

JOURNAL of INDIAN HISTORY

Vol. XXXVI, Part II

August, 1958

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PUBLISHED THREE TIMES A YEAR

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Annual subscription: Rs. 10, or by cheque Rs. 10-63 Naye Paise and 16s. abroad.

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Full page cover : Rs. 15 or £1 Half page cover : Rs. 8 or 12s.
Full page inside : Rs. 10 or 14s. Half page inside : Rs. 6 or 8s.

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
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Datia Succession 1839-40

BY

DR. HIRA LAL GUPTA, M.A., D.Phil.

In the principalities of Bundelkhand, subordinate to the British Government, the right of the Rajas to adopt whom they pleased was the most commonly accepted practice sanctioned by past traditions and long usage. But in most cases the system actually in vogue was the adoption of illegitimate offsprings in the absence of legitimate heirs to the throne.¹ During the thirties of the nineteenth century the Rajas of Panna and Bijawar were either illegitimate offsprings or descendants of an illegitimate branch of the illustrious family of Raja Chhatrasal.² Almost at the same time Rao Raja Parikshit Bahadur of Datia lost all hopes of having a progeny from his wife who had become invalid in the prime of her youth. Devoted to her husband and to the cause of her family, she advised the Raja to marry a second wife in order to have a son for the continuance of the royal family and the state. But the Raja who was equally devoted to her invariably refused to marry again.³ In these circumstances the question of succession was destined to crop up sooner or later. There was no nearer claimant to the throne on the ground of legitimacy of birth than the aged Raja of Tehri and Orchha who was also without an 'offspring born in wedlock'.⁴ Rao Raja Parikshit Bahadur was, therefore, anxious to adopt a son to succeed him after his death in order to maintain the separate existence of his ancestral state. He spotted out an illegitimate son of his own, aged four years, for this purpose and filed an application with the British Political Agent in 1830 for permission to adopt a boy of tender age and to obtain confirmation of the British Government for his adopted heir. To dispel any fears of future complications which might arise if a son was born to him at a future date, he stated that in that event the superior claims of the legitimate son

1. Bengal Pol. Con., 3rd September, 1832, No. 104.

2, 3 and 4. *Ibid.*



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would prevail against those of an adopted one and no inconvenience would result on that score.⁵

As the question of succession was not an imminent one, all the pros and cons of the case were leisurely studied. At first, when the parentage of the proposed heir was not known to Mr. Ainslie, the Agent to the Governor-General, he simply gave a very casual consideration to the Raja's request for permission to adopt by expressing a pious hope that there would be no necessity for an adoption as he himself would be blessed with an offspring in his own family and if it ever became absolutely necessary, then the selection of a boy from amongst the sons of his own relations would be most advisable.⁶ In this respect the attitude of the Rani and the related ruling families of Tehri and other states of Bundelkhand was ascertained. There seemed to be no likelihood of opposition on the part of the former as she herself had acknowledged the boy as her adopted son. The latter too had not shown any sign of opposition. Mahendra Vikramajit, the Raja of Tehri and Orchha, who was the senior member of the ancestral family of Raja Bir Singh Deo, had acquiesced in his relative's request by attending the hair-cutting ceremony of that boy and dining with the Raja of Datia on that occasion. Ram Chandra Rao, the Subedar of Jhansi, and several other chieftains of Bundelkhand had also participated in that ceremony.⁷ The mother of the boy being of the Kshatriya caste, there was no objection to the adoption of her son.⁸ Kunwar Dharmपाल, the son of the ruler of Tehri and Orchha, who alone could have legally disputed the claims of the adopted son had already expired. Hence, fear of a fratricidal dispute for succession was practically negligible although the aspirants could not be prevented from feeling frustrated.

On political grounds, too there was no objection to adoption. By the treaty with the state of Datia, signed on 15th March 1804, its ruler was recognised as an independent chieftain. His right to

5. Two letters from the Raja of Datia to Mr. Ainslie, Agent to the Governor-General in Bundelkhand, 25th September, 1830, & 28th October, 1830.

6. A letter from the Agent to the Governor-General in Bundelkhand to the Raja of Datia, 7th October, 1830.

7. A letter from the Raja of Datia to the Political Agent, 24th February, 1831.

8. Bengal Pol. Con., 3rd September, 1832, N. 104.

nominate a successor could not be legally disputed or challenged. He had all along been a faithful ally of the British Government. The only question, therefore, was as to what would be the policy of the Government of the East India Company in this regard; whether in the absence of a legitimate offspring the Government would decide to permit an adoption and leave the state to its own fate or it would allow the state to lapse to the Paramount State.⁹ Lapse had not become a common practice till then. It was only sparingly used when the British interests strongly dictated that course and the magnitude of adverse reactions was not feared to be great. In this case, lapse was considered inexpedient. Recognition of adoption was, therefore, considered to be most feasible by the Political Agent.¹⁰

Another question that required a categorical decision was whether by the terms of the treaty signed with the individual chieftain in possession of the state and his successors the words 'and his successors' would include his uncles, brothers and their children or only his sons and their children. In this connection, the case of the principality of Charkhari was recalled, where the ruler had taken a very strong stand, that by virtue of the Raj having been conferred upon him and his descendants by the British Government it must pass on rightfully to the Paramount Power in the absence of a descendant.¹¹ But at last this question was shelved as lapse was not contemplated.

For sometime the Political Agent adopted the policy of letting things alone and did not refer the matter to the Governor-General due to certain weighty considerations in his mind. Firstly, he expected that things would take a definite shape within a short time as was the case at Sumthar, where the Raja, under similar circumstances, had made a request for adoption but had later on withdrawn his request when a son was born to him. Secondly, he thought that the request of the Raja of Datia was dictated by sentiments and that in all probability he would marry again in the event of the death of his wife which was not improbable. Thirdly, he thought that delay would enable him to have

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Ibid.*

a full grasp of the situation.¹² But when on the death of the Rani without an issue the Raja showed no inclination to marry again and no claimant to the throne submitted his claims, the Political Agent placed the matter before the Governor-General for obtaining necessary guidance to determine his attitude in this case of succession.¹³ Lord William Bentinck studied the entire case and accorded sanction to the illegitimate child of the Raja of Datia as his adopted son and heir to the *gaddi* on May 9, 1833, as he was already recognised by other chiefs of the same descent, including the royal family of Orchha.¹⁴ However, as a precautionary measure, it was stipulated that in the event of the birth of a legitimate son to the Raja, if he happened to marry again, the adopted one might be set aside with a suitable provision.¹⁵ In this way the path was made clear for the succession of the young adopted boy to the *gaddi* of Datia.

Six years after, on the 13th August, 1839, Raja Parikshit Bahadur of Datia expired prematurely and his fondling, a boy of thirteen years succeeded him under the name of Raja Bijai Bahadur.¹⁶ The old Dewan, Ganesh Das, continued to manage the affairs of the state during the minority of the young chief with admirable efficiency. This was the occasion for the aspirants to express their displeasure. Certain very distant relations of the ruling family did not like the succession of a fondling, altogether unconnected with the ruling family, to the exclusion of their own or their descendants' claims.¹⁷ This indicated that disturbances of some kind were not improbable.

Till the death of Raja Parikshit Bahadur nobody in the state had disputed the right of his illegitimate son to succeed to the *gaddi* as an adopted son. But soon after his death, Dewan Madan Singh of Beroni, a member of the collateral branch of the late Raja's family, disputed the right of Bijai Bahadur.¹⁸ To prevent

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. Bengal P.C., 13th March, 1834 No. 3.

15. Bengal Pol. Con., Despatch of 22nd August 1833.

16. A letter from S. Fraser, Political Agent in Bundelkhand to T. A., Maddock, Secretary to the Government, 20th August, 1839.

17. *Ibid.*

18. Political despatch of the Governor-General, 13th April 1840.

him from disturbing the peace of the realm the two most influential ministers of the state, viz. Dewan Ganesh Das and Kunwar Bikramjit, son of the sister of the late Raja's father, acted with great promptitude and showed steadfast loyalty to the cause of the young ruler. They increased the military forces of the state and succeeded in nipping in the bud an attempt to unseat Bijai Bahadur from the *gaddi*. On account of peace and good government in the country, the people looked apparently quite happy and no other sign of trouble of any kind was visible.¹⁹ Later on many of the soldiers appointed temporarily were removed and their places were taken by a small and efficient body of disciplined men. The claims of the Beroni family were set aside.

About a month after his accession to the throne of Datia, the young Raja Bijai Bahadur addressed a *kharita* to the Governor-General on the 16th September, 1839, and another to the Chief Secretary to the Government of North-Western Provinces on the same date, seeking their favour for himself as ruler of Datia.²⁰ About three months after, he again addressed *kharitas* to them expressing his desire to have an interview with the Governor-General who was scheduled to pass through the Sindhia's territories on his way to Calcutta.²¹ Before giving a reply the Governor-General asked for the views of the Political Agent, S. Fraser, on the question of the grant of an interview to the new ruler of Datia, the recognition of his title, and the amount of *nazrana* to be demanded from him on the occasion of the proposed interview.²²

The approach of S. Fraser was different from that of M. Ainslie. The latter had declared him to be an illegitimate son of the late Raja in his report of 14th July, 1830. The former believed it to be inaccurate. He was of the view that the formal recognition of Bijai Bahadur as the chief of Datia and the terms of his recognition would involve a reference to the principles which would constitute the foundation of British policy towards a class of states in the region of Bundelkhand to which Datia

19. *Ibid.*

20. A letter from S. Fraser to Maddock, 2nd January, 1840.

21. A letter from Fraser to Maddock, 20th January, 1840.

22. A letter from Maddock to Fraser, 10th January, 1840.

belonged.²³ In this connection he recalled the policy of non-intervention laid down by the Court of Directors in their despatch of 30th August, 1837 and explicitly stated by Sir Charles Metcalfe, on 28th October, 1837, which enjoined the recognition of succession apparently agreeable to the Ruling Prince and the people or to the latter on the demise of the former. In the case of Datia succession, the problem was whether consistent with this principle the incumbent was to be recognised as ruler *de jure* or *de facto*. The observations of the Court of Directors were directed to the latter, while those of Sir Charles Metcalfe appeared chiefly directed to the former.²⁴

It was certain beyond doubt that the recognition of the rights of Raja Bijai Bahadur to the *gaddi* of Datia would unquestionably give support and stability to his authority which unrecognised he would not possess. It was equally certain that to leave him unrecognised would expose him to difficulties in the management of his state successfully. Some sort of recognition to him, therefore, seemed unavoidable. Of the two courses open to the Paramount Power, the recognition of Bijai Bahadur as the *de facto* ruler was considered to be the simplest practical rule for the British Government to pursue. It was not considered to be in any way inconsistent with the general course of British policy, which had never strictly adhered to the terms of past engagements, although at times it seemed to be tantamount to total renunciation of all reversionary rights of succession to the Raj on the part of the British Government and even altered materially the character of British engagements which were made with a specified chief and his heirs and successors in perpetuity.²⁵

On the other hand, the recognition of a chief as the heir *de jure* would bind the British Government to support his rights against all assailants and to restrain him from misgovernment. This would involve interference in the internal affairs of that state in opposition to the proposed principle of non-interference and would place the British Government in a very embarrassing situation.²⁶

23. A letter from Fraser to Maddock, 15th January, 1840.

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*

At that stage when Raja Bijai Bahadur was already in undisturbed possession of his state it was not considered wise to advert to the original issue of adoption recognised six years ago. If it was in any way irregular it was irremediable. Even though his peaceful accession was probably due to the grant of recognition to him during the life-time of the late Raja, he was fully entitled to recognition as the ruler *de facto*.²⁷ Therefore, the best possible way, according to the Political Agent, was to assure the Raja that he would be allowed to retain possession of his Raj so long as he could support himself in the exercise of his authority and that the British help to him would extend solely to protection from the acts of external aggression.²⁸

The question of *nazrana* was considered to be intimately connected with the policy to be adopted. If Raja Bijai Bahadur was to be recognised as the ruler *de facto* the British Government would have no just claim to a *nazrana* as it would yield him no equivalent and would not be called upon to interfere in his behalf if he was ousted.²⁹ On the other hand, if he was to be recognised as the ruler *de jure* the demand of a *Nazrana* would be perfectly justified as it would mean support to him against all opposition. In a case of this kind, the *nazrana* would be the price of British assistance to him.³⁰ Having explained the implications of the recognition of Bijai Bahadur as Raja *de jure* or Raja *de facto*, Mr. Fraser preferred the latter without any demand of a *nazrana*.³¹ The Governor-General agreed with this view and expressed his decision to accord him the necessary recognition by grant of an interview without any *nazrana*. He was so much pleased with the loyalty of the Raja to the Paramount Power and with the efficiency in the administration of his state that he exempted him from the observance of an important condition of the treaty to dispose of his troops and to contribute something to the formation of the Bundelkhand Legion.³² In lieu of it he was asked to maintain a small body of disciplined troopers, to be kept at the

27. *Ibid.*

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*

31. *Ibid.*

32. Minute of the Governor-General Lord Auckland, 30th January, 1840; A letter from Maddock to Fraser, 30th January, 1840.

disposal of the British Government without any payment, whenever required, for the preservation of general tranquillity in that region.

Recognition of Raja Bijai Bahadur as the *de facto* ruler and not as the Raja *de jure* of the state of Datia was full of dangerous possibilities for the peace and future of the state. It could have worked as an encouragement to rebellion, for the Raja was not granted any legal status and the British Government was not necessarily bound to support him against his enemies. Any ambitious person in the state could have taken advantage of this state of affairs to subvert his government and oust him from the throne and become the *de facto* ruler by sheer dint of might. The *de facto* ruler could be removed even by the Paramount Power at any time or on any pretext without any legal flaw. This policy of the British Government amounted to an imposition of liabilities on the ruler without itself being required to observe any reciprocity. It indicates that Raja Bijai Bahadur, who treated the Political Agent as his friend and benefactor, was allowed to become the ruler of Datia not by virtue of his right but simply by British benevolence and his own *de facto* position. Being a regularly adopted son, he was morally and legally entitled to succession in a *de jure* capacity. The denial of legal status to him was not without some end in view. The policy of questioning the legality of succession had started by that time although it had not become a general rule or it had not assumed the appearance of a doctrine. If necessary, this demotion of the adopted successor from his basic status could be used in future for the application of the land-grabbing policy of lapse which was unscrupulously employed during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Dalhousie. The true implications of this policy were probably not fully grasped by the principalities of Bundelkhand at that time. Although in actual practice the issue of the state of Datia did not create any significant problem in future, all the same the policy adopted in 1840 by Lord Auckland contained seeds of a deep game which was not extended ultimately to its logical conclusions simply due to inexpedient circumstances.

The Foundation of the Congress and *Russophobia*

BY

DR. NANDALAL CHATTERJI, M.A., Ph.D., D.Litt.

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It is indeed curious that there is as yet no satisfactory answer to the question as to why actually the Indian National Congress was founded in 1885. It would be wrong to assume that the Congress appeared as a sudden efflorescence. It would be equally misleading to assume, as many are inclined to assume, that the Congress was ushered in as a freedom movement. It is true that the Congress constituted a visible embodiment of the national awakening that came over India as a result of the impact of Western civilisation on Indian thought. It was thus in a way a fulfilment of the forces which British rule itself had set in motion. But, when one examines the various theories which have been advanced to explain the actual inception of the Congress, one finds that not one of them furnishes a convincing explanation. This creates the suspicion that the real object behind the foundation of the Congress could not be publicly acknowledged by its British promoter, Mr. A. O. Hume.

In the history of British rule in India, there occurs no greater paradox than the fact that the Congress which has successfully fought for India's independence for more than six decades owed its origin and initial progress to the enterprise of a British ex-Secretary to the Government of India in the Home and Revenue Departments, Mr. Hume. The considerations which impelled Mr. Hume and his co-adjutors are not clear. We have it on the authority of an ex-President of the Congress, Mr. W. C. Bonnerji, that Mr. Hume at first had intended to bring together leading Indian politicians once a year to discuss questions of social interest only. In other words, the Congress was intended to have been just a social conference. It is a pity that our historians have so far paid little attention to the considerations which forced Mr. Hume

to transform the Congress into a political body. To the average Englishmen in the last century, the idea of an all-India national organisation might well have sounded fantastic, if not positively dangerous. Yet, it is a fact that to a small group of farsighted Britishers the idea seemed desirable that Indian leadership should be organised for the benefit of England as much as of India.

There is no doubt about the fact that Mr. Hume was a liberal statesman and that he had little faith in the doctrine of "the whiteman's burden"—the gospel of the white bureaucracy to which he himself had belonged. He was one of those rare "White Babus" who thought it essential in the interest of the British Empire to direct the Indian political aspirations into constitutional channels. But, it was certainly not India's freedom or home-rule to which Mr. Hume could have looked forward. He and his collaborators sought in fact to strengthen rather than undermine the foundations of the British Empire. If they pleaded for reforms, they desired no snapping of the existing ties between England and India, but only asked for the loosening of those ties so as to make the connection both durable and popular.

An inquiry into the available evidence leads one to suppose that Mr. Hume's real originality lay not so much in the propounding of the idea of an Indian National Congress, for the Indian Association of Calcutta, founded in 1876, had already arranged for the Indian National Conference in 1883 at the instance of Mr. Surendranath Banerjea, but that his achievement was the by-passing of the aforesaid Indian National Conference and the formation of an admittedly loyalist organisation apart from, and independent of, the existing body. It seemed, as if Mr. Hume was out to sabotage the Indian National Conference sponsored by "a dismissed Government servant", Mr. Surendranath Banerjea, and controlled by "Babus from Bengal". The student of Indian history is entitled to ask why a parallel body with an identical programme had to be brought into existence, even though the National Conference was going to hold an all-India Session at Calcutta in the Christmas week of 1885—the same fateful week which saw the birth of the Congress at Bombay.

It is regrettable that not much contemporary evidence is available which might elucidate the inside story of the inception of the Congress. But, the scrappy details which may be gleaned

from authoritative records give us some clues to the real motives of Mr. Hume, the father of the Congress and its first General Secretary. A study of this evidence serves to show that the Congress was founded in fact as a precautionary move against an apprehended Russian invasion of India. Mr. Hume and his friends were afraid that at a time when discontent was growing among the educated Indians through the activities of the Indian Association, the rapid progress of the Russians in Central Asia might give rise to obvious complications. The steady advance of the Russians inspired the European mind all over India with open alarm so much so that in the eighties of the last century a Russian attack on India was supposed to be imminent. These fears were aggravated by the fact that much of Russia's conduct seemed unfriendly from the time of Lord Northbrooke onwards. In February, 1875, even the Secretary of State for India, Lord Salisbury, warned the Governor-General, Northbrooke :

"I agree with you in thinking that an immediate Russian advance upon India is a chimera. But I am by no means sure that an attempt on their part to throw the Afghans upon us is so improbable".

It is well-known that it was the Russian intrigues in Kabul which upset the Governor-General, Lord Lytton, and finally led to the Second Afghan War. Lytton later admitted this in so many words :

"I affirm that the real and the only cause of the Afghan War was an intrigue of long duration between Sher Ali and the Russian authorities in Central Asia, an intrigue leading to an alliance between them for objects which, if successfully carried out, would have broken to pieces the Empire of British India".

The notorious Vernacular Press Act of Lord Lytton was an avowed attempt to gag the Indian Press at a time when the safety of the Indian Empire was seriously threatened by the events in Central Asia. The Viceroy himself declared that the vernacular papers of Bengal had begun "to inculcate combination on the part of the native subjects for the purpose of putting an end to the British Raj". "Not content with misrepresenting the government and maligning the character of the ruling race in every possible way and on every possible occasion", he alleged, "these mischievous scribblers have of late been preaching open sedition". The

Afghan War itself evoked no enthusiasm among the educated Indians, and, on the contrary, occasioned strong criticisms in the Indian press on the score of financial strain the War imposed upon India, for it was well-known that the war cost the Indian taxpayer £21,000,000. The Indians' dislike to an anti-Russian policy was thus becoming a matter of deep concern to the watchful Britishers who realised the need for building up a strong home front in India through some loyalist organisation. If, therefore, Mr. Hume decided to sponsor the Congress movement, the object is intelligible indeed.

That mere repressive measures such as those that had been introduced by Lord Lytton could not create a loyal public opinion in India was emphasised by that liberal Viceroy, Lord Ripon, through his radical reformist policy. Ripon referred to the grave implications of Indian discontent in these significant words:

"A movement has begun which will advance with greater rapidity and force every year. Such a condition of affairs is one in which the task of government and specially despotic government, is beset with difficulties of no light kind; to move too fast is dangerous, but to lag behind is more dangerous still—and the problem is how to deal with this new-born spirit of progress so as to direct it into a right course and prevent it from becoming a source of serious political danger".

Ripon was more explicit when he warned the Secretary of State in these words:

"... as the Russians approach our frontiers more nearly, they may try to stir up discontent and trouble by intrigues carried on within our dominions, and the real question, therefore, is how can such intrigue be best met and defeated".

Ripon's words indicate that the official mind in India was on the look-out for some means whereby Indian agitation could be directed "into a right course" and the Russians prevented from fomenting intrigues in India. Bearing this in mind, one can readily infer why the Congress owed its birth to the initiative of Mr. Hume, and, what is still more interesting, to the secret encouragement of the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin. The Viceroy, it appears, had stipulated that his name in connection with the scheme of the Congress must not be made public. That is why

the Viceroy's personal share in the scheme was not known for a long time. The matter received publicity for the first time in 1898 when the first President of the Congress, Mr. Bonnerji, pointedly referred to it in one of his published writings. There is a further corroboration of this matter in a published statement of Sir William Wedderburn, another ex-President. Thus, two Congress Presidents have borne testimony to the surprising fact that the Congress came into being at the instance of a British Viceroy. Evidently, the Congress was meant to be the long-awaited counter-poise to possible Russian intrigue in India. The growing indications of political discontent culminating in the country-wide propaganda started by Mr. Surendranath Banerjea and his Indian Association, and also the Ilbert Bill episode which stirred up bitter racial feelings in India convinced Mr. Hume and Viceroys like Ripon and Dufferin that unless the Indian agitation was diverted to constitutional channels, there was the obvious danger that this might serve as a direct inducement to Russia in her ambitious designs. The potential conspirators and disloyalists could be prevented from becoming a tool of Russia, only if a pro-British Indian organisation was created with the support of Indian public opinion.

It is worthy of note that Sir William Wedderburn later explicitly corroborated the fact that the foundation of the Congress was a move to safeguard India against the menace of Russian invasion. According to him the Russian authorities in Central Asia depended for success in all their schemes for the invasion of India "on a hoped-for rising of the native population". In the course of his presidential address at the fifth session of the Congress held at Bombay in 1889, Sir William Wedderburn made a statement which has so far escaped the attention of historians. This statement reveals that in 1885 when the Congress was founded in all haste, the Russians were planning or at least pretending to plan an attack in the hope that the Indians might rebel against the British Government. Wedderburn suggested that the birth of the Congress discouraged the Russian designs. It may be pointed out that he mentioned this to emphasise the utility of the Congress.

"In 1885", he said, "they (Russians) appear to have put this idea to the test by a pretended advance. Had this move been followed by any signs of sympathy, or even by an ominous silence

of expectancy throughout India, Russia would have felt our position weakened. But India does not treat England's difficulty as her opportunity. On the contrary, there went up on all sides a patriotic cry calling on all to join with men and money and make a common cause against the common foe".

As was expected by the sponsors, the Congress became in its early years a platform for anti-Russian and pro-British propaganda. A few instances of such propaganda may be cited here. The first President, Mr. Bonnerji, asserted in 1885 that there were "no more thoroughly loyal" well-wishers of the British Government than the Congress leaders. The second President, Mr. Naoroji warmly eulogised the character of British rule, and said in the course of his speech in 1886, "Let us speak out like men and proclaim that we are loyal to the backbone (Cheers). The third President, Mr. Tyabji, went one step further and openly decried Russian designs on India. He warned the Congress session of 1887 that if India came under Russia, the people would have "nothing but a haughty and despotic government, whose chief glory would consist in vast military organisation, aggression upon our neighbours, and great military exploits". This remark was greeted with loud applause. The fourth President, Mr. Yule, likewise emphasised in 1888 the beneficent character of British rule and hoped for an enduring connection between "the two extreme branches of the Aryan race". The fifth President, Wedderburn, as has already been mentioned, went out of his way to preach pro-British and anti-Russian sentiments. He cautioned his audience in 1889 not to exchange "the rule of England, the freest and the most enlightened country in the world, for that of Russia which is one of the most barbarous and retrograde". The sixth President Mr. Mehta, declared in 1890:—

"I have unbounded faith in the living and fertilising principles of English culture and English civilisation".

Another President, Mr. Surendranath Banerjea, declared with his usual oratorical flourish:

"I have heard of this Russian invasion since the days of my childhood. The Russians have not come. If they do come, they will find the multitudinous races and peoples of India united as one man ready to die for the Sovereign".

Mr. Sankaran Nair, the President for 1897, dilated on the blessings of British rule, and warned his listeners that if British rule ever declined, there would be "anarchy, war and rapine". He added significantly, "And we have Russia and France waiting for their opportunities".

These presidential pronouncements would go to establish the fact that the Congress was originally intended to be a bulwark of British rule in India. The early leaders fulfilled this cherished expectation by making an ostentatious exhibition of their unswerving loyalty to the British sense of justice in unequivocal terms, and even boasted that they were not seditionists. They repeatedly proclaimed year after year that they aimed at making the bonds between England and India "a blessing to themselves and the whole world". Such flamboyant expressions of loyalty must have at times proved embarrassing to those for whom it was meant. It was clear, however, to all concerned that the Congress was ushered into existence to mobilise the public opinion in favour of the British connection, sing the praises of Pax Britannica and counteract the possibility of Russian intrigue in India.

Strange as it might seem, the old loyalist Congress worked up later to its own transformation, and, like the legendary Phoenix burnt itself into ashes in Mahatma Gandhi's non-co-operation movement whence to be re-born as the spearhead of India's freedom movement. The story of this transformation forms one of the most stirring chapters in Modern Indian History.

Wellesley and the Conquest of Orissa

BY

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Cornwallis failed to acquire Orissa through diplomacy. As soon as Wellesley became the Governor-General of India he revived the same old policy of entering into negotiations with the Raja of Nagpur to that end. On 16th April, 1800, Colonel Kirkpatrick, Secretary to the Government, wrote to Colebrooke, the Resident at Nagpur, that the Company desired the acquisition of Cuttack "for an equivalent in money or otherwise" and asked him to influence the Court of Nagpur to that effect.¹

At the same time a proposal was brought before the Raja of Nagpur for the establishment of a British subsidiary force in his territories. The Resident was told that the Governor-General "would readily accept a security for the payment of the subsidy of the troops and even prefer to any other arrangement an assignment of such part of the province of Cuttack as should be adequate to the purpose, and should place under the management of the Company such a tract of the territory as should establish the continuity of their dominions from Bengal to Northern Circars".² But the negotiations proved a failure, partly because of the Raja of Nagpur's apprehension of losing his independence by maintaining a British force and partly because of his resentment at the British alliance with the Nizam of Hyderabad, a country which had so long been subject to Maratha plunder.³ It now appeared to the Governor-General that nothing short of a war would give him an opportunity to fulfil his cherished desire.

On 27th June, 1803, the Governor-General wrote to Arthur Wellesley, "From the Raja of Berar I wish to acquire the whole

1. 16 April 1800, Government to Colebrooke, Y. M. Kale, (ed.), Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. V, p. 48.

2. *Ibid.*

3. T. E. Colebrooke, Life and Essays of H. T. Colebrooke, Vol. I, pp. 118-22.

province of Cuttack so as to unite the Northern Circars by a continued line of sea coast with Bengal. This cession including Balasore, etc., to be made either absolutely or upon payment of a moderate rent or as a security for a subsidiary force to be introduced into the dominions of the Raja of Berar". He further instructed Arthur Wellesley that in the event of a war with the Raja of Berar this object could be easily achieved; he should not make peace with the Raja unless Orissa was secured.⁴

It may be remembered that on 31st December 1802, the treaty of Bassein was signed by the Peshwa and the British as a consequence of which the Peshwa was obliged to accept a subsidiary alliance. This was a cause for resentment amongst the Maratha chiefs, particularly Sindhia and Raghuji. Having collected an army at Ujjain, Sindhia crossed the Narmada; Raghuji approached Sindhia's camp at Chikhli and on 4th June there was a junction of the confederate forces but they avoided any open rupture with the British.⁵

On 18th July Arthur Wellesley demanded that Raghuji and Daulat Rao Sindhia should immediately retire from the Nizam's frontier near Ajanta. On 1st August, the Governor-General-in-Council reported to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors that he had made arrangements for the occupation of Cuttack,⁶ explaining that "By the reduction of Cuttack in Orissa, an effectual blow would be struck against the Raja of Berar's resources; the only maritime territory of the Marathas on the eastern side of the peninsula of India, would be secured from all intercourse with the French, a valuable addition would be made to our revenue and a strong barrier added to the frontier of Bengal against predatory incursions; the intercourse between Bengal and the territories of Fort St. George would also be protected from interruption."⁷

War was declared against the Maratha confederates on 3rd August. Colonel Campbell of His Majesty's 74th regiment, com-

4. Bengal papers relative to the Maratha war in 1803, p. 185.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 181.

6. 1 August 1803, Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, M. Martin, (ed.), the Despatches, minutes and correspondence of the Marquis Wellesley, Vol. III, pp. 225-6.

7. Bengal papers relative to the Maratha war in 1803, p. 235,

manding the northern division of the army of Fort St. George, had already been directed to prepare for an invasion of Cuttack.

On 21st August he was told to invade because it was thought that during the absence of the Raja of Berar from the centre of his dominions, the seizure of a place as celebrated as Jagannath would produce an early impression on the minds of the confederate chieftains.⁸ W. Thorn rightly remarked, "the occupation of the maritime district of Cuttack formed a principal part of the general plan of attack against the confederates".⁹

The plan of invasion consisted in the movement and joint operation of forces from four different directions from Ganjam, Kedi-gree, Jaleswar and Midnapur.

First, the main force under Campbell consisting of about 1,500 native troops assembled at Ganjam. In addition, a detachment of two companies of His Majesty's 22nd regiment with artillery was detached from Bengal by sea. The British were so sure of success that they appointed John Melville, Civil Commissioner for the settlement of the revenue at Cuttack. Captain Blunt an engineer who had some local knowledge of the country, accompanied them.¹⁰

In view of the military equipment and arrangement directed against Cuttack, there was no fear of any successful resistance on the part of the Marathas, but the Governor-General wanted a peaceful surrender of the province. From the character of the Maratha administration it appeared probable that the Maratha officers might be induced to surrender the province in return for pensions or donations of money from the British Government. Letters were therefore addressed to Bungaji Pandit, under whose management lay ten-sixteenths of the province and Harbansa Ray who managed

8. 21 August 1803, Clive Governor of Madras to Campbell, Bengal Secret and Political consultations, 29 Dec. 1803, No. 181.

9. W. Thorn, *Memoir of the War in India*, p. 253. Sir William Thorn was born in 1781; joined the 29th Light Dragoons in India 1799; served in the Maratha war under Lord Lake 1803; at Laswari 1 November 1803; in the capture of Mauritius 1810 and of Java 1811 and Palambang in Sumatra 1812; returned to England 1814; one of his other works is "Memoir of the conquest of Java"; C. E. Buckland, *Dictionary of Indian Biography*, p. 423.

10. 3 August 1803, Govt. to Melville, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 1; Add. MSS. 13608, pp. 2-4 (same letter as above).

the rest of the country;¹¹ both Campbell and Melville were authorised to open negotiations with them. Considering that a considerable portion of the province of Cuttack was occupied by chieftains, many of whom acknowledged no superior authority or were merely tributary to the Maratha State, they were instructed to negotiate engagements on similar terms with such chieftains as possessed the means of embarrassing the progress of the British force.¹²

Campbell and Melville were instructed that they "should employ every possible precaution to preserve the respect due to the temple of Jagannath and to the religious prejudices of the Brahmans and pilgrims".¹³ To persuade the Brahmans at Puri that they could have confidence in placing the temple under British administration, a letter was obtained from Jagannath of Tribeni, the oldest and the most eminent of the Pandits in Bengal to Ram Chand and other Brahmans residing at Jagannath which recommended that "they need not be afraid to form connection with the British Government, which is distinguished for peculiar benevolence to its subjects". This letter was transmitted to Campbell to deliver to them at a suitable time.¹⁴

On 30th August, news having been received that Maratha reinforcements from Nagpur were expected, another detachment consisting of 500 Bengal native volunteers, commanded by Captain Dick, which had first been intended for the occupation of the port of Balasore, was sent with some additional battering guns to reinforce the main body of troops at Ganjam.¹⁵

11. 3 September 1803, Govt. to Melville and Campbell, Add. MSS. 13608, pp. 13-4; 7 September 1803, Govt. to Bungaji Pandit and Harbansa Ray, Bengal Secret Persian correspondence (trans.) Letters sent 1803, Nos. 123 and 124.

12. 3 September 1803, Govt. to Melville and Campbell, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 11.

13. 9 September 1803, Govt. to Melville and Harcourt, Add. MSS. 13608, p. 13.

14. Encl. 3 September 1803, Govt. to Melville and Campbell, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1 March 1804, No. 12A; Abstract of the contents of the letter from Jagannath of Triveni to priests at Jagannath, Bengal Secret Persian Correspondence (trans.), Letters Received 1803, No. 180.

15. 31 August 1803, Govt. to Campbell, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 51; 30 August 1803, Govt. to Harcourt, Add. MSS. 13608, p. 11.

The reason why the main force was despatched from Ganjam was to enable it to reach Cuttack quickly, take the fort of Barabati, the chief Maratha stronghold and then to send a detachment to secure the Barmul Pass, which was called "the key or the western gate of Orissa", because it occupied a strategically defensible position through which the Maratha entered Orissa. It appeared that several advantages would be derived from the occupation of that important pass. First it would probably attract the attention of the Government of Berar and induce them to detach a force towards the pass in order to keep the British troops in check. This would diminish their means of opposition to any attack which might be directed by the British from Allahabad and Hyderabad. Secondly, it would establish the security of the province of Cuttack by closing it against predatory Maratha attacks from that quarter. Thirdly, it would enable the British to complete their arrangements for an invasion of Berar from the side of Cuttack and transport troops and equipment without difficulty to the western extremity of the pass.¹⁶

After collecting provisions, Campbell marched from Ganjam. But high fever endangered his life. He was therefore carried back to Ganjam and Lieutenant Colonel Harcourt of His Majesty's 12th regiment proceeded to Prayagi. There he took command of the troops on 11th September.¹⁷ At this place he heard from a Brahman that "the Brahmans at the holy place consulted and applied to Jagannath to inform them what power was now to have this temple under his protection and that he had given a decided answer that the British Government was in future to be his guardian".¹⁸ He utilised this as a divine message worth communicating in his letters to numerous chiefs and zamindars, in order to encourage them to submit to the British authority.¹⁹ Although

16. Add. MSS. 13608, pp. 151, 155-6, (a memorandum sent to Harcourt, no date or author).

17. 1 November 1804, Governor-General in Council to the Court of Directors, Bengal Military Letters Received, 11 August 1803, 24 January 1805, Vol. I, pp. 538-9; 11 September 1803, Harcourt to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 55.

18. 11 September 1803, Melville to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 13.

19. 19 September 1803, Melville to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 14.

no treaty had yet been made with the Marathas, Sayid Rahimutullah, a Munshi acting on Melville's instruction, circulated report amongst the people of Cuttack that the Maratha chief had delivered up the country to the British in writing.²⁰

On the other hand, the Maratha Government at Cuttack offered to all the tributary Rajas to relinquish a whole year's revenue if they would assist in preventing the British from obtaining the possession of the province. But there was no response.²¹ The Marathas also made other defence arrangements. The Maratha chief at Balasore was appointed to the command of forces stationed at Guzurghat, Narasingpur, Ramachandrapur, Khathipur in Mayurbhanj and Phulwar Pass, which in all consisted of more than 1000 matchlockman, 100 horse and a number of Paiks.²² It appears that he was in charge of guarding the northern frontier of Orissa from British attack. One detachment consisting of 3,000 cavalry and infantry under the command of Balaji Kunar crossed the Mahanadi and took post on the north bank. He occasionally circulated a report that he would invade Bengal. Another detachment was placed in the fort of Barabati in Cuttack. A third under the command of Dharam Rai Pandit was posted at Piplipur (Pipli) to oppose the British army from the south. 3000 Maratha troops were also reported to have left Cuttack with the intention of disputing the passage of Harcourt at Manikpatna.²³

When Harcourt reached Mithakua on 13th September, the reported strength of the Marathas marching towards Manikpatna rose to 5,000 infantry. But when Harcourt fired a volley with blank cartridges the Maratha force intended to oppose his passage fled away. The British force took possession of Manikpatna on 14th September.²⁴ Fateh Muhammad the Maratha officer commanding the south-west frontier of Cuttack, agreed to the proposed

20. Encl. 24 September 1803, Lieutenant Col. Archibald Ferguson, Commanding a detachment on the bank of the Subarnarekha to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 191.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Add. MSS. 13609, pp. 43-5 (a report from Bhagaban Naik, Kotwal of the Company's factory at Balasore, no date).

23. Encl. 24 September 1803, Ferguson to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 191.

24. 13 September 1803, Harcourt to Government, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 56.

terms offered by Harcourt.²⁵ He sent his brother to the British camp. His brother accompanied the British force for some distance and helped them considerably by his local knowledge.²⁶

By the time the British force reached Narasingpatna on 17th September, they faced some difficulty in transporting adequate stores and provisions by land. It had been thought that they might be carried by water to Cuttack. But now it was found that the boats had to be unloaded owing to the shallowness of the water. In view of these obstacles the idea of transporting anything further by water was abandoned.²⁷ Moreover four-fifths of the road through which the detachment would have to pass belonged to the Raja of Khurda. What was apprehended most was that the Raja might be in secret alliance with the Maratha Government.²⁸ Therefore, Harcourt discussed the matter with Melville. Melville suggested that the Raja should be requested to afford every assistance to the British to expedite the advance of the stores, baggage and artillery and send 3,000 fighting men to co-operate with them to expel the Marathas, for which he should be paid one lakh of rupees. This proposal was accepted by Harcourt. Accordingly, a letter was written to the Raja to that effect. As a result the Raja helped the British.²⁹

From Narasingpatna Harcourt moved to Puri, passing through highly cultivated country. He took possession of the city on 18th September. A very conciliatory attitude was shown to the people here. A guard of Hindus was stationed in the temple of Jagannath. Measures were taken to give the Brahmans and the chief officers of the temple confidence in the British administration.³⁰

Then Lieutenant Ogilvie commanding a detachment of 2nd battalion of the 17th regiment Madras native infantry was directed

25. 17 September 1804, Harcourt to M. Shawe, Private Secretary to Wellesley, Add. MSS. 13609, p. 68.

26. 19 September 1803, Melville to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 14.

27. 3 October 1803, Melville to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 17.

28. 5 November 1803, Harcourt to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 28.

29. 3 Oct., 1803, Melville to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 28.

30. 18 September 1803, Harcourt to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 59.

to take post at Manikpatna because it commanded the passage of a river and was the chief means of entrance into the province to the southwards; it was also important as commanding a convenient landing place. He was instructed to protect that part of the country from Maratha predatory raids and to forward with proper escorts such stores and treasures as might be sent from Ganjam for the troops under Harcourt.³¹

A force was placed under the command of Major Fletcher,³² who was ordered to remain at Jagannath. He was directed to post sentries on the road to Cuttack as a precautionary measure against the Marathas. He was to keep a watch on what was passing to the southwards of the Pagoda.³³

Some stores which Harcourt found it impracticable to carry with him were left at Jagannath. Then he proceeded in the direction of Ahmadpur, crossing the rising nalas and rivers with great difficulty.³⁴ The Marathas attempted to harass the British force on the way, but after a few skirmishes here and there they were driven off by the advanced guard under Captain Hutchinson of the 20th Bengal regiment. The Marathas lost twenty men. On the British side only three were wounded. The bad weather and the inundated state of the country together with the attack of the Maratha foraging party delayed the passage of the heavy guns and baggage for five days before Harcourt reached Birapurussottampur.³⁵ In view of these difficulties a force was detached under Hutchinson to occupy a position near Mukundapur. As soon as he left the camp he was confronted with serious opposition from the Maratha forces, both horse and infantry, on his flank. The charge of the Marathas was so vigorous that Hutchinson could save his position only by a heavy discharge of grape shot from six pounders. This dispersed the Marathas. On the British side 21 were wounded and two killed.³⁶

31. 21 September 1803, Harcourt to Ogilvie, Add. MSS. 13609, p. 80.

32. Robert Fletcher, Captain, 17th Regiment, Madras Native Infantry.

33. 20 September 1803, Harcourt to Fletcher, Add. MSS. 13609, pp. 84-5.

34. 19 September 1803, Harcourt to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 60.

35. 4 October 1805, Harcourt to Shawe, Add. MSS. 13609, p. 100; 27 September 1803, Harcourt to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 62.

36. 24 October 1803, Harcourt and Melville to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 80.

The next resistance to the British force was offered by the Marathas on 4th October when the advance guard under Colonel Clayton³⁷ was marching to Mukundapur. But well-directed fire from the British guns forced the Marathas to retreat towards Balakati. In this skirmish the British loss was one pioneer wounded.³⁸

From Balakati the Marathas took shelter in the fort of Barabati, situated on the north of the island-like Cuttack and commanding to the northward the Mahanadi and the ferry.³⁹

Soon after his arrival at Cuttack, Harcourt took possession of the fort of Lalbag, which was on the south side of the 'island' and covered the town which lay between it and the fort of Barabati. This fort also commanded occasionally the ferry and always the ford over the Kathjuri river which "bounds the Island to the Southward as the Mahannaddy does to the northward". Then he pitched camp 1,000 yards in front of the south face of Barabati from which the Marathas were very weakly firing at his camp.⁴⁰

Harcourt in consultation with Melville was prepared to take the fort by negotiation by paying the garrison upto half a lakh of rupees. But he received no response from the Marathas. So arrangements were made to besiege the fort. All the boats on the Mahanadi were assembled and an officer was placed over them with instructions to prevent the Marathas from throwing supplies to the garrison.⁴¹ A spot was fixed at a distance of 500 yards from the outer gate of the fort. A battery was completed on 13th October and a twelve pounder, two howitzers and two six pounders were placed in it. After a heavy fire the Maratha guns were silenced at 11 O'Clock in the forenoon, and most of the defences on the south face of the fort were taken off. Clayton had to pass over a narrow bridge with one six pounder and a party of artillery men. He ultimately succeeded in blowing up the

37. Thomas William Clayton, Lieutenant Colonel, 18th Bengal Native Infantry.

38. 24 October 1803, Harcourt and Melville to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 80.

39. 29 October 1803, Harcourt to Shawe, Add. MSS. 13609, p. 162.

40. 11 October 1803, Harcourt to Shawe, Add. MSS. 13609, p. 102.

41. 11 October 1803, Harcourt to Shawe, Add. MSS. 13609, p. 102; 13 October 1803, Melville to Harcourt, Add. MSS. 13609, p. 123.

wicket only after being exposed for forty minutes to a heavy and ill-directed fire of musketry from the Marathas inside the fort. No sooner was this work complete than a storming party entered singly with much boldness into the fort proceeding in two different directions although it had to face desperate resistance from the hands of the enemy in the defence of the inner gates. The Marathas fled leaving three elephants and 120 guns of different calibres behind in the fort.⁴² While some of them were making efforts to escape they were drowned in the ditch.⁴³

Meanwhile, Harcourt carried on negotiations with Shiva Prasad, a Hindu chief at the head of a corps of infantry, who were considered by the Marathas as amongst their best troops; he was ultimately successful in detaching him from the Marathas, and utilised his services in taking possession of the fort of Sarangagarh.⁴⁴

Secondly it was decided to send a detachment to Balasore from Calcutta by sea. The object of sending this force was first to induce a Maratha force to be detached in that direction, which would facilitate the progress of the army under Harcourt to Cuttack, and secondly to open communications between Jaleswar and Balasore and between Balasore and Cuttack which would coordinate the actions of the British forces against the Marathas on both the north and the south of Balasore. For this purpose Captain Morgan of the 15th Bengal native infantry was appointed to the command of a force consisting of five companies of volunteers 500 men, one artillery officer, thirteen artillery men with guns, lashkars and artificers, and one assistant surgeon.⁴⁵ The Governor-General had been informed that a considerable number of Pathan adventurers from the British possessions were employed in the military service

42. 15 October 1803, Harcourt to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 70; 27 October 1803, Harcourt to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 90.

43. 15 October 1803, Harcourt to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 70.

44. 27 September 1803, Harcourt to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 62.

45. 6 September 1803, Government to Morgan, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 209; 4 September 1803, Govt. to Morgan, Add. MSS. 13608, p. 96.

of the Maratha Government at Cuttack. He wanted to induce them to desert⁴⁶; with this in view, a Muhammadan Subahdar belonging to the bodyguard of the Governor-General was ordered to act under the orders of Captain Grant, who accompanied Morgan.⁴⁷ Morgan was instructed to use force should he fail to obtain possession of Balasore by amicable means. He was ordered to be cautious, not to interrupt such pilgrims passing to and from Jagannath. Considering the difficult navigation of the Balasore river Mathew Wright an experienced pilot was ordered to attend him.⁴⁸

Morgan with the fleet⁴⁹ of transport left Kedegree on 14th September and reached the Nilgiri hills in the afternoon of the 17th at a distance of about sixteen miles from the bar of the river at Balasore. Because of adverse winds, he could not reach this place as early as he had expected.⁵⁰

The bar at the entrance of the river had ordinarily only two feet of water at low tide and ten feet at high tide, and was considered unsafe for larger vessels without the assistance of the

46. 6 September 1803, Govt. to Morgan Add. MSS. 13608, p. 105.

47. 6 September 1803, Govt. to Morgan Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 209; 7 September 1803, Govt. to Morgan, Add. MSS. 13608, pp. 109-110.

48. 4 September 1803, Govt. to Morgan, Bengal and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 208; same letter as above, Add. MSS. 13608, pp. 97, 101.

The original idea for sending a force by sea to Balasore was explained by Harcourt to the Governor-General in Council and accepted on 19 August 1803. This expedition was considered to be most secret. During the preparations for it the letters from John Shore, Secretary, Marine Board, to Harcourt were sent without mentioning the name of the place; only a long line was drawn in the letters in place of Balasore. In one of his letters Harcourt wrote to the Military Secretary to the Governor-General "if you will be kind enough to call me at the Govt. House this morning (25 August) we will settle the whole business; you will, of course, not mention anything which will tend to the discovery of the destination of this little expedition (Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 27 October 1803, No. 59).

49. It consisted of Alexander, George, Charles, Fairlie, Lizard, Anne and two long boats (Letter, 4 October, Shore to E. Lowes, Commander of Company's Cruiser Feighmouth, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 27 October 1803.

50. 20 September 1803, Morgan to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 218; 22 September 1803, Morgan to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 219.

local pilots who had some knowledge of the depth of the water.⁵¹ So Wright on the morning of the 18th, went out to explore the bar and wished to obtain a native pilot if possible. He came as near as Balaramgarhi house, where there was a Maratha post of infantry. The Marathas suspected the identity of the party headed by Wright and they fired into their boat but without causing any injury. The party thus managed to return to their place of anchorage. Later on, with the help of Pike, the pilot from the *George*. Wright was successful in finding a channel for the transport. Leaving the two large vessels, *Alexander* and *Anne*, at anchor, other transports moved on the 19th. They all crossed the bar at a favourable flood tide, except one of them, the *Lizard*, which was deeply laden. Two of the six pounders and a number of the detachment from her were taken off and placed in one of the long boats. Then the party entered the Balasore river and anchored nearly opposite the Balaramghari House on the 20th.⁵²

Some of the inhabitants of the villagers near the entrance of the river approached the vessels; they supplied native pilots. The fleet proceeded up the river but, owing to the darkness of the night and a very heavy fall of rain, they were forced to anchor for that day.⁵³

The next day (21st morning) it was reported that a party of Marathas who had been posted at the ghats between the river and Jaleswar were making rapid marches either to defend the town of Balasore or to destroy it. At this Morgan and Grant left the transport behind. They took with them six pounders and as many fighting men as a few boats could hold, and went up the river for two hours till they reached a clear spot of ground, where they were informed that it was only four miles by land to Balasore. Here Morgan consulted Grant. Both agreed that the enemy should be attacked without waiting for the guns. Accordingly with nearly 300 rank and file they landed from the boats. Then after crossing

51. 19 August 1803, Shore to Harcourt, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 27 October 1803, No. 58.

52. 20 September 1803, Morgan to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 218; 22 September 1803; Morgan to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 219.

53. 20 September 1803, Morgan to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 218.

over paddy fields inundated from one to three feet in water they halted at the town of Balasore.⁵⁴

Meanwhile, the Marathas had put Moro Pandit, the faujdar of Balasore, into confinement in the Maratha fort outside the town because he had been attempting to go over to the British in consequence of their intrigue with him. Now, in order to resist the attack of the enemy, they advanced on a place where the ground was elevated and commanding. The inner space contained several spacious buildings well-adapted to the accommodation of troops, perfectly dry and sufficiently large to receive from 400 to 500 men.⁵⁵ This continuous long defile stretching from the entrance of the town upto the neighbourhood of the factory house was cleverly lined by the Maratha cavalry and infantry in order to oppose the march of the British into the town and the factory house.⁵⁶

A British advance party was ordered to move on the Marathas. But they opened fire on it. So a flanking party was detached to assist the British advance in consequence of which, well-directed fire poured on the Marathas from both the parties, which drove them from their first positions; ten to twelve of them fell to the ground. Finding the British detachment moving forward the Marathas as a desperate last attempt poured fire on it from the entrance of the lanes, from the tops of the houses and from behind the walls and heights. Yet the detachment continued to proceed on its way and returned a spirited fire at intervals. Then it took possession of the factory house. Soon parties were posted in all directions outside it to ward off the Marathas. The Marathas sniped at the British for some time; they then moved towards the south. Grant tried to seduce a party of Pathan horse from the Maratha detachment but without success.⁵⁷

After the Maratha departure a part of the outside of the town called the Maratha fort was brought under the British

54. 22 September, 1803, Morgan to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 219; Same letter as above, Calcutta Gazette, Thursday 3 November 1803, pp. 260-1 (I.O.C., Vol., Year 1803).

55. 23 September 1803, Morgan to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 220.

56. 22 September 1803, Morgan to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 219.

57. *Ibid.*

possession. It was found that the Marathas had left there three old unserviceable guns on decayed carriages, one that appeared to be a six pounder, a small quantity of grain of different kinds and two chests with papers relating to the administration.⁵⁸

Soon after occupying the town of Balasore, Morgan sent a detachment against a party of Marathas; but they evaded it. On 26th September, there was a rumour that a party of Marathas, hiding in some part of Balasore were determined to burn and plunder the town; further it was learnt that a large body of Marathas had been encamped at the village of Ramnath eight miles from Balasore.⁵⁹ In order to reassure public opinion Lieutenant Tanner,⁶⁰ at the head of a small detachment was ordered to proceed to that village. Before he reached the place the weather had cleared up; so a large body of Marathas who had been encamped there had left on the 26th and marched to a small fort called Deoghur in a jungle about seven miles from Bamanaghati. So Tanner with his men returned to Balasore.⁶¹

Meanwhile the dak to the south of Balasore was not able to pass Suranga. So to open communication between Balasore and Cuttack, two companies, under the command of Captain Slye⁶² were sent in that direction;⁶³ Slye reached Haetierpur. He left it on 29th September; encamped at Begunia the next day, where he was informed that the Marathas had left the town and were encamped about two miles to the south. He marched on and gave the Marathas, consisting of 500 foot, a surprise attack on 1st October. After a short resistance the Marathas abandoned their position. Fifteen or twenty of them were killed or wounded. Five were taken prisoner.⁶⁴

58. *Ibid.*

59. 27 September 1803, Morgan to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 224.

60. Henry Tanner, Captain, 24th Bengal Native Infantry.

61. 17 September 1803, Tanner to Morgan, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 225.

62. Charles Slye, Captain, 28th Bengal Native Infantry.

63. 28 September 1803, Morgan to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March, 1804, No. 226.

64. 30 September 1803, Slye to Morgan, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 228.

By the time he reached Damnagar, he received news that between 2,000 and 3,000 Marathas had assembled at Suranga. The country there was covered with jungles and had a road generally no more than a narrow defile. With a small detachment he was not prepared to risk a fight. He wrote to Morgan for reinforcements;⁶⁵ in response to his letter, Ensign Scot, at the command of a company passing through Begunia, joined him;⁶⁶ the combined force now took possession of Suranga the Marathas left it and fled towards Bhadrakh.⁶⁷

At Suranga one of the Sepoys belonging to the British detachment informed Slye that Maratha forces to the number of 2,000 horse and foot were collected at a place called Jajpur about fourteen coss towards the south and situated on the bank of a large nala which was there fordable. Slye desired some verification of this news. So he sent Chait Sing and Baku Sing, two sepoy of his detachment in the disguise of fakirs to Jaipur.⁶⁸ They returned with the news that the forces amounted to 500 well-mounted horse and 600 irregular foot. They also added that they heard from the Maratha camp that a force consisting of 10,000 men under Raghunath Bakhshi was on its way from Nagpur and within a few days' march from Cuttack. The Raja of Athgarh was proposing to send soldiers to assist the Marathas; some zamindars and rich people were in league with them to oppose the British.⁶⁹ But at the news of the advance of the British force under Harcourt from the south, the Marathas at Jajpur and on the north of the river Mahanadi fell back towards the river in the direction of the fort of Barabat. So Slye had no further encounter with the Marathas.⁷⁰

65. *Ibid.*

66. 2 October 1803, Morgan to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 228.

67. 3 October 1803, Morgan to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 231.

68. 6 October 1803, Slye to Ferguson, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 198.

69. 9 October 1803, Slye to Ferguson, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 202.

70. 9 October 1803, Ferguson to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 199.

Thirdly an attack was planned from Midnapur; so a force was ordered to be ready at Jaleswar under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson.⁷¹ Soon he was joined by a detachment from the Governor-General's body-guard, with guns, tumbrils, ammunition, draught, carriage, cattle and so on.⁷² He was instructed to have correspondence with the Commanding officer at Cuttack, not to interrupt the pilgrims going to the temple of Jagannath, and to be very conciliatory to the inhabitants of Orissa when he passed the Maratha frontier. The object of sending this detachment was, first to drive-out the Marathas from the immediate frontier of Bengal and the country between Balasore and Jaleswar and secondly to remove all obstacles on the way from Jaleswar to Cuttack and to reinforce the main force under Harcourt.⁷³

As soon as Ferguson received the intelligence of Morgan's possession of the town of Balasore, he moved in that direction to reach the place "within the shortest period of time". But owing to rain and bad weather his progress was hampered.⁷⁴ In consequence of the attack of the force under Morgan at Balasore the Marathas stationed at the ghats between Jaleswar and Balasore had fled.⁷⁵ So Ferguson without receiving any opposition from the Marathas arrived at Balasore. He left it on 10th October on his way to Cuttack. By the time he reached Suranga, he received the news of fall of the Barabati. His detachment finally reached Cuttack without opposition.⁷⁶

Fourthly, a plan was made for an immediate occupation of the Maratha territory on the north-east of the Subarnarekha which chiefly consisted of Pataspur, Shahbandur, Kamarda, Bhograi, Rajichand and Kirchand because they were long desired by the British for a natural boundary between Bengal and Orissa. There-

71. Archibald Ferguson, Colonel, 24 Bengal Native Infantry.

72. 17 September 1803, Ferguson to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 177.

73. 5 September, 1803, Govt. to Ferguson Add. MSS. 13608, No. 87, 90-2.

74. 28 September 1803, Ferguson to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 195.

75. 26 September 1803, Grant to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 195.

76. 7 December 1803, Morgan to Fenwick, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 149.

fore Colonel Fenwick⁷⁷ commanding at Midnapur was directed to take measures for that purpose.⁷⁸

It was apprehended that the Marathas with the help of the powerful zamindars on the border might make incursions into the Company's territory. Therefore Fenwick was instructed to encourage the zamindars on the frontier to oppose such an attack; similar instructions were also given to T. H. Ernst, the acting Magistrate at Midnapur.⁷⁹ Sumitra Dei, the Rani of Mayurbhanj, had lands both in Maratha and in the Company's territories. As a Company's tenant she was in arrears to the extent of Rs. 1600 owing to losses she had sustained from inundations during the last two years. Now the payment of these arrears was suspended by the order of the Governor-General.⁸⁰ Similar friendly intercourse was maintained with Jagannath Dhall of Dholbhum and other zamindars.⁸¹ Ernst, by a proclamation, offered the protection of the Company to such of the zamindars as might choose to become its subjects.⁸² Accordingly most of the zamindars in the Maratha territories either sought this protection or showed a more submissive attitude. But Ramanand Bhuyan of Jammukonda who had for some years created disturbances in Company's land remained adamant. Raghunath Paikara Bhuyan another zamindar of Kirchand who on many previous occasions had plundered the British territory was also not ready to listen to the British proclamation. Rather he preferred to be secure in his fort, which was said by Ernst to be "the strongest on the southern frontier".⁸³

77. John Fenwick, Colonel, 5th Bengal Native Infantry.

78. 16 July 1803, Government to Fenwick, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 29 December, 1803, No. 18C; 5 September, 1803, Government to Fenwick, Add. MSS. 13608, pp. 82-3.

79. 8 September 1803, Ernst to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 12 November 1803, No. 118; 17 September 1803, Govt. to Ernst, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 12 November 1803, No. 19.

80. 16 July, 1803, Govt. to Fenwick, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 29 December 1803, No. 18 C.

81. 17 September 1803, Govt. to Board of Revenue, Bengal Secret Political Consultations 12 November 1803, No. 120; 8 September 1803, Ernst to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 12 November 1803, No. 118.

82. 17 September 1803, Govt. to Ernst, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 12 November 1803, No. 119; 28 September 1803, Govt. to Ernst, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 12 November, 1803, No. 123.

83. 8 September 1803, Ernst to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 12 November 1803, No. 118.

On 23rd September, 1803, by order of Fenwick, Captain Lamb of the 5th regiment, at the head of a detachment proceeded to the Parganas Pataspur, Kamarda, Shahbandar and Bhograi, to establish the police daroghas and tahshildars appointed by Ernst.⁸⁴ Being frightened at the approach of the British force, Ramanand Bhuyan surrendered to Lamb; who made him prisoner and sent him to Midnapur. His forts were destroyed.⁸⁵

Another detachment under Lieutenant Cooper, was sent against Raghunath Paikara. All that belonged to him on both sides of the Subarnarekha was soon occupied. The bamboo fences surrounding the forts were burnt. The mud forts were at once delivered up. But Raghunath Paikara managed to retire with a few attendants into the thickest part of the jungle.⁸⁶

The whole of the Maratha territories on the north-east of the Subarnarekha was soon brought under British rule.

Thus the total number of troops employed for the conquest of Orissa amounted to 4,916 men. Out of this number some 3,041 constituted the main force which marched from Ganjam and 500 men under Dick reinforced the main force later; 52 including 21 artillery men formed a party under Morgan to occupy Balasore; 854 were ready at Jaleswar with a view to move whenever it would be necessary; 1,300 were stationed at Midnapur in order to render assistance to troops at Balasore and Jaleswar.⁸⁷

In consequence of the attack and march of the British troops from different sides whatever Marathas were found in the country fled away in fear. After the fall of the fort of Barabati, a party of the Marathas under Balaji Kunar, consisting of 200 horse and 300 foot, retreated towards Barmul Pass,⁸⁸ Major Forbes, at the

84. 24 September 1803, Fenwick to Govt. to Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 144.

85. 4 November 1803, Ernst to Fenwick, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 29 December 1803, No. 41; 17 November 1803, Govt. to Ernst, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 29 December, 1803, No. 42.

86. *Ibid.*

87. Bengal Papers relative to the Maratha war in 1803, p. 244.

88. Encl. 24 March 1804, M.S. Elphinstone, Resident at Nagpur to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 21 June 1804, No. 53.

head of a detachment was sent to chase them,⁸⁹ but they evaded him. He occupied the Barmul pass, and the entrance of the Marathas to Cuttack was closed. Now a commanding position was available to him to watch the behaviour of the hill Rajas in the vicinity. As this station was unhealthy it was arranged that the garrison of 500 men would be relieved from Cuttack every fortnight.⁹⁰

After securing possession of the country, the British stationed troops near the passes and at different strategic places to maintain order and prevent Maratha raids from any direction. First, a force consisting of 1,000 men exclusive of the Europeans was stationed on the island of Cuttack of which 300 formed the garrison for Lalbag, to be relieved weekly from the principal strength in Barabati. Secondly, the post established at Manikpatna was re-inforced. Thirdly it was arranged to maintain a regular force at Jagannath. Fourthly, a force of 300 men with a field six-pounder was placed at Pipli. Fifthly, the post established at Suranga was strengthened, a force of 300 to 400 men was stationed at Jaipur and Bhadrakh. Sixthly a post nearly of the same strength was established at Balasore. Seventhly, a strong detachment was stationed at Kendrapara, which commanded the most important points towards the sea, in order to check the Raja of Kujang and some subordinate chiefs in that part of the country.⁹¹

After completing these security measures, Harcourt posted the 9th Madras Native Infantry in the fort of Barabati. This consisted of about 450 men. Shiva Prasad's irregular corps gave him 100 more. To it he wished to add 400 or 500 Europeans, 140 troopers with gallopers, four six-pounders and two howitzers. With a force thus formed, he planned to proceed direct to Sonpur. From that place he wished to march along the Sambalpur route to secure the possession of Rattanpur and the valuable district of Chhatisgarh, because he thought their acquisition would afford security to the

89. 18 October 1803, Harcourt to Forbes, Resident at Nagpur to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 87.

90. 21 October 1803, Harcourt to Shawe, Add. MSS. 13609, p. 137.

91. 3 December 1803, Morgan to Govt., Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1804, No. 244; 7 December 1803, Morgan to Fenwick, Bengal Secret and Political Consultations, 1 March 1803, No. 249; 29 October 1803; Harcourt to Shawe, Add. MSS. 13609, pp. 162-70.

whole of the possessions of the British Government from Benares to Ganjam. In fact this was not done because peace was established shortly afterwards.⁹²

On 30th November, 1803, Jaswanta Rao Ramachandar, an ambassador of the Raja of Berar met Arthur Wellesley at a conference at Deogan for the conclusion of a peace. In the course of discussions of various points Arthur Wellesley said that he would require the province of Cuttack to be connected by a convenient frontier with the Company's other territories. The Vakil made no objection except to the point that "Jagannath was his (Raja's) own pagoda, he was desirous to retain it, that his honour was involved in this point". Arthur Wellesley replied that the whole province of Cuttack was absolutely necessary, that the Company had long been desirous to obtain this province in order that there might not be any break in communications between Calcutta and Madras and to take only half of it, or to allow the Raja to take half of it, would entirely defeat that great object.⁹³ The Vakil was now convinced on this point. The treaties were prepared during the night of 16th November, 1803. They were signed on 17th by both Arthur Wellesley and Jaswant Rao Ramachandar. The British occupation of Orissa was confirmed.⁹⁴

92. 1 December, 1803, Harcourt to Shawe, Add. MSS. 13609, pp. 217-8.

93. Home Miscellaneous, Vol. 623, pp. 86, 103.

94. Ibid, p. 111; proclamation, 9 January 1804, Bengal Secret Persian Correspondence (trans.) Letters Sent, 1804, No. 1.

Origin and Growth of Communal Tension in India

BY

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A close study of the history of India will show that our country had no occasion to suffer from any serious ailment—either communal or religious—in the past, during the long period of Muslim rule in India. Though nobody disputes the fact that some Muslim rulers had shown terrific fanatical zeal at times, yet, when judged from the larger point of view, it must be admitted that the Muslim conquerors, on the whole, adopted an attitude of toleration towards the Hindus and other communities. History fails to give even a single authentic instance when communal groups of Hindus, Muslims or Depressed classes in mass had been set against one another. Even as late as two hundred years ago, two generals fought gallantly for Nawab Serajuddaula. One was Mohanlal, a Hindu and the other was Mir Madan, a Muslim, owing allegiance to the same Nawab. Periodical reports used to be sent to the British Parliament from the year 1765—when the East India Company was given the right to collect revenues—right up to 1858 when the Company had to relinquish its control over India. If one is to cast a glance over the pages of these reports, one will fail to find any mention of organised disturbances either between the Caste Hindus and the Scheduled Castes or between the Hindus and the Muslims. We do not get any report of even a single incident of communal nature during the great Indian Revolt of 1857 known as the Sepoy Mutiny. What, then, was the basic cause of the communal tension in our country of which the present generation had the misfortune of seeing so much. A study of the growth of this poisonous tree of communalism in this land of Mahabir and Buddha, Asoka and Akbar will be both interesting and instructive.


To have a dispassionate view of the growth of communal tension in India, we are to study the activities of the East India Company and His Majesty's Government in relation to the two

major communities of India—the Hindus and the Muslims. In the declining days of the Mughal Empire, the East India Company tried to establish their sway over as many parts of India as possible and over the whole of India, if and when possible. To achieve this end, they did not fail to take the fullest advantage of the mutual strifes and bickerings among the independent native rulers in different parts of the country. Good 'banyas' as they were, they realised the obvious fact that in the market of India, it is vigilance and caution, rather than money, that would buy them a rich empire. They were always on the look-out lest the Indians should combine against the British. It was one of the chief aims of the Company to set one native ruler against another and so on. It was in pursuance of this aim that they set the Nizam against Arcot and Arcot against the Nizam, the Nizam against the Mahrattas and the Mahrattas against Tipu. It will not be wrong to maintain that it is on the basis of the rift thus created among the Indians that the Company founded and stabilized the British rule in this country. "Divide and Rule" was as effective a British policy in those days as it was in the days of Churchill, Amery and Linlithgow. And it will not be far from truth if it is contended that the history of communalism in India dates back to these black days of the East India Company. It is now an open secret that this mischievous British policy of instigating one prince against another at first and then one community against the other was the main cause, if not the sole cause, of rising communal unrest in India and it is equally true that this policy was initiated by the East India Company.

The Mutiny came in 1857. The Indians, Hindus as well as Muslims, rose in revolt against the British. Here it is not necessary to go into the details of this revolt. The causes of this Mutiny may be briefly and conveniently summed up by quoting the words of Dr. K. K. Dutta who writes, "The rapid expansion of the British dominion in India, attended as it was by the changes in the administrative system and modes of existence to which the people had been accustomed through long ages, disturbed the placid currents of Indian life and produced commotions in different parts of the country". It has already been stated that the two principal communities of India took equally active part in this great revolt and both suffered heavily and equally. The dissolution of the East India Company took place in 1858 and subsequently, the

Government of India was transferred to the British Crown. The assumption of the Government of India by the Sovereign of Great Britain was not accompanied by any remarkable change in the British policy towards the major communities of India excepting that their campaign of reprisal towards the Mussalmans, whom they thought to be their real enemies, was intensified many times. That the British policy underwent no notable change after the Mutiny of 1857 is evident from the writings of Lord Elphinstone who wrote in 1859, " 'Divide et Impera' is the old Roman motto and it should be ours". We can have a very clear idea of the British attitude towards the Hindu-Muslim question from an eloquent passage by Rai Bahadur Bejoy Behari Mukherji which runs as follows: "The widespread insurrection which was deliberately misnamed the 'Sepoy Mutiny' of 1857 led to ruthless atrocities on either side. In that mutiny Hindus and Muslims had joined forces without stint and declared Bahadur Shah—the descendant of the emperor of Delhi—as Emperor. The dangers of Hindu-Muslim unity to British rule was brought home to a section of ruling groups. A new psychology took hold of the British rulers. That psychology had two aspects. The one showed up the unity of the people of India as a danger to the existence of British rule in India and the consequent urgent necessity of creating schisms while the other, in which the spirit of vengeance and reprisal dominated, reacted by denying to Indians as a class all chances of growth and strength".

The mutiny of 1857 revealed to the British Government that the Muslims were their chief enemy, in India. This led them to purge indiscriminately the civil and military services of Mussalman officers, despite the fact that the Queen's Proclamation stated unequivocally that all, "of whatever race, creed or community, may be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service". The European inhabitants of Calcutta went to the length of submitting a petition to the authorities in England demanding the recall of Lord Canning only because the latter failed to support the anti-Muslim cry raised by the European community of India after the Sepoy Mutiny. The British Government also realised that one of the main causes of the Mutiny was the wonderful unity among its armed forces. In the words of Sir John Lawrence, "among the defects of the pre-mutiny army, unquestionably the worst, and one that operated most fatally against us, was the



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brotherhood and homogeneity of the Army ... " Now they re-organised their armed forces on the basis of communal and caste distinctions.

Here it should be borne in mind that though the hostile attitude of the ruling race against the Mussalmans rendered it impossible for them to continue in Government services, their utter lack of English education was also a very important factor working against their obtaining any Government employment. The Mussalmans realised this and it is then that Sir Syed Ahmad Khan came into the picture. Sir Syed was one who firmly believed that the Hindus and the Muslims constituted one nation which he called the Hindu Nation, both the communities being inhabitants of Hindusthan. He himself wrote: "The word 'nation' or 'qaum' applies to people who inhabit a country . . . Remember that Hindu and Mussalman are religious words; otherwise, Hindus, Mussalmans and even Christians who inhabit this country—all constitute, on this account, one nation. When all these groups are one nation, then whatever benefits the country, which is the country of all of them, should benefit all Now the time is gone when only on account of differences in religion the inhabitants of a country should be regarded as of two different nations. Just as the Aryan people are called Hindus, even so are also Mussalmans Hindus, that is to say, inhabitants of Hindusthan". Sir Syed was an ardent admirer of the English education and it is with a view to spreading it among the Mussalmans that he founded the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh which later developed into the Aligarh Muslim University. The English Principals who were appointed in this college successfully converted a staunch nationalist like Sir Syed Ahmad into a communalist. And every careful student of India's communal politics will be at one with Dr. Rajendra Prasad when he says that the history of Muslim politics of the following 15 or 20 years is a history of the activities of these shrewd Englishmen who managed to create the gulf which, with some interruptions, has gone on widening ever since.

As has been stated above, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was a staunch nationalist believing in the inherent and essential unity between the Hindus and the Muslims. Now, one Mr. Beck became the Principal of the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College in 1883. He came to Aligarh with the sole intention of making the Muslim

youths a very strong and effective instrument in the hands of the British Government for counteracting the swelling tide of nationalism whose torch-bearers were mostly Hindus. He exerted his mesmeric influence over the mind of Sir Syed Ahmad and successfully converted him to communalism. His sordid efforts to dissociate the Muslims from the great national organisation, the Indian National Congress, add a few black pages to the history of our national movement. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan used to edit a paper called the Institute Gazette. On his arrival at Aligarh, Mr. Beck took in his hands the editorial control of that paper though the name of Sir Syed continued to be published as the editor of the journal. It may be noted here that Sir Syed Ahmad was a great admirer of the Bengalis whom he called the standard-bearers in the national movement of India. In order to embitter Sir Syed's feelings towards the Bengalis, Mr. Beck began writing editorials in the Indian Gazette criticising the Bengalis. The latter thought that the articles were written by Sir Syed himself and therefore, naturally, they began to blame Sir Syed. Thus Mr. Beck succeeded in creating strained relations between the Bengalis and Sir Syed Ahmad. It was at this juncture that the first session of the Indian National Congress was held in Bombay in December 1885 under the presidency of a distinguished Bengali, W. C. Bannerji. This explains why Sir Syed did not join the Congress and this also shows up Mr. Beck as a diplomat of the first water. Sir Syed was so much under the influence of Mr. Beck and other English professors that he actually began to think that it would be against the best interests of the Mussalmans to join the Congress. In 1888, an organisation of the Hindus and Mussalmans called the United Indian Patriotic Association was established at Aligarh under the guidance of Mr. Beck. It is interesting to read the objects of this organisation which were: (1) to inform the members of Parliament and the people of England through newspapers and tracts that all the communities of India, the aristocracy and the Princes were not with the Congress and contradict its statements; (2) to keep the Parliament and the people of England informed about the opinions of Hindu and Muslim organisations which were opposed to the Congress; and (3) to help in the maintenance of law and order and the strengthening of the British rule in India and to wean away people from the Congress. After five years of its existence, this organisation was dissolved and a new organisation, exclusively for the Muslims, under

the grandiloquent name of Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental Defence Association of Upper India was started with almost the same objects as those of the former one. It should be remembered that the previous organisation was open both to the Hindus and the Muslims but now Mr. Beck thought that even in the work of strengthening the British rule, joint action by the Hindus and the Muslims was not desirable.

At this time, the British Government was intending to push on its forward policy on the Frontier and for this purpose, they wanted to augment the military expenditure which was vehemently opposed by the Congress. But, surprisingly enough, the newly-formed Mohammedan Defence Association which was a purely Muslim organisation wanted the Government to increase the military expenditure for this very purpose.

Thus Mr. Beck and other British members of the teaching staff of the Aligarh College were singularly successful in misguiding and misleading the larger section of the Indian Muslims. But it must be admitted at the same time that good sense prevailed among some of the most distinguished Muslim leaders of the time like Mr. Badruddin Tyabji, Mr. Ali Mohammad Bhimji and Mr. Rahamtullah Savani and they joined the national movement which found its expression in the Indian National Congress.

As a bolt from the blue, Lord Curzon's scheme for the partition of Bengal came in 1903 by which the shrewd Viceroy wanted to cut out Chittagong and Dacca divisions and tack them to the neighbouring province of Assam. This incensed Bengal and, later, the whole of India. The motive behind this move of Lord Curzon is best illustrated in the following words of Sir Henry Cotton: "The object of the measure was to shatter the unity and to disintegrate the feelings of solidarity which are established in the Province. It was no administrative reason that lay at the root of this scheme. It was a part and parcel of Lord Curzon's policy to enfeeble the growing powers and to destroy the political tendencies of a patriotic spirit." Commenting upon this scheme of Lord Curzon, the Statesman wrote in its editorial, "This move was designed to foster in Eastern Bengal the growth of Mohammadan power, which, it is hoped, will have the effect of keeping in check the rapidly growing strength of the Hindu community". This move

shows how the British Government took an active interest in making Bengal a hotbed of communalism which in those days was the centre and source of nationalism in the whole country.

In order to check the rising tide of nationalism, to prevent the Muslims from joining the movement started by the Congress and above all, to create a rift between the Mussalmans and other communities of India, the British Government induced the Muslims to demand separate political rights. As a result of this, a deputation of Muslims under the leadership of His Highness the Aga Khan waited on the Viceroy, Lord Minto, on October 1, 1906. The deputation presented a memorandum, drafted by Mr. Archbold, the then Principal of Aligarh College, to the Viceroy in which, inter alia, thanks were offered to the British authorities for "the steps that were going to be taken, in accordance with the settled policy of the Government, in the direction of self-government," but at the same time, apprehension was expressed that by introducing election injury would be done to the Mussalman minority, and the hope was expressed that in introducing the system of nomination or granting representation on religious basis, the opinion of Mussalmans would be given due weight. The Viceroy gave a reply, couched in honeyed language, assuring the deputationists that nothing would be done that might affect the Muslims adversely. The meeting of this deputation is, indeed, a landmark in the inglorious history of India's communal question, for it is then that the poisonous seed of the much-hated separate electorate was shown in India. The British Government considered it a first-class diplomatic achievement. An important British official wrote to Lady Minto in the following manner which reflects the great joy that the authorities felt at that time, "I must send Your Excellency a line to say that a very very big thing has happened to-day. A work of statesmanship that will affect India and Indian history for many a long year. It is nothing less than the pulling back of 62 millions of people from joining the ranks of the seditious opposition". The British Press in England highly commended the 'wisdom' of the Indian Muslims. The British papers were flooded with articles by important personages of England paying tributes to the so-called far-sightedness shown by the Mussalmans. "It appears from these articles", as Maulavi Tufail Ahmad rightly remarks, "how the English Press looked upon Indians being one nation with a sense of shock and heart-burning and how pleased they were to see it

broken into pieces and how proud they felt in setting the Indians against one another on the basis of religion and of creating lasting hostility between them."

In the wake of the Muslim deputation to the Viceroy, the All-India Muslim League was founded on the 9th November, 1906. It is a significant coincidence that another all-India organisation of a communal nature, the Hindu Mahasabha, was set up in the same year. Though communal in composition and outlook, the Muslim League, indignant at the tactics followed by the British Government in Turkey during the Tripoli and Balkan Wars, became a strong supporter of the Indian National Congress so much so that prominent Congress leaders like Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu and Mahatma Gandhi attended the sessions of the Muslim League and once even participated in its proceedings. During the Lucknow sessions of the Congress and the Muslim League in 1916 which were held simultaneously, an agreement was arrived at between the Congress and the League by which the former accepted separate electorates for the Muslims and allowed them representation much in excess of their population in the Provinces. This agreement was the famous Lucknow Pact. Mr. Mahammad Ali Jinnah, from the League side, put his signature on the pact while from the Congress side, all the top-ranking leaders approved of it. It is difficult to say how far the Congress was guided by the lofty ideals of nationalism in entering into this agreement.

The Great War ended in 1918 in favour of Britain and her allies. The Khilafat movement was started by the Mussalmans of India against the British Government in support of the Khalifa of Turkey which was a defeated nation. Under the guidance of Mahatma Gandhi, the Hindus wholeheartedly supported the Khilafat movement. At this time, agitation against the Rowlatt Bills was also going on in full swing which found its dreadful culmination in the Jallianwalla Bagh Massacre of 1919. It should be noted here that a large number of the victims of this ghastly tragedy were Muslims. The Khilafat movement and the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre brought about a wonderful unity of action between the Hindus and the Muslims in general and the Congress and the Muslim organisations in particular. The Khilafat days have added a glorious chapter to the annals of Hindu-Muslim unity in our country. The sessions of the Congress and the Muslim League

were being held at the same place and time for some years. The most distinguished Muslim leaders of the country like Maulana Hasrat Mohani, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. M. A. Ansari and the Ali Brothers began to preside over the sessions of the Congress and the Muslim League.

But this unity was not destined to last long. The Congress, in its annual session at Nagpur in 1920, passed a resolution in favour of non-violent non-co-operation with the British Government. This was not in conformity with the desires of the aristocratic leaders of the Muslim League. In the following year, that is, in 1921, the Muslim League, in its Ahmadabad session, decided that it was not possible for the League to lend its support to the non-co-operation programme adopted by the Congress, Jamiat-ul-Ulema and the Khilafat Committee. Analysing the causes that led the Muslim League to take this decision, Maulana Shibli writes, "The first foundation-stone of the League was the Simla deputation and whatever constitution may be given to it in the future, the spirit of the Simla deputation will continue in it. The first brick of the foundation of the League was wrongly laid, and whatever structure is raised on such a foundation is bound to fall out of the line. The politics of the League is only this—whatever rights and places are won by the Hindus, the share of the Mussalmans in them must be fixed. This is not real politics. Real politics is concerned with the demand of the people as against the Government On account of the lack of this strength a member of the Muslim League cannot be prepared to suffer any injury and does not find in himself any high determination or courage." This is the most correct analysis of the psychology of the League leaders. They were obsessed with the idea that any step against the British Government would be suicidal for the League and the Mussalmans.

The cold-blooded murder of Swami Shraddhanand in 1926 gave a fresh impetus to the settlement efforts of the communal question. The Congress and the Khilafat Committee contested the elections held in the year 1923 with a view to opposing the Government through the Legislatures. The Muslim members of the Central Legislature joined the Congress members in opposing the Treasury bills. Thus, though a good deal of communal tension existed outside in the country, a considerable amount of mutual understanding prevailed between the Hindu and Muslim members in the Central Legislature.

In March 1927, some Muslim leaders met in a conference in Delhi and jointly put forward the famous Muslim Proposals by which they consented to accept joint electorates for provincial and central Legislatures provided (i) Sindh was given the status of a separate province, (ii) N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan were treated on the same footing as the other provinces, (iii) the proportion of Muslim representation was in accordance with their population and (iv) in the Central Legislature, it was not less than one-third of the total.

These proposals, with some slight modifications, were substantially accepted by the Congress and a section of the League led by Mr. M. A. Jinnah. Though another wing of the League under the guidance of Sir Mian Mahammed Shafi virtually rejected the proposals, it appeared that a solution of India's communal problem was in the offing.

But that was not to be. The infamous Simon Commission was appointed in 1927 with no Indian member on it. The Indian political parties took it as an affront and almost unanimously decided to boycott the commission.

In the following year, the Nehru Committee's report was published which apprised the nation of the outlines of a future constitution of India as envisaged by the Committee. Unfortunately, Mr. Jinnah, the League leader, could not find it possible to agree to all the points in the report. The amendments suggested by him were not acceptable to the nationalist elements in the country.

The Congress declared in December 1928 that if the British Government did not accept the Nehru Report which demanded Dominion Status for India by the end of 1929, the Congress would insist on full independence or "Purna Swaraj". The British authorities gave no reply to the Congress demand. The First Round Table Conference was held in 1930, attended by Muslim and States representatives but no Congress leader attended it. This conference held that separate electorates were best suited for India.

The Second Round Table Conference was held in the following year, attended by Gandhiji as the sole representative of the Congress. This Conference ended in a fiasco. It failed to evolve a magic formula for eliminating communal evil from India's body politic.

Then came the Communal Award of 1932 imposing the curse of separate electorates on India. This award entitled Mohammedans, Europeans and the Sikhs to elect their representatives through separate communal electorates. Seats were reserved for the Depressed Classes, Indian Christians, Zamindars and women. Special seats were given to labour, commerce and industry, mining and planting, to be filled by the Chambers of Commerce. Divisions were made on the basis of religion, occupation and service. This was, no doubt, a very serious blow to Indian Nationalism. And it is equally true that this was a great triumph of the British Government's 'divide and rule' policy in India. The Communal Award of 1932 laid the foundation on which the vast edifice of 'the largest Muslim State' and 'the fifth biggest sovereign State of the world' has been built in 1947. While disclosing the provisions of the Award, the Secretary of State for India announced that if, before the new Government of India Act was passed, the various Indian communities could reach a general settlement of their own which differed from his, he would willingly accept it.

Even after the introduction of this Award, an effort was made to settle the communal question in India. An All-Parties Conference, in which such eminent leaders as Maulana Shaukat Ali and Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya took part, had almost brought about a settlement when, quite unexpectedly, the British Government stepped in and torpedoed the whole thing. In a spirit of give-and-take, the All-Parties Conference came to a gentleman's agreement with the Mussalmans that the latter would have 32 % of seats in the Central Legislature. But the British Government could not entertain even the faintest idea of an agreement between the different communities of India because that would amount to nullification of the whole Communal Award which they had prepared so assiduously. The British authorities, with a view to winning over the Muslims to their side, issued a statement allotting 33½ % of British Indian seats to the Mussalmans, thus reducing to dust the herculean efforts of the All-parties Conference to reach an agreement. Commenting on this, Dr. Rajendra Prasad has remarked, "It was not to be expected that any agreement could be reached between all parties when it was clear that some group or other could always be found to object to any agreement, however just, and when the British Government was prepared to offer better terms than any that an agreed settlement could secure for a group willing to accept the highest bid."

The Government of India Act was, however, passed in June 1935 under which elections were held in 1936-37. Both the Congress and the Muslim League participated in the elections.

In July 1937, the Congress formed ministries in those provinces where it gained a clear majority. It was not possible to include League members in the Congress Ministries because they were not prepared to accept the Congress policy and programme. In March 1938, the All-India Muslim League passed a resolution voicing its vehement protest against "the deliberate policy of tyranny and oppression that the Congress Ministries were pursuing towards the Muslim minority." It appointed a committee under the chairmanship of the Raja of Pirpur to collect information about the alleged tyranny of the Congress Governments. Even after making sufficient allowance for exaggeration, it must be maintained that the Pirpur Report was mischievously drafted with the sole intention of discrediting the Congress organisation. When the then Congress President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, requested Mr. Jinnah to get the complaints investigated by an impartial authority like Sir Maurice Gwyer, the League leader refused to accept the suggestion. This at once proved the hollowness of the charges made by the League. It may be noted here that when the Congress Ministries resigned in September 1939, the Muslim League expressed its sense of joy and relief by observing a 'Day of Deliverance' and holding thanks-giving services.

From May 1938 right upto August 1946, the Congress made repeated but fruitless attempts to come to a just and amicable settlement with the Muslim League. The national leaders including Mahatma Gandhi had gone to woo Mr. Jinnah but the latter had remained adamant. In 1938, Subhas Chandra Bose, the then Congress President, tried to elicit from the League an idea of what would satisfy it but failed to get any explicit reply. In all negotiations with the Congress, Mr. Jinnah had insisted that the League must be recognised as the sole representative of the Indian Muslims and that the Congress should speak on behalf of the Hindus only. It was not possible to accept these demands. It was not possible to forget that there were many other Muslim organisations in the country which recognised no such right of the League. To use the words of Dr. Rajendra Prasad, "the Congress could not concede that it was a Hindu organisation—that would be denying its own past, falsifying its history and betraying its future."

In 1940, the Muslim League passed its famous Pakistan resolution in Lahore clearly stating that the areas in which the Muslims were numerically in a majority should be grouped to constitute a separate, independent State.

In March 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps came to India and in his declaration conceded, among other things, the right of secession to any province of British India from the All-India Union and thereby practically accepted the League demand for the creation of a Muslim State, independent of the Indian Union.

The Cripps Mission, however, failed and the Congress passed the momentous 'Quit India' resolution. Then followed the historic 'August Revolution', the last in the series of Gandhian movements for national independence. The Quad-e-Azam issued a statement from his luxurious Malabar Hill marble palace, calling upon the Mussalmans to abstain from any participation in the movement because "it was started with the sole purpose of forcing the Muslims to submit and surrender to the Congress bully."

In September 1944, Gandhiji once again knocked at the door of Mr. Jinnah to find a way out of the communal labyrinth but no agreement could be found.

The Simla Conference took place in the middle of 1945 to end India's political deadlock on the basis of the Wavell proposals. The conference ended in a fiasco due, largely, to Mr. Jinnah's intransigence. He insisted that all the Muslim members of the Viceroy's Executive Council should be nominated by him. This was more than what the Congress could accept.

In the meantime, the Labour Party came in power in U. K. Lord Wavell went to London for fresh consultations with the British Government. On his return, he declared that His Majesty's Government was determined to go ahead with the hope of bringing India to self-government speedily. It was announced in the House of Commons early in 1946 that a special mission of Cabinet Ministers would go out to India to see how best India's constitutional problem could be solved. By this time, a notable change was perceptible in the British policy regarding India. Prime Minister Attlee declared unequivocally in the British Parliament, "We cannot allow a minority to place a veto on the advance of the majority".

Kurattiyārs in Tamil Nād

BY

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While examining the epigraphical sources for reconstructing the history of Jainism in the Tamil country,¹ I noticed a few interesting features of this religion, which were more or less characteristic of the region. One of these was the Yakshī cult that has been briefly dealt with on an earlier occasion in this journal.² Another was the institution of the Kurattiyārs which I propose to discuss in this paper.

Kurattiyār or Kurattigaḷ is the honorific plural of the expression Kuratti which is the Tamil feminine form of the Sanskrit word *guru*. It may be translated as 'lady preceptor'. Kuratti Aḍigaḷ is another respectful term for a lady preceptor, which is also met with in the Tamil inscriptions.

We may commence our survey with an interesting episode relating to a renowned lady preceptor who flourished in the 9th century. Veḍāl in the Wandiwash Taluk of North Arcot District has treasured valuable Jaina antiquities including inscriptions. Not far away from this village are natural caverns on the hills which have been improvised with *maṇḍapas* of later construction. These appear to have been resorted to by Jaina monks and nuns who converted them into monastery and hermitage. In an inscription of the time of Pallava Nandivarman II, engraved on a boulder near the caverns, the place has been mentioned as Viḍārapaḷḷi, i.e., 'the Jaina monastery of Viḍāl'.

In this monastery resided a reputed Jaina lady teacher by name Kanakavīra Kurattiyār. She was the pupil of the venerable

1. This constitutes the subject-matter of a chapter in my book *Jainism in South India* published recently.

2. See my article 'Jainism in Kerala', published in the August issue (1957).

In the following March, the Cabinet Mission came out to India. After three-and-a-half months' busy negotiations with Indian leaders, they announced their plan on May 16, 1946. The Muslim League accepted it, the Sikhs rejected while the Princes announced their provisional acceptance of the plan. The Congress announced their acceptance of the long-term part of the plan but could not agree to participate in the proposed Interim Government. Meanwhile, the Muslim League changed its mind, withdrew its acceptance of the Cabinet Mission proposals and decided upon the infamous policy of "direct action" which led to the outbreak of unparalleled mob violence in Calcutta on August 16, 1946 known as the "Great Calcutta Killing."

In the meantime, the Viceroy invited Pandit Nehru as the president of the major political party in India to form an interim Government at the Centre. Panditji, on receiving the invitation, rushed to Bombay and met Mr. Jinnah to see if the League could join the Government. But nothing came out of this meeting. Pandit Nehru formed an interim Cabinet at the Centre. The Muslim League, however, entered the Government after a month.

While the leaders were demonstrating these political acrobatics in New Delhi, very serious disorders broke out in Noakhali and Tippera districts of East Bengal, followed by grave communal riotings in Bihar, the Punjab and N.W.F.P. It is hardly necessary to insert a detailed discussion here of these dark episodes in our history.

On February 20, 1947, His Majesty's Government made their historic statement announcing their 'definite intention' to transfer power to responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June, 1948. Viscount Mountbatten came out to India as the last Viceroy for carrying out the British intentions. He dived into business straightaway and held a series of talks and conferences with the Indian leaders. Then came His Majesty's Government's plan of June 3rd which announced the decision to set up a dominion of India and a dominion of Pakistan on August 15, 1947. India accepted the plan because the alternative before her, in the words of Sardar Patel, was either to accept the partition or to be faced complete balkanisation and anarchy.

The clock chimed twelve on the midnight of August 14/15 and colourful ceremonies marked the birth of Pakistan with Quad-

e-Azam Jinnah as its first Governor-General. The British diplomacy triumphed in India, bringing about the country's vivisection.

We, the people of India, failed to cry halt to the diabolic march of the communal monster. We failed to save the Great Man from its clutches. We failed to rally promptly and determinedly to the call of sanity, wisdom and common-sense. The innate urge of life failed to triumph over the passion for evil-doing. But to brood over them will lead us nowhere. The future beckons us and appeals to all that is noble, lofty and dignified in the Indian people. By infusing not only love and toleration which are, no doubt, important, but also a certain amount of strength and grit into our conduct and policies, we can even now rub out, to a considerable extent, the stigma that mars the pages of our history.

master Guṇakīrti Bhaṭāra of Viḍāl. Once there arose a dispute between this lady teacher and her five hundred female pupils on one side and the four hundred nuns of another group on the other. In this difficult situation the residents of the locality who owed their allegiance to Kanakavīra Kurattiyār came to her rescue. They promised to safeguard their worthy preceptor as well as her pupils and to provide for their maintenance.

The above details are disclosed by an inscription (*circa* 893 A.D.) of the time of the Chōla king Āditya I.³ This is perhaps the earliest historic evidence of the prevalence of the institution of the Kurattiyārs in the Tamiḻ Nāḍ.

An inscription of the time of the Chōla monarch Parāntaka I, dated 944 A.D., at Viḷāpākkam in the above District, speaks of a Jaina lady teacher named Paṭṭini Kuratti Aḍigaḷ who took a leading part in laying the foundation of a Jaina establishment for nuns.⁴ The name of the teacher may be translated as 'Her Holiness the Fasting Lady Preceptor'.

The existence of a Jaina lady teacher called Paṭṭini Kurattiyār hailing from Perumbattiyūr and her lady disciple Puvvanandi Kuratti is known from an epigraph⁵ at Aivarmalai in the Madura District. Paṭṭini means 'fasting'.

The above three instances would support what we shall observe presently.

Next we proceed further south to another interesting spot called Kaḷugumalai—which etymologically means 'a hill of vultures'—situated in the Koilpaṭṭi Taluk of Tirunelveli District. The place being rich in Jaina antiquities consisting of sculptures and inscriptions, affords ample material for investigating the topic of our study.

The earliest associations of this hill of hoary antiquity with the Jaina ascetics are perhaps to be traced in its natural caverns

3. *South Indian Inscriptions*, Vol. III, No. 92.

4. *Ibid.*, Vol. VII, No. 56.

5. *Madras Epigraphic Report*, 1906, Appendix B, No. 701.

possessing dressed up beds, popularly attributed to the Five Pāṇḍavas, and inscriptions in Brāhmī alphabet of about the third century B.C.⁶

Coming to the later times, the mount of Kaḷugumalai with its picturesque surroundings, became an object of fascination alike for the devotees and the artists of the Jaina as well as Hindu faiths, who have immortalised their religious fervour by creating out of the hard rock images and temples of superb workmanship in honour of their gods and deities. The idols and shrines of the Hindu persuasion are grouped under the common name Veṭṭuvān Kōvil. The Jaina sculptures are situated at a higher altitude, carved in relief, on the smooth surfaces of the overhanging rock.

The Jaina sculptures comprise mainly the Jinas and a few other deities of the Jaina pantheon, whose number is fairly large. Most of them bear brief inscriptions of the votive class, describing the person or persons who had them constructed for religious purpose. Such donors include the lay followers of the faith and members of the monastic orders, both male and female. The last of these who form a group by themselves may be enumerated here in detail for ready reference. These records are published in the *South Indian Inscriptions*, Vol. V, and the numbers noted against each item below indicate the particular inscriptions furnishing the details.

I. Pichchai Kuratti hailing from Chirupoḷal (No. 319). Pichchai, the name of the lady preceptor, is interesting. It is equivalent of Sanskrit *bhikṣhā* meaning 'begging'.

6. The mystery regarding the authorship of the rocky beds known as Pañchapāṇḍavar-ṣaḍukkai in Tamil and the puzzle of the Brāhmī writings with their peculiarities, have baffled their solution by renowned scholars who have tried their hands at the problem. From the association of the 'triple umbrella' which is a characteristic emblem of the Jina, with these beds at Śēdarampaṭṭu in North Arcot District (*Annual Report on South Indian Epigraphy* for 1939-40 to 1942-43, p. 11), it can now be safely asserted that some at least of the so-called Pañchapāṇḍava beds found in large numbers in many places, are the relics of Jainism, originally created by the Jaina monks and missionaries who preached their doctrine in the Tamil land during the centuries before the advent of Christ. Compare the *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. XXIX, p. 201, n. 5. For a detailed description of these relics see *Proceedings and Transactions of Third Oriental Conference*, pp. 275 ff.

II. Congregation of lady disciples hailing from Tiruchchāraṇam, who were disciples of Miḷālūr Kuratti (No. 321). This lady preceptor figures in other inscriptions also. She was known evidently after Miḷālūr, the place she hailed from.

III. Śaṅga Kurattigaḷ associated with the community of carpenters of Veṇbaikkūdi. She had a pupil named Śiriviśaiya Kurattiyār who, as her name denotes, was a lady preceptor of respectable status (Nos. 322-323).

IV. Tiruchchāraṇattu Kurattigaḷ (Nos. 324 and 326). This preceptor evidently hailed from the Kēraḷa region, since we know that Tiruchchāraṇam with which she was associated is the present Tiruchchāraṇattumalai near Chitarāl in the Vilavangod Taluk.⁷ We may note the occurrence of the locality above in No. II also.

V. Here is a succession of three teachers, viz., Nālkūr Amalanēmi Bhaṭāra, his lady disciple Nālkūr Kuratti, her lady disciple Nāṭṭikappatārar (Nos. 355-356). Amalanēmi and his disciple both hailed from Nālkūr and the latter is introduced by her place name only. Nāṭṭikappatārar, though a lady, bore the male designation Paṭārar which is Sanskrit Bhaṭṭāraka. This is interesting. The designation Bhaṭṭāraka generally denotes pontifical status.

VI. Tirumalai Kuratti who evidently hailed from Tirumalai. She had a male disciple in Enādi Kuttanan (No. 370). This Tirumalai is the Jaina sacred hill near Pōḷūr in North Arcot District.

VII. Mammai Kuratti who had a lady disciple named Araṭṭanēmi Kuratti (No. 371).

VIII. Tiruparutti Kuratti, disciple of Paṭṭini Bhaṭāra (No. 372). Tiruparutti may be shortened Tirupparuttikunram.

IX. Miḷālūr Kuratti, disciple of Pērur Kuratti. The former was daughter of Mīṅgaikumān of Piḍāṅkūdi in Karaikkāna Nāḍu (No. 394).

X. Enādi Māgaṇa Kuratti of Nālūr (No. 404).

The epigraphs giving the above details are engraved in Vaṭṭeḷuttu characters and may be assigned approximately to the period of the 10th and the 11th century.

7. See above, August issue p. 243f.

The following facts emerge from a careful analysis of the description of the Jaina teachers in the epigraphs noticed above.

1. There existed well-established monastic institutions of lady teachers in different parts of the Tamil country.

2. From Nos. 2, 3, 5, 7 and 9 of the above list, it may be observed that lady pupils were initiated by lady teachers and continuity of such succession seems to have been maintained.

3. Lady teachers were also initiated by male teachers as seen from Nos. 5 and 8 of the above list.

4. Lady teachers entertained male disciples also (*ibid.*, No. 6).

We may notice one more early instance from the Kēraḷa region. This was Guṇandāṅgi Kurattigaḷ who figures as the donor of gold ornaments to the Bhaṭāriyār (Jaina goddess) of Tiruchchāraṇattumalai in an inscription at Tiruchchāraṇattumalai. She was disciple of Araṭṭanēmi Bhaṭāra of Pērayakkūdi.⁸

The foregoing accounts of lady teachers of the Jaina persuasion culled out from epigraphic sources are not exhaustive. It has to be borne in mind in this connection that the epigraphs themselves present only a partial picture of the Jaina institution of Kurattiyārs which appears to have taken deep root and developed with spectacular growth on a large scale in all parts of the Tamil country.

In order to judge the significance of this Jaina institution of Kurattiyārs in the Tamil country, we have to ascertain if there existed similar institution elsewhere also in other parts of India in general and South India in particular. Here we have to draw a line of distinction between ordinary Jaina nuns who merely renounced the world and devoted themselves to the practices of self-discipline and ascetic culture on the one hand and female recluses of a special class who enjoyed certain privileges in the church like the monks and teachers of respectable monastic foundations on the other. The former class was usually an appendage to established monasteries of Jaina monks and treated as inferior to them. They had no independent status of their own, being always placed

8. Travancore Archaeological Series, Vol. II, p. 125, n. 1.

under the control and supervision of the senior preceptors and office-bearers of the order.⁹

The Jaina church encouraged not only men, but also women aspirants to vow themselves to the sublime path and practices of the faith. Firstly, among the female votaries of the faith there was the universal class of devotees who were householders. They were known as Śrāvīkās or lay followers and disciples. Next came the Jaina nuns who were called Āryā or Āryikā in Sanskrit or Ajjiyā in Prakrit. In North India the more familiar name for a Jaina nun is Sādhvī.¹⁰ In Kannaḍa inscriptions a Jaina nun is often mentioned as Ajji. The expression Kanti occurring in Kannaḍa literature and inscriptions seems to denote a particular class of Jaina nuns. Kavunti is a famous Jaina character in the Tamil classical work *Silappadikāram*. She may be the Tamil counterpart of Kannaḍa Kanti. Both these terms are perhaps to be connected with the Sanskrit word *kanthā* meaning 'a torn cloth'.

Let us revert to the Kuratti of the Tamil country. I have examined, and I may say almost exhaustively, hundreds of Jaina inscriptions of the Karnāṭaka, Āndhra and Tamil areas. I have looked into a good number of Jaina epigraphs bearing on the subject from different parts of North India. But nowhere have I come across so far an expression like Kuratti or its equivalent, let alone an institution like that of the Kurattiyārs of the Tamil inscriptions with their socio-religious activities. From these findings I am compelled to surmise that the Jaina institution of Kurattiyārs as revealed by the Tamil epigraphs was a regional development by itself brought about for special reasons under particular circumstances.

It is difficult to trace in the Jaina canonical works sanction for lady preceptors like Kanakavīra Kurattiyār of the Veḍāl inscription, who was in charge of a monastery and controlled as many as five hundred pupils of the fair sex. I am not sure if the leaders of the orthodox Jaina church would have approved the initiation

9. S. B. Deo: *History of Jaina Monachism* (Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute, June 1954—March 1955), pp. 465 ff.

10. Sādhvī is mentioned as Sāhūnī in Jaina canonical literature. There are other expressions also such as Bhikkhūnī and Nigganthī (*ibid.*, p. 467).

and succession of lady teachers by lady preceptors or a lady preceptor entertaining a male disciple as we have noted from the epigraphs at Kaḷugumalai. These facts, in my opinion, deserve to be treated as unique in the history of Jaina church and I invite scholars interested in Jaina studies to probe into them deeply.

The missionaries of all religions are interested in popularising them and devise means suitable to this end. True to this rule, the Jaina teachers of South India and particularly of the Tamil country had their own ways of spreading the message of the Jina. One of these,¹¹ it seems to me, consisted in fostering a less rigid and more liberal outlook in respect of the members of the fair sex. The history of Jainism in the Tamil country shows that this device did prove successful, as the womenfolk are the best propagators of religious faiths.

Generally speaking, Jainism advocated wider sympathies towards women than even Buddhism. Gautama Buddha himself was at first opposed to the admission of female members into his church as nuns, but was at last persuaded by his favourite disciple Ānanda to give his consent.¹² Mahāvīra is said to have been followed and accompanied by male as well as female recluses. It is stated that his followers included 14000 monks and 36000 nuns.¹³

Between the Digambaras and the Śvētāmbaras, the two main sects of Jainism, the former imposed more restrictions upon the female members of the monastic order. They held that on account of certain disabilities inherent in them due to their sex, women were not entitled for *mōksha* or Liberation in this life.¹⁴ The Śvētāmbaras, however, were less rigid in their attitude towards the female devotees of the faith. There was another sect of the Jaina monks in the South known as the Yāpanīyas. It is realised in my study of Jainism in Karnāṭaka that the northern areas of this region, particularly Dharwar District was the stronghold of the Yāpanīya sect. Some of the doctrines preached by the

11. The various devices of the Jaina priests and preachers that contributed to the immense popularity of the creed have been discussed severally in my *Jainism in South India*.

12. R. C. Majumdar: *Ancient India* (1952), p. 170.

13. Sinclair Stevenson: *Heart of Jainism*, p. 66.

14. *Pravachanasāra*, Translation p. 28; *History of Jaina Monachism* (op. cit.), p. 497.

Yāpanīyas were common both to the Digambara and Śvētāmbara schools. But the more reformist view that distinguished the Yāpanīyas from other sects was their advocacy of spiritual liberation for women in this very life.¹⁵

The history of Jaina church in South India has left no evidence to show that teachers either of the Śvētāmbara or the Yāpanīya order ever penetrated into the Tamil land. But the subtle influence of ideology, if it is powerful, sometimes traverses far beyond the physical barriers. Thus it may not be unreasonable to surmise that the institution of Kurattiyārs in the Tamil country was influenced and encouraged by the above precept of the Yāpanīya school.

A Note on the Police of the City of Poona DURING THE PERIOD OF SAWAI MADHAV RAO

BY

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Quite a few papers have been published about the administrative system of the Marathas. Yet very little has been written about their police system. An attempt is therefore made in the following lines to trace from the original records a history of the police administration of the Poona City.

Writing his famous report soon after the fall of the Marathas, Elphinstone tells us that the Patil was responsible for the police of his village. He was aided by the Kulkarni and the Chougula and when occasion required, by all the inhabitants. His chief assistant was the Mahar or Taral or Jagalya. The duty of a Mahar was to keep watch at night, to find out all arrivals and departures, observe all strangers and report all suspicious persons to the Patil. He was also expected to know the character of each man in the village and in the event of a theft committed within the village bounds, it was his duty to detect the thief. As his allowance was a small share of grain from each house it was possible for him to know a thief.¹

Poona was just a village before Bajirao I made it his chief place of residence. Naturally the police system was the same as narrated above. Bajirao I built the Shanwar Wada in Poona in 1730. Since then Poona gradually grew into a town. With the death of Raja Shahu in 1749 the *de facto* power of the Maratha Empire passed on to the Peshwas. Poona soon became the capital of the Maratha Empire. After the death of Tarabai, Satara, the official capital of the Marathas lost whatever importance it had, and Poona became the centre of all the political activities of the Marathas.

15. The Yāpanīya precept is set forth in the passage *striṇām tad-bhavaḥ mōkshah*; see *Journal of Bombay University, Arts and Law*, Vol. I, p. 227.

1. Elphinstone, p. 35.

During this time Poona had grown immensely in population and prestige. Peshwa Madhavrao I, therefore, thought it necessary to create a special police force for the city under a Kotwal. Accordingly by a sanad dated 18th February 1764 Balaji Narayan Ketkar was appointed Kotwal of the city of Poona. He was entrusted with the work of maintaining order in the city of Poona and was directed to work honestly under the orders of Balaji Janardan (Nana Fadnis).² In this sanad there is no mention of the duties of the Kotwal. Some time after this Balaji Narayan Ketkar was removed and Baburao Ram was appointed in his place. For a sanad dated 12th April 1768 mentions that Baburao Ram was removed and Janardan Hari was appointed Kotwal in his place that year. This sanad gives the following details about the duties of the office of the Kotwal.³

1. Minor disputes in Peths and Kashas should be disposed of by the Kamavisdar. Only important matters should be looked into by the Kotwal.
2. To fix prices of goods in the market, and to submit the list of price schedule to the Government.
3. To supply labourers from among the artisans and members of the several castes in the city.
4. To grant licences for the sale and purchase of lands in the city. To prepare the necessary documents and to collect the Government dues.
5. To take census, to keep a record of the people coming in and going out of the city. The Kamavisdar of various Peths should give the Kotwal relevant information in the matter.
6. To settle disputes regarding lanes, roads and houses.
7. To see that the professional gamblers do not gamble without a written permission from the Kotwal, also to collect from them the usual tax on gambling. To see that others do not gamble.
8. To furnish monthly accounts to the Government regarding the income and expenditure of the police department.
9. To levy taxes according to a specified schedule.

² P. D. Vol. VII, No. 629.

³ Ibid., No. 633.

The sanad further mentions that the office of the Kotwal should be at a place assigned for it in the Budhwar Peth. If the Kotwal has to issue any orders in execution of his duties he should proclaim the same by the beating of drums. If the Kotwal feels that the rules made by his predecessor or any other new rules to be fit for government work and faultless he should inform the government likewise, and then should act in accordance with the orders that he might receive.

For all this work the Kotwal was given a large establishment consisting of

Kotwal at Rs. 300	p.a
Fadnis at Rs. 200	p.a.
Dafterdar Rs. 150	p.a.
4 Karkuns for beat in the Peths	.. Rs. 125 p.a. (per head)
40 Constables	.. Rs. 44 per eleven months (per head).
2 Torch bearers	.. Rs. 55 per eleven months (per head).
2 Orderlies	.. Rs. 50 p.a. (per head)
6 Vatandar	.. Rs. 24 p.a. (per head)

Thus an annual budget of Rupees 3264 was sanctioned for the Kotwal office.

It will be seen from the long list that the Kotwal was alone the police officer, the magistrate, the price controller, the labour supplier, the licensing authority, the local tax collector and also a census officer. In this respect the Peshwas' Kotwal may be well compared with the Tudor Justice of the Peace rightly called the "maid of all work".

A few additional instructions were issued by a sanad dated 16th July 1776 granted to Anandrao Kashi which appointed him Kotwal in place of Dhondo Babaji.⁴ It seems therefore that sometime after 1768 Janardan Hari was removed and Dhondo Babaji appointed in his place, and in 1776 Dhondo Babaji was replaced by Anandrao Kashi. By this sanad Anandrao Kashi was enjoined

⁴ P. D., Vol. VIII, No. 946.

to act justly and honestly in the discharge of his duties, without oppressing the people and to keep the people contented by such conduct. He was also asked to patrol the city and maintain order in the city. Gangadhar Shamji was appointed amin (assistant of the Kotwal). All the members of the Kotwal staff were asked to attend the office (Chawdi) regularly for the prompt disposal of their respective assignments. If for any reason any member of the Staff was absent the amin was asked to officiate for him. The Kotwal was asked to carry on his work under the supervision of Pandurang Krishna, Sar Amin. The sanad further empowered the Kotwal to settle disputed cases, quarrels and other judicial matters according to his discretion.

It seems that the position of a Kotwal meant free licence for oppression and corruption. The rule of Anandrao Kashi was no exception. An anonymous complaint against him was sent to Nana Fadnis in 1773.⁵ The complainant says "Anandrao Kashi misbehaves, Brahmin and North Indian women from good families are arrested by him for alleged illicit connections. He takes them to his house and there violates their modesty and then releases them. The women move about saying that nobody informs this misconduct of the Kotwal to you (i.e. Nana). The Kotwal says that he is a favourite of yourself hence no one can cause him any harm. If an inquiry is started I can prove all this. He is to pay to the government to the tune of Rs. 25,000. He never inquires about the condition of the people before collecting taxes. He spends lavishly and forces his staff to make false entries. I have many more things to write but I am afraid that you may not like it. If an interview is granted I shall explain personally."

Either because of this conduct or for any other reason Anandrao Kashi was removed and Ghasiram Sawaldas was appointed in his place on 8th February 1777.⁶ But it seems that Ghasiram too was removed in a short time. A letter dated 26th March 1778 shows that Anandrao Kashi was Kotwal on the day.⁷ This letter refers to Ghasiram as ex-Kotwal. Again on 21st January 1782 Anandrao Kashi was removed and Ghasiram Sawaldas was re-

5. Itihas Sangraha Aitihāsik Sphut Lekh 3/15.

6. P. D. Vol. VIII, No. 948.

7. Ibid., No. 909.

appointed in his place.⁸ His salary was fixed at Rs. 500 p.a. In addition he was granted Rs. 66 p.a. for an attendant to hold the "Aftagir" and Rs. 55 p.a. for the torch bearer. The letter of appointment further refers to the unpaid amount of Ghasiram's first Kotwalship and asks him to clear the old debt. He is also to make good from the income of Kotwalship the unsanctioned amounts spent by his predecessor. This letter gives the following additional instructions to the Kotwal.

1. To act under instructions of Pandurang Krishna, Sar Amin.
2. Not to remove the peons and clerks of the Kotwal's office without the consent of the Sar Amin.
3. To see that the members of his staff discharge their duties properly.
4. To act honestly and justly in conformity with the established practice. To keep the ryots contented. Not to behave in an improper manner.
5. As there were no police posts in Narayan Peth and Shanwar Peth a number of offences were committed there, so the Kotwal was asked to have two new police posts there and to defray the expenses thereof from the fees and fines collected.
6. To maintain roads in good order. All sheds and varandahs built unauthorised after the great fire of Poona should be destroyed. To see that new sheds are not built.
7. To collect information through his staff from Peth to Peth about the traitors and conspirators who came to the city. This information should be forthwith communicated to the Government.
8. To warn the inhabitants of the different Peths against misbehaviour.
9. To send efficient clerks and peons for patrolling the city every night and to trace the thieves very carefully and then to hand them over to the Government.
10. Married women should not be given permits to act as prostitutes.

8. Ibid., No. 1158.

For carrying on all this work the Kotwal was given a staff of 78 men at a cost of Rs. 310 per month. The Kotwal was to render month to month account of the income and expenditure.

Of all the Kotwals of the city of Poona Ghasiram was the most notorious. He was a Kanoja Brahmin from Aurangabad who had come to Poona for employment. He soon secured the favour of Nana Fadnis and became the Kotwal of Poona. Rumour had it that he purchased the favour of Nana "by giving his daughter to be the mistress of Nana Fadnis".⁹ Ghasiram's rule seems to be efficient but ruthless. He has been charged with a number of exactions and even murders.¹⁰ Ultimately he met with a terrible death being stoned to death by a large crowd of Telanga Brahmins for the death of about twenty one of their caste, who died of suffocation in his custody. Eye witness accounts of this ghastly deed have been recorded by the clerks of Patwardhan,¹¹ and Baramatikar Joshi.¹² Sir Charles Mallet has given a graphic account of this tragedy to Captain Forbes.¹³

In spite of this the office of the Kotwal continued to gain in power and prestige. In Bajirao's time the monthly expenditure of the Kotwals establishment was Rs. 9000.¹⁴ Elphinstone in his report as commissioner says "The police however was good; on the whole murders or robberies, attended with violence and alarm, were very rare, and I have never heard any complaints of the insecurity of property".¹⁵ This statement is corroborated by Lt. Edward Moor who visited Poona in 1792. He says that the Poona police were "uncommonly well regulated".¹⁶

9. B. P. Gazetteer Vol. XVIII, part 3, p. 18.

10. B. P. Gazetteer Vol. XVIII, part 2, p. 280.

11. Khare No. 3374.

12. Itihas Sangraha Aitihasik Tipane 1/4.

13. Forbes Oriental Memoirs Vol. I, p. 422.

14. Elphinstone, p. 38.

15. Ibid.

16. Moor, A narrative of the operation of Capt. Little's Department, p. 364.

An unpublished Sculpture of *Ardhanārīśvara* from Rajasthan¹

BY

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On the philosophic side, the *Ardhanārīśvara* form of Śiva represented "two fundamentally opposite cosmic forces named *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* which are constantly drawn together to embrace and fuse with each other but separated by an intervening axis" (JUPHS, XXII, 1949, p. 129). The composite aspect of Umā and Maheśa, possessing all the iconographic features of Śiva in the right half and that of his consort Pārvatī in the other, has well been glorified in ancient Indian literature,² epigraphs and sculptures. The second stanza of the inscription of V.S. 547 (= 480 A.D.) from Chhoṭī Sādaḍī (Udaipur Rajasthan) and now preserved in the Udaipur Museum invokes the goddess Pārvatī—as the spouse of Śiva and refers to the *Ardhanārīśvara* aspect in the following words:—*Bhūyopi sā jayati yā Śaśīsekharasya dehārdhhamudvahati bhaktatayā Harasya* (Epigraphia Indica, XXX (4), 1956, pp. 124 and 126, line 2 of the epigraph). Still more, the fragmentary inscription of V.S. 701 (= 644 A.D.) from Khaṇḍelā Jaipur, Rajasthan) praises this aspect and even records the construction of a temple,³ dedicated to *Ardhanārīśvara* at Khaṇḍelā itself. This particular Śaiva edifice of the 7th

1. Abbreviations used:—

(a) JUPHS = *Journal of U.P. Historical Society*, Lucknow.

(b) JISOA = *Journal of the Indian Society of Oriental Art*, Calcutta.

2. Kālidāsa invokes the *Ardhanārīśvara* form in the first verse of his *Raghuvamśa*.

3. It is regretted that no panel or image of *Ardhanārīśvara* and pertaining to the Gupta period has been discovered in the regions of Udaipur and Jaipur so far. A temple of *Ardhanārīśvara* is said to have been constructed by Anantavarman—the Maukhari Chief [D. C. Sircar, *Classical Age*, Bombay, 1954, pp. 421-22]; cf. ASI. AR., 1936-7, p. 112 for an edifice dedicated to the same form of Śiva and built at Velapura in district Sholāpura.

century A.D. owed its existence due to the mighty efforts of one Adityāṅga, a Vaiśya by caste (cf. *A.S.I., A.R.*, 1934-5, pp. 73-4; *Annual Working Report of the Rājputana Museum at Ajmer for the year ending March 1935*; *Varadā*, Hindi Journal — now defunct, *Śrāvaṇa* 2002, Jaipur, Vol. I, p. 12). The inscription of V.S. 741 (= 684 A.D.) from Nagar [Jaipur Unit] also makes a reference to the composite form in the first line of it i.e., *Gauriruddhārdhadehopya-viṣayamanasām* (*Bhārata Kaumudī*, Vol. I, Lucknow, 1945, p. 273).

The earliest, so far known, depiction of this theme in the plastic art of the country is to be found in Kuṣāṇa reliefs from Mathura and now preserved in the local museum (Nos. 800, 874, 2520). Śiva, in No. 2520 is shown as two handed only and the male portion presents him in the *ūrdhvaretas* pose (V. S. Agrawala, *JUPHS*, December 1937, pp. 30-4; *JISOA*, December 1937, p. 134, pl. XIV, fig. 2; *JUPHS*, XXII, 1949, p. 142). The Gupta artists of course handled the theme with unexcelled perfection—a fact which is quite evident from the discovery of a number of sculptures and seals of the contemporary times. Some important finds of this variety may be noted as follows:—

- (a) Head only, No. 362 of Mathura Museum; V. S. Agrawala, *JISOA*, 1937, pl. XV, fig. 2; *JUPHS*, XXII, p. 129.
- (b) Bust of 3 eyed Śiva; Mathura Museum, No. 722; *JUPHS*, XXII, p. 130; D. B. Diskalkar, *Ibid*, Jan. 1932, pl. XV, fig. 1.
- (c) Terracotta-head, Mathura Museum; V. S. Agrawala, *JUPHS*, IX (2), p. 36, fig. 57.
- (d) An early-Gupta terracotta seal from Bhīṭā; J. N. Banerjea, *Development of Hindu Iconography*, Calcutta, 1956, 2nd edition, pp. 180-1.
- (e) Terracotta seal from Basārh; Adris Banerjee, *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, Calcutta, December 1955, p. 338.

The *Ardhanārīśvara* form also attracted the sculptors of the post-Gupta and early-mediaeval periods.⁴ The stone-panel from

4. Cf. T. G. Rao, *Elements of Hindu Iconography*, Madras, Vol. II (1), pp. 327-32 and the photographs; also J. N. Banerjea, *op. cit.*, pp. 476-8 for the images of three-faced Śiva embodying the *Ardhanārīśvara* aspect therein. Such specimens from Rajasthan have not been reported so far.



Ardhanārīśvara, Jhālāwār Museum, Rajasthan

Bādāmi presents some additional details such as the "natural hands of the androgynous god holding a *vṃṣā*, Nandī as bull and emaciated Bhṛīṅgī standing by the side of the male half and a female attendant by the female one; a number of *gaṇas* in the dancing and other poses are shown below" (*The Classical Age*, Bombay, 1954, p. 435). Another relief, from Elephanta, is all the more interesting because of the richness of the details including the figure of Skanda-Kārttikeya with elaborately dressed-hair (cf. Pramoda Chandra, *A Guide to Elephanta*, 1957, Bombay, plates XIV-XV, pp. 6-7).

The ancient sculptors of Rajasthan too carved out such panels and images in a successful manner as is quite evident from the noteworthy early-mediaeval (8-9 C. A.D.) sculptures of *Ardhanārīśvara* from Āmber,⁵ Osian,⁶ Ābānerī⁷ etc. The *Ardhanārīśvara* from Ābānerī is most graceful and imposing of all the extant contemporary specimens from Rajasthan and has been illustrated by me in the *Lalitkalā*, *op. cit.*, Nos. 1-2, pp. 130-1, pl. lii, fig. 1. Equally interesting is the colossal image of *Ardhanārīśvara* from Chandrabhāgā Pāṭaṇa and now preserved in the Archaeological Museum at Jhālāwār. It measures about 3 feet in height and about 19 inches in width; and has been exhibited as No. 88 of the Museum. Its size and prominent pedestal lead us to suggest that it was perhaps under worship inside some Śaiva shrine of the place. The influence of the Gupta art is evident at mere glance and the minutest details have been executed in a vivid manner. The four handed *sthānaka* deity, in the Jhālāwār *Ardhanārīśvara*, bears a vertical⁸ third eye in the centre of the

5. Near Jaipur. This unpublished image, inside the temple of Kalyānarāyaji at Āmber, presents Gaṇeśa in the same relief.

6. An unpublished but simple image (ht. 1' 7") carved in a niche outside the subsidiary shrine near the Temple of Sachiya Mātā at Osian, Mārwar. For the ancient temples of Osian, consult D. R. Bhandarkar, *A.S.I.A.R.*, 1908-9, pp. 101 ff.

7. About 50 miles from Jaipur; cf. my paper in the *Lalitkalā*, Lalitkalā Akadami of India, New Delhi, Nos. 1-2, pp. 130 ff and plates LII-LVI for the sculptures from Ābānerī.

8. Also presented by the Gupta bust from Mathura ie. No. 722 (*JUPHS*, XXII, p. 130); cf. a later relief as illustrated in *Ancient India*, *Bull. of the Arch. Survey of India*, New Delhi, VI, pl. XX, c, pp. 54-7 for an identical device in the icons of this variety.

forehead—a feature which is conspicuous by its absence in the later relief from Ābānerī. Still more interesting is the appearance of *sthānaka* and *dvibāhu* Skanda-Kumāra, with his *vāhana* (i.e. a peacock), standing near the left leg and under the lower arm. The dress, hair-decoration and beaded-necklace of Skanda have also been executed under the mighty influence of the Gupta art. The *jaṭā-jūta* on the half portion of the head and the plaited hair adorned with a crest-jewel and a lotus-bud on the remaining half, a halo behind the head, a *sarpaveṣṭita trisūla* in the right upper hand and a bull-faced attendant standing below the inverted lotus-bud in the outstretched lower-right hand of Śiva, sacred thread touching the prominent breast (of the female side), an anklet round the left leg, round ear-pendant of the male portion and an elongated one of the female side, two stringed beaded-girdle round the waist . . . etc., have been presented with great care and skill. Besides this, the nether-garment (i.e. the transparent *dhotī*) fails to hide the genital organs, both male and female. Not only that, Śiva appears in the *ūrdhvaretas* form as can also be seen in the Kuṣāṇa relief No. 2520 from Mathurā⁹ and illustrated by Dr. Agrawala in *JISOA*, Dec., 1937, fig. 2, pl. XIV and also in Nos. 800 and 874.

The existing relief of *Ardhanārīśvara* from Jhalawar (Rajasthan) throws a flood of light on the iconography of Śiva, Pārvatī and Skanda-Kārttikeya¹⁰ during the Gupta period and such a unique specimen of its kind has not been reported from other parts of Rajasthan so far. Iconographically too, the Jhalawar specimen is decidedly much earlier in date as compared to the early-mediaeval sculptures and panels from Osian and Ābānerī as already cited above. The existing statue from Jhalawar region thus occupies an important place in the realm of the plastic art of the Gupta period and deserves great appreciation of art critics. Let us await the discovery of even earlier specimens of this variety from Rajasthan and other parts of the country.

9. The only difference being that the Mathura relief presents the deity as 2 handed whereas the Jhālāwār *Ardhanārīśvara* bears 4 hands, the upper left hand being damaged in the latter.

10. Skanda-Kumāra is conspicuous by his absence in the *Ardhanārīśvara* reliefs from Osian and Ābānerī and that enhances the importance of the Jhālāwār specimen still further. Consult my paper in *Lalitkalā*, op. cit., Nos. 3-4 for some interesting sculptures of Skanda from Rajasthan.

The Accession of Nandivarman Pallavamalla

BY

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The Paṭṭattālmangalam Plates of the sixty-first regnal year of the Pallava king Nandivarman Pallavamalla say that he was the son of Hiranyavarman and came to the throne when he was quite young (*yuvaiva*)¹ while the Kasākkudi Plates dated in the twenty-second year of his reign give the additional particulars that he belonged to the branch (*varga*) of Bhimavarman, his sixth ancestor and the younger brother of Simhaviṣṇu of the main line, that he was "chosen—by his subjects" as king,² and that he "was engaged in ruling the kingdom of Paramēśva Pōtarāja".³ The circumstances under which this young boy-prince of a junior branch of the Pallava family six generations removed came to occupy the throne after Paramēśvaravarman⁴ would make an interesting study and these are narrated in the descriptive labels incised below the panels of the historical sculptures found on the walls of the Vaikunṭha Perumāḷ temple at Kāñcīpuram.

These sculptures which cover all the four walls of the raised *varandah* running round the central shrine of the temple and are arranged in two rows separated by a narrow horizontal band depict the entire history of the Pallavas from their mythical progenitor Brahmā upto the time of the construction of the temple. Though the sculptures commence from the northern side of the west wall and run clock wise in a *pradakṣiṇa* manner, there are

1. *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 120 and 123, verse 7.

2. *South Indian Inscriptions*, Vol. II, pp. 349 and 357, verse 27. *vṛtah prajābhīh*.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 350, 1.72. *Paramēśvara Pōtarājapada—prasāsana pareṇa*. Also p. 358.

4. The Udayēndiram grant dated in the twenty-first year of his reign mentions him as the son of Paramēśvaravarman II evidently to denote that he succeeded the latter or less probably he was the adopted son. (*Ibid.*, p. 363; also 11.19 and 37 on pp. 366, 367 and 371).

only thirteen explanatory labels all of them found on the south wall where the events leading to and following the coronation of Nandivarman Pallavamalla are sculptured. The labels constitute as it were the official version of the events relating to the selection and coronation of Nandivarman Pallavamalla and so are important and require careful study and interpretation. Among the thirteen labels four are unfortunately very much damaged, only a few letters here and there being decipherable. Some portions of the others are also damaged to a certain extent.⁵

The first label (Section A) contains the following:—In the Pallava family descended in this was from (the originator) Brahmā Paramēśvarap-Pōttaraiyar becoming a resident of Heaven (*svarg-gastar*) and the kingdom being reduced to a state of anarchy (*utsanna*), the *Mātrās*, the *ghaṭakayār* and the *Mūlaprakṛtis* approached Hiranyavarmma Mahārāja of the family of the Kādava lords (*Kāṭavēśa kula*) to request him to become king, being one able to bear the burden of the kingdom (*rājabhāram grahakka samarttar*) and of pure descent on both sides (*ubhayakula-pariśuddhar*). The facts that the kingdom was then without a king, and the throne was vacant are indicated by the blank space which occupies the wall following the coronation of the previous monarch Paramēśvara and preceding these labelled panels.

The next label (Section B) has:

When the members of the deputation came and saw Hiranyavarmma—Mahārāja, he asked them about the object of their visit. They replied, “the kingdom has fallen in chaos (*utsanna*) (we are) unable to manage. You being of pure descent on both sides (please) do come as king.”

The third label (Section C): Hearing this Hiranyavarmma Mahārāja sent for all the *Kulamallar* (*mallas* of the family) and enquired (if they were willing to accept the Pallava kingship). (But) none of them willing to go, he asked his sons Śrīmalla, Raṇamalla, Sangrāmamalla and Pallavamalla. Each of the first

5. S.I.I. (Texts), Vol. IV. No. 135. See also *The Historical Sculptures of the Vaikuntha Perumāl Temple, Kāñcī*, by Dr. C. Minakshi (Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India, No. 63). Appendix I, pp. 54-55.

three in turn excused himself saying, “you had better go to rule as king; we will not go”; while Pallavamalla *alias* Paramēśvara bowed to his father and supplicated, ‘I shall go’.

On hearing this Hiranyavarmma was tossed between two conflicting feelings. The fourth label (Section D) says: Hearing this (Hiranyavarmma) feeling happy (*harṣa*) at the thought that the good and truthful son (*satyānvita suputran*) born to enhance the glory of the Khāṭaka kula (*Khāṭaka kulam śirakka tōṇṇiya*) was going to rule the kingdom and grieving (with the thought) of separation (from him) and his heart feeling the touch of ambrosia and poison at the same time,⁶ said, “my son who is only a boy of twelve years, I will not send”. Whereupon Taraṇḍi-Koṇḍapōśar, an old *āgamika* assured, (and consoled) him that “this (Pallavamalla) had previously worshipped Mahāviṣṇu and would therefore become emperor (or is destined to become emperor). Do not grieve”.

The fifth label (Section E) is unfortunately very much damaged. Being very fragmentary we can make out only very little of it. Apparently Hiranyavarman saw something resembling a black elephant's head (*kariyakalirinṇalai*) and asks something which we cannot make out. Probably the reply for it is given by Taraṇḍi-Koṇḍapōśar as contained in the next label (Section F). Showing the thing presented by the soldier (*śēvakan*) of the retinue, Taraṇḍi-Koṇḍapōśar said to Hiranyavarmma Mahārāja “This is not an elephant's head; but the crown (and other royal insignia) of your son”, whereupon the fear (of the latter) was dispelled.

The seventh label (Section G) says: This is the place where (Pallavamalla) having been given permission⁷ by Hiranyavarmma Mahārāja and Taraṇḍi-Koṇḍapōśar to go got down from the *śivakai* (*sibika*: vehicle) worshipped, prostrated (to them) and took leave (of them).

6. *Amrtamun-na[nṇi] kalandan (na) hridayattan*. Dr. Minakshi reads the portion as *amrtamannareri kalanda hridayastan* meaning “filled as if with ambrosia and fire at the same time”.

7. The actual term is *viḍai koḍukka*. Originally it was read as *paḍai-koḍukka* and translated as “having been given weapons. The latter *vi* is clear and the correct reading is as above.

The next label (Section H) is read as follows:—

1. Aṅgu-ninṛum pōndu pala giri-nadi—vana-gahana[m]
gaḷaik-kaḷindu varuṅṇamai kēṭṭu Pallavadi-Araiyar
edirēy.
2. mahā balattōḍum vandu yānai ērrikkoṇḍu Kāñcīpura-
mahānagarattu ga marindu pōnda iḍam.⁸

This label inscription has been taken to mean: starting from there Pallavamalla was coming (to Kāñcīpuram) passing through on the way many mountains, rivers and thick forests; hearing these Pallavadi-Araiyar welcomed him with a big army and placing him on an elephant proceeded towards the great city of Kāñcīpuram. But the correct reading and meaning of this label will be discussed more fully later.

The ninth label (Section I) says: Hearing that his (Pallavamalla's) elephant was coming, the *Mahāsāmantar*, the *Nagarattār* merchants), the *Mūlaprakṛti* and the *Kaḍakka Muttarayar* went forward to meet him and all of them entered the palace (*kōyil*).

The tenth label (Section J) records: After entering the palace, the body of ministers (*mantrimaṇḍalam*), the *mahāsāmantar*, the men of the two *gaṇas* (*ubhayagaṇattayār*) and the *ghaṭakayār*, all combined together and anointed him (the prince) under the name of Nandivanman and (investing him) with all the insignia of royalty, such as the royal umbrella (to his chariot) known as *karivai*, the *samudraghoṣa* (conch blowing with the sound of the roaring sea) the *khatvāṅga* flag and the *ṛṣabha-lāñcchana* (the bull crest) proclaimed his authority by issuing commands under the royal seal of *viḍēl viḍugu*.

The explanatory labels do not stop with the coronation of Pallavamalla. Three more are found. The eleventh one (Section K) is damaged in important places, but enlightens some crucial points. It says: "When here (*ingē*) he became Perumāṇaḍigaḷ (i.e. His Majesty the King) and had been ruling the kingdom—the

8. The concluding portion of the second line was originally read as follows:

Kāñcīpura Mahānagaratturugi marindu pōnda iḍam. It may probably be read as 'Kāñcīpura Mahānagarattukkarugi (1) marindu pōnda iḍam.

ministers (*mantrigaḷum*), the *mūlaprakṛtis* (*mūlaprakṛtiyum*) and *Jinikayum* Śrī Calu who was zealous in prowess (*parākram-ō-tsāham uḍaya*)

The last two labels are still more damaged. The phrase *avvagaiye irundu pōṇa durdhukkamāga*.... (in such manner the great calamity having come (existed) and gone....) is decipherable in the twelfth label (Section L), while the expression *svaram gaṇḍār kūṭṭiya nipuṇargaḷ* (the experts assembled by some person or persons) is found in the last label (Section M). The last two labels begin with the word *avvagaiyē* (in such manner) while, as has been said earlier, the first label begins with the word *ivvagaiyē* (in this way). It is possible to conclude that the two expressions *ivvagaiyē* and *avvagaiyē* mark the beginning and end of the explanations of the series of sculptures relating to the accession and coronation of Pallavamalla, and thus the thirteen labels contain the official account of the same.

The eleventh label mentioned above begins with the clause "(when) Perumāṇaḍigaḷ was ruling here (*ingē*) as king". With regard to expression *Śrī Calu* in the label after which some letters are lost, Dr. C. Minakshi supplies the missing letters and reads the word as 'Chālukki Vikramāditta." Though the Editor of the Memoir says that "it is difficult to read these words from the existing traces" the suggestion of Dr. Minakshi appears to be acceptable in view of the fact that the expression *Śrī Calu* is prefixed by the qualification *parākram-ōtsāhamuḍaiya* (who was zealous in prowess). It may be taken that the monarch referred to hear was the Cālukyan king who was very likely Vikramāditya II.

The Narwan Plates dated in Śaka 664 (exp) *uttarāyaṇa kāla* and the eighth regnal year of the Western Chālukya king Vikramāditya II (A.D. 741 or 42) describe the achievements of Cālukya Vikramāditya II. The details contained in them are practically the same as those in the Vakkalēri and Kendūr Plates of Kīrti-varman II. It is said in all of them that "immediately on coronation, being resolved to uproot completely his natural enemy (*prakṛtyamitra*) (i.e. the Pallava) he reached *Tuṇḍākaviṣaya* in great haste, beat and put to flight at the opening of the campaign, the opposing Pallava king named Nandi-Pōtavarmman, took possession of particular musical instruments many elephants and a heap of rubies; he then entered the city of Kāñcī but did not

destroy it, and acquired great merit by granting heaps of gold to the stone temple of Rājasimhēśvara and other gods which have been caused to be built by Narasimha Pōtavarman.⁹ This statement finds corroboration in the much obliterated short Kannaḍa inscription of Vikramāditya found on one of the pillars of the Rājasimhēśvara shrine in the Kailāsanātha temple at Kāñcīpuram, mentioning that the king having captured Kāñchī (and) having inspected the riches (belonging to the temple of) Rājasimhēśvara gave (them) again to the God.¹⁰

This expedition of Vikramāditya against the Pallava took place according to the Cālukyan records immediately after his coronation and was carried out in great haste. He ascended the Cālukyan throne in A.D. 733-34 and we may not be far wrong if we take that the expedition took place in A.D. 734. His Pallava adversary at that time was the young Nandivarman Pallavamalla.¹¹ But this was not the first expedition of Vikramāditya against Kāñcī. A Kannaḍa inscription on a slab broken into two and lying near the dilapidated Trimūrti temple at Uḷchaḷa in the Kurnool Taluk, dated in the 35th regnal year of the Western Cālukya King Vijayāditya corresponding to A.D. 731 records that yuvarāja Vikramāditya went on an expedition to Kāñcī, levied tribute from Paramēśvara-Pallava, and while returning presented Uḷchaḷu and Pariyaḷu to Durvviniṭa Ereyappa who granted certain concessions.¹² It will be clear from the above that Paramēśvaravarman II was ruling the Pallava kingdom in A.D. 731 and that tribute was levied from him by the Western Cālukya. It is not known how long he ruled after that. Since no inscription bearing a date later than his third regnal year has been found so far, it may be taken that he died soon after and Nandivarman Pallavamalla ascended the throne by 733 or 734 A.D. Immediately thereafter Vikramāditya invaded the Pallava kingdom as shown above. The question naturally arises as to why he should have directed his wrath on this boy-king just

9. See *Ind. Ant.*, VIII, p. 23 pp. and XXVII, p. 129.

10. *Ep. Ind.*, III, p. 360.

11. Both Chālukya Vikramāditya and Nandivarman Pallavamalla came to the throne almost at the same time.

12. *Annual Report on South Indian Epigraphy*, 1943-44 and 1944-45. App. E. No. 22 of the collection in the year 1941-42. See also *Ancient India*, No. 5, p. 54.

twelve years old, especially when the previous Pallava king had submitted to the Cālukya and paid tribute earlier.

It appears that the eighth label (Section H) of the Vaikuṇṭha-Perumāl temple contains an indirect answer to the above. It records that a certain Pallavadi—Araiyan who came to meet Pallavamalla on his way to Kāñcīpuram to assume that Pallava crown died (*maṇḍu pōṇḍa*) probably near the outskirts of Kāñcī. This point has unfortunately not been noticed so far. Why should the death of a person be mentioned while narrating the events connected with an auspicious function like the coronation of a king, unless it has a bearing directly on it, very likely a conquest?

But the label as construed at present does not envisage any such thing. It is taken as recording the homage paid by the feudatories to the king-elect on his way to assume the crown. Further the Pallavadi-Araiyan, mentioned in it is taken as a feudatory chief of the Pallavas like the Muttaraiyan and Pēraraiyan. But we have to take the word Pallavadi-Araiyan to mean a junior member of the Pallava ruling family on the analogy of the word Gangadhī-araiyan which means Ganga princes ruling over provinces. Such usages are found in some inscriptions. For instance the Kūram Plates of Paramēśvaravarman I mention the construction of temple Vidyāvinīta Pallava Paramēccuragṛham and the gift of the village of Paramēśvaramangalam by Vidyāvinīta Pallavādhīrāja (Sanskrit portion 1.54).¹³ Again the Hellegeri Copper Plate grant dated in Śaka 635 (713-714 A.D.) corresponding to the thirty-fourth regnal year of the Western Ganga king Śivamāra mentions two persons Jayapallavādhīrāja and Vṛddhi Pallavādhīrāja the two year sons of the Pallava Yuvarāja.¹⁴

Really the label appears to record a different tale. It says that Pallavadi Araiyan came to meet the newly elected ruler with his great force or large army (*mahābalaṃ*). It would seem incongruous for a feudatory chief to take his large army (*mahābalaṃ*) with him when proceeding to meet and pay his homage to the king-elect on the latter's journey to the capital for his coronation. The wording of the label and the use of the word *mahābalaṃ* have to be taken to mean military action.

13. *S.I.I.*, I, p. 154.

14. *Ep. Car.*, Vol. III, Md. 113.

The sculptures depicting the scene do not also show the prince on the back of an elephant. The relative panels are described as follows:

Panel VII which is divided horizontally into two sections contains in the upper row a seated royal figure, sad and dejected, with two attendants to his right. The rest of the panel illustrates one scene. A number of men on the right side are cheering a person, evidently Pallava-malla, as he is proceeding on horse back. A man with a *kirita* on his head is meeting him. Evidently this is the Pallavadi Araiya. His army of elephants is represented in the next panel (i.e.) Panel VIII which is again divided as before into two sections. The upper is filled with the army of elephants and the lower contains the marching soldiers and horsemen. In the next panel (i.e. Panel IX), the officials, the townsmen, the feudatories and the *Mūlaprakṛtis* are all seen in the lower half of the panel going towards Paramēśvara Pallavamalla to welcome him. He is seen on horse back.¹⁵ Nowhere is the king-elect seen seated on the back of an elephant as the inscribed label is said to narrate. On the other hand the disposition of the elephants and of the marching soldiers and horsemen, nay, of the whole scene, seems to illustrate some military activity.

Further the expression which has been read as *ērrink-konḍu* meaning raising or placing the prince on the back of the elephant is not also supported by the sculpture. The word may better be read as *errik-konḍu* with a short *e*. The word *errudal* means to attack, to kick, to strike, to kill. With this suggested reading the label may be translated as follows: "Starting from there, he (Pallavamalla) was coming on the way leaving behind many mountains rivers, and dense forests; and hearing this Palavadi Araiya came opposite to him with a big or great army (*mahābala*), struck and killed elephants and died—(near) the great city of Kāñcīpuram.

Thus it will be seen that the selection of the boy Pallavamalla was not unanimous or without opposition as it has been supposed to be. The label clearly states that the boy's progress towards Kāñcīpuram was opposed by Pallavadi Araiya who however died in the skirmish though he killed some elephants.

15. Minakshi, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

Who the Pallava Prince was that opposed Pallavamalla on his way to his coronation and died is not clear. It is possible he was one of the two Pallavadhi rājas mentioned as the sons of a Pallava Yuvarāja in the Hellegere grant dated in 713-14 A.D. mentioned above. The name of the Pallava Yuvarāja is not given in the inscription. The then Pallava king was Rājasimha also known as Narasimhavarman II. He had two sons Mahēndravarman III and Paramēśvaravarman II. We have an inscription of Mahendra in the Kailāsanātha temple at Kāñcīpuram.¹⁶ But he does not seem to have succeeded to the throne. Evidently he predeceased his father.¹⁷ But when that happened is not known. Anyway the Yuvarāja mentioned in the Hellegeri inscription must be either Mahendra III or Paramēśvara II.

If the Pallava Araiya who opposed Pallavamalla before his coronation was possibly one of the two grandsons of Rājasimha, then naturally the question arises as to what became of the other. The Udayēndiram Plates dated in the twenty-first regnal year of Nandivarman Pallavamalla give a graphic account of his long and difficult campaign against the Southern powers and the services rendered by Udayacandra, the Lord of Vilvalapura, and the general of Nandivarman to his royal master.¹⁸ The grant says: "When he (Udayacandra) perceived that Pallavamalla was besieged in Nandipura by the *Drāviḍa* princes, unable to bear this, like the visible death of the cloud of the enemies of Pallavamalla, slew with his sharp sword which glittered like the petal of a water-lily, the Pallava king Chitramāya and others"¹⁹ (*Citramāya Pallavarājam*). Chitramāya was one of the titles of Paramēśvaravarman I.²⁰ Possibly the Pallava prince Citramāya killed by Udayacandra was the great-grandson of Paramēśvaravarman and bore his name. Thus even after his coronation Pallavamalla had a Pallava claimant to the throne to oppose him. It is possible to surmise from the

16. *S.I.I.*, I, No. 27, p. 22.

17. Minakshi, *op. cit.*, p. 32, descriptions of panels XVII and XVIII. The wounded chief being carried in a cloth hammock to the presence of the king and his queen and the two Brāhmanas seated on the floor below the king's seat as if in the act of prayer may well be taken as representing the death of Mahendra III.

18. *S.I.I.*, Vol. II, Pt. III, No. 74, pp. 367-374.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 372.

20. *Ep. Ind.*, Vol. X, p. 9; *S.I.I.*, Vol. XII, p. 10.

Udayēndiram grant that Citramāya who is mentioned there as king was not prepared to accept Pallavamalla as the Pallava king and probably was able to wrest a part of the Pallava kingdom from Pallavamalla and was ruling it as its king.

When there were thus at least two princes coming in regular Pallava line and claiming right to succeed to the Pallava throne, it will appear strange that the *Māttras*, the *Ghaṭikayār* and the *Mūlaprakṛtis* of the Pallava kingdom should approach Hiranyavarman and request him to accept the crown. The two requisite qualifications which were necessary to rule the kingdom, and which, they thought, Hiranyavarman possessed and so was eligible for being chosen as king, were ability to bear the burden of the kingdom and purity of descent on both sides (*rāja[bhā] ram grahakka samarthar—ubhayakula pariśuddhar*). But one wonders if the first requisite for the kingdom could have been satisfied by the selection of Pallavamalla as king since he was only a boy of twelve years and was living at a place far away from Kāñcīpuram and separated from it by hills, rivers and forests.²¹ In the early years of his reign at least he must have been a king only in name, the actual powers being in the hands of some others. But with the present available evidence it is not possible to say who the *de facto* ruler of the Pallava kingdom was during the early years of the reign of Pallavamalla or if he had the support of any foreign power. But it is certain that there was a strong party that stood for him and supported him successfully against the other Pallava princes who opposed him. But from the point of view of ability to bear the burden of the kingdom the Pallavadi Araiya who opposed Pallavamalla with a *mahābala* was probably a better person. He had possibly some support from inside and outside the Pallava kingdom. And even after his death we find that another, Citramāya, put forth his claim to the Pallava throne and partially succeeded in his attempt.

Thus there appears to have been two strong opposing parties in the Pallava kingdom. The expedition undertaken by the Western Chālukya, king, Vikramāditya II, in great haste immediately after his coronation against Pallavamalla would suggest that the

21. It is not even known whether the place where the junior family of the Pallavas to which Hiranyavarman belonged had been then residing was within the Pallava kingdom itself or outside it.

Pallavadi Araiya who fought against Nandivarman before his coronation and died had the support of the Chālukyas, and the expedition of Vikramāditya against Kāñcī was undertaken to avenge the death of his protege. The Kannaḍa inscription of the Chālukya king in the Kailāsanātha temple at Kāñcīpuram testifies to the fact that the expedition was successful, and that the Pallava kingdom was conquered by him. Probably he installed Citramāya on the Pallava throne and made grants to the Kailāsanātha temple, without destroying the city. All the above discussion would show that the first requisite thought to be essential for ruling over the Pallava kingdom does not seem to have been satisfied by the selection of Pallavamalla to the Pallava throne.

Much is not known about the purity of decent on both sides mentioned as the second requisite. From the information available it is seen that the rival princes were of the same Pallava family. As such the purity of their descent on the male side is beyond question. If at all any claim is to be made of purity it could be only on the female side. The Kaśākuḍi Plates describe Nandivarman as one "who is able to support the race of the Pallavas" (*Pallavānām kula bhārṇa paṭuḥ*) and "who is descended from a pure mother" (*śuddha mātranvavāyaḥ*).²² With this has to be compared what is stated in the Vaikuṇṭhaperumāl temple label, namely *ubhayakula pariśuddha*. Thus more than the ability to rule, family purity was considered important, and from that point of view Nandivarman Pallavamalla had obviously a better claim to the Pallava throne than Pallavadi Araiya who was probably an illegitimate son of Paramēśvarman II. Hence his choice.

Thus a careful examination of the contents of the label inscription in the Vaikuṇṭha Perumāl temple and other pieces of evidence would show that the accession of Nandivarman Pallavamalla to the throne was not so peaceful as is supposed. Since the available material bearing on the subject does not give the entire information it is not possible to determine in detail the exact course of events. But one thing is clear. There were other Pallava princes evidently of the main line itself who had good support from one section of the people and they strongly opposed Pallavamalla from the very beginning.

22. S.I.I., II, p. 350. 1.70.

The Acquisition and Loss of Ranthambhor by Rao Surjan Hada

BY

ARYA RAMCHANDRA G. TIWARI, M.A., LL.B.,

Conquest of Ranthambhor by Rao Surjan:

Being hard pressed by Habib Khan, an imperial commander, Sangram Khan, the Afghan Commander of Ranthambhor, agreed to hand the fort over to him on certain conditions, one of them being that a part of the stipulated money should consist of ready cash. Habib Khan had no ready money to pay. So he resorted to delaying tactics with the intention of conquering the fort by force.¹ Haji Khan, who had been expelled by the Mughals from Jaitaran,² arrived on the scene at this time. Possibly, on Haji Khan's advice and himself being also sure of the futility of further resistance to the Mughals,³ Sangram Khan called Rao Surjan of Bundi, the powerful Hada chieftain and a vassal of Mewar to help him.⁴ Surjan was then 'celebrated' for his wealth and number of followers.⁵ He went with 400 followers and contrived to enter into the fort at mid-night.⁶ One Savant Singh Chauhan, who had fled Bundi to save his life from Rao Surtan, the former ruler of Bundi, and joined Islam Shah Sur and got a post in the fort of Ranthambhor, was already there.⁷ Surjan, having paid the required money to Sangram Khan⁸ on behalf of Udai Singh,⁹ got

1. Al Badaoni (Lowe Tr.), II/25-6. The fort of Ranthambhor was surrendered to Sher Shah (Akbar Nama: Beveridge Tr., I/400) by Abul Farah Khan Khanan, the governor of Qadir Shah of Malwa, who had acquired it after the death of Bahadur Shah (Tarikh-i Sher Shahi: Allahabad MS, leaf 185).

2. Nensi I/60.

3. Ain-i Akbari (Second edition), I/482.

4. ibid, I/482; Akbr Nama I/133.

5. Tabkat-i Akbari: De Tr., II/234.

6. Vanasha Bhaskar, p. 2246.

7. ibid, pp. 2218-9.

8. Akbar Nama II/133; Tab. II/234; Al Badaoni II/26; Briggs: Farishta II/232; Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175.

9. cf. Nensi I/60, 111.

the fort well equipped and strong.¹⁰ The Rao held the fort against the Mughals¹¹ with the help of the Afghan garrison whom he won over to his side and employed in his service.¹² Sangram Khan on the receipt of the stipulated sum left Ranthambhor and, along with Haji Khan, threaded his way to Gujarat.¹³ The Mughals remained at Ranthambhor for some time and were ultimately compelled to raise the siege.¹⁴ Surjan won over the neighbouring potentates by bribe or diplomacy.¹⁵ Udai Singh, in whose name the fort was acquired from the Afgans, entrusted the command of Ranthambhor to Surjan Hada.¹⁶ Surjan took up his residence there,¹⁷ built a palace in the fort¹⁸ and stored a large quantity of provisions and arms.¹⁹ The adjoining districts were also brought under his control.²⁰ Gradually his authority was established over 400 villages in the vicinity of Ranthambhor which lodged terror in the heart of the Mughals.²¹ Akbar sent Habib Khan again to conquer the fort.²² Udai Singh checked the Mughals.²³ Habib Khan once again besieged the fort.²⁴ Hard battles were fought but Surjan stuck valiantly to the defence of Ranthambhor. The siege lasted for a long time.^{25 & 26} Meanwhile Bairam Khan revolted and the Mughals were once again compelled to raise the siege and retire.²⁷ The only gain to the

10. Vansha Bhaskar, p. 2248.

11. cf. Al Badaoni II/26.

12. Vansha Bhaskar, p. 2248.

13. Al Badaoni II/26. See also Mirat-i Sikandari; Faridi Tr., p. 279; Tab. II/400; Farishta IV/157.

14. Al Badaoni II/26. See also Ain. (i/482). Abul Fazl attributes this failure partly to ill-luck and partly to the confusion consequent upon the fall of Bairam Khan.

15. Al Badaoni II/26.

16. Nensi I/60, 110.

17. Vansha Bhaskar, p. 2248.

18. Akbar Nama II/133.

19. Al Badaoni II/26.

20. Akbar Nama II/133; Tab. II/234.

21. Vansha Bhaskar, p. 2248.

22. Akbar Nama II/133; Tab. II/234. Al Badaoni (II/29) calls him Hussain Khan.

23. Amar Kavya, SBU MS. No. 1661, leaf 33 (a).

24. Al Badaoni II/29; Akbar Nama II/133; Tab. II/29.

25 & 26. Tab. II/234.

27. Akbar Nama II/133; Al Badaoni II/29.

Mughals was the plunder from the area around the fort.²⁸ One year after the purchase of the fort Surjan removed the Afghan garrison from the fort.²⁹

Akbar's Preparations against Ranthambhor:

On his way back after his conquest of Chittoor Akbar reached Ajmer on Sunday, March 6, 1568 A.D. and prayed at the mosque of Khwaha Nizamuddin Chisti.³⁰ After a stay of 10 days on March 16, 1568 A.D.³¹ he left for Agra³² via Mewat,³³ Alwar and Narnul³⁴ and reached Agra³⁵ on April 13, 1568 A.D.³⁶ He stayed at Agra for some months.³⁷ During this period he decided to conquer the fort of Ranthambhor because the occupation of such a strong fort by the Rana had made peace in the empire impossible.³⁸ Orders were issued for the mobilization of those soldiers who had not served in Mewar. Asharaf Khan,³⁹ Sadiq Khan Mir Munshi,⁴⁰ Samanji Khan⁴¹ and Khwaja Gayasuddin Bakshi⁴² were sent with a huge army as an advance party for this task⁴³. Hardly had they moved out that the news of the return of Ibrahim Mirza and Muhammad Hussain Mirza, the sons of Muhammad Sultan Mirza, to Malwa⁴⁴ was received by Akbar from these generals.⁴⁵ So this army was diverted from Ranthambhor and sent to chase

28. Tab. II/234.

29. Vansha Bhaskar, p. 2246.

30. Tab. II/348; Al Badaoni II/108. (II/482) gives March 10, 1568 A.D.

31. Tab. II/348. Akbar Nama (II/482) gives March 14, 1568 A.D.

32. Tab. II/348; Al Badaoni II/108.

33. Tab. II/349.

34. *ibid.*, II/350.

35. *ibid.*, II/350; Farishta, II/232; Al Badaoni II/108.

36. Akbar Nama II/484.

37. Tab. II/350.

38. *ibid.*, II/350; Akbar Nama II/484.

39. Tab. II/484; Akbar Nama II/484; Al Badaoni II/110; Ain-i Akbari (Second Ed.), I/489.

40. Akbar Nama II/484. Tab. (II/350-1) and Al Badaoni (II/110) separate the words 'Sadiq Khan' and 'Mir Munshi' which confuses. In fact Sadiq Khan might have been 'Mir Munshi' of this expedition.

41. Akbar Nama II/484; Ain. I/489; Masir-ul Umara (Beveridge Tr. & Second Ed.), II/703-4.

42. Farishta II/232.

43. Tab. II/350; Al Badaoni II/110.

44. Tab. II/350; Farishta II/232.

45. Al Badaoni II/110.

out the Mirzas from Malwa⁴⁶ in conjunction with the forces of Qulij Khan, which were also originally mustered to attack Ranthambhor.⁴⁷ The Mirzas precipitately crossed R. Narbada and fled to Gujarat.⁴⁷ After the flight of the Mirzas, Qulij Khan, Sadiq Muhammad Khan and other amirs returned to Agra and the fief-holders of Malwa repaired to their estates.⁴⁸

Akbar's March against Ranthambhor:

During this period Akbar had called Mir Muhammad Khan Kalan, Qutubuddin Muhammad Khan, Kamal Khan Kakhar (Ghakkar)⁴⁹ and the whole Atgah clan⁵⁰ from the Panjab. They arrived at the court in August 1568 A.D.⁵¹ Hussain Quli Khan was called from Nagor⁵² and asked to remain with the emperor till the reduction of the fort of Ranthambhor.⁵³ His brother Ismail was also asked to stay in Agra.⁵⁴ On December 21, 1568 A.D.⁵⁵ Akbar moved from Agra to Delhi⁵⁶ to pray at the tomb of Humayun for victory at Ranthambhor.⁵⁷ After staying for some time at Delhi, he moved out for Ranthambhor⁵⁸ via Mewat and Lalsot.⁵⁹ The Mughals reached at the foot of the fort of Ranthambhor⁶⁰ on February 8, 1569 A.D.⁶¹

46. *ibid.*, II/110; Tab. II/350; Farishta II/232; Akbar Nama II/485; Masir. II/208; Faizi Sirhind: Akbar Nama, Elliot V/124-5.

47. Tab. II/350-1; Al Badaoni II/110; Farishta II/232.

48. Al Badaoni II/110; Akbar Nama II/486.

49. Tab. II/350-1. Cf. Akbar Nama II/486.

50. Al Badaoni II/109.

51. Tab. II/352; Akbar Nama II/487.

52. Tab. II/352; Akbar Nama II/487-8, Al Badaoni II/109; Ain. I/349; Masir., II/646.

53. Tab. II/352. Cf. Akbar Nama II/488.

54. Tab. II/352.

55. *ibid.*, II/352. Al Badaoni (II/100) simply says, 'in the beginning of Rajab' (976 A.H.), i.e., in the last week of sec. 1568 A.D.

56. Tab. II/352; Akbar Nama II/489; Al Badaoni II/110. Farishta (II/232) does not refer to this visit to Delhi by Akbar and says that in Dec. 1568 A.D. Akbar marched from Agra to conquer Ranthambhor.

57. Akbar Nama II/489.

58. *ibid.*, II/490; Tab. II/353; Al Badaoni II/110.

59. Akbar Nama I/490. Lalsot is 40 miles south of Jaipur.

60. *ibid.*, II/490; Tab. II/353; Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175.

61. Akbar Nama II/490.

Geographical Location of Ranthambhor:

At Ranthambhor two equally high peaks of Aravali, Ran and Thambhor, overlooking each other, stand side by side; one of them lodges the fort of Ranthambhor on it. The fort, defended by a girdle of mountains, is strong and lofty, incapable of being reduced by catapults. To the natural defences of the fort, Surjan had added a strong defensive masonry.^{61a} In May 1561 A.D. Akbar had passed near the fort of Ranthambhor on his way to Malwa to reduce Adham Khan. Rai Surjan had fulfilled the obligations of hospitality due to the emperor, possibly, at the instance and on behalf of Udai Singh, by suitable presents and personal participation in the function of welcome.⁶² It was near Ranthambhor that Akbar and Biharimal had met for the feast arranged to celebrate the occasion of the inclusion of Biharimal's daughter in the imperial harem.⁶³ Thus Ranthambhor lay on the direct imperial route and was too close to Agra to be left in the hands of the Rana of proved anti-Mughal inclinations.

Preliminary overtures of Akbar through Bhagwandas:

Before beginning of the siege Akbar sent Bhagwandas as envoy to Rao Surjan to arrange a peaceful surrender of the fort but the Rao refused to admit the Raja into the fort. So Bhagwandas delivered his message to the Rao through a messenger to surrender the fort to Akbar whom, according to the message, no power in India, could oppose. Surjan's asylum to Afgan soldiers was also cited by the Raja as conducive to quarrel and hence advice to disband them. Surjan refused both these requests⁶⁴ and prepared for the defence of the fort.⁶⁵ The reason for this defiant attitude of Surjan lay in the feeling of security offered by the natural strength of the fort of Ranthambhor,⁶⁶ wherein he had already collected ample provisions.⁶⁷

61a. *ibid.*, II/49.

62. *ibid.*, II/490. Abul Fazl wrongly calls it 'homage of submission'.

63. *ibid.*, II/491.

64. Vansha Bhaskar, PP/2260-2.

65. *ibid.*, II/2262; Farishta II/232-3.

66. Ain. I/449. See also Tarikh-i Alafi (Elliot V/175) and Masir II/917.

67. Akbar Nama II/497. See also Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175 and Al Badaoni II/26.

Siege of Ranthambhor:

Immediately after reaching the fort Akbar himself inspected the surroundings of the fort from a hill-lock.⁶⁸ Orders for fixing batteries around the fort were issued after reconnoitering the place with skilled engineers.⁶⁹ On March 10, 1569 A.D. the siege of the fort began.⁷⁰ Traffic to and from the fort was stopped.⁷¹ Batteries were carried forward.⁷² The construction of 'sabats' was undertaken.⁷³ Heavy cannonade on the fort commenced.⁷⁴ The eminence of the peak of 'Ran'⁷⁵ was found more suitable for cannonading the fort and orders were issued to carry heavy artillery pieces to that point.⁷⁶ Soon the Mughal engineers employed themselves to achieve this miracle which so far no sovereign intending to conquer Ranthambhor had attempted.⁷⁶ During this period the fourteenth anniversary of the accession of Akbar arrived on March 14, 1569 A.D. and the occasion was celebrated with befitting festivities for 3 days.⁷⁷ Muhammad Qasim Khan⁷⁸ and Raja Todarmal,⁷⁹ ordered to construct 'sabats',⁸⁰ showed great activity. Skilled carpenters, stone-cutters and smiths, working under expert supervision, succeeded in raising a 'sabat' near the valley of Ran and carried their construction⁸¹ close to the fort⁸² at level with the ramparts⁸³ in 20 days.⁸⁴ Meanwhile, according

68. Masir. II/917.

69. *ibid.*, II/917; Akbar Nama II/491.

70. Farishta II/233.

71. Akbar Nama II/491; Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175.

72. Tab. II/354.

73. Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175.

74. Akbar Nama II/491.

75. Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175. See also Al Badaoni II/111; Akbar Nama II/494, Farishta (II/233) calls it Mudun.

76. Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175.

77. Tab. II/353, n. 1. This passage, according to the Translator's remark, is found only in one manuscript.

78. Akbar Nama II/493; Tab. II/353, n. 1 (carried on to p. 354).

79. Akbar Nama II/493.

80. *ibid.*, II/493; Tab. II/353, n. 1 (carried on to p. 354).

81. Akbar Nama II/493.

82. Al Badaoni II/111; Tab. II/354 (here translation of leaves from other two manuscripts of Tab. is given).

83. Akbar Nama II/493.

84. Tab. II/354 (Extract from other two MSS of Tab.)

to the instructions of Akbar,⁸⁵ 15 culverins,⁸⁶ each of which could be dragged with great difficulty by 200 pairs of oxen over level ground,⁸⁷ were mounted into positions by the labour of porters⁸⁸ 7800 in number,⁸⁹ on the precipitous height of Ran,⁹⁰ an unprecedented achievement on the part of Akbar.⁹¹ Each of these ordnance pieces could discharge boulders weighing 5 and 7 'mans'.⁹² They could also dart heavy round-shaped compounds of seven metals.⁹³ From their positions opposite the fort⁹⁴ commanding the rampart of the latter,⁹⁵ the first shot from these cannon struck the house of Surjan.⁹⁶ This made Surjan very apprehensive.⁹⁶ The first day cannonade destroyed several houses.⁹⁷ A great consternation spread amongst the garrison.⁹⁸ Along with some tall buildings, the walls of the citadel were also shattered on the first day.⁹⁹ Each volley broke down either some portion of the fort wall¹⁰⁰ or pulled down some houses.¹⁰¹ Several

85. *ibid.*, II/354 (Extract from other two MSS); Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175.

86. Al Badaoni II/111; Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175; Tab., II/354. (Extract from other two MSS). Akbar Nama (II/494) and Farishta (II/233) do not give the number of these pieces.

87. Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175; Akbar Nama II/494; Tab. II/354 (Extract from other two MSS).

88. Al Badaoni II/111; Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175; Tab. II/354 (Extract from other two MSS).

89. Al Badaoni II/111. Tab. (Extract from two other MSS, II/354) gives the number of the porters as 500.

90. Al Badaoni II/111; Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175; Akbar Nama II/494; Tab. II/354 (Extract from other two MSS).

91. Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175; Farishta II/233.

92. Al Badaoni II/111; Tab. II/354 (Extract from two other MSS.). The statement of Tarikh-i Alafi (Elliot V/175 and Akbar Nama (II/494)) that these artillery pieces could discharge stones weighing up to 50 to 60 'mans' are obvious exaggerations. See also Oza; Rajputana Ka Itihas II/731.

93. Akbar Nama II/494. The statement about their weight of 30 'mans' cannot be accepted. See also Tab. II/354 (Extract from other two MSS.).

94. Tab. II/354 (Extract from other two MSS.).

95. Al Badaoni II/111; Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175.

96. Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175.

97. Al Badaoni, II/111; Tab. II/354 (Extract from other two MSS.). See also Akbar Nama II/494.

98. Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175.

99. Tab. II/354 (Extract from other two MSS.).

100. Akbar Nama II/494.

101. Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175.

breaches were made in the walls of the fort.¹⁰² The damage to the buildings by every salvo of artillery,¹⁰³ the panic consequent upon this damage¹⁰⁴ and the knowledge of the exemplary punishment to the garrison of Chittor¹⁰⁵ made Surjan anxious and desperate.¹⁰⁶ The incapacity of the garrison to oppose the assailants was now obvious.¹⁰⁷ However, the gunners continued to rain fire upon the besiegers.¹⁰⁸ So Akbar let himself to be persuaded by Raja Bhagwandas, who, by reminding the emperor of the difficulties and losses at Chittor, managed to get himself commissioned for fresh negotiations with Surjan,¹⁰⁹ who was also by now chastened by the activity of the artillery from the eminence of Ran.¹¹⁰ Bhagwandas was authorised to negotiate the surrender of the fort for districts in Benares, Mathura and on the banks of Narbada.¹¹¹ Surjan was also reminded of the dreadful consequences if he failed to respond properly. The threat of a general assault on the following day of Id¹¹² in case the Rao failed in making submission¹¹³ and the desperation of Surjan, who now despaired of the defence of the fort,¹¹⁴ made him sue for peace on the following conditions: —

(1) He should be permitted to give three cheers in the name of the Rana of Mewar even while attending the imperial court;

(2) He would never take up arms against the Ranas of Mewar;¹¹⁵

102. Tab. II/3545.

103. Farishta II/233.

104. cf. Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175.

105. *ibid*, Elliot V/175; Al Badaoni II/111.

106. Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175; Tab. II/353; Akbar Nama II/494.

107. Al Badaoni II/111.

108. Vansha Bhaskar, p. 2263.

109. Vansha Bhaskar, p. 2263; Nensi I/111. Though Akbar Nama (II/494) does not specifically mention Bhagwandas by name in this connection yet it refers to the intermediary role of some court nobles.

110. cf. Nensi I/111.

111. Surjancharitra, XVIII/2-22.

112. Akbar Nama II/494; Masir. II/917.

113. Akbar Nama II/494. The story of Akbar's entry in the fort as a mace bearer of Raja Man Singh (Tod III/1481) is simply fantastic.

114. Ain I/449.

115. Nensi I/111.

(3) No lady from his family would be demanded in marriage for the imperial family;¹¹⁶

(4) Ladies from his family would not attend the Nauraz festival;

(5) The Rao would bear arms in both Darbar-i Khas and Darbar-i Arm;

(6) The drums of the Hada ruler would keep beating upto the walls of the red fort;

(7) The Hadas would not cross River Attock in the north;

(8) The horses of the Rao would not be branded by the imperialists;

(9) He would not fight under anybody else's command;¹¹⁷ and lastly,

(10) In exchange for the fort of Ranthambhor he should get 26 fief-lands near Hadauti and 26 near Benares.¹¹⁸

116. Vansha Bhaskar, p. 2298. See also Masir I/409.

117. *ibid*, pp. 2268-9.

118. Vansha Bhaskar, p. 2298. The names of the fief-lands adjoining Hadauti were situated in the following places:—

(1) Hinglajgad, (2) Sahabad, (3) Malpur, (4) Toda, (5) Tonk, (6) Shergadh, (7) Rampur, (8) Kakadi, (9) Sironj, (10) Barwada, (11) Balabhet, (12) Mallarana, (13) Khatakheri, (14) Bhelsa, (15) Khandari, (16) Chainpur, (17) Bari, (18) Kheri, (19) Bainagadh, (20) Singoli, (21) Bhainsrorgadh, (22) Katholi, (23) Sathora, (24) Gugara, (25) Khalipur, (26) Agra.

The names of some of the places where the remaining fief-lands were situated.

(1) Manda, (2) Ramgadh, (3) Mainpur, (4) Saidabad, (5) Gadh Charna (Chunar Gadh), (6) Jhabalpur, (7) Awar. However, Nensi (I/111) says that Surjan got only 4 paraganas in Chunar, near Benaras for Ranthambhor.

Dr. Dashrath Sharma (Shaudh Patrika I/3-pp. 135-141) has made out a case in defence of Surjan with the help of the testimony of Surjan-charitra. He holds that Surjan did not get so many districts as Vansha Bhaskar states. However, it is to be borne in mind that it is difficult to rule out the testimony of Surajmal's Vansha Bhaskar because Kavi Chandra Shekhar fails to mention some of them. Any way, it is difficult to refute the charge of Tod (III/1481-3) that Surjan surrendered the fort for a bribe.

Visit of the Hada Princes to Akbar and Surjan's Surrender :

Akbar accepted these terms.¹¹⁹ So the Rao sent his two sons — Duda and Bhoj — with some officers¹²⁰ to the court¹²¹ and asked for his personal safety.¹²² Akbar received them well¹²³, honoured them with robes of honour, to wear which they were carried to an adjoining apartment. One of the attendants from the fort, somewhat of unsound mind, who was standing outside the camp, believed that the princes were arrested and carried into custody; so he pulled out his sword for rescuing them. Bipakdas Sakrwal, a servant of Bhagwandas, tried to explain the whole situation but in vain and got attacked by that attendant. After finishing the servant of Bhagwandas, this mad-man ran towards the imperial tent. Khuha Chaikhawat's son, Puranamal, along with two others, was injured in this melee. Shaikh Bahauddin Badayuni was cut in two by this insane man and was ultimately killed by a servant of Muzaffar Khan. The princes regretted the event when they learnt about it.¹²⁴ Akbar was astonished and the princes were ashamed of this occurrence.¹²⁵ As these princes were innocent, Akbar's good will did not suffer.¹²⁶ They were returned to Surjan¹²⁷ with an imperial assurance for the Rao's safety¹²⁸ provided he waited upon the emperor.¹²⁹ Joyously the princes returned to the fort.¹³⁰ Now Surjan, to save his face,¹³¹ solicited Akbar for some befitting imperial escort to lead him to the imperial presence.¹³² Akbar sent Hussain Quli Khan¹³³ who then held the

119. Vansha Bhaskar, p. 2269.

120. Masir, II/91.

121. Akbar Nama II/464; Al Badaoni II/111; Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175; Tab. II/355; Ain. I/449. Farishta does not mention the visit of the princes to the court.

122. Tab. II/355.

123. Ain., I/449.

124. Akbar Nama II/494-5; Masir II/917-8. See also Ain. I/449.

125. Akbar Nama II/495. See also Masir. II/918.

126. Ain. I/449; Masir II/918.

127. Ain. I/450.

128. Tab. II/365; Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175.

129. Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/175.

130. *ibid*, Elliot V/176.

131. Akbar Nama II/495.

132. *ibid*, II/495; Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/176; Masir. II/918. See also Ain. I/450.

133. Tab. II/355; Al Badaoni II/111; Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/176; Akbar Nama II/495.

title of Khan Jahan,¹³⁴ to assure,¹³⁵ comfort¹³⁶ and bring Surjan to the court.¹³⁷ As Hussain Khan approached near the fort, Surjan came forward to meet him and carried him to his residence where the Khan was hospitably treated.¹³⁸ Surjan was presented before the emperor to pay his homage, along with suitable presents and the keys of the fort of gold and silver.¹³⁹ Akbar treated him with great consideration.¹⁴⁰ Surjan requested the emperor through the courtiers¹⁴⁰ for 3 days time for evacuation of his own¹⁴⁰ and his followers' families and property from the fort, ¹⁴¹ thereafter it was to be made over to the imperial officers.¹⁴² The request was granted¹⁴³ on the stipulation that the sons of the Rao should be left as hostages.¹⁴⁴ After 3 days¹⁴⁵ Surjan came out of the fort with his family and baggage¹⁴⁶ on March 21, 1569 A.D.¹⁴⁷ However, Savant Singh Chauhan refused to surrender the fort in spite of several temptations by Bhagwandas and Akbar and died fighting the enemy with his small band of followers.¹⁴⁸ Surjan was permitted by the Mughals to leave the place unmolested.¹⁴⁹ The fort fell in the hands of the Mughals with all its ammunition,¹⁵⁰ granaries and stores.¹⁵¹ Akbar conferred it upon Mihtar Khan.¹⁵² Next day, Akbar entered into the fort and personally inspected its defences.¹⁵³ Then the army was ordered to return to Agra under Khwaja Amin (who had the title of Khwaja Jahan) and Muzaffar

134. Tab. II/355. See Ain., item 24.

135. Al Badaoni II/111.

136. Tab. II/355.

137. *ibid*, II/355; Al Badaoni II/111.

138. Akbar Nama II/495; Masir. II/918.

139. Akbar Nama II/495; Masir. II/918; Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/176.

140. Akbar Nama II/495.

141. Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/176. See also Masir. II/918.

142. Akbar Nama II/495; Masir. II/918.

143. Akbar Nama II/495; Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/176.

144. Akbar Nama II/495.

145. *ibid*, II/495; Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/176; Masir. II/918.

146. Akbar Nama II/495.

147. Tab. II/355; Al Badaoni II/222. Nensi (I/111) gives March 23, 1568 A.D. for it.

148. Vansha Bhaskar, p. 1169-70.

149. Farishta II/233.

150. Tarikh-i Alafi, Elliot V/176.

151. Akbar Nama II/495.

152. Tab. II/355; Ain. I/459.

153. Akbar Nama II/495-6; Tab. II/355.

Jahangir Farmans in Jaipur Archives

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Jaipur Rulers and Mughals had personal and official relations right from the period of Akbar to Aurangzeb and onwards. A great importance was given to Jaipur Rulers by the Mughal Emperors. Akbar patronized Bharmal, Bhagwan Das and Mansingh, while Mirza Raja Jai Singh played a very important role in times of Jahangir, Shahajahan and Aurangzeb. All these personalities had a deep regard for the Emperors. They were given the highest jobs which could otherwise be given to the royal princes. In return these princes showed great enthusiasm for all the royal activities both in administration and in fields of battles. Most of them were having big Mansabs and were considered trustees of the empire. Raja Mansingh, Mirza Raja Jaisingh and latter Sawai Jaisingh were pillars of the empire in their own times. With such good relations naturally a lot of correspondence was going on between the Emperors, and the rulers. A part of this correspondence is preserved in Jaipur Archives. Valuable documents throwing light on the various historical events are also available both in Persian and Rajasthani scripts. The documents in Jaipur Archives exist under the following categories.

1. Farmans and Nishans
2. Akhbarat
3. Vakil Reports to Maharaja in Persian
4. Vakil Reports to Maharaja in Hindi
5. Vakil Reports to Officials in Persian
6. Vakil Reports to Officials in Hindi
7. Khatut Maharaja in Persian .
8. Khatut Maharaja in Hindi
9. Khatut Officials in Hindi
10. Khatut Officials in Persian
11. Kharita in Hindi

Khan,¹⁵⁴ and the emperor himself proceeded to Ajmer for thanksgiving to the Khwaja for this victory.¹⁵⁵ Akbar conquered Ranthambhor in one month while Allauddin took one year for it.¹⁵⁶ From Ajmer Akbar made for Amber¹⁵⁷ and reached Agra on May 11, 1569 A.D.¹⁵⁸ The chronogram of this victory was found in the word 'Victory' or 'They took the fort quickly',¹⁵⁹ both yielding 976 (A.H.), the year of the conquest. After reaching Agra, Akbar built two images of Jaimal and Patta, representing them on elephants and one of Surjan, showing him with the face of a dog,¹⁶⁰ a fittest symbol of the mentality of selling the master's trust for a loaf of bread. In this way after governing the fief and fort of Ranthambhor on behalf of Udai Singh for about 9 years, Surjan surrendered it to Akbar.¹⁶¹ Surjan's eldest son Duda went to Rana Udai Singh straight from Ranthambhor and got some daily allowance for his maintenance.¹⁶²

There is no unanimity amongst the Muslim chroniclers about the date of the surrender of the fort of Ranthambhor to Akbar by Surjan. Al Badaoni¹⁶³ and Nizamuddin Ahmad¹⁶⁴ hold that the fort was surrendered for the occupation of the imperial officers on the 3rd day of Shawwal 976 A.H., i.e., March 22, 1569 A.D. while Akbar Nama¹⁶⁵ and Maulana Ahmad¹⁶⁶ hold that Surjan presented himself before Akbar on March 22, 1569 A.D. and the fort was surrendered three days later—i.e., on March 25, 1569 A.D. The views of Al Badaoni and Nizamuddin are more reliable. One day

154. Tab. II/355; Al Badaoni II/111.

155. Tab. II/355; Al Badaoni II/111; Akbar Nama II/496.

156. Akbar Nama II/495. Alauddin Khilji had captured the fort of Ranthambhor from Hammir Deo Chauhan (Nensi II/483) on Tuesday, July 11, 1310 A.D. (Kavi Rao: Kavitta Sanga ra, verses, see A.B.G. Tiwari: *ABORI*, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 41 n.).

157. Akbar Nama II/496.

158. *ibid*, II/497; Tab. II/355; Al Badaoni II/111.

159. Al Badaoni II/222.

160. Nensi I/111. In Mewar also Surjan was greatly codemned for this unchivalrous surrender to Akbar.

161. Nensi's view (I/111) that Surjan held Ranthambhor for 14 years is incorrect.

162. Nensi I/111.

163. Al Badaoni II/111.

164. Tab. II/355.

165. Akbar Nama II/495.

166. *Tarikh-i Alafi*, Elliot V/176.

before Id, i.e., on March 18, 1569 A.D. Duda and Bhoj would have appeared before the emperor because Akbar had threatened an assault on the day of Id.¹⁶⁷ Naturally, next day the Rao would have made his homage to Akbar. If the views of Abul Fazl and Maulana Ahmad be accepted, it is difficult to explain the lapse of three days between the appearance of the princes and the appearance of Rao. The time being very critical Akbar would not have permitted three days to Surjan which he could profitably use, due to cease-fire, in strengthening the defences of the battered fort. So on March 19 Surjan would have made his appearance in the imperial court and on March 22, 1569 A.D. the fort was surrendered to the imperialists.

167. cf. Akbar Nama II/494; *Masir*. II/917.

12. Kharita in Persian
13. Draft Kharitas in Hindi
14. Draft Kharitas in Persian
15. Applications to the Maharajas in Hindi
16. Letters of officials
17. Arastta
18. Waqaya
19. Barat
20. Awarza
21. Roznamcha
22. Council Records
23. Walter Sabha (Modern Departments-Revenue, Police etc.)
24. Shalmat Record
25. Amber Record
26. Correspondence regarding Shivaji's visit at Agra to Jaipur Camp
27. Kapatduwara Record

Out of the above documents the most important letters are in the form of Farmans addressed by the Mughal Emperors to the Maharajas. A farman was only addressed by the Emperor in the form of an order or a complimentary letter giving certain important information or important messages regarding administration or a battle. If a Mughal prince addressed such a letter, it was known as Nishan. A Prince also by authority of the Emperor could instruct or order the Maharajas or Princes of the states. There are about 257 Farmans including Nishans. Here details of Farmans and Nishans of Jahangir's period only would be dealt with. There are in total 21 Farmans including Nishans of Jahangir's period addressed to Mirza Raja Jaisingh. Out of them 17 are Farmans and 4 Nishans. They relate to the period 1622-1627 A. D. Out of these only one Farman (addressed by Noor Jahan) is of 1622, four of 1623, three of 1624, six of 1625, four of 1626 and two of 1627. These Farmans relate to the period when Mirza Raja Jai Singh was only in boyhood and was not more than 16 years of age. Right from the period of Akbar to that of Jahangir campaign against the Deccan was strongly pursued. Mirza Raja Jai Singh in his very early age was asked to go to Deccan by Jahangir along with the royal prince, and Khan Jahan was appointed as guardian and commander-in-chief to the prince. Two of the Farmans written in 1627 were sent by Prince

Khurram and Dawarbaksh informing about the sad demise of Jahangir and their accession to the throne respectively. This was the time when the contest for the throne was to be decided in the heated crisis created by Noor Jahan.

The farmans of the Mughal times are the fine specimen of Persian literature. The language used is of super quality. It is flowery, graceful and the oriental beauty permeates them throughout. For the beauty of style they can be produced as the fine specimen of any literature of the world. The phrases are well ornate and the words are appropriately-set. But they follow a deviation from the modern Persian. The modern Persian is less figurative and observes less ceremonies in writings. The reason is quite simple. The modern languages are the product of Democracy. They reflect upon the time and give a realistic picture of a democratic life. In a democratic society all men are treated on an equal footing and there is no superiority for anyone else on account of his status, wealth or riches. Flattery in language is not found to-day which marks a particular characteristic of a feudal time. Hence the frankness and fearlessness, the very blessings of democracy, has led us to direct, clear and unfigurative approach to our writings. But the language used in the past, say in the medieval times may be better termed as classics. Language of farmans clearly manifests the way of living tradition, mannerism and dignity of that age. It is the mirror of the picturesque life of the people of Mughal times. Since their advent in India, the Mughals were diplomatic and tactful. They knew that they were foreigners differing in religion, style, and culture. Therefore, in order to have a consolidated position it was absolutely essential to flatter or to praise those rulers whom they wished to keep as friends and strong subordinates. Hence the language is much flattering and figurative as to enhance the prestige of their subordinates. Looking to the addresses, it is quite clear that position of Rajasthan rulers particularly of Jaipur was very high. In a figurative style the Emperor has addressed Mirza Raja Jaisingh in too flowery language as—

نہدۃ الاشباہ والاقران لاتی الغایت ملایع الاسلام میرزا جہانگیر

in order to gather his sympathy.

This is a distinctive colouring tinged in Farmans. Here Zubedā means great and Ashba comes from Shabē, which means a picture of a ruler as we see reflected in a mirror. The 'shape' of a ruler is that of a ruler. Hence the full meaning of Zu be datul Ashabeh means the greatest of all rulers. Wal-Iqran means the nearest to all blood relations for qaran in Persian means the blood relations. Muti-ul-Islam refers to the follower of Islam Really Muti means those who obey and henceforth the impress of the language.

The titles thus conferred indicate their faith and reliance in the Jaipur rulers and this tendency highly reflects upon the Persian used in the Farmans. The language represents the old and classical characteristics but is graceful and beautiful all the while, which is rare in present times.

According to Ani-i-Akbari the Rajputana states were at that time formed under a Suba. The Suba consisted of all major states. They were kept under a Subedar with headquarters at Ajmer. This was done as all the states could easily be controlled from Ajmer which is the centre of Rajasthan. This strategic importance of Ajmer was felt in a similar manner by the British Government also. The Britishers kept Residents in each state and a Chief Agent Governor General at Ajmer.

It was customary that Mughals made correspondence through their Subedar, who then passed the letters or Farman to the Maharajah of the respective state. But this system was not prevalent for the Jaipur State. All the Farmans and other correspondence were sent directly. This is quite clear from the Farmans of this period. This shows what respect the Jaipur rulers had in the eyes of the Mughal Emperors.

These Farmans were sent through different Risalas. They were carried by the bearer in the silken bags having beautiful flowery decoration over the cloth. These farmans according to custom were received in a special Durbar arranged.

Ink:

The ink of farman is dark black. It is hardly washable. It is perfectly durable as is evident from the fact that it has not faded till now. No one can imagine that the documents were

written 300 years back. Who ever looking to the ink would be wonderstruck for its quality and durability.

The Mughal period has been famous for the art of calligraphy. This is depicted clearly in these farmans. Every word has its style and beautifully written. Hardly during these days in India we find such persons writing in such a good-hand.

Details:

Farmans of this period have got only one style throughout except there is some difference in the seal of Noor Jahan's Farmans. This would be discussed in details later.

As soon as you start reading Farman it starts with the praise of God "Allaha-ho-Akbar" "God is great" in the following form along with the address.

کتاب
الکتاب

زبدۃ الاشباہ الاقوان من نور الاشال والاعیان


قابل الاستقاء الاحسان مخلص بے پرو ورنک

واجب سیک بغایت علیہ مخصوص امیدوار کشتہ بزرگ حقیقت و خلاص مندی و دود تواریکی

لائی الغائبہ بوقعی معلوم مایست و ماورد از خانه ز اوان حجب نمیدیم خاطر بهر جہتی جمعی شسته

همیشه از احوال خود بدگاه و الاسر و منقبت باشد از فرموده خلف فخر و تحریر از فی تاریخ و حیات چاه

Seal:



On the right side of the Farman there is the Emperor's seal in round form. Seal is the most important feature of the Farman. It is the index of a Farman. Without a seal no one would care for the letter. Seal only could be the guiding force of the order. It consists of the names of previous Emperors prior to the present Emperor who had addressed it. This is in round form. In the centre the name of the present emperor is mentioned. This would become clear with the above seal of Jahangir. There is some difference of seal in the Nishan addressed by the prince. The seal of Noorjahan's Farman is different from all the other seals of Farmans addressed. This seal indicates Noor Jahan as Joint ruler of the empire. Noorjahan's name appears along with Jahangir. The names of other Emperors are not mentioned in round sequence as is mentioned in other Farmans of Jahangir. The seals of Nishans are different from that of the Farmans addressed by the Emperor. These previous rulers in round form are not mentioned. Only the name of the prince is mentioned alongwith the Emperor by whose courtesy it is sent.

Seals are decorated black when a Farman or Nishan is addressed at the time of death. This is indicated by a Nishan addressed by Dwarbaksh who informs Mirza Raja Jai Singh about the sad demise of Emperor Jahangir, but such indications are not available in the Nishan of Prince Khurram having the same

information. Hence no hard and fast rule for making the seal black on such occasions existed.

On the left side of the Farman a Tughra is written in the following form:—



This is a particular style of mentioning the name of Emperor who is addressing e.g. in one of the Farman's the name mentioned in the style is "Abul Muzzafar Mohammad Nooruddin Jahangir Gazi"; on the right corner below mixed in the words is written Farman signifying the same. A Nishan is mentioned in case it is addressed by a Prince. In Tughras of the two Nishans of Princes Dwarbaksh and Khurram the word Nishan as such does not occur. But this is not so in case of other Nishans of Shahjahan and Aurangzeb's period. This Tughra is always written in the golden ink plus some red ink here and there.

Subject:

After this, the actual Farman starts. It starts with high sounding titles to the Maharaja. This set of address is available in all the Farmans and Nishans of this period. This is in the following form—"Zubedatul-Ashabah-val-Ikran-laiqul-Inayat val Ahsan Khanejat Jan-nisar Beryoring Jai Singh".

After this the main orders or instructions start. Even in the middle of Farman generally high praises are mentioned according to the status and views held by them of the Maharaja.

The Farman or Nishan ends with the words "Taghuluf Nevar zad" meaning by that everything should be done according to the royal instructions. In continuation the dates are mentioned in the Hizri era and also in the regnal year of the Emperor. On the back side of the Farman or Nishan the name of the person

or Risala is mentioned through which it is sent. Let us take now each Farman to study their contents.

Farman No. 1

This Farman is addressed by Empress Nurjahan to Mirza Raja Jai Singh.

The first Farman in this series is of Empress Nurjahan of 19 Amarda San Jaloos 17 i.e. dated 2nd August, 1622 A.D. This is a joint Farman written by Nur Jahan on behalf of Emperor Jahangir. Noor Jahan desires Maharaja Jaisingh to send all the amount of Ijara and lease as per list attached of Pargana Amber through Mohmmmed Hashim, who has been specially appointed for collecting money of the said Pargana. The Ijara system prevailed in China and Persia also. Nurjahan further desires that unnecessary delay should be avoided to despatch the said amount.

It is not mentioned through which Risala the Farman was despatched. Probably this was despatched through the personal staff attached to Nurjahan. This document has been considered as a Farman not as Nishan, as Nurjahan in this period was a full-fledged ruler along with Jahangir and wrote by the authority vested in her. This is clear from the seal as Nurjahan's name is written below Jahangir's, and that it is mentioned for Nurjahan as "by courtesy of Emperor Jahangir".

Farman No. 2

This is a Nishan addressed by Prince Shahariyar to Mirza Jai Singh.

The second document is a Nishan as it is addressed by Prince Shahariyar to Mirza Raja Jaisingh. All letters from the princes are known as Nishans. Such letters by princes are written by the permission and authority of the Emperor. The seal of these documents is different from the seal of the Imperial Farman as names of princes and the rulers are mentioned only as compared to the seal of the Emperor in round form having names of previous emperors.

Prince Shahariyar informs Mirza Raja Jaisingh that Lokmandass is appointed as Kerori at Dausa. Maharaja should render all possible help to Lokmandass and communicate his progress.

This is 6 Bahman San Jaloos, 17 i.e. dated 15th January, 1623 and "is sent through Amir Begh NOBET Vakaya". This is written on the reverse of the Nishan).

Farman No. 3

This Farman is addressed from Jahangir to Mirza Raja Jaisingh.

Jahangir considers Mirza Raja Jaisingh a very useful person of the court. He has the highest regard and wishes him to the highest position. His Majesty was pleased to know that a battalion of able Rajputs was stationed with him for necessary help to the Emperor. Assures immense shower of kindness on all Rajputs participating. Emperor desires that the Raja with his forces should reach Delhi and see him here. He further wished that they might proceed with Khawas who was specially deputed to bring them all.

(This farman was issued at the bank of Ludhiyana River 17 Bahman San Jaloos 17 i.e. dated 6th February, 1623". It was sent through Abul Hussain Nobet Vakaya Jafar).

Farman No. 4

This farman is addressed from Emperor Jahangir to Mirza Raja Jaisingh and Girdrah Nagar-Bahadur jointly.

Emperor could know every thing about their love, affection and devotion through their letters received from Prince Parvez and Mubaruzuddin Mahabatkhan. His Majesty was highly pleased by their excellent work and desires him to follow all such directions in future.

(This is dated 8 Amardad San Jaloos 18 i.e. dated 20th July, 1623. It is not mentioned through which person or Risala it was despatched).

Farman No. 5

This farman is addressed from Emperor Jahangir to Mirza Raja Jaisingh.

· Informs that he had received the news of Maharaja's fight with Bedoulat and former's conquest over him. This information was given by Mubaruzuddin Khan Khana. Khilat and a horse is hereby sent.

("This is 14 Aban Sanjaloos 19 i.e. dated 26th August, 1624 and is sent through the Risala of Abul Hussain—Nobet Nawis Jaffar").

Farman No. 6

This Farman is addressed to Mirza Raja Jaisingh by the Emperor Jahangir.

Emperor says that he had sent a special Khilat with Ahmed Begh increasing his honour with instructions to carry on the duties strongly alongwith Prince and Mahabat Khan.

(This Farman is of 26 Afandar, Sanjloos 18 i.e. dated 24th March, 1624 and is sent through the Risala of Abul HASSAIN Nobet Vakaya Nawis).

Farman No. 7

This farman is addressed to Mirza Raja Jaisingh by Jahangir.

Says that Kutch Singh and Mirza Raja approached the prince for permission to leave for home. Informs that Rai Singh was deputed at Multan. Desires the Maharaja to execute his task sincerely and vigorously.

(This is of 9 Yuz Sanjaloos 21 i.e. dated 6th September, 1626 and is sent through the Risala of Mahabat Khan)".

Farman No. 8

This farman is addressed to Mirza Raja Jaisingh by the Emperor Jahangir.

Emperor says that Fiddai Khan had informed him about his meritorious services. He considers the Maharaja a wise and loyal servant and further directs him to join the expedition. Desires that he must be clear in his mind and not to be misled by certain persons.

(This is of 9 Aban Sanjaloos 20 i.e. dated 31st October, 1624 A.D.).

Farman No. 9

This Farman is addressed to Mirza Raja Jaisingh by the Emperor Jahangir.

Emperor desires Maharaja to act according to the instructions of Khan-i-jahan who has been appointed as guardian of the Prince and Commander in chief of Deccan campaign.

(This is of 7 Tir Sanjaloos 20 i.e. dated 7th June, 1625 and is despatched through the Risala Abul Hussain Vakaya Navis)".

Farman No. 10

This Farman is addressed to Maharaja Mirza Raja Jaisingh by Emperor Jahangir.

The Maharaja has been instructed strictly to follow Khan-i-Jahan who has been appointed as Commander of Forces. It has been strictly notified not to follow Khan-i-Khana and whoever follows would lose his Jagir.

(This is of 6 Yuz Sanjaloos 20 i.e. dated 7th August, 1625 A.D.).

Farman No. 11

This Farman is addressed to Maharaja Mirza Raja Jaisingh by Emperor Jahangir.

The Emperor directs the Maharaja to follow Khani Jahan. He has not liked Jai Singh's attitude for not following Khan Jahan. Directs Maharaja to go to Khan-i-jahan and work on his advice failing which warns for his confiscation of Jagir and Mansab.

(This is of 22 Yuz Sanjaloos 20 i.e. dated 23rd August 1625).

Farman No. 12

This Farman is addressed to Mirza Raja Jai Singh from Empress Noorjahan.

Empress Noor Jahan was highly pleased to know through Fida Khan "Imadatulmulk" that Maharaja had separated himself from Mahbat Khan. She blesses him and expects his similar attitude for the Emperor Jahangir in future. She also instructs the Maharaja to follow Khan Jahan for Royal favours".

(This is of 11 Aban Sanjaloos 20 i.e. dated 22nd October, 1625 A.D.).

Farman No. 13

This Farman is addressed to Mirza Raja Jaisingh from Emperor Jahangir.

Application of Maharaja through Fida Khan reflecting his attitude of true love and affection and obedience was received

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by the Emperor. Khana-i-jahan should be considered in all respects Commander of the Royal Forces, a tutor and a guardian which would win royal favours for him in future.

(This is of 3 Aban Sanjaloos 20 dated 10th November, 1625 and was despatched through the Risala of Abul Hussain Nobet Vakaya).

Farman No. 14

This Farman is addressed from Emperor Jahangir to Mirza Raja Jaisingh.

Emperor informs that Indaritmula Fida Khan is sent for consolation of people. He should be followed in all respects.

(This is of 30 Aban Sanjaloos 20 i.e. 10th November, 1625 A.D.).

Farman No. 15

This Farman is addressed from Emperor Jahangir to Mirza Raja Jaisingh.

Emperor appreciates the services of Maharaja rendered to Fida Khan as reported. Desires him to obey and work on consultation with the prince and Khanjahan.

(This is of 17 Bahman Sanjaloos 20 i.e. 23rd January, 1626 A.D. and is sent through the Risala of Abul Hussain Nobet Vakaya).

Farman No. 16

This Farman is addressed from Emperor Jahangir to Mirza Raja Jai Singh.

The Emperor was pleased to note the Maharaja's faithful and obedient attitude as praised by Mubaruzuddin Muhabat Khan. Wished Maharaja to act in the same manner for royal favours.

(This is of 15 Farwadin Sanjaloos 21 i.e. dated 26th March, 1626).

Nishan No. 17

This is addressed from the Prince Khurram to Mirza Raja Jaisingh.

This is the Nishan addressed from the Prince Khurram to Mirza Raja Jai Singh. States Ram Kishan while presenting himself to the Emperor reported about Maharaja's love and affection.

This has increased esteem and respects for him. Rajputs have been considered as highly faithful to the Mughals and it is only for these reasons the previous generations of Mughals respected them. It is only in view of such relations Emperor wishes the Maharaja to be on their side and increase the mutual love and affection. Assures Maharaja that his education will be imparted in the same manner as of Man Singh. Gopal Das should be treated as a trustee of the Emperor and regarded in high esteem.

(This is of 26 Raja Sanjaloos 21 i.e. dated 13th April, 1626 A.D.).

Farman No. 18

This Farman is addressed from Jahangir to Mirza Raja Jaisingh.

Emperor informs about Umber's death. A great chance has come. Orders that the Raja must use all his forces to put down conspiracies. Raja Sarang Deo could not be spared as impression of high preparation of war was not to be given. But now since he has been sent Maharaja should follow him in all respects. Raja Saran Deo should be considered as Emperor's true representative. Informs about his visit at Ajmer.

(This is dated 28 28 Uhurdad Sanjaloos 21 i.e. dated 11th June, 1626 A.D.).

Nishan No. 19

This is a Farman addressed by Noorjahan to Mirza Raja Jaisingh.

Praises Maharaja as one of her loyal servants and wishes him to report about his affairs without fear. Further directs him to serve loyally.

(This is of 24 Ahan Sanjaloos 22 i.e. dated 6th October, 1626 A.D.).

Nishan No. 20

This is a Nishan addressed by Noorjahan Begum to Mirza Raja Jaisingh.

Maharaja's request for attending court was not agreed due to some grave circumstances of war etc. Considers proper for him to stay where he was.

(This is of 21 Rabiulawal Sanjaloos 22 i.e. dated 25th December, 1626 A.D.).

Nishan No. 21

This is Nishan addressed by Prince Dwarbaksh to Mirza Raja Jaisingh.

This informs Maharaja about the sad demise of Emperor Jahangir. Noorjahan Begam and faithful nobles of the court saw the goodness of the Empire in giving consent to his ascending the throne on 17th Mah Aman. He ascended the throne accordingly and passed royal orders to all well wishers of the Empire for necessary obedience. Having known this fact, the Maharaja must feel grateful to God for fulfillment of his desires. The Emperor desires him to shoulder responsibility in right-earnest. All Vakils have been informed accordingly.

(This is of 24 Aban Sanjaloos 22 i.e. dated 25th June, 1627 A.D.).

Nishan No. 22

This is a Nishan from Prince Khurram to Mirza Raja Jaisingh.

This Nishan informs about his accession to the throne on the auspicious day of 10 Azarmab for the well being of the people. Directs the Maharaja to execute the task more zealously. Further desires to give it a top priority importance and not to act against the royal wishes.

(This is of Rabi ul-Awal Sanjaloos 21 i.e. dated 20th November, 1627 and is sent through Mubaruzuddina Khan Khan Bahadur Siphasalar).

Reviews

THE VICEROYALTY OF LORD IRWIN—1926-31 by S. Gopal.

It is not always easy to assess dispassionately the events and personalities of recent history. The difficulty is all the greater in respect of epochs like the viceroyalty of Lord Irwin which excited deep emotions among contemporaries. Sri S. Gopal has attempted this delicate task and has aimed at presenting an impartial account of the pro-consulship of a recent Viceroy of India.

Lord Irwin's viceroyalty opened with certain extraordinary difficulties. When he landed in Bombay in April 1926, fierce communal riots were in full swing in Calcutta. The Viceroy made a fervent appeal to the parties concerned, but in vain. Soon Irwin had to face the popular excitement caused by the appointment of the 'all-white' Statutory Commission, which, despite the theoretical justification, aroused the united opposition of the Moderates under Sapru and the Congress Party under Motilal Nehru. Hartals and other hostile demonstrations greeted the Commission wherever they went. Racial antipathy mounted high and was aggravated by extraneous incidents like the publication of Mayo's "Mother India", a malicious attack on Indian traditions and social life. Meanwhile, an arbitrary increase in the land revenue assessment led to the no-tax campaign at Bardoli. Feelings ran high and the agitation had to be resisted by stern measures. Gandhiji threw himself into the struggle and the Salt Satyagraha and the Civil Disobedience movement followed.

It must be said to the great credit of Lord Irwin that he faced these problems with sympathy and understanding. A deep scholar and an intensely religious person, Irwin brought to bear his learning and nobility of character on the solution of these thorny problems. He had devoted the earlier part of his Viceroyalty to the deep study and understanding of the Indian situation. Ultimately Irwin took a bold step in order to tide over the crisis by carrying the 'Conference method' to its logical conclusion. Releasing the Congress leaders, he arranged for Gandhiji's interview with him, and after prolonged negotiations there appeared the momentous 'Gandhi-Irwin Pact', which helped the active participation of the Congress in the Round Table Conference.

Though Irwin was acting with the approval of the Home Government, there is little doubt that the settlement of important issues like the Bardoli Satyagraha or the Civil Disobedience movement of 1930 bore the impact of Irwin's personality. The Viceroy's actions were criticised on the one hand by diehard politicians of Britain and on the other, by the extremist nationalists of India. But finally his sincerity and courage of conviction triumphed, 'Character was the keel of the Viceroyalty'. None will dispute the author's conclusion that, 'today free from distorting emotion and prejudice, we can see that Irwin's policy was overwhelmingly right and that he did more than most other men of his time to keep alive the faith of the two peoples in each other'.

But it is important to realise that Irwin's success was helped not a little by Gandhiji's sense of moderation and spirit of accommodation. However, Gandhiji's demand for an impartial inquiry into the government's atrocities like the lathi charge on a procession of women at Borsad—'official inhumanity against wholly defenceless and innocent women'—can by no means be dismissed as 'clever tactics', which the author has done. Though Gandhi's request was not complied with, thanks to the timely mediation of Sapru, Jayakar and Sastri, the 'naked fakir', as Churchill described Gandhi, sought an interview with the Viceroy in order to explore the possibilities of an honourable settlement. Nor is it mere sentimentalism to realise the grim fact that the tension caused by the execution of Bhagat Singh would have resulted in the complete breakdown of the Pact, but for Gandhi's magnetic influence over the other nationalist leaders. It is idle to belittle the mysterious spell that Gandhiji cast on the Indian political horizon even during the darkest days of the struggle for freedom.

The author has touched upon the part played by leaders like Motilal Nehru and Lala Lajpat Rai during Irwin's Viceroyalty. But it is doubtful whether the nature and importance of the valiant defence of constitutional privileges put up by Vithalbhai Patel have been given their due place. To quote one sentence: 'I will forget all your antics' (p. 41) from Irwin's letter to Vithalbhai torn from its context is to do scant justice to this stout constitutionalist.

The author has had the rare benefit of perusing the confidential records and of having personal interviews with Lord Irwin

himself. There is little doubt that the book will be warmly welcomed in Britain and India. An analytical Index is furnished. The Appendix reproduces the text of the settlement published on March 5, 1931. The book is well produced.

K. K. PILLAY.

GUIDE TO RESOURCES FOR COMMONWEALTH STUDIES—

by A. R. Hewitt: (University of London, Published for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies).

This is a useful guide for advanced research workers on the history and social studies pertaining to the countries of the British Commonwealth. The materials listed relate mainly to the sources available in London, Oxford, and Cambridge. Mr. Hewitt realizes that this limitation of its range is a drawback but hopes that, if and when a future edition of the book appears an attempt can be made to make the guide fuller in scope.

Part I provides a general survey of the Resources in which the principal libraries and research institutes in the United Kingdom are briefly described. The nature of the materials as well as the bibliographies available in each of them are furnished. The data in respect of the libraries of London are full and interesting. A similar treatment regarding the institutions in Oxford and Cambridge would have improved the usefulness of the volume. Details concerning Public Archives, Private Papers, Papers of Chartered and other Companies, Parliamentary Papers, Official Publications, Periodicals and Newspapers available mostly in London are provided. The facility for consulting the back numbers of Periodicals and Newspapers is remarkable.

The part provides a concise survey of Library Resources subject by subject. A catalogue is given of the institution which contain the source materials in respect of History, Political Science, Public Administration, Economics and Statistics, Law and Sociology, Geography and Collections of Maps, Charts, Atlases and Gazettes. Though Education is included here among the subjects the institutions providing source materials on Education have not been specified at length (p. 67). A fuller list is found to be helpful in respect of this important branch of study. While a list of

theses as well as research projects now in progress is added, perhaps the most useful portion in Part I is section 9 which provides a Bibliography of Bibliographies and works of Reference in respect of the various countries of the British Commonwealth.

Part II gets deeper into the matter and provides further details of individual collections available in London. Oxford and Cambridge. Besides fuller information on institutions like the British Museum and Commonwealth Relations Office, London, the Bodleian and Rhodes House Library, Oxford, the University Library, Cambridge, details of individual collections like those of the Baptist Missionary Society, Institute of Commonwealth Studies London are also provided.

Part III gives a brief summary of the facilities provided by the Universities in the U.K. for Commonwealth studies. A certain amount of repetition of matter found elsewhere is noticeable. But apart from this defect in arrangement this part of the book is incomplete. No detail regarding the nature of the material available is given. It contains little more than a list of the Universities as well as Research and Advisory Organizations.

But it is indisputable that this guide even as it stands at present, is useful for those engaged in advanced study and research. It is not always realized that much time is wasted by researchers in hunting for the sources. Works of this kind are sure to give valuable aid in the matter. However there is considerable room for improving the scope and contents of this guide. It can be made fuller and possibly exhaustive in respect of all the institutions in the United Kingdom. The matter may also be rearranged so as to provide all the necessary details concerning an institution at one stretch.

K. K. PILLAY.

SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN WESTERN INDIA 1817-1830.—By Kenneth Ballhatchet, (Lecturer in Modern Indian History, School of Oriental and African Studies, London).

Based on original sources like the Mountstuart Elphinstone papers, Sir John Malcom's private correspondence, the Western

India Mission records and the W. H. Mill papers, this book is the outcome of a thesis for which the author was granted the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by the University of London. The title of the book is, however, rather too ambitious and consequently misleading. Primarily a study of the administration of Elphinstone, the book describes the changes effected in the branches of administration like land revenue and justice. The author himself states: "As Englishmen then thought, these were the main—almost the sole—functions of a government: the maintenance of law and order, the collection of the revenue and the administration of justice". (p. 104). Though these duties of the government affected the village life to a certain extent, it seems too much to describe the change as 'social', unless an undue strain is put on the conventional usage of the term 'social'. Even G. M. Trevelyan's comprehensive definition of social history excludes politics from its purview. Somewhere the line of demarkation has to be drawn, and administrative measures have to be distinguished from those introduced primarily with a view to promoting social welfare.

It is indisputable that Elphinstone's far-sighted ideas regarding education and the burning of widows were directly concerned with social life. Unfortunately, however, their practical results at the time were not great. These laudable ideals of reform touched but a small proportion of the people during the period under consideration. In respect of education, Elphinstone himself realized that no 'extensive progress' could be achieved while he was Governor (p. 274). As for *Sati*, its abolition was looked forward to only 'at some future period' (p. 275). In passing it may be mentioned that in the southern Konkan, out of fifty widows who had resolved to become *Satis* in 1819, forty perished, while five were dissuaded by relatives (p. 279), and the remaining five alone may be deemed to have been prevented through the intervention of the Government.

Elphinstone's work of pacification and settlement of the Peshwa's territory is described in Part I and his administration of the new Bombay Presidency in Part II of the book, while the Epilogue is devoted to a survey of the continuation of Elphinstone's policy under his successor, Sir John Malcolm. In respect of land revenue, Elphinstone was faced by a conflict of the Utilitarian ideal and the need for preserving the then existing landlords in order to avoid a revolutionary break with the past. Ultimately he allowed

the jagirdar to continue in the north Maratha country. In the south it was found expedient to introduce the Village System, though theoretically the *ryotwari* settlement was the best. It must be said to the credit of Lord Elphinstone that he was not exclusively led by *apriori* considerations. What was found suitable to the particular region was adopted.

In respect of judicial administration a notable feature was the resurrection of the age-long *Panchayat*. Elphinstone called it 'the great instrument in the administration of Justice', and appreciating its supreme merit, tried his best to popularize it. He attempted to draw away people from resorting to the Munsiff's courts which had become popular particularly in the Deccan. Though he did not at first contemplate the use of *Panchayat* in criminal trials, he allowed it later when Briggs achieved some success in employing it in Khandesh. But despite the sincere efforts of admirers of the *Panchayat*, like Elphinstone, Munro and Metcalfe, the success achieved in revitalizing the old system was inconsiderable.

Sir John Malcolm continued Elphinstone's policy in respect of land revenue, and judicial administration. As regards education, Malcolm continued the Western pattern in a few institutions like the Elphinstone College. But he held that all educational institutions were not to adopt the English medium. His idea was narrower than that of Elphinstone, for Malcolm contended that English education was necessary only for those entering Government service. On the other hand, Elphinstone was of the view that the education of even the peasant should make him better able to deal with the problems of his life as a peasant. Even when he was reminded of the possible consequences of such a policy on the future of the British power in India, he stuck to his view (p. 249). This reveals the true man and his lofty sense of duty. He was dissatisfied with the progress achieved, as shown earlier, but it was for his successors to make leeway.

The book provides a good bibliography, an useful glossary of technical terms and an analytical index as well as a map of Western India and another of Khandesh.

K. K. PILLAY.

EARLY HISTORY OF NORTH INDIA 200 B.C.—A.D. 650
by Dr. Sudhakar Chattopādhyāya, M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Indology, Viśvabhāratī University. Calcutta, Progressive publishers, 1958. Pages xx and 317. Price 30 sh. Rs. 16/-.

This is a fresh study of the political history of North India from the fall of the Mauryas to the death of Harṣa. The author states that his feeling that in most current books 'archaeological sources have not been properly adjusted in the background of other available materials', and that scant attention has been paid in them to central Asian affairs, and the encouragement he received from the late Dr. P. C. Bagchi to undertake and complete the work on a definite plan suggested by him, were the chief incentives to him in his work. The present reviewer shares the author's regret that that fine scholar Dr. Bagchi has not lived to see the fulfilment of the plan he laid for Dr. Sudhakar Chattopādhyāya; who has done his work with admirable thoroughness, clarity and cogency. The book is a valuable contribution and is bound to engage the attention of future historians of ancient India for some years to come. They may or may not accept all the arguments and conclusions of Prof. Sudhakar; but they will ignore his work only at the risk of being considered purveyors of obsolescent knowledge.

Prof. Chattopādhyāya says: 'on many crucial points, I have ventured to differ from my *pūrva-sūris*, but I may humbly assure my readers that I have always been on the guard not to be led astray from the *terra firma* of solid facts by an eagerness for theorising.' There can be no doubt that he has succeeded in a remarkable measure in adhering to this rule, and that he has stated his new conclusions with studied moderation and reserve. He holds that Menander belongs to the first century B.C. rather than to the second, and with Taru accepts the view that he was a commoner by birth and not a Euthydemid as has generally been held; he places Maues later than is usual, about the beginning of the Christian era; Nahapāna's inscriptions are dated, not in the Saka era, but in his regnal years—as pointed out by some other writers earlier; Ghirshman's arguments for a second century date for Kanīśka, are not found conclusive or convincing, and the author prefers to treat the Kuṣāṇa emperor as the founder of the Saka era; on the Vikrama era he seems to be inclined to accept the plea for a foreign, East Iranian, origin for it (p. 56) though

he is not categorical about it; he holds that the Puṣyamitras, the enemies of the Guptas, were a tribe of Nāga origin (179) and that the Epthalites were more akin to the Yüeh-chi than to the Huns (191).

It is not possible to discuss in detail any of these and other interesting propositions that emerge from a perusal of the book. The documentation is quite detailed and there is an excellent bibliography at the end to assist the student who wants to pursue these questions further. In a few instances the author seems to have stopped short of his general rule of objectivity. For instance, he says: 'The Allahabad record, however, clearly shows that Samudra Gupta advanced in the South as far as Kāñci, and we do not know on what ground J. Dubreuil drew the above conclusion' (p. 151) that Samudra Gupta was opposed by a confederacy of the kings of the Eastern Deccan near the Colair lake. J. Dubreuil's view is amply justified by the wording of the Allahabad *prāsaṣṭi* which only mentions Viṣṇugopa of Kāñci, among other opponents of Samudra Gupta, and says nothing of the route followed by the Gupta emperor or the limits of his southern march. Again he seems to ignore some of the known data so often discussed by different writers when he affirms: 'But there is no proof whatsoever, that he (Rāma Gupta) was the elder brother of Candragupta II or that Dhruvadevi was his wife and later on became the wife of the Gupta monarch' (p. 166). Kālidāsa's reference to Bhāsa is well known, and its tone seems to go much against the author's view that 'Bhāsa may have been an early contemporary of Candragupta II'. (p. 171). Bāṇa's puns are celebrated, and one is not sure that Prof. Chattopādhyāya is justified in treating the references to Sindhurāja and Tuṣāraśailabhū in his references to Harṣa as altogether mythical (251); nor is it easy to see any ground for the statement that 'often there were clashes between Harṣa and Pulakeśin II' (ibid). The first quotation from the translation of the *Harṣa-carita* in p. 241 is puzzling as it stands because of inaccuracies in it, the chief being 'sieged' for 'seized'.

The name of the Tibetan historian is given as Tārānātha in the early pages, but later correctly as Tāranātha. There are a number of printing errors though the general get up of the book is good. It must also be said that the learned author's English embarrasses the reader often by the omission or wrong use of the

articles and by the confusion between 'some time' and 'sometimes' which occurs often. But these are trivial shortcomings in a work marked by earnest study and honest thought.

K. A. N. SASTRI.

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH 1766-1957, by Dr. A. V. Raman Rao, M.A., Ph.D., Popular Book Depot, Bombay. April 1958. pages xii and 384. Price Rs. 18.75.

This book constitutes, as Prof. D. R. Gadgil states in his Foreword, 'the first attempt at producing a connected account, over a long period, of economic developments in a specific region in India. The book covers two centuries; of these the first century, more exactly 1766-1865, formed the subject of a doctoral dissertation, which has been compressed and brought up to date in Parts I and II; Part III 1865-1947 (pp. 160-367) has been newly written. Unlike the earlier parts which have drawn largely on unpublished manuscript records in the Madras Record Office, this part rests mostly on printed publications and blue books, many of which, however, are not now easily accessible to the general reader. Part IV is a short statistical review of the economic data since Independence, with particular reference to the Five Year Plans, Community Projects and so on.

Andhra Pradesh now comprises three more or less distinct regions—the Circars, Rayalasima, and Telengana; of these the last was incorporated in the state only after the break up of Hyderabad in 1956, and has been necessarily omitted from this survey. The author, it is clear, has worked hard and diligently at the sources and every page of his book is full of well documented and authentic facts of economic history. The method adopted in documentation does not, however, aid easy verification, the index-numbers of references are grouped under each book or record at the end of each chapter, thus combining both bibliography and references, and this departure from the usual method of giving references in the order of their serial numbers must have meant some trouble for the author and also causes some trouble to the reader who wants to follow up the source.

It must also be said that while a great mass of factual data has been brought together, they do not seem to have been properly organized and digested. But we should remember that the author has had to face the difficulties of a pioneer, those of dealing with several discrete regions with features of their own in history and economy, and those of making one book out of two sets of chapters written at a rather long interval. We must be grateful for what we have got in the form of an authentic source book of the economic history of Andhra Pradesh for the last two centuries. The place of the book in our slender stock of the literature of economic history is justly assessed by Prof. Gadgil; he says: 'It has not been possible for Dr. Raman Rao to give a full account of the special characteristics and developments of the various sub-regions or to present a full, cogent and connected account of the dominant trends over the whole region consistently over any large part of the period under consideration. However, he has been able to bring together a large body of information and a large variety of data relating to almost all aspects of economic life and activity of a large and important region for a period of two hundred years. And this in itself is an unusual achievement in India'.

K. A. N. SASTRI.

THE SOMA-HYMNS OF THE RĠVEDA: A Fresh Interpretation, Part I (RV. 9. 1-15) by S. S. Bhawe, M.A., LL.B., Ph.D. (Bonn/A/Rhein), Reader and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Maharaja Sayaji Rao, University of Baroda, Sanskrit Series—3. Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1957. Pages 8 and 105 Price Rs. 4/-).

* This is the first instalment of a new translation of the Rġveda. The author bases the case for a new translation on the progress of linguistic research and other Vedic studies in the twenty-five years that have elapsed since Geldner's German Translation, the latest translation of the entire Rġveda, was prepared for the press, and on his own wish to take more guidance from Pāṇini for the interpretation of Vedic forms and words than has been the rule. He admits that 'specially significant fresh lines of approach to Vedic interpretation have not been recently introduced in Vedic research' (p. 3), and hopes only for progress in minute details

leading to a more authentic though not a final interpretation of the Rġveda. He has divided his notes into two groups: A- exegetical and important notes prefixed to the translation of a hymn, and B-less important and shorter notes given as footnotes; but in deference to a suggestion of 'some scholars' he intends to abandon this division in the further instalments (p.s. to the Author's preface, p. 7). No explanation is offered for starting with Book IX of the Rġveda and the Soma-hymns. A comparison of the English rendering (p. 77-8) of the French translation of the first hymn by Prof. Renou with the author's English translations of the hymn according to his new interpretation and according to Sāyana shows that the author's command of English is not equal to the ambitious task he is attempting. This is also apparent from numerous solecisms like 'the matter within brackets is as less as possible' (p. 6), or 'we have given a translation of Say.'s *bhāshya* on the hymns' (p. 79) by which is meant that the hymns are translated according to Sāyana's interpretation in the *bhāshya*. The book gives the impression, on the whole, of being the product of what may best be described as 'forced research'; but it has the disadvantage of seeking, with rather inadequate resources, to find something new in a field that has been the sphere of concentrated research by generations of the most talented scholars of several nations.

K. A. N. SASTRI.

LA BATALLA DE SAN JACINTO: A Collection of Documents compiled by Earnesto de la Torre Villar with an Introduction (Instituto Panamericano De Geografia E Historia, México, 1957).

This small publication is a commemoration volume, which is meant to be the token of the participation by the Instituto Panamericano De Geografia E Historia in the festive celebration of the first centenary of the Battle of San Jacinto in the sister Republic of Nicaragua. The Battle of San Jacinto of 1856 claims a place of unique significance in the national history of Nicaragua and also in the history of the other Central American Republics, because it is a symbol of the Nicaraguan independence and also a symbol of the old solidarity existing among the Central American Republics. This commemoration volume contains some selected documents with a learned illuminating introduction, in which the

antecedent events leading to the culmination of the Battle of San Jacinto have been well summarised and the significance of the Battle for the Nicaraguans as well as for the rest of the Central Americans has been well explained. Towards the end in the volume are included five commemoration speeches, delivered by high dignitaries on the occasion of the festive celebration of the Centenary of the Battle of San Jacinto in Nicaragua, which also further add to the interest and value of this small publication.

R. B. JOSHI.

PHILOSOPHY IN BRAZIL: J. Cruz Costa's book "Esbozo De Un a Historia De Las Ideas En El Brasil" (Fondo De Cultura Económica, Av de la Universidad, 975—México 12, D.F., 1957), translated into Spanish by Jorge López Páez.

The book under review surveys the evolution of ideas in Brazil. The survey of the ideas consists in tracing the evolution of Philosophy in Brazil from the early beginnings up to the present time. This book is the third publication of the series "Historia De Las Ideas En América—Colección Tierra Firme", published by Fondo De Cultura Económica, México—Buenos Aires, with the co-operation of Comisión de Historia del Instituto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia and with the help of the Rockefeller Foundation. This series of publications will be heartily welcomed by all those who are interested in having a handy but dependable survey of philosophy in different Latin American countries from early beginnings up to date. The philosophical developments in South America are not known so well and are not so clear as those in the U.S.A., which is called by the South Americans (Latin Americans) as North America.

Latin America, covering about eight and a half million square miles (which is more than three times the area of the continental United States), consists of twenty republics with the national language of all, except Brazil and Haiti (where Portuguese and French respectively are spoken), being Spanish. Culturally, of course, the bounds of Latin America extend still farther so as to include the European colonies (such as British Honduras in Central America; British, French, and Dutch Guiana in South America; and British West Indies) and the countries affiliated to

the U.S.A. (such as Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands) in Latin America, which are all only politically non-Latin-American. Today the Latin American countries as a block, knit together closely by historico-cultural and economic-political bonds, have been gradually gaining in importance in the present world situation. It is, therefore, bound to be of interest for all to have at least a glimpse into the ideological make-up of the Latin Americans. From this point of view this series is very important, because the publications under this series, surveying the evolution of philosophy in the various Latin American countries individually, have been providing stepping stones towards building a final synthetic and synoptic picture of the Philosophy of Latin America in general and as a whole—the Latin America, which, having certainly a lot in common with the U.S.A., is surely a lot different from the U.S.A. in its history as well as its ideological make-up.

The book under review, which is devoted to the survey of the evolution of philosophy in Brazil, is one such stepping-stone.

The philosophy in Brazil, on analysis, reveals two elements, one being the foreign element imported from Europe and the other being the native element. The foreign element is rich in its contributions of ideas to the Brazilian philosophical heritage. It is therefore, easily recognisable. In fact, the concrete contents of the Brazilian heritage of philosophical ideas are mostly and substantially drawn from the foreign sources. The native element has not contributed much in the form of important philosophical ideas to the Brazilian philosophical heritage. The contribution of the native element consists mainly of providing a mould, in which the imported foreign philosophical ideas were elaborated, re-thought, and re-lived. As a result of such elaboration, re-thinking, and re-living by the Brazilian thinkers the foreign philosophical ideas in the course of their historical evolution in Brazil assumed a form that is uniquely Brazilian in tone, stamp, and character, and constituted the Brazilian philosophical heritage. The contribution of the native element is not so easily recognisable like the contribution of the foreign element in the historical evolution of philosophy in Brazil. The author, who calls the foreign element as "transoceanism", has given a very lucid exposition of the contributions of the transoceanic and the native streams of thought and has maintained that these two streams have been present in the history of the Brazilian thought

at all the stages of its evolution and have for long inter-flowed, inter-mingled, and inter-penetrated.

Obviously, of course, then the native "mould" of philosophising, revealed in the history of the Brazilian philosophy, is more important than the actual contents of philosophy in Brazil from the point of view of understanding the philosophy of Brazil. The "mould" of philosophising is well revealed in the mind that philosophises, and the author has given a very lucid picture of the peculiarities of the philosophic mind of Brazil. Among the peculiarities of the philosophic mind of Brazil the most prominent one is its highly pragmatic temper. The Brazilian philosophic mind has no taste for pure speculation. It is not much interested in weaving the bloodless cobwebs of abstract thought, which is a very pet game of a highly influential and dignified tradition in the European philosophy. It does not take much delight in uselessness. It does not take pains to discover and advocate the utility of uselessness, which has been vehemently upheld by a contemplative tradition in the Chinese philosophy. But the pragmatism of Brazil is different from, and is not borrowed, from the pragmatism of the U.S.A. The pragmatic temper of Brazil is a Portuguese inheritance.

"La filosofía nunca se presentó en Portugal como especulación pura. Desde antes de la gran época de los descubrimientos y de la expansión es, como afirma Joachim de Carvalho y Vieira de Almeida, de carácter pragmático.

Desde muy antes, pues, el pensamiento portugués se presenta señalado por una finalidad *práctica*. Gravitará en torno de una problemática realista, de *objeto preciso, limitado, concreto*. El sentido de lo útil, de lo inmediato es lo que en él de preferencia trasluce" (pp. 69-170). This pragmatism has very deeply influenced the Brazilian thought.

"El sagaz Joao Ribeiro comprendió el sentido de nuestro pensamiento cuando dice que "nuestro idealismo no se aleja muy lejos de la tierra ni va más allá de los más próximos planetas; fuera de la poesía hiperbólica del gongorismo de los epítetos, nadie se preocupa del infinito" (p. 170)." Expresaba bien Alberdi el sentido de la filosofía en los países americanos cuando decía, en 1841, que "la dirección de nuestro estio no será en el sentido de la filosofía especulativa, de la filosofía en sí, sino en el sentido

de la filosofía de aplicación, de la filosofía positiva real, de la filosofía aplicada a las instituciones sociales, políticas, religiosas y morales de estos países. El pueblo será el gran ente, cuyas impresiones, cuyas leyes de vida, de movimiento, de pensamiento y de progreso procuraremos estudiar y determinar". "La abstracción pura—agregabala metafísica en si no echará raíces en América". Todo esto parece ser exacto (pp. 171-172). "Si consideramos el sentido de las ideas en el Brasil comprobaremos que son como instrumentos de acción, principalmente de acción social y política. La filosofía, en buena parte, estuvo en el Brasil al servicio de esta acción, como en el pasado medieval portugués estuvo al servicio de la teología y de la reflexión ético-política" (p. 170). "Solamente una filosofía de acción, solamente un pragmatismo puede, en estas condiciones, corresponder a sus necesidades profundas, a su edad intelectual. Y es su condicionalismo histórico lo que da sentido a su pensamiento. Es esta vida suya y esta experiencia las que deben constituir, en una primera etapa, el interés de aquellos que, abandonando la pretensión ingenua de hacer filosofía brasileña, quieren hacer simplemente filosofía" (p. 174). "La gran lección que se desprende de la filosofía moderna consiste precisamente en la afirmación de la auténtica. Esta lección sirve, principalmente, para que la especulación establezca contacto con la realidad. La inteligencia en los países americanos—como escribe Alfonso Reyes—no tuvo tiempo de romper, con los estímulos de la acción, como acontece en los países agotados por viejas civilizaciones, donde pueden edificarse torres de marfil y teorías estrafalarias conforme a las cuales el hombre de pensamiento que participe en la vida de su siglo viene a ser un 'clérigo craidor'.

Para nosotros la filosofía auténtica siempre estuvo ligada a la acción. Tenía razón, pues, Clovis Bevilacqua cuando decía que si alguna día pudiéramos alcanzar una producción filosófica más significativa, no surgiría de las cumbres de la metafísica" (pp. 174-175).

These quotations are quite illuminating as to the highly pragmatic temper of the Brazilian philosophical mind. The highest and deepest demand of the Brazilians is for a philosophy of action, for a philosophy of life or for, so to say, "Applied Philosophy" as distinguished from "Pure Philosophy".

Select Contents of Periodicals

- I. *Asiatic Society of Bombay—Journal of the*, December 1955, Vol. XXX, Part 2, Bombay.
Two Spurious Inscriptions of Maharana Pratapa of Udaipur, by R. C. Agrawala.
- II. *Asiatic Society—Journal of the*, August 1957, Vol. XXII, No. 2, Calcutta.
The Approximate Date of the Harivamsa, by Sivaprasad Bhattacharyya.
- III. *Bihar Research Society—Journal of the*, September-December, 1956, Vol. XLII, Parts III & IV, Patna.
The Epoch of the Ganga Era, by Prof. V. V. Mirashi.
Kurud Copperplate Inscription of Narendra, by Dr. Sant Lal Katore and Shri B. C. Jain.
History of Tappa Chanduary (Bhagalpur) (C. 1500-1900 A.D.), by Prof. Radhakrishna Choudhary.
Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy of History, by Dr. Vishwanath Prasad Varma.
The Date and Character of the Indus Civilization, by Basanta Kumar Chatterjee.
Western Front of Chandragupta II and Kumaragupta I, by S. V. Sohani.
Chandragupta I—Kumaragupta Coin Type: An examination, by S. V. Sohani.
Vina Coin Type of Samudragupta and Kumaragupta I, by S. V. Sohani.
- IV. *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. XXXI, Part III, July 1955, Delhi.
The Eastern Gange Inscriptions at Kanchipuram, by T. V. Mahalingam.
Note on Two Eastern Ganga Inscriptions at Kanchipuram, by D. C. Sircar.
Three Grants of Chalukya Jayasimha I, by M. Somasekharan Sarma.

Now as regards the other element in the Brazilian philosophy, the foreign imported element, what impresses one most here is the largeness and the variety of the imported ideas and doctrines. The imported ideas and doctrines, however, do not retain their original purity but are altered on coming in contact with the peculiar factors present in the new circumstances. And ultimately all these imported ideas and doctrines become adapted to and absorbed in the national intellectual culture in the course of the historical evolution of Philosophy in Brazil. Here too the basic and initial influence by Portugal on Brazil has been quite deep and lasting. This initial influence, exercised by Portugal on Brazil, has been twofold: the influence of "el aventurero" and the influence of "el jeuita". "Dos tipos pues aparentemente opuestos pero integrados en un idéntico sentido de acción, se enfrentan en la Colonia. De un lado, el jesuita, empenado, en el sentido más amplio de la palabra, en el *conquista espiritual*, y el aventurero dispues to a la *conquista de la tierra* y de los bienes materiales.

Con estos dos personajes nuestra amplia fachada atlántica se va abrir a la historia. Ahí se esb oza, quiza, una contradicción de nuestra historia y, también, el antagonismo de los dos aspectos de la cultura en el Brasil. Se abren ods grandes y contradictorias líneas en nuestro destino: hay en una la vocación atlántica, que nos obliga a mirar hacia el vasto horizonte oceánico, a imaginar y a sonar con Europa. Y hay el sertón, que, desde el comienzo, despertó la codicia del aventurero y la curiosidad del letrado.

Cupo al aventurero y al jesuita, la fijación de la cultura europea en nuestra tierra. Uno, abrirá caminos, construirá aldeas, establecéra ciudades; el otro, modelará la inteligencia brasileña" (p. 170). Starting with the equipment of such a jesuit tradition the philosophy in Brazil progressed through the course of four centuries, from the XVIth to the XIXth to that rich panorama at the beginning of the XXth century. The panorama, as it appeared in 1905, has been summarised by Silvio Romero as follows:—

(1) aquellos que fueron educados en las doctrinas de fines del siglo XVIII y pricipios del siglo XIX; (2) los que siguieron el sensualismo francés de Destutt de Traci y de Larominguère y que pasaron después al ecleticismo espiritualista de Cousin y de Jouffroy; (3) los puros sectarios del eclecticismo, como Gonçálves de Margalhães y Moraes Valle; (4) los representantes de la re-

acción católica; (5) los que se orientaron al principio hacia el agnosticismo critico y pasaron después al monismo haeckeliano o a las complicadas doctrinas de un filósofo poco conocido, Ludwig Noiré; (6) aquellos que siguieron las doctrinas de Comte y de Littré y; (7) los sectarios ortodoxos de Comte, esto es, los *ortodoxos del Apostolado*. Finalments, otros tres grupos; (8) los evolucionistas haeckelianos; (9) los spencerianos y, porfin, (10) los representantes de "tentativas independientes".

However, out of these several currents of thought those that continued to influence Brazil still later in the century can be reduced to the three main streams, which are as follows—(1) "la corriente que corresponde al pesamiento tradicional, el católico, el cual sequirá las variantes de las ideas católicas en Europa", (2) "el naturalismo o "cientifismo", impulsado también por la vicisitudes por las que pasaban es as doctrinas", (3) "la corriente que corresponde a la tendencia del movimiento criticista de fines del siglo XIX y principios del siglo XX, cuyos orígenes son aún europeos". It is, therefore, clear that Europe continued to influence Brazil even in the twentieth century as it did in the earlier century, though, of course, it is true that after the World War I Brazil began to show more independence in thought.

To conclude, the final impression that one gathers in the light of the author's conclusions, of the limitations whereof, of course, the author is well aware, about the evolution of Philosophy in Brazil from the early beginnings up to date can be recorded here in the form of pointing out some prominent features characterizing the Brazilian philosophical spirit,—especially as it is to-day. Today the Brazilian philosophising is characterised by a highly pragmatic temper, a greater independence of Europe in thought, a marked tolerance, an admirable open-mindedness, some susceptibility to the spiritual realities, a marked capacity for abstract thinking though temperamentally averse thereto, a greater interest in social questions arising in the wake of industrialisation, and a deep sense of nationalism (which, of course, is a very perplexing problem for a Brazilian, because almost everything Brazilian is drawn from the foreign sources—men, language, religion, customs, institutions, ideas, arts, industries). Today Brazil seems to be yearning for a philosophy of action, a philosophy of life, a philosophy of spirit.

R. B. JOSHI.

A SURVEY OF THE RISE OF THE DUTCH POWER IN MALABAR

DR. T. I. POONEN, M.A., PH.D.,

(Sometime Research Fellow, University of Madras, and for many
years a Senior Member of the History Department of the Union
Christian College, Alwaye).

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- V. *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. XXXI, Part IV, October 1955, Delhi.

Kamalapur Plates of Krishnadevaraya, Saka 1447, by the late Mr. V. Rangacharya.

Kalanjara Inscription of V. S. 1147, by Sant Lal Katore.

Brahmi Inscriptions from Bandhogarh by the late Dr. N. P. Chakravarti.

Two Grants from Galavalli, by D. C. Sircar.

- VI. *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. XXXI, Part V, January 1956, Delhi.

Two Grants from Galavalli, by D. C. Sircar.

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Printed by G. Srinivasachari, B.A., at G. S. Press, 21, Narasingapuram Street, Mount Road, Madras, and Published by the University of Kerala, Trivandrum.