

448

Philosophical

Quarterly

Jan 1959

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THE
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XXXI, No. 4]

[January, 1959

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448

OF

THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

AND

THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS


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
Yearly Subscription Rs. 6

For Congress Members Rs. 5

Foreign 10 Shillings or \$ 2-50. Single copy Re. 1-50 or 3 Shillings

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

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[January, 1959

The Real, the Unreal and the Illusory

by

S. C. CHATTERJEE, *Calcutta University*

In the Advaita Vedānta Brahman is real and this world of many objects is false or illusory (*Brahma satyam jagat-mithyā*). Much confusion and misunderstanding seem to have gathered round the idea of the world as '*mithyā*' or illusory. Although the English words 'false', 'illusory', 'unreal', etc. are generally used to translate the word '*mithyā*', yet in Western philosophy they bear a meaning which does not exactly correspond to what '*mithyā*' means in Advaita Vedānta. In Western thought the false or the illusory was once, and even now is, understood by many as non-being or non-entity, or at least as an unreal and fictitious entity. But in none of these senses is the world regarded as '*mithyā*' by Advaitins like Śaṅkara. They have made and upheld a clear distinction between the real (*sat*), the unreal (*asat*) and the false or the illusory (*mithyā*), using the last word in a distinctive technical sense. The object of this paper is to show (i) that the '*mithyā*' or illusory has a peculiar status of its own as distinct from the real and the unreal, and (ii) that although the Advaita Vedānta view of the world as illusory is criticised and condemned by many modern thinkers as absurd and world-negating, yet some contemporary Western systems of philosophy are slowly but steadily approximating to it in certain ways and respects which are indeed less apparent but not less convincing.

What the nature of the illusory object is depends on what one's conceptions of reality and unreality are. This is the reason why the status of the illusory object is different in different systems of philosophy with their different theories of reality and, conse-

quently of unreality. For common-sense realism, the real is that which is perceived by us, but exists independently of our experience in the external world of space and time. Illusory objects, although perceived by this or that individual, have no independent existence of their own in the world of space and time, nor can they be experienced in the same or similar way by all individuals. Hence they are regarded as unreal by the naive or common-sense realists. But if illusory objects do not exist in the common world of space and time and yet are given in our experience, where are we to place them? The common-sense or natural realist would say that they exist only as subjective states or ideas of our mind, which have no counterparts in the objective spatio-temporal world. Here, then, illusory objects are reduced to the status of subjective ideas which have no being except in the mind and are, therefore, regarded as unreal and unsubstantial entities.

The status of an illusory object is no better in the system of subjective idealism. For the subjective idealist reality consists of mind and its ideas. All objects of the world are only ideas of our minds, wrongly taken for external, material things. The existence of an object lies, as Berkeley said, in its being perceived, or as the Yogācāra would say, in the consciousness of it, since its existence is inseparable from its perception or consciousness. Just as in cases of dreams and hallucinations, a man fancies to perceive things outside, though they do not really exist there, so the objects which appear to be out there, are really ideas in the mind. The object and the consciousness of the object are identical. Though really one, they appear as two owing to illusion, just as the one moon appears as two to some owing to defective vision. Hence all objects of the world are only ideas of the mind, and their perception as independent extra-mental entities is erroneous and illusory. Yet a distinction, which is more practical than metaphysical, can be made between the objects of perception and illusion. The objects of our normal perception, e.g. the so-called real table, or real sweetmeat, have certain causal connections with other bodies and minds, and have wider practical consequences for us and others; but we miss these characteristics in illusory objects like an imaginary table or imaginary sweetmeat. On this view, the illusory object is an unreal and fictitious entity lacking even the causal and practical efficiency of our common subjective ideas, the so-called objects of the world.

In the modern schools of Western realism like neo-realism and critical realism, we find the status of the false or the illusory

object much altered and improved so as to make it somewhat like that of 'mithyā' in Advaita Vedānta.

The American neo-realist theory of illusion is based on an important distinction between reality and being or subsistence. In American neo-realism, the realm of being comprises all actual and possible objects of thought. In this all-inclusive universe of being all things,—physical, mental and logical, propositions and terms, existent and non-existent, true and false, good and evil, real and unreal,—*are* or *subsist*. By the real, however, is meant the totality of propositions comprising the spatio-temporal system of 'events' or 'elemental particulars' together with all that is implied by that system. Hence while all things *are* and have being or subsistence, all things are not real. Illusory objects are not real because they do not form any part of the spatio-temporal system, nor are they logically implied by that system. Still, they are not mental or subjective ideas. They do not, of course, exist in time and space like real physical things. But they are as good objects of experience as physical things and subsist in their own right in the all-inclusive universe of being; and their subsistence is not a status conferred on them by any mind. In American neo-realism the false or the illusory is thus found to be an unreal and yet objective entity which possesses being of a shadowy kind called subsistence. (*Vide The New Realism*). 448

In the American critical realism we find a different explanation of the problem of illusion, and a different account of the status of an illusory object which also is somewhat similar to the Advaita view of it. It is distinguished from other schools of realism by its peculiar view of sense-data. According to it, sense-data are neither physical nor mental entities. They are not existentially identical with the physical objects and their real qualities. Nor are they merely ideas or images of our mind. Sense-data are certain immediately given and actually perceived "character complexes" which are different from both physical objects and mental states. While both the latter exist in space and time, sense-data do not so exist and have no spatial and temporal relations. The critical realists, like George Santayana, think that the data are "essences" as distinguished from existences, and are universals and not particular facts or existents. In illusion the essences given to sense are instinctively imagined (i.e. perceived) by us to be out there and to exist in objects to which they do not really belong. The illusion consists in perceiving a datum to exist where it does not really exist. The illusory

object is thus a perceived content or datum wrongly referred to a real thing. (*Vide Essays in Critical Realism*).

Among the British neo-realists Samuel Alexander goes so far as to admit that an illusory object is a perceptible real entity which exists just as it is perceived, although not just *where* it is perceived. For him, illusory appearances are not subjective or mental products. They are perspectives of the real world. Everything which is illusory in illusion does actually *exist* in correspondence with the mental activity through which it is revealed, but the personal character of the activity dislocates the real object from its place in things, and refers it to a context to which it does not belong. 'Some of our objects', he says, 'are illusory; they are real so far as they are perspectives of Space-Time, but they contain an element introduced by our personality, and do not belong where they seem to belong. The world of illusions is the same as what we call the real world, but dislocated, its parts taken from their proper places and referred amiss'. Sometimes Alexander seems to go further and makes the illusory appearance not only real and objective elsewhere but as a constituent of the real thing to which it is referred. According to him, a thing is in itself a portion of Space-Time with a certain configuration and plan of combination of the motions which take place within it. But for our experience a thing is a synthesis of appearances in so far as it is a whole of presentations to our mind. These appearances may be real and mere appearances as well as illusory appearances. But if a thing, as Alexander holds, is a synthesis of all its appearances, and if the synthesis is not made by the mind but is in the thing itself, we are to say that illusory appearances belong, as real constituents, to the very thing in which they are perceived and to which they are referred by the mind. Alexander, however, shrinks back from this consequence and holds, perhaps inconsistently, that 'both real and mere appearances belong to the things apprehended, while an illusory appearance does not'. But on Alexander's view this much is certain that an illusory object is not a mere subsistent, nor an essence like a universal, but is an actually perceived existent entity which is real, at least, not unreal, even if it be wrongly related by us. (*Vide Alexander's Space, Time and Deity*).

In the absolute Idealism of F. H. Bradley reality is conceived as one comprehensive, coherent and self-pervading Experience. Reality is such that it does not contradict itself. Whatever contradicts itself cannot be real; it is a phenomenon, an appearance

of reality. The contradictory nature of the world shows that it cannot be real. Hence the world and all the things in it are mere appearances of reality; as appearances they fall within reality and somehow belong to reality. They are appearances because, on the one side, they are adjectives of reality, and, on the other side, they are adjectives which themselves are not real, being self-contradictory. All human knowledge, being concerned with appearances, therefore, gives us partial and fragmentary views of reality. What we know by means of thought and judgment, of course, refers to reality as the ultimate subject. But the adjectives or predicates which we apply to this subject do not give us the whole of reality, but a fragment thereof. Hence all human truths are partial errors and all errors are partial truths.

We are here especially concerned with Bradley's view of error and illusion. The problem of error, he admits, involves a dilemma. Error is the same as false appearance. It is neither real nor non-existent. In false appearance there is something attributed to the real which does not belong to it. If the appearance were mere naught, i.e. nothing, it could not be false. On the other hand, if it is or exists it must be real.

But for Bradley, all appearances, true as well as false, fall within reality and somehow qualify it. An appearance will be true when a content or idea is related to some fact which accepts its qualification. On the other hand, an appearance is false when it is content related to a reality with which it is discrepant and by which it is rejected. 'It is the collision of a mere idea with reality'. And yet it is and somehow belongs to reality.

But, then, the question is: How is it possible for false appearance to take its place within reality? Bradley's answer is this. A false appearance is discordant with the limited and particular aspect of reality which is taken as the subject and to which it is referred as predicate. But if we take a sufficiently wider view of reality and make it the subject, then the appearance will cease to be false and be found to belong to the larger reality or to reality as a whole. To illustrate: Take the subject as X (a b c d e ...) and let us say 'X (a b) is d'. This is false, because d is not present in the subject, and so we have a collision. But the collision is resolved if we take the subject, not as mere X (a b), but more widely as X (a b c d). In this case the predicate d becomes applicable. In this way reality *has* all those qualities and every arrangement which we seem to confer upon it by our

mere mistake. It not only owns the discrepancy of false appearance, but in its fullness and richness dissolves it in fuller harmony. But it is impossible for finite minds to know all the elements of the universe and all their possible conjunctions. So we cannot reconstruct in thought all our discrepancies and make them quite harmonious. We cannot understand how in the Absolute a rich harmony embraces every special discord.

For Bradley error is not the same as illusion. He makes a distinction between the two. "Everything", he says, "is error, but everything is not illusion". We have error where our ideas are not the same as reality, but give us appearances or partial views of reality. All our knowledge being such partial view is error. Now error in the sense of one-sided and partial view of reality or partial truth is necessary to our life. Our life would be impossible without such partial or finite truths. These are best suited to the practical needs and purposes of our life. Therefore we must have error always present in our life. But this presence entails some cases of illusion. We have illusion where, and in so far as, our experiences clash and conflict with one another, and lead to disorder, confusion, disappointment and pain. In it there is collision between our ideas and the course of events inasmuch as the ideas fail to lead to the expected experiences, and sometimes spell danger to our life. Thus error is false appearance which partially reveals, but is not the same as, reality, and which serves the needs of life. Illusion, on the other hand, is mere appearance which conflicts with false appearance and frustrates the practical ends and purposes of life. Although illusions exist here and there, our life and the world as a whole cannot be illusory. Appearances are appearances of reality and reveal reality in different degrees and measures. "There is no reality at all anywhere except in appearance, and in our appearance we can discover the main nature of reality". Reality is present in all appearances in different degrees and as diverse values. Reality is not an abstract being existing apart from and altogether transcending all appearances. It is in the appearances, and appearances are positively related to it as its adjectives. "There is no way of qualifying the Real except by appearances", and 'appearances can have being only in reality, for outside the Real there remains no space in which appearances could live'. (Vide F. H. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, 2nd ed.).

Let us now turn to the Advaita theory of 'mithyā'. In it that is 'mithyā', false or illusory, which is at first perceived as an

existent or objective fact, but is subsequently contradicted and negated by true knowledge of its substratum. The snake that one perceives in a rope in the dark or on account of defective eye-sight is 'mithyā' or illusory in this sense. The false or the illusory is logically defined as that which is distinct from both Being or Reality and Non-being or utter unreality. It is not mere non-being or negation, because it is given in our experience and is perceived by us, and has its basis in pure being; while mere non-being or negation, like a sky-flower, cannot be so given and perceived, and has no basis in being. Nor is the false same as being or reality, because it is contradicted and negated; while being or reality never is, and never can be, contradicted and negated. The false or the illusory is, therefore, an indeterminate entity which cannot be described as either real or unreal (*sada-sadanirvacanīya*) and yet it exists and is perceived as a fact.

Now applying this idea of falsity the Advaitins judge the world of our normal waking experience to be as illusory as the snake perceived in a rope or the palace seen in a dream. They, however, make a distinction between the two. Objects of dream or of ordinary sensory illusion have only an *apparent* existence (*prātibhāsika sattā*) which is contradicted by the objects of our waking or normal experience. But the world of our waking experience and its objects have a *practical and empirical* existence (*vyāvahārika sattā*). They serve the needs of our practical life and endure so long as our sense-experience continues, and are not, therefore, contradicted by our waking experience and its objects. Still, they are false or illusory in the sense that we cannot describe or determine them either as real or as unreal or as both. They cannot be both real and unreal, for that is unintelligible. They are not unreal, because they exist and are perceived. They are not real, because they involve change and contradiction. Of course, the world as a whole is not actually contradicted and negated for ordinary men like us; but that is only because of our ignorance of Brahman or the absolute reality which is the basis and support of the illusory world. Just as when we realise the nature of the rope which is its locus, the illusory snake disappears, so when we realise Brahman or the Absolute, the illusory world also would disappear; but not before that.

Since the illusory world is such that it is contradicted and cancelled by true knowledge of its real locus, it must be due to some positive ignorance (*bhāvarūpa avidyā*), because it is only the product of ignorance that can be negated by knowledge. The

ignorance is a positive principle which conceals the reality of an object and constructs, instead, the appearance of another object, as we find in the case of the illusory rope-snake. Hence the illusory object, the world as much as the snake, has no place in reality; it is not a part, aspect or manifestation of reality, though it apparently exists in and is sustained by reality. It does not exist anywhere except in reality—not however as a quality or adjective or appearance of it, but only as a false appearance *in* it. The relation between reality and the illusory object is neither positive nor negative, but only apparent and, therefore, strictly speaking, no relation at all. But, then, we should remember that the world has a positive, empirical and objective existence which is not unreal like a fiction or subjective idea, although it cannot be called real like the uncontradictory and uncontradictable absolute.

It will appear from all that we have stated above how some contemporary Western systems of philosophy are slowly approaching Advaita view of the false or the illusory in some respects, though they differ from it in others, and that perhaps at the cost of consistency. They no longer hold the old view that the false or illusory object is a subjective mental state or idea wrongly taken by us for an external object. In contemporary Western philosophy it is being increasingly recognised that an illusory object is not subjective or mental, but an objective fact perceived by us. (For a critical and comparative account of the Western theories of Truth and Error, see the writer's *The Problems of Philosophy* and *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*).

In American neo-realism what is illusory is objective, though unreal. It subsists of its own right in the world of being, independently of all experience; but it does not exist in space and time and is, therefore, unreal. But the difficulty in this view is that an illusory object is perceived by us as existing in space and time, and not merely as subsisting in a shadowy world of being. Hence we are to say that an illusory object exists and is perceived by us as much as a real thing, and cannot, therefore, be said to be totally unreal, even if it cannot be accepted as truly real.

The theories of illusion which we find in American critical realism and in Alexander, the British neo-realist, make an advance towards the Advaita position in one important respect. For them the illusory object is not merely a subsistent entity which does not exist in space and time, but is something which is actually

perceived by us in time and space. Then, for the critical realists, there is no error or illusion so far as our immediate experience of sense-data is concerned. The illusion arises when the immediately experienced data are instinctively referred by us to a locus or object to which they do not really belong. In similar way, Alexander holds that in illusion an actually perceived real object is dislocated from its place in things and related to another real to which it does not really belong. Thus these contemporary Western realists agree with the Advaitins in holding that the illusory object exists and is perceived by us. But the difficulty in their view is that they make an illusory object a complex of two elements wrongly related, namely, essence and existence (critical realists), or a real here and a real there (Alexander). From this it would follow that an illusory experience is a wrong combination of two experiences, namely, perception of essences or character-complexes and perception (or 'imagination in a broad sense' as the critical realists would say) of an existent object, or two different perceptions of two different reals at different places and times (as Alexander would have to say). But this will hardly explain the unitary character of an illusory experience which is one single perception of an object at the present time and place. Further, when the illusion is corrected, what we immediately feel is, not that something was wrongly related to something else, but that what was perceived to exist here and now did not really exist, and that it was due to our ignorance of the thing existing here and now. Now if one would, as one should, accept the deliverance of our immediate consciousness, one would be led to the Advaita view that in illusion ignorance conceals the nature of the existing object and produces in it the appearance of another object.

Bradley's analysis of error and illusion comes nearest to that of the Advaitin, though his metaphysical conclusions differ very much from those of the latter. Like the Advaitin he admits that error is false appearance which is not real in itself because it is self-contradictory, and that it is not non-existence because it exists as an objective fact. It is rejected by Reality because, being contradictory, it makes Reality discordant, while Reality is always concordant and harmonious. Like the Advaitin, he also draws a distinction between error which everything is, but which is necessary to our being, and illusion which causes pain, confusion and disappointment in our life. But while the Advaitin explains error and illusion as due to ignorance which conceals Reality and gives

rise to false appearances in it, Bradley takes them as manifestations of Reality and as somehow belonging to and qualifying Reality, in which their contradictions are reconciled and their discordance is absorbed. But, how the non-contradictory and non-relational absolute reality can contain contradictory things and relations is, as Bradley admits, beyond human comprehension and intellectual grasp. Further, if appearances are, as Bradley avers, partial manifestations of Reality, they are so far real; and we should call them real, and not false, appearances, only we are to remember that they are partial. A partial view of a thing is not false, so long as it is taken and treated as partial. But, then, everything even as appearance would be real and there could be no error or illusion anywhere in the universe. Bradley, however, could not go so far as this, and would condemn such a view as shallow pantheism. But for him, an appearance being a partial manifestation of reality is not, at least, wholly unreal.

One way out of this difficulty, and that is the Advaitin's way, is to say that while Reality is present everywhere, we in our ignorance fail to see it and, on the basis of it, construct instead, a world of many material things, bodies and minds, which exists and is perceived by us, and, therefore, is not unreal in the sense of being mere negation or nothing. At the same time, being impermanent and contradictory, it is rejected by Reality, and so cannot be called absolutely real either. Although Bradley would not accept just this position, he comes very near to it when he says that 'Reality is one Experience, self-pervading and superior to mere relations. Its character is the opposite of that fabled extreme which is barely mechanical, and it is, in the end, the sole perfect realization of spirit'. He goes on to say further that 'Reality is spiritual' and that 'outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality, and, the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real'. To one trained in the Vedāntic lore, this sounds like a remarkable note in the monistic music of Advaita.

Identity, Contradiction and Excluded Middle

by

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The purpose of this paper is to discuss briefly the alleged exceptions to the three widely recognised laws of thought. Such exceptions have been taken from time to time in the West,¹ and recently in India² by scholars in their attempts to defend some paradoxical positions, such as Buddhist *Sūnyavāda*, Vedantic Indeterminism, and some types of relativism and mysticism. It is proposed to show here that the alleged exceptions are only apparent, and that the paradoxes in Indian Philosophy can be explained consistently with the laws if they are carefully interpreted.

I

These laws are the three inseparable aspects of the principle of consistency governing thought which has to deal with things, propositions about things, and meanings conveyed by propositions. They may be, therefore, variously formulated. The principle of Identity:—If anything is (taken as) A, it is A (should be so treated); if any proposition is true, it is true; if a word is used in one sense in a context, it should be taken in that sense in that context. The principle of Contradiction:—Anything cannot be (in the same aspect or respect) both A and not-A; any proposition cannot be (in the same sense or respect) both true and false; a word cannot be taken in two opposite senses in the same context. The principle of Excluded Middle:—No thing can be neither A nor non-A (if A and non-A are relevant to that thing); no meaningful proposition can be neither true nor false; both of two contradictory meanings of a word cannot be rejected if relevant to a context.

These are but some of the possible explications of the ultimate laws which are presupposed tacitly by consistent thinking, in-

1. E.g. by F. C. S. Schiller (*Formal Logic*, Chap. X) and Mathematical Intuitionists.

2. E.G. by T. R. V. Murti (*The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, Chap. VI) and Shri Aurobindo (*The Life Divine*, pp. 333ff, et passim, American edn.).

cluding even these explications of the laws themselves and any consistent attempt to deny their validity. In Indian Philosophy we find more the many-sided implications and applications of the laws than any formal exposition of them.

But there is plenty of thread-bare discussion of these basic principles in diverse contexts, logical, epistemological and meta-physical, in the different systems. For example, identity is discussed in the contexts of *svabhāva*, *tādātmya*, *aikātmya*, *abheda*, *sāmānādhikarānya*, *paryāyatva*, *ananyatva* etc. Contradiction is discussed in the contexts of *virodha*, *vyāghāta*, *bādha*, *abhāva*, *ubhayābhāvābhāva* (non-existence of both) which last is the phase of Excluded Middle, and is what distinguishes contradiction from contrariety. Udayana briefly formulates the principles of contradiction and excluded middle together thus: If there is mutual contradiction (*paraspara-virodha*), there cannot be any identity of the opposites (*viruddhānām na ekatā*), nor any resort to anything other than these two (*na prakārāntarasthiti*).³ Buddhist logicians put the three principles together thus: The very first awareness of a thing "delimits it (*tat paricchinatti*), distinguishes other things from it (*tatonyad vyavacchinatti*), and implies the absence of a third kind (*trītiya-prakārābhāvam sūcayati*)".⁴

The formal and symbolic representations of the principles seem to be scarcely exceptionable. But as soon as we have to deal with concrete things there seem to arise all kinds of objections. It is worth while to ascertain at least the chief reasons for these. (1) Things are complex in nature. Nothing that forms the object of our thought, or the subject of a proposition is a simple point-instant entity. On the contrary, it has diverse parts or aspects, intrinsic and relational properties, abiding and changing, positive and negative characters which are innumerable. Unless we can isolate just a simple aspect of the thing for consideration at a time, the ideal identity is not reached, and contradiction is inevitable. (2) To complicate matters still further, every word used in a proposition is general and ambiguous (including even the definite, demonstrative like 'This'). It fails to

3. *Kusumāñjali*, Stavaka 3, verse 8.

4. Quoted in *Nyāyamaṅgalā* by Anandabodha (p. 40, Chowkhamba edn., 1901). For extensive Buddhist discussion of 'svabhāva' and 'virodha' see Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* with Dharmottara's and Durveka's coms., pp. 104ff., 116ff., 198ff., of Vol. II of Tibetan Sans. Works, Jayaswal Inst., Patna, 1955.

pin-point the particular aspect or respect considered, even though thought might have succeeded in isolating it. (3) The universe of discourse which helps the determination of the exact meaning intended by the speaker is too large and complex to be also exhaustively described along with the proposition. (4) The sympathy, rather empathy, needed for helping the understanding of the universe of discourse and the intended meaning of the speaker, is often rendered impossible by bias and prejudice.

All these conditions combine to give rise to the many apparent exceptions to the laws. So an apparently one, but logically multiple, subject like a pin may seem to justify such diverse and incompatible predicates as sharp (in respect of its point), not-sharp (in respect of its other parts), both sharp and not-sharp (in respect of its different parts), neither sharp nor not-sharp (in respect of its weight or colour to which tactual qualities are not relevant or meaningful, or even in respect of it as an undivided whole or as it is in itself which *cannot be described* as sharp or not-sharp). Unless attention is paid to the specific respects mentioned within brackets here, but usually left unmentioned to be understood, all the laws seem to be violated. Logically however each aspect of the pin has to be treated as a separate subject, and no violation occurs. The Jaina logicians, conscious of the composite and multiple nature of the world's objects, formulated thus the sevenfold schema of predication to do justice to the different aspects of each object of judgment:—S is P, S is not P, S is P and not P, S is indescribable, and then combining for greater comprehensiveness, the last with the first three successively, S is P and also indescribable, S is not P and is also indescribable, S is and is not P and is also indescribable. They took care also to qualify each of these seven forms of possible predication with the word '*syāt*', at the beginning, to indicate that it is true 'in some respect', holding as they did that only the Omniscient could have the irrelative, absolute knowledge of things and all these judgments were only partial and relative ones (*nayas*).

Ambiguity of words is another prolific source of apparent violation of the laws. 'Milton was the *writer* of *Paradise Lost*' is both true and false, because 'writer' means both 'author' and 'one who actually puts on paper or any other material the letter symbols'. Being blind Milton could not write in the second sense. But really there are two logical propositions here. Cleared of ambiguity they would be, 'Milton was the author of *Paradise Lost*',

which is true, and 'Milton was the person who put the *Paradise Lost* into letter symbols etc.' which is false. There is no violation of the principle of contradiction, then. Schiller based most of his criticisms of Formal Logic on Ambiguity. He did a great service by pointing out that unless words are taken in particular contexts in which the speaker uses them they have only 'potential' and not 'actual' meanings. So that even the so-called self-evident propositions like 'Two and two are four' cannot be true *a priori* without reference to the actual meaning of the assertor, and the facts concerned. Two little drops of liquid added to two more such stuff may make one big drop or two. Two and two do not make four if the judging mind does not combine them in a particular way so as to keep the units also distinct. Similarly 'No squares are circular' would be true only if it is asserted in a particular sense of 'square' viz. 'an equilateral rectangle', but it would be doubtful if 'square' means a 'park'. On such grounds Schiller challenges the axiomatic characters of the laws, formulated without reference to actual facts, and intention of the assertor. But they are accepted by him as the 'postulates' of thinking by which "we operate on reality". They "cannot be described as fictions so long as they work, so long as we judge it well to think before acting, to reflect on experience".⁵

While we are discussing ambiguity, we should also examine the two different meanings of the negative term not-A, in relation to A. In the abstract formulation of two contradictories it is usually said that they exhaust the entire universe. The question arises whether in any particular context two contradictories, like blue and not-blue, should be taken to exhaust the entire conceivable universe or only the universe of colours to which the terms are relevant. It is a great merit of Hegel to point out that two contradictories are meaningfully contrasted and related only as the opposite aspects of a next higher and more inclusive category. If it is true, then it is not reasonable to take not-blue to mean the entire universe conceivable, other than blue. This unrestricted sense also leads us to some absurdities. A rose may be said legitimately to be not-blue, but then how can it have fragrance, soft touch and weight etc. all of which would fall under not-blue?⁶ If we accept the restricted sense, that is that not-blue

5. Formal Logic, p. 133 (Macmillan, 1931).

6. Vide *Mind*, April 1957, Daya Krishna's art. "Law of Contradiction and Empirical Reality" where he makes this nice point,

means only not-blue colours, and that blue and not-blue exhaust only the universe of colours, we can, not only avoid such absurdities, but also explain away the so-called exceptions to the law of excluded middle that virtue is neither white nor non-white, the noumenal world (of Kant according to whom it is devoid of all *a priori* forms and categories) can neither be said to have a beginning in time etc. nor said to lack them, and so on.

If we bear this in mind it is not necessary for us to hold that Kant, Hegel and the Mādhyamika rejected the Excluded Middle, as Dr. T. R. V. Murti holds.⁷ Kant's rejection of the contradictory antinomies is just a case of rejection of the inapplicable, the irrelevant, as already shown. Hegel's seeking the third category, like Becoming, to reconcile the contradictory thesis and antithesis, like Being and Non-being, does not mean any rejection of the Excluded Middle. Becoming (like colour) is a more concrete category within which Being and Non-being are comprehended as abstract aspects (just as blue and not-blue are within colour). Becoming cannot be said, therefore, to fall between Being and Non-being and form a middle term. The Mādhyamika dialectic which, like Kant's, rejects many pairs of opposites in respect of the real nature of things need not be said to reject the Excluded Middle, since these opposite assertions are inapplicable. As in the case of Kant, and even of Hegel in some respects, such rejection is a realization of the limited universe within which the opposites are meaningful. It leads, therefore, to the recognition of something *beyond* that universe—the Unknowable, the Indeterminate, the Ineffable, or the more concrete and comprehensive, as the case may be.

Every philosophy of genuine reconciliation springs from the consciousness of a more comprehensive reality or point of view which transcends the sphere of opposites and yet contains them as its different aspects. And if we bear in mind that opposition is meaningful only in relation to a definitely limited sphere, we need not say that the discovery of the reconciling concept violates the law of contradiction, or any other law of thought, as Aurobindo sometimes says. It is more accurate to say that the Absolute of Aurobindo or Hegel is beyond the sphere of divisive, finite thought which alone is the sphere of these laws. It is no criticism of a law that it does not apply beyond its sphere.

7. Op. cit., p. 147.

It is the unrestricted and (as we have seen) untenable view about contradiction which has given rise to a host of apparent exceptions to the laws. Moreover, it is unthinkable how the law of contradiction can be accepted in its legitimate sense without also admitting its other phase, the Excluded Middle, which, Hegel rightly says, is the recognition of opposition in things.⁸ The Excluded Middle demands that of two contradictory propositions either the one or the other must be true (not both); ' $p \vee \neg p$ '. Intuitionist mathematicians like Brouwer reject this principle because in some cases we cannot decide which of the two contradictory alternatives is true. For example: *Either* every even number greater than 2 can be expressed as the sum of two prime numbers, or it cannot be so expressed. Now as even numbers are innumerable we cannot completely verify the truth of this disjunctive completely, we can verify it upto a limited number of cases and can see that the first alternative is so far true. Is this intuitionist position logically sound? It would be tenable if this principle of excluded middle were derived from observation of particular cases, so that an undecidable case would have obstructed our inductive generalization. But the inductive canons, their application and the verificational inference all presuppose the laws of consistency, and these cannot be derived from induction. If we are *intuitively* aware of contradiction, we are also aware of the exclusiveness of the contradictories and their jointly covering their particular sphere. In the case cited above the alternatives involving endless calculation are not really intuitively felt to be clear contradictories, hence they do not clearly present even contradiction. It is only within the sphere of what has definitely presented itself to thought that the laws of thought operate.

It should be mentioned in fairness to Brouwer, as Alonzo Church points out, "The intuitionist rejection of the law of excluded middle is not to be understood as an assertion of the negation of the law of excluded middle; on the contrary, Brouwer asserts the negation of the negation of the law of excluded middle, i.e. ' $\neg(p \vee \neg p)$ '. Still less is the intuitionist rejection of the law of excluded middle to be understood as the assertion of the existence of a third truth-value intermediate between truth and falsehood."⁹ This clarification is reassuring. But it should be added that according to the intuitionist the negation of the negation of any

proposition does not amount to the original proposition, but a little weaker form of it.¹⁰ In plain language it would be a reserved way of saying that it is not the case that the law is not accepted.

We can consider now, in the light of the foregoing discussion, the main logical types of paradoxes found mostly in Vedantic and Buddhist works, and try to show that, whatever might be their metaphysical justification, they do not involve any violation of the laws of contradiction and excluded middle in respect of their *logical forms*. Mysticism in all lands and times has to speak in paradoxes, if it speaks at all. Because it has to deal with very wide and complex entities like man, God, world and Absolute in their divergent aspects and relations, and all from a series of changing standpoints leading up to the Ineffable, where thought and its laws cease to operate. If we analyse the paradoxes we can bring them under five logical forms, briefly shown below with examples and their justification.

Form I. S is P and not-P (not logically incompatible, if S is taken in different aspects, or P is taken in different senses). 'God is sat and asat' (*Gītā* 9.19) — explained by Śaṅkara as meaning that God is the ultimate ground of what figures in some relations as the subject of affirmative judgment, and in other relations as the subject of negative judgment; explained by others as: God is manifested in some aspect, and not manifested in some other aspect. To this type also belongs the Sophist position reported by Buddha (in *Brahmajāla-sutta*) as holding that the world and the individual are (in some aspects) eternal, and (in other aspects) non-eternal.

Form II. S is neither P, nor not-P (tenable when S is indeterminate and beyond thought, or when S is outside the limited universe of P and not-P, which are not relevant, therefore, to S; or when P and not-P are only seeming contradictories, but really contraries.) E. G. 'Param (Supreme) Brahman is neither sat nor asat' (*Gītā*, 13.12) — *sat* and *asat* explained as above, applicable to the knowable or thinkable (either existent or non-existent, manifested or unmanifested), but not applicable to what is beyond that universe. "The Primordial was neither *asat*, nor *sat*" (*Rgveda*, 10.129) can be similarly explained. The position of some

8. Hegel (Scribners' Selections), *The Doctrine of Essence*, p. 147.

9. Article on Intuitionism, *Dictionary of Philosophy* (Phil. Library).

10. This position resembles that of the great Indian logician, Raghunātha Śiromani regarding double negation, as pointed out by Daniel Ingalls in his *Materials for the Study of Navya-nyāya Logic* (Harvard), p. 68 f.n.

Advaitins that the world (or *Māyā*) is neither describable as *sat* (*paramārtha-sat*, absolutely real) nor as *asat* (*atyantam asat*—absolutely unreal—like a barren woman's child), is explained as denial really of two contraries which look like contradictories. The position of the Sophists reported in the *Brahmajāla* as holding that 'the world is neither possessed of an end, nor endless' is explicable as significant in respect of the world, taken as it is in itself, to which the descriptions relevant to its aspects or parts are not applicable.

Form III. *S is P, and not-P, and neither P nor not-P.* (-a conjunction of the first two forms to give a comprehensive view of *S* from different aspects together). E.g. 'God is *sat*, *asat* and beyond (*tatparam*)'—(*Gitā* 11.37). Aurobindo's Integral view of Reality comprehending the opposite and relative mental views (mutable and immutable etc.) and the supramental aspect, would fall under this type.

Form IV. Denial of each of *S is P*, *S is not-P*, and *S is both P and not-P*, and assertion of *S is neither P nor not-P*. (-denial of the two partial aspects of *S* separately, and then jointly, in order to show finally that *S* in itself, or as an undivided whole, is beyond both *P* and non-*P*). This negative attitude is found in the Sophist position reported by Buddha in *Brahmajāla*, namely, that it denies that the world is eternal, is not eternal, and is both eternal and not-eternal, and it asserts finally that it is neither of these. This position is logically meaningful as indicated above.

Form V. Denial of each of '*S is P*', '*S is not P*', '*S is both P and not-P*', and even of '*S is neither P nor not-P*' (-an utterly negative position expressing unwillingness to assert even the last negative owing to utter puzzlement or sense of futility, or fear of being misunderstood). This position is reported by Buddha in the afore-said Sutta as held by a slippery sophist (*amarāvīkṣepika*) who denies all the alternatives regarding the world mentioned above, including the assertion that the world is neither eternal nor non-eternal, which should logically follow from the denial of the first three alternatives. The reported motive here is the avoiding of defeat. A similar position is taken, however, on other grounds, by Buddha himself, in the *Poṭṭhapāda-sutta*, when confronted by his disciple, *Poṭṭhapāda*, who put like wrangling sophists of the day the four alternatives whether the world etc. were eternal (finite etc.), or not-eternal, or both, or neither. Buddha declined to accept any of the alternatives, adding that it was futile

to discuss these questions, morally harmful, not conducive to Nirvāṇa, and also that he had profounder experience which could not descend to the level of reasoning (*atarkāvacara*). It would be fair to think then that in Buddha's case the refusal to accept any of the alternatives was due to his unwillingness to reason about things whose indeterminate (*avyākata*) nature is not amenable to reasoning. If Buddha at all agreed to enter the game of reasoning the question of the logical inescapability of the last alternative could have arisen. But he refuses to play the futile game. His subsequent Mādhyamika dialectician followers, though provoked by opponents to argue, only tried to puzzle the opponents by exposing the absurdity of the opponents' own assumptions, should they hold any of the four alternative forms of position. So they also cannot be said to violate any law of thought.

We see then that the different types of paradoxical statements can be said to be formally consistent with the laws of thought, and in the last case of utter refusal to argue the question of the violation of the laws does not at all arise.

We should also mention that the Jaina position that all judgments (*nayas*) are relative, or the Advaita position that everything other than Brahman is false is not necessarily self-stultifying. The theory of relativity is about a class of propositions, and cannot, therefore, be thought to belong to that class, as Russell points out in his *Theory of Types*.¹¹ So the theory itself is not logically involved in relativity. And even if it were relative, relativity would not be disproved, but rather further corroborated. The Advaita position similarly could be said to be exempt from the property of the class about which it is maintained. But even if in ultimate analysis it be false, things about which it is a theory, would not be proved to be not false, because the falsity-determining property (*niśedhyatāvachchedaka-dharma*), namely 'otherness than Brahman' is present in both the theory and the things within its purview. So Relativism and Absolutism cannot at least be said to be self-stultifying in these respects.

In a similar manner it could be shown that Scepticism and Agnosticism reached by reasoning presupposing the laws would not be self-stultifying, nor would they affect the laws they presupposed. Similarly, logical thought might also lead one to admit,

11. B. Russell, *Logic and Knowledge* (G. Allen & Unwin, 1956), p. 63.

without self-contradiction, the Indefinite, the Indeterminate, the Ineffable or any thing beyond its sphere of the definite, just as reasoning can discover the contradictory without contradicting itself. Mysticism, the belief in the supra-rational, would just fall outside logical thought. There would be no conflict between mystical belief, based on some direct awareness, and logical thought. But when mysticism tries to express itself in articulate language, it has to obey the laws of thought, if it at all hopes to be intelligible and convincing to any rational being. Whatever the matter of thought might be it must have to be consistently formulated, and the laws of consistency are not one for one school and another for another school. Had it been so, there could be no inter-school effort for convincing one another.

The Spirituality of the Human Soul

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A metaphysical psychology of man must not only vindicate his substantiality but also describe his nature and properties.¹ Metaphysical psychology differs from empirical psychology by the fact that beyond the relativity of the sensible determinations of the object it considers only the necessary and purely intelligible determinations of the object. Human metaphysical psychology will consider man, not according to the aspects which observation, experimentation or introspection reveals, but according to those aspects which metaphysical reflection discovers. Metaphysical reflection is that immediate knowledge which man has of the actual exercise of his activity. Our spontaneous consciousness of objects as other and our affirmation of them as such implies this self-consciousness, which is metaphysical reflection and gives the ground for an affirmation of the self as distinct from, and opposed to, the objects, in the realm of being. Hence the admission of the substantial reality of the self is the necessary condition of the necessary affirmation of the object which even Critical Philosophy acknowledges.²

The point we have made so far is very important, for it rejects all forms of phenomenalism, be it that of Hume, Taine or Ayer.³ Now, by this method, which remains critical and strictly metaphysical, can we go still further than this admission of the substantiality of the self? Most people admit that man has a body

1. In a previous paper which I read at the 32nd Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Srinagar, and which was published in *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 31, 1958, pp. 1-9, I explained *The Rôle and Method of Metaphysical Psychology* and gave already a critical argument which, I believe, proves the substantiality of man; cf. pp. 7-8.

2. For our answer to some objections against this thesis, cf. pp. 7-8 of the above-mentioned paper.

3. For Ayer, cf. his book: *The Problem of Knowledge*, Pelican Philosophy Series, 1956, Chap. 5: "Myself and Others", especially pp. 184-87 and p. 199: "Even if we cannot allow ourselves to speak of minds as substances....."

which is real. Many too admit that there is also some spirituality in man. Can we prove these points? And if man has both these properties of materiality and spirituality, how can we explain their union in a satisfactory way? At each step we meet with a host of difficulties and it is not always easy to find a solution which satisfies all the requirements of the case.

The Materiality of Man

Common sense readily admits that man has a body. Extreme Idealism or Immaterialism affirm that there is no material substance. Others hold that the body is an appearance, and by this they mean either an illusion or the manifestation of a higher reality. If we take the view of common sense and begin to develop it, we soon run into the difficulty of expressing ourselves accurately. Shall we say that we are our body or that we have a body? The fact that we think about our body as distinct from our thought does not allow us to identify ourselves completely with our body, as the former way of speaking implies. On the other hand, we do not *have* a body as we have a house, a book, or even the clothes we wear. "To be our body" exaggerates the identity; "to have a body" suggests too strong a dualism, even from the point of view of common sense.⁴ These difficulties should not drive us to the other extreme of Immaterialism, for obviously it offends common sense still more, obliging us, as it does, to call illusory the object of a knowledge which we have, on the ground of some mystical experience which most people do not have or of some *a priori* theory which has not taken account of the facts. Yet it is of little use to condemn some views, even in the name of common sense, until we have brought a serious argument against them.⁵ According to the method which I propose to follow, we should see whether and in what sense materiality is implied in, or connected with, our basic necessary activity of judgment.

The judgment with which Critical Philosophy is ready to start is the basic judgment of objectivity: "This is something". The 'this',

4. Cf. G. Marcel's interesting analysis in *Being and Having*, a translation by K. Farrer of *Etre et Avoir*, Westminster, Dacre Press, 1949, especially pp. 10-2; 156 foll.

5. An analysis of Bergson's conception of matter would be quite interesting (but too long to be given here), for, though he was primarily keen to prove the spirituality of the human soul, he had an original view of matter, first as a lower type of duration (Cf. *Matter and Memory*, esp. Chaps. I and IV) and later as the arrest of life (Cf. *Creative Evolution*, the end of Chap. III.).

or the object of the judgment, at its minimum value, means something which I can at least point to. Actually it has a form, which at first may not be quite clear but can often be progressively identified as the one of a stone, for instance, or a bush, or an animal, or a man. But we always recognize in the 'this' both a capacity of form, *viz.*, it can be either a stone, or a bush, etc., and also a limitation of form so that this object appears as one among an indefinite number of stones, for instance, which could exist with this same form. This principle of capacity and limitation of form is what metaphysics can call 'matter'. It is implied as inherent in the objects of our first direct judgments.

Conversely, if we pay attention to the subject of the judgments, I mean to the one who pronounces them, we realize reflexively that our minds come to their first mature consciousness in acts of affirmation of such direct objects. Though we may yet know very little about these objects, we are conscious that our activity of judging is specified by them. Being specified from the outside, our activity then is based on a passivity within us. This passivity implies in us the same potentiality as we found in the objects of our direct judgments. There is in us a capacity of forms, which we receive through our different senses before reacting through affirmations, and yet this capacity, when we analyze it, reveals itself as a limitation of our own form also, since we are, by it, only one among an indefinite number of subjects which could receive these forms in their sensibility and then affirm them. In short, we are forced to admit the presence of materiality within us. Later we shall explain more definitely how in man this principle stands with regard to the opposite element of form.

The Spirituality of Man

While we were considering the materiality of man, we were paying attention only to one aspect of his nature, in fact to the aspect which reveals his limitation and his dependence on objects. But since we judge of the objects, we transcend them, and by this we reveal another aspect of our nature. How far does this transcendence go? Do we have acts which do not imply materiality?

Nobody is going to deny the fact of thought. But crude materialism at times⁶ has tried to explain thought in terms of material

6. Cf. the Cārvāk Philosophers; the Epicureans, Hobbes, La Mettrie, etc.

processes which thought does not really transcend. Dialectical Materialism, on the other hand, proposes something apparently better when it speaks of qualitative changes springing from quantitative changes and makes of thought one of these qualitative products.⁷ This explanation is simple but its proof for the case of thought,—not to speak of the other alleged instances,—is still to be given. If there are arguments to show that thought presupposes the exclusion of an intrinsic dependence on matter, then the whole theory breaks down, at least at this point, for precisely thought would then require the exclusion within itself of that which is said to account for it.

Many, we must admit, have held or still hold this intrinsic dependence of thought on matter. The theories of Epiphenomenalism or of certain types of psycho-physiological Parallelism imply such a relation. H. Bergson is perhaps the one who had the greatest influence on the Continent to counteract such theories.⁸ Today, through the very progress of their studies, experts in physiology know better the limitations of their knowledge, and many are very careful when asked to give their opinion on such problems.⁹ Present language analysts, like A. J. Ayer and G. Ryle, attack all forms of dualism when speaking of mind and body.¹⁰ They do not reject thought of course; but Prof. Ryle, for instance, leaves so little originality to the mind that he himself expected to pass for a behaviourist.¹¹ He admits differences between persons and machines, but the trouble is that, after attacking the positions of others who try to explain these differences, he himself has only this to say: "I have not begun to show how we should grade these differences."¹² Had he tried, we would have been quite interested to see both how he would have done justice to the dif-

7. J. Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, Moscow, 1954, p. 10; and p. 21, the quotation of Marx, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 332.

8. Cf. especially his book: *Matter and Memory*.

9. Cf. *The Physical Basis of Mind*, edited by Peter Laslett, Oxford, B. Blackwell, 1952, in which most of the authors of the Broadcast Talks acknowledged how little, at least from their standpoint, was known on "The Physical Basis of Mind", let alone the nature of the mind.

10. *Ibidem*, pp. 70-79; cf. also Prof. Ryle's *Concept of Mind*, which mainly deals with this attack on dualism.

11. Cf. *The Concept of Mind*, pp. 327 foll., where Prof. Ryle tries to make us understand that he is not exactly a behaviourist, but without really saying what he is, if he is not one.

12. *The Physical Basis of Mind*, p. 79.

ferences and not fallen into some kind of dualism. It is in fact such a type of solution which we shall try to expose in our last part.

It is time for us to set about our own task of proving the spirituality which, I believe, belongs to man. True spirituality is the property of an action or of its cause, when the action is exercised, or the cause subsists, without intrinsic dependence on matter. In the beginning of this paper we have already spoken of this consciousness of the self which is implied in the necessary affirmation of objects and which we called metaphysical reflection. The fact of this experience is undeniable. We may deduce it as the necessary condition of the absolute affirmation of otherness, or we may simply recognize that we have this experience because we know that we know. All that we have still to do is to show that this reflection implies an intrinsic independence from matter and is thus spiritual. Matter, so far, has appeared to us as the principle of passivity, of multiplicity. Now, wherever there is matter, there is a certain separation from self, a lessening of self-possession. The passive element as such cannot be the same as the active element as such, since their properties are opposed. On the other hand, the self-knowledge which we have in perfect reflection presupposes a unity of subject and object which the multiplicity of matter would impede. Thus our necessary reflection presupposes immateriality.

One might object that animals have also a certain consciousness; that they are aware of their knowing; thus we must either admit that their activity is spiritual, or that matter does not prevent consciousness. The psychology of animals is not easily dealt with in metaphysical terms. Yet a reference to our experimental knowledge of them may help us here. We know that their activity is organic. The organs are spread in space. Now wherever we have knowledge through an organ, it is impossible that this knowledge be directly of the organ itself, for the organ cannot be the medium between the knowing power and itself. The eye cannot see itself directly. This exclusion of self-knowledge where there is an organ does not yet allow us to conclude that there is no knowledge whatsoever in the subject; the eye does not see itself, but the animal, through the instrumentality of the eye, knows the object and its relation to it, at least in time and space. Degrees of immateriality would thus allow for degrees of knowledge which may not amount to absolute knowledge of self.

Leaving aside the question of actual self-knowledge in animals, the point which we have made so far for our argument

is that animals will not have absolute consciousness of themselves, if matter is intrinsically present at the source of their activity, as we have made clear by the example of the eye. Conversely, we, who have absolute consciousness of ourselves, cannot have matter at the source of our consciousness. We are thus spiritual.¹³

The True, Though Imperfect, Spirituality of the Human Soul

So far we have proved the materiality of man and his spirituality. If our arguments have been valid, it would seem that they lead us to a dualistic conception of man. For, it could be argued, if man is material, he has a body; if man is spiritual, he has a soul. Shall we say then that the latter directs the former, as the pilot directs the ship, according to the simile so often attributed to Plato?¹⁴ Even Descartes rejected so strong a dualism.¹⁵ Yet according to him, the opposition of the principal attributes of thought and extension forces us to admit a duality of substances in the unity of man. It is the "Ghost in the Machine" which G. Ryle so strongly reproached Descartes with.¹⁶ The solution of the problem we are meeting with here is not to be found unless one looks carefully into what has been proved so far and is ready to admit a conception of being less rigid than the one often proposed by some philosophers of the Absolute.

So far, in man, we have discovered matter both as a capacity and a limitation of form. We have also discovered another principle, but one of perfection, which, on account of its self-knowledge, excludes materiality within itself. It is thus a spiritual principle.

13. For a difficult, but rich and thorough analysis of the basic argument for spirituality, one could see Bernard J. F. Lonergan's *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, (Longmans, Green and Co., 1957, pp. xxx, 785), especially pp. 514-20. This book covers a large field of epistemological, psychological and ethical questions within the framework of a realistic and spiritualistic metaphysics.

14. Prof. A. Mansion, a specialist in Ancient Greek Philosophy, writes: "Plato does not use this comparison in his writings". (*Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, Vol. 51, 1953, p. 437.)

15. "...I am not lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel". (*Meditations on First Philosophy*, VI, Everyman's Library, p. 135.)

16. *The Concept of Mind*, especially the First Chapter, pp. 11-24. At the close of this chapter, G. Ryle gives a "Historical Note" which fails to say that in Medieval Scholasticism and especially in Thomism, there was a real opposition to this Platonic Dualism. If he had paid more attention to some medieval trends of thought, he would have found many positive elements for the solution of the problem at hand.

Now in the presence of such principles one who has a rigid conception of being will say that here either we have two substances or that both these principles are delusive appearances of one single reality.¹⁷ On the contrary, one who has a realistic but more accommodating outlook will try to save both the multiplicity of the principles and the unity of the being. This seems to be possible only if one is ready to admit that all beings do not have the same structure. At this juncture, the Aristotelian theory of matter and form or, in broader terms, of potency and act, is one which suggests itself to the mind. This view may not be of much help to the man of science. He may remain indifferent to an explanation which is beyond what he can observe and verify. But once the question of substantiality of man has been put and metaphysically solved in the affirmative, as we hope to have done, it is of no small importance to the philosopher to have a theory which takes account of the facts and does not condemn him to the extremes either of Parmenides' Monism or of Heraclitus's Mobilism. It is the merit of Aristotle to have pointed to a view which sets the basis for a metaphysics of plurality and of degrees of being.¹⁸ We have no intention to explain here the well-known Aristotelian theory of act and potency.¹⁹ We only wish to say about it that anybody who conceives this theory as a dualism of complete and distinct substances, misses the point of the theory. Aristotle did not simply apply this theory to inorganic beings. In his psychology of man, though at first he had still followed a kind of Platonic dualism, yet as soon as he had elaborated his own hylemorphic theory, he also applied it in this field.²⁰ While he illustrated his view of act and potency through an analysis of the changes undergone by the bronze which becomes a statue or the wood which becomes the bed,²¹ yet he had a deeper conception of matter, when he spoke of prime matter as the source of ontological changes.²² It was thus a metaphysical principle.

17. F. H. Bradley, for instance, was led to Monism by such a rigid view of being.

18. Aristotle, *Physics*, I, 8, 191 a 24-33.

19. Cf. F. C. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, Vol. I, London 1951, pp. 306 foll., especially p. 311.

20. Cf. F. Nuyens, *L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristotle*, Louvain, Editions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1948. Cf. also F. C. Copleston, *op. cit.*, pp. 269-270; 326-331.

21. *Physics*, I, 7, 191 a 9.

22. "My definition of matter, writes Aristotle, is just this—the primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to be without qualification, and which persists in the result." *Ibid.*, I, 9, 192 a 31-2; translation under the editorship of W. D. Ross.

In the beginning of this paper, starting from the necessary judgment, we discovered matter in us as an ultimate limiting and potential principle and not simply as the actualized matter of marble, for instance, which receives a new shape so as to become this statue; it was really prime matter which has to receive its first form. Hence, so far, we have no difficulty to identify what we have discovered with the Aristotelian prime matter.

On the other hand, the spirituality which we have also discovered in man must be attributed to a principle opposed to matter, since spirituality of itself excludes materiality. Can we recognize this spirituality in the Aristotelian conception of the human soul? Aristotle held that the soul is the form which directly actualizes prime matter.²³ By this solution Aristotle was solving the problem of man's unity, since matter and form are principles of one single being and not two substances.²⁴ But with this solution was he saving equally well man's spirituality? At first sight, it would seem so, since for him the human soul is that "by or with which primarily, we live, perceive, and think."²⁵ Intellectual knowledge and reflection thus are attributed by him to the soul, at least as their remote principle, and thus we might conclude to the spirituality of the soul. But at a closer examination it is found that a great uncertainty remains here in Aristotle's view. First he affirms that the soul is inseparable from its body.²⁶ But soon he adds some restrictions: "at any rate... certain parts of it are (inseparable)." And immediately he raises a doubt: "if it has parts." As he proceeds, he brushes this doubt aside and speaks of the mind as a part of the soul.²⁷ Of the mind he affirms that "it cannot reasonably be

23. This is implied in the very definition which he gives of the soul as: "the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it." *On the Soul*, I, 1, 412 b 5-6; translation under the editorship of W. D. Ross, used in McKeon's *Introduction to Aristotle*, New York, Modern Library, 1947.

24. Aristotle himself adds here: "...we can wholly dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul and the body are one: it is as meaningless as to ask whether the wax and the shape given to it by the stamp are one, or generally the matter of a thing and that of which it is the matter. Unity has many senses (as many as 'is' has), but the most proper and fundamental sense of both is the relation of an actuality to that of which it is the actuality." (*Ibid.*, 412 b 6-9). This text alone should suffice to acquit Aristotle of any charge of extreme dualism.

25. *Ibid.*, II, 2, 414 a 12-3. (Emphasis ours.) Cf. also *Ibid.*, 413 a 23: "Living... may mean thinking...."

26. *Ibid.*, II, 1, 413 a 4-5.

27. *Ibid.*, III, 4, 429 a 10.

regarded as blended with the body."²⁸ We have thus the conflicting view of a soul which by some parts is inseparable from the body, or, we might say, intrinsically dependent on matter, and by at least one other part is separable from it. Aristotle even says that this part is "unmixed" with the body.²⁹ Thus this part is truly spiritual, or intrinsically independent of matter.³⁰ It thus seems that the Aristotelian solution left unsolved the problem of the reconciliation of materiality with spirituality; for now a dualism reappears within the soul: the soul, as form of the body, seems to be a material principle, and, as the first principle of thought, it is also an immaterial principle.

In the presence of such a difficulty, we are threatened again by the extreme solutions of pure materialism or immaterialism. The solution will lie, as we have already seen above for the notion of being, in a more accommodating outlook, but now applied to the notion of spirituality. Spirituality, we admit, excludes matter within its principle. But does it always exclude all relation to matter? Can there not be an instance of imperfect, yet true spirituality? It would have to be such that the principle of being in question, while remaining itself intrinsically independent of matter, yet takes a certain relation to it, and this within the unity of the same being. So far, we were satisfied with the Aristotelian theory of matter and form as allowing an inner structure which keeps the unity of being. However, this theory seems to fail us with regard to spirituality; one would think that a soul which has to be a form depends intrinsically on the other principle, matter. It is the merit of Thomas Aquinas, the great admirer of Aristotle, to have found the solution of this difficulty. Matter and form are mutually and intrinsically dependent, if the existence of a being is obtained only in and through their union. But one can

28. *Ib.*, 429 a 24-25.

29. *Ib.*, 430 a 18.

30. We do not intend to discuss here this difficult problem of Aristotelianism, viz., the relation of the mind with the soul and the exact nature of that which, in the mind, is perishable or not. This problem of exegesis entails the other problem of the distinction of the 'passive' and 'active' intellect. The commentators' interpretations vary greatly on this point, and here we can only draw attention to an article of A. Mansion: "L'immortalité de l'âme d'après Aristotle" (*Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, Vol. 51, 1953, pp. 465 foll.), in which the author, reviewing some recent studies on Aristotle's 5th Chapter of the Third Book *On the Soul*, defends the interpretation that while both the passive and active intellect are perishable, only the essence of the intellect is not perishable.

conceive that the existence of a being belongs primarily to the form alone and that the form communicates this existence to the matter together with its own essential perfection.³¹ It is then no more a case of two principles in mutual intrinsic dependence, (as we would readily admit for the matter and form of plants and animals), but of two principles, one of which, the form, possesses and gives itself without any necessary intrinsic dependence on the other, while the other principle, matter, receives and keeps its place in the unity of the whole being, but without impairing the independence or spirituality of the form. Yet since the form is not completely without relation to matter, its true spirituality is recognized as imperfect spirituality.³²

Having discovered this central point for a proper understanding of the spirituality of the human soul, we cannot proceed to evolve the consequences of this view for the origin and destiny of such a soul. This treatment would require a separate paper. We can only conclude by a review of the points we made.

Summing up


Starting from the necessary activity of judgment in us, we have detected both a necessary materiality and spirituality in man. We have found these characteristics by a method which is strictly in agreement with the requirements of Critical Philosophy. On the other hand, the very unity of the activity which revealed our materiality and spirituality imposed on us the rejection of all dualism as a metaphysical account of man's nature. By succes-

31. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 76, a. 1, c. et ad lum.

32. F. C. Copleston, in his book on *Aquinas*, (Pelican Philosophy Series, 1955, Chap. IV: "Man (1): Body and Soul") exposes at length the solution adopted by Aquinas and at the same time he does not hide its difficulties. (See especially pp. 164 foll.) One could also consult on this point the above mentioned book of B.J.F. Lonergan: *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, especially p. 520, where he writes: "A solution seems to result from a simple principle, namely, that material reality cannot perform the role or function of spiritual reality but spiritual reality can perform the role and function of material reality. Were man's central form a material intelligibility, then it could not be intelligent and so could not be the centre and ground of man's inquiry and insight, reflection and judgment. Inversely, though man's central form were a spiritual intelligibility, it could be the ground and centre of his physical, chemical, organic, and sensitive conjugates; for the spiritual is comprehensive; what can embrace the whole universe through knowledge, can provide the centre and ground of unity in the material conjugates of a single man".

sive deductions we have proved how we are bound to take up such a view as the Aristotelian theory of act and potency, or, more exactly matter and form, if we want to avoid falling back into some sort of extreme dualism or escaping the problem through the denial of either spirituality or materiality. Yet we had further to adjust our view of the relation between matter and form, so that the soul could still be the form actuating matter and remain intrinsically independent of it. Thus we have proved man's true, though imperfect, spirituality.

Mr. P. T. Raju, in his interesting article on "*The Concept of the Spiritual in Indian Thought*", aptly concluded his analysis by the following words: "... neither pure spiritualism nor pure materialism can be an adequate philosophy of man; and yet, neither spirit nor matter can be ignored for directing his action and life".³³ We have thus simply exposed the metaphysical solution which, we believe, takes account of all the requirements of the case and is not without practical importance, since, vindicating both the materiality and the spirituality of man, it allows us to face boldly all exaggerated materialism or spiritualism and sets a firm basis for a truly human Ethics, an Ethics neither too lofty, as if we were pure spirits, nor degraded, as if we were hardly more than matter.



33. *Philosophy: East and West*, Vol. IV (1954), p. 212.

Self-consciousness and Consciousness of Other Selves

by

G. R. MALKANT

All persons agree about the fact of self-consciousness. This consciousness is in principle not different from the consciousness of objects. As a matter of fact, we know the self only in relation to objects. It is the knower of objects. This is the ground for the Idealistic thesis that the relation of the Self to objects is a necessary relation. Neither term has any meaning without the other.

We cannot however help thinking that self-consciousness is in a privileged position. The objects that we know are in a sense foreign to the knowledge of it. They are external. They are sensible and materialistic. We cannot quite know them from within. They are mere appearances to the self. They may even be spoken of as having been *posited* by the self. If they are more than appearance, they are still foreign to the self and so in a way mysterious. This is not the case with the self. We appear to know the self from within or as the self really is. It is therefore an ideal object of knowledge. If we want to know the highest or the most metaphysical reality, we naturally like to know it as we know the self. Hegel's Absolute was accordingly conceived on the basis of self-consciousness. That was the only perfect kind of knowledge. Reality that was not foreign to the subject that knows it must be known by itself. The Absolute Idea as object must be known by the Absolute Idea as subject.

This view of self-knowledge as the perfect kind of knowledge is however open to certain objections. One and the same entity cannot be both subject and object at the same time. The subject-function and the object-function are diametrically opposed to each other. The object can only be *other* to the subject; and what is *other* to the subject cannot be the same thing as the subject. Objects have something in common, they are *given* to a subject. But there is nothing in common between the subject and the object. The subject *as such* cannot be given. The moment it is treated as given, it is degraded to an object. It ceases to be the

subject it was. It ceases to be the knower. As a matter of fact, when we distinguish the subject from the object and know it as related to the object, it has already ceased to be the subject. What we are knowing is an objectified image which has little resemblance to the original reality. The original reality was incapable of any determination, while the objectified image is nothing if it is not determined. This is why we think that Kant's distinction of phenomenal self and noumenal self was so important. Only Kant invested the noumenal self with some kind of mystery. We think that the mystery can be unravelled, if we stick to the true subject. The true subject always stays in the back-ground. It refuses to come forward in order to be known. It cannot be distinguished from anything. Only an object can be distinguished from another object. The real subject is the undistinguished ground of all objects. More than that. It is self-revealing to thought as the Absolute Subject, not to be known in the objective attitude. If thought must seek a more perfect knowledge of it, it must approach it in some other way appropriate to the subject-matter. The duality of knowledge and the subject-object distinction must be transcended. There is such a thing as non-dual knowledge. We must see the spirit with the eye of the spirit, and not with the sensuous eye which colours all our knowledge of the world.

The self is indicated by the term 'I'. The 'I' stands for no kind of objective entity. We can never say, "this is I". This has induced certain philosophers to argue that the term 'I' does not stand for any entity which deserves to be called 'I', and that therefore it should be analysed away into some kind of relation between mental states which are called "mine". There is no self-identical entity called a self. But even these philosophers cannot dispense with the use of this so-called misleading term 'I', and substitute for it any kind of objective relation that we know. If the term 'I' stands for no single or unique entity, why use it at all to confirm the popular misapprehension in this respect? It cannot be merely a matter of convenience, when this convenience is based upon a popular error. Why do the philosophers in question revert to the popular way of expressing themselves, if they are convinced that that way leads to an erroneous belief that there is some entity that deserves to be called 'I'? The truth is that their analysis will easily be seen to be non-sensical, if they attempted to express their personal experience in neutral and non-personal terms. The use of the term 'I' is not only natural and legitimate, but it is also necessitated if we want to make ourselves intelligible. No one has

really a problem of meaning about the 'I' or the self. The speaker has no doubt as to what he is referring to when he uses the term 'I'; and the hearer understands him perfectly and does not confuse the 'speaking I' with any neutral or public entity or with his own self. We *make* a problem of meaning when we disregard this common understanding, and want to *know* the kind of entity for which the term 'I' is used. We have already seen that we can never succeed in this, because the self is no kind of object which we can know; and yet the use of the term is perfectly significant.

Let us suppose that this argument is true. But then does not the *objectivity* of the self come in, in another way, and thus vitiate our conclusion that the self is immediate and non-objective? I use the term 'I' to stand for my self. You use the same term 'I' to stand for your self. Thus in truth and in fact, the term 'I' is used for two different entities. You use it to stand for x, and I use it to stand for y. The x and the y, my self and your self, are certainly not the same self. They are two different selves. But if that is so, 'I' can stand for two different entities which can be contemplated as two, though not directly known as two. Does not 'I' then mean some kind of object which can be distinguished from some other object, which is for convenience called 'you', but which can be called 'I' when the person concerned becomes himself the speaker?

Here, it appears to us, there is a confusion of stand-points. If I use the word 'I' to stand for my self, I cannot significantly use the term to stand for your self or any other self at any time whatsoever. Your self is only 'you' to me, never 'I'. The 'I' can therefore never be used logically for two different entities. Indeed the term 'you' can be used to stand for many different entities. But then all those entities are only objects to me, spiritual only in a secondary or derivative sense. They are supposed to be like 'I'. But are they *actually* 'I'? If they were, they would be indistinguishable from me; for there is only one 'I' that is directly intuited or that is immediate, and that therefore deserves to be called 'I'. All other selves that are called 'you' are just objects to me; and nothing that is an object can ever be properly called 'I' or be the same thing as 'I'.

If there is only one entity that can genuinely be called 'I', does that mean that there are no other selves as spiritual as my self? Other selves are 'you' to me. I have direct spiritual intercourse with them through the medium of language. There is a sense in

which I can be said to have a direct intuition of them under the form 'you'. Thus there are many different selfs. Selfs that are in some sense objective to me are also selfs. They are differently spoken. We address them as 'you'. They call themselves 'I'. The term 'I' is not the only term by which the self can be spoken or meant. A certain amount of objectivity is quite compatible with selfhood. There can be such a thing as a community of selfs, in which each is equal to each.

We cannot accept this view. It will be noted that our intuition of 'you' is not primary. If 'I', then 'you'. Unless I first intuit my self, I cannot intuit other selfs. The intuition of my self however is primary. It presupposes no other intuition and no intuition of 'you'. I proceed from I to you, never in the reverse direction. 'You' is something or some-one to me. I must be there before 'you' has any meaning. Like all objects, 'you' presupposes me. 'You' is merely the person 'spoken to'. Unless there is the speaking 'I', there is no such thing as the person 'spoken to'. And then what do I know of 'you'? I do not know this someone called 'you' from within, as I know my self from within. 'You' is never known as a reality 'in itself', but only as a reality that is to me. There is no direct intuition of 'you' co-ordinate with the intuition of 'I'.

It may now be argued that our lack of direct intuition of other selfs need not prove that there are no other selfs quite as spiritual as my self. After all other selfs use the term 'I' for themselves, and the term 'you' to designate my self. It is a matter of reciprocity. To save my selfhood, I must concede selfhood to others. The *Sāṃkhya* stand-point on this matter appears to be quite rational. According to it, the self that is freed can perceive other selfs no longer. But other selfs, who are struggling for emancipation, do not cease to exist on that account. Non-perception is no reason for non-existence. My universe may be made of my self and what it perceives. The universe of another self may be made of his self and what that self perceives. There is no contradiction in there being as many universes as there are selfs. There need not be a single universe inclusive of all other universes.

The difficulty of this view is that there is no possible stand-point from which we can contemplate the so-called many universes. The only stand-point is the stand-point of what is called the individual self. But since the individual cannot transcend

his own universe, he can only contemplate other so-called universes as part of his own and included therein. It is just like "many other selfs contained in the universe of a single dreamer". When this dreamer's dream is dissipated and he sees no other, there is really no other. Other souls and their stand-points are dissipated with the dream. There is no logical justification for sticking to a belief that has no rational ground and that is merely an uncriticised common-sense belief. Either my stand-point, from which there is no other, is fictitious, or the stand-point from which there is an other and there are other selfs is fictitious. There can be no compromise between the two stand-points. But the stand-point from which there are many selfs is fictitious; for it is after all the stand-point of the individual, who is a law unto himself. If he sees no other, there is really no other from any stand-point that is available. What we cannot do is to exalt the individual's state of ignorance of other selfs into a final state of illumination and of perfect freedom. The *Sāṃkhya* logic would seem to support this error.

An entity that excludes another entity at any level whatsoever is naturally limited by the latter. Such a limited entity is no longer a genuine self-luminous self. It is degraded to the status of all objects. There cannot be, in the very nature of the case, many real self-luminous selfs. That would be a self-contradiction in terms.

We cannot accept the reality of many selfs, but we cannot deny the appearance of the same. The real Self is one and one only. It is not the apparent self or the self in relation. The self in relation is not self-luminous and self-revealing. The self-revealing Self can however be spoken of as revealing itself as objective reality in an ultimate sense to the intellect as its own subjective function. In this sense, the Self can be said to be known by Itself. The Self has no natural division into subject and object and cannot therefore literally know itself. But it can thus divide itself when it has taken on the limitation of the Intellect. Self-consciousness in this higher sense of knowing the self-revealing absolute reality is possible.

Metaphysics and Linguistic Analysis

by

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Distinguished American Professors have asked me time and again during my sojourn in the U.S.A., why I have been taking a consistently destructive and negativistic attitude towards Western —by which they obviously meant the Logical Positivist and the linguistic—approach to metaphysics and theory of knowledge. My reply was that my attitude, which they called negativistic, was itself Positive, since it was only negativistic towards their own nihilistic approach to metaphysics; and that two negatives cancel out, and make one positive. I did not expect that so simple an answer would satisfy the diehard linguists that some of them were. One of them again was at a loss to understand how I, hailing from India, could take such a destructive stand, the more so because according to him some of our Hindu classical systems themselves abound in Logic and Epistemology of the same linguistic variety as in the west. He was, I believe, vaguely referring to our Nyaya and other systems of Logic and Epistemology. To all these philosophers my answer was, to put it briefly, this: Indians, though they indulged in Philosophical Analysis (sometimes even linguistic), treated it only as a means to an end, an end, which, according to them, was to understand reality. They never lost touch with reality, to unravel the mystery of which was their sole concern. In fact that was the genuine aim of all true philosophy. They had a living faith in real philosophical endeavour. On the other hand, the present-day western approach cut at the very root of philosophy.

In a previous article on "Philosophy, Philosophers, and Philosophical analysis" (published in the 'Philosophical Quarterly'—Jan. '58) I have briefly indicated the difference in the use of the instrument of Philosophical analysis by the ancient, modern, and contemporary philosophers. It was quite obvious that the ancients had clear notions as to the distinction between metaphysical and physical analysis, and it was the losing sight of this distinction, and not, as Russell imagined, 'the desire to separate philosophy from the empirical science' that has been responsible for the

'restriction of philosophy to triviality'. Failure to see that metaphysical material is, by its very nature, not amenable to physical analysis, has resulted in the thoroughly artificial doctrine of Logical Atomism which, leading us by gradual steps to Logical Positivism, finally landed us into linguistic analysis.

The linguistic analytic movement is the most recent 20th century innovation in Philosophy; like Behaviorism in psychology it is at best a method and a programme rather than a full-fledged philosophy. The roots of this linguistic movement were firmly laid in the analytic works of Moore and Russell, and the seedling was carefully nurtured by the Cambridge analysts, until it ultimately blossomed into a full-grown tree, thanks to the efforts of the Vienna Circle. It should be remembered, however, that even before Moore and Russell the British soil was ready for it, through the efforts of stalwart empiricists like Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Only, Russell's mathematical Logic gave a new twist to the whole empiricist movement, transforming it into what now goes by the famous name 'Logical Positivism'. As one philosopher put it, Logical Positivism is Hume plus Mathematical Logic. Just one more twist given to it by Wittgenstein and Carnap and we have the Linguistic Analysis. Though Russell and Moore were not technically speaking Logical Positivists, yet they are, without doubt, its real founders.

Let us consider now some of the fundamental assumptions underlying Logical Positivism. I shall take A. J. Ayer as one of the many typical representatives of this movement. Ayer's views, according to his own admission, derive from the doctrines of Russell and Wittgenstein which are themselves the logical outcome of the empiricism of Berkeley and Hume. Ayer accepts therefore Humean terminology, dividing all propositions into two classes: those which concern "Relations of ideas" and those which concern "matters of fact". To the former class belong the 'a priori' propositions of Logic and Mathematics which certainly are necessary, because they are analytic. They are tautological in nature, having to do with the manipulation of certain symbols; they certainly do not make any assertions about empirical reality. Matters of fact are just matters of fact, and are therefore empirically verifiable. They are never certain but only probable, and so are of the nature of hypotheses. A meaningful proposition therefore must, according to this criterion, be either one of these: either it must be a tautology or empirically verifiable. All other propositions are metaphysical, neither true nor false, but literally

senseless. Thus we see that the Humean view which Logical Positivists have adopted as their starting point has led them to the rejection of metaphysics altogether.

It is not our present purpose to present a critical exposition of Ayer's philosophy, but only to elucidate the fundamental assumptions of logical positivism and expose some of the sceptical consequences which ensue from them. One of the barren results which follow from its premises is a categorical rejection of metaphysics. What then remains for philosophy? The emphatic logical positivist answer is in one word, Analysis! Analysis of what? Analysis of language! This logical analysis 'logically' led the logical positivists to reject all metaphysics, and to reduce all the traditional problems with which philosophers from Plato downward have exercised themselves to nonsense! In short, with Hume, the Logical Positivists would willingly 'commit to flames' any book or volume which contained other than either 'a priori' propositions of the nature of Logic and Mathematics, or matters of fact of the nature of empirical hypotheses.

"Philosopher as an analyst" they say, "is not directly concerned with the physical properties of things; he is concerned only with the way in which we speak about them". In other words, the "propositions of Philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character". If the older metaphysicians have taken us on their wings into the transcendental world beyond the realm of fact, the present day 'metaphysicians' take us to the other extreme, dragging us into the unreal shadow world of language, where there are only problems of language.

The pivot round which Russell's whole philosophy revolves is the method of analysis which, according to Morris Weitz, has been exemplified in four distinct ways, namely; ontological analysis, formal analysis, mathematical Logic (Logistic) and constructionism. Though Russell never styled himself a linguistic analyst, what he had been doing all along was just linguistic analysis. His theory of 'descriptions' and 'Logical construction' has exerted not a mean influence on some of the leaders of the movement in the 'Vienna Circle' and contributed not a little to its process of crystallisation. It must be said to the credit of Russell, however, that he never rejected metaphysics altogether; and in a recent article in the Hibbert journal, he even went out of the way and had taken to task some present-day philosophers "for having abandoned without necessity the grave and important task which philosophy

through ages has hitherto pursued" and for "having got themselves so befogged in Philosophy that they have forgotten what is completely evident". Yet the fact remained that it was Russell himself who had released the shutters to the flood of this new philosophy which he now bewails is tantamount to 'triviality'.

Many 'left-wing' logical positivists—to use Copleston's phrase—identify philosophy with linguistic analysis. This identification remains one of J. B. Watson's equation of thought and speech-activity. The absurdity of this equation is patent if it is taken literally. It is one thing to admit that thought involves speech-activity, but entirely a different matter altogether to assert that it is that and nothing else. Identification of Philosophy with linguistic analysis suggests a similar absurdity. Philosophy involves linguistic analysis, no doubt, because it is part of the philosopher's endeavour to clarify linguistic expression of philosophical problems and also solutions, if any. But from this if we are to conclude that "all philosophical problems are only problems of language" and philosophical problems as such are pseudo-problems, it would be the height of rational impropriety, and we shall be guilty of making a statement which would make a clean sweep of the whole history of philosophy from Plato down to the present time. It is quite true that our thinking is largely dominated by the forms of language and to that extent we should accept what Prof. Everett Hall in his "What is value?" calls the 'lingua-centric predicament': yet, would that warrant us in taking the leap and concluding that philosophy is just the logic of language? That would surely lead us into a sort of linguistic solipsism, which would demand levels of language, zero level, meta-level, meta-meta level and so on, which would in turn necessitate representation of these in language by single, double, treble quotes respectively. Would all this contribute to knowledge of truth, I wonder! The linguists, however, make no claims to knowing the truth as we understand it. Their truth is linguistic which could easily be obtained and manipulated by symbols! Truth, in other words, is syntactical!

There is one more point which it would be necessary for us to mention here, and that is about the 'Ideal Language'. There could be no linguistic analysis in the strict positivistic sense of the term without an ideal language to work with. According to Bergmann, "Ideal language must be complete in the sense it must account for all areas of experience and that it must permit by ordinary discourse about it, the solution of all philosophical pro-

blems". Such a language, however, is only a schema; Russell himself admits that he had "never intended to urge seriously that such a language should be created". It is not a language which is 'talked', but only 'talked about'. The question is then, for what purpose is it talked about? There is a general assumption among professional linguistic philosophers that an analysis of metaphysical sentences in an ideal language will assist in unfolding the status or the structure of the world. Prof. E. W. Hall, for instance, in his book 'What is value?' makes the fundamental assumption that linguistic analysis of value sentences is of use in revealing the status or the nature of value. It is not my present purpose to offer a critique of this ideal language method of linguistic analysis. I am here content merely to mention the fact that linguistic analysis would be significant only if there is an ideal language. Philosophers therefore are now on the search for this unique 'Esperanto', which is not 'talked', but 'only talked about'.

We shall now consider finally whether linguistic analysis, be it in the every-day language or the ideal language, would really serve the ends of metaphysics, and would further its aims and ideals. In my view, philosophy has been reduced to a verbal affair. We find the language 'game' nowhere better exemplified than in Wittgenstein's 'tractatus' and 'philosophical investigations', and Carnap's 'Logical Syntax of language'. "This art of bewildering oneself methodically" has never reached a more near-breaking point than in the 20th century metaphysics. Hegel was arraigned for his Logic-intoxication. But has the Language-intoxication of our positivist friends of the 20th century made the transition from Language to reality any the less difficult? The problems of Reality do not vanish simply because the linguists of the 20th century choose to ignore or reject them! They remain in spite of them! Either they have to face them or confess their inability to tackle them; but they cannot simply brush them aside as 'nonsense'!

Metaphysics has to answer genuine questions regarding existence, knowledge and value. Purely linguistic considerations of these profound problems would not satisfy us. Logical Positivism, however, is perfectly within its right in holding fast to a strictly empiricist stand-point and asserting that knowledge, as it understands it, is restricted to perceptual facts. But the difficulty is with respect to what we understand by knowledge. The question is whether there is no knowledge outside perceptual obser-

vation, and whether all knowledge is restricted to empirical sciences. Even if the Logical Positivist denies that there is any such knowledge, we can still be tolerant towards such a view by considering it as itself being one kind of metaphysics. But if Logical Positivism turns round and blatantly asserts that anything other than empirical is pseudo-knowledge, and stigmatises all the problems of metaphysics as pseudo-problems, I think it is high time that philosophers throughout the world call a halt to such dangerous twists in speculation, lest human culture itself, wholly dependent on higher values and higher levels of experience, go down into the mire along with the academic problems of metaphysics. As Hall says in his article on 'Metaphysics', "Logical Positivism must be either wholly tolerant towards metaphysics or else become metaphysics itself".

Let it be understood, however, that we do not for a moment advocate giving up philosophical analysis altogether; never in fact has it been given up in the long history of philosophy; and wherever there was philosophical analysis, there was bound to be also linguistic analysis to some extent, though not of the Positivist-linguistic kind. But there is all the difference between actual analysis of philosophical problems using language with technical precision, and the so-called 'linguistic analysis', which is only used to destroy all metaphysics, reducing its problems to mere problems of language! It is only in the latter sense that we oppose linguistic analysis.

And finally, with apologies to Hume for taking liberties with his language to suit our own present purpose, we are tempted to exclaim:

When we run into libraries, persuaded of our principles—that is, anti-positivistic, linguistic!—, what havoc must we play? If we take in our hand any volume; of morals or metaphysics for instance; let us ask, does it contain any genuine analytic reasoning concerning its problems? No. Does it contain only linguistic analysis of metaphysical and value sentences? Yes. Commit it then to flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.

Linguistic Analysis and the Substance Theory

by

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In this paper I shall try to show that the whole plan of the traditional theory of substance is misconceived. The Theory is the result of a confusion of language, and, for the philosopher, the real issue involved in what is called the problem of substance is not factual, but linguistic or logical. What is needed, therefore, for the solution of the problem, is the proper understanding of the logical behaviour of certain linguistic expressions, and not any metaphysical insight. To substantiate my thesis I shall need to analyze, of course, for illustrative purposes only, some such historical positions on the subject as have been noticeably influential.

The problem of substance has figured in the history of philosophy as one of the most important issues. It can very well be called the central topic, or at least one of the central topics, of traditional metaphysics. This is evident from the amount of discussion devoted to it by philosophers, specially, of speculative type.

The main reason for the belief in the existence of substance (or substances) has been claimed to be the (so-called) need to account for the relationship between objects and their qualities. The distinction between objects and qualities is doubtlessly a common fact of experience. We say that a table is an object, and brownness, hardness, etc., are its qualities. It is seldom that we fail to recognize whether a term stands for a quality or an object. Our language is not at all ambiguous on this point.

But as long as we do just this, i.e., distinguish between objects and qualities, the metaphysicians say, we are on the level of pre-philosophical common sense. No serious problem faces us, and all that we need for the job is plain common sense. Unless we pass on to the level of philosophical reflection we do not feel the need of any theory, nor can we construct one. Philosophers admit that the preceptual experience of an object consists in the perception of certain qualities. To perceive a table is to perceive

its qualities, say, brownness, hardness, etc. But any quality, they do not fail to emphasize, lacks self-existence. This we realize if we do philosophical reflection. We find, then, that it is its very nature that it should be referred or attributed to something else. It must be the quality of something, and that something must be something other than a quality, otherwise there will be an infinite regress. The various theories of substance are offered as theories about this something, and to it they give the name 'substance'. Substance is, thus, claimed to be the ultimate support, base, or substratum of qualities. Without itself being a quality, or a group of qualities, it is that which sustains qualities.¹

Locke, whose theory of substance is of great historical importance, argues on almost similar lines. Being an empiricist, he holds that experience is the only source of simple ideas which are the ultimate building blocks of human knowledge. Simple ideas are ideas of qualities; therefore, we do not get from experience any idea of anything other than qualities. Experience being the only source, it means that we never get any other idea at all. But the essential feature of qualities, he says, is their lack of self-dependence or self-subsistence. They have to be the qualities of something, and without that something they are not intelligible. Moreover, there are some qualities which are always conjoined together. This conjunction also cannot be explained by qualities themselves. Because they cannot stand on their own legs, they cannot be the cause of their conjunction. ".....Not imagining that these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result; which, therefore, we call 'substance'."² ".....Because we cannot conceive how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by, some common subject"³ He confesses that we do not get the idea of substance from experience; therefore, there being no other source, we do not know what it exactly is. It is

1. Some philosophers have argued for the existence of substance on the ground that it is necessary in order to explain the fact of change. But this argument can very easily be shown to be a species of the above which derives from the self-incompleteness of qualities. That is why it does not deserve a separate discussion.

2. Locke: *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, selected by M. W. Calkins, Page 194.

3. *Ibid.*, Page 196.

"only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us".⁴

A very common objection against Locke's position is that it suffers from self-inconsistency. Being an empiricist he should not have admitted, as he has actually done, anything not warranted by experience. Saying something which is not self-consistent certainly deserves condemnation, but I do not wish to emphasize it because, as I shall show very soon, there is another error, more serious and deep-rooted, that has been committed not only by Locke but almost all metaphysicians and is responsible for the failure of their theories of substance. I do not think the former charge against him is invulnerable. He can free himself from it just by widening the meaning of 'empiricism' so as to include inference as an additional source of knowledge. This extension will not be illegitimate, because an empiricist does not have to exclude from his epistemology the use of reason as such, but only that of pure reason. The use of reason based on experience can quite justifiably be made by him, and the use of inference requires nothing more than that. I admit, however, that this device will not absolve Locke from all charges, but only from that of self-inconsistency.

Another important theory of substance is that of McTaggart. He belongs to a different epistemological and metaphysical tradition, yet he argues very much like Locke, though in a much more sophisticated manner than the latter. He also points to the fact that qualities are not self-existent, and, therefore, maintains that an assertion of existence about them is intelligible only if it ultimately links them up with something which exists in its own right. Sometimes one quality is predicated of another, but this cannot go on for ever if we intend to avoid a vicious infinite series. On the alternative suggested by Hume, he says, such innocent sentences of everyday discourse as 'Smith is happy' become unintelligible. If there is no substance distinct from qualities, and Smith is just the collection of its qualities, say, wisdom, happiness, etc., then only three interpretations of the above sentence are possible. (1) Happiness is predicated of itself, i.e. 'Smith is happy' = 'Happiness is happy'. (2) Happiness is predicated of another quality, i.e., 'Smith is happy' = 'Wisdom is happy'. (3) Happiness is predicated of the group of qualities, i.e., 'Smith is happy' = 'Wisdom + happiness + ... is happy'. None of these interpretations

4. *Ibid.*, Page 194.

represents the actual meaning of the sentence. Only a conscious being can be happy; therefore, it is meaningless to say of a quality, or a group of qualities, that it is happy. His conclusion, therefore, is this: "Something must exist, then, and have qualities, without being itself either a quality or a relation. And this is Substance".⁵

These two theories will suffice to serve my illustrative purposes. All such theories are ontological, i.e., they claim to prove the *existence* of substance. Some modern philosophers seem to maintain that they are linguistic. But, keeping in view the intention of their proponents, that would not be the right thing to do. On examination it may turn out that only a linguistic theory is possible on the subject, or that these theories are masquerading as ontological ones though in fact they are linguistic, or that their origin lies in some misunderstanding of the ways in which language functions. But all this will be our interpretation or innovation. Therefore, in this paper, the traditional theories will be treated as ontological and as making existential claims.

If we analyze the substance theory we find that it involves a threefold distinction, i.e., between substance, object (the object of experience), and qualities. Substance is not an empirical object, say, sugar; rather, it is that in sugar which supports or sustains its qualities. Sugar, on the other hand, is an empirical object, and, it is this which we experience as sweet, white, etc. It exemplifies these qualities. The term 'substance' must mean something different from what 'empirical object' does. If it does not, then its introduction in any epistemological or metaphysical scheme becomes superfluous. In that case the metaphysical statement 'It is substance which sustains qualities' becomes identical with (in a particular case) 'It is sugar which sustains its qualities', which only means 'Sugar is sweet, white, etc'. The metaphysical statement, thus, turns out to be only a queer way of saying what is very successfully said by a statement of ordinary language, namely, 'Sugar is sweet, white etc.' The advocates of the substance theory will have, therefore, to distinguish between substance and object. This will entail that substance does not exemplify any quality and, therefore, that it is shorn of all qualities. If it exemplifies, or has, any quality, it will become an empirical object, thereby requiring a fresh substance, and this

5. McTaggart: *The Nature of Existence*, Volume I, Page 68.

will go on ad infinitum. Thus, substance, object and quality have to be understood as distinct realities.

Now, because experience is restricted only to the apprehension of qualities, and substance exemplifies none, by the very nature of the case, its knowledge becomes a logical impossibility. It is unknowable, and that is why it is also inconceivable. But the substance theory requires us to *believe* in its existence, i.e., to think of it as real. This is simply impossible as we cannot think the unthinkable or conceive the inconceivable. Being an ontological theory it offers the statement 'Substance is real' as a statement of fact. But the subject term, being inconceivable, is something which we do not know how to apply or use. It has no use in language, and hence we do not understand it. We do not also know the meaning of the statement in which it occurs.

Locke attempted to justify the belief in the reality of substance on inferential grounds. But inference can legitimize a belief only in the reality of such an object which, though not actually experienced, is experiential, and, therefore, not in that of substance which can never be experienced.

The substance theory thus breaks down. It starts with the question 'What is that which supports qualities without itself being a quality?', and ends with a reply which is unintelligible and devoid of meaning. This unhappy ending is due to the deceptive nature of the question asked. It resembles in grammatical structure 'What is that which supports a house without itself being a house?'. But the latter is a genuine empirical question which can be meaningfully answered, while the former is a pseudo-question which cannot be given a meaningful answer. It can be answered only if we find something which can be described without attributing to it any quality, i.e., without making any predication. But this is impossible. To describe is to make predication which involves attribution of qualities. To describe substance, therefore, we shall have to describe it without describing, i.e., to perform a logically impossible task. The substance theory thus fails because it asks an impossible question, a question which cannot be answered because answering it would require the fulfilment of an impossible condition. The moment substance is said to be shorn of all qualities the possibility of any description of it is eliminated. Any description must assume the form 'Substance is A'. But it is not A, it is nothing except itself; therefore, to say that it is A is false. No description can be a description of

substance. 'Substance' has no meaning. We cannot even say of anything else that it is a substance, because we do not know what it means to say that.

If we look into the situation carefully we find that two questions, one factual and the other linguistic, have been mixed up together by the substance theorists. The question which underlies, though indirectly, all such theories is 'What is the constitution of an object, say, sugar?'. This is an empirical, scientific, question, and any answer to it can be accepted only on empirical grounds. For ordinary purposes we can say: sugar is what it is experienced to be, i.e., sweet, white, hard etc. It will not be a satisfactory reply for technical purposes; that can be given only by scientists. But even the scientists' reply must be based on experience, i.e., observation and experiment. In fact, this question is not a philosophical question; philosophers are in no way more qualified than non-philosophers to answer it. But there is one feature of the situation which raises another question. When we say that sugar is sweet, white, etc., we use quality terms which involve a reference to some other kind of terms. Hence the new question: What is it which they refer to? It is this question which is directly responsible for the formulation of substance theories. But the mistake of the theorists is that they treat it as a factual question, and therefore attempt factual replies. In fact, it is a linguistic question. It is an essential feature of language that words for qualities are originally adjectives (e.g., 'sweet'), which even in their derivative (i.e., abstract noun form e.g., 'sweetness') form, require a reference to substantives i.e., such terms as are nouns standing for objects. That there is nothing factual involved here is seen clearly when we realize that no need of an existential support is felt at the time we are actually perceiving a quality. When I am tasting sugar, I am just finding it sweet, i.e., having some sensations. I feel the need of any support (or referent) when I analyze, or try to understand, the use, i.e., the logical status, of the word 'sweet' or 'sweetness'. The question, thus, being linguistic, can be answered only by a linguistic device; neither can it be answered by, nor does it need, any factual or ontological theory. To make its linguistic form explicit the question can be rephrased as follows: What kind of words are those which quality words refer to? This is a philosophical question. This philosophical but non-factual question is confused by metaphysicians with the earlier one which is factual but non-philosophical. The result is a large number of substance theories.

The question, being linguistic, can be answered by quoting or explicating a rule of language. One can say: Adjectives (i.e., quality words) refer to substantives. The logical behaviour of the former is different from that of the latter. They are two kinds of words and have different uses in human discourse. It is a rule of language that they be used differently. The language game is played by the observance of a number of rules. If we want to play the game we have to observe the rules of the game. We cannot ask why a rule of language holds good, e.g., why adjectives behave differently from substantives, just as we cannot ask why the goal-keeper, in a game of football, and not any other player, is allowed to touch the ball with his hands.

The present analysis may seem too naive or simple. But that should not be any objection to it. The solution of a puzzle by removing the originating confusion is bound to look simple. It may, however, be asked why philosophers of repute advocated such mistaken theories when the solution was so simple. The reason, I think, lies in a misleading suggestion of language itself. It has been shown that quality words require a reference to substance words. The reference may be called a kind of dependence in a loose sense of the word 'dependence'. But, in any case, that would be a semantical dependence, because quality words can be said to depend on substance words only to get their meaning completed. This kind of dependence, which is a feature of language, is mistaken to be a feature of the universe. It is imagined that there are two kinds of things, qualities and substances, in the universe, of which the former depend upon the latter. Philosophers are misled because even when we do not mean factual or existential dependence we use a phraseology which gives the impression that we do. In Carnap's terminology, it is the material mode of speech which is very much instrumental in creating the illusion.

The view which I have suggested may be objected to by those who hold the picture theory of language, according to which the structure of language is a picture of the structure of the universe. In that case to infer a characteristic of the world from that of language would be quite legitimate. But this theory of language has been so conclusively refuted by present-day analysts that it does not need to be examined afresh. Moreover, within the limited space of the present paper I cannot go into that.

Describing and Prescribing : Philosophical Implications

by

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"This is a cat" or "Cats love fish" is a typically descriptive statement, while "One ought not to ill-treat cats" is a typically prescriptive one. But the distinction is not fundamental, as an element of decision is involved in the first two statements also and not only in the last one, while an element of coercion or pinned-down character is associated with the last statement also and not only with the first two. The first sentence may be expressed as, "One ought to accept this particular complex of sense-data and associate them with the class of physical objects called 'cats' which were in the past associated with similar sense-data, so that we ought to expect such other sense-data as will confirm our present postulate". The second statement may be put in this form, "One ought to believe and act upon the postulate that cats love fish, as it has been found to hold for cats so far examined". On the other hand, the third statement may be construed as "It is wrong to ill-treat cats", wrongness and goodness being considered as descriptive attributes of acts. The moral from the above is that science and ethics are not such enquiries that the first merely describes facts while the second prescribes how one should behave; rather both are engaged in prescribing certain behaviours, including beliefs and attitudes, while each may use either the 'is' mode or the 'ought' mode of statement according as it considers it fit to use. The 'is' mode is employed when the prescription is believed to be a universally accepted one and, so, to be readily acceptable by those to whom the statement is addressed, while the 'ought' is used when this condition is not available. We say, "*As a matter of fact* we ought to love our brothers", while we advance the quantum-mechanical description of matter as a postulate which we ought to adopt. Again, when we are in some doubt about the cat being there, we say, "It ought to be a cat" meaning "we ought to take it to be a cat", whereas when we are certain about a scientific theory or of our diagnosis of a disease we speak of it as if it is a fact we are reporting. We say, "Newton dis-

covered the law of gravitation", or "It is, no doubt, typhoid and we need not examine the blood to verify it." The element of hypothesis and decision is to be found in every knowledge and valuation, whether in a concealed or manifest form, and, so, as is urged by many modern writers on the topic, the difference between the two types of cultural enterprise is not fundamental.

But the question is, how to justify these basically prescriptive statements of science and ethics? A particular statement such as 'One ought to love one's brother' may not be justified if we use the pragmatic criterion of expediency or success in practice, yet one may feel it to be a just prescription and say, "It is a law of human behaviour and is true even if it leads to no worldly profit and nobody follows it." One may also stick to Newton's laws, regarding them as descriptive ones and true, and hold that all the observed facts of mechanics could be shown to square with them by altering our other hypotheses involved in the verification of them. He may even go to the extent of declaring false, and so rejecting, certain observational data that cannot be covered by the laws. So that we have to decide about the criterion for judging the worth of a prescriptive statement, or for checking the claim of 'truth' on its behalf when it is disguised as a descriptive statement. Here is another decision to be taken by us. We are familiar with so many criteria or what are sometimes called 'standards' in ethics, such as Hedonism—egoistic, altruistic and evolutionary—rigourism, endemonism and pragmatism. We have in science the criterion of systematic description of the sense-experience with the maximum of comprehensiveness and logical simplicity. A scientific theory, as a whole of its axioms, postulates and associated hypotheses, is tested against experience, and is accepted because of its predictive power over the largest possible area of experience with the minimum of logical complexity or gratuitous postulates and hypotheses. Thus the 'truth' of a scientific or an ethical theory is defined freely by us in terms of a criterion. So that the prescriptions involved in the statements are justified by procedures for which we seem to have no further justification. In fact we see that the series of justifications must stop somewhere. To the question, "Why do you adopt the character of systematic, simple and comprehensive description of sense-experience as a criterion of truth of a scientific theory?", one feels like replying, "Because that is most useful for our practice or life, in this world where we have to deal with our environment". Since a scientific theory is presu-

mably made for this purpose, it is no use asking why we bother after its success or instrumental value. A particular scientific prescription, usually in the guise of a description, is just or 'true', and so accepted, if in the context of its formal and material circumstances it proves to be so far the best (among its suggested alternatives) by the criterion of worth we have adopted for prescriptions of the kind. Similarly with regard to ethical standard or criterion we reply when asked to justify it, "Because that is what we believe to be most valuable for us." So that some may consider pleasure, some general utility, and others renunciation to be the highest good of life and the ultimate criterion of moral good. A particular act is good according to a particular moral standard if, in the context of formal and material circumstances and motives under which it is performed, it helps the ultimate good defining that moral standard.

Thus both in the case of science and ethics some practical aim is freely decided upon and adopted which guides the discipline, and serves as a criterion for the worth or 'truth' of the prescriptions. Now consider the formal and material circumstances that accompany a statement, whether implicitly or explicitly, and condition the prescription (either a manifest one or disguised as a description) which is seldom meaningful and effective when judged as an abstract maxim like "Heat expands bodies", "Sugar is soluble", "Always tell the truth" or "Stealing is bad". But these restrictive conditions, which supply the concrete meaning to the prescription in its bare form, are themselves prescriptions in disguise, only they are a good deal more pinned-down or accepted. So that, though we can in principle revise the whole system either to retain or to reject any prescription we please, we in practice move systematically in our cognitive enterprise, which is basically a pragmatic one involving the question of accepting beliefs that may help us most in dealing with our human situation. We move from the more simple and universally acceptable or pinned-down beliefs about our perceptual world, logico-mathematical forms and some ethico-religious mysteries or dogmas to other less simple and pinned-down ones which arise as we gradually extend the frontiers of our conscious life and experience through observation, interests and reflection. We do not find it paying to disturb one previously established system of beliefs to accommodate (or reject) a particular belief however impressive (or repulsive) it may appear in itself. It is the logical simplicity and coherence of the total system which is the measure

of the worth of a new change which must therefore occasion such changes in the system as will increase its over-all simplicity and coherence. Thus it was no use resisting Einstein's theory in favour of Newton's laws in the face of new observational facts. Logically one might either reject the facts or alter certain theoretical parts of physics and mathematics to retain Newton's laws, but each procedure would cause much greater complexity in the total system than what Relativity does. The alterations in the logical and algebraic laws introduced in new quantum mechanics are also similarly understood and justified. And similarly must we understand and justify the revolutionary changes that are taking place in morals, in which case, however, the standard itself in actual employment is not one but a mixture of many and, so, changes occur because of our shift of emphasis from one standard to another also. That there is no peace and harmony at any time, but always doubts and tensions in this adventure of man after competent dealing with his environment of ever-growing richness and complexity is to be explained by the vagueness of the conception of simplicity and coherence of a system and, as in the particular case of morals, by the ultimately alternative character of the various standards. An element of decision enters in each case and, so, one cannot justify one's choice of a scientific or a moral proposition in terms other than one's personal judgment or mode of viewing things, even if we accept a large body of his beliefs associated with the proposition and bearing upon this question of justification. These doubts and tensions over a particular choice subside *only gradually* when new and cognate beliefs appear which as a whole either confirm or refute them. But then doubt and tensions arise over many new items of choice and, so, we are never at rest in our efforts to have a clear set of beliefs or prescriptions regarding the question how to live. The world is an open system, and we have to move with the world, and ever venture our decisions as best as we can. Our life is thus a continual encounter with an environment which is fluctuating and pliable, and we have to react to it with such prescriptions of our own making as will yield us the best results.

Since the nature of this environment and the results we want depend on us, we are free to carve our own worlds and rules of behaviour. So we may differ considerably amongst ourselves in our outlook on life and our conduct, and the idea of a common world-view and culture is a dream. Unless it is proved that we

have a common mind, and such a one that our apparently free decisions are not really free but are psychologically conditioned, and that we shall gradually know them as such, we cannot know all the diverse philosophies as so many concrete determinations of an absolute but abstract philosophy or 'Truth'. It would then be like knowing the various shapes of the same natural laws in different parts of the universe as the consequence of choice of different spatio-temporal reference-frames and, so, knowing them not as forming separate worlds but as unified by a general law in a common system as the theory of Relativity shows us. The different worlds can thus be known as equivalent, and so might the different philosophies arising out of our apparently free decisions and sense of values. In that possible unified view, or God's vision, so to speak, every actual philosophy that any man or society ever held or will hold will appear to be equally true, just as the two lengths and two masses of a rod, as found by measurements in two relatively moving frames of reference are equally true, or as both the blue colour of an object when seen through blue glasses and its green colour when seen through green ones are equally true. To know truly is to know what would appear under certain circumstances; and if one could tell, from one's knowledge of the psychological make-up of minds of men and of their environmental conditions, what choice they will make and what philosophies they will severally adopt, and in this way could tell us of all the possible philosophies that may arise as various specifications of a general formula, then we might believe in this formula to be the unifying principle and matrix of all the philosophies and consequently of the minds who hold them. But so far it is only a 'profound' metaphysical speculation; and it seems we have to make peace with our human situation that does not offer us one mind for all, one philosophy, and so one human society, bound by a common culture and resting content with itself in a closed rather than an open universe.

So far, then, we must agree to differ fundamentally in philosophy, and the effort to whittle down differences by discussion appears to be futile. Yet conversions take place as a result of meeting, discussions and personal influence. Man sometimes examines and unsettles his most settled notions and revalues his values. He goes out of his own self to imagine other worlds of other selves, and in very rare and lucid moments comes to a feeling that every point of view may be right in its own way,

as every spatio-temporal reference-frame with the laws found in it is equally valid in Relativity mechanics. And sometimes he gives up his own point of view for a new and more comprehensive one, and feels as if he is reborn. Such capacities in us for sympathy with others' point of view and such conversions suggest that after all the metaphysical theory of a common mind underlying the diverse individual minds, which are its determinations, and of an all-inclusive master formula underlying different formulae we actually possess, which are its specific forms under different boundary-conditions, so to speak, is not as 'profound' or woolly as one might otherwise think. So that though we must agree to differ in our philosophies and must not put much trust on arguments and factual evidence, nevertheless it is dogmatic to embrace pluralism or even cheap eclecticism as a cult and close down meetings and discussions in philosophy, and in science, ethics, religion and cognate disciplines which are all essentially prescriptive though often appearing to be descriptive. The disciplines involve free decisions rather than coercive representation of any given facts; for even the so-called sense-data and this solid world may be rejected as illusory by the mind as it has been done by the acosmists; and so, there seems to be no common ground, resting on which, one might oppose his opponent and seek to win him over to one's own point of view. The experience of our philosophical controversies over the ages also supports this view to a large extent. The age-old rivalries in philosophy are not really settled, while some old ones in science raise their heads in new shapes, such as for instance the rivalry between a continuous and a discontinuous theory of matter and energy. But in spite of all this, persons do meet and seek to understand and influence one another, and they distinguish between a less and a more inclusive standpoint, which points to their having a vague notion of an ideal philosophical standpoint from which all the diverse philosophies might appear to be but so many perspectives or determinations, some wider while others narrower. And all this shows that metaphysics may not be wholly moonshine, and that it would be wise to let things go on in their natural course, that is, to allow full scope for free discussions and conversions. We must decide not to take any decision on this point, neither for nor against. Practice alone will pronounce the verdict on the issue, viz. whether or not we can through our present method of argument and persuasion really come anywhere nearer to our goal of a common philosophy or

'Truth' which may bind us together and make a single human society out of us. We are in such a stage of our cultural evolution that we cannot justify a proselytizing zeal, nor can we fully support pluralism and individualism in its extreme form. The present paper is an appeal to one's supreme insight to see that there may be things which we cannot decide for lack of adequate evidence, and that the question of unification of knowledge and culture through arguments and persuasions is one of them. It is an appeal to regard this question as *subjudice*, and to maintain an experimental attitude in our philosophical discussions, instead of either a cocksure prophetic one on the one hand or a sceptical non-communicative one on the other. We ought to meet and exchange views and try to convince one another of our respective standpoints with patience and understanding: we should neither give it up as an impossible idea, nor approach it with the naive confidence of a proselytizing preacher.

An Examination of an Instance of Metaphysical Logic —Analysis of Identity Propositions by Bradley and Sankara

by

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The President of the Logic and Metaphysics section of the Srinagar Conference last year stated that an unbridled development of an independent science of Logic is useless and non-sensical. According to him Logic "needs control from a higher source, from the normative sense, so that it may remain limited to the useful". The proper business of Logic is to lead the metaphysician from the given experience to its deeper and fuller meaning, in his quest for truth and Reality. Metaphysical Logic passes from level to level and progressively explores what may be the true meaning of that which apparently seems to be meaningful. It involves a process of exploration unlike a pure demonstrative science of Logic which involves a process of manipulation of symbols. He quoted the authority of Sankara in support of his contentions.

Such views are commonly held by many Philosophers in this Country. They all use language which is highly suggestive but equally difficult for purposes of pinning down its exact significance. I am, therefore, proposing in this paper to pursue an instance of the typical logical analyses given by two of the World's greatest metaphysicians, namely Bradley and Sankara, in order to understand what kind of Logic is this logic of exploration. I am proposing to follow their analysis of identity propositions from which both the philosophers derive important conclusions for their monistic philosophies.

II

Bradley attacks the traditional notion that every proposition consists of two ideas, a subject and a predicate, and that the proposition as a whole asserts a relation of agreement or disagreement between these two ideas. The traditional view is that every

proposition consists of three parts, a subject, a predicate and the Copula. The proposition is read in extension or intension depending on whether the predicate is taken in extension or intension. Against this view Bradley argues that this method of subject-predicate analysis will lead to serious difficulties. So he proposes that the whole proposition be regarded as one ideal content referred to a reality beyond the ideal content (Logic, pp. 10-11).

Bradley attacks the method of S—P analysis in two stages: (a) S—P analysis when strictly applied will reduce the statement to a statement of identity. (b) All statements of identity are trivial, and therefore false. His assumptions are:—

1. Subject/Copula/Predicate must be clearly demarcated, everything besides the copula being transferred to the predicate.
2. The subject and the predicate must both be taken either in denotation or in connotation. They must uniformly be read in the same fashion. If P is the name of a class, then S is the name of a class. If P is the name of an attribute, then S is the name of an attribute. Both are names of objects of the same kind. If both are names of entities of the same kind, then it is obvious that the proposition is a statement of identity.

In S-P analysis the possible alternative ways of interpreting propositions are:—

- (a) Attributive propositions predicate an attribute to the subject.
- (b) Class-membership propositions assert that the subject is included within the class of objects designated by the predicate term.
- (c) Relational propositions assert that the subject stands in a certain relation to the objects designated by the predicate term.
- (d) Identity propositions assert a relation of identity between the subject and the predicate.

(a) Now according to Bradley both the terms of a proposition should be interpreted in the same fashion. So, if the predicate term of an attributive proposition stands for a quality the subject term must also stand for a quality, and it is nonsense to say that one quality is another quality. Hence the only possible relation is that of identity, and identity propositions are trivial.

(b-c) Let us take such statements as 'A' is a member of the class 'B', or 'A' is to the north of 'B'. Now according to Bradley 'being a member of the class B' or 'being to the north of B' are attributes, and as such class membership and relational statements must state identity as shown in (a). Or if class-membership statements are taken in extension, then both the subject and the predicate being names of objects, they must name the same object. According to this interpretation the proposition—dogs are mammals—asserts a relation of identity. It asserts—"the dogs and dog-mammals are all the same".¹

After showing in this manner that S-P analysis, when strictly applied, will reduce the statement into a statement of identity, Bradley points out that all identity statements are trivial, and therefore false. "If you say that identity statements are all false, I shall not contradict you..... for I also believe that a judgment which asserts no difference is nothing."² So Bradley concludes that S-P analysis is unworkable since it can only explain identity statements, and all identity statements are insignificant. But since our judgments are not all insignificant they cannot be confined to ideas. The correct analysis is that the whole proposition consists of one ideal complex which is referred to a reality outside the ideal content. Every judgment asserts that within the identity of the real subject there is a synthesis of attributes.

III

It is interesting to note that Sankara and his followers give an exactly similar kind of analysis of the subject-predicate propositions. According to them an ordinary subject-predicate proposition can be taken either in denotation or in connotation. In each case, however, there is some *prima facie* difficulty. If we read denotatively the proposition—"the cow is white"—we get a tautology. The word 'cow' stands for cows of all colours and the word 'white' only repeats a part of the meaning of the subject. The proposition can, however, be saved if we assign a negative function to the words, namely, 'cow' excludes all non-cows and 'white' excludes cows of all other colours, and then they together determine the cow in question, by excluding all other cows of all other colours. If however we take the words in connotation, cowness and whiteness which are signified by the words

1. Logic—P. 177.

2. Logic—P. 24.

'cow' and 'white' respectively will have to be construed as belonging to the same substance. To account for the unity of meaning of the whole sentence, you will have to suppose the unity of ground in the same substance. Since a proposition is not barely negative in meaning, the connotative view is preferable. Every subject-predicate proposition asserts the identity of subject with differences of quality. This logical theory of predication seems to have been originally propounded by the Bhatta Mimāṃsakas but later on adopted by the Vedāntins.³ Sankara adopts this way of interpreting a proposition, according to which both the subject and the predicate terms are taken in connotation and a reality outside the meaning complex is supposed to be the subject. 'This lotus is blue' means 'there is an X in which blueness and lotusness go together.' Bradley's theory of predication seems to be merely a copy of this Indian theory.

Thus, according to Sankara subject-predicate propositions can be shown to be meaningful only by reducing them to some form of identity propositions—Identity of subject with differences of qualities. It is the identity proposition which reveals the form of thinking. Identity propositions are the ideal type of propositions, pure and simple, and all other types of propositions are only their impure forms. An identity proposition expresses an indivisible meaning (*Akhandarthākavakyam*). The cases of simple identity are illustrated in Advaita writings with such examples as 'This is that Devadatta' and 'You are the Absolute'. There seems to be, according to these logicians, an apparent contradiction (*virodhah*) here. This Devadatta as determined by the *present now* and the *present here* is different from that Devadatta as determined by some other now and some other here. Hence the true meaning of the proposition is reached by sublating the determinants and thereby reaching the identity of Devadatta through exclusive and non-exclusive metaphorical meaning (*Bhāgatyāga-lakṣaṇā*).

Here Sankara differs from Bradley who, as we have already seen, regards all identity propositions as tautological. Advaita writers repeatedly impress upon their readers that identification statements are the most significant of all types of propositions.

3. M. Hiriyanna—Vyādi and Vyāja pyayana—Indian Historical Quarterly, 1938. Vol. XIV....P. 265, and also edition of Vedānta Sāra—Poona 1929—P. 37.

They reveal to us a kind of immediate knowledge, as it were, where the distortion of a defective medium like the language is the least operative. The Advaita parable of ten people crossing a ferry is an exceedingly apt example for illustrating their meaning. 'You are the tenth man' is a supremely significant statement, because it removes an immediate puzzle of the group that was looking for the tenth man, since the man counting left himself out and could count only nine.

Sankara goes from this kind of interpretation of such statements of daily life to explain analogically upanishadic statements like 'you are the Absolute'. According to him, in this proposition 'you' means 'an embodied spirit' and 'Absolute' means 'the universal spirit'. If you do away with differences on both sides, you arrive at the identity of meaning which stands for 'pure consciousness' or the unqualified non-dual Absolute. In concluding our exposition of Sankara's analysis of the logical form of propositions we have to point out that Sankara is adopting the usual metaphysical procedure of searching for one ideal form for all propositions, so that we can know the structure of the world from the immutable structure of thinking. He thinks that identity propositions are not reducible to attributive ones, and that attributive propositions themselves become meaningful only on being shown as asserting some kind of identity (identity of the subject), and hence the necessary implication of our thinking is that one Reality appears in different contexts in changing forms. This impossibility of reducing identity propositions to attributive ones while keeping their meaning in tact proves that the world is substantially one, while the different objects are its deceptive forms which conceal the substantial identity. Bradley, on the other hand, thinks that all propositions are ultimately of the substantive-attributive type and, therefore, concludes that a monistic universe is the very assumption of all meaningful discourse. Reality is one and the multiple objects of the world enjoy only an adjectival status. Here our metaphysicians forget that propositions have no immutable form and that any type of proposition is as good as any other.

IV

With regard to Sankara-Bradlian strictures on S-P analysis of propositions, we have to point out that their assumption that in substantive-attributive propositions both the subject and the predicate terms are employed in a homogeneous fashion is not correct. It is true that if we take both the terms as names of

objects or names of qualities, then every proposition will amount to an assertion of identity between the subject and the predicate or will result in a non-sensical statement asserting that 'one quality is another quality'. But our philosophers failed to see that in S-P analysis we take the subject term referentially and the predicate term descriptively or attributively. So, we have to point out that Sankara-Bradlian strictures on substantive-attributive propositions are based upon a misconception. Substantive-attributive propositions are a genuine type of propositions and we employ them normally. They are not tautological, nor is there any need for supposing a reality (in the metaphysical sense) outside the meaning complex as the subject of such propositions. Both the philosophers wish to exaggerate the similarity of substantive words with adjective words in respect of their meaning function and completely ignore their syntactical function. They wish to reclassify substantive words with adjective words and yet keep the proposition in subject-predicate form. 'The cow is red' becomes in this analysis — 'X is a cow and is red'. Here the word 'cow' is divested of its referential function, which is assigned to a meaningless symbol, which is presented as the real subject. The symbol X has no meaning because it has not been given any. This linguistic innovation is presented as 'reality is the subject of every judgment' and it is ungraspable by finite thought.

Bradley's insistence that all identity statements are trivial is baseless. An identification statement like 'the morning star is the evening star' is a significant proposition. For centuries the shepherds knew the morning star and they also knew the evening star, but they did not know that both are the same. Hence the discovery that the morning star is the evening star is really significant for our knowledge of astronomical facts. Such a proposition is informative and not tautological.

It seems Bradley's stricture that all identity statements are trivial is due partly to his Hegelian bias and partly to his insistence that both terms of a proposition should be treated as names. It seems that it did not occur to Bradley that some identity statements might be significant, because he accepted with absolute faith the statement of the philosophical theory of Hegel on this matter. He was too anxious to discover one formula for all judgments so that the structure of the word could be deduced from the structure of thinking. He was absolutely convinced of the Hegelian doctrine of identity-in-difference. He writes, "As Hegel tells us,

it (identity statement) sins against the very form of judgments; for, while professing to say something, it really says nothing. It does not even assert identity."⁴ Bradley has obviously in the mind the symbolic form of 'A is A' as the formula of identity proposition.

One of the tests for ascertaining whether an identity statement is trivial or not is to reduce it to some form of S-P statements and then to see whether the reduced form is analytic or synthetic. 'The morning star is evening starish',—this is a synthetic statement. But this test is not open to Bradley, because of his assumption that both the terms of an attributive proposition are to be homogeneously interpreted.

Another way of showing that an identity statement is not trivial is Frege's distinction between sense and reference.⁵ 'The morning star' and 'the evening star' are different in sense though their reference is the same. But in Bradley's symbolic representation of all identity propositions in the formula 'A is A', this distinction is not revealed. Hence Bradley accepted the final position that all identity statements are trivial.

So, we agree with Sankara as against Bradley that identification statements are not trivial. Strawson rightly points out that an identification statement like 'That is the man who swam the channel twice on one day' asserts neither less nor more than the subject-predicate statement 'That man swam the channel twice on one day'.⁶

But Sankara's explanation of what is asserted in an identity statement does not seem to be correct. It is true that in the sentence "This is that man", 'this' and 'that' have different meanings. But in an identification statement like "This is that man" we do not assert the identity of meaning by sublating the differences in meaning of the two words 'this' and 'that'. We assert the identity of the man by the use of the two referring words 'this' and 'that'. Perhaps his mistake is to suggest that we talk about the world only with the help of the general meaning of the words we employ. Words have a general meaning, but we employ them referentially to mean the objects. The meaning of

4. Logic....P.

5. Translations from the Philosophical writings of G. Frege—Oxford 1952—Pp. 56-78.

6. Mind 1950 P. 343.

a word is not the object to which it may refer on the different occasions of its use. But on these different occasions we mean different objects with its help. In talking about the meaning of a word we talk about the rules which govern its use in different contexts. But in talking about the world we employ the words to mean objects.

Moreover his analogy about the Vedic statement does not hold. His idea of metaphor is quite clear. 'This man is a lion' means 'This man is strong and courageous like a lion'. But a lion is a perceptible object and the meaning of the word 'lion' is known from its employment in relation to the world. But the meaning of the word 'absolute' cannot be so known. A metaphor for which there is no cash value in literal meaning is a wasted metaphor.

So we conclude that metaphysical logic is not explorative in a mystical way. The logical theories of the metaphysicians are due to the misuse of language. The metaphysician is no better than a verbal magician who creates the illusion of proving a theory about the world by throwing ordinary words out of their usual employment and putting them into a strange use without notifying his intention. The metaphysician creates this linguistic illusion and enjoys it. His admirers read his works with pleasure because the theories gratify their unconscious emotional needs. The conflicting metaphysical theories appeal to the varying temperaments of different individuals. Those of us who do not want change and fear death will continue to read and enjoy the Advaita literature which speaks of man's identity with the Absolute. But those of us who do not like to live in a world of mystery and make-belief that death is an illusion will continue to read Buddhistic theories. Both of them are either indulging in a linguistic protection against frightening change or are making a verbal preparation for facing inevitable change. We are attracted or repelled by a metaphysical theory because it does or does not gratify our temperamental needs. It is enough for us if the metaphysician has given some semblance of a proof. If we do not understand him, so much the better. We retire with the feeling — "After all what he says cannot be wrong. Though I do not fully comprehend what he says, his general conclusions are all too true to be doubted."

Third East-West Philosophers' Conference

In an attempt to apply the work and results of the East-West Philosophers' Conferences held at the University of Hawaii in 1939 and 1949 to the general area of practical, social thought and action, the University of Hawaii will conduct a Third East-West Philosophers' Conference from June 22 to July 31, 1959, at the University of Hawaii in Honolulu, Hawaii. The theme of the conference is "East-West Philosophy in Practical Perspective." The purpose of the conference is "to consider the practical implications of comparative philosophy for cultural institutions as a basis of world understanding and co-operation."

The unique significance of this conference lies in the belief that real understanding can be achieved only through knowledge of the fundamental convictions of the peoples of the East and West, in the effort to explore the philosophical basis of world understanding comprehensively and intensively, and in the attempt to promote more comprehensive perspective in the field of social philosophy as well as in the more technical areas of metaphysics and methodology.

The work of the conference will be divided into six one-week sections as follows:


1. The Relation of Philosophical Theories to Practical Affairs.
2. Natural Science and Technology in Relation to Cultural Institutions and Social Practice.
3. Religion and Spiritual Values.
4. Ethics and Social Practice.
5. Legal, Political, and Economic Philosophy.
6. Conspectus of Practical Implications for World Understanding and Cooperation.

In conjunction with the conference eight special courses will be offered in the Summer Session of the University of Hawaii — two in Western philosophy, three survey courses in Asian philosophy (Buddhist philosophy, Chinese philosophy, Indian philosophy) and three comparative courses (Philosophy of Religion, Legal and Political Philosophy, and Ethics and Social Philosophy).

For further information write Charles A. Moore, Director, East-West Philosophers' Conference, University of Hawaii, Honolulu 14, Hawaii.

Books Received

1. "A Way of Survival", by Arthur W. Munk, Bookman Associates, New York. Price \$ 3/00.
2. "Hegel—A Re-examination" by J. N. Findlay, published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London. Price 35s. net.
3. *The Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol. No. 1, published by the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Calcutta. Price Rs. 35/-.
4. *Whispers from Eternity*, by Paramahansa Yogananda, published by Self-Realization Fellowship, California. Price \$ 3/00.
5. *Acte Et Etre*, by Michele—F. Sciacca, Paris, Aubier.



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