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The Impact of Freer Trade on the Localization of Industries*

by

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The purpose of this paper is to discuss the relationship of the International Trade Theory to the General Localization Theory in the light of Bertil Ohlin's analysis of mutual-interdependence theory and to examine as to how far a movement towards freer trade will influence the localization of industries. In this context the concept of freer trade has been taken to mean a movement towards the following goals :

- (a) the abandonment of all forms of quantitative restrictions, like exchange control, import licenses, etc;
- (b) doing away with all prohibitive as well as retaliatory tariffs; and
- (c) the formulation of a tariff policy consistent with international as well as national welfare. This would mean the retention of tariffs only if they lead to increased national social welfare, without causing serious international consequences.

The existence of transportation costs leads to a shrinkage in the volume of goods entering international trade. The higher the transportation costs the greater will be the obstruction to the flow of trade, and consequently cheaper production in most advantageous localities will be discouraged. According to the mutual-interdependence theory of Ohlin, the theory of international trade is only a part of the general localization theory. Natural resources influence localization of industry depending upon the pull of the

*This paper is based on the Doctoral Dissertation presented to the Purdue University, U.S.A., 1955. I am indebted to Dr. J. W. Hicks and Dr. J. W. Wiley, Purdue University, for many helpful comments. I am grateful to Dr. R. Balakrishna for many valuable suggestions and clarifications.

primary raw material constituent, availability of labour, capital and transportation facilities. The relationship that exists between the localization theory and international trade theory may be expressed as follows :

"It must be borne in mind that transfer costs are of slight importance to trade in many leading goods easily transportable and not subject to duties. This does not mean, however, that transfer costs in general do not affect them; on the contrary, transfer costs of other goods affect factor supply and factor prices in various places and hence the localization of all industries."¹

Trade between various countries is explained by a localization theory and therefore "a theory of international trade must be founded upon the general localization theory which gives special attention to circumstances arising from the existence of a number of countries".² There are many obstacles to the movement of commodities from one place to another and the transfer relation affects the localization of production and international trade. In addition to the factor of supply of productive agents, their local distribution is also an important element in the flow of trade. It is also true that the local distribution of demand is an important element in determining the course of trade.

Obstacles to International Commodity Movements :

Import duties play an important part in determining localization of industries and the direction of national as well as international trade. The theory of location introduces the element of space into the general theory of pricing. The one market doctrine needs a broader structure to take into consideration the geographical or territorial aspects of pricing. "Factors command varying prices in different parts of the same country, these differences in local factor supply affect the localization of production and inter-regional trade within countries in the same way as international differences affect foreign trade".³ The differences in transfer relations and the differences in factor equipment, on the whole characterize various regions and in a similar way the various countries.

1. Ohlin, Bertil G., *Interregional and International Trade*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1952, p. 211.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 243.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

The prices of non-competing home market goods differ widely as contrasted with the prices of the imported goods. Some home market goods compete with the goods that are exported from the country in question. Their prices tend to move in harmony with the prices of the exported goods. Since there are no fixed boundaries separating these various groups, it is quite possible that with changed conditions their classification also changes. Generally speaking, import duties on raw materials are lower than on manufactured goods. The import duties are found to rise as there is a rise in the value of a good. Such a tendency results in the raw materials being the items of import and export trade in many countries, in spite of the fact that costs of transport are greater in the case of raw materials. When import duties on finished products become prohibitive then domestic production takes the place of imported goods.

On the whole, tariffs result in a shrinkage of international trade. The extent to which territorial specialization could be achieved cannot be realized when duties are imposed. Diversification of production will reduce the real incomes for the factors of production. The international Commodity and factor price differences will be wider. "The tariff problem is one aspect of the problem of changed transfer conditions, which affect the localization of industry, nationally and internationally, and perhaps the distribution of labour and capital."⁴

Freer Trade will Influence the Localization of Industries :

Stating briefly the Weberian Technique, localization could be said to depend on the following three factors :⁵

- (1) Price range of raw materials,
- (2) Costs of labour, and
- (3) Costs of transportation.

As a starting point, let us suppose that there are several countries trading with each other and each of the participating countries have high tariff walls erected. Under such a situation there will be less scope for intensifying international division of production and territorial specialization. Each country will be more diversified in production. The commodity and factor prices will differ greatly

4. *Ibid.*, p. 298.

5. Friedrich, C.J., *Alfred Weber's Theory of Location of Industries*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1929, pp. 34-36.

between countries. "In each country demand for the relatively scarce factors is increased and the demand for the relatively abundant factors reduced."⁶ Import duties affect transferability and change transfer conditions. Duties affect the distribution of capital and labour in addition to localization of industry.

Costs of transport influence the movement of raw materials as it is more expensive to transfer raw materials than finished goods. But it is generally observed that tariff duties are heavier on finished goods than on raw materials. Therefore, in the presence of high import duties, raw materials tend to be transferred in international trade to the countries of final consumption where they will tend to be processed. "Internationally, market localization of secondary industries is favoured and raw material localization is counter-acted."⁷ whether it is the movement of factors of production or trade in manufactures, the effect on prices will be that of a tendency towards equality for similar goods. It is found commonly that during periods of depression many countries tend towards raising their tariff levels in order to maintain a high level of domestic employment. There is relatively less clamour for increased protection during periods of prosperity. A desire to achieve a higher employment on the part of many countries makes it necessary for them to put a premium on the development of secondary industries or manufacturing industries. Such an action in most cases may lead to greater production of raw materials elsewhere instead of trying to increase production of some of their own raw material.

To consider the overall effect of a tariff on the location of any given industry, mainly speaking, the changes brought about will be through changes in the three main factors which have been stated earlier. It might be meaningful to consider the effect of a tariff on each of those factors separately.

The Effect of a Tariff on the Price Range of Raw Materials :

The price of raw materials depends upon their nearness to the consumption centres and cost of production. Let us assume that high tariffs exist between countries. The levy of a duty, as long as it is protective, leads to a rise in the price of imports. According to the location theories industries tend to localize in regions where

6. Ohlin, *op.cit.*, p. 298.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 298-299.

low costs of production prevail for raw materials. Specially when high tariff duties exist on manufactured goods, it is commonly found that raw materials will tend to move from one country to another. Such a movement of raw materials though has the same tendency to equalize prices of their finished product as that which would be brought about by the movement of the finished goods. It is possible that the movement of raw materials will lead to higher factor prices due to the existence of transfer costs.

Particularly for weight loosing or "gross" materials it is much cheaper to transport the finished good from the region of raw material production. In the case of "pure" materials, which impart their total weight to the finished goods it might be more advantageous to transfer the raw materials as increased industrialization in any country increases employment and income in that country.

In a state of perfect mobility and unrestricted trade relations the location of each industry will depend upon its "material index". From the point of view of proper allocation of resources and minimization of income and employment, in the macro-sense, the localization of an industry will depend upon the types of raw materials constituting the production function.

The tariff duties influence localization of industries through changes in the price of raw materials. Therefore, the theory of location becomes a part of the general price theory and then both the theory of location as well as the trade theory become component parts of a general price theory.

The ultimate effect of tariffs which result in a movement of factors of production from their places of origin will reduce the opportunities of employment and income in the exporting country and consequently by the way of increasing home employment in a tariff-ridden importing country the prices for those products will be higher than otherwise would have been. The real incomes of factors of production would tend to be lower than under freer trade conditions.

Suppose there is an all round reduction in tariffs both on raw materials as well as on finished products, then most of the industries depending upon "gross materials" will tend to be located in the regions of their production. The industries which mainly depend upon "pure materials" will depend upon the pull of the consumption centres. Therefore, a freer trade will tend to localize industries according to their "material index" which will enable

a better allocation of resources because of the price range of raw materials. Such a localization guided by an economic allocation through the price mechanism will maximize the marginal product of each factor of production and thus there will be an increase in the real income for the world as a whole. Further, a movement of raw materials will tend to increase their production in their places of original production and discourage their production in the importing country.

The Effect of Labour Costs on Location

Labour costs exert a great influence on localization of industries. The one factor which can be moved more easily than others is labour but due to many kinds of national restrictions and human ties labour does not cross frontiers as easily as capital or raw material. The cost of labour depends upon the numerical strength of a given country, its marginal productivity (skill), the availability of other technical coefficients like adequate capital and good management and the demand for labour.

A country which has a larger labour force will have a comparative advantage over a country which has a scarce population. Of course, the quality of labour as well as the stage of technological development play an important part. The wages of labour will depend upon the marginal product of labour and the cost of living standards can be interpreted in many ways. But, as a working hypothesis we may say that a wage paid in a given country mainly depends upon the marginal product of labour.

This leads us to the clarification of the concept that wages of labour in different countries do not tend towards equality. But it is true that a country that has an abundant supply of labour with high skill will have a comparative advantage over other countries similar to a country that will have a comparative advantage if relatively it has an abundant supply of a given raw material. A movement towards free trade will tend to influence localization of industries in such localities as have a comparative advantage in labour costs in case of such industries which require a relatively large labour force.

The Costs of Transfer and Localization

In a study of a localization theory it is necessary to recognize that all economic activity takes place in a time-space continuum "in general, to minimize effort or factor services in producing a given social output, or to maximize social output with a given

amount of effort and factor services, is not to choose a path of action with respect to the time axis alone, or with respect to the space axis alone, but rather with respect to both axes".⁸ According to Walter Gard, the economic factors which press society into a spatial framework are: (1) deglomeration forces, and (2) inequality of resource endowment.

Gard prefers to call spatial relations as the distance inputs and this appears very meaningful. He defines distance input as the movement of a unit of weight over a unit distance and speaks of ton-kilometers, similar to Weber's treatment as ton-miles, instead of money costs.

The transport function is a vital aspect of production and therefore, influences the cost of any input of resource. "The character of production in a given place depends upon the distance and upon the transportability of the various goods, while the local distribution of consumers' market depends chiefly upon the local distribution of natural resources, labour and capital."⁹ The differences in transport features and transport facilities influence localization. Costs of transport need not be proportional to the distance a commodity is transported, because sea transport is cheaper than land transport. The presence of very good transportation facilities may to a great extent offset any unfavourable distance relations that may exist with regard to raw materials.

Possible Changes in Transfer Costs due to a Reduction in Tariff Duties

Suppose freer trade lowers the price of goods imported. Given an elastic demand more will be imported into a country at a lower price. The demand for transport services will increase. In the short-run if no expansion in the transport facilities takes place there will be rise in transport costs. But it is common experience that an increase in demand for transport services over a period of time will lower the costs of transport due to expansion of facilities and due to the realization of large scale economics.

It is possible that freer trade affects localization in two ways, first, the prices of imported goods will fall and imports will

8. Gard, Walter: "Distance Inputs and the Space-economy", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May, 1951, Vol. LXV, p. 186; refer to the article by the same author of "The General Theory of Location and Space-Economy", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November, 1949, Vol. LXIII, pp. 476-506.

9. Ohlin, *op.cit.*, p. 194.

increase. In the case of gross materials it would be advantageous to localize the industries in the place of raw material production. There may be a "split in location" if only some later stages of production locate themselves nearer the consumption centres. Secondly, a freer trade, if it leads to a discouragement of importation of raw materials and gives place to importing finished goods, the costs of transfer will be lower for finished goods than the raw materials. Then, given a situation when increased imports are paid for by exports, naturally exports also will be bound to increase. In such a case the same transport services may carry traffic back and forth and thus there will be a greater chance towards a reduction in transport costs due to the increased demand and supply, resulting in an increased volume of trade. And thus freer trade could achieve increased volume of trade and real incomes through changes in prices of imports and exports, and through a reduction in transfer costs.

Summary and Conclusion

International trade theory is but a part of the localization theory. The factors affecting localization of industry also determine the volume of trade. International as well as inter-regional trade ultimately lead to more efficient use of the factors of production and consequently to a larger output of goods. In other words, the real incomes of the factors of production will rise. All forms of trade restrictions lead to a shrinkage in the volume of trade and therefore, a movement towards freer trade will increase the volume of trade.

The greater the volume of trade, the greater will be the scope for intensifying territorial specialization. Thus, the demand for the relatively scarce factors will be reduced and the demand for abundant factors will be increased. A movement towards freer trade will influence the localization of industries in the following ways:

- (a) The tariff duties influence localization of industries through changes in the price of raw materials.
- (b) A movement towards freer trade will tend to influence location of industries in such regions which have a comparative advantage in labour costs.
- (c) The difference in transport features and transport facilities influence localization of industries.

The Indian Influence on Linguistics

by

DR. K. KUNJUNNI RAJA

India may rightly claim to be the original home of scientific linguistics. It is universally accepted that "the discovery of the Sanskrit language by European scholars at the end of the eighteenth century was the starting point from which developed the study of the Comparative Philology of the Indo-European languages and eventually the whole science of modern linguistics".¹ Scholars engaged in the study of linguistics have paid high tributes to the ancient grammarians of India like Pāṇini for their keen observation and accurate description of language behaviour.² A general survey of the part played by the 'discovery' of Sanskrit and the writings of ancient Indian grammarians in the development of the modern science of General Linguistics will show that India has continuously been exerting a stimulating and benign influence on modern linguistic studies, even though the Indian genius for linguistics has mostly remained dormant and still needs reawakening.

About the antiquity of grammatical studies in India the seventh century philosopher Kumārilaḥṭṭa says: "We cannot think of any point of time totally devoid of some work or other dealing with the grammatical rules treating of the different kinds of roots and affixes".³ In the *Black Yajurveda* itself there are clear references to the linguistic analysis started by the legendary Indra.⁴ Yāska's *Nirukta* and the various *Prātiśākhya*s also deserve men-

1. T. Burrow, *The Sanskrit Language* (1951), Preface.

2. L. Bloomfield, *Language*, vol. V, pp. 268f; W. S. Allen, *Phonetics in Ancient India* (1953), pp. 1-3; J. R. Firth, "A Synopsis of Linguistic Theory", *Studies in Linguistic Analysis* (1957), p. 1; M. B. Emeneau, "India and Linguistics", *JAOS*, vol. 75, pp. 145ff.

3. *Tantravārttika*, translation, Ganganatha Jha, p. 306 (Quoted by W. S. Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 2); Text (Anandāśrama Series), p. 279: *kiñcidgrantho-panibaddha-prakṛtipratyayādivibhāgadvārāprakriyātma- vyākaraṇasmṛtivar-jitakālābhāvāt*.

4. VI.4.7, *Vāg vai parācy avyākṛtā . . . tām Indro . . . vyākarot*. See R. G. Bhandarkar, *Collected Works*, IV, p. 244,

tion here. Pāṇini who lived two thousand five hundred years ago refers to many of his predecessors; and his great *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is the final product of generations of scholarship in linguistic analysis and classification.⁵

Leonard Bloomfield, one of the masters of modern linguistics, says about the value of Pāṇini's grammatical work thus: "The descriptive grammar of Sanskrit, which Pāṇini brought to its highest perfection, is one of the greatest monuments of human intelligence, and (what concerns us more) an indispensable model for the description of languages....Indo-European comparative grammar had (and has) at its service only one complete description of a language, the grammar of Pāṇini.....This scientific condensation which places every feature into its proper setting, is one of the two virtues which make Indian grammar a model for us. The other is completeness. Pāṇini gives the formation of every inflected, compounded, or derived word with an exact statement of the sound variations (including accent) and of the meaning.... For no language of the past have we a record comparable to Pāṇini's record of his mother-tongue, nor is it likely that any language spoken today will be so perfectly recorded....Pāṇini's grammar is one of the greatest monuments of man's intelligence."⁶

Professor M. B. Emeneau, another American Sanskritist, has recently spoken about the ancient Indian grammarians in high terms: "In linguistic matters the West has only been self-conscious about the canons of description for some decades now. Pāṇini's description of Sanskrit, on the other hand, is an exemplification of how linguistic description should follow scientific canons, and as a model of what should be attempted it has not yet been bettered except in the field of syntax....The Hindu achievements in morphological description were of a kind that we have only just begun to rival in modern Western descriptive linguistics and that we have not yet bettered. Allomorphic statement, the use of zero as an allomorph (*lopa* etc.), the identification of systematic similarities between sets of allomorphs, which we label morphophonemics (the Sanskrit term is *saṃdhi*), the setting up of morpho-

5. Cf. Batakrishna Ghosh, "Aspects of Pre-Pāṇinian Sanskrit Grammar", *B. C. Law Volume*, Part I; G. B. Palsule, "A Survey of the Pre-Pāṇinian Grammatical Thought in the Matter of Verbal Root", *Indian Linguistics*, (Bagchi Memorial Volume), 1957, pp. 116ff.

6. L. Bloomfield, *loc. cit.*

phonemes to ease the description in some complex cases (e.g. *ṛ*), the identification of meanings of classes (a part both of morphology and syntax) — all this most expertly done, is in the Hindu grammar."⁷

Compared to the great advance made by the ancient Indian grammarians like Pāṇini in the field of linguistic studies, the progress made by European scholars till the close of the eighteenth century is very little. "Aristotle laid the foundation of the division of words into 'parts of speech' and introduced the notion of case...Real insight into the nature of language made very little progress either with the Alexandrians or with their Roman inheritors, and etymology still remained in the childlike stage. Nor did linguistic science advance in the middle ages."⁸ The Renaissance widened the horizon by introducing the study of Greek; but the prevalent theological interest made it incumbent on scholars to believe that Hebrew, the language of the chosen people of God, was also the language spoken in Paradise, and hence the ancient language from which all the other languages later descended. All kinds of similarities between Hebrew and the European languages were brought in to prove the origin of the latter from the former. G. W. Leibniz in the eighteenth century criticized the Hebraic and every other variety of 'Goropianism' (Goropis Bacanus had suggested that Dutch was the original language from which later sprung all other languages).⁹ Western scholars were mainly interested in the origin of languages, and in fanciful etymologies of words.¹⁰

7. *JAOS*, vol. 75, p.147.

8. Otto Jespersen, *Language, Its Nature, Development and Origin* (1922), p. 20f.

9. Pedersen, *Linguistic Science in the Nineteenth Century* (English translation by J. W. Spargo, 1930), p. 51. See also H. Sweet, *Collected Papers* (Oxford, 1913), p. 57: "Philologists wasted their energies in vain attempts to find Hebrew roots in each of the languages separately".

10. Giles, *Language*, p. 46:

"So late as the last century the etymologies commonly proposed were so rash and so improbable, that Swift ironically set up as a philologist with such derivations as *ostler* from *oat-stealer*, and Voltaire remarked with considerable justice that etymology is a science in which the vowels count for nothing, and the consonants for very little". See also Pedersen, *loc. cit.* "They made no serious attempt to distinguish between stem and inflexional ending, root and derivational element".

"The nineteenth century witnessed an enormous growth and development of the science of language... More and more languages were studied and examined... linguistic forms were not only described and analysed, but explained... linguistic science passed from a purely descriptive to an explanatory science. The chief innovation of the beginning of the nineteenth century was the historical point of view... This brought out a vast change in the science of language."¹¹ The discovery of Sanskrit by European scholars at this time was the turning point in the history of linguistics; Sanskrit gave not merely the raw material to the Western scholars for the comparative and historical study of the languages, but also the scientific descriptive analysis of one of the languages by the ancient Indian grammarians.

The name of Sir William Jones (1746-94) is usually mentioned in connection with the discovery of Sanskrit by Western scholars, and the genesis of the science of comparative linguistics. Even at Harrow and Oxford he had shown a genius for languages, and at twenty-four he had mastered over ten foreign languages including Hebrew, Arabic and Persian. In 1783 he was appointed a Judge of the Supreme Court of Calcutta; this gave him an opportunity to study Sanskrit at first hand. In 1784 he founded the Asiatic Society for the cultural exploration of Asia; in this he had the co-operation of Charles Wilkins (1749-1836), 'the first Englishman who acquired critical knowledge of the Sanskrit language'. In the third annual address before the Asiatic Society, on February 2, 1786, Sir William Jones gave the memorable utterances:

"The *Sanskrit* language, whatever be its antiquity, is of a wonderful structure; more perfect than the *Greek*, more copious than the *Latin*, and more exquisitely refined than either; yet bearing to both of them a stronger affinity, both in the roots of verbs and in the forms of grammar, than could possibly have been produced by accident; so strong indeed, that no philosopher could examine them all three, without believing them to have sprung from some common source, which perhaps, no longer exists: there is a similar reason, though not quite so forceful, for supposing that both the *Gothick* and the *Celtick*, though blended with a very different idiom, has the same origin with the *Sanskrit*; and the *Old Persian* might be added to the same family, if this were the

11. Jespersen, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

place for discussing any question concerning the antiquities of Persia."¹²

This statement of Sir William Jones is considered as the starting point of Comparative Linguistics of the Indo-European languages; it puts in a nutshell the main conclusions later to be arrived at by the Continental scholars in the succeeding decades. Jones did not come to this result by a detailed and careful study and logical arguments; to him the truth came as a flash of insight. Moreover, the interest that he took in Oriental studies was mainly aesthetic. He did not have a high regard for such linguistic research. In a letter written to Prince Adam Czartoryski in 1770, before he was introduced to Sanskrit, he says: "Many learned investigators of antiquity are fully persuaded that a very old and almost primeval language was in use among the northern nations, from which not only the Celtic dialect, but even Greek and Latin are derived... We must confess that these researches are very obscure and uncertain."¹³ But by 1787 his view had changed, and he wrote: "You will be surprised at the resemblance between Sanskrit and both Greek and Latin."¹⁴ He did not live long to continue his investigations in the field; he died on April 27, 1794.

It may, however, be noted that Sir William Jones was not the first European to point out the resemblance of Sanskrit to the Classical languages of Europe. The Italian Filippo Sasseti (1540-88), who lived in Goa for five years (1583-88), was the first European to study Sanskrit and note the similarity between that language and the European languages.¹⁵ Benjamin Schultze (1725) also noted the affinity, and compared the numerals up to forty.¹⁶ A French Jesuit Missionary, Coeurdoux, sent a memoir to the French Institute in 1767 calling attention to the similarity of Sanskrit, Greek and Latin, both in vocabulary and in the flexion of

12. *Asiatic Researches*, vol. I (1788), pp. 422f; Jones, *Works*, vol. III, p. 34. Jespersen (p. 34) wrongly gives the date as 1796. Also R. A. Wilson (*The Miraculous Birth of Language*, p. 60) gives the date as 24th September 1786, which is not correct.

13. Max Müller, "Presidential Address", *Transactions of the International Congress of Orientalists* (1874), p. 182.

14. *Ibid.*

15. Dr. V. Raghavan, *Sanskrit and Allied Indological Studies in Europe* (1956), p. 55; JAOS, vol. 43, p. 4; Alfred Master, "Jones and Pāṇini", JAOS, vol. 76, p. 186; Windisch, *Geschichte der Sanskrit Philologie*, p. 24. Lefevre ascribes him to the close of the fifteenth century (*Race and Language*, p. 231).

16. JAOS, vol. 76, p. 186.

the present indicative and subjunctive of Sanskrit *asmi* with the corresponding forms of the Latin grammar; but his observations were published only forty years later.¹⁷ The mutual relationship of Sanskrit, Latin, Greek, German and even Slavonic was known also to Colebrooke. In some of his notes belonging to the year 1801 or 1802 there are long lists of words expressive of the most essential ideas of primitive life, which he proved to be identical in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, German and Slavonic.¹⁸ Yet neither Colebrooke, nor Sir William Jones, perceived the full import of these facts. It was left to the German and French scholars to bring to light the full wealth of the mine which these great English scholars had been the first to open.¹⁹ The real contribution of Jones lies in the fact that he appreciated the importance of the possible relationship of the languages, and authoritatively drew the attention of the Western scholars to it.

Friedrich von Schlegel (1772-1829) wrote in 1806 his celebrated work on the language and wisdom of the Hindus (*Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier*) which exercised a great influence on the development of the science of linguistics. He had studied Sanskrit for some years in Paris under Hamilton, and was full of enthusiasm for the old Indian works. He believed that all the Indo-European languages were derived from Sanskrit. The opening sentences of his book reveal his attitude towards Sanskrit:

"The old *Sanskrito*, i.e., the refined or perfect, also called *granthon*, i.e., the written or book-language, bears the closest relationship to the Roman and Greek as well as to the Germanic and Persian languages. The resemblance is found not only in a large number of roots, which it has in common with them, but extends to the innermost structure and grammar. The agreement is therefore not an accidental one, such as could be explained through intermixture, but an essential one, which points to a common origin. On comparison it is further discovered that the Indian language is the elder, the others younger and derived from it."²⁰

It may be mentioned here that there were strong reactions against the great prominence given to Sanskrit. The striking simi-

17. Jespersen, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

18. Max Müller, *loc. cit.* (Also *Chips*, IV, p. 418).

19. *Ibid.*

20. B. Delbrück, *Introduction to the Study of Language*, (English Translation), 1881, p. 2.

larity between Greek and Sanskrit prompted the Scottish philosopher Dugald Stewart to write an essay, *Conjectures Concerning the Origin of Sanskrit*, to prove that "Sanskrit must have been put together after the model of Greek and Latin by those arch-forgers and liars, the Brahmans, and that the whole of Sanskrit literature was an imposition."²¹

Franz Bopp (1791-1867) who is considered the founder of Comparative Philology²² got the inspiration from Schlegel's work. At the age of twenty-one he went to Paris to study Oriental languages, and studied Sanskrit under French scholars. His *Conjugations system*, published in 1816, marks the birth of Comparative Philology. He became a Professor in 1822. His *Comparative Grammar* was published between 1833 and 1849. He made a systematic comparison starting from the form of the verb, gradually extended over the whole language, and proved for all time what Jones and Schlegel had only stated. It may be noted that Bopp's aim was mainly to find out the origin of the grammatical forms.²³

Jespersen considers his countryman Rasmus Rask to be the real founder of Comparative linguistics. He says: "Rasmus Rask through his Icelandic studies had discovered Comparative Grammar before Bopp, without needing to take the circuitous route through Sanskrit."²⁴ Rask was born in Denmark in 1787. He was interested in grammar even from his childhood. He made a thorough study of the Icelandic language (Old Norse) and wrote a grammar of that language in 1811. His prize essay on the origin of the Old Norse language, written in 1814 but published only in 1818, is an important work of linguistic research. On June 11, 1818, he wrote: "I divided our family of languages in this way: The Indian (Dekanic, Hindostanic), Iranian (Persian, Armenian, Ossetic), Tracian (Greek and Latin), Sarmatian (Lettic, Slavonic), Gothic (Germanic and Scandinavian) and Keltic (Britannic

21. Max Müller, *loc. cit.*, p. 187. Also *The Science of Language* (1862) p. 163.

22. Delbrück, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

23. Hence the remark of Meillet that in the attempt to discover the origin of flexional elements, Bopp discovered Comparative Grammar, just as Columbus discovered America while attempting to find a route to India. (See Jespersen, *op. cit.*, p. 55).

24. *Op. cit.*, p. 55.

and Gaelic) tribes".²⁵ While appreciating the greatness of Rask and the value of his contributions, we have to note that it was Bopp who actually demonstrated the relationship by a thorough comparison of the languages. Jespersen also claims that Rask was the first to see that the Dravidian (by him called Malabaric) languages were totally different from Sanskrit.²⁶ But we have to remember that it was only in 1823 that Rask noticed the distinction and that much earlier than that the question had been clearly solved by F. W. Ellis, one of the pioneers of Dravidian linguistics who deserves a prominent place in the history of Comparative linguistics.

Francis Whyte Ellis (1780-1819) was the first European scholar who declared "that neither the Tamil, the Telugu nor any of their cognate dialects are derivations from Sanskrit, that the latter, however it may contribute to their polish, is not necessarily for its existence; and that they form a distinct family of languages with which the Sanskrit has, in later times especially intermixed, but with which it has no racial connection".²⁷ On the importance of the contribution of Ellis Dr. Burnell says in his note published in the *Indian Antiquary*, along with Ellis' essay on Malayalam language: "The above dissertation is of remarkable historical interest, for taken with the essay on Telugu, it proves that before 1816 Mr. Ellis had already foreseen the possibility of Comparative Philology not only as regards the so-called Aryan tongues, but also in respect of the Dravidian. Now it was not till 1816... that Bopp published his *Conjugations system* which was the beginning of Comparative Philology in Europe. Ellis could (considering the means of intercourse in those days) hardly have seen or heard of this work at all, for he died early in 1819. He must then in future be considered as one of the originators of one of the most remarkable advances in science in this century."²⁸

Ellis wrote dissertations on the Dravidian languages; of these the essay on Telugu was included in the *Telugu Grammar* by

25. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Essay on Telugu*, published in 1816 in the *Telugu Grammar* by A. D. Campbell. See Lefevre, *op. cit.*, p. 126, "Ellis first affirmed the original independence of Tamil, Kannada and Telugu".

28. *Indian Antiquary*, 1878,

A. D. Campbell about 1816.²⁹ The essay on Malayalam was published by Dr. Burnell in the *Indian Antiquary*. And the essay on Tamil is not available. If his essays had been published in Europe in his time, Ellis would have been recognized as one of the founders of the science of linguistics; unfortunately they did not exert any influence on the general stream of scholarship in Europe, which was mainly interested in the Indo-European languages.

Along with Bopp and Rask, the name of Jacob Grimm (1785-1863) must also be mentioned. He is the creator of historical grammar. The first volume of his German grammar came out in 1819. His name is also associated with the laws on the sound shift in Germanic languages (Grimm's Law), though to a considerable extent the law had already been noticed by Rask before him.³⁰


During the early period in the history of linguistics great prominence was given to Sanskrit, which was considered to be the *siye quo non* for every comparative linguist. Schlegel's extreme view about Sanskrit being the parent of the other Indo-European languages was not taken seriously even by Bopp; but nevertheless the importance of Sanskrit was fully recognized. Bopp says, "I do not believe that the Greek, Latin and other European languages are to be considered as derived from the Sanskrit in the state in which we find it in Indian books; I feel rather inclined to consider them altogether as subsequent variations of one original tongue, which, however, the Sanskrit has preserved more perfect than its kindred dialects."³¹ He believed that Sanskrit preserved the original traits of the parent language much more than the other Classical languages. He also made some other mistakes; he accepted the common belief that Persian was related more closely to German than to Sanskrit, and he tried to establish a relationship between Malaya-Polynesian and the Indo-European languages.

There were strong protests from the orthodox classical scholars to this new science of linguistics. The intrusion of Sanskrit everywhere was resented by these scholars who did not know

29. Reprinted in the *Annals of Oriental Research*, Madras University, vols. XI & XII, by N. Venkata Rao.

30. Jespersen, *op. cit.*, p. 43ff.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 48.



that language. "Those Sanskritists chatted of *guna* and *vrddhi* and other barbaric terms, and even ventured to talk of a locative case in Latin, as if the number of cases had not been settled once for all long ago".³² There was also the complaint that many of the linguists had only a superficial knowledge of the languages they were comparing.

Jespersen seems to belittle the importance of Sanskrit when he says: "Sanskrit was not in itself enough to give those who studied it the true insight into the essence of language and linguistic science, and on the other hand, ... real genius enabled at least one man to grasp essential truths about the relationships and development of languages even without knowledge of Sanskrit."³³ It is true that Rask showed that even without Sanskrit it was possible for the linguistic studies to advance a long step forward; but, as Pedersen points out, "it may be questioned whether it was possible to go appreciably farther than Rask" without the help of Sanskrit.³⁴ Pedersen speaks about the importance of Sanskrit, thus: "Sanskrit had an unsurpassed power of stimulating investigation. A mere acquaintance with this language had revolutionary effects, not only because it was something new, something which lay outside the old circle of knowledge, something to which scholars came unhampered by the old misconceptions which were not easy to shake off when Greek and Latin were concerned, but also because Sanskrit is so extraordinarily perspicuous in structure."³⁵ It was the light from Sanskrit illuminating Greek, Latin and the Germanic languages that made the comparative and historical methods in linguistics possible.

Jespersen, however, is not far from truth when he says that Sanskrit was not in itself enough to produce the science of Comparative Linguistics. The most significant contribution to Indo-European linguistics came from the Continental scholars of the nineteenth century; "and the land of Pāṇini remained a stranger

32. *Ibid.*, p. 66. See also Sweet, *op. cit.*, p. 59: "Learned Europe was scandalized at the idea of the classical languages of Greece and Rome being allied to that of a race of blackmoors—as the Hindus were popularly supposed to be. Then the very existence of Sanskrit was questioned . . . Some of those who grudgingly admitted the existence of Sanskrit declared it to be unattainable by Europeans."

33. Jespersen, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

34. Pedersen, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 256f.

to all that the intellect of Europe did in working out the Indo-European bases of Sanskrit and her sisters and cousins of the West, throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century."³⁶ The equipment needed for a Comparative linguist of the Indo-European languages was something beyond the reach of the ordinary Indian scholar of that time. It consisted "not only in a thorough knowledge of Vedic and Sanskrit, which is not wanting in India, but an equally thorough acquaintance with the ancient Indo-European languages and their history . . . combined with a proper appreciation and assimilation of the present day comparative and historical method. In addition to this a working knowledge of German and French in which most of the researches done in the field is enshrined, over and above that of English, is a necessity."³⁷ The most important contributions from modern Indian writers in linguistics are in connection with Indian languages.

It is usually stated by scholars that it is the transparent perspicuity of the Sanskrit language that led to the wonderfully accurate and rational analysis of it by the ancient Indian grammarians. Pedersen says: "It cannot be denied that Sanskrit is far clearer than Greek, not to speak of Latin. The perspicuity of the language led the ancient grammarians to the principles of correct analysis."³⁸ Whitney remarks: "The Sanskrit, above all things, is an analysable tongue, of transparent structure, falling easily apart into roots and suffixes and endings."³⁹ Here it must be noted, as pointed out by Professor J. Brough,⁴⁰ that the so-called clarity of the language is at least partly due to the Indian grammarians who analysed it; it is doubtful whether the analysis of the Indo-European languages could have been so easily possible but for the accurate analysis of one of the ancient languages already made by Pāṇini and others.

Sanskrit occupied a very prominent place in Comparative linguistics in the first half of the nineteenth century. It was taken to be the earliest of the Indo-European languages, contain-

36. S. K. Chatterji, "Linguistics in India", *Progress of Indic Studies*, (Poona, 1942), p. 320.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 324.

38. Pedersen, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

39. JAOS, Proceedings, p. 197. See also *Indian Antiquary*, vol. 14, p. 33.

40. J. Brough, "Methods of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians", *Transactions of the Philological Society*, London, (1951), p. 27. See also Emeneau, *loc. cit.*

ing the earliest linguistic forms; under the influence of German and the Sanskrit grammarians, Bopp and his followers admitted that the primitive Indo-European language had only three simple vowels, *a*, *i* and *u*, and that the Greek *e* and *o* were later developments from the original *a*. It was only much later, about 1880, with the discovery of the Palatalisation Law, that it was definitely proved that the multiplicity of vowels in Greek represented the original state of affairs more fully than the Sanskrit simplicity. When it came to be known that in some respects Sanskrit was less conservative than Greek, the glamour about the infallibility of Sanskrit was lost. Georg Curtius, the Greek scholar (1820-85), remarked with some resentment: "Sanskrit, once the oracle of the rising science and trusted blindly, is now put on one side; instead of the traditional *ex oriente lux* the saying is now *in oriente tenebroe*."⁴¹

It must be remembered that even in the brilliant discoveries made about the year 1880 regarding the phonetic structures of the original Indo-European language, and the "phonetic laws" pertaining to the individual languages, Sanskrit was playing an important role. Thus the discovery of *Verner's Law* was made possible only by the knowledge of the accentuation of Sanskrit. Jespersen says, "One of the most famous discoveries was that of the Dane, Karl Verner, that a whole series of consonant alterations in the old Gothic languages was dependent on accent, and (more remarkable still) on the primeval accent, preserved in its oldest form in Sanskrit only."⁴²

Another change that took place at that time in the position of Sanskrit in linguistic studies is regarding the theory of ablaut. The old theory was "based on the Indian grammarian's view that the shortest form was the root-form, which was then raised through *guṇa* and *vṛddhi*. This now is reversed, and the fuller form is shown to be the oldest, which in some cases was shortened according to a process paralleled in many languages."⁴³ But it has to be noted that Pāṇini's grammar was strictly descriptive and not historical; Pāṇini never stated that the root is the earliest form, which

41. Quoted by Jespersen, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 93. See also L. Bloomfield, *op. cit.*, p. 270: "If accentuation of Sanskrit and Greek for instance had been unknown, Verner could not have discovered the pre-Germanic sound-change that goes by his name."

43. Jespersen, *op. cit.*, 92.

in course of time developed into the inflected form; the root was only the minimum got through synchronic analysis. If the nineteenth century linguists in their enthusiasm mistook it as the most ancient form, and had to be corrected by later investigations, that cannot be taken as a fault of the system of Indian grammarians.⁴⁴

The names of two great exponents of general linguistics in the second half of the nineteenth century deserve special mention here: Max Muller and W. D. Whitney. Both were scholars in Sanskrit and wrote popular texts on General linguistics; but their attitudes towards Sanskrit were different. The German scholar was full of enthusiasm for Sanskrit. He declared, "Sanskrit certainly forms the only sound foundation of Comparative Philology, and it will always remain the only safe guide through all its intricacies. A Comparative Philologist without a knowledge of Sanskrit is like an astronomer without a knowledge of Mathematics."⁴⁵ Whitney, on the other hand, was less sympathetic. He considered that the Sanskrit language described by the Indian grammarians was "different both from the pre-classical dialects and from the classical."⁴⁶ He said, "The grammarians' Sanskrit... is a thing of grammatical rules merely, *having never had any real existence as a language*, and being on the whole unknown in practice to even the most modern pandits."⁴⁷

As regards this misconception about the position of the language described by Pāṇini, Bloomfield says: "Indian grammar has been undervalued and neglected by many linguists, especially in America. In part this neglect is due to a misconception of its historical place. European scholars naturally supposed that Sanskrit grammar bore the same relation to Sanskrit literature as Latin grammar bears to Roman literature. They assumed that the classical Sanskrit of literature represented a real development (or, perhaps, stagnation) and that the so-called native grammar pictured more or less accurately, some stage of this evolution.

44. Cf. Emeneau, *JAOS*, vol. 75, p. 148n: "The descriptive method involved here has at times been misconceived as a historical derivation; for samples of statements based on this misconception see Lakshmana Sarup, *The Nighaṇṭu and the Nirukta*, vol. 2 (1921), p. 13, fn. 6."

45. Max Müller, *Chips from a German Workshop*, IV, p. 19 (Quoted by Jespersen, *op. cit.*, p. 67).

46. *Indian Antiquary*, vol. 14, p. 34.

47. *Ibid.* Italics mine.

When they found in the grammar forms which they had not seen in the literature, they accused the grammarians of fraud.... Consequently the European saw in Classical texts a primary document, in the grammar a secondary one and unreliable at that. This was Whitney's view to which he gave unfortunate expression.... We now know that this was the reverse of the truth. Far from inventing forms, Pāṇini was describing a colloquial speech, a conservative upper-class language, to be sure, but a language native to him and used in everyday life by the Brahmins in his part of North-western India. It is much the same language as that of the oldest Brāhmaṇas and Sūtras. Classical Sanskrit literature was written by men who had learned Sanskrit composition from grammar and dictionary and used these books as their guides and authorities for correct usage."⁴⁸

Two other causes pointed out by Bloomfield for the general neglect of Sanskrit grammar in the West are the sense of superiority on the part of the Western scholars, and the difficulties of Pāṇini's technique. Because the Indians had not discovered the history of language, their work was supposed to be negligible. One forgot that the Comparative Grammar of the Indo-European languages got its start only when the Pāṇinian analysis of an Indo-European language became known in Europe."⁴⁹ "Composed with an algebraic condensation his work is a linguist's, and not a language teacher's grammar."⁵⁰

Throughout the nineteenth century Sanskrit was regarded as an indispensable requirement for a Comparative linguist, and all the masters in the field had acquired direct and intimate knowledge of that language. By the beginning of the twentieth century interest had spread much wider from the Indo-European languages to other groups of languages, especially to the uncultivated languages of Africa and America where detailed historical study was an impossibility. The historical and evolutionary approach which was the most characteristic feature of nineteenth century linguistics gave way to the descriptive methods of modern structural linguistics. L. Bloomfield, the founder of modern American linguistics, had the greatest admiration for the descrip-

48. *Language*, vol. V, p. 268f. (See also *JAOS*, vol. 47 (1927), pp. 66f, and *JAOS*, vol. 75, p. 146).

49. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

50. W. S. Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

tive methods of Pāṇini; his monumental work on language⁵¹ is to a considerable extent influenced by him.

The influence of ancient Indian phonetics on modern linguistics deserves special mention here. Professor W. S. Allen, author of *Phonetics in Ancient India*,⁵² which gives a systematic account of Indian phonetic doctrines and their evaluation in the light of modern linguistic theories, says, "The link between the ancient Indian and the modern Western schools of linguistics is considerably closer in phonetics than in grammar. For whilst Pāṇinian techniques are only just beginning to banish the incubus of Latin grammar, our phonetic categories and terminology owe more than is perhaps realised to the influence of the Sanskrit phoneticians."⁵³ Sir William Jones, who discovered Sanskrit for the West, was very much influenced by the Indian system of sound analysis. His paper "A Dissertation on the Orthography of Asiatic Words in Roman Letters"⁵⁴ was mainly based on Indian models. As Professor J. R. Firth points out in his paper on *The English School of Phonetics*, "without the Indian grammarians and phoneticians whom he introduced and recommended to us, it is difficult to imagine our nineteenth century school of phonetics."⁵⁵

The Indian influence on the phonetic views of W. D. Whitney may be inferred from his own statement that the ancient Indians had "a phonetic science of extraordinary merit which has called forth the highest admiration of modern scholars."⁵⁶ He adds, "Nothing approaching it has been produced by any ancient people,

51. *Language*, New York, 1933. It is said that Bloomfield used to speak of Pāṇini's grammar as one of his bedside books. His review of Liebhich's *Konkordanz Pāṇini-Candra* in *Language*, vol. V, pp. 267-76 is "a most explicit statement of what he found in Pāṇini and what he thought other linguistic scholars ought to find there; this essay should be better known to all linguistic scholars and students than it is." (Emeneau, *JAOS*, 75, p. 150).

52. Oxford University Press, 1953.

53. Preface.

54. *Asiatic Researches*, vol. 1 (1788), pp. 1-56. See also J. R. Firth, Foreword to *Devanāgarī Script* by H. M. Lambert (1953).

55. *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1946. (Quoted by W. S. Allen *op. cit.*, p. 3). Cf. "It is my conviction that Bell's 'Visible Speech' which was the beginning of 19th century phonetics was first suggested to Bell by what he read in Sir William Jones' writings". (*Proceedings of the Sir William Jones Bicentenary Conference*, The Royal India Society, London, 1946, p. 11).

56. *Indian Antiquary*, vol. 14, p. 33.

and it has served as the foundation in no small degree of our own phonetics, even as our science of grammar and language has borrowed much from India.”⁵⁷ Whitney was the pioneer in bringing out expositions of some of the ancient *Prātiśākhya*s dealing with phonetics. His criticism of the German scholars for their blundering over “seemingly obvious” distinction between voiced and voiceless was made possible by his knowledge of Indian grammarians, as shown by Lespius.⁵⁸ On the standard of scientific perfection attained by the Indian texts on phonetics, Allen says: “They display a level of phonetic discourse beyond the full comprehension of Whitney and his contemporaries, such as only the advances of the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries enable us to appreciate today.”⁵⁹ “The alphabet at the beginning of Pāṇini’s grammar comes very near to that which a modern ‘phonemist’ would evolve for Sanskrit by a substitutional—distributional analysis of word-isolates.”⁶⁰ There is much in common between the Sanskrit *varṇa* and the modern term *phoneme*, though no phonemic theory is implied by the former. As Dr. Suniti Kumar Chatterji says, “It is gratifying for us, Indians, to realize with a pardonable national pride that the accuracy of the descriptions of the sounds of Sanskrit which were made over 2500 years ago has been demonstrated by modern scientific phonetics.”⁶¹

It is generally accepted that the science of linguistics owes its origin to the so-called discovery of Sanskrit; but it is not so well understood, either in India or in Europe and America, that even in modern times the ideas of ancient Indian thinkers have been responsible for giving the inspiration for many of the theories in linguistics. The nineteenth century scholars in their enthusiasm for the historical and comparative methods had underrated the value of Pāṇini, as lacking in the two modern methods; but in the twentieth century, thinkers began to realize the importance of the descriptive method; and the modern Structural linguistics which is very popular in America, and which is spreading elsewhere, may be considered in a sense as a coming back to Pāṇini. Many of its methods are inspired by Pāṇini, as recognized by Bloomfield.

57. *Ibid.*

58. *JAOS*, vol. 7, p. 313; vol. 8, p. 344. Allen, *op. cit.*, p. 3f.

59. *op. cit.*, Preface.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

61. Proceedings of a Conference of Vice-Chancellors and Linguists, Supplement to *Indian Linguistics*, vol. 18, p. 56.

Professor M. B. Emeneau puts it clearly thus: “Linguistic method as stated by Bloomfield in his book *Language* shows much that is the result of his reading of the Hindu grammarians. It is not too much to say that his methods in phonemic analysis, and in morphology and syntax would hardly have been what they were or have been stated as they were, if Bloomfield had not been steeped in Hindu grammar, so that he became such a firm admirer of its “scientific condensation which places every feature into its proper setting”, and of its “completeness” (*Language*, V, p. 274) . . . most of the specific features that are taken at the present day to distinguish an “American” school of linguistics from others are Bloomfieldian, and, if I am correct, many are Pāṇinian.”⁶²

The idea of a zero element in linguistic analysis was taken by Bloomfield from Pāṇini. Bloomfield acknowledges this: “A single phonetic form, in the manner of homonymy, represents two meanings which are usually distinguished by means of a linguistic form, as singular and plural noun in *the sheep (grazes) ÷ the sheep (graze)*. Here the Hindus hit upon the apparently artificial but in practice eminently serviceable device of speaking of a *zero element*: in *sheep ÷ sheep*, the plural suffix is replaced by *zero*—that is, by nothing at all.”⁶³ Bloomfield did not develop this idea fully; his followers began to carry this notion of a zero element much further to explain all deviations from the normal pattern, so that the whole problem became confused, and some scholars are trying to get the inspiration from Pāṇini to clarify the problem.⁶⁴

It has been suggested by Professor Firth⁶⁵ that Ferdinand de Saussure, the great Continental linguist, might have been influenced by the Indian philosophers when he advanced the view that in language there are only differences without positive terms (*Dans le langage il n’y a que des différences . . . sans termes positifs*).⁶⁶

62. *JAOS*, vol. 75, p. 150.

63. *Language* (1933), p. 209.

64. W. S. Allen, “Zero and Pāṇini”, *Indian Linguistics*, vol. 16, pp. 106ff. See also W. Haas, “Zero in Linguistic Description”, *Studies in Linguistic Analysis* (Oxford), 1957, pp. 33ff.

65. J. R. Firth suggests (*Technique of Semantics*, p. 63) that “it is just possible that he (de Saussure) had learned something of Indian philosophy”.

66. *Cours de Linguistique Generale*, pp. 167ff. See also S. Varma, “Indian Semantics”, *Journal of the Department of Letters, Calcutta University*, 1926, p. 24.

Though we say that meanings correspond to concepts, we have to understand that these concepts are not positive in their content, but only differential. The function of a word is contextual elimination. Thus the meaning of a word in a sentence will be modified, if the neighbouring term undergoes modification. This is analogous to the *Apoha* theory of the Buddhist philosophers according to which the meaning of a word is not positive, but negative. After establishing the negative essence of meaning in the case of words, de Saussure says that the sign and the thing signified are negative only when taken separately but their combination is a positive fact. This idea is also similar to the Buddhist view according to which the import of a sentence is positive even though the meanings of individual words taken separately, are negative.⁶⁷

The general theory of linguistics developed by Professor J. R. Firth on the basis of the different levels of contexts is also to a great extent inspired by Indian thinkers. He starts his paper on "A Synopsis of Linguistic Theory, 1935-55" with the following statement: "The theory of general linguistics here presented in outline, has some of its roots in India, but it also has links with the laboratory of today."⁶⁸ His discussion on collocational study of words seems to be influenced by the Indian theories of *ākāṅkṣā* or mutual expectancy as the most important connecting link between words in a sentence. Prof. Firth says: "The collocation of a word or 'piece' is not to be regarded as mere juxtaposition, it is an order of *mutual expectancy*. The words are mutually expectant and mutually prehended."⁶⁹

The inspiration that India has been giving to the study of the various aspects of language is still continuing. Of late the interest of Western scholars is spreading to the field of 'meaning' which has till now been neglected by the linguists as incapable of being handled scientifically.⁷⁰ The discussions on the problem of meaning by the ancient Indian thinkers like Bhartṛhari, Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Anandavardhana show extraordinary linguistic acumen, and will be of much help in clarifying many of the complicated issues

67. *Tattvasaṅgraha*, verse 923: *Vākyārthaḥ pratibhālakṣaṇaḥ*.

68. *Studies in Linguistic Analysis*, p. 1.

69. *Ibid*, p. 12.

70. Cf. Bloomfield, *Language*, p. 140: "The statement of meaning is, therefore, the weak point in language study, and will remain so until human knowledge advances very far beyond its present state".

in modern discussions on the subject. The *Sphoṭa* theory of the grammarians, the concept of *Ākāṅkṣā* enunciated by the *Mīmāṃsakas*, and the linguistic theory of suggestion propounded by Anandavardhana, are beginning to be seriously studied by modern students of linguistics.⁷¹ Emeneau says: "But certainly in one other slowly-awakening department of linguistics, that concerned with meaning, the West still has something to learn from India. There grammarians, literary theoreticians and philosophers were all concerned with problems of meaning, and much was thought and written on the subject. Of this the West is, for all practical linguistic purposes, innocent. The Hindu treatises are in a difficult style and few in the West will be qualified to deal with them as Sanskritists, philosophers and linguistic scholars. Yet the results are likely to be worth the effort; it is a subject that can be recommended to aspirants."⁷² Some suggestive papers have been written by Professor J. Brough, who has studied the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari and made an English translation of the *Dhvanyāloka*,⁷³ it was under his guidance that the present writer prepared his Doctorate Thesis on 'Indian Theories of Meaning' surveying the whole field and bringing out the linguistically relevant views on meaning given by the various schools of thought in India.

This general survey of the Indian influence on linguistics may be concluded with the following statement of one of the seniormost Sanskritists and linguists of the present day, Professor Sir Ralph Turner: "In India the development of linguistic theory was far in advance of any other system of the ancient world, and it is surely of far-reaching significance that the detailed and accurate observations of the authors of the *Prātiśākhya*s, the acute analysis stemming from the genius of Pāṇini and Patañjali and the linguistic theories of a Philosopher like Bhartṛhari or a commentator like Uvaṭa should now be exciting the interest and directing the thought of the most important school of General Linguistics in the Western World."⁷⁴

71. See the papers by the present writer published in the *Adyar Library Bulletin* (1954-58).

72. *JAOS*, Vol. 75, p. 151.

73. J. Brough, "Audumbarāyaṇa's Theory of Language", *BSOAS*, Vol. XIV, pp. 73ff; "Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians", *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1951, pp. 27-46; "Some Indian Theories of Meaning", *Ibid*, 1953.

74. *Report of the Informal Conference of Linguists and Educationists*, Deccan College, Poona, from 26th to 29th May, 1953, p. 11.

Four Theories on Causality in Indian Philosophy

by

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Four different views regarding causality are maintained by the various Indian philosophers. They are the Samghātavāda, Ārambhavāda, Pariṇāmavāda and Vivartavāda. Buddhists follow the Samghātavāda, Tarkikas and Mimamsakas the Ārambhavāda, the Samkhyas, Yogins and non-Advaitic Vedantins support Pariṇāmavāda, while the Vivartavāda is solely adopted by the Advaitins. The Buddhists who accept external things maintain that apart from the atoms which make up a pot there is no object called 'pot'. The atoms themselves when arranged in a particular manner give us that unique appearance and name. The standpoint of the Buddhist is this:—There is no proof for the existence of a whole apart from the parts as the wholes can be explained by the assemblage of atoms. It cannot be urged that, since atoms are beyond the senses, pot etc., will not be perceptible, because although a single atom is beyond the senses a collection of them is perceptible, just as a single hair is invisible at a distance, while a collection of them is visible. Nor can it be urged that the notion 'this is jar, one and big' is inexplicable, as that too can be explained in the same manner as the notion, 'This is one big heap of paddy', in a large collection of small grains.

The Tarkikas do not accept this doctrine but they propound a new doctrine called Ārambhavāda by which a new article called pot is produced by the atoms. Not only the pot but right from the dyad upto the pot all the intermediate parts of the pot are new creations. Through the help of the efficient, inherent and non-inherent causes new things are born. When the inherent or non-inherent cause perishes the whole also perishes.

Refuting the Buddhist doctrine of Samghātavāda, the Tarkika says¹:—Since an atom is beyond the senses a heap of them is also

1. Vide Siddhāntamuktāvalī I Paricheda.

beyond the senses as otherwise there is the contingency of a group of invisible things say, ghosts, becoming visible. The hair analogy does not suit, as a single hair is visible near at hand while an atom is not. It may not be urged that at the moment a visible collection of atoms is produced, since an invisible thing cannot be the material cause of a visible thing. Otherwise the sense-organ, eye which is invisible can produce a visible eye. It may be asked how invisible atoms produce a visible triad in your school of thought; but we do not maintain visibility or otherwise of a thing by nature but a thing is visible when the aggregate of causes is present and invisible when it is not present. So triad is visible because of medium dimension (*mahatva*) but atom is not so because it has no such dimension. Thus the existence of whole things is necessary. This *ārambhavāda* is accepted by the *Mīmāṃsakas* also. But the *Sāṃkhya*s reject it and establish the theory of *Parīṇāmavāda* or theory of transformation. By this theory clay is transformed into a pot by the operations of a potter just like milk into curd. This is also called *Satkāryavāda* since the *Kārya* or effect is existent before it comes to light.

Enunciating *Sat-Kāryavāda* *Isvarakṛiṣṇa* says in his *Sāṃkhya-kārika* (No. 9):

Effect exists even prior to the operation of the cause since (1) what is non-existent cannot be brought into existence by the operation of a cause, since (2) there is recourse to the appropriate material cause, since (3) there is not production of all, since (4) only the potent cause effects what is possible and since (5) the effect is non-different from the cause. These five reasons are explained by the commentator *Vacaspati* thus:—

(1) If the effect were really non-existent no agency whatever could bring it about. Indeed a thousand craftsmen could not extract oil from sand.

(2) It is also seen that one who wishes to produce a particular effect seeks the appropriate material cause (e.g.) milk and not clay for curd.

(3) If effects were really non-existent, then, because of the absence of connection between the cause and the effect, any result should follow from any cause, a conclusion contradictory to experience.

(4) It may be argued that though there is no connection between the cause and the effect particular effects are produced

by only particular causes because of the varying potencies of the latter. But what is this potency? It must be the effect lying in a latent state in the cause.

(5) The identity of cause and effect can be proved by *anumanas*. If cloth and threads or clay and pot were different they must have different weights and if they had different weights the cloth must weigh twice as much as the threads of which it is made. Therefore if the cause existed before the origination of the effect, the effect also must have existed. Causation consists in manifestation in another form of that which already existed in one form.

Here the *Tārkika* asks: granting that causation is manifestation, we ask—is this manifestation existent or non-existent? If existent, then, the operation of the cause would be superfluous. If not, there will have to be a cause for manifestation ending in accepting a series of causes. To this the *Sāṃkhya* replies that a similar question can be asked against the *Naiyāyika* also viz. is origination existent or non-existent? In the former case there is no need for the operation of causes. In the latter there has to be another origination thereof resulting in infinite regress. If the origination is identical with the effect then we can never say 'the effect is originated' without being guilty of redundancy.

Thus *Parīṇāmavāda* consists in accepting (1) the identity of the material cause and the effect, (2) the existence of the effect before its birth and (3) the manifestation of the effect by the aggregate of causes.

Refuting this *parīṇāmavāda* the *Tārkikas* say that identity of the cause with the effect is untenable for the following reasons:

(1) Without difference cause-effect relationship is itself impossible as one and the same thing cannot be both.

(2) There is the contingency of the difference in practical efficiency sanctioned by experience being abandoned (e.g.) a pot is useful to bring water, while a lump of clay is not. A lump of clay can be made into a pot, while a pot cannot be.

(3) If the pot existed beforehand then the operations of a potter become useless.

(4) There is the contingency of the clay being observed as 'pot'.

The Sāṅkhyas reject the theory of Ārambhavāda thus: (1) The effect is not different from its material cause as the notions 'the clay is the pot', 'The threads are the cloth' go to confirm the view of their identity. (2) If the effect did not exist beforehand it can never be born as per rule: what is not existent cannot be born (e.g.) a hare's horn. (3) Agency in respect of origination is itself impossible for a pot which did not exist before its origination. Thus we cannot say that pot is coming into being as at that moment the pot is not existent but we will have to say that its parts are coming into being. (4) If the effect did not exist before its origination the relationship between the cause and effect would be impossible as usually relationship between two existents alone is conceivable and not between an existent and a non-existent.

Mostly all the Vedantins accept Parīṇāmavāda. The Advaitin alone accepts the Vivartavāda. According to Vivartavāda the effect is only an illusory manifestation of the cause. In explaining the difference between *parīṇāma* and *vivarta*, Appayyadikṣita says:² That change which is of the same grade of reality as the thing is transformation (Parīṇāma) what is not of the same grade of reality is illusory manifestation (Vivarta) or change which is of the same nature as the cause is transformation, what is of a different nature from that, is illusory manifestation: Or, the effect which is non-different from the cause is a transformation, the effect which even without being non-different from that, is yet difficult to state apart from that is illusory manifestation.

Vivartavāda is also called Anirvacanīyavāda in so far as the effect is inexplicable either as existent or non-existent and either different or non-different from the cause. The Sāṅkhyas reject difference advocated by the Tārkikas while the latter reject the identity maintained by the former. The reasons on both sides being strong and unanswerable, the Vedāntin decides that the effect is inexplicable and hence unreal. Indeed the clash among the various disputants is to the advantage of the Vedāntin who asserts that everything is inexplicable. There is a quotation in Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya or Prāśna Upaniṣad which means "throwing the reasons of conflict before the disputants, the knower of the Vedas keeps calm as the notion 'sat' is guarded by them". (Pr. 5-1).

Among the Advaitins some are of the view that the Maya is the transforming material cause and Brahman is the manifesting

material cause. Others however maintain that Brahman alone is the material cause Maya being helpful to the pure Brahman's causality.

The author of Tatvasuddhi supporting Vivartavāda asks the Sāṅkhya—Is the manifestation identical with the effect or is it different? If the former, then if it did not exist beforehand there is the consequence of Asatkārya of the Naiyayikas. If it did exist then you will have to accept another manifestation for this manifestation and so on *ad infinitum*. If it is different, then, some relationship should be stated between the effect and the manifestation since in its absence we cannot call it the manifestation of the effect. If there is some relationship we ask whether it exists before the origination or not. In the former case there is the futility of the operation of the cause. In the latter there is the contingency of asatkāryavāda. Therefore the effect is neither existent nor nonexistent before origination. But it is inexplicable. The same questions may not be asked about the inexplicable effect, since it is only an outcome of Maya which is a repository of all inconsistencies. According to Śaṅkara, the author of the *Vedantasūtras* advocates Parīṇāmavāda superficially while the Vivartavāda is his real view. The Sūtra *bhoktrāpatteh avibhāgaścet syāllokavat* (II. 1. 12), which is an answer to the objection that if Brahman were the material cause of the universe then there is the contingency of identity between the enjoyer and the enjoyed both of which are the products of the same Brahman, states that difference is possible as between water and bubble, etc., observed in ordinary experience. This example shows that Parīṇāmavāda is acceptable to him. But the next Sūtra '*tadana nyatvam ārambhāṇa śabdādibhyah*' (II.1.13) shows clearly that the author is in favour of vivartavāda since the Śruti text quoted in support of his theory supports only that vāda. This Śruti text means that the effects are mere names brought out by the origin of speech and the clay alone is real. Here it is clear that the effect is unreal. The word '*ana nyatvam*' means 'non-existence differently', and not identity. The word '*lokavat*' in the last Sūtra implies that it is not so in reality. In the Sūtra '*atmakṛteḥ parīṇāmāt*' the word Parīṇāma means illusory parīṇāma or vivarta and not the Parīṇāma of the Sāṅkhyas. The Sūtrakara who explicitly stated his view of Vivarta could not have used it in any other sense.

It is alleged by Bhāskara the exponent of Bhedābheda theory, that since the Sūtrakara has used the word 'pariṇāmāt' and since Brahmanandin, the author of the commentary, 'Vākhyā' on the Chāndogya Upaniṣad has said that the universe is a Pariṇāma, Pariṇāmavāda is accepted by them. Amalānanda, the author of Kalpataru rejects this contention saying that as Brahmanandin has explicitly used the word 'Samvyavahāramātratvāt' (since it is merely phenomenal) Vivartavāda alone is advocated by him. Answering the question as to how, without materials the Lord created the universe, Saṅkara accepting Pariṇāmavāda replies in his Bhāṣya on *Aitareya* that Māya which is identified with name and form is the material cause. But he then suggests as an alternative the example of a magician multiplying himself as many with the help of his Māya (his equipment to create another illusory magician) and concludes that this latter view is more logical (Yuktataram). The Acārya thereby suggests that his own view is Vivartavāda. Sarvajñātman, the author of Samkṣepaśārīrakam, says that the Sūtrakara rejects the Āraṇbhavāda and Samghata-vāda in Sūtras II-2.11 and 12 and favours Pariṇāmavāda and Vivartavāda. He accepts Pariṇāmavāda so as to save the practical efficiency of the things of the world and the whole of Karma-kāṇḍa (Sam. 2-58). The Pariṇāmavāda is a prelude to Vivartavāda. When the first is established the second comes off without any effort. The Sruti text itself recommends the Pariṇāmavāda when it says "I will create, I will myself become many", etc., but when it denies the existence of effects, it supersedes the former view in favour of Vivartavāda. He whose mind is not free from desire looks up for Pariṇāmavāda but he whose mind is free from sins favours Vivartavāda. He whose mind is firm in Brahman sees Brahman alone devoid of both the vādas (2-89). The enquirer just adopts Pariṇāmavāda for Karma but leaves it and takes up Vivartavāda when his mind gets pure and finally leaves the latter also fixing his mind in the secondless Brahman (2-84).

Vāchaspatimiśra, rejects the Pariṇāmavāda in a different way. He says that a pot cannot be said to be either different from the clay of which it is made or identical with it and hence it must be a Vivarta of clay itself. According to him the words Pariṇāma and Vivarta are synonyms.

Gauḍapādācārya, the earliest of writers in Advaita and the *Paramaguru* of Śaṅkara, vehemently attacks the cause-effect relationship itself in his *Māṇḍūkya-kārikas*. He says: "Some dispu-

tants (Sankhyas) accept origination for the existent. Yet others (Tarkikas) accept origination for the non-existent. By their arguments it is clear that neither the existent nor the non-existent originates (M. Karikas. IV.4). But we accept their arguments and advocate non-origination (IV.5). For the Samkhya who says that the Pradhāna which is beginningless transforms itself into the non-sentient world there is this defect namely: Pradhana which originates in the form of an effect cannot be beginningless." (IV.11). "Nothing is born of itself or from something else. If the effect is existent it is not born. The nature of existence-cum-nonexistence is contradictory. Therefore nothing is born. The notion that a pot is born from clay is illusory as the Śruti text says that all effects are mere words and clay alone is real" (22). This means that Brahman alone is real and not clay which is also an effect. The word 'iti' in the Sruti text signifies that the original cause alone is real.

Some Reflections on Jivanmukti in Advaita

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I

Śaṅkara holds that the released soul exists in the body until such time as the consequences of those actions, which have commenced fructifying, have been exhausted. The redeeming knowledge destroys everything that smacks of sin and is the seed of suffering, except that special store of action that has commenced fructifying, called the *prārabdha*. No power on earth or heaven can impede or slow down this inevitable *prārabdha*, the momentum of the past on the grinding move. There has been an irreversible maturation, growth and bursting into operation of the aggregate of works even while truth is realised, this realisation itself owing a great deal to the developing effects of the aggregate for its rise. This dependence is inviolate and must have to be borne, meekly.¹ It is like the bowman's dart that cannot be retarded or retrieved once it is set on motion.²

1. S.B. IV.1.15.

2. *Ibid*, III.3.32 pravṛttaphalasya tu karmāśayasya mukteṣoriva vegakṣa-yānnivṛttiḥ.

The commenced fruits of actions, *prārabdha*, are no mere seeds or causes; they have commenced fructifying even at the time of realisation. What has come into operation cannot be reversed, while what has been only the potency can be annulled by knowledge.

Rāmānuja criticises this observation of Śaṅkara as follows: Brahman—knowledge should sublate all nescience, inclusive of the particular erroneous appearance of embodiedness. In the case of the double moon, the defect of vision on which the erroneous appearance depends is *not* the object of the sublative act of cognition, ie. the sublative cognition of the oneness of the moon, and it, therefore, remains non-sublated and hence the double moon may appear. But nescience is sublated as a whole. R.B.I.1.4., According to Rāmānuja, release is not through mere knowledge but through the injunctions of meditation, the result of which is direct knowledge of Brahman. What is, however, effected by these injunctions of meditation is only the cessation of what impedes it, and that, too, only through knowledge—*Ibid*.

It is true that the great intuition of reality is the total illumination of truth consuming and dispelling all delusions without a residuum. But some delusions, like that of the double moon, persist even after the error has been exposed with the important difference that there is no giving in on the part of the individual to the delusion. The illusion is due to the lingering residua of impressions that the original error has left behind.³ The parallel tracts appear to meet at a distance even when one is aware that parallel lines do not meet. It is an optical delusion as in the case of the stick immersed in water that appears to be bent. The patency remains obstinately though not with any capacity to delude or mislead.

Similarly, the world is no more a mystery and a delusion to the realised soul, though the world-appearance may persist. The difference between the wise and the unwise is that while the former is in possession of the truth as to the nature of the world and his own self, the latter is blissfully ignorant and is hopelessly in a mess.

The destruction of delusion, of the manifold world of men and things, is not a physical annihilation. If it were so, nuclear weapons would be the surer means to *mokṣa* than a score of *śrutis*. The world-destruction is not like reducing hard butter to fluid ghee by the heat of fire. It is more like the removal of the illusion of the double moon by eradicating the cause for it, viz., the defect in the eyes by the application of medicine.⁴ Again, if it is a total physical destruction that is brought about by Brahman-intuition, the first instance of release would have accomplished it with no world thereafter for anybody to free himself from. The description of the *sthitaprajña* in the second chapter of the *Bhagavad-gītā* partakes of the same sense. What happens to the realised soul is that truth reigns in the place of error. The Self exists in its true nature. And the *sthitaprajña* is a *jīvanmukta*.⁵

Śaṅkara puts an end to the controversy, whether the *mukta* continues to live in the body for some time or not, by the whole authority of his personal conviction. He asks, with an assurance and command which none of his controversialist successors, who

3. S.B.: IV.1.15 cp. Maṇḍana's *Brahma Siddhi*; p. 131. See *infra*.

4. S.B.: III.2.21.

5. S.B.: III.2.21.

differ from him, could legitimately claim to possess: "For how can one man contest the fact of another possessing the knowledge of Brahman—vouched for by his heart's conviction—and at the same time continuing to enjoy bodily existence?"⁶

This wholesome certitude is refreshingly assuring. But the weight of personal testimony becomes imperative because to the inquisitive seeker, release and embodiment seem to be contradiction in terms. Śaṅkara asserts that the hard fact of being released while living in the body so that the *prārabdhakarmas* may be exhausted, however paradoxical it may appear to be, is vouchsafed in personal experience.

The instance of Vāmadeva who is said to have been a realised soul even while he was in the womb⁷ shows that release is not incompatible with embodiment. On release one becomes the very self, because release is of the nature of the self".⁸ That is how Vāmadeva sings, "I was Manu! I was the sun!"⁹

The story of Śuka illustrates the fact that release need not be simultaneous with the destruction of the body anymore than the death of the body means release.¹⁰ Śuka had attained the *sarvātmabhāva*, and yet his body did not perish.

Apāntaratamas and others who are the *ādhikārikapuruṣas*, had complete knowledge and were released souls. It is said that they passed *freely* from one body into another, as if from one house into another, in order to accomplish the duties of their offices, calculated to preserve the world-order, *lokasthiti*. They never lost their knowledge in and through all this. They created new bodies for themselves through their power over the material of the body and the sense-organs and occupied them either *all at once* or in succession.¹¹ Sulabhā, desirous of debating with Janaka,

6. S.B.: IV.1.15 Sarvajñātman makes Śaṅkara's observation clear in his *Śaṅkṣepaśārīraka*: *tasminnarthe svānubhūtiḥ pramāṇam*—Ch. IV. 43.

7. S.B.: III.4.51.

8. S.B.: I.1.4.

9. S.B.: III.3.32.

10. *Ibid.* Where Śaṅkara points out that 'That art thou' cannot be interpreted to mean, "Thou wilt be that after thou hast died".

11. Apāntaratamas and others were released souls who had their *prārabdhakarmas* to be exhausted. Though every *jīvanmukta* is not an *ādhikārikapuruṣa*, Apāntaratamas and others have many things in common with the *jīvanmukta*. S.B. III.3.32.

left her own body, entered that of Janaka, and after the discussions, returned to her own. Most of these instances given by Śaṅkara himself go to show, not the yogic powers, but the complete control of matter or *māyā* or *prakṛti* which these individuals were privileged to have. As the released soul is of the very nature of the Self, *māyā* is its slave, and creation is a play.

Now, the body continues to be in the state of *jīvanmukti*, according to Śaṅkara, as the result of the *prārabdhakarmas* which must work themselves out. But the *jīvanmukta* is not limited to the body constituted by the *prārabdhakarmas*. This is borne out by the instances that we have seen as given by Śaṅkara himself. Śuka, Apāntaratamas, Vāmadeva, Sulabha and others were free souls untrammelled by the limitations of the flesh, the legacy of works. When they could create a new body, as Apāntaratamas and others are said to have done, or when every inert and intelligent being could answer for Śuka when his father called out for him, where is the binding necessity of the karmic body? Now, why should it be suggested that the *prārabdhakarmas* shackle the free souls, for however short a time? Why should there be a limit for the exhaustion of the *karmas* that have commenced fructifying, as the *Chāndogya* text¹² and the *Brahmasūtra*¹³ declare? When there is no dependence on the body for the free souls, do the works affect the soul or the body? Obviously the soul is free and so far as the released soul is concerned, it is the very Self. Alternatively therefore the residual *karmas* affect the body only. The liberated beings live in the body which must run its course only to discharge utterly impersonal duties like the propagation of the Vedas and so on. The example here given is that of the sun who watches over these worlds for thousands of years, and attains rest, without setting or rising, after doing his duty.¹⁴ They appear in successive births, if need be, only to lift the world. Some like Apāntaratamas will take many bodies at the same time to accomplish this purpose. They engage in such offices of world-redemption till the residual *karmas* perish.¹⁵ For this purpose, they choose the instruments. Thus, from Śaṅkara's own arguments, it would appear that the *prārabdhakarmas* are turned to

12. VI.14.2.

13. IV.1.15.

14. *Chāndogya*: III.2.1.

15. S.B. III.3.32. ☞

the best advantage of world-maintenance and world-redemption. Thus, even these *karmas* are not so much *binding* residua of nescience, as the ground for being in the world and imparting the wisdom that they have gained to the enquiring seekers of truth and liberation. As this task is done on the empiric level, they *must* live in the body to communicate the ideas in the form of a preceptor. This is the only 'must' or necessity about their existence in the body. On this account, then, the teacher is not a special incarnation of providence, but one who has realised the truth here and now.

II

The author of the *Iṣṭa Siddhi*, Vimuktātman, accepts the possibility of *jīvanmukti*.¹⁶ He readily agrees with all the arguments of the *pūrvapakṣin*;¹⁷ only he does not accept the residuum of nescience, *ajñānaśeṣa*, which causes transmigration in another body for the knower. But he at once adds that that has been rejected by the *pūrvapakṣin* himself. But the *pūrvapakṣin* says in so many words that even though there may not be that residuum of nescience to cause transmigration, yet there is something of nescience, *ajñānaleśa*, to cause the embodiment of the realised person for some time. To this, Vimuktātman obviously subscribes. In so far as Vimuktātman has admitted *jīvanmukti*, he is in agreement with Śaṅkara. Whether it is the *prārabdhakarmas* or *avidyāleśa* that is the cause of the body, it is a matter of names. Continuance in the body even for a moment after the realisation is not *sadyomukti*, in the sense of *videhamukti*, but only *jīvanmukti*. If that much is granted, all else is unimportant.

If in the presence of explicit disagreement in the particular detail and in the presence of explicit agreement generally with what the *pūrvapakṣin* suggests, Vimuktātman's own position could be culled out, then he can be said to set his face against the particular theory of *avidyāsaṃskāra*, latent impressions of nescience, preferred by Maṇḍana in his *Brahmasiddhi*,¹⁸ as an explanation of the persistence of body.

In the case of snake-illusion, after sublation occurs, some people are free from the illusion instantaneously; some people,

16. *viduṣo jīvata eva muktissiddha*—I.S., p. 78.

17. *sādhīyānayaṃ pratibhāṣaḥ, ahamapi icchāmyeva ittham*. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

18. P. 131.

however, are freed from it only some moments later. Till that time, there is fear, trepidation, etc., not due to the original error, but due to the impressions that the error has left behind.¹⁹ Śaṅkara was really the author of this theory of latent impressions.²⁰ It is not the nescience that is responsible for the embodiment, but only its latent impressions.

This is not a welcome idea to Vimuktātman. There cannot be a latent impression without nescience, since latent impressions and their locus are of the nature of nescience.²¹ Fear, trepidation, etc., do not form the body of the nescience with reference to rope.^{21a} Thus this is not a sound analogy. If serpent-illusion is to persist, it is not due to latent impressions but due to nescience, without which latent impressions themselves cannot be there. So, it is the *avidyāleśa*, and not the *avidyāsaṃskāra* that is responsible for the continuing embodiment. However, this residuum is only so much as to cause embodiment till the death of the present body and it cannot cause fresh births.

The body of the realised person does not drop simultaneously with the realisation. In the Upaniṣadic utterance "The person who has got the preceptor realises and for him delay is only so long", the statement of limit is not in respect of realisation, because of the impossibility of realisation after death. Realisation is possible only for the living and not for the dead.²² And it is obvious that the statement does not refer to the ignorant person. So, the death of the realised person is not exactly at the time of realisation.

There is another excellent reason why one should accept *jīvanmukti*. The attainment of knowledge is from a preceptor and the preceptor is no mere intellectual but one rooted in authentic spiritual experience. He is the living wise man, who is authorised

19. yathā rajjvām sarpasamāropasamuttha bhayajanmāno vepathuprabhṛtayas tattvadarśanādapāvr̥tte bhaye kasyacit tadaiva nivartante, kasyacit kiyantaṃcit kālamanuvartante, tatsaṃskārāt. B.S., p. 131.

20. S.B.: IV.1.15.

21. avidyābhāve saṃskārābhāvāt, avidyāśarīratvāt saṃskāratadvatoḥ. I.S., p. 76.

21a. cp. Rāmānuja's criticism of Śaṅkara's view where he says that the defective vision does not come under the purview of the sublating cognition.

22. śarīrino hi tatsaṃbhavaḥ, I.S., p. 75.

23. upadekṣyanti te jñānaṃ jñānastattva darśinaḥ. B.G. IV. 34.

to impart the wisdom to others.²³ There is the scripture which declares that "the person who has a preceptor realises".²⁴ The actions leading to knowledge protect the realised person's body for some time, by which action, the line of the succession of teachers is kept unsundered. There is the necessity of having the body for some time for a realised person, so that knowledge can be imparted to others. All this will be nullified if there is not a preceptor who is a *jīvanmukta*.

Further, the experience of the *prārabdhakarmas* need not come into conflict with knowledge. All actions produce their results without coming into conflict with the results of actions that have already begun to manifest. The superior activities like the Horse-sacrifice, too, wait for the exhaustion of the experience of *prārabdhakarmas* to yield their own beneficent results. Similarly, the activities which lead to the rise of knowledge are capable of fructifying only in the body which is the locus of all experiences brought about by the *prārabdhakarmas*, without any conflict with them. Therefore, knowledge need not come into conflict with the fruits of the *prārabdhakarmas*. Because of these *prārabdhakarmas* only, knowledge is not in conflict with the *avidyāleśa*. When they cease, completely exhausted, the *avidyāleśa*, too, is cancelled. The bodily experience is not said to be in conflict with knowledge because the bodily experience is merely an appearance.²⁵ And, yet there is difference between a *jñānin* and an *ajñānin*. The *jñānin* has no sense of *egoity*, while the *ajñānin* is full of it.²⁶

It cannot be said that the activities that have knowledge as their fruit give birth to a new body and bestow knowledge there only, and not in the body brought about by the *prārabdhakarmas*, on the ground that knowledge cannot rise in a body subject to the experience of *karmas*, and that knowledge and experience cannot coexist. For to conceive of a body constituted by the *prārabdhakarmas* and another body by activities leading to knowledge is to multiply the concepts and is an offence against the Law of Parsimony, when it is possible for them to exist in the same body.

24. acāryavān puruṣaveda. See I.S.: p. 76: yāvatā vidyāsaṃtatyucchedo na bhavet.

25. bhogasyapratibhāsamātratvānna vidyāvirodhatvam. J.V., I.S., p. 444.

26. ahamkārapūrvakatvābhāvo viśeṣaḥ. J.V., I.S., p. 444.

And, such scriptural declarations as, "Being released he is released",²⁷ "Being Brahman itself he attains Brahman",²⁸ "The knower becomes immortal here",²⁹ "Just like the cast-off skin of the snake",³⁰ etc., become intelligible only when *jīvanmukti* is accepted. Now there are scriptural declarations about the transmigration of the departed soul through the path of light, etc., *arcirādimārga*. Does not the idea of liberation while living in the body come into conflict with the above declaration? No; the said transmigration refers to the attainment of the *kārya*-Brahman, and not of Brahman in the primary sense. It has been said: "Bādari (says) the effect—because of the possibility of journey in respect of that".³¹ The released soul being the very *self*, has no direction of up or down, has no destination above or below, and, thus, does not transmigrate.

It is said that *Vimuktātman* follows Maṇḍana in the matter of *jīvanmukti*.³² But it should be noted that there are certain differences between the two great ācāryas. (1) *Vimuktātman* does not subscribe to the theory of the *avidyāsaṃskāra* or latent impressions of nescience³³ as the cause of embodiment while Maṇḍana does.³⁴ (2) *Vimuktātman* considers the *sthitaprajña* as a *jīvanmukta*, and the released soul as the very *self*, the *kāraṇabrahman*,³⁵ while Maṇḍana thinks that the *sthitaprajña*, as described in the second chapter of the *Bhagavadgītā*, is only a highly developed *sādhaka*, who is in the penultimate stage of realisation.³⁶ (3) While Maṇḍana discusses both the views, *videhamukti* and *jīvanmukti* with no categorical preference for either of the two, *Vimuktātman* does not seem to favour *videhamukti* at all, but is in entire agreement with Śaṅkara.

27. *vimuktaśca vimucyate*—*Kathopanishad*, V. 1.

28. *brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti*: *Bṛhadāraṇyaka upaniṣad*, IV. 4-6.

29. *vidvānamṛta iha bhavati*—*Nārāyaṇopaniṣad*.

30. *tadyathā ahinirivayanī*—*Bṛh. Up.* IV.4.

31. *kāryam bādarirasya gatyupapatteḥ*.

32. see Prof. S. Kuppaswamy Sastri. Introduction to *B. S.* p. 40.

33. *I.S.* p., 76.

34. *B.S.*, p. 131.

35. *sthitaprajña guṇātītalakṣaṇavacanam copapannārthāni syuh*, *I.S.*, p. 77.

Also: *mukhyasya tu brahmaṇassarvagatatvāt etc.* *Ibid.*

anyaviśayatvāt gateḥ viduṣo jīvata eva muktisiddha. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

36. *sthitaprajñastāvāt na vikalitanikhilāvidyāḥ siddhaḥ, kim tu sādha-ka eva avasthāviśeṣam prāptaḥ syāt*—*B.S.*, p. 130.

However, he agrees with Maṇḍana in holding that the embodiment as the result of *prārabdhakarmas* is only till the moment of the body in which knowledge has arisen. He agrees with Maṇḍana that the residuum of nescience, whether it be *avidyāsaṃskāra* or *avidyāleśa* or *avidyāśeṣagandha* or *avidyācchāyā*, is only apparent.³⁷

III

The doctrine of *jīvanmukti* has been discussed widely and analysed intensively by the various Advaitic preceptors with varying results and preferences. Maṇḍana, Citsukha, Vācaspati Miśra, *Vimuktātman*, *Sarvajñātman*, *Brahmānanda Sarasvatī*, *Appayya Dikṣita* and others offer their opinions under the dictates of their own predilections. We shall hereunder briefly give the views of Maṇḍana, *Sarvajñātman*, and Citsukha.

Maṇḍana's views

Maṇḍana does not seem committed categorically to any one of the two alternative positions, viz. simultaneity of knowledge with the death of the body and release while living in the body. Both these positions are capable of being defended with the clinching weight of the Vedic testimony. One cannot say which the traditional position is as the interpretation of the text may vary from individual to individual.

Maṇḍana can first be taken to support the view³⁸ that the intuition of Reality brings about the residueless destruction of all actions, *prārabdha*, *sañcita* and *āgāmī*, the current, the causal and the coming. Release is instantaneous and the body being the product of nescience falls the moment wisdom dawns. Death is simultaneous with liberation. And the true release is *videhamukti*.

The *jīvanmuktivādins* draw the support of the scriptural texts like, "For him there is delay only till he is delivered from his body",³⁹ and the *Brahmasūtras*: "But only those former (works) whose effects have not yet begun (are destroyed by knowledge); because (scripture states) that (i.e. the death of the body) to be the term,"⁴⁰ and, "But having destroyed by fruition the two other

37. *ābhāsamātreṇa vidvānapi*—*B.S.*, p. 131.

ato viduṣo'pi *prārabdhabhogaśeṣābhāsamātra etc.* *I.S.*, p. 77.

38. *B.S.*, p. 130.

39. *Chāndogya Upanishad*: VI.14.2.

40. IV.i.15. *anārabdhakārye eva tu pūrve tadavadheḥ*.

(sets of work) he becomes one with Brahman".⁴¹ Maṇḍana would interpret the *Chāndogya* text somewhat differently from Śaṅkara; while Śaṅkara will read 'delay' until the *prārabdhakarmas* cease in the text, Maṇḍana will see only 'quickness' which means total absence of delay. This interpretation is substantiated with the secular observation, "I bathe, eat and get ready,—only that much delay there will be for me",⁴² where only the total absence of delay, and not delay, is meant. Otherwise, the expression '*tāvadeva*' or 'only that much' in the *Chāndogya* text would not have been preferred the word '*ciram*' would have been enough. By the word '*tāvadeva*' only quickness, or total absence of delay is conveyed.⁴³ So release is instantaneous.⁴⁴

But Maṇḍana offers the alternative interpretation of the text as meaning the time-limit also, thus accepting *jīvanmukti*.⁴⁵ But even then, the body is not due to *avidyā* but due to the *avidyā-saṃskāras*, which cannot stand long and which do not require a separate sublation or sublator, the original knowledge itself being enough for its destruction. Or else, they can be supposed to cease and destroy themselves, having been reduced to nullity.⁴⁶ But this *avidyāsaṃskāra* does not continue after the death so as to constitute the seeds of fresh births, and with the death of the body, there is absolute, unconditioned release.⁴⁷ And the released soul is not touched by anything that happens to the body and all that happens to the body after *jīvanmukti* is in attenuation of the *prārabdhakarmas*. So, even the *prārabdhakarmas*, so far as the *jīvanmukta* is concerned, do not affect.⁴⁸

IV

Sarvajñātmamuni's view

That the statement about *jīvanmukti* is purely figurative and texts speaking of *jīvanmukti* are eulogistic is a view ascribed to

41. IV.i.19.

42. *etāvaṃ me ciram yat snāto bhuñjānasya ca.*

43. *tāvadeva iti tu vacanāt kṣaipryaparātā gamyate—B.S., p. 130.*

44. *kṣipraiva muktiḥ. Ibid., p. 130.*

45. *athavā ciratvam anūdyā dehapātāvadhitvam atrocyate: Ibid.*

46. *Ibid., p. 131.*

47. *viduṣaḥ patite' smin śarīre kaivalyam avaśyaṃbhāvi—Ibid., p. 132.*

Sāṅkhya Kārika puts it: *tiṣṭhati saṃskāravasācchakra bramavaddhṛta-śarīraḥ—Ibid.*

48. *viduṣas tu tadassaṃsparsādābhāsamātram—Ibid., p. 133.*

Sarvajñātmamuni. According to Sarvajñātmamuni, who states both the views of *jīvanmukti* and *videhamukti* as Maṇḍana does, knowledge burns out all the impurities of nescience all at once with no residuum. Release is instantaneous. Consequently, to speak of *jīvanmukti* is only a figurative usage and thus only the scriptural declarations have to be understood.⁴⁹ This view is followed by one that accepts *jīvanmukti*.

If it is said that the *jīvanmuktas* are seen to exist, well, they exist and the continuance of their embodiment is due to the residuum of nescience, *avidyāleśa*.⁵⁰ There is a shade of duality, *dvaitacchāyā*, or *dvaitābhāsa* in the *jīvanmukta*. This *avidyāleśa* does not require a separate liquidation. The original knowledge is itself the destroyer of this nescience; or else, one can say that it exhausts itself out;⁵¹ that is to say, when the *prārabdhakarmas* have run down, the residuum of nescience, too, follows suit.⁵²

Nescience has two capacities: concealment of the truth and the projection of error. Of these, the concealing capacity, *āvaraṇa-śakti*, is destroyed totally in the state of *jīvanmukti*. So, the *jīvanmukta* is in possession of truth. But the projective capacity of nescience presents duality to him. Thus, though he perceives duality, he is not deceived by it. A person standing before the mirror knows that what lies in the mirror is only a reflection of his own face and not another real face. But all the same, he sees the face.⁵³

The difference between the *jīvanmukta* and his earlier state of existence is that now he has killed the delusion.⁵⁴ To the ques-

49. *jīvanmuktipratyayaṃ śāstrajātam
jīvanmukte kalpite yojaniyam |
tāvanmātreṇa arthavattvopapatteḥ
sadyomuktiḥ samyagetasya hetoḥ—Saṃ. Śār.—IV.39.*

50. *Saṃ. Śār., IV.40.*

51. *Ibid.* Rāmātīrtha writing on this verse says: *nirnimitta pūrva-prāptatattva vidyāriktanimitānapekṣā.*

52. *prārabdhakarmanāṃ bhogādeva kṣaye sati prayojanābhāvāt sā svayameva nivartate—Madhusūdana Sarasvatī on Saṃ. Śā., iv. 40.*

53. *yathā manmukhamevedaṃ na mukhāntaram iti aparokṣānubhava-bādhitamapi mukhabedādhyāsa hetvajñānam darpaṇādyupādhipratibandhāt na nivartate iti darśanabalād angikriyate tathā brahmasākṣātkāra bādhito'pi mohaḥ prārabdhapratibandhādeva anuvartata iti—Subodhinīṭikā on Saṃ. Śār., IV. 44. See B.S., p. 133.*

54. *idānīm mohadhvaṃso viśeṣaḥ—Saṃ. Śār. IV.44.*

tion why there should be the destruction of *āvaraṇa* alone and not of *vikṣepa* also, Sarvajñātman's answer will be that such is the experience of a *jīvanmukta* and this alone is the proof.⁵⁵

V

Citsukha's views

Citsukha quotes *Nyāyasudhā* with approval.⁵⁶ By the term *avidyāleśa*, only a different potency of nescience is meant, which remains only because of the remnant of *prārabdhakarmas*.⁵⁷ However, when the knowledge of the self has arisen, there is already release.

Though the primal nescience, *mūlāvidyā*, which is the cause of all transmigratory life and world-process is one, as *tūlāvidyā*, modal nescience, it has several forms. The *ekajīvanādins* will differ here from Citsukha and say that as nescience is one, and as there is only one *jīva* or soul, with the release of that soul, the single nescience is no more, and there will be no world any more. Some others may hold that there are multiple nesciences which is supported by the plural expression in "Indra through *māyās* took on many forms".⁵⁸

But Citsukha holds that there are diverse capacities or forms for one *māyā*.⁵⁹ One capacity or form creates the illusion of reality for the world. The second creates the illusion of things having practical efficiency. The third causes the appearance of the immediacy of the experience of the perceptible world. Of these, that form which causes the illusion of reality for the plural world is destroyed by the knowledge of non-dual reality. The second is counteracted by the immediate intuition of the truth. The third remains in the *jīvanmukta*,⁶⁰ and, thus, the perception of duality persists, even though the element of delusion is not there. How does the knowledge not cancel even this *avidyāleśa*? The

55. *prātibhāsika vikṣepaśaktimad avidyāmśo leśasabdārthaḥ. tatra vidvad-anubhavaṃ pramāṇayati*—Madhusūdana Sarasvatī on *Sam. Śār.*, IV. 43. Compare the statement of Śaṅkara in *S.B.* IV.1.15.

56. *T.P.*, p. 385. *Nirṇayasagar* Edn.

57. See *V.P.*—Chapter IX, 50.

58. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*: II.v.19.

59. *tasyāḥ santyeva bahavaḥ ākāraḥ*—*T.P.*, p. 385.

60. *anarokṣaprātibhāsayogyārthābhāsajanakastu māyāleśo jīvanmuktasyānivr̥ttaḥ*—*Ibid.*, pp. 385-6.

reason is that there is yet the *prārabdhakarmas* in the process of fructification. This is a source of hindrance for the operation of knowledge, *pratibandhaka*. The activities leading to knowledge yield their fruits only in the body that is the work of *prārabdhakarmas*. Otherwise, the activities yielding knowledge also will have to be said to produce a body of their own.⁶¹ So, without any conflict with those actions leading to the embodiment, and after allowing them to have their day, the actions yielding knowledge fructify. Thus only, knowledge does not annihilate *avidyāleśa*. When *prārabdhakarmas* burn out, there is the total annihilation of all nescience, *viśvamāyānivṛtti*.

And the *sthitaprajña* of the *Gīta* is not a highly advanced *sādhaka*, falling short of release. It is said in the *Gīta*, (II. 55) "when one conquers desires" etc., and this conquest of all desires and delusion is impossible without the immediate intuition of reality.⁶² There are statements in *smṛti* and *śruti* also indicating the same.⁶³ All this is an answer to Maṇḍana. Thus, the fact of *jīvanmukti* cannot be denied by mere animosity.⁶⁴

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

B.G.:	Bhagavadgītā
B.S.:	Brahma Siddhi
I.S.:	Iṣṭa Siddhi
J.V.:	Jñānottama's Vivaraṇa
R.B.:	Rāmānuja's Śrī Bhāṣya
S.B.:	Śaṅkara Bhāṣya
Sam. Śār.:	Samkṣepa Śārīraka
T.P.:	Tattvapradīpikā
V.P.:	Vedānta Paribhāṣā

61. *anyathā jñārthānāmapi karmaṇām bhogārthatvaprasaṅgāt*—*Ibid.*, p. 386. cp: *I.S.*, p. 75.

62. *na hi sarvakāmānām vimokaḥ paramātmāsākṣātkāramantarena upa-pannaḥ*—*T.P.*, p. 387.

63. *rasavarjaṃ rasopyasya paramdr̥ṣṭvānivartate*—*B.G.* II.59. *yadā sarve pramucyante kāma ye' sya hr̥dī śrītāḥ. atha martyo'mṛto bhavatyatra brahma samaśnute*—*Bṛhadāraṇyaka*—IV. 4.

64. *pradveṣamātreṇa nāpalapitum śakyate*—*T.P.*, p. 388.

A Day Inside a Temple in Kerala

(A Study in Legends and Beliefs) *

by

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I

Every country in the world is proud of its ancient holy places of worship; and its people mostly believe in the numerous legends associated with such sacred places. It is the legend that strengthens the faith in the individual; faith in the divinity of the place and its sacredness. To the people of Kerala, Guruvayur is one such holy place where Sri Krishna is being worshipped during the past very many years. The belief is that this image of Sri Krishna is a symbol of Jupiter Himself and was installed at the present place by Jupiter (*Guru*) and the Lord of the Wind (*Vāyu*) together after their weary and long search to find a pure spot that could become the seat of the Lord Krishna. As Guru and Vayu were the first to occupy this region the place came to be known as Guru-vayu-ur. The Lord of this place came to be called *Guru-vayu-ur Appan*. There is a Siva temple very near to this place of Sri Krishna; and it is said that this temple of Siva is older than the one dedicated to Sri Krishna. It is a practice among the folk to visit the Siva temple before they get into the temple of *Sri Guru-vayu-ur-Appan*.

Among the astrologers in the south-west coast of India there is a belief that if the planet jupiter (*Guru*) were to occupy a favourable and fine position in the horoscope of an individual, that person would be safe from all miseries; and this reveals that the very divine beings are in favour of him as their very abode is in *Guru*. As the image of Sri Krishna here is installed by *Guru*

* This paper is based on data collected in 1951, when the writer attended the Ekadasi festival at Guruvayur, which is 30 miles from the Shoranur Rly. Station.

Himself and as the Lord Himself is only a symbol of the Supreme, people worship this deity with great reverence and love.

II

A few stories relating to the glory and power of the deity presiding in the Guruvayur temple as I heard them narrated to me are given at this place. A Nambudiri brahmin who suffered from acute rheumatic complaint once came to Guruvayur to offer worship to the Lord. He kept a small bag containing cash on one of the steps to the tank and got into the water for his bath. It was his vow to offer the whole amount in the bag to the Lord. But what happened? In the temple there was another brahmin praying to the Lord to help him financially as he had no cash to celebrate the marriage of his daughter. The Lord appeared to him in a dream and instructed him to run away with the money-bag that was on the tank-step. The brahmin came to the tank, found the money-bag and took possession of it. On seeing this atrocious deed the owner of the money-bag bathing in the tank, got up rapidly and ran after the thief. It was in vain he ran.

As he could not fulfil his vow to the Lord he became very sad and agitated in mind. In exhaustion he fell into sleep. In sleep the Lord appeared to him in a dream and spoke to him thus: "What you desire is cure from your ailment. That now you have. Isn't it? The cash you brought for me, I have got".

A Nambudiri lady was tortured for a long time by rheumatic pains and to forget the suffering she spent most of her time in uttering the name of the Lord. Once the Lord appeared to her while she was in a state of sleep and said: "you have insulted your elders very much in your past birth. The present disease is a result of your sins. Rub this medicine wherever you feel the pain." It is said that the medicine He gave her was nothing but the oil with which the image of the deity is bathed every day at four in the morning.

The experiences of the devotees of this deity are too many to mention. An analysis of the legends shows that in absolute surrender to the Will of the Divine the devotee realizes the wishes of the heart fulfilled. The reality-value of the legends depends on the function the latter exercise in the life of the society. The legend functions not in the form of a mere suggestion, but reflects

the experience of an individual and through him of the society of which he is just a member.

III

The image of Sri Krishna, they say, is of the form that the Lord showed to Sri Vasudeva at the time of His incarnation. Daily worship to this deity is performed by a Nambudiri priest who observes complete celibacy during the period of his duty as priest in this temple.

Very near to the north of this temple there is the small shrine of a female deity. The belief is that this goddess was originally in the spot where now stands the image of Sri Krishna.

Let us consider the activities in this temple. At the stroke of three in the morning we hear the sound of the drum and the conch giving the idea that life begins within the temple. By that time there are many in the tank bathing. Before four o'clock the main doors are opened. The Nambudiri priest comes after his bath; he has a separate place of his own within the temple itself to stay. The previous day's flowers and garlands are all removed. The image of the Lord is bathed in fresh and pure gingelly oil; and water is poured over the image with the conch. One can see a number of devotees by this time over the dais in front of the temple and in the precincts. Fried paddy is offered to the deity. The used oil is collected and circulated to the visitors along with sandal paste and holy water. It is the experience of many that this oil offered to the deity has great medicinal value in curing bodily ailments and pains. At the hour of dawn, about five in the morning, rice prepared in ghee is brought as offering to the deity. At about eleven o'clock preparations begin for the mid-day worship.

It is now that rice prepared in milk, butter, fruits and honey are all brought as offerings to the Lord. The mid-day worship attracts a large number of people. The Brahmins are fed and it is the chief priest who comes to give the sacred water before they start eating. Songs from the *Gita-Govinda* of Sri Jayadeva glorifying the romantic life of Sri Krishna and Radha are sung for the mid-day worship. Offerings of fruits and sugar are given for worship at all times. After the mid-day worship the doors of the temple are closed and opened again at about four or five in the evening. Every day in the morning and in the evening a small image of the deity is taken in procession on the elephant inside

the precincts of the temple. One sees a number of devotees and pilgrims following this procession in groups singing songs in praise of the Lord. At about half-past-six in the evening, the hour of dusk, people gather again in large numbers to see the offering of light, that is *deeparadhana* to the Lord. The day's functions end at about nine o'clock in the night when the last worship and offerings are made.

Apart from the offerings of butter, fruits and flowers, the other offerings made to the deity include vegetables like bananas, cucumber and yam, sandalwood and silk, silver and gold ornaments, cows and bulls and bronze vessels. An interesting practice is of offering children. This custom is called *Adimakidathuka*. A token sum is offered at the time of symbolically giving the child as a slave to the Lord. Then the same amount is given annually to the temple by the devotee. One way of offering oneself to the Lord is of giving human forms in either silver or gold. Whatever one considers as of great value to oneself may be offered to Him as an act of acknowledging His Grace and Mercy in gratefulness and devotion.

Another custom that we see here is that most of the devotees engage themselves in the reading of the Bhagavatham that contains the episodes in the life of Sri Krishna. The essence of the Bhagavatham as given in the *Narayaneeyam*, the famous work of Meppathur Narayana Bhattathiripad, is well known to most of the people in Kerala, and it is a work that is read with veneration in many of the Hindu homes here. People are of the view that this famous devotional poem has received the sanction and seal of the Lord at Guru-vayu-ur.

In recent times people have started coming to this temple to celebrate marriages. But from very ancient days the practice of the first feeding of the child with rice is done in front of this deity by many who believe in His power. The custom of weighing oneself with the object one cherishes most is followed and the object that is used is offered as a gift to the deity. It depends upon the taste and the vow of the individuals to choose the objects for weighing. The practice is called *Thulabharam*. *Thulam* means weighing scales. *Bharam* refers to weight.

I heard a few legends connected with *Thulabharam*. Here is a legend given by way of an example. Once a lady was without any issues for a long time. She took up a vow that she would

weigh her child, if by the Grace of the Lord she could have one, with plantain boles and offer them to the God. It was because she was too poor to think of anything else she decided upon the plantain boles. Many years rolled on. She had a child and by that time her economic circumstances also were very much improved. She was ashamed to think of weighing her child with plantain boles to fulfil her vow to the Lord. So she thought that she could do the weighing of the child with sugar. Deciding so she came to the temple with her child and relatives to fulfil her vow. One has to place a small cash on the weighing pan, the idea being that the balance is purchased for the function. As she had changed the object of her choice to weigh her child with, the moment the child was placed in the balance the pans went down. Only after the plantain boles were brought and the child was weighed with them, the deity was pleased. The idea is that one should not change as one likes the object intended for weighing with. The individual should have a definite decision as to what he or she is going to do and should be prepared to know the will of God and not be a slave to changing fancies.

IV

The annual festival in this temple comes in February-March. When the festival begins, no one should start work on constructing buildings of any kind, nor should any be seen busy with any kind of creative activity. All in the region are expected to rest and take part in the festival of the Lord to win His Grace. The Nambudiri women usually do not come into the temple during festivals and on other ceremonial occasions when there is a large crowd inside it. The chief priest always should walk on wooden sandals. This is just to keep him pure from all kinds of pollutions.

The shrine of Sri Guruvayurappan is a small one with a small dais in front of it. The Nambudiris occupy this dais either repeating the many names of the Lord or reading the *Sri Bhagavatham*. Many depend on this temple for their very existence in some capacity of service.

V

In brief it may be said that the temple at Guruvayur is a famous religious institution of the people in Kerala professing the Hindu faith. The very functioning and growth of this institution through the centuries are no doubt strengthened by the religious practices and beliefs of the Kerala Brahmins and other Hindu castes living there. During the month of November, on the

eleventh day after the new-moon, people from all parts of Kerala gather here to have a vision of the Lord. This *Ekadasi* festival is very important to all the Hindus. The temple is bright with numberless lamps. All these do indicate that whatever be the changes which are happening in the socio-economic activities of groups living within this culture-area, the individuality of the culture of the people has essentially remained the same during the past many years though it was subject to influences of diverse kinds from different angles and foreign groups. This temple, I would not say, stands for giving security to some in life, but it is the manifestation of Hindu character in full and the Hindu way of life as practised by many till this day.

In conclusion it may be said with restraint that the legends do have some value and they do strengthen the beliefs of a people and perpetuate them; and beliefs according to their nature perpetuate and shape the character of the people and their way of life.

Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja on Sat

I

by

JAMES H. K. NORTON

The word *sat* has in Indian thought as varied and interesting a history as the word "being", its most common English equivalent, in Western philosophy. The very nature of a concept of being has presented a perplexing problem to philosophers of all traditions. And a very interesting example of the complexity and intricacy of this problem as it has developed in the Indian philosophical tradition can be seen in a consideration of the concept of *sat* as it is found in the works of the two great philosophers of Vedānta, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. It is therefore the purpose of this paper to show how these two philosophers differed in their use of this term, and to discuss how this difference points to a more basic difference in their respective metaphysics.¹

We will turn first to Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara defines *sat* (Being) as that which persists (*anuvṛtta*) and is not denied (*abādhita*) in our experience. What this definition means to Śaṅkara is that ultimately *sat* (Being) indicates only the Absolute Brahman, the one without a second, and, as we shall see, he never leaves this metaphysical ground.

Now it seems to me that we can best consider this general statement in terms of three specific points. First, it asserts that Being (*sat*) is a meaningful term, and not just a hollow expression. Second, it asserts that Being (*sat*) is meaningful in so far as it is used in a purely metaphysical conception. And finally, that Being (*sat*) in fact affirms the uniqueness of the Absolute, pure Brahman. If the above statement of Being means what it seems to say, then all three of these conditions must apply.

It may seem strange to have to make a separate assertion that Being is meaningful. But this assertion is important even without considering the recent criticisms of statements of being by the

1. Metaphysics is here used in the Aristotelian sense of the study of being *qua* being, or being in its own nature.

Logical Positivists. For the statement that Being is that which persists, undenied, by the very way in which it is stated, affirms that Being is a concept which is realizable in our experience. That is to say that we are aware of persistence and undeniability, and therefore there is presumably, given the proper conditions, a situation where these two conditions would hold true. It is not just an idle fantasy, but an attainable fact of experience.²

It is this affirmation alone which makes it very clear that Śaṅkara is consistent in his refutation of the Mādhyamika Buddhists, who hold that the ultimate truth is *śūnya*, or complete void. *Sat* as it is used by Śaṅkara is a meaningful designation of an attainable Reality. But it still remains to be seen just what Being does mean in terms of our experience. In the first instant, it should be obvious that the two characteristics of Being, namely, its persistence and its undeniability, are not evident in our everyday, common experience: what Śaṅkara calls the *vyāvahārika*. We are aware of pots and cloths and many other objects³ which persist neither in the world nor in our minds, and are therefore at every moment susceptible to being denied. Every assertion of being in this sense, such as "the pot is," "the cloth is", is but a useful fact of experience, and as such does not lead us any farther than the empirical world of transitory, impermanent and deniable existents. And we can therefore affirm with Śaṅkara that empirical beings, having *vyāvahārika-sattā*, are not *sat*. This point is explicitly described by the Advaitin in the *Anirvacanīyāvāda*, which explains that because the world of things and ideas is rooted in *māyā* (illusion), we cannot say that the nature of any object is *sat*. On the other hand, because objects do appear, we cannot say that it is *asat* either. It must remain *sadaśadvilakṣaṇa*, the non-excluded middle. This argument bears out our contention that any assertion that an object is *sat* is meaningless, simply because objects in our experience do not persist undenied.

There is still another alternative open to us in the empirical world, an alternative which some of Śaṅkara's followers were

2. The argument here bears many interesting similarities with St. Anselm's Ontological Proof of God: *sat* is made conceivable and hence actual.

3. *Vastu*: physical and mental objects which are valid—not hallucinations or imaginations.

quick to realize. They maintained that in such statements as "the pot is", "the cloth is", there is one aspect which does persist, namely, the "isness" (*astitva*) of the various objects. Pots and cloths come and go, but "is", the fact of existence, remains as a persisting element of all of them. But Rāmānuja carefully points out, an awareness of "isness" is one thing we cannot have. For if existence (*asti*) is the only persisting reality of our ordinary experience, then a man who desires a cow should be equally satisfied with a real horse, which is only real by this argument in terms of the fact of its existence. The fact that we are not satisfied with horses when we want cows proves that in the empirical world we do not recognize existence as separate from the object in which it is found.⁴ It is therefore clear that *sat*, or Being, by its very definition is not found in the *vyāvahārika* world of empirical things.

Rāmānuja has a second criticism of the view of the persistence of existence in things which brings us to the basis of Śaṅkara's definition, and also brings us to the second point which I said his definition affirmed. Rāmānuja contends that because the affirmation of Being is in *śabda*, or the revealed truth of scripture, if it is also affirmed by *pratyākṣa*, empirical perception, the affirmation of *śabda* would become mere *anuvāda*, repetition. And it is true that both Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara find the affirmation of Being presented in the revealed tradition of *śruti*.⁵ Being is in fact a metaphysical concept based upon the *a priori* validity of revelation. Without this basis, Being would have no meaning at all. It is for this reason that I have stated in the beginning that Being is meaningful only in so far as it is used in a purely metaphysical conception.

What is this metaphysical conception which establishes the meaning of Being? It is the revealed truth of the complete identity of *sat*, *cit*, *ānanda* in the Absolute Brahman. This truth is the basis of all Advaita philosophy, but for our present purposes, it takes on the rather special significance of equating *sat*, Being, and *cit*, Consciousness. This absolute identity of these two terms

4. It is interesting to note that Rāmānuja here anticipates Kant's criticism of the Ontological Proof of the Existence of God: that we cannot add existence to the conception of a thing.

5. Perhaps the most important text of this affirmation is the Chānd, Up. 6.2.1, which is frequently quoted by both,

means that in order for something to be, in any real sense, it must be consciousness; and in so far as it is consciousness, it is real. It is the point of the second assertion of the definition under discussion to affirm that Being is a purely metaphysical conception in that it is meaningful only as a demonstration of this basic identity.

So far, we have seen that Being is not found in the *vyāvaharika* world, which is *sadasadvilakṣaṇa*. And yet we have maintained that Being is meaningful and attainable in our experience. These two statements would appear to put us in an awful philosophical muddle if it were not for the fact that both of these assertions are from the beginning based upon this metaphysical revelation. It is only because Being is, or exists, only in so far as it is consciousness that we are saved from an apparent contradiction.

But how, we may ask, can we ever consider Being as consciousness? And here the Advaitin asks us merely to analyse consciousness as it is manifested in our own conscious experience. Consciousness, we find, does indeed persist, and there is no question of denying it. And it also has the added feature of being its own proof by its very presence; what Śaṅkara calls *svayam-prakāśā*, self-illumination. We do not have to rely on any other fact of experience to affirm our own consciousness. Being (*sat*) now becomes meaningful and attainable in terms of our own, self-certifying consciousness. Thus we see that the assertion of Being, though void of meaning in terms of an object, takes on a great importance in affirming the reality of our own conscious experience. In fact, it affirms that consciousness alone is real.

We must be careful not to conclude that an object is real (*sat*) because it is an object of consciousness. Such would be the conclusion of the Subjective Idealists, as the Vijñānavāda Buddhists, but not of the Advaitin. Being is, or exists, only in so far as it is consciousness itself, and not in that it is an object of consciousness. An object it clearly is not, for an object itself can only be real to the Advaitin as what is called the object-defined-consciousness, or pure consciousness appearing in the form of a conscious experience of an object.

And, to turn to my last point: we have seen that consciousness (*cit*) alone is real (*sat*) because it is established by the revealed metaphysical truth of the identity of *sat* and *cit* with Brahman. It must further be true, then, that Being and Consciousness are univocal as indications (*lakṣaṇa*) of Brahman in Its

Essence.⁶ In terms of Being, this final conclusion means that Being is an indication of the reality of Brahman alone, and not of anything apart from Brahman. Brahman is indeed the one without a second.

Rāmānuja, as I indicated in the beginning, does not have the same concept of *sat* as Śaṅkara. In fact, they are quite different. I can perhaps most easily point out the difference by translating *sat* not as Being, as I did in the case of Śaṅkara, but rather simply as existence. And we can therefore state right away, in the light of my last remarks, that Rāmānuja does not accept *sat* as an univocal indication (*lakṣaṇa*) of the Absolute Brahman.

But this divergence between Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara should not be taken as a misunderstanding or an incomplete understanding of Śaṅkara's philosophy by Rāmānuja. I have heard this contention stated often enough, and even by such a thorough scholar as de Smet,⁷ who maintains that it was a failure of Rāmānuja to understand Śaṅkara's treatment of the concept of *lakṣaṇa* which led to his divergence from the master. I think that there is ample evidence in the text of *Śrī-Bhāṣya* itself to contend that Rāmānuja was only too well aware of Śaṅkara's philosophy. His divergence must be understood rather in terms of any philosopher's rejection of a philosophy: not as a failure to understand, but an unwillingness to accept all of the consequences which an acceptance would involve. Rāmānuja saw in Advaita philosophy many conclusions which he could not accept as consistent with his view of the truth—a view which is sustained by his own philosophical tradition—and he therefore rejects them. Rāmānuja does not speak from weakness.

One consequence that Rāmānuja will not accept is that if *sat* is univocal as an indication of Brahman, then the world of objects, including the individual souls (*jīva*), would cease to be real in more than an illusory sense. But for him the world is real, *sattā*, and not as though real, *sattā ivā*, and therefore *sat* is to be understood as a meaningful designation (*viśeṣaṇa*) of it. *Sat* is an affirmation of existence in all things.

6. The fact that the meaning of *sat* is attained through consciousness is emphasised by Rāmānuja by the expression which he uses to describe the Advaita Brahman: *nirviśeṣa-cinmātra-Brahman*.

7. R. V. de Smet, S. J., *The Theological Method of Śaṅkara* (Thesis Pontifica Universitas Gregoriana, Rome, 1953).

The difference between these two conceptions of *sat* is perhaps best illustrated in an instance where Rāmānuja uses the word with no metaphysical significance at all—a feat I said Śaṅkara cannot do. At the beginning of the *Mahāsiddhānta* of the *Śrī-Bhāṣya*, Rāmānuja says that a *vastu*, an object of existence, in order to become an object of the valid means of knowledge (*prameya*) is *sat*, or existing, but that is not all. An object of knowledge must exist, or we would have no means, no *pramāṇas*, with which to ascertain it, but it also is a particular (*vyakti*) of a generic class (*jāti*), possesses form, and so forth. In other words, *vastu* is a substance which has existence as well as numerous other attributes, but it is not existence itself.⁸

The particular importance of this argument for our present discussion is that it is purely an epistemological argument. It tells us that if something is to be known it must first have being. But it does not tell us anything about being itself, other than that it is an attribute—a necessary condition—of a known object; nor does it tell us about all of the things which have being but are not known. Such is the case not because Rāmānuja's metaphysics does not have anything to tell us about the nature of all things, but rather because the statement is not a metaphysical one. It tells us only about the object as known, and not about the object as object.

But this is not to say that the word *sat* does not have for Rāmānuja very important metaphysical meaning, nor that his epistemology is not capable of leading us to an understanding of his metaphysics. These contentions are tantamount to denying that he is a philosopher at all. *Sat* can tell us a great deal about the object as object, but a much further development of the epistemological statement is necessary.

The first conclusion that we can derive from this epistemology is that the relation of an existent object to its being known implies a very clear distinction between being and being known. For we notice that the created world of things (*prakṛti*) exists, is *sat*, in a way that is only identified by our consciousness of it. Thus, by itself, devoid of a valid object, consciousness does not exist (is not *sat*). This conclusion is the basis of the *satkhyātivāda*, or the

8. *anuvartamānatvāt sat paramārtha iti tatsiddham eveti na sādhanam arhati...na sanmātram evavastu. Śrī Bhāṣya*, Abhyankar Edition, p. 33.

argument that all consciousness is of the true. If consciousness exists, it has a real object.⁹

We might well ask now, if being and being known are separate, how is valid knowledge possible? How is it possible to establish any connection between things as they are and things as they are known? And it is by asking these questions that we finally come to a formulation of Rāmānuja's metaphysics. We now come to the essential nature of what it is to be.

The metaphysics of Rāmānuja is based upon the revealed truth of the Supreme Lord, *Īśvara*, enhanced by an infinity of auspicious attributes, of which *sat* and *cit* are two. That is to say that in terms of metaphysics, *Īśvara* is for Rāmānuja a Supreme Substance which possesses both existence and intelligence, but which in Essence is not a being, but a Supreme Person. This Supreme Person has a relation to the created universe analogous to the relation of the soul to the body: a religious relation which takes the form of giving life and purpose, supporting, controlling and so forth. And because existence and intelligence are both attributes of this Supreme Essence, they are related to each other through this very essential identity that they possess in *Īśvara*. Because He is immanent in the world as, in the words of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, the truth of truth—or the being of being (*satyasya satyam*)—and as the understanding of understanding, an ultimate unity of the object of experience and our consciousness of it is attained.

Now it should be obvious that this is not the absolute unity of Śaṅkara, albeit it is a metaphysical unity. Rāmānuja does not accept the absolute unity of Śaṅkara because to him it amounts to a denial of any inherent reality in things as things, and a limitation of the Supreme *Īśvara* to consciousness alone. His philosophy differs from Śaṅkara's in that it seeks to develop a metaphysics which will maintain the reality of the created world and at the same time to affirm the infinite, incomprehensible plenitude of *Īśvara*. And in so far as Rāmānuja is successful in maintaining this difference, his philosophy makes a very significant contribution to the development of metaphysics in India.

9. It goes without saying here that Rāmānuja does not accept Śaṅkara's idea of consciousness either. For Rāmānuja, consciousness is a characteristic (*dharma*) of the knowing self, and not identical with the Absolute Reality.

The Concept of Sat in Samkara and Ramanuja

by

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II

The term *sat* literally means “that which really exists” (*asti iti sat*). It is equated with the term *sattā* (*sadeva sattā*) as it stands for the state of existence (*satto bhāvaḥ sattā*). In Indian philosophy no distinction is made between reality and existence. But we may roughly distinguish between the terms *sat* and *satyam* by saying that the former has a metaphysical signification and may be translated as reality and the latter meaning truth has an epistemological connotation. It is interesting to note that, in Śaṅkara, the two terms *sat* and *satyam* are ultimately identified when referring to Brahman, indicating thereby that the ideal of knowledge becomes non-different from its content in the transcendental experience that is Brahman.

The concept of *sat* is subjected to searching analysis in both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.¹ This does not mean that either Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja had to depend on logical analysis to reach the truth. They had the initial advantage of an intuitive plenary experience of truth, and their analyses were rather to render that experience probable to reason with a view to carrying conviction to posterity. A few points of comparison in the treatment of *sat* by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja are attempted in this paper.

I. Śaṅkara’s conception of the world and of the object of illusion in general as *sadasadvilakṣaṇa* has been much criticized by Rāmānuja, to whom the world is real. The object of illusory experience is, to the latter, a real object, and error consists in just mistaking the non-essential aspects of the object for its essential aspects. To understand — not to mention, appreciate — their respective positions it is necessary to note how each views the

1. By the terms Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja reference is made here not merely to those two ācāryas but also to those who have followed their respective traditions.

relation between *sat* and its opposite *asat*. The distinction made in Aristotelian logic between contrary and contradictory opposition may usefully be employed here to show the difference. To Śaṅkara, *sat* and *asat* are opposed as contraries. This is not to say that in itself *Sat* or *Brahman* which transcends logic and metaphysics has an opposite. *Asat* being simply non-existent, there can be no other to which *sat* in itself can be said to be opposed. But at the level of discursive thought, the concepts of *sat* and *asat* are opposed, and opposed as contraries. To Rāmānuja, they are opposed as contradictories.

A somewhat detailed explanation of Śaṅkara's position seems necessary at this stage, in view of the unique status that he accords to the world—a position much misunderstood. To Śaṅkara, to affirm the status of either *sat* or *asat* of an object would necessarily be to deny the other of it. But the denial of either *sat* or *asat* would not necessarily carry with it an affirmation of the other. For each of these negative premises admits of a third possibility—the *anirvacanīya*, which has the characteristic marks of neither *sat* nor *asat*, *sadasadvilakṣaṇa*. To call it *anirvacanīya* or *sadasadvilakṣaṇa* is not to express despair or admit defeat. It is not as if the advaitin fails in fixing the ontological status of an entity like the world or the rope-snake. *Anirvacanīya* is a positive concept implying a definite status of being, though the criteria of this status are not stated in positive terms. The criteria constitute simply non-conformity to the criteria of *sat* and *asat*, namely, unsublatability and uncognizability respectively. An entity like the world or the rope-snake is brought under the category of *anirvacanīya* by the elimination of the categories of *sat* and *asat* with reference to it. It is the failure to see that the advaitin treats *sat* and *asat* as contraries, supplemented by the want of a positive name to the *anirvacanīya* that has been responsible for the misconception that the advaitin is at difficulty when confronted with the problem of the reality of the world. The assumption of the critic is that a neat disjunction exists between *sat* and *asat*. To accept this assumption would, of course, place the advaitin in a dilemma. To treat the world as real would be to surrender the doctrine of the sole reality of Brahman. To call it unreal would be to declare himself a solipsist. But it is precisely the underlying assumption that the advaitin would question. *Sat* and *asat* are not the only possibilities within the relevant universe of discourse.

It is for this reason that Śaṅkara does not define *sat* and *asat* in exactly opposite terms. The criterion of *sat* is said to be unsublatability (*abādhitatva*), and if *asat* were its contradictory, its standard ought to be sublatability. But there can be no question of *asat* being sublutable, as it is never even presented as an object of cognition. Hence the essential characteristic of *asat* is non-cognizability (*avedyatva*). There can be no cognition of an unreal object. No one has ever cognized nor is ever going to cognize a horned hare, or a sky-lotus or a barren woman's son. It would be pointless for anyone to object that, for aught we know, there might be hares with horns on the Mars, for, if there were such 'hares', they would no longer be hares but quite a new species of animal. The essential point is that these terms can suggest only absolute non-existence (*tuccha*) and hence absolute non-cognizability. It is, indeed, a contradiction, as the Mādhyamika points out, to say that *tuccha* is non-cognizable. For, if *tuccha* were non-cognizable, it would not even be possible to say that it is non-cognizable. But it must be remembered that neither the expression '*tuccha*' nor the examples thereof are the advaitin's own. Borrowing them from the nihilist to whom *asat* or *tuccha* is the ultimate, the advaitin only says that *what the adversary calls the 'tuccha' is non-cognizable*.

It might again be objected that if non-cognizability is the criterion of *asat*, the *jīvasāksi* which is the subject of cognition is *asat*, in as much as, according to the advaitin, it is non-cognizable. The answer is that if the *jīvasāksi* cannot be cognized, it is for the reason that one and the same entity cannot at once be the cognizer and the cognized. In fact, it is this principle that establishes the advaitic conception of the *jīvasāksi* as distinct from the *jīva*. Nor can the pure *Ātman*, the undifferentiated consciousness be called *asat* merely because it cannot be an object of cognition in the empirical sense. For, how can the *Ātman* which is the very basis of cognition itself form the content of cognition?² But the mere fact that consciousness, either in itself,³ or as the witness self,⁴ which is virtually non-different from it, is not cognizable in the empirical sense does not mean that it is unrealized, for it is

2. *Ātmā tu pramāṇādivyavahārāśrayatvāt prāgeva pramāṇādi vyavahārāt siddhyati. Sūtrabhāṣya* II.3.7; p. 432, vol. II, Mem. Edn.

3. *Brahma tu nānyena jyotiṣopalabhyate, svayam jyotiḥ svarūpāt. Sūtrabhāṣya* I.3.22; p. 183, vol. I, Mem. Edn.

4. *Vidyāraṇya: Pancadasi*: X. 23-25,

self-revealing. It is not in either of the above senses that we speak of the non-cognizability of *asat*. Here we imply the distinction of the so-called *asat* from the cognizer and refer only to the logical impossibility of its being presented to the cognizer's consciousness.

We thus maintain that Śaṅkara conceives of three possible categories, *sat*, *asat* and *sadasadvilakṣaṇa*; and any two are to be taken as in contrary opposition, so long as the third is not excluded from the system of thought. The condition that we have added at the end of the above sentence needs to be emphasised. For it is only in conformity with this condition that a statement which Śaṅkara makes in his *Taittirīya-upaniṣad-bhāṣya*, which presents some apparent difficulty, can be explained as consistent with what we have so far maintained. The statement is "*Satyamiti yadrūpena yanniścitam tadrūpam na vyabhicarati, tatsatyam. Yadrūpena yanniścitam tadrūpam vyabhicarati, tat anṛtam iti ucyate*".⁵ "That is true whose nature by which it is cognized, remains constant; and that is untrue whose nature by which it is cognized, varies". We have here two contradictories defined. The condition that we laid down above implies that where one of the three alternatives referred to falls outside the system of thought, the other two do become contradictories. This happens in the case of *sat* and *sadasadvilakṣaṇa* when the principle of non-sublatability (or sublatability) alone is applied. What is unsublatable is *sat*; and hence what is sublutable is other than *sat*. The 'other than *sat*' normally must comprise *asat* and *sadasadvilakṣaṇa*. But as characterised by sublatability, it can stand only for *sadasadvilakṣaṇa*. For of the non-cognizable *asat* there can be no question of sublatability. *Asat* being thus excluded, the 'other than *sat*' as restricted to *sadasadvilakṣaṇa* stands opposed to *sat* contradictory-wise. It is only under this special circumstance of one of the alternatives falling outside the system of thought that Śaṅkara uses exactly opposite terms to designate *satyam* and *anṛtam*; and in line with what we have explained, *anṛtam* ought, in the present case, to be taken for the universe of 'other than true' restricted to what is neither true nor untrue.

Rāmānuja, to whom a third alternative is inconceivable, treats *sat* and *asat* as contradictories and ascribes exactly opposite cri-

teria to them. The criterion of *sat* is its knowability. Consciousness has always a real object. And there can be no knowledge of *asat*. Śaṅkara would quite agree with Rāmānuja on the non-cognizability of *asat*. But he would not accept that cognizability would necessarily establish *sat*. It would indicate only non-*asat* which would comprise *sat* and *sadasadvilakṣaṇa*.

It is not the purpose of this article to judge whether Rāmānuja is justified in treating *sat* and *asat* as contradictories and Śaṅkara as contraries. All that is desired to be emphasised here is that each view is consistent with its respective philosophy.

II. We turn to another important point of difference. To Rāmānuja, *sat* is an attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of an object (*vastu*), while to Śaṅkara, it is its substance, its very essence (*svarūpa*). A judgment 'the pot exists' or 'the pot is *sat*' means, to Rāmānuja, that the pot is characterised by existence, or that existence belongs to it. At the same time, existence is, to Rāmānuja, the essential condition of the knowability of a thing. There is no consciousness without a *real* content. An object must exist, if it is to be known. Taken in relation with the view that *sat* is an attribute, this can only mean that *sat* is the essential attribute of a *vastu* and all the rest of its attributes are known only by virtue of this basic attribute. But this would involve Rāmānuja in a contradiction. For it might legitimately be asked whether the attribute of *sat* is itself known or not known. If it is known, as all the other attributes are, how can it be, at the same time, the presupposition of knowledge? On the contrary, if it is not known but simply assumed to belong to the object, it can no longer be treated as an attribute, that is to say, it can never be the predicate of an attributive judgment.

Śaṅkara denies that *sat* is an attribute. A judgment like 'the pot exists' or 'the cloth exists' is, to him, not an attributive but an identity judgment. It means that the pot or cloth is rooted in *sat*, that it is ultimately non-different from *sat* (*Brahman*). As the Upaniṣad says, "all this is Brahman". The essential nature (*svarūpa*) of the pot or the cloth is non-different from Brahman, and the pot or cloth appears as such, ie., with a particular name and form, only on account of *māyā*. While, therefore, the particularities of *nāma* (name) and *rūpa* (form) such as potness or clothness are *sadasadvilakṣaṇa*, that which underlies *nāma* and *rūpa*, namely, Brahman alone is *sat*. The objects of the world are appearances for the reason that their so-called existence is not

their own but derived from Brahman on which their names and forms are superimposed.⁶

While Śaṅkara rejects the view that *sat* is an attribute, he does not, however, accept the other proposition of Rāmānuja, namely, that *sat* is the condition of the knowledge of a thing. To Śaṅkara, *sat* is knowledge or rather consciousness itself. This view has an incidental advantage. If *sat* is the pre-condition of knowledge, it would follow that *sat* itself cannot be known. But if *sat* were completely unknown, it would not be involved in judgments like "the pot is real", "the cloth exists" and so on. The difficulty is overcome in the complete identification of *sat* and *cit*—an identification which is the culmination of the two-way approach to the ultimate, the objective and the subjective. The method known as *anvaya-vyatireka* (co-presence and co-absence) which consists in sifting whatever is variable and inconstant from what is abiding and unsublated is relentlessly applied to the world of objects as well as to the inner world. In the next section is referred to the analysis of the external world which results in the pure *sat* as the real basis of all names and forms. Likewise, while the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep flit and pass, the pure intelligence (*saṁvit*) which witnesses them all reveals itself as the only constant existence. If *sat* is that which remains unsublated, *cit* alone is *sat*.

III. Śaṅkara's concept of *sanmātra* makes no appeal to Rāmānuja. Existence as such without reference to anything that exists is, to Rāmānuja, an abstraction as empty as the void of the Mādhyamika Buddhist. But, to Śaṅkara, it is the ultimate affirmation as vouchsafed in his own plenary experience. Nor is the concept unintelligible. In objects such as a pot, a cloth, a tree and so forth, we find attributes which are not common and constant. But we are also aware, though vaguely, of the common and invariable element of existence in all of them. As the persistent and unsublated factor, existence as such is more real than the contingent and varying factors like colour, shape, *jāti* and so forth. Pure existence, therefore, is not a bare abstraction but the real substrate

6. In Sūtra II.1.14 (*Sūtrabhāṣya*) Śaṅkara makes out with the support of several scriptural passages that the entire world of effects has no existence apart from Brahman. For on any other assumption the Chāndogya passage VI.1.4 which declares that by knowing the one everything becomes known would be unsustainable,

of particularities. It is only by the superimposition of varying qualities on pure existence that the latter appears as the different existents. Not that in practical life we go by pure existence rather than by particular existents. Our consciousness of existence is in the dim and distant background, and it is only by logical analysis that we are able to say that that must be more real. The awareness of pure *sat* being not yet a completely realized fact, does in no way interfere with the distinctions that we follow in empirical life. Rāmānuja's thrust that if the existential substrate of things were the only constant reality, a man who goes to purchase a horse could return as well satisfied with a buffalo really misses the point. Śaṅkara is never tired of emphasizing that as long as Brahman-experience does not become a *fait accompli*, there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not continue uninterrupted. "For as long as a person has not reached the unity of the self, so long it does not enter his mind that the world of effects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of actions is untrue".⁷

7. *Yāvaddhi na satyātmaikatvapratipattiḥ, tāvat pramāṇaprameyaphalalakṣaṇeṣu vikāreṣu anṛtatvabuddhiḥ na kasyacit utpadyate. Sūtrabhāṣya, II.1.14; p. 311, vol. II, Mem. Edn.*

The Occasion, Dating and Evaluation of Macflecknoe

by

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MacFlecknoe, according to all the standard histories of English literature and most criticisms of the poem, is supposed to be Dryden's answer to Shadwell's attack upon him in *The Medal of John Bayes*, which appeared in print in October 1682. Ian Jack, in his *Augustan Satire 1660-1750* (The Clarendon Press, 1952), breaks away from the common assumption and claims that "during the year 1678 something acted as a match to the heaped-up straw of Dryden's contempt for Shadwell, and set him writing the only poem in his work which is wholly devoted to satirising a private enemy". But no proof of the date of the poem seems available except that of the title page which reads :

MACFLECKNOE, / or a / Satyr / upon the / True-Blew Protestant / Poet T.S. / (Rule) / By the Author of / *Absolom & Achitophel* / Printed for D. Green, 1682.

From this evidence critics and literary historians have drawn the reasonable conclusion that the poem was written after *Absolom and Achitophel*, Part I, which appeared in 1681, and that it was part of the 1681-82 exchange of political and poetical satire. In this context, the assumed relationship between *MacFlecknoe* and *The Medal of John Bayes* has coloured criticisms and interpretations of Dryden's poem to the exclusion of other more poetic considerations.

Starting with the common assumption the poem is an answer to *The Medal of John Bayes* it might be well to look at the poems in other than a chronological relationship. Shadwell's poem is a lampoon : a scurrilous attack upon Dryden, his personal appearance, his morals and his intelligence, or rather his lack of it. Shadwell satirises "the Countrified manners" and "the lumpish conversation" of the "cherry-checked dunce of fifty-three", and enlarges upon his victim's extravagant spendings upon "Mistress Reversion". This attack was published on May 15th, 1682.

MacFlecknoe, the supposed answer to this attack, immortalises Shadwell as a mechanical poet, a prolific writer of dull plays, and as a plagiarist altogether lacking in invention. Moreover the poem abounds in terms of dramatic criticism and literary taste. Thus it is difficult to see any reasonable grounds on which *MacFlecknoe* can be understood as an answer to *The Medal of John Bayes*, unless we envisage the two poets as quarrelsome school-boys, so that when Shadwell shouts "Country bumpkin and loutish grafter", Dryden in exasperation first retaliates with "Dunce! born fool!" and then, getting his second wind vents his spleen on Shadwell's reputation as a dramatic poet by scoffing at his plays one by one and calling him the only rightful heir of a notoriously tedious poet whose eccentricity was on the borderline of madness.

The tradition that the one poem provoked the other apparently begun with Dr. Johnson who saw the occasion of the poem in the political storm which broke over Dryden's head after the accession of James II. Johnson assumed that Dryden was jealous and hurt because Shadwell, the "true-blew Protestant poet" had superseded him as Poet Laureate and Historiographer Royal. Johnson writes:

A Papist could no longer be Laureate. The revenue which he had enjoyed with so much pride and praise was transferred to Shadwell, an old enemy whom he had formerly stigmatised by the name of Og. Dryden could not decently complain that he was deposed; but seemed very angry that Shadwell succeeded him, and has therefore celebrated the intruder's inauguration in a poem exquisitely satirical called *MacFlecknoe*.

Johnson thus interprets *MacFlecknoe* as the work of an angry, resentful man whose chief aim was to belittle his successful rival's honourable appointment. However, there is nothing known of Dryden's life and character which commends our acceptance of *MacFlecknoe* as a public exhibition of mean-spiritedness. Besides Dryden was not called upon to relinquish the laureateship until six years after the publication of *MacFlecknoe*.

Later critics, either following Johnson or, like him, interpreting the evidence of the title page of the first edition evaluate *MacFlecknoe* as an answer to Shadwell's *The Medal of John Bayes*. The following passage relating to *MacFlecknoe* in John Mitford's *Life of Dryden* (1852) is typical of nineteenth century attempts to account for the poem.

During the year 1682 a shower of lampoons from wretched and despicable scribblers appeared against our poet, as full of abuse as they were empty of wit, none of which he condescended to answer; at length, as their infamous charges grew bolder by impunity, he was roused to revenge and punish them by *MacFlecknoe*.

Such champions of Dryden then proceed to see in the poem Dryden's "manly reply" to undeserved attacks.

The *Cambridge History of English Literature* (1912) also accepts the traditional view that *MacFlecknoe* was written in 1682, that it follows *Absolom and Achitophel, Part I* (1681) and is an answer to *The Medal of John Bayes* (May 1682).

Dryden and the True Blue Poet had been on friendly terms and the former had written a prologue for Shadwell's comedy *A True Widow* so recently as 1679, but in *The Medal of John Bayes*... Shadwell contrived to offend his political adversary beyond bearing... Dryden's *MacFlecknoe* is a jeu d'esprit, though one brilliant enough to constitute an unanswerable retort upon unwarrantable provocation.

... This cycle of Dryden's writings is completed by his share in *The Second Part of Absolom and Achitophel*, published in November 1682, a few weeks after *MacFlecknoe*.

The article on Dryden in the 1951 edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* merely gives a synopsis of the reiterated surmises about the date and provocation of the poem made since Johnson's day.

Three other satires followed *Absolom and Achitophel*... *The Medall: A Satire Against Sedition* (March 1682) was written in ridicule of the medal struck to commemorate Shaftesbury's acquittal. Then Dryden had to take revenge on the literary champions of the Whig party who had opened upon him with all their artillery. Their leader Shadwell had attacked him in *The Medal of John Bayes* which Dryden answered in October 1682 with *MacFlecknoe*... To the Second part of *Absolom and Achitophel* (Nov. 1682) written chiefly by Nahum Tate, he contributed a long passage of invective against Robert Ferguson, ... Elkanah Settle, Shadwell and others.

Such appraisals do not explain why, if *MacFlecknoe* were a thorough-going attack, Dryden should feel impelled to return to the attack within six weeks. Why should Dryden castigate Shadwell more violently than any other of his opponents in the Nahum Tate poem, if he had been given a thorough drubbing in *MacFlecknoe*? In any case, as has been seen, the latter is not in any

way an "answer" to Shadwell's satire. It is merely a shifting of the battle to the literary sphere. Is it not probable therefore that *MacFlecknoe* is not part of the politico-religious quarrels of 1680-82 after all?

Among the papers of John Oldham in the Bodleian Library there is a fair copy of *FacFlecknoe* in Oldham's handwriting and dated by Oldham 1678. This transcript is bound up with a group of Oldham's poems written in his own hand; and each poem inscribed by Oldham with the day and month and year of composition. But the transcript of *MacFlecknoe* bears only the date 1678. On this evidence P. L. Babington, in an article in the *Modern Language Review* of January 1918, argues that Oldham, not Dryden, is the author of the poem.

In the two articles, one of which appeared in the *Modern Language Review* of July 1918 and the other in the *Review of English Studies* of April 1925, G. Thorndrury argues that Dryden wrote *MacFlecknoe* and that he wrote it in 1678. G. Thorndrury's arguments in brief are as follows :

1. That the *Second Part of Absalom and Achitophel* (largely by Nahum Tate) was published on, or just before November 10th, 1682. Dryden made a violent personal attack on Shadwell and inserted it into the poem. If *MacFlecknoe* had been written in October 1682, Dryden must have made two attacks on Shadwell within five weeks.
2. There are numerous references to *MacFlecknoe* allied to Shadwell, and also quotations from and echoes of the poem itself in writings published before 1680; notably a song in D'Urfey's play *Sir Barnaby Whigg* (1681) not only borrows lines from the poem but also links Shadwell's name with that of *Flecknoe*.

Furthermore H. F. Brooks, in an article in *The Review of English Studies* of January 1935 points out that there are borrowings from *MacFlecknoe* in poems by Oldham written before 1682, notably in *Rochester's Farewell* (circ. 1680).

Such evidence makes it certain that *MacFlecknoe* was well known in literary circles at least two years before *The Medal of John Bayes* was written, and therefore cannot possibly have been evoked by it....If *MacFlecknoe* is thus assigned to a date some

few years earlier, then the portrait of Og in the *Second Part of Absalom Achitophel* is most likely Dryden's answer to *The Medal of John Bayes*. And on examination it proves to be so. In October 1682 Shadwell satirised Dryden as a base fellow, a coward upstart and a dishonest place-hunter. Dryden's reply came swiftly. On November 10th 1682 he published his portrait of Og and incorporated it into Nahum Tate's poem, a portrait which by no means exemplifies the gentlemanly restraint which, for two centuries, literary critics have imputed to Dryden. It is a revenge in which Dryden gives his reviler good measure, pressed down and running over :

Now stop your noses, readers all and one,
For here's a tun of midnight work to come,
Og from a treason tavern rolling home,
Round as a globe, and loquor'd every chink,
Goodly and great he sails behind his link.
With all this bulk, there's nothing lost in Og,
For every inch that is not fool, is rogue.
A monstrous mass of foul corrupted matter,
As all the devils had spewed to make the batter.
When wine has given him courage to blaspheme,
He curses God, But God before curst him.

.....
But though Heaven made him poor (with reverence speaking)

He never was a poet of God's making;
The miswife laid her hand upon his thick skull
With this prophetic blessing—be thou dull:
Drink, swear and roar, forbear no lewd delight
Fit for thy bulk, do anything but write.
Thou art of lasting make, like thoughtless men,
A strong nativity—but for the pen;
Eat opium, mingle arsenic with thy drink
Still mayst thou live avoiding pen and ink.
I see, I see, 'tis counsel given in vain,
For treason botched in Rhyme will be thy bane,
Rhyme is the rock on which thou art to wreck,
'Tis fatal to thy fame and to thy neck :

.....
A double noose thou on thy neck dost pull,
For writing treason and for writing dull;
To die for faction is a common evil,
But to be hanged for nonsense is the devil :
Hadst thou the glories of thy king express'd
Thy praises had been satire at the best;
But thou in clumsy verse, unlick'd, unpointed,
Hast shamefully defied the Lord's anointed :

I will not rake the dunghill of thy crimes,
 For who would read thy life that reads thy rhymes?
 But of King David's foes be this the doom,
 May all be like the young man Absalom;
 And for my foes, may this their blessing be,
 To talk like Doeg, and to write like thee.

This portrait of Og a lampoon: it is pure literary revenge
 "in the same nature", as justified by Dryden in his *Essay on Satire*:

That form of satire known in England by the name of lampoon is a dangerous sort of weapon, and for the most part unlawful. We have no moral right on the reputation of other men. 'Tis taking away from them what we cannot restore to them. There are only two reasons for which we may be permitted to write lampoons; and I cannot promise that they can always justify us. The first is revenge, when we have been affronted in the same nature, or have been in any ways notoriously abused, and can make ourselves no other reparation.

If then, the "Portrait of Og" is Dryden's counterblast "in the same nature" as the affront, what was the provocation of *MacFlecknoe*?

Dryden's own evaluation of *MacFlecknoe* in his *Essay on Satire*, is that it is a successful piece of Varronian satire whose chief characteristics are that it embodies "a tale or story of the poet's own invention", and that it "avoids impudence and filthiness and expresses only witty pleasantries". The other excellences spring from the poet's inborn mastery over the mysteries of his craft:

How easy it is to call rogue and villain, and that wittily!
 But how hard to make a man *appear* a fool, a blockhead or a knave, without using any of those opprobrious terms! To spare the grossness of the names and yet to do the thing yet more severely, is to draw a full face, and to make the nose and the cheeks stand out, and yet not to employ any depth of shadowing. This is the mystery of that noble trade, which yet no master can teach his apprentice. Neither is it true that this fineness of raillery is offensive. A witty man is tickled while he is hurt in this manner, and a fool feels it not. The occasion of offence may possibly be given, but he cannot take it. If it be granted, that in effect this way does more mischief, that a man is secretly wounded, and though he be not sensible himself, yet the malicious world will find it out for him; yet there is still a vast difference between the slovenly butchering of a man, and the fineness of a stroke that separates the head from the body, and leaves it standing in its place.

Surely this is a criterion by which *MacFlecknoe* should be judged as a poem, not forgetting that anonymity adds to the poem's success as a satire. But the open secret of the authorship of *MacFlecknoe* until Dryden acknowledged it in 1692 is somewhat distinct from the problem of the date and occasion of the poem. However, this much is clear: that the poem is a skilful piece of light-hearted raillery; that it owes a large measure of its success to the aptness of the poet's invented fable; and that it antedates the ping-pong exchange of scurrilous lampoons of 1681-82 by at least four years.

Although in *MacFlecknoe* Dryden endows Shadwell with immortal dulness, the truth of the matter is that Shadwell, by the 1670's, was extremely popular for his lively, bustling comedies. Indeed several of his plays had been acted at Court. *The Sullen Lovers* was acted at Court on May 24th, 1668, *Epsom Wells* on December 2nd, 1671, and again on December 4th, and for the third time that season on December 27th. It was again acted at Court on February 20th, 1680/81, a tribute to its enduring popularity. The first performance of *Psyche* was at Court on February 27th, 1674/5, and a repeat performance was staged there three days later: on March 2nd. *The Libertine* was acted at Court on May 25th, 1675, shortly after its opening night at the Dorset Gardens Theatre. *The Virtuoso* was requested at Court in the same way: a command performance on May 25th, 1676.

Nothing in this evidence supports Dryden's contention that the London theatre-goers found Shadwell's plays either stupid or dull. Moreover Shadwell's reputation as a man about town, as far as can be gathered from contemporary fragmentary references to him, was not that of a bore or a dullard. His love of wine (after the fashion of Ben Jonson), and his rollicking high-spirits made him the noisy, jolly companion popularly known as "good-natured, harmless Tom". If therefore, in the face of such facts, Dryden was moved to attack Shadwell's ability as a dramatist, Shadwell must have given Dryden some serious provocation, above the routine running-battle of jibes and rivalry which the two poets had carried on for the best part of two decades. And if the provocation is "in the same nature" as *MacFlecknoe* then Shadwell evidently had made a specific attack upon Dryden as a dramatist.

The Rehearsal in its revised form (1672) satirises Dryden as a playwright whose fertile genius is too inventive. His plays are

brought to disaster by his ardour for expanding his plot with exciting incidents and situations of fine poetic passion. *MacFlecknoe* would be the perfect answer to *The Rehearsal* except that Shadwell had no hand in the play. Besides 1678 or 1680 was too late a date at which to retaliate on a person for a play which had kept the town laughing for over six years. Literary raillery, if it is to be effective, must be swift in counterstroke.

To return to *MacFlecknoe*. The poem itself focusses attention on the date of composition, if not provocation, for in it, Dryden refers to every one of Shadwell's plays written between 1670 and 1676, with the exception of *The Libertine* (1675). He does not allude to any plays of later date than 1676, and Shadwell was an active playwright. If the offence were given in any of the plays alluded to in the poem, the offence would lie either in the words of the play or in the prefatory matter printed when the play was published. The publishing date in Shadwell's case, followed closely on the heels of the first performance. The Shadwell plays scoffed at by Dryden in *MacFlecknoe* were put on the boards as follows: *The Humourist*, December 1670; *The Miser*, January 1671/2; *Epsom Wells*, December 1672; *Psyche*, February 1674/5; and *The Virtuoso*, May 1676. There is no out of the ordinary insult offered to Dryden in any of these plays, least of all in *The Virtuoso*, the latest of them all.

But if Dryden wrote *MacFlecknoe* in 1682 why did he neglect to jibe at any of Shadwell's plays written between 1676 and that date? *The True Widow* was performed for the first time in March 1678/9; *The Woman Captain* in September 1679; *The Lancashire Witches* in September 1681; plays which in their titles alone would have provided Dryden with a set of obvious denizens for the Barbican and the Liberties in *MacFlecknoe*. Dryden was too expert a satirist to have thrown away such material. Besides the neglect of any Shadwell play over a period of five years would deprive of its sharpest topicality any satire on Shadwell as a dramatist. Yet the latest of all the plays mentioned in the poem is Etherege's *Man of Mode* which was first acted in March 1675/6. Thus a much earlier date than 1682 is necessitated by the nature of satirical revenge.

If however *MacFlecknoe* was written in 1678, as suggested by G. Thorndrury and claimed by Ian Jack, there still remains to be accounted for Dryden's omission of any sallies at Shadwell's plays

written between 1670 and 1678. That is, four plays, *The Libertine*, June 1675, *The Tempest*, April 1674, *Timon of Athens*, January 1677/8, and *The True Widow*, March 1678/9.

In *The Libertine* Shadwell makes a forthright attack upon Elkanah Settle, the Doeg of *The Second Part of Absalom and Achitophel*. Thus Dryden shared Shadwell's contempt for the inferior skill of the City Poet. If therefore he had included in *MacFlecknoe* an attack upon *The Libertine* he would have exposed to Shadwell a considerable chink in his armour.

The next two plays, *The Tempest* and *Timon of Athens* were both Shadwell's adaptations of Shakespeare. But during this period Dryden too was mining Shakespeare's plays for dramatic themes. During 1677 he was working on his classical re-shaping of *Antony and Cleopatra* which was produced in December 1677 at the rival theatre to Shadwell's. Thus any reference to Shadwell plagiarising Shakespeare, or of being in any way indebted to him, would have left Dryden wide open to counter-attack at that point. Thus by omitting all reference to Shadwell's Shakespearean plays Dryden successfully mans an impregnable position.

The omission of any reference to *The True Widow* poses a problem of different kind. *The True Widow* was first acted on March 16th, 1678/9, and judging from the dedication to Sedley it was a complete failure on the stage. Had Dryden embarked upon *MacFlecknoe* after the failure of *The True Widow* he would hardly have omitted any reference to it in a satire on Shadwell as the worst dramatist of the age. Thus the date of *MacFlecknoe* in all probability lies between March 1675/6 and March 1678/9, with the terminus a quo probably somewhere in 1678.

Evidence internal to the poem reduces this margin still further. In *MacFlecknoe* Herringman is satirised as the captain of the bilked stationers. From 1699 onwards Herringman was Shadwell's publisher, but his association with Dryden was of earlier date. From Dryden's first arrival in London shortly after the Restoration and until 1678 Herringman was first Dryden's benefactor and then for almost eighteen years his publisher. The relationship came to an end between January 1677/8 and January 1678/9. This breach is reflected in Dryden's shift to Tonson as his publisher during 1678 and in the satire on Herringman in *MacFlecknoe*.

The fact that Herringman is rallied in a poem which pillories Shadwell as a dramatist suggests that Herringman was involved in

the literary offence which Shadwell committed against Dryden, somewhere between January 1677/8 and March 1678/8.

Dryden's vicissitudes in the realm of drama help to reduce these limits even further. In March 1677/8 *The Kind Keeper* or *Mr. Limberham* was taken off the boards at the Dorset Gardens Theatre because of complaints about its gross licentiousness and particularly because the play was considered to be a libel on a well-known person. Dryden would hardly risk satirising Shadwell as an unsuccessful dramatist when *Mr. Limberham* was such a notorious fiasco.

Thus it seems that the limits of dating for *MacFlecknoe* are January 1677 and March 1677/8 or barely within March 1678.

Within these limits Shadwell did affront Dryden as a dramatist in printed matter which involved Herringman, for on February 16th, 1677/8 Herringman printed for Shadwell *The History of Timon of Athens* with a Dedication to the Duke of Buckingham, the leader of the group of wits who had been responsible for *The Rehearsal*. The play, in addition to satirising Dryden, is a burlesque of heroic plays in general. Dryden, following his own later counsel, wisely let the laughter go by him until he was able to pillory Buckingham as Zimri in the first part of *Absolom and Achitophel* (1681), in a satirical portrait which Dryden singles out in his *Essay on Satire* as being his own highest achievement in that vein. But by the Spring of 1678 *The Rehearsal* had kept the town amused for over five years. It was acted at Court on December 21st, 1674, with a repeat performance seven days later. It went through three editions between 1672 and 1675 (1672, 1673, 1675). Moreover the people who profited most from the play's continued popularity were the members of the King's Company of Actors for whom Dryden wrote most of his plays. Thus the provocation of *MacFlecknoe* probably lies not in the burlesque itself but in the front matter, in which Shadwell attacks Dryden as a dramatist, indirectly, by alluding to *The Rehearsal*. In addressing himself to Buckingham Shadwell first praises his patron's wit and judgement, and then in contradistinction singles out the salutary lessons which *The Rehearsal* holds for Dryden on how not to write plays. Shadwell wrote:

I am extremely sensible what honour it is to me, that my writings are approved by your Grace; who in your own have so clearly shown the Excellency of Wit and Judgment in yourself, and so justly the Defect of 'em in others' that they at

once serve for the greatest Example and Sharpest Reproof. And no man who has perfectly understood *The Rehearsal*, and some other of your writings, if he has any Genius at all, can write ill after it.

These words, in the context of the long success of *The Rehearsal* as a burlesque, are a sufficient provocation for *MacFlecknoe* which is a retort "in the same nature" as the play; more pungent in its treatment of Shadwell, but nevertheless, carried out in the spirit of a light-hearted jest. Shadwell's offence was made public in mid-February 1677/8. Retaliation in such cases to be effective, needed to be swift. Dryden's response was not long delayed. By the third week in March, that is before the *Mr. Limberham* fiasco, he had composed *MacFlecknoe* and had it in circulation among his admiring friends, some of whom, like Oldham, made copies for themselves.

A further point strengthens the case for March 1677/8 or very early in March 1678 as the date of composition of *MacFlecknoe*, which, being interpreted is "Son of Flecknoe". The Flecknoe referred to is Richard Fleckno, an unsuccessful dramatist and poetaster whose eccentricities had made him a standing joke among the literary men of Dryden's day. Richard Fleckno, a non-active Irish priest had taken up residence in Rome. Andrew Marvell made the Grand Tour in 1642-46 and in 1645 paid Fleckno several visits which he recorded in his *Satire on Richard Fleckno*. This satire, at a later date, provided some of the raw materials for Dryden's invented fable in *MacFlecknoe*. Marvell describes the eccentric poetical bore as follows:

Obliged by frequent visits of this man
Whom as a priest, poet and musician,
I for some branch of Melchizidech took
(Though he derives himself from my Lord Brooke),
I sought his lodging; which is at the sign
Of the Sad Pelican, subject divine
For poetry. There, three stair-cases high,
Which signifies his triple property,
I found at last a chamber, as 'twas said,
But seem'd a coffin set on the stairs' head.

.....
In hideous verse, he in a dismal tone,
Begins to exercise; as if I were
Possess'd; and sure the devil brought me there.
.....How I did endure,
And how I silent turn'd my burning ear
Towards the verse; and when that could not hear
Held him the other; and unchang'd yet,

Asked him for more, and prayed him to repeat;
 Till the tyrant, weary to persecute,
 Left off, and tried to allure me with his lute.
 I, that perceiv'd now what his music meant,
 Ask'd civilly, if he had eat this Lent?

.....
 His only impossible is to be rich
 Lest his too subtle body, growing rare,
 Should leave his soul to wander in the air.
 He therefore circumscribes himself in rhymes,
 And swaddled in's own poetry seven times,
 Wears a close jacket of poetic stuff.
 Thus underneath; he over all
 Does make a primitive Sotana fall;
 And above that yet casts an antique cloak
 Worn at the first council of Antioch.

Flecko's threefold function, priest, poet and musician, his intolerable verse, and his venerable cloak are transformed in *MacFlecknoe* into the attributes of Shadwell.

The news of Richard Fleckno's death in Rome reached England late in 1677 or early in 1677/8. Given the provocation of the *Dedication to Timon of Athens* on February 16th, the news of Fleckno's death at about the same time gave Dryden his cue. He envisaged Shadwell as Fleckno's heir, invented the coronation "fable", devised his satirical thrusts and had his *MacFlecknoe* circulating in manuscript within five or six weeks of the provocation.

One fact of literary history seems to weaken the case for this serious breach in the Shadwell-Dryden relationship early in 1678. In March 1678/9 Shadwell's *The True Widow* was acted with a prologue written by Dryden.

It has been suggested that this prologue indicates that Dryden and Shadwell patched up an uneasy truce before their enmity broke out again in 1681-82. Such a state of affairs seems unlikely. It is possible that such a gesture was made by Dryden as a bluff to keep Shadwell guessing about the authorship of *MacFlecknoe* for even though the author's name was an open secret, a pretended anonymity perpetuated the jest, and Dryden did not publicly proclaim the poem as his until 1692. Thus the Prologue to *The True Widow* may have been dust thrown into Shadwell's eyes.

But a much simpler solution commands itself. Acting companies from the time of Fletcher and Massinger onwards, used stock prologues from time to time. Thus it occasionally came

about that two plays of the same company would use the same prologue. Although Dryden and Shadwell usually wrote for rival companies, they were writing for the same company, the Duke's Men, for over a year. After the failure and notoriety over *Mr. Limberham* Dryden co-operated with Lee in writing *Oedipus* which was acted by the Duke's men in January 1678/9. Dryden's *Troilus and Cressida* was also acted by the Duke's men in April of the same year. Thus it would come about that Dryden might write a prologue for the use of the Duke's Men; it would become their property; and there was no reason to prevent their using it to introduce a Shadwell play in March 1678/9. Indeed the same prologue was prefaced to Mrs. Behn's *The Widow Ranter* when it was acted in 1689, and was printed with that play in 1690.

Thus the anomaly of the Dryden Prologue to a Shadwell play in 1678/9 can be accounted for in terms of theatrical usage.

The conclusion of the matter therefore is that *MacFlecknoe* was written within a few weeks of the *Dedication to Timon of Athens* in which Herringman published Shadwell's provocation on February 16th, 1677/8. In consequence, far from *MacFlecknoe* being Dryden's reply to Shadwell's *The Medal of John Bayes*, the converse is probably nearer the truth. Furthermore, when *MacFlecknoe* is judged as a piece of Varronian satire on Shadwell as the heir of Marvell's Richard Flecknoe and the dire opposite of the exuberant dramatist of *The Rehearsal*, then its excellencies as a poem emerge more clearly.

Dryden's subtle and creative use of the material in Marvell's satire, his ingenious invention of Shadwell's coronation and Fleckno's apotheosis, his aptness and economy in meeting the charges made against him in *The Rehearsal*, and his handling of the poetry (not only of the couplets), proclaim him a master craftsman in the art of poetry. Future critical appraisals of the poem should therefore be rooted in these antecedents and made in the light of Dryden's own evaluation of the poem in his *Essay on Satire*. Even from a simple contrast between *MacFlecknoe* and Marvell's satire on Richard Fleckno, Dryden's calibre as a poet is seen far more clearly than from any consideration of the poem as a piece of personal satire, misfired, though brilliantly so, during the religio-political squabbles of 1681-82. When *MacFlecknoe* is read as a poem in its true historical setting we are more likely to recapture for ourselves the delight, the surprise, and the admiration which it evoked in its first readers in March 1678.

Public Lotteries in Madras under the East India Company (1787-1845)

by

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Not long ago the Minister for finance with the Government of Madras made a proposal for running lotteries to finance the development plans of the Government. To many this might have appeared a novel idea. But history shows it differently.

Lotteries have been run by government in Madras for nearly fifty years in the past beginning from the last decade of the eighteenth century to almost the middle of the following century. Not only this; lotteries of this type have been run in Rome during the imperial times. Augustus and Nero and other Roman emperors as well used to run public lotteries to finance public undertakings, or even to enrich the state treasury. In the sixteenth century it was quite common in Europe. The first public lottery run in England dates in 1569 with Queen Elizabeth being its patroness. Students of literature know how often the idea of lottery is introduced from this period onwards in western literary works; and who does not remember the famous lines in Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice* where the choosing of the suiter is described as "the lottery that he hath devised in these three chests of gold, silver and lead".¹

Small wonder then that the idea of running a public lottery suggested itself to Lord Macartney, Governor of Madras during the period 1781-85. That was a period of great famine and at the same time of added expenditure to the state. Arriving at Fort St. George in the *Swallow* on the 22nd April 1781 he found the Carnatic overrun by Hyder Ali, the population of Madras suffering in the grips of poverty and the state treasury empty. Neither the Nawab of Arcot nor the Rajah of Tanjore, who were the erstwhile helpers of the English, could render them any assistance

1. *Merchant of Venice*, V. i, ii, 32.

while their own territories were held by the armies of Hyder Ali. To make matters worse, the number of the Councillors of the Governor was increased in the meanwhile to eleven, including the military member, by orders from home.² What money could be gathered amidst these difficult circumstances had to be sent to the army for which pay was already in arrears to the tune of six and a half lacs of pagodas. The plight of the Governor could not be better expressed than in his own words, when he wrote to the Directors of the East India Company under date 26th January 1782:

"We cannot avoid taking this opportunity of mentioning to your honours the peculiarly hard Situation of the Members of Council; and ever since the receipt of your Commands... they have been executing the duties of their station without receiving any emoluments from the service at a time when the expence of keeping up an appearance in the Settlement suitable to their rank is double what it heretofore has been".³

"Macartney tried in succession a local loan, application to Bengal and even a lottery, but with little advantage".⁴

Lottery to be a successful public venture in Madras had to wait six more years. It was to Peter Massey Cassin, a free merchant in Madras, appeared the idea of a new building for the Exchange near the sea gate and he proposed the purchase of the property of Robert Hughes for the purpose.⁵ He further proposed to pay for the new buildings by means of a lottery. This was in 1787; and the proposal once given was caught up by the government to great advantage. This was how lottery arose as a source of public revenue in Madras in the eighteenth century. The following is an extract from the Public Consultations of the year in which this scheme is put forth by Mr. Cassin together with a memorandum with regard to the first lottery:

"I informed Col. Ross that there was another house equally eligible in point of Situation on the Sea line, now the property of Mr. Robert Hughes, and which he is willing to sell and asked Col. Ross if he had any objection to an Exchange being erected there and he was pleased to say he had not. As the purchase of private property enhances the ex-

2. The original number was six.

3. Letters to England, vol. xxix.

4. Love, Vestiges of Old Madras, III, 222.

5. P. C., CXLIV, 17/8/1787.

pence of the building I have (with the approbation of the principal part of the Subscribers) taken the liberty to propose to your Honour in Council an augmentation of the lottery fund; and that the money be deposited in the Honble Company's treasury to remain there without any interest till after the drawing of the Lottery, and then to be applied to the discharge of the prizes agreeable to the accompanying memorandum.

Should these alterations meet the approbation of the Honble Board, the plan may be carried into execution without further loss of time and the Lottery tickets issued in the course of the ensuing month.—*Peter Massey Cassin.*

Memorandum

Lottery Fund, Star pagodas 100,000, to be divided into 10,000 shares or tickets of Pags. 10 each.

1 Prize of Pags.	5,000	5,000
2 " "	2,500	5,000
5 " "	1,000	5,000
10 " "	500	5,000
20 " "	250	5,000
50 " "	100	5,000
100 " "	50	5,000
3212 " "	20	64,240
First drawn ticket		500
Last drawn ticket		260
3400 Prizes amounting to star pagodas		100,000

6600 Blanks

10,000 Tickets

N.B.—Not 2 blanks to a prize and the lowest prize is equal to the price of 2 tickets.

The Lottery Tickets to be immediately issued by an Agent under the Committee....The prizes are to be discharged immediately after the drawing is finished, deducting ten per cent for prompt payment as is the Custom on paying prizes in the English lottery".

The profit on this lottery was thus Pags. 10,000 of which half was used to cover expenses and the remaining was to be devoted to the Exchange Fund.

The above extract speaks for itself as to the method in which lotteries were run by the government and this scheme was not only approved but was also used as a model for the lotteries that

followed. Accordingly, Mr. Hughes' house was purchased for 10,000 pags. in September 1787 and that was to serve as "a place of public, free, open and uncontrolled resort of all Merchants, dealers, Commanders of ships or others having any concern in trade". These buildings soon became known as the Exchange and it became the meeting place of merchants of all descriptions who sat and discussed, over a cup of coffee perhaps, and was thus a centre of trading activities. We indeed read from the records of the period that the Exchange contained also a coffee house and a restaurant where lunches could be ordered. Mrs. Fay, who visited Madras in 1796, writes as follows: "I was particularly pleased with the Exchange, which is a noble building, ornamented with full length pictures of Lord Cornwallis, Sir Eyre Coote and General Meadows".⁶ The fine hall in which they were hung, known as the *Long-room* was used as an Exchange, hall for public meetings, for entertainments and for lottery drawings.

Such was the origin of the public lotteries of Madras. Much good flowed out of them particularly from the side of meeting public demands like laying of roads, construction of bridges, maintenance of charitable institutions like the Male and Female Asylums; and for a Company of merchants carrying out the functions of a government without the necessary sources of revenue open only to a recognised form of administration the lottery was not only useful but in a sense even a necessity. Still it was open to criticism from the very beginning and conscientious people were not wanting to point out the essentially immoral character of a system like the lottery. Jealousy and the natural desire to find fault with others also played its part and in October 1787 two letters signed Z and Y appeared successively in the issues of the *Madras Courier* declaring the lottery as illegal. The Exchange Committee, which was then in charge of this, grew indignant and passed a resolution that the letters were "indecent and malignant" productions and that the writers were "a public nuisance of a most dangerous tendency".⁷

The lottery, however, continued its course and in a few years the whole mechanism was contrived in such a way that flaws could be avoided without difficulty. At first the Governor nominated a Committee of members, respected and responsible, who

6. *Original Letters from India*, Fay; 1817.

7. P. C., cxlvi, 6th Nov., 1787.

could be depended upon to conduct the lottery justly and without any unfavourable criticism. Thus we find in 1787 the first lottery being managed by the Exchange Committee. Later it was left to responsible firms of merchants to run the lottery. Thus in 1795 the promoters of the first Male Asylum lottery were Messrs. Porcher Redhead & Co., Colt Baker & Co., Tulloh Jervis & Brodie, McDowell Fraser & Hay and so on. A few years later allusion is made to the firm of Thomas Parry & Co., and to Messrs. Lys Satur & De Monte.⁸ It was during the period of Lord William Bentinck as Governor of Madras that the Company decided to have the lottery run always by a responsible committee. The proceeds of the lottery were deposited in the Government Treasury under the responsibility of the Accountant-General, who was called upon by the Governor in Council from time to time to disburse for purposes of public utility. In the days of Sir Thomas Munro a Superintendent of Lotteries was appointed to carry out efficiently the increasing work connected with them. Thus we have from the records the following establishment proposed for the office of the lottery under the signature of T. Daniel, Superintendent of Lottery:

Record-keeper to prepare the tickets	Rs. 50-0-0
Seller of tickets	" 100-0-0
Head writer	" 35-0-0
3 Writers at Rs. 21 each p.m.	" 63-0-0
1 Shroff	" 35-0-0
1 Moochy	" 10-8-0
4 Peons at Rs. 7 each	" 28-0-0
1 Water woman	" 2-8-0
	Rs. 324-0-0
 <i>At the Drawing</i>	
Extra writers	" 86-0-0
2 Criers	" 140-0-0
Drawing Boys	" 20-0-0
	Rs. 246-0-0 ⁹

The scheme was approved and the Secretary to Government ordered accordingly. The prize money was always paid punctually

8. P. C., 4th March, 1844; the last firm became the later day Arbuthnot

& Co.

9. P. C., 19th Nov., 1822 Nos 21 22.

at the Government Bank in the City and by the Collectors in the mufussil districts. As time went on the lottery tickets were classed into three varieties at different prices to suit the pockets of rich and poor. This innovation again was carried out in Munro's time and it was resolved that no prize ticket should be discharged after the expiration of twelve months from the conclusion of the lottery.

The beneficial results accruing from the lottery system were very great; and many of the roads that connect important regions of the city of Madras like the Mount Road and the one running in the centre of Chintadripet and many of the ancient bridges in the city like those in Otteri and Triplicane were all constructed from the proceeds of these lotteries, of which there seems to have been at least two every year. The Male and the Female asylums received an annual allotment of not less than Rs. 12,000 from the lottery fund. In April 1823 we find Munro making an allotment of Rs. 7,000 to the female asylum to supply the deficiency of its funds. In the year preceeding the Governor granted a donation of Rs. 5,000 to the same institution from this fund for erecting a new dormitory for 350 girls. From abstracts furnished by Mr. G. L. Prenderghast, Dy. Accountant-General in-charge of lotteries, in his communication to the Government dated 20th February 1844 an idea of the income from lotteries and the items of expenditure can be gathered:

Years	1833-34 to 1843-44
Profit	Rs. 819,351 5 0
Spent on Roads and other charities	„ 359,133 4 11
On the running of lotteries	„ 206,420 4 1
Balance	„ 253,797 12 0 ¹⁰

The above will give us an idea of the great use to which lotteries were put by the East India Company and during all the fifty years they were tried without much difficulty they paid well the government. During all the time the Board of Directors were, however, often raising their voice against this new method of finding money for governmental expenses, though they had perforce to accord their sanction in the circumstances in which the Company was placed in India. But from the first quarter of the nineteenth century the picture changed. Lotteries became unpopular in

10. P. C., 4th March, 1844; No. 32.

England by that time and we have reference in the *Letters of Junius* to his view with regard to lotteries. If Government had to pay, it was his view, it ought to do it by any means other than the lottery. Cavour in Italy voiced the feeling of many in Europe when he said that lotteries "were a tax on the imbecile".

In India also the East India Company had to obey the general turn in the feeling of the people. In 1845 the Marquis of Tweeddale was governor of Madras and he caught the new spirit in the air. He wanted to put an end to the system that was in bad odour already for long. The Government of India, however, expressed their disfavour only to private lotteries. When the opinion of the Governor of Madras was sought in the matter of a bill the Government of India was going to bring forward abolishing all private lotteries, Tweeddale expressed his agreement and at the same time pointed out that Government lotteries were no better and should be abolished. On this the Secretary to the Government of India wrote:

"I am directed to state that the Governor General in Council is prepared to approve the discontinuance of Government lotteries at Madras whenever the Governor in Council may be pleased to carry that measure into effect, for which purpose no act of legislation is required".¹¹

The seventy-fourth lottery had already been put through and the Governor ordered that that should be the last government-sponsored lottery in Madras. Under date 15th October 1844 we find Mr. A. Brooke, the Superintendent of the lottery handing over charge and the records of his office to the Acting Accountant General.¹²

11. P. C., 30th April, 1844; No. 48.
12. P. C., 12th November, 1844.

