


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
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XXXII, No. 2]

[July, 1959

Is Philosophy Linguistic Analysis ?

(Symposium)

DAYA KRISHNA

Saugor University

The query "Is philosophy linguistic analysis?" may expect an answer to any of the following questions or even to all of them together.

1. Can the term "linguistic analysis" be substituted for the term "philosophy" without affecting the truth-value of all the sentences in which the latter term occurs ?

2. Even if the connotation of the two terms be different, do they have the same denotation?

3. Does Philosophy belong to a wider class denoted by the term 'linguistic analysis' of which it is one but not the only member?

Any attempt to answer the first question raises problems clustering around what has recently been called "synonymity". But even without settling the generalized problem as to whether any two words or sentences can ever be completely synonymous or if any adequate criteria for synonymity can be found, we can easily see that the answer to the first question is a clear 'no'. If we go by established usage, and we can do nothing else in the matter, we shall find the term 'Philosophy' applied to types of thinking which have got nothing to do with 'linguistic analysis'. 'Existentialism is a particular type of philosophy' or 'Phenomenology is a particular type of Philosophy' is a correct expression in contemporary usage.

But to say that 'Existentialism is a particular type of linguistic analysis' or 'Phenomenology is a particular type of linguistic analysis' is obviously wrong, for these have got nothing to do with linguistic analysis. Similarly, with the derived words from the term 'philosophy'. If 'to be a philosopher' is to be one who practises philosophy and if philosophy is linguistic analysis, then one who is a philosopher necessarily practises 'linguistic analysis'. But to say 'Heidegger is a philosopher' seems correct by all contemporary usage, while to say 'Heidegger is a linguistic analyst' is just plain wrong, for he is nothing of the sort.

These examples dispose of the second and the third questions also. The terms 'philosophy' and 'linguistic analysis' do not apply to the same denotata, and the question of 'philosophy' being a proper sub-class of 'linguistic analysis' does not arise at all since every member of the class 'philosophy' is not a member of the class of activity called 'linguistic analysis'.

Prima facie, the converse position seems a more correct description of the state of affairs that prevails at the present time and that presumably prevailed in the past. 'Linguistic analysis' seems a proper sub-class of 'Philosophy', since every element of the class of activity called 'linguistic analysis' is also an element of the class of activity called 'philosophy' and not vice-versa. There seems hardly anyone who would deny the name 'philosophy' to the activity of 'linguistic analysis' being carried on by many thinkers to-day. Nor would there be any, we think, who would deny them the title 'Philosophers'. But these practitioners of linguistic analysis do not seem satisfied with this; they want to reserve the title and the name solely to themselves and their activity. But they fail to see that names are not the preserves of individuals, and that what they are doing is not an elucidation of the established use or usages of the word 'philosophy', but making a *covert proposal* that the word be used *only* in a certain way which accords more or less with the practice of these thinkers.

Now, there is nothing wrong in making a 'proposal', but it surely leads to utter confusion if it is presented not as a proposal but as the statement of an established fact. The question 'Is philosophy linguistic analysis?' should, therefore, be reformulated as 'Ought Philosophy to be linguistic analysis only?'. And if some feel 'Ought' too much of a moralistic term, they might reformulate it as 'Should Philosophy be linguistic analysis only?'.

So formulated, the question does not admit of an answer which may be regarded as true or false. A proposal is neither true nor false; it may have good reasons for it, adequate or inadequate, and may be accepted or rejected. But in no case does it make sense to speak of it as true or false.

Does the proposal to restrict the term 'Philosophy' to linguistic analysis have good reasons behind it?—is, then, the question we should attempt to answer.

The answer may be sought in different ways. One such way might be to inquire what philosophy is besides linguistic analysis, and whether these different ends, goals, or purposes which philosophy is supposed to set for itself are possibly realizable by the *methods* at its command, or whether they even theoretically make any-sense at all. If it is found, for example, that such ends can be better served by methods other than the philosophic or that they make no sense when adequately conceived, then it should presumably be taken as a good reason for accepting the proposed restriction on the meaning of the term 'Philosophy'.

Before starting on such an enquiry, I should like to make a few formulations which, I think, will be agreed to by most of the persons interested in the question. These may be formulated as the following:

1. Philosophy is a way of *knowing*, not of feeling or willing or imagining or being or enjoying a state of consciousness or anything like these.
2. It is *not* the scientific way of knowing, if by '*scientific*' we mean the understanding of phenomena through the hypothetico-deductive-verificational method adopted in all inquiries that are carried on under that name.
3. It is *neither* mathematics *nor* logic, whatever may be the exact nature of these disciplines.
4. It is *not* an intuitive way of knowing. The intuitive way of knowing may produce a saint or an artist, but never a philosopher. Intuition may play a preliminary role in philosophical investigation, just as it may do so in scientific inquiry. But its role is never the *decisive* one.

If these points are agreed to, it can easily be shown that many of the traditionally conceived businesses of philosophy belong to some other domain, or just make no sense. Take, for example, the

much-advertised business of philosophy as being the "science of sciences" concerned with the total integration of all knowledge. If this means the building up of a unified general theory in terms of which all phenomena can be understood, this is the task of science and not philosophy. Such a theory, in order to be accepted or rejected, must be verifiable in its nature; and if it has to be verified, it is science and not philosophy. It is a wrong conception of science to think it essentially concerned with specialised subject-matters only. It is as much, even if not more, concerned with the inter-relationships between different fields of phenomena, but only on the condition that the inter-relationships be genuine, i.e., verifiable. Already within the various physical and social sciences an attempt towards integrated inter-relationships is visible, and if it appears to some that no over-all integration is possible between the physical and the social sciences it is certainly not philosophy that can provide it. The simple point is that if the integration is to be genuine and not imaginary, it has to be verifiable; and if it is verifiable, it belongs to the domain of science and not philosophy.

Besides being regarded as the search for the total integration of all knowledge epitomized in the phrase "the science of sciences", it has also been considered as the search for "the really real", or the study of "eidetic essences", or the self-conscious articulation and critical examination of the pre-suppositions involved in all knowledge. All of these functions have been traditionally associated with Philosophy, and even to-day if any work is along these lines, it will be classified as 'Philosophical'. But is there anything more to this than 'traditional usage'?

The search for 'the really real' may be regarded as the *leit-motiv* of most philosophical thinking in the past and the present. Philosophers have not hesitated to declare the whole world 'unreal', and many have gone so far as to question whether anything 'really real' can ever be 'known' at all, and whether anything 'known' can ever be 'really real'. But what is this 'really real' after which the philosophers have been for ages past? Any distinction between 'real' and 'unreal' must be based on some criterion, some characteristic, the presence or absence of which would make a thing 'real' or 'unreal'. A change in criteria would divide the things in a different way and this, it is obvious, tells us more about the criteria than about the so-called 'reality' or 'unreality' of objects. Nothing more is conveyed by calling a thing 'real' or 'unreal' than that it possesses or does not possess certain charac-

teristics; and this, though an interesting information in itself, could certainly not have been so exciting as to engage the minds for the ages.

The trouble with the words 'real' and 'unreal' is that, though ostensibly descriptive, they are charged with valuational overtones suggesting appropriate emotional and volitional attitudes to be taken towards them. Something 'unreal' is supposed to be unworthy of attention or interest or pursuit. Deprived of these covert suggestions, the cognitive contention becomes innocuous and harmless. No-one, for example, is much excited by the fact that Hamlet is a fictitious person, and no one, on that account *alone*, will cease to be interested in him. A comparative study of the varying criteria used by different thinkers for drawing the dividing line between 'real' and 'unreal' will, I am afraid, reveal more about the philosophers concerned than the so-called 'reality' about which they seem so seriously to be talking.

The study of 'essences', though associated with philosophy since the time of Plato, is in no better situation in order to be identified with it. Surely, mathematics is the study of a specific type of 'essences', if there is anything like 'essences' at all. But no-one, as far as I am aware, will go so far as to contend that mathematics is a philosophic discipline or that 'to be a mathematician' and 'to be a philosopher' is the same thing. And if in one case it seems obvious that 'to be the study of essence' is not the same thing as 'to be the study of Philosophy', it is equally obvious that the generalized contention that 'Philosophy is the study of essence' must be false. The possibility, of course, remains that philosophy is not a study of all types of essences, but only of certain specific types of it. If so, it has to be pointed out what are the specific types included under it, and what is the justification for excluding others which, in any case, are 'essences' all-right. As far as I am aware, no such specification or justification has been offered by any of the thinkers concerned.

The articulation and critical examination of the pre-suppositions involved in all knowledge has been a perennial concern of philosophy. In a generalized way, it was known as epistemology in the past. No-a-days, in a detailed fashion, it has become 'the philosophy of science' which, though mostly concerned with physics, is gradually extending itself to other fields also. But, however perennial the concern and however legitimate as a subject of intelligent interest, there seems little reason to identify it with philo-

sophy. In a generalised way, for example, logic can be said to be presupposed by all the other sciences, but this does not mean that philosophy is to be identified with logic. It has, of course, been traditionally treated as a part of philosophy, but the recent development of logic as an independent discipline shows it to be as little a part of philosophy as physics or psychology which once were treated the same way. The sceptical may find the residue of such a tradition in the *Philosophical Transactions* of the Royal Society of England which has nothing philosophical about it.

Further, a presupposition is neither valid nor invalid, neither true nor false. It is just a presupposition. It may be interesting to know what we are presupposing, but the presuppositions are interesting not for themselves but for the sake of that of which they are the presuppositions. The specific presuppositions can be given up if the activity which presupposes them does not lead to successful results. 'Success', of course, would be defined in terms of the results intended. Generalized presuppositions, on the other hand, can only be given up if the activity itself is given up altogether. Whether generalised or specific, a presupposition raises no problems to which an answer may be sought. And philosophy, whatever it may be, is certainly no mere descriptive science seeking an answer to the question 'what is the case'? Presuppositions may raise problems of the acutest philosophical sort, but then they are not presuppositional at all. The moment a presupposition is questioned, it is no more being treated as a presupposition at all. But the philosophers seem to be doing just this. They are always declaring the presuppositions inadequate or unfounded or unintelligible, as if a presupposition could possibly be these without losing its character as a presupposition.

A philosophical problem can arise ostensibly from what may so obviously be an inquiry into presuppositions, but equally it may arise from what has got nothing to do with presuppositions. The relation of a philosophical problem to the ostensible field from which it seems to rise is so deceptive as to have misled many people. The problem is not specific to the realm in which it arises; in fact, one may be a thorough student of the subject without ever coming across the philosophical problems that are supposed by some to be so foundational to the subject. It is fairly common to find specialists in various fields stumbling on philosophical problems and writing about them as if they were directly relevant to their field. But it is equally a fact that only philosophers find

themselves interested in such work; the fellow-specialists in the field are mostly indifferent, if not hostile, to it and, at best, display an amused tolerance towards it.

It seems, then, that the various businesses of philosophy such as the integration of all knowledge, the search for the 'really real', the study of 'eidetic essences', the articulation and critical examination of the presuppositions involved in all knowledge are either better done by some other discipline or make no sense when critically examined. The same conclusion is sustained if we look at the method that philosophers have habitually used to solve their problems. Nothing, I suspect, so clearly reveals the nature of philosophy as the *method* it employs to solve its problems. This method does not consist of observation, hypothesis, deduction or intuition, though such an impression is created by many philosophical works. Arguments from design, for example, are sustained by a mass of facts. Sidgwick tries to establish God as a necessary hypothesis to account for certain moral facts. Spinoza tried to build his whole system on the geometrical model of the deductive method. Bergson has pleaded for intuition as the sole method for discovering reality. But however obvious the impression, it is mistaken. The argument from design relies not so much on the facts as on the obvious tautology that *all* the conditions necessary for the occurrence of any event or thing must be fulfilled in order that the event or thing might itself happen. The detailed enumeration of the facts is merely meant to hide the obvious tautology which, by itself, proves nothing. Similarly, Sidgwick's hypothesis is no hypothesis for it leads to no consequences which can be verified as true or false. The pseudo-character of Spinoza's deduction has long been exposed, and Bergson is not intuiting but giving *reasons* for holding that intuition is the only method for knowing the real.

The distinctive method of philosophy is, thus, different from the methods used in other disciplines. The problems that the method is supposed to deal with are also distinctive problems. The reality of motion as questioned by Zeno, for example, is not a question of fact or hypothesis or intuition or deduction but of a certain unintelligibility revealed in the concept when subjected to close scrutiny. The only method to deal with the types of difficulties raised by Zeno consists in a detailed analysis of the arguments raised and to show the confusions involved, if any.

Analysis, thus, seems the only adequate tool to deal with the types of problems encountered in philosophy. This analysis, of

course, is neither physical nor chemical in character. It is not even of the type that one meets with in literary criticism of the Empsonian variety. Is it, then, linguistic analysis concerned with an analysis of the words used? But philosophy is not philology, and words can be approached and analysed in different ways. Philosophical problems are not so much linguistic problems as conceptual ones. The analytic method dealing with them should, therefore, more properly be called conceptual analysis.

Shall Philosophy, then, be conceptual analysis only? Conceptual analysis, however, is a method; and a subject is described not so much by the method or methods it uses as by the field it studies. The subject-matter of philosophy, therefore, cannot be characterised as conceptual analysis. That is the method *par excellence* which philosophers use to meet the problems they encounter in their field. But what is the nature of the problems that strike us as philosophical and whose solution we seek to find through the method of conceptual analysis?

It is obvious that conceptual analysis can deal with *conceptual* problems only. A conceptual problem is that which arises from the nature of the concepts, and not from the nature of things, events or objects to which the concepts refer. To take a distinction from Tarski, in philosophy we do not use concepts but are concerned *about* them. Whenever, therefore, we stop using the concepts, and our attention gets caught by the concepts themselves we are in the realm of philosophy. A philosophical problem, thus, can arise from any realm, and once it has arisen it is seen to have no specific relation to that realm at all. The problem is felt to be a problem because of an incompatibility or unintelligibility discerned in the concept, and the attempt to remove it takes the usual form of conceptual analysis. Philosophy consists both in the revelation of the problem and in the attempt at its solution.

The term 'linguistic analysis' comes pretty close to describing what we have been proposing in the last few paragraphs. It has, however, certain misleading associations which, as we have pointed out, should be dropped if confusion is not to occur. If such precautions are taken, there seem good reasons to suggest that the term 'Philosophy' be restricted to the discovery of conceptual problems and their solution through the method of linguistic or conceptual analysis. This will be a technical use of the term philosophy. The term, of course, will continue to be used in its wider, popular and vague usage, but philosophers will have little

to do with it. This, it should be clearly understood, is a proposal, and as such may be accepted or rejected. I am only submitting that there are good reasons for accepting such a proposal. Anyone who chooses to differ will not only have to give good reasons for rejecting it, but also suggest alternatively what, in his opinion, an adequate conception of philosophy is. Unless this is done or unless it is believed that words should be allowed, even in a technical discussion, to remain as vague as possible, I submit that the proposal made in this paper be seriously considered by all those interested in the question.

Is Philosophy Linguistic Analysis ?

(Symposium)

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The question posed in the title of the symposium presupposes an agreed understanding of the expression "linguistic analysis", which unfortunately does not exist. During the last thirty years the term analysis has been used in innumerable contexts, in a variety of senses, and with varied interpretations as to its nature and use. The adjective "linguistic" has likewise been employed in ambiguous and confusing ways. However, there seems to have prevailed a general agreement among analytic philosophers in regard to the following characteristics of philosophy conceived as analysis :

- (1) Philosophy is concerned in a peculiar sense with language or linguistic expressions. This means that it is not directly concerned with facts, which constitute the province of science;
- (2) Philosophy is concerned with the clarification of language or linguistic expressions;
- (3) This clarification is effected by the rewriting or recasting of a given sentence or expression, or the translation or transformation of one sentence or expression, called the analysandum, into one or more sentences or expressions, which make up the analysans.

As regards the differences, the following points may be noted. The logical atomists thought that what metaphysics aimed at was the revelation of the structure of facts which could be achieved through the resolution of complex propositions into their atomic constituents, or the derivation of the former from the latter. To the logical positivists, analysis signified the resolving of complex synthetic statements of science and commonsense into basic protocol sentences consisting of direct records of the given. Both the atomists and the logical positivists, however, held the extensionalist view of language and thought that what they were directly dealing with in analysis was language. It is in this sense that they may be considered to conceive philosophy as linguistic analysis.

The view is characteristic of Wittgenstein in his later phase in a still more pronounced sense. In the *Tractatus* he maintained that the object of philosophy was the logical clarification of thoughts. 'A philosophical work consists entirely of elucidations', he had said. His emphasis now is on the view that philosophy should solve puzzles arising out of confused linguistic usages. This, it appears, can be achieved by bringing words back 'from their metaphysical to their everyday use'. (*Investigations*, I, 116). In other places, however, Wittgenstein seems to recommend a different, one might say contrary, course for philosophy. Thus we are told that what he wants is 'to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view.....' to which end he would 'constantly be giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of language *easily* make us overlook'. (I. 132 — *Italics ours*). Clearly there is an ambivalence in Wittgenstein's attitude with respect to the way in which philosophy should deal with language.

Pronouncements of the second type in Wittgenstein seem to be the source of the view, recently expressed by several thinkers, e.g. John Wisdom, Prof. Lazerowitz, and Miss Alice Ambrose, that philosophical theories are nothing but 'verbal innovations', i.e., recommendations or proposals to alter language or linguistic usages.¹

Should philosophy be equated with linguistic analysis taken in any of the above senses? A reply to this question presupposes that there is a standard or set of standards with references to which rival views concerning the nature of philosophy may be judged. Now a view about philosophy has the character of a philosophical view or theory, and it may be demanded that the criteria set up for judging views or theories about philosophy should be such as to be applicable to philosophical views or theories in general. However, within the limited space at my disposal here, it is not possible for me to formulate these general criteria. I shall, therefore, content myself with stating the criteria by which merits of different views concerning philosophy may be assessed.

An acceptable view of philosophy should satisfy the following three conditions: (1) it should clearly mark out the province of

1. See Morris Lazerowitz, *The Structure of Metaphysics* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1955), Chap. II and Wisdom's Foreword; also, Alice Ambrose, *Linguistic Approaches to Philosophical Problems*, *Journal of Philosophy*, Volume XLIX, April 21, 1952.

philosophy by distinguishing it from the sciences; (2) it should assign a worthy role and purpose to philosophy; and (3) it should indicate the nature of philosophical method and proof. In addition, a satisfactory view of philosophy should be true to its history, i.e., should enable us to detect the elements of truth contained in various descriptions of philosophy given by important historical thinkers.

None of the views quoted above satisfies these conditions. One obvious objection against them, as pointed out by the previous symposiast, is that they fail to do justice to the claims of such systems as existentialism and phenomenology to be called philosophy; they would also have us deny the name philosophy to the systems of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, Spinoza and Hegel. Such definitions of philosophy are wrong (if that term can at all be used in this context) for much the same reasons as would make wrong the definitions of poetry not applicable to the compositions of Homer and Kālidāsa.

I shall now proceed with other objections. None of the views in question succeeds in assigning to philosophy a role at once worthy and specific, such as would enable us to see how philosophy has a nature and purpose distinct from that of science. We can no more believe with Russell in his atomistic phase that 'the business of metaphysics is to describe the world'² or with Wisdom that 'the philosopher's intention is increased clearness in the apprehension of the ultimate structure of facts'.³ Surely it cannot be the aim of philosophy to describe *all* the facts that make up the world, or to apprehend or reveal the structures of *all* sorts of facts, particularly when those facts are held, as by logical atomism, to be distinct and separate from one another. As Mr. Black observes 'the philosopher is not "an extra-cautious scientist"—trying to talk like the scientist, but more carefully and about everything'.⁴ Moreover it is not clear how preoccupation with language can help the philosopher to describe better the facts or their structures than the methods used by the scientists. Nor can the philosopher be expected—and this is a different point with a bearing on the more clearly positivistic view—to busy himself

2. *Logical Atomism*, Lecture III, reprinted in *Logic and Knowledge* (Allen and Unwin, London, 1956), p. 215.

3. Vide, *Ostentation*, reprinted from *Psyche* (1933) in *Philosophy and Psychoanalysis*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1953, p. 8.

4. *Philosophical Analysis*, Ed. Max Black, Cornell University Press, 1950; Introduction, p. 11.

indifferently with the elucidation of any and every proposition, relating to any and every fact. Surely the philosopher must be permitted to exercise his choice, both with respect to facts and to propositions, if he is to preserve his sanity. And a correct view of philosophy should indicate *the principle on which the choice is to be exercised*. Whether philosophy has to deal with facts or with propositions (about facts), it should be clearly specified as to what sorts of facts or propositions fall within its purview. The reason why analytic philosophy fails to enunciate any such principle is that it has no clear conception of the specific aim and purpose of philosophy. It seems to believe that philosophy is nothing but a discipline auxiliary to physical and other sciences.

The later views of Wittgenstein seem to save philosophy from its position of subordination to science. The business of philosophy is neither to reveal the structures of facts nor to elucidate the statements of science and commonsense; its proper function is the solution of linguistic puzzles. As to the genesis of these puzzles or confusions Wittgenstein remarks that they 'arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work' (I, 132). It is not clear, however, why a philosopher should at all attend to language when it is idling, nor why this activity of his be taken seriously and regarded as important. Others write as if the puzzles or paradoxes such as those relating to motion presented by Zeno constituted the sole reason for the existence of philosophy. In that case, it would appear, the discontinuance of the highly inconvenient study of such philosophers, if not the total destruction of philosophical libraries, would be the ideal solution. These accounts of the genesis of philosophical problems or puzzles seem to make that discipline a mere aberration or an adventitious property of the human mind, a mere accident of man's intellectual history without any serious meaning or purpose. Philosophy so conceived can obviously have no future, not, at any rate, important future. For we believe that philosophy cannot survive unless it continually goes on asking new and significant questions, and not merely rest content with the solution of old puzzles. A correct view of philosophy should be able to show how it constitutes a real and serious need of the civilised man.

The view in question is open to another serious objection. Is it the function of philosophy to go on solving puzzles as they happen severally to present themselves, without caring to interrelate the different solutions? Should not philosophy rather proceed systematically to collect its various problems and to try to

tackle them together? Ought not philosophy to aspire to constitute "connected knowledge", in the manner of scientific knowledge? When Wittgenstein opines that 'there is not a philosophical method', but methods, 'like different therapies' (I, 133), he forgets that different therapies flow from a single science of medicine, which constitutes more or less a connected body of knowledge.

At the back of the aforementioned confusions concerning the nature and function of philosophy is the modern man's excessive preoccupation with facts, with whatever is the case, and his unwillingness to investigate the realm of values, where possibilities are apprehended and weighed against one another. The repeated attempts of European philosophers to make philosophy "scientific", or to assimilate it to the use of science, may be traced to this preoccupation. Losing sight of the circumstance that man as a conscious being is concerned essentially with the creation and enjoyment of values, most of these thinkers tend to make an apotheosis of facts and of factual knowledge.

All the activities of man are directed towards the production and/or enjoyment of values. Even the scientific activity does not constitute an exception to this rule. Science concerns itself with facts, or the attainment of factual knowledge, because man is interested in the manipulation and transformation of objects and energies which enter as constituents in facts. Science occupies itself with the investigation of those aspects of phenomena in virtue of which they suffer and produce changes. In other words, science is interested in the actual nature of phenomena because it wants to control the course of those phenomena. It is a mistake, however, to think that scientific knowledge reflects the character of facts in their pure actuality. Even the experimental or observational records which science apparently seeks to correlate, unify or explain do not refer to pure facts. All experimental records are generalised records made out of observations conducted on different occasions, and also in different laboratories, by the same or different scientists. The records in question are always constructions out of observed data. Further, as Max Planck informs us, every observational or experimental measurement 'first acquires its meaning through the significance which a theory gives it.....the finest and most direct measurements.....have to be corrected again and again before they can be employed for any practical (or theoretical?) purpose'.⁵ Nor is this all. All scientific explanations

5. Vide, *Where is Science Going?* (Allen Unwin, London 1946), pp. 84-85.

involve as ingredients not merely the variables referring to observable magnitudes, but also the axioms and postulates in terms of which those magnitudes are sought to be connected.

The contrast between science and philosophy, then, is not that the one deals with facts and the other with concepts and/or propositions. What both science and philosophy directly deal with are concepts and not facts. On the other hand it can be contended that philosophy too deals with facts, though these facts are distinct from those studied by the various sciences. For concepts or modes of conceiving are as much facts as the modes of change of the physical phenomena. However, as we have already suggested, the facts and concepts studied by philosophy are different from those studied by the sciences. The sciences study facts or concepts which are axiologically neutral, i.e., which can be contemplated in an axiologically neutral spirit. Philosophy, on the contrary, studies facts or concepts which claim to be bearers of values, i.e. which are meaningful to us only in virtue of their value-aspect. This is not to say that the study of science is useless. The scientists' manipulation of the conceptual data drawn from observation and experiment leads in the course of time to systematic picturing of and control over the environment. The philosopher's concern, on the other hand, is with the concepts or symbols created and cherished by man for their validity and/or their aesthetic worth. In seeking to correlate or explain observational or experimental concepts, the scientists produce conceptual or symbolic systems which are of interest to the philosopher. The poet or the artist similarly creates systems of symbols which are intrinsically interesting and which, therefore, provide materials for the philosopher's contemplative scrutiny.

The conceptional life of man, according to us, is coextensive with his symbolic life. Philosophy studies those forms or segments of this life which are valued by man for their own sake.

It is not wrong, therefore, to speak of philosophy as linguistic analysis provided that the following two points are borne in mind:

- (1) Every form of speech is a form of activity; it is, as Wittgenstein suggests, a form of life;
- (2) Philosophy concerns itself only with those forms of speech or symbolic life which are cherished and valued by men for their own sake.

This means that philosophy does not deal with *all* forms of speech, or with *all* forms of symbolic life. Further, philosophy

deals only with the general aspects of the significant forms or sectors of this life.

The symbolic life studied by philosophy forms part of the human psyche. Philosophy, thus, is a species of self-knowledge. However, the self that philosophy studies is not the individual self. It is the self constituted by the shared symbolic life of man. This self is a historically continuous and growing entity. Another peculiarity of this self is that its being consists in being known or enjoyed. A mass of symbols is not yet life, it is life in abeyance, or potential life. It is enlivened into conscious life through the contemplative activity of a self which is already alive, and is in the process of creative self-expression. The symbols constituting a poem or a theory become parts of a living psyche when the latter incorporates them as units in the totality of its significant awareness.

Philosophy may be defined as the attempt to analyse, interpret and evaluate the general forms of the significant symbolic life of man. This life is necessarily shared, impersonal or universal life. It constitutes its own excuse for being, and is the repository of what may be termed the ultimate values. The intuitive perception of these values necessarily precedes both their analysis and their conscious evaluation.

The significant symbolic life of man, in its varied forms and manifestations, may be called his culture; and philosophy may be described as the attempt of the cultural consciousness to attain self-articulation and self-awareness. This awareness relates to those aspects of human culture which make it significant or valuable to man. The awareness asserts itself in the consciousness of standards. In the sphere of scientific investigations the consciousness of standards manifests itself as the sense of evidence, or as insistence on a dispassionate, objective assessment and interpretation of evidence. In the domain of art and art-criticism it shows itself forth as the demand for impersonality and universality, completeness and maturity. These latter criteria are applicable to the realms of morality and religion as well.

Viewed in the light of the above discussion philosophy may be regarded as an instrument of the qualitative improvement of man as he expresses himself in his higher cultural activities. In this deeper sense philosophical theories may be taken as being proposals for regulating linguistic usage, though it would be more correct to say that they are attempts to formulate standards for the

regulation and critical appraisal of various cultural activities and achievements.

In conclusion, a word may be added concerning the nature of philosophical method and proof. Philosophical statements cannot be tested by their correspondence to an external observable reality. If the foregoing account of the nature of philosophy is correct, those statements cannot be regarded as being analytic either. The statements in question refer to certain aspects or areas of the symbolic life of man. The adequacy of a philosophical theory can, in the last analysis, be judged only by the degree of consistency and comprehensiveness which it enables us to achieve in the description and analysis of the relevant sector of our symbolic life.

Is Philosophy Linguistic Analysis ?

(Symposium)

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I

The Problem

Analysis is of something and *by means of* something. Linguistic analysis may, therefore, mean either

- (a) analysis of language by means of something which is not itself language, or
- (b) analysis of language by means of language, or
- (c) analysis of anything, but by means of language.

Logical positivists and philosophers of the school of Analysis are all agreed that it is analysis of language. Whether it is also analysis by means of language is not, however, evident. Analysis by means of language is a difficult concept. Whatever be the analysandum, philosophical analysis as it is commonly understood is made by thought, and though thought may involve language the two are not for that reason identical. If thought is to be identical with language, that would be from a new point of view altogether which neither logical positivists and Analysts nor old-world philosophers would readily accept. 'Linguistic analysis', then, means analysis of language, whatever be the method.

The proposition 'Philosophy is linguistic analysis' may mean, as Dayakrishna points out, one of two things — (a) it is nothing but linguistic analysis and (b) it involves that analysis but is in itself something else. Both Dayakrishna and Devāraj reject the first alternative and discuss at length what philosophy by itself is or should be. They, however, define philosophy in different ways, and though Devaraj has, it appears, successfully refuted Dayakrishna's view neither of them has developed the notion of philosophy from out of a consideration of the nature of analysis. They both have introduced it *ab extra*. They have not seen that if philosophy is something more than analysis, the additional feature might come out of a critical consideration of analysis itself.

They have not analysed linguistic analysis sufficiently. This is my main task in this paper. Only toward the end it will be seen what idea of philosophy my discussions lead to.

II

Arguments for linguistic analysis

Those who have identified philosophy with linguistic analysis have first dispossessed philosophy of its traditional status and then, having shown that it cannot have a task equal in dignity to its old one, have concluded that the only business left to it is linguistic analysis.

They have assumed that the only criterion of reality is untutored common experience and argue that if in old days philosophy had been chastening and systematising it, this task has now devolved on science which is more rigorous and systematic, so that nothing of common experience is left for philosophy to manage. Common experience means solid sense-experience.

Philosophy cannot claim that though common experience is excluded, there is still uncommon experience left which it might explore. Uncommon experience cannot be verified, verification being always in terms of common experience. One cannot say that it needs no verification, for this would mean that philosophy is an esoteric pursuit worth no serious attention. If, on the other hand, a philosopher seeks verification, the so-called uncommon experience would just be a scientific hypothesis which science with its thorough hold on common experience is more competent to verify. The uncommonness of experience is, therefore, no distinguishing mark of philosophy.

Philosophy does not, also, deal with concepts, except in a restricted sense. The concepts that are traditionally reserved for philosophy are all postulates either of science or of the common world-view, and in either case it is science which alone is competent to study them, because it alone is conversant with the situations that called for those concepts. Philosophy is not, again, a special type of study—speculative, as it is called—of these concepts. No one knows what this special study is, unless it be clairvoyance which is unverifiable.

Yet it is true that if philosophy has got any business, it is with concepts, facts of sense-experience being all monopolised by science and commonsense. But the only way it can deal with concepts is

to find, through the analysis of the corresponding terms and sentences, what are genuinely meant. This is the only course, because philosophy has nothing to do with matters of experience, and even with this experience itself. The genuine meanings, again, that philosophy is to discover are precisely those which science and commonsense refer to through those words, and as the real is only that which is experienceable through senses, and, further, as concepts themselves are not reals, the genuine meaning is in the long run simple reals of sense-experience to which, therefore, all pseudo-meanings have to be reduced.

Philosophy is sheer analysis of language, in both its semantic and syntactical aspects. So far as the semantic aspect is concerned, it analyses a complex word or sentence into simple reals; and so far as the syntactical aspect is concerned, it discovers the linguistic relations that cemented those reals into a complex concept.

Some of the Analysts have proceeded further. The meaning of a word *W* is not, according to them, any real but just another word or a set of words which can adequately replace that *W*, and these replacing words are ultimately primitive words that stand for data of sense-experience. According to them, therefore, an expression, or, better, the idea corresponding to it, is verified not by reference straight to data of sense-experience, but by reference to primitive words that stand for those data. This, though an extreme form of linguistic analysis, appears more consistent with the thesis 'Philosophy is linguistic analysis', the analysandum and the analysans being both language. It is consistent, however, only internally and does not debar external questions as to the very basis of positivism itself.

III

Critical considerations

Linguistic analysis is the analysis of words and sentences. When the analysandum is a complex word or sentence it is analysed into elemental words or sentences which stand directly for ultimate reals—sense-data or sensed facts. Obviously here the syntactical and the semantic aspects are inter-twined: to break up the complex expression into elemental words and their relations is the same thing as to find out its meaning. When, however, the given word—or, as some claim, the given sentence—is itself elemental, there is no question of syntax, and no question, therefore, of analysing it. The sole task of philosophy here, as also

of common sense, is to appreciate its meaning, to appreciate, in other words, what it stands for; or if meaning be understood as only a word or a set of words that can adequately replace the given word, there is no task here, whether for philosophy or for common sense.

The specific task of philosophy, then, is to find out, through analysis, the meaning of a complex word or sentence. We begin our criticism from here.

Is the meaning in question *actual* or *ideal*? Is it what people actually mean when they use the word or the sentence, or is it what they *should* mean? To find out the actual meaning is one task, to find out what should be meant is *prima facie* another. Phenomenologists, for example, are for actual meanings, they scrupulously avoid all theorising. The attitude of logical positivists is different. They are not impartial narrators. They have already a notion as to what meaning in general *should be*. They distinguish genuine meaning as what is at least conditioned by verifiability.

To insist on what *should be* meant is theorising or putting forward a proposal. Every theory or proposal has to be backed by arguments. But have logical positivists offered arguments for their theory or proposal regarding ideal meaning, viz., that it is what is verifiable by sense-experience? Many of them have not. They have quietly passed the ideal meaning as the actual. Many, however, conscious of the difficulty, have denied the distinction by arguing that the ideal meaning is precisely what an untutored commoner actually means. But this is a wrong argument. Common people do indeed often mean what is so verifiable, but often also they mean other things; and even when they mean the former it is doubtful if they mean it consciously as so verifiable. Often, again, they would reject what the Analyst wants them to mean by certain words and sentences.

It cannot be said that in these cases the so-called common people are not genuinely common because they are not untutored. The only conceivable way to decide whether these men are untutored or not is to enquire whether they recognise 'verifiability by sense-experience' as the only criterion of reality, whatever be their idea of meaning. It is true they rely much on this type of verifiability. But they equally admit other types. Occult phenomena, for example, are taken as verifiable through mystic intuition, not through sense-experience. They also believe in laws,

say, of science, which are not completely verifiable in the way of the positivist, and when they *postulate* something they take it as real only because of the self-consistent system of knowledge it has led to.

A positivist might argue that by 'verification' he means public verification, so that occult experiences are excluded from the beginning. But there are two points against this.

(a) There are at least one class of entities which are not public but yet taken as real even by positivists themselves. These are mental states. They are always private, being experienced by their possessors only, and there is no conceivable way to demonstrate them publicly. Yet not merely their possessors but others also ungrudgingly admit that at least many of them are real.

They can indeed be inferred, and inference, one might contend, is a legitimate method of public demonstration. But for logical positivists to allow inference would mean a risk. If mental states are allowed as real because inferred, why should the metaphysical truths which old-world philosophers derived through inference be dismissed without an examination of the inferences concerned?

One cannot, in favour of positivism, argue that as what is inferred is always perceivable, inference is a legitimate method of demonstration. The logic in question may be correct, but my mental states are never to be perceived by others who infer them.

Neither can positivists argue that others *perceive* all my mental states. I as a person, or some of my mental states on certain occasions may be directly known by others through sympathy, empathy or clairvoyance; but a great many of my mental states are ever private, and the way others are said to perceive some is decidedly un-positivistic.

(b) The second point against the positivistic claim that verification is to be public is that the sensuousness of the verification and its publicness are not internally related. The point, in other words, is that what is non-sensuously intuited may yet be public in the sense that it is directly assented to by others. Basic moral values belong to this category. Possible denial of basic values is as much an empty conjecture as that in Mars and Jupiter there are sentient beings who might not be sensing as we do.

Basic moral values are apriorities of a type, and apriorities are all intuited and yet public. They are neither wide-area conven-

tions nor generalisations from empirical data. Naturalistic interpretations of them, as much as of the values, are arbitrary, because there is always a surd left over, and to dismiss it as a mere psychic state or attitude betrays failure of the reduction. Apriorities are not also generalisations for the further reason that generalisation itself is impossible without them. Unless they are presupposed we cannot pass from a first case to a second. One cannot here argue that the very first case is generalised (and that the generalisation stands accepted till it is contradicted). Such peculiar generalisation, if there is any, is already *intuition* of the generality. Obviously, this intuition is not sensuous, though it may go in association with that.

We are often told that apriorities are nothing real. *A priori* propositions, we are told, are wholly analytic and, as such, meaningless in the sense that they refer to nothing that is real. But this is wrong. Analytic propositions cannot be meaningless. They assert as real at least what their subject terms stand for, though that assertion may be in the form of a tautology. Hence *a priori* propositions should be understood as asserting reals corresponding to their subject-terms. Only the subject-terms here are very wide, standing for *all* things in an extensive field, often covering the whole universe. Such '*all things*' cannot be experienced through sense. They are intuited non-sensuously.

The self-complete 'all' is no figment of speculative imagination. It cannot be said that there are only the particulars A, B, C, and that where the class is taken as yet closed the closure is no objective fact but only my colligating, a mere subjective attitude, a mental function. Such closed classes, each of an infinite number of particulars, stand asserted as real, and unless there are reasons to the contrary one has to put up with them. "All X's" might indeed be replaced by $X_1, X_2, X_3, \dots$, but never by A, B, C, X_1 is not A unqualifiedly, nor X_2 B, and so on. X_1 is A, but understood merely in the light of X-ness, i.e., merely as an instance of X, and similarly with X_2, X_3 , etc. The entire group containing A, B, C, up to infinity cannot, it is true, be intuited, because each member presents a unique empirical feature. But there is no such difficulty in the way of intuiting the group $X_1, X_2, X_3, \dots$ up to infinity, every one of these members being equally anticipated by X-ness, as just an instance of X. There is nothing so far against the self-contained 'all' being real and intuited.

It cannot be said that such 'all X' is nothing but X-ness. The denotative reading of 'all' is more primary than the connotative, as is evident from the historical fact that neither realists nor conceptualists nor nominalists have denied particulars. We have only added that the particulars in question that are meant by the word 'all X' are $X_1, X_2, X_3, \dots$, not A, B, C

Nor can it be said that because $X_1, X_2, X_3, \dots$ are but A, B, C, in the light of X-ness they, as depending in whatever manner on X-ness, are less primary. We have just shown that denotation is the more primary meaning. To maintain this its primary character one has to understand X-ness as either a subjective method of colligation or an immanent—may be half immanent and half transcendent—objective character defining the particulars under 'all X', no wholly transcendent objective feature.

It follows that *a priori* propositions are not even analytic in the sense of being tautologies. They are significant statements about all X's, neither derived from nor verifiable by sensuous matters. Not derived from, for two reasons. We have already shown that they are no inductive generalisations, and, secondly, though in the case of ordinary classes, called empirical, one has somehow to start with some empirical particular or particulars—for otherwise the cow-class could not be distinguished from the horse-class—there is no such start in the case of apriorities. They are not also verified by sensuous particulars, for the verification is destined to be incomplete. Though empirical general propositions also share the same fate, the incompleteness of the verification of *a priori* propositions is more profound, because they cover extraordinary wide fields. Apriorities, thus, are not verifiable in the positivistic manner, but yet universally assented to.

Common sense admits not merely sweeping apriorities but also empirical laws which, as already noted, are never completely verifiable. It admits also postulates which are verified only with reference to the consistent system of knowledge effected. In neither of these two cases is simple verification by sense-experience possible. Empirical laws are at best *incompletely* verified by sense-experience. But incomplete verifiability is, to whatever extent, absence of verifiability. The absence, it is true, is only privation, no denial, but the privation here being ever present is as bad as denial. Probability is of no help here; if a large number of cases have verified the law to whatever extent, there is always a larger number that privationally do not verify it.

It cannot be said that because some actual cases have verified the law and because no case has yet contradicted it, therefore future cases also may with confidence be taken as capable of verifying it. This cannot be said, because once the logic in question is permitted the *number* of verifying cases would be beside the point, *one* such case being enough. The increasing number of such cases would, on this view, only eliminate chances of error, but such progressive elimination of possible errors — even of actual ones — is no *logic* unless the corresponding thesis has been already established. The thesis here is the empirical law which, we contend, is established through a type of non-sensuous intuition (though in association with the sensuous), unless, of course, it is a mere postulate — a concept, formula or equation just postulated in order that certain phenomena may be neatly packed in a system.

Such postulates are verified by their efficiency to form self-complete consistent systems, never directly by *sense-experience*. It cannot be said that in their case there is indirect sense-verification — verification, in other words, just in so far as deductions from them are verified directly. All postulates are not so indirectly verified. Often a system of knowledge, a theory, is based on several postulates one or two of which may be so verified, but the rest are allowed because they stand systematically connected with those so verified. Even with regard to one from which deductions are said to be drawn, there is no assurance that they are drawn from it alone, and not from any of the others without which the deductions could not be drawn. The test of a postulate is, therefore, as much systematic connexion as sense-verification, if this latter is allowed.

Even if the sense-verification of postulates is allowed, it is doubtful if it is sense-verification in general, another name of which is general predictability. General predictability is perhaps an analytic feature of postulates and theories. If a theory is improvised for accounting for a certain type of situations, it and the postulates involved must be capable of predicting such situations; and if one insists on predicting *other types* of situation, this is possible only when the theory in question has been combined with other theories. Even there when the combination is made the required prediction follows *analytically*. The more general a hypothesis the newer and newer cases it is bound to cover. It follows that even *crucial test* is useless, because it follows analytically. Either, then, there is no significant empirical test of theories and postulates or, if there is any over and above the formal

test of systematic connexion, it must be something other than predictability — general or crucial. We venture to suggest that it is the nearmostness of a hypothesis to a known agency (or behaviour), nearmostness depending, of course, on the advance of science already effected.

IV


Critical consideration continued

If meaning is what is real corresponding to a word or sentence, we have seen that it need not be sensuously verified. One may even ask if meaning is at all the *real* that so corresponds. Some positivists, we have seen, understand by 'meaning' a word or a set of words that can adequately replace a given word or sentence. One may also hold that meaning is just what is referred to without any implication as to whether it is real or not.

Philosophy, we are told, is the analysis of words and sentences into genuine meanings. Can the two meanings of the word 'meaning', given above, substantiate this view?

The former of the two is still a theory — or, if one likes, a proposal. From the point of view of actuality, we as much mean this by 'meaning' as often the *facts* referred to by the words or sentences in question, so that to insist solely on the replacing words is a piece of theorising. The word 'man' often — perhaps most often — means actual men or their class, not always a certain word or words replacing it. One may even hold that *dictionary meaning* consisting of more familiar synonyms or conceptual elaborations is vicarious, what is really meant being the actual things or classes conveyed through those synonyms and elaborations. The original word and these synonyms and elaborations refer in a parallel manner to the same actual fact. Even when one says 'X means that which is such and such' (where X is the name of certain particulars) the clause 'that which is such and such' is really referring to those particulars or their actual class. If meaning is what is referred to it is the particular facts or their classes, not synonyms or conceptual elaborations. The latter, it is true, is often called meaning, but a more appropriate term would perhaps be *synonymity* or *linguistic substitutability*, and nothing of philosophical importance could be deduced from it.

The second idea of meaning stated above is that it is just what is referred to, it mattering little whether it is real or unreal. But this too is of the nature of a theory. In actual common usage



meaning is always a reality. Even when on correcting an error one declares the meant to have been unreal, there is no denial that it was nevertheless *taken as real*. Unreality, further, is coordinate with reality. Except in clear cases of supposal and mere entertainment, there is nothing that is meant and yet not definitely real or unreal. The subsistent or the irreal is either sheer verbal abstraction or a sub-reality in the form 'if it were *real*', so that no significant supposal or entertainment is without all reference to reality. Intrinsically the meant is taken as *real*; and between something taken as *real* and it being objectively so there is not much of epistemological distance: what is taken as *real* is objectively so, provided it is not contradicted. This small but significant proviso is an epistemological bridge that easily covers the much advertised distance between objectivity and ego-centricity. From the ego-centric point of view, contradiction, unless it is merely formal, is the fact that in a given knowledge some defect is discovered or believed as existent; and the defect is detected, or believed as existent, by the knowledge that reveals an object in place of the object of the former knowledge.

V

Philosophy concerned with the real

The real is not merely what is meant by a word or sentence, it is also revealed by knowledge, including non-sensuous intuition. Not merely that, unless something is already known as *real* through any of the *pramāṇas* it cannot be meant by a word or sentence.

Often, indeed, we mean a possible, and often, again, fictitious entities like dragon, fairy, etc. But the possible, if it is not purely formal, is what is possibly *real*; and fictitious entities are either not known to be fictitious, and so taken so far as *real*, or self-consciously constructed, when they are really objects-as-so-constructed. The word dragon, for example, when consciously constructed, means the *constructed dragon*, where construction as a process is a psychic reality. The dragon as constructed borrows the reality of this psychic process.

If meaning has to be already known as *real* it follows that language is only a way of stating the real. It may state the real precisely or not precisely, precision being determined by the use of standard words and rules of syntax acceptable to the community to whom the expression is directed. From this point of view, language is secondary. If philosophy is granted only this secondary

task of expressing what is known, not only would this be undignified, as Devaraj argues, for philosophy; really there would be no task left for it, because every science and concrete discipline is under an equal obligation to express its points precisely. If certain expressions are clumsy or misleading, or if they give rise to puzzles and contradictions, it is for the respective sciences to be on their guard against them and correct them. Philosophy can do nothing here, because precision is to be effected by reference to the *reals* accepted as data, or established, by those sciences themselves. A philosopher to sit in judgment on the expressions would presuppose that he is the master of all those sciences. In the absence of such mastery a philosopher can at best make grammatical and lexical corrections, which, however, is an empty formal business, never in the past recognised as philosophical. Or, he may correct by reference to sense-perceived data which are common properties of all men and monopolised by none (or he may do both).

In the second case there would arise a serious difficulty. If philosophy is to interpret all propositions in terms of sense-experience one might ask 'Why philosophy alone?' Is not science also under an equal obligation to do this? If yes, there is no task left for philosophy. If no, if, in other words, science is allowed to use other *pramāṇas*, why should philosophy be prevented? In any case, there would be no distinction between science and philosophy. A consistent positivist ought, then, to deny all philosophy, not metaphysics only.

If, however, philosophy is allowed the secondary task of lexical and grammatical corrections, still then all difficulties would not be over. Even lexical correction is impossible unless one is already aware of the facts of sense-experience that the words to be corrected and the replacing words stand for, and this, obviously, is going beyond formal linguistic business. If some positivists argue that the facts in question are involved in a *second-dimensional way* in the words in question, so that there may not be any direct reference to facts, this would be like saying that sense-perceived facts are only *functions* of words, much as the old-world Kantio-Hegelians understood the empirical as only a function of thought. This does not, also, help much. Either the so-called functions are a second dimension necessarily involved in the words or thoughts, or a certain degree of combination of words or thoughts is expected to be exactly equal to the sense-perceived facts. The latter is definitely wrong and at best a fond hope. The former does not deny facts of sense-experience; it denies only their independence.

Material meaning cannot abdicate itself and get completely merged in the formal, and the question is still open whether the present inseparability of the material is final.

Even granting that it is final, there is another difficulty. If there are only words and words and if the business of philosophy is only to reduce complex words or sentences to elemental words, one might still point out that the standard elemental words are relevant only to the community that uses them, and similarly with regard to the standard syntax. It would follow that meaning, and, therefore, philosophy itself, is relative and wholly conventional.

But as much with meaning as with philosophy, one cannot rest content with relativity. There is at least an implicit faith in universal philosophy. How, otherwise, could one think at all of defining philosophy? One may not successfully define it by pointing to the exact common character of different philosophies. But the implicit faith in a common pursuit is there. Do not people of one community understand the philosophy of another? Similarly with regard to language or meaning.

General language has to be admitted. This does not necessarily mean that the actual general language, the medium through which different peoples understand one another's meanings, can itself be described. It may operate in a pure functional manner, without ever being posited in itself. Some positivists who speak of meta-language are aware of this. They never take upon themselves the impossible task of describing the general language. But they propose constructing a symbolical language that would stand for this. This is decidedly a good proposal, provided it could be worked out to the end, and God only knows whether it can be. There is, however, another alternative, more practicable and natural. People speaking one language do actually treat another language as superior and, therefore, more comprehensive, if in picking up the latter they feel that some forms of expression not explicit in their language are explicit in the latter. Comparison may proceed this way, and through mutual understanding (without any initial bias) we can arrive at the best actual language and then suggest improvement even on that.

VI

Philosophy and science

We conclude that philosophy is no mere linguistic analysis, if by that term one means analysis of or by language or both. Philo-

sophy has indeed to analyse linguistic expressions, but through that it studies the *reals* that are so expressed, and these reals are known by *pramāṇas*. Philosophical analysis may also be taken as *by* language, provided that language is used as a means to carry on reflection and is, therefore, subordinate to thought. The method of philosophy is principally the *pramāṇas* and conceptual analysis. 'Conceptual analysis' does not mean analysis of concepts. It means thinking analysis as a result of which concepts may emerge to our view as ulterior realities. Philosophy is concerned with real objects of *pramāṇas*, as much as science is, and neither of them is wholly concerned with expressions. Some objects are sense-perceived, some others are inferred either in a straight manner or as valid hypotheses. Some are again discovered through analysis. So far science and philosophy belong to the same order.

With regard, however, to the types of analysis they employ they develop differences. The analysis that science employs is empirical. What it discovers as *such and such* through analysis is immediately believed as having already been present in the same form before the analysis began; or sometimes the analysans are postulates claiming no intrinsic reality but acquiring it on account of the empirical system effected through them. In the first case the validity of the analysans depends directly on sense-perception, they being either sense-perceived when the analysis is made or taken as what was sense-perceived, however vaguely, when the analysis began. In the second case the validity depends formally on the systematic character of the system, and materially on the system being empirical. The analysans in this case may also be taken as inferred in a way. In both the first and second cases the analysans are 'empirically real'.

The additional, if not the specific, task of philosophy is to discover, through a specific type of analysis, entities, often indiscriminately called *concepts, categories, idealities, essences, etc.*, which need not be empirically real, but as autonomous entities claim reality of their own. When they are analysed out they stand in a form in which they cannot be said to have remained before the analysis began. Substance, causality, the Sāṅkhya *tattvas* in their *tattva*-forms, the Brahman of Advaita, God, Hegel's Absolute, etc., even pure space, time and number, are in one form to pure philosophic speculation and in another in unreflective life. This is true with regard to values also. How and why this is so I have discussed elsewhere and have no space here to repeat. But

this is a fact. On the ground that they are not bound to be 'empirically real' one may dismiss them. One may also condescendingly recognise them if and only so far as they are empirically real. But there is the inevitable fact that in spite of all positivism they go on pushing in their claim as much to recognition as to intrinsic reality, and it would be wiser, therefore, to admit a type of mystic intuition—transcendental perception, as it is sometimes called—than dismiss what cannot be dismissed. Nor would it be wiser to consider them unavoidable (transcendental) illusions, for they cannot be adequately replaced. An illusion is that which is or has to be replaced by a claimant to identical recognition. But the philosophical analysts claiming non-empirical reality cannot be replaced by empirical reals. The philosophical essence is *over and above* the empirical fact. If there is at all a question of replacement it would be of the empirical by the philosophical, not conversely. But we are not concerned with that here. Dayakrishna believes that transcendental philosophy confuses reality with value. But there is no such confusion here: non-empirical reality need not be value which is only one type of non-empirical reality. Dayakrishna is probably under the phenomenologist's illusion that the non-empirical is only a *pre-supposition*. We contend that every genuine presupposition, i.e., one that is not a dead *postulate*, claims intrinsic reality (no mere 'empirical reality'), and till it is shown that it is contradicted or that there is no possibility of coming up to it we have to admit it as real, though that reality may be non-empirical. If non-empirical reality is not also necessarily value it follows that Devaraj's view of philosophy is equally unacceptable.

The mystic intuition of idealities is, we admit, a private affair to one who so intuit. But it should not be rejected on that ground. Empirical perception is equally private. We may be told that empirical perception is confirmable by inference. But, first, it is not taken as valid only on that ground; and, secondly, what exactly is this confirmation? Is it showing the compatibility of the percept with other such percepts, or is it the situation that the percept can be inferred much as fire is inferred from smoke? If the former, we reply that the mystic intuition that reveals an ideality comes also to reveal, when the intuition is deepened and sustained, a whole system or a hierarchy of idealities. If it be argued that still the whole system or the hierarchy remains esoteric, we reply that then there is the second alternative: the ideality in question may also be inferentially demonstrated much as an empirical percept

is done when it is challenged. Only, the inference here is peculiar. It is from data that are sense-perceived to one that is not so perceivable.

Those who allow idealities in so far only as they are 'empirically real' appear to have misunderstood their transcendent autonomy. Even as autonomous these idealities are not as removed from empirical facts as these philosophers apprehend. One must not blink at the fact that they are after all analysed out of concrete empirical situations; secondly, as we have just shown, they can to a considerable extent be inferred—either in a straight way or postulationally—from empirical situations; and, thirdly—and this is the most important point—in spite of their transcendent autonomy they are also functionally present in—another name of which is that they remain undistinguishedly fused with—empirical situations. They are not as opposed to the empirical as they are commonly thought to be. They are immanent regulative principles of the empirical. When as autonomous, they are distinguished out through philosophical analysis, what remains over is not the dead empirical, the empirical as such, for this latter can never as such be distinguished out. If the starting point is the concrete empirical situation, which, as concrete, is a homogeneous amalgam distinguishing neither the empirical as such nor the ideality as autonomous, what remains over when the latter is distinguished out is still the same amalgam, not the dead empirical. There is no dead empirical anywhere and at any stage.

As contrasted with science, philosophy has this additional or specific business of dealing with autonomous idealities. In recent days another discipline has developed under the name 'philosophy of science' which also appears to deal with like entities, called concepts; and the names of the subject-matter of both are often the same, viz. causality, substance, matter, motion, space, time, etc. But there is a fundamental difference between it and philosophy proper. Unlike philosophy proper, the so-called philosophy of science never studies the concepts *in their autonomy*. It is concerned with the concepts in so far only as they are functional. If science had just postulated them the philosophy of science reflects on them-as-postulates. The validity of these concepts is still understood as conditioned (formally by their compatibility and materially by their place in the systems effected). There is no question of a philosophical intuition of their autonomy.

VII

Language in a new perspective

We have throughout treated language as secondary to thought. This is why we have rejected the two theses — (i) philosophy is the analysis of language, (ii) it is analysis *by* language. There is, however, an intelligible possibility of rehabilitating both the theses, but never in the line of logical positivism.

One may hold that language (speech) also is one of the *pramāṇas*. A sentence heard produces a cognition of what it means, and it is also conceivable that a speaker points to a reality directly through his speech. To consider the second case: the speaker does not *first* think and *then* express the thought in language. Language is not a ready-made cloak for thought to pick up and wear. The very thought that is said to be cloaked is already speech implicitly. Thought and implicit speech may not be different, and overt speech may be self-concretion of the implicit. As for knowing something through a speech heard, this is possible presumably because speech could directly refer to realities. Particular words as conventions have indeed no intrinsic capacity to refer to specific particular things, and similarly with particular conventional rules of syntax. But that the word or the syntax means *something*, whatever it may be empirically, is an *a priori* law. If words and syntaxes had not this intrinsic function they could not be utilised by thought; and, further, this function of words and sentences cannot be explained by empirical association, association explaining only that the word means a particular definite object, and the syntax a particular definite relation.

If language itself be a *pramāṇa* there would be nothing against the thesis 'philosophy is analysis *by* language', for on this hypothesis thought and language are identical.

It would be difficult also to resist the other thesis, viz. that it is the analysis of language', for 'analysis of language' may mean, like 'analysis of concepts' in the statement 'Philosophy is the analysis of concepts', that pure autonomous forms of language, in their interconnexion, emerge to our view through philosophical analysis.

All this is by way of tentative suggestion which it is impossible to develop here. Its implications and requirements, however, should be clearly perceived. One will have to prove in more

rigorous details that speech and thought are identical, prove also that memory, inference, etc., are only ways of speaking, and decide also whether perception is mere speech or something more. A *prima facie* case has, however, been established, for the semantic business of language and its syntactical forms stand very close respectively to thought's reference to objects and the operational forms of thought. Add to this the possibility that the object meant is only a function of language, much as it was of thought in the old-world philosophy, and we have an idea of a full-fledged ontology of language which was probably in the mind of the older-world philosophers of Logos or *Śabda*.

Social Philosophy in the Nuclear Age

by

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1. The Purpose of This Paper

Today, as always, two basic problems confront *Homo sapiens* wherever he may turn. The first is, of course, the metaphysical: responding existentially to the many dangers which beset him every step of his perilous journey, and yet, at the same time, utterly amazed at the sheer wonder and glory of the intriguing mystery which surrounds him, man, in spite of all the positivistic anathemas and attempts at exorcism, cannot rid himself of the creative impulse which drives him to construct world hypotheses; some of which, like children's mud houses, last only until the next tide sweeps them away, while others, like cathedrals and skyscrapers, defy the ages.

The second problem is the social, growing as it does out of man's nature as a social being, out of the nature and deeper significance of his social institutions, and out of his desire to live meaningfully as a human being endowed with a spark of reason and a glimpse of the Moral Imperative. Suffice it to say that, even though the first problem is the most fundamental, the second, especially in terms of this dynamic new age into which we have just stumbled, is by far the most pressing; and since it increasingly concerns thoughtful men everywhere—interested as they undoubtedly are in the survival of man as the bearer of values—philosophers cannot afford to remain indifferent.

At any rate, it is this problem which we propose to consider in terms of that very important, though often neglected, aspect of philosophy known as social philosophy. Moreover, some attempt will be made to view social philosophy itself from the standpoint of its two fundamental aspects, that is, the theoretical and the practical.

2. The Nature of Social Philosophy

In order to understand the real nature of social philosophy, perhaps it is best to begin by considering its relationship to the social sciences. By the latter we mean, of course, history, political science, sociology, social psychology, and economics. Since space prohibits a consideration of its precise relation to each of the above, and since, as a matter of fact, for our purposes at least, the basic method involved in all the social sciences is essentially the same, it must suffice to consider them as a group.

Thus, it is evident that, while it is the primary function of the social scientist to understand the phenomena under consideration in order that he may describe them as accurately as possible and perhaps even venture to predict and make an attempt at control, the social philosopher must, of necessity, go much deeper. Beginning where the former ends, the latter not only tries to lay bare the basic structures and fundamental presuppositions upon which man's life as a social being rests, but he also attempts the much greater and more difficult task of viewing all the social aspects of human life in their totality; for philosophy, in all its various phases, is always in the end essentially integrative. Only in this manner, in fact, can the social philosopher venture his more comprehensive generalizations, theories, and hypotheses.

Perhaps it is well to observe at this particular juncture that, insofar as the social philosopher aims at this totality or larger perspective, his work parallels that of the philosopher of history: the only real difference being that, while the second is primarily interested in the general patterns occurring in the social and historical process as a whole and in its final or ultimate meaning, the first is more directly concerned with man as a builder of institutions and all that the latter ultimately imply. The real truth of the matter, however, is that the relationship between these two aspects of philosophy is so close that it is impossible, as the history of philosophy clearly shows, to find any real line of demarcation.

Coming back to the relation of social philosophy to the social sciences, it is clear that the former, unless it is interested in building its castles in the air, must ground its theories in facts supplied by the latter. At the same time, however, another basic difference must be emphasized; for, not only does social philosophy aim at a depth of analysis and a comprehensive synthesis or synopsis that goes beyond the ken of the social sciences, as we have al-

ready pointed out, but, whereas the social scientist is primarily interested in accurate description, the social philosopher, while always keeping clearly in mind the essential facts furnished by the former, must venture beyond description toward *evaluation*. This is, in truth, the most significant as well as the most venturesome aspect of his task.

In other words, while the social scientist need not go any further than an attempt at giving a strictly objective account of various democratic and totalitarian schemes, the social philosopher finds himself driven by a creative impulse to criticize, to evaluate, and even to attempt to reconstruct in the light of his vision of the ought as over against the is; and, it might well be added, that insofar as the former also finds himself moved in this direction, he really takes on something of the nature of the latter. Indeed, ultimately all the various disciplines, however great the value of the emphasis on their separateness may be for practical purposes, tend to interpenetrate; thus tending to give added credence to Hegel's well-known saying: "The truth is the whole".

Be that as it may, at any rate, in this whole endeavour at evaluation, the social philosopher has ample precedence. One need only mention the two greatest classics in the field, Plato's *Republic*, and Aristotle's *Politics*. Innocent of any signs of a positivistic and relativistic conscience that rises up in horror at the very appearance of evaluation, they were not afraid to exercise this highest and most difficult prerogative of the philosopher. The same thing is, of course, true of modern social thinkers from naturalists such as Hobbes (who, in spite of his relativism, had his vision of an ideal society) to idealists such as Kant, Hegel, and Royce.

In this light, the social philosopher is not only interested in what is, but even more in what ought to be and what might be; and, one is tempted to add, what must be in this dynamic age if man is to survive. In this respect, as a matter of fact, social philosophy joins hands with ethics, particularly that aspect known as social ethics. The former differs from the latter chiefly in its emphasis on such basic institutions as the state and in its attempt to develop comprehensive social and political theories.

Since the days of Plato and Aristotle, social philosophers have, indeed, been deeply interested in the nature and function of the state and all that it entails. Still, except for the extreme Machia-

vellians, who out-machiavelli Machiavelli himself, they have not regarded the state as an end in itself, but rather as a means to a higher end, that is, the realization of the good life. Here again we see the close connection between social philosophy and ethics.

It is clear, nevertheless, that political philosophy constitutes, as it were, the very heart of social philosophy. More than this, from this involvement in both ethics and politics stems the social philosopher's profound concern with such problems as the conquest of poverty, the abolition of war, and the establishment of a peaceful world order—problems which have never been more urgent than in this, the Nuclear Age. Besides if philosophical precedence is needed, it may be well to point out that, while Karl Marx and his disciples have shown an intense interest in the first, Kant and many modern and contemporary thinkers (Royce, Dewey, Hocking, Russell, Northrop, Radhakrishnan, etc.) serve as apt illustrations of philosophic concern for the other two.

3. The Social Philosopher as Teacher

There was a time when most philosophers, like most scientists, were inclined to stay aloof from any serious discussions of the burning social issues of the day. Some, under the guise of a false sense of sophistication, are still trying desperately to stay aloof. Others, especially the logical empiricists and the more extreme among the existentialists, are preoccupied: the former with the subtleties of logical analysis and semantics and the latter with such abstract concepts as being and nothingness. It is also evident that, in spite of the social maturity of men of the caliber of Dewey and Hocking, the average American philosopher is somewhat immature. This was painfully evident to this writer while attending the Fifth Interamerican Congress of Philosophy in Washington, D.C. during the summer of 1957.

So far as the actual teaching of social philosophy is concerned, three methods of approach are open. The teacher may play the role of dogmatist by attempting to force his own views on his students. This will induce many to follow him slavishly, some out of respect and others with an eye on certain favors. Others, however, including the more individualistic and gifted, will bitterly rebel in sheer desperation.

Again, the teacher may take the directly opposite course of neutralism. In other words, in spite of all the efforts of his students, he may never commit himself to anything whatsoever. Thus,

while boasting of his democratic impartiality, he may actually give the impression that he lacks creativity; or, worse still, that he is actually sceptical and cynical with no real concern for values. Moreover, if dogmatism tends to promote slavish conformity, sheer neutralism may lead to an ivory tower attitude; or, even to nothing short of outright confusion. Becoming lost in the maze of conflicting social philosophies, students may become little more than walking question marks. If mere conformity is dangerous, utter chaos is no less dangerous. Frederick Lilge, in his little book, *The Abuse of Learning*, has made one fact crystal clear: that the irrationalism, relativism, and the resulting confusion among German intellectuals helped prepare the way for Hitler. Long ago Socrates and Plato warned of the dangers of that totalitarianism which ever threatens to follow in the wake of the confusion produced by relativism.

Finally, the teacher may take the middle course, that is, between the Scylla of dogmatism and the Charybdis of neutralism. Thus, while trying to present the various points of view as clearly and objectively as possible, he may also present his own convictions and his reasons for them. More than this, if he is really creative in something of the Hegelian sense, he may even venture to present his own position in terms of a real endeavour at a comprehensive synthesis; and, if he is vitally concerned, he may go still further. In other words, he may actually venture out on the stormy waters of the contemporary scene by trying to interpret the issues of the day in the light of the philosophic perspective. This is, in fact, as rewarding as it is at once dangerous and necessary. At any rate, since the leaders of tomorrow are, after all, in our colleges today, the necessity is clear; for, if we do not give them some sense of direction, they will most certainly fail us when they find themselves in positions of responsibility in the years ahead—those fateful years which may well decide the destiny of man upon this planet.

4. An Experiment in Social Philosophy

Keenly aware of the philosopher's responsibility in this, the Nuclear Age, and dissatisfied with what had been done, about three years ago this writer drastically overhauled his course in social philosophy. As it is now being taught, it falls into three parts or natural divisions. The purpose of the first part is historical background in terms of an acquaintance with the greatest social philosophers from Plato and Aristotle to the present day.

Along with such classics as Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Politics*, good use is made of such books as Ellwood's *History of Social Philosophy*, Sabine's *History of Political Theory* (rev. ed.), and Chandler's *Clash of Political Ideals* (third ed.—now available in paper cover). The latter, in fact, serves as basic text for the entire course and is required reading for everyone.

With this serving as general background, the course moves on to a consideration of the three great systems which are struggling for the minds of men, namely, democracy, fascism, and Marxism. Along with an objective consideration of the nature of these systems, due consideration is given to the various totalitarian criticisms of democracy. This in turn is followed by an examination of these criticisms together with a presentation of the positive arguments in favour of democracy. Finally, an attempt is made, not only to view actual American policy in the light of its ideal, but also to formulate certain constructive proposals designed to correct the many glaring failures and weaknesses.

The third and final part deals with the problem of peace and world order. The discussion begins with the various philosophies which are not conducive to peace, chief among which are the materialistic philosophies of power so prevalent in the West as well as in the Soviet Union. After an effort is made to state the essentials of a philosophy of peace, the course moves on to a searching analysis of the present world situation. Next in line is an analysis of the causes of war in the light of such studies as Beard, *The Devil Theory of War*, Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, Toynbee, *War and Civilization*, and Wright's monumental work, *A Study of War*. The course ends with a consideration of certain positive proposals for peace.

What then have been the results of this threefold approach? While they have not been sensational, the reader can be sure that there has never been a lack of discussion—even heated discussion at times. One student even went so far as to say—though he was undoubtedly exaggerating—that it is one of the most widely discussed courses on the Campus. Be that as it may, this at least is the way in which one philosopher has tried to present his social concern to his students—in a time when mankind, as it were, seems to be hanging over the brink by a mere thread.

Pascal, Hobbes, and the Metaphysics of Anarchy

by

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• 1

Both Pascal and Hobbes regarded civil war as the prime evil and peace as the sovereign good; and both justified absolute monarchy by appealing to the need for peace. Had they been simply self-interested "conservatives", both could have advocated Divine Right, but their metaphysics and theories of knowledge embroiled them in active politics. Pascal's *Lettres Provinciales* are a principal document of the Jesuit-Jansenist controversy, but it is the political content of his notes for an "Apology for Christianity"—his *Pensées*—which we wish to examine here.¹ Here is a continuation of the Christian scepticism which begins with Arnobius, about a century and a half before Saint Augustine.² It presents a meaningful contrast to the almost contemporary system of Hobbes. . . . (*Leviathan* appeared in 1652; the *Pensées* were written between 1654 and 1662).

1. The text used is Pascal's *Pensées*: with an English Translation, Brief Notes and Introduction, by H. F. Stewart, N.Y., Pantheon Books, 1950. It offers a new organization, and face-to-face printing of the French and English texts. It includes the *Apology for Christianity*; the notes which Stewart calls "Adversaria", as lying outside the immediate scope of the *Apology*; and the *Notes pour les trois Discours sur la condition des Grands*. Numbers are section numbers in the text.

2. Of Arnobius (born ca. 260), Gilson comments: "What impresses Arnobius most in the Christian revelation is that it is for all a pressing invitation to intellectual honesty. This conviction is the real source of his alleged 'scepticism'. The personal experience of his conversion was still vivid in his mind when he wrote his *Apology*. . . . The fact that faith brings to them more truth than their intellect can investigate should help men to realize what they are: shapeless animals addicted to vain opinions, which comprehend nothing and cannot even see what lies before their eyes. This Arnobian man is an ancestor of the genuinely Christian family which comprises Montaigne and Pascal. We call them sceptics, but their scepticism is less a negation of the natural power of reason to know the truth than a reminder of its limits." *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, pp. 47-48.

Both Pascal and Hobbes feared anarchy; yet no purely empirical experience produces the idea of anarchy, for like the concept of a "self-conscious proletariat," it is a literary metaphor. Pascal's conception is metaphysical: "For I ask, what is man in Nature? A cypher compared with the Infinite, an All compared with nothing....Infinitely unable to grasp the extremes, the end of things and their principle are for him hopelessly hidden....What then is left to him but a glimpse of the mean of things, in eternal despair of ever knowing either principle or end?"³ In this situation, a man's only concern is personal salvation; and the prime function of a state is to maintain the peace requisite for this pursuit. Hobbes' analysis of anarchy is founded upon quite different views as to the nature of man.

Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he.⁴

The consequence of this equality is strife: "From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies;...."⁵ From this follows the anarchy of "natural man."

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre, and such a warre as is of every man, against every man....In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth....no commodious Building,....no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.⁶

With men as they are, it is clear to Hobbes that they must seek any means possible to end anarchy, for "the first, and Fundamentall Law of Nature....is, to seek Peace, and follow it," and the

3. Pascal, *Apology*, 43.

4. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Chap. XIII, p. 63.

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

second, "the summe of the Right of Nature....By all means we can, to defend our selves."⁷

In the context of his times, Hobbes' method (that of the "new science") is as literal as the content of his political theory; and in a like manner Pascal's social analysis reflects his methodology. Pascal's notes can be arranged into a standard Christian political philosophy, only slightly less complete than that of Saint Augustine.⁸ Man's estate is one of misery; but his original nature was such that if he were perfect he would be just and happy without the tempering mechanism of society. Man passed from this natural state to the present one through original sin; and the State is therefore a necessity. Recognizing this, good Christians obey the State, knowing that its imperfections will diminish as they work to make the earthly city a suburb of the Heavenly one. The Christian community is

a society of pilgrims of all languages, not scrupling about diversities in the manners, laws, and institutions whereby earthly peace is secured and maintained, but recognizing that, however various these are, they all tend to one and the same end of earthly peace. It (the Heavenly City) therefore is so far from rescinding and abolishing these diversities, that it even preserves and adapts them, so long only as no hindrance to the worship of the one supreme and true God is thus introduced. Even the Heavenly City, therefore, while in its state of pilgrimage, avails itself of the peace of earth....⁹

Each stage is reflected in the *Pensées*, the *Lettres Provinciales*, and the *Discours sur la conditions des Grands*, revealing the psychology which enabled him to draw upon both Augustine and Montaigne. Pascal's "logic" is polemical, and employed as a method of "education" both in the *Pensées* and the *Lettres Provinciales*.

In the state of natural ignorance, man accepts the State as he accepts the rising and setting of the sun; believes that the manners to which he is accustomed are universal; that the law is just; and that masters are intrinsically superior to servants. But once education commences, he finds that each of these is but a "facade." One could believe in justice if there were at least one universal

7. *Ibid.*, Chap. XIV, p. 67.

8. See: Demahis, Etienne: *La Pensée Politique de Pascal*, Université de Clermont, 1931.

9. Saint Augustine, *The City of God*, Book XIX, Chap. 17.

law, but "human caprice is such a medley that there is no such thing."¹⁰ If justice were known

one would see it implanted in all the Nations of the world and in every epoch; in place of which one sees nothing just or unjust that does not change this quality in changing location. Three degrees of latitude reverse all jurisprudence; a meridian decides truth. In a few years of possession [by a conquering power] the fundamental laws are changed. . . . A fine justice which is bounded by a river! Truth on this side of the Pyrenees, error on the other.¹¹

The source of this is Montaigne's "On Custom and That as Established Law is not Lightly to be Changed." His "Apology for Raymond Sebond" concludes a discussion of the absurdity of the dictum that "everyone should obey the laws of his country," with. . . "What truth can it be that these mountains bound, which is a lie to the people of the other side?"¹²

Having learned that the world is unjust, man seeks to discover the nature of justice; but "justice lies open to dispute,"¹³ and thus peace is, by default, the sovereign good. Moreover, any concept of justice which man's feeble reason can form will be false, and the Bible gives only the command to obey the laws of one's country. Pascal would have us agree on any means of ordering the world so long as it be simple and indisputable. He considers the whole problem of government to be trivial, and his examples are purposely trivial.

How right we are to distinguish men by outward appearance rather than by inward qualities! . . . Which shall give way? The less able? But I am as able as he; we shall have to fight it out. He has four lackeys, and I have but one. . . . This sets us at peace, which is the greatest of all blessings.¹⁴

By the same token:

The most unreasonable things in the world become the most reasonable because of man's lax attitude. Is there anything less reasonable than to choose a queen's eldest son to govern a state? We do not choose as captain of a ship the best born of the passengers. . . . who shall be chosen. . . . the most

10. Pascal, *Apology*, 401.

11. *Ibid.*

12. Montaigne, *Essays*, Ed. Garnier Frères, Paris, Livre II, Chap. XXI, p. 287.

13. Pascal, *Apology*, 416.

14. Pascal, *Notes pour les trois Discours sur la condition des Grands*, *Adversaria op. cit.*, 199.

virtuous and most able? At once we are at loggerheads. . . . So let us hang this attribute onto something that admits no dispute. The King's eldest son! That is clear, incontestable. Reason can do no better, for civil war is the greatest of all evils.¹⁵

What has this simple and indisputable quality? Force. . . But force appears less forceful when disguised as justice.

It is right that what is just should be obeyed; it is imperative that what is strongest should be obeyed. Justice without force is impotent; force without justice is tyrannical. Justice without force is flouted, because there is never any lack of delinquents; force without justice is condemned.

Justice lies open to dispute; force is easy to recognize and is undisputed. So we cannot wed force to justice, because force resists justice, saying that justice lies with her. And so, unable to bring it about that what is just should be strong, we have made the strong just.¹⁶

. . . being unable to compel force to follow justice, men have made it just to follow force; unable to give force to justice, men have justified force so as to unite justice with force and establish peace, which is the sovereign good.¹⁷

The psychological foundations of such power Pascal calls the role of the imagination. Once a dominant party has established itself by force, it wishes to end war without losing its position; so through popular election, primogeniture, or some other ruse, it cloaks its power in "justice". The situation thus changes from one in which power forced the facts to one in which it is secured. . . . and respected. . . . by "imagination". In France, "gentlemen" hold the power; in Switzerland it is the common citizens.¹⁸ Royal power is founded on a peculiar combination of public sense and public stupidity: "for there is nothing more sure than this, that the people will prove weak. That which is founded on sound sense is very ill-founded, e.g. the price set on wisdom."¹⁹

What makes the state possible is the ignorance which causes the people to do the right things for the wrong reasons. It is dangerous to reveal that the laws are unjust, for they are obeyed only because they are thought to be just.²⁰ The educated man

15. Pascal, *Apology*, op. cit., 414. See also *Notes*, 200.

16. *Ibid.*, 416.

17. *Ibid.*, 417.

18. Pascal, *Adversaria*, 194.

19. *Ibid.*, 210.

20. *Ibid.*, 197; and *Apology*, 405.

knows that "Justice is what is established",²¹ as fashion determines pleasure, so it determines justice as well.²² The learned man keeps his own council, judging things by "an idea in the back of one's head, . . . while speaking nevertheless like the people". The whole process is a "continual reversal for and against: We have shown that man is foolish in the esteem he pays to things which are not essential; and all these opinions are destroyed. We have then shown that all these opinions are very sound, the people are not as foolish as one might say. . . . But now it is necessary to destroy this last proposition, and show that it remains true that the people are foolish although their opinions are sound; because although aware of the truth, they are unaware of its proper place; and misapplying it, their opinions are always false and unsound".²³ As in the case of respect for persons of noble birth:

The people honor (them). The half-enlightened have contempt (for them). . . . The truly enlightened honor them in their private thoughts. The pious, who have more zeal than knowledge have contempt for them. . . . because they judge by the new light which piety gives them. But perfect Christians honor them by a superior light. Thus opinions replace each other, depending upon one's enlightenment.²⁴

But again he allies himself with Arnobius and Augustine: "true Christians respect the order of God, which, for the punishment of men, has subjected them to these follies".

2

Hobbes does not seek a definition of Justice or Right; for him there are only facts. Yet these supposedly empirical facts are themselves highly abstract. None of the terms he uses to describe the state of nature are terms of moral condemnation; for his method admits of no *a priori* idea of Justice. Hobbes claims to rely solely on the direct evidence of the senses; and he depicts men as acting in accord with true facts and their own interests, except when misled by false doctrines. For Hobbes, "To this Warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. . . . Justice, and Injustice are none

21. *Adversaria*, 198.

22. *Pascal*, *Apology*, 403.

23. *Pascal*, *Adversaria*, 208.

24. *Notes* (*Adversaria*, 190).

of the Faculties neither of the Body nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities, that relate men in Society, not in Solitude".²⁵ True Justice and Law are created by the rational utilization of the resources available in the original state of nature; i.e., rational men, the necessity of self-preservation, and the yearning for peace. The rational utilization of these resources is made possible by a covenant to surrender natural liberty—and by liberty Hobbes means only "the absence of external impediments"²⁶—in return for peace and protection. Such a "covenant of every man with every man"²⁷ is the Social Contract. Via the covenant, an artificial personality, the State, is born. "This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a 'commonwealth', in Latin *civitas*".²⁸ In this "person called a commonwealth", by the terms of the contract, a sovereign will is created. It is the sum of the surrendered will of every man, and may reside either in a monarch, an aristocracy, or an assembly of the people. The sovereign will define Justice: "Fear and liberty are consistent"²⁹ and no matter what the laws, those who obey them through fear are still free.

Hobbes has a heuristic preference for monarchy, on the grounds that it provides less opportunity for dissension, but concedes that aristocracy and democracy may sometimes be justified as the basis for the covenant. At one point he comes close to Pascal:

For the prosperity of a People ruled by an Aristocraticall or Democraticall assembly, commeth not from Aristocracy, nor from Democracy, but from the Obedience, and Concord of the Subjects; nor do the people flourish in a Monarchy, because one man has the right to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in any kind of State, the Obedience, (and consequently the Concord of the People), and they shall not onely not flourish but in short time be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience, to doe no more than reforme the Commonwealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish daughters of *Peleus* (in the fable); which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit Father, did by the Counsell of *Medea*, cut

25. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Chap. XIII.

26. *Ibid.*, Chap. XXI.

27. *Ibid.*, Chap. XVII.

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Ibid.*, Chap. XXI.

him into pieces, and boyle him, together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man";³⁰

3

The two chief scientific influences upon Hobbes were Galileo and Bacon, both of whom emphasized observation: Bacon by his attempt to reject Scholastic Aristotelianism, and Galileo by his unique experimental approach. By contrast, Hobbes saw no value in the work of Descartes (with whom he corresponded); and he was so mistrustful of anything that did not have its "originall" in primary sense data, that he made many attempts to disprove Descartes' analytic geometry. "*When a man Reasoneth*", writes Hobbes, "hee does nothing else but conceive a summe totall, . . . Reason in this sense, is nothing but *Reckoning*".³¹ Science is "a knowledge of all the Consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand. . . the knowledge of consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another. . . ." ³² The passions are the addition and compounding of certain vital motions peculiar to life; circumstances which are favourable to these motions give us pleasure, circumstances unfavourable cause us grief. The impetus to create a State, to "covenant together" is, for Hobbes, an obvious consequence of the motion of bodies (individual corporeal wills); and the positive exertion of the aegis of the sovereign was what "added" these motions of many wills into one will.

For Pascal, just as for Hobbes, the "new science" influenced much of the content of his political theory. Yet the relation of Pascal's theory of knowledge to his political theory is very different. Pascal is the "Arnobian man"; the contradiction between Reason and Ultimate Truth is not that Truth *must* contradict Reason, but that Truth is what Faith adheres to after Reason exhausts itself. The Reason of which Pascal writes is essentially Cartesian; although unlike Hobbes, he rejects not the method, but the results as "useless and uncertain".³³ Useless, because Descartes relegates God to the status of Prime Mover, and Pascal knows from personal experience that God is and does more; and uncertain because "The last step that Reason takes is to recognize that there is an infinity of things which go beyond it. Reason

30. *Ibid.*, Chap. XXX, p. 180.

31. *Ibid.*, Chap. 5, p. 18.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

33. *Apology*, 286.

is a poor thing indeed, if it does not succeed in knowing that".³⁴ In the end he approaches Hobbes: "Two things instruct man of his nature; instinct and experience"; nevertheless he insists that "we have an inability to prove, invincible to all dogmatism. We have an idea of truth, invincible to all skepticism". Pascal's faith makes it impossible for him to find a rational basis for political life, yet for heuristic reasons peace must be maintained, because only peace frees men to seek salvation through faith.

The firmness of his system is a mark of Hobbes' political acumen: Pascal's accomplishment is that he held fast to his Christian values without being forced to acknowledge any truth in the haphazard constructions of human society. His "scepticism" is clear and straightforward:

I lived much of my life believing that there was a Justice, and in that I was not mistaken for it does exist in the manner God has vouchsafed to reveal it. But that is not how I accepted it, and here I was mistaken; for I thought that our justice was essentially just, and that I possessed the means to know it and weigh it. But I have found myself so often wanting in right judgment that at last I have come to mistrust myself, and then others. I have seen all countries and men changing, and so after many changes in judgment concerning true justice, I recognized that our nature was but a continual changing, and I have not changed since; and if I were to change, it would confirm my opinion. The Pyrrhonian Arceselous turned dogmatist again."³⁵

34. Pascal, *Apology*, 49. See also *Ibid.*, 285-285a

35. Pascal, *Apology*, 406.

Fundamentals of Axionoetics

by

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Axionoetics or Axiology of Knowledge is interested in a valuational study of knowledge in all its various forms — science, philosophy, literature, art etc. — as products of human intelligence.

Axionoetics is based on the following three fundamental considerations: (1) The human intelligence is essentially valuational in its nature. (2) There is a fundamental idealism of human knowledge as such, which is distinct from the traditional epistemological and metaphysical idealism, and according to which knowledge is absolutely prior to reality. (3) The immediate and universal recognition of values constitutes the only reliable principle of the evaluation of knowledge, with a view to reaching a unity and continuity in human knowledge out of a chaotic accretion of the present state of knowledge.

Let us discuss them in order.

The popular belief that the dividing line between brutes and human beings is the possession of intelligence by the latter is progressively proved to be wrong by studies in comparative psychology. Intelligence, as psychology understands it, consists in an ability to learn through trial and error or through insight, and profit by experience. But such intelligence is found in all animals in different degrees. Dogs, monkeys and elephants are certainly the most intelligent among the beasts.

It is the contention of Axionoetics that proper understanding of the nature of human intelligence is not possible through such descriptive sciences as Psychology, Biology and Anthropology. We must make an axiological approach. The clue for human intelligence is found in its highest function of creativity, appreciation and systematization of values. The naturalistic explanation based on causal determination, though useful in other fields, including animal psychology and an extensive portion of human psychology, is not applicable with reference to the highest modes of human intelligence. There may be physico-chemical explanation in terms

of bodily build and blood chemistry and endocrine glands of the abnormals, of the dull and of the average human beings, but such explanation cannot be final and complete at least in the case of geniuses in the fields of science, philosophy, art and morals. And even in the case of normal men, an experience and recognition of values is not explicable in wholly naturalistic way. Human intelligence is largely insentient (*jaḍa*), but there is an innate potentiality in it of transcending this insentience, of going beyond the chain of mechanical determinations. The intelligence is at its real best when it enjoys the freedom of creation. Neither appreciation of necessity nor recognition of valuational discrimination (*viveka*) is either mechanically determined or naturalistically explicable. Human intelligence, therefore, essentially consists in valuational discrimination between the eternal and the transient, the good and the pleasant, the absolute and the relative, the ultimate and the provisional, the intrinsic and the instrumental, the ideal and the actual and so on. Whatever other abilities the beasts may have in common with human beings, the sense of values appears to be a differentiating characteristic of human beings. While the beasts are devoid of such a sense, the function of valuational discrimination is definitive of human intelligence.

It is in the light of this understanding of the nature of human intelligence that we can have a proper appreciation of human intellectual achievements in the fields of science and literature, morals and religion, philosophy and art. These are the diverse forms of human knowledge. Axionoetics undertakes to apply the concept of value which is so original to intelligence for a critical evaluation of human knowledge in this most comprehensive sense.

Coming to the second point, Axionoetics emphasises the inevitable priority of knowledge over reality. Its interest in showing this is that we are concerned directly with knowledge and nothing else. That a proper object for our valuation is knowledge only as we do have it.

Tattvajñāna, which is the word used in Sanskrit for philosophy, literally means knowledge of reality. The expectation is that there should be knowledge of reality as it is (*yathārtha*), and hence the appropriateness or validity of knowledge is ultimately determinable in terms of reality. But in spite of this very common and natural expectation, the fact remains that the only

way to reality is through knowledge. We have only to postulate or to hope that knowledge does conform to reality. There is no means of comparing knowledge with reality to ensure that knowledge faithfully represents reality, nor do we know that knowledge does not conform to reality. Therefore, we naturally think that knowledge is of reality, and also that it ought to conform to reality. A man does not have first an access to reality and then judge whether knowledge has made an access to it. There is no passage from reality to knowledge, but only from knowledge to reality. The proper function of philosophy is not to attempt a knowledge of what is originally given to be real. That is impossible. Its real function is contained in what Jñāneśvara has called *Anubhavāmṛta*. (This is the title of his philosophical work). Philosophy consists in a search of the immortal reality possessing the maximum value by a critical evaluation of one's own experience. We are directly aware of our own experience which constitutes our knowledge. By a gradational valuation of that knowledge, we reach the most valuable in that knowledge. It is to that knowledge which constitutes the summum bonum for us that we give the name of reality. Therefore, even though the word *tattva* comes first and the word *jñāna* comes afterwards in the composite term *tattvajñāna*, it is the latter through which alone the former could at all be approached. Reality is called the object of knowledge only because there is no other method of approaching it except knowledge."

The above is a brief statement of what I propose to call Axionoetic Idealism. The absolute priority of knowledge must not be understood to be a stale statement of hackneyed idealism. For, the statement does not refer to what Axionoetics believes to be a secondary problem in epistemology, e.g. the relation between knowledge and reality, which the traditional idealism solves by saying that reality is dependent on knowledge, and realism solves by saying that reality is independent of knowledge. Even if we grant that neither of these positions is verifiable in the logical-positivist sense, both of them must be looked upon as genuine cognitive pieces of knowledge, in terms of which alone the status of reality is attempted to be determined. Both idealism and realism are aspects of a more fundamental and more comprehensive idealism, according to which the determination of the independence or dependence of reality in relation to knowledge is itself a form of knowledge through which alone we approach reality. Even if the realist proves his case, he has only shown

that his knowledge ultimately decides that reality is independent of knowledge.

Had it been the case that between reality and knowledge it is the right of reality to determine knowledge, that reality is the original source from which alone knowledge springs, that in order that knowledge may become possible at all there must be a prior being of reality, that the most natural procedure is from reality to knowledge,—it is really very difficult to see why in spite of the unity of reality from which automatically a unity of knowledge ought to follow, there is only a prevalence of a diversity of knowledge supposed to be of the same reality. The unity of reality is irreconcilable with the variety of knowledge. Our expectation of a unitary knowledge is thus frustrated. Why are there differences in the philosophical positions like monism, dualism, pluralism, atomism, monadism, spiritualism, materialism and so on? Reality is one but the sages describe it variously.¹ The reason is that it is not a fact that reality determines as to how the sages should describe it. The fact rather is that it is the sages or philosophers who are trying to determine that reality through their conjectures and imaginations.² There is no royal road from the palace of reality to knowledge, but only circuitous lanes and bylanes of opinions from the huts of humble sages to the palace of reality. If the term knowledge is to be reserved for unitary, universal, absolute, ultimate and final knowledge, then I am afraid, we have no knowledge but only opinions, without there being an apparent prospect of elevating the status of opinions to that of knowledge.

In spite of the scathing criticism made by Śankarācārya of the hypothetical nature of intellectual knowledge and his recommendation of a direct intuitive knowledge, we are still faced with the diverse philosophical formulations of these original intuitions which do not seem to validate themselves. The question is not whether we have a rational or an intuitive knowledge. Whatever form the knowledge may take, it is through that only that the gateway to reality is opened to us. Reality does not intuit itself, nor does it offer a rational explanation of itself; it is for the knower either to reason or to intuit, and thus take a step towards reality.

1. Ekam sat viprā bahudhā vandanti, Rgveda.
2. Ekam santam bahudhā kalpayanti, Rgveda.

The question of existential priority between reality and knowledge is similar to that of their relation of dependence. Whichever way we may settle it, the priority of knowledge is unquestionable. The existential priority of reality may be a sounder proposition, yet that has to be first established in knowledge. The two famous orders of *ratio essendi* and *ratio cognoscendi* are the two forms of fundamental cognition. The prior existence of reality is not first asserted by reality and only acknowledged by knowledge later on; but it is first revealed by knowledge, and in so revealing, knowledge recognises its own secondary position too. It is in this most fundamental sense that knowledge is absolutely prior.

This position of Axionoetic idealism must also be distinguished from Metaphysical idealism. Idealism in Metaphysics asserts that the qualitative nature of reality is spiritual. It is antagonistic to materialism as a theory of the nature of reality. But Axionoetics declares that both spiritualism and materialism are forms of knowledge, through which alone the question of the nature of reality is approached and attempted to be solved. Their metaphysical validity is of no immediate importance for Axionoetics. Both of them cannot escape being theories of reality, and as such primarily cognitive in essence. Even if materialism is justified, Axionoetic idealism is not defeated thereby. For, whether reality is spiritual or material in character is an open question before human knowledge, and the decision that it is material is taken within human knowledge. It is this inevitability of the priority of human knowledge in relation to any question regarding reality that fundamentally favours the position of Axionoetic idealism. Reality does not assert its material character, it is for human knowledge to fathom it in order that its nature may be known.

The only approach to reality, therefore, is through our knowledge. Hence the question of validation of knowledge becomes supremely important. The various criteria of truth which are usually suggested have their own limitations. Self-consistency of knowledge leads to solipsism, correspondence to agnosticism and workability to relativism. Knowledge, in order to be valid, has at once to be self-consistent as well as consistent with reality and with practice. The various methods of knowledge like authoritarianism, empiricism, rationalism, intuitionism and pragmatism are not independently self-sufficient. Playing their valuable but limited role in the building of knowledge, and without

proving themselves to be superfluous they have necessarily to fall back upon the principle of self-validity of knowledge, because extrinsic validity of knowledge leads to infinite regress. But what does the principle of self-validity mean? Any knowledge, as it arises and when it arises, is true. The very conditions which originate knowledge also determine its validity. This position, however, does not guarantee the absolute validity of any knowledge, for there is always a possibility of any knowledge being contradicted by another. Progress in scientific knowledge, for example, is by sublation of the previous knowledge. Moreover, the principle of self-validity of knowledge suggests that all knowledge is equally valid. But the sense yet prevails that it is not so. Hence the need of a procedure for valuation of knowledge.

Here we come to the last point of great importance. What we know are the various theories in science and philosophy, religion and art through which we are making an approach to reality. We must believe in the internal unity and continuity of all human knowledge in which these varieties of theories are maintained. The question is of finding a method of organising this knowledge in a unitary system. There appears to be no better way than to fall back upon the basic experience which we have of value, in term of which we sit in judgment upon all forms of human knowledge. Recognition of human values has an advantage of being immediate and universal and therefore it offers a point of departure, a foundation that is beyond controversy, a criterion that supports itself. The differences among the axiological theories, including the positivist emotive theory of values, do not affect the assertion that there are such values.

How all human intellectual achievements stand in relation to these values and how in terms of these values those achievements could be evaluated is one of the central problems of Axionoetics.

At present human knowledge appears to be a big buzzing chaotic mass without there being any principle of organization. Each science goes its own way, little bothering how it affects other sciences, much less other human interests. Physical sciences and social sciences are not progressing on a par, sometimes they appear to be going at tangents. Scientists and artists, politicians and moral reformers, men of literature and of religion, appear to be occupied so much with their own pursuits that they little appreciate the possibilities of other valuable approaches and viewpoints. They have their own systems of values which con-

stitute their different 'ethoses' within which alone they move. But how does the ethos of physical sciences compare with the ethos of social sciences, where does the ethos of literature and art agree with that of science and where does it differ, in fact what is the possibility of a coordination of all these different ethoses and on what basis is it to be achieved, is a very important problem for Axionoetics.

Nobody feels the necessity and responsibility of building a unity of all knowledge which the unity of human life and existence makes it desirable to achieve. Such an integral view is made possible by a belief in the sanctity of all human values. To attempt this is the supreme task of Axionoetics.

Do We Explain ?

By

G. R. MALKANI

The ideal of explanation is the perception of necessity. The conclusions of formal logic may be said to have this necessity. Reality cannot be said to have any such necessity. It cannot be formally deduced from some other reality or contained in it. Reality must be just in itself. If it is related to some other reality, the relation cannot be a necessary one.

Reality is sometimes said to be caused by some other reality. But the causal relation explains nothing. If the cause is identical with the effect, there is nothing to explain. If it is not identical, no explanation is given as to how one thing can issue out of another. The law of reason is the law of identity. Being cannot come out of non-being, and vice-versa. If the cause ceases to exist before the effect arises, this law of reason is violated. As a matter of fact, if we are strict with this law, that which does not exist cannot come to exist, and what does exist cannot cease to exist. Real existence is eternal existence; and all appearances to the contrary are just *māyic*, pointing to the illusory character of all those things which appear to come into being or to go out of being.

Satkāriya-vāda, according to which the effect already exists in the cause, cannot explain the difference between the cause and the effect; and *asatkāriya-vāda*, according to which the effect is non-existent in the cause, cannot explain how one thing can come out of another or how being can come out of non-being. It is true that things happen in a certain way. But their happening cannot be rendered *intelligible*, and must be pronounced *māyic*.

Can we replace the causal relation by the logical relation of ground and consequent? The ground literally contains the consequent. The temporal relation of cause and effect can also be interpreted in these terms. The real cause is the entire cause, which cannot be divided from its effect by any interval of empty time. The real cause is the effect. If there is a relation between

the two, it is the relation of identity. More generally, the time-factor is illusory. Everything is as it eternally is in the whole. Nothing really happens there, and nothing is caused to exist. What is, eternally is? The idea of *necessity* is irrelevant to reality. Reality either is or it is not. When we say of a thing that it is, we have said all that is relevant and all that is intelligible. No further explanation is needed. It will be futile to reduce the 'is' into a 'must'.

If we accept this view, we cannot consistently demand an explanation for the existence of anything whatsoever. The only relevant question to ask would be, does the something in question really exist or does it only appear to exist illusorily? The whole question of explanation is thus simplified. Explanation is not only unavailable in the domain of reality, but the very demand for it is illegitimate. Philosophy need not explain, and it does not explain. To require it to explain is to misconceive the role of Philosophy.

Now we may all admit that there is some mystery about the world of our experience. This mystery requires to be resolved. We find that there is nothing eternal here. Things happen. They are in time. Their happening is a mystery to us. We seek to understand this happening by getting at the laws of the occurrence of things. The laws themselves are mere statements of facts. They do not explain anything. The mystery of the whole drama of the world-process thus remains. Science cannot help us in resolving this mystery. Can philosophy help? We think that it can, and it does.

Philosophy has a well-defined programme in this connection. It can prove certain things, and taken together they resolve the mystery:

(a) Philosophy can show that there is a reality which is eternally true, and which therefore offers no problem. There is no mystery about it.

(b) Secondly, it can show that what does not eternally exist does not *really* exist. It does not exist in the beginning, it does not exist in the end, and it only *appears* to exist in the middle. It is not substantial in character,—it only appears to be so. It is not being *in-itself*,—it is dependent being only.

(c) Thirdly, what appears to exist but does not really exist is what we call *illusory*.


(d) Fourthly, the illusory is by its very nature inexplicable. It is not explicable in terms of the real, because it has no real relation with it. It is perhaps explicable in terms of the illusory. But then we are not going beyond the illusory or explaining the illusory as such.

(e) Fifthly, there is no mystery about the illusory once it is exposed. We know that the illusory does not exist and its appearance to the contrary can be traced to a subjective error. In terms of objective reality, the illusory snake exists as little as the square-circle. There are no degrees of reality. So far as the subjective error is concerned, that too offers no problem. The perception of the illusory is itself an illusory perception. It is only an appearance of perception,—not a real perception. No one can claim that he perceived a snake, when the snake itself has been cancelled as illusory.

(f) Lastly, all so-called explanations belong to the realm of the illusory. There can be no explanation of the illusory as such. Once therefore our experience is analysed into the real and the illusory, the problem of explanation ceases to have any meaning. Neither the real nor the illusory poses any further problem.

The concept of *māyā* in Advaita Vedānta thus does not literally explain. If it explains, it explains in the sense that it does away with the problem of explanation itself. All it does is to show that in our experience which is eternally real and that which is illusory. It is in this sense a designatory concept (it gives things their correct ontological designation). It is not literally an explanatory concept. But it does all the work that is expected of explanation at lower levels. Explanation removes a problem. So does the concept of *māyā*. For as soon as we recognise the illusory, we are free from the illusory. We have no further problem.

We conclude that Advaitism does not literally explain anything. It lifts the whole problem of explanation to a higher level. It resolves the mystery of being, and that leaves no problem on our hands.



Books Received

1. Experience and the Analytic (A Reconsideration of Empiricism) by Alan Pasch, published by the University of Chicago Press, price \$ 6/50.
2. Religion and the Scientific Outlook by T. R. Miles, published by George Allen and Unwin Ltd., price 21 s./- net.
3. Revelation Through Reason by Errol E. Harris, published by George Allen and Unwin Ltd., price 15 s./- net.
4. The problems of perception by R. J. Hirst, published by George Allen and Unwin Ltd., price 30 s./- net.
5. The Edicts of Asoka, Edited and translated by N. A. Nikam and Richard McKeon, published by The University of Chicago Press, price \$ 1/75.
6. The Evolution of the Samkhya School of Thought by Dr. Anima Sen Gupta, published by the Authoress at Patna, price Rs. 6/-.
7. The Philosophy of Whitehead by W. Mays, published by George Allen and Unwin, price 25 s./- net.
8. The concept of morality by Pratima Bowes, published by George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., price 21 s./- net.
9. The Religion of the Buddha and Its Relation to Upani-
sadic Thought by Bahadurmal, published by Vishveshvaranand
Vedic Research Institute, Hoshiarpur, price Rs. 4/50 nP.
10. Great Thoughts of Great Men or Ideas and Ideals, by
Sain Das, published by V. Vedic Research Institute at Hoshiarpur,
price Rs. 3/50 nP.
11. The Psychological Contribution of Dr. Sigmund Freud, by
C. T. Bhopatkar of S. B. Garda College of Navsari, price Rs. 6/-

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