviet Union was becoming ready if not eager to meet that need and African-Asian opinion was predisposed to look with favor upon such transactions. By initiating its new relations with the Soviet bloc, Egypt heralded the transformation of the policy of passive nonalignment into one of positive and active neutrality. How from that moment on, Arab nationalism and the West have come to be gripped in a vicious cycle of action, reaction, infuriation, and retaliation is a matter of current history. Aswan, Suez, the tripartite invasion, the Eisenhower doctrine, and many others are but landmarks in a process of alienation between the Arab and the Western world.

## CONCLUSION

This very brief survey of the evolution of the attitude of Arab nationalism towards the East-West conflict reveals three main conclusions which may well serve as lessons of the past. Firstly, Arab nationalism has at every stage reacted to the actions or policies of the West which adversely affect vital and legitimate national interest uppermost in the Arab mind. Secondly, the attitude of Arab nationalism towards the East-West conflict has been decisively affected by Arab conflicts with the Western powers over issues of colonialism, and Zionism, the first antedating the cold war, and both unrelated to the cold war. Thirdly, Western policies towards the Arab world before and since the advent of the cold war have been predicated on inadequate recognition by the West of the legitimacy and reality of Arab sovereign rights and nationalist interest.

These factors are vital in understanding why Arab nationalism greeted the cold war with initial distrust of the West and why the Arab attitude has evolved from unconcern and indifference, to passive negative nonalignment, and finally to active and positive neutrality. Moreover they go a long way towards explaining why the Western position has deteriorated and why the Soviet position has improved in the Arab world since the advent of the cold war into that region in 1955.

To conclude, a hopeful look at the future suggests a possibility that a new phase may emerge in the attitude of Arab nationalism to the East-West struggle: a more balanced attitude of normal neutrality instead of corrective and, therefore, onesided neutrality which the Arabs have felt constrained to develop since 1955. However the initiative in facilitating such a transformation must come from the West. At least one major factor inviting such Western initiative has recently come into being. For Arab nationalism has given concrete evidence in recent months that it is not willing to submit to Soviet intervention in Arab affairs despite the fact

that some Arab governments have gone to the Soviet bloc for economic assistance. Similarly Arab nationalism has vindicated its claim to be the only bulwark in the Arab world against communism, or the only effective alternative to the appeal of communism. This factor provides Western statesmanship with the opportunity to recognize, at last, that in coming to terms with Arab nationalism and its legitimate aspirations, and in tolerating its neutralist bent, the West has a much better chance for safeguarding its legitimate interests in the Arab world than it has found possible by opposing Arab nationalism or by seeking to involve it unwillingly in the cold war.

# Beyond the Cold War

By D. F. FLEMING

ABSTRACT: Before the United States can extricate itself from the untenable position in world affairs which it is currently maintaining, it must learn that it cannot prevent a third world war by means which would have avoided the second. The Soviet Union is not a duplicate of Hitler's power-hungry fascist state, determined to obtain world domination at all costs. The Russians and Chinese would much prefer to devote their energies to their internal affairs; our policy of containing and encircling the Communists has generated the very military power which we fear. We must learn, since we cannot make a fortress of the Western world, to withdraw gracefully from our outposts. We must accept the changes taking place in the world and stop trying to force history into our own pattern. With the end of the garrison state must come a conversion of that tremendous part of our economy currently spent on armaments to such useful purposes as education and slum clearance. Increased negotiation will lead to an increase of mutual trust, which in turn will lead to the international cooperation and trade which are such an inevitable outgrowth of modern technology. Under capable leadership the United States can do much to make the world a unit for the benefit of mankind, instead of, as it now is, a unit for holocaustic war.—Ed.

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*D. F. Fleming, Ph.D., Nashville, Tennessee, is Research Professor of International Relations at Vanderbilt University. He is on leave for the coming academic year to serve as Fulbright Lecturer at the School of International Studies in New Delhi. He was formerly Foreign Editor of the Nashville Evening Tennessean and served as adviser to the atomic energy section of the State Department. He is the author of many books and articles on United States foreign policy including Can We Win the Peace? (1943), While America Slept (1944) and The United States and the World Court (1945).*

DURING the past hundred years we have fought three major wars, and each time we have been able to have a great war leader in the White House. In each case also the President has had wise and workable plans for making peace. Yet in all three instances the men who took power from his hands went in an opposite direction.

It is universally known that this happened to Lincoln. The Congressional "radicals" rejected his policy of mercifully binding up the nation's wounds and imposed the excesses of reconstruction upon the defeated South, with long-continuing results. After World War I, Wilson made a sustained and heroic effort to found a League of Nations which would substitute collective security for balance-of-power arms races. Never had a need been more pitifully demonstrated, yet the "bitter-enders" and "reservationists" of the Senate defeated our entry into the League and led us to refuse all responsibility for preventing the coming of another world war. We relied on occasional arms limitation conferences and a very gradual approach to the "non-political" activities of the League of Nations.

International politics was bad, but world economic entanglements were good, the more the better. A steady surplus of American exports was partly paid for by the acquisition of foreign factories and other businesses worth 7 billion dollars from 1922 to 1930. In the same period our private loans totaled 8 billion dollars, mostly evidenced by bonds which were valued highly until the great crash of 1929 revealed that many were worthless.

This catastrophe was the direct result of our attempt to get rich too quickly. When paralysis rapidly spread around the world, its unity from the standpoint of economics was clearly revealed. Then the economic collapse turned Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo loose on their careers of world conquest, indicating that the unity of the world for war-making purposes was about to be proved again. This was vehemently denied by our isolationists, who hastily passed laws forbidding us to do all the things which they thought had entangled us in World War I. However, the spread of rampant aggression on both sides of us soon destroyed these illusions. We had to fight another world war, and we agreed in advance to accept the United Nations. However, the opportunity of a national lifetime had been missed.

Referring to our failure to enter the League of Nations and lead it while we were the only strong, unravaged world power, President Virgil M. Hancher of the State University of Iowa said on May 4, 1955:

> When the historians of the 22nd century write the history of our time, we may be described as "the nation which missed the bus," the nation that came to maturity and turned aside from its opportunity, only to discover upon looking back that the center of the world was Asia and not Europe or America.[1]

## CONTAINMENT

Yet as soon as Roosevelt was dead, on April 12, 1945, his policy of making peace in co-operation with the Soviet Union, and of drawing her from ostracism into full co-operation in the world community, was abruptly reversed. Russia had been a mighty and indispensable ally. Her armies had taken by far the heaviest brunt of Hitler's onslaughts for four years. She had not complained overmuch as we took the long way through North Africa and Italy while her lands were ravaged deep into the Caucasus, and scores of millions of her people were subjected to sudden death or long agonies of privation and humiliation. When the war ended, her wounds were continental in size and poignantly deep, both physically and psychologically.

[1] From a lecture to the Walter J. Shephard Foundation at Ohio State University.



Nevertheless, Roosevelt's successor promptly castigated Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in the White House on April 23, 1945, for attempting to determine the character of the new Polish government; and when President Truman had failed to enforce free elections in Eastern Europe, he decided to "contain" the Soviet Union, many months before the Truman doctrine was promulgated on March 12, 1947.[2] The traumatic need of the Soviet Union for military and political security in East Europe, through which she had been disastrously invaded three times since 1914, was not accepted, and her age-old desire for secure access to warm water was rejected.

It did not seem possible that immediately after two world wars, in the atomic age, a third ideological power fight and arms race should be at once begun. Yet it quickly happened, and the new United Nations became a cold-war battleground instead of a place for binding up the world's wounds and forestalling a final disaster. Once more, too, we tried to avoid another war by doing all the things which might have prevented World War II—no "appeasement," firm resistance to any further advance either of Soviet power or communism, until both were sternly forbidden in the containment doctrine, which was then enforced by a giant ring of military bases constructed by us around the immense perimeter of the Soviet Union and China.

This incredible feat could not have been attempted against a power which had already developed the industrial strength to hurl Hitler's armies back from Stalingrad to Berlin had it not been for our monopoly of atomic bombs. It was this monopoly which enabled Truman, and for a time Churchill, to feel able to control the world, even after the Soviets had refused to forego the possession of atomic bombs by accepting our atomic control plan. Our politicians and military men thought our monopoly would be prolonged. Thus we swung all the way over from isolation and no responsibility for keeping the peace of the world to full responsibility for enforcing it upon the two great Communist powers, standing back to back on the bulk of the world's largest island, controlling huge natural resources and 900 million very capable people. It is impossible to imagine a more sweeping and dangerous overcompensation from the follies of isolation.

[2] William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), pp. 351–52; Walter Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), pp. 48–51; The *New York Times*, March 23, 25, 1947.

## FOREIGN BASES

The accompanying outthrust of American power has been one of the most spectacular in all history. Who knows how many Americans or American-armed bases there are overseas? One estimate speaks of 900 armed stations abroad, another of 400 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bases. We have sent arms worth 15 billion dollars to NATO allies and many other billions to the small fringe peoples we defend around Asia. Since 1945 arms have poured out of our factories to every country in the world that would take them, and we have labeled those who refused as foolish and "immoral" neutralists.

One of the first things we did was to supply the many armies of Latin America with big shipments of heavy weapons, presumably to keep the exhausted armies of the Soviet Union—deep in Eurasia—from storming ashore. No Russians came, but a bloody brood

of dictators—eight of them—did use our big weapons to impose their rule upon the Latin Americans, who hold that painful period against us bitterly. Along with this great distribution of arms has gone the building of giant military bases abroad. Even Spain, that last stronghold of fascism, has become an American bastion—or has it? The 600 million dollar network of our bases there cannot be used without the word of the canniest of dictators. He is aging and his people have a powerful tradition of staying neutral, which is heavily reinforced by the knowledge of the growing stockpiles of Soviet missiles, many of them trained upon Spain. On the other hand, the American influx has inadvertently opened the eyes of the Spanish youth to the way other peoples live and "youth in Spain finds liberty preferable to order." After careful study of the situation in Spain, Blair Bolles adds that Spain is a vivid example of the power and weakness of the present government of the United States in the exercise of world power.[3]

## GLOBAL INVOLVEMENT

The diplomatic face of our containment-encirclement policy has been a great burgeoning of military alliances, until the total of our allies is somewhere between forty-two and forty-five. After 1918 we abhorred the League of Nations as "an entangling alliance," the kind the Founding Fathers warned against, but now some of our alliances are so truly entangling that we do not know how to escape from them. Nor do we wish to escape from our general world-wide involvement. We have been taught that it is all strictly defensive and that it is probably a matter of life and death.

Furthermore, the great American expansion has become a matter of adventure, jobs, and profits for millions of Americans. This time we have been shy about accepting foreign bonds, but our acquisitions of outright ownership in the "free world" have been immense. Great sectors of the Latin American economies are in our hands. The Canadians have discovered that the commanding heights of their economy are American owned, and fears of the same fate are being voiced in Britain.[4] In Western Europe, Japan, and elsewhere the process has gone on apace. Both military and economic aid facilitates the export of American capital, goods, and people. The entire process has provided foreign travel and residence for millions of Americans, usually under paternalistic auspices, with good housing, comforts, and luxuries supplied, including servants. Doubtless this does not apply to all of our foreign personnel, but even in the Afghan desert the Americans working on a development project live "in a camp full of luxurious comforts, with varied menus, one-family houses, gardens, and a swimming pool." In South Korea our people live behind barbed wire in a "Golden Ghetto."[5]

It is no wonder that "young Americans, and especially their wives," are now eager to be employed abroad, one old American family having its entire generation of six children employed on foreign assignments. Reflecting on this new phenomenon in our national life, Professor J. A. Lukacs candidly calls it "The American Imperial Disease."[6] In his thoughtful study of American "open-door imperial expansion," Professor William A. Williams comes to the conclusion that if we cling to this policy much longer the result will very probably be "the literal isolation of the United States." Instead of "the accepted thesis that America's freedom and prosperity depend upon the continued expansion of its economic and ideological system through the policy of the open door," he urges the rational and equitable use of our own "human and material resources at home and interdependent cooperation with *all* other peoples." He does not believe that we can take our place in the world community until we both believe and demonstrate that we can sustain prosperity and democracy without open-door expansion.[7]

I have never before used the term American imperialism, because of the obvious danger of using a phrase which our adversaries apply to us so freely, and because I have been reluctant to believe that it had come to that. But when the sun never sets upon the expanding activities of Americans in other countries, what else is it to be called? Lukacs uses the term because he remembers what happened to Rome when she attempted to encompass the world, and because he has personally seen "what has happened to great European nations when they had been bitten by the imperial bug." He sees also what it is doing to Russia, but notes that since 1945 the Soviets have been evacuating advanced positions—the Danish island of Bornholm, their Finnish naval base, eastern Austria, Yugoslavia—in effect—Sinkiang, their Dairen naval base, control of the Manchurian railroads, and North Korea. What, too, of Outer Mongolia and Poland?

It is not too early for us to begin to realize that we have assumed responsibility for more of the world than we can manage, and that unless we begin to contract our sway the rest of the world will do it for us. The end result could be an enforced isolation in an embittered Fortress America that would not be a good place for individual liberty.

## COUNTER ENCIRCLEMENT

At first glance it might seem from the Soviet withdrawals listed above that our containment policy has already succeeded in forcing some Soviet retraction. However, our encirclement has generated the very power we feared. It stirred the Soviet peoples from their deep wartime exhaustion to reconstruct their devastated land and to struggle ahead to new heights of production for heavy industry and arms. It spurred them to achieve the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb long before they were expected to and to gain substantial parity in both rapidly. Containment drove them to build a force of intercontinental jet bombers before we did and to prove with their sputniks in the heavens that they could lay down Intercontinental Ballistics Missiles (ICBM's) in North America before we had any.

We think that we still have a lead in missile-carrying submarines, yet we know that the Soviets have by all odds the greatest force of submarines ever to be assembled, some 500, and we have no reason to doubt that they will soon be able to destroy any remaining American cities which might escape Red ICBM's, from our four sea coasts, including Hudson Bay deep in North America. It is one of the peculiarities of containment that the magnificent pioneering of our submarine under the northern ice fields never indicates the doom of Minneapolis and Chicago—only the cities of deeply landlocked Russia.

Under the lash of necessity, and of constant peril as they saw it, the Rus-

[3] Blair Bolles, *The Big Change in Europe* (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1958), pp. 305–6.

[4] See William H. Hessler, "Canada's Case of the American Jitters," *The Reporter*, February 19, 1959, pp. 18–21.

[5] Peter Schmid, "Coexisting in Kabul," *The Reporter*, February 5, 1959; *New York Times*, February 7, 1959.

[6] J. A. Lukacs, "The American Imperial Disease," *The American Scholar* (Spring 1959), pp. 141–50.

[7] William Appleton Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1959), pp. 209–10.

sians will soon have the power to encircle their encirclers and to destroy us if a big war comes—perhaps accidentally. Of course this is precisely what we would have done if in their place. No one could doubt what we would do if the Russians built bases on Long Island, in the Caribbean, and in Mexico to restrain our aggressive impulses. We would arm until we could break the encirclement and destroy or dissolve it. Can there be any question about what we would do if a Communist Quemoy existed on Catalina island, off Los Angeles?

### CHINESE UPSURGE

Yet the remarkable achievements of the Soviet peoples in industrialization and modernization seem certain to be surpassed by the rapidity of China's leap into the twentieth century. In China the dynamism of the world's oldest, toughest, and most numerous people has been both organized and released. Some months ago a Reuters' correspondent came out of China reporting that her universities were crammed to the limits with young people burning to surpass the West technologically, and the President of the Royal Bank of Canada returned to say that the feats of human labor which he had seen were beyond his power to describe. Another Canadian, scientist J. Tuzo Wilson, brought out an amazing report of China's upsurge.[8] R. H. Crossman's report of the spontaneous origins of the new Chinese commune system for organizing the year-round energies of 50,000 to 100,000 people in each local area coincided with Wilson's account of the fervor of nearly unsupervised labor. This was the impression of the publisher of the Toronto *Globe and Mail*, who found in China "the world's greatest human force moulding a great new industrial nation and making tremendous strides in every field." He was surprised by the resolute mood of the Chinese workers and "their amazing self-discipline."[9]

All foreign observers, including the Russians, have been deeply impressed by the evidence of what the determined labor of 650 million people—soon to be a billion—can accomplish in a short space of time. Crops are enormously increased, little industries by the thousands vie with the big new ones, and no task is too gigantic to be undertaken. China's immemorial scourge, the Yellow River, is tamed in one winter, adding greatly to crops and forests, though it may have taken the labor of 100 million people to do it. This mighty new force in the world is also fired by resentment at American ostracism, trade boycotts, and armed blockade—up into China's two seaports, Amoy and Foochow, which serve a thousand miles of her coastline—and by our protection of the threat of counterrevolution from Formosa. We should pause to reflect upon the explosive force of this resentment, rooted as it is in a hundred years of Western treatment of the Chinese as inferior beings.

It may be a decade or two before the Chinese have the military power to take control of their shores and islands. It may be another decade or so before Soviet industrial power is fully equal to ours. This is the brief period of grace we have in which to begin to retire from our most exposed positions on the containment ring, as the Russians have already done inside it, and to accommodate ourselves to the reality that in the future we cannot be the arbiter of events on the frontiers of either the Soviet Union or China, any more than they could police our own border areas.

This will be a very painful and dangerous period in our history. It is much easier to get into an encirclement contest than it is to get safely out of one. It will require all of our wisdom, common sense, and practical imagination to make the shift without becoming engulfed in a global catastrophe. We shall have to learn to think constantly about the way other peoples feel about our regulation of affairs in their neighborhoods. Our success in doing so will depend upon whether we can come to terms in time with the two giant powers whom we have sought to contain and still retain a role in the world commensurate with our power, and with our example as a world power which is also a good neighbor.

### SOME OUTMODED DOGMAS OF CONTAINMENT

If we are to succeed in working out a viable, long-range role for ourselves in the world, it will be essential to reexamine some of the false premises on which our leaders led us into the encirclement game.

*World conquest*

1. That the Soviet Union and China are out to conquer the world. This is the rock upon which the cold war was founded. Nations are too often guided by the traumas of the past. The Fascist trio had unquestionably been bent on conquering as much of the earth's surface as they could. Therefore when Russia retained her wartime conquests in Europe and sought access to the warm oceans, President Truman and many other leading Americans came quickly to the conclusion that they faced the first steps of another world conquest mania. This assumption was welcomed the more readily because the Soviets had a hated ideology, which had been born in conspiracy, subversion, and revolution. Some of its early prophets had believed that this process had to go on until all the world had become Communist, and it was always possible to quote some of their texts to show that world conquest was the aim of a frightfully exhausted and depleted Soviet Union. Our great organs of public-opinion formation willingly established this thesis. Hundreds of our leaders repeated it so many thousands of times that it came to be universally and deeply believed. Could anyone doubt what was heard so often?

The containment policy was built upon this foundation, and every act of the Russians was used to prove the rightness of the thesis. The ousting of the Smallholders party government in Hungary in the summer of 1947 and the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia the following February both proved the point, although the public proclamation of the containment doctrine had come first. The Berlin blockade of 1948–49 was a blatant act of aggression, although the serious currency dispute and some moves toward the creation of a West German state had preceded it. The North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 was assumed to have been ordered from Moscow, to try out the containment ring and if necessary to bleed us white on it. It could not have been a civil war between hot-blooded kinsmen. China's efforts to capture Quemoy labeled her as an aggressor, a user of "force." And now the Soviet effort to change the status of Berlin, 110 miles inside Communist territory, reveals the Red Bear on the march again. Our deep faith in the world conquest formula excludes from the defensive category any action that the Soviet Union or China could take. Each move they make is invariably a step in their master plan for world conquest.

Nothing important can be done to work out an acceptable territorial dis-

[8] J. Tuzo Wilson, "A Visit to Red China's Hidden Capital of Science," *Saturday Review*, November 8, 1958, pp. 47–56.

[9] R. H. Crossman, "The People's Communes," *New Statesman*, January 10, 1959, pp. 34–35; *Montreal Gazette*, August 22, 1958.

tribution of power in the world and to achieve an assumption of continued living on this planet while this dogma fills our minds.

*Domino theory*

2. The slightest withdrawal anywhere means the loss of everything. This is the blood brother of the world conquest belief. It is also the opposite side of the chain of containment. If it is breached at any single point then the Red flood will engulf the earth.

This corollary of containment has been stereotyped as the famous domino theory. In 1947 it was said that if Greece "went," Turkey and the Middle East would go, along with Italy, France, and all else. When the Korean conflict broke out, General MacArthur argued in his message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) on August 29, 1950, that to give up any of the "bulwarks" of our Pacific Ocean strategic position would "shift our future battle area 5,000 miles eastward to the coasts of the American continents, our home coast." He implied that if Formosa was lost to China, the Philippines and Japan would go, then the other Pacific islands, and the Chinese would appear on our California coast.

At every stage of the cold war the image of the dominoes of disaster crashing up to our borders is invoked. At the December 1958 meeting of the NATO ministers, Mr. Dulles warned that any United States withdrawal from the Western Pacific meant that the entire area would fall under Communist control. In other addresses he argued that our recognition of China would mean the loss of all of our small allies in the Orient. If the West finally surrenders at Berlin, said columnist Joseph Alsop on December 18, 1958, it "will surely start a whole series of political avalanches" in the Middle East, Far East, Africa, South America, and Europe. What is to be said of a political-military structure which is so fragile? The domino dogma really says that we ourselves are caught in the ring of containment, all around the globe, and that it must be perpetually held rigid at every point or disaster will ensue.

*Appeasement*

3. There must be no appeasement—or negotiation. This is another of the hindsights of history which dominate the minds of men and governments. When the democratic governments of Britain and France gave away Ethiopia, the Rhineland, Spain, Austria, and Czechoslovakia to the Fascist aggressors in the 1930's, they did not thereby save themselves or successfully turn Hitler's maniacal impulses toward the East. On the contrary, the Russians were consequently brought into Vienna and Berlin. Now the ghost of appeasement forbids any recognition that this monumental consequence has occurred. Instead, each Soviet move to consolidate their wartime gains, or to extend them in the direction of warm water, is resisted under the banner of no appeasement. We have had long years of "liberation" and "roll back," ending in our total inertia during the Hungarian tragedy. Today we propose to stand absolutely firm in West Berlin, even if this should lead by rapid stages to the destruction of the West itself. There must be no appeasement.

We are wise to learn from the bitter lessons of history, but they cannot be applied without taking into account the greatly changed conditions which nearly always exist. Only one law of history is inexorable, that one world war after another to change or defend the territorial status quo means the extinction of our civilization. It is under this dark and permanent cloud, with its accompanying fall-out of strontium 90 in both peace and war, that we need to judge the equation of no appeasement with no negotiation.



Ever since negotiations failed to move the Soviets out of East Europe in 1945 and 1946, and especially after their surprise achievement of the hydrogen bomb in 1949, we have been arming and waiting for the necessary position of Western strength and of Russian-Chinese weakness to develop before we make settlements. This has never happened. On the contrary, the strength of the other side has grown constantly and is set to expand indefinitely. Today we probably have our last chance to negotiate a European settlement. The terms now obtainable will be worse than we could have had in the years following Stalin's death, and almost certainly worse than any which may be had after the further growth of Russian power. This is true also about the Western Pacific, where it may already be too late to mitigate the bitterness and hatred of the Chinese leaders and people against us.

The illusion of our paramount position in an American century has blinded our leaders, both lay and governmental, far too long. Instead of standing in frozen rigidity, year by year, as we did until a few months ago, abhorring summit conferences and refusing to recognize the most obvious realities in any lesser negotiations, we should accept the urgent and obvious necessity for frequent negotiations. The suggestion of Senator Fulbright and Prime Minister Macmillan that there should be regular summit meetings, annually or oftener, comports with our urgent need to live in the world as it actually is, and to try to prevent its destruction.

*Surprise attack*

4. We must never suffer another surprise attack. This is another example of a past agony which governs a great nation. The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor was a painful shock and an intense humiliation. It must not happen again—with the weapons of annihilation.

Yet there are the Soviets in possession of these weapons, and we have taught ourselves that they are wholly wicked and bent upon our undoing. If they can destroy us all on some dark night they will. Only the certainty of "massive retaliation" will deter them, Maybe detection of the onslaught would help a little, but what becomes of the billions spent on radar detection lines when it is found that high altitude bombs can blanket them? How can we detect missiles coming from a great height at 20,000 miles an hour, let alone destroy them?

These apparently insoluble problems intensify our constant preoccupation with guarantees against surprise attack, enforced by foolproof inspection on Russian soil. This goal constantly haunts and eludes us. The Soviets will not admit the inspectors while the cold war lasts, and it must continue until they do.

From this dilemma there is no way out except to work to reduce the fears and suspicions, our own as well as theirs, to promote intercourse and cooperation and confidence by all possible means. Then mutual inspection to police disarmament agreements will be both facilitated and less necessary. There are no mechanical or electronic means whereby we may be saved from a final, accidental Pearl Harbor, touched off by some trigger-nervous colonel, spy, or statesman. We can gain assurance of avoiding such an ignominious and futile end only by changes in the minds of men, beginning with our own.

*The absolute evil*

5. We must be ever on guard against absolute evil. President Truman led

the nation in the formation of this nearly universal conviction. His devil theory was most fully expressed in two addresses on March 17, 1948, in which he said that "One nation" had refused to co-operate in making peace, broken the agreements it did make, obstructed the United Nations, and destroyed both the independence and the democratic character of a whole series of nations.

This simple explanation of the failure of World War II to yield results acceptable to us was shared by so many of our leaders that it became a firm segment of the American mind. In both the Soviet government and communism, we are dealing with absolute evil. The USSR has broken all the treaties it ever signed, without any compelling reasons. It seeks both to undermine our future and to encompass our doom. As James P. Warburg has observed, this article of faith obscures from our minds all the other great forces and revolutions which are operating in the world—the inevitable consequences of the fall of Germany and Japan and the rise of Russia and China; the disintegration of European colonial rule over most of mankind; the rise of many new nationalisms; the technological revolution which constantly shrinks time and space; and the social appeals of communism.

These are some of the powerful forces which change our environment, and we cannot cope with them successfully until we understand that the Soviet and Chinese peoples are also in the grip of the same forces and that these peoples have fine qualities and magnificent abilities, that they all seek the good things of life, and that they share some high values with us. We Americans are good people and we have made wonderful contributions to the life of the world in this century, but we can continue to do so only if we come to appreciate that the same things will be increasingly true of other great peoples.

## ESSENTIALS FOR FUTURE SURVIVAL

It is obvious that in the age of nuclear weapons and space travel no nation can survive unless it rapidly adapts itself to vastly changed conditions. One nation can now destroy all the others, out of nervousness or fear, but none can prosper in the future without modifying with great rapidity the age-old concept that the main business of great powers is to fear and fight the others. If we are to escape from the frigid grip of the cold war into a world geared for future survival and fruitful competition, there are several ways by which we can find a safer role. As I see it, some of them are the following:

1. Accept the results of World War II. These results are highly distasteful to us, but infinitely less so than the consequences of another war would be. The last one brought communism to East Europe and China, but the Russians have been invaded disastrously through East Europe three times since 1914, and World War II did turn loose a giant modernizing revolution in China which was beyond our power to control. What cannot be reversed must be accepted, and in time to permit tolerable relations with the two great peoples concerned. It is now so easy to perish together, and we all have much to contribute to mankind.

### *Disengagement*

2. Prefer disengagement to national suicide. Disengagement is now a very disreputable word with us, but it must acquire respectability. The question is not whether some disengagement should be begun, but how much and when.

Our position on the China seaboard is already highly explosive and will become progressively more untenable, both physically and in the opinion of mankind, and the latter is still the decisive arbiter of human affairs. On March 27 Ralph McGill observed in his column that "We knew at the time of the airlift in 1948 that the position of the old capital of Germany was an impossible one." So it was, if the Russians had had atomic bombs. Now they have all the military power that could conceivably be needed to deny us access to the Berlin pocket. We are all resolved to stand firmly in Berlin, just as if the weapons were still machine guns, yet no one can say how it could be done, or how we could avoid beginning the shooting, since Soviet radar jammers and the swollen requirements of the great capitalist showcase we have built in Berlin forbid the success of another air-lift, even if it should be permitted. Negotiation ought to save something of our position in West Berlin, but at the best it would seem that its dazzling brilliance must diminish, and that it must cease to be an unparalleled outpost for espionage and propaganda.

Each of our two most vulnerable involvements has a common characteristic —that it cannot be defended rationally by our nuclear power. This is something which can be used rationally only if national existence is clearly at stake. At Berlin the "conventional" power of our opponents is ample to determine the issue. In the Formosa Strait this may be true a few years hence, but if it is not we must expect that the Chinese will use nuclear weapons to remove an intolerable servitude upon the life of a great people, leaving it to us to convert a local war into global desolation. This is a responsibility which no sane president can take, which is why after 1960 we imperatively require in the White House a wise and mature man who will not be stampeded into disaster, and who will negotiate constantly to avoid it.

In trying to achieve a middle ground position in the world, well away from both isolation and Fortress America, and in choosing leaders for such a policy, we might well keep in mind Walter Lippmann's observation, on April 26, 1959, that in such matters "the extreme position is a phony. It takes much more boldness and firmness and internal courage to be moderate and rational than to be a jingo and a verbal fire-eater."[1] All of the old belligerent instincts are still in us, but the nuclear age forbids their expression and satisfaction. That does not mean that we must yield everything which other peoples want, but it does mean that we should withdraw from untenable points before being compelled in each case to do so.

No one can foresee the boundaries of our long-time zone of power, but Thomas K. Finletter may have suggested its outlines in an address to the Fifth World Order Study Conference in Cleveland on November 20, 1958. It was our monopoly of atomic power, he said, which made us feel safe in "extruding" our military power "outside our own society and into Asia and Africa." This was very different from organizing the defense of the West in NATO. Our extrusion outside the West was "never good foreign policy," because it was "precisely the definition of colonialism, and is therefore a sure way of losing friends and influence in Asia and Africa."

From this it would seem logical to conclude that we can be successful in defending our own Western society, that is, Western Europe, the Americas, and Australasia. We have already set Western Europe on the path to becoming a new great power, and still another one may be on the way in South America. The defense of the West is a far cry from Fortress America—until we can help to draw all nations into one world society.

Withdrawal from a fleeting world primacy is not disgraceful and it need not be disastrous. The British have been doing it for some 200 years, nearly always in good time, and they are more mature and civilized than ever. The withdrawal of France is forced, long drawn out, exhausting, and extremely painful. Which example shall we follow?

*Military cut-back*

3. Work our way out of a military economy and the garrison state. To all of us who want the American civilization which we love to long endure, it is deeply disquieting to remember that since 1914 we have had no prosperity which was not based on war spending—either preparing for war, fighting, or repairing the devastations of war, or waging the cold war.

Worse still, we seem to be depending permanently upon 40 billion dollars of military money poured annually into the economic system, at great profit to our corporations, and with high wages for labor. There is never any trouble about "markets" for military hardware. It competes with nothing, except a multitude of civilian needs, and is quickly obsolete. Any "surpluses" can be given away to our legions of allies.

But is this a reliable way of keeping our economy going when the past shows that great arms races end in grand smashes—another time smashing everything? There is no lack of alternative means of using our labor and resources, in ways which would be economically productive. The dying hearts of our cities could use fabulous amounts of reconstruction. Our scarce school rooms and skimped education constitute a crying need. Roads and bridges, airports, slum clearance, the conservation of our critical water sources and soils—what could we not do in these directions? Yet there is complaint from the American taxpayer only against the few pennies of the federal tax dollar which do go for social purposes.

What happens, too, when the Soviets decide that they have enough stuff to destroy the Americas several times and that production of usable things, especially for foreign aid, should have heavier and heavier priority?[10]

*Economic assistance*

4. Replace foreign military aid with economic aid. If any one thing is likely to characterize our reaction to the world since 1945 it would be our obsessive certainty that Communist imperialism is a military threat to us, to be met by military means, and not primarily an economic-ideological challenge. This has led us to conceive of "mutual security" as the heavy armament of all of our client states. For years "foreign aid" has been three-quarters or more military, with a little true economic aid for development thrown in on the side.

Of course this is an inherent aspect of maintaining the containment ring. Hence in the Far East we burden the bits and pieces of Japan's former empire with our arms and our heavily armed bases, but keep them all separated economically, existing on the various forms of our military dole. We favor economic integration for West Europe, but frustrate it for East Asia, leaving some 134 million people with such an uncertain future that it can be described as "a nightmare of economic and military insecurity."[11]

[10] See the special issue of *The Nation*, "Economic Hazards of Arms Reduction: What We Must Pay for a Normal Economy in a Stable World," March 28, 1959.

[11] Helen Mears, "Nightmare in the Far East." *The Progressive*, March 1959, pp. 18–22. This insecurity is implicit in the determination of the State Department to bring about the downfall of the Chinese Communist government, as stated last August in an official memorandum: "The United States holds to the view that Communism's rule in China is not permanent and that it one day will pass. By withholding diplomatic recognition from Peiping it seeks to hasten that passing" (p. 18).



The self-defeating nature of this reliance on military aid as our salvation has led to a growing belief, in Congress and outside, that the emphasis should be reversed and far more dependence placed on helping the underdeveloped peoples, even those on the fringe of the Communist countries, to become more stable and economically self-supporting. We act on a self-defeating principle, said Walter Lippmann, because our foreign-aid contributions "have not been voted on the principle that the rich have a duty to the poor but on the theory that we are subsidizing our allies in the cold war."[12] Too often we have given aid not to help others, but to shield ourselves.

The obvious shakiness of the kind of "security" thus obtained finally led President Eisenhower to appoint a distinguished panel of ten industrialists and military men to study the whole question and this body reported on March 17—urging much more economic aid and less military? No, they urged "Arms aid rise over a long period," a long-range commitment of some $2,400,000,000 a year in military aid, and about 1 billion in economic aid![13]

The committee was unanimously in favor of standing on the ring of containment everywhere, against the constantly growing military power of the Communist bloc, with its "continuing determination to dominate the world." Therefore more and more arms and missiles must be shipped to our allies, both in Europe and Asia, to prevent our being forced into "a state of siege" and to win "ultimate victory."

The extent to which our leaders and our future have been trapped in the containment ring could not be more alarmingly demonstrated. As C. L. Sulzberger summed it up earlier:

> of the $150 billion we disbursed overseas during recent years the greater proportion has gone for direct and indirect defense. We have helped build armies incapable of fighting modern war upon economies incapable of supporting such establishments.[14]

When will our bemused taxpayers tire of military "mutual aid," the dangers and burdens of which must constantly increase? Is it not time to seek first the good of the underdeveloped peoples and let the gains for our way of life come naturally as a by-product?

*Increased trade*

5. Prepare for two-way trade with economically sovereign states. Ever since 1914 we have been shipping our resources out of the country at a fabulous rate, without an adequate compensatory return flow. Our compensations have been victory in two world wars, checking the expansion of Communism, and the acquisition of title to immense amounts of property abroad. It is the latter asset which now threatens to turn our closest friends, the Canadians and Latin Americans, into distrustful peoples determined to be economically sovereign in their own houses. Other peoples, too, are likely to react in the same way, presaging a time when we

[12] *Nashville Tennessean*, February 1, 1959.

[13] *New York Times*, March 18, 1959. Chairman Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee made an effort to right the balance by proposing a 7 billion dollar program of economic aid on April 24, 1959.

[14] *New York Times*, November 27, 1957. Sulzberger added that we work from the top down while the other side works from the bottom up, and "we have yet to capture the imagination of newly independent masses." See also his book, *What's Wrong With U.S. Foreign Policy?* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1959).

shall have to take more of a junior partner role in the operation of their economies and buy regularly from them as well as sell to them.

The time when we can expel the products of our soils, mines, and forests from the country in far greater quantity than we get back may be nearing an end. If so, will we be really poorer if we receive as much wealth as we ship out and have also better relations with the other nations?

*Evolution inevitable*

6. Leave some things to time and evolution. From one end of Africa to the other, and in all other lands, people are determined to manage their own affairs and to have their human dignity respected. This is true not only in the dying empires of the West but also in the Communist empires. The peoples of Poland, Hungary, and Tibet are examples.[15] In our own dooryard, Cuba, Venezuela, and Colombia are exhibits of peoples recently rebelling against hated rule. Everywhere, also, people are armed with the knowledge that guerrilla warfare is the great antidote to hydrogen bombs and all other forms of super power. If backed by unflagging determination and a rugged terrain, it can wear down almost any government from which the mandate of Heaven is passing.

But short of this drastic remedy, the pressure for a better life and more individual security and freedom bears upon every government in the world, including the Communist regimes. The Communists give two hostages to fortune which must be redeemed: universal education and the promise of a higher standard of living. This was fully evident, say by 1928, and it is the reason why no war to the death with Communism was or is necessary. These two solvents change the character of the Communist societies as they advance. As people have more, materially and intellectually, they demand and receive more. They are also more conservative and more afraid of war.

The rise of the Soviet people is already spectacular, and that of the Chinese promises to be meteoric. The drive of the Chinese Reds may not slow down until China is the world's greatest power, fifty years from now. Still, it may.

What we do know is that every form of social organization on earth, including our own, is subject to constant evolution. Stagnation anywhere only invites revolution. A permanent residue of poverty among us, an economy depending on militarism, and an apparently permanent army of technologically unemployed—all suggest that there is some room for beneficial evolution even here. What we have yet to grasp is that we are in a long-term competition with another way of life which requires the best that we can do in every direction, and not merely in arms competition. It is most probable that other forms of rivalry with the Communists are much more important. We shall doubtless achieve parity with them in missiles, but what about our muscles? With manual labor required of all Russians and Chinese, together with immense programs of athletic sports, what becomes of the Americans atrophying on their automobile cushions and their divans before their television sets? Missiles can be used only for destruction; healthy muscles create a wealth of constructive things. So long as we ignore vital comparisons like this and remain hypnotized with that amorphous peril, "the international Communist conspiracy," we shall continue to lose ground in the rivalry to show the uncommitted third of our fellow men which system works best.

But who is to say that our best efforts to improve our system throughout our Western society will not be good enough to preserve its main outlines and its best features? What cannot be escaped, short of nuclear suicide, is the demonstration of what the enduring values of the Communist system are, and what ours are. Shall we rely mainly upon military Maginot lines during this world-wide and inescapable competition?

*International unity*

7. Work for the unity of mankind. As the world goes forward, the outcome will not be the universal triumph of one system over the other, as expected by the Communists and feared by the capitalists, but the modification of each by competition and by other diverse ways of life, such as the Indian and the Yugoslav. What we should have eventually is the synthesis of these diversities into a greater humanity.

This has been prevented thus far by the ability of men, and especially big states, to impose their wills upon each other by force. It has been retarded also by the failure of many men, including their leaders, ever really to mature. But in a world which can no longer get along with big wars, there is no choice but to learn toleration and unity.

Man's addiction to war and his preoccupation with making it ever more destructive has made the earth a unit for war. That no longer requires any demonstration except the final one which would finish man himself. But the world is increasingly a unit for the purposes of trade. How it thrived during the Pax Britannica, and how we missed it during the Great American Depression! Soon, said A. A. Berle some time ago, the entire world will be forced to trade by the urgency of everybody's requirements. Is this not compelled by the voracious demands of so many rising industrialisms?

How then can we escape world community? Is it not much nearer than we have thought? Is it not time to change drastically our attitude toward the United Nations? Thus far we have used it as a tool in the cold war. As Henry L. Roberts stated it, in one sentence: "In virtually every case the heart of the effort was the effort to oppose, through the instrumentality of the UN, further Soviet and Communist expansion (or the consolidation of areas of postwar expansion)."[16]

Why not now use the United Nations to develop the world community, to manage aid to the underdeveloped lands, and to do all the other aspects of the work of the world which must be done?

The answer waits upon our ability to produce leaders with courage, in Lester B. Pearson's words:

> To bring about a state of affairs where no one will wish to attack us at all—or we them, where eventually walls themselves will be as much of an anachronism as trenches, barbed wire and forts on the U.S.-Canadian border. This is the supreme obligation of all men in all nations.[17]

This, too, is the kind of vision without which the people always perish. It is the vision of greater unity for which Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt fought, and for which they all died. These men were great leaders, in Adlai Stevenson's

[15] For a sensitive reporter's story of "Poland's Peaceful Revolution," *see* Flora Lewis, *A Case History of Hope* (New York: Doubleday, 1958).

[16] Henry L. Roberts, *Russia and America* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), p. 115.

[17] An address at the University of Minnesota, November 1, 1957.

words: "not because they achieved purely American purposes, but because they were able to speak for humanity at large and extend their vision to the whole family of man." [18]

This is the breadth of leadership which we must have again to enable us to stop our violent swings out of and into world politics and to find our true role as a mature and leading member of the family of nations, one among equals in the growing community o man.[19]

[18] "America's Broken Mainspring," *The Progressive*, March 1959, p. 10.

[19] On one page of *New York Times Boo Review* for March 29, 1959, two books pointe the way toward world citizenship. *Interna tional Politics in the Atomic Age*, by John E Herz (New York: Columbia University Press looked toward a gradual growth of thinkin about those interests which mankind has i common. *The Movement of World Revolu tion*, by Christopher Dawson (New York Sheed and Ward), saw the West leading to ward a realization of "a common world, base on science, technology, social democracy, an popular education."

# Soviet Diplomacy: A Challenge to Freedom

By FRANCIS O. WILCOX

ABSTRACT: Because of the nature of modern weapons, relations between the West and Russia will determine man's life in the future. All facets of Russian society are at the disposal of her diplomacy while US foreign policy is dependent on Congress, the people, and group interests. Stalin held war inevitable; his successors have adopted a policy of co-existence, however, the goal of both is world domination. Soviet diplomacy has sought to weaken the Western position; there have been several maneuvers, the latest being the German crisis. By focusing attention on Berlin, the Soviets have tried to divert attention from German unification and European security. The US is ready to negotiate disarmament agreements, but traditional Russian mistrust of foreigners will not permit full inspection. The ultimate aim of Soviet economic aid to less-developed countries is penetration and subversion. The most important weapons of Soviet diplomacy are psychological warfare and propaganda. However, our information program, based as it is on truth, is an equally strong weapon. We should not be discouraged by Soviet rigidity and inflexibility in our search for negotiation since there have been some successes, for example, agreement was reached on the Austrian State Treaty. If the West maintains itself strong militarily, adheres to the principles of the UN Charter, tries to prevent Communist subversion in less-developed lands, and actively demonstrates its values, the way of life of free people will endure.—Ed.

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*The Honorable Francis O. Wilcox, Ph.D., Dr. ès sciences politiques, Washington, D. C., is Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. Formerly, he was Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and member of the United States delegation to the United Nations Conference, San Francisco, 1945; First General Assembly of the United Nations, London, 1946; Third General Assembly, Paris, 1948; Japanese Peace Conference, San Francisco, 1951; and subsequent annual meetings of the General Assembly through 1954. Dr. Wilcox is an extensive writer and lecturer on international relations and political science.*

FOR more than half a century the members of the American Academy of Political and Social Science have made a significant contribution to better public understanding of our political and social problems. There is no more important question in world politics today than the subject of this volume—the future of Soviet-American relations.

I believe that the character of the relations between the USSR and the United States and our allies will determine the nature of man's life on this planet for generations to come. It may indeed determine whether that life itself will continue or be abruptly snuffed out. In resolving this question the role of diplomacy is highly important.

Therefore, I would like to explore with you certain aspects of Soviet diplomacy which have a significant bearing on Soviet relationships with the Free World.

## THE CENTRAL CHALLENGE

Reduced to its essentials, the key question confronting us is this: Can a democratic, free enterprise, open society successfully compete in diplomacy with a totalitarian, centrally controlled society which is able to marshal its total resources in support of its foreign policy objectives?

In a little more than forty years, the USSR has changed from a comparatively backward, agricultural country to the second-ranking industrial nation in the world. Its gross national product is now increasing between 6 and 7 per cent annually. Mr. Khrushchev confidently looks forward to the day when the economy of the Soviet Union will surpass that of the United States. Soviet technical capacity is forcefully demonstrated by the fact the Soviet Union launched the first satellite into outer space. Soviet development of intercontinental ballistic missiles underscores its present military potential.

Every facet of the USSR's regimented society—economic, scientific, social, cultural, and psychological—as well as political and military—is at the constant and immediate disposal of Soviet diplomacy.

In contrast, in the conduct of foreign policy, our government is accountable to the Congress and the people of the United States whom its Members represent. It must also take into account varied sectional and group interests. Mr. Khrushchev, however, is accountable mainly to himself, and perhaps a few of his Kremlin colleagues.

Mr. Khrushchev's ability to take independent decisions enables him to move swiftly in using trade with other nations to advance the USSR's foreign policy objectives. The Soviets offer guns and grains to carefully selected countries in order to reap maximum political advantages. They extend long-term, low-interest loans. They buy up surplus commodities—which they may not need—if it is in their national interest to do so. Whether or not these transactions are essential to their economy is immaterial to the Soviets. "We value trade least for economic reasons and most for political purposes," Mr. Khrushchev has said.

On this basis it may seem that the struggle is an unequal one. A free society, which must constantly be responsive to the pressures of public opinion, cannot move with the speed and monolithic force of a totalitarian state.

Let me emphasize, however, that free societies have invariably proved more resilient, creative and enduring than those under the deadening hand of dictatorship.

The United States has simultaneously achieved the greatest industrial capacity and the highest standard of living known to man. We have built a defense establishment which protects us and the Free World against the threat of surprise attack. In co-operation with other free nations we have developed a system of collective security arrangements which serve as a formidable deterrent to Communist aggression anywhere. Our "Marshall Plan" prevented a Communist take-over of an economically exhausted and prostrate Western Europe after World War II, and our foreign aid programs have enabled free nations to develop on an increasing scale their economic and social well-being.



These achievements can scarcely be called the dying gasps of a decadent capitalism as the Soviets would have it. On the contrary, they offer to the Free World its greatest hope for a just peace and a co-operative way of life for free men in the future.

Of course, the diplomatic arrangements of the Free World may at times appear cumbersome. This is inherent in the nature of the alliance. Nevertheless, free world diplomacy has demonstrated tremendous strength. The position of the Free World is based on real and mutual interests. Our allies are partners and not puppets. Each country understands the stakes. Each appreciates the basis for action. Each wants to co-operate in a positive way in the common interest. The recent 10th Anniversary meetings of the NATO Council clearly demonstrate this.

The handicaps of freedom in this struggle are, therefore, apparent rather than real. Its strengths are great. Not the least of these is the faith of the Free World's people in the virtue and durability of freedom itself—a faith based on experience. In my judgment, this faith—this belief in the dignity and worth of the human being—is an element of strength which gives our military power vitality and direction. This is an unbeatable combination which the Soviet Union does not have.

## CHANGES IN SOVIET DIPLOMACY

In 1946 Josef Stalin asserted that the wartime partnership between the USSR and its Western allies had been a mere expedient. This set the pattern of post-war Soviet diplomacy. He served notice that war was inevitable until international communism had supplanted capitalism. Stalin even went so far as to blueprint the economic planning which would give to the Soviet Union a mighty arsenal to wage the "inevitable" war.

Stalin's successors, on the other hand, have consistently preached the virtue of "peaceful co-existence." Nevertheless, the long-range goal of Soviet foreign policy has remained constant—world domination. Soviet foreign policy has been made up largely of a series of probes seeking out Free World vulnerabilities or attempting to create them. Its record is studded with such probes: Iran, Greece, the Berlin blockade—and through its Far Eastern partner, the Red Chinese—aggressive actions against Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan Strait and Tibet—to mention only a few. The latest and most immediate of these is the current crisis in Germany.

## THE GERMAN CRISIS

Let us examine just what the situation in Berlin involves.

First of all, it is a deliberately staged and carefully timed Soviet maneuver designed in part to divide the Free World. The Soviet rulers are well aware that communism flourishes in conditions of tension and unrest. They have never hesitated to attempt to create such conditions when they considered this to be in their interest.

By artificially creating a "crisis" over Berlin, they seek to divert attention from the real issues of German unification and European security. They seek to draw us into negotiations on isolated

aspects of these problems whenever they think they have an advantage. Berlin is but one aspect, and certainly not the basic one, of the German problem as a whole. Many suggestions have been advanced for a solution of the "Berlin problem," including some involving the United Nations. However, for the reasons I have mentioned, the United States is not interested in discussing formulas for Berlin as an isolated question.

Second—and most important—the Soviet Union is hoping to build up the international status of the East German regime and thereby bring about the permanent division of Germany. This is the only way its puppet regime, the so-called German Democratic Republic, can survive. In the longer run, the future of the satellite empire of Eastern Europe likewise hangs in the balance.

Finally, the Soviet Union hopes to eliminate the monument to freedom which West Berlin constitutes deep inside the Communist bloc. However, as long as West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany are allied with the West and remain strong in their determination to maintain their freedom, they will stand as a symbol of the right of the German people freely to determine their future. Given this situation, the Soviets will not be able to achieve their objectives.

That is why the Soviet Union is now trying to launch a course of events designed to extend its rule to Germany as a whole and to exclude Free World influence in the area. The aim of the Soviet Union is not only to bring about the withdrawal of all Western forces from Berlin, but also the withdrawal of all American forces from the continent.

Having said this, it should be clear how vital a stake we have at this moment in Germany and in Berlin. Our forces are in West Berlin as a matter of right, on the basis of solemn international obligations to which the Soviet Union is a party. Mr. Khrushchev's proposals mean simply that the Soviet Union is now threatening, deliberately and unilaterally, to disregard these obligations if we do not agree to conclude a "peace treaty" with Germany on Soviet terms.

President Eisenhower emphasized an important principle in his speech to the nation on March 16. He made clear that we cannot accept the right of any government to break, unilaterally, solemn agreements to which we and others are parties. This principle must be upheld.

You will recall that for more than a decade the Western powers have been trying—in every feasible way—to bring about the unification of Germany. The Soviet Union has frustrated every such effort. One scarcely need ask why.

Establishment of a free, unified Germany does not coincide with the long-range objectives of the Soviet Union. At the least, it would mean postponing the communization of Europe, which remains a Soviet goal of long standing.

The course we should pursue in these circumstances is clear. We must never succumb to Soviet blandishments. Our heritage of freedom requires us to stand firm. At the same time we must make unmistakably clear our willingness and readiness to engage, as reasonable men should, in meaningful negotiations.

Such negotiations must have, as their primary purpose, the maintenance of our rights in Berlin until the unification of Germany is achieved under conditions which will assure its people of their right to a government of their own choosing. We cannot and we will not betray the trust of those millions of free Germans who depend upon the Free World to protect them.

Since World War I we have repeatedly seen that hesitation and lack of resolution on the part of free countries invite aggression. As President Eisenhower recently declared,

> . . . all history has taught us the grim lesson that no nation has ever been successful in avoiding the terrors of war by refusing to defend its rights. . . . The risk of war is minimized if we stand firm.

Even with good faith on both sides—which the Soviet Union has not always demonstrated—we cannot hope to settle the complex problem of Germany overnight. We can, however, continue to expect that a sound beginning can be made. Firmness, combined with reasonableness, now may be the most important key to meaningful negotiations with the Soviet Union. To follow any other course would invite the gravest perils to all we hold dear.

## DISARMAMENT

The problem of disarmament gives us yet another vantage point from which to view the challenge of Soviet diplomacy to the Free World. Here, the use of diplomacy to achieve the objectives of international communism has been subordinated to certain traditional Russian attitudes and concepts. These apparently must be maintained in order to perpetuate the present Soviet system.

Traditionally, both Imperial and Soviet Russia has suspected, distrusted, and even feared nearly everything foreign. They have normally regarded the outsider as a threat to the system imposed on the Russian people. We cannot afford to ignore this facet of Russian behavior, which is one of the driving forces of Soviet disarmament policy.

The United States and its allies have consistently sought agreement on comprehensive and balanced disarmament under effective international control. Such control naturally requires sufficient inspection on both sides in order to be reasonably certain that the terms of any agreement are in fact lived up to. In our proposals, inspection involves entry into the territory of the parties to the agreement, although both the United States and the United Nations have made it clear it must be carried out in such a way that no state would have cause to feel its security is endangered. It is on the question of inspection, however, that we have encountered almost insurmountable difficulties with the Soviet Union.

We remain ready and willing to negotiate effective disarmament agreements. We are prepared to permit Soviet representatives to participate in inspection arrangements in our territory. We do not fear their presence. In the circumstances envisaged, we would have nothing to hide.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, continues to fear the presence and the impact of Western representatives in its territory. Consequently, it resists—almost psychopathically—effective international inspection.

Let me give you some illustrations. Shortly after World War II, when the United States had a nuclear monopoly, we submitted the so-called Baruch Plan for international control of atomic energy. This plan—which was one of the most generous proposals made in the history of sovereign states—was designed to insure that man's new knowledge of the atom would be used for the good of mankind. It provided for certain inspection and control arrangements to this end. This would have opened the Soviet Union—and the United States—to foreign inspectors. The Soviet Union rejected the plan.

Since last October we have sought to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests under an effective control system. When Free World and Soviet experts agreed last summer that it was possible to establish an effective control system to police an agreement to dis-

continue testing, we were hopeful that this indicated a significant change in Soviet attitudes. Now, after nearly five months of continuous negotiations with the Soviets, we find ourselves up against the same old stumbling block—the question of inspection and control.

The Geneva nuclear test talks are now stalled on three key issues. These are the question of the veto, the question of on-site inspection of suspected violations of the agreement, and the staffing of the control posts. On each of these issues the Soviet position reflects its traditional desire to deny or restrict access to Soviet territory to foreigners.

Let us look first at the problem of the veto.

The Soviet Union insists that there must be unanimity of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union on all matters of substance under the agreement. This would include amendments to the treaty; all matters relating to possible treaty violations; the findings of inspection teams; the dispatch of inspection teams to investigate possible nuclear explosions; changes in the control system; positioning of control posts; and all fiscal, administrative, logistic, and personnel questions.

Obviously, the application of the veto power on this broad scale would render the control system meaningless and ineffective. The Soviet Union has advanced various technical arguments to support its position, but it appears to me that its main interest is to be sure that the machinery of the control system will in no way impair the ability of the Soviet Union to isolate its people from external influences.

This Soviet attitude is further borne out by the Russian proposals concerning on-site inspections. Here, too, the Soviet Union maintains that any inspection of an explosion or an unidentified event should only be made on the basis of unanimous decision. But it is perfectly clear to us that unless inspection teams can be dispatched without hindrance, there can be no effective control system.

The Soviet Union objects to having teams of this nature cross its frontiers because, they allege, such teams could act as a cover for espionage. We have sought to meet this fear by expressing our willingness to have the host country prescribe the routes to be taken by on-site inspection teams and to assign liaison officers to ensure that the teams do not exceed their proper functions.

The control mechanism to police an agreement to discontinue nuclear weapons tests recommended by the Conference of Experts provided for establishment of control posts in various parts of the world. We believe that the supervisory and technical personnel of such control posts should *not* be nationals of the countries in which the posts are located. We are quite willing to have such posts in this country supervised by Soviet nationals. By the same token, control posts in the Soviet Union should not be supervised by Soviet citizens, but by others.

It is true that the Soviet Union has expressed willingness to accept a limited number of non-Soviet personnel in the control posts located in the Soviet Union. At the same time, it has refused to clarify the duties and privileges of such personnel. Apparently they would serve as mere observers. It appears that what the Soviets really want is self-inspection within their territory, which, in turn, would insure continued Soviet isolation from outside influence.

Can anyone believe that such a system—made up of Soviet inspectors—would provide us with the safeguards we need? Can anyone believe that Soviet nationals would be permitted to report Soviet violations of the agreement—and to report them promptly?



The Geneva nuclear talks will be resumed in the next few days. We sincerely hope that the Soviet Union may come to realize that the conclusion of an agreement for the discontinuance of nuclear testing, with an effective control system, is much more in its interests than its traditional policy of shutting off its territory from foreigners. Certainly if they really want nuclear tests discontinued, we can make progress.

Time is on our side. Technological progress and constantly increasing mass communication facilities are making it more and more difficult for Soviet leaders to maintain the isolation of their people from the rest of the world. As the Soviet Union expands its own industrial and scientific facilities, contacts between the people of Soviet Russia and the Free World will continue to increase. All this brings closer the day when the Soviet policy of secrecy will be abandoned and one great obstacle to controlled disarmament will be removed.

## THE SOVIET ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE

Let us turn briefly to another aspect of Soviet diplomacy. I have mentioned the tremendously increased economic power of the Soviet Union. Armed with the formidable weapon of a totally controlled economy, Soviet diplomacy has not overlooked the golden opportunities inherent in the new wave of nationalism and the revolution of rising expectations in the underdeveloped areas.

To the Soviets in foreign trade as in every facet of foreign policy, the end justifies the means. Soviet foreign trade has always been an absolute state monopoly with Soviet leaders able to turn trade off and on or to shift its direction to suit their strategy. Nations that become dependent upon trade with the Soviet Union for their well-being may soon discover what a devastating weapon this is when it is placed in the hands of unscrupulous leaders.

Since 1954, there has been what might be called a strategic departure from the Soviet trade pattern. Eying the important prize of the newly developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the USSR is making a determined drive to penetrate and eventually subvert them. Since that year the Soviet Union, its satellites, and Communist China have extended 2.4 billion dollars worth of credits to these countries. In 1958, alone, these credits amounted to 1 billion dollars.

During 1957, Soviet bloc trade with underdeveloped Free World countries was 1.7 billion dollars. This was more than double such trade in 1954. And the upward trend is continuing.

Nor is this all. There are now 4,000 well-indoctrinated and dedicated Soviet technicians operating in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. This represents an increase of 65 per cent in a single year.

In this connection, we should not overlook the increased interest which Soviet leaders have shown in the economic, social, and humanitarian activities of the United Nations. For years they had only bitter criticism to offer for the United Nations Technical Assistance Program and the specialized agencies. More recently they have become active members of the International Labor Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organization, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. If you can't lick them, join them, now appears to be their motto.

I might add that these economic weapons have been blended by Soviet total diplomacy with carefully calculated military assistance, propaganda and political moves. Their short-range goal is

to provoke and exploit friction between these nations and those of the West. Their long-range goal is to prepare for eventual Communist subversion and take-over.

We must not forget, however, that the United States pioneered the concept of helping the underdeveloped countries advance their social and economic well-being. Our efforts in this respect are not always publicized with the fanfare and headlines that Soviet assistance programs obtain. But our programs are designed to achieve results which are solid and lasting. Soviet foreign aid has as its purpose the furthering of the USSR's goal of world domination. Our assistance from the very beginning has had but one purpose—to strengthen freedom.

I do not think it becomes a great nation like ours to boast about the assistance we have given. It is a fact, however, that the Marshall Plan constitutes only a fraction of our postwar foreign aid. If we were to add the Mutual Security Program and the contributions we have made through the Export-Import Bank, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and various other types of assistance including United Nations programs, our total foreign aid would run to something like 72 billion dollars since 1945. This figure serves as clear proof of our deep interest in helping to build a stable and a peaceful world.

Many people ask whether the United States can afford the Mutual Security Program. My answer to them would be clear and unequivocal: Of course our economy can safely bear the cost of this program. The total Mutual Security appropriation for 1959, which amounts to 3.3 billion dollars, is only 0.75 per cent of the estimated United States gross national product.

Excluding military assistance, funds for our Mutual Security Program for all economic purposes run to about two-thirds of 1 per cent of our gross national product—which is less than we spend each year for cosmetics. Our Mutual Security Program provides us with the greatest amount of security at the lowest possible dollar cost. It assists less developed free countries to build sufficient economic strength to maintain their freedom and sustain peace. I say that it is so vital to the conduct of American foreign policy that we cannot afford ***not*** to have it.

Neither we nor our allies have the complete identity between government and economy that the Soviet Union has —nor, I am sure, would we wish to. But there is a long history in the West of an effective working partnership between government and private enterprise in times when the existence of our free society has been seriously threatened. We are now living in such a time. We will continue to for the foreseeable future. I suggest that the hour has come when we should find new, imaginative, and effective ways to implement a vigorous and voluntary working relationship between free enterprise and free government.

## SOVIET PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES

In the arsenal of Soviet total diplomacy, no weapons are more important than those of psychological warfare and propaganda. In addition to its own gigantic propaganda machine at home, the USSR exploits the many opportunities to advance its objectives which are presented by the world-wide network of mass communications media, both free and controlled.

For example, every time Mr. Khrushchev makes a speech, the text is normally faithfully and fully reported throughout the Free World in its press and by other mass information media. Similarly every Soviet diplomatic note of any importance is printed. Even the cocktail talk of Mr. Khrushchev is reported as news in the Free World, thus presenting the Soviet Union with a tailor-made trial balloon device. His statements can readily be denied—and have been—when it suits the Soviet purpose. If the balloon floats, informal conversation may be elevated to the dignity of a pronouncement of state policy.

In sharp contrast, the addresses of Western leaders, and their press conferences, diplomatic correspondence, and formal statements of policy, are almost never published in full in the Soviet press and often are not even summarized. On those rare occasions when they are published, it is invariably after considerable delay. Even more, the texts which are quoted are frequently emasculated, interlarded with editorial comment and very often accompanied by lengthy rebuttal. President Eisenhower's recent address to the nation on the Berlin crisis was reported in the Soviet Union in the usual selective terms. For example, his assertion that ". . . the American and Western peoples do not want war" was not reported by any major Soviet media.

These are but a few striking examples of how Soviet diplomacy utilizes and exploits media of public information as a weapon. In spite of their talk about "the ruling circles," the Soviet leaders are well aware that real power in the Free World ultimately rests with the general public rather than any governing group. They know full well that every utterance or action of an American diplomat receives closest public scrutiny and criticism. Soviet leaders, therefore, seize every opportunity to appeal to the people of the Free World over the heads of their governments. Such appeals, which are often accompanied by distortion and plain untruth, are a standard technique of Soviet diplomacy.



In combatting this world-wide Soviet propaganda campaign, our information program based on truth has become a potent weapon. Its emphasis on fact and moderate tone have given it a growing reputation for reliability that has resulted in a vast and constantly increasing audience among the peoples in the Communist empire. The best testimony to the effectiveness of the United States Information Agency is the fact that the Soviets spend more money on jamming its broadcasts than the United States Information Agency spends on its entire operation.

I might also add that each issue of the Agency's magazine, *America Illustrated*, is a sell-out the moment it arrives on the Soviet newsstands. Obviously there is a growing number of Soviet citizens who want to know the truth. Indeed, their number may be much greater than we think.

## CONCLUDING COMMENTS

In view of the frustrations we have encountered, some Americans seem to oppose any serious attempt to negotiate with the Russians. Given the unreasonable attitude of the Soviet Union, the argument runs, given their rigid approach towards world problems, how can we ever expect to arrive at any serious agreement with them?

Admittedly, there is much to be said for this argument. The fact is the Soviets are inflexible. They are rigid. They are unbending. They are difficult, uncompromising, stubborn, intractable and obdurate.

But the facts also show that it is not impossible to find important areas of agreement with the Soviet Union. Three examples will suffice to make my point. In 1955, after 10 long years of frustrating negotiations, they finally agreed to the Austrian State Treaty. In 1957, after considerable opposition, they signed the Statute of the International

Atomic Energy Agency. Finally, in 1958, after extremely difficult negotiations, they agreed to the terms of the Lacy-Zaroubin Exchange Agreement.

Now these examples demonstrate that perhaps it is not impossible to get blood out of a turnip. They demonstrate that, if we search hard enough and persistently enough, it is not impossible to find certain areas of agreement with the Soviet Union.

No one can doubt that the task ahead of us will be a long and tedious one. It will call for many years of determined effort and sustained sacrifice on the part of the free peoples everywhere.

In our negotiations with the Russians we should always remember that they are not an impatient people. They are never in a hurry to get away from an international conference. They believe that history is on their side. And they are content to bide their time, constantly testing and probing for soft spots.

On our part we must do what we can, therefore, to develop an infinite amount of patience. Moreover, if we are to throw back the Communist challenge, we must display at least as much firmness, persistence, and determination as the Russians.

If we will pursue this course, Soviet leaders—encouraged by world opinion—may come to realize that it is in their own national interest to relax tensions and to come to further agreement with Free World nations.

Above all, we must never give up our eternal quest for a just peace. We must never give way to despair. We must never allow ourselves to become fatalistic about the prospects of war.

Thucydides reminds us that fatalism tends to produce what it dreads, for men do not oppose that which they consider inevitable.

In these circumstances, Free World strategy should be clear. If the free nations will hold fast to those policies which deter armed attack; if they will continue to support the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter; if they can, through constructive economic programs, prevent Communist subversion in the underdeveloped areas; and if they will demonstrate, by word and deed, the enduring values of freedom, then we can be sure the cause of free men will prevail.

* * *

## QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: I do not quite understand your point of linking the discontinuance of nuclear tests to the general problem of disarmament.

A: We are, of course, handling the problem of nuclear tests in a separate discussion at Geneva, and I am hopeful that we can arrive at an agreement without necessarily reaching agreement on disarmament. I think I was really making the observation that if we could make progress in establishing the beginnings of an effective control and inspection system in connection with the discontinuance of nuclear tests, this really would open the door and make more likely some real progress in the field of disarmament as a whole.

Q: Inasmuch as the basis of the Yalta agreement and the international climate toward the end of the war were a division of the world into spheres of influence, do you not think, Mr. Wilcox, that the Soviet Union has kept her sphere of influence intact whereas the West, the Free World, has failed to do so? Inasmuch as the Communist world does not allow any revolution within its own sphere of influence, but the Free World does allow revolution—even from the Communist side—within its own sphere, do you not think it would be better, inasmuch as the West has given up trying to liberate the countries of Europe and of the Communist world, to return to the divided sphere of influence?

A. My answer to that could be quite long. I shall try to make it short. I think we must never take the eyes of man off the great goals of liberty and freedom in the world. Once you take away the emphasis upon the dignity and the worth of the human being and the possibility of his achieving the right to govern himself in his own way, according to his own choosing, then I think you have taken away one of the most attractive arguments the Free World has to offer. I would hate to admit that large groups of people are forever compelled to live in a kind of controlled authoritarian society which does not give them the right to run their own affairs as human beings ought to have. Now I realize that is an idealistic sort of reply to your question. It does seem to me, however, that even though, for the moment perhaps, it is not feasible to do anything very concrete to help these people achieve their own destiny and to enable them to reach those heights to which all people would aspire, it would be unfortunate if you were to write them off at this time and suggest that they are forever condemned to live in that kind of system.

Q: Mr. Wilcox, have you found any indication of improvement in the education of our professional servants in the foreign service, are they acquainting themselves with the basic documents and the declared intentions of the opponents? In other words, are we much further ahead than the British Foreign Office whose officers went down to read *Mein Kampf* in August 1939?

A: I think there has been a good deal of improvement over the last decade, indeed since the beginning of the postwar period, in the in-service training of our foreign service officers. There are now a great many courses which are available in the Department of State, in the National War College, and in various other colleges which are set up by the government. Documentation is made available. I'm very pleased, frankly, with the great progress we have made in recent years in enabling foreign service officers to keep abreast of developments as we move along in these very difficult and turbulent times.

Q: Mr. Wilcox has rightfully pointed out the Soviet policy of dividing nations and ruling. I wonder if that has not been the policy of all imperialist nations before the Soviet Union?

A: My knowledge of history, I fear, is not profound enough to enable me to answer that question because I do not at the moment have at my disposal the facts which would permit me to evaluate the activities of all imperialist nations. You would have to define also what you mean by imperialist nation. It is true that in the past, aggressor nations, if I can substitute that term, have found from time immemorial that where they are confronted with an alliance of states which are determined to prevent the spread of power, the best way to achieve their objective, of course, is to divide the alliance if they can do so—to split it apart, to weaken them in their determination to hold to the alli-

ance, and to proceed to take them over one at a time. This is obviously a very elementary principle of power politics.

Q: I have two questions, and I am afraid I cannot formulate them in one sentence. The first concerns the double standard in the United Nations as practiced by the Soviet Union. I wonder whether, in view of the Soviet proposals that United Nations forces replace the Western forces in Berlin, it would not be useful to point out the way the Soviet Union uses the United Nations for her own purposes. Whenever the United Nations would replace Western power they support it, but the same Soviet Union systematically forbids the United Nations to affirm any kind of presence wherever Soviet power is effective.

A: It is true of course that in the history of the United Nations since 1945 the Soviet Union has not been enthusiastic about furnishing or making arrangements for the furnishing of troops for the United Nations, either to put down aggression or to take care of the other threats to the peace that might arise. They oppose the creation of troops under Article 43 of the Charter. They, of course, were very much opposed to the creation of the force at the time of the Korean incident. They did not approve the idea of sending the United Nations emergency force into Egypt. They did not like the idea of establishing the United Nations observer group in Lebanon, and they have made it quite clear that any attempt to create a United Nations force at this time on anything like a permanent basis would be vigorously opposed by them. Now when you refer to the United Nations troops in Berlin I do not think you would include East Berlin, would you? I think you are referring to United Nations forces in West Berlin.

Q: I would like to ask Secretary Wilcox whether he does not think that the technical aspects of disarmament have been and are being overemphasized. I specifically ask whether this is not a case of putting the cart before the horse and forgetting that the man behind the trigger is more important than the gun. I ask further whether the real solution to the problem of disarmament is not a political solution; that the real search for disarmament is to seek consistently popular controls wherever there are weapons which can destroy mankind; that the real road to disarmament is a political road, freedom, and popular control?

A: The question is whether we are not putting too much emphasis upon the technical aspects of disarmament and whether the political aspects ought not to be emphasized more. I certainly agree that if, as, and when, the great powers move in the direction of easing tensions and of solving some of the important political questions in the world the problem of disarmament will begin to take care of itself. I cannot imagine a situation in which the world moves ahead with a solution of its political problems without at the same time moving ahead in the direction of disarmament. Indeed, I think the pressures for disarmament in the countries involved would be so great under those circumstances that it would be very difficult to continue the armament we have at our present level. I think that it would be a very natural thing; it would be almost inevitable to have the level of armed forces drop rather considerably.

Q: Much stress has been laid, and is being laid, on the propaganda of the Soviet Union. My question is: Can we criticize the propaganda of the Soviet Union fairly? Are we approaching this problem with clean hands in this country?



A: I think the gentlemen of the press are perhaps in a better position to answer that question than I am. They are more expert in these areas. Yes, I think that we are in a reasonable position in being somewhat critical of the propaganda techniques of the Soviet Union. At least in a democratic country you have an opportunity to present the views and counterviews. I think it was Mark Twain who said that a lie travels around the earth while truth is putting on its shoes. If you are only permitted to tell lies, or if you are only permitted to tell one side of the story, or an unbalanced side, then it is extremely difficult for reason to catch up with it. But if you can put forth all kinds of points of view, then reasonable men at least can do what they can to ferret out the truth. I think the truth will perhaps prevail, but it certainly cannot prevail where it is not permitted to be presented.

Q: Does not the very nature of Western democracy prevent foreign diplomacy from being carried out as effectively as Russian diplomacy?

A: This problem arises in a variety of ways in a free society. The people look on the mistakes which are made by the inevitable processes of freedom, and they say to themselves: Would it not be much better if we would set up a dictator, have him make the decisions, and have him avoid all these foolish mistakes which we sometimes make in a free system. Sometimes these temptations, I think, are very insidious in their appeal to the human mind, and we must not let ourselves be misled by the fact that in the long run a free society has many strengths that a totalitarian system can never have.

Q: First I would like to clarify, if I could, a statement which I think Mr. Wilcox made. Did Mr. Wilcox say that he felt it either impossible or unwise to require unanimity of opinion in the matters of inspection and control, say with regard to atomic testing? Did you make that statement?

A: I did.

Q: My question then is, What, then, is your reaction to the value of any agreement that might be placed or based on, say, a majority of Great Britain and the United States without the agreement of the Soviet Union in this particular matter?

A: I think that an agreement reached by the United States and the United Kingdom in the field of nuclear testing without the Soviet Union's agreement would not be worth very much. With respect to the broader question that you raised, we feel that the three ought to be in agreement on general principles. However, when it comes to the minute detail of all the ramifications of the control and inspection process—if for example, there is a noise somewhere in the Soviet Union or in the United States or somewhere else that the scientists think might be an explosion—should any one member of the control system have the right to say: Oh no, the control team ought not to go there, the inspection team ought not to be permitted to go there. We think that it ought to follow that when such an incident occurs the inspection team should automatically perform its function and that no single member of the team should have the right to block the

inspection at every turn and every corner. It is a question of detail which is involved. If you have to have unanimity at every step of the way, then it becomes a very difficult and very tedious procedure, indeed.

Q: Why are we so afraid to negotiate with the Soviet Union? Should they not be afraid since we have the better argument? Why should we not be delighted to put our best egg heads, with the most quick brains and all the material at their fingertips, opposite them at the table and poke fun at them if they refer back to outmoded nineteenth century doctrines with our twentieth century superiority?

A: I have never been against egg heads. The fact that I was in the academic profession at one time, I think, would tend to bear that out. But the question you raised is a very important one and a very serious one, and I do not think that I can handle it in very short compass to your satisfaction. I would say this, that the United States government has always stood ready to discuss its problems with the other countries of the world whenever that seemed to be desirable from their point of view or from ours to do so. I do not think that we have ever refused access to the Department of State, or to diplomatic channels, or in any other way, or ever attempted to block an honest discussion of mutual problems. Now the method, the time, and the place for those discussions, of course, are things that have to be considered in the light of the objectives of our diplomacy, in the light of the state of public opinion in the world, and so on. Insofar as summit conferences are concerned, if that is what you are driving at, sir, we of course stand ready to participate in a summit conference if the discussions that take place in the Foreign Ministers meeting would seem to justify that. I should hope that they would. On the other hand, we have always taken the view that we do not see any advantage that can be derived from a four-ring circus, or from a summit conference that is destined in advance to be a spectacle and merely used for propaganda purposes by the Soviet Union. If there is some real indication that they are willing to move forward and make progress in the solution of our mutual problems, then, of course, we are ready to go right ahead with them.

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## *POLITICAL THOUGHT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*

MAX BELOFF. *The Great Powers: Essays in Twentieth Century Politics.* Pp. 240. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959. $4.50.

Every writer about human affairs is personally involved. One does not escape this by retreating into ancient history. The Pharaoh Ikhnaton is as good a touchstone of a present-day writer's prepossessions as President Franklin D. Roosevelt is. One of the sixteen essays in this volume is on F.D.R.'s rather less controversial predecessor and namesake. Another is on de Tocqueville—a sympathetic and penetrating appreciation of a great man whose work does not "date." Most of the rest are on current topics, and, even in the essay on Theodore Roosevelt, the main theme running through the book comes out.

The book is an elegy on Western Europe's recent ascendancy in the world. Professor Beloff has a nostalgia for this. He also has a sentiment for Israel, both for Israel's own sake and because its establishment on Arab ground is an offset to the recession of the West European powers from their former position in Asia and Africa. Both these feelings of Professor Beloff's make him dislike the present Asian and African movement for political independence, and also dislike, perhaps even more, the tendency in the United States to sympathize with it. He cannot bear the American tradition of anti-colonialism; and he boils over in his essay on "the Predicament of American Foreign Policy," where he deals with the Anglo-Franco-Israeli invasion of Egypt in the fall of 1956. Here all his angels are ranged on one side and two of his devils—the United States and the Soviet Union—on the other.

There are, of course, obvious adverse comments to be made on the political emancipation of the peoples recently under colonial rule. They have been winning their independence without having the experience or the personnel to work the difficult Western system of self-government. Perhaps they will never be able to work it. Anyway, the break-up of the great West-European colonial empire into a patchwork of smaller national states does not make economic sense in an age when the progress of technology is increasing the scale of practical operations of all kinds. Professor Beloff, who is a close student of federal institutions, points out that, under present-day conditions, federation can be of little help as an expedient for re-creating the larger political units that technology is now demanding. In the age of the welfare state, the classical division of powers between a federal government and its component states has become unworkable. All states with federal constitutions are now rapidly becoming unitary states in reality. Moreover, even if a federation of West European states were practicable, this would not make Western Europe strong

enough to stand alone; a comprehensive Western federation including the United States is out of the question.

All this is sound sense, but it is negative. The limitations of federalism as a cure-all and the practical weaknesses of Asian-African nationalism ought, of course, to be taken to heart. What, then, should be the West's positive policy? Professor Beloff seems to hanker after a policy of sitting on the safety valve:

> In Indo-China the French were successfully prevented by the United States from restoring their authority until it was too late to check the spread of Communism. A weaker British Government gave way largely to American pressure over the evacuation of Suez, with possibly fatal consequences to the authority and influence of the non-Soviet world in the whole Middle East.

The assumptions made in these two sentences are highly disputable, but Professor Beloff does not argue them. He just makes them and passes on.

"The United States belongs with the rich and not with the poor, and can get nowhere with an ideology proper to the latter countries." This reads like a paraphrase of the Communist doctrine that the capitalist powers are the enemies of the human race. Yet what was it that started up the present-day Asian and African resistance movements that Professor Beloff deprecates? What else but a shot, fired in 1776, that has been "heard round the world." Is that shot to be regretted?

ARNOLD TOYNBEE
Professor of International History, Emeritus
University of London
Retired Director of Studies
Royal Institute of International Affairs

C. L. SULZBERGER. *What's Wrong With U. S. Foreign Policy*. Pp. 255. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959. $4.50.

This is a good book well worth reading. It summarizes the deficiencies of American foreign policy as they appear to an astute and experienced reporter whose *New York Times* column "Foreign Affairs" has been dealing with the subject regularly since 1954. If it tends to reiterate the obvious this is the function of the commentators in a free press serving a democracy. How else can sound public opinion catch up with the needs of the day? And the reiteration is certainly both necessary and wholesome in view of the enormous lag between American public opinion and the facts of international life.

What is wrong with United States foreign policy? According to Mr. Sulzberger quite a lot.

First, our society itself is full of moral weakness and immaturity. Being a democracy this has an evil influence on our foreign policy. Our locker-room civilization sneers at egg heads. Yet we, above all peoples, need more brains in government. The intolerant waves of McCarthyism have drowned much of the self-respecting integrity in the Foreign Service. Those who are left hesitate to stick their necks out by telling the truth. We think it extravagant to pay adequate salaries and decent representation allowances to ambassadors. Hence able dedicated public servants cannot afford expensive posts, and we are relegated to rich amateurs, some better than others, in diplomatic posts of critical importance in the cold war. Our educational system is so deficient that we cannot find qualified diplomats who can speak the language of the country to which they are accredited.

We believe that we still control our national destiny and hence become impatient with secretaries of state who tell us the truth—that we are only one of a number of powers engaged in a long, long, tedious struggle for survival and, one hopes, peace.

We love to have our public servants promise the millennium to oppressed peoples the world over and destruction to the communist brutes who oppose justice, right, and America; meanwhile we acquiesce in the denial of the equal protection of the laws to our own negro minority, little appreciating that most of the world has skins darker than our own; and we would drive from public office the elected officials who dare to propose the taxes, the laws, and the sacrifices necessary to achieve our proclaimed objectives. What we need, says Mr. Sulzberger, is a good—and humble—look at ourselves.



Next, those who conduct our foreign policy have made rather a mess of things. We have given too much military aid to countries who can't afford it and don't know what to do with it. Our leaders have made a fetish of opposing communism and building up phony nationalism, frequently headed by dictators, when in fact our enemy is imperialism. The gap between the haves and the have nots is growing, yet we spend our money giving the Pakistani dictators obsolete weapons which they may one day turn against India, Afghanistan, or even their own downtrodden peoples, while denying adequate aid to the ill-clothed, the ill-housed, and the ill-fed. We persist in recognizing Latvia, Esthonia, and Lithuania —all nations doomed to extinction—while refusing deplomatic relations with China, the wave of the future in Asia. Mr. Dulles has destroyed the power of the State Department to plan and think while demonstrating again that lawyers do not make good Secretaries of State because they never look beyond the negotiation of the moment.

Our leadership has permitted our armed strength to disintegrate until it is no longer able to support the professed objectives of our foreign policy.

More specifically and in considerable detail, Mr. Sulzberger points out the deficiencies of our foreign policy in Europe, the Middle East, India, China, and Japan. In each instance his bill of particulars is well drawn and devastating. He finds that everywhere we are pursuing an outmoded policy quite unsuited for the needs of the day and conducive to nothing but further disaster in each area. He does profess a certain timid optimism with respect to Europe. However the book was written before the Berlin crisis.

Because he believes them of less short-range importance, the author does not deal with foreign policy in Latin America, Africa, Canada, or Australia.

The indictment is convincing. It is when one approaches the remedy that Mr. Sulzberger's prescription appears something less than a cure-all for the disease of inadequate leadership based on national mass materialism and indifference. In the end he has not much more to offer than "pondered realism" and "let the dust settle" plus a plea for more "'flexibility" and "imagination" in the conduct of foreign policy.

Yet one should not be too harsh with Mr. Sulzberger because he does not have all the answers. Who, indeed, does? It is the function of the discerning commentator to diagnose the difficulty. Others should be called on to prescribe the cure.

If this book should set a hundred first-class minds working on how to save freedom and America from our own shortcomings and the designs of our enemies it will have performed a valuable function.

To this reviewer, the place to start is with new leadership: leadership born, one might hope, in the twentieth century; leadership which is prepared to read, to listen, to think, to act with patience and intelligence; leadership with a decent respect for the past but leadership which, above all, recognizes that the resounding slogans of a day that has gone can be of little help in solving the incredibly difficult and different problems which confront our foreign policy today, tomorrow, and for many a long year ahead.

Perhaps that leadership, in both political parties, is just around the corner.

JOSEPH S. CLARK
United States Senator from Pennsylvania

DAVID SPITZ. *Democracy and the Challenge of Power*. Pp. ix, 228. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. $5.00.

Why is democracy as well as oligarchy guilty of impairments of liberty? Professor Spitz, well known for his *Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought*, appears admirably equipped to furnish us a considered answer.

He begins by probing the abuses of power to which man is exposed under democratic auspices. Although consent is presented as the primary source of power in a democracy, the highly generalized implications of this concept are not overlooked. Indeed, consent may be said to

exist even though no citizen identifies himself fully with all aspects of the government's program. A high degree of consent obviously raises a proportionate barrier to abuses of power that are offensive to such consent. But the author is aware of the "considerable disparity between the principles that men verbally espouse and the practices by which they actually live" (p. 17). These practices may be governmental; they may be political in a broader sense; no less significantly, they may be private. As the author shows, "abuses of private powers" form an important part of the larger problem.

Having assessed the incidence as well as the causes of inroads into man's rights under democratic government, Professor Spitz turns to the control of power. He examines first the "principle of responsibility," including the shredding effects of checks and balances. Next he takes up the "appeal to right principles," the "appeal to the right man," and conceivable modifications in the characteristics of both majority rule and the social order. Instead of holding forth a final answer, the concluding chapter is devoted to the "quest for a solution." It ends on this note: "Whether reason, so feeble in its persuasive power in the past, can yet prove equal to the task is still an enigma of the future" (p. 179).

No thoughtful reader, however, is likely to lay down Professor Spitz's essay with a sense of disappointment. It is rich in themes and bursting with relevance. It does not waver in the face of both ugly facts and taxing dilemmas. And its honesty is enhanced by careful writing. The great merit of the book lies in its attempt at penetrating beyond the conventional dimensions of the problem—on the one hand, the structure of authority and the ways of gaining access to it; on the other, the institutional arrangements available to the individual in the defense of his rights. But the result seems to be that the argument is being caught in a vast circular drift. Power would certainly be in safer hands if those wielding it could be made to "perceive the true values" (p. 47). But when they "would rather have power than be right" (p. 145), they are more likely to stay wrong. True, ultimately the restraint of power rests in the "intrinsic sense of decency of a people" (p. 178). Yet can one say more than repeat Jefferson's hope that the people, when straying off the path of the constitution, might come back to it again—a return unlikely to occur save for the stature of the people's leadership, in all walks of life?

FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX
Adjunct Professor of Political Science
American University
Washington, D. C.

G. D. H. COLE. *A History of Socialist Thought*, Vol. IV, Parts I & II: *Communism and Social Democracy, 1914–1931*. Pp. x, 454; vii, 457–939. London: MacMillan & Company; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958. $14.50.

This is the fourth volume of Cole's *A History of Socialist Thought*. In the Preface, he expresses the hope to complete the work in a fifth volume that would carry the story up to 1945. Alas, we shall never see that conclusion, for Professor Cole died on January 14, 1959, in London. Yet our grief over his premature death is alleviated by the fact that he had, at least, the opportunity of writing the history of Socialist thought from 1789 to 1931; actually, the story goes beyond that date in many places, so that his effort is by no means an incomplete fragment, but a full-fledged history of socialism from its earliest beginnings to the 1930's. Nothing quite like Cole's monumental history has ever been undertaken before, and it is highly doubtful that it will be tried again for many years to come. Taken together, his *History of Socialist Thought* is a veritable encyclopedia, a source of reference that no student of modern social thought and movements will afford to miss.

Even more than the preceding, particularly the very early, volumes, the present installment is a record of the Socialist movements in different parts of the world rather than of Socialist thought. This is due to two reasons: first, in its earlier stages, socialism was essentially an intellectual force, confined to a relatively small number of individuals. As it developed into large popular parties and movements, its theoretical orientation became insepa-



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rable from its operation as a practical political group. Thus, English socialism in the 1880's was largely thought or the literary propagation of ideas. Yet English socialism in the twentieth century can hardly be understood apart from the Labour Party, the labor unions, the co-operatives, and the other mass organizations which form the backbone of the Labour Party, and within which the basic ideas of socialism and social reform are hammered out in day-to-day operations. Secondly, the reason why, in Cole's record, the story of Socialist thought gradually becomes the story of the various Socialist movements throughout the world is that, unlike the international Communist movement, there is no authoritative definition of Socialist principles by any one country, one party, or—much less—by one man. Paradoxically, therefore, the more socialism spreads throughout the world, the more diverse becomes the spectrum of Socialist thought and opinion.

The present volume of Cole's is therefore organized largely according to countries rather than outstanding individual thinkers or issues, as was more frequently the case in his earlier volumes. One important gain that ensues from this method of treating the material is that the reader thus acquires easy access to information about socialism in countries that are generally not very systematically covered, such as Spain and Portugal, Latin America, Japan, India, and Indonesia, to mention but a few. Breadth of treatment often results in thinness and superficiality, but this is decidedly not so in this case, as the present volume runs to over 900 pages, while covering a period of less than twenty years.

Professor Cole always thought of himself as an out-and-out internationalist in the Socialist movement, yet his basic, and implicit, sympathies reflect a very English outlook. The dissent of socialism was not enough for him, and he always sought for formulas which dissented from dissent. Thus, in England he sympathized with the Independent Labour Party rather than with the Labour Party. In Germany, the Independent Socialists of the 1920's appeal to him more than the Social Democrats. In Russia, the Mensheviks and anarchists strike a stronger chord of response in him than the Bolsheviks.

During his long literary career, Cole wrote dozens of books, from technical economic treatises to books on philosophy, not to speak of his hobby of writing detective novels. In the opinion of this reviewer, his four-volume *History of Socialist Thought* will remain his magnum opus, destined to endure for generations as the standard work in the field.

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN
Professor of Politics
Princeton University

GERHARD LEIBHOLZ. *Strukturprobleme der Modernen Demokratie.* Pp. ix, 304. Karlsruhe, Germany: Verlag C. F. Müller, 1958. DM 18.80.

This volume brings together within two covers a variety of articles, addresses, and papers contributed over a period of some three decades by a senior professor of the law faculty of the University of Göttingen who has also been associated with the Federal Constitutional Court at Karlsruhe. It is subdivided into four sections, the second of which accounts for approximately half of the pages and gives the title to the entire collection. The other three sections consist of articles or papers dealing with Democracy and Electoral Laws, Democracy and the Totalitarian State, and Political Theory.

The ideas of a senior law professor in a West German university are naturally of interest to American scholars and this interest is heightened by the experience which the author has had with the youthful but vigorous Federal Constitutional Court. A collection of writings over a period of time stretching from the last years of the Weimar Republic, through the troubled days of the Allied Occupation, and well down into the period of the West German Federal Republic—it is significant that the years of the Nazi regime represent a blank—presents certain difficulties and on the whole may be regarded by some readers as a less satisfactory vehicle than a single monograph in which the author draws together well-rounded conclusions. Papers dealing with electoral laws, struc-

tural problems of modern democracies, democracy and totalitarian states, and political theory must suggest the scattered pellets from a shotgun rather than the more cohesive charge from a rifle. This difficulty is somewhat accentuated by the diverse purpose of the papers—some were originally intended for scholars and are quite detailed in analysis with extensive bibliographical notes while others are much more general in character, having been prepared for radio broadcasting.

It is interesting, even at times exciting, to compare the writings of a German scholar in the pre-Hitler era with those of the postwar period. At the same time one is sometimes left with a feeling of uncertainty and would like to put the query: What is the final, considered judgment which Professor Leibholtz would offer on these several major problems after his many years of observation and study?

HAROLD ZINK
Professor of Political Science
Ohio State University

THOMAS GILBY. *The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas*. Pp. xxvi, 357. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. $5.00.

This distinguished Dominican scholar has added another volume on St. Thomas' polity to his previous studies. The present intent is not so much to present the medievalist's political philosophy as to observe the influences at work which formed his thought. The author reminds his readers that "although his [Aquinas'] politics were subsidiary to his philosophy and theology, they represented his response to his situation; they cannot be properly exhibited by moving a sort of permanent Thomist platform backwards into history."

A brief introduction sketches the predominating political practices of the times of St. Thomas as expressive of the political convictions then prevailing. For the subsequent ninety pages there follows a richly detailed account of the influences bearing upon the problem of governance: theological, legal, literary, and philosophical. The major part of the book is devoted to an exposition of what St. Thomas added to this background in response as well as in reaction to it. An analysis of St. Thomas' notion of law discloses how his philosophical approach enabled him to weld together disparate elements into a new and comprehensive view of law as reason at work. A discussion of human law, its nature, limits, and its relation to political society points out the constitutionalism of medieval provenance which other scholars have repeatedly celebrated in their studies. The seventh and longest chapter, "Citizenship and Eccentricity," analyzes extensively the notions of justice, community, common good, legal justice and moral virtue, the corporate group, and the state as a "person." The influence of Aristotle receives separate treatment with particular emphasis upon the Stagirite's contribution to the whole theory of the nature and kinds of political society. The first part of the concluding chapter rather summarily assesses the influence of St. Thomas which, negligible in his own times, came into its own with the Spanish revival and the pontificate of Leo XIII. The volume ends with a broad outline of the development of human groups from the primitive community-group through the political group to a society of fellowship.

Father Gilby has made a noteworthy contribution to the greater and more precise knowledge and understanding of St. Thomas' political philosophy by intertwining the political practices and theories of the Schoolman's times and his own reaction and response to it. The result is a historical-speculative synthesis which for many may still serve as the broad basis for the establishment of the secular state. It is this supposition which constitutes the modernity of the medieval Friar. St. Thomas finished no formal political treatise yet his collated political reflections preserve the individual immune from collective absorption and define a political sociality which endures between the hazards of anarchic individualism and its alternate respondent, the absolute state. He was the philosopher par excellence of orderly relations derived from an order of essential exigencies. Unfortunately the balance he struck between political Augustinism and Aristotelianism was upset after his death by the clericals on the one hand and the secularists on the other. He had clearly defined the universal primacy of the Pope, he had also established the existence of political rights which needed no prior ecclesiastical ratification. His philosophy of law still remains the valid presupposition for the supremacy of law in the juridical order; the divine descent of authority through the natural law marked off the scope of human law as well as its limitations and the conditions for its exercise by men over their equals. Obedience to political authority was seen as the prerequisite that equal men may be more free in an order of law. St. Thomas may be credited with providing a reason of state long before the post-Reformation polities set antinomies between men's spiritual and temporal allegiances.

This scholarly volume should be of great use for university studies on St. Thomas' political philosophy and should invite more of the same approach to the medievalist in the hope of increasing our knowledge and of passing in review upon Father Gilby's own reflections. One reluctant demurrer, Father Gilby apparently cannot resist—in any of his publications—occasional idiomatic popularisms and modern allusions which annoy rather than please and enlighten—at least this reader.

JOSEPH F. COSTANZO
Professor of Political Philosophy
Graduate School
Fordham University

FERNAND VAN LANGENHOVE. *La crise du système du securité collective des Nations Unies 1946–1957*. Pp. 272. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff; Brussels: Institut Royal des Relationes Internationales, 1958. No price.

This sociological study by the president of the Royal Institute examines the crisis in the relations of the United Nations growing out of the cold war between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, and the character of the *effort d'adaptation* to save the organization from ruin.

The principal authors of the United Nations Charter—Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union—based the system of the United Nations on the assumption that, after the conclusion of the common struggle and victory over the Axis powers, their own declared wartime friendship and co-operation would continue and develop harmoniously in the post-war period. They also assumed that, acting in concert under the Charter, their chief concern would be to forestall or terminate breaches of the peace by the secondary powers and small states, and prevent the resurgence of the defeated Axis powers.

Actually, well before the war ended, there were signs that the leaders of the Soviet Union not only did not trust their Western Allies, but that they intended to exploit the coming victory for the aggrandizement of the USSR and the advancement of communism against the ideological enemy, capitalism. Thus events were soon to reveal that the assumption of postwar friendship and collaboration between the Soviet Union and the Western powers was quite unwarranted. Moreover, the greatest threat to peace was to come not from the small states or from the former enemy, but was to be generated by the cold war which developed in intensity among the chief architects of the Charter themselves as a result of the intransigence of the leaders of the Soviet Union.

In the post-war period the Russians have talked brusquely to their former allies, acted unilaterally in matters of international concern, frequently employed the veto in the United Nations to paralyze the organization, and pursued aggressive policies detrimental to world peace and security. Such a state of affairs was not anticipated by the framers of the Charter. The Soviet Union as a great power and permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations occupied a privileged position which theoretically made it exempt under the Charter from punitive action by the United Nations. Nor could the Charter be amended if opposed by the Soviet Union.

Frustrated by this situation, the Western powers, following the lead of the United States, concluded that the General Assembly must be utilized to the fullest extent under the Charter, particularly as a world forum to mobilize and express public opinion; and in December 1947 the General Assembly itself decided that an Interim

Committee, or "Little Assembly," should be established to enable it to function more continuously and efficaciously on behalf of peace and security.

The final chapter of the study under review analyzes the complementary system of regional security provided in Articles 52 to 54 of the United Nations Charter; and discusses the character and utility of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and other regional arrangements of the post-war period especially designed to provide more effective security against aggression.

FRANK M. RUSSELL
Professor of Political Science, Emeritus
University of California
Berkeley

RUTH B. RUSSELL assisted by JEANNETTE E. MUTHER. *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940–1945.* Pp. xviii, 1140. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1958. $10.00.

This book is, in order of publication, the fourth of seven volumes of a comprehensive inquiry into the history, organization, and performance of the United Nations. The other published volumes have dealt with the functions of the United Nations to maintain peace and promote general welfare, and with the proposal to reform the organization. The volumes to come will cover organization and procedures, regional security, and overall appraisal from the point of view of the United States.

The author of the present volume has enjoyed all the facilities required for a definite piece of historical writing. She was on the staff of Leo Pasvolsky, the principal United States articulator of the proposals that, processed through the various war-time conferences and committees, were finally put before the San Francisco Conference. Miss Russell also had access to records of the Department of State not before tapped. She had an excellent array of advisers and has written from sufficient distance in time to allow for perspective. It is obvious that she has made the best of these advantages.

The volume outlines first the early American thinking on the post-war world, beginning with the Atlantic Charter (pp. 11–204). Secondly, the American preparations for Dumbarton Oaks are discussed (pp. 205–410), followed by the conference itself, as well as the subsequent Malta and Yalta Conferences (pp. 411–544). The American preparations for San Francisco, including the clarification of the Inter-American position at the Mexico City Conference (pp. 551–624), are followed by the final chapter on the San Francisco Conference (pp. 625–968). The page scope of the last chapter, as well as of the preceding sections, indicates the attention to detail with which the topics are treated. The book concludes with an Appendix consisting largely of photographic reproductions of the essential documents.

If the quality of the book as a historical document cannot be questioned, its subject matter evokes mixed reactions. For those many who, as this reviewer, have lived through a period of high hopes that the United Nations was a definite road toward more rational political procedures in the world, this is melancholy reading. The factual tone of the historian brings out with all the deserved mercilessness those many reasons for the limited effectiveness of the world organizations that have been built into it because of the arrogant pretenses and assumptions of the big powers, and of the immature state of international political thinking. Although the original authoritarian conception of the four-power directorate was substantially blunted in San Francisco by the effort of the smaller states, the basic scheme remained and ran the inevitable course in the cold war environment, the elements of which, Miss Russell points out, were well sensed, but not taken into account, by the American architects of the post-war world.

JARO MAYDA
Professor of Law
University of Puerto Rico

WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy.* Pp. 219. Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Company, 1959. $4.75.

This volume, by a leading student of American diplomatic history, is intended to alert Americans to grave weaknesses in their past and present foreign policy and to suggest changed policies for the future. Professor Williams deserves plaudits for an economic interpretation brilliantly done, and all readers will profit from his tightly reasoned analyses; nevertheless, some of his viewpoints are highly controversial, and as such they are bound to be weighed. It is Professor Williams' contention that the dominant impulse in American foreign policy throughout the twentieth century has been the Open Door Policy, a policy which he defines as "a program of imperial expansion" instigated by "America's corporate leadership" to extend the frontiers of an ever-enlarging economy. The Open Door, he argues, is no less imperialistic "simply because it spurned territorial and administrative colonialism in favor of an empire of economics, ideology, and bases."

According to Professor Williams, the policies of President Woodrow Wilson represented the "broadest kind" of imperialism. "Wilson accepted the Open Door Policy as the strategy of American leadership and expansion. Article X was his basic proposal concerning tactics—the means of putting the strategy into operation." Nor did Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal "seek any fundamental change in the traditional policies of economic and ideological empire." F.D.R. "sustained and sought to extend the expansion of the American corporate system," and he continued the practice "of using economic pressure to protect American corporations and bankers." Even the Good Neighbor Policy "was defined by the immediate and specific needs of American businessmen."

By 1945, the policy of "open-door expansion" had been transformed "from a utopian idea into an ideology." One zealous believer, the author avers, was President Roosevelt's successor; shortly after his inauguration, "Truman made it clear that he intended to reform the world on American terms." It was that fateful "decision of the great majority of American leaders to employ the power of the United States in keeping with the traditional policy of the open door which crystalized the cold war." United States intransigence had "left the Russians with but one option: if they did not accept American proposals, they were confronted by American hostility."

The tragedy of American diplomacy, thinks Professor Williams, is "that it denies American ideas and ideals." While the Open Door Policy has "built an empire" for the United States, "it has not initiated and sustained the balanced and equitable development of the areas into which America expanded." And it has, in the face of insistent popular demand for revolutionary change throughout the world, thrust the United States into the role of defender of the Western-imposed status quo.

WILLIAM M. ARMSTRONG
Associate Professor of History
Fairleigh Dickinson University

## *AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY*

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR. *The Age of Roosevelt,* Vol. II: *The Coming of the New Deal.* Pp. xii, 669. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958. $6.75.

This book, Volume II of *The Age of Roosevelt,* has followed rapidly after *The Crisis of the Old Order.* There is no evidence of shoddy writing, of any lack of acquaintance with the materials, of any conclusions hastily drawn, or of any interpretations marred by false premises. To the contrary, *The Coming of the New Deal* reveals the high caliber of historical writing for which Professor Schlesinger is well known. With the appearance of this book one of the major works on recent American history is well on its way. Readers of the very best in historical literature will eagerly await the other volumes of this magnum opus.

Only two years of the New Deal Era are discussed in this book. Foreign affairs, with the single exception of the reciprocal trade pacts, were reserved for a later volume. The author deals here almost entirely with the domestic scene.

The New Deal was one of action, experiments, failures, and successes. Some who held key positions in the first two years of

Franklin Roosevelt's administration were wealthy, some were poor; most of them were middle class. As the author well says, only one thing united them—ideas.

If the bankers received first attention upon F.D.R.'s inauguration, it was the Department of Agriculture, with its "mystic" Secretary Henry Wallace, that initiated the New Deal program with the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA). Not the enactment of this law in the spring of 1933 but the fight in 1935 to salvage something out of the program, contends Dr. Schlesinger, made Wallace a national figure.

The National Industrial Recovery Act (NRA) was the New Deal's first law for business. Of all those making contributions to the NRA, none worked harder than Hugh Johnson. No one was more disappointed than Johnson when the President divided the administrative features of the law between him and Ickes. Perhaps because of Johnson the nation's recovery was soon identified with NRA. The role of this measure was the promotion of American unity in a grave crisis. Its best influence was social rather than economic, as Schlesinger makes clear.

Most of the New Dealers favored more nationalism, expressed in authoritative legislation. F.D.R., the humanitarian, was given more to experimentation. This trait was revealed in his handling of the monetary issue. Eventually the President decided on managed paper currency with a devalued dollar. This type of currency, coupled with government purchases of gold and silver, and supported with bilateral trade pacts, encouraged rising prices.

Only after local and state financial sources were depleted, as Professor Schlesinger writes, did the federal government attempt to provide money and work for the unemployed. This response to the cries in the streets was an emergency measure. The more permanent frontal attack on the problem was through social security. This program, now universally accepted, was a complete break with significant American inhibitions of the past.

With all of this defensive program of the New Deal there was an offensive campaign to make America a better place in which to live. The vast unprecedented conservation program, including the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), reforestation, and so forth, meant a revival of community life throughout the nation. Although F.D.R. began his administration with the support of big business he soon alienated it by such laws as the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act. A resurgence of the right was much in evidence prior to the congressional election of 1934.

For sheer enjoyment the best part of this excellent book is the "Evolution of the Presidency." Undoubtedly this is one of the best evaluations of Franklin Roosevelt as President found anywhere. F.D.R. believed competition in government, if adequately controlled, could mean creativity. The Chief Executive made the decisions and realistically controlled the government. On occasion Roosevelt engaged in low and high politics but he loved only the latter—humanized democracy through education. As no other president, he knew the usefulness of agencies of information as channels of political education. One of his greatest talents lay in the dramatization of politics.

Again Professor Schlesinger has written history that will live far beyond our times. He is to be congratulated upon establishing for the permanent record such a fine scholarly narrative of one of the most important eras of American history—the age of Roosevelt.

GEORGE C. OSBORN
Professor of Social Sciences
University of Florida

MERLE CURTI with the assistance of others. *The Making of an American Community: A Case Study of Democracy in a Frontier County.* Pp. vii, 483. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959. $8.50.

It is probable that no other document of anything like comparable brevity ever exerted so extensive and enduring an influence on the writing and interpretation of American history as the paper on "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," read by Frederick Jackson Turner, then a young professor at the University of Wisconsin, at the Chicago World's Fair in 1893. It dominated most of the historical writing which dealt with the development of the West and deeply affected the interpretation of American history in general, even that of developments after the frontier was officially closed in 1890.

It was Turner's general view that the history of the West was an example of the development of an ever-advancing frontier which created a society and social ideals that profoundly influenced the history of the whole country, both directly in the West and, by their reaction, in the East. Specifically, his thesis was that the frontier offered an abundance of free land which was open to individual ownership. This made possible a society which was free from legal oppression and the obstacles of a settled social tradition. This, in turn, led to the speedy development of democratic political institutions and practices, the creation of a high degree of social idealism, and a trend toward reformist zeal. The final result was the provision of a social laboratory in which these ideals and practices could be weighed, tested, and revised in the light of experience.

Following World War I, the Turner thesis was frequently and sharply attacked, notably by a group of the younger Marxist historians. This formidable volume publishes the results of a detailed testing of the Turner thesis by recourse to the case-study method, guided not only by historical concepts but also by the techniques of social science and statistical analysis. The work was carried out under impressive auspices. Professor Curti is one of the more distinguished American historians. He is a discriminating disciple of Turner and holds the Frederick Jackson Turner Professorship at the University of Wisconsin. He was aided by his wife, Margaret W. Curti, and three research assistants, Robert Daniel, Shaw Livermore, Jr., and Joseph Van Hise.

For their study, the group selected Trempealeau County, Wisconsin. They aimed not only to test the Turner thesis about frontier society but also to discover whether the truly objective methods of social science could be applied to a major historical problem. While the whole Turner thesis of frontier life is dealt with, special emphasis is placed on the examination of the extent to which frontier conditions promoted democratic ideals and institutions. The study covers the historical origins, the social history, the economic life, the political institutions and practices, and the culture and ideals of the community studied.

In the space available for this review, it is impossible to describe the data and methodology in any detail, but it may be observed that the work was carried out in an impressive manner, both as to thoroughness and the mastery of social science techniques. The conclusion is that: "Our study, both in its qualitative and quantitative aspects, lends support to what we believe are the main implications of Turner's thesis about the frontier and democracy, so far as Trempealeau County is concerned. . . . The story of the making of this American community is a story of progress toward democracy." It would appear to the reviewer that the vindication or refutation of the Turner thesis is more likely to be fruitfully promoted by a continuation of such studies as this than by generalized, ideological attacks or defenses, based on pre-conceived dogmas.

While the authors warn that it is a book for serious students of history rather than the general reader, the latter will find within the covers much highly interesting and illuminating material on social history.

HARRY ELMER BARNES
Malibu, California

CUSHING STROUT. *The Pragmatic Revolt in American History: Carl Becker and Charles Beard.* (Wallace Notestein Essays, No. 3.) Pp. ix, 182. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1958. $3.50.

This is a stimulating study of the ideas of Carl Becker and Charles Beard and the practice of those ideas in their writings and their public lives. It is a carefully done book, critical of the two subjects, but with affinity and tolerance for them as well.

Professor Strout links the thought of both men, yet he does not blur their differences—in temperament or ideas. His

evaluation of the contributions of both is the same: they did much to sophisticate and humanize the study of history in America. His general criticism of both is also the same: they never completely liberated their thought from the tradition of scientific history which they attacked, and their thought is therefore useful only as a point of departure. I cannot entirely agree with the latter judgment, nor with all of Professor Strout's carefully considered critical observations. I must, however, limit my comments to two points.

Professor Strout nicely places Becker and Beard in modern thought, since both were committed to the historical dimension of life. The two have more in common with the writers of New History such as Robinson and Barnes than Professor Strout recognizes. All were interested in the finite world and, in the phrase of James, "with things that have a history." The New History and the pragmatism of Becker and Beard are not different things. Moreover, the New History was more than the study of social and economic history and an exploitation of the past in the interest of reform. In essence, it was a call to the sophistication of history through the sophistication of the historian by cross-fertilization from other disciplines. The men involved had their differences but this was not because they inhabited different categories. Categories, philosophical or otherwise, do not have much relevance in understanding people who are primarily interested in the "concrete world of human history"; they are automatically antiformalists, underminers of traditional faiths, automatically empiricists and relativists.

Professor Strout explains that Becker viewed the historian as "time-locked" by the emotional and intellectual needs of his own lifetime, and his historical account is "only an illustration" of those needs. That is the theory but it is contradicted by Becker's high performance as an historian —his detachment transcended conventional barriers. Becker's "philosophy or his history must be fallacious" says Professor Strout. I think not. Relativism encourages detachment in that it brings the following point of view to the person dissecting human institutions: My conclusions cannot be labeled as "universal objective truth"; I must dissect myself and my bench marks —the things I cannot help believing—at the same time I write about the past; observable experience, not metaphysical truth or institutional thought, must be the focus of inquiry. That is the detachment of the relativist, and it sharpens analysis, encourages the asking of the important questions. If "scientific" means detachment, then the historical relativist is more scientific than the historian who thinks his account is understandable just in terms of the events of the past upon which it is based. Becker's actual detachment gives credit to his theories, and obviously such a historian is much more than "only an illustration of his contemporary climate of opinion."

Professor Strout is sketchy about his own views on history. I judge he says the historian must write within the human situation. I do not regard this as an advance from Becker or Beard, but enough; if we can get the detachment, I will not quarrel over the theories.

PHILIP SNYDER
Fullerton Junior College
Fullerton, California

THOMAS PERKINS ABERNETHY. *Western Lands and the American Revolution.* (University of Virginia Institute for Research in the Social Sciences.) Pp. xv, 410. New York: Russell and Russell, 1959. $7.50.

Students of the American Revolution will be happy to know that this reprint of Professor Abernethy's important contribution to our early western-lands history, first published in 1937, will assure the continued availability of the volume.

Based upon extensive research both in this country and in the rich collection of colonial manuscripts in the Public Record Office in England, the work under review challenges many widely-accepted historical interpretations and throws light into many a dark corner. The objectives of Franklin in the Albany Congress, the issues in Lord Dunmore's War, the significance of the Camden-Yorke opinion, Virginia's motives in declaring independence, the meaning of Maryland's insistence that her neighbors cede their western lands to Congress—these are but a few of the topics analyzed and interpreted by the author with impressive skill and insight.

Professor Abernethy has an extraordinary knack for ferreting out the motives of the land speculators. He places much emphasis on family, business, and political connections of the men seeking to exploit early America's greatest natural resource. For instance, the activities of speculator A with reference to speculator B may seem inexplicable until one discovers that A was the son-in-law or father-in-law of B. This reviewer knows of no other work which untangles and exposes these connections in so thoroughgoing a manner; this feature alone is sufficient to make the book an indispensable work of reference.

The history of early western land is exceedingly involved, tied in as it is with colonial rivalries, the intricacies of British politics, and the foibles of human nature. But whether it be the Illinois, Indiana, Loyal, Ohio, or Wabash ventures, or the Vandalia, Transylvania, or State-of-Franklin projects that are under consideration, the author presents facts and interpretations which no student of the period can afford to overlook. By 1789, claims and counter-claims to lands were piled high, overlapping, as the author says, "like shingles on a roof." The wonder is that clear titles were ever established.

The story of western lands cannot be divorced from the factionalism in the Continental Congress, the trading activities of some of that body's members, and the development of foreign policy. For this reason, Professor Abernethy includes many facts that the reader might not expect to find in a book on western lands. Altogether, the book is a vigorous, penetrating, and scholarly exposition of a very significant and complex phase of our early history.

JENNINGS B. SANDERS
Specialist for the Social Sciences
Division of Higher Education
United States Office of Education

FRANK THISTLETHWAITE. *The Anglo-American Connection in the Early Nineteenth Century.* (Studies in American Civilization, Department of American Civilization, University of Pennsylvania.) Pp. viii, 222. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959. $4.50.

Professor Thistlethwaite's lectures at the University of Pennsylvania have been developed into a short but weighty book which makes a worthy contribution to the already extensive literature on Anglo-American relations. The period chosen is that before the Civil War and, for the most part, after the war of 1812; the "Jacksonian age," the America of de Tocqueville. But the author does not attempt to cover the whole subject, even for this limited period. His major interest is the influence of radical reformers in the two nations on each other's activities; the connection "between, on the one hand, a middle-class, business, non-conformist, evangelical Britain, and, on the other, its cousinhood in the northern and western United States" (p. 160).

In this country we know best the upper-class visitors to our shores who, with a few exceptions, found crude, raw, sprawling America rather a warning than a model to England and Europe. But the working men who had supported the Chartist movement, and even the Cobdenite manufacturers, were much friendlier in their estimate of American institutions. The former said "The inhabitants of the United States are governed on the principles of Chartism, the consequence of which is that all legislation is bent towards the welfare of the many, and not of the few," whereas Cobden thought "the government of the United States to be at this moment the best in the world" (p. 43). Of course, most British reformers of all types disapproved of American slavery, but that bound them all the more closely to the abolitionists, who made a special point of celebrating "Emancipation Day"—the day when British slavery ceased in the West Indies. More copies of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* were sold, during the year after its publication, in Britain than in the United States (p. 119).

The anti-slavery movement, however, was not the only crusade of the times, though it has naturally attracted the widest attention. Peace societies, temperance so-

cieties, free trade agitation, popular institutes and lyceums for adult education, prison reform, women's rights, and a hundred other causes brought into close cooperation the do-gooders of both continents. On both sides of the ocean the same names constantly reappear, for while some were specialists for one reform only, more were making a broad Benthamite attack against all the evils of modern civilization. It was the age of the universal reformer. America really was in advance of much of Europe in some respects, such as popular education and a democratic suffrage, but another reason for our popularity with the advance guard of reform was that our thinly peopled land had room enough for experiments in communal living, such as Brook Farm and New Harmony. The left-wing churches—Quaker, Unitarian, Congregationalist—were especially active in both England and America in crusading for human betterment.

Professor Thistlethwaite closes his brief study with the reflection that in the twentieth century, America seems to be more conservative in English eyes, and England to be more radical to Americans. The two countries have, in a measure, exchanged historical roles. Yet, in the long run, liberals in both countries will be better friends than conservatives, for conservatism tends, in his opinion, toward a narrow "introverted" nationalism.

PRESTON SLOSSON
Professor of History
University of Michigan

MORTON KELLER. *In Defense of Yesterday: James M. Beck and the Politics of Conservatism 1861–1936.* Pp. 320. New York: Coward-McCann, 1958. $6.00.

This is a scholarly, thoroughly competent, biography of a man whose conservatism was so complete that it put him out of sympathy with every major trend in twentieth-century America. James M. Beck became a lonely voice protesting the centralizing, statist tendencies of Democrats and Republicans alike.

Beck began his political career in the 1880's as an anti-corporation Democrat, but by the end of the century "he realized," as his biographer puts it, "that to share in the fruits of legal service to big business he would have to take on a new political affiliation and a new social outlook" (p. 12). Attracted also by the expansionist policies of the McKinley administration, he joined the Republican Party and became Assistant Attorney General of the United States in 1900.

For a few brief years, Beck was happily in tune with his times. As Assistant Attorney General to 1903, and thereafter as a corporation lawyer, he was an eloquent spokesman for political and economic centralization. But the Progressive Movement showed that a strong central government might be used for social and economic reform; this drove Beck, like many of his corporation clients, back to the doctrines of states rights and laissez faire.

Thereafter he never changed his position. The 1920's, which seemed a period of fulfillment to many conservatives, brought no particular satisfaction to Beck. As Solicitor General in the Harding-Coolidge administration, he found it necessary to defend government intervention in which he fundamentally disbelieved. Republican laissez faire did not go far enough, and with the New Deal all his worst fears were realized. Elected to Congress from a Philadelphia district, he waged a hopeless battle against the Roosevelt program, retiring in 1934 in despair at being "one four-hundredth part of a rubber stamp" legislature. At his death in April 1936 he was working for the nomination of Alfred M. Landon, although fearful that he was altogether too much of a "liberal."

Beck was not always on the losing side. As an ardent spokesman for American intervention in World War I, as an opponent of the League, and as an active worker for the repeal of prohibition, he saw three causes triumph. But he found more and more of his real satisfaction in the contemplation of the American past, which he celebrated in speeches and writings.

Mr. Keller adds to our understanding of twentieth-century American history by viewing it through James M. Beck's career. But Beck's "politics of conservatism" were too obsolete to be representative. Most conservatives have been much more willing to make their peace with the centralizing tendencies of our times.

RANSOM E. NOBLE
Professor of History
Pratt Institute



HAMILTON, ALEXANDER. *The Mind of Alexander Hamilton: Basic Selections from His Public and Private Writings.* Edited by Saul K. Padover. Pp. vi, 461. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. $6.50.

To the existing "treasuries" of writings by outstanding Americans Dr. Padover has added a useful and provocative volume of selections from the pen of Alexander Hamilton. The book will be useful because it includes many significant writings not otherwise readily available now; it will also doubtless be provocative because Hamilton was, and still continues to be, one of the most controversial figures in our early history. The selections are organized into seven chapters of widely varying length and importance: personal papers; pre-Revolutionary pamphlets; national union and the Constitution; economic papers; foreign relations; maxims, mottoes, and brief opinions; and comments on contemporaries. Half the volume is devoted to Hamilton's economic writings and a quarter to his political and constitutional contributions. The editor prefaces the work with a biographical sketch which provides an opportunity to emphasize the "'inner disharmony" of Hamilton's character and the puzzling inconsistencies of his life and actions.

The chapter of brief selections from his personal papers is adequately annotated but from that point on the reader is pretty much on his own. Some chapters have brief headnotes and an occasional footnote, but in general the editor is content to let the documents speak for themselves. The very long chapter which includes the important economic reports, for example, has a five-line headnote but no editorial footnotes to assist the reader in understanding the text. Useful as the volume will certainly be, it would have been even more useful if Dr. Padover had provided additional guideposts along the way.

In general the selection of material is excellent; Hamilton's speeches in the New York Constitutional Ratifying Convention appear in full as do his major reports as Secretary of the Treasury. On the other hand, none of the *Federalist Papers* are included because, as the editor points out, they are easily available in inexpensive editions. This omission is probably justifiable, but one may ask whether any volume is quite properly titled *The Mind of Alexander Hamilton* which does not include at least representative passages from what is certainly his best-known contribution to American political thought.

The book will probably find its chief use as supplementary reading for college courses in political science and American economic history. It should also find a welcome place on many library shelves, both public and private, at least until such time as the comprehensive edition of Hamilton's papers, now in preparation at Columbia University, has been completed.

LEONARD W. LABAREE
Professor of History
Yale University

THOMAS JEFFERSON. *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson,* Vol. XV: *27 March 1789 to 30 November 1789.* Edited by Julian P. Boyd. William H. Gaines, Associate Editor. Pp. xxxix, 677. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1958. $10.00.

Of all the volumes which have hitherto appeared in this magnificent series, the present is unquestionably, from the European standpoint, the most interesting and important. Indeed, the time-dishonored phrase "packed with action and excitement" which movie advertisers and other purveyors of entertainment employ, could with truth be applied to the correspondence published here. These letters and documents extend through the period from March to November of 1789. Jefferson is still at his diplomatic post in Paris until he embarks on his voyage home in October. Therefore, he is the contemporary eyewitness and recorder—and, in some instances, an actual participant—of the outbreak and first climactic episode of France's Revolution.

Here then is a situation without parallel in political and literary history. The

philosopher-statesman, spokesman and co-architect of his own country's revolution, enjoying the friendship and confidence of similarly-minded leaders in the nation where he is accredited, surveys and observes, reflects and appraises, counsels and advises, while "such events as will be forever memorable in history" (p. 299) unfold before his discerning gaze. Whereas in earlier writings Jefferson had watched the French travail without apprehending how tortured it was destined to become, he now has no doubts about its profundity and significance. He calls it squarely a revolution, and names it "the first chapter of the history of European liberty" (p. 326). Through his letters we follow, almost daily, the vicissitudes of the drama; we learn in detail the attitudes of the "estates" and varied groups which make up the French body politic; we watch the maneuvers, the conspiracies, the mob scenes and dramatic strokes which mark the beginning of the end for the ancien regime. No report could be more vivid in the telling than that which relates the storming of the Bastille or the King's ride from Versailles to Paris. Jefferson sums up the prospects hopefully, since he respects the leaders of the Third Estate and shares in the principles by which they intended to draft a new constitution.

Meanwhile the new constitution is an accomplished fact in the United States. The federal government is duly inaugurated, its president and vice-president installed, and, though Jefferson only hears this at the time of his return, he is to be the Secretary of State. "The earth," he affirms, "belongs in usufruct to the living" (p. 392). He, by power of reason and of intellect, was one to ripen and enjoy the fruits.

LESLIE LIPSON
Professor of Political Science
University of California
Berkeley

HARRIS GAYLORD WARREN. *Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression.* Pp. x, 372. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. $7.00.

Professor Warren has apparently left no stone unturned to get at the whole truth of his subject. The pertinent sources and literature consulted are prodigious and the judgments are those of the expert and objective historian. Hoover had been so over-advertised that miracles were expected of him; this made all the more ironic the devastating depression. "President Hoover's willingness to undertake the drastic measures required was definitely limited by an apparently infrangible philosophy." So the budget had to be balanced though the heavens fell and there might not be even federal "loans" to provide food for destitute drought-afflicted farmers because that would be a "dole." Hoover even vetoed a bill to create an efficient Federal Employment Service. Even when hospital records were revealing babies and adults dying of starvation, the President was citing vital statistics to prove that there was no widespread undernourishment.

Hoover had an unshakable faith in the economic system as he conceived it but he failed to grasp the fact that the system is so dynamic that the textbooks on economics must be rewritten every decade. Opposition to his policies as Secretary of Commerce had come as he conceived it chiefly "from the conglomeration of professors and intellectuals tainted with mixed socialist, fascist and antique ideas."

The "insurgents" embittered him even though "they represented middle class Republicans, the social stratum to which he so obviously belonged and without whom he was lost." However, Professor Warren observes that in his first Congress Hoover "did provide so large a measure of leadership that the record, while controversial, was indeed impressive."

President Hoover's heart bled for the distressed nation as he set himself resolutely to stimulate the economic system to perform as he was sure it must to bring recovery. In the 1932 campaign Warren declares that Hoover's "defense was masterful, his revelation of Roosevelt's vacillation was merciless. On several issues impartial judges would have decided that Hoover won or at least came out even in the debate. He seemed to lose on very few issues—except at the polls."

In the three months after defeat he resolutely set to work to save the nation by persuading Roosevelt to "co-operate" on policies in the mounting catastrophe but "what he wanted was to commit Roosevelt to ratify the whole major program of the Republican administration; that is . . . the abandonment of ninety per cent of the so-called new deal." Naturally Roosevelt did not fall for this.

WILFRED E. BINKLEY
Professor of Political Science
Ohio Northern University

LUDWELL H. JOHNSON. *Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War.* Pp. 317. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. $5.00.

At a time when so much repetitious material is being produced on the Civil War era it is refreshing to read a monograph characterized by as much originality as this one. The book is well documented and thoroughly done, and the title is well chosen, since the narrative represents a careful intertwining of the play of military factors, cotton, and politics.

The scarcity of cotton in the North in 1862–63, the belief that there were large quantities of cotton owned by the Confederate government in parts of Louisiana and Arkansas, and the vision of control of Texas as a factor in supplying this commodity were all elements motivating the Red River campaign. The speculative fever connected with this staple, involving in dubious ways General Banks, Admiral Porter, and certain representatives of the Confederate government, is well analyzed.

The military campaign during the spring of 1864 was a brief one, but the author demonstrates that it was significant in a number of ways. Apart from its highly destructive character, its failure destroyed whatever chances Banks may have had for the presidency. Instead of becoming a hero who had opened up vast economic resources for the business interests of the north and new channels of revenue for the Federal government, he became a subject for investigation by the Committee on the Conduct of the War. Moreover, the futile use of Federal troops in this campaign and the postponement of the attempt to take Mobile had important bearings in prolonging the struggle between Johnston and Sherman.

Still another aspect emphasized in the detailed military narrative is the characterization of personalities. Halleck, in giving orders, is regarded as evasive and equivocal; Banks, as a courageous leader, but a political appointee with little military ability. Admiral Porter's naval acumen could hardly be determined on the basis of this campaign, since he spent much of his time battling the uncertain waters of the Red River, but the reciprocal ill feeling between him and Banks augured no good for this expedition. On the Confederate side, the different temperaments and concepts of strategy of Generals Kirby Smith and Richard Taylor sharply clashed. The author metes out some criticism to each, but seems to regard Taylor as somewhat superior in military understanding.

This monograph is remarkably free of errors. The only two noted, typographical or otherwise, were "anti-bellum" (p. 109) and "concensus" (footnote, p. 274).

HENRY H. SIMMS
Professor of History
Ohio State University

AVERY O. CRAVEN. *Civil War in the Making, 1815–1860.* (Walter Lynwood Fleming Lectures in Southern History.) Pp. xiv, 115. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959. $3.00.

Twenty years ago Professor Craven chose *The Repressible Conflict, 1830–1861* as the theme of his Walter Lynwood Fleming Lectures. What he then argued has been the subject of much discussion and some misrepresentation. He challenged the notion that the conflict was irrepressible, and pointed out how much damage was done by a small group of fire-eaters on both sides. Invited back to deliver four more lectures in the same series, Professor Craven has again drawn upon his deep knowledge of Southern history. This time he has attempted an exceptionally difficult task—to explain the ultimate sources of sectional hostility. He is too careful a scholar to look for any simple, single explanation. But while making concessions to other historians who have in some sense

revised his own revisionism, he nevertheless follows a novel line. Struck by the greater intensity of sectional controversy in the 1840's and 1850's than in previous decades, he suggests that this intensity differed in kind as well as in degree. Until the 1840's, "realities" prevailed; then it was the turn of the "abstractions." Every dispute shifted to the high ground of abstract morality; concession was viewed as "appeasement"; this was, he maintains, a nineteenth-century version of the "cold war." Why such a change? America, as Western Europe, entered the "Modern World," an era of swift and bewildering change, in which economic development both hardened the division between North and South and threw them closer together as interdependent elements in the complex structure of capitalism. Neither section, in economic terms, could ignore the other; and the situation also begot a new morality, in which the answer to the question "Am I my brother's keeper?" was an emphatic "yes."

Professor Craven is well aware of the intricacy of his theme. But one wonders whether he has allowed himself enough room to do it justice, and whether enlargement might not even weaken his case. His concepts are big and vague, his treatment necessarily sketchy. They seem to contain the seeds of another kind of determinism, a fresh doctrine of irrepressibility. Was the period from 1844 to 1851 in fact such a decisive watershed? Was the "Modern World" so sudden in gestation? Are "realities" so much more real than "abstractions"? Is the cold war parallel relevant? The wide margins of his little book, so original and provocative in scope, encourage the reader to fill them with queries and exclamations.

MARCUS CUNLIFFE
Senior Lecturer in American History and Institutions
University of Manchester
Manchester, England

NORTH CALLAHAN. *Henry Knox: General Washington's General.* Pp. xi, 404. New York: Rinehart & Company, 1958. $6.00.

At the time of Lexington and Concord, Henry Knox was a twenty-five-year-old bookseller in Boston, reading works on military science, and active in the militia. Soon he performed valuable service to the Continental cause by bringing the cannon from Ticonderoga to Boston. From that beginning he went on to become a major general, a close associate of Washington, and the head of the artillery in the Continental Army. Active in the founding of the Society of the Cincinnati, he became Secretary of War under the Confederation government. Later he was to support the movement for a stronger central government, and was to become a member of the first presidential cabinet. He retired from this last post during Washington's second term, and spent the rest of his life either in Boston or at his very elegant home and large—but not profitable—estate in Maine.

A huge man, often weighing nearly 300 pounds, Knox seems to have had an equally generous portion of loyalty and determination. He became at least a competent commander, and one of the merits of this volume is the light it sheds on his ability as a military planner. Knox certainly ranks high among the second-flight of our nation's early leaders. He was a hard worker and a good administrator. He was the long-time friend, correspondent, and sometimes confidant of such important men as Washington, Greene, John Adams, and Lafayette. The absence of a good biography of this man has been one of the more conspicuous gaps in the literature of our national beginnings.

For seven years, Mr. Callahan tells us, he has been working to fill that gap. Encouraged to undertake the research by the late Douglas Southall Freeman, this author has worked through many manuscript collections and is perhaps the first modern historian to do extensive work in the fragmentary Knox Papers. The result is the best available account of Knox's life and the major aspects of his career. Quotations from the Knox Papers are often interesting and sometimes of significance to the historian. There is little-known data on Knox as a military planner. The chapters dealing with the later years of Knox's life are perhaps the most valuable, since the last decade of his life is seldom mentioned.



Yet, in spite of the strengths noted above, the volume is disappointing. The reader does not get to know Knox as a person. The footnotes will not satisfy the scholar and will be of little interest to the general reader. Trivia are frequently documented, while novel and significant statements are unsupported. Some sources are used uncritically. The author continually emphasizes the closeness of Washington and Knox, without submitting convincing evidence. Finally, the book adds little if anything to our knowledge of the Revolution.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN
Professor and Chairman, Social Studies Department
Acting Dean of the College
State University of New York
Teachers College at Cortland

EUGENE BURDICK and ARTHUR J. BRODBECK (Eds.) *American Voting Behavior.* Pp. iv, 475. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. $7.50.

Editors Burdick and Brodbeck have collected here some twenty-two essays dealing with various aspects of voting behavior. With one or two exceptions the papers are drawn from survey research operations, such as polling, and/or psychological-psychiatric experimentation. Most of the authors are academicians; several are medical practitioners.

The range of materials treated is wide: "socialization" of political attitudes, measurement problems, irrationality and neuroticism in the making of political choices, effects of mass media on voters, group identification, psychodynamic aspects of voting behavior—these are a few of the contributed titles in *American Voting Behavior.*

The emphasis of these studies is on so-called "soft" data and on the newer approaches to political analysis. Though the breadth of treatment affords a number of first-rate papers, there is little emphasis on contemporary politics and the specifics of current political life. Aside from Key and Munger only one or two essays even touch upon such basic aspects of voting behavior as the party organization, ticket splitting, the specific of inheritance as a base of political action, the peculiar problems of political behavior in the South, and the like.

Alternatively, in the areas upon which the editors concentrate their coverage, the volume is detailed and the papers most helpful. For scholars in the field of political behavior, these essays are essential; for others, a selective examination of the volume could be very useful. Especially to be read in this category would be Peter Rossi's summary of studies in the field from Stuart Rice's *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (1928) up through the current work of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. The Rossi essay has particular value if used in conjunction with Leslie Fiedler's "Voting and Voting Studies" contribution and with Editor Burdick's own paper on "Political Theory and the Voting Studies." The usefulness of all three monographs is sharpened by R. L. Milne's comparison of British and American survey practice in his "Second Thoughts on 'Straight Fight'."

Mass media essays are also an especially useful part of this collection and Herbert Blumer, Ithiel Pool, and Kurt and Gladys Land all have interesting contributions in this area. Given the emphasis on polling and psychological approaches to voting analysis, the "hard data" specialists are represented minimally, but the Key-Munger paper on Indiana behavior patterns is an excellent example of the analytical school which seeks to "put politics back into the study of electoral behavior."

RICHARD M. SCAMMON
Director of Elections Research
Governmental Affairs Institute
Washington, D. C.

STEPHEN B. SWEENEY (Ed.) with the assistance of GEORGE S. BLAIR. *Metropolitan Analysis: Important Elements of Study and Action.* (One of a Series Commemorating the 75th Anniversary of The Wharton School and the 20th Anniversary of The Fels Institute of Local and State Government.) Pp. 189. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958. $4.50.

Examination of the action in any metropolitan area parallels, somewhat, the analy-

sis of a game in a sports' arena. The reaction of the spectator to the intricacies of the play depends largely upon his knowledge of the game, the angle from which he sees the plays, and especially on what team he favors. The latter is directly related to his possible vested interests in one side or the other, ranging from loyalty to his Alma Mater to the not-so-high ideals of financial wagers on the outcome.

At the risk of oversimplification, this reviewer sees the metropolis as an arena comprising two major elements: people and works. The first tend to be dynamic, unpredictable, changeable, quite abnormal; the second, in contrast, usually have a large factor of rigidity, permanence, and resistance to change. In the second category there are not only those fixed elements such as buildings and public works, but also very fixed—often entrenched—governmental and administrative structures which, unfortunately, become just as obsolete as the physical structures sheltering human activities, and sometimes perhaps more so.

One of the basic objectives of this study, with its workshops, conferences, prepared papers, and discussions, was an attempt to determine by what means the "rules of the game"—legislative structure—and their enforcement by the referees—administrative officials—can be modified and improved to direct and control the ever-expanding arena in which a rapidly growing number of players are participating. The challenge of injecting any measurable degree of adjustment and flexibility into a situation which is heavy with traditional, entrenched, and obsolete governmental structures, is presented and debated.

The material incorporated has been divided into three sections: the first is devoted to a discussion of the objectives and approaches of the study; the second comprises four papers—with reference to the Philadelphia area—in which four methodological approaches are analyzed: physical, social, economic, governmental. The purpose of this section is to outline a number of analyses which would provide useful and essential data of the structure within any area; the last part is primarily a review of three familiar experiments in metropolitan government: Los Angeles County, the Boston District Commission, and the Toronto Federation.

In the final paper, Dr. Gulick analyzes the mounting frustrations of metropolitan dwellers in both the central city and the suburbs. He presents an excellent case for the state to take the lead in fulfilling the requirements of metropolitan area population. While empirical research is essential to point up the extent and intensity of problems, the reviewer believes that the philosophy of Dr. Gulick rightfully stresses the need for creativeness and inventiveness in developing solutions through new and bold experiments in the field of metropolitan government action.

J. MARSHALL MILLER
Associate Professor of Planning
Columbia University

MARVER H. BERNSTEIN. *The Job of the Federal Executive.* Pp. x, 241. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1958. $3.50.

The Brookings Institution has an admirable record in noticing governmental situations or problems needing study, in collecting competent personnel and devising research or study procedures appropriate to the particular problems, and in sponsoring and pushing to completion the actual studies. The present volume, although relatively short, is among the best of these. It deals particularly with the key federal executives and the more precise conditions or environmental factors within which they carry on the government; and its method is refreshingly unique. That is, a round table was organized, made up of twenty-four persons, most of whom were high ranking executives with varying kinds and length of experience, but among them a few, such as Wallace Sayre—who became chairman—Rowland Egger, and Paul David, who lent the group both expertness and scholarly respectability. This group met in eight extended sessions over a period of three months for free, frank, and confidential discussion. Marver Bernstein served not only as another scholarly expert, but also as executive secretary responsible for the agenda and for summarizing the discussions. Out of all this came this book, to which therefore all the round table participants have contributed and of which Mr. Bernstein is as much the editor as the author. He has, however, done this combined task so well that the book, although interspersed with statements by the various participants, is a systematic, thoroughly readable analysis, and affords a fine inside view of the problems and difficulties in the federal service.

There are seven chapters which deal quite fully with such substantive problems as the work actually done by these high ranking executives, distinguishing carefully between the political and the career executive; the political setting—that is, the actual relationships, and the problems that grow out of them, to the White House, to Congress, and to the political parties and interest groups; the problem of recruiting, training—or rather, orienting and adjusting—and keeping the better executives. These are all perennial problems with which we must be continuously concerned if we are to have reasonably effective administration and reasonably responsible government. But some of them are peculiarly sensitive problems for the Eisenhower Administration, in view of the somewhat fervent feeling developed by the campaign slogans of 1952 for a thorough house-cleaning, and the consequent unusually large number of new executives, and also in view of the predilection, on the part of this administration, for businessmen generally unfamiliar with government, unaware of the differences between governmental and business operations and procedures, many of whom soon became so unhappy in their jobs as to resign and thus bring about an unusually heavy turnover. Considerable insight into both the perennial and the special problems is given in this book.

Finally, there is a concluding chapter in which "some lessons of experience" are noted out of the preceding discussions, among these lessons being the fact that government is different from business, with attention to the conditions that make it so; that "the design of the American government tends to produce conflict, friction, and tensions," and is something that always makes the task of the executive difficult at the best; but that there are, nevertheless, certain satisfactions in government jobs. There is an extensive classified Bibliography of materials relating to the federal administration, and a good Index. Altogether, this book is an illuminating contribution to an understanding of how the federal administration actually operates.

CLARENCE A. BERDAHL
Professor of Political Science
University of Illinois
Visiting Professor of Government
Southern Illinois University

## *EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY*

ERIC WALDMAN. *The Spartacist Uprising of 1919 and the Crisis of the German Socialist Movement: A Study of the Relation of Political Theory and Party Practice.* (Marquette German Studies, I.) Pp. xii, 248. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1958. $8.00.

This remarkable monograph is a study of the rift in the German Socialist movement during the First World War and of the impact of the November 1918 Revolution upon the Spartacists and Bolsheviks. The author states that he has aimed at a scholarly and objective treatment of "highly controversial issues" and made no effort to prove a particular point of view.

Part I of the book is concerned with the left wing of the Socialist party and its counteraction to nationalism and imperialism after the outbreak of international war. Part II deals with the impact of the November Revolution upon German socialism and "consolidation versus continuation of the revolution." At long last the author reaches (p. 161) the subject of the Spartacists and the January Uprising. The revolution in retrospect, conclusions and summary, the last eighteen pages of the monograph, modify points of view which are presented in the main chapters.

The author has carefully examined a majority of the primary revolutionary sources, books and articles. He cites outstanding contemporary memoirs, treatises, and books, and indicates sources that are quoted in them. He correctly states the

historical developments of the revolution concerning which there is general agreement among contemporaneous observers. His footnotes are excellent, and give the impression that this book is an outgrowth of a doctoral dissertation with a master's thesis on World War II in eastern Europe thrown in for good measure.

The fortieth anniversary of the November Revolution brought forth a number of popular and scholarly studies behind the Iron Curtain and three monographs by American scholars which present the "miscarriage," "the failure" or "the betrayal" of the Revolution by the Socialist leaders and German labor. Professor Waldman supports in general the communist viewpoint of the German revolutionary movement of 1918–1919. He omits a number of historic decisions of the Socialist Council of Peoples' Commissars which reveal the problems of Ebert's leadership at home and his resistance to the demands of the victorious four allied powers as well as the Council's belated plan to form a republican army in accordance with decisions of the Reich Congress. He omits any detailed reference to Liebknecht's ideological contributions to the left wing movement before 1914. Moreover, the author's history of the Socialist party follows approximately the line of polemics of the Communist parties and shows a lack of objectivity in evaluating highly subjective accounts. The German Socialist party cannot be dismissed with a polemic, since it survived Kaiser Wilhelm's repression, Lenin's attack, Hitler's persecution, and still flourishes. Professor Waldman omits references to the documents of the Armistice Commission, the minutes of the Council of Four concerning Germany, Poland, and Bolshevism, and the detailed secret reports of American Military Intelligence on the menace of the Free Corps. He cites the *Illustrated History of the German Revolution* which is a propaganda publication now "revised" by the East German government to commemorate the revolution.

The author concludes that during the first phase of international communism the German revolutionary movement was not "directed" by Moscow. The weight of historical evidence is that Liebknecht supported Lenin's thesis of class war in Germany, actually accepted money, guns, and an alliance from Lenin and appealed December 1918 in Berlin to "'the dregs of German society."

RALPH HASWELL LUTZ
Professor of History, Emeritus
Stanford University

GORDON A. CRAIG. *From Bismarck to Adenauer: Aspects of German Statecraft.* (The Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History, 1958.) Pp. xvii, 156. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. $4.50.

This slender volume in the distinguished series of the Albert Shaw Lectures in Diplomatic History at Johns Hopkins University resulted from the happy combination of Professor Craig's long standing interest in German affairs and in the history of diplomacy, and the study program of the Center of International Affairs at Princeton University concerned with "national differences of diplomatic style and method" (p. ix). Quite naturally, the author finds no one national diplomatic style and method in the history of Germany. Rather, and with his usual expertness, he sketches the skill of Bismarck, "one of the most illustrious masters of the art of statecraft in the modern period," the "hussar tactics of Wilhelmine statecraft" (pp. xiv–xv), the return to traditional diplomacy by the Weimar Republic, Hitler's contempt for diplomacy, and Adenauer's rise above narrow nationalism in his work for better German-French relations, his leadership role in the Western Alliance, and his success in gaining more voters' support for his foreign policy requirements than was secured by the leaders of the Weimar Republic. This summary and review is done with much insight and analytical ability, and in an attractive style.

Professor Craig's historical scholarship is evidenced by the general maturity of his discussion of the art of diplomacy in German hands, as well as by the fullness and variety of his documentation. However, in the last chapter on Adenauer's contemporary statecraft, the touch of the historian becomes less deft, and the treatment less penetrating even if most of his general statements and conclusions appear valid. For documentation too much reliance is placed upon *Der Spiegel*—a flashy imitation of *Time* magazine—and two pro-Adenauer biographies which, together, are referred to in almost half the footnotes of the chapter. Statements of German Social Democratic criticism—and even of reluctant admiration—are neglected, though some other voices from the ranks of the opposition are heard.

JOHN BROWN MASON
Professor of Government
Georgetown University

GERHARD RITTER. *The German Resistance: Carl Goerdeler's Struggle against Tyranny.* Translated by R. T. Clark. Pp. 330. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. $7.50.

The German resistance movement is today a pivotal topic in the literature devoted to analyzing the last years of the Third Reich. A performance of distinction in this field is Gerhard Ritter's study of Carl Goerdeler. Ritter is the most fertile and one of the most penetrating of German historians; moreover, he was himself a member of the resistance movement and suffered arrest in the tragic confusion which followed the attempt to assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944. His book is, therefore, both source material and interpretation.

Ritter concentrates on the political career of Goerdeler, a civil servant who rose to become mayor of Leipzig and commissioner for price control under the Brüning government. Goerdeler was affiliated with the national German people's party, but he remained aloof from the blind and obstinate leadership of Hugenberg, one of the many lackeys in the German high-bourgeoisie who helped Hitler rise to power. We touch here on one of the paradoxes of the German resistance movement. The greater number of its adherents were neither socialists nor communists, but high-ranking officers and civil servants. It is not difficult to ascertain the reasons for this apparent anomaly. The army and the rightist bourgeoisie bore a heavy responsibility for the Hitler triumph of 1933. They facilitated his ascent either by active machinations, as did von Schleicher, or by collaboration, as was the case with von Blomberg and von Schwerin, or by tacit consent. Goerdeler was no exception. He was quite willing to collaborate with Hitler in the beginning. Neither he, nor Beck, nor von Stauffenberg took exception to the numerous crimes committed by the Nazis since early in 1933. Humanitarian considerations were at low ebb in Germany, and those who voiced any protest they might feel against government by violence, outrage, and persecution were few and far between.

The awakening came in 1937, when it became apparent that Nazi leadership would inevitably turn to war for the final solutions of the multitudinous problems created by the Versailles treaty. Ritter confirms the report that the chief of staff, von Halder, was prepared to thwart aggression against Czechoslovakia in 1938 by staging a coup d'etat. Chamberlain's visits and the Munich agreement, however, cut the ground from under such plans. The responsibility of the Western powers for the failure of this earliest attempt cannot be denied, since the plans of the conspirators had been conveyed to their diplomats.

After 1938, the efforts to eliminate Hitler incurred more difficulties. His military triumphs had enhanced his prestige, the security belt that protected him was constantly reinforced, and his remarkable instinct for apprehending potential danger furnished him with those miraculous escapes from traps in which he might otherwise have perished. The opposition to Hitler evidenced no lack of courage, but it did reveal inexperience and an absence of revolutionary will-power. The leaders did not realize that the "revolution of nihilism" could not be undone by police action. They wanted to play it safe, and the quip, "assassins with *Pensionsberechtigung*," is not wholly unjustified. Moved by a wish to exonerate themselves before history and posterity, they kept records and lists of names which fell eventually into the hands of the Gestapo, and facilitated the round-up of most of their members. Prussian officers and civil servants do not make for "professional revolutionaries," and only men animated with the

same determination as the Nazis could hope to cope with them successfully.

Goerdeler, like von Hassell, was surprisingly naïve in his political plans for the future of Germany. Ritter's book reveals that he had by no means left German nationalism behind. The work, however, is not an apology. Ritter is quite conscious of the fact that the German resistance movement was a failure, "a revolt simply of conscience." Even as a revolutionary moved by his conscience, Goerdeler seems, in the eyes of this reviewer, inferior to such figures as von Treskow, who preferred to take their own lives rather than reveal to the Gestapo the range of the conspiracy.

Ritter leaves us without a final answer to the ultimate motives that led Goerdeler in the role of pretender for the leadership of a new Germany. Others, like Margret Boveri, in her *Der Verrat im XX. Jahrhundert*, have dealt with Goerdeler less mercifully, and accuse him of having been the self-appointed meddler in these tragic events. He was, perhaps, too old to combat the National Socialist movement unhampered by the prejudices of his earlier career, which was, after all, that of a German notable before 1933.

GERHARD MASUR
Professor and Chairman
Department of History
Sweet Briar College

J. ALDEN NICHOLS. *Germany after Bismarck: The Caprivi Era, 1890–1894.* Pp. xii, 404. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958. $7.50.

The period between the dismissal of Bismarck and the close of World War I—1890 to 1918—the Wilhelmian Epoch, was an era of "'contradictions, perplexities, and paradoxes." Prussia-Germany was beset by currents of glittering material prosperity, a relative decline of agriculture, conflicts between monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, and the rise of such critical "-isms" as imperialism, socialism, materialism, and racism. Above all, there was the problem of what sort of political system would succeed that forged by the *Blut-und-Eisen* Chancellor.


For the first four years of the Second Reich the new Chancellor was General Georg Leo von Caprivi, a Prussian Army officer and former head of the German Admiralty. It became the almost impossible task for this conscientious old soldier to handle the complex political creation that had escaped from the hands of its creator. Caprivi had no intention of changing the structure of the Bismarckian Reich, but he was determined to alter its methods and to reconcile the deep animosities that had arisen. The methodical Caprivi had to work within the shadows cast by a still alive and protesting Bismarck as well as with his own impulsive and fickle master, William II. More, he had to face the uncompromising hostility of the Prussian Junkers, that elegant, tough caste which eventually succeeded in acquiring his scalp.

Caprivi wanted compromise in both foreign and domestic affairs instead of the classic Bismarckian policy of *divide et impera,* and desired to substitute "his own 'dictatorship' of honest and essential good will for Bismarck's ruthless, unscrupulous opportunism." But, irresistibly, under the pressure of events he was unconsciously drawn to the democratic idea. Under his chancellorship the anti-Socialist law was eliminated, paternalistic labor laws introduced, a conciliatory policy adopted toward the Poles, the period of military service reduced from three to two years, a series of commercial treaties made with Germany's neighbors, and a progressive income tax introduced into Prussia. All this made Caprivi popular among the liberals and at the same time a target for outraged conservative Prussian landowners.

The story of the Caprivi era is told brilliantly in this model scholarly study by J. Alden Nichols. After a brief introduction on Bismarck, the author treats the early days of the New Course with attention to Caprivi's personality, his legislative program, and the renewal of the Triple Alliance. Successive chapters are devoted to the internal crises on the School Bill, the Big Army Bill, the trade treaties, and the final Conservative triumph.

Beautifully organized on a chronological basis, this book successfully portrays the personal tragedy of the obscure and nearly forgotten Caprivi and also gives a picture



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in depth of the lines and sources of political power that followed Bismarck's dictatorship. The documentation is excellent: the author has consulted not only the tremendous Bismarck literature but also the collection of Caprivi papers in the Berlin *Hauptarchiv* as well as the recently published *Holstein Papers*. Equally important, Dr. Alden is not only a solid scholar but a superb writer whose style flows admirably.

The conclusion is eminently just: "The post-Bismarck period started with high hopes which for one reason or another were soon blighted. This history of the era is largely one of the slow and often painful awakening of the German Nation to the real nature of the constitution of its Reich" (p. 367).

LOUIS L. SNYDER
Professor of History
City College of New York

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF. *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age.* (Praeger Publications in Russian History and World Communism, No. 71.) Pp. xvi, 283. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. $4.50.

Dr. Garthoff's latest book is part of the current series of studies on Soviet military strategy published by Frederick A. Praeger. This series represents a praiseworthy effort to explore a little known aspect of Soviet thinking. Studies in this field have appeared from time to time, but most scholars in the once small community of specialists on the USSR, it is fair to say, have avoided military affairs as much through lack of interest as through absence of materials on which they felt they could base plausible conclusions. The materials are still meagre, as Dr. Garthoff admits; full files of his major source, the theoretical journal *Military Thought*, "are not available here, for obvious reasons" (p. 256). But in the nuclear age it is an act of irresponsibility to ignore any longer this important aspect of Soviet thought. Dr. Garthoff's studies do much to repair this gap.

The Russians, Dr. Garthoff concludes, are not seeking to gain their objectives through war, but rather through "forceful political measures short of war" (p. 13). Still they systematically strengthen their military establishment to reinforce their diplomacy, to deter the United States—whose intentions they persistently mistrust—and to provide the necessary defense of the USSR should war occur. Some observers, Dr. Garthoff notes, detect a lag in Soviet military thinking, despite a conscious, and fairly public, effort after Stalin's death to bring their strategies abreast of the times. The lag is said to be reflected in their continued failure to appreciate the "growing potentialities for destruction and radioactive contamination on such a scale as to render almost meaningless the idea of fighting a total war" (p. 189). But is this a "lag," Dr. Garthoff asks. "A future war might be over in days, but if it weren't, would the side which had planned a long war be guilty of a 'lag'?" (p. 90). This reflects the author's central conclusion on Soviet strategy: a balanced development of all their forces and weapons, both traditional and modern, to meet all contingencies. Combined with this is their determination to remain flexible in their strategic decisions in order to be able to select the "most advantageous and least costly of alternatives" in any situation (p. 249). For both the balance and the flexibility Dr. Garthoff has the healthiest respect.

A reviewer not conversant with military affairs, such as the present writer, can hardly comment wisely on Dr. Garthoff's conclusions. Something, however, might be said about the author's occasional laxity in interpreting political evidence. For instance, in treating the era just before Stalin's death he claims, on no firmer evidence than his own assertion of it, Khrushchev's complicity in the infamous "doctors' plot," then proceeds to argue—in line with a theory he is evolving—that this shows Khrushchev's preference for Konev over Zhukov (p. 21). On another occasion he asserts, on hardly better evidence, a bid by Khrushchev in 1955 to have history rewritten to show him as a war hero, then reads into the failure of certain generals to support his "bid" a sign of their obstinacy, which ultimately led to their eclipse in political life (p. 25 ff.). In both

cases the premises are too shaky to support the conclusions drawn from them. Neither of these passages, of course, is central to Dr. Garthoff's revelations. Yet they cannot fail to raise some question as to his care in treating "evidence" in more purely military affairs. If there is a lesson to be drawn from this, it is perhaps that students of the USSR should avoid the temptation, in dealing with matters outside their specialty—in this case, politics—to descend to speculations more characteristic of journalism than scholarship.

CHARLES B. MCLANE
Professor of Russian Civilization
Dartmouth College

ROY D. LAIRD. *Collective Farming in Russia: A Political Study of the Soviet Kolkhozy.* (Social Science Studies.) Pp. v, 176. Lawrence: University of Kansas Publications, 1958. $2.50 paperbound; $3.25 hardbound.

Professor Laird presents here a readable introductory description of the basic organizational unit in Soviet agriculture. Its emphasis, as the title suggests, is political rather than economic or social. After a twenty-five page presentation of historical background, parts II and III of the study contain seventy-five pages outlining the evolution of the Soviet collective farm before World War II. The most original contribution comes in the final forty-eight page section describing changing Soviet agricultural institutions since the war. The author has managed to include brief treatment of the 1958 demise of Machine Tractor Stations.

The reader is given an introduction to the aspects of ideology and public administration on a Soviet collective farm. Professor Laird draws on the standard Western analyses by Jasny, Volin, and others; lays considerable weight on monographs by postwar Soviet *émigrés;* and cites a considerable number of primary Soviet sources, mostly in periodicals. There is no analysis of farming methods, and practically no economic or statistical analysis of agricultural performance, though the author's earlier work showed him quite capable of comparative analysis in this area.

This study will be a useful addition to reading lists for both students and teachers in courses on comparative economic systems. While it does not pretend to offer fundamental additions to our understanding of the Soviet record, its review of recent developments is so far the only compact alternative to a scattered series of journal articles.

The Bibliography provides a convenient checklist of almost all the basic Western literature in English on Soviet agriculture, and of many Soviet sources as well. Meticulous readers will be offended by poor proofreading, both in the English text and in the Russian transliterations, but the substance of the study is not appreciably impaired. All in all, readers will find this a stimulating introduction to the subject, well designed to lead them on to further study of the field.

HOLLAND HUNTER
Associate Professor of Economics
Haverford College

RICHARD CHARQUES. *The Twilight of Imperial Russia.* Pp. 256. Fair Lawn, N. J.: Essential Books, 1959. $6.00.

Richard Charques' volume is an unpretentious, matter-of-fact account of the reign of the last Russian emperor, Nicholas II. The author keeps much to the surface and successfully avoids the temptation of burdening his readers with details; this approach may well be the counsel of wisdom although it does not make the study any more informative. The narrative opens with a brief survey of Russian conditions in the middle 1890's when Nicholas II succeeded his father, Alexander III, and then moves through the principal domestic developments and policies to the downfall of the empire in March 1917. Foreign relations receive little attention and are but loosely integrated in the pattern of the story.

With commendable modesty the author describes his book as "a narrative history" in which he has "pursued no special thesis nor subscribed to any peculiar doctrine of historical causation." In unfolding his evidence Charques has endeavored to emphasize three points: the minor part played by the Bolsheviks in the overthrow of the empire; the "ifs" of the reign "which still exercise the imagination"—that is, the course of events was determined not by any law of history but rather by what H. A. L. Fisher has so well called "the play of the contingent and the unforeseen"—and, finally, "the confusion of the Russian liberals." The author rightly notes that "not a great deal of fresh documentary material of major interest has been brought to light in recent years," the only new publications worth mentioning being the memoirs of Chernov and Miliukov, neither of them of real significance.

*The Twilight of Imperial Russia* being what it is, it is particularly regrettable that it should be described in the blurb—for which the author is not responsible—as "the first comprehensive work on the subject in English . . . based upon wide study of Russian and other sources." As a matter of fact the few books in English listed in Charques' bibliography contain a great deal more information on the closing years of the empire than he presents, as well as interpretations which do not differ substantially from those he offers. The reader familiar with these publications may well feel uneasy about the very extensive use, not indicated in the text, which the author has made of these sources.

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY
Professor of Economics
Graduate Faculty of Political Science
Columbia University

WARREN BARTLETT WALSH. *Russia and the Soviet Union: A Modern History.* (The University of Michigan History of the Modern World.) Pp. xvi, 640, xxiii. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958. $10.00.

It is very difficult to write a history of Russia or the USSR, for the country has always been closely connected with Europe and yet has always been curiously apart with its own response—or lack of it—to the great currents that swept over the continent. Before World War I, the West saw Russia either through the eyes of the tsarist authorities or more frequently through the writings of the liberal and revolutionary exiles who would admit little good in their system of government. Since the coming of the Communists, Communists and anti-Communists have argued hotly over almost every point in the present and in the past. Professor Walsh has steered a satisfactory course between the extremes and has tried to point out the elements of change and continuity, the power of personality, and the impersonal and economic forces in history; he has presented an intelligible picture to his readers, especially in his evaluation of the unreliable character of all Communist dealings with the rest of the world.

His weakest point, as is that of many other writers, is his treatment of the nationality question. This, particularly in the case of Ukraine, is a thorny one, for no Great Rusian admits the national differences between Ukraine and Great Russia. The original dynasty which carried the Russian Empire through the Middle Ages took its rise in Kiev. The dominant branch then moved to Suzdal and Moscow and it was only when scholars began to ask whether the people were of the same nationality as the tsar that questions began to arise which have not yet found a settlement.

Professor Walsh rightly sees that the Hetmans of Ukraine from Hmelnetsky to Mazeppa felt themselves independent, or at least autonomous; but he does not believe that that feeling continued to exist among the peasantry, although throughout the empire, as he shows, there was little conscious patriotism among the great masses and little political thought until their confidence in the tsar was shaken. In view of this it is scarcely fair to say as he does (p. 403) that Professor Hrushevsky was a tool of the Austrians. Hrushevsky had been trained in Kiev and a fuller analysis of his position would have involved discussion of the Ruthenian-Ukrainian attitude toward the Poles in Galicia as well as to the Russians. In the same way, there is much that is vague on the Russian attitude toward Georgia. For example, this is true when he discusses the rise and fall of the separatist nationalisms (p. 169; p. 400), which received from the Soviets at least lip service by the establishment of the various Soviet republics, although Russifica-

tion is still being pushed by various devices within them. In this connection we must note also that it was only among the Great Russians that the periodic redistribution of peasant lands and the principles of peasant collectives were more or less at home.

We could note certain other omissions but when we compare these with Professor Walsh's careful delineation of the powers and characters of the tsars and the imperial machinery and also his recognition that the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 was a collapse rather than a revolution to set up a new and freer state, we must conclude that the book will give the average American a far more realistic picture of the situation prevailing in the old Rusian Empire and the new Soviet Union than he possesses at present. From that point of view we can congratulate the author and believe that it was the need for compression and brevity that led to some of his apparent errors and omissions. The volume will admirably serve its purpose.

CLARENCE A. MANNING
Associate Professor of Slavic Languages
Columbia University

EDWARD J. ROZEK. *Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland.* Pp. xvii, 481. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958. $6.95.

Professor Edward Rozek's book is mostly based on the diplomatic archives of the Polish war. On November 24, 1944, Mr. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, supported by his Peasant Party and a group of followers, disassociated himself from the Polish government-in-exile which he had headed since General Sikorski's death on July 4, 1943. Apparently he took with him a sizeable part of the official diplomatic war archives which, together with his private files, he made available to Professor Rozek years later.

The most important facts and problems included in those documents had already been revealed by Mr. Mikolajczyk himself in his book, *The Rape of Poland;* by the former Polish Ambassador to the United States, Jan Ciechanowski, in his excellent work, *Defeat in Victory;* as well as by the Congressional Committee on Communist Aggression in its publication of 1954, Polish Documents, *Appendix to Committee Report on Communist Take-Over and Occupation of Poland.*

No publication concerning Poland, however, has afforded such a wealth of documentation. The most important conversations between Polish, English, American and Soviet leaders have been quoted in toto; secret notes, memoranda, and correspondence between the Allied and Polish governments have been cited *in extenso,* interesting comments and observations of the leading war personalities have been meticulously reported. It is mainly because of these texts that the book should not escape the attention of any student of Allied war diplomacy.

The story told by the documents is depressing and, in spite of our acquaintance with the subject, revealing. Churchill, as early as July 1941, was resigned to buying Stalin's confidence by not opposing his territorial demands on Poland; in March to May of 1942 he was ready to recognize Stalin's demands in Eastern Europe in a formal, though secret, clause of the British-Soviet alliance. Churchill and Eden's pressure on the Poles to surrender to the Soviet demands was tremendous, culminating in the forty-eight-hour ultimatum on November 2, 1944; Roosevelt's policies with regard to Polish-Soviet relations, particularly in the years 1943–44, were vacillating and motivated largely by the exigencies of his electoral campaign for a fourth term. The Poles were most of the time left alone, helpless, and only too often unaware of their own weakness. Stalin and his lieutenants always had the initiative in their hands; by adroitly playing their own strong cards, they successfully exploited the Allies' fears and weaknesses. Mikolajczyk himself appears of good will but weak and pathetic in this futile struggle against forces which no Pole could control.

It is suggested that this book be placed on the reading lists of students of East Central European affairs in the graduate schools.

JAN KARSKI
Assistant Professor of Government
Georgetown University



ROBERT FINLEY DELANEY (Ed.). *This Is Communist Hungary.* Pp. xxviii, 260. Chicago: H. Regnery Company, 1958. $4.50.

Both editor and publisher should be congratulated on producing, two years after the bloody events of October and November 1956, such a timely and useful book dealing with Communist Hungary. This carefully edited work is a symposium composed of various articles devoted to family life, religion, the mass media, education, youth, Communist-organized politics, and economics in contemporary Hungary. Each of the essays was written by a different author, most of them refugees from the 1956 revolution. The best known and most highly publicized members of the authors' team are Dr. Ilona Nyilas Marton, wife of a prominent Hungarian journalist and a first-rate author in her own right, and Dr. József Koevago, former mayor of Budapest, whose eloquent testimony before the United Nations helped to focus international public opinion on the tragedy of Hungary.

As most collective works, the book suffers from a distinct unevenness of the contributions. The fine essay on family life in Hungary is followed by a haphazard and superficial survey of the religious problem, while the useful section dealing with youth remains poorly balanced by the feeble study on "the educational weapon." These, however, are minor flaws in a comprehensive work which set itself the ambitious goal of painting a detailed panorama of everyday life in post-revolutionary Hungary. The interested reader may well ask: to what extent is the Hungarian picture different from that of any other Eastern European satellite? This reviewer believes that the answer is implicit in the articles of *This Is Communist Hungary.* There is a latent violence and fierceness in the Hungarian national character which is ready to explode and assert itself with a bitter and tragic vengeance. The explosion is then inevitably followed by an era of bloody repression, punishment, and deep national melancholia, both intellectual and emotional. Mr. Delaney's valuable study catches the momentarily prevailing Hungarian mood and the distressing after-effects of the ruthless blood-bath of the fall of 1956. This book should be of immense interest both to the interested student of Eastern European politics and to the layman who showed such sincere humanitarian interest in the short-lived Hungarian struggle for freedom two and a half years ago.

ANDREW GYORGY
Professor of Political Science
Boston University
Naval War College

BURKE, EDMUND. *The Correspondence of Edmund Burke,* Vol. I, *April 1744–June 1768.* Edited by Thomes W. Copeland. Pp. xxv, 376. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. $8.00.

With the publication of this volume, a complete edition of Edmund Burke's extant correspondence begins to take form. Additional volumes are to appear "at the rate of one volume a year" until the series of ten, including a final index volume, is complete.

Back in 1844, some 300 Burke letters in the Fitzwilliam Collection were published, and other groups of letters have since appeared in widely scattered books and periodicals. A comprehensive edition finally became a possibility in 1948 when scholars were granted access to the Burke Papers in the possession of the Fitzwilliam family. In addition, "between 100 and 150 public and private collections" have been examined for other manuscript originals of Burke correspondence, and "nearly 200 sources" consulted for items already in print. As a result we shall have the texts of about 1700 letters, abstracts of missing letters, and transcripts of letters addressed to Burke considered valuable for understanding his own correspondence.

The general editor, Professor Copeland of the University of Massachusetts, is also the editor of this initial volume. Its introduction and notes are excellent. The correspondence begins in Burke's sixteenth year (1744) as a student at Trinity College, Dublin, and continues into 1768 when he was well established in Parliament. It contains 197 Burke letters, 24 in print for the first time.

It is a curious sweep of letters. The

first group, written by Burke the undergraduate, hardly foreshadows greatness. "I have no more to say because to tell the Truth, I have scarcely any Subject to talk upon" (May 10, 1744). The "lost" period of Burke's life, 1750 to 1759, remains obscure. Even now "there are not ten complete letters" for these critical years of his study at the Middle Temple and his subsequent drifting from the law, and then of his persistent efforts to develop a literary career. By 1761 his growing fascination with public affairs is revealed in the remarkable correspondence with his Irish friend, Charles O'Hara. In July 1765, Burke became private secretary to the rising Marquess of Rockingham and in the January following he entered Parliament. His reputation was very shortly in the making.

Historians have marked the development of Burke the critic, his "minority mind," his "persecution mania." But as Sir Philip Magnus has so effectively pointed out, Burke's character and personality have been matters of controversy from his day to ours. Even in the early parliamentary years one encounters his short temper, his moods of depression and his circumstances "perpetually uneasy." What then does one make of remarks such as those in a letter of December 11, 1767? After speaking disparagingly of his own early success in the Commons, he adds, "Thinking in this manner, nothing has happened that I did not expect. . . . Therefore my dear Sir, cheer up; nothing very much amiss can happen us, whilst it pleases God that we keep our health, our good humour, and our inward peace; None of which is, as yet gone from us."

ALFRED F. HAVIGHURST
Professor of History
Amherst College

R. BASSETT. *Nineteen Thirty-One: Political Crisis*. Pp. xvi, 464. London: MacMillan & Company; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958. $9.50.

Nineteen thirty-one is one of the most emotional dates in recent British political history, and the name of Ramsay MacDonald, its central figure, is still charged with the passions of nearly thirty years ago. Only a few weeks back, the increase in the British unemployment figures served to trigger off a heated correspondence in *The Times* in which the ghosts of MacDonald, Snowden, and their peers were invoked, praised, or abused almost as though they were still alive. The tremendous traumatic experience, in which the second Labour government fell with a pitiful crash, and the image of MacDonald was transformed almost overnight from the godlike hero of the British working-classes to the saviour of the state and the darling of the Conservatives, would well repay a profound study both of the crisis and of the movements and characters which led up to it. Unfortunately, this book is nothing of the kind.

It would be difficult, no doubt. In the absence of MacDonald's own papers, which are still withheld from the public, the historian has to rely for the events of the crisis on diaries, reminiscences, and newspaper articles, some written at the time and some long afterwards—though not "in tranquillity," since tranquillity has never yet descended upon that scene—and Mr. Bassett, filling the greater part of his book with a meticulous hunt through his sources, has, as might be expected, no difficulty in discovering a number of inaccuracies and discrepancies in accounts written in such an atmosphere. But to what purpose? At one point Mr. Bassett himself, after spending two or three pages trying to establish whether the number of members of the Labour Cabinet who voted against the final "economy" proposals was nine, ten, or eleven, is constrained to admit that "the precise number of the dissentients matters not at all." Pages and pages of similar milling-around over similar tiny details make very wearisome going for his readers, who will further observe, with some surprise, that Mr. Bassett deliberately made no contact with those of his authorities—not a few—who are still alive and who might have helped him by the production of facts not included in their publications at the time and might even have given him valuable comment upon his own conclusions.

These are emphatically one-sided. In the pages of "background" which precedes his dust-heap sorting Mr. Bassett, in a passing defense of Lloyd George's "coupon" and the 1918 election, makes it clear to the alert reader what his conclusion is going to be: MacDonald is to be proved right, on any and every point. He has no difficulty, of course, in showing, as everybody now knows, that the Labour Cabinet, no wiser than anyone else in matters economic—and not having digested Keynes, at whom, however, Mr. Bassett directs a casual and perplexing sneer—floundered miserably in face of the slump, that their floundering was accentuated by Snowden's rigidity and the almost gleeful haste with which he loosed the May Report, with its recommendations for violent cuts in the standard of the least well-off, upon the world, or that it was only at the last minute that the nine, ten, or eleven saw what they were doing and drew back from the brink. Had he been more balanced in his approach, moreover, he could probably have induced his readers to believe that some of the things said of MacDonald in the bitterness of the moment were unjustified. But he has not studied at all the nature and history of the Labour movement, or the changes in MacDonald's own attitude over the years; and hagiography, alas, is not history. The book contributes little to understanding, for all the pains its author has taken, and will scarcely help MacDonald's memory.

MARGARET COLE
London, England

E. A. BENIANS, JAMES BUTLER, and C. E. CARRINGTON. (Eds.). *The Cambridge History of the British Empire*, Vol. III: *The Empire-Commonwealth, 1870–1919*. Pp. xxi, 948. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1959. $19.50.

This is the third volume in the *Cambridge History of the British Empire*. When completed the series will have five more volumes: two on British India, and one apiece on Canada and Newfoundland, Australia and New Zealand, and finally, South Africa.

This book is more an encyclopedia than a history. It is authoritative, competent, and useful as a source of reference. On the other hand, as is inevitable in co-operative historical writing, it lacks unity, balance, and logical sequence.

For instance, over a third of the book is written by F. H. Hinsley, Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. His four chapters published as a single volume would provide a succinct, clear, and well-written history of British foreign policy from 1869 to 1914. So good are they that one might gather the impression that British foreign policy and the British Empire were synonymous. But this is hardly the case, and even if it were Mr. Hinsley's chapters are separated by other intervening chapters written by other historians on other aspects of imperial history, thus distracting the mind from the central theme.

Furthermore, no matter how close has been co-operation between the authors, in a book of this sort a certain amount of overlapping is inevitable. For instance, in the matter of the Uganda railway, the subject belongs quite logically to Professor Simpson in his chapter on "The Opening of Tropical Africa," to Mr. Robinson of St. John's College, Cambridge, in "Imperial Problems in British Politics," and to the late Mr. Benians in "Finance, Trade and Communications." We have now three different men accounting for a railway which was never completed—a waste of space.

Of the nineteen chapters in this book two are on trade and commerce, and two are on problems of imperial defense—a total of 168 pages, which is disproportionately large, it would seem to this reviewer, in view of the one chapter on World War I in which important events are hurriedly summarized in thirty-five pages.

Also, as in most books written by British historians, the achievements of Henry M. Stanley are cut to a minimum, his discovery and descent of the Congo reduced to half a paragraph, and his rescue of Emin Pasha only hinted at in a single sentence.

On everything concerning laws and legal procedure this book is excellent; *vide* Chapter XI, "Development of the Imperial Conference, 1887–1914," and Chapter XVIII, "International Law and Colonial Questions, 1870–1914." Finally Chapter XIX, the last, on "The Colonial Office,

1801–1925," gives authentic factual information difficult to find elsewhere.

WALTER P. HALL
Princeton University

OSCAR HALECKI. *From Florence to Brest (1439–1596)*. Pp. 444. New York: Fordham University Press, 1959. $6.00.

To most American students of the Middle Ages the history of the vast territory lying east of the Holy Roman Empire and north of the Byzantine Empire is virtually unknown. Using broad geographical terms rather loosely, this region can be described as comprising Poland, Lithuania, and Russia. Poland in the west was essentially Roman Catholic, while Russia was predominantly Greek Orthodox. In between lay a region where the two religious groups were mixed and in which many towns held a bishop of each rite. This region was in the late Middle Ages threatened by non-Christian invaders. The remnants of the Golden Horde ruled the districts to the north of the Black and Caspian Seas and held many of the Russian principalities in vassalage. The Ottoman Turks were gradually engulfing the Byzantine Empire.

During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries many farsighted men in both Eastern and Western Europe believed that only a union of the two rites could make possible a united front against Turks and Tatars. After a series of unsuccessful attempts such a union was officially achieved at the Council of Florence in 1439, but it was never accepted by the Orthodox Church as a whole.

Mr. Halecki treats in great detail the efforts to achieve the union of the Catholic and Orthodox rites in Eastern Europe, particularly in Lithuania. He shows clearly the incredible complexity of the problem. It was a political as well as a religious issue and the politics of the region were extremely confused. While one dynasty ruled Poland and Lithuania, they were usually governed by different members of the royal house and the power of the nominal rulers over the lesser princes was severely limited.

This is not a book for the general reader. It is far too detailed for anyone who has not a strong interest in the subject. Moreover Mr. Halecki makes no effort to aid the reader who has little knowledge of the region with which he deals. There are no maps and no genealogical charts of the important ruling families. No background is given in regard to the social and economic history of the region. Mr. Halecki is clearly writing for specialists in the history of Eastern Europe. Despite all this the story is a fascinating one and well worth the attention of the medieval historian with an active curiosity and no objection to being rather bemused by unknown names and places.

SIDNEY PAINTER
Professor of History
Johns Hopkins University

## *ECONOMICS*

PAUL STUDENSKI. *The Income of Nations: Theory, Measurement, and Analysis: Past and Present*. A Study in Applied Economics and Statistics. Pp. xxii, 554. New York: New York University Press, 1958. $25.00.

Professor Paul Studenski's massive tome of some 550 pages is a work of first-class scholarship. It is the product of many years of research and it has the distinction of being the only book in a Western language to present a comprehensive survey of the history, theory, and practice of national-income measurement on a world-wide scale. Its uniqueness should win for it wide adoption in our universities, as well as attract the interest of practitioners and users of national income estimations here and in other countries.

In a short review it is impossible to do more than outline the book's principal divisions and indicate some of the significant contributions which the author makes to our knowledge of "the income of nations." Structurally the book comprises four parts. It also has a statistical Appendix giving the national income aggregates of more than eighty countries at mid-century; about thirty pages of bibliographical notes, and Indices of authors, countries, and regions.

In the first part of the book, Studenski gives the history of national-income concepts and estimates in England, France, Russia, and other countries, in relation "to the political, social, economic, and cultural conditions, and to the state of development of economics and statistics" of the respective country over the past three centuries. His detailed and lucid exposition of the economic literature of the countries, showing how, through the efforts of many pioneering investigators, "the various conceptual and methodological problems have been solved," makes fascinating and rewarding reading. Completely novel to this reviewer was the chapter on Russia, where the first national-income estimate was done by an outsider—an Austrian mineralogist! Part I should give those concerned with national-income estimates a better insight and perspective of the subject.

In Part II Studenski surveys the theoretical and methodological problems in national-income measurement and the solutions that have so far been provided for them. Probably no other book offers the systematic discussion of the concepts and structure of national income and of the various methods used in estimating it, as well as indicates under which conditions the use of each method is preferred. Written with clarity and conciseness, this part could well serve as a text for a course in national-income analysis.

Part III presents detailed analyses of recent estimates of the income of Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Soviet Russia, Germany, France, Yugoslavia, Turkey, India, Brazil, British West Indies, and Malaya. These are "case" studies illustrative of different concepts, estimating methods, and different types of economies. It may be instructive to note here the conclusions which Studenski draws from his elaborate and critical review of national-income estimation in Soviet Russia: the official "figures so far published are completely useless. . . . The estimates prepared by non-Soviet statisticians are founded on inadequate statistics and are highly speculative in nature. They are a poor substitute for the home produced, official, objectively prepared figures that are yet to come" (p. 373). In the final part, Studenski discusses, albeit less intensively than in Part III, developments and current status of national-income measurement and analysis in sixty-six other countries. These "are arranged in five groups, partly along ethnological and linguistic lines and partly along geographical lines." For most of the countries the period covered is the years 1946–57.

New York University Press is to be commended for the fine technical production of this work.

ARTHUR LEON HORNIKER
Washington, D. C.

LEWIS H. KIMMEL. *Federal Budget and Fiscal Policy, 1789–1958*. Pp. x, 337. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1959. $5.00.

This is a factual account of the policies pursued during the period 1789–1958. First is the desire to keep federal expenditures low. Second, the federal budget should be in balance in times of peace. Third, the federal debt should be reduced and eventually extinguished. Public attitudes toward the budget were influenced by the assumed similarity between government finance and private or household finance.

Lincoln was the first to dispute these views. He said, "Held, as it is, for the most part by our own people, it has become a substantial branch of national, though private property. For obvious reasons the more nearly this property can be distributed among all the people the better. . . . The great advantage of citizens being creditors as well as debtors with the relation to the public debt is obvious. Men readily perceive that they cannot be much oppressed by a debt which they owe to themselves."

Among the economists the views of Alfred Marshall were among the first to represent a revision of prevailing thought. He said, "the constructive work of government, especially of local government, is life itself in one of its highest forms."

We find that Adams' views on public expenditures were decidedly forward-looking. He emphasized that the "social income rather than the governmental necessities" is the starting point for a theory of public expenditure.

It is when we come to the influence of

Keynes that we find a somewhat less than enthusiastic approval of policy issues. Although he includes the cash budget in the Appendix, I am surprised that he does not use them throughout his study.

This is a fair account of the significance of the patterns of budget procedure since 1789. As Butters has pointed out, the New Deal never really used fiscal policy because it was not tried.

PAUL J. STRAYER
Professor of Economics
Princeton University

WILLARD W. COCHRANE. *Farm Prices: Myth and Reality*. Pp. vii, 189. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958. $4.00.

This thin, closely-reasoned book deals with the price-income problems of commercial agriculture in the United States—the problems of that major class of American farmers who produce and sell products of more than $1,000 a year. The problems economically analyzed are also the major problems of Secretary of Agriculture Benson and many congressmen and senators coming from those districts and states where farmers and allied farming interests cast a majority of the votes. Professor Cochrane sees no near or easy end to these problems of agricultural surpluses and price fluctuations. The intent of the book is to "bring the best in modern analysis—information, economic, logic, and and social theory—to bear on price." The book is an excellent statement and analysis of our chief agricultural problems of the present.

In Part I the author explains what he considers to be "the myth" and "the reality" of farm prices. The myth is the theory of an automatically self-adjusting agriculture which somehow tends towards a golden mean; or holds that there is some desirable level and pattern of prices, production, and income for agriculture, towards which agriculture would gravitate if only it were left to the beneficent hands of three million agricultural enterprisers; or on the other hand, sees agriculture achieving a desirable level and pattern of prices, production, and income, towards which it would gravitate and stabilize if given a friendly and helping hand in the just-right proportion by governmental assistance and subsidies. The reality that is most important for all of us to see, according to Professor Cochrane, is that "wide and irregular swings in the farm price level are the norm," not maladjustments that move up and down around the norm. But around the major swinging norm there is a range of specific commodity-price swings from almost none to extremes. Farm prices tend to shoot upward and then come tumbling down. When periods of falling farm prices are prolonged, farm business failures multiply and become terrifying to farmers. In these last twenty-five years farmers have sought relief in politics and governmental assistance.

Part II is the difficult part of the book. The model of "cob-web" analysis will especially require considerable eyebrow wrinkling. Lay farm leaders will find this part of the book tough. The author sees American commercial farmers trudging along in a sort of agricultural treadmill—brought on ironically by surpluses arising from the modern technological drives to various farm improvements and efficiencies. This part of the book deals with the realistic aspect of the farm problem as the author sees it.

In Part III the author leaves the field of cold scientific analysis, which explains what the real farm problem is, and turns to policy and advocacy. While keeping the realistic economic situation in mind, he frankly avows his own ethical values and preconceptions, and recommends a solution based on the Golden Rule of mutual responsibility. The equity problems of agriculture are vital and significant. Equitable principles should be used in correcting the inequitable situations in agriculture. But collective and political policy and action provide no easy way out of the commercial farmers' dilemma. The author warns farmers and public offiicials against taking blind alley approaches of free markets, flexible price supports, fixed price supports, and greater farm efficiency. These approaches will only lead farmers to more trouble. The author's solution is one of hard policy choices, which he poses in questions directed not only to farmers but to all American voters: First, should the whole American people continue to support agriculture by billions of dollars a year, or bring this policy to an end? Second, what course of action should agriculture pursue where it receives little or no income support from the rest of the economy? If the whole society decides to discontinue the subsidies, then the hard and inescapable choice before commercial farmers will be either to check agricultural expansion and output or suffer many failures and bankruptcies. This will indeed be a hard choice to make after twenty-five years of governmental assistance.

FRED R. YODER
Social Science Division
Campbellsville College



PERCY W. BIDWELL. *Raw Materials: A Study of American Policy*. Pp. xvi, 403. New York: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1958. $5.95.

It is no accident that two books on the sorely neglected subject of raw materials policy should appear at essentially the same time. The shortages which were impressed upon us by World War II, the Korean conflict, and the post-Korean boom have given impetus to government studies that have been more effective in highlighting clashes of opinion than in promoting anything resembling a coherent national policy. Now the commercial publishers have picked up the subject, but whether the wider audience it is hoped these studies will reach will be enlightened or confused is problematical.

Percy W. Bidwell is a student of tariff policies, and his approach to the question of raw materials is governed by his long experience in this field. Following a review of the expediencies employed by the executive and legislative branches of the Federal government in the days of plenty before World War II, and in the subsequent days of shortages and dependence upon foreign sources of supply, he details government action on specific commodities. His attention is limited solely to items that feature in import trade—the base metals, nickel, ferrous alloys, oil, wool, and rubber.

National policy, however, cannot be restricted to materials that must be imported to augment domestic supplies. It should also cover coal, natural gas, bauxite, cotton, cattle, and other bulk commodities that feature in our internal economy or in our export trade. The author apparently sees little significance in the swelling volume of iron ore imports that threaten to alter the geography of the iron and steel industry. He fails to heed his own exhortation that "it is high time the President and the Congress should take an all-inclusive view of raw materials policy, instead of dealing with commodities separately in response to pressures of the moment."

Dr. Bidwell is ready and willing to foster the mining industry in underdeveloped countries. But he underrates its importance to sizable fractions of the residents of the eight states "in the sparsely populated, semiarid area lying between the Great Plains and Pacific slope [which], if represented in Congress only in proportion to their population . . . would have little influence." Only once does the author grudgingly pay tribute to the many small operators he would cheerfully put out of business in favor of foreign sources of supply.

Factually, Dr. Bidwell has given his readers a good and useful book. The formulation of a national raw materials policy, however, is not quite as simple as he would like to make it.

HOWARD A. MEYERHOFF
GeoSurveys
Washington, D. C.

C. A. MUNKMAN. *American Aid to Greece: A Report on the First Ten Years*. Pp. ix, 306. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. $5.00.

This volume is a case study—a valuable one. Its stated purpose is "to tell the ordinary taxpayer something of what happens to the dollars and pounds provided for foreign aid programs." The taxpayer, not a specialist in political or economic affairs or community development or any of the other fields related to international aid, but with only a desire to know more about the newest form of international relations, can read and acquire better informed judgments. The specialist, with an interest in economic growth, in public administration,

or in aid programs in another area, will find here a challenging exposition and analysis of issues and suggestions of general solutions to problems which beset development and aid programs everywhere.

It is not merely an historical analysis of the Greek aid program. For many aspects of aid there are brief analyses of the problems in general—for example, agricultural productivity, economic controls in emergency periods, the timing of successive stages of a project and of collateral or contributory functions, and the encouragement of private investment.

Author Munkman was Chief of Audits and Surveys of the United States Economic Mission to Greece. From his experience in the mission he has brought forth a well-planned exposition of the aid program in general—beginning with the basic situation with respect to international trade balances—and sketches of its components: agriculture, land reclamation, power, industry, health, transportation, housing, and public administration. Finally, there are an evaluation of the program in general and an all-too-brief comment on the planning of aid.

There is no glossing over of errors of judgment or execution, no freehanded compliments to aiders and aided, no wishful thinking regarding the productivity or efficiency of past and future aid efforts. Mr. Munkman is chary in his distribution of praise—and apparently with good reason. On balance, his evaluations are on the pessimistic side. Here are the deficiences and abuses in the rehousing program, the sanatoria built and not occupied, the dissatisfactions and apparent ingratitude of the Greeks. The work of an auditor-evaluator in the period covered—1948–1958, of which the author was a direct participant for four years, apparently 1952–1956—must have been most discouraging and frustrating. But, wherever possible, criticism is accompanied by sympathetic analysis of causes of the shortcomings and constructive suggestions for improvement.

This reviewer found little to object to in the author's treatment: occasional uses of unfamiliar terms without explanation, one or two instances of criticism which reflects impatience or irritation. The chief shortcoming is a tendency to brevity; the reader frequently would wish that analysis had been taken further—but this could be asking the author to do more than he set out to do.

Finally, one of the most interesting aspects of the book is the repeated identification of locations of development projects with the scenes of great events in Greek mythology and history. There is a peculiar significance in a water development project in the area of Thermopylae or in a project to lay a road in the valley between Ossa and Olympus.

HOWARD M. TEAF, JR.
Professor of Economics
Haverford College

JOSEPH S. BERLINER. *Soviet Economic Aid: The New Aid and Trade Policy in Underdeveloped Countries.* Pp. xv, 232. New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1958. $4.25.

Professor Joseph S. Berliner's book is an important contribution to the literature on Soviet bloc economic aid and trade policy in underdeveloped countries. In contrast to most writing on the subject which has been rather superficial, has given an oversimplified view, and has been in excited prose, Berliner's book provides a careful survey of the program. It compares Soviet bloc aid with the aid flowing to underdeveloped areas from the West and presents a sober and sophisticated discussion on the motives and objectives of Soviet aid policy, on the capacity of the Soviet economy to support an economic aid program, and on the implication of this for the USSR and the United States. The comprehensiveness of the book should make it welcome to the general reader. A few of the facts and conclusions stressed by Berliner may be summarized.

First, he points out that the Soviet bloc's widely publicized 1.6 billion dollar of credits—loans—extended to underdeveloped countries between 1953 and 1957 is misleadingly high. By the end of 1957 deliveries on the commitments were probably less than one-quarter of the total and only about half of the deliveries came from the USSR, although it had granted some four-fifths of all bloc credits. In contrast, in 1956 and 1957 alone, United States aid delivered to underdeveloped countries equalled about the total credits pledged by the Soviet bloc.

Second, despite the comparatively unfavorable showing, the author suggests that not only is the present Soviet aid program well within the limits of the USSR's capabilities, but "in purely aggregative terms a greatly enlarged program of exports on credit to the underdeveloped countries would pose no great problem for the Soviet economy." However, the test of Russian ability to support an aid program in the long run is not the drain caused by it on "the over-all size of the economy," but the willingness of the USSR so to reallocate its resources as to be able to satisfy the varied demands of an expanded aid program.

Third, Berliner's conclusion on this is negative. He rejects the argument which insists that the Soviet Union has much to gain by carrying out such a reallocation of its resources and that in fact such reallocation has been taking place through the process of Soviet industrialization which has changed its comparative advantage. Instead, he emphasizes the political motivation behind Soviet economic aid: "The pursuit of economic advantage does not appear to be an important motive behind the Soviet aid program." The reviewer disagrees with this conclusion. While he does not deny the political motives and objectives, he believes that the program is precisely an outgrowth of the evolution of the Soviet economy. Western European investigators likewise stress this and point to the "comparative advantage" and "economic gain" to the Soviet Union from aid and trade. And it is no accident that as far back as 1954, a Soviet economist, A. Petrov, cogitated on the advantages of the world economic division of labor and the irrefutability of the law of comparative costs (Wolfgang Eggers, "Die wirtschaftliche Aktivität des Ostblocks in den Entwicklungsländern," *Ost-Europa Wirtschaft*, August 1956). Clearly, the subject is of such crucial importance to formulation of a correct United States policy in underdeveloped countries that it requires far more extensive investigation than that (Chap. VII) from which Professor Berliner draws his conclusions.

ARTHUR LEON HORNIKER
Washington, D. C.

W. BRAND. *The Struggle for a Higher Standard of Living: The Problem of the Underdeveloped Countries.* Pp. ix, 438. The Hague: W. Van Hoeve, Ltd.; Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. $7.50.

This is a translation of a Dutch study published in 1954 in the Netherlands. The author, until 1957 a member of the United Nations secretariat, is now a professor at the University of Leyden. The book consists largely of competent summaries and syntheses of the views of others on the topics dealt with. Only now and then does it break new ground. Monographs, articles, and reports of the United Nations and other agencies have been thoroughly canvassed; there are sixty-eight pages of notes and a fourteen page Bibilography.

Part I, The Process of Economic Development, starts with a brief review of national income data, demonstrating the wide disparity between the richer and poorer countries and the "tragic . . . fact that this inequality has increased in spite of the conscious effort made in so many undeveloped countries to secure a higher standard of living for the population." Four chapters follow devoted to the respective roles in economic development of land, capital, labor, and leadership and organization. The author considers leadership and organization, "whether of the private entrepreneurial type or of the state, as the cardinal point in the process of economic growth."

Part II, Domestic Financial Resources, deals with the relations to economic development of the consumption pattern, domestic private investment, foreign trade, government income and expenditure, and inflation.

Part III, International Financial Resources, was to this reviewer the most interesting part of the book. It includes a brief history of international capital movements and a chapter each on private foreign investment and public foreign investment. The author finds it "difficult to escape the conclusion that the world

economy has been modified—as a result of the war, new political factors, and a greater sense of social solidarity—in such a way that a return to the conditions envisaged by official American spokesmen and by the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank (including a revival of the prewar pattern of private investment) seems to be most unlikely. One has the feeling that institutional changes have been of such a nature that the idea of a return to an environment in which private foreign investment can again become the moving force in economic development is only a pipe dream."

EUGENE STALEY
Senior International Economist
Stanford Research Institute

JOHN H. DUNNING. *American Investment in British Manufacturing Industry.* Pp. 365. Fair Lawn, N. J.: Essential Books, 1958. $6.30.

Twenty years ago a book on this subject would have been unthinkable. The one under notice was not only sponsored by the United Kingdom Board of Trade but the three-year research on which it is based was financed by conditional aid from counterpart funds derived from United States economic aid to Britain. It is the first comprehensive and important survey of the extent of American direct investments in British industry, of the reasons why they were placed there, and of the impact of these investments on the economy of Britain. Owing to the scarcity of published sources, the author, Dr. John H. Dunning, who is a Lecturer in Economics at the University of Southampton, obtained his data mainly by interviewing the United States subsidiaries and 45 Anglo-American companies—in which American equity shareholding is 25 per cent or more—and corresponding with 45 other firms. He believes that the 205 companies comprised all the important United States affiliates and that they employed between 90 and 95 per cent of the total labor force of American-financed manufacturing firms in Britain.

Dunning estimates that in 1955 United States business investment in British manufacturing probably exceeded 1,200 million dollars and was growing at the rate of 10 to 12 per cent annually. Much the larger part—about 700 million—he shows, was invested between 1950 and 1955. But he also traces the two earlier waves of American investment in Britain: the first, from 1870 to 1914; and the second, from 1919 to 1939, when import duties and quota restrictions on United States companies' products served as an incentive to set up plants there. He attributes the rapid growth of American investment since the war to the dollar shortage throughout the world, and particularly in the sterling area, which, by depriving United States firms of their prewar sales outlets, induced them to manufacture in the United Kingdom so that they might sell their products overseas for sterling; to the growing demand for all types of American designed and styled goods, and to Britain's need to develop specific industries, such as petroleum refining, in which American research and development methods hold a significant lead.

Although Dunning carefully analyzes the geographical distribution, size, and ownership pattern of the United States investments, and the financial and managerial supervision that American parent concerns exercise on their British affiliates, he is mainly interested in assessing the effects of the affiliates on Britain's economy. He believes that the growing American interests have greatly benefited Britain. The more than 300 United States subsidiaries and jointly financed Anglo-American companies have given employment to about 350,000 people and their sales turnover exceeded 2.3 billion dollars in 1956, roughly 4 per cent of the estimated value for all United Kingdom manufacturing industry. But their greatest advantage to Britain has been in the improvement in the balance of payments position and in the acceleration of economic development.

As regards foreign payments, American affiliates have reduced Britain's dollar import bill and increased its exports—to the United States itself and to other markets. In 1954 their exports accounted for nearly 12 per cent of all British manufactured exports.

The other great advantage, though less tangible and difficult to measure, has probably been the more important contribution of the United States financed companies. Linking the United Kingdom to the competitive and dynamic economy of the United States, they have contributed to it progressive developmental qualities through "access to American research, manufacturing and management expertize, and by being in close contact with—if not actually governed—by American business attitudes." This has increased receptiveness to new ideas and enabled Britain to adapt itself to its changing economic environment more quickly and with less frictional disturbance, and has advanced the general tempo of economic development.

ARTHUR LEON HORNIKER
Washington, D. C.

ALBERT H. IMLAH. *Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica.* Studies in British Foreign Trade in the Nineteenth Century. Pp. xiii, 224. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958. $6.00.

The nineteenth century was an era of formidable economic faith, but in pursuing its faith it did not depend on statistics. Probably only specialists in the subject have known how disproportionately small has been the actual information available on Great Britain's trade in the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries in comparison with the importance of that country's economic development and commercial policy in the same period, and this book is the notable and welcome result of Professor Imlah's efforts over several years to collect and construct statistics which would provide a more accurate record of the trade and price position than did the official figures. As he explains in the Preface, "When these studies were begun nearly twenty years ago it was not possible to make any very close evaluation of the role of British economy in world affairs in the early nineteenth century. There were no dependable series on the actual market values of British imports and re-exports before 1853; and there were no systematic data on British 'invisible' trade—the earnings of shipping, business services and foreign investments—or on the terms of trade until near the end of the century. Consequently it seemed necessary to undertake the long and laborious task of preparing estimates to fill in these gaps. The first constructions on these matters were published between 1948 and 1952. They have now been substantially revised in the light of further discussion and additional data, and it is this revision that prompts a second publication of these underlying statistical series with rather detailed accounts of the materials and procedures used in constructing them."

The statistical core of the book in is Chapters 2, 3, and 4, dealing respectively with "Real Values in British Foreign Trade, 1796–1853," "British Balance of Payments and Export of Capital, 1816–1913," and "The Terms of Trade of the United Kingdom, 1796–1913." These chapters are set in three others entitled "Distinctive Elements in the Pax Britannica," "The Failure of the British Protectionist System," and "The Success of British Free Trade Policy." Professor Imlah's statistical work throws new light on the economic conditions which accompanied the critical transition from a national policy of protection to one of free trade, and on the course of Britain's external trade subsequent to the transition, and he is emphatic about the advantages of free trade policy for Great Britain as well as its importance for the rest of the world. Quantitatively, these effects are of course demonstrable in the great increase in production, trade, and means of transportation. Where the less measurable issues of power politics are concerned, however, Professor Imlah's enthusiasm for the beneficent effects of free trade has a less solid basis. It is not clear whether his argument that free trade promoted national security as well as trade because "both diplomacy, and if it came to that, naval action were, if anything, rendered easier by free trade policy which promoted mutuality of commercial interests," should be taken as ending in 1913 when his statistical survey stops. Up to then, it is true, the free trade era had known little large scale international conflict, but it is difficult to regard national security and mutuality of commercial interests as the factors responsible for the trend of inter-

national relations since that date. The statement that "in domestic affairs, too, British free-trade policy contributed to national security. It allayed class bitterness and promoted national unity," ignores the whole class problem of industry and the proletariat which was taking shape long before 1913. Nevertheless, this is a book that no one interested in this period of economic and international history can afford to ignore.

IDA GREAVES
Visiting Lecturer in Economics
University of Pennsylvania

TIBOR SCITOVSKY. *Economic Theory and Western European Integration.* (Stanford Studies in History, Economics, and Political Science, XVI.) Pp. 153. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. $3.50.

In a series of four essays, three of which have appeared previously in economic journals, the author applies "some of the general principles of economic theory to the particular problems of the economic union of Western Europe." The first essay, "The Probable Effects of Economic Integration in Western Europe," heretofore limited to private circulation as an Office of Naval Research Technical Report, constitutes the main part of the book.

The author divides the main part of his analysis into two parts. In the first, he assumes the economic union as a self-contained and closed group of economies. Economic integration would increase trade and specialization among the members and would, on the whole, be beneficial to their internal economic organization. Far-reaching measures would be necessary to overcome certain obstacles. Due to the great dependence of the Western European countries on foreign trade—an obstacle to effective employment policies—it would be necessary to co-ordinate national employment policies through an all-European policy administered by a supranational employment authority as the only means of maintaining a stable level of employment without getting into balance of payments difficulties with the outside world.

In the second part of the analysis, whicl deals with the effect of integration on spe cialization and on trade between the unio and the outside world, the problem o weighing the beneficial effects of "trad creation" against the harmful effects o "trade diversion" is carried through a com plex discussion to the conclusion tha "Western Europe would benefit the mos from economic union if improvements i her productive efficiency were concentrate on domestic and import-competing indus tries, and if the resulting additions to he income were mainly spent on home-pro duced goods."

In order that an all-European marke may have fully beneficial effects on th integrated countries, the nature, scale, an geographical distribution of Europe's manu facturing equipment must be modified The market can do this only by influencin the investment decisions of private busi ness. Since these are long-run decisions there has to be an assurance that a fre all-European market is permanent and tha intra-European economic relations will n longer be disturbed by trade restriction exchange controls, or exchange-rate revi sions—a series of conditions which, if ful filled, mean the establishment, in effect, of a common currency. Also, the idea of a common all-European capital market is suggested by the analysis of the forces for equilibrating the balance of payments. There are compelling arguments in favor of an all-European employment and public-works policy to be carried out at a supranational level and aimed at stabilizing employment and prices and at co-ordinating public investments on an all-European basis.

Apart from some lack of continuity, together with a degree of repetition, resulting from the treatment in the smaller essays of special aspects of the problem, the book is well organized. In his application of theory to key problems of trade, exchange, and competitive enterprise, the author has placed his fellow economists in his debt.

AMOS E. TAYLOR
American University
Washington, D. C.



ST B. HAAS. *The Uniting of Europe: olitical, Social, and Economic Forces 50–1957.* Pp. xx, 552. Stanford: anford University Press, 1958. $8.00.

is a pleasure to say without equivo- on that this work by Professor Haas is only by far the richest book on the ication movement in western Europe on the European Coal and Steel Com- nity as a political mechanism and proc- but also a significant theoretical con- ution to the study of community mation across national boundaries. The oks represents a most impressive com- ation of meticulous empirical and imagi- tive theoretical effort. The author's sistence on the painstaking definition of ncepts, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, especially praiseworthy.

The book is concerned with integration a process rather than a status, and as process it is seen to rest on the percep- on of the interests of groups, individuals, nd governments. The focus, therefore, is n these actors, their motives, ideologies, nd conduct. From this point of view, he author tackles political parties, trade ssociations, trade unions, and governments n separate chapters, and traces over time heir relevant behavior on the basis of indices of integration. A lot of interesting data, observations, and conclusions—however tentative—are offered.

The theoretical contribution of the book is greatest in the delineation of useful concepts. One suspects, however, that the conceptual apparatus is not quite adequate to the aim of advancing generalizations about processes by which political communities are formed across national boundaries. Some of the generalizations—conveniently summarized in the Preface—certainly lack the element of surprise or novelty. Thus, the author states as perhaps "the most salient conclusion," "the fact that major interest groups as well as politicians determine their support of, or opposition to, new central institutions and policies on the basis of a calculation of advantage" (p. xiv). On what other basis could they possibly support or oppose? To give another example, Professor Haas concludes: "The initiation of a deliberate scheme of political unification, to be accepted by the Key groups that make up a pluralist society, does not require absolute majority support, nor need it rest on identical aims on the part of all participants" (p. xiii). Well, who would ever set absolute majority support as a prerequisite or require identical, as against convergent, interests for political innovation? However, other generalizations are more interesting. Thus, the author concludes that the voluntary acceptance of a federal scheme is facilitated by such conditions as social and ideological fragmentation, and a tradition of mutual consultation and of rudimentary value-sharing in the participating countries. The federative process is also facilitated if national governments prove unco-operative—and one suspects inefficient—in the solution of purely national problems for which federal solutions may be feasible.

It is to be hoped that Professor Haas will continue with his truly pioneering studies on the formation of trans-national communities.

KLAUS KNORR
Professor of Economics
Associate Director, Center of International Studies
Princeton University

## *SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY*

LLEWELLYN GROSS (Ed.). *Symposium on Sociological Theory.* Pp. ix, 642. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Company, 1959. $7.25.

This excellent compilation of papers on sociological theory calls into question one of the most durable ploys of all reviewmanship: the postulate that every symposium may safely be described as "uneven." The nineteen chapters comprising this volume, by such scholars as Mills, Bendix, Bierstedt, Timasheff, Hart, Gouldner, Hempel, Rapoport, Gross, Furrey, Wolff, and Sjoberg, to name only those most familiar to sociologists, are uniformly first rate. Inasmuch as current mores are quite explicit in requiring the identification of the attempted "range" of every theoretical enterprise, let us reluctantly borrow the Warner

class typology as an analogue in order to describe the present efforts as generally falling somewhere between upper-middle and lower-upper range theory. This barbarous phraseology is intended to alert the reader to expect the contributors to be content to surround restricted sectors of the social sciences with extensive preparatory approaches in anticipation of the day when sociological achievement will be measured in verified substantive propositions in lieu of paradigms. This reconnaissance in depth results in a number of carefully executed and technically impeccable papers dealing with the conditions of theory formation as these apply to the topics of social type, social order, social change, functional theory, models in social science, formalization of theory, values, and the sociology of knowledge.

The editor, Professor Gross, ably recognizes some leading theoretical convergences in the contributions to the symposium:

Values play a significant role in the process of creating social science.

Theoretical and methodological analyses must be anchored to recognized human problems.

The basic character of a scientific theory is determined by the set of concepts or principles that are chosen as central to its formulation.

Central concepts in sociology are placed or located in a theoretical framework through their linkage with one or more concepts.

Metaphors and analogies ranging from loose correspondences to near isomorphisms are pervasive features of every scientific theory.

When appraising conceptual schemes, one must display by detailed analysis their essential qualities and requirements, what they can and cannot do logically and factually, and where their implications lead in respect to both promise and accomplishment.

Though social science seeks to use language that is clear and correct, the current goal of analytic or procedural purity is questioned. At the present stage of social science, the liberal recognition of and tolerance for alternative perspectives in the formulation of every kind of method is the only sensible approach.

The intelligent advice contained in the preceding sentence serves to remind us that the type of self-conscious and rigorous attempt to examine assumptions, principles, and aims which characterizes this fine book is worthy of the sympathetic interest of every theoretically oriented social scientist.

MARVIN BRESSLER
Associate Professor of Sociology
New York University

JULIUS COHEN, REGINALD A. H. ROBSON, and ALAN BATES. *Parental Authority: The Community and the Law.* Pp. xii, 301. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1958. $6.00.

Here is a socially significant book, one that presents a method of ascertaining the moral sense of the community in relation to the law. Parental authority is the area studied but the same method can be used in future studies in other areas as well. What the people say the law should be can then be compared with the formal norms by which we are largely governed, namely, the existing statutes and judicial decisions.

A representative sample of the population of an entire state—Nebraska—was asked what they thought the law should be on parental authority over the child, autonomy for the child, and familial versus governmental financial support of family members. For example: should the law allow parents to disinherit children? Should the law allow a child to recover damages from his parent for injury resulting from the parents' carelessness? Does the child have an obligation to support his aged and indigent parents? Altogether, seventeen issues were examined. Of these, the community and the existing law disagree as to ten—possibly eleven—agree as to five, and perhaps evenly divide as to one. An important issue is raised by these findings. How responsive to public opinion ought the law to be?

In general the community would favor greater legal restrictions on parental authority over the child than the law presently allows. The community would also have the law grant more legally enforceable claims to pre-adolescent children than it now permits. And the community would have the law accord increasing degrees of autonomy as the age of the adolescent child increases. Why so? Mainly because of concern for the child's welfare. The law, on the contrary, appears largely to support patriarchal right. If the public opinion of the community is the voice of the present, is the law a voice from the past?

The authors, a professor of law and two sociologists, think that the conflict between law and public opinion stems from three sources: the greater impact of tradition on law-makers than on citizens, the relative lack of pressures on law-makers to signal the need for change, and the inadequacy of existing techniques used by law-makers for ascertaining the moral sense of the community.

This book, then, represents an advance in the sociology of law. Whether or not the moral sense of the community is an essential element in law, it is useful to have the kind of instrument here presented for defining that moral sense.

Finally, this useful work is made even more attractive because it is excellently organized and clearly written.

M. F. NIMKOFF
Professor and Chairman, Department of Sociology
Florida State University

H. G. RICKOVER. *Education and Freedom.* Pp. 256. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1959. $3.50.

Sputniks make strange bedfellows! Admiral Rickover joins in the attack on "life-adjustment teaching," on progressivist soft-pedagogy, and on the "American educationists" generally. "Our schools," he says, "must return to the traditional task of formal education in Western civilization." On the other hand, he urges that the rapid technological progress attendant on the scientific revolution of our times requires the encouragement of initiative and independent thinking, and that our talented students "should be given freedom to work out their own problems and to assume responsibility for what they do." The latter idea would seem to put him on the side of John Dewey, in whose conception the stimulation of creative intelligence, patterned on scientific experimentalism, is a central theme. But in a distorted portrayal of the Deweyan educational philosophy, Admiral Rickover attributes to its influence the major ills of the American educational system.

Admiral Rickover's real concern, apparently, is not with the liberal arts program in the humanist sense but with the scientific and technological training requisite for overtaking the Soviet Union in the production of atomic weapons and space missiles. Giving scant attention to the complex factors that have made possible the remarkable Russian achievement—the ability of a totalitarian government to mobilize all needed financial resources and scientific talent in unified research—he lays the blame for our lag on "the inadequacy of our American educational system in this dynamic twentieth century."

Besides the allegedly lax standards of progressive education, Admiral Rickover finds another major cause for the American educational deficiency: the popular "shibboleths," such as "democracy" and "equality" have led us to sacrifice the training of the intellectually gifted to the interests and needs of the mediocre average. As a remedy, Admiral Rickover advises us to turn to Europe—"old and wise at educating the young." He would have us adopt the two-track system of Europe before World War I in which, he believes, a public educational system good enough for the masses was combined with a superior education for the selected few. The educational system of Prussia and of Imperial Germany especially arouses his admiration. He does not, however, explain why this "excellent" system did so little to prevent Germany's defeat and the ruin of Europe. He has words of commendation also for the Soviet educational system, particularly after Stalin abolished the progressive ideas that had influenced Russian education in the earlier years of the revolutionary regime. The Admiral does not want the authoritarian and totalitarian features of the Prussian and Russian systems. He thinks we can adopt their educational methods without their political purposes; his technological mind sees no

relation between educational conceptions and social forces.

Admiral Rickover's magnificent achievement in the field of nuclear power, his devotion to the national security, and his sincere concern with the educational problem, make whatever he says worthy of serious consideration. But with all due respect, his recommendations are of dubious value for the needed reform of American education. Certainly, the ideas of John Dewey and of the progressives—incidentally, far from identical—which have made outstanding contributions to educational theory and practice require critical re-examination today in application to secondary education. The problem of the training of intellectual elites and of high-level scientific workers, which Admiral Rickover rightly emphasizes, is a crucial issue. But his wholesale condemnation of American educational thought in this compilation of addresses—not free from non-sequiturs and contradictions—provides no genuine solutions.

*Education and Freedom* resembles raw moonshine. It has a strong kick but is likely to leave ill effects as well as a bad taste in the aftermath. As a bracing antidote, the reader is referred to James B. Conant's *The American High School Today*, a careful, informed study which deals with the issues raised by Admiral Rickover in a constructive way, in harmony with American conditions, and not least in importance, in accord with our democratic educational tradition.

I. B. BERKSON
Professor of Education
City College of New York

DIETRICH C. REITZES. *Negroes and Medicine*. Pp. xxxi, 400. Cambridge: Harvard University Press for the Commonwealth Fund, 1958. $7.00.

This book is a study of the status of the training of Negro physicians and their integration into the practice of medicine as of 1956 and an analysis of the factors which contributed to or hindered such integration up to that time in fourteen American communities. Racial integration is defined here primarily in terms of the percentage of Negro physicians having affiliations at predominantly white hospitals.

The first section of the study is devoted to a statistical analysis of Negro medical students and Negro applicants to medical schools, dealing principally with the scores made by Negro applicants and students on the Medical College Admission Test (MCAT). These scores are analyzed for Negro applicants and medical students by racial type of medical schools—predominantly Negro schools, such as Howard University College of Medicine and Meharry Medical College, contrasted to predominantly white schools—by racial type of undergraduate college attended by Negro applicants and medical students, and by regional location of white medical schools attended by Negro students. The findings while not surprising, are interesting. First in 1938–39, 87 per cent of the 350 Negroes in medical schools attended the two Negro medical colleges and 13 per cent attended white medical schools. In 1955–56, 69 per cent of the 761 Negroes in medical schools attended the two Negro medical colleges and 31 per cent attended white medical schools. Second, the MCAT scores of applicants from Negro colleges fell considerably below the average for a normal distribution of applicants, and the mean scores of accepted applicants to all United States medical schools were significantly higher than the mean scores of accepted applicants to either Howard or Meharry. Third, MCAT scores of Negro students in white medical schools were highest for those in the East and lowest for those in the South. Mean MCAT scores of Negro students at white medical schools were significantly higher than MCAT scores of Negro students at Negro medical schools. Mean MCAT scores of students at Howard were consistently higher than MCAT scores of students at Meharry. Reitzes shows that the Southern Regional Education Plan sponsored by eleven southern states and in which Meharry Medical College participates resulted in Meharry accepting students from the participating southern states with considerably lower MCAT scores than those students accepted from nonparticipating states (pp. 22–23). While one cannot agree with the unfortunate suggestion by Reitzes that MCAT scores represent innate ability (p. 16), one may still be concerned over the long-range implications of an admission policy which, for financial considerations, accepts students with lower scores over students with significantly higher scores.



During the school year 1955–56, Negro students were attending fifty of the eighty-two approved medical schools in the United States. The problems of Negro medical students have shifted dramatically in recent years from racially discriminatory admission policies and the limited physical facilities of the two Negro medical schools to the problems of adequate preparation and motivation of Negro students to compete successfully with white applicants, and the need of Negro students for financial assistance.

The second section of the study has as its primary objective the identification and analysis of the specific process which brought about or prohibited the integration of Negro physicians into medical practice in fourteen communities. In general, communities with the highest degree of integration—Gary, New York, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Indianapolis, and Boston—were characterized by an absence of any predominantly Negro hospitals. Detroit and St. Louis were exceptions which proved the rule. The presence or absence of influential persons or groups actively pressing for integration in hospitals was another important factor. A third factor was the opportunities of Negro physicians for contact with white physicians, since these contacts often led to staff appointments in predominantly white hospitals. The action or lack of action by Negro physicians in seeking integration was cited also as a contributing factor. Interestingly enough, the supply of well-trained and well-qualified Negro physicians, using board certification as a criterion, was not a significant factor leading to integration except in Los Angeles, although once the pattern of integration was established in a community, training and qualifications greatly influenced which of the Negro physicians obtained affiliations with predominantly white hospitals.

In many respects, the results of this study are a sample of problems of the Negro professional person in American society, and one might well wish that the analysis had encompassed a broader perspective. This, however, was beyond the immediate objectives of the present work which is useful in its own right. It should serve as an important benchmark study of racial integration in medicine, and deserves a wide reading by counselors, community leaders, and persons concerned with medical statesmanship.

PRESTON VALIEN
New York State Department
of Health

FREDERIC D. OGDEN. *The Poll Tax in the South*. Pp. xiv, 301. University: University of Alabama Press, 1958. $6.00.

This scholarly book is a credit to the University of Alabama and to the University's Press. Alabama is one of five Southern states—Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia are the other four—which still retains a voter poll tax. Alabama, moreover, had the second highest cumulative tax, up to $36.00 in 1953, exceeded only by that of Georgia, $47.47, including penalties until 1945. Professor Ogden also believes that Arkansas and Texas will repeal their poll tax requirement before Virginia and Alabama. Mississippi will, as usual, be last.

Few books have appeared at a more opportune time. Its publication coincided with the obstructionist tactics used by Alabama registration officials to deny the Federal Civil Rights Commission access to their books. Subsequently, Alabama passed a law authorizing the destruction of Federal election records and the Eisenhower administration introduced a bill requiring the preservation of these records, with authority for the Attorney General to inspect them. The investigation in Alabama, as the preceding one in Georgia, supports one of Ogden's main theses, fully documented by tables in chapters 5 and 6, that the poll tax, now a nominal sum, is not the principal device for preventing Negroes from voting.

Indeed, Southern states adopted the poll tax during the Populist Movement for the

purpose of disfranchising "poor whites" as well as Negroes. But, as the author points out (p. 176): "Groups like Negroes and Texas Mexican-Americans, standing on the fringes of society, in it but not of it, have little incentive to meet a tax requirement for voting since the society gives them no encouragement to participate in its political processes." It is amusing to note that poll tax repeal in Louisiana and reduction of the cumulative feature in Alabama disclosed that more white women had been prevented from voting by the poll tax than either white men or Negroes (p. 286). Basically, however, "the one-party, or no-party, system of the South is largely responsible for the ills of the region" (p. 176).

Ogden, a worthy disciple of his mentor, Professor V. O. Key, believes that continued pressure for a Federal law, suits to test the constitutionality of state laws, and the continued activities of labor, Negro, veterans', women's and other organizations may bring about repeal in the five states. I commend particularly his last chapter, a model essay which summarizes the conclusions at the end of each chapter.

RAYFORD W. LOGAN
Professor and Head, Department of History
Howard University

DOROTHY BARCLAY. *Understanding the City Child: A Book for Parents.* Pp. xii, 273. New York: Franklin Watts, 1959. $4.95.

This is a book about the city child by a city-born and city-bred woman who lives with her husband and "five lively youngsters almost at the heart of the country's biggest metropolis." It is extremely well written, clearly evidencing the journalistic experience of the author, who since 1949 has been the Parent and Child Editor of the *New York Times*. Some, but by no means all, of its contents include articles previously published in the *Times* Magazine section.

The fundamental thesis of the book is that "the city child of city parents can have as rich and full a childhood as his counterpart in suburb or country." True, his problems will be different and the responsibilities of his parents must be greater. To be of aid in this connection is the author's basic purpose. The effort throughout is to distil from the abundant and multi-specialized literature on child care and guidance that part which will be helpful to city child and parent. Revealed throughout is a wide grasp of conflicting as well as of complementary approaches, and of the many detailed studies and generalizations in the area of child development.

The book covers a wide range of topics. Part I deals with the parents of the city child—parental roles, family size, family disorganization, and mothers who work away from home. The second part, larger than the others, deals with such practical problems as household planning, meals, television, allowances, reading, discipline, hobbies, pets, children's rooms, and the observance of family rituals. The next three sections are particularly helpful for parents of city children. They deal with the widening experience of the city child, his social life and the special opportunities for children which city life affords. Parents who take their responsibilities seriously will find much that is helpful in these sections. There is a final section on selected special problems, including the school progress of the child, his relations with the teacher, public versus private schools, learning to live with differences, the problems of the erratic stranger, and sex education. The volume ends with a brief summary of its main conclusions.

Its sane and balanced viewpoint, its practical helpfulness, its keen insight, and its readable style combine to make this a book which can be recommended without reservation to parents of all children.

JAMES H. S. BOSSARD
Professor of Sociology
Professor of Child Development
University of Pennsylvania

ELENA PADILLA. *Up From Puerto Rico.* Pp. xiii, 317. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. $5.00.

This book is a unique contribution to our knowledge of Puerto Ricans in New York City. While Mills, Senior, and Goldstein's study, *The Puerto Rican Journey*, was more extensive in many respects, its main focus was on historic, economic, demographic, and political factors with cultural elements taking a secondary place. Christopher Rand's recent work on the Puerto Ricans is superb journalism but it lacks intensive knowledge based on the familiarity of daily, first-hand participant observation.

Elena Padilla and her team of cultural anthropologists have filled this gap admirably. Working for two and a half years in a New York slum area having a large Puerto Rican population, the Spanish-speaking team became intimately acquainted with over five hundred people in an effort to discover their pattern of living as they adapted to this limited sector of American life. The author shows that there are three sub-patterns of adjustment depending on whether the Puerto Ricans are old residents of many years standing, the "born or brought up in New York," or more recent migrants. The latter are not only closer to traditional ways and subject to the greatest strains of change, they are also at the bottom of the prestige scale among their own people. Varieties of family structure with accompanying norms, values, and typical interpersonal roles are portrayed with remarkable fidelity. Race distinctions defined in the subculture are carefully analyzed and categorized. Forms of acculturation in linguistic changes and daily habits are minutely traced. The author livens the account with many anecdotes, conversations, and fragmentary life histories throughout.

By aiming at the "general public" rather than her confreres, Dr. Padilla has made a happy choice for which most readers should be grateful. Specialists, on the other hand, will doubtless want more. A brief introduction to methodology in the Preface cannot tell the social scientist precisely how some of her particular conclusions were validated. Comparison with the cultural base-lines in Puerto Rico—such as those given by Steward in THE ANNALS, Vol. 285—is missing. The frequencies of various sub-groups reported by Dr. Padilla such as the three mentioned above, the various family types, of the "transients and settlers" of her last chapter are not given, so that comparison with other communities is not possible. Yet it would be unfair to judge the book by criteria deliberately rejected by the author for reasons of space or manner of presentation. Dr. Padilla and her team of co-workers deserve the gratitude and commendation of the American public for a really definitive work.

RICHARD A. SCHERMERHORN
Associate Professor of Sociology
Western Reserve University

DAVID LOCKWOOD. *The Blackcoated Worker: A Study in Class Consciousness.* (Studies in Society.) Pp. 224. London: George Allen & Unwin; Fair Lawn, N. J.: Essential Books, 1958. $3.80.

This is a study of the historical development of the clerical classes in Great Britain, focused on evaluating the existence of, and the conditions that mitigate against, working-class consciousness among British clerks. The author concludes that on grounds of economic position—earnings and fringe benefits—and social standing or status, the British clerk is much like the manual worker and might be expected to be self-conscious of mutual class interests. On the other hand, the organization of clerical work in business offices and government bureaus—with nationalization the two have become one in some sectors of British industry—is what keeps clerks separate from manual workers and imposes barriers to their mutual identification. Thus, the clerical classes are class conscious, but not working-class conscious—this is the author's principal conclusion.

This study makes maximum use of historical materials to describe the origins of clerical work in the "counting house" and its evolution in the modern office. Similar kinds of data are used in analyzing the economic, work, and status situations of clerks, as well as trade unionism among them—one in four are union members, in sharp contrast with the very much lower proportion of American clerks in unions. Based largely on the analysis of clerical trade union policy, the author reaches his conclusions about class consciousness among clerks. This dependence on historical materials to reach conclusions about a social psychological phenomenon like

"class consciousness," highlights one of the basic differences between contemporary British and American sociology. An American sociologist attacking the same problem would most likely have used survey research techniques to collect opinion data from a sample of clerks about their class identification.

It would round out the picture to add to Lockwood's excellent study the kind of survey data dear to the heart of American sociologists. Lockwood has, nevertheless, contributed a solid study of the social structural features of British society and industry which have molded the clerical portion of the industrial division of labor.

ROBERT DUBIN
Research Professor of Sociology
University of Oregon

BENJAMIN J. DARSKY, NATHAN SINAI, and SOLOMON J. AXELROD. *Comprehensive Medical Services under Voluntary Health Insurance: A Study of Windsor Medical Services.* Pp. xvii, 392. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. $7.50.

Over a period of fifteen years the Canadian city of Windsor, Ontario has developed a highly remarkable voluntary health insurance plan covering approximately 85 per cent of the metropolitan population. We find excellent material to study the problems and effects of an extensive program covering services by general practitioners and specialists in the home and private office as well as in the hospital with payment on a fee-for-service basis.

Personal interviews with 96 per cent of the Windsor physicians showed that generally they view the plan as a good thing for the community, for their patients, and for the profession. In the United States there is need for comprehensive physicians' services in the home and office. Actuarial predictions of the utilization of the medical care is possible. The Canadian experience shows that the public is willing to pay the increased costs. Given a choice between comprehensive and limited plan, the public will select the more costly comprehensive plan over the less expensive in-hospital plan. Regardless of the payment mechanism—comprehensive insurance, limited benefits, or no pre-payment at all—the pattern of high utilization by small numbers of patients is in general the same. A striking proportion of subscribers use no physicians' services at all. The doctor-patient relationship has not been affected in any adverse manner. On the contrary, more patients now have a family physician.

In the Windsor plan the patients' use of physicians' services in accordance with their health needs is facilitated. The important implication of the plan's effects is that more people seek care which they otherwise would delay or not obtain. This undoubtedly means that they are getting earlier care and thus a greater proportion of services are truly preventive in nature.

In the United States comprehensive protection is still rather rare. Demand for this type of protection will grow as more people are covered and thus better able to evaluate their experiences and communicate them to others. It is to be hoped that the book will promote interest in the subject, so that the United States in the near future will have much more comprehensive health insurance on a voluntary basis, thus avoiding the pressure for a compulsory insurance as is found in quite a number of other countries, for instance England, Germany, and Scandinavia.

ALFRED MANES
Retired Professor of Economics
Indiana University

PAUL F. LAZARSFELD and WAGNER THIELENS, JR. *The Academic Mind: Social Scientists in a Time of Crisis.* (A Report of the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University.) Pp. xiii, 460. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958. $7.50.

Our knowledge of the effects of McCarthyism on academic men and their behavior, as well as on academic freedom, has hitherto been very largely anecdotal and personalized. Publication of this volume considerably expands and enhances that knowledge. The study reported in *The Academic Mind* was a national survey sponsored by the Fund for the Republic and directed by the senior author. Professional interviewers recorded in great detail the opinions, attitudes, and experiences of 2451 social scientists in 165 colleges and universities of every description. The survey was confined to social scientists since the nature of their subject matter involved them most directly in the salient issues of "the difficult years," 1945–1955. The volume analyzes the survey data and includes a lengthy appraisal by David Riesman of the interviewing process.

Among the many consequences of the pressures and strains of the crisis decade, apprehension and its manifestations are subjected to the most intensive scrutiny by the authors. The heart of their analytic scheme comprises an interpretation of apprehension in terms of a personal attribute, "permissiveness," and an attribute of social structure, college quality. Nearly half of the professors in the sample were at least "somewhat" apprehensive, but this did not constrain them in their public behavior: as apprehension increased, so did the teachers' expressions of defiance and militancy. On the other hand, in professional behavior and relationships, extreme apprehension manifested itself in consistently deleterious ways. In two chapters on "patterns of caution," the authors describe the avoidance of controversy, the elaboration of self-protective mechanisms, deterioration and strain in colleague and teacher-student relations, and the damage wrought on both academic freedom and education.

The study demonstrates, perhaps unexpectedly, that apprehension is not necessarily a direct consequence of personal threat and attack. The more apprehensive professors were also the more "permissive" —tolerant of unorthodoxy and controversy. Permissive teachers were more involved in controversial activities, more sensitive to issues involving academic freedom and civil liberties, more vulnerable to criticism and, therefore, more fearful than their conservative colleagues. In a most significant piece of analysis, the authors show that permissiveness is actually more than a personal trait. It is a major value among social scientists, it is positively correlated with professional success and it is, one might almost say, indispensable to social science inquiry. These considerations, incidentally, explain the book's title.

College quality also affected the level of apprehension. Social scientists in the better schools were subject to greater pressure and more attacks than those in lesser institutions; indeed, this finding was so pervasive as to lead the authors to conclude that during the crisis decade, ". . . what was really under attack was the quality of American college education." But, in general, administrative officers in the superior schools were more vigorous in the defense of their faculties and of academic freedom. As a consequence, the level of apprehension in these schools was lower than would have been anticipated in view of the greater permissiveness and vulnerability of their social scientists. Conversely, it was unexpectedly high in the most inferior schools because of the exaggerated timidity of their teachers.

Of course, the foregoing suggests only the central argument of an elaborate, highly detailed yet supremely lucid exposition, and omits mention of a wealth of important material. Some of the terminology is disconcerting and a number of interpretations may be debated. Those who find themselves in disagreement will suffer little of the disadvantage often encountered in dealing with reports of this type, for the authors, to their great credit, have presented their data, logic, and procedures with unusual candor and inclusiveness. Unquestionably, this volume constitutes a major contribution to the literature on academic freedom, the methodology of survey analysis, and the sociologies of education and the professions.

LEONARD H. GOODMAN
Assistant Professor of Sociology
State Teachers College
Cortland, New York

HILDE T. HIMMELWEIT, A. N. OPPENHEIM and PAMELA VINCE in collaboration with others. *Television and the Child: An Empirical Study of the Effect of Television on the Young.* Pp. xix, 522. New York: Oxford University Press for the Nuffield Foundation, 1958. $6.75.

This empirical study of television in the life of British youngsters aged ten to fourteen deserves the adjective "definitive." These social psychologists analyzed diaries

and questionnaire responses on leisure activities, reading and viewing preferences, factual knowledge, fantasies, and outlook on life. Children with access to television were matched against their classmates without access. Television as a cause was distinguished from television as a symptom by a before-and-after study which showed that children who were going to watch it when it became available in their region already differed appreciably from children who were not going to. The report achieves depth and coherence by placing television in the context of the child's total leisure activity pattern.

The conclusions support neither the glowing nor the dire estimates of television's impact on the "young and impressionable." Social status and IQ account for most of the differences between children; television's marginal effect becomes apparent only when these are held constant. Normal children, it appears, are fairly resilient creatures, capable of going about their principal task of orienting themselves to life without much help or hindrance from the pictures that flicker across the screen. They find their two hours a day for viewing, but books, sports, and scouting are less likely to give way for it than are movies, comics, and other time-killers. Older children, especially the intelligent, become selective of what they watch and when, and critical of what they accept as meaningful. There is a "television addict"—a child who by the hour uncritically soaks up whatever ready-made entertainment appears—but he turns out to be the dull, shy, or insecure child who, before he had television, spent the same hours at the movie or staring out the window.

One who tries to carry over these detailed reports to the American situation finds himself reassured that we will probably survive television, but he is not likely to be entirely happy about the situation. Many of the good effects in Britain seem to stem from BBC's effort to dramatize classics, encourage hobbies, and present information. This effort may be thwarted by the little conservatives, who switch to a familiar horse opera when it is available. When it is not, they stay tuned, and may later decide to read the book or pursue the subject on their own. Our commercial broadcasters, competing for listeners at peak viewing hours by giving the youthful audience just what it wants, may somewhat reduce the beneficial effects found in Britain.

WILLIAM BUCHANAN
Associate Professor of Political Science
University of Southern California
Los Angeles

EVERETT WEBBER. *Escape to Utopia: The Communal Movement in America.* (American Procession Series.) Pp. xv, 444. New York: Hastings House, 1959. $5.50.

Professor Charles Gide some three decades ago commented upon the fact that so many communitarian societies were founded during the nineteenth century, and almost all of them in the New World. While only a few of these remain in existence, the interest in them persists in this country—if published works about them are any indication. The English translation of Gide's *Communist and Co-operative Colonies* appeared in 1930. About a third of it was devoted to American Protestant and socialist communities. During the present decade we have had A. E. Bestor, Jr., *Backwoods Utopia: The Sectarian and Owenite Phases of Communitarian Socialism in America: 1633–1829* (1950); *Heavens on Earth: Utopian Communities in America 1680–1880*, by the Englishman Mark Holloway; and now this treatment by Webber. During the century ending about 1900, more than 130 communitarian villages housing a hundred thousand people from first to last endured long enough to get into the record. The secular communities have disappeared entirely, and—with the advance of the welfare state—are unlikely to reappear. Only a few of those of a religious nature continue.

The present work is much more extensive in its coverage than either Gide or Galloway. Not only does Webber deal with the Shaker communities, the Pantisocrats, Oneida, the Rappites, the Owenite Colonies, the Fourierist Colonies, Brook Farm, Fruitlands, Icaria, and Amana, but also such as the Strangite and Spragg Mormon offshoot communities, the Keilites of Aurora, Oregon, the Millerites, the Dowieites of Zion City, King Benjamin Purnell's House of David, and Teed's "Koreshanity" colony at Estero, Florida.

This is a lucid work, rich in the materials used and presented, and packed with facts. It does not have Bestor's voluminous footnotes, though there are fifteen pages of classified bibliographical materials at the end. There is less attention to the social and ideational circumstances out of which the schemes appear, to the underlying social-economic, philanthropic, or religious theory, or to the social organizational features of the colonies, than in the other works. It is a more "relaxed" book with the occasional touches of the novelist; it abounds in "human interest" materials regarding the "prophets" and "messiahs," including revealing personality "close-ups," contemporary newspaper comments about them, sometimes in doggerel form and seldom flattering, bits of dialogue between key actors, and quotations from journals and diaries.

This is a solid, readable, thoroughly enjoyable piece of work about these experimentalists, ranging from brilliant and consecrated intellectuals to confused crackpots, who sought to construct among us miniature working models of the perfect society.

J. O. HERTZLER
Professor of Sociology
University of Nebraska

OLIVER C. COX. *The Foundations of Capitalism.* Pp. 500. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. $7.50.

Oliver C. Cox, Professor of Sociology at Lincoln University, Missouri, presents in this work a study of "capitalism as a form of social organization," for, he contends, such studies are few and "in the West have been discouraged"—a contention that seems somewhat exaggerated when one thinks of all the Marxist and neo-Marxist efforts of this kind. Be that as it may, however, Professor Cox holds that all "major social problems of contemporary society are essentially problems of capitalism" and that existing works on capitalism throw little or no light on cyclical movements, race relations, and the like (p. 1). Consequently he has endeavored to fill the gap in the literature with a book that purports to describe the rise of capitalist institutions and typically capitalist behavior.

The author's procedure is well illustrated by his treatment of nationalism, the origins of which he finds in early medieval Venice:

> The capitalist community tends to live invidiously and antagonistically with other peoples in its competitive and exploitative relationships with them, hence its controlling attitude also tends to be exclusive, proud, and defiant. It appeals to group interests fundamental to all members of the community, and it consequently reaches the level of irrational group behavior (p. 55).

Similarly Professor Cox finds in modern society that war, religion, social organization, the state, and governmental policies are determined by capitalism. He leaves little room for individual personality or for the play of non-economic forces in the analysis of modern behavior. In fact, the entire study seems to be based on a kind of economic determinism which becomes explicit in the last paragraph of the book:

> It should be noted that while food and fibers tend always to be available in relative abundance in leading capitalist nations, some populations of the specialized food-producing areas may paradoxically go hungry. This dilemma has never been a real problem of capitalism: socialism, however, will not be able to escape it (p. 483).

However sympathetic one may be toward the intentions of Professor Cox, the critical scholar is almost certain to be unimpressed with the author's history and with his use of sources. All too frequently he quotes at length from "authorities" and almost as frequently these authorities turn out to be the authors of textbooks or of out-of-date works like the old *Cambridge Modern History*. Technical competence, which the author admits (p. 482) he does not have,

is a sine qua non to the successful writing of history.

SHEPARD B. CLOUGH
Professor of History
Columbia University

SALLY FALK MOORE. *Power and Property in Inca Peru.* Pp. viii, 190. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. $5.00.

This book brings a somewhat fresh approach to the frequently, and sometimes heatedly, discussed question of what the native Inca Empire was really like; for the author has the unusual background of both legal and anthropological training. Dr. Moore contends that all previous writers misunderstood the Empire in naively believing that it was completely uniform in structure and thoroughly consistent in practice. By constant reference to primary published colonial Spanish sources, but not to new archival materials, she shows that the Inca ideal was only incompletely achieved since it had to compromise with diverse local usages.

Particular attention is accorded land, distribution of goods, government, and judicial procedures. Dr. Moore shows that, although the Inca divided some land between the State, Sun—temple or church—and common people, a division which has been claimed as the theoretical distribution of all land, but which few authors have claimed was made in three equal parts, there were certain cases, as on the north coast, where tribute for state and church purposes was exacted from "tenants." She also cites "private," inheritable land, which the Inca granted to certain lords. Not all produce, therefore, went to the government or temple storehouses for redistribution. Labor services and special craft products, she points out, were often supplied directly to members of the ruling hierarchy without coming under the actual control of the Inca.

With respect to government, she cites instances to show that the Inca often kept local rulers in power or resorted to other expediencies and did not bring the entire population into the system of tens, hundreds, thousands, and so forth, with special rulers over each. In judicial procedure, there was no separate system of courts. Cases were judged by the rulers, with ultimate power resting in the Inca himself.

The author's rather polemic zeal in debunking previous views unfortunately leads to emphasis on what the Inca were not rather than to knitting together the threads of what they were. Nonetheless, the book is most valuable in indicating that, since the Inca were still creating their governmental structure and improvising procedures at the time of the Spanish Conquest, uniformity could not be expected. In view of the recency of the Empire—and the author might have stressed that it had been extended along 2,000 miles of the Andes in less than 100 years—it is remarkable not that there were many local survivals and improvisations, but that the tripartite division of land and the decimal system of rule had been so extensively imposed. This was a strong state, formed by conquest and with no commerce, money, or disposable title to private property. The Inca could appropriate a portion of the production of local lands or they could take the total production of a portion of the lands, they could reward nobles with lands and workers or deprive them, they could rule directly through officials appointed in the decimal system or indirectly through native rulers of conquered populations, and they held the power of life and death.

It is not surprising that the Inca tempered their use of power in handling a newly conquered population or that they adapted their procedures in some measure to local usages. It is surprising, mainly, that no one has stressed the diversities within the Empire before this. Dr. Moore has made the Inca Empire much more real and plausible.

JULIAN H. STEWARD
Graduate Research Professor
of Anthropology
University of Illinois

## *ASIA AND AFRICA*

*The United States and Africa.* Background Papers and the Final Report of the Thirteenth American Assembly, Harriman Campus of Columbia University. Pp. xiv, 252. New York: The American Assembly, Columbia University, 1958. $1.25 hard bound; $1.00 paper bound.

The grim reality of international gamesmanship now embraces Africa whose contact with America is growing: diplomatic relations are now everywhere established in the continent. Its primitive peoples are the guinea pigs of research workers. Africa's natural wealth is needed by the West, and, politically, the continent must be made "safe" within the western camp. This is evident in all the nine papers whose authors, academic and professional people, reflect the inflexible American view on the various contemporary "isms." This befogs the issues and prevents Africa from being understood in terms of its own self. More seriously, change, particularly political and economic change, may not be readily understood in terms of contemporary western ideology. Americans frequently fail to understand the operation of colonialism and see complex issues solely in terms of their own "historic role in furthering the principle of self-determination"; of liberting an oppressed people—which many Africans are. Significantly there are no papers on the history of colonialism—as there are in *Africa in the Modern World*, edited by Calvin W. Stillman, University of Chicago Press, 1955—or on social services, education, health, and housing.

Rupert Emerson's theme, closely argued, is that Africa's backwardness is itself an indictment of colonialism. Yet he ignores the fact that the old does not yield without a struggle. James Coleman reaches a high level of abstraction in his typology of contemporary nationalistic movements—not of traditional political systems—yet is forced to conclude that "simple chance may be the critical factor in determining the final outcome." African nationalism is still highly personalized: there is no professional and artisan middle class, so that anything might happen.

Vernon Mackay makes it abundantly clear that African leaders, having rejected the external pressures of the colonial powers, will do the same vis-a-vis Russia and America. If this is true the global giants will have to rework their partisan policies. Daniel Neumark's and Andrew Kamarck's economic analyses are solid contributions. Neumark's treatment of the distribution of natural resources is excellent. African economies are in a process of change and hence excessively dependent on industrialized countries.

Racial conflicts are discussed by William Brown and Hylan Lewis. But for a discussion of conflict in "primarily African" states, hence not race conflict, little new is contributed. Walter Goldschmidt's attempt to round off is totally unconvincing. Something more is needed than paragraphs on "culture," "acculturation," "detribalization," and the inevitable "values." He pulls the Masai and Sebei out of the hat as spot examples.

Otherwise, this is a good dollar's worth and reflects America's search to understand Africa. The papers could be used as an introduction to Africa.

PETER GUTKIND
Senior Research Fellow
East African Institute of Social
Research
Kampala, Uganda

PHILIP MASON. *The Birth of a Dilemma: The Conquest and Settlement of Rhodesia.* Pp. xi, 366. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. 30s.

The reader who looks hopefully to this study for a full explanation of recent events in Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia will not find it. As its title indicates, this volume is concerned with the beginnings of white rule in Rhodesia. Actually, most of the book is a detailed treatment of the conquest—of conditions prevailing in the area before the white man's arrival, of Lobengula, Rhodes, the Rudd Concession, the Pioneers of 1890, the Matabele War of 1893, and the rebellions of 1896. Southern Rhodesia is treated rather than Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland; for the latter whole volumes are needed and promised. The author is now Director of the Institute of Race Relations, a career which grew out of an interest in the British Empire generally after twenty years in the Indian Civil Service. This study shows that experience in India has taught the author much about the problems of colonial administration.

The "dilemma" of the title is the universal one which arises in areas where one race conquers and rules another. It comes from the inevitable clash between the high principles with which governments seek to justify the costly conquest of other peoples and the earthy interests behind the actual functioning of white rule in the given area. The Europeans who settled and ruled the conquered territories were less concerned with high moral principle than with the more immediate responsibilities of getting land, of recruiting native laborers to work their mines and farms, and of setting up an administration with schools and courts more favorable to themselves than to Africans. For a person separated from all this in time and space it is very easy to stress the hypocrisy of white rule; a reading of this book, however, is rather convincing with its evidence that the way of the hypocrite is not an easy one.

One wishes that the author could have given fellow historians a brief evaluation of Felix Gross's *Rhodes of Africa*, a book which covers much of the same ground and bears the marks of extensive use of source materials without a single footnote to permit a check on his bitter indictment of Rhodes. Let it be said that Mason makes no attempt to whitewash the men who made Rhodesia. They are portrayed with plenty of warts. If the volumes to come maintain the standard set by this one, students of African History will owe grateful thanks to its author and those working with him.

HARRY R. RUDIN
Professor of History
Yale University

DORIS GOODRICH ADAMS. *Iraq's People and Resources*. (University of California Publications in Economics, Vol. XVIII.) Pp. viii, 160. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958. $3.00.

In these drifting days anything said about Iraq may be wrong tomorrow. However, people and land change more slowly than governments, and Miss Adams' choice of subject dates her book but little. Although written in 1955 and revised in 1956, like the barrage over the Tigris at Samarra, it still holds water. Written in a lull between cyclones, it gives us a solid background from which the present political whirlwind can be evaluated. Anyone who reads it carefully—and it is easy reading—can see and smell the powder-train lying along the dusty gutters of Baghdad that touched off the most recent explosion.

Iraq is a country of about six million people. In the census year of 1947 they numbered four and a half million. No ethnic, linguistic, and religious majority exists. Of the 80 per cent of Arabs, only 30 per cent form the dominant Sunni group, while 46 per cent are Shi'a and 4 per cent Christian. Seventeen per cent of Kurds, all Sunni Muslims, perch as a powerful and strategically located minority in the mountains bordering Turkey and Iran. Turkomans and Persians form about 1 per cent each, while the last per cent is made up of Armenians, Jews—who numbered 125,000 before Israel—Yezidis, and Mandaeans. These minorities inhabit either inaccessible mountains or urban labyrinths.

These census figures were gathered under less than ideal circumstances. Fear of confiscation and conscription, shame at having produced female offspring, pride of sons, avoidance of the Evil Eye, and other cultural barriers blocked the pollsters. Data on literacy which show only 14 per cent of literate males in 1947 included persons who had memorized the Qur'an and used the pages as reminders, and excluded literate conscripts. The crude birth rate of about 55 per thousand falls close to the biological maximum for Homo sapiens, but misses the peak largely because, with a life expectancy of 30 years, widowers prefer marrying young girls to widows.

Unlike certain other "underdeveloped" countries Iraq has a large national income from oil royalties, and much unexploited land, and it is underpopulated. Like others it suffers from poverty, malnutrition—particularly of women and children—absentee landlordism, an eighth-century legal system, and an inefficient bureaucracy. The civil service furnished underpaid jobs for a leisured upper crust with more nepotism than training, excessive centralization, and a shrinking from responsibility. Inadequate pay and short hours fostered graft and outside jobs. The requirement of a doctorate for higher ranks drained physicians, surgeons, dentists, and scholars from needed professional activities. Iraq's problem was, therefore, largely a matter of education, nutrition, and organization.

My congratulations to the authoress, a fearless investigator and reporter, as much at home in anthropology as in economics, and an excellent literary craftsman.

CARLETON S. COON
Professor of Anthropology
University of Pennsylvania



TOM LITTLE. *Egypt*. Pp. 334. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. $6.50.

STEPHEN HEMSLEY LONGRIGG and FRANK STOAKES. *Iraq*. Pp. ix, 264. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. $6.50.

In this Nations of the Modern World Series, Tom Little has produced an extraordinarily interesting and useful book. It is not a "research" volume and the scholar will have to go to Lane, Cromer, Lloyd, and others for primary material, but it is a compendium of Egyptian history which should prove of genuine value. The story begins with Pharaonic Egypt and rapidly sums up the main thread of Egyptian history until the arrival of Mohammed Ali. From here on the narrative begins to include more detail. There is a good passage on the rule of Lord Cromer. Mr. Little feels he overstayed his constructive period, becoming brittle in his rule and thereby undoing some of the good he had earlier accomplished. The chapters covering the period 1907 to 1952 are graphic but almost force the reader to despair of human intelligence. It seems that everyone concerned infallibly made the wrong decision when there was a choice. Egypt became an inferno with nationalists, Wafdists, British, royalty, and Muslim brethren all competing to add impalatable elements into the witches' brew of political turmoil. The final chapters on the rise of Gemal Abd-en-Nasser are among the best and most objective studies of the leader yet published. Nasser has aroused such passions by his own dynamic emotions that it is difficult to find perspective in describing his career and ideas. Though Mr. Little was expelled from Egypt in the dramatic moments of the fall of 1956, one would not know this from any appearance of bias in the book. The book closes with the end of 1956. It is primarily a political study, the focus being on personalities and movements, but the social and economic factors are not forgotten. As a bird's-eye view of Egypt through time, the book is an asset. It is well written, accurate in detail, with an attitude of sympathy for the people of Egypt. Yet Mr. Little never glosses over the weaknesses, failures and blunders of the many characters who march across the pages of his book.

Another contribution in the same series, Mr. Longrigg's one-volume study on Iraq affords an accurate if sketchy picture of a country in the turmoil of transition. The ancient period is very briefly passed over, but with the nineteenth century A.D. the author begins to increase the focus on detail. The weakness of Turkish rule; the disintegration of law, order, and stability; and the internal suspicions and hatred of religious sectarians, tribes, Kurdish mountaineers, and city grafters all had combined to create extensive chaos and poverty when Iraq emerged in 1919 from the status of a province. For the next forty years, three names are writ large on the Iraqi scene—King Faisal, Nuri-as-Sa'id and the British.

The task they faced was colossal. The totalitarian concept of an Ottoman Sultan-Caliph was shattered. The Islamic philosophy had been a complete and coherent, if inadequate, system including law, government, administration, society, economics, religion, ethics, logic, and even aesthetics. It no longer could satisfy the new situation. The infant state was in need of a new framework to encourage experimentation in education, economic growth, political science, and the integration of ancient hostile elements. New classes were to emerge in a labor force. Iraq became a great oil exporter. In the chapters devoted to the changes brought about in these many fields, the authors give a handy set of references that are useful for illustrative purposes. Every phase of Iraqi life has

been subjected to study. It is no wonder that Iraq faced revolution. The changes were too rapid and bewildering and the large scale borrowings from the West were not integrated into a pattern which gave satisfaction to many elements.

The authors have a one-page Epilogue at the end, simply recording the revolution of July 14, 1958 when the text of the book was going to press. With the passing of the monarchy, the elder statesmen and the British influence, the new page in Iraqi history will record a lot of new names—but the problems will be the same. In summary, this is a good one-volume study on Iraq—so far.

EDWIN M. WRIGHT
Falls Church, Virginia

SIDNEY KLEIN. *The Pattern of Land Tenure Reform in East Asia after World War II.* (Bookman Monograph Series.) Pp. 260. New York: Bookman Associates, 1958. $10.00.

Dr. Klein begins his well-ordered and readable book with a list of questions about land reform asked by "the economists of many nations"—questions which his book is presumably designed to answer:

What is the economic need for reform in the rural areas of X country? What is the distribution of land ownership and the distribution of other forms of agricultural wealth? What is the distribution of agricultural income? What should be and what are the functions of the large landowners, with respect to agricultural administration, innovation, and investment? How secure is the tenure of the tenant? Would redistribution of the land, other agricultural wealth, or income from the land increase or decrease agricultural investment? Would such a redistribution increase or decrease agricultural productivity?

These are but some of the questions which have been asked; the author seeks his answers in the postwar experience of Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Communist China. All of these countries faced land tenure problems in an extreme form, as if "the present population of the United States were approximately 1,000,000,000 instead of 173,000,000 and if its economy were primarily agricultural and technologically primitive rather than highly industrialized in character" (p. 14).

In Japan, landlords managed to hang onto 3.54 million acres out of the 6.69 acres of tenanted land. However, "the Japanese land tenure reform was the first such program in Asia in modern times to be completely successful without the use of force." The program in Taiwan increased the area of owner-cultivated land by 50 per cent; this was "the second such program . . . to be successfully completed without the use of force" (p. 82). Klein agrees with Du Pasquier that the effect of land reform in South Korea was to leave the peasant unable to meet annual payments plus income tax on the land let alone "purchase new tools, livestock, or fertilizers or pesticides to raise the level of his production" (p. 106). Yet this program, too, he regards as "successfully completed without the use of force" (p. 110).

The account of the "Goods" ends there; Klein then moves on to the "Bads." The North Korean land reform was not a success; there is no clear evidence of improvement in the standard of living of peasants. The Chapter on Communist China is the longest and most interesting, but also the least convincing chapter in the whole book. To prove that the peasant's lot had not improved, he resorts to such dubious devices as assuming that since "it is the common people who pay for wars," and China was at war from 1946 to 1949, the effective taxation of peasants did not decline in that period; he then goes on to argue, for reasons not quite clear, that the tax burden on the peasant did not fall between 1949 and 1952 either (pp. 167–168). The life of the peasant in China was "disrupted," rather than being reformed as in Japan (p. 187). His conclusions do not seem to jibe with Dr. Wilfred Malenbaum's recent comparison of Chinese and Indian development. Certainly Malenbaum had no wish to find China's record much better than India's; but that is what he found, not only with respect to industrial output, but with respect to increases in agricultural production and in the level of consumption.



Some readers may question Klein's reiterated use of the expression "without force." The Japanese and South Korean reforms were carried out under the aegis of the American military governments; the Taiwan reform was modelled on the Japanese one with American aid and advice and with the American army much in evidence. True, no force was directly used; but in these countries, at this time, the American army was not entirely dissociated with the idea of force in the minds of the people.

The major shortcoming of this otherwise very useful book is that the author does not really answer the questions of the economists. He provides virtually no information about the contribution of land reform to economic development. He treats land reform as though its sole purpose was to "get the rascals out" and give "land to the tiller." He leaves us in the dark as to whether it accelerates or retards the take-off into sustained economic growth.

BENJAMIN HIGGINS
Visiting Professor of Economics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

JOAN V. BONDURANT. *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict.* Pp. xv, 269. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1958. $5.00.

This book argues for a re-examination of the relationship of means to ends in contemporary political theory in the light of Gandhi's philosophy of conflict. No political system has found a way of resolving conflicts between means and ends without resorting to violence and the threat of violence. Gandhi's *satyagraha* involved a "technique of conducting social relations characterized by constructive, peaceful attitudes, and infused with the determination to enlarge areas of agreement by persuasion."

Such a technique may, indeed, have great significance for our times, and we are indebted to Joan Bondurant for inquiring into the Gandhian method in a perceptive and rigorous fashion. In just 232 pages she explains the basic precepts of *satyagraha*, describes it in operation, examines the relationship of *satyagraha* to Indian traditions, discusses the error of regarding Gandhi as either a conservative or an anarchist, and finally sums up the possible relevance of *satyagraha* to contemporary political thought and practice. Because of the broad scope of the book, a problem is just brought into focus and its elaborations noted when we are led onto new considerations. Hence the book serves admirably to challenge the imagination and suggest new areas for more comprehensive work in political theory and in the operation of *satyagraha*.

The author shows that *satyagraha* is not merely an organized opposition that avoids violence. Without "truth" and self-suffering *satyagraha* does not exist. The book's interpretation of the "truth" in Gandhian philosophy is brilliant. *Satya* or "truth" must be understood in the ethical sense. In traditional Hindu thought it represented the highest goal to be achieved by individuals and was identified with being or reality. But Gandhi projected this conception of truth into the realm of social action. Truth, then, became a relative concept and lost the absolutistic quality that it has in some Hindu philosophy; Gandhian truth can be tested and be seen to work in social relations. Though the ethical relativism of *satya* is recognized, it is to a very meaningful extent modified by the necessary association of *satya* with non-violence, which Gandhi identified as the "positive state of love." Self-suffering means the willingness of the *satyagraha* to pursue his ends if need be unto death, and this avoids for Gandhi the charge that his was a method only for the weak.

The *satyagraha* philosophy accepts conflict as an unavoidable part of change; in resolving conflicts coercion may even be applied. In this doctrine and its operation under Gandhi there is a greater realism than is apparent in classical liberal democratic theory, and we must agree with Miss Bondurant that much more thought should be given to incorporating Gandhi's philosophy of conflict into modern democratic society. It seems doubtful, however, that *satyagraha* could ever be effective between

parties, one of which denied reason and relied entirely on force for the settlement of all disputes.

CHARLES H. HEIMSATH
Instructor in Political Science
Yale University

DONALD EUGENE SMITH. *Nehru and Democracy: The Political Thought of an Asian Democrat.* Pp. x, 194. New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1959. $5.25.

Donald E. Smith's *Nehru and Democracy* is a path-breaking study in many ways. He explodes the myth of inscrutability of the mind of Nehru. He examines the development of Nehru's social and political philosophy by assiduously combing through all his writings and speeches. In his analysis he confronts Nehru the thinker with Nehru, first the revolutionary leader of a large political movement, and then the pilot of the largest democracy in the East. And he shows that Nehru has carved out a philosophy for himself which is a queer mixture of Western liberalism and Marxist-Leninist scientific socialism, but which has a central theme that gives it a continuity and unity all its own. Dr. Smith maintains that in Nehru a new genus of leadership has emerged, which has a new political rhythm and which cannot fit into any of the old categories.

A reading of Smith's book will convince anyone that by training and inclination Nehru is a democrat. To Nehru, democracy means first, the freedom for the individual to choose his own values, second, a political structure based on representative government—popular sovereignty, majority rule, responsible political parties, and informed leadership being its key elements—third, economic and social egalitarianism, and fourth, a mental set of attitudes on the part of individuals and groups—with strong emphasis on social self-discipline, and such cherished age-old Indian values as *satyagraha* or the assertion of truth, toleration, peaceful methods and equal importance of means and ends.

However, Nehru approaches the problems of a democratic government strictly in a scientific and experimental manner. The final breakup of the old order of imperialism and the reshaping of capitalism in the West have certainly convinced him of the efficacy of certain Western procedures and methods of government. But the vast changes that swept Russia in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution and that attracted his imagination in youth have left an indelible mark on the mind of Nehru. He wants to transform the lives of millions of people from one of drudgery to one where they will be able to enjoy the fruits of a larger social and economic freedom. And in this experiment, Nehru is not at all afraid to draw from the experiences of the Soviets as he is inspired by the cherished democratic values of the West. Dr. Smith takes the reader through a procession of events which show that Nehru has modified, changed, and even contradicted himself, when delineating the social and economic rights of individuals and groups. A pragmatic approach to these problems is perhaps the best solution in a situation where no precedents seem to be satisfying. Dr. Smith gives us an adequate insight into this pragmatic approach of Nehru's.

A few words of criticism are now in order. An evaluation of Nehru's leadership is not possible from the exposition of the evolution of Nehru's political thinking in this book. The book has no adequate perspective on the recent social scene in India. The role of leaders like Subhas Chandra Bose and Vallabhbhai Patel—both now dead—and the politician-cum-hermit ex-Socialist Jai Prakash Narain in the shaping of modern India's mind is completely overlooked in the book. Their interaction with Nehru certainly influenced him in selecting one set of principles and rejecting others for guiding India's destiny.

Dr. Smith seems to concur with Nehru's interpretation of the situation with regard to the waywardness of the Indian Press. A careful reading of the Report of the Indian Press Commission does not justify the extreme conclusions arrived at by Nehru or Dr. Smith in this respect, especially because radio broadcasting, a vital medium of communication, is completely owned and controlled by the government of India. The book often smacks of the style of dissertation—it is Dr. Smith's doctoral thesis—simple points are sometimes overly labored, and arguments and expositions are frequently repetitious. However, these minor criticisms should not detract from the value of this otherwise scholarly and critical analysis of the political philosophy of an Asian democrat.

BAIDYA NATH VARMA
Instructor in Sociology
Hofstra College



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VOLUME 325 SEPTEMBER 1959

# THE ANNALS

*of* The American Academy *of* Political *and* Social Science

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*
RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Assistant Editor*







## AMERICAN CIVILIZATION AND ITS LEADERSHIP NEEDS, 1960-1990

*Special Editor of this Volume*
JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH
*Professor of Political Science*
*University of Pennsylvania*
*President, The American Academy of Political and Social Science*

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PHILADELPHIA
1959

*Issued bimonthly by The American Academy of Political and Social Science at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pennsylvania.*

*Editorial and Business Offices, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania.*

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# FOREWORD

Joseph S. Clark, presently senior United States Senator from Pennsylvania and former Mayor of Philadelphia, was given the Philadelphia Award for outstanding civic services. The award carried a cash grant of $10,000.

Senator Clark has believed for some time that the American republic has not developed an adequate system for selecting, persuading, and training leaders for the fields of science, defense, politics, industry, and art. This lack of an adequate system has become especially acute since the United States accepted the leadership of the Western world.

He accordingly asked the Academy to explore this subject. He offered to donate the $10,000 and his advisory services. The Academy gladly accepted and donated the services of its higher echelon of officers.

In authoritarian countries the allocation of select groups of manpower to pursuits essential to the promotion of the national interest is not a difficult problem. In a democracy, especially one associated with the philosophy of minimal government, the general feeling is that manpower allocations and leadership projects should be the result of supply and demand, and "higgling of the market." The problem arises when the higgling over compensation, in money or prestige, results in values and inducements which do not contibute to the national interest.

In studying this situation in the United States, two questions arise:

1. Has the distribution of leadership and select manpower become so bad that we should now take corrective action?
2. Should this corrective action, if taken, be private, quasi-public, or governmental?

The first step in exploring the subject was an all-day conference, attended by the men listed below:

James C. Charlesworth, President of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Ewan Clague, U. S. Commissioner of Labor Statistics
Joseph S. Clark, U. S. Senator from Pennsylvania
Harris Ellsworth, Chairman of the U. S. Civil Service Commission
Howard Hanson, Director of the Eastman School of Music, University of Rochester
Gaylord P. Harnwell, President of the University of Pennsylvania
Peter Henle, Staff Member of the Department of Research, AFL-CIO
Elmer Hutchisson, Director of the American Institute of Physics
Martin Meyerson, Director of the Center for Urban Studies, Harvard University
Robert A. Moore, Dean of the College of Medicine of the State University of New York
Otto L. Nelson, Jr., Vice-President of the New York Life Insurance Company
Filmer S. C. Northrop, Sterling Professor of Philosophy and Law, Yale University
Don K. Price, Jr., Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University





Thorsten Sellin, Editor of THE ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Donald C. Stone, Dean of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh
Stephen B. Sweeney, Director of the Fels Institute of Local and State Government, University of Pennsylvania
Max Ways, Senior Editor of *Time*
William L. C. Wheaton, Director of the Institute of Urban Studies, University of Pennsylvania
Alfred H. Williams, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, University of Pennsylvania
Henry M. Wriston, President of the American Assembly

The wide scope of the discussion at the meeting is revealed in the Précis which appears at the end of these articles. Among other decisions, the conference agreed that the Academy should publish a volume setting forth the needs and the possibilities for training leaders in America. It also agreed that steps should be taken to implement plans adumbrated in the volume.

It will be observed that the authors of the following articles are not in most cases the persons who attended the initial conference. This is because the contributions of the conferees were in the nature of appraisal and exploration, whereas the authors were selected because of their association in the specific movements and institutions dealing with select manpower.

This is how this present volume came about. The reader may now turn the page to learn from his own words what Senator Clark has in mind.

JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH

## INTRODUCTION

This volume stems from a conviction that we are not recruiting our ability in America today into the careers where it is most needed. Politics and teaching are only two of many areas of activity where both the quality and quantity of trained personnel are inadequate to meet our national requirements. At the same time, social status and monetary reward are inducing bright and able minds into occupations which at best are useless and at worst downright destructive of the values of our civilization. The parade of rich Teamster Union bosses to Washington to take the Fifth Amendment before the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in Labor-Management Relations is the most notorious current case in point.

Unlike the Russians, we have no national personnel policy. There, little Ivan is set to doing what seems to the Politburo best for the state. Such a system is repulsive to our concepts of democracy and freedom. Yet it gives our Communist opponents a measurable advantage in the cold war.

In nearly every other field of activity in America complete laissez-faire is a thing of the past. Yet we make little effort to mitigate the rigors of the amoral law of supply and demand when it comes to the selection of a career.

Has the time come to attempt through persuasion to channel American ability into the places where it is most needed? This is the question to which the present volume of THE ANNALS addresses itself.

At the conference held November 12, 1958 and referred to by Dr. Charlesworth in his Foreword there was no consensus of opinion in response to this inquiry. Nor I suspect will there be in the papers which follow this Introduction.

For myself I believe the question should be answered in the affirmative. Yet no policy, no plan, no program, no procedures are presently in existence for achieving the desired result.

Perhaps the first step is to determine what kind of a civilization we want. Let's admit success in this effort would be no small feat. Having done so we could make a rough estimate of the kinds and numbers of educated people needed in the next thirty years to advance us a few short steps towards the agreed goal. Next we might compare our existing and potential supply of people against the need in order to determine shortages and surpluses. Then we should survey our educational facilities to establish what changes should be made to assure an adequate output of required skills and talent.

Having done all this we might consider what methods compatible with freedom would increase the rewards and decrease the punishments for entering the careers where the greatest shortages exist. Finally we could give some thought to ways and means of changing the climate of public opinion towards those necessary occupations presently held in some contempt by cartoonists and commentators—such as United States Senators—who, perhaps unfortunately, will be required in the number of an even hundred for the foreseeable future.

The papers which follow discuss these matters from a wide variety of individual viewpoints. If this volume should generate a wider public interest in the need for action in an area critical to the survival and future development of American civilization, the time and money spent in its preparation will have been worthwhile.

JOSEPH S. CLARK
*United States Senator from Pennsylvania*



# What Kind of an American Civilization Do We Want?

By F. S. C. NORTHROP

ABSTRACT: There are reasons for believing that we do not now have the kind of America we want. It can be had, however, providing three major subjects are given a place of primacy throughout our educational system and in the training and the practice of all our legal, political, and other cultural representatives. These three things are: (1) creative art and the cultivation of aesthetic sensitivity; (2) normative tolerant religious, moral, legal, and political philosophy together with the presentation of alternative theories; and (3) continuous training in imageless formal thinking by means of the teaching of English grammar, traditional and symbolic logic, mathematics, and the theory of experimentally verified mathematical physics and its philosophy. Only if these three things are done is it likely that America can keep her ideals in the forefront of what she is doing to win the confidence of free men and also possess first-rate instruments for protecting and implementing these ideals.

---

*Filmer S. C. Northrop, Ph.D., LL.D., New Haven, Connecticut, is Sterling Professor of Philosophy and Law at Yale University. He is the author of The Meeting of East and West (1946); The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities (1947); The Taming of the Nations (1952), winner of the Freedom House award; and European Union and United States Foreign Policy (1954). Dr. Northrop has been an educational sojourner in Latin America, Europe, South Asia, Morocco, and China.*

IN 1950 the Cultural Division of the South East Asia Treaty Organization called a conference at Bangkok. Its concern was modern technology in Asian societies. Two facts were reported which make one ask whether we have the kind of civilization we want.

Mr. Tom Harrisson, representing Sarawak, reported that a more culturally isolated people than his neighbors on the island of Borneo do not exist. Little reaches them except a few radios and three broadcasts from Indonesia, Australia, and Communist China. Since they know none of the languages spoken, what they hear from abroad is not understood. Nevertheless, these broadcasts have disrupted their folk dances of high quality. By capturing their ears and imaginations, the mere beat of boogie-woogie has corrupted their aesthetic standards and is destroying their customs.

Ambassador W. R. Crocker, representing Australia, called attention to the English reading material from the Free World available on street-corner stands in Bangkok. He testified that it is similar to what he found at Jakarta when he was Ambassador to Indonesia. He suggested that it is all too similar also to what exists in Australia, Canada, the United States, and even Great Britain. Needless to say, it portrays young people of the most vulgar aesthetic taste with apparently no moral scruples whatever whose main concern is with sex at its crudest, making money by any means, and whipping out a revolver upon the slightest of whims. Many mollifying factors though there be, this is the image of the Free World which the marriage of mass communication with the businessman's laissez-faire profit motive is creating today both abroad and at home. It appears, Ambassador Crocker concluded, that there is a Gresham's law of culture as well as of money at work by which everywhere the bad is driving out the good.

To appreciate the full effect abroad of this image, the classical Asian, medieval European, and Latin American conception of proper relations between the sexes in public must be understood. In Confucian China, as in many Mexican villages today, a husband and wife do not walk down the street side by side. It is immoral also for even an engaged couple to meet unless the parents of both are continuously present. Imagine the impact upon the people when they see American movies, to say nothing about the "personal confessions" in the paperbacks. In 1950 the British educated editor of India's excellent magazine of art, *Marg*, said to the writer:

> If you think some of your American movies are vulgar, you should see some which are created by young Indians who are copying yours and who know nothing of the artistic and other cultural standards and achievements of the West. Having been thus led by the influence of your movies to repudiate the aesthetic standards and social customs of their own great civilization and knowing next to nothing of yours, they have no standards whatever to guide them. The result often is that compared with some Indian movies, the most vulgar of yours are models of aesthetic refinement and sensitivity.

The only moral and artistic standards they know being thus flouted, the conclusion follows easily that the Americans have no aesthetic or social good taste whatever and that for them "anything goes" providing one makes money in the process.

## CULTURE AND POLITICS

The ill effects are political as well as cultural. Once this image of America arises, it becomes natural for Mr. Arnold Toynbee to reply to an American secretary of state's broadcast about "massive retaliation at a time and place of one's own choosing" with "No annihilation without representation!" and for Asian statesmen to conclude also that the Americans, like the youth in their movies and paperbacks, are "trigger-happy" with the atomic bomb and hence not to be trusted as allies in protecting the Free World.

This is the trouble with neglecting the cultural factor in international politics. Because a secretary of state neglected the advice of cultural officers and other career diplomats in his own Department who are experienced in sensing the diverse cultural and political mentalities of the nations to which they are assigned and are expert in reporting objectively on the most likely foreign response to anything America does, the late Mr. Dulles defeated his own purposes. Instead of winning—through experienced diplomatic negotiations, tailor-made to the unique cultural and political concerns of each European, Latin American, African, Middle Eastern and Asian nation—the assent of his allies to his "new" foreign policy before he announced it, thereby giving political and cultural leaders abroad the time to prepare the minds of their own people for what he "really meant" by "massive retaliation . . . at one's own choosing," he unwittingly and quite unnecessarily drove into positive anti-Americanism even people like Mr. Toynbee, Pandit Nehru, and hundreds of millions of Europeans and Asians behind them, who want to believe the best about the United States. With far less money given to the Cultural Division and career diplomats than it costs to replace with American soldiers and weapons the military support thus lost, such unfortunate political and military consequences of the neglect of the cultural image of ourselves which we create abroad, could have been avoided.

Nor were Secretary Dulles' opposite numbers in the previous Democratic administrations entirely different. The major foreign policy adviser and Chairman of the Planning Board of Secretary Acheson's State Department was Mr. George F. Kennan. Quite contrary to his practice in understanding the Soviet Union, Mr. Kennan in his foreign policy theorizing tells us that "the moral-legal state of mind," that is, the cultural approach, is quite misplaced in international relations and that "power-balancing" "should" be used instead. This is equally self-defeating as the neutralism which it generated in South Asia following the Korean United Nations police action shows since it made the Soviet Russians' Mr. Malik's point for him when he returned to the Security Council. This point was that the presence of American forces in Korea was not the United Nations morally and legally authorized police action that it purported to be but was instead a militaristic power move upon the part of the United States to get its troops on Asian soil, into which America had duped her Asian and European allies.

Republican Candidate Eisenhower fell into the same Hobbesian error as Mr. Kennan when, in an irresponsible appeal for votes in his first election campaign, the General insisted against President Truman that the American boys in Korea were "in a war" and not in a United Nations legally authorized police action.

This power-politics philosophy of American foreign policy of the Republican candidate of 1951 and the Kennan-minded Democrats inevitably had the effect of reinforcing the image of America abroad as a military- and power-minded people rather than a morally and legally principled nation. It also left America morally and legally impotent when the Soviet tanks crushed Hungary. It is probably because of the

danger of such a broken American image of herself that our Founding Fathers warned us explicitly against following the Machiavellian and Hobbesian power politics of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe in our foreign policy. Jefferson—to whom our Founding Fathers entrusted the major share of the writing of their first foreign policy document, the Declaration of Independence—had studied the legal and political philosophy of the ancient Greeks, the Stoic Roman lawyers, and all the moderns including Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Rousseau. Jefferson's letters make it unequivocally clear that in the type of legal and political system which they created and in their foreign policy, the Founding Fathers' choice was between the political philosophies of Hobbes and Locke—and that they followed Locke. This is the point of Jefferson's statement that in his opinion "the three greatest men the world had ever produced [were] Bacon, Newton, and Locke."[1] This, rather than isolationism, is the point also of the warning issued to us by Washington, Jefferson, and Hamilton against "entangling alliances" with "the imperialistic nations of [eighteenth- and nineteenth-century] Europe."

Unfortunately this counsel has not been followed. The result is that due to a Kennan-minded Hobbesian Democratic foreign policy and an Eisenhower-minded Republican foreign policy which has oscillated between a Hobbesian interpretation of what happened in Korea and an international legal interpretation of British, French, and Israeli behavior at Suez, American international leadership in both parties has made America present a broken image of herself abroad. This is doubly tragic since it has occurred at the very time when the majority of Continental Europeans, as Continental European Union shows, and the majority of Britishers, as the existence of the British Commonwealth demonstrates, have repudiated Hobbes for Locke.

[1] Thomas Jefferson, *The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson,* edited and with an Introduction by Adrienne Koch and William Peden (New York: Modern Library, 1944), p. 609.

## DOMESTIC RESULTS

The domestic consequences are equally reactionary and serious. Only yesterday we read about the absurdity which occurs when three present Democratic foreign policy makers—Messrs. Acheson, Nitze, and King—whose expertness is that of the black-letter positive lawyer, wrote "a major foreign policy document" on military weapons, the efficiency of which they are obviously incompetent to judge. Also this Democratic foreign policy makes the professional soldiers who select their own successors the only competent deciders of foreign policy. Thus, again, military men and instruments are given primary roles in the image of America which American civilians are creating, thereby continuing the defeat of her purposes. Also, military men whose expertness is in instrumental values are forced, often against their own best judgment and wishes, to divert their attention from their own more-than-full-time job, to decide cultural and political goal-value questions in which they have no experience and little first-hand competence. Thus civilians in the State Department would behave like amateurish third-rate soldiers, and soldiers in the White House, Pentagon, and war colleges are forced to behave like amateurish second-rate politicians. The unfortunate de facto result—as seen objectively from abroad and as Sputnik has made evident within—is an America which in the realm of military instrumental values is dangerously close to being second rate and in the even more important domain of goal values is presenting a politically confused or crude and an aesthetically vulgar image of herself to the world. This image was not improved by Vice President Nixon's public exchange with Premier Khrushchev in Moscow, as the British reaction reported in the *New York Times* of July 26, 1959, clearly demonstrates.

But some will say: "Washington, Jefferson, and Hamilton did not have the Communist divisions and hydrogen bombs to face. Conditions are different today. Security must come first."

Let us reflect on what this means. It means what it says, which is that physical power and physical security are more important than civilized human beings who are the sole reason for physical power and security. In short, it means a self-contradictory and a persistingly self-defeating America.

Also, instead of curbing and eventually civilizing the Communists, it insures that we do precisely what Stalin designed the cold war to do—namely, cause us to abdicate the Lockean foreign policy ideals of the Declaration of Independence and the domestic religious and civil liberties of our Lockean Bill of Rights, thereby enabling the Communists to be feted at Bandung as the sole defenders throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Asia of the ideals for which the America of 1776 and 1791 stands. In short, the result is to hand the entire idealistic religious, legal, and political goal-value battle for the imaginations and loyalties of the youth of the world over to the Communists with little if any competition from us at the ideological-cultural level.

We must not fool ourselves. The Communists do not present themselves to Africans and Asians in terms of pressure for military bases or for the receipt of economic handouts. They present themselves instead in terms of their goal-value philosophy of an ideal world. In 1950 on the street-corner stands of Bombay, for example, one could buy for a few pennies the technical philosophical classics of Marx, Engels, and Lenin which define this ideal. On his return from India in 1950, the writer was told by informed people in Cairo that young Egyptian Communists were studying the Islamic classics in the world's leading Islamic university, thereby identifying themselves with the best in that great civilization, while also teaching their fellow Egyptian students the technical philosophical doctrines and ideals of the Communists. Consequently, the image which Stalin's Russia and Mao's China were then giving to the youth of Asia, Islam, and Africa was not that of youthful social parasites obsessed with sex, money-making, and gun play, but of a serious and poor Russian and Chinese youth, like themselves, who were working long hours in the classroom, the laboratory, and the factory to master the Marxist philosophy, the mathematics, medicine, and technology necessary to implement and protect the achievement of a specific philosophically defined goal-value ideal for all their people.

One looked in vain in 1950 in the street-corner stands of New Delhi, Karachi, or Cairo for the goal-value classics of America and the Free World. Instead, the literature described later by Ambassador Crocker at Bangkok was in its place.

It is to be noted that Australia's political scientist and diplomat did not put the blame for the present operation of a Gresham's law of culture solely on modern technology and the emphasis upon quantity at the expense of quality which it makes possible. Ambassador Crocker noted that the veneration of the businessman's profit motive as the highest good is also responsible. Cer-

tainly it comes near to being in major part culpable because technological instruments are normatively neutral with respect to what they communicate. It appears, therefore, that the vulgar image of themselves which the peoples of the Free World are exporting has its source in the false inversion of instrumental and goal values in which they have indulged at home.

Is this the America we want? If not, then must we not ask ourselves the following more specific questions?

## SOME POINTED QUESTIONS

Does creative art and the cultivation of aesthetic sensitivity to the artistic standards of our own and other great civilizations enjoy the place of primacy in our educational system and in the civilizing of our movie producers, commercial publishers, television viewers, and book buyers which an America of quality requires? Is the Cultural Division of the State Department listened to with sufficient seriousness when Congress examines the budget, or by our secretaries of state when they make major policy decisions and announcements? Do we possess a Cultural Division and Planning Board in the State Department composed of experienced diplomats, cultural anthropologists, and experts in the world's various cultural and political philosophies, including our own, who are capable of framing a consistent and principled foreign policy that is (1) based on the fact that our Founding Fathers created an America in which both domestic legal and foreign policy is grounded in the religious and political philosophy of Locke and Jefferson and the later Lincoln rather than in the philosophy of Machiavelli and Hobbes; and (2) capable of winning the joyful support of men like Mr. Toynbee, Pandit Nehru, Premier Nkrumah, and hundreds of millions of Europeans, Middle Easterners, Asians, and Africans who are now making their own Lockean and Jeffersonian declarations of independence?

Finally, are men whose expertness is in the instrumental values of the soldier, the businessman, or the latter's corporation lawyer, or whose foreign policy philosophy is that of instrumental material power, likely to express in their specific practical political deeds the primacy of concern with goal-value cultural and philosophical ideals which is required if one is to be an effective diplomat or a nonself-defeating secretary of state? In short, has not the time come in both political parties to create a single, truly American foreign policy by putting it in the care of fresh and more philosophically specific and imaginative minds who believe that the Lockean philosophy of goal values of our Founding Fathers still has something to say for itself in both domestic law and foreign policy?

## RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

If the answer to the foregoing questions be yes, certain additional questions follow immediately. Must not religious and political philosophy be given a place of primacy beside the cultivation of aesthetic sensitivity in the general education of everyone? More specifically, must not the religious philosophy of toleration and the separation of church and state of John Locke's *Letter Concerning Toleration* be required reading for every student? As the English social historian, Trevelyan, tells us, many people previously advocated toleration for reasons of religious or political expediency when they were in the minority or wanted freedom from religious wars, but it was with Locke for the first time that toleration became regarded as a positive good in and for itself even when one was in the majority.



Must not also the legal and political philosophy of the Stoic Roman lawyers and Cicero, of Locke's *Lectures Concerning Natural Law* and *Of Civil Government,* together with the letters of Jefferson and the *Federalist Papers,* be given a place of primacy in the general educational system, the war colleges, and the training of foreign service officers? Is there any reason also why these philosophical classics should not be made available in penny editions, translated into every native language and dialect for all the world to read?

Might it not be well also to acquaint everyone in the United States with Hobbes' *Leviathan,* the nineteenth-century English jurist Austin's *Province of Jurisprudence Determined,* Judge Learned Hand's *The Spirit of Liberty,* and essays on *The Bill of Rights* which derive, by way of Thayer of the 1890 Harvard Law School and Austin, from Hobbes? Then everyone will know the difference between the type of legal and political system of "checks and balances" based on Locke which our Founding Fathers created and the type of democratic positive legal institutions based on Hobbes which the British created and into which Mr. Justice Frankfurter sometimes, and Judge Learned Hand always, would now have us transform the institutions created by our Founding Fathers. Were this done, there would certainly not now be the confusion concerning whether it is the Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Brennan, and Douglas wing of the Supreme Court or the Justice Frankfurter-focused wing which represents the original conception of the Constitution and its Bill of Rights.

## LOCKEAN VS. HOBBESIAN THEORY

The heart of the difference between Locke and Hobbes is this. The former does not trust the locating of the entire political sovereignty of even a democratic government in any one branch of government. Consequently it divides political sovereignty between the three branches. It has a directly elected president who stays in office until the end of his term even when his party loses majority control of the legislative branch and who also has the power, which every American president has exercised, of vetoing majority approved legislative statutes for any reason he may choose to give. Similarly, in order to give legal protection to the religious and political beliefs of dissenters and to locate part of the political sovereignty in the judicial branch, the Lockean philosophy of democratic government as applied by Jefferson, Madison, the Adamses, and our other Founding Fathers adds a Bill of Rights which the federal judges are legally bound to interpret as law and use as a standard, not as Judge Hand would have us believe to "introduce a third legislature," but to measure the substantive content of the legislature's statutes in the legal protection of religious and civil liberties.

The first draft of the federal Constitution was sent by both Washington and Madison to Jefferson who was then Ambassador to France. Jefferson immediately replied that this constitution would not do, since it did not contain a "declaration of rights." Madison in his reply to Jefferson agreed, while adding certain reasons put forward to the contrary. On March 15, 1789, Jefferson replied to Madison as follows: "In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights . . . one which has great weight with me [is] the *legal* check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary." [2]

The word "legal" in the foregoing quotation from Jefferson speaks for itself. It means that the Founding Fathers who were persuaded in part by

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 462. Italics mine.

Jefferson's arguments to add the Bill of Rights to the federal Constitution intended it to be interpreted as law by the federal courts. They did not construe it to mean what Judge Hand, following Thayer, Austin, and Hobbes, would now have it mean, namely, mere "admonitions to forbearance" or "counsels of moderation" [3] which, if the legislators choose to ignore, a federal "judge of principle" will do nothing to redress. Making it doubly clear that the Bill of Rights is to be interpreted as law, Jefferson added in his letter of March 15, 1789, that "the executive, in our [state and federal] governments, is not the sole, it is scarcely the principal object of my jealousy. The tyranny of the legislatures is the most formidable dread at present, and will be for many years." [4]

In the Hobbesian theory of democracy on the other hand, which the positive portion of the British unwritten constitution follows (the living customs of Britain's unwritten constitution being Lockean), the whole of political sovereignty is placed in the legislative branch. Thus in Great Britain today, as in most of the other democracies of the contemporary world, the head of the executive branch of government is merely the leader of the majority party in the legislature, having no veto power over legislation approved by the majority and going out of office the moment his party loses majority control of the legislature. Similarly, no British court can declare a statute approved by the majority of the House of Commons to be illegal. The legal philosophy of Hobbes, Austin, Thayer, and Judge Learned Hand fits the positive law of Great Britain's unwritten constitution, but does not fit the legal and political system of the United States. The practical effect, therefore, of accepting the legal philosophy of Judge Learned Hand and the Justice Frankfurter wing of the present Supreme Court will be to transform the American legal and political system, which was based on Locke rather than Hobbes, into the Hobbesian positive legal portion of the British system.

Again two more questions arise: Is the latter the kind of America we want? In other words, do we want to follow Hobbes in our domestic as well as foreign politics? Or do we want to win back the confidence of the majority of Britishers who are now Lockeans, the majority of Continental Europeans who are now Stoic Roman internationalists, and the majority of the people of the world generally who are now issuing their own Lockean and Jeffersonian declarations of independence, by returning to both the domestic legal and the foreign policy philosophy of our Founding Fathers?

Whatever our choice, one thing is clear. To be a civilized American without knowing the religious, moral, legal, and political philosophy which specifies what American civilization and the world's freedom as we understand it mean, is to attempt the impossible. Hence, the philosophy of our goal values must take its place as primary beside the cultivation of aesthetic sensitivity in our entire educational system.

But even this is not enough. Sputnik has shown that in addition to the seeking of beauty and justice there must also be the seeking of mathematical truth.

## FORMAL THINKING AND FIRST-RATE INSTRUMENTS

Admiral Rickover has told us something which every general and admiral knows who may find himself carrying on a legally authorized international police action with second-rate weapons. American youth who are self-indulgent or concerned mainly with extracurricular activities during their schooling will not do. What has to be realized is that the practical man by himself is today the most impractical fellow on earth. Without the pioneer leadership in the frontier of human knowledge of the most formally minded theorists in symbolic logic, pure mathematics, and theoretical as well as experimental physics, the practical man knows, if he is honest with himself, that he will be a failure. Devoid of the most mathematical and even the most philosophical theory of natural science which Einstein, Heisenberg and countless others, such as Willard Gibbs, Maxwell, Kant, Leibniz, Newton, Euclid, Eudoxus, and Democritus pursued in and for its own sake, the practical instruments of today's world would not be. Moreover, unless today's and tomorrow's youth pioneer beyond Gibbs, Einstein, and Heisenberg, the military and industrial instruments of tomorrow's so-called practical people are likely to be second rate. This is why one commits instrumental as well as moral suicide when one puts sensitivity to money-making in the market place ahead of the seeking and telling of truth for its own sake in theoretical natural science and its philosophy.

But the symbolic logic and the advanced mathematics that are required to keep ahead in one's military and industrial instruments and strategy cannot be learned on the spur of the moment when the defense of freedom may become urgently necessary. Nor can they be studied for a while and then dropped to be picked up a year or two later where one left them off. When the writer was on the Executive Committee of Yale College some twenty years ago, it became evident that able students of high standing in mathematics who, for sickness or any other reason, were forced to drop their studies for even a year, on returning to college frequently failed their next course in mathematics. The practical moral should be clear: training in formal thinking, including English grammar, symbolic logic, and mathematics, must be given a place of continuous primacy in the educational system beside the seeking of beauty and tolerant religious, moral, legal, and political philosophy. Only if these three things are done is it likely that America can keep her ideals in the forefront of what she is doing to win the confidence of free men everywhere and at the same time possess first-rate instruments for protecting and implementing these ideals.

It will be said that the addition of these subjects in the degree indicated to the present educational curriculum is impossible since it is already overcrowded. Such a judgment will not, however, stand careful analysis. The plain fact at present is that most of the subjects now taught in the curriculum are not understood. The reason is that most of them require one or more of the three basic disciplines noted above for their understanding. How, for example, can a student possibly understand anything if he is incapable, as is presently the case with many students entering college, of framing semantically clear and grammatical sentences for an attempted paper? How can a person possibly distinguish sensed fact from inferred theory in natural or social science if he does not have the aesthetic sensitivity to distinguish (1) the impressionistic sensuous images which the senses convey to him from (2) the directly unobservable, theoretically known, and mathematically defined scientific objects which he infers from

[3] Learned Hand, *The Spirit of Liberty*. Papers and Addresses Collected by Irving Dilliard (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 204 and p. 73.

[4] Thomas Jefferson, *op cit.* (note 1 *supra*), p. 464.

these impressionistic aesthetic sensed images? How can a student, a teacher, or a statesman avoid being anything but confused about his normative religious, moral, legal, and political ideals and decisions if he is unaware of normative philosophy and the difference between a statement concerning what ought to be and a nonnormative statement about what is the case in fact? To put the three aforementioned basic subjects first in our educational system will be, therefore, to clarify the curriculum and to economize in the time it takes to civilize our citizens.

In any event, two things are clear: there is an American civilization of quality. We can have it if we want it.

# Humanists and Generalists

By HENRY M. WRISTON

ABSTRACT: "Planning" and "security" have become twin watchwords in the mid-twentieth century. Despite the tension, and occasional contradiction, between these two terms, their popularity shows no signs of diminution. Yet, when applied to humanists and generalists, both concepts have only limited validity. Their significance is even less apparent when we speak of leaders and leadership in these fields. We have no yardstick to measure the utility of humanists and generalists in society. Therefore, no method exists for estimating a quota appropriate to their numbers. In both fields, voluntarism is essential; compulsion is futile; control impairs or destroys values; and even guidance has limited scope. As planning is so difficult as to be of doubtful utility, security is also of dubious significance, particularly when applied to leadership. There are no quantitative measures of achievement; no time and motion studies have any relevance whatever. Even generally accepted qualitative measures do not exist. Every statesman, however eminent, has had his opponents and detractors. Every artist has had his critics, often savage ones. Every scholar's work is revised by his successors, if not by his contemporaries. Leadership in these areas is the product of personal qualities of many sorts; it is almost correct to say no two are alike. Leadership arises from circumstances, often not only beyond the potential leader's control, but even beyond his power to influence. Humanists and generalists must remain unplanned, and unpredictable, elements in our society.

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*Henry M. Wriston, Ph.D., Providence, Rhode Island, is President of The American Assembly, Columbia University. He taught at Wesleyan University and resigned his professorship to become President of Lawrence College in 1925. In February 1938, he became President of Brown University, from which he retired in August 1955. In 1953 he served as Chairman of the Secretary of State's Public Committee on Personnel and as a consultant on personnel problems in the State Department thereafter. He is President of The Council on Foreign Relations.*

I HAVE never heard of an analytical survey of the state of leadership that was likely to produce a complacent attitude. That statement can be applied to any field which is subjected to analysis.

Complaints about education and its deficiencies—due to lack of leadership—have been the standard pattern of discussion throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in America. The pace of social change always appears both more rapid and more decisive than the adjustment, not to say leadership, in the educational process. One sardonic educator summed up his view with the remark that it took about fifty years for half the educators to accept a new idea, however good. I can find the same thought, differently expressed, over a century ago. There is no point, therefore, in looking to the past to find a Golden Age of American education.

### LIMITATIONS ON LEADERSHIP

With the American genius—or weakness—for voluntary organization, we have had more committees, councils, societies, and associations to promote education than all the rest of the world put together. Yet the sad fact emerges that the larger part of their energies has gone into restrictive practices. They have not looked to recruitment of leaders, or to the development of leadership, but toward excluding from the guild any who do not meet "standards." The criteria by which the standards are defined have little to do with substance, and far too much with form. By deliberate design competent people are excluded from teaching because they have not performed some ritual of training. It is hardly too much to say that the net effect of alleged standards has been to inhibit leadership rather than stimulate it. Salary policies, enforced by organizational pressure, have had a like negative effect. Protection of those in the trade, including those who should be eliminated, has been the normal practice. Defense of the weak rather than scope for the strong has been the goal.

Analyses of our government are almost uniformly negative. The deficiencies of the democratic process as such, and of our forms and methods of government specifically, have occupied the minds of men ever since the Declaration of Independence. Conspicuous among our shortcomings has been the want of political thinkers of a high order. The government of today is radically different from the government designed—or codified, if it does not seem to you very "original"—in 1787. Critics can assert upon good evidence that it has been shaped and modified by crisis and circumstance, by pressure and politics, rather than by reason and intellect. Proposals, however logical, evoke only mild interest, and virtually no response in action. There is an all but complete divorce between the thinkers and the practitioners of politics. To see how serious is this breach, it is necessary only to recall the terms of opprobrium heaped upon those who try to bridge the gap; "egghead" is only a recent example, the successor of a long line of earlier epithets.

The history of analyses is even more pessimistic when one turns to the arts. They are poorly supported. Symphony orchestras and deficits are so closely associated in the public mind as to seem virtually synonymous. Opera has been dependent primarily upon Europe to supply singers for its leading roles. The number of opera companies which has survived in America is far too small. There is inadequate opportunity for training, and even less for the acquisition of experience. Europe is the Mecca for both.

Painting, sculpture, architecture are in similar case. Their economic foundations are shaky, facilities for education are inadequate in quantity and quality, and opportunities for expression far too few. These things remain true, despite the fact that the public interest has grown astoundingly. Attendance at exhibits—once a problem—runs to vast figures. It is far greater than the over-advertised attendance at sports events. Yet, under these circumstances, our greatest public museum is forced to curtail its schedule and close one day a week for lack of funds.



The customary explanation for most of these deficiences is historical. In a new country energy was absorbed in taming the land, in the westward trek, in building a standard of living which is the wonder of the world. It is in the economic field that names of leaders spring to mind: Rockefeller, Carnegie, Ford, on the one side; Green, Hillman, Lewis on the other. Such names are mere symbols; there has been a succession of giants in production, finance, marketing, and a striking number of labor managers whose leadership has been conspicuous, not only in America but in the labor movement around the world. It is a notable fact that when any such list is examined, it will be observed that nearly all the outstanding leaders were self-taught. They came up through the ranks, not by grace of wealth, or status, or privilege, but by energy, shrewdness, persistence, and a capacity to influence men. It is worthy of note, moreover, that strong leadership appears most often in an atmosphere of confidence; a defensive mood makes the task of becoming a leader enormously more difficult.

Despite the successes in the economic field, negative accents dominate current analyses. Voluntary organizations in this field—the Committee for Economic Development, the Chamber of Commerce, the Manufacturers Association—as well as the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, the United Mine Workers, the Teamsters—all lay stress upon deficiencies, shortcomings, and weaknesses, rather than opportunities. Negativism is a poor environment in which to develop leaders.

### PLANNING AND DYNAMIC CHANGE

All current analyses seem to be dominated by two concepts which have come to fascinate men's minds during the first half of the twentieth century—planning and security. These two words, neither of which is closely defined, have become the watchwords of this generation. In the dictatorships—black, brown, and red—"Plan" was the key; in this respect, the democratic welfare state flattered the opposition by imitation. Plans in the democracies have been neither so precise nor grandiose, but the root idea is there.

So far as humanists and generalists are concerned, planning means very little, and security is almost a contradiction in terms when applied to them. A plan can allocate resources: money, materials, and unskilled, semiskilled, and, to a moderate extent, skilled technical manpower. In planning it is possible, moreover, to make some projections regarding future needs.

Experience has shown those calculations to be extremely crude. This should not be surprising, for it is no exaggeration to say that ours is a revolutionary age outside the political world far more than in that relatively restricted sphere. The enormous growth of government in all countries and at all levels does not affect the validity of that statement. Since World War II, for example, agriculture has changed so rapidly and drastically as to have upset all calculations. Better seeds, better fertilizers, better machines, and better management have produced astounding results. Yet we see these things, not in terms of triumph, but as problems.

The bulging surpluses for which government assumes responsibility clearly show that the presumptions upon which the farm program was founded were wide of the mark. It is not long since there was acute concern because young people were leaving the farms for the cities; now the problem seems to be how to prepare them and induce them to do that very thing. The whole temper in dealing with the most astounding victories over hunger in the entire history of the human race is negative and defensive—the antithesis of a sound environment in which to develop leadership.

Industrial planning is complicated by the development of automation. The new word means the industrial revolution raised to the nth power. All estimates of the manpower of many kinds necessary to industry have been subjected to a sharp revision, and present projections bid fair to become obsolete within a very short time; yet the calculators and the servomechanisms are in their infancy.

It seems reasonably clear that, in a free society, planning can be relied upon almost in inverse ratio to development. It is easier to plan for a static or slowly expanding, rather than an explosively dynamic, society. Where science and technology, research and development are pressed, successive "break-throughs" make earlier calculations seem absurd. But so, also, do external events. Just before the outbreak of the Korean conflict, the government of the United States issued statistics which indicated surpluses—of all things!—of teachers and engineers. Within months the projections relative to engineers were shown to be wildly inaccurate; those relative to teachers almost equally so, though at a slower rate. Changes in working habits also make estimates go wrong; it now takes three nurses to do what it was quite customary for one, or at most two, to do only a few short years ago. The advent of prepaid hospital plans, the burgeoning of health and accident insurances of many kinds have had an additional impact. Every estimate of the planners was made obsolete by social changes as well as by science.

### SECURITY A HINDRANCE

The fact of error in planning is very easy to establish and sometimes relatively easy to explain, at least in part. But it has yet to be realized and appreciated that our two watchwords are always in tension, and often in contradiction. If security is essential, if hazard is to be reduced to a minimum, if even the marginal worker—at whatever level—is to be protected in the specific job he holds, planning cannot be bold, for boldness and security do not go together.

This fact goes far to explain many of our difficulties. The full-crew law retarded essential change in the railroads; security hampered progress and ultimately defeated itself. The teachers' requirements, restrictive practices under the guise of standards, assured us of a shortage of teachers in the name of security. During the depression, engineers, chemists, and many others sought to have government control and enforce licensure—again, "standards" covered a drive for security. The whole apprentice system has broken down; labor sought scarcity as a guarantee of security. The pressure for a shorter working week was only in part resistance to being overworked. The demand for overtime is evidence enough. It was a "spread the work" device and created so much "leisure" as to make that into a new "problem." Early and compulsory retirement and dozens of other devices and practices were launched in the name of security, until old age itself has become a "problem," for which we need a "plan."

But there are significant areas within our society for which planning is impossible and where security is unwise. Who can tell us, and by what powers of divination, how many poets we "need" or how many we could "absorb"? On an efficiency basis, the answer is clearly none. As Archibald MacLeish remarked, "Homer has already sung." A vast wealth of poetic literature is lying virtually unused. Some of it has intense beauty, extraordinary insight; it matches thought with cadence in a way to enhance both. If planning is to supply "felt needs," it is clear that millions feel no need, and, so far as reading or listening is concerned, there is already plenty of poetry for every man's lifetime.



It seems perfectly evident that if we are to have poets, it must be upon some basis other than public need or utility. It is part of the record of our society that poets are not always appreciated in their own day and generation. As with other artists, some achieve fame and rich rewards, material and immaterial, during their lifetime. But the general rule runs the other way. Should we plan on producing poets for our unborn generations? Any planner would denounce that proposition as arrant nonsense.

### THE "PLANNED" POET

Even assuming utility of poets from a social point of view, how train them, and in what numbers relative to the population? Here we run into a difficulty which even the totalitarians with their tight controls have so far found insuperable. It is possible to make some identification of some sorts of talent at a reasonably early age. All the qualifications in that sentence are important. For no one knows how many men have been lost to professions for which they had substantial talents because they developed slowly, were "late bloomers," and so were not chosen at eleven or twelve to get the education they could have used. Under most systems of education it is at those ages that the sheep are divided from the goats. What skills have been lost by faulty choices we cannot know. At the other end of the scale all who have been engaged in education are familiar with the talented boy or girl who never matures, whose precocity never fulfills its promise. What social pressures, physical weakness, moral deficiency, or any one or a combination of a number of other shortcomings halted development we may know without being able to overcome, or we may never know.

Where there are ability and will and resources, skills may be developed. A man can be trained as a fairly good engineer, at some level, by the expenditure of time and effort. He may make only a fair draftsman, or a satisfactory calculator, or succeed in routine design as a "handbook engineer." Or he may have imagination in addition to skill and knowledge and do wonderful things. We know that under Soviet rule many people are directed or "guided" into occupations they did not select; many others are trained in vocations, more or less voluntarily entered upon, yet they would like to change. Having once been channelled, however, they may not escape over the banks of the stream carrying them onward.

But I never heard of making a poet by training alone. The poetic equivalent of the engineering draftsman is a failure. More training may polish his technique; but if he has nothing to say, no emotional perceptions of a unique kind, skill as a rhymester will still make him no poet. Not all the dictators in the world could order a man, or train a man, to create poetry.

These considerations lead to an absolutely fundamental conclusion which must be accepted by all who would plan

our manpower: the only justification for a poet is the poet himself. Utility cannot supply a test. Self-development, self-expression are either valid within themselves, or we should tolerate no poets. For some develop slowly; others achieve recognition slowly. Robert Frost once remarked in my hearing on the instability of his economic status during his first fifty years.

If the poet cannot be manufactured by training or compelled to produce by ukase, and if his gifts, however great, may not be properly recognized, what of security? On the negative side, the answer is easy. The planners may deny him the right of publication. *Dr. Zhivago* could not be published in the Soviet empire; the manuscript had to be smuggled out. His living may be curtailed; Pasternak was denied the fiscal rewards of the Nobel Prize, and probably got little of the royalties earned abroad by his novel. He may be inhibited and stifled—killed, for that matter. But nothing short of death can extinguish the creative spark; the true poet has a compulsion to utter his thoughts, though they be lost in the wind. As nothing in planning, or pressure, or even incentives can produce a positive result from a poetic craftsman who has nothing to say, so none of those things can completely silence one who has much to say.

One fact is very clear. Even the Soviets have had to recognize some of these things as facts of life. As I started to write this paper, one of my first inquiries was how a man became a poet in Russia. It transpired that the word "totalitarian," as so many other words to which we customarily flee—from fatigue with precision—is grossly inaccurate. The inference carried by the word is false. There are vast reaches of life which, although affected, are not controlled even in a dictatorship. If a man wants to be a poet, he may become one. The hazards and difficulties may be severe, but the element of voluntarism remains.

The economy is "planned," but many aspects of experience outside production and exchange are not capable of such close governance. Surely there is not a quota of circus performers, even in Russia; clearly such people are not assigned certain feats to exhibit in the public arena. The element of voluntarism is high in such an area; and, significantly, performance is brilliant.

### THE NEED FOR VOCATION

I have written at some length of poets, but only as an example of all the arts—and, for that matter, the humanities. In thinking about developing leadership for the next generation, those whose predilection is to seek a "plan" will do well to remember that for poets, novelists, essayists, dramatists, actors, painters, sculptors, musicians, historians, philosophers, critics—and all the others who make up the humanistic army—no quotas, no selective service, can achieve a useful end.

Those who would devote their lives to any aspects of the humanities must launch themselves upon their careers by reason of an inner urge. They must have that sense of a call—a vocation—without which no one would face the inescapable hazards. We are aware of and accept the chances taken by the entrepreneur who launches a new business. We are acutely sensitive to the danger of unemployment and have hedged it about with insurances of one kind or another. We too often forget the risk run by a research scientist, and the element of luck in success or failure. Hundreds of men and women may be searching for an effective vaccine and fail to find it while one, whose intellectual gifts, education, and laboratory equipment are no better, hits upon the precise combination which achieves the results so many others sought. A large element of luck—or happenstance, if the word "luck" is offensive—permeates every aspect of life. Nor all the power, nor wealth of the state can alter that stubborn fact.



There is all too little awareness of the innate hazards that are inseparable from the humanities as distinguished from the sciences. The outlet for them is both a limited and a sophisticated market. Let the planners remember at every step of the way that the more other aspects of life are directed, regulated, and controlled, the more the outlet for humanistic talents tends to shrink. For the market is a voluntary market, and when voluntarism is replaced in any degree by compulsion and control, the loss extends to the receptivity of the public. Whatever pressure is put upon the humanist to conform—for instance, to such as Stalin's dogma's about art and music—the less his crippled work becomes acceptable.

It will be insisted by those who would direct effort more completely that the social hazards are not so marked in a democracy as they are in Russia. That is true; none the less, they may be very severe indeed. Some committees of the Congress in the exercise of their investigative functions have impaired a man's status as an artist for political reasons. Sometimes they have triggered social pressures of a disastrous kind: the blacklisting of writers, producers, and actors in Hollywood is a case in point. Speakers on the floor of the Senate and House of Representatives, under the shield of privilege, have done incalculable harm to men who had no like forum to defend themselves and no right of cross-examination, much less opportunity to produce witnesses in their own defense.

This is an exceedingly sensitive matter for the artist of whatever sort and for the humanist. With all their great contributions to our civilization, which must not be discounted in the least, the scientists, engineers, mathematicians, and production experts are, as specialists, in an essentially neutral position politically. If that were not true, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could not have made the giant technological and industrial strides that have characterized its spectacular career over the last forty years. The humanist, on the other hand, has as the heart of his enterprise human values. Inevitably, by the very nature of his commitment and the character of his craft, he must deal with ideas which are politically sensitive. He is guided by values politically dangerous in a planned society. He is not "necessary" to the "giant leap forward"; he is not essential to the economic supremacy to which the Soviets aspire. By the very nature of his work he is expendable, in the sense that even a manual laborer—in a society short of hands—is not.

### MENTAL LIBERTY

Whenever, and to whatever degree, a democratic society undertakes manpower planning, the vulnerability of those who deal with ideas is by that measure increased. This truth is partially concealed from us by the unfortunate habit of speaking of free enterprise only as an economic manifestation. Far more significant for the future of democracy is free enterprise of the mind. Vastly more important than economic liberty is freedom to choose voluntarily what one wishes to do, not only for a living, but for a life. Until free enterprise is conceived in these terms—so much broader than the economic—the humanities will suffer, not alone in economic rewards, but in popular estimation, in dignity, in the kinds of distinction which are often more important than the economic security upon which so much stress is laid.

I have been writing of the health,

perhaps the survival, of the arts and the humanities. What of leadership? This mysterious quality is not the result of formal training; it is not the fruit of economic reward. If we have many practitioners of the arts, and many scholars devoted to the humanities, the leaders will emerge. Partly it will be the consequence of innate traits; and the characteristics which produce this magic result will be as various as the individuals themselves. To some extent, it will result from environment; there are public moods hospitable to leadership, and others which make it vastly more difficult.

To some degree, it will arise from events. The kind of leader appropriate to one set of external circumstances may find no opportunity for his special brand of leadership in another situation. This is not a counsel of defeat or despair. On the contrary, man is a biological fact. That means, explicitly, that he grows—and decays. Human chemistry is so infinitely complex that the determination of what accelerates and what retards growth is only dimly perceived as yet. We know that growth is not usually steady; it occurs in successive rushes and pauses. The timing of one phase or the other is governed by factors so obscure that we have only the foggiest ideas about them. What is true of all men is peculiarly true of leaders: they grow; they appear; they are supplanted.

It is well in a discussion of leadership to remember that we are governed—whether in a democracy or a dictatorship—by amateurs, who may be regarded as humanists from some points of view, and as generalists par excellence. They are humanists in the sense that they deal with the human situation. In a characteristically provocative essay Lindsay Rogers has quoted Catherine the Great: "You philosophers are lucky men. You write on paper, and paper is patient. Unfortunate empress that I am, I write on the susceptible skins of human beings." They are generalists because the reach of government has now extended so far that no one can be expert in all its phases, or, indeed, in any considerable portion of them.

Those who govern are amateurs in yet another sense. No training course, no education of a formal kind introduces the novice to the art of government. Indeed, very few books are helpful to the practitioner of politics. In this respect, politics is something like teaching: it is an art. It is, therefore, a reflection of the personality of the practitioner. What is amazingly succesful for one man is the road to total failure for another. Some work wonders with speech, others with silence; each is astonishingly effective by his own method. Neither could conceivably copy the other successfully.

Moreover, there is no straight road into government. Indeed, few men—very few—start out to be politicians or deliberately plan to make politics their career. There are exceptions, but the usual thing is to get drawn into political action as an avocation and gradually make the transition to full-time absorption. The politician is the perfect example of learning by doing. He can read everything from Plato to Machiavelli to Rexford Tugwell. Reading may give him insights; it may help shape his philosophy of government; but he will get precious few tips on operating.

## CHANCE AND POLITICS

More than in most other professions, the element of chance plays an extraordinary part in his career. Illustrations are so abundant that every reader can think of his own. The dark horse who comes to the presidency, as did Polk, is one instance. I have seen a man prepare himself to be a senator by entering upon a succession of offices leading to that goal. He was frustrated once because a governor unexpectedly resigned; the lieutenant-governor succeeded and so got in line ahead of the "logical" candidate. So he stood in line, more or less patiently, while the man he planned to succeed refused to retire at a "respectable" age, and seemed destined to live forever. With each passing day, the waiting candidate's chances of ever achieving his cherished goal shrank. Any one of a whole series of accidents could have advanced him, as another series blocked his promotion.

When this element of chance is multiplied by the number of men in the House of Representatives, the Senate, the Cabinet, the Presidency—plus all those who sought those offices—the role of chance is seen to be very great indeed. When all the state offices and municipal offices and those who sought them are added, it is astronomical.

The element of chance continues to play a large part even when the politician attains office. Both Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt could easily have been classed as isolationists at the moment they took office. Yet both were forced by events to play great roles in international affairs. Some statesmen have a gift for leading their nation in war. But it has been observed many times that the man who can summon a people to battle and get them to accept all its hardships is often the wrong man to make peace and set policy in peaceful times. The changes on circumstance could be rung indefinitely, and any knowledge of history would be convincing that a planned career in politics is rare, and one that follows the plan with any faithfulness or consistency rarer still.



There are things to do appropriate for the youth who thinks of entering politics. He can read widely in history, in philosophy, and in literature. By that means, he can gain some perspective upon current events; they will lose their novelty, if not their newness. He will find analogues in the past; he will enter vicariously into the experiences of other times, other people, both real and imaginary. He will extend his memory, so to speak; he will stretch his imagination. He will observe that the moral issues remain much the same through the ages; while the circumstances of man alter at astounding speed, his nature changes ever so slowly. He will find relevant answers to present dilemmas in past experience. He will study economics and observe the competing theories. He will also see how seldom practice conforms with any of them.

In sum, he will seek a liberal education and then shape his own life as opportunities and circumstances make possible. Of all occupations for which planning is irrelevant, politics is among the first. How many politicians do we need? Who will set the quota? What will he do when he is out of office? To these and many other questions, there is no simple answer.

Humanists and generalists take years to produce and bring to ripe maturity. To reach this maturity requires personal decision, personal commitment, and readiness to face all the hazards peculiar to the opportunities.

# Occupational Statistics: A Tool for Determining Manpower Needs

By Ewan Clague

Abstract: The lack of accurate, current, and detailed occupational data seriously handicaps our analysis of manpower supply and requirements. In spite of limitations of the data, labor force and occupational composition projections have been developed. The major changes expected in the labor force between 1958 and 1970 are: a sharp rise in the youngest age groups, 14 to 24; a much smaller increase in the number of male workers 25 to 44; and substantial growth in the numbers 45 and over. A shortage of male workers in the important age groups from 25 to 44 years is expected. These groups normally supply the trained workers required to replace losses resulting from deaths and retirements and to fill expanding needs created by advancing technology. Occupational projections for the 1960's indicate a rapid growth of the so-called white-collar occupations and a slower growth in the blue-collar occupations accompanied by a continuing rise in the skill level for craftsmen. Among the white-collar workers, the employment of scientists, engineers, and technicians is expected to increase twice as fast as the labor force as a whole. The need for more and better education and training for increasing numbers in our labor force will create new and difficult problems in the decades ahead.

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*Ewan Clague, Ph.D., Washington, D. C., is Commissioner of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor. He was formerly associated with the Institute of Human Relations, Yale University and with the Pennsylvania School of Social Work. Dr. Clague was a former Director of the Bureau of Employment Security, Social Security Board.*





Part of the confusion surrounding the debate concerning the adequacy of our present and future supply of scientists, engineers, and other key manpower is a result of the lack of accurate current occupational information. It is a remarkable fact that we can pick up the Statistical Abstract of the United States and find out that, for example, on January 1, 1958, there were 22,357,000 milk cows in this country. Yet, we do not know with the same exactitude, how many physicists we have and how much they earn. This lack of information about key workers in our labor force is particularly anomalous when we deal with scientific personnel because measurement is certainly the beginning of a scientific approach.

Too few people realize that the only comprehensive detailed occupational statistics in this country are those collected every ten years in the Decennial Census of Population. The data from the Decennial Census, even when first available, are about three years old and are thirteen years old before the next set of data are published.

Between each Census, occupational data by major occupational groups and for a few large occupations are available from the Monthly Report on the Labor Force.[1] Both the Decennial Censuses and the Monthly Report on the Labor Force have serious limitations because their data are collected from members of households (for example, the wife) who frequently do not know the exact occupations of household members.

The limitations of current occupational data have become particularly important because of the nation's growing concern with its key manpower requirements. Accelerating technological change has intensified old manpower problems and created new ones. Because our economy is changing more rapidly and is requiring higher levels of education, training, and skills, educators, employers, and others concerned with training workers must be especially alert to technological, labor force, and other changes now occurring and anticipated. These changes must be analyzed and their trends gauged in order to do the best possible job of matching manpower with the new requirements of our dynamic economy.

The case for our lack of statistics should not, however, be overstated. We in the Labor Department and other groups working in this field are making advances in the development of accurate information on the demand for and the supply of persons in many important occupational fields. The Department of Labor has long been concerned with our nation's manpower resources and requirements. In keeping with the Department's objective to encourage full development and effective use of the nation's manpower resources, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has carried on a research program in the field of manpower. Some results of the Bureau's studies are particularly pertinent to this issue of The Annals which is considering the future leadership needs of our country.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics has for a number of years conducted research on trends in the size and composition of the labor force, the changing industrial structure of the economy, and the shifting demand for occupational skills as affected by changing markets, technology, social patterns, and industrial organization. We make these studies in connection with our occupational outlook program, the purpose of

[1] *Current Population Reports, Labor Force,* United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. After July 1, 1959, the Bureau of Labor Statistics was given the responsibility for the content and analysis of the data from the Monthly Report on the Labor Force. The Bureau of the Census will continue collecting and tabulating the data.

which is to inform young people in school about employment opportunities. We also make these studies to provide information to the Department of Labor and other government agencies concerned with manpower problems.

One of the major advances the Bureau has recently made was in its study of employment of engineers, scientists, and technical supporting personnel. Beginning in 1954, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has collected data on technical employment in American industry for the National Science Foundation. The survey was repeated for 1957, and, beginning in 1959, the survey will be made annually.

The Bureau has also developed a technique which provides on a current basis an approximation of detailed occupational employment in detailed industry sectors. This method, called the occupational-industry matrix, is a compilation of some 150 industry occupational patterns for the entire economy. These industry occupational proportional distributions were originally developed from 1950 Census data, Department of Labor manpower surveys, occupational data from the Bureau's wage studies, and information obtained from other sources. The industry occupational patterns are periodically brought up to date as current information becomes available.

In our manpower programs, which are designed to estimate future manpower and occupational requirements, we must first develop long-range estimates of changes expected in our economy. In developing these projections, we have made certain general assumptions: (1) that there will be no major depression; (2) no war or natural catastrophes; and (3) that scientific and technological advance will continue.

In order to determine our future manpower needs we must consider the kind of labor force we will have in the future.

## LABOR FORCE PROJECTIONS

We expect our labor force to increase by 15.8 million between 1958 and 1970, reaching a level of 87.1 million in the latter year. The major changes expected in the labor force between 1958 and 1970 are: a sharp rise in the youngest age groups, 14 to 24; a much smaller increase in the number of male workers 25 to 44; and substantial growth in the numbers 45 years and over.

We foresee an increasing labor force participation rate for women [2]—particularly among married women over 35 years of age whose children are of school age or older; a decline in the participation rate of young persons because of the trend to more years of schooling and the higher proportion of young people attending school; and a decline in the labor force participation of older men.

Of the 15.8 million increase in our labor force between 1958 and 1970, only 2.3 million will be among men between the ages of 25 to 54, the primary working group in our population. There will be almost 200,000 fewer male workers in the 35 to 44 age group in 1970 than there were in 1958, because so few babies were born during the depression years of the 1930's. This could mean that there may be a shortage of trained workers in the age group which is often considered to be most productive. In contrast, the number of male workers 55 years of age or over is expected to increase by about 1.7 million in the 1958–70 period as a result of high birth rates early in the century and the gradual lengthening of human life. This increase will take place despite the decline in the average age of retirement.

The great bulk of the increase in the labor force will come from two groups: women 35 years and older (4 million) and young workers below the age of 25 (7 million). Training specialists will have to turn to the age group under 25 for their needed supply of skilled workers: 20.2 million workers as compared to 13.2 million in 1958.

By 1970, there will be about 15.9 million part-time workers in the labor force, an increase of 3.7 million over their number in 1958. The part-time group, which comprises more than one-sixth of the total labor force, will account for nearly one-fourth of the growth in the labor force between 1958 and 1970. Part-time workers under 25 will increase to 5.8 million in 1970 and women over 35 will increase to 4.7 million.

## IMPLICATIONS

How will the changes in the age-sex structure in the labor force and the greater number of part-time workers affect manpower requirements? There will be a shortage of workers in some age groups and an ample supply in others. There will be a shortage of male workers in the important age groups from 25 to 44 years, which normally supply the professional, technical, and skilled workers required to replace losses created by death and retirement and to fill expanding needs created by advancing technology. This situation should be favorable to the older worker because the over-all need for workers will be rising while the number of men in the central ages will not be increasing. Employers may very well try to keep their experienced older workers.

Moreover, employers will have to find the additions to their skilled staffs among the large numbers of young workers and adult women who will be entering the labor force during the same period. The incoming group will be adequate in number, but many of them will be inexperienced and will therefore require training. Employers may have to consider using women workers in a variety of jobs not previously open to women. This too will mean job training. Some of the women returning to the work force will have usable job experience and skills acquired in earlier periods of employment, but others will require training, or at least retraining, in previous skills.

A great many inexperienced workers will be competing for jobs during the 1950's. By 1970, there will be nearly 50 per cent more workers under 20 in the labor force than there are today. Greater numbers of youth will mean greater competition for the jobs for which they can qualify. Yet the kinds of jobs which can be filled by inexperienced and untrained workers are diminishing relative to those calling for a higher degree of training. These two forces are likely to mean greater unemployment among our youth, unless measures are taken to meet this situation. At the same time, some retired workers will be seeking part-time, less skilled jobs; and they will also add to the competition.

Although a majority of the women and young workers will be seeking full-time jobs, a substantial number will want only part-time work. From the employer's point of view, this may mean the rescheduling of many jobs to a part-time basis. This would be an extension of the trend that has been developing in many trade and service establishments, where much of the recent increase in part-time employment has occurred.

## INDUSTRIAL SHIFTS IN EMPLOYMENT

According to our projections, employment in agriculture will continue to decline by perhaps a million during the 1960 decade. Transportation and public utilities will grow more slowly than the average. At the other extreme we ex-

[2] *Population and Labor Force Projections for the United States, 1960 to 1975*, Bulletin No. 1242, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

pect the finance, insurance, and real estate group to be the fastest growing division. Construction, service, and trade are also expected to grow faster than the average. Manufacturing—the largest segment of our economy—has had wide swings of employment in the post-World War II period. Employment in manufacturing is expected to reach all-time highs during the 1960's, but its rate of growth will be less than the average for all nonagricultural industries. Within manufacturing, we expect the largest increase to occur in the durable goods sector.

If we look at the industries which we expect to increase at the fastest rates in the next decade, we can see implications for training and manpower requirements. The construction industry is an example of an industry which shows important growth potential. Recent studies of the Department's Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training indicate that the number of new building craftsmen provided through apprenticeship throughout the country between 1950 and 1958 was fewer than the number of journeymen who left the trade as a result of deaths and retirements.

## Occupational Trends


Industry trends do not tell the whole story of the shifts occurring within our economy. One of the most interesting and significant developments in the past decade has been the rapid increase in the growth of white-collar worker employment. In 1948, there were about 12,700,000 production workers employed in manufacturing, as compared to 2,600,000 nonproduction workers. The latter are mostly the clerical, managerial, professional, and sales workers employed in the offices and laboratories of companies rather than in plants. In 1958, production worker employment in manufacturing had declined by about a million; whereas nonproduction worker employment had increased about 1¼ million. It should be noted that, generally, nonproduction workers are the last to be laid off during a short-term downturn in business. In our most recent experience, production workers bore the brunt of the cutback in factory payrolls. Between August 1957 and April 1958, production worker employment (seasonally adjusted) dropped 1.5 million, whereas nonproduction worker employment remained relatively unchanged.

The results of a 1957 Bureau of Labor Statistics survey emphasize the increase in nonproduction employment.[3] The manufacturers of electrical equipment (including radio, TV, and other electronics equipment, and electrical machinery), for example, employed 75,000 engineers, 95,000 technicians, and 18,000 scientists. The scientific and engineering staff in this industry expanded by 50 per cent in the three years ending in January 1957. In that same year, the machinery industries had a technical staff of 158,000, including 63,000 engineers, 12,000 sceintists, and 83,000 technicians. The third largest employer of these technical workers was the aircraft industry, which has been active in developing jet planes and missiles. The 66,000 engineers and 19,000 scientists working in aircraft plants were assisted by 51,000 technicians—a total of 136,000 technical workers. In the three years after 1954, the industry's technical staff grew by 75 per cent—more than twice as fast as the all-industry average for these jobs, and faster than any other industry. The same trends in white-collar employment can be found in five nonmanufacturing industries: construction,

[3] Harold Goldstein, "Increase in Scientific, Engineering, and Other Technical Jobs," *Occupational Outlook Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (February 1959).



TABLE 1—EMPLOYMENT IN MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS
1957 and Projected 1970




trade, finance, insurance and real estate, service, and government.[4]

As part of our occupational outlook program, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has made a set of occupational estimates for 1970 (see Table 1). The current occupational distributions for all industries in the economy were modified on the basis of past trends and expected changes in technology (including automation) and other factors so that they would reflect the kind of economy we expect to have by 1970. By applying these occupational distribution patterns to industry employment projections for 1970, occupational estimates for the major occupational groups and for individual occupations were obtained.

Looking at the economy as a whole, the major changes appear to be: a long-term rapid growth of the so-called white-collar group of occupations; a slower growth in the blue-collar occupations accompanied by a continuing rise in the skill level; a sharp decline in employment among farmers and farm laborers; and a faster than average growth among service workers.

In 1956, for the first time, white collar workers (professional and technical workers, managers, officials and proprietors, clerical, and sales workers) exceeded the number of blue-collar workers (craftsmen, operatives, and laborers). In 1910, white-collar occupations accounted for about 22 per cent of the labor force and, by 1958, the proportion was 42 per cent. In the next decade the white collar group is expected to grow faster than the labor force as a whole.

[4] Rudolph C. Mendelsohn, "Changing Shares of Jobs Among Nonmanufacturing Industries Since World War II," *Employment and Earnings*, Vol. 5, No. 6 (December 1958).

## Professional, Technical, and Kindred Worker Group

This has been the fastest growing occupational group in the post-World War II period. Within the professional group, the employment of scientists and

engineers has increased at a much faster rate than the traditional fields of medicine, law, teaching, and the ministry. Accompanying the expansion of the employment of engineers and scientists has been the rapid rise in employment of technicians such as draftsmen, engineering aids, and electronic specialists.

Nearly 2 million people were working as scientists, engineers, or technicians in the United States in 1957. Employment in these occupations grew very rapidly in response to the demands of World War II, the Korean conflict, and a vastly expanded research and development effort in American industry. Total research and development expenditures, which increased from less than 3 billion dollars in 1950 to about 8 billion dollars in 1957, was a primary factor in increasing the demand for scientific and technical personnel.

More than half of the nearly 2 million technical workers in the 1957 survey were professional scientists and engineers. The remainder were technicians.

In 1940, there was only one scientific or technical worker for every 100 workers; by 1957, one out of every 32 workers was found in these occupations. In this period, such products as televisions, jet airplanes, missiles, space vehicles, electronic computers, atomic reactors, and antibiotics were developed. With 2 million trained people engaged in the field of scientific discovery and in the application of their findings in practical production, the pace of invention and technical change can be expected to continue even more rapidly than it has in the past eighteen years.

The explosive force of research and development is expected to continue to have a dynamic impact upon both our occupational structure and industry employment. For this reason, we expect that the employment of professional, technical, and kindred workers will grow more than twice as fast as the labor force during the 1960's.

*Growth of white-collar occupations*

Within the white-collar group, clerical and kindred workers grew faster than any other occupational group during the period 1910–50. Our projections indicate that employment for these workers will continue to grow.

The rate of growth for the other two white-collar groups—managers, proprietors and officials, and sales workers—was not as rapid as those for the clerical and professional worker groups, but was above that for the labor force as a whole. Sales workers are expected to increase somewhat faster than the labor force during the next decade. Our projections indicate that the managerial group will have the smallest rise among the white-collar group.

Although blue-collar workers, as a whole, are expected to decline as a proportion of the total labor force in the next decade, we anticipate an expansion of more than 3 million blue-collar workers in the 1960's. Skilled workers are expected to increase at a somewhat faster rate than the labor force during the next decade. We also anticipate a rise in the skill level of our craftsmen.

One of the fastest growing occupational groups in the American labor force has been that of "operatives" (the Census designation for those who are generally called semiskilled workers). In 1910, they comprised about 14 per cent of the work force and by 1950 their proportion had risen to 21 per cent. The increasing application of automation in factories and other business establishments is expected to be a long-run gradual process which will not have severe effects on the employment of semiskilled workers. This large occupational group should grow at a somewhat slower rate than the nation's labor force in the next decade.



Reflecting the impact of technological change, the employment of laborers declined from 11.6 per cent of the labor force in 1910 to 6.1 per cent in 1950. Our projections indicate that little change in the actual number of industrial laborers will occur during the next decade, although the group will continue its long-term downward trend on a proportional basis.

*Decline of farm occupations*

Employment in the two farm occupational groups (farmers and farm managers and farm laborers) declined from nearly 31 per cent of the labor force in 1910 to only 12 per cent in 1950. In recent years, employment in the farm groups has continued to decline, although the rate has tended to slow down somewhat. It is projected that employment in these two groups will decline by about a million during the next decade.

The service worker occupational group, which includes workers such as those employed in private households, waiters, cooks, barbers, guards, and policemen, rose slightly from 9.6 per cent of the labor force in 1910 to 10.1 per cent in 1950. Employment in the service group is expected to increase substantially during the next decade.

## IMPLICATIONS

Our economy will employ an increasing number of white-collar workers in the next decade. Higher skill requirements for traditional crafts and the introduction of new and more complex equipment may markedly affect job content or create new jobs.

Our economy and our methods of production are changing faster than ever before. This means that we will need a more flexible and better trained labor force. The speed of change will create difficult educational and training problems.

TABLE 2—EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR OCCUPATIONS

| OCCUPATIONAL GROUP | INCREASE 1947–57 | MEDIAN SCHOOLING |
|---|---|---|
| Professional and Technical | 57 per cent | 16 years |
| Clerical | 33 per cent | 12.5 years |
| Craftsmen | 9 per cent | 10.5 years |

New workers coming into the labor market will have to meet higher entrance requirements. Jobs which demand high levels of education and skill are growing at a rapid rate. Table 2 highlights the point.

All educational requirements are rising. The work of skilled craftsmen is becoming increasingly complex, and higher levels of educational attainment are being specified for more and more skilled jobs.

But educational requirements for many white-collar ocupations are also being raised. For example, the length of time required to qualify for a degree in pharmacy and architecture has recently been extended from 4 to 5 years; in the teaching profession, the master's degree is required in a growing number of school systems; and some college work is being specified for more and more secretarial and other types of clerical jobs.

What are the implications for training in this rising educational attainment? The Bureau of the Census estimates that 48 per cent of our population, 15 years and over, will be high school graduates in 1970 as compared with 26 per cent in 1940.[5] Approximately 10,800,000 of this population group will be college graduates in 1970.

[5] *Projection of Educational Attainment in the United States: 1960 to 1980,* Series P-20, No. 91, Current Population Reports, Population Characteristics, January 12, 1959, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

In 1940, only 3,800,000 of our population had graduated from college.

The training of young people must also take into account the fact that the world of work is undergoing a major transformation. The work content of jobs is changing and requiring a better prepared worker. Employers are raising their standards for most jobs. It will become increasingly difficult for those without a good educational background to advance to jobs of greater responsibility and higher pay.

An analysis of the trends in the occupational composition and the educational attainment of our working population emphasizes the fact that the future leaders of this country will require more and better training. Occupational and educational statistics, however, do not measure the quality of a labor force. If our nation is to retain its world leadership, excellence in scholarship and work performance must become an even more important objective in all of our educational and training programs. Only then will we develop the highest quality leadership.

# Forecasting Surpluses and Shortages in Key Occupations

By DAEL WOLFLE

ABSTRACT: The usual question asked about manpower is whether there is a shortage or a surplus. In projecting future trends, it is frequently more useful to know how the total demand and the total supply will change. In engineering, science, and most of the other professions, the total demand will probably increase as a result of increased need for teachers, emphasis upon research, and industrial production. The total supply will also increase as rising college enrollments are followed by larger graduating classes. Whether, at a particular time, supply will be larger or smaller than demand is difficult to predict, but at least for science and engineering, most predictions for the next few years are of shortages. The real usefulness of manpower forecasts is to help guide actions that must be taken now. Consequently, the accuracy that can be usefully employed depends upon the extent to which present actions can be adjusted to projected supply and demand trends. Current accuracy is less than would be desirable. The whole field is in need of better methods of projecting demand trends.

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*Dael Wolfle, Ph.D., Washington, D. C., is Executive Officer of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. He was formerly Director of the Commission on Human Resources and Advanced Training of the Associated Research Councils, Executive Secretary of the American Psychological Association, and Editor of America's Resources of Specialized Talent. Dr. Wolfle was formerly a member of the faculty of the University of Chicago and other universities.*

ONE of the exasperating characteristics of many discussions of manpower supply and demand is that the most frequently asked question is the one that is hardest to answer, hardest to predict for the future, and usually of least importance. The usual question is: Is there a shortage or a surplus? In other words, is the supply less than the demand, or greater? The answer to this question can change quickly, and it can change as a result of a number of conditions that are difficult to predict.

Behind this question lie two others. One, What is the supply of persons who possess certain qualifications? The other, What is the demand for persons so qualified?

These questions, like the shortage-surplus one, can be asked about the present or the future; about a broadly defined group or a more narrowly defined one; about a local region, a nation, or a larger section of the world.

For many purposes, information concerning total supply or total demand is more useful than is information about the relation between the two. This is especially likely to be true in making predictions about the future. A student planning his career, or a university president contemplating an expansion of facilities, has greater use for the projection that in 1965 there will be 500,000 jobs in a field that now employs 350,000 than for the prediction that the supply will be a little larger or a little smaller than the demand.

Yet it is the surplus or shortage question that is given most attention. A rise or fall in *un*employment makes larger headlines than does a rise or fall in employment.

## SUPPLY-DEMAND RELATIONS

Most of the attention given to supply-demand relations has focused on scientists and engineers. This emphasis has

TABLE 1—SUPPLY-DEMAND RELATIONS FOR PURE SCIENTISTS IN WESTERN EUROPE, CANADA, AND UNITED STATES

(From Reports to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation)

| COUNTRY | BIOLOGY | CHEMISTRY | PHYSICS | EARTH SCIENCES | MATHEMATICS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | Balance | Balance | Balance | Balance | Balance |
| Germany | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Surplus of some | —— |
| Belgium | Serious shortage | Slight shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Balance |
| Denmark | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage |
| France | Slight shortage | Slight shortage | Slight shortage | Acute shortage | Some shortage |
| Italy | —— | —— | Shortage | Shortage | —— |
| Luxembourg | Balance | Shortage | Surplus | Balance | Balance |
| Norway | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage |
| Netherlands | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage |
| Switzerland | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage |
| Sweden | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage |
| United Kingdom | Some shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage of geologists | Shortage |
| Canada | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage |
| United States | —— | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage of geologists and geophysicists | Shortage |



TABLE 2—SUPPLY-DEMAND RELATIONS FOR APPLIED SCIENTISTS IN WESTERN EUROPE, CANADA, AND UNITED STATES

(From Reports to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation)

| COUNTRY | CIVIL ENGINEERING | CHEMICAL ENGINEERING | MECHANICAL ENGINEERING | ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING | MINING, METALLURGY, AND MISC. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | Balance | Balance | Balance | Balance | Balance |
| Germany | Balance | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage |
| Belgium | Shortage | Balance | Shortage | Shortage | Varies |
| Denmark | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage |
| France | Some shortage | Some shortage | Acute shortage | Shortage | Some shortages |
| Italy | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | —— | —— |
| Luxembourg | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage |
| Norway | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage |
| Netherlands | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage |
| Switzerland | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | —— |
| Sweden | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage |
| United Kingdom | Balance | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage |
| Canada | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage |
| United States | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage | Shortage |

resulted from the heavy technological demands of the contemporary world and from the fact that the demand for scientists and engineers has been changing more rapidly than that of any other comparable group. Special attention to scientists and engineers has characterized most of the European work as well as that in the United States. Twice within recent years the Organization for European Economic Cooperation has asked its member countries, plus Canada and the United States, to report on the supply-demand relations for various categories of scientists and engineers. The 1957 survey reports[1] are summarized in Tables 1 and 2, one of which gives information on the pure sciences and the other on engineering. Here and there, through these tables, a country indicated that it had a surplus of scientists or engineers in a particular specialty, and sometimes it indicated that the supply and demand were in balance, but far and away the most frequent report was of a shortage.

The explanation of these shortages is essentially the same throughout the whole of the industrialized world: the accelerating pace of scientific, technological, and economic change in the modern world has produced demands greater than the more slowly growing supply has been able to meet.

## FUTURE TRENDS

The only reasonable assumption for the future is that the pace of change will remain rapid and will probably speed up. Total demand, therefore, can be expected to continue at a high level. Three factors are of major importance: the need for teachers, the expected increase in research activities, and the expected continuation of a high rate of industrial production. The need for teachers is certain to expand. The figures on birth rate and on enrollment at lower school levels, the persistent demand for more education, and the increasing emphasis upon science and engineering point without question to a

[1] *The Problem of Scientific and Technical Manpower in Western Europe, Canada, and the United States.* (Paris: Organization for European Economic Cooperation, 1958), pp. 221.

great further growth in demand for teachers of pure and applied science.

Research expenditures in the United States have climbed steadily and sharply since the end of World War II, and the rise shows no sign of slacking off. Total research and development expenditures in the United States during the past ten years have amounted to approximately 60 billion dollars. How much greater the total will be in the next decade is uncertain, but a reasonably conservative estimate indicates that we will spend twice as much in the 1960's as in the 1950's. As Hill and Harbison have recently concluded from their study, *Manpower and Innovation in American Industry*,[2] increased research leads to increased industrial innovation—as is its intent—and innovation inevitably results in greater demand for managers, administrators, scientists, engineers, and other specialists.

Forecasts of total supply can be dealt with briefly, for the important facts are well known. A growing population with increasing percentages of successive age groups attending college permits of no conclusion other than a rise of total supply of persons prepared for occupations which require college training.

On the question of supply-demand relations, less certainty is possible. Most analyses, like those summarized in Tables 1 and 2, point to shortages in the fields of science and engineering.

When one turns to the traditional professions of law, medicine, and the ministry and to the fields of the humanities and social sciences, prediction becomes more difficult. Statisticians and manpower forecasters have given less attention to these fields. Consequently, there is less basis for trying to project the future. On the other hand, changes in supply and demand have been less volatile, and for that reason it may be safer to make predictions simply by extrapolating current trends. The Commission on Human Resources and Advanced Training included these fields in its study of supply and demand and predicted in 1954 that for the next several years the supply would be adequate in law, the ministry, agriculture, forestry, and pharmacy; that shortages could be expected in medicine, dentistry, and nursing; and that in the humanities and social sciences there would be an adequate supply at the bachelor's degree level and moderate shortages at the doctor's degree level. I know of no reason to change these estimates now except to point out that the anticipated great growth in college enrollment heralds a shortage of well-qualified college and university teachers in many fields in which teaching constitutes a large fraction of the total demand, for example, English, foreign languages, economics, and history.

[2] Samuel E. Hill and Frederick Harbison, *Manpower and Innovation in American Industry*. (Princeton, N. J.: Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, Research Report Series No. 96, 1959), pp. vi, 85.

## Problems and Use of Forecasting

It is usually more satisfying to be precise than to be vague, and anyone who has taken up the game of predicting manpower trends would like to be able to speak with assurance. Unfortunately, no high degree of assurance is justified. This state of affairs is due partly to the margin of error in the available statistical information, partly to the unsatisfactory nature of present methods of projecting demand, and partly to confusion over the purpose of such projections. These three points can be considered as three questions:

How are the forecasts used?
How accurate are they?
How are they made?

The purpose of manpower projections is not always understood, and it is sometimes thought that their value is measured by the closeness with which they agree with the later situations they try to predict. But this is wrong. A forecast is about the future, but it is for use now. If it is not used, it is simply an interesting statistical exercise. Projections are made to guide action that must be taken now, and not simply as a form of prophecy about the world at some future time.



There are, of course, difficulties in taking action in advance of necessity, even when good forecasts are available. One is simple political and social inertia; someone could coin today the proverb about locking the barn door after the horse is stolen, if that proverb had not been invented long ago. For the past ten years there have been widespread predictions of rising school enrollment in the United States. Increases in birth registrations, diaper services, toy sales, and nursery schools have all given ample warning. Yet many a community has postponed building new schools until the old ones were badly overcrowded.

Where responsibility and authority are centralized, action in anticipation of predicted changes can sometimes be taken quite readily. During and immediately after World War II, a series of British committees studied manpower supply-and-demand trends in the United Kingdom. A greatly increased demand for scientists and engineers was foreseen, and the educational capacity of the country was deliberately increased to try to meet the demand. In Norway, the Research Councils studied supply-and-demand trends[3] and predicted that there would be a continuing demand for approximately twice as many engineers as Norway's one institute of technology could produce; the Norwegian Parliament took the necessary action and doubled the capacity of the institute of technology.

Such direct, one-to-one relation between forecast and action is possible in a small country with central control of educational facilities. But it is not possible for the American educational system. No matter how many forecasts there are, and no matter how accurate they may be, decisions to increase, decrease, or alter educational facilities are so decentralized that only in a general way, and usually with considerable lag, can educational action follow manpower prediction.

One result of the difference between the United States and such countries as Norway and Great Britain is that the United States does not need as accurate forecasts as do these other countries. Norway can double its engineering capacity if it foresees a doubled need. It could increase by 60 per cent or 150 per cent if either of those increases seemed necessary. But actions taken in the United States in response to a predicted 60 per cent increase in demand are unlikely to differ greatly from those taken in response to a predicted 100 per cent increase. The trend and general magnitude of the expected change do influence planning, even with the delays involved, but detailed and small differences in prediction are not reflected in comparable changes in actions taken. Hence there is not now a requirement for highly precise forecasts in the United States.

[3] *Om Tilgangen på og Behovet for Akademisk Arbeidskraft*. (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1957), pp. 37 plus 18 separately paginated appendices.

## The Accuracy of Demand Predictions

Nevertheless, the problem of accuracy is an important one. A basic difficulty is the impossibility of determining the accuracy of past projections of supply or demand, for it is difficult, if indeed it is even possible, to determine the

present supply or demand with satisfactory accuracy. This difficulty comes from the absence of definitions. Who is qualified to be called an engineer? Does everyone who is teaching school merit the title of school teacher? Does the total demand include positions that have not been established simply because there are not enough qualified persons available to make it worth while to establish a new position? How many existing positions are filled by substandard employees, or could easily be abolished?

In discussions of manpower, it is easy, and—to the dismay of some economists—common practice, to treat demand and supply as if they were fixed quantities, independent of price. But there are also serious difficulties involved in treating supply and demand in terms of classic economic theory. For the labor market is not free. And the application of the free market model in an effort to determine the changing demand for engineers, as Blank and Stigler[4] have used it, leads to some peculiar results. For example, measured against the average of all wages, the average salary paid to engineers has decreased, relatively, during the past few decades. Does the relative decline in engineering salaries mean that we have had an excess supply? Except temporarily during the 1930's, other evidence does not point in this direction. In fact, the number of engineers employed has grown more rapidly than have the numbers of skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers. The discrepancy between wage figures and other evidence means, I think, that free-market concepts do not provide the proper model. The successful efforts of strong labor unions and a number of other powerful factors have narrowed the gap between formerly high- and low-income groups, both between and within occupational fields. Whether one interprets the decreased relative wage as evidence of decreased demand, or the larger number employed as evidence of increased demand, depends on whether he defines demand in economic or in manpower terms.

There is a further difficulty with salary data and also with census and similar records. The difficulty is that some of the terms used to designate different groups are ill-defined and loosely applied. In most European countries the title engineer is a protected one that can be used only by persons who have met the established qualifications. But this is not so in the United States. The prestige of the name engineer leads some workers to adopt it for themselves even though entitled neither by education nor duty to claim that name. Moreover, in the past dozen years, government contracting policies have made it advantageous for some employers to classify some of their technicians as engineers. Thus the term engineer—and similarly such terms as chemist and scientist—may not mean in one year what they meant in another, or in one company what they mean in another.

It does not matter so much how one defines an engineer, or a member of some other group, so long as the definitions are applied consistently. There would be substantial gain in this respect from following the recommendations of an advisory group to the President's Committee on Scientists and Engineers. One of the first recommendations of this advisory group was that a uniform set of definitions be adopted. Other recommendations called for the collection of statistical records on a uniform and consistent basis. If these recommendations were carried out, it would become substantially easier to agree upon supply-and-demand quantities and relationships. Correspondingly, it would become easier to determine the accuracy of earlier forecasts.

[4] David M. Blank and George J. Stigler, *The Demand and Supply of Scientific Personnel.* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1957), pp. xvii, 200.



## METHODS OF FORECASTING

If one wants to know what the demand for, say, electrical engineers is likely to be five years from now, one method is to ask employers of electrical engineers how many they expect to need at that time. This method has been used in a number of countries, including the United States.

Alternatively, one can use census, or similar records, plot past trends of number of persons employed as electrical engineers, and extrapolate the curve five years ahead.

Both of these methods are fairly easy to use; both have some value; but both involve hidden assumptions. When the predictions are wrong, as they frequently are, it is almost impossible to use that information in deciding how to do a better job next time.

There is, therefore, a general search for better methods of manpower forecasting. Every country that has had a reasonable amount of experience with these elementary methods is engaged in that search. Great Britain, France, Sweden, Norway, Holland, Western Germany, and other countries are examining their own scientific and engineering manpower trends and are trying out various methods of making supply and demand forecasts. So far, no method has worked well enough to justify relaxing the search for improved methodology.

In 1957 the President's Committee on Scientists and Engineers appointed a special committee to plan a co-ordinated program of manpower statistics that would give the nation satisfactory information on the supply and demand at any time and would provide the necessary factual background for projecting future supply and demand. The committee proposed the continuous or periodic collection of information through census, educational, industrial, and special-study channels. The committee recommended some new studies and that some existing statistical series be compiled in greater detail. The report has been published by the National Science Foundation[5] and is now in the process of being studied by the government agencies that have direct interests in better manpower information.

Perhaps the weakest part of the report of this special committee (I was a member and can criticize freely) was in its recommendations concerning the methodology of forecasting future demand. We gave high priority to these recommendations, but were not very original in proposing methods of carrying them out. We recommended that surveys of employers' expectations of future demand be made, but pointed out that this simple technique would be useful only for forecasts covering a few months into the future. For longer term projections, we recommended two other methods, one of which consists of the study of employment and production growth trends and the changing roles of different classes of scientists and engineers in different segments of industry. We had in mind such measures as the trends in ratios of scientists, engineers, and technicians in each industry to total number of workers in those industries, and the number performing specific functions, such as research, design, or testing.

We also recommended systematic historical studies of the relationships between demand and those factors that are

[5] *A Program for National Information on Scientific and Technical Personnel.* National Science Foundation and President's Committee on Scientists and Engineers, NSF 58-28, August 1958. pp. x, 63.

thought to be of major importance in determining demand. Study of the correlations among these variables would show the predictive efficiency of each and of various combinations among them.

The obvious difficulty in improving the methods of projecting demand is the great complexity of dealing with the welter of factors that will be responsible for the demand at some future date. Will business be good or bad? Will new technological, social, or management inventions alter the present situation greatly, or hardly at all? What will be the situation in other countries? Will the birth rate continue as it is, or change appreciably? Will the world be at peace, or, if not, in what stage of what kind of warfare, requiring what kind of men and materials?

Granting the reasonable assumption that we never will be able to answer all such questions, there is still an interesting possibility. Much of the change in industry and society is planned change or deliberate innovation. We cannot tell in advance just which plans will succeed and which will fail, but we can predict the trends, as some segments of industry are doing for themselves. A careful analyst might take these plans into consideration, consider also the most likely answers to some of the questions posed above, study economic trends of production and consumption of various commodities, basic ingredients, and services, and prepare probabilistic projections that would be of greater accuracy than are our present forecasts. The task would be somewhat similar to that of weather forecasting. The meteorologist also faces a welter of interrelated unknowns. His forecasts, too, can be thrown off by some wholly unexpected change. But with growing accuracy he is able to forecast weather conditions some time in advance, and as his accuracy increases, the economic advantage of basing economic decisions on those forecasts becomes more widely recognized.

The specialist who would seem to be best prepared to play the meteorologist's role in manpower forecasting is the economist, yet relatively little of the skill and knowledge of economics has been applied to this problem. The outstanding exception was a failure. In 1957 Blank and Stigler reported an interesting and valuable analysis of salary trends for engineers, an analysis that in terms of the classic concepts of supply and demand led to the conclusion that the demand for engineers has been declining for several decades—a conclusion that many readers found hard to accept, and one that has been discussed above. The purpose of mentioning this book is not, however, to consider what the authors did, but rather what they failed to do.

When the Commission on Human Resources and Advanced Training completed its work,[6] it was perfectly clear to all of us who had been involved in that effort that our predictions of future demand had been made by amateurish methods and that one of the important tasks to take up was the development of a more sophisticated methodology. Officers of the National Science Foundation agreed and discussed with several organizations engaged in economic research the idea of carrying out a systematic comparison of alternative methods, presumably depending heavily upon economic as well as educational data. The National Bureau of Economic Research expressed interest in this study and was given a grant to carry it out. But when the study was completed,[7] it

[6] Dael Wolfle, *America's Resources of Specialized Talent*. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), pp. xviii, 332.

[7] Blank and Stigler, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*).



was a disappointment, for it did not provide the hoped-for comparison—probably a completely retrospective one—of the accuracy of alternative methods of forecasting demand. The report was something quite different, and the probable reason was the great difficulty of developing and testing better methods of making demand forecasts.

The problem therefore remains. As a French economist pointed out in reviewing the study by Blank and Stigler, "Explanation of the movements of the supply of, and demand for, scientific personnel in the past and forecast of these movements for the future remains to be made."[8]

Projections of future demand will continue to be made, but real improvement can be expected only when we have better methodology, when someone gets a bright idea of how to handle at a more sophisticated level the job of combining available or procurable information into a forecast of future demand.

[8] Jacques Wolff, review of *The Demand and Supply of Scientific Personnel*, by David M. Blank and George J. Stigler, in *Science*, Vol. 127 (1958), pp. 87–88.

# Untested Assumptions and Disregarded Factors in Manpower Research

By Otto Pollak

Abstract: Manpower in America cannot be allocated by totalitarian means. At times such means may seem attractive, but this is not a form of attraction which we can afford to offer our citizens. Any study of manpower allocation must take a good many factors into consideration. The four original professions—the ministry, law, medicine, and teaching—have been augmented by dozens more. These new professions are almost exclusively involved with helping, rather than restricting, men; it is in these professions that a shortage of manpower is felt. The sources to fill this shortage are in many instances available by means of a re-evaluation of some of our basic beliefs. First, technology is releasing increased numbers of blue-collar workers; only prejudice keeps us from viewing them as an immense source of professional potential. Second, professional women are forced by the influence of psychology to stay at home through some of their most productive years in order to raise their children; the need of the children for their continuous presence beyond infancy may well be overrated. Also, the body of knowledge possessed by retired professionals is assumed to be obsolete—an obsolescence which is at least partly created by the immense value placed on the new and untested in our culture. In this same vein, reward is often withdrawn from the older practicing members of a profession in favor of the less experienced men. Lastly, professionals themselves create problems through their attitudes towards their co-workers in interdisciplinary teams.—Ed.

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*Otto Pollak, Ph.D., Villanova, Pennsylvania, is Professor of Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania. He has served as Research Consultant to child guidance clinics, family welfare agencies, and hospitals. He is the author of Social Adjustment in Old Age (1948); Criminality of Women (1950); Social Science and Psychotherapy for Children (1952); and Social Aspects of Retirement (1956), as well as numerous articles for professional journals. Dr. Pollak is a member of the American Sociological Society, the American Orthopsychiatry Association, and the National Association of Social Workers.*





THE questions raised in this volume center around the problem of whether manpower in the professions is effectively allocated and if not, whether the forces of supply and demand should be left to change the allocation. Beneath the apparent clarity of these two questions lurk other questions of considerable complexity. It might be asked for instance whether efficiency of allocation in totalitarian countries does not serve social goals different from those pursued in democratic countries. It might be asked whether the question of efficiency should be answered in terms of today and the next two or three years, or in terms of a longer perspective. It might be asked whether efficiency of allocation expresses itself only in the number of people assigned to specific tasks, or in the staying power, under stress, of the people so allocated, or in their productivity. It might finally be asked whether policy decisions in these matters are open to free choice or are predetermined by the history and the temper of a nation. What might be efficient in a totalitarian country with a totalitarian tradition might be highly inefficient in a democratic country with a history such as ours.

## Changes in the Professions

Many of these questions may require more information than is readily accessible at the present time, but some fundamental facts might be identified for the orientation of future research. For many centuries Western civilization has known only four professions: the ministry, the law, medicine, and teaching. These were the only fields in which scholastic effort, the mastery of an accumulated and transmissible body of specialized knowledge and its increase were rated as essential to the performance of a social or divine mandate. Today the number of the professions seems to have vastly increased. People engaged in business administration, social work, government service, labor relations, investment counseling, advertising, market research, weather forecasting, airplane piloting, engineering, digital computer programming, atomic research, nursing, and probably quite a few others lay claim to and are accorded professional status by the wider community. There are great differences among the new professions in the time required for preparation, the financial return, the evaluation of their importance for the welfare of the nation, and the personal fulfillment assumed to be derived from their pursuit. But one thing seems to characterize all of them, and, except for medicine, to set them apart from the tradition of the older professions. They are helping professions, offering to make man's fate easier and opposed to the normative character of the three original disciplines. Ministers, lawyers, and teachers for many centuries have told people "you should do this, and you should not do that." The professions of the twentieth century tell man "we are going to help you to achieve more than you ever achieved before, and we permit you to do things that were formerly not permitted to you." While the older professions were limiting in their major emphases, the newer professions are enabling. Actually the principle of help and of enabling service has begun to permeate the older professions. Lawyers have become interested in the rehabilitation of offenders, in mediation of labor conflicts, and in board memberships serving philanthropic agencies. Ministers have become interested in psychiatry in order to do a better job in pastoral work, and teachers have so much relaxed their demands on students for specific performance that the quality of our educational services has become a matter for national concern.

Concomitant with this shift from a

demanding to an enabling and permissive orientation in the professions has gone a change in the manpower situation. While the older professions are overpopulated, or in the case of medicine fight against this danger, the newer professions seem to suffer from a manpower scarcity. This is partly natural because many of them have not yet had time to build up a sufficiency of trained personnel. It is partly due to the fact that women have entered some of these new professions and have practically taken over others. Since we have convinced the women of the nation that motherhood requires their presence in the home at least during the pre-school years of their children, mental hygiene takes women out of the professions as fast as the professional schools can train them. There are also a great number of monopolistic tendencies which, however soft-pedaled and hidden under the cloak of a concern over standards, work effectively against an abundance of professional manpower. A special wrinkle in this situation is produced by the fact that business competes with government and teaching for manpower in many of these professions and in most instances successfully so.

## THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION

This shift in the number of the professions and the essential character of their contribution to mankind in our society has gone parallel with a slow, stumbling, and reluctant definition of the specific American contribution to the experience of human civilization. This contribution has been only recently recognized as the experience of abundance rather than that of ever-threatening want, as the belief in the conflict-reducing power of conferences and federal arrangements, and as the belief in pluralism as a way of life. Attention-catching names have been coined to designate these contributions—The Affluent Society, the United Nations, and even Coexistence. The acceptance of the last two terms on the international level reveals the realization of other nations of the promise and the power of these American ways of avoiding conflict and of making it possible for people to live together with a minimum of harm to one another. We are faced here with an adventure of global experimentation with the American way of life.

This is not sufficiently recognized by the prophets of doom who dominate the tenor of reporting in our mass media and in our scientific analysis of the world situation. It is true of course that the United Nations so far has not been as effective as many of us might wish. It is probably true also that the idea of co-existence is a smokescreen thrown up to blur the maneuvering for position by the totalitarian powers in the cold war. But the world outside of the United States is not blind to the fact that America for the first time in recorded history has created conditions approaching a state of abundance in material things and a state of fearlessness for the common man such as few people on this earth have even known. Over and beyond that, we have created and maintained longer than any other nation now in existence a form of government which, in spite of apparent inefficiency and graft, has never ventured to disregard the well-being of the individual or of a minority. Throughout its existence it has accepted compromise and respect for the essential interests of every group in the population as a working principle, and the world has not remained unaware of this fact. While the world is experimenting with the methods which have produced these achievements, the world is also questioning the intrinsic merit of these methods and their power of survival. Though one may experiment with the methods of the rich, one cannot really like them, of course. If they are found to be truly effective one's own way of life would appear a tradition-hallowed error and self-condemnation to failure.



Into this atmosphere of ambivalent feelings towards the American way of life comes the frequent appearance of success of a monolithic totalitarian way of life which seems to make possible a less chaotic, less stumbling, and less uncertain method of salvation: the planned society of communism where all efforts are synchronized by the power of government; where concern with abundance is scorned as antisocial; and where many matters, disagreements, and criticism are considered to be treason. This way of life has gratifications to offer which American civilization cannot give. It permits hostility against certain parts of mankind variably called capitalistic, imperialistic, colonial, and bourgeois. It takes from the individual the burden of decision-making and assures him of the wisdom and the omniscience of a superpower working in his behalf.

These are comforts which we cannot offer even when they would mean an increase in efficiency. We cannot offer our citizens the right to hate. We cannot plan for them instead of planning with them, and we cannot give them the illusion of a government that cannot err. Even if we tried, the people of this country could not avail themselves of such comforts. They have been the children and the grandchildren of people who have been convinced that it is better to love than to hate, that participation in decision-making is an inalienable right of adulthood, and that government is something to be watched rather than to be blindly trusted. If for reasons of national defense, for reasons of solving manpower problems, or simply for the aesthetic pleasures of a planned and orderly way of life we should attempt to establish an omniscient government, we would lose our identity and our potential of contribution to the world and probably also whatever abundance and individual fearlessness we have built up over the generations.

## UNREALIZED SOURCES OF MANPOWER

It is in this framework of concern that we must try to correct any maldistribution of manpower or the leadership problems which we face in the professions. Undoubtedly inequalities in professional rewards must be considered among the causes of such problems and must be studied with a view to remedial action if public opinion and private initiative, rather than governmental planning and authoritarian fiat, are to be entrusted with redistribution of manpower. Such an inquiry, however, must be broadly conceived in order to produce useful results. If the problem is viewed only in terms of monetary rewards, important sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction may be overlooked, and what appears to be an inquiry may well prove to be the selective gathering of data for a self-fulfilling hypothesis. In order to prevent such a sham inquiry, it might be well to examine the assumptions on which manpower shortage research is likely to be based.

### *Blue-collar workers*

The first of these assumptions is that current and future professional demands cannot be fully met and that if we want to meet a special demand we must take the personnel, at least potentially, away from another profession. Such an assumption is likely to overlook a fact which preoccupies national concern in another context, without apparently ever being considered when we discuss manpower shortages in the professions. This fact is the release of ever larger number of individuals from the demands of industrial production as a result of the increase in machine efficiency and automation. Labor is concerned with leisure

and the length of the work week; industry is concerned with feather-bedding and the choice between overtime and hiring a larger work force. The whole nation is concerned with unemployment. Apparently, however, no voice is raised to point out that the manpower pool which is so released by technological advances presents in the long run not so much a national problem as a national resource for the manpower needs which are arising in white-collar work and the professions. Here a silent and very undemocratic assumption is at work: that white-collar workers cannot be recruited from the blue-collar force and that leaders should be taken from leadership trainees rather than from the ranks. Perhaps we even have an assumption that young persons are unlikely material for positions in the office once they have been started on an earning career in the shop. Apparently our national experience with the high caliber students to whom only the G.I. Bill of Rights opened the colleges and universities has quickly been forgotten.

*The retired*

Another silent assumption which has a bearing on our concern with manpower shortages lies in the notion that retired members of the professions are probably obsolete and therefore cannot be called upon to meet manpower shortages which have developed in their own fields. Some significant research is being carried on in this area by the National Welfare Assembly with the help of the Dorr Foundation with regard to engineers, and more will be needed in other fields. A question of interest in this connection is how much of this obsolescence is artificially created by a change of scientific jargon and the public expectation of salvation from the young. It might be of interest, for instance, to investigate the relative frequency with which applications for research funds are rejected by foundations and governmental organizations on the basis of the age and publication record of the applicants. Such a check may indicate that acceptances are inversely correlated with the amount of scientific work already produced by the applicant. Ours is a country which looks for the new with unchecked fervor. Demonstrated quality is less interesting than untested promise. In other words we might well explore whether the support of scientific research does not create professional obsolescence instead of preventing it, and whether it does not ruin already developed leadership rather than using it. In industrial research, it is an important principle to mistrust companies which tend to engage their research workers in crash programs and then to call them off in order to employ them in new areas. We might well examine whether we do not do this on the national scene in more subtle ways and thus create artificial manpower shortages not by inequalities of reward but by the withdrawal of reward from maintained effort.

*Professional women*

A further factor which from the start might predetermine the outcome of manpower studies in the professions is the assumption that the demands of motherhood must withdraw professional women from continued activities, thus dooming them, after a number of years spent in the lower ranks, to retire permanently to child rearing. It might be interesting to see what educational and promotional effort could do to remedy the situation with respect to both the women themselves and those who might want to call upon their services. In this respect two related areas of research suggest themselves: the impact of working mothers upon the mental health of their children and of working wives upon their husbands. Here we are confronted by a paradox similar to that created by our failure to relate our concern about technological unemployment to the manpower shortages in white-collar work and in the professions. On the one hand ours is a society in which we utilize separation for the solution of many problems. In industry we find it desirable to combine promotions with transfers from one place of employment to another. In education we prefer our children to receive a college education away from home. In the arrangement of vacations we believe that our children will benefit from going to camp. In residential arrangements, even where efficiency would suggest the opposite, we prefer separation of office from home, and in family arrangements we believe in the separation of adult sons and daughters from their parents for purposes of starting families of their own. Against these many manifestations of a mobile population, we have a child-rearing culture, which, under the influence of psychiatry and psychoanalysis, burdens working mothers, and even working fathers, with guilt about not giving enough time to their children—this in a society in which education as well as recreation has been largely taken away from the range of family functions. At the same time, we foster female employment but retain a victorian picture of the male as the bread winner who loses his dignity if not his identity as a man if he assumes the duties of child care or the household.

Here an insufficient distinction is made between infant and child care. While mothering seems to be a need of the highest order for the infant, making his separation from the mother a source of great and apparently irreparable damage, no evidence is available to suggest that this holds true for later stages of development. Similarly we have little evidence to convince us that it does not hurt a husband to have his income supplemented by the earning of his wife, but that it does hurt him terribly if he washes the dishes or prepares a meal when she is out.

In summary it might be well to explore whether our manpower shortages are not to a great degree self-created by a disregard of available manpower sources in the ranks of labor, the retired, and married women. It might be interesting to explore whether these shortages are due to inequalities in reward or perhaps to the withdrawal of reward from tested manpower and a resulting transfer of reward to untested manpower whose very untestedness permits a greater play of imaginary and irrational expectations.

ATTITUDES OF PROFESSIONALS

If we turn from these general considerations to more specific considerations, we again encounter a few paradoxical situations. Americans expect help in the solution of almost all problems from education, but they do not respect the educator. Although we demand from him training for survival, we like to think of him as a slightly fussy, unworldly, and inefficient individual. We think of him as underpaid, but would not dream of raising his income to that of the other professions for which he is supposed to prepare his students. If he does well financially in spite of these obstacles, we question whether he gives his best to teaching. Even in the ranks of his colleagues, there will be suspicion that he is too much concerned with worldly goals and with a bend toward "unscientific" or "applied" work.

Although we are the country which alone in this world has made the skills of helping our fellow men a matter of professional training, we are inclined to talk of social workers as "do-gooders." Although we contribute to the United Fund and many private campaigns of charitable agencies, we are ashamed and reluctant to use these services ourselves.

After we have used them, we believe that the value of their services can be proved only by the fact that we do not need them again. People who would laugh at the idea that a visit to the office of a general practitioner should safeguard them against need to call upon him again will make fun of or pity people who "re-enter analysis." Mental health services, as wars, must be resorted to only in order to end the need for them once and for all.

Finally we advocate interdisciplinary work, but question the reality of democratic arrangements in the collaborative efforts between persons coming from different professional fields. In the field of medicine we encounter "auxiliary" medical services. In the field of penology, we have psychologists and chaplains as adjunctive personnel to the custodial officers. Everywhere, in interprofessional teamwork, we find one central profession which assumes leadership and preferred status, often with much disregard for the needs, in terms of both psychic and financial rewards, of the persons representing the other professions on the team. In other words, we cannot look only to the community for inequalities in professional rewards but must think also of those inequalities which the professions have produced by their self-evaluation and interdisciplinary arrangements. In the last analysis, the nature and scope of professional discomfort will have to be explored with due regard to the fact that the professionals involved are the people who cause as well as suffer from the inequalities which interfere with the allocation and productivity of professional manpower.

# Prestige

By EVERETT CHERRINGTON HUGHES

ABSTRACT: Indications are that the prestige rankings of various occupations in industrial and urban countries tend to be similar. But this is no guide to the effective choices of occupation by young people. For many occupations include people of a great variety of styles and quality of work; not all of these styles are equally visible to all segments of the population. We require an anatomy of prestige which will take differential visibility and the many images and nuances of reality into account. There are studies of how goals and standards are set and of the probability that young people of given backgrounds will enter various kinds of schools and occupations. But much remains to be done before we know just how goals are progressively set and revised in our schools, colleges, and professional institutions. Teachers and people in various occupations may, in fact, give quite contradictory messages to young people about what kind of work is essential to success and what is most valuable. Students then form their own standards, on the basis of what they come to believe, on the basis of their own experience and their own interpretations of the demands made upon them.

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*Everett Cherrington Hughes, Ph.D., Chicago, Illinois, is Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago and Editor of the American Journal of Sociology. His concern with education grew out of his early interest in racial and ethnic relations, which are ordinarily affected by the kinds and quality of education of the groups in contact (See his French Canada in Transition, 1943); and out of his present interest in how the basic values of professions are passed on. Together with Dr. Blanche Geer and Dr. Howard S. Becker he is preparing a report on their recently completed study of a medical school. His most relevant recent book is Men and Their Work (1958).*

THE occupations most characteristic of industrial-urban civilizations appear to be ranked in about the same order of prestige in all countries of that kind of civilization. Such was the finding of two sociologists in a survey of the pertinent available data.[1] The professions and industrial occupations were ranked most nearly in the same way in the several countries studied. The physician appears to be the world champion of this popularity contest. College professors, scientific workers, and those who manage industries are not far behind. The teacher in public schools does not rate very highly in these countries. He (or she) comes at about the middle of the rating. Urban Africans in Northern Rhodesia rank occupations open to them in a way which suggests that, with more urbanization and industrialization combined with less racial discrimination, they will approach the older industrial countries in their attitudes concerning occupations. Administrators of schools and teachers of secondary schools are rated at or near the top. The medical orderly, who is perhaps as high as an African is likely to get in the medical system there at present, is not far down.[2]

[1] Alex Inkeles and Peter H. Rossi, "National Comparisons of Occupational Prestige," *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 61 (January 1956), pp. 329–39. They compared studies made in the USA, USSR, Great Britain, New Zealand and Western Germany. Inkeles has continued to make such comparisons and has included other countries. In a recent lecture at the University of Chicago he argued strongly that his evidence shows that, quite regardless of form and doctrine of government, industrial civilizations do produce a common prestige ranking of the most crucial occupations.

[2] J. Clyde Mitchell and A. L. Epstein, "Occupational Prestige and Social Status Among Urban Africans in Northern Rhodesia," *Africa*, Vol. 29 (January 1959), pp. 22–40. Police inspectors and ministers of religion are, in fact, higher on the list than the medical orderly. The study rates only those occupations available to Africans. The higher positions in government and industry are not open to them. These authors, anthropologists, are pioneers in study of the urbanization of African peoples.

## PRESTIGE RANKING AND OCCUPATIONAL GOALS

If we could accept the ranking of occupations according to prestige by the public at large as some sort of evidence of the direction of flow of young people of talent, we should have little need to worry about our place in a world where science and its applications count for so much. But the very rankings themselves carry their own damnation. It is common knowledge that the medical schools are not beseiged by great numbers of applicants who cannot get in; the deans of captive state schools—captive in that they must get most, if not all, of their students from the state in which they are located—speak of scraping the bottom of the barrel. College professors are rated highly, yet they themselves think they are not highly regarded by people whose opinions count heavily in academic and public matters (although many of those in Lazarsfeld's sample allow that perhaps a trustee of their own institution would rate a professor ahead of lawyers, advertising account executives, or branch bank managers).[3] Governors of states, county judges, and heads of departments in state governments stand high in the American ranking used by Inkeles and Rossi. Yet we know that people constantly complain of the low caliber of those who seek public office. As a matter of fact, these prestige rankings are not a sure index of the goals of American parents for their children or of the young people themselves.

[3] Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr., *The Academic Mind* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), p. 12, Figure 1–5. The college teachers in the large sample used in this study were asked how they thought a typical businessman, congressman, and trustee of his own college would rate a manager of a branch bank, an account executive of an advertising agency, and a lawyer in relation to a professor.



## OCCUPATIONAL IMAGES

For one thing, most of the ratings simply sample the public in gathering their data. In giving everyone an equal chance to speak, they give no one a chance to speak out with his own voice. For another, the questionnaires do not generally ask people what they mean, let us say, by a lawyer, a physician, or a professor. Do they mean the lawyer who, although he approaches the ideal of individual independent practitioner, is really a chore-boy of small business and politics, captive of a clientele whose drab problems he dare not refuse—since he has long since forgotten how to work at the law?[4] Or do some of them mean the lawyer who, although he may have worked on salary all of his career, can devote his time to the law, or some branch of it, and can do the work he likes? And what kind of physician do they mean? A true general practitioner; a quasi-general practitioner who is a specialist by default because fate, pressure, and indolence have progressively narrowed the range of cases he gets and of the names of ailments which he enters on death certificates; a true practicing specialist, respected by his colleagues; an academic research man, with or without patients, in the clinic or in the laboratory? And what professor are they thinking of? For there are wide, even dramatic differences, in the style of work and of life of people called professors. At its best, we professors have a wonderful and stimulating life with access to wider ranges of friends and associates than people in perhaps any other profession—and with a good chance of marrying women of great intelligence and charm and of great powers of sympathy and support. Let us draw the veil over the worst and the circumstances which produce it.

As a matter of fact, many of our leading named occupations are inwardly so varied that to call them by one name is close to misleading. Ratings based on the name alone tell us little or nothing about the actual images which people have of the occupation. They also tell us nothing of how the images held by people of one kind (class, age, ethnic group, religion, region) vary from those held by some other kind. For the kinds of doctor, teacher, businessman, lawyer, or soldier visible to one kind of people may be quite different from those visible to others. And, as Hollingshead and Redlich have shown,[5] the people in a profession do not necessarily show the same kind of face to clients of all classes. The customer may be always right, but in most professions there are some who are righter than others; at least, some are preferred to others, although it does not necessarily follow that the least preferred will be given inferior service.

[4] Jerome Carlin, "The Lawyer as Individual Practitioner." Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. University of Chicago Libraries, 1958. Available on microfilm. Carlin studied a sample of the one-man office lawyers in Chicago.

## THE SETTING OF GOALS AND STANDARDS

The truth is that we do not have a fully worked out anatomy of occupational prestige, including all of the contacts and interactions out of which the images of the various occupations develop. Nor do we know a great deal about what kinds of experiences lead young people to take certain styles of work and life as goals; reality goals, that is, towards which they will effec-

[5] August B. Hollingshead and Fredrick C. Redlich, *Social Class and Mental Illness: A Community Study* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958).

tively strive. Certainly, sociologists and psychologists have learned a great deal about the influence of cliques of peers and about the probability that children of people of certain backgrounds will enter certain schools, colleges, and occupations. Much is being learned at present about the informal social organization of college and university campuses; about the creative "beatniks" who, far from being beat, are often the most hard-working and creative of all students (although they have low opinion of professors and parents, as of all respectable older folk); about home-town cliques, social cliques, and intellectual cliques of students on different kinds of campuses. But all of this, and much more, needs filling out and drawing together into a general, yet refined, body of theory and knowledge about effective choices of ways of studying, working, and living.

One thing that is quite clear is that students are quick to detect the contradictions in the behavior of those who try to set models before them. "You are not in high school now. You are in college. Be a man. You are on your own," say we professors. Then we deal out assignments in small daily rations and follow with a quiz next day to see if the ration has been properly assimilated, an intellectual toilet-training which is about as creative as any toilet-training. (And note the assumption that high schools are childish.) We claim that we believe in general education; then each of us, as a representative of a "professionalized" department of the university—if not of learning—joins with his departmental fellows in turning colleges into pregraduate schools in which each course is a link in a chain of prerequisites necessary to graduate work in a given field. The net effect is to force young people to follow another road than the one we proudly point to; they must choose a major field of study with a strict eye to the chance of getting into professional or graduate schools and getting higher degrees without the loss of time which the system brings upon anyone who changes his mind after the middle of college. Many students—I do not know how many—are aware of the discrepancy between preachment and pressure, follow the pressure, and give their slightly younger fellow students the low-down. They work on the daily dose—a principle which experience, in the form of peer-group culture, has convinced them that that is what the faculty really wants; so likewise do they choose between what is interesting and a bit out of line and that which is dully more of the same, but prerequisite by decree.

## BALANCE BETWEEN THE IDEAL AND THE REAL

Students, like other people going through the prolonged initiation into adult status, are proud of discovering the true road to success and of learning the prescription for mixing ideal and reality in just the right way. They have to learn to live and survive as students before they can live and survive as members of professions or other occupations. It may be that they receive very confused and contradictory messages concerning the most valued goals and about the ways toward them. What messages are, in fact, being passed along to students by their teachers, those whom they know out in the working world, and by their fellow-students of more experience and sophistication? Part of the study of the anatomy of prestige must be a frank and penetrating study, not of official pronouncements about the roads to glory and about what pursuits are interesting and valuable, but of the messages actually received and perceived by young people.

This is all perhaps merely another way of saying that the prestige-value given to various pursuits is never a matter merely of propaganda and pronouncements but is something worked out by each generation in an atmosphere largely but not completely created by the preceeding generation. The problem of prestige is then not a matter of a bit of advertising or of "plugging" in the media, but of learning what we can about various atmospheres and their effects upon young people. If we are to change the canons of prestige we will have to put ourselves through a painful process of analyzing the part of parents, counselors, teachers, future professional and business colleagues in determining them. And I do not so much mean our individual behavior directly toward young people—although that is certainly implied—but our behavior in setting up and playing our roles in educational organizations, in creating the environments in which young people must live and work from day to day.

If young people, regardless of the race, class, or region in which they are born, are to find the best and most satisfying ways of using their abilities, it will be because we manage to make effective living models of such use—and its burdens and rewards—visible to them and in such circumstances that there is a fair chance of them not being diverted by inferior teaching, by confusion of messages which leads them to settle for less than their best, or starts them up intellectual blind alleys (by early "professionalism" and the encouraging of "interested choices" by their teachers). I strongly suspect that close study of what goes on in schools and colleges, a sort of audit of the realities, might start a movement to self-improvement that would be of more effect than any amount of glamour showered on those occupations which we consider a matter of life or death. A good many people are, in fact, engaged in just this self-examination of American educational (sic) environments. One of the things we will certainly learn from it is that no modern civilization can rely for very subtle deployment of its human resources upon a series of childhood and adolescent judgments. Many of the finer judgments concerning a man's special calling are bound to be made later, when he knows some part of the world of work much better than any adolescent or student can know it. The problem of prestige—in so far as prestige is that which leads people to make choices of their pursuits—is then that of creating chains of opportunity to learn more and more about the possibilities within the main parts of the world of work, and to adapt one's self to new demands and to keep setting one's sights further off as he goes. Woe be to him who, through self-interest, doctrine, or laziness, blocks vision and learning at any point on the road.

# Molding Public Opinion on Select Manpower

By HARWOOD L. CHILDS

ABSTRACT: Molding public opinion on any subject involves several steps. First, it is essential to define clearly the objectives of the campaign. Second, the public or publics to be influenced should be clearly identified. Third, careful surveys of the attitudes and opinions of the relevant publics regarding the campaign objectives and programs should be made. Fourth, the survey data should be carefully analyzed to find out why people hold the views they do regarding the program or lack information regarding it. This is probably the most important and most difficult step. Once the previous analysis has been made the next step is to create an organization for the express purpose of carrying out the campaign. Special attention must be given to both the strategies of argument and persuasion. Publicity really presents no great problem, once the previous steps have been taken. To solve the problem effectively a number of specific suggestions are given. It is inherent in the democratic process that those who believe in an idea or program should exercise their constitutional right to try and win support for it. This propaganda effort, however, should use to the full, methods and techniques which really help citizens to decide rationally. Emphasis should be placed on education, information, and enlightenment.

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*Harwood L. Childs, Ph.D., Princeton, N. J., is Professor of Politics at Princeton University where he has been giving graduate and undergraduate courses in public opinion and political parties for many years. He is the author of books and articles in the fields of propaganda, public opinion, public relations, and pressure groups. He was the founder of The Public Opinion Quarterly and for a number of years served as it Managing Editor. He has taught at Dartmouth, Syracuse, William and Mary, and Bucknell and has been Visiting Lecturer at New York University and the University of Southern California. During World War II, he served on the Washington staff of the United States Office of War Information from 1943 to 1945. During the academic year 1953–54 he lectured at the School of Public Administration in Rio de Janeiro, an institution sponsored by the Brazilian government and the Technical Assistance Program of the United Nations.*





IN many respects the effort to mold public opinion on such a subject as select manpower does not differ very much from efforts to mold public opinion on a great many other subjects. The basic steps are the same, with such variations in application as the skill and imagination of the would-be molder make possible.

In the first place it is essential to define clearly the objectives of the campaign. What particular goals in terms of an occupational redistribution of the population are desired? Into which particular occupations should a larger proportion of the working population be encouraged to go? Which occupations are already surfeited? How much of a redistribution is necessary to obtain the desired balance? How much time is to be allowed for the change? What particular consideration will be given to types of people, skills, amount of training necessary, and other factors affecting the quality as well as the quantity of transfers? And last, but not least, how much will the proposed changes cost, and where is the money to be obtained?

In other words, if this initial and crucial step is properly taken, the objective might turn out to be the persuading of 10 per cent more men and women to become doctors, teachers, and government officials during the next ten years and at the same time the discouraging of 10 per cent from going into advertising, the amusement industry, and law. The occupations mentioned are used for illustrative purposes, of course, but they show the need for being specific. Not only is it important to define the metes and bounds of "selectiveness" quantitatively, but also to indicate clearly the quality of the people needed or not needed, the sources from which they are to come, and the places they should leave. It will obviously take much longer to increase the supply of surgeons than stenographers, of qualified nuclear physicists than hotel bus boys. To say that the country needs 10 per cent more doctors and 10 per cent fewer advertising men does not mean that the problem is simply that of enticing a certain percentage of advertising men to become doctors. In the long run it probably means persuading fewer people to become advertisers and more to become doctors, without seriously affecting the desired balance elsewhere. In the short run it may simply mean recruiting people with the needed qualifications wherever they can be found, if they can be found, and, at the same time, finding suitable jobs for those in long supply.

It is necessary, therefore, to be as precise as possible in defining the goals of the select manpower campaign. The problem of creating a new occupational balance and establishing a new equilibrium is a difficult and complex one. Each change may produce reactions, many of them unforeseen, with widespread ramifications. Goals should be defined with care lest significant implications are overlooked. And only when they are so defined can the propagandist move with assurance to the next step.

## IDENTIFYING PUBLICS

Once the goals of the campaign are clearly defined, the next step is to identify the groups or publics to be influenced. To illustrate: one of the objectives may be to increase the number of doctors and decrease the supply of advertising men. This may involve a crash program to bring about as quick a redistribution as possible, and, at the same time, a long-range effort to keep the relative supplies of manpower in the two occupations at the new level. It will be rather useless to try and increase the supply of doctors quickly, either by appeals to the doctors themselves or the public generally. To increase the supply of doctors appreciably, it may be necessary to start at the high school

level, or at least at the early college level, where decisions to go into medicine are usually and finally made. What, then, are the principal target publics whose support is necessary? A few seem to be obvious at the outset: high school and college students qualified for medical training; the parents of such students who may have much to do with their children's decisions, particularly in a case of this kind where they may be called upon to bear a large share of the expense of medical training; the medical profession, especially those directly concerned with medical schools, since their views may affect decisively the willingness and the ability of medical schools to admit additional students; and public officials whose views and votes may affect the financial side of medical training.

In addition to these primary publics there are other groups, including opinion leaders in many fields, proprietors of mass media, and the general voting public whose influence may be extremely important in the long run. However, the prime targets in the case of medicine would seem to be potential medical students, their parents, school officials, and certain groups of public officials.

Each occupation will have its specialized publics. There will be much overlapping, of course. The job in each case is to identify as precisely as possible the specific publics most closely related to the decision-making of those who might be persuaded to enter, or to leave, the target occupation.

The case of those engaged in advertising may be used to illustrate another side of the problem. We have assumed for the sake of argument that advertising is in long supply and the ranks of advertising men should, in the interest of the country, be thinned. What are the relevant publics to be influenced? The advertising occupation does not require long periods of specialized training, although experience may be a factor in outstanding success. Decisions to enter the field do not have to be made early nor are qualifications clearly and precisely defined. Moreover, it is not enough merely to discourage people from going into advertising unless equally appealing alternatives are offered. And it is obvious that medicine will not offer that appeal for most advertising men because of the special qualifications and long, expensive training demanded. Basically, therefore, stress must be laid upon the lure of occupations in short supply. The targets in this case would be the advertising profession itself, since those engaged in advertising are probably not so highly specialized that they cannot be quickly absorbed in other occupations. Again, the indirect influence of parents, school teachers, and mass media is important, especially for the long run. In the short run, the major target is the advertising profession itself.

The identification of key publics will become clearer as the preparation of the campaign proceeds, particularly after the third and fourth steps when critical areas and critical factors in the process of opinion forming become evident. The specific goals determine the specific publics, and specific publics indicate the steps to be followed thereafter.

## NEED FOR SURVEYS

Once the objectives of the campaign are defined and the key publics identified, the next job is to ascertain the attitudes and opinions of these publics with reference to the objectives. The purpose of these surveys is to find out what members of the public really know about the need for the select manpower program; what their attitudes are regarding it; and, depending on the particular public, their attitudes toward occupations in long and short supply



their reasons for entering the occupations they are in, willingness to change, objections to change.

Special care should be given to the preparation of the survey so that as many significant correlations as possible can be made between states of opinion and other factors which seem to be important opinion determinants such as family background, educational attainments, special aptitudes, group affiliations, underlying motivations, reading and viewing habits, and many others. How elaborate and technically refined the survey should be will depend upon the degree of precision desired; the amount of data already available, the size and composition of the public. In some cases rather crude indices of opinion are available, such as statements of group leaders, group publications, records of conferences, and the like, which may give a more or less satisfactory idea of the attitudes and opinions of the group.

The fourth step in the process of molding public opinion involves the analysis of the opinion data collected by surveys and in other ways. The purpose of this analysis is to find out why people hold the opinions they do; why, in the present instance, they may be opposed to the select manpower idea; may be opposed to entering particular occupations, or leaving or avoiding others. This stage or step is perhaps the most important of all because disclosures at this point will determine to a great extent the most effective methods to use in trying to activate, reinforce, or change existing opinions and attitudes.

Again, for the sake of illustration, we may assume that one objective of the select manpower campaign is to persuade more qualified persons to go into medicine and fewer people to enter the field of advertising. A careful analysis of the survey data obtained from relevant publics might disclose, for example, that five factors accounted in large part for the failure of more qualified people to go into medicine: cost of medical training, rigor and length of training, lack of qualifying aptitudes, prevailing images of a doctor's life, lack of information regarding the material and nonmaterial rewards of the medical profession.

Similarly, the surveys might disclose that several considerations were primarily responsible for the occupational appeal of advertising: ideas regarding the salaries and income of people in advertising; prestige of "Madison Avenue" and the "man in the grey flannel suit"; ease of entering the field and opportunities for rapid advancement; views regarding the way of life of people in advertising; treatment of advertising and advertisers in the mass media.

The analysis might quickly show how much of the prevailing public opinions were fact and how much fiction. It would suggest the type of informational programs needed and where they were needed. It might reveal the principal sources of mistaken notions and how to change them. It might lay bare basic drives and desires, dominant attitudes and appeals. It might show the role being played by parents, schools, mass media, group associations, and others in building up these images and motivations.

Once the objectives have been clearly defined, the relevant publics identified and surveyed, and the factors largely responsible for producing the prevailing attitudes revealed, it is time to prepare an over-all campaign strategy to bring about the opinion changes desired. The campaign will have many dimensions: breadth, intensity, depth, and time. All elements and phases of it must be carefully co-ordinated. Duplication and waste of effort must be avoided. Targets will be clearly specified. Activities will

be scheduled to a time program which will be effective to the highest degree.

### BASIC CAMPAIGN STRATEGIES

For the sake of convenience, the propaganda and promotional campaign may be divided into four basic strategies. This differentiation, although to some extent artificial, underscores the four principal types of activity: organization, argument, persuasion, and publicity.

An organization should be created for the express purpose of carrying on the campaign. Such an organization gives continuity and cohesion to the enterprise. Through financial ties, meetings, and the elaboration of offices, it helps to cement the allegiance of members. It furnishes a two-way channel between the campaign leaders and the rank and file, a channel which enables the leaders to communicate more effectively with the members and the masses and brings the desires and opinions of the members to the leaders. The organization also serves to give concrete and symbolic expression to the ideas and objectives of the campaign. It brings the ideas to life, makes them widely visible, helps to institutionalize them.

The form of the organization deserves careful study. It often, but not necessarily, involves the following features. First, there is usually a top executive body of some kind with considerable discretionary, rule-making powers such as a board of directors. This board consists of opinion leaders from the country as a whole and from vocations in long and short supply who enthusiastically endorse the objectives of select manpower.

Secondly, the organization will elaborate a nationwide network with regional and vocational subdivisions, as well as many committees and offices. Such structural elements give opportunities for extensive participation and help to tie the individual and personal elements of the campaign as a whole together. It is not necessary for every person to be on a committee or serve as an officer. Possibly a ratio of one to eight is reasonably satisfactory. The importance of organization in molding and stabilizing opinion should never be underestimated.

Again, every effort should be made to give each member of the organization a sense of real participation and involvement. This can be achieved through dues payments and other financial contributions; through voting and referenda, attendance at meetings, and numerous service and activity assignments. Special recognition should be given to those who contribute most to the success of the organization. In molding opinion, it is often helpful to set up different classes of membership, concentric circles of members as it were. Those on the outer rim would be the new members, the least involved, the least active who may, by passing through the inner circles, progress toward the center of influence and authority. This ever-present challenge to increase activity and accomplishment is a powerful force cementing individual opinions into a cohesive whole.

The second basic strategy of the campaign is the strategy of argument. To carry out this strategy much attention should be given to the preparation of a convincing statement of the reasons—statistical, empirical, logical—for the program. Such a statement should be comprehensive, scholarly in the most up-to-date sense, full of prestige and authority. It should be written in such a manner that it would impress and convince a wide range of serious students of public affairs, including scholars, editors, reporters, commentators, legislators and other government officials, and group leaders—any who may be seriously trying to think and reason their



ıy through to the solution of public problems.

Since the case for select manpower appears to have so much supporting evidence behind it, the preparation of convincing documents should not be difficult. These documents may take the form of government reports based on research undertaken by the government; on findings by special commissions appointed by private or public authorities; on legislative hearings. The documents may take the form of treatises on the subject by noted economists, sociologists, philosophers, political scientists—any who are competent to deal with it in a rigorous, analytical, scholarly manner. These documents will not reach and sway the rank and file directly, but they will reach many opinion leaders, and, through them, wider circles of influence. One thinks at once of many, many books, reports, documents, and papers which have exerted a tremendous influence on contemporary thought and opinion. In this day of singing commercials, spot announcements, subliminal advertising, and garish bill boards, it is sometimes easy to forget the power of fact and reason in molding public opinion. Each cause, campaign, and movement needs its textual "bible"—its Hobbes, Locke, Marx, Henry George, Dewey, Freud, Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Veblen, its Niebuhr, Keynes, Galbraith, Tawney, or Lippmann.

### STRATEGY OF PERSUASION

The strategy of persuasion seeks to supplement and bolster reason with emotion, conviction with action, belief with will. In the case of select manpower, it means that an understanding of the problem, an acceptance of the argument for an occupational redistribution of the population is not sufficient. People must be willing to go beyond mere belief in a program to a willingness to do something about it. Here the propagandist may use to a degree the findings of psychological and motivational research and relate his program to some of the basic human emotions, drives, motives, desires, and attitudes. He will seek to draw attention to his program and specify courses of action needed by dramatizing the issues involved, by making them stand out in a vivid way, and by the use of repetition keep them constantly before the target publics.

The molder of opinion will seek to involve the relevant publics emotionally as well as intellectually in the program, relating it to such forces as the desire for success, for public approval, for self-realization, for tangible and intangible rewards, for a certain kind of "immortality." He may seek to arouse fear of the consequences of inaction and failure to do something about the problem of select manpower. He will seek to develop admiration and enthusiasm for the program; hope, pride, and confidence in ultimate success.

How far is one justified in arousing and exploiting human emotions to further a course of action? This is a difficult and complex question to answer. And it does not help too much to differentiate between the so-called base emotions and those of a higher order. When, if ever, does the end justify the means? In peace time many people deplore the lack of motivation on the part of some young people, their inability to make the most of their opportunities, their refusal to try to learn, their distaste for self-development and purposeful living. In later years one may try to motivate people to give to community funds, perform some public service, to support some so-called worthy cause. At other times we encourage the play upon the fears of cancer, alcoholism, or financial loss. In wartime efforts may be made to arouse hate for the enemy, unques-

tioning obedience to authority, love of country, and even the desire to kill.

Human emotions are still surrounded by a great deal of mystery. They serve in many instances to protect the individual from harm; they provide a feeling of joy, contentment, apprehension, pity. They support action. The propagandist, promoter, educator, and press agent are sometimes criticised for their excessive use of emotional appeals. But when do emotional appeals become excessive? Perhaps when they serve as a substitute for, or an obstruction to, rational appeals. Possibly the more rational the appeals, the more justification there is for emotional support. Certainly, society is concerned that public discussion shall lead to more rather than less rational actions and decisions. There is very little, if any, justification for emotionally made decisions, but most actions are emotionally motivated. It is important, therefore, that emotions be harnessed end exploited to promote the more rather than the less intelligent decisions.

## ART OF PUBLICITY

Finally, there is the basic strategy of publicity, the most effective use of all relevant media of communication for reaching the significant publics with the message of reason and persuasion. One thinks at once of the mass media, but there are many specialized and selective media which are equally important. If the surveys mentioned earlier were properly prepared and conducted, much information would be available regarding the reading, viewing, listening, and communicating habits of publics. These findings would suggest the channels of communication which can be most effectively used.

There are many handbooks, textbooks, and guidebooks on publicity. The amount of "how to do it" literature is extensive. Only a few of the so-called "principles" will be mentioned here. The principles often do not state the conditions and circumstances of their application. This omission means that the strategy of publicity is more an art than a science. Nevertheless, a few illustrations may be suggestive:

- The media used should be those best adapted to the message and the target public.
- The use of all media should be properly co-ordinated and timed.
- Whenever possible messages should be related to the attitudes and desires of the target public.
- Special efforts should be made to dramatize the message and have it stand out.
- Whenever possible, use should be made of existing leaders and group channels of communication.
- Many aids to speedy communication such as slogans, clichés, and symbols can be used without distorting the message.
- Repetition and variety of presentation may be combined to gain attention, arouse and enhance interest.
- Use action as well as word and picture symbols.
- Stress the public interest significance of the message.
- Relate the message to current events of high attention value.

Is it in the public interest for an organization seeking to promote the cause of select manpower to use the strategies outlined—organization, argument, persuasion, and publicity—especially the last two? We live in a world of competing propagandas. We believe that if the public is to reach wise conclusions on matters of public policy, they must hear as many sides of a question as possible. Our constitutional system places a high premium on freedom of speech, press, and opinion because such freedoms foster public enlightenment and wiser public policies. But this holds true only under certain conditions; only when the competing propagandists seek to inform rather than deceive, enlighten rather than befuddle. Many if not most propagandists believe their causes are in the public interest, but this belief does not make it so. It is up to every propagandist to try and win support for his cause, but only through the methods of enlightenment. The public interest will definitely be served if those who believe in a select manpower program use to the full the propaganda resources available in the service of public enlightenment and refuse to participate in the competition for public opinion on any other basis.

# Society's Stake—and Responsibility for Allocating Manpower

By John J. Corson

Abstract: The institution by which the United States society places men and women of various competences in jobs will have to be greatly increased in efficiency if the society is adequately to utilize rich manpower resources. In an expanding and technological economy, rich in manpower resources, productivity depends in considerable part on the efficiency of placement institutions. Our philosophical concern with the freedom of individual job choice and our acceptance of the laissez-faire assumption that all workers are adequately informed to make that choice in their best interest adds to the importance of these institutions. Many workers find jobs "on their own" or through parents or relatives. These means provide little information as to alternative opportunities or the capabilities of the individual for the particular job. Seven other institutions distribute workers among jobs. The need is for the appraisal of the utility of each and the gradual stimulation of more effective placement institutions. This need is of prime importance in a technological society demanding a wide range of competences and in one marked by persistent employment.

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*John J. Corson, Ph.D., Washington, D. C. is a Director of the firm of management consultants, McKinsey & Company, Inc. Before joining this firm, he served as an executive for The Washington Post and for approximately ten years as an executive within the federal government. He is the author of previous articles in* The Annals *and in such other publications as The New York Times Magazine, The Atlantic Monthly. He has written four books—This Government (1938); Manpower for Victory (1943); Executives for the Federal Service (1952); and (with John W. McConnell), Economic Needs of Older People (1953). In recent years he has served on or assisted four Presidential committees: The President's Committee on Education Beyond the High School (1956–57); the "Gaither Committee" (1957); the Committee on World Economic Practices (1958); and the President's Committee to Study Military Assistance (1959).*





How efficient, both in terms of the society's and the individual's interest, are those institutions that help place individuals in jobs? In other words: as a people, do we have institutions equipped to aid each individual find a job in which he will best contribute to the national product and find the personal reward and gratification every human being seeks?

During recent years two forces have persistently emphasized the basic importance of these questions.[1] The persistence of the cold war and a continuing high level of prosperty (despite the recession of 1958) have maintained relatively full employment. The number of job seekers, including four million unemployed and those graduating from our high schools, colleges, and universities, and job movers, has been relatively small in relation to the number of jobs to be filled. But have those looking for jobs been assisted to find from among all available jobs those for which they were best suited?

The second force that has increasingly emphasized the importance of these questions is the "scientific revolution." The rapid technological advance in our civilization has greatly intensified the demand for scientists, engineers, and many kinds of supporting technicians. Simultaneously our ability as a society to produce only a limited number of individuals with the talents and training required has brought about a scarcity which has placed a high price on the heads of individuals with these skills. Illustrative of our response to this force is the recommendation of a special committee created to advise the President. It said: ". . . the nation which holds the lead in [science and engineering] holds the initiative in world affairs. . . . It is therefore appropriate that the nation concern itself particularly with the development of men and women in engineering and science."[2]

Faced by a persistent shortage of scientists, engineers, and technicians and, as well, of others, machinists, for example the American people are tempted to solve this segment of the manpower problem by establishing devices—for example, generous scholarships—that would channel outstanding high school and college students into scientific and technical careers. To do so would be to limit one of this nation's basic freedoms—freedom of occupational choice.

Hence, it becomes steadily more important that the American people evaluate the importance of the "placement function" in the industrialized, urban, technological society of the 1960's. It is essential that Americans give thought to the role and efficiency of the institutions that perform the increasingly essential function of placing individuals where they can function best in the interest of the society and for their personal satisfaction. It is essential that leaders of public thought and students raise questions regarding the adequacy of these institutions and suggest how they may be made more effective.

## Freedom of Choice

As a people we are concerned with utilizing this country's total supply of manpower in such a way as to produce the maximum gross national product—refrigerators, toys, dacron suits, radios, radar, and missiles—that will best serve society's ends. Our problem is to maximize the size of the gross national product and simultaneously to fulfill the hopes and desires of the individuals

[1] These questions were earlier posed in an article by the author entitled: "The Placement Function in an Industrial Society: The Unexplored Core of the Manpower Problem," *Improving the Work Skills of the Nation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), pp. 169–78.

[2] Final Report to the President, The President's Committee on Scientists and Engineers, December 1958.

whose future success and happiness depend upon finding that job in which their particular talents will be utilized fully and effectively.

In meeting these national and individual needs, we rely upon and treasure the freedom of the worker to choose his own vocation and his own job. But in insisting upon the individual's freedom of job choice we assume that workers are aware of the availability of alternative jobs; they can get specific information on conditions of employment; and they are free to examine and consider alternatives before making their choices. Are these assumptions valid?

If cold appraisal of these assumptions suggests that they are not firmly founded in fact,[3] we will still reject the alternative of formal planning or programing how human beings shall be distributed throughout the labor market. But can we as a people, in the light of the present and prospective importance of manpower to our society, leave to chance the social effectiveness of the institutions that are expected to inform individuals of the availability of jobs and conditions of employment?

The task that these institutions perform is a large one. In 1955 the United State Bureau of the Census estimated that of 75 million persons 14 years of age and over who worked at some time during that year, 11.5 million changed their jobs.[4] These 11.5 million job changes—and their successors in each subsequent year—include three distinguishable categories. There are those young people entering the labor market for the first time; men and women unemployed because of technological developments in an industry or because of revised production schedules in a plant; and individuals voluntarily changing jobs from one employer to another, or within the same enterprise.

[3] Abraham Bluestone, "Job Finding and the Theory of Job Choice," *Monthly Labor Review* (October 1955), pp. 1139–44.

[4] *Current Population Reports*, Labor Force, Series P-50, No. 70, February 1957.

### INFORMATION FOR DECISION

The central question—of vital importance to the individual and of increasing importance to a society dependent upon its manpower—is: Are there facilities available to help these individuals find jobs where their talents will be utilized to the fullest and, as a consequence, where their skills will be developed to the fullest?

Consider, for example, several individuals: one, a young man leaving high school; two, the college graduate; and three, the man or woman, 10 to 15 years out of school or college who, dissatisfied and unsuccessful, desires to make a change. Where does each obtain the information he needs to make a job choice in his best interest?

### THE HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE

In the school year 1957–58, local United States Employment Service (USES) offices provided counseling, testing, and placement services to more than one-third of the country's 23 thousand high schools.[5] These services were aimed at only those seniors who planned to go to work immediately after graduation and who had made no vocational choice.

The General Aptitude Test Battery[6] was administered to 93 per cent of the more than 230,000 students counseled. Permanent placements resulting from these services numbered more than 50 thousand.

Impressive as this may be, two-thirds of the nation's high schools received little or no help in placing their graduates. These high schools included many of the hard-to-reach rural areas where counseling is especially needed because of the students' lack of acquaintance with occupations away from their immediate geographical location for which they might show talent, and because of the growing trend to attract people away from overproducing agricultural areas.[7]

[5] Employment Service Program, Letter No. 980, May 6, 1959, Bureau of Employment Security, United States Department of Labor.

[6] "Follow-up studies that have been conducted on the usefulness of the GATB have indicated that counselees who followed the counselor's recommendations made with the use of the GATB were more successful and satisfied in their work than those who entered other types of work."—"The General Aptitude Test Battery," Beatrice J. Dvorak, Chief, Testing Branch, B. E. S., U. S. Department of Labor.

### THE COLLEGE GRADUATE

For the college man or woman, we can assume that college officials will aid the male graduate in deciding whether his ultimate vocational interests will be better served by (a) discharging his military liability immediately or by seeking deferment, (b) by taking liberal arts or vocational-professional courses. But can these school or college officials supply him with realistic assumptions as to labor market supply and demand in a period five to ten years hence? And can they supply him with a realistic appraisal of his own aptitudes and potentialities for alternative occupations?

A study[8] of more than 70,000 women college graduates in 1957 showed that 43 per cent obtained their first job after graduation by direct application on their own. School placement bureaus and public and private employment services accounted for only 29 per cent of the placements; families or friends for 17 per cent; and other—including advertisements and professors—11 per cent.

[7] A joint effort is being made here by the Departments of Labor and Agriculture, through USES and Agriculture Extension Service.

[8] "First Jobs of College Women: Report on Women Graduates, Class of 1957," United States Department of Labor, Women's Bulletin No. 268, 1959.

### THE JOB CHANGER

Consider, also, the situation of the older man or woman. He or she is convinced of the necessity of making a change or may have lost his or her job because of technological change or a company's curtailed production. How does each resolve such questions as: Is there enough hope for ultimate recall to the present job to warrant waiting for re-employment? If not, what occupational opportunities exist in the community which will utilize the skills already acquired? Would it be wiser, and can the worker afford, to undertake training for a new field? If so, for which field is the individual especially qualified by aptitude and personal skills? Are there better opportunities for work in the same related field in other areas of the country or in other industries than the one with which the individual has previously been associated?

A summary published in 1955 of the findings of eight major studies of this and related questions indicated, as one might expect, that workers changed jobs to get better wages or to find a job with more attractive physical characteristics.[9] The reader of this summary is left with a wonder as to whether the long-run interest of the individual was served if he achieved either of these gains.

On the other hand, the same article indicated that workers remain in their jobs because they feel the risk of remaining unemployed for a considerable length of time. They stay too, because they want to maintain established routines in their daily lives; because they prefer employment which permits them

[9] Abraham Bluestone, "Major Studies of Workers' Reasons for Job Choice," *Monthly Labor Review* (March 1955), pp. 301 ff.

to be close to their friends and family; because they enjoy the prestige associated with being an "old timer"; and because they do not want to give up the advantages of the seniority provisions which go with prolonged employment. And each of these factors may induce them to stay in the job for which they were never qualified.

Immediately, however, the question arises: Do these workers have the information for making decisions as to change? Do they have anywhere to turn for reliable information as to the labor market and as to their own capabilities in relation to alternative job opportunities? Are they free to make the choices that would serve their best interests and the best interests of the society? Or does sheer chance and eagerness exercise undue influence over these workers' job moves?

## THE CHANCE IN JOB CHOICE

For twenty years I have harbored the naive belief that most individuals find their way into the occupations or professions at which they spend their lives through, if not sheer chance, at least for illogical reasons. There is no scientific evidence to suggest that the occupation in which the father succeeded (or did not succeed) is the logical occupational choice for the son. Nor is there any scientific evidence to suggest that the course in which a student did well in his senior year in high school or college predicts with unerring accuracy for his teacher the occupation that he should advise the student to enter. And there is less scientific evidence to suggest that the father's friends may be employed in the particular occupations in which the son's talents will be most usefully employed.

Yet such studies as there are reveal that these are the bases that guide many s into jobs. One study revealed that nearly half of molders and coremakers chose their trade because of the influence of family or friends.[10] The bulk of the electronics technicians found their jobs by applying at a plant employment office, by learning about openings from someone working in a plant, or through a newspaper "Help Wanted" advertisement. A third study showed that the bulk of individuals who became tool and die makers did so because they believed themselves to be "mechanically inclined," because their families or friends influenced them. Typically, one tool and die maker commented "this trade has always been in my family so I took it up too." More than a quarter of the tool and die makers interviewed could give no definite reason as to how they happened to enter their trade. A fourth study of the experience of electronic technicians showed that more than a third sought a job in this field because of an interest in radio as a hobby; 14 per cent were assigned to and trained in this field while in the Armed Forces, and 9 per cent were directed toward electronics by the influence of families or friends.[11]
Finally, a fifth study of 3,000 apprentices indicated that 23 per cent had chosen the same trade as their fathers and an additional 29 per cent reported that their fathers were in one of the other skilled trades.[12]

These studies suggest that the job choices of these workers were made with limited knowledge of alternative job opportunities, of the future prospects of the trade, or of the individual's aptitude for the work.

[10] *The Mobility of Molders and Core Makers,* 1940–1952, Bulletin No. 1162, United States Department of Labor, June 1954.

[11] *The Mobility of Electronic Technicians,* 1940–1952, Bulletin No. 1150, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1954, pp. 43–45.

[12] *Career Patterns of Former Apprentices,* United States Department of Labor, Bulletin T-147, March 1959.



My naive and unscientific observations suggest that the same lack of logic holds true for perhaps a smaller proportion but for still many individuals at the professional level. The more extensive period of training enables the individual to test his own capabilities for the profession and to learn something about the job opportunities and trends in the field. Yet many have commenced the study of law because their fathers are lawyers, and once started have persisted because they had no ready alternative. Others have studied law because college classmates were headed in that direction. One man of my acquaintance became an actuary because his college roommate studied actuarial sciences. A third man started out as a messenger in a chemical department of a large corporation and studied at night to become a chemist; the department was moved out of town, and he was offered a job as a messenger in the company's legal department. He switched to the study of law and became a lawyer—a successful one. Even more often at a stage in life when children have come and expenses press hard on a too slowly rising income, occupational choices are forced with little knowledge of what other alternatives are available at the time and place.

If these unscientific observations are valid (and they are ventured in the absence of needed analyses) happenstance generally obtains in the choice of positions and professions. Does this not suggest that a substantial waste is involved in the way most workers "connect" with jobs? Is it not likely there is a substantial wastage in terms of both potential productivity lost and personal frustrations for the individual who is misplaced?

## DEVELOPMENT AND PLACEMENT

The United States exhibits many needs for more manpower in particular skills than is immediately available, but the evidence available is that we possess, even as we possess rich natural resources, even richer human resources. That is, we have a population that possesses a high level of capabilities. After a century of public education those individuals are, relative to many other countries of the world, "well developed"; there is little illiteracy; a large proportion have had some high school training; a large majority have acquired some significant work skills; and a substantial minority possesses a variety of highly developed scientific, technical, and other skills.

Contrast the level of manpower development in the United States with the manpower of one of the less-developed countries this country is aiding, Iran. There, more than 90 per cent of the population is illiterate. A small minority possesses even the rudest skills; the majority of the population living on the land eke out a living by the crudest of agricultural processes, and the women have never had the opportunity to develop even simple skills of homemaking and child care. In Iran, as in Pakistan, Burma, Ghana, and other less-developed countries, skilled manpower is a more essential requisite of development than is the capital we provide through foreign aid. This was dramatically illustrated in Teheran two years ago when the most modern pasteurization plant in the Middle East, built through the largess of the United Nations, was opened. On the day it commenced operations with a staff of Iranian employees who had had only brief training in the tasks they were to perform, a boiler burst. The accident was traced to the inability of one humble and much chagrined worker to read the gauge that stood prominently on the front of the boiler. Another and equally dramatic illustration is afforded by our provision of military "hardware" to Iran and

other countries. Imagine, if you will, what the uneducated and untrained young man from Korea, Pakistan, Vietnam, or even Turkey must learn before he can handle even the simpler modern military equipment!

Reading and writing are important skills there for the simplest development of that country's agriculture and industry. And, hence, Iran is rapidly pressing for the extension of its school system and for the training of those conscripted into the army each year. But in addition, it is training workers in an expanding vocational school system for the jobs being created in new textile, cement, canning, chemical, and other factories and for nontechnical jobs in hospitals. Institutions for channeling the individuals produced in these schools, vocational schools, the armed forces and expanding universities to the jobs where they are needed are little developed. But as yet the number of jobs in which they can be employed is small as is the number being trained, and, hence, a well-developed placement system is not as sorely lacking as here, where we operate on narrower margins.

## USING THE HUMAN RESOURCES WE HAVE

As Dael Wolfle put it in 1954[13] ". . . it would appear to be good business for the nation to use its brains well, just as it is good business to use well its forests, its waterpower, and its minerals. It is more than good business; it is a great national concern." Yet he points out, as a single indication of the manner in which we use our manpower, that of approximately 152 thousand who reach age 18 each year and who have superior intellectual ability, a third of the boys and more than half of the girls do not go on beyond high school.

His observation applies to the particularly talented young people, but the principle applies to our total manpower. The proportion of the oncoming generation that continues their education beyond high school is steadily increasing, but is yet probably not more than a third. Not every individual who graduates from high school is capable of benefiting from a college education; but as the President's Committee on Education Beyond the High School pointed out, each individual must, in the interest of our society, have his talents developed to the fullest.[14] If a quarter of a century ago a high school education was the requisite for intelligent citizenship in our society, then assuredly a quarter of a century later in the infinitely more complex, technological, international civilization of the 1960's, something more than a high school education is not only required for intelligent citizenship but for effective performance in commerce and industry.

As a people we have effectively accepted the obligation of developing each individual's talents to the fullest. Is it time that we accepted similarly a fuller responsibility for aiding each individual in making a vital occupational choice?

What information or price does the individual worker need? First, he needs reliable information about the market, both national and local, for the skills he has to sell. He should know what openings there are for one with his skills, experience, and interests. He should also know the relative advantages of remaining in his area of residence or seeking employment in another community. Increasingly in recent years, the Bureau of Employment Security in the United States Department of Labor and the affiliated state employment services have improved their processes for assembling and disseminating such information. To a greater degree, the information is now available and ordered.

Second, he should know enough about labor market trends to know whether he is choosing the job in a declining industry or in an establishment with an unstable employment record. He may make a different choice if he can know the prospective demand and supply for workers in each of the fields and for several employers with whom his skills are marketable. Within five years, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has substantially improved and expanded the data it has as to the demand and supply for workers in each of an increasing number of industries. There is much still to be learned, but data is steadily being accumulated.

Third, he needs assistance in relating himself to the job openings available. This involves assessment not only of the worker's basic experience, skills, and personal characteristics, but must include an intelligent appraisal of aptitudes in related work potentialities.

## DOORS TO JOBS

All too little is known as to how individuals find their ways into jobs. But it is known that seven institutions now assist many individuals in making the transition from either unemployment to employment or from one employment to another. Are these existing placement institutions equipped to render the three forms of assistance that have been specified?

### *The school or university*

As the number of individuals enrolled in high schools and colleges and universities steadily expands, the placement activities conducted by public school systems, colleges and universities constitute an increasingly important social institution. Is this institution equal to the responsibility it assumes?

Does the school or university placement officer have meaningful information concerning the national or even the local labor market? Is this placement officer supplied with available information as to the prospective future supply and demand for various types of labor? And does this placement officer have available reliable data as to the individual student's aptitudes and abilities? The individual making his first choice in the labor market has a vital stake in the placement officer's possession of these several types of information and his ability to relate them to the individual's immediate choice.

The urgent need for establishing in our schools additional skills in vocational guidance has been underlined in recent years by three significant developments. The first was the vigorous recommendation by the President's Committee on Education Beyond the High School that additional emphasis should be placed, and more skilled workers put to work, at giving competent vocational counsel to individuals in our secondary schools.[15] The second was the enactment in the National Defense Education Act of provision for the improvement of vocational guidance in our schools. Title 5, Part A, of this act authorizes funds for state educational agencies to establish better guidance programs. Part B authorizes funds for the establishment of tiny institutes to improve the qualifications of people who are or will be engaged in counseling and guidance work in the secondary school. The third was the vigorous recommendation by Dr. James Conant, in his epoch-making study of the high school, that

[13] Dael Wolfle, *America's Resources, A Specialized Talent* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), p. 1.

[14] *Second Report to the President,* The President's Committee on Education Beyond the High School, July 1957, p. ix.

[15] *Ibid.,* pp. 40–42.

vocational counseling services be available for students in all or most of our high schools at earlier ages.

These three developments should help, in time, to relieve an existing and serious shortage of professionally trained school counselors. Our high schools have less than half of the counselors they need. Only two-thirds of those available meet certification requirements. And a majority of our high schools are so small that they can ill afford to employ competent counselors on their staffs.

In the colleges and universities there is similarly a discouraging lack of professionally trained and competent counselors. The choice of a "major" is all too often a vocational choice made with little regard for the basic aptitudes of the individual. It is influenced by a teacher learned in the particular boy or girl's basic capabilities.

Hence there is little assurance, either in the high school or in the college or university, that the student who has been educated will be aided to make an occupational choice to his greatest advantage. If he makes an unfortunate choice, his employment record may be marred and, more important, his self-confidence impaired. Should not the American society expect its schools and colleges to develop greater capabilities for distributing the manpower that they develop throughout the complex industrial society?

### *The industrial personnel office*

The recruiter for a private company is, naturally enough, primarily concerned that his company shall get the "best buy" for its dollar. He is not directly concerned with such questions as: Does this young man know of alternative jobs against which he can compare my offer? Is the job offered the one for which the individual is best fitted? Will this job utilize the individual's highest capacities? Inevitably the recruiter resolves such questions in the interest of the company rather than of the individual.

For those individuals who are employed by a company and who wish to change jobs within the company, the industrial personnel office can and should be helpful. There is a mutuality of interest. The personnel office knows more about the individual and more about available opportunities. It has an important stake in placing the individual where he will do best.

### *The trade union and professional society*

The trade union plays an important placement role. Its activities influence the future supply of a given trade or craft as well as the distribution of workers among jobs. Is this influence exercised in terms of the nation's best interests? Or is the supply kept artificially and undesirably limited in order to give support to high wage levels?

In the selection of apprentices, what effort is made to assess the individual's aptitudes for the tasks to which he will devote his life? Do restrictive practices as to age, race, and other nonperformance factors deny some individuals the opportunity to make the choice of jobs that would be best for them?

"Every professional society," Kenneth Boulding told the National Manpower Council in 1954, "is a conspiracy against the public."[16] Is Professor Boulding's critical comment justified? Or do professional societies encourage the entrance of new people into their fields in the numbers warranted by the national interest?

There are those who contend that current shortages of doctors and engineers may be traced in part to the restrictive activities of the professional societies. Are these contentions valid? Are such activities in the interest of our society? Do they prevent the entry into these fields of individuals whose future prospects would be enhanced if these fields were open to them?

Secretary of Labor Mitchell has pointed out that what appears in our country to be "solely a shortage of scientists is in reality a shortage of scientists and a shortage of skilled workers and technicians needed to back up the scientists."[17]

Professional societies have long been aware of the shortages of skilled technicians. Do professional societies, by their concentration on the maintenance of high entrance standards in their limited fields, discourage the development of needed technicians at less than professional levels? Are they able and willing to aid in meeting this social need and thus contribute to the development of individuals in fields associated with their professions?

### *The newspaper classified ad*

Classified newspaper advertising has long played an important part in placing certain classes of workers in jobs. Its prominence, especially in the large urban centers, highlights the significance of the placement function in our society.

How much help will the typical classified ad give the individual in appraising his suitability for the work or the suitability of the job in terms of his long-range vocational objectives? May it not be that the poorer the long-run prospects of the job, the more misleading will information in the ad be?

### *The private employment agency*

Like the professional society, the private employment agency tends to operate in narrow occupational or industrial fields. Few agencies can aid the individual in appraising alternative opportunities in the labor market as a whole because they are concerned with special segments of the labor force: for example, teachers, nurses, accountants, clerical workers, and the service occupations. Within these occupational areas, the private agency is often an effective instrument for informing workers as to job opportunities. In some instances, it is skilled in appraising the individual's talents and aptitudes in relation to available jobs. Its very identification with the special field, however, makes many private agencies blind to trends and to future demand and supply prospects about which the workers should be informed.

Finally, one may ask: Do qualified workers fail to utilize the private agency because they feel they cannot afford a relatively heavy levy against their first year's earnings? Do others, able to afford the cost, feel as a matter of principle that American workers should not be required to "pay" for a job?

Excellent work, it must be admitted, has been done in a number of occupational fields through the efforts and accomplishments of recognized private agencies, but at the other extreme are some horrible examples of exploitation and unethical practice. In more than half our states, regulatory bodies have been established to license and inspect the work of private employment agencies.

[16] Kenneth Boulding, "An Economist's View of the Manpower Concept" in National Manpower Council, *Proceedings of a Conference on the Utilization of Scientific and Professional Manpower* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), pp. 11–25.

[17] Speech to the Research Council for Economic Security, Chicago, March 22, 1955.

*The public employment office*

Finally, how well does our federal-state system of public employment offices serve in "feeding manpower in" to the national economy?

It is the most comprehensive institution for bringing workers and employers together. Its association with unemployment insurance ensures that it has access to most of the available workers in the community. Because it operates in all occupational fields, it has the widest range of job openings available in the community. Through the several state systems, each local office is in contact with employment opportunities in other communities that cannot be filled through local sources. It provides a vast and well-ordered supply of information about the labor market and supply and demand prospects for each occupation. Many local offices can offer the job seeker counseling and testing facilities to aid him in appraising his own capabilities.

Yet, the public employment service despite substantial growth and progress has marked limitations.[18] A big "selling" job must be done if many important employers are to use these public employment offices. Another big selling job has to be done to establish the public employment system as an avenue to jobs for skilled, supervisory, professional, and scientific workers. After twenty years' development, the public employment system has not yet been made the effective national placement institution that is needed by society and the individual.

## WHAT MORE IS NEEDED?

The cursory evaluation of each of these seven institutions reveals all too clearly that no one is primarily concerned with providing the three kinds of information that will enable the individual to choose that occupational future that will be to his own and society's greatest advantage. To say that there must be active, effective, institutional arrangements for getting to each worker basic facts about the world of work and about himself each time he is about to make a decision affecting his vocational future, is not to challenge his choice or to substitute authoritarian for democratic arrangements. It is simply to underline the large importance of improving the facilities by which we aid employers and individuals distribute available workers throughout our industrial complex in relation to the individual's own interests and capabilities, and society's needs.

How shall this be done? Little attention has been given to the placement function in our society, its importance, and the institutions that perform this function. This is becoming an ever more apparent lack that we can ill afford. There is no need for a public "manpower agency" that will "draft" labor or "direct" men and women to where they are needed. Indeed the present emphasis on science may be already seducing many to enter a field for which they are ill-adapted and in which they will live a life of frustration. The need is for centralized leadership in the federal government, probably in the United States Department of Labor, continually to assess the placement activities of the variety of institutions that now perform this function, to co-ordinate the activities of numerous agencies within the federal government—the Office of Education, the National Science Foundation, and the Department itself—in gradually perfecting existing institutions and particularly in pointing to the need for improved placement arrangements.

The efforts of such a centralized agency might establish more definitely just what should be expected from each placement institution, the kinds of improvement needed in each, and the most effective means by which this society can weld these several placement agencies into an effective, co-ordinated effort to see that each man and woman serve where he can serve best. In short, it is high time that there be a thoroughgoing analysis of how we can improve the effectiveness of the "doors through which workers enter jobs."[19] This step in an era of full employment will constitute a major contribution not only to the freedom of the individual in an industrialized society, but to the productivity that will assure economic progress and national security.

[18] "The Employment Service in an Expanding Economy, 1953–58," *Employment Security Review* (October 1958).

[19] One of, if not the, earliest explorations of this aspect of the manpower problem was described in a book by an analogous title, *Doors to Jobs* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1942).

# Manpower Development and Utilization: A Governmental or a Private Responsibility?

By Henry David

Abstract: In a free and democratic society, responsibilities for the development and utilization of manpower resources are located in fact and by necessity in both private and public hands. Governmental policies and actions today constitute the most powerful single instrumentality for shaping the manpower resources of the United States. The quantitative and qualitative characteristics of these resources are determined by complex processes of interaction which reflect the total life of the society. The variables which are part of these dynamic processes are interdependent, unstable, and inconstant in their weight and influence. Manpower problems are complex human problems to which there are no quick and easy solutions. Whether the responsibilities for manpower development and utilization should be, as a general rule, a function of either private or public agencies is not a meaningful question. Greater congruence in the making of manpower policies can be achieved by governmental units and private individuals and organizations through rough agreement on a few central objectives. The values of a free and democratic society establish an obligation to discover and create the conditions under which the potentialities of all men may be realized.

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*Henry David, Ph.D., New York City, is Executive Director of the National Manpower Council, located at Columbia University, and Dean of the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social Research. He has been a member of the faculties of the Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, Queens College and City College. He has been a consultant to the RAND Corporation and to governmental and private organizations. During World War II, he was Director of Research for the North American office of the British Broadcasting Corporation. His major publications are in the fields of American labor history and manpower, and he is editor of the eight volume series, "The Economic History of the United States."*





JUST where the responsibility falls in a free society for the making and carrying out of manpower policies is a problem for inquiry. Where it *should* fall is a matter for debate.

If he is at all reflective, the investigator of the problem will be troubled by the questionable nature of some of the assumptions he is compelled to make, by the inadequacies of the data available to him, by the elusiveness of the processes he is studying, and by the complexity of the issue with which he is engaged. None of these sources of uncertainty will trouble the advocate when he debates where the responsibility should be located, for he seeks to write the rules under which manpower policies are to be made and to define their substance.

If one asks whether private individuals and organizations in fact influence the development and utilization of the nation's manpower resources, the answer, of course, is "yes."

## Areas of Private Responsibility

The family which invests in the education of its children; the father who persuades—perhaps even coerces—his son to follow in his footsteps and become a doctor; the wealthy individual who endows a chair in nuclear physics; the youth who leaves high school in his third year to take a well paying job as a semiskilled worker; the young wife who works in order to help her husband pursue a graduate degree; the labor organization which sets the conditions for apprenticeship, negotiates a contract with provisions governing promotions and access to training opportunities, or adopts policies designed to protect the health and safety of its members; the employer who requires graduation from high school as a qualification for employment, does not hire Negroes, restricts his recruitment of personnel to workers under forty-five, or ventures to utilize women in jobs to which men are traditionally assigned; the corporation which annually spends millions of dollars on the education and training of its work force, engages in productivity studies, or encourages its executive personnel to take a tour of duty in a governmental post; the professional association which establishes standards of education, training, and competence, or controls entrance into an occupation; the advertising council which, as a "public service," conducts a campaign to recruit young women into the nursing field; the community organization which seeks to improve guidance and counseling information and facilities; the foundation which finances fellowships, supports research programs, or underwrites experiments in educational methods—all of these private individuals or organizations are makers of manpower policies.

They may not be aware that they function in this capacity. They may not intend that their decisions or activities, which are directed to serve other ends, should influence the development or utilization of the nation's manpower resources. They may, on the other hand, be acutely sensitive to the manpower implications of their behavior, or act quite purposefully to effect intended manpower results. Whatever the circumstance, the right and the power of private individuals and organizations to shape the manpower resources of the society is not only recognized and accepted, but also, within certain limits, protected. They possess, in short, a large measure of responsibility as makers of manpower policies.

## Areas of Public Responsibility

If it is asked whether governmental agencies and actions significantly affect manpower development and utilization,

the answer, obviously, is once more in the affirmative. Federal, state, and local governments are all makers of manpower policies. There are more than 100,000 units of government in the United States, and almost each one exerts some influence upon manpower development or utilization, or both. In one fashion or another, the vastly greater number of separate governmental departments, bureaus, and agencies also make or carry out manpower policies. State employment services, local school districts, municipal departments of health, such federal agencies as the National Science Foundation, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the United States Civil Service Commission, state and municipal fair employment practices commissions, departments of the federal government, one of which, Defense, is the largest single employer of manpower in the nation, each of the armed services—all these represent a modest sampling of the total number of governmental organizations that play some role in fashioning the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the nation's manpower resources.

The governmental units are numerous and the public policies which have a bearing upon manpower development and utilization are fragmented, as well as diverse, and many policies designed to fulfill quite different purposes have unintended manpower results. Moreover, the full significance for manpower demand and supply relationships of direct public employment—which now accounts for one-seventh of total employment in the United States—and of employment for which governments are indirectly responsible is not readily perceived. Consequently, how much responsibility the society assigns to government for manpower development and utilization may not be immediately visible. Yet, the responsibility is extensive and decisive enough to prompt the relatively safe judgment that government today constitutes the society's most potent single instrumentality for determining the character of its manpower resources. This assertion may merely confirm the worst fears of those who are dismayed by "big government," whether defined in terms of function, power, or number of public employees. It is, however, an essential reference point for assessing the relationship between systems of private and public responsibility.

## RANGE OF PUBLIC POLICIES

Not only are the federal, state, and local governments large-scale, direct employers of manpower, but through their public policies, functions, and services they also profoundly affect the development and use of the nation's manpower resources in many other ways. Education, the foundation upon which manpower development rests, is overwhelmingly a public enterprise. Governmental health programs and services and medical and biological research activities have wide-ranging and even critical implications for manpower. Military manpower policies directly touch the lives of a significant proportion of the nation's younger men and have an important bearing upon their educational and work experiences and their occupational skills and employment opportunities. For years, the armed forces have represented the country's largest single undertaking in training and education.

Governmental policies affecting science and technology in general and the research and development programs of the federal government which are tied to defense purposes in particular, have been critical factors in the development and utilization of scientific, engineering, and other professional personnel. Immigration policy represents the nation's first expression of direct manpower policy. Foreign trade policies have declared manpower aspects and obvious manpower consequences. The list of other public policies and actions which are of moment to the manpower resources of the United States is too long to complete here. It will suffice to note that governmental policies which set employment standards; regulate employment practices; provide guidance and placement services for workers; and affect economic stability, change, and growth all have important manpower consequences.



## MANPOWER RESOURCES AND THE SOCIETY

That a free society places responsibilities for making manpower policies in both private and public hands is, of course, a commonplace, but one that calls for affirmation and understanding. These responsibilities could not in fact be either wholly private or public in nature in any modern society, whether free or authoritarian. The reason for this is that manpower development and utilization are, in the final analysis, functions of a society's mode of life. The proportion of its total population in the labor force, the sex and age characteristics of its working population, the occupational skills of its workers, the factors which influence occupational choices, the facilities for education and training, the distinctions between "men's" and "women's" jobs, the patterns of compensation—each of these may be isolated for purposes of analysis, but it can be explained or properly understood only when it is viewed within the frame of a society's total life. All of a society's institutions and activities, its knowledge and its beliefs, its science and technology, its ideals and its values, and its traditions and its aspirations enter into the complex processes of interaction which determine, finally, the manpower characteristics of its people.

## ECONOMIC AND NONECONOMIC FACTORS

In a market economy, the promises of future job opportunities and high earnings are important in the educational and occupational choices made by boys and girls, but no one could maintain that these economic considerations are determining. Family background, place of residence, peer group behavior, traditional patterns of choice, and still other variables determine the outcome of the occupational choice process. In occupational choice decisions already made by a single individual or by the members of a small and more or less homogeneous group, the relative importance of each variable can be ascertained, but only with considerable difficulty. In the case of larger, heterogeneous populations, however, only the loosest generalizations can be ventured about the influence exerted by each significant variable in the occupational choice process. Exposure to the occupational information and advice provided by the same high school counselor, for example, produces different consequences with different youngsters. In some instances, it may be strongly re-enforced by the values and aspirations of the parents, the casual advice of friends and relatives, and the character of the local labor market. In others, the play of these factors may serve to qualify or even to nullify the substance of the guidance and counseling encountered in school.

The price of labor is an effective mechanism for allocating manpower, but individuals do not automatically shift from one job or field of work to another in response to higher wage and salary rates. The prospect of long-term security frequently outweighs the attraction of high but uncertain income. Wages and salaries can be manipulated within margins with relative ease; personal values cannot. Not all teachers who

could earn more by engaging in other kinds of work flee the profession. One distinguished American scientist seems persuaded that psychic considerations deter many scientists from taking challenging and highly paid jobs in the field of space research. They are, he suggests, reluctant to abandon familiar research activities and to be labeled "space cadets" by their peers. The weight of psychic, as opposed to economic, considerations has been frequently noted by leading scientists in testimony before Congressional Committees and elsewhere. Some have observed, for example, that the dominant values of the American people have the effect of denigrating the worth of intellectual endeavor and achievement, and, consequently, profoundly influence the career choices of able youngsters. Others have noted that some of the difficulty encountered in securing first-rate personnel for defense research and development projects is rooted in the fact that many able scientists simply do not regard problems of military research as intellectually interesting and challenging. No one should have to be reminded of the unfortunate impact that the loyalty-security mania and the climate of McCarthyism had upon the recruitment of scientific and other highly trained personnel for governmental service.

The prestige or status associated with occupations is, by general agreement, a significant factor in educational and occupational choice decisions and, therefore, in the process by which manpower is occupationally allocated. It is widely taken for granted that the prestige of an occupation can be enhanced by assuring higher earnings for those in it. This assumption, for example, underlies the standard prescription for raising the status of the teaching profession and, thereby, broadening the flow of able people into it. High economic rewards frequently are positively related to high prestige, but it is also true that frequently they are not. Thus, white-collar occupations below the professional level seem to carry more prestige generally than blue-collar skilled occupations, even though the latter are, almost invariably, better compensated. In social status terms, the bank teller presumably ranks well above the tool and die maker, but in earnings he is very likely to run a poor second to the latter. The annual earnings of an assistant professor at a private liberal arts college are likely to be just about the same as those of a bus driver, but it seems safe to say that his occupation enjoys higher prestige in his community.

So much still remains to be learned about the hierarchical structure of occupations and about the determinants of prestige that it is hazardous to be positive about the influence they exert upon occupational choices in relation to a host of other factors. Yet, in the United States, where money income and consumption aspirations are such important points of reference in the behavior of so many people, economic considerations must be given considerable weight. Consequently, there is little choice but to hope that some occupational fields which are crucial to the well-being of the society can be upgraded in prestige by being better rewarded in money terms.

Some alterations in economic circumstances of even relatively brief duration are sufficiently potent to leave their mark upon the future character of manpower resources. There is, of course, the familiar example of the depressing effect upon the size of the freshman classes in engineering schools in 1950 and 1951, and upon the supply of accessions to the profession four years later, as a result of anticipations that newly graduated engineers would not readily find attractive jobs. On the surface it would appear that the recession of 1957, and the attendant severe unemployment



in defense and durable goods industries, produced a decline in engineering school enrollments in 1958—the first to occur in seven years—even though total college freshman enrollments were substantially higher than in the preceding year.

In other occupational fields, however, changes in the labor market conditions are not accompanied by equivalently sensitive alterations in the size of the supply entering upon the requisite course of education and training. Even in engineering, the influence of economic factors is qualified by other variables. Thus, the expansion in engineering enrollments prior to 1958 did not always mean a proportional growth in the supply of graduates. As the size of entering classes increased, there was a tendency for the proportion of students failing to graduate to rise as well.

## UTILIZATION FACTORS

Engineering is also one of many occupational fields, both professional and nonprofessional, that afford an opportunity to emphasize that the practices governing the utilization of manpower constitute an important variable in the processes that shape manpower resources. Under pressure of the high demand for engineers, employers were compelled to examine more closely the tasks to which their professionally trained engineers were assigned. It quickly became apparent that for a number of these tasks personnel of less than professional level training could be effectively substituted, as in the case of drafting, testing, and simple design work. Two consequences of this development have been the growing emphasis upon the need for increasing the supply of technologically trained personnel, equipped to work in related and supportive capacities to engineers and scientists, and the efforts to provide additional facilities for training technicians through junior colleges and technical institutes, as well as at the high-school level.

In the short run, such changes in utilization practices provide relief from shortages involving personnel whose occupational preparation is extended in time and costly in money. But they may also result in heavy demands for related personnel who can be more quickly and less expensively trained. In the last few years, for example, it has frequently been argued that "the shortage of engineers really represents a shortage of technicians." Over the longer run, changes in utilization practices may significantly modify the demands for and, consequently, the supply of specific categories of workers and result in substantial changes in the facilities for and the programs of education and training. This has occurred in the course of the present century in the health field, where many paramedical occupations have grown at much faster rates than professional occupations. Innovations in the utilization of educational personnel currently being tried on an experimental basis could conceivably influence strongly the future demand for and supply of teachers, both quantitatively and qualitatively, for all levels of education.

The significance of utilization practices and policies as factors influencing both the demand for and the supply of particular categories of manpower can hardly be exaggerated. Whether induced by a search for ways of reducing labor costs, a change in technology, a shortage situation, or some other reason, departures from existing policies and practices always affect demand and supply relationships involving particular groups of workers and, therefore, total manpower resources.

It should quickly be emphasized that changes in the kinds and numbers of workers are also the sources of new departures in utilization patterns. As recent developments in military tech-

nology and automation, as well as the experiences of underdeveloped economies, make clear, known ways of utilizing manpower more effectively must in many instances wait upon the availability of the requisite personnel. It must also be stressed in this context that, while some utilization policies and practices are susceptible to quick alteration, others, which reflect and are fashioned by deeply rooted attitudes and conventions, change only gradually.

Illustrative of this point are the striking developments in the United States during the last half century in the patterns of utilization involving women and racial and ethnic minority groups. The new significance of women as a manpower resource is, of course, the product of a great many more changes than the erosion of traditional conceptions of their "proper" functions in society and of their so-called distinctively "feminine" traits and qualities. It is the outcome of a whole series of gradual developments touching almost every aspect of the society's life, of the impact of two world wars, and of relatively recent patterns of marriage and childbearing.

## THE PLAY OF THE VARIABLES

It was earlier observed that a great variety of factors and forces enter into the complex processes of interaction which give a distinctive shape and character to the society's manpower resources. Thus far, only a few of them have been mentioned. But it is not necessary to detail the others in order to underscore the point that it is easier to identify the variables which are part of these processes than it is to delineate with any precision how they operate and interact.

These variables are not fixed and constant elements in a static system. They cannot be assigned precise weights. They modify one another constantly. Just as their significance alters with changing circumstances, they themselves cause the circumstances to change. Some of the variables are readily quantified. Others seem to defy measurement. Some are susceptible to direct control and manipulation. Others are not, for they are the end result of autonomous processes that are undetermined able to purposeful intervention. Changes in some variables bear fruit relatively quickly. With others, the consequences of change can only be felt at some fairly remote point in the future.

These observations on the inconstancy of the variables involved in the processes that shape the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the society's resources of manpower, and on the complexity and subtlety of the processes themselves, are not designed to induce despair in the heart and mind of the investigator who undertakes to conceptualize and describe them. Nor are they intended to prompt the judgment that so much about manpower development and utilization is still so poorly understood that it is fruitless to assess the worth and consequences of existing manpower policies and unwise to venture upon new ones.

## A CHALLENGE, A WARNING, AND REFERENCE POINTS

What has been said, however, should be read in the first instance as a challenge and second as a warning. The challenge, addressed to social scientists, is that there is a whole series of difficult, interesting, and important problems in the field of manpower research which await intensive and systematic inquiry. The warning is that those who are impelled to seek or to settle for simple, easy, and quick solutions to difficult manpower problems merely invite failure and frustration. Manpower problems are complicated human problems at their easiest. At their most difficult they are also reflections of underlying institutional and cultural problems. The proponents of "crash" programs for expanding the supplies of engineering and scientific manpower, or of remedying the deficiencies of American primary and secondary education, commit the error of the "easy and quick solution" in almost its most egregious form. They are matched only by those who propose to "solve" these same manpower problems by taking several leaves out of the book of the Soviet Union.



If Americans grow better informed about and, hopefully, still more concerned with the extent to which their well-being and national security depend upon the quality of their manpower resources, the question of where responsibility should be lodged for defining and achieving manpower objectives will be more energetically pursued than it has been up to now. If the expenditure of energy is to produce light as well as heat, Americans will have to learn to keep a few basic reference points firmly in mind.

One, already emphatically made, is that the responsibilities for making manpower policies are as a matter of fact and necessity—and should as a matter of choice—be lodged in both the community acting through government and in private individuals and organizations. In a free and democratic society there can be neither a single manpower policy nor a single locus of responsibility and power for its determination. The making of policy is a pluralistic endeavor, and the risk that the results will not always be consistent or complementary is a small price to pay to secure the values of the society. What has to be sought, therefore, is not a central source of authority to fashion a monolithic policy for manpower development and utilization, but a higher degree of congruence among policies and a rough measure of agreement among the many centers of policy-making about key purposes and targets.

It would be naive to suggest that either of these goals is easily attained. Yet, it would also be misleading to fail to indicate that some movement has been made in their direction. There is a growing understanding of the fact that severe and continuing imbalances between the demands for and the supplies of all categories of highly trained manpower may frustrate the realization of the society's objectives—social, economic, and political, as well as military. There is a growing sense that the nation cannot afford to be complacent about the quality of its manpower resources. There is increasing recognition of the need for ability and competence in all fields of endeavor. And, finally, there is increasing agreement on the importance of investing a greater share of the society's capital, both public and private, in its human resources.

A related reference point is that the question of where responsibility for manpower policy should reside as a general rule is not a meaningful question to which a meaningful reply can be made. There is no inherent advantage or virtue in private or public responsibility as such. What matters is the suitability of the instrument in which responsibility is located for fashioning an effective policy to achieve a given objective.

Finally, there is a reference point that is essentially moral in nature. The values of a free and democratic society imply an obligation which falls alike to governments and private individuals and organizations—an obligation to discover and establish the conditions under which the potentialities of all men may be realized.

# Dimensions for Progress

By Lawrence G. Derthick

Abstract: Over the past half century there has been a rapid growth of professions and occupations which require college training. The future need for college trained persons must be filled from a group of young people which is smaller in proportion to the total population than at any time in recent history. To be short on quantity in this group from which our leaders will emerge makes it more important than ever to make the most of the quantity available. Society looks to organized education for whole new fields of specialized training as well as refinements and extension of existing programs. Much greater emphasis will have to be placed upon learning as a lifelong process. To do the educational job America needs will call for substantial reorganization and expansion of school plant and facilities and bold and imaginative efforts to make tools of instruction more effective. The dimensions of opportunity which lie before us in the field of educational research are practically boundless but research in education to date has been meager. It is obviously going to take great sums of money and all of our ingenuity and effort as a nation to make the necessary progress to fill the trained manpower needs in every capacity.

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*Lawrence G. Derthick, LL.D., Washington, D. C., is United States Commissioner of Education. He has been a teacher, principal, supervisor, and superintendent. In 1948–49 he served as Chief of the Education Branch, Office of Military Government in Bavaria. He is a member of the Fulbright Board of Foreign Scholarships, the United States National Commission for UNESCO, and is a former President of the American Association of School Administrators. To gain first-hand information on the organization and operation of Soviet schools and colleges, Dr. Derthick directed a United States mission of ten educational leaders on a 7,000 mile tour throughout the Soviet Union in May and June of 1958.*





THE shattering impact of the accelerated accumulation of knowledge upon the whole gamut of human affairs presents all of us with an unprecedented challenge. Living in a society in transition, we now find ourselves moving from an age in which we enjoyed the luxury of time to adjust to slower paced changes to one in which new dimensions have suddenly opened in every phase of the educational endeavor.

## Dimensions of Quantity

Let us consider first the sheer quantity factor involved in the challenge. This fall the public and private schools will be employing 1.7 million professional staff to serve 42 million children. By the fall of 1968, the staff must increase by 440,000 to accommodate a 52 million enrollment. In addition some 100,000 teachers a year are needed to replace those who leave the profession. At present newly trained teachers fall short of the need by 132,000 a year.

The college enrollment in the autumn of 1959 is expected to total 3.4 million and a decade hence it is expected to be 6 million. Today there are approximately 300,000 professional persons engaged in providing the teaching, research, professional, and administrative services in higher education. By the fall of 1968 the professional staff of higher institutions must increase by 233,000 to accommodate an enrollment of approximately 5.6 million. In addition some 29,500 faculty members per year will be needed to replace those who leave the profession through retirement, resignation, and the like. At present newly trained higher education staff members fall far short of meeting this need.

The problem involved here is compounded when it is realized that the doctoral degree represents the desirable and standard preparation for teaching in college. Each year about 9,000 persons receive the doctoral degree. About half choose college teaching as a profession, but only a fifth of the total each year enter college as new college teachers, the others having been teaching while working for their doctorate.

In 1953–54, 40 per cent of all college teachers held the doctoral degree, but in this same year only 31 per cent of the new college teachers had such degrees. By 1958–59 the latter figure had dropped to 24 per cent. This represents a serious drop in the quality of teachers. Unfortunately, this deterioration in preparation is felt severely in the very fields with which the nation is now most concerned—science and mathematics.

Also, the number of well-trained persons who are potential college teachers is drained into other fields of work. The shrinkage is worse in some fields than others. At present, in chemistry about 2 out of every 3 persons holding the doctorate are employed in nonteaching occupations, in engineering it is 3 out of 5, and in physics 1 out of 2. Industry, which prizes the fine talent assembled in our colleges and universities, is able to offer higher salaries than the colleges can pay and therefore skims much of the cream of academic scholarship, taking not only the promising young scholars but their professors as well.

When holders of doctoral degrees are not available in sufficient numbers for college teaching, institutions turn to those with a master's degree. These teachers are frequently recruited from high school teaching staffs—thus weakening our secondary school system and at the same time placing on the college faculties those with less preparation for their work.

Certain necessary conditions of graduate instruction make its per capita cost

much higher than that of undergraduate study. These conditions include more expensive libraries, laboratories, seminars, smaller classes, and the best scholarly talent available for instructional and research staffs. Thus many well-qualified college graduates cannot afford to continue their education in graduate schools. And the graduate schools themselves, if they are to meet an increased enrollment, need expanded faculties and facilities.

Title IV of the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) is designed to make a beginning towards solving this double problem—the economic needs of students and the uneven distribution of available graduate instruction. It takes two approaches to this end: it provides students with funds; and it increases the number and scope of graduate programs of study, particularly in geographic areas where such programs are not now available.

It is interesting to look back over the past half century at the economic and social development of the United States and note the rapid growth of the professions and occupations which require college training. The number of workers in this group, for example, has increased 86 per cent since 1910, while the number of skilled and semi-skilled workers increased only 36 per cent during the same period.

Our economy will need nearly 40 per cent more professional and technical workers in the next few years. Scientists and engineers are expected to be in short supply for at least another decade. Five to six technicians are needed for each scientist and engineer, and we are currently producing only half that ratio.

The growing need for personnel with professional and technical training is the outgrowth of two factors. First, our rapidly growing total population with its increasing standard of living which requires a multiplication of the need for goods and services; and secondly, the increasing complexity of our society in every aspect.

The future need for college trained persons must be filled from a group of young people which is smaller in proportion to the total population than at any time in recent history. In 1940, out of a population of 132 million we had 2½ million 18 year-olds. Many college trained members of this group are now beginning to assume roles of leadership. Out of our present population of 177 million we have only 2.3 million in the 18-year-old group. By the time these young people are 40, the age at which the leaders among them can be expected to make their influence begin to count, the total population will be in the neighborhood of 260 million. Thus from a shallow manpower pool the nation must not only provide for additional professional scientific and technical leadership, but for the rank and file of other trained personnel as well.

Some observers have taken comfort in the gross numbers of the college population and assumed that all is well. It is true that there has been a considerable increase in the proportion of the age group 18–21 attending college. This increase has, however, failed to include a considerable body of youth capable of sustaining college programs.

Thousands of America's best young minds are currently being wasted through neglect. Higher education is losing up to one-half of the top 30 per cent or so of the nation's high school graduates. Each year, apparently, between 60,000 and 100,000 highly able secondary school graduates with aptitude and interest for college fail to continue their education for financial reasons. Another group of similar size and ability lack the interest or motivation for college.



## DIMENSIONS OF QUALITY

To be short on quantity in the group on which responsibility for our national progress must rest, makes it more important than ever to make the most of the quantity available. We can do this only by enlarging the opportunity for education for all children that will enable them to use their individual gifts and talents to the best advantage.

Essential to this process is early identification of student ability to provide the school counselor, the teacher, the pupil, and his parents with information essential in planning appropriate high school programs and developing suitable educational objectives.

As of now, not more than half of the high school boys and girls of America have access to such programs, and there is a critical shortage of personnel trained to perform these services.

From state to state and school to school there is wide variation in the distribution of the personnel employed and in the number of students which each counselor must serve. Altogether the nation's secondary schools now employ approximately 22,000 counselors; only about 12,000 of them work full time on the job. Over 51 per cent of the counselors in the United States are in the seven States of California, New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Illinois; these states have 37.5 per cent of the school age population. On the other end of the scale there are twenty-four states which account for only 12.5 per cent of the counselors but have 21.6 per cent of the school age population. The best estimates call for at least 15,000 additional full-time counselors for the public schools alone. The present yearly supply of trained workers is barely enough to meet current replacement needs.

Title V of the National Defense Education Act is aimed at bringing closer the day when the benefits of wise guidance will be available to all American children as a fundamental in the educative process. Part A provides federal funds to help states identify students with outstanding ability and advise them on what courses are best suited to their ability. Part B is designed to make sure that the programs in Part A will have the effectiveness that only a strong professional guidance staff can give.

Over recent years there has been a steady extension of the time young people spend in school, with more and more of them continuing their education at least through junior college. This is another indication of the increasing dimension of quality.

Of significance also is the tendency of society to look to organized education for whole new fields of specialized training as well as refinements and extension of existing programs. There has been enormous expansion in recent years of courses to train for specialized areas in business, industry, and other occupations; this will increase substantially as new areas of scientific and technical training develop. We are fast outgrowing the time when leaders in business and industry will hire young people without sound training in their chosen specialty and a well-rounded education in other fields.

The modern world is based on science. While it is most important that our schools provide a broad and balanced program of education in all fields, the teaching of science, and its essential base, mathematics, calls for great changes in programs calculated to enable students to adjust to the times. We have to be concerned not only with the level of scientific achievement today—but with our standing over the next thirty years.

The nation cannot hope to have the highly trained scientists and engineers

it will need in the years ahead unless steps are hastened to re-emphasize the teaching of science and mathematics in the high school. This must be done to develop the professional know-how needed and to help all young people—regardless of the careers they pursue—to get a better understanding of the increasingly scientific world in which they live.

The most recent nationwide survey of pupils studying science and mathematics showed that in the fall of 1956 there were 100,000 seniors in high schools where no advanced mathematics were offered. About 61,000 were in schools that offered neither chemistry nor physics. These restrictions apply primarily to the boys and girls enrolled in those schools too small or otherwise ineffective.

## CURRICULUM DIMENSIONS FOR LEADERSHIP

The urgency to strengthen instruction in mathematics and science gives added dimension to the job to be done in bringing balance into the entire curriculum in relation to America's position in a fast-changing world.

If we are to understand and cope with the nature of the problems facing individuals and society as a whole, we must have more effective means of spoken communication between people. Basic to understanding between people is an ability to talk to them in their own languages. Three quarters of the earth's population speak languages taught in only a few if any schools and colleges in the United States. Chinese is the native tongue of 500 million people, but only a handful of our schools offer courses in any of its dialects. High school students can study none of the four major African languages and only a few can study an Asiatic or Slavic language.

The United States has every reason to be linguistically educated. It has accepted a role of leadership in the world. The obligation rests heavily upon us to take that place in international affairs. Language competency is one of the necessary skills. More than 3½ million of its citizens, including members of the Armed Forces and their dependents, live, work and travel each year in other countries.

Strengthened language instruction, basic as it is however, is only one approach to broadening the dimensions of curricula to lead to wider appreciation of common international problems. Changes must include reorganization and strengthening of the teaching of such subjects as history, political science, economics, geography, sociology, and cultural anthropology.

Quite naturally, the ideas, languages, and traditions of Western Europe have shaped our schools and much of our thinking. Until now, teachers have, generally speaking, concentrated upon educating young people for living in an isolated America and for understanding a world centered mainly on Europe. This concept is now as outdated as the old flat world maps of the fifteenth-century navigators.

In high school and college, more persuasive influence must be brought to bear on the need to study and understand our own culture and form of government as well as those of other nations.

Much greater emphasis will have to be placed upon learning as a lifelong process. It is impossible to achieve the ultimate in our education in any given number of years, but we have fallen far short in providing the facilities and establishing the habits of continuing study. As noted by some of the leading thinkers of the time, heretofore life was such that one generation could teach the next; now changes and challenges are coming so fast that members of the present generation must constantly teach one another.



Automation will inevitably make leisure rather than *labor* a problem unless we are equipped to use that leisure wisely as workers, citizens, members of families and as people seeking a greater degree of self-fulfillment. To be equipped will call for more humanization of the curriculum—more liberal arts courses along with those devoted to scientific training, even if this means adding more time to the four-year college program.

In a world in which men are able mechanically to communicate with each other with the speed of light, and fly around the world in a matter of hours, we must consider all areas of our planet and our universe in our thinking and our learning. We have to broaden and extend our educational horizons in every direction.

## DIMENSIONS FOR FACILITIES

To do this will call for substantial reorganization and expansion of school plant and facilities and bold and imaginative efforts to make tools of instruction more effective.

A modern educational program cannot be conducted without suitable plant and facilities, yet there is no state in which a shortage of adequate schools and classrooms is not felt to a marked degree.

Institutions of higher education—both public and private—are experiencing mounting difficulties which restrict the effectiveness of their vital national role. They must gradually replace the obsolete structures which make up a significant proportion of their total facilities. To attract and hold good faculties, they will have to increase salaries. It will be necessary for many of them to elevate, and for all of them to maintain, their standards of academic excellence. They must increase their numbers of qualified teaches whose skills and knowledge are the truly indispensable elements. Straining their resources to satisfy the national demand for highly trained manpower, they must now prepare for doubling their facilities and their present rate of construction to prepare for the enrollment increases expected in the next few years.

The public elementary and secondary schools were short 142,300 classrooms in the fall of 1958. Considerable and quite impressive efforts have been made by the states and local school districts to meet their classroom needs during recent years—construction during the last few years has averaged 70,000 classrooms a year. Data available to the Office of Education indicate that over the next five years 418,500 classrooms will be needed to provide space for increased enrollment, for elimination of backlog, and for current replacement. That is more than 80,000 classrooms a year—at a cost for each classroom of about $40,000.

While enrollment increases account for a large proportion of the need to augment classroom facilities in public elementary and secondary schools, there are many other factors which contribute to the total school plant need.

The reorganization of school districts is one of these factors. Considerable strides have been made lately by the states in working on this problem. In the past ten years the number of local school districts in the United States has been cut in half, but despite all that has been accomplished, much remains to be done. There are still some 48,000 school districts in the country. Only about one out of every ten of these are school districts with more than 1,200 pupils, and only two states are without districts this small.

Numbers alone, of course, do not re-

veal the true picture. The fundamental question is the ability of districts to provide adequate educational programs. Most today are not big enough to do so. One of the concomitant results of the small districts is the preponderance of small high schools. As pointed out in the Conant report, almost 74 per cent of all high schools now offering a diploma have graduating classes of fewer than a hundred students.

The best American schools are unsurpassed. But as the school year opens, there are still about 30,000 one-room schools in operation. Again this year, hundreds of thousands of children will be on "half-day" sessions, and there will be almost 2 million more children in school than we have room for. Each new child jammed in takes room from those already there, so not only are the 2 million crowded, but also all of their classmates.

Many states are now working on one or more types of school district reorganization. These reorganizations very often affect the location of schools and in many cases call for added school plant construction at the new centers.

The changing school curriculum is, of course, an important factor in school plant needs. More attention is being given to offerings in physical education and creative work in the elementary and secondary schools. More provision will have to be made for science and language laboratories, new and larger shops, increased audio-visual facilities, and the like.

Changes in instruction methods are another important factor in school plant needs. Newer instruction practices where pupils work in co-operative groups, combining participation and learning, require greater space. The junior college as part of the public school system, kindergarten and nursery schools, and evening classes for adults are all enlarging factors in creating school plant needs.

Many interesting developments are taking place to better utilize the teacher's time. Educators and laymen alike are looking at the new communications media and asking questions. Are we doing all we can with motion pictures as a teaching aid? Mechanical and electronic equipment is revolutionizing the learning of languages—how may we make fuller use of it? What expanded use can we make of slides, filmstrips, magnetic tape, radio, and television?

The purpose of Title VII of the National Defense Education Act is to help get answers to such questions.

## DIMENSIONS OF RESEARCH

The dimensions of opportunity which lie before us in the field of educational research are practically boundless.

Throughout the nation there is lively debate about the aims, the content, and the effectiveness of the curriculum in the schools and colleges. The best answers to the questions basic to this debate will come as research in education is accelerated.

Miracles have been accomplished in recent years through research in the medical and other sciences and in industry. Industry invests an average of 8 per cent of its production costs on research and development; some of the more progressive companies invest as much as 11 per cent.

Research in education has been meager, however, contrasted to other fields. It has been estimated that less than one tenth of one per cent of the more than 20 billion dollars a year spent in this country on education goes into research.

While research in education has suffered from deficiencies of personnel, finance, and facilities, the lack of trained research personnel is a major factor limiting the research effort in the endeavor to do the kind of educational planning now required.



Some support for research in education is provided by the Cooperative Research Program and the research authorized in the NDEA for the Office of Education.

Through these enlarged horizons, an attempt is made to develop new knowledge about major problems in education or to devise new applications of existing knowledge. Contributions by the staffs of colleges, universities, and educational agencies through these programs hold high promise. Indicative of the matters under investigation are:

An analysis of curricular offerings in leading liberal arts colleges to provide base data for future curriculum planning.

The development of a system of modular construction of school plants—a potential for reducing costs, shortening construction time, and improving while preserving the flexibility of design.

A talent census, to help school personnel determine the nature of students' talents, the careers in which they are most interested, their plans for using their training in these careers, their progress in carrying out their career plans—a yardstick to help assess the effectiveness of counseling and guidance.

Others deal with the learning theory at all levels and take into account the need for more effective methods of instruction. Among many practical questions which can be answered through research are: What are sound practices in local school support? What part will new media play in meeting the practical needs of quantity and the more basic needs of quality in the expanding programs of education? What types and combinations of curricula need to be developed?

Such projects may be expensive, but the cost of not making them is something that this country can no longer afford. Research in education brings us to points at which the problems of society can be attacked at their fountainhead. If, for example, the identification and development of talent among children could be elevated so that a mere 1 per cent of those children who have been unsuccessful at the secondary level, but who have the potentiality for success in higher education, could be prepared to take advantage of it, the increased flow of human talent and ultimate productivity would be felt in every profession and industry. The quantity and quality of research in education to date have been such that we have not even begun to tap the potential.

## CONCLUSION

These are some of the dimensions to be kept in perspective as we dwell on requirements in the educational endeavor over the next few decades. It is obviously going to take great sums of money and all of our ingenuity and effort as a nation to make the necessary progress. We have to plan ahead and get the utmost mileage out of every educational dollar to fill trained manpower needs in every capacity—more engineers, more scientists, more technicians: yes, and more philosophers, musicians, artists, linguists, ministers, and more teachers of those who man these and other professions.

Over the next thirty years the growth and virility of American civilization will still depend, as it always has done, on the part that moral and spiritual values play in shaping our culture. More than ever we shall need to develop in oncoming generations the ingredients of character and basic integrity which constitute the primary source of a nation's strength.

Democracy, we should never forget, was not fashioned on gadgetry and easy living. It will not flourish no matter how brilliantly we may succeed in dazzling other nations by our achievements in the new age of science now unfolding, without what it has always taken to make it work. Democracy was built by God-fearing, brave, and dedicated men and women who made moving sacrifices and carried heavy burdens to gain and hold freedom. It will endure only as long as Americans are eager to work and sacrifice in order to hold on to it, and impress the world by their dedication to its ideals that democracy is something to enrich and ennoble a man's spirit, not merely his way of life.

# Improvements Needed in Secondary Schools

By LESTER W. NELSON

ABSTRACT: Rapid population growth, increase in knowledge, technological developments, and the acquisition of new sources of energy pose tremendous challenges to our schools. The challenge is threefold: providing education for vastly more students; maintaining educational opportunities for substantially longer periods of time; raising sharply the levels of human understanding and skill. This task requires clear definition of unique responsibilities, establishment of priorities consistent with these responsibilities and better utilizaton of resources. The nature of resources, both material and human, must be fully realized. The capacity of students to assume greater responsibility for their own learning must be recognized and exploited. Professional competences must be used more fully. To achieve these ends, employment of technological resources can make major contributions. Educational facilities need to be expanded and, more importantly, need to be redesigned and improved. Present restrictions imposed by conventional concepts of class size, school schedules, the uniformity of teachers' roles and rigid patterns of organization must be modified. Schools should stop thinking of themselves merely as consumers of teachers and assume a partnership responsibility in the recruitment and preparation of teachers. To accomplish such changes redefinition of practices is called for rather than mere refinement of existing practices.

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*Lester W. Nelson, New York City, is Treasurer and Associate Program Director of the Fund for the Advancement of Education and Associate Program Director of the Education Division of the Ford Foundation. His major areas of program responsibility are secondary education and teacher education. He was formerly principal of the Scarsdale High School, Scarsdale, New York.*

OUR schools confront the triple task of providing education and training for vastly increased numbers of students, for substantially longer periods of time, and at sharply heightened levels of understanding and skill. The three dimensions of this task are rooted in the facts of rapid population growth, the increase in human knowledge, modern technological developments, and the acquisition by man of new sources of physical energy.

The critical test of changes in our secondary schools is whether or not they meet more effectively the demands for more and better education for more students. Success in meeting this test will depend on their ability to define clearly the unique responsibilities of secondary education, to honor priorities consistent with these responsibilities, and to more effectively utilize the total of resources available to them.

Most past efforts to improve our secondary schools have been aimed at refinements of existing practices. Relatively few efforts have been directed to redefining what best practices should be. The commitment of professional educators and the public to existing premises has prevented the secondary schools from mounting and sustaining the kinds of experimentation which would do violence to the status quo. Essentially, the characteristic approach to improvement has been to attempt to do better that which was already being done. These efforts, furthermore, have been undertaken largely within the limitations imposed by acceptance of accustomed use of traditional resources. Many changes in our schools, well calculated to effect true improvements, have failed because of this persistent commitment to existing substance and structure.

Any comprehensive discussion of needed improvements in secondary schools would necessarily include consideration of the unique responsibilities and priorities of secondary education as well as improved arrangements for more effective utilization of resources. Limitations of space force the deliberate decision to devote this article to improved arrangements for more effective utilization of resources. It is believed the improvements suggested are applicable to schools of widely varying patterns of educational program.

## THE NATURE OF EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES

Teachers and laymen alike tend to think of educational resources in restrictive terms. Most commonly they are thought of as dollars, buildings, sites, equipment, furnishings, machines, materials. Admittedly, such resources are essential to the educational enterprise and much of our effort must be directed to their acquisition and use. The human resources, the students, teachers, parents, and citizens are of even greater importance.

All schools have limited physical resources; the skills, abilities, and intellectual capacities of human beings, however, are deep and abundantly available to every school. Human resourcefulness itself is a resource which, unfortunately, is too frequently ignored or discouraged. Commitment to any rigid, unyielding system or form of organization negates the possibilities of change which creative, imaginative minds could otherwise induce.

By definition, improvement is change. Change is requisite to learning, for the support of which schools exist. Change first takes form in human thought and then in human action. Human imagination constitutes our most important resource for improvement.

## PLACING GREATER RESPONSIBILITY ON THE LEARNER

The capacity to learn is not a function of age. High school students are as able to learn what is appropriate to their maturity and developed skills as are college students and other adults. Furthermore, they are equally able to assume greater responsibility for much of their own learning. Independent learning, to which we give verbal encouragement, is throttled by the contrived conditions under which we permit the learning to take place in schools. Many of these conditions often serve to make the satisfaction of intellectual curiorsity illegal.

The illegalization of independent learning is well illustrated by the frequent restrictions placed on the use by students of library facilities, the inaccessibility of laboratory facilities, the limited resources for learning, including not only books and other printed materials but the whole panoply of modern electronic devices, and many others. The relative inaccessibility of learning resources to the intellectually motivated student constitutes, in fact, a great educational lockout in secondary schools. This lockout is a result of poor school building design, frustrating regulations, the closing of facilities to use excepting for the limited periods of time when school is "in session," the assumption that learning requires an omnipresent teacher. In all too many communities the school is the one place where a student may not be legally or with community approval except between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., Mondays through Fridays, September through June.

To the extent that students assume greater responsibility for their own learning, the utilization of resources will be increased. This increased utilization applies not only to the individual student but also to the facilities, tools, and materials which support learning; to the ways in which teachers use their time and competences; and to the ways in which the educational dollar is allocated.



## BETTER UTILIZATION OF PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCES

The aim of secondary schools should be to enable teachers to function as nearly as possible at the top level of their professional competences for as great a part of their time as possible and for the benefit of an optimum number of students. Improvements directed to these ends will relieve teachers of nonprofessional chores; will redeploy the time saved thereby in making greater provision for planning, materials development, and individual or small group work; and will make the unique contributions of individual teachers available to greater numbers of students.

Present practices have been developed largely on a series of premises whose validity has remained too long unchallenged: ideas that all teachers are alike, that all teachers are equally competent in all the skills of teaching, that all teachers in a given subject matter area are equally competent scholars, that the role of all teachers should be the same, that all teachers should teach approximately the same numbers of students, that each teacher must do all of the things required in teaching. To be sure, our schools vigorously deny their acceptance of such premises but the practices of our schools controvert their denial.

Perpetuation of practices based on such premises limits professional productivity, unnecessarily erodes the quality of teaching and learning, and denies equality of opportunity for learning. The recognition of differences among students should be matched by an equal recognition of differences among teachers. Schools should not seek a faculty whose members are as nearly alike as possible; rather, they should seek teachers whose competences are of high quality, though different, and then do every-

thing possible to use these unique competences to the utmost.

Many improvements are possible in pursuit of these ends. Teachers can be relieved of much of their accounting, housekeeping, and custodial chores through the use of competent teacher assistants, aides, and clerical personnel. Teachers can be given more time for individual and group planning through changes in school schedules and by placing more responsibility on students. Teachers can work as members of teaching teams, wherein individual responsibilities for instruction are different and complementary. Teachers can be supported in their professional functioning by greater and more imaginative use of modern technological aids. Each of these approaches has been tried and adopted in some schools. Few schools, however, have seriously undertaken to make more than limited use of such possibilities. All schools could adopt some or all of such possibilities. Those which fail to do so will surely encounter increasing difficulties in maintaining or improving the quality of their educational program.

## TECHNOLOGICAL UTILIZATION

Few efforts to effect changes in our schools have encountered more vigorous opposition or enjoyed more ardent support than those relating to the use of modern technology in the classroom. The peak of opposition and support has been reached with respect to the use of television. The arguments advanced by both sides are not substantially different from those heard about printing, radio, films, and each of the successive technological advances of the past. They have been especially violent, perhaps, because of the unique power of television as a medium of communication since it possesses particular potential to improve or debase educational quality. For much the same reason, it appears to many to pose a threat to the teacher. In addition, many believe television to be too costly for education, generally, to afford.

Despite claims and counterclaims, television has had an unprecedented spread of use in our schools and has made giant strides in record time. Separately or in conjunction with other modern technologies, its use is increasingly demonstrating a capacity for improving the quality of learning, for achieving better utilization of other resources, for equalizing opportunity for learning, for bringing hitherto inaccessible resources into the classroom, and eventually, for substantially affecting the economics of education. The advent of videotape recording, making it possible to record both picture and sound simultaneously and, without any intermediary processing such as is required for film, to immediately reproduce the original program with no loss of quality—this has brought fantastic new possibilities for education. The best teaching available to any student anywhere in America can now be made available to all students everywhere, if schools choose to have it so.

The initial costs of television have already gone down very substantially. It is reasonable to assume that with constantly widening use and future improvements in design and production, these costs will be still further reduced. The tremendous future increase in secondary school enrolments and the accompanying necessity for equally great expansion of school facilities provide both the opportunity and the necessity for using television productively and with economic advantage. The same may be said of other modern technological developments—film projection and transmission, sound tape recordings, overhead projection, self-teaching machines, learning re-enforcement devices, combination slide and sound tape playback combinations. Devices within the financial ability of most schools to buy and use will soon be available for the recording of any television broadcast on tape, both picture and sound, to be used within the school at such times as local needs dictate and as often as long as the school wishes to use the recording.

It is unintelligent for schools to reject the use of the new technologies in the teaching of old knowledge and the rapidly accumulating body of new knowledge. It is particularly unintelligent for teachers to oppose their use since they offer freedom to teachers from needlessly boring and tedious repetition of material, from entrapment in the conventional limitations of space and time, for improvement in their professional status and increase in their professional productivity. Such advantages to teachers can, in time, be matched by significant economic improvements as well.

## IMPROVING OUR EDUCATION FACILITIES

Much has been done to improve our school facilities in recent years. Most such improvements, however, have related to over-all design of buildings, better provision for specialized services, improved relationships between the various kinds of spaces provided in the school. Far less has been done in improving the design and use of the various kinds of spaces themselves. Most spaces continue to be cubicles, four-sided, frozen into standard packaging, from the educational restrictions of which it is difficult, if not impossible, for teaching and learning to free themselves.

If the secondary schools of the future are to capitalize on the new learnings and technologies, they must evolve better ways to design facilities suitable to the purpose. Present schools, and most of those now in process of planning and construction, fail to make adequate provision for large classes where modern teaching tools can be effectively used. The size and character of facilities designed to house learning resources and materials continue largely to conform to past notions of school libraries, where quiet and immobility were presumed to be the necessary accompaniment to learning. They do not take account of the fact that listening and speaking, sound and motion, are the necessary accompaniments to much which is required by the learner if he would take advantage of the new tools of learning.

The location of the learning resources center, in most schools, continues to be related to the other facilities in such a way as to make their use difficult and expensive, if not impossible, at times when school is not in regular session. Assumption of greater responsibility for learning by the student more than implies that facilities be readily available and accessible—it *requires* that this be so. Furthermore, availability must not be restricted to the present limitations of so-called school hours or school days or to the months of the traditional school year. They must be available for more hours, for more days, and for every month of the year.

The basic character of the improvements needed in educational facilities is directly related to changes in educational program, improved utilization of technological resources, changing patterns of teacher functioning, and the increased responsibilities to be assumed by students. Unless these considerations govern our efforts at improvement, school buildings, despite other changes

and improvements, will fall far short of providing an effective setting for improved education.

### CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD CLASS SIZE

American education has been signally successful in achieving an almost universal acceptance of the premise that high quality of teaching and learning requires small class size. The interpretation of what number of students constitutes a small class varies widely from school to school. Major variances will also be found between subject matter areas within individual schools. Whatever the differences in interpretation, few schools can be found which would not say that they could do an appreciably better job if only the size of classes could be reduced. Generally speaking, this means the size of class considered to be most desirable by most schools is smaller than the size they now have.

This commitment to small class size rests on the assumption that the quality of learning is a function of numbers. This assumption, in turn, rests on a second assumption—namely, that the conditions surrounding and supporting learning must remain unchanged, regardless of class size. Suppose, however, that these conditions are changed in accordance with changes in class size. What then becomes of both assumptions? If we change the primary assumption about the basis of quality from one of class size to one of conditions for learning, what then?

The assumption concerning quality, more properly stated, should be that the quality of learning is a function of the conditions under which it takes place and the experiences of the learner under these conditions. If this assumption were used instead of the one to which our schools have committed themselves, the desirability of a given class size would be determined by the particular purposes to be served and by the appropriateness of the setting for attaining these purposes.

Considerable experimentation is presently going on in secondary schools in which flexibility and variance in class size are being tested under varying conditions. Aside from the differences in numbers, the major variables being tested include the size and arrangement of space, the utilization of technological aids such as television, tape recordings, overhead projection and others, and the use of various combinations of professional and nonprofessional personnel in instruction. The results of such experimentation are not thoroughly conclusive on all important points as yet, but they strongly suggest that class size may range from eight or ten to several hundred with no apparent loss in learning, provided the conditions and procedures employed are appropriate.

Three major considerations support the premise that variable class sizes are desirable. First, large classes, where appropriate, make it possible to create and sustain many more small classes where this is desirable. Large classes are particularly appropriate for lectures, demonstrations, and many kinds of presentation not requiring immediate discussion; small classes are desirable for discussion and maximum individual participation. Normal sized classes of 25 to 35 are unnecessarily small for the first purpose; they are too large for the second purpose. Second, greater flexibility and opportunity is afforded for teachers to function in a variety of ways, according to need and competence, rather than according to a single pattern of teaching. This makes improved utilization of personnel possible. Third, eliminating the wasteful duplication of effort when the same presentation is repeated several times to small groups, releases precious time for professional personnel to do more effective planning and preparation.



The inexorable facts of population and enrolment growth argue strongly that secondary schools will not solve their problems simply by a process of addition and multiplication. Redeployment is inescapable if quality is not to suffer serious erosion. This requires that division and subtraction also be employed in efforts at improvement. In no other area of secondary education is this so necessary as in the matter of class size.

### IMPROVING SCHOOL SCHEDULING PRACTICES

A reason frequently given for failure of the secondary school to adopt some promising practice is the difficulty of making appropriate schedule arrangements. The reality of such difficulties must be recognized. Close analysis of the problem, however, leads to the conclusion that the presumption of difficulty is frequently a local rationalization of inertia. The plain fact is that schools can almost always devise better ways of doing those things to which they give sufficient priority.

The problems encountered in schedule-making involve five primary factors: space (classrooms and laboratories), time (class and periods), numbers (class sizes and enrollments), personnel (teachers), and courses. The typical approach reduces these variables to fixed quantities. To illustrate: all class periods are 45 minutes in length; all classes meet 5 times per week; all teachers teach 5 periods per day; all classes are presumed to have an ideal 25 students; each student carries 4 courses. The actual figures will vary but, in essence, this is the typical approach.

The almost universal tendency of schools to perpetuate a particular schedule, year after year, is well known. Recasting a schedule requires organizing ingenuity and, furthermore, changes require that habits of both students and teachers must change. The costs of change, in effort and explanation, are relatively high. These considerations militate against change. If the five component factors involved are kept to fixed dimensions, the precision with which they can be combined in tidy patterns is likely to appeal to the orthodox mind of the "good school man." These components can be arranged in tiers and laid, one upon another, like a Roman wall, and, like a Roman wall, they are likely to last through the ages.

The kinds of improvements needed in secondary schools require that conventional schedule-making practices be changed. Variable class sizes, team teaching, technological utilization, greater accessibility and availability of learning resources—the embracement of such practices does violence to a traditional schedule. Without the doing of such violence, however, the ceiling of improvement in secondary schools will forever be arbitrarily depressed.

Learning is a dynamic process to which schools and teachers, at their best, have always committed themselves. No rigid formula can provide an adequate setting for the changes which learning requires. The institution, as well as the individual, must also learn. Here, again, the contrast between refinement of existing practice and the redefinition of practice stands out in stark relief. The educational needs of the learner, requiring flexible conditions for their satisfaction, must be supported by a flexible schedule.

### RESPONSIBLE PARTNERSHIP IN TEACHER EDUCATION

Our schools have too long regarded themselves as consumers of teachers rather than producers of teachers. Teaching has taken a casual attitude toward its responsibilities for recruiting

able minds and spirits into its ranks. It has adopted a passive attitude toward the pre-service as well as the in-service education of its members. This has been particularly pronounced in secondary education where, more than at any other period of formal education, the opportunities are so natural and rich for recruitment and for participation in the education of new teachers. Most schools limit their efforts to cooperation with teacher education centers rather than establishing a responsible, working partnership with such centers.

Secondary schools offer the best possible setting for the teaching of methods, the provision of clinical experience, and the opportunities of paid internships. Comparable settings cannot be duplicated by the teacher education centers nor, indeed, should they be duplicated if they could. It is argued here that schools should assume a responsible relationship to the education of new teachers in at least four important ways: by making their facilities readily available for observation; by providing paid internship opportunities to teachers in training; by establishing teaching teams in which the intern and the student not yet ready for internship can be working members; by participation of the school faculty in professional seminars and courses designed to meet the needs of new teachers.

Increasing numbers of schools are already involved in the kinds of responsible partnership activities referred to here. The number is distressingly low, however, in comparison with the total numbers of schools having opportunities to play such a role and the number of new teachers entering our schools each year without the benefit of such experience. Where may new teachers see teaching at its best and learn to develop true professional attitudes and competences, if not in the schools themselves? In the long run, no other improvement in education will have greater power to shape its character and raise its quality.

# Toward a More Effective Contribution by Colleges and Universities to National Leadership

By GAYLORD P. HARNWELL

ABSTRACT: The philosophy of American higher education is that it exists for the welfare of the individual. The value of colleges and universities is judged primarily by the opportunities offered the students; only secondary attention being given to the social function for the nation. It is a laissez-faire system, and until the advent of Sputnik our system had been accepted with complacence. Higher education in our country is rooted in our socio-economic system. In Russia, higher education exists primarily for the welfare of the state. It is centrally controlled, highly planned, consciously directed into pragmatic channels, and very efficient. Russia invests five times the proportion of the gross national product in higher education than does the United States; the Soviet Union accords great prestige and rewards to educated individuals. The greatest strength of education in the United States is the diversity of our colleges and universities. If higher education is to serve the leadership needs of the nation the present system must be strengthened. A solution is to seek the increase of financial support so that education may attain its objectives. Reassessment of educational methods and reappraisal of educational techniques are also necessary. Since in the United States education is intimately interrelated with society, it is necessary that society give adequate prestige and rewards to educational pursuits. Our colleges and universities must lead in advocating the importance of their cause, but society must give them its support.—Ed.

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*Gaylord P. Harnwell, Ph.D., LL.D., Sc.D., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is President of the University of Pennsylvania. He is Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Greater Philadelphia Movement and a member of the Executive Committee of the American Council on Education. Dr. Harnwell was a member of the commission of American educators who made a survey of higher education in the Soviet Union in 1958. He is an atomic physicist and former Chairman of the Department of Physics and Director of the Morgan Laboratory, University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Harnwell serves as a consultant for the Department of Defense and is a member of the Committee on Undersea Warfare of the National Research Council.*

THE philosophy of the American college or university is that it exists primarily for the student. For a considerable segment of our population the traditional four years of residence or attendance at a college—which may or may not be part of a university—represents the individual's culminating formal educational experience. During this period, young men and women gain some acquaintance with traditional and contemporary culture neatly catalogued into the humanities, social studies, and the natural sciences. In many of these institutions students are also able to concentrate on curricula of very practical utility directed toward their immediate advantage in special vocations such as business, engineering, teaching, nursing, and so forth. The professional schools of the university carry this opportunity still further, leading after additional years of study to fuller competence in these careers and also in those of law, medicine, dentistry, and many others.

In accordance with our national tradition in these matters, American colleges and universities are evaluated primarily by the educational opportunities they offer to the students who attend them and only secondarily by their success in the performance of any social function for the nation. Anyone who demonstrates the necessary competence is eligible for admission, and if he performs and conforms satisfactorily and also possesses, wins, earns, or borrows the funds necessary to meet his expenses, he can continue on toward his chosen goal. In general, he finds himself in a better competitive position and with a higher earning power as a result. Except for the kindly pressures exerted by family and friends, it is a laissez-faire system in which large, small, rural, urban, public, private, sectarian, liberal, and trade schools have all grown in a more or less harmonious and complementary relationship with one another, offering those particular educational experiences for which there exists an adequate popular demand. The nature of the standards and the quality of the performance required of students vary widely. Some are financially profitable private ventures, but most are not; and competition among them has in general taken the very favorable form of endeavoring to offer the best of education within our tradition to the ablest students who can be secured. This conflicts with the economic system since family funds and youthful talent are rarely proportional to one another. An uneasy financial basis for the system is furnished by public funds from states and municipalities; by grants from foundations, charitable institutions, and trusts; and by gifts from individuals and corporations. These eke out the difference between the costs and the tuition paid by students.

## Complacent Attitude Toward Education

Until very recently the nature of our higher educational system and the quality of performance of its various components have been accepted with very general complacence. We had evolved the system; as individuals we had passed through it; it was ours; and hence it was good. True, there were those who questioned whether our colleges really presented most effectively a stimulating educational opportunity to students during four of their most enterprising years, but the burden of proof was on these apostles of change, and the inertia of social custom and tradition was very great. Rising costs and decreasing return on endowment strained the precarious economics of the private or independent component of the educational system, but public equanimity was not greatly disturbed by the weakening of these institutions



and the concomitant imperiling of the educational standards which they represented. The values involved were intellectual and rather remote, and only alumni emotions were aroused. Should one be surprised to see uneconomic institutions go to the wall in an era of rugged competition? To think otherwise would smack of socialism. There were, of course, many who recognized that the colleges and universities produced educational values for society as a whole over and above those paid for by the student and accruing directly to him. But could the government afford to take cognizance of these values at the expense of what would probably be an additional levy on society which it had never had to meet before?

## Impact of Sputnik on American Education

The problems facing the colleges and universities before the advent of Sputnik were both literally and figuratively academic. The impact of this miniature moon has been dramatic upon our national consciousness. It put the capstone upon the earlier cumulative successes of the Soviets in the economic, international, and atomic energy fields and brought Americans up sharply in the face of an ominous and aggressive competitor which had transformed in a mere forty years an ancient but ineffective oriental tyranny into a determined and inscrutable opposition to our policies. How had this been done? How could such a nation by some feat of legerdemain leap over our centuries of tradition and suddenly and insidiously assume a posture which drew to it the eyes of the primitive and impoverished peoples the world over and plant itself squarely across the path which we considered to be the way of light and progress? The complete answer to these questions is not simple nor entirely relevant to our limited concern. But a component in the process has certainly been a system of education which has converted a polyglot population from 95 per cent illiteracy to 95 per cent literacy since World War I.

## Russian Attitude Toward Education

The Soviet conviction that higher education is so important as to warrant the investment in it of five times the proportion of gross national product which we have appropriated for the purpose, and the policy that has rewarded intellectual and technical accomplishment in a way we reserve for commercial entrepreneurs, have both made major contributions to this ineluctable phenomenon. The funds that the Soviet Union has devoted to higher education have brought into existence a system of universities and technical institutes which is quite comparable in magnitude to the sum of the public and private institutions in the United States. The rate of growth of the Soviet system appears to be well in excess of ours. Faculty salaries are relatively much larger than in our institutions. In commenting on the take-home pay of a Soviet professor, Crawford Greenewalt in his recent book, *The Uncommon Man,* remarks: "I was somewhat startled to compute that this is just about equivalent to my own compensation from the du Pont Company after applicable federal and state income taxes." There is food for thought along various lines in this comment. In the Soviet Union, the prestige of education and the educated individual is very great, the word "anti-intellectualism" is not heard, and the rector of the university is not asked how the football team is doing by well-meaning friends who are under the impression that this is a principal index of the success of his institution.

Education is not only considered to be of paramount importance and ac-

corded higher priority and greater resources by the Soviets than by ourselves, but it is more highly planned and consciously directed into pragmatic channels deemed to be of benefit to the state. All institutions of higher education are operated by the state, and the pattern among them is a uniform one determined centrally by the Ministry of Higher Education. The manpower requirements as determined by the ministers for successive planning cycles are translated into the quotas of students permitted to enter the different curricula in the several universities. Adjustable stipends provide additional incentives to ensure an adequate group of applicants from which the universities may choose individuals to study under the different faculties of specialization. Thus the requisite number of engineers, doctors, scientists, linguists, and others are provided to fill the needs in these professions if the planning has been well done and the system has operated successfully.

*Emphasis on the practical and utilitarian*

Inherent in this system is the concept that it operates primarily for the benefit of the state rather than the individual and the belief that the state can decide wisely how many students should study what subjects. This obviously results in an emphasis on the practical and utilitarian, and the scientific faculties are much larger and better supported than the humane faculties. Mathematics and the physical sciences and their applications in engineering are obviously of first priority, and the biological sciences and their applications in husbandry and health are high on the list. Languages and linguistics are clearly of prime importance to a polyglot nation bent upon advertising itself and proselytizing the rest of Europe and Asia. The arts do not come off as badly as might be supposed for they are a major factor in cultural satisfaction, and subjects such as history and anthropology provide useful intellectual background. On the other hand, philosophy, sociology, and large areas of psychology and economics represent subjects where varied opinions have for generations contested inconclusively for ascendancy and the practical value of following these speculative tortuosities is deemed questionable. In still another class are political science, management, industry, transportation, communication, finance, and others, which constitute politically sensitive areas of too great importance to be entrusted to academicians. Conflicting doctrine, which occupies much undergraduate time in the Western Hemisphere, is reserved for the select few, and party apprenticeship takes over the applications.

The balance is clearly a different one from ours, with an emphasis upon the applicable and utilitarian and a skepticism for speculation and opinion regardless of its significance or the emotional appeal of the motivation supporting it. The human tendency toward prejudice and mental cloture in social and political matters results under state planning in the banishment of such topics from the academic forum. Central planning and the strong motivations of high rewards and prestige lead, however, to striking success within the ideological limitations. The educational process is marked by efficiency and effectiveness. Elementary classes are large and laboratory equipment and texts are simple but adequate. Advanced classes become small, seminar methods are employed, laboratory equipment is extensive and varied, library facilities are comprehensive and readily available, and the responsibility for successful performance is shifted more and more from the teacher to the student. In the advanced phases of education where research plays the primary role, the academies, which are powerful operating agencies, tend to take over the process of providing the leadership of able senior scholars and scientists, excellently equipped laboratories and research facilities, advanced treatises and world-wide journal coverage, and literature-abstracting services which are the envy of the West. The competitive success of Soviet science and technology is the incontrovertible result of this enormous and integrated effort.

This digression to epitomize impressions of the Soviet system of higher education gained from a brief visit to both their central and provincial institutions and from following certain of their scientific publications and the evidences which have recently played such a crucial role in world affairs, is of interest in providing a norm against which our own system can be compared. Different as the tenets of these two societies are, the educational systems in each are engaged broadly in the same undertaking; namely, the maturing of youth into effective and responsible participation in the affairs of each society and, as a result of this, in the promotion of the ideals and objectives of each society. A comparison of the circumstances affecting the institutions of higher education in the two countries and of the relative success enjoyed in the accomplishment of their objectives can be very instructive.

## INTERACTION BETWEEN SOCIETY AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

After recognizing the basic difference in philosophy—the paramount position of the state in the Soviet Union and of the individual in the United States—one is struck by the disparity between the magnitude of the commitment to higher education in the two countries. This is a profound and deeply rooted socio-economic phenomenon which is not amenable to rapid change in a democracy. The interaction between our society and our colleges and universities is very strong, and except in isolated cases of small institutions, there is little opportunity among them for marked and successful eccentricity deviating from the expectation of students, the recollection of alumni, the tradition of faculties, and the contemporary mores of society. True, as Devereux C. Josephs, Chairman of the President's Committee on Education Beyond the High School, said in the committee's report, a college education may be reckoned as providing $100,000 additional income to an individual who has attained it, but the Horatio Alger tradition is strong in our society, the tax structure favors the entrepreneur rather than the professional, and the high road to success is not reserved for the college graduate. The educational and economic systems are not so effectively tied together as to ensure the financing of colleges in response to society's need for their graduates. Though various meritorious proposals for the according of income tax exemption for tuition have been advanced and other devices are under consideration, it will probably be some time before the deliberate democratic processes respond to even so vital a need as this and any real alleviation of financial pressures on our colleges and universities is achieved.

A. Whitney Griswold, President of Yale University, in a recent address at The Johns Hopkins University, places the emphasis upon education's need of a renewed sense of purpose. It is difficult to take exception to this, for obviously our educational objectives are both vague and varied and intractable to any crisp summation. This characteristic may, however, be to some extent inherent in a democracy's educa-

tional system, and a return to the educational tradition of the liberal arts as it was known to the Colonies and our early nation will not appeal to everyone as a cure. Again, in a recent pamphlet by the Policy Committee of the American Council on Education directed at the reduction of tensions between the private and public segments of our educational system, attention is called to the fact that our great and unique strength is in the diversity of our colleges and universities. They point out most properly that the denotations "private" and "public" do not constitute a neat dichotomy, for all are in a very real sense public in nature and each has aspects of privacy and independence. The Committee's emphasis is placed upon the need "for a greater investment in education as a whole." We need more dollars for our colleges and universities, more money for education and less for other things. Both of these criticisms are trenchant and are two consequences of the more basic phenomenon that we as a nation are not distinguished by a deep and moving conviction of the paramount importance of having a system of education of high excellence. In consequence, we do not have one that meets even the lesser standards commonly applied. We would rather be healthy and wealthy than wise, and we really do not see much connection between the third of these attributes and the other two.

*Need for financial resources*

Following the lead of the Policy Committee of the American Council on Education referred to above, it is evident that one direction in which the colleges and universities of this country should move in order to improve their contribution to national leadership is to seek by all means at their disposal to increase the financial resources which they may apply to their objectives. The current needs for capital and current expenses represent a deficit incurred over many generations of inadequate financing. The institutions are of such moment to society and their situation is so grave that if the current trend can be reversed the result should be strongly cumulative. Greater support should lead to a more effective performance of the educational function which should, in turn, justify more obviously to the public the need for this function and enhance the rate at which funds from tuition, gifts, grants, and so forth flow toward its performance. It is essential that this reaction be recognized, for chill penury has stunted the growth of the private independent segment of our institutions of higher education, and those colleges and universities which should be leading in innovation and experiment and striving for new standards of excellence and effectiveness have been unable to afford such a role. While an underpaid faculty with inadequate facilities may take great moral solace as the provider of an essential subsidy to society, it inevitably also develops defensive complexes and an inhibiting conservatism. These tend to repress enterprise and initiative and retard the generation and application of new educational philosophies and techniques. The variety of our educational system can be the greatest element in the quality and effectiveness of the contribution to our society: hence support and growth must conserve this variety; but without appropriate support and growth not only may the variety be lost but the entire pattern of the system we have evolved may be irretrievably altered.

## REASSESSMENT OF EDUCATIONAL METHODS

Another direction in which our colleges and universities might move toward increased effectiveness in meeting the manpower needs of our country is



to examine both more critically and more imaginatively the methods which they use to achieve their educational objectives. Such programs of reassessment would, of course, be futile if they were to lead solely to a re-emphasis of the need for unavailable resources. Though the hard facts of the situation inevitably keep this basic factor to the fore, there are many opportunities to break profitably with our particular tradition in academic techniques and within the limitations of our resources to improve the effectiveness with which the participants in the educational process play their complementary roles. The Soviet example, while unacceptable to us as a whole, suggests a number of lines of thought.

Though the touchstone of empiricism is not generally popular with the faculties of American colleges, it is not new even to our tradition in the humanities. From the words of St. Francis, "Tantum homo habet de scientia, quondum operatur"—which tells us that in the Saint's opinion a man has only so much knowledge as he puts to work—to Howard Mumford Jones' recent book, *One Great Society,* which sets forth most impressively the utility of the humanities, the practical applicability of knowledge has been upheld as a virtue. Benjamin Franklin's injunction to the American Philosophical Society to foster useful knowledge is, however, more congenial today to the sciences than it is to the sector of the liberal arts. In extreme reaction to the admittedly inadequate "trade school" or short-range approach to education, one even finds that in some quarters currency is given to the concept that the virtues of the liberal arts are directly related to their impracticality, their divorcement from anything useful, and their association with a mellow golden age of leisure.

This, of course, has the flavor of the effete and the dilettante and attracts few students of enterprise and ambition. It is false as well, for intellectual significance and content are not limited to the crisp and precise areas of the sciences. It is, of course, true that it is in the sciences that one finds the demonstrable and the quantitative, and the obviousness of importance and immediacy of application are particularly stimulating and satisfying to certain students. But it is possible to present the humanities in such a way that they provide essential foreground as well as pleasing background to the academic scene. A steady and balanced look at human beings and their behavior is as essential as a precise measure of things. As an example, the inherent vagueness and the visceral—as opposed to intellectual—nature of the connotations attaching to the abstract nouns with which our conversations are larded constitute a fact which, if recognized, can make a wiser man. Recognition that the common usage of such words as truth, beauty, freedom, virtue, good, and their opposites, and the vast proliferation of -isms, is as conversational tocsins or anodynes rather than as the symbols of any precise concepts, is evident from a critical study of the nature and intensity of the reaction to them by persons in contemporary societies. Historical perspective sheds still greater light upon this aspect of human intercommunication and can be used to illuminate the pitfalls in the way of any evolution toward a more rational society. An important component in any humane education is a recognition of the fact that most commonplace intercourse between human beings is an exercise in gesture and stereotyped verbalism for the purpose of inducing emotional as opposed to cerebral reactions with the intent of bringing about the desired action pattern on the part of the auditor with a minimal inconvenient interposition of his own critical faculties. This is not only an academically

fascinating and intensely human phenomenon, but recognition of it as being basic to the arts of the salesman, advocate, and political orator can lead to very practical personal advantage as well.

## REAPPRAISAL OF EDUCATIONAL TECHNIQUES

Colleges and universities could also very profitably give more attention to their educational techniques and the way they go about the business in which they are engaged. A re-emphasis on the values of education and some refinancing of it by society are, however, essential if our colleges and universities are to breach the stifling conservatism from which they suffer and if they are to stimulate individual enterprise and initiative in the many ways which are open to them. The fundamental objective is, of course, that the student shall be inspired to learn, and all of the human and material resources of the institution should be bent to bringing this about and facilitating his progress to the greatest extent his talents and determination permit. Too often, however, this is lost sight of in the faculties' desire to teach and to conduct the process in a convenient and traditional way. There is too much complacency in our willingness to jog along in college with the habits and methods of elementary and secondary school instruction. "What are the minimum requirements on which to pass?"—not: "What can I learn while I am here?" The practical requirement for some control and continuing assessment of the educational process implies the tolerance of certain routines and academic bookkeeping, but these in general tend to accentuate our proclivity to evaluate success in terms of the number of hours of exposure to certain intellectual experiences rather than in terms of the acquisition of an insatiable curiosity to understand what it is all about. The duplication of textual material in the form of professorial exposition is an amiable gesture to the student who cannot or will not read but represents a pedestrian use of time for the good student. Small classes are wasteful and pointless if the professor does all the talking. In many situations large classes supplemented by occasional individual counseling may provide a much more effective relationship, but this, in addition to being heterodox, is as disturbing to the precariously financed system as would be an earth tremor to the mountaineer hanging from his finger tips. Though we recognize that the rubbing of shoulders with contemporaries can contribute as much educationally as can the contact with the faculty, our tradition leaves the potentialities here but little exploited, and undergraduate communities tend to turn their backs out of hours on the purposes of the institution of which they are a part and instead indulge in preseason practice in the artificialities and intellectual stagnation typical of the country club for which so many of them are regretfully destined.

## CONCLUSION

This brief and very inadequate sketch of some of the directions in which our colleges and universities might move to be more effective in their essential social role emphasizes first their intimate interdependence on the society of which they are a part. If we do not think much of higher education nationally, we will not have good institutions engaged in its prosecution. Unless the prestige and rewards of education are important, there will be little motivation to pursue it. Unless its significance to the United States in competition with other nations is well recognized, there will be no focus of our attention and resource upon it. True, our colleges and universities have shown no great leadership in urging concerted action, but this is inherent in the variety and independence of our institutions and in their precarious financing and sensitivity to public relations and reactions. This same variety is, however, of the greatest potential value to the country and is most appropriate for a democracy whose people have learned by hard experience that a master-minded authoritarianism is the prelude to the end of their treasured system. The competition among this congeries of institutions is on the right plane; namely, an intellectual one, and they quite properly take great pride in the relative respect that is won by their faculties, their students, and their alumni. But an introverting poverty tends to vitiate this competition and in some measure condones the repressive and reactionary atmospheres that stifle enthusiasm and initiative for the necessary academic experiment and innovation. Our colleges and universities must indeed take the lead in advocating the importance of their cause, in presenting to society the paramount need for the funds to carry it on, in cultivating a motivation to learn on the part of our young men and women, and in achieving a more efficient and effective technique for the process as a whole. They will be impotent, however, to achieve their ends if the procession does not form up enthusiastically behind them, for they can be at best but an impractical and uneconomic vestigial appendage to an unsympathetic and anti-intellectual society.

# Continuing Education for National Survival

By C. Scott Fletcher

Abstract: Education in general and adult education in particular will determine the future well-being of the United States. The primary goal of education in a free society is to help the individual realize his potentialities and to enable him to expand his capacity to make wise decisions. The goal of a totalitarian society is the dominance of the state. The Soviet systems has a single philosophy which gives coherence to all aspects of life; there is a single organization in this system. In the United States there are many organizations, and we can organize and associate freely and voluntarily. Leadership in the USSR is assigned. Leadership in the United States is voluntary, fluid, and multiple. The economic needs of the Soviet Union and the United States are the same, but the methods and ends differ. The basic educational curriculum of a free society is that of the liberal arts and sciences. The teachers, students, and motivations of liberal adult education vary. To educate individuals to be responsibly free requires many methods, techniques, and tools; the goal should be the active participation by the learner. In recent years United States education has put increasing importance on educating the individual for responsible freedom in his private and public roles: in the home, on the job, and in the community. We further need to educate for public responsibility. Educational opportunities for our present and future leaders should be improved and expanded.—Ed.

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*C. Scott Fletcher, White Plains, New York, is President of the Fund for Adult Education and Director of the Fund for the Advancement of Education. He was formerly Consultant to the Economic Cooperation Administration, Executive Director of the Committee for Economic Development, General Sales Manager of the Studebaker Corporation, and member of the faculty of business at Indiana University.*





THE theme of this article is that the future well-being of the free society of the United States is primarily dependent upon education in general, and, more particularly, upon the systematic liberal education of adults.

In view of world affairs and the role America is forced to play in them, it is essential that we carefully examine not only the goals of our free society and the goals of our educational system, but also those of other societies and particularly of totalitarian societies. In an effort to indicate some of the major issues, I am going first to sketch some contrasts between the free society and the totalitarian society, and, more particularly, between the Soviet society and the society of the United States.

## Goals of Free and Totalitarian Societies

The goal of a totalitarian society is the dominance of the state over the individual. The Soviet system, for example, is based on a single philosophy. It gives coherence to everything—science, philosophy, art, politics, economics—all aspects of life. Communists claim that this idea gives order to history—explaining the past, guiding the present, charting the future. According to this idea there is no God—only the workings of inevitable forces—and therefore no sacred worth to the individual human being. If individuals oppose the workings of the "inevitable" forces, they are to be "rehabilitated" or destroyed. If they assist, they are to be rewarded and honored.

The goal of our free society is that each individual should realize to the fullest his unique potentiality; the logic is toward a nation of self-governing persons, each an end in himself, each a means of self-government. The free, or open, society seeks not only to encourage all its individuals to want to make decisions, but also to fit them to make wise and humane decisions. The American society has, not a single philosophy, but many philosophies. Its fundamental value is a regard for the uniqueness and worth of the individual in his own right. The individual is the end of the free society. However, the possibility of achieving this end depends upon how responsibly individuals use their freedom.

## Organizations

In the Soviet system there is one—and only one—organization. It runs through the society, supporting it, ordering it, moving it. The Communist system has been able to realize and use a high degree of singlehearted, single-purposed dedication by its people. All organizations whether for youth or adults are structured by the one organization, so in effect they are merely divisions of the one-over-all organization.

The American society is made up of many organizations. This means that there is not a single political party. It means that there are governments at various levels. It means that there are separate branches of government. But far more than this, it means that the American people are free to organize and associate voluntarily, that is, as they will. Besides businesses, labor unions, churches, and clubs there are affiliations of organizations of two basic kinds.

One kind of affiliation is committees, councils, societies of persons held together by a particular concern or idea. Examples are the Republican party, the Democratic party, the Committee for Economic Development, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the American Red Cross. The second type of affiliation or organizations or federations is according to occupational interest—farming, labor, business, vocations, professions. Exam-

ples are the Grange, the AFL-CIO, the American Marketing Association, the United States Chamber of Commerce, and the American Medical Association.

Because in a free society organizations are many, the future of freedom depends on the effectiveness of many organizations, and the effectiveness of these many organizations depends upon the quality of their many leaders. Ideas are the forces that energize history, and we must highly prize the creative person who can conceive and express them. But organizations are the agencies through which ideas are realized and we must prize highly those persons who give form and direction to co-operative action.

Sometimes our organizations have as their goals the pursuit of special interests and the advancement of the general welfare. Others try to balance special interests and the advancment of the general welfare. Others are concerned only with the general welfare. The problem is always the balancing of forces which can be done only by leaders who, with objectivity and wisdom, take into consideration the general welfare.

## LEADERSHIP

Leadership roles in the Soviet society are assigned by the Central Authority. Generally speaking, all jobs or positions are assigned. In the same way leaders are selected for their proven ability to condition the attitudes and behavior of others. The most skillful teachers and professors are assigned leadership roles in the work of the Young Pioneers or of the Komsomals. Their job is to instill enthusiastic dedication to the overall objective.

The one outstanding and significant fact about the Soviet society is that every aspect of it is planned, which means that even every suborganization must have precisely the same general objectives as the central organization.

Leadership roles in the United States are voluntary and both fluid and multiple. Leaders frequently move voluntarily from career to career. An editor may accept appointment to a federal commission. A businessman may become undersecretary of defense. An official of a local labor union may become secretary of labor. A university president may accept an important overseas assignment. This is true throughout the entire society. Leadership reveals itself as people seek or accept positions on school boards, on local committees for community development, on advisory committees to state bodies and in the federal government such as assistant secretaryships, assistant-to-assistant secretaryships, technical advisers overseas, and consultative positions of all kinds. After serving in such public offices for periods ranging from months to years, their temporary occupants usually go back to private life. This system of "fluid" leadership is sound, provided that good people adequately prepared flow through it. We can afford only the best—the best talent and the best preparation for that talent. The kind of preparation we cannot afford is that which is begun "on the job" at the expense of dire consequences to the American people.

An outstanding characteristic of the United States is "multiple" leadership. Leadership comes from many kinds of individuals: the intellectual whose insights protest against things as they are and indicate things as they might be; the lone writer whose conceptions and expressions may shape history; the executive who implements ends with means. Leadership is exercised in many positions on many levels of organizations and associations.

Americans—men and women—frequently give leadership in several fields



at the same time. A businessman may also be the mayor of a city and on one or more state or national committees. A lawyer may be the chairman of a national fund-raising campaign for the American Bar Association and at the same time be a director of three business concerns, a nonprofit organization in the field of educational television, and a consultant for a department in the federal government. It is not uncommon to see the name of a highly respected citizen on the board of directors or trustees of at least a dozen profit and nonprofit organizations. In many of these roles which are accepted voluntarily the citizen may be called upon to make decisions far more important than the decisions he has to make in his primary field where he earns a living. The major question we have to face is, Can we go on indefinitely with this system, hoping that wise decisions will come from such volunteers who are frequently unpaid, but, even worse, underpaid? who are almost always harassed and criticized, but, even worse, unhonored? A good example comes from the field of business. The February 28, 1959 issue of *Business Week* contained a two-page article entitled "Nobody Wants a Washington Job." The article pointed out that,

> There is a growing reluctance to take government jobs. It is not unusual for twenty-five or thirty men to turn down an important vacancy. This ran to seventy in the case of a recent Pentagon position. A recent research study conducted by the Harvard Business School Club in Washington, D. C. reveals the fact that more and more qualified businessmen are serving constantly shorter periods in Washington. During 1946–1949, 37% of businessmen served in Washington a year or less. In the 1953–56 period 70% served a year or less.

Because business is an important reservoir of executive talent for government service, this example is of significance.

## ECONOMIC PROGRAM

Regardless of differences in ends and means, the Russian and the American people face the same basic needs. The differences in the two systems lie in the ways these needs are met and the ends to which the margins above survival are used.

Internally the Russians are advancing at a constantly accelerating pace—scientifically, psychologically, industrially, economically. Despite the great cost in human dignity and suffering, they maintain a workably stable social order.

Externally, in all departments of both old and new weapons, according to the experts, they have the most formidable military strength that history has ever known. But military might is not their sole, or even, most effective, weapon for world domination. Even more effective than their employment or threat of employment of arms is their skillful use of ideas in the cold war of psychology—propaganda, deceit, distortions, and lies. Those who know say that in the field of propaganda we are not even close to the Russians. Today they are spending more than five times the amount we are, and our bill for world-wide information programs is about $100,000,000 a year.

The Soviet Union is offering and providing economic and technical assistance to the people of less-developed nations, playing upon these people's desire for "short cuts" and employing experts trained in not only appropriate specialties but also in a knowledge of other cultures and other languages. The Russians say convincingly to the peoples of less-developed countries, "Look what we have accomplished through communism. You can do the same." And the peoples in Southeast Asia, India, the Near East, Africa, and other

parts of the world are listening, looking, studying, and in the process of making decisions.

The American people in their own way must also maintain a healthy society and a dynamic expanding economy. On an ever wider scale, citizens are being called upon to make judgments on an ever-broader range of issues: economic flexibility and growth; proper balances between expenditures and investments and between private and public expenditures; concern for our domestic economy and regard for the economies of other free nations; the proper use of expert knowledge, yet the preservation of control by the people; freedom of opportunity for exceptional talents, yet equality of opportunity for all; the development of more effective co-operative action while enhancing individuality; the maintenance of great military strength without becoming militaristic.

## SOVIET EDUCATION

The Soviets give much credit for their accomplishments to their educational achievements. In this they are as frank about their means as they are about their ends, the world-wide triumph of communism.

During the past fifteen months a sufficient number of Americans, particularly American educators, have visited and reported on the Soviet educational system, and we now have sound facts concerning their objectives, subject-matter, and methods. As a result of reading and conversations I have had with at least six men and women who have visited Russia, I speak confidently about the matter.

First, the sum is that for Soviet purposes their educational system is good—frighteningly good. Under no circumstances should we copy it because their ends are diametrically opposed to ours; but we must understand it. We will strengthen our educational system, consequently the nation, if we advance those aspects of our system which the Soviets will not dare to imitate. A people cannot become free and remain free unless they question, explore, and assume both intellectual and moral responsibility for the decisions they help to make. But a free, critical mind is dangerous for totalitarian rulers because their ends and means must not be questioned.

In this respect the Soviet educational system forces a form. All talents, all expressions which do not fit this form are feared, discouraged, and destroyed. The treatment of Boris Pasternak is an example. *Dr. Zhivago* is a book the Kremlin is afraid to let the Russians read. Pasternak did not conform. He is now corralled. But within the form of the Soviet educational system excellence is carefully searched out, developed, and employed. Tests are given to all young people from kindergarten until their formal schooling ends. Then come other tests which last throughout life. As a result of these tests, some are assigned as farmers, some as industrial workers, some as technicians, some as professionals. The ablest are chosen for posts in four areas: science, the military, education, and the government.

The education given these persons is rigorous, broad, and continuous. Rigorous means long, hard, and solidly substantive. Broad does not mean free in our sense of doubting, questioning, testing, but it does mean wide-ranging and integrative. The ideally educated Communist leader is oriented as the atoms of a magnet are oriented, but he is also widely informed. Continuous means (1) from birth until death and (2) constantly, through all the forces which play upon the individual—not only the school, but also the home, the job, the community, and the mass media—all of which are manipulated by the party to produce dedicated obedience.

Such, then, is the education of the Soviet "organization man" within the single organization that makes up the Soviet state, that dominates the Soviet society and its pattern for the entire human race.

To sum up: the state is the end of the Soviet system; the individual is the end of the American system. The Soviet people can be compelled; the American people must be persuaded. There, power and decision-making are concentrated; here, they are diffused. The Soviet state speaks with one voice; we speak with many voices. The Soviet goal is the domination of the world; the American society has no single goal, unless it is peace and freedom for human beings to pursue many goals. More than two huge nations are engaged in the struggle. Two ways of life, two conceptions of the human being, two ideals for the future are also in competition. The question is, which will more successfully deal with the inescapable issues of the present and the future?

This elaboration on the goals of a free society versus those of a totalitarian society focuses attention on two major questions: Are our volunteer leaders being adequately equipped through education, and particularly continuing education, to fulfill the important positions they accept? What steps should be taken to insure that in all parts of the country educational facilities will be available for those who wish to prepare themselves more effectively for positions of leadership?

## LIBERAL EDUCATION

During the remainder of this article I will confine myself to education and particularly the continuing liberal education for adults.

The primary goal of education in a free society, which should be lifelong, should be to enable every individual at every stage of his life to develop his potentialities to the maximum. Putting this in other words, the primary goal of education in a free society is to enable each individual to enlarge his capacity to make wise decisions. There are other goals, to be sure, other goals to be achieved to enable this to happen. But ultimately the goal is education in action, knowledge and thought translated into wise decisions. This becomes more obvious when one considers the many decisions which one has to make every day which affect others in the home, on the job, and in the community.

My purpose now is to sketch those aspects of and to indicate those developments in adult education which, in my judgment, have the greatest significance for the future of our free society.

In this order I shall consider institutions and organizations; subject matter; teachers and learners; methods, techniques, and tools; and goals. These are all interrelated, of course, and I shall note some of the relationships. Finally, I shall bring these to focus on education for public responsibility.

## INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS

In a totalitarian society institutions and organizations are either established and controlled by the state or, if permitted, closely supervised. In our free society we have latitude to create and use institutions, organizations, and associations to serve our purposes.

A review of this point would be a review of the entire history of the United States. In the field of adult education I will give only a few illustrations.

Between the Civil War and World War I, the American Library Association and the National University Extension Association were founded. Between World War I and World War II, the American Association for Adult Educa-

tion and the Association of University Evening Colleges were organized. Since World War II many associations, societies, and councils concerned with the education of adults have come into being. These include the Great Books Foundation, the American Foundation for Political (now *Continuing*) Education, the Adult Education Association of the U.S.A., the National Association of Public School Adult Educators, the Council of National Organizations, and the Center for the Study of Liberal Education for Adults have been founded. This is the barest list of examples.

The point is that we are free to establish or modify the social machinery we think is necessary to reach our objectives. The objective I am considering is the continuing liberal education of adults.

## SUBJECT MATTER

What should be the subject matter of education designed to develop persons who can be responsibly free? Only a doctrinaire would have a glib answer. Just as there are no magical words, neither is there a magical body of knowledge. Knowledge, according to Bacon, is power, and power can be put to many purposes.

For the purpose of taking responsible part in the government of a world becoming ever more complex and ever more interrelated, a person must be able to engage in common discourse and cooperative action.

We are not starting "from scratch," of course. We have behind us the long experience of people who have used freedom to expand freedom. The educational curriculum for this is the liberal arts and sciences. This curriculum (whose root is "running") is always changing. It will continue to change. The important ideas are to relate the individual with the society and that which changes with that which endures.

In the liberal arts and sciences, the adjective "liberal" should apply to the sciences as well as the arts; the "arts" should include the social arts; the sciences should include the social sciences.

## TEACHERS AND LEARNERS

From what I have written, it should be evident that the students in liberal adult education are of many kinds and have many motivations. There are those who participate for the sake of learning in its own right—to keep alive and growing. There are those who wish to improve in or to prepare for their roles as parents, businessmen, farmers members of unions, public officials, professional people. And it should be evident that the teachers are also of many kinds—the faculty members of schools colleges, and universities; the staffs o organizations and associations; those who are affiliated with mass media; fa beyond this, those who, while not subject-matter experts or professional teachers, will assume leadership responsibilities as lay leaders in continuing education.

## METHODS, TECHNIQUES, AND TOOLS

Just as one cannot invoke an abracadabra in subject matter, neither can one use it to determine method. Methods must be appropriate to ends, to the subject matter, and to the times. There is no point, for example, in discussing the multiplication table, if one's purpose is to learn to count by nines; there is no point in memorizing the multiplication table if one's purpose is to discuss justice; there is no point during the twentieth century in copying manuscripts by hand if one's purpose is wide distribution.

The purpose of educating people to be responsibly free requires many methods, techniques, and tools; but the goal should be active participation by the learner. I call attention, therefore, to two recent developments in the methods of adult education.



### *Study discussion*

I have already referred to the Great Books Foundation and the American Foundation for Continuing Education as national organizations using study and discussion in informal groups led by trained lay leaders. The Fund for Adult Education has also created many study-discussion programs using reading and other properties, such as films, records, prints, and others; and it has experimented with various methods of sponsorship, leadership training, promotion, and financing. Here I want to consider the idea as a method.

Study combined with discussion is particularly appropriate for adults. Group discussion relates the individual and the society. It is best suited to those issues concerning which differences of opinion are widest, and a friendly discussion of emotionally charged issues exemplifies "the agreement to disagree agreeably," which makes self-government possible. The discussion method assumes a basic equality of all and respects the contributions of each. It draws on and stimulates other methods of learning—reflection, reading, viewing, listening. When orderly, sequential, and seriously done, it is admirably suited to continuing education.

Beyond stimulation by the play of ideas and clarification of understanding by the exchange of viewpoints, several skills are involved which are essential to other self-governing situations. To take part well in a discussion requires the ability to read, to listen, and to speak effectively. It requires esteem for oneself and for others, sensitivity to human relationships, and judgment concerning the contributions of one's self to others. To lead a discussion effectively requires awareness of others, the ability to draw others out, the ability to give direction. These are capacities and skills essential also in other situations in which free people co-operatively deal with their common concerns.

### *Educational radio and television*

At the other end of the spectrum from individual study and group discussion are the mass media. I will touch lightly on developments in educational radio and educational television.

In the early 1950's, when educational television was only an unlikely possibility, one of the main questions was whether educators and educational institutions could produce programs which would be both good education and good broadcasting.

A special committee of the National Association of Educational Broadcasters brought into being only a few years ago a new type of programing using the combined talents of educational broadcasters, scholars, and artists. The results were five series: Ways of Mankind, Jeffersonian Heritage, Peoples under Communism, Ways to Justice, and the Voices of Europe. Several of these won the highest acclaim of critics in publications for education, the mass media, and the general press.

It had been demonstrated that, given the time and money, educators operating educational radio stations can produce fine radio programs. The standards set have improved educational radio, and these improvements continue. The demonstration was a factor also in the development of educational television. In 1951, only eight years ago, not only did educational television not exist, but also, under the regulations of the Federal Communications Commission, there was no provision for bringing it into being. On April 14, 1952 the Federal Communications Commission set aside 242 channels (later increased to 258) for educational television.

The Fund for Adult Education and

other foundations interested in the potentialities of this new instrumentality joined forces with the American Council on Education, the Joint Committee on Educational Television, and the National Association of Educational Broadcasters. Later there came into being the National Citizens Committee for Educational Television and the Educational Television and Radio Center at Ann Arbor, Michigan. As a result of the co-operative efforts made by these organizations, educational television became a reality, and today there are 42 educational television stations throughout the nation, with more coming into being every month.

Teaching by television is here to stay, and educational television has already created a revolution in education, one which has moved faster than any other in the history of American education. This means that adults, too, can learn by television equally as well as in a class, and at the present time hundreds of courses are being offered for credit by means of both educational and commercial stations. This trend will increase rapidly in the future. Thus there is a call for unprecedented efforts to put the electronic media in the service of the education of a free people.

## GOALS: THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS ROLES

Our first concern should be the development of the individual human being who has those attributes necessary for responsible freedom. The individual, like the pressure of the atmosphere, is usually taken for granted. But the individual must not be taken for granted. In our society he is the end; he is also the ruler. The person as an individual is the basis for all his roles.

To come now to a trend, I consider it most significant that thinking about education during the past decade or two in the United States has put increasing importance upon the education of individuals for responsible freedom in their private and public roles.

This trend has not developed in adult education as far as it has in formal education—in the primary, secondary and higher and professional schools. But it is present and strengthening in adult education also. I shall illustrate in three of the major adult roles. These three roles are as a parent in the home, as employer or employee on the job, and as a citizen in the various communities to which we all belong.

### *In the home*

As parents in the home we are responsible for the development of newcomers to this world who will one day become adults. Here the parents should have as prime concern the creation of a climate conducive to the growth of healthy bodies and healthy minds which have a healthy appreciation of values.

In recent years a profound change in thinking about education for parenthood has taken place in the United States. This is symbolized in changes in words. What used to be called "child-rearing" or "child-training" is now commonly called by such names as "parenthood education," "family-life education" and so on. Note that the emphasis is taken off the child alone and is put upon the parents or upon all the members of the family. It signifies that not just the children, but the parents also must be educated; that these must understand more, not just about their children, but also about themselves and others and the world in which they live; that to give their children "all the advantages," they must give them the supreme advantage of a home that is emotionally fulfilling and intellectually exciting—a natural evolution into the larger world of mature interests and responsibilities. And many are the parents who come to learn something for the sake of their children and remain to learn for the sake of themselves—who start to learn how to guide their children's growth and discover their own capacities for growth and for self-direction.



### *On the job*

A second major role is on the job. I do not refer to the vocational or professional skills narrowly considered. These are important. But the motivations for seeking these skills are strong, the ways of teaching them are familiar, and support for their provision is widespread. I refer to the roles of the individual employer or employee on the job as a human being related to others in his organization and relating his job responsibilities to other organizations and to the larger society.

This role is particularly dramatic in the responsibilities of the corporate executive, and I use this to illustrate the entire field of concern.

During the last five years a good deal of discussion has taken place about the role of liberal education, with particular attention to the humanities and the social sciences in the development of executive talent for business. This discussion, some of it highly argumentative, has already provoked action designed to demonstrate in practice what liberal education for executives really is and what it has to contribute for executive development. Programs, variously organized, have been offered by the University of Pennsylvania, Clark University, Dartmouth College, Williams College, Wabash College, Swarthmore College, Southwestern at Memphis, Pomona College, the University of Denver, the University of Akron, and Northwestern University. The Bell Telephone System has been the most energetic in its support of such programs, but more than 150 other corporations have also taken part.

It is my belief that we are only on the threshold of education and special studies for the development of executives who are responsible not only for the profitable operation of corporations, but also for the social responsibilities which corporations are finding to be on the upgrade.

I have used business as an example. Other areas of our economic society—such as organized labor, agricultural extension and the law—are also recognizing the need for bigness, breadth, and flexibility of mind and are turning to education designed to cultivate qualities and abilities beyond vocational competence.

In the field of agriculture, refer to "The Cooperative Extension Service Today, A Statement of Scope and Responsibility," by the subcommittee on Scope and Responsibility of the American Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities. This statement, dated April 1958, recommends nine areas of program emphasis.

From Area VII, Leadership Development, I quote:

> In a democracy, progress is largely determined by the quality of leadership available and developed within the mass of the population. . . . Extension can be justly proud of its part in helping to identify and provide training and experience opportunities for this leadership. Such contributions from Extension will be even more important in the future.

From Area IX, Public Affairs, I quote:

> The increasingly complex interdependence of agriculture and other segments of our economy is causing rural people to have a greater and more definite concern with public affairs issues that bear directly on their welfare. They are turning to the Extension Service, as a readily available informational educational service, for help in acquiring the facts and for methods of analyzing and appraising such facts. Thus,

they may exercise their responsibilities as citizens in a better-informed way.

Committees are developing plans in these two areas as well as the other nine, and demonstration projects are getting under way.

In the field of labor, I cite two examples. The first is the liberal education program which the United Steelworkers now sponsors and supports for its members in co-operation with more than fifty-five universities. The second is the National Institute of Labor Education. The purpose of this agency is to help meet the other-than-vocational educational needs of union members. It has on its board of directors top representatives of labor, universities, and the public. Increasingly it is receiving the support of unions, governmental agencies, universities, and foundations.

From the professions I cite law. Last December the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association conducted a three-day National Conference on the Continuing Education of the Bar. The final statement reads in part:

> American lawyers today are confronted with problems of vast and increasing complexity. No law school education can be expected to deal with all of these problems. A practicing lawyer has an obligation to continue his education throughout his professional life. This education not only must increase his professional competence, but also better qualify him to meet his professional responsibilities to his clients and to the public. . . . Programs for continuing education have thus far placed a major emphasis on professional competence and have not always given to professional responsibility the attention it should have. In the future these programs must also emphasize the professional responsibilities of the lawyers. They must help the lawyer to fulfill a wide range of professional responsibilities: to the courts, to the administration of justice, to law reform, to the law-making process, to his profession, and to the public.

*In the community*

The third major role of the individual in our free society is as a citizen in the community. Perhaps we should use the plural, because we live in many communities: at levels ranging from the neighborhood through the city, state, and nation to the world; these communities are of various kinds and bound together by common ideas, concerns, and purposes.

As citizens, we are involved not just in those activities we call political, but more broadly in all of the social activities by which we conduct our affairs in the free society of the United States.

Earlier in this article I described the wide range of opportunities at all levels for participation in self-government in the United States through public, semipublic, semiprivate, and private organizations in the United States. I observed the multiple and fluid nature of American leadership. Without repeating, I refer to this now. The requirements and opportunities should make us alarmed, therefore, at what seems to be an increasing reluctance on the part of many of our gifted and privileged people to assume their responsibilities and to take advantage of their opportunities.

This reluctance to assume the responsibilities of public service is a criticism of our homes, our schools, and all the institutions and agencies that, knowingly or unknowingly, influence values and attitudes. It also calls attention to a national need to educate purposefully for public responsibility.

## EDUCATION FOR PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY

This is the note upon which I end. It is a note of concern—concern that we Americans must better fulfill our duties to ourselves, to our nation, and to the world in order to be equal to the ever-more demanding responsibilities which are ours.



Most urgently, we should improve and expand educational opportunities for those who bear public responsibilities—our leaders, particularly those younger leaders who are emerging.

The Directors of The Fund for Adult Education, therefore, propose that varied and systematic opportunities be provided for the education of leaders and emerging leaders for their public responsibilities.

The educational experiences should be of two kinds: (1) systematic and sequential study of principles and issues, problems and situations in public affairs, ranging from the local community to the world; and (2) practical experience through participation in the affairs of the community, state and nation, and of voluntary organizations.

These educational opportunities should be provided both in educational institutions—universities, colleges, and schools—and within the circle of various organizations.

They should be given the necessary support, including financial support, by educational institutions and agencies of many kinds, both public and private—governmental units, corporations, unions, organizations and associations. Unless agencies of all kinds provide encouragement and incentives and, where necessary, financial aid and "time off" to their members to take advantage of these educational opportunities, they will not be widely offered or used.

Because of the magnitude of the task, The Fund for Adult Education can hope only to give stimulation, encouragement, and aid to this proposal. It must try "to manufacture yeast, not bread." As a start, the Fund will concentrate on four major activities: projects in co-operation with the mass media; work with educational institutions; work with national organizations; and fellowships.

The idea of freedom is rooted in the conviction that, as a spiritual creature, the individual is of supreme worth; as a moral creature, he is responsible for his actions; as a rational creature, he is capable of governing himself.

Our first necessity is to renew our faith in the fundamentals of freedom. Freedom has not been tried and found wanting. It has merely been tried and found difficult. Our task is not to make it easy, but to make it understood. It can be defended and preserved only in the way that it can be served and fulfilled—by the will and the wisdom of free men.

# Appendix

## Précis of Remarks Made at the Conference on

## "American Values and Key Manpower Needs"

## Held at the Warwick Hotel, Philadelphia, 12 November 1958

Prepared by RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Assistant Editor* of THE ANNALS

### Members of The Conference

JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH, *President of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*

EWAN CLAGUE, *United States Commissioner of Labor Statistics*

JOSEPH S. CLARK, *United States Senator from Pennsylvania*

HARRIS ELLSWORTH, *Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission*

HOWARD HANSON, *Director of the Eastman School of Music, University of Rochester*

GAYLORD P. HARNWELL, *President of the University of Pennsylvania*

PETER HENLE, *Staff Member of the Department of Research, AFL-CIO*

ELMER HUTCHISSON, *Director of the American Institute of Physics*

MARTIN MEYERSON, *Director of the Center for Urban Studies, Harvard University*

ROBERT A. MOORE, *Dean of the College of Medicine of the State University of New York*

OTTO L. NELSON, JR., *Vice-President of the New York Life Insurance Company*

FILMER S. C. NORTHROP, *Sterling Professor of Philosophy and Law, Yale University*

DON K. PRICE, JR., *Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University*

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor of* THE ANNALS *of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*

DONALD C. STONE, *Dean of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh*

STEPHEN B. SWEENEY, *Director of the Fels Institute of Local and State Government, University of Pennsylvania*

MAX WAYS, *Senior Editor of* TIME

WILLIAM L. C. WHEATON, *Director of the Institute of Urban Studies, University of Pennsylvania*

ALFRED H. WILLIAMS, *Chairman of the Board of Trustees, University of Pennsylvania*

HENRY M. WRISTON, *President of the American Assembly*





The conference opened at 10:10 a.m.

CLARK—The key questions to be answered are two:

1. Where are brains and character most needed?
2. How shall we get them there?

On the broadest posible plane, is there any consensus on the kind of society that the people of the United States want? If so, can we establish a set of priorities for manpower needs and can we, within the democratic framework, set up inducements rather than compulsions to produce a more appropriate distribution of manpower, both qualitatively and quantitatively? Can we change the public image to favor the desired occupations, and can we improve the counseling services of youth to steer them into the needed occupations?

NELSON—Can we solve the problems of communication and information flow to reduce the present occupational immobility? As a start we might consider means of transferring accumulated fringe benefits from one occupation to another. This is particularly important in easing transfers between government and private employment.

CHARLESWORTH—Do we agree with the quoted remarks of Kenneth Boulding: "The whole manpower concept [is] repulsive, disgusting, dangerous, fascistic, communistic, incompatible with the ideals of liberal democracy, and unsuitable company for the minds of the young."

MOORE—Boulding is wrong if we think in terms of incentives rather than compulsions. The laissez-faire system is doing this right now, only it is haphazard rather than planned.

NORTHROP—Boulding is right, in a sense. The trouble is that we need to rethink our entire system of goal values before we decide to undertake such schemes. We have sufficient manpower, but it is not being used. If we could clarify and purify our general cultural orientation, proper distribution of men would emerge. Almost by default, we currently emphasize expert technicians whose role is essentially instrumental, but few are working on the definition of the goals these technicians are to achieve. The chief sources of power in our culture—business, the military, and government—should strengthen the hand of those who are specialists in goal values: humanists and philosophers. The current East-West struggle makes the need of clarification of goal values more pressing; a bi-partisan planning board should be established in the State Department which could counsel on the goal values of cultures throughout the world and seek ways of communicating the best of our civilization abroad.

PRICE—Our culture tends to exaggerate its economic and technical aspects. This in part is a result of the fact that nontechnical aspects are more implicit than explicit and thus less articulated and consistent. This is why we have difficulty in communicating anything but our economic and technical culture to non-Western countries. We should decrease the emphasis on large numbers of people and encourage individuals of outstanding quality. We must cut loose from our bureaucratic structure, or at least fill the upper echelons with generalists rather than specialists.

WRISTON—In discussions of manpower, no individual goals are ever mentioned except the least common denominators of money and status. We must make occupations individually rewarding in another sense. The teacher shortage is felt least in the school system that pays the lowest salaries, the Catholic schools. The critical factor is the sense of vocation which the individual gets. We must beware of making manpower programs on the basis of current surveys because we tend to extrapolate

our moods. Surveys during the Depression indicated that too many people were getting high school diplomas. In the current boom we feel that not enough people are getting a college education. There has been a ten- or fifteen-year lag in paying the costs resulting from bad predictions. We must not talk of numbers but of individual motivations and self-fulfillment.

WHEATON—The problem is not of training only a set number of people according to a prepared list of occupations. The proper question is how to impart the general motivations to do superior work. But there is an added structural problem. We must see that the doors of opportunity are open when an individual makes his vocational choice.

HUTCHISSON—The problem is not essentially one of numbers. For instance, we do not need more physicists. Society must understand the role of the physicist and use him properly. Most of all he needs a favorable climate in which to work. This is one reason why physical scientists are in the forefront of campaigns to strengthen liberal arts training. At the same time, the qualitative problem calls for a general raising of educational standards with a more severe weeding-out process.

MEYERSON—There are several immediate and practical problems to be faced. They all involve lubricating the marketing, communications, and decision-making mechanism to achieve the best distribution of talent. Three types of problems suggest themselves:

1. Underutilization of people who could be used but are not.
2. Lack of information at key points of decision-making.
3. Democratic procedures for manpower allocations being competitive only by occupational categories. Salary scales should be graduated along the entire range within each profession so that professors or musicians and business and political executives should be rewarded equally for equal excellence.

HANSON—The Arts are of absolutely no practical value. The society does not need artists in any practical sense. It is not certain that America has in fact decided on the climate it wants to establish. The lip service paid to the Arts is a case in point. If Americans want them, they should reward them.

PRICE—This is part of the more general gap between what our policies are and what we are willing to pay for and bet on. In governmental bureaucracy the problem is to motivate and draw in skilled decision makers and generalists.

CLARK—A major governmental problem is to draw in the generalists; The International Cooperation Administration (ICA) is a case in point.

WRISTON—There is a more immediate problem with ICA. Its personnel are given no status by Congress and there is, therefore, no reason why good people should stay in it.

ELLSWORTH—A fundamental distinction must be made between a bureaucratic structure wherein a series of specialized jobs are established into which people are recruited when they meet the qualifications, and a structure where the rank is inherent in the man and he carries this rank into whatever job he fills. The civil service is set up on the former system and the ICA, like the foreign service, on the latter. In the civil service system, individual performance is rated only to the extent that it fulfills the minimum qualifications for the job—satisfactory or unsatisfactory—with no motivation for superior work. This makes it doubly difficult to attract the superior generalist. Another problem of civil service is that pay rates are responsive to prevailing rates only at the blue-collar level. The entire white-collar hierarchy lags far behind competing posts outside of government.



HENLE—While the problem may be viewed here as one of getting superior generalists, the effective demand is for specialists. Either the demand must be met or persuasion used to change the demand.

WAYS—As the discussion is crystallizing, it seems to be concerned with:

1. The fact that our basic goals are not clear.
2. The market needs adjustment.

No society is ever clear on its goals. When they are clarified, it is on specific issues at times when the system binds. The essential problem is not money. Even if salaries and wages were adjusted to our satisfaction tomorrow there would still be a manpower problem. Can we state our national goals? We could possibly state them, but getting commitment from the society is a more difficult problem. There has been a general decline of consensus on goals accompanied by a diffusion of both general and individual goals.

WILLIAMS—We will all agree that this is a business civilization. The present role of businessmen, who are essentially negotiators, is not satisfying to them. Can we produce a humanistic management occupation?

MOORE—Medical schools, like most professional schools, effectively insulate students from everything except their specialty for about ten years. How can we restore humanism into specialties that are demanding increasingly long and restricted training periods?

CHARLESWORTH—There is apparent agreement that the present allocation of manpower is not ideal. To turn the discussion to practical matters of procedure, should a nonmilitary draft be called for, particularly in view of the Russian threat? Can we recruit an élite to give more form to our national culture?

HANSON—We are already employing a disguised draft through our fellowship programs in the colleges.

WAYS—The Russian system is more than a draft. The draft is only an instrument for a cohesive philosophy. Without the cohesive philosophy the draft will not work.

WHEATON—The Russian cohesive philosophy is backed by a religious fervor.

PRICE—The government is already engaged in a form of draft through its stockpiling of scientific and engineering personnel for defense. There are underlying manpower assumptions behind the continuous *New York Times* advertisements for scientists.

CHARLESWORTH—But the situation is becoming more pressing. Do we need a "pull" draft executed by a top manpower board which would administer incentives?

WAYS—He opposed the suggestion.

CLARK—Can we not state a need without suggesting the intervention of government?

ELLSWORTH—We are already in fair shape. A historical study should be made of the past few decades which would explain why we are constantly in doubt about our future.

WRISTON—We think we are in bad shape because our aspirations have increased and we have become compulsive in our zeal to patch up our failures. There is cause for optimism. Let us forget the Russians and be ourselves.

WILLIAMS—Perhaps the discussion would be more focused if the title of the conference were changed to "American Leadership Requirements" instead of trying to cover the broad spectrum of manpower needs.

CHARLESWORTH—It is hoped that out of this preliminary conference will come some suggestions for a more intensive

survey. A further study was proposed which should be divided among three topics:

1. Appraisal of American Cultural Emphases.
2. The Response of American Professional Groups to These Emphases.
3. Implementation of New Policies to Realize the General Objectives.

PRICE—He would agree, but would amend the second point to include the general structure of society rather than just limiting the discussion to organized groups.

WRISTON—He could predict that the response of organized groups would be uniformly hostile. Such groups usually attempt to maintain guild-like restrictions which, like college accreditation standards, usually are mechanical and inefficient, letting in many incompetent organizations and harassing the competent ones. Guild functions are survivors of the depression when the main impetus was the control of newcomers and the shielding of those already in the professions from the competition of those seeking admission.

NORTHROP—We should urge that men be trained in colleges with higher standards and fewer subjects.

CLARK—We are still faced with the question of priorities and how to direct men to meet our priorities in sufficient numbers. As a start we might all agree that the teaching profession needs a more equitable distribution of rewards and punishments, that scientists represent a problem of qualitative improvement, and that the arts should get support from the government.

At this point President Harnwell arrived and reported on the Soviet system of higher education as he observed it on his recent trip to Russia. He made the following points.

HARNWELL—1. The abilities of Russian students seemed comparable with ours.

2. Within the country, education was subject to regional variations as is ours. The Russian East resembles our Far West in its educational environment.

3. A larger proportion of the Russian national income is expended on higher education than is the case in the United States.

4. The orientation is intensely practical. Physical science and languages are the most impressive parts, while the humanities lag.

5. Higher education is centrally planned and controlled.

6. The techniques for allocating personnel among various training fields are to manipulate the relative rewards of one field or another as needed.

7. The needs of technical industries are set by the Council of Ministers and are translated into planned quotas and growth factors. The relative size of the inducements are changed to draw higher or lower proportions from the pool of applicants for university seats into one science or another.

8. The humanities are a much smaller group and present no problems. The demand among the students is not very great and those studying the humanities get the minimal students' emoluments. Languages and art skills, particularly those identified as folk culture, are an exception and are encouraged.

9. About one out of every four who apply for admission obtains a seat.

10. The selection of the top quarter is by aptitudes rather than by the ability to afford an education.

PRICE—Recently speeches by top Soviet leaders have shown the traditional peasant's distrust of learning and have urged that unnecessary frills be dropped. He remarked that it sounded familiar.

CLARK—Returning the discussion to its earlier focus, is it possible or desirable to have an inventory of leadership needs?



WHEATON—The problem of leadership in the United States is very different from that in the USSR. Here our leadership is diffuse while in Russia it tends to be monolithic. For the United States a basic program must:

1. Recognize that leadership comes from all professions and therefore must emphasize leadership within all professions.
2. Give special priority to those professions which serve public policy.
3. Eliminate impediments within these professions, getting rid of enforced career ladders, to encourage mobility among the professions.

STONE—Any survey of present inducements and current needs would show that community organization, recreation, youth agencies, and social work do not get the best people, while our need is great.

WRISTON—The humanities and arts have received no mention in the catalogue of needs.

CLAGUE—Much of the surveying has already been done. His office regularly publishes a handbook of occupations which estimates the prospects and chances for advancement of some 600 occupations. In a full employment society all occupations tend to be in short supply. Although professions may act as limiting guilds in some respects, they all insisted on being represented in the handbook in a search for the best people. He suggested two major problems:

1. How to compare general public service interests as against those of the military and government.
2. How to offset the normal demands and emoluments of business.

CHARLESWORTH—Is the present ranking of monetary rewards the best possible ranking in recruitment for the general public interest?

HARNWELL—At the college age, students are no longer easily movable from one occupational goal to another. One obstacle is that the most highly specialized professions require preparatory training in high school. At a later stage it is possible only to move out of these professions, not into them. Since the selection must be made early, the general climate of opinion in the society is the most important determinant.

NELSON—It is possible to manipulate this climate. His company has found that institutional advertisements stressing certain occupations have had excellent response from the public.

MYERSON—Any programs we suggest must be for the long run and thus must reach the high schools. Exploratory projections of needs for leadership should be made, keeping in mind several broad changes in the society that seem inevitable, such as increasing urbanization. Such a survey should also delineate what should happen and not just what will happen.

CHARLESWORTH—What kind of a group or organization would be best fitted to make such an appraisal?

CLARK—Should we continue the present laissez-faire practice or should we seek some practical way of reaching Russian goals of manpower allocation in some democratic fashion?

WRISTON—Laissez-faire is central to the American system, and we either trust it or we don't. There is no part-time laissez-faire. There are great regional variations in the problems with which centralized decisions cannot cope. Vocational guidance at the secondary school level should be improved and the rest left to normal distribution processes. The primary consideration is what the student wants to do.

MEYERSON—Several practical recom-

mendations seem to emerge from the discussion:

1. The unco-ordinated but extensive governmental interference in laissez-faire must be co-ordinated.
2. A greater use of the mass media must be achieved to influence the occupational choices of youth. Emergent as well as established careers must be emphasized.
3. New surveys and co-ordination of past surveys must be made.

CHARLESWORTH—Can we not go beyond general recommendations praising virtue?

NORTHROP—We should recommend that the curricula of the early schools should require those subjects which will prepare every student for the widest range of choices at a later date.

HANSON—Any decision-making body must not be at the governmental level. Its actions in the past have usually been to the detriment of the arts and humanities. We lack effective pressure groups specific to this set of needs. Influence must be exerted at the high school level —as far away from government as possible.

ELLSWORTH—Current studies show that the previous shortage of scientists and engineers no longer exists. Continued population growth will take care of many of the shortages that now seem so pressing.

WHEATON—Can we not agree that the present distribution of incentives creates a serious imbalance operating against the humanities, the arts, and the public policy professions? These should be first in priority.

HUTCHISSON—The fundamental problem is the decline of general work incentives for intellectual achievement.

CLAGUE—We can anticipate a number of imbalances in the short-run future. For instance, one million people will be displaced from the farms. Common, unskilled labor will be in surplus supply. Competition, even now, is qualitative rather than quantitative. We have been concentrating on problems of entry into occupations. There is an almost equal problem of attrition rates where valuable skills are lost. If any interference in the distribution system is justified it should be to guide people into those occupations for which they have genuine aptitudes.

WRISTON—The target should be the counseling services. The current overemphasis upon security must be replaced by a sense of vocation. In the main, we must open doors of opportunity that close too early.

HARNWELL—Two positive steps to improve counseling might be helpful:

1. Provide funds for better professional counseling.
2. Alter the situation so that access to college is determined by ability.

MOORE—The problem of estimating manpower needs is complex. Do we need more physicians? Yes. How many? Who knows? To answer the latter question we must define the functions which we expect doctors to perform. Druggists are now oversupplied if, as now, we limit their function to the distribution of prepackaged pills. The demand for hospital superintendents depends upon our plans for building new hospitals.

STONE—We need a private agency to focus on the problem. Resources for the Future is now dealing with physical resources. We need a private, nongovernmental group perhaps called Personnel for the Future.

CHARLESWORTH—What parent organization would be most appropriate as a sponsor for such a group?

CLARK—A good plan for proceeding with this task might follow these steps:

1. Collate the existing surveys.
2. Project present trends.
3. Attempt to state our national democratic goals and the appropriate individual goals.
4. Make a qualitative and quantitative study of existing data for discussing leadership needs.
5. Suggest methods for increasing the rewards and decreasing the punishments for those critical occupations which are or will be in short supply.
6. Consider the best ways of publicizing and setting up proper counseling.
7. Induce the mass media to alter their treatment of penalized professions and to encourage those which are needed.
8. Seek further support for the project.

CHARLESWORTH—Does the group think that funds could be obtained for further work on the project?

WRISTON—He sees no reason why not. Funds are always available for good ideas.

HUTCHISSON—He generally agrees with Clark's outline. Perhaps it would be more useful to put No. 3 at the outset of the study, indicating American values before the existing studies were collated.

HENLE—The AFL-CIO tried to do something similar, although on a more limited scale, at its conference in January on "The Changing Character of American Industry."

NORTHROP—Hope was expressed that any published volume will contain the diversity of views that represent American thinking on the problem. The greatest service will be to call attention to the problem.

CHARLESWORTH—Who should undertake the larger task? If neither the government, nor existing professional organizations can do it, must we create a new agency?

CLARK—Perhaps this question might be postponed until the preliminary study is completed.

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## *ECONOMICS*

GERTRUDE BANCROFT. *The American Labor Force: Its Growth and Changing Composition.* (Census Monograph Series.) Pp. xiv, 256. New York: John Wiley & Sons, for the Social Science Research Council in co-operation with the U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1958. $7.50.

CLARENCE D. LONG. *The Labor Force under Changing Income and Employment.* (National Bureau of Economic Research, No. 65.) Pp. xxiv, 440. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1958. $10.00.

Labor force analysis—the study of that part of the population which is economically active—has become a subject of increasing interest to both sociologists and economists in the last fifteen years. Studies on the composition of the labor force, on the participation of different segments of the population in the labor force, on the geographic as well as the job mobility of the labor force, and on various other aspects have appeared. Concurrent with this developing interest on the part of the academic community, and, in part, both cause and effect of it, a growing number of governments have undertaken programs of periodic population surveys designed to augment their knowledge of the forces affecting the supply of labor available.

The authors of the books reviewed here are among the most experienced analysts in the field. Miss Bancroft has been associated with the United States Bureau of the Census' Monthly Report on the Labor Force for a number of years and has been the author of many of the Bureau's publications on labor force developments. Professor Long has written several papers on the subject and the present volume is the culmination of many years of study.

Miss Bancroft's monograph is based almost entirely on data collected by the Census Bureau. Her first chapter is a general summary of the characteristics of the labor force in 1956, of the data currently available from the Census Bureau surveys, and of several aspects of labor force analysis that are of particular concern to sociologists—for example, the significance of the retirement of a growing proportion of the older population. With this as background, the book proceeds to a brief analysis of trends since 1890 and a much more intensive description of changes between 1940 and 1950. Despite the very major increase in the number and proportion of preschool children between 1940 and 1950, with the resultant increase in the child care responsibilities of young women, and despite the rise in the real earnings of men, the proportion of women in the labor force rose over the decade. As Miss Bancroft points out, it is primarily married women with children of school age or older who are responsible for the increase, and she notes that this influx of women past thirty-five into the labor force may represent a fundamental and permanent change in social custom. Interesting corollaries of the discussion of the rise in the number of married women in the labor force are the analyses of the part-time work force and of the changes in family employment patterns. As her concluding chapter, the author presents a series of projections of the labor force to 1975, a device that presents her with a fine opportunity to summarize what the major trends in labor force participation and the factors affecting participation appear to be.





Professor Long's book is somewhat broader in scope since it includes data for selected other nations as well as for the United States. As his title implies, his major interest is in the effect of changing income and employment levels on the proportion of population in the labor force. Although he discusses the possible influences of a number of noneconomic factors on the size of the labor force, and presents some very interesting quantitative estimates of some of them, his concern is that of the economist—that is, the labor force as a source of one of the factors of production. He finds considerable support from recent data for the hypothesis set forth by Paul Douglas some twenty-five years ago—namely, that at any given point of time labor force participation varies inversely with income. Professor Long's data indicate that this is true as among nations, as among areas within the United States, and as among socio-economic groups —the higher the income, the lower the proportion of population in the labor force. With regard to the influence of employment levels on labor force participation, his conclusions are less definite. In general, he finds that they have little if any effect on participation, except possibly in an extreme crisis situation such as the depression of the 1930's.

Miss Bancroft's book is more descriptive than Professor Long's and therefore raises fewer controversial issues. There are, for example, many who would take issue with the Long conclusion that the evidence indicates additional workers were drawn into the labor force by the high unemployment rates of the 1930's. Similarly, his hypothesis that the decline in the labor force attachment of younger and older men is causally related to the increased participation of women in the middle-age ranges —that, in effect, the men were "pushed out" by the women—is debatable.

Both studies present a wealth of material for further exploration and both are well worth the time and care required to read them.

ANN RATNER MILLER
Research Associate
University of Pennsylvania

ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN. *The Strategy of Economic Development.* Pp. xiii, 217. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1958. $4.50.

Unlike many economists, Professor Hirschman is aware of the need to go beyond hypotheses based on observations of a few cases. But more scarce than capital in underdeveloped areas is the data necessary for testing his hypotheses, thus impeding if not precluding the research that would enable us to accept or reject his propositions on the strategy of economic development.

Professor Hirschman's volume challenges traditional development theory; his argument for unbalanced development as a starting point in mobilizing latent resources is contrary to generally accepted notions of strategy but is in any case probably the only practicable approach. At the very least the strategy that he proposes is probably that which has been and is being employed with varying degrees of success throughout the world.

Development with backward linkage is concluded to be the best strategy for economic development in underdeveloped countries. The successful creation of a chain of supermarkets or department stores would be an example of backward linkage from tertiary to secondary and primary production. Not only may segments of the economy develop backward from industries of a more advanced type, but efficient public administrators and other personnel known to be lacking in underdeveloped areas may be created in the industrial training situation. Although projects re-

quiring maintenance have been criticized as unsuitable for underdeveloped countries, Hirschman points out that the need for maintenance may in itself be another spur to further development. Bound to bring rejoinder is the position that population pressure is not necessarily an obstacle to growth but may be an inducement mechanism. Space prevents a complete listing of his numerous divergent views.

Profesor Hirschman concludes that government in underdeveloped countries must "initiate growth through forward thrusts meant to create incentives and pressures for further action" and must also take action to alleviate these pressures. Construction of a steel mill would necessitate an improvement in the educational system, for example. The task of foreign capital is "to enable and embolden a country to set out on the path of unbalanced growth" as the most strategic pattern for development.

The fact that Hirschman devotes himself to the strategy of economic development as he sees it does not mean that he is unmindful of obstacles to development of a social nature. He is aware of the influence of social factors in economic development and deals with values, for example, as determinants of the rate of capital formation.

LYLE W. SHANNON
Assistant Professor of Sociology
University of Wisconsin

HAROLD G. MOULTON. *Can Inflation Be Controlled?* Pp. xii, 302. Washington, D. C.: Anderson Kramer Associates, 1958. No price.

During the past several years the attempt to control prices through interest rates charged by central banks has been the subject of lively argument in the United States. The idea that recent price advances are due to oligopolistic practices in industry and labor unions has been gaining ground. Harold Moulton's book lends some timely historical and analytical support for this trend.

It is Doctor Moulton's thesis that factor costs—principally wages—are and always have been the causal factor in determining the general price level. An augmented money supply is required to support the higher level but it follows as effect rather than preceding as cause.

In terms of remedies for inflation our author dismisses everything traditional except direct control of costs and prices. Restoring the gold standard would be ineffective: inflationary trends have been almost as marked with as without this safeguard. As to fiscal policy, "there never has been any correlation between fiscal deficits or surpluses and the movement of commodity prices." As to interest rates, they are an inconsequential element in costs, and control through them "has been repeatedly tried and found wanting." Rationing credit could do the job but its disruptive effects on industry would be too costly.

The conclusions are not optimistic. Control of prices and wages in peacetime involves elemental human rights that neither can nor should be lightly sacrificed. Moral suasion will be ineffective. All that one can do is to state the essential requirements for continued prosperity and stability. These turn out to be the Brookings formula: the fruits of technological advance should be divided three ways, a portion to labor, a portion to management for expansion, and a portion to the consumer in the form of lower prices.

An Appendix is devoted to a "technical" attack on the quantity theory of money and the equation of exchange which our author finds full of ambiguities and invalidities. Also included is a criticism of attempts to correlate price and money-supply movements historically, such as that of Earl Hamilton dealing with these phenomena in sixteenth-century Spain.

The book is a valuable contribution in terms of historical material, analytical content, and the presentation of a point of view. This will be acknowledged by many who, as the reviewer, doubt the validity of reducing the causes of inflation to a single principle. As the author himself points out, during some inflations wages have lagged behind prices while in other cases the opposite has been true.

HAROLD M. GROVES
Professor of Economics
University of Wisconsin



OSKAR MORGENSTERN. *International Financial Transactions and Business Cycles.* (A Study by the National Bureau of Economic Research.) Pp. xxvi, 591. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. $12.00.

The significance and nature of the business cycle as a major problem of contemporary capitalist society have received much attention by the National Bureau of Economic Research under the initial auspices and guidance of Wesley Mitchell. This work is another important contribution to the understanding of the nature and problem of the business cycle carried out in the Mitchell tradition: the high quality of research and analysis, the clarification of issues, the posing of significant questions for further scholarly endeavor.

Oskar Morgenstern deals here with certain kinds of financial relationships by which economic fluctuations are transmitted from one economy to another. Making his main contribution through his thorough and critical analysis of financial series either in existence already or developed by himself, the author examines such points of financial contact between the United States, Britain, France, and Germany for the classical period of the gold standard (1870–1914) and the interwar period (1925–1938) to see whether and how economic disturbances spread through the four economies. After defining the problem of the international spread of the business cycle in its many complicated aspects, Morgenstern proceeds to analyze factors which the classical theory of international trade considered crucial in changing economic conditions. These include short-term interest rates in different countries, gold points and interest-rate differentials between countries, stresses in and between the international money markets, central bank policy, long-term interest rates, and the conditions of security and capital markets.

In dealing with these critical points of contact between the four economies, the author provides a very useful description of these relationships and also subjects the statistical data to a rigorous shakedown. The student of the business cycle is presented with important data on financial transactions—with their intrinsic worth critically assessed—between countries and is also given an analysis of the meaning of the relationships as they bear strategically on the transmission of business cycles. The end result is an increased understanding of business cycles, paradoxically, at the same time as the author's analysis discloses wide gaps in our statistical and theoretical framework.

The conclusions must leave us with a deep sense of humility and ignorance as well as with a clearer picture of what tasks lie ahead if we are to further understand the cycle. The balance of trade is shown to be of dubious use as a tool of analysis; any reworked theory of international spread of business fluctuations looms as a complicated one with a need for careful qualification. Many of the notions of the behavior of the gold standard have to be drastically revised. The widely accepted idea that the gold standard imposed a rigid behavior on the countries involved seems unsupported by the evidence. Gold points were often violated by exchange rates rising above or falling below the export and import points. Market relationships under the gold standard also do not seem to have conformed to expectations in the theory. For example, only in times of stress and great activity did financial markets interact intensely, while in relatively quiet periods the interaction was much less intense. Thus continuity and interrelationships in these markets varied.

Given the inadequacy of data and thus of certain tools of analysis used in international transactions, the author poses a serious problem. One of his solutions to the problem is the use of a theory-of-games approach in which the inadequacy of data and theoretical tools is not a vitiating factor. In any event Morgenstern's comprehensive handling of the problem confronts both the policy-maker and the scholar of the business cycle and international economic relationships with much to make him pause, reconsider, and look more wisely at his subject.

CHARLES HOFFMANN
Queens College

BENT HANSEN. *The Economic Theory of Fiscal Policy.* Translated by P. E. Burke. Pp. xv, 450. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958. $8.00.

In this excellent book the director of the *Konjunkturinstitutet* in Stockholm assesses the possibility of using fiscal policy to secure a stable value of money at full employment. The author does not suggest a definite program for fiscal policy. His aim is "to show how problems of economic policy in general, and of fiscal policy in particular, ought to be dealt with in economic analysis. The main purpose is to expound and demonstrate an analytical method." The general theory of fiscal policy is considered in Part I. Part II is concerned with the micro-economics and Part III with the macro-economics of fiscal policy. A large portion of the analysis is at a high level of abstraction.

The distinction between parameters—means—and endogenous variables is of central importance for this study. Fiscal policy parameters usually include rates of tax or subsidy, "real" purchase plans, and the like. Income and expenditure items in the budget, on the other hand, cannot as a rule be regarded as fiscal policy parameters. While "it is possible to speak of the effects of parameter changes, it is meaningless to speak of the effects of changes in the endogenous variables." The budget balance may be the subject of an economic policy goal, but it is not an economic policy weapon or means. One should not expect to find simple connections between changes in the budget balance and other changes in the economic system. This reasoning differs markedly from that in numerous theoretical and practical discussions of budget and fiscal policy, which assume that the budget deficit or surplus—or changes therein—are the most important means of influencing the economy which the state has at its disposal.

It is here possible only to suggest the incisiveness and thoroughness of this notable work. Thus, on fiscal policy in relation to the supply of labor three questions are raised: Which occupation is to be chosen? A trade having been selected, how many working hours per day, week, or year—and what degree of intensity and skill—will one wish to devote to his work? When the household is the planning unit, how many members will seek employment? Fiscal policy can be expected to influence the choice in all three respects rather than merely affecting working time. In Hansen's view "there is nothing in economic theory, or more especially in welfare theory, to imply that fiscal policy should be directed towards increasing the incentive to work. This is purely a political question and it is quite conceivable that a reasonable policy may wish to lessen the willingness to work for welfare reasons."

This book will be of major interest to economic and fiscal theorists. There is an underlying realism that commands respect. This is nowhere more evident than in the discussion of incidence. Referring to the neoclassical distinction between the incidence and effects of taxes, Hansen states that the most reasonable interpretation is that the expression "tax incidence" refers to the influence upon the real net incomes of individuals, groups of individuals, or factors, while the expression "effects" refers to all other effects of the tax. "Incidence thus becomes one particular effect among all the other effects of a tax." In recent decades numerous students of taxation have come to accept a similar view: the rigid differentiation of Seligman and others has played a receding role in the literature. It is good to know that an economist of Hansen's skills takes the modern view.

LEWIS H. KIMMEL
Senior Staff Member
The Brookings Institution

HERBERT F. TAGGART. *Cost Justification.* (Michigan Business Studies, Vol. XIV, No. 3.) Pp. xvi, 588. Ann Arbor: Bureau of Business Research, School of Business Administration, University of Michigan, 1959. $12.50.

This big volume is not directly concerned with the dispute over the consistency of the Robinson-Patman Act (see Morris A. Adelman in *The A & P Case—A Study in Applied Economic Theory,* 1949) Nor is it concerned "directly" with Galbraith's fear of a design by the act's sponsors to inhibit the chain stores' employment of a benign countervailing power. Whether or not the Robinson-Patman legislation was really anti-trust or only fooling has been left to others; Professor Taggart is concerned here to show that the proof of cost differences in Federal Trade Commission cases is not, nor has been, impossible. The failure in some important cases to prove that differences in costs of selling to different buyers justified the differential pricing about which there was complaint has led to a belief that, in former Chairman Howrey's phrase, "The cost defense has proved largely illusory" (p. 543).

The author worked in Washington on "all of the recorded instances in which respondents to Federal Trade Commission complaints or defendants in treble damage suits have attempted to defend their pricing practices by presenting information about their costs" (p. v). He has included fifteen landmark cases in great detail, seven minor cases, three treble damage suits, and two cases bearing directly upon the question: Must a buyer know the seller's costs? One of these latter cases, Automatic Canteen Company *v.* Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 346 U.S. 61 (1953), has created the impression, referred to above, that the act is inconsistent.

The concluding two chapters are on "The Rules of the Game" and "Cost Justification: Where Does It Stand?" Herein Professor Taggart states the conclusion that recourse to Section 2(b)'s "meeting competition" defense is difficult, but not impossible, since the Standard Oil of Indiana case in 1958. But such recourse will be impossible if Congress passes a bill denying to competition-meeting the role of absolute defense. Thus cost defense under Section 2(a) will soon be the only defense available, as it seems more than likely to this reviewer that such legislation is only a matter of time. This is a very important book, examining each case in such great detail that the book should be interesting to cost accountants, lawyers, and economists.

There is a Bibliography of books, articles, public documents, and reports. The Advisory Committee on Cost Justification Report to the FTC, February 1956 is an Appendix.

This book should be on reference for the use of all students in government and business. It certainly provides cases for cost accounting. It goes a long way toward clearing the thicket that Commissioner Howrey describes as "the mystery and ignorance [both in industry and government] which surrounds distribution costs."

ROBERT ROCKAFELLOW
Professor of Economics
College of Business Administration
University of Rhode Island

LINCOLN H. CLARK (Ed.) with the assistance of JOAN B. CARNEY. *Consumer Behavior: Research on Consumer Reactions.* Pp. viii, 472. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. $6.50.

"This is the third volume issued by Consumer Behavior, Incorporated, a nonprofit organization established by a group of social scientists [of the University of Michigan, Survey Research Center, "school"] to promote research on consumer behavior toward the end of increasing our ability to predict what consumers will do." The book contains fifteen papers on various aspects of consumer behavior and one or more comments by participants in the two conferences where most of the papers were presented. The various papers are loosely organized around the topic of innovation and change in consumer behavior; several articles involve studies of other societies or international comparisons.

The book clearly reveals the current disordered state of consumer research, particularly as it is presented in the more formal, academic setting of conferences and courses. But the other areas of applied social science research are also in such a state. Indeed, one can say that even the recognition, common among the book's contributors, that consumer behavior is an applied area within the purview of the social and behavioral sciences is a significant advance, part of the increasing awareness by businessmen and business school faculties that they deal with human phenomena, and that they must look to those

sciences for the most meaningful concepts and methods for studying them.

Two common failings of current work in consumer behavior are sharply revealed by the papers. The researches reported tend to yield remarkably meager findings. For example, from Eva Mueller's "The Desire for Innovations in Household Goods" we learn that those who want innovations tend to be younger, family oriented, well-educated people well supplied with standard goods, who feel reasonably satisfied about their financial status. One might ask, "Who else?" On the other hand, the papers which offer broader generalizations and reflect a more complex conceptual approach tend to leave the reader dissatisfied with the sparse or categorical nature of the guidance offered for understanding the concrete human behavior involved. Samuel Stouffer's "Sociological Factors Favoring Innovations," for example, is stimulating because of the breadth of his approach to social change in the aggregate. Where, however, can one find the attention to specific human behaviors combined with a sufficiently sophisticated behavioral science approach to result in a sense of explanation—let alone prediction?

Sol Tax's "Changing Consumption in Indian Guatemala" and Simon Rottenberg's "Consumption Choices and Economic Change: The Case of Puerto Rico" come closest. Both are concerned—Tax more concretely—with the individual in his social matrix, and neither loses sight of the psychological base for the consumer's "preference schedules" and the social realities which condition his striving to satisfy these.

The book contains a good ninety-page Bibliography by James Morgan of empirical research on consumer behavior along with a discussion of the conceptual frameworks most often used in such research.

LEE RAINWATER
Associate Director
Social Research, Inc.

SHEPARD B. CLOUGH. *The Economic Development of Western Civilization.* Pp. xv, 540. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959. $7.50.

Professor Clough has undertaken a monumental task: to pack into 500 pages the economic history of Western civilization from ancient times to the Marshall Plan and Point Four. As a review of economic history, he has succeeded admirably. Here can be found brief, clear accounts of the many topics on which economic historians have worked: the enclosure movement, the Black Death, high farming, the industrial revolution, and so forth. There may be quarrels with emphasis—half a page is hardly enough for the fall of Rome; four mentions of the invention of the horse-collar perhaps too many. It would be difficult to take exception to Professor Clough's interpretations on particular points because for the most part he adheres to traditional positions, or is eclectic.

But whereas the book makes an admirable vehicle for the graduate student reviewing the field of economic history for his general examinations, it is hard to know how it can be used beyond that. The beginning student will find it too fully packed with information and theory to serve as an introductory textbook. In addition, numerous points are inadequately treated such as the introduction of a diagram *from the Network of World Trade* included on page 328 without a word of explanation, or the similar one on *Relative Price and Trade* on page 398.

The scholar will find the twenty-one-page Bibliography a useful review of the standard monographic literature in economic history. Beyond this, and its use for reference, the book serves no obvious purpose. Professor Clough asserts that it is intended as a contribution to knowledge which will aid mankind in attaining a higher level of civilization, presumably by illuminating the process of economic growth. But his explicit theory of growth in the introductory chapter is so multidimensional—with so many factors "crucial," "essential," and "important" that it is difficult to see how 2,000 years of economic history can contribute to the process of growth. "Change may originate in any segment of the economy." For a time it seemed to this reviewer that Professor Clough was going to attach a central importance in impeding growth to rigidities which are mentioned on pages 14, 41, 49, 55, 73, 80, and 101. But after the Middle Ages, the attention paid to this factor diminishes, as we are left with the view —doubtless correct, but of dubious help for policy—that economic growth involves many factors in complex interaction.

C. P. KINDLEBERGER
Professor of Economics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology



BARBU NICULESCU. *Colonial Planning: A Comparative Study.* Pp. 208. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958. Distributed by The Macmillan Company, New York. $4.25.

This little volume is an elaboration of a doctoral thesis submitted to the University of London in 1956. It began as a study of development planning in the Gold Coast, now Ghana. The "need for perspective, standards of comparison and completeness" led to its expansion into a comparative study of world-wide colonial planning. Selected development plans from the seventy low-income colonial territories were drawn upon for comparison.

After a general summary of statistical data on territorial incomes, capital accumulations, origin and size of planning grants, metropolitan contributions, obstacles and growth of the movement, the author deals with the "machineries" of planning such as resources and the planning and revising bodies used by metropolitan and territorial governments. He concludes with a discussion of the "priorities" of the various plans which have been tried out.

One could wish that the author, who is on the faculty of the University College of Ghana, had confined his efforts to a critical analysis of the carry-over of colonial development plans from the Gold Coast colony to independent Ghana. This could have been cogently presented in a book of equal size and would have met a world-wide and as yet unsatisfied curiosity. What indeed were the plans of action which stood the acid test of that transition?

The present armchair study, in a field on which there is such a voluminous literature, leaves the reader with what its author apologetically calls "a blurred and shifting picture of what such plans have succeeded in achieving."

As a reference work this publication leaves all too much to be desired. It is sketchy, incomplete, and lacking in specific source material. As a contribution to general public information in the field it lacks maturity and focus. To one familiar with the literature on colonial policy, whether English, French, Belgian, Dutch, or Scandinavian, it is academic, timid, trite and dull. In spite of the fact that it is well written, well documented, and a credit to the industriousness of the writer, the reader puts it down with the disappointing query: what of it?

CHARLES W. COULTER
Professor of Sociology, Emeritus
University of New Hampshire

## *BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES*

GEORG KARLSSON. *Social Mechanisms: Studies in Sociological Theory.* Pp. 156. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. $5.00.

In this thin but far from skimpy work the author points up current trends and probable future directions in the development of mathematical theory in sociology. For thorough understanding the reader should be equipped with the calculus, probability theory—especially stochastic processes—matrices, and differential equations. However, considerably less mathematical preparation would afford reasonable comprehension, especially since proofs are eliminated throughout the book.

The work consists of a brief introduction and three main sections. In the introduction Karlsson contrasts mathematical models of social processes with traditional sociological theory which he considers to be primarily classificatory. In the latter camp he places the works of Parsons and Becker, probably without their consent. As might be expected the contrast places mathematized theory in quite a favorable light because of its parsimony of expression and explicit delineation not merely of variables but also of relations among variables and of their temporal dynamics. Each of the three major sections

is divided into three subsections which are concerned with existing models, relevant empirical data, and suggestions for the construction of more adequate models.

The first major section is concerned with social diffusion, primarily of information but to some extent also of values and of behaviors. Here the well-known works of Rashevsky and Rapaport are discussed briefly as is an intriguing model of Hägerstrand which is not otherwise available in English. The second section discusses models of group choice, including sociometric choice situations, labor mobility, migration, and the choice of a marital partner. The final section deals with interactional mechanisms and emphasizes models by Festinger, Simon, and Arrow.

This is an important work for a number of reasons, possibly the most outstanding being the clear image which is presented of the weaknesses as well as of the strengths of mathematical theory in sociology. Necessary but sometimes ridiculous simplifying assumptions are usually pointed out clearly and critically. Lazarsfeld's Bernoulli model of random sociometric choice, for instance, makes the empirically naive assumption that the probability of choosing a given person in a social group and of being chosen by that person are statistically independent. Nonetheless, Karlsson presents ample evidence that such models sometimes yield predictions which are far more precise and accurate than those which have been afforded by more traditional sociological theory.

One could quibble with several aspects of this book if he so chose. It is far from being a survey of mathematical thinking in sociology. Its emphases are much too social-psychological to suit the tastes of some. There are a few notational errors and the burden of proof is left almost entirely to the reader. However, the work does comprise such a solid contribution to the literature on mathematical sociology that one would have to be extraordinarily testy to dwell at any length on these points. It is a book which deserves the careful attention of sociological theorists.

ROBERT MCGINNIS
Associate Professor of Sociology
University of Wisconsin

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET and REINHARD BENDIX. *Social Mobility in Industrial Society.* (A Publication of the Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California.) Pp. xxi, 309. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. $5.00.

In each of a score of industrialized nations scattered across the globe, at least a handful of sociologists could now pass the following test: if given a set of figures purporting to describing rates of social mobility in their own or a similar society, they could tell at a glance whether the figures should be given credence. A short decade ago, bravado alone could have prompted anyone anywhere to volunteer for the test, for virtually all of the evidence on which the judgment would now be based is that recent.

Empirical research on social mobility has benefited from excellent communication at international congresses, in scholarly journals, and through a series of books that collate and evaluate studies and that develop ideas to explain their results. *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* should assume a favored position in this series. Its Bibliography is comprehensive, its geographical coverage more complete than any of its predecessors, its interpretations plausible and stimulating. Because the interest in undertaking studies of social mobility gives no sign of flagging, the book will probably have a shorter half-title than if it dealt with a less rapidly cumulating field of research. It might therefore be in order to define this review as written with at least one eye on the historical record.

At this juncture, rates of social mobility are apparently roughly similar in all of the modern industrial and urban societies of the world. How much higher or lower the rates are than at specified times in the past is difficult to say, although they seem to have been relatively stable or to have exhibited only random fluctuation over at least the past half century, that is, since the Industrial Revolution took a firm hold in Western Europe and America. An excellent chapter in the book presents all the recently collected facts leading to this diagnosis.

Why the authors should then be led to



"explain" social mobility rates is not clear; surely one can make a better case for and test of a causal explanation of something when it varies than when it is present to about the same degree in all observed instances. Until a proper test can be made, little can be said of the theory.

A chapter on the origins of the American business elite deserves special praise. Five studies, including one hitherto unpublished, are compared with respect to their definitions of the elite, their sources of data, and their findings. Some puzzling contradictions among the earlier studies are resolved here by careful scrutiny of their assumptions and techniques—an accomplishment of the first order of importance.

Oakland, California was the scene of a survey on social mobility carried out by Lipset and Bendix. Three chapters of the book review and supplement a number of published articles describing that study. But it is in reading the final section of the book that one gets the strongest sense of standing on the brink of discoveries still to be made. The first chapter is called "Community Structure," the theme of which stems from the insight that social mobility rates are somehow linked with urbanization. The idea is, "the more urbanized the community, the higher the degree of social mobility of its inhabitants." Data from the Oakland survey and from other inquiries as well are summoned to see if this idea squares with the facts. Because most of the studies were not designed for this purpose, the facts are—as the authors say—not all they should be. But the idea is clearly an important one.

So with the chapter on "Intelligence and Motivation" and that on "Social Structure and Social Mobility," where again the supply of data is exhausted short of the authors' capacity to speculate. More power to their hunches, which will prove to be either valid assertions, bad guesses, or, most likely, first approximations, in the years to come.

NATALIE ROGOFF
Research Associate
Bureau of Applied Social Research
Columbia University

EVERETT CHERRINGTON HUGHES. *Men and Their Work.* Pp. 184. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. $4.00.

This volume is made up of a series of papers, all but one of which have been published previously. Some of the essays were originally published more than thirty years ago, some within the last few years. As connective tissue, the author has supplied a Preface and some new introductory remarks to some of the papers.

In spite of the diversity of origin in point of time, the papers concentrate on a relatively narrow range of material. The primary concern is with professional roles, and with the effect of these roles on the personality of the men and women who play them. Some papers consider this problem in the large; others deal with specific professions or would-be professions. Certain common themes run through these papers: the career history of individuals and the life history of careers, the effect of technological change on individuals pursuing careers and on careers in general, the interweaving of careers and society. Throughout, the emphasis is on the individual in his relation to role, not, for instance, on the structure of roles or the form in which they are organized. As the author himself states, his emphasis is social and psychological, not structural or organizational.

Along with these substantive themes, there runs a commentary on the concepts which have been used, their strengths and weaknesses. Hughes describes the aim of research as a deeper penetration into social and personal life, and this depends upon the concepts used and the questions asked. Thus he notes his own error while investigating the real-estate business in asking, "is this occupation a profession?" Rather, he says, the question should have been, "what are the circumstances in which the people in an occupation attempt to turn it into a profession, and themselves into professional people?" A similar criticism is made of the concept of "restriction of production," which was current in industrial sociology some years ago.

However, there is no central theory, only these isolated concepts. But why are some

questions considered and not others? Why are particular themes important? For instance, what is the significance of the insight that professions have access to "guilty knowledge"? The criteria are, in all cases, apparently the feeling of the author for their significance and interest. On this basis, the author is able sometimes to achieve brilliant insights into his material. But at least this reviewer felt throughout the work the absence of a central body of theory which might have served to unify the papers, to serve as a source of hypotheses, and to provide wider causal explanations of the phenomena under investigation. What emerges from this work is considerably less than what its title implies—a study of men and their work would need a very wide theoretical framework.

The papers are beautifully constructed and written. They offer sometimes wry, sometimes humorous, often pessimistic glimpses into the behavior of professionals, would-be professionals, and nonprofessionals. Investigation of the "simpler" occupations to point up the foibles of the professions is a shrewd and amusing move. There is one essay on the behavior of government statisticians under the Nazis which deserves a place in the catalog of the literature on the behavior of scientists and bureaucrats in general. And there is a little play appended to the volume which it would not be wise to describe for the reader; he is urged to sample it himself.

EUGENE V. SCHNEIDER
Associate Professor of Sociology
Bryn Mawr College

BERNARD KARSH. *Diary of a Strike*. Pp. xiii, 180. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958. $3.50.

This book constitutes an important addition to the as yet quite scanty literature on the sociology and social psychology of strikes. A great number of historical studies of strike movements are of course available, and labor economists have given us detailed statistical accounts of the cost and duration of strikes, and of the relation of proneness to and frequency of strikes to economic conditions in particular industries and to the general economic cycle. However, qualitative studies of social behavior in strike situations have been almost totally neglected, the books by Warner and Low, and by Alvin W. Gouldner being the major exceptions.

This study gives an account of the natural history of a "strike for union" in a small midwestern town, in which only about two hundred workers were directly involved. The situation studied is therefore not typical of strike movements in mass industries, but what is lost in representativeness is gained by the opportunity this limited setting afforded to follow closely the course of the strike and its impact on all the participants as well as on the small town in which it occurred. We get here a vivid picture of the tactics of organization and of the social process in which people are moved to engage in actions which earlier would have appeared perturbing and frightening. We learn how men redefine their relations with their fellows once new commitments create new lines of cleavage and new types of involvement. The complex interplay between union organizers and rank-and-filers, as well as the emerging union loyalties and the gradual growth of a feeling of solidarity, is discussed with a great deal of subtlety.

While this is primarily a step-by-step account of a strike's natural history, the book is still firmly grounded in theoretical perspective. It uses primary group theory to good advantage, describing the process by which individuals come to accept certain groups as frames of reference, orienting their actions and expectations as well as their self-image to significant persons in these groups. Professor Karsh is in accord with recent developments in the theory of conflict behavior by stressing that strikes, far from being a purely negative and destructive phenomenon as so many observers of the labor scene still assume, serve in fact a number of determinate and significant functions. "The strike," he stresses, "is both an overt expression of the conflict and a method of expedential resolution leading to a new *modus vivendi*." Conflict is an indigenous component of the worker-employer relationship, not, as Mayo and his school contended, a sign of sickness.



This book should be of interest not only to specialists in labor relations, but to sociologists and social psychologists studying problems of administrative and organizational behavior. It is indispensable for students of social conflict.

LEWIS A. COSER
Associate Professor of Sociology
Brandeis University

SHELDON GLUECK (Ed.). *The Problem of Delinquency*. Pp. xvi, 1183. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959. $10.50.

Like previous Glueck books, this will be a major reference work, even for those who regularly quarrel with the Gluecks.

Dr. Glueck, generally with his wife as coauthor, summarizes his own work in 19 of this collection's 186 articles. He also introduces 29 of the 33 chapters with brief "Notes." Legal cases or statutes constitute 54 of the articles, but only 185 pages. The remaining 73 articles—over 800 pages—are by 106 authors, including 24 psychiatrists or psychoanalysts, 19 sociologists, 19 social workers, 11 lawyers, 9 psychologists, and 24 of other professions or not classified by profession.

In this diversity almost everyone can find much interest and some treasure. My prize was Eisenstadt's functional analysis of "Delinquent Group Formation Among Children of Immigrants." If generalized to include internal migrants, this cogently explains most of the highest delinquency groups in American urban history, including today's apparent leaders—urban-reared children of Southern-rural and Puerto-Rican-reared parents.

Methodological deficiencies which have been apparent in some of the Gluecks' other writings persist in the contributions here. Reliability tests for subjective data are not reported, nor are classifications and classification procedures specified sufficiently to permit replication. Antecedent probability in validations of prediction tables is neglected. For instance, a table which predicts delinquency in most institutionalized delinquents might also predict it in nondelinquents, and even if it identifies 90 per cent of nondelinquents accurately, it will still, by Bayes' theorem, make more erroneous than correct predictions of delinquency in most schools where children are less than 10 per cent delinquent. Methodological critics, such as Meehl and Rosen in psychology and Reiss and Kuhlen in sociology, are also ignored.

The Glueck and Podolsky articles stress biological correlates of delinquency despite weak evidence, but neglect more markedly evident social correlates in Glueck data. The firmest biological finding, essentially, is that in high delinquency areas, average institutionalized delinquents are somewhat huskier than nondelinquents. This may reflect mainly selectivity by delinquent groups, and Detroit evidence suggests that police arrest the huskiest first.

Glueck dismisses differential association theory, preferring lists of zero-order correlates of delinquency, which he calls "multifactor theory." Such lists achieve few of the things which Phillip Frank's *Philosophy of Science* pointed out as distinguishing scientific theory: the quality of being simpler than the observations it represents, and the quality of promoting expansion of observations into unknown territory.

Despite these serious deficiencies, the Glueck research and this Glueck collection of readings are the most thorough works of their type on juvenile delinquency.

DANIEL GLASER
Associate Professor of Sociology
University of Illinois

PHILIP M. HAUSER (Ed.). *Population and World Politics*. Pp. 297. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. $6.00.

This book, a reader in the Social Sciences series of The Free Press, includes three public lectures and eight round table papers presented in November 1954 at the Thirtieth Institute of the Harris Memorial Foundation, Chicago.

Following an introduction by the editor, the eleven chapters are organized in three parts covering: World Population and Resources; Population, Levels of Living, and Economic Development; Population Policy and Politics. The contributors form a galaxy of demographers and other United States social scientists who have a basic interest in the subject of population. It

would be difficult to match their talent in this country or elsewhere. The group includes: John D. Durand, United Nations; Frank W. Notestein, Princeton; W. S. Woytinsky and Simon Kuznets, Johns Hopkins; Everett E. Hagen, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dorothy Swaine Thomas, University of Pennsylvania; Joseph J. Spengler, Duke University; Kingsley Davis, University of California; Frank Lorimer, American University; Irene B. Taeuber, Princeton; Quincy Wright and the editor, Philip M. Hauser, University of Chicago.

The volume is not one for reading at one or two sittings, and readers will naturally choose topics or authors to suit their tastes. It is a substantial addition to the references on population, and the series of lectures reflects the factual data and thinking of 1954. Since population changes occur so rapidly in this decade, a few statements among the lectures are already outdated.

Parts I and II form background material which leads to the consideration in Part III of Policy and Politics. While each lecture or chapter stands on its own merit, the reviewer felt that the book does not quite live up to the promise of its title. Most of the chapters emphasize demographic and socio-economic factors, and there is less of world politics than expected. Since all of the lecturers are authors of numerous articles and books of their own, this series has inevitably a sameness to other writings. However, this repetition and some overlapping between the chapters of individual lectures does not detract seriously. A few chapters might be omitted or combined with others without weakening the volume and its over-all theme.

The demographers, Durand and Notestein, discuss population growth on a world and regional basis and the changes in mortality and fertility which have occurred or are in prospect. Evidence of original analytical effort is found in the chapters by Kuznets on economic trends and by Spengler on the reciprocal relations of population growth and economic development. In the political group the offerings of K. Davis and F. Lorimer attract special attention because they touch upon the issue of population and Communist policy.

In turn the other contributors review their specialties. Woytinsky analyzes world resources in food, raw materials, and energy in relation to population growth. Mrs. Thomas presents the topic of international migration while Mrs. Taeuber gives most attention to the Far East and its political instabilities.

The final chapter by Quincy Wright draws the conclusion that United States policy is more concerned with population conditions abroad than at home. He expresses his personal views freely and in accord with United Nations principles urges greater study and understanding of the role of population in world affairs.

Each author treats his or her subject objectively and in general a notable absence of pessimism or alarm in the collective writings is observed. The special value of this volume, aside from its recording of a series of Institute lectures, lies in the fact that it collates and condenses in one place a considerable body of information and interpretation about world population. The editing function is well done by Philip Hauser. His fifteen-page Introduction adds to the general theme and summarizes the contributions of the individual lecturers.

M. C. BALFOUR
The Population Council.

REUBEN HILL, J. MAYONE STYCOS, and KURT W. BACK. *The Family and Population Control: A Puerto Rican Experiment in Social Change.* (A Social Science Research Center Study, College of the Social Sciences, University of Puerto Rico, in co-operation with the Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina.) Pp. xxvi, 481. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959. $8.00.

The rapid population growth in Puerto Rico, resulting from falling death rates and sustained high birth rates, is clearly a contemporary problem of the first magnitude. Its importance stems not only from economic and social problems confronting the island itself, but from the fact that Puerto Rico reveals many of the classical characteristics of low income areas in transition which are being watched with great interest and concern throughout the world.



The research findings reported in this volume are crucial to understanding the social-psychological bases underlying high fertility. Large families are clearly not the preference of most Puerto Rican couples. Although small families of two and three children constitute the typical preference, there is a great deal of ambiguity and ambivalence of attitude about family size. Small family preferences plus the fact that contraception is rarely started before the second birth prompt the conclusion that a small family norm is not yet crystallized.

Puerto Ricans are not ignorant of contraception. On the contrary, less than 5 per cent of the population appears ignorant of all methods. Moreover, 20 per cent of the women report having been sterilized. Apparently "la Operación" enjoys a certain status among women. Although evidently popular, its impact on the birth rate is slight because women typically have the operation following their sixth or seventh pregnancy.

The incidence of birth control practice and preferences for small families are clearly inconsistent with the official position of the Catholic Church. The fact that over 80 per cent of the island's population is Catholic, however, is of little apparent relevance per se to the level of high fertility; religious objections to nonchurch approved methods of birth control were confined to a minority.

The *machismo* hypothesis, another popular interpretation of high fertility, is also refuted. Anxiety about maleness was found to be most characteristic of age groups marginal to those in the marital, reproductive period.

The theoretical frame of reference employed views the family as an interactional, problem-solving system. In this context, communication between husband and wife about family size and contraception is a critical variable to which the authors devote much attention. In view of the empirical findings, this subject received considerably more attention than it deserved.

Many specific recommendations—such as devoting more attention to the husband in the birth-control clinic programs—emerge from this multi-phased research which included not only an extensive exploratory phase of semi-structured interviews, previously published by J. Mayone in *Family and Fertility in Puerto Rico* (1955), but a quantitative verification phase to test hypotheses and a final phase in which the effectiveness of six different educational approaches to birth control attitudes and behavior was experimentally tested. The limitations of the sampling plans which frequently had to be compromised for practical reasons are clearly described.

There are some aspects of this book which detract from its otherwise high level of presentation. The weakest section is Part III, Steps Toward a Model of Fertility Dynamics, the two most irritating features of which are its occasional theoretical pretentiousness and a tendency to verbalize selected correlations of negligible magnitude in such a manner as to mislead the reader who does not connect text with table. On the whole, however, the book demonstrates what imaginative social science research can contribute to the solution of pressing practical problems.

CHARLES F. WESTOFF
Associate Professor of Sociology
and Anthropology
New York University
Research Associate
Office of Population Research
Princeton University

JACK KENNY WILLIAMS. *Vogues in Villainy: Crime and Retribution in Ante-Bellum South Carolina.* Pp. viii, 191. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1959. $5.00.

In his Foreword, Dr. Williams explains that "the purpose of this book is to trace the patterns of lawlessness and the mechanics of law enforcement within South Carolina during the ante-bellum decades, 1790–1860." He hopes that "the study may suggest a fuller understanding of the South as a whole, and especially of the less favored white citizens," since for the most part the book is not concerned with slaves and free blacks.

In six chapters of carefully documented

but very easily read and interesting narrative, Dr. Williams parades before us a fascinating array of murderers, robbers, arsonists, swindlers, gamblers, brawlers, petty thieves, vagrants, and "sisters of riotous sensuality" whose killings, depredations, villainous acts, and lascivious misdeeds placed a heavy burden upon the shoulders of the colorful band of officers, lawyers, and judges to whom was entrusted the responsibility of maintaining law and order in antebellum South Carolina. It is a revealing tale of rascality, which, however, is not without its comedy relief provided by such picturesque characters as "Big Sall," whose prowess with fist and club gained her the reputation of being a fighter who "took on all comers, male or female." The forces of law and order also had their celebrated figures. Among these was Judge Aedanus Burke, who on one occasion refused to sentence a member of the state legislature who was guilty of hog stealing because "it was more important that so foul a stain should be kept off the character of the district, than that a hog thief should be punished."

The skill with which Dr. Williams organizes and presents his facts demonstrates a thorough familiarity with the primary sources in which much of his history is deeply rooted. In fact, one of the important features of this book is the Appendix in which the author describes and evaluates the sources from which he has drawn his material. It is partly because of the great care with which this Appendix has been prepared that the reader feels confident in accepting the author's conclusion that "crime was no less a problem in pre-Civil War South Carolina than in the present State; and that the moral fiber of the people, considered collectively, was not appreciably stronger nor weaker than it is today." Apparently while styles in almost everything else in South Carolina have changed, vogues in villainy are today very much as they were then.

In his *Vogues in Villainy,* Dr. Williams has given us a lively and sometimes humorous account of crime and punishment in antebellum South Carolina. His book can be read with benefit and enjoyment by all who are interested in the annals of crime and the development of American justice.

ROBERT G. CALDWELL
Professor of Criminology
State University of Iowa

FRED CHARLES IKLÉ. *The Social Impact of Bomb Destruction.* Pp. xxii, 250. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958. $3.95.

The ability of atomic and hydrogen bombs to destroy life and organized resources is obviously enormous. Consequently, it has often seemed easier simply to accept the statement that nuclear war spells the end of civilization, if not of all human life, than to attempt to specify and measure the specific consequences of nuclear bombing.

It is Iklé's purpose to take the harder course. In this book he attempts to examine the social consequences of varying degrees of bomb destruction particularly as these affect the organization and distribution of urban manpower. A city is seen as an ecological patterning involving a functionally homogeneous relationship between goods and services and their consumers. Such a patterning is disturbed or destroyed by disasters, whether plagues, floods, or bombings. Increasing physical destruction limits the elasticity of the remaining resources by increasing consumer demand for them. Thus if the destroyed proportion of such resources as food, housing, or transportation is great enough, the ability of a city or country to carry on will be ended.

The major part of this study is an examination of the experiences of German, English, and Japanese cities which were bombed in World War II. Anyone who is familiar with the detailed reports of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey will find the figures and conclusions presented familiar. Both demonstrate clearly that devasted cities can show extraordinary resiliency as in Hamburg after the ruinous air raids of July and August 1943. These took over 60,000 lives and destroyed almost one-third of the city's homes, yet five months later production was at 80 per cent of pre-raid levels. Both emphasize that although bombing in World War II lowered civilian morale, its effect on behavior was less significant since habit, fear of punishment, and lack of any real alternative kept men at their customary places and tasks.

The social consequences of nuclear bombing are necessarily much more speculative. Here the author indicates the increased difficulties in maintaining the social organization as the size of the areas of explosion increases and as the latter are widened by fire storms and radioactivity. In the end he does not forecast the destruction of civilization, but his carefully documented descriptions of past experience will strengthen many readers in their belief that the prevention of war is the only sure way to prevent destruction and its tragic consequences on a scale never before known.

The author insists, without proof, that stockpiling more and more bombs is a way to avoid such war (p. 178), which is perhaps naive. There are other criticisms. Rural areas and small towns are seen as unlikely to be affected by nuclear attacks beyond the nuisance of billeting evacuees (p. 186). Although it is true that little is known about the genetic effects of nuclear radiation, they are dismissed here in cavalier fashion (pp. 210–211). It is doubtful that the social effects of various natural disasters such as the floods in 1953 in The Netherlands can be compared to those attributable to wartime destruction, occurring as they do in a period when the national economy is not under stress and when the disaster itself is clearly short-lived.

Nevertheless, Iklé's book focuses attention on a subject much in need of careful study. It does so with commendable thoroughness and a sometimes chilling detachment.

VINCENT HEATH WHITNEY
Department of Sociology
University of Pennsylvania

MARGARET MEAD. *An Anthropologist at Work: Writings of Ruth Benedict.* Pp. xxii, 583. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959. $6.00.

This volume not only furnishes some intimate, back-stage details of how one anthropologist went about her work, but also provides revealing glimpses of the personality of one of the most widely read social scientists of our time. Margaret Mead has here collected numerous unpublished letters, essays, and poems of her friend Ruth Benedict as well as some previously published articles and verse not readily available to the general reader. She has also added several narrative, biographical chapters of her own, which provide the backgrounds for the other materials. Margaret Mead apparently was one of the few intimate friends Ruth Benedict had, and their close personal and professional relationship continued for some twenty-five years, beginning in 1923 when they were graduate students of anthropology together at Columbia University, and continuing until Mrs. Benedict's death in 1948 at the age of sixty-one.

A picture emerges of a greatly talented and intelligent, but painfully shy and sensitive, person who not until she became a recognized and established anthropologist in the mid 1930's found focus and integration for her life. She herself writes at one point that through most of her childhood and youth she lived in two worlds—an inner and an outer one. Some of her inner emotional life found expression in poetry, much of which was published under the pseudonym of "Ann Singleton." This reader is delighted to have these fine, often delicate verses brought together in this volume. And there is also a series of letters exchanged between Ruth Benedict and another poet-anthropologist, Edward Sapir, in which they criticize each other's efforts and chat about almost everything but anthropology. A few of Margaret Mead's poems also appear in the book.

As the doing and administering of anthropology came to monopolize Dr. Benedict's interests and energies, she gave up the writing of poetry, but her skill with words was still evident in her prose, notably *Patterns of Culture* and *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword.* Some of the letters and other records included herein indicate the care, sometimes mixed with moods of despair, with which these books, particularly the former, were prepared.

Professional anthropologists and perhaps

others may find a rather gossipy interest in the opinions Dr. Benedict expressed in some of her letters regarding various figures and movements in the field. One may also get an inside view of the coterie of graduate students at Columbia under "Papa Franz" Boas during the 1920's and early 1930's. For one who was not there, a certain insight is provided into the charm and influence of that remarkable, but often misunderstood, man. And for those in other fields who persist in thinking that anthropologists go off on luxuriously financed field trips whenever the whim seizes them, whereas "we have to pay for our vacations," there are some painfully explicit details of the efforts required of administrators and the sacrifice expected of field workers. Even after the war, when Ruth Benedict received a relatively large grant from one of the defense departments, she had to serve as director of the project without salary and was forced to use as much unpaid, volunteer help as she could, in order to get the job done.

A fascinating book—and not only for anthropologists.

JOHN P. GILLIN
Professor of Anthropology
University of North Carolina

FRANCIS L. BRODERICK. *W. E. B. Du Bois: Negro Leader in a Time of Crisis.* Pp. xiii, 259. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959. $5.00.

This book is the first full-scale study of Du Bois and represents a valuable contribution to the literature of race leadership. Over a half century ago, he demanded that Negroes protest against their second-class status, and in 1909 he became one of the founders of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). He edited the Association's magazine, *Crisis,* from 1910 to 1934, and in that capacity he was the Negroes' most prominent enunciator of the equal rights doctrines. He became frustrated and embittered after failing to gain aid and comfort from the two major political parties, socialists, and the labor unions. He also clashed with a host of Negro leaders such as Booker T. Washington, Marcus Garvey, and Walter White.

Desperately, he sought integration, while simultaneously, out of emotions of pain and pride, he also favored a separate social and economic system for American Negroes. He once described the conflict which burned within him: "One feels ever his two-ness—an American, A Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two waring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder." Sociologists Edward B. Reuter and Everett Stonequist used to find in Du Bois's inner struggles a confirmation of the "deracialized" mulatto type theory and the marginal man concept.

During the depression of the 1930's, his chauvinism finally brought about the disintegration of his relationship with the NAACP. He was repudiated by Walter White, James Weldon Johnson, E. Franklin Frazier, and many other Negroes. These men appeared ready to "canonize" him for past contributions, but Du Bois had cut himself off from the main stream and was a "leader without followers." Gradually, he concluded that the Soviet Union was the only haven of equalitarianism and cultural pluralism, and by the late 1940's he found "peace" with American Communists. The book contains an intriguing chapter on how he was wooed and won by the "extreme left."

In this excellent volume, Dr. Broderick carefully traces the development of a leader who in early life pleaded for the good will of whites—but who later described them as "the shameless breeders of bastards. . . . I hate them." Broderick shows how Du Bois was caught by the "myth of the wonderful oppressed" and found it possible to rationalize Japanese imperialism and Liberian slavery. Diatribes were only for white nations—except Russia, "the greatest single hope for future industrial democracy."

Broderick has effectively unravelled the complex facets of his subject's fascinating career. Du Bois, over his long and productive years, created a legend of himself as a race messiah who "flew round and round with the Zeitgeist"; in Broderick's well-documented portrait, the Negro leader's significance rests not on grandiose claims, but on two contributions—pushing



American Negroes toward a liberal education and prodding them to be satisfied with nothing less than first-class citizenship.

ELLIOTT M. RUDWICK
Assistant Professor of Social Welfare
Florida State University

JOHN W. BENNETT, HERBERT PASSIN and ROBERT K. MCKNIGHT. *In Search of Identity: The Japanese Overseas Scholar in America and Japan.* Pp. x, 369. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958. $7.50.

It is no trick to take pleasure in a book toward which one is favorably inclined before one picks it up. I approached this volume with little anticipation. One would, of course, expect a great deal of the authors, but the subject promised to be one undertaken by them only as a service to a worthy cause. After all, it is entirely appropriate that some responsible sources of funds, both past and potential, for study by foreign students in this country should have a care for whether there are lessons to be learned from past experience. This sort of dutiful attention to the needful work of the world does not, however, promise much of interest either to the field of scholarship generally or to the layman of broad interests. From this point of view this volume is most unusual. It will be of interest to many laymen, to those with general as well as scholarly interests in Japan, to social scientists generally, and to sociologists in particular.

This book is also another indication that books on Japan, even when intended for general consumption, are increasingly written by people who know something of Japan. In this particular case the authors clearly know a great deal about modern Japan, are able and willing to make something of it in terms of the Japanese historical background, and are adept at handling the Japanese sources, both oral and written.

The authors have a special advantage in having the Japanese case with which to deal. The Japanese clearly depended in much of their development on the importation of skills from abroad. In the historical environment in which this occurred this meant sending many students abroad for study. It also meant that a considerable number of them studied in the United States. Finally, and above all else, Japan is probably the most dramatic case we have of a previously nonmodernized country which influenced decisively the whole course of modern history by what she did with her imported skills. In the case of Japan, therefore, the significance of the kind of understanding sought by this volume was made in advance.

The authors have used some very modern techniques of scholarship in handling their material. From the point of view of the general reader, the most detailed discussions in these terms are mercifully relegated to Appendices which will satisfy the technical audience without horrifying others. What the authors found out will do a great deal to illuminate the experiences and problems of Japanese students in the United States, both to Japanese and to Americans. It also has a great deal to say about the problems and possibilities of application of the knowledge acquired by these scholars. Those interested in the evaluation of student exchange programs could hardly make a better investment than this volume. Neither Americans nor Japanese students will find any other source that will make one another more readily understandable. Social scientists will find this an excellent demonstration of the modern techniques of data collection and the value of structural analyses of societies when brought to bear on a concrete problem.

MARION J. LEVY, JR.
Associate Professor of Economics
Princeton University

CLARK BYSE and LOUIS JOUGHIN. *Tenure in American Higher Education: Plans, Practices, and the Law.* (Cornell Studies in Civil Liberty.) Pp. xvi, 212. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1959. No price.

The most serious limitation of this volume is that it appears to be quite frankly biased in favor of explicit and highly protective arbitrary tenure rules for college and university faculty members. Indeed the last statement of the volume makes the point. "The purpose of this study ha

been to suggest that one promising avenue toward productive reconstruction [of the structure of higher education] is that of improving the policies, plans, and practices which implement the tenure principle" (p. 160). Beginning with a foregone conclusion, it is hard for the findings to do anything but support it.

The views of the authors are found in chapter iv, "Conclusions and Recommendations." Readers may find cause to quarrel both with the conclusions and the recommendations since the perspective of the study appears to have been that of maintaining the tenure rights of the professor rather than taking other broader considerations into context, such as the fact that colleges and universities may serve different purposes and different values. Some of the important questions are entirely missed. For example, it may be that at the junior college level or the college level teaching is the primary function of the institution. In these cases, the job of teacher may be very much akin to the routine one that occurs in the primary, junior high, and high school levels. On the other hand, if the ideal of the university is scholarship and scientific productivity, emphasis on tenure, except in the constant battle against the merely satisfactory—as well as incompetence—is hardly coincident with the ideal. Making a recommendation that tenure plans should provide that retention of a teacher beyond a stated probationary term confers tenure (p. 140) seems to support the banner of mediocrity rather than the herald of achievement. Similarly, some may feel that emphasizing tenure at all ranks, rather than after achievement of a given rank, places emphasis on job security to the exclusion of other considerations, including the fact that job security may itself be an important form of reward rather than the given right of the individual.

While a reader may well appreciate the motivations out of which such a volume would arise, especially concern with dismissal from academic positions for reasons other than academic competence, he may find he does not want to subscribe to the recommendations proposed, nor to the implicit restricted frame of reference for analysis of the question of tenure. The future of analyses of problems of job tenure should make a more deliberate effort to examine equivalent problems in colleges and universities having different objectives, and should also give explicit attention to the comparative study of equivalent problems in other institutional settings, including industry. On the side of the "findings" reported, few of these will surprise persons already generally familiar with the academic marketplace.

EDGAR F. BORGATTA
Social Psychologist
Russell Sage Foundation

EDWARD D. EDDY, JR. assisted by MARY LOUISE PARKHURST and JAMES S. YAKOVAKIS. *The College Influence on Student Character*. An Exploratory Study in Selected Colleges and Universities Made for the Committee for the Study of Character Development in Education. Pp. xii, 185. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1959. $3.00.

This book should be required reading for every university and college administrator and faculty member. It is one of the few truly discerning analyses of the most important problems of higher education, among which is stressed the inculcation of moral and spiritual values. These two amorphous qualities find here specific definition and pin-pointing which relate them to the total purpose of a college. The author comes to grips with psychological and psychic realities with gratifying concreteness. And the result is a program of correctives which can supply guidance to all who will attend.

The discussion is centered on six elements. "Two of them—the level of expectancy and the effect of environment—result from the over-all attitude and approach of the college. The other four—the concept of teaching, the organization of the curriculum, the degree of student responsibility, and the opportunity for religious understanding and practice." These six, avers the author, "comprise a yardstick against which the college might well measure its success in implementing its chosen goals."

The inner effect of these six areas and the ways and means of leveling them provide the substance of the book. And whereas no one element is given novel handling, it is the synthesis and view of all six as focal that constitute the value and impact of the study.

The ultimate conclusion is again less novel than it is profound. And it deserves the discerning appreciation of every reader. For "we found that the conditions conducive to the development of character are, in many ways, the same ones which are conducive to good teaching and sound learning." In short, if teaching is understood in rightful depth and breadth of aim and method, and if learning is realized to be a conduct-altering experience, there will accrue benefits beyond the intellectual. For true learning has to do with feeling and acting no less than with thinking. And the feeling and acting which are significant carry moral and spiritual overtones of significance.

This is at once a sobering and a heartening book. For it is honest as to present inadequacies but positive and definite about potentialities. And it helps to break down the rigid distinction between "academic" or "classroom" objectives and an extension of study to illumine the whole processes of life, which is essential if moral and spiritual ends are to be encompassed, as they have to be.

This study does not say that knowledge alone is virtue or is power. It points beyond knowledge to the other phases and qualities of the living of a good life. And in so doing its consideration of ways and means becomes fertile, suggestive, practical, and self-fulfilling.

By happy circumstance this volume is a felicitous sequel, in effect, to Dr. Philip E. Jacob's controversial offering, "Changing Values in College." For it is constructive where the other survey was more analytical.

ORDWAY TEAD
Editor, Social and Economic Books
Harper & Brothers

GENE M. LYONS and JOHN W. MASLAND. *Education and Military Leadership: A Study of the R.O.T.C.* Pp. xvii, 283. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. $5.00.



As the subtitle states, this is an analysis of only one phase of training for military leadership, namely the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) of the several services. In an earlier volume, *Soldiers and Scholars,* also published by the Princeton University Press, Masland and Radway analyzed the role of education through military channels in the formulation of national policy. The two books are thus, in some respects, companion volumes.

The authors briefly review the early development of ROTC, emphasizing that the name indicated its basic function: to have a reserve supply of partially-trained officers who could be called to active duty to command a citizen army in event of war. Before the end of World War II, it became apparent that the need was for trained specialists of high ability and that the development of command skills could be provided more effectively within the armed forces.

To some degree, the Universal Military and Training Act of 1951 and the Reserve Plan of 1955 are adaptations of the traditional purpose of ROTC to meet the new needs. However, the authors firmly believe that the present complacency of both university officials and the military regarding the reserve program is not justified. "The time has come to jettison a good deal of the historical baggage that has encumbered the thinking about the ROTC programs and to make a fresh approach to their operation."

Among the issues which the authors believe should be appraised are: clarification of objectives in relation to the high degree of professionalization in the armed forces; modification of ROTC curricula to conceive it as preprofessional for military life and a means of recruitment for career officers; and more adequate federal support for the ROTC program.

The book concludes with a series of tables which point up the basic premises of the volume.

FRANCIS J. BROWN
Staff Associate
American Council on Education

JAMES B. CONANT. *The American High School Today: A First Report to Inter-*

*ested Citizens*. Pp. xiii, 140. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959. $1.00.

The study which is reported in this volume has received great publicity, and educators and citizens throughout the country have been awaiting the report with eager anticipation. This study was made possible by a generous grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. President Conant and his collaborators visited 107 schools in twenty-six states, fifty-eight of which he visited personally. Among the schools listed none is in the deep South, although Virginia, Maryland, and Texas were among the eighteen states involved. Data were received from forty-eight additional secondary schools and four large city school systems.

Secondary education in the United States, Dr. Conant points out, is becoming and will continue to become a program for all of the children of American youth.

On page nineteen there is a check list developed and employed in evaluating comprehensive high schools. The check list includes items under adequacy of general education, adequacy of nonacademic elective program, special arrangements for the academically talented students, and other features such as guidance service, student morale, well organized homerooms. In a good comprehensive program Dr. Conant believes that at least one-half of the academically talented boys have studied at least seven years of mathematics and science, and at least seven years in the social studies and English, and three years of foreign language. Dr. Conant recommends strongly that every school set up "an academic inventory" which will indicate the degree to which the academically talented boys and girls—the upper 15 per cent in academic ability—have been enrolled in the subjects indicated above.

Dr. Conant takes a very positive position that a school cannot be a good comprehensive secondary school which graduates fewer than 100 students a year and he advocates the elimination or at least a very mature reduction of schools not of that size.

Dr. Conant makes twenty-one specific recommendations on such points as the counseling system, individualized student programs, required general education programs, ability grouping, supplementary records to the high school diploma, English composition, diversified vocational programs, special provision for the very slow readers, the programs of the academically talented, and the program for the highly gifted pupils, the academic inventory, organization of the school day, prerequisites for advanced academic courses, abandonment of rank and class, academic honors list, homework, developmental reading program, summer school, foreign languages, two types of science courses, homeroom, and twelfth grade social studies.

In the report it is strongly recommended that the high school schedule of classes be organized so that there will be at least six periods available for courses other than physical education and driver education.

While strongly endorsing the comprehensive high school and arguing for better provision for the academically slow youngster and those who should receive some specific vocational education in the high school, Dr. Conant concludes that, while a considerable number of schools are doing splendidly in the provision for the academically talented youngsters, most schools do not have a program which is sufficiently challenging for the very great majority of their academically talented young people.

HARL R. DOUGLASS
Lecturer and Consultant
College of Education
University of Colorado

## *PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION*

ABRAHAM H. MASLOW (Ed.). *New Knowledge in Human Values*. Pp. xiv, 268. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. $4.50.

This volume consists of fifteen addresses delivered in 1957 at the First Scientific Conference on New Knowledge in Human Values organized by the Research Society for Creative Altruism, together with an extended Comment by Walter Weisskopf and replies by eight of the contributors. A Preface by the editor and a Foreword



from the Society by Pitirim Sorokin are also included. The question to which the speakers were asked to address themselves was "What do we know about human values?" with the further instruction that this might be interpreted to mean, among other things, "Is a science of human values possible?" The program committee in its letter of invitation expressed the hope that the conference would "make an impressive demonstration of (a) the general concern of thoughtful people with this problem; (b) the convergence of conclusions by people working independently in different fields; and (c) the increasing hope that a 'science' of human values is possible, and that we need no longer be content only with exhortation, with authoritarian statements, or with 'a priori' thinking" (p. ix).

The result is about what was to be expected. The editor notes "a heartening degree of convergence" among the distinguished participants and this is further specified by Weisskopf in his Comment. "From the deliberations of this symposium emerges union through love as the ultimate value" (p. 223)—a conclusion not unwelcome to the Society for Creative Altruism. And he further notes that "with few exceptions" an affirmative answer is given to the "hope that a science of values is possible" (p. 199). On closer inspection this convergence seems less impressive than, from these statements, it might appear. "Love" is so eulogistically identified and "ultimate value" so loosely used that it would have been surprising indeed if "love" had not "emerged" in this honorific status. I suspect that all the contributors would also, if similarly interrogated, be found to be against sin. And while "with few exceptions" the conferees "hope" that a science of values is possible—some even announce that they have achieved it—the meanings assigned to "science" and "values" are various indeed. For Robert S. Hartmann "the science of values" is a formal axiology based on the definition that "a thing is good when it fulfils the definition of its concept" (p. 20). Paul Tillich and Weisskopf identify the "science" in question as ontology—of the Tillichian, not the Thomistic, brand. Jacob Bronowski and Henry Margenau take the natural sciences as their model, while Allport thinks the social "sciences" might also make a contribution. Perhaps the conclusion most justly to be drawn from this aspect of the alleged "convergence" is that until some common meaning is assigned to its key terms the question as to whether there can be a "science" of "values" makes little arguable sense.

On the whole, I think, the reader will be well advised to read and judge these papers on their individual merits and to disregard the dubious attempt to glean from them a "scientific" vindication of "creative altruism." Some are interesting and original—those of Margenau, Hartmann, Bronowski, and Ludwig von Bertalanffy in particular. Others are rather perfunctory repetitions of themes their authors have repeated many times. Thus Tillich tells us that in his youth he "wanted being" and now, presumably, has found it. But what he has found remains as obscure as ever. Fromm contributes his familiar blend of sweetness and Freud. And Suzuki reiterates, not very helpfully for the aims of the conference, that "what moves human beings is decidedly not science and the rationality of human nature; nor does the scientific treatment of any thing and whatever knowledge accruing therefrom help us in any practical way to solve the problems such as we are facing at present" (p. 104). For the rest, this book is largely a procession of eminent scientists reporting on the "values" they have found important in their respective researches in an ethically loaded language whose logical structure they have made no adequate attempt to master.

The "new knowledge" and "new methods" that are expected to emerge from this sort of inquiry are not impressively foreshadowed in the book itself. Under the former heading, however, one item should be noted. Findings based on "something like 4,500 Christian saints about whom more or less reliable data could be collected" (p. 6) by the Harvard Research Center seem to Sorokin to warrant the conclusion that "altruistic persons live longer than egotistic individuals" (p. 11). Does this supply an "egotistic" reason for being altruistic? If so, the scientific case

for creative unselfish love has, to this extent, been measurably advanced.

ARTHUR E. MURPHY
Professor and Chairman,
Department of Philosophy
University of Texas

WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, JR. *Modern Revivalism: Charles Grandison Finney to Billy Graham.* Pp. vii, 551. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1959. $6.50.

Two things about revivals in America are noticeably striking: one that we have had so few of them and second that for all their noise they have had little influence on the social and religious life of the United States. "Revivialism is susceptible of no simple explanation. There is no meaningful correlation, for example, between the national awakenings in America and the great periods of political or economic crisis" (p. 6). Four general circumstances are necessary to produce a national revival: a grave theological reorientation within the churches themselves; ecclesiastical conflicts in which personalities play a large part; a sense of social and spiritual cleavage between the churches or between the churches and the world; and a feeling that Christianity has a particular relevance to the contemporary scene.

Professor McLoughlin brilliantly traces revivalism from 1821 down to the present —from Charles Grandison Finney to Billy Graham. His approach is biographical as he takes his readers around the circuits with the great modern revivalists. The technique of each noted evangelist is studied along with the general over-all influence that he had upon Church and society.

On the positive side revivalism has played a significant role in "stabilizing the centrifugal forces of pietistic separatism." The great revivalists, Finney, Moody, Sam Jones, Sunday, Graham and the rest, "sensed intuitively the profound feelings of hope and fear, of idealism and of guilt, which sought reassurance and help in critical and confused periods of national development. And with a strong, sure voice, each of them gave vivid expression to those symbols and ideals which have been the basis of the American dream" (p. 524).

Yet the revivalists were a primary factor in the increasing secularization of American Protestantism. Their religious and social message had little impact on emerging America. Often heart-religion was turned into anti-intellectualism, humility into self-righteousness, emotion and irrationality, and piety into religiosity or hypocritical posturing. "There is a fundamental anomaly inherent in the professionalism of the revival spirit. Revivals are not articles for manufacture and retail. As pietists have asserted since the beginning of Christendom, the virtues of religion cannot be organized. But its vices can" (p. 530).

This is a book that can be read for pleasure and profit. Dr. McLoughlin has done well. Perhaps more comparison and analysis would have added to the value of the book, but then again some of the biographical sections are delightful.

JOHN J. MURRAY
Professor and Chairman,
Department of History
Coe College

A. ROY ECKARDT. *The Surge of Piety in America: An Appraisal.* Pp. 192. New York: Association Press, 1958. $3.50.

Some five years ago A. Roy Eckardt, whose earlier publications identified him as a sociologically oriented student of religion, contributed an article to *The Christian Century* (November 1954) on "The New Look in American Piety" in which he expressed misgivings over certain aspects of the current religious "boom." The present volume is an amplification of his uneasiness and concern, from the viewpoint of liberal Protestantism, over what the present prosperity in religion is doing to Christianity, primarily Protestantism. He starts from the assumption—a biblical position—that it is not sacreligious to be critical of religion from the prophetic stance, for as the Dutch theologian Hendrick Kraemer has written, "A religion is at once creative and destructive, salutary and corruptive, sublime and demonic." He quotes with approval this scholar's remark



who, in response to a query as to whether a revival of faith was under way in Europe, replied. "Why perhaps there is. Church attendance seems to be decreasing."

A brief review of the available data concerning all the relevant indices such as church membership, construction, support, and so forth, supports the conclusion that religion is experiencing a great vogue and that this religiosity is diffusing into other culture areas such as government—"piety along the Potomac"—the entertainment industry, with ballads about "the Lord is a livin' doll." But even a cursory glance reveals grave problems and possibly a "new ordeal of Christianity." Eckardt singles out for his analysis such striking manifestations of the present upsurge in American religion as the fundamentalist revivalism of Billy Graham and the propagation of the cult of reassurance by Norman Vincent Peale. But he also includes in his scrutiny such organizations as International Christian Leadership, Spiritual Mobilization, and the Christian Freedom Foundation which equate religious faith with patriotism, free enterprise, or the American way of life.

Assembling the criticisms that have already been directed against these movements by religious writers with a social or existential concern such as Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, Paul Hutchinson, William Lee Miller, and Will Herberg, our author carries forward the critique. Without dismissing the new religiosity as escapist or fraudulent, he raises penetrating questions as to the significance of the present prosperity of religion. The very title of the book suggests the wave-like character of the phenomenon of folk religion and its possible evanescence.

He reviews the various explanations that have been given for the surge, such as the contemporary crisis of culture with its spiritual dislocation, insecurity and homelessness; desperation at the evil of the modern world; profound disappointment with science and social meliorism; the erosions of mass culture; the change in the American character structure; the need—following Herberg—of a third generation for identification and roots; and the pervasive social conformism. Writing from within the camp of religion, he lists the various hazards to religion itself from the sundry idolatrous aspects of the dominant mass cults, which are oriented to the conservation of time-bound values and not to judgment of them in the light of transcendent beliefs. He warns loudly of the perils of a religious orientation which hurls the individual back upon himself, identifying it with the concept of self perfection, which skirts the vast moral issues imposed by modern social problems and lacks any adequate sense of the economic, social, political, or ideological dimensions of our society.

Many challenging questions are provoked by this book. Is there not a permanent difference between mass religion and elite or virtuosi religion, as suggested by Max Weber? Are not pragmatic, patriotic, and therapeutic elements integral parts of mass religiosity; and does not mass religion always tend to assert a conservative influence? How different is the new American piety from comparable pulsations in the recent past such as Moral Rearmament and to what extent is the surge also felt in the other major religious groupings? Finally, is there any correlation with the arts where mass communication has been polarized into vulgarity and formlessness on the one hand and aesthetic razzle-dazzle on the other?

This book contains notes at the end of each of its eight chapters and an Index. Although written impressionistically it poses mighty issues, offers resistance to debasing tendencies in religion, and provides encouragement to maturity in the quest for religious alternatives to the vagaries of anthropocentric folk religion which not only fails to achieve what it purports but threatens the integrity of what may be deemed to be the heart of the Judeo-Christian teachings.

EPHRAIM FISCHOFF
Lynchburg, Virginia

RICHARD W. STERLING. *Ethics in a World of Power: The Political Ideas of Friedrich Meinecke.* Pp. xi, 318. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1958. $6.00.

This book tells the moving story of a great historian who received a bitter lesson

at the hands of history herself. It traces the evolution of the political ideas of Friedrich Meinecke—1862–1954—who propounded a Bismarckian theory of politics until World War I, only to recoil in horror from its consequences and to spend the rest of his life in the attempt to revise it in favor of ethical considerations.

Richard Sterling knew Meinecke in the twilight of the latter's life, from 1948 to 1951, and his account is permeated with sympathy for the man who never compromised his rejection of National Socialism and who resumed teaching after the Hitler era to give back to German youth a truer picture of their nation's past. The book renders a valuable service in presenting to American readers the intellectual development of the most eminent German historian of this century.

However, Sterling attempts to ascribe a coherent theory of politics to Meinecke, and here he errs. True, Meinecke held such a theory before World War I. He then conceived of the nation-state as the ideal political community. He believed that the state would and should subordinate the values of its individual citizens to its supreme need for power. These ideas were set out in a mature and powerful book, *Weltbuergertum und Nationalstaat* (1908), in which Meinecke found state egotism to be the central truth of politics and argued that foreign policy has primacy over domestic policy, so that the internal organization of a state must above all serve its paramount external interests.

On the basis of this theory, Meinecke enthusiastically supported Germany's entry into World War I. Only during that war did it dawn upon him that the state ego could not be trusted to regulate itself, that unshackled it would tend to destroy the very values which Meinecke conceived as its ultimate justification. And while this actual process of destruction engulfed Germany, Meinecke began to revise his ideas.

Sterling's title claims that Meinecke made a place for ethics in a world of power. The tragedy of Meinecke's life was his failure to do so. Continually backing away from his own earlier ideas, he never again achieved synthesis and could not devise a theoretical solution of the problems that tormented him. He found refuge in uneasy and unsatisfactory compromises.

Thus Sterling tells us that "Meinecke believed in constitutional government, but he preferred a constitution which did not permit the liberties of citizens to interfere with the state's external policies." He goes on to explain that "Meinecke could not accept the idea that a constitution should hand over all rights and responsibilities of governing to the people. Rather he saw it as an instrument for defining the competencies of the people, on one hand, and of the state on the other" (p. 113). And even though the agony of Nazi excesses finally drove Meinecke to reject the absolute primacy of the state, he was unable to arrive at a clear basis for doing so. Sterling sums up his political thought as an effort "to preserve the state contract by every means except an irremedial loss of personal integrity" (p. 277). We may be moved by Meinecke's tragedy, and we may learn much from it, but it does not offer us a theory of ethics and power. Sterling cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear.

STEVEN MULLER
Assistant Professor of Government
Cornell University

H. R. G. GREAVES. *The Foundations of Political Theory*. Pp. 208. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958. Distributed by Essential Books, Fair Lawn, N. J. $3.80.

It is the stated purpose of the author, who is on the faculty of the London School of Economic and Political Science, to suggest at what a political organization should aim, and by what criteria its ends, methods, and achievements should be judged. This means that in the author's view the political scientist has the right, indeed the obligation, to prescribe as well as describe, to search for general principles as well as for specific facts. Mr. Greaves thus places himself well within the perennial stream of philosophically-oriented political commentary and against the present positivistic and behavioristic trend which, as he sees it, will lead only to the eventual self-destruction of political theory of it succeeds in dominating.



Mr. Greaves is in general accord with Aristotle's claim that the foundation of the political order is moral in nature, and that the state exists to promote the good life of its citizens. Hence much of *The Foundations of Political Theory* is devoted to an analysis of various moral concepts and categories, and to such topics as the individual and morality, sociality and morality, and the general good.

Mr. Greaves' own moral philosophy is an integration of the greatest happiness principle of utilitarianism and the self-fulfillment doctrine of Plato and Aristotle, especially as it is represented in modern times by T. H. Green, Leonard Hobhouse, and Harold Laski. The political philosophy the writer ties in with this is a liberal democratic one rooted in the eighteenth century enlightenment with its faith in human reason, wisdom, and power. It is this weapon Mr. Greaves uses to attack the deterministic political philosophy which, stemming from the intellectual success of the law of evolution and the economic success of nineteenth century industrialization, depreciated man's spiritual autonomy and brought on the authoritarian political systems of the twentieth century. As would be expected, John Stuart Mill is appealed to frequently.

Although the book is not, and is not meant to be, a compendium of specific answers to specific political problems, some of the author's most useful insights are contained in the final chapter entitled "Democratic Political Theory: Applications." His characterization of the essence of the democratic method; his brief analysis of the meanings of the rights of life, liberty, and property; his discussion of democracy and the moral imperative—all these are very good.

*The Foundations of Political Theory* is not a pioneering work by any means, and it is not a major work. But it is a bit more than simply the introductory essay the author terms it. It is a well-knit and soundly-argued exposition of a possible moral basis of a modern democratic political philosophy. As such it merits our attention.

Mr. Greaves is also the author of a volume on the British constitution and of other works in the field of political science.

CARL Y. EHRHART
Professor of Philosophy
Lebanon Valley College

## *EUROPEAN HISTORY*

C. M. BOWRA. *The Greek Experience*. (The World Histories of Civilization.) Pp. xiv, 210. Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1958. $6.00.

Sir Cecil Maurice Bowra, formerly Vice Chancellor of the University of Oxford, is a classical scholar of great distinction. The present volume is his latest addition to a series of authoritative works on Greek literature and its title is intended to convey the author's own intimate perception of the Greek way of life.

*The Greek Experience* covers the centuries between the time of Homer and the fall of Athens in 404 B.C., and includes within its sweep a survey of politics and government, poetry and drama, philosophy and science, religion and mythology. The volume is not only a brilliant testimony to the ever fresh vitality and glory of the great age of creativity that ended with the Peloponnesian War but also a testimonial to the deep and learned appreciation of an ancient culture by a modern who lives in an age of technology. The book is primarily an intellectual analysis of the ideas and ideals by which the Greeks lived or expected the great and the noble to live. The poets, philosophers, and historians speak for themselves and their contemporaries when they set forth a vision of the good life and the excellence of human achievement. Consequently there are only scant and tangential references to the facts of social and political history and only illustrative use of the great historic Greek personalities. Within his defined perspective the author interrelates six centers of Greek experience—the political, moral, myth-making, literary, plastic, and rational—to sum up the inner meaning of Greek aspiration and the beauty, dignity, and

grace to which it gave outward and immortal expression. Not that the Greek ideal was without moral defects or many defections in daily living, but it did establish man as resourcefully endowed with reason and courageously adventurous enough to scrutinize and penetrate facts, things, men, and gods. From this sustained endeavor emerged Greek humanism and the possibilities of individual personality disengaged in great part, although not wholly, from the cosmological necessitarianism which held captive the minds and souls of the Greeks' Asiatic contemporaries:

> The Greeks both recognized that men are worthy of respect in themselves, and were content that they should win this in the only life of which we have any knowledge. But they saw at the same time that the significance of human behavior depends on powers which lie outside it, that man is not alone in the universe and cannot be disassociated from powers above and beneath him (p. 193).

> The unique splendor of the Greeks is that, with all their sense of the divine qualities in man and of his closeness to the gods, they knew that he was not and could not be a god, and they were content and proud that he should find his own magnificence and be ready to live and die for it (p. 202).

The heroic outlook which first evolved in the Homeric Age and continued with slight changes through the Peloponnesian War to the fall of Athens did inspire magnificent deeds deserving of public recognition and honor, but in less noble hearts it espoused selfishness and arrogance to the point of treasonable activities against the City. A doctrine of the golden mean was devised to temper the excesses to which the heroic ideal might mislead but it was never widely accepted. In his admiration for the Greeks the author does not close his eyes to their moral and intellectual failures or to instances of human debasement. But compared to their Asiatic contemporaries they shine as brightly as the Greek columns and their influence upon the West still remains a major determinant in distinguishing the cultured and civilized from the barbarian.

This precious volume is of inestimable help to those who wish a scholarly introduction to a glorious heritage and of no less advantage to those learned in the ways of the Greeks who wish an integrating synthesis. There are several judgments which will undoubtedly stir the reader to disagreement but even so it will be done with great reverence and not so easily. Rarely has so short a volume recaptured so rich an experience. Sixty-four pages of excellently chosen plates document and adorn Sir Maurice's observations.

JOSEPH F. COSTANZO
Professor of Political Philosophy
Graduate School
Fordham University

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. *Hellenism: The History of a Civilization*. Pp. xii, 272. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. $4.50.

In his famous chapter on "Cetology" the author of *Moby Dick* has divided his subject into Folio, Octavo, and Duodecimo whales, noting the essential sameness of all three classes. Students of Toynbee will recognize in the present modest volume all the well-known characteristics of the weighty *A Study of History* and its substantial abridgment by D. C. Somervell. Anyone reading Toynbee for the first time in this version will be fascinated by well-turned phrases such as: "The barbarian is, in fact, an adolescent who has lost the innocence of a child without having acquired the self-control of an adult" (p. 13); or—speaking of Rome after Hannibal: "The world was in the power of a victor who had been lacerated and whose wounds were aching" (p. 177). But also, if he is both perceptive and well-grounded, he will be made uneasy by the succession of unsupported assertions and by a narrative that unfolds like a scenario. In Toynbee history is presented as a series of crises in which fatal decisions are made, sometimes by choice, more often by accident. The author suggests, for example, that the future lay in the balance when Caesar was held for ransom by pirates (p. 188). He also reflects on the changes that might have occurred had neither Herod nor Jesus been born Jews—a circumstance that he attributes to Antiochus' advised violence to the Temple of Jerulem (pp. 190–191). He likes to think the Athenians as missing their great ıportunity to unite the Hellenes when ey decided to use the tribute to solve ıemployment and to build the Parthenon ). 108). There is more than a hint now d then of the approach to history that gins, "for the want of a nail the shoe ıs lost."

But Toynbee keeps hammering at his ain theme, the tragic failure of the Helnic society to unite. This explains his ırtiality for Augustus (p. 202), for Philip ). 154), and for Diocletian (p. 241). ccasionally he twists the evidence in favor a cherished view. The root of all evil, believes, lay in the Hellenic penchant r "man-worship," and he cites Protagos' dictum that "man is the measure of l things" to prove his point. But Progoras had something quite different in ind, as every reader of the *Theaetetus* ıows: the relativity of human knowledge. Like Plutarch Toynbee is also a moralist, ıd like him he sees a moral resemblance etween that ill-assorted pair Agis of parta and Tiberius Gracchus. Toynbee es much further, however, when he comıres both with Jesus of Nazareth, calling iberius: a "gentle Roman martyr aristo'at" (p. 226). To those familiar with the ıcts about that dashing young Roman ıperialist the term "martyr" is singularly ıappropriate. But Toynbee sees in him a ıan who appealed to the subject majority f the women and the poor, the group that nally made itself felt under Christian ıspices.

But *Hellenism* is emphatically a book to e read. Those who reject its conclusions ill be forced to look sharply to the dense of their own.

TRUESDELL S. BROWN
Professor of History
University of California
Los Angeles

. D. B. MILLER. *The Commonwealth in the World*. Pp. 308. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958. $5.00.

Although there has been a wealth of ıriting within recent years on individual Commonwealth countries and on special aspects of Commonwealth relations, surprisingly little attention has been given to the Commonwealth as a whole. For this reason, the volume by Professor Miller is particularly welcome.

The author views the "Commonwealth," or "Commonwealth of Nations," as comprising Britain and the independent member countries of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya, and Ghana. Potential members of the Commonwealth, to which brief attention is given, include Nigeria, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the Federation of the West Indies, all of which may acquire an independent status within the near future. An examination is made of the development of the national interests and the effect of Commonwealth membership upon foreign and domestic policies.

Perhaps the chief contribution of this volume lies in its analysis of the ties which bind, of the centripetal forces which serve to unite, this unique association of independent states. These include substantial "negative agreement" on certain broad issues, especially anti-communism and anti-colonialism; economic advantages of Commonwealth membership, including imperial preference, British investment and economic aid, and membership and participation by most Commonwealth members in the Sterling Area; and active encouragement of Commonwealth association in various ways by Britain. The author finds some significance in "shared values and ideals" and in the "mutual sympathy arising from the prevalence of parliamentary institutions," but considers these inadequate to explain the continuation of Commonwealth association. The Commonwealth "imposes no burdens. It provides contacts, opportunities, economic advantages, British good will and the sense of belonging" (p. 275). In short, it is a "concert of convenience."

Viewing the Commonwealth as a "concert of convenience," the author may well have maximized the significance of economic factors and have minimized that of "shared values and ideals." The reviewer might question some of the interpretations placed on the role played by individual

members of the Commonwealth. The reviewer is skeptical, though he knows that this point of view is widely accepted, that Canada serves in any unique way as a "go-between for Britain and the United States," and as a "middle term between the other two points of the triangle" (pp. 133–34). But these are minor reservations to a volume which provides not only a provocative, but also a thoughtful and realistic, appraisal of the bases for the continuing unity within the Commonwealth.

The reviewer also feels that the author has made some sound comments on American attitudes and United States policies toward the Commonwealth. After all of the conditions and exceptions have been noted, the basic fact remains that, "if we take a broad view of American policy as a whole, it has in no way been hostile to either the existence or the extension of the Commonwealth" (p. 296).

TAYLOR COLE
Professor of Political Science
Duke University

A. P. THORNTON. *The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies: A Study in British Power.* Pp. xiv, 370. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959. $7.50.

The idea of imperialism achieved its greatest respectability in Britain in the era of Gladstone and Disraeli. Both were imperialists but for different reasons. If one stressed idealism—national pride and the carrying of a burden—the other realistically saw the advantages of imperialism for trade and strategy. Also, again following the fashion of the time, both were imperial expansionists.

But imperialism would go out of fashion. Sharp was the contrast when late-comer imperialists took over certain governments in Europe: in the 1930's it was quite unwise for high-thinking Englishmen to speak of anything ruthless in Britain's imperial past. Did the imperial idea find itself outmoded in Britain because of a new idealism, or because of the new difficulties in competing with imperialism elsewhere—the new Japan or the Third Reich? Even if the world-wide competition could be met—which it could not—could the old imperial order any longer surmount the inherent competition of rising national feeling?

The author takes us on an interesting journey that traces the rise and decline of the idea of imperialism back of all this. The idea had to give ground to its enemies. It was the combined assault of World War I, of the driving impulse of nationalism, of democracy, of world-wide competition, that accounted for the changes in attitude toward the British Empire by the men in power and out and by the British public during the past century.

Sharp indeed is the contrast between the old imperial idea and the contemporary British Commonwealth, whose strength is in the like-mindedness of its member nations. "Not all imperialism is power-imperialism," the author points out. Everyone knows how badly the recursion of the old idea misfired in the Suez episode of 1956.

The author emphasizes the impacts of the Boer War and the two World Wars. Here is one author who can discuss British power and imperialism without troubling himself about most of Britain's nineteenth-century wars. There are, for example, the pros and cons of Palmerston as an imperialist without an awareness of such indirect imperialism as that which brought on the Crimean War. It is taken for granted that the reader already knows the historical record, the actualities of the British empire, the naval interpretations, and the "economic jewel" of India idea.

VERNON J. PURYEAR
Professor of Political Science
University of California
Davis

J. H. M. SALMON. *The French Religious Wars in English Political Thought.* Pp. vii, 202. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. $4.00.

Between 1562 and 1598 France was racked by civil wars which threatened not only orderly government, but even civilization itself. One main reason for these wars was the desire of the Protestant Huguenots to achieve hegemony, or at least toleration; this they succeeded in doing under the Edict of Nantes of 1598.



This civil conflict in France stimulated political thinking of two main types. On the one side there were the Monarchomachs who advocated active resistance to royal oppression. Their viewpoint was expressed mainly in the *Franco-Gallia* (1573), by Francis Hotman, and the *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos* (1579), whose probable author was Philippe Du Plessis-Mornay. On the other side Jean Bodin, in his *Six Livres de la Republique* (1576), argued for a royal sovereignty which should involve "supreme power over all citizens and subjects, unrestrained by law."

During the generation which followed the Edict of Nantes these two contrasted theories of political sovereignty were examined by such Dutch and German jurists as Althusius, Arnisaeus, Grotius, and Besold, by the criteria of Roman Law. These legal analysts perceived that both French viewpoints had certain common presuppositions. Thus they worked out certain combinations of French ideas which either extended the original arguments or attempted compromises between them.

This French political thought, developed and elaborated by the German and Dutch intermediaries, deeply influenced English thinking concerning government between 1642 and 1689. In the former year the English Parliament started an armed revolt against King Charles I, for what was thought to be his arbitrary rule; and the conflict thus precipitated was not finally settled till the Revolution of 1688, when Parliament offered the Crown to Dutch William and his wife, Mary, and thus established limited monarchy. Since the French political thought of the sixteenth century was well known in England, it was employed both by the Royalists, who supported the King, and the anti-Royalists, who supported Parliament, in expounding their respective viewpoints.

In this book Mr. Salmon gives a clear and authoritative account of this development. He has consulted and mastered, not merely the French originals, and their German and Dutch commentators, but also the vast literature—both in pamphlets and in substantial tomes—which the struggle between King and Parliament produced in England. He thus demonstrates what he calls "the extent to which seventeenth century Englishmen consciously adapted French theory and example to their own needs."

NORMAN V. HOPE
Chairman, The Department of History
Princeton Theological Seminary

KLAUS EPSTEIN. *Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy.* Pp. xiii, 473. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. $10.00.

On August 26, 1921, Matthias Erzberger, a chief architect of the Weimar government, was shot and murdered by political opponents as he wandered with a friend along the countryside near Bad Griesbach in the Black Forest. His companion, also shot, was able to drag himself along until he encountered "a fashionable lady vacationer from Hamburg." When he told her his story her reply was "How could you go walking with a man like Erzberger!" Perhaps more than any other passage in this volume this describes the atmosphere of the Germany of post World War I and the violent conflict between the Weimar idea and the person of Erzberger on the one hand and Wilhemine Prussian aristocracy on the other.

Viewed superficially one could say that the author has written a history of German politics for the decade before World War I and the period during that struggle. But it is much more than this, for it is an extremely readable and fascinating analysis of the factors inside Germany which from the start made the Weimar regime a necessary failure. Much has been written about the fault of the Allies in dealing with defeated Germany. In portraying the inevitable struggle between the Junkers and a tailor's son, between the traditional monarchists and the parliamentarian, between the Protestant majority and the devout Catholic, the author portrays the internal contradictions which aided in dooming Weimar and ultimately led to Hitler. And it is all related in an accurately documented but nevertheless colorful account. Thus: "The ruling class of the Wilhemine Empire was quite unwilling to accept the son of a Buttenhausen tailor—the log-cabin myth had no potency in Germany." Later, in discussing relations between

Chancellor Betham and Erzberger in 1914, the latter quoted the Chancellor as follows: "How do you [Erzberger] manage to have so many bright ideas all the time. I never have any!"

But aside from this insight into all the conflicting currents of German life, the book is also a vivid account of the rough and tumble of professional politics and particularly the personal power-politics waged in the Germany of that period. Against bitter internal opposition, Erzberger became a leader of the left-wing of the Zentrum (Catholic) party. He was an agitator, an organizer, and a pamphleteer and often his methods were Machiavellian. With his extraordinary ability he became a leading statesman and politician during World War I. He headed the German propaganda efforts in neutral countries. It was he who led the effort to keep Italy out of the war and who was one of the Armistice Commissioners in 1918. But it was also he who was blamed by his enemies for the Versailles Treaty. Although his own methods for achieving an objective were sometimes questionable, he was without reason smeared by his enemies. For example, the upstart tailor's son became an "illegitimate child." Money placed abroad for propaganda use became a supposed personal fortune exported in evasion of the German currency laws, and so forth.

Any student of Germany, anyone interested in the international relations of the period, anyone fascinated by politics should read this book.

RALPH F. BISCHOFF
Professor of Law and Associate Dean
New York University
School of Law

LUDWIG DEHIO. *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century.* Translated by Dieter Pevsner. Pp. 141. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959. $4.00.

This book by an eminent German historian consists of five essays originally published separately in several German journals. The translation is excellent, and the author's gift for expressing himself comes through very well. Although several of the essays are academic studies and others were written for current periodicals, the five together make a harmonious collection dealing with the part played by Germany in the politics of this century. One is reminded somewhat of Meinecke's little book *The German Catastrophe,* in that the reflections of Professor Dehio throw much light not only on vital events but also reveal the ideas of Germans about these events.

The first essay is a brilliant analysis of the impact of two world wars on Germany and how they came about. The next two essays, which historians will appreciate, cover the critical developments of German imperialism and nationalism up to 1918. The final two essays on Versailles after thirty-five years and the passing of the European system reveal the author at his best.

Rising to an eloquently written conclusion in the final pages, Professor Dehio demonstrates how, sheltered by American power, "European policy is beginning to follow positively parasitical lines. Exploiting the cover offered by American efforts, it is either avoiding efforts of its own, or else directing any efforts it might make towards a purely egocentric particularism in the vague hope that these puny particularisms may together amount to a third force in the world, between the two giants." All these complex phenomena, he concludes, "can be included within a single concept: the concept of the dying European system. That system is lying in ruins, but its spirit lives on, not so much among statesmen, who have become increasingly like officers without armies, as among their peoples, whose deep-seated instincts protest against the idea that the ruins should be usefully employed to help create a new concept" (p. 140).

Thus he illuminates the specific dangers of the European and German situation and the general concept which characterizes it —"the concept of a dying system of states whose spirit survives and whose obsolete conditions threaten to poison the creation of new ones." Written before the achievement of Franco-German rapprochement, and the inauguration of the European Market, the author's words still ring true. For if Western Europe, and particularly Germany, ignoring the hostile barbarian world on its frontier, once more loses its sense of proportion and fails to appreciate "the special responsibility she bears to the West as the power that wielded the last and most terrible of all European hegemonies," the future is dark indeed.

This little book which the author hoped would "make a modest contribution to the consolidation of our ideas," has certainly clarified a whole period of recent history, and sharpened its salient aspects.

JAMES K. POLLOCK
Chairman and Professor, Department of Political Science
University of Michigan

A. H. ROBERTSON. *European Institutions: Co-operation: Integration: Unification.* (Library of World Affairs, No. 44.) Pp. xix, 372. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. $7.75.

The United States of Europe may still lie far in the future but developments have now reached a point where one can speak of "the labyrinth of European integration," as Mangone calls it. To master that maze, a Baedeker is needed such as the book here examined. It was written by A. H. Robertson, a British lawyer who is Counsellor in the Office of the Clerk of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. His previous publications include *The Council of Europe: Its Structure, Functions and Achievements* (1956) which was reviewed in this journal (Vol. 312, July 1957, pp. 138–9); and *Legal Problems of European Integration* (1957). He is a member of the Editorial Committee of the *European Yearbook.*

The present work deals with seven major organizations and eight smaller or more specialized agencies. It does not discuss bodies created by the United Nations such as the Economic Commission for Europe. In addition to good Bibliographies and an Index, there are 120 pages of Appendices in which are reprinted, usually in full, most of the basic treaties and documents involved.

The book is a Baedeker but it is more than that. It is an incisive analysis of what is coming to be known as "the law of international institutions." Particularly noteworthy is the last chapter on rationalizing European institutions. Dr. Robertson argues for a Greater Europe which might be evolved from a merger of the Council of Europe with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and which would also embrace four technical agencies: Conference of Ministers of Transport, Civil Aviation Conference, Customs Cooperation Council, and Organization for Nuclear Research. The defense functions of the Western European Union (WEU) would be transferred to a restricted group within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and what was left of WEU would be absorbed by Greater Europe. As a result of rationalization, there would be a single organ of ministerial co-operation supervising all intergovernmental activities, along with one parliamentary assembly. In other words, the proposal looks to increased intergovernmental relations, rather than to supranationalism or federalism, as a practical minimum program for further advance. NATO, the Six-Power Communities, and smaller regional organizations like Benelux would, at least for the time being, be left out of Robertson's "Grand Design."

The study is an authoritative, scholarly, and well reasoned contribution to the literature of European integration. It should be widely used.

ROGER H. WELLS
Professor of Political Science
Bryn Mawr College

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ and others. *Protracted Conflict.* (A Foreign Policy Research Institute Book.) Pp. xvii, 203. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. $3.95.

Most of the existing studies of the Communists' international strategy and tactics, while placing almost exclusive stress upon communism as a social or economic ideology, ignore the significance of communism as a doctrine and a technique of conflict. In general, this study analyzes the intermediate range of challenges posed to the Western alliance by the Communists, particularly those operations which enable the Communists to carry on "nibbling expansion" at the expense of the free world without provoking the United States to

unleash the full force of its nuclear power. The analysis here proceeds from the concept of the protracted conflict as an historical phenomenon to the Communist strategies, the Communists' view of conflict, how an indirect approach is used to have no military showdown, the techniques of deception and distraction, the monopoly of initiative, the tactics of attrition, the implications of such tactics, the reasons for the present plight of the West and for the success of the Communists' "political technology," and the approaching crisis. The Appendix contains a reprinted article on "Communist Psychological Warfare."

To the reviewer this is one of the great books of the recent years. Although it is loaded with footnotes, the content also shows how the members of the Foreign Policy Institute utilized their time discussing the various issues, as well as the results of their trips to American missions around the world—under a grant from the Richardson Foundation. One could, in fact, safely say that the recommendation made by the late Secretary of State Dulles to Eisenhower to read Overstreet's book should be now replaced by a directive by President Eisenhower to the Department of State to study systematically this work. In fact, let us hope that President Eisenhower will read carefully this work before he will weaken and attend another fateful "summit meeting."

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK
Professor and Chairman, Departments of Political Science and Sociology
University of Bridgeport

RALPH TALCOTT FISHER, JR. *Pattern for Soviet Youth: A Study of the Congresses of the Komsomol,* 1918–1954. (Studies of the Russian Institute of Columbia University.) Pp. xvii, 452. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. $6.75.

The series of the studies of the Russian Institute, Columbia University, has been enriched by R. T. Fisher's *Pattern for Soviet Youth.* The study covers the years 1918 to 1954 and presents the Communist League of Youth not statistically, but dynamically, as it gradually appeared in the proceedings and resolutions of the twelve congresses held during the period under study. With respect to earlier years, when the congresses were frequent, two or three are treated as a group; with respect to later years—beginning with 1936—each congress is devoted a particular chapter. The author gives carefully checked information on the enrollment—twenty-two thousand in 1918, about nineteen million in 1954—on the composition of the individual congresses whenever possible with sex, age, ethnic, educational, and class distribution, on the general role ascribed to the Komsomol by the omnipotent leaders of the Communist Party, on the relationship between the two organizations, and especially on the content of Party directions conveyed, through the Komsomol, to the Soviet youth. Obviously, the concrete directions changed concomitantly with changes in the proximate goals of the Party leaders. What proved to be stable is the demand for a most difficult combination of iron discipline with initiative; with time, the accent shifted more and more to the former. Early dreams of some Komsomol leaders about a semi-autonomous youth organization soon dissipated; the Komsomol leaders were told that they had to act not as independent agents, but as obedient servants of the Party apparatus.

Reading the book, one revives Soviet history—the great struggles for power, Stalin's ascent, the purges, the postwar terrorism, the first steps of the now defunct collective leadership. The main traits of Soviet organization are well reflected: absolute contempt for "legitimacy," despite grandiloquent statements to the contrary; the absolute unity of the pattern of organization—the Komsomol is structured exactly in the image of the Party; the principle "all power to the Party" clearly appearing in the fact that all Komsomol functionaries, except those of the lowest levels, are members of the Communist party imposed by Party secretaries.

Dr. Fisher concludes his study by expressing the hope that it will be followed by others piercing through the crust of formal organization to the level of informal organization and of the motivations operative among the members; it is this purpose to which his work is mainly devoted. This hardly will be the case. For the period covered, his study will be final, because the Komsomol now embraces one-third of the eligible age groups, so that the profile of a model "Komsomolite" can hardly differ from the profile of a model Soviet youth, and, so long as the Iron Curtain exists, the latter remains unknowable. But let us hope that Dr. Fisher will cover later developments in the same lucid manner as he has covered the years up to 1954.

N. S. TIMASHEFF
Professor of Sociology, Emeritus
Fordham University
Professor of Sociology
Marymount College



M. S. ANDERSON. *Britain's Discovery of Russia, 1553–1815.* Pp. viii, 245. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959. $6.75.

Mr. M. S. Anderson, Lecturer at the London School of Economics, has written a fascinating book—an account of Anglo-Russian relations covering over two and a half centuries, from the days of Willoughby and Chancellor, who "discovered" Muscovy, to the Congress of Vienna. The study deals with a variety of subjects pertaining to the complex relationship of the two nations. To accomplish this the author has scrutinized a mass of documentary evidence, official and private English and Russian sources some of which have been hardly known to the historian.

The over-all picture of Anglo-Russian relations is a very uneven one: during the early period, which is virtually the first half of the period concerned, Moscow as a nonentity state played a minor part in continental affairs and for this reason served more as an object of curiosity than a weighty diplomatic factor. Since the death of Peter I, however, curiosity began to yield to a realization of Russia's growing economic importance. Political and diplomatic aspects began to assume greater prominence only by the end of the eighteenth century. Throughout this period England's interest centered around the discovery of trade routes by way of the Volga and the Caspian Sea to Persia and beyond and later by way of the Baltic ports with Russia. It may be of interest to note that some individual English writers demonstrated a keener interest in Russia and their accounts in turn stimulated others in broader aspects of the little known eastern state. Among the pioneering writers may be mentioned Fletcher, Richardson, Coxe, and Tooke.

The events that forced England and Russia into closer political collaboration were largely connected with the French Revolution. And if there ever was a justified case for the belief that familiarity breeds contempt, Anglo-Russian relations fully prove it. By the middle of the nineteenth century English russophobia became an established fact. The pity of it is that the familiarity that bred the phobia was not accompanied by badly needed information. The average knowledge of Russia in England in the first part of the nineteenth century was as superficial as it was in the sixteenth century. The concluding sentence of Anderson is worth citing: "There are few better examples of the tenacity with which popular conceptions of the nature of an alien society, once established, are adhered to, or of the slowness with which they are eroded by time and facts."

To this may be added that it is equally fascinating to observe the recurrent russophile and russophobe sentiments in England: when Russian aid was sought, particularly her manpower, the Russian people were spoken of as the young, promising gifted nation; when the sought aid was no more needed a quick reversal would reappear and the picture of a backward, dangerous Asiatic horde casting a shadow across the continent of Europe would dominate public opinion. *Britain's Discovery of Russia* is a refreshingly objective study written in the best scholarly tradition. Amidst prevailing current partisanship which continues to clutter up the field of historical writing this book holds out a promise that true scholarship is still possible. American students of Russian history should read this book for more than one reason.

ANATOLE G. MAZOUR
Professor of History
Stanford University

EDWARD HALLETT CARR. *A History of Soviet Russia,* Vol. I: *Socialism in One Country, 1924–1926.* Pp. x, 557. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. $7.50.

This volume, in spite of its bulk, is merely the first of three which E. H. Carr is devoting to the crucial turning point in Soviet development from which Stalinism was to emerge. In it the author has set the stage for the principal act dealing with the struggle for power in the twenties.

In Part One, Carr indulges in a broadly conceived essay on his philosophy of Russian history stressing the continuity between Soviet rule and preceding regimes and the ability of the Bolsheviks to become attuned to Russian conditions and needs. He then takes up several aspects of Russian society which were neglected in the four previous volumes: the family, the Orthodox Church, literature, and law and jurisprudence. The persistence of traditional ways is emphasized in Carr's treatment of the failure of certain Bolsheviks to abolish the family and to effect the "withering away" of the state by viewing legal norms and the judiciary with skepticism. In discussing the Orthodox Church Carr ignores the strong movement for autocephaly which existed among Orthodox Ukrainians in the twenties. On the literary front Carr includes the ill-fated Proletkult movement and the fleeting freedom granted to fellow-traveling writers as well as the *Smena Vekh* movement among the émigrés and the "Eurasian" historical school.

In another chapter the Communist party is viewed in terms of its changing class composition, and its self-image is diagnosed in the harsh light of reality and Lenin's disillusionment over the uncontrolled growth of Soviet bureaucracy. Among the most rewarding chapters is the fourth in which the personalities of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, and Stalin are treated in concise sketches, which include references to revealing appraisals of them made by other Bolsheviks.

However, almost two-thirds of this preliminary volume is devoted to a consideration of the economic background to the struggle for power in which the debate over economic policy played a key role. In a seemingly endless chapter of 140 pages the state of agriculture is thoroughly discussed with almost suffocating documentation. In spite of the detail—which conveys something of the confusion reigning in the Party at that time regarding the agricultural problem—Carr does succeed in emphasizing the dilemma which confronted the Soviet rulers as they endeavored to raise agricultural output by granting concessions to the more able peasants and still remain faithful to their dogma. Shorter chapters are devoted to industry, labor, domestic and foreign trade, finance and credit, and to planning.

Carr has, if anything, enhanced the high standard which he set in earlier volumes. One can only wish him continued success as he maintains his unrelenting pace in this prodigious effort.

JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR.
Associate Professor of Political Science
University of Washington

H. S. DINERSTEIN. *War and the Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking.* Pp. 268. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. $5.50.

This book, prepared for the United States Air Force by the RAND Corporation, reviews Soviet military thinking since the end of World War II and concludes that there has taken place since Stalin's death, specifically during 1955, a complete revolution in Soviet strategy for engaging in a third world war with the West. This has involved the scrapping of the older view, endorsed by Stalin, that in war only the "permanently operating forces" determine the outcome; and that such factors as surprise have relatively slight effect on the final result. It has now been realized, according to the author, that the employment of nuclear weapons would result in devastation on such a scale that the first blow may be decisive; hence, the Soviet Union must be prepared to anticipate such a danger by a "pre-emptive war"—one designed to avert an attack. This is definitely something quite different from a "preventive war."

The material on which these conclusions are based consists principally of articles that have appeared in the leading Russian military and scientific journals, public pronouncements made from time to time by responsible leaders, and opinions expressed in the Soviet organs, *Pravda* and *Izvestia.* The kaleidoscopic changes that have occurred in the leadership of the Communist party are used to demonstrate that the outcome of the struggle between competing theories has involved the political fortunes of more than one of the rivals for leadership.

Within the limits set by the author, this method represents a plausible approach to the problem of present Soviet strategy. But where many of the relevant facts are veiled in official secrecy, the conclusions are tentative and will not command universal acceptance. Moreover, one has a feeling that a longer view and a better historical perspective would have yielded sounder conclusions. Indeed, the historical precedents to which the writer appeals in at least two cases hardly support his arguments. The Triple Entente of 1905–1907, which he cites as an example of an alliance that failed to deter Germany from attacking France, actually involved no actual commitments, as far as Britain was concerned, and hence invited rather than deterred aggression. In the second case, Soviet suspicions and fears are not primarily to be ascribed to anything the noncommunist world has done or not done to the Soviet Union, as President Roosevelt discovered, but is necessarily the result of their deliberate cultivation of hatred of the West, and the constant exacerbation of all relations with capitalistic countries, which has been a settled policy of the Communists since Lenin first laid it down. It serves, among other purposes, to justify the iron discipline exercised by their dictatorship.

One wonders also whether Soviet pronouncements can be taken at their face value, as the author seems to have done. The revolutionists early had recourse to Aesopian language to veil their real meaning from the censor and this practice has been taken over by the Communists in dealing with the outside world.

A question left unanswered by this book and indeed not even raised is whether the purely military factors will determine the outcome of the struggle. We may be well advised not to overlook these but it would also be well to bear in mind that other less obvious forces such as national morale have sometimes more than counterbalanced the purely physical factors.

STUART R. TOMPKINS
Research Professor, Emeritus
University of Oklahoma

BARBARA WARD. *Five Ideas that Change the World.* (The Aggrey-Fraser-Guggisberg Lectures.) Pp. 188. New York: W. W. Norton & Company for the University College of Ghana, 1959. $3.75.

The material contained in this small book by Barbara Ward is not new. The well-known British economist has presented it frequently before, in many magazine articles and previous books, notably her excellent volume, *The Interplay of East and West.*

What is new is the communication of this material to a non-Western audience as lectures in a series established by Premier Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana as the "Aggrey-Fraser-Guggisberg Lectures" to commemorate the work of three Englishmen in the educational advance of the the Gold Coast, now Ghana. Without these three men, says Nkrumah in his foreword, "Ghana could not now lay claim to be as advanced in the educational field as any territory on the African continent." Barbara Ward, married to Commander Sir Robert Jackson, chairman of Ghana's development commission, and now known as Lady Jackson, is well qualified to analyze what she calls "points of conflict and cooperation" between the West and non-Western societies.

In discussing with her Accra audience the "five ideas that change the world"—nationalism, industrialism, colonialism, communism, and internationalism—Barbara Ward displays both the qualities and the weaknesses of her recent work. She understands, and sympathizes with, the rejection of colonialism by peoples who have lived or still live under the rule of Western nations—but would like to see the Western colonial powers have an opportunity

to make amends for previous failures by fulfilling the expectations they had aroused in the past, often without satisfying them. She is keenly aware that nationalism is an important feature of every people's development—but she is concerned about "the dark face" it shows in many areas, specifically referring to the Middle East.

She recognizes that the newly developing countries desire to achieve the industrialization attained over the past two centuries by the Western nations—but points out that "in his tremendous advance from primitive agriculture to dynamic industrialization," man "has taken some of his old problems along"; and she warns that countries short on resources will have to make harsh choices about what they can and cannot do. She believes that communism, with its political inflexibility, has not yet shown "that it can do more than drive societies at breakneck speed through the 'sound barrier' of modernization"—a statement which seems out of date about Russia.

In the international sphere nonalignment, she contends, offers no more security than a seesaw—"the posture of maximum instability." The Communists must shed their vision of a total and universal world order. But the Western powers, for their part, need to gain a consistent view of the world—"a sense of community and responsibility shared with all mankind," which they do not possess today.

These are all unimpeachable views, developed with a nice balance between ideals and realities. But in reading Barbara Ward's writings, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that they are concerned with "forces," "factors," and "processes" rather than with human beings. In her cool appraisal of contending ideologies she makes no allowances for the emotions which inspire human beings to seek change—for good or ill—and which are today, as they have been throughout history, the mainspring of growth and the source of survival through adaptation to or creation of new conditions. This noticeable lack makes her often sound like a well-meaning but rather grim school teacher intent on instructing peoples who are still young in political and technological experience on the way they should live—preferably the way of Western Christians. The approach is commendable and constructive. But, one wants to ask, is it practicable, or even desirable, given the present circumstances of the non-Western countries? May they not have to work out a pattern of their own, for which Western experience may be only a partial guide? One would like to see Barbara Ward explore these questions in her future writings.

VERA MICHELES DEAN
Foreign Policy Association
Director, Non-Western Civilizations Program
University of Rochester

JOHN H. HERZ. *International Politics in the Atomic Age*. Pp. viii, 360. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. $6.00.

As the author puts it, "this is an old-fashioned kind of book." It relies on thoughtful analysis of history and examination of ideas and concepts to make its undogmatic case for accommodation and universalism as tentative answers to the nuclear dilemma of current world politics.

In a previous work, *Political Realism and Political Idealism* (1951), Herz entered his major brief in the "great debate" on Morgenthau's power analysis. His plea there was for recognition of the political value, even defined in power terms, of the set of principles and policies loosely grouped under the heading "realist liberalism." The present study reasserts that view, with emphasis on those programs which the author feels requisite to human survival in the nuclear age. The contrast between classical and realist liberalism, in his words, is between the traditional "love-thy-neighbor" morality and the "love-thy-neighbor-if-you-love-yourself" argument which the nuclear threat makes valid today.

Most of the major concepts of modern international relations are re-examined in the light of the author's thesis that "permeability" of the state resulting from nuclear weapons has essentially modified the role of the traditional "territorial" state. Most governments can no longer perform the political function of defense—even the great superpowers can do so only partially. Measurements of relative national power become meaningless at the saturation capacity; moreover the certainty of retaliatory destruction of even the largest states has profoundly modified any instrumental meaning of sovereignty.

In this situation the world now has a new kind of power vacuum—not the territorial vacuum of a weak state, but the functional vacuum resulting from inadequate means for maintaining what Niebuhr has called "the minimal community of the fate of the common threat of nuclear annihilation."

Herz' two concluding chapters present his "Plan for a Holding Operation," which explores almost all the recent proposals for at least minimal accommodation between East and West, and an analysis of "Universalism as Alternative to the Power Dilemma," which similarly surveys existing patterns on which stronger integrating developments toward a world polity might be based. In each he is careful to avoid utopianism, to trace out what seems possible when what seems desirable is clearly not to be.

The author has written a wise book—a major contribution to the necesary re-evaluation of political concepts in the contemporary world. He offers a refreshing contrast both to the pure power doctrinaires and to the pure utopians in international relations.

OLIVER BENSON
Professor of Government
University of Oklahoma

## AMERICAN HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT

ROBERT E. LANE. *Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics*. Pp. 374. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. $7.50.

What's in a *name*? When I entered Poland in May 1959 with *Political Life* in my baggage, the customs officials at the border promptly impounded it. Despite prolonged protest I did not get it back until I left the country two weeks later. I rather doubt that the Polish authorities would have found Professor Lane's book very dangerous if they had taken the trouble to read it. It is not a controversial volume. However, they would have found it a most extraordinary source of information about political life in the United States.

The field of inquiry dealing with what is known as political behavior is an interdisciplinary hybrid. Political science, sociology, and psychology share in its parentage; none of them can fully claim it. Its development in recent years has been characterized by tremendous vigor but very little organization. A great variety of studies have appeared in the literature—mass studies, community studies, legislative studies, case studies, even psychoanalytic studies—their direction seeming to come much more from the inspiration of their authors than from any central theme.

Professor Lane has undertaken to review this scattered profusion of empirical studies. Despite occasional omissions—the Robinson-Hayes studies of the 1932 election, for example—and a tendency to accept uncritically data of very various quality, his accomplishment is impressive. There is certainly no other place where one can find such a complete and detailed report of the published and unpublished material in this area of study.

However the book is far more than an encyclopedia of empirical facts. Taking participation as his basic variable, Professor Lane has attempted to synthesize the great disorder of data which have been accumulating over the years and to organize them around suggested hypotheses. The hypotheses he proposes are not always at a very high conceptual level and they are consequently not very systematically related to each other. One may regret this lack of elegance in Professor Lane's theoretical structure, but it reflects the level of sophistication at which empirical researchers in this field currently work. It is doubtful if a more generalized system of constructs could have been introduced without incurring a serious loss of contact with the available research data.

Professor Lane has carried out an ambitious work and one which needed very badly to be done. He has produced a document which will have undoubted value as a reference book for students of politi-

cal behavior. It is not unrealistic to hope that it will also give stimulus and direction to future research developments in this field.

ANGUS CAMPBELL
Director, Survey Research Center
University of Michigan

WILFRED E. BINKLEY. *The Man in the White House: His Powers and Duties.* Pp. 310. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. $6.00.

The title of this little volume is a bit misleading. The book is not about the man currently occupying the White House. Nor, for that matter, is it solely about the office or even the institution. This is not to suggest that an alternative title comes quickly to mind for the simple reason that the book is a miscellaneous collection of essays about some of the men who have held the office, about the techniques by which some of them were nominated and by which some of them were elected to the office, and about both the office and the institution.

In addition to various chapters dealing with the president as chief executive there are others on the president as party leader, chief legislator, commander-in-chief, chief diplomat, and so forth. There is even one interesting essay on the president as a national symbol and another on the vice presidency and succession to the presidency. The arrangement of the collection is somewhat strange in spots. A chapter on pressures on the president is not surprising but it is a little strange to find this chapter in between one on apprenticeship for the presidency and one on nominating methods. The pressures on the president would seem to come after he gets nominated and elected.

There is much in this collection about the office and about how the office has become completely institutionalized—so completely institutionalized in fact that even President Eisenhower had no choice but to accept and continue it.

The historical background material is particularly impressive. Professor Binkley knows his American history well. He has had a long and distinguished career as a teacher. Moreover, he has already written extensively and ably on party history, on Congress, and on the presidency itself. This volume is no exception. Like its predecessors it is lively, interesting, and informative. Laymen as well as professional students will find it exceptionally readable and tremendously worth while.

E. ALLEN HELMS
Professor of Political Science
The Ohio State University

JAMES BURNHAM. *Congress and the American Tradition.* Pp. x, 363. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959. $6.50.

Once more the provocative author of *The Managerial Revolution* and *The Machiavellians* has produced a challenging book on the perennial problem of maintaining a serviceable government in a modern state. Following his earlier excursions among the Communist and Fascist writers, he now has discovered the Founding Fathers and conducts an interesting exploration in the classic political literature and current political practices of his own country. What he finds causes him to view with alarm the present condition and prospects of the Congress of the United States. Congress, he fears, "is on its way out." The result, he concludes, will be fatal to traditional American liberty.

The evidence with which Mr. Burnham supports this thesis is carefully selected but unconvincing. Consider, for example, his treatment of the investigatory power of the Congress, which he regards as one of its most important attributes, and of the censuring of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy by the Senate, which he regards as a most deplorable sign of the deterioration of the American constitutional system. To the ordinary American citizen, who notes that Senator McCarthy was not censured for his gross abuse of the Senate's investigatorial prerogatives, or for his subversive attack against the executive branch of the government, or for his mistreatment of anyone other than his fellow-senators, the action taken against McCarthy seems to have been the least the Senate could have done to maintain its proper position in the constitutional system. But the Senate did maintain its own self-respect.



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Later the Supreme Court intervened with some salutary decisions—particularly that in the Watkins case, which Burnham also deplores—and thereby re-enforced the creaking constitutional structure. American conservatives as well as liberals can rightly feel reassured at the accumulating proof of the stability of the American constitutional system. Burnham, who wishes to be the champion of conservatism, falls out of step with his own company.

Nothing discloses more clearly the inadequacy of Burnham's concept of conservatism than his treatment of this topic. He recognizes that the American tradition has placed a high value on the preservation of the authority and prestige of the executive and judicial branches of government. But, he argues, since 1933 true conservatism requires the exaltation of the Congress and the deflation of the Presidency and the Supreme Court. How has this change in the implications of conservatism come about? Burnham cannot clearly tell. Perhaps if he had deemed it proper to include the American party system in his study of the political tradition, he would have seen more deeply into the mysteries of American politics. But nowhere in the book does Burnham trouble himself to consider the impact of the unplanned party system on the constitutional scheme of government. This strange neglect may explain his failure to put together a more persuasive case for his pessimistic conclusions.

ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE
Professor of the Science of
Government, Emeritus
Harvard University

OSCAR KRAINES. *Congress and the Challenge of Big Government.* (Bookman Monograph Series for Historical and Political Science Studies.) Pp. 129. New York: Bookman Associates, 1959. $3.00.

Two nineteenth-century congressional examinations of economy, efficiency, and management in the executive branch are described and analyzed in this carefully executed volume: the Cockrell Committee, 1885–87; and the Dockery-Cockrell Commission, 1893–95. The author describes these inquiries as the first two "comprehensive Congressional investigations into administration," and as such they have great interest for students of administrative reorganization in the United States.

The two investigations had more in common with each other than they were to have with any of the twentieth century examinations of administration which were to follow. Both took for granted that Congress was responsible for the organization and methods of the administrative agencies, and neither President Cleveland nor President Harrison challenged this assumption; in fact, neither displayed any interest in the question. Both inquiries concentrated upon the internal processes of administration, the Cockrell Committee upon the "flow of work" within the bureaus, the Dockery-Cockrell Commission upon the financial, especially the accounting, procedures in the departments. The techniques of investigation were methodical, meticulous, and undramatic; within their scope, the methods were sophisticated —for example, the Cockrell Committee's examination of the work procedures of bureaus anticipated the flow-of-work charts of the scientific management men used a generation later, while the accounting reforms installed by the Dockery-Cockrell Commission matched those of the best managed contemporary business corporations. Neither investigation, on the other hand, displayed any major concern with the transfer of functions or bureaus, or with the reorganization of departments.

The main link between these two inquiries and their successors is found in their stress upon economy and efficiency in administration, and in the Dockery-Cockrell Commission's use of "experts." These experts, Charles W. Haskins and Elijah W. Sells, were prominent among the pioneers of modern accounting systems and had held high accounting posts in railroads and other large corporations; they were subsequently to establish the leading accounting firm of Haskins and Sells. The Cockrell Committee had done its work without a professional staff, but the Dockery-Cockrell Commission successfully demonstrated the desirability, if not the indispensability, of experts in such examinations.

The accomplishments of these two pio-

neer investigations of administrations were impressive to contemporary observers. A decade later President Roosevelt seized the opportunity to make such inquiries useful to the Presidency, and thereafter no President was indifferent to their potential assets and liabilities. When T. R.'s examining group, the Keep Committee, went to work at his direction, it drew generously upon the methods and ideas of its Congressional predecessors. The author of this study has illuminated a little-known chapter in the story of administrative improvement and reorganization in the United States.

WALLACE S. SAYRE
Professor of Public Administration
Columbia University

WALTER MILLIS with HARVEY C. MANSFIELD and HAROLD STEIN. *Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy.* (Twentieth Century Fund's Project on Civil-Military Relations.) Pp. 436. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958. $4.00.

The project of which this volume is the first result will include case studies. What we have here is an over-all historical sketch of civil-military elements in our national policy from 1931 to 1957. Part I, which was begun by Harold Stein, Research Director of the Project, and completed by Harvey Mansfield when illness befell Stein, covers the prewar decade and domestic and external aspects of the war effort. Part II, which was written by Walter Millis, deals with major aspects in the postwar period.

The volume has interest for the academic as well as the general reader. Its historical approach stands in contrast with the problem approach of Sapin and Snyder's short study of *The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy* (1954). It would be of greater assistance to the political scientist if it gave him documentation instead of six pages of Notes on Sources at the end. The explanation for this lack seems to be that the book is a "highly condensed" work on the "contemporary world."

Mr. Millis' conclusions are up to a point unchallengeable but in part open to question. He says that by 1957 the "military and diplomatic potentials" of "the new warfare" were "leading to a profound, yet unanalyzable, transformation in military institutions and international military relationships which had remained fundamentally unaltered since the rise of the armed nation-state." He doubtless means "as yet unanalyzable." He declares that to discuss the new issues in "conventional terms of the civil-military relationship seems irrelevant." The suspicion that this statement is too sweeping is reinforced by Mr. Millis's treatment of the relief of General MacArthur. The chapter on "Truman and MacArthur" is excellent in every respect except its failure to see the threat to and vindication of the principle of civil supremacy. It is indeed shocking to read that "the MacArthur problem was mainly a personal and political one, having little relevance to the fundamental relationship of civil to military power in the state." The principle of civil supremacy is wholly misunderstood unless it is seen that not only MacArthur but also Representative Martin and others were guilty of its flagrant violation.

JAMES HART
Professor of Political Science
University of Virginia

ROBERT V. REMINI. *Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party.* Pp. viii, 271. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. $5.00.

This volume advances the thesis that the making of the Democratic party—or more precisely the revamping of the Jeffersonian Republican party—was largely the work of Martin Van Buren. He was aided and abetted by many men, and Andrew Jackson naturally contributed an indispensable element to the work by lending his name and popularity to the movement. But the anti-Federalist professional politician, firmly entrenched in New York state, was convinced as a matter of deliberate principle that government should be bipartisan and conducted through well disciplined political parties. Suspicious of "traitors" with Federalist backgrounds who were hiding within the party of the people during the Era of Good Feeling, Van Buren was even more



disturbed by the program of John Quincy Adams which was designed to break up all party distinctions and to bring the whole people together in his administration.

The Senator from New York had routed the Federalists in his home state and he carefully planned the return of the nation to bipartisan government. Other historians have commented on the slight role played by Andrew Jackson in formulating party policy, but Professor Remini now has interrupted his work on a full length biography in order to prepare this detailed study of Van Buren's unique contribution to the formation of the Democratic party.

Essentially a study in political organization between 1821 and 1828, scarcely 5 per cent of this volume is devoted to Van Buren's personal life. The details of his experience and training in New York state politics account for something over a fourth of the book and are basic to an understanding of his success in re-creating a national bipartisan system. His political machine in New York, the Albany Regency, by the adroit use of patronage, created a well disciplined Republican party out of the anti-Clinton factions. The diversified and widely separated antiadministration forces in Washington were more of a problem. Some two-thirds of this study deals with Van Buren's work in Washington and his well planned contacts in the South and the West.

Mr. Remini's interest is in the political principles of Martin Van Buren—principles which were well developed before the Jackson campaigns. After first supporting Crawford, Van Buren accepted Jackson of the West to bind together the planters of the South and the "plain" Republicans of the North in a union that would last until 1860. But Van Buren had been arguing principles before he became a Jacksonian and they were the same principles after he became a Jacksonian. Mr. Remini effectively supports the thesis that it was Van Buren who provided the party organization of the Jacksonians, but it is perhaps going too far to suggest Van Buren as the first national politician.

CHARLES M. THOMAS
Visiting Lecturer in Political Science
Huntingdon College

ERNEST R. MAY. *The World War and American Isolation, 1914–1917.* (Harvard Historical Studies, Vol. LXXI.) Pp. viii, 482. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press under the direction of the Department of History, 1959. $7.50.

Mr. May, after careful survey of familiar ground and fresh sights over new terrain, has drawn another map of the American road to war, 1913–1917. The old mileposts —*Lusitania,* strict accountability, *Sussex,* the House-Grey memorandum—are, of course, all here and firmly fixed in the expected places. They are, however, exposed from time to time in somewhat greater detail than heretofore. And, more important, Mr. May has some new findings which enable him to place the whole circuitous path in a rather wider, clearer perspective.

This completion of a larger perspective is no mean achievement. The fact that you are not quite sure what is going on in the other fellow's mind no doubt makes the task of the diplomat more exciting, but it severely limits the contribution of the historian of diplomacy. Hitherto students of this period have known much more about what was taking place in Washington than in London or Berlin or Pless. Mr. May by his diligence has obtained a fuller understanding of the British position from his scrutiny of the still incomplete British sources and he has, from the recently available archives of the German Foreign Ministry, acquired impressive knowledge of the German attitudes. What he has discovered he has used to give far firmer shape than was heretofore possible to the shifting negotiations conducted by the officials in the three capitals.

To organize the materials of a diplomatic exchange is always difficult. Mr. May has done so with clarity and skill. He reveals also, in his pen sketches of the principals, a genuine feeling for the nature and influence of personality. Finally, he writes well and, at times, with imaginative grace. It is a pleasure to find an historian who will take the stylistic risk of saying that paper is the hemoglobin of a modern army.

Out of his labors will come a fuller com-

prehension of how the negotiations in the period 1913 to 1917 developed as they did, and quite possibly for some, as for Mr. May, will come also a larger and perhaps deceptive sympathy for the purposes of Bethmann-Hollweg. Yet out of this narrative, for all its amplitude and evidence of workmanship, will come no larger or more intelligible image of the central figure, Woodrow Wilson. As does Charles Seymour, Mr. May believes the President adopted a conscious policy of patience and firmness in the interests of peace. That, with all his stern injunctions, his attempted mediations, his reverberating oratory, he was a man of great good will is here, as in other places, indeed made clear. That he knew the nature of the forces he contended with, or understood the necessary connections between power and policy in that disordered world, is no clearer than before.

ELTING E. MORISON
Professor of Industrial History
School of Industrial Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

BROOKS HAYS. *A Southern Moderate Speaks*. Pp. xi, 231. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959. $3.50.

After conflict has reached substantial resolution, moderate positions may be accepted. The new status quo often resembles an old compromise proposal and frequently validates a formerly "immoral" compromise.

While the controversy is under way this likely future of the present compromise proposal gives little comfort. The moderate is a marginal man with divided loyalties to two extremes, both of whom say "If you're not with me, you're against me." He "finds truth" in pro and con on the basis of some larger ethic. He subscribes to symbols used by both sides yet he ascribes a private and variant meaning to these symbols. Consequently, for the radicals the moderate is predictably "unpredictable," while concurrently, the moderate wants to be "understood."

*A Southern Moderate Speaks* is a plea for understanding by a marginal man in the American race relations conflict. His New Deal administrative work, his Little Rock Urban League activities, his Baptist Church work, and his inherited party politics made him acceptable to whites and Negroes when he ran for office—though his moderation was a campaign issue. He continued to stress "racial reconciliation" within the Southern Baptist Convention, of which he was President during the Little Rock crisis. He was a mediator in recent national Democratic party conventions.

Brooks Hays was also a mediator during the Little Rock crisis. The formal constitutional fictions of state and federal sovereignties and of the formal division of powers were elements in the crisis. Hays, because of personal relationships established as a congressman, became the informal channel of communication between the presidency and the governorship. He was not able to perform a similar function between the federal courts and either the governorship or the Little Rock School Board. Ultimately Hays lost his congressional seat to a radical segregationist.

Brooks Hays favors gradualism, the maintenance of the dignity of the law, repugnance toward violence, local implementation of broad legal principles without outside interference, and a "tireless devotion to . . . love and patience," within the framework of Christianity. He probably does not greatly differ from many Americans in other regions.

Have we moderates placed undue responsibility on the Negro population when we ask for "patience" and an "appreciation of gains which have already been made," while the dominant white population evidences an inability to change local patterns except under heavy external pressure?

LEONARD BLUMBERG
Associate Professor and Chairman,
Department of Sociology
and Anthropology
Temple University

DUANE LOCKARD. *New England State Politics*. Pp. xi, 347. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. $6.00.

This is as good a one-man study of the politics of an American section as we are likely to get. The author had a term as a member of the Connecticut Senate and spent seven years collecting the data for this book. The treatment of each state seems good, that for Connecticut best. Politics is here examined largely at the state level, with some attention to such big cities as Boston; the unique politics of the New England town still needs doing by someone as politically astute as Dr. Lockard.

The politics of upper New England—Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont—are considerably different, as the author proves, from that in lower New England—Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. The Republican party varies from strong to dominant in the first set; it is weaker in the second. With the loss of Vermont in 1958, however, the Republican party can no longer rely on any New England state; the last rampart has fallen.

The picture of New England politics here presented is not rosy or sentimental, but hard and realistic. Rhode Island appears to have the worst politics: "Rhode Island cannot match the flamboyant and flagrant corruption that has flourished in Louisiana, but it does offer a formidable challenge. . . . There are laws covering ballot frauds in Rhode Island; unfortunately for the voters of the state they are more frequently needed than used. . . . Rhode Island's race tracks are the ultimate source of much of the corruption in the state. . . . When on one occasion a reporter found fourteen state legislators working at the tracks while being reported 'present' in the General Assembly, there was no great outcry."

After examining the six states one by one, the author devotes a chapter to the ethnic elements in New England politics. In what has elsewhere been called the second colonization of New England, the new immigrants "have been primarily those from Catholic parts of the world. Consequently there are divisions in the society which stem from the philosophic and social differences between Protestantism and Catholicism. . . . In many questions of public policy the two great religious communities . . . come into direct and often heated conflict."

Few American legislatures are fairly apportioned, but all the New England legislatures except the Massachusetts General Court appear to be grossly misrepresentative. Dr. Lockard shows for the others that "the apportionment of our state legislatures [is] one of the most blighting aspects of state government." The situation would be even worse, he thinks, except that in some states the minorities that control the legislatures "do not make as much of their special position as they presumably might" because the other party might win the governorship if they are totally indifferent to the general welfare.

DAYTON D. MCKEAN
Dean of the Graduate School
Professor of Political Science
University of Colorado

RONALD M. SCHNEIDER. *Communism in Guatemala, 1944–1954*. (Foreign Policy Research Institute Series, University of Pennsylvania, No. 7.) Pp. xxi, 350. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. $6.00.

Since the overthrow of the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954, several studies have been written to analyze the extraordinary climb of the Communist party there to a position of dominance. For the first time, however, a wealth of new documents has been made available, the result of which is Ronald Schneider's *Communism in Guatemala, 1944–1954*. Relying upon a collection of some 50,000 documents, including copious records and personal correspondence, the author has given us the most thorough and careful examination of the subject yet published.

The case history of Guatemala is a vivid example of Communist methodology at work. The presence of social unrest, coupled with outspoken nationalism, is among the many factors which made of Guatemala a proving ground for the Communist movement in Latin America. Through Schneider's book we see the continual extension of Communist tentacles until they reached nearly every sector of the Guatemalan social fabric.

At the risk of being trite, it must be repeated once more that what happened in Guatemala could occur elsewhere in the

hemisphere. Notwithstanding the dangers of seeming hag-ridden by the specter of communism, we must realize that many of the environmental circumstances aiding Guatemalan communism are present in several of the Latin republics. Schneider does not offer in any detail direct suggestions by which the United States might prevent another such episode. But inferential ideas are offered; his main purpose is the analysis of the Communist infiltration itself.

The author's approach is clearly that of the scholar. He has so organized his study as to sort out logically the myriad of problems, both tangible and otherwise. In general his presentation is quite clear, if occasionally bordering on the brusque. Without question this work should be required reading for those interested not only in Guatemala but, more widely, in problems of contemporary Latin America.

It seems sad but probable that, as other excellent works in this field, Schneider's book may not receive wide attention. That would be unfortunate. The lessons of the Guatemalan episode are applicable to both Latin and North Americans. It must be remembered that communism could again seize upon institutional and social weaknesses in a Latin American republic, conceivably going even further than in Guatemala.

Those who wish to pursue the subject further should note that microfilms of the documentary collection have been made available to researchers at the Library of Congress through donation by the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

JOHN D. MARTZ
George Washington University

## *ASIA AND AFRICA*

R. P. DORE. *City Life in Japan: A Study of a Tokyo Ward.* Pp. x, 472. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958. $6.75.

As Dore himself states it: "The chief aim of this book is to give an idea of what it is like to be a Japanese living in Shitayama-cho, a neighbourhood of some three hundred households not far from the centre of Tokyo" (p. 3). Dore's study is an excellent addition to a growing body of literature on neighborhoods in large urban places throughout the world. Work is continuing on neighborhoods in American cities; Oscar Lewis is carrying out research along these lines in Mexico City; several British anthropologists and sociologists are studying urban neighborhoods in England, and so on. Slowly but steadily we are accumulating a valuable body of knowledge on urban communities and sub-systems thereof.

Dore's work is based upon data collected in 1951 primarily through questionnaires administered by Japanese students to 243 households in one Tokyo ward. Although quite heterogeneous in its composition, this ward contains proportionally more persons in high status occupations and a better educated populace than Tokyo as a whole, points that need to be kept in mind when one evaluates Dore's findings. We are treated to a wealth of empirical data on the family, religion, leisure, friendship patterns, and so on. Dore gets a great deal of mileage out of the material collected—perhaps too much, for he occasionally forgets about some of the stated limitations of his survey. Nevertheless, I am most sympathetic to his approach. He sees this sector of Tokyo in both societal and historical perspective, analyzing the neighborhood in terms of accumulated knowledge of the broader Japanese society. And happily, he contrasts the present with the past, affording us an appreciation of some of the monumental changes wrought by industrial urbanization and "Westernization" in Japan. Not unexpectedly, hiatuses appear in the social structure—for example, in marriage, family, and religion; thus in the realm of marriage we are told: "Despite the acceptance of the love-marriage ideal, there are no established patterns of courtship" (p. 170).

Although Dore avoids an overweighting of pure description by contrasting preindustrial and industrial Japan, this is hardly enough. I personally would have been pleased with more discussion as to whys and wherefores. An already excellent work would have been strengthened perceptibly by a more explicit statement of the theory and hypotheses. But others may disagree, for in detailed description there is strength, and this book is a fount of data for all manner of social scientists, be they empirical investigators of cities around the world or social theorists. I heartily commend this work.

GIDEON SJOBERG
Associate Professor of Sociology
University of Texas

SHIGETO TSURU. *Essays on Japanese Economy.* (Economic Research Series, 2. The Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.) Pp. iv, 241. Tokyo: Kinokuniya Bookstore Company, 1958. No price.

Professor Tsuru is one of Japan's outstanding economists. For this reason as well as for his elucidation of basic problems of the Japanese economy, it is worthwhile to have assembled eight essays which he wrote for American and other journals over the past eighteen years.

The collection is divided into two sections. The first comprises six essays on economic problems of postwar Japan. Successive articles treat such matters as inflation and stability, reconstruction and development, production for the Korean incident and for peace, industrial expansion and reconcentration, employment and unemployment, and the 1956–1960 economic plan and its weaknesses. Throughout is emphasized the basic problem of the postwar Japanese economy: the need to grow rapidly enough to absorb increases in the labor force. The prerequisites for such growth are high rates of domestic savings, investments, and exports. There is some unevenness; the later essays are better, with the one on employment problems the best concise English-language presentation of the conceptual and statistical difficulties in measuring unemployment in Japan.

The second half of the book contains two articles written in 1941 on now-historical periods of the Japanese economy. One, an outgrowth of the author's Harvard doctoral dissertation, ably applies business cycle analysis to the period 1868–1893. It would be interesting to see how Tsuru would approach this same period today in light of developments in the theory of economic growth. The final essay, by far the longest, represents an endeavor to determine the cost through reduction of living standards of the "China Incident" to Japan. While inadequate in terms of present-day theoretical tools, it nevertheless is an interesting early attempt at empirical aggregative analysis.

Seven of the eight essays address themselves to the broad economic problems of Japan at the times they were written. Such topicality means that sometimes the analysis suffers from lack of data, from weaknesses in the contemporary theoretical tools, and from certain errors in judgment. Consequently, it is probably unfair to judge these articles in light of present knowledge. As the author indicates in the Preface, the collection provides the "objective record of my progress as an economist." In these terms, Professor Tsuru well reflects not only his own progress but also that of the economic profession. However, since the essays assembled are already more or less available, it would have been of greater interest and significance to have instead translations of Tsuru's essays which have appeared only in Japanese. This would have provided us with a greater sampling of his undoubted knowledge and insight.

HUGH T. PATRICK
Lecturer in Economics
University of Michigan

CHARLES DAVID SHELDON. *The Rise of the Merchant Class in Tokugawa Japan, 1600–1868: An Introductory Survey.* (Monographs of the Association for Asian Studies: V.) Pp. x, 205. Locust Valley, N. Y.: J. J. Augustin, for the Association for Asian Studies, 1958. $5.00.

This is a fine scholarly contribution to our growing historical literature on Japan. Teachers of Japanese history frequently refer to the "rise of the merchants" in Tokugawa Japan, but they are often not very clear on the mechanics or the limitations of that rise. Sheldon's work fills out

the general lines of the story of the merchants with examples and analysis.

It is a fascinating story. It is impossible to mention all the facets which Sheldon explores, but some of his observations are particularly interesting. Searching the scholarly literature of the Tokugawa period, he finds that though they were conscious of the "deadlock" in Tokugawa society which the economic prosperity of low class merchants created, neither samurai nor merchant writers seriously questioned the feudal structure and attitudes which lay at the root of the problem. His discussion of rivalries among the merchants themselves is very enlightening, particularly the country-wide phenomenon of provincial castle town merchants' contesting the positions of the long established "city merchants" of Osaka and Edo in the latter part of the Tokugawa period. And in discussing the great merchant confiscation cases, Yodoya and Zeniya, the author's presentation of the details enables the reader to see important differences in these cases, which help to explain the city-provincial merchant complex.

Sheldon's research in this field, which began at the University of California under the direction of Professor Delmer M. Brown, was completed under Professor Yasuzo Horie, while the author held a Fulbright grant at Kyoto University. Source materials in Japanese and Western languages are carefully used and the result is a fine example of the rewards of scholarship of international exchange.

HILARY CONROY
Associate Professor of Far Eastern History
University of Pennsylvania

ALLAN B. COLE. *Political Tendencies of Japanese in Small Enterprises.* With Special Reference to the Social Democratic Party. (Studies on Japan's Social Democratic Parties.) Pp. 155. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959. $3.00.

This pioneer study begins by describing the very important role played by small and medium-sized business and industrial concerns—the *chūshō-kigyiō*—in Japan's economy, and their subordination as subcontractors to larger companies. It then examines their problems, and evidence regarding the political behavior and tendencies of employers and employees. The author reaffirms earlier findings to the effect that a great majority in both categories are conservative, and that both continue, in the main, to support the Liberal-Democratic party, influenced as they are by family ties, concern for the stability of enterprises upon which their livelihood depends, and the deeply-rooted habit of deference to officials and patrons. The remaining half of the study is devoted to the attitudes and activities of the minority of owners, managers, and laborers—the "urban peasants"—who are turning slowly toward the Socialist party, the development of unions and their relations with the national federations of labor, and the accomplishments of the right and left Socialists in their efforts to attract support from this massive sector of society.

Professor Cole does not attempt to cover the whole of this vast field but he has provided students with much data on four main federations of associations composed of *chūshō-kigyiō* members and on their relations with the Shakaito. His sources are public opinion polls, the writings of investigators, most of them Japanese, and the publications of government agencies, labor organizations, and the Socialist party. In addition he interweaves his own interesting findings obtained in interviews in the largest industrial and commercial centers. He includes also a number of illuminating tables of statistics, charts, and maps. His treatment is objective, his comments considerate of the hard circumstances of Japan's small-time entrepreneurs and laborers but aware also of compensating factors and of obstacles to more rapid change. No student of Japanese political and economic development should fail to read this scholarly monograph.

He writes in conclusion: ". . . it can be seen that there has been postwar growth in political consciousness and activity among many persons engaged in small-scale sales and production. Petty mercantile interests seem to be somewhat more aligned with leftist parties than are the sympathies of personnel in small industries. Still



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
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
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there remains massive traditionalism, conservatism and inertia."

HAROLD S. QUIGLEY
Professor of Political Science, Emeritus
University of Minnesota

ARTHUR F. WRIGHT. *Buddhism in Chinese History.* (Stanford Studies in the Civilization of Eastern Asia.) Pp. xiv, 144. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959. $3.75.

Other books have been written about Buddhism in China, but this is the first to examine it primarily as an active agent in a lengthy process of acculturation. Beginning with the advent of Buddhism in China in the first century, and ending with its "last twilight" there today, how did Buddhism affect the course of Chinese civilization, not merely in religion and philosophy, but also politics, social organization, economics, art, and culture generally? This question, rather than that of Buddhism itself as a self-contained entity, is the primary concern of this book.

The picture that emerges should not only be of great interest to students of Chinese history, of religion, and of cultural interaction, but may also throw light on the renewed process of borrowing and adaptation taking place in China today. Despite the formidable scope and complexity of Professor Wright's subject, he succeeds in handling it with masterly succinctness, lucidity, and insight. Expert use is made of numerous specialized studies in Chinese and Japanese, as well as the usual European languages.

The book's extreme brevity—accounted for by the fact that its material was originally presented as a series of six lectures—unfortunately obliges him to treat many topics, including entire schools of Buddhism, only lightly if at all. Such a significant figure as Seng-chao (384–414), for example, receives no mention—save in the Bibliography—and even the mighty pilgrim and translator, Hsüan-tsang (596–664), has to be content with a single sentence. Two sentences suffice to describe the great persecution of 842–845, while names and titles Śramana, *ch'ing-t'an*, and Huang-lao fou-t'u appear without translation. Furthermore, the book's central concern with the effects of Buddhism, rather than its inner content, obliges the "educated public" for which it is primarily intended to look elsewhere for a satisfactory exposition of Chinese Buddhist tenets and practices per se. This reviewer believes that an excellent book could have been made still better had it been extended to perhaps twice its present length.

As to the illustrations, the fact that all eight are devoted to examples of sculpture, of which no less than half consist of relatively small bronze figurines, gives them a collective sameness despite their individual excellence. Inexplicable is the absence of what is undoubtedly the crowning glory of Chinese Buddhist art, namely stone sculpture. Interest and variety could have been enhanced by inclusion of at least one monumental stone figure, preferably shown *in situ* at one of the famous caves, as well as a view of some one of China's many lovely Buddhist temples.

DERK BODDE
Professor of Chinese
University of Pennsylvania

ALBERT FEUERWERKER. *China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai (1844–1916) and Mandarin Enterprise.* (Harvard East Asia Studies.) Pp. xii, 331, xxxii. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959. $6.50.

This fine, scholarly appraisal of China's early industrialization helps us to understand more fully why China, unlike Japan, was unable to develop its industries rapidly and thus bring to its teeming millions some relief from the debilitating yoke of inordinate poverty—the unhappy fate that confronts hundreds of millions of the world's population existing marginally in underdeveloped areas today. Looking at the ways in which Chinese merchants and other enterprisers set up and operated modern commercial and industrial units at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, Feuerwerker successfully sheds light on the causes of China's industrial retardation.

Beginning with a useful survey of the range and value of China's industrialization around 1912, the author focuses attention on the *kuan-tu shang-pan* (official

supervision and merchant management) system which was the main basis for Chinese industrialization. This system, which embodied a marriage of private merchant capital and official government bureaucratic management, militated against rationalized organization, functional specialization, and impersonal discipline. Since the firms taking this form in shipping, banking, communications, textile manufacture, and so forth, were set up in a traditional Chinese mold and exercised a monopoly control, no significant industrial progress took place.

To point up the critical importance of motivations, techniques, and institutions in the process of economic change, the author first outlines Chinese economic thought in the nineteenth century. Then he draws a biographical sketch of Sheng Hsuan-huai, an official and industrialist involved in the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company, one of the *kuan-tu shang-pan* enterprises. His careful description and analysis of Sheng's activities in the China Merchants' Company and other similar enterprises is the solid basis for conclusions about how the traditional practices, even of profit-motivated entrepreneurs, together with other institutional barriers—political, social, and economic—retarded almost completely the development of Chinese industry.

Feuerwerker's thorough exploration of the activities of four *kuan-tu shang-pan* enterprises and the role played by Sheng in them is a contribution of great merit. His masterful weaving of the tools of economic history through the fragmentary as well as fuller accounts of these companies' ups and downs over the years and his application of Schumpeterian concepts to the entrepreneurial performances given by Sheng are models of workmanship for the economic historian, the chronicler of entrepreneurial history, and for any student of economic development.

CHARLES HOFFMANN
Department of Economics
Queens College

CHOH-MING LI. *Economic Development of Communist China: An Appraisal of the First Five Years in Industrialization.* (Publications of the Bureau of Business and Economic Research, University of California.) Pp. xvi, 284. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. $7.50.

This is an economic analysis of Mainland China's growth from 1952 to 1957, leading on to a concise assessment of the further "Prospects" (pp. 196–222) concentrating on "some strategic factors of growth."

The author, devoting several years' work to this task, has assiduously and competently used Communist Chinese sources. This is a solid but lucid academic work, which will take a basic place in the literature of the subject; it deals with fundamental questions which will not be quickly solved or evaded, however drastically Chinese communism continues to advance.

The figures in the text, and sometimes the conclusions, are in summarized form. This makes the book suitable for general readers, as well as specialists; the latter will make more use of the good Statistical Appendix, Notes, and Index.

An especially valuable feature is the analytical discussion of what the Chinese Communists mean by various standard concepts and expressions—basic construction, heavy and light industry, investment norms, and so forth—in which they depart from bourgeois, and sometimes from Soviet Russian, usages. Despite such difficulties as the lack of absolute price indicators, Mr. Li's study will be very useful to those concerned with, for instance, the conversion of Communist national-income calculations into non-Marxian terms.

The population problem rightly looms large in the summation (pp. 196 ff.). Private consumption per capita of everything except staple food grains actually declined during the First Five-Year Plan. The heavy pressures—in per capita terms especially—will not diminish in the next fifteen years, in which China is to "catch up industrially with Britain."

This apparently assumes—as other dictators have assumed before—that Britain is a stationary object. But if, as British economists anticipated, United Kingdom standards will roughly double in the same time, while China's 1970 population will be 900 millions and Britain's 45, the United Kingdom's per capita levels of 1970 will still be about 40 times those of China.

But there are many other economic pressures—exports, large agricultural needs, urbanization problems, and so forth—not to mention other types of strain. A Chinese Communist newspaper, in a masterpiece of understatement which he quotes, aptly points Mr. Li's conclusion: "Inconvenience is being felt by the public in every phase of their daily life. This is going to be the basic situation for many years to come—and not a temporary accidental phenomenon" (*Ta Kung Pao*, Dec. 14, 1956; cit. Li, p. 216).

E. STUART KIRBY
Professor and Head, Department of Economics and Political Science
University of Hong Kong
Editor, *Contemporary China*

CHARLES A. MYERS. *Labor Problems in the Industrialization of India.* (Wertheim Publications in Industrial Relations.) Pp. xvii, 297. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958. $6.50.

India is at present engaged in the gigantic task of rebuilding her economy with the sole objective of raising the standard of living of her people. The democratic way in which this task is being executed has aroused world-wide attention, as it is considered to be a crucial experiment of wide import by all democratic nations. This probably explains the unprecedented attention India has received from economists, politicians, and so forth, in recent years and also accounts for the number of scholarly studies of various facets of India's social, economic, and political problems in this critical phase of transformation. Mr. Charles A. Myers' book is an illuminating and valuable study of some of the current problems of India: those facing labor, management, and government in industrialization.

Viewed from a purely Western angle, and studied in isolation from social, economic, and political influences, the labor policies and problems of India can readily become an enigma. They have their own characteristic features which have developed from peculiar circumstances, such as the rural background of the working classes, the low level of education, poverty, the social system, and the prolonged period of foreign rule. Mr. Myers' book is perhaps the first analytical treatment of various forces which have shaped the labor problems and policies in India to their present form. One cannot but admire the excellent grasp of the main problems shown by Mr. Myers. With his masterly balance of treatment he has been able to present the problems in their proper perspective.

His exposition of various subjects such as the growth and nature of entrepreneurship, emergence and commitment of the industrial labor force, development and character of trade unions, managerial response, labor-management relations, and the role of government, is exhaustive and the interrelationship of these factors has been well brought out. However, one is left with a feeling that if a little more detail about the standard and level of living were given perhaps it would have been much easier for readers to appreciate the magnitude and importance of the present task before India.

The book is well produced, but high price may prevent its securing a wide circulation in countries like India. Perhaps the answer can be a cheaper edition.

A. M. LORENZO
Director, Labour Bureau
Ministry of Labour and Employment
Government of India

GENE D. OVERSTREET and MARSHALL WINDMILLER. *Communism in India.* Pp. xiv, 603. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. $10.00.

The objectives of this study are twofold: to examine in detail the Communist movement in India, historically and analytically; and to throw light on the complex arena of Indian and world Communist politics. The authors have worked on the book for several years, have made copious use of published Communist literature, and have relied—for the early period of communism in India—almost exclusively upon two Government of India (British) reports on communism in India. They have scarcely delved into the primary sources on the basis of which these

reports were drafted. Another little-known book which has given them "detailed information not found elsewhere" is Saumyendranath Tagore's *Historical Development of the Communist Movement in India*. According to their own admission, this book has a "strong bias against M. N. Roy together with factual errors." Given the fact that the history of the Communist party of India for its first ten years virtually coincides with the ideas and activities of M. N. Roy, together with the apparent bias against him and factual errors in Tagore's book, the question arises how the authors of *Communism in India* have ascertained the authenticity of the "detailed information not found elsewhere," on which their book is so largely based.

This is only one, though the major, instance where *Communism in India* displays little knowledge and appreciation of the pioneers of the Communist movement in the first quarter of this century, in India or elsewhere, when some of the most brilliant young people of the generation were powerfully attracted by the ideas and ideals of communism, though later they either fell by the roadside or discovered that their humane aspirations could find better fulfillment elsewhere. Reading this book, nothing seems to have motivated those early Communists but ambition for self-aggrandizement, scramble for power, jealousy, and rivalry. Insincerity is imputed to people who had their gaze fixed on the stars. This approach prevents conscientious chronicling as well as intelligent appraisal and interpretation.

If the authors' main nonofficial source is of admittedly doubtful authenticity, the official sources are no less politically biased, and at least in the first decade of Communism in India, politically ill-informed. Later, the British authorities in India actually played out the Communists against the rising nationalist movement. Thus, the authors have failed to analyze the covert intentions of the British Government in India when they allowed an almost unrestricted supply of Communist literature to the political prisoners in the late 1920's and in the 1930's, attributing this to a strengthening of communism in India at the time of its lowest ebb in its ultra-leftist and sectarianist period. The intention on the part of the government was merely to exploit Communist criticism of the Civil Disobedience Movement.

After their diligent study of the Communist movement in India, the authors have concluded that "The CPI is neither monolithic nor unchanging, and it is sure to be shaped by future events in India and elsewhere. Up to now, its nature has been more Communist than Indian" (pp. 538–39). They have also discovered that "instances could be cited from virtually every phase of CPI history to demonstrate official deviation in defiance of international communist policy" (p. 531). Such sweeping generalizations have been passed without any substantiation. The instances quoted are those when the CPI did not know what the official international Communist policy was, as during World War II or after the 20th Soviet Congress. As soon as the Indian Communists came to know what the official policy was, they readily went through the requisite brainwash and promptly toed the official line. To be taken in by this so-called "flexibility" and "adaptability" of the CPI, with which the latter is trying to make itself more respectable and more aceptable, betrays a misunderstanding of the insidious and opportunist nature of Communist movements everywhere in the mid-twentieth century.

There are many slips and mistakes which, though each in itself may be of a minor nature, should not have occurred after the years of diligent labor which have obviously been invested in this compilation, and reduce the value of the book even as a work of reference. However, as such it has its uses, though the students of communism in India should be aware of the doubtful authenticity of some of the major sources and the authors' lack of insight into the early Communist movement generally, its ideas and ideals and abstruse controversies. This book is a typical instance of a certain type of "research" with an air of scholarship in which the significance of historical facts or events can be lost in a welter of unintegrated detail presented as the writing of history. It also shows how fruitless it is to base surmises on secondary sources which can, in effect, make it more difficult for future historians perusing such works as reference material to sift authentic facts from unauthentic ones, and to interpret and integrate them with a fresh and original approach.

M. K. HALDAR

Delhi University

ASOK CHANDA. *Indian Administration.* Pp. 274. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958. Distributed by The Macmillan Company, New York. $5.75.

India's eminent philosopher, Vice-President S. Radhakrishnan, in his foreword to this work praises India's Comptroller and Auditor-General for reviewing "with impressive lucidity the historical growth of Indian administration, its present setup and trends, and the direction in which it would need to be modified to suit the growing needs of our government and its social policies." No words could be better chosen. Shri Asok Chanda, drawing upon a lifetime of wide experience in public service, and complete familiarity with British and French administrative practice, has written an urbane and balanced commentary which should be on the desk of every senior Indian government official and every student of public administration. For the Indian official, it may provide a guide to the workings of his central government. For the student of public administration, it affords perhaps the best brief study of the evolution of India's executive government from its British origins. Relevant comparisons with United Kingdom practice are made at every point. The first few pages of the section on "treasury control" (pp. 204–213) give an extremely clear description of the organization of the British Treasury in 1958.

True to the traditions of his high office, which the new Indian constitution properly made independent of the vicissitudes of party politics, the author views the administrative scene, especially the proliferation of officialdom, with an Olympian detachment, not sparing words of warning and admonitions for reform. He has perceived the future dangers to the sanctity of the Constitution by the ease with which it can be amended in minor matters and suggests that "the fundamentals of the Constitution should be isolated from the non-fundamentals" (p. 54). He therefore recommends the immediate adoption of an "omnibus" amendment, making those parts of the Constitution which are mere "administrative arrangements" subject to change by simple majority vote in Parliament. He thus apparently hopes to spare the Indian schoolboy of the year 2000 from confronting a Constitution 600 pages or more in length. He is deeply troubled by politicians who allow themselves to be needled into campaigning against civil servants on insufficient and uninvestigated evidence. He goes so far as to say: "Unless a convention grows that representations pursued otherwise than through official channels will be completely disregarded, if not taken adverse notice of, it will be impossible to improve the tone of administration" (p. 136). He would rectify at once that curious defect of the administrative system—largely the accidental result of the lapse of functions previously performed by the Secretary of State for India in London—the absence of an individual head of the all-India services. This authority is now diffused among officials in the Home Ministry. He obviously views with alarm the confusing increase and merging of ministries and departments which so baffle foreign students of the Indian Cabinet.

Perhaps most interesting to foreigners is his discussion of those quasi-public corporations which are becoming, in their various guises, so characteristic an aspect of the welfare state. Here his prescription is quite forthright. Government should decide what enterprises are wholly of public interest, and what are not. Those that are, such as ordnance factories, railway locomotive shops, and the like, should not be run as companies at all, but directly administered by the appropriate government department. In those that are not, government should exercise only the rights of a shareholder. "In this reorientation, the operation of the Crown Corporations in Canada affords an acceptable model" (p. 264). All in all, this is a most informative and perceptive book. To American

really concrete proposals for the realization readers, it will be a matter of regret that the author is not as well versed in American as in British and French constitutional practice. He has missed the point that the President of the United States, as well as the President of India, can be impeached and removed during his term of office (p. 45).

HOLDEN FURBER
Professor of History
University of Pennsylvania

FAYEZ A. SAYEGH. *Arab Unity: Hope and Fulfillment.* Pp. xvii, 272. New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1958. $4.00.

A good book on the Arab world is timely enough, and one written by Dr. Fayez A. Sayegh is all the more welcome, particularly since it comes from a man with a wide and varied experience with Arab political affairs over so many years. *Arab Unity: Hope and Fulfillment* is an intelligent and objective commentary on the nature, evolution, and prospects of Arab nationalism and Arab unity. This book, which consists of fourteen chapters and seven Appendices, has been divided by the author into three parts. The first sketches, briefly and succinctly, the main features of Arab nationhood from the seventh to the nineteenth centuries. The second treats analytically the origins and evolution of the idea of union among the Arabs in the twentieth century. Pan-Arabism, within the framework of the "Fertile Crescent," is dissected, and is treated as "an application of the general principles of nationalism to the Arab situation," against the somber reality of the fragmentation of the Arab nation into "multiple political units." By the end of the 1930's "the doctrine of an Arab nation-in-being" is accepted, its main determining factors being language, culture, and history. Hence, the author's argument that the idea of Arab unity "pointed to a *past* unity—seeking at first to *protect* it, and, when it was changed by forces beyond Arab control, to *restore* it" (pp. 61 ff.). The place of Islam in Arabism—"ambiguous," according to Dr. Sayegh—is treated calmly but inadequately, it is submitted (pp. 89 ff.). The evident lack of any of Arab unity before the establishment of the Arab League in March 1945 is stressed, though, of course, the two cognate projects of Nuri as-Sa'id and King Abdullah, the "Fertile Crescent" and the "Greater Syria" schemes, are noted.

In the third part of the book, the author treats the Idea of Arab Unity in Action, where, with candor and optimism, he analyzes the idea of Arab unity in the realm of reality, particularly after the emergence of the Arab League. To him, the League has not been a complete failure. The role and experiences of the League as a first step towards a closer and more integrated Arab union are sketched, and the efforts to evolve the League from within, from 1951 to 1954, are mentioned. The failure of the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation provides the stimulus "for attaining unity independently of the League"; hence the "new period in the history of the Arab national movement." The foundation of the United Arab Republic—union of Syria and Egypt—is, to the author, "the *first real challenge* to the political framework of the Arab World which emerged from the wreckage wrought by the cataclysmic events of the First World War" and "a step towards the unification of all Arab states and the erection of total Arab unity" (pp. 187–188, 205). The North African sector of the Arab world—Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco—is treated in this connection, though mainly within the framework of the possible establishment of a federation of the Arab *Maghrib*. The over-all present and future political relationship of these countries to the Arab *Mashriq* is, however, for the main part overlooked.

The seven Appendices appearing in the book and containing the most recent official documents of Arab unifications, are a valuable addition to the book, though the translations are not completely accurate. The addition of the text of the Pact of the Arab League would have been useful. A Bibliography would also have helped the interested reader. For the rest, the book remains one of the best written on Arab nationalism. The reviewer, indeed, holds that it should be compulsory reading for all students of Arab affairs; above all, for political scientists, statesmen, and Foreign Office officials interested in the welfare of the Near and Middle East.

MUHAMMAD KHALIL
Assistant Professor of Political
Science and Law
American University of Beirut



CAROL A. FISHER and FRED KRINSKY. *Middle East in Crisis: A Historical and Documentary Review.* Pp. xii, 213. Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1959. $5.00.

This volume, which had its inception in teaching experience at Syracuse University, was designed for both the general student and the lay reader and dedicated to the citizen who desires to inform himself and make his views felt in the shaping of United States policy in the Middle East. It consists of sixty-nine pages of introductory essay, forty-eight "key" documents, and a bare two pages of Bibliography. In the opinion of this reviewer, it is a very disappointing performance.

The introductory essay is much too sketchy to lay a sound basis for discussion of fundamental problems in the vast Middle Eastern region—land and peoples, nationalism, natural resources, Soviet policy, the Palestine question, the Suez issue, and the shaping of United States policy. Leaving aside matters of interpretation, there are elementary errors of fact, such as the twice-assigned date of July 28, 1958 for the Iraqi revolt of July 14. The chapter on the Palestine question is hardly a model of historical objectivity, and it may certainly be questioned whether any nationalism, at least in a modern sense of the term, dates from as early as 70 A.D.

The documentary collection is representative, although the conclusions of the King-Crane Commission (1919) might well have been included. It is difficult to understand why the authors chose to give the reader not the actual text of the readily available Feisal-Weizmann Agreement of January 3, 1919, but Dr. Weizmann's view of it, expressed on June 10, 1936. Again, why are the Tentative Recommendations of the Intelligence Section (January 21, 1919) to President Wilson cited as his recommendations?

In such a brief volume, designed as a guide for study and discussion, one might have expected a somewhat more ample and representative Bibliography. Yet one looks in vain for a citation of many basic and convenient works, among them Borckelman's *History of the Islamic Peoples,* George Kirk's *Short History of the Middle East,* J. C. Hurewitz's *The Struggle for Palestine,* Don Peretz's *Israel and the Palestine Arabs,* or even George Antonius' classic work on *The Arab Awakening.* Since the volume is concerned with documentary sources, surely there could have been reference to such convenient sources as J. C. Hurewitz's two volumes on *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East* and the three recent documentary volumes published by the Department of State on *The Suez Problem; The United States in the Middle East;* and *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents* (1950–1955).

HARRY N. HOWARD
Beirut, Lebanon

RICHARD HILL. *Egypt in the Sudan, 1820–1881.* (Middle Eastern Monographs, II.) Pp. xi, 188. New York: Oxford University under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1959. $4.00.

This is the second volume in a series of Middle Eastern Monographs which the Royal Institute of International Affairs plans to publish from time to time in order "to illuminate the background of the modern society of the Middle East—its ideas and beliefs, its economic activities, its social and political institutions." The years 1820–1881 mark the first part of the period of the occupation of the Eastern Sudan by Egypt, under Muhammad Ali: that able and capable administrator generally known as an Albanian, but described by this author as an Anatolian Turk.

Muhammad Ali was the Ottoman Sultan's Viceroy for Egypt. An aggressive personality prone to violence, he assumed more and more power until he was virtually an independent ruler. He embarked upon the conquest of the Sudan, which may

be regarded as the final instance of colonialism on the part of the Ottoman Sultans. The Viceroy had significant reasons for his independent subjugation of the Sudan, of which the first and foremost was to carry out slave raids in negro Africa to prevent the exhaustion of the supply of this human material necessary for his great projects. Muhammad Ali felt that the conquest of the area in its then tribal disorganization would be less difficult than later. Reports concerning much gold also lured him on, to which was added the attraction of control over the Red Sea with profitable domination of its commerce in trade, as well as the pilgrim traffic to the Holy Places of Islam. To these ends Sinnar and Kordofan were conquered, and the Sudanese, smarting under the new Egyptian rule, rose in hopeless revolt and were slaughtered to the number of over 50,000. In the early chapters of this book there are fascinating and discerning comments concerning the policies and character of the Viceroy.

The Great Viceroy is portrayed as a superior administrator, with an uncanny understanding in his relations with his chief subordinates. Nevertheless the distance between Cairo and Khartoum was so great, and the difficulties of communication so baffling, that the administrative ability of Muhammad Ali was not sufficient to prevent ruthlessness under the primitive conditions in the backward Sudan, brutalized as it was by the cruel effects of the military inroads to enslave large numbers of negroes. Conditions of morality were exceedingly low and corruption so general that the depressing effects were deepened. The energy of the Viceroy in Cairo was often not sufficient to control the activities of the Governors-General in Khartoum. In a characteristically keen observation, the author states that upon the death of the Viceroy in 1849, the immediate effect on the spirit of the government in the Sudan "was as though a gigantic dynamo had run down leaving a silence broken only by the thin, metallic voices of the mechanics."

The successors of Muhammad Ali were men of lesser stature. Successive policies of centralization and decentralization of the Sudanese Government resulted in confusion. Influences toward disunion were many, as nomads against valley settlers, Muslims against pagans, Arabs against negroes, and Western sentiment against slavery interests. Under the Governor-Generalships of the Englishmen, Sir Samuel Baker Pasha and later Sir Charles Gordon Pasha, conditions in the Sudan improved greatly, but they slipped back after their departure. Both Baker and Gordon had instructions to suppress the slave trade, and Calvinist Gordon was a forthright crusader in this, to the neglect of general administration, and had a lack of understanding of the Muslim's attitude toward slaves and free men. The author's appraisal of Gordon's work is of absorbing interest.

Much of the significance of this volume is appreciated only if one realizes the great distance that has been traveled by the Sudanese in government, economic, social, and moral conditions, between their cruel and primitive lot of somewhat over a century ago, and their new Republic with sovereign status and progressive orientation.

EDGAR J. FISHER
Consultant
American Friends of the Middle East

FREDERICK HARBISON and IBRAHIM ABDELKADER IBRAHIM. *Human Resources for Egyptian Enterprise.* (A Project of the Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University.) Pp. x, 230. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1958. $5.50.

Two basic human factors of Egyptian enterprise form the major subjects of this stimulating little book: the development of manpower and labor protest. Within the first area the authors examine the problems of entrepreneurship and management, the recruitment and commitment of labor resources, and the institutions for their employment. The second part of the study deals with the Egyptian labor unions, their regulation by the government, and collective relations. The study was undertaken "on location" under a Ford Foundation grant.

In dealing with human resources, Egypt exhibits a textbook illustration of economically underdeveloped countries. The types of industrial management range from the primitive to the efficient and even sophisticated. The polarization of human resources and their uses, remuneration, and the resulting stratification are extreme. Unskilled work is expendable, while top management forms part of the power elite. In Egypt large-scale unemployment is chronic; hence the recklessness in disposing with workers. When at work, about one-fifth of the industrial workers earn less than $2.80 a week. Top executives, on the other hand, are reputed to earn top salaries.

Arrogant affluence and unabashed pauperism keep uneasy company. The cities are filled with flashy private cars, superservice stations, and stores with luxury goods. The rank and file of the workers are afflicted with disease, ignorance, and poverty. Because human life is so cheap, safety devices in most factories are absent and laborers work in hot rolling mills without shoes. Employers impose sanctions on their workers for breaking plant rules. Social insurance is nonexistent as yet, although there is a measure of privately financed planning for disability, life insurance, and old-age pensions in industries. Strikes and union political activities are prohibited. Farm workers have acquired the right to organize within limits. It is only now that a law requires that workers should be paid in legal currency, on workdays, at their places of employment, and at periodic intervals.

What could Egypt do to make better use of her human resources? The authors indicate that the first and most important need is the increase of agricultural production through better use of the available acreage and the reclamation of desert land. This requires heavy investment and something like a High Dam. Next they see the need of expanded industrial production. The Egyptian Minister of Industry plans to double production within five years. Then, there is need for more careful prospecting of the country's subsoil resources, particularly oil. Schools, hospitals, highways, and communication systems will have to be improved. As industrialization progresses, organized industry and labor, the authors hold, may acquire a larger measure of influence in the affairs of the state.

EMIL LENGYEL
Professor of Education
New York University

GEORGE L. HARRIS in collaboration with others. *Iraq: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture.* (Survey of World Cultures.) Pp. 350. New Haven, Conn.: HRAF Press, 1958. $7.00.

FAHIM I. QUBAIN. *The Reconstruction of Iraq: 1950–1957.* Pp. xxi, 277. New York: Frederick A. Praeger under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, 1959. $6.00.

Here are two books which will be wanted in the libraries of students of the Middle East and Iraq in particular. Qubain's little book will also appeal to persons concerned with social change in the less developed areas of the world no matter from what specific point of interest such persons may approach the subject. This reviewer is not certain who might constitute a wider audience for the encyclopedic effort of Harris and his collaborators. In this case the reader is confronted with another—sometimes it seems a duplicate—in the Human Relations Area Files surveys of world cultures. This book is exactly what it tries to be: a wide-ranging survey of a nation-state hung onto an outline predesigned to carry any and all cultures as soon as surveys are completed. As far as the Arab-Islamic-Middle Eastern culture pattern is concerned, the authors of this survey of Iraq seldom go beyond, but do confirm, most of the observations previously presented in an almost identical volume on the Kingdom of Jordan by Raphael Patai. As with the Jordan study we meet again the comparative adjustment trichotomy of nomad, villager, and urbanite in a full range of institutional situations but once again we meet them as non-empirical generalizations and are given practically no documentation by which to verify the pictures presented. There are constant inferences drawn about how certain Iraqis feel about this or that, and even a chapter on "national attitudes," but not one social-psychological or anthropological attitude

study is cited. The book is without a footnote although there are important, if often dubious or ambiguous, generalizations and conclusions drawn on nearly every page. A list of 164 "recommended readings" includes many of the important titles on the subject and area but little that is not familiar even to the casual student of the Middle East.

As for audience appeal, I would think the layman or tourist would find this volume tiresome and redundant due to its textbook style of organization. The serious student of the Middle East who keeps up with current events through the better journalism will find nothing new or challenging. Semiprofessional students—for instance college undergradutes, missionaries, foreign service workers, and businessmen about to be stationed in Iraq—will probably find this a useful introduction to Iraqi society and environment. Yet even some of these will want more supporting evidence for matters of opinion than is provided. All in all, to the extent verification is possible, or can be assumed on the basis of the reputation of the HRAF, the major merit of this book lies in its usefulness as a casebook applicable to at least two theoretical disciplines—socio-economic and political development, and Middle Eastern social anthropology.

Qubain's task perhaps was an easier one than that of the HRAF data analyzers. With clarity and a purposefully straightforward organization, Qubain tells the story of planned development in Iraq. Moving from a concise presentation of relevant characteristics of Iraqi human and physical resources, the author describes social, economic, and political conditions for the period 1920 to 1950. Next there follows a review of the founding of the Iraqi Development Board with interesting commentary on the changes which it has undergone in structure and in terms of the plans it has produced and implemented.

Having introduced his subject, Qubain moves directly into an intelligent description and discussion of the agricultural sector—four chapters—the oil and other basic industries, education, public health, and social welfare. Qubain is parsimonious in drawing conclusions from this study, an attitude which is consistent with his general disinclination to go beyond his data. Yet he perceives and delivers an important message in his warning on the need for integration and balance as between long and short term interests, the human and physical needs, and "grass root" and centralized initiative and authority. Qubain's crystal ball was quite clear as to what might—and did—happen should the planners not implement such reforms in time.

LINCOLN ARMSTRONG
Visiting Associate Professor of
Sociology and Near East Studies
Princeton University

GEORGE L. HARRIS in collaboration with others. *Jordan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture.* (Survey of World Cultures.) Pp. 246. New Haven Conn.: HRAF Press, 1958. No price.

This book on Jordan is very comprehensive. Jordan as a state has little or no "history." In the Second Millenium B.C., it was the territory of wandering nomads with a few village communities, incorporated into Israel under David, soon lost but reconquered by Ahab in 900 B.C. Under Mesha of Moab, it revolted and had a brief moment of independence, then disappeared under Assyrian rule, never to emerge as a unit until British political manipulations found it convenient to create a separate political entity in 1923. The effort to create an independent sovereign state in an area of such poverty and internal social diversity is well discussed in this book, but it raises far more questions about the future than it answers. Yet for anyone seeking factual and accurate information on the religion, social structure, economics, political dynamics, and international relations of Jordan, this book is the answer. Unfortunately it went to press just before July 1958, when another crisis of major magnitude took place and King Hussein appealed to the British to send in troops to save his crown. As a compendium of knowledge about Jordan, the book is excellent.

The book has an added advantage. In the chapters on religion, tribes, social customs, and many other phases of life, Jordan is but a small part of a larger Arab world and these descriptions are valid for much of the great belt of land that lies within the desert side of the Fertile Crescent.

The United States is assisting Jordan with a $50,000,000 aid program in 1959. If Americans wish to understand why the program is so large for so small a state or how the aid will affect the area, this book gives a very good picture of the problem involved. It is short but adequate and accurate.

EDWIN M. WRIGHT
Falls Church, Virginia

AARON WILDAVSKY and DAGMAR CARBOCH. *Studies in Australian Politics: The 1926 Referendum; The Fall of the Bruce-Page Government.* Pp. xxvi, 292. Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1958. 40/-.

Until just the other day detailed studies of particular episodes in Australian politics were practically unknown. In view of the fact that Australia has long been a highly political society, this was odd, just as it was odd that there were also few political biographies and fewer good autobiographies. Australians constantly "talked politics" but they rarely wrote down accounts of political behavior. The situation is now rapidly changing and *Studies in Australian Politics* is indicative of the nature of the literature beginning to cumulate under the direction of Henry Mayer of the University of Sydney. Mr. Mayer's introduction is a cogent statement of the questions at issue as he sees them.

Aaron Wildavsky's study deals with a referendum on constitutional changes, Dagmar Carboch's with the fall three years later of the government that initiated the referendum and persisted in trying to deal with the question at issue. Wildavsky is an American now teaching at Oberlin, Carboch is an Australian of Czech origin now studying in England. Since both the referendum and the election have traditionally been interpreted as giving popular verdicts —voting compulsory in both cases—on the labor arbitration system and its organization, the authors are both much concerned to illustrate the ambiguities which are concealed in such simplistic interpretations of complex political events. Not only do they show how the verdicts indicated by the voting figures are not "clear" but they examine in detail the complex conflicts of ideas and feelings which destroyed the clarity. And they deplore the fact that they cannot pursue the confusion into its ultimate resting place: the mind of each individual voter.

Thus Wildavsky and Carboch not only provide valuable detailed studies of famous political episodes, but they—Carboch more especially—raise a problem in the philosophy of politics: do politicians state and stand upon precisely perceived and phrased issues and do voters render verdicts on the exactly stated issues, or do they really talk and vote upon questions located behind, beside, or not even contingently related to the allegedly central question? In short, is there any sense any longer in treating politics as "rational" behavior, or is it not rather a happy hunting ground for students of human irrationality?

Beyond a doubt there is "something" in the irrationality stance, but the stubborn facts remain that Bruce's referendum proposals were lost and his government did fall. These are negotiable historical realities. But Mr. Wildavsky and Miss Carboch show us it is puzzlingly unclear exactly why these things should be. Even Mr. Bruce's liking for spots once again becomes a foible of high symbolic significance; and another John Brown marches portentously into history. What I'd like to see is Bruce's—he is now Lord Bruce of Melbourne—commentary on all this.

C. HARTLEY GRATTAN
Katonah, New York

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VOLUME 326 NOVEMBER 1959

# THE ANNALS

*of* The American Academy *of* Political *and* Social Science

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*
RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Assistant Editor*

## INFLATION

*Special Editor of this Volume*

ALFRED G. BUEHLER, Ph.D
*Professor of Public Finance*
*University of Pennsylvania*

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PHILADELPHIA
1959

*Issued bimonthly by The American Academy of Political and Social Science at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pennsylvania.*

*Editorial and Business Offices, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania.*

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The articles appearing in THE ANNALS are indexed in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* and the *Industrial Arts Index.*

# The Problem of Inflation

By Alfred G. Buehler

Abstract: Many persons have recently expressed great concern over the problem of inflation. The President has warned repeatedly against its dangers and a Cabinet Committee has reported that action is needed to forestall inflation and assure sustained economic growth and social progress. Inflation involves rising consumer prices under conditions of so-called "full employment." Many explanations of inflation have been offered, but whatever the cause, the consumer bears the brunt of it, and it unequally affects the population. The price level flattened out during the 1957–58 recession and has recently shown signs of advancing toward new peaks. Some persons regard inflation as no real threat in peace time and may even think it is a necessary price of continuing economic growth. It is more difficult to arouse the population to the evils of inflation than it is to the dangers of recession and depression. To halt inflation it is necessary to curb excessive spending by governments, businesses, and consumers until the supply of desired goods and services has become adequate. It may also be necessary to increase taxes and apply other controls which are unwelcome. Reasonable stability of prices must be accepted as a national goal along with reasonable economic growth and social progress.

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*Alfred G. Buehler, Ph.D., L.H.D., Philadelphia, Pa., is Professor of Public Finance a the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of various books and articles on pub lic finance and has served as President of the National Tax Association and President o the Tax Institute, Inc.*

THE newspapers recently reported that the cost of living index pushed upward to a record high level. They have been replete with comments about postwar inflation and the possibilities of further price increases. Some observers think that creeping inflation is a real long-run danger.

President Eisenhower has warned repeatedly against the menace of inflation. His former economic adviser, Professor Arthur F. Burns, is so concerned over the dangers of creeping inflation that he has written a book, *Prosperity Without Inflation,* in which he diagnoses the causes of inflation and the measures he believes may be needed to curb it.

Last January the President appointed a special Cabinet Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth, headed by Vice President Nixon. He also named Dean Allen Wallis of the School of Business of the University of Chicago Executive Vice Chairman. At the end of June 1959 the Committee released its first interim report. The Committee, consisting of five Cabinet members entrusted with economic and financial responsibilities and Dr. Raymond J. Saulnier, Chairman of the President's Economic Council, expressed its unanimous opinion "that our economy is now at a critical juncture urgently requiring action to forestall inflation and insure sound and sustained economic growth and progress." (The report is attached in the appendix.)

The issue of inflation is also the subject of Congressional inquiries and debates. It enters into controversies over appropriations, taxation, the public debt, the activities of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System, the profits of big business, and the wage demands of labor unions. It is evident that inflation is a complex financial, economic, political, and psychological problem and that there is much disagreement over the prospects of continuing inflation, its causes and dangers, and what, if anything, should be done about it.

## WHAT IS INFLATION?

To many persons inflation implies an insidious, cancerous swelling of prices and the erosion of the purchasing power of their incomes and savings. It has frequently been called the cruelest of all taxes, hitting everyone and especially those with small and fixed incomes. Life insurance companies, many banks, and many corporations have recently been emphasizing the evils of inflation and the need to stop it.

Other persons, with incomes increasing faster than prices and finding advantages in inflationary booms, may look upon inflation as a blessing. Some argue that in recent years prices have stabilized and that inflation is an illusion. Still others contend that economic growth and social progress require some increase in the level of prices.

To the individual, inflation is a money problem. He relates it to the high cost of living. He may see the remedy in acquiring more dollars, even if their purchasing power falls. He may fail to realize that purchasing power must ultimately be limited by the production and supply of goods and services and the demand for them. His remedy for inflation, increasing the availability of money by one method or another, may cheapen his money by forcing prices upward.

Economists have related inflation, with its rise in the cost of living, to periods of full employment of labor and other resources. It is thus a phenomenon of booms and prosperity.

Complete agreement has not been attained, unfortunately, on the definition of full employment. There is always some unemployment of labor, machinery, buildings, and other productive facilities. The modern economy is never completely stable. We all want growth, even if its costs are some instability and unemployment. Arthur F. Burns finds that economists have recently assumed that the minimum unemployment is something like 4 per cent of the labor force.[1] This does not, of course, delimit what might be regarded as the minimum amount of idle plant and equipment. Actually, our measures of full employment are quite crude and occasion much controversy.



Inflation has been associated with sustained, substantial and even wild increases in prices during and after wars. The American Revolution, the Civil War, World Wars I and II, the Korean Conflict, and the ensuing cold war have been attended by rising prices. Wars are commonly financed largely by borrowing. Currencies depreciate and prices soar. After a costly war, there may be a great outburst of inflation and rising prices.

In certain periods in modern history, a great influx of gold has brought rising commodity prices. Both gold and silver have been found to be unstable bases for the monetary system. Paper money, bank notes, and various forms of credit may be issued in such amounts during wars, postwar booms, and times of speculative fervor that currency depreciates in value.

Inflation may be temporary, as during the boom period of a business cycle, or it may run over a period of years. If the creeping inflation gives way to wild uncontrolled inflation, the monetary system may collapse, government and other debts may be repudiated, and public and private insolvency may result. One may find many examples in modern history of runaway inflation.

Inflation has long been thought of as a condition resulting from a superabundance of currency in relation to the available supply of goods and services. With a strong demand, a limited supply of goods and services, and a great inflow of purchasing power in the markets, the pressures on prices increase and tend to force them upward. Too many dollars are said to be chasing too few goods. The so-called "demand-pull" factors compel prices to rise.

As many newspaper writers have stated, recently there has been much emphasis on the so-called "cost-push" factors in the attempt to explain how inflation occurs. Prices are said to be rising because costs are climbing. Big business may be blamed for high profits and administered prices. Labor unions may be blamed for compelling employers to yield wage increases exceeding gains in productivity. Higher interest rates, taxes, and other costs may also be cited as "cost-push" factors.

Disputes over the importance of the "cost-push" factors may divert attention away from issues other than inflation. The appropriate rewards for labor, the taking of risks, managerial service, and other economic activities are questions involving more than the issue of inflation. There is always a struggle between employers and employees over "the cutting of the cake," that is, the distribution of the output or income of an undertaking. How much of the income of an enterprise should go out in profits, interest, wages, and various other shares is a continuing and inevitable problem. In the controversy over wages and profits, the question of inflation may be dragged in as each side seeks to place blame on the other for price increases and both seek to obtain the largest possible share of the income of the undertaking.

Increases in wages and profits may be a symptom of inflation rather than a cause of it. At any rate, in the opinion of many economists, monetary and "de-

[1] *Prosperity Without Inflation* (Buffalo, N. Y.: Smith, Keynes and Marshall, 1958), p. 29.

mand-pull" factors are very largely responsible for recent price increases. If increases in wages and profits are inflationary, it may be much more difficult to prevent them than it is to control the monetary factors involved. Wage, rent, and other price controls have commonly been rather futile in the face of strong inflationary pressures.

## THE MEASUREMENT OF INFLATION

It is commonly agreed that inflation involves an increase in the cost of living, particularly in periods of high employment and prosperity. Over the measurement of inflation, as well as the causes, implications, and remedies, there has been much controversy. Changes in the cost of living and the purchasing power of money are measured by indexes of relevant data. The construction of price indexes involves many technical and practical problems. The indexes refer to conditions assumed to be more or less typical of the situations covered at a given time. Cost of living indexes may thus refer primarily to the living costs of families of wage earners and clerical workers in our cities.

The consuming and expenditure habits of families are not completely uniform at one time or over periods of time. The commodities and services purchased may vary from time to time and place to place. The breads, pastries, and other foods of today are not altogether identical with similar commodities ten or twenty years ago. Clothing, shelter, home furnishings, and other commodities and services do not remain entirely uniform.

With the changing modes of living, size of families, age of population, and other factors, demand changes in the markets. More income means more leisure and travel, as well as other changes in levels of living.

Price and cost of living indexes, therefore, suffer various limitations, even after corrections for changing condition of demand and supply. Some observer argue that the quality of many goods and services has improved to a greater extent than the prices. Thus, it is said that while an automobile may cost much more today than a decade ago, it is a superior vehicle. Others, to be sure, may deny this and argue in the opposite direction. The question is, how can price changes be related to changes in quality and quantity of goods and services purchased?

Another factor involved in the construction of price and cost of living indexes is the allowance for the cost of government as revealed in taxes and other charges. The taxes which constitute business expenses and are reflected in prices are included in prices and living costs. As government services increase in quantity, tax rates may be increased and new taxes may be imposed. If the quality of government services is raised, taxes will also tend to rise. But higher taxes and other charges may result from greater population density, as in urban and suburban areas, rather than from more and better service. It is well known, for example, that the per capita costs of local government tend to increase as population increases, not only because new and better services may be demanded but also because of the greater difficulties encountered in serving concentrated populations and increased unit cost pressures.

Taxes reflect inflation as governments find it necessary to pay more for the goods and services they purchase as prices advance. Higher salaries for government employees may not mean a higher quality of service. In public, as in private, employment, productivity may not increase so fast as wages and salaries.

Another complication arises in making allowances for taxes. Farm subsidies and other payments to various industries may conceal the cost to the consumer and taxpayer. Farm prices may be reduced or held down, but personal income and other taxes supporting the subsidies are higher because of the subsidies. But taxes not included in prices will be excluded from the cost of living index.

Generally speaking, there is lacking a cost accounting system which could measure the costs of government in terms of uniform service units. Both the quality and quantity of public services are subject to variation.

Still another complication arises. The services provided by governments, as in public education, health, and welfare, may be paid for largely with income, property, and other taxes imposed on persons who receive little or no direct benefits. The value of the benefits received may be far greater than the cost to those who receive the services. The taxes paid, then, do not show the services enjoyed.

The measurement of living costs, in conclusion, is a rather crude technique which measures some changes in purchasing power and conceals other changes. Lacking more adequate statistics of living costs, however, use is commonly made of price and cost of living indexes for what they may be worth. With their limitations in mind, there are presented here two charts which were designed to indicate certain price changes.

## IS INFLATION A MENACE?

If one may judge by the recent outpouring of books, articles, government reports, and other literature on inflation, there are many persons who regard creeping inflation as at least a potential menace. There remains the question, of course, of whether we are able to contain inflation if it does threaten our financial and economic stability and our social progress.


One may note the rise in the consumer price level by observing that consumer prices, as reported by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, have risen from 42.3 per cent of the 1947–49 average in 1913 to 124.5 per cent in June 1959. The index averaged 59.4 per cent in 1939. It climbed to 114.8 per cent in 1954, fell slightly in 1955, and averaged 123.5 per cent in 1958.

The index rose to a peak of 85.7 per cent in 1920, then declined to a low of 55.3 per cent in 1933. During and after World War II, the consumer price index rose rapidly and climbed to a peak of 102.8 per cent in 1948. After a small drop in 1955, the index again moved upward to 123.9 per cent in July 1958, wavered through March 1959 with slight variations, and went back to 123.9 per cent in April 1959. After watching the rise in consumer prices through May and June 1959, the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth expressed fears that the boom in business and the renewed increase in the cost of living portend a serious inflation menace unless corrective measures are taken to forestall the threat.

The Conference on Economic Progress, of which Leon H. Keyserling, the economic adviser to former President Truman, is President, has criticized the attack by the present Administration and private organizations as a spurious crusade against inflation.[2] It is argued that the campaign against inflation overlooks the fact that most inflation has been due to war, that much less inflation has occurred than claimed, that the talk about inflation has aggravated the danger of inflation, that economic growth would be sacrificed to price sta-


[2] See Conference on Economic Progress, *Inflation—Cause and Cure* (Washington, D. C.: Conference on Economic Progress, 1959).

CHART 1—CONSUMER PRICE INDEX: 1913–1957




Source: *Statistical Abstract,* 1957, p. 327.

CHART 2—CONSUMER PRICE INDEX: 1953–1959




ource: *Economic Indicators,* July 1959, p. 23.



bility, and that economic and social growth can be accomplished within a framework of reasonably stable prices.

The Great Depression of the 1930's gave birth to the "New Economics" which contended that capitalism was addicted to chronic unemployment and depressions. At the close of World War II and since, there has been a fear among some economists that our economy would slump into another great depression despite some temporary inflation. To prevent mass unemployment and general depression and to assure continued economic growth at a satisfactory rate, it is said that the spending by consumers, business, and government must be increased. Some economists, indeed, regard mild continued inflation as an inevitable price of sustained growth. Government deficits thus become normal. Wage and other income increases are found necessary to provide increasing consumer spending.

That there is some inconsistency between the goals of growth and stability cannot be denied. A completely stable economy would be a static one. A dynamic, growing economy, which most Americans desire, will always experience some imbalances, some unemployment of resources, and some local depressions. General downward movements as well as general prosperity, with the risk of at least temporary inflation, are inescapable in our complex economy. Reasonable growth with reasonable stability are the most that we can anticipate.

We have not yet learned how to iron out the general fluctuations in the economy which we call business cycles. The patterns of the succeeding cycles vary somewhat and defy complete understanding. Short periods of inflation during business booms, each bringing a higher price plateau, would seem to be possible. Particularly possible is this type of creeping inflation if prices do not fall during a recession. Thus, in 1959, the price level in recovery is already high because the recession of 1957-58 failed to produce a general price decline.

State and local government taxes are increasing as their rates advance and as new taxes are added. Federal taxes remain high, with little prospect of reduction. The expenditures of all levels of government have been increasing at a faster rate than tax collections. Government debts, as a result of extensive borrowing, have been increasing. Even in times of prosperity there is great inertia and resistance to increasing taxes and service charges sufficiently to prevent inflationary government spending.

Another costly war would shoot federal spending and the debt skyward. It would also bring tremendous inflationary pressures.

Aside from war, however, there are forces at work which could combine to generate continuing inflation, except in short periods of recession. Consumer and business, as well as government, spending is high and increasing in our growing economy. Much of the increase is financed by borrowing. When the money, including currency, in the markets is increasing at a faster rate than the supply of goods and services, the pull of demand will compel prices to rise.

Many persons anticipate continuing inflation and borrow and buy accordingly. Escalator clauses are inserted in some wage contracts to assure that the purchasing power of wages will be maintained. Wage increases are demanded as an offset to inflation with the argument that workers are producing more and are not sharing equitably in business earnings. Inflation invites rising prices, and higher prices invite higher wage, interest, and other costs. Whether the higher costs and prices are the re-

sult or cause of inflation, the consumer is the victim of the price squeeze.

The anticipation of inflation has obviously affected investment and speculative activity. Hedges against inflation are being sought in common stocks, real estate, and various commodities. Fears and hopes of speculative gains feed on inflation and breed further inflation.

To recite the facts of history and remind ourselves of the waves of inflation during and after wars and in some boom and speculative periods and the mild inflation running into 1957 does not prove, of course, that inflation is a serious long-range threat. The rise of inflation in the past and the instability of our economy at present do, however, point to the possibilities of at least mild inflation in the future. It is evident, too, that mild inflation may become wild inflation if the necessary fiscal, monetary, and other restraints are not judiciously applied.

### THE INDIFFERENCE TO INFLATION

Granted that there are risks of inflation in the modern dynamic economy, is inflation a real or an imaginary menace? Modern nations have recently shown much more concern over the problems of recession and depression than over prosperity and inflation. When the economy is in a slump, there are cries for massive measures to end it by stepping up government spending, reducing taxes, lowering interest rates, encouraging borrowing by other measures, providing subsidies to consumers and business enterprises, and otherwise increasing the flow of money in the markets to stimulate total spending. Just a little increase in unemployment and the existence of local depressions are enough to create a clamor for "the government to do something."

Mild inflation has pleasantly intoxicating effects on many persons. If the masses have more money, they are carried away by the money illusion and think they are better off until they wake up to the fact that prices have increased as much as, or more than, their incomes. Those who experience a gain in purchasing power want the good times to continue. They dislike paying higher prices which bring more dollars to other persons, but if their supply of dollars increases at a rate sufficient to give them more purchasing power, they are prone to think that inflation has really been a blessing to them. The losses in purchasing power suffered by those with fixed or slowly increasing incomes are not counted, nor is the danger that the instability of inflation will eventually give way to deflation and widespread unemployment considered to be imminent or serious.

To halt inflation, it is necessary to curb excessive spending by governments, businesses, and consumers until the supply of desired goods and services has become adequate and perhaps to increase taxes and apply other controls which are unwelcome. If interest rates are raised by the Federal Reserve Banks to help check inflationary borrowing, it will be argued that higher interest rates raise costs and are inflationary. Buyers and sellers whose activities are slowed down or halted will cry out in anguish against the anti-inflationary measures, and those in political offices will hear their cries.

It is plain that a little inflation is a popular tonic. What it may do eventually to the individual and the nation's economy as its doses are continued may be so remote as to seem not worth calculating. There may, indeed, be a conviction that economic and social growth requires continuing doses of inflation and that modern man is fully competent to control the dosage of and the reactions to this powerful drug.

Those who are greatly concerned about inflation today generally do not anticipate swift runaway inflation of the type that may burst out during and immediately after wars. They do fear the threat of mild continuing inflation. Like termites eating away steadily at the foundations of our homes, this type of inflation, if not halted, may, in time, cause the price level to rise materially. Its ultimate effect on prices and purchasing power could be somewhat similar to the swifter and more spectacular effects of runaway inflation.



### WHAT MAY BE DONE ABOUT INFLATION?

Assuming that inflation has been at work during the 1940's and 1950's and that it may be a threat in years ahead, what should be done to curb it when it endangers the healthy flow of economic activity? The question involves many complications and will be the subject of discussion in the ensuing papers in this issue of THE ANNALS. Greatly oversimplified, the approach to the prevention and curbing of inflation requires effective action along several lines.

Economic analysis and economic forecasting must be improved and rationally employed. No one can fully foresee the future. Economic forecasting has frequently been in error in the past and some of those who have been eager to combat depression or prosperity inflation have been willing to utilize massive doses of control prescriptions without fully calculating the consequences or have been too fast or too slow in their application of control measures. Some would go to the extreme of introducing rigid government controls over virtually the whole economy. Others would go to the opposite extreme and rely exclusively, or practically so, on private action. Over the economic effects of government and private activity there is much uncertainty and controversy. Needed is the continuous appraisal of the effectiveness of financial, monetary, and economic measures and the improvement and adaptation of such measures for the more effective promotion of economic stability and growth.

There must be a common will to fight inflation and instability, and teamwork among government and private agencies in fighting them. Too often the different levels of government, the different agencies of the same government, and the different sectors of the economy are pulling against each other and preventing a unified and consistent course of action. Also too often there is lip service to preventing inflation or depression but at the same time there is an unwillingness to endure the sacrifices or other restraints needed for success in the battle against economic instability. To prevent inflation, excessive government, business, and consumer spending must be stopped and the supply of goods and services which are scarce must be increased to overcome the existing imbalances.

If increased government spending on defense, education, health, welfare, and other services is regarded as essential in boom periods, then the financing should be placed on a pay-as-you-go basis as fully as possible and inflationary borrowing should be avoided.

Even balanced government budgets, with taxes increased to support increased spending, may, however, be inflationary in boom periods. Total spending may be increased because funds which would otherwise not be spent are poured into the markets, the production of consumer goods may not increase so fast as it would if the funds were privately employed and keep up with the growing consumer demand, and costs may rise more when governments purchase than when private buyers are bidding for commodities.[3] Substantial

[3] Burns, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), pp. 74–75.

budget surpluses, attained by tax increases if government expenditures are not reduced, may be required to produce an over-all anti-inflationary effect.

Government monetary, as well as fiscal, policies must be employed effectively if strong inflationary pressures are to be curbed. How effective fiscal and monetary policies may be in overcoming instability and promoting growth is uncertain. That they may be helpful cannot be denied.

Voluntary restraints must also be exercised by consumers, business, agriculture, organized labor, and other groups in their spending, saving, and economic activity if inflationary pressures are not to be generated and maintained. Price fixing, short of war, is generally regarded as undesirable in this country. Even in times of war it is likely to be ineffective because it strikes at the symptoms, rather than at the roots, of inflation.

Reasonable stability of prices must be accepted as a national goal along with reasonable economic growth and social progress. It is too much to hope that economic growth and social progress can be sustained indefinitely by an unstable economy with an unstable price level. Steady growth and progress, as fast as our resources will permit, are all that we can reasonably ask.

# The Federal Government's Weapons to Fight Inflation and Economic Instability

By JAMES A. MAXWELL

ABSTRACT: The federal government has never explicitly declared that prevention of inflation is its responsibility, and only recently has a strong opinion arisen that such a declaration should be made, possibly by amendment of the Employment Act of 1946. Some of those who desire price stability believe that, to achieve it, the federal government should add control over installment purchases and over major wage contracts to its repertoire. They feel that fiscal policy, depending upon Congress, is untrustworthy and that a tight monetary policy does not quickly reach important sectors of the economy. Opposition to federal assumption of responsibility for price stability comes especially from those who fear that its implementation will slow up economic growth. In their view, the "cost-push" is chiefly responsible for our recent inflation and for the prospect that creeping inflation lies ahead. It should be accepted as a fact of economic life, with some effort to mitigate its inequities through widespread extension of escalation. Such a step is, however, to be opposed both on grounds of equity and of theory. Widespread escalation is not feasible, and creeping inflation, if accepted as policy, will create economic disorder rather than accelerated growth.

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*James A. Maxwell, Ph.D., Worcester, Massachusetts, is Professor of Economics at Clark University. He is the author of several books and numerous articles in the field of fiscal policy. During World War II, he served in the Office of Price Administration and the Department of State.*

THE federal government has never explicitly declared that prevention of inflation is its responsibility. But from the outset the dominant economic maxims, accepted by the two major political parties, have aimed at financial responsibility by government: the monetary unit should be tied firmly to the precious metals; budgets should be annually balanced; federal borrowing should be an emergency device.[1] Accordingly, after 1789, a bimetallic dollar was established; the large government debt resulting from the Revolutionary War was rapidly retired and, by 1836, completely extinguished. Under stress of the Civil War, the dollar became inconvertible and a new large federal debt was amassed. But when, after 1865, the nation was reunited, conservative fiscal and monetary principles once again brought about resumption of specie payments and rapid reduction of the federal debt. Financing of World War I was quite orthodox and so were the fiscal and monetary policies of the 1920's. Since 1929, however, a series of events has undermined many of the old rules. First came the great depression; and then, after World War II, came the cold war, the prospect of large military outlay for decades ahead, success in abolishing depressions, and a lack of success in controlling inflation. As a result new and unusual federal economic policies are under discussion.

TABLE 1—ANNUAL INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1958

| SECULAR SWINGS | YEAR | LOW [1850–59 = 100] | HIGH [1850–59 = 100] | PERCENTAGE CHANGE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1789–1814 | 94.0 | 184.4 | +96.2 |
| 2 | 1814–1843 | 184.4 | 75.1 | −59.3 |
| 3 | 1843–1864 | 75.1 | 220.9 | +194.1 |
| 4 | 1864–1896 | 220.9 | 75.1 | −66.0 |
| 5 | 1896–1920 | 75.1 | 249.3 | +232.0 |
| 6 | 1920–1932 | 249.3 | 104.6 | −58.0 |
| 7 | 1932–1958 | 104.6 | 296.2 | +183.2 |

[1] A history of views and theories concerning fiscal policies is conveniently provided by Lewis H. Kimmel, *Federal Budget and Fiscal Policy, 1789–1958*. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1959.)

## SECULAR PRICE CHANGES

Recently Professor George R. Taylor and Mrs. Ethel Hoover have presented an annual index of wholesale prices in the United States, 1720–1958.[2] Neglecting the period before 1789, Table 1 shows seven secular swings—four up and three down—in the 169 years, 1789–1958. Over this period, the price level increased nearly three and one-half times (the index for 1932 was, however, only higher by 11 per cent than that of 1789). Although these secular swings often aroused sharp political controversy, most statesmen and economists, until the Great Depression of the 1930's, viewed them with some complacency.[3] The forces behind such swings were changes in the supply of gold and silver, or else a major war, and about them little could be done. And a similar complacency was manifested toward the shorter swings in the price level, attributable to the business cycle, because faith in the self-adjusting capacity of the economy was strong.

Creation by Congress of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 brought no shift in opinion. The objectives mentioned in the preamble of the Federal Reserve Act are limited: to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, and others. Only

[2] *Hearings of the Joint Economic Committee*, Part 2, *Historical and Comparative Rates of Production, Productivity and Prices*, 86th Congress, 1st Session, April 7–10, 1959 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 394–97.

[3] Among economists, Irving Fisher was an exception. During the 1920's he was concerned about our unstable dollar and made unsuccessful attempts to get something done about it.



slowly did the System come to accept the broad objective of promoting economic stability, and only gradually were such objectives as "preventing injurious credit expansion and contraction" added by amendments. During the 1920's, indeed, an effort was made to write into the Act an explicit directive concerning stability of the price level by the Goldsborough Bill (H.R. 494, 68th Congress, 1st Session) and the Strong Bill (H.R. 7895, 69th Congress, 1st Session). The latter bill provided that "all the powers of the Federal Reserve shall be used for promoting stability in the price level." This the Federal Reserve opposed, arguing that it could not fulfill such a directive, that the directive was too narrow, and that prices were chiefly a result and not a cause of economic stability.[4]

Then came the great depression, and with it the focus of attention became employment and unemployment rather than the level of prices. With World War II, price stabilization temporarily became important in order to strengthen the war effort. But when, in 1945, Congress began consideration of postwar economic responsibilities, its interest again was employment. In the original version of the Full Employment Bill of 1945, the President, at the beginning of each regular session, was to send to the Congress a program which would "assure a full employment volume of production." Opponents declared that this meant federal guarantee of full employment, and, through their efforts, this provision, as well as the adjective "full," was removed from the Bill. The President was required merely to submit yearly an Economic Report setting forth current levels of employment, production, and purchasing power, and their foreseeable trends.

The Employment Act of 1946 specified a trilogy of objectives—"maximum employment, production, and purchasing power" (Public Law 304, Section 2)—which it is the responsibility of the federal government to promote. The commitment is, however, qualified, since what is done by the federal government must be "consistent with its needs and obligations and other essential considerations of national policy. . . ." The meaning of these words is not obvious, and, as Edwin G. Nourse, the first Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, has observed, the Act is "rich in ambiguity."[5] Some economists have surmised, besides, that the three objectives may be incompatible and have been concerned as to which, in such case, should have priority; others have noticed and regretted the absence of a directive of price stability; and still others have been concerned at the lack of mention of economic growth. If the Act were to be rewritten today, it is very likely that stress would be given to growth with dynamic stability. Certainly these have recently been emphasized in the reports of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA). It can be argued, of course, that the ambiguities of the Act with respect to economic objectives make it adaptable to whatever is the climate of economic and political opinion and that Congress has, after all, acknowledged its responsibility for achieving reasonable economic stability. But some people feel that this broad commitment is not enough, and that the Employment Act should be amended to express objectives which now seem more important than they did in 1946.

[4] The position of Benjamin Strong, the Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the dominant figure in the System, is indicated in Lester V. Chandler, *Benjamin Strong, Central Banker* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1958).

[5] *Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic Association*, May 1957. Edwin G. Nourse, "Ideal and Working Concepts of Full Employment," p. 100.

### PRICE STABILITY

Congress in 1945–46 conceived and passed the Employment Act with the fear of postwar depression uppermost in its mind, and with no serious worry about the dangers of inflation. And until the Korean conflict, the CEA, in administering the Act, was not alert to inflation. Since then, and especially since 1956, the opposite charge has been made: that the CEA exaggerates the inflationary danger and therefore favors policies which retard growth.

Does the Employment Act offer any directive concerning price stability? Edwin G. Nourse declares that the objective of "maximum purchasing power" should be interpreted to embrace price stability. Others argue that "maximum purchasing power" is consistent with any level of prices and that, therefore, the Act is silent in this respect; and even if price stability is implicit, it might well be made explicit by amendment of the Act. Arthur F. Burns, Chairman of the CEA, 1953–55, has said:

> I would urge an early amendment of the Employment Act, so as to make stability of the consumer price level an explicit and solemn objective of national economic policy, because I believe that this is the most effective action that the government can now take to arrest the dangerously spreading belief that we are living in an age of inflation.[6]

While such an amendment of itself would be simply a declaration of purpose, it would alert the CEA and the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress to pay closer attention to prices than in the past; it would put private groups on notice that the government is determined to protect the dollar against further encroachment, and that the paths which governmental policy takes will depend largely on the moderation that business managers practice with regard to prices and that trade union leaders observe with regard to wages.[7]

A number of other economists have taken a similar position, averring that if an explicit directive had been in the original Act neither the Congress nor the CEA could have been so passive in the face of the inflation 1946–50. William McC. Martin, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, has recently stated that the Board "would favor an amendment which would make it explicit that national economic policy is concerned with preserving the purchasing power of the dollar."[8]

A subtle set of objections to such a step has been offered by those who stress the importance of economic growth. It may be that rapid growth, economic fluctuations, and price instability are somehow linked. Certainly growth in the United States has not proceeded smoothly: sometimes it has lagged; at others, it has accelerated. A dampening of economic fluctuations might retard growth and so might achievement of a stable price level.

### "COST-PUSH" AND CREEPING INFLATION

These fears have been given point by the opinion that our recent inflation has been of the "cost-push" variety. Most past inflations in the United States have been "demand-pull," the immediate cause being that money demand for output outran the supply. Such an excess demand is general and not confined to a few products; it, therefore, brings about a rise in the price level. As a remedy, restrictive monetary and fiscal policies are indicated and will be effective. But considerable evidence indicates that our recent inflation stems from increases in costs—especially wage costs—which are independent of supply-and-demand forces to a considerable extent. Such a "cost-push" persuades sellers to raise their prices, and this process is the easier because price competition is not very intense. If it is objected that a general rise in prices requires an increase in the money supply, an answer is that, in the short turn, velocity will increase. While a rise in velocity has limits, it can be sustained long enough to enable a considerable price rise to take place. Indeed, the time lag is sufficiently great that, for practical purposes, the price increase will seem to be disassociated from the "cost-push" which caused it.

How restrain a "cost-push" inflation? The traditional instruments of monetary and fiscal policy will, so it is argued, be less than satisfactory. In order to be effective in checking inflation, they would have to be applied early in recovery. Such early restraint would slow up the rise of employment; it would moderate the pressure of labor for wage increases and also, through its pressure on profits, reduce the willingness of employers to yield to wage demands. But all of this would retard economic growth. As Sumner Slichter has said: "It is simply a proposal to subordinate growth to stable prices."[9] And he goes on to declare that most of the demerits commonly alleged against creeping inflation are erroneous, or exaggerated, or correctable. In short, he is willing to accept creeping inflation as the easiest and best way to promote rapid growth, high employment, and abolition of depressions.

On the other hand, the case against creeping inflation is strong, especially if the inflation is planned and accepted as economic policy. The impact of a general increase in prices always has been uneven, and great injury has been inflicted on persons whose money incomes lag. The proponents of inflation would prevent or cushion this injury by extension of escalator clauses in wage, salary, and pension contracts and by adding such clauses to loan contracts. A vast escalator network would be spread over the economy. About this, four major questions should be asked: (1) Is such an extension feasible? It is hard to see that it is without a complete reconstruction of the present financial system of savings institutions, and this, if it is to be orderly, is a task of great complexity and delicacy. (2) If, by some alchemy, the extension could be made, would it not achieve the same market allocation as is now secured with a stable price level? (3) Can inflation be made to creep if escalation is widespread? At present, with limited escalation, the strong and strategic groups gain at the expense of weaker groups. Might not attempts to protect the weaker groups, which would serve to reduce the gains of the stronger groups, lead the stronger groups to reassert their power and therefore to speed up the whole inflationary process?[10] (4) Does creeping inflation stimulate growth and high employment if it becomes a normal expectation of business and consumers? At best, the historical evidence is inconclusive because the United States has never experienced

[6] The American Assembly, *United States Monetary Policy* (New York: The American Assembly, 1958), p. 215; also Arthur F. Burns, *Prosperity without Inflation* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1958), p. 71.

[7] *Ibid., p.* 215.

[8] 85th Congress, 2nd Session, *Hearings on H.R. 12785,* Amending the Employment Act of 1946, etc., p. 101.

[9] 86th Congress, 1st Session, Joint Economic Committee Hearings, *Employment, Growth and Price Levels* (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 9–13.

[10] 85th Congress, 2nd Session, Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, *Relationship of Prices to Economic Stability and Growth,* p. 196, where the First Report of the British Council on Prices, Productivity and Incomes is printed.

planned inflation. Rapid growth and rising prices seem coupled usually in periods either of war or of recovery from recession. In the former case, the combination of patriotic incentives and government controls produces results not to be expected in peacetime; in the latter case, the public expectation is not that prices will continue to rise.

### CONTROL OVER INSTALLMENT PURCHASES AND WAGE CONTRACTS

If creeping inflation is rejected as an economic policy, some people believe that we will need to add new defensive weapons to the arsenal of the federal government. The two currently most discussed are: control over installment purchases and supervision—perhaps control—over major wage contracts.

In 1956, the Federal Reserve Board, at the request of the President, undertook a study of the need for stand-by authority to regulate the terms of installment purchases. "The evidence assembled through this study was inconclusive, and, consequently, no statutory enactment was either recommended or provided."[11] Many economists, nonetheless, believe that this control will be needed in the future because of the growing importance of consumer credit and because the instruments of monetary policy do not readily influence consumer credit. But it may be that the techniques used during World War II and the Korean conflict—specified minimum downpayments and maximum periods of payment—would not be adequate in peacetime to handle enforcement, and that new methods must be devised.

Another new weapon, designed particularly to combat the "wage-push," would require the CEA to report to the President concerning the anticipated effects of proposed major wage contracts so that the President might recommend against them if they "would be contrary to economic stability."[12] This step is opposed by many as the beginning of a process which would lead to federal control over the collective bargaining process, and it is unlikely at present to receive much consideration.

### FISCAL POLICY AND DEBT MANAGEMENT

Recently most of the responsibility for economic stabilization has fallen to monetary policy. And yet a decade ago, not to say in the 1930's, economists expected that fiscal policy and debt management would provide significant assistance.

By fiscal policy is meant the use of government expenditure and revenue as balancing factors to add to or subtract from aggregate demand so that surpluses are generated in order to restrain boom and deficits to dissipate recession. Belief in the potential of fiscal policy remains strong, but many doubts have arisen concerning its practical utility in our political and institutional set-up. Some solid achievements for fiscal policy can, however, be claimed because of the operation of built-in flexibility. Federal revenues, when allowed to operate by Congress without new legislation to change existing provisions, tend automatically to produce deficits in recession and surpluses in prosperity. The tax obligations of individuals and corporations under income tax are sensitive to cycles. Some federal expenditures, notably unemployment benefits, show a similar built-in flexibility. On the other hand, exercise by Congress of its discretionary power to alter tax provisions and expenditures has not conformed clearly to the principles of fiscal policy.

[11] Ralph A. Young, "Tools and Processes of Monetary Policy" in The American Assembly, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), p. 32.

[12] 85th Congress, 2nd Session, *Hearings on HR 12785, Amending the Employment Act of 1946,* etc. (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 9.



The two major postwar tax reductions in 1948 and 1953 were inspired and dictated less by fiscal policy than by political considerations, and it was a lucky accident that, in part, their impact was countercyclical. In the postwar years, Congress has, over-all, displayed a bias in favor of expansive action, and this means that it has enhanced inflationary pressures.

If Congress could be persuaded to give the Executive some limited power to alter tax rates for countercycle purposes, this bias might be removed. But Congress is understandably jealous of its fiscal prerogatives not only because of fear of Executive aggrandizement, but also because of scepticism concerning how fiscal policies would operate. What would be the effective weight of a two-point change up or down in the beginning rate of the individual income tax, or of a $100 change in the per capita exemption? Until more quantification of possible fiscal policy actions is provided, Congress will be hesitant to place new power in the hands of the Executive.

The outlook for countercyclical use of debt management is even more discouraging. The standard theory is that government should issue long-term securities as an anti-inflationary step, and short-term ones as an anti-recessionary step. While this theory has not been articulated in detail, it may be doubted that debt management can do anything that monetary policy cannot do.[13] In any case, countercyclical debt management runs into the important practical fact that it would enlarge the interest costs of the Treasury. This is so because interest rates on long-term securities tend to be high in prosperity; that is, at the very time when the theory dictates that they be issued. Enlarging the interest cost is politically distasteful, and, aside from stabilization, of no economic merit. The Treasury will, indeed, usually be glad to issue short-term securities in recession.[14] It will issue long-term ones when the money market is favorable, with little regard to countercycle effects.

[13] See Herbert Stein, "Managing the Public Debt," *Journal of Law and Economics,* Volume 1.

### CO-ORDINATION OF ECONOMIC POLICIES

Responsibility for operating our two major economic controls is split: monetary policy is assigned by the Congress to the Federal Reserve System, a body which is independent of the Executive, and fiscal policy rests with the Congress. A good many federal departments and agencies, besides, carry on lending and loan-insuring activities which have a distinct effect on cyclical conditions, and these activities are often not subject to direct control by Congress, the Executive, or the Federal Reserve. The Council of Economic Advisers in the Executive branch, and the Joint Economic Committee in the Legislative, are meant to provide a co-ordinating machinery, and they have served this purpose. But the powers of both are limited and have depended largely upon the personality of the chairman of the CEA and of the Joint Economic Committee. Under the Eisenhower Administration in 1953, an Advisory Board on Economic Growth and Stability was established, chaired by the chairman of the CEA, with membership from the chief spending departments, the Bureau of the Budget, and the Federal Reserve Board. Meeting weekly, its aim is to advise the CEA of governmental activities affecting the economy.

Perhaps an informal organization of this sort with advisory powers is enough.

[14] In February and May, 1958, the Treasury issued some intermediate and long-term securities because, in the last few years, the occasions when the market would accept long-terms were rare.

But sceptics raise such questions as: What if an agency disregards advice? What if an outright conflict in economic policy should arise? The collision between the Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury in 1950–51 provides a case in point. In the years after 1946, the Board became increasingly restive over its commitment to support the prices of federal bonds and, in 1949, it was receptive to the idea that a Monetary and Credit Council be provided, hoping thereby to secure backing for a break-away from Treasury dominance. The Treasury, however, was not then interested. But when, in 1951, the Federal Reserve Board was successful in securing its independence, it lost interest in a Council. The Treasury, on the other hand, began to see merit in such a body.

Here the matter rests, and so long as the economic peace is not disturbed by a depression or by a falling-out of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury, interest in creating a formal board, with the duty of co-ordinating federal economic policies, will be slight.[15]

[15] Mention should be made of the opinion expressed most cogently by Professor Milton Friedman that discretionary monetary policy should be replaced by an automatic monetary policy which would provide us with a stable and continuous growth in the money supply. A popular statement of this position is provided by Edward S. Shaw, "Money Supply and Stable Economic Growth" in The American Assembly, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), pp. 66–71.

# The Need for Balanced Federal Budgets

By MAURICE H. STANS

ABSTRACT: It should be the policy of the federal government to aim always for a balanced budget or financial stability will be upset. To balance the budget, action should be taken to reduce or end some federal programs which we have been acquiring in the past thirty years. The compensatory theory of federal spending has not been successful until now and offers little hope for the future unless there is control in the growth of federal spending. We should not initiate programs as temporary expedients during times of recession since they create great problems in future years. Although we must accept deficits when the country is in a national emergency, we should later create equivalent surpluses to offset deficits caused by the emergency. It is, therefore, necessary to pay as we go if we want to reduce the national debt and taxes. It is also necessary to plan for budgetary surpluses in good years if we do not want to extend inflation in the future.—Ed.

*Maurice H. Stans, LL.D., Washington, D. C., is Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Formerly he was Financial Consultant to the Postmaster General and Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Mr. Stans was previously executive partner in the national accounting firm of Alexander Grant and Company. He is a member and former President of the American Institute of Accountants, member and former Director of the Illinois Society of Certified Public Accountants, and member of the National Association of Accountants, the American Accounting Association, the Federal Government Accountants Association, and the American Society for Public Administration.*

THE federal government should have a balanced budget; its expenditures, especially in times like these, should not exceed its income. Of this I am deeply convinced.

As a matter of fact, I find it difficult to understand why there are still some people who do not seem to agree. Even though I have now been an official of the government almost four years and know by hard experience that there are at least two sides to all public questions, on this one the facts speak eloquently for themselves. And the arguments that are marshalled in opposition to show that a balanced budget is unimportant —or that it can be safely forsaken for lengthy periods of time—certainly seem unsound. It is true that we as a nation have been extremely fortunate in maintaining our fundamental strengths thus far despite the heavy deficit spending of the past thirty years. But we cannot count on being lucky forever, and more and more the consequences of past profligacy are now catching up with us.

Let us look at some of the facts:

1. It is a fact that in 24 of the last 30 years the federal government has spent more than it has received.

2. It is a fact that last fiscal year the federal government had a deficit (12.5 billion dollars) larger than ever before in time of peace.

3. It is a fact that the federal government debt is now 290 billion dollars and that the annual cost of carrying that debt is more than 10 per cent of the budgeted income of the government—and has been going up.

4. It is a fact that our economy is operating at a higher rate of activity than it ever has before and that the standard of living it is producing for all America is far beyond that of any other country in the world.

5. It is a fact that in times of high economic activity there is competition among business, consumers, and government for the productive resources of the country; if government, by indulging in high levels of spending in such times, intensifies that competition, it openly invites inflation.

6. It is a fact that with an unbalanced budget, federal borrowings to raise the money to spend more than income tend to add to the money supply of the country and therefore are inflationary.

7. It is a fact that the purchasing power of the dollar has declined more than 50 per cent in the last twenty years. Today we spend more than $2.00 to get what $1.00 would buy in 1939.

8. And finally, it is a fact that all too often in history inflation has been the undoing of nations, great and small.

True, there are many people who still feel that a bit of inflation is a tolerable, if not a good, thing. I think they fail to see that a bit of inflation is an installment on a lot of inflation—a condition in which nobody can hope to gain.

Those of our citizens who believe that inflation is not undesirable simply overlook the history of nations. Inflation is an insidious threat to the strength of the United States. Unless we succeed in exercising a tighter rein over it than we have been able to up to this point, I am afraid that we will all lose—as individuals, as a nation, and as a people.

In my view, the facts that I have recited clearly demonstrate the need for:

1. Containing federal expenditures within federal income—which means balancing the budget—in fiscal years 1960 and 1961.

2. Establishing the principle of a balanced budget—including some surplus for reduction of the national debt—as a fiscal objective for the prosperous years ahead.

These are the standards on which fiscal integrity for the nation should rest. These are the standards by which the force of inflation induced by reckless fiscal policy can be averted. Yet in 24 of the last 30 years we have not been able to attain them.



Let us look at some of the circumstances which have caused heavy federal spending in the past and have, perhaps, made us insensitive to the dangers of deficits.

### LOOKING BACK

Over the last three decades the federal government has spent 264 billion dollars more than it has received. The six years in which there was an excess of income over expense produced negligible surpluses in relation to the deficits of the other years.

We need hardly be reminded of the cause of most of those deficits. In the earlier years it was depression; in the middle years it was war; in recent years it has been war again and then recession.

In the depression years it was not possible to balance the budget; while government services and costs were growing by popular demand, federal revenues declined as a result of economic inactivity. The efforts made to balance the budget by increasing tax rates in 1930 and 1932 and in 1936 to 1938 were apparently self-defeating.

As for the expenditure side of the budget, the decade of the 1930's produced a great deal of talk about "pump-priming" and "compensatory spending" —federal spending which would compensate in poor times for the decline in business and consumer demand and thus lend balance and stability to the economy. The theory was, of course, for the federal government to spend proportionately larger amounts during depression times and proportionately smaller amounts during good times—to suffer deficits in poor years and enjoy surpluses in prosperous years, with the objective of coming out even over the long pull.

Then, in the early 1940's came World War II. During the war years, the federal government's expenditures vastly exceeded its income, and huge further deficits were piled up. In retrospect, most students of wartime economic developments now agree that we did not tax ourselves nearly enough. We did not pay enough of the costs of war out of current income. We created a large debt while suppressing some of its inflationary consequences with direct economic controls, but the suppression was only temporary.

Depression and war, although major factors, were not the only reasons for increased federal expenditures and deficits during the past thirty years. It was more complex than that. In the 1930's the national philosophy of the responsibilities of the federal government underwent a major change. The country's needs for economic growth and social advancement were gradually given increased recognition at the federal level.

The aim of economic growth, of social advancement, and of "compensatory" economic stability became intertwined. Many federal activities of far-reaching implications were established in ways which affected federal expenditures for very long periods of time—if not permanently. Social security, greatly increased support for agriculture, rural electrification, aids to homeowners and mortgage institutions, public housing, public power developments like the Tennessee Valley Authority and other multipurpose water resource projects, and public assistance grants are just a few examples. All of them, however, remained as federal programs after World War II. And we were actually fighting in that war before federal spending for work relief could be stopped.

The immediate postwar period was marked by dramatic demobilization. Nevertheless, many of the major costs of war lingered on. The maintenance

in the postwar period of even the reduced and relatively modest structure of our Armed Forces was far more costly than anything that existed in the way of the machinery of war prior to 1940. The war also left us with greatly increased expenditure commitments for interest on the public debt, for veterans, and for atomic energy. The Marshall Plan and the mutual security program followed in succession. It became obvious, next, that the cold war was going to be expensive. Then, with the Korean aggression, it became necessary to rearm and, even after the shooting stopped, the peacetime striking force and defensive machinery we had to maintain continued expenditures at levels that far exceeded in cost anything we had earlier imagined.

Thus, the postwar growth of the budget has been partly in the area of national security, partly deferred costs of World War II, and partly the inheritance of activities and ways of thinking that characterized the depression of the 1930's. We have now learned that many of the programs the federal government initiated in the 1930's were neither temporary nor "compensatory" in character. Moreover, we have not only retained many of them, but we have also greatly expanded them in the postwar period. Since World War II we have seen large increases in federal expenditures for urban renewal, public health, federal aid for airports and highways, new categories and a higher federal share of public assistance grants, aid to schools in federally impacted areas, great liberalization in aid to agriculture, as well as new programs for science, education, and outer space.

## THE PRESENT

What can we conclude from all of this?

It seems to me that in the first place we must recognize that the compensatory theory of federal spending has failed thus far and offers little hope for the future unless we exert a more forceful and courageous determination to control the growth of federal spending. The major spending programs which originated in the depression years have in most cases persisted in the following decades. A work relief project could be turned off when we started to fight a war, but most of the programs established in the 1930's developed characteristics of a far more permanent sort.

An example can be found in the program of the Rural Electrification Administration (REA). This program was started in 1936 when only a minority of farm families enjoyed the benefits of electricity. Today, 95 per cent of our farms receive central station electric service. We have invested 4 billion dollars in this program, at 2 per cent interest. Nonetheless, indications are that future demands for federal funds will be even greater as the REA cooperatives continue to grow.

The startling fact is that three out of four new users currently being added are nonfarm users. About one-half of REA electric power goes to industries, communities, or nonfarm families. The reasonable approach is that rural electric co-operatives should now be able to get some of their financing from other than government sources, especially for nonfarm purposes that compete with taxed private industry. Recognizing this, the President last year—and again this year—recommended that legislation be adopted to encourage cooperatives to switch from government to private financing, and his budget recommended a decrease in the funds for government loans. These proposals were not enacted by the Congress.

Inability to turn off expenditures is not all that is wrong with the compensatory theory of the prewar period. Initially, it dealt largely with the spending side of the fiscal equation whereas the income side now appears to be playing a more important part. Today—with corporate income tax rates at 52 per cent—any substantial reduction of corporate earnings produces an immediate proportionate and large loss to the federal treasury. Personal income taxes also respond, though less sharply, to a fall in national production and employment. Thus, when times take a turn for the worse, federal revenues decline promptly and substantially.

Couple this with enlarged social obligations in times of recession or depression—unemployment compensation, public assistance, and so on—and you have substantial leverage of a more or less automatic character for the production of federal deficits in times of depressed economic activity. To do more than this—to deliberately step up expenditures still more, for public works and other construction, as was done last year—runs grave risks. There is, first, the risk that an antirecession expenditure program cannot be turned off after the recession, but instead represents a permanent increase in the public sphere at the expense of the private. Second, it is difficult to start programs quickly, so the major impact may come long after the need for the economic stimulation has passed. Both of these risks mean that antirecession actions can well represent an inflationary danger for the postrecession period. The danger is there even if, as some believe, positive governmental intervention is required to counter recessions. It is more grave, however, if—and I believe this was proved true in 1958–59—the economy is vigorous and resilient enough to come out of a temporary recession and to go on through a revival period to new prosperous peaks without any direct financial federal interference.

I think we may conclude that it is inevitable that our nation will be faced with large budgets in the years ahead. This is particularly true for the defense obligations which our country has assumed, for its international undertakings to provide economic and military assistance to other free nations, and as a result of many programs which have been started over the years—major programs for water resource development, agriculture, veterans' benefits, low-cost housing, airways modernization, and space exploration—all these and many others have taken on a permanent quality which makes it clear that federal budgets will be large budgets in our lifetimes.

There is still another conclusion which springs from this short recitation of the history of the last thirty years. It is that the federal government has asumed more and more reponsibility for activities which formerly were regarded as being under the jurisdiction of state and local governments. More and more the federal government has assumed responsibility for public assistance, housing, urban renewal, educational aid to areas with federal installations, and many other programs that are now supported by federal grants-in aid to the states. All this, of course, contributes to the conclusion that these federal programs are not only large at the present time, but have a built-in durability—a staying power with which we must reckon as a fact of life.

I think these thoughts are well summarized in the words of Mr. Allen Sproul, former President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, who recently said:

> Government, in our day, touches upon the economic life of the community in an almost bewildering variety of ways, but its overall influence comes into focus in the consolidated cash budget and, in a subsidiary way, in the management of the public debt. When we abandoned the idea of taxation for revenue only and admitted, as we must, a more important role of Government in economic affairs, we thought up a tidy little scheme called the compen-

satory budget. This envisaged a cash budget balanced in times of real prosperity, in deficit in times of economic recession, and in surplus in times of inflationary boom. What we have got is a budget that may throw up a shaky surplus in times of boom, but that will surely show substantial deficits in times of recession. The bias, over time, is toward deficits, with only wobbly contracyclical tendencies.

### LOOKING AHEAD

It seems to me that as we move into another decade it will be essential to recognize that unless we have a more positive program for operating our federal government within its income, the forces that have gained such tremendous momentum in the past will perpetuate the tradition of deficits—to the great disadvantage of the country as a whole.

Assuming a continuous, but not uninterrupted, economic growth for the country, accompanied by ever-increasing, but not uninterrupted, growth of federal revenues, we should nevertheless expect that the growth of programs started in the past will have a strong tendency to absorb the expected additional revenues—unless aggressive controls are exercised by an alert administration and a statesmanlike Congress during those years.

On those occasions when the economy recedes from its way of growth, we must expect great leverage to be exerted toward the building up of additional deficits. We must learn to live with recession-induced deficits as a matter of necessity, but we should not take unneeded actions which mortgage our nation's future with both more debt and an inflationary potential.

### CONCLUSIONS

It seems to me to follow from these facts and analyses that it should be the policy of the federal government to strive determinedly for a balanced budget at all times, for, clearly, if it does not, the forces at work to upset financial stability will surely prevail as a matter of momentum.

As we move into the next decade we have the lessons of the three past decades to guide us:

1. Federal programs persist and in most cases grow. As demand expands, the programs expand. It is extremely difficult to curtail them. Their growing costs—and a growing economy—must be reckoned with realistically. This means that actions should be taken to reduce or to end them as they accomplish the purposes for which they were initiated (eighteen such proposals were made in the President's budget message for the fiscal year 1960).
2. In times of recession, it is important to avoid doing things as temporary expedients which will become longer range programs and create major problems later on. We have plenty of these as carryovers from earlier days; we should avoid creating new ones for the years ahead.
3. We must, of course, learn to live with deficits when major national emergencies threaten or exist in our country. But we should resolve to create equivalent surpluses later on to offset such deficits.

The lesson is clear. We should pay as we go, and if we are to look for debt reduction or tax reduction on a sound footing—as we should—we must do more than this. We must plan for substantial budgetary surpluses in good years—or we will surely contribute to further dangerous inflation in the years ahead.

# Social and Economic Growth Without Inflation

By GERHARD COLM

ABSTRACT: There is no clear correlation between the rate of economic growth and price developments. Very rapid expansion is usually associated with price rise, a business slump with price drops. In the wide range between these extremes, growth may be associated with rising, stable, or falling prices. This is explained by the great variety of factors influencing prices, often working in opposite directions. Since there are multiple causes of price rises, there are also several policies which should be combined to combat price rises. They include: positive policies designed to increase productivity and to overcome obstacles to greater production; more effective credit policies to combat demand inflation; and arrangements designed to articulate the public interest in price and wage developments as a means to restrain cost increases.

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*Gerhard Colm, Dr. rer. pol., Washington, D. C., is Chief Economist of the National Planning Association and Professorial Lecturer at George Washington University. He served with the Budget Bureau and Council of Economic Advisers in the Executive Office of the President from 1940 to 1952. Dr. Colm is author of The American Economic in 1960 (1952), Essays in Public Finance and Fiscal Policy (1955), and co-author of The Economy of the American People (1958) and author of other books and articles.*

THE topic suggests that there is a question as to whether or not it is possible to have social and economic growth without inflation. Several writers, Sumner Slichter the foremost among them, have contended, indeed, that we have to choose between a satisfactory rate of economic growth and reasonable price stability; that some continuing price rise is the price we have to pay for adequate economic growth; and that only inadequate or spasmodic growth is compatible with price stability. This view holds that continuing economic growth and high employment are higher priority national objectives than price stability and that, therefore, we have to learn to accept some degree of permanent inflation.

Others fear that the expectation of even a continuing small degree of inflation may lead to an increasing degree of inflation. They are inclined to choose the other alternative, namely to be satisfied only with a smaller or discontinuous rate of growth which is compatible with price stability. In the terms of this alternative, we have to live with less than full utilization of our technological and managerial potentialities and periodically also with less than full employment.

It will be the thesis of this article that these alternatives of either adequate growth with inflation or inadequate growth without inflation represent a gross oversimplification of the problem. Inflation is a problem we have to face irrespective of whether the rate of growth is or is not adequate. Although policies designed to promote economic growth may conflict with policies designed to promote price stability, such conflict is neither inevitable nor unavoidable. Rather what is needed is a reconciliation of these policies. The relationship between growth and inflation is more complex than is implied by the dilemma between the objectives of growth and stability.

## Price and Cost Behavior in the Business Cycle

The simplified view that prices in a period of expansion rise and in a period of slack decline with some possible long term stability as an average requires considerable qualifications. In the following argument I assume a cycle with alternating periods of expansion and slack, an assumption which in itself requires qualification.

In a period of expansion, prices often rise because optimism leads business to revise its investment plans upwards and consumers to increase debt financed purchases. The resulting claims on resources may lead to price rises through the so-called "demand-pull" inflation, particularly in basic industries. The high level of activity may raise profits so much during the expansion period (because of lower overhead costs per unit of sale) that despite increases in costs, business may not raise prices as far as would be likely if "what the market can bear" were the sole criterion of price determination.

To the extent that prices in basic industries do increase in this period of intensive demand, they affect costs of the processing industries sooner or later. The price rise in the basic industries may become a serious "cost-push" in other industries at a time when the excess demand has disappeared. This is one way in which the "demand-pull" of the expansion phase may become a "cost-push" in a subsequent stagnation phase of the cycle.

In a period of economic slack or inadequate expansion, basic industries working at a low rate of operation are faced with a rise in unit costs of their product and a severe fall in profits. Since industries depend to a considerable extent on earnings for the financing of their modernization of plant and equipment, they have a strong incentive to raise prices. Firms in the "administered price" field which have postponed a possible price rise during the expansion period may choose to increase prices in the slack period of the cycle. In certain other industries a price rise, even in a period of some slack, may result in mitigating the decline in profits even if the price rise deters some customers. At least there will not be the price decline which takes place in industries of higher price elasticity and more nearly perfect competition. In a period of economic slack the effect of these cost-raising tendencies may be offset by price declining tendencies due to inadequate markets. In the event of a recession, a general stability of the price level, therefore, may result from offsetting tendencies of raising and lowering prices.

During a period of economic growth and rising profits, labor demands and may be granted substantial wage increases. In order to maintain its profit position, business may increase prices in proportion to, if not by more than, the increases in real labor costs—that is wage increases in excess of wage saving due to technological and managerial advances. Wage increases in some industries sooner or later affect wage scales in other industries with little productivity gains. As was the case with other cost increases, wage rate increases originating in high-profit industries during an expansion period may hit other industries after the expansion period has come to an end and may exert a "cost-push" effect on prices.

Because of this rather complex relationship between price and cost developments in periods of expansion and slack, there is actually no clear statistical correlation between the rate of economic growth and the price development.[1] Admittedly, our reasoning is of a speculative nature because our knowledge about the behavior of prices and costs in the cycle is still incomplete. Nevertheless, available statistical observations do not conflict with our hypothesis. From these arguments may be derived the following rules of thumb concerning price and cost behavior.

A very rapid economic expansion (forced draft) is likely to be associated with a substantial price rise (unless suppressed by price controls). Rather arbitrarily and simply to indicate an order of magnitude, I would say that a rate of growth of more than 5 per cent per year could not be sustained for long in the United States without causing considerable price pressure.

In the event of a serious and long lasting economic set back, the effects of shrinking markets are likely to prevail over the effects of the cost increases with a substantial price fall as a result.

Within a rather sizable range of potential growth rates, no general statement about price developments can be made. That is to say, within that range there would be no clear correlation between the rate of growth and a rise in prices. Depending on a number of factors other than the rate of economic growth, prices may rise moderately, substantially, or not at all, or may even decline.

## An Unsolved Problem

Throughout the history of economic thought, attempts have been made to explain the rise and fall in prices by reference to a single causal factor. Each of these explanations was based on observations valid in some situations but proved wrong in others. One of the

[1] Otto Eckstein, "Inflation, The Wage-Price Spiral and Economic Growth," *Joint Economic Committee Study of the Relationship of Prices to Economic Stability and Growth*, March 31, 1958 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1958).

most convincing explanations suggested was that the price level is determined by the amount of money in circulation. At one time the rise in prices following an influx of gold, or following the creation of paper money, seemed to validate this theory beyond doubt. And yet without taking into account the effect of the velocity of circulation on the price level, this theory proved to be inadequate. The velocity of circulation is subject to erratic changes; therefore the usefulness of the quantity theory of money as an explanation and as a guide for policy is limited to situations with a truly massive change in the quantity of money.

Another theory of price behavior proposes that it is the government deficit that causes inflation, a government surplus that causes price declines. This theory is borne out by the experience of wartime inflation, but in other periods no such simple explanation proves to be valid. During the calendar years 1947, 1948, 1956, and 1957 the federal government experienced substantial cash surpluses, while at the same time a substantial price rise was taking place. In 1953, with a big deficit, there was reasonable price stability. Also, the price stability during the recent recovery—from Spring 1958 to the Spring 1959—occurred in a period of a large government deficit. Such experiences contradict these simplified theories of direct causation.

A new monistic theory has been advanced recently by Sidney Weintraub[2] in which he undertakes to prove that wage rate increases are virtually the sole determinant of price changes. This theory again is in accord with the facts in some situations but is refuted by the facts in others.

[2] Sidney Weintraub, *A General Theory of the Price Level, Output, Income Distribution and Economic Growth* (Philadelphia, Pa.: Chilton Co., 1959).

The century-old attempt to explain the movement of prices by reference to any one single factor should be buried forever. This attempt is as futile as an attempt to explain changes in the body temperature by any one single bacillus. On the other hand, the fact that neither changes in the quantity of money, nor government deficits, nor wage rate increases, nor changes in the rate of growth can adequately explain a change in prices does not mean that these factors are unrelated to the price development. On the contrary, an analysis of prices must take all these factors into consideration. Sometimes one factor, sometimes another is predominant. Accordingly, policies designed to promote price stability cannot deal with only one of these factors but must use a variety of measures depending on the specific situation.

## THE POLICY CONSEQUENCES

The main consequence of this analysis is that the monistic policy approach to price stability is as deficient as the monistic theoretical approach. There is a widespread opinion that a price rise —whether originating from the cost or demand side—can always be prevented by appropriate monetary policies. This would be the case if a price rise, irrespective of its prime causes, depended on monetary expansion at least as a secondary cause. The argument is that a price rise must at least be validated by an increase in the money supply, disregarding possible changes in velocity. If, in the face of an upward pressure on prices, no increase in the money supply takes place, prices cannot rise or else a shrinkage in the market and unemployment will result. This shrinkage in markets, so the argument runs, would in time bring prices down. Thus, a restrictive monetary policy in order to prevent a price rise or force a price reduction may lead to a recession. Possibly a real recession of considerable severity and duration would be needed to counteract the upward pressure on prices.



Using monetary restraint as a remedy against inflation is justified under conditions of excessive demand. In such instances, a restrictive monetary policy is designed to operate through the market by curtailing demand to a point where it is in approximate balance with available production. If, however, it is also used to combat a price rise resulting from rising costs of materials or labor, a more drastic curtailment is needed and the economic effect of the medicine may be worse than the disease.

Therefore, a policy designed to promote economic growth and price stability must move on several fronts at the same time.

First, measures can be adopted which at the same time promote both economic growth and relative price stability. Private and public measures which increase productivity not only support economic growth and increase the supply of goods and services but thereby aid in counteracting inflationary tendencies. Such measures include efforts in support of research, technological development, education, training, provision for adequate aids to transportation and communication, development of resources—for example, water —and so on. Also, removing obstacles to productivity—for example, featherbedding—fosters economic growth and price stability. In addition, by promoting full employment conditions, an economic climate is created in which business is inclined to set lower prices in expectation of relatively high levels of operation; and labor is inclined to accept the introduction of technological advances in expectation of continued high levels of employment. We have come to identify anti-inflation policies largely with restrictive measures. And yet the most effective anti-inflation policies are of a positive character and are largely those policies which support economic productivity and economic growth.

Second, there is also need to be prepared with restrictive measures. If, for example, a large increase in national security expenditures threatens to create inflation, restrictive measures would be needed to check the increase in private demand. In another instance, economic expansion may require a promotion of demand. If, however, such policies are overdone, inflationary pressures may be created. Also, a period of balanced expansion may generate optimism and may lead to speculative overexpansion, for example, in plant and equipment, or business inventories, in stock or real estate buying, residential construction, or in consumer installment buying. Such excesses may create imbalances and, if occurring on a broad front, may lead to "demand-pull' inflation. Measures to deal with such situations include special and general credit controls.

Of particular importance and difficulty is the need for measures which influence business investment. The largest part of business investment is financed from internal business sources —undistributed profits, depreciation and depletion accruals. Available monetary and credit controls have no direct —and at best only some indirect—effect on the accrual and use of these business funds. Proposals have been made to use flexible tax devices either to encourage or to discourage the active use of these internal business funds. None of these proposals has yet found serious legislative consideration. Until a satisfactory solution of this problem has been found, the control of booms by monetary policy will not be very effective and will be, in effect, discriminatory. Monetary and credit restraint

exerts a more severe impact on young and small businesses than on seasoned and large enterprises; it adversely affects housing unless offset by special credit measures; it also discourages local government undertakings. This discriminatory effect of restrictive credit policies, in addition to its other undesirable aspects, diminishes the political acceptability of the stringent use of general credit controls.

*Credit controls and the public debt*

There is another aspect of monetary regulation which ought to be mentioned. The operation of credit controls has been complicated by the fact that it is inextricably tied up with the management of the large public debt. Inflation during World War II was held down by direct controls, and credit policy was conducted primarily with the view of supporting war finance. Continuation of this easy monetary policy after the war severely reduced the possibility of using credit policy as an anti-inflationary device. The "accord" between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve in March 1951 was understood to initiate a policy which would reconcile the need to support an orderly market for government securities with the need to foster price stability. Recently, the Federal Reserve has pursued a policy motivated primarily by the fear of inflation and without much regard for conditions in the government security market. During the recent Congressional debate on debt management—in connection with the President's request for removing the interest ceiling on federal bonds—proposals were made that the Federal Reserve pursue a policy which at times would lend support to the government securities market without jeopardizing the flexibility of the Federal Reserve to combat inflation. Such a policy, for example, could utilize open market operations to facilitate debt management but could limit the expansionary effect of such transactions by raising bank reserve requirements. Improvements are certainly needed in the ability of the Federal Reserve to regulate the flow of credit in a manner which supports economic growth without creating excess demands. The Monetary Commission which has been established with the aid of the Ford Foundation can be expected to make recommendations in this respect.

Third, as was pointed out above, a restrictive credit policy cannot effectively resist the "cost-push" type of price rise. To do battle effectively in this situation requires a policy which can take account of such factors as limited competition, administered prices, and wage rate increases in excess of productivity gains. How can increases in costs of materials which are not the result of scarcities be prevented? How can increases in wage rates which are out of line with general productivity gains and which are not justified on social grounds—substandard wages—or on special economic grounds—labor shortages in bottleneck industries or bottleneck areas—be prevented? One of the most important tasks of economic policy is to bring price and wage determination under conditions of imperfect competition in line with economic growth and price stability objectives—without resort to warlike price and wage controls. This task again requires a combination of measures. Policies which prevent the abuse of private economic power would help. Foreign competition can be a very effective check on a domestic price rise. Also, policies would be helpful which promote competition not only within an industry but also among substitutable products or services—for example, synthetic building material vs steel; air freight vs rail freight.

But, perhaps the most important element for curbing unreasonable price or wage demands is a public opinion which forces business and labor to consider the general interest in the pursuit of their private interests. That business and labor find public opinion important may be demonstrated by the large amounts spent for advertising their side of the story in conflicts like the recent steel negotiations. However, this "power of the public" could be mobilized in a more systematic and effective manner. Proposals such as those recently made by Congressman Reuss and Senator Clark for amending the Employment Act of 1946 give expression to this objective. They propose public hearings in case of price and wage increases, actual or intended, in crucial industries. In the case of wages, hearings would be called only if wage increases in the opinion of the firms concerned would force prices up. There is room for discussion as to the best arrangement for conducting such hearings. None of the proposals made would prevent the parties from going ahead even with economically undesirable price or wage changes. Price or wage controls have not been proposed in this connection. Nevertheless, the idea of public hearings is important because it dramatizes the fact that price and wage determinations in these crucial cases are not merely a private affair of those directly concerned but are also a matter of legitimate public concern. Articulating this public concern in such a way that business and labor take it into account is probably the only alternative to more drastic measures of government interference.



## SUMMARY

In summary, a reasonable rate of economic growth and a reasonable degree of price stability are compatible objectives. To a large extent, the same policies will serve to promote both objectives. The problem of inflation in the modern economy is serious irrespective of whether a somewhat greater or smaller rate of growth is held desirable. Meeting this inflationary "bias" in our economic system requires institutional arrangements which should be designed to articulate the public interest in private decision making. More important than the adjustments in institutional arrangements, however, are the needed adjustments in the attitudes of private decision makers. It is not utopian to expect that these adjustments will be made; they are already in the making. Economic growth without inflation is not a contradiction in concepts as some maintain; rather it is a necessary realizable objective of a free society.

# What Would Labor Do About Inflation?

By George Meany

Abstract: The major needs of our time are adequate national defense, public services for a growing population, comprehensive economic and technical aid for the uncommitted peoples of less-developed areas of the world who are emerging from colonial domination and social and economic adjustments to rapid technological change. These needs must be met for national survival and the continued progress of our free society. They can and should be met by economic expansion of at least 5 per cent a year. Restrictive economic policies that curtail economic progress and growth must be abandoned. The "tight money" policy should be halted if growth is to be stimulated. Continuing wage and salary increases should be encouraged if growing consumer markets are to be attained. The government's budget policy should aim at balancing the budget in times of full employment from an expanding economy rather than restricting government expenditures and retarding economic growth. Full employment and economic growth of 5 per cent a year should be established as basic national objectives, to be implemented by government policies. To achieve these major requirements, there should be an end to the incessant propaganda campaign about runaway inflationary pressures that have not existed in the past eight years. Solutions for the type of price changes of recent years have to be developed on the basis of the facts in each separate part of the economy. The main task of the day is more rapid economic expansion to sustain full employment and meet the nation's needs. This will do more than anything to stabilize the price situation.

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*George Meany, Bethesda, Maryland, is President of the American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations. Formerly, he was President of the New York State Federation of Labor, 1934–39 and Secretary Treasurer, 1940–52 and President, from 1952 of the American Federation of Labor. During World War II, Mr. Meany was a member of the War Labor Board, and in 1957, he was nominated by President Eisenhower to be a United States Delegate to the United Nations General Assembly. Mr. Meany holds honorary degrees from De Paul, Pennsylvania, Catholic, Long Island, and Seton Hall Universities.*





A PHYSICIAN makes a diagnosis before he prescribes medicine or surgery for an illness. As a practical trade unionist, I think it is essential to examine the issue of inflation before possible solutions are offered. This is particularly true because I believe that this subject has been misrepresented, with consequences that are harmful to our national interests.

Inflation is a condition of sharp price rises associated with too much money chasing after too few goods. The United States has had experience with inflation in connection with wars. Such a situation of excessive demands pressing against shortages of goods, labor, and machines has not existed during the past eight years. However, increasing propaganda about runaway inflation has continued.

A nationwide campaign has characterized runaway inflation as America's major problem. The propaganda campaign has thereby distorted reality. It has submerged the crucial problems facing the nation: namely, national defense in a cold war, public service needs of a growing population, economic aid for the uncommitted peoples of vast regions of the world emerging from colonial domination, and adjustments to automation and rapid technological change.

This campaign has had even more serious results. The Administration and to an extent the Congress have joined this campaign by pursuing restrictive economic measures to curtail demand at a time when both manpower and machines have been idle. These policies have contributed to two recessions in the past six years with the resultant effect of slowing down economic progress. The pace of economic growth in the United States since 1953 has been slower than in almost every other industrial nation and merely one-third to one-half the rate of economic advance in the Soviet Union. The slowing down in the pace of expanding production and income has contributed to government deficits. Americans have been told, however, that the nation cannot afford increased expenditures for defense and public services because further deficit spending will bring on inflation.

It is time to call a halt to this vicious cycle that has been choking economic progress and has been blocking advances that are needed if America is to remain a vital center for freedom in the world of the middle of the twentieth century. Tough problems in the real world have to be faced and solved.

## Three Years of Postwar Inflation

In the thirteen years since the end of World War II, there have been three years of actual inflationary pressures. Immediately after the end of World War II, excessive demand pressed against a shortage of goods and machines. The pent-up demand of consumers and businesses for all types of goods and the early end of government controls shot prices upward. Between January 1946 and January 1948, consumer prices rose 30 per cent.

The expansion of the economy's ability to produce goods and services brought an easing of inflationary pressures. For two and one-half years, from the start of 1948 to mid-1950, there was reasonable price stability. Consumer prices moved up one-half of one per cent in that period.

The outbreak of the Korean conflict brought another wave of sharply rising consumer and business demands pressing against the supply of goods, labor, and machines. From mid-1950 to early 1951, there was excessive speculation and inventory building by business and hoarding by consumers. In the year between mid-1950 and mid-1951, consumer prices increased almost 9 per cent.

Approximately three-quarters of the

entire postwar rise of consumer prices occurred in those three years of inflationary pressures—1946, 1947, and mid-1950 to mid-1951. Restrictive economic policies may be properly used to curb such inflationary pressures. It is well to remember, however, that "tight money," high interest rates, and federal budget surpluses tend to curtail demand and slow down economic expansion. If such policies are pursued when there are idle machines and manpower, they result in economic slack and unemployment.

## THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST EXPANSION

For four years, from the middle of 1951 to the middle of 1955, there was reasonable price stability. Wages and salaries rose, the economy expanded at a fair pace and consumer prices went up about eight-tenths of one per cent a year. Those four years were not ideal, but they indicate clearly that it is possible to have economic expansion, wage and salary increases, and reasonable price stability at the same time.

During those four years of reasonable price stability, however, many political and business leaders began a continuing propaganda campaign against inflation—"the nation's number one problem." The government joined this campaign in early 1953, with restrictive economic policies designed to reduce the pace of economic progress and increase unemployment. These policies contributed to bringing on the recession that started in the summer of 1953.

The campaign to curtail economic expansion paused temporarily for several months, while economic activities declined, but it was resumed again when production and employment rose. Restrictive economic policies cut short the recovery from the recession. The number of unemployed was an average of 2,860,000 in 1955 and 1956, compared with 1,970,000 in 1951–53.

Despite restrictive policies and the persistence of slack in the economy, prices began to creep upwards. During the three years from mid-1955 to mid-1958, consumer prices rose about 2½ per cent a year. Although there was no excessive demand and there were no general shortages, these creeping price increases were termed inflation. The propaganda campaign against runaway inflation was stepped up. The newspapers, radio, and television were filled with fear-inciting declarations on inflation and justifications for economic policies that became increasingly restrictive.

Under the impact of these policies, economic expansion slowed down in 1956 and almost ground to a halt in the in the first half of 1957. Nevertheless, the money supply was further tightened in August 1957, at about the same time as the start of the recession. As unemployment soared to more than five million, the campaign against runaway inflation was relaxed again, only to be resumed in the summer of 1958, as soon as an economic improvement was under way. Prices, however, leveled off, and the consumer price index was reasonably stable from mid-1958 to mid-1959.

## THE PRICE LEVEL IN PERSPECTIVE

The facts reveal a problem in terms of prices, but not a problem of excessive demand and general shortages. In the eight years from mid-1951 to mid-1959, consumer prices increased by an average of less than 1½ per cent a year. The real problem, therefore, has not been runaway inflation, but rather a slowly, upward creeping price level.

"Tight money" and other restrictive economic policies may make sense in reducing excess demand during an inflationary situation. They have not stopped the slow, upward creep of the price level. However, such policies have achieved their purpose of reducing the pace of economic growth and increasing unemployment.



A Harvard professor, Alvin Hansen, has tried to put into some perspective the slow, creeping price rise of recent years. Professor Hansen has pointed out that in the entire 1948–58 decade, which includes the Korean inflation, the average yearly rise of consumer prices was 1¾ per cent. Professor Hansen states

> In contrast, in the sixteen years of peacetime prosperity from 1897 to 1913, the compound rate of increase was much higher —2½ per cent. Taking the longer view covering the six decades from 1897 to 1958, the per annum rate of increase of prices (wholesale and consumer) was 2⅛ per cent . . . the record during the years 1948–58 (which, however, included a war of considerable dimensions) discloses a per annum price increase not much more than half as large as that of the entire sixty-year period. This is by no means an irresponsible period.[1]

This is not to *condone* or to be pleased with price increases. It is only an attempt to place the price rises we have had in proper perspective. The record of the past decade has been exaggerated by a propaganda campaign that seeks support for "tight money," slower rates of economic expansion, higher levels of unemployment, and attacks on organized labor and collective bargaining.

## THE ATTACK ON ORGANIZED LABOR

The campaign against economic expansion has been directed particularly against organized labor and collective bargaining. The newspapers, radio, and television have been full of this daily attack for several years. Americans have been told incessantly that wage increases are an inflationary evil, since they are supposed to have resulted in both excessive consumer demand for goods and great increases in costs per unit of production.

There was no excessive consumer demand, however, from mid-1955 to mid-1958, when prices were creeping up. There were no general shortages of goods. Instead, there was weakness in consumer markets during most of that time and there was a growing gap between the economy's ability to produce and its ability to consume. What was needed in that period was more consumer demand, not less of it.

As for unit costs, the propagandists who have fought so hard for restrictive policies fail to reveal the facts. Rising output per manhour of work tends to offset the cost increases of improvements in wages and fringe benefits. Since 1947 output per manhour of work has risen at a faster rate than in previous periods, despite the slow pace of economic progress in the past few years.

In manufacturing, where unions have been subjected to a continuing attack, payroll and fringe benefit costs of factory production and maintenance workers per unit of output were no greater in 1958 and the first half of 1959 than they had been in 1953. Can these relatively stable unit costs of factory production and maintenance workers possibly be the cause of creeping price rises?

It is the attack on trade unions and collective bargaining that exposes the underlying drive of the campaign for restrictive economic policies. The entire campaign is basically a fight against economic expansion and full employment. The attack against trade unions, as well as the propaganda for "tight money" and budget surpluses at low levels of output and income, is an attempt to achieve a slow pace of eco-

[1] Letter in *New York Times*, January 23, 1959.

nomic progress and high levels of unemployment. What the restrictionists have not yet fully developed is a formula by which they can attain sufficiently high levels of unemployment to satisfy them and win elections at the same time.

### WAGE INCREASES ARE REQUIRED FOR EXPANSION

Steadily increasing real wages and salaries are a basic necessity for economic progress. They are the foundation for expanding consumer markets. It is largely on the basis of growing mass consumer markets that America's industries and productivity have been built.

About two-thirds of all the goods and services produced in the United States are bought by consumers, the economy's largest market. An additional 4 per cent of the nation's total output goes for home building which is largely based on the state of family buying power and availability of credit for customers. The sale of approximately 70 per cent of national output depends on the incomes of consumers and their desire to buy the goods and services that can be produced. If the economy is to grow, consumer mass markets and family incomes must increase, or industry's improving ability to produce a rising volume of goods and services will be to no avail.

Consumer markets also are the base for business decisions to invest in new plants and machines. Rising family incomes, growing consumer markets and expectations of increasing consumer sales—these are the basic incentives for businessmen to increase their investments in new and more efficient productive capacity.

Growing mass markets have been one of the secrets of the American economy's success. For decades, Americans were proud of high and rising real wages and salaries, low unit profit margins, and continuing improvements in living standards. Foreign experts came to study America's economy where working people shared in the fruits of progress. Other countries were urged to adapt American emphasis on expansion and consumer markets to their own societies.

Now, however, the present campaign tells the American people that such achievements are to be considered evil, that restrictive policies provide little economic progress, and that there is very little room for improvements in wages and salaries. At the very time when European countries are beginning to move in the direction of America's pattern of economic success, the United States is moving in the opposite direction, towards economic stagnation.

### GREAT COST OF RESTRICTIVE POLICIES

The campaign against inflation and the restrictive economic policies that go along with it have cost the nation dearly. The pace of economic growth has been cut in half, and crucial national needs have been neglected. The volume of real national output, which rose by a yearly average of 4.7 per cent in 1947–53, has slowed down to an average yearly rate of 2.4 per cent in 1953–59. Since the population has continued to grow by about 1.7 per cent a year, real national output per man, woman, and child has increased at a snail's pace in the past six years.

This slow pace of economic expansion has produced a trend toward relative economic and military weakness in relation to the Soviet Union, although the Soviet's total output is merely about half as great as America's. The totalitarian system siphons off a large share of production for military and cold war purposes. In recent years, total production in the Soviet Union has been increasing two to three times faster than



in the United States—permitting rising outlays for military and cold war purposes and some small increases in consumer goods. The slow growth of national output in the United States and the government's overriding emphasis on balancing the budget at all costs have placed severe limits on defense and foreign aid expenditures. At the same time, the increasing needs of America's growing population for such public services as education, health, housing, urban redevelopment, and community facilities have been neglected.

The number of jobless has risen from 3 per cent of the labor force in 1951–53 to an average of about 5 per cent in 1953–59. In addition, the economy's failure to provide a sufficient number of new jobs has aggravated the difficulties of hundreds of thousands of workers who have been displaced by technological change in manufacturing, mining, and railroads.

The restrictive policies that were supposed to curb price increases have contributed to pushing up the price level. As a result of the economy's slow growth, the costs of new machines and technological improvements have been spread over a slowly rising number of units of output—pushing up unit costs and applying an upward pressure on prices. More rapid economic growth would stabilize unit costs.

The slowing down in economic expansion has been largely responsible for federal budget deficits in the fiscal years ending June 1954, 1955, 1958 and 1959. These deficits were, in large measure, the results of recessions and declines in output and income. A higher rate of economic expansion would have produced greater incomes and increased federal revenue.

Increasing propaganda about runaway inflation has had an effect on upper-income families, convincing many of them to invest their savings in stocks rather than in long-term government bonds. This has contributed in great part to the government's financial difficulties.

### FIRST THINGS FIRST

The crucial task, in terms of economic policy, is to put first things first on the basis of reality, regardless of how unpleasant reality may appear. Indeed, the longer America continues to tilt with windmills of inflation, the more unpleasant the reality will probably become.

There are major problems to be faced in the areas of national defense and economic and technical aid to the uncommitted peoples of less-developed regions of the world. To move forward to meet these needs requires increased government expenditures that can be financed with the government revenue derived from a faster pace of economic growth.

There are likewise enormous problems to be met in increasing the public service needs of a growing population. According to government estimates, by 1965, there will be 54 million more Americans than there were in 1945. Public services neglected during the depression and war years have been inadequately met since the war's end. A dent has hardly been made in the great backlog. Little if anything has been done to meet the needs of our growing population. These needs can and should be met by comprehensive government programs that can be financed by increasing government revenue that would be collected from rising incomes associated with a rapid rate of economic growth.

Hundreds of thousands of workers, thousands of businesses, and scores of communities are economically distressed because of technological change. Industries have shut down or moved to new locations. The spread of automation and rapid technological change threaten to increase the seriousness of this prob-

lem, even if most of the nation is prosperous. Federal government aid is long overdue for the retraining of displaced workers in new skills, attempts to attract new industries into distressed communities, and assistance for businesses in such communities to adjust to new products and markets.

Extension of coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act to millions of low-paid workers and an increase in the federal minimum wage from $1.00 to $1.25 an hour, would be of great help in eliminating poverty in America. Great housing shortages continue to persist as older homes are not replaced and our population grows and the rate of family formations increases. Slum areas and deterioration of the central core of our great cities require that urban renewal and development programs be vigorously pursued. Dilapidated condemned structures that house our school children need to be replaced, to say nothing of the need to construct even more new schools to take care of the growing number of school age children. Hospitals and health facilities are greatly in need of being increased. These are just some of the nation's major problems that require immediate action. They should be given top priority in any meaningful economic policy.

## Economic Expansion of 5 Per Cent a Year Is Essential

After examining America's vast needs and great economic potential, a recent report by the Rockefeller Brothers' Fund stated that,

> a growth rate of 5% is possible if we realize fully our impressive opportunities for economic expansion . . . . We can afford the defense program essential for survival. In doing so, however, unless we achieve a 5% growth rate, we shall have to hold back otherwise desirable expenditures in the government field and keep the growth of private expenditures below a level commensurate with our aspirations.[2]

Rising national productivity of about 3½ per cent to 4 per cent a year and annual increases in the labor force of 1½ per cent make economic expansion of 5 per cent a year both possible and necessary. Indeed, if the economy fails to expand by 5 per cent a year to create enough new job oportunities, rising productivity and a growing labor force will mean increasing unemployment.

Economic expansion of 5 per cent a year, therefore, should be the central point of national economic policy—to enable the nation to meet its major needs and to sustain full employment. Rising national output of 5 per cent a year would also minimize the kind of increases in unit costs of recent years that applied upward presures on the price level.

## Steps to Curb Price Rises

Since actual inflationary pressures of excessive demands and general shortages are related to wars, it seems to be a matter of common sense that the government should be armed with comprehensive, standby economic stabilization legislation to be used if war breaks out. Such legislation should include comprehensive controls over the commodity exchanges and bank credit for business and consumers as well as price and wage stabilization to be imposed in the event of war. It took seven months of sharply rising prices after the Korean conflict began before Congress enacted stabilization legislation and administrative machinery was set up.

If one remembers that more than three fourths of the price rises in the post-World War II period occurred in the three years 1946–48 and 1950–51, then the need for comprehensive standby legislation to curb inflationary pressures associated with war or the aftermath of war is essential.

[2] *The Challenge to America* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1958), p. 73.



The actual problem of a slowly, upward creeping price level in peacetime such as we had from mid-1955 to mid-1958 requires careful study and analysis rather than restrictive policies and antilabor prejudice. A more rapid pace of economic growth would minimize some of the pressures that produced an upward creeping price level in these years. A faster pace of economic progress would also provide a healthier environment for sober examination of the problem and development of possible solutions.

During the period from mid-1955 to mid-1958, the major pressures were from the prices of food and services. In both these areas, important factors in the price increases were population growth and suburban living. Food prices were affected by crop conditions as well as shifts in consumer tastes towards packaged and frozen foods. Prices of services were pressed upward by increasing demand for better housing, health care, professional services, finance and insurance charges, and other types of services.

Each part of the economy should be examined for the possible development of greater efficiency and lower profit margins. The focus of public attention should be placed on the cost-price-profit-investment policies of the dominant corporations in key industries, whose prices are administered rather than set by competition.

The Congressional Joint Economic Committee and the Subcommittee on Anti-Trust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee have begun parts of such careful studies. A comprehensive effort is required, however, to devise specific suggestions to curb the varying types of slowly rising prices in peacetime.

# The Fight Against Inflation in Canada

By Harvey Perry

Abstract: Canadian postwar experience with inflation has closely paralleled the American with the exception that its federal government budget has been balanced for most of the period, capital expenditure has been a higher proportion of gross national product, and foreign investment in Canada has been extremely heavy. Recent attitudes towards inflation reflect an intense reaction on the part of investors towards government financial measures and a concern that returning prosperity will produce price rises. Lessons of Canadian experience raise some serious questions as to the efficacy of fiscal and monetary policy.

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*Harvey Perry, Toronto, Canada, is Director and Chief Executive Officer of the Canadian Tax Foundation. He was with the Department of Finance, Ottawa, for sixteen years. In 1952 Mr. Perry was appointed Director of Research of the Canadian Tax Foundation and in 1954 became Director and Chief Executive Officer. In May and June 1953, he was engaged on special assignment for the Colonial Office in Nigeria, West Africa, and in January and February 1958 visited Ghana on a mission for the United Nations. At present he is making a survey of the budgeting system of the Province of Newfoundland. Mr. Perry is a frequent contributor to tax and other periodicals. He is the author of Taxation in Canada (1951) and of Taxes, Tariffs and Subsidies, a history of Canadian fiscal development (1955) and co-author of Financing Canadian Federation (1953).*





CANADA shares the common experience of the Western world that in the past year inflation has been an issue of general public concern. Economists have propounded their views on its causes and remedies; financial and governmental authorities have dilated on its dread consequences; labor leaders have risen to challenge allegations of the pregnant role of wage increases in the inflationary process; and the public at large has shown an aroused consciousness of the issues involved. The final episode, just concluded as this article is being prepared, was an enquiry, with public hearings, on inflation by the Finance Committee of the Canadian Senate. Such hearings are rare in Canada, and the parade of witnesses who presented briefs on behalf of nearly every major economic group in Canada reflected current intense interest.

The most remarkable aspect of all this activity is that it has taken place in the face of substantial unemployment and virtual stability in prices; agreement is almost unanimous that there is no inflationary movement at present and that the risks are almost entirely latent. Despite this background just as in the United States a strong "psychology of inflation," amounting almost to a phobia, has taken root. Influential elements in the financial and business community appear to have lost confidence in the future stability of the currency, and this fear has been reflected in strong expressions of alarm, which in turn have further undermined general public confidence. It will be the purpose of the present article to present briefly some of the particular aspects of Canadian experience which have led to the present position.

## Past Price Rises

It goes without saying that the first cause of concern with inflation is that it has happened before. Canada, despite its record for extreme conservatism in fiscal and monetary policy in the postwar period, has been through at least three bouts of steep price rises. The aggregate rise in the Consumers Price Index between 1946 and 1958 was 47.5 per cent, an annual rate of 3⅝ per cent compounded. The first and sharpest rise was during the consumer buying boom of 1946 to 1948; the second came with the Korean conflict and rearmament in 1950 and 1951, and the third arose from an investment boom in 1955 to 1957.

Each of these rises has been less acute than the previous and would have been more severe had not fiscal and monetary policy been employed as a countermeasure. In the immediate postwar period the federal government maintained taxation sufficiently heavy to produce substantial budgetary surpluses. During the Korean episode and the rearmament step-up, fiscal policy was again relied on almost entirely as a countermeasure. Strong public pressure for a price ceiling and an excess profits tax was resisted. In their place general increases in levels of existing taxation were enacted almost sufficient to offset the new expenditures. The unusual step was also taken of deferring depreciation under the tax laws on certain kinds of investment expenditures incurred during a fixed period. Monetary policy took the form largely of suasion exerted by the Bank of Canada on the chartered banks to maintain a ceiling on their loans.

As contrasted with the earlier strong emphasis on fiscal policy, during the "investment boom" of 1955–57 monetary influence was the predominant factor of restraint. The chartered banks, again under suasion, increased their liquidity ratios and ceased long-term loans for new capital investment, then a new and rapidly developing feature

of Canadian banking. After a decade at relatively low levels, interest rates began a climb in 1955 which has continued ever since. In the 1955–57 period tax rates remained relatively stable, but were kept sufficiently high that surpluses continued to emerge in the federal budget.

### SUSTAINED INFLATIONARY PRESSURES

In addition to the special factors which accentuated price rises during these three periods, the postwar years have brought sustained pressure as the result of the dynamic growth of the Canadian economy. The rate of population increase has been unprecedented, amounting to over one-third in the 1946 to 1958 period. During the same period gross national product rose by 134 per cent; even deflated by approximately one-half to allow for price increases, this is still a rate of growth paralleled in few other countries. The most unusual feature about the period however was the continuously high level of capital expenditure. On average, 23 per cent of gross national product was accounted for by such expenditure, as compared with a corresponding ratio of perhaps 12 to 15 per cent in the United States. A substantial part of the private segment of this expenditure was financed by an inflow of capital from abroad. This massive inflow has added to the inflationary pressure and has created additional problems by maintaining the Canadian dollar at a premium of 3 to 5 per cent over United States funds for the last several years. Other long term sustaining factors have been the introduction by the federal government of income maintenance programs, such as family allowances and universal old age pensions at age 70, and a general rise in government expenditures at all levels. In recent years in particular the capital expenditures of provincial and municipal governments have been growing rapidly to meet the demands of the increased population and heightened economic activity.

To an American audience most of this record of recent developments will sound familiar. Canadian economic movements follow very closely those of the United States, and it is only in minor respects that divergencies appear. In the present context the differences that are most relevant are: the maintenance almost throughout the postwar period of a surplus in the Canadian federal budget; the higher proportion of the gross national product devoted to capital investment in Canada; and the marked concentration of economic growth in the postwar decade.

### THE PRESENT POSITION

Against the background of this admittedly brief summary of the postwar decade in Canada, it is possible now to review the immediate situation in perspective.

The recent period can be taken as roughly the two years from mid-1957 to mid-1959, or in general the period of the Canadian recession. Data related to 1958 will serve to give its main characteristics, although conditions are beginning to change in 1959. There was relative stability of consumer prices by previous standards (2.6 per cent increase); relatively high unemployment (a peak postwar rate of 6.6 per cent of the labor force in 1958); a sharply diminished rate of growth in gross national product (2½ per cent in 1958 over 1957 as compared with the average annual growth of 8.7 per cent for the eleven years 1946 to 1958) and a decline in capital expenditures (about 3 per cent).

Obviously none of these are portents of inflation—rather the reverse. In 1959 underlying trends are showing an upturn, with an increase in gross national product of 7 per cent anticipated and capital expenditure on a slightly higher scale than in 1958. Unemployment is also at a rate lower than a year ago. But a price increase of even lesser proportions than in 1958 is forecast and excess capacity in many industries gives substance to this prediction. These basic indicia therefore still give little ground for anticipation of an immediate inflationary movement.



In this light the psychological overtones of the current fears are probably more relevant than statistics—and certainly are much more difficult to assess. As far as the present writer has been able to determine, and there are many other views that could be advanced, in the present juncture the most productive subject for analysis is the investor; he is not alone in his concern with inflation, but current fears seem to be dominated by the reactions of the financial markets and the persons and institutions which guide those markets. As indicated by recent relationships between prices of equities and government bonds, the investor is so concerned with future loss of capital values that he shuns first-grade bonds with an unprecedented yield for the inflationary hedge of shares, even at a low annual return.

Again Canadian experience is not unique in this respect, but there are some special circumstances which go a long way in accounting for the particularly sensitive attitude of the Canadian investor in the recent past. They are:

1. The emergence in 1958 of the first substantial postwar deficit in the federal budget. This was a sharp reversal of the long series of surpluses, some of them very substantial, that had prevailed for over a decade. In total it amounted to about 650 million dollars, or some 15 per cent of expenditures. It came about as the result in part of the economic downturn, which reduced revenues, and in part as the result of increased expenditures attributable to the implementation by a new government of its election promises. That these promises involved a further extension of the welfare state through the introduction of a national hospital insurance plan and an increase in the amount of the old age security pension did not add to their luster in the eyes of conservative business and financial elements. On economic grounds a deficit was justified for 1958; but its origin was disturbing.

2. The fact that in addition to the financing of its first large postwar deficit in 1958 the federal government required almost as much again in new cash for other purposes (housing, etc.) in that year. Total net cash requirements, including the financing of the deficit, amounted to 1¼ billion dollars. This is a comparatively large amount of financing for the Canadian market, and its psychological impact was all the greater because for a long period previous federal borrowing had not exceeded 200 million dollars in any year. The market was therefore unprepared to absorb in one year new financing of this magnitude.

3. To add further to the strain on the market, the federal government chose 1958 as well as the year in which to refund about one-half its existing debt to a longer term. This operation took place in the summer and fall of 1958 and was known as the Conversion Loan. Its success was felt to be sufficiently important to warrant increasing the rate of interest on the debt involved from about 4 per cent to 4½ per cent. Almost immediately after the operation was completed—in the fall of 1958—in common with the United States experience, government bond prices began to drop and have been falling almost continuously since.

Finally, to ease the new financing requirements and the Conversion Loan operation, the central bank increased

the money supply during the course of 1958 by about 1 billion dollars. This was felt by many to pose a threat for the future and contributed to the general unsettlement of the financial community.

In retrospect it can be seen that in 1958 the Canadian financial and money markets were badly shaken by a conjunction of unusual circumstances. The sharpest indication of the continuing apprehensive frame of mind has been the rate on 90-day government treasury bills. Five years ago this rate was below 1 per cent; now it ranges between 5 and 6 per cent. This abnormal exaction for lending short-term money to governments seems to focus the current attitude of the business and financial community. The flight into equities, which by raising prices has reduced yields on first-grade Canadian stocks to about one-half the yields of government bonds, is also evidence on classical lines of a fear of inflation, in which concern for the stability of the national budget seems to have played an important role in Canada.

Apprehension regarding the national budget has now outlived its time. Tax increases announced by the Minister of Finance in his Budget Speech of last April, along with a rapid recovery in revenues with climbing business activity, will probably close the deficit gap in the next twelve months. This should have satisfied the many voices that called for a return to a balanced budget, but none of the usual signs suggest that confidence has been restored. On the monetary front the Bank of Canada has resolutely resisted any temptation to increase the money supply, which has remained at almost the same level since last October. This should in turn have satisfied those who expressed grave concern over the possibility of a further injection of new cash into the banking system but seems to have had no such result. In fact, there are now stray voices suggesting that perhaps the Bank is going a little too far and that with an upturn in business activity the economy requires more cash. If not the spoken prayer then this must at least be the silent one of most chartered bank presidents, whose institutions are now selling off bonds at much below cost in order to obtain cash for the rapid expansion in business loans that has marked the first half of the year.

What inflationary dangers may arise in the next phase of the Canadian economy it is difficult to say as yet. There is still uncertainty as to how much momentum lies behind the current upturn, since it is not as buoyant as the American. The view of some economists is that Canada may not have a recurrence of the rapid upsurge of the past decade, and if this expectation is realized the problems will be correspondingly diminished. However, it would be naive to assume that inflation will give no further trouble in Canada; on the contrary even a continued expansion at a slackened pace will keep pressure on the economy. It is therefore relevant to see what lessons if any can be derived for the future from the experience of the last decade.

## FISCAL POLICY

In view of the active adherence of the Canadian federal government to the dictates of contracyclical budgeting, as manifested by a long series of surpluses in the postwar period, it is ironical that fiscal policy in the final analysis turned out to be an Achilles' heel. The public at large seemed to accept with very little question the concept of reducing debt in good times, but when the budget was allowed to go into deficit the result was a major loss of public confidence in the federal financial authorities. This aspect of deficit financing had hardly been anticipated, and it leaves many



questions regarding psychological implications which might have been expected but did not arise during the earlier period of surplus financing. This outcome is fortunate for the cause of anti-inflationary fiscal policy, but leaves the other half of the cycle in question.

Another equally important limitation of fiscal policy lies in its inability to distinguish among causes. Nearly every tax measure that ingenuity could devise has been employed in Canada in recent years, and all have been found blunt and unwieldy to the point that few federal tax authorities today have much faith in the efficacy of special devices. The fact that none has been employed in recent years is the best evidence of this. Fiscal policy is equally ineffectual for influencing individual regions or industries. A general tax raise may be indicated as the right medicine for the economy as a whole, but may be poison for struggling industries or lagging areas.

## MONETARY POLICY

Almost the same deficiencies have been found to arise under monetary policy in practice. Lack of selectivity in over-all ceilings on bank loans means that small businesses, the municipalities, and the weaker provincial governments bear the heaviest burden of the restriction. Tight money policies and high interest rates have presented a dilemma to borrowers with good credit ratings but little authority in the market. Among these the Canadian municipalities, to which capital funds could be diverted with great advantage to the over-all economy, are the most conspicuous instance. What is even more striking in the last decade is the insularity of wealthy and well-established corporations from general measures of credit restriction. Internally generated funds now seem to have given many large business organizations virtual immunity from credit controls. Ironically it is the combination of relatively high rates of write-off for fixed assets and relatively high levels of corporate taxation that has fostered this position.

A feature of monetary policy in Canada that constantly puts the central bank on the horns of a dilemma is the effect of high interest rates in attracting international investment funds to this country. The enhanced flow that always follows an interest rise adds to the pressure on the Canadian dollar and by increasing its premium further worsens the position of the exporting industries in relation to the rest of the economy. A high Canadian interest rate also stimulates borrowing in New York, with a resulting further pressure on the Canadian dollar. Frequently a great part of the weight of a tight money policy falls on Canadian exporters through the indirect route of exchange appreciation, a result which is rightly regarded as being as inequitable and capricious as the effects of inflation itself.

Monetary policy, unlike fiscal, is still executed in Canada by an independent central bank. Increasing discussion of all its aspects in Parliament, however, gives rise to a question as to whether it will be possible to maintain the position in the future that monetary issues are outside the purview of the federal government. The Minister of Finance frequently finds himself in a perplexed and unhappy position under the present arrangements.

## THE FUTURE ALTERNATIVES

All of this is perhaps no more than to say that the instruments of control have been found to be imperfect in many respects. To improve their operation would require making them more selective, and each step in this direction means moving farther away from the basic ideal of setting the climate in which market forces may oper-

ate with relative freedom. The only feasible alternative is that urged in its report by the Senate Finance Committee—general public understanding and appreciation of the basic issues involved in the inflationary process. This may be a counsel of perfection when addressed to union leaders, company executives, and politicians, each of whom can easily persuade himself that his individual actions will have only slight influence on the economy as a whole. It also assumes that there are some basic truths about inflation that have been graven in economic stone and handed down as final precepts, an illusion quickly dispelled by a review of any current economic journal. Perhaps in the end the greatest need is for economists to agree on a clear statement of the issues involved in terms that the public can accept.

# Should We Accept Inflation?

By CARROL M. SHANKS

ABSTRACT: Under conditions existing in the American economy today, there are periods when it is extremely difficult to achieve simultaneously the two major goals of high employment and stable prices. Abandonment of the goal of price stability is not an acceptable solution to this problem—first, because reasonable price stability is essential to a just distribution of output, and second, because it would be even more difficult to maintain high employment under a conscious national policy of inflation than under a policy directed toward stable prices. Under every assumed rate of inflation, the monetary and fiscal authorities would again be faced with exactly the same dilemma. The goal of stable prices would have been sacrificed only to find that nothing had been gained with respect to employment and output. As in the case of most dilemmas, the solution is found by restating the problem: it is not stable prices and high employment which are incompatible; it is unrestrained monopoly power and high employment which are incompatible. The acceptance of inflation will not solve the problem. High employment and an equitable distribution of output can be maintained only by taking steps to restrain monopoly power, wherever it may exist in the economy.

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*Carrol M. Shanks, Newark, New Jersey, is President of The Prudential Insurance Company of America. Before joining the Prudential in 1932, Mr. Shanks practiced law in New York, was Associate Professor of Law at Yale Law School, and lectured at Columbia Law School. He is co-author, with William O. Douglas, of several textbooks on corporation and business law. Mr. Shanks is a trustee of Rutgers University, Johns Hopkins University, Wheaton College, and the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, New Jersey. He is a Director of Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Bigelow Sanford Carpet Company, Inc., Fidelity Union Trust Company, National Biscuit Company, Union Carbide Corporation, and Georgia-Pacific Corporation. Mr. Shanks is a Director and past president of the Life Insurance Association of America.*

THE two most widely recognized objectives of economic policy in the United States today are a high level of employment and a stable level of prices. During the postwar period, we have succeeded with respect to one of these goals, but we have fallen down rather badly with respect to the other. Except for brief recessions in 1949, 1954, and 1958, employment has been maintained at a very high level, and real output has advanced at a rapid rate. We have not succeeded, however, in maintaining reasonable stability of prices. From the end of 1945 to the beginning of 1952, consumer prices rose by 6.4 per cent per year, and a further increase of 8 per cent took place from the beginning of 1956 to the middle of 1958. The cost of living today is 60 per cent higher than at the end of World War II.

Our success in achieving high employment and our failure to achieve stable prices have led to a widespread and growing fear that inflation is inevitable. This fear has had its sophisticated counterpart in the thesis that, because of structural rigidities in the American economy, stable prices and high employment are incompatible. If we want high employment, so it is held, we must accept inflation. Price stability can be secured, it is argued, only at the cost of a large amount of unemployment, and because price stability is after all a relatively unimportant objective it should be sacrified to the more important goal of high employment.

The basic questions which the above thesis raises are these: Is it true that high employment and stable prices are incompatible? Is the goal of stable prices relatively unimportant so that it could be sacrificed without serious harm to the economy? Would abandonment of the goal of stable prices solve the problem? Would it be easier to maintain high employment under a national policy which publicly accepts inflation than under one designed to achieve stable prices? Is it stable prices and the steps necessary to maintain them which conflict with the goal of high employment, or is there a more basic problem? What public policy steps need to be taken to improve our ability to maintain high employment, as well as to achieve our other basic economic goals?

## ARE HIGH EMPLOYMENT AND STABLE PRICES INCOMPATIBLE?

During any period of high employment there is likely to be upward pressure on prices simply because high employment generates high incomes, and these incomes in turn lead to increased consumer purchases. Business expenditures for inventory and for plant and equipment are also likely to be high, so that still more employment is created and there is a further swelling of incomes. Total money demand tends to rise in cumulative fashion and eventually reaches the point where the economy cannot turn out goods and services fast enough to meet this demand.

With employment high and businessmen bidding for their services, workers are likely to seize the opportunity to secure large wage increases; this increase in the cost of production is likely to result in many cases in a rise in the price of the product. The fact that total money demand exceeds the capacity of the economy to turn out goods and services is thus likely to provide the setting for a rise in the general level of prices, or inflation.

In such a situation, a good deal of the pressure for price rises can be relieved by appropriate monetary and fiscal policy. If government expenditures are reduced, a portion of the excess money demand will be removed, and if Federal Reserve policy is restrictive, it will be more difficult to secure loans to finance consumer and business purchases. Appropriate monetary and fiscal policy might thus hold total money demand to the level which would be just sufficient to purchase the total output of the economy at high employment of labor and plant, and at a stable level of prices.

Suppose, however, that in this finely balanced situation strong labor unions continue to push for large wage increases in excess of improvements in productivity. Inasmuch as times are good, businessmen may not resist effectively these excessive wage demands but may pass them along to the consumer in the form of higher prices. Rising prices will then lead to the adoption of a more restrictive monetary and fiscal policy, which will further curb total money demand. The combination of rising prices and restricted demand will result inevitably in a reduction in the real volume of goods and services sold, which after a while will result in cutbacks in production and the appearance of some unemployment. If labor continues to push for large wage increases, the resulting steady upward movement of prices will force an even more restrictive monetary and fiscal policy which will further reduce real output and employment. Under the assumed conditions, the attempt by the monetary and fiscal authorities to achieve stable prices will succeed only in reducing output and employment.

The illustration above is cast in somewhat extreme terms, but it is nevertheless a sufficiently accurate picture of the workings of the American economy during boom periods as to suggest a real dilemma for monetary and fiscal policy. Where wages and prices can be forced upward in the face of a stable level of final demand, there will inevitably be periods when it is extremely difficult, and perhaps impossible, to achieve both price stability and high employment. It is this dilemma which has led some observers to suggest that the goal of price stability be abandoned, and monetary and fiscal policy be adapted to whatever degree of price rise seems necessary in an attempt to maintain high employment.

Before jumping to this seemingly easy solution, it may be well to ask the following two questions: Is the objective of price stability unimportant, so that it can be abandoned with no serious injury to the economy? If price stability were abandoned, would it solve the dilemma described above?

## IS REASONABLE STABILITY OF PRICES IMPORTANT?

I believe that the avoidance of inflation is not only an important, but an essential, objective of national policy.

All of us are prone to discuss inflation as though it were a peculiarly financial phenomenon involving mysterious forces such as the quantity of money, foreign exchange rates, fiscal policy, monetary policy, or the price of gold. In the real world, however, prices are not determined by the quantity of money; they are determined by people. The process of inflation does not consist of the numbers appearing in the consumers' price index; the real process of inflation occurs when the seller of a good or service unduly enriches himself at the expense of the buyer. Except in the unlikely situation where all prices and all wages and other incomes rise in exactly the same proportion, inflation means that the standard of living of some groups is being raised by depressing the standard of living of other groups. By its very nature, the inflation process indicates that some individuals or groups in the economy are gaining and others are losing.

Who is it who gains, and who loses, through inflation? Inflation is the

means by which a small but tightly monopolized segment of the economy appropriates real goods and services from the great majority of the public. Some of the losers in the inflation struggle are easily identified. The retired, families living on the proceeds of savings, the disabled, the unemployed, and the very large group of workers whose dollar incomes remain relatively constant over many years—all these obviously suffer a decline in their real standard of living through inflation.

But these are not by any means the only groups whose welfare is sacrificed when we surrender to inflation. The losers include a good portion of organized, as well as unorganized, labor. When, for instance, a strong labor union secures a wage increase large enough to force an increase in the price of the product, or a corporation pushes through a price increase not necessitated by rising costs, the members of this union, or the owners of the corporation as the case may be, take real purchasing power away from all buyers of this product, including the rest of organized labor. The inflation process is thus a means by which strong labor unions and other highly organized groups exact tribute from weak labor unions, as well as from the great majority of the public which is not organized.

There has been insufficient recognition of the fact that the wage-bargaining process is, in its end effects, a struggle between groups of workers, and not between workers and corporations. Because wages are the principal component of costs, the wage-setting process largely determines the price of the product. Wage increases which absorb the full improvement in productivity are the means by which labor in a given industry prevents all other workers, as well as the retired and the unemployed, from sharing in the fruits of advancing technology in that industry. Wage increases in excess of productivity improvements are an out-and-out transfer of real income from the majority of workers to the relatively small group which is able to force an increase in the price of the product. Wage increases in excess of productivity gains are paid for—and in the last analysis can be paid for only—not by capital but by other workers, and those not employed, in the form of higher prices for the goods and services they buy.

A national policy which endorsed inflation would encourage and facilitate the transfer of economic advantage from the great mass of workers to the small group represented by the most tightly organized and most monopolistic elements in the economy. The most pernicious aspect of chronic inflation is not that it frequently leads to maladjustments and recessions, not that it may break away into a wild boom, not that it is beginning to price us out of foreign markets as well as volume domestic markets, not that it encourages speculative as opposed to productive activity. Inflation does all these things, and they are undesirable. But its worst aspect is that it increases the disparity of power and of real income in the economy, and does so in an arbitrary fashion having little relationship to any standard of fairness and justice.

The objective of stable prices must constitute an essential part of national policy if we are to approximate a just distribution of our economic output.

## ARE HIGH EMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION INCOMPATIBLE?

Let us suppose for a moment, however, that we are willing to sacrifice the economic welfare of broad groups in the economy, and that we are willing to accept the injustice and the growing disparity in economic power which inflation brings. If we accept these evils and embark on a national policy which deliberately adjusts monetary and fiscal policy so as to attempt to maintain high employment through a conscious policy of inflation, are we likely under these circumstances to avoid the dilemma discussed earlier in this article? Would it be any easier in practice to maintain high employment with inflation than it is to maintain high employment with stable prices? Might we sacrifice the goal of stable prices only to find that we had gained nothing with respect to employment?



I believe that this question can be answered with a fair degree of certainty. Sacrificing the goal of stable prices would not improve our ability to achieve the goal of high employment. We would, instead, find it more and more difficult to maintain prosperity. The economy would become progressively less stable, the distribution of our output would become progressively more inequitable, and employment and prices would become progressively less amenable to the influence of any government measures short of direct price and wage control and direct allocation of the labor force.

Take the situation discussed earlier in this article in which the economy is operating at capacity, demand is exceeding the output of goods and services at current prices, and the stronger labor unions seize this opportunity to push through wage increases in excess of productivity improvements and thus start prices upward. In order to prevent the price rise from resulting in a reduction of output and employment, an expansionary monetary and fiscal policy would then be adopted in order to raise money demand so as to absorb full output at the new, higher level of prices. What is likely to be the reaction of business and labor to this easy money policy?

The pressure on business to resist inflationary wage demands would be lessened. The monopoly position of the strongest labor unions would be strengthened because of the high demand for labor, and unions would now have an added incentive, in the form of a rising cost of living, to demand still further wage increases. The fact that productivity would necessarily be increasing only slowly over time would no longer have any bearing on the bargaining process. Inasmuch as wage and price increases of any size are now to be validated by a conscious national policy of expanding money demand, only the foolish or the weak would be satisfied with moderate wage and price increases.

The net result would be that, if it had initially been necessary to permit a 2 per cent annual increase in prices in order to maintain high employment, it would soon be necessary to permit a 3, and then a 4, and then a 5 per cent annual increase in prices. Because there would be no limit to the money wage increases which could be demanded, there would obviously be no limit to the increase in the money supply which would be needed to accommodate the resulting rise in prices. Labor unions could certainly adjust wage demands upward as rapidly as the monetary and fiscal authorities could expand the money supply, so that the government would be faced constantly with the situation in which a rise in prices threatened to reduce sales, output, and employment.

Unfortunately, the task of maintaining high employment under a conscious policy of inflation would prove even more difficult than under a policy of stable prices. Once it became known that the government was willing to accept any degree of inflation forced upon it by the combination of the wage-price push and its own determination to maintain high employment, expectations and actions throughout the economy would

speedily adapt themselves to the certainty of chronic price rises. There would be a general lessening of resistance to price rises because each buyer would hope to be able to recoup as a seller. There would be a general overextension of credit, not only because borrowers would count on price appreciation of goods purchased on credit, but because the Federal Reserve would be compelled by its over-all policy to keep credit plentiful. The lack of buyer resistance to price increases and the heavy reliance on credit would further intensify demand and hasten additional price rises.

Interest rates, instead of being low as might at first be imagined because of the easy money policy, would rise to unprecedented levels because lenders would demand rate compensation for the expected decline in the value of the funds lent. If legal ceilings were placed on interest rates, the supply of loanable funds would decline drastically and there would be a strong shift of investments to the stock market and to the holding of real property. Because of the increase in speculative activity and the necessity for greater attention to all sorts of attempts to hedge against price increases, productivity would decline so that although dollar measures of economic activity would reach new heights, our real standard of living would decline. In the end, the spiraling boom would probably collapse in a mass loss of confidence in the government's ability to control the economy—and the resulting decline would be far more serious than the mild type of setback we have experienced from time to time in recent years.

The conclusion is inescapable that if we attempt to achieve the goal of high employment by sacrificing the goal of price stability, we will end up with neither stable prices nor high employment. Inflation intensifies, rather than cures, the basic factors which endanger the goal of high employment.

## STEPS TOWARD OUR BASIC ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

The preceding discussion has indicated that price stability should be a primary objective of national economic policy—first, because inflation encourages and facilitates injustice in the distribution of our economic output, and second, because inflation lessens, rather than improves, our ability to maintain high employment and growth. The discussion has also indicated, however, that under conditions as they exist in the American economy today, there are periods—particularly in the later stages of a boom—when it may prove very difficult to maintain both high employment and stable prices. During such periods, monetary and fiscal policy is faced with a dilemma under which actions designed to maintain employment are likely to lead to inflation, and actions designed to maintain stable prices may result in declining employment.

Those who have failed to think the problem through have proposed that we escape this dilemma by abandoning the goal of price stability, accepting chronic inflation as a means of maintaining high employment. More careful thought indicates, however, that inflation would not solve the problem. At every assumed rate of inflation the monetary and fiscal authorities would again be faced with the situation in which an attempt to hold the price rise to the assumed rate would endanger employment. The goal of stable prices would have been sacrificed, yet the dilemma would remain.

If it is difficult, under conditions existing in the American economy today, to maintain high employment with stable prices, and even more difficult to maintain high employment with inflation, must we throw up our hands in despair and conclude that continued high employment is an unattainable dream? Not at all. What we must do is revise some of the catchy sayings which pass for economic truths so as to disclose the real nature of the problem. It is not stable prices and high employment which are incompatible; it is unrestricted and unrestrained monopolies and high employment which are incompatible. High employment is more attainable under stable prices than under inflation. But there is no government policy short of forced labor which can consistently maintain high employment when monopoly groups possess unrestricted power to force up wages and prices.



The American public is beginning to recognize the connection between excessive wage demands and inflation; there is still insufficient recognition of the connection between excessive wage demands and unemployment. It has long been recognized that a business monopoly is bad for two reasons—because it may appropriate an unfair or unjustified share of the output of the economy by raising the price of its product and because raising the price of its product is likely to result in restriction of real output. These same socially undesirable results flow from the abuse of unrestricted labor monopoly. Excessive wage demands by unrestricted labor monopolies result in inequity and unemployment just as surely as do excessive price demands by business monopolies.

What, then, is the solution to the problem? The solution does not consist of embarking on a "union-busting" program designed to bring labor leaders to their knees. In the first place, a labor union is not the only pressure group which uses its privileged position to gain, through inflation, at the expense of less powerful groups. The federal government itself engages in all sorts of programs designed specifically to raise the price of products produced by powerful voting blocs. There are too many instances where business has made little effort to pass along the benefits of improving productivity to consumers via lower prices, and then has pointed an accusing finger at labor for employing the same technique. There are continued attempts to maintain prices, or reduce competition, through contracts between manufacturer and retailer. There are attempts to maintain prices by excluding foreign competition through tariffs or import quotas. Labor unions are not by any means the only example of the use of economic or political power to raise prices; the attempt to curb abuse of monopoly power should not be made an excuse for labor-baiting.

In the second place, there is no question that labor must have the legal right to monopolize, that is, to act in concert through a labor union if it is to achieve equal footing with the employer. The problem arises from the fact that we have not yet discovered methods of imposing sufficient safeguards to prevent the abuse of this legal monopoly grant. The grant has been so broad that it has extended to labor unions rights and immunities completely outside the sphere of employer-employee relations. The irresponsibility inculcated by these immunities has done more to encourage the abuse of labor union power—and to hurt the prestige of labor unions—than has the grant of economic monopoly itself.

It has been proposed that the problem might be solved by limiting the size of labor unions—for example, by prohibiting industry-wide bargaining through limitation of a single union to the employees of a single corporation. Although it would be possible to so limit the size of a union, it is doubtful whether in practice this limitation would

prevent industry-wide bargaining. On both the union and the industry side, there would undoubtedly be agreements to act in concert and it would be difficult to prevent these behind-the-scenes agreements.

A more reasonable approach is one which is in fact being developed in the process of bargaining. During the postwar period there has been a growing tendency for all employers in an industry to act in concert for the purpose of bargaining. It is quite possible that the spread of this practice will erect a countervailing force of about equal power to industry-wide unions so that neither business nor labor may gain sufficient ascendancy to use its power to injure the public. A danger in this development is the possibility that management and labor in a given industry may join forces to exact tribute from less powerful industries. This danger is heightened where products which compete with each other, for example, steel and aluminum, are organized into a single union. For this reason, it may be necessary in the future to limit a single union to a single industry or craft.

In addition to the development of a countervailing force through concerted employer bargaining, a solution to the problem is likely to be found along the following lines: (1) Pressure must continually be brought on management to make it difficult to raise prices and to force management to resist wage increases which are so large as to necessitate price rises. This pressure should take the form, first, of a vigorous antitrust program; second, of a monetary and fiscal policy which has price stability as one of its primary aims; and third, of a public opinion which recognizes the true nature of inflation as a device for enriching the strong at the expense of the weak. (2) Labor law must be amended so as to safeguard the economic monopoly power of the labor union but remove the unreasonable immunities which have led not only to the use of physical violence as a means of settling economic differences, but also to the deprivation of the rights of labor union members. I am convinced that most labor union members are sufficiently concerned with the general welfare, and sufficiently aware of the danger to their own self-interest from the exercise of unrestricted monopoly power, that they would endorse reasonable limits on that power.

The problem facing us is not whether it is possible to have both high employment and stable prices, but whether it is possible to have both high employment and unlimited monopoly. The acceptance of inflation will not solve this problem. We can maintain high employment and an equitable distribution of output only by taking steps to restrain monopoly power, wherever it may exist in the economy.

# Taxation and Inflation

By HAROLD M. GROVES

ABSTRACT: It is adequacy of taxation in the quantitative sense and in relation to public expenditure that is the most important aspect of taxation for inflation control. A well-developed public economy financed by a progressive tax system supplies a powerful automatic check on fluctuations in the private economy. A less progressive tax system would have some advantage in its reduced impingement on savings and incentives, but the advantage would not be large nor important enough to offset considerations of equity which must be weighed in the balance. As to state and local taxes, the federal government could do more to protect the states from interterritorial competition—income tax credit—and it could provide a more flexible support for state public works than tax-exempt securities. Several tax gadgets for inflation control are reviewed but none appear to be politically or otherwise promising at present. Nevertheless it must be recognized that oligopolistic practices in industry are a major factor in the present inflation problem. Fiscal policy, including its tax element, is important for counterinflationary purposes, but it encounters powerful vested interests, and it should not be our sole reliance in a stabilization program.

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*Harold M. Groves, Ph.D., Madison, Wisconsin, is Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin. He was Chief of Staff of the Committee on Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, United States Treasury, and is a director of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Dr. Groves is author of Financing Government (1939); 5th edition (1958) and Postwar Taxation and Economic Progress (1946) and coauthor of Federal, State and Local Government Fiscal Relations (1943).*

INFLATION itself may be regarded as a tax—uncertain, capricious, and regressive in its incidence. If some practical manipulation of the tax system could be devised that would check price fluctuations everyone would applaud.

Our treatment of this subject divides itself into three parts: the first deals with quantitative issues or aggregative taxation; the second treats the qualitative side—which of the familiar taxes is most efficient against inflation—and the third introduces special proposals, "gadgets," that offer to promote our objective.

## QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS

Before the so-called "Keynesian revolution" students of public finance were primarily concerned with three issues: the welfare implications of public spending; equitable distribution of the tax burden; and the incidence of taxation. The public economy was conceived much like a private household, only larger. Now a fourth area has been added, and the concept of the public sector has been changed. The area, frequently termed "fiscal policy," considers the manipulation of public expenditure, taxes, and debt management to serve the goals of stability, full employment, and adequate growth. Government finance is regarded as a balance wheel or control factor to keep the private economy functioning in accordance with accepted objectives.

In the older dispensation, the canons of taxation stated and elucidated by Adam Smith were accepted with qualifications as covering the objectives of the tax system: taxes should be equitable, certain, convenient, and economical. Now a new canon has been added, namely that taxes should be adequate. The fifth canon might be supposed to refer to a sufficiency of revenue to sustain approved public services. But it is now generally given a more specia interpretation; namely, that taxes shoulc be adequate to prevent inflation. Thi: conception is frequently associated witl Abba P. Lerner who startled the fraternity of public finance scholars with the proposition that "the purpose of taxation is never to raise money but tc leave less in the hands of the taxpayer."[1] So far as meeting the public payroll is concerned, printing money would serve as well as extracting it from the taxpayer. Even Henry Simons, never classed as a Keynesian, accepted the view that adequacy should be regarded as a sovereign objective of taxation and "adequacy is simply the inflation problem."[2] The least that can be said specifically about adequacy of taxes in a peacetime situation where inflation threatens is that they should bring in enough revenue to finance current expenditures. The application of this rule to the present loophole-ridden tax system of the United States in the present juncture of public affairs we leave to the reader.

### *War finance*

Apply this conception to war finance. Here we start with an unbalanced budget and inflexible public expenditures. The hypothesis is that of the several ways of supplying the deficit, augmented taxation will be the least inflationary. Printing money or borrowing from banks, which amounts to much the same thing, will add to the purchasing power of the public the full amount of the deficit at a time when the public is receiving more income than it can spend on available goods at current prices. Selling bonds to nonbank purchasers could absorb private purchasing power, but such purchasers are likely

[1] *The Economics of Control.* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), pp. 307–308.
[2] *Federal Tax Reform.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), p. 4.



directly or indirectly to use their new assets as security or pretext for enhanced private borrowing. Taxation, on the other hand, leaves the private sphere with less current income and no new assets. It is the logical device to induce a substitution of public tanks for private automobiles. However, the taxpayer may insist on maintaining his customary purchases even if he has to borrow to pay taxes. If monetary restraints were tight enough to prevent this, a genuine substitution of public for private demand could conceivably occur, and the case would not differ from that where private demand shifts from automobiles to television sets. But monetary restraints are very unlikely to provide this check; such a tight money policy would be deemed a threat to maximum war production. In other words, the monetary restraints could not be sufficiently selective to curtail nonessential without impeding essential output. Thus we must have some wartime inflation no matter what the financial program. But this does not defeat the hypothesis that financing war by taxation is the least inflationary of the alternatives.

However, there is another aspect to consider and this is the possibility that taxes may adversely affect the supply side of the market through their impingement on incentives. Instead of working overtime the labor force might give up and go fishing. Of course, some people might also work harder and longer in order to keep up with the tax. But historically it was concern for incentives, along with disagreement about kinds of taxes to be levied, that set the limits to tax financing during World War II. Nevertheless many people, including the author, are of the opinion that taxation during this period was "inadequate" and that the inflation problem could have been eased substantially had we then achieved more fiscal courage.

### *Peacetime inflation*

Analysis of war finance can be transferred in the main to the problem of checking inflation in a cyclical boom, or a secular tendency toward rising prices in peacetime. But there are some differences. Here the budget may be balanced and counterinflationary effects of taxes must be achieved through a budgetary surplus. A new problem appears in disposing of the surplus. Logically it at first appears that reduction of the public debt held by banks will reverse the process by which purchasing power and the quantity of money had become unduly expanded in a previous period. But the expansion process may not be reversible. Paying banks money for securities will replenish bank reserves and thus facilitate a private expansion of credit. Here again fiscal policy might need assistance from monetary policy. Or the difficulty could be avoided by retiring the debt held by Federal Reserve Banks. This would be tantamount to sterilization of the surplus receipts in the government's treasury.

Moreover, peacetime public expenditures are less inflexible than those of a war period, and this suggests an alternative means of achieving a treasury surplus.

There are those who would argue that heavy taxation to achieve a budgetary surplus is more likely to aggravate than to mitigate an inflation. Here we may refer briefly to the interesting debate associated with Colin Clark who argued that taxes above a certain limit in terms of a ratio to national income—for instance 25 per cent—must constitute an inflationary influence. The issue tends to become confused with the problem associated with high public expenditures. If the latter be accepted as in-

elastic, then the issue is between various ways of financing a given outlay. This has been discussed in connection with the war situation where it was concluded that taxes, within very wide limits, are likely to be less inflationary than alternatives.

In the peacetime situation the problem is still one of alternatives, but the alternative of reduced expenditures is now presumably open. If taxes are already very high, enhancing them will meet the objection that this will have an adverse effect on incentives. The political and economic inelasticities of both taxes and expenditures are the main road block to attacking inflation via government surpluses. It has often been noted that tax and expenditure practices are institutions with long run implications, including vested interests, and they cannot at the behest of fiscal policy be turned on and off like a spigot. One cannot build up an educational system over the years and then abandon it in a particular year, nor can one apply a death tax in inflationary years only. Politically, reduction in expenditures and enhancement in taxes are likely to be inelastic. Fiscal policy, then, is likely to be applied more effectively in coping with a depression than in checking an inflation.

But taxes have some economic elasticity which might achieve some surplus during inflationary periods even without rate increases or new levies. This is particularly true of a progressive tax system which is thus said to have "built-in flexibility." The volume of revenue will fluctuate not only in response to a change in tax rates but also in response to a change in income. With a progressive tax system this automatic fluctuation in revenue will also be greater than the fluctuation in income. In the case of the individual income tax, more income per taxpayer means higher effective rates even though the nominal rates do not change. When Jones' income rises from $2,000 to $4,000 his income tax might quadruple. In the case of the corporate income tax the fluctuations in revenue greater than those in national income are due to the tendency of corporate profits to fluctuate more than other elements in income. There is also some built-in flexibility on the expenditure side of the budget as for instance where transfer payments for welfare and price supports can be reduced when national income is high. Built-in flexibility is a function of large budgets as well as progressive ones; here high taxes play a beneficial role, and the achievement of full-fledged peace might aggravate economic instability. It has been calculated that under conditions in the middle 1950's the built-in flexibility factor in public finance in the United States might compensate for fluctuations in private incomes to the extent of some 40 per cent of their magnitude.[3]

One school of thought has expounded the view that with the device of built-in flexibility, it should be possible to counteract instability without governmental intervention:

> . . . set the tax rates to balance the budget and provide a surplus for debt retirement at an agreed high level of employment and national income. Having set these rates, leave them alone until there is some major change in national policy or condition of national life.[4]

No forecasting or decisions as to timing would be required. As the figure cited above indicates it would be optimistic to expect built-in flexibility to do the job alone of compensating fully for instabilities in the private economy. But

[3] Richard A. Musgrave, *The Theory of Public Finance*. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959), p. 511.

[4] Committee for Economic Development, *Taxes and the Budget* (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1947), p. 2:



it can help, and the pessimists are likely to conclude that full use of its potentialities is about all that can be expected of (tax) fiscal policy in checking peacetime inflation. On this view also tax features legalized in 1948 that weaken progression, such as the splitting of income between spouses, are bad in terms of inflation control.

### QUALITATIVE CONSIDERATIONS

In either a deflationary period or an inflationary period, but particularly the latter, the question will arise as to what kind of tax is most effective to check movements of prices and employment. Some writers have concluded that while progressive income taxes were well adapted to the period when fiscal policy doctrine was first formulated, the post-war period is characterized predominantly by an excessive and inflationary tendency to spend much and save little. In this situation consumption taxes would be more appropriate than income taxes, but we cling to the latter because of an intellectual lag.[5]

For consumption taxes as compared with income taxes in this context the following advantages may be claimed:

1. Consumption taxes are usually regressive which means that they fall with special weight upon the classes which have a high propensity to spend all or most of their incomes on consumption. The more affluent classes also spend their incomes, but in their case the outlay is largely on investment—either real investment, new capital, or existing shares in old investment. Real investment is thought to be more or less independent of saving; if it is not financed out of ample saving it will be financed by an inflationary expansion of credit. Thus, savings—even if not held idle—are counterinflationary. Moreover, in the long run, investment will supply more goods to offset the money put in circulation to create it. Putting all of this together one can conclude that taxes which press lightly on the well-to-do are most effective in stopping inflation.

2. Consumption taxes offer the taxpayer an opportunity to avoid taxes by spending less and saving more. They are levied, so to speak, on the act of spending for consumption. They favor saving as against spending whereas income taxes are neutral between the two.

3. The effect of the above discrimination associated with consumption taxes is enhanced by a "money illusion." People whose incomes are cut by income taxes will adjust their budgets with full knowledge that they have less to spend and save. People whose real income is cut only by virtue of the fact that the same money income will buy less consumption goods—bringing higher prices—will, because they do not realize what is happening, seek to maintain the relative proportions disposed on consumption goods and savings. They will be defeated in respect to their outlay on consumption goods, and this will promote more saving proportionately.

4. The above arguments are in terms of equal revenue from the two taxes being compared. If this assumption is relaxed, one can advance a fourth argument; namely, that the addition of consumption taxes to a system dominated by income taxes can be pushed to yield more revenue than taxpayers would submit to pay by addition to an existing, heavily worked tax. In other words, diversity in a tax system is conducive to adequacy. Much was made of this point in promoting a general federal sales tax during World War II.

All of these points have been met with counterarguments. Studies of consumer behavior have suggested that the distribution of the tax burden, irrespec-

[5] William D. Ross, "State-Local Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth," *National Tax Journal*, Vol. 10 (March 1957), pp. 67–77.

tive of its size, has a relatively minor effect on consumption at least in the short run. While groups with low income spend relatively more on consumption than do groups with high income, it does not follow from this that they react differently to a change in their incomes. Concerning the taxpayers' response to the built-in opportunity for avoidance of consumption taxes, this would in large part be defeated if the tax were permanent or expected to remain in effect a long time. Insofar as the taxpayer only saves for future consumption, as in retirement saving, he will be caught by the consumption tax eventually anyway, and he might as well maintain his existing habits. Nobody knows whether the "money illusion," conceded to be a highly ingenious discovery, actually fools many people for long. And the political resistance to consumption taxes may be quite as great as to additional income taxes. Add to all this the allegation that in the short run, which matters most here, stimulating investment may be as inflationary as favoring consumption.

The case against consumption taxes also stresses their escalation effects. Notwithstanding money illusions, labor may react much more positively to an increase in prices than to a decrease in disposable incomes. Such reaction is built into the system where escalator clauses in wage contracts assure wage increases when the cost-of-living index rises. Increases in wages following advances in prices are a familiar feature of the so-called inflation spiral.[6]

[6] The point is not to be confused with the contention that sales taxes must be inflationary because in their case higher prices are the means of collecting the tax. The invalidity of this contention is generally conceded; the higher prices, in the case of the sales tax, transfer purchasing power to the government and are quite a different species from the higher prices that are part of the private inflationary spiral.

The positive case for progressive income taxes includes the built-in flexibility feature already explained. This relieves the counterinflationary tax program from the political inelasticities associated with properly timed tax legislation to meet the vicissitudes of the business cycle.

On balance it may be concluded that consumption taxes may have some advantage over income taxes as a tool of counterinflationary fiscal policy, but that the difference—quantity assumed equal—is not great. It must also be noted that the price effect of alternative taxes is only one among many, and that other advantages of one tax or another —greater equity, for instance—might outweigh this consideration. Particularly important in this regard is the fact that temporary tax measures leave permanent effects on future choices.

*Expenditures and state and local taxes*

Concerning the equity aspect of taxes in relation to their fiscal policy aspect, much can be said for an over-all expenditures tax. It will be recalled that this was one proposal which the Treasury submitted during World War II to increase the proportion of war cost that would be borne by taxation. The over-all expenditures tax may be conceived with some simplification as an ordinary progressive income tax with saving exempt. It may also be conceived as an over-all rationing program under which one could spend as he pleased but be fined for spending excessively. It would avoid the disadvantage of other consumption taxes associated with their regressive incidence. However, special administrative difficulties are urged as a point against this form of levy, and as a standing feature of the tax system, which temporary use might involve, it could lead to, what some would regard as, an overconcentration of wealth.

Much has been said about the desirability and the difficulties of bringing state and local governments into a cooperative role in national fiscal policy. During a depression this calls for such federal measures as supplementary unemployment compensation and aid for public works. Substitution of the latter for income tax exemption of interest on state and local bonds would be an improvement on several counts but particularly in its greater flexibility in exercising fiscal policy. As to state taxation, and looking both to depression and inflation, the federal government could give increased support for state and local taxes that have some built-in flexibility—notably the state income tax. The principal impediment to such taxation in the states is interterritorial competition. A federal credit of some sort like that used in unemployment compensation payroll taxes would give much more effective protection here than the present allowance of deductibility for state taxes in deriving the federal income tax base.



GADGETS

Especially during periods of price and wage instability, proposals to use taxes in their policing capacity abound. Most special tax incentive proposals are aimed at depression and unemployment, but there are also devices that aim to curb inflation. Among this latter group are proposals to tax bank loans, to disallow, perhaps partially, income tax deductions for advertising expense, to manipulate depreciation allowances, and to disallow, for a time, the deductibility to employers of wage increments.

Space does not afford the opportunity to discuss these proposals in detail. Some of them look promising, but they all suffer from the political impediments, such as vested interests, in their path. Depreciation allowances were liberalized in 1954; this was in response to the contention that prevailing practices did not provide capital to replace worn-out equipment as rapidly as the equipment wore out. The point is a highly controversial one, and the present statute is maintained by a balance of power among powerful economic and political interests. Probably neither friend nor foe would respond to the invitation to change the formula with every economic wind that blows.

We have mentioned above that we can expect chronic inflation if the average propensity to spend is too high. Concerning more saving it is also argued that a shortage here limits economic growth. If these views are valid some discouragement of advertising and consumers' credit would seem in order. But there are also many who still fear redundant saving and see no real basis for concluding that the rate of economic growth has been hampered by a deficiency in saving. There are few, if any, areas today where productive capacity does not substantially exceed demand. Some of the same people who deplore the impact of progressive taxation on thrift would shout loudest against any means of reducing consumers' interest in buying the so-called "good things of life."

It should also be noted that there is increased following for the view that the current problem of inflation is due primarily to oligopolistic practices in industry and labor unions. An augmented money supply is required to support the higher levels of administered prices, but it follows as effect rather than preceding as cause. In recent years inflation has persisted despite budgetary surpluses, monetary controls, and recession. The gadget listed above which would go directly to this "cost-push" aspect of inflation is the one which suggests tax pressure on employers who grant wage increases. But it looks like too crude a weapon to achieve its objective. It is doubtful if anything

short of direct controls can go to the root of administered-price inflation. But it does not follow that fiscal policy in this situation has lost all of its relevancy.

### CONCLUSION

Re-examining what the writer has contributed on his subject, he notes that it is predominantly negative in tone. Control of the quantity of taxation with inflation in view is important, but except for the built-in flexibility which attends a progressive tax system and a huge budget—features which developed fortuitously—we have not, nor are likely to make much use of it. As to qualitative distinctions in the tax system, inflation analysis suggests minor advantage for the sales tax but not enough in the author's opinion to warrant changing the emphasis of the present tax system. Tax gadgetry is principally of academic interest.

Nevertheless, it remains true that hardly anybody now regards balancing the federal budget as involving no more economics than is at stake in balancing his private accounts. We made commendable efforts to finance recent wars by taxation, and we cut taxes once during 1954 in a deflationary phase and came close to doing so again in 1958. As to tax policy, the Keynesian revolution is genuine and important, but it has not replaced everything else either in ordering the tax system or in inflation control.

# Income Taxes and Inflation

By MARTIN R. GAINSBRUGH and J. FRANK GASTON

ABSTRACT: The income tax, which has been regarded as the chief weapon in the battle against inflation, has come to be scrutinized as a possible factor in inducing inflation. Prior to World War II, the comparatively low rates of corporate and personal income taxation made such taxes appear relatively unimportant. High rates of taxation, however, have been carried over to the postwar period and, consequently, have served to focus attention upon the effect of such taxation upon economic growth and stability, distribution of income, and the efforts made by corporations and individuals to pass along the higher rates of income tax as well as the effect that these taxes may have on savings and investment. Until fairly recently, it was generally expected that business corporations and the stockholders bore the burden of the corporate income tax. This absorption theory has been giving ground to the shifting theory which maintains that under present-day competitive conditions, the corporation is able to shift taxes in the form of higher prices. Empirical studies have noted an increasing tendency for businessmen to say that they take income tax increases into consideration when setting prices. With respect to the personal income tax, there is growing reason for believing that work incentives and willingness to make risk investments are adversely affected and that efforts are made to pass along higher income taxes in the form of higher wages and salaries.

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*Martin R. Gainsbrugh, New York City, is Chief Economist of the National Industrial nference Board and Adjunct Professor of Economics, New York University.*
*. Frank Gaston, New York City, is Director, Division of Consumer Economics, tional Industrial Conference Board.*

THE income tax, both corporate and personal, is still widely regarded as one of the major means used by government to combat inflation. Primary reliance was placed upon such taxes for this purpose during World War II. High, normal, and excess profits taxes were imposed upon corporations, and steeply progressive rates of personal income tax were applied against individual income. True, the justification for high wartime rates did not rest solely upon the control of inflation alone. But extremely heavy emphasis was placed upon the need to siphon off excess personal or corporate income to restrain civilian demand.

The postwar years bear further witness to the primary reliance upon income taxes for revenue purposes. Income taxes are now the mainstay of the tax system. They comprise about three-fourths of all taxes. As compared with 1939's tax of 12½ per cent–16 per cent on corporate income below $25,000 and 19 per cent thereafter, the general rate today is 52 per cent. One may well ask whether continued primary reliance upon such a tax to meet today's problem of cost-induced inflation is as warranted as it was when such taxes were first raised to restrain excessive civilian demand. Is the income tax as effective a weapon in the battle against the wage-cost-price push as it is in restraining the war-engendered "demand-pull"?[1]

TABLE 1—EFFECTIVE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX RATES

| YEAR | FEDERAL TAXES AS PER CENT OF PERSONAL INCOME | STATE AND FEDERAL CORPORATE INCOME TAXES AS A PER CENT OF PROFITS BEFORE TAXES |
|---|---|---|
| 1929 | 1.5% | 14.2% |
| 1939 | 1.7 | 22.5 |
| 1944 | 10.6 | 55.5 |
| 1948 | 9.0 | 37.8 |
| 1958 | 10.2 | 49.0 |

Source: United States Department of Commerce.

The mechanics through which income taxation operates in controlling war-induced inflation are essentially simple. Income accruing to businesses and individuals so taken limits present or potential civilian demand for goods and services. The increased income tax revenues in turn help to finance the war. Demand by government continues to push up prices, but far less than might have been the case had government financed its war needs though heavier borrowing and less tax revenue.

Heavy as the income tax levies of World War II may have seemed to many and effective as they proved to be in restraining the orthodox type of inflation—that is, too much money chasing too few goods—there are some who say it did not go far enough. More stringent taxation, they argue, would have prevented the wartime buildup of liquid assets and the subsequent "demand-push" inflation that characterized the first postwar decade.

## POSTWAR LEGACY OF HIGH INCOME TAXES

Whatever the merits of even higher wartime taxes, a disturbing legacy is the continued high rate of individual and corporate income taxation. The current rates, while below those of the war, tower above those existing earlier. Table 1 shows the higher effective average rates. Statutory rates are hard to compare because of tax law changes. The continuance of such high rates during the first postwar decade have raised many new questions about taxation, including the taxable capacity of a nation or an individual. The term "capacity" embraces not only financial ability but also the degree of tax resistance or unwillingness to pay taxes that high rates have provoked, leading both to tax minimization and tax evasion. Businessmen grow ever more conscious, too, of the cost and inconveniences of tax compliance, much of which they maintain is unnecessary.[2] Some, like Colin Clark, have even advanced the proposition that 25 per cent of national income may well be the economic limit of taxation which a nation is prepared to accept in peacetime.[3] Other questions that have arisen relate to the impact of high taxes on economic growth and stability on incentives to work and to invest, on the distribution of income, and on patterns of consumption.[4]

One effect that high income taxes may have upon the price level is the bias they create toward free spending for various types of business expenses. Growing concern was expressed during the war about the so-called "nineteen cent after-tax dollar" and the wasteful expenditure that it induced. So long as a dollar of expenditure could qualify as a business deduction, after-tax income would be reduced by only nineteen cents; the remainder represented the effective rate of the excess profits tax.

Even today, with the corporate tax rate of 52 per cent instead of 81 per cent, business expenditures as well as financial decisions (for example, the cost of borrowing) are still affected by after-tax considerations. The point still has validity, but it is not as acute as it was with the high wartime excess profits tax rates.

## INCOME TAXES AND PRICE THEORY

A more recent concern is the relationship of high income taxes to prices and inflation. Until fairly recently it was generally accepted, at least among theorists,[5] that business corporations bore

[1] For the first extended discussion of the change from "demand-pull" to "cost-push" pressures upon price and the economic implications of this change in inflationary environment, see The Conference Board Economic Forum, *Wage Inflation*, "Studies in Business Economics," Number 56 (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1957).

[2] For a recent survey, see "The High Cost of Tax Compliance," The Conference Board Business Record, August 1959.

[3] "This now brings us to the question of whether there are any grounds for hope that the 25-percent limit could be safely exceeded, and if so, under what circumstances. As you will see from the original articles in Economic Journal and Harpers the 25 percent is a round figure rather than a precise limit and should certainly be written 24–26 if not 23–27. When, however, your figure is as high as 27 I should say myself, I would be willing to bet with a fairly high degree of probability on a further increase of money wages and consequent inflation to the national income as a whole.

"If taxation of this order of magnitude appears unavoidable, you may then ask whether there is any form or forms of taxation least likely to cause an upward pressure on prices and incomes.

"Under circumstances envisaged with an inescapable necessity of imposing taxation at a level of 27 percent or more, on national income, we can minimize the upward pressure by a system which, in general terms, keeps down marginal taxation with consequent necessary raising of average rates of taxation. Such a program, it need hardly be pointed out, would be extremely unpopular. It would mean removing, where possible, the progressive elements in the tax system, charging lower rates on the high incomes and higher rates on the low incomes, relying upon indirect rather than direct taxation, and making indirect taxation fall upon necessaries rather than upon amenities." Colin Clark, Letter to Joint Committee on the Economic Report, dated January 18, 1952, published in the *January 1952 Economic Report of the President. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Economic Report, Congress of the United States,* 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, January 23–February 1, 1952 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 316.

[4] As an indication of official concern with these and other problems, see the Joint Comon the Economic Report, *Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability: Papers Submitted by Panelists Appearing Before the Subcommittee on Tax Policy,* November 1955 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1956).

[5] Businessmen have generally dissented to the proposition that income taxes cannot be shifted, but their position has been looked

the burden of a corporate income tax. That thesis held that corporations were unable to shift such taxes either forward to consumers in the form of higher prices or backward in the form of lower wages. In a competitive economy, the argument ran, business firms produced up to the point where their marginal revenue—that is, additional dollar of revenue—equaled their marginal costs, thereby maximizing their profits. Hence a higher tax on net profits which would not affect costs would simply result in a higher share of the profits going to the government in taxes. The point of maximum profits would not be changed. Further, the relative position of all companies making the product would remain unchanged. None could change his output or price for fear of losing sales to his competitors.

This older theory has been increasingly challenged over the past decade and a new theory of incidence has come to be regarded as having large elements of truth. The new theory maintains that the corporation is able to shift the income tax in many more situations than was first thought possible. Following Terborgh,[6] the newer theory emphasizes "shifting" in contrast to the olde thesis of "absorption."

### Two Theories Opposed

The main lines of argument of th two schools are well presented in thi digest by the Joint Economic Com mittee:

> The debate over the proper place of th corporation income tax in the revenue sys tem is complicated by disagreement wit respect to the incidence of the tax. Ac cording to one view, a substantial portio of the total corporate levy is shifted for ward to consumers through price adjust ments reflecting the tax, while most of th remaining burden is shifted backward t shareholders and to the productive service employed by corporations. Such an inci dence pattern characterizes the corporat income tax as a sales tax. In this case the argument that corporate taxes shoul be eased to increase the financial resource required for noninflationary expansion o investment loses much of its force. I addition, this type of incidence patter makes the corporation income tax subjec to the criticism frequently directed against consumption taxes with respect to thei inequitable burden distribution and adverse effects on competitive relationships. Proponents of this view generally argue that corporate income taxation should be assigned a relatively minor role in the revenue system and should be regarded primarily as a device for source collection of shareholders' income-tax liabilities.
>
> Opposed to this position is the view that the corporation income tax is not shifted, at least in the short run. It is argued that the most profitable output of the corporation in the short run is the same whether or not an income tax is imposed. Accordingly, so long as demand remains unchanged short-run price adjustments intended to pass on changes in corporate income-tax liability will not increase the corporation's profits after tax. While proponents of this view concede that over the long run the corporation income tax may be reflected in the price structure, they nevertheless hold that alternative methods of taxation which would produce the same revenue would have a significantly more adverse and more immediate impact on the distribution of real income and on economic growth and stability.[7]

Basically, the "shifting" theory maintains that the assumptions of the "absorption" theory are far from valid in today's market place. Competition is imperfect and product differentiation is the rule rather than the exception. Further, it is held that the present pricing policy for a variety of reasons is not one that aims at maximizing profits. Rather, a "reasonable" or "fair" profit is regarded as more nearly describing the goal of businessmen. Consequently, the possibility of price change exists.

For all of the above reasons and others, the belief that considerable shifting does take place is gaining greater currency. The nearer the "shifting" theory is to the truth, the more likely it is that a tax rate on corporate income of 50 per cent may have an appreciable effect in influencing prices. Just how much influence it exerts remains highly speculative.[8]

### Rate Increases and Shifting

Certainly one may say with some authority that as tax rates increase, more and more personal thought and business effort will be devoted to ways in which such taxes might be recouped. The findings of the three studies already cited support this point of view. Even in the earliest study, reflecting the views of businessmen in the mid-1920's when the corporate tax rate was 12 per cent, nearly a fourth of the replies from manufacturing firms indicated that the corporate income tax was reflected in prices. The study by Ellis can be taken to represent the opinion of businessmen just prior to our entry into World War II. At that time—when the corporate normal and surtax rate was 31 per cent for income above $25,000, plus an excess profits tax which ranged from 35 per cent on the first $20,000 of adjusted excess profits net income to 60 per cent on amounts in excess of $500,000—slightly more than a fourth of the replies, from manufacturing and nonmanufacturing companies, indicated that the corporate income tax would influence price policy, a percentage not very different from the study of the 1920's.

In Kimmel's inquiry relating to the middle of 1948, 60 per cent of the replies from manufacturing companies indicated that they took income taxes into consideration when setting their price policy. At that time, the rate was 38 per cent. To throw more light upon the influence of the tax rate, a further question was directed to the 60 per cent who replied that income taxes influenced pricing policy. They were asked if their answer would be the same if the corporate tax rate in 1946–48 was "in the range of 10 to 15 per cent." Four-fifths of them replied that their answer would have been different.

In addition to the direct raising of prices in order to recoup the income tax, George Terborgh[9] maintains that there is another and more important way in

upon by theorists as resulting from the businessman's inability to understand the complexities of price and tax theory.

[6] See George Terborgh, *Effect of Corporate Income Tax on Investment* (Washington, D. C.: Machinery & Allied Products Institute and Council for Technological Advancement, 1959); see also Terborgh's incisive comments on incidence in *Fortune*, July 1959, p. 91, particularly: "If the incidence of the corporate income tax is to be inferred by comparing after-tax rates of return in the recent high-tax period with those of earlier low-tax periods such as the Twenties, it is obvious that the conclusion will depend on the kind of return employed for the comparison. If it is the return on sales or output, the inference will be that the tax has been largely absorbed. If it is the return on investment, the tax will appear to have been largely shifted.

"While such historical comparisons cannot prove anything one way or the other, they are certainly of evidential value . . . ."

[7] Joint Economic Committee, *The Federal Revenue System: Facts and Problems, 1959* (Washington, D. C.: United States Printing Office, 1959), p. 26.

[8] Three comprehensive inquiries have been made in the United States among businessmen concerning, among other things, the effect of income taxes upon prices. These indicators of the attitude of the business community toward high corporate income taxes are: National Industrial Conference Board, *The Shifting and Effects of the Federal Income Tax*, 2 Volumes (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1929, 1930); Paul W. Ellis, *The Effects of Taxes Upon Corporate Policy* (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1943); Lewis H. Kimmel, *Taxes and Economic Incentives* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1950).

[9] *Effects of Corporate Income Tax on Investment, op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), pp. 10 ff.

which the income tax affects prices. It does so by constituting a barrier to new investment and it thus reduces the supply of goods over what would be the case in the absence of such taxes as well as increasing their costs.[10] Terborgh stresses that,

> The present corporate levy of 52 per cent on taxable income is equivalent to a rate of 108 per cent on the after-tax return required to justify investment. If that return is 10 per cent, for example, the tax is 10.8 per cent of investment, the combined rate being therefore 20.8 per cent. What the tax does, in effect, is to raise the required pretax return to this rate. This alters the "terms of trade" between capital charges and operating advantage to the detriment of the former.
>
> The increase in the required pretax return automatically excludes a whole range of investment projects that would be eligible in the absence of the tax, or at a lower rate. It limits eligibility, in other words, to projects of great urgency. The result is the deferment of both new business ventures and investments in the improvement of existing operations until their expected pretax return rises to the higher requirement.

### EFFECT ON INVESTMENT

High corporate income taxes may not only cut off new investment, but such taxes also affect the volume of investment simply through reducing income after taxes. Should dividend payments be reduced correspondingly, retained earnings could be kept where they were; consequently, funds from the latter source for investment would not be affected. The cut in dividends, however, would reduce the ability to attract outside capital. Conversely, were dividend payments maintained, retained earnings would be reduced and less funds would be available from the latter source. In either event, the net effect is to cut the total amount of funds available for new business investment; that is, the amount that is generated internally through retained earnings plus the amount that can be attracted from the capital market through a high dividend rate.

### ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION

Accelerated depreciation, that is the ability to charge off the cost of the equipment in less than its useful lifetime, would tend to foster investment in expanding phases of the business cycle and to contract them when business activity was on the downgrade. This phenomenon would occur simply because more funds would be available through the introduction of such a device when business profits were good and would not generate any additional funds on the downgrade when business profits were either low or actual losses were being incurred. This conclusion would have to be modified, of course, as a result of the possibility of offsetting current losses against past profits and, consequently, receiving a tax refund. Further, the possibility of recouping the original investment through accelerated depreciation should have a buoyant effect on investment even in periods of business depression.

One other effect might be expected from accelerated amortization. It might result in the more rapid replacement of durable assets. This might occur because the advantage of large depreciation allowances would be exhausted presumably when the cost of the asset had been recouped from current income. In order to continue this, new assets would have to be acquired to replace those against which no further depreciation allowances would be permitted. Powerful incentive might be given to the rapid replacement of durable equipment. Whether this rapid replacement would accrue in some over-all social gain, or whether it would be at an excessive rate is a question that might require further examination.

There are other aspects of the relationship between high corporate income taxes and inflation that cannot be mentioned here for reasons of space. Outstanding among these is the inadequacy of depreciation allowances, for example, in a period of rising prices. This may limit investment at such times and thereby reduce the ability of industry to offset the "cost-push" of higher material and wage costs through expanded capacity, greater mechanization, and heightened productivity. A productive service will have been performed by the above comments, however, if they serve to raise questions concerning the extreme reliance that is placed upon the corporate income tax as a weapon against "cost-push" inflation.

### PERSONAL INCOME TAXES AND "COST-PUSH" INFLATION

The personal income tax, because of its sheer magnitude, can have not only an effect on individual incentives and the willingness and ability to make risk investments, but even more on the individual's propensity to absorb his share of the tax burden or to shift it in terms of higher wage-salary demands. With respect to the willingness and ability to make risk investments, the conclusions of one authoritative study are worth quoting:

> The tax structure, as of 1949, cut substantially into the investment capacity of the upper income and wealth classes—the strategic source of venture capital for investment in business—and, on balance, it also decreased the willingness of these investors *in the aggregate* to make equity-type investments. In other words, for equity-type investments considered as a whole the investors who were induced by taxes to shift *to* less risky investment positions appear to have overbalanced the opposite reaction of appreciation-minded investors. The latter group, however, may have been so stimulated by the tax structure to seek out investments offering unusually large capital gains potentialities, such as promising new ventures, as actually to increase the flow of capital to such situations. However this may be, it is clear that the combined impact of these effects fell far short of drying up the supply of equity capital which private investors were willing and able to make available to business. The evidence indicates that the accumulation of investable funds by the upper income classes has been consistently large during postwar years, despite the existing tax structure, and that individuals with large incomes and substantial wealth continue as a group to hold and invest a large proportion of their funds in equity-type investments.[11]

With respect to the individual's propensity to absorb his share of the tax burden, there is even less, however, than in the case of the corporate income tax that one can offer as empirical evidence to support one point of view or another on the impact and effect of personal income taxes.[12]

[10] "Since three-quarters of the output of the private economy comes from the corporate sector, the problem of accelerating economic growth is to a large extent the problem of increasing the incentive for corporate investment and enlarging the supply of capital funds to finance it. Our own studies indicate that the corporate income tax runs counter to this objective whether absorbed or shifted. Other countries know this and are taking steps to mitigate its harmful effects sometimes by rate reductions, more often by accelerated depreciation write-offs." (Terborgh, *Fortune*, *op. cit.* (note 6 *supra*), p. 91.

[11] J. Keith Butters, Lawrence E. Thompson, Lynn L. Bollinger, *Effects of Taxation: Investments by Individuals* (Boston, Mass.: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1953), pp. 50–51.

[12] It is clear that raising taxes other than income will have a decided influence in raising prices directly and indirectly. Directly, the higher taxes represent increased prices of purchased goods and services. Sales taxes, excise taxes, processing taxes, postage, tolls, and others, are all reflected in the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Price Index upon which escalator contracts are based. Thus, indirectly, these increased taxes will also become the

One can point to several tendencies, however, which make it clear that efforts are made to pass along the personal income tax in the form of higher wages and salaries. It is not possible to say how effective these efforts are. With respect to wages, the emphasis in collective bargaining is upon the maintenance or even increase of take-home pay. The lowering of exemptions, the raising of rates, and the resort to withholding have served to focus attention on the amount the worker carries home with him—the amount that he regards as available to meet his everyday living expenses.

With respect to executive compensation, one may note the variety of means that have been employed to increase salaries and to reduce taxes. Thus, employee stock options, pension and profit-sharing plans, deferred-compensation contracts, all are employed in addition to salary to enable the employee to reduce his tax and also as an inducement to hold or attract valuable personnel. It is difficult to prove that such devices are necessarily more costly to the employer, but they are obviously grounded in the employee's desire to maintain take-home pay now and in the future and to minimize his tax liability. One question worth raising in this connection, but which cannot be discussed for lack of space, is the effect such plans have upon unincorporated businesses and the self-employed since, with the exception of deferred-compensation plans, these devices are not generally open to them.

High income taxes leave their impact on the desire of people to work and, perhaps, even on the occupations they may prefer. Income taxes have an important connection, too, with such decisions as an individual may make between increased labor or more leisure. For most people the enjoyment of leisure is predicated upon the availability of spendable income, and higher personal taxes may serve to reduce the desirability of leisure. To maintain a given level of living, an individual may well be compelled to work even harder to earn more income so that his level of living will not be impaired by higher taxes. This argument is frequently cited as a response to the loss of incentive argument. Again, there are some to whom work is either so habitual or who derive such pleasure from work that higher personal taxes have little influence on incentives. For others, however, higher taxes may serve to reduce the amount of work that they—particularly the skilled or gifted—are willing to perform. By their own standards of equitable taxation, too much of the additional dollar of income is siphoned off for social overhead. This attitude is reinforced where the income tax on individuals is steeply progressive, resulting only in a small addition to net spendable income for every dollar of gross income.

These people do not view the tax they pay as their proper share of the cost of services received from the government. They see little correspondence between the amount of taxes they pay and the services rendered to them by the government. The net result in many instances is a shift of the excessive tax burden where this is possible or a greater preference for leisure. In either event, wage-cost-price pressures are again intensified.

mechanism for wage increases through raising measured living costs. Personal income taxes are not reflected in the BLS Consumer Price Index, and, therefore, are not a part of this tax-price-wage mechanism.

# Taxation and Business

By EMERSON P. SCHMIDT

ABSTRACT: It is not obvious that taxes in themselves are a significant element in inflation. When taxes reach a level that is regarded as unduly high by a broad spectrum of taxpayers, protective and defensive reactions are likely to take place. Although the primary cause of inflation is the growth in the money supply resulting from deficit financing, even a balanced budget under certain circumstances can be inflationary. The corporation income tax is probably largely shifted forward to the consumer; but its level tends to defer new investment, and therefore has a price-lifting effect which, however, is not cumulative. A shift toward a tax system emphasizing direct rather than indirect taxes might help encourage opposition to government expenditure increases.

*Emerson P. Schmidt, Ph.D., Washington, D. C., is Director of Economic Research of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America. He taught economics at several universities, leaving the University of Minnesota for his present position in 1943. He served as Chairman of the Manitoba Rural Electrification Inquiry Commission in 1942. He is author of numerous books, monographs and pamphlets and edits Economic Intelligence. He edited and authored most of the seventeen-pamphlet series used in the adult economic education program of the National Chamber. He is Chairman of the Business Research Advisory Council to the U. S. Commissioner of Labor Statistics and serves on the Budget Bureau's Advisory Council on Federal Reports. He is the founder of the Conference of Business Economists and a founder and a director of Automation Shares Inc.*

THERE is general agreement that United States Treasury deficits financed by borrowing from the commercial banks or the central banks are closely related to inflation. Such financing increases the money supply and may reduce its buying power. But very little has been said about the level of taxes or the tax structure and inflation, except as related to the avoidance of deficits and generating surpluses in time of boom.

It is not clear whether taxes in themselves are a significant element in inflation; but to the extent to which they are important, their influences work themselves out through the various other inflationary forces in operation. Recent major studies of inflation virtually ignore taxes or the tax structure as inflationary causes. A few of them make passing reference to the subject, but in most cases the discussion runs in terms of bulging government expenditures, recognizing that any deficits may have inflationary impact.

Dr. Colin Clark, however, has repeatedly argued, in spite of criticisms of his position, that when governments absorb from 23 per cent to 25 per cent of the national income, inflationary forces are set in motion.[1] Under full employment it has also been demonstrated that a rise in public expenditure may force a rise in prices. Thus, Richard A. Musgrave states: "Under conditions of full employment, an expansion in the balanced budget cannot but raise prices. This will be true whether the increase in expenditures is matched by an increase in income or in consumption taxes."[2] This has come to be known as the balanced budget theorem and is generally accepted. Thus, it has been said:

> . . . not only are increased taxes politically unpopular, but their effectiveness as an anti-inflationary device depends on the tax structure and the particular kinds of taxes being increased. When tax rates are already high, additional taxes may impair incentives and reduce output—or at least slow the expansion of output. Moreover, to the extent that additional taxes reduce money savings rather than consumption spending, they do not reduce total money demand, and they prevent capital investment from being financed in a noninflationary manner. On two counts, then, higher taxes may reinforce certain inflationary pressures, though in the aggregate taxes usually act as a deflationary withdrawal of purchasing power. At least, we should expect responsible fiscal policy during inflation to maintain taxes at a high enough level to produce a substantial budget surplus and to make some reduction in the public debt.[3]

Major or substantial and "galloping" inflation can be explained primarily by large increases in the money supply. Creeping or slow but more or less persistent, mild inflation, such as prevailed from 1956 into 1959 in the United States, can be understood in terms of lag effects, numerous pressures, economic rigidities, institutional arrangements such as wage escalation clauses, minimum wage fixing, and other forces.

## Output and Inflation

Sometimes it is said that more and more production is the answer to inflation; again, it is argued that improved productivity is the answer, and in so far as a tax system retards growth or productivity, or both, the tax is inflationary. These answers are a part, but only a part, of the answer to inflation. They are only a partial answer because excessive monetization of public or private debt may exceed any attainable economic growth. The government printing presses or other fiscal and monetary operations turning out money —either directly through merely printing more money or through the sale of government bonds to the banking system—can always be made to outperform the growth in real output or the growth in the efficiency of the economy.

But the emphasis on more output and improved efficiency is on the side of less inflation, even though it may not be the complete answer. If so, anything, including a disincentive tax system, which stands in the way of more output and more efficiency is a roadblock.

In short, any forces which reduce output or the competitiveness of our economy tend to make it operate at less than optimum efficiency and higher real costs; but this is not what we generally mean when we express concern over major or persistent inflation problems.[4]

## Tax Reform

By changing our tax system in ways which will bring home to the taxpayer that he is paying, we may increase our ability to cope with inflation. This requires that he understand that he pays whether the budget is balanced or unbalanced.

In so far as pressures for more government spending are effective because the accompanying costs are underrecognized, a tax system which relies heavily upon pay-as-you-earn, or indirect and hidden taxes, encourages government spending.

Apparently, it has been easier to expand the programs and expenditures of the national government than of the state and local governments. This greater "elasticity" of the supply of the national government funds is partly due to differences in the tax structure of the national government from that of the state and local governments. The taxpayer is quite conscious of most of his state and local taxes. This is less true of national government taxes.

In 1958, out of nearly 70 billion dollars of national government budget receipts, about 50 per cent was derived from personal income taxes. The remainder was raised primarily by indirect or hidden taxes: corporations, 20 billion dollars; excises, 8.6 billion dollars; and 5.7 billion dollars from other sources—primarily indirect sources such as customs, estate, and gift and employment taxes.

Since the personal income tax rates are steeply progressive, reaching up to 91 per cent, apparently it is popularly assumed that the rich and those with above-average income pay the bulk of these taxes. This attitude, although it greatly exaggerates the degree of progression in practice, helps to reduce resistance to national government spending and, therefore, may contribute to inflation. The pay-as-you-earn withholding system, likewise, reduces tax consciousness. If the taxpayers generally understand that about 80 to 85 per cent of all personal income tax revenue comes from the basic 20 per cent bracket rate, resistance to taxes might rise and, thus in turn, might encourage more careful scrutiny of government spending proposals and the threat of deficit spending, assuming that the taxpayer also understands that inflation growing out of deficits is also a "tax" on him.[5] Inflation also may raise

[1] Colin Clark, "Public Finance and Changes in the Value of Money," *Economic Journal*, Vol. 55, Cambridge, England, December 1945.

[2] For the line of reasoning, see: Richard A. Musgrave, *The Theory of Public Finance* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959), p. 452.

[3] *The Mechanics of Inflation* (Washington, D. C.: Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1957), p. 47.

[4] For suggestions on improving the mobility of production factors, see: *Disemployment Forces and Reemployment Prospects* (Washington, D. C.: Chamber of Commerce of the

[5] For the argument from a labor leader in favor of relatively more national government spending on the basis of the progressivity of

"effective" tax rates quite sharply as individuals are "inflated" into higher tax brackets.

Because of the heavy reliance on indirect taxes—nearly half the budget receipts—it may be assumed that the average taxpayers are generally not fully aware that they do pay these taxes too.

Taxes levied on business or collected via business are popular with politicians apparently because they assume that either business, and not the average citizen, pays or that while business must pass the tax along like other costs, the final incidence of these costs is hidden from the general taxpayer. The latter reason smacks of hypocrisy and is undemocratic in its overtones. The former is false because business per se is not taxed and does not pay taxes. Individuals pay taxes, even when the collector relies on a business unit as the collection medium.

While national sales taxes or taxes assessed on retailers on the basis of their sales volume are widely resisted, similar taxes levied at the manufacturers' level may be applauded. Even though, because of some tendency toward pyramiding, the latter may be more burdensome to the consumer than the former, the politician will nearly always favor the tax assessed against the manufacturer.

Similarly, the politician favors the pay-as-you-earn, withholding system, income tax with extreme progression because it reduces general opposition to taxation. Even if he has to fashion all sorts of exceptions, called "loopholes," to lessen the damage of the high rates, he prefers to keep the high rates and the steep progression.

A forthright downward revision of the largely ineffective, high bracket income tax rates and more emphasis on retail sales taxes, rather than on hidden excises and corporation income taxes, would probably encourage much broader citizen concern with government spending and deficits and their inflation potential.

its tax structure, see: "Tax Plan Drawn for School Help," *New York Times*, December 18, 1955.

## THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX

But perhaps the weakest link in our tax structure, in terms of fighting inflation, is to be found in the corporation income tax. This is so for several reasons. This tax amounts to about 52 per cent of most corporations' pretax income. When Uncle Sam becomes more than a 50 per cent partner in any enterprise, its owners may have substantial incentives to build up certain costs and to find ways and means of minimizing Uncle's share.

Professor Sumner H. Slichter of Harvard University has repeatedly argued that our corporation tax system minimizes the employers' resistance to excessive wage demands. Since about 50 per cent of any wage increase is, in effect, paid by a reduction of the corporate employers' income tax, the typical employer tends to be profligate, it is argued, in acceding to "inflationary" wage demands.

Whether this conclusion is correct or not, we have no way of knowing. It could have at least a marginal effect. Under a competitive economy, however, each employer is under significantly steady pressure to control his costs. Wages (and fringe benefits) constitute about 25 per cent of the typical manufacturer's costs. But for the economy as a whole, wage costs constitute more than two-thirds of all costs—twice as large as all other costs combined. Thus, what happens to wages is of the utmost importance to employers, in terms of both their direct and indirect employment costs.

It would be somewhat surprising, therefore, to find that employers, in their wage policies, would be greatly influenced by their corporate income tax liability. Why should any employer burden himself permanently with higher labor costs merely because, for the moment, half of the increase can be absorbed by a reduced income tax on the business? Corporate income and earnings are highly volatile and uncertain. But a wage increase, once granted, is enduring and may pave the way for another increase a year later. In short, we have no evidence or reason to believe that the corporate income tax is an important factor in elevating wage costs.

But this may be less true for some other corporate operating practices. During the period when the so-called Excess Profits Tax was in force, with combined rates running as high as 80 per cent, there was widespread public discussion of the wastefulness of this high rate. The "waste" took the form of less diligence in restraining expense accounts and in placing and determining the volume of advertising.

It encouraged maximum expenditures on the maintenance of the properties and other items, because they were operating expenses, and this reduced the net income subject to the exalted tax rates. That there was much to these arguments can scarcely be denied. One corporate executive at that time told the writer: "We are sweeping everything under the rug." He did not tolerate sheer waste or profligacy; rather, all expenditures were made which would be of profit in the future, such as greatly increased advertising, stepped-up maintenance, additional investment in training personnel, and so on. Many similar cases could be cited.

With a 52 per cent corporate income tax rate, these same tendencies may be less pervasive and may be somewhat reduced. But it would be surprising if such a high rate did not encourage many business practices which would be absent in the face of a more moderate rate or a zero rate.

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has greatly increased its investigations of corporate expenditures. It has challenged and disallowed many expenditure items and has issued a host of new rules disallowing numerous deductions. But with hundreds of thousands of taxpayers under its care, the IRS, even though it has thousands of revenue agents, cannot keep up with the growth of ways and means that the mind of man can devise to minimize the tax payment. How important the corporate tax may be in fostering and encouraging the misallocation of resources and undermining the cost consciousness of business executives, we do not know. But that it reduces the incentive to control or cut certain types of costs, can hardly be denied.

The combination of high personal and corporate tax rates, however, also encourages reinvestment of earnings, which, by providing more capital per worker, may lead to lower costs. Many of the more than 13 million shareholders capable of living on their wages, salaries, and other income prefer to avoid receiving dividend income, if through the plowing back of corporate earnings the market value of their holdings rises. Then they are in a position to realize capital gains on which the maximum tax is 25 per cent. Corporations, recognizing this, have learned how to print their own "greenbacks" in the form of stock dividends in lieu of cash dividends. Whether on net balance this situation encourages industrial expansion and therefore lowers product prices is not easily determined. It does mean, however, immobility of capital, since it tends to concentrate expansion more heavily within existing firms and puts a penalty on new enterprises.

### HIGH TAXES DEFER INVESTMENT

The corporation income tax, by virtue primarily of its high level, does have a different price lifting effect—although not a cumulative inflationary effect—by means of a process which is not too obvious. This process has been described by Dr. George W. Terborgh in his recent studies.[6] To understand this point, we must answer these questions: Who pays the corporation income tax? Is it absorbed? Or, is it shifted, and if so, how is it shifted? Does it retard new investment and modernization?

Those who believe the 52 per cent corporation income tax is not shifted but is absorbed by the shareholders, argue that the application of this tax, particularly at the current high rates, inevitably involves a substantial impairment of the incentive to invest and expand and causes a severe drain on the funds available to finance any expansion.

If the present tax rate reduces corporate profits by 52 per cent, it must inevitably have a drastic effect on the volume of retained earnings available for financing expansion. It must also reduce substantially the savings of shareholders from dividend income. Furthermore, since it lowers the expected return from new corporate investment, it reduces not only the supply of funds but the incentive to use them. Pretax corporate profits have averaged about 40 billion dollars from 1955 to 1957 (allowing for correction of over and understatement resulting from inflation and five-year amortization). The tax share has averaged about 22 billion dollars, thus leaving only 18 billion dollars of net profits. If we assume that the income tax has been wholly absorbed, we must also recognize that in the absence of the tax—other things remaining the same—profits would have averaged 40 billion dollars annually, instead of 18 billion dollars.[7]

[6] For an extended analysis of the incidence of the corporation income tax and an explanation of how it is shifted by deferring new investment, see: George W. Terborgh, *Effect of Corporate Income Tax on Investment* (Washington, D. C.: Machinery and Allied Products Institute, 1959).

### A SHIFTED TAX

In contrast with the absorption theorists, many of those who assume that the corporation income tax is shifted tend to view this tax with considerable complacency. They seem to assume that if it does not come out of profits, it must be harmless to corporate investment. This is a dubious conclusion. While the degree to which the corporate income tax is shifted is not known precisely, there is increasing agreement among students that, in the long run, the bulk of it tends to be shifted. But this shifting occurs gradually through the curtailment of production which otherwise would be larger. Thus, the reduced output can be sold at a higher price and in this way the tax is shifted.

The shifted tax limits the supply of output by imposing a barrier to new corporate investment; and since about three-quarters of all investment is done via the corporation, this is of considerable importance. How does this work?

The corporate tax falls on the earnings of the shareholders. This means that to justify new investment, a project must show prospects of yielding a pretax return that will leave an after-tax return, when the tax is paid, which is adequate to justify the new investment.

A corporate tax rate of 52 per cent

[7] The 22 billion dollar difference is not a final measure of the net loss due to the tax; part of this amount would have been drained into the United States Treasury via the personal income tax on dividends, and the abolition of the corporate tax would have required the imposition of substitute taxes. For calculations and other qualifications, see: George W. Terborgh, *ibid.*



on taxable income is equal to a rate of 108 per cent on the after-tax return required to justify investment. If we assume that the prospective return sufficiently high to induce new investment (always uncertain as to outcome) is 10%, the tax is 10.8 per cent of the investment. The combined rate is, therefore, 20.8 per cent.

What the tax does, then, is to raise the required pretax return of possible new ventures to this rate. This level of required pretax return excludes a wide range of possible investment projects that would be eligible in the absence of the tax, or at a lower tax rate. This limits eligibility to new projects of great urgency—that is, of good prospective earning power. The result is that investments in new business ventures and in the improvement of existing facilities are deferred until their expected pretax return rises to the higher requirement.

As Dr. Terborgh points out:

> The main effect of such a high corporate investment threshold is to hold an umbrella over existing productive facilities. For it defers the introduction of new capacity competitive therewith. Old facilities must become more decrepit and inefficient before they are replaceable. Their service lives are extended. The economy drags along in consequence with a productive mechanism of greater average age and with more accumulated deterioration and obsolescence than would obtain in the absence of the tax.

This shielding of existing capacity from new competition permits the sale of its products at higher prices than could otherwise be obtained. It is through these higher prices that the income tax is shifted, in the long run, to the market.

Dr. Terborgh also found that the injurious effects of a shifted tax are related to the corporate tax rate, but they are by no means proportional to it. He found that the percentage increase in the earning power required to justify new investment becomes very rapid after the tax rate passes 40 per cent. Under certain conditions, a reduction of the rate by 12 percentage points (from 52 per cent to 40 per cent) would yield more than two-fifths of the benefit to be obtained by abolishing the tax entirely. And, it is thus evident that we are in critical territory with a 52 per cent tax rate. A reduction of the tax rate from 52 per cent would lower the corporate new investment threshold.

Thus, whether the tax is absorbed or shifted, it tends to slow down new investment. It tends toward higher prices than would otherwise prevail. It slows down technical advance, modernization, and economic expansion. It penalizes business done via the corporation form relative to other forms of business organization. This all is damaging enough to justify substantial reduction—some would say, the elimination—of the tax, entirely apart from any question of cumulative inflation.

Is the tax inflationary? Not in the sense in which the word "inflation" is used by those who adhere rather strictly to the monetary explanation of inflation. It does generate higher prices than would otherwise prevail; but its effect, while general and pervasive, is not cumulative from year to year as may be the case, according to some analysts, of annual wage increases in excess of national productivity improvements, or in case of persistent deficit spending with the deficit financed through the banks.

### CONCLUSIONS

Inflation cannot be explained without major reference to money and credit policies and deficit spending. But apart from deficits, our economy does seem to have an inflationary bias, a matter

discussed by other participants in this volume. High taxes, the tax structure, and the tax system may contribute toward upward price pressures. Tax reform designed to generate more investment funds and to improve risk-taking incentives would lower real costs and prices.

Incentives to discover and adopt so-called "tax loopholes" grow out of the extremely high personal and corporate tax rates. The taxpayer, whether individual or corporate, is increasingly making his business and economic decisions in terms of minimizing his tax burden; this drains energy and ingenuity from constructive economic activity to the negative activities of tax avoidance. Considerable misallocation of human and other resources is a consequence of the high rates. Vast armies of high salaried attorneys, accountants and economists, as well as business executives, devote a prodigious amount of time, energy, and resources to ways and means of minimizing the tax burden. A significant reduction or elimination of the corporate income tax would not only reduce this misallocation of resources, but would encourage industrial modernization and new investment which, in turn, would lead to lower real prices.

In terms of fighting inflation, however, it is not clear that changes in the tax structure could make a major contribution. Efforts to shield the taxpayer from tax consciousness are not only undemocratic but also reduce public resistance to unlimited government and excessive government spending. Taxes levied in such a way that the taxpayer has a clear conception of the burden of the tax could improve the allocation of resources between the public and the private sectors. Similarly, efforts made to get the taxpayer and the consumer to understand that deficit spending—and at times even a balanced budget—under conditions of high or rising prices is likely to redistribute wealth and income in uncertain and arbitrary ways.

# Excise and Sales Taxes as Anti-inflationary Measures

By JOHN F. DUE

ABSTRACT: Sales and excise taxes are in all likelihood typically shifted forward in the form of higher commodity prices. Their anti-inflationary influence arises from their effect in reducing real purchasing power by raising commodity prices relative to factor incomes. Unlike other price increases, this type does not have a spiraling effect because it does not generate additional income. Sales and excises have some relative advantage over income taxes so far as inflation control is concerned. They place a heavier relative burden on persons spending high percentages of their incomes and compel them to reduce consumption. They give some incentive to spend less and save more. In addition some persons may tend to spend the same dollar sum, including tax elements, as before. If persons attempt to maintain their old consumption levels of goods and services, they increase their tax liability by so doing. On the other hand, much of the greater anti-inflationary advantage of the sales and excise taxes will be lost if they generate wage increases. The sales and excise taxes may also offer some limited advantage from the standpoint of production incentives, but this can easily be exaggerated. The principal objections to the sales and excise taxes are equity ones; the levies conform much less closely with accepted standards of equity in taxation than the income tax. Sales and excise taxes, as well as the income tax, are greatly inferior to the expenditure tax as anti-inflationary measures, and the latter is more equitable than the commodity taxes.

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*John F. Due, Ph.D., Urbana, Illinois, is Professor of Economics in the University of Illinois. He taught at the University of Utah, 1939–42 and 1945–48; served as Economist, Tax Research Division, United States Treasury, 1942; and as Consultant, Tax Advisory Staff, United States Treasury, 1950–53. He has taught at the University of Illinois since 1948. He is the author of The Theory of Incidence of Sales Taxation (1942), Intermediate Economic Analysis (1947, 1950, and 1956), Government Finance (1954, 1959), Sales Taxation (1957), studies on Canadian sales taxation, and articles in professional journals.*

INCREASED reliance upon commodity taxes is often defended on the grounds that they are more effective, per dollar of revenue, in checking inflation than income taxes and are less injurious to production incentives. On the other hand critics of these levies not only question their superiority on both of these bases, but in addition condemn them on equity grounds. Before the arguments are examined, a brief review of terminology is necessary. Commodity levies are grouped into two classes, sales and excise taxes. The former type applies to all or a wide range of commodities; the latter, to particular articles or groups of articles. This terminology is not universal; for example, the National Association of Manufacturers has long supported a levy which it calls a general manufacturers' excise but which is a sales tax in terms of the definitions given above. But to an increasing extent the terminology has become standard. Commodity taxes are also frequently called consumption taxes under the assumption, examined in the next section, that they are shifted forward to consumers and thus are borne in relation to consumption expenditures. In addition to commodity taxes, there is one other major form of consumption tax, namely, the expenditure or spendings tax. This tax applies to total consumption expenditures (less deductions) and is collected, like the income tax, from the individual taxpayer on the basis of returns.

## THE SHIFTING OF COMMODITY TAXES

The nature and strength of the case for the use of commodity taxes in checking inflation are conditioned by the extent to which these taxes are shifted forward to consumers in the form of higher prices, or, in other words, the extent to which commodity prices are increased relative to wages and other factor incomes. This question has been reviewed very extensively in the literature for decades, but there still exist substantial difference of opinion. However, the traditional argument that such taxes tend to shift to the consumer is most widely accepted.[1] In the nonpurely competitive markets, in which such taxes typically apply, direct and immediate price increases are likely to occur in view of usual pricing practices, since all competing firms are subjected to a uniform cost increase. The strong demand typical of inflationary periods facilitates shifting. Inevitably, there are some exceptions, and some downward adjustments in prices of particular factor units may occur. Thus for example an increased tax on wine, by lessening wine consumption, will reduce the demand for land specially suited for wine grape production and lower its rental and sale value. But the exceptions are likely to be minor.

It is sometimes argued that a consumption tax, particularly a sales tax will reduce the total demand for factors of production and thus lower factor prices rather than bring about increases in commodity prices.[1] However, given the strong demand characteristic of inflationary pressures and usual pricing methods, commodity price increases are much more likely to occur. The argument that any general price increase which occurs cannot be attributed to the tax but to monetary policy which permits such an increase not only involves misplaced emphasis on causal factors in the picture, but is meaningless in an inflationary situation, since if monetary policy were in fact preventing price increases, there would be no need for sales taxes or any other tax increases.

The question may be raised about the possibility of a commodity tax being

[1] See E. R. Rolph, *The Theory of Fiscal Economics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954) Chaps. VI, VII.



anti-inflationary when it directly and immediately raises prices. But this price increase is a once-and-for-all proposition (apart from possible effects on wages discussed in a subsequent section); unlike the usual price increases of an inflationary spiral, it does not give rise to increases in factor incomes and thus does not bring further increases in demand. The tax constitutes a wedge driven between the price paid by consumers and that received by business firms, and thus it absorbs purchasing power, checking further price increases.

## SALES AND EXCISE TAXES VS. INCOME TAXES

To what extent are commodity taxes more effective, per dollar of tax revenue, in checking inflation than personal income taxes?[2] It has frequently been argued that the commodity tax effects are greater. In the first place, the tax places a heavier relative burden than the income tax on those persons who spend high percentages of their incomes. These persons frequently must absorb the tax in reduced consumption since they have little or no savings margin. Secondly, the commodity tax gives some incentive to curtail spending since tax liability can thus be reduced. The income tax has no such effect because the direct and immediate liability is unaffected by the use of the income. The effect of a commodity tax is likely to be much greater if the levy is regarded as temporary than if it is considered to be a permanent element in the tax structure. Thirdly, the relative influence may be affected by the so-called money illusion. Some persons may spend the same total dollar sum from a given income regardless of prices and thus when prices rise because of a sales tax, their expenditures for consumption, net of tax, fall by the full sum of the tax. Persons whose savings consist entirely of fixed commitments (insurance, and others) will also behave in this fashion. Finally, the commodity taxes differ in one other major respect: if a person attempts to maintain his old consumption level despite the tax, that is, to resist attempts of the government to restrict his consumption, he increases his tax liability by so doing. Thus, for a given tax yield the effectiveness of the consumption tax is greater.

On the other hand, commodity taxes suffer from one major weakness as anti-inflationary measures; since they directly affect the cost of living, they are more likely to generate wage increases than other forms of taxes. With escalator clauses in wage contracts the effect is automatic; even without them, the cost of living increase is certain to generate demands for higher wages. Income taxes may have this effect as well since they reduce take-home pay, but the influence is much less direct and certain. Exclusion of the sales or excise tax element from the cost of living index is likely to meet strong political objections and is questionable on other grounds; even the exclusion might not accomplish the desired ends. Whenever a tax generates wage increases, its effectiveness in checking inflation is largely or entirely lost.

[2] See R. Goode, "Anti-Inflationary Implications of Alternate Forms of Taxation," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (May 1952), pp. 147–61; E. C. Brown, "Analysis of Consumption Taxes in Terms of the Theory of Income Distribution," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1950), pp. 74–89; R. A. Musgrave, *The Theory of Public Finance* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 447–52.

## PRODUCTION INCENTIVES AND EQUITY

Maintenance of a high and growing level of output is universally regarded as a desirable feature of the economy quite apart from its aid in checking inflationary pressures with given level of total demand. Charges are frequently

made that high progressive income taxes reduce output and development, while sales and excise taxes have much less effect of this type per dollar of revenue. Income taxes, it is maintained, reduce the incentive to work, to develop and expand businesses, and to seek maximum efficiency. Sales taxes, since they are not progressive and do not apply to the portion of income saved, presumably would have less effect. While this argument may have limited merit, several objections must be noted. In the first place, a large part of any difference which may exist must be attributed to the progression of the income tax rather than to the use of the income base, as such, and could be eliminated by altering the progression in the income tax structure. Secondly, to the extent to which persons desire income for purposes of consumption, the commodity taxes may also reduce incentives. Finally, there is little evidence that present income taxes are having serious effects upon incentives.

The primary objection to greater use of sales and excise taxes is based on equity grounds. A sales tax in its usual form tends to be regressive and to place substantial burden on the lower income groups. This effect can be greatly reduced by food exemption, but only at the expense of diverting consumption from other purposes to food and increasing inflationary pressures on the latter, as well as discrimination in favor of persons preferring expensive foods. The effect of the regressive distribution of burden is the concentration of the personal expenditure reduction induced by the tax on the lower and lower-middle income groups, with inequitable burden on those families in these groups whose circumstances require them to spend high percentages of income on consumption. The excise taxes, to the extent to which they reduce consumption of the taxed goods, likewise concentrate their effects on the lower income groups since those in higher levels can continue to consume the product despite the tax. Excises are likewise inevitably discriminatory among various persons, in terms of their relative preferences for taxed and untaxed goods.

### COMMODITY TAXES VS. AN EXPENDITURE TAX

Sales and excise taxes are clearly inferior on bases both of inflation control and equity to an expenditure tax.[3] This form of levy would be collected directly from individuals on the basis of returns which would be filed in conjunction with those for income taxes. The tax liability would be based upon total consumption expenditures made during the year, as calculated by subtracting the net increase in the person's wealth (the net amount saved during the year) from income earned. Certain expenditures, such as those for medical purposes, education, and others, would presumably be deductable; as with the income tax, a standard exemption would be permitted as well for each member of the family. The taxable expenditures could then be subjected to highly progressive rates, the exact degree depending on the desired anti-inflationary pressure. Rates could exceed 100 per cent; if for example, in a period of severe inflation, a 500 per cent rate were applied to expenditures in excess of $20,000, the expenditure by a person of an additional dollar would increase his tax payments by $5. Such a levy would not only give much greater incentive to lessen consumption than either commodity taxes or the income tax, but would also be more equitable than commodity taxes because of the personal exemptions. The sales tax cannot approach the expenditure tax in its ability to discourage spending; it is less equitable, in terms of usual standards, and it offers greater danger of giving rise to wage increases.

[3] See N. Kaldor, *An Expenditure Tax* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955).



### SALES VS. EXCISE TAXES

If commodity taxes are to be employed for purposes of inflation control, the choice between a sales tax and a group of excise taxes is difficult to make. The broader scope of the sales tax increases its potential influence at rates which may be regarded as acceptable. The sales tax is less discriminatory on the basis of personal preferences, but it is more regressive, a consideration which in practice may limit the politically tolerable rate to one far lower than that acceptable on excises. The sales tax avoids the inevitable effect of excises in shifting consumption from some goods to others and thus increasing the inflationary pressures on the latter.

This shifting effect is desirable in one type of situation, namely, when the demand is transferred from very scarce items to ones much less scarce. Such a tax may be designated as a demand shifting excise and distinguished from the form simply intended to absorb purchasing power (demand absorbing excise). The former type is more effective to the extent to which the demand is elastic, the latter to the extent to which the demand is inelastic. The absorbing type must be employed on items of widespread use and thus may be as regressive as the sales tax itself. In contrast, the demand shifting type may have a much more acceptable burden pattern by income group.

### MODIFICATIONS IN PRESENT COMMODITY TAXES

The federal government now obtains about 16 per cent of its tax revenues from excises—liquor and tobacco levies accounting for about half of this total—while the states gain about 23 per cent of tax revenues from sales taxes and 8 per cent from liquor and tobacco taxes. Could changes in these levies aid economic stability and growth? So far as the federal excises are concerned, they are now largely confined to consumption goods; while some may be criticized on equity grounds as discriminatory against persons with high preferences for taxed items and others as regressive, most of them likely have little adverse effect on the economy. One particular tax, however, is open to serious criticism, namely, that on passenger transportation. This tax, by encouraging travel by private automobile, adds to highway congestion. At the same time it makes the task of commercial passenger carriers in continuing to supply adequate service more difficult and the service more expensive, per passenger, because of reduced volume. Repeal of this tax, which was originally imposed to check passenger travel in World War II, is long overdue.

The state sales taxes have one feature which may be regarded as undesirable. Most of them apply to capital equipment as well as to consumption goods. As a consequence they artificially increase the cost of new investment and may have some influence in slowing down the rate of economic growth. From a short-run standpoint, however, the investment restriction aids in the checking of inflation.

### CONCLUSIONS

The substitution of a federal general sales tax or a much more extensive system of excises for a portion of the present income tax burden would probably do little good from the standpoint of inflation control. The difference in production incentive effects of the change would probably not be very great, and such advantages could largely be gained by alteration in the rate structure of the income tax with much less loss of equity. While greater use of commod-

ity taxes might appear to have somewhat greater anti-inflationary effect, per dollar of revenue, much of the advantage would be lost if the tax were regarded as permanent, and all of the gain might be more than offset by wage increases generated by the higher cost of living. A more extensive and heavier excise system would increase the discrimination inherent in the present excise system; a general levy would be more burdensome on the lower income groups and would result in duplication with the major tax source of the states, the retail sales tax. A basic dilemma is also encountered on the question of the choice of types of sales tax. One at the retail level, probably on the whole the most acceptable form, involves collection from large numbers of firms and would directly duplicate the state levies. But a sales tax at the manufacturing level gives rise to substantial pyramiding of tax as merchants apply markup percentages to purchase prices which include tax. This would create serious problems of determining a suitable price figure to which the tax rate would be applied in fields in which some manufacturers have assumed wholesaling functions and sell directly to retailers or consumers, while competing firms have not.

On the whole, continued primary reliance on income taxation is to be preferred to increased use of excises or a federal sales tax on the basis of considerations of equity, inflation control, and economic development. The income tax conforms more closely to accepted standards of equity and probably has relatively little greater adverse production incentive effects than the commodity taxes. While its direct anti-inflationary effectiveness might appear to be less than that of consumption levies, this advantage is largely offset by the greater tendency of the latter to generate wage increases. The demand-shifting type of excise, however, may play a useful role in an inflationary situation in which some nonnecessary items are very scarce. In contrast to the limitations of commodity taxes, a well designed expenditure tax is without question far superior to an income tax as an anti-inflationary measure and avoids the inequities of commodity taxes. If further inflationary tendencies continue, this type of levy warrants much more attention than it has received in the past.

# The Payroll Taxes and Social Security

By PAUL G. CRAIG

ABSTRACT: The social security system encompasses a broad group of compulsory public and negotiated private quasi insurances which protect workers against the economic risks of death, old age, disability, and unemployment. The various parts of this system cover from 25 per cent to 95 per cent of all workers. And the combined revenues of the public and private programs are around 25 billion dollars per year. There are two approaches to an analysis of the economic stability effects of this system, a cash flows approach and a tax incidence approach. Analyzed on a cash flows basis, social security has had very slight influence on economic stability. Analyzed from an incidence point of view, social security programs have been slightly inflationary. But because of the similarity of the propensities to consume in the various income strata, this influence is negligible. Hopes that alternative methods of financing might make the social security system into an effective instrument of countercyclical fiscal policy are largely groundless for several reasons. The institutional complexity of the system, the basic purposes which it serves, and the size of the federal budget all preclude significant changes in financing.

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*Paul G. Craig, Ph.D., Watertown, Massachusetts, Associate Professor of Economics, The Ohio State University, is a Ford Foundation Faculty Fellow at Harvard University for 1959–60. He served as Economist in the Division of Research and Statistics, The Ohio Bureau of Unemployment Compensation in 1953. Since 1956 he has served part time as Economist in the Bureau of Business Research, The Ohio State University, and presently he is a member of the visiting faculty of the School of Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology. Dr. Craig is co-author with Edison L. Bowers and William Papier of Financing Unemployment Compensation (1956). He has contributed articles to The Encyclopedia Britannica Yearbook and various professional journals. His principal areas of study are social security and business fluctuations.*

WHAT do payroll taxes and social security have to do with inflation and economic stability? To answer this question one must first define what is meant by social security and payroll taxes. This immediately leads to a problem of scope. Not all worker benefits which one might logically call social security are financed by payroll taxes. Should all of the benefits be considered or only those financed by payroll taxes? For the purposes of this paper, we shall determine our scope in terms of benefits rather than the more narrow dimensions of tax-financed benefits.

Social security means different things to different people. To the man on the street it usually means one specific thing, the federal Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI). This is the program which requires a worker to have a "social security" card and a "social security" number. It is financed by a combination of a payroll tax on employers and withholdings from the earnings of workers. It is a compulsory public insurance which provides some security against the economic insecurities associated with old age, premature death, and disability; hence the appropriate title, social security.

To some people social security has a broader meaning. It includes all compulsory public programs of a quasi-insurance nature which protect workers against the economic risks of death, old age, disability, and unemployment. This definition encompasses OASDI; the state unemployment compensation systems; the state workmen's compensation laws covering job-connected disability; and the special programs covering similar risks for railroad workers, merchant seamen and the employees of the federal, state, and local governments.

It is increasingly common, however, to define social security by including all of these public programs and the private ones which supplement and/or extend them. Business firms now provide large numbers of workers with group life insurance, hospitalization and medical benefits, temporary disability or sick leave pay, old-age pensions, and supplemental unemployment benefits. These private employee benefits are similar in intent and effect to their public counterparts and are distinguished from them by the facts that they are not compulsory and not tax financed. Together the public and private benefit programs constitute the rather unique American social security system.

## MAGNITUDE OF SOCIAL SECURITY

This broadly defined social security system looms large in our economy. Its effects on individuals, business, and society are far reaching. The various public programs cover from 65 per cent to 95 per cent of all workers. The private benefits, excluding the relatively new supplemental unemployment benefits, cover from 25 per cent to 60 per cent of all workers. In the single year of 1957, the most recent year for which complete data are available, the public social security activities had receipts from all sources of 14.5 billion dollars and paid benefits of 12.6 billion dollars.[1] The private programs had estimated 1957 receipts of 9.9 billion dollars and expenditures of 5.6 billion dollars.[2] Thus in one year the whole social security system had revenues of 24.4 billion dollars and expenditures of 18.2 billion dollars. The revenues were slightly more than 10 per cent of the total wage and salary bill of the United States economy, and the benefits paid were over 7.5 per cent of total wages and salaries.

[1] U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement* (Washington, D. C.: United States Printing Office, 1957), p. 14.

[2] Alfred M. Skolnik and Joseph Zisman, "Growth in Employee-Benefit Plans, 1954–57," *Social Security Bulletin*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (March 1959), p. 10.



Although a social security system of such magnitude certainly has many effects, we are concerned here only with the effects on economic stability and the problems of inflation and deflation. There are two approaches to analysis of this aspect of social security. One attempts to answer first the incidence question, that is, who really pays for the benefits—workers, through lower money wages than they otherwise would have received; property owners, through lower profits; rents, and interest receipts; or consumers, through higher prices. This approach then proceeds to analyze the stability effects of the incidence conclusions. The other approach ignores the incidence question and concentrates on the aggregate flow of spendable income as it is affected by social security. This approach is justified in part at least by the fact that the marginal propensities to consume and save are quite similar for different income groups.

## SOCIAL SECURITY CASH FLOWS

Regardless of who ultimately bears the cost of social security, the taxes, contributions, and insurance premiums which finance the system are a subtraction from someone's current income. They therefore reduce someone's ability to spend. Likewise, social security benefits are an addition to someone's current income and increase someone's ability to spend. If, during each accounting period, the receipts of the system equaled its expenditures, the system would make no net change in aggregate spendable income. True, there would be transfers of spending power within the economy but no change in the volume of spending power. Assuming that the transfer process did not influence personal or business behavior in a destabilizing way, such a social security system would be neutral in regard to economic stability.

The social security system can be classified into three basic financing groups—nonreserve accumulating, increasing reserve accumulating, and variable reserve. Each class has different stability effects and must be analyzed separately.

### *Disability, medical, retirement, and death benefits*

Disability and medical benefits are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis. For each accounting period, the payments into the system are about equal to disbursements. Except for small actuarial reserves to meet random variations in annual costs, these programs are nonreserve accumulating and have no significant stability effects.

Retirement and death benefits programs are increasing reserve accumulating until they reach maturity, that is until the number of persons in the system and the average age of those persons both stabilize. Since the labor force is growing, the average age of the population is changing, and retirement and death benefits programs are being extended to an increasing share of the population, these programs will continue for some time to be increasing reserve accumulating. Thus, this part of the social security system extracts from the income stream more money than it puts back. In the twenty-two years that OASDI has been in effect it has accumulated reserves of 21.4 billion dollars.[3] It has, therefore, acted as a form of forced saving which has tended to depress or restrain the economy. Since for most of this time, the economy has experienced gradual inflation, the reserve accumulation has had a desirable stabilizing influence. Without it the inflation probably would have been

[3] *Social Security Bulletin*, Vol. 22, No. 5 (May 1959), p. 27.

greater. Private pension programs are estimated to have 34.8 billion dollars in reserves and may be construed to have similar effects on the economy.[4]

The combined reserves of the public and private retirement and death benefit funds are equal to 1.8 per cent of the total wages and salaries paid in the United States in the last twenty-two years. Such a rate of forced savings has a considerable restraining influence on our economy. One might raise the point that these reserves are not idle cash hoards. They have been invested and thereby have found their way back into the spending stream. But the investments, or expenditures, which they financed certainly would have taken place even in the absence of these savings. For example, almost the entire OASDI reserve and a substantial part of the private pension funds are invested in the federal debt. This debt was incurred largely to finance World War II and the Korean conflict. Had the retirement funds not been available for loan, the government would have borrowed the money elsewhere, largely from banks. Such bank borrowing would have added to inflation, whereas the borrowing of pension reserves did not.

*Unemployment benefits*

The unemployment compensation system is based on variable reserves. These reserves are quite substantial, but they are no larger now than at the end of World War II. Total public unemployment compensation reserves were 6.6 billion dollars in December 1944 and 6.4 billion dollars in March 1959.[5] Over fifteen postwar years, involving three recessions, the system has been in approximate fiscal balance. For shorter time periods, however, the system has not been in fiscal balance. Aggregate state reserves increased by about 2 billion dollars in the four years 1944–48, thereby reducing the flow of spendable incomes in those inflationary years. In 1949 reserves declined 740 million dollars, increasing the flow of purchasing power during the recession. From December 1949 to December 1953 reserves rose by 1,777 million dollars, helping to curb spending power during the Korean inflation. Reserves fell 808 million dollars during the recession year of 1954. In the three following years reserves grew by 361 million dollars. Then in the fifteen months from December 1957 through March 1959, reserves declined 2,685 million dollars, by far the sharpest rate of decline since unemployment compensation began.[6]

These fluctuations in unemployment compensation reserves are stabilizing in nature. However, when the changes in reserves are compared to the total flow of wage and salary income, it becomes obvious that the stabilizing effect of unemployment compensation financing is quite negligible. In none of the time periods described above was the change in reserves as high as 1 per cent of the wage and salary income for the period. By far the greatest stabilizing influence came in the fifteen months preceding March 1959, and here the decline in reserves was only 0.9 per cent of the wage and salary income for the period.

The conclusion to be drawn from an analysis of the social security system relative to spendable income flows is that the system has only a slight effect on economic stability. The bulk of this

[4] Skolnick and Zisman, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), p. 12.

[5] *Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement* (Washington, D. C.: United States Printing Office, 1957), p. 17; and U. S. Department of Labor, *The Labor Market and Employment Security* (Washington, D. C.: United States Printing Office, May 1959), p. 57.

[6] All of the data on unemployment compensation reserves are taken from the *Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1957*, p. 17.



effect may be attributed to the reserve accumulation process in OASDI and private pension funds. As a whole, social security cash flows have been slightly deflationary. During a period of inflation this has been salutary. If we were to again be faced with secular deflation, the system's financing could be cause for concern.

## PAYROLL TAX INCIDENCE

Turning from the cash flows to an incidence approach, the analysis is more complex and uncertain. Over the years a majority of writers on incidence have concluded that payroll taxes are ultimately borne by workers. This was especially true of those writing before World War II and was a basic doctrine of neo-classical economics. H. G. Brown's 1922 article was a classic statement of the position. "An insurance premium . . . imposed upon employers . . . according to the number and wages of workers hired, will not raise prices in general and must fall upon wage-earners and upon wage-earners alone."[7]

A few writers such as A. M. Rosenson have concluded to the contrary that "Labor as such will escape the incidence of the [payroll] tax almost entirely."[8] Consumers and employers presumably will share the tax according to the degree of monopoly in the various industries. Almost all of these earlier conclusions, however, are the result of deductive reasoning, little empirical work being possible. Recent improvements in data, although inadequate to settle the issue, have shaken the certainty of current students of the problem. R. A. Musgrave, certainly one of the most capable and empirical students of public finance, concludes that "the search for quantitative estimates of tax incidence leads the explorer through a wasteland of muddled concepts, inadequate theory, and lack of data."[9] Professor Carl Shoup, in discussing research to answer the incidence question and the public policy issues involved concludes that ". . . the difficulties are indeed so formidable that the product would not be of material assistance with respect to deciding the broad question of policy . . . ."[10]

Most recent students have come to agree with L. H. Kimmel who says, "We conclude . . . that no general rule can be laid down as to who ultimately bears the pay-roll taxes imposed on employers."[11] In a dynamic economy which is continuously in a process of change, the effects of payroll taxes are so blurred that any causal sequence is all but impossible to establish.

*Labor's share of income*

We know that labor's share, including wages and fringes, of total income has increased in the last thirty years, both within homogeneous sectors of the economy and in the economy as a whole.[12] But in assessing the role played

[7] Harry Gunnison Brown, "The Incidence of Compulsory Insurance of Workmen," *The Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (February 1922), p. 70.

[8] Alex Moses Rosenson, "Monetary Effects of Wartime Social Security Taxes," *The Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 40, No. 6 (December 1942), p. 892.

[9] R. A. Musgrave, J. J. Carroll, L. D. Cook, and L. Frane, "Distribution of Tax Payments by Income Groups: A Case Study for 1948," *National Tax Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 1951), p. 1.

[10] Carl Shoup, *The Prospects for A Study of the Economic Effects of Payroll Taxes* (Washington: Social Science Research Council, 1941), p. 2.

[11] Lewis H. Kimmel, *Taxes and Economic Incentives* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1950), p. 181.

[12] Research by the author, using the National Income data of the United States Department of Commerce, indicates that the compensation of employees, including fringe benefits and social security contributions, increased from 58.7 per cent of total national income in 1929 to 70.7 per cent in 1956. Much of this increase is attributable to struc-

by social security benefits it must be recognized that they are only a small part of total labor gains. Furthermore, collective bargaining gains only partly explain labor's increased share of national income. Bargaining has taken place during a period of broad government intervention in the economy and significant changes in the structure of the economy. Federal housing and tax policies have reduced the rent share of total income. Monetary policies have reduced the interest share. The decline in agriculture, a decline in the relative importance of business proprietorships, the relative increase in government in employment, and the relative increase in manufacturing and service industries all have contributed to a decline in the property share and rise in the labor share in national income. We may conclude, therefore, that some part of social security costs have been borne by employers, but exactly what part is uncertain. We cannot conclude that all of social security costs were borne by employers because we do not know what would have happened to money wages and other benefits in the absence of social security.

*Productivity and prices*

We know also that in the postwar years, especially since Korea, labor's compensation, wages plus fringes, has increased faster than productivity. From 1947 to 1956 man-hour productivity in the private nonagricultural sector of the economy increased 26.1 per cent and average money wages per hour rose by 61.4 per cent. Until 1950 productivity and hourly wages increased more or less together but from 1950 to 1956, the productivity index (1947 = 100) increased by 12.8 percentage points while the hourly wage index rose 42.9 percentage points. Throughout this period prices increased. The logical conclusion is that part of labor's gains, including social security, was paid for by consumers.[18] The summary conclusion from incidence analysis is that, although we cannot separate social security benefits from other labor gains, their cost obviously is diffused among workers, employers, and consumers, with the two latter groups carrying most of the load. What does this mean in terms of the stability effects of social security?

*The effects of incidence*

That part of social security cost borne by workers serves either to transfer income from one group of workers to another, or, in the case of individual workers, to transfer the effective receipt of income from one point of time to another. Since such transfers are mainly horizontal, that is, not up and down among income strata, they have little influence on aggregate spending. To the extent that the social security system has accumulated cash balances, the effect has been to increase worker savings. This is deflationary.

To the extent that employers have borne the cost of social security, there has been some transfer of income from upper income property owners to lower- and middle-income wage and salary workers. However, available evidence suggests that the marginal propensities to consume are very similar at different income levels, with only slightly higher propensities among lower income groups. When we recognize that part of the income transferred to the lower income groups goes into forced savings, we must conclude that the relative balance between the flows of spending and saving is little affected by this part of incidence. The stability effects are negligible.

Finally, that part of social security paid for by consumers through higher prices is obviously inflationary. But, as was pointed out earlier, social security benefits are a relatively small part of aggregate labor gains, and their share of any inflationary pressures stemming from labor-cost increases must be correspondingly small.

Social security programs have brought considerable economic stability into the lives of individual persons. But, whether analyzed on a cash flows or an incidence basis, they have had little influence on the stability of the economy as a whole. Only unemployment benefits have countercyclical financing effects, and even here the influence is so minor as to be washed away in the broader flow of events in business fluctuations.

## ALTERNATIVE FINANCING

Over the years there has always been some interest in proposals to finance social security out of the general revenue fund rather than through specific ear-marked payroll taxes. Some exponents of such a change favor it as a means of redistributing income, arguing that general revenue financing would place a larger share of social security costs on upper income groups through the effects of the progressive income tax. More commonly, however, general revenue financing has been proposed as an instrument of countercyclical finance. Present payroll taxes continue to take in large tax receipts even in recession, consequently social security cash flows have little stabilizing effect. Supposedly, if social security were financed out of general revenues, the receipts of the system could be varied in a countercyclical way, making large contributions out of general revenues into social security funds during prosperity and little or no contribution in recession.

There are many objections to general revenue financing and postwar developments have strengthened most of them. The social security system is not primarily a stability device. It is a program of compulsory insurance to bring basic economic security into the lives of individuals. To perform this function the actuarial soundness of its finances must be secured, and this requires that the finances be relatively free from transient political pressures. Furthermore, to protect the system from abuse and to preserve the dignity of the participants, the program must be viewed as one of worker rights not charity. Payroll taxes and employee contributions serve these purposes better than general revenue fund appropriations.

In the last twenty-five years big government has come to stay. This has brought with it two strong new objections to general revenue financing for social security. First, the general revenue budget is already large enough to allow adequate room for countercyclical fiscal policy. The federal budget is around 15 to 16 per cent of the Gross National Product and shows little evidence of declining. There is no need to add social security into the budget just to make it large enough for pur-

tural changes in the economy such as the decline in agriculture, in which labor payments are a small share of output, and a rise in manufacturing and service industries, in which wages are a large share of output. However, even after correcting the data to allow for these structural changes, employee compensation increased to 64.2 per cent of national income by 1956. Out of seventeen major manufacturing industry groups studied, labor's share of output increased in 12. In the Transportation Equipment industry, for example, labor's share of output increased from 83.8 per cent in 1929 to 89.6 per cent in 1956. In the Metal and Metal Products industries labor's share increased from 72.7 per cent to 78.7 per cent.

[18] U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Productivity, Earnings, Costs and Prices in the Private Non-Agricultural Sector of the Economy, 1947–1956," May 13, 1957. Mimeographed.

poses of manipulation. Second, a budget as large as the government now has forces us to use a broad array of taxes to finance it. The dimensions of federal spending have gone far beyond the point at which we might expect the "rich" to pay the bills. If social security financing were put into the general revenue fund, it is almost certain that the present payroll taxes or similar counterparts would be used to supplement the general revenues.

## CONCLUSION

We have a social security system that has greatly improved the lives of millions of citizens. It does so without adverse effects on economic stability and growth. Considering its basic purposes and the size of modern government that is the best we can hope for. Social security can and will be improved, but its financing will remain largely unchanged.

# A Federal Tax Program to Promote Economic Stability and Growth

By LEWIS H. KIMMEL

ABSTRACT: Federal tax policy is no longer based on the assumption that an annually balanced budget is essential. Increasing taxes to maintain budgetary balance during a recession or depression would be construed as a perverse approach to fiscal policy. The built-in stabilizing features of the tax structure are regarded favorably by economists, members of Congress, and government officials. Federal tax policy can be helpful in preventing or controlling inflation. Not all inflationary situations can be controlled by increases in taxes; marked rises in taxes in themselves have dislocating effects. Sharp changes in federal expenditures have been more important as an inflation-making factor than postwar deficits. The bases for the personal and corporate income taxes should be strengthened. Inclusion of sources of income now excluded and the elimination of various forms of favored treatment would permit appreciable reductions in tax rates.

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*Lewis H. Kimmel, Ph.D., Washington, D. C., is a member of the senior research staff of The Brookings Institution. He is the author of Governmental Costs and Tax Levels (1948), Taxes and Economic Incentives (1950), Share Ownership in the United States (1952), and Federal Budget and Fiscal Policy 1789–1958 (1959). He is currently engaged in a study of the evolution of state and local finance.*

THE federal tax system is widely criticized and occasionally commended. Critics hold that the tendency to narrow or contract our leading tax bases is an especially grave defect. A few have asserted that the present tax system is not a "system" in any meaningful sense. On the other hand, those who feel that the federal tax system is entitled to at least modest commendation stress its productivity. Rather than being inadequate, an enormous flow of revenues has been maintained.

The position here taken is an intermediate one.[1] Excluding the fiscal year 1959, federal postwar budgets in the aggregate came close to balance and on a cash basis there was a surplus.[2] In the circumstances, any charge of fiscal inadequacy would be meaningless. Considering the postwar record, it would be difficult to sustain the claim that federal taxes have seriously retarded economic growth. At the same time, a realistic appraisal suggests that improvements are desirable.

## THE NEW FOCUS OF TAX AND BUDGET POLICY

Throughout most of our history federal tax policy was predicated on the assumption that an annually balanced budget was essential, except in time of war. The goal of tax policy as recently as the early 1930's was a volume of revenues that would restore a balanced budget. In the depth of the depression, rates for existing taxes were increased, additional taxes were enacted, and a broadly based sales tax was strongly urged—in the hope that the budget could be brought into balance. Tax and other revenues equal to expenditures were thought to be a necessity if confidence was to be regained and private investment flows restored.

The change in outlook in recent decades is well illustrated by the "economic principles" formulated by the Joint Economic Committee in 1956. The first principle is:

> Federal tax policy should recognize that the level of tax revenues in relation to the amount of government expenditures has an important bearing on the level of economic activity. This would tend to result in federal surpluses and debt retirement during prosperous and boom periods and deficits during recessions and depressions.

The committee believed that:

> increasing taxes to maintain federal revenue in balance with expenditures during a recession is a force toward deepening the recession. By the same token, maintaining a budget balance by reducing tax rates when a budget surplus emerges from inflationary expansion of income could serve to reinforce inflationary pressures.[3]

The second principle is: "Tax policy should improve the automatic stabilization potential built into the federal revenue system." The committee expressed its satisfaction with the "built-in features" of the present tax structure, though it was recognized that automatic stabilization features cannot fully counteract fluctuations in economic activity. Automatic or built-in stabilizers are elements of governmental revenues and expenditures that operate to increase or decrease output or spending power. They are set in motion by a decline or rise in economic activity without the necessity of formal action for the purpose of effecting such increases or decreases. In the committee's view, increasing the capacity of the tax system to provide automatic stabilization is an important factor in federal tax policy. Enhancing the built-in flexibility of the revenue system would require mainly strengthening the individual and corporate income taxes.[4]

One who approves the present built-in features of the tax structure, together with improvement of the automatic stabilization potential, cannot logically favor an annually balanced budget. Perhaps less apparent is the absence of any conflict between acceptance of automatic stabilization as a guide to policy and a balanced budget over a longer period such as a complete business cycle. Adoption of automatic stabilization as a guide to policy does not mean that the balanced budget concept has ceased to be meaningful. What it does mean is that approval of automatic stabilization as a leading component of fiscal policy cannot be harmonized with the annually balanced budget philosophy.

The turn-about in tax and budget policy is little short of amazing. A concerted effort to increase tax revenues during a serious recession, in the expectation that a balanced budget and fiscal soundness would thereby be maintained, would be construed as a perverse approach to fiscal policy. The change in our thinking is illustrated by pronouncements concerning the income tax. Until the mid-1930's the tendency of income tax revenues to decline more than proportionately with changes in national income was regarded as a principal disadvantage of this form of taxation. With the more recent emphasis on automatic stabilization, this disadvantage has become a virtue.

Most economists hold that if tax and budget policy are to make their maximum contribution to economic stability, discretionary action may be needed as a supplement to the built-in stabilizers. A tax reduction, it is said, is likely to be more effective than an increase in public works or other expenditures. Under the withholding system, a tax reduction will be reflected promptly in increased disposable income. Moreover, it is possible to time the termination of the reduction in accordance with the requirements of the economy. In contrast, a public works program cannot be started at full speed when it is approved, and there is always a possibility that the impact on consumer buying power will be strongest when it is no longer required.

Under our system of divided powers the implementation of discretionary fiscal measures is not an easy matter. Partly for this reason, it has been suggested that some form of formula flexibility might provide an appropriate supplement to the built-in stabilizers. Under formula flexibility a law might be enacted providing that the first-bracket rate for the personal income tax be reduced from 20 per cent to 15 or 10 per cent and withholding rates lowered proportionately, if unemployment exceeded 4.5 or 5 millions for a period of say 3 months. Formula flexibility would be a sort of half-way measure between automatic stabilization in a strict sense and discretionary action.[5]

## FEDERAL TAXES AND INFLATION

A reasonably stable price level is widely recognized as a necessary condition for economic stability and orderly economic progress. Is the federal tax system helpful in controlling inflation? Do federal taxes in themselves contribute to inflation?

[1] The views expressed in this article are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the other staff members or the administrative officers of The Brookings Institution.

[2] Budget receipts for the twelve fiscal years 1947–58 combined covered all but 12.6 billion dollars or 1.9 per cent of budget expenditures. On a cash basis, receipts from the public—general, special, and trust funds—exceeded payments to the public by almost 19 billion dollars, or 2.6 per cent.

[3] *Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability*, Senate Report 1310, 84th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D. C.: United States Printing Office, 1956), pp. 2–3.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.

[5] A decade ago a committee of the American Economic Association recommended formula flexibility as a subject for further exploration. *American Economic Review*, Vol. 39 (1949), p. 1268.

Federal and other taxes are helpful in controlling inflation. This conclusion rests upon a simple theory. Inflationary pressures arise because of market demands for goods and services in excess of supplies available at prevailing prices. To prevent or eliminate inflationary pressures, the combined demands of consumers, purchasers of capital goods, and government must be held or reduced to an appropriate level. This goal may be achieved, it is reasoned, by setting tax rates at a point where private expenditures for consumer and capital goods will be in balance with available supplies at constant prices.[6]

To anyone familiar with postwar financial and economic developments, it is obvious that the large deficits of the war years, the enormous backlog of unfilled needs at the end of the war, and the large volume of liquid assets in the hands of consumers contributed importantly to the postwar inflation. What is less well understood is that postwar federal deficits in themselves have not been a dominant reason for inflation.[7] Sharp changes in federal expenditures have been far more important. It is not denied that a more vigorous tax policy might have had a dampening effect on aggregate demand and pressures on the price structure. On theoretical grounds, it can be argued that a sufficiently high structure of tax rates can halt inflation. But in practice the dislocating effects that would be produced cannot be ignored.[8]

The point we wish to emphasize is that at times pressures throughout the economy may become so strong that inflationary tendencies are not controllable by any tax policy that would be acceptable. An especially troublesome problem arises when there are sharp changes in the direction of demand; for example, in situations such as the Korean outbreak. In the absence of rigid price controls, increased demands for goods in excess of available supplies are inevitably reflected in some rises in prices. Holding the price level constant assumes a forced reduction in other prices. When the economy is buoyant, this may prove to be virtually impossible.

The weakness of the position that a vigorous tax policy, which will yield substantial surpluses when combined demands emanating from the private and public sectors are unusually strong, can prevent inflation was demonstrated in 1948. At the beginning of the year inflationary pressures were recognized as a "major threat to the stability of the American economy." A large cash budget surplus was in the making, but action to reduce the size of the surplus was not deemed desirable. Because of the strength of other demands, deferral of public works—federal, state, and local—was recommended wherever feasible.[9] When the accounts for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1948, were available, the budget surplus was 8.4 billion dollars and the cash surplus was 8.8 billion dollars. Revenues exceeded payments by approximately one fourth.[10]

[6] Lester Chandler, "Taxation as an Instrument for Inflation Control," in *The Limits of Taxable Capacity* (Princeton, N. J.: Tax Institute, 1953), pp. 97 ff. An alternative method would be to reduce governmental expenditures.

[7] Federal cash receipts from the public for the period 1947–58, as pointed out previously, exceeded payments to the public by almost 19 billion dollars.

[8] "Taxes reduce purchasing power, but not homogeneously. Therefore they have destabilizing effects of their own." Kenyon E. Poole, "Tax Policy's Effect on Inflation," in *Proceedings*, Fiftieth Annual Conference on Taxation, 1957 (Harrisburg, Pa.: National Tax Association, 1958), pp. 359–60.

[9] *Economic Report of the President*, Jan. 14, 1958 (Washington, D. C.: United States Printing Office, 1958), pp. 47, 98.

[10] *Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1950* (Washington, D. C.: United States Printing Office, 1949), pp. A 4, A 123



To those who held that inflation was principally a consequence of deficit financing, continuation of inflation when the government was running a large surplus posed a dilemma. The situation was well summarized in a report of the Joint Economic Committee. The inflationary condition, the Republican majority stated, "is due to our attempt to accomplish more than is possible at our present capacity for production." Liberal credit policies and low interest rates facilitated the expansion of the many large programs the people and the government were carrying on.

> [The] attempt to carry them all on at once, with very little restraint in the field of consumer spending and liberal credit policies, is the basic reason for inflation, which otherwise could hardly coincide with a large Government surplus.[11]

In considering the second question—whether federal taxes may contribute to inflation—an economic budget with the federal accounts in balance will be assumed. Opinions concerning the incidence and price effects of leading taxes often differ, but there is universal agreement that all taxes involve the appropriation by government of a portion of the annual income that otherwise would be available for consumer expenditures and private capital expansion.[12] All taxes have what may be called a generalized incidence. An obvious corollary is that some price effects attributable to taxes are inevitable when government requirements are as large as they have been in recent decades.

The price level is definitely higher because of federal taxes. Manufacturers' excises are largely reflected in higher prices, and the retailers' excises are added specifically to the base price. That is, the incidence of these taxes is mainly on the consumer. To an indeterminate degree prices are higher by reason of customs duties. Although levies on imports account for only a minor portion of federal revenues, the cost-of-living and regressive arguments that were long prominent features of tariff debates have not lost all meaning.

The situation concerning the corporate income tax is less clear. Ever since the *Galveston* decision of 1922, regulatory commissions have taken the position that the fair rate of return to which utilities are entitled is an "after income-tax" return.[13] Numerous executives of large manufacturing and other companies, especially in administered price industries, hold that this tax is taken into account in determining price schedules and is reflected in price. The use of a target return on capital investment in setting prices lends support to this view.[14] There is of course nothing inconsistent between the view that the short-run incidence of the corporate income tax is on the share owner and the idea that over a period of time a substantial portion of this tax may be reflected in price.

It is almost universally assumed that the incidence of the personal income tax is on the taxpayer—that is, the tax is

[11] Senate Report 1358, 80th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D. C.: United States Printing Office, 1948), pp. 3–4.

[12] Inheritance and other death duties may appear to be an exception. To the extent that these taxes are covered by liquidation of assets, there is "dissaving" which in most circumstances merely means a somewhat lower volume of net saving.

[13] Galveston Electric Co. v. City of Galveston, 258 U. S. 388.

[14] A. D. H. Kaplan, Joel B. Dirlam, and Robert F. Lanzillotti, *Pricing in Big Business* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1958), pp. 8, 128, 130 ff. "Target return on investment was probably the most commonly stressed of company pricing goals." P. 130. See also the author's *Taxes and Economic Incentives* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1950), pp. 27–31.

not shifted. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that high rates for this tax may contribute to higher prices. The emphasis on take-home pay in wage negotiations, particularly in the early postwar years, lends support to this view. Though the level of wages may be somewhat higher because of personal income taxes, it does not necessarily follow that a substantial portion of the tax is shifted. To the extent that personal income taxes have influenced wage decisions, they have also affected costs and the level of prices. The end result is probably some redistribution of the burden of personal income taxes, rather than the shifting of an appreciable part of the burden.

There is nothing inconsistent between the two principal conclusions reached in this section: (1) that federal tax policy is a valuable aid in the control of inflation; and (2) that federal taxes contribute to a higher level of prices. The first conclusion follows logically from an appraisal from the demand side, whereas the second was reached from the cost or supply side. With the economy in balance and inflationary pressures completely absent, the second conclusion would still be valid.

## TAX POLICY AND TAX BASES

A federal tax system that will facilitate economic growth is a principal goal of fiscal policy.[15] A fundamental requirement if the federal tax structure is to be improved is a broadening of leading tax bases. The federal personal income tax is imposed on a base equal to less than one half of the income of the American people.[16] Underreporting and evasion account for part of the difference between estimated personal income and total income reported on tax returns. Thus, there is reason to believe that entrepreneurial income from farming is seriously underreported. Dividends and interest continue to be unreported in substantial amounts. The present exclusion of old-age and survivors insurance and railroad retirement benefits should be re-examined. Under present practice, interest on state and local bonds and other obligations is excluded from gross income. Another line of attack involves the capital gains provisions. Re-examination and general tightening of all provisions under which income from various sources is accorded capital gains treatment would result in some broadening of the tax base and an even larger proportionate expansion of revenues.

The optional standard deduction should be discontinued. Taxpayers are now entitled to a deduction of 10 per cent of adjusted gross income or $1,000 —whichever is lower. This deduction can be claimed even though the taxpayer would not have any allowable deductions if only itemized deductions were allowed. Since the tax advantage is available, regardless of whether any contributions are made, the optional deduction works to the disadvantage of charitable, educational, and scientific organizations that derive all or part of their income from contributions. For this reason, it is opposed by the National Council of Churches, among other organizations. This deduction is in effect "a premium for not giving." From an equity standpoint the optional standard deduction seems indefensible. A middle-income married couple with other allowable deductions of $100 that gives $900 per annum for charitable, educational, and religious purposes obtains no tax advantage whatever, as compared with a couple similarly situated that does not contribute to such institutions. For the latter couple the optional standard deduction is equivalent to an additional exemption of $900.

The desirability of deductions on account of contributions for charitable, educational, and religious purposes is universally accepted. The only question relates to the level of permissible allowances. Since World War II, allowable deductions were increased from 15 to 20 per cent of adjusted gross income and later to 30 per cent provided the additional 10 per cent goes to specified purposes. These contributions are used for purposes strongly affected with a public interest. On the other hand, one may well ask: Is there any higher public purpose than the adequate defense of the United States? This question, it is believed, should be carefully weighed in any re-examination of these deductions.[17]

The base for the corporate income tax is substantially smaller than the optimum. It has been estimated that for 1955 over 8 billion dollars of corporate income was excluded from the base for this tax. A first policy goal should be to prevent further erosion. A second and equally important goal should be the subjection of all provisions that authorize or permit exclusion or special treatment of income to the closest scrutiny, with a view to broadening the base. In particular, the depletion allowances and all cases of special treatment for specific industries should be re-examined.[18]

For American taxpayers generally, broadening the federal income tax bases is of vital importance. Equity considerations alone suggest the desirability of this course. It is obvious that the broader the tax base, the lower the rate schedule required to yield a given volume of revenue. The possibilities in this regard were fully explored in the careful analyses of Pechman and Hellmuth. Pechman concluded that a personal income tax rate schedule with rates ranging from 15 to 68 per cent, instead of the present 20 to 91 per cent, might be possible. Similarly, Hellmuth's study indicated that corporate income tax rates of 21 per cent on the first $25,000 and 43 per cent on all above $25,000 might be feasible; present rates are 30 per cent and 52 per cent.

Public policies with respect to tax bases, allowances, and exemptions are deeply rooted in conceptions of the role of government that are now largely outmoded. Throughout the nineteenth century and the first third of the present century, government was viewed primarily as a burden on the private sector of the economy. Underlying most discussions of taxes and governmental activities was the assumption that public expenditures are less desirable than private spending. The complementarity of private and public activities stressed by Henry Carter Adams, among others, had not yet gained wide acceptance. Allowances for contributions to charitable institutions and the like were justified

[15] It is important to keep in mind that growth is one among a number of objectives. See Norman B. Ture, "Economic Growth and Federal Tax Policy," in *Proceedings* of the Fifty-first Annual Conference on Taxation, 1958 (Harrisburg, Pa.: National Tax Association, 1959), pp. 388 ff.

[16] *The Federal Revenue System: Facts and Problems 1959*, Materials Assembled by the Committee Staff for the Joint Economic Committee, 86th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D. C.: US Printing Office, 1959), p. 9.

[17] For a discussion of the erosion of the personal income tax base, see Joseph A. Pechman, "The Individual Income Tax Base," *Proceedings* of the Forty-eighth Annual Conference on Taxation, 1955 (Sacramento, Calif.: National Tax Association, 1956), pp. 304 ff.

[18] Because of space limitations, the possibilities of broadening the corporate tax base cannot here be considered in detail. See William F. Hellmuth, Jr., "Erosion of the Federal Corporation Income Tax Base," *ibid.*, pp. 315 ff. Depletion allowances and special treatment for specific industries affect the personal income tax base as well as the corporate tax base.

or rationalized on the ground they were for a higher public use.

Acceptance of the modern view that private and governmental activitites are complementary does not invalidate the doctrine of higher public use. Rather, it merely requires that the order of priorities be re-examined. At the present juncture one may well ask: Is there any higher public use than the allocation to government of the financial and material resources required for the defense of the United States? Are any expenditures more important than those for public-school and higher education, including training in the advanced technology associated with the atomic space age?

# Managing the Public Debt

By B. U. RATCHFORD

ABSTRACT: Debt management includes decisions about the composition and terms, but not about the amount of the public debt. The heart of the countercyclical debt management theory is that short-term obligations provide liquidity and induce spending while long-term obligations do the reverse. The effects of such management are indirect, uncertain, and weak and may be redundant if monetary policy is adequate. Debt management is less flexible than monetary policy, and its effects may persist after a change of policy is required and thus become an obstacle to the effectiveness of monetary policy. In a recession, short-term financing tends to raise short-term interest rates and may delay a resumption of spending by offering attractive returns on funds. In recent years the average maturity of the debt has been declining, thus increasing the possibilities of inflation. The only two recent occasions on which the debt was lengthened moderately were in periods of recession; apparently the lengthening did not delay recovery. The potentialities of countercyclical debt management have been overemphasized in recent years, especially if an effective monetary policy is assumed. At least one competent student of the problem advocates substituting cost for economic stabilization as the proper criterion for debt management.

*B. U. Ratchford, Ph.D., Litt.D., Durham, N. C., is Professor of Economics at Duke University and has been on the staff of that institution since 1928. He has been Director of Research for the NPA Committee on the South and President of the Southern Economic Association and is now Chairman of the Inter-University Committee for Economic Reseach on the South. He has served with OPA, ECA, U. S. Military Government, and the IBRD Mission to Turkey. Dr. Ratchford has written various articles for professional journals and is the author or co-author of American State Debts (1941), Berlin Reparations Assignment (1947), Economic Resources and Policies of the South (1951), The Economy of Turkey (1951), and Public Expenditures in Australia (1959).*

IN recent years it has generally been accepted that countercyclical management of the federal debt is an important measure for the control of inflation and deflation. It does have significance as a stabilization device, but its importance has often been overestimated because of misconceptions about its nature, scope, and inherent capabilities.

Perhaps the most popular misconception about debt management is that it includes decisions about the amount of the debt. With one exception this is incorrect. Within limits—which may be very narrow when the debt ceiling is tight—Department of the Treasury officials can determine how large a cash balance to carry and where it will be deposited; these decisions may have significant effects of a monetary nature. But with this one exception, the size of the debt is determined by the results of fiscal policy—that is, decisions about revenues and expenditures.

Stein defines debt management as policy regarding the composition of the federal debt held outside the government and the Federal Reserve Banks. He notes that the size of the debt held outside the government is a matter of budget policy while the amount held by the Federal Reserve Banks is an aspect of monetary policy.[1] In much the same way, Murphy has pointed out that debt management is "bounded on one side by the factors determining the receipts and expenditures . . ." and "on the other side by monetary policy."[2]

[1] Herbert Stein, "Managing the Federal Debt." *The Journal of Law and Economics*, Vol. 1 (Oct. 1958), pp. 97–98.

[2] Henry C. Murphy, "Debt Management," in Kenyon E. Poole (Ed.), *Fiscal Policies and the American Economy* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951), p. 158. Murphy defines debt management in greater detail as the power "to fix the terms of new issues of public debt securities—that is, their maturities, rates of interest, redeemability or optional call provisions, tax exemption privileges, if any, and all other provisions of the contract between borrower and lender." *Ibid.*, p. 159.

Defined in this way, debt management loses much of its importance and tends to be overshadowed by fiscal and monetary policy. It is restricted even further when the managers of the debt must "meet the test of the market" with respect to interest rates, maturities, and other detailed provisions of the contract and when, as at present (July 1959), they are hamstrung by the rigid ceiling on the interest rate which may be offered on long-term bonds.

## THE THEORY OF DEBT MANAGEMENT

The effects of debt management upon incomes, the general price level, and economic activity are exerted only indirectly. Fiscal policy, by varying revenues and expenditures, can affect incomes directly. Monetary policy acts more indirectly; it can vary the supply of money, but changes in the velocity of money may offset or reduce the effects of changes in amount. Debt management exerts its effects still more indirectly since it operates upon the factors which influence the supply of money and of near money or money substitutes.

The theory that debt management can be used as a means of economic stabilization rests basically upon the proposition that the composition of the debt affects the liquidity of the economy. The reasoning is that short-term obligations are more liquid, more nearly like money, and better substitutes for money than are long-term obligations. The short-term obligations are safer and more appropriate investments for commercial banks if and when they wish to invest surplus funds. Nonbanking business firms and individuals can use them as a money substitute, reduce their holdings of real money, and thus increase the velocity of the money supply. This means that if the need is for greater liquidity and more spending, debt management should work toward a larger proportion of short-term obligations in the total debt while if the need is to restrain demand, lower liquidity, and reduce spending, it should work toward a higher proportion of long-term obligations.

But the control of liquidity is primarily the responsibility of monetary policy. If monetary policy is able to perform that function satisfactorily, the efforts of debt management to control liquidity may be superfluous and redundant. Or, since monetary and debt management policies are determined by separate agencies, the two policies may at times work at cross purposes. Thus the significant question would seem to be whether the monetary authorities can do the job alone, or, as Stein puts it, whether debt management can do anything that monetary policy cannot do. If not, Stein holds that here are two reasons why debt management should not be used for this particular purpose: (1) the division of responsibility between different agencies permits evasion of responsibility, and (2) countercyclical debt policy may have a cost in terms of other objectives, especially in interest cost.[3]

In certain respects it is possible to argue that, subject to a qualification noted below, monetary policy can do the job better without collaboration of debt management. Monetary policy can be reversed quickly and completely; changes in debt management policies require more time, are less complete, and at times may be quite difficult and even almost impossible. In fact, the postwar experience indicates that in practice debt management has been to a considerable extent a one-way street—toward shorter maturities and greater liquidity. As Robinson points out:

[3] Stein, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), p. 99.



> There is never any difficulty in making the public debt more liquid. . . . But the debt cannot be made less liquid quickly; this is a slow process. Barring authoritarian methods of refunding, the public debt can be made less liquid only by the slow process of selling investors on the advantages of buying new securities that are less liquid than those they are holding. And to get them to do this voluntarily would require offering various inducements, possibly of a fairly costly sort.[4]

Following a recession in which both monetary and debt policies have been directed toward greater liquidity and lower interest rates, it may be necessary to act quickly to forestall an incipient inflation. The central bank adopts measures to "mop up" excess funds and tighten credit, but large amounts of near money in the form of short-term obligations are afloat in the economy to blunt the effectiveness of monetary measures. These liquid assets increase what Smith calls "the resiliency of the financial system." The widely held public debt, he says, "has constituted a means of mobilizing the existing supply of funds more effectively in support of economic activity at times when the supply of new bank credit was being restricted by Federal Reserve policies."[5] Thus the overhang or delayed effects of debt policy may constitute an obstruction or a handicap to the effectiveness of monetary policy.

In another way countercyclical debt policy may defeat or weaken the effects of monetary policy. In a recession the object of monetary policy is to provide more liquidity in the economy. There can be little doubt that the central

[4] Roland I. Robinson, "Monetary Aspects of Fiscal Policy," in Poole (Ed.), *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), pp. 91–92.

[5] Warren L. Smith, "Some Unsettled Issues in Monetary Policy," in The Second Duke American Assembly, *United States Monetary Policy* (Durham, N. C.: Second Duke American Assembly, 1959), p. 20.

bank, if it is sufficiently determined, can create any amount of liquidity deemed desirable. But, of course, liquidity is not an end in itself; it is only a means to an end. The desired goal is to induce the holders of funds to resume spending. If at such a time the government is selling large amounts of short-term obligations, this will tend to raise short-term interest rates. Holders of funds then have the possibility of holding assets nearly the equivalent of money and at the same time realizing an attractive return on them. This may delay rather than speed the resumption of spending. The ultimate goal of monetary policy might be realized more speedily if the holders of funds had only the alternative of spending their funds, for investment or consumption, or of holding real money which yields no return. Again it must be emphasized that the central bank can, within reason, create any amount of bank reserves it wishes and thus drive down short-term interest rates to very low levels. However, in so doing it might have to flood the market with funds which could be troublesome when it became necessary to reverse policy.

Earlier it was noted that there was one qualification to the above argument. That qualification is that when it becomes desirable to induce an increase in the money supply, there must be available in the economy an adequate supply of liquid assets suitable for commercial banks to purchase and hold. Short- and medium-term obligations of the federal government are among the most desirable types of such assets.

It is the responsibility of debt management to see that there is available a proper amount of appropriate federal obligations to meet the needs of commercial banks. This, however, is no problem at present. In addition to the large amount of short- and medium-term federal obligations there is a ever-increasing amount of the obligations of state and local governmen which commercial banks buy and ho in substantial amounts. In any even this particular aspect of the problem more a matter of countering deflatio than it is of resisting inflation.

## OTHER ASPECTS OF DEBT MANAGEMENT

In recent years the Treasury ha waged a constant, and largely unsuccessful, struggle against a steady short ening of the debt. The passage of tim will bring about such a shortening un less medium- or long-term obligation are issued from time to time. In addition to the fact that it may cause too much liquidity, an excessive short-term debt carries two other dangers. First, the short maturities may be monetized by being purchased by commercial banks. "In lieu of an increase in near money we then face an increase in money itself."[6] Second, a large short-term debt requires the Treasury to go to the market frequently for refinancing. During such periods of financing, "the Federal Reserve cannot use its credit controls as freely as at other times" and this "may permit a kind of inflationary leakage to occur."[7]

Despite these dangers, there are several factors constantly pushing the Treasury toward excessive short-term financing. First, short-term rates are usually lower than long-term rates and thus long-term financing raises the interest cost. Second, short-term financing is more certain and reliable. Treasury Bills, the shortest obligations, can

[6] Henry C. Wallich, "Public Debt Management and Economic Stabilization Policy," in The Second Duke American Assembly, *op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), p. 37.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 37.



be offered on an auction basis, allowing the market to set its own rate; this avoids the danger of a failure because the Treasury has set a rate which is too low. Further, in refunding, the Treasury frequently offers holders of maturing securities a choice of several different maturities. "Typically the shortest issue offered becomes the 'anchor' of the operation which must assure its success if the longer issue or issues prove less attractive than anticipated."[8] Third, the Administration may decide against the use of long-term issues for political reasons. In 1956 and 1957, when countercyclical policy indicated the use of long-term obligations, both President Eisenhower and Secretary Humphrey stated that there would be no long-term issues because the federal government should not compete with housing, private firms, and state and local governments for long-term capital funds. Fourth, with respect to large institutional investors, the Treasury is competing with itself for long-term funds by offering guaranteed and insured mortgages which yield more than direct Treasury obligations. Finally, the market may be strongly averse to long-term issues and the Treasury may be unable to offer interest rates sufficient to sell such obligations. Since about the middle of 1958 the fear of inflation has driven many investors away from fixed dollar obligations and into equities. In the face of rising interest rates, the Treasury is caught by a ceiling on the rate of interest it can pay on bonds. It cannot offer a rate of interest which would enable it to sell bonds at par, and it has a strong aversion to selling bonds at a discount. As a result it can offer only short- and medium-term obligations.

In view of the potential dangers of an excessive short-term debt and of the many factors pushing the Treasury in that direction, perhaps the greatest contribution debt management could make to the fight against inflation would be to find some way to reduce the reliance of the Treasury on short-term financing. Actually, however, circumstances of recent years have forced a greater rather than a smaller reliance upon the shorter maturities. Within the past three years there has been a fundamental shift in the sources of funds available for the purchase of government obligations. This shift was especially evident in 1957 and 1958, but it is likely that important elements of it will be permanent. Table 1 gives a statistical summary of this shift; its implications for the future of debt management are of major importance.[9]

Briefly Table 1 shows that from 1947 through 1956 three sources provided nearly all of the funds for the purchase of government securities. In the order of their importance they were: United States government investment accounts; state and local governments; and miscellaneous investors, a considerable number of whom were foreigners. Together their net purchases amounted to about 4 billion dollars per year. But by 1958 conditions had changed radically; government investment accounts were liquidating investments to meet the heavy claims on them; state and local governments were turning to more attractive investments; and foreigners did not hold the dollar in such high regard in relation to their own currencies as formerly. The result was that these three groups made net sales of securities of 0.5 billion dollars in 1958. At the same time individuals, who had

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

[9] The data in this table cover all maturities and all holders of government securities, governmental as well as nongovernmental. This approach is dictated by the form in which the data are made available.

TABLE 1—CHANGES IN THE OWNERSHIP OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SECURITIES
(Amounts in $ billions)

| CLASS OF HOLDER | AVERAGE ANNUAL CHANGE, 1947–56 | CHANGE IN 1957 | CHANGE IN 1958 |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States Government Investment Accounts | +2.3 | +1.2 | −0.8 |
| Federal Reserve Banks | +0.2 | −0.7 | +2.2 |
| Commercial Banks | −1.5 | −0.2 | +8.1 |
| Mutual Savings Banks and Insurance Companies | −1.6 | −1.3 | −0.2 |
| Other (Nonfinancial) Corporations | +0.3 | −1.7 | +0.4 |
| State and Local Governments | +1.0 | +0.9 | +0.3 |
| Individuals | +0.3 | −0.5 | −1.7 |
| Miscellaneous Investors | +0.8 | +0.4 | ... |
| Total Debt | +1.7 | −1.7 | +8.0 |

Source: *Treasury Bulletin* (April 1958), p. 44.

been small net buyers, made net sales of 1.7 billion dollars of securities.

Between 1947 and 1956 commercial banks, mutual savings banks, and insurance companies, on the average, liquidated about 3 billion dollars of federal securities per year. In 1958 the demand for loans fell off and the Federal Reserve System lowered reserve requirements. Commercial banks made net purchases of 8.1 billion dollars of securities—almost exactly the amount by which the debt increased. By a fortuitous development, the Federal Reserve Banks were able to buy 2.2 billion dollars of securities without increasing bank reserves. Gold flowed out by about that same amount, and the Reserve Banks merely purchased securities to replace the reserves lost by the gold outflow.

Commercial banks are now selling securities again as the business boom progresses and credit is kept tight. The liquidation by government investment accounts has halted, but it will be a considerable time before they again buy as heavily as they did between 1947 and 1956. The Treasury must indeed look hard to find purchasers for any new securities it must sell and to replace old security holders who want to liquidate.

## THE PRACTICE VS. THE THEORY OF DEBT MANAGEMENT

With only a few small interruptions, the average maturity of the marketable debt of the United States has steadily declined since World War II. Between 1946 and 1951 the Treasury, in addition to rolling over bill issues weekly, engaged in fifty-six debt operations. None of the issues offered to the public ran for as long as five years and only three ran for as long as two years.[10] In the meantime the average maturity fell from about eleven years at the end of the war to six years, seven months on June 30, 1951.

The Eisenhower Administration came to power pledged to lengthen the debt and made several efforts to do so. It scored a few temporary successes but on the whole lost ground. The average maturity fell from five years, four months in 1953 to four years, nine months at the end of February 1959.

[10] See my article, "Some Aspects of Debt Management in the United States," *Public Finance* (No. 2/1955), p. 135.



It is impossible to measure what contribution, if any, the shortening of the debt made toward the inflation which has prevailed generally since World War II because innumerable other factors were at work. It would certainly be illogical, however, to contend that the shortening helped to restrain inflation. It would seem quite likely that it has made it more difficult for the Federal Reserve System to make its credit policies effective.

It is noteworthy that the two periods in which the debt was lengthened moderately were in periods of recession. In 1954 and the early part of 1955, the average maturity was increased from five years to six years, one month. Since it is generally admitted, in the light of hindsight, that the Federal Reserve System created too many bank reserves at that time and thus set the stage for the inflation of 1956–57, it would seem that the lengthening did no harm and perhaps made a contribution toward stabilization. The other period of lengthening was in the early part of 1958, when the Treasury sold 4.2 billion dollars of long-term and 12.7 billion dollars of medium-term bonds. The average maturity was increased from four years, seven months to five years, two months. In view of the short length of the downswing, the rapid recovery we have had since then, and the necessity for applying credit restraints since the middle of 1958, it would seem that this experience, too, was at least harmless and perhaps helpful.

Perhaps is was considerations of this kind, among others, which led Stein to break away from the theory of debt management which has been generally accepted in recent years. He says:

> The proper guide to cyclical management of the debt should not be economic stabilization. More long term debt should be issued in recessions, more short term debt in booms. This would hold down the Federal interest burden, reduce fluctuations in long-term interest rates and leave to monetary policy the responsibility for helping to stabilize total monetary expenditures through influencing the supply of money, supply of liquid assets, asset values and interest rates.[11]

As to whether it would be desirable to lengthen the debt beyond its present level, he says that this is almost entirely a matter of cost because "considerations other than cost seem so uncertain, on balance, as not to justify lengthening the debt if substantially more interest cost would be required."[12]

## CONCLUSION

In summary, the central core of the theory of countercyclical management of the debt is that the composition of the debt affects the liquidity of the economy—shorter maturities give more liquidity and encourage spending and vice versa. This effect is necessarily indirect, uncertain, and weak, and it may be redundant if monetary policy has already caused the desired change in liquidity. Changes in debt policy require more time than changes in monetary policy, and the effects of a given debt policy may lap over into a following period and constitute an obstacle to effective monetary policy. Short-term financing of the debt in a recession tends to raise short-term interest rates and may delay the resumption of spending by providing an attractive return on funds.

It seems clear that the potentialities of countercyclical debt management have been overemphasized in much of the stabilization literature of recent years. This is true especially if a reasonable effectiveness is assumed for monetary policy. Furthermore, reflecting the ideological lag from the prewar

[11] Stein, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), p. 101.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

depression era, the emphasis has been disproportionately heavy on the inflationary or stimulating possibilities of debt management. On the other hand, relatively little attention has been given to its anti-inflationary or restraining effects, either in theory or in practice.

This has come about because it is sometimes assumed, often unconsciously, that any device or practice which can make even a small contribution toward stabilization should be used to the hilt for that purpose regardless of problems it might create in other fields. Further, those who do this usually do not have a very high opinion of the potentialities of monetary policy. The difficulties of the Treasury in the past year have shown us that unwise or short-sighted financial planning of the debt can offset, or more than offset, any constructive contribution which debt management can make toward economic stabilization.

# Financing Business and Consumer Needs Without Inflation

By HOWARD S. ELLIS

ABSTRACT: "Needs" for short-run inventory credit formed the basis of a particular school of thought regarding monetary policy early in the nineteenth century in England, and this philosophy imbued the Federal Reserve in the United States at its inception. In the early 1930's, a swing of the pendulum in the opposite direction brought into dominance the Quantity Theory, which denied any relevance of business and consumer needs to desirable credit policy. The state was supreme in these matters and could, through appropriate central bank operation, control the quantity and availability of bank credit and hence—it was thought—the evolution of prices and production. Nowadays the position is less simple. Nonbank financial organizations and firms can create near moneys, and the needs of producers for credit may be satisfied outside the banking system. This may reduce the efficacy of Federal Reserve control of inflation; but the control exercised by the Federal Reserve over money may be sufficient to master the situation in all money and credit markets. On the other hand, effective control of inflation does in fact seem to be jeopardized by monopoly pricing by industries and by labor unions; a "need" for money is thus created which is not easily denied by the monetary authority. Some types of direct control of monopoly practices may become unavoidable.

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*Howard S. Ellis, Ph.D., LL.D., Berkeley, California, is Flood Professor of Economics, University of California. He was Assistant Director of Research and Statistics for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from 1943 to 1945 and Director of the Marshall Aid Research Project, Council on Foreign Relations in 1949 and 1950. He has served as a visiting Professor to the University of Tokyo, the University of Bombay, and Columbia University. President of the International Economic Association from 1953 to 1956, he also served as President of the American Economic Association in 1949. Dr. Ellis is the author of Approaches to Economic Development (1955), Exchange Control in Central Europe (1941), and German Monetary Theory 1905–1933 (1934) and the editor of A Survey of Contemporary Economics, Vol. 1 (1948).*

JUST what roles the needs of producers and consumers play in the creation of credit and what responsibilities, if any, attach to producers and consumers individually for the avoidance of inflation is probably best considered from the vantage point of a brief historical retrospect. Against the background of abandoned or modified dogmas, present attitudes take on their full meaning.

### THE BANKING SCHOOL

In discussions pertaining to the establishment of a sound banking and currency system following the disturbances produced in England by the Napoleonic wars, a certain set of doctrines evolved by the so-called "Banking School" of economists and journalists was destined to become classical. For nearly a century these ideas held virtually unshaken dominance, and in some quarters and in some guises they still persist. According to this school, a sound currency and banking system requires unswerving adherence to one great rule: bank credit, whether in the form of banknotes or demand deposits, should be created only upon evidence of debt arising from goods in the process of manufacture or sale. Bank lending to consumers was simply taboo. The need of business for inventory credit was thus the supreme mandate for monetary and credit policy; the need of consumers was ruled out of court.

According to the Banking School doctrine, if credit was called into being as a particular "batch" of goods came into being and extinguished when these goods came in the hands of the final purchaser, a perfect parallel of goods and money was guaranteed. Money could never be excessive in quantity and cause inflation; loans were perfectly liquid; speculative misuses of credit were precluded. So far as concerns the responsibility for maintaining sound monetary and financial conditions, it is evident that, according to the Banking School philosophy, neither government, producer, nor consumer was answerable. Responsibility rested squarely upon the individual banker for preserving the purity of a credit system based exclusively upon "prime commercial paper" or "real bills," as the instruments emanating from inventory loans were called. The central bank was not invested with discretionary authority. Its function consisted in meeting the "needs of trade" by supporting the commercial banks when necessary by taking over part of their holdings of "real bills." It may be surprising to many Americans to learn that these Banking School doctrines imbued the Federal Reserve System at its inception and that they apparently still find credence in the USSR.[1]

In the presently accepted lore of bank examinations, something of this ancient dogma still persists in the high regard accorded by the regulating authorities to producer—and particularly inventory—loans, even though strict commercial credit today consists of only a fraction of bank lending. Otherwise Banking School ideas have been completely superseded. The neat "parallel" of goods and money resting upon prime commercial paper was discovered to be an empty truism. A rise of prices could make any amount of money equal to the existing flow of goods—inflation was the very way the "parallel" asserted itself. As for the guarantee that the great rule of classical banking was supposed to afford against the speculative use of credit, it came to be realized that the most solid merchant or manufacturer could, if he wished, circumvent the rule by borrowing on inventory and using his own funds for speculation. Or banknotes or deposits, originally called into being on credits to carry goods in process of manufacture, could circulate into other hands and thus perhaps into the nefarious business of speculation. Finally the harsh lesson had to be learned that in time of crisis or depression the vaunted self-liquidation of inventory loans disappeared. In the universal rush for liquidity, the exchanging of goods for money could drive prices far below the level at which the loans had been extended.

[1] Cf. the doctoral dissertation by Raymond P. Powell on "The Money and Banking System of the U.S.S.R.," on deposit at the University of California, Berkeley.



### THE QUANTITY THEORY

If these facts were not sufficiently revealed to careful students by the inflations, crises, and depressions of earlier history, they became amply evident in the Great Depression of the 1930's. The Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 marked the legal recognition of a de facto abandonment of Banking School beliefs and practices which had gradually been adhered to almost from the inception of the Federal Reserve System. Into the gap left by this abandonment came the Quantity Theory with a completely different concept of the role of the needs of businessmen and private persons in the monetary system. According to the implications of this theory, needs for credit are simply limitless at sufficiently high commodity prices or at sufficiently low rates of interest. Consequently these needs supply no criterion for monetary policy. Indeed no rule as to the type of lending by banks can suffice to control inflation. The behavior of prices depends simply upon the quantities of money and credit in existence and upon their velocities of circulation, without regard to the occasion for the coming into being of these quantities.

To control inflation, therefore, the absolutely necessary, as well as the virtually sufficient, condition according to Quantity Theory postulates, was to control the quantity of money, usually envisaged as the amount of currency in circulation plus demand deposits. This concept of money as something contrasting categorically in its perfect liquidity with everything else was included as one piece of complete orthodoxy in the otherwise rather heterodox system of economics by J. M. Keynes.

On the basis of the Quantity Theory, it is natural that the only real responsibility for stable prices and employment should attach to the state. "Das Geld ist ein Geschöpf der Rechtsordnung," Georg Friederich Knapp had once written: "Money is a creation of the law." The role of the central bank was no longer to be described in terms of satisfying the needs of trade; businessmen and consumers could not be held individually responsible for inflation, deflation, overly full employment, unemployment, and so forth. These were matters for the monetary authority, in conjunction with appropriate fiscal action, to control or eliminate. This straightforward, if somewhat too simple, monetary theory enjoyed wide currency in the 1920's and 1930's, although significant modifications began to appear in the latter part of the Great Depression and again in the war and postwar periods.

### NEAR MONEYS; NONMONETARY FORCES

Among many other criticisms, Keynes' General Theory[2] provoked the observation that, while money is undoubtedly perfectly liquid as he maintained, other claims or evidences of debt—such as savings deposits, stocks and bonds, consumer credit, mortgage, and so forth—represent varying degrees of liquidity.

[2] J. M. Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936).

They are, also in varying degrees, near moneys or money substitutes. This observation was powerfully reinforced during the war by the appearance of the Series E bonds, which were almost perfectly liquid assets for ordinary citizens and by the large mass of Treasury bills and other short-dated government securities, which banks and firms could regard as virtual money. Thus the need of consumers and producers for liquid balances could be supplied almost perfectly by these short maturities, and in lesser degree, by longer dated maturities, private as well as government. Near moneys such as these, it was recognized, had to be exchanged for money before being used as means of payment, and in this respect the Quantity Theory stood intact. But in the function of a "store of value" other claims running in monetary terms could, in greater or lesser degree, compete with balances in cash or deposits held by persons, firms, or the government. So much for a newer interpretation of the "need" for money and credit when viewed from the angle of those who need or demand liquid balances to hold against recurring payments or against contingencies.

Further modification of strict Quantity Theory premises and deductions, for pure theory and for practice as well, was due to come from the side of supply of money, in the sense of money loans in various forms. The researches of Raymond Goldsmith and of Shaw and Gurley revealed a large increase over the last few decades of nonbank institutional lenders such as finance companies, building and loan associations, insurance companies, and so forth.[3] The "need" of producers and consumers here takes on the sense of their desire to purchase securities of particular sorts adapted to individual tastes and requirements.

The ability of nonbank lenders to supply funds independently of the banks suggested to some writers that central bank controls, limited as they are to the quantity of money and bank credit, are incapable of controlling credit in the aggregate. Payments, it was conceded, would finally have to be effected in money or in demand deposits; but the nonbank "financial intermediaries" could vitiate Federal Reserve controls through a more intensive utilization of existing volumes of currency and demand deposits. This powerful leverage would be exercised by the market via the velocity of circulation of money and deposits, if one chose to stay by the language of the Quantity Theory. But no answer of deference to traditional terms could alter the fact, according to this way of thinking, that responsibility for economic stability, so far as it depended upon money and credit, had passed from the control of bank credit to "financial control" in an inclusive sense.

In retrospect, the emphasis upon the role of money substitutes or near moneys has served to restore, at least to some degree, the importance of businessmen's and consumers' need in monetary theory and policy. First, near moneys can, to an extent determined by the individual or firm, take the place of money in the provision of liquidity, thus increasing the potency of a given sense of need, the desire of investors and lenders for an extensive array of specialized securities. Second, there is a factor operating to increase purchasing power through the increased velocity of currency and deposits.

Before we can come to an evaluation of the practical significance of these innovations, we ought probably to take account of another possible interpretation of "need." If the prices of commodities and/or services are determined in some other way than through the forces of competition on free and open markets, the possibility is certainly given that money and credit appear as residuals or results rather than as active causes of the behavior of prices and employment. In Marxian economics, where labor cost determines values and prices, money is a mere appendage, adjusting itself by the hoarding or dishoarding of the public to a predetermined "socially necessary circulation value."

In contemporary discussions, somewhat analogous positions are represented by the "cost-push" theories. Prices are either directly determined by industrial monopolies, "administered prices," or they are the indirect consequence of an equally arbitrary settlement of wages through collective bargaining. In these settings, the amount of money and credit is adjusted by the individual holders of money balances, by the banks, and, presumably also, by the monetary authority to what is "necessary" at predetermined prices. In this context, "necessary" may—according to the various political or social creeds prevailing in a given country—mean a certain degree of economic stability, or "full employment," or such an amount of employment or output as to satisfy one or another of several conceivable objectives, such as a Five Year Plan, a balance of payments goal, and so forth.

## DOES NEED RULE THE ROOST?

From the historical retrospect, several deductions can be made with reasonable certainty. In the first place, contrary to the Banking School, the needs of industry and trade for inventory credit supply no reliable criterion for sound banking or for a stable monetary system. Responsibility of the state cannot be avoided by any such automatic rule.[4] At the other extreme, the existence of near moneys and the autonomus determination of prices by labor and commodity monopolies make it likewise imposible to invest the Central Bank with such responsibility for the behavior of money and credit. Currently the difficult task of the economist is to estimate the degree to which the needs of trade in one or another significant sense are able to assert themselves independently of, or perhaps in direct opposition to, Federal Reserve policies.

Consider first the growth of near moneys emanating in an increased velocity of actual money. According to an analysis of Professor John G. Gurley, the gross national product of the United States rose by 50 billion dollars from 1955 to 1957, the rise of prices meanwhile accounting for half this increase. In the same interval, the money supply was augmented by 3.3 billion dollars and velocity rose by 15. Thus, concludes Professor Gurley, the increment to velocity was four times as powerful as the increment to money.[5]

Most economists would be loath to quantify the importance of velocity compared to the stock of money as precisely as Gurley, and many economists would directly reverse the order of importance. Professor Arthur F. Burns notes the increase of money substitutes in recent years but believes that inflation cannot get out of hand if the quantity of money is controlled.[6] In similar vein, Professor Haberler believes that

[3] Cf. J. G. Gurley and E. S. Shaw, "The Growth of Debt and Money in the United States, 1800–1950," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (August 1957), pp. 250–62.

[4] Or by any other automatic rule; but this is too wide a subject for the present paper.

[5] J. G. Gurley, "Agenda for a National Monetary Commission: Discussion," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 48, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings (May 1958), p. 104.

[6] Arthur F. Burns, *Prosperity Without Inflation* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1958), p. 15.

a rise in velocity by itself has never caused or substantially intensified serious inflationary trouble.[7]

One thing is certain, that mere changes in velocity are not in themselves direct evidence of the increased importance of near moneys or of the insufficiency of monetary, as contrasted with much more inclusive, "financial" controls. Over the decade 1947–57 velocity of circulation in the United Kingdom rose from 20 to 47 per annum, in the United States from 13 to 22.[8] It is quite possible and indeed probable that part, and conceivably all, of this change could have arisen from a gradual adjustment of balance holders to the liquidity ratios which prevailed before the enforced hoarding of war and postwar years through commodity rationing. But even if part of this change in velocity is accountable through the growth of money substitutes, it might still be possible that such a phenomenon was primarily a matter of secular change, and that the significance of near moneys for short run variations is not great. Some economists, indeed, have argued that the existence of a large volume of credit beside commercial bank loans renders the whole financial structure more rather than less sensitive to changes in the discount rate, open market operations, and reserve requirements of the Federal Reserve. At present the evidence is not clear either way; but it would be premature to minify the efficacy of traditional monetary controls for the short run stabilization of prices and employment, merely on the grounds that nonbank finance has grown relatively to bank credit.

[7] Gottfried Haberler, "Internal Factors Causing and Propagating Inflation," International Economic Association, Roundtable on Inflation, Elsinore, Denmark, September 1959; mimeographed.

[8] Bank for International Settlements, Twenty-eighth Annual Report (Basel, 1959), pp. 62, 98–99.

## Monopoly Pricing by Business and Labor

A more potent threat to the effective operation of monetary controls, particularly against inflation, is posed by monopoly pricing. Since labor is nowadays more aggressive than most industrial monopolies, the chief threat probably comes from collective bargaining. However it is not precluded that oligopoly and monopoly on the side of the sellers of goods also contribute to inflation. Professors John K. Galbraith and Gardner Means have recently emphasized the actual or potential role of administered commodity prices in inflation. By far the greater number of economists, however, have ascribed greater responsibility for recent periods of inflation to labor union wage demands. But the most aggressive unions are found exactly in those industries which are characterized by monopoly or oligopoly. Hence it is most difficult to separate the "cost-push" influences of labor unions on the one hand from commodity monopoly on the other. The dispute as to which is the more powerful inflationary force is apt to continue for some time.

Wage advances are inflationary, if the increases of money wages exceed increases in productivity expressed in terms of price, provided the increases in productivity are only those ascribable to improvements in labor efficiency and not to increased capital investment per laborer. Over the postwar period 1946–1957, a 90 per cent increase in hourly wage rates may be compared to a 37 per cent increase in output per man hour and a 44 per cent increase in the consumers' price index.[9] With wage increases of this magnitude, it would seem virtually certain that they played an important role in the postwar inflation, particularly since a part of the 37 per cent increase in "output per man hour" is actually to be ascribed to increased capital investment per laborer and not to increased labor efficiency.

[9] Neil H. Jacoby, "Maintaining Prosperity Without Inflation: Objectives, Problems and Policies." Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress. Mimeographed, Los Angeles, March 28, 1958.



Labor or commodity monopolies tend to create a "need" for money or credit creation in order to avoid unemployment; they tend to deprive government of control of inflationary forces. A tight credit policy in this setting may have a restraining effect upon aggressive pricing tactics on the part of labor or industry sufficient to avoid inflation. But individual businesses and individual unions derive a short-run advantage if they succeed in keeping their own price advances ahead of the general level. Thus a long-run failure to gain from inflation or even an actual loss is a weak restraining force over the field as a whole, and there is no guarantee that monetaray and fiscal controls may be able to master the drive of "cost push." It still remains to be seen whether a free enterprise economy such as that of the United States will be able to master the problem of inflation without some kind of direct controls on monopoly pricing.

# Monetary Policy and Inflation

By C. Canby Balderston

Abstract: Inflation does not stimulate sustainable growth; it just creates a temporary illusion of it. Real growth requires that competition do its work both at home and abroad. Competition must be allowed to produce the kind of flexible change that brings out the maximum use of resources and does not allow inefficiency to hide behind the shelter of monopoly or other forms of protection. Rapid growth requires use of the most advanced technology. That which is inefficient and outmoded must be abandoned quickly. To employ some form of protection merely to preserve the status quo, whether through subsidies, tariffs, or featherbedding, tends to retard growth. The problems of monetary policy are the problems of a society organized around the principles of free markets and freedom of choice. In an economy where freedom is exercised by individuals and by business units, effective regulation of the money system is of prime importance. In brief, the problems that are the concern of monetary policy in a free society are those which flow from the exercise of freedom in the use of money. Monetary policy cannot be successfully managed by formula because it must be adapted to the variety of our economy and to its changing moods.

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*C. Canby Balderston, Ph.D., Washington, D. C., is Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. He served as Professor of Industry, Chairman of the Department of Geography and Industry, and Dean (1941–54) of the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania. At various times he has also served as President of Leeds and Lippincott Co., Trustee of Bryn Mawr College President and later Chairman of the Board of the National Bureau of Economic Research Director of the Wage Stabilization Unit, Headquarters, Army Service Forces (1942-45); Class C Director and Deputy Chairman, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, and Vice President of the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce. Among other books, he is the author of Profit-Sharing for Wage Earners (1937) and Wage Setting (1940); he is a co-author of Vertical Integration in the Textile Industries (1938) and Management of a Textile Business (1938).*





THE struggle to keep sound the monetary unit of a country is an issue centuries old. The great debate in which our country is engaged is neither new nor novel. Ancient and medieval history records the mismanagement of money that resulted from the perfidy of kings and the cupidity of speculators.

For example, debasement of the currency pervades early Roman history. By the third century BC the monetary unit, theoretically a pound of copper, actually weighed no more than 4 ounces; by about the year 89 BC, only ½ ounce.[1] The coinage instituted by Augustus remained undisturbed for three-quarters of a century, but Nero, Trajan, and their successors debased both the gold aureus and the silver denarius. The fluctuations in the value of money affected Rome's foreign commerce seriously for, beyond the borders, traders required that they be paid in good silver. At home, gold was hoarded, and frightened men clutched at "bits of copper as the sole reality in a crumbling world."[2]

At long last the government sought to counteract the paralysis only to encounter the opposition of speculators. By the time of Diocletian, the disintegration had proceeded so far that the best that autocratic soldier could do was to re-establish uniform standards of weights and measures. Failing to achieve a currency standard, he resorted in AD 301 to his renowned price fixing to control the hysterical speculation. The decree covered items ranging from beer and silk to the services of shaving men and shearing sheep. But within five years the effort was abandoned as a failure, and an observer concluded "Money had more to do with the distemper of the Roman Empire than the Huns or the Vandals."[3]

After the disruption caused by the dissolution of the Roman Empire, the use of money was slowly re-established. Barter was again replaced by the use of coin. The right of issuing money was a special prerogative of the sovereign power, which claimed the authority both to coin money and to debase it.

In England the Norman kings rarely tampered with the coinage, but Henry III began a process of debasing the currency, together with other forms of confiscation of wealth.[4] The value of metallic currency suffered extreme changes in value just as credit currency has done subsequently. This practice continued while the Middle Ages gave way to the advent of Modern Times. Leading practitioners of the art of debasement were Henry IV,[5] Edward IV,[6] and Henry VIII.[7]

Gold entered the money system of Britain in the reign of Edward III, who thereupon encountered the problem of balancing the respective values of gold and silver. In the very year when his coin was debased for the last time, "it was enacted that the price of labour, under the new standard, should be restricted to its nominal amount under the old standard . . . whilst provisions were permitted to rise in value."[8]

Henry VIII had inherited immense wealth from his father, but his love of display led to such cupidity as to reduce the amount of silver in the coinage to one-fourth of its face value.[9] Then, taxes were raised and both silver and

[1] Elgin Groseclose, *Money: The Human Conflict* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1934), p. 36.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 41.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 44.
[4] James Taylor, *A View of the Money System of England* (London: Littlewood & Co., 1828), p. 23.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 35.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 38.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 42.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 32–33.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

gold coin debased. Rents and food prices rose; even clipped silver, despised at other times, became scarce because no one would lend what he believed would be repaid in baser money. Henry's successor, Edward VI, devalued the currency so often that the unsuspecting people were robbed of half their money. The richer people "had knowledge of these changes beforehand . . . so that the chief loss fell on the lower orders."[10]

Finally came Elizabeth. She had both the ability and the will to bring the silver money of England to a par with its gold money. But even while her government was preparing to suppress the circulation of base monies in England, a commission was granted to the chief officers of the mint to coin base money for the Irish.[11] By this device the sophisticated English got rid of their base coin leaving the loss to fall upon the simple folk who were not "in the know."[12] "Elizabeth flattered herself that she had settled the money question upon a lasting basis; that 'she had [as she expressed it] conquered that monster which had so long devoured her people;' but the subsequent History of England, and even that of Elizabeth's own reign, shews that though his power was checked, the monster was not annihilated."[13]

## INFLATION IN FRANCE

The French inflations have been well publicized and numerous. Between 768 and 1764 the livre of Charlemagne had declined to one sixty-sixth of its original value. To illustrate how the livre depreciated during the last part of that period, the price of a mark weight of gold in 1309 was 44 livres de compte; four hundred years later, the purchase of a mark of gold required 576 livres. This was just before John Law secured control of the French currency.[14]

In fact, John Law's experiment with paper money was one of the best known of the French inflations. This Scot born financier had failed to convert his fellow Scotsmen to his theory of a land currency equal to the value of the land and to the value of actual coin outstanding. He had argued that the Scot people were poor because they had but little silver and gold. But he did win a convert in the Duke of Orleans, Regent of France. In France, Law promoted, not currency based upon land, but money secured by commercial credit. Starting with a private bank in 1716, he was so successful in bringing down interest rates that in 1718 he was looked upon as a financial wizard and his bank was converted into a state bank. Then began his ascent to power and prestige, culminating in a dramatic and tragic fall. To feed the great speculation known as the Mississippi bubble, he declared dividends that had not been earned. During 1719 the price of his shares rose 100 per cent in forty days. The ensuing security speculation was supported by printing press money. The rampant bull market drew speculators to Paris from all over Europe. The price of houses and farms tripled; that of bread doubled.[15] Before the end of 1720, the state's paper currency was extinguished and Law fled the country. And so the Western world's first great experiment with paper money proved a fiasco because the supply was uncontrolled.

Still another contribution to our knowledge of inflation stemmed from the French Revolution. It has been so competently described in Andrew White's *Fiat Money Inflation in France*[16] that it can be passed over here in favor of France's most recent experience, halted in 1958 by firm measures continued by the government of General de Gaulle. At the end of 1955, France began to exhibit evidence of how overexpansion of economic activity tends to increase inflationary pressure. To the worldwide surge in demand was added the inflationary financing of a large government deficit of about 20 per cent of expenditures in both 1956 and 1957. Moreover, the bank credit extended to the private economy in each of these years proved excessive. There followed inflationary results according to the classic pattern. Between January 1956 and July 1957, France lost over half of her official reserves of gold and dollars. Almost immediately there was a de facto devaluation of the franc of 17 per cent. By the end of 1958, French prices were judged by the new de Gaulle regime as too high to compete in the markets of the world at the rate of exchange then in effect. Accordingly, the French franc was once more devalued—this time by 15 per cent. Miss Ruth Logue of the Board's staff observes that "quite aside from the fact that it would be difficult for any country to maintain such a high rate of expansion during a very long period, in France it was clearly nonsustainable because it depended upon an import surplus paid for by the dissipation of foreign exchange reserves and by foreign aid."

The main domestic question of the moment in the United States is whether it can achieve the desired economic growth, with concomitant living standards and employment, and still preserve the purchasing power of the dollar. There are ancillary issues, however. Can inflation actually be controlled in the face of upward wage pressures and of demands for increased governmental spending? Does general flexible monetary control, in combination with fiscal policy, have the power to keep inflation in check?

## MONETARY POLICY AND OBJECTIVES

As long as monetary policy objectives are stated in general terms, there is little dispute. Everyone wants the country's standard of living to continue to rise. Strong economic activity and adequate job opportunities are goals that all agree upon, and so sustainable growth without inflation is high among accepted objectives. Political and economic freedoms are American hallmarks.

Monetary policy actions, however, must be specific, and decisions on such actions must be made in relation to policy objectives that are definite. Accordingly, from these generally accepted goals one may distil four objectives which flow from the mandates that are implicit in the Federal Reserve Act and the Employment Act of 1946. These are: to foster orderly economic growth; to sustain maximum employment; to protect the purchasing power of the monetary unit; and to keep international payments in balance—a main purpose of monetary policy for most countries even more than for our own. These objectives take on their full meaning if translated into human terms.

I think of maximum employment as job opportunities for a husband and father who has children of high school age who will be seeking employment in the 1960's when the number seeking a start in life will be twice as great as in the early 1950's. The kind of realism that would help to meet this family's need for job opportunities now and later requires keeping American firms competitive by turning out products that people want at home and abroad, and

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 47.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 51–52.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 52.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 60.
[14] Groseclose, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), p. 68.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 140.
[16] Andrew D. White, *Fiat Money Inflation in France*, Privately printed for James Simpson, Chicago, 1933.

at prices they are willing and able to pay.

And the protection of the purchasing power of the dollar, I associate with the same worker and his wife, who will outlive him by eight years. In addition to Social Security, these two are among the 14 million with pension rights under private plans, the 40-odd million who hold government bonds, and the 112 million who carry insurance. These two hard-working people are savers, and both will be dependent upon savings.

Although even the four specific goals I have mentioned might receive general acceptance, it must be recognized that they represent plural objectives that may seem incompatible. For instance, certain nations, like England, have at times been forced to slacken their rate of domestic growth in order to balance their international payments. Moreover, there is considerable debate in this country as to whether the goals of full employment and stable prices are completely reconcilable. Most of the day-to-day problems in economic policy making, however, arise not out of differences as to objectives, but out of the choice of specific policies which will promote those objectives. It is at this point that confusion starts.

Unemployment, price stability, and economic growth have become subjects of popular debate. It is asserted by some that a stable dollar and enough economic growth to provide an acceptable level of employment are incompatible. It is my own conviction, however, that price stability is necessary for high employment to be sustained over any lengthy period. Perhaps our most urgent domestic necessity is to protect the purchasing power of the dollar while providing widespread employment opportunities. Both for the protection of those who live on fixed incomes, like pensioners and school teachers, and for the benefit of those who need steady work to support themselves and their families, we must—as indeed we can—achieve high employment without inflation.

*Employment levels*

Inflation is not an effective long-run means of creating job opportunities. But on this point thinking is confused. A recent letter asked "How can industry expand, buy machine tools and provide jobs for us millions of unemployed when you guys create tight money? . . . Haven't any of you men got the guts to stand up for an expanding money supply and abundance of credit to encourage production and help make jobs?" A blunt answer to this heartfelt query is that the mere running of the printing presses, or the ballooning of bank credit, do not foster productivity improvement and higher standards of living. Even when credit is under restraint, it usually is growing. The proper idea is to keep its growth in line with the possibilities of increasing the "real" output of goods and services. In other countries, and even in our own, highly trained ability has been diverted from producing goods to speculating on inflating prices. Speculative activity does create some employment to be sure, but not employment that lasts. Eventually inflation endangers and disrupts job stability for it is during inflationary booms that the seeds of deflation are sown.

Nor will inflation cure structural unemployment that stems from shifts in the use of resources. A dynamic economy forsakes the old for the new, and so one may expect rapid economic growth to bring about some unemployment of a structural sort. Even though further expansion will tend to put more people to work, an unemployment percentage higher than that reflecting frictional unemployment might lead to the question of whether job opportunities



would not be greater if certain prices were lower.

As expansion continues, the rising investment demand stemming from industrial research and management initiative requires an increased flow of savings. If we are to remain competitive at home and abroad, we shall need not only enough capital to implement technological advance, but competitive prices as well. Competition is, of course, a relative matter. How do our products compare with those of other countries as to quality, price, and promptness of delivery? While ours have improved, foreign-made products seem to have been improving even more rapidly. There is evidence that our cherished advantage in some types of machinery, as well as in autos and certain other mass-produced items, has been diminishing. This is a situation that will not be cured by ignoring it, or by the mere passage of time, or by passing laws. The sole solution lies in seeking continuous increases in technological and marketing efficiency, while preventing costs from rising faster than compatible with those increases. Only thus will our firms remain competitive.

*Price levels*

Prices were buoyant during the recent decline and subsequent recovery. In the recession, the industrial-price average fell only 0.6 per cent, though prices of crude materials slipped considerably. However, prices of farm products and foods went up sharply. As a result the total wholesale price index rose 1 per cent even while business was contracting. Since the turn-around in business activity in May 1958, the average of industrial prices has risen (as of July 1959) approximately 2 per cent above the previous all-time high. Average industrial prices have risen sooner and faster than in the two previous recoveries when prices did not advance at a significant rate until after output had regained its previous peak.

Last fall Congress' Joint Economic Committee canvassed economists as to their views concerning the reconciling of unemployment with price stability. It sent questionnaires to members of 150 college economics departments. Replies were received to 615 of the questionnaires, or 40 per cent of the total number mailed out.

The first question read as follows: "Do you believe it feasible to achieve simultaneously both relatively high employment and relatively high stability of the general price level?" Of those responding, 60 per cent thought this achievement feasible even in the short run. Still a greater number, almost three-fourths, believed it possible in the long run. This expression of informed opinion indicates a widespread belief that there is no inherent conflict between these two types of economic stability.

No one expects all individual prices to be stable. Indeed, some movement of individual prices serves an essential economic function. In our market economy, it is the normal way of getting a proper distribution of scarce goods and the most productive allocation of resources. Stability of the over-all price level is, however, a clearly desirable goal to the extent that it is attainable. How stable, then, should one expect the price level to be?

Forty-four years have passed since the starting of the Federal Reserve System in 1914. If the consumer price index is used to measure price variability during this period, its annual fluctuations, both up and down, have been less than 3 per cent in 25 of the 44 years. This period, however, included some extremely large price changes caused primarily by war financing and postwar readjustments. If we exclude the two World Wars and the Korean

hostilities, the 3 per cent standard was met in 24 of the remaining 31 years. Excluding these wars, the cumulative price changes since 1914 just about balance out. Dr. Roland I. Robinson has suggested to me that, without the influence of war, the current price level might not be far different from that prevailing about a half century ago. If all cyclical movements in activity could be avoided, we might then look hopefully toward a high degree of general price stability. However, as long as there are fluctuations in inventories or in business expectations or international crises occur, it is not reasonable to expect complete stability in the over-all price level.

What is damaging, however, is continued bias in price expectations. There has spread to consumers an acceptance of the notion that creeping inflation is inevitable. This notion already has been accepted by too many purchasers of common stocks and real estate and may have been overly influential in business policy making. It is itself a cyclically disturbing force. The risks of inventory accumulation in excessive amounts may seem abnormally small to businessmen if they feel certain that prices will rise. Thus one of the classic problems that has caused business instability is aggravated by lopsided price expectations.

## GROWTH WITHOUT INFLATION

I turn now to rates of economic growth. Such rates, once of interest only to specialists, have now come under general discussion. The rates commonly cited, such as 3, or 4, or 5 per cent per annum, actually reflect two factors. One is the aggregate growth in economic resources, of which the principal one is population; the other is the increase in per capita productivity. While total growth since 1889 of 3½ per cent per annum may correctly measure the increase in our capacity to fight a war, the peacetime emphasis should be on per capita growth as the determinant of our standard of living and of our over-all well-being.

Healthy growth of the economy can be attained only by a close gearing of bank credit expansion with that of the economy generally. Such growth requires that the central banking system provide enough but not too much money to achieve and maintain balanced growth without inflation. Recent historical research of the National Bureau of Economic Research shows that, while growth rates have fluctuated considerably in the short run, the growth process, if measured by decades, has been remarkably durable. Except for the decade containing the Great Depression, we have had appreciable growth during every decade for the last seventy years. A highly significant point brought out by this research is that growth was strong during the period of falling prices in the last third of the last century. This evidence suggests that price stability and rapid growth are quite compatible. The essential point is that per capita growth depends to a considerable extent on improving productivity. Productivity, in turn, depends on the existence of a flexible economic system, one ready to use advanced technology.

In the private sector of the economy, the free choice of the consumer and the free choice of the businessman dominate the use of our resources, as they should. Consumers have been devoting a smaller proportion of their income to the purchase of products of factories, where statistical productivity gains have been great, and a larger proportion to services where there is no statistical measure of productivity. Repairs of cars and appliances, medical care, and travel have been a growing part of consumer expenditures. This shift from manufactured products to services, however, diminishes the statistical measure of productivity increase. Moreover, since productivity in these services has undoubtedly improved, even though not measurable, the extent of their price rises has been exaggerated.



To sum up the argument thus far: inflation does not stimulate sustainable growth; it just creates a temporary illusion of it. Real growth requires that competition do its work both at home and abroad. Competition must be allowed to produce the kind of flexible change that brings out the maximum use of resources and does not allow inefficiency to hide behind the shelter of monopoly or other forms of protection. Rapid growth requires use of the most advanced technology. That which is inefficient and outmoded must be abandoned quickly. To employ some form of protection merely to preserve the status quo, whether through subsidies, tariffs, or featherbedding, tends to retard growth.

## MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY CAN SUCCEED

I shall now attempt to show that prudent financial housekeeping is possible under conditions worse than ours. In fact, there are some recent examples of how effective monetary and fiscal policy can be when they work together as a team. For instance, in Italy, 1947 marked a turning point in postwar financial and economic development. Prior to the introduction of the defense of the lire policy, Italy had been in the grip of a severe inflation. In a little over one year wholesale prices had risen by 150 per cent. The cost of living had doubled and paper money was being issued at a rate faster than the growth in national income. A new fiscal policy, in combination with a tighter monetary policy, ended this by (1) reducing the budget deficit to a level which could be financed by noninflationary means (through Treasury borrowing out of savings, thus ending the resort to the printing press); (2) restraining the growth of credit to an amount consistent with the actual growth in real resources.

The effective contribution of Italy's stabilization program in escaping from its plight after World War II is indicated by the contrast between the doubling of the cost of living in about one year prior to 1947, and the 48 per cent increase in the entire decade that followed. Since the restoration of confidence in the currency, bank deposits have increased seven-fold. The real budget deficit, instead of being 140 per cent of revenue, was only 8 per cent of it in fiscal 1958, and the gold and foreign exchange reserves increased by nearly 700 million dollars. These reserves are now the third largest in Western Europe. Certainly if European countries such as Italy, Austria, and West Germany can overcome the ravages of war sufficiently to put their financial affairs in order, our own nation can achieve sound financial management. If it is to be achieved, however, those responsible for fiscal and monetary policies must overcome certain obstacles.

## DIFFICULTIES OF MONETARY POLICY MAKING

Even if there is basic agreement as to the facts, they are not interpreted alike by all individuals. On occasions an increase in business inventories may appear to some as voluntary adjustment by businessmen in anticipation of rising production and sales, while to others it may appear to be an involuntary adjustment resulting from a falling off of sales. In the early phase of the present recovery, the slow growth of bank loans to business might have signaled to some that monetary policy was too restrictive, while to others it seemed to reflect high business liquidity and ample funds from internal sources.

Another problem of policy making is that many of the economic facts needed for policy formation are frequently unavailable, or become available too late. In the interim, it is necessary to rely upon "straws in the wind" obtained by word-of-mouth. Decision making within the Federal Reserve System faces the same difficulties as decision making in other areas, including the necessity of having to make decisions before the evidence is complete.

Finally, there are problems arising out of the need for monetary policy to be co-ordinated with Treasury financing. If we had the kind of fiscal policy sometimes hopefully and idealistically outlined in the textbooks, there would be no need to finance government deficits except in periods of low business activity. During such periods the financing of deficits creates no real problem for the monetary authority. Unfortunately, government deficits often have to be financed in periods of expansion—an unhappy fact that the Federal Reserve cannot ignore. In addition, the Treasury faces a continuing problem of refinancing the vast volume of securities maturing in the course of a year and of engaging in large borrowing and debt retirement operations to compensate for the uneven flow of tax receipts.

Monetary policy must take these heavy Treasury financing operations into account so that their success will not be placed in jeopardy. On the other hand, monetary policy must not be subordinated to fiscal policy. They must work as a team. A well-known example of the lack of such teamwork was the inflationary "pegging" of government bond prices after World War II.

Occasionally, the co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policies encounters difficulties of timing. For example, consider the problem posed for both the Treasury and the Federal Reserve when the state of the economy called for raising the discount rate in the spring of 1957. For some months business confidence had been mounting. It was evidenced by a rise of industrial orders and of loans; by buoyant stock prices; by plant expansion; by a scarcity of steel, cement, and glass; and by higher material prices. The indicated discount change was necessarily delayed by Treasury financing activities in February, March, May, and July 1957. The Federal Reserve Banks, with the approval of the Board of Governors, finally raised their discount rates in August. This action that was needed for technical as well as economic reasons was delayed by these financing operations so that it came nearer the cyclical peak than would have been desirable.

Additional complications stem from the so-called "administrative lag" in the use of fiscal policy. Since it is necessarily long in the making and in the execution, it may exert an impact on business at just the wrong time to improve the latter's stability. In fact, governmental buying that was originally intended to be compensatory may actually be superimposed on a boom and further accentuate the demand that is distorting the economy.

## INFLUENCE ON MONETARY POLICY OF FREE MARKETS AND FREEDOM OF CHOICE

The problems of monetary policy are the problems of a society organized around the principles of free markets and freedom of choice. In an economy where freedom is exercised by individuals and by business units, effective regulation of the money system is of prime importance. In fact, the major concern of monetary policy in such an economy is to minimize the unstabilizing effects of changes in the use of money and credit that businesses and individuals generate in the exercise of freedom. But freedom, even though it entails flaws, is the well-spring of social and economic advance. It spurs the creative process; it permits experimentation leading to change. The resultant economic hazards are small prices to pay for the rewards.

In the field of credit, the government cannot compel any man to lend his money against his will—even to the government itself—in circumstances or upon terms not acceptable to him. This important freedom of the lender—matched of course by the freedom of the borrower to reject unacceptable terms—can have embarrassing results for the government, as happens when many investors abstain from purchasing government bonds.

Another freedom involved in determining policy is in the use of money itself. Those who hold cash balances may allow idle cash reserves to accumulate when interest rates are only moderately attractive. However when short-term interest rates are high, there is an incentive to economize in the use of cash balances. Increases occur in the velocity of money. Such an increase represents a legitimate exercise of economic freedom, but it complicates decisions as to what money supply is appropriate to sustain economic growth.

Still another economic freedom tha has repercussions on the monetary sys tem is the choice among inventory poli cies. The recession that began in th fall of 1957 was accompanied by rapi inventory liquidation. Indeed it con tinued after the bottom of the cycl was reached, but manufacturing inven tories are now increasing rather briskly The great buying or liquidating wave that flow from changes in inventory policy create a real challenge, not only for those concerned with monetary policy, but ultimately for individual businessmen themselves.

In brief, the problems that are the concern of monetary policy in a free society are those which flow from the exercise of freedom in the use of money. These problems are ever changing and no mortal can predict with certainty where they will lead. Accordingly, monetary policy can never be reduced to formulas or the application of routine adjustments to standard situations. It must continuously be modified to fit a changing economic environment. The Congress, in creating the Federal Reserve System, has designed an institution eminently suited to formulate monetary policy that is flexible. It is suited to the variety of our economy and to its changing moods. It recognizes that central banking is an art, or perhaps a craft, and not a science.

# Inflation: Its Cause and Cure

By Beryl W. Sprinkel

Abstract: Despite widespread concern over inflation, prices have risen less since 1951 than in most past periods. The average annual rise in the price level has been about 1 per cent in the past eight years compared to 5 per cent to 8 per cent from 1946 to 1951 and 2.5 per cent to 3 per cent in the past half century. One of the major factors inciting inflation fears during the past year was the mammoth size of the fiscal 1959 federal deficit. Prices remained stable during fiscal 1959 because slack in the economy permitted production increases to equal spending increases. Inflation is caused by excessive increases in spending relative to the capacity of the economy to increase production. It is absolutely critical for the success of any program for the containment of inflation that management of the federal budget and monetary policy be designed to promote growth in total demands only so fast as the real economy grows. In particular, growth in the stock of money should be no faster, on average, than growth in production of goods and services. The Federal Reserve System has the power to control the stock of money and has used that power wisely since 1951. Budget policies have been less adequate. The informed citizen should urge support of flexible monetary and stabilizing budget policies.

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*Beryl W. Sprinkel, Ph.D., Chicago, Illinois, is Economist for the Harris Trust and Savings Bank, and Editor of Barometer of Business. Formerly Dr. Sprinkel taught at the University of Missouri and the University of Chicago. He has been a consultant on economic policy to the Federal Reserve Board, United States Treasury, and the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress. He has served as a member of the faculties of the Life Officers' Investment Seminar, Northwestern University Institute for Management and the Graduate School of Banking, Rutgers University. Dr. Sprinkel has contributed articles to various professional journals and is currently a member of the Economic Policy Committee of the United States Chamber of Commerce and the Research Council of the American Bankers Association.*





THERE has been growing concern in recent months over the problem of inflation. Government spokesmen and financial writers comment on the subject frequently, and, as has been indicated in opinion polls, inflation is one of the greatest concerns of Americans today.

Before discussing the prospects for preventing inflation, a common understanding of the meaning of the term must be established. Inflation means to most observers a rise in the general price level of goods and services and will be so defined in this paper. The rising cost of maintaining a rising standard of living need not be inflation. Failure to distinguish between the cost of maintaining a rising standard of living and the cost of maintaining a constant standard of living is the source of much confusion. Only an increase in living costs in excess of the rise in living standards is inflation. Careful analysis of changing family budgets usually discloses that much of the apparent rise is due to better living—more and better food, clothing and shelter, as well as better automobiles and appliances, improved schools and other governmental services. A rising standard of living should not be feared and criticized but should be welcomed as the inevitable consequence of improving per capita production. In other words, much of the recent rise in family budgets is not due so much to the high cost of living as it is due to the cost of high living!

Nonetheless, the American consumer has suffered some inflation in recent years. The important question at this stage is how much inflation has occurred and how did the recent inflation pace compare with previous periods.

Inflation in this country is not new. It is something Americans have been accustomed to throughout most of the history of this country. The price record in recent years, in fact, has been superior to most past periods. Since 1951, the average annual compound rate of rise in the consumer price index has been 1.3 per cent, while wholesale prices have risen at an average annual pace of 0.8 of 1 per cent. These increases were far less than the 5 per cent yearly rise in consumer prices from 1946 to 1951, and the 8 per cent annual rise in wholesale prices. The recent record also compares favorably with the past half century average annual rise of 3.1 per cent in the consumer price index and 2.3 per cent in the wholesale price index.

Although our price indices are superior to those existing in earlier periods, there is reason to believe that our present indices are biased upward. This bias is due primarily to inadequate adjustment for quality improvement in goods and services produced. Much of the apparent price rise was due to higher prices for merchandise of better quality rather than higher prices for the same goods and services. It is far from certain that any inflation has occurred on average in the past seven and one-half years if proper account is taken of the upward biases in the indices. The technical problem of adequate adjustment may be largely insurmountable since quality improvements over time are difficult to measure precisely. It is clear, however, that even though it may prove difficult, some further refinement should be attempted. If there exists a bias of as much as ½ of 1 per cent to 1 per cent per year, no inflation has occurred since 1951. The extent of the bias is unknown, but it appears to be sizeable. In any event, the American economy has suffered a very moderate inflation, if any, since 1951.

## Source of Current Inflation Concern

If it is true that recent inflation has been mild, why the current concern?

There are at least three factors that account for present apprehension. One is what appears to be a misunderstanding of the price performance in the recent recession. Many have argued that in contrast to previous recessions, prices did not decline in 1958. The facts are that prices typically did not decline in past recessions. Prices declined in this century only during depressions of which there have been three really serious ones: 1920–21, 1929–33 and 1937–38. In those three periods, declines in the consumer price index ranged from 5 per cent to 25 per cent. In the early part of most recessions prices rose moderately and then leveled out. Also, in the early months of the three contractions, which eventually became depressions, prices rose. The recent experience was in line with past performance —a modest rise in the early phase of the recession followed by a level trend. Those contending the recent pattern was unique are misreading history. If the late recession had deepened into a depression, prices would have dropped. Fortunately, antirecession measures were adopted promptly, and the economy is now enjoying vigorous growth.

Another reason for the current great fear over inflation is the widespread belief that the recent bull market trend in stock prices bears no relation to previous trends. There are always some differences in market developments over recession-recovery periods, and there are differences this time. But the stock price pattern experienced during the recession and early recovery periods was in line with usual trends. Typically, stock prices turn up before business activity improves. The average lead of stock prices over the business recovery is about seven months. In the recent recovery the stock price trend led five months. The National Bureau of Economic Research has pointed out that there tends to be an inverse relationship between the size of the stock market rise following recessions and the size of the preceding recession.[1] The greater the drop in economic activity, the smaller the subsequent rise in the stock market in the first and second year of recovery. The smaller the drop in economic activity, the greater the rise in stock prices in the first and second year of recovery. The recent performance was on schedule. The stock market rise in the first year of recovery from the low of the recession was greater than the rise occurring in the same time period following the next most severe recession, but it was less than the rise in the stock market following most milder recessions. To the extent that the recent bull market in stocks is inciting inflation fears, the concern is ill founded.

Perhaps the major factor increasing inflation concern was the approximately 12.5 billion dollar federal cash deficit in the past fiscal year—the largest peacetime deficit in our history. All of us have learned that a deficit inevitably causes inflation. Yet, that answer is too easy. A deficit causes inflation when two conditions hold. A deficit is inflationary if: one, it is financed by new money obtained from banks. Only a small amount of the cash deficit in fiscal 1959 was bank financed. Two, the economy is functioning at practical full employment of resources. The economy had substantial unemployment during the past year. Although current concern about future inflation appears to be at an all-time high, it is interesting to note that general price indices have been almost perfectly stable for over a year despite the mammoth deficit.

In summary, it has been possible over the past year and a half to substantially

[1] Geoffrey H. Moore, "The Behavior of Business Indicators in a Recovery Period," *Evaluating and Using Business Indicators*, American Management Association Report No. 25, 1959, pp. 17–21.



increase total spending without inflation since the economy had room for expanding production. Production rose just as rapidly as did spending.

### IS FEAR OF LONG-RUN INFLATION ILL FOUNDED?

Do the preceding comments mean that we should not be concerned over the long-run danger of inflation? Certainly not! There are good reasons why concern is justified. The Employment Act of 1946 and the philosophies of both major political parties provide considerable assurance that prolonged depressions will not be permitted to develop. Yet, it was only in periods of prolonged depressions that prices declined in the past. In effect, a "floor" has been placed under the general price level. It therefore becomes critically important that a "lid" be established on the general price level if long-run inflation is to be prevented. Stabilization of the general price level need not mean fixed prices for particular goods. It is only through fluctuations in relative prices that a growing economy responds to the changing demands placed upon it. Those that argue for government investigation and regulation of price and wage changes would place a straitjacket on the American economy which would make it impossible to secure the optimum allocation of resources. It would be indeed unfortunate if concern over maintaining price stability resulted in more, rather than less, government intervention in the pricing process. The existence of a practical "floor" under the general price level does mean that the avoidance of inflationary pressures should become a major factor influencing the formulation of future government economic policies.

### CAUSES OF PAST INFLATIONS

What are the causes of inflation? The cause of all inflations in this country has been excessive spending relative to the capacity of the economy to increase production. It is absolutely critical for the success of any program to contain inflation that management of the federal budget and monetary policy be designed to promote growth in total demands only as fast as the real economy grows. There is perhaps no empirical regularity among economic data that is based on so much evidence for so wide a range of circumstances as the connection between substantial changes in the stock of money (demand deposits plus currency) per unit of production and the level of prices. The Federal Reserve System has the power to control the stock of money through its monetary policy actions. In the main, Federal Reserve policies, since the 1951 "accord" was achieved, have been of a stabilizing nature. The key to preventing future inflation lies in limiting growth in the money supply to the pace of real economic growth.

Some say that we must have inflation if we are to achieve maximum economic growth. Yet two recent independent and careful studies by Bach and Friedman concluded there was no apparent relation between the rate of inflation and the rate of economic growth in previous periods in this country.[2] During some periods substantial growth occurred without inflation and during other periods substantial growth occurred with inflation. There was no apparent consistency between rate of growth and the rate of inflation.

[2] G. L. Bach, "How Important Is Price Stability in Stable Economic Growth?", *The Relationship of Prices to Economic Stability and Growth*. Compendium of papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, March 31, 1958 (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 33-48. Milton Friedman, "The Supply of Money and Changes in Prices and Output," *ibid.*, pp. 241–256.

## PREVENTIVES FOR FUTURE INFLATIONS

Let us turn for just a moment to the means for encouraging economic growth. Achievement of adequate growth requires a continued high level of investment and more efficient use of existing resources. More attention could usefully be devoted to revising the tax system to encourage investment and hence increase productive potential. Also, our nation can no longer afford such wasteful luxuries as the farm support program, uneconomic regulation of transportation rates, federal support of retail price maintenance, high tariffs, and permissive policies toward featherbedding practices of unions. Government efforts should be designed to reduce artificial barriers to the flow of labor and capital from less to more efficient lines, rather than the reverse.

The Federal Reserve System currently has the power to control the stock of money through its monetary policy actions. Yet, strong pressures are now developing in many circles for eliminating the power of the Federal Reserve to restrict credit when inflationary pressures exist. If a flexible money policy is abandoned, substantial long-run inflation is inevitable. Federal Reserve powers in recent years have been used to restrict credit in times of full employment when inflationary pressures increase and to encourage monetary growth during recessions. Since the adoption of this type of policy in 1951, prices have been more stable than in most earlier periods in our history, and a high level of employment has been maintained most of the time. The recent record was not an accident. It was very closely related to the fact that monetary policy has been vastly improved.

The rate of growth in the money supply is clearly correlated both to periods of boom business and recession.[8] Prior to every recovery, including the last one, a rise in the rate of monetary growth occurred, and prior to every recession there has been a decline in monetary growth. The data strongly suggest that the relation is a causal one.

Present monetary policy is much superior to previous policies from an anti-inflation and economic stabilization point of view. However, there are probably further improvements that can be made. It is not accidental that in the past fifty years, the three periods when the most violent declines in the rate of monetary growth occurred preceded the three worst depressions. Also, periods of rapid and sustained monetary growth have been inevitably followed by inflation once the economy attained practical full employment. At present, extreme fluctuations in monetary growth are avoided, and this practice should continue. Monetary policy must be tied to sensitive action guides. In the past the Federal Reserve sometimes used the consumer price index as a major guide to action. That was probably a mistake because the consumer price index moves upward after business activity starts down, and it continues to be level long after inflationary pressures begin. Monetary policy must be tied to sensitive indicators rather than laggers such as the consumer price index.

### *Need to balance the budget*

It is important, from an anti-inflation point of view, that the fiscal 1960 federal budget be balanced. A small bank-financed deficit in fiscal 1960 would be much more inflationary than was the mammoth deficit of fiscal 1959. The reason is simple. Bank-financed deficits

[8] Beryl W. Sprinkel, "Monetary Growth as a Cyclical Predictor," *The Journal of Finance* (September, 1959).



stimulate total spending. As long as labor and capital resources are idle, sharp increases in total demands are matched by equally sharp increases in production. Once practical full employment is achieved, production increases will be moderate. Unless demand increases are also moderate, inflation will result.

The federal budget automatically exerts a stabilizing impact over the business cycle due to "built-in" stabilizers. Federal revenues decline in recessions due to the drop in personal and corporate tax liabilities. With no change in spending, a deficit emerges. Actually, transfer payments such as unemployment compensation payments and certain social security payments tend to rise during recessions, thereby increasing the size of the deficit. As business activity improves revenues rise and transfer payments decline thereby reducing the stimulus from the federal budget. Direct federal spending programs initiated by Congress during a recession frequently exert a destabilizing influence due to the lags between the formulation of the program and the eventual outflow of money.

The recent deficit played a beneficial role in stemming the recession. Federal revenues are now rising rapidly as personal and corporate incomes increase. Unfortunately, some of the spending programs initiated during the recession are now getting under way and will increase the difficulty of balancing the federal budget in the coming fiscal year.

Legislative decisions as to the size of the federal budget should be based primarily on the relative efficiency of the federal government versus state and local government and private enterprise in performing the service under consideration. From an inflation-control point of view, it becomes critically important that federal revenues at least equal expenditures during prosperous periods so that deficit financing may be avoided. Tax rate reductions during prosperous periods are consistent with inflation control only if a surplus results from a reduction in federal spending or growth in the economy which automatically increases tax receipts.

In summary, the budget should be at least balanced during periods of full employment and a deficit should be welcomed during recession periods. A budget surplus is desirable in the period immediately ahead.

In addition to continuing a stabilizing monetary-fiscal policy, the objective of attaining stable prices would be enhanced by an amendment to the Employment Act of 1946 to include the goal of price stabilization as an equally important objective of government as the current goal of maximum employment and production. As of now the emphasis of the Employment Act of 1946 is primarily on maintaining maximum employment and production. This Act does not emphasize price stabilization. If the Employment Act were amended to include price stabilization as one objective—not the most important, but equally important—the Act would give clear direction to responsible government agencies when formulating economic policies. Also, such an amendment would tend to stabilize price expectations in the private sector of the economy.

There is no convincing evidence that direct wage and price controls would stop inflation. Such controls do not affect the cause of inflation but merely affect the symptoms. Direct wage and price controls neither increase the productive capacity of the economy nor do they limit final demands. Therefore, they cannot prevent inflation. Furthermore, direct controls are inconsistent with a free enterprise economy, for controls prevent adjustment in production patterns in response to changing de-

mands by consumers, businesses, and governments.

### ACTION PROGRAM FOR INFORMED CITIZENS

What can the intelligent citizen do to further the cause of price stability? Unfortunately, the basic causes of inflation are beyond the direct control of the individual. Admonitions to individuals to save more, buy more savings bonds, spend wisely, avoid excessive wage increases, join buyer's strikes, and so on, are destined for failure unless a stabilizing budget and a flexible monetary policy are pursued. If these policies are adopted, such admonitions are neither necessary nor beneficial. Within the limits established by custom and law, individuals should feel free to make spending and saving decisions based on their own personal needs rather than upon the impact their action may have on the economy. It is the responsibility of the Executive, Congress, and the Federal Reserve Board to follow policies which will restrain total spending during inflationary periods and hence provide assurance that free private choice will be consistent with the public good.

But ultimately governmental authorities must be responsive to public opinion. It is the obligation of an intelligent citizen to first make sure his opinion is an informed one, and second to communicate his opinion to his elected representatives. It is critically important that the present Administration and Congress understand that the public fears inflation and wants price stability. A balanced budget in fiscal 1960 would contribute to that goal.

Also, it should be recognized that the Federal Reserve System is ultimately responsible to Congress. Although virtually no one objects to easy money during periods of recession, many legislators, as well as others, fail to see the necessity for pursuing a restrictive monetary policy during boom periods. The reason for this attitude is clear. No one likes to defer spending plans because of the unavailability of money. Yet, if all borrowing demands during boom periods were accommodated by the creation of new money, the production of goods which satisfy wants and services would not be increased, but prices would rise. Congress should be informed that the pursuance of a flexible monetary policy is critically necessary if further inflation is to be avoided.

# APPENDIX

## The Need to Check Inflation

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
IN MAKING PUBLIC THE INTERIM REPORT OF THE
CABINET COMMITTEE ON PRICE STABILITY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH

June 29, 1959

The Interim Report submitted to me by the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth, of which Vice President Nixon is chairman, contains recommendations for checking inflation that are important to all Americans. I am therefore making the Report public and sending copies of it to all members of the Congress. I urge that the Congress consider anew the Committee's three recommendations, all of which require legislative action. Each of these recommendations has been previously submitted by me to the Congress.

The Committee is continuing its work and will issue statements from time to time to inform the public on questions related to economic growth and price stability. A sound public understanding of the facts bearing on these questions is needed if we are to find constructive answers to them.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

### INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

By Cabinet Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth

It is the unanimous opinion of the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth that our economy is now at a critical juncture urgently requiring action to forestall inflation and insure sound and sustained economic growth and progress.

It is the purpose of this interim report to give an appraisal of the current state of the economy, to make recommendations for immediate action which we believe is essential if inflation is to be checked, and to indicate those areas to which the Committee is presently directing its studies for the purpose of developing long run, positive recommendations to increase efficiency and productivity and thereby assure maximum economic progress.

*Current state of the economy*

The economy has recovered from the recent recession and is now breaking into new high ground. Though unemployment persists in some areas and industries, the evidence of recovery is unmistakable:

. . . Overall output is the highest in history and rising vigorously.

. . . Employment is rising sharply and unemployment is falling steadily.

. . . Average weekly earnings, personal consumption expenditures, and

private investment are at record levels and are continuing to rise.

*Threat of inflation*

For more than a year the average prices of the things families buy have been remarkably stable, but the Committee has reached the conclusion that our ability to maintain reasonable price stability will be seriously threatened unless affirmative action is taken now. Danger signs that cannot be ignored are:

. . . Prices of industrial commodities and many other goods have been rising in wholesale markets and this is usually followed by rises at retail.

. . . While the average level of consumer prices has been relatively stable, prices of many consumer goods and services have continued to go up in the past year.

. . . The multi-billion dollar Federal deficit of the budget year just ending (fiscal '59) is creating sizable inflationary pressures.

. . . While prospects for holding the line on expenditures for the budget year just starting (fiscal '60) appear much brighter than they were before such wide and strong public support developed in the fight against deficit spending, there still remain strong pressures for irresponsible spending. To yield to these pressures, either through appropriations for next year or through authorizations for later years, would create serious inflationary forces. The Committee has noted an alarming tendency in the Congress to work toward only an illusory balance in the budget, by substituting for current appropriations commitments for later years which will make it exceedingly difficult to avoid future deficits.

. . . There are strong tendencies toward increased spending by State, county, and local governments.

. . . Wage settlements have been made recently which raised wages substantially; wage agreements negotiated in earlier years provide for increases in rates this year; and wage agreements to be negotiated this summer or autumn in many industries (steel, aluminum, other metals, construction, rubber, lumber, railroads, paper, longshoring, meat packing, and metal containers are among them) could result in wage increases of such magnitude as to lead to price increases.

*The choice before us*

We are confronted, in summary, with overwhelming evidence that we have arrived at a time of decision as to the future course of our economy.

The Committee's conclusions can be stated in two sentences:

. . . We face a serious risk of price increases which not only would be directly harmful to American families but would seriously endanger the healthy prosperity now developing.

. . . If, on the other hand, inflationary forces are substantially checked, we can move forward into the greatest and soundest period of economic progress and prosperity in history—a period of sustained economic growth with reasonable price stability.

*Effects of inflation*

The Committee rejects three misconceptions that are sometimes heard:

. . . that a small amount of inflation is no cause for concern;
. . . that inflation will stimulate economic growth;
. . . that "a little inflation is inevitable, relax and enjoy it."

Moderate price rises in the period of vigorous economic expansion which is now well under way would not be cause for alarm if these price rises were simply offsetting declines in the recent recession. In the recent recession, however, there was no decline in the overall average of prices. The record shows, in fact, that for the past quarter of a century the price increases which characterize periods of rising prosperity have not been offset at other times. Thus, moderate increases even for short periods cumulate in the course of years to immoderate increases in the cost of living.



Increases in the cost of living

. . . Inflict unjust hardships on the many families whose incomes or pensions are fixed in dollars, or do not rise in proportion to prices.

. . . Violate our standards of fair play by harming families whose incomes are average or below-average more than families whose incomes are above average.

. . . Contradict promises implied when people put aside income in insurance, government bonds, retirement funds, and other forms of saving; for when the money is returned it fails to buy the goods and services that people were led to expect when they put the income aside.

Resistance to inflation is bound to cause temporary inconvenience to some and to limit the gains of others, but price stability will powerfully promote the welfare of all.

*Fallacies of price and wage control*

The Committee rejects government control of prices and wages as a method of controlling inflation. Such controls would not only fail completely to achieve any good but would do more harm than any amount of inflation that we have ever experienced or are likely to experience in peacetime.

While reasonable stability of the *average level* of prices is desirable, variability of *individual* prices is essential, because that controls the efficiency and the progress of our dynamic economy. Differences in prices reflect the priorities attached by consumers to different products; they thereby guide productive efforts, which seek the best returns for their effort, into useful activities. Differences in prices show the scarcities of different raw materials, machines, and personal skills, and thereby induce managers, who seek to produce at least cost, to use methods and materials which are most abundant and to conserve those which are most scarce.

If prices are regulated they cannot reflect accurately the relative priorities of various goods and services, or the relative scarcities of various means of producing goods and services. The result will always be—as history shows clearly that it always has been—waste, inefficiency, and slowing down of progress.

Furthermore, price control inevitably leads to wage control. The two together inevitably lead to rationing goods and regulating jobs and working conditions. The resulting loss of freedom would ultimately prove even more disastrous than the loss in living standards.

*Recommendations for immediate action*

There is no panacea, no easy way, to control inflation. As a minimum course of action to meet the problems the Committee recommends that the following steps be taken promptly:

(1) The Congress should make it clear that the Federal Government intends to use all appropriate means to protect the buying power of the dollar. Recognition by the Congress of reasonable price stability as an explicit goal of Federal economic policy was proposed in the State of the Union Message last January and repeated in the Economic Report. The Congress should give the highest priority to this pro-

posal. By speaking out clearly on this issue during this session it can effectively support the Administration and the public in the fight against inflation.

(2) Not only is it imperative that the budget be balanced in the fiscal year starting next month, but it is important that the national debt be reduced. Any effort to increase expenditures beyond the levels recommended in your budget should be vigorously resisted. Holding the line on expenditures, together with improved revenues from prosperous business conditions, would make possible some reduction of the debt. Not only must the line be held on the total of next year's appropriations, but it is important that the greatest restraint and selectivity be exercised in authorizing programs for later years. Excessive authorizations, by making deficits or higher taxes likely in the future, could create permanent inflationary forces.

(3) Without firm control of the quantity of money and credit, all other measures to check inflation will be futile. Sound monetary policy requires that the Federal Government avoid making its bonds, other than those of comparatively small denomination designed for family savings, the equivalent of money. Government bonds are the equivalent of money if they can always be changed into actual money at virtually face value, not only when they are due and payable but any time before. This is the case if the Treasury is forced to issue only very short-term bonds, or if the Federal Reserve System stands ready to buy at a pegged price all government bonds offered to it in advance of the date when they are due to be paid by the Treasury. There is only an imperceptible difference between the government's issuing bonds that are equivalent to money, and the government's just cranking up the printing presses and rolling out greenbacks. The government will be forced to continue issuing large additional amounts of short-term bonds that are the near-equivalent of money until the Congress allows the Treasury sufficient flexibility to achieve a balance in our debt structure by inducing people of their own free will to invest their savings in long-term government bonds. Thus, to avoid inflation it is essential that the present limitation on the interest rate on long-term government bonds be removed, as the Administration has already recommended. The issue is whether we want price stability or whether we want, in a concealed way, to do the equivalent of printing money—something the American public would not stand for if done openly.

*Actions needed to promote economic progress*

The preceding three steps are direct defenses against the present danger of excessive price rises. The Administration has already recommended all of them to the Congress. We emphasize them in this Interim Report because these actions are needed without further delay.

In the long run, however, the most effective antidote to inflation is increased efficiency and productivity of the economy. This is one of the reasons why a major part of our work is directed toward actions to promote sustained economic growth. Furthermore, such growth is necessary for maintaining our increasing standard of living and our national security.

Among the subjects on which we are working because of their importance to the efficiency and productivity of the economy are:

. . . *Tax reform.* A certain amount of revenue raised in one way may interfere far more with efficiency and productivity than the same amount raised in another way. Some taxes make it profitable for people to devote energy and ingenuity to avoiding tax liabilities, rather than to devote their efforts to doing the most useful things they can in the most efficient ways. Tax reforms are needed to promote economic growth. The "time in the foreseeable future when needed tax reforms can be accomplished," to which you looked forward in your State of the Union Message, can perhaps be realized soon; for, if the line can be held on the Administration's budget, tax revenues should more than meet current expenditures. This will provide the margin needed to provide for reduction in the debt and absorb any temporary losses of revenue caused by shifting to rates which, by improving incentives, will enlarge the tax base. Studies are now under way with a view to proposing changes in our tax laws at the appropriate time.

. . . *Our competitive position in foreign markets.* A significant part of our total employment depends on exports. If we price ourselves out of foreign markets we price ourselves out of jobs, and our prosperity and economic growth will be hampered. Several government agencies are studying this problem, including the Departments of State, Commerce, and Labor, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Council of Economic Advisers. On the basis of these and other studies the Committee will issue a report with recommendations.

. . . *Government regulations affecting industry.* Many government regulations, formulated by regulatory agencies, by administrative agencies, or by legislation, were originally established under very different conditions to protect the public against exploitation that is now virtually eliminated by technological developments. Some of these regulations have costly side effects, by seriously reducing productivity or causing inefficiency. There is need for a thorough review looking toward elimination of regulations which retard economic growth. Several studies have been initiated to explore the modifications needed to encourage economic growth.

. . . *Farm price support programs* Under existing obsolete laws, price supports on a few favored crops are inflationary through their enormous costs. They also contribute to raising the prices that consumers must pay for food and for goods made from agricultural raw materials. Our export subsidies required by law handicap our own industries by making American-grown raw materials available more cheaply to foreign competitors than to American manufacturers. The expenditures of the programs go largely to comparatively few large producers, and to industries only remotely connected with farming. The Committee will conduct special studies leading to recommendations for changes designed to alleviate the major inflationary effects of existing programs.

. . . *Practices of labor and business.* Excessive concentration of power in the hands of labor or business results in practices which are contrary to the public interest. Such practices reduce efficiency and productivity, and they create inflationary pressures. Remedies for these practices should be sought through eliminating the power to injure the public interest, rather than through public control or review of the decisions of businesses, of unions, or of collective bargaining. The Committee will examine and report on the extent to which concentrations of power in labor and business contribute to inflation or impede economic progress.

. . . *Public understanding.* One of the functions assigned to this Committee in the State of the Union Message is to "strive to build a better public understanding of the conditions necessary

for maintaining growth and price stability." As part of our work on that assignment we shall from time to time issue reports on various facets of the broad problem of economic growth and price stability.

Respectfully submitted,

Cabinet Committee on Price Stability for Economic Growth

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Vice President

Robert B. Anderson
Secretary of the Treasury

Arthur E. Summerfield
Postmaster General

Ezra Taft Benson
Secretary of Agriculture

Lewis L. Strauss
Secretary of Commerce

James P. Mitchell
Secretary of Labor

Raymond J. Saulnier
Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

W. Allen Wallis (*Executive Vice Chairman*)
Special Assistant to the President

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## *INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*

HOLBERT N. CARROLL. *The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs.* Pp. xviii, 365. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958. $5.00.

Dr. Carroll, an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh, has done a painstaking scholarly job. The Foreword by Dr. William Y. Elliott of Harvard could hardly be bettered as a "book review" by another qualified historian. My comments, therefore, may be taken as those of a private soldier who served in these wars and who is thankful to this war correspondent for placing in perspective that which was obscured by the dust of battle and "The Fog of War." I venture, as a fellow author, to express respectful appreciation of the research in depth required to make this book possible.

The author has caught, with a sense almost tactile, the changing kaleidoscopic moods of the Congress. He has detected, too, the gradations in the quality of committee leadership during successive Congresses. One would like to hear his private opinion of some of the members of the House as to their capacities for good or ill.

There is much of interest in this book concerning a matter not well understood by the politically unaware. I mean the acceptance of the necessity for bipartisanship in the creation or annotation of foreign policy. Partisan interplay and bloc interests are also discussed in some detail, but one notes and agrees with the considerable differentiation between bipartisanship in committee work and the necessitous descent into the political Avernus on the House floor.

This book is rarely marred with factual errors. One notes, however, on page 18, the statement that, in 1938, "Congress voted not to fortify Guam." Here, the author unwittingly perpetuates an ancient canard of the political forum. This was a bill to deepen a harbor in Guam to facilitate the approach of commercial seaplanes. This is an excellent example of a false charge, so frequently repeated, as to lull the researcher into accepting it as factual.

The author's thesis that the House Appropriations Committee has been more effective than the Foreign Affairs Committee in the area of foreign policy administration, as distinguished from foreign policy, seems to me to be well taken. In comparing the impact of the Appropriations Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee on executive agencies, particularly the State Department, the author astutely observes that "it is often wiser to please the money committee than to placate the legislative committee which authorized the policy, if the two do not agree."

The operations of other committees, as they affect foreign policy, are knowledgeably discussed. Much research is evident in highlighting the influence of such com-

mittees as Agriculture, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Merchant Marine and Fisheries. The attitude of the House toward its powerful Rules Committee—half grudging resentment and half gratitude for suppression of politically embarrassing legislation—is interestingly discussed.

One notes some examination into the work of conferees with the Senate committee conferees, the operation of joint committees of both Houses, and of channels of House-Senate co-operation. A full development of this interrelationship would require another book. This reviewer eagerly awaits it.

HUGH SCOTT
United States Senator from
Pennsylvania

PERCY E. CORBETT. *Law in Diplomacy.* Pp. xii, 290. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. $6.00.

In a Preface the author states that "this book proposes to study and in some degree measure the influence of legal notions on foreign policy without assuming or elaborating a system of international law . . . ."

The study is centered around the foreign policies of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Actual illustrations and case studies are taken from the diplomatic history of these countries. Criticisms are made in many cases where the author sees discrepancies between politics and law.

In "The Soviet Dilemma," Chapter III, credit is given to Czars Alexander II and Nicholas II, respectively, for initiating the Brussels Conference of 1874 and the First Hague Conference of 1899. But for the Soviets "the emphasis is sharply upon international law as a tool rather than as an objective system of control" (p. 101). The Soviet government is strongly criticized for "the savage suppression by Soviet arms of Hungary's tragic struggle for free government in the autumn of 1956" (p. 103).

In a lively discussion of "Mare Clausum and Mare Liberum," Chapter IV, there is included a splendid account of the development of the three-mile limit. In view of conflicting national claims the freedom of the seas "is still as remote as the vigorous world government which could alone give it reality" (p. 135). In "The Diplomacy of Arbitration," Chapter V, national restrictive and limiting influences hamper more complete jurisdiction of arbitrators and courts. As to Russia its policy has shifted from the days of the czars when it actively supported the practice of arbitration to the present when Moscow "wishes not only to avoid any obligation to arbitrate, but, if it should participate in arbitration, to preserve its discretion at each stage of the proceedings" (p. 171).

In "International Organization," Chapter VI, the various disputes handled by the League of Nations and the United Nations are discussed. Here again the pull and tug between politics and law is noted in the accounts. The author sees some hope in the work of the various functional international agencies. In "Human Rights and World Community," Chapter VII, note is taken of how the cold war is reflected in national viewpoints on human rights. As "between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States and the United Kingdom on the other, there is no doubt in most Western minds where the greater solicitude for the liberties and opportunities of the individual resides" (p. 263).

By way of some general conclusions the author recognizes that some progress has been made "toward acceptance and improvement of modes of settling disputes." But these "forward steps do not mean that we are within sight of an effective world community with its necessary general submission to law and collective monopoly of force . . ." (p. 271).

This is a very thought-provoking book, filled with vigorous language which does not stop at criticisms of national policies. There is much useful, well-documented material which defies brief review but warrants careful study. One may hope that the notable lines of divergence between politics and law so sharply delineated by Professor Corbett will be progressively lessened as peoples everywhere sense, with increasing clarity, the relationship between international law, human rights, higher



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University of Southern California

JAMES P. WARBURG. *The West in Crisis.* Pp. 192. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1959. $3.50.

Mr. Warburg continues his notable public service with this latest of his valuable books which may fairly be called Tracts for our Times. It is, he says, "a book prompted not only by deep concern but by a feeling close to despair—despair on the part of one who is enough of an optimist to believe that man was not put upon this earth merely in order to destroy himself." This feeling, the present reviewer owes it to you to confess, he fully shares as he shares Mr. Warburg's general point of view on what should be American policy, especially in the realm of foreign affairs. The book is so timely that it contains a sympathetic note on Mr. Dulles' fatal illness and supplementary notes bringing the chapter on the 1958 crises and prospects for disengagement down to the Berlin crisis. Here Mr. Warburg includes his valuable interpretation of the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis—which was not solved but only sleeps—and the letter to the State Department and senatorial leaders suggesting the lines of a reply to the Soviet government's note of November 27, 1958 on Berlin.

These immediate approaches to pressing problems are by no means improvisations; they spring from the settled convictions of an experienced observer on the proper basis for a Western, and more especially, an American policy. He examines threats to "Capitalism" and soft spots in the American economy. He discusses disarmament and disengagement, examining both as they should be examined as necessarily complementary. He is guided in his positive suggestions by his conviction that our difficulties largely arise from a dilemma which he describes as follows: "The government of the United States has not yet fully adjusted its foreign policy to the fact that the United States is no longer, as it was for a short moment of history, the paramount power and that, therefore, it can no longer police the world or dictate the conditions of a peaceful settlement. . . . That, in the opinion of this observer, constitutes one part of the basic dilemma of American diplomacy in the second half of the twentieth century. . . . The other part of the dilemma is that the government of the United States has not adjusted its policy to the drastic change which has taken place in the nature of physical, economic, and psychological power" (pp. 82–83).

Space prevents even a summary of Mr. Warburg's development of this theme and his positive recommendations. They can be found very clearly stated in this book, among whose excellences succinct brevity ranks high.

NORMAN THOMAS

New York City

LOUIS J. HALLE. *Dream and Reality: Aspects of American Foreign Policy.* Pp. xxi, 327. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959. $3.75.

In 1955, when Louis J. Halle published *Civilization and Foreign Policy,* his objective was the development of an "applicable body of theory" for guidance in United States foreign policy. His latest book has quite a different objective. The title, *Dream and Reality,* epitomizes the conflict inherent in our foreign policy. In his own words: "We Americans have constantly dreamed of isolation and have repeatedly experienced involvement. We have dreamed of security behind our watery ramparts only to awaken belatedly, time and time again, to the approach of danger across those very seas to which we have confided our protection."

During the interval since his earlier book Mr. Halle has apparently come to believe that until certain basic changes in America's interpretation of its place in the world occur, it is premature and perhaps even irrelevant to think about a theoretically based foreign policy. The purpose of this book, then, is clearly that of correction and reorientation; *Dream and Reality* instead of being a sequel to *Civilization and Foreign Policy* is precedent to it in conception and design.

The author's main thesis is that from the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 until 1947, when the Truman Doctrine signalized a realistic about face, United States foreign policy was postulated upon a legendary rather than a factual conception of the world and our relation to it. In developing his argument, Mr. Halle observes that the demands of diplomacy place a high premium upon sophistication, judgment, and skill in reconciling the "strategic" and the "ideological" aspects of any issue. He uses these terms to distinguish between a realistic pursuit of a national security interest and a program grounded mainly on popular appeal.

Mr. Halle's theme is not new but seldom has it been more persuasively advanced. His technique of arguing his case by reviewing some of the pivotal decisions that have shaped our foreign policy conveys a sense of reality that carries marked impact; he has conceived his task shrewdly and executed it with skill. On first reading, the book gives the impression of unevenness, poor coherence, coverage that is both spotty and discursive. All of these things may be true, but they do not destroy the general effectiveness of his presentation. He does not pretend to tell the whole story of American foreign policy; rather he employs the case method and succeeds in preserving the integrity of both his method and his subject matter.

LAWRENCE H. CHAMBERLAIN
Professor of Government
Columbia University

EUGENE M. EMME. *The Impact of Air Power: National Security and World Politics*. Pp. xiv, 914. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1959. $12.50.

It is difficult to dissent from the judgment of the distinguished reviewers quoted on the dust cover of this book, that Dr. Emme has furnished teachers and students of military affairs with an invaluable aid in their little documented studies. He has presented a nine-hundred page collection of documents on the doctrine of air power, ranging from tentative prophecies in the first decade of this century to the confident prognostications of the astronautic experts of our own day. Within his range he comprises such historic and recondite material as Winston Churchill's "Air Defence Memoranda of 1914"; the report of the Smuts Committee of 1917, which made possible the creation of the Royal Air Force and all other independent air forces which followed it; declarations of faith by Goering, Trenchard, Mitchell, and Seversky; expert analyses of the role of air power in the Second World War; a wide selection of documents on nuclear warfare and the theory of deterrence; a useful group of statements, Russian and foreign, about the evolution of Soviet air policy since the Second World War; and an extremely useful selection of speeches and writings by the principal protagonists in the great debate on American defense policy which has raged during the past ten years. To each section is added a reading list of relevant books and articles which will be invaluable to teachers of a subject whose bibliography is still hopelessly unorganized. It is, in short, difficult to exaggerate the value of this work.

In view of this value, criticism seems churlish; but certain criticisms must be made. The first is that in this book Dr. Emme is insufficiently critical, especially in his selection of contemporary documents. More than four hundred pages are devoted to quotations from documents on postwar defense policy. Much of this material is redundant and overlapping; some is blatantly propagandist; and some, alas, is intellectually worthless. Dr. Emme does not always fulfill his editorial duty of critical comment or of textual analysis in showing the controversial circumstances in which certain statements were made to enable students to evaluate their worth. Secondly, it does not fully emerge from Dr. Emme's selection quite how controversial a subject air power has been. The impression given by this book is of a gradual revelation of the truth about air power. Nothing is quoted, for example, from the sections of the "United States Strategic Bomber Survey" critical of the achievements of Allied bombing forces during the war, and, among the documents bearing on the controversy over American defense policy, the statements of the protagonists of air power are given far greater prominence than those of their critics. It is an unbalance which a more detached, editorial commentary would have done much to redress. Finally, many students of international politics will find highly controversial the uniformly unfavorable, editorial judgments of Russian intentions and policies over the last ten years. It is difficult, in the climate of the cold war, to escape emotional engagement; but in a scholarly edition of documents a certain degree of self-discipline in such matters is desirable. Nevertheless Dr. Emme gives us a wide selection of documents and comments on Soviet policy, and this is by no means the least valuable section of his book.

MICHAEL HOWARD
Lecturer in War Studies
University of London
Official Historian
Cabinet Office

D. A. GRABER. *Crisis Diplomacy: A History of U. S. Intervention Policies and Practices*. Pp. xviii, 402. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press in co-operation with the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy, University of Chicago, 1959. $6.75.

Breaking United States diplomatic history into four periods, 1789–1848, 1849–1898, 1899–1939, and 1940–1958, Miss Graber gives for each parallel accounts of actual interventions by the United States in other countries and of the principles professed by our government with respect to intervention. In the first period she finds the assertion of an unqualified principle of nonintervention designed to deter the Concert of European States from interventions in the Western Hemisphere. Actually the United States observed this principle only with limitations dictated by national interest. During the second period a doctrine forbidding intervention except as required for national security or permitted by treaty emerged, and the United States practice moved toward conformity with the principle. This trend was broken by the Spanish-American War and later interventions in the Caribbean area which continued into the 1930's. Since 1939 the United States first abandoned unilateral intervention in favor of collective security, then finding the latter insufficient to meet the threats of cold war sought again grounds for intervention. It is Miss Graber's contention, fortified by hundreds of instances, that our policy has actually responded to immediate conceptions of national interest rather than to doctrinal positions or legal standards, and that in all four periods there was disparity between actual practice and professed principle.

These conclusions are unlikely to surprise students of United States diplomatic history. Much of Miss Graber's thesis and nearly all her evidence can be found in standard works of Samuel F. Bemis, Thomas A. Bailey, and others. Little new ground is broken in research; in some instances recent monographs upon particular points seem not to have been used. But the book is a useful survey which highlights our intervention practice. It can be commended especially to the general reader.

No definition of intervention is offered. Miss Graber indeed concludes that neat lines cannot be drawn between permissible and forbidden conduct. Therefore she treats as interventions conduct ranging from landing marines to withholding recognition of de facto governments or remonstrating against mistreatment of individuals or minorities. The reviewer continues to feel that it is preferable not to characterize the permissible ways of influencing the conduct of other states as interventions. It strains language to say, as Miss Graber does, that our postwar mutual defense treaties were made in order to provide justification for later interventions. Economic or military assistance which has been invited and is welcomed by the recipient state has not usually been thought an intervention.

C. H. MCLAUGHLIN
Professor of Political Science
University of Minnesota

LELAND M. GOODRICH. *The United Nations*. Pp. x, 419. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1959. $5.60.

WILLIAM A. SCOTT and STEPHEN B. WITHEY. *The United States and the United Nations: The Public View 1945–1955*. (National Studies on International

Organization.) Prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace under the auspices of the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan. Pp. xiii, 314. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1958. $3.00.

The second of these volumes is a report on the views of the American people regarding the United Nations during its first decade. Making use of research data derived from a large number of national attitude surveys and opinion polls, it outlines certain tentative conclusions about public sentiment on matters of international organization. Despite the authors' candid warning that the materials of various research organizations are often not comparable, the sheer accumulation of data in this volume is impressive and convincing.

Briefly, here are some of the conclusions reached by the authors, Scott and Withey: The United Nations was regarded by most people as an instrument to prevent war—and virtually nothing else. Knowledge about the organization was generally meager, even at times when it was dealing with a critical world situation such as the Korean conflict or the Berlin blockade. Its performance was most applauded during relatively peaceful or, from the American point of view, successful periods, while criticism was highest in times of frustration. Sentiment in favor of continued United States' membership in the United Nations was uniformly high. Most Americans even favored continuing membership if Communist China were admitted, although a great majority were themselves against admitting that nation. Groups that were better informed tended to support the United Nations more than poorly informed groups. Beyond this, there were virtually no significant differences in reaction among people living in various geographic areas nor among those of different political party affiliation. The greatest variations were related to education, with the higher educated groups likely to support the purposes and functions of the United Nations but also apt to be more critical of its performance. Most of this is fairly evident, but it is good to have some empirical evidence to reinforce common sense observations.

Professor Goodrich's volume is a textbook, although its Preface makes the usual obeisances to the general reader. As was to be expected from one of our leading authorities on the United Nations, this is a work of sound, informed judgment that will be of inestimable value in a variety of undergraduate courses. Unlike many surveys of the United Nations, Goodrich's study is not stifled by the details of structural organization. His chapters on structure and function are clear, succinct, and uncluttered by an underbrush of insignificant minutiae. At the same time, the author has placed his analysis firmly in the context of the international situation which has developed since the end of World War II. Recognizing the realities of national power and the significance of great power conflict, he does not, however, admit to despair in the light of the genuine achievements of the United Nations at a variety of levels. His assessment is calm and just; it leaves the reader with the feeling that not the least valuable asset of the United Nations is the group of clear-headed scholars like Goodrich who have made its study the center of their work.

HENRY R. WINKLER
Professor of History
Rutgers, The State University

JAMES W. WIGGINS and HELMUT SCHOECK (Eds.). *Foreign Aid Reexamined: A Critical Appraisal.* Pp. ix, 250. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958. $5.00.

The papers collected in this volume were prepared for a symposium on culture contact in less developed countries held on the campus of Emory University. Their authors have re-examined United States foreign aid and in the majority of cases find it wanting or are neutral toward it. None give it wholehearted endorsement. Only H. G. Barnett takes a positive, constructive view of technical assistance in arguing for "aided self-help" in place of "imposition of assistance" and "progress by decree."

J. Fred Rippy asserts that "The assets of our people should not be wasted by overstaffing, extravagance in salaries, favoritism toward exporters, and sentimental



benevolence at the expense of coerced taxpayers. In comparison with traditional diplomacy at the height of its achievement, the programs are likely to be of minor significance in world politics. . . ." (p. 19).

Foreign aid is seen as ". . . a patchwork of conflicting ideologies, contradictory purposes, and confusing mechanisms" (p. 25) by Elgin Groseclose. "It represents an effort to identify Church and State, that is, to convert the government into an instrument of the moral conscience. It conforms to various ideologies, both Fascist and Communist, in that it represents an effort to identify the State with the totality of the social life. . . ." (p. 27). He feels that ". . . the federal government is not the proper instrument for the expression of the charitable and benevolent impulses of the citizens" (p. 41). Furthermore, "The United States is in fact doing concretely what Soviet Russia has been doing only through propaganda: it is pouring out vast sums to promote totalitarian and communistic economic and political systems" (p. 37).

George Peter Murdock assumes the role of a Cassandra to attack the "Truman-Eisenhower" philosophy of international relations as "fundamentally unsound," "inherently self-defeating," and "potentially dangerous" (p. 44). "Foreign aid, whatever its nature, has thus tragically injured the very ones whom it has sought to assist. . . ." "Experience and theory unite in demonstrating that foreign aid has not accomplished, and cannot accomplish, more than a minuscule proportion of what it aims to achieve" (p. 47). "The giver of foreign aid can never win. To expect to be appreciated or liked is incredibly naive. The only rewards to be realistically anticipated are envy and dislike, or, if the benefactions are generous enough, full-fledged hatred" (p. 51).

Helmut Schoeck thinks "people in the United States, hearts bursting with altruism, should not delude themselves by believing that they can really—through loans and grants from government to government—help the 400 million Indians. . . . Conceivably, the most promising thing that could happen to the long-range economic chances of the Asian masses would be for their top planners to run out of Western Funds" (p. 98).

The perpetrators of foreign aid are identified by these authors to be, among others, religious leaders (pp. 1–2, 26), " 'liberals,' many of whom exhibit a profound lack of confidence in the economic, social and political institutions of the United States . . ." (p. 48), Barbara Ward (pp. 98–99), Gunnar Myrdal (pp. 102, 147–48), and intellectuals (p. 95). The intellectual seizes on foreign aid because he has an underdog he can champion. It helps him salve his own social conscience: he can ethically accept his own higher standard of living. He has always resented his insignificant role in the distribution of wealth. Now he has an almost unlimited field where he can manipulate billions and still have a good conscience while doing it.

Other authors present critiques of particular aspects of foreign aid without coming to summary judgments about its overall worth.

Contrary to certain statements in the book: Defense support has not been eliminated in appropriations for foreign aid (p. 31). Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal had been planned before the United States denied him funds and was not simply a reaction to that denial (p. 51). It does not follow that "internationalism" has made "little or no progress" simply because the possibility of world war remains (p. 57). Much of the literature I have read on technical assistance does cite cultural values as important obstacles (p. 81).

The reader is left with the impression that the book might better be titled, "Foreign Aid Repudiated."

RICHARD W. GABLE
Associate Professor
University of Southern California

J. FRED RIPPY. *Globe and Hemisphere: Latin America's Place in the Postwar Foreign Relations of the United States.* Pp. xi, 276. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company in co-operation with Foundation for Foreign Affairs, 1958. $6.00.

Neither the title nor the subtitle of this provocative volume is really explanatory of its contents. Professor Rippy admit-

tedly slights the political, diplomatic, and military aspects of Latin America's postwar international relations. He concentrates on a number of the economic problems, either neglected by most writers or obscured from public view in their intricate and sometimes devious courses.

The treatment is episodic: following three introductory chapters of primarily economic history the succeeding chapters deal with specific situations and reveal not only the fabric of the problems but also, and sometimes especially, the seams. Examples are his chapters on the "Inter-American Highway," "the canal zones"—Panama and Nicaragua, "rubber-planting fiascos," "fishery troubles," and so forth. Commentary is supplemented by many statistical tables.

The author writes with a good deal of moral indignation. He does not like the corruption and venality of various Latin American regimes; he takes a very dim view of the pressures, usually disguised, which were brought to achieve the consummation of many policies followed by the United States government. All is not "sugar 'n' spice" in United States-Latin American relations—much is sugar, of course, but to Rippy it has been demonstrably mixed with vinegar.

The author becomes the defender of that nebulous and often unsung individual, the American consumer and taxpayer. Many of the expenditures of the United States in and for Latin America were unwise, he insists, and cannot be continued except at the injury of the taxpayer; many grants, loans, and other aids have really been made, he maintains, because of the successful lobbying of automobile companies, manufacturers of road-building machinery, or those who stood to profit in other presumably unethical if not illegal ways.

Professor Rippy performs a service by directing attention to some of these overlooked economic problems and relationships. They have certainly been overshadowed by the space given in books and periodicals to the conventional political and strategic problems. His approach in much of his discussion may or may not be unduly choleric—that is a matter of subjective opinion, and certainly he cites enough evidence to justify a good deal of indignation.

In the opinion of this reviewer the author, in his conscious omission of consideration of the political, fails to relate sufficiently strongly the economic problems he discusses—and the significance of them—to political attitudes, courses, and objectives. Few people will deny that communism is a threat in Latin America, though there is great disagreement as to the degree of the danger. The present volume would be still more useful if it dealt adequately with the relationship of such a matter, and other political problems, to the somewhat soured economic feast with which the author provides us.

The book could be worn as a hairshirt of sorts by various people in many countries of the hemisphere, and it is certainly stimulating and challenging to all who read it. Its controversial and forthright nature will necessarily, as the author confesses in his Preface, "expose it to the mercy of reviewers."

RUSSELL H. FITZGIBBON
Professor of Political Science
University of California
Los Angeles

JOHN D. MARTZ. *Central America: The Crisis and the Challenge*. Pp. ix, 356. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959. $7.50.

Persons concerned over the frequent reports regarding unrest in Central America will welcome this book. It presents a brief political history of recent events in each country, especially during the post-World War II period, and concludes with a frank criticism of the foreign policy of the United States in that area.

Mr. Martz spent two years studying and teaching in Central America. He was the recipient of a Buenos Aires Convention Fellowship, and has traveled widely in Latin America. He is also author of a work on Communist Infiltration in Guatemala.

The first chapter of the present work called "Sub-Continent in Crisis," presents background material for the whole area which forms a sort of geographic bridge between the two halves of the Western Hemisphere. It is not a very pretty picture. Good agricultural land resources are fairly abundant but are concentrated in the hands of a very few people, while the masses of the population try to make a living on tiny plots, or work as laborers on the plantations. The large *latifundio* (estate) and the tiny *minifundio* (small plot) exist side by side. Tremendous contrasts exist between the few who enjoy wealth and the vast majority who live in poverty. Governments tend to be dictatorial in character. The democratically conceived constitutions usually contain clauses permitting the executive to declare emergencies at his pleasure and suspend guarantees of individual rights.

The author devotes a chapter to each of the six countries describing the major political events in each. Communist penetration in Guatemala is emphasized, and Communist influence in the other countries is discussed.

The final chapter, called "Challenge to the United States," deals with the foreign policy of the American government in this area. The author feels that United States diplomats have often been too intimate and friendly, on a first name basis, with Latin American dictators such as the late Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua. He criticizes severely the various military assistance programs of the United States with the Latin American governments. He argues that "The instrumentality of the Organization of American States is such that United States military treaty assistance seems fatuous" (p. 328). He contends that the military in Latin America can be considered as a regressive influence. They tend to support the "strong man" and if they become dissatisfied with the state of affairs, they are likely to install a government of their own. Thus the chief executive will attempt to placate the military leaders with high salaries and numerous perquisites so that they, in turn, will encourage dictatorship. United States military assistance may be used, therefore, to delay democracy rather than to encourage it.

N. L. WHETTEN
Dean, The Graduate School
University of Connecticut



## *AMERICAN HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT*

KARL LOEWENSTEIN. *Political Power and the Governmental Process*. Pp. ix, 442. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. $6.00.

This admirable book originated in a series of lectures given on the Walgreen Foundation at the University of Chicago, a foundation peculiarly fruitful in evoking masterful, original contributions to American political thought. Among other Walgreen lectures of the past decade were the first versions of Kennan's *American Diplomacy 1900–1950* and Morgenthau's *In Defense of the National Interest*.

There is a certain family resemblance between the three works, for Loewenstein, like Morgenthau and Kennan, makes power the focus of his interest and considers politics in a narrow rather than a broad context. He thus runs counter to a considerable trend in recent writing on politics Whereas much recent work in politics has called in the aid of the psychologists and the sociologists to broaden the context of political decision, and has sought to explain in terms of these other disciplines how political decisions are influenced or made, Loewenstein eschews all this. The pejorative way of describing his book would be to call it "old-fashioned"; but this would be sheer name calling, and entirely inappropriate to a book so original in thought, and so rigorous and scrupulous in method. One prefers to say that the book represents a refreshing change from much current writing. The vice of the school of political scientists who lean towards psychology and sociology is a certain flabbiness of thought, an inability to focus the problem precisely, which also infects their style. The power school, for some reason, almost invariably write better than their opponents. They may ignore some factors, but there is a geometric precision about their style, as about their arguments, that is an intellectual pleasure to peruse.

Loewenstein defends himself against possible criticisms by arguing that any attempt "to come to grips with the reality of the power phenomenon . . . by measur-

ing the degree and intensity of reciprocal interactions in the various sociopolitical configurations . . . has little chance of penetrating to the core of the power situation." He therefore confines himself to an examination of the central machinery of state power in various patterns of government: how, in each of them, political power is gained, how it is exercised, and how it is restrained. With a masterful and convincing display of the Germanic ability to subsume the bewildering variety of data offered by the real world into a framework of theory, he creates a "common conceptual roof" to explain the functioning of power under different régimes. The sections of the book deal with, first, the political process and the patterns of government; secondly, "horizontal controls" on power—control of the executive by legislature and judiciary, and so forth; thirdly, "vertical controls"—federalism, guarantees of individual liberties, and pluralism.

In working out his argument the author displays a precise knowledge of an astonishing range of political and constitutional data, drawing his examples at will from the experience of France, Germany, the United States, Japan, and British Commonwealth countries. In all instances the citations appeared to be both appropriate and correct. This book is a solid contribution to discussion of the central problem of government, the reconciliation of freedom with authority.

ARTHUR C. TURNER
University of California
Riverside

ARTHUR MAASS (Ed.). *Area and Power: A Theory of Local Government.* Pp. 224. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959. $5.00.

The concept of power is necessarily central to any concern with politics, and it is remarkable that the literature of the field has given so little attention to the division of governmental power on an areal basis. These papers do not quite reach the goal of the subtitle of the volume, *A Theory of Local Government,* but they do help to stimulate our thinking regarding the nature and implications of power and area.

The authors recognize that values influence the division of power, and their analysis is constructed around the use of government to secure liberty, equality, and welfare. It is not assumed, however, that this is a closed value system, and the question is raised whether the growth of security means a change in the areal dispersion of power. To attain values, power may be divided by process, function, and constituency; and the areal division may be either exclusive or there may be powers which are shared by several levels of government. This study also makes clear than any areal division, whether by constitutional provision or delegation, is dynamic both in form and intent. The movement of the American federal system with the political, economic, and social development of the country is a case in point familiar to most of us. Other virtues of this study are that it attempts to extend its analysis of the areal division of power to unitary as well as federal states, and although it is limited primarily to divisions of governmental powers, the authors recognize that they are necessarily related to the total power structure of society.

Paul Ylvisaker in an essay on "Some Criteria for a 'Proper' Areal Division of Governmental Powers" states in a provocative and concise manner the assumptions upon which this study is based and then advances a number of criteria as maxims. Unfortunately, these maxims cannot be fully developed in such a short paper, but they do raise some challenging questions. For example, a serious application of maxim one—"The assignment of powers to component areas should in each case be a general one, covering the whole range of governmental functions, rather than a partial one related only to particular functions"—would mean a radically different approach to the problems of local government. This reviewer wishes that the maxim that "The optimum number of levels among which to share the power to govern would seem to be three" had been developed more fully.

Our failure to develop a "general process of government" for metropolitan areas is becoming more and more embarrassing. Mr. Ylvisaker thinks we may be ready for a general solution; but that if we must have a transitional stage in which one or more functions are chosen to be "the cornerstone of a more general system," a combination of planning and zoning might evoke sufficient citizen interest. Mr. Wood, however, would utilize transportation as the proper functional approach to a general process of metropolitan government.



There is a danger that any discussion of area and power will overemphasize efficiency and the necessity that the state be able to act. It is encouraging to report that this volume is interested in areas where debate is possible and political participation can be achieved. The political as well as the functional aspects of the problem are discussed by Mr. Robert C. Wood in his chapter on "A Division of Powers in Metropolitan Areas."

Area and power are also examined in chapters on the role of the states, the federalism of Canada, the writings of French political theorists, and the thinking of the Founding Fathers of the Constitution of the United States. These applications of the general theme perhaps attempt to cover too much ground, but they do provide us with valuable comparative insight into the problem.

This volume does not formulate a theory of local government, but it does give us a promising point of departure in developing one. It is encouraging to see this addition to a field of the literature of political science which has not received the attention it deserves.

LAWRENCE L. PELLETIER
President
Allegheny College

MARSHALL E. DIMOCK. *Administrative Vitality: The Conflict with Bureaucracy.* Pp. xiii, 298. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. $5.00.

From long and wide experience as a perceptive student of government and of business in the United States and abroad, Professor Dimock, head of the Department of Government at New York University, examines the nature and values of orderliness in bureaucracy and of creativeness in enterprise. The best of each can be blended, he concludes, through "administration by objectives" to contribute to institutional vitality. By this approach objectives are democratically defined and rules minimized to free officials and employees for the exercise of abilities, initiative, and ingenuity with attendant satisfaction and achievement in their work. The frequent conflict of precedents and rules with inventiveness and energy can be more nearly stabilized, through wise administration, to great social advantage.

A major asset of this stimulating, practical book is its analytical cataloging of the signs or evidences of institutional vitality or decay, of the basic concepts of sound bureaucracy and of potentially complementary enterprise, and of specific ways whereby an amalgam of the most successful organizational techniques can lead to energized administration. Pertinent, brief case histories of governmental and business growth and integrative leadership are interwoven with analysis. There is also critical examination of major theoretical approaches to the administrative process.

This book is a candid but ultimately optimistic appraisal of the admitted danger that attrition of effective leadership will stagnate complex and proliferating social institutions. "The best in bureaucracy is scientific management and technological progress; the worst is indifference to the consumer. The best in enterprise is innovation and energy; the worst is confusion." The best and the worst are scrutinized with meticulous insight meaningful to all who think of administration. Prescriptions for combining the best of enterprise and of bureaucracy, for "the blending of these two opposites," while inevitably and frankly suggestive of guidelines rather than of definitive detail, not only offer the wisdom of a leading practitioner and scholar in administration but also preserve the common touch of integrity, humility, and interest in people. In this urbane, readable exploration are many lessons from past and present for administrative progress.

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
Professor and Director
Bureau of Governmental Research
University of Maryland

JOSEPH M. BECKER. *Shared Government in Employment Security: A Study of Advisory Councils.* Pp. xiii, 501. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. $6.50.

Father Becker of Saint Louis University presents a detailed description of the workings of advisory councils for employment security agencies in fifteen states. His study shows the development of the council idea in employment security; its major use in the field of unemployment insurance rather than the employment service; the councils which have been most effective, moderately effective, and relatively ineffective. Although Father Becker recognizes that men might differ in the meaning of an "effective" council, he finds the most objective evidence of an "effective" council to be one which produces "agreed bills." The Wisconsin Council, which clearly is the author's model, has had four labor representatives, four employer representatives, and the state's director of unemployment insurance as its nonvoting chairman. The Wisconsin Council has not had public representatives. This Council from its inception in 1932 through 1959 has failed only once (1957) in reviewing the operation of the state's unemployment insurance law and agreeing on amendments. The resulting "agreed bills" have regularly received the support of industry and labor in the state legislature. The state legislature, with occasional minor changes, has almost as regularly amended the original unemployment insurance act in accord with the agreed bills. What makes the Wisconsin Council a success? The author's answer would include: the personal qualities and experience of the unemployment insurance director in the chairman's role; the inclusion of the leaders and decision-makers among employer and labor groups on the council; the absence of strong animosities among labor and employer groups together with a willingness to moderate differences; and a modest original unemployment insurance law which has been efficiently administered and gradually extended in coverage to benefit labor without excessive increases in costs to employers.

The author raises significant questions of democratic theory and the political process. In effect he asserts that government, meaning generally the bureaucracy, needs to be watched. Political parties cannot do this as well as can representatives of the groups immediately concerned. Only labor and industry are interested in unemployment insurance. If the unemployment insurance program in its general operation and in its basic law meets the approval of or is supervised and framed by labor and industry leaders, then we have responsible democratic control. The role of parties is discounted, and to a degree deplored, although not ignored (for example, p. 204). These assertions on the value of advisory councils as a device for shared government would have gained if the author had given some attention to reasonably related studies which emphasize other aspects of the political process.

CLARA PENNIMAN
Associate Professor of Political Science
University of Wisconsin

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT. *The Political Offender and the Warren Court.* (The Gaspar G. Bacon Lectures on the Constitution of the United States, Boston University.) Pp. 74. Boston: Boston University Press, 1958. $3.00.

BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT. *Consensus and Continuity, 1776–1787.* (The Gaspar G. Bacon Lectures on the Constitution of the United States, Boston University.) Pp. 60. Boston: Boston University Press, 1958. $3.00.

These modest little volumes preserve in print the Gaspar G. Bacon Lectures at Boston University for the academic years, 1956–57 and 1957–58. Both volumes examine important aspects of the Bacon Lectureship's permanent subject, "The Constitution of the United States," and both reveal this lecture series, which began in 1927, at its best, for both authors are concerned with two crucial questions: Why has the American constitutional experiment been so successful? How can the lessons of the past be most wisely utilized in coping with the unprecedented constitutional and political problems which our nation faces today?



Mr. Wright, who was at the time he delivered his lectures President of Smith College, works at one end of the historical spectrum, the critical decade that separated the Declaration of Independence from the drafting of the Constitution at Philadelphia. Mr. Pritchett, who is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, is concerned with a striking development at the other end of this spectrum, the important series of Supreme Court decisions between 1954 and 1957 by which a Court majority under Chief Justice Warren's leadership struck down certain of the more extreme efforts of the national and state governments to safeguard the nation's security against the threat of internal subversion.

President Wright's purpose is to show once more that the American revolutionary and constitutional period was marked by a strong consensus in the political and economic areas, and, where differences existed, by a very considerable willingness to compromise. In particular, it was an age that rejected the extremes of egalitarian and aristocratic theory and practice. Smith, Parrington, Hacker, and, above all, Beard, are vigorously criticized for their erroneous and once widely-accepted description of the 1780's as an era of black reaction. Fortunately, says Wright, later scholars have given us a sounder view of the purposes and achievements of the Founding Fathers so that we are now enabled to view them in their true light as neither reactionaries nor radicals, as men of experience and common sense, loyal to many established principles and institutions yet flexible and progressive in outlook, cognizant of the proper claims of property and other vested interests yet eager to discover new and better political forms. Above all, the age was marked by a strong continuity of beliefs, practices, and institutions. Past, present, and future were fused together in a tradition, albeit a changing one. As Wright sees it, this condition is essential to the success of any constitutional experiment. While only the main outlines of the story are suggested, and only favorable evidence is marshaled and that rather sketchily, the thesis is developed with considerable interest and persuasion.

Professor Pritchett examines a series of eight or ten decisions of the Warren Court by which the excesses of Smith Act prosecutions, congressional investigations, and loyalty-security testing of government employees were declared illegal. One of the ablest contemporary students of constitutional law, Mr. Pritchett assembles his facts with great care and understanding. In his view the majority rulings in such cases as Watkins, Sweezy, Slochower, Schware, and Yates were both sensible and moderate. They helped establish a better balance between the interests of individual freedom and the needs of national security, and they reflected a proper, traditional exercise of judicial power. One wishes that critics of the Warren Court, including the eminent members of the American Bar Association, might read this short, accurate, skillfully written account of the work of the Court and ponder carefully its defense of the Court's findings. No recent volume supplies a better corrective to the lopsided and vehemently asserted views of these critics.

ROBERT K. CARR
Professor of Government
Dartmouth College

JULIUS PAUL. *The Legal Realism of Jerome N. Frank: A Study of Fact-Skepticism and the Judicial Process.* Pp. xxii, 177. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959. Guilders 17.90.

This is a good and useful, little book even though in my opinion the author fails to achieve his announced goals. Dr. Paul states his purpose: "to systematically and critically assess the ideas . . . of the late Judge Jerome Frank, . . . a leading exponent of the so-called school of American 'legal realism.'" The study is sound and carries evidence of thorough preparation, but is limited in scope and penetration.

The author says: "I have read all of Jerome Frank's published writings on law and politics, and as much criticism of his work as I could find." This statement cannot be challenged. Yet too much of the

author's thesis is based on Judge Frank's early full-length book, *Law and the Modern Mind*. Dr. Paul's implied justification that much of Frank's subsequent writing is elaboration and modification of his original theories or replies to critics and detractors hardly excuses the relatively little direct attention accorded Frank's judicial opinions and other numerous publications.

The critical appraisal promised by the author fails to materialize in terms of a fresh or personal appraisal, largely because of the method used. Dr. Paul, in preparing his study, selected some half dozen topics characteristic of Frank's contributions to the philosophy of American law, presented these briefly in appropriate philosophical, social, and legal settings, and for purposes of evaluation marshaled an array of concurring and opposing views selected from the publications of recognized scholars. The study is more than a study of the literature, however. The Paul personality is not entirely lost. On occasion his conclusions and convictions are positively stated, yet over all the reader is required to make his own judgments and, for the most part, to discover the author's convictions from his selection of assembled evidence rather than from stated conclusions.

It appears, too, that the author has fallen short of his goal to "present a systematic statement of Frank's philosophy of law and its role in modern society." He has selected and subjected to appraisal several samplings from Judge Frank's ideas. The five pertinent chapter headings are: "The crusade against the 'myth' of legal certainty," "Psychology as the new weapon of attack," "The role of the judge in the judicial process," "Trial by jury and the problem of legal education," and "Frank's contributions to the philosophy of American legal realism." Perhaps it would not be unfair to say that Judge Frank is the pivotal point about which a dissertation on a segment of legal history has been written. The study demonstrates breadth and thoroughness of study. It implies a knowledge of and appreciation for Judge Frank and the "legal leftists" far broader in scope and more penetrating than is revealed from the printed page. It is hoped that Dr. Paul will continue the studies, presumably initiated here.

HAROLD M. DORR
Professor of Political Science
University of Michigan

DAVID J. SAPOSS. *Communism in American Unions*. Pp. xii, 279. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959 $7.50.

Few authors are as well qualified a David Saposs to discuss communist activi ties in the American labor movement. I this book he brings up to date the wor started many years ago in his *Left Win Unionism*.

After a brief introductory statement o the communist inheritance from early rad calism, Saposs devotes the two major se tions of the book to communist penetratic of the American Federation of Labo (A.F. of L.) and of the Congress of Indu trial Organizations (C.I.O.), respectivel This is followed by a discussion of the ro of union leaders, rank and file unionist employers, and government in combati communist domination. A final chapt summarizes recent developments, includi efforts of some of the remaining commu nist-led union groups to find sanctuary as affiliates of more respectable unions. The scholarship is sound and the documentation careful and complete.

More questionable is the allocation of space between the two former rival federations. Despite the major importance of the communist issue within the C.I.O. and its relative insignificance in the A.F. of L., Saposs has chosen to devote equal space to the two groups. This he does by telling at great length the story of communist efforts to dominate Hollywood unionism. Though he explains that he followed this course because of the abundance of data available, the result is to distort somewhat the picture of communist penetration of the two federations.

To a degree the C.I.O. section goes over the same ground that Max Kampelman covered in his fairly recent *The Communist Party vs. the C.I.O.*, although there is enough difference in focus and treatment to make the Saposs book a welcome addition.



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Saposs is critical of many union leaders, as well as of some employers and government officials, for failing to combat communist influence with sufficient vigor. Perhaps his sharpest criticism is of the national leaders of the C.I.O., prior to the expulsion movement of 1949–50; had they given leadership to the anticommunist groups, he asserts, rather than followed a policy of conciliation and compromise, the communist strength might have been reduced much earlier. Yet Saposs finds the same blindness to communist dangers, for the sake of temporary advantage, in the recent willingness of some unions to admit communist-led groups without adequate screening.

The author is also critical of some management groups for supporting communist unions rather than their rivals in representation battles, because of a hope for more advantageous contract terms from a hard pressed leadership; and he has little sympathy for government administrative officials who, interpreting their powers narrowly, failed to act as vigorously against communist unionists as they might have.

Anticommunism may be pushed so hard, however, that other equally important objectives are sacrificed. The ranks of anticommunists in labor have included racketeers and autocrats, who do not thereby deserve support. Civil rights and freedom of choice may be trampled, and honest, militant unionism endangered, as government seeks to root out communist unionism. It seems to this reviewer that in his anticommunism Saposs risks losing sight of these other values.

Readers will find in the volume a wealth of data on communist tactics in unions. They are unlikely thereafter to view communist unionism with complacence.

JOEL SEIDMAN
Professor of Social Sciences
University of Chicago

RICHARD H. ROVERE. *Senator Joe McCarthy*. Pp. 280. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959. $3.95.

De mortuis nihil nisi bonum!

So said the ancients. Not so, however, said Richard Rovere when writing about the late Senator from Wisconsin. His book *Senator Joe McCarthy* is an interesting and readable work.

Rovere leaves no one in doubt as to what he thinks of the late Senator McCarthy.

"A man of loose tongue, intemperate, trusting to tumult, leading the populace to mischief with empty words." These are not Rovere's words though they might have been. These were written centuries before by Euripides in his description of the typical demagogue.

Rovere's marshaling of the facts, his discussion of details in connection with various incidents cited in support of his conclusions indicate his close and intense study in trying to learn what made McCarthy act the way he did.

He sees no good in the man. Early in his book he states ". . . the social and economic order didn't interest him in the slightest."

It is hard to believe that a person with enough determination to do a complete high school course in a single year, who worked his way to a college degree, who aspired to public office, and won several times by the vote of the people ending up in the high office of United State Senator could be as wholly depraved a Rovere would have us believe.

One can hardly quarrel with the mass o evidence that Rovere presents as to Mc Carthy's complete immersion in the caus of anticommunism and the ruthlessnes with which he pursued his course.

Rovere suggests that McCarthy deliberately selected communism as the expedient issue in politics. Many have thought that his taking up the fight on communism was almost completely accidental since the speech given by him in Wheeling, West Virginia, had been prepared for another speaker. Whether true or not, many have felt that the unexpected response from the Wheeling audience caused him to repeat the speech, that this set off the wave of deep anticommunist reaction, and that McCarthy simply decided to ride the wave.

Rovere brings out the fact that at no time did McCarthy try to set up a separate organization, start another political party, or take advantage of what might have been an opportunity to aim for political dicta-

torship. In fact, as Rovere brings out, McCarthy was almost as critical of the Republican party as he was of the Democrats, of Eisenhower as he was of Truman, and of Dulles and his foreign policy as he was of Acheson.

Rovere injects much of his feelings throughout the book. However, he has given a graphic description of a short period in the history of this country when one man following a single issue was able to occupy the stage almost by himself and to play to a tremendous audience.

JOHN SPARKMAN
United State Senator from Alabama

HENRY SAVAGE, JR. *Seeds of Time: The Background of Southern Thinking.* Pp. viii, 312. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1959. $4.50.

Possibly the best criticism this reviewer can pass on this book is to say that she is glad that it was sent her for review, as otherwise she might not have encountered it.

In process of developing his theme the author presents the reader with a recapitulation of the history of the South, and a remarkably adequate one, considering that the whole tale is condensed into about three hundred pages. Always he seeks out in each period the factors which contribute to the composite product which he thinks of as the southern mind. It must suffice here to note two characteristics: an intense sectional pride born of the rich contribution to the national government, and bitterness from the Reconstruction period. Until Lincoln southern men had filled the presidency fifty of the seventy-two years; John Marshall, a Virginian, presided over the Supreme Court for many years and through a series of great decisions solidified the foundation of central government; this section had contributed a striking number of members of the cabinets and diplomatic service. Under the impact of numerous disasters, southerners turned to the past for solace. From the long slavery controversy and jealousy of New England prosperity, attributed to the protective tariff, came resentment, and from the loathed measures of reconstruction came even hatred.

Possibly the most valuable chapter is the concluding chapter, devoted to a discussion of the desegregation issue, which—be it remembered was written by a Southerner—is the fairest discussion of this difficult question which this reviewer has seen. It would be well if every American could read it. It stresses the necessity for the South to abandon its intransigent attitude toward the Supreme Court's decision for acceptance of integration. He sees only folly in closing schools when most of southern problems arise from insufficient education. Self-appointed demagogues have bred a fear which real leaders have not dared to combat. This has bred deterioration in race relations in all classes and an organized, aggressive Negro electorate in the South, prompted by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (N.A.A.C.P.). He pleads for time—a generation at least—to make the adjustment: to release the potentially great southern moderation; time for youth under liberalizing influences to grow up, for education to operate, for Negro migration to reduce the Negro majorities in certain sections and to raise the economic and social standards of the Negro; time for voluntary abandonment of traditions deeply ingrained for a quarter-millennium.

ELLA LONN
Professor of History, Emeritus
Goucher College

SOPHIE HUTCHINSON DRINKER. *Hannah Penn and the Proprietorship of Pennsylvania.* Pp. iv, 207. Philadelphia: National Society of the Colonial Dames of America in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1958. $4.50.

This scholarly little volume is composed of letters from the correspondence of Hannah Callowhill Penn, the second wife of the founder, in her successive roles as "A Person Unexceptional"; "Helpmeet" (1701–1718); and "Sole Executrix" (1718–1726); and informing and scholarly comments, modestly called "explanatory notes," lists of documents, and fine, pertinent illustrations. In a brief Foreword on the provenance of the correspondence, Mrs. Drinker tells the story of the discovery of the larger group of letters at Stenton, the home of James Logan, where Deborah Norris Logan found and copied them, adding notes of her own. Transferred to the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, they were later augmented by another collection found in England when the Penn estate was finally settled.



Of the 115 letters in Hannah Penn's hand, fifty-eight appear in the volume. Practically all are addressed to men high in the business and government of the province, much the largest number to James Logan. Occasionally replies and individual letters available only in photostat are used. Spelling and punctuation are modernized, but the "Salutations and Farewells" are given as they were written, in order to retain as much as possible "the flavor of early 18th century style." A special feature of this volume is the historical background with frequent suggestions by the editor on the letters as they follow in chronological sequence. Contrary to the usual practice of printing material of this kind in different type, it appears in the same format as the letters.

Seen from the point of view of her correspondence, Hannah Penn appears in a new perspective, not only as a remarkable administrator of the proprietary government of the province, but also as a much neglected, but heroic character in the annals of America's pioneering women. Conspicuous in the historic background of her remarkable career are feudal institutions of the past in process of disintegration under the pressure of concepts of a new economic and political order. Amid these, her dynamic energy and ability, buttressed by early practical experience in the not inconsiderable business of her father, and later as "Helpmeet" to her invalid husband in the management of the affairs of Pennsylvania, enabled her to step into the position of an absolute proprietor assuming "rights and accepting a responsibility greater than possible for a woman of our own day, and greater even than any customary for one of her contemporaries" (p. 6). For fourteen years, until her death in December 1726, she battled for her rights and the province. Ably advised by James Logan and others but guided largely by her own judgment, she had the satisfaction of seeing her efforts crowned with success. Penn's will was confirmed; the claims of her stepson, William III, set aside; the mortgage paid off and the long negotiations for "the Surrender" ended; Governor Keith finally dismissed; and the province left to her sons. These and many other problems of the proprietary called for the exercise of statesmanship of the highest order, and it is in the negotiations on these as they appear in the correspondence that Mrs. Drinker discovers the real nature of Hannah Callowhill Penn.

The text is well documented. There is a detailed Bibliography, a list of documents of Hannah Penn, a good Index, and on the flyleaf a map in gray of Bristol, England, suggestive of the Quaker atmosphere of the book. New and scholarly in its approach to a partially familiar story, the volume merits a place in every library concerned with colonial history. Some readers may object to the criticism of historians for their inadequate treatment of "the Surrender." Others will wish to probe further into the provenance of Hannah Penn's correspondence and the relations to Penn papers in general. Meanwhile, the timely appearance of this interesting and original appraisal of the only woman governor in the annals of the commonwealth again suggests the publication of a comprehensive edition of Penn papers in line with the current trend in American historiography of publishing the papers of its great men.

WILLIAM E. LINGELBACH
Professor of History, Emeritus
University of Pennsylvania
Librarian, Emeritus
American Philosophical Society

## *EUROPEAN HISTORY*

EUGENE DAVIDSON. *The Death and Life of Germany: An Account of the American Occupation.* Pp. ix, 422, xx. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959. $5.75.

The whole story of the occupation of Germany has not yet been written, and since it involves an analysis of such enormous and complicated problems, it may never be written. In recent years a num

ber of researchers have contributed greatly toward a more complete understanding of what has transpired in the German area since the war. Among these, Balfour, Litchfield, Golay, Hiscocks, and Zink come readily to mind. In the present book, the author, although he gives the subtitle *An Account of the American Occupation*, actually deals with the international planning for the occupation as well as with many aspects of the total occupation including all of the four zones. In fact Germany in the years from 1945 to 1955 is much more the focus of attention than the American occupation, even though American actions and behavior clearly constitute one of the author's principal concerns. Only a very careful reading discloses the book's main contribution—the presentation of a very thorough and judicious assortment of revealing data on every aspect of the occupation.

Some critics might complain that the presentation is diffuse and not particularly original. But the thorough and careful research which the author has done in this vast field deserves nothing but commendation. After all, when a great nation in a vast industrial area is completely dissolved in ruins, it is only by patching together the results of all the postwar labor and thought that one is enabled to approximate an over-all judgment of what has happened. Certainly the author deserves to be applauded for delving so deeply and circumspectly into the vast documentation, some of which still remains untouched.

It is good to be reminded of the shortcomings of Allied planning about Germany, and what has been done year by year until West Germany regained her sovereignty in 1955. One easily forgets the seamy side and often overlooks the most constructive side of Allied, and especially American, occupation. Here the whole panorama, year by year, is carefully reviewed and cautiously evaluated. No book yet written has covered so much so well.

Some phases, it is true, are not clearly brought into focus. For instance, the development and growth of German self-government, at first in the American zone and later in the British and French zones, together with the identification and support of its leaders, is inadequately presented Sentences here and there and election re turns from time to time are mentioned But the net result or its significance i lacking. Likewise the frequent reference to America's great proconsul, General Clay are too often related to his punitive mo ments and not to his generous, helpful, an statesmanlike actions without which th whole occupation would have been a colos sal failure.

A brief concluding chapter displays th author's hopeful opinion of West Ger many's future. "The democracy of Wes Germany is young," he writes, "but i is successful—enormously successful fron the economic point of view, less so fron the political." He feels that both German and the American occupiers learned much How true! His final words deserve quota tion: "In the survivors and in the million who became aware of what the Nazis hac done the voice of the child [Anne Frank re-echoes. Not everyone hears it directl and some remain deaf to what they hear But it is there for all of them, for th people of good and ill will, for the confi dent entrepreneurs of business and govern ment, for the workers and housewives, th Bavarians, the Rhinelanders, the Prussian in exile. It can never be silent."

JAMES K. POLLOCK
Professor and Chairman
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan

JOHN L. SNELL. *Wartime Origins of th East-West Dilemma over Germany*. Pp 268. New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1959 $7.00.

John L. Snell, Associate Professor of His tory at Tulane University, tries to retrace the slippery, and often highly dangerous road of Allied wartime policy with regard to postwar Germany. From the first for eign ministers' meeting of the "Big Three" in 1943 to the summit conferences of Yalta, Teheran, Potsdam, and to the con tinuous negotiations on lower levels, it led to the present-day division of Germany— which, as of today, unhappily appears as the end of the road.

By skillfully using abundant official documents, personal memoirs and biographies, studies published by American, British, and West German authors, and also the yet unpublished *Potsdam Papers* of the United States Department of State, Dr. Snell has succeeded in presenting an interesting account of the Western intrigues, illusions, and idealistic intentions which permitted the Soviets to arrive at their goal of a semipermanent division of Germany. The American domestic struggle between advocates of a "soft" and a "tough" policy toward postwar Germany—the latter strengthening the Soviet hand, though unwittingly more often than not—and the American desire to win the war first, and worry about the postwar world later, are Dr. Snell's main themes. His compilation of dispersed source material results in a rather comprehensive chronicle.

However, the emerging picture remains regrettably one-sided since the author's account of Western diplomacy and policy is, perhaps unavoidably, considerably better documented and more perspicacious than his account of Russian diplomacy and policy. Unfortunately, the author seems to disregard the very fact that Russian policy concerning postwar Germany was planned and executed by Communists, and therefore represented an important campaign in their long-term struggle for world conquest. Dr. Snell indicates that Soviet policy toward Germany was mainly motivated by the two German invasions which Russia experienced in this century, while other and weightier rationales and goals are not mentioned. His concluding remark that hostility against Germany "lives on among the peoples of Eastern Germany, obstructing compromises on the contemporary German problem," seems unduly naive. Surely it was not the feelings of, say, Polish or Czech citizens which instigated the Berlin crisis or which led the Soviet rulers to break their pledge of permitting free elections in East Germany; there is little evidence to the claim that "the peoples of Eastern Europe" today show greater hostility toward Germany than toward their Soviet oppressors. Without evidence, Dr. Snell submits that "the degree of support for Germany among Soviet citizens has been exaggerated in the American press since 1945." Yet the American press has shown extremely little interest in this question, while the high degree of support for the Germans has been established by Alexander Dallin, Eugene Lyons, and George Fischer.

Although Dr. Snell's treatment of Soviet policy—which, after all, has been and is the key factor in the contemporary *East-West Dilemma over Germany*, the subject of this book—does little to promote our understanding, his chronicle of American wartime planning for postwar Germany supplies a useful and meritorious starting point for further, more critical researches.

NORBERT MUHLEN
New York City

AUGUST VON KNIERIEM. *The Nuremberg Trials*. Translated by Elizabeth D. Schmitt. Pp. xxii, 561. Chicago, Ill.: Henry Regnery Company, 1959. $12.50.

Of all that has been written on the Nuremberg trials this is by far the most comprehensive and learned inquiry into the legal problems involved. Mainly concerned with the twelve trials following the proceedings against Goering and the others, the author, who as chief counsel of I. G. Farben, was himself a defendant, shows, with devastating logic and citations from the trial records, how one-sided the proceedings were, and on what dubious moral and legal grounds many of the defendants were convicted.

The trials were conducted under hybrid law which was neither continental, Anglo-American, nor international, and as a result safeguards that had grown into the established systems of Europe, England, and America were often lacking. The prosecution had overwhelming advantages in preparing and conducting their cases. Legal counsel was available to the defense only after the prosecution lawyers had had months to gather their evidence and to interrogate the accused; the witnesses and key documents were in their control, and the defense could examine the documents and many of its witnesses only through the courtesy and co-operation of the occupying power which was also the judge and prosecutor. Eighty defense lawyers, in 1947, had one telephone among them, with

no opportunity of making calls outside Germany, or bringing witnesses from abroad or travelling there themselves.

The Tribunals although called international were entirely American after the first trial. Among them were good and true judges, but others were manifestly incompetent and biased, and it is no wonder that their decisions conflicted. In the Krupp judgment, the court quoted twenty-five pages from the prosecution's final plea, and left out a crucial "the," which made it appear that officials of the firm had asked for forced labor, whereas the letter in evidence showed they had wanted higher food rations for the 300 laborers assigned them. In the High Command case, the court held that a defendant had done nothing to soften the harsh orders he had drafted, when in fact the very document cited included mitigating phrases the accused had inserted. This part of the document, however, was omitted.

Like other able lawyers the author sometimes tries to prove too much. The treatment of Russian prisoners of war was scarcely a reprisal as he asserts. Hitler's exhortations to disregard international law in this struggle between two irreconcilable ideologies preceeded the start of the campaign. The case Mr. Knieriem presents is too sound to benefit from such technical improvements.

EUGENE DAVIDSON
Bad Tolz, Germany

E. STRAUSS. *Common Sense about the Common Market: Germany and Britain in Post-War Europe*. Pp. 168. New York: Rinehart and Company, 1959. $3.50.

The title of this book might better be "Uncommon Sense about the Common Market." It accepts few of the enthusiastic expectations found in most American presentations of this important European development. It even questions the justifications usually advanced by American writers: that the enlarged geographic market will be an enlarged economic market; and that the political integration towards which it strives is to be desired.

The author's point of view is British and is strongly colored by his belief that the Community as it stands is bound to be dominated by Germany.

In brief his argument runs as follows: The European Economic Community in conjunction with the Coal and Steel Community and Euratom is an extremely important development. Britain neglects it at her peril. Its founders have shown great skill in overcoming many difficult problems but they have been unwise in failing to recognize that in any customs union the strongest state will dominate. Hence, unless new forces are introduced Western Germany is bound to control the Community. A major element of weakness in this domination is the open border with East Germany. West Germany would undoubtedly surrender the Community if this could be done in return for a united Germany.

Great Britain's attempt to protect her own position in relation to the Customs Union was to propose the device of the industrial Free Trade Area. The other members of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) found a common interest with her. However, the six did not regard access to the market of the Free Trade Area as a sufficient inducement.

From the standpoint of British industry and commerce the continental market has been and can be important. But if the Community were to depart from its present policies and adopt protective tariffs, then British industry would be at a severe disadvantage. Furthermore, the continental countries will have a favored position in the overseas associated territories such as French Africa and the Belgian Congo.

The author sees two important, possible additional offers which the British might have advanced which would have been more attractive than the Free Trade Area. The first of these is to have opened the Commonwealth Preferential Area to the Community. The second is to make available to Euratom its fund of nuclear technology.

However, it is when such proposals as these are made that one begins to realize the cultural width of the English Channel and the inherent difficulties if the United Kingdom is to become part of the "European" body politic.



There are a number of the author's judgments concerning the Community with which one is inclined to disagree. He underestimates the economic strength of France and the Benelux countries. While paying formal deference to Monnet as the "true founding father" of the Community, he minimizes French leadership and emphasizes German. He also underrates the extent of Dutch and Belgian leadership in the origination, promotion, and development of the Community as well as the other postwar organizations in Europe.

However, the book is written to encourage the search for means whereby the United Kingdom may associate itself in effective leadership with continental countries. As such it deserves wide and thoughtful consideration.

THOMAS C. BLAISDELL, JR.
Professor of Political Science
University of California
Berkeley

NATHAN LEITES. *On the Game of Politics in France*. (A RAND Corporation Research Study.) Pp. xiii, 190. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press (first published in French, 1958), 1959. $4.50.

Dr. Nathan Leites' new work is an inquiry into the nature and causes of the *immobilisme* of governments of the Fourth Republic—their lack of decision, dispersion of responsibility, and postponement of action until it is determined by *force majeure*. Most commentators have been content to ascribe these defects to the multiplicity of parties in French politics, which itself derives from the number and extent of political divisions within the country. Mr. Leites suggests that however important such doctrinal differences have been in the past, their significance under the Fourth Republic has come to be exaggerated. He therefore directs our attention to the codes and customs governing the behavior of politicians and statesmen, to the unwritten "rules of the game," and especially to that institutional introspection which gave more importance to maneuverings in the Assembly than to the domestic or international events from which they derived.

Every institution in fact creates its own rules and *mœurs*, and thereby imposes some degree of unity on its members. This is as true of a Rotary Club as it was of the French National Assembly. In political institutions indeed it is an indispensable part of the process by which conflicts of ideology and interest in the community are translated into political opposition. Yet this purpose can only be served effectively if government remains genuinely representational, and if political opposition itself leads to some decisive reconciliation or compromise of interests.

It is just this which the Fourth Republic failed to achieve. In an excellent Introduction to the book Professor Brogan asks how far the game of politics in its French form is duplicated in other countries; but this is one of the many questions which Mr. Leites deliberately excludes from more than cursory consideration. We are left to wonder why French politicians are so lacking in that ambition for power and responsibility which characterizes their counterparts elsewhere. On the other hand the work scarcely indicates any of the achievements of the regime, except in an Epilogue, provoked by the events of May 1958, in which the author hastens to the defense of "republican legality."

For this reason, the book will have greatest value for the specialist rather than the general reader. It can perform an invaluable service in dismissing or revising preconceived notions, and illuminating aspects of French politics not usually evident to the outsider; but it is most likely to do so for the reader who is able to place it in perspective, and who is aware of the questions which it provokes.

WILFRID F. KNAPP
St. Catherine's Society
Oxford

JAMES JOLL (Ed.). *The Decline of the Third Republic*. (St. Anthony's Papers, No. 5.). Pp. 127. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. $3.50.

This little volume consists of a collection of four papers—three by British scholars and one by an American scholar—dealing with phases of the disintegration of the Third French Republic during its final six years.

The first paper, by Max Beloff, interprets the riots of "The Sixth of February" of 1934 in terms of whether they should be considered an abortive coup d'état, and if so, why it failed. The author's conclusion is that, although there was some linkage with the future "men of Vichy," the evidence now available does not prove the thesis that the riots were an attack on the Republic itself.

In the second paper, entitled "The Making of the Popular Front," James Joll skillfully reconstructs the events leading to the short-lived electoral alliance of French Communists, Socialists, and Radicals during the mid-1930's. The Popular Front, observes Mr. Joll, was built outside parliament as a countermove to rightist demonstrations—almost entirely by Communist initiative, and, as it turned out, largely for their own ends. The dilemma of the Socialists and the hesitations of the Radicals over joining such a combination for "united action against war and fascism" are vividly portrayed. Once in power, following its smashing electoral victory of 1936, the Popular Front, due to Communist sabotage, could hold together only long enough for Leon Blum to launch an economic and social "New Deal" for France; but it was too late to implement this "social revolution" before tragedy struck from without.

In the third paper, on "The Rhineland Crisis of 1936," W. F. Knapp attaches special importance to the French army's lack of preparedness to move effectively against Hitler—even if the British had been willing to support such a policy on the part of the Quai d'Orsay. But the disease of appeasement had spread too widely in both countries, while France was already showing signs of the national demoralization that was to culminate in the debacle of 1940.

The subject of the fourth paper, by John Sherwood of Columbia University, is "The Tiger's Cub: The Last Years of George Mandel." Here we follow the political vicissitudes of one of the few "strong" leaders left in the Third Republic —a man who conceivably might have become a second Clemenceau, his early mentor, if he had not been so sensitive to rightist attacks on his Jewish identity. Mandel, with Paul Reynaud—and at a different level De Gaulle—formed the only "solid core of resistance" to the German invaders; but even they were overwhelmed by the tide of defeatism that swept over France as its supposedly "invincible" army collapsed before the Nazi *blitz*.

These four studies, all of them examples of careful, historical scholarship, convey in their ensemble a graphic but depressing picture of the forces of division and intrigue that undermined French morale and shattered French patriotism during the last days of the republican regime which, despite its institutional weaknesses, had contributed much to the modernization of French life over two generations. Its immediate successor, alas, was destined to play a less enviable and more ephemeral role on the French political stage.

WALTER R. SHARP
Professor of Political Science
Yale University

RICHARD BARRON. *Parties and Politics in Modern France*. Pp. xi, 213. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959. $4.50.

A principal problem within French political life during the period from 1945 to 1958, or "from DeGaulle to DeGaulle," was to hold together enough support in the center to put down those groups on the left and on the right that wanted traditional party activity to cease. In the 1947 municipal elections, for instance, only 25 per cent of the vote favored the continuance of party life within the parliamentary regime. And this quarter of the voting electorate was a conglomerate of factions that found many points of disagreement.

In the face of this puny center were the strong and well-disciplined Communists on the left and the conservative, Catholic Movement Republicain Populaire on the right. DeGaulle, who had the nation as a whole at heart, wanted to do away with partisanship, and so he organized his own party, or rally, to end all parties. Many people sincerely believed in 1947 that the success of DeGaulle would mean the end of the Republic and of democracy.



The central interest of the book is the contest—the life struggle—between the internally divided center, mainly the Socialist party, on the one hand, and the two giant movements that sought to kill while supporting or to support while killing the regime of the Third and Fourth Republics on the other hand. As usual, it was the external political equation that conditioned domestic party orientation, for until German influence was eradicated, DeGaulle could count even Communists among his followers; whereas after 1946 it was the Communist danger that rallied men to the DeGaulle standard. The author has set for himself the task of straightening out the alignment of parties and groups since 1945 and of giving the reasons for the many changes.

He attacks his subject by giving us an interesting chapter on French political motivations and traditions. He then studies the three principal parties separately, the Communist, the Socialist, and the Movement Republicain Populaire. The lesser, and sometimes the more familiar parties, are grouped in a final chapter.

The author is scholarly and objective. If he leans at all, it is toward the hope for a continuance of free party life within the framework of parliamentary government. The Third Republic seems to him to have met many of the political and psychological needs of France. He fears that the great monolithic parties will destroy democratic government, although the one on the right may not be as destructive as the one on the left. His style is clear and his Notes, which are at the end of the volume, are detailed and voluminous.

Dr. Barron does not recount election details in great number, but rather is interested in party structure, in electoral systems, in recruitment and education of members, in party discipline, in finance and in changing party platforms. He includes a good analysis of the history of DeGaulle's political life down to the autumn of 1958 when he returned in order to try his hand at settling the Algerian trouble. DeGaulle feels the pulse of the nation as does no other man, says Dr. Barron.

The book is timely, and it makes a valuable contribution to our literature on political and party life in contemporary France.

W. HENRY COOKE
Visiting Professor of History
Harvey Mudd College

M. K. DZIEWANOWSKI. *The Communist Party of Poland: An Outline of History*. (Russian Research Center Studies, No. 32.) Pp. xvi, 369. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. $7.50.

This volume fills a gap in English literature on the origins and past performance of communist parties in the world. Founded in December 1918, the Communist party of Poland is one of the oldest. Due to the prominent role played by some members of the pro-bolshevik socialist organizations in Poland in the 1903–1917 bolshevik movement, in the October revolution, and during the first decade of Soviet Russia, the "Polish bolsheviks"—Dzierżyński, Kon, Radek, Unszlicht, Pestkowski, Marchlewski—held a special position in the Russian and international communist movement. Although the author does not dwell on this subject, his volume contains many interesting leads for the study of this little-known topic.

It is only natural that in presenting the history of a political party, the author had to project it against the background of current political, economic, military, and other developments in Poland. The author, however, could not resist the temptation to go sometimes too far in presenting background developments. This brought into the volume fragments of interesting accounts on Polish-Soviet relations, on the Polish-Soviet war of 1919–1920, and on the operations of the communist-dominated Polish state. But these fragments are not necessarily needed for the presentation of the subject, and sometimes blur the continuity of the history of the party.

Professor Dziewanowski collected and presented the most important facts and events which led to the founding of the party and its activities before and after World War II. The documentation, obtained from scarce Polish sources, is rich and lucid. The last five weeks before the founding congress, December 16–18, 1918

when the SDKPL and PPS-Lewica acted jointly under the leadership of an Interparty Council, deserved perhaps broader treatment. For the student of international communism the volume will be a welcome reference work. The scholar searching for details of developments and texts of documents will find adequate source references.

In presenting background information on the events in Poland in 1919–1921, the author tries to formulate new concepts which are not always relevant. So, for instance, speaking about the Polish-Soviet war of 1919–20, he calls it in February 1919 a "small war" (p. 82) and in April 1920 a "full scale armed conflict" (p. 87). It was, in fact, the same war which in January 1919, at a time when there was no contact yet between the Polish and Soviet forces, started with the order to Soviet forces to advance in the direction of the Vistula and Warsaw (*Grazhdanskaia voina,* Moscow 1930, vol. III, pp. 151–153). There were three phases of one war, but not different wars.

W. S. SWORAKOWSKI
Assistant Director
The Hoover Institution
Stanford University

MILOVAN DJILAS. *Anatomy of a Moral: The Political Essays of Milovan Djilas.* Edited by Abraham Rothberg. Pp. xxxii, 35–181. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. $2.95.

This series of eighteen essays contains a strong indictment of Tito's regime by a man who at the time of writing was one of the top-ranking members of the party and government hierarchy of Yugoslavia. These essays also express a thorough disappointment and disillusionment of a man who had dedicated his life to the party, convinced that the Communist revolution would bring about a better, more humane, and more creative life for all. Djilas finally came to the bitter realization of the fact that it was not idealist-humanists, but power-seekers, careerists, and opportunists who took over the control of the party and of the government after the seizure of power by the Partisan fighters, after much destruction and suffering, and after several hundreds of thousands of human lives were coldly sacrificed to achieve this objective. And instead of a system of democratic socialism in which everything was to be done to improve the well being of each human being and in which every member of the new society was to have a say in the affairs of his community and of his country, the profiteers of the revolution have developed a system of arbitrariness, chicanery, and inhumanity. An exclusive and exalted caste composed of self-centered, grabbing, and beastly individuals has imposed its rule over the rest of society. Their own selfish interests as well as the interest of the caste as a whole have become paramount. To their internal intrigues and bickering for power everything else is sacrificed. There cannot be progress in such a society, Djilas concludes, only regression, demoralization, and disintegration. The only possible salvation from the sad fate of the Revolution, according to the author, is a return to the old pre-Revolution philosophy of idealism, humanism, dedication, and self-sacrifice. Therefore the Communist party, as a monolithic, dogmatic, omniscient, and all-powerful organization, is outdated and should be disbanded. Power should be in the hands of the masses. A group of intellectual leaders should dedicate their lives to educating the masses in the principles and practices of a democratic socialism—communism. Only if such developments take place is there hope that the fruits of the Revolution will not be abused and lost.

Such a course of events would entail the loss of power by those who are at present in control of the party and of the government. By disbanding the party they would lose the main instrument of their power. The reaction was therefore quick and determined against this challenge and threat to a caste which had just begun to enjoy its newly-acquired, worldly possessions and privileges, its luxurious city homes and its country villas, its servants and governesses, its exclusive boxes in the theatres and stadiums, its special food and clothing stores, its shiny cars with government-paid chauffeurs, as well as its exclusive social life, and its love affairs. In a hastily convened meeting of the Central Committee of the party, presided over by




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
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Tito, charges were brought against Djilas by Edvard Kardelj, the party's ideologist, who accused him of "revisionism," the greatest sin in this system of monolithic dogmatism conceived and built by Lenin and Stalin. Thus Kardelj used the same arguments against Djilas as Lenin did against his own opponents in the early days of his party, as if nothing had happened since. Of course the whole "trial" was window-dressing. There could be no fair debate of principles, as Djilas had hoped for. There were only accusation and condemnation in the inquisitorial, Soviet-style, tradition. The ruling caste was protecting its vested interests and therefore condemned Djilas as the enemy of the party, divested him of his party and government positions. Djilas was eventually sentenced to long years in prison, since the new caste, still insecure in its power, feared the man who knew them so well. But the spirit of this Montenegrin fighter has not been broken. He has continued to fight for his ideas and against the new masters, as his well-known work, *The New Class,* written in prison, testifies.

The work under review is very significant, not just as a personal document of another disappointed Communist, but much more as a work written by a leading Communist while he was still at the summit of party and government power in a Communist-ruled country. This work is particularly significant also because the author points out the injustices and inhumanities of the Communist system even when some external features of its police regime are relaxed for the sake of appearances and in order to appease democratic and humanistically minded public opinion in the West.

D. A. TOMASIC
Professor of Sociology
Indiana University

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG. *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus.* Pp. 174. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. $6.00.

There are several reasons, according to the author, why the Ukrainian elite provides a particularly valuable case study for an understanding of contemporary Soviet leadership: since almost all of the higher officials in this area were replaced during the 1938 purges, the process of tracing the current elite can begin with that year; because few middle level officials have been transferred to and from other regions, the apparatus in the Ukraine can be studied as a distinct and relatively homogeneous group; source materials on the subject—newspapers, books, memoirs, Soviet dissertations, and the like—are numerous; and, finally, Khrushchev, who rose through the Ukrainian party hierarchy himself, has used the apparatus there as a basis for extending his own power, transferring an unusual number of Ukrainian officials into the top Soviet leadership.

In the careful, step-by-step development of his analysis, the author identifies the bosses of the Ukrainian apparatus, examines in detail their training for leadership, considers their various responsibilities at different levels of the hierarchy, and isolates their mechanisms for control—and also the mechanisms by which they themselves are controlled.

Perhaps the most striking impression which emerges from an examination of the Ukrainian apparatus, according to the author, is the human diversity within the outwardly monolithic structure. This diversity does not necessarily signify weakness, but the author does tend to support the impressions of many recent visitors to the Soviet Union to the effect that the "new oligarchy" provides considerable opportunity for mobility and change.

To date the dominant leadership group is still composed largely of "men of '38," trained prewar; but the pressures upon them are great, and the incidence of heart trouble high. As a group they may not last many years longer.

These leaders, almost to a man, rose from the ranks through practical political ability and cunning. Few of them were formally educated. By contrast, the men who will succeed them—almost wholly trained after the war—will be university and technical school graduates with very different views of the world and of the society in which they live. There may be a growing tendency for a leadership of this kind to combine with industrial manage-

ment in a number of technocratic groups formed on a regional or economic basis, and yet, despite this trend, "the present oligarchy," the author feels, " is a long way from being a technocracy." In any case, the dominance of the Ukrainian-apparatus elite means a strengthening of oligarchic—as contrasted to the Stalinist autocratic—control of the Soviet Union. What will happen to the oligarchy as more and more of the younger members of the elite move into positions of influence remains largely to be seen.

ROBERT C. NORTH
Associate Professor of Political Science
Stanford University

RICHARD HARE. *Portraits of Russian Personalities Between Reform and Revolution.* Pp. viii, 360. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. $6.75.

In his previous book, *Pioneers of Russian Social Thought,* published in 1951, the author describes the struggle after the Napoleonic wars of the Russian intelligentsia against a sterile bureaucracy and for a discriminating europeanization of their country. In his present book he extends his research from the end of the Crimean War to the October Revolution of 1917. Against the background of the changing political scene he draws the portraits of fifteen personalities who, mostly doubting the benefits of westernization, searched in their different ways for an alternative course. The author thereby takes fresh evidence into account.

The portraits are those of Nikitenko, a plebian conservative of the reform period who represented the "hardy, honest, and energetic section of the rising middle class which formed the principal moral backbone of post-reform Russia" (p. 3), Bakunin, the aristocratic anarchist, the man of "spontaneous duplicity," the "bewildering blend of sincerity and fraud" (p. 41), Turgenev, the "good and generous liberal" (p. 96) who "caught and recorded in flight the rapidly changing pattern of Russian society" (p. 69), Dostoyevsky, "who could not justly be named either a revolutionary socialist or a republican, but at most an impassioned political dreamer and diligent free thinker" (p. 112), Tolstoy, the social and religious rebel who demolished "the whole misleading radical fixation on discernible laws of history and social change" (p. 193), three representative Narodniks, three religious-minded intellectuals, three thinking statesmen, and finally Kropotkin, the respectable, benevolent anarchist.

Most, if not all of them, justify their presence in this gallery, and the presentation by the author is excellent. His judgment is authoritative, and the treatment is impartial. It is not the author's fault if some of the pictures seem faded and remote in period, environment, and national characteristics, but an assessment by the author of the influence of these analysts and prophets, reformers and revolutionaries on the political parties of their time and the course of events would have helped the reader in his appreciation of their lifework.

The author has wisely left "suggestive analogies with present-day experience to the reader's own imagination" (p. vi). It was the anarchist Bakunin who stated in his *Confessions* over a hundred years ago: "Communism has spread, and continues to spread, as much from the top as from the bottom. In the masses it lives as a vague desire, an instinct to rise higher—in the higher classes as an indefinite and helpless fear, the result of weakness and an impure conscience. That fear and the unceasing outcry against communism have nearly done more to promote its advance than communist propaganda itself" (p. 36). "True," wrote Nicholas I, for whom the *Confessions* were written, in the margin.

OTTO HEILBRUNN
Gerrards Cross
Bucks, England

ALFRED ERICH SENN. *The Emergence of Modern Lithuania.* Pp. 272. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. $6.00.

This is essentially a study of the political and diplomatic efforts of the leaders of the Lithuanian national movement to establish an independent Lithuanian state.

The bulk of the book deals with the period from September 1917 to May 1920 during which, to use the author's words, "the Lithuanian national state evolved from a council of twenty-two men with no definite authority into a regularly constituted and elected government" (p. 221).

In addition there is an introductory chapter on "The Development of Lithuanian Nationalism" and a concluding chapter which summarizes the author's views on the factors responsible for the emergence of independent Lithuania.

The book is based on a great deal of conscientious research, but, in the opinion of this reviewer, has several serious shortcomings.

In the first place, in his effort to concentrate on the activities of that handful of dedicated people who identified themselves with the cause of independent Lithuania, the author seems to have divorced himself to a considerable degree from the geographical and social reality in which these men have acted. The presence of other national groups in the territories claimed by the Lithuanians is barely mentioned and their political aspirations are largely ignored.

The book contains no information on the number and distribution of the Lithuanian population either before or after World War I. Such information, even if based on somewhat inaccurate figures of the prewar Russian censuses, would have provided the reader with some facts necessary for the evaluation of fantastic territorial claims advanced by the Lithuanian nationalists.

The same may be said about the author's treatment of the social organization of the Lithuanians themselves. He provides virtually no information about their occupational or educational structure, nor even about their political groupings and orientation. One looks in vain for a discussion of the origin and development of Lithuanian political parties which are mentioned occasionally or for an evaluation of their relative strength and influence among the people.

Finally, despite his praiseworthy effort to be objective, the author, perhaps under the influence of his main sources, occasionally steps out of his role of an impartial observer to assume one of a defender of Lithuanian nationalism. For example, he reiterates again and again that the policy pursued by the Lithuanian leaders was the only one possible under the circumstances, without ever trying to prove why any other policy was, as he puts it, "out of the question."

He maintains this even with respect to the Lithuanian intransigence about Wilno, although in this case the "impossibility" of a different approach was clearly psychological, not political. The author seems to be conscious of this himself when he points out that "had the Poles not stopped the Bolshevik advance, Lithuania might well have fallen under Soviet control in spite of the peace treaty" and that "Vilna would have served as an entering wedge for the Bolsheviks to conquer Lithuania" (p. 220).

In spite of these limitations, the book is an informative and useful survey of the emergence of Lithuania as a modern political entity. Its value is augmented by a chronological table, lists of members of consecutive Lithuanian governments, and an extensive Bibliography.

KONSTANTIN SYMMONS
Professor and Chairman
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Wilkes College

TITUS KOMARNICKI. *Rebirth of the Polish Republic: A Study in the Diplomatic History of Europe, 1914–1920.* Pp. xiii, 776. London and Toronto: William Heinemann, 1957. 3/3s.

Shortly before the end of World War I an independent Poland had been promised by the Allies; a Polish army had been equipped by France; and a provisional government set up in Paris. But there had been no independent Polish state since the eighteenth century, and to create one *de novo* presented well-nigh insoluble problems.

What were the boundaries of Poland to be? Were they to be drawn on historical, ethnological, strategic, or economic lines? Should Wilson's principle of self-determination be applied, and how? Unfortunately Poland never had any natural boundaries. To draw new ones on the west, north, and south involved annexations of lands hitherto belonging to the German and the

Austro-Hungarian empires; to draw them on the east was still more difficult, since the rise of Bolshevism thrust Russia into civil war.

At the peace conference at Paris the French and British could not see eye to eye in regard to the future of Poland. Traditionally, France had ever been pro-Polish, and France wanted a strong and powerful Poland as an ally against Germany, but Britain was opposed to weakening Germany too far. The weaker Germany became all the better from the French viewpoint, and France advocated ceding Danzig outright to Poland, giving that country a wide sweep through the valley of the Vistula, Posen, Galicia, and a return to the Polish boundaries of 1772. Quite different, however, was the British tradition. It had been one that favored a balance of power between a few big states. If Germany lost too much power by the peace treaty, and France allied with Poland gained too much, that balance of power would be lost.

The result was a compromise. Poland was not given Danzig but merely economic rights; there were plebiscites ordered to check her gains in the west and south. And the peace conference ended with no boundary on the east whatsoever, since what was taking place in Russia in 1919 was anybody's guess.

Meanwhile England and France continued to differ in regard to Poland. Both countries opposed Soviet expansion; but Lloyd George proposed to fight Bolshevism in the region of the Baltic whereas Clemenceau urged that the French-trained Polish army act as the spearhead of the counter-attack of the West.

Pilsudski, chief of state at Warsaw and commander of the Polish army, led his troops deep into the heart of the Ukraine, capturing Kiev in May, 1920. Immediately a Red counterattack drove him back to the gates of Warsaw. By the treaty of Riga in 1921 the eastern boundary of Poland was finally drawn, well to the east of the German trenches in Russian Poland in 1915–1916.

WALTER P. HALL
Professor of History, Emeritus
Princeton University

LUIS DIEZ DEL CORRAL. *The Rape of Europe*. Translated by H. V. Livermore. Pp. 310. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959. $5.75.

This book, translated from the Spanish, is written in essay style. Its chapter titles are: I, Europe and Universal History; II, Decadence or Dispossession; III, Europe Seen from Spain; IV, The Oecumenical Scene and Theme; V, The Expropriation of the Rural City; VI, Secularization and Historical Dynamism; VII, Alienation in Art; VIII, Nation, Nationalism, and Supernation; and IX, Europe, the Sorcerer's Apprentice.

As the chapter titles suggest the book is a philosophical rather than historical treatise, seeking to establish general conclusions concerning European history and its institutions, the relations of Europe to the outside world, and of one period of European thought and life to another. The reader is frequently confronted with abstract observations which arouse philosophic speculation, but not always clarity of understanding. Nuggets of valuable truth and frequently quotations are intermixed with less valuable theorizing.

As the title, *The Rape of Europe*, indicates, the author has a theory to advance to which he devotes considerable attention especially in the second chapter. His idea appears to be that Europe through its expansion spent much of its vitality—true in the case of certain countries—and its culture was expropriated by peoples outside Europe. He fails to say just how or in what respects although he does mention the rise of Japan with institutions modeled on those of Europe to rivalry with that continent. He refers to the opinions of historians for the causes of the decline of Rome and Greece and states that authors living between the two world wars of the twentieth century discoursed on the possibility of European decline.

The author is so engrossed in his conception of Europe's loss of vitality to the rest of the world that he completely ignores the important contributions made by the oversea world since the beginning of the modern period to European science and culture, to social life, to promoting the power of European governments and to expanding greatly European commerce and wealth.

The author draws on his wide knowledge of European scholars in the field of civilization to furnish many valuable interpretations of European historical institutions and developments. His is a scholar's book requiring painstaking checking on sometimes obscure illusions to gain the full richness of his meaning.

Throughout the book are many thought-provoking statements. As an example, the author mentions that England regarded as the originator of the Industrial Revolution had for some time previously been assisted by technicians from other nations such as Italian shipbuilders, German miners, and Dutch hydraulic engineers. Besides, technical advance was made possible partly by appropriating other civilizations' inventions, among them the compass and printing type from the Far East. Great thinkers such as Roger Bacon, Leonardo da Vinci and Francis Bacon centuries before the technical age had suggested many of the inventions which later took place. Thus, Paul Mantoux, quoted by the author, called the Industrial Revolution "the sudden bursting and flowering of seeds that have lain dormant for many years."

It was Europe's development of modern science and technology which made its civilization dominant over that of other continents.

JAMES E. GILLESPIE
Professor of History, Emeritus
Pennsylvania State University

DANTE L. GERMINO. *The Italian Fascist Party in Power: A Study in Totalitarian Rule*. Pp. x, 181. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1959. $4.50.

Professor Germino has given us an excellent book on a most interesting theme. He has analyzed the structure and the functions of the National Fascist party of Italy through its operations and political vicissitudes. The National Fascist party was indeed a new tool for despotism, and the author describes its origins, its formation, its structure, its paramount quality of expediency—"the flexible structure"—its compositions, its leadership, its function in taking over Italian youth and then the school system. He also analyzes the internecine struggles of the party—which echo the same story in Berlin or in the Kremlin—and in a most interesting chapter the uneasy *modus vivendi* between party and police, party (in particular, the fascist militia) and Royal Army and party and bureaucracy.

The book has a thesis which it demonstrates in a most effective and convincing manner: Fascism was a totalitarian regime, of the Nazi and Soviet variety. Even though a number of illustrious writers, among whom the author quotes Hanna Arends, state that fascism did not have totalitarian traits, Germino shows well their shortcomings and presents fascism in a true and systematic perspective.

The book is written on the basis of firsthand documents and Germino has left no stone unturned nor available document unread. The book has also the quality of being extremely readable. This reviewer undertook the reading of it with a sense of duty, and ended it with a feeling of pleasure. Its Bibliography is of the most complete and the Notes, conscientious and unpretentious.

To indulge in "nit-picking": On page 115 one reads ". . . in September 1923 the Government . . . sent three legions of Militia to Corfu' where they remained until May 1924." As far as I know, no militia was sent to Corfu' during the brief Italian occupation which started at the end of August 1923 and ended in September of the same year. But the author should not worry about this slip. He has written a worthy book.

RENZO SERENO
Professor of Political Theory and Cultural Relations
School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University

J. A. LAUWERYS (Ed.). *Scandinavian Democracy: Development of Democratic Thought and Institutions in Denmark Norway and Sweden*. Pp. 437. Copenhagen: The Danish Institute, The Norwegian Office of Cultural Relations, and The Swedish Institute in co-operation

with the American-Scandinavian Foundation, 1958. $6.00.

RAYMOND E. LINDGREN. *Norway-Sweden: Union, Disunion, and Scandinavian Integration.* (A Publication of The Center for Research on World Political Institutions, Princeton University.) Pp. ix, 298. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. $5.00.

In recent years a number of books and pamphlets have appeared dealing with present-day conditions in the Scandinavian countries, many of them sponsored by the publishers of *Scandinavian Democracy.* While these earlier publications discussed specific aspects of Scandinavian life, the present volume aims "at explaining and discussing the ideological and philosophical foundations of the economic, social, political and cultural institutions of the Northern lands . . . ." It is a composite work of twenty-three Scandinavian specialists who contribute articles under the following headings: What Is Democracy?; The Heritage of History; Justice, Security, and Government; Economic Life in Scandinavia; Building Up Democratic Attitudes; The Defense of Democracy; Scandinavian Democracy and the World. While this volume is free of the easy generalizations and fulsome praise that characterized many of the American books about Scandinavian countries published between the wars, it is nevertheless plain that the authors have faith in the system they describe. They definitely feel that the Scandinavian "way of life" is worthy of the attention it has attracted and that the small countries have a role to play not only in cultural matters but also in international affairs. To American readers the sections on economic life and on the building of democratic attitudes will probably be the most interesting. These chapters discuss various aspects of Scandinavia's controlled capitalism—"the middle way"—and the formative influence of education, the arts, and the mass media on the democratic tradition. In view of the important part which literature and religion have played in the life of the Scandinavian peoples, it is disappointing that these factors are given so little emphasis. Nevertheless, this book is undoubtedly the best introduction to present-day Scandinavia available in English.

While *Scandinavian Democracy* has one chapter dealing with current co-operation between the northern countries, *Norway-Sweden* deals with the specific relations between these two countries from 1814 to the present. From 1814 to 1905 Norway and Sweden were joined in a dynastic union characterized by almost continual friction. On two occasions war between them seemed a definite possibility. In this case "political amalgamation" did not produce a "security-community," to use the terminology of The Center for Research on World Political Institutions which has sponsored this volume. Only when the union was dissolved did the relationship evolve in such a manner that war has become unthinkable.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the causes of the friction before 1905 and the later development of strong bonds of understanding. Professor Lindgren's research makes it clear that the union, which in some respects stamped Norway as an inferior partner, was the source of numerous irritations that were blown to dangerous proportions by the intense nationalism and the fierce political battles of the period. The union thus became a barrier to that very amalgamation it was presumably designed to further. With its dissolution forces were freed which, building on close affinities in language, religion, ethnography, and traditions, reared a vital "security-community" which included also the other northern countries.

The author has studied carefully all the principal Scandinavian authorities dealing with the union problems. The main part of the book, covering the hectic period from 1902 to 1908, is built on exhaustive examination of the primary sources, many of them unpublished.

There are a few points with which this reviewer takes issue. Statements on pages 26, 60, 61 make it appear that the Norwegian constitution gave the king absolute veto over legislation. The constitution granted the king merely a suspensive veto over ordinary legislation but said nothing about the veto in connection with constitutional amendments. It was over this latter point that fierce political battles raged prior to the introduction of the parliamentary system in 1884. On page 57 the great poet and national leader, Björnstjerne Björnson, is made to appear even more of a weathercock than Ibsen accused him of being. His attitude toward politics, religion, and the union question mellowed with time but did not undergo any radical change. On page 256 it is correctly stated that the Danes "complained much less than the Norwegians" over Swedish yielding to German pressure during the early part of the Second World War, but it must also be said that the Danes had much less cause for complaint. Little matters like these, however, do not detract from the value of this interesting, thorough, and well-written book. It should attract the attention of people concerned about international affairs because it deals with the central problem of our time—that of "integration" or understanding between nations.

CLARENCE A. CLAUSEN
Professor of History
St. Olaf College



AMRY VANDENBOSCH. *Dutch Foreign Policy since 1815: A Study in Small Power Politics.* Pp. x, 318. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959. Guilders 25.50.

In his Preface the author expresses his gratitude to various institutions and persons to whose aid he admits himself indebted, amongst others to a number of persons in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, chiefly in the archives division. "That their help," he adds, "was not more extensive was not due to unwillingness on their part to be of service." What then was it due to? The author politely evades an answer to that question, but we can guess in the light of a sensational utterance by the president of the foreign press association in Holland. He published early in March of this year an outspoken criticism of the official information service, which is so skimpy that several foreign correspondents have left The Hague and settled in Brussels, where they are treated with less formality and polite reserve. It is an old complaint. The Foreign Office staff at The Hague has always considered the country's foreign policy a special preserve from which they barred inquisitive outsiders. During the First World War several protests from members of parliament induced the then minister to be more communicative, but the policy of secrecy, though attenuated, is evidently still in force. Hence it is not easy for a scholar from abroad to inform himself thoroughly of the policy of the Foreign Office.

Dr. Vandenbosch has done his research with industry and skill and has succeeded, despite official aloofness, in producing an informative and solid piece of work. The Second World War had a revolutionary effect on the conduct of Dutch foreign affairs. It brought to an end the nineteenth-century system, maintained for a hundred years with great caution and success, of neutrality and independent action. It was abandoned for a policy of participation in various movements towards West-European union: the Benelux Plan, the North Atlantic Defense Pact, the Coal and Steel Community, the European Common Market. In the seventeenth century the Dutch Republic was one of the Great Powers. No one in Holland would wish to see their country regain that position of influence. But through the judicial opinions of her leading statesmen Holland is still able to have a voice, and often a persuasive one, in the councils of Europe.

An extensive, yet strangely incomplete, Bibliography concludes the volume. Among important publications that it ignores is C. Van Vollenhoven's brilliant monograph, "The Three Stages of International Law," and his justly famous doctoral thesis accessible to English-speaking readers in *Bibliotheca Visseriana* (Vol. X), which presented such novel ideas that it was not fully appreciated at the time of its first appearance in print, but which, as Jhr. W. J. M. Van Eysinga asserted in 1933, the year of Van Vollenhoven's death, "seems self-evident truth to the present generation."

ADRIAAN J. BARNOUW
Professor Emeritus
Columbia University

NORMAN ST. JOHN-STEVAS. *Walter Bagehot: A Study of His Life and Thought together with a Selection of His Political Writings.* Pp. xvi, 485. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959. $7.50.

While Bagehot's political essays are not readily available in convenient form, both his great work on *The English Constitution* and his *Physics and Politics* are. Likewise, while no recent biography is available, Alastair Buchan's long-promised full-scale biography, probably to be definitive for our time, is due from the press at any moment. Hence, one may seriously question the value of the present work, which contains in its Introduction a brief biography, a not uninteresting and curiosity-provoking analysis of Bagehot's religious views, a nice but too brief analysis of him as a writer and literary critic, and a somewhat less illuminating statement of his position as an economist, a moderate-sized commentary on his political ideas, followed by a very considerable analysis, not so much of his work on the English Constitution as of what has happened since. This analytical and descriptive section occupies half of the total Introduction and, largely independent of much of what has preceded it, is also in considerable part rather loosely related to Bagehot, save that is is organized by themes according to the structure of his own work.

The selections may prove interesting, may be sufficient to give the reader an over-all impression of the range of Bagehot's thought on government and on politics, and of the way in which he analyzed statesmen, though the omission of essays dealing with this country is a little unfortunate. Perhaps the *English Constitution* cannot readily be cut, but, because of its availability, its reproduction here, taking up about half of the space devoted to the writings, is less than warranted. While, on the other hand, the very brief abstract from *Physics and Politics* scarcely gives the unfamiliar reader an adequate feeling or understanding of that work. Also Mr. St. John-Stevas in his Introduction devotes less attention to this work than its due.

This book may be valuable to a student or general reader who wants to know something about Bagehot and to get a firsthand taste of his political writings. It does not contribute notably to scholarship, and, for those who already know or are interested in Bagehot, the price of the convenient assembling of a few essays is rather high.

THOMAS I. COOK
Department of Political Science
Johns Hopkins University

PETER GAY. *Voltaire's Politics: The Poet as Realist.* Pp. xii, 417. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. $6.00.

Great men are often controversial men. Sometimes they bring controversy on themselves, through their own ambiguities and complexities. Sometimes later scholarship is responsible, as it dissects, distorts, and misunderstands. In the case of Voltaire, responsibility seems to be equally shared. At any rate, we are left with a "Voltaire problem," notably in the area of Voltaire's political action and thought.

Mr. Gay contends that Voltaire scholars have slighted this aspect of his work, and have never successfully placed Voltaire's political ideas in the framework of his time. He notes the curious contrast between the variety of views about Voltaire, on the one hand, and the general acceptance of a rigid stereotype on the other. Mr. Gay is no disciple, but he believes that the sage of Ferney has been much maligned. He was, Mr. Gay tells us, a realist in politics; a practical hard-headed man of empiricist temper and relativist views; a reformer more concerned with conditions than with theories; a crusader for the right of free expression and the rule of law. Mr. Gay rejects the thesis that Voltaire advocated something called enlightened despotism, for despotism of any kind violated his deepest convictions. What Voltaire favored instead was "constitutional absolutism," an illogical yet attractive doctrine derived from the old *thèse royale* used by the king's lawyers for centuries. Mr. Gay admits, however, that Voltaire's doctrine provided no institutions, save the force of enlightened public opinion, that would guard against the corruption of absolutism into despotism.



In the course of his argument, Mr. Gay touches lightly upon or digs deeply into a great many intriguing aspects of the eighteenth century. There are provocative accounts of Voltaire's relationships with Frederick and Catherine; of Genevan politics; of the long guerrilla warfare between king and parliaments; of the Calas affair and the whole matter of judicial procedures in a prereform age; of Voltaire's campaign against *l'infâme* which, Mr. Gay argues, meant neither fanaticism nor religion in general, but Christianity in all its forms. There is also a defense of the Enlightenment temper that is refreshing in our age of despair.

Mr. Gay has already given us a most comprehensive study of Eduard Bernstein; his work on Voltaire is of equal importance as a reassessment of the man and the age. He writes with vigor, verve, and understanding on a subject that requires all of these qualities. Special note should be made of the thorough and useful Bibliographical Essay, and of the handsome format that continues to make Princeton the envy of all university presses.

GORDON WRIGHT
Professor of History
Stanford University

ARNOLD BRECHT. *Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought.* Pp. xviii, 603. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. $12.00.

Professor Brecht is to be congratulated for having crowned his long and distinguished career in government both as a practician and a scholar with a work of the first magnitude. The prediction can be made without any hesitation whatsoever that this book will henceforth be studied by every serious student of political theory, whether or not he agrees with the author's findings and conclusions. Two reasons are behind this prediction: first, it is the only book in any language that surveys, in minute and scholarly detail, the many and varied methodological and scientific efforts to construct valid foundations for a theory of politics, law, sociology, or ethics. Some of the English or American authors discussed by Professor Brecht are relatively well known in the United States; but he also examines many Continental European thinkers, whose works have not been translated into English, opening up new vistas and theories which so far have been terra incognita even to the well-informed American scholar. There is hardly a single strand of thought missing in the fabric woven so skillfully by Professor Brecht. Written in a lively and clear style, his book is a veritable encyclopedia of twentieth-century political theory, an indispensable starting point for any further study and research.

The intellectual situation in which Professor Brecht has created his great work can briefly be stated as follows: the decline of religious faith has largely resulted in the abandonment of the belief in the eternal verities in political, legal, and social philosophy. The loss of excessive certitude as provided by traditional metaphysics and religion has led, particularly in the last half century, to the opposite extreme of excessive despair, as reflected in the various manifestations of relativism. What Professor Brecht is trying to do in his *Political Theory* is to explore the possibilities which are still left to creative reason in the formulation of general philosophical principles in politics. He calls his own position "scientific value relativism." He does not claim to provide an ultimate solution for the problem of the relationships of science and values, but seeks to discover in what ways science can be useful in analyzing and formulating universally valid criteria of values. Whereas religion and metaphysics solve this problem too easily by making critical reasoning unnecessary, and relativism claims that reason is futile in this area, Professor Brecht tries to build a middle ground of enlarging the function of reason and science in the world of values. Even if one concedes that ultimate values cannot be proved scientifically or by critical reasoning, there is still a wide area of creative rational exploration before one gets to the ultimate values. Much of the tension, confusion, and strife in human relations occurs with respect to values which are not ultimate, but intermediate, and here reason has not even begun to fulfill its potential.

The above brief summary gives a very inadequate impression of the scope and depth of Professor Brecht's work, both as a masterful summary of the existing scholarly literature on the subject and as a pioneering effort of moving forward, of breaking the intellectual deadlock created by the decline of religion and the rise of relativism.

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN
Professor of Politics
Princeton University

G. R. ELTON (Ed.). *The New Cambridge Modern History,* Vol. II: *The Reformation, 1520–1559.* Pp. xvi, 685. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1958. $7.50.

This second and most welcomed volume of the *New Cambridge Modern History* describes and analyzes the forty years that began with the accession of Charles V as Emperor and the excommunication of Luther and closed with the signing of the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, the accession of Elizabeth to the throne in England and the recrudescence of Catholic power in a church not only ready to stand her ground but ready to take determined action against her foes. When compared with the second volume of the first *Cambridge Modern History,* the scope of the newer work is chronologically more restricted, but the results of new planning are effective.

The second volume of the new history contains twenty chapters written by specialists. Even a hasty glance at the Table of Contents shows the work to be the result of international co-operation and in no sense exclusively the reflection of Cambridge or even merely of British thought. In the chapter on Economic Change a professor from the University of Munich writes on agriculture; a professor of theology in Copenhagen describes The Reformation in Scandinavia and the Baltic; a contributor from Bonn discusses the German Reformation to 1555; Delio Cantimori of Florence provides a section of considerable interest on Italy and the Papacy; H. Koenigsberger, now at Manchester, has an essay on The Empire of Charles V in Europe; and the concluding chapter on Europe and the East was written by the late Senior Lecturer in History in the University College of Achimota, Ghana.

G. R. Elton, the highly competent editor, provides the general introduction and with learning, insight, and skill evaluates the Reformation. He calls the age "passionate, partisan and narrow" and pointedly recognizes that there are no simple answers to explain its constantly baffling complexities. Elton impresses on his readers the importance of the fact that in the East conditions were in general becoming worse and that there "territories once again became marches against an alien foe." Elton's observations are those of an informed and reflective historian who knows his business and who knows how to handle the problems he must face. The temptation to quote from him at length is great. He takes a firm stand in refusing to credit the age as being the beginning of modern times, but he does see it as the epoch of the ascendancy of Europe, "an ascendancy that the future may well decide came to an end in 1914."

As is bound to be the case with any composite work, all sections do not have similar appeal, yet readers will find each chapter worthy of attention. And the quality of the volume as a whole is high. The pages on Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, the Strassburg reformers and other Protestant leaders will have especial attraction. To appreciate them fully the reader must approach them prepared. They are written for the literate and the informed, certainly not always for the beginner. The sections on eastern Europe are especially welcome, as are those by Denys Hay and A. R. Hall on Intellectual Tendencies and on Schools and Universities. There are riches and delights in this new volume, but the omission of any sort of a Bibliography borders on the tragic.

GRAY C. BOYCE
Chairman, Department of History
Northwestern University

ANDRÉ BONNARD. *Greek Civilization from Antigone to Socrates.* Translated by A. Lytton Sells. Pp. 248. London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959. $6.00.



Like its predecessor this volume is filled with unusual views dogmatically, sometimes belligerently proclaimed by the author. And he glories in it. "In this work in which *everything* proceeds by choice, as a matter of chance or calculation I might have 'forgotten' Pindar, as I shall forget many other spirits of an amplitude equal to his" (p. 104). Among those he "forgets"—except for casual references—is Thucydides. To Herodotus, however, he devotes a whole chapter (Ch. 6), yet in that chapter manages to ignore Herodotus' main theme, the Persian War. But only Bonnard could have written: "For the father of history, the acme of the historical would in short be the marvellous guaranteed by reliable witnesses" (p. 127). He rightly calls attention to the conflict in Herodotus between his love of truth and his delight in a good story. However, in making him responsible for the beginning of scientific geography as well as history (p. 126) he deprives Hecataeus and Anaximander of their due.

It would be tedious to dwell on minor inaccuracies, particularly as a number of them have been indicated by the translator (e.g., on pp. 109; 110; 111; 176—though he missed Grote as a "German" on p. 207, n. 1), but sometimes the error leads to false conclusions. In discussing Aristophanes' *Birds* he misses the whole point of the play because he believes it was produced: ". . . at the moment when Athens, prostrated by the Sicilian disaster . . . was getting ready for the final assault . . . preparing against her" (p. 188). But the play appeared in the spring of 414, more than a year ahead of the disaster.

At other times he flaunts his opinions in the face of the evidence. This is probably true in his suggestion that in early Greek sculpture both the archaic smile (p. 40) and the statue's immobility (p. 41) were caused not by technical awkwardness but religious feeling. But his remarks about Socrates offer a clearer example. After alluding to the difficulties caused by the prejudices of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristophanes, our best informants, he says: "All this affords plenty of work for the scholars" (p. 217). Then he proceeds to create his own Socrates, and ignores the whole problem.

His two chapters on Sophocles are perhaps the most rewarding in the book. The interpretation is not conventional, but it is well thought out and supported by constant references. Chapter seven, on fifth century medicine, also deserves special mention. It is well informed and contains a surprising amount of useful information and comment. As the author says, however, it is largely borrowed from the work of L. Bourgey (p. 148, n. 3).

In closing it may be said that Bonnard has produced a work calculated to fascinate the neophyte and to horrify the careful classical scholar. If there is a moral in that I prefer not to point it out.

TRUESDELL S. BROWN
Professor of History
University of California
Los Angeles

## *ASIA AND AFRICA*

ANSLEY J. COALE and EDGAR M. HOOVER. *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-income Countries: A Case Study of India's Prospects.* Pp. xxi, 389. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1958. $8.50.

This is a book about pie and pie eaters. The pie is India's national income and the pie eaters are the country's population. It is reasonable to expect, the authors say, that the pie will double within 25 or 30 years. If the current birth rate stays the same then, according to Coale and Hoover, the number of pie eaters will also double, and average per capita annual income will remain unchanged. If over the next 25 years the birth rate can be halved, each pie eater in the 1980's will have a bigger piece of pie.

The argument that things will not get much better in India until the population starts levelling off is no longer novel. What is new in this book is the attempt to support the argument with batteries of figures for India's future population and output.

To what extent do these numerical projections deepen our knowledge or understanding of the forces likely to affect the pie to pie eaters ratio in the course of the next few decades? It is immediately apparent that projections are worth neither more nor less than the assumptions which they embody.

Let us look first at Coale and Hoover's economic assumptions. Their discussion of India's economic prospects—the growth of the pie—focuses on the printed volumes setting out the First and Second Five Year Plans for 1951–56 and 1956–61, respectively. They accept, broadly, the plan estimates of the current level of national output. Without exploring the profound uncertainties in national product figures for agriculture, handicrafts, and services, the great bulk of national product, Coale and Hoover are satisfied to make use of the estimates provided in the Plans. They express the opinion that investment and output have been increasing and will continue to increase more or less according to the plan. This judgment reflects quite faithfully the rosy complacency of New Delhi in 1955–56, the year in which Coale and Hoover visited India. The illusion that things would continue to go forward on the same economic basis and in the same general way underlies their economic calculations. For India, this is the least likely eventuality. The economic position in India in 1955 was at least as delicately balanced as that of the United States in the New Deal year 1935. If any one thing seems certain for India in the proximate future, it is the likelihood of a basic departure—whether Right or Left we need not discuss—from the kind of economic program that Prime Minister Nehru was pushing in the 1950's.

By contrast, Coale and Hoover appear more at home in the chapters on population, the discussions of the number of pie eaters. Nonetheless, the materials with which they have to deal are few and frail. Questions of the future aside, neither they nor anyone else knows with any precision the current birth rate, current death rate, current age distribution, or even total size of the current population of India.

In sum, both the economic and the demographic data which Coale and Hoover have utilized are subject to appallingly wide errors. The India of our day does not provide the statistical base from which long-range population and output projections may safely be launched.

DANIEL THORNER
Indian Statistical Institute
(Bombay Branch)

RICHARD L. PARK and IRENE TINKER (Eds.). *Leadership and Political Institutions in India.* Pp. x, 486. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1959. $10.00.

This volume is an important contribution in its field covering as it does a survey of the traditions that may influence contemporary politics in India, a description of such political institutions as the Council of Ministers, the role of parliament in decision making, and an appraisal of political parties. The field of public administration is examined in relation to national planning, the public services, and the Five Year Plans. A concluding section rightly goes to the still basic, socio-political unit in India, the village. A number of rural communities are described from first-hand field work in terms of the role of village leaders, caste, and problems of factionalism.

Specific comment can be made only on a few of the essays in this volume which were originally presented by a group of American and Indian social scientists at a seminar held at the University of California at Berkeley in August 1956. The essay on "Traditional Concepts" by Professor D. Mackenzie Brown seeks to isolate and describe the most potent historical, political concepts that may have relevance to contemporary politics. While affording an interesting background, it seems unlikely that the seesaw of Indian politics is influenced much by the rather nebulous political ideals of the past.

The paper on the "Politics of Modernization" by Professor Myron Weiner is a penetrating analysis of the most striking feature of Indian politics—the presence of charismatic leadership—what would social scientists do without charisma?—the vari-



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
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ous cleavages in Indian society reflected in politics, the rapid growth of the scope of government, and so forth. Three political personalities have been singled out for biographical treatment: Nehru, Subhas Chandra Bose, and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. These are excellent vignettes. The paper on Subhas Bose is one of the best brief studies available on this controversial figure.

All in all, the contributors to this volume give us a valuable insight into Indian political institutions with special reference to the function of leadership. It is, however, interesting that perhaps the most obvious characteristic of this leadership today —its concentration in the hands of a few aging statesmen and the consequent problem of succession—receives little attention in this volume. A recent piece in the Calcutta *Statesman* refers cogently to the "aging team of ministers" at Delhi and to the lack of new leaders who "are not coming up as rapidly as is desirable." This condition is perhaps unconsciously reflected in the three biographical essays on political leaders; two are deceased and Nehru will likely retire from active political life in the next few years.

T. WALTER WALLBANK
Professor of History
University of Southern California

GEORGE ROSEN. *Industrial Change in India: Industrial Growth, Capital Requirements, and Technological Change, 1937–1955.* Pp. xxv, 243. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press (for The Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), 1958. $5.00.

Rapid economic development is the keynote of national policy in India today. By definition, this would almost involve a change in the country's industrial structure. Development can be intelligently planned only with a thorough understanding of the requirements of capital and labor in the various sectors of the economy and their relationships to output. Authentic studies in this field in India are few and the planning authority had to assume a great deal in making their projections for the five-year plans. Dr. Rosen's book, coming as it does at a time when the third Five-Year Plan is in the process of formulation, will provide a firmer basis for all such projections. But its greater contribution will be the stimulus it will provide to Indian scholars to pursue this field of research which is now recognized in India to be most important in planning for economic development.

Several of Dr. Rosen's findings shed a new light on the relationships between capital, labor, and output. For example, his finding that the capital-output ratio for both large and small firms is roughly equal, and possibly lower for the large firms, has a significant bearing on the policy of encouragement to small-scale industries on the ground of relative scarcity of capital. Similarly, his finding regarding the rising capital-labor coefficients and a tendency towards a gradual introduction of labor-saving devices would necessitate a revision of the estimates of the employment potential of new investment. It may be noted that according to Dr. Rosen, the estimates of capital-labor coefficients, both for the investment goods sector and the factory consumer goods sector, made in India by Professor Mahalanobis, appear to be on the low side. Reference may also be made to the author's finding that the hypothesis of "unlimited" supply of labor does not hold true economically in the organized manufacturing sector. Does this mean that in underdeveloped economies in the early stages of development there is not one labor market, but two or probably more?

Dr. Rosen's book has aroused new interest in the economics of industrial growth in India and is currently enjoying high priority in the reading list of economists, both in the universities and in the government.

M. L. DANTWALA
Department of Economics
University of Bombay
India

F. C. JONES. *Hokkaido: Its Present State of Development and Future Prospects.* Pp. viii, 146. London: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1958. $3.40.

THOMAS C. SMITH. *The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan.* (Stanford Studies in the Civilizations of Eastern Asia.) Pp. xi, 250. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959. $5.00.

These recent studies by Jones and Smith have much in common. The books deal with selected aspects of the economic history of Japan; they have been written by individuals who are primarily political historians rather than economists; the books were urgently needed to shed light on hitherto neglected aspects of Japan's economic growth; the texts are both comprehensive enough to cover the subjects considered without, in general, overlaboring matters; the subjects have been both competently researched and written; and they dispel deeply intrenched illusions concerning their respective specialized subjects. Unfortunately, however, to differing extents, both could have benefited from the constructive criticism of more quantitatively minded colleagues. This last matter detracts relatively slightly from the distinctly praiseworthy and instructive efforts of both authors, efforts which should result in their studies being widely used.

Jones deals with the economic and political history of Hokkaido, its physical and economic geography, postwar development plans and accomplishments, its agricultural and pastoral situation, fisheries and forestry, mineral resources and production, general industrial development and prospects, and the importance of Hokkaido to the economy of Japan. The study appears to rest heavily on materials available in the English language—Ackerman, Lensen, Nasu, Keene, Harrison, and so forth—but these have been strongly bolstered by the impact of three months of travel and "enjoyable experience" on the island in 1954. There are twenty-six tables and five maps in this physically but not intellectually slim volume.

While both the form and content of Jones' study are generally impressive, the book could have been tidied up with respect to statistical matters. Not until page 116, only twenty pages before the end of the text, are readers warned that ". . . statistical data are none too reliable. . . ." Prior to this, data are directed at the reader in broadside fashion, with most of them being offered authoritatively as final in type. In a few instances where the author has come across data which conflict with each other, the reader is presented with Jones' choice of one figure over the other without the basis for the choice (for example, p. 86, Table 20; p. 87, Table 22). Nor are the data presented in a uniform fashion. Since 1 *cho* = 2.45 acres, 247 acres = 1 square kilometer, and 640 acres = 1 square mile, why could not acres have been used in lieu of *cho* and square miles used in lieu of square kilometers uniformly throughout the study instead of the units being used alternately in apparently indiscriminate fashion. In a similar vein, either dollars or pound sterling should have been used as a measure of value in relation to the *yen* but not both alternately (p. 60). Also, 1,580,000 *cho* is not "pretty much the same" as 1,450,000 hectares (p. 58, f.n. 1), it is larger by 8 per cent—roughly 290,000 acres—in absolute numbers. Lest these remarks be misunderstood, it needs to be reiterated that the study is well done, and students of economic development will find it rewarding. The experiences of United States General Horace Capron in Japan in the 1870's, for example, have an almost current Foreign Operations Administration and International Cooperation Administration-like ring to them (pp. 1–14 *passim*).

Smith's analysis of the traditional village in Japan and the impact on it of the growth of markets, the development of agricultural technology, the transformation of labor, the development of new class relations, and so forth rests on a wide variety of micro-type data: family journals, village reports, oral and written traditions, and the literature of the times. Parts of the book are based on original materials, most of it is based on the research of Japanese scholars who collected and studied these raw materials, and practically all of it is based on writings in the Japanese language. Both Smith's scholarship and writing leave a distinctly good impression and the desire to see more of his research efforts. There are a number of very minor criticisms which can be made but these are hardly worth mentioning. Smith as well as Jones has produced an excellent addition to any library of East Asian studies.

SIDNEY KLEIN
Assistant Professor of Economics
Rutgers, The State University

SHAO CHUAN LENG. *Japan and Communist China.* Pp. ii, 166. Kyoto: Doshisha University Press, 1958. Distributed by the Institute of Pacific Relations, New York. No price.

The Peking regime's impact on its Asian neighbors is insufficiently reflected in Western literature on international affairs. This statement certainly applies to the case of Japan.

Despite the obvious significance for the balance of power in Asia of Japan's foreign policy orientation, few American scholars have attempted to evaluate the changing relations between Communist China and Japan.

Dr. Leng's book thus is something of a pioneer effort in an important field. The author bases his analysis in the main on Chinese and Japanese periodical literature and official documents, supplementing these sources with personal interviews conducted in Japan during 1956 and 1957. The study was concluded at a time when Japan's economic position seemed more vulnerable to the lure of Chinese trade than it is today, and when the Peking regime's policy toward the Kishi cabinet was less aggressive. This may explain why some of the author's short-range forecasts do not always stand up against current developments.

Dr. Leng modestly calls his work a "suggestive survey." Actually the study is an exceedingly useful and, despite its brevity, a surprisingly comprehensive treatment of the first six or seven years of relations between Communist China and Japan.

Starting with a chapter which provides the setting for the subject, the author proceeds to a discussion of Peking's "people's diplomacy" toward Japan, then takes up in considerable detail the economic relations between the two countries, touches upon the repatriation of Japanese and Chinese nationals, and offers a brief survey of official and unofficial political contacts. A chapter on the Japanese reaction to Communist China generally confirms the findings of C. Martin Wilbur's lengthier treatment of the subject in the book by Hugh Borton and others, *Japan between East and West.* The author's views on the future outlook for Sino-Japanese relations and several useful documentary and statistical Appendices round out the presentation.

Currently, relations between the Kishi cabinet and the Mao regime are at an all-time low, a development that was perhaps not fully anticipated in Tokyo when this book was written. On the other hand, the Japanese government's ability to withstand the Communist bloc's propaganda pressure and its unwillingness to make political concessions despite Peking's suspension of trade with Japan, may have come as a surprise to the Chinese Communist policymakers. While the final outcome of this test of strength is difficult to predict, the present situation suggests that the economic factor, in the near future at least, will be somewhat less important in shaping the relations between the two countries than one might have thought only a few years ago.

PAUL F. LANGER
Assistant Professor of International Relations and History
University of Southern California

ARTHUR WALEY. *The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes.* Pp. 257. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959. $4.75.

The present work is the first venture into the field of history by the well-known translator of Chinese literary works. It is the translation of selections of a collection of historical documents on the Opium War, published, some for the first time, in *Ya-p'ien chan-cheng tzu-liao ts'ung-k'an (Corpus of Material about the Opium War,* Shanghai, 1955).

Part I (pp. 11–157) is the translation of selected passages covering the period from February 1839 to July 1841 from the

diary of the special opium commissioner, Lin Tse-hsu, whose uncompromising attitude, instead of suppressing the opium traffic, led to the conflict with the British. Part II (pp. 158–186) contains the translation of the *Tu-tu yin* ("Songs of Oh dear, Oh dear!") describing the ill-fated Chinese counteroffensive under General I-ching against Ningpo, by Pei Ch'ing-ch'iao, an officer on I-ching's staff. Part III (pp. 186–196) is the translation of a diary recording thirteen days, June 16–28, 1842, of the British invasion of Shanghai, by the scholar Ts'ao Sheng. Part IV (pp. 197–221) is a description of the British occupation of Chingkiang from July 8 through October 4, 1842, based on the diary of the poet, Chu Shih-yun. Part V (pp. 222–243) gives the biographies of Charles Gutzlaff and of some of his collaborators.

While Mr. Waley's work is written "chiefly for the general reader" and is limited in scope, not attempting "to give a complete and consecutive story of the war" but only as viewed through Chinese eyes, it is historical in nature and must be judged as such. In this connection the following remarks must be made. By annotating the Chinese accounts and by comparing them with accounts from Western sources, mostly British, Mr. Waley gives us the story of *The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes* but British-colored glasses. The absence of a more complete Bibliography and of footnotes authenticating statements drawn from non-Chinese sources is regrettable. There are also minor inaccuracies throughout the book. For example, *Yueh hai-kuan chih kao* is translated as "History of the Customhouse at Canton" while it should be "Draft Gazetteer of the maritime customs of Kwangtung"; *Chih-fu* is Prefect and not Governor; *Chih-hsien* is District Magistrate and not Prefect, and so forth.

In spite of these shortcomings Mr. Waley's book is a contribution. It is the most balanced of all British accounts of the Opium War.

JOSEPH S. SEBES
Assistant Professor of History
Georgetown University

WARREN S. THOMPSON. *Population and Progress in the Far East.* Pp. ix, 443. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959. $7.50.

Over the last four decades Warren Thompson has been a dedicated and compassionate student of the increasing populations of the Far East. Now, in nominal retirement, he has seen and studied the countries of the Far East as they are today, assessed and judged their policies and prospects, and weighed the possibilities for progress in the various countries. In *Population and Progress in the Far East,* there are no summaries of past works, and there is no lament for the Far East as it might have been if the warnings of past decades had been heeded. There is, instead, a series of current pictures on broad canvasses. Regionally, they cover Japan, India, China, Pakistan, Ceylon, the mainland and island Southeast Asian countries, Taiwan, and Korea. Topically, each country analysis includes location; area and resources; agricultural status, developments, and prospects; industry and plans for industrialization; and prospects and probabilities. Population is included, but it is integrated with the total situation in a focus on probable rates of population growth and the likely relations between feasible increase in per capita income and the fulfillment of the expectations of the people for better lives and more abundant living.

Since summary is impossible, three of the recurrent conclusions in country studies and general analyses may be stated in somewhat too categorical a form. 1. The basic problems in securing rising per capita income are social and cultural rather than directly economic. 2. The essential course to economic development in the agrarian Asian countries lies in increasing agricultural productivity, and then utilizing the rising product from agriculture to sustain industrial growth. The case of Japan is examined in some detail as indicating the feasibility of economic growth in the Far Eastern setting if the path is followed. 3. The pressures of populations create tensions and expansionist activities among those nations that have the pow



pand into the territories of their neighbors. 4. "In the long run . . . the only sure relief for population pressure and the tensions and troubles it creates is population control" (p. 399).

The title, *Population and Progress in the Far East,* suggests that Warren Thompson's views of the prospects for the Asian countries are optimistic. On the contrary, there is deep pessimism concerning the next few decades. The probabilities for the development of adequate food supplies are not encouraging, and economic developments will not be rapid enough to prevent increased feelings of population pressure. Emigration on a sufficient scale is not possible. Dependence on foreign trade cannot ease population pressures, and it is economically and politically precarious. The control of population is essential, but not even India is making the major efforts essential to the reduction of birth rates. Thus the broad conclusions are somber. Over the next generations, limitations to expansion in production and continuity or quickening in population growth are likely to bar much improvement in living conditions. Felt population pressures are likely to increase significantly.

IRENE B. TAEUBER
Office of Population Research
Princeton University

J. S. FURNIVALL. *The Governance of Modern Burma.* Pp. iv, 132. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959. $2.50.

Students of postwar Southeast Asia will welcome Mr. Furnivall's thoughtful comments on the structure and functioning of Burma's government. The introductory chapter covering background considerations includes a cursory description of British colonial administration, the effects of the Japanese interregnum, and problems attending temporary postwar British control and eventual transfer of power to Burma's Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) leadership. This is followed by three detailed chapters describing the central government, local administration, and regional—non-Burman—rule, viewed from both the constitutional and the practical point of view. These four descriptive chapters, written in 1957 and early in 1958, are apologetic in tone, stressing objectives over actuality. Only the Introduction and the concluding post-mortem chapter take into account the debacle of the AFPFL regime down to September 1958.

Mr. Furnivall stresses the inherent contradictions between Burma's parliamentary and liberal aspirations, its bureaucratic tradition inherited from colonial times, and the concern of postwar leaders to achieve a welfare state limiting individual initiative and utilizing state capitalism as the means of economic development. These conflicting objectives were to be realized, furthermore, in a state ruined economically by the war and plagued by continuing disorder, and by youthful leadership lacking in both administrative and business experience. While conceding the basic validity of Mr. Furnivall's analysis of the problem, the account is vulnerable to criticism not only from its consistently apologetic tone but occasionally on grounds of inaccuracy. It is questionable whether "frozen commercial interests" held the balance of legislative power from 1937 to 1941, whether Dr. Ba Maw's wartime regime exercised real administrative initiative, or that all British military men—not to mention Governor Dorman-Smith—respected General Cueng San in 1945. More surprising is the author's characterization as "more democratic and efficient" the completely ineffective, party-dominated pyramiding of local councils, soviets, initiated in 1953, which threatened to destroy the entire traditional administrative structure.

The final chapter explaining the breakup of the AFPFL government from May to September 1958, is written in a mood of sadness reflecting the author's dedicated concern for the well-being of Burma and her people. Here he deals with political realities—personal feuding and distrust, competition between mass organization factions, the lack of genuine authority in Premier Nu's government—all of which were eagerly ignored in the preceding chapters. Not explained are Nu's initial concern to deprive his Socialist party oppo-

nents of their control over the Union Military Police, and the role played by this same body in precipitating the regular army's take over in late September 1958. Incidentally U Kyaw Dun's name is consistently misspelled. Another omission is Nu's desperate effort to maintain a parliamentary majority that involved making sweeping promises to dissident Arahanese and Mous, the release of Communist M.P.s from jail, and, finally, political partnership with the pro-Communist National Unity Front. The account is a most welcome contribution to recent history, but it is hardly the last word on the debacle of the AFPFL coalition government.

JOHN F. CADY
Professor of History
Ohio University

ANDREW COHEN. *British Policy in Changing Africa.* (Northwestern University African Studies, No. II.) Pp. x, 116. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1959. $4.50.

Sir Andrew Cohen deserves a good share of the credit for the relatively smooth transfer of power from Britain to Ghana. He was also behind the scenes in the Colonial Office at the time of the conception of the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Before assuming his present role as British representative on the United Nations Trusteeship Council, Sir Andrew was Governor of Uganda through a period of social and economic advance as well as political turmoil.

Men most qualified to speak are often the most reticent. Sir Andrew is not timid by nature or deed. He rejects the Marxian interpretation of inevitable exploitation by all colonial powers. While criticizing Americans for oversimplified attacks on colonialism, he admits frankly that British policy in Africa has grossly underestimated the time available before self-government. Now it becomes clear that the time is too short for indirect rule through chiefs to evolve easily into a democratic pattern. African nationalism is more urban than assumed by British policy. The pattern has been to build carefully a firm foundation. Often this is done by first resurrecting traditional institutions as supports, and then, under the threat of storm clouds, hastily to put on the roof. No wonder some of the resulting structures are held up primarily by military power as in the Sudan.

Sir Andrew is most cogent in discussing the development of almost wholly African countries. His omission of British policy in Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland may reflect a lack of solutions for parts of Africa where policy must penetrate hide-bound Europeans, or the inadvisability of making such policy explicit in lectures, such as these for the Northwestern University African Studies Program.

Sir Andrew wisely concludes that the United States and Britain "have a cooperative job to do. To do it successfully we need to understand each other and the nature of the job." This handsomely produced book is an excellent contribution toward that goal, and one for which the Northwestern African Studies Program is to be congratulated.

EDWIN S. MUNGER
African Associate
American Universities Field Staff
Kampala, Uganda

PIERRE MONTET. *Everyday Life in Egypt in the Days of Ramesses the Great.* Translated by A. R. Maxwell-Hyslop and Margaret S. Drower. Pp. xvi, 365. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959. $8.00.

Professor Montet, who is a respected authority in Egyptology, has given us, in this volume, a summary of the home and family life of the common man, the aristocrat and the pharaoh, as well as their environment in the city and country; he comments on the calendar and time awareness, the travelling facilities, the attitude of the Egyptian toward the foreigner, the hardships he suffered in the desert, mining in the mountains, and on the sea. Then follows a description of the pharaoh's daily schedule in affairs of state and religion, his occupations and diversions, the intrigues of harem and palace. The most complete survey is devoted to the soldier of the army and an account of his equipment, climaxed by an excellent description of the battle of Quadesh. After a review of the government and its officials, the book comes appropriately to an end with the story of religious festivals and the rites of burial. The work is furnished with excellent References, a Glossary, Abbreviations, and a general Bibliography.

First and foremost, the general reader will find a bone of contention in the title of the book: the author, drawing heavily, as he must, on the earlier periods of Egyptian history, could easily have included in his title the whole panorama of daily life from the first dynasty to the Ptolemies. Granted that many changes were made in cultural expression from the first to the nineteenth dynasty, the common denominator was more constant on the Nile than in any other ancient civilization. The most obvious lacuna is the omission of spinning and weaving, and we know the Egyptian was more than proud of his linen fabrics; no mention is made of the manufacture of glass, which was such a delight to Breasted; very little is said about the craft of the sculptor and nothing about the painter's work on the walls of tombs. The crowns of the pharaoh are confused (p. 198), and business life, I'm sure, was not always "a very laborious affair" (p. 168).

Professor Montet has, however, woven together an interesting pattern of pictures from literature, art, inscriptions, and tools. He is evidently a scholar whose imagination reaches beyond pedantic cataloging and enumerating; though some authorities would lift a quizzical eyebrow, why should he not state, if he has some reason for so doing, that Ramesses II was the oppressor of Israel (p. 161), and that he knows the approximate location of Punt (p. 183)? He adds some interesting information from his own area of work, for example, the roofing and the viticulture of the north. The book will, beyond a doubt, make stimulating reading for the student approaching the rich heritage of Egypt for the first time.

ELMER G. SUHR
Professor of Art and Archaeology
University of Rochester



## *SOCIOLOGY AND EDUCATION*

C. WRIGHT MILLS. *The Sociological Imagination.* Pp. 234. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. $6.00.

Social scientists tend to define themselves as members of one of three loosely related clans pursuing quite diverse occupational goals and *modus operandi:* the Pure Scientists, the Actionists, and those who seek Significance. The epistemology of the Pure Scientist is extracted from the logic of experimental inquiry; his favorite glow word is "empirical" by which he ordinarily means quantitative; his devil-symbol is "arm-chair philosophizing"; and his chief conceit is that in contrast to the "tender-minded" who seem always to be babbling about value problems he himself is quite above any such untidy preoccupation with moral issues. The Actionists and the school of Significance, on the other hand, are alike in their willingness to subordinate considerations of austere conceptual clarity and methodological nicety to the demands of an agonized social conscience. But where the Actionists are content to dwell in a finite world in which as middlemen of the mind they translate the knowledge of the social sciences for the benefit of social work the more ambitious votaries of Significance serve as liaison men between social science and social philosophy. The Actionist "solves problems"—he deals with the maladjusted child, the alcoholic, the employee with poor morale. The man of Significance "illuminates issues"—he deals with freedom, alienation, crisis.

*The Sociological Imagination* is essentially a polemic in which a gifted and prolific advocate presents the case for Significance. Mills believes that social scientists have the obligation to illuminate the nature of private troubles and public issues confronting contemporary men. Many of these arise as a consequence of the altered conditions of social control in our time. Power structures become increasingly difficult to locate, let alone control, and the emergence of the Cheerful Robot testifies that although we have become progressively more rational, that is to say bureaucratized, we are scarcely more free. Responsible

social science, then, entails specifying the conditions under which freedom and reason are possible.

A task of this magnitude can be performed only by possessors of the "sociological imagination," those who conceive their task to be the extension of the classic traditions of fruitful sociological inquiry. According to Mills, "biography, history, and their intersections within social structures" should always provide the "coordinate points of the proper study of man." The major requirement, then, for productive enterprise in social science is that the individual scholar shall be endowed with a mind sufficiently sensitized by erudition, subtlety, and moral urgency to permit him to range freely across all levels of analysis in order that he may comprehend finally not only the concrete facts of individuality and immediate milieu but also social organization in its largest meaningful units and time measured in epochs.

Most of Mills' book is a spirited and incisive demonstration of the delinquencies of contemporary social science as measured by the standard of the "sociological imagination." The chief villains turn out to be protagonists of "grand theory" and "abstracted empiricism," standard bearers of what I have called the Pure Scientists, and also those social scientists, the Actionists, who wrestle with segmental problems or act as philosophers for the kings of power. Along the way Mills has some jolly fun with parsonian prose, the microcosmic view of the operationists, and with scarcely concealed relish identifies some bureaucratic types whose resemblance to live sociologists is most assuredly intentional. His most trenchant critique is reserved for the Pure Scientists: "A conception is an idea with empirical content. If the idea is too large for the content, you are tending toward the trap of grand theory; if the content swallows the idea, you are tending toward the pitfall of abstracted empiricism."

The nonprofessional who is witness to the fiery rhetoric of the schools might well conclude that they deny each other any intellectual merit whatsoever. He would be mistaken. Even the most orthodox Pure Scientist can be beguiled into an admission that Reisman and Mills have "germinal minds and their work while not really science is often useful for hypothesis formation." For their part, the Big Issue sociologists will concede that the man who stands, clicker in hand, at the Mason-Dixon line, counting migrants "while not engaged in genuinely scientific activity does perform a certain housekeeping function." In effect, much of the heat generated by the disputants depends on counterclaims concerning who more legitimately has the right to speak in the name of a single honorific symbol, science. But surely this is a matter of surpassing triviality unworthy of the detailed attention of serious men.

Perhaps we would do better to think in terms of the common device of popularized general semantics and employ subscripts to distinguish between various types of social science. We might then be more generous in providing both adequate opportunity for graduate training and also for subsequent equal reward in the coin of the scientific and secular realm for able practitioners in all types of social analysis. Grand theory, abstracted empiricism on a large scale, and the emergence of actionists in assorted bureaucracies are largely of post-World War II origin—only classic analysis has been given an extended trial. I do not believe that it is too innocently nineteenth century to proclaim that at present our major obligation is to find the appropriate administrative arrangements which would allow all tendencies in social science to compete in the marketplace of ideas. Is it naive to require professors to reject the ethos of bureaucratic thrust and counterthrust in favor of the liberal standards of the academy?

MARVIN BRESSLER
Associate Professor of Sociology
New York University

ROBERT K. MERTON, LEONARD BROOM, and LEONARD S. COTTRELL, JR. (Eds.). *Sociology Today: Problems and Prospects.* Pp. xxxiv, 623. New York: Basic Books, 1959. $7.50.

In planning the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society for 1957, the program committee decided to build the sessions around a review of the present state and trends of sociology. To the chairman of each section was assigned the task of providing a paper focussing upon the work of a major subdivision or aspect of developments in the field. After the critical discussions of the section sessions, those papers were to be revised and sharpened for publication in a single volume to serve as something of a baseline for an appraisal of developments and problems of sociology. The result is *Sociology Today*, edited by the president of the Society and the editors of the two journals published by the Society.

This is a volume which, short of available space for a critical appraisal of each unit contribution, is most adequately reviewed by the simple statement of its purpose amplified by a list of its distinguished contributors. Each of them is recognized as a representative of a major area of specialization. The fact that more than 10,000 copies were purchased in the first few months following its release is one measure of its usefulness to everyone who wants to know what sociology in America is doing.

In a volume which brings together the work of twenty-nine authors, there is an impressively high standard of performance. The editors have wisely avoided any attempt to present the separate unit studies in anything but an expedient order. They have grouped the items included under five headings: 1. Problems of Sociological Theory and Methodology; 2. Problems in the Sociology of Institutions; 3. The Group and the Person; 4. Problems in Demography and Social Structure; and 5. Selected Applications of Sociology. Despite the misleading impression of a potpourri or encyclopedic coverage, the fact is that these studies do demonstrate, not in their sequence as chapters, but in their problemization with all its range and conceptual variability, the unity of an enterprise. With his felicitous clarity, Robert Merton has provided a unifying orientation to what may seem a bewildering array of specialties in a reference on the formulation of problems. The fact remains, however, that the manifest unity is in the way the parts gear into one another as a field. Here is no overweighted emphasis upon methodology, even where the tools and the skills of the research technician are a major concern. Qualitative studies set the pace along with the quantitative studies. One finds recurrent assignment of priority to the need for theory and its more adequate formulation. One of the values of this as a synopsis of a field is its faithful mirroring of the vigorous state of probing and growth, with all of its unevenness of conceptualization and the level of problemization.

Finally, it is worth underscoring that *Sociology Today* is not merely a report or a series of reports on the record. At least eight of the twenty-five chapters interpreted the assignment so flexibly that the subject matter is substantial material not previously reported. Even the other two-thirds of the chapters deal not only with the state of the specialty but appraisal and trend projection. The volume will be a much-used resource for the sociologist. For others who want to keep abreast of the field, it will serve as a guide to forthcoming developments in theory, research, methodology, and the sharpening specializations of sociology.

WELLMAN J. WARNER
Professor and Chairman, Department
of Sociology and Anthropology
New York University

FLOYD HUNTER. *Top Leadership, U.S.A.* Pp. xvi, 268. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959. $6.00.

Readers with any interest in the topic of leadership—or knowledge of the mountainous and often banal literature on the subject—will welcome this fresh focus on persons and groups who color and influence issues from local to national levels.

Generalizing from data collected on transcontinental shuttles, Professor Hunter embraces in *Top Leadership, U.S.A.* all grades and levels of policy and decision makers who form the multiple and interlinked power pyramids essential for winning social goals.

His thesis is that powerful individuals "willing that things be done or not done" must unite with other similar persons to achieve their socially allowed objectives. In the process a small group of peers—

not an oligarchical conspiracy—unofficially has its will and purpose carried out by the many who defer to it. Similar interconnected structures are shown operating at community, state, and national levels, as well as in a specific industry such as housing, on specific issues, and in corporations. The essential cement inside and between structures, as well as from level to level, is informal and personal contact. Power in action becomes a "fan-out affair" wherever initiated. In the community, a circuit of more influential persons—policy shapers, opinion leaders, decision makers, and so forth—represent the largest industries, banks, law firms, commercial houses, and newspapers. As a nuclear group they call in politicians, educators, clergymen, and labor leaders for conferences on community issues. Since there are revolving committees of leaders linked with other similar clusters, the community's policy making structure is a multiple, not single, pyramid of power.

Top leaders in communities, states, regions, service organizations, and industrial complexes come to know and assess each other and to engage in joint actions on the basis of individual fitness, interest, and recognition of a claims system in which all function. But where Hunter implies absence of collusion and corruption in the actions of his informants and subjects (pp. 157–158, 213), this reviewer would suspect varying degrees of calculation and improbity that are checked by more responsible members.

The central finding is that "leadership" cannot be pinned down to the formal operations of offices and organizations. A gap exists between planned and working action, as well as between our tradition of equality among individuals and their influence in practice.

Most specialists will be pleased with Hunter's detailed enumeration of steps in the research, effective use of sociograms and informants' comments, and his ranking of leaders by occupation.

MELVILLE DALTON
Associate Professor
Department of Anthropology
and Sociology
University of California, Los Angeles

WILLIAM MCCORD and JOAN MCCORD with IRVING KENNETH ZOLA. *Origins of Crime: A New Evaluation of the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study.* Pp. xvi, 219. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. $6.00.

One of the largest experimental attempts to prevent juvenile delinquency—the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study, 1939–1945—treated by various kinds of counselling 325 boys matched with 325 untreated boys. The now famous results of the experiment were discouraging: no significant differences were found to exist in major areas of adjustment among the treated boys compared with their controls.

The McCords' book reports their findings in an analysis of data contained in the files of the study, with reference to further criminal behavior which occurred between 1945 and 1955 among an attenuated group of 253 treated boys. Convictions in Massachusetts courts were used as the criterion of criminality, and they revealed that 41 percent of the treated group and 37 percent of the control group had been convicted of at least one non-traffic offense by 1955. Furthermore, the groups experienced convictions for approximately the same number and kinds of crimes, and a tendency for decreasing criminality at similar rates in similar age categories was observed.

In the book's remaining analyses only the treated youths are considered, since the data obtained from the controls were too scanty. Subjected to detailed statistical scrutiny were treatment factors—intensity and duration, number of counsellors to which each boy was exposed, and so forth, and personal-social factors—intelligence, physical condition, social circumstances, home atmosphere, discipline, parental character and relationships. Types of criminal acts and age at first criminal behavior were also examined in their correlations with personal-social factors.

A general summary of the authors' multitude of findings is that, "the absence of parental affection [makes] a child prone to delinquency," and that, "family conflict, inconsistent discipline, and the influence of parents who themselves rebelled against the standards of society [lead] to crimi-




# THE MAN:
# DAGOBERT D. RUNES



Former director of the Institute for Advanced Education and editor of *Journal of Aesthetics, Philosophic Abstracts,* and *The Modern Thinker,* Dagobert Runes has won international renown as philosopher, scholar, author and lecturer. He is the author of 20 books, including *Twentieth Century Philosophy, On the Nature of Man, Letters to My God,* and *Dictionary of Judaism.*

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— *Orientamenti Pedagogici (Rome)*



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nality." The authors recommend specific treatment measures for specific types of criminals, based on their presumed demonstration of respective etiological processes. Thus, property offenders require attention, recognition, and nonpunitive discipline, while sex criminals need approval and affection. The McCords unfortunately used a highly questionable classification of offenses: included within property crimes were illegal possession of firearms, vagrancy, violation of game laws, and nonsupport. Crimes against the person included armed robbery but excluded rape and abuse of female children. Sex crimes included illegitimacy.

While the authors deserve credit for their very informative follow-up on the boys' later criminal careers, the study contains at least one serious weakness. The McCords' method of analysis was to determine, for each factor-category, the rates of conviction of boys classified within its subcategories, and then to test the statistical significance of the distribution. But where intercorrelations between factors exist—and common sense indicates many in this study—then a presumed finding of a relationship between a factor and a particular conviction rate may be spurious. Techniques exist for grouping variables to minimize this difficulty, but the authors used them in only a few of their many computations. Consequently, their conclusions and recommendations for preventing delinquency must be regarded skeptically.

RALPH W. ENGLAND, JR.
Assistant Professor of Sociology
University of Illinois

MORRIS JANOWITZ. *Sociology and the Military Establishment*. Pp. 112. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1959. $1.50.

In this report, published for the American Sociological Society, the author briefly reviews the surprisingly limited sociological literature on the American military establishment. He devotes the bulk of his study to a description of the basic trends which are transforming military institutions in the United States.

Janowitz first outlines some parallels and contrasts between military and civilian variants of bureaucratic organization. Several fresh insights are offered. For example, the author points out that the current militarizing of American society entails to some extent the civilianizing of the military establishment. He also explores the increasing complexity of the military skill structure and its relation to the class structure of modern society. This relationship is compared with that prevailing in feudal society.

We can mention only a few of the other findings of this report. Technical specialization, in the army as in modern industrial society, has made for an increasing proportion of middle-rank personnel. Co-ordination of specialties rather than orders to inferiors has become a major part of the military commander's job. Indeed, the complexities of the new technical skills tend to clash with the traditional hierarchies of military authority. More initiative must be granted to individuals and to small local units—and therefore more awareness of the operation and aims of the whole organization must be conveyed to individual members by better training methods.

A trend from nomination to manipulation, says Janowitz, characterizes military as well as civilian bureaucracies.

A chapter on the assimilation of military roles identifies the barriers and incentives to recruitment. Conventional methods of testing personnel for military leadership come in for sharp criticism. Another chapter deals with the significance of small groups for military organizations, and with the responses of such groups to stress.

*Sociology and the Military Establishment* sketches some important social changes in modern military machines. It is a well-written report, with many stimulating insights. In such a short work, omissions of relevant material are inevitable. Perhaps the chief shortcoming of the bulletin is its failure to grasp the present historical situation of American society. The militarizing of American society can scarcely be analyzed comprehensively without considering the specific relations of American capitalism to war and to the social revolutions abroad. Nonetheless, Janowitz approaches his subject critically and independently. Many of the sociological studies he cites, however, indicate an un-

fortunate tendency on the part of social scientists to become technicians—efficiency experts—uncritically serving the military ends of American national policy.

ARTHUR K. DAVIS
Chief Research Officer
Center for Community Studies
University of Saskatchewan

MELFORD E. SPIRO with the assistance of AUDREY G. SPIRO. *Children of the Kibbutz.* Pp. xix, 500. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958. $10.00.

The *Kibbutz* (in the plural, *Kibbutzim*), a voluntary, collectivist, socialistic, primarily agrarian settlement in Israel, presents a most interesting phenomenon in the global march towards the welfare state. The *Kibbutz* was born out of the realities of the upbuilding of the Jewish national home, of the dreams of Tolstoyan self-labor, socialism, and the Jewish tradition of social justice. It became a powerful mainstay of the Jewish community in Palestine under the British mandate and a most important factor in the achievement of Israel's independence and its defense.

The *Kibbutz* also offers proof of the feasibility of voluntary collectivist forms of living in contrast to the cruel, forced communist collectivization. The *Kibbutzim* are organized in several groupings differing in their political and political-religious ideologies. However, there is much latitude in experimentation in the individual settlements.

Child rearing in the *Kibbutz* has been a fascinating subject for research, particularly in the psychiatrically-oriented disciplines. Its radical breakaway from the norms of both the Western and the traditional Jewish cultures, the latter in its various stages of westernization, has been manifested most drastically in the far-reaching replacement of the parents' role by that of nurses and educators, the application of psychiatric theories in child rearing, including, for instance, attempts to circumvent the oedipus complex, an accepted dogma in many circles, and in other ways. All these have elicited the attention of scholars in Israel and abroad.

The weighty study by Dr. Spiro, a Freudian American anthropologist, follows his earlier work, *Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia* (Harvard University Press, 1956). Its locale is a village belonging to the Hashomer Hatzair movement, an idealistic Mapam pioneer group, puritanic in its addiction to an outdated synthesis of Orthodox Freudianism and Marxism.

In their pioneering stages, the *Kibbutzim* have always had to struggle against terrific odds, greater than those faced by the Hutterites and similar groups in America. Israel is surrounded by neighbors who intend to exterminate the Jews. The *Kibbutzim* usually occupy the front line in a country where the front is almost everywhere. They have suffered from attacks and warfare. They have faced and continue to face physical dangers, difficulties in the absorption of newcomers, lack of manpower of nurses and teachers, intermittent ideological disputes, and the ever present lure of the cities. Thus the *Kibbutz* has never been a really sheltered laboratory.

Spiro's study which covers the entire span of education from the nursery to the emergence of the young adult member of the *Kibbutz* not only offers a detailed description and critical analysis of a child-centered culture, but also constitutes an important contribution to general education. It is most regrettable that space does not permit me to summarize it more adequately, particularly since it is based on close and minute observation on the spot.

*Kibbutz* education is basically institutional upbringing. The infant is separated from its mother upon birth. Although she feeds it and together with the father plays with it regularly, the infant's true home is the play pen or dormitory, and its peers constitute its extended family, just as the *Kibbutz* is that of the adults. The basis for this arrangement is ideological as well as economic. This does not imply absence of parental love. It is quite possible that upper class American children may receive less evidence of parental love, and children of working mothers less attention. It would seem, according to various studies, that *Kibbutz* children appear to be retarded until the age of six, with ensuing psychic disturbances. Later, such manifestations are overcome.



The reader is apt to feel that *Kibbutz* education presents too many difficulties. The study reveals, for instance, that it leads to introversion, insecurity, aggression, sometimes expressed in insolence. The *Kibbutz*-raised *Sabra,* the native Israeli Jew, is conservative in his sex attitudes. After brief pre-marital sex experiences, he marries young and stays married. He accepts the *Kibbutz* as his way of life without the ideological enthusiasm of his parents, and not without ambivalence about its opportunities and limitations. He prefers physical work as a duty and avoids professions. He is relatively indifferent to politics. Despite his aversion to religion, he insists on a religious marriage ceremony. Like many other *Sabras,* he shows little interest in the Jews outside of Israel.

The product of *Kibbutz* education is a co-operative man, who is very devoted to his family, his settlement, and his people, and who takes his obligations seriously. His heroism in pioneering and on the battle front is well proven. No data are available to permit comparison with young people raised in other *Kibbutzim* and societies. Regrettably, the number of young adults studied is insufficient to arrive at definite conclusions.

Hashomer Hatzair, in my opinion, is more rigid in its ideology and its culture patterns than other groupings. This may account in part for the manifestations shown. The less dogmatic *Kibbutzim* seem to have solved the problem of child education in better ways.

For better or worse, the *Kibbutz* continues to be the most important effort at social living that represents voluntary collectivism. Fortunately, *Kibbutz* educators are most touchy on the subject of their children and generally accept criticism by experts. It is to be hoped that the points raised by Spiro will be taken into consideration by the educators. Until we have more comparative data, the final verdict over *Kibbutz* education cannot as yet be passed.

ABRAHAM G. DUKER
President and Professor of Social Studies
College of Jewish Studies
Chicago

RASHI FEIN. *Economics of Mental Illness.* (Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health, Monograph Series No. 2.) Pp. xx, 164. New York: Basic Books, 1958. $3.00.

Most psychiatrists are too busy trying to help their patients to pay attention to the costs of mental illness. A few hospital administrators are only too well aware of the cost because of their chronically inadequate budgets. This small but excellent book will direct attention to this problem and help to explain budget insufficiencies. In this study for the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health, Dr. Fein first details the tremendous cost of mental illness—3,000,000,000 dollars every year when both direct expenditures and indirect losses are accounted for. Yet even this huge figure omits some large items, particularly the costs of such neurosis, personality disorder, and behavior disorder in children which never require hospital care, and the costs of increasing quantities of medications taken by millions throughout the country. He delineates methods by which he arrives at his conclusions so that others may repeat his estimates, or refine them. His is as much a study in methodology as in statistical findings. From this point of view alone it is invaluable. In addition, he makes observations on the effects of population growth and increased longevity, and on the small amounts spent for research.

In a book of this size the author could not cover the whole of his subject. We would like to know the facts and his opinion regarding such matters as the place of insurance and union fringe benefits in the economics of mental illness. If Blue Cross, private health insurance, group policies and union benefits covered mental illness to the extent that they do most physical illness, the cost would be the same, but burdens on government agencies and on the taxpayer would be much less, and the effect on the sufferer and his family less catastrophic. With less expenditures needed for the direct care of the mentally ill, more money would be available for research. In Europe, notably in Britain and in Switzerland, some mental patients are able to earn part of their way by industrial work

carried on in the state hospital premises. This may be possible in the United States, during times of full employment, with the co-operation of industry and unions. In these and other ways creative thought and experimentation can add further chapters to this important subject to whose study Dr. Fein's work has given such a useful impetus.

ROBERT A. CLARK, M.D.
Director of Resident Training
Friends Hospital
Philadelphia

JACOBUS TENBROEK and FLOYD W. MATSON. *Hope Deferred: Public Welfare and the Blind.* Pp. 272. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. $5.00.

While the authors have given a lucid review of legislation beneficial to blind persons and have emphasized what they consider the violation of the Social Security Act, as administratively interpreted by the Social Security Board, the book, as a whole, is marked by the strong prejudice of the authors in stating and defending their conception of the discriminated-against blind.

A book such as this must stand or fall on the validity of its basic premise. Can proof be established by listing thirteen or 130 current examples of shocking discrimination against blind persons on the part of the public when thousands of examples of the exact contrary could be produced? Can the attitudes of prominent authorities and spokesmen in the field of welfare of the blind be quoted in evidence that even such leaders do not accept the "normality, ability and adaptability of the blind population" when the quotations are from writings over a quarter of a century old or are lifted completely out of context and plainly at variance to everything else the quoted person has written?

It is regrettable that the authors throughout the book generalize about "the blind," who have little if anything in common except varying degrees of loss of vision. Nowhere are we reminded that according to the latest estimates obtainable from National Society for the Prevention of Blindness 52 per cent of the blind persons in the United States are age 65 or over, about 85 per cent of these being 70 and over, and about 75 per cent being 75 and over. Are we to assume that these are all "normal, able, adaptable" and healthy and should be employed, even if they are not, in competitive occupations? How many had retired before they became blind?

The chapter on vocational rehabilitation is somewhat out of date—1954—and certainly gives no recognition of the very substantial achievements of many states, notably, New York State, where the Vocational Rehabilitation Service for the Blind (V.R.S) contracts with private agencies for most of the psychological testing, counseling, vocational rehabilitation, and placements.

The so-called "sheltered workshops" are roundly condemned either as an agency for vocational rehabilitation for normal competitive employment or as a place of terminal employment for the severely handicapped deemed incapable of restoration to normal livelihood. Little evidence is offered to support such sweeping charges, even if true. The "oases" which brilliantly demonstrate what a modern factory for blind employees can do are not mentioned. One factory for blind workers paid in 1958, not including nine fringe benefits, annual wages ranging from $2,180 to $5,770, with 47 out of 165 blind employees earning over $2,700. The authors state the average annual earnings of workers in National Institute of the Blind sheltered workshops in 1953 as $1,100. In 1958 the average hourly wage was $1.02.

On the whole, the creditable goal to improve public understanding of and opportunity for the blind has carried the authors too far from the actualities of present-day facts, thinking, or behavior. That we are far from the millennium, however, none would deny.

PHILIP S. PLATT
Madison, Connecticut

HARRY ECKSTEIN. *The English Health Service: Its Origins, Structure, and Achievements.* (Harvard Political Studies.) Pp. xxi, 289. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press under the direction of the Department of Government, 1958. $5.50.



This book by a professor of government at Harvard is a study of the development, structure, and achievements of the English Health Service. It deals mainly with the development and establishment of the Service, including a description of medical services prior to the war, the effect of the war upon them, the gradual growth of a view that after the war a substantial revision of the country's health services was needed; the development of plans of the Coalition government and of the Labor Party for the Service, and the role of the British Medical Association and the leaders of the profession. All of this takes three fifths of the book, leaving only 100 pages for a description of the Service and an appraisal of its operation and achievements.

Professor Eckstein finds that the coming of the Service was due to many factors. He is at pains to point out that the primary factor was not unmet medical needs of the lower classes; more important, in his view, was that the whole complex of existing arrangements had reached an impasse. They were not satisfying the upper, middle, or lower classes, nor the medical profession; the voluntary hospitals were bankrupt; the absurdity of the complete lack of co-ordination between the voluntary and public hospitals had become clear. The existing system was simply incapable of bringing the potentialities of modern medicine to meet the needs of the people.

The author bestows praise very stintingly in his appraisal of the accomplishments of the Service. "Some real progress has been made towards achieving its objectives." "It has improved many things and made nothing appreciably worse." Eckstein thinks it not too important that the Service makes available to all, free of charge or close to it, comprehensive medical care. To this reviewer that seems an important accomplishment, but Eckstein argues that, in general, medical care was available to all prior to the inception of the Service. He feels that the quantity and quality of the services now available are not much different than before. I think some of these conclusions are arguable. The unexpected great demands for dental care and eyeglasses under the Service would seem to indicate that previous needs were not being met. Eckstein says that one of the accomplishments of the Service is a better distribution of physicians which would in itself indicate that areas formerly remote from medical care are now better served.

Eckstein holds that the cost of the Service has been quite moderate. The English expend a smaller percentage of the gross national product for maintenance of the Service than we expend for health services. Owing to other urgent demands upon the economy, there has been virtually no construction of new hospitals since the beginning of World War II. However there has been considerable refurbishing of old hospitals. He feels that it is time for the Service to go on a "spending spree."

It is obvious to Eckstein that the National Health Service has yet to be completed. The position of the general practitioner, isolated from hospitals and specialists, is unsatisfactory. There need to be closer co-ordination or integration among the Regional Hospital Boards, the Boards of the teaching hospitals, the executive councils which administer the general practitioner service, and the local health authorities which administer the other health services.

On the whole this is an interesting and useful book on the English Health Service. It is a competent and unbiased study. It will be of special interest to those concerned with a rational, effective organization of our own health services.

LOUIS S. REED
Associate Professor of Medical Economics
Sloan Institute of Hospital Administration
Cornell University

HOWARD H. QUINT. *Profile in Black and White: A Frank Portrait of South Carolina.* Pp. vii, 214. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959. $4.50.

This is an interesting, accurate, and readable account of how South Carolina has

reacted to the 1954 decision of the Supreme Court regarding school desegregation. It is not pleasant reading. It reports the bitter editorials, the violent speeches of politicians, and the intense antipathies of white citizens in all walks of life. It relates the activities of numerous organizations which have arisen for the purpose of preserving white supremacy and of thwarting the Negro's efforts to improve his status—the Ku Klux Klan, the States Rights League, the National Association for the Advancement of White People, the Grass Roots League, the Federation of Constitutional Government, and the White Citizens Councils.

While the book is focused on South Carolina, it is in effect a study of the Deep South, for the same sentiments, organizations, and activities recounted here are characteristic of other southern states. It reveals the lengths to which whites are prepared to go in their determination to maintain their caste system.

The principal sources used were five South Carolina newspapers. The Charleston *News and Courier* reflects the sentiments of the most extreme segregationists. The Florence *Morning News* was, until its editor was forced to resign, an advocate of "militant moderation." The Columbia *State* and the Columbia *Record*, while conservative, are less extreme than the *News and Courier*. Finally, the Anderson *Independent*, though no supporter of integration, is loyal to the national Democratic party and devotes less attention to the race issue. These sources were well chosen, for they represent a cross section of the state's press, both geographically and ideologically.

The author is a native of Connecticut and for eleven years was on the faculty of the University of South Carolina. Because he believed that this book should be published, but did not wish to cause embarrassment to the University, he resigned his poisition prior to publication.

The book arrives at three main conclusions: (1) South Carolina has not yet embraced democracy "as the term is generally defined by Americans outside the South." (2) Many South Carolinians accept a racism which "approaches that of Hitler and the Nazis." (3) Not a few of the arguments of the segregationists are illogical and riddled with inconsistencies.

The author is very careful with his facts, and what he has to say is well documented. However, his own position is not an impartial one, and he makes no pretense at writing an "objective" history. He frankly states that he regards the abolition of racial segregation as desirable, that Southerners are fighting "the tide of history," and that the Negro's efforts to end segregation will be successful. However commendable and true these convictions may be, the author's commitment to them is such that his book partakes more of a polemic than of "a frank portrait of South Carolina." This reviewer is also of the opinion that the author overestimates the North's enthusiasm for democracy and integration. Since he, however, like the author of this book, is also committed to these values, he rejoices that this book has been written, and hopes that it will reach a large audience.

BREWTON BERRY
Professor of Sociology and
Anthropology
Ohio State University

H. HARRY GILES. *The Integrated Classroom*. Pp. xii, 338. New York: Basic Books, 1959. $5.00.

Teachers and school administrators faced with problems of integrating minority and majority group children into their schools should find this book very useful. The book has three parts: 1. A description of the conflict between majority and minorities as it exists in the schools today, particularly in view of the Supreme Court 1954 decision declaring forced segregation illegal. 2. An analysis of the sources of the conflict in American ideals, in hereditary and socially learned differences and in attitudes. 3. A list of procedures and teaching aids suggested as tools for reducing the problem.

The first part of the book is valuable especially for its comparison between school systems that have integrated successfully and those that have resisted integration. Points of view recorded are those of the Supreme Court, the resisters, the minority group leadership, and the children involved in integration. In addition to using popular and scholarly sources of information, the author has gathered statements from children regarding their own experiences and attitudes and what their parents have told them, and from teachers and school administrators regarding their problems and experiences with integration.

The analysis of the problem in the second part of the book is so superficial as to be misleading if the teacher were to rely primarily on it. The author would have done better merely to outline the sources for an analysis rather than to attempt to provide the analysis itself in so brief a space. In some eighty pages, the author attempts to provide a history of American minority problems, an analysis of American ideology, the anthropology of race and the social psychology of racism, a statement of Negro goals, the research on the consequences of prejudice and discrimination, the sociology of group relations, psychiatric and other explanations of prejudice—and then he attempts to relate all this to the problem of integrating children in a classroom. Such a hodgepodge will confuse most of his readers even though it contains no specific errors.

If the author is weak on theory, he is strong on practical suggestions. The teaching aids offered range from a general plan for integration to the most specific suggestions for conducting the first day's classes, and from visual aids to techniques for handling grievances. Books, films, recordings, organizations, and other means of getting assistance in the practical problems of integrating a classroom are listed in handy form. This section alone justifies the volume.

ARNOLD M. ROSE
Professor of Sociology
University of Minnesota

HAROLD W. STOKE. *The American College President*. Pp. ix, 180. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959. $3.50.

There are now some 1,800 college and university presidents in the United States. Obviously this number is large enough to constitute a subspecies of *homo academicus*, and this reason alone would justify the recent upsurge of interest in the character and problems of the American college president. Dr. Stoke adds a further justification for his book. It is his thesis that the recent changes in responsibilities of the colleges and universities in this country have forced the president of the college into a new and unique position. Once upon a time he was a scholar or a clergyman, and his administrative tasks took up very little of his time. His primary concern was education, and all the other tasks of his office were secondary to that.

Today the job has become vastly more complex, and Dr. Stoke undertakes to analyze the nature of the job in terms of its various relationships to the faculty, to the students, to the trustees, to the public, and so on.

Dr. Stoke obviously speaks with authority. A former president of the University of New Hampshire and of Louisiana State University, he is now president of Queens College in New York City. He has also served as dean of the Graduate School of the University of Washington and as dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences in New York University. Out of this wealth of experience, and out of wide reading and discussion with other college presidents, he has distilled this analysis of what a modern college president has to do, and what the perils as well as the delights of his job are.

As a new university president, I must say that I think this book should be given to presidents only after they have been inaugurated. For although Dr. Stoke stresses frequently the rewards and satisfactions which a college president gets, actually the great bulk of the book is devoted to the trials and tribulations. College presidents can only pray that this book will have a wide circulation outside of academic circles, in the hope that the general public will understand a bit more clearly the difficulties which constantly confront a college president, and will also come to know why he behaves as he does from time to time.

This book will perhaps also serve to explain to faculties and to students the peculiar position that their president finds himself in. Dr. Stoke shows very clearly the kind of qualities that a faculty would

like to find in the president of their institution, but he also shows why this combination is often almost impossibly difficult.

What Dr. Stoke fails to show in this book is why anyone would ever want to be a college president. The general assumption seems to be that one finds himself in the position, and then looks around him and finds all these besetting difficulties. But surely there must be many college presidents who find themselves in their job not merely because of their desire for status, but rather because of some idealism, possibly doomed to frustration, which makes them feel that in their position they can accomplish some greater good than would be possible in some other position. Such idealism, however, must properly be educational in character, and if, as Dr. Stoke suggests, the president has less and less to do with educational matters per se, then the frustration must be inevitable and occupational.

I may be wrong in detecting an overtone of almost despair in President Stoke's analysis of the subspecies. But if I do detect it, then something is very wrong indeed with the college presidency. The American college is essentially a healthy and vigorous institution, but if its tone is to be set by a president who is constantly plagued by frustrations, then this health and vigor cannot be guaranteed for the future. Dr. Stoke may have well provided an enormous service to American university life by pointing out this danger.

Or possibly it is just that college presidents talk too much to each other.

MASON W. GROSS
President
Rutgers, The State University

KARL JASPERS. *The Idea of the University.* Edited by Karl W. Deutsch, translated by H. A. T. Reiche and H. F. Vanderschmidt. (Seeds-of-Thought Series.) Pp. xxi, 135. Boston: Beacon Press, 1959. $3.75.

This little volume probes deeply into the subject of the higher learning and into the meaning of the university ideal. After dealing with the methods and assumptions of science and the nature of philosophy, the author declared that they do not coincide, that philosophy is not just another science for it differs from science in origin, method, and meaning. While it pervades science and guides it, it is not accessible to its method.

The author touches but lightly on the meaning of culture, defining it as an acquired state, and citing, as examples, the Greek, Roman, and English ideals. The educational values of the liberal arts and the natural sciences, he suggested, are so different as to appear to represent two distinct cultural ideals. Humanism and realism have not yet been joined togther for their mutual enlightenment.

With this introduction, the author proceeds to discuss the objectives of the university and the requisites for its existence.

The university has three functions—"research, transmission of learning, and education to culture." All three are essential; if isolated, the spirit of the university is lost. Teaching is stimulating to research, and, at the same time, vitally needs what research alone can supply. The university cannot achieve these purposes except in the framework of an institution which, in itself, is a standing threat to "the idea of the university."

Political and sociological influences affect the forms of the university but despite the changing forms its integrity is maintained by the timeless ideal of intellectual insight which is dominant though always in danger of being lost. A university's corporate independence and autonomy are assured by its charter and yet it is responsible to the state that charters it. Consequently, the great question is whether society will agree to reserve a place for an understanding which may be beyond its comprehension.

The author's experience in Hitler's Germany makes him keenly conscious of the forces that can destroy the university. He warns that it can serve nations or mankind only "through the medium of intellectual creativity" and that "it suffers when it seeks to serve extraneous purposes." He concluded that "nationalism, like everything else, forms a legitimate topic of research but cannot provide the basic direction of the university itself."

Though the presentation of *The Idea of the University* is somewhat disjointed and its meaning brought out indirectly, reading it heightens one's sense of the crucial importance of the ideal "the lifeblood of higher education," as he termed it, and of the dangers which beset its path. It is an eminently timely and worthwhile contribution to educational thinking. It has a special message for the English-speaking world where, since World War II, the universities have, for the first time in history, become predominantly publicly-supported institutions.

OLIVER C. CARMICHAEL
Consultant to the Fund for the
Advancement of Education
New York City



JOHN A. PERKINS. *Plain Talk from a Campus.* Pp. vii, 195. Newark, Del.: University of Delaware Press, 1959. Distributed by University Publishers, New York. $4.00.

Written by a man of stature, balance, and broad experience in the field of education, this book ranges freely and, for the most part, with a gentle tread through the fields and groves of Academe. Dr. Perkins, President of the University of Delaware for the past nine years, seems to be at his most authoritative in speaking of the financial problems and plight of higher education. While recognizing the increasing but still inadequate contribution of corporate industry, he applauds the steps taken by the federal government and urges much more extensive and intensive aid from both state and national treasuries.

On the theme of class versus mass, or education for the élite versus education for all, Dr. Perkins takes a moderate view. He feels that colleges and universities must supply both education for leadership and education for citizenship; they must help our best young minds fulfil their potentialities, and at the same time they must not underestimate or exclude the average.

Another recurring theme evolves from Dr. Perkins' understandable interest in public universities and colleges. He points out on several occasions that public colleges in recent years—since 1953—have enrolled considerably more than half of the total number of students, until in 1958, when 61.3 per cent of all freshmen enrolled in public universities and colleges. The status, the inadequacies, and the hard times ahead for public higher education are competently and authoritatively dealt with.

Finally, Dr. Perkins calls repeatedly throughout the book for single-minded devotion on the part of faculty and students alike to the true goal of education: "Every student who enters a university should have complete commitment and involvement in one great cause—learning" (p. 193). One gets the impression that Dr. Perkins would make short shrift, if he had his way, of such extra-academic activities as football, fraternities, and most of the usual social activities.

This book deserves a wide readership among college and university teachers and administrators; its appeal to the lay public, I am afraid, would be somewhat limited. At best it is wise and gentle, at worst somewhat superficial. It touches on most of the important aspects of higher education today and tomorrow, emphasizing the adjustments that ought to be and have to be made to meet the challenge of tomorrow's tidal wave and yesterday's Sputnik. This is indeed plain and interesting talk from a campus. With a refreshing lack of pompousness, Dr. Perkins sounds somewhat less like a university president than like an educator on his day off.

RANDALL W. HOFFMAN
Dean of Students
Hofstra College

## *ECONOMICS*

THOMAS C. COCHRAN. *The Puerto Rican Businessman: A Study in Cultural Change.* Pp. 198. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959. $5.00.

Professor Cochran has utilized a great deal of valuable information, astute analysis, and meaningful hypotheses in his small book. Following a concise account of "aspects of economic and business growth" from 1898 to 1955, the author confronts his central problem, namely, the effect of

Puerto Rican culture on business enterprise.

Over one hundred Puerto Rican and mainland businessmen were interviewed, representing older leaders, younger entrepreneurs, and a comparative group of United States manufacturers. The questionnaires used appear in an Appendix.

The study revealed how certain Puerto Rican social and cultural features, stemming in part from the Spanish heritage, have impeded economic and business growth as viewed from the mainland standpoint. In particular, Professor Cochran explored such socio-cultural characteristics as the family-centered pattern, the role of *personalismo* in business enterprise, the special Latin American or Spanish type of individualism, and its linkage with the subtle concept of *dignidad*. He found, for example, that the family-centered pattern associated with a stable agricultural society has been carried over into business enterprise only slightly transformed as the family firm.

*Personalismo,* which demands face-to-face contacts between buyer and seller, employer and employee, and so forth, persists in Puerto Rico despite being wholly unsuitable to modern enterprise. *Dignidad* and the special individualism which stress man's uniqueness as an individual in terms of personal inner qualities place extra burdens on the entrepreneur in many crucial ways. These are spelled out in the book.

Professor Cochran sums up his findings as follows: "The Puerto Rican social and cultural heritage has often sacrificed progress for family interests, fostered nepotism, hindered the building up of a supply of professional managers, increased the difficulties of supervising production, reduced interest in new and more efficient technology, lessened the urge for expansion, and made entrepreneurs unwilling to merge in order to gain larger volume and secure essential technical advice" (p. 163).

The fact that the patterns found in Puerto Rico apply widely throughout Latin America as well lends added significance to the author's findings.

The ways and means by which Puerto Rican business practices are being influenced by United States entrepreneurship are also described in detail. Nevertheless, the author maintains judicious restraint in all questions of comparative values between mainland and island patterns. Although he indicates trends toward change throughout the book, Professor Cochran sensibly limits himself to most cautious predictions on the future of Puerto Rican economic and business enterprise. This is an excellent book, one to be recommended without reservations.

MORRIS SIEGEL
Visiting Professor of Anthropology
University of Illinois

JOSEPH DORFMAN. *The Economic Mind in American Civilization,* Vols. IV & V: 1918–1933. Pp. lxxxviii, 776. New York: Viking Press, 1959. $12.50.

This two-volume work concludes a monumental task begun some twenty years ago which has no equal in the whole of economic literature. The first three volumes treat the period from 1606 to 1918. The last two volumes cover the exciting years when changes in the economy were exceeded only by greater changes in economic thinking and in remaking national policy. The years since 1933 Professor Dorfman leaves to future writers.

The pages of these volumes reveal even more strikingly than the earlier ones the economic mind at work in shaping the course of events. The reader will find the familiar names of the best-known economists, politicians, and statesmen and the parts they played, both directly and indirectly, in helping to build both past and present doctrines and policy. The work of less well-known persons, academic or otherwise, social and economic reformers, popular movements, pressure groups—in fact, nearly everyone who had a part in the events of these historic years—claims our attention. A great deal more than a mere history of the economic aspects of the period is presented. The student from any discipline or the average reader will find in these two volumes a comprehensive treatment of the socio-economic events of the fifteen eventful years from 1918 to the New Deal in 1933.

The author has carefully documented the status of traditional doctrines over the



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years and the criticism they evoked. New schools of thought and their exponents, new developments in specialized fields such as labor, monetary theory, foreign trade, agricultural economics, crisis and business cycle theory, depression measures, and many other items get careful treatment.

Care has been taken to avoid repetition of biographic materials presented in the earlier volumes. Frequent reference is therefore made to facts in volume three when needed to supplement the current discussion. The new materials serve to etch the persons firmly in the 1918–1933 setting. The controversial issues and personalities are treated with unusual fairness and objectivity.

The two volumes are divided into two parts; the first part (20 chapters), the Era of Adjustment and Progress, covers the story of the 1920's after the Armistice. Part two (5 chapters) deals with the depression years 1929–1933. The events and the persons who shared in them are vividly described. The reader who remembers the eventful years will relive them; the younger generation of readers will find an excellent account of the travails which beset the economy and of the measures designed either to reverse the trends or to bring semblance of stability. These five chapters contain the best description of the depression known to this reviewer.

The coverage of materials in these volumes is broader than that found in the preceding ones for they contain far more than the basic ideas associated with a history of economic thought. The part played by economists, business men, labor leaders, politicians, pressure groups, the growth of 'isms, the panaceas for social, economic, and political reforms are presented. The thoroughness of the researches and the detail of accurate presentation are results of patient and scholarly research.

The present volumes together with the three earlier ones provide an encyclopedia of American economic materials without peer. They offer far more than the workings of the purely economic aspects of the nation in the given years, but rather a panorama of its culture and growth. Both the successes and the failures of the measures receive attention. There is ample proof that the economy has basic staying powers and that great progress, although costly at times, can be made without major revolutions.

J. F. BELL

Professor of Economics
University of Illinois

CLARENCE SENIOR. *Land Reform and Democracy.* Pp. xiii, 269. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1958. $6.75.

This is a case study of land reform in its relation to democratic achievement. Since it is the author's objective "to lay the basis for an understanding of the principal problems of agrarianism, in so far as its advocates hope to build a new social system in which democratic values and practices are basic," he points up his argument by reference to the agrarian experiment with which he is most familiar—La Laguna in Mexico.

La Laguna is located in a dry lake area of north-central Mexico where the states of Coahuila and Durango adjoin. Although inhabited by seminomadic Indians when the Spaniards first discovered the region in the sixteenth century, Laguna did not achieve its potential until late in the nineteenth century with the coming of European capital and technology which brought water and prosperity to the region. Cotton and wheat were grown on irrigated land which required exploitation on a fairly large scale and with expensive machinery to bring economic success. These holdings were expropriated by decree of President Cárdenas on October 6, 1936, and given to *ejidos* or farm groups in which the land was commonly owned and co-operatively worked.

To say that Dr. Senior is familiar with La Laguna is an understatement, for he is undoubtedly the outstanding authority on the project viewed from the socio-economic angle. According to his own confession, from March 1937—six months after the expropriation—to August 1952, he made periodic visits to the region on twenty-three different occasions. The visits extended from three weeks to six months. For several summers he conducted, under the auspices of the American Friends Service Committee, groups of college students

from the United States who helped the peasants build schools, dig irrigation ditches, erect cotton gins, and so forth.

Dr. Senior's intimate acquaintance with, and comprehensive understanding of the various aspects of the La Laguna experiment are most impressive, and indeed can be accepted in most respects as authoritative. Therefore, if his excellent exposition is liable to criticism it is purely on the basis of omission.

This political scientist is not satisfied with the picture of the La Laguna community, because there is little or no discussion of political action. The region and its inhabitants are fully and ably described from many angles, but not the political. Since the objective of the study is to indicate progress made along the democratic highway, it is surprising that no account was taken of La Laguna representation in the agrarian sector of the Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI), nor of the elector process in local, state, and national campaigns. It is still valid to measure democratic achievement by a political yardstick.

Despite his enthusiasm for the La Laguna project Dr. Senior is critical and restrained in his final judgment. He says, "the building of democracy must extend far beyond the agrarian institutions directly involved and be expressed in structure and functions of all major social institutions if a fundamentally sound democracy is the aim." The shortcomings of La Laguna should warn against future error in agrarian reform.

J. LLOYD MECHAM
Professor of Government
University of Texas

WALTER GALENSON (Ed.). *Labor and Economic Development.* Pp. xiii, 304. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959. $6.75.

The Inter-University Study of Labor Problems in Economic Development has sponsored an impressive collection of research essays on the labor factor in the economic development of five greatly different societies in widely separated parts of the world and in very different stages of industrialization: India, by Charles A. Myers; Japan, by Robert A. Scalapino; Egypt, by Frederick H. Harbison; French West Africa, by Elliot Berg; and the British West Indies by William H. Knowles. Since all five studies necessarily emphasize the particular problems of an individual country or area, the incisive Introduction by the editor, Walter Galenson, rightly concentrates on problems and characteristics common to all five, or at least to some of them.

The editor's introductory summary benefits from the common outline followed by the individual studies. All of them cover, in approximately the same order, (1) the particular cultural, economic, and to a somewhat lesser extent historical and political background of their country or area; (2) the processes and problems accompanying the growth of a labor force committed to industrial employment; (3) the development and characteristics of labor organizations, including their history, structure, and government, leadership, politics, and ideology; (4) the nature and problems of industrial management; and (5) the role of government as the leading force in the economic development process and as the dominant partner in the triangular labor-management-government relationship.

This common framework is yet flexible enough to permit considerable variation in approach and emphasis as necessitated, on the one hand, by the different backgrounds and interests of the contributors and, on the other, by the objective differences in their material. We are dealing after all with one country, Japan, which was never a colony of a European state, one area, French West Africa, which except for the recent change in Guinea is still an overseas territory of France, and three others that attained their independence or self-government from Britain in very recent times. We are also confronted with the already highly industrialized nation of Japan and four others in various early stages of industrialization and with quite different growth potentials. The cultural and historical differences are, if anything, even greater than the economic and political ones.

These real differences need not obscure the less easily perceived similarities so ably summarized in Professor Galenson's introductory chapter. To this summary, which for lack of space cannot even be sketched here, I would add only the observation that all five studies appeared to contain the underlying expectation that under more fortunate circumstances the several trade union movements would, and should, act more like American labor organizations—and that labor-management relations would someday hopefully acquire the proven patterns found in the United States. This is a shortcoming against which comparative research must constantly be on guard.

All five essays are summaries of monographs which have either appeared in book form already (Myers, Harbison) or else are being prepared for separate publication (Scalapino, Berg, Knowles). The present volume will appeal to a wide circle of readers interested in the social and economic aspects of economic development. It is also well fitted for classroom use. The area specialist or the student of economic development will, however, want to consult the monographs on which these studies are based.

JOHN P. WINDMULLER
Associate Professor of Industrial
and Labor Relations
Cornell University

HYMAN G. WEINTRAUB. *Andrew Furuseth: Emancipator of the Seamen.* (Publication of the Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California.) Pp. x, 267. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959. $5.00.

This book may be considered under three principal headings. In the first place, it is an excellent job in writing, in organization of the material, in documentation, and in printing. It deals with an interesting period, 1880 to 1936, in the life of the American sailor. It opens with Andrew Furuseth and his fellow sailors working on the sailing ships—they were craftsmen of a sort, but it is in the latter days of the craft—and the troubles of the sailors, afloat and ashore, mount as the economic relationships of owners and seamen become almost completely depersonalized; it closes in the last days of Furuseth after he, with his associates, had brought the plight of the sailors to the attention of government, and laws had been passed that gave the seamen a measure of protection from the economic conditions that burdened their lives.

In the second place, Dr. Weintraub brings into his study a considerable degree of admiration for Andrew Furuseth, the man. This is a result of delving deeply into Furuseth's character—his philosophy, his astuteness, his courage, his living habits, and his foibles. It is difficult, I think, for the reader to work up any great affection for Furuseth, however much one may admire his single-minded devotion to the seamen and to the Sailors' Union of the Pacific. Throughout his long life, Furuseth thought of the sailor as a craftsman; a man who had served his apprenticeship; one who had advanced to become an "able seaman." In itself, this was a most useful bit of ancient history for Furuseth. It helped to create unity among the seamen; it served to limit their numbers in the labor market; and it impressed some legislators with the justice of the bills that Furuseth was lobbying for in Washington. Nevertheless, this admixture of mythology brought forth some attitudes and actions by Furuseth that were far from admirable. He created difficulties for all workers by fighting the longshoremen; his overt dislike of some nationalities caused discord among union members; and his stubbornness in insisting upon his own wording in proposed laws and in administrative orders finally alienated his friends. But when we set side by side the contributions and the failures of the man, we must agree that the former far outweigh the latter. It is this weighting of the scales that Dr. Weintraub has most successfully accomplished, and we must agree with him that Furuseth well deserves the title "Emancipator of the Seamen."

In the third place, this is a book of considerable breadth. It covers Furuseth's activities in the Sailors' Union of the Pacific, in the International Seaman's Union, in his many visits to Europe and to Washington, D. C. It deals in detail with the enactment of the various laws for the protection of the seamen, and with the political manipulations that went on behind the

scenes; it describes the struggles with the shipowners on the Pacific Coast and in the national capital. Dr. Weintraub is to be congratulated upon bringing back to life an all but forgotten, important labor leader.

FREDERICK L. RYAN
Director of the Institute of
Labor Economics
San Diego State University

MELVILLE DALTON. *Men Who Manage: Fusion of Feeling and Theory in Administration.* Pp. xi, 318. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959. $6.75.

The author is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles. The book deals with the methods, procedures, and compromises by which managers attempt to reconcile rational industrial organization with pragmatic, intuitive and largely irrational human ends. The original field work covers four anonymous concerns in the Middle West; this material is supplemented by an extensive review of relevant literature.

The case material indicates that managers are engaged in a continuous struggle for power; that they govern by the creation and manipulation of cliques and factions; that their methods are frequently reprehensible by accepted standards of morality; that they condone violation of established rules, evasion of responsibility, sabotage of production, and secret manipulations of working rules and grievance procedures. An atmosphere of tension and distrust pervades the organization; the roadside is strewn with human wreckage—the frustrated, defeated, neurotic victims of the system. Nevertheless, top management, by a complex process of manipulation and compromise, contains these interpersonal conflicts within tolerable limits, adjusts organizational necessities to human ends, and gets the job done.

The nature of this job, however, is not clear. Is it to maximize profits, to produce goods at minimum cost, to serve the public welfare, to develop human personality, or merely to advance the personal interests of management? By failing to posit a defensible goal, external to the organization itself, the author denies himself any valid standard of social criticism. Lacking this, he accepts a sort of naturalistic, Machiavellian theory of industrial politics, from which all moral and social values are excluded, and in which even the ignoble ends and base conduct of management are endowed with a certain pragmatic sanction. He ends on a weak note of facile optimism: "Contained conflict in industry gets the job done, brings recognition to those who blend the official and unofficial, and speeds personal growth to bear responsibilities" (p. 264).

The factual report of observed practices constitutes a devastating critique of industrial management. There is, however, an unintentional bias here arising from overemphasis of the sordid, and relative neglect of the good manifestations of human behavior. Little attention is given to the influence of those basic virtues, such as honesty, integrity, courage, loyalty, and toleration, without which social co-operation would be impossible. In the strengthening and more effective application of these social virtues lies the hope for the future. Instead of merely condemning the aberrations of industrial management, or excusing them on grounds of naturalism or organizational necessity, we should strive to make management more moral, more humane, and more socially responsible.

HORACE M. GRAY
Professor of Economics
University of Illinois

SEYMOUR MELMAN. *Decision-Making and Productivity.* Pp. xii, 260. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958. $7.00.

This is a most interesting book, and its frame of reference is a welcome addition to the growing literature of decision-making in industry, particularly, the automobile industry. While the author refers to his subject as "the politics of production," this reviewer would like to add it is more appropriately the "human relations" of production.

Dr. Melman definitely shows that a single "best way" in decision-making is an outmoded characteristic of behavior. Major alternatives do exist and have a most discernible effect on productivity.

The author has used as his base of study the Standard Motor Company of England; the data he employs are mostly representative of the period 1950–53. Incidentally, it should be emphasized that a study of this kind would not be possible unless both management and labor co-operated. In this instance, the author had every reason for being most grateful to the Standard family.

In presenting his analysis of alternative modes of decision-making the author has been careful in his understanding of deterministic-causal processes and their common ignoring of deliberate control. Therefore, this book is offered as an exploratory approach in terms of defining opportunities which exist for accelerated productivity.

One final comment should be made. Though the subject matter uses an English firm for its major concern, the thesis and conclusions are certainly applicable in terms of serious, suggestive possibilities to other firms regardless of national locale. The material included will be a point of vital discussion for a long time to come.

ARTHUR LERNER
Psychology Department
Los Angeles City College

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