

THE
ANNALS

OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

Understanding Alcoholism



January 1958

BOOK DEPARTMENT: NEW LITERATURE
IN THE FIELD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

COLUMBIA

Yearbook of the United Nations 1956

The YEARBOOK provides the most comprehensive account of the work of the United Nations and its specialized agencies and provides a permanent reference for all those concerned with international affairs. This tenth edition records the course of United Nations events during 1956 and early 1957. Included are such important matters as the crisis over Suez and the Hungarian situation. \$12.50

Effecting Change in Large Organizations

ELI GINZBERG and EWING W. REILLEY with the assistance of DOUGLAS W. BRAY and JOHN L. HERMA. A pioneering investigation into the problems encountered when a large organization, business or nonprofit, seeks to alter its basic structure to improve operations. With the aid of case materials the authors develop a framework for the study of group behavior under conditions of directed change. \$3.50

The Revolutionary Theories of Louis Auguste Blanqui

ALAN B. SPITZER. Probing behind Blanqui's reputation as a man of action, the author establishes his importance as a theoretician of revolutionary socialism. Blanqui emerges from this study with greater personal and historical dimension. \$3.75

Soviet Education

Edited by GEORGE L. KLINE, with a Foreword by GEORGE S. COUNTS. These nine first-hand reports by former Soviet teachers and students provide a unique source of insight into the day-by-day functioning of the Soviet educational system during the 1920s, 1930s, and early 1940s. The reports convey the intimate texture of academic life, both inside and outside the classroom. \$3.50



COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS


2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y.

Publishers of THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA

Entered as second-class matter, January 21, 1939, at the post-office at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, under the Act of August 24, 1912. Accepted for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in paragraph (d-2), Section 5640, P. L. & R. of 1948, authorized January 21, 1939.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
ALCOHOLISM: NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM	<i>Mark Keller</i> 1
ALCOHOLISM: ATTITUDES AND ATTACKS, 1775-1935	<i>Raymond G. McCarthy</i> 12
INTOXICATION AND ALCOHOLISM: PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTORS	<i>Leon A. Greenberg</i> 22
PERCEPTION, LEARNING, AND EMOTION: THE ROLE OF ALCOHOL	<i>John J. Conger</i> 31
THE SEARCH FOR THE ALCOHOLIC PERSONALITY	<i>John D. Armstrong</i> 40
SOCIOCULTURAL BACKGROUNDS OF ALCOHOLISM	<i>Albert D. Ullman</i> 48
ALCOHOLICS DO NOT DRINK	<i>Selden D. Bacon</i> 55
THE CHRONIC DRUNKENNESS OFFENDER	<i>Earl Rubington</i> 65
THE WOMAN ALCOHOLIC	<i>Edith S. Lisansky</i> 73
THE CASE OF MARY DOE	<i>Jean E. Markham</i> 82
ALCOHOLISM AND THE FAMILY	<i>Joan K. Jackson</i> 90
PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT OF ALCOHOLISM	<i>Sidney Vogel</i> 99
ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS	<i>Harrison M. Trice</i> 108
MEDICAL PRACTICE AND THE ALCOHOLIC	<i>Robert Straus</i> 117
SOCIAL WORK AND ALCOHOLISM	<i>Jean V. Sapir</i> 125
CURRENT RESOURCES FOR THERAPY, EDUCATION, AND RESEARCH	
	<i>Ernest A. Shepherd</i> 133
INDEX	196



BOOK DEPARTMENT

HUMAN RELATIONS

	PAGE
BRAMELD, THEODORE. <i>Cultural Foundations of Education</i> . George D. Spindler, Associate Professor of Education and Anthropology, Stanford University	152
BRUNO, FRANK J. <i>Trends in Social Work, 1874-1956</i> . Charles N. Lebeaux, Associate Professor of Sociology, Wayne State University	147
COHEN, ALBERT, ALFRED LINDESMITH, and KARL SCHUESSLER (Eds.). <i>The Sutherland Papers</i> . Albert Morris, Professor of Sociology, Boston University	145
EBENSTEIN, WILLIAM. <i>Political Thought in Perspective</i> . Hans Kohn, Professor of History, The City College of New York	154
FELDMAN, FRANCES LOMAS. <i>The Family in a Money World</i> . Carle C. Zimmerman, Harvard University	144
GOOD, H. G. <i>A History of American Education</i> . Frederick Shaw, Research Associate, Board of Education, New York City	150
JENNESS, DIAMOND. <i>Dawn in Arctic Alaska</i> . William S. Laughlin, Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of Wisconsin	154
KEITH-LUCAS, ALAN. <i>Decisions About People in Need</i> . Wilbur J. Cohen, Professor of Public Welfare Administration, University of Michigan	148
KOMAROVSKY, MIRRA (Ed.). <i>Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences</i> . Wellman J. Warner, Chairman, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, New York University	151
NEISSER, EDITH G. <i>The Eldest Child</i> . James H. S. Bossard, William T. Carter Professor of Child Development and Professor of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania	147
O'CONNOR, D. J. <i>An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education</i> . I. B. Berkson, Professor of Education, The City College of New York	149
ROBERTS, GEORGE W. <i>The Population of Jamaica</i> . Raymond Priestley, Director, Falkland Islands Dependencies, Scientific Bureau, London	146
WARNER, SAMUEL J. <i>The Urge to Mass Destruction</i> . Otto Klineberg, Professor of Psychology, Columbia University	150
WARRENDER, HOWARD. <i>The Political Philosophy of Hobbes</i> . Helmut Kuhn, München, Germany	153

ECONOMICS AND LABOR

BLANK, DAVID M., and GEORGE J. STIGLER. <i>The Demand and Supply of Scientific Personnel</i> . David L. Kaplan, Chief, Occupation and Industry Section, Bureau of the Census, Washington, D. C.	158
CLARK, JOHN MAURICE. <i>Economic Institutions and Human Welfare</i> . Bert F. Hoselitz, Professor of Social Sciences, University of Chicago	155
CROWTHER, GEOFFREY. <i>Balances and Imbalances of Payments</i> . William E. Gordon, Lecturer in Economics, Marquette University	156
LEITER, ROBERT D. <i>The Teamsters Union</i> . Herbert J. Lahne, Silver Spring, Md.	158
RANNELLS, JOHN. <i>The Core of the City</i> . Earle H. MacCannell, Sociology Department, San Diego State College	157
SHUCHMAN, ABRAHAM. <i>Codetermination: Labor's Middle Way in Germany</i> . Fritz Karl Mann, Professor of Economics, The American University, Washington, D. C.	159

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

ALEXANDER, ROBERT J. <i>Communism in Latin America</i> . Robert E. Scott, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois	170
--	-----

BARUCH, BERNARD. <i>Baruch: My Own Story</i> . George C. Osborn, Professor of Social Sciences, University of Florida	169
HAMMOND, BRAY. <i>Banks and Politics in America</i> . Charles Hoffmann, Department of Economics, Queens College	165
HOOKE, SIDNEY. <i>Common Sense and the Fifth Amendment</i> . William M. Kunstler, Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School	161
KONVITZ, MILTON R. <i>Fundamental Liberties of a Free People</i> . Henry S. Drinker, Drinker, Biddle & Reath, Philadelphia, Penna.	162
MCKEON, RICHARD, ROBERT K. MERTON, and WALTER GELLHORN. <i>The Freedom to Read</i> . Edward B. Shils, Associate Professor of Industry, University of Pennsylvania	161
MALCOLM, GEORGE A. <i>American Colonial Careerist</i> . Walter Robb, Book Review Editor, <i>The Asian Student</i> , San Francisco, Calif.	167
MITCHELL, BROADUS. <i>Alexander Hamilton</i> . Raymond Walters, Jr., <i>The Saturday Review</i> , New York City, N. Y.	166
PERKINS, DEXTER. <i>The American Way</i> . James Burnham, Kent, Conn.	165
PERKINS, DEXTER. <i>The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt</i> . George C. Osborn, Professor of Social Sciences, University of Florida	164
ROSEBOOM, EUGENE H. <i>A History of Presidential Elections</i> . Wilfred E. Binkley, Director, Division of Social Sciences, Ohio Northern University	168
STANLEY, TIMOTHY W. <i>American Defense and National Security</i> . Leo Fishman, Professor of Economics and Finance, West Virginia University	169
SUTHERLAND, ARTHUR E. (Ed.). <i>Government Under Law</i> . Harold M. Dorr, Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan	163
TUGWELL, REXFORD G. <i>The Democratic Roosevelt</i> . Donald R. McCoy, Assistant Professor of History, University of Kansas	164

ASIA AND AFRICA

ALLEN, G. C., and AUDREY G. DONNITHORNE. <i>Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya</i> . Douglas Paauw, Associate Professor of Economics, Lake Forest College	173
ELLIS, HARRY B. <i>Israel and the Middle East</i> . Bradford G. Martin, Author and Consultant on Middle Eastern Affairs, Washington, D. C.	175
GRIFFITHS, PERCIVAL. <i>Modern India</i> . Robert I. Crane, Assistant Professor of History, University of Michigan	171
GROSS, FELIX. <i>Rhodes of Africa</i> . Harry R. Rudin, Professor of History, Yale University	176
HODGKIN, THOMAS. <i>Nationalism in Colonial Africa</i> . William O. Brown, Director, African Research and Studies Program, Boston University	175
<i>India and the United Nations</i> . Marshall Windmiller, Center for South Asia Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.	172
VELLA, WALTER F. <i>Siam Under Rama III, 1824-1851</i> . Kenneth Landon, Staff Assistant, Operations Coordinating Board, Washington, D. C.	174
WOYTINSKY, W. S. <i>India: The Awakening Giant</i> . Willis D. Weatherford, Associate Professor of Economics, Swarthmore College	173

EUROPE

EDWARDS, R. DUDLEY, and T. DESMOND WILLIAMS (Eds.). <i>The Great Famine: Studies in Irish History, 1845-52</i> . Norman D. Palmer, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania	184
---	-----

FALK, MINNA R. <i>History of Germany</i> . Carl G. Anthon, Associate Professor of History, American University of Beirut	182
FOGARTY, MICHAEL P. <i>Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1820-1953</i> . James Edward Gillespie, Professor of History, Emeritus, The Pennsylvania State University	183
KANN, ROBERT A. <i>The Habsburg Empire</i> . Oscar Halecki, Professor of East European History, Fordham University	179
KRIEGER, LEONARD. <i>The German Idea of Freedom</i> . Hans Kohn, Professor of History, The City College of New York	179
MCNEILL, WILLIAM HARDY. <i>Greece: American Aid in Action, 1947-1956</i> . Harold F. Alderfer, Deputy Superintendent of Public Instruction, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg, Pa.	185
MCVICKER, CHARLES P. <i>Titoism: Pattern for International Communism</i> . Joseph S. Roucek, Professor of Sociology and Political Science, University of Bridgeport	184
RICH, NORMAN, and M. H. FISHER (Eds.). <i>The Holstein Papers</i> . Gerhard Masur, Professor of History, Sweet Briar College	180
SINEY, MARION C. <i>The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1914-1916</i> . Louis L. Snyder, Professor of History, The City College of New York	178
STERLING, ELEONORE. <i>Er ist wie du: Aus der Frühgeschichte der Antisemitismus in Deutschland (1815-1850)</i> . Louis L. Snyder, Professor of History, The City College of New York	181
ZINK, HAROLD. <i>The United States in Germany, 1944-1955</i> . Norbert Muhlen, New York City	177

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BERGER, CARL. <i>The Korea Knot</i> . Kyung Cho Chung, Monterey, Calif.	189
CAGLE, MALCOLM W., and FRANK A. MANSON. <i>The Sea War in Korea</i> . Leland P. Lovette, Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.), Alexandria, Va.	190
CAMPBELL, CHARLES S., JR. <i>Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903</i> . D. W. Brogan, Professor of Political Science, Cambridge University	188
EHRMAN, JOHN. <i>Grand Strategy, Vol. VI, October 1944-August 1945, History of the Second World War</i> . John Miller, Jr., Office of Military History, U. S. Department of the Army	191
FEIS, HERBERT. <i>Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin</i> . Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Professor of History, Harvard University	186
MATECKI, B. E. <i>Establishment of the International Finance Corporation and United States Policy</i> . Wilfred Malenbaum, Visiting Professor of Economics, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology	187
MURRAY, JAMES N., JR. <i>The United Nations Trusteeship System</i> . J. Eugene Harley, Professor of Political Science, University of Southern California	192
OSGOOD, ROBERT ENDICOTT. <i>Limited War</i> . Floyd A. Cave, Professor of Government, San Francisco State College	191
OTHER BOOKS	193

The articles appearing in THE ANNALS are indexed in the *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature* and the *Industrial Arts Index*.

FOREWORD

Any theoretically systematic collection of articles by different authors may well need a foreword. Because the different authors possess different knowledges, exhibit varying breadths of orientation, write with different purposes, utilize methods or logics of various disciplines and philosophies, the reader may need some yardstick or some particular set of intellectual eyeglasses to appreciate the fact that there is a system and to evaluate each part in terms of the whole. If there is no theoretical system, if the articles are just arranged, say alphabetically, then a foreword merely needs to indicate the particular abstract order and the means available to the reader to find the subject in which he is interested; such a collection is of the order of a telephone book, dictionary, or customer's catalogue.

In purpose this collection represents a theoretical system. It does not pretend to cover the entire field, but it suggests that the subject matters, modes of approach and viewpoints in these articles are minimal requirements for the person who would have an appreciation of the problems of alcoholism in the United States. On the other hand, no one of the articles is supposed to be a manual for the expert or artist or administrator in his own field.

The order of presentation is rather standard: what is the phenomenon we are talking about and how have understanding and action of the past influenced current interpretation and procedure; then the physiological, psychological, and sociologic aspects of the condition are discussed; this is followed by four descriptions of alcoholics and a report on the alcoholic's family—how it affects him and vice versa; finally there are five articles on certain formal systems of response, mainly therapeutic, to the alcoholic and the condition of alcoholism. Many other subjects could have been selected: inheritance; the hangover; legal and religious aspects; alcoholism and problem drinking in the armed services or industry; the psychotic alcoholic; drug treatments for intoxication; the hospital, psychological conditioning, or pastoral counseling in alcoholism therapy; antiscientific attitudes in America as seen in this field.

Because alcoholism is an emergent condition stemming from chemical, physiological, psychological, and sociologic preconditions, because responses to alcoholism cut across every segment and institution of our society, and because the painful and destructive impact of the condition is not only extensive but is experienced and for generations has been experienced in almost every sector of our society, there is practically no subject relevant to American life which is not relevant to alcoholism. The question of topic selection, however, was not equally problematic throughout the collection. The subject matter or approach of the first seven articles would probably be considered essential for any systematic approach to alcoholism; this does not imply either that the specific report here presented would be the best or that each could not be greatly elaborated. Greater is the question concerning selection of topic applied to the next four subjects, since there are many types of alcoholics and many ways of describing them. Perhaps the greatest degree of question concerned description and analysis of "what is done about it?" Finally, one might ask "why is there no grand summation about what does it all mean, where do we go from here, what about prevention, science, and education?" After some soul-searching your editor decided to leave this to the reader or, perhaps more

realistically, decided not to inflict such grandiose and necessarily biased philosophizing on either reader or the contributors.

However, to introduce a report on alcoholism in the United States, more is needed than a bird's-eye view of the subject matter to follow with accompanying implication of its nature, extent, and importance. The subject has for so many decades been almost the core of a pattern of ignorance, emotionalism, confusion, hostility, and, perhaps above all, evasion of recognition, reality, and responsibility that any publication is subject both to suspicion and stereotyping. What is the general orientation? What subject matters, what attitudes, what action programs are omitted?

One popular, long-lived, and extensive orientation would be to define alcoholism as the condition found in any individual who has sufficient alcohol in the system that behavior is in any way affected adversely for almost any situation; this would mean a concentration of alcohol of perhaps 0.03 per cent (explained in Dr. Greenberg's article). This, in a man of about 160 pounds, would be achieved by drinking an ounce and a half of whiskey or two ordinary sized bottles of beer. To indicate that such thinking is not limited to untrained and professionally unrecognized individuals, it is worth noting that a professor of physiology, head of the department of Clinical Science at the College of Medicine of the University of Illinois, has within three months publicly advanced this conception with elaborate emphasis. One conclusion to be drawn from this position is that in any given month in the United States there are about 50,000,000 or so alcoholics; following this philosophy, most of them would be termed "acute alcoholics." An important strategic conclusion stemming from this orientation is that, for all practical purposes, the use of alcohol is equivalent to alcoholism; therefore, not only is alcohol the cause of alcoholism, but the proper attack on alcoholism is an attack on the use of alcohol, especially on persons who are involved in the production, distribution, promotion, and sale of the product.

An almost opposite conception holds that alcoholism is a condition found in those who, usually after drinking extraordinarily large amounts for many years, manifest obvious organic disease or clear psychotic disturbance along with this exotically heavy and persistent use of alcohol. Perhaps 1.5 per cent of American users of alcohol (and many of this persuasion would say 0.5 per cent) are so affected; it therefore follows that alcohol has little to do with the matter in a causal sense, that cause will necessarily be found in some glandular or other organic peculiarity of these rare individuals.

Most people do not adhere to either of these extreme and, to put it mildly, intellectually threadbare positions. However, the impact of this archaic and presently quite sterile war of Wets and Drys has been such that even those who feel aversion to both groups but who are still faced with problems related to the use of alcohol tend to form opinions along similar lines. Many think of alcoholics as Skid Row bums or as a particular type of psychotic or as neurotic Lost Weekenders. Notions of lack of will power or perverseness or inherited predispositions (always undefined) or "just too damned much whiskey" suffuse their rather vague thinking on the matter. Nor do they know what to do in any specific instance and so frequently fall back on responses of pity, hatred, avoidance, fatalistic acceptance, often manifesting first one and then another.

Still other groups, finding that some particular procedure is effective for some particular segment of alcoholics, in cult-like fashion rush to claim omnipotence and,

such is the powerful impact of the old Dry movement, see total answers not just to alcoholism in its complex entirety, but even to all the problems related to alcohol and its use. Perhaps such enthusiastic and oversimplified responses are necessary for the development of new recognition, new vision, and new action; but they also are potentially stultifying in the unconscious arrogance and narrow ritualism which lie so closely underneath their enthusiasm and energy.

One thing all these groups have in common is a belief in a "quickie" solution, in fact a simple, easy, and all-encompassing "quickie" solution. They would resolve all the problems by some particular pledge, belief, pill, legislation, or other happy, cheap, relatively effortless innovation.

To some degree all these groups will be disappointed in, if not actually angered by, the orientation of this volume. This collection of reports has a basic premise that effective understanding is essential for any lasting and generally effective action. It is not against action, but it will not worship or propagandize action systems until some testable and tested knowledge is at hand. One of the authors, replying to the editor's request for a paper on a certain subject, a request suggesting some of the probable topics to be included, replied that she would be glad to comply but that she could not cover one of the subtopics because she neither possessed nor was aware of the existence of any factual material on that subject. This might well appear to be intellectual and moral cowardice to some of the current action-group adherents. There is no implication that all of the reporters for this volume either know all the facts or have adequate factual proof for every statement. They would be among the first to deny such an allegation. It does imply that they consider relevant factual evidence imperative and that theories, answers, and conclusions must always respond to fact—not vice versa.

A second orientation which will be displeasing to many is that alcoholism is defined. Not that all the writers would agree on one specific definition, but all would agree that it needs to be defined. All would agree that no serious understanding would allow the lack of definition. All would agree that a definition which allowed alcoholism to be the same thing as alcohol, the same thing as intoxication, or the same thing as drinking would be intellectually pitiable. All would agree that alcohol, drinking, and intoxication were significant phenomena for the phenomenon of alcoholism. All would agree that the definition must spring from analysis of the phenomenon itself, not from some theory or analysis related to other phenomena. They would agree that no one existing intellectual or organizational theory had all the answers. These agreements may help to explain why there is no article on the liquor industry, on driving under the influence, on drinking and youth, on bootlegging, or ridiculous tax structures; may help to explain why there are several approaches rather than one to the description of the condition. It may help to explain why there may be disagreement between the authors, but an absence of condemnation and attack.

It is an orientation which attempts to be objective and discriminating, one whose aim is understanding rather than exhortation or exhortation. In the field of American alcoholism this is a bold venture indeed. In fact, in itself it may be a sort of preface. This might well be its aim—a preface to learning about alcoholism in the United States.

SELDEN D. BACON

Alcoholism: Nature and Extent of the Problem

By MARK KELLER

Abstract: Alcoholism is a behavioral disorder causing some physical, social, or economic disability in over 4 million adults in the United States. Its exact etiology is not established; it may be related to constitutional, psychological, sociologic, and pharmacological factors.

ALCOHOLISM is thought by some to be a disease, by others the symptom of a disease. Some regard it as a peccadillo, others as downright sin or horrible vice. Some think that to speak of anything but plain drunkenness is pampering the wicked; others would restrict the problem to the extreme malady, alcohol addiction. And there are those who refuse to make any distinction between alcoholism and drinking: he who drinks one glass of wine is thereby an alcoholic.

The lack of consensus about alcoholism is nothing new. It prevails not just in common speech and the popular press but in scientific and professional literature as well. In some articles by physicians describing specific treatments of alcoholic patients, published only last year in medical journals, it is not possible to know with certainty whether the treatment refers to the patient's propensity to get drunk or to the psychological sequels of the last bout. Perhaps Doctor A is treating the first and Doctor B the second condition; both say they are treating alcoholism.¹

Disciplined workers know that precise

definition is the foundation stone of scientific discourse. In an area such as that of the problems of alcohol and alcoholism, where members of many disciplines are trying to work together, lack of agreement on the symbols for communication can frustrate their efforts. They might even never get beyond arguing the question, "What are we talking about?" Now, alcoholism has not lacked definition. Fifteen years ago Bowman and Jellinek² tabulated some thirty definitions from the psychiatric literature indicative of substantial agreement about a medical disorder for which the compilers preferred the term alcohol addiction and about a melange of diseases connected with excessive drinking to which, on historical grounds, they applied the general term, chronic alcoholism. But their text shows that the definers had used a variety of terms, including inebriety, abnormal drinking, problem drinking, alcoholism, pathologic alcoholism, and chronic alcoholism, for "alcohol addiction." This demonstration of logical agreement in spite of terminological chaos did not inhibit the subsequent coining of new terms and definitions or the repetition of ambiguous old ones.

¹ References to these articles are omitted. The examples are not intended to criticize a particular Doctor A or Doctor B for the common practice of assuming that "everyone is supposed to mean what I mean when they use this term."

² Karl M. Bowman and E. M. Jellinek, "Alcohol Addiction and Its Treatment," in E. M. Jellinek (Ed.), *Alcohol Addiction and Chronic Alcoholism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), Ch. I, pp. 6-9.

Mark Keller, New Haven, Connecticut, is Editor of the Publications Division of the Yale Center of Alcohol Studies and Managing Editor of the *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*.

Among the recent neologisms are alcoholoses, alcoholites, alcaddiction, and alcodipson. Proposals to formulate authoritative terms and definitions have been countered by the claim that scientific workers cannot be made to sink their individual judgment, that those who do not feel comfortable with the authoritative dicta will go on doing what they have always done, and that the best way to facilitate meaningful communication is to persuade each writer to define clearly what he means.³ In line with this latter suggestion the following definition is offered:

Alcoholism is a chronic behavioral disorder manifested by repeated drinking of alcoholic beverages in excess of the dietary and social uses of the community and to an extent that interferes with the drinker's health or his social or economic functioning.

This definition owes much to two earlier formulations.⁴ It has had the good fortune to be tested upon two live populations of alcoholics and found to fit.⁵

³ The Committee on Classification and Nomenclature of the North American Association of Alcoholism Programs has proposals for an authoritative dictionary under consideration. A resolution of the 24th International Congress Against Alcoholism (1952) called for the establishment of a "commission on language" to "bring into being a standard vocabulary. . . ." A Subcommittee on Alcoholism of the World Health Organization Expert Committee on Mental Health has discussed the problem and adopted a number of definitions. See Mark Keller, *The Language of Alcohol Problems, With a Selected Vocabulary*, Brookside Monograph No. 2 (Toronto: Alcoholism Research Foundation, 1957).

⁴ World Health Organization, Expert Committee on Mental Health (Alcoholism), "Report on the Second Session," 15-20 October 1951. (WHO/Ment/28; mimeographed) Geneva, 2 November 1951, p. 13. Also: Mark Keller and Vera Efron, "Alcoholism," *Encyclopedia Americana*, 1954 edition.

⁵ D. Bruce Falkey and Solomon Schneyer, "Characteristics of Male Alcoholics Admitted to the Medical Ward of a General Hospital," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 18, No. 1, March 1957, pp. 67-97, quoting a

That, of course, does not make it an ideal definition. Its deficiencies are substantial: it does not clarify whether alcoholism is a disease or the symptom of an underlying personality disorder. It does not specify whether physiological or psychological addiction to alcohol is involved. However, it certainly implies that one who is addicted to alcohol has alcoholism and is an alcoholic. And it says nothing at all about etiology—surely a major flaw.⁶ But the cause of alcoholism is not presently known, and so it is not surprising that there are so many definitions or that to be useful to more than a special group or discipline, a definition must be purely descriptive and extremely general. The definition given here claims only to describe a condition which does not require individual medical diagnosis and a population which can be identified by measures familiar alike to health workers, for example, epidemiologists, and to social scientists such as anthropologists.

slightly different earlier formulation, say of their sample of over 300 alcoholics (p. 68), "We believe that the present sample actually represents patients suffering from alcoholism within the meaning of Keller's use of the term." Solomon Schneyer, "A Short Form of the Wechsler-Bellevue Scale, Form II, for Alcoholic Outpatients," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 18, No. 3, September 1957, pp. 382-87, quoting the same formulation, says of his sample of over 100 alcoholics studied in an outpatient clinic (p. 383), "There is no doubt that patients seen at the Center were suffering from the condition so described."

⁶ A medical style definition of alcoholism, which does not omit the etiological aspect, goes like this: "Alcoholism; diseased condition due to acute or chronic excessive indulgence in alcoholic liquors," *Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary* (Philadelphia: F. A. Davis Co., 1953). On analysis it is obvious that the etiology of alcoholism is said to be excessive drinking. Thus it either makes alcoholism mean such things as hangover and cirrhosis of the liver, or the "etiology" could hardly be more superficial since it does not tell anything about what the "excessive indulgence" is "due to."

It is thus suitable for use in surveys; it will enable us to know whom we are talking about when we say that there are X million alcoholics.

Avoidance of an etiological statement in the definition of alcoholism does not denigrate the importance of causation. The question "What's behind it?" is rather the foremost issue and will be discussed in due course. It is more convenient, however, to clarify first some fundamental distinctions, to place the role of drinking in some perspective with alcoholism, and to detail a few basic numerical facts.

DRINKING AND DRINKERS

Alcoholism involves drinking and, almost always, drunkenness; but not all drinking or drunkenness involves alcoholism. There are people who occasionally or even with some frequency drink to excess and become more or less intoxicated, and who nevertheless are not alcoholics. And, of course, the vast majority of drinkers are not alcoholics.

Alcoholic beverages have been made and drunk since prehistoric times; the European settlers of the Americas brought their beers, wines, and distilled spirits along with them. The drinking of the colonists was mainly moderate and presumably beneficent. There were "abusers" among them, however, as the legislation of the colonial period amply testifies.⁷ By the latter part of the eighteenth century the popularization of "ardent spirits" began to cause anxiety in the minds of many leaders and gave impetus to the American temperance movement which was to become successively a teetotal and prohibition move-

ment.⁸ But the drinking patterns of the American population have not been static. Until the middle of the nineteenth century drinking was chiefly a male practice, mostly divorced from the family and almost limited to hard liquor. On the frontier these conditions prevailed into the present century. The proportion of heavy drinkers was undoubtedly very high.⁹ Over the past century substantial changes have occurred: though it is still true that more men drink than women, the proportions are not extremely disparate. Of some 68 million drinkers in the "drinking age" population (15 years and older), 40 million are men and 28 million are women.¹⁰ Much more of the drinking takes place in homes now: though exact measurements for either period are not available, the sale of beer for home consumption had been steadily outpacing its sale in drinking places¹¹ even before the television era. And, strikingly, in 1850 almost 90 per cent of the absolute alcohol consumed in this country was in the form of distilled spirits and hardly 7 per cent in the form of beer, but by 1950 only 38 per cent was in spirits and 51 per cent in beer,¹² a beverage now

⁸ See the article by Raymond G. McCarthy in the present issue of THE ANNALS for a detailed account of these events and of the temperance movement.

⁹ The rate of "chronic alcoholism" was nearly twice as high in 1910 as in 1955. For the 1910 rate see E. M. Jellinek, "Recent Trends in Alcoholism and in Alcohol Consumption," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 8, No. 1, June 1947, p. 20.

¹⁰ All original statistics used in this article have been prepared in collaboration with Vera Efron, Research Analyst, Laboratory of Applied Biodynamics, Yale University.

¹¹ United States Brewers Foundation, *Brewers Almanac* (New York, 1956), Tables 3 and 4.

¹² Absolute alcohol refers to the alcohol content of the beverages, not total gallonages of fluid. It is meaningless to compare gallons of beverage, since this would compare chiefly the changes in the amount of water consumed along with alcohol.

⁷ Edward G. Baird, "The Alcohol Problem and the Law, Part III, The Beginnings of the Alcoholic-Beverage Control Laws in America," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 6, No. 3, December 1945, pp. 335-83; Vol. 7, No. 1, June 1946, pp. 110-62; Vol. 7, No. 2, September 1946, pp. 271-96; Vol. 9, No. 1, June 1948, pp. 80-118.

containing about 4½ per cent alcohol and requiring a determined drinker to produce intoxication.¹³ Finally, while the consumption of the average person in the drinking-age population¹⁴ is only slightly less than a hundred years ago, it is obvious that if the number of actual drinkers in 1850 were known, a comparison per capita of drinkers would show a great decline in this average. Just between 1940 and 1955 the consumption of absolute alcohol in all beverages per capita of drinking-age population rose by 24 per cent, while in per capita of actual drinkers it declined by 5 per cent. The increased volume of beverages was being shared by a great many more mouths.

These shifts in beverage preference, drinking patterns, and numbers of drinkers are related to many collateral social and cultural changes. One is the heavy immigration of Germans that started in the late 1840's and of southern Europeans from 1890 on—groups with traditions favorable to beer and wine. Another is urbanization which is consistently associated with drinking as opposed to abstinence. Still another is the growing employment of women and related alterations in their status, accompanied by the assumption of some behaviors once largely reserved to men. Finally there is the increase in the material prosperity of the population, leading to wider use of all manner of manu-

¹³ Leon A. Greenberg, "The Definition of an Intoxicating Beverage," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 16, No. 2, June 1955, pp. 316-25.

¹⁴ The drinking-age population (15 years and older) rather than total population is used because in this country young children account for only an infinitesimal portion of the alcohol consumed, while between 1850 and 1950 the proportion of the drinking-age population in the total population grew by 25 per cent. To base alcohol consumption statistics on total population would leave out of account the enormous relative increase in the number of potential drinkers.

factured goods, including alcoholic beverages.¹⁵

DRINKING PATTERNS AND ALCOHOLISM

Although drinking is not the same thing as alcoholism and is not even the cause of alcoholism, drinking patterns and practices have their role in the problem. Aside from the fact that without drinking there could be no alcoholism, it must be borne in mind that the numbers who drink, as well as what, how much, and in what context they drink, can all decisively influence both the rate of alcoholism and its clinical manifestations. This has been demonstrated by Jellinek in a study covering several countries. In France, for example, the drinking of two quarts of wine a day is regarded as normal and harmless for a working man; there is also a substantial consumption of spirits; the common drinking pattern allows the presence of some alcohol in the tissues at almost all times, intoxication is treated indulgently, and refusing a drink is offensive. In Italy the consumption of wine is also very large, but there is almost no drinking of spirits; much of the wine is taken with heavy carbohydrate meals, limiting the blood alcohol level to some extent; intoxication is frowned upon; and a drink may be declined without offense. In the United States drinking is rejected completely by nearly one-third of the adult population, a high intake of alcohol is regarded as "wrong" by a great many of those who do drink but "right" by others, and the attitude toward drunk-

¹⁵ Here it is worth noting that while dollar expenditures for alcoholic beverages have recently risen sharply—from 4.185 billion dollars (\$41.94 per capita of the drinking-age population) in 1941 to 9.050 billion dollars (\$75.30 per capita) in 1955, in proportion to income and other expenditures they have actually declined: from 5.1 per cent of personal consumption expenditures in 1941 to 3.6 per cent in 1955.

ness is ambivalent. The different drinking patterns of these populations are associated with certain differences in the picture of alcoholism. In the United States, chiefly people with a high degree of "psychological vulnerability" expose themselves to the dangers of alcoholism. Alcoholism is therefore frequently associated with manifest neurosis and guilt feelings. In France, men with much less psychological vulnerability can become alcoholics, the rate of alcoholism is higher, and the disorder tends to have some characteristics of a disease caused by alcohol itself. In Italy the rate of alcoholism is comparatively low and it occurs almost exclusively in association with gross deterioration, including the presence of complicating diseases.¹⁶ The changes which have occurred in American drinking customs in the past century have apparently had their repercussions in the incidence of alcoholism, in the picture of the disorder as it presents itself to medical and other observers, and in the frequency and variety of its concomitant diseases. These conditions are still undergoing evolutionary change.

HOW MANY ALCOHOLICS?

The question most commonly asked in this area is, how many alcoholics are there? There has been no nationwide census and none is in sight, though there have been a few significant local surveys.¹⁷ In the absence of direct

¹⁶ E. M. Jellinek, "Alcoholism in Different Societies." Lecture delivered at Yale Summer School of Alcohol Studies, July 1957. (Summarized from notes.)

¹⁷ These have been most recently reviewed by Robert E. Popham, "The Jellinek Alcoholism Estimation Formula and Its Application to Canadian Data," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 17, No. 4, December 1956, pp. 559-93. See also Jerome G. Manis and Chester L. Hunt, "The Community Survey as a Measure of the Prevalence of Alcoholism," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 18, No. 2, June 1957, pp. 212-16.

means for determining objectively the number of alcoholics, E. M. Jellinek devised a formula whereby the number of "alcoholics with complications"—those who exhibit a diagnosable physical or psychological change due to prolonged excessive drinking—can be estimated from the reported deaths from cirrhosis of the liver. The principle of the formula rests on Jellinek's determination of the constant relationship between the percentages of alcoholics (separately for men and women) who die of cirrhosis of the liver and the proportion of all death from cirrhosis attributable to alcoholism. Once the number of alcoholics with complications is thus calculated, another constant is required to allow the addition of alcoholics without complications. This latter constant varies from country to country. In the United States and Canada, according to Jellinek, it is 4; that is, there are 3 alcoholics without for every alcoholic with complications, hence the number with complications must be multiplied by 4 to obtain the total number of alcoholics.¹⁸ A highly

¹⁸ The full formula is expressed as follows: $R(PD/K) = A$, where D = number of reported deaths from cirrhosis of the liver in a given year, P = the percentage of such deaths attributable to alcoholism, K = the percentage of all "alcoholics with complications" who die of cirrhosis of the liver, R = the ratio of all alcoholics to alcoholics with complications, and A = the total number of alcoholics alive in a given year. The Jellinek estimation method was first reported in World Health Organization, Expert Committee on Mental Health, *Report on the First Session of the Alcoholism Subcommittee*, WHO Technical Report Series, No. 42, 1951 (Annex 2). Revised constants for the formula were reported in E. M. Jellinek, "The Estimate of the Number of Alcoholics in the U. S. A. for 1949 in the Light of the Sixth Revision of the International Lists of Causes of Death," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 1952, pp. 215-18. The most complete explanation and analysis of the method will be found in Robert E. Popham, *op. cit.* (note 17 *supra*).

TABLE 1—ESTIMATED RATES OF ALCOHOLISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1955, BY SEX^a

YEAR	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH SEXES	MALE:FEMALE RATIO
1940—	5,230	870	3,050	6.0
1941—	5,340	940	3,140	5.7
1942—	5,700	980	3,310	5.7
1943—	5,040	980	3,180	5.5
1944—	5,350	920	3,070	5.3
1945—	5,290	950	3,090	5.5
1946—	5,790	970	3,330	5.7
1947—	6,200	1,100	3,600	5.5
1948—	6,850	1,150	3,930	5.7
1949—	6,850	1,160	3,930	5.7
1950—	6,710	1,180	3,890	5.5
1951—	7,180	1,260	4,160	5.5
1952—	7,680	1,280	4,380	5.8
1953—	7,590	1,320	4,390	5.5
1954—	7,860	1,320	4,530	5.7
1955—	7,550	1,290	4,360	5.6

^a Rates are per 100,000 adults (aged 20 years or over) of same sex, excluding armed forces overseas, and represent alcoholics with and without complications.

Sources: 1940-1948, E. M. Jellinek and Mark Keller, "Rates of Alcoholism in the United States of America, 1940-1948," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 1952, pp. 49-59, Table 2; 1949-1953, Mark Keller and Vera Efron, "The Prevalence of Alcoholism," *ibid.*, Vol. 16, No. 4, December 1955, pp. 619-44, Table 1.

critical analysis of the formula nevertheless concluded that

Jellinek formula estimates of the prevalence of alcoholism in Canada and the United States, based on data reported in recent years, would probably provide reasonably reliable indications of the magnitude of the problem.¹⁹

This is in agreement with an earlier opinion, based on a comparison of Jellinek formula estimates with results of several local surveys carried out by a variety of methods, that

the various empirical confirmations justify substantial confidence in the Jellinek estimation formula. We therefore consider estimates of the prevalence of alcoholism based on this formula to give at least a

¹⁹ Popham, *op. cit.* (note 17 *supra*), p. 591.

satisfactory approximation of the magnitude of this problem in the United States.²⁰

Estimated by the Jellinek formula, in 1955 there were 4,712,000 alcoholics in the United States—4,002,000 men and 710,000 women.²¹ A far more meaningful datum, of course, is the rate of alcoholism. Based on adults (aged 20 and over), the rate per hundred thousand population of same sex is 7,550 in males and 1,290 in females. The rate in both sexes combined is 4,360. The sex ratio is 5.6 to 1. The rate of alcoholism varies greatly by geographic region, by states and by cities,²² as well as among ethnocultural groups. Only a small part of the alcoholic population will be found on Skid Row. Alcoholics may be discovered in every stratum of the population, and it has been estimated that more than 1,650,000 are employed in business and industry.²³

IS ALCOHOLISM INCREASING?

The recent statistical trend in the rate of alcoholism (1940-1955) is shown in Table 1. The impression of a rather steady rise during this interval, however, may be due to an artifact. The

²⁰ Mark Keller and Vera Efron, "The Prevalence of Alcoholism," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 16, No. 4, December 1955, p. 627.

²¹ These numbers, it will be remembered, represent all alcoholics (with and without complications); the numbers with complications are exactly one-fourth of the given values.

²² For estimates by numbers and rates in states and geographic regions see Keller and Efron, *op. cit.* (note 20 *supra*); and for cities, *idem.*, "Alcoholism in the Big Cities of the United States," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 1956, pp. 63-72. For estimates going back to 1910, and the fundamental consideration of problems of biometrics in this area, see Jellinek, *op. cit.* (note 9 *supra*).

²³ Ralph M. Henderson and Selden D. Bacon, "Problem Drinking: The Yale Plan for Business and Industry," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 247-62, June 1953, p. 250.

period since 1940 has witnessed a progressive change in public and medical attitudes about alcoholism. Doctors sometimes spare the feelings of the bereaved in making out death certificates, and alcoholism and related disorders are among the known underreported causes. But in the past fifteen years attempts by families to conceal alcoholic disorders have become less common and less intense. There is evidence²⁴ of the emergence of formerly hidden categories of alcoholics. Presumably there is less pressure on physicians to substitute a nonstigmatizing diagnosis. Furthermore, the diagnosis of cirrhosis of the liver, on which the results of the Jellinek formula rest, has undergone decided improvement in the past two decades. Thus the apparent rise in the rate of alcoholism may only reflect franker and more complete medical reporting. Confirmation of this view comes from an examination of changes in the rates of alcoholism in states and cities. In the ten states ranked lowest in rate of alcoholism in 1940 there was an average increase of 56 per cent by 1953; in the ten ranked highest, the average increase was 32 per cent. Similarly, in twelve cities ranked lowest in 1940 the rate increased by 158 per cent in 1950, but in the twelve highest it increased by only 17 per cent. The explanation for this kind of difference seems to be that the cities and states with more underreporting in the past (they tend to be the less populous) have been catching up at a faster pace.

If these surmises are correct, then we have not had a steady rise in alcoholism but steadier improvement in reporting. This would mean that the most recent

rates reflect a truer picture of the situation than those of the past. If the rates should now tend to flatten out, it may mean that reports have finally caught up with reality, or even that the rate of alcoholism has begun to decline.

Well-publicized claims that alcoholism has been increasing especially among women, and even that there are really just as many women alcoholics as men, are apparently founded on uncontrolled observation. The reported sex ratio in various samples of alcoholics ranges from 1 to 1 in one physician's private practice to 14 to 1 in a jailed group. But the rather steady rate around 5½ to 1 in the national estimate by the Jellinek formula is overwhelmingly convincing that there probably are about 5 or 6 men alcoholics to every woman alcoholic and that up to the present there has not been any substantial proportional increase in alcoholism among women. This ratio may change as an effect of the exposure of more women to drinking, but such a change has not yet appeared in any appropriate index.

TYPES OF ALCOHOLISM

The preceding statistics have dealt with alcoholism, that is, the disorder which consists essentially of excessive drinking to the extent of harming the self physically, socially, or economically. It is implied that this disorder is properly classifiable as an illness because the alcoholic would stop such self-injurious behavior if he could, or if it were not intensely needed for the alleviation of some underlying discomfort which is less tolerable than the harms from inebriety. In many diagnosed cases alcoholics are designated as addictive drinkers, alcohol addicts, and the like, the essential point being that they have lost control over drinking. This means that whenever they attempt to drink they cannot be sure they will be

²⁴ Robert Straus and Selden D. Bacon, "Alcoholism and Social Stability; a Study of Occupational Integration in 2,023 Male Clinic Patients," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 12, No. 2, June 1951, pp. 231-60.

TABLE 2—FIRST ADMISSIONS FOR ALCOHOLISM, WITH AND WITHOUT PSYCHOSIS, TO STATE AND PRIVATE MENTAL HOSPITALS, BY SEX, U.S.A., 1951

ADMISSIONS	STATE		PRIVATE	
	MEN	WOMEN	MEN	WOMEN
FIRST ADMISSIONS				
Alcoholism With Psychosis.....	3,670	790	661	307
Alcoholism Without Psychosis.....	6,748	1,105	3,713	1,244
Total With and Without Psychosis..	10,418	1,895	4,374	1,551
RATE PER 100,000 ADULTS				
Alcoholism With Psychosis.....	7.41	1.53	1.34	0.59
Alcoholism Without Psychosis.....	13.63	2.14	7.50	2.41
PER CENT OF ALL FIRST ADMISSIONS				
Alcoholism With Psychosis.....	6.68	1.77	4.43	1.40
Alcoholism Without Psychosis.....	12.28	2.48	24.89	5.68

Source: National Institute of Mental Health, Biometrics Branch. *Patients in Mental Institutions, 1950 and 1951* (Washington: U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service, 1954), Tables 32 and 36.

able to stop at will. Distinction between this type of alcoholic and others who may not have lost control or perhaps never will is certainly important and desirable. Among American alcoholics it seems likely that the vast majority have experienced loss of control. But at present there is no way of establishing this proportion; it takes individual diagnosis to determine whether loss of control over drinking has occurred, or whether an individual is an alcohol addict, a symptomatic alcoholic, or one of the various other classificatory types that have been proposed; it is not known how many of each kind there are. All of them are included in the total of alcoholics—with and without complications—dealt with herein. It may be that many of the types of alcoholics represent stages in the developmental process of alcoholism.²⁵

ALCOHOLIC DISEASES

But what of the complications, other than addiction, which affect one-fourth

²⁵ E. M. Jellinek, "Phases of Alcohol Addiction," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 13, No. 4, December 1952, pp. 673-84.

of the alcoholics in this country? They include physical disorders such as cirrhosis of the liver, pellagra, gastritis, and others which, generally, are now attributed to faulty nutrition rather than the direct action of alcohol on organs and tissues. They include nervous system and mental disorders such as peripheral polyneuropathy, Wernicke's encephalopathy, delirium tremens, and Korsakoff's psychosis. The first two have been proved to be caused by nutritional deficiencies, and the last two are suspected of the like etiology. The distribution of these diseases among alcoholics, however, is not known. Undoubtedly the general improvement in the nutrition of the American population since 1940 has affected alcoholics also, and fewer of them exhibit the florid "alcoholic" diseases of an earlier period.

The "medical complications of alcoholism" do not include disorders such as head injuries, pneumonia or tuberculosis to which alcoholics may be particularly susceptible. Nevertheless the higher incidence and more serious outcomes of such disorders in a population of over 4 million adults must be considered an important item in evaluating

the extent of the problem of alcoholism. But at present there are no statistical measures of this factor.

There are statistics of national scope on admissions of alcoholics to the state and some other mental hospitals. A summary of these is shown in Table 2. According to the Jellinek formula, there were about 4,200,000 alcoholics in 1951; thus fewer than half of 1 per cent of the alcoholics were admitted to these mental hospitals in one year. But this tabulation does not include admissions to veterans and some nonreporting mental hospitals, or to general hospitals which receive some patients who recover rapidly and are thus not transferred to mental hospitals.

DEATH FROM ALCOHOLISM

The most dramatic rubric is "death from alcoholism" and related causes. As reported by the Bureau of Vital Statistics, in 1950 this came to a total of 5,957 cases, with a rate per hundred thousand adult population of 2.3. The same rate in 1940 had been 2.9 and in 1950, 5.5. The steady decline in the rate of death from alcoholism does not mean a reduction in the incidence of alcoholism, however. It is due to advances in medical management of the disorders reported in this category when they terminate fatally.²⁶ Perhaps it reflects also the tendency of alcoholics in more recent times to come to the attention of physicians at earlier stages in their careers. Especially noteworthy, however, is the fact that one of the items which make up the declining total

²⁶ In this section "alcoholism" does not mean what we have defined it to mean in all other contexts but whatever is incorporated under the term in the coding *Manual* of the Bureau of Vital Statistics. For a thorough discussion of "death from alcoholism" and its uselessness as an index of alcoholism, see E. M. Jellinek, "Death from Alcoholism" in the United States in 1940: A Statistical Analysis," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 3, No. 3, December 1942, pp. 465-94.

of death from alcoholism moved in the opposite direction. This is "death from cirrhosis of the liver with mention of alcoholism," of which 1,437 cases were reported in 1940 and 3,199 in 1950. Considering the notable advances in the treatment of cirrhosis of the liver precisely since about 1940, it is unavoidable to suspect that this is a phenomenon of more complete reporting. If so, it supports the view that the apparent rise in alcoholism since 1940 is in reality a reflection of the better reporting of death from cirrhosis.

THE QUESTION OF ETIOLOGY

But what causes alcoholism?

An illness or symptom which numbers more than 4 million American adults among its victims, which is responsible for a vast amount of related human suffering (family break-up) and economic loss (reduced productivity), which causes the hospitalization or clinical treatment or jailing of many tens of thousands each year, and accounts for the death of thousands does not have an established etiology. This is a condition that cries for major research efforts.

There are, of course, etiological theories; and it is possible to speak of two leading schools. A physiologically oriented school attributes alcoholism to a biochemical defect of one kind or another which provokes an uncontrollable craving for alcohol. For example, Williams²⁷ blames it on an idiosyncratic genetotropic lack of nutritive elements; Tintera and Lovell,²⁸ and Smith²⁹ blame

²⁷ Roger J. Williams, "The Genetotropic Concept—Nutritional Deficiencies and Alcoholism," *Annals of the New York Academy of Science*, Vol. 57, 1954, pp. 794-811.

²⁸ J. W. Tintera and H. W. Lovell, "Endocrine Treatment of Alcoholism," *Geriatrics*, Vol. 4, 1949, pp. 274-80.

²⁹ James J. Smith, "The Endocrine Basis and Hormonal Therapy of Alcoholism," *New York State Journal of Medicine*, Vol. 50, 1950, pp. 1704-6, 1711-15.

it on defective function of the endocrine glands; Randolph⁸⁰ blames it on a masked food sensitivity. According to any of these hypotheses, the incidence of alcoholism in a population is a factor of the frequency of the causative defect, which most often is assumed to be genetic. Only Randolph, whose theory has the lowest acceptance, has adequately rationalized the relationship of the hypothetical defect to a craving for alcohol particularly. Williams, Smith, and Randolph have each suggested that correction of the hypothesized defect should constitute a cure of alcoholism and allow the alcoholic to resume moderate drinking. Thus far very few such cures have been demonstrated. Nor has any of the defects been proved to have existed in substantial numbers of alcoholics before they became alcoholics.

A psychologically oriented school considers alcoholism to be a manifestation of neurosis based on deficient or arrested development of personality, rooted in childhood. A constitutional predisposition, either to psychic deviation or to alcohol tolerance, is often assumed. Environmental factors, favoring recourse to intoxication as a defense against unconscious stresses connected with personal and social life responsibilities, are thought to explain why the illness takes the form of alcoholism rather than some other neurosis. Eventually, conditioning or addiction to the pharmacological action of alcohol may supervene. The incidence of alcoholism in a population, then, depends on the frequency of the combination of constitutional predisposition, inadequate childhood rearing, and intoxication-permissive circumstances. A happy feature of the lineup in this

etiological conflict is the fact that adherence does not go strictly by disciplines: there are sociologists and psychiatrists who like the biochemical theories, physiologists and chemists who prefer the psychological.

A third school can be cited which holds that the cause of alcoholism is alcohol itself—a belief which has some adherents among scientists and a substantial popular following. This school, however, must rely on one of the theories of its rivals to explain the differential frequency of alcoholism in various ethnic, cultural, and geographic populations as well as the immunity of the vast majority of drinkers.

PREVENTION

The significance of etiological concepts goes beyond the sufficiently important issue of scientific knowledge. Well before the question of cause may be decided, policies of treatment and strategies of prevention must be adopted. Inevitably, activities of this sort are projected according to etiological theories. If, for example, there is a strong belief that the cause of alcoholism is alcohol, then the kind of work public health people do is sidetracked for political solutions. If a biochemical theory is favored, then research will be directed toward the discovery of a "wonder drug" which will abolish the somatic defect and allow the alcoholic to become a normal drinker. Yet it may be a dearly bought folly to concentrate major resources on this still remote hope. From the viewpoint of preventive public health work, especially, the triple-faceted psychologically oriented theory offers the most realistic promise: it does not deny the possibility of a necessary constitutional soil for the disorder; obviously if this is specific and subject to correction, alcoholism might

be treated successfully by physiological measures and prevented by the early identification of the susceptible. Thus physiological-biochemical research which is etiologically relevant is well worth while. But psychotherapy is effective now and prevention can also be achieved by activity related to the second facet—by discovering and applying principles of mental hygiene which will avert those errors in child rearing and socialization that lead to neurosis. Finally, preven-

tion can be sought through the development of culturally acceptable controls of adolescent and adult behavior which will minimize resort to drunkenness as a means of adaptation to social and psychological stress.

This does not invoke belief in an etiological theory because it favors more scope in tackling a public health problem; it only urges action upon that theory which allows the most far-reaching strategy of prevention.

⁸⁰ Theron G. Randolph, "The Descriptive Features of Food Addiction; Addictive Eating and Drinking," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 17, No. 2, June 1956, pp. 198-224.

Alcoholism: Attitudes and Attacks, 1775-1935

By RAYMOND G. MCCARTHY

Abstract: For generations uncontrolled drinking was looked upon as a matter of individual perversity and moral defect. One or two physicians pointed out the disease character of this behavior, but they received little recognition from their colleagues. Society in general tended either to ignore the condition or to deal with it through legislation and punitive action. Attempts at elimination of uncontrolled drinking during the last one hundred and fifty years have demonstrated that this is a mixed medical and social problem. Joint responsibility and co-operation of both medicine and the community are imperative if a solution to the condition is to be achieved. There is evidence that this co-operation is slowly developing.

ONE OF the earliest scientific formulations of the disorder of alcoholism was reported by Thomas Trotter, an Edinburgh physician, in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. In addition to describing the symptomatology and progression of the condition, Dr. Trotter commented on the conflict between the concepts of disease and of perverseness in the causation of alcoholism which circulated both among physicians and laymen. In a study completed in 1778, Dr. Trotter noted:

Mankind, ever in pursuit of pleasure, have reluctantly admitted into the catalogue of their diseases, those evils which were the immediate offspring of their luxuries. Such a reserve is indeed natural to the human mind: for of all deviations from the paths of duty, there are none that so forcibly impeach their pretensions to the character of rational beings as the inordinate use of spirituous liquors. Hence, in the writings of medicine, we find drunkenness only cursorily mentioned among the powers that injure health, while the mode of action is entirely neglected and left unexplained. . . . The priesthood hath poured forth its anathemas from the pulpit; and the moralist, no less severe, hath declaimed against

it as a vice degrading to our nature. Both have meant well; and becomingly opposed religious and moral arguments to the sinful indulgence of animal appetite. But the physical influence of custom, confirmed into habit, interwoven with the actions of our sentient system, and reacting on our mental part, have been entirely forgotten. The perfect knowledge of those remote causes which first induced the propensity of vinous liquors, whether they sprung from situation in life, or depended on any peculiar temperament of body, is also necessary for conducting the cure.¹

A century and a half later, Jellinek and Bowman, in the preface to a review of theories of alcohol addiction and alcoholism, commented:

Every medical issue is or ought to be a social issue too; and some social issues, regarded strictly as such, ought to become medical issues. The latter type of social issue usually becomes suitable for effective social handling only after medicine has

¹ E. M. Jellinek, "Classics of the Alcohol Literature. An Early Medical View of Alcohol Addiction and Its Treatment. Dr. Thomas Trotter's 'Essay, Medical, Philosophical and Chemical, on Drunkenness.'" *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 2, June 1941, p. 585.

adopted it, but only long after. This is due to the fact that when medicine first accepts a social issue as a medical one, the social effects tend to cling to it and temporarily to becloud the purely medical integration of the problem. Medicine can eliminate these encumbrances only gradually. When this has been accomplished, however, the quondam social issue emerges as a rigid medical problem. This stage, too, is not the most productive, for at this time society does not recognize the issue as its own, but tends to accept the narrow view that it belongs in the restricted sphere of the medical scientist. Finally, medical development of the problem reaches the stage when medicine can afford to drop the role of exclusiveness with respect to it. Medical science itself now reintegrates the desirable social aspects into the problem, and it becomes manifest in its correct proportions as a medico-social issue. Society is then ready to tackle it with the greatest promise of success.²

Whether or not a fundamental shift in social attitudes regarding the nature of alcoholism has occurred in the last two decades is open to question. Certainly progress has been made. But during the past several generations, conflicting social attitudes and the ambivalence of physicians in treating a disorder characterized by popular and scientific misinformation illustrate the complexities which adhere even today to the medico-social illness of alcoholism.

ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES USED WIDELY IN COLONIAL TIMES

The use of beverages containing alcohol has been almost universal among people in Western Europe for centuries, and the Englishmen who colonized this country were no exception. In New England and the Middle and Southern colonies along the eastern seaboard, beer and ale were part of the daily diet and believed necessary to maintain

health. However, from the earliest days, drunkenness was frowned upon and punishments were imposed on those who consumed more than was considered seemly.

During the late eighteenth century rum, which has a far higher alcohol content than ale or beer, became an integral part of the economic and social life of the colonies. Numerous distilleries were established in all the population centers. One writer has commented:

It inspired those in sorrow and distress, gave courage to the soldier, endurance to the traveler, foresight to the statesman, and inspiration to the preacher. By it were lighted the fires of revelry and devotion. Few doubted that it was a great boon to mankind.³

At the same time, drunkenness increased. This was particularly observable in the westward movement with its frontier culture, but excessive drinking was not confined to any one locality.

Questions began to be raised about the effects of drunkenness on the body and on society. Dr. Benjamin Rush, physician-general to the Colonial Army during the Revolution, reported that in his opinion the use of rum to ward off sickness among soldiers had not been effective. In 1784 Dr. Rush published "An Inquiry Into the Effects of Ardent Spirits on the Human Body and Mind," in which he directly challenged the beneficial effects of spirituous liquors. In 1790 a Memorial of the College of Physicians in Philadelphia to Congress stated that

the habitual use of distilled spirits in any form whatsoever is wholly unnecessary; that they neither fortify the body against the morbid effects of heat and cold nor render labor more easy nor productive; that there are many articles of diet and drink which are not only safe and physi-

² E. M. Jellinek, *Alcohol Addiction and Chronic Alcoholism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), p. x.

³ John A. Krout, *The Origins of Prohibition* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1925), p. 38.

Raymond G. McCarthy, New Haven, Connecticut, is Associate Professor of Health Education, Yale University. He is a staff member of the Yale Center of Alcohol Studies and has been Associate Director, Yale Summer School of Alcohol Studies since 1953.

cally salutary, but preferable to distilled spirits for the above-mentioned purposes.⁴

It is significant that criticism at this time was directed toward the use of ardent spirits, chiefly rum. From the beginning, however, there was believed to be a direct relationship between individual control of drinking and personal character and morals. Stringent regulations had long been imposed against the sale of rum to irresponsible individuals of low status, for example, indentured servants, Indians, and the adventurers who flocked to the colonies in the early days. Drunkenness was thought to breed dissolute habits and was considered a threat to the spiritual life of the individual and of the community. The concept of alcoholism as it is understood today, embodying as it does a lack of control over the urge to drink arising from some constellation of personality factors, was conspicuously lacking in the public pronouncements of the day.

TOTAL ABSTINENCE BECOMES A MORAL ISSUE

The American temperance movement arose about 1825. For approximately twenty years the emphasis was on abstinence from ardent spirits. With the development of the concept of unfermented wines used in the Bible, the temperance organizations became identified with the pledge of total abstinence from all that might intoxicate, on the assumption that Christ could not sanction the use of anything that constituted a threat to spiritual welfare. By 1850 alcohol in any form was identified with Satan. Total abstinence was demanded morally of all who aspired to the good life.

The moral issue in the use of alcohol was strongly supported by millions of

people. It was at the core of the temperance movement, which in turn challenged the liquor industry and all who benefited from it. Total abstinence for the individual was prescribed as an example to the weaker brother. Yet not all churches accepted this principle. While there was no sanction for drunkenness, the concept of alcohol as one of the Creator's goods intended for the use of man was maintained. By the middle of the century, waves of immigrant Irish and Germans, many of them members of churches which did not subscribe to total abstinence, strengthened this side of the controversy. Moreover, not only were these people users of alcoholic drinks, but the Germans became active in the brewing industry and the Irish were not averse to employment in the retail sale of alcoholic beverages.

The Maine law of 1851 gave a precedent for total elimination of the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages by legislative fiat. During the 1880's every New England state passed similar legislation, and although these acts (except in Maine) were repealed within a few years, they indicated a trend which was to culminate in the National Prohibition Enforcement Act of 1920.

In 1862 the federal government established a system of taxation of the liquor industry which led to the creation of the United States Brewers Association and paved the way for the formal organization of the liquor industry. The emergence of a number of new temperance organizations, many of them social and fraternal in character, provided further support for a national movement to abolish the manufacture and sale of alcoholic drinks. The liquor industry was viewed as a pernicious and ungodly power which could only be controlled and eventually eliminated by law. In this manner, the problem of the individual excessive drinker became submerged in the struggle between the

organized temperance movement supported by many church leaders and the alcohol beverage industry.

INCREASING SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF ALCOHOL METABOLISM

Previous to 1860, physiologists believed that alcohol was completely oxidized in the body. About 1860, animal experiments showed that alcohol could be recovered from the urine and expired air. Researchers then concluded that alcohol was not metabolized at all. Given this lack of knowledge, the concept of the build-up of alcohol in the blood of a drinker to the point where spontaneous combustion might take place, as was often reported, was understandable. The modern study of alcohol metabolism began about 1870. Numerous researchers, investigating the amount of energy liberated by the oxidation of alcohol, concluded that alcohol can be utilized as a foodstuff by the organism. During the early years of the present century, the rate of metabolism of alcohol in animals and in man was calculated. Widmark's micro-method for alcohol determination in 1922 was an important step forward. During the next ten years, he and others cleared up the general facts about alcohol absorption, distribution, and elimination in the animal and human body.

THE PROBLEM OF ALCOHOLISM BECOMES SUBMERGED

The combined weight of authority represented by clergy, physicians, educators, and civic leaders established in the minds of the public the concept that excessive use of alcohol inevitably brought about physical deterioration and disease. As a matter of conscience, the individual had two alternatives with respect to social custom. He might abstain completely, or he might use alco-

holic drinks in controlled fashion. The possibility that for some men control was out of the question was brushed aside rather generally by most authorities. The number of drinkers who sought medical help and were restored to health, only to relapse after a few weeks, demonstrated that the individual did not wish to lead a wholesome life. To most physicians who found the treatment of such cases frustrating, it suggested neurological damage from alcohol which made it impossible for the individual either to abstain or to drink in a controlled manner.

Early temperance leaders felt an obligation in conscience to help those who had become "victims of alcohol." The term "drunkard" appeared frequently in the literature, but there was an element of compassion and sympathy associated with it. One of the annual reports of the American Temperance Society commented:

No class of men are entitled to draw so largely on their compassion as drunkards are, and especially do they feel this [the members] when they consider how much they have themselves done to make drunkards.

And again,

The drunkard's self-despair arises in great measure from the conviction that he is an outcast from public respect and sympathy. Of this we have been aware in our efforts to reform him; we have sought to show him that as to ourselves at least, this conviction shall henceforth be groundless.⁵

It was the opinion that men who had lost control to a point where excessive indulgence and drunkenness became a common behavior pattern were men in need of help physically, socially, and spiritually. This concept running

⁵ Cited in Francis McPeck, "Religious Bodies and Treatment of Inebriety," Lecture 29 in *Alcohol, Science and Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945), pp. 403-18.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

through the early temperance literature is conspicuously absent in later years when the emphasis was placed on "the fallen man" as an example of the pernicious manipulations of the liquor industry. There was then the implication that to help the "drunkard" would remove some element of responsibility from the liquor business.

THE DISEASE OF ALCOHOLISM NOTED BY DR. TROTTER AND OTHERS

Because of the concern in this country about drunkenness, it is surprising that there was little reflection in medical practice of the ideas expressed by Dr. Thomas Trotter in Edinburgh in a publication released in 1804, entitled, "Essay, Medical, Philosophical and Chemical, on Drunkenness."⁶ Trotter said,

In medical language, I consider drunkenness, strictly speaking, to be a disease; produced by a remote cause, giving birth to actions and movements in a living body, that disorder the functions of health.

And again,

It is to be remembered that a bodily infirmity is not the only thing to be corrected. The habit of drunkenness is a disease of the mind.

Trotter believed in the psychogenesis of the condition and in the need to suit treatment to the individual case. He stated:

In treating these various descriptions of persons and characters, it will readily appear to a discerning physician that very different methods will be required. The patient already knows, as well as the priest and moralist, that the indulgence is pernicious, and ultimately fatal: He is also aware, without the reasonings of the physician, that the constant repetition will de-

⁶ The quotations which follow are all cited in E. M. Jellinek, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 2, June 1941, pp. 584-91.

stroy health; but it is not so easy to convince him that you possess a charm that can recompense his feeling of the warmth of a grateful stimulus, or bestow on his nervous system sensations equally soothing and agreeable as he has been accustomed to receive from the bewitching spirit.

Trotter stressed the importance of establishing a good working relationship with such patients, pointing out that the craving for alcohol had become so strong that they were likely to resort to varying tricks and modes of deception. At the same time, he stated,

I firmly believe that the injudicious and ill-timed chastisement of officious friends have driven many unfortunate inebriates to ruin that might have been reclaimed by a different method. . . . This disease, I mean the habit of drunkenness, is like some other mental derangement; there is an ascendancy to be gained over the person committed to our care, which, when accomplished, brings him entirely under our control.

This concept of the disease factor beyond the toxic action of alcohol received little attention at the time. It is possible, however, that the Reverend Lyman Beecher, one of the pioneers of the American temperance movement, had read of Trotter's work. Beecher is reported to have exclaimed, after sitting at the bedside of a dying parishioner, a drunkard, that "I indulged the hope that God saw it was a constitutional infirmity, like any other disease."

Dr. Benjamin Rush, in his lectures at Philadelphia College in 1790, suggested the disease theory of uncontrolled drinking. In 1828, Dr. Eli Todd, superintendent of the Hartford (Connecticut) Retreat for the Insane, urged that an inebriate asylum be established. A committee of the Connecticut State Medical Society in 1830 picked up this idea and recommended the establishment of an asylum for the medical care and treatment of inebriates. In 1833 a

similar recommendation came from Dr. Woodard, a mental hospital superintendent in Worcester, Massachusetts. But the proposition that drunkenness might be a form of disease, susceptible to medical treatment and cure instead of punishment, was acceptable to only a limited number of physicians at the time and received little support from the public at large.

The resistance which the community offered to the disease concept of inebriety is illustrated in the experience of Dr. J. Edward Turner, a physician of Bath, Maine. In 1846 he proposed an institution in which patients would be treated as suffering from a physical disease and where proper remedies in suitable surroundings would be brought to bear on the individual to eliminate the malady. Dr. Turner felt that physical restraint and control were needed before such patients could learn to live rational lives. He eliminated all questions of pledges, will power, and moral suasion. Inebriates, he asserted, existed in a twilight zone of insanity. The opposition to this concept was tremendous, not only from the public but also from his medical colleagues. It was argued that to attempt by physical means to remedy a spiritual condition was sacrilegious. It was considered foolish to label drunkenness as a disease and in this way to excuse vice and immorality by lessening the degree of personal responsibility. Such arguments, advanced more than a century ago, are not infrequently encountered among workers in the field of alcoholism today.

The New York State Inebriate Asylum, financed by private funds, was finally opened at Binghamton in 1864. Dissension, misunderstanding, and difficulties in dealing with patients characterized the work at the institution for a number of years, until finally Dr. Turner was forced to resign. The hospital was then taken over by the State

of New York for the treatment of mental disease.

WASHINGTONIANS ESTABLISHED TREATMENT HOUSES

A social and religious development to eliminate drunkenness was dramatically typified in the Washingtonian movement. A group of habitual drinkers, meeting in a tavern in Baltimore in 1840, were impressed by the work of a temperance lecturer and decided to take the pledge of total abstinence. It is not clear why this particular group was so impelled to change its habits or why others who were approached by individual members responded so readily. In any case, within a matter of months, thousands joined the organization, and meetings characterized by tremendous enthusiasm and emotionalism were held in a number of cities. Everywhere the pattern was the same. A former inebriate, telling his story in dramatic and moving fashion, was able to persuade hundreds in his audience to take the pledge and in turn become missionaries in the cause.

For a time the Washingtonians were looked upon with enthusiasm by the traditional temperance societies. Thousands of people who were not subject to uncontrolled drinking, but who believed in temperance, became members. Within a matter of two years, the movement spread beyond the Alleghenies into the new states of the Middle West. As the Washingtonians began to establish independent temperance groups which competed with the older organizations and as a number of recruits, some of them prominent in the movement, relapsed again into drinking, criticism spread rapidly. The charge of atheism was made against some of the leaders. Because the members did not advocate elimination of the liquor industry, they were accused of using temperance reform to arouse opposition to Christian

principles. These charges were generally unfounded, but the lack of central organization within the movement, the rising opposition on the part of many church and temperance leaders, and the falling-off of enthusiasm from the high emotional pitch generated in the early months brought about the gradual disappearance of the movement.

A significant development occurred in the opening of "homes" where the medical side of drunkenness could be treated. Such establishments were maintained by the Washingtonians in several cities along the eastern seaboard. Habitual drunkenness was looked upon as a physical as well as a mental and moral disease. Prayer and religious services, in addition to medical supervision, were available. No coercion was used. Unlike the practice in state mental asylums, patients admitted to the homes were without restraint, were allowed to go about the city on parole, and were treated as men of honor rather than degenerates.

Although the homes gradually disappeared because of lack of support, one—the Washingtonian Home for Fallen Men, opened in Boston in 1868—is still in operation as the Washingtonian Hospital, a progressive psychiatrically oriented institution. Dr. Albert Day, the first superintendent, published a text in 1867 in which he outlined his understanding of the nature of the condition and its treatment. Dr. Day stated,

The simple form of the disease results from the introduction into the system of any of those poisons which first stimulate, then narcotize. The chronic form has often causes more remote than continuous stimulation, under the action of which the passion for stimulants amounts to a mania, seemingly irresistible and incurable. These causes are either idiopathic, or are induced by habits or manner of life.⁷

⁷ Albert Day, *Methomania* (Boston: James Campbell, 1867), pp. 5-6.

Dr. Day had definite ideas on the need for treatment beyond the sobering-up stage. Moreover, he felt strongly that there was no specific drug which would effect a cure of the condition.

When the physician has been so fortunate as to see his patient restored to a normal condition, he should remember that his duties are not yet complete. It may safely be laid down as a rule that no man has thus needed his care that does not stand in need of still further assistance and advice.⁸ . . . And while the *Materia Medica* furnishes drugs, valuable and perhaps even specific for immediate use, it should be borne in mind that no specific has been provided as a preventative of further indulgence. And the complex nature of the disease, varying both in cause and effect with every form of constitution and habit, renders it extremely improbable that any such specific will ever be discovered.⁹

In addition to sensing the need for treatment beyond correction of the effects of acute intoxication, Dr. Day pointed out the social implications of alcoholism and the importance of early identification of the condition. Referring to what today would be called the "hidden alcoholic," Day said,

It seems to me that the very general prevalence of the disease is not appreciated. Everyone knows of one or more cases, but they are looked upon as infrequent exceptions; whereas it may be said there is hardly a family of any size which has not amongst its members at least one who is either a confirmed inebriate or more or less tainted with the disease. It must be borne in mind that a large proportion of these cases are not visible to the eye of society, but are hidden from the world by the decent pride of friends, or the sensitivity of the patients themselves. No social limits are narrow enough to exclude it, and it knows no distinction of sex.¹⁰

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

APPROACHES TO THE STUDY AND ALLEVIATION OF INEBRIETY

In 1870 a number of superintendents of state hospitals and other physicians interested in the physiology of drunkenness organized the Association for the Study of Inebriety. This group held annual meetings at which papers of general interest were presented. In 1876 a publication, *The Quarterly Journal of Inebriety*, was established. Like the society, it was bitterly condemned, particularly by the religious press, and even by many medical colleagues who considered the work being done unworthy of scientific notice. Throughout the next twenty-five years a significant degree of interest in the action of alcohol in the body was maintained by a few physicians in this country. They were stimulated by the development of similar groups in England and on the Continent. In 1902 the *British Journal of Inebriety* began publication in England.

Alleviation of inebriety during the last quarter of the nineteenth century rested to a great extent in the hands of the missions and the Salvation Army. There were privately operated or church-sponsored institutions, for example the New York Home for Intemperate Men, founded in 1877 and now known as Chester Crest, and the Keeley Institutes. The Salvation Army concentrated on a religious conversion experience, moral support, and provision through work for regaining and maintenance of self-respect.

In some states "drunkards" were committed to mental hospitals where treatment consisted chiefly of sobering a man up and helping him recover from the acute effects of the drinking spree. Other states limited admission to men in psychosis. The workhouse, the county farm, and the county and municipal jails were for years a temporizing element in the course of a drinking career. Be-

cause the alcoholic population included such a variety of personalities in different stages of the disease, unquestionably some individuals were helped by some of the rehabilitative procedures, but in general these custodial approaches produced negligible results. They failed to advance knowledge of the causation of the condition or to develop treatment techniques which might have been applied successfully to a cross-section of the inebriate group.

THE EMMANUEL MOVEMENT AND PEABODY'S PROGRAM OF RE-EDUCATION

The rise of psychiatry in Europe had a somewhat limited influence upon American medicine before the early years of the present century. As a result of World War I and the contact of American physicians with European systems of psychology and psychiatry, a marked stimulus was given in this country to the role of psychological mechanisms in emotional disorders.

The application of psychological principles in the field of religion and health was explored intensively in Boston at the Emmanuel Episcopal Church. Two clergymen, Elwood Worcester and Samuel McComb, in collaboration with a physician, Dr. Isador Coriat, established a clinic in which physical medicine, psychological suggestion, and the resources of religion were integrated. These men stressed the interrelatedness of mind and body. Scientific procedures were employed in diagnosis, case records were kept, and specialists in physical medicine were employed where indicated. The clinic included among the patients a certain number of "drunkards"; many of them responded favorably. After a physical checkup, a suggestion of relaxation and of suggestion therapy, and in many cases hospitalization, and in many cases hospitalization. A group program, the Jacoby Club, was organized for those who were recovering from

and through group support, mutual help, and inspiration many recoveries were achieved. The Emmanuel Movement spread rapidly and extended in selected centers throughout this country and into Europe.¹¹

Shortly after World War I, Richard Peabody returned from military service seriously disorganized as the result of drinking. Hearing of the Emmanuel program, he approached Courtenay Baylor, a psychologist associated with the clinic, and asked for help. Through suggestion, hypnosis, and relaxation and by gaining insight regarding his own personality and the significance of alcohol use to him, Peabody was able to make a recovery. He decided to specialize in the treatment of alcoholism, and after a period of study in the field of abnormal psychology developed a system of re-education which, perhaps for the first time, incorporated modern psychological principles specifically in the treatment of alcoholism.

Peabody's educational program consisted of nine steps, as follows: a mental analysis and the removal of doubts, fears, and conflicts originating in the past; permanent removal of tension by formal relaxation and suggestion; influencing the conscious mind by suggestion so that it co-operates with the unconscious to bring about a consistent, intelligent course of action; control of thoughts and actions; physical hygiene; daily routine of self-imposed schedule to keep the patient occupied, to train his ^{the} power and efficiency, and to give ^{those} the feeling that he is doing something about his problem; warning the ^{narcotic} against unexpected pitfalls; prolation, ^{the} patient with some means of sion for ^{cession} and realization that the seemingly ^e which drove the patient to causes are ^{by} habits of ^{Emmanuel} Movement is described in ^{God} Worcester and Samuel Mc-

¹¹ Albert D. *Mind and Spirit* (Boston: Mar- Campbell, 180., 1931).

disintegration can, under conditions of sobriety, carry him beyond the level of average attainment.¹²

Peabody insisted that each patient be given a medical examination and that he accept treatment voluntarily. Through a system of readings, of frequent interviews, and of formal relaxation during a part of the interview, the alcoholic acquired a series of techniques to be applied in his daily routine. Emphasis was placed on the fact that responsibility for recovery rested with the individual; that it should be approached for his own sake, not to please others. Systematic suggestion incorporated in a series of notes to be written out each evening before retiring was followed. As progress developed, the patient became less dependent upon the lay therapist and developed skills sufficient to manage his own affairs, make decisions, avoid physical and emotional fatigue, and to live as an independent person without alcohol.

Probably Peabody as much as anyone is responsible for introducing into the popular vocabulary the word "alcoholism" and substituting "alcoholic" for the emotionally charged label "drunkard."¹³ A number of individuals who experienced Peabody's program recovered and extended it to various parts of the country. One of the permanent results has been the program at the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine under Dr. Edward Strecker, a psychiatrist, and Francis Chambers, a lay therapist. Following the basic principles evolved by Peabody, the system has been improved and applied successfully with a selected group of patients for

¹² For further discussion, see Richard Peabody, *The Common Sense of Drinking* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1935).

¹³ This was tremendously intensified and expanded with the rise of Alcoholics Anonymous throughout this country and the publicity which this organization received in newspapers and popular journals.

a number of years.¹⁴ Peabody's program has been criticized on theoretical grounds. It was appropriate for only a limited segment of the alcoholic population, but it provided a stimulus to work in the treatment of alcoholics which was of major importance.

THE MEDICO-SOCIAL ASPECTS OF ALCOHOLISM REMAIN A CHALLENGE

For more than a century and a half, the problem of alcoholism has been obscured by inability to dissociate it from that of drinking and drunkenness. As a result, a social problem which should also have been a medical problem has been handled ineffectively and emotionally.

A decade of national prohibition (1920-1933) which introduced new elements in social attitudes toward drinking, particularly among women, further accentuated the gap between the advocates of total abstinence by law and those in our society who insisted on maintaining the right to drink. The alcoholic, lost in the turmoil, became the responsibility chiefly of county jails and psychopathic wards of municipal

hospitals. For those few who were able to pay for treatment, the private sanatorium and the psychiatrist were available.

Prevention of drunkenness is related to prevention of alcoholism, but alcoholism and drunkenness are not necessarily the same. Medical treatment of acute intoxication and its physical consequences is, as Dr. Trotter pointed out more than a century ago, only the first step in the treatment of alcoholism. The antagonism in the past years of some of the leaders of certain churches toward anything that would minimize or weaken the drive for total abstinence for all has resulted in weakening the position of the church in an approach to the solution of this major social problem.

There is evidence that this condition is changing. In recent years it has been possible for a physician, a clergyman, a social worker, a judge, and a recovered alcoholic to sit on the same platform and contribute, each from his experience, ideas that taken together may lead to better understanding of the problem. As a mixed social and medical problem, neither the community nor the medical profession holds the solution. Together, progress in the future may be anticipated to a degree that was not achieved during the last century.

¹⁴ See Edward Strecker and Francis Chambers, Jr., *Alcohol: One Man's Meat* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938).

Intoxication and Alcoholism: Physiological Factors

By LEON A. GREENBERG

Abstract: Alcoholism is a complex problem whose full comprehension involves concepts from many disciplines. One of these is physiology, dealing with the nature of alcoholic beverages and their fate and action in the body. The primary action of alcohol is on the brain, producing intoxication. Since alcohol is consumed in the body liberating energy, its excessive use curtails adequate intake of other essential foods, creating deficiency diseases common to alcoholics. Intoxication itself also indirectly injures organs and functions of the body. Although physiology has contributed much to knowledge about the course and medical treatment of alcoholism, it has not provided an answer to its etiology.

IT IS not without significance that an entire issue of *THE ANNALS* has been devoted to the subject of alcoholism. Not only does it express the recognition attained by this behavior as an individual, social, and economic problem of important magnitude, but the headings under which the problem is considered indicate the wide spectrum of scientific disciplines involved in a comprehension of the problem in its fullest dimensions. One of these disciplines is biological, encompassing the nature of alcohol and its beverages and its metabolism and physiological actions. Metabolism refers to what the body does to alcohol; physiological action refers to what alcohol does to the body.

It is not surprising that even in the earliest efforts to deal with the use—and especially the misuse—of alcoholic beverages, attention has been directed to the properties of alcohol for, obviously, if alcohol did not have these properties—if it had those of orange juice or milk—there would be no problem. In the atmosphere of anxiety and emotionalism surrounding these problems there has grown an abundance of misconcep-

tions and fallacies, particularly since many have lent themselves well to the technique of the psychology of fear often used in efforts to solve the problems. But more recent research has provided a body of scientific information about the actions of alcohol. The present article will deal with this.

In considering alcoholic beverages it will be well to state at the beginning that we are speaking of a particular alcohol—ethyl alcohol. Ethyl alcohol is only one of numerous compounds designated chemically as alcohols. It is only with ethyl alcohol that we are concerned here, the alcohol common to all alcoholic beverages whether they be wines, beers, or any of the stronger distilled beverages.

All of the alcohols are intoxicating if taken in sufficient amounts, but each is characterized by certain peculiarities of action in the body which distinguish it. Thus methyl alcohol—more commonly known as wood alcohol—is no more intoxicating than is ethyl alcohol, but methyl alcohol is destroyed—oxidized—in the body extremely slowly while ethyl alcohol is destroyed rapidly. Thus a man who drinks, say, a pint of

whisky in a day has no alcohol left in his body the next day. But a man who drinks an equivalent amount of wood alcohol does not dispose of it for perhaps a week. He not only has a long period of intoxication, but if he drinks more within the week he is in danger of accumulating methyl alcohol in his body. In addition, the products of ethyl alcohol combustion in the body are harmless; the small amount of methyl alcohol which is oxidized produces a poisonous and persistent substance which damages the nerves, often the optic nerve with resultant blindness. Thus ethyl alcohol, because of its properties, is the most suitable of all alcohols for human consumption.

Pure ethyl alcohol is a colorless, liquid fluid with little odor but a powerful burning taste. The statement that alcohol has little odor may be perplexing in view of the common expression that an imbibor's breath has an alcoholic odor. Actually, the beverage is so highly diluted in the body that only the odor of the aromatic oils and not the alcohol is detectable. In its pure state alcohol has a great attraction for water. This quality has given rise to the erroneous belief that similarly in the body, where even in extreme intoxication the alcohol is highly diluted in the tissues and fluids, it is also dehydrating. Nothing is further from the truth; and, furthermore, nobody drinks pure alcohol; they drink alcoholic beverages, the strongest of which contain only about 50 per cent of alcohol.

CATEGORIES OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES

Alcoholic beverages can be divided into three categories: wines, beers, and distilled spirits. The earliest history of man indicates that he already knew, perhaps to both his delight and distress, that fruit juices undergo a profound change on exposure to air in a warm place. The process is fermenta-

tion. It is the process by which alcohol is formed in nature. Fermentation is due to the action on the sugar content of the fruit juice of a tiny yeast plant which is present as dust in the air and settles in the liquid. The yeast cells grow and multiply and in the process change sugar to carbon dioxide—a gas—and alcohol. In most beverages the gas is allowed to escape but in some, such as champagne, it is retained. The process of fermentation is exactly the same as that of raising bread with yeast. Here the carbon dioxide gas is caught as bubbles in the dough, giving it a porous structure; most of the alcohol formed is driven off in baking.

Fermentation will continue until no sugar is left or until the concentration of alcohol has risen to about 14 per cent. At this concentration of alcohol the yeast cells literally become so drunk from their own product that they stop working. Thus no beverage with an alcoholic content greater than about 14 per cent occurs in nature; any stronger beverage is the ingenious improvisation of man. Some wines are fortified, that is, strong alcohol is added, in order to increase the alcohol content to about 20 per cent.

Brewed beverages such as beer and ale are made by the fermentation of a broth made from cereals, but an additional preliminary step is necessary. Malt is added to the grain to first convert the starch to sugar on which the yeast can act. Fermentation is stopped when a concentration of 3 to 6 per cent of alcohol is reached. Both wines and brewed beverages contain the minerals, solids, and some of the vitamins of the original fruit or cereal from which they were made.

Although the use of wines and brewed beverages is ancient, the application of distillation to these for the production of stronger beverages is comparatively recent. In distillation heat is applied to

Leon A. Greenberg, Ph.D., New Haven, Connecticut, is Associate Professor of Applied Physiology and Director of the Laboratory of Applied Biodynamics, Yale University. A member of several professional societies, he is the inventor of the "Alcometer."

wines or brews so that the alcohol, which boils at a lower temperature than water, passes off as a vapor. The vapor is then cooled and condensed into a strong alcoholic fluid. Distillation is applied to wines to make brandy and to beer to make whisky. Distilled beverages, unlike wine or beer, contain no solids, minerals, or vitamins, a matter of considerable importance in connection with the dietary deficiency diseases often encountered in excessive users of alcohol. Distillation marks an important event in the history of the problems of alcohol, for though drunkenness existed before brandy or whisky, distillation offered a convenient and concentrated source of inebriety.

METABOLISM OF ALCOHOL

The metabolism of alcohol refers to its fate in the body. On imbibing alcohol its effect is exercised only after it is absorbed. Absorption refers to its passage through the walls of the alimentary tract into the tissues and fluids of the body. Unlike most foods, alcohol requires no digestion before it can be absorbed. However, since the function of the stomach is mainly that of digestion, alcohol like most other ingested substances must pass into the small intestines in order to be rapidly and completely absorbed. It is only the alcohol which is absorbed and carried by the circulating blood to the brain that exercises an intoxicating effect. That which remains unabsorbed in the alimentary tract—no matter how great the amount—is without effect. The speed with which the alcohol leaves the stomach, and therefore the rate of absorption, depends on the amount of food in the stomach, on the kind of beverage drunk, and on individual constitutional factors.

Food in the stomach retards the passage of alcohol into the intestines, delaying its absorption. It is not an un-

common observation that a single cocktail taken on an empty stomach—before eating—has a substantial “kick”; two or three after dinner are without effect. The cocktail hour traditionally precedes the dinner for a good reason. The kind of food in the stomach is also important. The intoxication-minimizing effect of ingesting fatty substances such as olive oil before drinking is surpassed by some proteins; a few glasses of milk is a good bulwark against the results of an overenthusiastic session of “social drinking.”

Some beverages, such as beer, contain food substances which themselves slow absorption. Thus the same amount of alcohol consumed as beer has less effect than that consumed as whisky. Some carbonated alcoholic beverages, such as champagne, are known for the speed with which they “go to one’s head.” Carbon dioxide expedites absorption.

In some individuals the muscular valve which separates the stomach from the intestines closes tightly if they drink immoderate amounts of a strong alcoholic beverage. This closure is called pylorospasm and prevents passage of the stomach contents into the intestines. A large part of the alcohol consequently remains unabsorbed for many hours. Pylorospasm is often accompanied by nausea and terminates in vomiting. Although a distinction is not often made between having been drunk and having been sick from drinking, needless to say, such individuals do not often become excessive drinkers.

After absorption, alcohol is distributed by the circulating blood to all of the tissues of the body. Actually the alcohol becomes dissolved uniformly in the water of the body. The body consists of about 70 per cent water; some tissues, such as blood, contain a large proportion of water, other tissues such as muscle a moderate proportion, and still others such as bone a small amount.

The concentration of alcohol in each of these will be correspondingly large or small. But human bodies all contain essentially the same proportions of the various tissues and water, and it is therefore possible to predict quite accurately from the concentration of alcohol found in the blood the total amount present in the whole body. Thus in a person of average size weighing about 150 pounds, an ounce of whisky or a 12-ounce bottle of ordinary beer will yield a concentration in his blood of 0.02 per cent; and conversely a finding of 0.02 per cent of alcohol in the blood would indicate that he has consumed at least this much alcohol. When a blood test reveals a concentration of 0.15 per cent, indicating that the body contains $\frac{1}{2}$ pint of whisky or 8 bottles of beer, the overworked “two-beer” alibi of the drunken driver in court becomes incredible.

Once absorbed, alcohol starts to undergo destruction and elimination. Only about a tenth of the ingested alcohol is eliminated unchanged from the body, mainly through the kidneys and lungs. The concentration of alcohol in both the urine and breath bears a fixed relationship to that in the blood. Chemical analysis of either urine or breath is thus useful for the indirect but accurate estimation of the alcohol content of the blood. The major part of the alcohol is destroyed in the body.

Oxidation

Alcohol is destroyed in the body by oxidation. Oxidation is the process by which all foods liberate their chemical energy in the body in the form of heat and work. The rate at which the ordinary foods—fats, proteins, carbohydrates—are oxidized is determined by the body’s need for energy; the more work that is done the faster the oxidation to provide the energy. But the rate of oxidation of alcohol is independent of the body’s energy expenditure

and is essentially constant and similar for all people. In the average person this amounts to the equivalent of approximately $\frac{3}{4}$ of an ounce of whisky each hour. Thus one could sip whisky at this rate for 24 hours, a total consumption of over a pint of whisky, without accumulating alcohol in the body and without intoxication. Consuming this same amount in 1 or 2 hours would have quite a different result; it is not recommended.

As a drug, alcohol is thus unique in that, like the ordinary foodstuff, it can provide a rich source of energy in the body. In its oxidation an ounce of whisky provides about 75 calories of energy. A highball or cocktail containing $1\frac{1}{2}$ ounces of whisky liberates the same number of calories as 6 teaspoons of sugar, 2 pats of butter or $1\frac{1}{2}$ slices of bread. This is all a matter of straightforward bodily energy dynamics. To speculate that use of the calories liberated from alcohol is rejected by the body tissues, one must invoke a new philosophy of cellular morality. The energy liberated from alcohol can, indeed, replace that from the oxidation of ordinary foods. And to the extent of such replacement the oxidation of the ordinary foods is curtailed and the unoxidized food is stored in the body as fat. Thus the moderate consumption of alcohol without a corresponding curtailment in the regular meals may be fattening. The afternoon or evening cocktail is as threatening to the lady’s figure as the nibbling of bonbons.

With the heavy drinker the story is a different one. The daily consumption of large quantities of alcohol results in a marked decrease in the amount of ordinary food eaten, just as the appetite is “spoiled” by eating too much sugar candy. A pint of whisky liberates about 1,200 calories. The average man expends about 3,000 calories daily. The excessive drinker who satisfies a large

part of his caloric requirements with alcohol will correspondingly curtail his daily intake of ordinary foods; his appetite declines; he is "drinking his meals." Ordinary foods provide the minerals, proteins, and vitamins essential to bodily health; alcohol does not. Although the individual may be in caloric balance, he is not satisfying his other nutritional needs. Such dietary deficiencies result in nerve degeneration and other deficiency diseases such as pellagra and beriberi. Many of these diseases in alcoholics were formerly thought to be due to a direct damaging action of alcohol on bodily tissues.

Some way of hastening the disappearance of alcohol from the body and thus diminishing intoxication has been sought for widely; the efforts have been unrewarded. Many drugs which greatly increase bodily metabolism and oxidation of other foods have no effect on the rate of alcohol oxidation; nor is the inhalation of oxygen effective. The common belief that alcohol can be disposed of and intoxication "worked off" by exercise has no basis except to the extent that exercise takes time. And sobering up is a matter of time that might just as well be spent in relaxation. Stimulant drugs may counteract some of the depressant actions of alcohol, altering behavior. Such changes are not uncommonly interpreted as sobering. Thus the inebriate, frequently prone to fall asleep, is stimulated by the caffeine in the "black coffee"; he is now merely a wide-awake drunk instead of a sleepy one.

PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ALCOHOL

The actions of alcohol with which we are concerned here are those relevant to intoxication and alcoholism. Little more than fifty years ago this matter was settled with superb simplicity. You took a tumbler of alcohol and the white of

an egg. You broke the egg into the alcohol. The albumen turned white, coagulated and shriveled. By analogy the man who imbibed became the tumbler and its contents. His brain and his liver were the white of the egg. What happened to the egg happened to him. His gray matter clotted and shriveled, his nerves dried up; he stumbled over his toes when he walked and slurred his words when he spoke. His liver dried up until it resembled the sole of an old boot with the hobnails showing—the "hobnail" liver. Nothing remained to be added to the physiology of alcohol; it was all very simple, very graphic, very satisfying.

Since then, orderly research has provided more reliable facts. These are worthy of examination. Pure alcohol is intensely irritating and damaging to all living tissues. A 40 or 50 per cent solution of alcohol, as in whisky, is also irritating. A drop placed in the eye would provide convincing evidence of this. Below 15 or 20 per cent, alcohol is only slightly irritating; below 5 or 6 per cent, there is no irritation. Attention is called to these facts because, as shall be seen soon, the concentration of alcohol prevailing in the body tissues, even in extreme intoxication, is a small fraction of that tolerated by the tissues without irritation. The highest concentration of alcohol ever attained in the living body is far lower than that which can cause organic damage or destroy, corrode, dissolve, or dry out the body cells. This includes the cells of reproduction; alcoholism is not genetically transmissible.

The prime action of alcohol in the body is its depressant action on the function of the central nervous system, the brain. This is an anesthetic action no different from that of ether or chloroform. The part of the brain affected and the degree of impairment depend on the concentration of alcohol in the

blood and therefore acting on the brain. Although this action is entirely on the brain, disturbance in behavior is manifested in the organs controlled by the particular brain areas affected. Speech is thick, hands clumsy, knees sag, the person appears drunk—not because of the presence of alcohol in his tongue, hands or knees, but because it has depressed those parts of his brain controlling these organs.

In a person of average size, 2 or 3 ounces of whisky present in the body will produce 0.05 per cent of alcohol in the blood. With this amount the uppermost levels of brain functioning are depressed, diminishing inhibition, restraint, and judgment. The drinker feels that he is "sitting on top of the world"; many of his normal inhibitions have vanished; he takes many personal and social liberties as the impulse prompts; he is long-winded and has an obvious blunting of self-criticism. At a concentration of 0.10 per cent of alcohol in the blood, resulting from 5 or 6 ounces of whisky in the body, function of the lower motor area of the brain is dulled. The person sways perceptibly; he has difficulty putting on his coat; he fumbles with the key at the door; words stumble over a clumsy tongue.

Illusion of stimulation

The states so far described are popularly designated as mild intoxication or "feeling high." The significant feature of these states is depression and dulling of sensory and motor function and, contrary to popular belief, not stimulation. The illusion of stimulation is given by the increased tempo and altered quality of behavior occurring when the normally prevailing inhibitions and restraints are removed by alcohol. The effect may be compared to releasing the brakes rather than stepping on the accelerator. Notwithstanding this illusion there is actually measurable reduction in sensitivity,

impaired discrimination, and diminished speed of motor response. The drinker, however, often denies that this occurs; often asserts, on the contrary, that after a few drinks his reactions, perception, and discrimination are better. This is an important effect of alcohol; his judgment about himself and his own activities is blunted, allowing for an inflated feeling of competence and self-confidence.

With increasing concentrations of alcohol in the blood there is a corresponding progression of impairment of functions. At 0.20 per cent, resulting from about 10 ounces of whisky, the entire motor area of the brain is profoundly affected. The individual tends to assume a horizontal position; he needs help to walk or undress. At 0.30 per cent, from the presence of a pint of whisky in the body, sensory perception is so dulled that the drinker has little comprehension of what he sees, hears, or feels; he is stuporous. At 0.40 per cent, perception is obliterated; the person is in coma, he is anesthetized. At 0.60 or 0.70 per cent, the lowest, most primitive levels of the brain controlling breathing and heartbeat cease to function and death ensues. Throughout this entire progression the concentrations of alcohol in the body are far too low to cause any direct organic damage to the tissues. The disturbance is entirely one of nerve function and is reversible; short of death, when the alcohol disappears the effect goes with it.

With these facts about the metabolism of alcohol and the effects of various concentrations in the blood, the relationship of these to the various beverages can be expressed in Table 1.

Supplementary physiological effects

So far only the depressant, intoxicating action of alcohol on the nervous system has been considered. Intoxication is but one of a series of events that re-

TABLE 1—THE EFFECT OF ALCOHOL BEVERAGES

AMOUNT OF BEVERAGE CONSUMED	CONCENTRATION OF ALCOHOL ATTAINED IN BLOOD	EFFECT		TIME REQUIRED FOR ALL ALCOHOL TO LEAVE THE BODY
1 highball (1½ oz. whisky) or 1 cocktail (1½ oz. whisky) or 3½ oz. fortified wine or 5½ oz. ordinary wine or 2 bottles beer (24 oz.)	0.03%	No noticeable effects on behavior		2 hrs.
2 highballs or 2 cocktails or 7 oz. fortified wine or 11 oz. ordinary wine or 4 bottles beer	0.06%	Increasing effects with variation among individuals and in the same individuals at different times	Feeling of warmth—mental relaxation—slight decrease of fine skills—less concern with minor irritations and restraints	4 hrs.
3 highballs or 3 cocktails or 10½ oz. fortified wine or 16½ oz. (1 pt.) ordinary wine or 6 bottles beer	0.09%		Buoyancy—exaggerated emotion and behavior—talkative, noisy or morose	6 hrs.
4 highballs or 4 cocktails or 14 oz. fortified wine or 22 oz. ordinary wine or 8 bottles (3 qts.) beer	0.12%		Impairment of fine coordination—clumsiness—slight to moderate unsteadiness in standing or walking	8 hrs.
5 highballs or 5 cocktails or (½ pt. whisky)	0.15%	Intoxication—unmistakable abnormality of gross bodily functions and mental faculties		10 hrs.

For those weighing considerably more or less than 150 lbs. the amounts of beverage indicated above will be correspondingly greater or less. The effects indicated at each stage will diminish as the concentration of alcohol in the blood diminishes.

inforce and perpetuate each other in a vicious circle in the phenomenon called alcoholism. Intoxication alone is not alcoholism. There are other physiological effects of alcohol seen in the disturbed functions of other organs. These often persist after intoxication. While they are not due to the direct action of alcohol upon the organs involved, but rather indirectly to disturbance of their nervous control; they are nevertheless important features in alcoholism.

Alcohol affects the pituitary gland

whose hormonal secretions in turn affect the activity of other glands and functions. The pituitary influences growth; it influences sexual development, and sexual cycles; it acts on kidney functions; it influences the adrenal glands. The adrenal glands control the balance of mineral salts and water in the body. Alcohol affects important functions of the liver. During and after intoxication the liver is often seen to be swollen and yellow, an event caused by a disturbance of chemical

and hormonal states in the body essential to the normal handling of fat by this organ. Frequent repetition of this may underlie the genesis of liver cirrhosis in alcoholism.

Intoxication affects the so-called water balance of the body. It was believed—and still is by many—that alcohol dries out the body, giving rise to the intense thirst of the hangover. Actually, the water of the body is not depleted but merely shifted from within the cells to the spaces about the cells, giving rise to a sensation of thirst and the “wet brain.” With this dislocation of body water, there is a corresponding alteration in the distribution of salts within the various compartments of the body structure, a change which itself causes a host of other malfunctions.

Clearly, intoxication represents not only a disorientation of the whole individual in relation to the realities of his external environment, but also a disorganization of the complexly poised interrelationship of organic functions and biochemical states constituting his internal physiological environment—a disturbance of the normal homeostasis. This internal organic disruption and the attendant malfunctions often persist after intoxication; they are the physical components of hangover. In the prolonged and repeated inebriety of the alcoholic, just as his deviant performances increasingly injure his normal relationships with his external environment, his disrupted internal environment injures tissues and organs of his body. Repeated injury to tissues results in persisting damage—the cirrhotic liver, degenerated nerves, delirium tremens.

CURE OF ALCOHOLISM: HOPES AND REALITY

Needless to say, the alcoholic is sick—sick physiologically as well as emotion-

ally and socially. It is pointed out here that research in the metabolism and acute physiological effects of alcohol itself, and in the indirect effects of excessive use and repeated inebriety, has given to therapy a better knowledge of these disabilities and a more rational and effective basis for their medical treatment.

The immediate purpose of medical treatment is to alleviate threatening and painful symptoms. But the ultimate goal of medical progress is to discover and remove the cause of these symptoms. Although the concept of alcoholism as an illness is relatively new, or perhaps because it is new, hypotheses as to its physiological etiology have already been proposed. One of these attributes the cause of excessive and addictive drinking to vitamin deficiency—a vitamin inadequacy based not on any normal standards of vitamin needs, but on a postulated genetically inherited extraordinary need for vitamins. This hypothesis was undoubtedly inspired by the observation that alcoholics are frequently in a state of vitamin deficiency, a condition, as we now know, resulting from inadequate nutrition common in excessive drinkers.

The other hypothesized physiological etiology attributes alcoholism to improper function of the adrenal glands. This theory, too, originated in the observation that among the organic disturbances in alcoholics some were indicative of adrenal malfunction.

Both of these hypotheses are examples of the classic error in reasoning—“post hoc, ergo propter hoc”—alcoholics suffer vitamin deficiency and adrenal malfunction, therefore the latter are the cause of alcoholism. The proponents of both theories have competed in promises of the quick eradication of alcoholism. In clinical application, unfortunately, these

promises have not been realized. What these hypotheses lack in reality they seem to make up in simplicity.

Alcoholism is indeed a complex phenomenon involving both in its origin and manifestations subtle and devious interplay of physiological, psychological, and social factors. Definition of the etiology of alcoholism in the exclusive terms of any one of these disciplines is, under present knowledge, as

inadequate as a similar explanation of the entire manifestation would be. In fact, present knowledge of physiology offers no certain answer as to the cause. But to deny entirely a physiological etiology would be to deny psychosomatic concepts. When we have learned the physiology of thought, emotion, motivation, and social behavior, then will we, perhaps, know the physiological etiology of alcoholism.

Perception, Learning, and Emotion: The Role of Alcohol

By JOHN J. CONGER

Abstract: A good deal is already known about the effects of alcohol on specific psychological functions such as perception, memory, judgment, learning ability, and certain emotions. We are also beginning to understand something of how the effect of alcohol on an individual's need-patterns may lead to continued drinking, and, further, how alcohol can give rise to quite different patterns of behavior in different individuals or in the same individual at different times. Much remains to be learned, however, about the specific ways in which the need-patterns of normal drinkers and nondrinkers differ from those of addictive drinkers.

THE EFFECTS of alcohol on behavior have been the subject of poetic eulogies, righteous indignation, and—occasionally—disinterested observation almost since man's discovery of the fruits of fermentation. Goldsmith, in *She Stoops to Conquer*, remarks:

Let school-masters puzzle their brain
With grammar, and nonsense, and learning;
Good liquor, I stoutly maintain,
Gives genius a better discerning.

Housman's *Shropshire Lad* asserts that "... if 'tis dancing you would be, there's brisker pipes than poetry."

Despite such enthusiastic assertions that alcohol serves as a stimulant to mental functioning, the great majority of systematic studies of specific psychological functions provide little support for such a notion. In fact, the weight of the evidence points clearly to the conclusion that alcohol, far from being a stimulant, actually serves to depress most psychological functions. Further, this depressant effect increases in proportion to the percentage of alcohol in the blood and is greater for more com-

plex and more unfamiliar tasks than for simpler and already well-learned tasks.¹

A number of illustrative findings may be cited. It has been found, for example, that alcohol—even in moderate dosages—impairs the binocular fusion reflex,² decreases the time of the patellar tendon, or knee-jerk reflex,³ and depresses the sexual reflexes in large doses, completely abolishing them.⁴ This latter finding should hardly prove surprising to most readers, since it has frequently been the subject of popular observation. As the porter in *Macbeth*

¹ E. M. Jellinek and R. A. McFarland, "Analysis of Psychological Experiments on the Effects of Alcohol," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 1, 1940, pp. 272-371.

² G. A. Brecher, A. P. Hartman, and D. D. Leonard, "The Effect of Alcohol on Binocular Vision," *American Journal of Ophthalmology*, Vol. 39, 1955, pp. 41-51.

³ L. E. Travis and J. M. Dorsay, "Effect of Alcohol on the Patellar Tendon Reflex Time," *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, Vol. 21, 1929, pp. 613-24.

⁴ W. Horsley Gantt, "Effect of Alcohol on the Sexual Reflexes of Normal and Neurotic Male Dogs," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, Vol. 14, 1952, pp. 174-81.

John J. Conger, Ph.D., Denver, Colorado, is Professor of Clinical Psychology and Head of the Division of Clinical Psychology, Department of Psychiatry, University of Colorado School of Medicine. He is co-author of *Child Development and Personality* (1956).

remarks concerning alcohol: "Lechery, sir, it provokes, and unprovokes; it provokes the desire but it takes away the performance; therefore, much drink may be said to be an equivocator with lechery."

It has been pretty clearly established that alcohol, even in small doses, increases reaction time—as, for example, in applying a foot brake after seeing a red light.⁵ In contrast, on simple tests of muscular strength there appears to be an increase in muscular output, at least for a short time, following the ingestion of small doses (10 to 20 cc.) of alcohol. This increase seems to occur, however, primarily because alcohol makes the individual more immune to sensations of fatigue rather than because it actually increases strength, even temporarily. In large doses, alcohol produces an immediate impairment of muscular output; and in tasks where motor co-ordination as well as simple strength is involved, the apparent facilitating effect of alcohol is not observed.⁶

It should probably be emphasized again that the simpler and better learned a task is, the greater will be the amount of alcohol required to produce an observable impairment of function. Thus, in a recent study by Greenberg and Carpenter, it was shown that wine or aqueous solutions containing 12 per cent alcohol (in amounts up to 12 ounces) produced no detectable impairment in the performance of subjects on a simple and familiar card-filing task. These authors also emphasize that factors of motivation and habituation to the effect of alcohol must be taken into account in studying impairment of function under alcohol.⁷

⁵ Jellinek and McFarland, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), pp. 323–36.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 336–46.

⁷ L. A. Greenberg and J. A. Carpenter, "The Effect of Alcoholic Beverages on Skin Conductance and Emotional Tension. I, Wine,

While alcohol sometimes appears to lower the threshold at which sensory stimulation can be perceived—notably in the case of vision—it also impairs the individual's ability to discriminate sights, sounds, and tactile sensations to a considerable degree, even after the equivalent of only two or three highballs.⁸

ALCOHOL AND TIME ESTIMATION

Alcohol also affects the ability to estimate time. In one study, subjects were trained over a period of several days to sound a bell at what they felt to be five-minute intervals until they were able to perform consistently with no more than a 30-second error. When, however, they were given an amount of wine equivalent to 3¼ ounces of whiskey, they delayed until eight minutes, on the average, before sounding the signal. On the other hand, when these same subjects were given a stimulating drug such as thyroid extract, they waited an average of only four minutes before ringing the bell.⁹ In a related study, with some interesting implications for the drink-while-you-drive problem, it was found that automobile drivers who were each given the equivalent of 1½ drinks of whiskey drove a given route in a shorter time than before drinking, but thought they had taken longer.¹⁰

Findings in various perceptual studies also tend to show impairment, again with the amount of loss being greater

Whisky and Alcohol." *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 18, 1957, pp. 190–203.

⁸ H. W. Haggard and E. M. Jellinek, *Alcohol Explored* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1942).

⁹ O. Sterzinger, "Chemopsychologische Untersuchungen über den Zeitsinn," *Zeitschrift für Experimentelle und Angewandte Psychologie*, Vol. 134, 1935, p. 100. Cited in H. W. Haggard and E. M. Jellinek, *Alcohol Explored*.

¹⁰ H. M. Vernon. Cited in H. W. Haggard and E. M. Jellinek, *Alcohol Explored*.

the more complex the task. Thus, the ability to read letters or syllables flashed briefly on a screen or to perceive various colors decreases under alcohol—with the degree of impairment being a function of the amount consumed and the time interval between consumption and testing.^{11, 12}

In other studies, it has been shown that alcohol, even in moderate amounts, produces memory losses, impairment of learning ability, and relative impoverishment of thought content. In a recent study employing the Rorschach, or Ink Blot Test, it was found that alcohol slows down the individual's thought processes, narrows the scope of his imagination, and generally leads to a decrease in original thinking with a corresponding increase in banal, stereotyped, and poorly formulated percepts and associations.¹³ In brief, little support was provided for the notion that alcohol "gives genius a better discerning."

Such results as the above do not seem too surprising when it is recalled (see Article 3, this issue of *THE ANNALS*) that alcohol is basically an anesthetic and one which acts first to inhibit the higher cortical functions. Thus, like other anesthetics, it would be expected to have a generally depressing effect on specific psychological functions. It also does not seem surprising that more complex activities such as reasoning, judgment, and learning would be found to be impaired more rapidly than simpler functions such as tasks involving muscular strength.

Most of the psychological studies of

¹¹ Jellinek and McFarland, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), pp. 317–23.

¹² I. Schmidt and A. G. A. Bingel, "Effects of Oxygen Deficiency and Various Other Factors on Color Saturation Thresholds," *USAF School of Aviation Medicine Project Reports*, 953; Project No. 21–31–002.

¹³ A. Rabin, N. Papania, and A. Michael, "Some Effects of Alcohol on Rorschach Performance," *Journal of Clinical Psychology*, Vol. 10, 1954, pp. 252–55.

the effects of alcohol have been similar to those just described; that is, they have dealt primarily with the individual's efficiency in the performance of specific tasks. Studies of this sort, while of definite value, leave many of the vital questions regarding the effects of alcohol on the individual's over-all adjustment largely unanswered. To take an extremely simple example, it might well be asked why any individual who has once experienced to a considerable degree the various impairments of function just described would continue to drink. And yet millions of people do—a small percentage of them to excess.

It might also be noted, at least with respect to social behavior, that the change which frequently occurs after a few drinks at an initially rather constrained social gathering would seem to be more aptly described in terms of apparent stimulation than of depression.

Studies of specific psychological factors also tend to be of little assistance in explaining the tremendous variability in the effect of alcohol on different individuals. When Circe gave the same drink to all of Ulysses' shipmates, some of them turned into bears, other into pigs and monkeys. Somewhat similar observations can be made at almost any large cocktail party. The French have shown a keen appreciation of the variable effects of alcohol on different individuals, although they discreetly attribute the behavior to the alcohol rather than to the individual. Thus, if a person becomes quarrelsome, it is said that he has tasted *vin de lion*; if overly garrulous, *vin de pie*; if maudlin, *vin de cerf* (apparently on the assumption that deer weep).

Unfortunately it has proved difficult to find ways of approaching these more complex problems relating to the social-emotional effects of alcohol in a truly experimental fashion. Thus, the theoretical formulations expressed in the fol-

lowing paragraphs must be regarded as tentative. It should be added, however, that they appear generally consistent both with most clinical observations and with such experimental work as has been conducted to date.

WHY DO PEOPLE DRINK?

First of all, why do people drink? It should be stressed that the question being raised here is not simply, "Why do people become alcoholics?" It is true that a small percentage of those who drink go on to become addictive drinkers; most, however, do not.

One of the basic principles characteristic of the functioning of biologic organisms generally is that of homeostasis—the tendency of the organism to maintain a state of internal equilibrium. At a purely physiological level, the principle is illustrated by the tendency of the body to maintain an even temperature, despite changes in the temperature of the surrounding environment.

At a psychological level, essentially the same process seems to be at work. It has been found, in repeated experimentation on the process of learning, that when a person's or an animal's equilibrium is disturbed by heightened tension resulting from unsatisfied drives or needs, he tends to become restless and active. This process, furthermore, is likely to continue until some response occurs which satisfies the need and restores the individual to a state of equilibrium. The response may involve eating in the case of a hungry individual, lovemaking in the case of one who is sexually stimulated, or finding "someone to watch over me" in the case of a person with strongly aroused dependency needs.

It appears to matter little whether the need or drive is a primary, physiological one like hunger, or a socially learned one like dependency or the need for recognition. It is also important to note

that once a response which satisfies a drive has been made, even if only by chance, it tends to become learned. That is, the response becomes more likely to occur the next time the individual finds himself faced with a similar state of unsatisfied need. Technically, it is stated that the response tends to become learned because it has been reinforced—that is, rewarded—by a reduction in drive-tension.¹⁴ Thus, it would not be surprising for the drinking response to tend to become learned if it actually leads to a decrease in tension stemming from a heightened, unsatisfied drive, or drives. Conversely, of course, the response would be expected not to be learned if for some reason it leads to an *increase* in drive. In actuality, some variation of this basic notion runs through much of the clinical literature on alcoholism.^{15, 16}

With respect to social drinking, the function of alcohol in reducing slight amounts of anxiety or self-consciousness is usually noted. The therapeutic value of alcohol in abating various mild bodily aches and pains, especially in older persons, and in promoting a feeling of general relaxation and well-being is also frequently emphasized.

In the case of alcohol addiction, it also appears to be generally agreed that the drinking response is continued because it somehow reinforces the individual's needs. It is usually assumed, however, that in these cases the motivation for drinking is more intense and insistent, and may even be qualitatively different, than in the case of the casual social drinker.

¹⁴ J. Dollard and N. E. Miller, *Personality and Psychotherapy: An Analysis in Terms of Learning, Thinking, and Culture* (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1950).

¹⁵ E. M. Jellinek (Ed.), *Alcohol Addiction and Chronic Alcoholism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942).

¹⁶ O. Diethelm (Ed.), *Etiology of Chronic Alcoholism* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1955).

There is, however, no universal agreement as to the nature of the needs presumably met by alcohol in the addictive drinker. Thus, some authors maintain that such persons possess special pathophysiological needs which alcohol is at least to some extent capable of fulfilling.¹⁷ Williams' theory (see Article 3) of an hereditary factor which makes certain individuals require more of certain foods than the average person, would fall into this general category.

At the other extreme would fall those writers, including notably the psychoanalytic group, who hypothesize special psychological need-patterns among alcoholics which stem largely from the individual's developmental experiences. Thus, for example, Fenichel, speaking as a psychoanalyst, remarks that persons who become alcoholics are characterized by their "oral and narcissistic pre-morbid personalities."¹⁸ The implication is that drinking tends to satisfy oral—that is, passive, dependent—and narcissistic drives. Other authors, less specific about the presumed motivations important in alcoholism, stress the role of alcohol in reducing "tension," "worry," "anxiety." A comprehensive discussion of the basic needs and personality patterns assumed to be characteristic of addictive drinkers may be found in the following article.

As already noted, little truly experimental work has been done on such complex topics as the motivational basis for continued drinking, or on the reasons for the considerable variability in response to alcohol of different persons, or of the same individual at different times. However, in recent years a beginning has been made, although to

date most of the work has been done with animals, for fairly obvious methodological reasons.

ALCOHOL AND CONFLICT BEHAVIOR

In an interesting series of experiments with cats, Masserman and Yum began to span the gap between previous experimental investigations and clinical observations by demonstrating that alcohol, though it produces a lessened efficiency in specific tasks, at the same time may produce an increase in the over-all adaptivity of an animal's behavior by reducing what they refer to as a "highly complex neurotic process."¹⁹

These investigators trained cats to work a switch which opened a box in order to obtain food. The cats were then made "neurotic" by subjecting them to air blasts or shocks whenever they opened the box, so that the animals developed fear reactions to the procedure. However, when these same animals which had previously refused to approach the switch were administered alcohol, they once more spontaneously worked the switch and fed on signal.

It was the present writer's impression in reading Masserman's work that the essential nucleus of his experimental situation might well be a fairly simple approach-avoidance conflict²⁰ in which the effect of the alcohol was to produce a reduction in the drive of fear which was keeping the animals from the switch. An analogous situation at the human level might be the case in which an adolescent boy wishes to call a girl on the

¹⁹ J. H. Masserman and K. S. Yum, "An Analysis of the Influence of Alcohol on Experimental Neuroses in Cats," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, Vol. 8, 1946, pp. 36-52.

²⁰ N. E. Miller, "Experimental Studies in Conflict," in J. McV. Hunt (Ed.), *Personality and the Behavior Disorders* (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1944), Vol. 1, pp. 431-65.

¹⁷ W. L. Wilkins, "The Idea of Proneness in Relation to Alcoholism," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1956, pp. 291-95.

¹⁸ O. Fenichel, *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis* (New York: W. W. Norton Company, 1945).

telephone to ask her for a date, but vacillates for fear of being rebuffed. Or the case of a salesman who wishes to approach an important prospective client, but fears that he may make the wrong impression.

In order to test the above hypothesis, two simple experiments were designed.²¹ In the first, albino rats were trained to run down a straight-line alley to secure food and then were thrown into an approach-avoidance conflict by giving them an electric shock at the goal. It was found that five minutes after a control injection of water the rats would not approach the food-shock end of the alley; after an injection of alcohol they ran up to get food. Parenthetically, it may be noted that two other psychologists, Bailey and Miller, have recently obtained similar results with cats, using barbiturates such as sodium amytal instead of alcohol.²²

Having determined that alcohol reduced the simple approach-avoidance conflict set up in these animals, a second experiment was performed to determine more specifically how alcohol affected each of the two competing tendencies involved in the conflict. In other words, did the alcohol act primarily to strengthen the approach responses based on hunger, to weaken the avoidance responses based on fear, or both?

Since it was obviously impossible to measure the strength of conflicting approach and avoidance tendencies simultaneously in the same animal, the following procedure was adopted. An approach tendency was created in one group of rats by teaching hungry ani-

mals to run down the alley to obtain food. An avoidance tendency was created in the second group of rats by electrically shocking the animals at the goal instead of giving them food. The strength of the tendencies to approach and avoid was measured by the animal's pull against a calibrated spring when it was temporarily restrained. Half the animals in each group were tested under control conditions and half under the influence of alcohol.

As it turned out, the alcohol produced very little decrease in the pull of the hungry animals toward food and a marked decrease in the pull of the frightened animals away from the place where they had been shocked in previous trials. Before alcohol, the avoidance was stronger than approach; after alcohol, the avoidance was weaker than approach.

It appeared, therefore, that the primary reason for the resolution of the approach-avoidance conflict in the first experiment was that alcohol produced a reduction in the avoidance response motivated by fear, thereby allowing the animal to get to the goal and eat.

NEED-REDUCTION THEORY

The results of these experiments seem to have several implications for a need-reduction theory of drinking. In the first place, they appear to provide support for the clinical observation that alcohol reduces the tension resulting from fear or anxiety, thus helping to restore a state of equilibrium in the individual.²³ As previously noted, this

²³ In this connection, it is interesting to note that in Greenberg and Carpenter's recent carefully controlled study (note 7 *supra*), it was found that 12 ounces of wine containing 12 per cent alcohol produced a marked decrease in emotional tension (as measured by basic skin conductance level and galvanic skin response) although, as already mentioned, this amount of alcohol produced no observable impairment in performance on the simple card-filing task.

²¹ John J. Conger, "The Effects of Alcohol on Conflict Behavior in the Albino Rat," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 12, 1951, pp. 1-21.

²² C. J. Bailey and N. E. Miller, "Effect of Sodium Amytal on Behavior of Cats in an Approach-Avoidance Conflict," *Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology*, Vol. 45, 1952, pp. 205-8.

alone might provide a sufficient basis for learning to drink in tension situations.

However, there are several other interesting possibilities. In the above conflict situation, the reduction in the strength of the avoidance response provided by the alcohol made it possible for the animal who was suffering from heightened hunger drive to run up to eat and hence to satisfy this need. Thus, reduction in hunger drive may provide a further basis for the adoption of the drinking response in the future. Similar situations can easily be thought of on the human level. Let us assume that the salesman in the example already given finds that he can reduce his fear of the prospective client by a quick drink or two ahead of time. If he is then successful in selling the client, he may tend to repeat the drinking the next time he is faced with a similar situation, not only because the drinking is rewarding in that it reduces painful feelings of anxiety, but also because other motives—perhaps those for security, prestige, or recognition—are satisfied if he is successful in placing an order. Of course, the net result of such an experience may well be either favorable or unfavorable in terms of the individual's long-term adjustment. If, as one might hope, this initial experience of success is sufficiently reassuring to the salesman, he may not feel under as much tension when faced by similar situations in the future and may not have as much need for his bracer. If this is not the case, however, and he again feels genuinely anxious and apprehensive, he may easily resort to the previously effective response of drinking—eventually becoming dependent on alcohol to help him through all such situations.

A rather ingenious demonstration of the tendency of the drinking response to become habitual in tension situations if it has been previously rewarded by

decreases in anxiety is provided by Masserman and Yum. In their previously mentioned experiments with cats, they noted that before being frightened at the feeding box by air blasts or shock, normal cats regularly preferred plain milk to milk containing 5 per cent alcohol. However, after the cats had been frightened and were then given mild doses of alcohol by injection and had their fear and conflict relieved by its effects, they developed a preference for the 5 per cent alcohol solution. Finally, during a series of trials in the same apparatus, but without punishment, all signs of fear were extinguished and the preference for alcohol disappeared. In this experiment the response of drinking alcohol seems to have been rewarded by the reduction of fear or conflict produced by fear.

At the human level, the anthropologist, David Horton, in an excellent cross-cultural study of drinking behavior in nonliterate societies, found that "the strength of the drinking response in any society tends to vary directly with the level of anxiety in the society."²⁴

However, if we conclude that drinking tends to become learned because it is rewarded, an apparent exception occurs in the case of the "lost week end" sort of individual whose drinking seems, at least socially, to be more punishing than rewarding. The man who is effectively alienating his employer, his wife, and his friends hardly seems to be socially rewarded for his drinking. However, two mitigating factors should probably be considered here. One might be called "the immediacy of reward." It is a familiar finding in learning experiments that immediate rewards are more effective than delayed ones. The promise

²⁴ David Horton, "The Functions of Alcohol in Primitive Societies: A Cross-Cultural Study," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 4, 1943, pp. 199-320.

of an ice cream cone after supper is frequently more effective in encouraging a child to behave than the distant image of a new bicycle for Christmas. Thus, it may well be that the immediate reduction in anxiety in some addictive drinkers more than compensates for the punitive attitudes of a wife or boss the next morning and the physical punishment involved in a hangover. The other factor is the amount of drive and conflict. The personal anxiety-reducing effect of alcohol may, if the anxiety is great enough, come to constitute greater reinforcement than the competing social punishment.

VARIABILITY IN BEHAVIOR AND CONCENTRATIONS OF ALCOHOL

There is considerable indication in the experimental studies and clinical observations already discussed that alcohol may produce a differentially great reduction in fear or anxiety. If so, the way appears open for a better understanding of some of the puzzling variability in the effects of similar concentrations of alcohol on different individuals or on the same individual at different times.

In the first place, it is obvious that a wide variety of different behaviors may be inhibited by the responses motivated by anxiety. In the normal drinker, these may amount to little more than an increased and less cautious affability or flirtatiousness. On the other hand, in the abnormal drinker, fairly extreme reactions, which the individual could not consciously accept in his sober state, may emerge. Robert White cites the case of a rather quiet, if somewhat caustic college student who became extremely belligerent when he drank,

picking quarrels and coming to blows with men in bars. His friends often had to rescue him because, although he fought like a demon, his slight physique was really

unequal to these encounters. At mixed parties he regularly passed through the belligerent stage to expressions of a different character. He would lay his head on a girl's lap and weep piteously for her loving care, describing himself as a lonely outcast. The following day he would dimly remember his aggressive adventures, but his extreme show of dependence would be safely wrapped in complete amnesia.²⁵

It also appears reasonable that if alcohol should have a depressing effect on other drives besides fear while not depressing them as much as fear, then different results would have to be expected, depending on the extent to which behaviors motivated by the other drives were inhibited by conflicting responses motivated by fear. In the absence of any inhibition, alcohol might reduce the strength of behavior motivated by another drive, for example, sex. But in the presence of strong enough inhibiting responses motivated by fear, the net effect of alcohol might well be in the opposite direction—a release of the behavior motivated by the other drive. Thus, studies by Gantt and others suggest that while alcohol reduces the sexual effectiveness of normal dogs, in "neurotic" dogs there may actually be improvements in sexual functioning under alcohol.²⁶

Finally, alcohol might well be expected to have different effects if the relative strength of two incompatible tendencies in a conflict situation—the one inhibitory, the other struggling for expression—are different. In the examples just given, a relatively balanced conflict has been assumed. However, in some situations the restraining tendencies of an individual are initially so great that he never comes close enough to a potentially tempting course of action for strong impulses to be aroused.

²⁵ Robert W. White, *The Abnormal Personality* (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1956), Second Edition.

²⁶ Gantt, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*).

Thus, there is in effect no real conflict. Alcohol, however, may reduce these restraining tendencies enough to permit the person to be aroused but not enough to permit any actual fulfillment of his inhibited desires. The net effect of the alcohol then would be to *produce* conflict and an increase in anxiety as the individual is tempted to approach nearer to the fulfillment of his unacceptable wishes. Such reasoning may help partly to account for the fact that some individuals find alcohol not tension-reducing but tension-increasing. For such individuals alcohol may operate to destroy an adequate psychological defense structure involving successful repression of unacceptable impulses, rather than reducing anxiety resulting from repressive attempts which are already none too successful. Experimental work, as well

as clinical observation, suggests that alcohol may also lead to *increases* in anxiety if consumption of alcohol has in the past been associated primarily with painful experiences.²⁷

In brief, it appears that we now know a good deal about the effects of alcohol on specific psychological functions, and we are also beginning to understand something of how the effect of alcohol on an individual's need-patterns may lead to continued drinking. We have, however, a considerable way to go in clarifying the specific ways in which the need-patterns of addictive drinkers differ from those of normal drinkers or nondrinkers.

²⁷ John J. Conger, "Reinforcement Theory and the Dynamics of Alcoholism," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1956, pp. 291-324.

The Search for the Alcoholic Personality

By JOHN D. ARMSTRONG

Abstract: The limited experience of many investigators leaves the impression that there are certain features unique to the personalities of alcoholics. However, scientific reports to date do not permit us to define such an alcoholic personality, or even to come to any substantial agreement as to what it may be like. It seems more likely that a number of personality types have a peculiar susceptibility to alcoholism. There is a great need for more effective techniques to continue the investigations.

PROBABLY in no other area of alcoholism is the attempt to bring an orderly concept out of multitudes of ideas and bits of knowledge more like chasing the will-o'-the-wisp than in efforts to settle the problem of the alcoholic personality. It is exceedingly easy when faced with a seemingly endless repetition of certain behavioral or personality characteristics within a known alcoholic population to generalize and assume that such observations are typical for the whole alcoholic population. Yet we find diametrically opposed ideas as to what the characteristics of such a personality would be. For instance, East¹ in 1936 and others both before and since have suggested a relationship between manic-depressive psychosis and alcoholism. Yet Pauleikhoft² in 1954 writes on the rarity of excessive drinking among cyclothymic depressives. Surely one or both of these observers are overlooking some facts which have played a significant part in preselecting the populations they are observing;

¹ W. N. East, "Alcoholism and Crime in Relation to Manic-Depressive Disorders," *Lancet*, Vol. 230, 1936, pp. 161-63.

² B. Pauleikhoft, "On the Rarity of Excessive Drinking among Cyclothymic Depressives," Abstract, *Psychological Abstracts*, Vol. 28, No. 6362, 1954.

since we must assume that in such grossly defined diagnostic categories, their reported observations on such populations would be reasonably accurate. On the other hand, there are many who are either frankly sceptical that such an entity might exist or who at least retreat uneasily from formulating a precise description as to what such a personality might be.

The various descriptions suggesting a specific personality type arise in many instances from the circumscribed experiences of individuals in certain settings who are attempting to particularize their impressions gained over many years of observation. Unfortunately, however, one cannot assume that alcoholics caught in a criminal act and observed in prison, or alcoholics sophisticated enough to use the analyst's couch, or alcoholics experiencing a religious conversion all form the same type of personality and were only by accident caught and observed in such different settings. It is true that some alcoholics do undergo some or all of the above experiences, but it may be very misleading to generalize from studies of such groups as these. Nevertheless, there seems to be justification in continuing the search for some psychological fac-

tors permitting segregation of one or more alcoholic personalities, for to date the evidence for the existence of specific physiological or social factors to exclusively determine the development of alcoholism seems equally assailable.

The problem of assessing the role of personality characteristics in any individual case of alcoholism is complicated by both physiological and social factors. These have to do in the first instance with the body's response to the drug and in the second with the social occasions, the group attitudes, and the cultural patterns in which drinking takes place. These factors will undoubtedly influence our ability to discern any personality constellations which would be considered specially susceptible to dependence on alcohol. In other words, we have to be aware that under social conditions which permit frequent usage in large amounts, even drunkenness, a possibly less disturbed or at least different personality type might more readily become dependent on alcohol than in the group where alcohol usage is accepted in a different way or perhaps rejected entirely by most of the group.

Methods of study reported in the literature vary from mere résumés of clinical diagnoses to extensive personality evaluations of selected populations, using batteries of psychological tests which in themselves vary considerably in their standardization and reliability. One always feels that such studies, no matter how earnest, honest, and commendable in terms of effort expended, reveal information only about certain individuals selected by some bias from the total alcoholic population—for example, by arrest, by being sick enough to be committed, by being well enough to apply voluntarily, or rich enough to enter one clinic or poor enough to enter another. Such methods might be comparable to attempting to evaluate a nation's dental

health by examining only the residents of an old people's home.

TERMINOLOGY A PROBLEM

Again there seems little agreement on how we define "alcoholism," let alone terms such as dependence, hostility, psychopathic personality, and so on, where the concept denoted may be quite vague. The psychiatrist is used to having his population selected by no effort of his own but by the social occurrence of some grossly measurable symptom or act demanding the attention of the patient's family, often through a legal procedure of committal, with the incidence of the symptom not necessarily related to the actual incidence of the disease. Thus we must remember that the clinical investigator in the fields of personality and mental disorders is almost never dealing with a random sample of the condition he is concerned with, but only with those cases forced on his attention. One might assume that a general physician would have occasion to see reasonably representative samples of heart disease or diabetes since the illness brings early distress to all. In contrast, however, schizophrenics, sex deviates, firesetters, and alcoholics frequently experience pleasure balancing or outweighing their distress and will delay long in seeking help.

When these cases are seen, the need for a precise, quantitative measurement in diagnosis does not always exist for clinical purposes, for less exact methods still permit sufficient differentiation to arrive at a decision as to management of the problems presented. Thus, there tends to be confusion when attempts are made to generalize observations made originally in terms suited to personal or local convenience, especially when one communicates such impressions with the assumption that these

John D. Armstrong, M.D., Toronto, Canada, is Medical Director, Alcoholism Research Foundation of Ontario and Associate in Psychiatry, University of Toronto.

casual observations are substantiated facts which have universal application.

THE RECURRING PATTERN

At Brookside³ we are inclined to believe that certain constellations of personality characteristics are seen much more frequently than one would find them in a normal population, or conversely in other populations of sick people such as those attending a public psychiatric clinic. While speculating on such impressions, we are also led to criticize those reports which suggest that all alcoholics are of a similar psychological type.

We feel we find many types represented, each having certain unique or accentuated characteristics which we believe are related to the way in which alcoholism manifests itself in the individual. On the other hand, we do not believe one should throw up one's hands and reject all suggestions of special characteristics because they are multiple or too complex. Throughout nature, whether we discuss edible fruits, sea shells, or insects, we find a bewildering variety; yet in each case there are unique characteristics which clearly make the apple a fruit, the conch's home a sea shell, and the honey bee an insect. So perhaps among alcoholics a variety of personalities as great as that for apples, pears, peaches, or the host of edible fruits might present itself, yet belong unequivocally to the category of alcoholics.

An oblique kind of casual observation, also from our own clinic, leads us to suspect certain consistencies in the male alcoholic when we see over and over again a recurrent and almost caricatured combination of domination and mothering in their wives. The number of alcoholics with nurses as wives seems out

of all proportion to what would be expected, given the frequency of nurses in the population.

Similar observations have been made by others in attempting to formulate descriptions of wives of alcoholics. For instance, Futterman⁴ describes a number of types of wives: the maternal type; the nagging, deprecatory, hostile type; or the narcissistic, masochistic, guilty one.

Perhaps because she comes to our attention less frequently or later in the illness than the male, the woman alcoholic seems to present more obviously characteristics special to her illness. But again we might expect to find a variety and not a single constellation of characteristics.

MOST ALCOHOLICS SHOW PERSONALITY PROBLEMS

However, if for the moment we disregard the polar arguments that on the one hand alcoholism is a distinct biophysical phenomenon, or on the other hand is merely a symptomatic expression of another underlying psychiatric disorder, we find that in many surveys—as those of Sherfey⁵ and more recently Wallerstein⁶—individuals in the studied populations almost invariably do lend themselves to psychiatric diagnosis; the list of recorded diagnoses covers the whole field of psychiatric illness. When allowance is made for the known confusion and disagreement among psychiatrists themselves as to the finer distinctions in separating various diag-

⁴ S. Futterman, "Personality Trends in Wives of Alcoholics," *Journal of Psychiatric Social Work*, Vol. 23, 1953, pp. 37-41.

⁵ Mary Jane Sherfey, "Psychopathology and Character Structure in Chronic Alcoholism," in Oscar Diethelm (Ed.), *Etiology of Chronic Alcoholism* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1955), pp. 16-42.

⁶ Robert Wallerstein and others, *Hospital Treatment of Alcoholism*, "Menninger Clinic Monograph Series" No. 11 (New York: Basic Books, 1957).

nostic categories, there still remains an impression that labels suggestive of basic personality disorder appear proportionately very frequently as compared with the true psychoses, the various depressive states, and the neuroses which are found much less commonly in ordinary psychiatric clinic practice. In Diethelm's book, Sherfey presents a breakdown of psychiatric diagnoses and personality profiles of 161 cases. It is acknowledged that certain selective social factors undoubtedly play a part in bringing patients into this private clinic. In this carefully diagnosed group 42.8 per cent fell into well-defined categories as paranoid schizophrenia, manic-depressive reaction, asocial psychopathic personalities, psychoneurotic psychopathic personalities, epilepsy and epileptoid reactions, and brain damage. Fifty-nine and six tenths (59.6)⁷ per cent did not belong to usual diagnostic categories but were felt to demonstrate serious personality defects which could be labeled character disorders and which were further divisible into five separate groups. The division of diagnoses here might not hold true for the whole alcoholic population. One obvious distorting factor is a much higher percentage of women—over one third—in the sample than one ordinarily feels to be a true distribution—about one in six or eight.

Wallerstein's study has interest in that, in order to investigate methods of treatment, patients admitted to hospital for alcoholism were randomly divided into four groups—the respective groups to receive Antabuse, conditioned reflex therapy, group hypnotherapy, and milieu therapy—the latter actually being intended as a control group. In each group, the fact of doing well or poorly seemed to depend on some relationship between certain factors of personality and the treatment involved—for example, patients with a tendency to com-

pulsivity tended to do well with Antabuse, and similarly passivity played a part in hypnotizability and better prognosis with hypnotherapy.

The point to be determined in any such study is whether the factors assisting in treatment or those militating against treatment, such as aggressiveness, appear in alcoholics in gross disproportion to what one would expect in a randomly selected general population.

A VARIETY OF PERSONALITY TYPES

Sometimes when we look at surveys of clinic populations and find large percentages of patients with apparently normal social characteristics,⁸ we might wonder if this rejects the importance or even the existence of underlying psychological difficulties. It is true that alcoholics are found at all levels financially, in all professions and at all status levels, and that they commonly demonstrate many of those family and social responsibilities regarded as normal. But if we suppose that there is not just one but perhaps a variety of personality types specially susceptible to alcohol, and that alcohol is merely a vector for expression of the problem of that personality, then perhaps there is opportunity among the many ways of using beverage alcohol for allowing certain conflicts peculiar to particular social groups to come into the open in particular ways.

For instance, we could assume that the alcoholic physician has certain personality characteristics which set him apart from other physicians and that the alcoholic lumberman has characteristics distinct from other lumbermen, without ascribing common personality characteristics to both the alcoholic lumberman and physician. In short, the physician may be a sensitive ideal-

⁸ R. Straus and S. D. Bacon, "Alcoholism and Social Stability," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 12, 1951, p. 231.

⁷ Percentages given by author.

³ Brookside Clinic is the name of the Toronto treatment center of the Alcoholism Research Foundation of Ontario.

ist with goals unresolved; while our lumberman is a belligerent, alcohol-filled roisterer, dispersing excess energy or avoiding boredom. They have little in common but their dependence on alcohol—and yet still have that dependence determined by particular failures of their own personalities which then find alcohol a suitable or even an inevitable agent for the manifestation of symptoms.

Frequently a dogmatic statement is made such as that all alcoholism may be consequent to latent homosexuality. This statement is based, undoubtedly, on the assertions of Ferenczi⁹ early in the history of psychoanalysis, or, less dogmatically, to the effect that emotional immaturity is a prerequisite to alcoholism. One must seek for the clinical evidence of homosexual trends to consider such a factor to be of any significance. Quaranta,¹⁰ who used two objective personality tests in attempting to explore the roles of homosexuality and emotional immaturity in the personalities of alcoholics, felt that there was no significant correlation between alcoholism and these two characteristics. The results did suggest some evidence that "compulsion" and "psychasthenia" were common in the alcoholic's behavior. Quaranta suggests that the general picture of the alcoholic gained from his evidence is of a person

unstable, disorganized, unnecessarily anxious, and easily depressed. His actions are not guided by the high tribunal of critical ability, but rather driven compulsively. He tends to be oblivious to ordinary social sanctions, acts on rash impulse, and fails to grasp the depth of what most people hold dear.

⁹ Sandor Ferenczi, "Alkohol und Neurosis," *Jahrbuch für Psychoanalytische Forschungen*, 1911.

¹⁰ J. V. Quaranta, *Alcoholism: A Study of Emotional Maturity and Homosexuality as Related Factors in Compulsive Drinking*. Fordham University Thesis (New York, 1947).

Many will feel that these ways of behaving are met with remarkable frequency in the alcoholic population, but for them to conclude they describe "the alcoholic" would be premature. Also one might criticize both the source of the samples studied—Alcoholics Anonymous and Bridge House, a residential treatment center for alcoholics—as presenting a preselected population and the methods of analysis as not being adequate to secure exact and sensitive personality profiles of the individuals studied.

Nor can we overlook claims such as those of Manson¹¹ that he has devised a test which is 97 per cent reliable in its identification of alcoholics, 94 per cent for social drinkers, and 100 per cent for abstainers. However, it would be misleading to assume that this test delineates the alcoholic personality, since it simply concerns itself with the attitudes of three distinct social groups when measured at a particular point in time. In other words, it is concerned with present attitudes and values, and not necessarily with those traits present and firmly established before the emergence of a pathological drinking pattern.

A study currently being carried out by Blackburn and Clark¹² employs a battery of psychometric tests in attempting to demonstrate psychological factors in alcoholism or an alcoholism-prone personality. In commenting on a number of reported studies, using various testing techniques, they suggest that the one generalization that can be made is that the alcoholic tends consistently to score in the direction of clinical deviation on the commonly used personality tests. In comparing a group of alcoholics and nonalcoholics, they

¹¹ M. P. Manson, "A Psychometric Determination of Alcohol Addiction," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, Vol. 106, 1949, pp. 199–205.

¹² J. M. Blackburn and J. W. Clark, Queen's University, Personal Communication.

note that the alcoholics scored higher on each scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory¹³ than did the nonalcoholic group. Nevertheless, in a subgroup of penitentiary inmates the tests did not differentiate the alcoholics from the nonalcoholics. By using factor analysis, the authors plan further to study test results with the hope of finding some personality constellations, not necessarily unique to the alcoholic, but specific enough that a significant correlation with the alcoholism syndrome may be demonstrated.

PERCEPTION TESTING

Some interesting leads on the approach to studying basic factors in personality are suggested by Witkin.¹⁴ Working in the field of perception testing, he notes that alcoholics (selected both from hospital wards and from Alcoholics Anonymous) tended to show a pattern significantly different from college students and from other psychiatric patients. It would appear that the alcoholics had difficulty when they had to identify or locate objects unrelated to their own body structure or position, although they were able to do reasonably well on those tests where their own body or self position was involved. It was suggested that this was consistent with the type of personality in which there is high awareness of self, amounting to preoccupation which tends to exclude sensitivity in relationships outside of or not directly bearing on the self.

"WHAT WAS HE LIKE BEFORE HE DRANK?"

One of the most vexing aspects of the situation is the clinical experience of watching changes in personality take

place as a disease situation advances, leaving one in almost complete bewilderment as to what picture existed before the superimposition of a pattern of attitude and behavior which we recognize as alcoholic.

There is no report of studies in which it was possible successfully to examine the premorbid or even the early alcoholic history in such a way that a reliable personality profile could be obtained and compared with that observed in the fully developed disease state. Such a study would require imagination and patience, but is very badly needed.

Wittman¹⁵ attempted such a study using retrograde information from the patients themselves. This is the common way, of course, in which doctors attempt to learn about patients and which for many illnesses is quite satisfactory. One recognizes, however, that the patient's belief and recollection provide a distorted and only partial account of what actually took place in his early years. Thus memories of gross physical illnesses may be sufficiently clear for clinical purposes even after many years, while events of psychological importance may not be so reliable. Wittman's subjects are reported to have described: a domineering but idealized mother and a stern, autocratic father whom the patient feared as a child; a marked degree of strict, unquestioning obedience demanded in family life, with little freedom allowed; a feeling of insecurity as evidenced by an insistent feeling of need for religious security and a strong feeling of sin and guilt; marked interest in the opposite sex with many love affairs but poor marital adjustment; lack of self-consciousness with marked ability to get along with and be socially acceptable

¹³ One of the objective type of personality studies.

¹⁴ H. A. Witkin, S. A. Karp, and D. R. Goodenough. Material to be published.

¹⁵ P. Wittman, "Developmental Characteristics and Personalities of Chronic Alcoholics," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 34, 1939, pp. 361–77.

to others; occasional depressions and periods of marked unhappiness; a keyed-up emotional level—work done under high nervous tension; a definitely expressed and disproportionately greater love for the maternal parent.

Results of alcoholic personality studies

Wittman recognized a lack of homogeneity in the subjects of her studies; and in a later study dealing particularly with temperament of alcoholics, she expressed concern that she might merely be looking at the result of modifications due to alcoholic excess, rather than at the basic personalities concerned.

Diethelm¹⁶ and his associates have presented some evidence to indicate that alcohol seems to have a somewhat selective antagonism for chemicals (neuro-humors) apparently produced in those emotional states which could be classified as of a resentment type compared with those with predominant anxiety (sympathetic) or tension (parasympathetic). Furthermore, this substance seemed to occur more commonly in alcoholics than nonalcoholics. However, in these studies again, the alcoholics seen were in the throes of their disease, leaving us to conjecture as to what biochemical findings might have been noted many years previously. We must ask if the biochemical accompaniments of a personality handling resentment poorly, truly induce a person to find the social expedient of alcohol uniquely acceptable and relief-bringing, or does this biochemical finding, yet to be confirmed, come as merely one response to the stress of prolonged pathological drinking, much as we believe some changes in behavior and attitude either may occur or be grossly accentuated? This study seems as close as modern investigators have come to the discovery of a

¹⁶ Oscar Diethelm (Ed.), *Etiology of Chronic Alcoholism* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1955), pp. 43-109.

chemical change pathognomonic for alcoholism.

Beyond this there is the widely held impression that people differ qualitatively in their responses to alcohol from the beginning. This idea is also hard to delineate and investigate. It is easy to accept that even mild impairment of cortical function due to ethyl alcohol may release any of a variety of pent-up feelings. It is not so easy to accept the view that alcohol verily and unexpectedly brings about a complete change of personality when imbibed even in small quantities. Even if such a phenomenon did occur, it would not explain why the individual repeatedly returns to experiment with the source of his diabolical transformation—a common man's elixir comparable to that so arduously prepared by Dr. Jekyll. It would seem most logical to presume some special facet of personality apart from a physiological idiosyncrasy in the face of alcohol.

Perhaps it is more easy to understand the pride of a man who can consume extraordinary amounts of alcohol without seeming drunk; but perhaps others with the same physiological endowment find drinking dull and merely expensive. Surely we could explore the characteristics of personality that distinguish individuals showing comparable unusual responses to the drug.

Generally speaking, one has the impression that little unusual took place in the physiological response of most alcoholics to given quantities of the drug until after long or large exposure and dietary neglect. This does not mean that their drinking patterns and observed behavior would not show unhealthy facets, but these should be examined most particularly in terms of the mores of their society and the individual personality characteristics. We must seek the role played by alcohol in the individual's life—was it a special

hedonistic pleasure or was it as more aptly stated¹⁷ over two hundred years ago, in referring to increasingly distressful drinking practices in London, "the solace of the henpecked husband, the kind companion of the neglected wife, the infusion of courage into the army, and the support of the pawnbroker," or was it rather one of life's pleasant but otherwise unimportant experiences?

"THE SEARCH HAS JUST BEGUN"

Recently Syme¹⁸ in a critique of studies published since 1949 concluded that there was general failure to produce data allowing inference of a consistent theme relative to the alcoholic personality. Syme analyzed studies involving both projective and nonprojective testing techniques. In discussing the projective studies (tests designed to uncover personality traits), Syme states,

The scant empirical evidence presented to substantiate theoretical notions falls far short of scientific requirements. Methods of procedure are often questionable; moreover, when they are adequate, the results obtained often contradict the findings of other competent investigators.

This is the scientific position, then, at the moment, and again quoting Syme,

¹⁷ Sir John Charles, 1955 Harveian Oration, Royal College of Physicians, London, *Lancet*, Vol. 2, 1955, pp. 987-93.

¹⁸ Leonard Syme, "Personality Characteristics of the Alcoholic," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 18, 1957, pp. 288-301.


There is no warrant for concluding that persons of one type are more likely to become alcoholics than another type. Much further thought and research is yet needed before any extreme position can be justified in this area.

Nonetheless it would seem equally premature to abandon the search because of failure to date to determine adequate methods or to discover the appropriate investigative tools.

Thus we feel that the quest for an alcoholic personality or constellation of frequently predominant characteristics in alcoholism has barely begun. Imaginations have been caught and may well have seized on valid leads in noting characteristics of those becoming alcoholic in various special populations.

The ideal experiment is yet to be designed and carried out, one which will allow observation of an unsuspecting population, seemingly representative of a larger society, over a time span sufficiently long to watch the adolescent reach the age of social drinking and progress to the time when he or some of his fellows will show various unusual characteristics related to his drinking which will eventually be labeled alcoholic—all this to be accomplished without disturbing the study sample by the processes of observation.

While the evidence is not forthcoming so far that positive factors would be necessarily identified, it seems hard to escape an impression that it will be so.



Sociocultural Backgrounds of Alcoholism

By ALBERT D. ULLMAN

Abstract: Physiological and psychological interpretations of the causes of alcoholism have been found insufficient to explain differences in rates of alcoholism among various groups. Consequently, examination of the sociocultural backgrounds of drinking is needed to isolate those factors associated with high or low rates of alcoholism. One such finding is that, compared with members of low alcoholism groups, members of high alcoholism groups have conflicting attitudes toward drinking; the conflict is caused by the lack of integration of drinking customs with the rest of the culture. This finding is shown to be consistent with ethnic and sex differences in rates of alcoholism.

AN OBVIOUS starting point in attempting to unravel the causes of any behavioral phenomenon is the consideration of the differences between those who demonstrate the behavior and those who do not. So it has been in the study of alcoholism. When alcoholism was considered a moral problem, those who dealt with it found differences in the moral fiber of normal and abnormal drinkers. While this approach to the problem has been abandoned in the recent surge of scientific interest in the causes of abnormal drinking, the process of comparing the problem with the "nonproblem" drinker goes on. The two groups have been compared in the way their systems metabolize alcohol and utilize sugar and in their hormonal and other physiological functioning.

These studies have been paralleled by others using the same comparative technique to investigate the personality of the problem drinker. Still others have dealt with his family situation.

One major flaw has been general: the problem drinker is usually compared with the normal drinker *after* he presents a problem. In the progression of addictive drinking, many things happen

to the individual. Both personality and physical changes occur. To distinguish between cause and effect, we must know what the problem drinker was *before* his drinking became abnormal. In addition, we need to know the prevalence in the general population of items which are sometimes taken as characteristic of the problem drinker. For example, one reads that the alcoholic has a domineering mother and an autocratic father.¹ We do not know whether this condition applies to most people, only to alcoholics, or to alcoholics as well as other problem groups.

One set of comparisons that seems to have been productive of ideas on the causes of alcoholism has to do with deviations by individual drinkers from the typical drinking pattern of a given group. The need for this line of investigation has been highlighted by the tendency to define alcoholism in terms of departure from some typical mode of drinking. For example, the Alcoholism Subcommittee of the Expert Committee

¹ Mary Phyllis Wittman, "Developmental Characteristics and Personalities of Chronic Alcoholics," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 34, July 1939, pp. 361-77.

Albert D. Ullman, Ph.D., Medford, Massachusetts, is Associate Professor and Chairman of the Department of Sociology, Tufts University. He is President of the Professional Association on Alcoholism and Vice-President of the Boston Committee on Alcoholism.

on Mental Health of the World Health Organization has in part defined alcoholism as "... any form of drinking which in its extent goes beyond the traditional and customary 'dietary' use, or the ordinary compliance with the social drinking customs of the whole community concerned, . . ." ² Although there is not universal acceptance of this definition, general agreement does seem to hold that here we have a fruitful area for research. In our present state of knowledge, differences in rates of alcoholism cannot be explained in physiological or psychological terms alone. Some promising leads into understanding the pressures placed on the physiological and psychological processes are coming to us from investigations of the sociocultural terrain on which drinking occurs.

By and large, investigators have been interested in the differences among societies in the way alcoholic beverages are used as well as in attitudes toward drinking, drunkenness, and related aspects. One gain has been the discovery that differences in drinking customs exist not only between societies, but among subgroups of the same society: for example, subgroups differentiated on the basis of age, sex, or ethnic origin.

The challenge in the study of drinking customs is to be found in the possibility of correlating diverse customs with rates of alcoholism. Where customs differ and rates of alcoholism differ, we need to know whether these differences are functionally related. Of more general interest is the possibility that the student of this relationship may be making progress along lines that will be useful in other areas of mental health. Specifically, what the investigator in this field is trying to do is to discover how membership in a group sharing a certain culture predisposes one to a par-

² World Health Organization Technical Report Series, No. 42, 1951.

ticular method of handling anxiety, whether "normal" or otherwise. He is working on the problem of symptom choice.

ALCOHOLISM RATES AND SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF DRINKING

For some groups or societies we have excellent descriptions of the use of alcohol but know nothing about the prevalence of alcoholism. In a few instances, particularly in civilized societies, we know something about the rates of alcoholism but have no adequate accounts of the drinking customs of those groups within the society which contribute most heavily to the alcoholic population. France is a case in point.

What we need, then, is the following: descriptions of drinking customs, epidemiological information which tells who the alcoholics are and in what numbers, and information on enough societies and subgroups to tell whether the relationship between custom and alcoholism found in any group is significant or merely due to chance. We should be fortunate were we to find that some characteristic of the drinking custom is totally present or absent when alcoholism does or does not occur; however, this does not happen.

Another way of describing our task is to say we must discover in the drinking customs those independent variables upon which the presence of alcoholism is dependent. In doing this, it will be useful to look at some of the variables which have already been suggested as independent. An example is frequency of drinking. We must note that we cannot compare alcoholics and normal drinkers in this regard. The finding that alcoholics drink more frequently than others tells us nothing, even if true, about frequent drinking as causative of alcoholism. However, if we should find that groups which use alcoholic beverages more frequently than

others also have a higher rate of alcoholism, then we should have a useful relationship established.

The truth is that no such relationship is found. Numerous studies have shown that American Jews, particularly the Orthodox, and Italian-Americans are among those having extremely low rates of alcoholism accompanied by relatively high frequency of drinking. The evidence is sufficiently clear to cause us to abandon frequency of drinking as a cause of alcoholism.

If, instead of frequency of drinking, we examine frequency of drunkenness, we have a case that is not quite so clear cut but still convincing. Gerald D. Berreman's study of drinking patterns among the Aleuts, William Mangin's report of drinking among South American Indians, and Edwin M. Lemert's descriptions of the use of alcohol among Northeast Coast Indians all point out that in these instances drinking to get drunk is accompanied by low rates of alcoholism.³ Thus, we cannot say that frequency of drunkenness is causally related to alcoholism.

Still another possibility is that the alcoholic content of the beverage is related to alcoholism. Here, again, we find no support for the hypothesis. An example of contrary evidence is found in Charles Snyder's studies of drinking among American Jews. He has shown that this low alcoholism group uses beverages ranging in potency from mild wine to strong spirits.⁴ Also, evidence

³ See the following: Gerald D. Berreman, "Drinking Patterns of the Aleuts," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 17, September 1956, pp. 503-14. William Mangin, "Drinking Among Andean Indians," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 18, March 1957, pp. 55-66. Edwin M. Lemert, *Alcohol and the Northwest Coast Indians*, University of California Publications in Culture and Society, Vol. 2, No. 6 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1954).

⁴ There have been a series of articles by Charles R. Snyder published under the gen-

from primitive societies demonstrates that those who use native brewed or fermented beverages of low alcohol content show about as much alcoholism as those who have taken over the use of distilled beverages.

INTEGRATION OF DRINKING CUSTOMS

If we cannot find a simple mechanistic relationship between some aspect of drinking and alcoholism such as the variables examined above, we need either abandon the drinking custom as a field of research or go into the more complicated area of culturally produced attitudes toward drinking. We can readily see how the social environment is responsible for certain attitudes, but we still must ask if certain constellations of attitudes are more frequent among groups with high rates of alcoholism than among those with low rates.

The answer which will be supported here is that *in any group or society in which the drinking customs, values, and sanctions—together with the attitudes of all segments of the group or society—are well established, known to and agreed upon by all, and are consistent with the rest of the culture, the rate of alcoholism will be low.* Conformity to the drinking standards is supported by the total culture. However, under conditions in which the individual drinker does not know what is expected or when the expectation in one situation differs from that in another, it can be assumed that he will have ambivalent feelings about drinking. Thus, ambivalence is the psychological product of unintegrated drinking customs.

An excellent example of this situation is provided by Snyder's studies with the "purest" case of cultural consistency

eral title "Culture and Sobriety" in the *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 16, March 1955, pp. 101-77; Vol. 16, June 1955, pp. 263-89; Vol. 16, September 1955, pp. 504-32; Vol. 16, December 1955, pp. 700-742; and Vol. 17, March 1956, pp. 124-43.

found among Orthodox Jews.⁵ Members of this group start to use alcohol in childhood, they drink with relatively great frequency, exhibit little or no drunkenness, and have virtually no pathology associated with drinking. Because they have been introduced to alcohol so early, and because they use it in situations such as religious ritual where its function is clear and where the situation itself is free from ambiguity, Jewish children see nothing unusual or immoral about the use of alcohol.

Giorgio Lolli and his collaborators as well as Phyllis H. Williams and Robert Straus have provided us with another example very much like the Orthodox Jews.⁶ Reports on drinking by Italians and Italian-Americans show that they also begin drinking in childhood, drink frequently, exhibit little drunkenness and virtually no alcoholism. Perhaps the outstanding feature of the drinking patterns of the Italians (changing somewhat among Italian-Americans) is the use of wine with meals. As with the Jews, drinking occurs in clear-cut situations with no immoral connotations attached to the act. Everyone feels the same way about drinking, and there is no clash with other elements of the culture.

Still another example of a people with well-integrated drinking customs is to be found in Chinese society. Merrill

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Two series of articles on the Italian and Italian-American drinker have appeared in the *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol* between 1950 and 1954. The earlier group is by Phyllis H. Williams and Robert Straus, bearing in March and September 1952, September 1953, the general title, "Drinking Patterns of Italians in New Haven: Utilization of the Personal Diary as a Research Technique." Particular attention is called to those appearing in the March and December 1950 issues. The articles by Giorgio Lolli and his associates to which the reader's attention is drawn appeared and December 1954.

Moore, Wesley LaBarre, and Milton L. Barnett all give the same picture of the use of alcohol in this group.⁷ A statement by LaBarre is typical of their findings. He says,

As for drinking, the Chinese indulge in it on all occasions of eating, and without the slightest discernible ambivalence, lacking the really very intricate attitudes that have been built up toward it in the West.⁸

Like Jews and Italians, Chinese begin using alcohol early, but, unlike them, quite frequently exhibit drunkenness. Barnett's description of celebrations in which drinking to a point of mild intoxication occurs is pertinent. His study is also useful in providing statistics of the low prevalence of pathological drinking among Chinese-Americans.⁹

It should be clear from the above that Orthodox Jews, Italians, and Chinese, among others, are free from ambivalence in the drinking situation precisely because their culture is so consistent in this regard. One should expect the opposite in cases of unintegrated drinking customs.

UNINTEGRATED DRINKING CUSTOMS

We can take as an example of lack of integration the description offered by Selden D. Bacon of drinking by a group he refers to as the "United States American of the Northeast quarter of the nation—Protestant, middle-class, urban, white, from Anglo-Saxon background of

⁷ See the following: Merrill Moore, "Chinese Wine: Some Notes on its Social Use," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 9, September 1948, pp. 270-79. Wesley LaBarre, "Some Observations of Character Structure in the Orient. II. The Chinese. Part Two," *Psychiatry*, Vol. 9, November 1946, pp. 375-95. Milton L. Barnett, "Alcoholism in the Cantonese of New York City: An Anthropological Study," in *Etiology of Chronic Alcoholism*, edited by Oskar Diethelm (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1955).

⁸ LaBarre, *Ibid.*, p. 376.

⁹ Barnett, *op. cit.* (note 7 *supra*).

three or more generations in this country." Part of the description of the drinking customs and attitudes of this group is as follows:

The social functions of drinking are rather vaguely and somewhat defensively described: they concern drawing people, both family members and also complete strangers, together, often for purposes of "fun," often to allow relaxation from . . . moral norms. . . . The rules and procedures are on occasion rather specific, but also show enormous variability so that a given individual may follow one set of rules with his family, another with business or professional associates, and the third on holiday occasions and show even different patterns when away from the home-town. . . . Sanctions for violations are extremely irregular. . . . Parents, employers, priests, physicians, and other agencies of sanction are most uncertain sources, both in formal statement and in actual behavior, many of them avoiding the issue whenever possible. . . . Sometimes the learning stems not from parents, ministers, physicians, elders, and teachers but from other adolescents, sometimes on trains, in cars or in commercial places. The custom is not significantly entwined with family and religious institutions. . . . There is great emotional feeling about the problem on the mass level as well as by individuals, feeling that has run rampant for generations. Activating the custom, especially by the young, is often attended with feelings of guilt, hostility, and exhibitionism and may occur as a secretive practice insofar as parents or employers or elders are concerned.¹⁰

The contrast between these drinking customs and associated attitudes and those of the Jews, Italians, and Chinese is clear. The difference in rates of alcoholism among the three groups mentioned and the one described by Bacon is also clear. The group Bacon portrays vividly is probably above average.

¹⁰ D. Bacon, "Social Settings Concomitant with Drinking: A Sociological Approach to the Problem," *Journal of the American Association*, Vol. 164, May 11, 1957, p. 10.

¹¹ There has been an association, Vol. 164, May 11, 1957, Charles R. S.

age in its contribution to the total population of alcoholics, while the other groups contribute very lightly.

We can now turn to a group which appears to contribute heavily to the population of alcoholics: the Irish-Americans. All studies of American ethnic groups show this one to be at or near the top in alcoholism rates; consequently its pattern of drinking is of particular interest. We are fortunate in having two excellent researches by Robert F. Bales and Donald D. Glad which compare drinking by Jewish-Americans with Irish-Americans.¹¹ The general findings are that Irish-American youths drink differently and hold vastly different attitudes toward the experience. In many respects, the situation for the Irish-American drinker is close to the Northeastern American described by Bacon, with some aspects seen in exaggerated form.

Unlike the Jewish drinker, says Glad, the Irish-American defines the drinking situation in terms of the "affective consequences, in which the physiological and psychological changes produced in the individual by alcohol per se are of primary importance."¹² This attitude leaves the drinking situation open to further definition on each separate occasion. While the purpose of drinking is to get drunk, and in this the Irish-American bears some resemblance to many primitive drinkers, the degree of intoxication often has to be handled quite delicately, unlike the primitive who will not be punished for his drunkenness. This is a very different situation from that of the Jewish, Italian, or

¹¹ Robert F. Bales, "Cultural Differences in Rates of Alcoholism," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 6, March 1946, pp. 480-99. Also, Donald D. Glad, "Attitudes and Experiences of American-Jewish and American-Irish Male Youth as Related to Differences in Adult Rates of Inebriety," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 8, December 1947, pp. 406-72.

¹² Glad, *Ibid.*, p. 461.

Chinese drinker, most of whose drinking takes place under familiar, regulated circumstances. There is no need to manipulate the degree of intoxication achieved because ordinarily one does not drink to get drunk.

Some preliminary evidence gathered by the present writer supports this view. He found that the Irish-American tends to have his first drink under somewhat less protected circumstances than do members of many other groups. It may also be an emotionally significant experience, marked by some degree of intoxication, taking place in unusual places outside the home, and it may occur in the presence of companions who place pressure on the neophyte to "drink like a man."¹³

We may also suppose that the Irish-American has more frequent contact with alcoholism due to its relatively frequent appearance among friends, members of the family and of the families of contemporaries. Undoubtedly, this results in formal and informal sanctions against drinking. The person who violates these sanctions must enter the drinking situation with high ambivalence.

Somewhat different problems are faced by one of the most interesting categories of drinkers in our society. These are the Mormons who drink, thus directly violating their religious and familial training.¹⁴ Proportionately, those Mormons who drink contribute more heavily to the number of problem drinkers than do other drinking groups. All of the factors we have indicated as associated with high rates of alcoholism are present when the Mormon drinks.

SEX DIFFERENCES

A clear difference in the rate of alcoholism between the sexes is found. In the United States, latest estimates show

¹³ Albert D. Ullman, "Ethnic Differences in the First Drinking Experience" (in preparation).

¹⁴ See Bacon, *op. cit.* (note 10 *supra*).

there are 11 male alcoholics for every 2 female.¹⁵ Studies by Robert Straus and Selden D. Bacon as well as by the present writer indicate that there are different expectations for the young man and young woman in the drinking situation.¹⁶ There is less social pressure to drink and fewer kinds of situations in which drinking is expected of the girl. She does not have to "prove" her womanhood by drinking. There are hints that, in the case of the woman alcoholic, there is some confusion in her identification with the expected female role; that is, the woman alcoholic may feel pressures on her in the drinking situation which are typical of those felt by the man.

We have seen that the task of integrating drinking with the rest of one's activities and beliefs is made more or less difficult by virtue of one's ethnic group and sex membership. However, the culture is in large part transmitted through the medium of the small, face-to-face unit the sociologist calls the "primary group." There has been some work in this area which fits in with the theory that lack of cultural integration in the sphere of drinking activities and attitudes is directly related to higher rates of alcoholism. For example, Joan K. Jackson and Ralph Connor have shown that parents of alcoholics held inconsistent attitudes toward drinking. John L. Haer gives us evidence that the individual tends to drink more like his contemporaries than like the members of his childhood family.¹⁷ For the

¹⁵ Mark Keller and Vera Efron, "The Prevalence of Alcoholism," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 16, December 1955, pp. 619-44.

¹⁶ Robert Straus and Selden D. Bacon, *Drinking in College* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953). Also, Albert D. Ullman, "Sex Differences in the First Drinking Experience," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 18, June 1957, pp. 229-39.

¹⁷ Joan K. Jackson and Ralph Connor, "Attitudes of the Parents of Alcoholics, Mod-

people investigated, well-integrated attitudes toward drinking were impossible because the major primary group influence did not agree.

Probably no one comes into the drinking situation with more ambivalence than the child of an alcoholic. He has seen at first hand what can happen, yet he appears to be under extra compulsion to drink. In part, it may be because he is afraid of being a deviant or a "defective" person. We have here, in an exaggerated way, the situation of anyone who enters into drinking activity feeling that it is bad or dangerous. By the nature of things, if such a person drinks, his attitudes toward the act are conflicting.

ISOLATED GROUPS

It is not at all unusual to find someone who having been moved from his customary residence to an isolated group such as an army camp, lumber camp, foreign resort, or shipboard drinks less temperately than at home. Two comments are pertinent here. First, isolated groups such as the military or lumbermen are often strictly male. It follows that some of the pressures which have already been suggested as present when men drink are emphasized in an all-male society. Furthermore, the neutralizing effect of negative sanctions on drinking stemming from the presence of mother, sister, wife, daughter is absent in such communities. Second, removal from one's typical way of life may involve deprivations and usually does mean some anxiety. In these unusual circumstances, alcohol is useful in reducing anxiety. But we must keep clearly in mind that heavy drinking,

particularly under temporary stress, is not the equivalent of compulsive or addictive drinking.

The picture of heavy drinking in the isolated group is further complicated by the fact that persons who are already having trouble with their drinking, meaning that they drink differently from their usual companions, seek out places where they can drink heavily without being unusual. The individual who first learns to drink in such circumstances as an army camp may represent a problem. He has no way of knowing that his teachers are deviant in their drinking, that their attitudes are not typical of the normal drinker.

Heavy drinking under circumstances such as those described above is not to be confused with that done by another category of drinkers: namely, those who have not taken on the value system of their society. These persons are spoken of as "unsocialized" or "undersocialized." Such individuals may drink immoderately, but they are not necessarily compulsive drinkers. Our assumption is that many such persons drink because they want to avoid the responsibilities of sobriety, not because they are compulsively driven. Article 8 of this volume will discuss this group in greater detail.

A final word of caution is necessary. The amount of information available to us in the field is much less than necessary for validation of theories of causes of alcoholism. What has been described in this article represents a beginning in a kind of research that looks most promising. Intimate knowledge of the sociocultural factors which are conducive to alcoholism should help us to focus upon those physiological and psychological factors which are involved in establishing an addiction. Undoubtedly, additional information in all three areas will be needed before final answers are available.

Alcoholics Do Not Drink

By SELDEN D. BACON

Abstract: No effective answers have been gained for the questions "why do alcoholics drink so much," "why can't they stop drinking" or "why can't they learn to drink moderately?" Formulators of such questions have failed to define the key word in these questions—drink. Drinking is defined according to a well-established system of knowledge. Then the actions of the alcoholic are compared to this defined behavior system. The two are discovered to be antithetical rather than similar, or, as some insist, identical. Application of this knowledge to some typical problem situations is suggested.

A PERENNIAL question addressed to alcoholics as well as one posed in discussions about them is "why don't they stop drinking?" Currently this query is likely to elicit considerable scorn. Members of Alcoholics Anonymous and their friends, persons who have read semipopular articles about alcoholism, and the growing number of professional therapists in this field are all likely to answer "they can't." In fact, it is fairly generally agreed even by the experts that "lack of control" over drinking is not only one of but perhaps is the most significant single characteristic for diagnosing the presence of clear-cut alcoholism. Scorn for the person proposing the question probably stems from the feeling, quite probably a correct feeling, that the asker adheres to an archaic psychology based on abstract rationality and will power and assumes that his will power and rationality are obviously superior to that of the alcoholic being discussed.

However, it takes no genius to perceive that those who correctly say "they can't" have not answered the question. Somewhat in the manner of Humpty Dumpty they have announced that this

is not a question, rather it is a fact. This aloof denial is followed by the practical advice that if the alcoholic wishes to maintain nonalcoholism he must never drink again. Practical as this advice may be, it surely carries no indication of an answer to the original question "why don't they stop" or to the naturally emerging question "why couldn't they learn how to drink in controlled fashion?" To the person suffering from alcoholism, these questions are perhaps irrelevant. He or she has no more need to know "why" than the sufferer of pneumonia needs to know "why" penicillin clears up that condition.

However, to the people who are interested in health and disease, as such, the question "why does penicillin have that effect" is most relevant. From the development of answers to such a question may stem better and earlier diagnosis, more effective use of the medication, more effective medicament, and, perhaps above all, more profound understanding and therefore ability to cope with not only pneumonia but other conditions as well. Similarly, to the student of alcoholism the question "why

erate Drinkers and Nondrinkers Toward Drinking," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 14, December 1953, pp. 590-613. Also, John L. Haer, "Drinking Patterns and the Influence of Friends and Family," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 16, March 1955, pp. 178-85.

Selden D. Bacon, Ph.D., New Haven, Connecticut, is Professor of Sociology at Yale University, Director of the Yale Center of Alcohol Studies, Director of the Yale Summer School of Alcohol Studies, and a Member of the American Medical Association Committee on Alcoholism.

can't they stop or control their drinking" is most germane. If almost all of the people who drink can control their drinking but none of the alcoholics are able so to do, then we have, at least at this preliminary stage of investigation, a clear-cut distinction—one alleged by experts to be *the* significant differentiation. Pursuit of the anatomy, the functioning, and the chronologic development of this "can't stop" or "can't control" factor should lead to that earlier and more exact diagnosis, should allow more effective exploration for therapeutic techniques, and should lead to the discovery of more and more practicable prevention.

Many researches have been projected along these lines. "Can't stop" drinkers have had their glands, livers, metabolic functioning, their anxieties, inhibitions, and complexes dissected, measured, toned up and tuned down. The intuition-plus-experiment manipulators have filled alcoholics with gold and with emetics, have tapped the spine, exorcized the Freudian demons, removed allergic complexities, substituted nonalcoholic sedatives and tranquillizers for the sedating and tranquillizing alcohols, have done, in fact, almost anything one can imagine. However, when controlled experiments were instituted, it usually appeared that no very significant effects could be found. For the therapists, the outstanding fact remained that the alcoholic if he were to recover must not drink and never could drink again. These other specifics—whether vitamins, or spiritual experiences, or psychological relearning, or vocational rehabilitation, or resocialization—were sometimes helpful, but *no more drinking* was the essential requirement.

Actually, this picture of the inefficacy of research on alcoholism is overdrawn; we have discovered a good deal about alcoholism, a good deal that was unknown even twenty years ago; but much

that is implied above is undeniably and unfortunately all too true. What was wrong with the research? Answers to the question "why can't they stop drinking" or "why don't they stop drinking" or "why can't they drink again," answers which would stand up under controlled comparisons, just did not seem possible. Yet there was no question but that out of any random number of Americans using alcoholic beverages, one out of fifteen showed this amazingly different pattern. To the researcher this apparent impasse—that is, regular, distinctive, and persistent differentiation of one portion of a group from the rest of the group with no apparent regularity, persistency, or distinction in *any other* way, growth, factor, relationship, process, lack, or other aspect—does not suggest that the attempted answering was inefficient. It implies instead that the question itself may have been improperly presented, may have included unnoticed and unproven assumptions, or may be logically unanswerable.

THE DEFINITION OF DRINKING

There is one element in the questions posed which is clearly the central matter involved: this is the word "drink." One might easily assume that "anyone knows what drinking is" and it is surely obvious that these alcoholics "drink too much." However, researchers of a scientific orientation have repeatedly been taught that "the obvious" is not always quite as apparent as assumed. It is almost axiomatic that "what anyone knows" is rarely scientifically accurate fact. Finally, scientific researchers are supposed to define their terms.

The drinking we are discussing refers only to the drinking of alcoholic beverages. But does that sufficiently define the term? What kind of a phenomenon is it? Is it a biological process? Is it merely chemical? Or, as so much literature on the subject would seem to

suggest, is it primarily psychological in nature? That chemical, biological, and psychological aspects are present in the phenomenon of "drinking" is not only "obvious," it is provable. However, no one of these factors forms the unique characteristic of drinking, that which differentiates it from other phenomena. One could inject alcohol into a jellyfish or an elephant, but to call the phenomenon "drinking" would be an affront to common sense or to any ordinary use of language.

A great many medicines contain alcohol, sometimes very large proportions of alcohol, for example, 10 to 25 per cent of the liquid, but is ingestion of alcohol in this fashion correctly called drinking? A dentist may inject alcohol into his patient to deaden a nerve; is the patient drinking? Certain cakes and many sauces for a variety of cooked foods have alcohol in them. Is the person consuming such food "drinking"?

How can we effectively discover what is meant by this word? Fortunately there is a means; it consists of observation and recording. We observe people all around the world, noting, first, any ingestion of alcoholic beverages and, second, what these people or those around them say and do about this action. It becomes clear that what is unique about "drinking" is that it is of the order of phenomena called "a custom." It is a "way" characteristic of a named group of people, a "way" that is learned by members of that group. Different groups have different ways. One group ferments milk from horses, consumes it on certain days with particularly appropriate words, clothes, accompanying foods, and so on; perhaps only males of a certain status activate this way. Another group utilizes fermented grapes, the resulting wine is mixed with three to five times the same amount of water, and everybody uses the beverage three or four times a day,

always with meals. A third group uses a millet beer, a fourth group a distillation from cereal or potatoes. Perhaps in one group the act is primarily a ritual of deep religious significance, in another the usage is always one whose purpose is that of getting everyone intoxicated. Whatever the drinking "way" may be, it is very clear that for each group its own "way" is *the* way, the appropriate, proper, "natural" and decent way to consume alcoholic beverages. But no matter how various the ways and how ethnocentric group members may be about them, drinking refers to a group's customary "way" of imbibing alcoholic beverages and drinking may so be defined.

Anthropologists and sociologists have developed a systematic procedure for describing customs whether they deal with clothing, prayers, games, acquiring food, or other patterned and repetitive practices exhibited by a group. This can also be employed in the description of a particular drinking "way." With such a picture of the custom of drinking of a particular group, it will then be possible to examine the behaviors of members of that group who are called "alcoholics" to see in what manner and to what degree they differ.

Such systematic description¹ would include references to social function, individual function, rules, charter or rationale, material apparatus, personnel and functionaries, sanctions and sanctioning agents, stratification and role differentiation, modes of teaching the way, relation of the particular way to other ways, emotional importance of the way to the members of the group, flexibility and change.

Some of these characteristics of a "way" when applied to drinking can be quite useful for attaining greater insight

¹ Selden D. Bacon, "Sociology and the Problems of Alcohol," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 4, December 1943, pp. 412-30.

into the alcoholic who is almost universally discussed, reacted to behaviorally, or studied as if he were essentially a "drinker." As the title of this paper indicates, the major conclusion is going to be that this is a misconception, one that has allowed, even fostered, a good deal of the confusion, anger, and paradox so frequently encountered when alcohol and alcoholism are under consideration.

ANALYSIS OF AN AMERICAN DRINKING CUSTOM

One of the first things to note is that a custom is a societal, not a biological phenomenon. In defining drinking, then, we are limited to consideration of one group at a time. We can talk about Egyptian drinking or Japanese drinking or drinking in the American colonies. They are different from each other. For purposes of this discussion we shall consider mid-twentieth century, white, middle-class, adult, northwestern European background persons of the urban, northeastern quarter of the United States. Since no adequate study, in fact no serious study at all, has been made of drinking in this group, the description must be general, vague, and largely bolstered by the casual experience, observation, and viewpoint of the reader. For purposes of the comparison to follow, however, this description will be sufficient.

The social functions of drinking are many. For present purposes the "sociality" rather than the achievement of specific social needs will be stressed. Drinking is an activity which, with a few exceptions, occurs always with two or more participants. In order to be socially functional the drinking by one of the participants must be satisfying to the others. The fact that John Smith ingests an alcoholic beverage and feels happy in the act is secondary. The first

important point is that John Jones, who is with him and who is drinking, is pleased or is less anxious or feels better because Smith is drinking; the second point is that Smith is pleased that Jones is drinking. It is this reciprocal pleasure in the other person(s)' participation which is the essential aspect of the social function. The particulars and forms of the pleasure felt to be gained or the unpleasantness felt to be avoided by this joint participation can be many. It may allow freer conversation, the avoidance of controls not desired in the particular setting, reductions of anxiety, less discriminating and therefore less effortful amusement, forgetting of mutually depressing, irritating, or disconcerting matters, and so on. As the custom becomes entrenched, its very activation may be rewarding in itself.

The individual functions of drinking stem, first, from the action of alcohol on the central nervous system—the reduction of tensions, of sensitivity to unpleasant realities, of feelings of pain, guilt and so on. Secondly, granted that there is a custom, the individual can gain satisfaction from its effective activation, in this instance, giving a "good" cocktail party, possessing a "fine old brandy," and so on.

The rules would relate to how much of what, in what order, with what related activities, with whom, and, of special importance, where and when. As usual, the rules of a negative sort are more obvious, more readily verbalized. Since drinking frequently if not invariably is accompanied by other activities—for example, singing, conversation, eating, dancing, mourning—there are also rules for these other activities which, when drinking accompanies them, may be somewhat different from rules for the same behavior without drinking.

Material apparatus for the group being discussed, with variations for different subgroups, would consist of glasses,

decanters, bars, and various appurtenances of a physical nature.

The charter consists of the "reasons" commonly given for drinking, including the poems, advertisements, old sayings, explanations and so on—whether these reasons are for not drinking, heavy drinking, drinking this or that beverage, and so on.

The personnel are the activators of the custom who do not have markedly specialized roles with additional individual and social functions, charter rules, and so on; these are the drinkers. Whether being a host at a party would be considered as playing the role of a functionary is a question. The latter term, however, is appropriate for the barmaid, the distiller, or the member of the state alcohol beverage control board; in fact, functionaries do not even have to be drinkers.

Sanctions and sanctioning agents

Sanctions for drinking are to be seen in the various forms of approval of the personnel and functionaries for doing what is expected, for especially gracious, accurate, well-timed, or otherwise approved modes of activating this behavior. Friendship, smiles, various forms of tangible and intangible reward are rather easily brought to mind. Exclusion, frowns, negative gossip, withdrawal of tangible and intangible rewards usually expected, and even overt punishments are suggestive of the negative sanctions.

Inasmuch as drinking is a relatively integrated custom in the group, the sanctioning agents—following, of course, that most important one for the socialized person, the self—will be practically the same persons important as sanctioning agents for other behaviors. They are, for example, parents, spouse, clique members, those immediately superior in

more specialized relationships such as the foreman, the president of the garden club, and so on until finally the more or less impersonal and almost professional sanctioners such as policeman and judge come into play; these last, of course, are almost entirely negative sanctioners.

Stratification and differentiation in our society can be viewed in many categorical settings: by age, sex, racial and ethnic background, wealth, religion, and so on. For the northeastern quarter of the United States, drinking ways tend to show differences according to these usual categories. The drinking ways of the recently emigrated Polish Catholic woman of 40 years of age are sharply distinct from those of the Orthodox Jewish male of 30 or the boy attending a private college, the son of wealthy, Unitarian Scotch-English parents, eight generations in this country.

The learning and teaching of the way in those three categories would differ markedly in terms of the content of teaching, the age of learning, the roles through which teaching occurred, and so on.

The flexibility of the rules might be great for the college boy, a considerable degree of individual interpretation and action, even experimentation might be expected of him. Whereas for the other two a fairly rigid system might be observed: in one case perhaps an ideal of abstinence; for the other, prescribed regular use, buttressed by the most moral sentiments of family, faith, and total group solidarity. In the Jewish group, the way would be inextricably interwoven with other social institutions; for the other two it might be peripheral or even in conflict with other social systems of the group. Similar differences could be seen in the rate of change of the drinking custom or the emotional reactions it received within the group.

DRINKING BEHAVIORS OF THE ALCOHOLIC

However the reader may fill these descriptive categories with concrete illustration from his experience, reading, or observation, he will have no difficulty in recognizing that the behaviors now to be described with respect to *any* of the drinking ways of this northeastern United States area are deviations. And if the reader has experience with alcoholism or with the literature about it, he will have no difficulty in recognizing these deviant behaviors as the symptoms of American alcoholism.²

1. The individual begins to drink *more* than the other members of his group. If they usually have 2 or 3 cocktails, he usually has 4 or 5.

2. The individual begins to drink *more frequently* than the others. If there are from 4 to 10 occasions a month considered appropriate for drinking and if the average group member with the same status of this individual usually activates the custom 6 to 8 times a month, this individual usually imbibes on all 10 occasions and probably many other times.

3. The individual shows *more* of that behavior which might be labeled "ordinarily forbidden but given temporary license for socially defined drinking situations." This may mean so-called drunken behavior, but it may only refer to increased noisiness, exhibitionism, carelessness about some proprieties, and so on. This individual with increasing frequency not only reaches to the farthest limit of the allowed license; he often goes beyond. Further, he may define certain situations as being appropriate for this license when others do not.

² E. M. Jellinek, "Phases in the Drinking History of Alcoholics," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 7, June 1946, pp. 1-88.

4. This individual begins to experience "blackouts," temporary amnesias during and following drinking episodes. These are not to be confused with "passing out" or stupor. Such amnesias, certainly their appearance three or more times, do not merely represent differences *in degree* from the other drinkers. They are an accompaniment to the use of alcohol beverages not within the limits of *any* drinking custom.

5. The charter of drinking, the usual understandings of members of a given group about why, how often, when, how much, for how long, with whom, what, and so on of the use of alcohol beverages becomes inadequate for this individual. He "needs" more and different explanations. He "rationalizes" his drinking "too much" and with "excessive" intensity and with "bizarre" explanations from the point of view of his fellows.

6. He often drinks more rapidly, especially at the start of a drinking situation, than his fellows. He gulps his drinks.

7. He begins surreptitious drinking, sneaking drinks, using alcohol in such a fashion that his fellows will not know about it.

8. A crucial behavioral change is called the "loss of control." With increasing frequency the taking of the first drink becomes an effective trigger for the achievement of intoxication. This may occur no matter what the situation. Since only a small percentage of any drinking situations in any subsociety of the area here being discussed allow, to say nothing of call for, intoxication, the individual at this point becomes rather obvious unless strong countermeasures are undertaken.

However, even before such heroic departures from the world of drinking custom are activated, it is extremely doubtful that this individual can still be called a "drinker." To contrast some of these

"alcoholic" behaviors with drinking behaviors will serve to underline the conclusion. That aspect of the social function of drinking described as "sociality" or reciprocity of reward (Jones' drinking rewards Smith and vice versa) has not only dwindled, it has gone into reverse. If Jones is our alcoholic, his use of alcohol is with increasing frequency irritating, perhaps frightening, perhaps even measurably damaging to Smith. The various Smiths in the group may even verbalize about this, at first only in joking terms but soon in more serious fashion; they may even leave him "out" of certain situations. But it is equally clear that the drinking of the "custom bound" Smiths is not only inadequate but rather irritating to our increasingly alcoholic Mr. Jones. He may "use" the Smith's cocktail party to get alcohol, but the party itself is of little interest, often, in fact, interferes with his preferred patterns of alcohol consumption.

The functions which alcohol serves for any individual drinker are still gained by Jones. Indeed, they are magnified to the point that most members of his group would call them distorted. The others like drinking. Jones *needs* alcohol.

For the custom of drinking the time, place, amounts, frequency, accompanying behaviors, and on and on are all covered by rules, most of them fairly readily describable for any given group. Mr. Jones no longer accepts these rules. The charter of drinking is likewise describable. It is not sufficient for Mr. Jones. Mr. Jones has avoided or accepted with no change in his behavior the sanctions brought into play because of his drinking deviations. Mr. Jones has avoided, counterattacked, deceived, or given false promises to the sanctioners of customary drinking.

Other aspects of a custom included its relation to other ways and the impor-

tance ascribed to it. Mr. Jones has extended the use of alcohol beverage into times, places, and situations not considered appropriate by his associates. He may take drinks at the office, on the train, or during midday breaks in the work routine or in answer to the mildest headache or cough, although, for the sake of example, let it be said that these situations or other sets of activity are *not* utilized for initiating drinking by his particular associates. And the use of alcohol has become, at the least, one of the most important activities in his total existence.

If there were a gradation of phenomena called psychological, psychopathic, and psychotic and a parallel gradation called social, "sociopathic" and "sociotic" and if the latter could be applied to special areas of behavior, then the individual exhibiting the traits listed so far would, in relation to drinking behavior, be on the borderline between "sociopathic" and "sociotic." To call him a drinker would be as remote from reality as to call the patient in the dentist chair who receives an alcohol injection a drinker. On the other hand, he still can remind one of a drinker, albeit a distorted reflection with many elements of the usual drinker lacking and with some added attributes quite foreign to the ordinary drinker. And then the picture clearly changes. After a brief intermission of quasi-exploration and quasi-invention, both thinly connected to the world of social drinking, our Mr. Jones usually moves not only to the "sociotic" in relation to alcohol but also to, at least, the "sociopathic" in other areas of custom. First, let us note his quasi-explorations and inventions in relation to drinking.

Variation of the social charter

9. He attempts new patterns of alcohol usage. He switches from bourbon to gin to vodka. He tries "the beer

route," perhaps even Rhine wine and soda. He "drinks" only every day or only after 4 o'clock. He "drinks" only with his wife or only at home or only away from home, only when eating or when not eating. The variety of activities is fascinating in its individuality and also, paradoxically, in its almost complete similarity to the squirmings and writhings of all the other alcoholics. However, it is not invention in the sociologic meaning of that term. First, the patterns evolved are not supposed to be adopted by anyone else. Second, although others may be fooled as well as Mr. Jones that these are variations from the social usage of drinking, in reality they have little to do with that custom except for the most fragile outer mask; they are merely modes of ingesting alcohol. They are closer to the dentist's injection than to *any* custom of drinking. It is a great pity that wives, friends, even physicians are likely to confuse these activities with drinking.

10. There is another heroic measure open to the alcoholic. He can keep on imbibing in the same fashion, but he can change the social locale. In this way the negative sanctions and sanctioning agents of his group will be eliminated. Mr. Jones can take "the geographic cure." He can move from suburb to central city or from Newark to New Orleans. Failure is "built into" the adventure before it even starts, but Mr. Jones may "travel" quite a bit before this becomes obvious. But Mr. Jones can achieve the same results by "traveling" socially without leaving his own city. He can do his "drinking" in places and with people who are of a different, almost invariably, from the point of view of his former associates, lower social status. He can have his alcohol on the "other side of the tracks."

This intermediate stage of alcohol-imbibing behavior could at least be said to have pretensions of relationship to

social drinking. Actually it is merely a thrashing around by an excited organism in a completely hostile environment. It is more significant for an associated development, one quite distinct from any aspect of alcohol, than it is for the imbibing history of the individual. For now we have to observe two developments in Mr. Jones: he becomes "sociotic" in relation to drinking; he becomes "sociopathic" in one or more other areas of custom.

11. Mr. Jones may become a "loner." He does his meaningful alcohol injection by himself. This is by definition a complete rejection of drinking.

12. Rather than manifesting excessive rationalizations about alcohol and its use, he avoids any and all discussion of the subject. If forced by physician, friend, minister, wife, employer to consider the matter he may produce ingenious alibis, outrageous (to common sense) explanations, even bald-faced lies. However, he is quite aware of what he is doing, has no personal belief whatever in his statements, is merely trying to stave off, appease, or deceive the custom-bound people who are interfering with him. He is not varying from the social charter. He has denied it.

13. He may start utilizing techniques for the ingestion of alcohol which are beyond the pale of any conceivable development in the drinking usages of his group: starting off the day with 7 or 8 ounces of gin or whiskey; spending 4 or 5 days of the ordinary work-a-day week doing nothing but ingesting alcohol; taking alcohol in such forms as mouthwash, canned heat preparations, vanilla extract, and so on; in addition, he may omit such practices (if they were the norm in his group) as using ice, glasses, chasers, mixes.

14. Concomitant with these last 3 or 4 modes of behavior—and often starting much earlier—our hypothetical Mr. Jones has manifested changes, socially

unacceptable changes, in areas other than those related to drinking. Dishonesty, excessive rationalization, avoidance, and the other deviations, once perhaps even rare in his behavior, then noticeable where alcohol was concerned, now begin to appear in the family situation or perhaps in friendship groups or on the job. Accidents, job losses, family quarrels, broken friendship, even trouble with the law may take place, not just when he is under the influence of alcohol, but even when he is not. And such occasions quite usually set off further drinking. The social and geographic "traveling" mentioned earlier may speed this departure from culture and society.

15. Characteristics of the final phases of alcoholism are so exotic, whether concerning drinking or any social behavior, they need only be mentioned: binges—a complete rejection of social reality—physical tremors, hallucinations and deliria, horrifying but unidentified fears and hatreds, collapse of all former social status, compulsive hiding and flinching of drinks against probable hangovers, surrender of all rationalizations, early death.

Somewhere in this progression, perhaps at about the time of the behaviors numbered 4, 5, and 6, the word drinking no longer applies to this man's use of alcohol. He is no more a drinker than a kleptomaniac is a customer or a pyromaniac is a campfire girl. Alcoholics may consume alcohol. They do not drink.

Indirectly members of Alcoholics Anonymous have indicated one proof of this conclusion by a technique they have often suggested to people who were not sure whether or not they were alcoholics. The doubtful one was asked to state what he thought would be a proper social drinking schedule—2 cocktails and 1 highball a day or 3 highballs or whatever he wished. Then he was told to

adhere to that exact schedule, never taking more, never taking less, for 28 days; many felt that 10 days would tell the story. The alcoholic could not do it. He could go "on the wagon"; he could sporadically or steadily get drunk. He could not drink.

WHAT OF IT?

The theoretical questions "why do they drink so much," "why do they drink," "why can't they, after therapy, drink again" are now to be seen, not as questions wrongly answered or not yet answered, but as questions containing a false assumption, one that makes any answer impossible. One might as well ask "why don't worms jump higher?"

Applications of the knowledge that alcoholics do not drink might be helpful in a number of situations which are referred to in other articles of this presentation. There is the wife trying to understand, modify, or explain her alcoholic husband's "drinking." There is the alcoholic worried about his "drinking." There are the physicians and others in the position of therapist or counselor who are worried about their own drinking because it may affect their treatment of the alcoholic's "drinking"; that any physician dealing with a kleptomaniac would worry about his own buying of goods in stores or, when dealing with a pyromaniac, his own habit of lighting cigarettes, is rather doubtful. There is the minister or teacher who, when giving information to the young, may feel that he has to explain drinking in terms of alcoholism and yet is aware that his listeners, especially if their parents are drinkers, will disbelieve everything he says. There are judges who are trying to deal with drinkers who had "too much" and were a public nuisance or worse as if they were psychologically ill people, and there are other judges dealing actually with alco-

holics as if they were rational individuals who would learn "to be better" through punishment, not again let their "drinking" get out of hand.

This is not the first time nor will it be the last that a problem is maintained and enhanced by a confusion between words and reality. In this instance the words alcoholism and drinking have been used as if they were practically the same thing. Such concepts as "the first drink is the first step to alcoholism," "every time you drink a little, you die a little," and similar slogans exemplify this confusion. In fact, one of the great social movements of 1840-1940 in our country carefully nurtured and disseminated the proposition that

alcoholism and drinking were one and the same thing. There are connections between drinking and alcoholism: certain drinking customs form an excellent terrain for the emergence of alcoholism; alcohol is a necessary precondition for both; drunkenness is inevitable for one and may occasionally appear in the other. Such connections, however, in no way indicate that the two phenomena are actually one phenomenon. As the preceding description indicates, they are rather strikingly distinct. More widespread appreciation of this fact may help to clarify some of the confusion which still surrounds this extensive, costly, and deeply painful problem of alcoholism.

The Chronic Drunkenness Offender

By EARL RUBINGTON

Abstract: The social roles which men play are more often the result of networks of social relations than the product of any individual's attributes. The behavior of chronic drunkenness offenders, ordinarily explained by their properties as individuals, is viewed here as a consequence of conformity to Skid Row social norms. Skid Row subculture, its social functions, how people come to it and behave once there are discussed. The half-way house, a new method of rehabilitating offenders which seeks to capitalize on this network of deviant social relations, is then described.

CHRONIC drunkenness offenders are usually considered to be closely attached to alcohol and relatively detached from people. Their interest in other people is said to proceed in inverse ratio to their interest in drinking. Current therapeutic and punitive approaches, hoping to reverse this interest ratio, seek to separate the offender from alcohol and thereby increase the chances of sober association.

This paper suggests that offenders are actually connected with other people through excessive use of alcohol, that knowledge of these connections may prove useful in social rehabilitation. The first part of this article traces the connections between offenders; the second describes briefly a new technique of rehabilitation which tries to take these connections into account.

Agencies which deal with chronic drunkenness offenders regard their behavior as a product of certain individual attributes. Offenders, they believe, suffer from a variety of biological, psychological and moral defects. These defects, they argue, compel offenders to rely more and more upon alcohol and less and less on other people for satisfactions. According to agency

opinion, these attributes sustain the offender in a pattern of socially irresponsible behavior which recurs with such amazing regularity as to constitute a major social problem.

Agency concern with chronic public drunkenness, the outstanding feature of this behavior pattern, has not been matched with any appreciable success in controlling chronic drunkenness offenders. By locating the mainsprings of behavior in certain offender attributes, agencies see their task as modifying these attributes, employing what is called here "the individualistic approach." In theory, modifying attributes should decrease the frequency of chronic public drunkenness. In fact, modification, even where successful, has had little effect on the chronicity of offense. Arrests for chronic public drunkenness have been almost uniformly constant or increasing for generations, while traditional attribute-focused techniques of punishment and rehabilitation have reclaimed few chronic drunkenness offenders.

Making a whole behavior pattern dependent upon an exclusive number of individual attributes appears to have been a case of misplaced agency em-

Earl Rubington, Ph.D., New Haven, Connecticut, is a Special Assistant for the Connecticut Commission on Alcoholism and a Research Assistant in Sociology at the Yale Center of Alcohol Studies.

phases. It seems more likely that these attributes are in themselves dependent in some ways upon the behavior pattern. Agencies of social control argue that these attributes of offenders, whether moral failure, personality disturbance, or social isolation, result in chronic public drunkenness. Yet chronic public drunkenness itself is only one aspect of a broader behavior pattern. In the study, treatment, and punishment of offenders, exclusive concern with these attributes has deflected attention from this larger pattern of behavior—the offender's way of life or subculture.

Some consideration must be given to the social environment of chronic drunkenness offenders in order to supplement the individualistic approach, explain the persistence of public drunkenness, and improve methods of social control. It is the position of this paper that the most important factor common to chronic drunkenness offenders is their participation in a deviant subculture. The system of social relationships prescribed by this subculture may serve to explain aspects of the offender's drinking which are obscured by the individualistic approach. Offenders are all part of a larger whole, Skid Row subculture, and unless their relationship to that subculture is understood, no satisfactory explanation of their behavior can result.

All large cities have their Skid Row sections; smaller cities, their equivalent. Here the homeless, the outcasts, the derelicts, the drifters all congregate and make for themselves a way of life substantially at variance with dominant social norms. Here the chronic drunkenness offender—a person who is arrested for public intoxication three or more times each year—also finds a congenial habitat. Skid Row is not, then, a random collection of individuals who all share an individual peculiarity, the craving for alcohol. It is, rather, a collection of people with different personali-

ties who are all bound up in Skid Row subculture in different ways.

If these observations are correct, they carry important implications for current methods of modifying the behavior of chronic drunkenness offenders. One important implication, to be treated later, is that opportunities for departing this way of life depend upon Skid Row status. Before examining this implication, however, it is first necessary to account for Skid Row as a way of life, its existence, the functions it fulfills, how people come to it, and once there how they act.

SKID ROW SUBCULTURE

The behavior of chronic drunkenness offenders is expressive of a common group membership. The obvious facts offenders share in common, excessive social drinking and repeated arrests for intoxication, are in themselves reliable indices of group membership. It is practically impossible to remain on Skid Row and not drink. Drinking there takes place most often in groups and frequently results in intoxication. When intoxicated, it is difficult for some offenders to escape arrest. The coexistence of drinking and frequent arrests binds offenders to the Skid Row way of life. The more the offender is bound to this way of life, the more he exhibits the characteristics of group membership.

Punitive social reactions to drunkenness play an important role in the establishment of this group membership. Arrest, the traditional reaction to intoxication, defines the offender as a person who is something less than human, thus not eligible to receive the benefits of customary social participation. Conversely, the offender is now socially defined as a member of the deviant community, thus eligible to receive the benefits of nonconformist social participation.

Each time the offender is arrested he

is exposed to the sentiments of moral indignation symbolized for society by police action. To this he responds with increasing sentiments of solidarity with the category of oppressed peoples, other offenders like himself. The increasing frequency of arrest marks the stages in alienation from society and in identification with the deviant subculture.

The punitive social reaction to public intoxication sets in motion the typical vicious circle which characterizes relations between conformists and deviants. The more the chronic offender is punished for deviant acts by conformists, the more he is rewarded for the same acts by deviants. As a consequence, the major sources of approval and self-esteem can only come from a group of people who are exposed to the sentiments of moral indignation of the society at large. To the degree that he confines social participation to other deviants, he defends himself against these sentiments. The fundamental dilemma for the Skid Row inhabitant is that conformity to Skid Row drinking norms does not completely insulate him from punishment.

Other indices of membership which denote the existence of a subculture are shared ways of acting, thinking, and feeling. Skid Row has a language of its own, an argot made up of Elizabethan thieves' cant, American underworld and tramp slang, and the idiom of contemporary lower-class culture. This argot is the major vehicle for the transmission of the subcultural heritage. Its usage communicates Skid Row values and orients newcomers and old-timers alike to their social environment. Its proper usage marks one as a member in good standing.

Additional indices are techniques of obtaining and consuming alcohol which are learned, shared, and transmitted to members of the group. Perhaps more important as indices are sanctions, both

positive and negative. Refusing a drink, drinking more than one's share from a communal bottle, and absconding with funds intended for the purchase of a group bottle all invite negative sanction. Notable among positive sanctions are sharing values—money, drink, and housing being most frequently shared—and assisting members who are "sick"—a generic term on Skid Row for the effects of acute hangover.

The pattern of sharing money and drink is perhaps the most conclusive proof that this is not a way of life based upon the personality traits of alcoholics, although confirmed addicts can participate. Respectable alcoholics are more likely to drink alone; chronic offenders drink, for the most part, in a group. Despite the fact that a supply of alcohol is readily available, many Skid Row habitués do not drink until a group can be assembled. The confirmed addict would find it almost impossible to exert such control. This widespread group drinking has led some authorities to believe that probably not more than 8 per cent of the excessive drinkers on Skid Row are alcoholics.¹

Its existence

How are we to account for the existence of the Skid Row way of life in our large cities and its counterpart in the many small towns around the country? Alienation from major value-patterns is one of the prices a complex society must pay for ineffective socialization. Those alienated from basic cultural traditions fend for themselves in one way or another. A certain proportion of the alienated find it convenient to fend to-

¹ Wayne M. Wellman, Milton A. Maxwell, and Paul O'Hollaren, "Private Hospital Alcoholic Patients and the Changing Conception of the 'Typical' Alcoholic," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 18, September 1957, p. 401.

gether, and they do so by banding together and expressing their alienation as part of a pattern of organized behavior. Denied status in respectable society, they develop or seek out a social organization in which a role more suitable to their own needs is possible. If that role prescribes social drinking as defined on Skid Row, the alienated are quite willing to comply.

Not all of the people alienated from dominant cultural traditions find their way into Skid Row subculture. Unless they establish some connections with people who can provide group support for the expression of their alienation, they are not likely to identify themselves with Skid Row subculture.

The failure to account for the absence of some alienated individuals on Skid Row casts doubt on the individualistic literature on chronic drunkenness offenders. The bulk of this literature stresses undersocialization, broken homes, low educational attainment, low occupational rank, high residential mobility, mental illness, psychopathic personalities, and physical defects as factors which cause persons to take up the Skid Row way of life.² Nevertheless, many other people having similar characteristics fail to select the Skid Row alternative.

If people with similar characteristics do not select the Skid Row alternative, then theories which assign causality to these attributes are insufficient. The literature, stressing individual attributes as the major determinants of behavior, assumes that all people possessing these attributes will ultimately withdraw from society and become completely dependent upon alcohol. In this view, the final stage of withdrawal from society takes place when the social isolate is

alone on Skid Row with his bottle as a substitute for people.

Since, however, these attributes are necessary but not sufficient conditions of alienation, the explanation for Skid Row recruitment must lie elsewhere. The position taken here is that these attributes are indices of disrupted social relationships. Where the attribute theorists argue that absence of rewarding social relationships necessarily leads to further withdrawal and ultimate dependence on alcohol, the contention here is that the absence of rewarding social relationships creates the search for a primary group. Ultimate dependence on alcohol is a possible consequence of this search, but it is neither the most likely nor the only consequence.

Under certain conditions, the establishment of new primary-group ties may result in abstinence, moderate drinking, or even alcoholism. It may also result in a host of entirely different patterns of behavior. Under certain other conditions, new primary-group ties may be the cause of habituation to alcohol. For the incipient offender, dependence upon an alienated primary group sets in motion the habituation to alcohol. Habituation, for chronic drunkenness offenders, is more likely to be the result of a new system of social relationships rather than the effect of no relationships at all.

The establishment of new primary-group ties following a disruption of previous social ties would seem to be, then, the most satisfactory hypothesis to account for the selection of subcultural alternatives.³ Given two individuals subjected to similar stress and strain

³ For a lucid account of the genesis of subcultures cf. Albert K. Cohen, *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955). Those who have read Cohen will recognize the author's indebtedness to him.

in their social relationships, one avoids the Skid Row alternative because a different system of interpersonal relations binds the prospective deviant to major value-patterns. This suggests that the next primary group into which the person enters consequent to major stress determines the subsequent degree of conformity to dominant social norms. The high rate of informal social participation of juvenile delinquents⁴ and incipient alcoholics in their teens⁵ lends strong support to this hypothesis.

Skid Row functions

What are the functions Skid Row fulfills? An achievement-oriented society which accords status to individuals upon the basis of socially recognized effort requires certain negative reference groups in order to maintain achievement striving. These groups are composed of "failures" and "social misfits" who collect in the "blighted areas" of many American cities. Residence in these areas is typically explained as the result of inability to comply with the ethics of individual responsibility. Residence there symbolizes rejection of the dominant emphasis upon upward social mobility. Upward social mobility requires downward social mobility as a condition for the further status striving of some, the validation of present status for others. Skid Row, an area in which recruits have descended from earlier statuses, provides strong support for out-group achievement norms.

For the derelict in-group, the functions are somewhat similar. Associations are somewhat similar.

⁴ Bartlett S. Atwood and E. H. Shideler, "Social Participation and Juvenile Delinquency," *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 18, May-June 1934, pp. 436-44.

⁵ Charles William Wahl, "Some Antecedent Factors in the Family Histories of 109 Alcoholics," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 17, December 1956, p. 653.

tion with people who have undergone similar experiences compensates for the effects of alienation. The fall from status is broken by the knowledge that one is no longer alone. Social support, which the respectable world withdraws, can be had from one's associates on Skid Row with less effort.

Recruitment patterns

Who gets there and how? Only a process of selective drift could account for the replenishment of Skid Row populations since Skid Row is not self-perpetuating as most societies. Periodic migration of the alienated guarantees stability and continuity of Skid Row subculture beyond the life cycle of any of its current members. Uprooted and alienated from the American value-system and from the social structure which supports and distributes those values, some unattached individuals find their way into the subculture once they have "hit the skids."

Despite popular stereotypes, the several social strata which make up American society do not contribute their equal share of Skid Row recruits. These strata differ in the access they offer the alienated for orientation and induction into Skid Row subculture. Because of these differences, the majority of the homeless on Skid Row appear to have emerged from the lower and lower-middle classes. These strata appear to be more vulnerable to physical and mental illness, economic insecurity, broken homes, and cultural inconsistencies. These are some of the social conditions which precipitate alienation. Under appropriate conditions, a certain number of the alienated become oriented towards and later inducted into Skid Row life.

The social strata from which recruits have been alienated shapes the different

² A representative example is Robert Straus, "Alcohol and the Homeless Man," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 7, December 1946, pp. 360-404.

modes of orientation for and induction in Skid Row subculture. These differences bear heavily upon the different ways men participate in the culture once they have become introduced to it.

Skid Row social groups

On Skid Row men are connected to each other by the ways in which they use alcohol. These connections, which depend upon the strata from which they were alienated and their induction into Skid Row subculture, make for a system of statuses and roles. Thus, for example, those who prefer whisky look down upon those who drink only wine or nonbeverage alcohol. One study⁶ reports that this group of men are known as "lushes," that they are the "elite," and that their rejection of wine drinkers forces "winos" to group together. This elite group seems to be more organized, more protective of its members, and less likely to get arrested for intoxication than other Skid Row social groups.

In a sense, the elite group is marginal to Skid Row society, thus more likely to leave it. It is commonly held that men at this level of Skid Row society are better risks for therapy because they have known "a better way of life" and have something to which they can "return."⁷ Men at increasingly lower levels have known little which differs significantly from what they currently experience, hence have nowhere to "return." In this view, position in the Skid Row status system determines the chances of social reintegration. The elite, aware of the discrepancy between their past and present status, find fewer

⁶ Joan K. Jackson and Ralph Connor, "The Skid Road Alcoholic," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 14, September 1953, pp. 468-86.

⁷ Ralph M. Henderson, "The Skid Road Alcoholic," *Proceedings of First Annual Alberta Conference on Alcohol Studies*, August 30-September 2, 1954, p. 92.

satisfactions in Skid Row subculture than their less-esteemed associates.

THE INDIVIDUALISTIC APPROACH

Consideration of the social environment in which the chronic drunkenness offender exists plays no prominent part in the individualistic approach to modifying offender behavior. The individualistic approach, whether in punishment or in rehabilitation, focuses upon specific urges to deviance—for example, the craving for alcohol—or personality dynamics—for example, psychopathic personality. Ignoring the fact that personality itself is largely a product of systems of social interaction, the individualistic approach seeks to eliminate urges or alter personality structure.

Jail, outpatient clinic, and inpatient service rip the offender from his customary network of social relations in order to modify behavior. When they have finished incarcerating, exhorting, or treating him as an isolated individual, they thrust him out again into the world. Their practices only confirm the offender's isolation from respectable society while cementing his existing ties with deviant social organization. Any success in altering drinking behavior is vitiated when the offender returns to a social environment which insists upon that very pattern. Manipulating the individual without regard for his customary social environment has cost many communities enormous sums of money and yielded few significant changes in behavior.

A NEW APPROACH: THE HALF-WAY HOUSE

In recent years, a new approach to the problem of chronic public drunkenness has appeared. This approach, which usually takes the name of "half-way house," blends individualistic tech-

niques of social control with the offender's social environment. The outstanding characteristics of the half-way house are the following.

Offenders, once they have voluntarily affiliated with the half-way house, are expected to comply with its few and simple rules. They are expected to get jobs, pay for their room and board, assist in upkeep and maintenance of the house, stay sober while members, and participate actively in the therapeutic program. Half-way houses vary in the length of time a man is permitted to stay, yet most staff personnel agree that maximum benefit comes with a maximum stay, usually three months. Unlike jail, clinic, and hospital staffs, half-way house personnel are usually recovered alcoholics themselves, very often members of Alcoholics Anonymous, and, occasionally, former participants in Skid Row living. The staff, because of their past experiences, are in many ways well-equipped to conduct formal and informal counseling sessions designed to get the individual to recognize the problem he has with alcohol and to help him modify his way of life.

Conformity to half-way house norms is no different in principle from conformity with Skid Row norms. In both instances, group pressures operate; in the first instance, to create abstinence, in the second, inebriety. Group pressures may cause sobriety in a jail or in a hospital; these pressures are short-lived for two reasons. One, the offender is confined against his will, and, two, the pressures emanate from people who are not members of his group. A half-way house is a voluntary association, a man coming into it and leaving it of his own accord. The pressure to remain sober and to live a more stable life emanates from staff and members alike, all of whom have shared similar experiences. In effect, the half-way house seeks to capitalize on the effects of the

previous network of social relations developed among chronic drunkenness offenders. This is in sharp contrast with jails, clinics, and hospitals which either deny the existence of such a network or reject it as a possible therapeutic tool.

The half-way house serves as a middle ground between both therapeutic and punitive agencies and organized, respectable society. The offender ordinarily has nowhere to go when he leaves these agencies. Whether he wants to or not, he is drawn back into the Skid Row setting. Compliance with its norms means that he will be back in jail in a short time. A half-way house seeks to fill the gap, to provide a protective environment where the offender can live and work with men like himself, where he can derive his usual satisfactions from group membership without recourse to alcohol.

Program

All half-way houses take drinking to be the major difficulty and provide some kind of therapy for alcoholism. Whether alcoholism is the central problem or not, while men live in a half-way house, they comply with its norms of abstinence and achieve satisfactions in a group comparable to their past drinking group. The same men on Skid Row drank in order to achieve similar satisfactions. These same men, no different in personality when they lived on Skid Row, now actively pursue a more conventional set of goals. Manipulating the system of social relationships rather than the individual alone results in a different pattern of behavior.

Experience with these half-way houses has indicated that substantial changes can occur in men whom their society had long ago given up as lost. While they live in the half-way house, chronic drunkenness offenders become sober and productive members of the community who earn their keep at regular employ-

ment and who meet the obligations of half-way house life. While members, they no longer are a drain on community resources. The half-way house appears to be, then, for a certain proportion of chronic drunkenness offenders, a more efficient response to the stubborn problem of chronic public drunkenness than continual jailing.

At the present time, there are more than twenty programs for chronic drunkenness offenders based on the theory of the half-way house. While there may be considerable variation in aims and philosophy, the common factor is the idea that the chronic drunkenness offender must continue his membership in a group of people like himself and that this group can be manipulated to change the offender's pattern of behavior, once the properties of this group membership are better understood.

Research on patterns of half-way house life may provide systematic data on the properties of this group membership. The Compass Club in New Haven, a half-way house run by the Connecticut Commission on Alcoholism, is one program for chronic drunkenness offenders which conducts research on its own operations. Since its inception in February of 1956 a sociologist, the present writer, has been gathering data on social life in the half-way house. This research has uncovered distinctive Club membership careers, long-term members differing in some important ways from short-term members. These differences bear upon the person's career while in the half-way house and in the difficult

transition period when he seeks to "make it" on his own, after leaving the Club.

Skid Row presents differential opportunities for leaving; the larger society offers differential opportunities for returning to a more respectable way of life. These opportunities, for leaving and returning, appear to be related to previous status in respectable society and status on Skid Row. These statuses regulate experience while on Skid Row, either limiting or expanding social participation in the subculture. Long-term members of the half-way house appear to be men who were limited in the extent to which they shared in Skid Row culture patterns, and, to that extent, had more opportunities of being accepted back into respectable society.

When these different levels of participation in Skid Row subculture are more carefully worked out, it should be possible to determine potentials for rehabilitation among the population of chronic drunkenness offenders, screen applicants in accordance with these potentials, and adapt therapeutic programs to the different levels of participation. From the outside, all chronic drunkenness offenders look alike. Observed in a half-way house, it becomes clear that there are significant differences among them. Effective social therapy with chronic drunkenness offenders requires knowledge of the way they have participated in Skid Row life and selection of a future social role which may provide similar benefits to the individual without the usual costs to the community.

The Woman Alcoholic

By EDITH S. LISANSKY

Abstract: There is evidence of a large increase in the number of American women who drink, but there is little evidence that the incidence of alcoholism among women has increased dramatically in the last several decades. Ideas presented by various investigators about the alcoholic woman are summarized.

A recent study by the writer indicates that women alcoholics vary greatly in degree of social integration. Two groups of women alcoholics—those attending a voluntary outpatient clinic and those committed to a penal institution—proved to be different in several measures of socioeconomic background and social class, some aspects of marital disruption, and some aspects of drinking pattern.

THE PROBLEM of the woman alcoholic is fraught with more than the usual difficulties encountered in alcoholism problems. The moralistic attitude toward the male alcoholic is on the decline; increasingly the male alcoholic is recognized as an emotionally disturbed individual who has lost control of his drinking. The moralistic attitude toward the woman alcoholic will be relinquished more slowly because all of us find alcoholism in women a more disturbing phenomenon. Drinking and drunkenness are more tolerated in men than in women in American society—and probably in all societies—and drinking is, in fact, considered a sign of manhood by some groups. Intoxication in women, on the other hand, is invariably disapproved. The comic drunk scene in vaudeville presents a man, never a woman, at whom people laugh and for whom some may even feel sympathy.

Alcoholism in women is more disturbing because it represents the breaking of stronger taboos against drinking and intoxication in women, because it runs so strongly counter to the American ideal of self-controlled, "ladylike" behavior, and because it probably pro-

duces even greater disruption in family life than alcoholism in men. But the first step in examining this problem is to recognize that we are more likely to sit in judgment on the woman alcoholic than on the male alcoholic. This double-standard attitude exists, to a greater or lesser extent, in all of us and we need to be aware of it.

How great is the problem? In all Western societies, male alcoholics outnumber women alcoholics. In the United States the male to female ratio of alcoholism is about 5.5 to 1. In actual numbers, of the approximate 4,500,000 alcoholics in the United States, about three-fourths of a million to a million are women.

Recently there have been several assertions that alcoholism is markedly on the rise among women. While there may well be a small, genuine increase, the available statistical information does not show a sudden, sharp dramatic rise over the last two decades. Several things must be considered in evaluating alleged increases in female alcoholism: first, the changes in medical diagnosis and recording and the greater likelihood that an alcoholic woman will be so

Edith S. Lisansky, Ph.D., New Haven, Connecticut, is Lecturer in Psychology at the Center of Alcohol Studies, Yale University. She was formerly consulting psychologist for the Connecticut Commission on Alcoholism and the Yale Plan Clinic.

labeled; second, ". . . a greater rate of emergence of formerly hidden alcoholism among women . . ."¹ as they find help and acceptance in clinics, Alcoholics Anonymous, physicians' offices, and so on; and third, the increase in drinking among women in the decade following World War II. If one wishes to "view with alarm," one may with greater statistical safety view with alarm the large increase in the number of American women who drink. Drinking by women in public places is more common now than it was twenty years ago, drinking by women in general has increased, and drunkenness in public is undoubtedly more frequently seen. This is part of a much larger change in the culture's definition of feminine behavior: the New Woman in mid-twentieth century United States may drink and drink publicly. But drinking and even drunkenness in social gatherings or public places do *not* constitute alcoholism.

The increase in drinking among women in the last several decades is undoubtedly related to new pressures and strains in women's lives. Pressures have piled up, produced by changes in the role and status of women, the swiftness of such changes, the vagueness of new standards, the strains of competing in what used to be men's work, and the conflicts of opposite and mutually exclusive goals. Coupled with the increase in the sense of strain felt by many women is the increased acceptability of women's drinking, within limits. It is true that an increase in drinking per se, in a sense, exposes more women to the possibility of becoming alcoholics. It is also true that for those women vulnerable to alcoholism, alcoholic beverages almost always have been available, if not quite so accessible.

Whether alcoholism in women is in-

¹ M. Keller and Vera Efron, "The Prevalence of Alcoholism," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 16, 1955, pp. 619-44.

creasing dramatically or not, we certainly hear more about it in books, plays, movies, newspapers, and so on than formerly. There seems to be developing a stereotype of the woman alcoholic compounded of two contradictory elements: the well-to-do woman of high social status who loses control of her drinking partly because she is bored and the physically and emotionally deteriorated end-of-the-road woman who appears in court. Both really are part, but only part, of the total picture of the woman alcoholic in the United States.

It is probably wisest to assume at this point that alcoholism in women has increased over the last two decades and that this increase is small. The fact that three-fourths of a million to a million women are involved makes it an important social and medical problem.

POINTS OF VIEW

What is actually known or theorized about the woman alcoholic? Research interest in this problem has been slight. In the vast literature on alcoholism there are only two reports^{2,3} on alcoholic women which go beyond brief statistical summary or mere conjecture. There are, however, many secondary references in the general literature which illustrate the thinking about alcoholism in women as it differs from alcoholism in men; this may be summarized in the following seven points.

Greater psychopathology

It is the viewpoint of some⁴ that women alcoholics are ". . . much more abnormal" and show greater personality disorganization than do men al-

² J. H. Wall, "A Study of Alcoholism in Women," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, Vol. 93, 1937, pp. 943-52.

³ F. J. Curran, "Personality Studies in Alcoholic Women," *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disorders*, Vol. 86, 1937, pp. 645-67.

⁴ B. Karpman, *The Alcoholic Women* (Washington, D. C.: Linacre Press, 1948).

coholics. The reasoning is: alcoholism in women is more disapproved than in men, therefore the woman alcoholic is more poorly adjusted to her social milieu. A variation of this reasoning: in our society women are subject to more repression than men and therefore build up more tension; when pressure becomes intolerable and the woman loses control of her drinking, her alcoholism ". . . must be more vehemently expressed being in proportion to the tension behind it."⁵ It follows—an important inference—that women are more difficult to treat. In fact, the opinion is frequently voiced among professional personnel working with alcoholics that women patients present more difficult problems in treatment and in routine management by clinic or hospital.

The difficulty with this general viewpoint is its lack of definition. Does "much more abnormal" mean that there is more initial and basic disturbance in the prealcoholic personality structure of women who become alcoholics? Does "much more abnormal" refer to deviation from a single norm of behavior for both men and women or does it mean that women alcoholics deviate more from the norm of feminine behavior than do men alcoholics from the norm of masculine behavior—that is, are we dealing with a double standard? Is the proportion of therapeutic "successes" actually smaller in treating women than in treating men? Is it a tenable thesis that both men and women alcoholics, as groups, embrace a wide range of psychopathology or is it that women alcoholics are a more homogeneous group in this sense, consisting largely of seriously emotionally disturbed people? All of these are inferred but not clearly defined in describing women alcoholics as "much more abnormal."

⁵ *Ibid.*

As a rule, women alcoholics, like men, are not seen in clinics or hospitals until the drinking problem has gone on for some years. It is likely that the social consequences of the drinking problem: that is, family breakup, job dismissal, rejection by friends and associates, and general social disapproval are greater for the woman alcoholic who is known as such. The woman patient who comes to a clinic or hospital after years of uncontrolled drinking therefore conceivably could be a more disturbed individual than her male counterpart as a *result* of her alcoholism and its socially punishing consequences; not because she was initially, in her prealcoholic personality, a more disturbed individual. A higher proportion of suicide attempts among alcoholic women than among alcoholic men, sometimes cited—though not statistically established—as proof of their greater emotional disturbance could be interpreted as a result of more intense punishment and rejection by society and not necessarily as a result of greater prealcoholic psychopathology.

Diseases of chronic alcoholism

This is related to the point above. There is medical evidence that the diseases of chronic alcoholism are more frequent among alcoholic women than among alcoholic men and the possibility has been raised⁶ that the sex differences in the incidence of such diseases are based on the ". . . more severe degree . . ." of alcoholism among women.

Greater variability

Wall⁷ has presented the view that among women alcoholics, ". . . the

⁶ D. M. Spain, "Portal Cirrhosis of the Liver, a Review of 250 Necropsies with Reference to Sex Differences," *American Journal of Clinical Pathology*, Vol. 15, 1945, pp. 215-18.

⁷ Wall, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*).

problem is more highly individual." This may be interpreted several ways. First, the early etiological roots of alcoholism may show more variability among women patients than among men. It may be assumed that the etiology of alcoholism for both sexes is rooted in early family difficulties.⁸ Whether these basic early causative circumstances vary more among women alcoholics than among men, we simply do not know. Second, there may be more variability among women alcoholics in the circumstances surrounding the onset of excessive drinking—that is, the immediate precipitating causes of the alcoholism may be more variable for women than for men alcoholics. We do not know. Third, there may be more variability among women alcoholics in maintaining their alcoholism—that is, in their present reasons for drinking. They may continue their problem drinking past the point of its beginning for more variable reasons than do men alcoholics. Again, we do not know.

Telescoped development

There is an hypothesis that women begin to drink later in life and that when they do become alcoholics, the shift from controlled to uncontrolled drinking is more rapid than it is for the male alcoholic.⁹ There is some evidence in the literature to support this.

Sexual promiscuity

There is a not too clearly stated assumption that alcoholism in women and sexual promiscuity are somehow related. The most obvious problem is defining

⁸ G. Lolli, "The Addictive Drinker," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 10, 1949, pp. 404-14.

⁹ World Health Organization, Expert Committee on Mental Health, Alcoholism Subcommittee. 2nd Report. Technical Report Series No. 48, 1952.

what is meant by sexual promiscuity. One study refers to ". . . loose heterosexual activity . . ." ¹⁰ implying active sexual seeking by the women under discussion; other writers refer to the increased likelihood of sexual attack while the woman alcoholic is under the influence of alcohol. Sexual promiscuity may mean prostitution, it may mean an occasional sexual adventure, it may mean extramarital love affairs. Sexual standards of behavior vary from one group to another in American society and what is considered sophisticated and perhaps acceptable by one group may be tabooed and defined as sexual promiscuity by another.

The association between prostitution and alcoholism is a dubious one. Although prostitutes undoubtedly drink, it is questionable whether alcoholism is rampant among them. It is a safe guess that drug addiction is more frequently a concomitant of prostitution than is alcoholism.

The little evidence available indicates that the question is not a simple one. Levine ¹¹ suggests that the characteristic sexual problem of women alcoholics in his study was frigidity, sometimes associated with promiscuity, but more frequently associated with inhibition and lack of interest. Curran, ¹² too, notes the frequency of frigidity among his subjects and he states quite specifically, "contrary to public opinion, the alcoholic women do not express their heterosexuality more freely in the acute alcoholic intoxication." The stereotype of the promiscuous woman alcoholic may be based on occasional observation of women who display their alcoholism publicly and who get into difficulty with the law, probably a minority. A recent

¹⁰ Wall, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*).

¹¹ J. Levine, "The Sexual Adjustment of Alcoholics," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 16, 1955, pp. 675-80.

¹² Curran, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*).

study of alcoholic women ¹³ indicates that sexual promiscuity is associated more frequently with one particular subgroup of women alcoholics than with another.

Precipitating circumstances

Wall ¹⁴ has stated that among women alcoholics, ". . . the excessive drinking [is] more intimately associated with a definite life situation"—that is, alcoholism among women is more likely to be associated with some concrete situation than is true among men. The inference is that precipitating circumstances play more of a role in the development of alcoholism among women. Asked in a recent study ¹⁵ about the circumstances surrounding the beginning of problem drinking, twice as many alcoholic women as men cited a specific past experience: a parent's death, a divorce, an unhappy love affair, a postpartum depression, and so forth. Social environmental pressures may indeed play more of a precipitating role in women's alcoholism.

Feminine physiological functions

A relationship between alcoholism in women and feminine physiological functions—menstruation, childbirth, and menopause—is postulated by some.¹⁶ Menstruation and particularly premenstrual tensions are presumed to set a cyclical episodic pattern to women's drinking. Postpartum depressions and menopausal difficulties are mentioned as etiological precipitations. The age range and temporal patterns of drinking of the women alcoholics in a recent study ¹⁷

¹³ Edith S. Lisansky, "Alcoholism in Women: Social and Psychological Concomitants. I. Social History Data," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 18, 1957, pp. 588-623.

¹⁴ Wall, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*).

¹⁵ Lisansky, *op. cit.* (note 13 *supra*).

¹⁶ Wall, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*).

¹⁷ Lisansky, *op. cit.* (note 13 *supra*).

indicate that there is no such simple relationship between problem drinking and feminine physiological functioning. What would seem to be of far greater consequence in the development of alcoholism is the woman patient's emotional adjustment to and acceptance of these feminine physiological functions.

WHO ARE THE WOMEN ALCOHOLICS?

Male alcoholics are, primarily, a large group of individuals who have chronic problem drinking in common, but it has become generally accepted that male alcoholics represent a wide range of psychiatric disturbance, a continuum of psychopathology so to speak, ranging from relatively mild degrees of maladjustment to very severe psychopathology. In addition, with study it has become evident that this group represents a wide range of social integration. It includes men with hidden alcoholism whose personal and social lives have barely been touched as yet; it includes the respectable men who go to physicians, clinics, clergymen, and so on, holding jobs and with home and family still intact; it includes the homeless men of Skid Row, the chronic drunkenness offender and the hospitalized, sometimes deteriorated alcoholics.

Women alcoholics, too, constitute a large group of individuals who have in common chronic problem drinking. Further than that, little has been known and little is still known about the range of psychopathology they present. A recent study ¹⁸ indicates that women alcoholics, like men, represent a wide range of social integration. In this comparative study of the social histories of 46 alcoholic women who came as voluntary patients to Connecticut outpatient alcoholism clinics for at least two visits and 37 alcoholic women committed to a penal institution, the Connecticut

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

State Farm and Prison at Niantic, for varying legal offenses including drunkenness, the following results emerged.

General social information

The outpatient clinic women were significantly older than the state farm women, a mean of 41.3 years as compared with 37.5 years. The outpatient clinic women have had significantly more education, an average of 12.0 grades completed as compared with 10.2 grades completed by the state farm group. The distributions of their own occupational classification and father's occupational classification were significantly different for the two groups. Of the outpatient clinic women, 25 per cent worked at labor level, skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled; of the state farm women, 82 per cent worked at labor level, most of it unskilled. The religious backgrounds of the two groups differed significantly: of the outpatient clinic women, 40 per cent were Catholic and 53 per cent Protestant; of the state farm women, 73 per cent were Catholic and 24 per cent Protestant.

Home background information

The two groups did not differ significantly in the proportion reared in a home broken by death, divorce or desertion; in the proportion reared by other than parents; and in the proportion whose parents had manifested problem drinking. In all comparisons, however, the state farm women showed higher proportions and the percentages cumulatively suggest more disruptive early home backgrounds for the state farm women. Significantly more mothers of state farm women worked to support the family than did mothers of outpatient clinic women.

Present family structure

Both groups of alcoholic women marry to the same extent as do women in their

age groups in the general population. Both groups show more marital disruption than does the general population and although the difference is not significant statistically, the state farm women show even greater marital disruption than do the outpatient clinic women: 31 per cent of the outpatient women and 49 per cent of the state farm women are divorced, widowed, or separated from their husbands. More husbands of state farm women manifest problem drinking than do husbands of outpatient clinic women although this difference again is not significant statistically. There are significant differences between the groups of women in distribution of husband's occupation—the status of the outpatient clinic women's husbands is higher—in the proportion of women who marry men ten or more years older than themselves—significantly more state farm women do—and in the proportion whose husband or boy friend treats them in a physically abusive way—significantly more state farm women are so treated. Both groups have approximately the same number of children, but more than twice as many outpatient women attempt to rear their children themselves as do state farm women; this difference, 77 per cent and 35 per cent, is a significant one.

History and patterns of drinking

Both groups begin drinking at approximately the same age and the state farm women lose control of their drinking at a somewhat earlier age. Problem drinking in a close relative—that is, parent, sibling or husband—occurs among 57 per cent of the outpatient clinic women and 92 per cent of the state farm women, and this difference is significant. Significantly more of the outpatient women drank alone and significantly fewer of the outpatient women have been arrested or in a mental hos-

pital. And although the obtained data are controversial, it is worth noting that significantly more state farm women than outpatient women report sexual promiscuity as a concomitant of their drinking.

All of these comparisons indicate quite clearly that we are dealing with two different social groups of women who have problem drinking in common and are therefore called alcoholic women. If we are to call all women who have a drinking problem "women alcoholics," then, on the basis of this study, we can distinguish at least two subgroups: the relatively respectable woman alcoholic whose drinking is more concealed from public view and who comes for help to an outpatient clinic and the woman alcoholic whose drinking is more drawn to public attention and who comes into conflict with the law. There is, as a matter of fact, no reason to limit our subgroups to these two. There may be many other subgroups: for example, the early stage women alcoholics who are still concealing their alcoholism, the small group of isolated, perhaps schizoid Skid Row women, and others.

The study discussed above did not include women with drinking problems hospitalized in institutions such as state hospitals or private sanatoria. When Wall's¹⁹ social description of alcoholic women who were seen in a hospital in a suburb of New York City which takes paying patients is compared with Curran's²⁰ description of alcoholic women seen in a free municipal hospital in New York City, it is clear that the Connecticut outpatient clinic women are more like Wall's private hospital patients and that the Connecticut state farm women are closer to Curran's municipal hospital subjects in age, education, religious background, and marital status.

The question may be raised: are we

¹⁹ Wall, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*).

²⁰ Curran, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*).

dealing with different *stages* of alcoholism and are the state farm women of the study discussed above further along the path than the outpatient women? The trend of evidence does not support such a view. First, the state farm women are a younger group. Second, the duration of the alcoholism is the same for both groups of women—in both instances 10 years. Third, a case for different stages of alcoholism can be made only if we assume two approximately similar groups, but it is clear that there are marked social differences between these two groups of women. Fourth, there is reason to think that in some ways the alcohol problem may be different for these two groups of women—that is, their alcoholism may fit into the total picture of their difficulties in different ways.

There is the question of whether or not the state farm women should be called "alcoholics" in the same sense in which the outpatient women are so defined. A differentiation has been made between addictive drinkers and non-addictive pathological drinkers.²¹ The Subcommittee on Alcoholism of the World Health Organization terms the latter "habitual symptomatic excessive drinkers."²² Among male alcoholics, the addictive drinker is more likely to be the alcoholic who comes to the outpatient clinic, the nonaddictive pathological drinker more usually the "homeless man" or Skid Row drinker.²³

The distinction between groups of women alcoholics is not necessarily the same as that made between different

²¹ R. Straus and R. G. McCarthy, "Nonaddictive Pathological Drinking and Patterns of Homeless Men," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 12, 1951, pp. 601-11.

²² World Health Organization, *op. cit.* (note 9 *supra*).

²³ R. Straus, "Alcoholism," Chapter 29 in A. M. Rose (Ed.), *Mental Health and Mental Disorder* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1955).

groups of male alcoholics, but the conclusion is inevitable that a similar distinction needs to be made.

COMPARISON OF OUTPATIENT CLINIC MEN AND WOMEN ALCOHOLICS

In the same study discussed above,²⁴ comparison was made of the social histories of 46 alcoholic women and 55 alcoholic men who came as voluntary patients to outpatient clinics for alcoholics in Connecticut and who had at least two contacts with the clinic.

General social information

Differences between outpatient clinic men and outpatient clinic women in age, education, and the distribution of occupational classification, father's occupational classification, and religious and ethnic background are small and not significant statistically. It appears, then, that these men and women patients are drawn from approximately similar social backgrounds.

Home background information

There were no significant differences between men and women patients in the proportion whose early home lives were broken up by parental death, divorce, or desertion. However, proportionately more women than men reported being reared by other than parents, reported a mother who worked to support the family, reported problem drinking in the parents and siblings, but only the last named difference was significant.

Present family structure

The marital status of the men and women patients was quite similar, 56 per cent of the men and 57 per cent of the women living as married individuals at the time they attended the clinic. The most striking difference appears in the proportion of men and women patients whose spouses are a problem drinker.

Of the patients who are or have been married, 35 per cent of the women and 9 per cent of the men report problem drinking in the spouse. While the difference between men and women patients on this point is a statistically significant one, such statistical comparison would assume the equal likelihood of a man or a woman becoming an alcoholic. The relative rates of alcoholism among men and among women must be kept in mind. The chance likelihood of a woman marrying a man who is or becomes an alcoholic is 5 to 6 times greater than a man's marrying a woman who is or becomes an alcoholic. For both men and women patients the proportion who marry a spouse who is or becomes an alcoholic is far in excess of chance expectancy. Based on the estimate of four million male alcoholics in the United States, one may crudely estimate the likelihood of a woman marrying an alcoholic or potential alcoholic as 1 in 10, there being approximately 40 million married men in the United States. This is a conservatively high estimate since the figure of four million male alcoholics includes the nonmarried as well as the married. This 10 per cent estimate is to be compared with the 35 per cent reported by the alcoholic outpatient women.

In the same way, the likelihood of a man marrying an alcoholic or potentially alcoholic woman is approximately 1 in 50. This 2 per cent estimate is to be compared with the 9 per cent reported by the alcoholic outpatient men.

The disproportionately large number of patients who marry individuals who are or who become alcoholics suggests that there is an emulation of symptom, or, more reasonably, that persons with a predisposition toward alcoholism are more likely to marry individuals with similar predisposition or that alcoholics are more likely to marry other alcoholics. This needs verification.

History and patterns of drinking

Outpatient men in this study began drinking at a significantly earlier age than the outpatient women (17.0 and 20.8 years) and the men are younger than the women on the average when they lose control of their drinking (27.3 years and 31.4 years). The women patients, however, have been problem drinkers for a relatively shorter period (9.8 years) than the men (12.3 years) when they appear at the clinic. Significantly fewer of these women attending outpatient clinics than of the men have been arrested. Significantly fewer of the women have ever been in a mental hospital. The pattern which emerges here is evident: if these women alcoholics do their drinking alone at home and avoid arrest and hospitalization, they manage, for the most part, to keep out of public view and out of difficulty in the community. They are not the obvious "public nuisances"; they are rather the "respectable" women alcoholics.

STILL TO BE DONE

The problem has only begun to be explored. There are at least three vital areas for further research.

Continued investigation of the question, who are the women alcoholics? Sociologic study of women alcoholics in state hospitals, Skid Row, private sanatoria, and so on is needed. Techniques

need to be devised for finding and studying the concealed, early-stage alcoholic women who drink at home.

The personality structure, emotional problems, and psychopathological behavior of these alcoholic women need study. Comparisons must be made between different groups of women alcoholics and between women alcoholic and nonalcoholic women from the same social populations.

Continued investigation of the social histories is necessary. Next to nothing is known of the early life experiences of alcoholic women. Even in dealing with the present, information is sadly lacking on husbands' attitude and behavior in relation to the women's drinking, or drinking patterns and behavior reported and observed, on the effect on children on the frequency of emotional disturbances among the children of alcoholic women, and on many other points.

The research problems of sex differences, emotional disorder, and alcoholism converge in the study of women alcoholics. When we know more about the different ways in which alcoholism manifests itself in women and in men we will also know a great deal more about etiology and the physiological, psychological, and sociologic variables which determine this symptom choice. We will also be further along toward understanding the demands of changing sex roles in twentieth century United States.

²⁴ Lisansky, *op. cit.* (note 13 *supra*).

The Case of Mary Doe

By JEAN E. MARKHAM

Abstract: The case presented illustrates the progressive course of alcoholism in a woman who for a period of eleven years received many community services. These included help from family and welfare agencies, hospitals, courts, psychiatric and child guidance clinics, Alcoholics Anonymous, and religious institutions. The hidden aspect of her alcoholism over a long period of time contributed to her steady deterioration to the point where everyone gave up hope for her. Despite the final diagnosis of irreversible psychosis, this patient, after her alcoholism was in the open, made a successful recovery for which everyone now wants credit.

THE CASE of Mary Doe is illustrative of a large group of patients who come, quite frankly as a last resort, to an alcoholism clinic. Although excessive drinking has appeared to both community and patient as part of the problem, it has never been a focal point of attention. The fact that the extent of the drinking problem had not been recognized by most of the agencies and clinics which had previously known Mary Doe is not unusual. Also typical is the fact that the alcoholism had nevertheless been a vital factor in contributing to the many other serious problems with which the patient and the community had been struggling. Nor does Mary Doe's severe underlying emotional pathology and somewhat dramatic recovery distinguish her from many other patients whose formerly hidden alcoholism finally comes to the foreground and receives direct attention. The chief reason for presenting this case is the fact that Mary Doe's contact throughout the past eleven years with various community services has been so steady and so fully recorded that it is possible to document her activities and concerns—and those of the agencies working with her—over that

period of time. Thus one is able to gain a more objective picture of her illness and recovery than might otherwise be available.

There might be some objection to selection of this case because it concerns a woman. Since only 15 to 20 per cent of alcoholics are women, it could be implied that this is necessarily a nonrepresentative illustration. To some degree this objection is valid. On the other hand, it is possible that current social attitudes about alcoholism, particularly freedom to recognize its emergence and significance, are more clearly and frequently to be viewed in the case of women. Failure to recognize, perhaps even to admit, that excessive drinking is relevant and even crucial to a person's condition of illness or maladjustment is generally recognized as a major barrier to therapy as well as to prevention. Understanding of this barrier may be more effectively helped by description of the more dramatic case. From observation of the more exceptional instance it may be possible to gain insights into similar but less pronounced processes among less severely stigmatized patients.

Mary Doe is 33 years old. She is

the alcoholic mother of three children who are now ages 11, 12, and 14. She has been known to the Connecticut Commission on Alcoholism for over four years and has a detailed history of seven preceding years of contact with many other clinics and social agencies in the community. Among these were a children's protective agency, a psychiatric outpatient clinic, the Domestic Relations Court, family service agencies, local and state welfare departments, a child guidance clinic, and another alcoholism clinic. She had been seen and helped in various ways by at least as many individuals over this period of time; sometimes by psychiatrists, sometimes by internists, and sometimes by social workers. At times, she had been helped by direct treatment as a patient or client in her own right. At other times the focus had been on problems with her children.

She came to the clinic expressing concern about her drinking. While it was indeed an obvious problem, she seemed less concerned with doing anything about it than she was with acquiring a new treatment relationship. She readily told about her early background and previous agency and clinic contacts and was eager for the clinic to have reports on them.

PREVIOUS HISTORY

Mary Doe was the illegitimate daughter of a mother who was a store clerk and a father who was an unsuccessful actor. She lived with her Catholic mother until she was four and was then sent to board with an elderly Protestant woman who was very strict and moralistic. This was a sharp contrast to Mary Doe's promiscuous, easy-going mother with whom she spent holidays. At age eleven, Mary Doe returned to her mother who had married and who had a baby boy the next year; another boy was born a year later. Mary Doe

was troublesome in school but got good grades and was graduated from high school. She didn't get along with her stepfather, and at seventeen she left home to elope with her boyfriend whom she had known for two years. After the first week of marriage, she found she no longer loved her husband "because of his meanness and jealousy." In 1949, after eight years of marriage, characterized by constant quarrels, they finally were divorced.

Professional attention

Mrs. Doe first went to a psychiatric clinic in 1945 complaining of "spells." She had fears of killing her children, Dorothy, born in 1941, Mary, born in 1943, and Louise, born in 1944. She had feelings of unreality and spells of shaking; she wanted to scream on the street and in the midst of groups; and she had difficulty in sleeping, fearing her heart would stop. She dated her "nervousness" from the year before, when her husband had been overseas. Until 1947 she was treated intermittently at the psychiatric clinic by different psychiatric residents. She was drinking considerably then and would discontinue treatment for several months at a time but would then return again.

In 1947 and 1948, Mrs. Doe was seen at an alcoholism clinic to which she brought her problem of heavy drinking and her fear of complete breakdown of self and consequent loss of the children. Her husband, who was also seen, appeared not to want her to stop drinking altogether. Rather he wanted her to drink only with him. In addition to her concern about her drinking, Mrs. Doe still had the older fears of hurting her children and of death. She was seen by all members of the clinic staff, but mainly by a social worker. She was able to modify her behavior to some extent and to create more harmony in the home. A year later, when the so-

Jean E. Markham, New Haven, Connecticut, is a Supervising Psychiatric Social Worker at the Connecticut Commission on Alcoholism.

cial worker left the alcoholism clinic, Mrs. Doe was referred back to the psychiatric clinic, for it was felt that she could accomplish more at an intensive level of treatment.

There, from 1948 to 1949, she was seen by a psychiatrist for a total of 80 hours. The gain was slow and inconsistent. As the treatment relationship improved, however, her symptoms of irrational fears tended to disappear, and when treatment ended she was somewhat better. A little later Mrs. Doe returned to the psychiatric clinic and this time was seen by a student social worker for several months. Her many reality problems included overweight and trouble with financial management—at this time she was receiving help from the state welfare agency. Her continued drinking hampered her use of this clinical service; she would come a little drunk to appointments and use the “glow” from the alcohol actually to add to her enjoyment of the interviews. The case was closed in 1951 when the student social worker left. Mrs. Doe then arranged for her children to go to a summer camp and obtained a job as ward maid in a hospital. She lost the job after a few months, partly owing to distraction by other matters and partly because of her drinking.

Mrs. Doe next went to the child guidance clinic. She felt she could handle the old irrational fears which she still suffered, but she wanted help for Dorothy. Dorothy did not want treatment, and as a result she was seen by a psychiatrist for only three months. Moreover, it was felt that Mrs. Doe had so many problems that help for the child would depend primarily on improvement in the mother. Mrs. Doe was, therefore, seen weekly in casework interviews throughout the year, until July 1952. She seemed to function better but appeared to need indefinite attention. Her obvious intermittent

drinking was not discussed by her during this period. Again, being a little drunk seemed to enhance her pleasure in interviews. Her occasional outbreaks of more severe disturbance were always related to her drinking more heavily than usual. She refused referral to a family agency and felt rejected. During the child guidance worker's vacation in August 1952, Mrs. Doe on her own initiative came to the State Commission on Alcoholism Clinic to gain help with her drinking problem.

ALCOHOLISM IN THE OPEN

At the initial interview, Mrs. Doe said that in her contacts with other agencies and clinics she had “covered up” the extent of her increasingly severe drinking problem. She now discussed her drinking in detail and with apparent enjoyment. She described her daily consumption of a quart of wine, spaced out during the day, and her heavier week-end drinking. This sometimes included passing out or blacking out which seemed to constitute temporary amnesia but without loss of consciousness. Her drinking also seemed to be tied up with her obesity problem about which she expressed almost equal concern. In the previous several months she had gained about fifty pounds. During the day she adhered to a restrictive diet, but throughout the evening she consumed sandwiches along with her wine; the day's drinking relaxed her so that she no longer cared about her appearance. Her mother, a petite, well-groomed woman, was disgusted with Mrs. Doe's appearance, had not seen her for some months, and would not do so until Mrs. Doe had lost weight. Since, in spite of considerable past casework and psychiatric help, Mrs. Doe's drinking had not been altered, except for the worse, a variation in the approach to her problem

seemed indicated. Accordingly, visits with the internist were proposed so that she might receive medical help in getting off alcohol altogether. It seemed that otherwise her drinking, and perhaps happy but hardly sober or constructive interviews with therapists, would continue indefinitely. She turned up her nose at seeing a “medical doctor,” saying she didn't think much of taking medicine and that that wasn't the way she “liked to do it.” However, she accepted this plan reluctantly and, except for one early evaluation interview with the psychiatrist, was seen by the internist alone for the first two months. Early in this period she was hospitalized for two weeks at Blue Hills Hospital which is the inpatient facility of the Connecticut Commission on Alcoholism in Hartford. Psychiatric diagnosis then and at repeated intervals throughout the following year was schizophrenia, and a progressively downhill course was noted.

NEED FOR CONTINUING HELP

After this initial exploratory stage, Mrs. Doe's urgent need for someone to talk to, increasing awareness by the staff of the precariousness of her whole life situation, and especially the clinic's concern about the children resulted in arrangements for her to see a student social worker as well. The social worker's role at this stage and for some time to come was restricted, by virtue of Mrs. Doe's continued drinking, to one of watching and waiting. By the end of the fourth month of treatment, her drinking was markedly worse and she was in trouble with neighbors and with her landlord. She was readmitted for two weeks to Blue Hills Hospital and, with her permission, the state welfare agency, which was still helping financially, was notified of possible need of other plans for the children. It was

also hoped that observation of her sober behavior at the hospital would be helpful.

As before, Mrs. Doe responded positively to hospitalization and then resumed her regular contact with the internist and student social worker. She also resumed her drinking. As her own behavior became more disturbed, she spoke of increased disturbance in her oldest daughter, Dorothy. The child guidance clinic staff, when consulted, agreed that placement of Dorothy in another home seemed advisable, but Mrs. Doe had previously refused to consider it. The guidance clinic staff did not feel that their seeing Dorothy again could help. Mrs. Doe again refused to consider voluntary removal of the children.

At this point the issue of Dorothy's disturbance became critical, and, since the state welfare agency and the children's protective agency were both working with Mrs. Doe, an interagency conference was arranged. There was concern about the effect of Mrs. Doe's alcoholism on all of the children, for she had gotten to the point of dragging them with her from bar to bar where she picked up various men. Particularly there was concern about Dorothy. She was showing definite signs of disturbance and was approaching adolescence when her difficulties could be expected to increase. It was agreed by all the agencies that the children needed to be placed in other homes.

CRISIS

But Mrs. Doe still was completely unable to accept any such plan. She feared that her ex-husband would then gain control of the children. She felt that recommendation for the children's removal was a reflection on her own adequacy as a mother, and she could not accept the fact that it was rather

a reflection of the concern of the clinic staff about the children's confused position. She blamed herself for having "told too much to too many people" and was extremely threatened by the loss of income from the state welfare agency which would follow removal of the children. When it became certain that she could not accept the reality of the children's need for another home, she was told that authoritative action to this end would have to be precipitated by the agencies concerned.

Resenting her ex-husband's marriage, Mrs. Doe had long been locked in rivalry with him, and they had both used the children as weapons against one another. This situation had indeed contributed to Mrs. Doe's increased drinking which in turn enabled her to avoid seeing her own needs and those of the children. In panic about losing the children, however, she now turned to her ex-husband for help in preventing their removal from her custody; this was the step which actually precipitated crisis. Mr. Doe, also upset by the idea of the children's going to another home, consulted briefly with the protective agency and the state welfare agency, but then, on his own, rushed to sue for custody of the children. In the Superior Court hearing that followed, Mrs. Doe appeared in such a bad light that the children were placed in their father's custody. Thus Mrs. Doe, faced with the reality of the children's need of a more suitable home, took matters into her own hands and acted, ostensibly to prevent authoritative action, but actually to speed their removal. Under pressure, it was she herself who succeeded in bringing about the very loss she had apparently so dreaded—and perhaps unconsciously so longed for.

When first seen by the present caseworker in April 1953, Mrs. Doe had just experienced the shock of losing the children and, with them, her own social

status of mother. She also faced loss of income from the state welfare agency and eviction for nonpayment of rent. She was full of plans to appeal from the Court's decision, and her brief period of sobriety at this time, clearly based on the necessity of having to "make a good impression" in the court, was, therefore, very insecure. In order to make her appeal she needed \$200 within a few weeks, but as things stood, she even lacked funds for her immediate daily needs. Her thoughts about getting a job were vague. She was in legal trouble for annoying her ex-husband who now had custody of the children. She felt their removal as an injustice, and yet the focus of her concern did not seem to be the children but rather the effect of their loss on her.

During the next four interviews she was increasingly upset, and again her drinking became heavier. The main focus of the clinic was now not upon Mrs. Doe's feelings about her loss but on her own practical planning, for example, meals, a roof over her head, and income. Therefore, readmission to Blue Hills Hospital seemed indicated in order to call a halt to her drinking, for it was impossible to work with her on these problems until she could be sober. The hospital psychiatrist felt that on this admission her downhill course was steadily progressive and that in all probability she would eventually need long-term institutional care. Again the function of the clinic was seen mainly as one of supervising her life, keeping other agencies from getting unnecessarily involved, and standing ready to arrange for her long-term care if needed. Two weeks later she was discharged and returned to the clinic.

Post-hospital care

On her return, Mrs. Doe was calmer, but she was still unable to formulate practical plans for herself. At this point

the impending loss of income and housing had become an acute problem. She expressed concern about feelings of depersonalization and unreality, much as she had described them in the past, and spoke of how drinking had helped bring her back to reality. She wanted more psychotherapy in order to get rid of these feelings "for good" and waved off the suggestion that she might become able to accept these feelings if she would try to find more practical ways of handling them. The clinic's focus was, however, still on helping her to face the immediate situation of having to care for herself and to work out ways of meeting her concrete needs for food and shelter.

During the next several months, Mrs. Doe was seen irregularly at intervals of approximately twice a month. The focus of attention continued to be her reality problems, and after a few weeks she did get a job as a ward maid in a Catholic convalescent home. Her drinking continued to cause trouble sporadically and resulted in her being evicted from one cheap room after another. She gradually seemed better able to accept the separation from the children, however, and could even voice her enjoyment of freedom from responsibility.

The most striking feature in Mrs. Doe's adjustment at this time was her ability to hold her job. True, she did so under considerable stress and in spite of a good many interpersonal difficulties. In fact, her concern about her job and the people with whom she worked became a major focus in the interviews. When her continued drinking began to interfere with her work, she was warned that she might be dismissed. Since she knew of no way to handle her "nervousness" except by drinking she felt that she was on very thin ice and for some time made genuine efforts to control the drinking, at least to the point of not letting it interfere with work. Even-

tually it did become more of a problem as she began to sneak more drinks at work and to get into more trouble with drinking outside of work. Her problems involved such things as finding herself stranded and penniless after an evening's drinking and indulgence in transitory involvements with strange men. In spite of all this, Mrs. Doe saw her children fairly regularly every week. She usually managed to be sober for these occasions. She also attended the evening high school, completing three courses with an "A" in every subject. At this time too she began irregular attendance at meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous. She seemed to try to keep herself occupied every possible moment rather than risk having idle time on her hands. After six months, however, through drinking and misbehaving around her place of employment, she lost her job.

TURNING POINT

The loss of this job was something she found even more difficult to accept than the loss of her children; it appears, in retrospect, to have led up to a turning point for her. She was at first quite shattered, and her drinking for a couple of weeks became more uncontrolled than ever. During this period she lived on small loans doled out by her mother on a day to day basis. At this time of most uncontrolled drinking she wandered into a Salvation Army meeting and was warmly welcomed by the members. Later she felt very guilty about breaking her promises to them that she would not drink any more. They even came to her room to try to help her—something which she had longed for from all the social workers she had known. When even the Salvation Army people despaired at her continued drinking, Mrs. Doe was shocked into sudden sobriety. One drink followed that decision to stop. Up to this time—a pe-

riod of more than three years—she has not had another.

She wanted to work again at the Catholic convalescent home, but her record was too bad. Finally she took a job which she hated, but by sticking it out for several weeks she convinced the nun, who was nurse supervisor at the convalescent home, of her dependability and got back her former job.

RECOVERY

She still has that job and has made progress in it and in every other area during the past three years. First, she moved into a modest apartment. This was done partly in the hope of getting the children back but partly also to re-establish herself more securely as a person of some status. Aided by her new friends in Alcoholics Anonymous and the Salvation Army, she worked phenomenally long hours at making the place attractive. She also began to make regular payments on her old bills and to handle financial problems, not only realistically but outstandingly well. Her relationships with her children and with her mother improved strikingly as they gained more confidence in her. When she brought her case back to court to ask that custody of Dorothy be returned to her, she seemed to act as much out of concern for Dorothy as from her own need. Dorothy, since she has been back with her mother for two years, has improved considerably, and while Mrs. Doe's attitude toward her has been warm and accepting, she has not hesitated to set limits where needed. She hopes to improve her relationship with Mary and Louise too and, if successful in this, plans to ask for custody of them as well. Meanwhile she is taking a two-year course which will qualify her for a better job as a trained attendant in the convalescent home where she works, and she is performing excellently in her class. She has bought a used car

which makes management of her very full daily schedule much easier. She has also gradually lost a considerable amount of weight, dresses more carefully, and in general presents an attractive appearance. While she is in some conflict about religion, participating in activities of two different churches, she has not been extremely uncomfortable about this but simply states that she needs both.

With the implicit support of the clinic, another part of Mrs. Doe's new adjustment has been her avoidance of constantly running to doctors with somatic complaints. Since she has been sober, her treatment at the clinic has been almost exclusively with the social worker. The continuity of contact with one person has seemed very meaningful to her. This is particularly important in view of her many previous short-lived treatment relationships, the termination of which had always left her feeling abandoned. She kept regular weekly appointments until the past year. She comes less frequently now, and she and the clinic staff agree that eventually she will be able to manage without the clinic.

CONSIDERATIONS IN RECOVERY

What made this patient get better, despite all expectations to the contrary? She regards her own recovery as the result of a "spiritual experience" and expresses annoyance with the fact that certain groups—notably the Salvation Army, Alcoholics Anonymous, the Catholic Church, and presumably the clinic too—each seems to "want credit." Her annoyance is understandable in the light of her long history of seeking help, being referred from one agency to another, and often being assigned to people who were just beginning to develop their professional skills. For she was aware of such handling and the unhelpful attitude implied. This was evi-

denced by her remark to one of the student social workers whom she saw: "You're not a professional person yet. Oh, you're learning, and some day you will be, but not yet!"

The hidden aspect of Mary Doe's drinking problem over the years before she came to the clinic undoubtedly was largely responsible for her failure to get more pertinent help earlier. Here was a patient with many obvious social and psychiatric difficulties clamoring for attention. But at the same time she harbored an obscure problem which kept mysteriously interfering with treatment while yet remaining hidden. Thus early promises of improvement repeatedly failed to materialize. Her being a woman may, incidentally, have prolonged the hidden aspect of her alcoholism. As such she was less likely than a man to be sent to jail for drinking and, as a housewife, did not have to dread its causing her dismissal from a job; her very likeability may also have made it difficult for previous doctors and social workers to see the extent of her drinking problem.

Nor does this negate the value of her earlier treatment experiences; without them she would probably not have had the strength to bring herself to the point of seeking direct help for her alcoholism. But, unquestionably, the final recognition of the severity of her alcoholism and focus in treatment upon the

daily reality problems which it so complicated were essential for her recovery. While Mary Doe's case serves as an example of how it is possible for alcoholism to remain a hidden problem for a very long time, it also serves to illustrate how little change is possible until this problem is in the open and can be dealt with directly.

COSTS INVOLVED

The enormous cost to the community of the virtual hiding of the real nature of this case for almost a decade is inestimable. Such cost must be counted not only in terms of services from courts, hospitals, clinics, and agencies but also in terms of such immeasurable loss as was felt by Mary Doe's children, her mother, her employers, indeed undoubtedly to some degree by everyone who came into meaningful contact with her. Nor can one begin to count the cost to Mary Doe herself, who, while clinging to and covering up her excessive drinking, lost ten years of her life in the process. Again, this quality of costliness in the case of Mary Doe is to be considered as typical, not exceptional. For in any situation where alcoholism is stigmatized as it is in our culture the same costs are incurred by this process of "not seeing," mislabeling, or even denying the painful reality of chronic excessive drinking.

Alcoholism and the Family

By JOAN K. JACKSON

Abstract: The relationship between an alcoholic and his family is a two-way one. The alcoholic affects the personalities of family members and the functioning of the family as a unit. The family in turn contributes to the alleviation or persistence of the alcoholism. A description of the family crisis precipitated by alcoholism is given. Treatment of alcoholism should include help, not only for the alcoholic but also for the family.

UNTIL recently it was possible to think of alcoholism as if it involved the alcoholic only. Most of the alcoholics studied were inmates of publicly supported institutions: jails, mental hospitals, and public general hospitals. These ill people appeared to be homeless and tieless. As the public became more aware of the extent and nature of alcoholism and that treatment possibilities existed, alcoholics who were still integral parts of the community appeared at clinics. The definition of "the problems of alcoholism" has had to be broadened to include all those with whom the alcoholic is or has been in close and continuing contact.

At present we do not know how many nonalcoholics are affected directly by alcoholism. However, an estimate can be derived from the available statistics on the marital histories of alcoholics. The recurrently arrested alcoholic seems to affect the fewest nonalcoholics. Reports range from 19 per cent to 51 per cent who have never married¹—that is, from

slightly more than the expected number of single men to three to four times the expected rate. The vast majority who had married are now separated from their families. Alcoholics who voluntarily seek treatment at clinics affect the lives of more people than jailed alcoholics. While the number of broken marriages is still excessive, approximately the expected number of voluntary patients have been married.² Any estimate of nonalcoholics affected must take into consideration not only the present marital status of alcoholics, but also the past marital history. About one-third of the alcoholics have been married more than once. Jailed alcoholics had multiple marriages less frequently than clinic alcoholics.

Occupational Integration in 2,023 Male Clinic Patients," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 12, June 1951, pp. 231-60.

² *Ibid.*; E. P. Walcott and R. Straus, "Use of a Hospital Facility in Conjunction with Outpatient Treatment of Alcoholics," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 13, March 1952, pp. 60-77; F. E. Feeny, D. F. Mindlen, V. H. Minear, E. E. Short, "The Challenge of the Skid Row Alcoholic: A Social, Psychological and Psychiatric Comparison of Chronically Jailed Alcoholics and Co-operative Clinic Patients," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 16, December 1955, pp. 645-67.

¹ J. K. Jackson, "The Problem of the Alcoholic Tuberculous Patient," in P. J. Sparer (Ed.), *Personality, Stress and Tuberculosis* (New York: International Universities Press, 1956), pp. 504-38; R. Straus and S. D. Bacon, "Alcoholism and Social Stability: A Study of

There has been no enumeration of the children and other relatives influenced by alcoholism. From the author's studies it can be estimated that for each alcoholic there are at least two people in the immediate family who are affected. Approximately two-thirds of the married alcoholics have children, thus averaging two apiece. Family studies indicate that a minimum of one other relative is also directly involved. The importance of understanding the problems faced by the families of alcoholics is obvious from these figures. To date, little is known about the nature of the effects of living with or having lived with an alcoholic. However, there is considerable evidence that it has disturbing effects on the personalities of family members.

Once attention had been focussed on the families of alcoholics, it became obvious that the relationship between the alcoholic and his family is not a one-way relationship. The family also affects the alcoholic and his illness. The very existence of family ties appears to be related to recovery from alcoholism. Some families are successful in helping their alcoholic member to recognize his need for help and are supportive of treatment efforts. Yet other types of families may discourage the patient from seeking treatment and may actually encourage the persistence of alcoholism. It is now believed that the most successful treatment of alcoholism involves helping both the alcoholic and those members of his family who are directly involved in his drinking behavior.³

³ D. J. Myerson, "An Active Therapeutic Method of Interrupting the Dependency Relationship of Certain Male Alcoholics," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 14, September 1953, pp. 419-26; L. H. Gliedman, D. Rosenthal, J. Frank, H. T. Nash, "Group Therapy of Alcoholics with Concurrent Group Meetings of Their Wives," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 17, December 1956, pp. 655-70.

THE ALCOHOLIC AND HIS CHILDREN

The children are affected by living with an alcoholic more than any other family member. Personalities are formed in a social milieu which is markedly unstable, torn with dissension, culturally deviant, and socially disapproved. The children must model themselves on adults who play their roles in a distorted fashion. The alcoholic shows little adequate adult behavior. The nonalcoholic parent attempts to play the roles of both father and mother, often failing to do either well.

The child of an alcoholic is bound to have problems in learning who he is, what is expected of him, and what he can expect from others. Almost inevitably his parents behave inconsistently towards him. His self-conception evolves in a situation in which the way others act towards him has more to do with the current events in the family than with the child's nature. His alcoholic parent feels one way about him when he is sober, another when drunk, and yet another during the hangover stage.

What the child can expect from his parents will also depend on the phase of the drinking cycle as well as on where he stands in relation to each parent at any given time. Only too frequently he is used in the battle between them. The wives of alcoholics find themselves disliking, punishing, or depriving the children preferred by the father and those who resemble him. Similarly, the child who is preferred by, or resembles the mother is often hurt by the father. If the child tries to stay close to both parents he is caught in an impossible situation. Each parent represents the affection the other receives while demanding that the child show affection to both.

The children do not understand what is happening. The very young ones do

Joan K. Jackson, Ph.D., Seattle, Washington, Research Instructor, Department of Psychiatry, University of Washington School of Medicine and Consultant, Firland Sanatorium, Seattle was formerly a Research Assistant, Department of Sociology, McGill University. This study was supported in part by the National Institute of Mental Health, U. S. Public Health Service.

not know that their families are different from other families. When they become aware of the differences, the children are torn between their own loyalty and the views of their parents that others hold. When neighbors ostracize them, the children are bewildered about what *they* did to bring about this result. Even those who are not ostracized become isolated. They hesitate to bring their friends to a home where their parent is likely to be drunk.

The behavior of the alcoholic parent is unpredictable and unintelligible to the child. The tendency of the child to look for the reasons in his own behavior very often is reinforced inadvertently by his mother. When father is leading up to a drinking episode, the children are put on their best behavior. When the drinking episode occurs, it is not surprising that the children feel that they have somehow done something to precipitate it.

Newell⁴ states that the children of alcoholics are placed in a situation very similar to that of the experimental animals who are tempted towards rewards and then continually frustrated, whose environment changes constantly in a manner over which they have no control. Under such circumstances experimental animals have convulsions or "nervous breakdowns." Unfortunately, we still know very little about what happens to the children or about the duration of the effects.

Yet some of the children appear undisturbed. The personality damage appears to be least when the nonalcoholic parent is aware of the problems they face, gives them emotional support, keeps from using them against the alcoholic, tries to be consistent, and has insight into her own problems with the alcoholic. It also appears to mitigate

⁴ N. Newell, "Alcoholism and the Father Image," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 11, March 1950, pp. 92-96.

some of the child's confusion if alcoholism is explained to him by a parent who accepts alcoholism as an illness.

THE ALCOHOLIC AND HIS WIFE

The wives of alcoholics have received considerably more attention than the children. The focus tends to be on how they affect the alcoholic and his alcoholism, rather than on how alcoholism and the alcoholic affect them. Most writers seem to feel that the wives of alcoholics are drawn from the ranks of emotionally disturbed women who seek out spouses who are not threatening to them, spouses who can be manipulated to meet their own personality needs. According to this theory, the wife has a vested interest in the persistence of the alcoholism of her spouse. Her own emotional stability depends upon it. Should the husband become sober, the wives are in danger of decompensating and showing marked neurotic disturbances.⁵

A complementary theory suggests that prealcoholic or alcoholic males tend to select certain types of women as wives. The most commonly reported type is a dominating, maternal woman who uses her maternal role as a defense against inadequate femininity.

Any attempt to assess the general applicability of this theory to *all* the wives of alcoholics runs into difficulties. First, the only wives who can be studied by researchers are those who have stayed with their husbands until alcoholism was well under way. The high divorce rate among alcoholics suggests that

⁵ D. E. MacDonald, "Mental Disorders in Wives of Alcoholics," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 17, June 1956, pp. 282-87; M. Wellman, "Toward an Etiology of Alcoholism: Why Young Men Drink Too Much," *Canadian Medical Association Journal*, Vol. 73, November 1, 1955, pp. 717-25; S. Futterman, "Personality Trends in Wives of Alcoholics," *Journal of Psychiatric Social Work*, Vol. 23, 1953, pp. 37-41.

these wives are the exception rather than the rule. The majority of women who find themselves married to alcoholics appear to divorce them. Second, if a high rate of emotional disturbance is found among women still living with alcoholics, it is difficult to determine whether the personality difficulties antedated or postdated the alcoholism, whether they were partly causal or whether they emerged during the recurrent crises and the cumulative stresses of living with an alcoholic. Third, the wives who were studied were women who were actively blocking the treatment of their husbands, who had entered mental hospitals after their husbands' sobriety, who were themselves seeking psychiatric care, or who were in the process of manipulating social agencies to provide services. It is of interest that neither of the studies which deal with women who were taking an active part in their husbands' recovery process comment upon any similarities in the personality structures of the wives.⁶

It is likely that the final test of the hypotheses about the role of the wives' personalities in their husbands' alcoholism will have to await the accumulation of considerably more information. No alcoholic personality type has been found on psychological tests; no tests have been given to the wives of alcoholics. Until we know more about the etiology of alcoholism and its remedy, the role of the wives' personalities in its onset, in its persistence, and in its alleviation will remain in the realm of speculation.

No one denies that the wives of active alcoholics are emotionally disturbed. In nonthreatening situations, the wives

are the first to admit their own concerns about "their sanity." Of over one hundred women who attended a discussion group at one time or another during the past six years, there was not one who failed to talk about her concerns about her own emotional health. All of the women worry about the part which their attitudes and behavior play in the persistence of the drinking and in their families' disturbances. Although no uniform personality types are discernible, they do share feelings of confusion and anxiety. Most feel ambivalent about their husbands. However, this group is composed of women who are oriented towards changing themselves and the situation rather than escaping from it.

THE IMPACT OF ALCOHOLISM ON THE FAMILY

When two or more persons live together over a period of time, patterns of relating to one another evolve. In a family, a division of functions occurs and roles interlock. For the family to function smoothly, each person must play his roles in a predictable manner and according to the expectations of others in the family. When the family as a whole is functioning smoothly, individual members of the family also tend to function well. Everyone is aware of where he fits, what he is expected to do, and what he can expect from others in the family. When this organization is disrupted, repercussions are felt by each family member. A crisis is under way.

Family crises tend to follow a similar pattern, regardless of the nature of the precipitant. Usually there is an initial denial that a problem exists. The family tries to continue in its usual behavior patterns until it is obvious that these patterns are no longer effective. At this point there is a downward slump in organization. Roles are played

⁶ J. K. Jackson, "The Adjustment of the Family to the Crisis of Alcoholism," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 15, December 1954, pp. 562-86; Gliedman, Rosenthal, Frank, Nash, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*).

with less enthusiasm and there is an increase in tensions and strained relationships. Finally an improvement occurs as some adjustive technique is successful. Family organization becomes stabilized at a new level. At each stage of the crisis there is a reshuffling of roles among family members, changes in status and prestige, changes in "self" and "other" images, shifts in family solidarity and self-sufficiency and in the visibility of the crisis to outsiders. In the process of the crisis, considerable mental conflict is engendered in all family members, and personality distortion occurs.⁷ These are the elements which are uniform regardless of the type of family crisis. The phases vary in length and intensity depending on the nature of the crisis and the nature of the individuals involved in it.

When one of the adults in a family becomes an alcoholic, the over-all pattern of the crisis takes a form similar to that of other family crises. However there are usually recurrent subsidiary crises which complicate the over-all situation and the attempts at its resolution. Shame, unemployment, impoverishment, desertion and return, nonsupport, infidelity, imprisonment, illness and progressive dissension also occur. For other types of family crises, there are cultural prescriptions for socially appropriate behavior and for procedures which will terminate the crisis. But this is not so in the case of alcoholism. The cultural view is that alcoholism is shameful and should not occur. Thus, when facing alcoholism, the family is in a socially unstructured situation and must find the techniques for handling the crisis through trial and error behavior and without social support. In many respects, there are marked similarities between the type of crisis pre-

cipitated by alcoholism and those precipitated by mental illness.

ATTEMPTS TO DENY THE PROBLEM

Alcoholism rarely emerges full-blown overnight. It is usually heralded by widely spaced incidents of excessive drinking, each of which sets off a small family crisis. Both spouses try to account for the episode and then to avoid the family situations which appear to have caused the drinking. In their search for explanations, they try to define the situation as controllable, understandable, and "perfectly normal." Between drinking episodes, both feel guilty about their behavior and about their impact on each other. Each tries to be an "ideal spouse" to the other. Gradually not only the drinking problem, but also the other problems in the marriage are denied or sidestepped.

It takes some time before the wife realizes that the drinking is neither normal nor controllable behavior. It takes the alcoholic considerably longer to come to the same conclusion. The cultural view that alcoholics are Skid Row bums who are constantly inebriated also serves to keep the situation clouded. Friends compound the confusion. If the wife compares her husband with them, some show parallels to his behavior and others are in marked contrast. She wavers between defining his behavior as "normal" and "not normal." If she consults friends, they tend to discount her concern, thus facilitating her tendency to deny that a problem exists and adding to her guilt about thinking disloyal thoughts about her husband.

During this stage the family is very concerned about the social visibility of the drinking behavior. They feel that they would surely be ostracized if the extent of the drinking were known. To protect themselves against discovery, the family begins to cut down on their so-

cial activities and to withdraw into the home.

ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE THE PROBLEM

The second stage begins when the family defines the alcoholic's drinking behavior as "not normal." At this point frantic efforts are made to eliminate the problem. Lacking clear-cut cultural prescriptions for what to do in a situation like this, the efforts are of the trial and error variety. In rapid succession, the wife threatens to leave the husband, babies him during hangovers, drinks with him, hides or empties his bottles, curtails money, tries to understand his problem, keeps his liquor handy for him, and nags at him. However, all efforts to change the situation fail. Gradually the family becomes so preoccupied with the problem of discovering how to keep father sober that all long-term family goals recede into the background.

At the same time isolation of the family reaches its peak intensity. The extreme isolation magnifies the importance of all intrafamily interactions and events. Almost all thought becomes drinking-centered. Drinking comes to symbolize all conflicts between the spouses, and even mother-child conflicts are regarded as indirect derivatives of the drinking behavior. Attempts to keep the social visibility of the behavior at the lowest possible level increase.

The husband-wife alienation also accelerates. Each feels resentful of the other. Each feels misunderstood and unable to understand. Both search frantically for the reasons for the drinking, believing that if the reason could be discovered, all family members could gear their behavior in a way to make the drinking unnecessary.

The wife feels increasingly inadequate as a wife, mother, woman, and person. She feels she has failed to make a happy and united home for her husband and

children. Her husband's frequent comments to the effect that her behavior causes his drinking and her own concerns that this may be true intensify the process of self-devaluation.

DISORGANIZATION

This is a stage which could also be entitled "What's the use?" Nothing seems effective in stabilizing the alcoholic. Efforts to change the situation become, at best, sporadic. Behavior is geared to relieve tensions rather than to achieve goals. The family gives up trying to understand the alcoholic. They do not care if the neighbors know about the drinking. The children are told that their father is a drunk. They are no longer required to show him affection or respect. The myth that father still has an important status in the family is dropped when he no longer supports them, is imprisoned, caught in infidelity, or disappears for long periods of time. The family ceases to care about its self-sufficiency and begins to resort to public agencies for help, thereby losing self-respect.

The wife becomes very concerned about her sanity. She finds herself engaging in tension-relieving behavior which she knows is goalless. She is aware that she feels tense, anxious, and hostile. She regards her precrisis self as "the real me" and becomes very frightened at how she has changed.

ATTEMPTS TO REORGANIZE IN SPITE OF THE PROBLEM

When some major or minor subsidiary crisis occurs, the family is forced to take survival action. At this point many wives leave their husbands.

The major characteristic of this stage is that the wife takes over. The alcoholic is ignored or is assigned the status of the most recalcitrant child. When the wife's obligations to her husband conflict with those to her children, she

⁷ W. Waller (Revised by Reuben Hill), *The Family: A Dynamic Interpretation* (New York: Dryden Press, 1951), pp. 453-61.

decides in favor of the children. Family ranks are closed progressively and the father excluded.

As a result of the changed family organization, father's behavior constitutes less of a problem. Hostility towards him diminishes as the family no longer expects him to change. Feelings of pity, exasperation, and protectiveness arise.

The reorganization has a stabilizing effect on the children. They find their environment and their mother more consistent. Their relationship to their father is more clearly defined. Guilt and anxiety diminish as they come to accept their mother's view that drinking is not caused by any behavior of family members.

Long-term family goals and planning begin again. Help from public agencies is accepted as necessary and no longer impairs family self-respect. With the taking over of family control, the wife gradually regains her sense of worth. Her concerns about her emotional health decrease.

Despite the greater stabilization, subsidiary crises multiply. The alcoholic is violent or withdraws more often; income becomes more uncertain; imprisonments and hospitalizations occur more frequently. Each crisis is temporarily disruptive to the new family organization. The symbolization of these events as being caused by alcoholism, however, prevents the complete disruption of the family.

The most disruptive type of crisis occurs if the husband recognizes that he has a drinking problem and makes an effort to get help. Hope is mobilized. The family attempts to open its ranks again in order to give him the maximum chance for recovery. Roles are partially reshuffled and attempts at attitude change are made, only to be disrupted again if treatment is unsuccessful.

EFFORTS TO ESCAPE THE PROBLEM

The problems involved in separating from the alcoholic are similar to the problems involved in separation for any other reason. However, some of the problems are more intense. The wife, who could count on some support from her husband in earlier stages, even though it was a manipulative move on his part, can no longer be sure of any support. The mental conflict about deserting a sick man must be resolved as well as the wife's feelings of responsibility for his alcoholism. The family which has experienced violence from the alcoholic is concerned that separation may intensify the violence. When the decision is made to separate because of the drinking, the alcoholic often gives up drinking for a while, thereby removing what is apparently the major reason for the separation.

Some other events, however, have made separation possible. The wife has learned that the family can run smoothly without her husband. Taking over control has bolstered her self-confidence. Her orientation has shifted from inaction to action. The wife also has familiarity with public agencies which can provide help, and she has overcome her shame about using them.

REORGANIZATION OF THE FAMILY

Without the father, the family tends to reorganize rather smoothly. They have already closed ranks against him and now they feel free of the minor disruptions he still created in the family. Reorganization is impeded if the alcoholic continues to attempt reconciliation or feels he must "get even" with the family for deserting him.

The whole family becomes united when the husband achieves sobriety, whether or not separation has preceded. For the wife and husband facing a sober marriage after many years of an alco-

holic marriage, the expectations for marriage without alcoholism are unrealistic and idealistic.

Many problems arise. The wife has managed the family for years. Now her husband wishes to be reinstated as head of the house. Usually the first role he re-establishes is that of breadwinner. With the resumption of this role, he feels that the family should reinstate him immediately in all his former roles. Difficulties inevitably follow. For example, the children are often unable to accept his resumption of the father role. Their mother has been mother and father to them for so long that it takes time to get used to consulting their father. Often the father tries to manage this change overnight, and the very pressure he puts on the children towards this end defeats him.

The wife, who finds it difficult to believe that her husband is sober permanently, is often unwilling to relinquish her control of family affairs even though she knows that this is necessary to her husband's sobriety. She remembers when his failures to handle responsibility were catastrophic to the family. Used to avoiding any issues which might upset him, the wife often has difficulty discussing problems openly. If she permits him to resume his father role, she often feels resentful of his intrusion into territory she has come to regard as her own. If he makes any decisions which are detrimental to the family, her former feelings of superiority may be mobilized and affect her relationship with him.

Gradually the difficulties related to alcoholism recede into the past and family adjustment at some level is achieved. The drinking problem shows up only sporadically—when the time comes for a decision about permitting the children to drink or when pressure is put on the husband to drink at a party.

PERSONALITY DISTURBANCES IN FAMILY MEMBERS

Each stage in the crisis of alcoholism has distinctive characteristics. The types of problems faced, the extent to which the situation is structured, the amount of emotional support received by individual family members, and the rewards vary as to the stage of the crisis. Some stages "fit" the personalities of the individuals involved better than others.

Although each stage of the crisis appears to give rise to some similar patterns of response, there is considerable variation from family to family. The wife whose original personality fits comfortably into denying the existence of the problem will probably take longer to get past this phase of the crisis than the wife who finds dominating more congenial. The latter will probably prolong the stage of attempting to eliminate the problem. Some families make an adjustment at one level of the crisis and never seem to go on to the next phase.

With the transition from one stage to another, there is the danger of marked personality disturbance in family members. Some become their most disturbed when drinking first becomes a problem; others become most disturbed when the alcoholic becomes sober. In the experience of the author, there has been little uniformity within families or between families in this respect. However, after two or three years of sobriety, the alcoholics' family members appear to resemble a cross section of people anywhere. Any uniformities which were obvious earlier seem to have disappeared.

THERAPY AND THE FAMILY

The major goal of the families of most alcoholics is to find some way of bringing about a change in father's

drinking. When the alcoholic seeks treatment, the family members usually have very mixed feelings towards the treatment agency. Hope that father may recover is remobilized and if sobriety ensues for any length of time, they are grateful. At the same time, they often feel resentment that an outside agency can accomplish what they have tried to do for years. They may also resent the emotional support which the alcoholic receives from the treatment agency, while they are left to cope with still another change in their relationship to him without support.

Most families have little awareness of what treatment involves and are forced to rely on the alcoholic patient for their information. The patient frequently passes on a distorted picture in order to manipulate the family situation for his own ends. What information is given is perceived by the family against a background of their attitudes towards the alcoholic at that point in time. The actions they take are also influenced by their estimate of the probability that treatment will be successful. The result is often a family which works at cross purposes with therapy.

Recently there has been a growing recognition that the family of the alcoholic also requires help if the alcoholic is to be treated successfully. An experiment was tried at the Henry Phipps Psychiatric Clinic of Johns Hopkins Hospital. Alcoholics and their wives were treated in concurrent group therapy sessions. The Al-Anon Family Groups provide the same type of situation for the families of AA members and have the additional asset of helping the families of alcoholics who are still not interested in receiving help for themselves. Joint treatment of alcoholics and the members of their family aims at getting a better understanding of the underlying emotional disturbance, of the

relationship between the alcoholic and the person who is most frequently the object and stimulus of the drinking behavior, and of the treatment process.⁸

Joint treatment of the alcoholic and his family has other assets, as Gliedman and his co-workers point out.⁹ Joint therapy emphasizes the marriage. In addition, with both spouses coming for help, there is less likelihood that undertaking treatment will be construed as an admission of guilt or that therapy will be used as a weapon by one against the other. The wife's entrance into therapy is a tacit admission of her need to change too. It represents a hopeful attitude on the part of both the alcoholic and his wife that recovery is possible and creates an orientation towards working things out together as a family unit.

The members of an Al-Anon group with which the author is familiar receive understanding of their problems and their feelings from one another, emotional support which facilitates change in attitudes and behavior, basic information about solutions to common problems, and information about the treatment process and about the nature of alcoholism as an illness. Shame is alleviated and hope engendered. The nonalcoholic spouses gain perspective on what has happened to their families and on the possibilities of changing towards greater stability. Anxiety diminishes in an almost visible fashion. As they gain perspective on the situation, behavior tends to become more realistic and rewarding. By no means the least important effect derived from membership in the group is a structuring of what has seemed to be a completely unstructured situation and the feelings of security which this engenders.

⁸ Gliedman, Rosenthal, Frank, and Nash, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*).

⁹ *Ibid.*

Psychiatric Treatment of Alcoholism

By SIDNEY VOGEL

Abstract: This article presents an examination and evaluation of the role of psychiatry in the treatment of alcoholism, and an interpretation of the nature of addiction and the concept of alcoholism as an addictive disease. It treats the conflicts and problems of the alcoholic with a description of common neurotic methods used to solve them; the psychological needs served by alcohol; methods of therapy, including psychotherapy, group therapy, psychoanalysis, Alcoholics Anonymous, and so forth; the role of the patient and therapist in determining results of psychotherapy; and the need for a co-ordination of scientific and lay disciplines to further our knowledge and improve results.

PSYCHIATRISTS and analysts have sometimes been accused (and not only in the *New Yorker*) of making strange and bizarre interpretations of common everyday behavior. We are alleged to claim that a gossip is merely expressing a wish to do those very same wonderful, horrible things, and that a surgeon may be merely a sublimated butcher. At this introductory point, whatever the reader is thinking of the author's interest in alcoholism and its significance to his unconscious drives is his own prerogative.

The truth is that the psychiatrist seeks only an understanding of human behavior with the goal of treating and aiding the mentally ill. The purpose of this article is to present, examine, and evaluate the role of psychiatry in the treatment of alcoholic addiction. It must be said at the outset that psychiatry is only one of the tools used in the treatment of this widespread disease which involves an estimated five million Americans and their families.

Some knowledge of the character of addiction is necessary for an understanding of alcoholism. Without this, confusion, intolerance, and questionable therapeutic attitudes result.

Derived from the Latin root "to adore," common usage has changed the original meaning of "addiction" to imply a dreadful, unbreakable, uncontrollable, self-destructive, antisocial craving with an ultimate dire end.

However, addiction is not always destructive to this extent, nor is it solely confined to drugs and alcohol. There are addictions without drugs. Addiction to food results in obesity, and to stealing in kleptomania. Gambling addicts are common, and even "love addicts" have been described in psychiatric literature.¹ Wives often complain of their husbands' hobbies as addictive. On close observation, few of our friends, and on introspection, few of us are entirely free of even a tiny bit of addiction, if only to tobacco, reading, or golf.

Addicts, with or without drugs, have many common denominators. The similarity between the symptoms of different addictions is often striking and unmistakable. If one were to listen to the verbal productions of the addictive drinker or food addict, the parallels would be quite evident. Which case of

¹ O. Fenichel, *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1945).

Sidney Vogel, M.D., New York City, is engaged in the private practice of psychiatry, is a member of the American Psychiatric Association, American Group Therapy Association, Academy of Psychoanalysis, and National Council on Alcoholism.

obesity does not minimize the degree and frequency of overeating and say to the harassed doctor, "Really, I don't eat a thing"? Which inveterate gambler, like the alcoholic, does not feel omnipotent, that he can "beat the game" and control his gambling in spite of the obvious destructiveness to himself and to those around him?

With reference to alcoholism, the first concept to recognize is that an alcoholic addict is not someone who drinks "more than I do." For general purposes, alcoholics can be described as those people who drink in a very special way—that is, to excess, compulsively, without control, and self-destructively. The lack of control must be emphasized. Alcoholics have always been subject to condemnation and stigma. They are generally self-condemnatory and with few exceptions deeply guilty. They resort to numerous rationalizations to explain their alcoholism. The majority on initial contact either deny, or at the very minimum, underestimate alcohol as a problem. Even those who verbally beat their breasts with alcoholic confessions have hidden doubts of varying degrees as to the causation and extent of their difficulties. The lack of control, the fact that the alcoholic minimizes his drinking and will not face the extent of his problems must be considered symptoms of his illness, just as anxiety and depression over a nonexistent heart disease are symptoms of a "cardiac neurosis." The urgency, intensity, and insatiability lead to dependency and the typical final picture of a patient whose major interests revolve around the source and substance of alcohol. Marital, domestic, vocational, and social interests change, suffer, and deteriorate, depriving the alcoholic, the family unit, and society of the individual's potentialities and abilities.

There have been many attempts made to describe a specific character type as prone to become an alcoholic. There is

a suggestion of both heredity and doom about these sometimes impassioned descriptions. Many alcoholics themselves resort to this as a defense against sobriety. For example, there is the Irishman who states, "I am an alcoholic because I am Irish," with the implication that it is "in the blood" and therefore nothing can be done about it. He is somewhat chagrined when he is told that the Irish as a national group are not first in alcoholic consumption.

THE NEED FOR ALCOHOL

No matter what terms are used, the alcoholic drinks in a special way because he "requires" alcohol. The nature and source of this "need" is a basic problem in alcoholic research. It is not mere pleasure that the alcoholic seeks as commonly claimed by the uninformed. In actuality, he is the victim of an uncontrollable drive to compensate for a defect in his physical and/or psychic structure. Though there are pleasurable aspects to addictive drinking, the process is so insatiable and uncontrollable that it becomes a chronic disintegrating process. Alcoholics themselves recognize this and often describe it graphically as "slow suicide."

That one should so intensely seek self-destruction seems contradictory and irrational; but deprived of alcohol, the addictive drinker becomes restless, beleaguered, depressed, and anxiety ridden. Perhaps a more understandable example of this process is suggested by those feelings of inner disquiet and discomfort which compel a person about to fall asleep to repeatedly switch on the light, fearing that the alarm clock is not correctly set. This compulsion is relatively benign because it interferes but slightly in his life. However, if he is never certain and spends the night flicking on the light and is unable to sleep, it no longer is benign and psychiatric help is then advised. This compulsion,

with its insatiability, its destructiveness to sleep, and its associated feelings of disquiet is comparable in a minor and less destructive way to the compulsion of the alcoholic to drink.

There is general agreement that alcohol compensates for a defect, but no consensus as to the nature of the defect. Is the defect physiological in origin like the diabetic who needs insulin because he cannot utilize sugar well, or is it psychologically determined? Is this defect, whatever its nature, hereditarily, sociologically, or culturally determined, or is it a combination of all three? Only when these questions are definitively and scientifically answered will the genesis, dynamics, and cure of alcoholism be in sight.

From the organic point of view, various physiological and biological changes such as improper functioning of certain endocrine glands, dietary, and metabolic deficiencies, and so on have been described. Specific treatment methods, such as hormones, vitamins, and many drugs have been used in an attempt to eliminate these imbalances and thus "arrest" the disease.

The psychiatrist, on the other hand, describes the defect as psychological in origin resulting from emotional conflicts, and he thinks in terms of what gratification, release, inner peace, illusory pleasure the alcoholic is seeking in this celestial fluid. He also asks what specific role does the chemical, alcohol, play and why is the process so insatiable.

DEFENSE MECHANISMS²

Struggle, an ever-present part of life, is evident biologically from birth to death, whether it be observed in the single cell or in the total individual. Psychological struggle, or conflict, as it is called, is always accompanied by feel-

ings of anxiety, discomfort, and psychic pain. This may be manifested by certain behavior patterns or more specific emotions such as depression, irritability, apprehension, anger, and so on. The individual may be aware of the actual conflict, its cause and attendant symptoms, such as the anxiety that accompanies making a major decision. Or the conflict may be repressed, deeply hidden, and expressed by feelings, symptoms, and behavior the cause of which is unknown to the individual, like the patient so frequently seen by the psychiatrist who states: "My business is fine, I love my wife, my children are no problem at all; but I'm depressed." And he is, feels, and acts depressed.

The methods an individual uses to defend himself against frustration, psychic pain, or anxiety arising from conflicts are called, in psychiatric parlance, "defense mechanisms." Everyone uses and needs them. Which ones are chosen—and this is not a planned or conscious choice—how and when they are used is of extreme importance in the understanding of the dynamics of character formation and behavior. These mental mechanisms are not necessarily pathologic. In fact, in many instances they are essential to mental health, and the psychiatrist, minister, and social worker supported by our religious and social mores often try to reinforce them. What daily anguish, what inner restlessness, what unendable self-recrimination would we endure if we could not rationalize certain aspects of our behavior that do not meet our own socially acceptable standards. And "rationalization" is a defense mechanism. Of course, this is a matter of degree. If one rationalizes all failures, limitations, and neurotic behavior, then one is lacking in that important attribute of maturity—self-criticism. In extreme degrees this becomes too divorced from reality and may be considered a severe disturbance.

² A. Freud, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence* (New York: International Universities Press, 1946).

Alcoholics, like other individuals, make use of numerous defense mechanisms to protect themselves from anxiety and to resolve their conflicts. This also permits them to continue drinking and avoid treatment. Although they resort to many defenses—and individual alcoholics differ—as a group they seem to have a special predilection for certain defense mechanisms. This explains much of their behavior, and it is with an understanding of this that the therapist must work for effective results.

Most striking, and common, is the mental mechanism that psychiatrists call "denial." This is an unconscious means of either denying reality and facts or coloring reality to suit the individual's tastes and needs. It is not lying which is a conscious denial of truth. In itself this piece of magic with its omnipotent quality is neither pathologic nor uncommon. In fact, certain aspects of it are universal. Childhood or adult fantasies, fairy tales, games and play of children are replete with denial. It is within normal limits for a child to play at being a tiger, a horse, or a parent or for an adolescent whose shyness and lack of social success is threatening to picture herself as being quite popular. Only when denial departs too widely from reality does the psychiatrist focus a quizzical eye. For example if an oceanographer begins to think that his depthometer is influencing the ocean currents, he is getting off the "deep end." When the alcoholic minimizes his drinking and its destructive effects, wonders why his wife and society object to his behavior, he, like the oceanographer, is resorting to denial.

A second defense mechanism commonly used by alcoholics is called "projection." This is a means of ascribing to others one's own objectionable character traits, behavior, wishes, and ideas. The wife who constantly accuses her faithful husband of philandering when in reality it is she who is flirting with

every man who comes her way is resorting to that very convenient mechanism, projection. As in denial, projective mechanisms are used in a benign way by all of us. When the degree is extreme, pervades one's entire thinking and behavior with resultant loss of contact with reality, it becomes the fabric of delusions and hallucinations and is then pathologic.

Rationalization, already mentioned, is a third defense mechanism commonly used by alcoholics. Here too we are dealing with a mental mechanism that all of us use in normal life. However, the alcoholic resorts to it in an extreme way to minimize and explain away his excessive drinking and objectionable behavior.

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF ALCOHOLIC ADDICTION

Some individuals are better equipped than others by heredity and environment to cope with their conflicts and problems. Certain situations may be so overwhelming, as in war, that even the best equipped eventually are affected or succumb in one way or another. How an individual faces and handles his inner problems and the problems of his environment, what conflicts arise, and what specific methods are used to solve them influence and determine his character, maturity, and social adjustment.

The exact nature of the alcoholic's conflicts and problems has been the subject of much discussion and research. Are they unique, more intense, or is the alcoholic just not equipped to handle his day-to-day problems? These questions are some of the riddles of the alcoholic sphinx.

Rather widely diverse psychological theories have been developed as to the genesis and dynamics of alcoholism. A variety of specific psychological and emotional factors have been described, sometimes with great passion, often with

erudition. Each theory has been developed with great care and logic. However, to date, no one theory either organic, psychological, or sociocultural completely explains alcoholic addiction.

The psychological conflicts described in the literature as causes for alcoholism are either specifically sexual in origin or more general. Those of sexual origin most commonly mentioned among orthodox psychoanalysts are homosexuality, the Oedipus complex, masturbation, and fear of castration. This theory holds that everyone has homosexual drives and conflicts which are resolved satisfactorily in the majority of individuals as they mature. If no resolution is reached and the drive is intense and recognized, the individual may become a practicing homosexual in spite of his conflicts. If it is latent and unrecognized, he may express the conflict by a variety of behavior patterns and attitudes such as celibacy, bachelorhood, or even lead a heterosexual life without deriving any of the real meaning and richness of a normal sexual relationship. Others are described as sublimating these unacceptable drives constructively by absorption in work or creative activity.

Many psychoanalysts stress these unresolved homosexual conflicts as a common basic cause of alcoholism. Within this framework, the alcoholic is described as having strong homosexual drives, either overt or latent. His behavior is interpreted as a regression to an earlier developmental level comparable to the infant with intense oral longings, seeking gratification via the bottle. He resorts to the sedative, alcohol, in an attempt to get relief and surcease from psychic pain. In addition, the drinking patterns of our culture are pictured as allowing him to express in acceptable forms some of his homosexual drives through the camaraderie of talking and drinking with men and the entire so-called "masculine" atmosphere and ac-

ceptance of drinking. This theoretical concept of the relation of homosexuality to alcoholism is further developed and elaborated to include the Oedipus complex which is basic to Freudian psychology.

As in all psychological theories there is always the danger of making the patient fit the theory, leaving unanswered the fundamental crucial question of why so many individuals with the same sexual conflicts either are social drinkers or teetotalers. In the author's opinion, it is a moot question whether sexual conflicts are any more than a partial, contributory factor in alcoholism.

Among other psychological conflicts described are those concerning lack of self-esteem, lack of self-assertion, depression, various guilts, anxiety, forbidden feelings, and insecurity stemming from early unhappy family constellations. Most psychiatrists stress the lack of self-esteem, whatever its origin, as a most important reason for addictive drinking.

Whatever the source of conflict and anxiety, whatever the "need," there is no doubt that alcohol is a solution that lessens inhibitions, colors reality, fulfills wishes, banishes care, and makes great obstacles seem Lilliputian. It is a way of coping with the superego, the "thou shalt not" of the individual's psyche, which has been so aptly defined as "the part of the mind that is soluble in alcohol." This is quite a solution!

MOTIVATION

The desire to get well, or motivation, as it is commonly called, is essential to successful therapy. Though it may be couched in different terms, all therapeutic orientations from Alcoholics Anonymous to psychoanalysis stress this. Motivation involves a change in feelings, attitudes, and way of life—in alcoholic addiction this demands deprecation of alcohol.

Every alcoholic has some drive to move in the direction of sobriety and become an accepted, constructive, functioning member of society. Another part of him is driven in the opposite direction, to a life revolving around alcohol.

Lack of motivation was graphically described in 1822 by Thomas De Quincey in *Confessions of an English Opium Eater*. Though written about opium addiction, it applies just as aptly to alcohol, or in fact, to any addiction:

... the reader is to consider me as a regular and confirmed opium eater, of whom to ask whether on any particular day he had or had not taken opium would be to ask whether his lungs had performed respiration or the heart fulfilled its functions. ...

... no old gentlemen 'with a snow-white beard' will have any chance of persuading me ... to surrender 'the little golden receptacle of the pernicious drug.' No; I give notice to all, whether moralists or surgeons, that, whatever be their pretensions and skill in their respective lines of practice, they must not hope for any countenance from me. ...³

This is the conflict of all alcoholics. Motivation, a resultant of two forces working in opposite directions, applies not only to alcoholism but is a basic therapeutic aspect of any character disorder, neurosis, or emotional illness. The ultimate outcome depends in which direction the arrow moves. It is a moot question whether in alcoholic addiction this conflict is ever fully resolved. Certainly, dreams, fantasies, and other evidence suggest that most nondrinking alcoholics have a persistent yen. No method known today permanently eliminates every vestige of the craving for alcohol. As a result, sobriety remains for the true alcoholic, as Alcoholics Anonymous puts it, a twenty-four hour, day-to-day struggle.

³ Thomas De Quincey, *Confession of an English Opium Eater* (New York: A. L. Burt Co., n.d.), p. 176.

The process of alcoholic addiction is not static. It either moves in the direction of further dependency and deterioration or in the opposite direction of sobriety. There is no in between land of social drinking which all alcoholics, with their feelings of omnipotence, fantasy they can attain. The balance of forces in this conflict is tenuous. If weighted in the direction of sobriety, the alcoholic comes to treatment with a determination to get well. If weighted in the other direction, he avoids help or comes to treatment with insufficient interest and lack of co-operation, the result of which is to preserve the status quo of drinking. At present there is no magic pill, injection, or method to motivate all patients. The therapist must ally himself with and support those forces that are striving for sobriety, utilizing all known methods—medical, psychiatric, social, religious and educational as they may appear necessary to support these healthy drives.

PSYCHOTHERAPY

The immediate aim of therapy is sobriety, and the long term goal is a re-synthesis of life without dependence on alcohol. The alcoholic must learn and accept in a deep and thorough sense that he does not have the choice of temperate or social drinking. This admission of impotence in the face of alcohol, or "surrender" as described by Tiebout,⁴ is a sine qua non for the successful arrest of the illness. This is not easily achieved for the problems that fostered drinking are threatening in sobriety, and the urge to find relief through the quick acting agent—alcohol—is strong and unfortunately, too often, overwhelming.

Alcoholics have a low frustration tol-

⁴ H. M. Tiebout, "Surrender Versus Compromise in Therapy: With Special Reference to Alcoholism," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 14, 1953, pp. 58-68.

erance, are often emotionally unstable, and resentful of restraint. They feel threatened by a society which they consider too ready to take away without substitution the crutch which has been used to resolve their omnipresent problems.

A constructive substitute for alcohol must be found. This is a slow, painful, and undramatic process. It demands a radical change in their way of living, new interests and attitudes, new friends or new ways of relating to old friends, and new ways of coping with difficulties. The purpose of psychotherapy is to help the patient understand his problems, realize his potentialities, and through this, find a substitutive way of life.

Psychiatry and its implementing tool, psychotherapy—which includes psychoanalysis—is neither universally applicable, nor a panacea for all emotional ills. Certain definite limitations, which apply to any emotional illness, exist today and must be recognized. These restrictions are determined by: the patient; the nature and character of his illness; the present level of scientific knowledge regarding alcoholism; and finally, the limitations of the therapist himself, whether he be psychiatrist, analyst, general practitioner, psychologist, social worker, or minister.

The therapist's own feelings and attitudes towards alcoholism and the alcoholic addict form a major problem not ordinarily met in day-to-day experiences with other sick people. It must be faced self-critically and dealt with honestly. Too commonly the alcoholic is considered consciously vicious, stubborn, and self-indulgent. This attitude will put the patient on guard, preclude a positive relationship, and prevent him from accepting the outstretched hand. Just as one should not become angry, irritable, and contemptuous towards someone with an ulcer or heart condition who responds slowly and with difficulty to treatment,

so by the same token one should not have these same feelings towards an alcoholic who does not quickly attain sobriety and a well-integrated life. Lack of understanding parallels intolerance and precludes therapeutic effectiveness.

It should be emphasized that unfortunately the patient has a critical role in determining the applicability and effectiveness of psychotherapy. Pneumonia can be cured, a successful surgical procedure performed, or life-saving inoculations given against the will of the patient or to one who is unco-operative, for example, a child. But it is not so with psychotherapy and particularly with alcoholics where much of the therapeutic result depends on the patient's "capacities, assets, functioning, adjustment and degree of integration before the onset of illness; the degree, duration, and stage of alcoholism; age and intelligence; the fixity and rigidity of character patterns; and social, familial, economic and occupational life situation."⁵

Since psychotherapy does not as yet have the specificity of some other scientific disciplines, there is no general agreement as to theory, applicability, method, results, role of the patient and of the therapist. Consequently, one finds a variety of techniques and methodology, depending on the theoretical orientation, training, and experience of the therapist. The therapist may take an active or passive role in the treatment process; his approach may be along psychoanalytic, supportive, directive, or inspirational lines; movies, books and other aids may be used as a basis for discussion. He may enlist the assistance of a social worker, minister, Alcoholics Anonymous, or other ancillary aids. Flexibility is essential as no one method is applicable to all cases.

⁵ S. Vogel, "An Interpretation of Medical and Psychiatric Approaches in the Treatment of Alcoholism," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 14, 1953, pp. 620-31.

The psychiatrist has no magic or mystical method up either sleeve. Based on his knowledge of human drives and behavior, he attempts to understand the origin, dynamics, development, and causes of the patient's feelings and behavior. With this knowledge he tries to make the patient examine and understand himself in a clear, objective light in order to mobilize the healthy and eliminate the unhealthy feelings, attitudes, and behavior.

All aspects of the patient's background, his moral and ethical concepts, his attitudes, motivations, behavior, and conflicts are examined in a tolerant, understanding way so that the patient can see what he has been doing all his life and thus understand himself. His relationships to people, more specifically those close to him are examined in detail. Obviously, treatment is often painfully slow, undramatic, with ups and downs. The process is a re-education. Concentration is not on the morality of behavior, but on the "why," with the patient developing constructive and socially acceptable attitudes. Ventilation and objective examination of feelings, attitudes, and behavior form the matrix on which emotional and personality changes are built.

GROUP THERAPY ⁶

One method of psychotherapy which deserves special mention because of its wide applicability to alcoholics is group therapy. Work, play, study, and activity in groups is certainly not a new concept. Identification with common interests and group goals is a universal human attribute whether it be reflected within the confines of a family unit or in a larger social, political, or cultural setting. Group therapy, where several

patients work together with a therapist, is being increasingly used as a method in psychotherapy. It focuses in an organized way on a specific group aim, using special methods based on the confirmed observation that each group member can be of help to one another, emotionally, psychologically, and intellectually.

Results of group therapy, as in all psychotherapy, are far from predictable. Some patients do better in group than individual therapy and vice versa. Some psychiatrists consider group therapy limited and others are dedicated to it. However, most who have had considerable experience in dealing with alcoholics agree that group therapy, whatever its structure and method, is preferable for alcoholics.

In the group, alcoholics feel safe. Their problems no longer are singular and they are among "friends." The situation can now be compared to the frightened horses so vividly described by Kropotkin.⁷ When the horses were attacked by wolves, they would form a circle with heads turned inward so that they could kick outward and protect themselves from the common danger. Similarly in a group, alcoholics can "kick out" and examine their conflicts regarding sobriety and the society in which they live.

The group atmosphere is permissive and noncondemnatory even though it makes the same demands of sobriety and a new way of life that society does. This atmosphere is new and at first bewildering. It insists on an honest examination and evaluation of behavior and feelings of each group member. Problems of anger, resentment, inadequacy, lack of self-esteem, rejection, loneliness, and so on can be bared and

examined without fear of punishment or rejection.

Alcoholics Anonymous, although it differs widely from psychotherapeutic groups as conducted by psychiatrists, can be considered a form of group therapy and a very successful form if the term is used broadly. After all, it does bring individuals with common problems and goals together to overcome difficulties in themselves and help others to do the same. In an orthodox sense, however, Alcoholics Anonymous is not psychotherapy since it concerns itself not with the "why" of behavior but with a day-to-day schedule of sobriety.

CONCLUSION

Whatever the type of medical therapy recommended, it is the consensus that psychotherapy in some form is necessary as a conjunctive therapy. Psychotherapy, group therapy of various kinds, or Alcoholics Anonymous should be recommended. The combination of organic treatment and psychotherapy is more effective than either alone. Although psychoanalysis, as distinct from psychotherapy, offers a rational, developed theory of the dynamics of alcoholism and

addiction, few cases undergo or continue in psychoanalysis.

The nonspecificity of present-day treatment methods should not result in therapeutic nihilism, which unfortunately is often used by physicians and others as a rationalization to avoid this important problem. There definitely are ways to treat the alcoholic.

Treatment of the alcoholic is not the sole province of the psychiatrist, internist, endocrinologist, sociologist, minister, or any one scientific or lay discipline. Recognition of this is fundamental. A total "push" and mobilization of all methods and facilities is necessary to improve results and make help available to more alcoholics.

We must not follow in the footsteps of the six blind sages of Hindustan who on touching an elephant described him variously as a fan, a rope, a snake, a tree, a spear, and a wall. Rather, we must co-ordinate and synthesize psychiatric, biological, and sociologic research and knowledge to understand and master the problem of alcoholism. Only with this new-found knowledge will further inroads be made on this widespread and devastating disease.

⁶ S. Vogel, "Some Aspects of Group Psychotherapy with Alcoholics," *International Journal of Group Psychotherapy*, Vol. 7, 1957, pp. 302-309.

⁷ P. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid as a Factor in Evolution* as quoted by S. R. Slavson in *The Practice of Group Therapy* (New York: International Universities Press, 1947).

Alcoholics Anonymous

BY HARRISON M. TRICE

Abstract: The fellowship of Alcoholics Anonymous has successfully restored some 200,000 compulsive alcoholics to sobriety. Thousands more have tried to affiliate with A.A. but have failed. The movement, however, has spread throughout the world and is still growing. Changes in the self-conception of members constitute the main therapeutic effect. Possession of an ability to adjust to the casual, informal group life of the fellowship characterizes those alcoholics who affiliate with A.A. in contrast with those who do not. Alcoholics Anonymous demonstrates the effectiveness of group processes in altering individual behavior. As such it indicates a technique for the treatment of degenerative diseases in general. Its success has renewed our realization that man is more than physiology, that his ills can often be reduced by his involvement in face-to-face therapeutic groups.

ALCOHOLICS Anonymous is a fellowship of compulsive drinkers, both men and women, who join with each other in a mutual effort to remain sober. It was started by alcoholics themselves in their despair and hopelessness and has apparently achieved a success as great as if not greater than, professionally directed therapies.

At both "open" meetings to which the public is invited and at "closed" meetings for alcoholics only, its members frankly narrate their drinking histories—their "stories"—and explain how the A.A. program enabled them to gain sobriety. State-wide "retreats" to some outdoor spot widen the scope of associations. Members travel in small groups to adjacent communities to tell their "stories" and share their program for sobriety at A.A. meetings there. Often two or three members will hold meetings in prisons or hospitals where they explain the A.A. program to alcoholic inmates.

The fellowship, however, is more than this. Local groups sponsor dances, parties, and picnics. Families of members

who attend such events together often form family auxiliaries with scheduled meetings. Individual members get together to eat lunch, drink coffee; they meet after work, to bowl, fish, and play cards. These informal contacts between members extend the relationship developed at the formal meetings. In this network of interpersonal relations, the "Twelve Steps," listed below, are the core of the joint effort to remain sober.

Membership in A.A. depends solely upon whether or not an alcoholic says he is a member. New members are sought through "Twelfth Step Work," that is, carrying the message to other alcoholics. According to the society's definitions, an A.A. group exists whenever two "drunks" join together to practice the A.A. program for sobriety. There are no officers, no hierarchy, no dues. Local secretaries are necessary, but tenure is short.

Although A.A. is not organized in the usual sense, a common body of tradition underlies the movement. The "Twelve Traditions" set forth the policies that have been effective guides for the society

in the past. One of them is a statement of A.A.'s single purpose: to help alcoholics remain sober. Another is to refrain from embracing any cause except the one of aiding alcoholics. Its Traditions keep A.A. apart from any temperance or political movements and allow it to concentrate solely on rehabilitating alcoholics.

This is A.A. in broad outline. It is a group endeavor on the part of alcoholics themselves to find a solution to their crippling compulsion. Out of their face-to-face associations with each other there arises a network of group controls for sobriety that is not present in the usual doctor-patient situation. Members refer to this encompassing experience as a "way of life"—an apt phrase since A.A. is, in essence, an emotionally satisfying alternative to chronic drinking.

A DESCRIPTION OF THE FELLOWSHIP

On a Friday night in a small Midwestern city numerous persons are parking their cars outside a large brick house in the University district. Some of them are wearing casual sport clothes and some are dressed more conservatively; their cars are of all makes and models. Other persons, obviously still in work clothes, are walking from the bus stop toward the house. This is the A.A. clubhouse, and the meeting is scheduled for eight o'clock. But, as one member put it, "We never start then; we have to do some 'coffee-clatching' first."

Inside the meeting hall many more people are standing around and talking in small groups. One man is describing his reaction to telling his "story" last week at the mental hospital, "I saw myself as I used to be, sitting right there in the front row." To others recapitulating last Saturday night's party, a woman is saying, "We had fifty-eight people here. I had a hilarious time and all of it without any booze."

Approximately sixty persons have as-

sembled. A man at the speaker's stand announces that this is the regular Friday night "open" meeting of A.A., and he calls for a moment of silence to be used as each person sees fit. "My name is Jim P. and I am an alcoholic," he begins and explains the general nature of the fellowship. As chairman for this meeting, he has invited two members of a new group in a nearby community to speak this evening. He calls on the first one.

"My name is Dave L. and I am an alcoholic." Dave's "story" is a series of anecdotes embellished with frank humor. Laughter from the group interrupts him frequently. Someone whispers, "If he made it, anyone can. What a lush he used to be!" His excessive drinking landed him in a mental hospital five times. In the process of his alcoholism he went from manager of a chain grocery store to itinerant laborer. His family had forsaken him, and numerous times he heard the ward doctors brand him hopeless. He "hit bottom" after his third attack of delirium tremens. Twice he almost died from them.

Dave had scorned the idea of A.A. when a member came to him during his fourth commitment. "I thought the guy was shooting an angle, but when I finally went to a meeting during the fifth time I was at the hospital, I discovered he wasn't." He repeats several times that he was surprised to learn from A.A. that he was "sick," but that as such he could still be respectable. The idea of a "higher power," a God, was difficult for him to accept. He finished dramatically, telling the group that he has found in A.A. a "bunch of real friends—twice as good as those drinking buddies who pumped me for every cent I had."

The second speaker is a woman. She starts with the customary introduction, "My name is Grace B. and I am an alcoholic." She observes that her "story" is different from Dave's in almost every

Harrison M. Trice, Ph.D., Ithaca, New York, is Assistant Professor, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University. He is one of the nonalcoholic members of the Board of Trustees of the General Service Board of Alcoholics Anonymous.

respect but stresses the common denominator of alcoholism.

Her drinking began in college. After her marriage to a prominent lawyer she gradually became a confirmed alcoholic. There were no mental hospitals, no jails, no "drying out" places for her; but there were large medical bills for politely labeled illnesses. Her father was convinced that she was not capable of caring for her two children and urged her husband to divorce her. Instead, her husband asked his law partner, an A.A. member, to send a "Twelfth Stepper" to see her. Grace had no difficulty in accepting the program as described to her by this woman. "I had been looking for some way to admit to myself and to others that my drinking had defeated me. I found the spiritual emphasis something I had yearned for, but could not find alone."

When she finishes her talk, the chairman comments on his own alcoholic history. His concluding remarks concern anonymity. Alcoholics Anonymous, he explains, makes every effort to protect the names of its members; and it is one of the Traditions to insist on anonymity at the level of the press, radio, and television. After these remarks he asks everyone to stand and say the Lord's Prayer. The meeting is over and the "coffee-clatching" starts again.

At "closed" meetings of fewer members, there is more informal discussion of how the program works—that is, how the members "live this program for twenty-four hours at a time rather than face the hell of living the rest of our lives without the stuff." Members intimately confess their drinking escapades and often disclose personal problems. A point frequently made to newcomers is, "We did it, so can you."

HISTORY OF A.A.

The society of A.A. has its roots in the Oxford Groups, a religious move-

ment which operated informally through small discussion groups, emphasizing confessions, honesty, talking out of emotional problems, unselfishness, and praying to God as personally conceived. Both cofounders of A.A. had been exposed to the movement and for a short time worked within its framework.

In 1934, Bill W., a New York broker and an alcoholic, had been introduced to the Oxford Groups by an alcoholic friend who was staying sober by attending their meetings and following their precepts. Impressed by the effects, the broker attended their meetings and he, too, was able to remain sober after what he termed "a spiritual awakening."¹

He promptly tried to convert other alcoholics to his method but failed due to what his doctor called "too much preaching." The physician told him to first convince his prospects that they suffered from a physical allergy and a mental obsession, and mention the spiritual aspects later. Early in 1935 Bill W. tried this approach on a physician in Akron, Ohio, Dr. Bob S., and it worked. They tried it on other alcoholics in Akron, and the first A.A. group grew from these efforts.

Bill W. started another group in New York City, using a modification of the Oxford Group technique. By this time A.A.'s main strategy had been determined; they met in small groups, admitted they were alcoholics, prayed to some conception of God, and sought other sufferers with whom to share their method.

In its efforts to raise money the New York group formed a tax-free charitable trust, the Alcoholic Foundation, with a board of trustees composed of both alcoholics and nonalcoholics. As part of this drive the early members wrote and published their "stories" and their "program" in a book entitled *Alcoholics*

¹ *Alcoholics Anonymous Comes of Age: A Brief History of A.A.* (New York: Alcoholics Anonymous Publishing, 1957), p. 63.

Anonymous.² Favorable publicity about it created a wave of interest in A.A. during 1939 and 1940. An article in the *Saturday Evening Post* in 1941 accelerated the sale of the book and a flood of inquiries. Using the book as a guide, groups of alcoholics throughout the country began to hold meetings. The trustees of the Foundation established a headquarters in New York City to answer inquiries and stimulate the growth of the movement.

Without organizational mechanics to guide this sudden expansion, the society experienced a period of confusion. From the policies evolved through trial and error from 1942 to 1946, the headquarters staff formulated the Twelve Traditions to guide local groups. During the late forties when expansion continued, especially internationally, the cofounders and headquarters staff became concerned about linkage of these far-flung developments. The trustees authorized an experimental plan for elected representatives to attend a General Service Conference each year. This gave A.A. more, but very loose organization.

The Conference has no authority over any individual group; it expresses to the trustees the opinion of A.A. groups throughout the movement and in its debates to reach consensus it, in turn, influences local groups. After a five-year trial, the Twentieth Anniversary Convention in 1955 recognized this body as "the voice of the group conscience of our entire Fellowship, and the sole successor of its cofounders, Dr. Bob and Bill."

EXTENT OF A.A. ACTIVITIES

In 1938 there were three A.A. groups and approximately 100 members. By 1944 the movement had 10,000 members in 300 groups in America and Canada.

² *Alcoholics Anonymous* (New York: Works Publishing Company, 1939).

In 1950 there were 90,000 members in 3,000 groups spread throughout the world. The 1957 estimate was 200,000 members and 7,000 groups.

The movement has spread to sixty countries; in all, there are 710 foreign groups with 15,000 members. Although many members are Americans living abroad, the majority are natives. Problems of translating A.A. literature have arisen and there are numerous variations on the A.A. theme.

Alcoholics Anonymous groups hold meetings in institutions in both the U.S. and abroad. In 1957 there were 257 hospital groups with 6,000 members and 296 groups with 15,000 members holding meetings in jails, reformatories, prisons, and workhouses. Approximately 1,000 seamen and "lone" members in remote areas maintain a contact with each other by mail. Al-Anon Family Groups number approximately 1,000; these are relatives of alcoholics who have banded together to overcome the difficulties of having an alcoholic in the family.

Other facets of A.A. activity are the operations of its General Service Board. Alcoholics Anonymous Publishing, Inc. makes available to local groups a wide variety of booklets, pamphlets, and articles on A.A. subjects. General Service Headquarters with a staff of twenty corresponds with groups, institutions, "loners" and answers general inquiries. Members of A.A. throughout the movement contribute their case histories, group discussions, personal impressions of A.A., and group problems as articles in the *Grapevine*, a monthly journal.

THE TWELVE STEPS

The "Program," as A.A. members call it, consists of twelve suggestions for recovery from alcoholism. They originated in the process of writing *Alcoholics Anonymous* when the early members

listed specific steps they took to reach sobriety.

1. We admitted we were powerless over alcohol—that our lives had become unmanageable.

2. Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to sanity.

3. Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God as we understood Him.

4. Made a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves.

5. Admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human being the exact nature of our wrongs.

6. We were entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of character.

7. Humbly asked Him to remove our short-comings.

8. Made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became willing to make amends to them all.

9. Made direct amends to such people wherever possible, except when to do so would injure them or others.

10. Continued to take personal inventory and when we were wrong, promptly admitted it.

11. Sought through prayer and meditation to improve our conscious contact with God as we understood Him, praying only for knowledge of his Will for us and the power to carry that out.

12. Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these steps, we tried to carry this message to alcoholics and practice these principles in all our affairs.

One of the most bitterly debated points in the development of the Steps concerned the spiritual references. Atheist and agnostic members challenged the concept of God, and other members objected to doctrinal implications. Slowly, discussion forged a common agreement

on the phrases "a power greater than ourselves" and "God, as we understand him." Thus the Steps rest on a broad spiritual base, allowing members practically any conception of spiritual power.

In recognition of the fact that an alcoholic will resist pressure in any form, the Steps were labeled "suggestions." In the permissive tone that has come to pervade A.A., the Steps are phrased in terms of "we did" rather than "you must."

From the psychological standpoint, the Steps create attitudes that are therapeutically effective for the alcoholic. Step 1 relieves the alcoholic of the need to demonstrate that he can drink like others. Instead of grudging compliance to sobriety, this Step advocates complete surrender. Steps 2 and 3 enable the alcoholic to realize that to remain sober he needs help from outside himself. Alcoholics Anonymous offers the emotional support of the group and of God "as you understand him" as a way to meet this need.

Step 4 recognizes the fantastic rationalizations that the typical alcoholic has constructed to justify his drinking and encourages a constant effort to see these for what they really are. Step 5 helps the alcoholic reduce anxiety by sharing his emotional problems, and step 8 helps him reduce guilt by making restitutions.

Step 12 proposes that the member continue to see himself as he was in the past by seeking another alcoholic who is not a member and telling him about the program. He makes himself available to the novice for consultation and companionship, reteaching himself in the process.

TYPES WHO ARE ATTRACTED TO A.A.

Alcoholics Anonymous is effective for the alcoholic who can affiliate with it because it gives him a new conception of

himself. This change is due to Twelfth Step Work, A.A.'s insistence upon alcoholism as an illness, and the feeling of group solidarity that provides a sense of belonging. He does not feel alone in his efforts to remain sober; all around him are living, breathing examples that the group purpose is within his individual reach. He has become a part of a group that has "found a way out," and this group stands apart from the rest of the alcoholics even though it constantly seeks their affiliation. A network of mutual obligations, shared emotional problems, and reciprocal aid between members engenders an "in-group" feeling. Finally, this "we" attitude is cultivated in an informal, often casual, atmosphere. Each member is accepted at face value, no questions asked, no censure raised.⁵

Unfortunately, this group therapy takes place *after* an alcoholic has affiliated with A.A. How he came to affiliate with the society in the first place is another matter. Thousands of alcoholics are exposed to A.A. but do not affiliate with it. Many join upon first exposure. What basic differences exist between these two types?

One detailed study⁶ of the affiliation process with A.A. found that those alcoholics who affiliated with it differed significantly from those who did not in that: (1) they regarded themselves as persons who could easily share their basic emotional reactions with others, and (2) they also believed that they easily adapted themselves to the casual give-and-take that develops before and after A.A. meetings. Other research shows that affiliates had considerable ex-

⁵ Some observers have doubted this "accepting" nature of A.A. See Alan D. Button, "Psychodynamics of Alcoholism," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 17, 1956, pp. 443-60. He states, "A.A. is by no means as 'accepting' as is advertised."

⁶ H. M. Trice, "The Process of Affiliation with A.A.," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 18, 1957, pp. 39-54.

perience with informal, small groups.^{5, 6}

Why does this outgoing, sociable type of alcoholic align himself with a group whose chief norm is sobriety? It is quite probable that only those who regard their drinking behavior as symptomatic of a "problem" do so. Affiliates in this study saw few social rewards in the results of heavy drinking. They visualized them as a threat to home, job, and community esteem. They had developed greater emotional conflict about their drinking behavior than had nonaffiliates. They were "ready" to do something about it. Nonaffiliates, on the other hand, associated the pleasures of living with their drinking experiences. "Blackouts," "shakes," even delirium tremens, were not, to them, indicative of an "illness." This was the price paid for a "good time." Furthermore, their drinking behavior brought them prestige among their drinking friends.

Aids and impediments to affiliation

Within the broad type just sketched, specific experiences acted to aid or impede affiliation. Nonaffiliates had, in contrast to affiliates, significantly more esteemed friends and relatives who, they thought, had stopped drinking by their own volition. When they went to their first A.A. meeting they were faced with a choice between an unknown A.A. group and acting like their "will-power model." Affiliates, on the other hand, were not faced with such a choice.

Furthermore, nonaffiliates had heard A.A. members described as insincere, and this prejudiced them even more against A.A. Also, nonaffiliates were still actively drinking in well-defined drinking groups at the time they first went to a

⁵ Eugenia Hanfmann, "The Life History of an Ex-alcoholic," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 12, 1951, pp. 405-43.

⁶ Joan Jackson and Ralph Connor, "The Skid Road Alcoholic," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 14, 1953, pp. 468-85.

meeting. Consequently A.A. faced stiff opposition.

The way A.A. groups received newcomers created, at times, further obstacles. Although sponsorship is a vital part of the A.A. technique, the evidence indicates that nonaffiliates were not sponsored in the full A.A. meaning of that word. Often they were not sponsored at all; and if they were, it was only a superficial relationship. Whenever the sponsor, however, brought the newcomer beyond their own close relationship to over-all contact with the whole group, the newcomer was more likely to affiliate with the society. Moreover, field observations during this study indicate that some A.A. groups overlook the newcomer; forget his doubts, confusions, and false expectations; and at times decide in advance that "he can't make it."

After attending meetings for a few weeks the probability of affiliating with A.A. was further improved if the wife or girl friend attended the meetings and supported what she saw and heard. Nonaffiliates were not fortunate in this respect. Often their wives presented them with a hard choice; drink with the woman you love or abstain with a group of strangers. Another aspect of family life influenced affiliation. If an alcoholic during the first few weeks of attending A.A. experienced a great deal of support from relatives in his drinking behavior and in the problems deriving from his drinking, he was less apt to become affiliated.

This research also developed a definite hypothesis about the temporary nature of nonaffiliation for many alcoholics. Large numbers of those who turned away from their first contact with A.A. later returned in desperation after trying other methods without success. At this point the individual realized it was literally a question of "do or die." Under these conditions A.A. may be ac-

cepted where it had been initially rejected.

These points show that, although there were many A.A. successes, there are also many factors operating against affiliation. Alcoholics Anonymous has been eulogized and analyzed, but seldom have its "negative instances" been scrutinized. Further, specific study of them may reveal how more alcoholics can be brought to sobriety via A.A.

ADAPTATION TO AMERICAN SOCIETY

Since A.A. has been largely an American development certain dominant themes, relatively unique to American society, have influenced it. Individualism, suspicion of established authority, lack of class consciousness, pragmatism, and simplified spiritual experience can be seen as American values to which A.A. has adjusted itself; however, there is only partial adaptation to any one of them.

Alcoholics Anonymous is most ambivalent about individualism. On the one hand, it suggests that the alcoholic admit he is powerless, that his life is unmanageable. This is in opposition to the American norm of "standing on your own two feet," but it is essential if sobriety is to be achieved. On the other hand, members perform many A.A. activities in an individualistic manner. Even though they emphasize group action, they put it in this kind of framework. Thus a recipient of a Twelfth Step call is merely told the member's story and left to decide on any further action himself. Alcoholics Anonymous speakers constantly state, "every one gets this program in a different way—it's up to the individual himself," or, "this is just my story and my opinion; it might not fit you."

When suspicion to establish authority is considered, A.A. has demonstrated a closer relation to the American norm. Even the smallest group retains its

autonomy. Alcoholics Anonymous attempts to lodge final determination in the individual groups who, in turn, tend to emphasize the rights of specific members. Even here, there is no complete expression of this value. Informal controls and guidance form the very stuff A.A. therapy is made of. It has avoided centralized authority, as the structure of the General Service Conference shows, but it has developed a standardized program with authority through its Steps and Traditions. It has never given its cofounders any definite "office" or status; on the other hand, these men have exercised a personal influence that clearly sets them apart.

The same partial adaptation to the American ideal can be seen in A.A.'s lack of class consciousness. Compared to other societies, class differences are minimized in America and A.A. reflects this characteristic. It can do it more effectively than many groups because there is a common malady linking upper, middle, and lower class members. Again, however, the agreement between value and action is not complete. Alcoholics Anonymous groups often divide along class lines. Class factors operate in aiding or blocking affiliation.

Other central values in American life are likewise operative in A.A. behavior. Alcoholics Anonymous is quite pragmatic, paying scant attention to theories about alcoholism and in this respect it mirrors the American emphasis on "practicality," on "doing something." Alcoholics Anonymous simplified approach to spiritual experiences is compatible with the behavior of many Americans who seek such experiences outside formal churches. However, this parallel is blurred by the fact that members tend to return to their church organizations in response to the spiritual content of A.A. The important point is that A.A., like other face-to-face groups in American life, never fully expresses any one

specific theme. American values are too complex, too heterogenous for that. So, although A.A. is composed of deviants as far as drinking is concerned, it is characteristic of the general American scene from which it emerged.

IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICAL SOCIOLOGY

In addition to physiological therapy techniques are needed in treating degenerative illnesses such as heart trouble, mental illness, and alcoholism. Therapeutic methods extending beyond the purely clinical and into the everyday life of the patient are essential. In this context, A.A. shows the therapeutic potential available in groups of patients assuming responsibilities for their own recoveries. For many alcoholics, medical treatment has joined with A.A. for long-range treatment success. Similar combinations have aided mental patients, tuberculosis victims, the aged, and drug addicts. These extensions of A.A. type therapy indicate that successful follow up in degenerative illnesses may be substantially increased by group processes similar to A.A.

The Al-Anon Family Groups—composed mainly of wives, husbands, and children of A.A. members who hold meetings patterned after the A.A. program—indicate that involvement of close relatives in follow-up therapy is a valuable treatment adjunct. Since these relatives may have developed their own emotional problems because of living with and attempting to adjust to the alcoholic, they may be helped therapeutically by participating in such an auxiliary A.A. group. This, in turn, creates a more favorable environment for the recovery of the alcoholic himself.

Finally, formal group psychotherapy might profitably recognize that A.A. has succeeded because it encouraged the alcoholic to take the active role of therapist through Twelfth Step work. He is not in the subordinate role of "patient"

with an "expert" analyzing him. Rather he is playing a protective, helping role toward one who is "still in his cups." It seems reasonable that group therapy in a clinic or hospital setting might incorporate this approach by encouraging patients of some different illness categories to seek out others with similar diagnosis in Twelfth Step fashion, informing them of such group effort and offering hope, support, and guidance on this nonprofessional level.

CONCLUSION

Alcoholics Anonymous is not the only pioneering effort to do something constructive about alcoholism. It was,

however, in the forefront of the trend to regard alcoholism as a treatable condition. Rather than moral condemnation or therapeutic hopelessness, A.A. has shown beyond the slightest doubt, that an alcoholic can be rehabilitated.

On the other hand, its therapy tends to be limited to those who can adjust to the intense group life of its program. Consequently many alcoholics are not treatable via its approach. Despite this limitation, A.A. remains one of the chief ways of dealing with alcoholism. As a follow-up method it is unexcelled and, for thousands of alcoholics, it constitutes the main hope for a life free from the compulsive use of alcohol.

Medical Practice and the Alcoholic

By ROBERT STRAUS

Abstract: A positive attitude of the physician toward his alcoholic patient is an essential component of a satisfactory therapeutic relationship. Despite society's recognition of alcoholism as a form of illness, the physician has been reticent to accept alcoholics as patients. Alcoholism has not been medically respectable; it has no well-defined etiology or therapy. The "special problem" community approach has permitted the practicing physician to feel justified in referring alcoholics elsewhere. It is suggested that medicine's new emphasis on comprehensive care, the health team concept, and new therapeutic discoveries may permit the physician to view alcoholism as an interesting clinical entity.

IN RECENT years both professional and popular references to medical practice have reflected an increasing interest in the doctor-patient relationship. It has been stated frequently that the quality of rapport developed between the physician and his patient can directly influence the diagnostic acuity of the physician, the course which the patient's health problem may take, and the relative success which the physician and his patient are able to achieve in management of the health problem. The importance of rapport to the therapeutic process is especially evident in relationships between practicing physicians and their alcoholic patients. In this connection, Howard W. Haggard has written

There is no group of individuals—except children—which is more responsive to the attitude of the physician and senses his sincerity, or lack of it, more acutely than the alcoholic. It is the attitude of the physician and his depth of understanding which may be the deciding factors in the recovery of the alcoholic; if he understands him, and if he can make the members of the family and business associates likewise

understand and cooperate, he has a good chance of steering the alcoholic toward recovery. Contrariwise, an adverse attitude, whatever its reasons may be, and may remain, is the insurmountable obstacle to recovery.¹

The importance of a positive doctor-patient relationship is not limited to the patient's ability to benefit from treatment; it is also seen as a critical component of the physician's ability to serve his alcoholic patient. Florence Powdermaker has discussed the "acuteness of hypersensitivity on the part of the alcoholic patient" which she feels "makes it a *sine qua non* for effective treatment that the therapist have no hidden or overtly critical attitudes toward the symptoms." She notes that it is from "sincere appreciation of the patient's capacities and potentialities, and friendliness toward him, . . . as well as from scientific interest in the problems of alcoholics, that the therapist derives the

¹ Howard W. Haggard, "The Physician and the Alcoholic," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 6, September 1945, p. 220.

Robert Straus, Ph.D., Lexington, Kentucky, is Professor of Medical Sociology and a member of the planning staff for the new Medical Center at the University of Kentucky. Formerly he was on the staff of the State University of New York's College of Medicine in Syracuse.

patience and objectivity needed for their treatment."²

Many observers believe that the remarkable effectiveness of Alcoholics Anonymous and the substantial help which lay therapists have provided for some alcoholics are made possible in great measure by sympathy, understanding, and a positive interpersonal relationship.

In this discussion of relationships between physicians and their alcoholic patients it is desirable to consider two significant trends. One of these involves changes in the understanding and treatment of alcoholism. The other concerns ferment in the philosophy and patterning of medical care.

CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD ALCOHOLISM

The last twenty years have witnessed dramatic changes in American society with respect to the general understanding of and response to the problems of alcoholism. Although the existence of medical ramifications in alcoholism has long been recognized, until recently it has been defined primarily as a moral problem associated with personal inadequacy and moral degradation. In fact alcoholism carried such social stigma that the condition was considered unmentionable, and great efforts were made to conceal or deny its existence. Many persons found comfort in the fallacious notion that the only real alcoholics were derelicts—the homeless chronic inebriates of Skid Row. From this misconception it was reasoned that men or women who, despite pathological drinking, were able to retain a degree of stability in their family, job, or community relationships could not be true alcoholics because they did not fit the derelict stereo-

type. Although most persons could count at least one problem drinker among members of their family or close friends, there prevailed an ostrich-like denial that such "nice people" could be real alcoholics. Unfortunately this faulty reasoning enabled many alcoholics themselves to deny the serious implications of their drinking pattern and to rationalize a rejection of the idea that they might be ill or need help. As long as they could reason that alcoholics were personally to blame for their own condition, members of society could justify their rejecting the alcoholic and even excuse a righteous feeling of hostility toward him.

Physicians have not been immune to these negative attitudes which have prevailed in the larger society. Although they have long accepted responsibility for treating the damaged liver, the cardiologic or respiratory problems, or the overt psychosis which may occur in individuals who are alcoholics and although they have provided emergency treatment for the effects of acute intoxication, physicians have been slow to accept the concept that they might also accept responsibility for the treatment of alcohol addiction. In some respects the redefinition of alcoholism as a form of illness, a public-health and medical problem, has gained more rapid and complete acceptance among the general public and alcoholics themselves than among some members of the medical profession.

The physician's dilemma

In 1945, Haggard discussed the dilemma which the redefinition of alcoholism would impose on the practicing physician.

The sound conception that the alcoholic is an ill man needing and deserving medical care and guidance has had wide publicity and gained sympathetic response. Increasingly in the future, alcoholics and their

relatives will turn to the family practitioner for aid in controlling addiction. They will expect to obtain this aid. The practitioner will then be increasingly confronted by a condition to which, in the past, he has usually given little serious medical regard.³

For the physician, acceptance of alcoholism as a medical problem imposes a responsibility which he may well feel reluctant to bear. There are many factors which in combination help to explain this reluctance where it exists.

First, it is important to realize that many of the men and women who are practicing medicine today received their medical education during a period when alcoholism was virtually ignored as a clinical entity. Although general hospital wards contained many alcoholic patients, these were usually admitted because of more medically acceptable symptoms. As a medical student the physician learned to think of the liver, the heart, the respiratory system, the skin disease, the psychosis, or the fractured limb as the primary problem. While he may have recognized that excessive drinking was an associated factor, he was seldom encouraged to pursue its real implications.

Furthermore, when the physician has given thought to alcoholism he has found that this is a uniquely evasive clinical phenomenon. Unlike many of the conditions with which he is accustomed to dealing, alcoholism presents no well-defined diagnostic or therapeutic picture; there is no common etiology, no consistently characteristic course, no accepted method of management. There are, in fact, many alcoholisms; but the various types are not clearly defined or delineated.

Alcoholism is a problem which involves many aspects of human behavior. It is a social problem, an economic problem, a psychological problem, and its

moral aspects must also be considered. Quite understandably the physician has considered these other problems beyond his own sphere of competence. Yet treatment of the medical ramifications of alcoholism alone has seldom proved effective. Working with the alcoholic frequently is discouraging and an unrewarding investment of his time. Despite the pronounced emotional ramifications of alcoholism, most psychiatrists have been just as reluctant as their medical colleagues to become deeply involved in the treatment of alcoholic patients.

Studies of physicians' attitudes

In addition to its complexity and evasiveness, alcoholism presents other conflicts for the physician. Some of these are reflected by studies in which an effort has been made to ascertain the extent to which practicing physicians are dealing with the problems of alcoholism, the methods of treatment which they employ, and their attitudes toward these patients.

In 1945 Riley and Marden⁴ interviewed 455 physicians representing a 10 per cent sample of the practicing physicians in New Jersey. They found that a surprisingly high 65 per cent of their respondents reported that they were seeing some cases of chronic alcoholism with an average of 7.3 such cases seen by each doctor during the course of the year. However, it was found that the methods of treatment in most frequent use were palliative in nature. Sedation, vitamins, and nutritional therapy accounted for the majority of treatments. On the basis of their findings, Riley and Marden concluded:

The doctors who are currently treating for chronic alcoholism are taking few steps toward the long-term rehabilitation of their

² Florence Powdermaker, "The Relation Between the Alcoholic and the Physician," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 5, September 1944, p. 249.

³ Haggard, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), p. 213.

⁴ John W. Riley, Jr. and C. F. Marden, "The Medical Profession and the Problem of Alcoholism," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 7, September 1946, pp. 240-70.

patients. They are giving temporary relief, but little else. This, however, must not be taken as an indictment of the doctors. . . . The rehabilitation of the alcoholic is . . . a long process. The general practitioner has neither the time nor the facilities.

While more than 90 per cent of the physicians interviewed recognized that alcoholism has medical ramifications, the vast majority also discussed certain difficulties which they encountered in trying to work with alcoholic patients. Forty-three per cent categorized the alcoholic as a "nonco-operative patient" who fails to carry out the physician's directions or suggestions.

"They don't carry out treatment prescribed. They are not inclined to return for additional treatment when diagnosis is made, . . . They come with various complaints and if you tell them it's alcoholism, they either stop or never come back."

Twenty-eight per cent characterized the alcoholic as a nuisance who may be unmanageable and may create specific annoyances:

"These people coming into a doctor's office create a bad impression, annoy other patients. They frequently don't pay their bills."

Finally, many of the physicians pointed out that the presence of alcoholism in a patient seriously complicated the treatment of other problems.

Responses to similar questions were reported in 1946 by The Committee on Public Health Relations of the New York Academy of Medicine.⁵ The Committee distributed a questionnaire to all members of the five County Medical Societies of Greater New York. Replies were received from 1,609 physicians rep-

⁵ The Committee on Public Health Relations of the New York Academy of Medicine, "A Survey of Facilities for the Care and Treatment of Alcoholism in New York City," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 7, December 1946, pp. 405-38.

resenting a 13 per cent return. Sixty per cent of the reporting physicians indicated that they did not treat alcohol addiction, and two-thirds of the other 40 per cent indicated that alcoholic patients comprised less than 1 per cent of their practice. In fact, only 10 physicians reported that alcoholic patients comprised more than 10 per cent of their patients and 3 doctors devoted more than 25 per cent of their efforts to alcoholics. The authors of this report concluded that their findings reflected "a feeling of futility and a realization that specialized knowledge is required to deal effectively with the various phases of it [alcoholism]." They noted further "unless a physician deals exclusively with the treatment of alcoholism, he finds it a nuisance in his practice because of the time required and the unsatisfactory results obtained."

In 1952, Straus reported a community survey conducted in Jackson, Mississippi⁶ in which 52 of the community's 126 physicians counted 851 problem drinking patients during the previous year. However, the majority of these were merely seeking relief from the effects of acute intoxication. Methods of treatment employed in Jackson, as in New Jersey, were overwhelmingly palliative in nature. Attitudes expressed by the Jackson physicians reflected a generally negative feeling toward the alcoholic:

"I don't like to treat them. A doctor could quickly develop a practice of nothing but alcoholics. They're usually insulting, hard to manage, and in most cases are soon drunk again."

"He is a sick individual. He needs confinement under proper nursing supervision."

"Disgusted. I do not feel many of

⁶ Robert Straus, "Community Surveys: Their Aims and Techniques," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 13, June 1952, pp. 254-70.

them need a doctor, and resent the calls. I feel it is a moral problem, not an illness."

"More to be pitied than shamed."

"As a patient, he is ill mentally and physically, but as a citizen, he creates social and economic problems."

"The usual alcoholic has no motivation toward health, is unwilling to assume responsibility, deprives psychiatric patients of care by consuming the therapist's time in fruitless effort."

"The problem drinkers create special problems for the doctor. Special provisions should be made to treat them. My general feeling is a sympathetic one but I realize that I can offer little treatment to him."

"It is an illness and I am sorry for them but they are undesirable patients—usually uncooperative, poor pay, require night calls; not good for reputation to have too many—rarely accomplish any permanent good."

While these various surveys probably represent a fairly accurate reflection of prevailing attitudes, the data on numbers of alcoholics treated should be interpreted with caution. In this connection A. B. Hollingshead⁷ has noted:

If data from physicians . . . are to be used as a criterion to determine alcoholism in a population we are going to have a very low rate of alcoholism, yet there may be a high rate of abuse in the society. We need another criteria of alcoholism than the impressions of medical practitioners.

Commenting on 300 patients of private psychiatrists studied in his survey of mental illness in New Haven, Hollingshead found:

Not a single patient is diagnosed as an alcoholic. The private psychiatric practitioner diagnosed the patient in terms of behavior

⁷ August B. Hollingshead, "Views on the Etiology of Alcoholism" in H. D. Kruse (Ed.), *Alcoholism as a Medical Problem* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), p. 59.

he considered to be more basic to personality structure than excessive use of alcohol.

As we have already suggested, the physician prefers to classify his patients according to basic organic or body system disorders, and the hospital administrator frequently will not admit the alcoholic patient unless he has some associated symptoms which are medically respectable.

The alcoholic as a patient

Attitudes expressed in these studies substantiate the impression that most practicing physicians have great reservations about treating patients for alcoholism. In fact, the average physician may have much greater difficulty accepting the redefinition of alcoholism as an illness than members of society at large. Redefinition brings to the physician a responsibility which he may feel unable to discharge. The assignment is far from comfortable. As suggested by the attitudes quoted above, the alcoholic symbolizes many problems for the physician and considerable conflict. This patient often appears unco-operative and unappreciative. He causes many minor and some major disturbances. If given a little attention and sympathy he may demand much more. He may present some personality eccentricities which are personally offensive to the physician. Although intellectually the physician may know that these traits are a manifestation of the illness, emotionally he may have to struggle to maintain professional objectivity. He may find that he cannot identify himself with his alcoholic patients or establish empathy. He may even find that the alcoholic introduces personal conflict over his own orientation to the custom of drinking. Few persons growing up in American society during the last century have been immune from the impact of the "wet-dry" controversy. For most persons, what-

ever their drinking or nondrinking habits, the question of drinking carries emotional overtones. Whatever his drinking custom, the physician may find difficulty in detaching his personal orientation from his professional relationship with the alcoholic.

In addition, the physician is faced with the very practical dilemma of not knowing how to help his alcoholic patients. His efforts to provide palliative relief bring no real solution. In order to hospitalize an alcoholic he must often resort to an alternative diagnosis, and he is subject to rebuke if his subterfuge is discovered. Furthermore, the demand for medical attention for alcoholics is so great and the supply of sympathetic physicians so small that the average physician finds it difficult to treat only a few alcoholics. Yet once word is spread that Doctor "R" is "treating" alcoholics, he fears that he will become so labeled that other patients will stay away. Faced with this combination of complex forces, it is understandable that relatively few physicians have welcomed alcoholic patients.

"Special problem" emphasis

Although the recent era of enlightenment with respect to alcoholism has included the definition of alcoholism as a medical and a public-health problem, one aspect of this "movement" has actually provided the practicing physician with a rationale for giving little attention to the problem. This is the "special problem" emphasis which has characterized much of the organized community effort to deal with alcoholism. Proponents of the "special problem" approach argue that unless the disease is singled out for emphasis, it is invariably lost among traditional health and welfare services. This reasoning is by no means unique to alcoholism. It has characterized the voluntary health movement in the United States. Because alcoholism

is a particularly complex phenomenon and one historically subject to so many gross stigmas and misconceptions, there is unquestionable need for a concentrated effort better to measure, understand, and interpret this illness and its associated problems. However, special concentration has frequently resulted in narrow conceptualization and a possessiveness on the part of alcoholism workers who feel that only the specialist can fully understand and effectively deal with the problem. Faced with such possessive and sometimes antagonistic zeal on the part of a small but vocal number of alcoholism workers, physicians and other professional persons, whose interest might be stimulated to work with alcoholics in the course of their general practice, have sometimes completely disassociated themselves from any effort to serve alcoholics or even families which include alcoholic members.

The wide publicity afforded Alcoholics Anonymous, community "information centers," and special alcoholism clinics has provided the practicing physician with a rationale for referring his alcoholic patients elsewhere despite the fact that many of these other resources are not equipped to deal with the medical and psychiatric aspects of the problem. However, even the best of these special resources can work with only a small segment of the alcoholic population. If significant numbers of alcoholics are to be helped, it is essential that the general health resources of the community, including the practicing physicians, be a part of this effort. Overemphasis on the need for a specialized approach can seriously impair the attainment of this goal.

TRENDS IN MEDICAL CARE

Thus far we have considered the conflicts which have arisen for the practicing physician in connection with his al-

coholic patients. It has been suggested that while society at large has appeared to accept the concept of alcoholism as a form of illness and has manifested an increasingly sympathetic attitude toward the alcoholic, the physician, who acknowledges medical and public-health ramifications in alcoholism, still finds it difficult to accept alcoholic patients. Most of the physicians who report that they treat alcoholism do so in a limited way and with considerable reservation. A distinct lag is apparent between society's definition of alcoholism as a medical problem and the readiness of the medical profession to accept full responsibility for dealing with this problem. This lag is in part attributable to the fact that society's definition oversimplifies the complex nature of the problem. Alcoholism is not generally responsive to medical treatment alone. In part the lag is explained by the fact that alcoholism does not fit compatibly into the traditional categories of disease which have characterized the philosophy and organization of medical practice during recent decades. However, medical practice is now in a state of ferment, and there is reason to believe that current trends in the philosophy and patterning of medical care may actually lead to a distinct interest in the treatment of alcoholic patients.

A significant concomitant to the rapid scientific development which has characterized medicine for more than fifty years has been the pattern of segmentalization in medical education and research and of specialization in medical practice. Medical education is now undergoing a trend away from the unilateral consideration of body systems and distinct disease entities toward a more comprehensive conceptualization of the patient's health and disease. Many medical schools are experimenting with multidiscipline patterns of teaching which seek to provide a broad orienta-

tion to the basic relationships between all aspects of human biology and behavior without sacrificing the specific competence and depth which more traditional approaches have developed. Not only is there stress on relationships among the basic medical sciences, the clinical areas, and between clinical and basic science subject matter; but the horizons of medicine are undergoing expansion. It is recognized and taught that human adaptation to illness is not restricted to man's organ systems but includes factors in his personality, his social group relations, his customs and beliefs, and the physical environment in which he lives. The philosophy of comprehensive medicine stresses the importance of all of these factors in the maintenance of good health and in recovery from or adaptation to disease.

Under segmentalized forms of medical education little attention has been given to alcoholism. It is a highly complex phenomenon which does not fit neatly into any of the traditional categories of disease. Its etiology and management are evasive and unorthodox from a medical point of view. As noted above, physicians have long recognized that medical treatment alone seldom is effective therapy for the alcoholic. In order to teach comprehensive medicine, medical educators have had to re-evaluate their choice of case material. It is suggested that the alcoholic patient, whose alcoholism has been virtually ignored in the past, even while his neatly categorized cirrhosis has provided teaching material, has now become an "interesting" patient. When medical education focuses on the whole man, the alcoholic, in whom organic disease, personality stress, and a multiplicity of health problems are so often combined with well-discernible social and environmental problems, appears to be an ideal vehicle for demonstrating the interrelatedness of problems in health and disease.

New medications and approach

Not only is alcoholism medically respectable to the young physician trained in the philosophy of comprehensive medicine, but through the use of recently developed medications, including the various tranquilizing drugs, the physician now has a new feeling that he can do something for the alcoholic. Only time will tell whether tranquilizing drugs can have a prolonged role in alcoholism therapy. However, because these drugs enable the disturbed alcoholic patient to behave in a less eccentric fashion he will less often be classified as a nuisance, as nonco-operative, or as an undesirable patient. The use of tranquilizers certainly appears to enable the physician to feel less uncomfortable with his alcoholic patients and thereby achieve a more satisfactory relationship with them.

Also significant to the medical handling of alcoholic patients has been the emergence of the health-team approach to medical care. Specialization in medicine permitted a high degree of concentration and competence, but it resulted also in a segmentalized form of care in which patients were frequently shunted from one specialist to another for the episodic treatment of specific complaints. Seldom was the health of the patient evaluated in its total context. With specialization, there have emerged also a number of ancillary professional and technical groups of medical personnel: the laboratory and X-ray technicians; physical, occupational, and diversional therapists; social workers; clinical psychologists; and others. Frequently, the services of these adjunctive personnel

have been employed only in a limited and highly specialized way. With the philosophy of comprehensive medicine, new patterns of medical practice are developing in which groups of medical specialists and ancillary personnel combine their skills in the total evaluation and management of health problems. For alcoholism, which invariably carries complications beyond the strictly medical sphere, the health-team form of organization may offer still further encouragement and potentiality for success to the physician who undertakes to provide therapy. It is noteworthy that the team concept was employed in the first outpatient alcoholism clinic established in 1944, and this pattern has served as a prototype for most alcoholism-treatment programs which have been developed since that time.

Together, the various trends in medical philosophy, organization, and practice which have been considered—comprehensive medicine, the health team, and newer forms of therapy—provide promise that newer generations of physicians will develop the positive attitude toward the alcoholic as a patient which is an essential component of effective rapport and treatment.

It is suggested that this attitude will emerge when, with continuing research, the physician can feel more hopeful and confident of helping the alcoholic; when through health-team organization he can supplement his skills with persons trained to deal with psychological and social ramifications of the problem; and when his philosophy of medicine enables him to define alcoholism as an interesting and medically respectable problem.

Social Work and Alcoholism

By JEAN V. SAPIR

Abstract: This article discusses the need for increased attention to, and work with, the alcoholic in all agency settings; the role of the social worker in an alcoholism clinic in relation to case finding, case study and case treatment; team work between psychiatrists, physicians, psychologists and social workers in meeting the treatment needs of alcoholic patients; and the contributions social work can make to research in relation to alcoholism. It presents a discussion of social work techniques which are helpful when agencies must work with alcoholics not seeking help. The need for better informed teaching related to alcoholism, alcohol problems, and treatment both social and individual at our schools of social work is examined.

ALTHOUGH social workers have been called upon to deal with the social consequences of alcoholism in all its ramifications from the time the profession itself came into existence, only during recent years has social work begun to consider what it can contribute to rehabilitation in this field. One cannot dodge the fact that direct work with alcoholics in the past had come to be avoided by social workers on the basis of frequent failure; that it had become almost a recognized policy in many private agencies to discourage staff from "becoming involved" with alcoholics because they were too sick psychiatrically to be able to use casework help. Instead, staff was urged to turn such cases over to an expert.

The trouble with this policy, as we all know, was that the alcoholic seldom seemed to be able to use the meager psychiatric clinic facilities which were available; for example he couldn't keep regularly scheduled appointments, and he would appear drunk when no one had time for him. Unless he or his family had money for private care, there were no treatment facilities for him.

With the development of state and local alcoholism-treatment programs, some maintaining hospital as well as outpatient services, this situation has been remedied somewhat during the past decade. Although these facilities fall far short of meeting the total need for treatment of this disability, they do offer some help to some people with alcohol problems. They also provide physicians, psychiatrists, social workers, and nurses with concentrated experience in this field, thus building a sound base for the development of more effective treatment approaches.

The usefulness of social casework at certain stages of study and treatment with all patients and of casework therapy as the treatment of choice for a substantial number of patients is clearly demonstrated by these clinics. The case of Mary Doe, article 10 of this issue, offers an admirable example of a situation where casework therapy was considered to be the only possible treatment approach to a severely ill alcoholic woman.

At present there are fewer than 200 trained social workers employed in spe-

Jean V. Sapir, New Haven, Connecticut, is Director of Psychiatric Social Service, Connecticut Commission on Alcoholism.

cialized clinic work with alcoholics in the United States and Canada. However, the very fact that social workers are active in this field as part of such planned programs with physicians, psychiatrists, and others has sparked fresh thinking in the field of social work as a whole regarding what social workers in any setting might be able to do to promote rehabilitation of alcoholics. In other words, the "blind spot" as far as the alcoholic and his needs are concerned has begun to shrink as more knowledge about him becomes available and as more practical "know-how" concerning problem management is accumulated and communicated.

THE ROLE OF THE SOCIAL WORKER IN AN ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT CLINIC

Social workers have long been members of the "clinic team" in psychiatric outpatient clinics for adults and in child guidance clinics. They not only participate in the study and treatment of specific patients in such settings, but they make special contributions of their own as social workers in relation to the clinic's dealings with its public—those who are attempting to use the clinic for their own benefit and those who are attempting to help others to use it.

Most alcoholism clinics are organized after the pattern of the general psychiatric clinic, but their actual operation has to be different if the needs of the patients they serve are to be met. Because of the average alcoholic's overwhelming ambivalence about accepting his need for treatment, the clinic must be ready to have him come in as soon as possible after he indicates willingness to accept help. It is taken for granted that this will happen only when he feels overwhelmed by the trouble he is getting into because of his drinking. If the clinic does not answer this call immediately there is a good chance that the op-

portunity will be lost, if not for always, at least until the next time he gets into massive trouble. This means that both physicians and social workers will hold themselves ready to see new patients on an emergency basis—the social worker in order to get at the minimum a bird's-eye view of his drinking problem and current predicament and the physician or psychiatrist in order to handle his most urgent medical needs such as hang-over relief or hospitalization. Because usually some time passes before most patients are able to keep regular appointments, there are likely to be enough cancellations or ignored appointments to make the above possible. If on the basis of the intake interview the social worker feels that immediate medical or psychiatric help is needed, usually a new patient will be treated briefly between other appointments. Flexibility of schedule and variability of handling is a continuing feature of effective work in an alcoholism clinic—plans for each patient are made on the basis of his need. Such treatment sessions will vary from five minutes a week or a month with a physician the patient has come to trust, to a weekly fifty minutes of formal psychiatric therapy. Case study may involve one interview with the social worker for exploration of the problem and one examination by the physician followed by monthly contacts of the briefest nature. It may also involve a full-scale study with hospital observation, elaborate psychological study, full-scale "social study" on the part of social workers, and subsequent psychiatric or casework treatment of the spouse as well as the patient.

Referrals and family services

Although the social worker in an alcoholism-treatment clinic does not have the task of building up a waiting list of suitable patients for treatment, a signifi-

cant portion of his time is taken up with talking to people wishing to refer cases to the clinic—helping those who describe problems the clinic cannot possibly meet to find other solutions and helping those who describe possible patients to work out the referrals they wish to make. Referrals come from relatives, other agency workers, and interested parties such as ministers and employers. In almost every case the referring party needs help in interpreting the clinic service to the prospective patient, particularly in relation to what he may and may not expect by accepting even an exploratory appointment. This effort is most important to the success of the clinic not only in expanding its service to alcoholics, but also in terms of increasing understanding of problems related to alcoholism on the part of the public.

The most time-consuming and rewarding of these interpretations will be the work done with family members who may need help in handling their own feelings in relation to personal and social difficulties created by the drinking before they can successfully introduce the idea of clinic treatment to the drinker. Contacts made with relatives before the patient actually comes in will frequently be renewed in crises. If handled thoughtfully, they will tend to foster identification with the clinic's attitudes towards alcoholism and alcoholics and promote family co-operation with the clinic's treatment effort. In the case of spouses, these preliminary contacts may even develop into treatment relationships with the social worker, occurring simultaneously with treatment of the patient by another member of the staff. In such situations the social worker's support is given to the spouse's efforts to solve his or her own problems, whether or not these are directly related to the drinking of the patient. For example, the overly managing wife may be

encouraged to explore the circumstances in her life both now and in the past which favored the development of her difficulty. With this help she may become able to relax control as her husband starts to take over responsibilities which are clearly his own, and she may learn to sustain and eventually to enjoy the new family situation which results.

Initial contact with patient

In most public alcoholism clinics the new patient's first contact is with the clinic social worker. Her duty is to interpret the clinic service to him and to get certain facts from him about his immediate life situation and drinking problem which are vital to the planning of first steps in treatment. A less obvious function of this interview will be to reduce the new patient's fear of what he has "let himself in for" by coming to the clinic. This can be achieved through careful attention to what the patient has to say about his problem and his reasons for seeking help. Many patients come in response to pressure from others, and when they come to the clinic will have only one clear impulse—to *get out*. Often this first interview will in itself determine whether he goes or remains to receive much needed treatment. The patient may stay because he feels treated with respect as a person, regardless of his miserable appearance and general confusion. He may stay because he feels reassured by the professional approach of the interviewer who responds to his drinking as a health problem, which enables him, perhaps for the first time, to look at it as something apart from himself, something which might possibly be treated. Again he may stay simply because the initial visit with the social worker and the physician has demonstrated their interest through a practical response to his emergent need for hospitalization, medication, shelter care, or some specific service.

Many alcoholics make several brief contacts with an alcoholism clinic before they are able to use its help in a consistent manner. These visits will usually be in relation to their need for help with a hangover or their need to appease someone in their environment—wife, employer, minister, court worker—by making a gesture in the direction of asking for help. Medical help will be freely offered on such occasions, and the relief gained will lay the foundation for a favorable relationship between the clinic and this tentative patient. It may incidentally also bring relief to the referring party by giving him a foretaste of the type of response to distress—both his and the patient's—that the clinic is prepared to make! The social worker will also have a therapeutic role to play in relation to the tentative patient who will need skilled encouragement to "talk out" his conflict—first, whether or not he does have a problem; second, what the problem is; and third, granted there is any problem, whether or not he needs help in handling it. To the patient these conversations will seem to be preliminaries to treatment, but will in fact be an integral part of the clinic service since through them his ability to identify his drinking problem will increase. Further, his not unnatural fears of what clinic treatment implies will be allayed. These conversations may even take place, off and on, over a number of years and still have this significance.

Follow-up treatment

Once a patient decides to continue coming, the study of his problem continues simultaneously with its treatment. Quite often he will see social worker, physician, psychiatrist, and psychologist at one or another stage of his treatment. These contacts, however, will be planned according to the study or treatment needs of each situation. Such plans are

made in meetings of the staff as a whole and grow out of a review of the clinic's experience with the patient to date—that is, what approach he seems to respond to and what type of treatment his situation appears to demand. Usually only "next steps" in treatment are planned, although at any time a permanent plan, such as referral to another type of service or assignment to one particular therapist, may emerge.

Social workers take part in active therapy in a variety of ways. They will sometimes keep on seeing a patient after the intake interview, even during the time he is having contacts with other staff members. This is usually the case when he needs help in relation to specific social problems, but it may also take place when the clinic feels he needs continuing support from one person while he must adjust to one new staff member after another. This treatment may also be used in situations where a patient sees his problem altogether in terms of physical illness and uses his interview with the physician accordingly. In cases where social and emotional problems seem urgent, the physician may ask the patient to see the social worker as well as himself to talk over these problems, and he will then gradually cut his own time down to a minimum. It has been found that such a patient may tolerate contact with a social worker where contact with a psychiatrist would be refused; that he may be able to make some progress towards emotional stability by working with the social worker on practical everyday problems of living.

There are two types of situations in which major therapeutic responsibility is likely to be assigned to a social worker—one where the patient is considered to be gravely ill from the psychiatric point of view and the other where it is felt that the patient will make most progress by working on the problems of his "outer" rather than his "inner" life. In

the first case the patient is likely to be what is loosely called a "walking schizophrenic"—that is, his illness has become stabilized, and it is felt there would be danger in attempting direct psychiatric therapy outside an institution. The goal set for the social worker here will be to sustain the patient's efforts to function on a sober basis in the community by offering him warmly expressed interest, practical guidance where indicated, and above all human contact according to his need.

In the second case the patient will be considered to be capable of emotional growth. The social worker's goal then will be to help him improve his relationships with significant people in his environment through realistic discussion of his day-to-day dealings with members of his family and people he meets on the job or in his social life. Such discussion may promote awareness of his own hampering attitudes which not only impoverish his social relations generally but constrict his participation in situations which specifically involve him with others—for example, if he is a factory worker he may be missing the chance to learn more about his job from his foreman and fellow workers by being preoccupied with concern over fending off what he considers their unwarranted "bossing."

Mention has already been made of therapy done by social workers with the spouses of patients at the same time patients are receiving treatment. Usually this will not be undertaken unless the clinic feels the spouse is capable of using constructively the relationship offered. Some clinics do a great deal of individual work with spouses of patients and in others this is combined with group therapy for spouses. Social workers usually lead these groups and in some clinics and hospitals do group therapy with the patients as well.

Interpreting services

It is part of the traditional role of the social worker to interpret his service to other community agencies as opportunity offers. The most fruitful opportunity for such interpretation will come when other agencies become active in relation to a patient or his family and wish to co-ordinate their work with that of the alcoholism clinic. Conferences between agency and clinic social workers in such situations promote communication of the clinic's point of view as well as its special understanding of the situation. It may also increase the clinic's understanding of the difficulties other agencies encounter when they attempt to make their service available to alcoholics. Out of many such conferences the service agencies involved have the opportunity to develop a better informed approach to the solution of such immediate problems. They may also emerge with new and more effective ways of helping alcoholics in general, whether they be clients or significant relatives of clients. The alcoholism clinic on its side cannot fail to have its own view of alcoholism as a community problem broadened and to increase its own ability to help its patients take advantage of much needed community services.

Part of the social worker's liaison work will be the maintenance of a working relationship with Alcoholics Anonymous. Many members of this group will have been patients of the clinic, and as part of their "Twelfth Step work" will be bringing in new patients. It is most important that such Alcoholics Anonymous members feel supported in this work and in their work in general. It is vital also that they feel the clinic personnel both endorses and respects the A.A. movement. Social workers can and do underline this endorsement by the acceptance of invita-

tions to talk at open meetings and by occasionally attending other open meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous as auditors.

SOCIAL WORK PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH

A great deal of research is yet to be done in the field of alcoholism both as to its nature and the effectiveness of the treatment approaches which have been devised to date. Because social work in alcoholism-treatment services involves intimate acquaintance with the day-to-day lives of numerous alcoholics, frequent direct contact with members of their families and continuing relationships with those making referrals—employers, pastors, police officers—much useful research material can be gained from the social worker's experience. Such data, directly relevant to the social and psychological functioning of the alcoholic, prior to and during the treatment relationship, often appear to have been overlooked in attempts to "fit" the alcoholic into some classically designed psychiatric or sociologic typology. Of course, time and clerical aid must be available if the social worker is to make this contribution.

Social workers also have a vital role to play in the planning and in the execution of research designed to evaluate results of treatment through follow-up studies. This is particularly true in the field of alcoholism because of special problems to be encountered in finding and then getting into contact with people who seldom can tolerate remembering they ever "had to" use clinic service.

THE ALCOHOLIC AND THE SOCIAL AGENCY

It can be seen that with the increase in number of social workers receiving special experience with alcoholics in clinic treatment centers, a nucleus of social work specialists in this field is slowly being formed. Comparatively few

alcoholics, however, become involved with such treatment centers, either because they are too severely ill to reach out for or sustain such contacts or because they do not consider themselves handicapped enough by their alcoholism to need specialized help. Nonetheless many of these alcoholics will have involuntary contact with all types of social agencies in relation to the social consequences of uncontrolled drinking—the breakup of homes, emotional breakdown in family members, delinquency of children, personal encounters with the law, mounting job difficulties, increased susceptibility to accidents and all manner of diseases, and emergency relief crises. Consequently they will have contact with any number of social workers whose attitudes towards alcoholics and alcoholism will have great bearing on their progress—in either direction. To illustrate, when a hospital social service becomes active in relation to a family where there appears to be an unusual amount of emotional strain and illness and the husband's alcoholism is found to be a factor, the approach made to him by the social worker may have crucial importance for the future of the whole family. If the alcoholic is both made to feel the "cause of it all" and also finds himself left out of all the family planning that is going on, he will have that much more excuse to shrug off family responsibilities and devote himself to fun with the boys at the corner bar. On the other hand, if he is drawn into all the discussions of family problems, his own among them, he may instead feel supported and strengthened in whatever effort he is able to make to fulfill his function as a husband and father. In the one case his feeling that he is an outsider and that it does not matter what he does will be strengthened and his drinking will continue or get worse; in the other, his impulse to escape his responsibilities through indulgence of

immature pleasures, including drinking, will be weakened, with a good chance that he will need to drink less.

Attitude of social workers toward alcoholics

It has to be acknowledged that until recently social workers in general tended to avoid involvement with alcoholics, viewing them as either too difficult to tackle or too hopeless to help. As a consequence, alcoholics often failed to receive services to which they as citizens were entitled, getting instead only a deepened sense of being now and forever "rejection-worthy."

Of late there appears to be some break in this attitude, encouraged first by the accomplishments of the A.A. movement and second by the pioneer professional work in this field sponsored originally by the Yale Center of Alcohol Studies and later on by a growing number of state alcohol programs.

It is obvious that social workers originally stumbled over the difficulties of working with people whose first consideration appeared to be to conceal the existence of, then the extent of, their devastating problem both from themselves and from those trying to help them. After repeated failures to diagnose this difficulty in time to avoid certain well-known pitfalls (such as handing out money for food which is used for alcohol, to mention the best known) or to make progress with alcoholics where the difficulty was in the open, it is understandable that patterns of avoidance for the whole problem would develop on the part of the social workers. Such patterns of avoidance can and have grown into unwritten policies in many social agencies, both public and private, with the result that minimum service only is given to alcoholics once this problem is identified. However, such unwritten policies can fade out of existence when the social workers carrying out the day-

by-day work of an agency begin first to notice, then to give individualized attention to the alcoholics in their caseload. This alone will stimulate an active search for knowledge about the problem and a new approach to the alcoholic himself. Out of this in turn can grow new and more constructive unwritten policies concerning alcoholics which eventually will constitute an impetus towards and a sound basis for major policy changes.

Promoting awareness of social workers toward alcoholism

To "spark off" such developments, practising social workers need more stimulation to take a fresh look at these ever-present problems. In communities where alcoholism treatment centers exist this can develop as described earlier. Such centers are few, of course, but reports of work done are beginning to be available in professional journals and may, to some extent, serve the same purpose. Social workers with special experience in the field of alcoholism can themselves foster interest by sponsoring workshops for the discussion of social-work problems related to alcoholism on the programs of national, state, and local social-work conferences. Such workshops will have accomplished something constructive even if they get no farther than recognizing and defining the problems related to alcoholism which are met in various agency settings. This in itself will stimulate fresh thinking and point up what can and what cannot be done with the available resources.

In general, the best way to promote awareness of problems related to alcoholism among social workers is to see that schools of social work cover the subject adequately. For this to be possible, the teachers of courses in public welfare, psychiatry, sociology, and case-work themselves will need to develop a more realistic understanding of the ex-

tent and nature of our alcoholism problem as well as the treatment approaches to it which are possible on both the community and the individual levels. Only when this happens will we have reason to feel assured that an adequate knowledge of this complicated problem is being made part and parcel of the basic educational equipment of the professionally trained social worker. What

we do need is to have all social workers coming into the field trained to recognize and approach constructively whatever problems related to alcohol they encounter in the course of their everyday work. It will not be until all social workers approach alcohol problems in this spirit that social work will be able to make its maximum contribution to rehabilitation in this field.

Current Resources for Therapy, Education and Research

By ERNEST A. SHEPHERD

Abstract: A revived interest in alcoholism since 1930 has developed specialized activities in treatment, education, and research. A new underlying philosophy has characterized fresh modes of action. State governmental programs have been outstanding. Research and study are grave needs. As new services for Skid Row drinkers have developed and nationally established general agencies and institutions have directed their attention to this aspect of the problem, sweeping programs have been proposed.

IT WAS clearly inevitable that the social vacuum created around the problems of alcohol by the defeat of prohibition could not persist. However reluctant the reconsideration of these problems may have been it could not be indefinitely postponed, and it was not.

Fresh approaches to the problems of alcohol were evidenced in the 1930's by the appearance of a new Research Council on the Problems of Alcoholism, the founding of Alcoholics Anonymous, and development of a special program of study on alcohol in Yale University's Laboratory of Applied Physiology. New goals of investigation or treatment were projected by each.

Chronologically, it is interesting to record that Alcoholics Anonymous was founded in 1934, that in 1938 the Research Council brought together an eminent group of scientists to initiate its activities, that in 1940 the first issue of the *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol* appeared, that in 1943 the first session of the Yale Summer School of Alcohol Studies was held, and that the Yale Plan outpatient clinic for the treatment of alcoholics was opened also the same year. In 1945 the rapid development of specialized activities continued as the National Committee for Educa-

tion¹ on Alcoholism was organized and as the Connecticut Legislature authorized an independent governmental agency to deal with this problem. Other study and treatment activities also appeared in the District of Columbia, Oregon, and New Hampshire during this same time.

The social vacuum was rapidly filling up with specialized programs, and while in one instance activities were later taken over by a different group, in substance the primary endeavors continued in one way or another. The National Research Council Committee on the Problems of Alcohol is the present heir of the Research Council on the Problems of Alcoholism. Alcoholics Anonymous, by far the most successful non-medical, therapeutic approach, has quietly expanded as a grass-roots movement which is democratic in its organization, spiritual in its teachings, and moral in its goals, reaching people inaccessible to other help. Yale University's Laboratory of Applied Physiology (now Applied Biodynamics), the first organized university group to study consistently and exclusively the problems of alcohol, set up its Center of Alcohol Studies which has a diversified, inte-

¹ Now called the National Council on Alcoholism.

Ernest A. Shepherd, Avon Park, Florida, is Administrator of the Florida Alcoholic Rehabilitation Program, past President of the North American Association of Alcoholism Programs and a member of the editorial board of the *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*.

grated program covering many types of research, educational projects, and publications. The Connecticut Commission on Alcoholism developed and directs one of the largest of the state governmental programs in the United States, providing treatment, education, and research.

UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES

It would be a serious mistake to believe that these new modes of action, or others that followed, were either extensions of former approaches or compromises between extremes. Rather, their key ideas and plans were on different levels, and this may explain why older, controversial factions have looked with suspicion upon them and sometimes attempted to discredit them. An analysis of the Connecticut legislation gives a recapitulation of its underlying principles which makes evident the contrast between the assumptions of this law and those of its predecessors. They are as follows:

It recognizes that alcoholics are sick people.

It recognizes the fact that alcoholics can be rehabilitated.

It recognizes a responsibility on the part of the government to meet this problem.

It calls for study of the problem.

It calls for public education on the subject of alcoholism.

It omits all mention of punishment as a means of controlling the problem.

It recognizes the necessity of diagnosis, the possibility of various forms of treatment, and the advisability of probationary rather than institutional treatment whenever possible.

It offers free service to those requesting it.

It recognizes that many groups, individuals and official bodies have interests which are affected by the problem of alcoholism and that they have skills which may be required if rehabilitation and eventual prevention are to be realized.

It has accepted the principle of separate administration.

It has located responsibility in a new state board and has given to that board sufficient discretion and power.²

This underlying philosophy constant in all of the new specialized activities can be more broadly and briefly restated in the following concepts: that alcoholism is susceptible to treatment; that the alcoholic is worth rehabilitating; that there should be systematic, controlled study of the problem; that objective knowledge should be applied to improve control; that activity should be based on tested information; that there is to be continuous evaluation of results.

Obvious as some of these key thoughts seem, they are departures which challenge older attitudes and ideas. Common distortions such as the beliefs that alcohol is the cause of alcoholism, that intoxication and alcoholism are the same thing, that alcoholism is due to a lack of will power, that alcoholics come from the lowest strata of society are left behind by the new assumptions and are consistently pushed aside as fallacious in favor of principles which can be empirically verified. Their influence and penetration, moving out from the specialized programs, at times unrecognized or denied, is extensive and crucial.

To counteract these antecedent and also continuing beliefs, present-day specialized activities and programs have developed resources for treatment, for dissemination of information, and for research, or combinations of them. The various state governmental programs on alcoholism, local citizens' committees, the work of the Salvation Army and the Volunteers of America, and the incorporation of specific services for the care of alcoholics in established general public agencies—such as penal institutions,

² Selden D. Bacon, "New Legislation for the Control of Alcoholism: The Connecticut Law of 1945," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 6, No. 2, September 1945, pp. 13-14.

hospital psychiatric wards, and tuberculosis sanitariums—form the specific ways in which concerned citizens have implemented their convictions.

Differing in purposes, varying in services and standards, these activities have been guided and shaped by a striking agreement about underlying concepts.

A broad expression of these fresh modes is found in the present work of the National Council on Alcoholism, formerly the National Committee on Alcoholism. This counterpart of lay groups organized around other public health problems, holds as its fundamental purposes the arousing of public opinion and its consequent mobilization for action against alcoholism as a disease. Offering consultation with legislative, industrial, medical, and educational leaders, it disseminates information in every possible way. It sponsors special conferences, institutes, and scientific meetings to encourage the exchange of information and has become one national focal point of interest in voluntary and public action.

STATE PROGRAMS

A second conspicuous demonstration of the new drive on alcoholism has been the emergence of specialized governmental programs. At the state level, the new thrust to have alcoholism looked upon as a public health, as well as a moral and legal problem, began in 1943 in Oregon with the formation of a study commission to consider official ways and means of dealing with the situation.

In the past fourteen years, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have followed with some type of law recognizing alcoholism as a medical problem and providing for government financed services covering treatment, educational work, and/or research.

Reporting last year to the North American Association of Alcoholism Programs, a continental conference limited

to governmental agencies on alcoholism, were thirty-four states and the District of Columbia in the United States with two additional states—Illinois and Iowa—indicating study commissions which would make recommendations to their state legislatures. Of the thirty-four programs, twenty-four have specific services for treatment and rehabilitation.³ Thirty have educational activities. With the exception of New York and Delaware, all of the state governmental programs on alcoholism are directed by law to disseminate information in this field. Eighteen of the agencies reported to the national association that they had engaged in some type of research during 1956. The type and character of the research projects were varied and covered many scientific disciplines.

Funds made available to the agencies were in excess of \$3,000,000, and in 1956 the agencies reported that they had a total of 22,926 cases.

With this unusual upsurge in activity in a short period of time, it would be a mistake to conclude that the programs and agencies are identical or that they are firmly established. Public opinion has not yet finally concluded that alcoholism is a governmental responsibility nor that it is a treatable medical condition. Because of these uncertainties, state programs vary widely in their objectives, organizational patterns, and scope of services, and as recently as the last two years, two of the state programs—Kansas and Wisconsin—terminated their work because of lack of funds.

Youthful, specialized services are confronted by a major challenge to demonstrate the validity of their claims and the usefulness of their services. They also must solve such problems as the recruitment of competent, professional personnel and the clarification of goals

³ North American Association of Alcoholism Programs Committee on Standards and Program Evaluation. "1957 Report," unpublished.

and relationships with other related groups.

STANDARDS

Aware of these difficulties, the Committee on Standards and Program Evaluation of the North American Association of Alcoholism Programs recommended to its members the adoption of goals and criteria for agencies. In 1955 it urged that the following be considered minimal guides for organizational planning:

1. An annual plan should be prepared prior to each operating year and reviewed at the end of that year.

2. After a year's end review of the plan, a report of activities should be submitted to the supervisory body.

3. As recommended by the Committee in 1954, each stage agency operating outpatient clinics should participate in the reporting program of the National Institute of Mental Health.

4. There should be clearly defined administrative responsibility for the agency and its functions.

5. There should be clearly stated descriptions of each position including the functions.

6. Admission policies to both in- and outpatient facilities should be clearly stated and defined.

7. There should be regularly stated clinic hours.

8. There should be a physician charged with a clearly defined medical responsibility for the total care of patients.

9. Each patient should be examined by a physician.

10. Each patient should be seen, or his case history reviewed for diagnostic evaluation by a psychiatrist.

11. The new A.P.A. nomenclature should be used in diagnosis.

12. A social history should be taken on each patient, not necessarily at first interview but as the patient is ready to reveal it from time to time.

13. Each state agency should make available some type of hospital arrangement, not necessarily state operated, so that patients can be hospitalized if necessary.

14. An organized record system should be established and maintained and be available to the professional members of the staff.

15. There should be published a syllabus or manual of procedures.

16. That three functions: treatment, education and research, be part of every state program.

17. A specific person should be assigned (either full or part-time) administrative responsibility for supervising each function.

18. A literature list of available publications should be maintained and revised at yearly intervals (or more frequently).

19. Personnel of State Programs should cooperate with colleges, universities, and other agencies in the training of personnel.

20. Each program should maintain a co-operative arrangement with other community agencies or individuals concerned with the problem, e.g., A.A., Family Service Society, The Courts, etc.⁴

RESEARCH

One need recognized as basic by special agencies is that for valid research on alcoholism. To meet this, the North American Association of Alcoholism Programs, through the assistance of a grant of funds from the National Institute of Mental Health, sponsored a Research Institute on the problems of alcoholism in 1954. By bringing together at the University of Wisconsin in Madison a group of research workers representing several disciplines, an evaluation of the state of research relating to alcoholism and profitable lines of future investigations were attempted. The conference met simultaneously in five separate sections to consider the areas of physiological, biochemical and pharmacological research, sociological research, and psychiatric research. Reporting their findings to the general group, the sections critically assessed the shortcomings in their fields, and there was substantial agreement on the following points:

⁴ North American Association of Alcoholism Programs Committee on Standards and Program Evaluation. "1955 Report," unpublished.

1. In dealing with alcoholism, a complex, biosocial problem is presented with unsolved components and great difficulties of precise formulation (the term, "alcoholic," for instance, includes a great diversity of human behavior with only a common symptom of uncontrolled, excessive consumption of alcohol).

2. There is no single, specific, simple therapeutic agent that is generally effective in the treatment of alcoholism (the Institute concluded that it is not known now why one patient recovers and why another does not).

3. That there is a great need for basic investigations into the problems of etiology, dynamic pathology, and therapeutic methods.

4. That well-designed programs on research should cut across disciplinary boundaries and bring together interdisciplinary teams with variable leadership according to comprehensive objectives.

5. Research is necessary on the levels of pure and applied study.

6. There is a great need for the integration of sound, continued study by established disciplines, but no need for new disciplines.

7. Research projects must be placed with appropriate organizations having adequate facilities.

8. Adequate support, both as to finance and administrative attitude and policy, must be found.⁵

The concluding paragraph of the section on psychiatric research reflected the approach of the other sections as well, stating that

psychiatric research in this biosocial problem can give satisfactory results only if the psychiatric investigator works with investigators from other fields whenever their knowledge of special methods demands

⁵ Ebbe Curtis Hoff and others, "Current Research on Problems of Alcohol," Reprint from *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 16, No. 3, September 1955.

teamwork. In research problems in which the psychopathological aspects are the leading issue, the psychiatrically trained investigator should assume the leading role. Whenever the problem is primarily physiological or psychological or sociological, the investigator of the respective field should assume leadership, with the psychiatrist being an active member of the group. Anton Carlson clearly recognized the need for a broad and integrated attack on the problem of alcoholism. It is most regrettable that the more recent trend has been to split the field of investigation according to various disciplines. Such studies may be fruitful along special lines but the findings must be correlated with those in other fields and finally considered from the total, i.e., biosocial viewpoint. Psychiatric research can afford less than any other science to be isolated and to proceed along its own special lines. The most essential plea is, therefore, for well-formulated psychiatric investigations, related or closely integrated with the other sciences which can contribute to the solution, especially the clarification of the etiological factors.⁶

Of particular interest this year in the area of research has been a grant by the National Institute of Mental Health to the Yale University Center of Alcohol Studies for a three-year evaluation of the treatment results of state program services. The proposed study, now in formulation, aims to evaluate the treatment of alcoholic patients in selected clinics and will endeavor to determine what contributed to response to treatment and what did not. The general intent of the project is to see if the effectiveness of the treatment of alcoholism in state services can be assessed or determined.

SKID ROW SERVICES

During the past ten years, a specialty within a specialty has appeared. A flurry of activity has blown up in various kinds of programs to help the so-

⁶ *Ibid.*

called "homeless alcoholic" or the chronic drunkenness offender. Even though the Salvation Army and the Volunteers of America have had records of work with this particular segment of the alcoholic population, other private and governmental agencies are now attempting to devise and initiate assistance for these classes of excessive drinkers, and at their instigation, studies have been undertaken to define and describe the group who bear the label, "Skid Row drunk."

Careful investigations by Robert Straus and Raymond McCarthy strikingly report that the individuals who make up this group are a discouraging and perhaps inappropriately classed section of the alcoholic population. Straus describes the typical Skid Row drinker in this way:

The typical homeless man (i.e., the one representing the majority), left his parental home at an early age, often following the death of one or both parents or conflict with his parents. Either he never married or his marriage was dissolved by separation, divorce, or the death of his wife. When seen in the institution, he is in the middle years of his life, probably around 45, his education has been meager and most likely stopped by the 6th or 7th grades, if he went as far as high school, he probably never was graduated . . . although his father had a skilled trade, his occupational status is that of an unskilled or casual laborer. His physical condition, while not good, is such that he can do a day's work. Finally, he drinks too much.⁷

In a later study, Straus and McCarthy report:

Although they [homeless alcoholics] talked further about their patterns of drinking, and readily admitted that most of their income was spent on alcohol, the majority of these men did not feel that they had a drinking problem. They pointed out that

drinking allowed them to overlook their lack of material possessions and status and forget their loneliness but mostly that it gave them a feeling of well-being in the midst of poverty and degradation. The men seemed to realize that alcohol provided a form of adjustment for them. For those who suffered from repressed grief and remorse, drinking also provided temporary relief. When they felt ashamed or were reminded by others that they should be ashamed, they could console themselves with the rationalization that their condition was not due to personal inadequacy but to the unfortunate habit of drinking. Among the homeless population, drinking even supplies a certain status, the non-drinker is the exception. He may be considered queer and avoided by others. About 70% of the men interviewed in the New Haven study stated with apparent sincerity that they desired no change in their drinking practices.⁸

Special services offering care and assistance for the homeless, excessive drinker have been set in Boston, Massachusetts; New Haven, Connecticut; Seattle, Washington; Detroit, Michigan; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Washington, D. C.; Los Angeles, California; Worcester, Massachusetts; New York City; and Rochester, New York, to list locations of some of the new programs. Agencies have been financed by local Community Chest funds, while some have been organized as parts of city or county health or welfare services.

This segment of the drinking population obtrudes on public attention as a dramatic subject of newspaper stories and magazine articles, and as it attracts considerable attention, it possibly deters consideration of the greater numbers of alcoholics who are not socially deteriorated. However, the small amount of success in treatment reported by the

⁸ Robert Straus and Raymond McCarthy, "Non-Addictive Pathological Drinking Patterns of Homeless Men," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 12, No. 4, December 1951, pp. 608-9.

⁷ Robert Straus, "Alcohol and the Homeless Man," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1946, pp. 362-63.

agencies balances the striking qualities of their clients. With or without response, the programs recognize the community responsibility for providing management and care beyond detention and custody for homeless, excessive drinkers in the hope that some individuals can be rehabilitated. While most of the services have been organized pragmatically to meet needs, certain ones have been planned around careful rationales and without illusions as to the number of socially unacceptable people who can be made socially acceptable only through environmental support.

EDUCATION

It is natural that remedial services for alcoholics should splash over into the field of public education. Limitations in personnel and money for treatment have naturally pushed the consideration of prevention, and the hope of protection through education has been undimmed by major shifts in other emphases.

Up to 1943, practically every state had laws requiring public school instruction on alcohol, but educators were understandably cautious in their meeting the statutory requirements. Older materials had not been revised. New materials were not prepared. Feelings and attitudes from former experiences and controversies kept alive and aggravated strong differences of opinions about goals, methods, and subject matter; but a change was conservatively, cautiously encouraged by a few special workshops and summer schools which objectively examined alcohol education problems. By 1947 a greater willingness to plan for education on alcohol appeared. A number of official state manuals were revised or entirely rewritten. Committees of educators prepared resource manuals and teaching plans. Workshops, institutes, and special conferences increased; and faculties assigned more time to the subject for class-

room presentation. While many state departments of education have not set up single or individual departments with special personnel for alcohol instruction, they have not avoided the subject, and it has been assigned to other related broader curriculum areas.

Reflecting and pushing the new interest is a national organization known as the Association for the Advancement of Instruction about Alcohol and Narcotics. It is strictly a professional group for teachers, school supervisors, administrators, school physicians and nurses which serves as a clearing house for information about material and as a stimulus to more effective teaching.

Summer schools or courses have already been mentioned. Governmental programs, universities, and church groups have sponsored them. Best known is the Yale Summer School of Alcohol Studies which extends over a four-week period and has continued its unique influence through annual sessions since 1943. The purpose of the School is to orient community leaders and professional people to the most recent information about alcohol.

In the area of community action, where it has been demonstrated that education in public health problems can be effective, the National Council should be singled out again as the leader in promoting the organization of local committees on alcoholism in more than sixty areas. These stress co-ordinated community education and the dissemination of information by every possible means.

The energy manifested in these educational developments indicates that the increased interest in and attention to the problems of alcohol will continue, even though its controversial character is recognized.

THE FUTURE OF SPECIAL PROGRAMS

Recognizing the enormous size of the problems of alcoholism, it is inconceiv-

able that specialized programs of any kind can be expected to deal with it totally. While a conservative expansion of services and activities can be expected, they will reach only limited numbers of people, leaving untouched large areas of the problem.

Traditionally, three different, general groups have been interested in excessive drinking of alcoholic beverages: the law, the church, and medicine. In the past, each has become involved because of effects of excessive drinking, and in response, have developed approaches to them. Legal agencies, because of the community problems arising from intoxication, have punished the drunkard by fines and incarcerations. Religious groups, especially Protestant, have taught and preached total abstinence and political action for its enforcement. Medicine, because excessive drinking led to changes in health, treated the resulting symptoms; but in the past, the major social institutions had little interest in underlying causes and only a limited belief in scientific study.

Sound modifications are slowly taking place. While legal agencies still have a major responsibility in the handling of alcoholics, the traditional separation of medicine, law, and religion is being altered in favor of their active co-operation in the attainment of the goal of helping the alcoholic. This has added to the established moral, punitive attitude the scientific-therapeutic approach; and while this has been rarely or poorly defined, the dictum that the excessive, uncontrolled drinker suffers from some kind of an underlying disorder is a basic assumption. The collaboration of these broad community groups and agencies is in the direction of alleviating the effects of drinking while searching for the causes of the alcoholism problem and of dealing with these factors in multidisciplinary ways.

GENERAL MEDICAL STATEMENTS

In the last eight years, more inclusive groups in the field of medicine and health have coincidentally responded to changing approaches and have given to alcoholism a new status among the health conditions which are regarded as sufficiently serious to warrant public attention.

At the national level, a Committee on Alcoholism was appointed in the Council on Mental Health of the American Medical Association. In 1956, the Council on behalf of the Committee, presented to the American Medical Association House of Delegates a resolution and report stating that the Council on Mental Health was of the opinion that:

1. Alcoholic symptomatology and complications which occur in many personality disorders come within the scope of medical practice.

2. Acute alcoholic intoxication can be, and often is, a medical emergency. As with any other acute case, the merits of each individual case should be considered at the time of the emergency.

3. The type of alcoholic patient admitted to a general hospital should be judged on his individual merits, consideration being given to the attending physician's opinion, cooperation of the patient, and his behavior at the time of admission. The admitting doctors should then examine the patient and determine from the history and his actions whether he should be admitted or refused.

4. In order to offer house officers well-rounded training in the general hospital, there should be adequate facilities available as part of a hospital program for care of alcoholics. Since the house officer in a hospital will eventually come in contact with this type of patient in practice, his training in treating this illness should come while he is a resident officer. Hospital staffs should be urged to accept these patients for treatment and cooperate in this program.

5. With improved means of treatment available and the changed viewpoint and attitude which places the alcoholic in the category of a sick individual, most of the problems formerly encountered in the treatment of the alcoholic in a general hospital have been greatly reduced. In any event, the individual patient should be evaluated rather than have general objection on the grounds of a diagnosis of alcoholism.⁹

Such recommendations are a marked shift from the practices reported in 1944 in a study of the American Hospital Association, "Institutional Facilities for the Treatment of Alcoholism," in which treatment for the alcoholic was viewed with considerable skepticism.

A second national agency, in this instance a governmental one, also pinpointed alcoholism. Dr. Robert H. Felix, Director of the National Institute of Mental Health, in the course of justifying a budget request of \$35,000,000 for the Institute's fiscal year, specifically listed alcoholism and outlined the Institute's proposals in relation to chronic, excessive drinking. The director emphasized that the over-all approach of the National Institute was based on the psychiatric premise that alcoholism is a reaction syndrome basically related to deeper problems that derive from psychological and physiological functioning of the total personality structure. To assist programs for the care and rehabilitation of alcoholics, he requested the extension and intensification of the federal program of consultation and assistance as well as improved and expanded training for professional personnel. Preventive programs were similarly related to health education as a resource. Greater interest on the part of research workers in the medical and behavioral sciences was urged. While these recommenda-

⁹ "Hospitalization of Patients with Alcoholism" from the "Reports of Officers," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, October 20, 1956, pp. 750.

tions were in keeping with the established policies and functions of the United States Public Health Service, they included alcoholism by name and placed it on the roster of problems to be given more planned attention.¹⁰

RELIGIOUS BODIES CHANGE

With activities and convictions dynamically altering public opinion, national religious bodies have felt the changes in the social climate. Noting this, many major religious bodies in the United States have included in their official pronouncements during the last twenty years careful and deliberate statements about the responsibilities and the obligations of their clergy and members in relation to alcoholism. In some religious bodies, this has been a radical move from previous positions. To others, it was a matter of reviving an historical interest in the problems of alcohol. Prominent features in religious statements are the emphases on pastoral counseling of alcoholics and the prevention of the excessive use of alcohol through church education; in some instances such special attention to alcoholism was added to traditional beliefs opposing all use of alcohol. In all, there has been a recognition that the problem, in complex ways, is multidetermined and reaches deeply into the legal, religious, and social roots of the community and social life.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Alongside these national activities is the international World Health Organization's work by its expert committees. The Committee on Drugs Liable to Produce Addiction, the Committee on Mental Health, its Alcoholism Subcommittee, and the Committee on Alcohol have all released professional reports relating di-

¹⁰ Robert H. Felix, "Mental Health Problems," *Social Legislation Information Service*, No. 25, July 1, 1957, pp. 176-77.

rectly or indirectly to alcoholism. Concentrating on both the theoretical and practical aspects of the problem, the publications affirm that there is sufficient scientific knowledge to enable a serious attempt at the medical control of alcoholism, although, at the same time, major difficulties are recognized. This, however, is in marked contrast to an earlier situation when in 1928 medical and scientific information was so lacking it prevented the League of Nations Health Committee from undertaking a program when it considered alcoholism. At that time, there appeared to be no differentiation between the medico-scientific outlook on the one hand and the reform-political action outlook on the other. A distinction is now drawn between them, and the "Report of the First Session" of the Subcommittee on Alcoholism projects a full blown program. The summary of the comprehensive recommendations follows:

Section 1

- (a) WHO (World Health Organization) should encourage public health services to undertake the medical prevention and early treatment of alcoholism;
- (b) WHO should provide advisory, educational, and other services on this subject.

Section 2

- (a) A subcommittee on alcohol (as opposed to alcoholism) should be set up under the Expert Committee on Drugs Liable to Produce Addiction;
- (b) This subcommittee should study the modification of metabolism occurring in alcoholism;
- (c) It should also study the physiological aspects of alcohol tolerance;
- (d) The term "successfully arrested" should be used rather than "cure" in cases of "addictive drinking" which have been successfully treated, and the criterion of such

result should be based on several years' continued abstinence.

Section 3

- (a) All countries should develop national statistics on alcoholism;
- (b) A small working group of experts with special experience of this subject should discuss this problem before the next meeting of the alcoholism subcommittee.

Section 4

- (a) Outpatient dispensary services for alcoholics should be set up at general hospitals;
- (b) Non-medical workers directing residential institutions for long-standing cases of alcoholism should receive special training and should work under medical supervision.

Section 5

- (a) WHO should take steps to obtain international acceptance of a common name for tetraethylthiuram-disulfide;
- (b) This drug should not be used by laymen; it should be available only to the medical profession and should be employed only on cases in which continued supervision is possible by physicians experienced in the problem of alcoholism;
- (c) Further research should be conducted on the value of ACTH and cortisone in the handling of the clinical problems of alcoholism.

Section 6

- (a) Teaching on the subject of alcoholism should be included in the training of all physicians, public health nurses, and medical social workers;
- (b) Dispensary services for alcoholics at general hospitals should be used to provide clinical teaching on this subject.

Section 7

- (a) WHO should publish a classified bibliography on alcoholism;
- (b) WHO should make available to important centres in different regions sets of the Abstract Archive of the Alcohol Literature which exist at Yale University;

- (c) WHO should foster the creation of an international organization which would unite the professional and scientific societies and individual experts working in the field of alcoholism;
- (d) WHO should sponsor a travelling study-group on alcoholism to review and report upon recent developments in the prevention and treatment of this problem;
- (e) WHO should collaborate in holding short courses for individuals professionally concerned with the problems of alcoholism.¹¹

While it would be a serious error to conclude that broad policy statements and comprehensive proposals by general religious, legal, or medical groups are reflections of rank-and-file opinion and conviction, they are signs that the new approaches to and ideas about alcohol-

¹¹ World Health Organization Expert Committee on Mental Health, "Report of the First Session of the Alcoholism Subcommittee," September 1951, pp. 16-18.

ism have gained increasing acceptance. There can be great gaps between top-level formulations and grass-roots thinking, but intellectual and emotional change which precedes action has taken place in key segments of the leadership of major groups.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This description of the development of specialized programs on alcoholism points out their presence and newness. It indicates unanimity of agreement about basic concepts and, through their revival of consideration of excessive drinking, emphasizes their influence on established agencies. Probable future activities will be the stimulation of more research projects, the conservative increase in rehabilitation services, and the incorporation of tested treatment and education activities into the total work of inclusive social institutions where alcoholism will receive the attention its complexity and prevalence require.

Book Department

	PAGE
HUMAN RELATIONS	144
ECONOMICS AND LABOR	155
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY	161
ASIA AND AFRICA	171
EUROPE	177
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	186

HUMAN RELATIONS

FRANCES LOMAS FELDMAN. *The Family in a Money World*. Pp. iv, 188. New York: Family Service Association of America, 1957. \$2.50.

The author, who teaches social work at the University of Southern California, is concerned in this book with people in trouble over family finances; the role of the social worker in advising them; and the present practices they use in trying to remedy the situations. The first part consists of six chapters which deal with the family in a money world from marriage to its dissolution. The eight chapters of the second part discuss the patterns which the social worker and others use to try to get the families out of trouble. The study was started in the "tract areas" surrounding Los Angeles, but it was expanded to include experiences in other regions using a large advisory committee composed of people from a variety of disciplines.

This work is very valuable for the social worker and for anyone else who wishes to get some insight into the mentality of a large number of our current wage-earning and salaried families in the United States. No matter what kinds of difficulties they have—and many at various times in their lives have problems which involve social workers—these always seem to bring on financial trouble either primarily or secondarily. The social worker may not be able to solve all of a family's troubles, but at least he tries to do something for the

"money world" ailments. All along the traditional family path, from marriage and child rearing to old age and retirement, there are numerous problems and crises. In addition, there are the troubles of the "single adults," of unmarried mothers with children, of broken families, and so on.

The work more or less suggests and implies that this "money world" is pretty much of an "American" problem and not universal. The reviewer feels that similar varieties of these same problems exist wherever there are wage-earning and salaried people in a money exchange economy. Then too the book gives some impression of the philosophy that "whatever is, is the best form of life," even if this means loading up with time payments and their exorbitant interest charges. Obviously almost anyone can now buy on time, and a goodly proportion of those who do so get into trouble and fail to pay out. This means that those who do pay are buying not only for themselves but are making up for the losses on others. Here any criticism of this brittle kind of economic life is pushed aside as more or less old-fashioned "New Englandism." The author herself shows that this money-proletariat philosophy is not as prevalent among the educated "in any age group" as among the uneducated (p. 13). Neither does this disclaimer meet the arguments of prominent philosophers—Toynbee, Sorokin, and many others—concerning our brittle economic life.

Finally, the author in several references seems to imply that the support by parents

of "young married people attending college" is more or less a "free-will" or voluntary offering. Generally these youngsters, if not veterans, have married because of fortuitous events or certainly against parental advice and consent. The ensuing results "cause" parents, often against their better judgment, to spend much on them which these aged persons should be putting away for old age and retirement. The older couple then retires on "social security" with few additional funds, and on the death of the father, the mother wishes to move in with her son or daughter. This is a vicious circle.

Family advisers say many times: "You should give this money you have saved for your daughter's education to your son-in-law for his education so he can support her properly." Parents generally will do so, but not "willingly." The other notorious type of case begins with the famous statement: "She will work and help me finish my education." Then the young woman begins "expecting," and this "blessed event" puts the burden back on the aged parents. All of this is completely different from the normal social procedure of helping the offspring—unattached—to prepare for a profession. This is sound social procedure whereas the former is an injustice to the parents.

The problem of family exigencies and money was first taken up by the Elizabethans and the Political Arithmeticians. Later Le Play, Ernest Engel, and others made their contributions. The reviewer does not believe that only this last generation has solved the matter through its creeping inflationary economy and carelessness in handling ever mounting volumes of "transfer payments." But in spite of this disagreement the book is very highly recommended.

CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN

Harvard University

ALBERT COHEN, ALFRED LINDESMITH, and KARL SCHUESSLER (Eds.). *The Sutherland Papers*. Pp. vi, 330. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956. \$5.00.

The quarter century (1925-50) encompassed by these papers witnessed a heartening extension of rigorous scholarship and of improved methods of scientific research

for dealing with criminal behavior. This volume, which brings together in readily accessible form some of Sutherland's more significant published and hitherto unpublished papers, is both a demonstration of the maturing of criminological thought and an evidence that Sutherland was a major contributor to it.

The writings here presented include Sutherland's incisive critical evaluations of such criminological research monographs as Hooton's *Crime and the Man* and *The American Criminal*, Sheldon's *Varieties of Delinquent Youth*, and the Gluecks' *Later Criminal Careers*. The papers also include commentaries on significant current problems, procedures, and methods of which *Murder and the Death Penalty*, *The Sexual Psychopath Laws*, *Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency*, *The Reliability of Criminal Statistics*, and *The Prison as a Criminological Laboratory* are representative. Three of the papers present Sutherland's views on *White Collar Crime* based upon his own research, and four papers are devoted to the development of Sutherland's theory of crime causation in terms of differential association.

Criminologists who are professionally obligated to understand and make the best possible evaluation of the theory of differential association will be happy to have easier access to Sutherland's address on the origin and development of this theory. And Sutherland's own critique of it, intended only for circulation among his associates, and previously unpublished, is also a useful inclusion. The four papers in this section not only clarify the theory but also make it obvious that Sutherland considered it a tentative formulation. They show that he was aware of its limitations and that he considered that the problems involved required modifications of his theory which would also, hopefully, permit the retention of whatever in it might appear to be valid. The life history of the theory is not only an illuminating account of its emergence but an evidence of the stature of Sutherland as a devoted scientist.

The collection of these papers, diverse as they are in substantive content, does, nevertheless, show a unity in ultimate objective and method. It discloses an im-

pressive array of other fruitful concepts which Sutherland had nurtured and developed to the point of specific applicability in the analysis of criminal behavior. One such idea is that of "differential social organization" as an improvement over the concept of "social disorganization" in understanding the group role in crime causation. This concept was suggested by Sutherland who saw criminal behavior to be quite as much an expression of a specific form of social organization and as surely rooted in it as is noncriminal behavior.

If Sutherland neither originated nor first emphasized the importance of the type of criminal behavior to which he attached the label "white collar," he certainly presented the most comprehensive analysis of its sociological characteristics. His distinction between the accessibility of "private culture"—analogous to the culture of primary groups—and "public culture"—as presented in mass communications media and observable in business, politics, and sports—is suggestive. This is also true of his analysis of crime as part of a specific type of conflict process.

The volume is thoughtfully edited with brief informative commentaries. It includes a Bibliography of Sutherland's books and principal articles, the latter arranged chronologically.

Laymen will find these papers written in decent, clear, unpretentious English with only an essential minimum of sociological jargon. For them this volume will constitute an introduction to some significant problems in criminology. These are presented in a manner which should command respect for the rigorous methods and scholarly standards of their author. Sociologists may find improved understanding and clarification of Sutherland's principal concepts which are here brought so felicitously together.

ALBERT MORRIS

Professor of Sociology
Boston University

GEORGE W. ROBERTS. *The Population of Jamaica*. Pp. xxii, 356. London: Cambridge University Press for the Conservation Foundation at the University Press, 1957. \$7.50.

This book provides an excellent example of the growing debt the British colonies, and through them the British people, owe to American philanthropy and scholarship. Dr. Roberts has made a careful and comprehensive study of population differences and trends in Jamaica since the commencement of British occupation. The existing records are used with discrimination and with a full realization of their shortcomings from a statistical point of view. The available evidence is marshaled and analyzed; its comparative reliability thoughtfully assessed; and its value carefully appraised. It is interesting to note how, in this as in so many other respects, Jamaica as compared with the rest of the British Caribbean is "out on a limb" and differs radically from its sister components both in its past history and its present characteristics. Similar factors have operated, but in different degree. The net result of natural increase, varying mortality rates, and migration in Jamaica has been a more stable progress—a steadier increase in population than elsewhere.

Anyone interested in the future of Jamaica will find the book—as the writer has done—of very considerable interest. It is, for instance, quite clear that up to the last census external migration has played a very slight part in Jamaica's demographic experience. One begins to wonder, as one notes the rapidly increasing number of Jamaicans in London, whether this is going to be as true in the immediate future. Walking not infrequently through London and Birmingham today, as the writer has occasion to do, one probably gets an exaggerated impression of the proportion of Africans, and particularly of West Indians in the population. Nevertheless, the migration is substantial, appears to be sustained, and is posing serious problems both to Britain and the West Indies.

The coming of federation may also alter the weight of internal migration as a factor. However, this is less likely to have considerable effect since Trinidad is already overcrowded enough to be politically very sensitive to the problem; the East Indian majority in British Guiana will be definitely hostile; and in British Honduras, there is already a marked tendency to look to Span-

ish America for recruits rather than to the Caribbean.

Dr. Roberts' study of the mating and fertility patterns is exhaustive, and slightly repetitive, though perhaps not more so than their peculiarities—and the consequent need for emphasis—warrant.

Lady Molly Huggins' attempt to promote mass marriages under gubernatorial patronage was an interesting, if slight, attempt to influence the mating pattern in favor of marriage as against common law union, but history and custom still prevail. The book culminates in a study of two possible projections of "controlled growth" that may prevail in the future. Of the two, the writer considers the second more likely. Either will pose problems that will be very difficult to solve. Money for education, pensions for the aged, and work for potential workers will all be difficult to find without very substantial outside financial aid.

RAYMOND PRIESTLEY

Director
Falkland Islands Dependencies
Scientific Bureau
London

EDITH G. NEISSER. *The Eldest Child*. Pp. xiv, 174. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$3.50.

This is a popular book, designed for the general reader. Its purpose is to help toward an understanding of the problems of the eldest child in the family, and it should be assessed on this basis.

The book's eight chapters range over myths and customs in various cultures relating to the eldest child; the effect upon the parents of the arrival of the first child; his reign as an only child, the next arrivals, and the role in which the eldest child comes to be cast; and the eldest child in special family situations such as adoptions, incomplete homes, homes with three generations, and the like.

The treatment throughout is discursive, suggestive, and highly readable. For the critical scientific student, it poses a large variety of hypotheses; for the general reader, it is replete with thought-provoking insights; for the parent, it contributes understanding and helpful hints; and for the reader who, like the present reviewer, has

been the eldest one, it offers interpretations that cannot but contribute to one's self-understanding.

The five Appendices include references on the following: myths and customs; studies of the eldest child; a reading list for parents; the eldest in fiction, drama, and biography; and the eldest in contemporary children's literature. While the contents of the book are dressed in popular garb, its roots are well imbedded in the scientific literature.

JAMES H. S. BOSSARD

William T. Carter Professor of
Child Development and
Professor of Sociology
University of Pennsylvania

FRANK J. BRUNO with chapters by LOUIS TOWLEY. *Trends in Social Work, 1874-1956: A History Based on the Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work*. Pp. xviii, 462. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957. \$5.75.

The late Frank Bruno's *Trends in Social Work*, a history of social work based on the *Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work, 1874-1946*, was first published in 1948. The present volume consists of that book plus three chapters by Louis Towley based on the *Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work, 1946-56*.

Bruno's work is a successful evocation of the past. Himself a "grand old man" of social work, he lived through a good part of the history he describes and gives a sense of immediacy to the reader's understanding of social welfare people and events in the latter 1800's and early 1900's. The *Proceedings* are not slavishly summarized but are used rather to illustrate what Bruno himself knew and wanted to say about social welfare. The tone is more one of reminiscence than of history.

About thirty of Bruno's thirty-six chapters deal with specific welfare programs and topics—child labor, state welfare boards, mother's pensions, charity organization, and so forth—rather than with the profession of social work. These discussions of welfare programs are perceptive but perforce brief; fuller treatments can be found elsewhere. The real value of the book lies in

the light it throws on the curious process by which the broadly liberal, humanitarian, and reform-conscious social work of the early decades became the a-historical, case-minded, technique-focussed social work of 1950. Though Bruno himself became dean of a professional school of social work, there runs through his writing a strong note of regret and bewilderment at what professionalism has done to the welfare work and welfare worker of his youth. He wonders wistfully how greatly the use of volunteers might have been expanded "had it not been blocked in the early twentieth century by the rise of a professional personnel" (p. 104). He feels it "tragic" that an impetus toward narrow technicism "was given social work at the very inception of its professional consciousness" by the famous 1915 Conference paper on professionalism by Flexner (p. 141). He would be happy to see the great efforts professional social work is now making to re-expand its philosophical and intellectual boundaries.

Towley's three chapters on the 1946-1956 period are, pardonably, less successful; it takes rare genius to make understandable history out of a welter of events so close they are still upon us. Though the correct major developments are selected for discussion, little perspective is achieved; there is considerable floundering between insignificant detail and inchoate generality, and the language is often opaque—a come-down from Bruno's clear and stately prose.

To make sense of its past and give direction to its future, American social work badly needs an expanded historical literature. This book is a valuable addition; most of it can be read with enjoyment by the general public as well as by the student of social welfare. One hopes, however, that the publishers do not intend to pursue a plan of decennial additions to Bruno's basic work—it stands best by itself.

CHARLES N. LEBEAUX

Associate Professor of Sociology
Wayne State University

ALAN KEITH-LUCAS. *Decisions About People in Need: A Study of Administrative Responsiveness in Public Assistance*. Pp.

x, 318. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957. \$6.00.

Professor Keith-Lucas has written a provocative and challenging attack on some widely accepted current beliefs in social work and public assistance. His book is certain to create great emotional and intellectual upheaval among public welfare personnel.

The author has performed a valuable service in subjecting some sacrosanct principles in public welfare to logical and penetrating analysis. Reviewing a wide variety of scholarly reports in public administration and the social sciences, he has presented, in a well-documented manner, the great dilemma between public assistance policy and administration.

The author contends that it is impossible to have a public assistance program which simultaneously safeguards the "right to assistance" and provides "service." "While it may be obvious that Americans might want both, they cannot have both in the framework of the same program." He thus runs counter to the expressed national policy embodied by Congress in the Social Security Amendments of 1956 which specifically incorporated the "service" element in the public assistance program. He points out that these amendments attempt the very kind of compromise which he "believes to be both unworkable and unfair" and refers to their "paternalistic approach."

Arthur J. Altmeyer, former Commissioner for Social Security, states that the book has value in alerting us to the danger that under the guise of such noble goals as "service," "we may unwittingly be retrograding toward old fashioned poor relief with its intrusion into the control of the private affairs of our economically disadvantaged citizens."

The perplexing issue discussed by Keith-Lucas deserves more extended critical exploration than can be given in a brief review. He assumes that adjustment services are an intrusion in an individual's life, and that case-work services are undemocratic and undesirable. He infers that he would leave all such "adjustment" activities solely to religion and the courts. There are many who will take exception to these

points of view and to the omission of any discussion of the consequences of not providing services in public assistance.

In this reviewer's opinion, Keith-Lucas may be described as an "either-or" or "black or white" public administration logician. He assumes a program can have only one basic purpose and that other possible objectives cannot be reconciled within the same administrative framework. This type of reasoning tends to be out of line with the pragmatic approach in American life where "multiple-purpose" programs are operative in hydroelectric power, education, social security, and in other institutions. Where is there a going social institution, whether it be marriage, the family, or public welfare, which has only one basic purpose with no internal conflicting principles? One of the tasks of the political scientist and the social worker is to discover how to harmonize conflicting needs and principles so as to make our institutions work more effectively in a real world of people with infinitely varying motivations and potentialities.

WILBUR J. COHEN

Professor of Public Welfare
Administration
University of Michigan

D. J. O'CONNOR. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*. Pp. vii, 148. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. \$3.75.

This is a concise statement by a professor of philosophy at the University of Liverpool touching on major issues in metaphysics, morals, and religion, as well as on the problem of educational theory. The title may be misleading. The book does not offer a philosophically grounded educational program. It comprises an exposition—intended for students of education with little formal training in philosophy—of the contemporary conception termed "philosophical analysis." Its purpose is "rather to get rid of misconceptions than to give any positive information."

The diffident approach follows from the view that the function of philosophy is limited to clarification and criticism. Philosophical analysis, it is held, has first the negative purpose of "an intellectual anti-

septic," of inhibiting the growth of ideas that lie beyond validation by logic and experience. It can also have the positive result of "clarifying and refocusing our thinking" on questions for which science gives no final solutions. Throughout, there is an undercurrent of attack on "traditional metaphysics," and on its claim of providing a secure foundation for ethics and education. The ultimate reliance of philosophical analysis is on scientific method; this depends on careful observation which is controlled by hypotheses, subjected to logical analysis, and checked by experiment. Sound theory in all areas must be in accord with scientific findings of fact and developed by methods which emulate the logical and experimental procedures of the natural sciences.

Applying his stringent criteria, Professor O'Connor concludes that educational theory rests on very weak foundations and that the use of the term "theory" in educational contexts is hardly more than a "courtesy title." Educational theory of necessity depends on the psychological and social sciences which are still in an embryonic stage of development. Philosophical activity can aid toward developing a valid educational theory by stressing the need for factual evidence, by insisting on the meaningful use of words, and by making plain the value judgments implicit in educational proposals; but it is not its business to project any positive program. Educational theory, in the proper sense, must await the future development of the psychological and social sciences. The best we can do in the meantime is to follow empirical common-sense experience.

Professor O'Connor recognizes that his limitation of the philosophic function to an "intellectual antiseptic" and to the achievement of order and clarity in our thinking will not be readily accepted. It should be clear that it will be regarded as inadequate not only by those who seek a transcendental sanction but by the great body of educators who take a humanistic and cultural view. Professor O'Connor's endeavor to sterilize philosophy renders it mostly sterile.

Philosophy respects science and endeavors to formulate its assumptions and conception of human purpose in harmony with

scientific findings. But educational philosophy must be based on a philosophy of life, not on a philosophy of science. And this implies a broader range of human experience than the realm of science. It includes aspiration and a vision of the good life. Philosophy, it is true, begins by criticism of accepted beliefs, and it involves clarification of issues. But its task is not finished until it restores beliefs—beliefs which are better not only because they are more in accord with scientific findings but because they satisfy better the ethical ideals of our civilization.

I. B. BERKSON

Professor of Education
The City College of New York

H. G. GOOD. *A History of American Education*. Pp. vii, 570. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956. \$6.00.

When the definitive history of education in the United States is written, it will undoubtedly be linked to the mainstream of American life. It will show how education developed from political, economic, and social conditions; conversely it will describe the impact of educational efforts on American society itself. This survey will not be confined to formal schooling; it will consider such educational influences outside the classroom as museums, county fairs, 4-H Clubs, and adult forums.

Professor Good's summary of American education from the time of Elizabeth I to the recent past makes a good start in this direction. Like Parrington's *Main Currents in American Thought*, the story is etched against the background of American civilization. The growth of political and social democracy, for example, is related to the transformation of American education from a system of private schools for the privileged to a system of public education. This emerging system, Professor Good states, is opening "schools of all levels to all peoples of every color and condition and both sexes." Unfortunately, there is little effort in this volume to appraise the performance of American education in terms of such objectives. We never discover whether the new opportunities for learning, made available in the recent past, have really made American education a

highway for upward mobility for depressed economic groups or a means for improving the condition of minorities.

In all fairness, these apparent shortcomings cannot be ascribed solely to the author. His citations reveal a thorough grasp of existing literature in the area. It is the literature itself which is inadequate. The monographic work in this subject is sparse indeed when compared with the output of researchers in political, constitutional, or even economic history. No one individual, of course, could be expected to make a systematic study of all the original sources in the field. George Bancroft, it may be recalled, spent half a century hunting down the sources for his pioneering volumes, and his searches cost a quarter of a million dollars in current purchasing power. Bancroft's works, however, were limited chiefly to political-military history, and he covered half the period essayed by Professor Good.

Curiously enough, the most interesting sections are written with little relevance to the American political and economic scene. The concluding chapters present an objective overview of current educational theory and trends. These include such things as progressive education, new curriculum practices, the rise of the junior high school and junior college, desegregation, and recent criticisms of public education. Long after scholarly research has presented fresh facts and viewpoints in American educational history, this volume may be remembered for its apposite summary of contemporary issues in American education. For present-day readers it offers something else besides—a well-written account of three and a half centuries of American education, based on the best research in the field today.

FREDERICK SHAW

Research Associate
Board of Education
New York City

SAMUEL J. WARNER. *The Urge to Mass Destruction*. Pp. xii, 188. New York: Grune & Stratton, 1957. \$3.50.

The author, a consulting psychologist and psychotherapist, devotes this little volume to "the urge of man to destroy himself along with others" (p. viii), or the impulse to what he calls self-and-other de-

feat. He analyzes three manifestations of this urge. In the first place it is seen in the "defeating patient" in psychotherapy; that is the patient who does not really wish to be cured, who directs his energies against the efforts being made by the therapist and thereby defeats himself as well. The second manifestation is to be found in the concept of Satan, who sought to defeat and destroy the work of the Creator even if he destroyed himself in the process. The third is represented by the philosophy of Nietzsche; he replaced the humanitarian values of Judeo-Christian religion by the quest for power, and his basic tenets were incorporated into the totalitarianism of the Nazis. The common characteristics in these three areas are the craving for individual power and the motive of revenge. The common etiological pattern is the severe frustration resulting from the feeling of being insufficiently loved; this leads through various intermediate steps to the urge to destroy, even to efforts to organized mass self-destruction. What man needs, therefore, is "the sense of being loved" (p. 170); we must move away from the exaltation of power and take the road to mutualism, brotherhood, and the ethic of love.

The author is obviously on the side of the angels, and he has worked hard to marshal the evidence in favor of his humanitarian thesis. There are probably few among us who would quarrel with his view that man has the ability to love as well as to hate, that he needs the security of acceptance by others, and that when that is denied him he may turn to hostility instead of co-operation. Is it necessary for the defense of that position to hunt so assiduously for analogies among Nietzsche, Satanism, and a negative therapeutic reaction? Does it help to explain Nietzsche's philosophy as the outgrowth of his mental illness—which is debatable—or to relate his ideas to the development of National Socialism—which is also debatable, and in any case has been done by many others? Can improved therapy applied to the negatively oriented patient help us to deal with mass destruction as a social phenomenon? Does the cult of Satanism really play an important part in the lives of people today? Even granting that the urge to self-

other destruction can be identified in these three areas, does that tell us more than we knew at the outset, namely, that some people and some philosophies are like that and that other ways and different attitudes are preferable?

These questions are asked in all honesty by a reader who admires the author's erudition and humanitarianism but remains puzzled as to the purpose of his book.

OTTO KLINEBERG

Professor of Psychology
Columbia University

MIRRA KOMAROVSKY (Ed.). *Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences*. Pp. vii, 439. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press and Falcon's Wing Press, 1957. \$6.00.

The timing of this volume is acute, and its form is a deliberately devised tool. Consisting of a series of studies, long and short, with no common theme or type of presentation, the skillful hand of editorial direction makes it clear that it is an enterprise in the solid tradition of crusading scholarship. It tackles at least two critical issues. Its tactic is not so much a direct attack but an infiltration which is calculated to take effect by the provocations of self-evidence.

The target is to redress a threatening imbalance in methodology emerging out of the momentum of quantification and to reduce the wastage of scholarly resources incident to communication blocks between specialists. This is a large order. It deserves probing and debate. It obviously invites the conflict of strong opinion—even polemic—in an affective area.

This well-conceived plan of attack takes a fresh route. Within their specializing frames of reference, history, economics, and political science stake out their claims to human behavior problems. What relevance have these disciplines to sociology, psychology, and anthropology? It should be noted that this question may be asked both in respect to the methodological tools they use and in respect to the selection of problems. This is the more general form of the issue, although in the execution of this volume it sometimes take the form of asking what contribution psychology, sociology, and anthropology—or even more

narrowly the research-techniques specialist—can make to the specialties of economics, history, and political science.

It would have been possible to bring together a symposium focused on these issues which might either have produced an explosion or been a repetition of commonplaces—more likely the latter. Instead, the editor chose to dramatize the problems by making it possible for a number of specialists to present a study, each in his own field, and let the demonstration speak for itself. The result is to lift some problems out of the atmosphere of superficial controversy and give them the sharp definition of fruitful communication. The exercise is not encyclopedic but selectively illustrative. One may feel that the distribution of materials concentrates too heavily on the distribution of poll techniques to history, economics, and political science, or that there is too much of a tendency to frame the issue narrowly on what the measurement techniques in sociology and psychology may contribute to the other disciplines. Nevertheless, despite the emphases, what is made clear again is the two-way debt—an acknowledgment of the fact that the historian, the political scientist, and the economist all have contributions to make to the more generalizing social scientist.

One significant service of the demonstration is to spell out, at a juncture when it is important to recognize it, that none of the social behavior disciplines has a monopoly on any set of methodological techniques. The boundaries between fields are legitimate, but they are not in principle methodological. They are substantive in the sense that the problematics of each reflect differences of reference points and thus the kinds of questions asked. Even here they overlap, so that specific problems may have reference points which properly locate them in more than one framework. Thus we find that when patterned recurrence is the historian's interest; the measurement of decision-making is the assignment of the sociologist; the dynamics of groups in interaction is the concern of the social psychologist; or model analysis is the task of a Keynesian economist, then the discipline label is no cogent claim to

monopoly. Assuming that there are only two generic methods in the human behavioral studies (the adaptation of measurement techniques and the massing of cumulative accessible evidence), then all of these disciplines will tackle their problems with any of the appropriate tools. Communication between them is productive and its facilitation a part of that common enterprise which not only does not need to blur the special tasks of each but may increase the resources of the specialties.

The service of this symposium is that it brings into focus issues which are urgent in their current demand for attention. Its strength derives not from the advocacy of any facile conclusions but from the self-evident demonstrations that provoke the kind of debate upon which productive scholarship flourishes.

WELLMAN J. WARNER

Chairman, Department of
Sociology and Anthropology
New York University

THEODORE BRAMELD. *Cultural Foundations of Education: An Interdisciplinary Exploration*. Pp. xxi, 330. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$5.00.

This innovative and challenging book is focused around three massive problems and propositions concerning the interrelationship of education to culture. They are as follows: the problem of human order—education cannot be ordered without a search for renewed order in the culture; the problem of human process—understanding process in culture will permit us to vitalize the methodology of learning; and the problem of human goals. This last focus can best be communicated by a direct quotation: "If, accordingly, the educator hopes to clarify any issue involving human goals—and thus the goals of students, parents, teachers, or administrators—he, too, must move beyond mere verbalizing. In fact, he must move far beyond the domain of the school. He must look to the source from which all issues of education ultimately spring—where the sorrows and frustrations, the joys and satisfactions of real human life are in ceaseless flow. He must look, in short, to the culture" (p. 25).

In the analysis of these three problem areas, Professor Brameld ranges impressively through philosophy, psychology, history, sociology, political science, and other related fields, seeking relevance and meaning for educational theory. But his search centers upon the offerings of cultural anthropology. Without any doubt, his book is the most thorough analysis of the relevance of this discipline to education, at the level of theory, that exists to date. It constitutes an explicit and unique recognition of the potential power of a cultural approach to educational problems and processes that was first recognized more than fifty years ago but about which little has been done—at least from the specifically anthropological point of view.

At many points throughout his searching analysis, Professor Brameld reveals his passionate feeling for the reconstruction of our culture and the educational process, with the goal that human potential for the good and creative life may be realized more fully. This value orientation permeates the book and may be shared or rejected by the reader according to his own predilections, since it is an apparent and forthright bias.

Though his exploration of the conceptualizing, theoretical literature of anthropology is both thorough and creative, his task is so defined that he does not encounter many descriptive ethnographic studies or objective scientific research. And it is these substantive, explicit analyses of cultural form and process which include the best work of anthropologists and the most significant contributions of the discipline.

The next move is up to the anthropologists. What is needed now are operational treatments of education in our culture (and vice versa) which reduce the level of abstraction from the concepts of education and culture to the actual behavior of children, teachers, school administrators, parents, and school boards in the context of American culture. Some first steps in this direction are described in *Education and Anthropology* (Stanford Press, 1955). Work of this order is being undertaken and reported by a few anthropologists like Jules Henry, Solon T. Kimball, Margaret

Mead, and this reviewer. Professor Brameld's book defines the conceptual scope of the problems and provides an integrated frame of reference which is essential to further systematic effort.

GEORGE D. SPINDLER

Associate Professor of
Education and Anthropology
Stanford University

HOWARD WARRENDER. *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation*. Pp. ix, 346. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1957. \$6.75.

In interpreting Hobbes, the author focuses on an issue of fundamental importance for an adequate understanding of his political philosophy. Is there an authentic concept of obligation in Hobbes, and, if this is so, what is its philosophical basis? Mr. Warrender's answer to the first of these two questions is in the affirmative. He argues not only that Hobbes does entertain a clear idea of obligation but also that this idea, sustained throughout all of Hobbes's writings, applies to the state of nature as well as to civil society. The latter thesis is defended against the alternative view according to which obligation, absent from the state of nature, is brought into existence by the social contract. But what, precisely, does Hobbes mean by obligation? In *De cive* (English Works, II, 209) Hobbes affirms that there are two types of obligation, both characterized as privations of liberty. The first type is instanced by "heaven and earth, and all creatures," the constraining factor being "the common laws of their creation"; the second type, by the loss of liberty through hope and fear "according to which the weaker, despairing of his own power to resist, cannot but yield to the stronger." The stronger one, exercising power and thereby imposing obligation, is first of all God, then also the human sovereign. The first type, styled "physical obligation" by the author, plays, so we learn, no important part in Hobbes's doctrine and can be safely neglected; the second type, called "moral obligation" or, more conservatively, "what stands for moral obligation in Hobbes's doctrine," holds a dominant position. Thus Mr. Warrender vindicates the logical con-

sistency of Hobbes by showing "that there is in Hobbes's philosophy a theory of obligation of the same type, that runs through the whole of his account of man, both apart from and within civil society" (p. 7). Up to a certain point, the author, a level-headed analyst of admirable intellectual honesty, succeeds in establishing his point. But being no philosopher, he fails to see, or fully to appreciate, the fact that Hobbes's "obligation" is actually a form of compulsion, an acting under duress, and that the qualifying adjective "moral" is a misnomer. In asserting that Hobbes's theory of duty "belongs essentially to the natural-law tradition" (p. 322) he falls a prey to an illusion created by an artfully designed terminology.

HELMUT KUHN

München
Germany

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN. *Political Thought in Perspective*. (McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science.) Pp. xiv, 588. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1957. \$7.00.

Fellow political scientists are indebted to Professor William Ebenstein of Princeton University for a number of useful textbooks on political thought. A few years ago he published a volume on *Great Political Thinkers* from Plato to the present day. These were presented to the reader on the basis of a selection of the most characteristic passages from their own writings. Such a reproduction of original statements, accompanied by appropriate introductions, is certainly the best way to acquaint students not only with the various trends in political thought but also with some of the great classical writings of our Western heritage. This time Professor Ebenstein has chosen a new approach. He presents the evolution of political ideas from Plato to the present day as seen by distinguished fellow thinkers and statesmen themselves. In many instances, several critical and appreciative viewpoints about the same political thinker are printed. The reader thus receives the benefit of assisting at a discussion of political ideas and issues by a most prominent gathering. Many of the selections have been unavailable before in

easily accessible English editions. The book can be warmly recommended as a supplementary text in courses on political theory.

HANS KOHN

Professor of History
The City College of New York

DIAMOND JENNESS. *Dawn in Arctic Alaska*. Pp. 222. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957. \$4.75.

Culturally and physically, Eskimos are among the most thoroughly studied people in the world. Against the background of these studies of over three centuries, this superbly written account of anthropological research among the Eskimos stands out for both its detail and synoptic characterization of Eskimo life. With an invitation from Edward Sapir to join the Stefansson Expedition, Dr. Diamond Jenness went to the Arctic coast of north Alaska in 1913. He proceeded to learn the language, a feat he accomplished by living with Eskimo families. In addition to his ethnological observations, he conducted archaeological excavations in prehistoric house sites. The first winter, 1913-14, he was unaccompanied by other members of the expedition for the greater part of the time. His dependence upon the Eskimos in consequence contributed to his acceptance by them. Though the purely scientific studies have been published elsewhere, this small volume covers the full range of Eskimo culture. It is written with such consummate skill that the reader is scarcely aware of the wealth of articulated detail. A glance at the extensive Index confirms the thoroughness of his observations.

Under the accipitrine eye of Dr. Jenness, household members become individual personalities; even particular children become distinct entities with their own personal histories and characteristic reactions to the harsh physical surroundings and the amazingly cohesive cultural environment. Art, sickness, cooking, and cat's cradles assume a logical place in the life of each household and of its members. With unerring accuracy, Dr. Jenness identifies those habits or characteristics of Eskimos which are generic, as contrasted with the idiosyncratic habits which distinguish one from another. It is this knowledge of the universal or

generic elements of Eskimo culture which renders this account of even more value than if it possessed only the precise and insightful observations which provide its understorey.

The ecological background covers not only descriptions of hunting, fishing, trapping, sled travel, animals, and birds. It also consists of the prices received for furs, the purchases made with these receipts, and the function and meaning of the goods in the households where they eventually arrive. Those aspects of culture change which resulted from increasing contacts with Europeans on the coast between Barrow and the Mackenzie delta, and include the coastward movement of the inland Eskimos, are well documented. The inventiveness of the Eskimos, a major theme in their culture, is amply illustrated with descriptions of things as apparently diverse as a three-way screw driver and an especially contrived mosquito-proof hat. Non-material traits, such as the reworking of elements of Christian religion, are equally well treated, and the total result is useful to understanding culture change among these people. Drawings of an Eskimo artist are included, as well as those prepared more recently by an Italian artist. Five maps enhance the utility of the book.

Two important generalizations are to be found in the concluding portions of this work. They proceed quite naturally from specific examples cited in descriptions of family life and interpersonal relations. One concerns the unusual degree of authority granted each person, an authority which permits him to jeopardize or even destroy himself without the intervention of others; it does not, however, permit him to threaten the welfare of the group. The other, a corollary of the first, remarks the spirit of teamship and tolerance of idiosyncrasies which make possible the maintenance of small communities without either government or leaders.

A final testimony to the charming accuracy of descriptions of individual Eskimos and the pencil drawings is the sketch of Mapterark whom I had the pleasure of meeting at Anaqtuavik Pass where he is now a founding father and patriarch of a new village. In the opinion of this re-

viewer, *Dawn in Arctic Alaska* provides a splendid view into Eskimo culture and is a model of observation and writing. It is well worth study by all persons who wish to conduct field research in anthropology.

WILLIAM S. LAUGHLIN

Associate Professor of Anthropology
University of Wisconsin

ECONOMICS AND LABOR

JOHN MAURICE CLARK. *Economic Institutions and Human Welfare*. Pp. xii, 285, x. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957. \$4.00 text; \$5.50 trade.

This book examines one of the most crucial aspects of the modern economy, the question of how we can shape our economic institutions so as to preserve a maximum of freedom and to provide, at the same time, a maximum of human welfare. Professor Clark rejects the simple utilitarian precept that a guarantee of the former automatically brings about a realization of the latter; that is, that the ruthless pursuit of self-interest leads in itself to the greatest happiness for the greatest number. But he sees clearly that diametrically opposed to a system of unrestrained individualism there is the Soviet system of totalitarianism in which neither freedom nor human welfare are attained. Yet communism has a striking appeal, notably in poorer countries. Here propaganda is directed at getting the people to reject the "fetters of capitalist imperialism" and replace them by a system of communism; thus, they are told, they will attain higher living standards and a "new freedom."

On the whole, in the wealthier countries of the West, this propaganda falls flat; but in Asia and Africa it has noticeable effects. Professor Clark attributes this to the fact that communism makes its appeal in the guise of a simple formula, and he asks whether the West cannot develop an equally simple formula which describes accurately its capacity to combine the improvement of human welfare with the effective maintenance and strengthening of liberty. Clearly, a restatement of the principles of extreme individualism is inade-

quate, and Professor Clark comes out in favor of a "balanced economy" in which economic freedom is mixed with varying doses of regulation. The particular mixture varies from country to country and may change over time within each country. It depends upon the resource endowment of a society, the stage of economic development, its social and cultural features, and, most importantly, upon ethical considerations. Unless the economic acts of various individuals and groups are tempered by moral considerations and go far beyond sheer self-interest, the permanence of Western economic systems—whether "capitalist" or "democratic socialist"—are not ensured.

This is perhaps the most controversial and complex issue in Professor Clark's work. What he says about the ethical basis of modern economics in detail is not under dispute. But the appeal to ethics or virtue in itself does not carry us far, and the particular ethical norms applicable in each society will vary. If a high administrative official in the American civil service would appoint his otherwise little qualified nephew to a responsible post in his department, he would be considered as acting unethically. In India, it would be considered unethical if he failed to do so. The point is, of course, that whatever may be true of the universal validity of a generalized system of ethical norms, there exists no uniform system of practical ethics.

But, in addition, the concept of a balanced economy in Professor Clark's terms is not a simple exposition of Western economic systems. Even if we disregard the dissent of liberals of the old school—as, for example, Professor F. A. von Hayek—we are scarcely able to present a clear-cut analysis of the "right" balance. The difficulty is recognized by Professor Clark himself (in a footnote on p. 172) when he reports that to a question by a Nigerian statesman of what Western democracy stood for, the reply was given that it meant that each country must develop for itself the formula that suits it. The answer, in itself, is unobjectionable, but it is scarcely sufficiently operational. What the Nigerian wanted to know was what his country and people could do to get more of the good things of life. The reply cited

by Professor Clark hardly provides an answer, though it appears, on the surface, simple enough. There may not be a simple answer to this question, and there may not be a simple formula to describe the American economy, its ethic and institutions, and its capacity to preserve liberty and enhance human welfare. But if an answer which takes close to 300 pages to give is permissible, Professor Clark's book comes close to providing it.

BERT F. HOSELITZ

Professor of Social Sciences
University of Chicago

GEOFFREY CROWTHER. *Balances and Imbalances of Payments*. (The George H. Leatherbee Lectures, 1957.) Pp. vii, 70. Boston: Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration, 1957. \$2.00.

The balance of payments is defined as an estimate of all transactions between a nation or an area, on the one hand, and the rest of the world, on the other. *Trade* includes insurance premiums, banking commissions, royalties and governmental expenditures, in addition to services as usually defined. *Interest* completes the current transactions. *Capital* may include foreign aid. It is the negative or positive difference between the totals of inward and outward transactions.

The four familiar stages by which a trading country proceeds from the debtor status to a creditor nation are clarified and extended to six. The two contributions are made (1) by distinguishing between the debtor country which is repaying a foreign government out of an export surplus minus its interest payments, and the debtor country which is seeking to repay direct foreign investors. When the investors prefer to remain, the debtor country may become a debtor-lender by lending to other countries; and (2) by showing why debtors may eventually insist on repaying a growing country in goods; this may cause that country to consume some of its interest and may later even lead to a consumption of capital.

Four main points are made in these lectures:

(1) There is a discussion of the com-

bination of balances of payments and presentation of results for each of six groups of countries, from the immature debtor-borrowers to the creditor-borrowers. In 1937 there was very little borrowing or lending; in fact, there was virtual stagnation. The United States imported \$962 million in gold; and Britain and France, with large adverse *trade* balances, received more inpayments than the new loans they made.

(2) A similar combination of balances of payments for 1949–51 shows most of Western Europe, including France and Western Germany, back in the immature debtor-borrower group, and, corresponding with this, large loans by the United States. Brazil and Argentina too are in this class, making net outward interest payments, while Canada appears as a perpetual borrower for development, with outward interest payments greatly in excess of a moderate export surplus.

(3) Lending by the United States in 1952–54 fell to half the total for 1949–51. As a result, Britain appears in an immature status while Western Germany has become the second largest exporter of capital; most of the world's supply of capital was not going to countries needing development most, but instead mainly to European countries, including France and Italy.

(4) The thesis is put forth that the European Payments Union and the sterling area, taken together, will remain one world, and the dollar area from North America to the Caribbean another; this results from the fact that restrictions on currency convertibility in the first are indispensable because of high productivity and cheap and widely desired goods in the United States.

The lectures clarify and elaborate known facts. Sir Geoffrey does not make his two worlds inevitably permanent, but to him ultimate adjustment is remote. The absence of any analysis to show the outcome of continuing gains by non-European countries in the European Payments Union and the sterling area, from imports of a variety of cheap goods from the United States, as their own development proceeds is a conspicuous omission; for the greater the increase in the trade between these countries and the United States, the more

must Western European countries depend on taking in one another's linen; this Sir Geoffrey admits is already being done.

Because of this omission, the stringent restrictions—characteristic of those imposed in European colonies—which he prescribes as prerequisites for a flow of more capital to these underdeveloped countries are difficult of acceptance as objective conclusions.

WILLIAM E. GORDON

Lecturer in Economics
Marquette University

JOHN RANNELLS. *The Core of the City: A Pilot Study of Changing Land Uses in Central Business Districts*. Pp. xxix, 233. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. \$5.50.

The stated purpose of this study is "to describe and analyze the changing patterns of land use that are found in urban centers. . . ." This is to be accomplished by classifying units called "establishments" into standard industrial and other land-use groups. An establishment is defined as "individuals or groups using a definite location as a recognizable place of business, residence, government, or assembly." The classifications are based on the Bureau of the Budget's *Standard Industrial Classification Manual*. The relationships which are described are limited to the most easily observed, common-sense kinds of patterns; for example, the well-known concentration of retail stores at points where large numbers of pedestrians may be expected, or the fact that establishments tend to occupy buildings not suited to their operations as the city expands. The data pertain to the city of Philadelphia in 1934 and 1949. The use of statistical and graphic techniques is introduced as a means of making the subjectively observed patterns more precise and detailed rather than as a method of determining patterns objectively.

The measures of land use which are developed show ingenuity, but reference to already established techniques which are directly related to the map distributions, distribution curves, index of concentration, and so forth of this study would both clarify and extend the usefulness of the contribution. The whole idea of overlapping groups, as presented in Chapter VIII,

hints at but fails to approach the sophistication of symbolic logic. Graphic methods should clarify and organize material for quick and ready comprehension, but the charts and figures in this work are consistently so poorly devised and so badly reproduced as to be almost completely worthless.

A more careful analysis by the author and a more legible printing of the manuscript would have added greatly to the value of this work. Much still remains to be accomplished in the description and analysis of "the changing patterns of land use that are found in urban centers."

EARLE H. MACCANNELL

Sociology Department
San Diego State College

ROBERT D. LEITER. *The Teamsters Union: A Study of Its Economic Impact*. Pp. 304. New York: Bookman Associates, 1957. \$5.00.

Professor Leiter who was previously known for *The Foreman in Industrial Relations* and *The Musicians and Petrillo* has now, along with many others, turned his attention to the Teamsters Union. Of course, to produce the volume at this time, he started back in 1954 with a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. Luck, or prescience, or just plain haste, puts the book before the public at a time of peak interest in this union and the personalities who inhabit its higher echelons. Without knowing the author's work schedule, this reviewer would guess that haste was a primary factor in the publication.

Starting with the story of the union before 1907, Professor Leiter rushes through twelve chapters devoted to Tobin and Beck, structure and government, jurisdictional problems, Hoffa, industry economics, wages and collective bargaining, technological advance, welfare fund problems, racketeering, union brushes with the law, and, finally, the role of the Teamsters Union in our economy. If there is any pattern of organization or any attempt to link the chapters together, this reviewer has failed to discover them. The failure to "link" is not fatal; there are many good volumes whose chapters are really separate essays

on divisions of the main subject. When, however, this failure is joined with a lack of decent organization within each chapter, the result is hardly edifying. Each subject is treated in cursory and sketchy fashion, and some paragraphs have the appearance of being thrown in at random, so little connection do they have with the subject matter of the chapter or the topic under discussion.

In speaking of Beck, the volume has an air of unreality in referring to him and his office in the present tense. This is not the fault of the author, except that from some attempts to bring the volume absolutely up to date it seems that the author was torn between the advantage of quick publication and the possibility of waiting for the Teamster convention to make a definitive end point for the story. The judgments of Professor Leiter on the union's leaders are charitable and, in some cases, downright naïve. The same is true of many of his explanations of Teamster organizational tactics and their role in disputes with other unions.

To sum up, this is a volume of quick sketches and surface impressions. It relies heavily and uncritically upon Teamster publications. As a "beginners book" on this union it could serve to stimulate research on the many topics and problems it leaves hanging in mid-air. As a contribution in and of itself, it leaves much to be desired.

HERBERT J. LAHNE

Silver Spring, Md.

DAVID M. BLANK and GEORGE J. STIGLER. *The Demand and Supply of Scientific Personnel*. (National Bureau of Economic Research, No. 62, General Series.) Pp. xix, 200. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1957. \$4.00.

The point of most immediate interest in this monograph is its approach to the well-known current problem of the "shortage of engineers." The statistical analysis presented here is that of the trained economist. Focusing on a market-place definition of shortage (rather than on social, military, or other noneconomic criteria),

the authors compare the changes in the earnings of engineers with those for other professionals from 1929 to 1955. The figures indicate that the earnings of engineers have fallen, not only in relation to the earnings of other professionals, but also in relation to the earnings of the entire working population; the authors' conclusion therefrom is "... that up to at least 1955 there had been no shortage—in fact an increasingly ample supply—of engineers" (p. 29).

Whether or not this rather sweeping conclusion is correct—and a number of questions can be raised about the validity of the basic data and the inferences drawn therefrom—the authors have certainly performed an important service by their work. Consideration of this problem in the past has been frequently marked by preconceived notions, overemphasis on unrepresentative situations, and absence of broad-scale, consistent information. Although, for example, the global approach in this report may camouflage substantial shortages in certain engineering specialties of particular interest in these times, Blank and Stigler have injected a breath of fresh air into future discussions of the engineering shortage.

There is, of course, more to this monograph than the above-mentioned topic. A chapter on the supply of engineers brings together some basic material on the college-trained engineer, his numbers and degrees, and, more uniquely, presents a particularly useful discussion of the nongraduate engineer. Another chapter analyzes the reasons for the sharply growing demand for engineers and chemists, and it explores the impact of the greatly expanded research program of the federal government. The authors conclude that "... roughly 4/10 of the increase in the ratio of engineers and chemists to total employment is due to changes in industrial structure ..." (p. 62); that government-financed research has been only a minor factor since about "... seven-eighths of professional employment on government research contracts represents a substitution of public for private research" (p. 59); and that the remaining half or more of the rise is the result of "... reductions in the relative cost of highly

trained personnel [which] have led to the substitution of this class of workers for skilled or unskilled workers" and "... changes in the technology of production [which] have increased the relative demand for highly trained personnel" (p. 63).

As can be expected from these two authors and the National Bureau, this volume is competently done and constitutes a very worthwhile addition to the literature. However, one aspect of the book, irritating at least to this reviewer, is the occupational coverage cited in the title. The book covers neither all "scientific personnel" (for example, no mention is made of social scientists), nor even all the natural science fields. Aside from the material on engineers, the book is limited to a chapter of about a dozen pages on mathematicians and physicists, some data and discussion regarding chemists, and a few odds and ends of information on certain other scientific occupations. The numerical preponderance of engineers in the technological professions does not support—as seems to be implied in the opening paragraphs of the book—the coverage claim in the title.

DAVID L. KAPLAN

Chief, Occupation and Industry Section
Bureau of the Census
Washington, D. C.

ABRAHAM SHUCHMAN. *Codetermination: Labor's Middle Way in Germany*. Pp. vi, 247. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957. \$4.50.

West Germany's extraordinary come back during the postwar period has, to some extent, diverted attention from a recent significant revision—generally known as "codetermination"—in her industrial structure. Hailed by labor as a gain for organized group power and a step towards further democratization of the economy, it has been criticized by businessmen and orthodox economists as an obstacle to the efficiency of management and planning. Therefore, an objective analysis and appraisal of this novelty, based on primary sources, has been badly needed.

Dr. Shuchman has taken pains to explain to his readers why Germany was to be the birthplace of such a compromise

between capitalistic and socialistic forces. In fact, he devotes more space to its ideological and political prehistory than may be appropriate. Out of the five parts of his book, three deal with the evolution of similar patterns of reconciliation ranging from the old schemes of a "constitutional factory," workers' councils, and profit sharing systems to mixed organizations on the supraenterprise level such as vocational parliaments, industrial councils, chambers of labor, national and district workers' councils, labor communities, autonomous industry councils administered jointly by employers' and workers' representatives, and so forth.

While this century-old tug of war represents an important part of the German labor movement, it indicates also that most ideological elements and technical devices of codetermination as established today in Germany had been aired and partly tried out before the Weimar Republic ceased to exist.

To most readers, however, Shuchman's careful historical account will be less significant than his analysis and evaluation of the present stage of development. To be swallowed by German business groups, the bitter pill of codetermination was produced in two different sizes and in two kinds of composition. The stronger pill has been administered to a limited group of corporate enterprises, the larger corporations in the iron and steel and coal industries. Under the Codetermination Act of April 19, 1951, labor was granted a minority representation on two echelons of those corporations, the supervisory board and management. To assure labor's influence in management, a "labor director" was to be appointed as a top business executive being on the same level as the other commercial and technical directors of the firm. Yet those concessions were not extended to other private industries nor to public enterprises. Hence there was need for supplementation. The pill prepared by the second law, the Plant Organization Act of July 20, 1952, was somewhat weaker; however, it was compulsory for all private industrial enterprises not covered by the preceding law. In this case, workers' rights were more closely circumscribed.

Labor was supposed to exercise its control by participating in a hierarchy of councils and by being represented in the supervisory board by fewer people than under the former law.

Shuchman's review of this legislation is to be highly commended. He correctly emphasizes that many crucial problems have remained unsolved. The position of the labor director, for instance, is precarious. Owing loyalty to both the firm and the union, he may be accused of betraying the confidence of one or both of them. In general, the concessions made to labor fall short of its expectations and, still more, of the goal of "full codetermination." Though according to the author (p. 170) the first law has granted labor greater rights regarding enterprise management than ever before in Germany, and anywhere in the world of today, those rights may, however, never go beyond the right of consultation. Under the second law, those rights are still more restricted. While at best they are identical with a right to consultation, they may be limited in other cases to a right of information and a right of protest. Though the influence of labor has been strengthened, ultimate decision and responsibility in German enterprises remain in the hands of management (pp. 170-172).

The author has chosen to conclude his study with an appraisal of the more ambitious scheme of "full codetermination" as proposed by the German trade unions. Yet in dealing with its probable economic and social effects, especially on private property, employment, planning, productivity, and income distribution (pp. 177-244) he relies on more or less outworn arguments, gleaned from well-known debates on corporatism, capitalism, socialism, and syndicalism. It should be questioned, also, whether the sympathy expressed by the author for full codetermination was derived from genuine scientific arguments. His final proposition, for instance, that by steering such intermediate course between capitalism and collectivism "a more rational and more just social order" would be attained (p. 244), should indicate to a critical reader that his discussion has eventually shifted from solid objective analysis

to the less certain ground of political judgments and preferences.

Fritz Karl Mann

Professor of Economics
The American University
Washington, D. C.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY

SIDNEY HOOK. *Common Sense and the Fifth Amendment*. Pp. 160. New York: Criterion Books, 1957. \$3.00.

In 1657, an erstwhile and cantankerous English pamphleteer died a moderately peaceful Quaker. John Lilburne, known to his many followers as Freeborn John, spent most of his adult life in one jail or another for his premature populist views. His dour life was, however, hardly in vain. In 1641, the Long Parliament upheld his refusal to testify against himself before the Star Chamber four years previously.

Some 300 years later, a portly American labor leader, relying squarely on John Lilburne's hard-won right, refused to acknowledge to a Senate investigating committee the paternity of his own son. Perhaps even Freeborn John would have shaken his head at that one. But his "privilege against self-incrimination" (never his phrase) sits securely in the federal Constitution as well as in those of most states, and if Dave Beck chooses to rely on it, how can we seriously protest and remain true to its irascible originator?

But protest there is—and from influential quarters. Thus far it has been centered on the nature of the community's attitude toward those who have, as the saying goes, "taken the Fifth," rather than on the privilege itself. Two schools of thought on this issue have crystallized since 1950: one holds that it is not proper to assume that the recalcitrant witness is guilty of whatever it is he refuses to answer; the other insists that the public is justified in making reasonable inferences as to his integrity.

Dr. Sidney Hook is a most articulate spokesman for the latter group. His brief book is in the form of a rebuttal to a

work by Dean Erwin N. Griswold of the Harvard Law School entitled *The Fifth Amendment Today*. By means of carefully posed hypotheticals, Dean Griswold attempted to prove that there may be other reasons than guilt which can rationally prompt resort to the privilege. Some of these are a fear of a perjury prosecution, a disinclination to reveal political beliefs and a desire to protect former friends and associates.

To Dr. Hook, Dean Griswold's hypothetical cases are, to say the least, unrealistic. Innocent men, he argues, do not have to hide behind silence, and "invocation of the privilege establishes some presumption of guilt with respect to the question at issue." However, he is careful to avoid begrudging anyone's right to resort to the Fifth provided the sole purpose is to protect the witness from prosecution for crime. But the community remains free to draw its own inferences from such conduct and take appropriate action, even to the extent of economic or social sanctions.

Dr. Hook presents a compelling case, particularly in view of the recent episodes before Senator McClellan's Labor-Management Unlawful Practices Committee. However, the Supreme Court has not swallowed his argument and has steadfastly insisted that issues of constitutional privilege should not "discredit . . . a person who asserts it." Naturally, it is impossible to control public sentiment or to dictate what inferences should or should not be drawn from any human conduct. But it seems to me, as it does to Dean Griswold, that pleading the Fifth should only be one of the factors, and not the sole one, to be taken into consideration when evaluating the worth of a man.

WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER

Associate Professor of Law
New York Law School

RICHARD MCKEON, ROBERT K. MERTON, and WALTER GELLHORN. *The Freedom to Read: Perspective and Program*. Pp. xvii, 110. New York: R. R. Bowker for the National Book Committee, 1957. \$2.50.

The authors respectively are: Professor of Greek and Philosophy, University of

Chicago; Professor of Sociology, Columbia University; and Professor of Law, Columbia University. These specialized backgrounds provide an interdisciplinary approach to a study which is concerned primarily with problems of censorship and with the reading of books.

It appears that the problems of censorship have their basis in the broad problems of individual morality as well as social action. According to the authors, censorship presents an obvious threat to the freedom to read, but they admit that such freedom can be advanced ultimately only by raising the level of reading tastes, changing the demands they generate, and encouraging the work of creative artists and thinkers in contemporary society.

The response of the authors to censorship in the case of paperbound books which have a mass audience and which are easily available to the young is rather unusual.

While they are averse to pornography and sadism, to filth and to trash, they nevertheless are convinced that efforts to cut off access to such material stimulates curiosity and has a negligible effect in reducing interest in obscenity or immoral behavior. The authors also object to censorship as exercised by public authority in that it reduces morality to an extremely narrow range of sex and criminal violence. Also the criteria employed are apt to extend far beyond that range to include much that might be sound information or good literature.

The parent, the juvenile court judge, the newspaperman would all find grounds for disagreeing in part with the authors' conclusions. They would, however, probably agree that the work is definitely challenging and that much necessary research is yet possible in regard to the following: the effects of books upon the personality and behavior of readers; the social psychology and economics of reading; and the social consequences of censorship.

EDWARD B. SHILS

Associate Professor of Industry
University of Pennsylvania

MILTON R. KONVITZ. *Fundamental Liberties of a Free People: Religion, Speech, Press, Assembly.* (Cornell Studies in

Civil Liberty.) Pp. xiii, 420. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957. \$5.00.

This is a well-thought-out and well-written book, professedly a "critical rather than a technical work." It is eminently worth while reading for everyone interested in the provocative questions discussed, no matter how thoroughly the reader believes that he understands them. In the very brief review requested of me it is impossible to do justice to its merits or to comment adequately on what appear to me to be certain deficiencies.

Mr. Konvitz begins with freedom of religion and discusses it, as its legal importance warrants, more extensively than any of the other three freedoms. He does not, however, attempt to define "religion" or what constitutes its "free exercise" (p. 49). It is refreshing to find an entire absence of religious prejudice or attempt to proselytize. In fact, from his treatment of the subject, the reader would not know whether the author is a Catholic, a Protestant, a Jew, or an atheist.

Apparently Mr. Konvitz is in sympathy with the view of Justices Black, Murphy, Douglas, and Rutledge that the Fourteenth Amendment protected all the First Amendment freedoms from impairment by the states, just as if it had read "no state shall abridge any of the rights enumerated in Amendments I to VIII"—this despite the authoritative rejection of this theory by the Court (*Wolf v. Colorado*, 338 U.S. 22, 26).

He might well have emphasized more clearly the differences in the language of the two amendments, as well as the practical differences in the problems—Congress and State—as explained by Justice Jackson in *Beauharnais*, 343 U.S. 250, 268, and by Justice Holmes in *Gitlow*, 268 U.S. 654, 672; he also might have summarized the differences of opinion in the Court as to the four theories on which the freedoms were protected from state action, the final adoption by the majority of Justice Cardozo's view in *Palko v. Connecticut*, 302 U.S. 319, and the demolition of the "incorporation" and "preferred status" theories advocated by Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge. (See also *Whitney v. California*, 274 U.S. 357, 371.)

His chapter on "Picketing in Labor Disputes" is believed to be unnecessarily concise, and profitably expandable by an analysis of the intended and practical effect of picketing and of how the Court changed its mind about the Thornhill doctrine and relegated labor disputes primarily to the states, where I believe they properly belong. Neither in this chapter nor in that on Jehovah's Witnesses does he refer to *Breard v. Alexandria*, 341 U.S. 622, nor adequately to *Valentine v. Chrestensen*, 316 U.S. 52 and cases denying constitutional protection to what is essentially commercial advertising.

Mr. Konvitz would, I believe, have done well to point out more clearly how much of the difficulty with the First and Fourteenth Amendment decisions is due to the use of the judge-made slogans "wall of separation," "clear and present danger," "picketing is free speech," "the streets are the evangelist's cathedral," and so forth. Instead of dealing directly with the more onerous problem of applying Justice Cardozo's test in the *Palko* case to determine whether, in the particular case, any person has been arbitrarily deprived of a substantial right, the exercise of which is recognized as one of the basic and fundamental liberties inherent in our way of life.

An irritating feature of the book is the placing of all the notes in an Appendix without carrying chapter numbers on each page of the text and the Appendix.

His chapters on "Previous Restraint," "The Freedom Not to Listen," his history of "clear and present danger" and of the "Adoption of the Bill of Rights" are particularly interesting.

HENRY S. DRINKER

Drinker, Biddle & Reath
Philadelphia, Penna.

ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND (Ed.). *Government Under Law.* A Conference held at Harvard Law School on the Occasion of the Bicentennial of John Marshall, Chief Justice of the United States, 1801-1835. Pp. xi, 587. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. \$7.50.

This volume is the published record of a three-day conference which was sponsored by the Harvard Law School on the occa-

sion of the two hundredth anniversary of John Marshall's birth. The contents are rather evenly divided between addresses delivered at the conference and papers presented for discussion.

With two exceptions (addresses by President Pusey and Professor Tunc) the major addresses were delivered by distinguished justices drawn from the United States and other common law countries. The papers were prepared by an equally distinguished group of justices, scholars, and legal practitioners. They were not read at the conference but were printed and circulated among the participants some four months in advance of the conference. In the presentations a common pattern was followed: the author introduced his subject through a brief oral statement, this presentation was followed by "comments" from one or more invited guests, and the subject was then open for discussion. It is assumed that this procedure was used not only to increase opportunities for participation but to invite a diversity of points of view, to clarify and sharpen issues, and to enliven the proceedings. If the objectives were realized, the success of this aspect of the conference is not adequately revealed in the printed record. Without exception the papers are scholarly and substantial. The oral presentations suffer by comparison. In lesser scope the "comments" are also substantial but rarely reveal critical evaluations of the author's point of view. The discussions are desultory.

The conference was planned about the general thesis, "Government Under Law." There is a conspicuous emphasis on constitutionalism, morality, and the "individual's good." Whether or not any new concepts were introduced will be left to the individual reader. Certainly old concepts were either presented in new dress or reconstructed for new situations. Fragments of statements made by two participants are presented here to reveal opinions on the tone of the conference and to provide standards for evaluation. Professor Melvin Hart, Jr. called attention to the "note of negativism" which runs throughout the papers and added: "In none of them separately, nor in all of them taken together, do I find the kind of muscular statement

of the reasons why constitutional government is a good thing, and of the ways in which it can be made to work at its best. . . ." Later Professor Samuel Beer said that the conference had been "inundated by the praise of constitutionalism and the spirit of law generally . . ." and continued, "how can you assess the value of constitutionalism if you don't seriously compare it with its opposite, and that's what I want to suggest to you. For I think there is something to be said for the opposite, namely for unconstitutionality, or if you like, for personalism."

It must be remembered, however, that this is a published account of a symposium and is not calculated to present a completed or orderly developed thesis on government under law. It does present several well-argued points of view which cannot be ignored by, and should be of interest to, all students of law and government.

HAROLD M. DORR

Professor of Political Science
University of Michigan

REXFORD G. TUGWELL. *The Democratic Roosevelt: A Biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt*. Pp. 712. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1957. \$8.50.

The writing of serious biography is a challenging task. Not only must the biographer capture for his readers the spirit and quality of a man and his life, but he must write with understanding of the total environment in which his subject operated. Mr. Tugwell has attempted to achieve these objectives in his biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the hope of "interesting a new generation in the one man to whom no one in my generation was indifferent."

In this volume, one sees in Roosevelt an extraordinarily versatile man, determined to get ahead personally and yet vested with a belief in helping others whenever he could. Here is a person whose ambition to build and whose faith in divine guidance and commanding destiny made him unafraid to face decision. Tugwell's Roosevelt is a hero, to be sure, but not a hero without defects. Blunders are seen by Tugwell in Roosevelt's scuttling of eco-

nomic planning, prosecution of the court fight, dropping of domestic reform to gain support for defense and war, acceptance of Darlan as an ally, and promulgation of the unconditional surrender dictum. The result of all this is a stirring portrait of a man whom no one could ignore.

On other counts, the author is open to serious criticism. Tugwell is most deficient in evaluating President Roosevelt's opponents and even his associates. Those who disagreed with the chief executive are dubbed enemies, deserters, business dictators, Tories, reactionaries, and old fashioned. It would seem, moreover, that no one but Roosevelt was responsible for the triumphs of his career. Disdain for the American political system is evident throughout the book: members of Congress are generally characterized as ignorant, petty, and self-seeking; state and local governments are at best ineffectual; the top level bureaucrats are appraised flatteringly only when mirroring the President's thinking; those who sought to oust Roosevelt from the White House were touched with megalomania. An unexpected disappointment of the book is the author's failure to set forth new facts despite his close connections with the Roosevelt administration and his lengthy research effort. Even more surprising is that the data cited in the volume appear to have been drawn mainly from the works of Frank Freidel and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and from the published collections of Roosevelt letters and public papers.

The reviewer has only hinted at the values and weaknesses of *The Democratic Roosevelt*. With this large book, so abundant in judgments and in events recounted, it is impossible to do more. Historical interpretation will be enriched by Tugwell's insight into Roosevelt, but it has been robbed by his lack of understanding of those who disagreed with the President.

DONALD R. MCCOY

Assistant Professor of History
University of Kansas

DEXTER PERKINS. *The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt: 1932-45*. Pp. ix, 193. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. \$3.50.

This book is a volume in "The Chicago History of American Civilization Series." The earlier studies in this series have been scholarly and readable with emphasis on vivid interpretations. Editor Daniel J. Boorstin has chosen competent scholars to make contributions to the series. Certainly the author of this volume has written one of the best brief accounts of the New Deal era. Professor Perkins' task was especially difficult because of the complexity of Roosevelt's personality and because of the increasing pluralism of American culture. The author has written with careful objectivity, although he is not devoid of sympathy for his subject.

Repeatedly Mr. Perkins quotes statements and conclusions from Roosevelt's most bitter critics. The author frequently states briefly the conditions under which the criticisms were made. He then notes that time has altered the bitterness of feelings and has sometimes revealed the fallacy of Franklin D. Roosevelt's critics. By no means does Professor Perkins exonerate Roosevelt in all of the crises that occurred. For example, when the President attacked the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes accepted the challenge and clearly came out the victor. This victory the author approves.

One of the best features of this splendid little book is the six pages of annotated suggested readings at the end. The student and the general reader are introduced to the best literature on the New Deal. Furthermore, they know the type of book and the attitude towards the era expressed in the book before reading it. This reviewer doubts if anyone could write a better treatment of Franklin Roosevelt's Administration in the space allotted. Professor Perkins is to be congratulated.

GEORGE C. OSBORN

Professor of Social Sciences
University of Florida

DEXTER PERKINS. *The American Way*. Pp. 141. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957. \$2.75.

In the five lectures which are published here as a small volume, Professor Perkins articulates an academic analogue of Eisenhowerism. "The American way" is the

middle way, moderately conservative and at the same time moderately liberal, but never extremely anything. Without jeopardizing its genial balance, it also manages to be libertarian, empirical, and fluid.

"Those of a conservative cast of mind have often made an important contribution to American life and to the welfare of the republic." But the liberals and liberalism are no less essential, for "the liberal tradition in America is the record of [man's] aspirations and faith, and when, if ever, these things pass, America, as we know and honor it, will have passed too." For that matter, "the line that separates the moderate conservative from the cautious liberal [Dwight Eisenhower from Adlai Stevenson?] is never a very definite one."

Moreover, though they have never become dominant in American life, even radicalism and socialism have made their "positive contributions to the movement to American political and social progress."

In fact, the hospitality of "the American way" is broad enough to welcome under its integrating semantic roof all varieties of political man, with one axiomatic exception. The quintessential un-American—"unscrupulous, violent, with no respect for truth, and still less for the integrity of the individual personality"—Senator McCarthy, that is, must be "driven" from our public life. And as it happened, between proofs and publication, the junior Senator from Wisconsin was indeed laid low, by a sword even more relentless than that of Professor Perkins.

JAMES BURNHAM

Kent, Conn.

BRAY HAMMOND. *Banks and Politics in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War*. Pp. xi, 771. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. \$12.50.

This is a book which is rich in facts, insights, and interpretation; its discerning treatment of some of the crucial events in the Republic's life up to the Civil War is a delight to behold. Detailing the evolution of banks in America (including Canada) from 1782, Bray Hammond blends, in a most felicitous manner, the political, constitutional, legal, financial, and economic issues surrounding the growth of banking

and credit institutions. The result is not a history of banking but a dynamic interpretation of the transformation of a rich agrarian economy into one of anxious business accumulation.

After surveying the British and colonial antecedents of the Republic's banking system, Hammond deals at length with early commercial banks, the first Bank of the United States, problems arising during the War of 1812, the second Bank and the bitter struggle between Biddle and Jackson, the period of "free banking," the national banking system, and so forth. Each subject is examined topically over its entire chronological range. The strength of the book's underlying unity comes from the author's keen grasp of the major social forces at work over this period of great change. Throughout its length, the book "reflects the political and cultural force of business enterprise . . . the most powerful continuing influence in American life since Independence. . . ." Consciousness of this significant force becomes both the author's and the reader's guide to a more meaningful comprehension of certain important facets of American history.

Hammond discusses old issues, and yet he brings to each one a breadth of knowledge and insight which give profound authority to his interpretations. His critical handling of the struggle between Jackson and Biddle over the second Bank is a case in point. Casting aside the traditional view of the conflict as being mainly between agrarians (against the Bank) and commercial and industrial interests (for the Bank), Hammond demonstrates forcefully how the Bank stood in the way of the growing entrepreneurial class which was seeking more favorable credit conditions; and he shows how, in the main, this class stood alongside Jackson rather than Biddle in the bitter conflict. While Jackson was avowedly a hard money partisan, those closest to him reflected the soft money entrepreneurial interest. Thus for Hammond the Bank's demise is consistent with his view of the powerful influence of business enterprise which was, save for some conservative members, in a compulsive get-rich-quick mood.

In similar fashion, the author penetrat-

ingly leads the reader to the crux of each major issue in the period under review. The result is a deeply gratifying experience which presents the reader with a new, more profound notion of the major economic and social forces then at work.

CHARLES HOFFMANN

Department of Economics
Queens College

BROADUS MITCHELL. *Alexander Hamilton: Youth to Maturity, 1755-1788*. Pp. xvi, 675. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. \$8.75.

Of the spate of books about Alexander Hamilton which have appeared this year to coincide with what is (according to Congressional act and Presidential proclamation, though not the best evidence of the documents) the two-hundredth anniversary of the birth of the first Secretary of the Treasury, Broadus Mitchell's stout volume is by all odds the greatest scholarly contribution. Having been years in preparation, the study is based on wide reading and research—its 675 pages (210 of them Notes, Bibliography, and Index) give impressive evidence of this—and it is the product of a mature mind, especially well versed in economics. Despite its bulk, the book carries Hamilton's story through only the first thirty-three of his teeming, fruitful years—from his birth in the West Indies, through his education in New Jersey and New York, his military service, and his law practice to his work on behalf of federal union. The work culminates in his authorship of *The Federalist* papers and the adoption of the Constitution. The rest of the story, his last sixteen years, from his appointment as Secretary of the Treasury to the fatal duel, remains to be dealt with in a second volume of similar scope.

If the first volume is a showpiece of scholarly industry and judiciousness, it also sadly lacks those qualities that make biography a literary art. There is little or no narrative quality to Professor Mitchell's account; his method is to state the facts, sometimes in a most offhand fashion, as if he were confident that the reader was already familiar with them. His real interest is obviously analysis—consideration of the conflicting evidence on debatable points

in the record (as in the circumstances of Hamilton's parentage and upbringing) or of interpretations made by earlier historians and biographers (as in the motives that led to the movement for a federal Constitution). Sometimes by yielding to this interest he loses sight of Hamilton for several pages; and sometimes, when a sketch of the background of the events in which Hamilton played a prominent role would illuminate the meaning of his actions—the course of the Revolutionary War, for example, or the vicissitudes of New York state politics at the time of the adoption of the Constitution—it is sadly lacking.

Yet, when one has said all this, he must quickly add that Dr. Mitchell has written what is certainly the best biographical study of his subject that we yet have. Persons not familiar with the career of Alexander Hamilton will find Nathan Schachner's biography, published eleven years ago, an excellent and highly readable brief synthesis of what was known at that time; those who wish to learn more and dig deeper, using the evidence of the latest scholarship, should then turn to Dr. Mitchell.

RAYMOND WALTERS, JR.

The Saturday Review
New York, N. Y.

GEORGE A. MALCOLM. *American Colonial Careerist: Half a Century of Official Life and Personal Experience in the Philippines and Puerto Rico*. Pp. 288. Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1957. \$5.00.

George Arthur Malcolm opens his memoirs of a measurably eminent public service career in the Philippines and Puerto Rico with this quotation from the late Manuel L. Quezon which was made in an address to Congress in 1913: "To know a people you must not only live with them for a number of years, but share their feelings, possess a sympathy for their aspirations, and, most important of all, be broad-minded enough to abandon race prejudice and fixed views on the superiority of one civilization over another." This point of view, certainly axiomatic in Justice Malcolm's life, has been rewarded, apart from university honors, with honorary citizenship in the Republic of the Philippines and

the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

As the reader bowls along the book's easy, nostalgic gradients, he glimpses fleeting billboard impressions; at the close these merge into a quite accurate picture of Justice Malcolm himself.

During thirty-three years, no man was closer to the Filipinos than Justice Malcolm. He enjoyed their complete confidence, which he still retains. It seems clear, too, that the Puerto Ricans found him equally *persona grata*. His career at Manila paralleled the Filipinos' progress from an abasing colonial status to the Commonwealth of the Philippines; this was converted into complete independence on July 4, 1946. His three years in San Juan were coeval with the movement, agitation, and reforms that have been reconciled under an autonomous commonwealth status for the Puerto Ricans; they have evidently decided that, with its obvious advantages, this is all the independence they desire.

Justice Malcolm's Philippines career began when he was twenty-six years old and a graduate in law from the University of Michigan. In 1917 President Wilson appointed him an Associate Justice of the Philippines Supreme Court; at this time he was thirty-five years old and the youngest man ever named to the venerable Court either by Spain or the United States. (This touches a point which seems important and which Malcolm does not bring out. Wilson appointed him, Congress confirmed him, but the Philippines paid him. From the outset of civil government in 1901, the Philippines paid their way. An exception to this was the military which Congress kept there at its own option and in the national interest; to maintain domestic peace and order, the Philippines had their own insular police—the famous Philippine Constabulary—which Justice Malcolm shows furnished many trained and competent officers for World War I.)

The worth and charm of Justice Malcolm's backward glance at his career come out in the pen portraits and full profiles he sketches of the governors—William Howard Taft to Frank Murphy—the vice-governors, and the members of the Philippine Commission. This body both made and enforced the laws until October 16, 1907,

the date which brought into existence the Philippine Assembly; this was the first Filipino law-making body in the country's history. The reader sees precisely what manner of men the architects of Philippine freedom were: Manuel Quezon, Sergio Osmena, Rafael R. Palma and so on down the line to the men of today, on whom Justice Malcolm's influence has been decisive. (In 1956, in a Supreme Court of eleven members, nine of them—the Chief Justice included—were formerly Malcolm's students at the University of the Philippines.)

Justice Malcolm saw war looming high over the Pacific horizon in 1939. He thereupon closed his Philippine career and accepted the Puerto Rican attorney generalship which made him an ex officio member of the Executive Council. Governors changed, however, and he was soon at loggerheads with Governor Rexford Guy Tugwell who had Secretary Ickes' support. After three years, Malcolm was out. When he would not resign, he was removed: "I was fired," he says; that perhaps adds a bravura-like emphasis to the controversy. Anyway, only thirty pages of his book are taken up with Puerto Rico. The real theme of the saga is the Philippines.

WALTER ROBB

Book Review Editor
The Asian Student
San Francisco, Calif.

EUGENE H. ROSEBOOM. *A History of Presidential Elections*. Pp. vi, 568. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. \$8.50.

This is a history of national politics in the United States and an interpretation of the pattern of the quadrennial competition of political parties for the stakes of power involved in presidential elections. It includes an adequate treatment of national party conventions, candidates, campaigns, and elections. Within the cramped limits of a single volume, party platforms are given rather more treatment than could be expected, though necessarily in very condensed form.

The history begins with the short-lived Federalist party which flourished at first under the genius of nation-building Alexander Hamilton; his ineptitude as a poli-

tician, however, hastened its untimely end. Hamilton's policies, enacted in statutes, integrated the agrarians and frontiersmen into a belligerent opposition which practically adopted the almost reluctant Jefferson as their leader. The resulting Republican party had a quarter of a century of control of the national government.

A spontaneous uprising of Mississippi valley agrarians and eastern urban artisans against the ruling class that had so long run the government coalesced into a party movement that adopted Andrew Jackson as its leader; thus emerged the Democratic party. Clay and Webster strove, largely in vain, to stem the tide of Jacksonian Democracy and thus came about the Whig party.

In the 1850's, out of the disintegration of the two-party alignment, emerged the elements that came to constitute the second Republican party; this group virtually adopted a reluctant Whig, Abraham Lincoln, as its leader. The pattern varies in detail, but Woodrow Wilson and the two Roosevelts by and large repeated the feat of exploiting emerging movements with demonstrations of the art of party leadership.

It is gratifying to see Professor Roseboom correcting the error of some historians that Lincoln created the Union party for the election of 1864. In fact it sprang up spontaneously in the fall of 1861. The antiquated myth of a weakling President McKinley and ogre Mark Hanna is once more exploded. For example, concerning McKinley: "No President has been more successful in mirroring the composite views of a majority of the voters" which compares with Beveridge's conclusion that Lincoln "neither led nor retarded mass movements but accurately reflected them." As to Hanna, Roseboom observes: "But as the campaign (of 1896) grew in heat and bitterness ugly aspects appeared for which Hanna had no direct responsibility." One gets the distinct implication from this history that there is something very wrong with the cliché that makes "McKinleyism" synonymous with reaction and sin.

There are the inevitable slips. The back-country farmers and frontiersmen of co-

lonial times were certainly not "overrepresented" in the assemblies. Was "John Marshall a solitary critic" of the Alien and Sedition Acts among the Federalists? Hamilton condemned the legislation as "violence without energy." The Supreme Court did "reject" jurisdiction instead of "assuming" it in the Dred Scott decision. Was Marshall a "near midnight" judge—six weeks is a long time before midnight. But these are mere trifles in an otherwise enlightened interpretation of American politics as related to presidential elections. It is to be regretted that inflation has hit the publishers so hard that every footnote citation in this scholarly book has been eliminated.

WILFRED E. BINKLEY

Director, Division of Social Sciences
Ohio Northern University

TIMOTHY W. STANLEY. *American Defense and National Security*. Pp. viii, 202. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956. \$3.25.

In *American Defense and National Security*, Timothy W. Stanley provides the first comprehensive survey and analysis of the administrative framework and operation of this country's national security program.

Four chapters dealing with the National Security Council, the State Department, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff make up the heart of the book. In these chapters the history of these agencies from an administrative viewpoint is traced, their structure is outlined, and the process of policy-making is described. Other chapters deal with background issues and problems, the coordination and integration of the component programs and policies, and several case studies. The Appendices include a description of the British National Security Organization, the National Security Act of 1947, Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, and the Key West Agreement for the unification of the armed forces.

The constructive features and positive administrative accomplishments of this country's national security organization are emphasized by the author. Nevertheless, he

does not ignore shortcomings and failures. Perhaps the most important of these has been the failure of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to achieve a unified military establishment. Stanley points out that overlapping with respect to important functions carried on by the three armed services still exists, and that conflicts which weaken the national security effort still take place.

"One service, one uniform, and one academy" has been proposed as the solution. Stanley points out, however, that it is unrealistic to assume that this "solution" would automatically result in a truly unified military establishment. Differences of opinion and conflicts of interest would probably still exist among the land, sea, and air forces, as is the case today. Administrative unification alone, even if extended farther than it has been to date, will not be enough. As Stanley suggests, fundamental changes in military concepts and strategy are needed as well. It is evident that the ultimate solution to this thorny problem is not simple, and that it cannot be achieved with haste.

Based primarily upon research conducted under the auspices of the Harvard Defense Studies Program, this book is written in a concise, interesting, and straightforward manner, and it throws clear light on a timely subject. The reviewer commends it to those interested in the administrative aspects of national security.

LEO FISHMAN

Professor of Economics and Finance
West Virginia University

BERNARD BARUCH. *Baruch: My Own Story*. Pp. xiv, 337. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1957. \$5.00.

In Hebrew, Baruch means blessed, and Bernard Mannes Baruch has been blessed in many ways. His father left Germany in 1855 to escape a military draft act. His mother, native born, possessed an unusual personality and an inspiring philosophy of life. To her son, Bernie, she on occasion said: "Always remember no one else is any better than you and you are no better than anyone else—until you prove it." As a southern-born Jew, who in youth moved

with his parents to New York City, the ambitious boy frequently recalled this gem of wisdom.

Baruch wanted to go to Yale, but his mother was determined to keep him at home. He trudged forty blocks daily to and from New York City College, and as an alumnus, he later served it as a trustee.

In the heroic age of big business, Bernard Baruch, along with Thomas Fortune Ryan of Virginia and James Buchanan Duke of North Carolina, became widely known as a southerner who amassed fortunes on Wall Street. These "Carpetbaggers in reverse" were as successful in speculations and investments as any of the Yankees who created fortunes in the southland during the aftermath of the Civil War.

Indeed, Mr. Baruch's autobiography is another splendid example of the Horatio Alger-type of American. At nineteen he began by earning \$3.00 a week as an office boy on Wall Street. At twenty-five he became a partner in a brokerage firm, and at thirty-two he had made a fortune of \$3,200,000. He withdrew from the partnership and became Wall Street's lone wolf. When the young man spoke of his millions, his father jolted his self-confidence by asking "what good" he intended doing with his recently made fortune.

From his parents Baruch evolved a magnanimous philosophy. For example, he insisted that his daughters join the Episcopalian faith of their mother, but because they were Jews they were refused admission to a dancing school which their mother had attended. Instead of allowing these things to embitter and frustrate them, says Baruch, "I told them to take these discriminations as spurs to more strenuous achievement . . . above all, I told my children, not to be blinded to the greatness of America by the pettiness of some people in it."

The greater part of this book deals with Baruch's financial exploits and speculations during the period before World War I. "I felt the surge of empire welling within me," admits the author. Obviously, this imperialistic nature has welled within Mr. Baruch ever since. Whether the natural resource was Rio Grande sulfur, Colorado copper, Alaska gold, or Belgian Congo rubber Ber-

nard Baruch has sought to possess, to develop, and to make available to his fellow man these important resources—always, of course, at a profit to himself.

In his long, successful, and extremely beneficial life, Mr. Baruch became acquainted with many celebrities at home and abroad. In fact, to list those with whom he formed acquaintances would be to include most of the famous of his generation.

In his thirties, acting on his mother's advice, he purchased a 17,000 acre South Carolina plantation—Hobcaw Barony. Some of the most interesting parts of this book are those dealing with the famous guests at Hobcaw and with the Negroes who were on the plantation.

Thousands will read this enlightening book and will anticipate with pleasure the publication of the second volume in 1958.

GEORGE C. OSBORN

Professor of Social Sciences
University of Florida

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER. *Communism in Latin America*. Pp. x, 449. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957. \$9.00.

The appearance of this study is doubly welcome; it not only meets a long-felt need but is a distinct contribution to the literature of this area. As might have been expected from one with Mr. Alexander's long experience in studying the Latin American region, *Communism in Latin America* is scholarly and penetrating as well as most timely. It should be useful to the specialist in Latin American affairs who wishes to learn more about Communist activities in the region and for the person interested in communism who knows nothing about the area. For that matter, the nature of the presentation is such that the nonspecialist will also find the book very useful.

Much of the utility of this study lies in the nature of its organization. About a quarter of the material is devoted to general commentary and the remainder to description of Communist activities in specific countries. This is an almost inevitable solution to the problem of attempting to write on a common theme covering some twenty separate countries, for it allows the

reader to absorb the commonly shared aspects of the subject under consideration without undue repetition for each country. At the same time, situations and historical conditions peculiar to any given country can be stressed in their proper place.

The introductory section deals with "The Communist Movement in Latin America—Its Background, History and Prospects." It includes chapters on "Conditions Favoring the Rise of Communism in Latin America"; "The General History of Communism in Latin America"; "Latin American Communists, the Comintern, and the Soviet Union"; "Communists in the Latin American Labor Movement"; "Leaders of Latin American Communism"; and "The Latin American Communists as a Potential Military Danger to the United States."

With the approach of this introductory section and with the materials Mr. Alexander presents in the chapters dealing with specific countries I am in agreement. And insofar as my firsthand knowledge extends, the author's facts and presentation in both sections are accurate and penetrating. His book really is first-class work, based on long experience and extensive research and interviews. If the bibliographical note at the end of the book is rather short and general, the chapter footnotes are not. They supply numerous further citations concerning the particular subject matter or country involved. And, quite obviously, Mr. Alexander's close ties with the labor movement—he is officially an economist, though much of his work has concerned politics—have provided him with opportunities to check published materials for accuracy and to obtain a depth of understanding by means of personal interviews with both North and Latin Americans—Communists, ex-Communists and anti-Communists.

If I have any criticism of *Communism in Latin America*, it lies in the necessary decision to limit the general, introductory section to a quarter of the book. Important as the sections for each country may be, they must soon begin to go out of date, so that a slightly longer presentation of general principles might have prolonged the applicability of the book. But this is a decision every author must make for him-

self. As for the immediate future, this is a valuable—almost an invaluable—book, and, within the limitations of Mr. Alexander's decision to stress the country by country materials, I am delighted with it.

ROBERT E. SCOTT

Assistant Professor of Political Science
University of Illinois

ASIA AND AFRICA

PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS. *Modern India*. (Nations of the Modern World Series.) Pp. xiv, 255. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$5.75.

Sir Percival's most recent title on India is apparently designed to meet the needs of different audiences and as such can be evaluated from different perspectives. If it be taken as directed toward the literate public, and not the specialist, it must—on the whole—be welcomed. It contains sections dealing with India since the transfer of power that are not only quite up to date and informative but also quite perceptive. A number of the postindependence topics discussed in this book are hardly to be found in any other single volume.

However, it remains in some respects a curiously "light" book. When compared with the same author's *The British Impact on India*, one feels that in the case now under review Sir Percival wrote rapidly even if lucidly. Nor is that simply because the present title is so much more contemporaneous.

The opening section of the book deals in a summary fashion with the historical background. Certainly the weakest part of the book, this background is treated with what seems to be needless superficiality and with an irritating tendency to present the British "case"—as though that were necessary—blandly and with insular confidence. The chapter on "Law and Administration" under the British is, for instance, unnecessarily platitudinous. Sir Percival could, in fact, have made out a better and more provocative case than he has.

The second section dealing with political affairs in independent India is quite a bit better and more rewarding. Useful and in-

sightful analyses of important characteristics of recent Indian politics are presented effectively, as in the discussion of politics and parties or of India's relations with Pakistan.

The last section dealing with economic affairs since independence is unusually valuable. Sir Percival takes an urbane, informed, and perceptive view of India's economic policy and of its national plans; and he provides trenchant criticism where necessary. The nonspecialist will find this portion of the book especially helpful in tracing recent trends and in highlighting their significances.

There are, of course, some basic questions that need to be asked if one is to get to fundamentals in evaluating trends—political and economic—in contemporary India, and Sir Percival's account tends to emphasize descriptive summary rather than sober analysis. Perhaps that only proves that the basic questions can hardly be framed in any meaningful fashion as yet, time not having provided us with perspective. But I am not convinced by such reasoning, and that is why I remarked above that *Modern India*—despite its many fine qualities—is a “light” book.

ROBERT I. CRANE

Assistant Professor of History
University of Michigan

India and the United Nations. Report of a Study Group set up by the Indian Council of World Affairs. (National Studies on International Organization.) Pp. xi, 229. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1957. \$3.00.

Aware that Charter review would be on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1955, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace decided in 1952 to sponsor a series of study groups in which nationals of various United Nations member states would evaluate the impact of the world organization on their respective foreign policies. This volume on India is the fifth of the series to be published and is the result of the discussions of nine well-known Indian academicians and public servants.

The book divides the subject into eight subheads: development of Indian attitudes on international organization; India's for-

eign-policy objectives; organization and structural questions; administration of dependent territories; international action for racial equality; pacific settlement of disputes; disarmament and collective enforcement measures; and economic and financial questions. The approach in each case is to outline the official government position, describe public opinion as reflected in the press and political party documents, and then present the views of the discussion group—which generally agree with the government. This method gives the reader a brief summary of the official Indian position on most of the major issues which have come before the United Nations, and it makes the book a useful little reference work. The assessment of public opinion, however, lacks system, and because the holders of the recorded dissenting views within the study group are not identified, one cannot discern the attitudes of individuals or determine if there was any consistency in how opinion divided.

The main question posed by the group—has the working of the United Nations helped or hindered the realization of the basic aims of India's foreign policy?—is answered by the book “in both negative and positive terms.” The UN has provided India a forum “for giving expression to its views,” but “certain actions of the United Nations General Assembly and other organs on matters relating to dependent territories have thoroughly disappointed India.” The book makes it clear that India looks upon the UN as a prop for nineteenth century colonialism, but that it is not beyond redemption.

Certain inconsistencies in Indian policy emerge clearly. India agrees that the South African Indians are nationals of South Africa but does not concede that South Africa's segregation laws are matters of domestic jurisdiction. “India's rejection of the legal argument based on the domestic jurisdiction clause of the Charter was based primarily on the stand that the issue was basically a moral and political one.” But when the issue is closer to home, the attitude changes: “The problem of Kashmir is in fact a difficult one for solution under international auspices,” and whether based on moral grounds or not, India has little

use for the United Nations demand for a plebiscite. Moreover, “it is almost certain that India will oppose any substantial amendment to . . . the United Nations Charter, which prevents the United Nations from intervening in ‘matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.’” In short, India's view of the UN is just like that of all of the other member nations: it is a fine organization when it puts other people's houses in order, but it can never be allowed to meddle in one's own.

MARSHALL WINDMILLER

Center for South Asia Studies
University of California
Berkeley, Calif.

W. S. WOYTINSKY. *India: The Awakening Giant*. Pp. xv, 201. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$3.75.

For the reader who wants a popular presentation of modern India's economic and social dilemma, stated in warmly sympathetic terms, this is the book. Woytinsky gives an informed report of a visit to India covering only those subjects which come within his range of special competence: the Indian economy and Five Year Plans, education and social welfare, and the relationship between her ideology and economic planning. The book presents no new information to the specialist, but at numerous points the author forsakes the descriptive approach to make a keen analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of India's planning process and ideology.

The importance of human resources and human values in planning for and measuring economic progress is the theme which binds the work together. The basic cause of India's poverty is found not in overpopulation nor in lack of capital but in a lack of the psychological and human prerequisites for growth: initiative, risk taking, and widespread education. This is the background for Woytinsky's most basic criticisms of the Five Year Plans, although he does congratulate India on a good start with the planning process.

He criticizes “spiritual India” for not giving sufficient emphasis to human values. The very measure of development used is

national income rather than per capita consumption; this last, Woytinsky feels, is a much more fundamental measure. This leads to an exaggerated emphasis on heavy capital equipment and an underemphasis on consumer-goods industries in the second Plan. An even more serious weakness of both Plans is the lack of a bold educational program, especially at the elementary level, with only 2 per cent of the second Plan expenditures allocated to primary education. The author feels this will be little short of disastrous in the next decades when able manpower will be the first necessity for expansion. He gives the Community Development Program as the most exciting aspect of India's planning since this is the one place where mechanistic capital planning is forsaken in favor of developing the potentialities of the people.

It is shown that India's much talked of “socialist pattern” is not nearly as socialist as even Indians think. It is Fabian socialism, not Marxian, and the emphasis is on equitable distribution of income—long accepted in the West—rather than on exclusive state ownership of the means of production.

It is obvious that Woytinsky was excited and charmed by the Indian people and their potentialities for development. This makes his observations more poignant and his friendly criticism more deserving of attention. It is an excellent introduction for the American reader to the Indian economic and political orientation.

WILLIS D. WEATHERFORD

Associate Professor of Economics
Swarthmore College

G. C. ALLEN and AUDREY G. DONNITHORNE. *Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya: A Study in Economic Development*. Pp. 321. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. \$5.00.

This book is a valuable addition to our stock of knowledge about economic development in Southeast Asia. The authors have compiled and digested a vast amount of information previously scattered throughout a forbidding and multilingual literature. This is precisely the strength of the book. Historical documents are competently sur-

veyed, and data relevant to the history of foreign enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya have been neatly packaged in one volume.

While the historical aspects of the subject have been treated with the painstaking research that also marked the authors' earlier study on China and Japan, their treatment of the contemporary period suffers from lack of adequate reference to the recent literature. The authors show little awareness of the adjustments which many foreign enterprises are making to meet the challenge of changing political and social conditions. Perhaps the task of assessing the role of foreign enterprise in this entirely new environment should not have been attempted without the benefit of firsthand research. Indonesia's development plans and her nationalistic Benteng policies, for example, have severely circumscribed foreign enterprise; but several Western firms have carried on, and some have expanded their operations. The significance of these dynamic factors in the contemporary situation is scarcely mentioned. In short, one should not read this book to understand how the postwar changes in Indonesia and Malaya have shaped the role which Western enterprise is now playing, and can be expected to play, in the economic development of these countries.

The authors' background on China and Japan provides the opportunity to draw a number of contrasts among three models of Western influence under which Western enterprise had functioned in Asia. In Indonesia and Malaya, where the Western powers had political control much within their own grasp, the institutional framework for economic development could be constructed to their liking. The authors find that this feature of the Southeast Asian situation provided much positive impetus to development. A problem they fail to face, however, is whether or not the resulting economic and social dualism promoted what we now understand to be economic development. The assertion is repeatedly made that positive economic achievements are evident in the many Western institutions and economic structures brought by foreign enterprise. Yet, in 1950, Indonesia stood near the bottom of the world scale in terms of *per capita* income. It seems

to this reviewer that a study of the historical role of Western enterprise in underdeveloped countries should squarely face the question of whether or not its impact was successful in, or even capable of, bringing growth of *per capita* income to the domestic sector of the economy.

DOUGLAS PAAUW

Associate Professor of Economics
Lake Forest College

WALTER F. VELLA. *Siam Under Rama III, 1824-1851*. (Monograph of the Association for Asian Studies, No. 4.) Pp. ix, 180. Locust Valley, N. Y.: J. J. Augustin for the Association for Asian Studies, 1957. \$5.00.

This is the first scholarly illumination of the reign of Rama III by an American using primary sources. Accordingly it is an event of some importance. The scant sources of Siamese history are indicated by the gleanings of a mere 144 pages of narrative; and these few pages encompass King and court, government and people, religion, arts, vassal states, and international relations. This adds up to lean history.

The Bibliography of Thai materials occupies eight pages and of Western materials six pages. The author provides Thai script for authors and titles of Thai works. An Index completes the volume.

The strength of this study lies in its faithful reflection of Thai source materials. But this is also its weakness, for those materials had been carefully edited to enhance the Chakri Kings and strengthen the dynasty. There is a consequent loss of winsome, human fallibility in all matters pertaining to the King.

Unfortunately, such writers and poets of the reign, who were more impressed with the King's human than with his "Divine" qualities, were unable to do more than the famous poet, Sunthon Pu, who grumbled slyly in his rhymes about his lack of a patron. Unstinting praise was the key to publication and literary success.

Mr. Vella has done well with the materials available, and it is hoped that he will not stop with this brief study but go on after larger game in the dynasty. There

are very few Western scholars who have his ability to use the primary sources, and few if any Thai are trained to be objective in the writing of their own history.

The people of Southeast Asia were generally independent during the reign of Rama III. Later, however, the rising tide of colonialism inundated the area, leaving Thailand a political island. Mr. Vella has shown that during that period the Thai played a key political role, extending their influence into the Lao states, the Malay Peninsula, and Cambodia. Perhaps there is something to be learned from the reign of Rama III which has significance for the current situation. Once again Southeast Asian people are independent and once again the Thai nation is playing an important role in their destiny. How important remains to be seen. The past may indeed be prologue to the future.

KENNETH LONDON

Staff Assistant
Operations Coordinating Board
Washington, D. C.

HARRY B. ELLIS. *Israel and the Middle East*. Pp. vii, 260. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1957. \$4.00.

In his *Israel and the Middle East*, Harry B. Ellis—formerly Middle East correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor*—gives a balanced account of the origins of Arab and Israeli nationalism; and he weighs here the chances for a solution to the Palestine problem which he feels must be solved before any durable peace can be achieved in the Middle East. Mr. Ellis' account of the beginnings of Zionism, the British offer to the Zionists for the foundation of a Jewish national home in Uganda in 1902, the divergent attitudes of Eastern and Western Zionists to settlement there, and the gradual growth of the Yishuv in Palestine against growing Arab resistance are carefully drawn. Mr. Ellis properly presents these episodes in perspective as a long series of troubles and clashes whose end cannot be foreseen even now.

To gain insight into the problems of individuals who are caught up in this conflict and have no way out of it, Mr. Ellis visited the Arab town of Qalqiliyya and the Israeli

kibbutz of Nir Eliahu which face each other across the armistice line, about twenty-five miles northeast of Tel Aviv. The attitudes of the Turkish and Rumanian Jews from the kibbutz and those of the Arab inhabitants of Qalqiliyya are revealing; each side is convinced of the unadulterated justice of its cause and of the infamy and treachery of the other. Infiltration by Arabs and retaliatory raiding by Zionists have so hardened these attitudes that no peace seems possible for a long time to come. This bodes very ill for any efforts to create political stability along this border or within the Middle East in general. Instability means that the situation can be exploited endlessly by the Soviet Union to embarrass the West, and with a greatly enhanced risk of a general international conflict.

Mr. Ellis is well aware of the dilemma of United States policy in the Middle East, and he realizes that we are now wedged into a position—having commitments to both Zionists and Arabs—which leaves us little room for maneuver but permits the Soviet Union to move freely. Although American planners have now played the cards of mediation, economic assistance, irrigation projects, and the Eisenhower Doctrine, they have not yet even won a hand. Mr. Ellis is entirely right in predicting for the United States a "leading and lonely role" in this region.

Minor mistakes in geographical names—Safad and Safed are the same place—and a poor Index do not detract from this objective and moderate study. It deserves to be widely read since, without a guide, the reader can easily go astray in the wilderness of conflicting claims and contentions surrounding Palestine.

BRADFORD G. MARTIN

Author and Consultant on
Middle Eastern Affairs
Washington, D. C.

THOMAS HODGKIN. *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*. Pp. 216. New York: New York University Press, 1957. \$3.75.

In this compact and readable book, Mr. Hodgkin gives an incisive account of the more significant features of nationalism in the postwar period of tropical colonial Af-

rica. His claims for the study are modest. In his own words: "It does not claim to be more than *prolegomena* to a study of African nationalism." His "chief concern is to present, in small compass, the results of other men's work; to indicate the boundary between what is known and what is unknown; to suggest connections and comparisons; and to raise questions which further investigation might help to answer" (p. 16). These stated aims are more than realized by the author.

Crucial to an understanding of Mr. Hodgkin's analysis is his conception of nationalism. His inclination "is to use the term 'nationalist' in a broad sense, to describe any organization or group that explicitly asserts the rights, claims and aspirations of a given African society (from the level of the language-group to that of 'Pan-Africa') in opposition to European authority, whatever its institutional forms and objectives" (p. 23). The author is aware that this somewhat inclusive formulation diverges from more limited usage which would restrict the concept to "those types of organization which are essentially political, not religious, economic or educational, in character, and which have as their object the realization of self-government or independence for a recognizable African nation, or nation-to-be" (p. 23). He, in contrast, prefers to view all significant manifestations of opposition to European authority as implicitly or explicitly nationalistic in character. Such manifestations, in his view, are not confined to national congresses or political parties, consciously committed to nationalist objectives, but are present also in the myriad associations of the new towns, the tribal unions and trade unions, and other groupings and organizations which have emerged in response to new conditions and requirements. He stresses that opposition to European authority is not merely negative; from such reactions, aspirations and activities emerge which result in the development of new ideas and social and political forms.

In terms of this approach, Mr. Hodgkin probes for the sources of opposition to European authority, and he regards the towns as the primary context and source of this dynamic. Symptoms of nationalist senti-

ment, both embryonic and formalized in character, are described. He traces the growth and identifies the characteristics of national congresses and political parties; and he gives an extraordinarily perceptive analysis of the ideologies, doctrines, and myths which emerge as nationalist movements in Africa evolve and mature.

One may be troubled by the author's rather sweeping conception of nationalism in colonial Africa, or one may feel that he often imputes rather than demonstrates meaningful connections between nationalism and such phenomena as trade union activities and separatist church movements. But such anxieties and doubts aside, this is a significant study. Not only does it contribute to a basic understanding of nationalism in Africa, but it provides, as well, suggestive leads and insights for students of nationalist movements in other parts of the world still partially or until recently under the control or subject to the authority of Western powers.

WILLIAM O. BROWN

Director, African Research
and Studies Program
Boston University

FELIX GROSS. *Rhodes of Africa*. Pp. ix, 433. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$6.75.

This detailed biography of Rhodes is one that no student of South African history or of British imperialism can disregard. It is the story of a fabulous empire builder, a man who more fully than any other incarnated the idea and spirit of imperialism. Its author is a South African journalist of international experience who spent twelve years sifting through documentary sources of many languages and places to make this brutal portrait of Rhodes.

Ignoble motives are not imputed to Rhodes, who was most sensitive to that particular accusation. The ambition for money and for power that drove him on did not have him as sole beneficiary. In general, it was for the British Empire that he sought to paint with imperial red as much of Africa as possible. The author's criticism is aimed at the unscrupulous methods Rhodes adopted for reaching his

high goal. The book makes it clear that if Rhodes found blood necessary to paint Africa red, blood had to flow. People who stood in his way had to be eliminated. Bribery or similar persuasion would be tried in the first instance because with Rhodes it was axiomatic that every man had his price; if the obstructive person could not be "squared" in this way, deception and force would be employed. In one case, the author comes close to saying that even murder was used.

Rhodes so dominated his associates that they, too, used the same methods in working for him. It was the son of the great missionary, Moffat, who deliberately deceived Lobengula into signing a paper which eventually robbed him and his people of their extensive lands. Rhodes's closest friend, Dr. Jameson, was troubled by no moral scruples in planning for and making his raid into Transvaal. The raid is studied in great detail, Gross going further than most writers in his charges against both Rhodes and Joseph Chamberlain. The author even accuses Rhodes of blackmailing the Colonial Secretary into whitewashing him in Parliament. Readers of this engrossing book will learn much about these and other events in the crowded history of South Africa.

The book has two serious shortcomings. One is its lack of a bibliography; this is so large, according to the author, that a separate volume will be needed for its publication. Until then students will have to be satisfied with the copies placed on file in four different libraries. In America, the Library of Congress is the only one to receive a copy. The omission of footnotes is a far more serious fault in the book; for here the author's excuse is merely a desire "not to interrupt the continuity of the story." Every page has generous quotations from unidentified sources. As a result, the extreme conclusions of the book must remain under the cloud of a large black question mark until students are enabled to verify the author's challenging statements.

HARRY R. RUDIN

Professor of History
Yale University

EUROPE

HAROLD ZINK. *The United States in Germany, 1944-1955*. Pp. x, 374. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1957. \$7.50.

The presence of the United States in Germany began as an invasion, continued as a hostile occupation, turned into a friendly occupation, and ended as an alliance—if not a new form of political symbiosis. After Germany's total surrender, America attempted an almost total reform of the conquered country; as it would seem today, this effort has been successful. Yet it remains unknown whether, to which degree, and in which field, it was American effort, rather than other factors, which made this success come to pass. The unique experiment of the postwar decade, in which the United States governed a quarter of Germany, can be reported and analyzed only against the full background of American as well as German political, social, and cultural history.

Harold Zink is at present Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University. Previously, though sporadically, he was connected with various phases of United States military government in Germany and in 1950-51 served as its "chief historian." In this book he has set out to present the history of the United States in Germany. In order to achieve this task, an historian must cover much of recent German history, from surrender to sovereignty. But Dr. Zink is mainly concerned with the complex and changing bureaucratic structure of the military government and with its programs of denazification, political reconstruction, exchanges, information, economics, labor, legislation, youth and "religious affairs." Rather than a descriptive, let alone analytical, history of the occupation—and an evaluation of its forces, failures, achievements, and general impact—Dr. Zink has supplied us with a partial, limited contribution to such a history.

What the book offers, in the main, is a view of the "paper occupation" which succeeded the "paper war." If this sector of World War II was distinguished for its

mass production of, and saturation bombings by, military-bureaucratic written material—which was often only slightly related to, and widely ignored in reality—the output of memoranda, directives, surveys, reports, and reports on reports by United States military government personnel in the occupation area has been no less impressive; its files, according to Dr. Zink, fill “approximately 70,000 square feet.” Much of it has found its way into Dr. Zink’s volume; but does this suffice for the history of the gigantic undertaking, while other available and important sources are neglected? Surely many competent students—whether they themselves took a leading part in the history of those years or watched it from close by—might doubt the adequacy of Dr. Zink’s approach.

Since it is true that the “paper phase” of governmental planning and reporting did play an interesting and sometimes important part in the American occupation of Germany, this book does, therefore, contribute much to one chapter of its history. Unfortunately, personal generalizations and snap judgments—some quite misleading—are interspersed between the factual information, without being marked as such. Rather than expand the archivist study into the “history” which it tries to present, these excursions lessen its usefulness. If the author had drawn a visible borderline to separate all the official, factual, and therefore valuable information on military-governmental operations, which he has collected in the bulk of his book, from his often superficial personal impressions of people and events, his book could serve as a more useful reference work.

NORBERT MUHLEN

New York City

MARION C. SINEY. *The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1914–1916*. (University of Michigan Publications in History and Political Science, Vol. XXIII.) Pp. x, 339. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1957. \$6.50.

When the German drive on Paris was stopped at the first battle of the Marne (September 6–12, 1914), it became obvious that the era of quick Bismarckian thrusts to victory was over. World War I then

descended into the stalemate of trench warfare, with such accompanying horrors as the blood bath of Verdun. In this situation, economic warfare became of supreme importance. Each side sought to blockade the other, to deny it the raw materials necessary for war, and to starve it into submission.

Dr. Siney has produced a first-rate study showing how the British and French sought to disrupt the economic life of the Central Powers, particularly Germany. The major part of this meticulous book is devoted to the negotiations carried on from 1914 to 1916 by the Allies—principally the British—with the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The author’s account provides a valuable addendum to the literature of World War I.

When the Germans, desperate for supplies, began to pay high prices, Scandinavian merchants, especially, saw opportunities for substantial profits. The Allies quickly realized that they were faced with the crucial task of closing the back door to Germany. Instead of stationing a naval force off German ports to seal off entrance and exit of all ships, the Allies decided upon other means of solving the problem. These included contraband lists, black lists, searches in home ports, control over exports, navicerting (issuing a sort of commercial passport), rationing of neutral imports, and purchasing agreements.

The measures fell into four categories: those based on belligerent maritime rates; those undertaken as reprisals against the illegal actions of German submarines; those that constituted an exercise of sovereign rights; and those of pure policy. The legal pattern for the system was set by the Order in Council of March 11, 1915 and the French Decree of March 13, 1915, enacted in response to German submarine warfare.

By the close of 1916, the Allied blockade of Germany was in full working order and as effective as it could be made without the intervention of the United States. The brunt of the burden inside Germany was borne not by the Army, which was supplied with ingenious *ersatz* materials, but by the civilian population. Labor, horses, agricultural implements, and wagons were all lacking; crops could neither be raised

nor harvested. Shortages were so great that neither rationing nor supplies received from the border neutrals could make up for the deficiency. It was precisely here that the Allies found the Achilles heel of Germany. The German response was an all-out submarine campaign to break the back of the blockade and bring the war to a close. Instead, this action brought the Americans into the war and finally led to the doom of Germany.

Dr. Siney has told her story well from the pertinent and available documents. Her performance is all the more noteworthy because she has gathered scattered and often fragmentary materials even though generally governmental archives are not yet open. Her intended subsequent volume on the period from 1917 to 1919 will be awaited with interest by all students of World War I.

LOUIS L. SNYDER

Professor of History

The City College of New York

LEONARD KRIEGER. *The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition*. Pp. xii, 540. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. \$7.50.

Professor Leonard Krieger of Yale University has written an important contribution to the understanding of the “German problem.” In the defeat of liberal democracy in Germany, a peculiar German attitude toward liberty was involved. An analysis of the German idea of freedom has long seemed indicated. Dr. Krieger now submits such an analysis. Western liberalism affected German thought and institutions, but as the author rightly points out the process was incomplete and un-integrated. Modern industrial civilization and society had to be grafted on the still strong foundation of a preindustrial aristocratic society. This caused innumerable maladjustments and an ill-feeling which expressed itself, especially among the intellectuals, either in pessimism about the value of modern civilization or in a return to a much praised new authoritarianism. The psychological situation of the German intellectuals has been well characterized by Dr. Krieger: “The Germans’ position half within and half without the Western com-

munity caused them to participate genuinely in ideas and institutions of the Western type while imparting new connotations and new associations to them.” They named their own values in Western terms and thereby created a confusion in which their own brand of liberty or liberalism was regarded as superior to that of the West. This was seen not as a defect in freedom but as a distinctive German dimension to freedom.

In three sections Dr. Krieger shows the growth of this attitude from the territorial principalities of the eighteenth century to the development of liberal parties in the middle of the nineteenth century. The Germans succeeded in making the idea of liberty not the polar antithesis but rather the historical associate of princely authority. The various claims to human freedom were successively absorbed into the structure of monarchical authoritarian government without undermining its foundations. This 200-year-old association of aspects of modern liberty with the authoritarian tradition was smashed by the Nazis. Their defeat brought about a devaluation in the German mind of the traditional state. Thereby the central strand in German modern political tradition was cut and the stage set free for a possible new departure.

The book is valuable both for the material which it presents and for its synthesis of this material. It is written for scholars and advanced students interested in modern German history. Why for such students—or for any reader—the title of the *Berliner Tageblatt* should be translated into *Berlin Daily* (and that is only one of many similar examples) is difficult to understand. It would be comparable to a German author writing about the *New Yorker Zeiten* when he meant *New York Times*.

HANS KOHN

Professor of History

The City College of New York

ROBERT A. KANN. *The Habsburg Empire: A Study in Integration and Disintegration*. Pp. xii, 227. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$5.00.

This will prove a most useful companion volume to Professor Kann’s basic work

on *The Multinational Empire*, published in 1950 by Columbia University Press. The Princeton Center for Research on World Political Institutions had invited Professor Kann to contribute to its inquiry into the history of political integration by studying the case of Austria-Hungary. To do this it was necessary to return to the nationalities problem of the Habsburg Monarchy, which was the main obstacle to its integration and the main reason for its disintegration; it was not, however, the direct cause of its collapse and complete disappearance. For this, as he rightly stresses in the first part of his study, was the practically inevitable result of a noninevitable war.

Turning to the process of integration and disintegration itself, or rather, as it had to be said in the given case, to "the problem of non-integration," Professor Kann had to adhere strictly to the frame of the whole inquiry—no easy task—and to a rather involved terminology which had to be explained in the Appendix. He also had to explain in one of the notes the terms which he used in his special case, and it seems doubtful whether one of them, "Transleithanian Austria" as designation of Hungary, has any legal basis, particularly after 1867.

In general, however, the author has succeeded well in giving, on a limited number of pages, a clear and objective picture of conditions which in many respects were really unique and can be properly understood only against a historical background of many centuries. Professor Kann was entirely correct when, in his brief sketch of the "historic setting," he started with the early ninth century; and even more when he stressed the difficulty of satisfying those nationalities which in the course of that long process came under Habsburg rule only in part. But in the case of two of these nationalities, the Poles and the Ruthenians, he definitely overrated "the emotional drawing power" which those of them who were under Russian exercised on their kin in Austrian Galicia: on the contrary, almost all Poles and most of the Ruthenians or Ukrainians, except the so-called Old Ruthenians, considered Galicia a Piedmont in the struggle for ultimate unification and liberation.

Entirely new and highly provocative is the third part entitled "Supranational Man and Idea." Here, it should be noted, the author's careful and well-balanced approach necessarily led him to the negative conclusion that in spite of a common pattern of institutions and behavior, and of a concept of "Austrian idea and mission," the Monarchy did not create "a typical Austrian man." Here and on many other pages of this book the reader, especially if familiar with the Austrian tradition, will find ample material for reflection and further study, particularly in the social and cultural field.

OSCAR HALECKI

Professor of East European History
Fordham University

NORMAN RICH and M. H. FISHER (Eds.). *The Holstein Papers: The Memoirs, Diaries and Correspondence of Friedrich von Holstein, 1837-1909*, Vol. II, *Diaries*. Pp. xix, 404. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957. \$8.50.

This second volume of *The Holstein Papers*, available now in a very readable English version, will arouse considerable interest among historians and lay readers who are devoted to the age of Bismarck. Though he had been advised by his illustrious chief that it was indiscreet for an officer of the foreign service to keep a diary, Holstein began to make a record of his daily encounters in the early 1880's. He took, however, the precaution of sending these leaves to his cousin, Ida von Stülpnagel, for safekeeping. The present volume starts with March of the year 1881 and takes us to November of 1888.

The outline of Bismarck's foreign policy in these years was already well established, and one can hardly expect great surprises from the observations of a man who was not in a position to influence the fundamental decisions. However, the Holstein papers deserve attention for more than one reason. Holstein was an imperfect pupil of Bismarck's conduct of European affairs: in particular, he failed to understand Bismarck's basic concern for the preservation of peace in Europe. On the contrary, Holstein thought that "war was inevitable" and that Germany would find herself confronted with the necessity of fighting on

two fronts—that is, against France and Russia at the same time (p. 361). He therefore opposed Bismarck's attempts to keep the wire to St. Petersburg alive and judged that the famous Rückversicherungsvertrag of 1887 was a safety device, invented not so much for the welfare of Germany as to render its creator indispensable. "Our policy with its criss-cross of commitments . . . resembles the tangle of lines at a big railway station. The chief pointsman thinks he can click everything into its proper place and hopes particularly that the greater the confusion the more indispensable he is" (p. 332).

Holstein attributed the Reinsurance Treaty to Herbert Bismarck rather than to the aged prince, and he wrote: "The old man is led by his son and the son is led by vanity and the Russian Embassy." Holstein revealed here the pathological streak of suspicion in his intellectual outlook which in his later life played such a destructive role in his blueprinting of German foreign policy. He was quite obviously jealous of Herbert, as he was antagonistic to Bismarck's son-in-law, Kuno von Rantzau, whom he challenged to a duel on the grounds of a trifling matter of social etiquette. If his judgment was impaired on such occasions, he showed, on the other hand, a remarkable astuteness in gauging the main personalities of the imperial court, especially the future Kaiser and the crown princess Victoria. The reader of these diaries will be amazed at the extent to which the death of the old emperor and the impending succession, with its anticipated change toward a more liberal regime, overshadowed both domestic and international discussions in Germany of the 1880's. Holstein shared the unfavorable judgment of Victoria that Bismarck professed, and he was fully aware of the weaknesses in Wilhelm II's character. From the anecdotes preserved in Holstein's diary we receive the impression of a morbid vanity as the main ingredient in the psychological make-up of the Kaiser.

Finally, there is, though unconscious, a sociological element in these pages that deserves attention. The circles in which Holstein moved were, quite naturally, those of the diplomatic world. It would seem as

though the bourgeois class, which was then making powerful strides, did not exist for him. The names that figure time and again in his record are those of the high and low nobility and, strangely enough, those of Jewish financiers such as Bleichröder and Baron von Meyer-Cohn. Here we find one more confirmation of the social vacuum in which Germany's foreign policy was conducted.

This volume is carefully annotated and carries both a biographical and a subject Index which enhances its usefulness.

GERHARD MASUR

Professor of History
Sweet Briar College

ELEONORE STERLING. *Er ist wie du: Aus der Frühgeschichte des Antisemitismus in Deutschland (1815-1850)*. Pp. vii, 235. Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1956. No price.

The massacre of millions of Jews by asphyxiation in gas ovens marked a low point in the history of civilization. It has been necessary to invent a new name—genocide—for this stupendous crime against humanity. How was it possible for such a highly civilized people as the Germans to descend into barbarism in this most gruesome fashion? How can one "clarify the inexplicable"?

The thesis that Nazi anti-Semitism was a "sudden catastrophe" that struck the German people—one of the lesser contributions of the brilliant Friedrich Meinecke—is plainly untenable. One must dig deeply into German history to find its roots. And the subject demands not a highly charged emotional reaction but the calmness and earnestness of the conscientious historian.

Eleonore Sterling has produced an excellent book and one of the best and most enlightening ever written on this painful subject. It is a model study, in organization, in content, and in writing. Concerned primarily with the *Vorgeschichte* of the anti-Semitism that led to the horrors of 1933-45, the study is limited to the period from 1815 to 1850. The author has gone to the archives and painstakingly gleaned the most significant contemporary material not only on anti-Semitism but also on the general socioeconomic pattern of the period. She

has utilized not only the tested methods of historical research but also the best techniques of modern sociology.

Dr. Sterling divides her work into four major sections: (1) The Reality—the historical hypothesis of the conflict as expressed in general and Jewish history in the first half of the nineteenth century; (2) The Expostulation—the theological and secular image of Jews and Judaism; (3) The Theory—the dislocation of theological ideas in the sphere of sociopolitical theories; and (4) The History—the secularized Christian-Jewish relationships of the era. Within this ingenious framework, rather than a chronological or geographical one, the author presents the results of her meticulous scholarship.

It is demonstrated adequately here that early German anti-Semitism embodied not only mutual theological enmity between Judaism and Christianity but even more a reflection of the political, social, and economic structure of the era. Anti-Semitism was in effect one response by the German bourgeoisie to its endangered position in a difficult period. Psychologically, the hatred of Jews was a hatred of Germans against themselves. In the Jews the Germans saw a reflected image of their own misery.

Dr. Sterling shows a rare research talent in seeking out the strands and weaving them into a recognizable historical pattern. It is to be hoped that she will augment her superb book with another study bringing the subject up to 1945.

LOUIS L. SNYDER

Professor of History
The City College of New York

MINNA R. FALK. *History of Germany: From the Reformation to the Present Day*. Pp. x, 438. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. \$6.00.

According to the advertisement on its dust cover, this brief survey, "in a well-balanced division of space covering four centuries of German history, emphasizes factual material essential to an understanding of modern Germany." Actually, except for the first seventy-six pages, the book covers the same ground, chronologically at least, as the excellent work by Koppel S. Pinson, *Modern Germany* (Macmillan,

1954) which begins with the period of the French Revolution and which filled an acute need in historical literature.

The present work unfortunately has no such *raison d'être*, and even as a popular survey it adds little to the earlier works by S. H. Steinberg, Veit Valentin, and the provocative A. J. P. Taylor. It consists largely of familiar summaries and unsupported (often unsupportable) generalizations, together with many half-truths, clichés, and fallacious conclusions. The style is infelicitous and occasionally obscure, marred by grammatical errors, misused words, and arbitrary terminology. The number of errors in spelling the names of persons and places decidedly exceeds the permissible limit, even in this age of illiterate typesetters and overworked editors. More serious is the confusion of personal names. Thus, Count Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg appears as Georg von Stauffenberg; Austen Chamberlain as Joseph Chamberlain; and Anton Drexler, the early founder of Hitler's German Workers' Party, appears twice as Anton Feder. These examples, which could be multiplied at will, are unfortunately accompanied by numerous factual errors, though mostly of a minor nature. Only a few need be pointed out. "German Silesia" was not incorporated by Czechoslovakia in 1919 (p. 319); the Schutzstaffel was not formed after the Roehm purge in 1934 (p. 349) but in 1929; the final payment Germany had to make under the Lausanne Reparation Agreements was not \$2 billion (p. 349) but \$750 million; the Turks did not close the Mediterranean to Allied shipping in 1914 (p. 299) but the Straits and the Black Sea; and the *Daily Telegraph* episode occurred not in 1909 (p. 281) but in 1908.

Although the author served for three years with the military government in Germany and Austria, she regrettably gives the reader only the barest summary of developments since World War II; this is in contrast to the "full discussion of the present government of the Federal Republic and the situation in eastern Germany," as promised by the publisher on the dust jacket. It is strange indeed to find a familiar institution like the Bundestag re-

peatedly referred to as the "Volkstag" (was the author thinking of the Volkskammer in eastern Germany?). The haphazardly selected Bibliography, in which even the most familiar names appear disfigured, glaringly reflects the general character of the book.

CARL G. ANTHON

Associate Professor of History
American University of Beirut

MICHAEL P. FOGARTY. *Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1820-1953*. (International Studies of the Committee on International Relations, University of Notre Dame.) Pp. xviii, 461. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1957. \$6.75.

This book by Michael P. Fogarty, British economist and Catholic layman, is a careful and detailed study of Christian Democracy from its origins to 1953.

In a sociological and economic discussion, comprising the first two parts of the book, the author explains the origin and characteristics of the movement. Part III is an historical survey of Christian Democracy from 1820 to 1950. Aspects touched upon include relations of the Catholic Church to the State, how the Protestants developed their own Christian Democracy, and the rise of labor movements which adopted a positive Christian as opposed to a materialist-socialist policy. On the whole, the Christian Democrats are said to be found in their greatest strength in a belt of territory extending across Central Europe from Belgium through Austria.

The relative strength of the unions formed under Christian Democratic auspices, whether Catholic or Protestant on the one hand or Socialist-inspired trade unions on the other, is dealt with in detail. It is presented both in the text and by statistical tables embodied in the chapters. These tables list figures for Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, France, and Italy.

The ways in which Christian Democrats differed greatly from the Socialists in methods, aims, and ideology are made clear by the author. While the Socialists advocated public ownership and national planning, the Christian Democrats favored a decen-

tralized economy of industrial self-government. Under this latter system, firms were independently owned and managed; employees participated in management, ownership, and profits; and their trade unions and employers' associations collaborated. Contrary to the Marxian belief in working-class advancement through class war and revolution, Fogarty presents Christian Democracy as standing more for individual personality and the Christian ideal, with its belief in the "supernatural as well as in the earthly destiny of man."

Later chapters deal with Christian Democratic responsibility for management, middle-class and farmers' associations as well as for youth and family movements with much detail as to their formation and activities. An extensive chapter deals with the Christian Democratic political parties in the various countries.

Chapters XXII and XXIII are entitled "Is a New Orientation in Sight." By the use of text and of numerous statistical tables, Fogarty here discusses such questions as the changing strength of Christian Democracy in the various countries, the Church's stake in education, the proportion of baptized Catholics who actually practice their religion and attend mass regularly, and the characterization of such regular churchgoers—both Catholic and Protestant—as to sex, age, occupation, place of residence, and political views.

The book concludes with a discussion of Christian Democracy in the perspective of church history and of Christianity itself. Many valuable conclusions are drawn but the brevity of this review does not permit discussion of them. The periods of Early Christianity, the Middle Ages, the Reformation, the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in which a new advance and synthesis is recorded, the role of the laity, the relevance of revelation, all these are topics discussed. The author concluded that "the Protestant contribution to the Christian Democratic movements would not have been possible without Protestant awareness of the Church as an organized body and of their own responsibilities as members of it. Catholics for their part could have contributed little to Christian De-

mocracy if they had not taken over from Protestantism its tradition of flexible adaptation to current trends and in particular its traditional emphasis on the role of the laity."

The author has produced a stimulating book which shows admirable balance and perspective. At times the style appears too detailed and labored; this is perhaps due to the complexity of the subject discussed.

JAMES EDWARD GILLESPIE

Professor of History, Emeritus
The Pennsylvania State University

CHARLES P. MCVICKER. *Titoism: Pattern for International Communism*. Pp. xx, 332. New York: St. Martin's Press; London: Macmillan & Company, 1957. \$6.00.

Based on the author's doctoral thesis at Princeton University, the book is a survey of the development of the political and social systems of Yugoslavia after that country's expulsion from the Cominform. The introductory chapter covers, very briefly, the reorganization of Yugoslavia after Tito's partisan army captured Belgrade on October 20, 1944. It is followed by a more detailed chapter dealing with "Nineteen Fifty—The Year of Change"; a section titled "Decentralization to Remedy Over-Bureaucratization" which is focused on major economic, agricultural, political-administrative, social, and legal reforms; and the concluding section, "Major Ideological Developments," which deals with the role of the state, the role of the party and the Popular Front Organization, and the new stress upon the individual. McVicker's conclusion is that "Titoism is neither communism as it is practiced in the Soviet Union nor democracy as it is known in Western liberal societies. Instead it is a compromise, a synthesis of those parts of Marxism-Leninism and those parts of Western democracy which the Yugoslav leaders consider necessary or practical to their cause" (p. 305). Furthermore, "as a system of minority rule, Titoism is at best a benevolent dictatorship which attempts to recognize human rights but does not dare to grant the one human right which is fundamental—the right of the individual to

choose his own government and to control his government's theoretical and practical aims" (p. 305).

Roughly speaking, McVicker's work is the best available survey in *English* of Titoism. In that respect we must be thankful to the author since we have seen lately too many books—not to speak of articles—on Tito and Titoism; most of them are written with fervor and indict Tito as well as his system. Hence it is refreshing to discover here a book which portrays calmly, and in language any one can understand, the intricacies of Titoism. In fact, the book could serve well as a text for the few courses in Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe offered in this country.

Yet the handling of the topic is not without some glaring weaknesses. The reviewer has a definite impression that the author has allowed himself to be snared in theoretical and legalistic claims and formulas of Titoism, as shown in his numerous references in his footnotes to five journals published by the Belgrade regime. Here and there, McVicker cites "other" authorities (R. N. C. Hunt, Hugh Seton-Watson, H. F. Armstrong, A. B. Ulam, L. Adamic, and so forth) but fails to note the existence of several other penetrating analyses. From that point of view, a good bibliography would have helped McVicker's offering immeasurably. Finally, the author's tendency to allow his presentation to be snared in legalistic and semantic technicalities of approach induced him to treat weakly such traditional and subtle ideological undercurrents as the influence of Pan-Slavism in Tito's schemes.

Basically, then, McVicker's original theme is good, but it could have been strengthened by more skillful handling.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

Professor of Sociology and
Political Science
University of Bridgeport

R. DUDLEY EDWARDS and T. DESMOND WILLIAMS (Eds.). *The Great Famine: Studies in Irish History, 1845-52*. Pp. xvi, 517. New York: New York University Press, 1957. \$6.00.

The Great Famine in Ireland in the late 1840's was "a watershed" in Irish social

and political history; and it had profound repercussions on Anglo-Irish relations and on the character of the population of several other countries, notably the United States, Canada, and Australia. Among other consequences, it produced the greatest population movement of the nineteenth century. It destroyed one Ireland and created another, "which was not confined within the shores of one small island."

In assessing responsibility for the Great Famine, most Irishmen have been inclined to blame the landlords and the British and to agree with Charles Gavan Duffy that the Famine was nothing less than "a fearful murder committed on the mass of the people." The editors of the present volume reach a different conclusion: "Human limitations and timidity dominate the story of the Great Famine, but of great and deliberately imposed evil in high positions of responsibility there is little evidence. . . . The conventions of the day proved stronger than even the best intentions."

The seven chapters in the volume, each by a different author, deal respectively with Ireland on the eve of the Famine, agriculture, the political story of the Famine period, organization and measures for relief, the medical history of the Famine, Irish emigration, and the Famine in oral tradition. Each chapter is well documented and breaks new ground; this is done either by presenting fresh evidence or by drawing upon new sources to document familiar aspects of the Famine story. Of special interest are Kevin Nowlan's account of the impotence and lack of unity within the repeal movement during the Famine years; Thomas O'Neill's description of the organization and administration of relief, with particular attention to relief by public works, the soup-kitchen scheme, and poor law relief; and Sir William MacArthur's medical history of the Famine, with its precise identification of the cause of the disaster—"a fungus disease of the potato due to *Phytophthora infestans*"—and his account of the Famine epidemics—typhus, relapsing fever, dysentery, and scurvy.

In the Foreword the editors modestly state that the "present collection of studies . . . does not claim to be a definitive his-

tory of the Great Famine but rather a contribution towards such a history." The individual chapters are presented without editorial comment and there is no concluding chapter. Unfortunately, the editors felt that because of "the dearth of specialised studies in Irish economic history in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries," they could not include any essay on the long-term implications of the Great Famine. This is carrying scholarly caution to a fault. There is, in fact, a widespread agreement among all of the authors on fundamental interpretations, and the volume holds together remarkably well. It is the outstanding single work on the Great Famine and a particularly important contribution to modern Irish history.

NORMAN D. PALMER

Professor of Political Science
University of Pennsylvania

WILLIAM HARDY MCNEILL. *Greece: American Aid in Action, 1947-1956*. Pp. x, 240. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1957. \$3.00.

This is a sound and solid report on Greece, dealing, as it does, with the effects of American aid on its economy, its politics, and its society in general. The author is no tyro in this field, having been a member of The Twentieth Century Fund's team which visited Greece and published a report in 1948. This latest book is, in essence, a summary and an evaluation of American efforts in behalf of this little country—whose strategic importance to the Western world is equalled only by the magnitude of the problems which confront it—in its struggle to survive as a free nation.

The author believes that real gains have been made. Agricultural productivity has been increased through the work of Greek and American agricultural extension personnel; these groups stimulated and spearheaded the expanded use of fertilizers, the introduction of new crops, the improvement of seed, the extension of water control and irrigation, and the development of other modern farming and marketing methods. American engineers and dollars constructed a modern highway system of trunk and dirt roads which constitutes "the most funda-

mental of all the great changes wrought by the American aid program in Greece." Its effect was to break down, once and for all, the traditional isolation of Greek villages; for these are still the backbone of the nation in spite of rapidly increasing urbanization. American aid, supplementing earlier British military assistance, defeated communism in Greece—of that there can be no doubt. Whether or not communism will stay defeated there, Mr. McNeill is unwilling to say. In this connection, he points out that substantial pockets of disaffection and discontent still exist in the hill villages and within the urban proletariat whose economic lots have not materially improved. Whether or not modern industry can gain a foothold in Greece is still a moot question in spite of the establishment of a great public power grid that covers the entire nation and makes available for the first time electric power in quantity and at a reasonable price.

On the positive side also is the fact that there are now top-ranking civil servants in the economic ministries of the national government who understand and work enthusiastically for the real needs of Greece—the improvement of the nation's balance of payments and the expansion of employment opportunities. Furthermore, the revitalization of Greek local government has produced "highly beneficial results in some localities at least." Both of these improvements were brought about through the American mission's interest in upgrading public administration so that more effective use of American aid could be made.

But of course money—even 2½ billion dollars coupled with topflight administrative and technical assistance—could not remake, in a period of nine years, a country which in spite of superficial similarities to Western culture is still basically Near Eastern in social habit and mental outlook. Nor could it heal the wounds inflicted by years of war, occupation, and revolution which have been the lot of Greece during most of the twentieth century. Greek politics remain unstable; inflation has not been controlled; poverty is still the condition of a substantial majority of the eight million inhabitants; and the Cyprus question remains unresolved.

But Mr. McNeill feels that if present trends continue, Greece will be back on her feet economically in a few years, and then the nation can enter a period of internal social stability which has eluded it for more than a generation. All this presupposes that neither war nor international economic depression comes again; for Greece will continue to be helpless in the face of these ever-present dangers—with or without American aid.

An excellent feature of this book is the intimate glimpses into six different types of villages and the analysis of life in the towns and cities—especially Athens, the Piraeus, and Salonika. Altogether, Mr. McNeill has written a rewarding book.

HAROLD F. ALDERFER

Deputy Superintendent of
Public Instruction
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Harrisburg, Pa.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HERBERT FEIS. *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought*. Pp. xi, 692. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. \$6.95.

With this remarkable volume, Herbert Feis carries out another of his even-tempered and lucid exercises in the unraveling of the knottiest episodes of our modern history. Having traversed *The Road to Pearl Harbor* and clarified *The China Tangle*, he now faces up to the most intricate and tricky problem of all—the story of the rise and decline of the great wartime partnership between the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. His manner is, as usual, patient and cool; his research thorough; his judgment reasoned and astute, with generous moral feeling tempered by a consistent understanding of the burdens of responsibility.

Though Dr. Feis has had access to the papers of Averell Harriman and to State Department records (one regrets, by the way, that he has not given exact citation of these manuscript sources in his footnotes), his story does not contain a great

deal of new material. What counts rather is his success in bringing order into a confusion of issues and documents—this, and the astringent sanity of his summations. He explodes the myth that "unconditional surrender" was an impulsive Rooseveltian inspiration at Casablanca. He throws light on such murky questions as Churchill's alleged demand for a Balkan invasion and the fate of the proposed American postwar credit to the Soviet Union.

He is crisp and perceptive on his leading characters. Roosevelt emerges as the sanguine pragmatist in his attitude toward Russia. As for Churchill, Dr. Feis writes that he could not evade "the curious conclusion that Churchill's views of what might be hoped and expected of the Russian rulers were more volatile than Roosevelt's. The narrative, alas, comes to a rather abrupt end in May 1945. A final paragraph sketches what came after but concludes, to the reader's disappointment, that "all this and much more awaits another opportunity, other narrators and other interpreters, and a freer and fuller disclosure of the record."

One could have wished that Dr. Feis had occasionally broadened his focus. I think, for example, that a study of instructions given to national Communist parties might have afforded useful clues to Soviet purposes and timing. Certainly the famous Duclos comment on Browderism in the April 1945 *Cahiers du Communisme* must have expressed a basic policy decision taken somewhere in the recesses of the Kremlin. By concentrating on the diplomatic exchanges among his three great figures, Dr. Feis sometimes misses the illumination which events outside the diplomatic orbit often cast on diplomacy. Still, this does not detract from the book's success as a brilliant and masterly study in diplomatic history.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.

Professor of History
Harvard University

B. E. MATECKI. *Establishment of the International Finance Corporation and United States Policy: A Case Study in International Organization*. Pp. 194. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$5.00.

In their autobiographical publications, key figures in world affairs have frequently thrown new light on the events of their times. At best, such personalized history warrants gentle handling by the student. Still, the man who played a key role can generally be counted upon to have insights not available to other, more removed, observers.

In this little book, Dr. Matecki attempts to give an analytical account of the creation of the International Finance Corporation. Apparently, he was not an insider in a pertinent United States government agency or international organization at the time. Nor is there any documentary material yet available from the pen of key people on either the international or the national side. The result is a rather labored piecing together of a chain of events. One cannot be certain of their relationship. Even if they were all related, they would not constitute sufficient proof of Dr. Matecki's points.

These specific tasks are (1) to discover whether the "idea of an IFC, first publicly expounded by the U. S. International Development Advisory Board, had its source" in international rather than national agencies and (2) what caused the United States, long negative toward the establishment of such an international organ, to shift its views late in 1954. In particular, did the views of international institutions influence this shift in United States policy? A good internationalist, Dr. Matecki likes to feel that there has been this type of international influence upon national policy. His book does argue that this was the case. On the basis of my own governmental experience in this general area through 1952, rather than on the basis of the book, I am convinced that Dr. Matecki is correct. Personally, I doubt that it is worthwhile to venture a general proof on such matters—unless in this case the author could speak for Eugene R. Black, President of the International Bank, and George M. Humphrey, the United States Secretary of the Treasury when the shift in our position occurred.

Indeed, the elaborate putting together of bits and pieces of evidence, which make the case, results not only in an unconvincing

total but in some distortion of rather straightforward relationships. The IFC emerges as an organization whose potential importance is of greater significance than even its most ardent well-wishers claim. United States citizens who are staff members in international organizations take on an exaggerated importance for our national policy. The subheading, "Subservience of International Bank to United States—a Myth," is a formulation which misses its essential intimacy with an international organization whose function is a task close to the policy interests of its most influential member nation. Many more illustrations might be given.

If the judgments of this reviewer are strong, it is clearly not because I doubt the author's "answers" nor the importance of a better understanding of national-international agency relationships. I simply submit that the origins of ideas and their play in the national-international communities of Washington and the United Nations are not amenable to documentation by the usual social science methods. There may be an opportunity here for the carefully structured interviews of the psychologist. Most fruitful, it seems to me, would be the records of a conference for which the half dozen key individuals involved in the creation of IFC were brought together with a few social scientists interested in the role of international organization in national policy. Princeton University, at which Dr. Matecki was a visiting fellow while he worked on this study, has conducted a number of conferences of this type, and with very happy results.

WILFRED MALENBAUM

Visiting Professor of Economics
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

CHARLES S. CAMPBELL, JR. *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903*. Pp. vii, 385. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957. \$5.50.

Dr. Campbell has shown again what perhaps should not need to be shown: that a scholar of industry, intelligence, and critical acuteness can take a theme that one is disposed to write off as hackneyed, if not

completely exhausted, and make of it a living and important topic. This he has done, but not by pursuing novelty or paradox for its own sake. He is content to accept traditional judgments when the evidence justifies them. He thinks that Anglo-American understanding was a good thing, that the settlement of various more or less serious disputes was a good thing, and that the men of intelligence and good will who contributed to this end deserved to be thought well of by their respective countries. He praises men who have been already justly praised: Julian Pauncefoot, Henry White, and, a little less convincingly, John Hay. He finds little to say to elevate the rank of Henry Cabot Lodge as a statesman. He treats Theodore Roosevelt with sympathy, and yet a touch of irony. He is, it may be suggested, a little too severe on the Canadians and, possibly in compensation, a little too kind to Lord Alverstone. Was he "the most eminent jurist in England"? He was Lord Chief Justice, and ranked as such by the Lord Chancellor, so that this was not even formally true. But in any case, a jurist and a judge are not necessarily the same thing, and Alverstone, the Sir Richard Webster of the Parnell affair, was not much more a jurist than Lodge.

Dr. Campbell's main contribution lies in making clear the sometimes neglected fact that there were not merely formal but serious issues dividing the three countries, most notably dividing Canada and the United States. He makes plain how often rational and generous American policy was bedeviled by senatorial vanity and by the political necessity of placating the voters of Gloucester, Massachusetts. It was from there that "Gussie Gardner" was sent to Congress, a fact important only because Representative Gardner was the son-in-law of Senator Lodge. On this "reef of Norman's woe" how much was wrecked! One is almost tempted to sympathize with Lodge and to apply to him the French song, launched at the expense of President Grévy at the time of "l'affaire Wilson," *quel malheur d'avoir un gendre*.

From the point of view of 1957, one of the most important novel notes struck by this able narrative is the continuing sloven-

liness of the Foreign Office's attitude to the urgency of American questions. That after one Venezuelan affair there should have been a second is almost unthinkable. One is not surprised that, at a critical moment, Lord Lansdowne was at Bowood, as if he had been a later Foreign Secretary or Prime Minister making things easy for Hitler! The other novel (or archaic) point of view is the cavalier way in which both Britain and the United States pushed Canada around. Those were not the days of a six-cent premium on the Canadian dollar! There is some comic relief provided by Wilhelm II invading the bedroom of the British ambassador and a lot of light on the impact of the Boer War on British policy. But it must be pointed out not only that the "A. C. Corbett" of page 59 (later Lord Rowallan) was not the "member for Glasgow"—there were then seven—but that he did not represent the business district, the Central Division. He was a worthy and philanthropic politician of the second rank, but he was not an intrinsically weighty figure.

D. W. BROGAN

Professor of Political Science
Cambridge University

CARL BERGER. *The Korea Knot: A Military-Political History*. Pp. 206. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957. \$5.00.

For centuries Korea has been recognized as a key strategic peninsula in Asia and a focal area for the conflicting interests of major powers. Ravaged by war and by foreign occupation for the past half century, Korea has been called the "Balkans of the Orient"; and she has been trampled in turn by neighboring powers. Subjected to strong external pressures, Korea's freedom to make decisions concerning her own fate has been drastically limited, and her present status is a clear example of the futilities and tensions of the post-Yalta world. *The Korea Knot*, written by Mr. Berger, a former newspaperman, is a survey of a short Korean history. It covers the crucial decade between 1943, when the United States formally re-entered Korean political affairs, and 1953, when the Ko-

rean conflict was brought to an inconclusive end.

In fact, this text is a political rather than a military history of Korea. The story related here is of tragic political events in Korea after the post-Yalta world. It is the brief story of a grim struggle for independence on the part of the long-subjugated Korean people; of diplomatic and political maneuvers by the Great Powers of the world; and of bloody combat in an unhappy "Land of the Morning Calm," which occupies a strategic position on the rim of the vast and sprawling Asian continent.

Beginning with a brief account of the troubled historical past of this strategic peninsula, Mr. Berger, a former army historian, sets the stage for Korea's catastrophic hour—the result of the division of a once-united nation into two countries at the end of World War II. It is this division, the author maintains, which is the key to the Korean tragedy. His book ranges from the Cairo Pledge to the present. It examines the shifts in international diplomacy, Soviet Russia's change in attitude after Yalta and the death of Roosevelt, and the intransigence of Soviet Russia's occupation of northern Korea after the surrender of Japan in 1945.

The author also vividly describes North Korea's invasion of South Korea and President Truman's convictions on this point which led to the United Nations action to meet the challenger under the leadership of the United States. The bitter warfare of the "police action," the world-wide shock of the Chinese "volunteer" army's sudden entry into North Korea, the recall of General Douglas MacArthur, the struggles to work out the armistice, President Rhee's despairing attempts to force the unification of Korea, all these events the author attempts to unfold in dramatic sequence.

In summarizing the political happenings of the last decade in Korea, there is some repetition in the description of events and material in the organization of the book which reduces its interest. The true internal political picture in North and South Korea since the establishment of their governments in 1948 is not thoroughly covered in this textbook: the future of Korea depends upon large issues on several differ-

ent levels, beginning with the contest for supremacy among Korean political leaders in both North and South Korea.

Although *The Korea Knot* tries to be a detailed study that puts the newspaper headlines of the recent past into the perspective of history, this book requires more carefully documented materials to supplement its excellent maps, pertinent statistics, informative photographs, valuable detailed Bibliography, and selected official documents on Korea in the Appendix. With commentary analysis, this book would be a more readable account of the Korean conflict—the events leading to it, its international repercussions, and its possible future effects. If the author were more objective, the reader would have an enlightening interpretative history of the United States's foreign policy in Korea and gain new insight into the unhappy plight to which power politics has brought the "Land of the Morning Calm."

Because of the disunited political status of Korea, it may perhaps be too difficult to present the full significance of all of these events having nation-wide applicability to Korean political affairs. However, a more comprehensive study, with more commentary and with sufficient background to place it in perspective with regard to the issue of the reunification of Korea, may be written; such a work would make an important contribution to our understanding of the dilemmas—war and peace, freedom and repression—which still face a divided world.

KYUNG CHO CHUNG

Monterey, Calif.

MALCOLM W. CAGLE and FRANK A. MANSON. *The Sea War in Korea*. Pp. xix, 555. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1957. \$6.00.

"At 2200 on the night of 27 July 1953, an uneasy truce settled along the battle lines in Korea. The 37 months-and-2 days war had ended. It had cost the United States 142,091 casualties and almost 20 billion dollars."

Thus terminated the once-designated "police action," a unique war meriting most

careful account; insofar as sea and naval air activities are concerned, these events have been ably recorded by two naval historians, Cagle and Manson. From a chapter on the military and diplomatic backgrounds of the war to a conclusion that touches lightly on the debatable subject of whether the United Nations and the United States won or lost the Korean war, every effort apparently was made to record the activities of the far-flung United States Navy.

The authors include personal observations of senior and junior officers who participated in the fighting; they also make some pertinent informal comments on the "headaches" incident to the operations of joint services and allied nations; all of this livens the history.

A strong case is inferentially made for preponderant sea-naval airpower in all overseas and amphibious operations. With authority, the authors report: "Six of every seven people who went to Korea went by sea. Fifty-four million tons of dry cargo, 22 million tons of petroleum products went to Korea by ship." They go on to say that "for every ton of trans-Pacific air freight, there were 270 tons of trans-Pacific sea freight. For every ton of air freight, four tons of gasoline for the airplanes had to be delivered across the Pacific by ship."

However, with admirable restraint the authors refrain from overstressing weapons and Services; rather, by an account of missions, means, and results, they support in general the succinct farewell statement of a senior peace negotiator and war leader, the late Vice Admiral C. T. Joy, who said: "We need balance between the Services and balance within the Services."

Profuse illustrations which include twenty clear charts and ten Appendices listing all commanders, ships, patrol squadrons, technical terms, and statistics—including casualties—contribute tremendously to the historic value of the work. In fact, with the fully documented chapter notes and its general Index, the volume should long serve as the major reference work of the role and accomplishments of the United States Navy in the *first* war fought by the

United States and the United Nations to resist Red imperialism.

LELAND P. LOVETTE

Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Alexandria, Va.

JOHN EHRLMAN. *Grand Strategy*, Vol. VI, *October 1944–August 1945, History of the Second World War*. (Military Series.) Pp. xvi, 422. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956. (Distributed by British Information Services, New York.) \$5.60.

With this volume, the second on the subject of strategy to appear in the United Kingdom military series on World War II (Volume V came out first), Mr. Ehrman expertly concludes the war. While many of the subjects—Yalta, the decision not to drive for Berlin, the decision to use the atomic bomb—are already familiar to Americans, Mr. Ehrman's analyses are informative, and his treatment of Burma and Southeast Asia adds new data.

Volume VI, like its predecessor, is distinguished by its felicitous style, depth of research, and its impartiality. In treating disagreements between the Americans and British, Mr. Ehrman presents each point of view accurately and sympathetically.

For students of history, government, and war alike, perhaps the most illuminating section of the entire volume is Chapter X, "The Central Organization." Here Mr. Ehrman offers his mature appraisal of the various British and joint United States-British constitutional and military organs which directed the war, together with pithy sketches of the personalities involved.

The evaluations of President Roosevelt and of Marshall, King, and Arnold are perceptive and fair. Of Churchill: "The virtues were on a grand scale and the defects were peculiarly those of the virtues. Thus confidence could become dogmatism, resolution obstinacy, and exhortation—despite all protestations to the contrary—interference" (p. 337).

Mr. Ehrman points out, and with justice, that one source of argument among the combined Chiefs of Staff was their careless use of language. "It was not only that British and Americans sometimes meant different things by the same phrases, but

that both were so slipshod in their use of language. Papers on both sides of the Atlantic were often dismally obscure; and the obscurity too often reflects an obscurity of thought. Papers were verbose and imprecise because their arguments were imprecise; and the fact that neither side was obliged to translate into another tongue encouraged both to tolerate phrases which they might otherwise have had to define . . . the authorities' frequent misuse of language to mask a frequent looseness of thought was a factor in the Second World War which should not be ignored" (p. 349).

Mr. Ehrman's final estimate: "When all is said and done, the Western Alliance formed the closest and most far reaching combination of sovereign states in war, on the basis of equality, that has yet been seen" (p. 350).

JOHN MILLER, JR.

Office of Military History
U. S. Department of the Army

ROBERT ENDICOTT OSGOOD. *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*. Pp. xi, 315. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. \$5.00.

Few books have been written in a more workmanlike and closely reasoned fashion. Osgood's thesis is that the United States must prepare for limited war as the only conceivable alternative to universal destruction. Concomitantly, it must not relax its readiness to meet an all-out attack upon us with unlimited weapons.

Osgood assumes that neither side will resort to total war, except where national survival is at stake, because neither could hope to avoid destructive retaliation. In their anxiety to avoid mutual catastrophe, the Soviet Union and the United States will not only abstain from the use of absolute weapons, they will avoid threats to use them. This means that both sides must use cold logic in determining each move in the international struggle.

Given the assumed conditions, these conclusions seem to follow. But are the conditions as assumed? Neither side seems fully convinced that an all-out attack upon them with nuclear weapons would destroy them. Therefore, there is always the gamble for world victory at one stroke. In the

armaments struggle, too, there is always the chance that one nation will forge ahead of the other to an extent that might seem to justify an all-out attack. If Russia, for example, should be able to establish space platforms before we do, they might have a great incentive to do this.

Moreover, threats of an all-out attack may have some value. While they may be used as a bluff, the opposing side cannot know this, and if they believe the threat real, they may be deterred from action. Threats may also be used for propaganda purposes, to give the illusion of superiority or to strengthen the hand of a truculent satellite.

In his analysis of limited war, Osgood defers markedly to the "go-it-alone" theory. Allies may hamper, but they also aid us in many valuable ways. Certainly the British are too valuable to us to be jettisoned. Also, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with all its shortcomings may prove, in time, to be the means to ultimate victory. Few would argue that we should give up our present allies. If we cast them adrift, Russia would probably snap them up, as she did China. Nor can we safely assume that American-trained Oriental troops are worthless against the Chinese or Russians. Korea proved the falsity of this. Limited wars we shall probably have, but the United States will, no doubt, adapt herself to them more readily than Osgood seems to think.

FLOYD A. CAVE

Professor of Government
San Francisco State College

JAMES N. MURRAY, JR. *The United Nations Trusteeship System*. (Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. 40.) Pp. 283. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957. \$4.50 clothbound; \$3.50 paperbound.

This study is adapted from the author's doctoral dissertation at the University of Illinois and is listed as one of the "Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences." In his Introduction the author states that he chose to emphasize "the actual functioning of the international supervisory machinery involved" in the trusteeship system rather than the effect on the territories them-

selves; he properly recognizes, however, that the impact of the procedural machinery upon the "actual conditions in the trust territories cannot be ignored." The period covered is from the launching of the trusteeship system through the sixteenth session of the Trusteeship Council in 1955. Very properly, there is a discussion of the historical background of the trusteeship system featuring the mandate system of the League of Nations, the San Francisco Conference as it dealt with matters of trusteeship, the setting up of the Trusteeship Council, and a complete chapter devoted to former Italian Somaliland as a sort of case study offering some special lessons traceable to "world power politics."

Based upon the first two chapters, dealing with the mandate system and the work of the San Francisco Conference in regard to trusteeship, the author concludes that the provisions for trusteeship are more complete and better formalized than those dealing with mandates. For example, the trusteeship system accepts petitions from trust territories and may send periodic missions at times agreed upon. The Trusteeship Council is set up according to a separate chapter in the Charter, and detailed provisions are made for its composition, its functions, and to some extent its procedure. The trusteeship system does not have as standards the A, B, and C type of mandates as found in Article 22 of the Covenant. One notable difference between the mandate system and the trusteeship system is that the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League was composed of private experts while the Trusteeship Council has government representatives.

By way of general conclusions the author brings out the point that "the trusteeship system represents a decided advance over the mandate system." He cautions us not to expect too much of the new system by way of idealistic or humanitarian values. But "the Trusteeship Council is an institution where the various national policies may be pursued with the assumed understanding that any clash of those policies will be peacefully solved," and all things considered, "the trusteeship system functions successfully as a result."

This is a solid contribution to knowledge

about the trusteeship system. There is considerable data brought out by the author on various aspects of the functions of the new system which have not been presented before. Students of international organization will find the study very helpful.

J. EUGENE HARLEY

Professor of Political Science
University of Southern California

OTHER BOOKS

ABRAMOVITZ, MOSES, and VERA F. ELIASBERG.

The Growth of Public Employment in Great Britain. Pp. xiii, 151. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. \$4.00.

ADLER, SOLOMON. *The Chinese Economy*. Pp. xi, 276. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957. \$5.00.

ALEXANDROV, VICTOR. *Khrushchev of the Ukraine: A Biography*. Pp. vi, 216. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. \$4.75.

BALY, DENIS. *Multitudes in the Valley: Church and Crisis in the Middle East*. Pp. ix, 307. Greenwich, Conn.: Seabury Press, 1957. \$5.00.

BARBER, HOLLIS W. *The United States in World Affairs, 1955*. Pp. xii, 346. New York: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1957. \$6.00.

BASTIN, JOHN. *The Native Policies of Sir Stamford Raffles in Java and Sumatra: An Economic Interpretation*. Pp. xx, 163. Oxford: Oxford University at the Clarendon Press, 1957. \$4.80.

BAUER, PETER T., and BASIL S. YAMEY. *The Economics of Under-Developed Countries*. (Cambridge Economic Handbooks.) Pp. xiii, 271. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. \$2.25.

BIXLER, RAYMOND W. *The Foreign Policy of the United States in Liberia*. Pp. 143. New York: Pageant Press, 1957. \$3.00.

BLANSHARD, PAUL. *The Right to Read: The Battle Against Censorship*. Pp. 339. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955. \$3.50.

BULLOCK, ALAN, and MAURICE SHOCK (Eds.). *The Liberal Tradition: From Fox to Keynes*. Pp. lv, 288. New York: New York University Press, 1957. \$4.50.

CLOUGH, SHEPARD B. *The Rise and Fall of Civilization: An Inquiry into the Relationship Between Economic Development and Civilization*. Pp. xi, 291. New York: Columbia University Press. Copyrighted in 1951 and published in 1957. \$4.75.

COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION, THE. *Organizing the Teaching Profession: The Story of the American Federa-*

tion of Teachers. Pp. 320. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955. \$4.50.

CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH IN INCOME AND WEALTH. *Short Term Economic Forecasting*. (National Bureau of Economic Research, Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. XVII.) Pp. xl, 506. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955. \$7.50.

CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH IN INCOME AND WEALTH. *Problems of Capital Formation: Concepts, Measurement, and Controlling Factors*. (Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 19.) Pp. xi, 612. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. \$7.50.

CONFERENCE ON RESEARCH IN INCOME AND WEALTH. *Problems in the International Comparison of Economic Accounts*. (Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 20.) Pp. x, 404. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. \$8.00.

CROOME, HONOR. *Introduction to Money*. (Home Study Books.) Pp. viii, 209. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1956. \$2.20.

CURRY, ROY WATSON. *Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy, 1913-1921*. (Bookman Monograph Series for Historical and Political Studies.) Pp. 411. New York: Bookman Associates, 1957. \$6.00.

DAVIS, JEROME. *Religion in Action*. Pp. xii, 319. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. \$4.75.

DEAN, BETH, and VICTOR CARELL. *Dust for the Dancers*. Pp. x, 214. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. \$6.00.

DEAN, VERA MICHELES. *The Nature of the Non-Western World*. (A Mentor Book.) Pp. 284. New York: New American Library, 1957. 50 cents.

DIAMOND, WILLIAM. *Development Banks*. Pp. xiii, 128. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957. \$3.00.

DINWIDDIE, JOSEPH. *Aid to Nationalist China*. Pp. 177. New York: Vantage Press, 1957. \$2.95.

EELLS, RICHARD. *Corporation Giving in a Free Society*. Pp. xiii, 210. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. \$3.50.

FIREMAN, PETER. *Justice in Plato's Republic*. Pp. 52. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. \$2.00.

FOX, JOSEPH. *The Chronically Ill*. Pp. xix, 229. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. \$3.95.

FRANK, WALDO. *Bridgehead: The Drama of Israel*. Pp. xiv, 220. New York: George Braziller, 1957. \$3.75.

GARDNER, D. E. M. *The Education of Young Children*. Pp. 118. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. \$2.75.

- GROTIUS, HUGH. *Prolegomena to the Law of War and Peace*. Translated by Francis W. Kelsey. Pp. xx, 43. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957. 50 cents.
- HARRISON, W. E. C. *Canada in World Affairs, 1949 to 1950*. Pp. vii, 374. Toronto: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1957. \$4.50.
- HATT, PAUL K., and ALBERT J. REISS, JR. (Eds.). *Cities and Society: The Revised Reader in Urban Sociology*. Pp. 852. Rev. ed. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957 (first published in 1951). \$7.50.
- HEATH, SPENCER. *Citadel, Market and Altar: Emerging Society*. Pp. xxiv, 259. Elridge, Md.: The Science of Society Foundation, 1957. \$6.00.
- HINDLE, BROOKE. *The Pursuit of Science in Revolutionary America, 1735-1789*. Pp. xi, 410. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Va., 1956. \$7.50.
- HOFSTADTER, RICHARD, WILLIAM MILLER, and DANIEL AARON. *The United States: The History of a Republic*. Pp. xvi, 812. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1957. \$7.95.
- HULME, HAROLD. *The Life of Sir John Eliot, 1592 to 1632: Struggle for Parliamentary Freedom*. Pp. 423. New York: New York University Press, 1957. \$6.75.
- HUNTON, W. ALPHAEUS. *Decision in Africa: Sources of Current Conflict*. Pp. 255. New York: International Publishers, 1957. \$4.00.
- Indian Communist Party Documents, 1930-1956*. Pp. xx, 345. Bombay: Democratic Research Service; New York: The Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957. \$4.00.
- JORDAN, HELEN, and CLARENCE JORDAN (Eds.). *Benjamin Franklin's Unfinished Business*. Pp. xi, 313. Philadelphia: The Franklin Institute, no date. No price.
- KITCHEN, HELEN (Ed.). *The Press in Africa*. Pp. iii, 96. Washington, D. C.: Ruth Sloan Associates, 1956. No price.
- KOHN, HANS. *The Twentieth Century: The Challenge to the West and Its Responses*. Pp. ix, 300. New and enlarged ed. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. \$4.50.
- LAQUEUR, WALTER Z. *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East*. Pp. xi, 362. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. \$6.50.
- LEUBUSCHER, CHARLOTTE. *Bulk Buying From the Colonies: A Study of the Bulk Purchase of Colonial Commodities by the United Kingdom Government*. Pp. x, 206. London: Oxford University Press and issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956. 30 s.
- LEWIS, W. ARTHUR. *The Theory of Economic Growth*. Pp. 453. Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1955. \$6.00.
- LINCOLN, JOHN C. *Ground Rent, Not Taxes: The Natural Source of Revenue for the Government: An Economic Study*. Pp. 72. New York: Exposition Press, 1957. \$2.50.
- LLOYD, WESLEY P. with chapters contributed by FRANCIS P. ROBINSON and EDWARD S. BORDIN. *Student Personnel Services in Japan*. Pp. xi, 111. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1957. \$2.00.
- LOCKE, WALTER. *This World, My Home*. Pp. xiii, 171. Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1957. \$3.00.
- LUCE, R. DUNCAN, and HOWARD RAIFFA. *Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey*. Pp. xix, 509. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957. \$8.75.
- MEADE, JAMES E. *Negotiations for Benelux: An Annotated Chronicle, 1943-1956*. (Princeton Studies in International Finance, No. 6.) Pp. 89. Princeton: International Finance Section of the Department of Economics and Sociology, Princeton University, 1957. 25 cents.
- MENDIS, G. C. (Ed.). *The Colebrooke-Cameron Papers: Documents on British Colonial Policy in Ceylon, 1796-1833*, Vol. II. Pp. vii, 416. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956. Rs. 70.
- MERRILL, FRANCIS E. with the assistance of H. WENTWORTH ELDREDGE. *Society and Culture: An Introduction to Sociology*. Pp. xiii, 592. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1957. \$6.75.
- MOREELL, BEN. *Our Nation's Water Resources—Policies and Politics*. (Lectures given at the University of Chicago, April and May 1956.) Pp. v, 266. Chicago: Law School of the University of Chicago, 1956. \$3.50.
- NORTHCOTT, C. H. *Personnel Management: Principles and Practice*. Pp. vii, 428. 3rd rev. ed. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. \$10.00.
- OLDS, JAMES. *The Growth and Structure of Motives: Psychological Studies in the Theory of Action*. Pp. 277. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956. \$5.00.
- OLIVECRONA, KARL. *The Problem of the Monetary Unit*. Pp. 185. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. \$3.00.
- PALMER, HAROLD. *Psychopathic Personalities*. Pp. 179. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. \$4.75.

- PERLO, VICTOR. *The Empire of High Finance*. Pp. 351. New York: International Publishers, 1957. \$5.50.
- PICKARD, BERTRAM. *The Greater United Nations*. Pp. 86. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956. (Distributed by Columbia University Press.) 50 cents.
- POWELL, THOMAS REED. *Vagaries and Varieties in Constitutional Interpretation*. Pp. xv, 229. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. \$3.50.
- REDER, MELVIN W. *Labor in a Growing Economy*. Pp. xii, 534. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957. \$6.50.
- REDL, FRITZ, and DAVID WINEMAN. *The Aggressive Child*. Pp. 575. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957. \$7.50.
- ROBINSON, BLACKWELL P. *William R. Davie*. Pp. xiii, 495. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957. \$6.00.
- ROSENBLUTH, GIDEON. *Concentration in Canadian Manufacturing Industries*. (National Bureau of Economic Research, No. 61, General Series.) Pp. xv, 152. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. \$3.50.
- ROYAL COMMISSION ON AGRICULTURE AND RURAL LIFE. *Crop Insurance*. (Report, No. 9.) Pp. xii, 143. Saskatchewan: Royal Commission on Agriculture and Rural Life, 1956. \$1.00.
- RUSSIAN INSTITUTE OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (Ed.). *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*. (A Selection of Documents.) Pp. vii, 342. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. No price.
- SCHOENBRUN, DAVID. *As France Goes*. Pp. vii, 341. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$3.75 text ed.
- SCHREIER, FRED T. *Human Motivation: Probability and Meaning*. Pp. xxi, 256. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957. No price.
- SEAMAN, L. C. B. *From Vienna to Versailles*. Pp. viii, 216. New York: Coward-McCann, 1956. \$3.50.
- SITTERSON, J. CARLYLE (Ed.). *Studies in Southern History*. (The James Sprunt Studies in History and Political Science, Vol. 39.) Pp. viii, 168. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957. \$2.50.
- UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. *Investment in Central America: Basic Information for United States Businessmen*. Pp. viii, 273. Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1956. \$1.50.
- VAN DOREN, JOHN. *Big Money in Little Sums: A Study of Small Contributions in Political Party Fund-Raising*. Pp. xii, 82. Chapel Hill: Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina, 1956. \$1.00.
- VERNEY, DOUGLAS V. *Parliamentary Reform in Sweden*. Pp. xii, 295. Oxford: Oxford University at the Clarendon Press, 1957. \$7.20.
- WEBB, ROBERT, and MURIEL WEBB. *The Churches and Juvenile Delinquency*. Pp. 64. New York: Association Press for several units of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, 1957. 50 cents.
- WEILER, E. T., and W. H. MARTIN. *The American Economic System: An Analytical Approach to Public Policy*. Pp. xxvi, 623. Rev. ed. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. \$6.00.
- ZINNER, PAUL E. (Ed.). *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe: A Selection of Documents on Events in Poland and Hungary, February-November, 1956*. Pp. xx, 563. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. \$2.95.

INDEX


- Addiction, 99-100
- Al-Anon Family Groups, 11, 115
- Alcohol
- and obesity, 26
 - compensation role of, 101
 - effect on thought processes, 33
 - effect on time estimation, 32-33
 - effect on psychological functions, 33, 38
 - approach-avoidance conflict, 35-36
 - social-emotional effects of, 33-34
 - variability in effects of, 38-39
- Alcoholic beverages, 3
- and distillation process, 23-24
 - and fermentation process, 23
 - brewed beverages, 23
 - use of in American colonies, 3, 13-14
- Alcoholic diseases, 8-9, 26
- cirrhosis of the liver, 5, 7, 8, 9, 28
- Alcoholic personality
- and latent homosexuality, 44
 - and physiological and social factors, 41
 - and psychological factors, 40-41
 - descriptions of, 40
 - frequency of certain characteristics and psychoses in, 42-43
 - methods of study, 41
 - premorbid and early history, 45-46, 48
 - problems of terminology, 41-42
 - quest for, 47
 - role of alcohol in life of individual, 46-47
 - results of studies concerning, 46, 47
 - tests to determine, 44-45
 - perception testing, 45 - types of wives, 42
 - variety of types, 42, 43-44
- Alcoholic-treatment clinics
- follow-up treatment, 128
 - initial interview, 127-128
 - role of social worker in, 126
 - interpreting clinic service to patients, 127-128
 - participation in active therapy, 128-129
 - referrals and family services, 126-127, 129, 130
- Alcoholics
- attitude of social workers toward, 125, 131
 - comparison between men and women clinic outpatients, 80-81
 - comparison with nonalcoholics, 48
 - contact with social agencies, 130-131
 - defense mechanisms of, 101-102
 - denial, 102
 - projection, 102
 - defined, 100
 - difference in rate between the sexes, 53, 73
 - Jellinek formula estimates, 5-6, 7, 9
 - lack of control over drinking, 55-56, 100
 - need for alcohol, 100-101
 - number of, 5-6
 - in U. S., 6, 99 - types of, 7-8
- Alcoholics Anonymous, 44, 45, 55, 74, 103-106
- passim*, 129, 131, 133
 - affiliation, 108
 - aids and impediments to, 113-114
 - comparison between affiliates and nonaffiliates, 112-113
 - ambivalence about individualism in, 114-115
 - defined, 108, 109
 - history of, 110-111
 - implications for medical sociology in techniques of, 115-116
 - influence of American culture on, 114-115
 - meetings, description of, 109-110
 - pioneer in recognizing treatable condition of alcoholism, 116
 - programs and activities, 108-111
 - Twelve Steps, 111-112
 - as psychological therapy, 112 - Twelve Traditions of, 108-109, 115
- Alcoholics, chronic, 118
- defined, 66, 138
 - detachment attitude toward others, 65
 - governmental programs for, 138
 - rehabilitation of
 - Half-Way House approach, 70-72
 - program, 71-72
 - individualistic approach, 65-66, 68, 70 - services for, 137-139
 - studies concerning, 138
 - See also*, Skid Row subculture
- Alcoholics, women, *see* Woman alcoholic
- Alcoholism
- among culturally isolated groups, 54
 - and drinking, 3, 4, 48, 49-50, 58, 63-64, 74
 - and intoxication, 26-29 *passim*, 50
 - Church interest in, 140
 - change in attitude of religious bodies, 141
 - death from, 9
 - definitions, 1, 2-3, 7, 42, 48
 - disease theory of, 7, 12-13, 16-17, 18, 29, 118, 123, 135
 - dilemma of physicians concerning, 118-119
 - opposition to, 17, 121
 - in Canada, 5, 6
 - interdisciplinary approach in cure, 12-13, 15-16, 22, 54, 107, 123, 124
 - interest of the law in, 140
 - lack of consensus concerning, 1
 - medico-social aspects of, 12-13, 21
 - prevention and treatment, 10-11
 - terminological chaos, 1-2, 7-8
 - See also*, Rate of alcoholism
- Alcoholism and drinking
- moral issue of, 14, 15, 48, 118
- Alcoholism and medicine
- and specialized approach, 122
 - attitudes of physicians concerning, 119-121
 - negative attitude toward patients, 118, 122-123
 - changing attitude of medicine toward problem, 140-141, 143
 - hypersensitivity of alcoholic patient, 117
 - new medications and approach, 124
 - tranquilizing drugs, 124
 - health-team approach, 124
 - rapprochement between doctor and patient, 117-118, 124
 - trends in medical care, 122-123
- Alcoholism and psychiatry
- aims of psychotherapy, 104-105, 106
 - Emmanuel Movement, 19-20
 - group therapy, 106-107
 - limitation of psychotherapy, 105-106
 - role of patient, 103
 - role of therapist, 103 - Peabody educational program, 20-21
 - psychological theories of, 102-103
 - latent homosexuality, 103
 - need-reduction theory, 103
 - role of motivation in successful therapy, 103-104
- Alcoholism and social work
- interpreting social work services to other community agencies, 129-130
 - promoting awareness of problem among social workers, 131-132
 - role of social work in rehabilitation of alcoholics, 125-126
 - See also* Alcoholism-treatment clinics
- Alcoholism and the family
- attitude of family members toward therapy, 97-98
 - dual relationship between alcoholic and the family, 90-91
 - effect of alcoholism on children, 91-92
 - effect of alcoholism on family structure, 93-94
 - effect of alcoholism on wives, 92-93
 - joint therapy for family and alcoholic, 98
 - methods of solving crisis
 - attempts to eliminate the problem, 95
 - denying the problem, 94-95
 - reorganization of the family, 96-97
 - separation from the alcoholic, 95, 96 - role of Al-Anon Family Group in therapy, 98
 - role of personalities in response and adjustment to problem, 97
 - role of wives' personalities in husband's alcoholism, 93
- Alcoholism, approaches to problem
- specialized programs
 - education, 139
 - future of, 139-140
 - research, 54, 56, 135, 136-137
 - role of social work in, 130 - state programs, 135-136, 137
 - principles of Connecticut Legislation, 134
 - underlying principles, 134-135
- American Hospital Association, 141
- American Temperance Society, 15
- ARMSTRONG, JOHN D., *The Search for the Alcoholic Personality*, 40-47
- Association for the Advancement of Instruction about Alcohol and Narcotics, 139
- BACON, SELDEN D., *Alcoholics Do Not Drink*, 55-64
- Bacon, Selden D., 51, 52, 53
- cited, 52, 53
 - quoted, 51, 52
- Bailey, C. J., 36
- cited, 36
- Bales, Robert F., 52
- cited, 52
- Barnett, Milton L., 51
- cited, 51
- Baylor, Courtenay, 20
- Beecher, Lyman, 16
- Berberman, Gerald D., 50
- cited, 50
- Bill W. (co-founder of Alcoholics Anonymous), 110, 111
- Blackburn, J. M., 44
- cited, 44
- Bob S. (co-founder of Alcoholics Anonymous), 110, 111
- Bowman, Karl M., 1, 12
- cited, 1
 - quoted, 12
- Bridge House, 44
- Carlson, Anton, 137
- Carpenter, J. A., 32
- cited, 32
- Center of Alcohol Studies, Yale University, 133-134, 137
- Chambers, Francis, 20
- Clark, J. W., 44
- cited, 44
- Committee on the Problems of Alcohol, National Research Council, 133
- Committee on Alcoholism, Council on Mental Health, American Medical Association
- resolution concerning alcoholism, 140-141

- Community Chest, 138
 CONGER, JOHN J., Perception, Learning, and Emotion: The Role of Alcohol, 31-39
 Connecticut Legislature, 133
 Connor, Ralph, 53
 cited, 53
 Coriat, Isador, 19
 Curran, F. J., 76, 79
 quoted, 76
- Day, Albert, 18
 quoted, 18
 De Quincey, Thomas, 104
 cited, 104
 quoted, 104
 Diethelm, Oscar, 43, 46
 cited, 46
 Drinking
 definition of, 56-57
 motivation for, 34-35
 need-reduction theory of, 36-38, 39
 Drinking patterns
 American, 3-5
 factors in shift of, 4
 in France, 4, 5
 in Italy, 4, 5
 in nonliterate societies, 37
 in Western Europe, 13
 of American and Orthodox Jews, 50, 51, 52
 of American Indians, 50
 of Chinese and Chinese-Americans, 51, 52, 53
 of Irish-Americans, 52-53
 of Italians and Italo-Americans, 50, 51, 52
 of Mormons, 53
 of Northeastern Americans from Northwestern European background, 51-52, 58-63
 alcoholism and variations in customs of, 60-63
 individual functions of drinking, 58
 material apparatus, 58-59
 personnel of the custom, 59
 sanctions and sanctioning agents, 59
 social charter and variations of, 59, 61-63
 "sociality" of drinking, 58
- East, W. N., 40
 cited, 40
 Efron, Vera
 cited, 3
 Etiology of alcoholism, 123
 physiological theory, 9
 psychological theory, 10
- Felix, Robert H., 141
 Ferenczi, Sandor, 44
 cited, 44
 Futterman, S., 42
 cited, 42
- Gantt, W. Horsley, 38
 Glad, Donald D., 52
 cited, 52
 Gliedman, L. H., 98
 cited, 98
 Goldsmith, Oliver
 quoted, 31
 GREENBERG, LEON A., Intoxication and Alcoholism: Physiological Factors, 22-30
 Greenberg, L. A., 32
 cited, 32
- Haer, John L., 53
 cited, 53
 Haggard, Howard W., 118
 cited, 117
 quoted, 117, 118
 Health Committee, League of Nations, 142
 Hollingshead, August B.
 cited, 121
 quoted, 121
 Horton, David, 37
 cited, 37
 Housman, Alfred Edward
 quoted, 31
- Inebriety, alleviation of, 19
 and the Salvation Army, 19
 custodial approaches, 19
 Emmanuel Movement, 19-20
 Peabody's educational program, 20-21
 Intoxication and alcoholism, physiological factors
 action of alcohol on the liver, 28
 action of ethyl alcohol in body, 22, 23, 46
 action of methyl alcohol in the body, 22, 2
 alcohol as a source of energy, 25-26
 alcohol metabolism, 15, 24-25
 attempts at diminishing intoxication, 26
 depressant action of alcohol on nervous system, 26-27, 31-32
 effect of alcohol on pituitary gland, 28
 intoxication and illusion of stimulation, 27
 oxidation of alcohol, 25
 rate of alcohol absorption, 24-25
- JACKSON, JOAN K., Alcoholism and the Family, 90-98
 Jackson, Joan K., 53
 cited, 53
 Jellinek, E. M., 1, 5, 6, 12
 cited, 1, 5
 quoted, 12
- Keely Institutes, 19
 KELLER, MARK, Alcoholism: Nature and Extent of the Problem, 1-11


- LaBarre, Wesley, 51
 cited, 51
 quoted, 51
 Laboratory of Applied Physiology, Yale University, 133
 Lemert, Edwin M., 50
 cited, 50
 Levine, J., 76
 cited, 76
 LISANSKY, EDITH S., The Woman Alcoholic, 73-81
 Lolli, Giorgio, 51
 cited, 51
 Lovell, H. W., 9
 cited, 9
- MCCARTHY, RAYMOND G., Alcoholism: Attitudes and Attacks, 1775-1935, 12-21
 McCarthy, Raymond, 138
 McComb, Samuel, 19
 Mangin, William, 50
 cited, 50
 Manson, M. P., 44
 cited, 44
 Marden, C. F., 119
 cited, 119
 quoted, 119
 MARKHAM, JEAN E., The Case of Mary Doe, 82-89
 Masserman, J. H., 35, 37
 cited, 35
 Miller, N. E., 36
 cited, 36
 Moore, Merrill, 51
 cited, 51
- National Committee for Education on Alcoholism, 133
 National Council on Alcoholism, 135, 139
 National Institute of Mental Health, 136, 137, 141
 Newell, N., 92
 cited, 92
 New York Home for Intemperate Men, 19
 North American Association of Alcoholism Programs, 135, 136
 recommended standards, 136
 North American Association of Alcoholism Programs Research Institute
 report of, 136-137
- Pauleikhoft, B., 40
 cited, 40
 Peabody, Richard, 20, 21
 Personality, alcoholic, *see* Alcoholic personality
 Popham, Robert E.
 cited, 5, 6
- Powdermaker, Florence, 117
 cited, 118
 quoted, 117
- Quaranta, J. V., 44
 cited, 44
 quoted, 44
- Randolph, Theron G., 10
 cited, 10
 Rate of alcoholism, 6
 effect of primary-group attitude on, 53-54
 effect of social customs on, 49, 50, 51-52, 57-58
 increase in, 6-7
 Research Council on the Problems of Alcoholism, 133
 Riley, John W., Jr., 119
 cited, 119
 quoted, 119
 RUBINGTON, EARL, The Chronic Drunkenness Offender, 65-72
 Rush, Benjamin, 13, 16
- Salvation Army, 134, 138
 SAPIR, JEAN V., Social Work and Alcoholism, 125-132
 SHEPHERD, ERNEST A., Current Resources for Therapy, Education, and Research, 133-143
 Sherfey, Mary Jane, 42, 43
 cited, 42
 Skid Row subculture, 6, 54, 66-70
 alienation from major value-patterns and existence of, 67-68
 drinking norms in, 66-67
 establishment of new primary-group ties in, 68-69
 functions of, 69
 indices of membership in, 67
 role of arrests in status of members, 66-67
 social groups in, 70
 status in and return to dominant society, 72
 types attracted to, 69-70
 Smith, James J., 9, 10
 cited, 9
 Snyder, Charles, 50
 cited, 50
 STRAUS, ROBERT, Medical Practice and the Alcoholic, 117-124
 Straus, Robert, 51, 53, 120, 138
 cited, 51, 53, 120
 Strecker, Edward, 20
 Summer School of Alcohol Studies, Yale University, 133, 139
 Syme, Leonard, 47
 cited, 47
- Temperance movement, American, 14-15, 16, 133

- National Prohibition Enforcement Act of 1920, 14
 Washingtonians society, 17-18
 Tiebout, H. M., 104
 cited, 104
 Tintera, J. W., 9
 cited, 9
 Todd, Eli, 16
 TRICE, HARRISON M., Alcoholics Anonymous, 108-116
 Trotter, Thomas, 1, 16, 21
 quoted, 1, 16
 Turner, J. Edward, 17
- ULLMAN, ALBERT D., Sociocultural Backgrounds of Alcoholism, 48-54
 United States Brewers Association, 14
 United States Public Health Service, 141
 University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, 20
 University of Wisconsin, 136
- VOGEL, SIDNEY, Psychiatric Treatment of Alcoholism, 99-107
 Volunteers of America, 134, 138
- Wall, J. H., 79
 cited, 79
 quoted, 75, 77
 Wallerstein, Robert, 42, 43
 cited, 42
 Wernicke, Carl, 8
- Williams, Phyllis H., 51
 cited, 51
 William, Roger J., 9, 10
 cited, 9
 Witkin, H. A., 45
 cited, 45
 Wittman, P., 45, 46
 cited, 45
- Woman alcoholic, 7
 abnormality and personal disorganization in, 74-75
 case history, 82-89
 defined, 77
 diseases of chronic alcoholism in, 75
 history and patterns of drinking of, 78-79
 home background of, 78
 and individuality of problem of alcoholism, 75-76
 and life-situation, 77
 moralistic attitude toward, 73
 need for further research in problem of, 81
 number of, 73
 increase in, 73-74
 role of feminine physiological functions, 77
 sexual promiscuity of, 76-77
 social background of, 78
 social subgroups, distinction between, 79-80
 Worcester, Elwood, 19
 World Health Organization, 79, 141-143
 Report of the Subcommittee on Alcoholism
 summary of recommendations, 142-143
- Yum, K. S., 35, 37
 cited, 35

THE
ANNALS
OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE



The Satellites in Eastern Europe



May 1958

BOOK DEPARTMENT: NEW LITERATURE
IN THE FIELD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

"*America Votes* . . . assembles more detailed and official statistics of American elections than ever before collected for any period, and for the first time in one volume. Until now these figures had to be sought in hundreds of scattered sources."

Arthur Krock in *The New York Times*

AMERICA VOTES

Compiled and Edited by
Richard M. Scammon

Director of Elections Research
Governmental Affairs Institute

Designed as a biennial reference, the *America Votes* series presents the only complete reference concerning United States political election records. Compiled by state sections, a profile sheet that summarizes each state's basic political data introduces each section.

The Second Volume is now available which offers the complete up-to-date United States voting history for 1956 and 1957. Among the many new features are the primary election results for the 1956 Presidential election, primary and actual results of the Gubernatorial elections for both years.

Supplementing the election statistics are new Congressional District maps illustrating boundaries, the latest figures on membership in state legislatures and new districting arrangements. Only *America Votes* presents the official indisputable record of United States elections in handy reference form.

AMERICA VOTES—VOLUME I
(1945–1955) \$12.50

AMERICA VOTES—VOLUME II
(1956–1957) \$12.50

The Macmillan Company

60 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 11, N.Y.

Entered as second-class matter, January 21, 1939, at the post-office at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, under the Act of August 24, 1912. Accepted for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in paragraph (d-2), Section 3640, P. L. & R. of 1948, authorized January 21, 1939.

VOLUME 317



MAY 1958

THE ANNALS

*of The American Academy of Political
and Social Science*

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*

RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Assistant Editor*



THE SATELLITES IN EASTERN EUROPE

Edited by

HENRY L. ROBERTS, Ph.D.

*Professor of History
and Director, Russian
Institute and the Program
on East Central Europe
Columbia University*

© 1958, by
THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
All rights reserved

PHILADELPHIA
1958

CONTENTS

	PAGE
FOREWORD	<i>Henry L. Roberts</i> vii

BACKGROUND

DIFFERENCES IN THE COMMUNIST PARTIES	<i>Hugh Seton-Watson</i> 1
THE CLIMAX OF STALINISM, 1950-1953	<i>Robert F. Byrnes</i> 8
THE BEGINNING OF THE THAW, 1953-1955	<i>Edmund O. Stillman</i> 12

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL CHANGE

ECONOMIC POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE FROM 1950 THROUGH 1956 .	<i>Edward Ames</i> 22
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY	<i>Nicolas Spulber</i> 36
AGRICULTURE IN EASTERN EUROPE	<i>Jozo Tomasevich</i> 44
SOCIAL STRUCTURE: RUMANIA UNDER COMMUNISM	<i>Ghița Ionescu</i> 53
EDUCATION AND YOUTH	<i>George Bereday</i> 63
CULTURAL AND LITERARY DEVELOPMENTS: POLAND AND HUNGARY .	<i>George Gömöri</i> 71

POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CRISIS

THE PATTERN OF POLITICAL PURGES	<i>Zbigniew Brzezinski</i> 79
THE LIMITS AND PROBLEMS OF DECOMPRESSION: THE CASE OF POLAND	<i>M. K. Dziewanowski</i> 88
THE LIMITS AND PROBLEMS OF DECOMPRESSION: THE CASE OF HUNGARY	<i>Paul Kecskemeti</i> 97
TITOISM	<i>Charles P. McVicker</i> 107
A "LOYAL" SATELLITE: THE CASE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA	<i>Ivo Duchacek</i> 115
THE SOVIETIZATION OF THE BALTIC STATES	<i>Alfred Erich Senn</i> 123

EASTERN EUROPE AND THE WORLD

CONTINUITY OF COMMUNIST STRATEGIC DOCTRINE SINCE THE TWENTIETH PARTY	
CONGRESS	<i>Bernard S. Morris</i> 130
THE SOVIET STAKE IN EASTERN EUROPE	<i>Alexander Dallin</i> 138
EASTERN EUROPE IN EXILE	<i>Elizabeth Valkenier</i> 146
EAST EUROPE, GERMANY, AND THE WEST	<i>John C. Campbell</i> 153
INDEX	222

BOOK DEPARTMENT

PAGE

EASTERN EUROPE

- DELLIN, L. A. D. (Ed.). *Bulgaria*. W. S. Sworakowski, Assistant Director, Hoover Institution, Stanford University 167
- DJILAS, MILOVAN. *The New Class*. D. A. Tomasic, Professor of Sociology, Indiana University 166
- HALECKI, OSCAR (Ed.). *Poland*. Wayne S. Vucinich, Professor of History, Stanford University 167
- MCLEAN, HUGH, MARTIN E. MALIA, and GEORGE FISCHER (Eds.). *Russian Thought and Politics*. Anatole G. Mazour, Assistant Professor of History, Stanford University 168
- MAMATEY, VICTOR S. *The United States and East Central Europe, 1914-1918*. Carl G. Anthon, Associate Professor of History, American University of Beirut 164
- SPULBER, NICOLAS. *The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe*. Norman J. G. Pounds, Chairman, Institute of East European Studies, Indiana University 165

WESTERN EUROPE

- CALOGÉROPOULOS-STRATIS, S., in collaboration with P. A. ARGYROPOULO and others. *La Grèce et les Nations Unies*. Johannes Mattern, Associate Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, Johns Hopkins University 172
- EINAUDI, LUIGI. *Lo Scrittoio del Presidente (1948-1955)*. Ferdinand A. Hermens, Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame 173
- HIRSCH-WEBER, WOLFGANG, and KLAUS SCHÜTZ. *Wähler und Gewählte*. Ralph Haswell Lutz, Professor of History, Emeritus, Stanford University 170
- LAWRENCE, ELWOOD P. *Henry George in the British Isles*. Alfred F. Havighurst, Professor of History, Amherst College 174
- LERNER, DANIEL, and RAYMOND ARON (Eds.). *France Defeats EDC*. Walter R. Sharp, Professor of International Relations, Yale University 169
- LINDSAY, J. O. (Ed.). *The New Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. VII: *The Old Regime, 1713-63*. Maurice Lee, Jr., Assistant Professor of History, Princeton University 175
- NATO: *A Critical Appraisal*. STANLEY L. SCOTT, Major General, USA (Ret.), Alexandria, Va. 171
- POCOCK, J. G. A. *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law*. Leonidas Dodson, University Archivist, University of Pennsylvania 176
- SCHWARZ, LEO W. *Refugees in Germany Today*. Ralph F. Bischoff, Associate Dean and Professor of Law, New York University 171
- SPEARMAN, DIANA. *Democracy in England*. Henry R. Winkler, Associate Professor of History, Rutgers University 174

ASIA AND AFRICA

- BORTON, HUGH, and others. *Japan Between East and West*. Albert E. Kane, Attorney, Public Housing Administration, Washington, D. C. 179
- CALLARD, KEITH. *Pakistan*. Norman D. Palmer, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania 177
- DEAN, VERA MICHELES, and others. *New Era in the Non-Western World*. Frank J. Moore, Economic Planning Department, Pan American World Airways, San Francisco, Calif. 181

PAGE

- FAWZI, SAAD ED DIN. *The Labour Movement in the Sudan, 1946-1955*. D. W. Bittinger, President, McPherson College 182
- OH, CHAE KYUNG. *A Handbook of Korea*. Kyung Cho Chung, Monterey, Calif. 180
- OSTWALD, PAUL. *Japans Weg von Genf nach San Franzisko*. Hyman Kublin, Associate Professor of History, Brooklyn College 178
- SMITH, WILFRED CANTWELL. *Islam in Modern History*. Aziz S. Atiya, Visiting Professor of Arabic and Islamic History, Princeton University 178

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

- COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE. Chaired by Arthur N. Holcombe. *Strengthening the United Nations*. Richard H. Heindel, Vice-Chancellor and Professor of History and Government, University of Buffalo 187
- CROSLAND, C. A. R. *The Future of Socialism*. W. Henry Cooke, Professor of History, Emeritus, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, Calif. 185
- FULLER, C. DALE. *Training of Specialists in International Relations*. John F. Melby, Executive Vice President, National Council on Asian Affairs, Philadelphia, Pa. 188
- MARX, FRITZ MORSTEIN. *The Administrative State*. Fred W. Riggs, Associate Professor of Government, Indiana University 184
- PFEFFER, KARL HEINZ. *Handwörterbuch der Politik*. Leo Silberman, Visiting Professor, Center of Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago 187
- ROETTINGER, RUTH LOCKE. *The Supreme Court and State Police Power*. Clara Penniman, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin 183
- SHKLAR, JUDITH N. *After Utopia*. Dale Pontius, Associate Professor of Political Science, Roosevelt University 186
- WATSON, GEORGE (Ed.). *The Unserving State*. W. Henry Cooke, Professor of History, Emeritus, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, Calif. 185

AMERICAN HISTORY

- BAKER, ELIZABETH FAULKNER. *Printers and Technology*. J. Edward Gerald, Professor of Journalism, University of Minnesota 197
- DUDDEN, ARTHUR P. (Ed.). *Woodrow Wilson and the World of Today*. Frank M. Russell, Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley 189
- GALBRAITH, JOHN S. *The Hudson's Bay Company as an Imperial Factor, 1821-1869*. Samuel Flagg Bemis, Professor of Diplomatic History and Inter-American Relations, Yale University 195
- KURTZ, STEPHEN G. *The Presidency of John Adams*. Alfred H. Kelly, Chairman, Department of History, Wayne State University 193
- LINK, ARTHUR S. *Wilson the Diplomatist*. Frank M. Russell, Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley 189
- McKINLEY, SILAS BENT. *Woodrow Wilson*. Roy V. Peel, Professor of Political Science, University of Utah 190
- MEYER, ADOLPHE E. *An Educational History of the American People*. Jonathon C. McLendon, Associate Professor of Education, Duke University 196
- STOLLER, LEO. *After Walden*. Donald L. Kemmerer, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Illinois 192
- SUMMERS, FESTUS P. (Ed.). *The Cabinet Diary of William L. Wilson, 1896-1897*. George E. Mowry, Professor of History, University of California, Los Angeles .. 191

	PAGE
TOLLES, FREDERICK B., and E. GORDON ALDERFER (Eds.). <i>The Witness of William Penn.</i> Alphonse B. Miller, Associate Finance Secretary, American Friends Service Committee	194
WASHBURN, WILCOMB E. <i>The Governor and the Rebel.</i> Jennings B. Sanders, Specialist for Social Sciences, Division of Higher Education, U. S. Office of Education	194
WEST, RICHARD S., JR. <i>Mr Lincoln's Navy.</i> Donald H. Stewart, Professor of History, State Teachers College, Cortland, N. Y.	191

SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

ARGYRIS, CHRIS. <i>Personality and Organization.</i> Eugene V. Schneider, Associate Professor of Sociology, Bryn Mawr College	207
BEYER, GLENN H., and J. HUGH ROSE. <i>Farm Housing.</i> Richard U. Ratcliff, Professor of Land Economics, University of Wisconsin	203
BLAUSTEIN, ALBERT P., and CLARENCE CLYDE FERGUSON, JR. <i>Desegregation and the Law.</i> Rayford W. Logan, Professor of History, Howard University	206
BRUNNER, EDMUND DES. <i>The Growth of a Science.</i> Murray A. Straus, Assistant Professor of Rural Sociology, University of Wisconsin	200
FIRTH, RAYMOND (Ed.). <i>Man and Culture.</i> A. Irving Hallowell, Professor of Anthropology, University of Pennsylvania	197
FRENCH, WILL, and associates. <i>Behavioral Goals of General Education in High School.</i> Esther Lloyd-Jones, Head, Department of Guidance and Student Personnel Administration, Teachers College, Columbia University	204
GLAZER, NATHAN. <i>American Judaism.</i> D. de Sola Pool, Rabbi, Congregation Shearith Israel, New York	202
GREENBLATT, MILTON, DANIEL J. LEVINSON, and RICHARD H. WILLIAMS (Eds.). <i>The Patient and the Mental Hospital.</i> Joseph W. Eaton, Lecturer, School of Social Welfare, University of California, Los Angeles	203
ORTEGA Y GASSET, JOSÉ. <i>Man and People.</i> W. Rex Crawford, Professor of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania	199
SHOEMAKER, DON (Ed.). <i>With All Deliberate Speed.</i> Arthur E. Sutherland, Professor of Law, Harvard University	206
STILES, LINDLEY J. (Ed.). <i>The Teacher's Role in American Society.</i> Theodore L. Reller, Professor of Education, University of California, Berkeley	205
WILLIAMS, GLANVILLE. <i>The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law.</i> G. K. Stürup, Medical Superintendent, Institution for Criminal Psychopaths, Herstedvester, Denmark	201
YOUNG, MICHAEL, and PETER WILLMOTT. <i>Family and Kinship in East London.</i> Geoffrey Gorer, Sussex, England	198
ZANDER, ALVIN, ARTHUR R. COHEN and EZRA STOTLAND. <i>Role Relations in the Mental Health Profession.</i> Richard Lonsdorf, Instructor in Psychiatry, School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania	208

ECONOMICS

COCHRAN, THOMAS C. <i>The American Business System.</i> W. N. Mitchell, Partner, A. T. Kearney & Company, Management Consultants, Chicago	210
DUE, JOHN F. <i>Sales Taxation.</i> Charles P. White, Professor of Finance, University of Tennessee	214
FOWKE, VERNON C. <i>The National Policy and the Wheat Economy.</i> Murray R. Benedict, Professor of Agricultural Economics, University of California, Berkeley	214

	PAGE
KATONA, GEORGE, with the collaboration of ALBERT LAUTERBACH and STANLEY STEINKAMP. <i>Business Looks at Banks.</i> Fred A. Shannon, Professor of History, University of Illinois	213
MUND, VERNON A. <i>The Right to Buy—And Its Denial to Small Business.</i> Leo Fishman, Professor of Economics and Finance, West Virginia University	213
MYRDAL, GUNNAR. <i>An International Economy.</i> William E. Gordon, Lecturer in Economics, Marquette University	209
SAKOLSKI, AARON M. <i>Land Tenure and Land Taxation in America.</i> A. F. Vass, Professor of Agricultural Economics, University of Wyoming	215
SCAMMELL, W. M. <i>International Monetary Policy.</i> Arthur Leon Horniker, Washington, D. C.	212
OTHER BOOKS	216

The articles appearing in THE ANNALS are indexed in the *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature* and the *Industrial Arts Index*.

FOREWORD

The present issue of *THE ANNALS* has been planned as a sequel to the issue of September 1950, *Moscow's European Satellites*, edited by Joseph S. Roucek. Whereas the first set of studies was centrally concerned with the Communist seizure of power in East Central Europe in the 1940's and with the initial Sovietization, the essays that follow deal with the vicissitudes of the 1950's, a period of mingled hope and despair for the hard-pressed peoples of the area. The pivotal point in these years was the death of Stalin, in March 1953; the climax, the dramatic and tragic events of October and November 1956. And yet, as we look back from our present vantage point in 1958, it becomes clear that 1953, while a turning point, by no means implied a rupture with the past; and that 1956, a year of such high achievements and crushing disasters, was no terminus, either for good or for ill. The end of the story is not in sight.

The organization and arrangement of these essays attempt to suggest both the dramatic and the problematic quality of the last eight years in East Central Europe: following an introductory section to set the stage and to trace the transition from the final years of the Stalin era to the beginnings of the "New Course" and the "thaw," attention is devoted to the broader economic, social, and cultural problems and prospects of the "People's Democracies." From this the studies turn to the crisis of the Stalinist system, a crisis that differed widely in intensity and manifestation from one country to another. Finally, Eastern Europe is placed in its international setting as one of the most important and refractory problems of the contemporary world.

For an area so complex and variegated, despite the leveling impact of communism, it has, unfortunately, been impossible to provide equal treatment for every nation. Some countries, Poland and Hungary, have been singled out for obvious reasons. Others have been selected as illustrative—though perhaps not wholly representative—of certain general trends. This combination of topical and national studies will, it is hoped, achieve a reasonably well-balanced portrait of Eastern Europe as it is today.

Inevitably, in a series of essays devoted to such closely related topics the reader will encounter a number of overlapping discussions. More than that, he will find that on several very important issues—the nature of the "thaw," the reasons why revolts broke out in some countries and not in others—the authors present quite diverse, perhaps conflicting, interpretations. But this is as it should be. We are here confronted with some enormously complex, and unprecedented, historical events, the full meaning of which we will spend many years seeking to understand. At this stage what is needed, on the part of writers but also on the part of readers, is sensitivity, imagination, and alertness: not only for purposes of comprehension but also to meet the enduring challenge of finding some way to raise the dark if rift-torn cloud that hangs over Eastern Europe and over the world.

HENRY L. ROBERTS

Henry L. Roberts, Ph.D., New York City, is Professor of History and Director of the Russian Institute and the Program on East Central Europe, Columbia University. He is the author of Rumania (1951) and Russia and America (1956).

Differences in the Communist Parties

By HUGH SETON-WATSON

Abstract: Historically and at their inception the East European Communist parties differed greatly from one another. Whereas those of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland were workers' parties, those of Bulgaria and Rumania were essentially parties of revolutionary intellectuals. From 1945 to 1948 the Communist parties, strongly supported by Soviet military power, established their one-party dictatorships. There followed a period of intensive economic pressures in order to create the maximum in heavy industry and general mobilization. Though the pattern was the same in all these countries, some were more severely affected than others. Where revolutions did occur—as in Poland and Hungary—a definite cleavage of opinion at the highest level of the party existed as did a surviving Communist leader of great prestige who symbolized all the desire for reform and freedom which had accumulated over the years. In the remainder of Eastern Europe the parties, internally unstable though they are, have changed very little. It will, nonetheless, be well to watch here for differences in personalities, policies, and tactics, for in changed international circumstances these may prove politically decisive.—Ed.

IN the period of seizure of power (1944–48) and in the period of the purges and the intense drive for heavy industry (1949–52) the East European scene impressed the free observer with its uniformity. Admittedly the East European nations had different origins and traditions, but they were all being subjected to the same process of Stalinization; and this was being done by the same instruments, the Communist parties. Since the death of Stalin, however, it is not the uniformity of the pattern but its diversity which impresses the free observer. The “New Course” policy of 1953 was differently applied in each country; the effects of the Twentieth Congress of February 1956 were different; and the climax came in October 1956 in Poland and Hungary where the revolutions were of different kinds—elsewhere there were no revolutions. In the light of the diversity of recent years, it seems worth while to

look back into the past and see whether the different Communist parties were really such similar instruments as one was earlier inclined to assume.

Between 1918 and 1944 the East European parties differed greatly from each other. The Czechoslovakian party essentially resembled the German Communist party. It was made up of workers who were drawn from the left wing of the social democratic movement which had existed under Austria-Hungary. In the Czech lands the working class was divided into two approximately equal halves, and in Slovakia and Ruthenia a certain number of poor peasants and intellectuals also were attracted to communism. The Hungarian party was originally similar, but it soon grew into artificial size and power in the disturbed conditions of the winter of 1918–19. After the defeat of the Communist government of 1919, the Communist party was reduced by police persecution and

*Hugh Seton-Watson, London, is Professor of Russian History at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London. He is the author, among other books, of *The Pattern of Communist Revolution* (1953).*

popular disillusionment to a tiny sect; it was never again of importance in Hungarian political life until the Soviet invasion of 1944. In Poland, too, the Communist party could trace its descent from the old labor movement; it was a combination of the doctrinaire Marxist Social Democracy of Poland and Lithuania with the left wing of the old Polish Socialist party. In the winter of 1918-19 the Polish Communists had some support among a minority of the working class which was itself a minority of the nation. But the defeat of the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1920 was a deadly blow to the party. Though there were times in the following twenty years when it increased its following, it was never much more than a small sect.

If the Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, and Polish parties were workers' parties—the first strong, the other two weak—the Communist parties of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Rumania were essentially parties of revolutionary intellectuals. They were composed of an unstable following among workers and peasants; at times this was great and at times negligible, rapidly rising and falling according to changes in economic conditions and the intensity of police pressure. These three parties had the structure of the old pre-1917 Bolshevik party in Russia, rather than that of a Western radical labor group such as the German Communist party. Of the three, the most impressive was the Bulgarian party; in the years 1919-23 it polled in free elections about 25 per cent of the popular vote and was supported by almost all the small working class. From the mid-1920's it was savagely persecuted, but it always managed to keep a hard core of underground conspiratorial cadres. It went into action with some success in World War II and emerged in 1944 as a genuine internal force to be reckoned with. The Yugoslav party had a much more erratic rec-

ord. It had large but unreliable mass support between 1919 and 1921; afterwards it completely disintegrated under the double effect of persecution and public indifference. In the 1930's it re-emerged as the most active of the smallest of the groups fighting for a Popular Front and for resistance to native and foreign fascism. In these years it won over a large part of the most politically minded section of the student youth. In World War II these new cadres, mostly derived from the intelligentsia, were able to mobilize vast masses of peasants in their national and civil "war of liberation"; this ranks beside the Russian and Chinese revolutions and civil wars as one of the three epic victories in the history of communism. In contrast to these two, the Rumanian party was a negligible sect. Such as it was, its structure was of the second, or "Balkan," rather than the first, or "Mid-European," type. But in fact its membership amounted only to a few hundred, and it had not the slightest effect on Rumanian political life between the wars or during World War II.

EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY STRENGTH

In 1945 it was clear that the two strongest Communist parties in Eastern Europe, in the sense that they had enthusiastic support from at least a large minority of the population and possessed an apparatus of power of their own making, were the two "Balkan" parties, the Yugoslav and the Bulgarian. The two weakest and most miserable sects of Soviet agents imported from Russia or blackmailed into service on the spot were the Polish and the Rumanian parties. Czechoslovakia had numerically the most impressive Communist party. In the free election of 1946 it won 40 per cent of the votes in the Czech lands. In the trade unions the Communists seized the key positions.

They were helped not only by the presence of the Red Army in the first months of "liberation" but also by the fact that the German occupation of six years had destroyed the old social democratic organizations. Most Czech workers voted Communist, and so did many intellectuals and many opportunists in the administrative machine. The Czechoslovakian Communist party was a rather bourgeois organization in its spirit, based on vested interests and ambitions rather than on the fanatical revolutionary zeal which marked the two Balkan Slav parties. The Hungarian party was numerically far less impressive. At the free election of 1945 it won 17 per cent of the popular vote. It did, however, build up a certain following among the workers, especially among the unskilled and in the newer industries. The older trade unions were still in social democratic hands.

ONE-PARTY DICTATORSHIP ESTABLISHED

Between 1945 and 1948 the Communist parties, strongly supported at decisive moments by the Soviet military power, established their one-party dictatorships. By terror, threats, bribery, or intrigue they divided or destroyed first the peasant parties and then the social democratic parties. By 1948 the Socialists, their ranks thinned by well-planned purges, were "fused" into the Communist parties. Then came the breach between Moscow and Belgrade, the witch-hunting campaign against "nationalist deviations," and the later anti-Semitic purges which reached their height just before Stalin's death. This was also the period of greatest economic pressure on the masses. The aim was maximum creation of heavy industry and general militarization. The timing of this pressure (1951-52) left no doubt that it was connected with the international tension caused by Communist aggression in Korea.

But though this general pattern was the same, its application was not uniform. The purges were not equally severe in all countries. Some impression can be obtained by a comparison of the proportion of members of the Central Committees of the parties who disappeared from public life during these years. The highest turnover was in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In Czechoslovakia, of ninety-seven persons elected members in 1949, fifty-three were not re-elected in 1954, and of eighty-four persons elected in 1954, thirty-nine were new names. Thus, 55 per cent of the 1949 Central Committee disappeared and 45 per cent of the 1954 Central Committee were new people. In Hungary, of ninety-two persons elected to the Central Committee in 1948 or 1951, forty-six were not re-elected in 1954. Of these, twenty-one disappeared between 1948 and 1951 and twenty-five between 1951 and 1954, making a total turnover of just 50 per cent. In Bulgaria and Poland, on the other hand, the turnover was low. Of forty-eight persons elected to the Central Committee of the Bulgarian party in 1948, only fourteen had disappeared by 1954. Of seventy-two persons elected to the Polish Central Committee in 1948, sixteen had disappeared in 1954. In the Rumanian party the turnover was similar—twelve disappeared by 1954 from a Central Committee of forty-six elected in 1948. These figures are liable to minor error and to some uncertainties about individual cases, but the picture which emerges of the differences in turnover between the different party leaderships is clear. Detailed information is not available to the author on the turnover in the lower levels of the party apparatus, but the general impression, based on such scraps of evidence as have come his way, is that at this level, too, the purge was severest in the Czechoslovakian and Hungarian parties

and lightest in the Bulgarian and Polish parties.

"PERSONALITY CULT" AND THE PURGES

Another difference between the parties concerns the intensity of the "personality cult." Three Communist leaders of this region were quite outstanding as regards propaganda build-up—Georgi Dimitrov of Bulgaria, Klement Gottwald of Czechoslovakia, and Mátyás Rákosi of Hungary. Dimitrov died in the Soviet Union in 1949, supposedly as a result of illness for which he was undergoing treatment. But his death occurred at a very convenient moment, when world-wide Communist propaganda was concentrating on the "unmasking" of the Yugoslav leaders with whom Dimitrov had had rather friendly relations; it was also not long after Dimitrov had incurred official Soviet wrath for speaking in favor of East European federation. His successor, Vulko Chervenkov, received a certain amount of build-up, but not on a scale comparable to that which Dimitrov had enjoyed. Gottwald died in 1953, supposedly as a result of a cold contracted in Moscow on the occasion of Stalin's funeral; but this also coincided with a moment of major change in international Communist policy. His successor to the presidency, Antonin Zápotocký, received no special build-up, and since that time the Czechoslovakian leadership has remained remarkably colorless and anonymous. It is a regime without personal glamor and is more genuinely a "collective leadership" than any in the Communist world, the Soviet Union included. Mátyás Rákosi, however, lasted longer and retained far more power. Indeed, the much-purged Hungarian party became more truly a one-man show than any other Communist party with the exception of the Soviet prototype. The Central Committee consisted of Rákosi's creatures, and the

party was ruled by an absolute autocracy. Even the "New Course" period of 1953–55 did not change this. Imre Nagy became Prime Minister and introduced substantially different policies. But Rákosi remained First Secretary, controlled the party machine, and was able, when the fall of Malenkov in Moscow gave him his opportunity, to overthrow Nagy. In Poland and Rumania there was never any build-up comparable to these three cases. Boleslaw Bierut was the most publicized figure in Poland, and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in Rumania, but neither was elevated to the stature of a pocket-Stalin like Rákosi, Gottwald, or Dimitrov in their great days. Bierut died in Moscow, also supposedly of natural causes, at the time of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union—yet another landmark in international Communist policy.

THE "NEW COURSE"

During the "New Course" period the parties acted differently from each other. The much-purged Czechoslovakian and Hungarian parties were glad of the opportunity of milder policies. It was in Hungary that the relaxation of pressure went furthest. It appears clearly from Imre Nagy's memorandum in 1955, recently published in the United States, that the Soviet leaders directly intervened in favor of concessions. Nagy not only made great efforts to conciliate the peasants and reduce the tempo of industrialization, but he also treated the churches more mildly, demanded greater freedom for the intelligentsia, and released a considerable number of persons from prison or labor camp; these included those Communists and Socialists who had been arrested in connection with the purges of 1949–52, especially those regarded, rightly or wrongly, as followers of the executed László Rajk. In Czechoslovakia there

was little relaxation of political terror, but considerable economic concessions were made. During these three years the Czechoslovakian leaders were able to build up a more sound economy and to create the conditions for Czechoslovakia's present status as the most prosperous of all the satellites. In Poland change came somewhat later and was not so much in the economic field as in the intellectual. Already in 1955 the "thaw" in cultural life was very visible. Here one of the most important factors was the reduction in the powers of the police; this was brought about by the fall of Lavrentii Beria in Moscow, the defection of the Polish security police official, Józef Światło, and the massive propagation of his revelations to Poland by broadcasts and balloon-borne leaflets of Radio Free Europe. The Polish Communist leaders had less popular support than most East European Communists. On the one hand, this basic situation made them dependent on Soviet support; on the other, the almost universal anti-Soviet sentiment among the Polish masses spread upwards into the party hierarchy. The Polish leaders were not isolated from this sentiment by a protective cushion. The solid layer of middle-level, devoted, indoctrinated cadres was weaker than in most parties, and the feeling of the party members and the masses penetrated to the leaders. In 1956 the effect was that the leaders ended by identifying themselves with the masses rather than with their Soviet patrons. The death of Bierut and the Twentieth Congress accelerated the trend. The Rumanian leadership was in a similar situation: if anything, it had even less support and an even thinner protective cushion than the Polish party. But in both the intellectual and the economic fields the Rumanian leaders were more sparing with their concessions; and they talked less about

what few concessions they did make. In Bulgaria there was no "New Course" at all. The Bulgarian party, stronger in the past and less purged since seizure of power than any other, maintained its own policies. It was more radical and more brutal; this was not because Moscow forced it to be so but because its leaders wished it to be. Paradoxically it may be argued that this, the most "Stalinist" of all the East European parties, was and is the most independent of Moscow. It is true that Traicho Kostov was executed and that there were some dismissals and disgraces, but by and large the leaders of the party from the underground period have remained in power and have been loyal to each other. Among other reasons why they did not yield to Khrushchev's recommendations in 1955 and 1956 for a milder policy was probably a reluctance to accept policies which seemed to be inspired by Yugoslav advice. Added to the old dislike of Bulgarians for Serbs and the rivalry for control of Macedonia—in the sphere of Communist party affairs as well as in the interstate sphere this rivalry goes back to the 1920's—may be added the belief of the Bulgarian leaders that their party has as good and as long a revolutionary record as the Yugoslav. They therefore proceeded with their "tough" course, especially by increasing the collectivization of agriculture; and they never accepted the "soft" policy introduced in the rest of Eastern Europe.

CRISIS IN HUNGARY AND POLAND

In the crisis of October–November 1956 these differences between the Communist parties appeared more clearly. The two countries in which revolutions occurred were the two in which there was a definite cleavage of opinion at the highest level of the party and in which there was one surviving Communist leader of great prestige who symbolized

all the desire for reform and freedom which had accumulated inside the party for years past. The hopes placed in Gomulka and in Nagy were essentially the same. In the other parties, however, no such clear cleavages existed, and no outstanding figures were available around which opposition could crystallize. In Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria collective leadership was a reality—in the first case of a "soft" and in the second of a "tough" type. In Rumania the leadership was unsure of itself, but the whole party was so weak and so lacking in persons of intellectual or political distinction that no action was likely.

In other respects, however, the situations in the Polish and the Hungarian parties were very different. In the Hungarian party everything depended on the autocracy of Rákosi. Once Khrushchev had decided, in the summer of 1955, to come to terms with Tito, it was clear that the Yugoslav leader would press for the removal of the Hungarian boss; for it was he, of all the East European satraps, who had gone furthest to insult him and his regime. But Rákosi fought back, and it must have been extremely hard for Moscow to find a successor. Rákosi even survived the Twentieth Congress and himself had the effrontery to make public speeches denouncing the cult of personality. At last, in July 1956, he was removed, but his successor was Ernő Gerő who had been his closest collaborator for ten years past. Gerő was a man of undoubted ability but hardly any feeling for political tactics. He was no less a fanatic and a dogmatist than Rákosi, but unlike Rákosi he commanded no respect. Gerő was accepted by Tito and visited him in Belgrade in October 1956. Believing that his prestige had been increased by this visit, he returned to Budapest determined to preserve his authority; here he was faced with the

popular October demonstration. Inflexible and frightened, he refused to yield, and the party leadership, composed of Rákosi's creatures, could think of nothing to do but throw themselves on the protection of Soviet arms. In Poland, the dead Bierut was replaced by the moderate Stalinist, Edward Ochab, a man very different from Gerő. He and his colleagues decided that they must yield to popular pressure. The Poznań rising of June 1956 confirmed them in this intention. Pressure from within the party and within the Warsaw working class for the return of Gomulka grew during the summer. Ochab and a majority of the Central Committee voted for making Gomulka First Secretary. That there was a minority in the Committee is shown by the fact that twenty-three out of seventy-six members voted for the re-election of Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky to the Politburo. But even this minority voted for Gomulka's appointment. The demand for the return of Nagy was no less strong within the party and the working class in Hungary. But where Ochab yielded, Gerő resisted. Moreover, whereas the Polish security police had lost power in the previous year—the armed security forces were commanded by a man loyal to Gomulka, General Waclaw Komar—in Hungary the security police and armed security forces had retained their previous powers and outlook, and in the emergency they loyally obeyed Gerő and fought beside the Soviet army against their compatriots.

It is not any difference in ability or moral character between Gomulka and Nagy—which may or may not exist—but the difference between the Polish patriotism of Ochab and the doctrinaire treason of Gerő that explains the different course of events in Poland and in Hungary. Generalizations about sensible, realistic Poles and silly, romantic Hungarians have even less validity.

Nor is the argument convincing that the Poles refrained from extreme action because they believed in the Polish-Soviet alliance against Germany, while the Hungarians cast aside discretion because their neighbor was only peaceful Austria. This difference in the geographical situations of Poland and Hungary, and their different foreign policy problems, is of course a fact. But I know of no evidence that this was a decisive factor in the events of October 1956. If, when Khrushchev and his colleagues appeared in Warsaw, they had found a divided leadership, and if Ochab and the old team had asked for Soviet help and orders had been given to the Soviet army to attack, then there would have been a far greater blood bath in Warsaw and in Poland than there was in Budapest and Hungary. Not all the high qualities of Gomulka, the realism of the Polish people, or the concern for the Oder-Neisse line could have stopped it.

OTHER EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITES

The basic factors of discontent without which revolutions do not occur were the same not only in Poland and Hungary but throughout Eastern Europe. Everywhere the peasants wanted freely to use their land, the workers to be paid better real wages and work shorter hours, the intellectuals to talk and write freely, the whole nations to be independent of Moscow. But the special superficial factors which decide whether there shall or shall not be a revolution were present only in Poland and Hungary. The two most important of these factors were the existence of prominent Communist leaders around whom opposition within the party could crystallize

and the existence—especially in Hungary—of a number of Marxist intellectuals of an older generation; this group was disillusioned with the regime and even with Marxism itself and was able to give leadership and direction to the rather inarticulate discontent of the intellectual youth. We have already seen that the first condition was absent in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria; the second was also absent. In both Czechoslovakia and Rumania, the student youth in 1956 expressed its discontent, but it found no support from its elders.

A year after the Hungarian Revolution, the parties of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria remain much as they were before it. The Czech and Slovak leaders can congratulate themselves that they escaped disaster and that they have ensured tolerable living conditions to their subjects. The Bulgarian leaders remain united in their savage fanaticism, proud of its results and little troubled by criticism from within or without. The Rumanian leaders remain as cautious as ever. All have of course been impressed by the Soviet victory of 1956, the inability of the West to do anything for Hungary, the double standard of morality accepted by the United Nations, the successful mobilization by Soviet policy of racial hatred throughout the world, and the sputniks. Yet the parties are internally unstable; the relationship of their countries to the Soviet Union is insecure, and they know it. Western observers would do well to follow the small differences in personalities, policies, and tactics which differentiate the parties from each other, for at a not distant date, in changed international circumstances, they may prove politically important.

The Climax of Stalinism, 1950-1953

By ROBERT F. BYRNES

Abstract: Stalin's last years were especially bitter for Eastern Europe. With control firmly in Soviet hands, Stalin sought to tighten the Soviet grip, to reshape the cultural values of the conquered peoples, to develop a heavy industrial base in each country, to promote agricultural collectivization, to exploit the area more efficiently, and to use it as a point of pressure against Western Europe and Tito. He achieved some success, but at the cost of rousing such popular resentment and such dissatisfactions, even among Communists, that his successors were forced substantially to modify his policies.

BY 1950, the Russians and their Communist aides in Eastern Europe had obliterated opposition parties and groups. The local Communist parties had been purged, and control of the commanding heights of political, military, and economic authority had become concentrated in the hands of Russians and native Communists who were considered loyal to the Soviet Union. The careful and suspicious Russians maintained chains of command through several channels—the Communist parties, the Soviet diplomatic service, the secret police, trade organizations, and cultural groups. Political and military alliances strengthened the relationships, and economic methods were also used to bind each satellite firmly to Moscow. Thus, by 1949 or 1950, Soviet control was supreme, and Stalin felt able to divert Soviet energies and resources toward developing the economic and military resources of the area for the benefit of the Soviet Union. Further, he acted to tighten the economic and other ties which lashed each state to the Soviet Union and attempted to promote a heavy program of Sovietization. This plan was designed to create new gen-

erations which would be isolated from Western culture and influence and trained to recognize and applaud the benefits of Soviet and Communist rule.

By 1950, the "people's democracy" pattern was quite well established throughout Eastern Europe—except for East Germany—and the Titoist heresy, or those charged with it, had been eliminated. During the next three years, the Russians concentrated generally upon the steady process of weeding, purifying, and re-educating the Communist parties, governments, and various bureaucracies; and they worked to tighten the effectiveness of their controls over the police and armed forces, which at Stalin's death possessed a total of about 1,500,000 men.

Except for new constitutions in Rumania and Poland in 1952—based even more closely than before upon the Soviet model—only minor changes were made during Stalin's last few years in government structure, economic priorities, and shifts or purges of top personnel. The only significant "treason" trials occurred in Rumania and Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovakian trials occurred in November 1952 when Vladi-

mir Clementis, Rudolf Slánský, and twelve others were tried and found guilty of sabotage and treason. These trials were less an accurate reflection of Stalinist policy in Eastern Europe than a forewarning of what probably would have happened in the Soviet Union if Stalin had lived longer. Eleven of the fourteen tried were Jews, and the "doctors' plot" in Moscow, early in 1953, was marked by the same kind of anti-Semitism.

CULTURAL POLICIES

Stalin's last few years of rule were also marked in Eastern Europe by a major effort to indoctrinate a new generation in loyalty to the Soviet Union. In 1950 and 1951, the Communists, particularly in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, sought to break the Catholic Church; they wished to destroy its links with the Vatican and to create national Catholic churches. The school systems were transformed into organizations designed to mold a young generation along Soviet lines. Russian films and literature were poured into Eastern Europe, and the peoples of the area were isolated as much as possible from every Western influence. The Free Europe Committee, with its radio voices jammed effectively, was even reduced to floating balloons into Poland and Czechoslovakia in order to break through this powerful series of barriers.

ECONOMIC CHANGE

The Russians and their local Communist agents were, of course, especially eager to transform the economies of the states of Eastern Europe which had come under their control. During the eighteen months between late 1949 and early 1951, each government in the area launched a Five Year Plan; these were designed "to build the foundations of

Socialism," especially through concentrating upon heavy industry and upon agricultural collectivization. The plans were based upon Soviet models, and Soviet experts assisted in their preparation. Each country, regardless of its natural resources, sought to industrialize—with each state developing similar industries. In 1951, with the Korean conflict engaging the attention of the world, the targets for each of the plans were increased by approximately 50 per cent, and the industries of most of the countries, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia, were twisted more painfully into the production of military equipment. The new targets were extraordinarily high. Industrial output in Poland was scheduled to be 195 per cent greater in 1955 than in 1949; Czech heavy industry was to increase production 230 per cent between 1949 and 1954; production of machinery was to triple in Hungary between 1950 and 1956; and Rumanian labor productivity was to rise by 75 per cent in five years.

These vast programs had results similar to those endured in the Soviet Union under its early plans: significant increases in industrial production, especially in heavy industry and engineering; general neglect of consumer-goods production, except in plans and publicity; currency "reforms"; elaborate, expensive, and unfulfilled projects such as the Danube-Black Sea canal project in Rumania; extraordinary inefficiency and waste; the production of goods of poor quality; the Soviet labor system, with its ever-rising norms and pressures; the rapid growth of the industrial working class; forced labor, especially in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia; rapid urbanization and its attendant evils, especially in Rumania where the urban population rose from 3,800,000 in 1948 to 5,500,000 in May 1953 and where thousands of members of the old middle class were brutally evicted from

Robert F. Byrnes, Ph.D., Bloomington, Indiana, is Professor of History at Indiana University. He is General Editor of the *Mid-European Studies Center Series: East-Central Europe under the Communists* and author of *Antisemitism in Modern France: The Prologue to the Dreyfus Affair* (1950).

the cities; and, perhaps above all, depressed standards of living.

In the field of agriculture, Stalin's last three years produced heavy pressures for agricultural collectivization; these pressures were accompanied by the same tragedies as in the Soviet Union. Thus in Bulgaria, the number of collective farms rose from 56, early in 1950, to 1,966 in May 1953.

SOVIET-SATELLITE RELATIONS

The Soviet ruler in his last years also concentrated upon tightening Soviet-satellite relations and upon maximizing economic and other benefits to the Soviet Union as a result of Soviet control. In this climax of Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe, the foreign trade of the area was diverted to and firmly tied to Moscow; for example, the Soviet Union absorbed more than half of the foreign trade of each country. The long-term trade agreements, which were reinterpreted annually, not only made each state more dependent upon the Soviet Union for critical supplies and commodities but also involved price arrangements and currency manipulations which grossly favored the Soviet masters. This resulted in the overpricing of Soviet goods and the underpricing of those produced in Eastern Europe. Thus, the people of Poland were forced to pay 15 per cent more for Soviet wheat than they would have paid for Argentinian wheat; in return they received 80 per cent less for Polish coal "sold" to the Soviet Union than they obtained from Western purchasers. Bulgaria sold tobacco to the Soviet Union for a price so far below its standard market price that the Soviet Union was able to sell Bulgarian tobacco in Italy for dollars at a price 35 per cent below the best price the Bulgarians could offer the Italians. Soviet manipulation of the ruble was even more successful as a means of exploiting Eastern Europe.

THE SATELLITES AND YUGOSLAVIA

In "foreign" affairs, the satellite governments and Communist parties were all reliable tools of the Kremlin. They supported the Soviet Union in the United Nations, accused the United States of sabotage and subversion, and echoed the Soviet "germ war" and other charges. Those countries bordering Yugoslavia maintained a general war of nerves against the resolute heretic. Tito after 1948 was isolated politically and economically from the rest of Eastern Europe, and his former friends used all the techniques of political warfare against him. Mail and rail traffic were often cut; Yugoslav shipping on the Danube was delayed and molested; and they would have paid for Argentinian each satellite regime broadcasted virulent propaganda against Tito and his regime. Military maneuvers were staged on the Yugoslav frontier in 1951 and 1952, and, particularly in the year before Stalin's death, border incidents multiplied as forceful Soviet pressure increased.

SOVIET PROGRESS

In Stalin's last few years, the Eastern European states achieved considerable economic growth and made substantial progress towards state ownership of industry and agricultural collectivization. The reshaping of the societies, isolated with considerable skill from the non-Communist world, apparently made rapid progress, and Soviet control over the instruments of rule—the Communist parties, governments, bureaucracies, police, and armed forces—grew tighter. Finally, the net of Soviet ties bound each of the states and peoples more firmly to the Soviet system and made the Soviet empire a more impressive one for its opponents to contemplate.

This control over Eastern Europe gave the Soviet Union several immense ad-

vantages at the time of Stalin's death. It helped to assure the frontiers of the Soviet Union against attack; it gave the Soviet Union a strong advance base in Central Europe; it divided the great continent of Europe and placed a gun at the forehead of Western Europe; it gave the Soviet Union a veto on any solution to the reunification of Germany; it provided a rich empire for plunder and exploitation; and it strengthened the confidence of Communists, and the fear of neutralists, that these increments to Russian power proved that communism represented the wave of the future.

STRAINS AND PROBLEMS

On the other hand, Stalin's rule in Eastern Europe carried with it serious problems and strains. Soviet control was regarded with awe and horror by Americans and most Europeans; they believed that the Soviet system was so powerful, relentless, and effective that all hope was gone for the recovery by Europe of its lost territories. However, we underestimated the bitterness, the

resentment, the pride, the memories, the skepticism, and the bravery of the conquered peoples; and we failed to comprehend the impact Stalin's political, economic, and cultural policies had had upon the people under Communist rule. Massive centers of dissatisfaction were created by the establishment of huge bureaucracies which were staffed by people who were lukewarm or hostile to Communism and the expansion of the new state bourgeoisie; these people were profoundly dissatisfied with material conditions, restrictions, and the arrogance of their Russian colleagues and rulers. Grinding poverty—the lot of even the privileged workers—and Communist authoritarian rule inflamed resentment everywhere. Thus the Stalin program, while apparently a substantial success, created dissatisfaction even among the privileged groups. It stirred profound nationalistic forces and promoted pressures which broke loose after his death when some slight relaxations of his policies were effected by his successors.

The Beginning of the "Thaw," 1953-1955

By EDMUND O. STILLMAN

Abstract: Following Stalin's death, party leaders in Moscow and the satellites made public pronouncements indicating a sharp break with Communist dogma. "New Course" policies included: concessions to agriculture and peasantry, readjustment of proportions between heavy and light industry, increase in consumer-goods production, sharp rise in living standards, and a new respect for "forms of Socialist legality." After the introduction of the first economic reforms the "New Course" took on a political dimension. East European party and governmental leaders found themselves in unfamiliar ground—it was no longer merely a case of what the center chose to do, but how the masses would respond. The "New Course" was not a success and initiative was passing from Communist hands. A strategy of restoration was initiated by Russian leaders who intended that 1955 should be a year of salvage, a going back to pre-"New Course" policy. However, in Eastern Europe this was too late.—Ed.

IN THE summer and early fall of 1953—within a matter of seven months of Stalin's death—ranking Communist party and governmental leaders in Moscow and the satellite capitals delivered a series of public pronouncements which, taken at face value, implied the sharpest break with dogmas in force for a quarter century or more. The speeches appeared with a kind of mechanical regularity from the month of July forward; this regularity, coupled with a certain ritual monotony of expression, tended to belie the genuineness of these calls for reform.¹

"We must note, and we must state frankly before the entire nation," said the newly appointed Hungarian Premier

¹ The East Germans had hinted at a new policy approximately one month earlier when, on June 10, 1953, the Politburo of the SED (Socialist Unity Party) "recommended" reforms affecting industry, agriculture, and certain areas of civil life. It was not until July, however, that the policies emerged with any clarity and gave evidence of being more than a specifically East German tactic.

Imre Nagy on July 4, 1953, "that the objectives of the augmented Five Year Plan are beyond our strength. . . . The development of a Socialist heavy industry cannot be an end in itself."² A month later, on August 8, the Soviet Premier Georgi Malenkov declared: "For the present . . . we must ensure a more rapid increase in the material and cultural levels of life . . . and press, by all means, the development of our light industry."³ On August 22, the Romanian Premier Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej noted that "the rate of industrialization has been forced, especially in respect to heavy industry, leading to the establishment of too large a volume of capital investment in comparison with national income. . . ."⁴ On September 8, the Bulgarian Premier Vulko Chervenkov agreed. "We must adopt . . . a considerably reduced tempo of industrialization enabling us to step up the

² *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), July 5, 1953.

³ *Pravda* (Moscow), August 9, 1953.

⁴ *Scinteia* (Bucharest), August 25, 1953.

Edmund O. Stillman is a member of the New York Bar and Chief of the Publications Department of the Free Europe Press. He is the author of several articles on political affairs and is now editing an anthology of contemporary Marxist revisionism in the Soviet orbit and the West.

output of consumers goods and . . . agriculture."⁵ And by September 15, it had "become clear" to the Czechoslovak Premier Viliam Široký "that certain targets of the extended Five Year Plan for heavy industry were too high."⁶

Perhaps the sameness of these declarations had begun to prove a source of embarrassment. In Poland, on October 29, Premier Boleslaw Bierut explained:

It is no mere coincidence that the problem of what the emphasis of our future economic development should be . . . has appeared with equal force and timeliness in all the countries of the Socialist camp.

The similarity of these programs sprang not only from the identical character of the social changes taking place in these countries, but from the basic identity (in spite of certain differences) of the class structure . . . as well.⁷

NEW POLICIES

Whether Bierut spoke truly or not, all of these speeches in one degree or another spelled out concessions to agriculture and the peasantry, a readjustment of the proportions between heavy and light industry, an increase in consumer-goods production, and, more generally, a sharp rise in living standards in company with a new respect for the "forms of Socialist legality."

There were, however, important differences in the formulations put forward by these men. The Soviet statement, supplemented some weeks later by Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's revelations of agricultural disarray, was certainly the most grudging of all so far as specific concessions were concerned. Elsewhere the "Socialist transformation" had not progressed so far, and there the leaders were able to promise a limited

⁵ *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), September 9, 1953.

⁶ *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 16, 1953.

⁷ *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), November 6, 1953.

revival of the private sectors of the economy—a relaxation of pressure on the independent peasantry and even some slight encouragement to private artisanship and small trade. In both Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the more usual talk of "voluntariness" as the "inviolable principle" of collectivization was reinforced by the specific promise that peasants might leave, and even disband, the kolkhozes if they so chose. In Bulgaria, Chervenkov supplemented his review of affairs by a guarded appeal for the "normalization" of relations with the United States, Greece, and Yugoslavia. But in Hungary alone, the new Premier dwelt on political issues at some length and to some point, employing verbal formulas that must have sounded strange indeed to the party stalwarts gathered to hear him.

Nagy went very far when he said:

In developing our national economy the government will now reckon with the country's economic resources and will not set itself tasks . . . beyond . . . the nation's strength. [There must be] a steady improvement in living standards. . . . Agricultural production has come to a standstill. . . . In the process of land collectivization too much bullying was used . . . [and] serious uneasiness caused among the peasants. . . .

The government considers it essential to bring about [new conditions of] security. . . . Intellectuals must be esteemed. . . . We must display greater tolerance in religious matters. The foundation of the Socialist . . . state is a strict respect for the rule of law.⁸

THE HUNGARIAN CASE

Whatever the party rank and file in Hungary may have understood by this show of moderation, the mass reaction was immediate—and adverse. One week later Nagy and his party colleague, Mátyás Rákosi, returned to warn the nation against the deterioration of in-

⁸ *Op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*).

dustrial and agricultural order following the July 4 address. Factory discipline and productivity were essential to the new consumer program. Peasants were not to desert the kolkhozes before the autumn harvest was in. Rákosi, grudging in his view of these new policies and unable to reconcile himself to what was, in effect, a repudiation of his personal role, put it bluntly:

We shall not idly tolerate the enemy's attempt to undermine the achievements attained in the Socialist construction of the countryside. We shall not tolerate any propaganda against the cooperatives, just as we shall not tolerate propaganda against our Socialist order. . . . Our authorities, therefore, acted quite correctly when they arrested those kulaks who turned up on co-operative land and began to cut the crop, or those who offended against the laws in the mistaken belief that their hour had struck.⁹

Developments in Hungary in the week of July 4–11 went largely unnoticed in the West where most observers treated the "New Course" programs—as these reforming policies in the Soviet orbit came to be known—with great reserve. Yet Hungary, in the short space of eight days, had enacted *in parvo* the pattern of the succeeding forty months, demonstrating with great clarity the dilemma before the Communist regimes: there had been the rhythmic beat of concession and threat, each inadequate to its task; the divergent symptoms of party instability and dogmatism; and finally the show of mass hostility on the part of a people who once alienated could not easily be rewon.

Perhaps the failure of Western observers to catch the significance of these events can best be explained by a too exclusive preoccupation with internecine struggles in the Kremlin which provided no real clue to the shape of the future, or, even worse, by a tendency to view

⁹ *Szabad Nep*, July 12, 1953.

the Soviet world through the glass of dogmatic analysis. Yet the truth seems to be that 1953, in its own terms, marked a unique point in the development of policy in the Soviet orbit—the emergence of the first public signs of a crisis of the system and the first groping efforts, by certain Communist leaders, to devise policies which they conceived as an adequate response. As such the year marked a turning, the beginning of a reappraisal of the political and economic legacy of Stalinism which continues, officially or unofficially, on one level or another to this day.¹⁰

Earlier pauses in the forward rush of Communism—Lenin's NEP (New Economic Policy), Stalin's "Dizziness with Success" speech—provide no true precedent. The new policies enunciated in the Soviet orbit in 1953–54 were different in kind. Although there was certainly no unanimity of opinion among Stalin's legates—indeed, as we shall

¹⁰ It may, of course, be objected that to trace the origins of contemporary East European "revisionism"—the opinions of such men as Harich, Chalasinsky, Kolakowski, and Veres—to a series of deliberate pronouncements by party and governmental leaders in the summer of 1953 is absurd, particularly when the series included such patently insincere statements as those of Chervenkov and Gheorghiu-Dej. The answer is that at least one of these speakers, Imre Nagy, was later revealed to be a revisionist according to the most exacting definition of the term; and again, that it was precisely these early official departures from dogmatic Stalinism that created the intellectual and moral climate conducive to revisionism. Certainly it is a fact that revisionism was well developed in Poland and Hungary and showed promising signs in Czechoslovakia long before the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow and Khrushchev's sensational attack on Stalin, events usually cited as the starting point of the trend.

Whatever the true origins of East European revisionism—native left-wing ideologies, quasi-Marxist in nature which have resurfaced, or actual branches from the main stream of Stalinism—they could never have developed in an era of militant dogmatism.

see, renewed factionalism was one of the major features of the succeeding era—certain of the leaders perceived that Stalinism, in the sense of a pitiless and ever increasing pressure on the party ranks and masses, an economic grandomania, and a propensity to disregard national, social, and even natural obstacles to planning, had gone far beyond the point of diminishing returns. There is good evidence that they had reached these conclusions even before the Pilsen-Ostrava riots (May 30–June 4, 1953) and the East German uprising less than two weeks later.¹¹

ISSUE IN DOUBT

The violence of these episodes can only have confirmed their fears. The problems they faced were complex and demanded new solutions. While time was to prove that the system, in the Soviet Union at least, was securely rooted, in the newly assimilated regions of Eastern Europe the issue was in some real doubt. Zdenek Nejedly, the "grand old man" of Czechoslovak Communism, put it well, if indiscreetly, in an extempore radio address in October of that year: "For more than ten years we were driven as if by the wind. . . . Now the pace has slowed; the situation has changed. It is necessary to gain new strength, to think everything over."¹²

Indeed the stereotypy which characterized the more official pronouncements was profoundly misleading. The true significance of the "New Course" was to be found in the exact reverse of any exercise in party discipline or neat display of Moscow's supranational authority over the satellite leaderships, for the next few years demonstrated the breakdown of ideological controls, an unsure-

¹¹ See, for example, the SED (Socialist Unity Party) resolution of June 10, 1953, obviously in preparation for some weeks.

¹² Radio Prague, October 18, 1953.

ness of direction, and the re-emergence of *difference* on a national scale in a region heterogenous in the extreme before the Soviet Army engulfed it in 1944–45.

These symptoms, of course, appeared with varying force throughout the satellites: Chervenkov's speech in September 1953, for example, was merely the minimum token surrender to the new ideological fashion, and the policies he directed from that time forward bore a suspicious resemblance to those of the past.¹³ But in the sense that a nation like Bulgaria did little to adapt to the new line, displaying an individuality of response, it inevitably demonstrated that the units of the "Socialist camp" no longer functioned as interchangeable parts.

Certainly the experiment was pushed to extremes in Hungary where violent shifts of policy became something like the rule, and the opposition demonstrated a self-confidence and propensity to self-assertion long before the rebellion of October 1956. Czechoslovakia, some may say rather typically, chose a middle road; but in the early "New Course" era the regime was forced into concessions of some magnitude, and there was evidence of considerable indiscipline in both urban and rural areas. In Poland, perhaps most significantly of all, the "New Course" hardly began until 1955 when elsewhere these policies were—temporarily—reversed.

ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS

How can we explain these differences? If Bierut spoke truly in his early "New Course" address, the *similarities* sprang from the uniform character of the social changes taking place in the "People's Democracies." By mid-1953 each of these had assimilated to a type—single-party rule, nationalization of industry

¹³ There was, however, a halt in collectivization from 1953 to 1955 when the drive was renewed.

and trade, autarchy, collectivization, rapid accumulation of investment capital, concentration on heavy or "engineering" industry, and depressed living conditions. Native social institutions had been broken up and native value systems dishonored. In the course of the war, the region had been prostrated—politically, economically, and socially—and, apart from the resistance of scattered individuals or groups, there was no effective defense.¹⁴

The point is, however, that this attempt to refashion Eastern Europe in the Soviet image had not been pressed with equal rigor everywhere and in any case had been pressed with varying degrees of success—as a simple reference to collectivization statistics will show. The new system did not weigh equally on each of the component parts. Nor was the reaction that set in with mid-1953—the slow re-emergence of effective national consciousness and opposition to Soviet forms—equally severe.

If by 1953 the gravity of the local challenge to the party varied, it is also true that the local leaders were not equally astute in estimating the situation and framing an adequate response. It is from the interaction of these two factors—the character of the challenge and the character of the leaderships—that each "New Course" (and in this context, the phrase must embrace the mass reaction as well as the official programs) derived its special quality.

¹⁴ This is a matter quite separate from American willingness, or unwillingness, to make a trial of strength in Eastern Europe in the immediate postwar era. It is true that, in these early years, a vast majority of the people of the region looked to the United States to pose an effective challenge to the USSR, but, by and large, they could not conceive of a firm stand against the Communists without such support. Yet by 1953, as events in East Germany and Czechoslovakia clearly demonstrated, the American posture was largely irrelevant in determining the quality of their response to the Soviet imperial system.

Eventually, to return to our two specific examples, the Bulgarian party was able to resume the offensive; but the Hungarian leaders of Rákosi's stripe misjudged their people and were swept away.

The precise role of the Soviet diplomats and planners, even Stalin, in engineering the *Gleichschaltung* in Eastern Europe which gave rise to this crisis is open to some doubt. Not that the general imperialist posture of the Soviet Union is in question, but rather the direction of policy at any particular point and the rationale for the methods it chose to use.

Between 1944 and 1947 there was considerable talk of "People's Democracy" as a means of circumventing dictatorship of the proletariat in the process of "transition from capitalism to Socialism," as a system flexible enough to adapt to local economic realities. Nor was this talk of "People's Democracy" by the Communists always a contrived deception; on the lips of such men as Gomulka and Nagy, who played a role in this very early period as well, it may have been meant for something like the truth.¹⁵ From the standpoint of Soviet interests, rationally determined, "People's Democracy" gave some hope

¹⁵ See, for example, the rather pregnant passage in one of Nagy's essays in defense of his 1953-54 policies: "[In] the People's Democracies . . . many socio-economic formations or sectors, or remnants of these, exist side by side during the transitory period. . . . [but] we simply copied the Soviet method . . . thus skipping whole stages of development. That is the reason why Hungary needed a New Course to make it possible that basic principles and requirements of the transitional period could fully assert themselves, leaving room for . . . specific traits arising from concrete [local] conditions. . . ." Imre Nagy, *On Communism: In Defense of the New Course* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), pp. 82-83. There seems to be a close connection between early theories of People's Democracy and "national communism" as it later developed in Eastern Europe.

of success. But from 1947 forward, a date which may conveniently be taken to mark the assumption of total power by the Communist parties of Eastern Europe, a general process of tightening began. The process was accelerated by the breach with Yugoslavia; but even though Moscow must have signaled the beginning of the drive and unquestionably took the lead in organizing such supranational organizations as the Cominform and Comecon, avowedly designed to ensure a "harmony" of direction in the Soviet sphere, it is not so certain that the Soviets blessed the specific and frequently irrational course of economic development in each satellite state. The interaction between Soviet demands on the region (admittedly intensified at the time of the Korean crisis) and the predilections of the satellite leaders themselves for Stalinoid economic and social policies deserves the most careful historical analysis, for which the usual stereotypes will not do.

"COUNTRIES OF IRON AND STEEL"

In any case, the excesses of economic planners in the satellites are a matter of record, and when Zoltan Vas in 1954 denounced those who had wanted to turn Hungary into a "country of Iron and Steel," his strictures might as easily have applied to the rest of the zone as well.

How far this infatuation with the unreal could go is driven home by a conversation, tragi-comic in its overtones, cited by Nagy in his political testament:

In June 1953 in Moscow . . . Comrade Mikoyan made the following statement concerning our . . . industrialization policy: 'The matter of [your] economic planning shows a certain adventurous spirit, particularly the excessive development of your own iron smelting industry. Hungary has no iron ore, nor coke. . . . No one in Hungary has figured out . . . the price of a ton of iron ore and steel. . . . Hungary is

building foundries for which no one has yet promised to supply the ore.'¹⁶

Similar instances of agricultural mismanagement are too well known to need documentation. By the time of Stalin's death, disinvestment and the collectivization drives had combined to drive production and marketing to catastrophically low levels.

Yet it would probably be an error to see in these economic dislocations the sole, or even the principal, stimulus to the "New Course." The truth is that these conditions in industry and agriculture had existed for a long time and had even become something like an institutional feature of the "mature" system. The year 1953 in the satellites was not, on the face of it, appreciably worse in strict economic terms than 1951-52. What had changed was the party's ability, or belief in its ability, to master these conditions.¹⁷ There had been a failure of Communist nerve. Afterwards, each show of caution and doubt by the party only stimulated an aggressive mass response.

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

Thus from mid-1953 forward the East European party and governmental leaders began to operate in an unfamiliar environment, according to an unfamiliar set of rules. Where once it had been sufficient to issue a Central Committee resolution or ministerial order, the regimes found themselves dealing with forces and entities which defied central control. Party *élan*, managerial creativity, the productivity of industrial labor—all these things were needed, but they could not be got through the old methods of police terror and purge. It

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 106-7.

¹⁷ Even the Soviet leaders seem to have anticipated panic and civil disobedience in the days following Stalin's death. On March 7 the Council of Ministers issued a call for unity and a warning against "panic."

was no longer merely a case of what the center might choose to do, but how the mass would *respond*.

The *Szabad Nep* leader of May 16, 1954, eloquently expressed the dilemma of this period:

Our goal is the consolidation of legality, but now certain persons think that the reduction of delivery quotas is a law, and that deliveries themselves are no longer compulsory. We have denounced the method of command and compulsion, but now certain persons believe we have renounced all discipline. . . . We have given more support to independent farmers, but now certain people have taken this to mean we are against the kolkhozes. We have broadened Party democracy, but now there are Party members who believe they are free to slacken . . . the fight. . . .

In these circumstances, less than a year after the introduction of the first economic reforms, the "New Course" took on a political dimension. Once again the process was not entirely uniform: in Rumania and Bulgaria, a certain equilibrium had been achieved, and there the party introduced no significant departures; but in Budapest, Warsaw, and Prague the regimes gingerly made the first experiments with the decentralization of political authority, "initiative from below," and "activization of the non-Party masses." Again Hungary was the boldest innovator. The Third Party Congress in Budapest (May 24–30, 1954) heard proposals for the revival of the People's Front, moribund for some years, and a significant enlargement of the power of the Local Councils. Forthcoming elections to these bodies were to be held under slightly modified rules, permitting a narrow but unprecedented choice by the voters.

In Czechoslovakia, the experiment came to nothing. Three series of elections had been planned for 1954–55: to the National Assembly, to the National Committees (the units of local

government analogous to the Local Councils in Hungary), and to the shop committees of the trade union apparatus. At the time of the introduction of two bills for the reorganization of the National Committees on January 10, 1954, it had been explained that the purpose was to "create conditions favorable to the widest participation of the people in the administration of the state," but by early summer there was rather more "local initiative" in Czechoslovakia than the regime could comfortably use.

By way of contrast, in Hungary the elections developed into something of a contest. *Szabad Nep* of November 10, 1954, complained that at the nomination proceedings, anticipating the formal elections, fully 15 per cent of the regime's candidates had been defeated by nominees more acceptable to local opinion. And in Poland, *Nowa Kultura*, in an election day story, admitted that in the course of the campaign "a rather large internal opposition was mobilized. . . . Wherever possible, people at best indifferent to the regime were brought into the National Councils."¹⁸

STRAINS ON PARTY UNITY

In these conditions, the instinct of the left was to revert to type very quickly; and they sought to revive, as Rákosi later put it, the "beautiful traditions" of earlier years. Yet the general slackness of discipline favored the development of "opportunist" or revisionist trends; and the party leaders, even those who unlike Rákosi sought to give the "New Course" genuine meaning, were soon engaged in an ideological battle on two fronts.

Coherent liberalist ideologies developed early in Czechoslovakia where the non-Communist left had once been very strong. By the middle of 1954 the

¹⁸ *Nowa Kultura* (Warsaw), December 5, 1954.

press began to catalogue a whole spectrum of deviations—"pseudo-humanism," "Masarykism," "Social-Democratism," "Anarcho-Syndicalism" and, perhaps most challenging of all, "the theory of equal stomachs." Surprisingly, the trend was somewhat retarded in Hungary and Poland where opposition did not take on pronounced *ideological* coloration until the following year.

Thus, the result of these experiments was hardly reassuring. Apart from the political opposition which had begun to mobilize in the three Western satellites, state discipline was declining. By the end of 1954, the collective sector of Czechoslovakia had shrunk from a previous high of 40 to 29.4 per cent of the land and in Hungary from 27.9 to 18 per cent.¹⁹ In Poland and Hungary legal limits on the size of the household plots (a remnant of private ownership within the collective farm structure) were frequently exceeded by 4 and 500 per cent.²⁰ Worst of all, in Hungary the output of heavy industry in 1954 fell by 3.1 per cent below the preceding year's level. As for industry as a whole, plants and factories responsible to the central ministries—the heart of the Communist economic program—increased their output by a mere 0.3 per cent; by contrast, small-scale local industry, artisans' co-operatives, and private enterprises showed a growth of 28, 30, and 100 per cent, respectively.²¹

¹⁹ Hungarian figure for June 1953 (the high point) from *East Europe* (New York), Vol. 6, No. 11, November 1957, p. 19. All other data from *Voprosy Ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 3, 1956, p. 165.

²⁰ For an extensive contemporary survey of these and other violations, see Elizabeth Marbury, *The Household Plot: A Study of Private Farming within the Collective Farm* (New York: Free Europe Press, May 1955).

²¹ See the "Report of the Central Bureau of Statistics on Fulfillment of the National Economic Plan for 1954," *Information Bulletin of the International Relations Department of the HWP* (Budapest), Vol. 7, Nos. 1–2, 1955.

There had been a moderate improvement in living standards, but, on the face of it, the "New Course" was not a success. Initiative was passing from Communist hands.

REVERSAL

In these circumstances, the left wing began to rally. By the closing months of 1954 ominous signs of displeasure began to appear in the Hungarian press, and simultaneously Rákosi and his colleagues mobilized support in Moscow where Malenkov's tenure of office was drawing to an end. The break came on January 24, 1955, when *Pravda* published a long and definitive editorial by Dimitri Shepilov bluntly stating that it was time to draw back.

Lenin and Stalin emphasized a thousand times that, if there is to be a successful development of the entire national economy, decisive importance attaches to the question of rapid—even outstripping—rates of heavy industrial development.

There could be no compromise, said Shepilov, with the "vulgarizers of Marxism."²² The next day, Khrushchev joined in a stinging attack on "Bukharinites" and the exponents of "calico industrialization."

The issue had been drawn, and on February 8, 1955, Malenkov resigned his post as Soviet Premier. Less than one month later the Central Committee of the Hungarian party published a resolution directed against Imre Nagy.

What was the inner significance of Shepilov's new "general line"? Ostensibly it was a narrow discussion of economic dogma, yet by any objective test his strictures were hardly germane—certainly in the Soviet Union, where the "New Course" promises had never borne real fruit, or even in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, where the propor-

²² *Pravda* (Moscow), January 24, 1955.

tion of investment devoted to heavy industry still remained very high. On the other hand, as later events seemed to prove, it was more than a ritual utterance or a simple gambit in the game of political chess—Khrushchev *vs.* Malenkov, Rákosi *vs.* Nagy.

The nearer truth seems to be that these categorical assertions of the primacy of heavy industry did duty as a symbol—a symbol of the siege mentality, self-abnegation, and discipline of Stalinist years. The Soviet system had come to be an organic whole, and forced rates of industrialization were not so much the means to an end as a necessary condition of Communist society. Planning dogma and the mores of the party functionary were inextricably intermeshed. Party instability and national opposition had set in with the first talk of economic reform in mid-1953; the reversal of these trends was to be signaled by the public proclamation of older economic formulas. Certainly the Shepilov thesis was not meant for the literal and enforceable truth: economic policy in the orbit continued to follow more rational lines and there was no marked reversion to Stalinist tempos.

Nineteen fifty-five was therefore intended for a year of salvage, a time of restoration—not so much of Stalinism as of civil discipline and party control. But in Eastern Europe, at least, it was already late. The collectivization drives began again, but, except in Bulgaria, without the old vigor. In Poland the party continued with its policy of “legality,” relaxing censorship and, in a wide series of reorganizations, curbing the power of the police. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia factionalism was not really dead.

NEW ROADS TO SOCIALISM

The results of a strategy of restoration, implacably pursued, will never be

known. Conceivably there was no way to avert the Soviet catastrophes of 1956, for mighty forces had been set in motion and Eastern Europe was now caught up in an historical drift. Yet the satellite parties might have reached a new state of equilibrium had Moscow's foreign policy in this era really been calculated to support the sense of encirclement and siege. Unfortunately for the stability of the East European regimes, precisely the reverse was true. Two months after the publication of the “March Resolution” in Budapest, the new Soviet leadership signed the Austrian State Treaty, raising the hope of a general European settlement. On May 27, Khrushchev and Bulganin made their act of contrition at Zemun Airport. After nine days of festive dinners and carefully staged tours, the Soviets, together with Tito, pledged themselves to “mutual respect and non-interference . . . for any reason whatsoever,” adding that “different social systems and different forms of Socialist development are the exclusive business” of each separate state. By so pledging themselves, they impugned the position of the Soviet Union as the “first land of Socialism” and compromised their “Muscovite” henchmen in the satellites, setting the stamp of approval on ideological diversity and, at least by implication, on theories of “People's Democracy” suppressed seven or eight years before.

In July there was the summit conference at Geneva. One month later, on August 21, the weekly *Nowa Kultura* in Warsaw published Adam Wazyk's *Poem for Adults*. This, in a sense, was the price.

Wazyk's poem was a landmark. When he appealed “for reason, for a flaming reason,” for “a simple distinction between words and deeds,” he expressed the inchoate discontents of the post-Stalin era in a form which was at

once an historical and literary event.²³ Afterwards nothing could be quite the same. In October of that year the Polish journal *Nowe Drogi* was constrained to denounce prevailing conditions of “doubt . . . confusion . . . and . . . ideological chaos” in the party, the surfacing of “nihilistic” trends and “vague, abstract moral criteria. . . .”²⁴ In

²³ A single stanza will give the flavor of this long and important poem:

“Fourier, the dreamer, charmingly foretold
that lemonade would flow in seas.
Does it not flow?
They drink sea-water,
crying:
‘lemonade!’
returning home secretly
to vomit.”

There is a full translation available in *News From Behind the Iron Curtain* (now *East Europe*) (New York), Vol. 5, No. 1, January 1956, pp. 31–33.

²⁴ See “Let Us Increase Efforts in the Ideological Struggle,” *Nowe Drogi*, Warsaw, Vol. 9, No. 10 (76), October 1955, pp. 3–12. The article is conclusive proof that ideological

Hungary the following month saw the related phenomenon of the First Writers' Revolt.

The history of the second half of 1955 properly belongs to the succeeding era: the time of the emergence of coherent and calculated intellectual opposition when students and writers took the lead. These movements are increasingly well documented. Yet the twenty-four months from the summer of 1953 to the summer of 1955 deserve the most intensive study. In this earlier time there were few articulate *philosophes* to pose an intellectual and moral challenge to Communism; the peasants, workers and party *apparatchiki* held the stage. But the obscure events of the first post-Stalin era sufficiently studied would throw a flood of light on the strains of totalitarian society and the factual limits of its capacity to reform.

chaos was widespread in Eastern Europe long before Khrushchev's attack on Stalin.

Economic Policy in Eastern Europe From 1950 Through 1956

By EDWARD AMES¹

Abstract: Growth in East European industrial output, employment, and labor productivity, while rapid, slowed down markedly after 1950, as did agricultural collectivization. These are all explainable by inflationary pressures. At first, governments reacted to inflation only by drastic operations like currency conversions, but in 1952, Stalin's *Economic Problems* presented a more basic price analysis. His successors rejected it in favor of farm price revision and altered investment. By 1955, a controversy over direct controls had obscured interest in pricing and monetary aspects of inflation, and stressed Marxian theories of whether shortages—an inflationary phenomenon—should be met by more investment in raw materials industries or by increased authority to plant managers.

BY THE end of the 1940's, the Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe had virtually (except for East Germany) completed the nationalization of industry. The nationalized plants were operated under the Soviet "Khozraschet" system in which: the plant management controlled current output, but could not undertake construction work; credit was used only for inventory and payments purposes (except in agriculture) and could be issued only by the central banks; and construction was financed almost wholly from the state budgets whose revenues came mainly from profits earned in the sale of consumer goods.²

¹ Limitations of space have made necessary heroic simplifications of a complex subject, and certain statistical liberties have been taken, notably in the area of presenting series pertaining to groups of countries. Statements are therefore made without the conditions which might be made if this treatment were of book length.

² The main source of investible funds, the turnover tax, is in form an excise tax. If supply is perfectly inelastic (as is the case of

Output in these countries, while above the low prewar levels (except in East Germany), seems to have been below peak levels of the wartime period, and Poland in particular had probably some underutilized capacity in its newly acquired Silesian territories.

When, therefore, these countries began industrialization, there was good reason to suppose that rapid expansion

Soviet bloc enterprises, which are governed by production plans), excise taxes are borne wholly by sellers and have the same effect, therefore, as profits taxes. I shall, for convenience, treat the revenue from turnover taxes as part of the profit originating from the sales of consumer goods. This is not the practice of such writers as Abram Bergson and Hans Heyman, *Soviet National Income and Product, 1940-1948* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954) or Franklyn Holzman, *Soviet Taxation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955). These writers assume, respectively, that the tax is a transfer payment (as the United States Department of Commerce assumes in its treatment of United States excise taxes), and that the tax actually raises retail prices above what they would otherwise be.

Edward Ames, Ph.D., Lafayette, Indiana, is Associate Professor of Economics at Purdue University. From 1951 to 1954 he was with the Division of International Finance at the Federal Reserve Board, and from 1942-45 with the United States Embassy in Moscow.

TABLE 1—OUTPUT OF PRINCIPAL INDUSTRIAL RAW MATERIALS IN SOVIET EASTERN EUROPE, 1950-1956, IN THOUSAND METRIC TONS

RAW MATERIALS	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956
Electric Power ^a	44.1	49.5	55.4	59.9	65.5	73.3	79.8
Increase over previous year	7.6	5.4	5.9	4.5	5.6	7.8	6.5
Percentage increase	20	12	12	8	9	12	9
Coal and Lignite	295,800	310,300	329,500	359,500	377,800	405,200	417,300
Increase over previous year	33,400	14,500	19,200	30,000	18,300	27,400	12,100
Percentage increase	13	5	6	9	5	7	3
Pig iron	4,551	4,859	5,726	7,380	8,020	9,036	9,685
Increase over previous year	596	308	867	1,654	640	1,016	649
Percentage increase	15	7	18	29	9	13	7
Steel	8,224	9,743	10,997	12,395	12,669	13,801	14,997
Increase over previous year	1,303	1,519	1,254	1,398	274	1,132	1,196
Percentage increase	19	18	13	13	2	9	8
Cement	8,344	9,156	10,188	11,955	12,455	13,704	14,731
Increase over previous year	3,186	812	1,032	1,767	500	1,249	1,027
Percentage increase	62	10	11	17	4	10	7

^a Billion kilowatt hours.

Sources: For East Germany, 1949, *Economic Survey for Europe*, 1953 (U. N. Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva, 1954), p. 273. Other countries 1949: I. Semenov and N. Sokolova, "Construction of a Socialist Economy in the European People's Democracies," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 3 (1956), p. 163. For 1950-56, tabulations are given in *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 5 (1957), p. 97, except for Rumanian cement production 1949-53, which was obtained from the *Economic Survey for Europe* (1953), *op. cit.*, p. 276, and for 1954, which was interpolated by the writer. Rumanian pig iron production 1951-56 is from the *Anuarul Statistic al RPR 1957* (Bucharest 1957), p. 86.

could take place, given Soviet type controls over the level and type of investment. Centralized budget financing and the taxation of consumer-goods industry would aid the rapid development of heavy industry; the forced development of co-operative farms would provide a supply of industrial labor; and political and economic controls would force popular compliance with the intent of the government.

In 1949 and 1950 "very high"³ rates

³ The words "very high" is, of course, to be understood with reference to Soviet bloc indices which typically show larger changes than they would if computed by our methods. The writer does not assume more for any output index in Eastern Europe than this: if the Soviet bloc index shows a larger change from Year 1 to Year 2 than from Year 2 to Year 3, a properly constructed index would also show

of industrial growth were achieved. This effort to maintain high rates of growth, accompanied by an almost unlimited political power, gradually petered out around 1954-55. If an explanation of this slowing down were possible, it might suggest how far and how fast a new surge of industrialization which appeared to be getting under way in 1956-57 might go.

The data readily available on output of basic industrial materials (Table 1) show that the increase in electric power output was larger in 1950 than in any year until 1955; the largest increase in coal and cement output for the entire period 1950-56 was in 1950; the peak

this same relationship. Readers are directed to the voluminous United States literature on Soviet output indices.

increase in steel output was in 1951. Only in the case of pig iron was the greatest growth as late as 1953. Absolute growths in output indices (Table 2) increased slightly in 1951 over 1950, but *percentage* rates of growth were highest in 1950 and therefore dropped despite continuing growth in the output

TABLE 2—ESTIMATED COMBINED OFFICIAL INDICES OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT, INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT AND OUTPUT PER MAN-YEAR IN SOVIET EASTERN EUROPE, 1949-56^a

	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956 ^c
SIX COUNTRIES, COMBINED INDICES ^b								
Industrial Output (1949 = 100)	100	128	158	188	214	231	252	271
Increase over previous year,								
points	16	28	30	30	26	17	21	21
Per cent	20	28	23	19	14	8	9	8
Industrial Employment (thousands)	6,178	6,923	7,472	7,900	8,270	8,513	8,657	n.a.
Increase over previous year,								
thousands	n.a.	745	549	428	370	243	144	n.a.
per cent	n.a.	12	8	6	5	3	2	n.a.
Output per Man-Year (1949 = 100)	100	114	131	147	160	168	180	n.a.
Increase over previous year,								
points	n.a.	14	17	16	13	8	12	n.a.
Per cent	n.a.	14	15	12	9	5	7	n.a.
FIVE COUNTRIES, COMBINED INDICES ^b								
Industrial Output (1949 = 100)	100	129	159	192	219	235	258	279
Increase over previous year,								
points	16	29	30	33	27	16	13	21
Per cent	20	29	23	21	14	7	6	8
Industrial Employment (thousands)	4,165	4,700	5,062	5,394	5,717	5,883	6,036	6,297
Increase over previous year,								
thousands	n.a.	535	362	332	323	166	153	261
Per cent	n.a.	13	8	7	5	3	3	4
Output per Man-Year (1949 = 100)	100	114	131	148	160	166	178	185
Increase over previous year,								
points	n.a.	14	17	16	12	6	12	7
Per cent	n.a.	14	15	12	8	4	7	4

n.a.—not available.

^a The industrial output indices are obtained from official indices of producer-and-consumer goods (except for East Germany, where only total output was used). These were weighted by the average industrial employment of the respective countries, 1953-55. Industrial employment data are from direct reports wherever possible; elsewhere they are derived by dividing official indices of output by official indices of labor productivity. Details of the computations are available from the writer on request. The output per man-year are obtained by division of output by employment.

^b The *five-country* indices refer to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. The *six-country* indices refer to these countries plus East Germany. Albania was *not* included in any index because the writer could find no adequate figures on industrial employment, which in any case must be very small.

^c The 1956 index of employment includes Hungarian employment only for January-September. It therefore is not affected by the decline in output after the Hungarian uprising in October. The other two indices, however, include Hungarian annual totals and thus include the effects of the uprising.

TABLE 3—OUTPUT OF PRODUCER AND CONSUMER GOODS IN FIVE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 1949-56, ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL INDICES (1949 = 100)

OUTPUTS	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956
Industrial Output, Total	100	129	159	192	219	235	258	286 ^a
Producer Goods	56	72	91	113	132	141	154 ^a	172
Consumer Goods	44	58	69	79	87	94	104	115
Indices of Output of								
Producer Goods	100	128	161	200	234	250	273 ^a	304 ^b
Increase over previous year								
Points	n.a.	28	33	39	34	16	23	31
Per cent	n.a.	28	26	24	17	7	9	11
Consumer Goods	100	130	158	181	200	216	239	264 ^b
Increase over previous year								
Points	n.a.	30	28	23	19	16	13	25
Per cent	n.a.	30	21	15	10	8	6	10
Increases in the Components of								
Industrial Output								
Producer Goods, in points of total								
index	n.a.	16	19	22	19	9	13	18
Consumer Goods, in points of total								
index	n.a.	14	11	10	8	7	10	11
Increases in Producer Goods output,								
in per cent of the total increase in	n.a.	53	64	69	70	56	56	62

^a Assuming no change for Bulgaria, for which no index is available.

^b These indices differ from those of Table 2 which use the Hungarian output index of 1956. The writer has been unable to find Hungarian output indices for producer and consumer goods separately for 1956. He therefore omitted Hungary from his 1956 computations. He did this because he wished to determine the extent to which the role of consumer goods in output increases (last item in column) might have changed in 1956.

Method of computation: Indices of producer and consumer goods output for individual countries were used. They were weighted as follows: For 1953 and 1955 the percentage breakdown of output as between the two categories was available for these countries. Assuming labor productivity the same in the two categories, employment data were broken down for these two years into "producer goods labor" and "consumer goods labor." These employment figures were used as weights. While this procedure would be very bad if any better method were available, it seems permissible in the absence of anything better; and the results conform largely with what might have been expected on analytical grounds.

of producer goods⁴ (Table 3) and of imports of Soviet equipment.⁵

⁴ Since armaments expenditures of these countries began a rapid increase in 1951, the increase in producer-goods indices could represent an increase in armaments production rather than capital goods. It is the writer's understanding from American press accounts, however, that the equipment of East European armies was mainly of Soviet manufacture.

⁵ It has not been possible to present a continuous series for Soviet machinery exports,

Investment programs capable of producing given additions to total output may require varying amounts of capital equipment. If the East European investment programs had scheduled first those objectives requiring small amounts of capital, and only later those requiring larger amounts, larger investment and smaller increases in output would have

which at this period would have been largely to this area.

been observed.⁶ This possibility does not explain the slowing down in the rate of growth of industrial employment (Table 2). While in 1950 industrial employment rose by 12 per cent, in 1952 it rose only by 6 per cent and dropped steadily to 2 per cent in 1955.

INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY INDICES

Increases in industrial employment come about partly through decreases in the number of dependents in urban families and partly through movement of peasants into the cities. However, the growth in the acreage of co-operative farms was greatest in 1950 and declined steadily until 1955⁷ (Table 4).

Co-operative farm expansion will tend to create migration into the cities partly

⁶ One reason for such "decreasing returns" might be a deficiency in better grade mineral reserves. These have been discussed by V. H. Winston in *Resources and Planning in Eastern Europe*, N. J. G. Pounds and N. Spulber, Eds., Slavic and East European Series, Volume 4, Indiana University Publications, 1957, p. 36 ff.

⁷ This statement is not strictly true if East Germany is included. Collectivization started later there than elsewhere, so that the expansion (including that in East Germany) led to somewhat higher levels in 1953 than in 1952. For the other five countries, however, it is true.

TABLE 4—AREA OF CO-OPERATIVE FARMS, IN THOUSAND HECTARES, 1950-1956

COUNTRIES	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956
Six Countries ^a							
Area	3,690	4,860	6,460	8,230	8,090	9,150	10,320
Increase over previous year in thousand hectares	2,890	2,170	1,600	1,770	-140	1,060	1,170
in per cent	361	59	33	27	-2	13	13
Five Countries ^b							
Area	3,690	4,860	6,310	7,480	7,310	8,050	8,930
Increase over previous year in thousand hectares	2,890	2,170	1,450	1,170	-170	740	880
in per cent	361	59	29	19	-2	10	11

^a Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, East Germany.

^b Excluding East Germany.

because some peasants not wishing—or permitted—to join co-operatives will move to the cities, and partly because co-operatives combine small landholdings into units large enough to permit the use of machinery.⁸ Thus it is tempting to make a causal connection between the slowdown in the expansion of industrial employment from 1950 through 1955 (and the speedup in 1956) and similar changes in the growth of co-operative farms.

The official indices of output per man-year show the same general tendencies as total output and industrial employment. The largest increases, both absolute and in per cent (Table 2), occurred in 1951 and were followed by declines until 1955. If the construction projects completed in later years were more capital-consuming than those completed in earlier years, in order to compensate, they would presumably have to be less labor-requiring than the earlier projects. But then the growth in labor productivity should have continued stable, or even increased.

⁸ If the amount of machinery increases more rapidly than co-operative farm acreage, the movement into cities may be greater. The available information shows, however, that the tractor power available per acre of co-operative land did not change markedly from 1949 to 1955.

TABLE 5—CHANGES IN MONTHLY WAGES AND IN ANNUAL OUTPUT PER WORKER, IN INDUSTRY, SIX EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1950-1956

(Per cent above previous year)

COUNTRIES		1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956 ^a
Poland	Monthly wage ^b	21	10	9	42	6	4	11
	Output per worker ^c	10	13	1	7	6	6	5
Czechoslovakia	Monthly wage ^d	11	7	8	8	7	2	4
	Output per worker ^c	7	7	15	4	3	8	7
Hungary	Monthly wage ^e	8	7	28	4	11	5	5
	Output per worker ^c	20	12	9	4	0	6	
Rumania	Monthly wage ^f	11	10	-15	14	13	21	8
	Output per worker ^c	8	14	13	5	3	11	10
Bulgaria	Monthly wage ^g	6	7			6	2	2
	Output per worker ^c	16	14	12	9	2	8 ^h	
East Germany	Monthly wage ⁱ	13	13	12	9	9	3	3
	Output per worker ^j	14	8	8	10	5	9	10

Pairs of numbers enclosed in square indicate cases where inflationary pressure certainly increased.

^a Tabulations of output per worker are from *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 5 (1957), p. 96.

^b *Rocznik Statystyczny 1957* (Warsaw 1957), p. 267.

^c Unless otherwise noted, from the tabulations of Semenov and Sokolova, in *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 3 (1956), pp. 159 ff.

^d For 1949-53, *Rozvoj narodniho hospodarstvi CSR v letech 1948-1953* (Praha 1955), p. 59. Changes from 1952 to 1953 are net of the 80 per cent reduction in all prices at the time of the June 1953 currency conversion. For 1954-56, same source as in ^a.

^e For change from 1949-50, same source as ^a. For later years, UN *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, 1957. 1956 figures are for January-September only.

^f For 1951-56, data on average retail sales per person employed in the economy were calculated from *Annuaril Statistic al R.P.R.*: These are value terms; they can change without corresponding changes in money wages if (1) taxes or voluntary savings change or if (2) the amount of involuntary savings (currency inflation) changes. With caution, therefore, they may be used as a guide to wage changes, since these are not available. The 1950 figure is a wage change, given in *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War* (Geneva 1953), p. 33.

^g For 1950-51, *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War*, p. 33; for 1954-56, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1956* (Geneva 1957), p. 14. Other years not available.

^h For 1949-50, the 1950 report of the Planning Commission; for 1951-52, speeches by Leuschner (October 2, 1952) and Rau (May 16, 1953); for 1953, Ulbricht speech of March 30, 1954 to SFD Party Congress. The 1953 figure relates to socialist enterprises only; other figures to all industry. Data for 1954-56 are from the source listed in ^a.

ⁱ For 1950, Grigorev, "Rise of Peaceful Economy of the German Democratic Republic," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 8 (1951), p. 83. For 1951-55, Kohlmeier, "The Economy of the German Democratic Republic on the Threshold of the Second Five-Year Plan," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 11 (1956), p. 45 ff.

These official productivity indices apply only to industry where productivity increases certainly exceeded those in the rest of the economy. Even if they cor-

rectly measured industrial labor productivity, therefore, they would exceed indices of over-all productivity. Thus, whenever wages increased as rapidly as,

or more rapidly than, official productivity indices, there was almost certainly to be an increase in demand for consumer goods relative to output; for, as may be seen in Table 3, over most of this period output of consumer goods increased less rapidly than output of industry as a whole. Data on productivity and wages are shown in Table 5. In over half of the total cases for which data are available, wages grew more than industrial productivity. If industrial productivity indices are as little as one point higher per year than the overall indices, two-thirds of the cases noted would fall into the "inflationary" category.

To sum up: (1) while industrial output has risen steadily—even, on balance, rapidly—it has failed to maintain its rates of growth; (2) industrial employment and average output per worker have shown the same tendencies; (3) money wages have risen steadily and probably, on balance, more rapidly than output, so that (4) there has been continuing or at least recurrent inflationary pressure. The rest of this paper will explain the interrelation among these phenomena.

OBSTACLES TO INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION

The present problem is most readily presented by considering an East European economy as comprising three sectors: the state, the workers, and the peasants. The state owns all manufactured goods (including processed foods), which it sells to workers and peasants; the peasants own farm goods, which they sell to the state or to the workers; and the workers own labor, which they sell to the state. Peasants, moreover, may become workers. The state hopes that many will do so. The state can fix all prices and wages except those which the peasants charge the workers; but it cannot fix—although it can influence—the amounts of labor and farm produce

which will be sold it. The state wishes to retain as many manufactured goods for itself as it can. The goods it does retain will be called accumulation.⁹

While certain levels of accumulation may present no particular obstacles, an indefinite expansion of accumulation may present difficulties because of the interrelations between the other two sectors.

Relations between state and workers involve the exchange of labor for consumer goods. To increase accumulation, the state must prevent workers' consumption from rising as much as total industrial output. If workers save there is no problem. However, living standards are apparently so low in Eastern Europe and expectations of inflation so high that voluntary savings cannot be increased much. Semivoluntary savings (subscriptions to government bond issues) have been achieved through high-pressure tactics. Workers' consumption can also be limited by the absence of adequate stocks of goods in stores, an arrangement made more orderly through issuance of ration cards. In this way, the workers are forced to save paper money. Alternatively, the state could raise prices relative to wages and thus reduce consumption and attract investible funds in the form of profits.

Relations between the state and peas-

⁹ An apology is due here to Karl Marx, who presents the term in his *Critique of the Gotha Program*, the cornerstone of modern Communist national income terminology. More precisely, the term should be "accumulation and social consumption funds." The former includes additions to plant, equipment, and state-held inventory; the latter services not paid for directly by their users, and ranging from free schools and hospitals to free armies and secret police services. The two categories are here combined, for simplicity, into the single term "accumulation." For simplicity it is also assumed that only manufactured goods are here involved, services being ignored, although it is well known that "stone walls do not a prison make."

ants involve the exchange of manufactured goods for farm goods. Since farm goods are relatively nonessential to accumulation,¹⁰ the state's need for them is primarily to obtain profits from their resale to the city population. The state must, therefore, acquire additional farm goods without corresponding increases in farm consumption so that it may increase profits and thereby accumulation. It can do so either if peasants save—voluntarily or otherwise—or if prices of manufactured goods rise relative to the prices the state pays for farm goods.¹¹

Consumption control

In both sets of transactions, the state has a choice of methods for holding down consumption. It may allow the prices it charges to rise relative to the prices it pays and retain the added profits. It may also force up savings by selling bonds or by putting direct controls over prices and the quantities of goods it buys and sells.

If workers are forced to save more than they wish in cash, they can spend less on goods than they wish, assuming the amount of work they were willing to perform were unaffected by this scarcity of goods. On the other hand, if they are satisfied with given amounts of consumer goods, involuntary savings will be associated with involuntary labor—the state will have to use "persuasion" or "force" to get the labor it wishes. Increases in accumulation will thus tend to be accompanied by willingness of workers (and state enterprises)

¹⁰ However, to the extent that the satellites export consumer goods to the USSR in exchange for machinery, the acquisition of farm goods by the state may be a necessary part of the accumulation process.

¹¹ Soviet bloc governments in their farm policy try to lower the "parity index," whereas the United States tries to raise the index. If the United States is faced with chronic farm overproduction, the Soviet bloc should be faced with chronic farm shortages.

to pay more than official prices in order to obtain more goods (and labor) than are available, and a second price level (often inexactly termed a "black market price level," although it need not be illegal) will appear. "Progressive" piecework wage systems are instituted in which the pay for any given increment of output exceeds the average piecework rate for output up to that level. The state itself will sell unrationed goods at a "commercial" price higher than it charges for rationed goods, and the connection between commodity and labor shortages is emphasized by having ration cards issued through the personnel departments of plants.

Similarly in agriculture, involuntary savings will be associated with shortages of goods in rural stores and with the failure of government purchasing agencies to buy as many goods from the peasants as they wish to. In this case also, multiple pricing will appear; the state buys a certain quantity of goods (compulsory deliveries) at very low prices, and additional amounts at higher (contract) prices. Peasants will sell to workers at "free market" prices approximating those the government charges workers in "commercial" (unrationed goods) stores.

Whatever the price system, the state's efforts to increase accumulation may actually limit the movement of population off the farm. Suppose the state has instituted multiple prices and direct controls. If accumulation is to increase, urban—as well as rural—incomes must be held down. Urban incomes must be kept above rural incomes if movement to the cities is to be encouraged. But if workers have money which they can only spend in the free market, they will bid up free-market prices and raise peasant money incomes. They will simultaneously reduce the sale of farm goods to the state, the differential between urban and rural standards of liv-

ing, and the profits earned by the state in the processing and distribution of food. Industrial and construction plans assume the movement of peasants into industry so that wages must increase to attract this labor. In attracting it, however, the state increases involuntary savings and the control problem.

Suppose the state wishes to maintain a unified pricing system and to increase accumulation by raising retail prices relative to wages and to the prices it pays peasants. It cannot then raise urban prices and not rural, or vice versa. But when retail prices go up, peasants may sell less farm goods to the state, or workers supply less labor. In both cases, workers' demand—and hence prices—in the free market will rise because of the decrease in goods in other retail channels, or because the smaller supply of labor relative to demand pushes up money wages and spending power. Here, too, movement to the city will slow down.

AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET BLOC ECONOMIC POLICY

It is tempting to ascribe political causes to Soviet bloc economic policy. The orders of the Communist parties to increase accumulation in early 1951 and to slow it down in 1953 can be associated with the beginning and end of the Korean aggression. The decision to begin the Five-Year Plans in the late 1940's can be associated with concern over West European economic recovery and with desire to isolate the satellites from trade with the West; in internal politics, it reflects Soviet concern over "cosmopolitanism" and "Titoism." The decision to slow down the growth in accumulation in 1953 would then reflect the uncertainties of Stalin's heirs. Increased accumulation apparently beginning in 1956–57 would then reflect either the success of the new Soviet leadership in eliminating its competitors or its concern over popular discontent,

notably as expressed in the Hungarian uprising of 1956.

Such an approach, however, would be valid if only political factors constrain economic policies in Eastern Europe. But in 1951–52, rates of growth in accumulation dropped off despite efforts to increase it, and in 1953–54, the growth in consumer-goods output slowed down despite efforts to increase it. The wishes of governments are thus not always attained. The obstacles are not, in general, political.

Alternatively, economic policy can be defined solely in terms of the objectives listed in the long-run economic plans. Of these, each country now has had two—one published in the late 1940's and the other being approved for 1956–60.¹²

Inferences as to the reasons for deviations of performance from plans, and for changes from one plan to another, must necessarily run in terms of long-run factors such as availability of resources, trends in population growth, and so forth. Such evaluation of the fulfillment of a long-term plan is valid if the plan itself was the basis for economic policy throughout the entire planning period; comparison of two long-run plans is meaningful if transient objectives are embodied in neither and if economic factors such as those suggested in the section, Obstacles to Industrial Expansion, of this paper may be ignored.¹³

In 1951, the Communist parties of Soviet East Europe prepared goals superseding those of existing plans; in

¹² A thorough appraisal of these plans is given in N. Spulber, *The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), especially Section III.

¹³ In accordance with Soviet practice, published satellite long-term plans have been primarily a set of production targets. They contain relatively little explanation of the reasons for the selection of particular objectives and even less examination of the consistency of these objectives.

1953 they prepared other goals, apparently replacing the 1951 objectives; in 1955 they apparently discarded their 1953 objectives. These changes seem as important as the basic long-run plans. Although these appear to cover a relatively long period, they may in fact be revised at any time.

Before October 1952, Soviet bloc economic policy was most dramatically expressed in "abolition of rationing." These occurred in Poland (January 1949), Hungary (December 1951), and Bulgaria (May 1952). In Bulgaria, the abolition of rationing was a part of a currency conversion operation. Two other countries also had currency conversions: Poland (October 1950) and Rumania (January 1952).¹⁴ Abolition of rationing replaces multiple pricing of consumer prices—rationed goods prices, commercial prices and free market prices—by a single price level high enough to restrict consumer demand to the volume of goods available. In cases where the new level could be set *at or below* the former commercial store level, apparently no currency conversion¹⁵ was needed. If the new level would have had to be *above* commercial prices, a currency conversion was ordered so as to reduce the equilibrium level of prices.¹⁶

¹⁴ See my "Soviet Bloc Currency Conversions," *American Economic Review* (June 1954) for a detailed discussion of the relation between price unification and currency conversions. One conversion (Czechoslovakia, June 1953) occurred after 1952.

¹⁵ That is, the turning in of several units of old currency for one unit of new, so as to reduce the money holdings of the population. In terms of the discussion in the part Obstacles to Industrial Expansion, of this paper, it eliminates accrued involuntary savings, cutting down excess demand for goods and labor.

¹⁶ As a precautionary measure, prices are apparently fixed, at the time of unification, somewhat above the level the authorities expect to be a permanent level. This caution is explainable by the fact that some wages are usually increased, with unpredictable results.

Explanation of price problems

Soviet bloc literature on price problems prior to October 1952 is almost confined to statements that high free market prices are due to speculators that shortages in retail stores are due to inefficiency; that shortages of farm goods are due to kulaks; and that short ages of labor are due to poor party propaganda. The literature is perhaps silent because price unification lower "real wages"¹⁷ by eliminating the low (rationed goods) prices.

In October 1952, Stalin published his *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*. It has the merits of admitting an unpleasant fact; giving a real, though possibly faulty diagnosis of its cause and prescribing a real, though possibly incorrect remedy. Stalin's most important assertion was that "it would be incorrect . . . to assert that there are no contradictions between our productive forces and productive relations." This in its context is an assertion that Soviet institutions are an obstacle to the development of heavy industry. Until October 1952 Soviet bloc economists have been hampered by the claim¹⁸ of full correspondence between the two so that no economic policy problems might exist. His diagnosis ran as follows: the state can allocate capital goods and the output of state enterprise, but it cannot allocate the output of collective farms. These are co-operative and are owners of their output, capable, in some degree of bargaining with the state and of de-

In any case, price unification is usually followed, after a period of months, by one or more price reductions.

¹⁷ It does not necessarily decrease consumption, and there is no real evidence of change in consumer-goods output as a result of price unification.

¹⁸ Voiced for instance in the tremendously authoritative *Short History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, 1945 Russian edition, p. 118.

ciding how much to sell on the free market. Stalin's prescription is to "raise collective farm property to the level of national property" by means of "product exchange" in which the state would contract in advance to barter industrial goods for the entire output of collective farms above their own requirements. In this way, farms would receive income only from the state, and workers could spend income only in state stores. The principal criticism of Stalin's view is that even if involuntary cash holding cannot spill over from the workers to the peasants, multiple pricing and controls in either sector singly can have undesirable results.¹⁹ On the other hand, in the absence of such pricing and controls, his solution would make no economic difference.

After Stalin's death, this policy received little mention. Party central committees and government bodies of the satellites, after July 1953, began to put out resolutions and decrees giving a somewhat different argument:²⁰ (1) Output of consumer goods has tended to lag behind output of producer goods; (2) it has lagged because agricultural output has failed to increase much, so that there are deficiencies in the raw materials supply for the consumer goods industries; (3) short-term increases in consumer durable goods output can satisfy part of this demand; (4) agri-

¹⁹ I have summarized Soviet bloc views on multiple pricing and controls affecting workers in the article cited; those on multiple pricing and controls affecting peasants are summarized in the *Economic Survey of Europe in 1956*, *op. cit.*, pp. 21 ff.

²⁰ Summaries of the actions in individual countries are given in the handbook *Khozyaistvennoe Razvitiye Stran Narodnoi Demokratii* (Economic Development of the People's Democracies), N. I. Ivanov, Ed., published by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade, 1954. A more theoretical analysis is given by I. Dudinski, "Commodity Production in the European People's Democracies," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, Vol. 5 (1954), p. 59.

cultural output or at least sales by the peasants to the state can be encouraged by raising compulsory delivery and contract prices, by reducing compulsory deliveries and rent on farm machinery, and by tax reductions. Some farm co-operative members may be allowed to return to private agriculture. Even if peasants do not increase output, but merely sell less on the free market and more to the state, an improvement occurs, partly because money in circulation goes down—as a result of state profits on handling farm goods—and partly because the state can better control the distribution process.

Lag in consumer-goods output

The statement often appearing in satellite writings of 1953–54 that consumer-goods output had lagged behind producer-goods output makes the foregoing argument a *non sequitur*, strictly speaking. Suppose, for example, that prices were held constant and wages decreased. Then an increase in accumulation without any increase in consumption would cause no particular difficulties which would justify "lag" in a pejorative sense. Only if wage and price changes have caused a disequilibrium in consumer-goods markets is it possible to speak of a lag in consumer-goods output.

The decrees of 1953–54 in several countries even proposed increases in investment in consumer goods industries, housing, and agriculture and reductions in total investment. In 1952 output of consumer goods (Table 3) had increased no more than output per worker (Table 2). Since some consumer-goods plants were under construction throughout the period, there was presumably idle capacity which could only be used if accumulation declined (there being no urban unemployment, and the movement off the farm having dropped with the better treatment of peasants).

The small growth in producer-goods output is explained, in 1954–55, by the slowing of the growth of accumulation. The small growth of consumer-goods output through 1955²¹ is more puzzling. If consumer goods are mostly processed farm goods, such slowing down would mean that farmers had not sold more to the state despite the more favorable terms offered them. Any of a number of explanations would suffice: continued free market sales, increased peasant food consumption, or lower farm production. Generally lower prices in state stores²² argue against the first, while some official statements²³ suggest the last two. Given an increase in wages relative to prices (Table 5) in 1954, the diagnosis of a "lag in consumer-goods output" is a possible diagnosis.

In 1955, however, a new official analysis replaces the "disproportion" between investment and consumer goods by a "disproportion" between raw materials and processed goods, leading to shortages of the former (excess capacity of the latter). Two types of raw materials are mentioned: agricultural and industrial, particularly fuel and minerals. Shortages in raw materials are to be remedied by expanded investment in these sectors. In fact, since other investment is not to decline, total investment must rise.

Although "raw materials" are treated as a unit in this literature, agricultural and industrial raw materials are really quite different problems. Investment in

²¹ Not until 1956 did the growth in consumer-goods output regain its 1952 rate. By that time, expanding this output was not a primary government objective. If this is the belated effect of the consumer-goods program, then it may be concluded that where Malenkov sowed, Khrushchev reaped.

²² E. C. E., *Economic Survey of Europe in 1956*, p. 14 indicates relatively large price reductions in 1954, smaller reductions in 1955, very small reductions in 1956.

²³ Such as that of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers Party in March 1955.

agriculture means, to a considerable extent, mechanization.²⁴ Mechanization does not increase yields, but it does decrease labor requirements. Since increased consumer-goods output in 1953–54 had reduced the labor available for accumulation, expanded accumulation in 1955–56 must involve more movement off the farm. Hence mechanization—and collectivization—were once again stressed beginning in 1955.²⁵

Production of industrial raw material

The "disproportion" of industrial raw materials production appears as shortages of supplies, interruptions of electric power service and of materials deliveries, hoarding of scarce materials, low quality output, and so on. Table 1 shows continuing decline in the growth of coal and pig iron output through 1956. Beginning in 1950–51, "materials balance" systems were introduced to guarantee supplies of hundreds of individual commodities to priority consumers. The administration of this system causes general dissatisfaction, partly because of its bureaucratic methods, and partly because its operations require an unambiguous relation between requirements for individual material and output of individual plants and between minimal stocks of individual materials and output, which are hard to determine.

There are two views of this "disproportion." The orthodox view is that a shortage occurs because investment in the materials-producing industry has

²⁴ Expansion of livestock involves investment to the extent that animals are held off the market for breeding. To some extent this is financed from the proceeds of the higher livestock prices introduced in 1953–54. To some extent, however, it does involve loans by the investment banks of the various countries from budget receipts.

²⁵ It will be interesting to see the effect of the dissolution of Polish co-operative farms in late 1956 on Polish accumulation.

been too small. This is a defect in planning and can be remedied by increased investment. Meanwhile, strengthening of controls over utilization may be useful until materials output rises relative to output of users.

A heterodox view is that the shortages occur because of inherent inefficiencies in allocations (the bureaucracy) or else because plant managers have no incentive to use materials efficiently. Even if output were too low, that would reflect the fact that planners (bureaucrats) and producers alike have no incentive to eliminate shortages. The remedy for a shortage, then, is to reduce centralized controls, increase the scope of plant managers' decisions, and create incentives for producers to make more and consumers to use less.

These views are called "orthodox" and "heterodox" in terms of Stalin's analysis in the *Economic Problems of Socialism*.²⁶ Stalin said that the "law of value" did not apply in the Soviet Union to capital goods output (and his reasoning would generally apply to industrial materials output) since: all industrial plants belong to the same owner, the state; plant managers are agents of the state, whose function it is to operate a part of the state's property on the basis of the state's plans; prices are fixed by the state and serve only as a unit of measurement of performance and for auditing purposes. As a result the only incentive of plants is to fulfill plans. In contrast, collective farms are somewhat independent economic units with the consequences already discussed.

The heterodox view apparently has considerable appeal throughout the satel-

²⁶ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 8-9, p. 28. See also Venediktov, *Gosudarstvennaya Sotsialisticheskaya Sobstvennost* (State-owned Socialist Property), Moscow, 1948, for an exposition of the legal consequences of this view. Vladimir Gsovski, *Soviet Civil Law*, Ann Arbor, Michigan, has set forth some of the difficulties in the Soviet concepts.

lites.²⁷ Even in the USSR, Khrushchev went part way in meeting objections to "bureaucracy" by replacing centralized control in Moscow with regional controls. It is unclear what will be the outcome of this discussion. The economic leadership of the satellites would clearly prefer to eliminate shortages by expanding output—even if this means some waste—rather than to eliminate them by dismantling the control structure.

Curing shortages

Neither the orthodox nor the heterodox prescriptions for shortages provide necessary or sufficient conditions for curing them. A shortage may exist because output is too small, or consumption too large, or inventory increases too great. It should be possible to raise production either by increased budget appropriation for investment or by allowing the producers to finance expansion from higher profits.²⁸ Likewise, consumption could be held down either by more vigorous bureaucratic intervention²⁹ or by higher prices of materials, if plant management is forced to show a profit.

²⁷ See P. J. D. Wiles, "Changing Economic Thought in Poland," *Oxford Economic Papers*, June 1957 for expressions by Polish economists. I. Dvorkin, "The Reactionary Essence of Contemporary Reformism," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 6 (1957), esp. pp. 95-96 attacks Yugoslav views in general, while Grigorev and Kostin, "Against Attempts at Revision of Marxist Political Economy," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 4 (1957) single out two East German economists as under Yugoslav influence.

²⁸ Stalin points out, however (*loc. cit.*, pp. 12-13), that if the USSR invested only in industries where profits were large, it would have to invest mainly in consumer goods industries and not heavy industry. This statement, of course, might not hold if the state were willing to bid up sufficiently the prices of heavy industrial goods.

²⁹ However, materials-balance literature stresses the practical difficulties in establishing an unambiguous relation between output and materials requirements.

If the state is prepared to subsidize losses, however, it will be difficult to enforce efficiency.

Even if the state were not willing to cover losses, however, plants could incur losses and hoard inventory if enough credit is available. In fact, there is scattered evidence of a continuous credit expansion throughout this period which had enabled enterprises to obtain funds without making profits or appropriations. It increases effective demand for materials; and since prices are fixed, a shortage must develop. Since the banking systems must refuse drafts which cover transactions at illegal prices, secondary price levels (as in retail trade, labor, and agriculture) cannot create stability in the system. Enterprises, anticipating further shortages, naturally hoard whenever possible so that interruptions in deliveries will not prevent production plan fulfillment.

The heterodox view is thus correct in stressing the difference between the incentives of management and of the state. The orthodox view is correct in linking centralized control with price fixing in its treatment of the "law of value." Shortages in Eastern Europe are no different in principle from shortages in Western Europe in the 1940's.³⁰ This hypothesis is not currently acceptable in Eastern Europe, however, because it bypasses the emotionally

³⁰ Thus Oskar Lange's article, "For a New Economic Programme" (*Zycie Gospodarcze*, July 16, 1956, available in translation through the Center for International Studies at M.I.T.), reads as an attack on repressed inflation by a former member of the Department of Economics at the University of Chicago should read; it resembles attacks on the economic policy of the postwar Labor Government in England; or attacks on United States price controls in 1946. Instead of attacking inflation, he attacks controls. If the controls were removed without appropriate credit restrictions, price increases would begin. As recent Yugoslav experience shows, the shortages might disappear, but price rises and balance of payments problems would continue.

charged issue of centralized control and also because it does not fit into generally accepted monetary theory.³¹

Thus the change in official policy in 1955-56, increasing investment in agriculture and industrial raw materials, is an attempt to cope with inflationary problems by new means. It differs from the pre-1953 policy by greater emphasis on unified pricing in the consumer and peasant sectors and from the 1953-54 policy by greater emphasis on investment in raw materials industry rather than price policy as a means of maintaining equilibrium. The new policy, however, reflects a desire to maintain a centralized structure of controls which has apparently been challenged in recent years. If the "orthodox" view triumphs politically, as it apparently has (except in Poland), it must still be seen whether the acceleration in the growth of industrial output in 1955-56 can be maintained, or whether it will slow down, as was the case after 1950. If price policy, as before, retards the movement of population into the cities; and if shortages of materials cannot be resolved by the new investment program, then the slowdown observable after 1950 will probably resume.

³¹ Before the Communist regimes, "money" and "note circulation" were used almost interchangeably in central bank literature; this was justifiable because of the low level of deposit banking in most countries. Marx had the same practice, which was also justified in Europe of the 1860's. The Communist requirement that payments among enterprises be made by draft has greatly altered the importance of deposits in the total money supply, but has not been fully appreciated; the view is held that increases in notes are inflationary, but increases in deposits are not. It is fortified by a "real bills doctrine" (like that of much United States and other central bank discounting legislation): a loan secured by goods does not push up prices (or create shortages), since output must rise as much as the money supply. East European bank loans have, for practical purposes, commodity collateral.

The Development of Industry

By NICOLAS SPULBER

Abstract: The object of this paper is to analyze the characteristics of the industrial development of Eastern Europe from 1950 onwards and to indicate the main directions of the industrial growth of the area. Attention is focused on Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia; but whenever useful, the discussion is extended to Eastern Germany. The postwar period could be conveniently subdivided in the following way: up to 1948, reconstruction years; from 1949 to the end of 1953, years of planning on an "all-round" basis, that is of simultaneous growth for all branches of the economy with the aim of reaching "self-sufficiency"; 1954-55, years of significant readjustments in the previous pattern of investment and growth; 1955-60, years of the second long-term plans¹ characterized by simultaneity in the launching of most of these plans and by efforts toward co-ordination between the countries of the area at both the level of trade and the levels of outputs of certain commodities.

THE background of the industrial development in the period 1950 to 1960 can be said to have been dominated by two main economic policies. Up to 1953, each of the East European countries, with the exception of Yugoslavia, attempted to reproduce in miniature Soviet industrial development and hence strove to develop along parallel lines. After 1953, the satellite countries

¹ The dates of the actual plans overlap our divisions. Thus, the first Czechoslovakia Five Year Plan extended from 1948 to 1953; the Polish Six Year Plan from 1950 to 1955; the Hungarian Five Year Plan from 1949 to 1954; the Rumanian Five Year Plan from 1951 to 1955; the Bulgarian Five Year Plan, from 1949 to 1952. The Yugoslav Plan was scheduled to run from 1947 to 1951 but was extended up to 1952. The first four countries mentioned launched their second long-term plans at the turn of 1956, for the period 1956-60. Bulgaria proclaimed completion of her Second Plan (1952-57) in 1957 and decided to fall in step with the others by 1960, after operating under a three-year plan. Yugoslavia is now putting the finishing touches to her second long-term plan which is to run up through 1961.

decided to turn, though yet in a rather hesitant manner, toward a division of labor among themselves. Why did these countries harbor strong autarchic tendencies up to 1953 and why the subsequent though hesitant reversal? The attempts toward re-creating in miniature the Soviet economy, whatever the budget of resources or the size of the country might be, and the mechanical copying of the Soviet "model of industrialization" have been conditioned by both a dogmatic approach to the question of the so called "enlarged economic reproduction" and by the interest of the Soviet Union itself in treating these countries as economically autonomous units each dependent on its own resources and capacity for investment.²

² This combination between autonomous and integrating factors at play in the Soviet bloc is evidently continuously changing. However, while gearing their investment and outputs to the needs of the Soviet market, these countries still remained economically autonomous units.

INDUSTRIALIZATION POLICIES

The Marxian approach to the problem of economic growth, embodied in a schemata presented in the second volume of *Kapital*, pointed to certain necessary proportions between the totals and components of the gross value of output of producer- and consumer-goods industries³ when the economy re-creates its past year's output or when it engages in expanding "reproduction." The ideas embodied in the schemata were later taken by the Soviet economists as a guide for the establishment of basic ratios between the sectors of the Soviet economy and for the planning of its growth. Since the Marxian schemata had, for purposes of simplification, dispensed with the assumption of foreign trade, it fitted so much the better both the subjective and objective factors which had molded the autarchic Soviet growth during the Stalin era. The Soviet government's policy of differential growth of producer- and consumer-goods industries was finally erected into an allegedly immutable "law" of "planned proportional development of the Socialist economy."

When, after the war, the Communist-led East European countries also entered the road of economic planning, they automatically followed the established model. Very soon, however, the innumerable difficulties created by their limited resources and size, the bottlenecks arising from the sharply differentiated planned rates of growth of the various sectors of the economy and the actual performance, and the increasing

³ In Marxian terms, the components of the gross value of output are *constant* and *variable* capital and *surplus value*. "Constant" capital represents the outlay on raw materials and consumption of fixed capital; "variable" capital represents the returns to labor; "surplus value," or profit, is taken as the equivalent of "nonpaid labor."

conflicts arising between these countries in the intrabloc market itself forced a serious reappraisal both of past policy and future possibilities. From 1953 on, there was a growing awareness that Soviet economic growth could not be easily duplicated, that autarchic tendencies were placing severe brakes on the development of the area, and that the division of labor was a necessity. But even under these conditions the Communist leaders, prevented by Soviet interests and by national traditions from engaging in extensive economic co-operation among their countries and accustomed to rationalizing the situation in terms of the Marxian schemata of "reproduction," could hardly reach a clear-cut conclusion concerning the planned direction of development of their own economy or the division of labor in the area.

The conflict between the pressures built up during the first long-term plan of "all-round" autarchic development and the political and psychological barriers toward a wide division of labor led finally to the following compromise: each of the national governments would continue to stress the need for developing simultaneously both producer- and consumer-goods industries at sharply differentiated rates—the producer-goods industries remaining the primary claimant on investments—but in each country the emphasis within the producer-goods industries would, henceforth, correspond more closely with the country's own basis of resources. In other words, a significant division of labor is in process of being achieved in the area, but mainly in respect to producer-goods industries.⁴

⁴ This is how two Rumanian economists discuss the past and current industrialization policies. "The attempt made at the beginning of the socialist industrialization (of the countries of popular democracy) to develop all the branches of the heavy industry, following mechanically the experience of the Soviet Un-

Nicolas Spulber, Ph.D., Bloomington, Indiana, is Associate Professor of Economics and member of the Executive Committee, Institute of East European Studies, Indiana University. He is author of *The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe* (1957).

Against this background let us now sketch, first, the nature and the limitations of the industrial growth of the area from 1950 to 1955 and then the current and prospective developments.

CAPACITY, LABOR FORCE, AND OUTPUT GROWTH

To provide for rapid economic development, the countries of the area currently allocate from 20 to 30 per cent of their net material product to gross fixed investment.⁵ Roughly half of the

ion, proved incorrect. The so-called 'autarky' toward which it was tended is not possible especially for small countries which dispose of neither the economic resources (including the varied gamut of natural resources) and necessary financial means, nor of an internal market sufficiently vast to absorb large scale industrial production of all the products." (See: M. Iarcovici and B. Contantin, "Trăsăturile Industrializării Socialiste" ["The Features of Socialist Industrialization"] in *Probleme Economice*, No. 10, Bucharest, Oct. 1957, pp. 66.)

Thus, it is not the idea of autarky itself which is put into discussion. What is stressed now as being "incorrect" is the attempt of small countries—and only of these—to tend toward self-sufficiency. This position is easily understandable. No East European Communist would dare to question the legitimacy of the development path followed by the Soviet Union nor the supposed "objective necessity" of applying the Marxian schemata of "enlarged reproduction" to any industrializing country. Hence, even the new policy stresses: the "necessity" of developing in each country both the producer- and consumer-goods industries (called respectively sectors I and II of the economy) and the "necessity" of *subordinating* any consideration of comparative advantage in foreign trade to "the law of the planned proportional development of the economy which imposes the respect of the correlations objectively necessary between sectors I and II, group A and B, etc." *Ibid.* p. 65.

⁵ *Net material product* corresponds to the Western definition of *net national product* minus "nonproductive" services. The relation of *gross* investment to *net* product increases the relative share of the investment; however, the error is not too appreciable since the depreciation allowances—which would have to be added to net product to obtain the gross figure—are generally small.

total investment is channeled toward industry, the largest share of the industrial investments being earmarked for heavy industries. The relative share of gross fixed investment in the expanding net product increased up to 1953, but then declined somewhat. The relative share of industrial investment remained, however, at around 50 per cent of the total, while, within the sum allocated to industry, the share of the light industries was somewhat increased after 1953. This enormous effort—enormous since actual investments have run at three to four times their prewar level—has led to a significant expansion in industrial capacity, labor force, and total output, particularly in the priority branches. The strenuous efforts to develop in each country a "heavy industrial base" led to the systematic development and expansion of the *machine-building industries, ferrous and nonferrous mining and metallurgy, energy resources, construction materials, and chemicals*. In the machine-building industries, countries such as Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, and Hungary, which already had a sizable plant available, emphasized modernization, re-equipment, and diversification of output. The other countries, with Poland foremost among them, aimed more directly at expansion in capacity.

Czechoslovakia developed the manufacture of large-size diesel engines, steam turbines, and heavy-machine tools such as milling machines, vertical lathes, giant presses. She thus became the world's fifth exporter of machine tools and of fully equipped plants. She exported and installed the large power stations, each with capacities between 100 to 200 megawatts (mw.) which went into operation during the first long-term plans in Poland (Kłon, Miechowice, Jaworzno), Hungary (Inota), Rumania (Bicaz and Doicești), Bulgaria (Dimitrovo) and China. The

mainstay of the machine-building industry continued to remain the well-known Škoda Works at Plzeň, Vitkovice Ironworks, First Brno Engineering Works, Kovosvit at Szelimovo Usti, and the ČKD Prague Works.

In Poland, expansion took place in the production of metal-working machine tools, the leading producer of which is now the Zipso establishment in Poznań; in steam locomotives and railway-rolling stock, manufactured by a former German plant at Wrocław; and in the motor industry, based on the newly created Zeran Works near Warsaw completed with Russian equipment in 1950. Poland has also engaged in the export of fully equipped plants for the food-processing industry, mostly to underdeveloped countries outside the Communist bloc, and has further developed a significant shipbuilding industry at Szczecin.

Hungary has made an important effort to develop the manufacture of medium-heavy machine tools, trucks and buses, and diesel-equipped engines of all types. The nucleus of the engineering industries is, however, still represented by the prewar firms located at Csepel. Expanded facilities or new plants have also been completed in the smaller countries.

While each country has taken a lead in specific branches—for example, Czechoslovakia in heavy electrical equipment, Poland in railroad-rolling stock, Hungary in trucks and buses—they all continue, however, to produce a considerable number of similar products—tractors of closely related specifications, all types of agricultural machinery, rolling stock, and machine-tools of various sizes—thus each trying to meet most of its needs from domestic output.

All the countries of the area have made a decisive effort to expand capacity in the field of ferrous metallurgy. Czechoslovakia is in process of com-

pleting the great Gottwald foundry at Kuncice, which, when completed in 1960, will surpass in extent all Czechoslovak metallurgical plants. Poland has completed the first construction stage of the Steel Works at Nowa Huta near Krakow, the biggest investment of her Six Year Plan. She has now in operation the first continuous strip mill in East Central Europe, which is of Russian make. She has further expanded her foundries near Warsaw and Częstochowa. Hungary has constructed a giant blast furnace at Dunapentele and is now completing another. Rumania has significantly expanded the Hunedoara Ironworks. Bulgaria has created a new steel industry of limited scale. All, including Yugoslavia, have substantially renovated the plant and equipment of their older metallurgical establishments. Enormous efforts have been, and are being, made to increase the output of iron ore, pig iron, and metallurgical coke to sustain the scheduled increases in steel output. Several bottlenecks have appeared, however, and the targets set have been only partially attained.

As far as energy resources are concerned, a systematic attempt has been made to expand the outputs of coal, oil, and gas and to increase electric-generating capacity. Coal production had to be carried under particularly difficult conditions in view of the run-down state of the mines and of a large part of the available equipment. Old mines were reopened, new mines were put into production. However for hard coal, only by 1955 did Czechoslovakia and Poland again reach the former peak level of output of 1943. For lignite, Czechoslovakia and all the other countries surpassed the previous peaks but have fallen below their planned targets. For oil, important successes were claimed by the main producer of the area, Rumania; but they are very hard to ap-

praise since no detailed data has been made available. The expansion of electric-generating capacity, one of the main Communist preoccupations, has by all criteria been substantial (see Table 1). The results are even more appreciable since, in this case also, a large part of the old plant had to be rebuilt and recommissioned. Increases in capacity have often been concentrated in power stations of over 100 mw., while before the war, most of these countries had few installations rated at more than 30 mw.

In order to sustain planned capital construction, a large effort was made in the field of building materials, chiefly in the cement industry. All the countries of the area opened new and important automatic cement plants—for example, in Poland, the Wierzbica in Kielce and Rejowiec II in the province of Lublin; in Hungary, the plants at Hejőcsaba and at Vac; in Rumania, at Medgidia, all apparently of Soviet make.

Significant developments were also brought about in the chemical industry. Capacity expansion took place for basic chemicals, for example, for sul-

TABLE 1—ELECTRIC GENERATING CAPACITY (MW.)

COUNTRIES	1934	1948	1955	PLANNED ADDITION DURING 2ND QUINQUENNIA
Czechoslovakia	1,870	2,624	3,978	2,300
Poland	a	2,460	3,629	a
Hungary	854	823	1,085	638
Rumania	510	600	1,220	1,300
Yugoslavia	520	673	835	a
Bulgaria	120	170	415	a

Sources: For this and all the other tables, the sources are: The Plans and the Statistical Yearbooks of all the countries of the area (published in 1956 and 1957) and, Nicolas Spulber, *The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe* (New York: John Wiley & Sons and The Technology Press of M.I.T., 1957).

^a Data not available.

TABLE 2—GROWTH OF THE INDUSTRIAL LABOR FORCE, 1950–1955

COUNTRIES	NO. EMPLOYED IN 1000		RATIO TO TOTAL POPULATION	
	1950	1955	1950	1955
Eastern Germany	2,530	3,110	13.7	17.3
Czechoslovakia	1,693	1,968	13.5	14.9
Poland	2,033	2,690	8.2	9.9
Hungary	808	1,124	8.6	11.5
Rumania	809	1,078	5.0	7.6
Yugoslavia	665	800	4.9	6.1
Bulgaria	355	459	4.0	4.5
Total	8,893	11,229		

phuric acid, for the utilization of coal, oil, gas, and salt. New industries were launched such as plastics in Hungary or petrochemicals in Rumania. Only now, however, are the chemical industries able to obtain top priorities.

While many of the “producer-goods” industries were modernized, re-equipped, and expanded, the consumer-goods industries such as textiles, leather, and food processing suffered from lack of investments. Capacity expansion in this field was only modest, and while the efforts to increase production have apparently met with some success, actually all this was achieved at the expense of the further deterioration of an admittedly run-down and obsolete plant.

The industrial labor force grew in the area as a whole along with growth in capacity. Between 1950 and 1955, the industrial labor force, including Eastern Germany, increased from 8.9 million to 11.2 million—that is, by some 20 per cent. In every country the ratio of industrial labor force to population grew significantly (see Table 2).

The growth achieved in certain outputs appears impressive. For the three items which have received the highest attention from the East European planners—electricity, steel, and cement—the increases up to 1955 for the area

(excluding Eastern Germany) were over three times the prewar level for electricity and over two times that level for steel and cement. By 1960 the increase is to be over five times the prewar level for electricity, close to four times for steel, and over three-and-a-half times for cement.

According to official data, the rapid increase in total industrial output led to a significant increase in the share of industry in the net material product, except for Yugoslavia where industrial growth leveled off between 1952 and 1955 (see Table 4).

The key question in this context, “At what rates have the increases in total industrial output been achieved?” unfortunately still escapes a clear-cut answer. The official data consists of indices of gross value of output which are very deficient statistically and must be discarded. Other sets of data on which a better appraisal could be made, such as the data on national income and its components, are still sparse, often uncertain and incomplete. On the basis of these later data, however, it can be inferred that the increases in total industrial output have been of the order of 80 to 90 per cent during the period 1950 to 1955—for example, at the high compound rate of 12 to 13 per cent yearly.⁶

TABLE 3—OUTPUTS OF ELECTRICITY, STEEL AND CEMENT

	1938	1948	1955	1960 TARGET
Electricity (million mev. hr.)	14.6	21.2	48.0	77.7
Steel (million tons)	4.9	6.2	12.4	18.9
Cement (million tons)	6.1	5.7	12.8	20.5

⁶ Industrial growth of various capitalist countries for the same period was Great Britain: 3.6 per cent; France: 3.8; United States:

TABLE 4—SHARE OF INDUSTRY IN NET MATERIAL PRODUCT IN 1949, 1952, AND 1955

COUNTRY	1949	1952	1955
Eastern Germany	48 ^a	53	57
Czechoslovakia	57	69	65
Poland	43	47	52
Hungary	46	59	59 ^b
Rumania	40	55	52
Yugoslavia	41	48	48
Bulgaria	35	47	c

^a 1950.

^b 1954.

^c Data not available.

GROWTH DISCREPANCIES AND PROSPECTS

The increases in each of these countries in machine-building, iron and steel works, energy, chemicals, and building materials were achieved thanks to the concentration of the available investments in these key branches. Within certain of these economies, the development of the same “priority” branches appeared both as highly expensive and of questionable value. Thus, as far as machine-building is concerned, the production program within each country became unduly varied at the expense of the advantages of large-scale production. Certain achievements were, in fact, only “misconceptions if measured by standards of up-to-date industrial development.”⁷ In the iron and steel industry, plants have been constructed without regard for the raw materials available. Thus, all the steel industries of the area—except Yugoslavia’s—depend on imports of iron ore from the distant Krivov Rog. Hungary depends heavily on imports for both iron and coal, and her oversized steel industry

4.2; West Germany: 12.5; and Japan: 15.5. See *Statistical Yearbook 1955* (New York: United Nations, 1956), pp. 116–31.

⁷ See G. Kemeny, “East European Developments in Social Economic Structure,” in *World Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Oct. 1953), pp. 78–83.

has been described by one of Hungary's top planners as a "megalomaniac swindle." Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia depend heavily on imports of coking coal. Efforts at increasing domestic supplies of iron ore and coking coal have been generally disappointing, notwithstanding the overtaxation of labor and equipment. Finally, some of the highly advertised big expansions in steel—in Czechoslovakia (the Huko combination in Slovakia), in Hungary (at Mohacz), in Yugoslavia (at Skoplje)—had simply to be abandoned; some other capacity expansions scheduled for the first long-term plan had to be extended to the second planned quinquenniums.

The discrepancies between the growth of the "priority" branches and their "raw-material basis"—not only for iron and steel but for other industries also—and the lag in output of light industries and agriculture created numerous bottlenecks in the economy. It also placed insuperable obstacles to the regular supply of the population in a period of stepped-up urbanization and industrialization. The combination of small investments in the "nonpriority" branches, of reduction in imports of light industries, and of increasing exports, substantially reduced the amount of consumer goods available per capita. Furthermore, the constant deterioration in the output produced rendered even worse an already difficult situation.

The systematic influx of unskilled labor into industry limited the increase in output per capita. For the period 1950 to 1955, the increases in productivity appear to have been of the order of 48 per cent for East Germany and Czechoslovakia, 34 to 36 per cent for Poland and Hungary and 12 to 20 per cent for Yugoslavia and Rumania. These increases, far below the targets set or the officially claimed performance, hampered

any significant increases in real wages. The inflexible emphasis on priority producer goods and the lags between planned and actual performance, especially in the consumer-goods branches and in agriculture, created enormous imbalances in the economy. The diminution of supplies for the consumers and the lack of improvement in real wages, together with human strain of the stepped-up industrialization effort, led to the corrosion of the will to work and to internal economic dislocation. The uprisings in Hungary and Poland were undoubtedly due in a large measure to these deep-seated processes.

The necessity of insuring raw material supplies and more "stable" markets, of enjoying, at least up to a point, the advantages of large-scale production, of restoring the corroded will to work of the hard pressed workers, and of reducing the pressures on the harrassed consumers, finally led to the search for a more systematic division of labor between the planned economies, the abandoning of certain projects, the avoidance of duplicating key plant facilities in the area, the increase of the share of consumption in national income, some increases in real wages, and the reduction of the flow of unskilled labor in industry. During the current Second Plan and even for some years after its completion, the emphasis will probably have to be shifted toward a serious improvement in the technological level, increase in productivity, discarding of obsolete plant and machinery, and the development of capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive facilities. In the long run, these policies would probably tend to increase the overpopulation problems in the countryside and would diminish in towns the pressures resulting from a too rapidly expanding urbanization.

Technological improvements have been

extremely uneven, especially in the newly industrialized countries such as Poland, Rumania, or Yugoslavia. Intensification of technical assistance between the countries of the area, increases in trained personnel, and the slowing down in the years to come of the influx of unskilled labor will quite probably contribute to more significant results in this field. But the real hope for serious technological improvement lies, above all, not only in an increased division of labor in the area, but also in the abandoning of some of the dogmatic clichés with re-

spect to industrialization and the channeling of efforts toward the development of those industries which today carry the revolution in technology: synthetics, electronics, electro-technical products, petrochemicals, and others.

Some of the East European countries, such as Poland, seem to understand these problems⁸ and are already attempting to steer their course of industrialization in these new directions.

⁸ See: Oscar Lange: *Some Problems Relating to the Polish Road to Socialism* (Warsaw: Polonia Publishing House, 1957), p. 18.

Agriculture in Eastern Europe

By JOZO TOMASEVICH

Abstract: After World War II, governments carried out agrarian reforms in Eastern Europe. This measure resulted in a radical change in the distribution of land ownership. Later a policy of collectivization and formation of state farms followed. Agricultural production has stagnated and fallen behind the planned mark and needs of the population. Conditions concerning production, marketing, and income reduce incentive for greater production and for the marketing of larger amounts of production. Agriculture has played a subservient role to the rapid development of industry, and generally represents the least successful sector of Communist economic policy.

IN A survey of recent developments in Eastern Europe the question of agriculture is of basic importance for several reasons. First, in comparison with the pre-1940 period, great changes have taken place in regard to land tenure, and important changes still go on. Second, some changes have taken place in agricultural production structure; but, more important, agricultural production has stagnated. It has fallen behind the planned targets and behind the need of the domestic population for food and of domestic industry for domestically procurable agricultural raw materials. As a consequence, most of these countries, which prior to 1940 exported considerable amounts of a wide variety of agricultural products, are now forced to import grains on a large scale—this puts a heavy burden on their balance of payments and reduces their capacity to import other high-priority products needed for economic development. Third, production, marketing, and income in agriculture are now developing under completely different institutional conditions, conditions which greatly reduce the incentives in agriculture both to produce more and cheaper and to market a larger amount of production. Fourth, in the over-all economic policy of these countries, agriculture is maintained in a subservient position to the policies favoring rapid industrialization. Fifth, in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia the problem of agricultural overpopulation has not been solved, though conditions for more effectively dealing with this problem in the future have been improved by the development and rapid growth of an industrial sector. In Poland and Czechoslovakia agriculture, apparently, is experiencing considerable difficulties in securing sufficient labor because of the continuing flight of the younger peasants into the urban areas. Sixth, in Yugoslavia since 1952 and in Poland and Hungary since the revolutions of the fall of 1956, far-reaching concessions to the traditional social and economic forces in the village, especially in regard to collectivization, had to be granted in order to increase production and marketable surpluses. Thus, at the present time, greater differences exist among various countries of Eastern Europe in regard to land tenure and other agricultural policies than in regard to any other sector of economic policy.

*Jozo Tomasevich, Ph.D., Palo Alto, California, is Professor of Economics at San Francisco State College. Among other works he has published *Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia* (1955).*

Seventh, the Communist regimes have had less success in their agricultural policies than in any other major sector of economic policy, and agriculture remains the weakest and most troublesome link in their economies. Therefore, while the course in all other major sectors of economic policy in these countries—assuming the continuation of the present regimes—will probably continue along the lines pursued since about 1950, agricultural policies will continue to change considerably, and, for some time at least, move in different directions in the various countries.

POST-WAR AGRARIAN REFORMS

In no country of Eastern Europe immediately after the war did the Communist parties openly announce or pursue a policy of collectivization of agriculture or other policies typical of the Soviet economic system. Undoubtedly this attitude was dictated by tactical reasons. However, as the Communist parties established themselves securely in power, they started to follow the Russian model also in regard to economic policies. In the following we will briefly discuss the agrarian reforms, the collectivization, and certain other policies affecting production, income, and the general position of agriculture within the economies of the Eastern European countries.

After World War II all Eastern European countries executed agrarian reforms. Generally speaking, the expropriations affected large estates and their remnants, land owned by churches, banks, and business corporations, land owned by the German minority and by those considered collaborators or war criminals, and the excess of land above a decreed maximum owned by big and medium peasants. Although the terms and political tone of these reforms were more radical than those following

World War I, they were basically of a similar character. But while the democratic elements considered the reforms as a terminal measure (in Hungary, Poland, and Albania long overdue) which in countries of peasant farming would realize the principle that "land belongs to those who till it," the Communist parties considered the agrarian reforms primarily as a measure of political and economic warfare against their enemies in the countryside and as a first phase in the planned Socialist transformation of agriculture. In Poland and Czechoslovakia in particular, and to a certain extent in Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, the agrarian reform was combined with resettlement of land vacated by the German minority.

Complete information on the agrarian reforms is not available for all countries. Available data indicate, however, that the amount of agricultural and forest land expropriated was about 25 million hectares or one-fourth of the total agricultural and forest area. In Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary it affected 49.9, 38.4, and 38.8 per cent respectively of the total agricultural and forest land; while in Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria it involved only 7.5, 7.0, and 2.1 per cent. Up to 1948 the states distributed to individual farmers the following percentages of the expropriated land: Poland 43.8, Czechoslovakia 37.8, Hungary 58.2, Rumania 73.3, Yugoslavia 50.9, and Bulgaria 72.2 per cent.¹ The bulk of the forest land was kept by the state. Of the remainder of the agricultural land part was incorporated into state and other publicly owned farms, part was allotted to collective farms, and some was left as part of the state land reserve. The handling of

¹ Nicolas Spulber, *The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe* (New York: John Wiley, 1957), p. 242. Somewhat different data are given in *European Agriculture* (Geneva: United Nations, 1954), p. 50.

land not distributed to individual peasants shows that the agrarian reform contributed directly to the socialization of agriculture.

The agrarian reforms resulted in a radical change in land-ownership distribution. All large estates and their remnants were eliminated, the amount of land held by big and medium peasants was diminished, the number of landless peasants was greatly reduced, and the land much more evenly distributed among the peasantry in the form of dwarf, small, and medium farms. The land tenure system in the whole area moved in the direction of the pre-war Bulgarian pattern. The agrarian reform as such undoubtedly affected the structure of farm production and its total, as well as marketable, surpluses; but because of other agricultural measures that were undertaken in those and subsequent years, most of them having unfavorable effects on production, it is not possible to appraise the economic consequences of the reform. Moreover, from 1949 on land tenure in the whole area was greatly affected by the policy of collectivization and the formation of state farms. Nevertheless, in those countries in which the policy of collectivization has been reversed—namely in Yugoslavia and Poland—and partly also in Hungary, the agrarian reforms have greatly contributed to the present-day character of land tenure.

Yugoslavia undertook a second agrarian reform in 1953 at the time when collectivization was given up almost completely. It consisted in reducing the maximum area of land allowed to be privately owned from 25 to 10 hectares (with certain exceptions), and in expropriating the surplus. In the course of this reform the state expropriated about 270,000 hectares, or less than 3 per cent of cultivated land, to the credit of the national land fund which was later divided among the state farms, col-

lective farms, and general purpose agricultural co-operatives.

FARM COLLECTIVIZATION

Farm collectivization started on a small scale immediately after the war in Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, though for tactical reasons it was not publicized. In other countries it started after the introduction of the Communist dictatorship and with the inauguration, around 1949, of the first multiannual economic development plans. At that time also it began to be pushed strongly in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Data presented in Table 1 show the development of collectivization in seven Eastern European countries and the following process of decollectivization in some of them. This table embodies a very involved and interesting story, but lack of space allows us only a few comments.

In addition to the collectivized portion of agriculture, the socialized sector also comprises state and other publicly owned farm units. In the latter part of 1956, but before the revolution in Poland and Hungary, approximately the following percentages of agricultural land were held in this form: Bulgaria 5, Czechoslovakia 10, Hungary 14, Poland 12, Rumania 13, and Yugoslavia 6 per cent.²

The progress of collectivization in countries in which it was not reversed as a consequence of fundamental political changes—that is in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser extent Rumania—shows since 1948 three phases: the phase of forced collectivization lasting to the end of 1952 or the middle of 1953; the phase between mid-1953 and the end of 1955 when a slack-

² Data for all countries except Yugoslavia, from U. S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, *Notes on the Agricultural Economies of Six East European Countries*, Washington, D. C., May 1957; for Yugoslavia, from Yugoslavia, *Statistički godišnjak 1957*, Belgrade, 1957, pp. 164-66.

TABLE 1—DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVES (COLLECTIVE FARMS)

DATE (end of year)	ALBANIA		BULGARIA		CZECHOSLOVAKIA		HUNGARY		POLAND		RUMANIA		YUGOSLAVIA	
	NUMBER	PER CENT OF LAND	NUMBER	PER CENT OF LAND	NUMBER	PER CENT OF LAND	NUMBER	PER CENT OF LAND	NUMBER	PER CENT OF LAND	NUMBER	PER CENT OF LAND	NUMBER	PER CENT OF LAND
1945	—	—	382	3.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	31	—
1946	7	—	480	3.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	454	—
1947	21	—	549	3.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	779	—
1948	56	—	1,100	6.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,318	3.4
1949	58	—	1,608	11.3	—	—	200	(2.4)	243	0.2	56	0.1	6,626	18.8
1950	90	—	2,587	43.0	1,843	—	2,185	6.6	2,199	2.2	1,027	2.0	6,964	—
1951	94	—	2,739	47.5	3,138	—	—	—	3,056	3.4	1,089	2.0	6,797	24.1
1952	113	—	2,739	51.0	5,848	—	5,315	24.6	4,509	4.7	3,629	6.5	4,679	17.2
1953	115	—	2,747	51.7	6,679	—	4,677	20.0	8,017	7.2	4,023	7.3	1,165	3.3
1954	128	—	2,723	63.0	6,502	—	4,381	15.6	9,712	9.0	4,968	8.2	896	2.8
1955	308	—	2,735	—	6,795	26.0	4,816	18.9	9,963	9.0	6,325	12.1	688	2.3
9/30 1956	—	—	—	—	—	—	4,858	20.8	10,203	—	—	—	—	—
1956	881	30.8	3,100	78.0	8,016	30.0	2,089	8.5	—	—	10,709	17.5	561	2.1
3/31 1957	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1,752	—	—	—	—	—
6/30 1957	1,432	46.3	—	—	8,553	—	3,457	11.5	—	—	—	—	—	—

Sources: Albania: Stavro Skendi, (Ed.), *East-Central Europe under the Communists: Albania*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), p. 164 and *East Europe*, January 1958, p. 36. Bulgaria: L. A. D. Dellin (Ed.), *East-Central Europe under the Communists: Bulgaria*, New York 1957, p. 300 and U. N., Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1956*, Geneva, 1957, p. 1, 24. Czechoslovakia: J. Divilova and J. Pacha, "The Development of the Unified Agricultural Cooperatives and the Results of Their Operations," in Czechoslovakia, State Statistical Office, *Statistický obzor*, Prague, October 1957, p. 474. Hungary: Ernest Helmreich, (Ed.), *East-Central Europe under the Communists: Hungary*, New York, 1957, pp. 238-39, partly estimated, and Hungary, *Statistikai Havi Közlemények*, Budapest, July 1957, p. 44. Poland: Oscar Halecki, (Ed.), *East-Central Europe under the Communists: Poland*, New York, 1957, pp. 238-39, partly estimated, and Hungary, *Statistický obzor*, Prague, October 1957, p. 474. Rumania: Stephen Fischer-Galati (Ed.), *East-Central Europe under the Communists: Rumania*, New York, 1957, p. 208 and U. N., Economic Commission for Europe, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1956*, Geneva, 1957, p. 1, 24. Yugoslavia: various official sources and Yugoslavia, Federal Statistical Office, *Statistički godišnjak 1957*, Belgrade, 1957, p. 169. Note: These data are not strictly comparable. Thus data on co-operatives include in Albania the higher-type co-operatives; in Bulgaria the "labor co-operative farms"; in Czechoslovakia the "unified agricultural co-operatives" of type III and IV; in Hungary the "agricultural producers' co-operatives," some of which are comparable to the agricultural producers' co-operatives in Western Europe; in Poland the co-operatives of the I, II, III, and IV types; in Rumania the collective farms and the agricultural partnerships; and in Yugoslavia the "peasant working co-operatives" of types I to IV. As far as land is concerned, private plots seem to be included in all cases. To what category of land the percentages refer in Albania is not clear. In Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania the percentages refer to arable land, while in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, the percentages refer to agricultural land, that is arable land plus permanent meadows.

ening or even decline in collectivization took place as a reflex of the "New Course" policy introduced by Malenkov in the Soviet Union; and the phase since 1955 which is marked by a stepped-up drive for collectivization. In Rumania, the progress of collectivization was much slower, but it has been continuing without interruption. According to economic plans presently in force, collectivization is to be continued in all these countries.

In Yugoslavia the stubborn opposition of the peasants, the effect of the droughts on agricultural production, the consideration for the vital economic and political relations with the United States, the introduction of the "new economic system," and the overriding need to increase agricultural production, led in 1951 and 1952 first to a complete arrest in the progress of collectivization and soon thereafter to a rapid decollectivization movement. By the end of 1953 only 3.3 per cent of the agricultural land was in the hands of the collective farms, and they included only about 60,000 peasant families.

In Poland and Hungary, on the whole, collectivization followed the pattern of the first group until the revolutions of the fall of 1956. One of the chief changes in the economic realm connected with these revolutions was a rapid decollectivization in agriculture. Since Poland succeeded in maintaining a regime relatively independent of Moscow, it was able to follow the Yugoslav example, and only a relatively small amount of farm land remains organized in collective farms. In Hungary the number of collective farms was reduced during and after the revolution to less than one half of the former number. But after the Kádár regime established itself securely in the shadow of Russian tanks, the policy of collectivization was resumed and the number of collective farms there is slowly increasing.

There are several types of collective farms in Eastern European countries (they are always called co-operatives, such as "unified agricultural co-operatives" in Czechoslovakia, "peasant working co-operatives" in Yugoslavia, and so forth). In the least structured ones only farm machinery (but not land or livestock) is pooled and some jobs are accomplished collectively. However income depends primarily on the assets belonging to each member and only secondarily on his labor contribution. In the other extreme, the most advanced type, land—with the exception of a small privately owned plot—and all other production assets are transferred to the collective in full ownership; the bulk of all work is accomplished collectively; and the income of various households is related exclusively to their contribution in labor. This type approaches the Soviet *artel*. If peasants had no choice but to join, they preferred the lower-type organizations, while the government pressed for the higher-type ones. Contrary to the legal provisions and to the repeated public declarations of the respective governments, many kinds of political and economic pressure have been used to entice or to force the peasants into collectives. This was especially true in the period 1949 to 1953. The best indication of the way the peasants feel about collective farms is the fact that they seldom enter willingly in spite of certain advantages that the governments grant to such collectives, that they co-operate only half-heartedly, and that they withdrew whenever opportunity arises. The interesting fact that perplexed Communist authorities in Yugoslavia, and later in Poland and Hungary, was that even the economically very successful collectives disbanded as soon as they could. Collectives which continue to exist in Yugoslavia, for example, are only those which have received a large portion of their total land

from the government and in the case of dissolution would have to give it up.

OBJECTIVES OF COLLECTIVIZATION

Politically, the objective of collectivization was the destruction of the well-to-do element in the village; eradication of the remaining influence of the peasant parties; the separation of the peasant from the ownership of land and his transformation into an agricultural worker much easier influenced and controlled by the Communist party and the state; and the taking over of decision-making in the village by party members. But while it was rather easy to eliminate the political influence of the old political parties and to take over much of the decision-making in the village, it was and still is impossible to win over the peasants and to induce them to co-operate fully on terms imposed by the Communist regimes.

The first economic objective was to transform the subsistence and mixed peasant farming of this area into one based on large collective farms. The latter were to operate according to economic plans imposed from the top; as large units, they were supposed to use modern agricultural technology to raise productivity per man, to produce enough food to feed the peasant population and the greatly augmented population of the urban sector, and to produce a large portion of agricultural raw materials needed by domestic industry. It was also thought that by increasing production more exports would be available or at least that dependence on imports, where it existed, would be reduced. Moreover, mechanization of agriculture was to free the necessary labor force needed by expanding industry.

In a larger sense, however, the economic objective of collectivization is a part of a more general acceleration of economic development which requires the reduction of current consumption

to a rock-bottom level and the extraction of a maximum amount of savings from the economy as a whole in order to finance the desired investments. Since all of these countries, following the example of the Soviet Union, have greatly favored the development of industry, and of heavy industry in particular, the basic task of agriculture has been to contribute a large portion of its earnings toward the development of industry. Collectivization was thus only one of the avenues through which the Communist regimes tried to gain control of the process of income generation and distribution in agriculture. Other avenues were prices, organization of the market, taxation, credit, and rationing and allocation of materials.

It appears that the overwhelming portion of collective farms, in spite of favored treatment, have been failures economically. The reason lies partly in the fact that many of these collectives were established where actual conditions were very unfavorable. More generally, however, they are very often large farm units in name only. Economically and technologically, they are simply agglomerations of a large number of dwarf, small, and some medium farms with a certain number of landless agricultural families and some administrative and technical personnel from outside. The combination of land, labor, and capital engaged was most often quite unfavorable, management poor and inexperienced and often despised by the membership, co-operation among membership lacking.

Although collectivization has failed to produce the results sought after by the Communist regimes and is opposed by the peasantry, it has been completely reversed only in Yugoslavia and Poland where "national Communist" regimes have been established. Decollectivization actually becomes one of the important marks of this kind of Com-

munist rule at this particular stage of development. Policies pursued in this regard by the countries which closely follow the Moscow line are much more in agreement with the accepted Communist thinking and with the Soviet practice. The question whether the Yugoslav and Polish policies of decollectivization are simply tactical withdrawals under the influence of adversities is certainly an open one. In the long run their professed objective is also Socialist transformation of the village. When the pendulum is going to be pushed in that direction cannot be foretold. It seems, however, that the present policy will be continued for some time, as the increased production and marketable surpluses which follow decollectivization (implemented by other measures discussed below) now seem much more important than the following of a dogma.

PRICE AND TAXATION POLICIES

An essential component of Communist agricultural policies in Eastern Europe has been the compulsory deliveries of major agricultural and livestock products to the state trading organizations at prices which were much below (50 per cent or even more) those the state paid for purchases above the decreed quotas. The quotas of individual farmers were progressive, rising steeply with the increase in the size of the farm. Collective farms were generally obliged to deliver a flat quota, approximately comparable to that imposed on small peasants. Compulsory deliveries are actually a heavy land tax payable in kind. Since they have been patently discriminatory they have been a foremost tool of economic warfare against individual farmers in general and medium and big farmers in particular. At the same time the acquisition of large quantities of agricultural products at low prices enabled the government to

furnish a large portion of food requirements to the urban population at low prices, a basic factor making possible the maintenance of the low-wage level.

Compulsory deliveries have been one of the most detested measures of agricultural policy, but they have also inhibited production and have had to be relaxed gradually. Yugoslavia abolished the system in the course of 1951 and 1952, while the other countries began to relax it after the inauguration of the "New Course" in 1953.

It would be wrong to think, however, that the removal of compulsory deliveries at discriminatory prices has established a free price system for agricultural products. These prices continue to be fundamentally influenced by the state or state-supervised co-operative trading systems and contracts concluded between state enterprises and producers. Furthermore, the government is responsible for the price formation of products peasants buy and thus has full command over the terms of trade between agriculture and the other parts of the economy. While considerable improvements in these terms have taken place in recent years, they are still unfavorable for agriculture and will continue to be so.

STAGNATING PRODUCTION

The result of these unfavorable agricultural policies was stagnation of production. This is clearly indicated by Table 2 and Table 3 which show the production of principal grains and the numbers of cattle and pigs in countries for which data are available. While economic plans of the first half of the 1950's had planned marked increases in both crops and livestock, the available data indicate that on the whole, yields in these years corresponded to those of the 1930's or were below them. The present five-year plans also count on ambitious increases. Assuming satis-

TABLE 2—PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL GRAINS IN SELECTED YEARS
(Thousand metric tons)

YEAR	HUNGARY			POLAND		YUGOSLAVIA		
	WHEAT	RYE	CORN	WHEAT	RYE	WHEAT	RYE	CORN
1934-38	2,220	697	2,306	1,965	6,854	*2,467	*208	4,691
1948-52	*1,820 ^a	732	2,862 ^b	1,807	6,320	2,174	248	3,078
1954	1,660	480	2,550	2,002	5,844	1,385	191	3,004
1955	2,130	540	2,910	2,134	7,003	2,436	262	3,900
1956	1,845	—	2,033	—	—	1,600	205	3,370

Sources: for 1934-38 to 1955, *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, 1956: Production* (Rome: U. N., Food and Agriculture Organization, 1957), pp. 31, 33, 40. Hungary for 1956 from Hungary, *Statistikai Havi Közlemények*, Budapest, July 1957, p. 43; Yugoslavia for 1956 from Yugoslavia, *Statistički godišnjak 1957*, Belgrade, pp. 144-45. All data apply to postwar territory.

* Unofficial figures.

^a Average for 3 years.

^b 1948.

factory weather conditions, yields will depend on the level of investment which will be allowed in agriculture and the incentives prevailing in agricultural production.

Since earlier policy in agriculture tended to defeat its own objective, it appears that somewhat more favorable conditions for agricultural production are being created in all these countries.

TABLE 3—NUMBERS OF CATTLE AND PIGS IN SELECTED YEARS
(Thousands)

COUNTRY	PREWAR		DATE	OCTOBER-SEPTEMBER			
	DATE	NUMBER		AVERAGE 1947/48 TO 1951/52	1952-53	1953-54	1954-55
CATTLE							
Bulgaria	Aug. 39	1,512	—	2,028 ^a	—	—	1,855
Czechoslovakia	Dec. 37	4,706	Jan.	3,693 ^b	—	4,082 ^c	4,041 ^c
Hungary	May 38	1,882	March	2,090	2,236	2,075	2,128
Poland	June 38	10,554	June	6,895	7,385	7,686	7,912
Rumania	Dec. 39	3,494	—	—	—	—	—
Yugoslavia	March 31	4,875	Jan.	4,869	5,007	5,109	5,285
PIGS							
Bulgaria	Aug. 39	752	—	2,1420 ^a	—	—	1,415
Czechoslovakia	Jan. 38	3,538	Jan.	2,3169 ^b	—	4,174 ^c	4,771 ^c
Hungary	Spring 38	5,224	June	3,936 ^b	4,977	4,454	5,818
Poland	June 38	7,525	June	7,439	9,730	9,788	10,888
Rumania	Dec. 39	2,296	—	—	—	—	—
Yugoslavia	March 31	5,036	Jan.	3,957	4,527	4,318	4,780

Source: *Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics 1956: Production* (Rome: U. N., Food and Agriculture Organization, 1957), pp. 133, 138.

* Unofficial figures.

^a Two-year average.

^b Three-year average.

^c December.

More and more responsible people now realize that the raising of yields is indispensable for increasing agricultural production in Eastern Europe. Recent changes in price, taxation, investment, and credit policy may enable agriculture to use more machinery, more fertilizers, and better seed. While it still remains subservient to the policy of rapid industrialization, agriculture has apparently been put into a position to increase production somewhat and to share substantially in the increment. But even under the most ideal conditions, the improvements in yields of crops and livestock contemplated in most of these countries for the period 1956-60 seem to this writer to be beyond the possibility of realization.

Marked increases in the production of sugar beets and some oil seeds have taken place in most countries since the war. Production of potatoes is somewhat lower than before the war. In the last two or three years, in obvious imitation of the Khrushchev experiment, corn is being pushed even in such countries as Czechoslovakia and Poland where it cannot be expected to ripen. In Rumania the rise in corn hectareage has been very substantial.

From data on cereal production in Hungary and Yugoslavia in 1956, it is clear that crops in 1956 were much poorer than in 1955. This seems to have been the case in all countries except Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, production of wheat and corn in Yugoslavia in 1957 seems to have reached the postwar peak.

It would be wrong to equate the real income of the agricultural population with the value of agricultural production, sold or retained for home consumption. Even before the war a large portion of peasants who were landless, or had dwarf and small farms, derived a considerable portion of their income from working part of the year in lumbering, mines, road transport, urban construction, or industry. Now, with the rapidly expanding urban economy this type of income has greatly increased. Unfortunately, this interesting topic cannot be elaborated here.

FOREIGN TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

The stagnation in Eastern European agriculture, growth of population, and changes in dietary practices, especially as a consequence of growing urbanization, have led to a great decline in exports of food products from all of these countries in comparison with pre-1940 years. On the contrary, many of these countries have become heavy importers of bread cereals and fats. The bulk of these imports originates outside of the Communist bloc. The need for large food imports poses the issue of how to pay for them and thus has been one of the troublesome issues in the balance of payments. Yugoslavia's needs in this regard have been filled since 1950 primarily through imports from the United States on the basis of aid agreements and purchases for domestic currency. The latter technique has been used during the past year also to help Poland.

Social Structure: Rumania Under Communism¹

By GHIȚA IONESCU

Abstract: Refusal to allow the workers to take a direct part in industrial management or leadership and the emergence of the intelligentsia as a privileged layer, as in the Soviet Union, were confirmed in the first ten years of existence of the Rumanian Popular Republic. The strengthening of the social category of the medium farmers, owning their own farms of between 5 and 20 hectares, is one of the most revealing phenomena of social stratification in that Eastern European "Popular Democracy," differing in this from the Soviet Union.

THE STUDENT, comparing the social phenomena emerging in the first thirty years of Soviet Russia's existence with those noted in the first decade or so of Communist rule in Rumania, can sometimes rediscover some of them; but these phenomena are distorted by the speed of a development which has been compressed into a shorter time span. For instance, both the refusal to allow the Rumanian workers to take a direct part in either management or leadership and the emergence of the intelligentsia as a privileged layer were hastily and indiscreetly confirmed in the first years of existence of this junior Soviet-type society. At other times, on the contrary, the student finds social developments in Rumania which stem precisely from the differences in social and economic background of that country and Soviet Rus-

sia. One such example is the strengthening of the social category of medium farmers who own their land. This is in contrast to the process of collectivization by expropriation prescribed by Lenin and applied by Stalin in Soviet Russia. The reasons for these similarities and differences are the principal theme of the present paper.

A new census, taken in 1956 and 1957, provides data about the state of the Rumanian population and economy for the first time since the Communists came to power. It shows that the density of population, generally speaking, increased from 60.1 per square kilometer in 1930 to 73.6 in 1956. It also shows a population rise of more than 3 millions—from 14,280,729 in 1930 to 17,489,794 in 1956. Both figures are calculated on the present territory of Rumania.

TOTAL	IN ABSOLUTE FIGURES		RURAL	IN PERCENTAGES ²		
		URBAN		TOTAL	URBAN	RURAL
1930.....	14,280,729	3,051,253	11,229,476	100	21.4	78.6
1956.....	17,489,794	5,474,379	12,015,415	100	31.3	68.7

¹ The present paper does not attempt to discuss the social changes which have taken place throughout Communist Eastern Europe. The new regimes have been in power for only half the span of a generation, an insufficient period for a proper assessment of the proc-

esses of social mobility, amalgamation, or stratification. Moreover, the data are drawn exclusively from Rumania.

² *Anuarul Statistic al R.P.R. 1957* (Bucharest, 1957), p. 59.

GhiȚa Ionescu, New York City, formerly Rumanian Economic Counselor in Sofia and Ankara, has published many studies on political, social, and economic subjects in Eastern Europe. He is now at work on a book, "Rumania under Communism."

Three observations must be made concerning these figures. First, those for the urban population and percentage have been arbitrarily inflated in the census by the inclusion of "681,674 inhabitants from 172 villages which, although according to the administrative division are included in the rural sphere, belong to the urban range of occupations."³ Without this controversial addition the percentages of urban and rural population are 27.4 per cent and 72.6 per cent.⁴ Second, it must be noted that within the figure given for urban population, the number of workers in industry is only 1,101,100.⁵ Finally, it cannot escape notice that, in absolute figures, the number of persons engaged in agricultural work has increased as against the number in 1930. Thus, it is doubtful whether, in spite of the progress made in the mechanization of agriculture by the Communist regime, and in spite of the absorption through urban and rural industrialization of more than one million inhabitants, the extent of agricultural overpopulation is much less now than it was before the war.⁶

The main real change is rather to be found in the economic position of the various strata of the urban population. Here, the former members of the bour-

geoisie, who were previously the richest inhabitants of the towns, have been reduced to dire poverty and indeed to "beggary" and "vagrancy"⁷ after years of selling their possessions at the "tkalciock."⁸ Those who have maintained a certain standard of living are the middle-class intellectuals and professionals now sharing in the general privileges granted to the intelligentsia.⁹ The most well-to-do of the urban inhabitants are leaders and members of the party, intelligentsia and governmental bureaucracy who form a state bourgeoisie.

THE PEASANTS

The general theory of social classes in Rumanian Communist doctrine is that, as of December 30, 1947, the day the new Republic was proclaimed, the working class has taken the lead in the state. This has been effected through the nationalization of all means of production previously belonging to the bourgeoisie. The working class is formed by workers from the Socialist sector of industry and agriculture. There is also a remnant of the bourgeoisie to be found, especially among the kulaks. The liquidation of the kulaks remains a major goal.¹⁰

A recent and detailed study¹¹ states that there are in the RPR (Rumanian People's Republic) various social classes which differ from one another because of their economic bases. Although it

⁷ A definition used in various Communist penal laws for people without official employment and papers, and therefore liable to compulsory work.

⁸ An expression of Russian origin for the open street markets in which second-hand objects are traded.

⁹ See section on Intelligentsia in this article.

¹⁰ L. Metzger and I. Almas, "Ce clase sociale există astăzi în R.P.R.," *Lupta de Clasa*, No. 12 (Bucharest, December 1954).

¹¹ M. Dulea, "Structura sociala și clasele în R.P.R.," *Probleme Economice*, No. 12 (Bucharest, December 1956).

has been possible to liquidate the bourgeoisie, the transformation of the peasantry into a Socialist class will be more difficult and will take longer. The existence of a class which "through its very economic basis is still a class of the old society" limits the action of the working class. The working class

in spite of the fact that it has a relatively small specific weight compared with that of the rest of the population is today the *principal* [underlined in the text] class as a producer of material goods in the country.

The working peasantry, with privately owned holdings, is a principal class too, although "it is not a class of the Socialist order." The land-owning peasant is, in reality, a petit bourgeois. The bourgeois are kulaks. But even their contribution to agricultural production as a whole, which has decreased in recent years, must from now on be organized so that the state can draw more profit from it.

Behind all this confused ideological smoke screening lies the fact that the Rumanian Workers' party has had to revise drastically its agricultural policy and doctrine. The main changes in policy took place in 1953 when the First Five Year Plan aiming at speedy and heavy industrialization was halted and replaced by a scrambled "New Course." Changes in doctrine were revealed at the Second Congress of the Workers' party on December 24-28, 1955 when the Second Five Year Plan was announced with a more cautious approach to industrialization.

In his report to that Congress, First Party Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej showed that in spite of sustained efforts to speed up the creation of the Socialist sector in agriculture, the goal was still far from being in sight. In 1955, according to Gheorghiu-Dej, the Socialist sector occupied only 26.5 per cent of the arable land, and 32.2 per cent of the entire

agricultural sector.¹² Moreover, in the Socialist sector itself, collective farms represented only 8.3 per cent of the arable land, while the state farms (which also existed in Rumania before the Communist regime) represented 13.7 per cent, and agricultural associations 4.5 per cent.

The policy recommended in the light of these revelations was one of collaboration with individual farmers in production and of trying to induce them to join, if not the collective farms, then at least another type of co-operative and association which preserved private ownership of the land. This led to progress within the newly named "co-operative sector" of agriculture. Within it, the co-operatives and associations were relatively popular. Indeed, according to a report by Moghioros, the Politburo member for agricultural questions, by July 1957

the number of collective farms had grown in the previous six months by 301 units, with 7,565 families and 25,987 hectares, while the number of associations had grown by 2,696 units, 84,343 families and 129,340 hectares.¹³

A further development in this order of ideas was the introduction in 1957 of "the production associations with rent."¹⁴ On March 1, 1958 there were, according to figures released by Gheorghiu-Dej in his speech of April 3, 1958: 2,756 collective farms with

¹² G. Gheorghiu-Dej, "Report at the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party at the Second Congress of the Party," *Probleme Economice*, No. 1 (January 1956).

¹³ A. Moghioros on the "Situation in Agriculture," *Lupta de Clasa*, No. 8 (August 1956). He also showed that up to July 1, 1956, there were 577,239 "families" in kolkhozes and co-operatives.

¹⁴ *Probleme Economice* (October 1957). The incomes were divided not only according to the work and to the output, but also according to the surface and quality of the land brought by each farmer—hence the "rent" paid by the others.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

⁴ See: "Anuarul Statistic R.P.R.," in *Romania* (New York, November 1957), No. 19.

⁵ *Anuarul* (note 2 *supra*), p. 73. The figure refers to workers employed in Socialist industries.

⁶ For a more detailed explanation of the problem of Rumanian agricultural overpopulation, see: Virgil Madgearu, *Evolutia economiei romanesti* (Bucharest, 1940); Henry L. Roberts, *Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951) and my "The Peasant in Eastern Europe's Economic Planning" and "Changes in Eastern Europe's Economic Planning," *World Today*, August 1949 and December 1953 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs).

1,669,184 hectares, 125 producers' co-operatives with 15,501 hectares and 11,431 agricultural associations with 2,145,691 hectares.

Village social structure

The revelations on the social structure of the countryside made at the Second Congress were even more interesting than those on the economic. In his report, Gheorghiu-Dej showed that after ten years of Communism the social structure of the Rumanian village was:

Members of collective farms	5.5%
Members of agricultural associations ..	5.8%
Agricultural proletariat	under 1%
Peasants with small holdings	45.2%
Peasants with medium holdings	40.5%
Kulaks	2.0%

The thinning out of the agricultural proletariat is one feature of this breakdown. The peasants on the state farms and the workers on the machine tractor stations are considered to be a "new detachment of the working class in the villages." They are no longer agricultural proletariat: being employed by the state, they are not exploited. The agricultural proletariat has also lost members who became peasants with small holdings when they received their 3 acres through the agrarian reform of 1945—when 762,129 individuals received 3 acres each, as compared with the "bourgeois" reforms of 1919–21, when over one million peasants each received 10 acres.

The grouping of land ownership around the medium-sized plot was the other important socioeconomic phenomenon disclosed by the report. It made clear that while the percentage of small holdings had decreased from 57 per cent of the area in 1948 to 45.2 per cent in 1955, medium holdings had risen from 34 per cent to 40 per cent and were still growing. This shows, concluded Gheorghiu-Dej,

that the medium farmer is becoming increasingly the pivot of our villages and that his importance as a producer of agricultural goods is also increasing.

According to figures released at the end of 1956, individual holdings, small and medium together, produce 75 per cent of the entire crop of cereals and vegetables in the country.¹⁵ The Communist definition of small and medium holdings—hitherto a matter of some confusion—was also made clear through this report: small holdings comprise properties of 5 hectares or less, medium holdings comprise properties between 5 and 20 hectares.¹⁶

The grouping of land ownership around the medium-sized plot indicates the resumption of a process which was taking place in Rumania between the two world wars. One of the unfavorable results of the main agrarian reforms of 1919–21 had been to atomize the agricultural land into myriads of small, un-

¹⁵ Dulea, *op. cit.* (note 11 *supra*).

¹⁶ The percentages given for 1948 and repeated from the official text of the Resolution of March 3–5, 1949: 57 and 34 per cent, obviously correspond to the 0–5 hectare and 5–20 hectare categories in the following table for that year, taken from *Probleme Economice*, No. 9–10, September–October 1948:

SIZE OF HOLDING	PER CENT OF TOTAL AREA
Less than 1 hectare	7.1
1–3 hectares	26.2
3–5 hectares	24.4
5–10 hectares	23.0
10–20 hectares	10.6
20–50 hectares	5.7
Over 50 hectares	3.0
	100.00

An example of the difficulties which have been encountered on this point is the statement in a recent handbook (*Rumania Under Communism*, edited by Stephen Fischer-Galati, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957) according to which "a peasant owning between 2 and 5 hectares is a middle peasant and over 5 hectares, a kulak." Kulaks, it should be added, are not defined by the size of their holdings.

productive plots (in Rumania 7 hectares is the limit of productivity).

During the interwar years, however, there was a perceptible trend toward the extension of medium holdings. It is significant that this indication of the viability of such holdings is again being confirmed, even in present unpropitious circumstances.

Renascent capitalism

Moreover, from a social point of view, it is interesting to see that the middle peasants had the means to acquire these new plots and to consolidate their social and economic position in the villages. This suggests that the peasant class, in spite of persecution, compulsory quotas, exorbitant taxes, and exaggerated prices for the services of the tractor stations, has been able—because of its ineluctably central position in the national economy—to save enough to acquire more land.¹⁷ Even kulaks—a term describing those rich farmers who hire labor on a large scale and who are said to own only 2 per cent of the area—are invited to deliver their crops to the official purchasers. Conditions are still bad, but not coercive. The cat-and-mouse game between the state purchaser and the agricultural producers has been transferred from the dark field of terrorism and black market to marketing with controlled production and prices. In this field the producers move with greater economic ease and with a shrewd sense of their indispensability.

The main hope of the regime to check this process of renascent capitalism in the countryside lies in the policy of strengthening the Socialist (co-operative) sector. The objective of the Sec-

ond Five Year Plan is that by 1960 the Socialist sector of agriculture will be able to supply 60 to 70 per cent of the marketable products. This is to be attained by increasing productivity and "co-operativization." Since the Congress, some success has been achieved on both counts. In December 1956, it was known that roughly 30 per cent of the entire arable surface of the country belonged to the Socialist sector.¹⁸ However, its share in general agricultural production was still under 30 per cent. At that time, as was seen in Moghioros' report, co-operatives and associations retaining private possession of the land were relatively more popular than the genuine collective farms. With regard to the latter, farmers with medium-sized plots join far more slowly than those without any land or with small plots. Moreover, there is lacking a precise definition of the "members" or "families" who join the Socialist sector. It has, for example, been revealed that more than half the "members" of collective farms are women.¹⁹ This could be taken as a sign that the men continue to work their land, while they lend the weaker members of the working family to the Socialist sector.

The Communists, nevertheless, do consider the entrance of the middle farmers into the limited co-operatives as the beginning of a gradual process towards collectivization and the abolition of the "old class" of the peasantry. For the moment, social realities of the countryside show contrary tendencies.

THE WORKERS

Official statistics and publications give the over-all picture of the number of personnel in the RPR as 1,100,000

¹⁸ Dulea, *op. cit.* (note 11 *supra*).

¹⁹ Chirculescu: *Organizarea și distribuirea muncii în G.A.C., Lupta de Clasă*, No. 9 (1957); see also *Romania*, No. 20 (December 1957).

¹⁷ In this connection it must not be forgotten that all three currency reforms, especially that of January 28, 1952, were directed against the farmers who had savings in the form of money.

workers in 2,200 state-owned industrial plants, 36,000 in machine-tractor, 400,000 in building and construction. Among the latter may be included detachments of the manpower reserves for compulsory and public works on certain sites, 180,000 in transport and communications, 19,000 in the Socialist sector of trade, and the ever-changing figure of workers "in state and collective farms."²⁰ Even the arbitrary total sum of 2,000,000 or so personnel quoted officially during 1957 falls short by one million of the forecasts of the Five Year Plan 1950-55 which heralded a gross total of "3,000,000 workers, technicians and clerks" for the final year.

To come now to the figures of the genuine "workers" in this arbitrarily composed list, we find the following:²¹

IN THOUSANDS	1950	1953	1956
TOTAL PERSONNEL			
SOCIALIST INDUSTRY	809.2	1027.7	1,101.1
state-industry	743.9	918.3	972.1
co-operatives	65.3	109.4	129.1
TOTAL WORKERS	627.3	847.6	916.8
state industry	569.7	750.1	803.1
co-operatives	57.6	97.5	113.7
Persons occupied in the private sector	188.9	86.3	129

Thus, compared with the figure of roughly 750,000 workers in Rumanian industry in 1936, the absolute increase of workers must be now somewhere between 150,000 and 200,000. Since 1956 the number has increased very slightly, if at all. The Second Five Year Plan called for greater specialization rather than for a rise in manpower, especially in its first three years. The real advance was made between 1950 and 1953 when forcible heavy industrialization was in full swing. It slowed down in the last two years ("New Course") of the First Plan, and there is no reason

²⁰ Dulea and *Anuarul*, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*).

²¹ *Anuarul*, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), p. 90.

why it should gather momentum under the more cautious provisions of the present plan. This, of course, spells the end of any utopian hopes of the working class becoming, even in the remote future, the determining element in Rumanian society. It leaves it only with the moral satisfaction of being called "the leading class" of that society and of seeing that the top positions both in the party and in the government are now occupied by former workers: Gheorghiu-Dej, Chivu Stoica, G. Apostol, and others.

Otherwise, in Rumania the management and control of production were, from the very beginning of the Communist regime, exercised on behalf of the state by the technical personnel and by the inflated industrial bureaucracy. From the figures given in the above

table it appears that there is almost one clerk to every four workers in industry in the RPR, both in the general and in the state sector.²² The resulting professional and social resentment has served to increase the Rumanian workers' political dislike of the regime..

Attempts at diminishing workers' discontent

During 1955 the Central Committee made two attempts to abate some of the feelings of frustration among the

²² Respectively, 184,000 clerks to 917,000 workers and 169,000 to 803,000. But, according to official sources, in many enterprises the ratio is 1 to 3. *Lupta de Clasa*, No. 6 (June 1955).

workers' elite by creating two bridges over which they could pass from their underprivileged status to positions of responsibility in management. Both attempts pivoted around the function of foreman, the threshold between the two worlds. The first set up trade schools for apprentices and technical schools for foremen.²³ The second undertook to raise the status of the foremen in their plants and factories.²⁴ It described the foreman as the sole leader of the department of work entrusted to him and made him responsible only to the technical staff. But it did not show how the foremen could rise to managerial positions; and, indeed, no statistics have been published or data released showing the number of workers who have risen to leadership in industry in the RPR. In Soviet Russia, after the same length of time from the Communists' seizure of power, Lazar Kaganovich, in June 1930, was able to show that more than half of the chairmen of trusts, factory directors, and so on came from the workers' stratum.

After Poznań, and especially after the events in Poland and Hungary in the autumn of 1956, a moment of unrest which exploded among the Rumanian workers²⁵ revealed for the first time the serious hostility of the workers. In particular they welcomed the experiment of the "workers' councils" in Yugo-

²³ Decision of the Central Committee and Council of Ministers, January 11, 1955. In the first year, 1955-56, 97 schools were set up with a total of 7,929 industrial and agricultural foremen attending; half of these schools offered day courses and the other half free lectures. In the second year, 1956-57, there were 96 schools with an attendance of 12,723 pupils and with the same proportion of courses and lectures.

²⁴ Decision on "Raising the Part Played by Foremen in Industry," *Scanteia* (July 10, 1955).

²⁵ At the Red "Grivitza" headquarters of the railwaymen and in other industrial towns such as Timishoara, Reshitza, Ploeshti and especially Iassy, near the Soviet frontier.

slavia, Poland, and for a time also in Hungary.

On January 24, 1957, the Plenum of the Central Council of Trade Unions met and considered, among other points on its agenda,²⁶ the "active participation of the workers in organization and leadership of production." In his main report, G. Apostol²⁷ took the usual "dialectical" line of Communist leaders in periods of strain. He asked the workers to be more co-operative with, and interested in, the production plans of management and the economic authorities; but, at the same time, he criticized the latter for not paying enough attention to the constructive proposals of the workers' agencies. With great emphasis he launched the idea, hitherto kept in the background, of "production meetings." Within the framework of these meetings, which "embody the collective experience of the workers, engineers, technicians and economic leaders," all problems were to be discussed. It was decided that at these meetings decisions should be able to be made concerning problems in which the production solution depended exclusively on the respective collective team or department.

One year later there had been no appreciable change in the situation. From an industrial point of view, decentralization introduced into the RPR in 1957 brought certain changes—for instance the greater freedom of decision granted to the managers, replacing the harassing dependence on the departments in Bucharest for every order or authorization. As for the production meetings,

²⁶ Recent decisions of the Central Committee of the party, December 25-26, 1956 were the main reason for the calling of the Plenum. These tried to promise to alleviate some of the hardships prevailing before the Hungarian revolt: norms of production, wages, shortage of consumer goods, and so forth.

²⁷ Report on "The Tasks of the Trade Unions," *Scanteia* (January 25, 1957).

it was disclosed that they were more successful in the big concerns and plants, the so-called "top enterprises,"²⁸ than in the small and medium ones. One may surmise that these meetings are probably still a façade. The state and party would like to make more use of them both to integrate the workers more actively into the productive process, and at the same time to take the edge off their protests against the frustrating conditions in which they are forced to work. But this is a far cry from direct worker participation in leadership and organization, and the significance of the whole program appears negligible when one takes a bird's-eye view of the demographic, social, and political position of the working class in the RPR.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

When the Rumanian Republic was founded, the Communist party had very few contacts with the intelligentsia of the country. It had fewer intellectuals among its rank and file than did the National-Peasant, Liberal, and Socialist parties. The only recruits it had made in this category in 1944-45 were former members of the Iron Guard, mostly gathered from unemployed white-collar workers, who, through fear and through totalitarian affinities, had offered their services *en masse* to the Communists (thousands of them were purged in 1949).

Between 1948 and 1950, the Communist government continued to persecute indiscriminately the vast majority of the Rumanian intelligentsia, sending

²⁸ A recent study, *Consfătuirea de producție, formă importantă și eficace de participare a maselor la conducerea și gospodărirea întreprinderilor socialiste* by C. Bărbulescu and D. Joița in *Probleme Economice*, expressed the authors' concern about the slow progress made by the production meetings, especially the freedom to take decisions, apart from those in top enterprises.

them to prisons, labor camps or, at best, depriving them of their positions and means of livelihood. It treated them as class and party enemies rather than as specially equipped elements useful to society. This phase can be compared with the New Economic Policy years in the history of the intelligentsia in Soviet Russia when the party had not yet founded its own cadres of technicians and scholars, had not started to run the state as a central employer, and suspected all middle-class professionals of being saboteurs.

When, however, after two one-year economic plans, it was decided, as late as 1951, to launch a five-year plan, the problem loomed up of filling all the technical, managerial, and cultural "posts of responsibility." A list of these posts at all levels was drawn up, the main categories coinciding with those of the list of Soviet intelligentsia released by Molotov in January 1937. Two moves were made to solve the problem. One was the increase of technical and other teaching by overcrowding the existing schools with new hastily recruited pupils. In 1948-49 there were 454 technical schools with 75,168 pupils; 377 with 96,900 in 1950-51; 375 with 110,682 in 1951-52; 366 with 114,829 in 1953-54, dropping back to 281 with 79,078 in 1954-55 when the Plan was altered and the teaching and education program modified.²⁹ This move can be compared with similar steps taken in Soviet Russia on the launching of the First Five Year Plan, with the difference that the Soviet effort was also accompanied by an increase in schools and teachers.

As its second move the regime brought out of prisons and camps certain intellectuals and technicians of the old regime, and, considering that the time thus spent had been a "political re-education," decided to use them for the

²⁹ *Anuarul*, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), p. 190.

new cultural assignments of the Plan, ranging from artistic propaganda to expert management. This move can be compared with the very early one in Soviet history, the phase which followed immediately after the decree of general nationalization of June 1918.³⁰

By 1953 the universities and schools were packed beyond capacity. Fewer teachers were being forced to teach more and more pupils; there were, for example, 6,482 teachers for 75,168 pupils in 1948-49 and 5,495 for 96,900 in 1950-51.³¹ The first graduates of the short-term courses were extremely disappointing. Their general education had been so thoroughly sacrificed to hasty specialization that they were useless in fields in which they should have been experts. The teachers and examiners, pressed by the Plan Commission for more technical cadres, had constantly raised the percentage of graduates: 10 per cent in 1948-49, 9 per cent in 1949-50, 14 per cent in 1950-51, 20 per cent in 1951-52. The system of examination in schools was altered in 1953.³²

³⁰ At the time Lenin explained, in his speech on the "Soviets at work," "Now that the attack on capital has been successful we need middle class specialists. . . . It is a special phase of social development. Without the help and direction of specialists in the various branches of learning, of technique, the change to socialism is impossible. But specialists inevitably belong to the middle classes. . . . We have at present been obliged to resort to the middle classes' method and promise a very high rate of remuneration in order to obtain the services of the most important middle-class specialists." Actually, Lenin's speech was frequently used in the "Popular Democracies." For instance, it was the main defence of the East German government when, in June 17, 1953, the anger of the East Berlin workers was concentrated against "die Intelligenzler und die Funktionäre" who were so obviously privileged in a regime which called itself "proletarian."

³¹ *Anuarul*, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), p. 191.

³² Decision on "promotion examinations and graduation examinations in elementary and secondary schools and examinations for ob-

The reform of teaching in universities was delayed until 1957.³³ It dealt, among other things, with the unfavorable social composition of the mass of the students. It was decided that, in the future, at least 40 per cent of the candidates admitted to universities should be sons of workers and that, in any case, 70 to 75 per cent of the total number of students should be sons of workers and peasants. Indeed, there had been another failure in the regime's plans for education: The percentage of sons of peasants or of workers graduating was much lower than that of young people emanating from "other classes"—a euphemism for the bourgeoisie and middle classes.³⁴

With the need for competent people in all fields becoming more and more acute, the regime extended its collabora-

taining the matriculation diploma," No. 3557, October 1953.

³³ Decision of the Central Committee of the party concerning "the amelioration of the higher education system." *Scanteia*, June 26, 1957. In its preamble one reads: "The sterile way in which some subjects are being taught and the under-estimation of many positive achievements in the traditional education in Rumania, have created difficulties in the development of our education. The principle of the complete education of the student has not been understood in our teaching, that is, of intellectual, moral, physical and aesthetic education."

³⁴ The Rumanian figures were not as fully disclosed as those for Hungary. In the wake of Imre Nagy's speech of July 4, 1953, it was disclosed that only 52.7 per cent of the children of workers and 30 per cent of the children of peasants who applied for admission to the various high schools from among the graduates of technical schools were admitted, whereas 83.8 per cent of the sons of "other classes" passed the tests. In Rumania, it is only known that 138,807 pupils reached the final three classes of the general schools in the "urban sector" and 6,140 in the "rural one"; but the first figure probably also included the many young peasants who came to town and the fact that there are more high schools in towns than in villages.

tion with the intellectuals of the old regime. More university professors, architects, and engineers were given managerial and state executive positions. More artists and writers who had shared in the privileges granted intellectuals under the Carol II and Ion Antonescu dictatorships went back to the posts they had previously occupied and were more feted than ever before. Thus, the state prizes of 1954³⁵ for prose and poetry went to two writers and one poet whose names were made under Carol's protection; for drama to a former surrealist poet, known before the war for his obscene writings; for literary criticism to a Marxist critic but also to one of the former senior members of the Royal Foundation; for music, painting, and sculpture to artists celebrated for long decades and then persecuted by the Communists. The absence of new or, for that matter, old, but genuine, Communist intellectuals is exceptionally striking in the Rumanian People's Republic.

Meanwhile, too, another social phenomenon already in evidence in the Soviet Union was making itself felt in the new Rumanian society, though with

different consequences. When Stalin decided to acknowledge in public the new status which the intelligentsia had shaped for itself in Soviet society, the Soviet press could justify this by explaining that these were "yesterday's workers and peasants advanced to commanding posts."³⁶ Only the fact that its members were sons and daughters of workers and peasants could alleviate the reality that the Soviet intelligentsia had become something of a caste, with a way and standard of living far superior to that of the "toiling classes" and with an obvious opportunity of transmitting to their children privileged accessibility to culture, social rank, and their own professions.

But when this caste-like position of the intelligentsia in a postwar Communist society was transferred to the Rumanian "hired middle-class specialists" and when they received the charismata already granted their elders in the Soviet Union, the social crystallization which thus took place in a much shorter time caught in it quite different layers, men, and mentalities. These men were differently moulded, above all, in their attitude towards the state.

³⁵ *Scanteia* (November 13, 1954).

³⁶ *Izvestia* (December 29, 1945).

Education and Youth

By GEORGE Z. F. BEREDAY

Abstract: The evidence available points to a successful and steady improvement in the pedagogical caliber of satellite schools since 1950. Yet the same period witnessed a steady alienation of youth from Communism in Poland and Hungary and to a lesser degree also in Czechoslovakia and Rumania. It is suggested that the schools cannot easily fulfill the role assigned to them by totalitarian regimes. Unless there is some correspondence between the ideals they are asked to teach and actual reality, indoctrination may only increase the chances of youth disturbances.

A YEAR ago, *Seven Days in Poland*, a Polish official journal dedicated to spreading goodwill among Polish émigré groups, contained a description of a *Bim Bom* pantomime show:

Take the famous balloon scene. A group of boys and girls play gaily with a little red balloon. They are joyful, they are happy. Suddenly a solemn creature carrying a briefcase appears on the stage. He wants to crush the balloon underfoot. In the last moment he gives up this idea, but instead touches it with the burning cigarette end. The little balloon bursts—the end of gaiety, the end of play. But not the end of the scene. Lo, a cluster of young people appear in front of the curtain with burning cigarettes in hand. In the corner stands a girl who sells little balloons. Now, the group of youngsters, who were a moment ago deprived by someone of their fun, approach the girl and destroy all the balloons with their cigarettes. Not one word is uttered during this scene. And yet this pantomime has a deep meaning, it is a general symbol of the complicated political and psychological process of the recent years.¹

As claimed, this little story does supply most of the clues to the problems of youth in satellite countries. It depicts

¹ *Siedem Dni w Polsce*, No. 8 (April 21, 1957), p. 5 (my translation).

the initial willingness of the young to experiment with the new order. It demonstrates the bungling of officialdom, infallible, but ineffectively performing its role of leadership. It shows the resulting reaction and loss of faith by disenchanted youth. As such, the story introduces well the main theme of the present article—the appraisal of the ebbing fortunes of political indoctrination in satellite education.

There is no need here to establish the fact that political indoctrination of a Soviet type was imposed, along with major Soviet features of organization, upon the schools of the new dependencies. That phase of educational history took place mainly before 1950 and was treated at length in an earlier issue of *THE ANNALS*.² The subsequent period which began at midcentury, or more correctly, with the death of Stalin, has turned out to be a testing point of the Communist blueprints. The events in Poland and Hungary and, somewhat more tentatively, the climate of opinion in Czechoslovakia and Rumania³ seem

² John S. Reshetar, "Moscow's European Satellite, The Educational Weapon," *THE ANNALS*, Vol. 271 (September 1950), pp. 135-44.

³ Only these four countries are dealt with here. For others consult: Irwin T. Sanders, "Communist Dominated Education in Bul-

George Z. F. Bereday, Ph.D., New York City, is Associate Professor of Comparative Education at Teachers College, Columbia University. He is editor of the *Comparative Education Review* and joint editor of the *Year Book of Education*.

to warrant the generalization that the results of the hoped-for indoctrination have fallen short of the original expectations.

This failure raises an interesting problem not only for students of comparative education, but now also for the public at large. In an age which once again argues over the effectiveness of education as a tool of indoctrination and selectivity, it is relevant to ask whether the causes of Communist failures belong inside or outside schools. Either there is something inherent in the state of education itself—its dynamism or lack of it, its modes of instruction, its faith or cynicism—that predisposes the youth favorably or unfavorably towards absorbing its offerings or the schools merely reflect the industry or sloth, the optimism or pessimism which the youngsters bring with them from outside. The case of Communist education is too special to warrant generalizations applicable to ideologically freer and administratively less centralized systems. But for what it is worth, the experience of satellite regimes would seem to suggest that the pedagogical caliber of education is quite secondary to wider social considerations in determining the final allegiance of its pupils. Since the age of Sputnik climaxed the many convictions that quality of instruction is solely and directly responsible for the final product of education, an examination of the current scene in East Central Europe may con-

garia: A Study in Social Relations," *American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (October 1956), pp. 364-81; Joseph S. Roucek, "Tito's Educational Experiences and Experiments," *Educational Forum*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (January 1957), pp. 193-202; Max A. Lange, *Totalitäre Erziehung: das Erziehungssystem der Sowjetzone Deutschlands* (Frankfurt, 1954), 432 pp.; Stavro Skendi (Ed.), *Albania* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), Chap. 17, pp. 269-84. Other handbooks of the Free Europe Committee, Mid-European Studies Center, also contain chapters on education.

tribute towards the acceptance of a much needed corrective.

THE EDUCATIONAL SCENE

The actual quality of education in the satellites seems on balance satisfactory. Communist education introduced the obvious debilitating changes in the field of history and literature. It filled the extracurricular time with the stagnant functions of youth organizations. It permeated the schools with militant and yet shallow political orthodoxy.⁴ But apart from these changes, the school offerings suggest a reasonable degree of vigor and high caliber. Whatever its shortcoming, satellite education on the whole has succeeded in combining the prewar scholarly traditions with the postwar dynamic expansionism.

Good or bad scholarly traditions are now a matter of much disputed definitions. But if one agrees that good scholarship should satisfy two conditions—the avoidance of abrupt breaks in the continuity of the curriculum and a subject-oriented content—present satellite programs seem to satisfy both stipulations. In point of time they are only a decade away from the inauguration of the new regimes and thus roughly at a stage the Soviet system was at the end of the 1920's. But the subsequent reversal of Soviet education to formalist traditions has enabled the satellites to retain unbroken their own tight prewar patterns of instruction. In this sense the schools of East Central Europe were off to a better start than their original Communist prototypes. Their names, years of training, and programs were changed in a piecemeal fashion to bring them into line with the Soviet practices. War, revolts, defection, and discrimination deprived them

⁴ For a detailed description see, for instance: "Free Europe University in Exile," *L'évolution de l'enseignement dans les démocraties populaires* (Paris, 1956), 110 pp.

of many men with good teaching potential. The mass admission of students of humbler origin must have forced upon them the necessity to popularize their offerings. But at least the methods and thus perhaps also the basic quality of instruction remained substantially unchanged. Official protests against grade repeaters and early school leavers, some 10 per cent of the school population, bear witness to this.

In all satellite schools curricula are organized as sequences of traditional subjects taught uniformly according to central directives. Even though they suffer under obvious political limitations, the humanities continue to enjoy an honored priority. One foreign language or Latin in addition to Russian is taught throughout two-thirds of the years of secondary schooling. At the same time the Soviet influence has brought in an increasing emphasis on science offerings. At least five science subjects are now taught in schools throughout Eastern Europe. As an example, in Poland, Polish language and literature was taught (in 1954-55) throughout for five to eleven hours per week. Russian was given in the upper seven grades for three hours a week. Foreign language or Latin occupied two to three hours for eight years. In the field of science, mathematics was offered throughout for four to six hours; geography and biology for nine years at two to three hours each; physics for seven years at two to four hours; chemistry for four years at two hours; astronomy and geology in the uppermost grade for one to two hours each.⁵ With such concentration on subjects it is small wonder that, unlike the Soviet ten-year schools, the academic secondary schools in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland require eleven years of training. The

combination of the prewar traditions in humanities with the postwar interest in sciences has now led Rumania, too, to switch to an eleven-year program.

BY-PRODUCTS OF A HEAVY CURRICULUM

No doubt, a heavy traditional curriculum has led in practice to much dull memorization. It also necessitates methods of training that are strictly disciplinarian in character. In his description of Hungarian education, William Juhasz notes that failure to keep up the standards of work and study are treated almost like an industrial sabotage.⁶ An insistence on almost military obedience, placement of the responsibility upon parents for all breaches of school discipline, pillorying of transgressors in school newspapers, study rooms for supervised homework, and threat of dismissal for slackness—this is the familiar mixture of traditional European and new Soviet sternness. But insofar as these features of instruction are regarded as shortcomings, they tend to be counterbalanced by the new corrective movement towards politization. In Czechoslovakia, Ministry of Education instructions for 1955-56 and 1956-57 have recommended the reduction of subject matter. Instead, sixteen hours of laboratory work and two excursions per year are introduced in physics, chemistry, and biology; and five hours per week are to be devoted to handicrafts, school farms, and machine shop practice. In Hungary "oversize or obsolete" textbooks are now being revised. Practical work is being experimented with in the first four years of physics, biology, and chemistry. In Rumania, too, first steps have been taken to link "theoretical knowledge with practice," although the extension of secondary schooling has put greater emphasis on political economy,

⁶ William Juhasz, *Blueprint For a Red Generation* (New York: Mid-European Studies Center, 1952), pp. 66, 67.

⁵ Brian Simon, *Education in the New Poland* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954), p. 62.

logic, Latin, and foreign languages. Even in Poland, which is using its newly won autonomy to expand its offerings in Western languages and to follow less slavishly the Soviet educational precedents, efforts are being made to "free pupils from excessive work" and to restrict promotion by examinations which is responsible for "an atmosphere of nervousness" in the schools.⁷ Satellite educational offerings thus seem to be characterized not only by adherence to subject matter but also by watchfulness over the perennial tendency of such methods of instruction to become too rigid. Nobody can vouch for the effectiveness of an educational program by merely glancing at official tables of offerings. But the impression of the content of satellite education is one of conservative solidity.

Contrary to some predictions this solidity does not seem to have been significantly diluted by the mood of expansion. The extension of educational opportunities, the point of pride of the Communist program, has rather been accomplished in the atmosphere of upgrading of standards. Between 1930 and 1950 rough comparative figures indicate a drop in illiteracy in Czechoslovakia from 4.1 to 2.3 per cent; in Hungary from 9.6 to 5; in Poland from 25.3 to 10; in Rumania from 42.9 to 23.1 per cent.⁸ The upward expansion of compulsory education as yet has left untouched the work of senior secondary schools. This is partly due to the general insistence on performance and discipline in all schools; partly to the strenuous efforts to build up vocational schools, which now cater for roughly one-half of those who continue their education beyond the compulsory age; but mostly to the fact that ambitions for mass edu-

cation have made a very small impact at a secondary level. In Czechoslovakia some 20 per cent attend beyond the compulsory nine years thanks to the system of one-day-a-week vocational schools. In Hungary, Rumania, and Poland only some 10 per cent continue beyond the legal age of 14 in the former two and 13 in the latter.⁹ Most of the available educational information is still derived from official communications, and Communist regimes yield precedence to none in the optimism with which they regard their own achievements. But even with that caution, one is left with a strong impression that the changes that have occurred have had very little negative impact upon traditional standards. The educational picture thus supplies no basis for an explanation of youth tensions.

EDUCATION AND THE POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES

A recent joke has it that a foreign visitor in Poland in the middle 1950's asked and received permission to visit a prison. While there, he came upon three political prisoners and inquired of them the cause of their arrest. The first answered: "I am here because I was against Gomulka." The second replied: "I am here because I was for Gomulka." The third said: "I am here because I *am* Gomulka." This little story, an illustration of the many political jokes of which people in satellite countries are so fond, supplies the clue to the attitude of disenchantment of youth in all countries of East Central Europe. That attitude is a result of the zig-zags of the official policy, exasperation with which spurred the revival of nationalistic and religious traditions. It is not the educational context that is at the basis of present youth unrest. It is the twists and turns of the political situation as

⁹ UNESCO, *World Survey of Education* (Paris, 1955), pp. 187, 324, 527, 547.

reflected in school teaching that have brought it into being.

At the time of the establishment of the Soviet-sponsored regimes there was obviously little sympathy among youth for the changes then taking place. Most people, young and old, considered the arrival of the Communists as an imposition from without. In Poland, in particular, public indignation at the immorality of the Yalta Agreement and at the Russian inaction during the Warsaw Uprising was added to the bitter memories of the Russian partitions. The reception of the Russians, even though they posed as liberators, everywhere ranged from lukewarm to hostile.

But harassment, foreign occupation, and exploitation is an old story in Eastern Europe. The tradition of dogged determination to hang on to national identity and native soil quickly develops as a self-protective countermeasure. Yet another bitter experience of defeat in World War II served to discredit the tradition of patriotic romanticism with which all national calamities were hitherto confronted. Clearly, heroic underground military exploits were hardly calculated to ensure survival in the pedestrian and industrialized future. What was needed was realism and practicality. This mounting feeling of "realism" very quickly grew in education as elsewhere into the doctrine of accommodation to Communist domination. It was useless to struggle without. One had to survive within. The foundations of acquiescence, greatly aided by methodical deportations of potentially dangerous people and by police terror over the rest, were thus firmly laid.

EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE MASSES

It is at this point that education became additionally important. Through schools another incentive was built into this readiness of public opinion to acqui-

esce. By promising educational opportunity the satellite regimes could elicit self-interest and thus secure the loyalty of the youth otherwise devoid of ideological enthusiasm. In a society formerly dominated by landowners or a gentry-descended intelligentsia, the new era meant the opening of new prospects to sons of the small middle class, of workers, and above all, of peasants to whom previously only few avenues of mobility had been available. The new states thus were able to create a class of young people loyal to them. Their personal good fortune depended completely upon the new society's good fortune. Through expanding educational opportunities for the masses, the Communists made a bid for the political loyalties and for the economic dynamism of working-class and peasant youth, long famous for industry and perseverance and now aroused by the vision of advancement and prosperity.

The personal motivation was easily susceptible to conversion into full-fledged Socialist allegiance. The path from old patriotism to realism has, in fact, ended in the trap of a new patriotism. A system synonymous with good opportunities could obviously hope to be identified as a good system. At the close of the Stalin period, the chorus of voices pronouncing Communism the salvation of the satellites was no longer merely a result of the political terror of the era. There was a tinge of spontaneity in the numerous expressions of educational authorities and youth organizations.¹⁰ It was as if any belief were thought to be better than no belief at all. In the words of a personal acquaintance who returned to Poland voluntarily at that time: "Communism is an inevitable fate of our age. It is marching triumphantly across the world.

¹⁰ See, for instance, Sigfried Kracauer and Paul L. Berkman, *Satellite Mentality* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), pp. 93-96.

⁷ *International Yearbook of Education* (Geneva: UNESCO, 1956), pp. 131, 194, 304, 317.

⁸ UNESCO, *World Illiteracy at Mid-Century* (Paris, 1957), pp. 41-42, 101, 118, 145.

One cannot run away from it. Why not join it and grow strong through its strength?"

Thus, the old romantic notions transcended realism in the form of an overriding new need to "believe." And it is the subsequent disappointment of this belief in the strength, virtue, and altruistic dedication of socialism that has paved the way to the return of the old type of nationalistic patriotism. It is perfectly natural that this reaction should be particularly marked in the schools. It is in the schools even more than in adult cultural life, which is never completely harnessed, that the highest ideals of Socialist life were enunciated. It is in schools that the adolescent would attempt to find guides to conduct in a perplexing world. The breakdown of values was most likely to register in the sensitive area of education. Nowhere in the world and certainly not in the satellites has general uneasiness ever failed to spark unrest among students.

Participation of youth in the anti-Communist and anti-Russian outbreaks spans the decade from February 1948, when the students of Prague University demonstrated against the Communist *coup d'état*, to October 1957, when the students of Warsaw Politechnic protested against the suppression of the youth magazine *Po Prostu*. Its major 1956 landmarks in Poland and Hungary are too well known to need restatement. The continuation of the ferment that caused them can easily be predicted.

It is already certain, however, that its causes are political and economic. The barring of educational opportunity to people of wrong social class has always kept alive a hard core of political malcontents.¹¹ At the opposite pole the

¹¹ See Neal Buhler and Stanley Zukorowski, *Discrimination in Education in the People's Democracies* (New York: Mid-European Studies Center, Free Europe Committee, 1955), 61 pp.

alienation of the most eager supporters through the unimaginative tedium of youth organizations has deprived the regime of effective young leadership.¹² It was when the average young man in between was awakened by de-Stalinization that the roof finally collapsed.

Young people could not help noticing that the party representatives and the press lied to them all the time. It was clear that the living standard was going down; but they were told in enthusiastic terms that it was going up, thanks to the party. At home they heard their parents complaining; at school they had speeches on the general satisfaction and gratitude of the people. They were told that this or that article was a Russian invention. They went home, looked it up in a pre-war encyclopedia, and found these statements disproved. It was borne in on them that they were living in an atmosphere of lies, that they were fed on lies and breathing lies all the time, and they were determined not to be brought up to be liars themselves.¹³

ECONOMIC MOTIVATION, NATIONALISM AND RELIGION

Political disappointments with the policies of the regimes were, in a sense, economic disappointments too. It was economic hopes that kept Czesław Miłosz's young men practicing so assiduously the arts of the Ketman. It was economic privation that drove the uprooted young peasants to delinquency. Recently *Polish Magazine* polled its readers on their life philosophy. In irredentist Poland, 425 out of 500 young people put forth economic answers to an invitation to make the "greatest" wish in their lives: 105 wanted improved standards of living; 67 oppor-

¹² See "Crisis in the Youth Leagues," *News From Behind the Iron Curtain*, Vol. 4, No. 6 (June 1955), pp. 25-35.

¹³ George Mikes, "Where Communist Indoctrination Failed: On the Young People in Hungary," *The Listener* (London, December 27, 1956), p. 1057.

tunity to travel; 41 to obtain a profession; 41 to study; 39 to obtain an apartment.¹⁴ The promise of wellbeing at the end of the long road of transition to heavy industry does little to relieve the gnawing impatience with present privations.

As the political and economic situation is the cause of ferment, so are nationalism and religion the symbols of refuge and defiance. The nationalist theme is now common and easily documented in all satellites. For instance, an official Czech history textbook for eleventh grade and normal schools, published in 1955, treats the history of socialism in Czechoslovakia with discernibly nationalistic overtones.¹⁵ The insistence on teaching of religion is also common knowledge. While the Russian schools remain militantly atheistic, Rumania provides religious instruction after school hours for all whose parents desire it. In Czechoslovakia the 1948 Education Act included religion, albeit with some potentially debilitating clauses, as a full-fledged though voluntary subject of primary and secondary school programs. The current situation in Poland has an originality and significance of its own. The Polish Communists are in the unusual situation of having had to allow the existence of private Catholic schools, including the University of Lublin, the only Catholic college in the Communist world. Polish *state* schools offer noncompulsory instruction in religion in two weekly sessions, while the government, through a special "Society of the Friends of Children," maintains *private* secular schools dedicated to atheism. This is an almost incredible concession and one that is not given lightly. Only last October Gomulka complained that the situation in Poland

¹⁴ *Magazyn Polski*, No. 3 (Warsaw, April 1957), p. 129.

¹⁵ *Dějiny ČSR*, Vol. 3 (1918-1948), Prague, 1955, pp. 34-62.

differed not only from that of other socialist states, but also from such countries as France and the United States. He warned the Church to realize that a new state had been built in Poland and that church privileges should not be taken as license to disregard this fact.

But the disparity between the Communists' wishes and the resiliency of their adversaries can be seen from Cardinal Wyszyński's 1957 Christmas message to Poles in America:

Faithful to the Cross and the Evangel, faithful to the Fatherland, we endure in fraternal love, we endure amidst suffering and toil. We believe that the face of the Polish soil, our cities and fields by the Vistula, Oder and the Baltic, will be reborn out of our sacrificial labors.

In education, too, this resistance persists, and though it is found in varying degree in the different countries of Eastern Europe, it continues to rebuff the efforts of indoctrination.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Educational progress in East Central Europe stands out to advantage among the many less successful areas of the Communist program. The limited evidence available seems to indicate that the satellite regimes have managed to expand educational opportunity without too much loss of prewar educational quality. Yet much to the surprise of the authorities, it is precisely youth who has been the source of political unsettlement. That this is due to political and not to educational reasons seems to be the inescapable conclusion.

Obviously, the schools in Communist regimes as elsewhere perform merely the role of intermediaries. Their role is more one of prevention than of cure. The Communist reversals seem to be due not to the nature of school instruction, but to the failure of the regimes to live up to their theoretical ideals and to the persistence of religious and national

traditions. The schools render the contrasts obvious and reflect the tensions thus aroused. But the pedagogical scene can only register the extent, rather than account for the causes, of the present setbacks of Sovietization.

One must not forget, however, that the story is only half told. Communist regimes seem to be better able than democratic governments to learn from their past mistakes. The blatant enforcement of aggressive indoctrination may be the very reason of its failure. Profiting from this lesson, Communist school instruction once more is being exposed to official re-examination. Already the satellite states are working to increase the areas of their successes. They continue to press for expanded range of education. They watch over the quality of teaching against the excesses of theory and practice. They build schools and playgrounds and palaces of culture. They encourage the flow of cultural exchanges with their Eastern neighbors. They have now laid the groundwork for new cultural exchanges with the Western nations. At the same time they have cut their losses and are trying to correct their shortcomings. They have relented on the in-

conquerable question of religion. They have given up the thought of wholesale collectivization. They have cut down the more brazen-faced aspects of political teaching. To make their program less objectionable, they have shifted more towards nationalism.

The result is already a partial recovery. Certainly, the cause of freedom has received new setbacks since the Hungarian revolt. Only time can tell whether what has happened in the satellites under de-Stalinization will produce lasting relaxations. And at least part of these may be due to the general easing of conditions in the whole Soviet orbit rather than to the reaction against Communist domination. Such reaction must also be tempered by the obvious successes of Soviet-type education in really advancing knowledge and in providing opportunity in nonpolitical fields. Only by our remembering such cautions for the future can past Communist educational attempts and failures be properly assessed. As the schools become more effective vocationally and less constrictive politically, the potential chances of their acceptance by the now defiant satellite youth may increase correspondingly.

Cultural and Literary Developments: Poland and Hungary

By GEORGE GÖMÖRI

Abstract: By 1950 standardization of cultural life in Soviet-dominated countries was nearly complete. This was more easily effected in literature than in painting or music—areas in which the artist's position was less clearly defined. Pressures for conformity caused artists and writers to resort to three main types of behavior. Some collaborated wholeheartedly, others became semi-collaborators, and still others chose to collaborate not at all. It soon became obvious that the "new literature" was failing to fulfill the task laid down by the party of re-educating men and was instead stifling creative work. The demand for an essentially romantic picture of everyday reality demanded by "Socialist realism" had become anything but real, and to ease the dilemma writers took refuge in the past. The cultural and political thaw which followed Stalin's death was felt most keenly in Hungary and Poland. In the former the full-scale campaign waged by the Rákosi regime against "rightist deviationism" propelled the country into revolution. In the latter a greater sensitivity to popular demand on the part of the leaders has helped to avert such a bloody upheaval. In fact, the freedom of creation under Gomulka's regime is still unequalled in all of Eastern Europe.—Ed.

BY 1950 standardization on the Soviet pattern, or one might say, "Zhdanovization," had been completed in all the Soviet-dominated countries. The purge of cultural life through a subservient state apparatus proceeded quickly between 1948 and 1950, though in some countries, such as Rumania, the process had started even earlier. In Poland and Hungary, the two countries with which this article will be chiefly concerned, this *Gleichschaltung* became evident at the Writers' Congress in Szczecin (1949) and at the First Congress of the Hungarian Writers Union (1950). At these gatherings, apart from some timorous criticisms by fellow traveling writers, who were duly attacked for their "hesitations," there was an atmosphere of familiar Zhdanovite "unanimity."

By now Zhdanovism had permeated all artistic life. Neither composers nor painters, shackled as they were by a specious theory of realism, could express themselves as freely as they would have wished; but they still contrived, on occasion, to compose music which was not merely programmatic and to paint pictures which were not just photography. Such work, though criticized, was not inevitably rejected. Modern "decadent" music and abstract painting were, of course, forbidden. But the mere fact that there was a certain amount of latitude given to works which did not obviously belong to this category only underlined the absurdity and futility of Zhdanovism, based as it was on absolutism of judgment.

By its very nature, literature was more amenable to the cut-and-dried

George Gömöri, Oxford, England, is a research student, St. Antony's College, Oxford. During the Hungarian revolution of 1956, he was an editor of the revolutionary students' paper, Egyetemi Ifjúság. His works have been published in Irodalmi Ujság.

canons of Soviet doctrine. A writer, unlike a painter or a composer, could be forced into a much more clearly defined position. When petty dictators of cultural life—a Révai in Hungary or a Berman in Poland—were supreme, they had no difficulty in demonstrating that neutrality on the part of a writer was "desertion from the front of socialism" or that silence was "disbelief in our People's Democracy" or that writing about one's own problems or simply about nature, love and flowers was "escapism" and "intimism." The latter expression was one of the rare Rumanian contributions to this new language of literary criticism.

Added to the methods of physical coercion now at the disposal of the state, the atmosphere of moral intimidation reflected in these proliferating "isms" led to the adoption by the artist and writer of three main types of behavior. The first solution open to him was "to sell his soul to the Devil": to enter the path of complete collaboration, serving the party's aims with the ardor, whether real or feigned, of a neophyte. (In fact, as it subsequently turned out, even this bargain with the Devil was in many cases a provisional one.) It was the people of this type—and some old Communist writers—who received the lion's share of state prizes and decorations; it was they who went on the subsidized jaunts to the Soviet Union and other "fraternal" countries. This treatment made them pampered and privileged prisoners of the situation they had chosen. Despite all the material advantages of their loyalty, they were isolated from real life by the bars of their ideological cage and their artificially fostered self-confidence.

The second group ranged from semicollaborators to bogus-collaborators. The majority were non-Communists, but once having published books they found themselves under some obligation to the re-

gime. They were granted concessions of one sort or another and in return were expected to continue writing. Although not everybody would agree, many Hungarians of the younger generation consider that it was the people in this group who preserved the national traditions in a period when even the best Communist writers wrote nothing but tedious propaganda doggerel on anti-imperialist and similar themes. It is important to stress that this second group of people, who somehow continued to write without sacrificing themselves totally to the "party line," were much more important to the survival of the national intelligentsia than was the third group, those who retired into complete silence and became so-called "internal émigrés." The moral influence of the latter was purely passive and negative, whereas the semicollaborators were sometimes able to give some spiritual sustenance in the wilderness. I should explain that by the term "bogus-collaborators" I mean those writers or poets who, unable to publish original work and unwilling to flatter the new ruling class, turned to translations, thus seeming to express a readiness to serve "the cause," at least as craftsmen, if not as creative artists.

The third pattern of behavior, spiritual emigration, was akin to the literature in exile; but since it could not be offered for publication it was usually without influence, unlike the work of semicollaborators which was often published in many thousands of copies. This does not mean, of course, that this literature which was written "for the drawer" produced nothing of value. Quite the contrary, much of it was outstanding, as we learned after it had been published: for example, the work of the Czech poet, Hrubin, and the young Polish poet, Miron Białoszewski. Curiously enough, the most outstanding example of spiritual émigré literature

which came to light only as a result of the Hungarian revolution is the poem by a "semicollaborator," Gyula Illyés, "On Tyranny,"¹ which might almost be read as an answer to the French Communist poet, Eluard, author of the poem "Liberty."

THE DECAY OF SOCREALISM: ² THE DÉRY DISCUSSION

Even before Stalin's death, by about 1952, it had become painfully obvious, even to the dictators on the literary front, that Zhdanovism, far from producing a "new literature" which would fulfill the task laid down by the party of re-educating men, had simply stifled creative work and sterilized it to such an extent that literature was no longer a useful adjunct to party indoctrination. The various modes of adaptation to the doctrine on the part of writers and artists had only helped to nullify "Socialist realism" and to reveal its deep contradictions. The official critics, first in Russia and then, by the usual process of slavish imitation, in the satellites, began to express their deep anxiety at this state of affairs in which literature, far from "educating," was scarcely read even by the most devoted. In diagnosing the sickness which had now so evidently stricken all cultural activity, they were unwilling or unable to subject to any scrutiny the fundamental party doctrine, "Socialist realism." Typically, they invented a new term to explain away the blight which had fallen on literature and the arts and to imply in the usual way that the victims, not the authors of the doctrine, were really to blame. The new term was "schematism," or, as it was also called, "the

varnishing of reality." But it was precisely the embellishment of conditions under the new regime, the creation of a dangerous fiction of reality, the illusion of a near Canaan which had always been demanded by the Socialist realist critics. Apart from the question of artistic conscience, the demand for an essentially romantic picture of everyday reality had in fact led to complete divorce of literature from reality. Socialist realism was now anything but realism. This glaring contradiction in the doctrine was later aptly expressed by one Hungarian writer: "What Socialist Realism is was only known to one man, Zhdanov, and he took the secret with him to the grave."³

This was already quite clear in 1952 but in Stalin's lifetime it still could not be discussed in rational, even if disguised, terms. In the meantime, with Socrealism in full decay, the writer had no choice, if he wished to create something readable, but to take refuge in the past and avoid writing about contemporary realities. Historical fiction and the works of classical writers—it must be said as one of the rare points in favor of the regime that these were produced in vast editions—now achieved unprecedented popularity.

It was in 1952 that there occurred the celebrated case of the most talented of the Hungarian Communist writers, Tibor Déry. This incident was a good illustration of the difficulties caused by the crisis of "Socialist realism." Unlike Gyula Illyés, Déry did not escape to the more distant and innocuous past, but retreated only to the period between the two wars. He had intended to write a trilogy on the career of a lad of working-class origin, the first two volumes being devoted to life in pre-war Hungary, and the third to the beautiful, happy life in Hungary under

¹ *Irodalmi Ujság*, Budapest, 1956, November 2d. First in English: "One Sentence on Tyranny," *Hungarian Literary Gazette Anthology*, London, 1957, p. 78.

² An abbreviation from Socialist realism (pronounce: Sotz'realism).

³ Paul Ignotus, "The Revolution of the Word," *Encounter*, April 1957, p. 10.

Communism. No sooner had Déry published the second volume of his trilogy, than Révai, the Hungarian Zhdanov, provoked a "discussion" on certain "ideological problems" which he considered to have been wrongly treated in Déry's book. His first objection was that Déry's description of a love affair between a bourgeois professor and a Communist girl was so untypical as to be a "distortion." Secondly, he accused Déry of giving a false picture of the illegal Communist party in the 1930's. Déry, he alleged, had depicted this tiny organization as a sectarian group, lacking real contacts with the bulk of the working class. Révai demanded that Déry should rewrite his book as Fadeyev had rewritten his *Young Guard*. Déry rejected this impudent demand—impudent, because Révai, unlike Déry, had no personal knowledge of the real situation in the Hungarian Communist party in the 1930's—and kept silent for a while. Surprisingly, some of the writers involved in the discussion took his side, and Révai's victory, sponsored by the party, was a hollow one. More than anything else it created bitterness among the rank-and-file members of the Union of Writers, whether Communist or not, against such "administrative methods." The importance of the Déry discussion lies in the fact that for the first time since 1948, and at time, moreover, when nearly everybody realized that "something was rotten in the state of Denmark," there was a public controversy between the party leadership and a considerable section of the Communist intellectuals.

Very shortly after Stalin's death the crisis just described came into the open and became a matter of *real* public debate. It is well known that the political and cultural "thaw" was simply a consequence of the fact that the monolithic unity of the party had always been a myth and depended on the personal dic-

tatorship of the dead tyrant. With his death a babble of voices broke loose. Ehrenburg's short novel, *The Thaw*, is not one of the masterpieces of Russian literature. But for all its imperfections it marked the beginning of a new epoch, an epoch, which, indeed, took its name from this work. This was the first time in many years that a Soviet novelist had felt himself free to depict a hitherto hidden part of reality. He showed the depressed, insincere life of a society which lived by slogans, oppressed genuine talent in the arts, but gave the highest awards to servile conformists, proclaimed the sanctity of human rights all over the world yet severely restricted them at home, masking the contradiction by an unparalleled hypocrisy. All this was implied rather than said in *The Thaw*, but to people so accustomed to reading between the lines, its meaning was plain. What to a Westerner was an indistinguished and cautious novel, was, to Eastern readers, a vivid and courageous revelation.

THE FIRST HUNGARIAN "THAW" (1953-54)

Paradoxically the Hungarian thaw began nearly a year before the publication of Ehrenburg's novel—in June 1953. At that time a new liberal policy inaugurated by Imre Nagy had already encouraged writers to cast aside their doubts and fears and speak freely. Within certain limits they were indeed expected to express their true opinions. The weekly literary paper *Irodalmi Ujság* was not slow to react to the new policy. Shortly after Imre Nagy's speech it published a series of poems by the young poet Sándor Csoóri. He was the first to point out the gap existing between reality and slogan fiction. These poems created a stir throughout the country, and Csoóri was soon followed by other poets, such as Kónya and Kuczka, who criticized the diffi-

culties of life in its various aspects. Kuczka, for instance, told of the accumulation of bitter hatred among the peasantry against their Communist rulers. Kuczka went too far on this theme in his *Diary from Nyírség* and received a severe official rebuke.

The limitations of this first Hungarian "thaw" were now becoming apparent, and Nagy's evident desire to grant more freedom to writers was constantly sabotaged by the Rákosi clique, who still had a strong hand in the Central Committee and was eagerly awaiting the moment when Nagy could be ousted with the blessing of Moscow. This did in fact happen early in 1955.

But in these one and a half years of limited freedom Hungarian letters, particularly poetry, came to life again. Writers who had been silent returned to literature. One of the most significant of these, Áron Tamási, published two novels in one year. New poets emerged from semiobscurity; and two of them, László Nagy and Ferenc Juhász, brought about a revolution in poetic style and language. Juhász, who had been known as a talented young poet of the prewar generation, could not develop his gifts until 1954 when he wrote a long epic poem, *The Prodigal Country*. Here he took as his theme the great Hungarian peasant revolt of Dózsa in 1514. Obviously using this as a device, he was able to give a picture of a devastated, sullen country in the aftermath of the revolt; few readers could fail to see the parallel with present-day Hungary occupied and exploited by Russia. But the topic perhaps was less dangerous than the language. Juhász's neo-expressionistic vision required a new style: he described with extraordinary vividness the living world of flowers, animals, flies, jellyfish, horses, and hardy and boisterous men. Though his epic is uneven, and sometimes inhumanly difficult, its last verse contains a clear and beauti-

ful message which could easily be the motto of our age:

. . . freedom is the greatest gift that humanity can bestow upon itself *

Juhász's poetry was the instinctive reaction of a great writer against the dead conformity of the preceding period. The "Dionysiac madness" in his use of the language was itself an indirect threat to the party's cultural policy. In attacking Juhász's "decadent" poetry, infuriated Communist critics might well have argued that freedom in art would lead to a demand for freedom in politics.

When he re-established his power by the end of 1954, or the beginning of 1955, Rákosi's first act was to begin a full-scale campaign against "rightist deviationism" particularly in literature. This sudden frost was followed by a short, dumbfounded silence. But before speaking of the reaction to Rákosi's new attempt to muzzle the writers, we should consider the events which had been taking place in the meantime in Poland, since these were to become an important element in the Hungarian situation.

THE POLISH "THAW" (1954-56)

The precise moment at which the Polish "thaw" began is still a matter of controversy, but I think it can be roughly dated from the time in 1954 when the revelations of the high-ranking Polish Security officer, Józef Światło, became known to the Polish people through external media. These revelations caused a great disturbance among party members, as they revealed in an authoritative way all the terrible abuses and corruption of the Stalinist period. In 1954 there already were unmistakable signs that these revelations had contributed to the feeling that some radical change

* F. Juhász: *A tenyészet országa*, Budapest, 1956.

in the party's policy was inevitable. But this malaise became articulate in the nation at large only about a year later when some Polish literary papers and the students' weekly *Po Prostu* were able to establish themselves as the vanguard in the struggle against Stalinism. The first break-through—and a highly sensational one—was the publication in *Nowa Kultura* of a long poem by the well-known Communist poet, Adam Wazyk. He was an intellectual who accepted the new ideology in good faith and renounced it when its failure had become obvious. His long poem, the *Poem for Adults*, was fiercely attacked by conservative Communists and hotly defended not only by the radical—"enraged"—Communist youth, but by nearly every literate Pole. The essence of this work is that one cannot really change reality by telling lies about it or by proving "scientifically" that everything has changed for the better. Sea water does not become lemonade, even if authorities declare that it is not really salty. Before long this poem had repercussions in Hungary, too. When, in the summer of 1956, the Hungarian journalist, Tibor Tardos, wrote an article against blind dogmatism and enforced credulity under the title "Brine is brine," this was immediately understood by readers as a reference to Wazyk's bold poem which had now been illegally circulated in rough translation.

Though the editor of *Nowa Kultura* was dismissed and Wazyk severely reprimanded, nothing could now stop Polish writers from becoming more and more outspoken. The spell had been broken. In 1956, for instance, at the Nineteenth Session of the Polish Council of Culture, Jan Kott gave a frank analysis of the situation created by Zhdanov and his followers. Kott was the first to discuss publicly the fundamental errors of Soviet cultural policy

and the basic contradiction inherent in the term "Socialist realism."

In the spring of 1956 the revelations made by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress led to a wave of criticism and self-criticism in Poland. Communism was no longer sacred; the true believers were disillusioned and demoralized. The predominant mood in the younger Communist or pro-Communist generation was summed up at that time by Jan Stanislawski writing in *Po Prostu*:

I can see only one conclusion emerging from this chaos, and you must see it too; *there are no authorities any more*, and this applies not only to the District Party Secretary but also to the First Secretary of the Central Committee.⁵ [Italics added]

The whole country knew that a change was to come. The change could have been carried out in two different ways: the Stalinist Natolin group appealed to the reactionary sentiments of the people, offering and promising everything while Gomulka stood for democratization. The Natolinites lost the battle because the people gave their support to Gomulka, and the links between the people and Gomulka were Natolin's main opponents: the writers and journalists.

THE WRITERS' REVOLT AND THE SPONTANEOUS "THAW" IN HUNGARY (1955-56)

The Hungarian writers' revolt in 1955 was an isolated but important action; a year later these "reckless" writers became the spiritual leaders of the nationwide reform movement. Most of the leading Communist writers and journalists had kept silent after the change in June 1953, but they reacted sharply

⁵ *Po Prostu*, 1956, III, 25th. Quoted also by K. Syrop, *Spring in October: The Story of the Polish Revolution, 1956* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 35.

to the restoration of Rákosi in early 1955. Above all, they recognized that the whole country had sympathized with Nagy's effort at liberalization. Haunted by the ghost of László Rajk and shocked and incited by stories told by their rehabilitated Communist friends, they were the first to raise their voices against the re-establishment of something definitely wrong. The revolt began, albeit indirectly, in the summer of 1955 when *Irodalmi Ujság* published some "pessimistic poems" by an outstanding Communist poet, László Benjámín. The poems, telling of Benjámín's painful disillusionment and his bitter self-accusation, were a blunt refusal to lie or accept lies however "necessary" these might be. Subsequently he published some epigrams, one of which made fun of the Minister of Culture, Darvas. At this the Central Committee quickly intervened, confiscating that issue and sacking the editor of *Irodalmi Ujság*. The new, party appointed editor was cautious at first, but it soon became evident that he was willing to publish nearly everything. He continued, for instance, to publish Benjámín's poems, including the very outspoken ones which contained such lines as this:

... but inhuman in the name of humanity,
dishonest in the name of honesty,
false in the name of truth—
nobody can ever be
"A Single Life"⁶

Besides Benjámín, there were three writers who were particularly anxious "to redeem the irredeemable": Zoltán Zelk, the poet, Gyula Háty, the playwright, and Tibor Déry. There were some interesting differences in the behavior of the Berlin-Moscow trained and the exclusively Moscow-trained commu-

⁶ Rough translation. Hungarian original: Benjámín László, *Egyetlen élet*, Budapest, 1956.

nists. Those who had spent a long time in Berlin—Háty, Déry, and Georg Lukács, the philosopher—were all involved in one way or another in the anti-Stalinist revolt. When the writers' struggle reached its peak, Déry—previously expelled from the party by Rákosi—became a dignified symbol of this struggle for human rights.

After the Twentieth Congress the discussion club of the young intelligentsia, called the Petöfi Circle, held a series of important meetings to discuss historical, economic, and philosophical problems. The biggest meeting, a "discussion on the situation of the press and public information," took place in June 1956. It was an ideological dress rehearsal of the October Revolution. For hours six thousand people heard and applauded brave and brilliant speakers, but none of the writers or journalists spoke as calmly and wisely—and yet busting all the colored balloons of Communist cultural policy—as Déry: "The main source of our troubles," he said, "is the lack of freedom." It was something everyone knew, yet no one before him had dared to utter it in public.

Fuming with rage, Rákosi banned the Petöfi Circle. He planned a mass arrest of Imre Nagy and his followers—four hundred men, mainly intellectuals. From a Stalinist point of view he was completely right: everyone who speaks too much about freedom must be arrested, otherwise the party will collapse. But he omitted to inform the Russians about his decision, and this turned out to be a serious mistake. Mikoyan came and Rákosi went. That was the writers' victory.

From 1955 *Irodalmi Ujság* carried on with the publishing of material which was exciting from both a political and a literary point of view. Poems by Benjámín and Zelk, Déry's short stories, and some excellent articles by Tardos and Pálóczi-Horváth contributed much

to the widening and deepening of the second, already spontaneous, "thaw." This thaw soon produced a flood against which all dams of the weakening terror proved insufficient. In the summer of 1956 Gyula Háy published a significant article on the question of what should be allowed for a creative artist:

It should be the writers' prerogative to tell the truth. To criticize anybody and anything. To be sad. To be in love. To think of death. Not to ponder whether light and shadow are in balance in his work. To believe in the omnipotence of God. To deny the existence of God. To doubt the correctness of certain figures in the Five Year Plan. To think in non-Marxist manner. To think in a Marxist manner. . . . To believe something unjust that is still officially maintained to be just.⁷

This was nothing less than a denial of the party's right to have a monopoly over the soul, especially over the soul of writers. And when few months later the Hungarian people refused to live in the old way and took up arms for freedom and independence, the former communist writers, together with their non-Communist colleagues, Benjámín as well as Illyés, Déry as well as László Németh, stood up for the rights of their nation. The revolution restored their faith in the nation, and the nation's faith in itself. After decades of silent self-contempt Hungarians regained their self-respect. And Déry must have been proud of saying in those stormy days: ". . . I feel myself responsible. . . . But we, Hungarian writers, have an excuse: even if rather late, we opened the fight against tyranny."⁸

⁷ "One Sentence on Tyranny," London, 1957, p. 31.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

THE "UNGRATEFUL" SATELLITES TODAY

Despite the losses and retreats since the autumn of 1956, a considerable amount of freedom continues to be given in Poland and Hungary for non-political artistic creation. Of course, the situation is rather different in the two countries: the Poles now write what they want, being aware of their responsibility (and the censorship); the Hungarians write what they want, being aware of the censorship (and a fair chance of being imprisoned). In both countries writers are allowed to describe the beauty of nature and love, but they have been warned not to brood too much on political matters. "Apolitical" has become a favorable epithet; apolitical writers are, on the whole, tolerated. The Kádár regime in Hungary persecutes most furiously not those who welcomed the revolution but those who prepared it intellectually, the "revisionist" Communist men of letters. Déry, sentenced to nine years imprisonment, is regarded by the regime as a "stubborn counter revolutionary" since he had the strength to maintain his true convictions before the court. In Poland, the "revisionists" have merely been expelled from the party and *Po Prostu* was closed—but in fact, the freedom of creation in Gomulka's pessimistic bitter-sweet paradise is still unequaled in all Eastern European countries.

Adam Ważyk, after coming back from Hungary, where he saw the 23d of October, wrote in his poem: ". . . the last myth collapsed." The myth of the only right way and the absolutely true theory has ceased to exist. Eastern Europe has done her best; what will the West do for her?

The Pattern of Political Purges

By ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI¹

Abstract: The purge is inherent in the totalitarian system but it differs in form depending on circumstances and stage of development of the system. Objectives of a purge are: the cleansing of the party, the restoration of its vigor and monolithic unity, the elimination of enemies, and the establishment of the correctness of its line and the primacy of the leadership. Communist purges are of two types: purges whose content is programmatic and whose form is non-violent, and purges whose content might or might not be programmatic and whose form is violent. In the satellites, purges were most violent in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. After Stalin's death during the "New Course" there followed a time of "anti-purge" purges which in some countries shook the foundation of Communist control. The dramatic events of fall 1956, however, again produced pressures for further purges.—Ed.

THE PURGE is a product of the uniquely totalitarian combination of a monolithic and monopolistic political movement with a doctrinaire and dogmatic ideology. When this combination, which is the essence of a totalitarian party, comes to power both organizational and programmatic pressures produce the need for a purge. With power seized, all sorts of elements otherwise not identified with the objectives of the movement flock into the ruling party. Absence of competition, inherent in a monoparty system, results in internal stagnation, decay, and loss of revolutionary zeal. Various "mutual-admiration societies" develop, sponsoring one another within the movement purely from the standpoint of self-interest. Power, in brief, corrupts, and a totalitarian system lacks the competitive qualities of democratic party struggle to minimize the corruption.

In addition, there is a tendency for

¹ The writer wishes to acknowledge his obligation to the Russian Research Center for the support given him.

some members to feel that the revolution has ended since power has been seized. They wish to enjoy the fruits of victory. Others insist on a violent intensification of struggle for the sake of the movement's alleged ideals; they reject the adoption of a policy of compromise and moderation for the purpose of consolidating the newly won power. At the same time, the regime expects its members to perform to the utmost of their energies. The expectations of the regime are often in excess of a member's capabilities. Failure to perform, however, leads to doubts about one's intentions and loyalty. At the top, factors such as those sketched above tend to translate themselves into a struggle for power—either because of the natural power impulse or because power in a totalitarian system is a source (albeit an uncertain one) of security, or because genuine ideological differences do exist. The isolation of the leadership, surrounded by sycophants and competing careerists, makes it suspicious and develops in it a dangerous paranoia.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Cambridge, Massachusetts, is Assistant Professor, Department of Government and Associate, Russian Research Center, Harvard University. Among other works, he is the author of *The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism* (1956).

tendency. The periodic problem of succession adds fuel to this situation. The method of resolving these dilemmas is the purge.

The purge is meant to cleanse the party. It is to restore its vigor and monolithic unity. It is to eliminate real or alleged enemies. (The difference may not be too important—the important thing is that the party membership be convinced that enemies are being eliminated.) It is to assert the leadership's primacy and to underline the correctness of its line. The purge thus differs from totalitarian terror which is normally associated with the totalitarian efforts to remake society, to destroy the old order, to remove all possible sources of opposition to the old regime. The consequences of the purge, for example, imprisonment or execution, help to intensify the terror atmosphere, but the purge itself has an identity of its own and refers specifically to processes affecting the ruling bodies, and primarily the ruling party. It occurs, therefore, more frequently when the party has consolidated its power and can afford the "luxury" of purging itself without fear of the purge being exploited by its opponents.

The purge has been most developed in the Soviet totalitarian system. On the basis of the Soviet experience we can distinguish basically between purges of the top leadership which are programmatic in content and nonviolent in form (for example, the mid and late 1920's purges of the Soviet Central Committee or the case of Molotov *et al.* in mid-1957) and purges of the top which may or may not be programmatic in content and are certainly violent in form (for example, the *Yezhovshchina* period in Russia or the shooting of Beria by Stalin's successors in 1953). A similar distinction obtains for the membership at large (for example, the *Yezhovshchina* as compared to some

earlier and later party purges in the USSR). This pattern has been duplicated in the various Soviet satellites from the late 1940's to the present.

PURGES AND POWER

In the late 1940's, and in some cases still today, the internal policies of the various Eastern European countries were closely associated with the policies and purposes of Moscow. The late 1940's and early 1950's were a period of reassertion of the role of the secret police in the USSR, the disappearance and execution of the up-and-coming Politburo member and *Gosplan* head, Voznesensky, the massacre of the Jewish Communist intellectuals in the USSR, and of growing indications of Stalin's apparent feeling that the Soviet party needed an invigorating dose of the purge. In Eastern Europe the Communist parties were, of course, much less monolithic than the Soviet. They had acquired power recently, were still split into a variety of overlapping factions (for example, the Moscow Communists *vs.* the domestic ones, the "hards" *vs.* the "softs," the Soviet stooges *vs.* "our own road to socialism" believers, and so on), and were only on the brink of launching the internal revolution which follows a consolidation of power. The situation was further complicated by the embarrassing presence of an independent Communist regime in Belgrade, and Moscow feared that some Communist leaders might be tempted to emulate the path taken, somewhat unwillingly, by Tito. The Cominform accordingly warned the Communist leaders that they must "increase by all possible means revolutionary vigilance in their own ranks. . . ." In this manner subjective pressures for a purge emanating from Stalin were combined with some of the existential forces working for a purge because of the situation pre-

vailing in the East European Communist movements themselves.

Broadly speaking, the purges which followed were of the two varieties sketched above. In Poland, the purge revolved around a genuine issue of program, namely, the degree of violence to be employed in collectivization and industrialization and whether there was a distinct Polish way to socialism. In general, the Polish purge oscillated between limited violence and nonviolence *vis à vis* those purged. The same was the case in East Germany and initially in Rumania, although the ideological issues there were not as apparent. The purge was most violent in Bulgaria, Hungary and particularly Czechoslovakia. In these countries public trials of some of the leading Communist figures were held, followed by their execution. The accusations did not involve just ideological deviations; the defendants were charged with treason and conspiracy on behalf of capitalist enemies. The victims came from diverse backgrounds: some were old Communists now accused of having been Gestapo agents; some had fought against Franco, they were now "cosmopolitan" traitors; many were Jews, they were accused of being Zionist infiltrators; some were even Moscow-trained *apparatchiki*, they were now supposed to have betrayed the movement. The pattern of the Soviet purge of 1936-38 was thus being closely imitated.

The first violent purge took place in Hungary. In September 1949, László Rajk, Politburo member and Minister of the Interior, a Communist with many years of devoted service, faced a People's Court and was accused of being an employee of Messrs Allen Dulles and Alexander Rankovich, head of Tito's secret police. Sharing the dock with him were several important party and army functionaries—including, for instance, General Palfy, who engineered

the communization of the armed forces. In a "trial" remarkable for the fantastic content of the confessions and the apparent calm of the defendants (after the Hungarian Revolt it became known that they had been tortured and also promised clemency for confessing), the chief defendants were condemned to death and duly executed by garroting. Rajk's execution and the resulting atmosphere of fear did much to strengthen the hand of Rákosi, Stalin's devoted lieutenant, and put above discussion the blind imitation of Soviet forced industrialization and collectivization programs. Dependence on Soviet support, a consequence of this policy, naturally increased, and any Titoist alternatives (whether such had been considered is not known) were out of the question.

A similarly violent operation was almost simultaneously performed on the upper echelons of the Bulgarian Communist party. As in the Hungarian case no explicit ideological conflict was apparent although the issue of collectivization, which was being rapidly pushed, was probably involved. The political picture, complicated by previous Bulgarian negotiations with Tito concerning a Balkan Union (the matter was dropped when Moscow expressed disapproval), provided opportunities for charges of complicity with Belgrade. The undisputed chief, G. Dimitrov, had been ailing for some time and this necessarily generated a certain amount of struggle for succession. In March 1949, Traicho Kostov, a Deputy Prime Minister and Politburo member, was summarily removed from his posts. He had previously been one of the contenders for power and was associated with the rapid economic revolution being pushed in Bulgaria. According to some reports, he became so enthusiastic over his tasks that he tended, despite his known anti-Titoism, to develop a "Bulgaria-first" outlook. His fall was followed by the

rapid advance of one his chief rivals, Vulko Chervenkov, who succeeded to Dimitrov's mantle. In December 1949, Kostov, together with several high party functionaries, was indicted on charges which might have been borrowed directly from the Rajk trial. The only sensation of the "trial" was Kostov's sudden repudiation of his alleged confession. Kostov, as a matter of course, was executed, and the official party organ, *Rabotnichesko Delo*, reported that after the sentencing he repudiated his repudiation. His associates received severe prison sentences, and the top party echelons were thoroughly purged. Of the 40 members of the Central Committee 17 were removed.

The most extensive violent purge swept the leadership of the Czechoslovak party. The purge gradually gained momentum between the years 1950 and 1952. Individual leaders were dropped from their high posts; others then accused them of treason. In turn the accusers were dropped and accused. The first to go early in 1950 were some high officials handling foreign policy and trade—for instance Vilem Novy, Editor-in-Chief of *Rude Pravo*, the official organ, and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly, and Evzen Loeb, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade. They were followed by Dr. Vladimir Clementis, the Foreign Minister and a high ranking Slovak Communist. The purge then swept the top echelons of the Slovak Communist party. By late 1950 and 1951 it began to embrace the Czech Communist leadership itself, and finally reached its zenith in November 1951 with the announcement that Rudolf Slánský, a Deputy Prime Minister and formerly the powerful Secretary General of the Central Committee, had been arrested. Gottwald, the President, stated: "... new disclosures have proved Slánský guilty of a direct, active and, one might

say, leading part in the anti-Party and anti-state conspiracy."

The purge then proceeded to cleanse the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the Central Committee itself. Gottwald's primacy was now consolidated. Fifty of the 97 members were removed, and the purge reached deep into the bureaucracy and the army. It was the most thorough East European purge. In so far as Slánský and Clementis were concerned, their cases were linked into one, and a typical Soviet-style show trial was staged. The Minister of Justice explicitly drew parallels between the Slánský trial and the Soviet purge trials of the late 1930's. The special feature of the show trial held in November 1952 was its openly anti-Semitic character. This paralleled the anti-Jewish campaign being then waged in the USSR in the form of special press emphasis on the execution of "Jewish speculators" and culminating in the "Doctors' Plot." Since a high proportion of the defendants in the Slánský-Clementis trial were Jews, including Slánský himself, the prosecution repeatedly stressed the alleged links of the defendants with Israel; mocked some of them for their Jewish accents; and accused them of a "cosmopolitan" orientation. Eleven of the accused, headed by Slánský and Clementis, were hanged on December 3, 1952.

PURGES AND POLICY DILEMMAS

Less violent purges occurred in Rumania, Poland, and East Germany. In February 1950 several high Rumanian Communists—including Ana Pauker—were dropped, but recourse to violence was strangely delayed until April 1954 when L. Patrascanu—purged in 1948 for alleged nationalism—was executed. This operation, however, lacked the staging and the "glamor" of the Rajk, Kostov, or Slánský performances. Clearly 1954 was no longer the season, and appar-

ently the Rumanian leadership wanted to get rid of an inconvenient skeleton in its closet. Unlike all the other parties no open violence was involved in the purges of the Communist leadership in Poland and East Germany. In 1950 the East Germans removed Willi Kreikemeyer and Paul Merker, and in 1953 F. Dahlem and Else Zaisser paid a political price for the East German domestic difficulties. They, together with the Minister of Justice Fechner, were accused of pursuing a "defeatist" line towards opponents of the regime. One-third of the Central Committee's membership of 51 was also purged. These moves, however, were relatively *sub rosa* and did not produce any openly significant ideological cleavage nor any major show trials. The absence of an explicitly ideological aspect distinguished the German purge from the Polish.

In Poland, the removal of Gomulka occurred in the context of a power struggle between him and Bierut which, given the circumstances, was almost predetermined in favor of the latter. It also occurred, however, in the context of an ideological dispute which, as events have shown, was not resolved by Gomulka's removal and which ultimately paved the way for his triumphant return. The ideological discussions lasted from the late summer, 1948, to November 1949, during which time Gomulka and his associates were demoted and then expelled. The Soviet pattern of development was now obligatory for Poland; Stalinism was the official path. Nonetheless, initially Gomulka was not even arrested—he was taken into custody in 1951—and never tried. Some of his associates, such as Marian Spychalski, received much more severe treatment; but they, too, escaped execution.²

² References to a nonviolent purge are not to be construed as meaning that physical violence did not take place. What is meant is the pattern of the ultimate disposition of the

No show trials of Polish Communists were staged. What are the reasons for this distinct pattern in Poland and East Germany (although in Germany no one of Gomulka's stature was involved)? No definitive answer can be made without access to party archives. Nonetheless, we do know that Stalin had insisted that the purge trials be held and that severe methods be used. Polish observers were "invited" to the various show trials and presented with evidence "implicating" Gomulka. At the Eighth Plenum (October 1956) J. Berman, the Politburo member most responsible for the secret police terror in Poland, explicitly took credit for having, together with the Politburo, resisted Soviet pressures to do away with Gomulka. There is no way of checking Berman's veracity, but since none of his enemies challenged him at that session we may assume an element of truth in his account. Why did the Polish party resist Stalin's pressures and, more important, why was it able to procrastinate until his death, thereby saving Gomulka?

The causes might possibly be linked to the fact that the Polish Communist party labored under the bitter legacy of Stalin's 1938 accusation that the party was an agency of Polish espionage. As a result, the Comintern abolished the Polish Communist party, and Stalin completed the process by shooting practically all its leaders, many of whom had served with Lenin. The reconstituted party, according to accounts of

victim. Gomulka's fate contrasts sharply with that of Slánský. However, there certainly was physical violence in so far as treatment of political prisoners by the secret police is concerned. This was admitted by J. Swiatlo, a colonel of the police who defected, and in 1956 by members of the Polish Central Committee. It was officially confirmed that Spychalski had been tortured, that prisoners were subjected to sadistic mistreatment (in which Swiatlo participated), and that some prisoners committed suicide rather than endure further brutalities.

some of its well-informed members, was consequently very wary of any further executions of its leaders. Furthermore, the openly anti-Semitic character of the Slánský trial might have frightened Berman, the Politburo member responsible for such matters. As a matter of self-interest he might have felt it advisable to avoid such excesses. On a more general level, elsewhere in East Europe Stalin's pressures for violence were combined with domestic needs for a purge which arise when a totalitarian party has consolidated its power. The Czech party might well have actually needed a violent shake-up of its leadership, once the democratic elements had been crushed. Security tends to breed disunity and factionalism, and Stalinists know only one way of resolving such difficulties. Paradoxically, the relative weakness of the Polish and East German parties might have made it possible for them to avoid the violent purge by pleading that such violence would further undermine their position and be detrimental to the still unfinished process of consolidation. (In East Germany there was, of course, the further problem of wishing to appeal to some left-wing West German elements.) Weakness here might have thus been a source of strength.

All the Eastern European Communist parties also adopted broad measures to reassert the "monolithic" quality of their organizations. This took the form of purging their memberships of all sorts of real or alleged "unhealthy," "alien," or "hostile" elements more or less on the basis of the categories established in the purging of the prominent "deviationists." Since very large numbers were involved, the degree of violence was less intense than in the more spectacular individual cases. The scope of the purges is suggested by the following data on Communists purged in this period.

POLAND	CZECHOSLOVAKIA	RUMANIA
370,000	550,000	200,000

On the average, about 1 out of every 4 party members was purged in each of the East European parties.

DE-STALINIZATION AND THE PURGE

Stalin's death did not lead to immediate changes in East Europe, and, as we have seen, some important Stalin-like executions took place in Rumania even a year later. However, the process of the purge had been largely completed and, on the whole, fulfilled its objectives. The most notable exception was Poland where, even with Bierut's power firmly consolidated, the shadow of Gomulka was lurking in the background. But first a series of events closely connected with Soviet affairs and policies had to run their course.

Stalin's death led to a number of personnel changes in Soviet leadership, the most significant being the elimination of Beria in June 1953. This was followed by a noticeable downgrading of the secret police in the Soviet system and was paralleled by a policy initiated by Premier Malenkov, often called the "New Course." Its substance was a decrease in the tempo of rapid industrialization and more emphasis on consumer consumption. A necessary corollary was a general relaxation in internal atmosphere, a "thaw" as Ilyja Ehrenburg aptly called it.

The events in the Soviet Union gradually found reflection in events elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. Some form of a "New Course" was adopted, "collective leadership" was proclaimed, and the secret police became much less conspicuous. In Hungary, however, the economic new course was linked to an actual change in political leadership with Imre Nagy becoming Premier in the summer of 1953. In Poland the abolition of the Ministry of State Se-

HUNGARY	EAST GERMANY	BULGARIA
200,000	300,000	90,000

curity late in 1954 dismantled an important cog in the Stalinist purge machine. In East Germany even in June 1953 riots did not lead to a policy of mass repression. A delicate mood of widespread relaxation was in the air.

A more dynamic phase followed Khrushchev's ascent to power, his re-emphasis on heavy industrial development, and his bold foreign policy moves vis à vis Yugoslavia. The first tangible consequence was the reassertion of Rákosi's power in Hungary in the spring of 1955 and the purge of Nagy and his followers. According to Nagy's own account, a large number of Communists were expelled and imprisoned. The violent form of the purge was Rákosi's method. But his success was short-lived. While Khrushchev's economic policy seemed to buttress Rákosi's position, Khrushchev's foreign policy undermined Rákosi's power. In June 1955, Khrushchev arranged for a rapprochement with Tito; and the Tito affair was now branded as a Beria-inspired plot. Tito, as a price for settlement, was insisting that all anti-Titoist trials now be repudiated. Moscow seemed willing to accommodate him.

We now enter a phase which, in this age of missiles and antimissile missiles, we might appropriately call *the period of the antipurge purges*. Following Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin's past at the Soviet Twentieth Party Congress, the East European parties were faced with external pressure—from both Moscow and Belgrade—to review the "anti-Titoist period" and with domestic pressures—from the intellectuals, the youth, and parts of the party—to reject the past as a Stalinist deformation. It was clearly an embarrassing time for the East European Stalinists, and one after another was forced to bow. The spring and summer of 1956 were accordingly marked by a series of gory rehabilitations culminating in the ex-

humation and reburial of Rajk's mortal remains.

In Bulgaria the regime at first limited itself to pious editorials in the party paper which condemned the cult of the individual. Nonetheless, these attacks soon linked the name of Stalin with that of Vulko Chervenkov. His fate was sealed when the official announcement of April 14 rehabilitating the hanged Kostov also condemned the premier for having practiced one-man rule. Three days later he resigned amidst attacks on his "brutality." In Hungary Rákosi resigned in mid-July accompanied by attacks on him as a "Judas" and "murderer." In his statement of resignation he complained of "hypertension" which, under the circumstances, seemed to be a justified malaise. In Czechoslovakia the regime picked A. Cepicka, the Minister of Defense, to be the scapegoat for the past and purged him for practicing one-man rule. After some hesitation it decided not to rehabilitate Slánský, although the regime admitted that he had not been guilty of "Titoism." Retroactively, he was now said to have been hanged for practicing "brutal methods" within the party. A very extensive shake-up took place in Poland, the highlight of which was the resignation, on May 6, of J. Berman as Deputy Prime Minister and Politburo member. A number of ministers were also dropped from the Cabinet, and shifts in major posts continued until the very eve of the October 1956 events. In brief, *the antipurge purge* developed a political momentum of its own which, in some countries, actually shook the very roots of Communist control.

POST-OCTOBER 1956

In Poland and Hungary, as it is traced in other papers in this issue, dramatic upheavals were the ultimate consequence. In Hungary, the Communist party of some 900,000 members dis-

integrated in a few glorious October days. Its power was reimposed only by Soviet bayonets and a new party was constructed. Its membership is now only about 50 per cent of what it had been on the eve of the revolution. Nagy and his supporters have been imprisoned, and the party membership subjected to a purge characterized by a return to the Stalinist pattern of violence. Even to this day the Kádár party is split between competing factions, with J. Révai apparently urging a "hard" policy, Kádár more or less representing a "centrist" one, and with a leaderless faction on the wing favoring a policy of popular conciliation. Further purges seem likely.

Gomulka's triumph at the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee in October 1956 led to the expulsion from the Politburo of the most notorious Stalinists: Zenon Nowak, Konstantin Rokossowski, and five others. In a majority of the provincial party committees the first secretaries were also changed, and similar changes occurred on lower levels. It was largely a spontaneous purge. The situation changed gradually, however, in the following year. It became clear to Gomulka that in the long run he could not base his power on popular sentiment, primarily of an anti-Russian character. The party had to be strengthened and Gomulka's primacy established on firmer organizational foundations. As a result in late 1957, at the Tenth Party Plenum, Gomulka announced that the party would be purged in a "verification" campaign because its present membership of 1.3 million was clearly too unwieldy and insufficiently monolithic. Gomulka outlined the following categories as marked for removal: "two-faced elements" who joined the party simply because it was the ruling party but had no personal commitment to socialism; active "clerical" elements who

were opposed to the goals of the party; criminal elements who used the party as a front for their nefarious activities. In broader ideological terms, Gomulka asserted that the party must weed out the "revisionists" who were in favor of excessive liberalization and whom he compared to a "case of tuberculosis," and the "dogmatists" who favored a return to a form of Stalinism and whom he compared to a severe gripe. In a somewhat strained medical analogy Gomulka claimed that the latter can be cured only by getting rid of the former.

The purge, however, was to be non-violent and completely devoid of any negative consequences for those purged. Gomulka reiterated this several times; and, in fact, till now the former *Po Prostu* editors, expelled for revisionism, have not suffered any further consequences from their divorce of the party. One of the purged even continues to be a Deputy to the Parliament, to which he had been elected on the party ticket. Also, none of the purged Stalinists has been persecuted. Late in 1957 and early in 1958 the Polish press began to feature numerous articles on the "verification" campaign launched by Gomulka's speech. The articles are illustrative of the difficulties of operating a nonviolent, even allegedly a "democratic" purge, within a framework which lacks the ultimate terror sanction of the secret police. Some party members are showing complete lack of concern and blandly hand in their cards and resign. Others put up an argument and maintain that members of the "verification commissions" ought to be expelled. And the commissions themselves seem uncertain as to what constitutes the criteria for purging a member.³ Some commis-

³ Many commissions are reportedly troubled by the following situations: if a member is an old and sincere Communist but presently inactive, should he be purged or merely urged to be more active? If a convinced Commu-

sions prepared special questions which all the members in a given party organization had to answer as a form of ideological testing. According to press reports, sample questions included the following: "What is your attitude toward religion and the USSR?" or "Do you still believe in the superiority of the capitalist system?" Such questions were condemned in the papers as indicating an inadequate and formalistic approach, although even the press was at a loss how to identify positively a revisionist or a dogmatist.⁴ In brief, the purge shapes up as a rather confused operation which is not likely to resolve the more fundamental difficulties besetting Gomulka. Nonetheless, while not as spontaneous as the 1957 purge, it is most likely going to remain a nonviolent one.

The Polish events of 1957-58 are of interest because they again point to the fact that a monopolistic political movement with a doctrinaire ideology must periodically rely on the purge, even if it wishes to avoid some of its more violent consequences. A ruling party has difficulties in maintaining its zeal and its revolutionary flavor. This is particularly true if the party becomes a mass party too rapidly. It is noteworthy that since Stalin's purges of the early 1930's, the Soviet leadership has made an effort to restrict party membership. This was not done effectively in East Europe, and the party member-

nist has become disillusioned with Stalinism, should he be purged or "reconverted"? If he is a believing Catholic but not a religious "activist," should he be purged or let alone? Or should he be subjected to an antireligious discussion? But then, he might resign!

⁴ In one village the local activists were reported to have thought that revisionism means support for the German designs against the Polish frontier on the Odra-Nysa rivers!

ships grew much too rapidly. Furthermore, most of the parties have tended to become highly bureaucratized even though many of the civil servants and white-collar workers still antedate the revolutionary period. As a result some of the parties, which are supposed to be the vanguard of the proletariat, are distinctly nonproletarian. This is illustrated by the following percentages of social origin for two of the largest (in absolute numbers) East European parties:

	1956	POLAND	CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Workers		44.6%	36.3%
Peasants		12.8%	7.3%
Bureaucrats and Intellectuals		39.5%	56.4%
Others		3.1%	

These figures suggest persistent difficulties and the persistent need for corrective measures.

The purge, violent or nonviolent depending on the particular combination of existential and subjective conditions, is thus apparently a usual concomitant of the totalitarian revolution. However, once the totalitarian revolution is more or less completed, the mass purge tends to recede into the background. Institutional controls are more developed. Membership policies are more selective and draw on a generation already nurtured in the system. Ideological conflict is hidden from view and is resolved in the inner sanctum of the leadership before the purge of the vanquished is announced. The purge then becomes a process operating at the higher levels and tends to lack the drama of an open policy cleavage or the trauma of mass expulsions. That appears to be the Soviet situation. Present events suggest that East Europe has not reached this more advanced stage of totalitarian development.

Limits and Problems of Decompression: The Case of Poland

By M. K. DZIEWANOWSKI

Abstract: Revelation in 1953 of the corruption of members of the United Polish Workers party and of the sadism of the secret police caused a shake up in the party and the Ministry of Public Security. The resulting "thaw" was accompanied by many changes: "Socialist realism" was rejected; some Marxist tenets were questioned; economic policies were openly criticized. Events at Poznań and revolt of workers in June 1956 revealed dissatisfaction of the masses with party policies. Debates took place within the party—two factions emerged: "Liberal" and "Conservative." Gomulka was subsequently elected First Secretary. His speech at the Eighth Plenum was a return to a "specific Polish way to Socialism." The Plenum was followed by many revolutionary changes: in religion, leadership, economic policy, and elections. Gomulka then began to lean toward the Stalinists. His position was made difficult by the economics of the country and its need to remain within the Soviet orbit. A certain recompression of liberty has taken place since the summer of 1957, but not all the accomplishments of October 1956 have been destroyed. However the trend of events in Poland has worried the people.—Ed.

THE OCTOBER upheaval in Poland and the triumph of Gomulka must be viewed against the background of the closing years of the Stalinist period, 1950–53. During those years the United Polish Workers party (UPWP), pressed by Moscow, embarked upon a process of forcible Sovietization of the country. Arbitrary arrests and show trials of "enemies of the people," "spies," and "saboteurs" became quite frequent. A bitter struggle against the Catholic Church was unleashed; by 1954 at least nine bishops and nearly 1,000 priests were in prison. Rigid thought control was extended to all spheres of intellectual life, and "Socialist realism" was prescribed as the only approved artistic method.

In the economic sphere, the ambitious Six Year Plan (1949–55) devoted more than 50 per cent of all investments to

heavy industry; while agriculture, housing, and consumer goods were sadly neglected.

The Six Year Plan was a grandiose undertaking by Polish standards;

(writes an American economist, J. M. Montias, in *Foreign Affairs* of April 1957)

its various aspects are difficult to evaluate from a perspective of a few years, but some of its negative aspects are obvious even now: at the cost of enormous investments, officially estimated at around 25 percent of national income, but more probably over 30 percent, the Plan was successful in its main goal: the output of producer goods, according to the official index, nearly tripped between 1950 and 1955. During this period non-agricultural employment increased by more than 60 percent. Forty-five percent of all investments went into industry (and most of those to metallurgy,

machine building and armaments), only 9 percent to agriculture (mainly to the collectives and state farms), and 10 percent to housing (primarily in the large industrial centers).

Consequently, by 1952, the country began to suffer from the results of over-industrialization. The agrarian crisis became acute; and Poland, still a half-agricultural country, had to import one million tons of grain from abroad.

All this time the United Polish Workers party, while ruthlessly energizing the "Socialist revolution" and enjoying a monopoly of power, succumbed to the inevitable impact of its native environment and absorbed a great deal of patriotic and anti-Soviet sentiment. While expanding from a small sect of professional revolutionaries to a movement numbering well over a million members, the party was penetrated by a considerable number of non-Marxist elements: some were simple opportunists or adventurers, some were Polish patriots who decided to accept the inevitable and to join the Communist movement in order to work within it for the good of their country.

Many members of the UPWP had vivid memories of Stalin's liquidation of the Communist party of Poland in 1938, and massacre of its leadership. According to a former "activist," Seweryn Bialer, now in this country, a popular saying freely circulating among the party activists in 1955 was:

It is not fair that the French Communists call themselves the Party of the Murdered. It is we who deserve that name. And no Okhrana or Gestapo killed as many of our comrades as did the Soviet NKVD.

They knew about the Soviet deportations of the years 1939–41, the behavior of the Red Army in Poland, the Katyń massacre, the role played by the Soviet Army during the Warsaw uprising, and the Soviet colonial exploitation of the country.

The near-absolute power exercised by the party for a decade corrupted its leadership. This leadership gradually began to crystallize into a distinct stratum, a "new class," separated not only from the rest of the nation but even from the rank and file of the party by a wall of special institutions, shops "with yellow curtains," luxurious housing, hunting parties, rest homes, and special medical care.

Yet, as the events of the autumn of 1956 were to prove, the gap separating the party from the rest of the nation was nowhere as deep as in Hungary. Despite its subservience toward the Kremlin the Polish party managed to preserve a spark of independence, sometimes carefully camouflaged by outward servility. Polish agriculture was less collectivized than any other in the area; in 1955 the state farms covered only 14 per cent of the land and all types of rural co-operatives only 9 per cent. Moreover, Poland was the only satellite country that erected no monument to Stalin. Numerous competitions were arranged, and many prizes awarded; but each time a project was submitted to the Polish party boss, Boleslaw Bierut, he would invariably say: "No! This is unworthy of our great Leader! We must have a much, much more impressive statue to honor Him!" And still another competition would be announced. Eight years passed and Stalin got no monument in Poland.

The Polish party, unlike those in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, or Bulgaria, did not physically liquidate its chief opponent to the Stalinist line. Wladyslaw Gomulka was condemned in 1948 for his "rightist deviation," for his insistence on a "mild revolution," and a "specific Polish way to Socialism" without forcible collectivization or large scale terror; he also favored a certain measure of autonomy for Poland within the Soviet orbit. But while he was dis-

M. K. Dziewanowski, LL.M., Ph.D., Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, is Associate Professor of History, Boston College. He is the author of *The Communist Party of Poland: An Outline of History* to be published by the Harvard University Press in 1958.

missed from the party in 1949, and later on even imprisoned together with some of his political associates, no mock trial was ever staged despite repeated reminders from Moscow. As in most cases, Bierut would answer obediently that evidence was still being collected and that the trial would come in due time.

It is evident, therefore, that to understand the process of decompression in Poland, one has to bear in mind that in many respects the Stalinist pressure was relatively milder, and that the Polish party had managed to save from destruction an alternate team of courageous former underground leaders who automatically gained a certain popularity in the eyes of the public because of their opposition to Stalin and his Polish stooges. This team was invaluable when the party eventually maneuvered itself into a highly explosive situation.

THE "THAW"

The progressive corruption of the "new class" and the sadistic depravity of the secret police were revealed when, in 1953, one of its agents, Józef Światło, fled to the West and published some of the details concerning the manners and morals of several of the party "elite." Światło's revelations, broadcasted back to Poland and spread by means of leaflets dropped by balloon, eventually caused an extensive shake-up in both the party and the Ministry of the Public Security. The liquidation of Beria brought about the extensive purging and reorganization of the Soviet secret police and a curtailment of many of the powers of this force with which the Polish police was closely linked. As a consequence, in December 1954, the powerful security chief, Stanisław Radkiewicz, and many of his vicious henchmen were fired; the dreaded Ministry of Public Security was reorganized and tamed. During 1954-55 police terror abated

somewhat, arbitrary arrests became rare, and censorship was relaxed.

The "thaw" resulting from this shake-up was accompanied by growing ferment among the Communist youth and party intellectuals. Soon some bolder writers and artists joined in the struggle; "Socialist realism" as the only norm of artistic creation was rejected, and several of the basic tenets of Marxism were questioned. Economic policies, especially those leading to the shortage of basic consumer goods and the breakdown of agrarian policy, were openly criticized. The leadership of the party tried to put a brake on the decompression; but the pressure of the rank and file, goaded by the broad masses of the people, was relentless. Demands for further relaxing of the police system, for more freedom of expression, and for more consumer goods were so strong that the party leadership did not dare resist them.

In February 1956 came the Twentieth Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union with its debunking of Stalin, the rehabilitation of the Communist party of Poland, and the death of Bierut in Moscow. Bierut's place was taken by a younger man, Edward Ochab, an old member of the Communist party of Poland and outwardly an experienced and trusted "*apparatchik*." But meanwhile, under the impact of the Moscow congress, the "thaw" in Poland began spreading rapidly. The Moscow congress was more dangerous for the UPWP than for any other Communist party outside the Soviet Union because for most Poles Stalinism and Communism were identical.

Under the mounting pressure of public opinion Ochab promised that the Five Year Plan (1956-60) would restore the balance between agriculture and industry and that defense spending was to be curtailed. Soon amnesty was decreed for thousands of political prisoners.

Initially the decompression had been acquiesced to by the party as appeasement of the masses. Now, however, it became a dangerous phenomenon for the party itself because the people began asking whether Stalinism alone was to be blamed for the conditions prevailing in Poland for nearly a decade.

Thus, in the spring of 1956, as a result of the revelations of the Moscow congress, the release of thousands of political prisoners, the tales told by the repatriated deportees from Russia, and the loosening of censorship, a new climate was created in Poland: press and literature again became informative, colorful, and vivid; topics that had been forbidden for over a decade now were frankly debated. Deportations, show trials, concentration camps, the persecution of the Polish Home Army—all these hitherto forbidden subjects were openly discussed for the first time in ten years.

THE FLOOD

Such was the moral and intellectual atmosphere in Poland on the eve of the Poznań strike and the uprising of workers of June 1956. The strike was caused by exploitation of the workers, waste, bureaucracy, bad housing conditions, and shortage of consumer goods. During the suppression of the uprising at least 53 persons were killed and about 300 wounded. Initially the regime tried to ascribe this outburst of proletarian anger to "foreign agents" and "provocateurs." Gradually, however, under the pressure of public opinion and the press, emphasis was shifted to the actual wrongs and abuses suffered by the workers. The revolt of Poznań posed an explosive problem: how far can decompression go without destroying party control and without provoking Soviet intervention?

Although Cyrankiewicz announced on June 29th that "the bloody events of Poznań will not . . . stop nor weaken

our efforts at democratization," it was feared that progress would be halted. The threatening attitude of the masses, however, pushed the regime further along the road of decompression. On July 20, Ochab spoke of the moral shock produced by the Poznań events and of the "immense wrongs" suffered by the Polish working class. Heavy armaments imposed on Poland as a result of the Korean crisis were blamed as the main reason for the neglect of consumer goods and agriculture; but he also denounced bureaucracy and the soullessness of the authorities, both central and local.

The Seventh Plenum of the party Central Committee (July 18-22, 1956) was conducted in the tense atmosphere created by the uprising. The fear was gaining ground that the party must reform itself under new leadership if it wanted to avoid further serious disturbances. The resolution of the Seventh Plenum conceded that the Poznań uprising "caused a profound shock throughout Poland" and promised a better deal for workers in industry and agriculture. Efforts were to be made to correct "all possible injustices done to the working people."

Parallel to the mounting discontent of the working class, which manifested itself in Poznań and several smaller localities, a broad movement developed in factories. During the summer and early autumn of 1956 the workers, disregarding the trade union leadership and the local primary party cells, both of which were bureaucratized and largely manned by the Stalinists, spontaneously elected workers' councils independent from, and even opposed to, these compromised levers of control.

Thus despite the Poznań uprising—or perhaps because of it—Poland continued its decompression in a state of increasing ferment. There were numerous meetings and manifestations of stu-

dents and workers, of youth and trade union organizations; resolutions were passed demanding "democratization of social life"; a penetrating analysis of the economic ills pestering the country was presented in the press. It was revealed that statistics had been rigged, that six key crops gave a lower yield per hectare in 1954 than in 1934-38, and that Polish agriculture used less fertilizers than before the war. In September, the government announced the closing of the communal machine stations, the sale of machinery to the peasants, the dissolution of the inefficiently run collective farms, and the resignation of Poland's economic boss, Hilary Minc.

Need for new policies

New men and new methods were needed to save the regime from disaster. The attention of an increasingly large segment of the nation was now focused on Gomulka. Since the Poznań uprising, negotiations had been going on between Gomulka and the Politburo to enlist his support for the party, but he would come over only if he could resume his old place. To the party rank and file he was still an underground Communist hero; to the people at large, while he had been, between 1945 and 1948, an embodiment of the Soviet occupation, he was now the man who had challenged the mighty Stalin, who had favored Poland's independence from Moscow, who had become a martyr for the cause of freedom and independence. The Seventh Plenum finally rehabilitated Gomulka, Spychalski and Kliszko.

At the same time a bitter debate was going on within the party leadership on the best way of solving the mounting crisis. As a result of the discussions two factions emerged: one became known as "Liberal," another as "Conservative." The "Liberals," led by the former Socialists, Jozef Cyrankiewicz,

Oskar Lange, and Adam Rapacki, argued for further decompression and favored Gomulka's return to the party leadership. The "Conservative" group, led by Zenon Nowak, Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, Franciszek Mazur, and Franciszek Jozwiak-Witold, favored suppression of the ferment and resumption of the stern policies of the Stalinist period. Initially the position of the First Secretary, Ochab, was doubtful. Gradually, however, under pressure of the rank and file of the party, Ochab shifted his allegiance to the cause of the "Liberals." He sensed the mood of the country; he believed that continuation of Stalinist methods would spell a nationwide outburst, and that Gomulka represented the only way out for the tottering regime. Thus, the late summer of 1956 witnessed a considerable shift within the ruling group. Each faction tried to win over to its side as many members of the Central Committee as possible before the coming Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee. This behind-the-scenes maneuvering went on until the middle of October with the "Liberals" gaining more and more ground and with public opinion and most of the press solidly behind them.

THE OCTOBER UPHEAVAL

The story of the crucial days of October 19-21, the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee, and the election of Gomulka to the post of First Secretary against the violent opposition of the unwelcome Soviet delegation headed by Khrushchev, Molotov, Mikoyan, and Kaganovich, is too well known to need retelling; so is the story of the readiness of the Polish armed forces to fight if necessary, and the grim but peaceful and dignified manifestation of the Warsaw population for Gomulka, and against the Soviet leaders as well as their native stooges.

The programmatic speech which Gomulka delivered to the Eighth Plenum was in many ways a return to his original idea of a "specific Polish way to Socialism." In his statement he critically analyzed the relations between Poland and the USSR and within the UPWP and found them overshadowed by the "cult of personality," a system "organized with precision, crushing every independent Socialist thought."

From now on,

stated Gomulka emphatically,

the relations between Poland and the Soviet Union should be based on full independence, and the rights of each nation to a sovereign government.

Continuing to dissect the Stalinist system in Poland, he pointed out that many

innocent people were sent to their death. Many others, including Communists, were imprisoned, often for many years, although innocent. Many people were submitted to bestial tortures.

Gomulka praised some of the basic achievements of the Six Year Plan as far as industrialization of the country was concerned, but he decried its waste, its distortions and exaggerations, especially the neglect of the consumer-goods industries and agriculture. He pointed to the progressive inflation which had been carefully camouflaged by manipulated statistical data. A system, the essence of which was to be "abolition of exploitation of man by man," had, in its Stalinist interpretation, become a sad distortion of the promised Marxist paradise. While subscribing to ultimate Socialist objectives, he rejected compulsion as a means of implementing them, especially in agriculture, and emphatically stressed that "the ways of achieving this (Socialist) goal can be different. They are determined by various circumstances of time and place."

Gomulka promised the end of lawlessness: the Diet would again become the supreme legislative organ; "the election law must enable people to elect, and not merely to vote."

The Eighth Plenum was followed by many revolutionary changes which took place concurrently with the tragic events in Hungary. On October 28, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, Primate of Poland, was freed from the house arrest in which he had been kept since September 1953. His release was followed by that of most ecclesiastics still remaining under arrest. At the same time, Catholic organizations and periodicals were allowed more freedom of expression. The hated Minister of National Defense, Marshal Rokossovsky, was replaced by General Spychalski; several high ranking general officers of Soviet origin were also replaced by Poles. There was a far-reaching alteration of the entire economic policy of the regime; the Five Year Plan (1956-60) was reshaped. The Communist youth organizations and the trade unions were reorganized. Over 8,000 of the existing 10,000 rural "producers' co-operatives" disintegrated. During the October days, the Union of Polish Youth fell to pieces. The puppet United Polish Peasant party and the moribund Democratic party revived, revealing surprising vigor. In the conditions of near-competitive co-existence in which the party found itself during the "thaw," the UPWP melted down to the size of its apparatus, and for a while became just one of the numerous political currents. Thus the October upheaval revealed that the mask of unity, so arbitrarily imposed on Polish political life during the Stalinist period, could be maintained only by force.

The Kremlin's official acceptance of the October upheaval was indicated by Gomulka's visit to Moscow in November 1956 when he even obtained some economic help for his country. Russian

acquiescence in the *fait accompli* was given reluctantly, however, and only on the condition that Poland remain within the "Socialist camp" and permit "temporary stationing of the Soviet troops in Poland." The agreement was a triumph for Gomulka since it consolidated both his position in Poland and Poland's position within the Soviet bloc.

The decompression that took place in Poland in 1956 was the climax of the long process of the "thaw" which had started in 1954; its successful conclusion may be ascribed to Gomulka's leadership and to the remarkable discipline and common sense of the Polish people who refrained from using their traditional but tragic weapon of national uprising. The fact that most of the party backed Gomulka prevented serious domestic complications that would probably have led to Soviet intervention. Ochab's siding with the "Liberals," quietly stepping down from his post and bowing to Gomulka, assured a peaceful transfer of power and made the Soviet delegation look like intruders, not mediators. The press and the radio played their crucial role, first by gradually moulding public opinion and then by their restraint, which helped prevent an unnecessary outbreak.

In accordance with Gomulka's promise, the *Sejm* elections which took place on January 20, 1957 were no mere replica of a Soviet plebiscite. Local commissions, formed by the three existing political parties—the United Polish Workers' party, the United Polish Peasant party, and the Democratic party—as well as by social, cultural, and economic organizations proposed candidates. Thus, although only one list of candidates was allowed, the voters had some choice from among various candidates on the list. The vital importance of the elections was dramatized by Gomulka's speech made on the eve of the polling day. Pointing to the exam-

ple of Hungary he warned his countrymen that a failure to support him and his party would have tragic consequences for Poland and might result in the country's disappearance from the map of the world. The Polish electorate understood the meaning of the grim warning. Under the circumstances the elections were an unqualified success for Gomulka, if not for his party.

THE RECOMPRESSION

Since the elections, Gomulka has been squeezed between the pressure of his people for further decompression and the need to placate the Soviet Union, uneasily watching the Polish people "attempting to crossbreed authoritarian with liberal institutions," to use the expression of J. M. Montias. Gomulka has been trying to stabilize his position within the party by endeavoring to restore its monolithic unity and by making certain concessions to the Stalinist faction, while preserving some of the basic achievements of the decompression. Gradually, taking into account the trends prevailing in the USSR, the facts of geography, and the worsening international situation, Gomulka tried to lean more and more toward the Stalinists. This was proven by his speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee when he sharply attacked the "Revisionists" and emphasized the need of restoring discipline, obedience, and the returning to a monolithic concept of the party. The press, one of the chief instruments of the October upheaval, was reprimanded for its outspokenness and given as its main task the "mobilization of all national forces in support of the Party's and Government's policies." On the other hand the Eleventh Plenum brought about the exclusion of some of the most aggressive Stalinists from the party.

The suspension of the outspoken weekly *Po Prostu* in the summer of

1957, and its closing in October, further alienated the original supporters of Gomulka. This has been especially true of the party intellectuals, often called the "enraged ones," who have resented Gomulka's compromise with the Stalinists and with the grim realities of international politics. The changed attitude toward the Soviet Union was given official expression by Gomulka during his visit to Moscow to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. In Moscow the Polish leader emphasized the need for the unity and solidarity of the Soviet bloc, more than the "specific Polish road to Socialism," though he did oppose the revival of any international Communist organization. Another example of the increasingly accommodating attitude of Gomulka toward the Soviet Union was his decision not to send an official delegation of the Polish party to the April congress of the Yugoslav party, despite initial promises to this effect.

Gomulka's position has been made difficult because of the shaky economic situation. The Poznań uprising and the ensuing unrest, the strikes and stoppages of work connected with the October Coup and followed by the reshaping of economic planning, all further dislocated the functioning of the Polish economy. While liberalizing the hitherto totalitarian regime, writes the American economist already quoted, Gomulka, "loosened the bond of compulsion that kept the old economic system together" before reviving individual initiative and enterprise. Only agriculture made a spectacular recovery which astonished everybody; the situation in industry has improved a little bit.

Thus, although a certain recompression of the sphere of liberty has taken place since the summer of 1957, the achievements of October 1956 have not been completely destroyed. On one hand, the party dictatorship has been

mitigated, mass police terror as a major instrument of power has disappeared, Soviet colonial exploitation of the country has been removed, the peasants have received back most of the land, and agrarian policies have been overhauled. Furthermore, during all this time Poland has continued to evolve toward a more diversified market economy comprising three sectors: state industry, co-operative enterprises, and a private sector in agriculture and handicraft. In addition to these reforms, the Diet has regained some of its prestige and influence; despite some relapses the press has retained a measure of freedom, small by Western standards, but impressive by the standards of the Soviet bloc. Cultural intercourse and freedom of research exchange with the West have also been continued. Religious instruction has returned to Polish schools.

On the other hand, the loudly advertised program of "democratization" of the party has remained on paper. The attempted changes of the "economic model" have been slowed down; the Workers' Councils were first reduced to the role of debating societies and then merged with the Trade Union cells and Factory Councils, both controlled by the party; private initiative in economic and social matters has been discouraged, to put it mildly. The pledge to better the lot of the common people has also been pushed into the background, and the reform of prices and wages has been postponed until 1959. This is, roughly speaking, the balance sheet as of early 1958.

Oscillations of the decompression seismograph are caused by the shifting balance of power within the Soviet Bloc, largely determined by China's attitude, by the struggle for power between the rival factions in the Kremlin, and by the passions and aspirations of the Polish people. The ultimate limits of the Polish decompression are set by the

basic facts of geography, postwar power politics, and the internal situation of the "Socialist camp." In a way, this constitutes a vicious circle; no really essential and lasting changes in Poland's domestic structure are possible so long as the country remains within the Soviet orbit; but any attempt to leave this orbit would be suicidal, as was shown in the case of Hungary. This is understood by Gomulka, who, after his *Sturm und Drang Periode* of the autumn of 1956, has returned to the role of a hard-

boiled, astute politician, an old Communist but also a patriot, supremely aware of the stakes in the game. Still, the general trend of events in Poland has worried the people. This concern has recently been given expression by the leader of the Catholic parliamentary group, Stanislaw Stomma, who said during a parliamentary debate: "People are tired and impatient because they are not sure of the future, and have not been told, even in general terms, what the future is to be."

Limits and Problems of Decompression: The Case of Hungary

By PAUL KECSKEMETI

Abstract: Anxious to dilute authority within the Communist regimes in the satellite countries, Stalin's successors in 1953 compelled Hungary's party boss, Mátyás Rákosi, to share power with a moderate Communist, Imre Nagy. The Moscow center hereafter consistently sought to balance one set of Communist powerholders in Hungary against another. It is shown how this manipulation policy eventually undermined the stability of the Hungarian regime and rendered it unable to stem the tide of revolt provoked by accumulated past grievances.

IT IS a safe generalization that revolutions do not break out when governmental tyranny is at its peak. As Crane Brinton puts it:

Nothing can be more erroneous than the picture of the old regime as an unregenerate tyranny, sweeping to its end in a climax of despotic indifference to the clamor of its abused subjects. Charles I was working to "modernize" his government. . . . George III and his ministers were trying very hard to pull together the scattered organs of British colonial government. Indeed, it was this attempt at reform, this desire to work out a new colonial "system," that gave the revolutionary movement in America a start. In both France and Russia, there had been a series of attempted reforms, associated with names like Turgot, Malesherbes, Necker, Witte, and Stolypin. It is true that these reforms were incomplete, that they were repealed or nullified by sabotage on the part of the privileged. But they are on the record, an essential part of the process that issued in revolution in these countries.¹

To the classic examples cited by Brinton, we may now add that of the Hun-

¹ Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, revised edition (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952), p. 41.

garian uprising of October 1956. In trying to explain the Hungarian revolution, the first thing we must bear in mind is that it occurred during a period of "thaw." The second is that this "thaw" did not originate in Hungary but was part of the "decompression" campaign which started in Soviet Russia with Stalin's death and spread over the whole satellite empire. A third essential point that we have to take into account is that, although the relaxation of governmental practices throughout the Communist world followed the same blueprint everywhere, the results varied considerably from one part of the Soviet empire to another.

The main question facing the historian in connection with the Hungarian revolution of 1956 as well as the parallel developments in Poland is surely related to this last point: what we have to explain is, first and foremost, why events took a violent turn in Budapest and nearly did so in Warsaw when in Prague and the other satellite capitals everything remained quiet. In trying to find the answer, we must look for political factors that were present in Hungary and Poland but not elsewhere.

Paul Kecskemeti, Ph.D., Washington, D. C., is Senior Research Associate with The RAND Corporation. He was formerly regional analyst with the Office of War Information and the War Department.

One such differentiating factor can be identified at first glance: it was only in Poland and Hungary that the top leadership of the Communist party broke up into two sharply antagonistic factions: the Gomulkaites *vs.* the Natolin group in Poland, the Nagy wing *vs.* the Old Guard led by Rákosi in Hungary.

The split in the party leadership, however, could not have developed the way it did if it had not been for a novel factor introduced into Soviet political life in 1953. This was the basic post-Stalin rule forbidding Communist power-holders anywhere to use police and judiciary terror against Communist rivals and opponents. There had been some departures from this rule, but on the whole it had been adhered to up to the October events, not only in Russia and in those satellite countries where the party leadership was reasonably homogeneous, but also in Poland and Hungary where sharply polarized factions emerged within the leadership. The rule continued to be observed even when it became apparent that the liberalizing, national-Communist groups in Poland and Hungary by mobilizing mass support were gaining strength at the expense of the more orthodox and conservative wing.

In Hungary, the regime was in open crisis from the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist party onward. For months on end, Budapest presented the astonishing spectacle of a Communist capital where the government and the official party leadership were denounced day in and day out in newspapers and public meetings. Still Moscow did not relax its ban on police and judiciary terror. Not that it was neutral as between Rákosi and his Communist detractors: it backed the former but expected him to keep, or rather regain, control by means short of terrorism, relying only on the techniques

of the modified totalitarianism of the post-Stalin era.

The general conclusion that emerges from this preliminary analysis is that the techniques of political control developed by the Moscow leadership after Stalin's death did not enable the Soviet Union to remain on top of political developments in Poland and Hungary. How and why post-Stalinist modified totalitarianism came to grief in Hungary will be shown in outline below. As we shall see, the Soviet leadership manipulated the distribution of political power in the Hungarian party by fiat, first favoring Nagy over Rákosi and then throwing its support behind the latter, but never allowing its favorite of the moment to become all-powerful. The idea was to maintain stability by keeping antagonistic forces in balance, but the intraparty struggle got out of hand and eventually brought the regime down in a violent explosion.

COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP

When Stalin died, Mátyás Rákosi was the undisputed boss of Hungary. Not content with the position of Secretary General of the Hungarian Communist party (officially designated as Hungarian Workers' party), he also assumed the office of Prime Minister in August 1952—up to that time, he had been Vice-Premier in a number of successive cabinets of varying composition. Such a cumulation of offices, however, could not endure long after Stalin's death. The new Soviet leadership proceeded to dilute authority at the top: control of the party apparatus was separated from leadership in the administration. Hungary, of course, had to follow suit, but Rákosi was not allowed to redistribute authority as he saw fit. It would have been easy for him, if left alone, to divest himself of part of his offices and fill them with his own dummies; and

this was precisely what he set out to do when Moscow instructed him to replace "one-man rule" by "collective leadership." But the center was in dead earnest about diluting authority. In May 1953 Rákosi was summoned to appear in Moscow *ad audiendum verbum* and to take along, not only his faithful henchmen Ernő Gerő and Mihály Farkas, but also two mavericks, Imre Nagy and István Dobi.

This was a straw in the wind. It indicated that Moscow not only wanted to replace one-man rule by collegiate government in Hungary, but also was interested in giving authority within the new governing body to people who did not see eye to eye with Rákosi on certain important matters. The choice of the outsiders whom Rákosi was instructed to take along much against his will was significant. Dobi was not even a member of the Communist inner circle but a former Smallholder party man turned Communist; Nagy, an old party wheelhorse and former émigré in Moscow, had only recently been reinstated as member of the Hungarian Politburo after being under a cloud for Titoist deviations. Both were known to be extremely critical of Rákosi's policy of forced collectivization of peasant holdings. By giving them the nod, the Moscow center intimated its desire for concessions to the peasantry.

Appearing early in June before the Moscow Presidium with his ill-matched companions, Rákosi was forced to listen to a scathing denunciation of his stewardship during the past years. Beria, Malenkov, Molotov, Khrushchev, and Kaganovich took him severely to task. He was told that his attempt to build up a gigantic heavy industry in Hungary under his Five Year Plan of 1950, expanded further in 1951, was unsound, extravagant adventurism. His farm policy, determined in the needs of industrialization, had also been disastrous.

It drove hundreds of thousands of peasants from the countryside, swelling the ranks of industrial workers who could only produce at a loss while leaving the land without enough people to work it. The country lacked food and the mood of the people was bitter. If the situation was not remedied, the government would eventually be "booted out."²

Rákosi chastized

The Hungarian delegation returned to Budapest with precise instructions. The Central Committee was to meet and condemn Rákosi's policy of overindustrialization and forced collectivization. Rákosi was to abandon the premiership and hand it to Imre Nagy, whose mission was to placate the peasantry by stopping the collectivization drive and to emphasize production of consumer goods at the expense of heavy industry. There were also to be other reforms, notably the relaxation of police terror. At the same time, Rákosi was to remain head of the party apparatus; the party under Rákosi and the administration under Nagy were to work hand in hand to correct the mistakes of the past and create more tolerable conditions.

The Hungarian Communist party did as told: meeting on June 27–28, the Central Committee duly condemned Rákosi without deposing him as party leader and adopted new policy directives in accordance with Moscow's wishes. On July 4, Nagy was ap-

² A deliberately vague summary of the Soviet leaders' denunciation of Rákosi's policy is found in *Imre Nagy on Communism* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 66. The last remark about the Hungarian government facing the risk of being "booted out" is attributed there to Khrushchev. Nagy also states that at the June meeting, Molotov and not Beria (*sic*) told the Hungarians that there was no objection to permit the dissolution of kolkhozes (*ibid.*, p. 153). The covert meaning of this pointed reference to Beria will become clear as we proceed with our narrative.

pointed Premier. Presenting himself before the National Assembly on the same day, he announced a bundle of reforms. Peasants, he said, will no longer be forced to join kolkhozes or even to remain in them against their will; the people will be given more consumer goods; police terror will be abolished.

The Hungarians could hardly believe their ears when they heard Nagy's inaugural speech. The more sanguine in the countryside concluded that "Communism was over," and proceeded to restore private property in land. In the cities, there were great expectations; for the first time since the establishment of the Communist one-party state, the country had a government which had a measure of genuine popularity.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE "THAW"

This was the beginning of "decompression" in Hungary. While Rákosi's regime had been, in some respects, the most Stalinist of all, the "thaw" under Nagy was the most sudden and most radical. To be sure, the Hungarian innovations were not unique; but it was only in Hungary that the announcement of the new course created the impression of a substantial change in the nature of the system itself.

The Moscow center neither anticipated nor desired this, and Nagy himself was too orthodox a Communist to conceive his role in such terms. He neither wanted to change the nature of the system nor aspired to set up a "national Communist" regime independent of Soviet tutelage. In fact, in all he was doing, he felt he was merely carrying out Moscow's instructions, as implemented by the Hungarian party's Central Committee. Hence, from Nagy's point of view, there was no reason why Rákosi should not go along with him. The differences between them concerned

only tactics, and the highest party authorities had pronounced his, Nagy's, tactical approach to be the correct one. As a disciplined Communist, Rákosi had had no choice but to co-operate in putting Nagy's reforms into practice.

Split in leadership

Rákosi, however, did no such thing. Rallying the party apparatus which he still controlled, he gave out the watchword that Nagy's drive was full of danger and must be stopped. In fact, within a few days after Nagy's speech, the whole countryside was in uproar; the peasants decided to disband the kolkhozes before the harvest rather than wait for the directives which the government promised to issue after it was completed. This led to many clashes, a situation which Rákosi exploited to discredit Nagy. At a meeting of the Budapest party organization on July 11, he sounded the alarm about kulaks moving to destroy the Socialist order. All those present understood that Rákosi's real target was the Nagy government. Thus, the beginning of the "thaw" in Hungary also marked the beginning of the split in the Communist leadership.

At first, the split was not a matter of clashing doctrines. Rákosi did not say that Nagy's reform program was wrong in principle. What Rákosi told his followers was to keep their powder dry; he, Rákosi, would soon be back in Moscow's favor, and the apparatus would then be restored to supreme authority. There were, indeed, capital developments in Moscow which nourished Rákosi's optimism: Beria, who had carried the ball at the Moscow conference which condemned him, was liquidated soon afterward.

Even after Beria's fall, however, Rákosi did not make much headway with this master argument which he kept urging in Moscow. The center,

apparently, was quite happy about things as they were, with the state machinery and the party apparatus locked in stalemate. Moscow also was far from being dissatisfied with Nagy's reform policy as such, in spite of such initial mishaps as the peasant revolts of the summer of 1953 which Rákosi took such pains to exploit against his rival. In 1953 and 1954, when Malenkov's authority was at its height, there was not much chance of undermining a policy based upon making concessions to the people and relaxing terrorism.

In May 1954, the Hungarian leaders went on another pilgrimage to Moscow, asking the center to arbitrate their differences. Rákosi trotted out his Beria argument; but was told that Beria, scoundrel though he was, had for once been quite correct in so far as he, Rákosi, was concerned. This is what Khrushchev, according to Nagy, said on that occasion:

In June, 1953, we correctly passed judgment on the Hungarian Party's leadership, and that judgment is still entirely correct today. They can't hide behind Beria as Rákosi is trying to do. We were there, too, when these errors were ascertained, every one of us! We were right, and what we decided then is also right today. This should have been acted on already!³

The last cryptic sentence in Khrushchev's speech is particularly revealing. Nagy does not explain it; this is understandable, since his book is a brief he composed after his exclusion from the party in the fall of 1955, arguing the case for his reinstatement. To the party audience for which Nagy's text was written, the allusion was perfectly clear. What Khrushchev had in mind was that the Hungarian party's Third Congress, scheduled to meet on April 18 to elect a new Politburo from which some of Rákosi's followers were to be dropped,

³ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

had been postponed at Rákosi's urging to give him a chance to plead his case once more in Moscow. The delay, Khrushchev implied, was totally unnecessary: the prearranged script was not to be changed. Thus, the pilgrims having returned from Moscow, the Congress convened on May 24; on the 30th, it elected the new Politburo minus the three Rákosités whose elimination Moscow had prescribed.

THE FREEING OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

The Moscow meeting of May 1954 also decided in Nagy's favor a policy dispute of long standing between him and the apparatus, a decision which was to have extremely far-reaching consequences in the sequel. The dispute concerned the release of many thousands of political prisoners detained in concentration camps and penitentiaries. In his inaugural speech of July 1953, Nagy had promised to put an end to the system of arbitrary police arrests, to dissolve the concentration camps, and to review the cases of all those who had been incarcerated on political charges during the Rákosi era. Rákosi fought this policy tooth and nail and with considerable success. To be sure, there were no more political arrests after Nagy assumed the government, and many totally innocuous and obscure interneés were freed. Rákosi had no objection to this; but he was vitally interested in blocking the review of the cases of hundreds of people, mostly Communists and Social Democrats, who had been arrested, tortured, and sentenced on fictitious charges in the vast purges he had instituted in 1949-52. For about a year, Rákosi had his way, but Nagy continued to press the matter. When the question came up at the May conference, the Soviet leaders expressed displeasure with the dilatory way in which the issue was being handled and ordered the release

and rehabilitation of the victims of Rákosi's purges. For Moscow, this was a matter of course. There had been a political amnesty in Soviet Russia the year before; no satellite government could be allowed to follow a different path.

The Hungarian case, however, was not comparable to the Russian. No mass purges had occurred in Russia since before World War II, and the amnesty of 1953 was not calculated to raise grave moral problems among Communists brought face to face with the enormity of synthetic trials and extorted confessions. By contrast, when hundreds of Hungarian Communists and Social Democrats returned from prisons and concentration camps and told their friends what had happened to them, the moral effect was devastating.

These tales, of course, were not published at that time. The public comments made by Nagy and the spokesmen of his regime after the rehabilitation campaign was nearly completed in the fall of 1954 were stern enough but still remained on a general plane. Nagy, for example, wrote in an article in *Szabad Nép* on October 10, 1954:

The Party's June resolutions⁴ have been put into effect by the rehabilitations, by the liberation of unjustly sentenced comrades. . . . In this sphere, too, we must and will liquidate the grave mistakes of the past. This demonstrates the Party's sense of justice and its strength, as well as the wisdom of collective leadership.

There was nothing in this to disturb the peace of mind of the general reader:

⁴ The reference is to the Central Committee's resolutions of the previous year (June 1953) which censured Rákosi's policy and spelled out the "New Course." Nagy and the publicists of his regime were constantly invoking the "June resolutions" which, however, were withheld from the general public: Rákosi had succeeded in obtaining a party decision blocking their publication.

there had been faults, but the party in its wisdom had seen to it that they should be corrected. At the nerve center of the party, however, the rehabilitations had entirely different repercussions.

Many of the former political prisoners were left-wing intellectuals, writers, and journalists who had always moved in the Budapest literary set and now made it a point to tell all to their erstwhile cronies. Nights were spent going through what had happened—a story of unspeakable, gruesome tortures, revealing the Communist state apparatus as a monster of depravity. The recipients of these confidences wished they were dead, for as Communist writers they had provided a richly orchestrated literary accompaniment to the purges. They had exhausted the remarkable resources of the Hungarian language to vilify the victims and render thanks to their torturers for saving humanity and socialism from harm. Now they felt they had no excuse whatever and began to hate themselves and Communism, the cause of their utter moral degradation. This was one of the decisive impulses behind the revolt of the Communist writers which set the stage for revolution two years later. It must be stated here that the greatest figure among the Communist writers, Tibor Déry, did not need this kind of shock to see the light: he never lent his name to Rákosi's man-hunts and was in opposition throughout the latter's reign.

Another momentous consequence of the rehabilitations was that many party functionaries who had gone through the inferno of Rákosi's jails and camps were restored to high or middle party offices. The best known of these is János Kádár, one of the architects of the October revolution who was to betray it; he was made First Secretary of the Communist party organization of the Thirteenth District of Budapest, a working-class quarter which early in 1956 became one

of the focal points of the intraparty revolt against Rákosi.

NAGY'S FALL

In October 1954, Nagy's position seemed impregnable and Rákosi appeared to be on his way out. He was absent from the Central Committee meeting of late October which again condemned the forced industrialization policy of the Rákosi era and gave the green light to Nagy for a reorganization of the economy with emphasis upon consumer goods. A few months later, however, Nagy was ousted; and Rákosi was back. The wind suddenly changed in Moscow: Malenkov was forced to resign in February 1955; and on March 9 the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist party, following instructions from Moscow, condemned Nagy's reform policy as a "rightist deviation." From then on, Nagy's political decline was rapid. On April 14, the Central Committee not only deposed him as Premier but also dropped him from the Politburo; in November he was expelled from the party.

Nagy, as we see, was treated far more rigorously than Rákosi had been when he fell out of favor. The Soviet center, in fact, no matter how displeased with Rákosi's conduct of Hungarian affairs, always viewed him as an insider, an important figure in international Communism, whereas Nagy was expendable. To be sure, after Nagy's fall, Rákosi was not permitted to combine his party office with the premiership; the latter post went to András Hegedüs. But this separation of offices had no real significance: Hegedüs, a nonentity, was completely dominated by Rákosi. Hungary seemed to have returned to one-man rule in substance if not in form.

The main reason for Nagy's fall was that his key policy, the reconversion of industry, was anathema to the anti-

Malenkov group which got the upper hand in Moscow. The chief stumbling block was that new capital would have been needed to put reconversion into effect, but Hungary had no money and Moscow firmly refused to foot the bill. It was now Nagy's turn to be criticized for extravagance. He pleaded for an expansion of trade exchanges with the Soviet Union, but Moscow told him that Soviet supplies to Hungary would be cut in half in 1955. He then proposed to increase trade with the "people's democracies," but learned that these were moving toward autarchy. In desperation, Nagy decided to try to finance his experiment by trade with the Western countries.⁵ This definitely was the last straw; the idea of financing his domestic schemes by sources outside the "camp of peace and democracy" put Nagy's Communist loyalty in doubt. Rákosi's past crimes were venial by comparison. Nagy had to be dealt with harshly; he had no roots in the apparatus, and he dabbled in heresy.

Nagy's policy appeared costly and dangerous in other ways too. The economic report submitted to the October meeting of the Central Committee admitted that labor productivity in 1954 had dropped 3.3 per cent; this was due to the relaxation of the Rákosi regime's slave-driving methods. That tendency, too, had to be stopped. Whatever the merits of Rákosi's industrial policies had been, Moscow now decided that Hungary had better get along with the industrial plant that was there, forgetting about reconversion and higher standards of living. Rákosi's reinstatement was the logical consequence of this decision.

Rákosi regains power

It would be a mistake to interpret Rákosi's comeback as a return to Stalinism. The *status quo ante* was restored

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 184 ff.

in some respects, notably as regards labor policy; conservatism was the order of the day, and all ambitious reform plans were shelved in the chilly new climate of retrenchment. But wholesale terror was not resumed, no new collectivization drive got under way, and most important, the policy of rehabilitation was not rescinded. Rákosi had to endure the presence in the apparatus of returnees from the camps who thirsted to get even with him. Khrushchev's pet foreign political scheme, the reconciliation with Tito, also was potentially dangerous for him, since Tito was not likely to forget the exceptional viciousness of Rákosi's conduct toward him—and, incidentally, toward Yugoslav minorities and residents in Hungary—during the conflict. Rákosi's enemies in the party could count upon the warm support of Tito whose star was rising in Moscow.

Rákosi, in fact, regained only the shadow rather than the substance of his erstwhile power. The old party bureaucracy continued to back him almost to a man, but the newly reintegrated functionaries back from prison hated him; and the Communist intellectuals, too, now were his fierce enemies. These opponents adopted Nagy as their hero, the man who had attempted to humanize the regime but was brought low by Rákosi's intrigues. It was after his fall that Nagy became the center of a cult among disgruntled Communists.

OPEN REBELLION

The first symptoms of overt rebellion in the party appeared in the fall of 1955 with a bristling note to the Politburo denouncing the regime's cultural policies and signed by all prominent Communist writers of the country. The Politburo reacted with a sharp resolution verbally castigating the writers, but nobody was arrested; there were only a

few disciplinary punishments which the writers shrugged off. In the winter, critical articles began to appear in the official organ of the Writers' Association, the *Literary Gazette*.

These were only isolated incidents. After the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956, however, all hell broke loose. Khrushchev's secret speech became known overnight. Khrushchev spoke only about Stalin, but his revelations seemed to suit Rákosi to a T; and the latter's foes in the Hungarian party immediately concluded that the new party line, as formulated by Khrushchev, authorized them to denounce the boss openly and in public.

The subsequent press campaign against Rákosi and his system, conducted mainly in the columns of the *Literary Gazette*, has since been described in Western publications, and so has the series of explosive meetings in the Petöfi Circle, a discussion club operating under the auspices of the Communist Youth League.⁶ It is less well known that rebellious voices of extreme bluntness were frequently heard in the spring of 1956 at party meetings in various working-class districts of Budapest. The party rebels at first did not know the magnitude of the risks they were taking; they reckoned with the possibility of being arrested. But it soon became clear that there would be no arrests: the police was not permitted to touch Rákosi's critics.

After the Twentieth Congress, the Old Guard was retreating step by step. On March 2, Rákosi publicly admitted that the most prominent victims of his purges, Rajk and the other alleged

⁶ See United Nations, *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary*, New York, 1957, paras. 379-385. The fullest documentation on the intellectuals' revolt is found in a special issue of *Les Temps Modernes*, Paris, Vol. 12, Nos. 129, 130, 131 (January 1957).

Titoist conspirators executed with him, had been innocent. This admission gave new impetus to the outcry against the boss. He was now commonly referred to as the "bald-headed murderer"; his authority in the party and in the country sank to zero. Moscow at first sought to keep him in power: the only real alternative, in fact, was Nagy, but the center still regarded him as impossible. In the end, a weak intermediate solution was adopted.

Realizing that Rákosi had outlived his usefulness, Moscow let him go. The axe fell on July 18, but this time there was no pilgrimage to Moscow: instead, Mikoyan came to Budapest. He told the Hungarian party to remove Rákosi as First Secretary and replace him with Ernő Gerő.

This did not appease the critics; Gerő, in fact, had always been closely identified with Rákosi; and he had been one of the driving forces behind Rákosi's Five Year Plan, the source of Hungary's misfortunes. He was in a difficult position. He could not change basic economic policy since Moscow's objections to reforms in this field remained in force. But the people now demanded tangible improvements, and the Poznań riots of June 1956 had shown that violent outbreaks were no longer unthinkable. In his quandary, Gerő tried to create a better atmosphere by wooing the party opposition. His promised freedom of criticism and sought to improve his position by diverting popular wrath against the political police. The solemn reburial on October 6 of Rajk and some of his co-victims was an astonishing spectacle; it was essentially a demonstration under government auspices against the political police. A few days later, Mihály Farkas, the chief torturer of Rajk and his associates, was arrested. But this move could as little save Gerő as Straford's execution could save Charles I.

Nor was Nagy's readmission to the party on October 13 sufficient to stem the rising tide of revolt.

THE EFFECTS OF THE DECOMPRESSION

This is not the place to go into the revolutionary events themselves; the purpose of the present article was merely to show the working and effects of decompression in Hungary following Stalin's death. What the above analysis suggests above all is that in the special case of Hungary, the policy of decompression which was imposed by the domestic constellation of forces in Soviet Russia raised a number of problems defying solution. This can best be stated in a number of "if" propositions.

The ravages of Rákosi's Five Year Plan might have been mitigated "if" the Soviet Union had been ready to underwrite Nagy's reforms with the necessary funds. This would probably have been less costly in the long run than the course actually followed; the subsidies Russia now must grant the Kádár regime may well be greater than the sums that would have been sufficient to tide Nagy over. But in 1955 fiscal conservatism was the order of the day in Moscow, and Rákosi was able to exploit this in his favor.

Further, the moral crisis of the regime would probably not have become fatal "if" Rákosi had been dropped entirely after the rehabilitations. But this would have involved the complete re-vamping of the party apparatus, and an operation of such magnitude may well have been infeasible. Also, one of Moscow's guiding principles, collective leadership, militated against a wholesale purge of such radical scope.

Conversely, agitation within the party might have been stopped "if" Rákosi had been allowed to subdue his opponents in the party by police and judi-

ciary terror. In all probability, such measures would not have provoked mass outbreaks. But a number of factors, such as the climate created by the Twentieth Congress and the Soviet Union's need to reconcile Tito, precluded this sharp course. It is also doubtful whether Rákosi, discredited as he was by the dramatic revelation of his past outrages, would have been in a position to impose a new purge even if Moscow had permitted him to do so.

To sum up: revolt in Hungary might well have been forestalled by a consistent evolutionary policy or, failing this, by a recrudescence of terror. Moscow, however, chose to steer a middle course between these alternatives. It had an illusory faith in the unlimited efficacy of manipulation from above and underestimated the moral factor. The Hungarian developments have demonstrated the fallibility of Moscow's concept of manipulative decompression.

Titoism

By CHARLES P. McVICKER

Abstract: Tito has worked out a questionable compromise between Marxism-Leninism and democracy. This synthesis permits the average Yugoslav more personal freedoms than he had during the early postwar years of Tito's rule. But these new freedoms are all cautiously prepared to make certain they do not challenge ultimate Communist minority control. Many non-Yugoslav Communists, beset at home with the creeping sclerosis of Stalinism, cast covetous eyes at Tito's successes—foreign as well as domestic. Even Khrushchev was attracted until the Hungarians taught him that it was Soviet domination the captive peoples detest, not merely Stalinism.

STALIN moved to ruin Tito when he ordered Yugoslavia expelled from the Cominform in June 1948. The plan misfired and as the cold war developed, the Titoists worked diligently at creating a new political, economic, and social system. In essence this system is a blend of Marxism-Leninism and certain carefully selected Western liberal democratic institutions and practices. The Titoists call their new system "social democracy"; outsiders refer to it as "Titoism." No matter how it is called, it unquestionably represents an advance over the type of communism still practiced in countries whose rulers' tenure depends entirely upon the Soviet Union. The comparatively higher standard of living which Titoism provides and the relative domestic freedom it permits cannot fail to impress the remainder of the Communist world.

Some see in Titoism nothing more than Yugoslav independence from the Soviet Union. While it is undeniable that this independence is an important ingredient of Titoism, it is most certainly not true that it is the only ingredient. One should not ignore the Titoists' apparent success in circumvent-

ing the incompatibilities of a nationalized planned economy and a free market, or the equally paradoxical fact that Titoism seems to have provided for a kind of limited pluralism working within the over-all monolithic Communist political framework.

Should Titoism vanish tomorrow the history of its development will still be relevant source material to all who seek a peaceful compromise between the two major contending ideologies of our day. Its theory and practice are important if only as examples of what has been tried and found wanting. To Western liberal democrats, Titoism is unacceptable since it has yet to provide the one freedom considered the *sine qua non* of democratic existence: the uninhibited right of each individual to choose his government and to disagree with it as often and as openly as he likes. Nevertheless, many Western observers, not the least among whom are the British Fabians, constantly probe Titoist innovations in search of lessons relevant to the progress of their own systems. On the other hand, the limitations of political freedom in Titoism make it a more palatable compromise for those Com-

Charles P. McVicker, Ph.D., New Haven, Connecticut, is Instructor in Political Science at Yale University. He was American Consul at Zagreb, Yugoslavia, 1950-1952, and he is the author of *Titoism: Pattern for International Communism* (1957).

munists seeking a way to check the dangerous ossification of Stalinism. In this respect, the importance of Titoism—as a compromise not entirely unacceptable to the Kremlin and as a liberalized form of communism containing a relatively greater potential for political freedom than does Stalinism—is all too often overlooked by Western policy makers.

The outstanding instances where Titoism has obviously influenced the course of Communist development have been and continue to be front-page news. In many ways, the Twentieth Congress of the Bolshevik party (February 1956) might be labelled "The Titoist Congress." Acknowledging Titoism as an orthodox variant of Marxism-Leninism, the Congress underlined the acceptability of several specific Titoist theses, among which were: the permissibility of separate roads to socialism, the downgrading of Stalin as a menace to further socialist progress, and the instruction to Communists to seek out those things in capitalist experience which could benefit communism.

Ensuing pressure for liberalization came to a head at Poznań in June 1956 and reached a successful climax with the Polish October revolution. Immediately upon assuming command Gomulka proclaimed workers' self-management and citizens' self-government—the central pillars of Titoism—as the fundamental rationale for Polish reform. Several days later the Hungarian people revolted; but their uprising soon shifted its focus from Stalinism in particular to communism in general and thereby issued a challenge beyond the Hungarians' capacity to defend. The Polish and Hungarian events disrupted the Moscow-Belgrade love feast. Even so, Yugoslav "social democracy" continues to have a decidedly corrosive effect within the Soviet satellite area. The latest example of this is the East German Communist party crisis which came

to light earlier this year. Three of the party's top leaders were purged for their belief that the obvious lessons of the Twentieth Bolshevik Congress and of the Polish and Hungarian revolts were foolishly being ignored by the East German leadership.

TITOISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE

In many respects the Yugoslav Communists reached a crucial turning point in their career at their Seventh Party Congress held in Ljubljana last month. Prior to the Congress they believed it advantageous to refrain as much as possible from challenging too openly the Kremlin's jealous monopoly of theory. In fact the Twentieth Bolshevik Congress had given them reason to hope that if they were discreet about their improvements of Marxist-Leninist theory there was even a chance the Kremlin would find some of these improvements worthy of adoption to be sponsored as Soviet dogma. Hence, the Titoists, in their eagerness to maximize their influence abroad, stressed the practical successes of the institutional and structural changes they had made at home. However, as good Marxist-Leninists, the Titoists were wedded to the principle that practice must not be isolated from theory. Each of their major reforms was therefore accompanied by a labored theoretical rationalization, but these theoretical innovations were kept a quiet counterpoint to dominant practice. The Polish and Hungarian revolts dampened Khrushchev's ardor for compromise with Tito. By the time the program of the Yugoslav's Seventh Party Congress was drafted the Titoists had obviously decided to throw caution to the winds. The Congress calmly and boldly presented a comprehensive analysis of both the theoretical and the practical improvements which the Titoists believe they have added to classical Marxism-Leninism. Without directly

labelling it as such, the Congress in effect offered Titoism as the most advanced stage yet reached by any society in the "dialectical transition from capitalism to communism."

Expulsion from the Cominform in June 1948 was at first a traumatic experience for the Yugoslav leaders. Deprived of the Red Army as the real source of their power, the Titoists eventually came to realize that their longevity depended upon their ability to broaden the popular basis of their rule at home. Essentially, this meant that their model Stalinist police state had to be reorganized to grant greater freedom and security to the ordinary citizen. But the Yugoslav Communists are a minority group, exercising power without the specific consent of the vast majority of the people they rule. Eventually the Titoist improvisers solved the problem of initiating liberalizing reforms without automatically threatening their minority rule: they simply substituted less offensive indirect methods of control for the existing direct ones. Called "decentralization", this tactic has both practical and ideological plausibility. In the practical sense it puts an end to the demoralizingly inefficient overcentralization and overbureaucratization which the Titoists now consider to be synonymous with Stalinism. In the realm of theory it is a simple matter to hail decentralization as proof of the rediscovery of the true path of Marxist-Leninist progress from which Stalin had willfully strayed: the Titoists advertise decentralization as the beginning of the realization of that important Marxist-Leninist concept of the withering away of the state.

As good Marxists, the Titoists naturally began their decentralizing reforms in the economic sphere. The fundamental economic reforms comprise what is commonly referred to as the system of workers' self-management. Basic to this system is the Workers' Council

Law¹ enacted in June 1950. It many respects this act is the most revolutionary of all Titoist reforms. It decreed the end of Stalinist centralization within the economy, created the workers' council as the nucleus of the workers' self-management system, and provided that each economic enterprise be managed by its own workers and employees through the workers' council, elected yearly by the entire working staff from among its own ranks.² In practice these councils have been given real, even if limited, authority to run their enterprises as they deem appropriate.

The central aim of all the major economic reforms has been to give fuller meaning to the theory and practice of workers' self-management. In pursuance of this aim the important decision was made to jettison the Soviet-type controlled market and to return to a free market. To accommodate the free market the highly centralized planning and fiscal systems had to be reformed. Today, federal economic plans contain only the general outline of desired development; the more specific details are left to the individual republican,³ dis-

¹ Full title of this law is "The Basic Law on the Management of State Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Enterprises"; text in *Službeni List* (Official Gazette) No. 43 (Belgrade: July 5, 1950).

² Election lists are the prerogative of the dominant trade union in each enterprise; however, adequate provisions are made for non-structured groups to add names to the lists. Also, the law forestalls the possible entrenchment of a permanent ruling clique by decreeing that only a fixed minority of the members of the council and management board (see footnote No. 4) may seek to succeed themselves and then only for a limited number of consecutive terms.

³ Titoist Yugoslavia is a federation of six constituent republics (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Montenegro) and two autonomous areas (the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Autonomous District of Kosovo-Metohija). The autonomous areas are nominally under the supervision of the Republic of Serbia.

trict, and communal plans. Production and marketing plans are more or less the individual responsibility of each separate enterprise. The federal budget now confines itself to purely federal income and expenditures; republican and local governments draw up their own budgets and co-ordinate expenditures with estimated income, much of which must come from local sources. Though the banking system remains centralized, greater individual responsibility has been granted to local branches in the handling of investment and credit facilities. Also, separate savings, commercial, and agricultural banking systems reporting ultimately to the Federal National Bank have been created.

WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT

Because it theoretically provides for the realization of the Marxist-Leninist dream of having the workers manage their own factories, the system of workers' self-management is carefully and earnestly nurtured by the Yugoslav Communists. With the exception of the president of the workers' council and the director of each enterprise, party affiliation is not necessarily the prime prerequisite for membership in the workers' councils or the management boards.⁴ But the Titoists' indirect control of their economy does not rest solely upon the tenuous party connection with the organs of workers' self-management. The various hierarchies of trade and professional associations are important government-sponsored channels of communication between the central authority and the outermost reaches

⁴ The management board is a smaller group elected by each workers' council and while held entirely responsible to the council it is charged with the day-to-day affairs of management. The author visited a number of Yugoslav factories in 1955 where less than one-third of the members of the workers' council and management board were Communists.

of the Yugoslav economy. The regime also resorts to such capitalist fiscal methods of control as income taxes, excess profits taxes, and discount and rediscount rates on bank credits. In the final analysis, however, the primary instruments of supervision and direction are the district (county) and local government organs. Under the political decentralization reforms these state agencies have been given a great deal of direct responsibility for the economic welfare of their territorial areas.

Despite the Kremlin's growing disdain for it, the Yugoslav system of workers' self-management is a powerful attraction in the Communist world. Its influence gains in proportion to its successes in raising Yugoslav worker morale and productivity.⁵ Because wages now have direct connection with success in the market, workers' councils stress efficiency and improved production methods; councils have even taken to dismissing negligent directors. Although the workers' council is meticulously hedged in by official economic plans, law, and regulations; within this framework it has considerable freedom to make its own decisions. Recently the councils were given expanded independence in disposing of their firm's excess profits. Wage and bonus rates are now supposedly to be left almost entirely to the councils. This liberal authorization, how-

⁵ The following industrial production index for Yugoslavia is taken from: *Statistical Pocket-Book of Yugoslavia 1957* (Belgrade: April 1957), p. 66. (1939 = 100)

1950	172	1955	242
1953	183	1956	266
1954	208	[1957	302*]

* From speech by Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, *Borba* (Belgrade), Jan. 11, 1958.

Note: Although most of the considerable rise in Yugoslav industrial production results directly from the completion of the major capital investment projects near the end of 1953, some of this rise is also unquestionably due to the improved worker morale resulting from the system of workers' self-management.

ever, was accompanied by a law creating a personal graduated income tax for all workers and employees. These two simultaneous reforms are a good example of the Titoist tactic of improving the system by substituting indirect for direct methods of control. Wishing to take advantage of the fact that individual income responds more readily to material than to spiritual reward, the Titoist decision makers granted the workers' councils the power to gear salaries and bonuses more directly to profits. But total freedom in this respect is incompatible with the delicate state of the Yugoslav economy. Therefore, the income-tax device was adopted to permit the central authorities ultimate, though indirect, regulatory control over real wages.

Though the workers' councils generally receive the greatest publicity, it is the "socialist free market" which really deserves the distinction of being Titoism's most original contribution to politico-economic history. Often highly inefficient and containing gross imperfections—official monopolies, for instance—the Yugoslav free market still manages to provide for genuine competition and to permit domestic prices to be formed freely and to have production follow these prices. If nothing else, the Yugoslav Communists have given the world an interesting example of how a nationalized, "planned economy" and a "free market" can be combined.

Agriculture

Agriculture was the step-child of Titoist development until 1953 when collectivization was abandoned and a ten-year agrarian improvement program was begun. By 1954 the Titoists had adopted a policy aimed at increasing agricultural output by encouraging the private peasant to produce only those products bringing him the greatest return in the

local market. To be in a better position to control free-market food prices indirectly, the government worked to improve urban-rural communications and food storage and processing facilities. Another important step in the liberalized agrarian program was the 1957 order to collective and state farms to offer goods and services to private peasants for fees mutually arrived at. Thus, it is now possible for private peasants to have their land cultivated and their crops harvested and processed by the most modern methods. Despite these and similar attractions, however, the Yugoslav peasant remains disdainful of communism. He is well aware that the Yugoslav Communists must socialize the agrarian sector of their economy before they will be in a position to claim the completion of their avowed mission.

"CITIZENS' SELF-GOVERNMENT"

Economic decentralization required equivalent politico-administrative reform. The political decentralization reforms are usually subsumed under the heading of "citizens' self-government." Basic reorganization of the politico-administrative apparatus began with the local organs of government, the people's committees. These were refurbished to equip them for the many responsibilities handed down to them by the republican and federal governments. Today these committees solve independently most of the problems pertaining to their own areas and work closely with their respective district people's committees in supervising and co-ordinating the economy of their areas. Although committee members are elected to office, the nomination procedure works to the decided advantage of the Communists. On the other hand, two new institutions were created which do serve to bring the ordinary Yugoslav into local government affairs. "Citizens' councils"

are permanent or *ad hoc* bodies of local citizens whose experience and talents make them especially well qualified to advise their people's committee in the various specific areas of its competence. The "voters' meeting" is a periodical assembly of the voters of a single election district called together to discuss preannounced agendas of local and national issues. In practice these meetings have become worthwhile forums in which ordinary citizens discuss and criticize local administration with some possibility of having their comments influence policy. In no instance, of course, can these meetings be used for anti-Communist activity.

The Fundamental Law of January 1953⁶ ordered the appropriate changes in the federal and republican structures. In the main these changes involved the destruction of the Stalinist-type state apparatus and created in its stead a much less complicated one. Offered by the Titoists as visible proof that their state is withering away, the new and much less complex structure actually serves to strengthen state administration by bringing it greater flexibility and efficiency. The Fundamental Law created the office of the President of the Republic, to which Tito was duly elected. It also reorganized the federal and republican parliaments. The old Federal Council of Nationalities was merged with the upper chamber of the new National Assembly, and in its place was created the Federal Producers' Council to top the pyramid of similar second chambers now existing in the republican, district, and local governments. Composed of workers and employees regularly engaged in production, producers' councils interest themselves mainly in suggesting solutions to the economic

welfare problems of the territories in which they serve. Theoretically they represent a further strengthening of the workers' self-government system by giving workers a direct role in government. A complicated election procedure assures the minority industrial sector of the economy the majority representation in most producers' councils. Another important creation of the Fundamental Law was the system of standing committees it attached to the federal and republican parliaments. Permitted to criticize and to demand changes in draft legislation, these committees have in practice brought valuable expert and grass-root opinion to the Titoist law-making process.

Well-drafted laws are of increasing importance to Titoism in its growing reliance upon the reformed court system to act as its primary agency of supervision. The secret police, while still too much in evidence, have been curbed considerably. In all but the most serious political crimes, the secret police are expected to use strictly legal means to apprehend their prey. So far as we know, their prisoners are now turned over to regular courts for trial rather than being tried and sentenced administratively as was once the case. Basic Yugoslav criminal and civil law, stripped of most of the Soviet content it acquired prior to June 1948, has now been modernized and codified. The substitution of competent legislation and responsible courts for the purely arbitrary authority of the former police state is one of the major practical improvements wrought by the Titoists since 1948. It has been a prime factor in restoring some semblance of personal security to the individual Yugoslav citizen.

PARTY MORALE

It has not been a simple matter to get the rank and file of the Yugoslav

Communist party⁷ to adjust gracefully to decentralization. All too often this adjustment has meant the loss of sinecures. Strong and determined action is constantly required of the Yugoslav leadership to impress upon the large mass of party members that they are just as important as gentle persuaders of public action as they were as ruthless intimidators during the Stalinist period. The rapprochement with the Soviet Union in 1955 did much to halt the persistently waning morale and discipline within party ranks. The popularity which Titoism gained in the Communist world once it had received the Kremlin's blessing gave the ordinary Yugoslav Communist a glowing pride in a leader and a system whose orthodoxy he had often doubted. Tito owes a debt of gratitude to the Soviet leaders for thus having helped to ease a most vexing dilemma, for without his party he is lost; and his party has a tendency to be restive under his vigorous, often privilege-shattering reforms.

SEPARATION OF PARTY AND BUREAUCRACY

One of the most helpful reforms yet achieved by the Titoist leaders is at the same time their most spectral. It grew out of an early recognition of the need to combat Stalinism in Yugoslavia by loosening the party's strangle hold on the state administrative apparatus. The party as such had to be separated from the administration. But how was this to be possible since only Communists could be trusted not to betray the minority rule? Many a good Yugoslav broke his head on this conundrum. Milovan Djilas came a cropper because he failed to see that it did have a solution—phantom though it might be. The problem was resolved by the simple but

⁷ Now officially called the Union (or League) of Communists of Yugoslavia.

questionable expedient of permitting officials to be devoted essentially to Yugoslavia and to Titoist progress in their administrative capacities and to the Communist party only when on strictly party business. In practice this tenuous distinction actually does provide a helpful separation of party and bureaucracy. Whenever possible, less able party members are employed in purely party pursuits; the more competent generally find no difficulty in recognizing a clear distinction between their duties and responsibilities as state functionaries and as party members. This process is simplified by the fact that at all levels of government top officials are loyal first to Tito and only second to the party.

It is not easy to know why Djilas had so little faith in the wizardry of his colleagues. He himself, as his party's master propagandist and agitator, had been responsible for some of the major Titoist circumlocutions of his day. It may be that he had come to believe in the superiority of Western liberal democracy. But this does not explain why he based his demand for greater democracy in Yugoslavia upon the patently false assumption that the large majority of the Yugoslav people had come to admire socialism and to accept it willingly. It is difficult indeed to fathom how the top Titoist public opinion expert could have been so grossly misinformed.

No matter what Djilas' real motives may have been, the fact remains that, ironically or not, he has become a martyr to the cause of democracy. In the process he has once again underlined the crushing inconsistency of Marxism-Leninism: that its means so often betray its ends. In his running fight with the Titoist leaders he has accentuated the basic frustration of the entire Marxist philosophy which, while automatically positing the perfectibility of man, actually forces its practitioners to en-

⁶ Full text of this law (English) is given in: *New Fundamental Law of Yugoslavia* (Belgrade: Union of Jurists' Associations of Yugoslavia, 1953), pp. 53-99.

slave man while waiting for him to perfect himself.

The Titoist leaders would seem to have their private doubts about man's perfectibility. They have unequivocally decided that money and not social conscience is the major stimulus to productivity. Then, too, they have had the bitter experience of observing the frequent corruption and misuse of their decentralization reforms for unsocialist personal purposes. Here the chief offenders are Communists, particularly those permitted to perform their official administrative duties outside the framework of regular party discipline. Djilas insists that this privileged class is the inescapable outcome of Marxism-Leninism. However, despite the fact that decentralization has given man's frailties

greater opportunity to prosper, the Titoist leaders continue to try to restore human dignity to the individual Yugoslav wherever it is possible to do so without undermining their own power. Workers' councils, citizens' councils, voters' meetings, parliamentary committees, and other similar institutions do provide the individual Yugoslav some means of influencing his destiny. But this leeway is decidedly limited and is subject entirely to the whim of a government which is beyond his control. Even so, the relatively relaxed atmosphere of Titoism is more likely than the Stalinism it replaced to foster the eventual realization by Communist and non-Communist Yugoslavs alike that no freedoms are secure until political freedom has been achieved.

A "Loyal" Satellite: The Case of Czechoslovakia

By IVO DUCHACEK

Abstract: Several factors explain the almost complete absence of drama on the Czech political scene: a relatively high standard of living, the pragmatism of the Communist leadership, and the sophisticated sobriety of their opponents reared in the tradition of democracy and its nonviolent methods of action. Within this framework some minor changes have already occurred and still may. Any substantial change in the Czechoslovak orientation continues to be severely limited by the hypnotizing effect of Soviet power, unmatched by the Western posture in the area.

EVER since Stalin's death, and especially since the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist party, many Western observers of the East Central European scene had hoped that partial relaxation of Stalinist controls might lead to a gradual liberalization of communism and perhaps even result in some kind of Socialist democracy within a Mid-European neutralized zone. This hope seemed to be supported by an analysis of the causes of the "thaw": the relaxation reflected the political and economic needs which long-term competition with democracies had imposed on the Communist orbit, rather than any sudden explosion of human warmth in the hearts of the Soviet leaders. In this setting, some observers expected Czechoslovakia rather than Hungary or Poland to lead the way.

There seemed to be some valid reasons for such an expectation. Czechoslovakia's prewar experience with Western democracy was more satisfactory than that of other East Central European countries; the Czech and Slovak peoples seemed to have digested the principles and experienced the practice of parliamentary government. In the

period following the Communist coup in 1948 there were many indications of the fact that the number of Czechs and Slovaks favoring Communist rule were less than at the time of the last free elections in Czechoslovakia. These elections were held in May 1946 when the Communist party polled 43.26 per cent of votes in Bohemia, 34.46 per cent in Moravia and 30.37 per cent in Slovakia. The tradition of other than Leninist forms of socialism seemed to support the image of Czechoslovakia as a potential laboratory in gradualism within the Soviet orbit.

Because of her physical contact with the West—first through the American-held Bavaria, later through the German Federal Republic, and since 1954 through Austria—Czechoslovakia, it seemed, remained exposed to Western influences, although on a very limited scale after 1948. Unlike Eastern Germany, Poland, and Hungary, Czechoslovakia, since December 1945, remained free of the physical presence of Soviet armed forces.

A closer analysis of the political climate of Czechoslovakia during its Communist decade (1948–58) will reveal,

Ivo Duchacek, J.U.D., New York City, is Assistant Professor of Government, City College of New York. Prior to his coming to the United States in 1948, he was a member of the Czechoslovak Parliament and Chairman of its Foreign Affairs Committee, 1945–1948.

however, that these apparently convincing reasons for Czechoslovakia's becoming the torch bearer of disloyalty during the "thaw" have, to the present at least, been neutralized by even more telling reasons for Czechoslovakia's conduct as the least turbulent of the Soviet satellites.

DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONS: A BARRIER TO RELAXATION

Every single reason which has been adduced can equally well serve to explain Czechoslovakia's rather passive behavior in 1955 and 1956. The Czechs' and Slovaks' high degree of intimacy with democracy, the experience with non-Leninist socialism, the training in Western trade unionism, and the lingering somewhat idealized image of the Masarykian Golden Age (1918-37) counseled extreme prudence to the Czechoslovak Communist leadership when they started to ponder the implementation of the "Geneva spirit" and the Twentieth Party Congress. They must have feared—and probably rightly—that any substantial relaxation of Stalinist controls might lead to a series of changes which either would finally call for extreme forms of repression—which would be contrary to the new image that post-Stalinist Russia wanted to create in Asia and Africa—or would threaten the power monopoly of the Communist party. The inability of the regime to oppose successfully several popular pressures at the end of the Stalinist era—labor's demands for higher wages, peasants' partial success in opposing rapid collectivization, the noncooperative attitudes of the youth—was a dangerous enough indication as to what the Czech and Slovak peoples, recalling and reusing their experience in democratic action, might possibly do if given sufficient leeway.

Since the Twentieth Party Congress had permitted a limited amount of na-

tional interpretation, the Czechoslovak Communist leaders, being among the last to come to power and therefore, perhaps, a bit more insecure, tended to use their new local powers with circumspection. Clearly, in the Czechoslovak context the new freedom given to local leaders to relax old Stalinist controls was construed also as meaning the possibility *not* to relax at all if the local situation did not warrant such a course. At the beginning of the New Economic Policy, Lenin warned that there should be given "as many concessions as possible within the limits, of course, of what the proletariat can concede and remain the ruling class." The Communist leaders of Czechoslovakia interpreted Lenin's limits in the narrowest possible sense. The result was a line of policy which in Czechoslovakia was nicknamed "Stalenkovism," "Stalinist political rules . . . combined with a Malenkovian emphasis on some consumer goods and a rising standard of living."¹ While Poland and Hungary engaged in a display of de-Stalinization, the Czechoslovak leadership avoided excessive moves and finds itself today in a rather comfortable position. It does not need to readapt itself to the quickly moderated anti-Stalinism of the present era. Indeed, the huge, granite monument dominating Prague remains an eloquent symbol of continuing "Stalenkovism."

DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONS: A HANDICAP FOR REVOLT?

The former democratic tradition had still another impact on the Czechoslovak situation. While the democratic experience gives the people more profound motives for opposing totalitarianism, it does not necessarily provide a democratic society, oppressed by totalitarianism, with stronger impulses for a bold action, street demonstrations, or re-

¹ London *Observer*, January 17, 1957, article by Veronica Weir.

bellion. Political elites trained in the belief that political negotiations and elections can solve most political conflicts, may rationalize themselves into any compromise and away from the barricades. If there is such a thing as national character, the Czechs (and to a lesser degree the Slovaks) appear, in their modern political history, as pragmatists, less inclined than their northern and southern neighbors to indulge in spectacular or suicidal actions. While patriotic Czechs, who had proved their worth in heroic underground activities or partisan warfare, protest that the literary figure of Good Soldier Schweik—the clever, seemingly stupid Czech private in the Hapsburg Army who successfully muddled through World War I—does not represent the average Czech attitude in politics, it seems that those who protest by action are rather the exception than the rule. There appears to be a very general tendency to adopt a down-to-earth approach to politics and try to negotiate the Czechoslovak state through history.

The former Czechoslovak association with the democratic West and a continuing exposure to its image may also be construed as actually discouraging rather than encouraging bold action aimed at a change of the dominant system. The West, in the case of Czechoslovakia, has too often proved an unreliable friend after having been first the source of Czechoslovakia's birth and then the guarantee of her survival (1918-38). The memory of Munich lingers alongside the American willingness to allow the Russian Army to reap the political fruits of a Soviet liberation of fighting Prague in May, 1945. There is also a memory of the American electoral promise of liberation, which, in East Central Europe was interpreted as policy of action and not, what it has always been, "liberation by declamation." While some Czechs and Slovaks

might have had hopes in 1956 that the West would not and could not allow the Hungarian revolution to die, the Hungarian tragedy on the whole proved to them that the West is at best a well wisher, but not an active coshaper of East Central European destinies. Commenting on the "foolishness" of the Hungarians who had expected some help from the West, a recent Czechoslovak refugee expressed the general thought: "Of course, the Hungarians did not know the West as well as we do; now, they know."²

It is in this context that the seemingly great difference disappears between Czechoslovakia, free of the Soviet troops, and partly occupied Poland, East Germany, and Hungary. The Red Army, while physically absent, is psychologically present in every Czech and Slovak village, the more so since it has become clear that when the chips are down, the West would again limit itself to uttering sympathetic noises. This analysis of the Czechoslovak situation suggests that it is not the lack of desire for democracy or absence of articulated opposition to Communism which prevents those nations from trying to change their destinies; but above all, if not uniquely, the radiation of the Soviet power, unmatched and unmatchable by the West in that area.

COMMUNIST INSECURITY

As to the Communist leaders, on the whole they share the democratic majority's opinion as to the unlikelihood of direct Western influence on events in East Central Europe. While some non-Communists may continue, in spite of past evidence, to hope against hope; the Communists, in spite of the same evidence to the contrary, sometimes dread that their premise of Western abstention might not be right after all.

² *Current History*, July 1957, author's article.

As practical politicians they know, of course, that no political attitude is unchangeable when and if some elements of the general situation are altered. There will be times when the Communist leaders will live in real anguish lest the Soviet Union belie the cherished image of an ever-present and ever-reliable supporter of their rule.

Such a situation did occur during the Hungarian crisis when the forces of the revolution seemed to be winning and Soviet support was not yet in sight. In the middle of the Hungarian tragedy, the editorial of the central organ of the Communist party stressed the hope that the Soviet Union would succeed in reversing the course of events in Hungary:

In the gravest moments of our destiny the fraternal assistance of the Soviet people has always been available to us. It was with the Soviet tanks that the sun of freedom came to us in 1945. . . . Whenever we turn to our Soviet brothers, we always find understanding and support.³

When the Soviet tanks reimposed the Moscow brand of Communism on Hungary, the Czechoslovak regime's sigh of relief was audible in the following commentary, broadcast by Prague home service on November 4:

Together with the Hungarian people we feel a profound gratitude toward the Soviet army which as always, and as in 1945, and now again came to help *in time*. (Italics added.)

STANDARD OF LIVING

It is usually extreme economic distress which sends angry crowds to the streets. From there intellectual elites or revolutionary organizers may lead them further to storm the Bastilles of political and economic oppression. The October Communist revolution in Russia and the October anti-Communist revolution in Hungary, as well as Poznań riots, had

³ *Rude Pravo*, October 27, 1956.

one thing in common: their slogans were meaningful because they had placed "Bread" in prominence. The Poznań slogan "Bread and Liberty" can be translated into the Czech language but not into the Czechoslovak economic reality. Whether planned or as a result of manifold pressures from below, the standard of living in Czechoslovakia has not only been superior to that of Poland, Hungary, and Russia but since the 1953 currency reform has tended to improve slightly rather than to deteriorate. The lack of turbulence in Czechoslovakia cannot be properly evaluated without taking into account the fact that the Czechoslovaks' desire for more freedom and less monotony has rarely been provided with the fuse of major economic dissatisfaction. When such a fuse was provided, as in Brno in 1951 and then in Pilsen in 1953, situations similar to those in Poland and Hungary in 1956 did develop. Workers' strikes and demonstrations in Brno were the result of the governmental decision to cancel the Christmas bonuses. The serious strikes and riots of Pilsen workers on June 1, 1953, during which the control of the city passed into the hands of insurgent workers assisted to some extent by the local police and members of the garrison, were consequences of a sweeping confiscatory devaluation which had wiped out almost all savings and lowered the living standard of all, including the rank and file of the Communist party. Nevertheless, even in those situations, not the slogan "Bread and Liberty" but a much less inspiring slogan, such as "Better Christmas Dinner and Liberty" or "Savings Accounts and Liberty" would have been appropriate.

THE NATURE OF THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP

Any Communist party which has succeeded in growing from the stage of a conspiratorial group of revolutionary or

frustrated individuals into a mass organization carries with it some portions of its underground past. At the same time, it starts to reflect—often as a rather distorted mirror—political traditions and thinking of its non-Communist environment. The autocratic and other traditions of Russia reflect themselves in the thinking and practices of the Soviet Communist party—just as the Czechoslovak Communist party certainly bears with it some heritage of its period of formation as well as its active existence in the interwar period. Unlike all the other Eastern European Communist parties, the Communist party of Czechoslovakia was created and continued to operate in the political climate of liberal democracy. The political training ground of the Czechoslovak Communist leaders was the floor of the Prague Parliament rather than exile, prisons, or underground, with the exception of the period of Nazi occupation. The Czechoslovak Communist party had always been a legal party; thus it had perhaps greater opportunity to learn to manipulate popular sympathies. At the same time, it could not avoid being influenced by the down-to-earth pragmatism of its environment. When the Stalinist era in Czechoslovakia reached its peak in 1951–52, the Communist leaders dutifully staged the first and only great purge trial in the history of Czechoslovak communism. While other Communist parties at that time sent to prison the more popular leaders, like Rajk in Hungary, or Gomulka in Poland, Kostov in Bulgaria and Xoxe in Albania, the Czechoslovak Communists sent to the gallows the most hated man in Czechoslovakia, Secretary General of the party, Rudolf Slansky, who in 1958 would be labeled a conservative Stalinist. At the same time, they also sent to the same gallows an opposite symbol of deviationism, a Slovak Communist, Foreign Minister Vlado Clementis, who

today would be called a liberal, revisionist, and nationalist. Of course, his nationalism had a limited appeal since his was a Slovak nationalism with more anti-Czech than anti-Russian overtones.

Having gotten rid of both, the symbol of excessive dogmatism and that of nationalist deviationism, the Czechoslovak Communist leaders today can almost claim that they had been Khrushchevites before Khrushchev. When, after Moscow's condemnation of the cult of the personality, a minor purge was required as a proof of the Czechoslovak agreement with the new line, they chose, as though anticipating the 1957 purge of Marshal Zhukov, to liquidate the least popular member of the Politburo, Minister of National Defense, Alexej Cepicka. In Czechoslovakia, the Army was not an instrument in the post-Stalinist change but rather a target. Unlike Russia, where men enjoying some degree of genuine popularity had to be replaced (Malenkov, and then Zhukov), the Prague regime eliminated some of the obvious objects of popular hatred and party rank and file discontent.

Thus, the same core of the leading group whom Stalin, Beria, and Molotov used to trust, whose loyalty to Moscow was reconfirmed by Malenkov, who have been fraternally kissed by Khrushchev during his visit in July 1957, just a few days after the purge of Malenkov, this same core continues to steer Communist Czechoslovakia along the middle road of "evolutionary revolution"—a slogan which so well mirrors the Czechoslovak political climate.

The Czechoslovak Communist leaders' almost baffling talent for political survival in a period marked by such uncertainty for others has not quite been matched by their personal capacity for physical survival: the period of 1950–58 is marked by the deaths (the author hastens to add: *natural deaths*) of

the first two presidents of Communist Czechoslovakia. Klement Gottwald died, so to speak, dutifully, one week after Stalin. Antonin Zápotocký died on November 13, 1957.

The Communist party of Czechoslovakia—and in this it perhaps reflects the traditionally rational, unemotional environment in which it has to operate—has not produced so far a hero type of national deviationist. It is significant that the only potential Titoist—but not Tito as he had no following in the party—was a Slovak rather than a Czech: Vlado Clementis. The stress of the post-Stalin line on national adaptation did not lead in politically pragmatic Prague to a concept of an independent Czechoslovak way. In Slovakia, on the other hand, the local, more emotional nationalism has led at least to some expression of anti-Czechism, although not anti-Russianism. In this connection it is somewhat puzzling why the effort should not have been made to calm the Slovak national emotions by choosing Premier Viliam Široký, a Slovak, for the presidency rather than Antonin Novotný, who, like all presidents of Czechoslovakia since 1918, is a Czech. Evidently, Slovak emotions are viewed by Prague as controllable.

Milovan Djilas' description of the present phase of Communism—"The heroic era of Communism is past; the epoch of practical men has set in"—seems to apply fully to the leaders of Communist Czechoslovakia. Believing in little except their own political survival, well trained in manipulating mass sympathies and fully aware of the political climate of the country, allowing some degree of liberalization on the periphery of the Communist apparatus, and greatly encouraged by the outcome of the Hungarian revolution and the show of the Soviet strength in the area, they appear to be firmly in the saddle.

This does not mean that their rule

over the non-Communist majority, so sensitive to impulses from outside, has been or will be easy. Obviously their control of Czechoslovakia appeared easier under Stalin than today when the Soviet line imposes on Communists not only the two major tasks of the Stalin era: to remain in power and to expand industrially; but also two additional tasks which in the past could be so easily sacrificed in favor of the first pair: to improve the standard of living and to create a more relaxed and self-confident climate which would facilitate economic and political competition with the West.

The Czechoslovak Communists have, of course, the advantage of being able to administer and manage an important industrial base, which allows them to provide the people with a relatively high standard of living. On the other hand, as the industrial base of Czechoslovakia was created by the preceding capitalist era, unlike other Communist leaders they cannot claim some degree of national gratitude for their success in transforming a backward country into a modern one, the only excuse which Djilas seems to grant Communism. This probably adds to the opportunistic and dreary character of Czechoslovak Communism, almost completely devoid of a missionary zeal and inspiration.

FORMS AND QUALITY OF RESISTANCE

Czechoslovakia does not differ from her neighbors in the intensity of the people's desire for freedom and national independence. There is little doubt that the Communist regime would not survive the removal of the Soviet protective umbrella over the area.

It does differ somewhat, however, in some of the forms and methods used to resist and oppose the regime. A bloodless, often more than discreet, but permanent "civil war" is the order of the day in Czechoslovakia as elsewhere in

East Central Europe. The people scored important victories in 1955 and 1956; the regime regained most of the lost ground by 1958. There are no war communiqués from either side on the progress and interplay of pressures and counterpressures. Advances and withdrawals of both sides are, however, amply reported by the official Communist press. Its complaints and warnings point both to the seriousness and permanence of the Czechoslovak "discreet civil war."

Unlike Poland and Hungary, Czechoslovakia has not witnessed the development of antiregime pressures on a broad national front which would include non-Communists and a portion of the Communists. Furthermore, the compartmentalized character of the Czechoslovak totalitarian system allows the regime not only to deal with specific demands or complaints of one group, such as students, writers, workers, and peasants in isolation from the others; but also to create jealousies, or at least misunderstandings, between different streams of discontent. Although the cause of specific complaints is obviously the Communist system, the regime sometimes succeeds in blurring this basic fact and erects walls of near-hostility between, say, workers who oppose and fear the promised reduction of 48 hours week to 46 hours as it might result in a quickened tempo of work, and writers who claim the right to read Françoise Sagan and admire abstract art; between peasants who refuse to join Communist collective farms, and the students who clamor for the return of Latin in their curricula, for more jazz and rock'n'roll as well as for a greater share in shaping the nation's destiny.

The fragmentation of Czechoslovak pressure against the Communist system and the absence of a link with a portion of the inner core of the Communist party makes the Communist rule over

Czechoslovakia easier than elsewhere, but this does not mean that at all times it has been an easy job. In succession, under the impact of the post-Stalin developments, one compartment of the totalitarian society after another threatened to get out of hand. At the second congress of Czech and Slovak writers (April 22–29, 1956), for example, two poets, Jaroslav Seifert and Frantisek Hrubin, boldly assisted by many others, unfolded the flag of revolt and condemned the totalitarian past and the Communist regimentation of art and literature in courageous, admirable, and explosive terms—identical in spirit to those uttered by the Polish writers and the Petöfi group in Budapest.

The Congress, as organized, was supposed to be only another occasion for acclamations, declarations, and stereotyped praises without admitting really basic mistakes,

said official Radio Bratislava on May 2, in a commentary by Ladislav Blasko. But

in contrast to this trend, the Congress became a fighting arena where opinions were exchanged. . . . [It was clear that] many writers experienced everything which today is passing through the minds of our people.

The students, too, reached and went beyond the limits set as safe by the regime. Unlike the writers' revolt in April, the Czech and Slovak antiregime demonstrations in May spread in an *organized* fashion to all university cities. "The anti-regime resolutions were dispatched to other colleges and universities," a Slovak Communist publication complained,⁴ "with the help of charted planes."

As to the workers, their trespassing beyond the Communist party's safety limits has been confirmed by a rather eloquent report of a workers' meeting

⁴ *Kulturny Zivot*, May 26, 1956, article by M. Ferko.

in one of the Prague industrial establishments. The demands were listened to and then turned down by one of the most important members of the Communist inner circle, Bruno Koehler. According to Koehler's report,⁵ the Prague workers asked for

an extraordinary congress of the Party and new Party line, . . . doubts were expressed as to the obligatory character of Party decision for the government, parliament and non-Communist organizations . . . a demand was voiced that the press censorship and jamming of enemy broadcasts be abolished . . . our duty is to prevent and not to facilitate the work of those criminal instruments [Koehler named Voice of America, Free Europe, and BBC]. This is why we jam them wherever we can. . . . Your organization even suggested that the need for the existence of the workers' militia be revised.

The above samples of the popular pressures going beyond the regime's assigned limits for the "thaw" confirm the

⁵ *Zivot Strany*, No. 6, Prague, March 1957.

general impression of Czechoslovakia being a huge radish. The red crust is thin indeed and the white core, representing the overwhelming majority of the people, is extremely sensitive to any real or assumed crack in the crust.

The relatively high standard of living, the practical approach of the Communist leaders and their political experience, combined with the traditional political pragmatism of the Czechs and Slovaks, seem to indicate that the absence of drama will also characterize Czechoslovak developments in the future. This does not mean that below the red crust the mutual positions of the people's antiregime front and the regime itself will remain unchanged. It does, however, mean that the red crust around Czechoslovakia, in spite of being so thin and vulnerable, may remain solid as long as the distribution of power in East Central Europe remains so favorable to the Communist status quo and so unfavorable to any substantial change in it.

The Sovietization of the Baltic States

By ALFRED ERICH SENN

Abstract: Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have been subjected to an intensive campaign aimed at integrating them into the Soviet Union. The Communists have reorganized the economy, deported their opponents, and tried to re-educate the Baltic peoples in a spirit of devotion to the USSR. Since the death of Stalin they have let up somewhat, allowing a greater degree of personal freedom; but there is no indication that they would ever willingly give the Baltic nations their freedom. Despite their almost hopeless position, the Baltic peoples have continued to cling to their old national ideals and to hope for liberation.

ALTHOUGH the three Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia had previously existed as independent states for only two decades, their annexation in 1940 by the Soviet Union remains an international issue. While the USSR has steadfastly maintained that they entered into the Soviet Union of their own free will and has bitterly attacked any challenge to the legitimacy of their incorporation, the United States has refused to recognize this action and continues to grant diplomatic status to representatives of the former national regimes.

The incorporation came about as a direct result of the Soviet-Nazi agreement of August 1939, a secret protocol of which consigned Latvia and Estonia to the Russian sphere of influence and Lithuania to the German. A revision of the terms in September 1939 turned Lithuania over to the Russians. Given a free hand by this arrangement, the Russians first coerced each country into admitting Soviet troops within its borders and then later, after the German occupation of Paris in June 1940, forced the governments to reorganize. New legislatures, elected in each country under very restricted conditions, voted to

request admission into the Soviet Union. At the beginning of August 1940, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR granted these requests, accepting the Baltic states as the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth Soviet republics. By the end of August all foreign missions had been directed to leave the Baltic area.

The Communists moved quickly to eliminate open and potential opposition among the native population—chiefly by means of mass deportations—but the process of Sovietization was at first slow. Only large industrial enterprises were nationalized; the smaller ones continued to be operated privately. There was no effort to collectivize agriculture, and rumors of such a move were branded "provocative." Instead, an extensive land reform was effected, making 30 hectares the legal limit for individual holdings. The German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 brought a quick end to the Sovietization program, and when the Red Army returned to the Baltic in 1944–45, the Communists had to begin again from scratch. Partisan movements in the Baltic, originally organized under the German occupation, now turned against the Russians; and it took the Communists

Alfred Erich Senn completed his doctoral studies at Columbia University and is currently a lecturer in history at Hunter College, New York. He has done extensive research in Lithuanian affairs.

several years to stamp out all armed opposition.¹

ISOLATION FROM THE WEST

The status of the Baltic states is that of constituent republics of the USSR. Formally they have the right to secede from the Soviet Union at any time, but this right could hardly be exercised short of a full-fledged revolution. The reins of government in each state are tightly in the hands of the local Communist party, which is a branch of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the governments themselves are little more than local administrations of the central government in Moscow. Although the Constitution permits each of the republics to carry on independent relations with foreign powers, none has any representation abroad,² nor are foreign governments allowed to send representatives to the Baltic republics.

The isolation of the Baltic states from the West was a necessary measure if the Communists were to realize their plan of Sovietization. Before World War II, the Baltic nations were strongly oriented toward the West through close economic, political, cultural, and religious ties. These ties were re-enforced by large numbers of emigrants living in the United States who kept in close touch with relatives and friends. At the end of hostilities in 1945, many Baltic nationals then in Germany refused to return home; and an intense propaganda campaign by the Communists persuaded only a few of these to change their minds. Having had a taste of Soviet rule in 1940-41, these displaced persons were by and large strongly anti-Communist; and they have done a great

¹ See Boris Meissner, *Die Sowjetunion, die baltischen Staaten und das Völkerrecht* (Köln: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1956), pp. 132-40.

² At the Yalta conference, Stalin unsuccessfully attempted to secure a seat in the United Nations for the Lithuanian S.S.R.

deal in the postwar years toward keeping alive the idea of national independence for their respective countries.

Within the Baltic states themselves, the Communists were doing everything possible to reorient the people toward the East. In order to break all old ties, they sought to cut off the Baltic nations from outside contacts, even with the "People's Democracies" of Eastern Europe. All economic, political, and cultural life had to be focused on Moscow. The realization of this aim, of course, required the elimination of any opposition. It has been estimated that in the first three years after the war, 371,000 Baltic nationals were deported to other parts of the Soviet Union.³

As soon as the time seemed ripe, the Communists began to reorganize the economy along Soviet lines. In late 1947 a call arose for the collectivization of agriculture. Having met with little success throughout 1948, the campaign gained momentum only after a new wave of deportations in early 1949. By the end of that year about 80 per cent of all arable land was under collective cultivation. But the collectivization had immediate and deleterious effects on agricultural production: the sown area in each republic in 1955 was from 15 to 25 per cent less than it had been in 1940, and the losses in cattle suffered during the collectivization drive have still not been made up.

Reformation of economy and propaganda drive

Industry, on the other hand, has shown a remarkable growth since 1945, thanks chiefly to the special attention paid to it under the planned economy. After the war the Communists at first concentrated on restoring the industry which had existed before 1940, and they per-

³ Casimir Smogorzewski, "The Russification of the Baltic States," *World Affairs*, New Series, Vol. 4 (1950), pp. 168-81.

mitted the continued existence of small private industry. But just as collectivization eliminated the individual farmer, these small enterprises soon underwent nationalization. By the beginning of the Fifth Five Year Plan in 1950, new industries were being introduced geared to markets within the Soviet Union. According to official—and probably exaggerated—Soviet figures, the "physical volume of gross production of all industry" in Estonia in 1955 was 6.7 times that of 1940. Latvian industry had increased by 4.88 times, and Lithuanian by 3.95 times over the same period. In Estonia, industry's share of total production grew from 38 per cent in 1940 to 79 per cent in 1955, and in Lithuania the growth during the same years was from 33 per cent to 65 per cent.⁴

With the reformation of the economy went an intensive educational drive aimed at instilling in the people "the ideology of Soviet patriotism," "a spirit of love and devotion toward the Soviet Union." "Soviet patriotism" has been defined as meaning "love for the Socialist Fatherland with daily care for the growth of its power and glory." The Baltic peoples were told that it was only through the care and protection of Russia that they could enjoy the benefits of industrialization. It is commonly claimed in the Communist press that the Baltic states, in the period between the world wars, were simply colonies of the Western Powers, their economies being deliberately retarded lest the "imperialists" lose them as markets. In contrast under Soviet rule the Baltic republics have developed a varied and large industry, the products of which are used throughout the Soviet Union.

One of the strongest links between the

⁴ See *The National Economy of the USSR: A Statistical Compilation*, by the Central Statistical Administration, Council of Ministers USSR (Moscow: State Statistical Publishing House, 1956).

Baltic nations and the West was religion, and the Communists have devoted special efforts to sever this tie. Church property has been confiscated and attendance at public worship discouraged. The Communists also sought to deprive the religious of their leadership by arresting those clergymen who refused to endorse official policies. Of the twelve bishops in the Lithuanian Roman Catholic hierarchy before 1940, only one still remains: three died during the war, four are abroad, and four were arrested by the Communists.

THE NEW RUSSIFICATION

The Tsarist regime unsuccessfully attempted to Russify the Baltic peoples. The Communists now have their own Russification program, but instead of open suppression they are employing other methods. The national languages continue to enjoy official sanction, but the teaching of Russian is required in all schools. Every possible means is exploited to prove that the "Great Russians" and each of the Baltic peoples have a common culture. In Lithuanian readers, translations of such Russian writers as Leo Tolstoy and Alexander Pushkin stand beside works by Lithuanians. The Communists accept as much of the national cultures as they can fit into their scheme, but strike out whatever they find unacceptable. Antanas Smetona is presented only as the dictator of Lithuania from 1926 to 1940; his prose translations of Greek classics, certainly exemplary pieces of Lithuanian style, are passed over in silence. In the last years of his life, Vincas Krėvė-Mickevičius, who had gone to the United States as a displaced person after World War II, was also ignored by Soviet writers, although he is perhaps modern Lithuania's greatest literary figure. It was only after his death in 1954 that the rulers of his native

land saw fit to give any recognition to his work.

The history of the Baltic peoples has undergone extensive rewriting. All past relations with the "Great Russians" have to be considered exclusively from the Russian viewpoint. There can be no question of a conflict at any point in history between the national interests of the Baltic peoples and those of the Russians. Every opportunity is seized to show connections between Russian life and that of the Baltic area. Thus, in a new Lithuanian history, more time and effort is devoted to studying the impact of figures such as N. G. Chernyshevski, the revolutionary philosopher, and Felix Dzerzhinski, the head of the Cheka and a onetime member of the Lithuanian Social Democratic party, than to the usual Lithuanian national heroes. Furthermore, historical study has to show that the Baltic peoples always profited by their relations with Moscow. The inclusion of these peoples in the Russian Empire in the course of the eighteenth century was a step forward in their historical development since it facilitated the transition from the "feudal relationships" then prevalent in the Baltic to the capitalist relations of nineteenth century Russia. As for the incorporation of the Baltic states in 1940, that was an

historically determined act, prepared by all the preceding development of the Baltic lands, by the entire struggle of their toiling masses against the capitalists and the landlords. Outside the Soviet system, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia had no possibilities for economic and cultural development.⁵

⁵ See the account of the conference of Baltic historians, held at Tallinn, Estonia, in October 1954, *Voprosy istorii*, December 1954, p. 160. The Tallinn conference was dedicated to the history of the Baltic states from 1917 to 1940. An earlier conference at Riga in March 1953 considered pre-1917 history. See *Istoricheskie zapiski*, Vol. 45 (1954).

"Bourgeois yoke"

The years of independence between the world wars are now called the period of the "bourgeois yoke": the true will of the Baltic peoples to be a part of Soviet Russia had been repressed by the intervention of the Western "imperialists" against the Soviet Republics and found free expression only after the Soviet Union had forced the hand of the "bourgeois dictatorships" in 1940. In their works between the wars, Communist writers had noted that Lithuania's relations with the Soviet Union were much friendlier than those between the USSR and Latvia or Estonia. Now that the three are a part of the Soviet Union, however, this distinction has been dropped; and they all are pictured as having been consistently and unjustifiably unfriendly.

The Communist authorities maintain a close watch lest any ideas of national separatism or "Titoism" take hold in the Baltic states. In 1950 and 1951 an extensive purge was carried out in Estonia, removing, among others, the First Secretary of the Estonian Communist party, the Prime Minister, and the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, all on charges of "bourgeois nationalism." In 1952, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, August Kirchensteins, was forced to resign under similar charges. The Chairman of the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, Justas Paleckis, came under fire for his views on Lithuanian independence as expressed in his book *Sovetskaia Litva* (Soviet Lithuania, 1949), but he nevertheless managed to keep his position in the government.

POST-STALIN RELAXATIONS

After Stalin's death in March 1953, there was a slight relaxation in some as-

pects of the Russification campaign in the Baltic. Criticism arose of the failure to train "national cadres," and a number of high ranking Russian officials in the Baltic governments gave way to Baltic nationals. Nevertheless the Russians maintain a tight grip on the Baltic states. Russian officials occupy strategic posts throughout the party and the government where they can keep a watchful eye on any expression of nationalist or anti-Communist sentiments.

In 1955 the authorities eased controls on contact with foreign countries, allowing selected visitors into the Baltic area and occasionally sending Baltic nationals abroad as members of Soviet delegations. The visitors to the Baltic were usually groups of Communists or sympathizers who were agreeable to the Communist regime. The area remained closed to the average Westerner, supposedly because of a lack of proper accommodations; however, émigrés have claimed the reason to be the continued opposition by the Baltic peoples to the Soviet regime. In 1957 Riga was opened to tourists; but, while the entire Baltic area is now relatively accessible to visitors from the "People's Democracies," the bulk of the region is still tightly closed to Westerners.

The year 1955 saw one very significant change: it was no longer considered dangerous to correspond with persons abroad, even in the United States. The re-establishment of contact between friends and relatives long separated marked a significant breach of the wall erected around the Baltic states. The freedom with which persons in the Baltic request drugs, clothes, and other goods from their contacts in the United States indicates that they do not subscribe to the black views of American life to be found in the Communist press.

At the end of 1955 the Soviet government proclaimed an amnesty for many

members of the anti-Communist resistance movements in the Baltic at the end of World War II. The practical result of this was that many persons in prison camps in Siberia were released, but very few were allowed to return home. Most of them had to settle in Siberia, with very little prospect of ever again seeing their homeland. The pain of exile was somewhat alleviated by the fact that families broken up in the process of deportation could now reunite, and conditions have now improved to the point where former political prisoners can obtain permission to undertake professional studies. The number of Baltic nationals deported to Siberia was so great, however, that now they are able to form entire communities there, keeping alive their language and customs.⁶

Perhaps because they have little left to lose, the exiles in Siberia have been much bolder in their letters to persons abroad than have those still living in the Baltic. Their letters offer ample proof that the national spirit is still far from crushed. One young Lithuanian who had spent nine years in a labor camp compared himself and his comrades to the "book-carriers," men who in the latter part of the nineteenth century had smuggled Lithuanian books into Russia at the risk of exile into Siberia.

By-product of de-Stalinization

The downgrading of Stalin in the Soviet Union had little practical effect as such on the Baltic peoples. One interesting by-product, however, is that Baltic Communists purged by Stalin in the

⁶ One eyewitness of the uprising at the coal mines at Vorkuta in 1953 noted that the Lithuanians made up one-fifth of the inhabitants of his camp. Joseph Scholmer, "The Rising at Vorkuta," *The New Leader* (May 31, 1954), Section 2, p. S5.

1930's were being rehabilitated even before Khrushchev's famous secret report. In his speech to the Ninth Congress of the Lithuanian Communist party in January 1956 Sniečkus linked Zigmas Aleksa-Angarietis with Vincas Mickevičius-Kapsukas as one of the founders of the Lithuanian Communist party. Angarietis had disappeared from view in 1936, and the subsequent attacks on him as an "enemy of the people" indicated that he had been purged. Sniečkus' rehabilitation of him came without any previous public fanfare, and a sympathetic biography published later makes no mention of his ever having been in disfavor.

The partial relaxation of controls in the Baltic republics raised speculation abroad in early 1956 that they would soon be allowed to secede from the Soviet Union and to assume satellite status. But these rumors were based on wishful thinking rather than any factual evidence. The relaxation came only in areas which could not affect Communist controls or the integration of the Baltic states. There have been no reliable indications that the Soviet Union would consider releasing its hold on the Baltic nations; all the evidence points toward the continuation of the present situation.

The troubles in Poland and Hungary in the fall of 1956 had serious repercussions in the Baltic area. In Lithuania, demonstrations of a nationalistic character took place in early November. The demonstrators apparently made no concrete demands, but simply showed their discontent with existing conditions. In a speech before the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet in December 1956 Sniečkus took note of these demonstrations, attributing them to "remainders of the former antipopular parties and exploiting classes, bourgeois-nationalistic elements, and their helpers." Never-

theless he admitted that there was widespread discontent among the students; he called for the strengthening of "political-educational work among the students" and the correction of "unhealthy, foreign attitudes and mistaken opinions" among the Lithuanian intelligentsia. It is significant that he felt it necessary to declare that the Communists had a deep respect for the achievements of the Lithuanian nation:

We Communists do not claim that there was nothing positive in the life of the Lithuanian nation in the years of bourgeois rule. . . . The Communists place a high value on everything positive done by the Lithuanian nation in the various branches of life under bourgeois rule.

At the same time, however, he denounced any attempt to "idealize bourgeois times."⁷

THE PRESENT BALANCE

The relaxation of controls after Stalin's death allowed the Baltic peoples to renew to a limited degree old contacts with the West. The interest engendered by the new knowledge gained through these contacts has apparently alarmed the Communist rulers, who now are conducting a campaign to discredit various émigré groups and to convince the people that they are living in the best of all possible worlds. When a Lithuanian dramatist in America, Kostas Ostrauskas, expressed his fears that the national culture would have a hard time surviving on foreign soil, the Lithuanian Communist press eagerly picked up the statement and invited Ostrauskas to return home where he could work among his own people.⁸ The newspapers regularly publish reports on the return of groups of

⁷ *Sovetskaia Litva*, December 9, 1957.

⁸ *Tiesa*, January 6, 1957.

émigrés who have become dissatisfied with life abroad—usually in South America.

Despite the perils accompanying the decompression the Communists have not reverted to the open national oppression of Stalinist days. In the governmental changes of July 1957 in Moscow, one of the charges against the Molotov-Malenkov-Kaganovich-Shepilov "faction" was that these men had hindered the development of friendly relations between the various peoples of the USSR. As a result of the changes the First Secretary of the Latvian Communist party, J. Kalnberzins, holds the position of an alternate to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, marking the first time a member of a Baltic Communist party has risen so high.

One sign of the continued relaxation in the Baltic republics is the granting of permission for cultural delegations to go abroad. In the summer of 1957 Lithuania and Poland exchanged theatrical troupes. Newspaper reports of the exchange welcomed the renewal of cultural ties between the two nations

but passed over the long period of mutual isolation as having been hardly more than an oversight.

The Baltic states offer a remarkable example of the power of nationalism. Neither years of exile in Siberia, nor economic pressures, nor an intensive educational campaign has been able to dim the ardor of national feeling. Even more significant, the youth, who has grown up under Soviet rule, has given its support to the national idea. But the prospects for the future are bleak; the fate of the Baltic nations seems to be tied with that of the peoples of Soviet Russia rather than with that of other nations of East Central Europe. It is extremely doubtful that the Russians would ever withdraw voluntarily from the Baltic; the Baltic peoples have very little hope for an "October" such as the Poles experienced unless there is a general collapse of the Soviet government. Given the opportunity, the Baltic nations would break with Moscow, but it is one of the unfortunate aspects of their history that they have repeatedly found it impossible to determine their own political destinies.

Continuity of Communist Strategic Doctrine Since the Twentieth Party Congress¹

By BERNARD S. MORRIS

Abstract: The Soviet leaders have not broken as abruptly with Stalinist doctrine as the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union attempted to suggest. Yet the post-Stalinist modifications of doctrine concerning the inevitability of war and the status of the colonial and former colonial areas are directly related to the more flexible conduct of foreign relations by the Khrushchevite leadership. The course of events, themselves, rather than any premeditated doctrinal revisions was responsible for the crisis between Moscow and the national Communist parties and has given some substance, notably in Poland, to the doctrine of "national roads to socialism."

WHAT has been called "the crisis of Communist ideology" since the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (February 1956) was not, properly speaking, a crisis in ideology at all, but rather a crisis in the Soviet structure of power. Such a crisis, inherent in a state in which the transfer of political power has not been subjected to effective constitutional norms, was initiated by the scramble for dominance among Stalin's followers. It was as a by-product of that power struggle that the international Communist movement could once again, for the first time in thirty years, take stock of certain of its basic principles, particularly those governing the relations between Moscow and the national Communist parties.

In the controversy touched off by Khrushchev's denigration of Stalin, the refusal of the Soviet leaders to engage their Communist critics on a genuinely theoretical level was then an accurate

indicator of the extent to which they were prepared to see any modification of Communist doctrine. In a review of the events from the Twentieth CPSU Congress in February 1956 to the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution on November 7, 1957—roughly the period of the crisis—the salient fact is that Stalinist doctrine has emerged basically unchanged. What is more, there is little to suggest that Khrushchev, or any of his competitors for that matter, had any intention of departing from the essentials of that doctrine. It was rather the failure to foresee the effect of various actions than any fundamental doctrinal change which produced the confusion on policy and the centrifugal tendencies in the Communist movement.

Although the ideological controversy ranged over many fields, this article is confined to an examination of Communist doctrine affecting the Soviet Union's foreign policy and relations between the CPSU and the national Communist parties. The point of departure is the Twentieth CPSU Congress' pronouncements on war and peace, colonial libera-

tion, and the Communist road to power, all of which had more in common with the Stalinist era than is generally supposed. But the Congress itself gave the impetus to a course of events which may indeed lead to modifications of Communist doctrine on such a vital matter as "national roads to socialism"—that is, the extent to which the national Communist parties are permitted to direct their countries' policies.

WAR AND PEACE

For Khrushchev, no less than for Stalin, "peaceful coexistence" retains its place as the major gambit of Soviet foreign policy. And the doctrinal prop for the entire claim also remains the same as that formulated under Stalin,—that is, that there are no social classes in the Soviet Union which could expect to gain anything from war. At the Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev made it clear that, as with Stalin, "peaceful coexistence" will continue to be a policy of waging political and economic warfare against the non-Communist world. Stated this way, "peaceful coexistence" is diplomatic phraseology for the perpetuation and intensification of the international contest between the United States and the USSR without resort to general war.

Although "peaceful coexistence" had the same meaning for Stalin and himself, Khrushchev was intent on making this "line" more plausible to the West than it had been under Stalin's dispensation. Consequently, at the Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev explicitly rejected the Communist canon that war was inevitable.² Lenin's theory of war between capitalist states, it will be recalled (*Imperialism, the Highest Stage of*

Capitalism, 1916), argued that a maturing capitalist economy makes the profitable employment of capital increasingly difficult. Capitalist states are consequently forced to look for a way out in a policy of imperialism, with the result that these states must eventually clash.

After the seizure of power in Russia, the inevitability of war between capitalist states became less of a concern to the Bolshevik leaders than the possibility of war between Russia and its enemies. Lenin, for example, predicted that "... a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable,"³ and this was incorporated into Stalin's theory of "capitalist encirclement." In effect, then, there were two theories of "inevitable war," though the one predicting a war between capitalist and Communist states never received the theoretical elaboration of Lenin's doctrine concerning intercapitalist wars. The distinction between the two doctrines of war was blurred, particularly after World War II, when attention was largely focused on the probability of a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, with the corollary that such a war was just as "inevitable" as the intercapitalist wars predicted by Lenin.

At the Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev, paying lip service to the Leninist thesis that "... so long as imperialism exists, the economic basis giving rise to wars will also be preserved . . .," strongly affirmed that "war is not fatalistically inevitable." "Today there are mighty social and political forces," he said, "possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war, and if they actually try to start it, to give a smashing rebuff to the ag-

¹ I should like to thank my good friend, Morris Watnick, of Harvard's Russian Research Center, for his comments and editorial assistance.

Bernard S. Morris, Washington, D. C., Lecturer in International Politics at the American University, has written for various journals on Communist doctrine, strategy, and organization.

² I should like to express my appreciation to my colleague, Frederic S. Burin, for the use of his unpublished paper on the Communist doctrine concerning the inevitability of war.

³ "Report of Central Committee at Eighth Party Congress" (1919), in *Selected Works*, Vol. VIII (New York: International Publishers, 1943), p. 33.

gressors and frustrate their adventurist plans."⁴ What Khrushchev was implying is that in the present constellation of power, the Soviet Union and its allies are strong enough to deter the "imperialists" from making war on the "socialist camp"—that is, war is no longer inevitable. "Capitalist encirclement" and its corollary, the inevitability of imperialist war, have given way to the "socialist system" and the avoidability of war.

Strictly speaking, Khrushchev's statement on war can hardly be regarded as a doctrinal innovation. In Marxian terms "inevitability" has no deterministic connotation. War can be prevented if the "forces of peace" are strong enough, as Stalin so often exhorted his followers. Manipulating the doctrine in pursuit of his own version of "peaceful coexistence" in 1952, Stalin came out with the statement—then as startling as Khrushchev's in 1956—that war between the Communist and capitalist world was less likely than intercapitalist wars.⁵ Thus, Khrushchev's pronouncement may be regarded as a more explicit affirmation than Stalin's of the possibility of avoiding Communist-capitalist war and not essentially a departure from it. However one is inclined to weigh these matters, the important change is that of military technology and the power position of the USSR. Given the destructiveness of modern weapons and their own strength, the present Soviet leadership is probably even more convinced than was Stalin that war with the capitalist countries is avoidable and that peace, that is—the present condition in which the world finds itself—is the best way of expand-

ing Communist power and influence. There is thus no reason to doubt that the Stalinist perspective of a prolonged contest of strength with the West still governs Soviet policy.

COLONIAL LIBERATION

If the Twentieth Congress' prescription on foreign affairs did not break with the Stalinist tradition, it was nonetheless more alert than Stalin to the realities and opportunities of the international scene. The "two camp" doctrine, a feature of Soviet "forward" policy ushered in with the formation of the Cominform in 1947, was allowed to lapse. Instead, Khrushchev found a third area of underdeveloped countries (the "semi-colonies" of Stalin's day) now recognized as politically independent with a neutralist foreign policy that qualified them as members of the Khrushchev-proclaimed world "zone of peace." These nations were now to be cultivated or, better still, aligned if possible with the Soviet bloc.

In the doctrinal reformulations which accompanied Soviet recognition of a new state of affairs in the underdeveloped areas, Soviet theorists categorized the following three groups of nations "according to their degree of state and national independence":⁶ (1) the Communist states (China, North Korea, and North Vietnam); (2) those which have achieved "national independence" (India, Indonesia, Egypt, Syria, Burma, and others); and (3) those which have gained "formal national independence" but whose sovereignty is limited by "economic dependence" and "unequal treaties" (the Philippines, South Korea, and Iraq among others). It is the second group of nations that is the main focus of Soviet attention today. Com-

⁶ See, for example, V. Semenov: "The Collapse of the Colonial System of Imperialism and Questions of International Relations," *Kommunist*, No. 18 (December 1956).

⁴ "Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Twentieth Party Congress," Supplement to *New Times*, No. 8 (February 16, 1956), p. 22.

⁵ J. Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR," Supplement to *New Times*, No. 44 (October 29, 1952), pp. 14-16.

plementing Soviet diplomatic pressure on these countries, the Communist parties, following the Chinese Communist model, are expected to unite all classes and groups in a lasting national democratic movement.⁷

This, in brief, is the doctrinal underpinning for current Soviet diplomacy and economic penetration in the underdeveloped areas. It may, of course, be argued that the departure from the Stalinist view is nothing more than a temporary expedient to court the Asian and Near Eastern leaders, but that basically, the Leninist-Stalinist doctrine of the two hostile camps—Communist and capitalist—has not changed. Be that as it may, the new view of the underdeveloped areas is the crucial point for Communist strategy during the present period. It is, at the very least, more realistic than the Stalinist position which refused to take account of the independence and importance of newly formed states in the underdeveloped parts of the world and has opened a new dimension to Soviet diplomacy.

THE COMMUNIST ROAD TO POWER

The most publicized point of doctrine and the one which was—and still is—materially at stake during the post-Twentieth Congress crisis had to do with the seizure of power and the subsequent development of "socialism." The Congress denied that violence is prescribed in Communist doctrine on

⁷ This strategy prescribed for the Communist parties in underdeveloped countries dates from Stalin's days. What is more interesting is that although the identical strategy is in force today, the new Soviet diplomatic approach to these countries has put pressure on the Communist parties to move toward a "united front from above" strategy, that is, to give partial support to the regimes with which the Soviet Union is co-operating. See my article, "Recent Shifts in Communist Strategy: India and South East Asia," in *Soviet Survey*, No. 16-17 (June-July 1957), London, pp. 40-46.

the transition to socialism or that other Communist countries are required to pattern themselves on the Soviet model. Khrushchev pointed out that there were already three situations in which "socialism" was being developed in accordance with particular historical and social conditions: the Chinese People's Republic, the European "People's Democracies," and Yugoslavia.⁸ Moreover, he asserted that it is probable that more forms of transition to socialism will appear which need not be associated with civil war under all circumstances. In a number of capitalist countries there is a real opportunity, he said,

to capture a stable majority in parliament, and transform the latter from an organ of bourgeois democracy into a genuine instrument of the people's will.

Khrushchev made this something less than a universal proposition by his qualification that in those countries

where capitalism is still strong and has a huge military and police apparatus at its disposal, the reactionary forces will of course inevitably offer serious resistance. There the transition to socialism will be attended by a sharp class, revolutionary struggle.

The situation is more propitious, as Mikoyan indicated in his speech to the Congress, in a small bourgeois country neighboring on socialist countries; there the transition to socialism can take place by peaceful means, *vide* Czechoslovakia.

In citing Lenin's dictum that all nations will arrive at socialism, but not in exactly the same way, Khrushchev added nothing substantial to the doctrine of "national roads to socialism." It is precisely because of the vagueness of this concept that conflicting and heretical interpretations emerged in the

⁸ Khrushchev's remarks on the transition to socialism are in the "Report of the Central Committee" (note 4 *supra*), pp. 22-24.

crisis following de-Stalinization. The separate and peaceful roads formula had actually been incorporated into the program of a number of Western European Communist parties while Stalin was still alive. As far back as 1951-52, for example, the Communist party of Great Britain had held that

... the people of Britain can transform capitalist democracy into a real People's Democracy, transforming Parliament, the product of Britain's historic struggle for democracy, into the democratic instrument of the will of the vast majority of her people.⁹

Finally, if Khrushchev had been in the mood at the Twentieth Congress to pay respect to his mentor, he might have mentioned Stalin's prediction in his *Foundations of Leninism* (1924) that

in the remote future, if the proletariat is victorious in the most important capitalist countries, and if the present capitalist encirclement is replaced by a socialist encirclement, a "peaceful" path of development is quite possible for certain capitalist countries. . . .

The proletariat has not yet been victorious in the most important capitalist countries and "capitalist encirclement" has not yet given way to "socialist encirclement" but, as the Communists today boast, it has been replaced by the emergence of two parallel world systems, the "socialist" and the capitalist. The "remote future" has become our reality.

Khrushchev's caveat that peaceful transition should be ruled out "where capitalism is still strong and has a huge military and police apparatus at its disposal," suggests, moreover, that this "revision" of doctrine was not intended as a revision at all, but as propaganda

⁹ *The British Road to Socialism*, program of the Communist party issued in April 1952, p. 10.

pure and simple as far as the Western democracies are concerned. If it has any relevance, it is to the underdeveloped countries where a Communist-led national coalition (on the Chinese Communist pattern) may have the opportunity of achieving power "from within," that is, by seizing the reins of government by coup d'état or by parliamentary takeover.

DE-STALINIZATION AND THE REASSERTION OF THE OLD ORTHODOXY

The post-Twentieth Congress crisis in the Communist movement was precipitated when Khrushchev denounced Stalin's terroristic practices and megalomania without then, however, challenging fundamental doctrine or inter-party relationships.¹⁰ Delivered primarily for reasons of domestic politics which are still obscure—a quiet de-Stalinization had been going on for some time—Khrushchev's speech had unforeseen consequences in the Communist orbit, notably the return to power of Gomulka in Poland and the Hungarian revolt. How serious and unprecedented was the centrifugal pull within the international Communist movement is suggested by the spectacle of Togliatti's calling upon the Soviet leaders for a "Marxist explanation" of the Stalin phenomenon¹¹—the Soviet leaders were unobliging¹²—and the intervention of the

¹⁰ Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" is printed in *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 1-89.

¹¹ Togliatti's interview in *Nuovi argomenti*, published in *The Anti-Stalin Campaign*, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-139.

¹² On June 30, 1956, the CPSU Central Committee issued a statement "On Overcoming the Personality Cult and Its Consequences" (Supplement to *New Times*, July 5, 1956, No. 28) in which it tried to end the confusion among Communists stemming from Khrushchev's attack on Stalin. Posing the question "How could the Stalin personality cult, with all its adverse effects, arise and

Chinese Communists as conciliators in Eastern Europe. That the leader of a Communist party would have the temerity to criticize the Soviet system and to deride his masters in the Kremlin for being poor Marxists, or that the CPSU would have to call on the assistance of another party to pull its chestnuts out of the fire was symptomatic of the shaken unity of the Communist movement, following the policy of de-Stalinization. The subsequent Hungarian uprising came as close as anything to disrupting that unity entirely.

Yet, paradoxically it was the Hungarian revolt which smoothed the way for the re-establishment of Soviet primacy and the reassertion of orthodoxy. Soviet suppression of the revolt served as a warning to the exponents of rapid liberalization in Poland. The Chinese Communists, dependent on the Soviet orbit for capital equipment and technical aid, were alarmed about the possible disruption of deliveries and certainly about the threat to the cohesion of the system that they consider their best security guarantee against the West. Even the Yugoslav Communists, equivocal about the necessity of Soviet intervention in Hungary, registered concern over the consequences of a "counter-revolution" in Eastern Europe. In addition, the Soviet Union had the support of parties both inside and outside the orbit: the East German, Czech, Dutch, French, and others. In the end,

spread under the Soviet socialist system?", the Central Committee in a most un-Marxist way attributed it to Stalin's "personal characteristics," his control of the security apparatus, and so forth. It vehemently denied that the personality cult stemmed from the very nature of Soviet society and that its existence indicated that the social system of the USSR had changed somehow. To Togliatti's question whether the personality cult reflected "certain forms of degeneration" in Soviet society, the Central Committee retorted "there are no grounds whatever for this question." Q. E. D.

something like order was restored within the movement, not, however, without considerable losses in membership and popular support, particularly in Western Europe. It was not until the fortieth anniversary celebration of the Bolshevik revolution in Moscow that the effect of the turmoil on Communist doctrine could be assessed.

THE TWELVE-PARTY DECLARATION

The leaders of the international Communist movement assembled in Moscow when the Soviet Union's prestige had never been higher. With the launching of the earth satellite, the USSR had taken a "qualitative leap into space." The Soviet leaders made good use of the occasion to enforce the claims of doctrinal orthodoxy and of their policies.

On November 14-16, 1957, the representatives of the twelve Communist parties in power¹³ signed a "Declaration" which embodied the "basic laws" applicable to all countries embarking on a Socialist revolution and building socialism.¹⁴ These "laws" are, in brief, the indispensability of the Communist party in achieving a proletarian revolution "in one form or another" and establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat in "one form or other"; public ownership of the basic means of production; gradual Socialist reconstruction of agriculture; planned development of the national economy; and solidarity of the working class of one country with the working class of other countries—proletarian internationalism.

¹³ The Yugoslav Communists did not join in this "Declaration," probably because of their disagreement with the way in which the leading role of the Soviet Union was formulated and, it may be surmised, because of the strong attack on "revisionism" with which they have often been labeled for their internal decentralization policies and their contention that in some areas the Communist party is not indispensable for achieving socialism.

¹⁴ *Pravda*, November 22, 1957.

These guidelines for the Communist parties hardly show any departure from those of the Stalinist era. The qualifications that "national peculiarities" must be taken into account in carrying out these "laws" is standard in Communist literature, and the "Declaration" itself warns that exaggeration of these peculiarities is just as harmful to the cause of socialism as disregarding them would be. Taken together with the statement that "in condemning dogmatism, the communist parties believe that the main danger at present is revisionism," it is difficult to escape the conclusion that a new orthodoxy—hardly differing from Stalinist orthodoxy—has been reimposed on the Communist movement. The Soviet leaders, themselves, prefer to stress the continuity of "line" from the Twentieth CPSU Congress,¹⁵ but there is no essential contradiction involved: the Twentieth Congress was Khrushchev's attempt to break with the harshest and rigid aspects of Stalin's ways of doing business; there was no break with the essentials of the system.

NATIONAL COMMUNISM

And yet it cannot be said with certainty that the *status quo ante* was re-established. The mere repetition of the basic doctrine is not itself crucial since the doctrine is broad enough to permit a whole range of tactics. If the state of mind of the Khrushchevite leadership is different from Stalin's, if the political pressures within the Communist orbit do dictate what one observer has called "rationalized totalitarianism," some change in methods and tactics within a rigidly prescribed framework may yet evolve. And change would

¹⁵ See Khrushchev's report to the Jubilee Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, November 6, 1957 in Supplement to *New Times*, No. 46 (November 14, 1957), pp. 13-14.

seem to hinge more on developments in Gomulka's Poland than in Yugoslavia. With Yugoslavia outside Soviet control, Khrushchev could afford to make concessions to Tito on such matters as separate roads to socialism. Concessions to Poland, however, precisely because it is within the area of Soviet control, may have more far-reaching effects on the satellite countries.

In his report on the November conference of Communist parties, Gomulka stated that

the main ideas contained in the declaration and manifesto¹⁶ have been frequently expressed before by Communist and workers parties, including our party. Although the declaration and manifesto contain ideas expressed before, their great importance consists in the fact that these ideas are assuming increasing practical significance, that they are becoming more and more timely, and that the correctness of these ideas is confirmed more and more in actual life by a growing number of facts.¹⁷

While Gomulka did not see eye to eye with the Soviet leaders on all points at the Moscow Conference—he and the Hungarians apparently were opposed to the formulation on the leading role of the Soviet Union¹⁸—he was prepared to see the reconciliation of what have been in practice two mutually exclusive concepts: loyalty to the Soviet Union and,

¹⁶ The reference is to the "peace manifesto" signed by 64 Communist parties including the Yugoslav at a meeting in Moscow, November 16-19, 1957. The text is carried in *Pravda*, November 23, 1957.

¹⁷ "Report on the Results of the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers Parties to a Warsaw Meeting of Party Activists," November 28, Radio Warsaw, November 29, 1957.

¹⁸ The SED delegate, Friedrich Ebert, in his report on the Conference, omitted Gomulka and Kádár from the list of those who had "unanimously agreed with Mao Tse-tung that only the CPSU can be at the head of the socialist camp." (*Neues Deutschland*, November 30, 1957, p. 4.)

as he put it, the "complete political and organizational freedom and the genuine sovereignty of each party."

Of course there is always the chance that Gomulka is deluding himself, but what he is fighting for—a circumscribed yet crucial area of freedom of decision—is of utmost importance for the other Communist parties and the future development of communism. As a Leninist—one is almost tempted to say, as a realist—Gomulka has long since endorsed the "general principles universally applicable in the struggle for socialism": a Marxist-Leninist party, establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, socialization of the means of production, and a policy in accordance with the Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism.¹⁹ But on the doctrine of national roads to socialism Gomulka is precise where his Soviet colleagues have been purposely vague. To him, "national roads to socialism" means the differences between the way in which socialism is constructed in a given country and the way it developed in the Soviet Union. The concrete path to socialism, Gomulka said, is determined by concrete, general historical conditions; by the concrete correlation of class forces both in a given country and on an international scale; and by the more favorable economic and world situation of today which permits a slower pace in development, particularly in the countryside. It is an international road in the sense that every national, and thus also the Polish, road to socialism should be based on the general fundamental principles which are com-

¹⁹ Gomulka's speech of May 15, 1957 to the Ninth Plenum of the Polish Communist Central Committee; Radio Warsaw, May 16, 1957.

mon to all countries. But this general international road to socialism, he continued,

presupposes in turn a national understructure, peculiar to each country, and it is in this sense that we speak about the national, and thus in our case, the Polish road to socialism.

Gomulka, then, is advocating a change that boils down to the ability of each national Communist leadership to make its own decisions without interference from Moscow but within broadly conceived rules—the "basic laws." In formalistic terms, this would represent no change in the doctrine of proletarian internationalism, or of national roads to socialism; in fact, it would be a fundamental change in Communist practice and outlook.

The Twentieth CPSU Congress was in a sense a tragedy for the Communist movement; it raised hopes beyond anything that was indicated by a close reading of the speeches and proceedings. Poznań, the unseating of the Polish Stalinist leadership, the Hungarian revolt, the outpourings of the intellectuals contributed to the impression that far more basic changes were being forced on the Soviet leadership than it had anticipated. Lost sight of was the fact that the post-Stalinist leadership, in tempering the brutality of the regime, had not departed essentially from Stalinist doctrine. But events have their own logic, and it may be that Gomulka will be proved right in saying that developments since the Twentieth Congress have given some content to what were then merely propagandistic pronouncements concerning national roads to socialism.

The Soviet Stake in Eastern Europe

By ALEXANDER DALLIN

Abstract: Practical power politics as well as ideological considerations were at the root of the Soviet seizure of Eastern Europe at the end of World War II. While Soviet policy has since Stalin's death become more flexible, the basic assumptions and motives have apparently not changed. In its own view, Moscow cannot afford to abandon Eastern Europe even if, in material and military terms, the area becomes a liability.

FOR MORE than a decade, the Soviet Union has sought to maximize its control over Eastern Europe. By arms, by diplomacy, and by deceit, it seized and consolidated power in "successive, consequent stages"—to use Moscow's terminology—employing dependent Communist regimes to reshape Eastern Europe in the Soviet image. At considerable risk, it then proffered the satellites a modest relaxation analogous to that which the USSR itself witnessed after Stalin's death. And, to maintain its hold over the "People's Democracies," Moscow has used all manner of means to cope with some of the greatest challenges in its history—challenges symbolized by the names of Tito, Gomułka, and Nagy. Why?

Moscow has never made an explicit statement about the Soviet "stake" in this area. By the very nature of the problem, a frank assessment of Soviet motivation and commitments cannot come from the Kremlin. Indeed, it is likely that the Soviet leaders themselves make decisions on the basis of various considerations whose specific weight they may be unable to relate or identify.

It would be fatuous to ignore the complex body of Marxist-Leninist doctrine which has played so pervasive a part in Communist outlook and action. Even

though the ideology, in its day-to-day application, has itself become an object of pragmatic manipulation, the basic image of the world-wide historical process—rooted in the dialectic concept of two inevitably struggling opposites—is deeply and perhaps ineluctably impressed on the thinking and feeling of Soviet policy makers. Originally limited to a vertical, class struggle within each society, the "two-world" concept was soon projected upon a horizontal, geographically divided world. If the victory of Communism in Russia failed, in 1917–20, to spark similar take-overs elsewhere in the world, this was due according to Moscow to a "temporary stabilization of capitalism"—temporary since inevitably new crises and wars would bring about successive defections from the capitalist into the Communist "camp." This is still the view:

Marxism-Leninism teaches [a recent semi-official analysis confirms] that between capitalism and socialism [i.e., communism] lies a period of transition which is the era of the destruction and, eventually, complete downfall of capitalism—the period of the germination, ceaseless growth and victory of socialism. The basic content of the period of transition is the struggle between the dying and vanquished but not yet destroyed capitalism and the newly

born and rapidly growing Communism, according to the principle of *kto kovo* ['who bests whom?']. . . .¹

In the Soviet explanation, World War II set off a new phase in this world struggle which resulted in the defection of Eastern Europe into the Soviet camp. *Kommunist*, the theoretical journal of the Soviet Communist party, explained:

After the crushing of the aggressive powers [in World War II] . . . there began the second round of national wars and revolutions. The imperialist chain was broken in several spots, and an entire family of socialist states has appeared on the globe. . . . Socialism has become a world system.²

With blind faith in its inevitable progression, with pride in its step-by-step realization, this view of the expanding "world system" symbolized by the satellite orbit has been frequently repeated in recent years. The Communist parties of the Soviet orbit in November 1957 reiterated that nothing can amend or arrest the "inevitable laws of historical development."

Thus the East European orbit is the expression of an ideologically perceived, unalterable manifest destiny. At the same time its existence is also a source of genuine pride—and propaganda. Time and again the emergence of the world system of twelve powers—including seven in Eastern Europe—is cited as a manifestation of the "triumphal march" of communism—and a show piece for the outside world. It is

the material expression of Lenin's rightness, when he said in 1921: "Our path is correct, for this is the path which sooner or later the other countries will inevitably follow, too."³

¹ Akademiia nauk SSSR, Institut Filosofii, *O narodnoi demokratii v stranakh Evropy* (Moscow, 1956), p. 59.

² Editorial, *Kommunist*, No. 6 (Moscow, 1957), p. 7.

³ *Kommunist*, No. 5 (1957), p. 14.

And in its operational application, it provides a model for the West:

It is no accident that of late the program of Communist parties in capitalist countries speaks of the people's democracies as the proximate goal for whose attainment the Communist party appeals to the masses.⁴

THE IDEAS OF POWER

Awareness of ideological mainsprings by no means implies neglect of power considerations. In harmony with the "unity of theory and practice" intrinsic in Leninism, ideology and power are married to produce the rationale for Soviet foreign policy. Given the perpetual struggle between the two "world systems," offensive and defensive are reduced to complementary facets of an objectively determined tug of war in which the retreat of one side *ipso facto* means the advance of the other. In the context of interwar Russia, expansion was foreshadowed by the Soviet demand for "friendly neighbors" as a prerequisite for the attainment of Communism—a theme successfully exploited by Soviet press and diplomacy as a security measure during World War II.

Can socialism victorious in one country consider itself as fully secure [Stalin asked in 1938]? . . . It cannot . . . [unless] our country were situated on an island and if it had not many other countries around it. But since we live not on an island but in a system of states, of which a considerable number are hostile to us . . . we say openly and frankly that the victory of socialism is not yet complete.⁵

In the long run, Moscow maintains, none but "Socialist" states can be "friendly neighbors."

Not that the establishment of an East European bloc has been permitted to dull Soviet intransigence or has re-

⁴ Akademiia nauk, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), p. 22.

⁵ *Izvestiia*, February 15, 1938.

Alexander Dallin, Ph.D., New York City, is Associate Professor of International Relations, Russian Institute, Columbia University. He was formerly Associate Director of the Research Program on the USSR and Director of the Columbia University Research Project on Hungary.

duced the danger of conflict.⁶ But it has, in fact, made a very substantial contribution to the Soviet "position of strength" in international dealings. Divorced from ideological underpinnings, the Russian advance to the Elbe has meant the filling of a power vacuum created by the defeat of the Nazi empire: as elsewhere on the peripheries of the USSR, geographic accretion—even at the price of enmity from erstwhile friends—has been the almost unailing reflex whenever opportunities arose to expand.

Since the geopolitical co-ordinates remain unaltered, Moscow has in the process fulfilled what amounts to the maximum program of traditional tsarist objectives in Europe (as formulated, for instance, in 1914-16). To recognize this is not to reduce "ideology" to a mere front for the implementation of jingoist daydreams. It is to acknowledge the existence of "objective" national and strategic considerations in Soviet policy in Eastern Europe.

Defense objectives have played some part in Russia's attempt—in 1944-48 as in earlier generations—to rid itself of the neighboring Western-oriented *cordon sanitaire* and of the staging area of a German-sponsored *Drang nach Osten*. Enhanced by the absence of natural borders in Eastern Europe, such considerations are given strength by the past use of the "Middle Tier" as a springboard against Russia, and by the traditional Russian strategy of relying on space as a weapon against invasion.

The apparent plausibility of such de-

⁶ "Certain comrades [the party rebuked the heretics in 1951] have erroneously construed the establishment of a system of people's democracies in a number of countries bordering on the USSR as liquidating the capitalist encirclement. Evidently these comrades look upon capitalist encirclement as a purely geographical concept, which is of course entirely wrong." (*Bolshevik*, No. 16, 1951, p. 61.)

fensive factors permitted the Soviet authorities to exploit the reality of anti-German sentiment—and Western compassion for wartime Russia—to justify an immodest program of totalitarian aggrandizement; an effort whose manipulative character is revealed by its politically inspired modulations since the end of the war. The original posture of solidarity with East European allies and of all-Slav brotherhood (with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia) as against the enemy states (Rumania and Hungary included) was abandoned when they all became "co-equal" members of the Socialist family of nations; the anti-German *obligato* was muted when East Germany emerged as a fledgling member of the bloc. Correspondingly, in recent years, the bloc—through bilateral agreements, the Warsaw Pact, and secret arrangements—has served as a bastion against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, West Germany, and the United States.⁷ The reality of its strategic worth remains to be examined; but the Soviet determination to have and to hold the area has, in Soviet eyes, been justified by considerations of doctrine and defense alike. There is normally no conflict between the dictates of Soviet power and ideology.

It is rare to find Soviet admissions that the satellite area was intended as a bridgehead against the West. There is little doubt that, in the West European fluidity of the immediate postwar years, Stalin had harbored such military designs; but in his letter to Tito on May 4, 1948, he admitted that "unfortunately the Soviet army did not and could not render [any] assistance to the French and Italian Communist

⁷ An additional, though clearly minor, use was the co-ordination of foreign policies, the appearance of the Soviet "bloc" in international organizations, and the formal differentiation that permitted the fiction of a "neutral" Poland or Czechoslovakia during the Korean crisis.

parties." The less overt expression of this aggressive concept was the elevation of the "People's Democracies" to the status, formerly held by the USSR alone, of "shock brigades in the international liberation movement."⁸

FORM AND FAÇADE

In Eastern Europe, just as within the USSR, Moscow has striven for maximum *effective* but not formal control. Skillfully applying the "salami tactics" of eliminating competing foci of power and personalities, it has sought to have the satellites emulate Soviet example and experience—which, during the heyday of Stalinism, constituted the sole permissible "road to Communism."

Yet, while the practice in Eastern Europe seemed to be approaching the Soviet norm, Moscow betrayed an amazing sensitivity to forms and fictions. A theory of "people's democracy" was formulated with an embarrassing absence of Marxist-Leninist foundations. At first it was advertised as a possible middle course between West and East: clearly, an artifact. When, about 1948, Communist control in the satellites was secured, the distinction between Soviet and East European systems of government was abandoned. In the words of Jozef Révai,

we must liquidate the concept . . . that a People's Democracy is some quite specific kind of state which differs from the Soviet not only in form but also in its essence and function.

Revai openly acknowledged that the plan to eliminate all non-Communist influence had existed from the outset but that "it was not correct to show our cards."⁹

"Not to show our cards" was part of the motivation behind the maintenance

⁸ *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, 2d ed., Vol. 29 (Moscow, 1954), p. 135.

⁹ *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), March-April 1949.

of "sovereign" states in Eastern Europe. Cognizant of national sentiment and of the impact on the outside world, Stalin chose to recognize the sister states as independent: a decision he had made a generation earlier when he wrote to Lenin that outright incorporation of "a future Soviet Germany, Poland, Hungary, Finland" into the Soviet Union would not be politic:

It is doubtful whether these peoples, with their own states, armies, finances, would—once Soviet—consent to enter into direct federal union with Soviet Russia as the Bashkirs or Ukrainians did . . . because they would see in a Soviet type of federation a device of reducing their political independence, a violation of this independence. I have no doubt that for these nations the most expedient form of bringing about a rapprochement would be a confederation, a union of independent states. . . .¹⁰

THE DILEMMA OF DECOMPRESSION

Ideology and power were congruent in dictating Soviet action in Eastern Europe after 1944. Ideology and power were both challenged by the forces unleashed in the course of the controlled "decompression" of the post-Stalin period. Titoism had foreshadowed the resulting problem, but so long as Stalin was alive, the "People's Democracies" were assumed to be hermetically sealed off from the centrifugal contagion. The dilemma in moderating the totalitarian vise inhered in the necessity of abandoning Stalinist rigidity before a new *modus vivendi* was found. Decompression invited more decompression, and neither of the two obvious alternatives seemed acceptable: further liberalization invited Poland's "October"; a return to Stalinism provoked Hungary's. Eastern Europe was caught between the Soviet determination to maintain control and the necessity to relax controls.

¹⁰ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia*, 3d ed., Vol. 25 (Moscow, 1932), p. 624.

Stalin's death, the reconciliation with Tito—involving recognition that there were various “roads to socialism”—and the shock-wave started by Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech invited an effective challenge to Moscow's monopoly of power as well as of ideology in the Communist world.

Khrushchev was groping for a new formula of empire, which would combine latitude for the East European dependencies with an assurance that the Soviet stake in the area was not jeopardized. While Bulganin lectured the Poles about their ill-conceived centrifugal endeavors “under the guise of conforming to so-called ‘national features,’ attempts to undermine the authority of the people's democracy under the pretext of ‘extending democracy,’”¹¹ Khrushchev offered to transform the bloc into “a stable indestructible commonwealth of many countries.”¹² While warning against Yugoslav, Hungarian, and Polish excesses of national communism, Moscow admitted its “mistakes” of yesteryear and—in the midst of the Hungarian crisis—went so far as to offer to discuss ways and means “to remove any possibility of violation of the principles of national sovereignty, mutual benefit, and equality”; to negotiate the removal of advisers, armed forces, and economic exploitation; and to establish “a great commonwealth of socialist nations.”¹³

Up to October 1956, the dominant course was one of reluctant concessions calculated to take the wind out of the sails of “national communism”: a change of tactics that involved no basic reassessment by Moscow of its vital and variegated “stake” in Eastern Europe. The explosive events that ensued demonstrated the inadequacy of these tactics.

¹¹ *Pravda*, July 22, 1956.

¹² *Pravda*, July 16, 1956.

¹³ *Pravda*, October 31, 1956.

KHRUSHCHEV vs. MOLOTOV

The new course in Eastern Europe was not charted without serious dissension within the Kremlin. The conflict came to a head at the closed Central Committee Plenum of July 1955. Khrushchev reformulated Soviet strategy in a characteristic amalgam of traditional ideological categories and realistic appraisal of power relationships. His conclusion amounted to a recognition that in Europe the “second round” had come to an end. Since a new “temporary stabilization” had obtained there, efforts to push westward must be halted as futile.¹⁴ In Europe, the object of Soviet policy must be to hold the line—the Lübeck-Tirana line, that is—against the West: a course opportune in that it permits Khrushchev sincerely to demand a recognition and freezing of the status quo—the recurrent leitmotif of recent Soviet pronouncements. As in the 1920's, when Soviet attention shifted from Germany to China, eastward lies the course of empire; in Khrushchev's terminology, the fate of world capitalism may be decided in Asia, where the slogan of anti-imperialism must unite Communists with non-Communists against the West.

Soviet policy since 1955 has accordingly attempted to implement the four-point program offered by Khrushchev: in the West, avoidance of conflict; in the underdeveloped world, a sizeable intensification of participation and penetration; with Yugoslavia, a reconciliation based on recognition of national diversity; and flexibility with regard to

¹⁴ Eugene Varga, the prominent Soviet economist, was allowed to elaborate this point by admitting that the Communist parties in the West had failed to win popular support. “The influence of the Social-Democratic parties . . . has spread in a number of countries to the majority of the working class.” (*Kommunist*, No. 4, 1957, p. 44.)

marginal areas such as Austria and Finland where a compromise was deemed possible. The implicit formula for Eastern Europe was to maintain the Soviet hold.¹⁵

The “Stalinists,” with Vyacheslav Molotov as their major spokesman, opposed this strategy: they opposed as a retreat an abandonment of Eastern Austria; they protested a settlement with a Tito who had succumbed to capitalist blandishments; they foresaw an invitation to national communism in Eastern Europe. When the dangers foreshadowed by Molotov proved to be no chimera, Khrushchev's position was momentarily weakened. At the same time, Khrushchev was able to point to Georgii Malenkov and others who had tolerated and nurtured “rightists” and “revisionists”: Imre Nagy, Wladyslaw Gomulka. A secret circular of the Khrushchev *apparat* had even earlier accused Malenkov of inviting “serious dangers for the people's democracies and for the relations of the Soviet Union with these countries. . . .”¹⁶

Khrushchev steered a middle course—or, more correctly perhaps, vacillated—between the Stalinists and the advocates of reform, previously supported as he was apparently by those in the armed forces who, from their professional point of view, were prepared to keep Hungary and probably Poland under effective Soviet rule.¹⁷

¹⁵ The account of the July plenum, first revealed by Seweryn Bialer on the basis of the stenographic record, has been indirectly confirmed by other Polish and Yugoslav evidence.

¹⁶ Seweryn Bialer, “The Three Schools of Kremlin Policy,” *The New Leader*, July 29, 1957.

¹⁷ It is possible that the accusation of “adventurism” in military and foreign policy, leveled against Marshal Zhukov at the time of his ouster, referred to an insistence on military intervention in Poland in October 1956. (*The New York Times*, November 3, 1957.)

BETWEEN STALINISM AND SPONTANEITY

If politics is the art of the possible, Khrushchev has been the artist of the totalitarian middle: neither the use of brute force nor the tolerance of “revisionist” anathema could restore unanimity in Eastern Europe. Could a mixture of both obviate the dangers? Once the previous tactics had proved to be in vain, the Kremlin—still seeking a new formula for the Soviet imperium—chose to use its power to keep the sphere intact—and then to embark on a flexible, vigorous attempt to promote more meaningful changes within.

In theory and ideology, this middle course has been marked by a recognition of both “multiple paths” to communism and doctrinal unity. The new formula recognizes the predominance of the USSR within the system; reduces divergences to a matter of tactics;¹⁸ and defines the minimum common denominator of Communist orthodoxy throughout the Soviet bloc.¹⁹ A vigorous attack on deviationists of all hues has been in progress to restore the “purity” of ideology in Eastern Europe, China, and the Soviet Union itself. Despite

¹⁸ “The variety of conditions in different countries tolerates no stereotype, no standardization in the application of tactical means of struggle.” (*Kommunist*, No. 9, 1957, p. 9.)

¹⁹ Suslov, the Presidium's theoretician, in November 1956 formulated the following four conditions: Communist one-party rule; co-operation with peasants and other toilers; liquidation of capitalist ownership, and economic planning; and vigilant police control. (*Pravda*, November 7, 1956.) The declaration adopted by the twelve Communist parties of the Soviet bloc one year later elaborated these into nine points, which now also include dictatorship of the proletariat, socialist revolution in ideology and culture, national equality, and proletarian international solidarity—that is, recognition of Soviet leadership within the “camp.” (*Pravda*, November 22, 1957.) “The most important common feature of the transition from capitalism to socialism is the leadership of . . . the Marxist-Leninist Party.” (*Kommunist*, No. 16, 1957, p. 5.)

the concessions, Moscow continues in its insistence that it alone can, or may, interpret the creed.

In practical politics, there has been a similar attempt to walk the razor's edge between Stalinism and spontaneity, between force and freedom. Most dramatic in the case of Poland, the complex network of Soviet controls has been cut back. A variety of genuine relaxations—from the release of prisoners to greater realism (and Soviet assistance) in economic policy—have contributed to a change in climate and attitude. Yet there is a point beyond which Moscow will not yield. In the last analysis, Gomulka, and perhaps Kádár himself, is tolerated only as a necessary evil; and by the end of 1957 a new and partly successful drive was once again under way to reduce the scope of satellite autonomy, culminating in the demand that Poland cease accepting aid from the West.

The "German menace" has been aptly used to keep Poland, and perhaps Czechoslovakia, in line. This is bound to be a potent argument.²⁰ The Gomulka wing, warning its followers not to go "too far," explained unmistakably:

Here and there demands for the withdrawal of Soviet army units from Poland are being voiced. . . . In the present international situation such demands are contrary to the most vital interests of the nation and to Polish *raison d'état*. . . . The Soviet Union is so far the only one of the Four Powers to have recognized and guaranteed our western frontiers. . . .²¹

With some variation, the combination of power, persuasion, and porridge has been equally apparent in the other satellites.

Yet, however important the changes in economy and cultural life, and how-

²⁰ Bulganin and Zhukov made use of it in their declaration of July 25, 1956.

²¹ Paul E. Zinner, Ed., *National Communism and Popular Revolt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 282-283.

ever genuine the reduction in the omnipresence of the terror machine, it is significant that Moscow continues to ban any combinations that might challenge Soviet power. The deeply engrained Stalinist suspicion of autonomy was bared when in 1948 Moscow vetoed a Balkan federation of "people's democracies." A power bloc of "People's Democracies" independent of Moscow continues to be a nightmare today, and Tito's backstage attempts at ties with Warsaw and perhaps Bucharest and Sofia, as well as expressions in favor of an East European federation emanating from Warsaw,²² are bound to arouse the most profound suspicion in Moscow. The new variant of inter-Communist contact is, in part, a response to this feeling. In Khrushchev's words, "the contacts must be on more elastic and different lines. But they must be effective."²³ The Soviet power monopoly must remain intact.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Recent events in Eastern Europe have demonstrated the absence of a broad popular basis for the satellite regimes. The new strategy reflects at least a partial awareness of the necessity for Moscow to offer genuine improvements, to manufacture consent to the status quo not only from without but also from within the bloc—consent on the part of subjects who have given the Soviet Union a startling object lesson in the failure of its methods and ideas. Not even the Soviet empire can live by bayonets alone.

²² As one Polish writer puts it, "the Soviet Union has lost the moral right to be the exclusive guardian of the interests of the Revolution. . . . Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, here is the heart of Europe. . . . An alliance? perhaps a federation?" (Jerzy Lovell, in *Życie Literackie*, November 25, 1956.)

²³ Konni Zilliacus, *A New Birth of Freedom?* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1957), p. 105.

If Eastern Europe must be ruled by a handful of loyal agents and an arsenal of arms, the value of the Middle Tier as a strategic base vanishes. It becomes a glacis that ties up weapons and manpower but promises to be unreliable in case of war. Among the considerations that led the Soviet authorities to urge the adoption of the Rapacki Plan, the reluctance to provide thermonuclear weapons to Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary must carry considerable weight.

The resolution of the Supreme Soviet urging a "denuclearized" zone in Central Europe made a European settlement contingent on the recognition of the status quo. To Moscow this means a perpetuation of the Soviet sphere, an acknowledgment by the West of the permanence of the "two-world" concept. Just as Stalin took for granted a vivisectioned Europe,²⁴ so Khrushchev today rules out neutralist defections in Europe. It was Imre Nagy's declaration of neutrality on November 2, 1956, that broke the camel's back. And, when reminded that Tito wished to belong to neither of the two power blocs, Khrushchev retorted: "But how can he say that—he must belong somewhere!"²⁵ Either—or: the dialectical bipolarity of the Soviet world view remains.

How rational is the Soviet commitment in Eastern Europe? Clearly, the elusive balance of considerations does not rest on a fulcrum of "cost accounting." Moscow must hold on to the satellite sphere even if it hurts. Even if Soviet economic and military expenditures there exceed the material benefits, Moscow must stand fast. To yield the

²⁴ Milovan Djilas (*The New Class* [New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957], p. 197) recalls a private comment by Stalin that "the Western powers will make a country of their own out of West Germany, and we will make one of our own of East Germany—that is inevitable."

²⁵ Zilliacus, *op. cit.* (note 23 *supra*), p. 103.

"People's Democracies" would mean to strike a body blow at the badly shaken faith in the "triumphal march" of the Cause; it would mean an unprecedented setback to Soviet prestige and power on both sides of the Great Divide. There is method in this principled rigidity amidst tactical gyrations: today Moscow knows better than the outside world what the repercussions of a new "October" would be.

This is not to say that the Soviet regime could never yield. In the cases of Austria and Finland—where the withdrawals involved no collapse of Communist governments but merely the abandonment of zones or bases—the present leadership proved able to compromise when given a chance to do so without loss of face. Elsewhere, it has refused to do so. Yet one may argue that the days of Kadavergehorsam are gone forever in the Soviet orbit. Institutional strains among Communist states and parties; national dissimilarities and differences in policy and outlook; ideological "policentricity" in the Communist world, in substance sanctioned by China and other "fraternal" movements; economic autonomy, fostered by recent changes in policy; conceivably, a more adroit policy of the West; and the very experience of the post-Stalin era—all attempts, over the long haul, foreshadow a continual chafing of Eastern Europe at the Soviet leash.

Since November 1956 Soviet action has been marked by considerable dexterity. Yet it is doubtful whether the present "middle course" can indefinitely stem the tide. Whether Moscow some day will decide that the gains are not worth the chips, remains to be seen. As of now, there is no evidence of such a reappraisal. The Kremlin has toned down and redefined Stalinist assumptions and objectives, but it has not abandoned their essence.

Eastern Europe in Exile

By ELIZABETH K. VALKENIER

Abstract: Because of their composition, the World War II emigrations from Eastern Europe have had two main purposes: the preservation of national cultures subject to intensified Russification and destruction, and the liberation of their compatriots from an alien and unpopular rule. The recent détente in the international situation and signs of liberalization in the satellites have called for a reassessment of the émigré policies and have caused disagreement on the role of the political and cultural mission of the exiles.

DESPITE great and fundamental differences, all emigrations from Eastern Europe since World War II have one feature in common—a high percentage of intellectuals and public figures. Proportionately they constitute a far greater part of each emigration than they did of the population of their countries. Moreover, their homelands were under a foreign domination which made unparalleled efforts to transform, not merely the political structure of each nation, but its social and political life as well. Together these factors placed a great responsibility on those representatives of Eastern Europe's political and cultural elite who found themselves in exile. Thus, émigré activities assumed a double aspect: they were concerned with the liberation of each nation from alien rule and with the preservation of its culture, which was subjected to fundamental alterations designed to negate its national, Western, and Christian traditions.

For this reason cultural activities among East European exiles are not limited to keeping the emigrants in touch with their homelands through the publication of newspapers and magazines in the native tongue, the production of plays from the classical reper-

tory, the organization of lectures and social gatherings. Something much more important is at stake which goes far beyond giving a sense of belonging and participation to people who find themselves lonely and isolated in a new country. It involves the preservation and encouragement of national artistic, literary, academic, and scientific pursuits in an atmosphere free from political oppression.

These aims may sound somewhat presumptuous to a non-East European. But he may not be aware of the organized onslaught on national traditions in Russia's satellites—a program which cannot be excused by the claim that the culture of those countries is being transferred from its prewar, largely elite base, to a new mass base. For this change involves not only the destruction of certain time-hallowed national illusions, but also an outright falsification of the past.

Nevertheless a problem—and a very serious one—remains. It is whether a small group of writers, journalists, artists, and scholars can preserve and develop a national culture apart from its homeland and without connection with the millions of compatriots who, of necessity, are the bearers and the inspiration of that culture. Without that vivi-

fyng and corrective source and background, it is quite easy to fall into a sterile or static conception of one's country and its people as it is preserved in memories antedating 1939, 1945, or 1948. For even though the nations behind the Iron Curtain are enslaved, they are experiencing these trying and difficult years and are therefore creating new allegiances, hopes, and ideals, of which the new political and economic arrangements form an integral part.

Creative writers are the ones most acutely aware of this problem. Even though they are in the fortunate position of being politically free to write of the world as they observe and understand it, many writers, especially of the older generation, feel that their literary activity in exile faces eventual extinction because of the loss of contact with their native life, the living language of the people, and a wide, responsive audience. Far from feeling that they are continuing to create a national literature, some complain of living and working in a vacuum. As Jan Cep, a Czech Catholic writer living in France, put it:

After eight years of exile we feel less and less that we can rightly present ourselves as the messengers or ambassadors of our country to our friends in the West. It becomes increasingly difficult for us to imagine the spiritual atmosphere and to evolve the feelings and the thoughts of those we have left behind.¹

ÉMIGRÉ SCHOLARSHIP

Fortunately not all the intellectual effort of the exiles is bound to be caught in this tragic dilemma. Émigré scholars have an easier path before them. Many

have been able to continue their professions and interests in foreign countries. During the years 1948–55, when Eastern Europe was practically sealed off from the rest of the world, they kept up their nations' contribution to knowledge. At the same time, they kept the Free World informed about the advances in learning which did occur in Eastern Europe during, and in spite of, the worst Stalinist oppression.

Many of the social scientists among them have strengthened the thin ranks of East European experts in the Free World and have helped to meet the growing demand for detailed information about the past and present of this area. A glance at any magazine, symposium, or book about East European or Russian affairs reveals the names of a great many émigrés. Their scholarship, personal experiences, and knowledge of languages have greatly increased and enriched the information available on Russia and Eastern Europe.

But the effort which many émigrés deem most important is the work devoted to the preservation and development of national scholarship. This assumes all the more importance in view of the fact that the past of each East European state is not merely given a new interpretation by the Communists but is often patently falsified to fit the requirements of foreign and domestic politics in the satellites.

Each emigration has its own academy of sciences² and several specialized institutes. Some, like the Czechoslovak Institute in Exile in Holland which puts out studies on political, social, and economic developments in the satellites, are devoted to contemporary problems. Others, like the Polish Historical Institute in Rome, which concentrates on

¹ "Fate of Czechoslovak Writers," *The Christian Democratic Review*, Vol. 6, No. 27–28 (September–October 1956), p. 13. See, also, J. Wittlin, "Sorrow and Grandeur of Exile," *The Polish Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2–3 (Spring–Summer 1957).

² In 1951 the Académie Internationale Libre des Sciences et des Lettres was established in Paris to unite refugee scholars. Its membership numbers 260.

Elizabeth K. Valkenier, New York City, is on the staff of the Council on Foreign Relations. She has written articles on East European affairs for various American journals and has contributed to a forthcoming history of Continental socialism.

ecclesiastical history, confine themselves to research in older subjects and disciplines. Each institution is conscious that it is preserving the values of impartial scholarship—though sometimes it is producing no more than anti-Communist tracts—and hopes to make its output available to students and scholars behind the Iron Curtain.

Several examples will illustrate the vitality and importance of these institutes. During the worst of the Stalinist period, members of these exile institutions were the sole representatives of East European learning at various international congresses. The Rumanian Charles I Institute in Paris, for example, participated in a dozen international gatherings in 1952. Now that some cultural contacts between East and West have been resumed, the attendance of émigré scholars serves to correct some of the tendentious assertions made by their colleagues from the satellite states. Thus, at the Tenth International Congress of Historical Sciences, held in Rome in the fall of 1955, the presence of an émigré Lithuanian historian was the best answer to the claim of the Soviet participants that they represented all the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, and that only Soviet historiography dealt properly with these peoples, allegedly neglected by "bourgeois" historians.

The research and publication carried on by institutes and individuals in exile are at times performed under very difficult conditions. Often unaided by the established institutions of the Free World, and with only limited resources, the émigrés publish collections of documents, complete editions of authors, and lengthy historical or linguistic works. To give but a few examples: Latvians have published the memoirs of J. Vacietis, the first commander of the Soviet army, who played an important role in

the political and military events of both Russia and Latvia during and after the Bolshevik revolution, but who has been relegated to the dustbin of history. A Pole is putting out a three-volume history of modern Poland which contains much new material on the activity of non-Communist leaders and parties; it is based in part on personal interviews with surviving personalities whose recollections and experiences might otherwise have been lost. The Rumanians have started a program of publications anticipating the moment of liberation. It includes a complete edition of the greatest national poet, M. Eminescu, free from the alterations to which his work had been subjected by the Communists.

Émigrés also follow carefully whatever is published at home and subject it to searching criticism. Thus many falsifications and, more recently, partial attempts at the rectification of impartial learning, which otherwise would have gone unanswered, are discussed and exposed in detail. For instance, the new multivolume history of Poland which the regime-sponsored Academy of Sciences is putting out was reviewed at length in a monthly which does reach Poland and is avidly read by intellectuals there. The reviewer had also followed the critical discussions printed in Poland and therefore was able to point out where, in spite of the recent, more liberal atmosphere in the universities, the criticism fell short of the heart of the matter.

It must be admitted that impartial scholarship and high standards do not always prevail in all émigré publications. But interestingly enough, those works which are scholarly and unbiased and rise above petty political diatribes are the ones read and followed with deep interest by intellectuals behind the Iron Curtain.

CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

The ultimate purpose of the cultural effort of the emigrations has been brought to focus by the growing pressure from the satellites for cultural contacts and exchanges. Emissaries of the regimes have been visiting writers, journalists, and scholars in exile with requests to write for home newspapers, to publish in their native countries, or to visit with a course of lectures. There is no agreement among the émigrés in how to deal with this problem. Some maintain that these invitations give the exiles a chance to perform a real service to their nations—to help them out of their isolation and backwardness and to diversify their hitherto one-sided approach in art and learning. Others oppose any contacts, believing that they will only compromise the émigrés in their independent role of opposition and will help the regimes to entrench themselves in power.

The degree of opposition to cultural co-operation depends on the degree of liberalization at home. With the Poles, contacts have flourished most and best. Their institutions in exile supply Poland's universities, hospitals, and libraries with books, equipment, and periodicals. They also help Polish scholars and writers who come to the West to establish contacts with foreigners and compatriots alike. Works of exiled writers are being published and discussed at home, and there have been instances of some articles from Poland appearing in émigré periodicals.

Other emigrations do not have such a lively interchange, but they are under growing pressure to institute it. As this trend continues it will become increasingly difficult to ignore requests, especially in view of the devastations wrought on the intellectual life at home and the sincere desire of people behind the Iron Curtain to put an end to their

isolation. The problem of where to draw the line between what constitutes collaboration and independent co-operation with a satellite regime is bound to plague Eastern European émigrés for some time to come.³

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Political action is equally important to the several emigrations. The democratic and liberal émigrés have made the United States the center of their liberation efforts. As the cold war waxed, national councils and committees composed of former members of parliament and diplomats, as well as of other leading personalities on the cultural and political life of each state, were formed in Washington and New York with the official consent and private support of Americans.⁴ These

³ It is well-nigh impossible to gauge the attitude of the people behind the Iron Curtain to this aspect of émigré activities. However, *Tygodnik Powszechny*, the independent Catholic weekly published in Cracow, has recently had some significant observations on the subject. One of its chief contributors, upon visiting England, was appalled by the exclusive preoccupation of Polish émigrés with Poland as it was before 1939, their complete lack of understanding for present-day Poland, and their underestimation of the moral strength and resiliency of Poles at home, which, in the opinion of that writer, had enabled them to withstand Communism. He urged the exiled writers to participate in the current literary discussion in Poland, holding that opposition to the regime neither justified nor excused their refusal to influence Polish society and the present-day generation. All in all, he had little sympathy for émigré activities conducted in such willful isolation from the nation and its people. St. Kisielewski, "Polacy w Londynie," *Tygodnik Powszechny* (Dec. 8 and 15, 1957).

⁴ Some other national political groups were also formed by the extreme rightists and self-appointed spokesmen for East European minorities, some of whom had been Nazi collaborators or sympathizers. But these groups command a very limited support among the émigrés and no support in official Western circles.

councils do not claim to be governments in exile, but merely spokesmen for their nations under the yoke of an alien and unpopular rule. They do not aspire to determine the future political and economic structure of their countries, but aim to bring about a situation wherein without foreign interference their people will be able to decide the form of government under which they want to live.

Of necessity, the action of the national councils is largely confined to keeping up a steady stream of reminders⁵—in the form of memoranda, personal visits, and delegations—to foreign statesmen, governments, international organizations, and gatherings that so long as Eastern Europe is held captive by Soviet Russia there can be no solution to current international problems. This work has become more effective as the various democratic national committees have combined in one organization, the Assembly of Captive European Nations (with headquarters opposite the United Nations building in New York) which can speak with one voice on various issues affecting Eastern Europe. Moreover, there are various associations of specialized character, like the Council of Free Youth of Central Europe; the International Center of Free Trade Unions; the Center of Writers in Exile; the Central European Federal Movement; and the Christian Democratic, the Socialist, the Peasant, and the Liberal-Democratic Unions of Central Eastern Europe. Each has extensive relations with, and varying degrees of influence in, similar European or international organizations where it keeps the problem of Eastern Europe in the public eye.

⁵ In some instances the national councils have had a measurable influence on government action; for example, it is said that the position of most Polish émigré groups in favor of extending economic aid to Poland confirmed the United States government in its decision to do so.

There was never any unanimity among exiled politicians as to what would constitute an effective liberation. But during the height of Stalinism and the cold war the issues between East and West were clear-cut, as was the role of the émigrés. Then the death of Stalin, his downgrading, and the concomitant partial relaxation in the satellites, as well as the general détente in international tensions, opened up prospects for new approaches. Finally the Hungarian rebellion and the October events in Poland made their impact on émigré thinking. Whereas the first demonstrated beyond any doubt the inability and/or unwillingness of the Free World to deal with the situation forcibly and effect a solution, the second showed that a peaceful, internal solution—even though far from complete but nevertheless commanding nationwide support—was possible.

Naturally these two events could not clarify émigré political thinking altogether because the one brutally thwarted national aspirations and the other satisfied them only partially. Nevertheless, this was the first time since the Communist seizure of power that peoples of the Soviet satellites had so clearly spoken up for themselves and much of the new political thinking among the exiles derives from this fact.

Representatives of those countries—like the Baltic states, Rumania and Bulgaria—where both national sovereignty and the popular will are still being flouted, are by and large less affected by the new trends. They still emphasize total liberation, comprising the departure of Soviet troops and truly free elections. Many émigrés from Poland, where Gomulka restored a degree of national independence and personal liberty, are apt to stress a minimum program based on a gradual approach wherein change for the better could evolve from the present situation. There

is no clear-cut trend discernible among the Czechs and the Hungarians who have adherents of both views.

NEW TRENDS IN POLITICAL THINKING

There is also a natural difference between generations. On the whole, the older émigrés are apt to preserve a more sceptical, distrustful attitude toward recent internal changes in Eastern Europe. The younger ones, on the other hand, are more sympathetic and see more hope in the limited liberalization that has been achieved among the satellites.

A small minority among those who base their hopes on internal developments have jettisoned the old liberation policy which held that to be free, captive nations must rejoin Western Europe. They believe that freedom must and will come from within the countries and hold that the creation of a neutral zone in East Central Europe will provide the best opportunity for this process, as well as the best détente in East-West relations.⁶

A most interesting example of new trends in the political thinking of émigrés is the change in the program of the Hungarians since the revolution. At first there seemed to be an irreconcilable difference between the World War II refugees and those who escaped during and after the 1956 uprising. The recent émigrés stood for the democratic socialism of the revolution and set up, in January 1957, their own organization which scorned the Hungarian National Council in the United States as being too conservative. Before the

⁶ For the arguments on this subject see V. V. Tilea, "To Free the Satellites," *The Times* (May 28, 1957) and the letters by P. Tigrid and V. Masens to *The New York Times* (October 30 and November 7, 1957) occasioned by H. E. Salisbury's series of articles on Eastern Europe, the last of which called for a new United States policy.

end of the year, however, the two groups were negotiating a fusion based on the program of the revolution. Because of public opinion at home as it has become known through the freer press, the increased contacts, and the political upheavals of 1956, many émigrés have come to feel that the East European states have gone too far along the road to nationalization and socialism to turn back and that, once free, Eastern Europe will retain a good measure of the socialistic base.

Other émigrés, again a minority, do not think that it is enough to bring their programs in closer conformity to the political climate at home. Some maintain that partial liberalization and national communism make it possible for public opinion to reassert itself. Therefore they want to break completely with the practice at the height of the cold-war period when the émigrés spoke for and represented their forcibly silenced compatriots. They maintain that since Eastern Europe has spoken for itself, the émigrés must find the necessary humility to give up the heroic phrases of the previous period and to be "no more than intermediaries." Now there are no more "armies to lead," only "services to perform."⁷ Others see Eastern Europe speaking for itself as only a possibility. Thus, the Czechoslovak Foreign Institute in Exile proposed in one of its studies the formation in the Soviet-dominated countries of small discussion groups. These groups would lay the foundation for a democratic public opinion and "prepare a democracy that will guarantee the optimal participation of the inhabitants in the decision-making process."⁸

Several projects take into account the fact that it was the liberal forces of

⁷ *The Central European Federalist*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (July 1957), p. 3.

⁸ *Commentary*, No. 3 (July 1957), pp. 11-18.

free inquiry among the East European intellectuals that challenged the Communist regimes in Poland and Hungary. A group of young Czechs started the publication of a periodical, *Svedectvy*, intended especially for the intellectual and political elite in Czechoslovakia. They believe that through a proper approach discussions with the Communists could be begun, fermentation of ideas started, and the horizon of freedom gradually expanded. As an example, and a successful one, they have the Polish monthly, *Kultura*, published in Paris. This magazine, widely read and commented on in Poland, tries to play the role of the opposition which it defines in the following manner:

Opposition believes in the possibility of evolutionary change; it accepts the circumstantial limitations of a given system and without aiming for its liquidation (as does the counter-revolution), it undertakes to struggle for fundamental reform.⁹

⁹ *Kultura*, No. 11/121 (November 1957), p. 80.

Many other émigrés, and the majority of the émigré politicians, regard the *Kultura* group as too soft toward the Communists. But the fact remains that despite the close censorship of the mails this monthly finds its way into Poland where, as the best-known émigré organ, it is followed with great interest by people active in learning, culture, and politics.

The same problem faces both the political and the cultural roles of the emigrations. Are the émigrés to remain in radical opposition and keep working for solutions which may be preferable in principle but perhaps not realizable or viable? Or are they going to accept the promise that a new world is emerging in Eastern Europe which is neither pro-Communist nor procapitalist and participate in its development? If the trend continues whereby the nations of Eastern Europe will be increasingly able to speak and act for themselves, the former position may be increasingly difficult to justify and to maintain.

East Europe, Germany, and the West

By JOHN C. CAMPBELL

Abstract: Both the Soviet Union and the Western powers have had to rethink their policies concerning Eastern Europe since the crisis of 1956. Both have to take full account of the cardinal importance of Germany. Many in the West now find hope in the possibilities of negotiation and "disengagement" to avert dangers of war and to promote freedom for Eastern Europe. For the West it promises to be a long, hard road before an acceptable solution of the German problem and that of Eastern Europe becomes possible. Its main task is to look to its own strength and unity.

THE EVENTS of the autumn of 1956 in Eastern Europe and the reaction to them on the part of the great powers brought to a dramatic climax the period of uncertainty and confusion ushered in by the death of Stalin three years before. At the same time they forced a clarification in the policies of the Soviet Union and of the Western powers. Perhaps history will show that they marked a great divide in the history of the struggle for Europe and in that of the peoples of the captive states for freedom and independence. If so, the critical question for the political scientist, and also for those responsible for Western policy, lies in the character of that divide. Did it mark, as some have asserted, the beginning of the end of the Soviet empire, its inability to hold the allegiance of its satellites exposed by the defiance of Poland and the violent revolt of Hungary?¹ Or did it confirm for the indefinite future the intent and capability

of the Soviet Union to maintain dominance by force and the impotence of the West to do anything about it? Moscow and the capitals of the Western world have both drawn certain conclusions—as have the captive peoples themselves—conclusions which underlie the policies which they have since pursued.

Soviet policy has been analyzed in a preceding article. Suffice it to say here that the Kremlin continues to regard Eastern Europe as an essential part of its security system; that it will use force if necessary to prevent any of the nations now in the Warsaw Pact (with the possible exception of Albania) from breaking away, either by its own means or with outside support; and that it will make every effort to maintain the machinery of control whereby it determines their basic policies both foreign and domestic, although perhaps not so directly or completely as in Stalin's day. Even in a case like that of Poland, where the Kremlin reluctantly accepted a degree of independence, it sets limits beyond which that independence cannot be exercised. Moscow has not accepted and does not seem likely to accept the concept of "national communism" as a basis for organization of the Communist

¹ See, for example, Ambassador Lodge's statement before the U.N. General Assembly, December 10, 1956 (Paul E. Zinner, Ed., *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1956*, New York: Harper & Brothers for Council on Foreign Relations, 1957, p. 266).

John C. Campbell, Ph.D., is Director of Political Studies, Council on Foreign Relations. He was formerly in the Office of Eastern European Affairs and a member of the Policy Planning Staff, United States Department of State.

world (except as between the USSR and China). It is certainly aiming, in the long run, to prevent the appearance of Titoism or "Gomulka situations" in the other satellites and to reduce Poland and even Yugoslavia to the same dependent status as Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and the rest.

For our consideration of Western policy it may be useful to sketch briefly its main premises as they have developed since the closing stages of World War II. The principal role, inevitably, has been played by the United States. France has not been willing or able to regain its old position as an important factor in Eastern Europe. Great Britain has been the main partner of the United States in a policy which has combined *de facto* acceptance of Soviet control of that region with *de jure* protest against it, although the acceptance has been rather more philosophical and the protests less indignant. Both Britain and France were well aware of the menace which Soviet control of the eastern half of Europe represented to the security of the western half. Both accepted the American thesis that the West could not accept as justified or as permanent the Soviet domination of East Europe.² But they were inclined to live with it as a situation they could do little about and to concentrate on the recovery and defense of Western Europe. They saw no promise, only risk, in talk of "liberation" and in active policies aimed at bringing it about.

The United States, then, was the only Western power which could take the lead in a policy toward Eastern Europe. Indeed, by reason of its global confrontation with the Soviet Union, it

² Communiqué issued by the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the Premier of France at Bermuda, December 7, 1953 (Peter V. Curl, Ed., *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1953*, New York: Harper & Brothers for Council on Foreign Relations, 1954, p. 217).

could not avoid doing so, implicitly or explicitly. We can define, in general, three periods in the development of the East European question in the East-West conflict, in each of which the United States had to rethink and define its policies. The first was a period of relative fluidity, from 1944 to roughly 1947 or 1948, in which Soviet control of the area was gradually being consolidated; and the West, groping for policies amid the dissolution of the wartime coalition, still had some role to play, some choices to make, which might have retarded or prevented that consolidation. The second (excluding the change involving Yugoslavia) was a period of rigidity, from 1948 to 1953, during which political and economic Sovietization proceeded relentlessly in the satellite states and the Communist leadership was purged of all but the Stalinists, while on the Western side relations with the regimes were reduced to a minimum and contact with the peoples was almost entirely lost. The third period, from the death of Stalin through the crisis of 1956, saw a return of fluidity in which the monolithic structure showed some cracks; the control of events was seen to be not wholly in the hands of the Soviet leadership—itsself rent by struggles for power—and more freedom of action was possible to the satellite governments, the captive peoples, and the West.

Certain popular labels have been attached to American policies in these different periods. The first bears the stigma of "appeasement," in which the United States and Britain presumably were outmaneuvered by Stalin, accepted the empty promises of Yalta, failed to react effectively to Soviet violation of them, and acquiesced in fact if not in words in the extension of Soviet domination over all Eastern Europe except Greece. The second is known as the era of "containment," in which the United

States concentrated its energies on holding the barriers to expansion of Soviet power beyond the line of the Iron Curtain, without doing anything about what was going on behind it. The watchword of the third period was "liberation," with sights set on the "rollback" of Soviet power and freedom for the Eastern European nations.

TWO LEVELS OF U. S. FOREIGN POLICY

Over the span of a dozen years there were changes in the character and tone of official pronouncements. The labels generated much public discussion and debate. The question of Eastern Europe, indeed, was one of the main issues of the election of 1952, with the new Republican administration pledged to a positive and more dynamic policy. Yet a review of the historical record shows more of consistency over the years than was apparent on the surface. It would seem that United States policy has proceeded on two levels. On one flies the flag of principle, standing for what is moral, just, and, in the abstract, desirable. The peoples of Eastern Europe have been deprived of their freedom in violation of treaty obligations. They have a right to its restoration. Europe, both Eastern and Western, has a right to live as a free community of nations. The United States would like to see these rights restored and says so officially. But such statements do not reflect the totality of American policy, for there is another level, involving what is possible or impossible, practical or impractical, necessary or unnecessary, in terms of the requirements of America's global strategy. This level has its own considerations which determine governmental action, or inaction, on any given issue and has determined them on the issue of Eastern Europe through all three periods mentioned above.

To minimize confusion and self-de-

ception, it is important to be clear about the term "objective." The freedom of Eastern Europe from Soviet control has often been described as an objective of American foreign policy. It is something which we should very much like to see. Its accomplishment would enhance the security of Western Europe, and thus indirectly that of the United States, as well as being an act of justice to the captive peoples. But the question arises whether the United States, in policy papers or in public statements, should set up as an objective, to which it is presumably committed, an end which it has no plan to reach and no usable means of reaching. For it has been apparent from the start that Soviet domination of this area, regrettable as it is, has not been considered such a threat to American security that it was necessary to use force or to accept risks of war in the effort to remove it; and the United States has been obviously unable, having no concession to offer in which the Soviets might be sufficiently interested, to eliminate it by diplomacy.

It is somewhat beside the point, therefore, to complain of the "gullibility" of Mr. Roosevelt in accepting Stalin's word, of the "passivity" of Mr. Acheson in doing nothing except to "contain," or of the "betrayal" of Mr. Dulles in not making good on his supposed pledge of liberation. All of them deplored the suffocation of freedom in Eastern Europe, as did the American people. But all of them acted on the basis of a conviction, shared by the American people, that it was not in the interest of the United States to challenge the USSR to a showdown on this issue. The position taken by the United States toward the East German revolt of 1953 made this quite clear. The position taken on Hungary three years later, when a captive nation freed itself momentarily by its own efforts, ended the Communist dictatorship at home, and

asked for the protection of the United Nations—a situation exceeding even the most optimistic American estimates of what could be accomplished by the people themselves—left no further doubt. Even in his controversial statements made in the election campaign of 1952, Mr. Dulles, while giving the impression that with the necessary will and ingenuity we could bring about liberation, had been careful to state that it could and should be done in other ways than by military force.³ After Hungary, he described American policy as follows:

We do not ourselves incite violent revolt. Rather we encourage an evolution to freedom. . . . When Hungary was invaded and freedom crushed, we sponsored a United Nations condemnation of the Soviet Union. And when some steps are made toward independence, as recently in the case of Poland, we show a readiness to respond with friendly acts.⁴

The change in tone since 1952 is apparent. While the bedrock considerations which set the limits of policy remain unchanged, they are now more candidly recognized.

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

Whether or not it had any influence on the American decision not to intervene to save freedom in Hungary, or on our unpreparedness for action which might have accomplished that result without all-out war, a certain downgrading of Eastern Europe's importance in calculations of military strategy had followed almost inevitably from the changes in weapons technology and the nature of war. Military considerations, although not the main element in the Soviet decisions of the war period to

³ John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," *Life*, Vol. 32 (May 19, 1952), pp. 146-160.

⁴ *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 36 (May 6, 1957), pp. 715-719.

seize and to hold Eastern Europe or in American desires to see it kept out of Soviet control, had been far from negligible in thinking of both sides. In terms of "conventional" warfare, Soviet possession of the area provided both a defensive glacis and a series of advanced positions for possible offensive action, and it added greatly to the burdens and problems of the West in the task of defending Western Europe. As the two great powers have approached and reached the situation of nuclear stalemate, however, the strategic importance of a few hundred miles of territory is necessarily diminished; and Sir Halford Mackinder's dictum that control of Eastern Europe means eventual control of the world appears to lose whatever validity it may have had. Each side is in a position to annihilate the other regardless of who holds Eastern Europe, and Western Europe lies under threat of destruction by Soviet missiles whether or not 22 Soviet divisions are deployed in East Germany. From the Western viewpoint, even the complete liberation of Eastern Europe would not eliminate the core of Soviet power or dispose of the Soviet military threat, which resides in the nuclear capabilities existing in the USSR itself. From the Soviet viewpoint, perhaps the satellites are now more a military liability than an asset; and perhaps Soviet security might be as well served by their neutralization. If so, the idea has had no apparent effect on Soviet policy. As the party in possession, the Kremlin has preferred not to face the consequences of retreat.

Military considerations, of course, are but a part of the picture. The political implications of continued Soviet control of Eastern Europe, and of possible liberation, are a more important part of it. There are those—and they may include the Soviet leaders—who believe that the Soviet system in the USSR itself could not survive the political effects of the

loss of the satellites. In any case, the political imperatives to stay are stronger for the Soviets than are the imperatives for the West to push them out. For as the West now surveys the global scene in search of some way to cope with and somehow to reduce, without world war, the Soviet military threat to its existence, it looks more to the possibilities of controlled disarmament rather than to ideas of the territorial "rollback" of Soviet power in Europe. And the political struggle has many theaters, most of them in the Free World, on which the West's attention is and must be concentrated. As a matter of coldly calculated interest, the West can afford delay in the liberation of Eastern Europe; it cannot afford the loss of Asia or the Middle East.

The very difficulties of reaching any general agreement with the Soviet Union on disarmament, however, together with renewed fears of a situation from which there will be no way out other than with missiles and hydrogen bombs, have turned attention and added urgency to new approaches. There have been official and unofficial speculations, and some specific proposals, on possibilities of (1) a "disengagement" in Europe, so that Soviet and Western armed forces would not confront each other directly across the line of the Iron Curtain, dangerous incidents could be avoided, tension could be relaxed and political settlements initiated,⁵ or (2) a start on the problem of disarmament and security through limited agreements for in-

spection, banning of atomic weapons, demilitarization or neutralization affecting specific areas on both sides of the line in Europe.⁶

Greater freedom for Eastern Europe, even its ultimate liberation from Soviet control, is envisaged by Western sponsors as an important aim or by-product of progress in either of these approaches. The guiding concept of both is frankly that of trying to strike a bargain with Moscow for the partial or total withdrawal of Soviet power from Eastern Europe in exchange for a comparable Western withdrawal in the West, replacing the old idea of attempting to bring it about, by pressure or other means, as a one-sided gain for the West. A third approach, looking toward a larger measure of independence for the governments of Eastern Europe but without concessions in the West, retains that old idea but adapts it to the conditions, and obvious limitations, of the new situation existing after the revolutions of 1956 in Poland and in Hungary. All three, necessarily, take account of a factor now of much greater importance than in the late 1940's or in the days of the heady talk of "liberation." That factor is Germany.

⁵ Proposals of the U.K. Delegation at the "Summit Conference," Geneva, July 21, 1955 (Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955, pp. 199, 216-217); proposal of the Western powers in the U.N. Subcommittee on Disarmament, August 29, 1957 (*New York Times*, August 30, 1957); proposal of Poland for the banning of nuclear weapons in Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, taken up by Premier Bulganin in his letters of December 10, 1957, to President Eisenhower and other heads of governments; and the proposal of Bulganin for withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Warsaw Pact countries and of all U. S., U. K. and French forces from Germany and NATO countries, contained in his letter of December 10, 1957, to Chancellor Adenauer, broadcast by Moscow radio, December 12, 1957.

⁶ See especially George F. Kennan, "The Problem of Eastern and Central Europe," *The Listener*, Vol. 58 (November 28, 1957), pp. 867-870; "The Military Problem," *ibid.* (December 5, 1957), pp. 907-910. Sir John Slessor, "Let's Test the Soviets on Disengagement," *New York Herald Tribune*, January 22, 24, 26, 1958. Denis Healey, *A Neutral Belt in Europe?* (Fabian Tract 311), London, 1958.

GERMANY AND EASTERN EUROPE

Germany seems to be recognized on both sides as the key to Europe. Caution and fear, again on both sides, tend to keep it divided. A free and united Germany associated with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization represents too great a danger for the Soviets. A Germany united on Soviet terms or exposed to that fate represents too great a danger for the West. A Germany united but neutral or "neutralized" seems too risky to tempt either.⁷ Furthermore, Soviet determination to hold on to East Germany is reinforced by concern for the Soviet position in the whole of Eastern Europe. The "German Democratic Republic" is an instrument of Soviet policy on the German question, but is also a satellite state and regime associated with the other Soviet satellite regimes in Eastern Europe. Should that regime be sacrificed or be overthrown, would it start a chain reaction which Moscow could not stop? As the German question has been fruitlessly discussed at a succession of Four-Power conferences, from Moscow in 1947 to Geneva in 1955, the Kremlin has shown no sign of willingness to give up its hold on East Germany, except at what would be for the Western powers an impossible price.

East Germany, however, is a satellite with a difference. It is subject not only to the general pressure of Western policies aimed at weakening the Soviet grip on half of Europe, but also to the more direct pressure of German nationalism intent on reuniting the German people. Since the German Federal Republic has come on the scene as a sovereign state, growing in strength and able to play an independent role of its own, the question of Germany and that of Eastern Europe

⁷ Richard C. Hottelet, "The Illusion of German Neutrality," *The New Leader*, Vol. 41 (January 20, 1958), pp. 15-18.

have taken on new dimensions. The aims of the Federal Republic appear to be the same as those of the other Western powers: the unification of Germany in freedom and the relaxation of the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe. However, Germany's geographic position, the special compulsion which the Germans naturally feel on the matter of their national unity, and the opportunities which Bonn may have in direct relations with the USSR and with Eastern European nations are all factors which give German views and German policies a special significance. Any Western move for disengagement by agreement with the Soviets, any Western efforts to do something about Eastern Europe, will have to take account of the views of the Federal Republic. Also, the field may be open to initiatives or moves which the latter may wish, or may feel compelled by its public opinion, to take without regard to the views of other Western powers, including the withdrawal of American and British forces from German soil.

THE POLICIES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

Chancellor Adenauer has set his country firmly on a course of solidarity with the West. So long as he and his party are in charge of the political fortunes of the Federal Republic, we are not likely to see any attempt to make some kind of direct deal with Moscow, in defiance of the other members of NATO, to gain German unity at the risk of losing German independence. Whether that might happen after a turn of the political wheel in West Germany is another question. The Chancellor and the Bonn government are also likely to be very cautious on proposals for "disengagement" which would remove the protection of Western, especially American, troops from West Germany. The heart of their whole policy is the close asso-

ciation and alliance with the West. An unprotected "neutral" Germany, the Chancellor has stated, would mean the end of NATO and the end of freedom in Western Europe.⁸ If the Soviets should offer, in exchange for a Western withdrawal and an "alliance-free" Germany, the total evacuation of their own forces from East Germany, so as to permit their satellite to be absorbed into a free Germany by elections or by revolution, the Bonn government would find it very hard to refuse. But there is no sign that such an offer will be forthcoming. Bulganin's letter of December 10 did propose withdrawal of Soviet forces from all Eastern Europe in exchange for the return of all NATO forces to their own soil from Germany and other NATO countries, but without any indication of a change in policy on German unification. If the Soviets succeeded in getting American forces out of Europe before the Federal Republic has substantial forces of its own, they could look forward to solving the German problem in their own way.

Bonn, accordingly, tends to be distrustful of all schemes, whether for mutual troop withdrawals or for partial limitation of armaments in a zone of central Europe, unless they are tied to steps toward the reunification of Germany in freedom. The Germans, judging from the available evidence, are not so anxious for a "relaxation of tensions" or for "stabilization" in Europe that they are willing to accept propositions which give stature and recognition to the puppet "German Democratic Republic" and freeze the status quo. Adenauer's opponents, however, maintain that his policies are making na-

⁸ Speech of Chancellor Adenauer, broadcast on West German home service, January 15, 1958 (*The Bulletin*, issued by the Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, Vol. 6, January 21, 1958), pp. 1-2.

tional unity impossible; and it is quite possible that the continued frustration of hopes for unity may drive more and more Germans toward the idea of a united and neutral Germany, doubtful as it may be that the Soviets would agree to it on terms compatible with German freedom. If the Western powers, therefore, somehow hope to work toward the retraction of Soviet power from Eastern Europe by negotiation with Moscow, they must realize the risks they run in Germany, either by seeming to legalize the Soviet puppet regime in Pankow (East Berlin) or by undermining the pro-Western policies of the Bonn government. Unless they cast caution to the winds, they cannot expect to gain anything by negotiation on mutual withdrawal except in the context of a prior or simultaneous settlement of the problem of Germany's reunification which leaves Germany free to maintain its associations with the West.

Germany comes into the Eastern European picture in yet another way: the possible development of ties with the satellite states. At present the Pankow regime is the only German government with which they have diplomatic relations; but whether formal relations exist or not it seems likely that the Federal Republic, like German governments in the past, will look eastward as well as westward. That it may already be developing a more active "Eastern" policy is indicated by certain changes within the German Foreign Office.

The great obstacle, of course, is the "German Democratic Republic." Bonn has taken a rigid position, illustrated by its severance of relations with Yugoslavia, against maintaining relations with any state (except the USSR) which recognizes the Pankow regime. This makes it more difficult to establish contacts with the other satellite governments, the close allies of East Germany

in the Soviet alliance system. But West German trade with those states will probably grow. And the very existence of a dynamic new Germany as a going concern is bound to have some effect on the calculations of satellite governments and the thoughts and actions of the captive peoples, especially if the Iron Curtain is to be at least partially raised and cultural contacts are to grow in volume.

Formidable obstacles persist, with particular respect to Poland and Czechoslovakia, in the hatreds of the past and the unsettled issues of the future. Poles and Czechs have not forgiven or forgotten their experience under the German heel, nor do they feel easy about the prospect of a revived and possibly aggressive Germany. Moscow's propaganda has not ceased to hammer on these points. Yet for these nations the threat from Germany appears in new, and smaller, dimensions. Even the question of the Oder-Neisse boundary may not be an impossible barrier to some rapprochement between the Federal Republic and Poland. If the Gomulka regime, or any regime in Poland, wishes to fortify its independence and add to its bargaining power against Russia, it may be expected to throw out some lines to the West. Although no German government could publicly accept the Oder-Neisse line, a realistic basis for understanding with Poland may nevertheless exist. If it were certain that the present Soviet-occupied zone would be restored to Germany, the latter could well be satisfied with a token revision of the Oder-Neisse line.

Cautious moves toward opening a channel of contact between Bonn and Warsaw have not progressed very far. Tito's recognition of Pankow and Bonn's break with Belgrade have thrown an additional obstacle in the way, to evident Soviet satisfaction. But German

efforts in the direction of an "Eastern" policy through ties with the satellites, unless the latter are again subjected to strict Stalinist control and isolation, are not likely to languish permanently.

THE TWO SIDES OF U. S. POLICY

American policy, in its attempts to weaken the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe, has wavered in its choice of method. One line has been to encourage the anti-Communist peoples in opposition to their Communist masters, both the Russian overlords and their local satraps. Another has been to support the concept of Titoism or "national communism," in the hope that other satellite regimes would follow the example of Tito and assert their independence. The United States government never made a definite choice as to which one of these mutually inconsistent courses to pursue. Perhaps because it has had so little success with either, it has been able to pursue both in a general sort of way without making the choice.

After the Tito-Stalin break in 1948, Washington had some hopes of the spread of Titoism, which it tried to encourage directly or indirectly by its aid to Yugoslavia. For a variety of reasons, including drastic preventive purges, Stalin was able to hold his other satellites in line; and American attention, with the change from a Democratic to a Republican administration, turned more to the slogans of freedom for the peoples. Even so, Secretary Dulles continued the policy of aid to Yugoslavia after the dramatic Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation in Belgrade in 1955. He publicly expressed his belief that "national communism" was a force that could undermine the Soviet empire.⁹

⁹ Statement to House Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 25, 1955 (*Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 32, June 6, 1955), p. 913; also statement on his visit to Belgrade, released

The events of the year 1956 put both policies to the test. The initial challenge in both Hungary and Poland developed within the Communist parties and their associated organizations. In Hungary it then turned into a revolt by the people which, when momentarily successful, posed to the West the question of "liberation" in the stark terms of a decision involving war with the Soviet Union and demonstrated that the latter could "crush the counterrevolutionaries" without interference from outside. At the same time, these events seemed to show that "national communism" was no permanent stopping place: the forces that had been loosed swept Hungary right past that stage and out of the Communist system altogether.

Poland, on the other hand, stopped at the Titoist or semi-Titoist stage, owing to the aplomb of its Communist leaders, who were able to wrench vital attributes of independence from the Russians without losing control of public order. The Soviet leadership decided against crushing the new regime of Wladislaw Gomulka as they did that of Imre Nagy in Hungary, for Gomulka did not insist on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland or on leaving the Warsaw Pact. Thus the United States, which could do nothing for Hungary except sponsor protests and investigations by the United Nations and help the unfortunate refugees, found that for "Titoist" Poland it could do something more. Through what Mr. Dulles called "friendly acts" (chiefly economic aid) it could help the Poles to maintain and consolidate the measure of independence they had gained. Yet Poland's equilibrium trembles in an uncertain balance. Although the Gomulka solution may endure for some time because neither Moscow nor responsible Poles

November 7, 1955 (*ibid.*, v. 33, November 21, 1955), p. 833.

want to face the consequences of a decisive move in either direction, events may force a showdown which the West, judging from the Hungarian experience, has no policy to meet.

CONCLUSION

If the events of 1956 hold any lesson, it is that the fate of Eastern Europe depends primarily on developments within the Soviet empire itself, rather than on the attitudes, declarations, and acts of the Western nations. Nevertheless, the latter must still define their attitudes and devise policies for the future. One alternative might be frankly to accept the permanence of Soviet control, to refrain from acts aimed at upsetting or disturbing it, and to try to make it as bearable as possible for the captive peoples themselves. Such a policy would be a voluntary abdication of influence and a boon to the Soviets in the cold war, as well as a repudiation of a position of principles long held. The United States government, wisely, has rejected it, even though it may not have decided what positive line of policy it will follow.

It would seem that the weakening of the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe, the encouragement of the idea of independence, and the creation of difficulties for the Soviets in that area should still be proper objectives of American and Western policy, bearing in mind the limitations on positive action. The Kremlin has major problems of its own, being faced with a great dilemma: whether to make the attempt to organize the Soviet empire as a kind of commonwealth, with a degree of individual national autonomy and tolerance of "separate roads to socialism," or to try to restore something like the monolith of Stalin's day. It may be driven to the latter course. In any event the decisions are going to be difficult. Western policy should at least seek ways to make it more so, without

irresponsibly encouraging the captive peoples to violent revolt.

Official American statements have continued to stress the right of the captive peoples to governments of their own choice and to call on the Soviet government to show its will to peace by permitting them to do so. President Eisenhower raised the question with the Soviet leaders at the Geneva "Summit Conference" in 1955. It appeared again in his note of January 12, 1958, to Premier Bulganin. These are statements for the record and for the future, however, rather than realistic negotiating proposals. It is good tactics to keep the question of Eastern Europe's freedom on the bargaining table and before the eyes of the world and not to treat it as a closed issue. Still, it is well to recognize that in present circumstances the Soviet government is not open to persuasion.

Circumstances, of course, may change. The Kremlin may come to a different view on Eastern Europe (1) if the Soviet system there so deteriorates that the burdens of maintaining it are not worth the effort, or (2) if the West is able to offer some change in its own position that will appear to the Soviets as an adequate price for withdrawal. To take up the second point first, in the present state of relative disarray in the West it does not appear that it could make any offer acceptable to Moscow that would not undermine or destroy its own security. The current agitation in the West for negotiation with the Soviets, insofar as it is aimed at a continuing sounding out of Soviet views and positions, is justified. But insofar as it is based on fear and weakness and represents a willingness to dismantle Western positions of strength, it can be highly dangerous. It seems scarcely likely, just because some in the West would like a "relaxation of tensions" and think that negotiation is a prefer-

able alternative to building up a capability in missiles to match Soviet strength, that the Soviet Union will oblige by dismantling its own position in Eastern Europe. "Disengagement" is no magic word which will, from a situation of weakness and uncertainty, somehow produce a relaxation of the cold war, a united Germany, and freedom for Eastern Europe.

To return to the first point stated above, and also to the lessons of the crisis of 1956, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the West cannot get an acceptable settlement in Europe by negotiation or in any other way until there is a further strengthening of the West—militarily, in order to maintain a tolerable balance of power to ensure survival, but especially politically—and also a further deterioration of the Soviet political position in Eastern Europe. The great task is to build up the political strength and unity of the NATO nations, for the real contest with the Soviets will be on that level. When the West has proved itself in that way, and when the Federal Republic has achieved well-grounded political stability and a respectable military establishment of its own, then the time may come when the Western powers will be able to negotiate in terms of the neutralization of the whole of Central and Eastern Europe (including a united Germany) in a way which would leave the entire area covered by an American guarantee, would not imperil the security and independence of any Western nation, and at the same time would serve the cause of freedom in Eastern Europe.

Secretary Dulles, according to his public statements, confidently looks forward to the collapse, or at least to the metamorphosis, of the Soviet system. Others may be less sanguine. This is largely a matter of faith. But has the West any choice but to hang on, while keeping the lines of diplomatic com-

munication open and seeking every opportunity for acceptable agreement on the contested issues both large and small? The contradictions and weaknesses of Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe, exposed by what happened in 1956, remain. National feeling and questioning minds may be stifled but they cannot be abolished by Moscow's *ukaz*. The West, especially if cultural

and other contacts with the peoples are allowed to grow, can make its influence felt by encouraging "gradualism," by being helpful with "friendly acts," as Secretary Dulles put it. The Polish experiment may not last, but it is a hopeful sign. "Firmness and patience," Secretary Byrnes' slogan of more than a decade ago, seems still to be the soundest guidepost for Western policy.

Book Department

	PAGE
EASTERN EUROPE	164
WESTERN EUROPE	169
ASIA AND AFRICA	177
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY	183
AMERICAN HISTORY	189
SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY	197
ECONOMICS	209
OTHER BOOKS	216

EASTERN EUROPE

VICTOR S. MAMATEY. *The United States and East Central Europe, 1914-1918: A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda*. Pp. xi, 431. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. \$7.50.

This book will be welcomed by historians and political scientists as an important and much needed contribution to the vital problem of America's relations with East-Central Europe during World War I. It will be very instructive to those seeking the roots and meaning of our enigmatic, fragmentary foreign policy with regard to this area in both world wars and in the post-war periods. But it is equally useful as an analysis of the impact of Wilsonianism on political developments in East-Central Europe.

It is a commendable work in every respect, being thoroughly scholarly, vividly and lucidly written, and admirably balanced in its critical judgments. The author is indeed well qualified to tackle this subject. He is an American historian of Slovak descent, now teaching at Florida State University; he studied at Comenius University in Czechoslovakia in 1938 and has traveled through all the countries in the area with which he deals. Being primarily a study of American foreign policy it is based chiefly on State Department documents and other American official and

semi-official sources, but the author has also used some Czech, Yugoslav, and Polish—surprisingly no Austrian—primary materials. The secondary literature in all Western and most Slavic languages has been richly tapped.

Beginning his study with a chapter on "Austria and Her Peoples"—incidentally one of the most competent summaries of this complex subject this reviewer has seen—Mr. Mamatey in six successive chapters painstakingly singles out the delicate and hidden strains of America's relations with the leaders of the Austrian Slavs. With consummate skill and unusual detachment he elucidates and evaluates the attitudes and policies of the men whose persistent energies, aided by certain favorable circumstances, were to culminate in the liberation of the subject nationalities. Step by step, almost day by day, the author traces the threads which led to the ultimate liquidation of the Austrian Empire and the establishment of independent successor states. At first skeptical and reluctant, Allied and American leaders were driven gradually but inexorably by the logic of events—but chiefly by the pressure of war—to that revolutionary policy—"loaded with dynamite" as Lansing correctly realized—which hastened the process of dissolution and liberation. The path to freedom was strewn with countless obstacles and seemingly insoluble problems. The most thorny of

these was no doubt the secret treaty of London by which the Allies had made extravagant promises to Italy and which embittered Italo-Yugoslav relations for years to come. Almost equally aggravating was the rivalry and suspicion among some of the Slavic leaders themselves, notably between the Serbian Prime Minister, Nikola Pašić, who stubbornly and carefully pursued a pan-Serbian policy, and Dr. Anta Trumbić, President of the Yugoslav Committee in London, who demanded a genuine federation of Croats and Slovenes with Serbia.

All these problems were new and baffling to America, and Wilson and his advisers attempted to find their way through the maze as cautiously as possible, being careful not to commit the country too far and too quickly. For a long time the Administration—through Colonel House and the enigmatic figure of Professor George D. Herron, an expatriate from America and Grinnell College—tried to bring about a separate peace with Austria-Hungary. Only after these peace feelers had been rudely ruptured by Clemenceau's rash publication of the "Sixtus letter" were Wilson and Lansing driven to adopt a stronger line vis-à-vis the Austrian Empire by applying "force to the utmost, force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant force which shall make Right the law of the world. . . ." However, the author concludes that neither Allied nor American diplomacy caused the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. The empire was dead several weeks before the Paris Peace Conference met, and the new states were securely entrenched largely through the initiative of the subject nationalities themselves. America had played a significant role in accelerating the process through its support and sympathy for the Austrian Slavs in Europe and in America. The decisive factor in the picture was, of course, the winning of the war. A resurrection of the empire was unthinkable, but the author rightly deplores the failure to build a Central European federation which might have continued the stabilizing and unifying influence of the defunct empire.

Professor Mamatey has provided us with a thoroughly satisfying and significant

work, and it can only be hoped that he will be encouraged to continue his analysis of this subject beyond 1918 through the Paris Peace Conference and the postwar years and preferably with the inclusion of Poland which he chose to omit in this particular study.

CARL G. ANTHON

Associate Professor of History
American University of Beirut

NICOLAS SPULBER. *The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe*. Pp. xxviii, 525. New York: Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall, 1957. \$12.50.

The countries of East-Central Europe, between the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean, have at various periods in their history shared a common fate. They formed a stage on which was enacted the drama of Russo-German relations; they were all exposed at various times to the invasion of Tartars and Turks; and all—including Poland—still retain the marks of this earlier bondage. In the years from 1945 to 1948, all succumbed to Soviet infiltration, and each in its own way became a Communist state. Yugoslavia, it is true, broke away from the Soviet sphere, and Poland has achieved a kind of aloofness toward the rest of the bloc, but all have become, since the Communist seizure of power, the scene of economic planning and forced industrial development.

It is this economic change of the postwar period which forms the subject of Professor Spulber's book. He restricts himself to six countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Albania he omits for lack of statistical data; East Germany because historically it does not belong to peasant Eastern Europe.

After a brief survey of the resources of the area, including its population, he examines the process of nationalization of the economies of the six countries; and he emphasizes that in general it preceded the Communist seizure of power and was a condition of later, planned development. Along with the nationalization of banks and of industrial and commercial under-

takings went the liquidation of what was left of "feudal" ownership in the countryside and the formation of peasant holdings.

A second phase in the economic development of the area was the initiation of the development plans with their ancillary collectivization of agriculture. Professor Spulber examines critically each of these phases. He does not minimize the very real achievements of planned economies, but he is quick to emphasize that in detail they were frequently doctrinaire and took little account of the realities of local problems and resources.

It is an ostrich-like mistake to assume that statistical data from these countries are inadequate for such an appraisal; it is true, however, that they come in strange shapes and are fragmentary and difficult to locate and interpret. No praise can be too high for the way in which Professor Spulber has gathered, collated, and evaluated these data. He has given us an insight into the economic development of the region as a whole during the postwar period such as we never had for the prewar years, when it was incomparably easier to gather and sift the evidence.

NORMAN J. G. POUNDS

Chairman, Institute of
East European Studies
Indiana University

MILOVAN DJILAS. *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*. Pp. vii, 214. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$3.95.

The aim of this work is "to present a picture of contemporary Communism in a complete but brief form" (pp. i-ii). The author, therefore, avoided quotations, statistics, and a recital of events. Instead he expressed his personal observations and elaborated on them by reasoning and logical deduction. The author himself has "traveled the entire road open to a Communist, from the lowest to the highest rung of the hierarchial ladder, from local and national to international forums, and from the formation of the true Communist Party and organization of the revolution to the establishment of the so-called socialist society" (p. vi). Djilas presents the picture and the ideas of the world

which he helped to build. While dedicating himself selflessly and fanatically to the revolution as one of its outstanding leaders, he had a different image of it. But when his illusions were gradually dispelled, and when he finally perceived the reality of Communist power in all its nakedness and cruelty, he revolted against it with equal resoluteness and courage. As a result of this rebellion we have in a concise and well-written form "an analysis of the Communist system."

Djilas is still a Socialist, but his ideal now is a "democratic socialism." This is the opposite of the vanguard and monolithic socialism as conceived by Lenin and applied in practice by Stalin, Mao, Tito, Khrushchev, and other disciples and followers of Lenin's teachings. It was these teachings, and the practices based on them, that brought about the formation of one of the most rigidly controlled social systems known to mankind. This barrack-and-prison society is ruled by the "new class." This is a small minority of self-appointed and self-perpetuating professional conspirators. To maintain themselves in power this arrogant and conceited group of usurpers has established its monopoly over ideas, over the means of production, and over the fruits of labor of their subjects. The "new class" has also assumed the power of life and death over its subjected multitudes. This, of course, is the exact opposite of the idea of "true Communism" and the ideas of equality and brotherhood among men—ideas which brought Djilas as a young enthusiast and idealist into the Communist party of Yugoslavia. But the party had failed to "re-educate" Djilas; it had failed to kill the humanist in him. It had, therefore, failed to instill in Djilas a fundamental precondition for the formation of the psychology of the "new man" and particularly the mentality of the party leader which is imperative if the "new class" is to maintain itself in power. *The New Class* is, therefore, a confession, as well as an indictment, of a humanist who had at first accepted the inhuman methods of communism for the sake of its utopian ideals; but the humanist had then finally realized that in order to advance toward these all-human aspirations and longings for brotherhood

and equality, the means, too, must be human.

D. A. TOMASIC

Professor of Sociology
Indiana University

L. A. D. DELLIN (Ed.). *Bulgaria*. (East-Central Europe Under the Communists: Mid-European Studies Center Series.) Pp. xvii, 457. New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee, 1957. \$8.50.

This is another useful "handbook" in the series "East-Central Europe Under the Communists," prepared by the Mid-European Studies Center. Covering one of the least-known countries of Southeast Europe, it will not please the few specialists on this area because it was not intended for them. College students, governmental officials, journalists, and businessmen will find in it basic information on practically every subject related to Bulgaria in which they might be interested. A vast Bibliography (24 pages) and a good Index provide further leads for more intensive inquiry. Biographical sketches on leading Bulgarian Communists, a chronology of events during the years 1944-56, and a list of treaties and agreements concluded by Bulgaria after World War II form additional and quite useful appendices.

The volume is the result of the co-operative work of fifteen authors under Dr. L. A. D. Dellin's able editorship. As with almost every collective work, this volume also has its merits and shortcomings: some authors handle their subjects with a perfect knowledge and understanding of the country and its peculiarities and with clarity of thought and language; a few contributors are lacking in some of these qualities. The volume is still a success. Assuming in principle a critical attitude toward the present Communist rulers of Bulgaria, the authors—Americans and Bulgarian exiles alike—manage to retain a remarkable degree of objectivity in discussing the achievements and failures of this regime.

Among the contributions to this volume, Professor Cyril E. Black's presentation of "Bulgaria in Historical Perspective" merits special mention as a most useful introduc-

tion; and it will give to every reader of this handbook a clear picture of the country's past. The chapters by Dr. L. A. D. Dellin on "Politics and Political Organization," by Dr. N. Spulber on "Planned Economy," and by Dr. J. Wszelaki on "Industry" also belong to the best written parts of the volume.

This handbook on Bulgaria is a valuable addition to every reference shelf.

W. S. SWORAKOWSKI

Assistant Director
Hoover Institution
Stanford University

OSCAR HALECKI (Ed.). *Poland*. (East-Central Europe Under the Communists: Mid-European Studies Center Series.) Pp. xviii, 601. New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee, 1957. \$10.00.

In 1954 the Mid-European Studies Center, a unit of the Free Europe Committee, adopted a plan to publish a series of handbooks on "East-Central Europe Under the Communists." The general editor of the series is Robert F. Byrnes of Indiana University, and the editor of the handbook on Poland is Oscar Halecki, an eminent historian and author of many scholarly works. The list of contributors includes refugee scholars, American academicians, and anonymous writers—presumably government employees.

The text begins with a sixteen-page summary of Polish history by Halecki; this is, despite some ambiguities, a brilliant achievement when one considers the complexity of the subject and the span of time which it covers. The one permeating theme in the handbook has already appeared in volumes of the series previously published. This is the idea that the satellite countries belong to the Western European cultural and political orbit. In Halecki's opinion, the present position of Poland is artificial; he calls for "the integration of a free and independent Poland with a freely united Europe integrated in turn with the modern Atlantic Community for the defense of Western civilization and the heritage of Christianity." This is an eloquent plea, but one that hardly reckons with Polish

geographic and economic realities such as the problem of the border with Germany and territorial claims against the Soviet Union. The idea of a Polish orientation toward the West is stressed also in the chapter on Polish literature and culture. The author of this section, Ludwik Krzyżanowski, shares the view of those who say that "between Polonism and Slavonism there is a complete and ineradicable incompatibility." The author's analysis of Polish Communist literature and culture is fairly extensive and well done.

Some of the contributors to the handbook tend to minimize the shortcomings of the interwar Polish regime. An example of this is a statement to the effect that in interwar Poland "the personal freedoms . . . were sometimes flagrantly violated, but never to the same degree as in the other countries of East Central Europe" (p. 75). The author must have forgotten about Czechoslovakia, which despite some defects in its body politic was the only democracy in Eastern Europe before the war.

Particularly valuable are several sections on the economy, which include much useful information and expert analysis on Poland's economic transformation. The official Communist statistics, it is pointed out, are frequently based on false or misleading principles, as, for example, making comparisons between Communist production figures and those for 1932, the year in which prewar production reached its lowest ebb. In the sphere of social welfare, the Communist achievements have apparently not been striking. We learn that "except for the abolishment of unemployment insurance, the introduction of family allowances, and rather minor changes in details," the general prewar schemes remained, until recently, the basis of social security. As for the Polish armed forces, they "are the strongest of the captive states" and completely sovietized, but they are of dubious value to the Soviet Union because their combat attitude "would depend on circumstances." The Gomulka government has taken steps to limit the "power of the secret police," but this has not gone far enough.

In dealing with the problems of educa-

tion and religion the Communists have apparently had the least success. The policy of drawing increasing numbers of students from the working class did not produce a reliable Communist intelligentsia, as officially anticipated. The unprecedented religious homogeneity and the Roman Catholic church's hold "over its communicants in Poland" produced the most stubborn and long-drawn-out struggle between church and state in any Soviet-occupied East European country (pp. 201-2).

As can be seen, this handbook on Poland contains a large amount of pertinent data on politics and on economic, social, and cultural problems, as well as brief assessments of major developments in Communist Poland. In the reviewer's opinion, this is one of the best in the series "East-Central Europe Under the Communists," probably because more information was available on Poland than on any other satellite country, and also perhaps because of the larger number of competent specialists. Considering the number of contributors and the diversity of their backgrounds, one cannot but marvel at the degree of uniformity achieved in the handbook; much of the credit must unquestionably go to the editor.

WAYNE S. VUCINICH

Professor of History
Stanford University

HUGH McLEAN, MARTIN E. MALIA, and GEORGE FISCHER (Eds.). *Russian Thought and Politics*. (Harvard Slavic Studies, Vol. IV.) Pp. xi, 513. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. \$7.50.

This volume of the "Harvard Slavic Studies" is dedicated to the well-known teacher and scholar, Professor Michael Karpovich, by his former students. It opens with an Introduction by Philip E. Mosely who presents a lucid biographical sketch of Professor Karpovich. This is followed by twenty-seven essays covering a wide range of subjects, from Karamzin and Radishchev of the early nineteenth century to such recent themes as the Sovietization of Uzbekistan.

In an aggregate work of this character it is only natural to find the essays of

diverse merit and interest. Each reader will have his own preference, depending on his field of interest—or prejudice. The present reviewer found the essays by Stanley J. Zyzniewski and Arthur P. Mendel on "Miliutin and the Polish Question" and "Legal Populism" of special interest. Miliutin's views are ably traced to Samarin's Slavophile influence and deserve wider knowledge in any complete account of the sorrowful history of Russo-Polish relations. Aggressive Polonism has contributed its share to the antagonism between the two states, a factor often overlooked by most writers. Samarin believed, and Miliutin fully accepted, that the source of Polish enmity for the Russians was a Latin culture foisted upon the Poles; this in turn produced a militant Polish nationalism and an exaggerated sense of Messianism. Poland's assumed role of a *Kulturträger* of eastern Europe often explains the proselytizing spirit and aspiration for building a "Greater Poland" as a bulwark against "Asiatic Russia."

Mendel's essay on "Legal Populism" shows how the Legal Populists believed that the czarist government pursued a policy of forced industrialization at the expense of mass impoverishment. This view of nearly three-quarters of a century ago carries a familiar note of more recent criticism. Nor can one fail to observe the fact that collectivization figured as a panacea to the agricultural problems of Russia among the Maximalists of the Legal Populists. These similarities might delight recent writers of the so-called "Continuity" school of Russian history. Space does not permit mention of other equally deserving contributions to this well-chosen series of essays covering a century and a half of Russian history.

I have no desire to be captious, but I must not fail to point out the unhappy method of transliteration which the editors have adopted in this book. The system employed is at times inconsistent, often confusing, and to the English reader must be a source of perplexity. The Decembrist, Poggio, is referred to as "Podbio" (p. 96); if the editors wished to be consistent throughout, the spelling of "Trosky" (p. 341) should have been "Trotsky," other-

wise names like "Voroncov" and "Kokovcov" should have been spelt "Vorontsov" and "Kokovtsov"; the spelling of "Nizne-Devick uezd" (p. 473), "Tverkoj" (p. 264), or "Bogat'ev" (p. 440) calls for correction. The book sadly lacks an index.

ANATOLE G. MAZOUR

Assistant Professor of History
Stanford University

WESTERN EUROPE

DANIEL LERNER and RAYMOND ARON (Eds.). *France Defeats EDC*. Pp. xii, 225. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$5.00.

Nothing, observes Raymond Aron, has "so deeply divided France" since the Dreyfus case as the four-year debate on the European Defense Community treaty—a debate that ended in 1954, ironically enough, with the rejection of an idea born in France itself; this rejection was followed, only four months later, by French acceptance of the admission of a potentially rearmed Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, one of the objects so vehemently fought by most of the opponents of EDC. What is the explanation for this apparent political paradox?

The authors of *France Defeats EDC*, an elaborate empirical study based upon parliamentary records, press commentaries, public-opinion polls, and elitist interviewing, do not offer any simple explanation. Their primary concern as scholars and publicists—one American and eight Frenchmen—was to analyze "in depth" the processes of national decision-making on an issue inflamed by emotional nationalism, obsessive fears, and personality conflicts. The inter-related factors in the complex controversy are admirably identified, and, in some measure, their relative impact on the final outcome is assessed.

In generalized terms, the overriding factor appears to have been the failure—or refusal—of the French nation to come to grips with the realities of its drastically altered power status in postwar Europe. But interwoven with this psychological blindness was a complex of other influences

—adroit Communist propaganda, traditional ideological cleavages, the role of vested interest groups, institutional weaknesses, and the curious maneuvering of Mendès-France himself. There was no clear realization of the fact that the future of France necessarily involved some kind of organized military as well as economic relationship with Germany—the traditional enemy. As the debate progressed, the refusal of the British to join EDC outright, along with Secretary Dulles' ill-advised threat of an "agonizing reappraisal" of America's European defense policy, only added fuel to the flames of "neutralist" and "ultra-nationalist" opposition. At the same time, hope of negotiating with the Soviets came increasingly to the fore; and "as the image of the USSR as the danger weakened, in just this measure the image of Germany as the adversary was strengthened." Every political party but the Communist and the Popular Republicans (MRP) split down the middle in a morass of confusion, and EDC became a nefarious scheme for placing patriotic French soldiers under the command of ex-Nazi generals. The passions of the past prevailed over reasonable considerations of the future.

In retrospect, one is tempted to interpret the rejection of EDC as a necessary catharsis for pent-up nationalist feeling—an act which may have smoothed the path for the recent approval by France of Euratom and the Common Market. With EDC out of the way, France could once again assume leadership in the uphill struggle for western European integration. Strange are the vagaries of political behavior *à la française*.

WALTER R. SHARP

Professor of International Relations
Yale University

WOLFGANG HIRSCH-WEBER and KLAUS SCHÜTZ. *Wähler und Gewählte: Eine Untersuchung der Bundestagswahlen, 1953*. (Schriften des Instituts für Politische Wissenschaft, Band 7.) Pp. xxi, 462. Berlin and Frankfurt: Frank Vahlen, 1957. DM 41.--.

The Institute of Political Science, formed by the Free University of Berlin, and the *Hochschule fuer Politik* first published a

volume on the history and analysis of the Berlin elections of December 3, 1950. Since then this distinguished Institute has published seven monographs of which the present volume is the latest. Two of these previous publications—*Parties in the Federal Republic: Studies of the Development of the German Parties to the Bundestag Election, 1953* and *Totalitarian Education: The Educational System of the Soviet Zone of Germany*—throw light on this exhaustive investigation of the national elections of 1953. (Unfortunately American scholars almost ignored the Soviet methodology and techniques which were employed by the Russians in the planned education of the East German youth.)

Professor Otto Stammer, the head of the Institute, has written an impressive Foreword to this study of voters and elected deputies of the Bundestag. In it he has dealt with the significance of the electoral campaign and election for a decision between the united government coalition of democratic parties and the highly organized opposition of the Socialist party of Germany. He also stressed the problems of co-operative research by historians, sociologists, psychologists, and statisticians in this study of the national elections.

The book is divided into five parts. Part I considers the election campaign as a problem of political science with an analysis of the preparation of the parties, the contribution of various associations, and the propaganda techniques used in the conflict of parties. Part II reviews the elections from 1946 to 1953. Part III is a successful analysis of the voting of various groups of the population including voters of different ages, sexes, religious affiliations, occupations, schooling, and political backgrounds. Part IV considers the voters and the complex electoral system including an evaluation of the motives of the voters. Part V gives the resulting composition of the political parties in the Bundestag. The summaries, conclusions, and comments at the end of almost every chapter, as well as the final conclusions and observations, reveal the profound character of this research which influenced many voters in the 1957 national elections. The analysis of

the public opinion polls, the indexes, and the numerous tables and graphs all merit the highest praise.

At a time when it is fashionable in America to criticize group research projects in the social sciences and to question even the validity of area studies in these fields, this brilliant co-operative analysis of the German elections of 1953 shows what can be accomplished by a group of dedicated scholars. Here are explained the strengths and weaknesses of Allied occupation policies, the reasons for the remarkable internal stability of the Bonn government, and the present problems confronting the Federal Republic. One historian or political scientist could not have written this definitive work.

RALPH HASWELL LUTZ

Professor of History, Emeritus
Stanford University

LEO W. SCHWARZ. *Refugees in Germany Today*. Pp. 172. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1957. \$5.00.

To anyone concerned with one of the greatest human and economic problems of our time, this small volume should be of interest. If, in addition, one has himself journeyed—as I have—from Tempelhof airfield in West Berlin to Hamburg in recent years, the interest should be more than doubled. For, as the author points out, Berlin has been the funnel through which so many of the East German refugees have streamed since the Iron Curtain closed all other exits. Each flight from Tempelhof carries its share of these poor souls who have been completely uprooted from the past. Only through such experiences do refugees become more than part of a statistical table.

The intention of this monograph, however, is to trace the refugee problem since 1945, primarily from the legal aspect, and the influence it has had on the United Nations and international law. Thus, the emphasis is on the legal controls and the administrative regulations, first under Allied occupation, and second under the laws of the German Federal Republic after it was established in 1949. Included in the first period were, of course, the measures adopted by the German *Länder* for dealing

with this sudden influx of millions of refugees of many nationalities and from many areas. The achievement by the Federal Republic since 1949 can only be characterized as stupendous, and Mr. Schwarz devotes considerable space to describing the many methods used to cope with the "great-migration" of history.

One of the most interesting sections of this book is that which explains the difference in the attitude toward refugees between the Western nations and Russia. Where the West early established the principle that *German* refugees were to be integrated with the local German population, Russia forced integration in the case of *all* refugees. The Federal Republic has, in general, followed the Western concept, but more recently an irredentism has become more marked. Perhaps the next question will be, what happens politically if many refugees indicate nostalgia for the old home behind the Iron Curtain?

RALPH F. BISCHOFF

Associate Dean and Professor of Law
New York University

NATO: *A Critical Appraisal*. A Report Prepared by Gardner Patterson and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. on the Basis of an International Conference held at Princeton University from June 19 through June 29, 1957. Pp. v, 107. Princeton: Princeton University Conference on NATO, 1957. No price.

Princeton University sponsored a ten-day international conference on the University campus during June 1957 for the purpose of discussing some of the major problems facing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This is the second such conference held at a university. Oxford sponsored the first one, and it is expected that a similar one will be held next year in France, or some other European country. These conferences are strictly nonofficial. Although NATO and the United States Department of State supported the Princeton Conference, the responsibility for determining the agenda, selecting the participants, directing the discussion, and publishing the report rested with the University.

All fifteen NATO states were represented. The list of sixty participants in-

cluded political leaders, journalists, businessmen, military leaders, and academicians. Since the purpose of the Conference was to generate ideas helpful to the solution of major NATO problems, rather than an attempt to reach agreed positions, it was determined that free, frank, and open discussion was fundamental to the success of the Conference. This was accomplished by selecting mostly private citizens rather than government officials as participants and assuring those who attended that their names would not be attached to any specific ideas or statements.

Professor Gardner Patterson, the Conference Director, and Professor Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., the Associate Director, were responsible for what is included in or left out of the report and for the manner in which the material was presented. Although there was no voting, the compilers have indicated areas in which they thought there was either general agreement or no agreement at all.

The NATO report includes discussions of Soviet and American policies, Western defense strategy, economic problems, broadening the base of political consultation, the price of German reunification, and the meanings and prospects of NATO.

The ninety-page NATO pamphlet is packed full of slants, insights, and attitudes toward complicated international problems. Although there are no answers, there are plenty of ideas—many of which are thought-provoking. A student will find there are many sides to NATO problems and many implications which never occurred to him. The pamphlet greatly broadens one's outlook and causes the re-examination of conclusions which were previously thought to be as sound as the Rock of Gibraltar.

STANLEY L. SCOTT

Major General, USA (Ret.)

Alexandria, Va.

S. CALOGÉROPOULOS-STRATIS in collaboration with P. A. ARGYROPOULO and others. *La Grèce et les Nations Unies*. Prepared for the Société d'Études Internationales d'Athènes and the Dotation Carnegie pour la Paix Internationale. (Études Nationales sur l'Organisation Internationale.) Pp. xiii, 190. New York:

Manhattan Publishing Company, 1957. \$3.00.

In this book the author and his collaborators are concerned with the following problems: To what extent are the aims and policies of Greece and other relevant countries influenced by the organization of the United Nations? To what degree have the aims and principles of the Charter served as guides for action by the UN? Is the division of power and responsibility among the organs of the UN equitably distributed? What role should the UN play in relation to other types of international organizations? In what measure has the UN served the common interest rather than the satisfaction of national interests? What reforms, statutory or procedural, does the experience of past years suggest?

Nine chapters cover Greece's cautious relations with her former overlords and her involuntary involvements in the squabbles of East and West. Her security on land and sea has rested and still rests in the sphere of compromise, from the Persian Gulf to the Adriatic.

Chapter 1 deals with the objectives of foreign politics; Chapter 2 with the factors of foreign politics, public opinion, powers, and means of information; Chapter 3 with the role of the Great Powers; Chapter 4 with the evolution of the United Nations, centralized organization, pacific means for solution of conflicts, international security, military sanctions, and right of veto; Chapter 5 with the organic structure of the UN, maintenance of peace, the General Assembly, the Security Council, and national competence; Chapter 6 with specialized institutions; Chapter 7 with protection of rights of man; Chapter 8 with Greece's activity in the UN and with the question of Cyprus; Chapter 9 with regional accords, the Balkan Pact, North Atlantic Treaty, Arab League, and intercontinental accords.

Since the formation of the modern Greek state, Greece has found herself obligated, in order to assure her security, to compromise between East and West. The temporary effacement of Russia after 1918 permitted the Western powers to establish the stabilization of their influence in the Middle East. World War II not only

restored Russia's former power but at the same time created a temporary equilibrium among the forces of the Middle East. During World War II the United States appeared as a Great Power in the Mediterranean, challenging the past primacy of Great Britain. The ensuing rivalry of the Great Powers became a determining factor in the delicate Middle East situation. Under these circumstances, Greece realized that her security was to be found only in membership in the United Nations.

JOHANNES MATTERN

Associate Professor of Political Science,
Emeritus

Johns Hopkins University

LUIGI EINAUDI. *Lo Scrittoio del Presidente (1948-1955)*. Pp. xvi, 677. Turin: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1956. L. 3000.

Luigi Einaudi, who served as President of Italy from 1948 to 1955, was the first person to be elected to that office after the new Constitution had gone into effect. This volume contains papers on a variety of subjects as they were occasioned by the duties which the Italian Constitution imposes upon the head of the state. This particular head of the state happened to be an outstanding social scientist; he had the advantage of being part of a tradition to which the formal separation of economics, sociology, and political science is unknown, and which, therefore, encourages a harmonious combination of the three. Thus, Einaudi was able to argue as an economist as well as a sociologist and a political scientist. Some of the problems, of course, with which he had to deal—as in the field of foreign policy—lent themselves to a scientific approach only within narrow limits. There were others, such as those pertaining to economic and social questions, however, in regard to which the social scientist had ample opportunity to show his mettle; and Einaudi demonstrates how this can be done. At the same time, he represents the case of the scholar who is able to see what is politically relevant and to say it in nontechnical language.

Not the least interesting part of the volume is the Preface. Here the author sketches the interpretation of the presi-

dency by which he was guided. He emphasizes that, according to Article 95 of the Constitution: "The President of the Council of Ministers directs the general policy of the government" and adds that he was, perhaps, inclined to interpret the meaning of this provision rather broadly. He felt that the framers of the Constitution had a definite "system" in mind and that the country was looking to the government and its parliamentary majority for political guidance rather than to the President of the Republic. This does not mean that the latter's functions were considered insignificant; had this been so, the present volume could not have come into existence. Thus, Einaudi insisted upon his right to be informed on all developments, and he did not neglect the opportunity to present objections to a given course of action when he felt such objections were needed. At the same time, he never pressed his point. Wherever, according to the Constitution, other officers of government, in particular the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, were entitled to act, he left the final decision to them. On the other hand, the Constitution does contain certain provisions which, as understood by Einaudi, conferred definite rights upon the President, and these rights he was prepared to use.

Einaudi's successor, President Giovanni Gronchi, has taken a different view of the presidency. According to him, the head of the state may attempt to guide the over-all policy of the government into particular channels. This interpretation threatens to lead to the type of political dualism which the parliamentary system adopted by Italy's constitution-makers was designed to exclude. To no one's surprise there has been at least one major case of public conflict between the government and the new President, and Luigi Sturzo implied in a speech delivered in the Senate that there has been friction all along. Einaudi's book demonstrates that the head of the state under a parliamentary system can perform a real function without embarking upon a course beset by such dangers.

FERDINAND A. HERMENS

Professor of Political Science
University of Notre Dame

DIANA SPEARMAN. *Democracy in England*. Pp. xviii, 238. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. \$6.00.

It is a little difficult to estimate the market which this curious book is designed to reach. Mrs. Spearman has written a cool—perhaps cold is the better word—assessment of English democracy in its historical context. The general reader will, I think, find it rather hard going, if only because of an infuriating habit of using a comma to link together sentences which ought to be separated. Thus we have literally scores of constructions which the following serves to illustrate: "Perhaps the real importance of this procedure is its effect on the rule of law, this will be discussed later. . . ." So it goes, until one's teeth are set on edge. Nor will the professional scholar, who is not concerned with the niceties of language—according to the popular reviewers—be better served. He will be surprised to find that Henry George is "now completely forgotten" or that Robert Lowe is likewise "a man now forgotten." He will have difficulty in knowing what to make of footnotes like "Gladstone, the Whips and the General Election, 1868" which identify neither article, nor author, nor source, nor whatever else may be intended.

Mrs. Spearman's discussion runs from a study of the "old constitution" through a description of the balanced advantages of the eighteenth-century atmosphere to chapters dealing with the emergence of majoritarian democracy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Put simply, her theme is that the main danger to democracy is an obsession with equality. She is a libertarian, profoundly disturbed by the possibility that mass democracy will lead not to freedom but eventually to tyranny. Her work, therefore, is not really as dispassionate as its form might indicate. It is rather a tract for the times, dedicated to the praiseworthy thesis that governments must not be omnipotent and that the constitution must be balanced by checking the overwhelming political power of a numerical majority.

Unfortunately, Mrs. Spearman has little to offer in the way of constructive remedies. She notes three possible means of

reintroducing a balanced constitution: a recognition of fundamental rights which could not be infringed upon by any government, however large its majority; some system of proportional representation; or a second Chamber with substantial powers. Rejecting the first two as impracticable, she plumps for her second Chamber with generous powers of delay. This is a disappointingly puny mouse to result from Mrs. Spearman's not inconsiderable labor. It leaves the reader with the feeling that he has been following not so much a scholarly analysis of democracy in England as a dressed-up bit of conservative apologetic—as indeed is the case. Those who remember Mrs. Spearman's *Modern Dictatorship* will recognize the tone of various *obiter dicta*, but they will regret that *Democracy in England* has few of the merits of the earlier work.

HENRY R. WINKLER

Associate Professor of History
Rutgers University

ELWOOD P. LAWRENCE. *Henry George in the British Isles*. Pp. 203. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957. \$5.00.

In 1897 J. A. Hobson, the Liberal economist and journalist, wrote a celebrated tribute which concluded: "Henry George may be considered to have exercised a more directly powerful and educative influence over English radicalism of the last fifteen years than any other man." This judgment was recorded in the year of George's death. Now, fifty years later, we have corroboration in a careful historical analysis of the impact on Britain of the famous American "single taxer." Professor Lawrence of Michigan State College has supplemented the well-known collection of George material in the New York Public Library with an exhaustive search of the London and British provincial press. There cannot be much more to learn about Henry George in the British Isles.

The stirring story of the close relation of Henry George to the rise of Socialist thought in Britain in the 1880's—the sale of over 100,000 copies of *Progress and Poverty*, his inspiration for the Fabian Society, his direct influence on the minds of

Shaw, Webb, Snowden, Hyndman and many others, his vital role in the conversion of trade unionism to Socialist doctrine—is common knowledge. The author does make more intelligible the paradox presented by an American individualist—a product of the frontier—who can now be termed "a catalyst for British socialism," "a kind of godfather to the Labor Party." His explanation is that Henry George's influence was not in spreading the gospel of the "single tax" but was something far more comprehensive—his dramatization of the limitations of a society which permitted progress and poverty to develop side by side, his insistence that poverty was neither necessary nor natural, a message which stirred the evangelical conscience and persuaded even his critics of the possibilities of a better world.

As historical knowledge, the chief contribution is in the treatment of Henry George's "political influence," both before and after his death. Parliamentary radicals of the 1880's and 1890's had broad objectives very similar to those of George; in particular, the land reforms in the "Radical Program" of Joseph Chamberlain directly reflect George's ideas. By 1906 the Liberals officially advocated a tax on land values; this was a policy which was incorporated into the Budget of 1908 and deliberately used, Professor Lawrence suggests, to challenge the Lords. But this proved to be the end of legislative enactment of the principles of Henry George. The Liberals never seriously considered adoption of the "single tax," and Labor, when it moved ahead, felt that the "single tax" was "not socialism." A land valuation measure did, it is true, become law in 1931, but only to be promptly suspended by the succeeding government. After 1945 Labor turned to other means of securing for the whole nation "the unearned increment of land."

Altogether, this study is an interesting and useful supplement to Charles A. Barker's more comprehensive book, *Henry George* (1955).

ALFRED F. HAVIGHURST

Professor of History
Amherst College

J. O. LINDSAY (Ed.). *The New Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. VII: *The Old Regime, 1713-63*. Pp. xx, 624. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957. \$7.50.

More than fifty years have passed since the first volume of the original *Cambridge Modern History* appeared, and 1957 has seen the publication of the first two volumes of the new series. The result, to judge from the volume presently under consideration, can only be described as disappointing.

Comparisons with the older *Cambridge Modern History* are illuminating. In the first place, the great majority of the chapters in the volume on the eighteenth century in the older series were devoted to separate country histories. These are still there, in the present work, as are a few chapters on such "all-European" events as the War of the Austrian Succession, the diplomatic revolution, and the Seven Years' War; but in addition there are topical chapters on such matters as trade and commerce, the arts, religion, and warfare. Secondly, in the older work a number of Continental scholars were invited to contribute. In this volume every contributor is British; only one, J. H. Parry, holds a university post outside Great Britain; and about half are situated at Cambridge. Thirdly, the present volume contains no bibliography. The general editor of the series, Sir George Clark, explains in his general introduction in the first volume that "so many bibliographies, general and special, are available that additions to their number can only be justified if they are appropriate." It is to be hoped that Sir George and his fellow editors will reconsider on this point. The bibliographies in the older series were enormously useful and would be so again if they were brought up to date.

As to the individual chapters, they are, as might be expected, of variable quality; they range from excellent, in the cases of Professor Horn on the diplomatic revolution and the late Eric Robson on eighteenth-century warfare, to mediocre. Unfortunately, most of them are written in a soggy and monotonous style which makes

them very heavy going and which will repel the general reader whom the editors evidently hope to attract. In fact, the usefulness of this sort of collaborative venture into general history is open to serious question. The format of the present volume invites repetition and conflicting judgments, which are abundant. The editor has tried valiantly, but vainly, to overcome some of these difficulties by contributing four chapters himself, in addition to an Introduction summarizing the contents of the volume as a whole. It would have been a more cohesive and useful book, in my opinion, if he, or someone else, had written the whole of it.

MAURICE LEE, JR.

Assistant Professor of History
Princeton University

J. G. A. Pocock. *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century*. Pp. viii, 261. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957. \$5.50.

"The history of historiography is not only the history of the rise and perfection of a particular manner of thought . . . it is the history of all the ways in which men have felt committed to their past." So the author justifies in part his attempt to correct the relative neglect accorded seventeenth-century English historiography. This historiography was anything but detached. Concentrating upon law and government, it sought to find support in the past for the contending ideologies of the present. The strong feeling that precedent constituted justification stemmed from the contemplation of the common law, and it seems to have affected all parties prior to the time of Locke, though in varying degrees.

The "common law mind" doubtless had its classical embodiment in Sir Edward Coke who, brilliant and learned though he was, was able to contend that the law and the constitution had been from time immemorial just what they were in his own day. Sir Matthew Hale, champion of the common law of the next generation, did

much better; he held the law to have resulted from a process of constant adjustment to the needs of society. But, from the viewpoint of the historiography of our own day, the royalist protagonists had the better of it. If this book has a hero, it is Sir Henry Spelman. More detached than some from contemporary controversies, Spelman demonstrated, with painstaking scholarship, that Norman and Angevin England had been a feudal state, that feudalism had been imported at the Conquest, and that the institutions and concepts of this era had to be understood in their own context and could not be applied uncritically to contemporary situations. Those who succeeded Spelman did not follow these ideas to their logical conclusion. They did not take the view that the issues of the past were largely irrelevant to those of the present, and that the past should be studied for its own sake, as well as for an understanding of the process whereby it had become the present. Instead—Robert Brady is the key figure here—they took the partisan stand that the laws and liberties of England had come into being at the will of a sovereign king.

The worsting of the champions of the Ancient Constitution in the historical arena and the discrediting of the victors through the submerging of their cause at the Glorious Revolution aided in preparing the way for the more philosophical approach of the eighteenth century. Not until the nineteenth century did feudalism again receive the attention accorded it by Spelman and Brady.

No brief summary can do justice to this excellent study. Its scholarship is impressive, its insight keen. From its pages most readers will gain a deeper knowledge of a number of old friends and will make the acquaintance of new. Its prime concern is with historiography, and it deals less with "historical method" than with the evolution of an understanding of the significance of history as a discipline. It is thus part of the mosaic of the intellectual history of mankind.

LEONIDAS DODSON

University Archivist
University of Pennsylvania

ASIA AND AFRICA

KEITH CALLARD. *Pakistan: A Political Study*. Pp. 355. New York: The Macmillan Company in co-operation with the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957. \$6.00.

The story of the politics of Pakistan, a complex and confusing one, is not well known to most Americans. Fortunately it has now been told, with remarkable clarity and objectivity, by Professor Keith Callard of McGill University.

Professor Callard's study portrays concisely the decline of the Muslim League and the efforts to form other political parties, usually centering around individual personalities; the steps in constitution making; the role and the weaknesses of the two Constituent Assemblies as legislative bodies; the role of the Governors-General, from Jinnah himself, to whom the ordinary conventions "could never apply," to Ghulam Mohammad, who dismissed a Prime Minister who still commanded majority support in the Constituent Assembly and then the Constituent Assembly itself, thus precipitating two constitutional crises of historic importance, to Iskandar Mirza, who in 1956 became the first President of the Republic of Pakistan; the evolution of "an unusual federal system," with particular attention to the relation between the center and the units, the "special case" of East Pakistan, and the steps leading to the formation of a single unit in West Pakistan; the Islamic aspects of "a nation which claims to form an 'ideological' state, but where there is no agreement on the meaning and application of that ideology"; the position of the minorities, and especially of the 10,000,000 Hindus in East Pakistan; the fundamental rights of the citizens of Pakistan, and the extent to which these rights have either been violated or limited; the role of the public services, especially the Civil Service of Pakistan, a small body of dedicated persons who, together with the military services, virtually run the country and who have given Pakistan such stability as it has been able to achieve; and the foreign relations of Pakistan, especially relations with India, which

"have been the main preoccupation of the foreign policy of Pakistan."

Most of the deficiencies in this admirable book arise from limitations of space or from the complexity of the subject. Professor Callard manages to pack a remarkable amount of description and analysis into less than 320 pages, but inevitably he could not sketch in the background of many of the developments to which he refers. The result is, unfortunately, that in spite of the clarity of presentation the book is rather heavy going for those who are not already somewhat familiar with the politics of Pakistan. Even within the space limitations, more attention should have been given to historical background, to economic problems and development programs which have very profound political implications, and to major aspects of foreign policy which do not center around relations with India.

Professor Callard offers a timely reminder that even Pakistan's association with other states in military alliances and its acceptance of aid from the United States seem to be motivated largely by a desire to strengthen itself vis-à-vis India, and that "domestic changes or the possibility of a settlement with India might . . . bring about a sudden and drastic alteration in Pakistan's world view."

Pakistan was "born in chaos" in 1947, and it has led a troubled existence since it achieved independence. Because of a lack of effective leadership, grave economic problems, internal divisions, and serious disagreements on fundamentals, it did not receive a postindependence constitution until 1956, and it has not had a single national election. Cabinet government has been instituted in form, but "the traditions of cabinet government have not been accepted either at the centre or in the provinces." Political parties generally "have presented a picture of almost unredeemed failure." "Democracy has been accepted as an ideal," but it is not yet a reality. Nevertheless, Pakistan is "a free society" and "is publicly committed to the operation of democratic institutions." Under the circumstances, as Professor Callard points out, "it is a remarkable achievement that

the country has fared no worse." All friends of Pakistan will hope that it will fare better in the years ahead.

NORMAN D. PALMER

Professor of Political Science
University of Pennsylvania

PAUL OSTWALD. *Japans Weg von Genf nach San Franzisko*. Pp. 122. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1955. DM 7.20.

There is perhaps no more acid a commentary upon the attempts of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan to promote close political and cultural relations during the late thirties and early forties than the present state of German scholarship on Japan and Japanese scholarship on Germany. For despite all the previous state sponsorship and subsidy, German and Japanese scholars in the postwar period have continued to follow their older and more highly specialized interests. In the case of German scholarly concern with Japan this has meant the persistence of a humanistic orientation. The occasional appearance of a German work on Japanese politics thus merits more than usual attention.

Ostwald's work is, despite its somewhat deceptive title, actually a survey of Japanese foreign policy and affairs from the outbreak of the Manchurian incident in 1931 to the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. Following an introductory flashback to the post-World War I era, Ostwald traces Japan's diplomatic course from Manchuria to the advent of war with China in 1937. The chapter on Japan's foreign policy from the Marco Polo Bridge affair to Pearl Harbor—in which Japanese relations with the Axis Powers, China, Soviet Russia, and the United States are reviewed—makes up approximately half the monograph. The final portion of the book skims over Japan's foreign policy during the World War II years and her experiences under the American occupation.

It is difficult to see what useful purpose is served by Ostwald's book. For a layman with no background in modern Japanese history it can provide no deep understanding or insight into the causes, nature, or processes of Japanese imperialism. Similarly, the work can shed but little light

upon the policies and actions of the allies and antagonists with whom Japan was most intimately involved. Ostwald has, in short, bitten off more than he can chew and has furnished the reader with not enough to digest.

Though there does not exist a single work in a Western language embracing the period covered in Ostwald's book, there are a number of studies worthy of collective reading for an understanding of Japanese foreign policy from 1931 to 1951. For the decade from Manchuria to Pearl Harbor the studies of Frank W. Ikle (*German-Japanese Relations, 1936-1940*), Hans Trefousse (*Germany and American Neutrality, 1939-1941*), and Herbert Feis (*The Road to Pearl Harbor*) are invaluable; for the post-World War II years Edwin O. Reischauer's work (*The United States and Japan*, revised edition) has no peer.

HYMAN KUBLIN

Associate Professor of History
Brooklyn College

WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH. *Islam in Modern History*. Pp. ix, 317. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. \$6.00.

This is one of the most remarkable books on modern Islam to appear in our lifetime. Good books on Islam are badly needed for a fuller understanding of the 350 million Muslims distributed over Asia and Africa, especially those concentrated in the crucial area of the Middle East. The book is written with profound insight by a scholar who is familiar with Islam and the Muslims and has spent many years of his life in Islamic countries, speaking the language of the people among whom he lived. The author offers his work as a contribution to a politico-social-economic study—a study which is fundamentally an inquiry into comparative and contemporary Islam. Thus it has to be remembered in the first instance that the work is not intended to cover the history of Islam in modern times. Evidently this study is a cumulative set of efforts extending over many years; it embodies the author's published and unpublished research which he brought together after shuffling, emending, and amplifying his material.

The book consists of eight chapters. The first two are devoted to "Islam and History" and "Islam in Recent History." The author treats his subject in an interpretative spirit with philosophical acumen and illuminating lucidity. Readers will surely find many inspiring arguments and forceful statements in this, the core of the book. Curiously, however, one may be struck by the insufficiency of the place accorded providential ordinance or the doctrine of fatalism (*al-Qaḍā' wal-Qadar*) in the conduct of Islamic history. There is a discussion of the chief movements in modern Islam including the Wahhabis in Arabia, Waliyullah in India, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, whose influence extended far beyond the confines of his native land, liberalism as represented by leaders like Muhammad 'Abduh of Egypt, and nationalism which has to be studied in the individual Muslim countries with an eye to the sentimental unity of the Islamic world. The writer then explains the attitude of apologists who champion with dynamism, rather than trying to comprehend and elucidate, the fundamental ramifications of Islam in the Western progressive setting of nationalism and secularism.

The following chapters are devoted to regional studies and surveys of Islam in various areas. The author legitimately begins with Arabs in the Islamic crisis. The idea of identifying Arabism with Islam receives full treatment, but only cursory reference is made to the Christian Arabs who have taken pride in their Arab heritage and their contribution to Arab awakening. He touches in passing, and without due emphasis, on the place of militant Zionism and Israel in the Middle East. The discussion of the Muslim Brothers (*Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*) is inadequate (pp. 156-60). The literature on the subject—both official and unofficial—including the monumental records of their trial before the military court and their total suppression in Egypt should have been used with greater scrutiny. The dismissal in a curt footnote (p. 116, n. 14) of the Muslim-Christian Fellowship as still of doubtful significance does not appear to us justifiable. Begun at Bhamdoun in 1954 by representatives of all creeds of both faiths, and drawn

from twenty-six nations, the movement was resumed at Alexandria, Teheran, Washington, and Karachi; and, without being spectacular, it is gradually spreading among the elite of many nations.

Other chapters deal chiefly with Turkey and its Islamic reformation, where the secularization of the state did not mean the divorce of religion; with Pakistan and the hard experiment of erecting an Islamic state; and with India, where a very considerable Muslim minority presents a serious Islamic involvement. Chapter 7 on Islam in the Soviet Union, China, Indonesia and Negro Africa compares rather badly in size and purport with the other big chapters. Iran, not Arab yet intensely Muslim, has no special place in the great canvas which the author has set out to paint with great ability.

It is hard to understand why the author meticulously employs diacritical marks with Arabic names and vocabulary in the notes and yet shuns them completely in the text. I should like to have seen a classified bibliography at the end of the book. The author is content with references in the notes. It is hoped that some of these minor remarks may be of some service to the second edition of this book—a book which deserves to have many more editions. It is indispensable not only to the student of Islam and the East but also to all those who should be armed with deep understanding in handling the affairs of these decisive areas and tempestuous climes. Historians, philosophers of religion, politicians, journalists, missionaries, and many other classes whose interest and imagination may carry them into the field of the lands of Islam will find in this book an acquisition of the highest order.

AZIZ S. ATIYA

Visiting Professor of Arabic and Islamic History
Princeton University

HUGH BORTON and others. *Japan Between East and West*. Pp. xxii, 327. New York: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1957. \$4.75.

Six experts in separate chapters present here their views on the changing role of independent Japan in world affairs. Of ne-

cessity the essays overlap each other, and there is a great deal of repetition; what is remarkable is the unanimity of views on the main issues. The continued maintenance of United States troops and military bases in and near Japan as part of American military strategy in Asia and as a deterrent to Communist aggression appears to be the key problem. Because of its greater co-operation with this policy and because it favors Japanese rearmament, America has supported the conservative, Liberal-Democratic party, even though this party sponsors constitutional and electoral changes and centralized control of education which would necessarily weaken many of the occupation-inspired reforms. The Socialist opposition party endorses policies promoted by the United States which would tend to ensure the democratization of Japan, but it is anti-American in sentiment. Consequently, America cannot depend wholly on one party or the other. The Communists, independently, are not presently strong, but they exert considerable influence by working through leftist groups whose aims coalesce to some extent with theirs.

Economically, Japan has made a wonderful recovery. By diversifying production, it runs less risk of foreign resentment and is in sight of balancing its international payments even though United States special procurement expenditures end. Almost all Japanese favor in some degree official resumption of trade relations with Communist China; this is true even though statistics indicate that the entire Communist bloc is now incapable of meeting more than a small fraction of Japan's need for cotton, wool, wheat, oil, sugar, scrap iron, iron ore, rubber, and tin.

Japan will undoubtedly try to regain in some measure its former role as an independent and dominant Asian power, but it will hardly be able to accomplish this objective either as a Russian satellite or while largely dependent upon the United States. Just as the United States, in order to secure a firm basis of friendship with Japan, must try and understand the viewpoint of both major political parties, so Japan wants to be independent and to be nobody's "ally," at least militarily; Japan wants to walk warily between East and West, hop-

ing to achieve greater security through a strengthened United Nations. However, the United States has been Japan's best friend in the international community and saved it from the rigors of a partition such as occurred in Germany and Korea; we can only hope that in the inevitable hour of decision Japan will perceive that her destiny lies with the West.

All this is presented adequately and clearly in this book, and not only scholars but laymen as well should read these papers to get into better perspective the Japan of today.

ALBERT E. KANE

Attorney, Public Housing Administration
Washington, D. C.

CHAE KYUNG OH. *A Handbook of Korea*. Pp. 389. New York: Pageant Press, 1957. \$5.00.

Relatively few books about the "Land of the Morning Calm" have been published in the English language, and most of them have been no more than well-meant attempts. For the most part they have been written by foreigners, and from the point of view of tourists describing the strangely exotic for armchair travelers at home. Some have gone deeper, of course, but the interpretations were still of Korea through Western eyes.

The need has been great for a work which would give the world a true picture of Korea's troubled past as well as her present and future potentialities—a work from which a fair perspective could be gained for a proper evaluation of the Asian peninsula's importance in East Asia. Recently, two native Koreans have come out with timely books based on their intimate knowledge of their native land. One of these entitled *Korea Tomorrow* is an unofficial, indispensable volume which paints a unified portrait and presents an authoritative study of Korea's entire problems; the other book, *A Handbook of Korea*, is an official publication presenting a many-sided picture of the young Republic of Korea in its most crucial period during the last decade.

A more nearly accurate title for Chae Kyung Oh's *A Handbook of Korea* could be *The Yearbook of the Republic of Korea*

(South Korea), 1956. For that is what the book really is. Mr. Oh is a compiler rather than the author of this book and is presently the Director of the Office of Public Information, Republic of Korea. This study is a revised official publication compiled in October 1955 by Mr. Jai Hyon Lee, a public information officer. In fact, this text is not to be considered either a scholarly or original work as its title implies.

What the author has done by way of producing a basic reference work is to give a thoroughly enlightening and yet subjective introduction to the Republic of Korea's administration; the book also gives a concise account of events in South Korea since the liberation by the Allies in 1945. Just as in a yearbook, each chapter takes up a specific aspect of Korea, and subheads on subtopics are inserted throughout each chapter. This handbook briefly reviews Korea's history, its geography, and the religion and culture of its people. Incorporating useful statistics as of 1956, it also presents a short description of South Korea—its agriculture, industry and mineral wealth, schools, hospitals, local and national government, domestic economy and trade, transportation and communication, reconstruction work, national defense, and foreign affairs. A true picture of the political, economic, and cultural events in North Korea since V-J Day in 1945 is omitted in this volume.

An extensive collection of basic documents includes the text of the Republic of South Korea's Constitution and the text of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States; five significant post-Korean war official documents—excluding the text of the Korean Armistice—are also added, together with four pages of photographs and two pages of inadequate maps of the Korean peninsula. This handbook does not include the following useful appendices: a chronology of significant historical and contemporary events relating to Korea and a glossary of Korean, Japanese, and Chinese proper names used in the text. A comprehensive annotated bibliography and a useful index are not contained in the book at all.

In an attempt to summarize such an

over-all survey, there is some repetition of material in the organization of the book, and its yearbook style reduces its readability and interest. While this is an official publication, however, readers will find Mr. Oh's admiration for his people well justified and will gain a new insight into the unhappy plight to which power politics has brought the "Land of the Morning Calm." How the Korean people in South and North Korea have met the challenge of the past, and what they are now doing to build a more stable and prosperous future, is not described, nor is there any presentation of suggestions for resolution of the problem of peaceful reunification of a once-united country.

If commentary analysis had been included, this handbook would be a more interesting account of Korea's problems and the possible future prospects for a better Korea tomorrow. This reference work may, however, be a useful guide to other scholars who may be inspired to conduct additional research on one or more of the important topics which the author has here presented. It is to be hoped that those who read this book will also have the opportunity to read a more comprehensive study, with a better-balanced report on South Korea and with sufficient background on North Korea to place it in perspective with relation to the problem of Korean reunification. This still unwritten book may make an even more important contribution to the unhappy and still divided "Land of the Morning Calm."

KYUNG CHO CHUNG

Monterey, Calif.

VERA MICHELES DEAN and others. *New Era in the Non-Western World*. Edited by Warren S. Hunsberger. Pp. xi, 152. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957. \$3.00.

This stimulating book is the record of a public lecture series held under the auspices of the Non-Western Civilization Program of the University of Rochester. Among the usual advantages of this type of publication are the wide coverage and a broad range of viewpoints by ranking specialists on topics which increasingly demand attention. The merits of the book far outweigh

the equally typical shortcomings which lie in the unevenness of the individual contributions, both in style and content.

Dr. Vera Micheles Dean sets the frame for the lecture series by asking and answering the question: "Who are the people of the Non-Western World?" She explains convincingly the reasons for the restlessness, the impatience, and what so often strikes people in the West as the irresponsibility of the leaders of the non-Western world.

The outstanding contribution both in scope and clarity of exposition is that of Professor Benda. His chapter is a masterful summary of the meaning of nationalism and revolution in the context of the existing social, economic, and political problems of the newly emerging nations; and he goes on to analyze the implications of the solutions that are being sought. In a few pages, many of these problems can only be sketched rather than discussed, and one must hope that Dr. Benda will be able to follow up some of his ideas in more detail in the future.

Dr. Hunsberger's chapter, which ranges widely over a number of economic problems, may have held the interest of a live audience more than that of a reader. The remaining topical contributions dealing with science (Noyes) and social adjustment (Gittler) in the non-Western world seem to fall short, in various measure, of the intent of the book. They lack organization which would orient them clearly to the purpose of interpreting the non-West to a Western public.

In a brilliant concluding chapter, suitably entitled "America Proposes, Asia Chooses," Dr. de Kiewit stresses the heart of the problems confronting both West and non-West. Decisions which must now be made will profoundly affect both us and them. His recognition and advice that "there is clearly a fluidity in Africa and Asia which should persuade us to be very flexible ourselves in reading and assessing the shape of the new future" is worthy of careful thought.

It may be no more than a coincidence that among the six contributions the three of surpassing merit are by authors who themselves have had intimate personal

knowledge of the non-Western world. Perhaps this is an indication that understanding of the non-Western world requires more than intellectual curiosity, more than academic knowledge, more even than sympathy—however sincere. Be that as it may, by focussing attention on the complexity and urgency of the problems which have been created by the changing relationships of West and non-West, all the authors have made a worthwhile contribution. Their book deserves to be recommended to a wide nonspecialist readership.

FRANK J. MOORE

Economic Planning Department
Pan American World Airways
San Francisco, Calif.

SAAD ED DIN FAWZI. *The Labour Movement in the Sudan, 1946-1955*. (Middle Eastern Monographs, No. 1.) Pp. xiv, 175. London: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1957. \$4.00.

This book is a carefully compiled study of a movement which is in its infancy in the Sudan as well as in other parts of Africa and in similar emerging industrial areas of the world. It is a valuable historical document since it is written so nearly at the beginning of a cultural and historical change and since the conditions described with reference to these beginnings in the Sudan may aid in the development of the labor movement elsewhere.

The author, Dr. Saad Ed Din Fawzi, is himself a Sudanese who occupies the Chair of Economics in the University College of Khartoum. The material for his study of the labor movement came from the files of the government and the labor organizations of the Sudan and from actual on-the-scene observations and experiences.

The Foreword to the book by Professor E. H. Phelps Brown, Professor of Labor Economics at the University of London, concisely sums up the general reasons for the emergence of labor movements and indicates the ends which they should legitimately seek. He says of Dr. Fawzi's book: ". . . Dr. Fawzi's work is remarkable. It is contemporary history. . . . Dr. Fawzi has preserved for posterity what could

never be reconstructed subsequently from the written record alone."

The book records developments in the labor movement only in the northern Sudan, which is predominantly Muslim. The first of these developments was sponsored by the government itself in its attempt to foster closer relations between labor and management; this is especially interesting in that the government, either directly or in connection with government-regulated industry, is one of the largest employing bodies in the Sudan. The second labor development came from the workers themselves and was called the Workers' Affairs Association. Its attempts to be influential or to manifest bargaining power were difficult because the industries it represented were small; men could leave their jobs and return to farming; labor was sporadic, part-time, tribally divided, and frequently migrant.

The labor movement really began primarily around the railroads. The movement was, in the beginning, very militant and relied heavily on the strike method. Furthermore, strivings toward political independence and for labor negotiations were intertwined, and progress was, therefore, difficult.

But progress is being made. Labor legislation is coming into being rapidly. Better wages and working conditions are emerging. Political independence has been realized, at least in part.

Dr. Fawzi has done well in this study. Similar studies should be made in other areas of emerging industrialism.

D. W. BITTINGER

President
McPherson College

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

RUTH LOCKE ROETTINGER. *The Supreme Court and State Police Power: A Study in Federalism*. Pp. vi, 252. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957. \$4.50.

This book serves the purpose of cataloguing United States Supreme Court cases involving state police powers during the

years from 1930 through 1956. It is the published version of a doctoral dissertation completed at the University of North Carolina.

Part II, representing about two-thirds of the study, summarizes in the briefest fashion and under broad classes the state police power cases of the following four time periods: 1930-40, 1941-45, 1946-52, and 1953-56. The cases are catalogued under nine classes such as "Personal Rights and Liberties" and "Labor Relations." For each section and chapter of Part II Miss Roettinger has added the number of decisions supporting and the number of decisions opposing state use of police powers; and she has calculated percentages as a means of showing the disposition of the Court toward the states. "The over-all picture is one of state power sustained in 249 cases of the total of 484 or in 51% of the cases" (p. 201). The author puts in the proper sentences indicating her recognition of the limits of such a method of evaluating the vitality of federalism. But having made these statements, she continues with analyses which cannot but leave the impression that she believes her undertaking worthwhile and that in reality we can evaluate the power of the states today by such arithmetic means.

Parts I and III of the book attempt to place in some perspective the Supreme Court's role in defining the power of the states; the constitutional authorities extensively quoted by Miss Roettinger may be anyone from John Marshall to Senator Sam Ervin. The last chapter—was this the purpose of the book?—drops the arithmetical analysis and substitutes a discussion, largely by quotation, of the school desegregation decision as an "unconstitutional" exercise of power by the Court and an infringement on state police power and federalism.

To make the argument persuasive that the Court has made serious inroads on state police power and weakened the federal principle, the book would have gained from an empirical illustration of the limiting effects in practice of these decisions. Otherwise the general findings dealing with the real possibilities of continued virility of state government in such works as the *Report of the Intergovernmental Relations*

Commission, William Anderson's *The Nation and the States: Rivals or Partners?* and the American Assembly's volume, *The Forty-eight States: Their Tasks as Policy Makers and Administrators*, must stand.

CLARA PENNIMAN

Assistant Professor of Political Science
University of Wisconsin

Fritz Morstein Marx. *The Administrative State: An Introduction to Bureaucracy*. (The Chicago Library of Comparative Politics.) Pp. x, 202. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. \$4.00.

"The increasing participation of modern bureaucracies in the decision-making process of governments" is analyzed in the second volume of a new series of studies, edited by Roy C. Macridis, entitled "The Chicago Library of Comparative Politics." The series, inspired by the work of a seminar on comparative politics, sponsored by the Social Science Research Council, and chaired by the editor, will include case studies—John Hazard's *The Soviet System of Government* was the first—and works on various aspects of politics; legislatures, executive branches, and the study of various bureaucracies under review.

Fritz Morstein Marx's years of study and research in Germany and America, his experience as a teacher in many universities, his extensive work in the United States Bureau of the Budget, and his many publications on government and administration make him a fortunate choice as author of this study. He treats of bureaucracy as a type of organizational structure characterized by "hierarchy, jurisdiction, specialization, professional training, fixed compensation and permanence." He recognizes dangers in the use of this word since it is also used to refer to some pathologies of organization, to gigantism in modern government, and even to the alleged domination of some governments by their presumed public servants. Marx admits the increasingly weighty role of bureaucracy in the government of modern industrial societies, but he considers that this is not a major threat to democratic government and that bureaucracies can and indeed must be controlled.

It is impossible in a brief review to do

justice to the richness of this book: its intriguing characterizations of "Guardian, Caste, Patronage and Merit" bureaucracies, its vivid picture of the atmosphere and pitfalls of bureaucratic life, and its analysis of the juxtaposed problems of safe-guarding and protecting the civil service as against the need to keep the service responsible to popular control. Particularly noteworthy is the author's forthright condemnation of the excesses of the internal security system in the United States. "If the blight spreading in the law of civil service is not checked," he warns, "the prospects of working for the government are bound to become less appealing for all but the least articulate or the most conventional aspirants" (p. 129).

The major focus of this study is Western democratic government, but the author on occasion glances bleakly at the state of bureaucracy in totalitarian systems, and in his chapter on "Types of Bureaucracies" he ranges widely over Oriental and classical examples. Clearly, however, his preoccupation is with contemporary Western democracies, and specifically with some problems of "Merit Bureaucracy."

One regrets that more space was not devoted to historical and non-Western bureaucracies. The influence of bureaucracy in governmental "decision-making" might then have been seen as ubiquitous, not merely as a modern phenomenon—though this thought is suggested in the treatment of "Guardian" and "Caste" bureaucracies. The qualitative changes in contemporary bureaucracies would be better understood as a product of industrialization in both East and West, and under both totalitarian and democratic regimes.

Perhaps the chief defect this reviewer finds is the author's attachment to a bipolar frame of reference. This difficulty stems from the weakness of our terminology for referring to variables and the ease with which words for polar extremes come to mind: we think "hot" and "cold" instead of "degrees of temperature." A man who had never left the humid tropics might say of the weather: "It is something hot and moist" instead of something having "temperature and humidity." Similarly the author's "essentials" of public administra-

tion—"rationality, responsibility, competence and continuity"—refer not to variables but to polarities. But bureaucracies vary markedly in the degree to which their structures and practices express rational or irrational attitudes, responsible or irresponsible behavior, and so forth. Indeed, most bureaucracies may well be neither rational nor irrational. (One hesitates to coin a term such as "rational-irrationality" to match Chamberlin's "monopolistic-competition.") And certainly we can find instances of quite "irrational" bureaucratic structure. A conceptual framework oriented to variables rather than polarities would permit, with more precision, characterization of the varieties of bureaucratic behavior observable in past as well as contemporary, Eastern as well as Western, bureaucracies.

Precision of analysis would also be served by a sharper differentiation between description and prescription. The author tends, somewhat confusingly, to mix statements about what *is* with views about what *ought* to be. It is this reviewer's opinion that a more analytically descriptive and variable-conscious approach would have made this useful book even more useful, both for understanding and for guidance.

FRED W. RIGGS

Associate Professor of Government
Indiana University

C. A. R. CROSLAND. *The Future of Socialism*. Pp. 540. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. \$7.00.

GEORGE WATSON (Ed.). *The Unservile State: Essays in Liberty and Welfare*. Pp. 324. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. \$4.75.

Many aspects of a welfare state have been accepted generally by British society in the past twelve years; and as a result the parties of protest have lost some of their thunder. Mr. Crosland asks whether the successes of the Labour party, some of whose members have had support from the Conservatives, have gone too far or not far enough, and what the future Labour program might be? The Liberals, in the book of essays edited by Mr. Watson, seem

to want to preserve many of the features of the welfare state as it has developed and to suggest a program for their revived party which will be under the governance of free individuals who have learned social responsibility. In as much as Mr. Crosland advocates the coexistence of both public and private industry, both state-supported and privately-supported schools, and other means to preserve individual freedom, it can be seen that the two books come close together at certain points.

Mr. Crosland reviews the origins of many of the planks in Socialist theory and finds most of them out of date. He is almost as hard on the Socialist doctrine of the twenties and thirties as are the writers advocating liberalism. And the Liberals are almost as generous on the nationalization of industry and on the present programs of social services as is Mr. Crosland, the Socialist and former Labourite Member of Parliament. This may be because none of the writers sees a way to set back the clock of time; all try to go forward from where they are, and all try to save traditional freedoms as well as the welfare society.

This reviewer finds the strongest and most informative essays in Watson's book to be those by Peter Wiles on "Property and Equality," by Alan T. Peacock on "Welfare in the Liberal State," by Graham Hutton on "The Dynamics of Progress," by Nancy Seear on "Relations in Industry," and the essay on "Monopoly" by Neville Ward-Perkins. A few ideas may indicate the trend of their liberalism.

"Property is now as little a determinant of class differences as is religion" says Mr. Wiles (p. 89). He writes also that "nationalisation of industry can have advantages" (p. 105). "The re-definition of the Liberal attitudes to the social services requires no modification of the general aims laid down by the earlier Liberal philosophers" writes Peacock (p. 116). And Graham Hutton expresses traditional liberalism when he says: "Humility about the infinite variety of human individual's talents and potentiality, not the arrogance that wants to clap all individuals under the same treatment, underlies the Liberal's approach to society" (p. 175). He goes on

to list the planks of his program: equality of opportunity, reform of the abuse of inherited wealth, rewards in terms of proven skills and responsibilities, careers open to the talents, eradication of vested economic interests that stifle initiative and competition, and due safeguards by the state for the pains and penalties of transition, mobility, and flexibility demanded by a dynamic society (p. 175).

Mr. Crosland's aims for socialism are "personal freedom, social contentment and justice" (p. 116). He goes on to spell out in detail a program for education that would be of high "public" school quality and open to all qualified students alike, as well as a program for the care of the sick and needy. He proposes the abolition of the subsidies now in existence, proposing to equalize wealth mainly by income taxes, taxes on profits, and a capital gains tax. He sees no reason why publicly owned industry and private industry cannot exist side by side, and he urges that there be no discrimination between them by the government. He is like a Liberal in hoping that there can be as little regulation of men's individual lives by government and by labor organizations as possible, saying that personal freedom and leisure are indispensable.

Mr. Crosland admits that his only reason for being a Socialist is that he finds more kindred spirits in that camp than among the Conservatives. He thinks it necessary, however, for socialism to take on a positive rather than a protest character if it is to have any future.

If Mr. Crosland should re-enter the House of Commons, his political weakness might lie in his very moderation; but as far as the student is concerned, his scholarly and objective approach is a boon. His volume is far more than a pamphlet for party consumption. It is a critical analysis of Socialist-Labour objectives and program since 1945; and these are presented in the light of experiences in other Western countries and with a prescription for continuing usefulness.

W. HENRY COOKE

Professor of History, Emeritus
Claremont Graduate School
Claremont, Calif.

JUDITH N. SHKLAR. *After Utopia: The Decline of Political Faith*. Pp. x, 309. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. \$5.00.

Judith N. Shklar emerges in this book as a penetrating critic of a considerable body of the thought of recent times. *After Utopia* demonstrates a remarkable ability to search for the significant in the political thought she believes most significant, and in those philosophic and religious attitudes important for political thought. The doctoral thesis upon which this book is based received the Birkhead Prize of the American Political Science Association. The author now teaches in the field of political theory at Harvard University.

Mrs. Shklar examines both the gradual decline of rational political optimism since the Enlightenment and the growth of romantic and Christian social despair, which she sees as "the clearest expression of the contemporary mood." Instead of beliefs in rationalism, progress, and the ability of men to control and improve their lot and their environment—which she holds to be the essence of radicalism—the author finds in their place today a prevalence of cultural fatalism. The result of all this, she holds, is the disappearance of political philosophy in recent years. We no longer have a political philosophy, and we are no longer capable of producing one. Heir to this fatalism, she believes our age able only to resurrect a reasoned skepticism from the ruins.

The modern age, buffeted by devastating wars, totalitarianism, the destruction of simple beliefs in God, and with a technology made up of a new mass of robots, has produced new varieties of romanticism and Christian social despair, with survivals of weakened philosophies in other movements. The author surveys attitudes which range from aestheticism and the politics of the unpolitical to Existentialism, "the abolition of man," the Conservative fear of planning ("Plan and Perish"), Liberalism without self-confidence, and Socialism which is neither radical nor hopeful. Across the pages of this book are strung Rousseau, Hegel, Kant, Shelley, Goethe, Nietzsche, Maistre, Kierkegaard, Ortega, Sartre, Hayek, Donosa Cortés, and Maritain, to mention only some.

The author displays wide learning and often unmasking the grave deficiencies of the purveyors of gloom. Their failure to examine historic or political realities often discredits their theories. The implicit faith in political values, also found in modern times, escapes, by a similar token, the ken of Mrs. Shklar.

DALE PONTIUS

Associate Professor of Political Science
Roosevelt University

KARL HEINZ PFEFFER. *Handwörterbuch der Politik*. Pp. 275. Darmstadt: C. W. Leske Verlag, 1956. DM 9.80.

German scholarship has always excelled in the compilation of encyclopedias. Indeed, this ability has become proverbial. Where the Frenchman might dash off a spirited essay on the love life of the elephant, the German professor writes an exhaustive *Handbuch*—an encyclopedic endeavor which will be absolutely definitive until another German scholar overhauls it and produces an even more comprehensive opus. German academic workers have returned to this long-established tradition of giving us works of exemplary conciseness and objectivity. Some of them are also up to date and engagingly written.

A model of this kind of work is the book under review. The entries are pithy—obviously written by an intelligent person—and the net is thrown wide. It draws in, quite rightly, articles on the Vatican and on other religious bodies of the world. With contemporary Islam re-emerging as one of the great political forces to be reckoned with, this is a wise inclusion. Cultural matters, too, in this era of total cold war, are taken into account. Thus, the dictionary provides thought or information on political geography, "human" questions—race, nationality, population—government, international affairs, and economic and spiritual problems.

A notable feature of the book is the fact that it was obviously written by one man. The doling out of subjects to a large number of usually ill-paid writers leads to a patchwork of styles and methods of treatment in which some contributors lean heavily on the history of the subjects while others neglect entirely the past,

which is most irritating and contrary to the whole spirit of a survey. Since the *Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences*—according to many the most important single undertaking in our field—will not be revised in the near future, as was hoped a little time ago when the Ford Foundation was seriously considering its commissioning, political scientists will require just such a brief, unified, and topical encyclopedia as this German *Handwörterbuch* to supplement the older, bulkier, and more unequal tomes which, in the truest sense of the word, are the essential tools of the student of politics. Nothing quite as congenial exists in English and an American publisher might consider a translation. It would fit well in the bookcase at our elbow.

LEO SILBERMAN

Visiting Professor
Center of Economic Development
and Cultural Change
University of Chicago

COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE. Chaired by Arthur N. Holcombe. *Strengthening the United Nations*. Pp. xii, 276. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$3.00 text ed.

"The United Nations was designed for an age that is rapidly passing away. . . Nations must look more to reason than to tradition for their guide. . . There is no rational alternative to strengthening the United Nations."

This group work, chaired by Arthur N. Holcombe for the Commission—the research affiliate of the American Association for the United Nations—is a sane, significant, and comprehensive application of reason. This tenth report, as well as the twelve reports of the special study committees, merits close study and wide diffusion both here and abroad.

Eighty-seven eminent experts—all Americans, I believe—have worked on and signed the report, including the twenty-four recommendations, in a remarkable display of agreement. Properly, some parts of the study are directed especially at the United States. (In view of the recent national attention received by "group reports," one almost wonders about the creative area left to the individual thinker and scholar. In

this instance, to extend the "authority" further, one might speculate on the end result and universal impact if all nationalities had been involved in the work.)

It is impossible to summarize all of the recommendations which are supported by cogent studies. The report is comprehensive and up to date. For example: "We believe that the United Nations should undertake the responsibility of administering certain contested areas of international importance for water or air transport, and certain uninhabited areas like Antarctica, at the request or with the consent of states having claim to such territories. With respect to the bed of the high seas beyond the continental shelf and to *outer space* (my italics), which are outside the jurisdiction of any state, we urge the General Assembly to declare the title of the international community and to establish appropriate administrative arrangements" (pp. 6, 40-41, and 208-23). About the only thing missed is the control of weather—presumably a likely threat to peace!

Interestingly, the largest amount of dissent is registered on Chapter 10, "The General Assembly," largely on the grounds that a disproportionate amount of attention is given to a supposed necessity to "reform" the voting procedures of the General Assembly.

Apart from the devoted good sense and insights of the participants, perhaps one clue to the soundness of this volume is revealed in an introductory sentence (p. 12): "We do not place our faith in the mechanism of a balance-of-power system, but we insist upon the fundamental significance of power, as we have done consistently from the beginning of our existence as a Commission."

I would venture to guess that the greatest weakness of this enterprise is that plans and support are not sufficient to rapidly diffuse the volume throughout the world and in the necessary translations.

RICHARD H. HEINDEL

Vice-Chancellor and Professor of
History and Government
University of Buffalo

C. DALE FULLER. *Training of Specialists in International Relations*. (Studies in

Universities and World Affairs.) Pp. xv, 136. Washington: American Council on Education, 1957. \$3.00.

It should by now be axiomatic—although unhappily it is not—that the gap between man's knowledge and understanding of the physical world, on the one hand, and his advances in the social world, on the other, is so great that practitioners in the two fields might well be operating on widely separated planets. Whether social man still has the time and imagination to catch up before physical man destroys him is open to debate.

Nowhere is this disastrous lag more evident than in the field of international relations. For if men are still doing a rather disreputable job of living together within groups and communities, their behavior collectively as nations is something less than civilized. This situation might be tolerable—as it has been in the past—were it not for the fact that the major nations now possess the capability on very short notice of mutual elimination—a factor of consequence in anyone's account book; and there is little reason to question that the same instruments will be in the hands of most nations within the predictable future.

This excellent study by Dr. Fuller suggests, at least by implication, how far the field of international relations still has to go before it has the effectiveness of the traditional disciplines. He begins with a definition of what international relations is and what it is not, describes the specialist, then outlines some of the main existing courses of study, points out strengths and weaknesses of the programs, and concludes with a few recommendations for improvement.

It is typical of the situation that the technique for the study of international relations—the interdepartmental committee which was devised a generation ago—is increasingly being abandoned. This technique was conceived to meet the broad needs of the specialist for some competence in a variety of areas, since the factors which go into the relations between states most un-co-operatively refuse to lend themselves to any one discipline.

The reluctance of traditional disciplines to accept international relations as a mem-

ber of the family comes partly from the understandable tendency of any specialist to consider that his world is half of Isfahan, and partly from a fear of competition. The fact is—as anyone with experience in international relations recognizes—that the demands on practitioners in the modern world are such that only with broad knowledge in many fields can we hope to provide ourselves with the necessary skills in the incredible range of topics which influence the relations between states. The variety of specialists in any well-staffed embassy alone should be suggestive. One might almost borrow a wisecrack and say that in this field, at least, the twentieth century trend toward specialization—of having to know more and more about less and less until one knows everything about nothing—must be pointed in the direction of knowing less and less about more and more until one knows nothing about everything.

It is worth noting in passing that of those questioned by Dr. Fuller, teachers of international relations found their training less satisfactory than did other specialists in the field.

JOHN F. MELBY

Executive Vice President
National Council on Asian Affairs
Philadelphia, Pa.

AMERICAN HISTORY

ARTHUR P. DUDDEN (Ed.). *Woodrow Wilson and the World of Today*. Pp. x, 96. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957. \$2.75.

ARTHUR S. LINK. *Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at His Major Foreign Policies*. (The Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History, 1956.) Pp. xii, 165. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957. \$4.00.

Woodrow Wilson, grim and inflexible in spite of being exhausted by illness and beaten in battle with the Senate, determined to play for the "verdict of history" rather than for the approval of his own passion-swept generation.

These two volumes, appearing more than

three decades after the Senate had, in Wilson's view, "cut the heart out of the Covenant" and rejected what he felt was basic and sound in the Paris Peace Settlement, are scholarly contributions to that final "verdict of history" from which the American President expected ultimate vindication.

Wilson's thoughts and actions in politics were rooted in certain religious and ethical beliefs and values associated with the Christian tradition, and particularly with his Presbyterian theological background. From these he derived those principles and arrived at those assumptions concerning the nature and ends of government, including the special role of the United States in the development of mankind, for which he was to battle during his political career. And if at times he tended to "oversimplify the vast complexities of international politics," it is also true to say that "while hatreds and passions threatened to wreck western civilization, he held high the traditions of humanity and the ideal of justice, and by so doing he helped to salvage them for a future generation" (Link, pp. 17, 18).

As early as the Spanish-American War, Wilson conceived a greater and ever larger role for the United States in world politics than it had played heretofore; and for the President he envisaged "greatly increased power and opportunity for constructive statesmanship" (quoted from *Congressional Government* by Link, p. 8). An "extreme activist," his policies during World War I and his position at the Peace Congress were in accord with these convictions which he held tenaciously, implemented audaciously, and defended with courage and determination to the end.

Wilson's initial response to the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 was that of a pacifist and leader of a people desiring to remain neutral. As the war with its savagery and injuries to the rights and interests of the United States and other neutrals progressed he sought, by appeals to the belligerents, to have it conducted under the rules of international law and terminated at the first opportunity by a just peace. After the United States itself became a belligerent as a result of German submarine policy, the President took the lead in developing a constructive program designed to organize

the world against future wars. And during the Peace Congress which followed the war he worked, not wholly successfully, for an equitable peace and for a League of Nations designed to foster justice and equity and keep the world at peace.

Finally, faced by a Senate many of whose members were hostile to what he conceived to be essential to a peaceful world, and who were unwilling to endorse his conception of the leadership of the United States in a League of Nations for collective security, Wilson refused to compromise; he "spurned the role of statesman for what he must have thought was the nobler role of prophet" (Link, p. 155). In the meantime, World War II came, as Wilson foresaw it would, and another league of nations under American leadership was born. "It is Wilson, the prophet, who survives in history" (Link, p. 156).

FRANK M. RUSSELL

Professor of Political Science, Emeritus
University of California
Berkeley

SILAS BENT MCKINLEY. *Woodrow Wilson: A Biography*. Pp. 284. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$4.50.

During the three years, 1955-57, the Woodrow Wilson Foundation assisted in the publication of four books on Wilson; ten others were published with its approval; eight journals issued special commemorative numbers; and ninety-seven articles were published in a number of other periodicals. Scores of films, brochures, and reprints were also made available, and hundreds of speeches on Wilson were delivered. Many universities held special programs, and all of the media of communication—films, radio, and television—made contributions to the celebration of the Woodrow Wilson Centennial.

McKinley's volume is one of the independent efforts to pay tribute to the great President. The author is an admirer of Wilson and yet makes it plain that he is not blind to Wilson's "faults," such as "excessive partisanship, obstinacy, and self-assurance," and "extreme stubbornness." I have a feeling that he would not accept the judgment of those who acclaim Woodrow Wilson as one of the greatest Presidents.

On the other hand, he does not find it necessary even to mention such snide remarks about Woodrow Wilson as the writer, Edmund Wilson, found it necessary to quote, along with his own dubious compliments, about his illustrious namesake. The first eight chapters are conventional in treatment. McKinley describes Wilson's heritage, early life, education, and the establishment of his career as college professor and university president; this is done in a manner calculated to give as little offense as possible to a generation nurtured on the biographical essays of the nineteenth century. This kind of writing, based on the biological and psychological assumptions of the 1880's, is more reassuring than the clumsy efforts of some modern historians and biographers who employ psychoanalytical techniques, which they have imperfectly mastered, to materials which are inadequate. But it is somewhat dull.

This reviewer found the account of the struggle between Wilson, on the one hand, and Andrew F. West and the soap millionaire, William Cooper Procter, on the other, superior to most of the previous accounts of this epic contest. But he is not satisfied with McKinley's explanation of the failure of Wilson's plan for effective organization of higher education. One might say, in McKinley's defense, that the significance of the setback to Wilson's program cannot be covered in a single short chapter.

The book does not provide an explanation of Wilson's extraordinary achievement in capturing control of the Democratic party in New Jersey, winning the gubernatorial election, and two years later winning the nomination and election to the Presidency of the United States. Again, it must be said that no one else has convincingly accounted for Wilson's rise to the highest office of the land during a political career of only two years. There have been fairly reliable expositions of the success of another university president in attaining the same high goal without any previous political career, but this case is not quite comparable.

If the reader wishes to understand the development of Wilson's political philosophy, he would be well advised to turn to

Walter Lippmann's Introduction to the recent reprint of Wilson's *Congressional Government*. And, if he wants the story of Wilson's theory and practice of legislative leadership and administration, he should consult Louis Brownlow's article in the *Public Administration Review* and Arthur MacMahon's article in the *American Political Science Review*.

A definitive biography of Wilson will probably not be written until enough time has elapsed to dull the prejudices of those now living who thought that Wilson's actions were hostile to their own selfish interests or those of their class. One of the most intellectual, if not intelligent, of Presidents, Wilson still rouses the bitter emotions of those who distrust both idealism and rationality. McKinley's book, sedate, unpretentious, and fair, will help to keep alive, at least among the younger generations, a devotion to the traditions of intelligence, responsibility, and concern for the welfare of mankind which were so firmly established by the early leaders of the Republic, and which are so necessary today if the United States is to meet the challenge of destiny.

ROY V. PEEL

Professor of Political Science
University of Utah

FESTUS P. SUMMERS (Ed.). *The Cabinet Diary of William L. Wilson, 1896-1897*. Pp. xxvii, 276. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957. \$5.00.

William L. Wilson was a college professor, a Congressman from West Virginia for the twelve years, 1883-95, and Postmaster General for the last two years of Cleveland's second administration. He ended his career as president of Washington and Lee University. His name became nationally known as the Democratic low-tariff champion in the House during the debates over the Wilson-Gorman Tariff, and he was frequently mentioned as the possible presidential nominee of the aberrant Gold Democrats in 1896.

This daily diary starts on January 1, 1896, nine months after Wilson assumed his Cabinet position, and continues until he left official Washington in March 1897. As the only diary that has so far turned

up from Cleveland's Cabinet for this period, it is quite disappointing. Again and again of the biweekly Cabinet meetings the author comments that "nothing of importance" was discussed. There is much here of official dinners attended and names of people met; but, with the exception of two short passages on Bryan and McKinley, there is little critical evaluation of the major figures of Washington political life. As little is said about the major political issues. Students of the post office and of patronage will find that Wilson was a remarkably reticent and cautious man, even in a diary which the editor states was not meant for publication. Perhaps the most valuable contribution which this personal record makes to the history of American politics is as a reflection of the mind of a conservative Cleveland Democrat. Despite the rise of the city, of nationally organized industry and labor, the onslaught of major industrial depression, and the long-enduring agricultural crisis, Wilson could still sincerely believe that progress "means not an increase but diminution of governmental restraints . . . and that our prosperity is to be sought and our highest destiny reached, more by individual efforts than by laws." In the context of these beliefs it is interesting to note that as a Cabinet officer he met the threat of a silver victory by converting what free personal funds he had into sterling until politics took "a more certain turn."

Professor Summers has done an adequate job of editing and has supplied a useful glossary of persons named in the text.

GEORGE E. MOWRY

Professor of History
University of California
Los Angeles

RICHARD S. WEST, JR. *Mr. Lincoln's Navy*. Pp. xiii, 328. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1957. \$6.50.

The rash of volumes on landfighting during the Civil War should not obscure the water-borne action in that conflict; some of it was extremely important. Professor West's earlier studies admirably qualify him for the service of directing attention to this fact.

In his day, Gideon Welles was berated as

petty and lethargic, but despite some shortcomings he emerges as the real hero of this work. It was he who recognized immediately that the task of Lincoln's navy would be threefold—blockading the Confederacy's coastline and seizing Hatteras and Port Royal for blockaders' bases; combining operations, particularly along Midwestern rivers, to support Union offensives; and hunting down Southern raiders on the high seas.

That these duties were less spectacular than those of the army in no way dwarfs their consequence; nor does the South's lack of a genuine navy really minimize the accomplishment. The Union possessed but forty-two ships at the war's commencement, and most of these were "genteel hulks," only four of which were in home ports. After preliminary hesitation and confusion, Welles (and his admirable Assistant Secretary, Gustavus Vasa Fox) had the Navy Department functioning with relative efficiency. Braving public opinion, he correctly adjudged the blockade to be the navy's most important function, and he built up the fleet toward that end. Only the threat of the *Merrimack* made the department do anything about ironclads, and not until the activities of Raphael Semmes were sizable forces detached to cope with Confederate cruisers. (Significantly, the navy did least well in handling this last problem.)

Essentially this is a survey of Union naval operations rather than the penetrating or detailed analysis one might have anticipated. It gives a fair picture of obstacles encountered and how they were surmounted. Interservice rivalry is indicated—especially in matters of supply—and the navy was not entirely blameless. With Grant and Sherman, however, teamwork was usually good, and the navy's support of army efforts on the Mississippi and its tributaries may have spelled the difference in such ventures as the all-important Vicksburg campaign. Certainly history has few parallels for Farragut's deep-sea fleet activities five hundred miles from salt water.

Welles ran his own department after demonstrating resistance to outside interference, but Lincoln evidenced considerable

concern over naval affairs. A number of vital decisions—in procurement, army-navy relations, and construction of the *Monitor*—were made by the President himself.

Notwithstanding several trivial errors—for example, some incorrect dates and ranks—this is a valuable work. Most annoying are the inadequate maps; they are neither sufficiently broad for the general reader nor detailed enough for the specialist. The volume itself, however, will interest both.

DONALD H. STEWART

Professor of History
State Teachers College
Cortland, N. Y.

LEO STOLLER. *After Walden: Thoreau's Changing Views on Economic Man*. Pp. 163. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957. \$4.00.

Although this is the expansion of a doctoral dissertation by an English professor, it was written under the direction of historians of economic thought. Its economics are of the broadest kind—economics defined as "the study of man making a living." Professor Stoller attempts to show how Thoreau compromised with the forces of the industrial revolution.

"Henry Thoreau is the man who lived alone in a hut by Walden Pond near Concord, Massachusetts and went to jail rather than pay taxes." He once wrote in 1857 that "everyone who deserves to be regarded as higher than the brute may be supposed to have an earnest purpose to accomplish which is the object of his existence . . . but the economy does not . . . allow a man to earn his living by an activity that furthers this object, hence he must divide his life between his true work and making a living."

To Thoreau, "the amusement of getting a living" was there "for diversion and relaxation" (p. 118). He lived his life along these lines—working at odd jobs, such as surveying in the morning and then writing or studying science in the afternoon. It puzzled him that men submitted to factory routine. Division of labor tended "to make all things venal" (p. 122). He could not reconcile industrialism "with the integral development of the whole person

which was essential to his doctrine of self-culture." He admired the expert craftsman and would not accept a highly organized society. He would not join reform organizations devoted to goals which he approved. His solution was that by "spontaneous parallel individual actions" people would refuse further to tolerate an evil such as slavery.

After the Walden experiment, Thoreau gave way on a few of his individualistic beliefs. As a surveyor of wood lots he would calculate the salable cords of wood in the morning and then write scientifically on deforestation in the afternoon. But he might also recognize later that the cleared fields were beautiful, the view of the mountains improved, and conclude that the change was not a bad one. He also visited some textile and iron factories and was impressed by the attention to detail required of each worker. Likewise he contradicted early attacks on the "devilish Iron Horse" by his remark in 1853 that "the steam-whistle at a distance sounds even like the hum of a bee in a flower. So man's works fall into nature."

Professor Stoller has written a brilliant analysis of Thoreau's beliefs and philosophies in the years after Walden. Nevertheless, his evidence is not convincing that Thoreau compromised appreciably with his earlier beliefs, except that he did not repeat the Walden experiment.

DONALD L. KEMMERER

Assistant Professor of Economics
University of Illinois

STEPHEN G. KURTZ. *The Presidency of John Adams: The Collapse of Federalism, 1795-1800*. Pp. 448. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957. \$8.50.

This is an excellent book, although it appears to this reviewer to possess a certain inner inconsistency of interpretation. Its merit arises in considerable part from its extraordinarily wide use of the letters and other private papers of a great number of political personages of the 1790's, ranging all the way from Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, William Giles, and Fisher Ames to the little-known John Beckley, "the resourceful and unscrupulous" Penn-

sylvania Republican boss and clerk of the national House of Representatives. The result is a remarkably clear portrayal of the details of partisan infighting from the ratification of the Jay Treaty to the Federalist party's defeat in 1800.

Out of this process a number of generalizations emerge, and not the least important of these is a disparagement of the traditional "liberal" historian's assumption that the Federalists were a party of monarchists and aristocrats as opposed to their Republican opponents. "Was Jefferson less an aristocrat than Washington . . . or Hamilton more . . . than Madison?" The author concedes that there were "some differences" in "matter of theory" between the two parties, but "in horses, slaves, clothing, and wines for the table there were no great differences"; quite evidently he thinks this similarity in externals more important than distinctions in political theory.

Thus the differences between emerging political parties become, to a considerable degree, matters of personalities and factionalism rather than deep-seated economic or sectional interests or social theory.

This treatment of parties as largely factional entities is quite at odds with the author's brilliant and careful exposition of the growing schism between the Adamsites and Hamiltonians between 1795 and 1800. Adams is the hero of this story; the author thinks his patriotism and political good sense in settling the quarrel with France "saved the nation from Hamiltonian militarism and prevented the outbreak of civil war." Hamilton, by contrast, is portrayed as his party's "bête noire," the leader of a "vindictive militaristic faction" which desired war with France in order to destroy the Republican opposition and which saw in the army of 1798 an instrument for potential civil war which would destroy the Jeffersonians and prepare the way for a centralized and aristocratic political order. This reviewer can only conclude that if this is what Hamilton stood for, then the distinction between Hamilton and his cohorts, on the one hand, and Adams and the Republicans, on the other, was no mere factional matter but a profound difference in social insight; and that the Federalist

party's demise was not the product, except in the most immediate sense, of the Hamiltonian factionalism—which the author portrays so well—but rather of certain long-range democratic tendencies in the American social order.

ALFRED H. KELLY

Chairman, Department of History
Wayne State University

FREDERICK B. TOLLES and E. GORDON ALDERFER (Eds.). *The Witness of William Penn*. Pp. xxx, 205. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. \$3.75.

Anyone who tries to evaluate William Penn as an historical, religious, or literary figure is faced with formidable difficulties. No one, I am sure, would be willing to take the position that he was one of the really outstanding figures in either British or Colonial affairs. Yet nobody's influence was more decisive in an important area of early American history or during the first, faltering evolution of our unique national ethos.

Penn, too, may hardly be counted one of the pioneer Friends. Neither in time nor in background did he qualify for such a distinction. By comparison with George Fox and his compeers, he may justly be called a Johnny-come-lately. He joined Quaker meeting under the tutelage of one who had first to be convinced by Fox. The humble origins of the early Quakers contrast strangely with Penn's aristocratic forbears. He grew up in a privileged group whose privileges he lost no opportunity to deride, yet this almost wholly accounts for the founding of Pennsylvania.

An acute selection from his principal writings forms the body of this book. These are suffused by a deadly earnestness, vast learning, and a deep sense of conviction. Yet in a time when England had outlived Elizabethan genius and sparkle and become the victim of turgid and artificial modes of writing, Penn was truly a creature of his age. Only occasionally, most often in *No Cross, No Crown*, does his fervor lift him above the trammels of style. Today most of his prose makes difficult reading, and one is moved by what he has to say almost despite the way he says it.

Let me illustrate. In one of his books,

speaking of God's infinite love, he has this to say: "For as it reached the conscience and broke the heart and brought many to a sense and search, so that which people had been vainly seeking without with much pains and cost they by this ministry found within where it was they wanted what they sought for, viz, the right way to peace with God." It takes a deep interest in the subject to surmount such an archaic, tortuous style.

The authors are to be commended for their illuminating Introduction, their informative little prefaces to their selections from Penn's various books, and the unobtrusive but helpful textual notes. They have aided greatly in making this rather shadowy personage a real and dynamic figure.

ALPHONSE B. MILLER

Associate Finance Secretary
American Friends Service Committee

WILCOMB E. WASHBURN. *The Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia*. Pp. xv, 248. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, 1957. \$5.00.

Historians of Bacon's Rebellion have called attention to social, economic, and political grievances said to have been suffered by Virginians in the 1660's and 1670's; and they have interpreted the rebellion as a protest against these conditions and against the administration of Governor Sir William Berkeley. Some writers have viewed the movement as premonitory of the American Revolution which occurred a century later.

Mr. Washburn dismisses these grievances as either nonexistent or as being grossly exaggerated, and he focuses attention on the Indian situation which, it has long been recognized, precipitated the rebellion led by young Nathaniel Bacon.

It is with reference to this last matter that the author makes some of his most striking observations. He says that it was "the frontiersmen's continuing violation of Governor Berkeley's efforts to settle the Indian-white relationship with fairness to both sides" which started the rebellion;

further, that "the aggressiveness of the frontiersmen" is the one cause of the rebellion "that has been consistently overlooked." It has been "overlooked," the author avers, partly because of "the white historian's unconscious immersion in his racial bias," and because he has written from what was regarded as a "liberal" point of view, a view whose "mythology" has made the American frontiersman a symbol of "America's freedom, democracy, and hatred of oppression." And as for the charges against Berkeley, these "are vague political smears" which historians have accepted "because their own prejudices and assumptions have inclined them to favor a colonial rebel against a representative of imperial Britain."

The author notes that his research on "the legal and moral justification for dispossessing the American Indians" led him into other investigations which eventuated in the present book. He also notes that he used some sources not previously utilized by historians and that these sources "confirmed" a belief he had already formed "that the accepted interpretation of Bacon's Rebellion was incorrect. . . ."

One finishes the reading of this book, which is the most elaborate apologia for Governor Berkeley that this reviewer has come across, with the feeling that it leaves largely unexplained the causes of a rebellion which implicated the vast majority of Virginians in 1676. It supplements, but by no means supersedes, older treatments of the subject, among which the one by Professor T. J. Wertenbaker is especially significant.

JENNINGS B. SANDERS

Specialist for Social Sciences
Division of Higher Education
U. S. Office of Education

JOHN S. GALBRAITH. *The Hudson's Bay Company as an Imperial Factor, 1821-1869*. Pp. viii, 500. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1957. \$6.75.

The theme of this book, explains the author, is the expansion, consolidation, and decline of the Hudson's Bay Company fur trade from the date of the absorption of the North West Company in 1821 to the

end of the chartered monopoly—vis-à-vis British subjects—in British North America in 1869; the book also deals with the political implications of this development. The Company's own stupendous archives, conserved in London and at last in our times open to historical research, constitute the principal source for history of the fur-trading expanse of empire north and west of the Canadian provinces on this continent prior to the establishment of the Dominion of Canada. Professor Galbraith's laborious study rests principally on a half-century of these records which have been bulwarked by investigation of official collections in the Public Archives of Canada and in the British Record Office, as well as a voluminous accumulation of printed sources and secondary material.

The author analyzes the techniques of the Company in stifling competition in the frontier ranges bordering on the Canadian provinces, the United States, and Russo-America, as well as in the diplomatically contested Pacific Northwest; this elimination of competition was looked upon as a necessity in order to keep inviolate the rich fur reserves of the Company's interior domains. In all these frontier zones it was a matter of bidding up the price of pelts, even at a temporary loss, and trapping out a border area—as, for example, the sterilization of the Snake River belt, first made known to us by Professor Frederick Merk's researches in the Company's archives—in order to discourage interloping Canadian free-trappers in the prairie West and the infiltration of rival American "mountain men" in the Far West. As for Russo-America, elimination of competition finally came to rest on a sensible agreement with the Russian-American Company; this agreement held good even during the Crimean War between their sovereigns in Europe.

During this half-century of private commercial competition, the Hudson's Bay Company did not receive much active support from the British government. Notable instances are the Oregon controversy with the United States and the domestic turbulence of the restive Canadians in the Red River Valley north of 49°.

"The proprietary Company performed an important function for Canada and the

British Empire" is the conservative conclusion of the author; "that it did so for motives of profit does not lessen the magnitude of its achievement."

Though not a literary monument, this volume is a notable contribution to Canadian and American history, including the diplomatic history of the Pacific Northwest.

The Company still lives on today—though without benefit of monopoly or special privilege—as one of Canada's greatest mercantile institutions.

The publisher disappoints the hopes of the *American Historical Review*, and the scholars' view in general, by putting the notes in the back of the book, requiring a sixth finger for systematic reference.

SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS

Professor of Diplomatic History
and Inter-American Relations
Yale University

ADOLPHE E. MEYER. *An Educational History of the American People*. (McGraw-Hill Series in Education.) Pp. xx, 444. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1957. \$6.00.

Textbooks in education, as well as in some other fields, are frequently said to be dull, drab, and dry. The compendious surveys that typically constitute textbooks in the history of education have been particularly susceptible to this charge. A few years ago Luella Cole's *History of Education* (in Europe) provided a refreshing exception. Now Adolphe Meyer has produced a history of education in the United States that is both colorful and scholarly. Numerous footnotes supplement the text, constitute a useful bibliography, and attest to the author's use of many primary sources. The author has avoided, for the most part, the temptation to which writers of textbooks in history often succumb—to produce a catalogic survey of names and events. Rather, Meyer has written a description—based upon incisive analysis—of the salient characteristics of America's schools and colleges through the various stages of their development.

The early part of this chronologically organized book includes extensive attention to social history germane to the learning of

the times. Essentially, however, the book is devoted to the historical development of formal education in the United States rather than to the more inclusive subject denoted in the carelessly worded title.

The author's expressive style is equalled by thoughtful identification of the main currents and eddies in the stream of American education. Pungently, forthrightly, and insightfully he identifies, by way of background, the renaissance prototype of secondary schools in western Europe and America during historically modern times. He correctly indicates little progress in schooling in most parts of the ante bellum South. For a brief treatment, his assessment of Dewey is scarcely surpassed, including specific evidence that Deweyism and Progressivism are related but not twins. If the author seems to assign to Dewey less influence than a sole architect of twentieth-century American education would have had, he is comparably impartial in evaluating Hutchins. The influence of Hutchins' philosophy is evident only at St. John's, "a speck in the vast ocean of American education—so tiny, in fact, that for the moment its presence therein is barely perceptible" (p. 269).

Some will regret a number of errors and misleading interpretations that a brief treatment of so broad a subject engenders. The author must intend to refer to the sixteenth century, rather than the fifteenth, as the time by which printing had aided massive reproduction of classical literature. The "vernacular school" had earlier roots than that of Protestantism, and in other ground. The term "schoolmen" is confusingly substituted for "scholastics." The size given for the average landholding in the seventeenth-century South is distinctly too great. The American Historical Association's Commission (not committee) on the Social Studies was chaired by A. C. Krey (rather than George Counts). It is the National Council for the Social Studies (not "of Social Sciences"). Fused courses in social studies have scarcely "become an established commonplace." The extent and level of requirements for teachers' certificates are higher than reported. The distinct trend among teachers colleges toward becoming liberal arts colleges is overlooked. Among

the more serious bibliographic omissions is Howard K. Beale's *A History of the Freedom of Teaching in American Schools*. The well-selected references in the "Bibliographic Note" which is appended to the text should be of value to students. But the three sections of pages which are cluttered with illustrations and widely separated from their explanatory captions add little of value to the book.

JONATHAN C. MCLENDON

Associate Professor of Education
Duke University

ELIZABETH FAULKNER BAKER. *Printers and Technology: A History of the International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union*. Pp. xviii, 545. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957. \$7.00.

This book relates the story of the International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union, one of the large groups in the graphic arts field. The author describes the work as a documentary history. The term is both validating and limiting; it is validating in that the book is drawn almost wholly from the journals and convention proceedings of the union, and limiting in that the documents were conditioned by the judgment of the recording secretaries and journal editors who made them. Because of the limitation, the first half had to be rescued from the dusty dullness of union routine by the author's rich experience in the labor field and by her clear style, sustained by faith in the value of the material. When George L. Berry arrives, in 1907 and at page 290, for his forty-year service as president, the tone of the book changes, and the story rides thereafter on the momentum of Berry's leadership.

The reader is told of the origin of the union within the International Telecommunications Union and how its drive for autonomy was sparked by resentment of the typographers, who assumed that their skill made them superior to pressmen. The union's program is described as it developed through depressions, wars, opposition by employers, and periods of prosperity. Its program emphasized peaceful arbitration in preference to strife, and it made pioneer provision for medical care, pen-

sions, and education for technical innovation. The reader becomes sufficiently acquainted with Berry so that he can understand the process by which the president, through long service, came to mingle his personal finances and those of the union to such an extent that a severe muddle—defined as something less ugly than larceny—had to be untangled after his death. Changes in machine design and in graphic arts processes are understandingly observed from inside the union where they created organizational and jurisdictional problems.

However, several other important matters—wage patterns and comparisons, the effect on pressmen of the Norris-La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act, the National Recovery Administration, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Taft-Hartley Act—will have to be sought outside Dr. Baker's volume; the documents with which she worked evidently did not deal with them, except to note a growth in membership from 36,800 in 1935 to 103,527 in 1956.

J. EDWARD GERALD

Professor of Journalism
University of Minnesota

SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

RAYMOND FIRTH (Ed.). *Man and Culture: An Evaluation of the Work of Bronislaw Malinowski*. Pp. viii, 292. New York: Humanities Press, 1957. \$6.00.

The contributors to this volume were selected as "a representative set of Malinowski's former students and colleagues who came under his influence in London." And, as the editor states, "the essays are not eulogies but evaluations." This is what gives the book authority and distinction. It is a model of its kind. Each chapter deals with some particular facet of Malinowski's work; there is detailed documentation in every case, and, since in the fifteen years which have elapsed since his untimely death British social anthropologists have been remarkably active, Malinowski's historic role emerges with great clarity in both its strength and weakness.

The editor contributes the introductory chapter on "Malinowski as Scientist and

as Man" as well as one on his work in economic anthropology. Audrey I. Richards discusses her concept of culture, and Ralph Piddington his theory of needs. Talcott Parsons, the only American contributor (who attended Malinowski's lectures in 1924), deals with the relation of his work to the development of the theory of social systems. The epistemological background to Malinowski's empiricism is discussed by E. R. Leach, his field work methods by Phyllis Kaberry, the topic of language by J. R. Firth, law by I. Schapera, kinship by Meyer Fortes, magic and religion by S. F. Nadel, and social change and anthropology as public service by Lucy Mair and H. Ian Hogbin respectively.

Besides offering a fully documented picture of the vital force which Malinowski was, this book reflects the radical changes which occurred in the thinking of British social anthropologists after Malinowski left England in 1938; this is particularly so with reference to the influence of the late Radcliffe-Brown who, in earlier days, was often grouped with Malinowski as a "functionalist."

Although many of the contributors may be numbered among the earliest of Malinowski's students, they cannot all be labeled disciples; yet his influence was profound. For as Meyer Fortes observes, Malinowski viewed himself "as the leader of a revolutionary movement in anthropology," and his personality was such that "he could not shake off the compulsion to present his theories and his ethnographic discoveries in the form of an assault on the *ancien régime*." However this may have warped his work, Fortes says, "he was basically right." It is indeed difficult to conceive what the course of British social anthropology might have been without him.

A. IRVING HALLOWELL

Professor of Anthropology
University of Pennsylvania

MICHAEL YOUNG and PETER WILLMOTT.
Family and Kinship in East London.
Report of the Institute of Community
Studies. Pp. xix, 232. Glencoe, Ill.:
Free Press, 1957. \$5.00.

Over the last generation, but most spectacularly since 1945, the London County

Council has been building large housing estates on the outskirts of London. These are designed to provide healthy accommodations in up-to-date houses for working-class parents of young children and to remove these families from slum-clearance areas or boroughs where a great deal of the older housing had been destroyed by air attack. Dr. Michael Young and his associates in the Institute of Community Studies—an independent research group—originally planned to study the adjustment made to these surroundings in "Greenleigh," one of the housing estates. As a basis for his findings he took both a sample of some fifty married couples with at least two children under fifteen who had been moved from the East End working-class area of Bethnal Green and a second group of similar size and composition who were still resident in Bethnal Green. The results of this research form an illuminating portion of the book under review, but not the section of major interest. In studying the small married sample of Bethnal Green, Dr. Young was so struck by the role of the extended kin group in the lives of these families that he made an extensive study of the kinship patterns of this poor London borough, having a formal interview conducted on the subject with every thirty-sixth person on the current electoral role; this was a sample of just under a thousand adults from the total population of 54,000. The result is one of the best documented and most illuminating studies of the role of kinship in contemporary working-class society which has been made to date, and one which carries important implications for government policy in rehousing.

The predominant pattern in Bethnal Green is the "mother-centred" three generation family; the mother, her married daughters, and their children form a close-knit interacting group; they exchange a very wide variety of mutual services and usually all live in very close proximity. Typically, the mother secures accommodation for her daughter when the daughter marries, and the husband moves, both physically and socially, from his family of birth to that of his wife. Traditionally, the Bethnal Green husband played rela-

tively little role in the home beyond providing some housekeeping money and begetting the generally numerous children; most of his money and leisure were spent either in sports or at one of the numerous pubs with his mates. In the current generation, the spread of contraceptive knowledge and perhaps the influence of mass communications have given the father a more significant role in the smaller household. This, however, has not altered the dominant role of the maternal grandmother. Nanna—the term which is also typically used by upper-class children for a loved children's nurse—remains the focal source of wisdom, succor, and help for her daughters and grandchildren; loneliness and the recurrent crises of sickness or confinement are obviated by Nanna. Although the physical surroundings are frequently repulsive and well below the minimum contemporary standards of hygiene, the life, as Dr. Young portrays it, is warm and cosy, jolly and emotionally secure.

Everything is reversed with the move to "Greenleigh." The physical surroundings are of a high standard of hygiene and comfort, but the emotional life is barren and desperately lonely for the mothers of young children. With so much reliance on kinsfolk, people from Bethnal Green do not easily make friends out of neighbors; help and advice are not available, or at least are not obtained; and were it not for television, many of these women would not hear a human sound from the time of the husband's early departure for his long journey to his place of work until the children's return from school. The housing authorities pay no heed to ties of kinship in allocating houses to those most in need; and those parents who stay in the desolate comfort of the housing estate—quite a number return—are making a very major sacrifice for their children's sake. In Dr. Young's words, life on such a rehousing estate changes the Bethnal Greeners from "people centred" to "house centred"; or, in Dr. Riesman's phrase, they move from "tradition-directed" to "other-directed." Dr. Young documents the great importance attached to the competitive possession of goods in the housing estates—and in older middle-class residential suburbs—compared

with their relative unimportance in the tradition-ridden slum. Since this shift offends his implicit scale of values, Dr. Young advocates strongly the reconditioning of the slums so that the locally concentrated kinship networks would not be dispersed into the present two-generation communities. He would have at least as much stress put on warmth as on welfare. This is a question of policy which, as far as I know, no government of long industrialized and highly urbanized countries has to date tried to take into serious consideration.

GEOFFREY GORER

Sussex, England

JOSÉ ORTEGA Y GASSET. *Man and People*.
Translated by Willard R. Trask. Pp.
272. New York: W. W. Norton & Com-
pany, 1957. \$4.50.

For once, those who insist that we get important European productions without delay are in the right; for Willard Trask's excellent translation of *El hombre y la gente* appears simultaneously with the original. Whether this means that we are fully aware of Ortega's importance is another question, since for us he is primarily a man of one book.

Though *Man and People* is sociological, it is philosophical rather than empirical, personal more than impersonal. It is a plea for curing the confusion and crudeness of which the author accuses all current sociology and for refining our basic concepts, especially the concept of society.

Such refinement is not for its own sake; it is emphatically for the sake of action, for the salvation of a society about which our author is profoundly worried. As a balanced man, Ortega hopes, on the one hand, to do justice to the clear and straight thinking of the Greeks, and the necessity of withdrawal into meditation; equally he hopes to satisfy the action-mindedness of the American, perpetually harassed by his environment and pitifully unable to detach himself from it. For him, action must be governed by a previous contemplation, but it is equally true that "we think in order that we may succeed in surviving." We must find the clear ideas by which we have some chance of living.

When he criticizes sociologists for not

having done this, Ortega mentions only Comte, Spencer, Durkheim, Bergson, and Weber. For the American reader, it will help to think of him as being in the tradition of Mead and Cooley, whom he never mentions.

Even the great, whom Ortega admires, do not proceed to lay the foundations of sociology in the only defensible way; this way begins with the patent, radical reality of one's own life. The solitude of it—which threatens to become the cliché of the intellectuals—impresses Ortega. His first step toward society is the "Other Man," the "Other Woman." When one acts, the other can be expected to respond; one can even influence his response. The likeness of this build-up to "the social," to Weber's *soziale Handlung*, is at no point alluded to, although Weber is thrice mentioned with the highest respect. By looking at the overlapping worlds of human beings, we may catch in their content glimpses of "the social" and of society, and we may learn why "the other" may reasonably be expected to respond in certain ways.

Society is responsible for the conventional, even the false, in conduct; this results in withdrawal into the solitude of oneself for the truth of being. Philosophy humanizes; the social at least runs the risk of dehumanizing, which is the hated thing for Ortega and always was. Coexistence and reciprocity are the matrix for social relations, but what goes into those relations is dictated from without. Something from without can render the other man (at least before he is you-ified into a unique person) less a stranger, less a danger, by requiring a technique of approaches that Ortega analyzes under the heading, "the salutation."

Society, then, forbids and commands, tells us what is done, how it is to be done, and so socializes. "Who forces us? . . . It is usage." Ortega argues unconvincingly that this formulation is quite unlike that of Durkheim, whom he criticizes for mysticism. Statistics of frequency do not make usage, but rather the threat of a penalty, or lack of satisfaction, from society. Ambivalently, the author sees the need for such socialization, but at the same time he sneers at the meaninglessness, even

the loss of former meaning, in most conventional behavior; this last, he feels, is mechanized, dehumanized, soulless. What we are to think of its source, *people*, as contrasted with *man*, is now quite apparent. The task of philosophy, then, is to criticize the conventional life, and by implication the most violent power by which it is enforced, the State.

The American reader is likely to find that Ortega considerably overestimates his own originality and underestimates the work and the thought-work which has been done by sociology.

W. REX CRAWFORD

Professor of Sociology
University of Pennsylvania

EDMUND DE S. BRUNNER. *The Growth of a Science: A Half-Century of Rural Sociological Research in the United States*. Pp. x, 171. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$3.00.

With farm people now constituting only 12 per cent of our population, and with a 10 per cent drop in the farm population in 1956 alone, the acceleration of long-standing trends has reached the point where American rural life is crossing the threshold to a new pattern. The appearance of a compact review of rural sociological research by a leading figure in the field is, therefore, especially welcome at this time, when many of its practitioners are or should be reviewing past accomplishments and seeking new directions. It will also provide people in other fields with a well-stated description of the field and its accomplishments.

The development of rural sociological research is divided into four periods: (1) the early period in which rural sociology became established in a few colleges and universities and in the Department of Agriculture as the Division of Farm Population and Rural Life; (2) the period from 1924 to the depression when the Purnell Act provided the financial base for the gradual expansion of rural sociology in the land-grant colleges; (3) the depression period in which unprecedented sums were made available for research related to the problems of rural life in that period; and (4) the period since the end of World War II.

Except for an introductory chapter on the pre-Purnell period, however, the book is organized topically rather than chronologically. The topics to which the author devotes a chapter each and into which rural sociological research has been divided are: "Community Studies," "Population," "Social Institutions," "Social Organization," "Sociological Aspects of Economic Problems," and "Regionalism, Suburbanism, Trends and Values." Representative research in each of these areas is briefly described, together with some of the generalizations which have emerged. The general tone of the presentation is descriptive rather than critical or evaluative. There is, however, a consistent attempt to deal with theoretical and methodological issues, especially in the concluding chapter, "Retrospect and Prospect."

One might wish that Brunner had enlarged the scope of his work to make it the sociology as well as the history of a science. In particular, the state agricultural experimental stations of the land-grant colleges now provide the administrative structure and financial support for the vast majority of research in rural sociology. The intellectual and administrative environment provided by this setting is an important determinant in the research undertaken. An analysis of the functioning of rural sociology within the agricultural experimental station system would assist in a reappraisal of the field and also would be a valuable contribution to the sociology of science.

MURRAY A. STRAUS

Assistant Professor of Rural Sociology
University of Wisconsin

GLANVILLE WILLIAMS. *The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law*. Pp. xi, 350, xi. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957. \$5.00.

The problem of this book is: to what extent ought human life, actual or potential, to be protected under the criminal law of English-speaking people?

It is an extraordinarily interesting book, with very detailed presentation of all facts and possible controversial issues. For the reviewer—a Dane—it was a great surprise to become acquainted with religious prob-

lems, practically never raised in Scandinavian discussions, and with a series of legal hurdles, also unknown here and not yet overcome in Anglo-Saxon law. The problems in themselves are many-sided. The presentation seems to be perfect, based on a very wide knowledge of the juridical as well as the medical fields; at the same time an elaborate use is made of the moral and religious literature. The style is clear and precise. Since in many instances the problems are handled very differently in Denmark, it seems appropriate for the reviewer to state some of the practical differences. This must be done briefly and very incompletely. The legal situation is very nearly the same in the other Scandinavian countries.

The protection of human life is necessary. Murder could not be permitted. Yet there are forms of murder—suicide, infanticide, abortion—which give rise to "special legal, moral, religious, and social problems." These and related problems are treated very extensively in this book; examples here include legal attitudes toward sterilization, artificial insemination, and the very prickly one of euthanasia. Concerning this last it might be asked to what extent can the law effectively and to what extent should it properly penalize one who, perhaps from motives of humanity, kills another with his consent?

In Denmark the lack of any difference between the legal and the medical definition of live birth—such a distinction is made in England—gives rise to misunderstanding when dealing with infanticide. The Danish court will usually accept the medical statement given by the state pathologist; and as a rule this is endorsed by the Medical-Forensic Council, a body of experienced physicians whose duty it is, because of their position, to give superior advice to the courts and authorities. The mothers who commit infanticide are usually found at the time of the deed to have been psychotic or in a state equivalent to psychosis. Especially if the patient is in need of further psychiatric treatment in a hospital, the prosecutor may refrain from further action. The court can, if the mother is found at the time of the deed to have been irresponsible due to a psy-

chotic state or mental deficiency, place her under a guardianship. The "normal" mother may obtain a prison sentence of up to four years—usually much less (one to one and a half years).

Sterilization is an important preventive tool. It can be performed on medical, medico-social, or eugenic grounds. The same good results as quoted for Sweden (p. 77) are obtained in Denmark. Many mentally defective persons can, after sterilization, manage a normal life, marry, and run a little home of their own, whereas this would be impossible for them if they had children to bring up. Especially in cases of mental defectives and immature and very primitive personalities it would be impossible to rely upon other methods for control of conception.

After careful study of the necessity and possibility for legal regulation of artificial insemination, no law was passed in Denmark. And as for abortion, few doctors would want to do without the liberalized legislation which we now have in Denmark concerning it. The possibility of abortion is one of the most important factors bringing the pregnant mother to the Mothers Aid clinics where every form of help can be discussed and initiated.

In Denmark suicide is not considered a crime, and we do not need help from the courts in the treatment of suicidal patients. Assisting in suicide may, however, be punished with a fine or a short, light imprisonment.

Euthanasia is prohibited by law, and opinions are as divided as in the English-speaking world. It is doubtful if a change of law is needed. If any change should be proposed, the liberty for individuals—patients and doctors—as stressed by Williams is very important. To make it lawful for a physician whose patient is seriously ill (p. 345) to give enough drugs in order to stop pains, with the risk of habituation or addiction, and to refrain from taking steps to prolong the patient's life by medical means "in good faith with the consent of the patient and for the purpose of saving him from severe pain in an illness believed to be of an incurable and fatal character," or to "accelerate the death," has, outside England, not yet been considered a legal

proposal. No reports are published as to when or to what degree such practice—in spite of official disapproval—is carried out. Neither can such figures be found in Williams' book.

G. K. STÜRUP

Medical Superintendent
Institution for Criminal Psychopaths
Herstedvester, Denmark

NATHAN GLAZER. *American Judaism*. (Chicago History of American Civilization Series.) Pp. xi, 175. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. \$3.50.

This study sets out to analyze the past and the present of American Judaism and to peer into what may be its future. Every earnest reader will welcome the thoughtful and searching analysis which this book presents, even though he may debate not a few of its observations and findings. Its generalizations inevitably tend to strain perspective, and, where hues are shades of grey rather than sharp black or white, the drawing of epigrammatic contrasts becomes difficult indeed.

The author reviews 300 years of historical development of Jewish life in this country. He feels that in general religion is not easily at home in our modern world. Yet despite losses, the Jewish "ethnic group" has maintained itself in the United States. Until recent days this continuity was assured largely by immigration; now, with this cut down to a minimum, the problem which American Jewry faces is how to maintain and transmit itself almost entirely from its own resources.

The Jewish way of life stresses ritual, customs, and a distinctive way of living. It is clear that without Judaism, the Jew cannot survive. In expressing and organizing this Judaism, the number of synagogues in America—whether Orthodox, Conservative, Reconstructionist, or Reform—has consistently grown. In his examination of the weaknesses of each of these groups, the author makes the interesting observation that "orthodoxy serves in American Judaism the function of a 'saving remnant' that supplies the fund of Jewish knowledge on which all the rest draw."

He finds that the influence of the present-day move to the suburbs has been to-

ward integrating Jews into their community. How far this tendency is in response to a religious, social, or communal need is a question to which as yet no absolute answer can be given. But it is unquestioned that the present generation of Jews in America has seen a retreat from early twentieth-century secular Jewishness, most marked in some Jewish labor circles, and that American Jewry is now showing a new interest in Judaism.

D. DE SOLA POOL

Rabbi, Congregation Shearith Israel
New York City

GLENN H. BEYER and J. HUGH ROSE. *Farm Housing*. (Census Monograph Series.) Pp. xi, 194. New York: John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall for the Social Science Research Council in co-operation with the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1957. \$6.00.

This well-focused analysis of farm housing in the United States is more than a convenient compendium of facts; its aim is to throw light on significant relationships and changes. The major sources used are the 1940 and 1950 censuses of population and housing, and the 1940, 1945, and 1950 censuses of agriculture. The qualitative characteristics of farmhouses are described against the background of such factors as geographic location, economic class of farm, family characteristics, tenure status, race, income, and sources of income. Chapters are devoted to the impact of urban centers on farm housing and to the housing of nonwhite farm families. There are forecasts for the future of farm housing and suggestions for needed research.

The quality of farm housing is measured by the physical condition of the structure—its age, size, equipment, and facilities. In the aggregate, it compares unfavorably with urban housing, but it has improved from 1940 to 1950—a period when the number of farm dwellings decreased by 17 per cent. Quality correlates directly with family income and is higher among owner-occupants than among tenants. While the number of farm dwellings has been decreasing, construction of new houses has continued at a

fairly high rate. But new construction has had surprisingly little effect toward improving the quality of farm housing.

The regional comparison of farm housing, based on twelve areas of the United States, each with its own particular type of farming, shows that qualitative differences are substantial. However, such differences appear to be primarily related to income levels. Further geographical analysis demonstrates the substantial differences in housing characteristics within each of the regions.

The impact of urban centers on farm housing was measured by a correlation between qualitative differences and increasing distance from the city. The results of this analysis are not conclusive, but, with respect to certain factors, correlation with distance appears to be high. The authors identify the following as economic factors which explain differences: off-farm employment opportunities, marketing advantages, and land values. The social factors are: desire to acquire greater house comforts, urban social values, and migration from urban to suburban areas.

The 12 per cent of farm housing occupied by nonwhites is shown to be lower in quality than farm housing in general. The suggested explanations are low income, a high proportion of tenancy, a remote location, and high mobility. There was some improvement in quality between 1940 and 1950, and the authors predict a continuation of this trend.

The authors of this monograph are admirably qualified for their task, and they have produced an authoritative and useful treatise.

RICHARD U. RATCLIFF

Professor of Land Economics
University of Wisconsin

MILTON GREENBLATT, DANIEL J. LEVINSON, and RICHARD H. WILLIAMS (Eds.). *The Patient and the Mental Hospital: Contributions of Research in the Science of Social Behavior*. Pp. xviii, 658. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. \$6.00.

Mental hospitals have grown enormously in size, and many house from 5,000 to 10,000 patients, or even more. Their complex bureaucratic structure sometimes in-

terferes with the attainment of treatment goals. Team members who avowedly aim to pool their skills for the benefit of patients often work at cross-purposes, with the patient as battleground. *The Patient and the Mental Hospital* presents, in the form of a book of readings, research and thinking relevant to this emerging area of study. The writers first presented these papers in 1955 at the Research Conference on Social and Environmental Aspects of Patient Care in Mental Hospitals held under National Institute of Mental Health sponsorship; however the editors have had to do a good deal of work to organize the material.

The book presents ample evidence that treatment of the mentally ill in many hospitals has been more symbolic than real. Morton Kramer points out, for example, that the following patient-personnel ratios existed at the end of 1951 in full-time state hospitals for the prolonged care of psychiatric patients: one physician (psychiatrist or other) for every 250 patients; one graduate nurse for every 109 patients; one attendant or psychiatric aid for every eight patients; one social worker for every 549 patients; and one psychologist for every 1,299 patients.

Facts never speak for themselves, for they do not tell us about the quality and professional competence of these employees. But it is obviously logistically impossible to provide intensive personal treatment for patients with complicated mental problems with such small ratios of professional personnel to patients. The frustrations of this realization are somewhat ameliorated by the evidence presented in this book that much can be done, even with these limited resources, to strengthen the helping functions of hospitals through administrative measures. Patients' care can be supported by conscious planning of the hospital milieu.

JOSEPH W. EATON

Lecturer, School of Social Welfare
University of California
Los Angeles

WILL FRENCH and associates. *Behavioral Goals of General Education in High*

School. Pp. 247. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1957. \$4.00.

The year 1918 represented a landmark in secondary education in this country. Educators and laymen have been working at secondary education ever since—arguing about it and criticizing and defending it as it has moved toward the more effective realization of the purposes clearly spelled out for it forty years ago.

General education leaves to special education those levels and kinds of competence that lie outside the common ones which are attainable, at least at a minimum level, by all youth. General education maintains as its task the meeting of the common needs of youth for competence as persons and as citizens. The present report is based on the conviction that a high school should make as direct an approach to the development of behavioral competence in its general education program as it now uses in its program of specialized education. It defends convincingly, by the weight of well-selected authorities and by logic, the thesis that the purposes of general education will be more surely realized as we translate these purposes explicitly into the kinds and levels of behavioral competence we want to help our youth to achieve. A first step toward the realization of these goals may be the spelling out in some detail of the desired behavioral outcomes of general education: (1) administrative and supervisory groups will be given a concrete basis on which to develop—along with teachers, lay groups, and students—co-operative efforts for improving the high school's general education program; (2) interested lay groups will be able to study much more intelligently and helpfully the program provided by the school to promote behavioral competence; (3) individual teachers will find many worthwhile uses for the spelling out of general purposes in terms of desired behavioral outcomes; (4) guidance and testing activities will find new and more effective ways for improving their work; and (5) other educational agencies and organizations—such as state Departments of Education and institutions that prepare teachers—will be able to use the detailed but organized descriptions of

desired growth outcomes in innumerable ways.

Most of the report (pp. 85–213) is given over to a description of the three large purposes of general education—growth toward self-realization, growth in ability to maintain desirable small group relationships, and growth in ability to maintain the relationships imposed by membership in large organizations; these purposes are discussed in terms of desired behavioral outcomes, and they are further described by a wealth of illustrative behaviors.

The study was made under the joint sponsorship of the Russell Sage Foundation, the National Association of Secondary School Principals, and the Educational Testing Service, with planning assistance from the United States Office of Education, the American Association of School Administrators, and the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development. The line-up of distinguished people who worked on the Planning and Editorial Committee, the Committee of Consultants, the Committee of Advisers, and the Committee of Reviewers sounds like an all-star team. As a result of all of this representation, co-operation, and hard work, the report can be said to represent for the first time a consensus of the expectations which citizens and educators hold for the American high school.

ESTHER LLOYD-JONES

Head, Department of Guidance and
Student Personnel Administration
Teachers College, Columbia University

LINDLEY J. STILES (Ed.). *The Teacher's Role in American Society*. (Fourteenth Yearbook of the John Dewey Society.) Pp. xxi, 298. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$4.00.

The First Yearbook of the John Dewey Society, published in 1937, dealt with *The Teacher and Society*. Now, twenty years later, the Society once more examines the role of the teacher in America.

Attention is given first to the situation regarding the teacher in present-day society. The social origins of teachers are examined in the light of somewhat limited but significant data. The relationships between the social backgrounds of teachers

and their attitudes toward and understandings of administrators, colleagues, parents, and children are presented. The wide diversity of teaching situations—from the rural area or small village to the slum school of the metropolis—is related to the apparently increasing diversity of the social backgrounds of teachers.

These conditions result in conflicts and problems for the teacher and the society. A few of these critical problems are examined. Among them are: the conflicting role-expectations of the teacher, the problem of whether the teacher shall be a conservator of the past or a leader for change, and the opportunity and responsibility of the teacher as a citizen and participant in political life.

The teacher's job is considered in relation to the complex changes occurring in society. Note is taken of the impact on the work of the teacher by such factors as: the changing family, the changing moral values, the mass media of communication, and power politics. The dangers of self-censorship and the differences in outside pressure groups are recognized.

Finally, the question of why people become teachers is explored, and some analysis is offered relative to the problem of a society which prizes education and depends heavily upon it and yet faces a serious shortage of competent, qualified teachers.

This volume does not offer a solution to the diverse problems involving the teacher and the society. It does, however, present a large body of data related to these problems and through careful analysis points out many directions which need to be explored. It is a genuine contribution to the citizen who has an interest in educational problems. It offers a broad base for understanding the changing function of the teacher in an age of change, and it should help any serious reader avoid the widespread present-day tendency to find simple answers for exceedingly complex educational problems. Its importance is plain to one who realizes that in a significant degree the old truism, "as is the teacher, so is the school," holds even in a society which talks mathematics and science but by its behavior reveals at least an equal need for social science.

The work is the result of the efforts of a considerable number of students on various phases of the problem. Considering the fact that it is a yearbook developed and written by a number of people, it is remarkably well woven into a cohesive whole.

THEODORE L. RELLER

Professor of Education
University of California
Berkeley

DON SHOEMAKER (Ed.). *With All Deliberate Speed: Segregation-Desegregation in Southern Schools*. Pp. 239. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$3.50.

With All Deliberate Speed is a report on educational desegregation in the southern states in mid-1957. The book consists of eleven essays; nine of these were written by staff members of the Southern Education Reporting Service and its paper, *Southern School News*. Mr. Shoemaker, who edited the book, is Executive Director of the Southern Education Reporting Service. The first essay, "Law of the Land" by Professor Robert A. Leflar of the University of Arkansas School of Law, is a summary of the legal status of desegregation. "The South's Own Civil War" by Weldon James sets out the differences over segregation which exist even among white men in the deep South. "Communities in Strife" by Wallace Westfeldt is a roundup of episodes of violence. "Along the Border" by Robert Lasch surveys the situation in Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas. "City Limits" by Edgar L. Jones treats of urbanization. "The Deep South" by W. D. Workman, Jr. discusses the impact of the segregation cases on Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia—Virginia apparently being thus classified because of its determined opposition rather than because of its geographical location. "Segregation and Politics" by Bert Collier is described by its title. "Be It Enacted" by Patrick E. McCauley is an account of state legislation—at least 136 new measures—adopted in various southern states to attempt to oppose desegregation.

"Nation's Showcase?" by Jeanne Rogers tells of the District of Columbia. "Halls of Ivy—Southern Exposure" by Joseph B. Parham tells of colleges and universities. The eleventh essay, "Man in No Man's Land" by Glen Robinson, Assistant Director of Research, National Education Association, describes the situation of the school administrator. Mr. Shoemaker begins and ends the book with brief pieces.

The source material of *With All Deliberate Speed* is principally the *Southern School News* to which the reader must, in general, look for documentation. *Race Relations Law Reporter* is a necessary periodical reference for more precise information about legislation and litigation. The book necessarily omits the most recent developments; the violence and military intervention in Little Rock occurred entirely after the book went to press, as did passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957.

The attitude of the authors is detached; they have made an evident effort to be factual rather than polemic. They write brightly; some a bit hastily. There is inevitable duplication in the essays. The book is a piece of journalism—so intended—and well serves the purpose of informing the general reader.

ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND

Professor of Law
Harvard University

ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN and CLARENCE CLYDE FERGUSON, JR. *Desegregation and the Law: The Meaning and Effect of the School Segregation Cases*. Pp. xiv, 333. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957. \$5.00.

The authors—Blaustein, Associate Professor, and Ferguson, Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers University Law School—have achieved their purpose of writing a scholarly book—marred by a few lapses into the style of *Time*—for the intelligent layman. Bitter passions of Congressman John Bell Williams of Mississippi, who coined the term "Black Monday," of Senator Eastland, of former Justice Byrnes, and of others do not justify the accusation that the Supreme Court decisions were motivated by the large Negro vote in New York, Chicago, or Detroit. The brief of

the United States as *amicus curiae* stated: "It is in the context of the present world struggle between freedom and tyranny that the problem of racial discrimination must be viewed" (p. 12). Courts do make laws, but not out of whole cloth. The authors agree with Justice Douglas that in constitutional laws "*stare decisis* must give way before the dynamic component of history" (p. 24). Although the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment was inconclusive with respect to segregation in the public schools, "nothing was said or done by the framers to preclude necessary Supreme Court adaptation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the normal course of constitutional litigation" (pp. 72–73).

While the five decisions were "class actions," authorized by the provisions of Rule 23 (a) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, other Negro plaintiffs must bring legal action against other school authorities in order to obtain similar relief. "In this situation, of course, the law of the case would be inapplicable; there would be no direct Supreme Court order to the lower tribunals. In subsequent cases, the courts would be bound by the indirect, precedent effect of *Brown v. Board of Education*" (p. 185). Affirmative action has been taken by courts in Arkansas, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Louisiana have actively engaged in legal delaying action. But the Supreme Court decision in the Montgomery, Alabama case of *Gayle v. Browder* made a "constitutional nullity" of the "separate but equal" doctrine (p. 209).

The Supreme Court has extended the effect of *Brown v. Board of Education* to the field of higher education, and the use of public athletic facilities; decisions in Missouri and Michigan have extended its effect to public housing. "With all deliberate speed," which originated in Justice Holmes' decision in *Virginia v. West Virginia*, requires an express statement by the federal district courts as to the actual basis for their decision. The large cities of the South will lead the way to total desegregation. The Table of Authorities and the

Table of Cases will be of inestimable value to future writers and to students of the meaning and effect of the historic decisions of May 17, 1954 and May 31, 1955.

RAYFORD W. LOGAN

Professor of History
Howard University

CHRIS ARGYRIS. *Personality and Organization: The Conflict Between System and the Individual*. Pp. xiii, 291. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$4.00.

This book is essentially a restatement and development of that theory which sees the root of our industrial problems in the incongruity between human personality and formal industrial organization.

Human personality is conceived of as striving eternally for "self-actualization," that is, for the fulfillment of needs, the attainment of goals, and the expression of certain abilities. All of these are of great variety, though finally limited by biological nature and cultural conditioning. Personality is a dynamic structure; it changes as the individual matures—generally by becoming less shallow, more independent, more varied, oriented to more distant goals, and more self-aware. If frustrated in its search for self-actualization, the personality is beset by anxiety, conflict, and frustration, and seeks for protection in various "defense mechanisms" such as aggression, compensation, rationalization, and so forth.

The formal organization also seeks to actualize itself. But, at least in industry, it can do so only by inhibiting the self-actualization of the personality, especially that of the worker, and, in fact, causing it to regress to infantile patterns. This is because the specialization, chain of command, unity of direction, and strict control which industry demands permit the worker or other subordinate only minimal control over the working world and demand instead passivity, dependence, and subordination; they shorten the time perspective of the subordinate and permit him to use only a few shallow abilities. Attempts of management to remedy this situation, whether by tightening up controls, offering "dynamic" leadership, or by use of "human relations" techniques, only worsen the

situation—"compounds the felony" as the author says.

The industrial subordinate may react to this situation in one of several ways, none of them particularly congruent with formal organizational aims or with the aims of those who manage the organization. To mention just a few of the more important reactions, the subordinate may form informal groups or join trade unions. He may "goldbrick" on the job, on the one hand, or concentrate so wholeheartedly on pecuniary rewards, on the other, as to lose every trace of interest in his job or loyalty to the organization.

The major weakness of such an approach to industry and its problems is that it does not take account of the environment in which industry functions. The author explicitly recognizes this. However, the book does throw new light on *internal* sources of industrial conflict; it also brings new insight to such areas as the executive role, the nature of pecuniary motivation, human relations programs, informal groups, and so on. Considering the scope of empirical studies which the author has examined, and his interesting attempt to synthesize these studies within the framework of one consistent body of theory, the book should prove of considerable interest to behavioral scientists, as well as to the executives, personnel men, and technicians to whom the book is primarily addressed.

EUGENE V. SCHNEIDER

Associate Professor of Sociology
Bryn Mawr College

ALVIN ZANDER, ARTHUR R. COHEN, and EZRA STOTLAND with the collaboration of BERNARD HYMOVITCH and OTTO RIEDL. *Role Relations in the Mental Health Profession*. Pp. vii, 211. Ann Arbor: Research Center for Group Dynamics, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1957. No price.

"This report is the result of a study of intergroup attitudes and behavior among the members of three professional groups, and of the conditions which appear to determine these feelings. The reasons for making this investigation were both practical and theoretical. The practical interest arose out of our awareness that social

welfare and medical agencies, among others, have found it efficient to use staff teams composed of persons from various occupations in order to conduct their professional work. The fact, however, that the team members often belong to different professions means that they bring different points of view to their joint enterprise. The problem, then, was to describe the nature of the feelings and difficulties that a cross-disciplinary group needs to face if it is to maintain itself as a team. The theoretical concern had its origin in the widely accepted notion that a person's role determines the quality of his relations with those in other roles. There is little understanding of the dynamics of this process. We have tried to develop an approach to an explanation for it."

This quote is from the Preface of the book, and it adequately explains the scope and goals of the study. The work was sponsored by the Research Center for Group Dynamics of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan and conducted by members of its staff.

The professional groups studied were psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers; these are professions which have long worked together in various mental health institutes throughout the country. Approximately 160 from each of these professions were questioned concerning their attitudes and feelings toward themselves and their own profession as well as toward the allied professions and their members. The interviewers asked prepared questions, and those interviewed were asked to reply on a seven-point rating scale.

The conclusions are detailed in the body of the book at considerable length, and a summary could only do injustice to the findings. Briefly, for example, they found that persons of high status whose rank is threatened from below react by perceiving subordinates as hindering personal relations; they will then react by trying to keep the lower-level roles at a subordinate status. If, however, they are assured and certain in their relations with subordinates, they will perceive these subordinates as supportive, will stimulate co-operative effort between roles, and will encourage professional growth of subordinates.

Similar conclusions are drawn on the interrole behavior of subordinates toward superiors in the hierarchical relationship; on the interrole behavior of a subordinate person toward those who are in a role at the same level; and on the behavior of a person in a hierarchical relationship toward occupants of his own role.

Most important, perhaps, is the final section of the book dealing with maintaining comfortable role relations. The authors point out that certain conditions, as, for example, personal gratification, acceptance of the importance of the different professions by one another, agreement by the group on common goals, and so forth, can minimize the insecurity brought about in interdisciplinary groups. But where these conditions are not met, their results suggest that such simple mechanisms as providing more frequent contacts or increasing one another's knowledge of what each profession values and does will not be sufficient. In these latter cases, they point out that cross-disciplinary investigations must explore the causes of the insecurity, the means by which the relevant groups may be helped to provide mutual security, as well as the most important causes and methods of resistance to these means. The self-esteem of the various members of the group would appear to be the really crucial factor in determining the security or insecurity of the individuals; needless to add, the factors in determining this individual self-esteem stem not only from the profession to which the individual belongs, and the status of this profession, but also to many and varied unconscious factors which make up the character and personality of the person.

This book is an excellent basic study in a field which has many important implications and ramifications. Better understanding of these problems would be most helpful, not only in situations similar to the hierarchical arrangement of the mental health clinic, but also in groups in which the hierarchical arrangement is present, but not so clearly—for example, cross-disciplinary research groups. Better understanding would also be useful in the more formalized hierarchies—for example, worker-employee relations in industry. More re-

search is certainly indicated, and unconscious factors must be considered and understood to better determine the importance of the consciously known and stated attitudes and feelings.

RICHARD LONSDORF

Instructor in Psychiatry
School of Medicine
University of Pennsylvania

ECONOMICS

GUNNAR MYRDAL. *An International Economy: Problems and Prospects*. Pp. xi, 381. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. \$6.50.

The picture drawn is of a world decidedly more disintegrated today than in 1913; at that time, international transactions and migrations were effective, but the existing model of civilization excluded the majority of mankind from direct or substantial benefits. Dr. Myrdal finds, as does Professor Viner, that the economic ends of nationalist political and trading groups have defeated international economic organization in a world in which real per capita income is "perhaps" lower than in 1900; this is because the most productive nations are a decreasing proportion of the world's population. The author is sufficiently uneasy about this to invite students of international affairs to ponder over Dr. Singer's conclusion that on the international scene it is partly true that high standards of living for minorities coexist with deterioration and impoverishment—and this is not inconsistent with Marxist analysis.

Myrdal asserts that a different international economic order is imperative because the submerged part of the world's population is more than two-thirds of the whole; and because of greater awareness of their condition, but also because the state of political dependence imposed on many of them by colonization had submerged them more than Europeans had ever known, this majority has ceased to be passive in its relations with the rest.

National economic integration is seen as firmly established and growing stronger; so much so that it seems that integration

through international organization would be unrealistic and fruitless. As an outstanding example of national integration, Sweden is quoted as having continued its industrial progress during the depression of the thirties and having subsequently achieved the abolition of abject poverty and serious unemployment; Sweden has also provided minimum protection for every citizen against all major economic risks. This has enhanced the faith of the Swedes in their national economic structure and made them less responsive to international integration, which from their point of view might impair the functions of the former.

Dr. Myrdal emphasizes that economic life is much more regulated in industrial societies than is commonly admitted, and he impressively reminds us that free-market conditions are being increasingly changed by governments and social groups. This is due to the fact that in both the United States and Europe the large individual producers opposed free markets, and, consequently, government and consumers' organizations have effectively exercised countervailing power.

He proceeds to state, without qualification, that all industrially advanced countries are rapidly becoming "welfare states," and he brings in an argument by Dr. Humayan Kabir to support this. In Dr. Kabir's analysis, the welfare state exists as a consequence of recognition of the individual's dignity. But for this the state would not change normal functions in the society to give him inalienable rights. Therefore, it is the concept of democracy which gives birth to the welfare state. The typical welfare state is governed by a Labor or Socialist party, and since labor leaders are more narrowly nationalistic than are conservative leaders, the internationalistic spirit of the labor movement has not been preserved.

We should expect to find, then, that countries become less susceptible to international integration as the characteristics of the welfare state are increasingly adopted.

Regulation of imports and control of exchange—as political expedients that national parties have been goaded by influential producers to use—are more appreciable as causes or evidence of negative

attitudes to international integration. It is easy to understand that national autarchy is thus promoted. But it seems equally clear that there are important differences of degree in the lengths to which countries could go in the use of such restraints.

For the foregoing reasons Dr. Myrdal concludes that national economic policy structures should be internationalized and the values they represent be preserved, instead of making, at present, any further effort at international integration. The form and manner of this alternative internationalization are not immediate problems. Myrdal's initial purpose would be served if, as a step toward this, major international economic problems such as agricultural protection, support of industries, and stable production and markets were approached as economic areas capable of international solidarity.

Dr. Myrdal hopes that out of this solidarity would come a more equitable distribution among industrialized countries of the cost of economic aid to underdeveloped countries—up to 3 billion dollars per annum.

Thus the book is based on hope, and possibly faith; perhaps too largely on these, and with a great deal of enthusiasm. If it is true that the more pronounced the welfare state or socialistic traits of a state the more negative are prevailing attitudes to international integration, we should expect a predominant national will in the United States for international integration; because here free enterprise is the prevailing ideology. But the will does not exist.

The crucial point in the book is whether pragmatic pressures for benefit will cease or whether they will be substantially reduced in the quest for internationalization of economic policy structures? This question is unanswerable.

WILLIAM E. GORDON

Lecturer in Economics
Marquette University

THOMAS C. COCHRAN. *The American Business System: A Historical Perspective, 1900-1955*. (Library of Congress Series in American Civilization.) Pp. viii, 227. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. \$4.75.

Professor Cochran has traced the history of our nation's business forms and actions during the first half of the twentieth century and related these to the cultural complex constituting the American way of life. The treatment is in major part descriptive rather than interpretive. Indeed, to this reviewer, his lucid descriptions of events are more acceptable than occasional efforts to interpret what these events really mean. The book presents little new material, and, though well-documented, references are to secondary sources which are readily available in any reasonably well-stocked library. But the discussion is logically developed, well written, absorbing, and rewarding to lay readers who have lived through these stirring events and would like to review them in proper relationship to one another.

The author's aim is to contribute to better understanding and thus "improve future prospects of economic stability, democracy and human welfare."

His approach is to focus attention successively upon the following: developments in the institutional structure reflecting shifts in relative importance of small, medium-sized and large-scale enterprises; the vicissitudes of alternating depression and prosperity which marked the uncertain course of enterprise during this period in which a truly industrial society has emerged; the ups and downs in public esteem accorded business and businessmen, sometimes in unaccountable ways; how the present corporate structure has, layer by layer, come to be, as entrepreneurs, bankers, technicians, politicians who are bent upon regulation, and managerial professionals, gradually evolving a science of administration, have left their imprints.

To cover so broad a field in 200 pages places rigid limitations upon events and developments to be emphasized. This reviewer would like to have seen, even at the risk of more pages, less resort to well-worn commentaries and more room for relatively unexplored phenomena, possibly of greater influence in setting the "wave of the future" in our business system.

The reader is spared customary commiserations concerning the fate of small business and, indeed, is reminded that, in numbers at least, small businesses have

very well held their own in a society which less objective commentators like to insist is completely dominated by large and ruthless corporate interests. But more attention might well have been given to the integrating force in technical organization, possibly dating from wartime experience—an integrating force not necessarily contrived through interlocking ownership but possibly through more binding contractual relations between small supply sources and large purchasers of end-product components.

Monopolistic tendencies of capitalists in relation to waning confidence in the theory of self-regulation are dissected with discrimination, but nowhere are these placed in proper perspective with the monolithic growth and policy of labor organizations.

The new role of the salaried executive and the incentives which presumably motivate this professional elite and color business decisions receive attention; there is, however, no adequate notice of probable long-run effects upon personalized capital formation and individualized risk-taking of a steeply graduated tax structure in a profit-oriented system.

The dispersion of corporate ownership with assumed relaxation of pressure by stockholders upon this hired management is emphasized, but how rapid concentration of corporate ownership in institutionalized trusteeships, or the power of the proxy in the hands of an aggressive and sometimes unscrupulous minority interest, can readily place this professional management in jeopardy would possibly have been of more timely interest.

Most of these relatively unexplored facets of the business system bear upon the ideal which the author seems to long for of "achieving a democratic system of operation within the company—with policy formation on a participative basis."

His final conclusion, somewhat ruefully arrived at—or so it seems to this reviewer—with respect to the American business system at mid-century is that "there are few democratic procedures in business by which opinion from below can effectively influence actions of those on top." This truth, if it is true of practical workings of the system, often seems as valid in political as in business entities—in all large

organizations, in fact, where human relations tend by force of circumstances to lose their personal touch. But organizational experience, nevertheless, seems to prove, if it proves anything, that even in the largest and most impersonal sorts of institutions, whether business, state, military, or church, responsible leadership, however selected, cannot with impunity encroach too far upon informal authority coming from beneath any more than upon formal authority coming from above.

W. N. MITCHELL

Partner, A. T. Kearney & Company
Management Consultants
Chicago

W. M. SCAMMELL. *International Monetary Policy*. Pp. xiv, 402. London: Macmillan & Company; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957. \$9.00.

Mr. W. M. Scammell, who is Lecturer in Economics at the University College of North Wales, provides us with a detailed assessment of "the worth and the record" of the multilateral payments system under the control of the International Monetary Fund—set up at Bretton Woods in 1944—and the alternative experiments in international monetary co-operation which grew from the efforts of the Western European nations to bring order into their monetary affairs since the financial crisis of 1947.

In his highly critical analysis of "the effort to build an equilibrium system" at Bretton Woods, Scammell blames "the miserable record of the IMF" for the failure of such a system to develop. "While the IMF has made useful peripheral contributions to world payments, its inability to provide the elements of a real adjustment mechanism has prevented its moving to the central position in the world economy for which it was intended." As a consequence, two methods of monetary reconstruction were created: "one carefully and methodically planned, preparing the blueprint of a multilateral, control-free payments system to be established once the adjustments of the postwar period had been completed; the other growing naturally and progressively, from the efforts of individual nations or groups of nations to

solve problems as they came, produced a pattern of effort into which order and sense of purpose later came, and which produced the outline of the present world economy." This economy groups the countries of the world into great regional clearing areas—the Organization for European Economic Co-operation countries of Western Europe, the sterling area, and the dollar area. But the European Payments Union, organized by the OEEC countries in 1950, has already established a bridge with the sterling area "in the common membership by Britain of both groups, [which] served to create freedom of payments within and between these two groups."

Scammell apparently feels that this development "holds promise of further broadening to the ultimate goal of convertible currencies and multilateral payments." But this can only be achieved "as the warping influence of the dollar shortage on world payments lessens." And Scammell is optimistic regarding the solution of "the dollar problem." While he disagrees with the economists who have argued that "the dollar problem was solely one of postwar adjustment," he believes that "the intense postwar phase of the dollar problem ended in the early 'fifties and that we are now faced with the structural problem of dollar shortage upon which the problems of war and its aftermath were for a time superimposed." However, the recent world apprehension concerning the re-emergence of a serious "dollar gap," caused by a substantial surplus in the United States balance of payments and by the loss of gold by the nondollar world to the United States for the first time since 1952, makes questionable his suggestion that it would be possible to cope with the structural dollar problem.

Mr. Scammell's book makes a notable contribution to the literature on postwar monetary problems. University teachers and students, as well as international bankers and economists who are actively concerned with problems of international finance, will welcome this sober and critical study.

ARTHUR LEON HORNIKER

Washington, D. C.

GEORGE KATONA with the collaboration of ALBERT LAUTERBACH and STANLEY STEINKAMP. *Business Looks at Banks: A Study of Business Behavior*. Pp. vi, 184. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1957. \$5.00.

This study avowedly covers the attitudes of only big and medium-sized business firms. Small businesses are excluded because "their impact on economic or financial developments in the country is much smaller than their number would indicate" (p. 9). The greatest good for the greatest number, it would seem, must give way to the greatest profits for the most powerful interests, a theory recently given vast publicity by the remarks of Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson.

The gathering of data for the essay was done by a corps of specially trained interviewers proceeding by methods which would do credit to the best and most approved questionnaires of the colleges of education. The results show almost invariably that big business has a more favorable attitude toward banking practices, and especially toward the greater banks, than has medium-sized business; this could mean, among other things, that big banks favor their own kind. What would the findings have been if small business also had been consulted? It is noticeable, furthermore, that no names appear, even of the largest firms, and some of these have been known to fight valiantly against bank control or influence. Was the Ford Company or the late Robert R. Young consulted? If so, when? It would seem that the study would carry more weight if a full or even representative list of firms consulted had been appended. It would not be necessary to violate any confidences by stating individual attitudes.

It was not the purpose of Dr. Katona to place his findings in a historical setting, but a final judgment of their validity can come only after this is done. There is a suggestion (p. 23) that traditional ties played a significant part in the choice of banks employed. But much more must be known in order to reveal whether current attitudes are rational or only the result of hidebound tradition.

If economics, as it has been defined by

certain doubting Thomases, is a system of justification for business activity as it exists, then studies such as this should do much to further the doctrine. In 1942 the same author published *War Without Inflation* which was more amenable to the carping definition than it was prophetic in nature. Better luck this time!

FRED A. SHANNON

Professor of History
University of Illinois

VERNON A. MUND. *The Right to Buy—And Its Denial to Small Business*. A Report Prepared for the Select Committee on Small Business, United States Senate. (85th Congress, 1st Session, Document No. 32.) Pp. viii, 118. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1957. 35 cents.

This study, although published as a report of the Select Committee on Small Business, is the product of independent investigation and analysis by Vernon A. Mund. In it Dr. Mund deals with the refusal by dominant firms in some industries to sell their product(s) to one or more prospective buyers.

Professor Mund points out that "refusal to sell as a business practice means action by a commercial seller . . . in refusing to sell . . . goods to some buyers, offering to meet the terms of sale, at the time that sales are being made in the same market to other buyers."

As Professor Mund shows, in competitive markets "refusal to sell" is seldom if ever encountered. Moreover, on those rare occasions when it does occur, the spurned buyer can readily purchase identical or similar goods from another seller. "Refusal to sell" becomes a problem only where the seller dominates his industry and controls a substantial portion of available supplies.

In evaluating the right of a commercial seller to refuse to sell his product(s), two basic and apparently antagonistic principles must be considered. On the one hand, the seller has an unqualified property right in his product. On the other hand, businessmen have a right to follow freely occupations of their own choosing without being restrained from doing so by other business-

men. The former principle furnished the basis for the decision in the Colgate case (250 U. S. 300 [1919]) in which the Court ruled that a commercial seller may freely determine to whom he will or will not sell his product. But the latter principle, Professor Mund claims, is fundamental in a competitive society. Moreover, the conflict between the two principles, he believes, is apparent rather than real.

The right to "refuse to sell," Mund contends, merely means that a seller may refuse to sell to any buyer who refuses to pay the asking price. When a commercial seller refuses to sell to one or more prospective buyers willing to pay the asking price, he is discriminating unfairly among competing prospective buyers. Refusal to sell under these circumstances constitutes restraint of trade and violates our antitrust laws. In support of his point of view Mund refers to common law decisions in the English courts as far back as the fifteenth century. The Colgate decision, he argues, is not in accord with the English common law on which American antitrust policy is founded and is actually inconsistent with our antitrust laws. "The ruling in the Colgate case," Mund writes, "stands as a judicial error of serious magnitude" and should be overruled.

Clearly written and cogently argued, *The Right to Buy—And Its Denial to Small Business* can be read by expert and layman alike with profit and interest. A pioneer work in a highly controversial field, it may well have a lasting influence on our antitrust policy.

LEO FISHMAN

Professor of Economics and Finance
West Virginia University

JOHN F. DUE. *Sales Taxation*. Pp. xi, 396. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957. \$5.75.

This is probably the most comprehensive and thorough study of sales taxes which has appeared in recent years. It is not restricted to the United States; in fact only two of the eighteen chapters deal exclusively with conditions in this country. One of these discusses state taxes while the other is concerned with municipal levies,

especially the local "supplementary" taxes as used in California and Michigan.

The first three chapters consider the nature of sales taxes, the effects of such taxes on the distribution of real income, and the rationale of sales taxation. These chapters, especially the latter, might well be required reading for all students of taxation. Two final chapters are devoted to questions of sales tax structure. Here the relative advantages and disadvantages of the various types are reviewed and evaluated. The standards used in making the evaluation are: distribution of burden, economic neutrality, and administration. Attention is also given to the always troublesome problems of taxing services and producers' goods and of exempting food and other necessities. The possibilities of granting personal exemptions in lieu of food exemptions and of introducing a degree of progression by differentiating rates are discussed briefly.

The intervening thirteen chapters are devoted to the development and operation of the various types of taxes in various areas. Three chapters deal with multiple-stage taxes in Germany, Austria, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, and Belgium. One chapter treats the value-added tax in France, with a five-page appendix on Michigan's recently imposed gross receipts tax and the proposed levy in Japan. In all, ten chapters are used in reviewing single-stage taxes: the manufacturer's tax in Canada and Finland; wholesale taxes in Great Britain (two chapters), Switzerland, Australia, and New Zealand; retail sales taxes in Norway, Canada, the United States, and other countries; and the general excise systems of the United States, Denmark, Sweden, and Spain.

The study is comprehensive, thorough in treatment, and up to date. The author's conclusions are judicious and clearly stated, and reflect, in many instances, his firsthand observations of the systems under discussion. For these reasons the book should become the standard reference in the field thus tending to replace the earlier pioneering studies of Buehler, the National Conference Board, Haig and Shoup, and later works of Jacoby and Oster. However there are still ample opportunity and need

for intensive study of the actual operation of state and local sales taxes, particularly in the areas of administration and economic effects.

CHARLES P. WHITE

Professor of Finance
University of Tennessee

AARON M. SAKOLSKI. *Land Tenure and Land Taxation in America*. Pp. xii, 316. New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1957. \$3.50.

This author gives a splendid review of the history of land ownership and its philosophical and political aspects. Starting with primitive man, he traces the evolution of the land tenure system as practiced by aboriginal tribes, ancient Hebrews, and North American Indians; he treats of the feudal and colonial systems, the post-Revolutionary period, and the federal disposition of land, including the early Colonial and Mexican land grants. He shows the change from a collective concept, where the title never rested with one individual or group, to a legal status whereby individuals or groups obtained power to hold, use, and transfer land without regard to public welfare. The upheaval resulting therefrom has been, according to the author, one of the principal sources of conflict within nations.

"Land hunger and the desire to reap the unearned increments arising from land ownership through population growth were manifest among early colonists. These characteristics have never been lost or discarded." The author gives much emphasis to the harmful effects of the desire of man to reap the "unearned increment" or profit resulting from increased land values. He seemingly considers such earnings as unfair profits, although he mentions the heavy losses of the land speculators and railroads that were given land grants. Perhaps much, if not all, of the so-called "unearned increment" was earned by land speculators and pioneer settlers who took the risks and bore the hardships of the rugged, untamed frontier.

The author dwells at length on the evils of tenancy but gives little or no considera-

tion to its possible favorable use. A poor and inefficient operator, whether he be owner or tenant on a fertile and potentially productive farm, may be considered detrimental to the general welfare. He is comparable to a poor, inefficient professor having permanent tenure. Tenancy is often the steppingstone used by young men in their move from hired man to landowner.

The author states that the methods used in disposing of the public domain were a source of irritation, dispute, corruption, and despair to the Republic for more than a century and a half; and they form one of the most remarkable historical episodes in the story of civilized man. The reviewer is of the opinion that the greatest weakness of the federal land disposal program was basing the size per unit on acreage rather than on a production basis. If production per unit had been used it would no doubt have prevented much of the graft, and the western grazing land would have passed into private ownership instead of federal tenancy. The result would undoubtedly have been more efficient and productive use of the land, and the federal government would have been saved millions of dollars in expenditures.

The reviewer feels that we should not be too critical of the methods used by the government in getting the greater part of this vast area of land into private ownership; for by doing this, homes were provided for the settlers, a tax base was established to yield funds for the government, and use was made of the unused natural resources to produce cheap and abundant food and fiber for all.

Thomas Jefferson, in his inaugural address of 1805, proposed the distribution of the public domain among the states and recommended that the proceeds therefrom be used for improvements within the states. The reviewer wishes to add that 152 years later many of us in the western states, where the federal government still claims ownership of more than half of our natural resources, believe that President Jefferson had an excellent idea and that it should be carried out, even at this late date.

The volume is well written with bibliographies provided for each chapter. It is

a valuable historical contribution to the subject of land tenure.

A. F. VASS

Professor of Agricultural Economics
University of Wyoming

VERNON C. FOWKE. *The National Policy and the Wheat Economy*. (Canadian Social Science Research Council Studies, No. 7.) Pp. viii, 312. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957. \$5.50.

"National policy" as used in this study is more specific and more narrowly defined than is customary in the United States. It has to do with the specific purposes for which the Dominion government was created, namely, to give national status and unity to a group of diverse and widely scattered provinces which had few common interests or contacts.

Specifically, Canadian "national policy" refers to the policy of tariff protection put into effect in 1879 to create a bond of interest and a flow of trade between eastern and western Canada by means of railway lines located within Canada and a protected market that would encourage domestic industrial production. Thus, it had a more definite and tangible objective than that of the United States where development has been rather haphazard and without plan.

After discussing these broader aspects of national policy, the author relates them to the development of the wheat economy of the Prairie Provinces. This leads into a discussion of the efforts of the grower groups to break away from what they regarded as undue dominance of their marketing structure by the open-market system centering in the Winnipeg grain exchange. The first effort was to gain control of local and terminal handling facilities and to eliminate monopolistic controls in the physical handling of grain. This developed into the growers' co-operative movement of the 1920's which centered in United Grain Growers Limited and the provincial wheat pools.

Centralized purchasing by the Allies in World War I resulted in the establishment of the Board of Grain Supervisors and later of the Canadian Wheat Board which acted for a time as a government monopoly. There was continuing grower agi-

tation for revival of a government monopoly in wheat, even in the period of greatest growth of the co-operative movement. That led ultimately to re-establishment, in 1935, of the Canadian Wheat Board, a government agency which was continued as the central feature of the Canadian wheat marketing structure.

The study makes a real contribution to an understanding of Canadian policy and is particularly useful to United States students who have not in general been well informed as to its broader underlying elements. It deals almost wholly with the policy aspects of the problem. There is a minimum of economic analysis of the underlying causes of the difficulties faced by the growers. Despite this limitation, Professor Fowke's study provides a useful and significant contribution to broader understanding of Canada's experience in the marketing of its principal export product.

MURRAY R. BENEDICT

Professor of Agricultural Economics
University of California
Berkeley

OTHER BOOKS

ADAMS, EPHRAIM DOUGLASS. *Great Britain and the American Civil War*. Two volumes bound as one. Pp. xi, 340. New York: Russell & Russell, 1958 (first published in 1925). \$10.00.

ADAMS, RICHARD N. *Encuesta sobre la Cultura de Los Ladinos en Guatemala*. (Seminario de Integración Social Guatemalteca, Publication No. 2.) Pp. 288. Guatemala: Ministerio de Educacion Publica, 1956. No price.

ALLEN, ROBERT LORING. *Middle Eastern Economic Relations with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Mainland China*. Pp. 128. Charlottesville: Woodrow Wilson Department of Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, 1958. \$1.00.

ANNUAIRE EUROPÉEN, Vol. III: *European Yearbook*. Pp. xvii, 534. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff under the auspices of the Council of Europe, 1957. 25.50 guilders.

BEACH, WALDO. *Conscience on Campus: An Interpretation of Christian Ethics for College Life*. (A Haddon House Book.) Pp. 124. New York: Association Press, 1958. \$2.50.

BELTH, N. C. (Ed.) in association with HAROLD BRAVERMAN and MORTON PUNER.

Barriers: Patterns of Discrimination Against Jews. (A Human Rights Reader.) Pp. v, 121. New York: Friendly House Publishers, 1958. \$2.95.

BLANSHARD, PAUL. *American Freedom and Catholic Power*. Pp. xii, 402. 2nd rev. ed. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. \$3.95.

BÖHLER, EUGEN. *Nationalökonomie: Grundlagen und Grundlehren*. Pp. 296. 3rd ed. Zürich: Polygraphischer Verlag Ag Zürich, 1957. No price.

BOS, MAARTEN. *Les conditions du procès en droit international public*. (Bibl. Viss., 19.) Translated by Maarten Bos. Pp. xv, 344. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1957. 34.— guilders.

BOYD, ANDREW. *An Atlas of World Affairs*. Pp. 159. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$3.00.

BUNKER, ROBERT. *Other Men's Skies*. Pp. 256. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956. \$4.50.

CARPENTER, WILLIAM SEAL. *Foundations of Modern Jurisprudence*. Pp. vi, 230. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1958. \$3.25.

CHATHAM HOUSE STUDY GROUP. *Collective Defence in South East Asia: The Manila Treaty and Its Implications*. Pp. xiv, 197. London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956. \$2.25.

CHRISTENSEN, HAROLD T. *Marriage Analysis: Foundations for Successful Family Life*. Pp. x, 645. 2nd ed. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1958. \$5.50.

CLARKE, DESMOND. *Arthur Dobbs, Esquire, 1689-1765: Surveyor-General of Ireland, Prospector and Governor of North Carolina*. Pp. 232. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957. \$6.00.

CLYDE, PAUL HIBBERT. *The Far East: A History of the Impact of the West on Eastern Asia*. Pp. xxviii, 836. 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1958. \$10.60.

CORRY, J. A., and HENRY J. ABRAHAM. *Elements of Democratic Government*. Pp. ix, 734. 3rd revised and enlarged edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. \$6.50.

Cultura indigena de Guatemala: Ensayos de Antropología social. (Seminario de Integración Social Guatemalteca, Publication No. 1.) Pp. 302. Guatemala: Ministerio de Educacion Publica, 1956. No price.

A Public Relations Bibliography: And Reference and Film Guides. Compiled by Scott M. Cutlip. Pp. xvii, 313. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press under the auspices of the Public Relations Society of America, 1957. \$5.00.

The Danish Criminal Code. Pp. 118. Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gad, 1958. D. Kr. 20.—

D'ARCY, MARTIN C. *Communism and Chris-*

tianity. Pp. xii, 241. New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1957. \$4.00.

DAVIS, HAROLD EUGENE (Ed.). *Government and Politics in Latin America*. Pp. vi, 539. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1958. \$6.50.

DICKSON, H. R. P. *Kuwait and Her Neighbours*. Edited by Clifford Witting. Pp. 610. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956. (Distributed by The Macmillan Company.) \$12.75.

DILLON, CONLEY H., CARL LEIDEN, and PAUL D. STEWART. *Introduction to Political Science*. (Van Nostrand Political Science Series.) Pp. vi, 298. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1958. \$4.85.

DRAKE, JOSEPH T. *The Aged in American Society*. Pp. ix, 431. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1958. \$5.50.

DUNCAN, OTIS DUDLEY, and BEVERLY DUNCAN. *The Negro Population of Chicago: A Study of Residential Succession*. Pp. xxiv, 367. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. \$6.00.

EBB, LAWRENCE F. (Ed.). *Public Law Problems in India: A Survey Report*. Proceedings of a Conference held at the Stanford Law School, July 15-August 16, 1957. Pp. xi, 194. Stanford: School of Law, Stanford University, 1957. \$2.50.

EBENSTEIN, WILLIAM. *Today's Isms*. Pp. ix, 243. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1958. \$2.95.

ELLIOTT, WILLIAM Y., and NEIL A. McDONALD. *Western Political Heritage*. Pp. xvi, 1027. 5th printing. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1957 (first published in 1949). \$8.00.

EWALD, ROBERT H. *Bibliografía comentada sobre Antropología social Guatemalteca, 1900-1955*. (Seminario de Integración Social Guatemalteca.) Pp. 132. Guatemala, 1956. No price.

EWING, CORTEZ A. M. *American National Government*. Pp. xvi, 735. Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1958. \$7.25.

FALS-BORDA, ORLANDO. *El Hombre y la Tierra en Boyacá: Bases sociológicas e históricas para una Reforma agraria*. Pp. xiv, 259. Bogotá: Ediciones Documentos Colombianos, 1957. No price.

FRANKLAND, NOBLE (Ed.) with the assistance of PATRICIA WOODCOCK. *Documents on International Affairs, 1955*. Pp. xix, 513. London: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1958. \$9.60.

FRIEDRICH, C. J. *Constitutional Reason of State: The Survival of the Constitutional Order*. (The Colver Lectures at Brown

- University.) Pp. xi, 131. Providence: Brown University Press, 1957. \$3.00.
- GOLDWIN, ROBERT A., RALPH LERNER, and GERALD STOURZH (Eds.). *Readings in American Foreign Policy*, Vols. I, II, and III. Pp. vii, 261; 249; 194 respectively. 5th ed. Chicago: American Foundation for Political Education, 1957. No price.
- . *Readings in World Politics*, Vols. I and II. Pp. xii, 280; 299 respectively. 4th ed. Chicago: American Foundation for Political Education, 1957. No price.
- GORDON, WENDELL C. *International Trade: Goods, People, and Ideas*. Pp. xvii, 647, xix. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958. \$6.75.
- GWINN, WILLIAM REA. *Uncle Joe Cannon: Archfoe of Insurgency: A History of the Rise and Fall of Cannonism*. (Bookman Monograph Series for Historical Studies and Political Science.) Pp. vii, 314. New York: Bookman Associates, 1957. \$5.00.
- HARRIS, PHILIP J. *Local Government in Southern Nigeria*. A Manual of Law and Procedure Under the Eastern Region Local Government Law, 1955, and the Western Region Local Government Law, 1952. Pp. xii, 348. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957. \$5.50.
- HARROD, ROY F. *International Economics*. (The Cambridge Economic Handbooks.) Pp. xiv, 186. Rev. ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. \$2.25.
- HART, HENRY C. *New India's Rivers*. Pp. xiv, 301. Bombay, Calcutta, Madras: Orient Longmans, 1956. (Distributed by the Institute of Pacific Relations.) No price.
- HIRSCH, WARNER Z. *Introduction to Modern Sociology With Applications to Business and Economics*. Pp. xiv, 429. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. \$6.50.
- HOLDER, ROSE HOWELL. *McIver of North Carolina*. Pp. xi, 283. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957. \$5.00.
- HORN, D. B., and MARY RANSOME (Eds.). *English Historical Documents, 1714-1783*. (English Historical Documents, Vol. X.) Pp. xxvii, 964. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957. \$15.20.
- North Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak. (Country Survey Series.) Pp. xi, 287. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1956. No price.
- HUBBELL, HARRY M. (Ed.). *Yale Classical Studies*, Vol. XV. Pp. 193. New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1957. No price.
- HUDSON, G. F. (Ed.). *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 1. (St. Antony's Papers, No. II.) Pp. 145. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957. \$3.00.
- HUNTINGTON, EMILY H. *Spending of Middle-Income Families: Incomes and Expenditures of Salaried Workers in the San Francisco Bay Area in 1950*. Pp. 179. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1957. \$3.00.
- HUSAIN, A. F. A. *Human & Social Impact of Technological Change in Pakistan*. A Report on a Survey conducted by the University of Dacca and published with the assistance of UNESCO, Vol. I. Pp. xix, 404. Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1956. \$2.65 (the set).
- . *Human & Social Impact of Technological Change in Pakistan*. A Report on a Survey conducted by the University of Dacca and published with the assistance of UNESCO, Vol. II (Reports of Case-Studies). Pp. viii, 344. Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1956. \$2.65 (the set).
- Integracion social en Guatemala*. (Seminario de Integración Social Guatemalteca, Publication No. 3.) Pp. 479. Guatemala, 1956. No price.
- JACKSON, J. HAMPDEN. *Marx, Proudhon and European Socialism*. (Teach Yourself History Series.) Pp. 192. New York: The Macmillan Company. No date. \$2.50.
- JAKOBSON, ROMAN, GERTA HUTTL-WORTH, and JOHN FRED BEEBE. *Paleosiberian Peoples and Languages: A Bibliographical Guide*. (Behavior Science Bibliographies.) Pp. vii, 222. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1957. \$5.50.
- JENNINGS, IVOR. *Parliament*. Pp. xi, 573. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957. \$8.50.
- JOHNSON, A. H. *Whitehead's Philosophy of Civilization*. Pp. xi, 211. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. \$5.00.
- KENNEDY, WILLIAM F. *Humanist Versus Economist: The Economic Thought of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*. (University of California Publications in Economics, Vol. XVII.) Pp. 96. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958. \$2.00.
- KITAOKA, JITSU. *Over-Population and Family Planning in Japan*. (The Science Council of Japan, Division of Economics & Commerce, Economic Series, No. 14.) Pp. 71. Tokyo: The Science Council of Japan, 1957. No price.
- KRAFT, JULIUS. *Von Husserl zu Heidegger: Kritik der phänomenologischen Philosophie*. Pp. 146. 2nd and enlarged edition. Frankfurt am Main: Öffentliches Leben, 1957. DM 9.80 clothbound; DM 7.50 paperbound.
- LAMONT, CORLISS. *The Philosophy of Humanism*. Pp. xi, 243. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957 (first published in 1949). \$2.75.
- LERCHE, CHARLES O., JR. *Foreign Policy of the American People*. Pp. xii, 547. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1958. \$7.50.
- MADSEN, BRIGHAM D. *The Bannock of Idaho*. Pp. 382. Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1958. \$5.00.
- MALLORY, WALTER H. (Ed.). *Political Handbook of the World: Parliaments, Parties and Press as of January 1, 1958*. Pp. 229. New York: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1958. \$3.95.
- Marsilius of Padua: *The Defender of Peace*, Vol. II: *The Defensor Pacis*. Translated by Alan Gerwirth. Pp. xciv, 450. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. \$8.50.
- MAYER, MILTON (Ed.). *The Tradition of Freedom*. Selections from the Writers Who Shaped the Traditional Concepts of Freedom and Justice in America. Pp. 766. New York: Oceana Publications for the Fund for the Republic, 1957. \$7.50.
- MELTZER, BERNARD N., HARRY R. DOBY, and PHILIP M. SMITH. *Education in Society: Readings*. Pp. xiv, 498. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1958. \$3.25.
- MEZERIK, A. G. (Ed.). *Disarmament: Post-war Through 1957*. (International Review Service, Vol. III, No. 39.) Pp. 69. New York: International Review Service, 1957. \$2.50.
- MINSKI, LOUIS. *Deafness, Mutism and Mental Deficiency in Children*. Pp. viii, 82. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. \$3.75.
- MONTAGU, ASHLEY. *Education and Human Relations*. Pp. 191. New York: Grove Press, 1958. \$3.50 clothbound; \$1.45 paperbound.
- MORA JOSÉ FERRATER. *Man at the Crossroads*. Translated by Willard R. Trask. Pp. vi, 252. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. \$5.00.
- MORTENSEN, SVERRE, and PER VOGT. *One Hundred Norwegians: An Introduction to Norwegian Culture and Achievement*. Illustrated by One Hundred Portraits. Pp. 206. Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag, 1955. No price.
- MUELLER-DEHAM, ALBERT. *Human Relations and Power: Socio-Political Analysis and Synthesis*. Pp. xxi, 410. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. \$3.75.
- MULLER, HERBERT J. *The Uses of the Past: Profiles of Former Societies*. (A Galaxy Book.) Pp. xi, 394. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957. \$2.25.
- NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON URBAN TRANSPORTATION. *Better Transportation for Your City: A Guide to the Factual Development of Urban Transportation Plans*. Pp. xiii, 96. Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1958. No price.
- NESS, FREDERIC W. (Ed.). *A Guide to Graduate Study: Programs Leading to the Ph.D. Degree*. Pp. xi, 335. Washington, D. C.: Association of American Colleges, 1957. \$5.00.
- NOBLE, JOHN. *I Was a Slave in Russia: An American Tells His Story*. Pp. 182. New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1958. \$3.75.
- ORGANSKI, A. F. K. *World Politics*. Pp. xii, 461, xi. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958. \$7.50 trade; \$5.75 text.
- OWEN, WILFRED and others. *Financing Highways*. Symposium Conducted by the Tax Institute, November 8-9, 1956, Princeton. Pp. vi, 217. Princeton: Tax Institute, 1957. \$5.00.
- PATAI, RAPHAEL (Ed.). *Current Jewish Social Research*. Pp. viii, 102. New York: Theodor Herzl Foundation, 1958. \$2.00.
- PAUL, BENJAMIN (Ed.) with the collaboration of WALTER B. MILLER. *Health, Culture, and Community: Case Studies of Public Reactions to Health Programs*. Pp. viii, 493. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1955. \$5.00.
- PFEIFFER, GERD, and HANS-GEORG STRICKERT. *Outlawing the Communist Party: A Case History*. The Decision of the First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court of West Germany. Translated and edited from the original German edition by Wolfgang P. von Schmertzling. Pp. xii, 227. New York: Published and distributed by The Book-mailer, 1957. \$5.00.
- REDFORD, EMMETTE S. *Ideal and Reality in Public Administration*. Pp. xii, 195. University: University of Alabama Press, 1958. \$2.50.
- RENSHAW, EDWARD F. *Toward Responsible Government: An Economic Appraisal of Federal Investment in Water Resource Programs*. Pp. xii, 164. Chicago: Idyia Press, 1957. \$3.00.
- Revision of the United Nations Charter: A Symposium*. Pp. 144. New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs; Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1956. \$1.70.
- RICHBERG, DONALD R., and ALBERT BRITT. *Only the Brave Are Free: A Condensed Review of the Growth of Self-Government in America*. Pp. viii, 355. Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1958. \$6.00.
- ROBSON, WILLIAM A. *The Government and Misgovernment of London*. Pp. 518. London: George Allen & Unwin. No date.

- (Distributed by The Macmillan Company.) \$5.75.
- ROSS, RALPH, and ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG. *The Fabric of Society: An Introduction to the Social Sciences*. Pp. xv, 777. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1957. \$7.50.
- SABINE, GEORGE H. *Marxism*. The Telluride Lectures, 1957-58 at Cornell University. Pp. iv, 60. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958. 75 cents.
- SANDERS, IRWIN T. *The Community: An Introduction to a Social System*. Pp. xvi, 431. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1958. \$6.00.
- SARGENT, J. R. *British Transport Policy*. Pp. ix, 163. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1958. \$2.40.
- SAVELLE, MAX with the assistance of TREMAINE McDOWELL. *A Short History of American Civilization*. Pp. xxii, 665. New York: Dryden Press, 1957. \$6.75.
- SCHNEIDER, BEN ROSS, JR. *Wordsworth's Cambridge Education*. Pp. xi, 298. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957. \$6.00.
- SCHNEIDER, BETTY V. H. *Industrial Relations in the West Coast Maritime Industry*. (West Coast Collective Bargaining Systems Series.) Pp. viii, 83. Berkeley: Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, 1958. 50 cents.
- SCHRIEKE, B. *Indonesian Sociological Studies, Part II: Ruler and Realm in Early Java*. (Selected Studies on Indonesia, Vol. III.) Pp. ix, 491. The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1957. (Distributed in the United States by the Institute of Pacific Relations.) \$5.00.
- SCHULZ, ERNST B. *Essentials of Government*. Pp. x, 532. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1958. \$6.95.
- SCOTT, K. J. (Ed.). *Welfare in New Zealand*. (Studies in Public Administration, No. 3.) Pp. 130. Wellington: New Zealand Institute of Public Administration; London: Oxford University Press, 1955. \$2.50.
- SÉMINAIRE 1954 DU SÉMINAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE RECHERCHE SUR LA FAMILLE ET DE L'INSTITUT UNESCO DES SCIENCES SOCIALES. *Recherches sur la famille: Studies of the Family: Untersuchungen über die Familie*, Vol. I. Pp. xi, 287. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1956. No price.
- SHANNON, FRED A. *American Farmers' Movements*. (Van Nostrand Anvil Books, No. 28.) Pp. 192. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1957. \$1.25.
- SHIELDS, CURRIN V. *John Stuart Mill: Considerations on Representative Government*. (The Library of Liberal Arts, No. 71.) Pp. xlv, 275. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. 90 cents.
- (Ed.). *John Stuart Mill: Autobiography*. (The Library of Liberal Arts, No. 91.) Pp. xviii, 201. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957. 90 cents.
- SOROKIN, PITIRIM. *Social & Cultural Dynamics: A Study of Change in Major Systems of Art, Truth, Ethics, Law and Social Relationships*. Pp. 718. Revised and abridged in one volume. Boston: Porter Sargent, 1957. \$7.50.
- STEIN, HERMAN D., and RICHARD A. CLOWARD (Eds.). *Social Perspective on Behavior: A Reader in Social Science for Social Work and Related Professions*. Pp. xix, 666. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. \$7.50.
- STIPP, JOHN L. (Ed.). *Soviet Russia Today: Patterns and Prospects*. Pp. xii, 270. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. \$3.00.
- TAFT, PHILIP. *The A. F. of L. in the Time of Gompers*. Pp. xx, 508. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$6.75.
- TAYLOR, GEORGE, and IRENE D. NEU. *The American Railroad Network, 1861-1890*. Pp. viii, 113. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. \$3.75.
- Toward the Liberally Educated Executive*. Edited by Robert A. Goldwin with Charles A. Nelson, consultant. Pp. xi, 111. White Plains, N. Y.: The Fund for Adult Education, 1957. No price.
- TOYNBEE, ARNOLD, and VERONICA M. TOYNBEE (Eds.). *The War and the Neutrals*. (Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946.) Pp. viii, 278. London: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956. 50 net.
- TROY, LEO. *Distribution of Union Membership Among the States, 1939 and 1953* (Occasional Paper, No. 56.) Pp. viii, 32. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1957. 75 cents.
- ULLMAN, EDWARD L. *American Commodity Flow: A Geographical Interpretation of Rail and Water Traffic Based on Principle of Spatial Interchange*. Pp. xxii, 215. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1957. \$4.00.
- ULLMAN, LLOYD. *The Rise of the National Trade Union: The Development and Significance of Its Structure, Governing Institutions, and Economic Politics*. Pp. xix, 634. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. \$9.50.
- UTLEY, T. E., and J. STUART MACLURE (Eds.). *Documents of Modern Political Thought*. Pp. ix, 276. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957. \$3.75.
- VAKIL, C. N., and PERIN H. CABINETMAKER. *Government and the Displaced Persons: A Study in Social Tensions*. Pp. v, 144. Bombay: Vora & Company, Publishers Private Ltd., 1956. Rs. 3/- inland; \$1.00 foreign.
- VIELJEUX, CHRISTIAN. *Aspects marocains*. Pp. 134. La Rochelle: Éditions F. Pijollet, 1957. No price.
- WEBSTER, DONALD H. *Urban Planning and Municipal Public Policy*. Pp. xii, 572. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. No price.
- WEIL, SIMONE. *Intimations of Christianity: Among the Ancient Greeks*. Collected and translated from the French by Elisabeth Chase Geissbuhler. Pp. 208. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958 (first published in English in 1957). \$3.95.
- WEST, ROBERT C. *The Pacific Lowlands of Colombia: A Negroid Area of the American Tropics*. (Louisiana State University Studies, Social Science Series, No. 8.) Pp. xiv, 278. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957. \$5.00.
- WILLIAMS, ROBIN M., JR., and MARGARET W. RYAN (Eds.). *Schools in Transition*. Pp. xiii, 272. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1954. No price.
- WILLIAMSON, ADOLPH ANCRUM. *The Cosmic Function of Life: A Transcendent Hypothesis*. Pp. 78. New York: Vantage Press, 1958. \$2.50.
- World on the Move, A: A History of Colonialism and Nationalism in Asia and North Africa from the Turn of the Century to the Bandung Conference*. Pp. 264. Amsterdam: Djambatan, International Educational Publishing House; New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956. \$7.50.
- ZINK, HAROLD, HOWARD R. PENNIMAN, and GUY B. HATHORN. *American Government and Politics: National, State, and Local*. (Van Nostrand Political Science Series.) Pp. vii, 446. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1958. \$5.25.

INDEX

Acheson, Dean, 155
 Adenauer, Konrad, 157, 158
 cited, 159
 Africa, 116
 Agriculture (Eastern Europe), 44-52
 background, 44-45
 collective farms, 26, 48
 economic failures, 49
 peasants' attitude toward, 48-49
 collectivization, 46-49
 objectives, 49-50
 decollectivization, 49-50
 exports, decline in agricultural, 52
 land-ownership distribution, change in, 46
 price and taxation policies, 50
 production, agricultural, stagnation of, 50-52
 reforms, agrarian, post-World War II, 45
 See also Eastern Europe; *names of individual countries*
 Albania, 153
 collectivization in, 46
 Aleksa-Angarietis, Zigmás, 128
 Almas, I.
 cited, 54
 AMES, EDWARD, Economic Policy in Eastern Europe From 1950 Through 1956, 22-35
 Antonescu, Ion, 62
 Apostol, G., 58
 cited, 59
 Asia, 116, 157
 Austria, 115, 143, 145
 Austrian State Treaty, 20
 Balkan Union, 81, 144
 Baltic States, 150
 agriculture, collectivization of, 124
 and the West, 124, 125, 128-129
 annexation by Soviet Union, 123
 decompression in, 128, 129
 deportations from, 124, 127
 economic reforms, 124-125
 émigrés, 128-129
 government, control of by Soviet Union, 124
 Hungarian and Polish revolts, repercussions of in, 128
 industry, growth of, 124-125
 nationalism in, 129
 political prisoners, release and rehabilitation of, 127-128
 religion in, 125
 Sovietization of, slow progress of, 123-124, 125
 relaxation of program, 126-127
 status of, 124

Russification of
 and history, 126
 and language and literature, 125-126
 Bărbulescu, C.
 cited, 60
 Benjámín, László, 77, 78
 cited, 77
 quoted, 77
 BEREDAY, GEORGE Z. F., Education and Youth, 63-70
 Bergson, Abram
 cited, 22
 Beria, Lavrentii P., 5, 80, 84, 85, 90, 99, 100, 101, 119
 Berkman, Paul L.
 cited, 67
 Berman, J., 72, 83, 84, 85
 Bialer, Seweryn, 89
 cited, 143
 Bialoszewski, Miron, 72
 Bierut, Boleslaw, 4, 5, 6, 13, 15, 83, 84, 89, 90
 quoted, 13
 Blasko, Ladislav
 quoted, 121
 Brinton, Crane, 97
 cited, 97
 quoted, 97
 British Broadcasting Company (BBC), 122
 BRZEZINSKI, ZBIGNIEW, The Pattern of Political Purges, 79-87
 Buhler, Neal
 cited, 68
 Bulganin, Nikolai A., 20, 144, 157, 159, 162
 quoted, 142
 Bulgaria, 150
 agrarian reforms in, 45, 46
 collectivization in, 46
 Communist party in, 2
 leadership in, 6, 7
 personality cult in, 4, 85
 foreign trade, 10
 industry, development of, 39
 imports, 42
 "New Course" in, 5, 15, 16, 18
 See also Purges
 Burin, Frederic S., 131
 Burma, 132
 Byrnes, James F.
 quoted, 163
 BYRNES, ROBERT F., The Climax of Stalinism 1950-1953, 8-11
 CAMPBELL, JOHN C., East Europe, German and the West, 153-163

Carol II (of Rumania), 62
 Center of Writers in Exile, 150
 Central European Federal Movement, 150
 Cep, Jan
 quoted, 147
 Cepicka, Alexej, 85, 119
 Chalasinsky, Józef, 14
 Charles I Institute, Paris (Rumanian émigré institute), 148
 Charles I (of England), 97, 105
 Chernyshevski, N. G., 126
 Chervenkov, Vuklo, 4, 13, 14, 15, 82, 85
 quoted, 12
 China, People's Republic of, 95, 132, 133, 143, 145, 154
 Chirculescu, I.
 cited, 57
 Christian Democratic Union of Central Eastern Europe, 150
 Clementis, Vladimir, 8, 82, 119, 120
 Cominform, 80
 Communism, national, 136-137
 Communism, international
 twelve-party declaration, 135-136, 137
 Communist doctrine and the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
 colonial liberation, pronouncements concerning, 132
 de-Stalinization speech by Khrushchev, consequences of, 134-135
 foreign policy
 peaceful coexistence, 131
 underdeveloped countries, wooing of, 132-133
 ideological controversy, 130-131
 power seizure and development of "socialism," pronouncements on, 133-134
 war and peace, pronouncements on, 131-132
 Communist parties (Eastern Europe)
 differences in, 1-7
 establishment of one-party dictatorships, 3, 8
 split in, 80
 See also *Names of individual countries*
 Communist Party of the Soviet Union
 Congresses
 Twentieth, 4, 5, 6, 77, 85, 90, 104, 106, 115, 116
 and Titoism, 108
 consequences of, 137
 See also Communist doctrine and the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
 Communist policy
 collective leadership, 84
 "New Course," 13
 public pronouncements following Stalin's death, 12-13
 "Peoples Democracies" concept of, 16

Stalinism
 Sovietization, program of in satellites, 8
 Contantin, B.
 cited, 38
 Council of Free Youth of Central Europe, 150
 Culture (Eastern Europe)
 "Socialist realism"
 decay of, 73
 standardization of, 71
 Zhdanovism, 71, 73
 "thaw" period, the, 5
 Csóori, Sándor, 74
 Cyrankiewicz, Jozef, 92
 quoted, 91
 Czechoslovak Foreign Institute in Exile, 151
 Czechoslovak Institute in Exile (Holland), 147
 Czechoslovakia, 154
 agrarian reforms in, 45
 collectivization in, 46
 Communist party in, 1-7 *passim*
 leadership, nature of, 6, 7, 118-120
 insecurity of, 117-118
 personality cult in, 4, 85
 democratic tradition and Communists' fear of relaxing controls, 116
 democratic tradition and revolt, 116-117
 disillusionment with the West, 117
 education in, 65-66
 elections in, 18, 115
 exposition to Western influence, 115
 fear of Soviet strength, 117
 government and group rivalries, 121
 heavy industry, development of, 38-39, 41
 industrial base created by capitalist era, 120
 nationalism in, 120
 "New Course" in, 4-5, 15
 political trials in, 8-9
 productivity, increase in, 42
 "Stalenkovism," 116
 reason for passive behavior during "thaw" (1955-56), 115-116
 revolt against Communism
 by students, 121
 by workers, 121-122
 by writers, 121
 standard of living in, 118, 120, 122
 bloodless resistance to Communism, 120-121, 122
 second Congress of Czech and Slovak writers, 121
 See also Purges
 Dahlem, F., 83
 DALLIN, ALEXANDER, The Soviet Stake in Eastern Europe, 138-145
 Darvas, Jozsef, 77
 Dellin, L. A. D.
 cited, 47
 Democratic party (Poland), 93, 94

- Déry, Tibor, 73, 74, 77, 78, 102
 Dimitrov, Georgi, 4, 81, 82
 Divilova, J.
 cited, 47
 Djilas, Milovan, 113, 114
 cited, 145
 quoted, 120
 Dobi, István, 99
 DUCHACEK, IVO, A "Loyal" Satellite: The Case of Czechoslovakia, 115-122
 Dudinski, I.
 cited, 32
 Dulea, M.
 cited, 54, 56, 58
 Dulles, Allen, 81
 Dulles, John Foster, 155, 160, 162, 163
 cited, 156
 quoted, 156, 161
 Dvorkin, I.
 cited, 34
 Dzerzhinski, Felix, 126
 DZIEWANOWSKI, M. K., Limits and Problems of Decompression: The Case of Poland, 88-96

 Eastern Europe
 agriculture, mismanagement of, 17
 and the Soviet empire, 161-163
 industrialization in
 return to pre-"New Course" thinking, 19-20
 "New Course," 17, 142
 and party unity, 18-19
 Khrushchev-Molotov conflict concerning, 142-143
 political dimensions of, 17-18
 reaction of individual countries, difference in, 15-16
 overindustrialization in, 17
 Soviet control and dissatisfaction of the people, 11
 trade tied to Soviet Union, 10
 United States policy toward, 161-163
 Western policy toward, 161-163
 East-West conflict
 and Germany, 157-159
 cold war, 149, 150, 161
 disarmament, 157
 Iron Curtain, 147, 148, 149, 155, 157, 160
 Ebert, Friedrich, 136
 Economic policy (Eastern Europe), 22-35
 and political factors, 30
 consumption, control of, 29-30
 currency conversion, 31
 industrialization, 22-23
 and human values, 42
 inflation
 investments, increase in as a cure for, 35
 investment programs, 25-26, 38, 41
 long-run economic plans, 30
 nationalization of industry, 22
 price problems
 post-Stalin interpretation and solution of, 32
 disproportion between investment and consumer good, 32-33
 disproportion between raw materials and processed goods, 33
 heterodox view of, 34, 35
 orthodox view of, 33-34, 35
 Stalin's explanation and solution of, 31-32
 rationing, abolition of, 31
 shortages
 curing, solutions for, 33, 34-35
 Stalinist period, 9-10
 Economy (Eastern Europe)
 composition of, 28-29
 imbalance in, 42
 industrial growth, rate of, 23, 24
 inflation, 28
 markets, needs for suitable, 42
 productivity indices, 26-28
 wages, 28, 42
 See also Agriculture, economic policy, industry
 Education (Eastern Europe), 9, 63-70
 curricula, 65
 discipline in, 65-67
 disinchantment of youth in, 68, 69
 educational opportunities for the masses, 67, 69
 illiteracy, drop in, 66
 nationalism, role of in, 69
 policies, re-examination of, 70
 political circumstances, role of in, 66-67
 quality of, 64-65, 66
 religion, role of in, 69
 Soviet indoctrination in, 63
 failure of, 64
 See also Hungary, Poland, Rumania
 Egypt, 132
 Ehrenburg, Ilyja, 74, 84
 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 157, 162
 Eluard, Paul, 73
 Emigration, Eastern Europe
 post-World War II, 146
 Émigrés, political
 activities, aspects of, 146
 and development of national culture in foreign soil, 146-147
 cultural exchange with satellite countries, problem of, 149
 political activities, 149-151
 Assembly of Captive European Nations, 150
 liberation, differing views concerning, 150-152
 national councils, 150

- scholarship, 147-148
 institutes, 147-148
 publication and research, 148, 151-152
 Eminescu, M., 148

 Fabians, 107
 Fadeyev, Alexander A., 74
 Farkas, Mihály, 97, 105
 Fechner, Max, 83
 Finland, 143, 145
 Fischer-Galati, Stephen
 cited, 47, 56
 Foreign policy (Soviet Russia)
 and national communism, 20, 142, 153-154
 and Poland, 153
 and Yugoslavia, 85, 104
 Eastern Europe, control of, 10-11, 20, 153
 and decompression policy, 141-142
 and establishment of "People's Democracies," 141
 and nuclear weapons, 156
 as bridgehead against the West, 140
 defense objectives, 140
 Khrushchev middle course policy, 143-144
 political implications, 156-157
 power objectives, 138-140
 present-day policies, 144-145
 Foreign policy (US)
 and Hungarian revolt (1956), 155-156
 and uprisings in Hungary and Poland, 161
 and Yugoslavia, 160
 anti-Communist opposition, encouragement of, 160-161
 appeasement of communism, 154
 containment of communism, 154
 national communism, support of, 160-161
 re Eastern Europe
 and nuclear weapons, 156
 principle and practicality, 155-156
 rollback of communism, 154
 Foreign policy (Western)
 acceptance and protest of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, 154-155
 and nuclear warfare, 156
 and uprisings in Hungary and Poland, 153
 France, 154
 Franco, Francisco, 81
 Free Europe Committee, 9

 Geneva "summit" conference (July 1955), 20, 162
 George III (of England), 97
 German Democratic Republic, 40, 42, 81, 83, 84, 85, 108, 116, 117, 140, 156, 158, 159
 and German nationalism, 158
 diplomatic relations with satellites, 159
 "New Course" in, 85
 productivity, increase in, 42
 revolt in (1953), 155

 German Federal Republic, 115, 140, 158, 159, 162
 and Czechoslovakia, obstacles to rapprochement between, 160
 and Poland, obstacles to rapprochement between, 160
 and relations with East European satellites, 159-160
 and the West, 158-159
 Germany
 and Eastern Europe, 158
 Communist party in, 1, 2
 unification of, 158, 159
 Gerö, Ernő, 6, 99, 105
 Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe, 4, 14, 55, 56, 58
 cited, 55
 quoted, 12, 56
 GÖMÖRI, GEORGE, Cultural and Literary Developments: Poland and Hungary, 71-78
 Gomulka, Wladyslaw, 6, 7, 16, 66, 76, 78, 83, 84, 86-89 *passim*, 92-96 *passim*, 119, 134, 136, 137, 138, 143, 144, 161
 cited, 137
 quoted, 136
 Gottwald, Klement, 4, 120
 quoted, 82
 Great Britain, 154
 Greece, 154
 Gsovski, Vladimir
 cited, 34

 Halecki, Oscar
 cited, 47
 Harich, Wolfgang, 14
 Háry, Gyula, 77
 quoted, 78
 Healey, Denis
 cited, 157
 Hegedüs, András, 103
 Helmreich, Ernest
 cited, 47
 Heyman, Hans
 cited, 22
 Holzman, Franklyn
 cited, 22
 Hottelet, Richard C.
 cited, 158
 Hrubin, Frantisek, 72, 121
 Hungarian National Council (in the United States), 151
 Hungary
 agrarian reforms in, 45, 46
 amnesty, 101-102
 compared with that of Soviet Russia, 102
 collectivization in, 46, 48
 Communist party in, 1-7 *passim*, 89
 collective leadership, 98-99
 leadership, 5-6, 7, 84, 86
 anti-Rakosi sentiments, 105

- Ernö Gerö appointed First Secretary, 105
 Nagy's fall, 103
 Rakosi's comeback, 103-104
 make-up of, 87
 Nagy cult, the, 104
 Nagy's inaugural speech, 100, 101
 Nagy's policies, Soviet displeasure with, 103
 personality cult in, 4, 85
 Rakosi's policies, condemnation of, 99
 reorganization of, 99-100
 split in, 98, 100-101
 cultural policies, condemnation of, 78, 104
 cultural thaw in, 74
 resurgence of literature and poetry, 75
 culture, present status of, 78
 decollectivization in, 48
 education in, 65-66
 elections in, 18
 imports, 41-42
 industry, development of, 39, 40, 41-42
 literature
 Benjamin poems, publication of, 77
 writers revolt, 21, 76-78, 102
 effect of liberated prisoners on writers, 77
 literature and the press in, 104
 "New Course" in, 4, 13-15, 18, 84, 100
 Petöfi Circle, 77, 104, 121
 police and judiciary terror, ban on, 98
 productivity, increase in, 42
 revolt in (fall 1956), 5-7, 42, 48, 77, 78, 85-86, 97, 118, 150
 and Soviet primacy, 135
 failure of the West to aid in, 117
 possibilities for averting, 105-106
 Soviet intervention, 86
 symptoms of, 104-105
 Soviet policy concerning, 98, 99
 Union of Writers, 74
See also Purges
- Iarcovici, M.
 cited, 38
- Industrialization
 Marxian theories concerning, 37
- Industry (Eastern Europe), 36-43
 and country's resources, 37
 building materials, 23, 40, 41
 chemical, 40, 41
 consumer-goods industries, 28, 41, 42
 energy resources, expansion of, 23, 39-40, 41
 expansion of, obstacles to, 28-29
 iron and steel, 24, 39, 41-42
 ferrous metallurgy, expansion of capacity of, 39
 imitation of Soviet industrial development, 36, 37
- machine-building, 38, 39, 41
 output, total, 23-25, 40-41, 42
 producer-goods industries, 24-25, 37, 42
 raw materials, lack of, 42
 Second Plan, changes in policies in, 42
 targets and achievement, lags between, 42
 technological improvements, 42-43
See also Eastern Europe, *names of individual countries*
- Ignotus, Paul
 cited, 73
- Illyés, Gyula, 73, 78
- India, 132
- Indonesia, 132
- International Center of Free Trade Unions, 150
- IONESCU, GHITA, Social Structure: Rumania Under Communist, 53-62
- Iraq, 132
- Ivanov, N. I.
 cited, 32
- Jews
 persecution of in Russia, 80
- Joita, D.
 cited, 60
- Jozwiak-Witold, Franciszek, 92
- Juhász, Ferenc, 75
 cited, 75
 quoted, 75
- Juhász, William, 65
 cited, 65
- Kádár, János, 48, 78, 86, 102, 105, 144
- Kaganovich, Lazar, 59, 92, 99, 129
- Kaliberzins, J., 129
- KECSKEMETI, PAUL, Limits and Problems of Decompression: The Case of Hungary, 97-106
- Kemeny, G.
 cited, 41
- Kennan, George F.
 cited, 157
- Khrushchev, Nikita S., 5, 6, 7, 13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 33, 34, 52, 76, 85, 92, 99, 101, 104, 119, 128, 130-134 *passim*, 136, 142, 143, 145
 cited, 133, 134
 quoted, 19, 101, 131
- Kirchensteins, August, 126
- Kliszko, Zeno, 92
- Koehler, Bruno, 122
 quoted, 122
- Kolakowski, Leszek, 14
- Komar, Waclaw, 6
- Kónya, L., 74
- Korean People's Democratic Republic (North Korea), 132
- Kostov, Traicho, 5, 81, 82, 85, 119
- Kott, Jan, 76

- Kracauer, Sigfried
 cited, 67
- Kreikemeyer, Willi, 83
- Krévé-Mickevicius, Vincas, 125
- Kuczka, P., 74, 75
- Labor, industrial (Eastern Europe), 40, 42-43
 workers' morale, 42
- Lange, Max A.
 cited, 64
- Lange, Oskar, 92
 cited, 35, 43
- Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, 14, 19, 53, 61, 83, 131, 133
 cited, 141
 quoted, 61, 131, 139
 theory of intercapitalist wars, 131
- Liberal-Democratic Union of Central Eastern Europe, 150
- Literature (Eastern Europe)
 and Soviet doctrine, 72
 "Socialist realism," 90
 and the Tibor Déry case, 73-74
 writers
 collaborators, 72
 semicollaborators, 72
 spiritual emigrés, 72-73
See also Hungary, Poland
- Literature (Russian)
The Thaw, the publishing of, 74
- Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr.
 cited, 153
- Loebl, Evzen, 82
- Lukács, Georg, 77
- Mackinder, Halford, 156
- McVICKER, CHARLES P., Titoism, 107-114
- Madgearu, Virgil
 cited, 54
- Malenkov, Georgii, 4, 19, 20, 33, 48, 84, 99, 101, 103, 119, 129, 143
 quoted, 12
- Malesherbes, Chrétien Guillaume de Lamoignon de, 97
- Mao Tse-tung, 136
- Marbury, Elizabeth
 cited, 19
- Marx, Karl, 28, 35
 cited, 28
- Marxism-Leninism
 inconsistency in philosophy, 113-114
- Masens, V.
 cited, 151
- Mazur, Franciszek, 92
- Meissner, Boris
 cited, 124
- Merker, Paul, 83
- Metzger, L.
 cited, 54
- Mickevicius-Kapsukas, Vincas, 128
- Middle East, 157
- Mikes, George
 cited, 68
- Mikoyan, Anastas I., 17, 77, 92, 105, 133
 quoted, 17
- Milosz, Czeslaw, 68
- Minc, Hilary, 92
- Moghioros, A., 55, 56
 cited, 55
 quoted, 55
- Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, 60, 80, 92, 99, 119, 129, 143
- Montias, J. M.
 quoted, 88, 94
- MORRIS, BERNARD S., Continuity of Communist Strategic Doctrine Since the Twentieth Party Congress, 130-137
- Nagy, Imre, 4, 6, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 61, 74, 75, 77, 84, 86, 98-101 *passim*, 103, 104, 105, 138, 143, 145, 161
 cited, 16
 quoted, 12, 13, 16, 17, 102
- Nagy, László, 75
- Necker, Jacques, 97
- Nejedly, Zdenek, 14
 quoted, 15
- Németh, László, 78
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 158, 159, 162
- Novotny, Antonin, 120
- Novy, Vilem, 82
- Nowak, Zenon, 86, 92
- Ochab, Edward, 6, 7, 90, 92, 94
 quoted, 91
- Ostrauskas, Kostas, 128
- Pacha, J.
 cited, 47
- Paleckis, Justas, 126
- Palffy, Georgy, 81
- Pálóczi-Horváth, Gy., 77
- Pauker, Ana, 82
- Patrascanu, L., 82
- Peasant Union of Central Eastern Europe, 150
- Philippines, the, 132
- Poland
 agrarian crisis and reforms in, 45, 46, 89, 92
 and Russia, 93-94, 95, 96
 collectivization in, 46, 48
 Communist party in, 2-7 *passim*
 abolished in 1938
 corruption of elites, revelation of, 75, 90
 defense, leadership changes, 93
 Eight Plenum, 92-93
 Gomulka speech at, 93
 Gomulka, dismissal of, 89-90

- leadership, 5-6, 7, 83, 84, 85, 89, 90, 92, 93
 make-up of, 87
 personality cult in, 4, 85
 return to monolithic concept, 94-95
 Seventh Plenum of Central Committee, 91
 split in, 92, 98
 Stalinists, demise of, 85, 86
 Tenth Plenum, 94
 verification campaign, 86-87
 co-operatives, 93
 cultural thaw, 90, 91
 culture, present status of, 78
 decompression and balance of power in Soviet bloc, 95-96
 decollectivization in, 48
 education in, 65-66
 elections in, 18, 94
 Five Year Plan (1956-60), 90
 foreign trade, 10
 industry development of, 39, 40
 literature and the press, 76, 91, 92, 94-95
Poems for Adults, consequences of publication of, 20-21, 76
 "Natolin" group, 76
 "New Course" in, 5, 15, 83, 84-85
 overindustrialization in, 89
 Polish way to socialism, 81, 93
 political prisoners, amnesty for, 90
 productivity, increase in, 42
 religion, 95
 release of Catholic ecclesiastics, 93
 Six Year Plan, 88-89
 Sovietization of, 88
 Soviet middle course policy in, 144
 underground leaders, 90
 United Polish Workers party (UPWP), 88, 89, 90, 93, 94
 uprisings in (fall 1956), 5-7, 42, 85-86, 91, 92, 94, 95, 97, 108, 118, 150
 achievements of, 95
 working class, discontent of, 91-92
See also Purges
 Polish Historical Institute (Rome), 147-148
 Political trials, 8-9, 81, 82, 83
 Population (Eastern Europe)
 overpopulation problem, 42
 Pounds, N. J. G.
 cited, 26
 Purge
 and totalitarian systems, 79-80, 87
 as result of Stalinist policies, 80-81
 defined, 79
 objectives of, 80
 types of, 80
 Purges
 in Baltic States, 126
 in Bulgaria, 3-4, 81-82
 in Czechoslovakia, 3, 81, 82
 and anti-Semitism, 82, 84
 in Eastern Europe, 84
 in Hungary, 3, 81
 in Poland, 3-4, 81, 82, 83, 86-87, 90
 in Rumania, 3, 81, 82-83, 84
 in the German Democratic Republic, 81, 82, 83, 84
 in USSR, 81
 Pushkin, Alexander, 125
 Radio Free Europe, 122
 Radkiewicz, Stanislaw, 90
 Rajk, László, 4, 77, 81, 82, 104, 105, 119
 reburial of, 105
 Rákosi, Mátyás, 4, 6, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 75, 77, 81, 85, 98-105 *passim*
 quoted, 14, 18
 Rankovich, Alexander, 81
 Rapacki, Adam, 92
 Reshetar, John S.
 cited, 63
 Révai, Jozef, 72, 73, 86
 quoted, 141
 ROBERTS, HENRY L., Foreword, vii
 Roberts, Henry L.
 cited, 54
 Rokossovsky, Konstantin, 6, 92, 93
 Roman Catholic Church, 9, 88, 93, 125
 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 155
 Roucek, Joseph S.
 cited, 64
 Rumania, 150, 154
 agrarian reforms in, 45
 capitalism, reascent, in, 57
 collectivization in, 46, 48, 55-56
 Communist party in, 2-7 *passim*
 leadership, 5, 6, 7
 personality cult in, 4
 education in, 65-66
 percentage of workers and peasant sons in student body, 61
 stepped-up program, 60, 61
 technical teaching, increase in, 60
 imports, 42
 industrial bureaucracy, 58, 59
 industry, development of, 39, 40
 land ownership
 medium-sized plot, 56-57
 "New Course" in, 18
 political trials in, 8-9
 population, 53
 economic position of, changes in, 54
 rural, 54
 urban, 54
 Rumanian Workers party
 Second Congress, 55, 56, 57
 Second Five Year Plan
 objectives of, 57, 58
 social structure
 intelligentsia, 60-62

- co-operation with old-regime intellectuals, 62
 persecution of, 60
 release of intellectuals from prison, 60-61
 kulaks, 54, 55, 57
 peasants, 54, 55
 similarities and differences between Rumania and Soviet Russia, 53
 working class, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60
 socialist sector, 55, 56, 57
 technical personnel, 58
 village, social structure of, 56
 workers, industrial, 57-58, 59, 60
 foreman, development of as bridge to management, 59
 discontent among, 58-59
See also Purges
 Salisbury, H. E.
 cited, 151
 Sanders, Irwin T.
 cited, 63
 Scholmer, Joseph
 cited, 127
 Seifert, Jaroslav, 121
 Semenov, I.
 cited, 23, 27
 Semenov, V.
 cited, 132
 SENN, ALFRED ERICH, The Sovietization of the Baltic States, 123-129
 SETON-WATSON, HUGH, Differences in the Communist Parties, 1-7
 Shepilov, Dimitri T., 20, 129
 quoted, 19
 Simon, Brian
 cited, 65
 Široký, Viliam, 120
 quoted, 13
 Skendi, Stavro
 cited, 47, 64
 Slánský, Rudolf, 9, 82, 84, 85, 119
 Slessor, John
 cited, 157
 Smetona, Antanas, 125
 Smogorzewski, Casimir
 cited, 124
 Sniečkus, Antanas, 128
 quoted, 128
 Social democracy *see* Titoism
 Socialism
 economic disappointment of satellite youth in, 68-69
 Socialist Union of Central Eastern Europe, 150
 Sokolova, N.
 cited, 23, 27
 Soviet Union, 148
 "New Course" in, 84
 SPULBER, NICOLAS, The Development of Industry, 36-43
 Spulber, Nicolas
 cited, 26, 30, 40, 45
 Spychalski, Marian, 83, 92, 93
 Stalin, Joseph, 1, 3, 4, 8-12 *passim*, 14, 16, 17, 19, 21, 30, 32, 34, 37, 53, 62, 63, 67, 73, 74, 80, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 92, 97, 98, 104, 107, 108, 119, 120, 126, 130, 132, 133, 136, 138, 140, 142, 145, 155, 160
 cited, 31, 34
 quoted, 31, 32, 34, 134
 Stanislawski, Jan, quoted, 76
 STILLMAN, EDMUND O., The Beginning of the Thaw, 1953-1955, 12-21
 Stoica, Chivu, 58
 Stolypin, Piotr Arkadevich, 97
 Stomma, Stanislaw
 quoted, 96
 Strafford, 1st Earl (Sir Thomas Wentworth), 105
 Swiatlo, Józef, 5, 75, 90
 Syria, 132
 Tamási, Áron, 75
 Tardos, Tibor, 76, 77
 Tenth International Congress of Historical Sciences, 148
 Tigrid, P.
 cited, 151
 Tilea, V. V.
 cited, 151
 Tito, Marshall (Josip Broz), 6, 10, 20, 80, 85, 104, 107-114 *passim*, 120, 136, 138, 140, 142-145 *passim*, 160
 Titoism
 acceptance of theses by Soviets, 108
 agriculture, reforms in under, 111
 and Polish reform, 108
 and Stalinism, 108, 113, 114
 and Yugoslav independence, 107
 marriage between Communist and Western ideologies, 107
 blend of Communist and Western ways, 107
 citizen's councils, 111-112
 citizens' self-government, 108, 111-112
 civil and criminal law, reforms of under, 112
 corrosive effect of on Soviet satellite area, 108
 decentralization and Communist party modernization under, 109, 111, 112, 114
 economic reforms, 109
 free market, return to, 109-110, 111
 economy, control of, 110-111
 taxation, 110
 Fundamental Law of January party and bureaucracy, 113

politico-administrative reforms under, 111-112
 producers' councils, 112
 theory, 108-109
 wages and bonuses, 110-111
 workers' councils, 110-111
 workers' self-management, 108, 109, 110-111
 Togliatti, Palmiro, 134
 cited, 134
 quoted, 134
 Tolstoy, Leo, 125
 TOMASEVICH, JOZO, Agriculture in Eastern Europe, 44-52
 Turgot, Anne Robert Jacques, Baron de L'Aulne, 97

 Union of Polish Youth, 93
 United Nations, 7, 156, 161
 United States, 127, 131, 140, 149, 151, 155, 160, 161
 United Polish Peasant party, 93, 94
 Urbanization (Eastern Europe), 42

 Vacietis, J., 148
 VALKENIER, ELIZABETH K., Eastern Europe in Exile, 146-152
 Varga, Eugene, 142
 Vas Zoltan
 quoted, 17
 Veres, Peter, 14
 Voice of America, 122
 Voznesensky, Nikolai A., 80
 Vukmanović-Tempo, Svetozar
 cited, 110


 Warsaw Pact, 153, 161

 Watnick, Morris, 130
 Wazyk, Adam, 20, 76
 quoted, 20, 21, 78
 Western Europe, 155, 156, 159
 Wiles, P. J. D.
 cited, 34
 Winston, V. H.
 cited, 26
 Witte, Count Sergei Yulyevich, 97
 Wyszynski, Stefan, 93
 quoted, 69

 Xoxe, Koci, 119

 Yugoslavia, 10, 133, 154, 159
 and Soviet Russia, 107, 108, 110, 111
 agrarian reforms in, 45, 46
 collectivization in, 46, 48
 Communist party in, 2
 decollectivization in, 48
 expulsion of from Cominform, 107
 imports, 42
 industry, development of, 42
 See also Titoism


 Zaisser, Else, 83
 Zápotocký, Antonin, 4, 120
 Zelk, Zoltán, 77
 Zhdanov, Andrei A., 73, 74, 76
 Zhukov, G. K., 119, 144
 Zilliacus, Konni
 cited, 144
 Zinner, Paul E.
 cited, 144
 Zukoroski, Stanley
 cited, 68



THE ANNALS

OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

Asia and Future World Leadership



July 1958

BOOK DEPARTMENT: NEW LITERATURE
IN THE FIELD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

COLUMBIA

PHILIPPINE FREEDOM, 1946-1958

ROBERT AURA SMITH. This account of the birth and development of the republic of the Philippines gives a vivid picture of the first of the modern "colonial" states in Asia to gain its independence. After sketching the history of the American administration, Mr. Smith tells of the problems facing the new nation at the end of the Second World War — a shattered economy, inflation, and the "Huk" rebellion — and explains how Ramon Magsaysay rose to power to meet those problems. Final chapters report on the election of November, 1957, and weigh the prospects for the future.

\$5.00

A SERBIAN VILLAGE

JOEL MARTIN HALPERN, a social anthropologist, spent a year in the Serbian village of Orašac to observe the process of social and cultural change in a community that has historically felt the influences of foreign cultures. He examines how strongly native cultural patterns have endured under pressures to conform to the communistic political and social system of today. This is the first community study in English on Yugoslavia and one of the few works of social anthropology available for the whole Balkan and East European area.

Illustrated. \$6.00

THE ADVENT OF THE LABOUR PARTY

PHILIP P. POIRIER. Based upon unpublished private papers and official documents, this is an important study of the British Labour Party that centers mainly on a crucial period of its history, from the turn of the century to its emergence as a major political force in the General Election of 1906. Dr. Poirier's book throws new light on British interparty politics before the First World War and relates the Labour movement to the broader forces of change in British life.

\$4.50



COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y.

Publishers of THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA

Entered as second-class matter, January 21, 1939, at the post-office at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, under the Act of August 24, 1912. Accepted for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in paragraph (d-2), Section 34.40, P. L. & R. of 1948, authorized January 21, 1939.

VOLUME 318

JULY 1958

THE ANNALS

*of The American Academy of Political
and Social Science*

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*

RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Assistant Editor*



ASIA AND FUTURE WORLD LEADERSHIP

Edited by

JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH, Ph.D.

*Professor of Political Science
University of Pennsylvania
President, The American
Academy of Political and
Social Science*

69629

© 1958, by
THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
All rights reserved

PHILADELPHIA
1958

CONTENTS

	PAGE
FOREWORD	<i>James C. Charlesworth</i> viii

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS IN ASIA

ASIA'S INCREASING POPULATION	<i>Irene B. Taeuber</i> 1
RELIGION AND LANGUAGE AS FORCES AFFECTING UNITY IN ASIA	<i>W. Norman Brown</i> 8
THE ASIAN ECONOMIC POTENTIAL	<i>Wilfred Malenbaum</i> 18

POLITICAL AND INTELLECTUAL FACTORS IN ASIA

INTELLECTUAL PROGRESS IN THE EAST	<i>Harry Emerson Wildes</i> 27
A BURMESE VIEW OF WORLD TENSIONS	<i>U Thant</i> 34
AN INDONESIAN POLICY AIMED AT MAINTAINING FREEDOM AND PROMOTING WORLD PEACE	<i>Moekarto Notowidigdo</i> 43
HATTA AND CO-OPERATIVES: THE MIDDLE WAY FOR INDONESIA?	<i>Benjamin Higgins</i> 49

ASIA AND THE WEST

LEADERSHIP IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC AND SOUTHEAST ASIA	<i>Paul M. A. Linebarger</i> 58
UNITED STATES POSTWAR POLICY IN ASIA	<i>James P. Warburg</i> 72

CURRENT NATIONALISM IN ASIA

ASIAN XENOPHOBIA AGAINST THE WEST	<i>Chitra Fernando</i> 83
ASIAN NATIONALISM VIS-À-VIS OTHER ASIAN NATIONS	<i>Gaganvihari L. Mehta</i> 89
POSSIBLE PERMANENT CLEAVAGES IN ASIA	<i>You Chan Yang</i> 97

MILITARY FACTORS: EAST AND WEST

THE SOVIET EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY STRENGTH FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES <i>Herbert S. Dinerstein</i>	104
BELIEF IN THE CONTINUED SOLIDARITY OF OUR WESTERN ALLIANCES <i>Anthony J. Drexel Biddle</i>	113
CONDITIONS OF EAST-WEST PEACE	<i>Frederick C. Barghoorn</i> 122

CONDITIONS MAKING FOR FUTURE WORLD LEADERSHIP

FACTORS LOOKING TO EASTERN WORLD LEADERSHIP	<i>Mohammed Ali</i> 132
FACTORS LOOKING TO WESTERN WORLD LEADERSHIP	<i>Thomas K. Finletter</i> 138
INDEX	211

BOOK DEPARTMENT

PAGE

ASIA AND THE ARAB WORLD

- BALLHATCHET, KENNETH. *Social Policy and Social Change in Western India, 1817-1830*. Robert I. Crane, Assistant Professor of History, University of Michigan 150
- BODDE, DERK. *China's Cultural Tradition*. Francis L. K. Hsu, Chairman, Department of Anthropology, Northwestern University 146
- CHENG, TIEN-FONG. *A History of Sino-Russian Relations*. Earl H. Pritchard, Associate Professor of Far Eastern History, University of Chicago 147
- EDMONDS, C. J. *Kurds, Turks, and Arabs*. Avedis K. Sanjian, Research Fellow, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University 154
- GIBB, H. A. R., and HAROLD BOWEN. *Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century*. Dankwart A. Rustow, Associate Professor of Politics and Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University 153
- MAXON, YALE CANDEE. *Control of Japanese Foreign Policy*. Herbert Passin, Research Associate, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Ohio State University 149
- PATAI, RAPHAEL. *The Kingdom of Jordan*. Edwin M. Wright, Lecturer, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University 151
- RICE, TAMARA TALBOT. *The Scythians*. Samuel Noah Kramer, Professor of Assyriology and Curator of the Tablet Collection, University Museum, University of Pennsylvania 154
- SIU, R. G. H. *The Tao of Science*. Pitirim A. Sorokin, Director, Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism, Cambridge, Mass. 146
- VAN DER MEULEN, D. *The Wells of Ibn Sa'ud*. William Yale, Professor of History, Boston University 152
- VATCHER, WILLIAM H., JR. *Panmunjom*. Harold Vinacke, Professor of Political Science, University of Cincinnati 148
- ZIMMERMAN, ANTHONY F. *"Overpopulation": A Study of Papal Teachings on the Problem, With Special Reference to Japan*. Paul H. Landis, Professor of Sociology, State College of Washington 150

POLITICAL THEORY

- ACHESON, DEAN. *Power and Diplomacy*. George B. de Huszar, Chicago, Ill. 155
- DUNAYEVSKAYA, RAYA. *Marxism and Freedom*. Anatole G. Mazour, Assistant Professor of History, Stanford University 159
- HAINES, C. GROVE (Ed.). *European Integration*. Milton Gilbert, Director of Economics and Statistics, Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, Paris 157
- LISKA, GEORGE. *International Equilibrium*. D. F. Fleming, Research Professor of International Relations, Vanderbilt University 156
- MONTGOMERY, JOHN D. *Forced To Be Free*. Norbert Muhlen, New York City 157
- SLESSOR, JOHN. *The Great Deterrent*. Gordon B. Turner, Professor of Maritime History, Naval War College 160

AMERICAN HISTORY

- BOWERS, CLAUDE G. *Chile Through Embassy Windows*. Arthur P. Whitaker, Professor of Latin American History, University of Pennsylvania 165
- CUNNINGHAM, NOBLE E., JR. *The Jeffersonian Republicans*. Donald H. Stewart, Professor of History, State Teachers College, Cortland, N. Y. 163
- MEYERS, MARVIN. *The Jacksonian Persuasion*. Richard P. Longaker, Associate Professor of Political Science, Kenyon College 164

PAGE

- OSTRANDER, GILMAN M. *The Prohibition Movement in California, 1848-1933*. Peter H. Odegard, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley 160
- PATTERSON, SAMUEL WHITE. *Knight Errant of Liberty*. T. Harry Williams, Professor of History, Louisiana State University 162
- SCHLESINGER, ARTHUR M., SR. *Prelude to Independence*. Robert Leroy Hildrup, Professor of History, Mary Washington College, University of Virginia 164

EUROPEAN HISTORY

- BARK, WILLIAM CARROLL. *Origins of the Medieval World*. Albert Hyma, Professor of History, University of Michigan 172
- BOLLES, BLAIR. *The Big Change in Europe*. Joseph J. Mathews, Professor of History, Emory University 176
- BREA, L. BERNABÒ. *Sicily Before the Greeks*. Machteld J. Mellink, Associate Professor of Classical Archaeology, Bryn Mawr College 171
- BROGAN, D. W. *The French Nation*. W. Henry Cooke, Professor of History, Emeritus, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, Calif. 170
- BUTLER, J. R. M. *Grand Strategy*, Vol. II. John Miller, Jr., Office of the Chief of Military History, U. S. Department of the Army 174
- FREUND, GERALD. *Unholy Alliance*. Gerard Braunthal, Assistant Professor of Government, University of Massachusetts 174
- HELMREICH, ERNST C. (Ed.). *Hungary*. Joseph S. Roucek, Professor of Sociology and Political Science, University of Bridgeport 173
- HISCOCKS, RICHARD. *Democracy in Western Germany*. Roger H. Wells, Professor of Political Science, Bryn Mawr College 177
- KENNAN, GEORGE F. *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920*, Vol. II. David J. Dallin, New York City 168
- KIRKPATRICK, EVRON M. (Ed.). *Year of Crisis*. Otto Heilbrunn, Gerrards Cross, Bucks, England 177
- MATHEWS, JOSEPH J. *Reporting the Wars*. Frederic E. Merwin, Director, School of Journalism, Rutgers University 175
- MEYER, KARL W. *Karl Liebknecht*. Ralph Haswell Lutz, Professor of History, Emeritus, Stanford University 168
- MITCHELL, WILLIAMS M. *The Rise of the Revolutionary Party in the English House of Commons, 1603-1629*. Alfred F. Havighurst, Professor of History, Amherst College 169
- NAMIER, LEWIS. *Vanished Supremacies*. Louis L. Snyder, Professor of History, The City College of New York 166
- RUNCIMAN, STEVEN. *The Sicilian Vespers*. Joseph R. Strayer, Professor of History, Princeton University 171
- TOMPKINS, STUART RAMSAY. *The Russian Intelligentsia*. Murray Polner, Lecturer in History, Brooklyn College 167

ECONOMICS AND LABOR

- BOULDING, KENNETH E. *The Skills of the Economist*. Michael O'Connor, Professor of Economics, Central Michigan College 178
- Britain and Europe*. Allan G. B. Fisher, Washington, D. C. 181
- BROWN, J. DOUGLAS, and FREDERICK HARBISON. *High-Talent Manpower for Science and Industry*. Van D. Kennedy, Professor of Industrial Relations, Department of Business Administration, University of California, Berkeley 191

	PAGE
CHAMBERLAIN, NEIL W., FRANK C. PIERSON, and THERESA WOLFSON (Eds.). <i>A Decade of Industrial Relations Research, 1946-1956</i> . Selig Perlman, Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin	191
CIRVANTE, V. R. <i>The Indian Capital Market</i> . Arthur Leon Horniker, Washington, D. C.	180
DAVIES, R. W. <i>The Development of the Soviet Budgetary System</i> . Franklyn D. Holzman, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Washington	180
DICK, WILLIAM E. <i>Atomic Energy in Agriculture</i> . Claude Gifford, Associate Editor, <i>The Farm Journal</i> , Philadelphia, Pa.	190
GOLDSMITH, RAYMOND W. <i>Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy Since 1900</i> . Charles Hoffmann, Department of Economics, Queens College, Flushing, N. Y.	189
GOLDSMITH, RAYMOND W. <i>A Study of Saving in the United States</i> , Vols. I and II. M. Bronfenbrenner, Professor of Economics, Michigan State University	184
GOLDSMITH, RAYMOND W., DOROTHY S. BRADY, and HORST MENDERSHAUSEN. <i>A Study of Saving in the United States</i> , Vol. III. M. Bronfenbrenner, Professor of Economics, Michigan State University	183
JAMIESON, STUART. <i>Industrial Relations in Canada</i> . H. A. Logan, Labor Relations Consultant, Ontario Department of Labour, Toronto	194
JENKS, C. WILFRED. <i>The International Protection of Trade Union Freedom</i> . Herman Patteet, Permanent Representative, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Geneva, Switzerland	193
KINDLEBERGER, CHARLES P. <i>Economic Development</i> . Jerome B. Cohen, Professor of Economics, College of the City of New York	186
LEIBENSTEIN, HARVEY. <i>Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth</i> . Philip W. Buck, Professor of Political Science, Stanford University	185
LUNDBERG, ERIK. <i>Business Cycles and Economic Policy</i> . K. E. Boulding, Professor of Economics, University of Michigan	179
PERLMAN, MARK. <i>Labor Union Theories in America</i> . Morris David Morris, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Washington	196
SCHLOSS, HENRY H. <i>The Bank for International Settlements</i> . Frank Whitson Fetter, Professor of Economics, Northwestern University	188
SMITH, HOWARD R. <i>Government and Business</i> . Robert Rockafellow, Professor of Economics, University of Rhode Island	188
TIMOSHENKO, VLADIMIR P., and BORIS C. SWERLING. <i>The World's Sugar</i> . Wilfred Malenbaum, Visiting Professor of Economics, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology	187
WALKER, CHARLES R. <i>Toward the Automatic Factory</i> . A. K. Rice, Consultant, Tavistock Institute, London	193
WALKER, GILBERT. <i>Economic Planning by Programme and Control in Great Britain</i> . Mary E. Murphy, Professor of Business Administration, Los Angeles State College of Applied Arts and Sciences	182
YEARLEY, CLIFTON K., JR. <i>Britons in American Labor</i> . John P. Windmuller, Associate Professor of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University	195

SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

BERNERT, ELEANOR H. <i>America's Children</i> . Clyde V. Kiser, Technical Staff, Milbank Memorial Fund	199
BEYER, GLENN H. <i>Housing: A Factual Analysis</i> . Charles S. Ascher, Professor of Political Science, Brooklyn College	200

	PAGE
FARNSWORTH, PAUL R. <i>The Social Psychology of Music</i> . John H. Mueller, Professor of Sociology, Indiana University	203
JACOB, PHILIP E. <i>Changing Values in College</i> . Samuel S. Stratton, President, Middlebury College	197
LATOURETTE, KENNETH SCOTT. <i>World Service</i> . Justin Wroe Nixon, Professor of Christian Theology and Ethics, Emeritus, Colgate-Rochester Divinity School ...	207
NIEBUHR, REINHOLD. <i>Pious and Secular America</i> . Conrad Henry Moehlman, Professor of the History of Christianity, Emeritus, Colgate-Rochester Divinity School	205
ROSE, ARNOLD M. (Ed.). <i>The Institutions of Advanced Societies</i> . Rhoda Métraux, Institute for Intercultural Studies, New York City	197
SAUVY, ALFRED. <i>La nature sociale</i> . J. R. Kantor, Professor of Psychology, Indiana University	202
SHRYOCK, RICHARD HARRISON. <i>National Tuberculosis Association, 1904-1954</i> . Erwin H. Ackerknecht, Director, Medizinhistorisches Institut, Universität Zürich ..	206
TÖNNIES, FERDINAND. <i>Community & Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft)</i> . George E. Simpson, Chairman, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Oberlin College	198
VON MERING, OTTO, and STANLEY H. KING. <i>Remotivating the Mental Patient</i> . Richard Lonsdorf, Instructor in Psychiatry, School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania	201
WINCH, ROBERT F. <i>Mate-Selection: A Study of Complementary Needs</i> . William M. Kephart, Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania	204
WOLFE, DON M. <i>The Image of Man in America</i> . Glenn M. Vernon, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Central Michigan College	204
WOOFER, THOMAS J. <i>Southern Race Progress</i> . Roscoe C. Hinkle, Jr., Assistant Professor of Sociology, Ohio State University	201
OTHER BOOKS	207

The articles appearing in THE ANNALS are indexed in the *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature* and the *Industrial Arts Index*.

FOREWORD

The papers in this volume of *THE ANNALS* are the addresses presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academy, April 11–12, 1958, at the Warwick Hotel, Philadelphia.

The audience was made up of representatives of many countries, including delegates from 24 embassies; 14 United Nations missions; 95 universities and colleges; 144 civic, cultural, and scientific organizations; and a number of cities and states. Attendance at the six sessions averaged 540 persons. A number of delegates and observers spoke extemporaneously from the floor at the conclusion of the prepared statements.

Several persons attending the meetings, observing that the roster of speakers included representatives of six Asian countries, inquired as to why such a strategic area as the Middle East had no spokesman on the platform. There were two reasons for their absence. First, the area is the focus of world attention because of a conflict between two local ways of life and also because of pressures attributed to two antipodal world powers. The conflicts there are not, strictly speaking, of Asian significance. Second, if this reason were not enough, it was known that the two most appropriate speakers representing the area—Mr. Eban of Israel and Mr. Malik of Lebanon—were not available.

JAMES C. CHARLESWORTH

Asia's Increasing Population

By IRENE B. TAEUBER

ABSTRACT: The population of Asia today is five times what it was three centuries ago. In 1950 the world population was 2.5 billion people and that of Asia 1.4 billion people. Rates of growth have been high. Factors in this growth have been many and varied: administrative control which brought peace to certain areas, particularly when it also brought agricultural improvements; the introduction of new foods; improved sanitation; increased production and movement of foods; and recent Western scientific and technical advances. However while Asia's population was growing, its economic change was partial and its social change muted. Rates of growth are increasing because birth rates remain at their ancient levels while death rates decline. Continuation of this situation to the end of the century would increase the population from 1.5 billion of the year 1955 to 4.2 billion in the year 2000. The decisions of the governments of great Asian countries to slow population increase through encouraging planned parenthood indicate that resolution of the problem of growth may come through reduced fertility rather than increased mortality. The case of Japan is given as an example.

*Irene B. Taeuber is a Research Associate, Office of Population Research, Princeton University. She has served as consultant in demography to international organizations and to various agencies of the United States government. Her recent works include a joint authorship of the census monograph, *The Changing Population of the United States* (1957). Her major study, *The Population of Japan*, will be published by the Princeton University Press in the summer of 1958.*

IN 1950, there were 2.5 billion people in the world, and 1.4 billion of them were in Asia. In 1960, there will be about 2.9 billion people in the world, and 1.6 billion of them will be in Asia.¹ Growth in this single decade will amount to 420 million for the world, to 240 million for Asia. These specific figures may be questioned, for two years of the decade remain in the future, and the censuses, vital statistics, and other figures for many countries are dubious in their accuracy. The fundamental fact cannot be questioned. Sharply reduced mortality and unchanging fertility are producing rates of growth unparalleled in world history.

The regions, the peoples, and the cultures of Asia are diverse. So also are the relations of population to resources, the rates of population growth in the present, and the prospects for growth in the immediate and the longer-run futures. Since here we are discussing the over-all view, there must be broad generalization about that three-fifths of the world's people who live on the largest of its continents. Since the focus is the future, there must be emphasis on process rather than on status. Hence the growth of the past will be surveyed to see how Asia achieved its massive populations and why birth rates did not decline along with death rates. There will then be an examination of what popu-

¹ The compilations and estimates of Asian and world population used throughout this report are the work of the Population Branch in the Bureau of Social Affairs in the United Nations. For the estimates of historic populations and their rates of growth, see: United Nations, Population Division. "The Past and Future Growth of World Population: A Long-range View," *Population Bulletin of the United Nations*, No. 1 (December 1951), pp. 1-12. *Ibid.*, "Framework for Future Population Estimates, 1950-1980," *Proceedings of the World Population Conference, 1954*, Vol. III, pp. 283-324. The projection will be published as *The Future Growth of World Population*, ST/SOA/Series A, No. 28 (New York, 1958).

lations would be in the future if the trends of the recent past continued until the end of the century. And, finally, there will be some comments on the forces that may make changes in the populations of sovereign nations differ from those that characterized colonial areas.

THE DEVELOPMENTS

The distinctive characteristics of Asian populations are products of the growth and diffusion of the great civilizations rather than the simpler cultures whose modern bearers inhabit the isolated and peripheral areas. Intensive agriculture, and particularly irrigation, required order and continuity in local areas and broad regions. Cohesion in village life, co-operation in economic tasks, and universal labor were essential to the survival of the people who existed at the moment and to the preservation of their ways of life for their descendants. The individual existed within the family, and the family was dedicated to continuity rather than to the happiness of its members.

Marriage occurred early, especially for women, and there were few who did not marry. Birth rates were very high, apparently far higher than those in medieval Europe. The barriers to rapid or continuing growth were formidable, despite the abundant production of children. Death rates were high in normal times, for the major concentrations of people were in semitropical or tropical areas where disease was prevalent, and the close life of the villages spread contagion. Undernourishment, famine, and epidemic were frequent. Internal disorders and external conquests occasionally produced devastation and depopulation. The unrestored irrigation tanks of Ceylon and the ruins of Cambodia attest to the catastrophes that have occurred. Semiarid and desert areas that were once centers of irrigated agricul-

ture and cities buried beneath the shifting dust portray the vicissitudes in the past growth of Asian populations.

The year 1650 is a convenient one from which to view the modern phase of Asia's population increase. The industrial revolution had not yet altered the nature of population growth among European peoples. The settlement of the Americas was beginning, while the increase of the Chinese people during the Ching dynasty lay in the future.

In the middle of the seventeenth century, there were 470 million people in the world.² Some 257 million people lived in Asian areas below the Soviet frontier. Thus, prior to the upsurge of European populations and the spread of European influences throughout the world, Asia included about half of all the people in the world.

Many factors were involved in the growth of Asian populations in the centuries when most of Asia remained premodern in economy and social structure. Sometimes developments in Asian areas were favorable to increase over considerable periods of time. Administrative control that brought peace to local areas often resulted in appreciable population growth, especially when it was accompanied by central or local activities to expand cultivated acreages and to in-

² Figures on the populations of the world and its major regions in past centuries are compilations of estimates that were built up gradually with the concurrence of the various Western scholars who struggled with the problems. Elements of uncertainty are great, especially for Asia; and, within Asia, for China. The acceptance, rejection, or modification of the figures of the Ching dynasty for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and those of the People's Republic of China for the modern period are controversial topics. There are no accepted series of estimates for continental and world populations that utilize either the data derived from the statistical activities in Asian countries after World War II or the materials and research of recent years on the population histories of specific areas.

crease or improve irrigation systems. The introduction and spread of new foods, such as the sweet potato, permitted the land to maintain larger numbers of people without changes in technology.

The initial influence of the commercial expansion of Europe on the peoples of Asia differed from one area to another. Contact with the West brought decimation if not extermination to many of the island peoples. Introduced diseases, economic dislocations, and interferences with political and social institutions probably brought increased death rates to many peoples in many areas of the mainland, but measurement is seldom possible. Soon, however, there were counteracting forces. In the areas of European occupation or operation, there were likely to be some activities to improve sanitation and to increase the production and movement of food. Even minimum transportation facilities permitted some movements of food and so some reductions of the mortality associated with famines.

As Western science and technology developed and colonial governments became more extensive, more efficient, and more humane, a pattern of population growth developed in Asia. It was a product, not alone of the policies of colonial powers, but of the nature of the industrial civilization, and it owed much of its course and many of its distinctive characteristics to the local cultures. There was economic development, but it was of a specific type. There was either export of a portion of peasant production or a special sector in the economy that produced for the export market. There was no comprehensive industrial development and hence only a limited development of a technically skilled labor force. Public health was advanced in so far as funds and personnel permitted. There was advanced education for a very few, but severely restricted

elementary education preserved mass illiteracy. Native people and colonial rulers lived side by side, but in separate societies that limited diffusion from the one to the other.

Economic change was partial, and social change was muted. The people remained agricultural and rural. Family systems and values retained their ancient orientations. Political, economic, and health activities operated to reduce death rates and perhaps to increase birth rates. The sterility associated with famines, epidemics, and debility may have decreased. Lowered death rates increased the proportions of girl babies who survived to marriageable age. In many instances, controls of births that had been widely practiced in the past were defined as barbaric. Thus stable or increasing birth rates existed alongside declining death rates. Rates of population growth increased.

There were wide variations in the detailed patterns and the chronology of the developments from the middle of the seventeenth to the middle of the twentieth centuries. In Asia Minor the Ottoman Empire long governed non-Turkic peoples, while in the Far East Japan developed as an industrial nation and held Asian areas as colonies in the European tradition. Neither Thailand nor China became overtly colonial. For the continent as a whole, population growth proceeded at an increasing rate. As we noted earlier, the accepted estimates give Asia 257 million people in 1650. Numbers increased more than two and one-half times to reach about 650 million in 1850. In 1930, the population of Asia was more than one billion. In 1950, it was 1.4 billion. And, as we noted earlier, it will probably be about 1.6 billion in 1960.

Asia had about five times as many people in 1950 as it had had in 1650. In a sense this was not unique, for the world's population of 2.5 billion in 1950

was also five times its population of 470 million in 1650. In Asia, though, numbers had multiplied again and again while conditions of living changed little. The 1.4 billion people of 1950, as the 257 million of 1650, were predominantly agricultural and rural. Illiteracy was high, and per-capita productivity was low. Japan alone was industrial and urban. The newly independent nations had the large populations that had been generated by three centuries or more of limited economic development and blocked social transformation. They had the high potential for growth implicit in their family systems, the mores of their people, and the quiescent acceptance of a way of life that had existed for many generations.

THE PRESENT

The movement of 1.4 billion people from the ancient agrarian to the modern industrial world would have been a gigantic task under any circumstances. A coincidence of great historical events compounded the difficulties. The Japanese war in the Pacific terminated not alone the Japanese Empire and Western political power in Asia but the colonial system. Independence came swiftly for Asian peoples, though for some of them the path lay through strife, war, and revolution. The political retreat of the Western powers and the period of revolutionary change eased the rapid advance of Soviet imperialism. Mainland China became a Communist People's Republic, while sharp lines divided the parts of Korea and Vietnam. Defense expenditures, blocked channels of trade, and ideological schisms compounded the problems of modernization.

Scientific and technical advances in the West have often contributed to the solution of population and other problems in Asia, but in the last decade they were instrumental in making the rate of population growth a major hazard to

economic advance and political stability in many areas where population problems were already acute. Insecticides, antibiotics, and other products of the laboratories can be used by public health services to reduce death rates spectacularly and cheaply. This can be done without increases in per-capita income, improvements in nutrition, or social changes. The activities that lead to reduced mortality are largely extraneous to village and family life. Hence the functional associations between high fertility and high mortality are broken, at least for the short run.

Thus the dimensions of the population, economic, and social problems of the Asian nations have been altered. Formerly populations grew slowly, for the types of economic and social advance that led to reduced death rates led eventually to declining birth rates. Today high birth rates and low death rates exist alongside each other. In one after another of the smaller countries and in region after region of the larger countries, rates of natural increase approach or surpass 3 per cent a year. It must be emphasized that in Asia these rates of increase are not occurring in countries whose economies can easily sustain them. They are occurring in countries where people are settled densely on the land, techniques are archaic, skills are limited, people are illiterate, and familism is largely intact.

A rate of population increase of 2 or 3 per cent a year may seem a lesser factor in the acute problems of economic development and political stability that confront Asian peoples today. In fact, the size of the population in relation to the immediately available resources and the rate of growth of that population are factors in many different types of problems in all the countries of the continent. The present difficulties in Indonesia must be interpreted against the background of the densely settled

and rapidly increasing Javanese who cannot be maintained without economic assistance from the Outer Islands. The relation of population growth to the achievement of planned economic development requires mention only since it is considered in a later paper. Educational advance requires the provision of schools and teachers, not simply for a constant but for a rapidly increasing number of youth. The internal migration from rural to urban areas may be a normal aspect of the growth of the industrial economy. It may occur without industrial growth. In this case, urbanization may represent a concentration of the society's problems of poverty and disorganization rather than progress in the solution of its social, economic, and demographic problems.

THE FUTURE

The practical problems of population growth involve both their intimate relation with other problems at given times and their cumulative nature. With rates of increase such as those now emerging in Asia, populations that are initially large soon reach very high numbers. In a recent series of projections, the staff of the Population Branch of the Bureau of Social Affairs of the United Nations determined the populations that would be produced in future decades if the fertility of Asia's population remained at the level indicated by a gross reproduction rate of 3.0 at the same time that mortality declined along the general path followed in other countries. If this coincidence of unchanging fertility and declining mortality were to continue, the population of Asia would increase from the 1.5 billion of 1955 to 2.2 billion in 1975 and 4.2 billion in 2000. The increase in numbers would amount to 720 million between 1955 and 1975, to 2.0 billion between 1975 and 2000.

An Asia of 4.2 billion people in a world of 6.9 billion people is an awesome prospect for the end of the century. It is not possible to estimate the probability that the numbers in the actual populations of the future will correspond to those that have been estimated for that future. It should be noted, however, that the realizations of populations such as these in the year 2000 would permit no Malthusian interpretations. If Asia does have a population of more than four billion at the end of the century, that population will have been fed, clothed, and sheltered, and it will have had the levels of nutrition and the medical supplies that permitted its low death rates.

There may be a contradiction in the assumption that high and unchanging fertility continues to coexist with declining mortality in the large Asian populations. The maintenance of the increasing numbers of people would require rapid economic growth. Increasing proportions of peasant youth would have to leave agricultural for industrial employment. Rapid urbanization would be a necessary correlate of such industrialization. Major educational advances would be essential. But the experiences of Western countries and Japan alike indicate that industrialization, urbanization, and advancing education lead eventually to declining fertility.

Whatever changes may be produced by the social and economic developments of future decades, there are as yet few signs of significant decline in the fertility of any of the peoples of Asia below the Soviet frontier. If economic development continues in a milieu of peace, death rates will doubtless continue to move downward. It is reasonable, therefore, to assess the populations that would exist if systematic and widespread declines in fertility did not begin until the year 1975 but then continued

to the year 2000.³ Under these assumptions, the projections of the United Nations' Secretariat indicate that the population that was 1.4 billion in 1950 would reach 2.2 billion in 1975 and 3.9 billion at the end of the century. The retardation in the rate of population growth would not be sufficient to preclude enormous increases in the populations of the Asian countries in the latter half of this century.

Although declining birth rates are not yet apparent in the great populations of Asia, it may help in the assessment of the future to assume that such declines come quickly and that they persist without interruption over the rest of this century. One of the series of projections made by the staff of the Population Branch of the United Nations involved the assumption that fertility and mortality alike declined according to consistent patterns from the year 1955 to the year 2000. If this coincidence in decline occurred, population increase would continue, but it would be reduced greatly in amount and in speed. The population of all Asia below the Soviet frontier would grow from the 1.4 billion of 1950 to 2.0 billion in 1975 and 2.9 billion in 2000. The absolute increase in the last quarter of the century would be greater than that in the third quarter of the century, but the rate of increase would be slowing. The gross reproduction rate would have been cut in half. Population increase would no

³ The problem of projecting declining fertility in a great region where such decline has not begun is a difficult one. In the projections of the Population Branch of the United Nations, a uniform annual decline is assumed, the amount of that decline being a generalization of European experience. The assumption amounts roughly to reducing the gross reproduction rate from 3.00 to 2.25 in the first twenty-five years of decline, and then from 2.25 to 1.50 in the second twenty-five years of decline. Thus the gross reproduction rate is cut in half in fifty years.

longer reflect the imbalance of an unchanged birth rate and a sharply reduced death rate. Instead, that growth which was still occurring would be the difference between a relatively low birth rate and a generally low death rate. The termination of growth could be anticipated sometime in the early portion of the twenty-first century.

Unfortunately, there is little basis in Asian experience for anticipating immediate, regular, and almost automatic declines in fertility. The experiences of Japan and Turkey alike suggest that the fertility of Asian peasants is not likely to decline soon or swiftly in the absence of government action and intensive educational campaigns.

It is possible that new patterns of fertility decline may emerge in Asia. If the analysis of the future is focused backward on the historic experiences of European peoples or on the situation in Asia itself in recent centuries, the possibilities for radical innovations in the approach to population problems in Asian lands may appear slight. If the analysis is focused on the governments and peoples of contemporary Asia and a major break-through in scientific research on human fertility is recognized as possible, the problems of the future differ in form and in dimensions. The governments of Mainland China and of India have policies to limit the increase of their populations through the encouragement of planned parenthood. Other governments, including that of Pakistan, are sponsoring activities in this field. The interest of Asian peoples in the experience of Japan is great, for here permissive legislation on abortion and sterilization combined with government-sponsored education for contraception led to a precipitant drop in fertility unmatched elsewhere in the world.

It is widely recognized that industrial

Japan offers no firm basis for assessing the probable future in agrarian Asia. It should be noted, however, that drastic changes did occur in the fertility of the Japanese, including both peasants and urban dwellers, and that these declines were not foreseen by statesmen or by publicists. They were not predicted by demographers, whether in or outside Japan. And, as far as the author knows, no students predicted the legalization of all means of population control by Mainland China and the advances of political and educational activities to spread the practice of birth control in a Marxian state. These are segments of the evidence which suggests that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe and historic Asia may be unsafe guides to the population prospects of Asian countries.

Perhaps economic development can keep pace for a while with rates of population increase of 2 or 3 per cent a year. Perhaps Asia can move through a demographic transition that gives her a population of 12 to 15 billion sometime in the next century. Perhaps growth is such an insuperable problem that Asian peoples can escape only temporarily from a ruthless limitation of their numbers by malnutrition, debility, and premature death. Perhaps there are optimistic possibilities also, with biological and social science contributing the means and the techniques for achieving reductions in fertility that parallel those in mortality, thus permitting humane solutions to the problems of rapid population increase in the Asian setting. The answers are known to none of us. They will be given in the actions of Asian governments and the decisions of Asian peoples, not alone in the restricted field of fertility control but in the broad fields of economic development and social change.

Religion and Language as Forces Affecting Unity in Asia

By W. NORMAN BROWN

ABSTRACT: Religion and language move Asians less than anticolonialism and the desire for economic development. It is the hope of Asian countries to attain increased agricultural production, industrial expansion, more equitable distribution of wealth, and the attainment of the good life for their citizens. In the Near East religion and language furnish some of the background for Islamic and Arab hostility to Israel, but they are not strong enough to unite either the Islamic or the Arab nations. In the Far East and Southeast Asia, they play scarcely any part. In South Asia religion led to the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan. This division has been an embarrassment for the Western democracies since it has divided South Asia at a time when the West wanted a united South Asian support of its cause in the cold war. Language is an internally disruptive force in both India and Pakistan. In South and Southeast Asia the ethical concept of Ahinsa is one of the elements producing "neutralism" toward the cold war. It is felt that this "neutralism" can contribute more toward world peace than the propaganda and arms race.

W. Norman Brown, Ph.D., Litt.D., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is Professor of Sanskrit and Chairman of South Asia Regional Studies at the University of Pennsylvania. He has traveled extensively throughout Asia, particularly in India and Pakistan. Among other works, he is the author of A Pillared Hall: From a Temple at Madura (1940); India, Pakistan, Ceylon (1950); and The United States and India and Pakistan (1953).

RELIGION and language are not the most important motivations in modern Asia. In the international sphere the most important political force is nationalism. This takes the form of anti-colonialism directed against the colonial powers of Western Europe and carries with it considerable suspicion of the United States as the present economic and political heir of those powers, liable, some Asians fear, to develop its own sort of imperialism. In the fulfillment of their nationalism, the Asian nations are trying to achieve the double end of becoming like the West in respect to many of their public institutions and at the same time remaining themselves in respect to personal institutions, art, literature, and other. They want to attain prestige in the modern world while cherishing their own cultural heritage. In the sphere of domestic affairs the principal incentive of Asian nations is economic development through increased agricultural production, industrial expansion, more equitable distribution of wealth, and the attainment of the good life for their citizens. Religion and language function secondarily to these major purposes, aiding or impeding them. My assignment is to examine religion and language in this larger context. I shall try to indicate where they are effective, what the nature of that effect is, and what significance it has for the world at large. I shall attempt to do this by commenting briefly upon religion and language in various parts of Asia as they influence the international position and upon the same subjects in selected nations as they affect domestic purposes.

RELIGION AND LANGUAGE AS FACTORS IN ASIAN RIVALRIES

Religion is obviously a component in national rivalries in the Near East—or Middle East—and South Asia. In the Near East the antipathy between Islam

and Judaism is a continuous irritant setting the Islamic countries adjacent to Israel against the latter. I think the nature of that irritant worth a few comments. It seldom comes from immediate theological disagreement, questions of belief, or cult practise. Whatever may have been the waging of a Holy War, or the smiting of Philistines hip and thigh in the past, the modern Near East, like most of the rest of the world, rarely engages in either now. The persecution of religious heresy is pretty well out of date. But the strength of religious separatism is still strong enough to mark off communities from one another so that they quarrel on a variety of nonreligious issues. Hence, to the Islamic Arab peoples, who have for long been opposing Britain and France in the Near East, the fact that Israel like these countries is non-Islamic and has been aided economically by funds from the West makes it seem an agent of Western imperialism. Israel gives them a common focus of hatred—near at hand and clearly seen, but yet not a strong enough unifying force to bring all Near Eastern Islamic nations together against Israel; Turkey and Iran stand out.

The situation with language is similar. The Arabic language as a common speech gives a sense of community to Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco; a feeling of common interest; common history; common cultural tradition; common ideals against Israel and Hebrew, and more distantly against the entire non-Muslim world—but again, as with religion, the strength of that feeling is limited. Egypt and Syria have merged and Yemen is trailing along with them, but the Hashemite kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan have federated in a rival union, while so far Saudi Arabia and Lebanon seem opposed or uncommitted. The North African Arabic-speaking areas again show

no eagerness to accept Egyptian hegemony.

Religion and language separately give a thin sort of unity to groups of Near Eastern states, groups which overlap yet are not identical. Each of the unities is strong enough in its anticolonialism to embarrass the Western democracies and to give comfort to the Soviet Union bloc, but neither is strong enough to prevent the Near Eastern states from quarreling among themselves. Arab unity seems no stronger today than it was during World War II, when the Arab League for a brief period dragged out an undernourished existence; a Pan-Islam seems no more feasible today than it did fifty years ago. General Asian Pan-Islam is blocked at the start by the rival hopes of Egypt and Pakistan for leadership in it and the intractability of Indonesia to being led by either. Also a smaller Near Eastern united Islam seems to have no likelihood of transcending the jealousies among the Islamic nations. Any sense of community that exists in the Near East exists only when Islam and the Arabic language combine to strengthen the anticolonialist feeling against Israel and against the West; neither is sufficient by itself, and the combination can only be considered unstable.

In the Far East and in Southeast Asia neither language nor religion seems to be an important force to unite or separate nation states from one another. It is true that the boundaries of a few states, such as Cambodia and Laos, appear to have been drawn in part at least with language areas in mind, and in South Vietnam the religious movement Cao Daiism has had an effect upon internal affairs; but the effects are minor enough for us to be justified in passing those areas by in this survey. So, too, is the case in Indonesia where there has been some opposition to linguistic domination from Java over other islands which use different languages. The ef-

fect there, however, seems to have been of relatively small importance.

Dividing forces in South Asia

But in South Asia both religion and language have been playing a conspicuous role. There they have constituted forces of division. In the sphere of international affairs the nation state of Pakistan owes its very existence to religion. Not economic, military, or political considerations were responsible for its creation in 1947—when what had been India was divided into two nations, India and Pakistan—but the demand of the Muslim minority in India to have a state of its own. Muslims were convinced that in an India that was increasingly becoming democratized the Hindu majority would never grant them their needs and rights. They did not complain seriously that they were being deprived of purely religious rights, the ability to worship as they please, to observe Muslim social institutions, to hold to Muslim theology. Their complaint was that as a minority marked off by a religious boundary they were deprived of economic, political, and educational opportunity and were shut off from full intercourse with the majority by its caste taboos on marriage and intermingling and by other forms of social separatism. Hence they succeeded in splitting India into two parts, setting up their own part as a nation state with the name Pakistan, "Land of the Pure"; and for it they adopted in 1956 as their charter of government "The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan." Although the constitution has a generally secular character it mixes in a good deal of the religious. It opens its Preamble "In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful," and then goes on to proclaim the Islamic basis and purposes of the state. In the main text it provides as one of the "Directive Principles of State

Policy" that "Steps shall be taken to enable the Muslims of Pakistan individually and collectively to order their lives in accordance with the Holy Quran and Sunnah" (article 25) and requires in respect to the highest office of the nation, that of President, that "a person shall not be qualified for election as President unless he is a Muslim . . ." (article 32 [2]).

The rightness or wrongness of the Muslims' demand for a separate state was vigorously debated in India before partition in 1947, and the dispute was so bitter that many people thought the outcome had to be partition with the creation of the new state of Pakistan or else civil war. It should be noted, however, that partition has not solved the Hindu-Muslim problem in South Asia. Many Hindus have migrated from Pakistan to India, especially from Eastern Bengal, often destitute, full of bitterness, with tales of physical abuse, deprivation of civil rights, loss of property; and the need to care for them has been a continual irritant to Indians. There has also been migration of Muslims from India to Pakistan but on a much smaller scale. Today there are in Western Pakistan almost no Hindus, while in Eastern Pakistan the number has been materially reduced since partition—no one knows by just what percentage. In India there remain somewhere around 45 million Muslims. The latter make few public complaints about their status, but they will frequently complain privately to foreigners that they are discriminated against in the same areas of life as those they specified before partition. Though India's Constitution (1950) is a secular document and the system of government and administration has no religious features, Muslims often affirm that it is operated by the Hindu majority to the disadvantage of Muslims.

INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS OF PARTITION

Internationally the clash between Islam and Hinduism, expressed between Pakistan and India, never sleeps. Each nation views the other as constituting its chief international problem. Each spends large sums, much more than it can afford, on armament out of fear of the other and thus handicaps its economic development. There are unresolved disputes between them, of which the principal ones concern use of the water in rivers flowing in both lands and the status of Kashmir. The genesis and context of the latter quarrel, like that leading to partition, is also religious in setting. Kashmir, which is contiguous to both India and Pakistan, has a predominantly Muslim population. Each nation covets it, and each proclaims its right to it. Pakistan claims it on the ground of common religion and is confident that a plebiscite, if one were to be held, would show that the people of Kashmir want to be Pakistanis. India considers its right to lie in the fact that under the terms of the Indian Independence Act of 1947, the then Maharaja of Kashmir legally gave the accession of the state to India. At that time and now as well India holds that a part of Kashmir is illegally occupied by invading foreign forces, meaning those of Pakistan, which the government of Pakistan will not withdraw. The issues between India and Pakistan have several times seemed liable to lead to war, and if such a war broke out a general world war might grow out of it.

For the Western democracies the quarrel between India and Pakistan has been a grievous mischance. It has divided South Asia at a time when they wanted common South Asian adherence to the cause of the West in the cold war. Pakistan did align itself with the West

and took arms from the United States, but its economic advance has been disappointingly slow and the Pakistani élite, in their disappointment, have been becoming resentful against its Western allies so that now the value to the West of the alliance with Pakistan appears to be seriously impaired. India regarded the giving of arms to Pakistan as potentially unfriendly to herself, and in consequence considerable anti-American sentiment developed in India. India would ask no arms from the United States, apparently feeling that to do so would breach her position of nonalignment in the cold war. Thus the Western democracies seem to have gained little in either of the large South Asian nations from the United States' program of arming Pakistan. Sundered by a quarrel that has religious differences as its most fundamental cause, the two countries have been hampered in both the major aims of Asian nations—namely, freedom from entanglement with Western powers and the development of economic resources—and neither has yet cultivated the degree of self-reliance that a single undivided India might have achieved.

LANGUAGE AND NATIONAL UNITY

Although language has not affected the international position in South Asia, it has been an element in the internal political situation in every South Asian country. Because the developments in India and Pakistan are of more importance than those in Afghanistan, Ceylon, and Nepal, I shall deal only with those first two countries.

India and Pakistan, like every other country of South Asia, are multilingual. In any nation today multilingualism is generally viewed as a threat to national unity because it conduces to internal dissension, especially when regional rivalries exist also on social and economic grounds with which it interacts. In the

nineteenth century a kind of slogan or principle became popular, "One language, one state!" This was used to encourage secession and the creation of new states. Today there is a tendency to reverse the slogan to "One state, one language!" and so to encourage the adoption of a single language or at least to give one language a preference over others for official use. Neither slogan has worked very well; viewing languages realistically, nations try nowadays to work out an accommodation between competing ones.

In India there are a dozen modern spoken languages of major importance and a number of others of lesser importance. In Pakistan there are five of major importance and a few others which are less important. Each nation would like to have an indigenous language as its official language. In addition, each nation at present uses English as its official language, language of the courts, of higher education, and in part as language of the cultural life. The language rivalries within each country are those among the indigenous languages and that between the indigenous languages and English. To clarify the nature of these rivalries I shall need to make a few somewhat academic remarks about the language situation in South Asia. Among the indigenous languages there are represented several families of speech, of which the two largest are competing with each other. These are the Indo-European family and the Dravidian. The Dravidian family was in South Asia first; the Indo-European entered the area some time in the second millennium B.C., perhaps between 1500 and 1200 B.C. Since its introduction the Indo-European languages have been slowly but steadily advancing, pushing back the frontier of the Dravidian-language territory. Today, the Indo-European languages extend, with minor areas excluded, over all of Pakistan and over

northern, western, eastern, and central India. They also extend over Afghanistan, much of Nepal, and the greater part of Ceylon. Sanskrit is the great literary language of the Indo-European family in South Asia, but many of the modern colloquial languages of that family also have literatures—Hindi and Urdu (sometimes jointly called Hindustani), Bengali, Gujarati, Marathi, Sinhalese, to mention only a few. The Dravidian family exists today in the southern part of the Indian peninsula and in the northern part of Ceylon. Its chief members are Tamil, Telugu, Kannada, and Malayalam, all of which have literatures. The constant advance of the Indo-European family into territory once held by the Dravidian languages has long been galling to speakers of the latter. They feel themselves the victims of a linguistic, more widely, a cultural, imperialism which magnifies the worth of an Indo-European civilization and diminishes the worth of theirs. When the Indian Constitution (1950) declared that "the official language of the Union shall be Hindi," the Dravidians felt that this was the current manifestation of the Indo-European cultural aggression which they had been experiencing for three thousand years. Since the government of India has been endeavoring to promote the use of Hindi in administration and in education, the resentment of the Dravidians has flared up ever more strongly, and they have correspondingly affirmed the worth of their own languages and culture. Partly they have felt that their economic and political interests would be jeopardized in a Hindi-dominated India; partly they have felt that their inherited culture, symbolized by its language or languages, was being slighted. There have been demonstrations especially in favor of Tamil, but also in favor of the other Dravidian languages in the areas where they are spoken, and

against Hindi, with refusal to learn and use it. Southern India is, in short, widely opposed to Hindi; and the opposition, instead of diminishing, seems to increase steadily.

LINGUISTIC REGIONALISM

Other rivalries among indigenous languages are those between members of the same language family. These have occurred in the case of the Dravidian languages. Rivalries have been based on the generalization that all speakers of the same language should, as far as possible, live in the same state of the Indian Union; this has sometimes been accompanied by a corollary that each separate language should occupy a separate administrative unit in the nation. Such rivalries also exist among the members of the Indo-European language family. Sometimes the opposition is against Hindi and for reasons similar to those which lead Dravidian speakers to oppose Hindi. For example, Bengali speakers have objected to the promotion of Hindi in Bengal, thinking that it would supplant their own venerated language. Another kind of conflict is that of the non-Hindi languages among themselves. For example, there is strong rivalry in Western India between Marathi and Gujarati which occupy contiguous areas and meet in the city of Bombay. The old Bombay state contained most of the speakers of both languages, though some lived in other states bordering it. The Marathi-speaking people have a strong historic tradition of the empire which they held in India until about 150 years ago; they are intensely proud of it and of their culture generally. They have been agitating for a separate state to be called Maharashtra to be focused on Bombay. The speakers of Gujarati also have had aspirations for a separate state, which they were less aggressive in promoting; and they also wanted their state to be focused on the

city of Bombay. Language was by no means the only element in this regional rivalry, but it became a symbol of the whole conflict. There were other inter-language clashes in India but none so intense as that between Marathi and Gujarati.

The whole vexed question of linguistic regionalism became so critical in India that at the end of 1953 the government of India appointed a commission to study reorganization of the separate states of the Republic. This commission submitted its report late in 1955. Following it, the boundaries of states were redrawn with the intention of trying to preserve linguistic integrity by giving the speakers of each language a separate state, so long as it was not inconsistent with important economic or other considerations. In the case of the Marathi-Gujarati conflict over Bombay city, various solutions were considered and one was even adopted, but nobody was satisfied. Finally the government of India in despair merely enlarged the existing Bombay state to take in almost all the areas where either Marathi or Gujarati was dominant. The result is that the new Bombay state is the largest and administratively most unwieldy state in India, and the Marathi-speakers are still dissatisfied. They showed their dissatisfaction in the elections in 1957 by defeating many Congress party candidates running in their area.

In Pakistan the phenomenon of linguistic regionalism has had features similar to those among the Indo-European languages in India. In East Pakistan, which has about 55 per cent of the population, Bengali is the language of nearly all the population. In Western Pakistan there are several languages, among which Urdu has the greatest prestige even though it is the mother tongue of only a small portion of the population. However, the others—Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtu—seem willing to

yield first place to it. Western Pakistan has been the more vigorous of the two sections, and it desired that Urdu should be the state language. The East Pakistanis, however, were not willing that Bengali should take second place to Urdu. After serious troubles the Pakistani Constitution was finally written with the provision (article 214 [1]): "The State languages of Pakistan shall be Urdu and Bengali." This, of course, will make it necessary for at least the governing part of the population to be bilingual.

USE OF ENGLISH IN ASIA

In both India and Pakistan it was a desire from the time of independence to replace English as the official language with some indigenous tongue. This was natural, since it seems unreasonable for a country to be administered through the medium of a foreign language. But the expulsion of English was not to be accomplished merely by making patriotic speeches against it. It is the language of administration and all administrative procedures have been developed in it. More important, it is the language of the courts, decisions are written in it; all the legal thinking and the entire context of legal terminology are in the English language. Still wider in its implications is the fact that all but a very limited amount of higher education has been through the medium of English. Textbooks, lecturing, research, thinking in modern mathematical, physical, biological, and social sciences, and in a good many of the humanistic fields as well, has been, and still continues to be, in English. No indigenous language has the vocabulary for the court or education, and to a lesser extent for administration. The need for English was apparent in both countries when they obtained independence. Hence the Constitution of India provided (article 343 [2]) that English should be continued

as the official language for fifteen years and (343 [3]) could be continued after that period if it was desirable. The Constitution of Pakistan provides (214 [1]) for the use of English for twenty years and thereafter also if Parliament so decides. As time has gone on and the language controversy has raged more violently, particularly in India, and as the limitations of the Indian languages have become more apparent and the chauvinistic speeches against English less convincing, and as the needs of India have been better understood by Indians, the hostility to English has been decreasing. Today a paradoxical kind of situation seems to be developing. While before independence English was attacked by spokesmen for nationalism as being intrusive and a usurper—though it was through English, and English alone, that the nationalist leaders from all parts of India could communicate and build up the strength of the independence movement—so now, with independence achieved and the bitterness of the struggle fading away, the practicalities of the situation in each country are turning people to an acceptance of English. It is not impossible that English may be continued in both India and Pakistan as a unifying force, as it was before independence, and as a reconciler bringing linguistic peace.

LANGUAGE AS SYMBOL OF REGIONALISM

The circumstances of the language controversies in India, Pakistan, and Ceylon possibly provide some light on the question of when and how language becomes an element, not to say the symbol, of regionalism in a multilingual state. First of all, every language involved in these countries has achieved a position as a literary language. The language has thereby won self-consciousness. In no one of the countries is there

a single literary language, elevated umbrella-wise over a number of nonliterary or humble spoken languages, as was the case with India until seven hundred years ago before the Muslim conquests when Sanskrit held a position of dominance over a number of subordinate vernaculars. But when the vernaculars of India became literary vehicles, the first step was taken toward linguistic regionalism or linguistic nationalism. As a vernacular acquired a literature, enshrining the cultural values of the users of the language, the language itself won a sentimental attachment of the people, deeper and warmer than that formerly associated with Sanskrit. In India, it seems that a language needs to be both colloquial and literary to become a "nationalist" or "regional" symbol.

Second, every one of the languages involved has become a vehicle of education, at least on the lower levels. The vernaculars were first used for instruction in India by the missionary Ziegenbalg at Tranquebar early in the eighteenth century. Later, missionaries in North India and officers of the East India Company introduced instruction in the languages of the area in the first half of the nineteenth century until at last every major spoken language and many of the minor ones were so employed.

Third, there was in India unequal distribution of economic opportunity and political preference among the various language groups. Put in another way, this may mean that, as democratic processes diffused education and opportunity throughout the country at large, each separate language group clamored for a fair, not to say disproportionate, share of these advantages. Education through the medium of the vernacular languages provided spokesmen of the language groups with audiences to hear their propaganda.

Fourth, the force of the considerations

which I have mentioned was strengthened in India by the presence of a foreign power as ruler; it was still further strengthened by the fact that the foreign power imposed its own language over all the indigenous languages. The fact that this imposed language became the sole means of universal communication throughout India strengthened the case of the local languages by widening the audience which could hear the complaints of their champions.

Fifth, India has had an increasing demographic problem, and this has made the rivalries of regions more intense as each sought a larger share of the national opportunities for its inhabitants; hence each language gained added importance in promoting the cause of its users.

Finally, India has had a consciousness of language greater than that of any other nation of antiquity. Its grammarians were more aware of linguistic phenomena and language differences than those of any other area, and they developed the science of language in a way that no others ever approached. It is to the researches of the Indian grammarians, starting from a time 2500 years ago, that the modern science of linguistics owes its beginning and inspiration.

Possibly not all the conditions mentioned here, and certainly not the last one, are essential concomitants of the rise of language as an instrument of nationalism or regionalism; but they have surely been present in many situations outside of India, such as Switzerland, Belgium, Canada, perhaps even France in the case of Breton, and the United Kingdom in the case of Welsh.

ETHICS OF ASIAN NEUTRALISM

As my last point, I want to refer to a special aspect of religion. This is in the area of ethics and it concerns that

attitude of India, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia, and some other Asian countries which in our moments of exasperation we Americans call "neutralism" and at other times in an effort to be tactful we refer to as being "uncommitted." It is a position of refusal to join either side in the cold war. In an analysis of this phenomenon, Mr. William Henderson of the Council on Foreign Relations traces it to eight sources—anti-Westernism, preoccupation with newly won freedom and a determination to keep it untrammelled, physical weakness and emotional exhaustion, indifference to or ignorance of foreign affairs, the influence of Marxist doctrines, the felt necessity of seeking an accommodation with Communist China, the conviction that neutralism in the cold war can make a positive contribution to the maintenance of peace, and the concept of neutralism as an active instrument for the containment of Communist expansion.¹ Without commenting upon the separate parts of his penetrating analysis I wish to add another source, namely the ethical, which has India as its center of diffusion.

It is true that for many of the reasons which Mr. Henderson mentions India cannot contemplate a third world war and avoids every step which she fears might lead to it. She would inevitably be drawn in and would just as inevitably be ruined, whichever side won. Her hope is peace, in which she can pursue her own program of economic development and nation building. But this is not all. India, generally, has a revulsion against war on moral grounds. War is the ultimate violation of Ahinsa, nonviolence, the most dynamic concept of Indian ethics since the days of the Buddha and Mahavira, 2500 years ago,

¹ William Henderson, "The Roots of Neutralism in South Asia," *International Journal*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Winter 1957-58), pp. 30-40, especially 31 ff.

down to Mahatma Gandhi in our own time. Hence India objects to aligning herself with either side in the cold war and urges other nations toward the same posture. All of them, she maintains, should concentrate on their national development. She views the arming of an Asian nation less as a protective measure for that nation than as an irritant calculated to incite attack and so stimulate war. That was one of the several reasons why she opposed United States military aid to Pakistan and refused to ask for aid herself. She has a similar aversion to tests of nuclear fission weapons and the publicity given them, and that is why Russia's recent declaration that it was discontinuing such tests gave Russia a striking propaganda advantage over the West in India and other Asian countries. India's proclaimed policy governing international relations has been expressed by Prime

Minister Nehru in Five Principles (Pancha Sila) which amount to a doctrine of coexistence, live and let live. These she thinks should have worldwide acceptance. This attitude toward world peace is in Indian eyes not merely expedient or judicious or farsighted. It is a moral imperative. Emanating from India, the doctrine of Ahinsa has gone to those lands where Buddhism and Hinduism have gone. It may be less firmly fixed there in popular religious attitudes and conscious political philosophy, but it nevertheless makes itself felt and combines with other considerations to move a wide-extending group of Asian nations toward the position of neutralism. It seems to me entirely possible that it can contribute more toward a solution of the world's present major problem in international relations than does frantic competition in armaments and propaganda.

The Asian Economic Potential

By WILFRED MALENBAUM

ABSTRACT: Output in Asia will need to expand at a rate of almost 2 per cent each year if individual levels of living are not to fall. Unless output grows at least twice as fast, however, incomes in Asia will not improve relative to those elsewhere in the world. Experience in some Asian countries in very recent years, notably in India and mainland China, corroborates conclusions based on the general study of the growth process: the countries of Asia can look forward to a more favorable economic future. This will follow not from the discovery of new resource frontiers, from further technological advances in sources of energy and methods of processing, or from new programs of foreign assistance. All these will play a role—but as adjuncts of purposeful domestic action for economic change under conscious and skilful leadership. Development programs need to be formulated with realistic goals which do demand major efforts by the people. Only government can provide the inspiration for these efforts; this constitutes a priority task among the competing pursuits confronting national leadership in newly independent nations. With this type of action the nations of Asia can avoid a return in the economic sphere to the stagnation that has characterized the past fifty years or so. To sustain political vigor and even national independence economic progress seems to be essential.

Wilfred Malenbaum, Ph.D., Cambridge, Massachusetts, is Director of the India Project in the Center for International Studies at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He served with the United States Department of State until 1952 with particular responsibilities for development financing. He was United States official representative to the Colombo Plan meetings in Karachi, 1952, and also participated in United States delegations to United Nations ECOSOC and ECLA meetings on the problems of economic growth. Dr. Malenbaum is author of the World Wheat Economy, 1885-1939 (1953), India and China: Development Contrasts (1956), and various articles in professional journals. He taught economics at Harvard University, 1939-41 and is now Visiting Professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

THE PROBLEM

WHAT are the prospects for the economies of the Asia that stretches from Pakistan to Korea, from Indonesia to China? Neither time nor my own knowledge will permit me to treat with the many exciting programs in process or in prospect in individual countries in this area—new transport facilities in Vietnam, the Gal-Oya valley development in Ceylon, aluminum and power in Indonesia, steel expansion in India and mainland China, for example. Indeed, I cannot deal much with individual countries, nor with the gain to Asia as some of these industrial advances increase regional complementarity in an area in which most countries are primarily agricultural. In this last respect, Japan (which I do not include here) is especially important since it is already a major exporter of industrial goods and an importer of food and raw materials that are exported by other Asian countries. These interesting possibilities are not pursued. Rather, I consider prospects for Asia as prospects for a group of economically underdeveloped countries in a world where there already are important modern countries, some of which are still developing rapidly. The argument will therefore be general. It is based on the over-all pattern of developments in Asia to date and the role which Asia's basic endowments, as we know them, might play in the future. It is also based on our understanding of the factors which have determined economic achievement elsewhere. The time focus will be an intermediate period—some generation from now, about 1980. We ask therefore, does Asia have the potential for embarking during this period on a path of economic expansion, such that the rate of increase in product exceeds that of population growth by ever greater margins?

Let us first be clear on the situation today. By and large we are concerned with a large area of the world whose people have levels of living which are on the whole well below that found in any other area of significant size. Indeed, using United Nations estimates, we find only a handful of countries elsewhere, and these mostly in Africa and sparsely settled, which have lower average incomes than are found here. With the exception of three or four countries—Malaya, the Philippines, Ceylon, Thailand and their 4 per cent of the population of our Asia—incomes in all the remaining nations average well below \$100 per capita per year. India and Communist China, with about 70 per cent of all the people, are closer to a \$50 average. Together, the fifteen countries in this Asia have today over half the world's population, but their billion and more of people can claim less than one sixth of the world's income. We might ask therefore not only whether increases can be expected in the low level of income per man, but whether this populous part of the world can be expected to claim for itself a larger percentage of the world's income. Are there reasons to anticipate, in other words, that per-capita income will increase more rapidly in Asia than in the rest of the world?

The past record in this regard is not clear. Poor countries do not generally provide us with rich collections of data. Yet, the Western image of Asia and the East has been one of great wealth. Five hundred years back, adventuresome, and presumably less well-to-do Europeans dared the unknown in attempts to tap the great resources of precisely our Asia. There is, of course, little evidence as to how widespread was this past wealth. Per-capita incomes were low even then, but probably more in line with incomes elsewhere. In any case, it does seem true that most Asian peoples have suffered a decline in per-capita incomes

from the turn of the century to 1950, let us say. In general, population growth has more than matched increases in output. This occurred while per-capita incomes in the rest of the world were increasing.

The record in the postwar years has been a more hopeful one. Annual surveys prepared by the United Nations' Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) reveal important forward strides in major fields of industry and to some extent in agriculture. National incomes per head seem to have been moving upward rather generally. Still, these increases need to be interpreted in terms which stress the important amount of recovery from wartime dislocations and devastations. New growth is slow. Indeed, the evidence for 1957 is that the combined effect of reconstruction and growth is now showing a marked slowdown. Agricultural improvement is small. The postwar industrial boom had less vitality in 1957 than during 1956; industrial expansion will be still smaller in 1958. In total, while there is evidence of economic growth, it is not possible to extrapolate postwar experience in any way which creates confidence that output will continue to exceed population growth. Additional steps must be taken if this is to be assured.

THE POSSIBILITIES FOR GROWTH

Still there is past experience which shows that Asia *can* expand its national product—through increases in agricultural yields, through the diversification and extension of its modern industries, and through action to make more effective the labor supply it now generally underutilizes. We know this requires action not only in these fields themselves, but in the basic overhead sectors—transportation, power, education—where improved facilities will spur de-

velopments in the direct income-producing parts of the economy. There can be little doubt, from recent experience in this area, for example, that this increase can be at least the 2 per cent or so needed annually to match population growth and maintain per-capita income. In fact, double this increase, more or less, would not be an implausible goal. Such a rate of increase would provide a per-capita income 50 per cent above present levels in a generation—and might even see Asia's product increasing relative to that elsewhere. However possible may be a steady growth of 3 to 4 per cent annually over the next twenty years or so, its achievement will require major programs of domestic action directed toward the growth objective. Without such action, economic potential notwithstanding, Asia or important parts of Asia might even experience a declining per-capita income.

There are familiar ways of estimating what it would require to provide for these different rates of increases in output—what would be required in total and what part of it would need to be provided from abroad. Such estimates are, I feel, more provocative than definitive. Moreover, they imply an automaticity to the growth process—invest *X* and you'll have output *Y*—which is far from reality. Increasingly we are learning that the nonhuman inputs into the expansion process—the steel and energy of industrialization and the endowments of nature, the raw materials from which they come—are much less important than the motivation and drive of leaders of government and enterprise, to say naught of the workers themselves.

Not that these natural resources are without significance. Their (anticipated) presence could spur greater development efforts, and with more rapid results, than might otherwise have occurred. But the decisive requirement in all cases is the program of action. We

can observe the high incomes and the history of growth in such countries as Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Denmark—far beyond expectations from a resource point of view. Compare the progress of resource-poor Israel with the performance of its oil-rich neighbors.

The nations of Asia cannot be termed rich relative to their human resources. Vast China and India do have the coal and ore which could assure important steel industries. Indonesia stands out for its power potential. There is of course much hope for new resource discoveries in these relatively underexplored lands; detailed study and itemization would doubtlessly show significant assets in each country even now. On the whole, however, with present knowledge and techniques, a big push toward economic growth from some Asian "frontiers" cannot be anticipated; the need is rather for carefully prepared and inspiringly led programs which chart a deliberate path for steady expansion of output.

New technical discoveries are bound to improve this prospect. There is every reason to expect atomic power, for example, to play some role in productive enterprise in these countries. India is today essentially abreast of many countries of the West in this regard. But mostly we find that these new break-throughs serve the needs of the advanced countries more readily than the poorer lands. While atomic power may be the only feasible way of bringing energy to remote villages or desert areas in Asia, the installations will need to be small, and costs per unit of power will be high. Increasingly, cost studies indicate that such important developments as atomic power, desalinization of water, and solar energy may well continue to be relatively expensive when the amount demanded is small. Their early introduction will make more sense in the well-to-do countries where

the costs of alternative processes are relatively higher than in the poorer lands. With coal in India much lower in price than in the United States, for example, the inducements to shift to atomic power, even if it is a completely indigenous product, will be so much smaller.

Growth in the poorer countries

This point bears not only upon prospects for Asia's growth, but upon this relative to economic growth elsewhere. There are arguments which stress the possibilities for differential growth in poorer lands. First, these countries can import the technological gains and development knowledge which were evolved elsewhere. Also, given the relative scarcity of capital in Asia, one might expect the return from a unit of new investment there to be larger than in the capital-rich West, for example. There is strength in the first point. Russia's painful experience on collectivization becomes a datum to China. The bitter developments of a decade can become a more systematic program of years. More broadly, these countries can acquire in a relatively simple way the techniques and processes of modern industry which evolved more slowly in the more developed nations. This means that there can be a shorter period between initiation of a program and its results than was generally true in the past. It does not mean that *current* rates of growth should be higher in the less developed lands. Similarly, the principle of diminishing productivity of capital is not usually applicable when comparing Indonesia, say, with the United Kingdom, or even Japan. Capital is not applied in a vacuum. In the wealthier lands, new investment, even though it is a small increment to the existing capital stock, does benefit from the comprehensive network of skills and facilities in

the environment. Most of these have yet to be created in the newly developing lands. Neither argument therefore gives any "automatic" assurance of more rapid progress in Asia than in the presently more advanced areas of the world.

Instead, making economic progress—enough to offset population growth, or to expand per capita output, or to catch up with the levels of output elsewhere—means formulating and implementing programs of development directed to these ends. This shows up clearly in India and China, the two countries which bulk so large in Asia and which not only shared in, but essentially determined the earlier long-run decline in per-capita income. Without benefit of significant increments in nonhuman resources—foreign assistance has played a quantitatively small part in the two investment programs—stagnant deteriorating economies have been pushed into rates of improvement which have already increased per-capita incomes and which suggest the initiation of a process of steady growth. At least, this latter possibility exists in both cases. What was injected was a new leadership devoted to progress, to industrialization, to modernization.

Independence and new nationalistic governments have also come to most of the countries in this area since the war. But this is not a sufficient condition for assuring leadership and action for growth. However helpful the shift from colonial to independent status, the leaders for independence need not be effective leaders for progress. Other Asian countries have formulated programs for their expansion, notably Burma and Pakistan, but there is only slight evidence of movement forward. More action for development is needed in practically all the countries. In some, it is not yet clear that first beginnings have been made.

DEVELOPMENT TASKS OF LEADERSHIP

The emphasis is thus on human factors, on the extent to which local talent, energy and resources are directed to the domestic constructive tasks of modernization. On the basis both of Asian and other experience, less emphasis need be given to the role of resources, new discoveries, foreign aid, and expropriations as initiating forces for a more or less automatic process that will carry a nation from traditional stagnation to a stage of expanding growth. But this rather helpful shift away from the natural material endowments to human determination and to individual competence need scarcely ease the task, even in nations where domestic leadership has only recently led a successful struggle for independence. What are some of the demands of development progress upon leadership?

In the past, considerable impetus for expansion came from the private entrepreneur. While his role—even in the major private enterprise economies—was smaller than is generally assumed, it can be expected to be significantly less important in Asian development. Colonialism does not provide a favorable habitat for the development of indigenous business leadership. Opportunities tended to be somewhat greater in the "middleman" functions of trade and finance than in modern industry. Such industrial talent as did develop had only limited experience with the large-scale efforts required now. For these and other reasons, business entrepreneurship will become an important function of government. By and large, it is not a function which comes naturally—nor is it too amenable to the rotation characteristics of most civil services. This task of leadership may therefore require important innovations in the way of life of a high-status elite group.

Actually, the idea of public participation in business life is appealing to most new governments. The localized role played by foreign private investment in their countries had not served the cause of over-all national growth, and the new nations tend generally to be biased against private enterprise, particularly in large-scale industry and mining. Yet, experience has shown that indigenous private enterprise in Asian countries does respond favorably to a new post-colonial factor—an over-all environment in which government is encouraging economic expansion. In particular, its know-how can be most useful to public enterprise. There is thus need for considerable flexibility in the specific mix of private and public enterprises. Government must be prepared to step out of business—despite popular objection in many cases—as well as to step in.

Leadership must determine the specific economic program which gives the best promise for converting stagnation into growth. Output is increased by expanding the economy's capital base and by making all productive resources, the old as well as the new, more efficient. But the expansion desired needs to assure a feedback into further investment rather than into increased consumption only. Here, government must either know much about the economy's laws of behavior—how much of increased income different groups will want to consume, for example—or must have a detailed program of action which will assure that less is consumed than earners might desire. By concentrating new investment in heavy industry a reasonably self-sufficient country can assure the availability of capital goods for increased investment. By that token, however, there will not be an increase in the availability of consumer goods to go with higher incomes. In these circumstances, farmers may prefer not to sell their produce to industrial areas

from which they cannot obtain the goods they desire. Government may then find it necessary to take responsibility for food collection and distribution. This illustrates the problems with which government must cope if it is seriously seeking the economic growth of the nation.

Allocation of investment

With respect to specific allocations of investment resources and of administrative capacities, it is difficult to generalize for all the countries in Asia. Yet, certain conclusions are emerging from the actual experience with developments in Asia, however limited progress has yet been. This points up the tremendous importance of increased productive capacity in agriculture and of the output potential from the employment of idle or underused hands in relatively labor-intensive forms of activity. This last, it may be noted, is also important because the unemployed become increasingly a political threat to whatever government is in power—whether this be a democratic government, as in India, or a Communist government, as in China or in the Indian state of Kerala. This experience shows how slowly the capacity to sustain urbanization increases in these countries. There is a greater desire on the part of the population for urban living than can be met, even with major attention to industrial and urban expansion. Again this is as true for China as for India. This means that the urgent need for increased investment to expand modern industries, for production of both capital and consumer goods, must be paralleled by an expansion in the labor-intensive and rural sectors; the urban growth rate potential has to be curbed at least in part and for some intermediate period. Finally, in this two-pronged emphasis upon the urban-industrial and the rural and small-scale, the private sector does emerge as an effective tool for serving the national

interest. But its potential lies primarily in the large-scale modern sector; in the rural and small-scale sectors private activity most needs government leadership and assistance.

If these interpretations of past experience in Asia are essentially valid, governmental programs must emphasize the small, the labor-intensive, and the agricultural much more than they have. Government must be prepared to discourage to some extent the popular emphasis upon the traditional symbols of industrialization and growth—the capital-intensive producer-goods industries. Initiating growth in Asia seems to require leadership which is able to take such difficult courses of action.

Nor should we forget that development progress demands a large flow of resources through government. Usually this means high rates of taxation upon the narrow base that exists in most Asian countries. It is precisely from these upper-income groups that most present-day leadership was recruited; in some measure it is still financed by them. On the other hand, even the least well-to-do in the community, those who apparently have little to give, need to be encouraged to greater efforts, perhaps out of proportion to their immediate gains from the development program. Thus, the tax base generally needs to be extended to provide for an income tax in agriculture. Clearly therefore, leadership skills must include not only wise technical knowledge for the tasks in hand, but also the ability to arouse the interest and support for a broad popular movement dedicated to development achievement.

COMPETITIVE ROLES FOR LEADERSHIP

Great leaders with the requisite talents frequently prefer to exercise them in other ways, however. Most of the areas here are in some state of transition between a relatively static, primarily ag-

ricultural economy, with sparse industry, to one where modern techniques are almost universally applied. And this is also true of the political sphere. Here they are in transition between some form of regionalized organization and a centralized state which can act on a national basis. They are independent nations, but the scars of colonialism are still most visible. Leadership needs to assume the important tasks of national unification and of international self-assertion. Both these *can* complement an active program for improving the output and levels of living of the population. Frequently, generally, they become alternatives as the current scene shows so clearly. Indonesia today, South Vietnam a few years past, Pakistan, and others—all have allowed the essential creation of internal unity to impede their pursuit of economic progress. In Egypt—to take the clearest illustration—and perhaps in India, there has been a similar diversion of leadership talent into the international scene. Again, however important the contribution of the new and less developed lands to world affairs, this effort can also be self-defeating. Without success in the domestic sphere, a nation's world status is not apt to persist.

The three basic tasks need to go hand in hand, with the lead role given to domestic progress. In the struggle for domestic growth, which can itself then contribute both to unification and international status, success can be achieved only if leadership assumes the hard and unglamorous tasks to which we have referred earlier.

RESOURCES FROM ABROAD

It is here in our analysis—after pointing up the basic role of domestic leadership, in the face of the diverse possibilities confronting it in achieving a nation's economic potential—that we can best discuss the role of foreign as-

sistance in the potential for economic growth in Asia. Net imports from abroad augment the resources immediately available in the economy; they can facilitate and accelerate progress toward economic expansion. But the most generous assistance from abroad can achieve little, if anything, in an independent nation without the full participation of its domestic leaders. On the other hand, there is probably no state where some progress cannot be made if those in power wish to do so. Even in a very poor state, totalitarian methods can divert resources into capital construction but at a high price in human suffering. In a country which is determined to develop its economy, such nondemocratic techniques may be the cost which it and the Free World pay for the absence of, or for inadequate kinds and amounts of, assistance from abroad.

Foreign aid will be effective in achieving economic growth only so far as it combines with local initiative, energy, and resources in tasks of economic construction and modernization. Here we deal with much more than a matter of numbers, of how much aid. A country which is concerned, as it should be, with the effectiveness of the assistance it provides abroad must also be concerned with elite attitudes in the recipient countries toward the purposes for which the aid is extended. Thus the United States does believe that growing economies in Asia are essential for our own interests in world peace. It is appropriate therefore not only that we provide economic assistance but that we also use our influence, through international as well as bilateral channels, to assure that the recipients are concentrating their talents and resources upon the tasks of development. This concern about internal affairs in a foreign land is certainly more meaningful in regard to countries in transition—economically and politically

—than is our great concern about their specific stance in today's East-West conflict.

Looking at the present participation of foreign countries from the West and the East in economic programs in Asia—and in the Near East, Africa, and Eastern Europe (Yugoslavia) as well—one can only conclude that the government of the USSR understands better than does our government the key interrelations between political and economic actions. I am not saying that on this account Communist powers have done a better job for the development of the poorer lands. Russia's policy interests in some of these "areas in transition" are at times better served by encouraging leadership action away from domestic construction and into other domestic and international preoccupations—by stimulating what Professor Rostow has recently termed "the tempting but diversionary moods of 'bloody shirt' nationalism." But Russia can apply the development formula also, as its role in Mainland China makes clear. It would seem high time that the United States participate effectively also if successful development in Asia, by the methods of democracy and popular consent, is in fact of basic importance to our own national interests, as we claim it is.

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND WORLD STATUS

To conclude, I would like to elaborate somewhat this last point on the international significance of successful development efforts in Asia. Our economic prospect for Asia encompassed a range from declines in per-capita income to increases which might even enlarge Asia's share of an expanding world product. Will the specific degree of achievement within this range, by Asia together or by particular parts of Asia alone, bear somehow on the influence Asia or Asian coun-

tries exert among the nations of the world? It is obvious that per-capita income is scarcely the index of a nation's political power in the world community. Thus between the per-capita incomes of the United States and the USSR are those of at least a dozen countries which we would all agree are today of lesser importance to the course of world affairs. Indeed, Premier Khrushchev's recent remarks notwithstanding, these relative economic positions may be more or less retained over the next generation or so. At the other end, many would agree that India has performed a big-power role on the international scene almost from the day Mr. Nehru became Prime Minister of the new nation. There are some who would hold that Mainland China has now acquired "big-power" status. It would seem reasonable to expect that, whatever happens to Asia's economic position, Asia could retain some form of power status; at the minimum, increasing population numbers would seem to demand this. Nor need this leadership be exclusively the moral voice of a nation speaking for the vast but impoverished population of the area. For, however low their average levels of per-capita incomes, India and China could still be large enough steel producers to have an important say in international flows of this basic commodity. Similarly, some Asian countries will soon be users of atomic power. Even a poor nation which is large and which has some command of modern techniques can be a potent military

force—as an ally, if not as an independent. Economic growth need therefore not be an essential ingredient for the continued importance of Asia in the councils of the world.

It need not be, but I think it is reasonable to expect that it will be. Failure to increase per-capita incomes—to say naught of population increases which run ahead of output—will make Asian countries increasingly dependent upon the largess of wealthier nations. Asia would provide the setting for continuous interference by the more powerful nations—to house advance military installations, to tighten a dependency status, and so forth—Asia's voices would become more nearly those of the "independent" satellites so familiar to this postwar world.

But the people of Asia will insist upon governments which do make economic progress. Successful development will provide guidelines for other countries. In this context, there is competition within Asia between China's program for growth under communism and India's, under democracy. It is important to the rest of the world, to us in America, that the lead for growth and the voice for the world be provided by Asian nations which conduct their affairs under a system of popular consent. Economic aid can be of great help; it will be of decisive importance if, along with it, the West, by its attitudes, procedures, and international role generally, can stimulate leadership in Asian countries to high economic achievement.

Intellectual Progress in the East

By HARRY EMERSON WILDES

ABSTRACT: In its attempts to reach a rapprochement with the West, the East sought to Westernize itself; this resulted not in a synthesis of the best elements of both cultures but in a thin Western veneer applied to a solid native base. Instead of trying to steer this imitative trend into more productive channels, the West was merely flattered by it. As for the East, by indiscriminately gulping a frightful mass of Western indigestibles, it gained little but a cultural stomachache. Small wonder, therefore, that, in the first flush of nationalism, reformers and puritans—proponents of the "New Life"—struck out against corrupting "foreignisms." Asia for the Asians meant a return to the high spiritual culture of ages past. The wiping out of unwanted Western ways was made easier because they were neither very broadly spread nor deeply rooted. After World War II, Western prestige rose again, and although the East continued to scorn Western materialism as a principle, in practice it was willing to bring in the skills, techniques, and tools which gave democracy its strength. Creative energies in the East have been released as the result of national upheavals, and under a more democratic way of life they will surely flourish.—Ed.

*Harry Emerson Wildes, Ph.D., is a Philadelphia journalist and writer. He was Professor of Economics and Social Sciences at Keio University, Tokyo, in 1924. During World War II he was Regional Specialist for Japan in the Office of War Information and during the occupation of Japan served as Chief of the Political and Social Affairs Division, Civil Historical Section. He was a Fulbright Lecturer in Political Science at the International College of the Sacred Heart, Tokyo, 1952-53 and Lecturer on Southeast Asia at the New School of Social Research and at Wisconsin State University, 1956-57. Dr. Wildes is the author of *Social Currents in Japan* (1927), *Japan in Crisis* (1934), *Aliens in the East* (1937), *Typhoon in Tokyo* (1952), and is currently preparing a history of Temple University and a survey of recent Japan cultural developments.*

INTELLECT is that faculty, or complex of faculties, whereby we know or reason. Can intellect vary? Does the difference between well-developed lands and those not so fortunate lie in their mental power? How is one to measure a cultural advance, a movement made up of many variables on many fluid fronts? If measurable at all, the yardstick to be used will be elastic, for cultural advance is certainly a most subjective concept.

Asians, to be sure, are moved by the same compulsions to satisfy identical basic needs, but long-continued training in a background different from ours sets up special standards. Their moral and spiritual values; their behavior, either singly or as a community; their customs and tabus are not our own.

Had we recognized many years ago that all this was platitude, we would have spared ourselves much pain. During long centuries of isolation, divergencies were dangerous; they bred suspicion and fear, distrust and hatred. Both East and West were equally intolerant. We thought that all who did not profess our codes were backward and barbaric; the East believed us hypocritical materialists.

IMITATION OF WESTERN WAYS

To its credit, the Orient tried to reconcile the clashing cultures. Its motive was less lofty than the everlasting restless search for truth and beauty. By following a Western course, the East, through sympathetic magic, would win wealth and power. Nor was the method sound. Instead of synthesizing the best elements, the Orient applied a thin veneer upon a solid native base.

Like hungry tourists descending on an Asian shopping street, the East did not invariably choose the best that was available. Scorning their own *shibumi*, the aloof, suppressed beauty of their classic styles, the Orientals imitated

Landseer and the impressionists. With Noh dances, puppet plays, and kabuki before them, they turned to Russian drama and staged strange Shakespeare with Hamlet riding in to Elsinore upon a bicycle. Discarding the literature which we are slowly, but belatedly discovering, they ground out, in all seriousness, romances of the Bulwer-Lytton type and in poetry produced, of all things, a Japanese *Charge of the Light Brigade*.

Nor is the curious assimilation finished. Name a Western artist, writer or musician, a philosopher, a teacher or a man of prominence in any field and there will be an Asian equivalent. Walt Whitman and James Joyce, Ralph Waldo Emerson and William Faulkner, Ernest Hemingway and Marcel Proust each had his counterpart; there has been a Japanese T. S. Eliot, a Virginia Woolff, and, yes, a Gertrude Stein. A self-styled avant-garde sets up a Left Bank on the Ginza. Shintaro Ishihara glories in the title of Japan's Mickey Spillane; before she captivated Hollywood, Machiko Kyo was, for no discernable reason, the "medieval Theda Bara." Japan has both a Françoise Sagan and a beat generation which bows toward San Francisco. Teen agers with pony-tails dyed a henna red swoon over a folk-tale crooner whom they hail "Mit-chan, Mit-chan" or, with more reverence, Japan's Elvis Presley.

Westerners should have deplored the imitative trend or, failing that, have steered it on a more productive course; but we were flattered by it. Moreover, in the light of what was blaring from our radios or seen on movie screens and newsstand displays, we were completely powerless. If neons lighted up the evening sky, if night clubs flourished, if businessmen drove foreign cars to modern office buildings where they telephoned for luncheon dates in Statler-style hotels, if clerks and college boys

sat over coffee cups in the chain restaurants, all this was as it should be; the changeless East was waking up. If teen agers crowded foreign film shows—provided they came from Hollywood or Elstree rather than from Moscow—if youths played alien records, if boys played baseball and their elders took up golf, if college girls played hide-and-seek and mothers went to cooking school, we saw a swing toward friendship with the West.

By indiscriminately gulping a frightful mass of indigestibles, the East gained little but cultural stomachache. The Eastern craze for European dress and food and roller skates and yoyos no more turned Orientals into Westerners than a taste for fish and rice made Orientals out of Westerners. To decree, as Meiji did in 1881, that guests at court wear foreign clothes did not assure that Japanese heads beneath hard hats or Japanese hearts beneath the cutaways functioned in the Western ways.

REVOLT AGAINST "FOREIGNISM"

Small wonder, therefore, that in the first flush of nationalist fever, reformers and puritans, proponents of the "New Life," struck out savagely against corrupting "foreignisms." If the West's vaunted *de-mo-kra-sie* meant bobbed hair and *pa-ma-nen-tos* for the girls, long tresses for boy students, and highballs and gin rummy for the nation, no Asian wanted any part of it. Asia for the Asians meant a return to the high spiritual culture of ages past.

To wipe out unwanted Western ways was fairly easy. The new ideas had not spread widely, nor struck deep. They had affected only the larger cities, only certain strata within those cities and, even then, only the pseudosophisticates, the rich and some few others who had lived, rather than merely traveled, in foreign lands.

Allied victory shot Western prestige upward like a rocket. The logic was inescapable. By importing foreign brains and by copying Western machinery, the prewar East had prospered; but high spiritual culture and the "New Life" movement spelled ruin. Obviously, the proper thing to do was to rely again upon ideas from abroad.

Thus the East scorned Western materialism as a principle but in practice brought in the skills, techniques, and tools that gave democracy its strength. Postwar economic levels rose—they could do nothing else—but not proportionately to the rise in Europe and America. Living standards also rose—these, too, could not fall!—but as late as 1956 the Ministry of International Trade and Agriculture warned against misreading the advance as due to native genius. Japan's budget for scientific research, the Ministry declared, was but a third that of West Germany, a tenth that of Great Britain, and but one-fiftieth that of the United States.

The warning went unheeded. Only last month, the Science and Technology Agency issued a white paper showing that Japan spent one-hundredth the amount that America spent for research work. Japan's exports of electrical machinery were worth less than its exports of pearl buttons.

Thus to judge the Orient is to repeat past errors. The message of the East is not to be found in research statistics or the total of machine-tool production but in the spiritual realm, the field of arts and letters, and in the approximation to the brotherhood of man.

Here, rather than in trade or commerce, is the important postwar change. It would be pleasant to believe that all of us, on both sides of the Pacific, realize that no man stands alone; that, despite Rudyard Kipling, the twain can meet; and, because the world is all one family that they must meet if either is

to live. Some of us do think so, but some of us are too impatient.

If new machinery and managerial skill can be imported freely, economic revolution can happen overnight. Given a powerful central government which, like MacArthur's, brooks no opposition and superficial government reform comes, waving banners in a summer's afternoon. But cultural revolution takes lengthy time and endless patience.

ECONOMIC CHANGE AND CULTURAL GROWTH

Doubtless, it could not come at all were there no economic change. Culture grows when social soils are fertilized by time and leisure. Poets write and artists draw in garrets, but only when their stomachs do not rumble and when their fingers do not freeze.

Much praise is voiced, and rightly, about the contributions to the arts of Western women; too little has been said to glorify the inventions that made the contributions possible. The Eastern woman has not lagged because she was oppressed by man-made law but because, until the present day, she has not had the Western household gadgets. The housewife on the American frontier had precious little time for culture when she had to do her chores by hand, firing the stove and caring for a kitchen garden, baking bread and putting up preserves, sweeping and sewing and doing a big family wash, spinning and weaving and making clothes for everyone. Such a busy person, caring for her children—and her husband, too—is scarcely likely to compose a symphony.

Conferring political equality upon women chained to their kitchens was an empty honor, perhaps a ghastly joke, until the gadgets came. The electric refrigerator, the washer, the gas stove, and, where it could be used, the vacuum cleaner, not the vote, emancipated women in the East. The supermarket,

rather than the right to free divorce, led them to cultural equality.

So, too, with men. The automobile and the paved road broke down the isolation of the past. Only a few brief years ago, the urban Oriental who strayed half a mile off his beaten track was so hopelessly lost that the policeman in the corner police box had to direct him. Narrow localisms ruled; while Easterners were superpatriotic, their loyalty was to a small locality, not to a larger entity. It is not in the least unlikely that what we used to condemn as lack of humanity and want of public spirit was merely ignorance of anything that lay beyond a near horizon.

The outlook has widened now and will continue to expand. As modern science spreads, the gadgets bring Eastern living standards closer to our own. Eastern insularity is breaking down. The world grows more alike.

Sometimes it is very hard to see what is occurring. To report a cultural advance is difficult; to find space even in professional publications to talk of slow improvement is impossible. Passing frivolity makes headlines; the press displays the froth. Yet fads and fashions are important, too; they show the East as anything but static and impassive.

Change is the rule, not the exception. Five years ago, when Japan boasted one pinball machine for every twenty people, the ring of *pachinko* was the national anthem; today, the one-arm bandit is a minor interest. So, too, within four years, the vogue of *strippu-teasu* passed, together with the mambo, the *Banana Boat Song* and the Audrey Hepburn hairdo.

Let not the lunatic fringe delude us, as in prewar days it misled the militarists, into thinking that the Orient has a hotdog, coca-cola culture. It is no Tin Pan Alley sputnik. The Orient still copies; its little theaters are more likely to present Tennessee Williams or John

Osborne than plays by Eastern writers. Yet there is selection, too. As late as last year, rock-and-roll had failed to hit the Orient with the same impact that it struck Europe; Tokyo alone reported *Around the World in 80 Days* a flop, even when the admission price was cut below the normal.

What is vitally important is that the East has saved its soul. The scholar still commands respect, perhaps not in such high degree as when the schools were fewer and less free, but scholarship is changing. When Confucianism stressed the ideal of an ordered world where each man acted with the propriety his class required, the Orient stood still. Scholasticism, rather than research, prevailed. The East, it has been charged, bred scholars but not thinkers.

But is this true today? In 1955, *Look* Magazine, in selecting world leaders in the varied fields of science, economics, philosophy and government, art, letters and theology, found but one Japanese worthy of inclusion. Taikwan Yokoyama, the 87-year-old painter who died in March deserved the honor but were there not others also?

The obvious explanation is ignorance, for there are outstanding omissions such as Daisetz Suzuki and Hideki Yukawa who won the Nobel prize. When, last year, the American Watercolor Society held its 90th annual exhibition, fifty Japanese artists were represented. Last year, also, the Metropolitan Museum of Art had a one-man show by Tomioka Tessai who died in 1924 but not before he had demonstrated that a youthful spirit may imbue traditional themes with striking modernism.

MOVIE MAKING IN JAPAN

The movie makers need to learn that lesson. Eastern movies, by and large, have not impressed the world. Japan is an exception, an astonishing excep-

tion, for her studios are busier than Hollywood's.

Japanese pictures gained world-wide fame. At international festivals, at Cannes and Nice and Edinburgh, the movies took top prizes. Cynics may suggest that the awards were politic, that films like *Rashomon*, *Ugetsu* and *Gates of Hell* received awards because they were exotic and because their abstractions seemed profoundly philosophic; but no one doubts their technical excellence. Their themes were medieval, but they were magnificently photographed and their direction was superb; delicacy and grace marked every scene.

Unfortunately, success fixed a pattern. Studios ground out endless versions of kabuki plays. This was good, for it restored kabuki to the masses for whom kabuki was intended but from whom it had been alienated by the special language and the esoteric conventions of the stage.

There is, as Faubion Bowers notes, a kabuki play in which an actor is required to pantomime by facial expression alone a quick gamut of grief, surprise, perplexity, joy, conflict of motive and, finally, the resolve to kill himself—all this to an audience of 2,500 people while concealing it from other actors on the stage. There is a problem for the audience, too. Just when, asks Bowers, is a spectator to know when the flutter of a fan symbolizes a falling leaf, a letter or a tea cup, a flute, a sword or moonrise beyond yonder hill?

The movie saved kabuki, not alone because it conveyed the story more clearly and with sharper understanding, but because it brought in profits from which kabuki might be subsidized.

Beyond the range of medieval films the movie has not done so well; the magic charm of Eastern art has not been transferred to the modern theme. There is, moreover, the unhappy truth

that, for a time at least, the leftists ruled both stage and studios. They had the actors and directors; they had the foresight and the ability to use their opportunity. They had the plays; it may well be true that in the five years following the war, more Communist-line plays were viewed by Japanese than by the Russians.

Happily, that period has passed. The vogue of virulent anti-American plays and movies has now faded though its bad taste lingers.

Fellow travelers brought more than drama to the East; they also popularized ballet. Tokyo, in 1950, blossomed with hundreds of ballet schools. Only a few teachers held proper licenses to teach but this did not deter; many of them unblushingly posted signs bearing the names of foreign artists, the advertising being designed to leave the impression that the maestro was personally teaching Japanese. Ah well, there are few towns in America where Arthur Murray does not have a studio.

EDUCATION

I cannot explore here the teaching situation other than to say that as in America, the theme is disenchantment. The ancient type of sterile scholarship has been discredited; a new system, forcibly and suddenly imposed, leads only into chaos. East, as well as West, is questioning the virtues of progressive education but anticipated us. Even prior to sputnik, Orientals, not all of whom were black reactionaries, were wondering why high school graduates could neither read nor write as fluently as would have been desirable.

Perhaps an explanation lies in a lack of public libraries. On Pearl Harbor day, Japan had 3,300 libraries but only two of these, public or private, owned as many as a million books. Half the Japanese universities owned less than 10,000 volumes; one in every nine had

less than 5,000 while one so-called university possessed fewer than 3,000. The Seattle public library owned more books than did all the municipal libraries in Japan; the total circulation of all Japanese libraries combined was less than that of Cleveland's system.

Yet Japan prided herself on being the most literate of Oriental nations.

The situation has improved somewhat, but there is much to do. The American Cultural Centers have popularized library use, but large appropriations are imperative. The average expenditure on new books by all public libraries in Japan is less than \$20 yearly.

Japan last year produced 50 per cent more new book titles than did the United States. True, the books were shorter, and not all of them were works of art; but, considering *Peyton Place*, Americans are in no position to complain.

Their books, moreover, appeal beyond the boundaries. Year after year, their foreign sales increase—from 900 million yen in 1954 to 1,300 million yen, \$4,000,000, in 1956. The richest market, as might be expected, is in China whose people read ideographs; second comes Brazil with its large number of expatriates; United States is third on the list. They are solid books, these exports, Asians buying works on medicine and agriculture; Americans, both north and south, reading works on arts and letters.

CREATIVE RENAISSANCE

National upheavals released creative energies. Just as the Elizabethan era led to Britain's Golden Age, so the Meiji Restoration, the Russian conflict, and the World War II catastrophe each produced noteworthy literary outbursts. Donald Keene, whose recent anthology is a masterpiece, commented that the decade between 1905 and 1915 brought forth three times as many new writers than developed in thirty years there-

after. Harold Strauss, Knopf's Editor-in-Chief, leading drummer for contemporary Oriental authors, continually discovers writing genius in the East.

Was not this genius always present? Were not those thirty years of drought caused quite as much by excess supervision as by want of talent? In prewar days, when young enthusiasts much like our own wrote novels to advance the cause of proletarians, there was coercion not only by the warlords but by keepers of the sacred party line.

But now, free speech, democracy, and the passing of regimentation allow the literary tap to run full force.

The output is, as everywhere, uneven. Plots, all too often, are vague, obscure, and outside Western understanding. They may be, and often are, brutal in theme or wildly pornographic but neither characteristic should be strange to readers in America. Japan's novels may be preoccupied with endless writing of the subtlest changes possible in human character; but, after all, *The New Yorker* grew rich on "nothing stories."

However odd the art may seem—in movies, books, or canvas—the adept senses the old virtues, the theme of soul force as superior to violence, the exaltation of the goal above the means where-

by the goal is reached, the glory of the spirit. In most of the cultural output—though not invariably apparent in the fleshly school—there is serenity and depth of feeling, beauty and warmth of spirit.

Does all this mean that everything has touched perfection in the East, that every zephyr out of Asia brings the fragrance of Utopia? Far from it. The East also has its comic books, its crime-and-passion movies, its *taiyo-zoku* novels which cater to the least common denominator, Topic A. It has its yellow journals, though their hue is somewhat less garish than of yore. It has its crew-cut Sun Tribe, with their standard uniform of aloha sport shirts, tight trousers, and pointed shoes of suede; the mop-haired girls who sit with them in high partitioned booths in coffee shops wear treader pants. Scorning the ways of their ancestors, but replacing them with nothing they respect, they feign a deep to-hell-with-it cynicism.

But just as America is sound despite a shook-up generation, as Britain survives despite its Teddy Boys so is the Orient sound of heart and sound in spirit. The intellect may not progress, the spirit may not progress, but they co-operate to drive the Eastern culture ever upward.



A Burmese View of World Tensions

By U THANT

ABSTRACT: Dedication to parliamentary democracy and aversion to totalitarianism characterize the approach of Burma and her leaders to national and international problems. By means of democratic socialism Burma is endeavoring to create a society of free and equal peoples. The Burmese see the world as plagued by age-old tensions—political, social, and economic—and they believe firmly that the safety and survival of free political institutions depend upon resolving these tensions before they become intolerable. Although committed herself to democratic ideals, Burma refuses to pass judgment on the international affairs of other countries and subscribes instead to the principles of peaceful coexistence. She believes that man must rise to the challenge of his age—an age which calls for a new outlook, a new approach, even a new philosophy. The old ways are no longer adequate for the new circumstances and for the crucial issues of today. These issues include not only communism versus democracy but also strong versus weak, prosperous versus poor, ruler versus ruled, master race versus sub-human. These issues can be resolved only when mankind is willing to sit down together and create for itself a world which will guarantee freedom, justice, well-being, and equality to all.—Ed.

His Excellency U Thant, New York City, is Ambassador of Burma to the United Nations and Permanent Representative of Burma to the United Nations and Chairman of the Delegation. After Burmese independence in 1948, U Thant entered the Public Service. Formerly Adviser to Prime Ministers U Nu and Li Ba Swei at the Colombo Prime Ministers' Conferences and Adviser to Prime Minister U Nu at the Bandung Conference, Ambassador U Thant has also been a prominent member of Burmese delegations abroad. Both before Burma's independence in 1948 and since that time he has constantly played an active part in the social and cultural development of his country.

IT IS a commonplace that today we are witnessing tensions all over the world. There are what are generally known as East-West tensions, tensions between the haves and have-nots, tensions between the rulers and the ruled, between whites and nonwhites, and so on. Dictionaries define the term "tension" as "a strained condition of relations." It would be historically inaccurate to say that tensions are a phenomenon only of the present day. They have existed all through the ages, but now they have assumed new characteristics.

One of the most fascinating side lights on the history of mankind is the gulf which has persisted between urban and rural societies. All ancient civilizations and forms of society bear testimony to this truth. The countryside was earth-bound, and it shared very little of the intellectual excitement and social comforts of the urban dwellers. Between the two there has always been hostility. The country was exploited by the town and could not share in what the town could give it. The labor of the country dweller fertilized the life of the town, but he was shut out from its excitements. Country labor was too hard for leisure, and without leisure the mind remained torpid. The neglect of the countryside has always been a feature of human societies, and it has constituted a perennial social tension. This neglect entailed ever-widening social and economic disparity between peoples, and we see some countries endeavoring to remedy this defect by the introduction of planned economic systems. One of these systems is known as socialism.

It is not my intention to dwell at any length on a discussion of the concept of socialism, but in so far as it relates to the relaxation of social and economic tensions, a brief reference to its characteristics may be pertinent.

BURMA'S DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM

Burma is committed to a system of parliamentary democracy; Burma believes in democratic ideals and the dignity of man; and Burma is thoroughly averse to the idea of dictatorship in any shape or form. This dedication to parliamentary democracy and aversion to totalitarianism has been the consistent theme of utterances and actions of the Burmese leaders. They feel rather strongly that the rebuilding of their country will be meaningless if the democratic ideals are discarded. The type of society they are trying to evolve is not patterned after maxims mechanically lifted out of textbooks. They see to it that its roots are in the Burmese soil, Burmese history, and Burmese background. The experiences of the past decade, since independence, have helped in molding a new type of society which, for the sake of convenience, is generally known as democratic socialism.

Those of you who have not gone through the same experiences and shared the same background will not easily understand either the real significance of the term "democratic socialism" or the need for laying stress on this ideology which to most of us in Burma is not just a school of thought but a new culture, a new civilization. The aims of a democratic socialist movement in Burma are the creation of a society of free and equal peoples with equal opportunities for all, a society based on certain values of human and social life. In a country like Burma, this movement is the only sensible movement which can and will remove the age-old social and economic tensions.

Perhaps a brief amplification may be necessary. Democratic socialists believe that the society in which we live is divided into classes. The very nature of its economic system has produced a

clash of interests which has generated class struggle and class consciousness. In doing away with this clash of interests Burma adheres strictly to democratic methods. Burma is convinced that in the circumstances prevailing there, the democratic method is the only right method to work for socialism. There is thus no ambiguity in Burma's policy on this score.

These observations may seem irrelevant to the general theme of this paper, but they are in fact relevant. We see around us social and economic tensions of varying degrees. The safety and survival of free political institutions depends upon resolving these tensions before they become intolerable. Many of the political tensions come from this source. In tackling this basic problem opinions differ regarding the respective roles of the public and private sectors. At what point the frontier between the public and private sectors should be fixed is a question that will be answered differently in different countries, and according to their traditions and stages of historical development. In countries with a primitive economic development, where revolutions have occurred, it is natural that industries will grow up in the public domain. This is now evident in many countries of Asia and Africa—as was the case in Russia and China—although of course methods differ widely. In the Western world the extension of the principles of public ownership will be influenced by the extent to which large aggregations of private capital have formed into monopolies in which profit becomes a burdensome tax on the community and no longer a reward for investment and speculation. This, I venture to think, reflects the views of many Asians who are interested in finding solutions to the most pressing problems facing their countries.

However, political tensions, and not social tensions, are receiving prior at-

tention of most of us because of their urgency and their explosive character. Let me, therefore, deal with political tensions as a Burman sees them.

WORLD TENSIONS THROUGH BURMESE EYES

One of the difficulties of international relations is that it is hardly possible to express critical views about the policies and actions of a nation to which one does not belong without exposing oneself to the charge of being anti that nation. This unfortunate reaction is fed by various influential mass media such as newspapers, radio and television, and of course by those whose policies and actions are criticized. Now if there is on thing which I find very objectionable, it is generalizing about whole peoples. There are no doubt individuals who are good or bad, brave or timid, cultured or wild, but when we try to apply such adjectives to nations and groups of nations, we are in fact describing our own emotional reactions to things and peoples which meet with our approval or disapproval.

Here let me make one point absolutely clear. Within three months of Burma's attainment of independence, the Communists in our country went underground and started a widespread insurrection. A few dissident factions followed suit, and at once the whole country was in a veritable state of anarchy. While the young Burmese government is suppressing Communist and other rebellions in Burma, our relations with all countries, Communist and non-Communist, continue to be friendly. Our dedication to democratic ideals does not preclude us from viewing the world around us in proper perspective. It is true that many countries have chosen systems of government very different from our own. It is, however, not our business to pass judgment on the internal affairs of other countries. The

recognition of this basic fact enables us to subscribe to the principles of peaceful coexistence.

Our attitude toward political systems prevailing in other countries is governed solely by considerations of peace. We are convinced that it is not the path of wisdom to form military blocs, to enter into a hectic armaments race, and to rant hysterically at each other. These things certainly do not make for peace; they only increase tensions. If the world's great religions like Islam and Christianity, after a prolonged and bloody war for centuries, can flourish side by side in peace and amity, why should not Communist and non-Communist systems be permitted to coexist peacefully? This is Burma's approach to international problems. We are convinced of one thing: man must learn to live with himself. Regardless of his beliefs, traditions, ideologies, and the economic, social, and political systems to which he subscribes, he must learn to live with his neighbors. This calls for a new outlook, a new approach, and even for a new philosophy. Past history, dealing with a completely different kind of era and circumstances, will no longer stand him in good stead. He must rise to the challenge of the thermonuclear age. More than ever, he needs to exercise courage, patience, tolerance, and imagination. Fear and suspicion which for so long have characterized international relations must no longer feature in this hydrogen age. In this new situation, how are the nations of the world to be guided in their relations with one another? I believe that the answer is to be found in the most sensible art of living together in peace.

CONSIDERATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Let me be candid. When American foreign policy did concern itself with what was happening in the rest of the

world, it did so out of fear and suspicion—fear of communism and suspicion of Communist motives. Fear and suspicion are very undesirable states of mind. They breed hatred, and hatred in turn breeds cruelty and intolerance. Fear of Soviet communism has led the United States, and those who follow her lead, to take a distorted view of the world situation and of the forces that are at work in modern society. I do not wish to be misunderstood. I look upon free institutions as not only the most desirable of political systems but also as those most congenial to the flowering of human genius. But these institutions are threatened not only by political dictatorships. The resistance to social and economic change *inside* our own societies, undermining the faith of the masses in their own power, can be equally deadly.

When I say that American foreign policy is unduly dominated by fear and suspicion of communism, I think I reflect the views of most thinking Asians. The weapons of the Soviet Union are in the first instance economic, social, and ideological; only secondarily are they military. If she relied primarily upon military action, why has she not resorted to it before now? The Western Powers have assured the Soviets of their present weakness and of their future strength. Why has Russia waited for the strength of the Western Powers to grow? Why should Russia wait for a time most unfavorable to her? These questions really must be faced.

This brooding sense of fear and suspicion also breeds a tendency to escape from reality. There is at the moment a very considerable uneasiness in this country regarding "poor" American propaganda in contrast with "good" Russian propaganda. For instance, when the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru warmly welcomed the Soviet Union's announcement of the suspension of

nuclear tests, the reaction of this country was that Russian propaganda works better than American propaganda. In this connection I think I cannot do better than to quote Mr. Walter Lippmann who observed:

This theory rests on the notion that our many reverses and the decline of our influence are due not to defects in our policies but to the superior advantages of the Soviet Union in propaganda. That is to say, when our products do not sell, the trouble lies not with the engineering in the quality of the product but in the packaging and the advertising. . . . American propaganda is in trouble not because the Russians are able to lie with impunity but because in so many critical areas American propaganda is trying to sell policies which for one reason or another are obsolete, are fictions, are profoundly unpopular.

There is the central fiction in the Far East that Formosa is China and that the actual government of China on the mainland ought to disappear. No propaganda can make a policy based on that fiction credible, much less convincing and inspiring. . . . In the Middle East there is the fiction that the Arab States will remain with the West if only we can prevent the Soviet forces from invading them.

And in Europe, there is the fiction that Adenauer's Germany will absorb East Germany and that in some unknown way the Red Army will roll itself back out of Eastern Europe. The fact of the matter is that the mass of the people do not like these fictions and the informed leaders of opinion know that they are fictions and do not believe in them. That is why our propaganda works badly.¹

AMERICA'S CHINA POLICY

Mr. Lippmann's reference to this country's China policy, it seems to me, needs some elaboration, for it is directly related to the existence of tensions in the Far East. I think that this is the appropriate occasion to put across the

¹ "Today and Tomorrow," New York *Herald Tribune*, April 3, 1958.

views of a citizen of an uncommitted nation like Burma to the leaders of American life. Let me endorse Mr. Lippmann's contention that United States policy toward China is unreal. It needs a thorough re-examination and reappraisal. The State Department holds the view that the government in Peking should not occupy the Chinese seat in the United Nations. The Security Council is invested by the Charter of the United Nations with permanent executive authority. It is the body invested with authority to pronounce judgment in any dispute which is of international concern. The composition of such a body is, therefore, a matter of the utmost importance. The legal title of each of its members is beyond question. Under Article 23 of the Charter the "Republic of China" is allotted a permanent seat on the Security Council. But this Article has been violated by the presence of a Chinese member who no longer represents, in any sense, the government of his country. The nature of the problem is much more profound and much more significant than most of us are apt to think, since it is a fact that if only the United States decided to reverse her attitude towards China, more than fifty nations of the world would follow suit overnight. The reason behind the United States attitude toward China is the contention that Communist China is bent on world domination. It is an aggressor and morally and politically unfit to be a member of the United Nations. Normally one would expect to be at war with a country of which one spoke in such terms; and the United States is in fact at war with Communist China in every respect except the one usually associated with a state of war—it is not fighting China by force of arms. The only logical sequence of such a policy is the inevitability of conflict, a doctrine which the United States attributes to the Commu-

nist camp. I find it difficult to understand this attitude when military force is neither in use nor immediately in prospect. However, the United States has very rightly avoided this attitude in her dealings with the Soviet Union.

The significant fact is that many of the closest colleagues of the United States have recognized Peking. The United Kingdom and many others claim that recognition implies neither approval nor disapproval but is merely a practical arrangement suitable for maintaining contact with any government, whether friendly or unfriendly.

The refusal of the United States to support the admission of China to the United Nations is based on two assumptions: that the Peking government's grip on China may be broken at any moment. No one, however, believes this. The second assumption is that the Chinese government's behavior unfits it for membership in the world organization. Many instances are cited in support of this view.

In this connection, it is important to remember that the main job of the United Nations is to settle disputes without war. The more the countries disapprove of one another, the more important it is that their accusations and counteraccusations should take place within the organization. Otherwise they may settle their disputes only on the battlefield. The United Nations exists precisely to prevent this from happening. By excluding the Peking government, one damages not Peking but the United Nations, which is thereby ruled out as an effective instrument of international conciliation. I believe this is not the intention of United States policy, but it is its unhappy consequence.

If the above argument holds good, then it is true that the trade embargo on China has no justification. Britain's breakaway from the United States em-

bargo has considerably damaged Anglo-American solidarity. Moreover, the recent breach in the economic blockade of China has now ended whatever effectiveness United States policy might previously have claimed. Trade is beginning to flow between China, on the one hand, and countries such as Canada and Japan, on the other.

One may very well ask what can now be gained by a change in United States policy. No one, of course, believes that the diplomatic recognition of China by the United States, the admission of China to the United Nations, and opening up of trade relations with that country would transform Peking overnight into a co-operative regime. The question, therefore, is not helpful. The only helpful question would be to ask what dangers and disadvantages might be avoided by the diplomatic recognition of China and the general normalization of relations. The answer is plain to all who care to think objectively. The United States, everybody knows, has sufficient power and resources to be able to buy the friendship of a few Asian states who need its military protection, but it is generally true to say that no one in Asia, except two or three leaders, comes anywhere near sharing the American attitude toward Peking.

FURTHER CAUSES OF TENSIONS

Let me now turn to a few other factors which are responsible for the existence of tensions. The West argues that Communism is basically international in character, that the Soviet Union has been an aggressor and disturber of peace, in as much as Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and so forth were compelled to set up pro-Soviet governments, if not as a result of military invasion at least by means of political pressures. This argument raises a maze of complex issues from which it will be difficult to draw correct conclusions.

The Communist reply, as we all know, is that in all these countries pro-Soviet regimes were established by the will of the majority of the inhabitants. But even if we reject this plea as false, and insist that Soviet pressure was the decisive factor, we have to recognize that at the termination of World War II, two clear-cut groups—Communist and Western—emerged in Europe. The West was suspicious of Communist intentions, and the Communists were likewise suspicious of Western intentions. The Soviet Union, rightly or wrongly, considered the situation to be such that it must establish a cordon of friendly states around itself. It may be likened to the anxiety on the part of the United States which caused her to feel it necessary to make Latin American countries "safe for Democracy." Britain and France, together with other West European countries, moved closely together and established close association with the United States. To ask which party started this process is as unprofitable as to ask who fired the first shot in a war between two countries. The relevant consideration in this context is that, unlike Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union did not compel by actual military invasion any of its neighbors to become satellites.

It can be argued, however, that though the Soviet Union has not as yet attempted to impose its will on any state outside the Communist cordon, the Soviets have had and still have the intention of doing so whenever the circumstances are favorable. But it is very difficult to arrive at an objective appraisal of such suppositions. Suspicions are not proof, and it is doubtful whether any proof has been established to sustain this charge. The usual Western explanation of why Russia has not resorted to openly aggressive measures is that she has been deterred from doing so by Western armed strength. Let us do a little plain thinking. If the So-

viet Union in the immediate years after the war desisted from launching a military offensive because of Western armed strength, Western strength must have been sufficient to preserve peace even at that period. But the contention of the advocates of Western rearmament has always been that the Soviet forces were relatively so much stronger than those of the West that rearmament was essential. If that were so, and if the Soviet intentions were to attack the West, why did not Soviet Russia launch the attack while the West was so comparatively weak? Why wait until the West had grown strong?

The plain fact is that Soviet Russia does not want to launch a shooting war against the West, just as the West does not want to launch one against the Soviet Union. Everybody knows that a third world war will be a hydrogen war and that the consequences of such a war will be catastrophic both for victor and vanquished. In the event of a war between the Soviet Union and the West, many Western European countries could be virtually annihilated and the United States seriously injured. The Soviet Union would suffer the same fate. The leaders of the Kremlin know full well that a third war, even if the Soviet forces were nominally victorious, would put back Soviet progress many decades. That is a price they are not prepared to pay.

Then why do they persist in cold war tactics? The answer is that they distrust the West, that they detest the capitalist system just as fully as the West distrusts and detests communism. In the same way as the West believes that communism, by its inherent defects such as the suppression of fundamental human rights, is doomed eventually to oblivion, so the Communists are convinced that the capitalist system is doomed eventually to decay. This mutual dislike need not make war inevi-

table. Indeed, the more Communists believe that Western civilization will eventually collapse, the less inclined should they be to pay the price of going to war merely to hasten the process. That is why the Communists are now clamoring for a peaceful and competitive coexistence. If the West is really convinced of the superiority of its own system, it should welcome it with open arms.

A SOLUTION IN PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

The possibility and desirability of peaceful coexistence in the plane of diplomacy and international relations does not, of course, mean that coexistence is possible and desirable on the plane of ideas. I, for one, regard the fundamental freedoms as of paramount importance in human societies. In the context of the twentieth century, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and the dignity of man are the essence of culture. I hold it a great truth that humanity cannot be half slave and half free. But these beliefs and convictions do not shut me off from the knowledge that there are others who believe differently. To put it plainly the plane of ideas between the culture of democracy and the culture of communism cannot be reconciled.

This brings me back to my previous contention that if the world's great religions such as Islam and Christianity, after a prolonged and bloody war for centuries, can flourish side by side in peace and amity, why should not Communist and non-Communist systems be permitted to coexist peacefully? Wars of crusades were fought hundreds of years ago between the adherents of these two religions, each determined to eliminate the other. The European Christians then thought that the followers of Islam were a menace to the Christian faith and therefore they must be put to the sword. The Moslem Saracens re-

garded the Christian crusaders as evil heretics and thus a long war of attrition ensued. When tempers calmed down and common sense prevailed it was discovered by both sides that hostilities were a folly and that the two great religions could exist side by side peacefully, without any side surrendering any of its beliefs. This I consider to be an apt instance to serve as a beacon both to the Western democracies and the Communist countries.

But there is one significant difference between the two episodes. Both Christianity and Islam are no longer *competing* for supremacy; they just flourish side by side in amity. By the very nature of their concepts, however, democracies and totalitarian systems must compete for supremacy, though by peaceful means. Victory will come to the side which understands and takes into account the most important phenomenon of the twentieth century—nationalism. The problem is in essence the problem of equality of opportunity. Let me touch briefly on this.

There are millions of people in the world who do not have enough to eat and enough to cover themselves with, and whose children cannot go even to the primary schools. It seems comic to talk to them about the virtues of democratic ideals and the dignity of man. During the last war there was a great deal of talk of the imperative need for democracy to triumph over fascism. Mr. Churchill had then invited the Burmese people to take part in that "war for democracy." Young Burmese nationalists had said then that Burma would not fight for democracy when she herself was enchained in slavery. And for that answer "democracy" did not hesitate to shut up a number of young Burmese leaders in prison.

Is the situation different today? Take Africa for instance. Over a hundred million people are being ruled today by the

free nations of the world. What does the fight against totalitarianism mean to these millions of people? When France, for instance, proudly proclaims to the world that her soldiers are killing four thousand Algerians every month, is the cause of the democracies enhanced? The white settlers of South Africa, who treat the colored people as worse than lepers, are greater enemies of democracy than the Communists. They are generating tensions much more ruthlessly than the cold war tactics allegedly employed by the Communists.

Let us not delude ourselves with the oversimplification of the world issue. The issue today is not only that of communism versus democracy. The more essential issue is the division of the world into the weak and the strong, the prosperous and the abject poor, the ruler and the ruled, the master race and the subhuman. Therefore, if the war for democracy has any meaning, it is necessary that we all sit together and create here and now the conditions that will guarantee freedom, justice, well-being, and equality to all.

An Indonesian Policy Aimed at Maintaining Freedom and Promoting World Peace

By MOEKARTO NOTOWIDIGDO

ABSTRACT: Left with the colonial heritage of a lopsided economy, a lack of trained personnel in practically every field, Indonesia, even though rich in natural resources, was born poor. Because it needs peace and tranquility to stabilize its economy and its government, Indonesia is pursuing an independent foreign policy free of alignment with either Western or Communist bloc, but not without international responsibility. Even though it prefers to remain "uncommitted" the true principle of democracy is very much alive in Indonesia, having been practiced for centuries in the villages. This principle, allowing all voices to be heard, is now being applied on the national level in the concept of the oft-misunderstood guided democracy of the Indonesian government, with a cabinet, responsible to a parliament based on general free elections and assisted by an advisory council composed of representatives of all walks of life. Striving for peace and given time to correct past mistakes, Indonesia has faith in its ability to achieve and maintain a strong government.

His Excellency Moekarto Notowidigdo, Washington, D. C. is Ambassador of Indonesia to the United States. He has been a leader of the Indonesian Nationalist Party since 1945. As Inspector General of the Indonesian Foreign Service he visited all of Asia, except China; western Europe; and the United States. In 1950 he was appointed Deputy Chief Delegate to the United Nations. In 1952 he was recalled to Indonesia to become Foreign Minister in the Wilopo Cabinet. His appointment as the Republic of Indonesia's Ambassador to the United States was approved by the United States government on September 17, 1953.

HISTORIANS and political scientists must constantly remind themselves that the platform from which they observe is often founded on treacherous and shifting sands. Indeed, if they are to be loyal to their credo of impartial analysis, they must constantly examine the perspective in which they view the subject matter under scrutiny. It is with this in mind that I ask the scholars of America, if not the statesmen and politicians, to recheck their assumptions concerning the Asian political scene.

First, it is folly to judge the evolution of democracy among the Asian countries by the Western measuring rod. Democracy (in the Western sense) has been in existence for hardly more than a decade in Asia. Second, you cannot equate all Asian countries with each other. You must recognize that there are important and profound differences.

Western democracy was conceived, roughly speaking, two hundred years ago. In those two centuries, the West has moved from oxcart to Vanguard, from the pony express to transcontinental television, from the confines of the earth to limitless space itself. As dramatic as these changes appear, you were able to incorporate them without too much shock, for the time period was sufficient for a proper ingestion. Along with these great technological revolutions, you developed, espoused, and practiced the principles of universal education, of health for all the people, and universal suffrage. For your material and spiritual contribution you have every reason to be proud. The orderly development of your technology and political evolution has given you great strength and dignity. The perfect balance of freedom and wealth, of technology and spirituality, has made you the inspiration for all underdeveloped peoples. We will never forget that your people treasured and fought for the

principles of democratic progress, never hesitating even to lay down your lives to insure that those principles would be perpetuated.

The history of the United States during your revolutionary period is the one that impresses my people the most—so much so, in fact, that it was from the writings of Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and other Americans that the revolutionary leaders of my country, Indonesia, drew philosophical and spiritual strength. It would have done your hearts good to see the Dutch colonial troops compelled to wash down walls upon which Indonesian patriots had written such mottoes as "A nation cannot live half slave, half free" and "The tree of liberty is watered by the blood of patriots" or to see Indonesian postage stamps bearing the faces of George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln. Your struggles for the principles of democracy and freedom have meaning far beyond the boundaries of the United States.

We have many other common points of history. The United States and Indonesia are among the very few countries to gain their freedom on the battlefield against colonial oppressors. Indonesia and the United States at the time of their birth were both countries of enormous potential wealth. Both had an abiding conviction that their future was their own, that they should avoid entangling alliances. Internal political convulsions are known to both of our countries. The grand phrase, "The Union must be preserved," has real significance to Indonesians.

One cannot compare, however, the atmosphere in which America emerged as a free nation with the conditions of birth of the Asian countries, which did not become free nations, after all, until the end of World War II. The difference is as great as that between the shot at Concord, heard round the world, and

the one at Hiroshima, which almost blew it apart.

If you can conjure up the vision of the Green Mountain Boys of New Hampshire in 1776 contemplating the problems of atomic energy, air power—in fact, the twentieth century's industrialization generally—then you may have some idea of what confronted my people in 1945 when Indonesia as a nation was born. We were required to adjust ourselves to the twentieth century almost overnight, and I assure you, this was no easy problem.

THE DUTCH COLONIAL HERITAGE

For 350 years prior to its independence, Indonesia was a colonial treasure house for the Dutch. It was a cornucopia of spice, rubber, mineral resources, oil, and, above all, enormous resources of expendable human beings. After 350 years, what did the Dutch bequeath to Indonesia?

A country rich in natural resources, Indonesia was born poor. We were left with a lopsided economy, with practically no manufacturing facilities. The Dutch had decreed that manufacturing was to be done in Holland and that agriculture and mineral extraction were to be the principal economic activity of the Netherlands East Indies. We were confronted by a terrible lack of trained political, engineering, educational, medical, and administrative personnel—unlike India and Pakistan, where the British had paved the way for independence by training over the years a capable Indian civil service and broadening the base of education. And the Dutch left Indonesia with the highest death rate in the world and 90 per cent illiteracy. All the public relations men in the world cannot change the import of these statistics.

In addition, Indonesia emerged as a new nation devastated by the wreckage and wastage of war. In some countries

the transfer of sovereignty was orderly—as in India, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Burma. In Indonesia, unfortunately, independence had to be fought for with a bloody war and the sacrifice of human lives. Even after it gained its independence, Indonesia had to fight Dutch subversive actions within its own borders—as in the notorious Westerling affair—and it also had to fight internationally against Dutch anti-Indonesian propaganda. Added to all the other burdens was the huge monetary debt to Holland which we assumed as a price to stop the bloodshed.

AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY

While Indonesia and the other new nations of Asia are attempting to pull themselves up by their bootstraps, the contestants in the cold war are cleaning their atomic and hydrogen bombs. It is unsettling to know that the cloud on the horizon may contain lethal fallout as well as rain. At the very time when the new Asian nations need peace and tranquility, there is a demand that they take sides in this gigantic tug of war. Every move they make toward independence and dignity is regarded with suspicion. The feeling cannot help but grow among the Asian countries that they are being regarded as pawns in the great power struggle.

Our independent policy free of alignment with either the Western or Communist bloc does not mean it is one without international responsibility. We are devoted members of the United Nations, regarding that body as an essential instrument for avoiding violence in the world. I think I can guarantee now that whatever the international organization of the future will be—League of Nations, United Nations, or the Association of the Solar System—Indonesia will observe its obligation and be a loyal member and participant.

The decision of the Asian countries

with regard to the cold war crisis is obviously not uniform. Some accepted the invitation to join the military alliance for the declared purpose of being defended against aggression by the Communist powers and also of receiving economic aid from the West. Other nations—like India, Indonesia, Burma, and Ceylon—preferred to be called “uncommitted.” They declared their policy to act independently and not to join any military bloc. They wanted to concentrate their efforts on economic reconstruction of their countries and to build a sound democratic society without interference by foreign powers. They asked themselves whether newly independent countries with little political and economic power could, merely by joining such an alliance, become members equal to the big powers.

The West has given the impression to the “uncommitted” nations that the issue in the cold war is based on pro- or anticommunism. Sometimes we are given the feeling that it does not matter to the West whether a nation is building a positive democracy or not. It seems important to them only that it be anti-Communist and join the Western bloc. Why is there little appreciation for countries which they call “uncommitted,” even though those countries are adhering to the democratic principles of government?

It is important to note here that some of the Asian allies of the United States have not yet had free general elections, while the “uncommitted” countries have already had general elections. With these free elections have come cabinets responsible to parliaments.

To some, Indonesia has given the impression of being unstable and Communist-dominated. The truth is that the Indonesian nation, having obtained national freedom, is now struggling to find a formula to establish a society which will give the maximum happiness to the

people. They have two alternatives: a dictatorship, either Communist or Fascist, or a free society.

The Indonesian people have made their choice for a free society, as they decisively proved in the last general elections. The non-Communist political parties won a clear majority. I assure you that the direction toward a free society is irreversible.

Elections alone, however, cannot bring about stability. Why? One must know a little about the background and history of Indonesia's political life to understand its current affairs. Indonesia's political party system is a reflection of the multiple-party system in Holland. After the general election, there was no single party which could command a sufficient majority in Parliament to form a cabinet, and it was therefore necessary to form a coalition for this purpose. But the coalition, with the ephemeral quality so often present in such arrangements, was unable to support the cabinet, which therefore collapsed. A fluid situation ensued.

THE GREAT DEBATE

From this unstable condition emerged two dominant schools of thought: one led by President Soekarno and the other led by former Vice President Mohammad Hatta.

The group led by President Soekarno concerns itself with a search for norms within the indigenous cultural heritage of the nation and an endeavor to augment this with parliamentary democracy. This group is of the opinion that the Western parliamentary system as had been practiced in Indonesia, with so many political shades and factions, has proved less suitable to the people who still adhere to values and customs of their traditional community life.

I am aware that Westerners may find it difficult to understand some of the recent expressions of Indonesian political

life, just as we in the East sometimes find it difficult to understand some of your political institutions. The electoral college, for instance, is a most confusing concept to Asians. However, when one understands its evolutionary development, meaning begins to emerge.

A great deal of nonsense has been written and spoken about the concept of guided democracy in Indonesia. Actually, the national council, which is to act as an adviser to the Cabinet, finds its historical roots in the ancient community system of *gotong royong*. For ages this principle has been practiced in the villages of Indonesia, where the members of the village have met in a true democracy and *all* points of view have been heard. The democracy of *gotong royong* will not suffer one voice to remain unheard. This principle, applied on the national level, is visible in the advisory nature of the national council which encompasses many views without voice in the cabinet.

Also being revived are the traditions of *musjawarah* and *mufakat*. The former means open discussion among all representatives of the community. The latter, which stands for general agreement after consultation, may be used as a substitute procedure by the cabinet.

Since contradictory ideologies found in a multitude of political parties would cause any government—village or nation—to break down, a sense of tolerance must replace the inflexibility of ideology, as though the problems involved were being decided by members of the Indonesian family. Indonesians are puzzled by the West when the West calls the ancient *gotong royong* of the Indonesian villages a Communist ideology.

A second group, which is led by Mr. Hatta, is not of the opinion that the Western parliamentary system has failed in Indonesia. Instead, it seeks to pursue a course which will possibly cor-

rect errors in the implementation of democracy itself.

This group believes that the causes of the present difficulties in the country are not merely political and constitutional in nature but are primarily economic, financial, and administrative. Therefore this second group seeks to find a solution of the problem along the lines of rationalization of the administration. It is opposed to the idea of creating a government which is composed of representatives of all political parties, including Communists. This is because, unlike the first group, it does not believe that compatibility or cooperation between national political parties and the Communist party is possible within a government structure. But even Hatta has said “A democracy which is intolerant of other viewpoints is no longer democracy but strays into totalitarian ways of thinking.”

Since President Soekarno's ideas on government received a majority vote in Parliament, a new cabinet emerged. This sequence of events was the basic reason that an extraparlimentary opposition emerged and crystallized in the action of Sjaffruddin Prawiranegara in Padang (Sumatra). This is why government troops were landed in Central Sumatra, an action which your Abraham Lincoln would have fully appreciated.

THE CHOICE FOR FREEDOM AND WORLD PEACE

The question now arises: Can Indonesia remain strong?

From the viewpoint of people and resources, there is no doubt about it. The history of Indonesia shows that before the Dutch came, Indonesia was a great nation, stretching its influence as far as Madagascar where a form of Javanese is still spoken.

As for the present, much progress has already been made in the fields of edu-

cation, agriculture, co-operatives, public health, rehabilitation, rural economics, and, to some extent, foreign trade. However, Indonesia has a long way to go. The growth of political consciousness has surpassed the physical and technical capabilities of the Republic so that the comparatively good results obtained in the past few years are being viewed with dissatisfaction. This feeling of discontent, coupled with yearning ambition to do so much for so many in so short a time, leads to unfortunate outbursts of defiance and highhanded actions. These are no more than attitudes for self-correction.

Also from the viewpoint of present-day history where giants are wrestling with life and death, Indonesia wants to be let alone in peace, not to be dragged into the cold war. Internal conflicts will be settled by the Indonesians themselves.

As one delegate from a "rebellious" province to the National Conference pointed out:

In the course of progress of a new nation, frequent changes, modifications or even small upheavals are bound to take place. It would be wrong to identify these phenomena as a sign of disintegration of the state. In the history of the United States of America in its struggle towards a mature nationhood similar developments took place. These actions in the provinces should be recognized as a healthy sign which warns that the building up of Democracy in Indonesia is not a monopoly of the Central Government alone, but is the cooperative work of the peoples of all regions of the Republic.

What Indonesia needs is sound political growth, *not* disturbed by any outside influence. Indonesia does not need grants. If necessary, it will apply for loans for economic development.

Indonesia possesses the self-confidence

to build itself into a strong nation. It guarantees its citizens full freedom to express themselves, because this, it believes, is the foundation for a strong and happy society. As time goes on, Indonesia will create enough statesmen to correct the past mistakes of its leaders.

Indonesia looks at the cold war with misgivings. Small nations are dragged into it without the opportunity to experience the slow democratic growth of a nation. Just one mishap, such as the dropping of an atomic bomb by mistake, can start a world war. It is only peace that will start the new nations on the road to becoming politically and economically strong.

Also, the present-day press looks upon world issues as being either black or white, or Communist or anti-Communist. Life is more complicated than that. There are other shadings of color in between which may suit a particular nation better.

It is to be regretted that Asian nations are accused of communism whenever they deviate from the West's conception of a political state. This has happened too frequently. Basically, their philosophy of life is the same as that of the Western nations: they believe in freedom.

True, our way of bringing about freedom is different from that of the West. When the West calls itself "anti-Communist," we call ourselves "non-Communist." While the West is unable to communicate with the Communist world, we want a peaceful coexistence.

When the West stresses military alliances and military build-up, my nation wants nonmilitary alliances and political and economic build-up.

Indonesia wants peace, Asia wants peace, the whole world wants peace! Are we so bereft of good sense that we cannot achieve it? I for one have faith.

Hatta and Co-operatives: The Middle Way for Indonesia?

By BENJAMIN HIGGINS

ABSTRACT: Because of Hatta's role as a leader of the moderate and rationalist faction in Indonesia, his book has wide interest. As Vice President from 1950 to 1956, he was able to act as a buffer between extreme Nationalists and Communists and the more pro-Western groups. His book shows that he takes seriously Article 38 of the Constitution which calls for organization of the national economy on a co-operative basis. His anticapitalist attitudes are apparent throughout the book, and he repeatedly contrasts corporations, which are for him the epitome of class struggle, and co-operatives, which are the Indonesian route to the classless society. Yet Hatta also regards co-operatives as a technique for economic development; but it is clear even to him that a "co-operative national economy" cannot be attained for decades. Meanwhile, the failure of independence to bring prosperity is a major factor in the current conflict in Indonesia. It is clear that Indonesia cannot await the organization of a co-operative economy to begin an effective economic development program. What Indonesia needs most now is a large dose of "*ad hocery*"; it is doubtful whether Hatta alone can provide the necessary leadership for such a practical economic development program.

*Benjamin Higgins, Ph.D., Cambridge, Massachusetts, is Visiting Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Director of the Indonesia Project in the Center for International Studies. During 1952 and 1953 he was Monetary and Fiscal Adviser to the Indonesian Government, working with the Ministry of Finance and the National Planning Bureau. In the course of three trips to Indonesia, Dr. Higgins has spent some three years in the country. Dr. Higgins has also served as Chief Economist of the United Nations Mission to Libya and as Economic Adviser to the Philippines government. He is author of the recent book, *Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and Development* (1957).*

INDONESIA'S achievement of independence in December 1949 has been followed by eight stormy years with eight different governments. Throughout most of this period, Sukarno as President and Hatta * as Vice President were the major elements of stability in Indonesian government. Hatta became the symbol of moderation as well as stability; during the succession of cabinets dominated by Masjumi (Moslem), right-wing PNI (Nationalists) and PSI (Socialist) parties, he served both as mediator and buffer between the Cabinet and the President who relied increasingly on left-wing Nationalist and Communist support. The two Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinets and the Djuanda cabinet were supported by this same faction and were closely associated with the President. Under these administrations, Hatta was unable to play his traditional role. By December 1956 he felt himself no longer able to remain in the government and submitted his resignation. Hatta's resignation was widely regarded as a threat to Indonesia's unity, and pressure has been exerted on him from various quarters to return to the government, either as Vice President or as Prime Minister of a new cabinet. With the outbreak of civil war early this year, the infant Republic faces its most severe crisis. Many people, both in and out of Indonesia, are looking to Hatta, as a "middle of the way" man, to lead the country out of its present dilemma and back to the path of unity and progress.

Thus the publication in English of Hatta's book of essays has an interest far beyond its immediate content. What manner of man does it reveal? What is Hatta's program for Indonesia? What

* This article is based on Mohammed Hatta's *The Co-operative Movement in Indonesia*. Edited by George Mc. T. Kahin. (Cornell University, 1957.)

is the relationship of this program to the current conflict?

HATTA'S BACKGROUND

Indonesian political observers are fond of dividing Indonesian political parties into three categories: Moslem, Nationalist, and Marxist. One of the reasons for Hatta's success as a middle-of-the-way moderator is that he combines all three strains of Indonesian political thought in his own ideology. He is a devout Moslem. His father was a well-known *Ulama* (Moslem religious scholar) who gave him a thorough training in Islam. He was one of the early leaders of the Indonesian nationalist movement which culminated in the revolution in 1945. As early as 1918, at the age of sixteen, he became Treasurer of the young Sumatran Association, a local nationalist movement. As a student in Holland, he was a leader of the Perhimpunan Indonesian (Indonesian Association); and by 1927 his campaign for Indonesian independence was influential enough for him to be arrested by the Dutch and imprisoned for six months. Seven years later, Hatta was arrested again and this time was sent to a concentration camp in New Guinea. He joined Sukarno in the Declaration of Independence on August 17, 1945 and became Vice President at that time. During the crucial period of negotiations for independence and until August 1950, Hatta served as Prime Minister of the new Republic and then became Vice President again.

Hatta also shares with most of the educated Indonesian leaders a distinct Marxist bent, having acquired his Marxist views as a university student in Holland. Hatta graduated with distinction from the leading Dutch high school in Batavia (now Djakarta) in 1921 and spent the following ten years studying at the Rotterdam School of Commerce where he earned the degree Doctor-

andus in Economics.¹ Thus Hatta's education is European, and particularly Dutch; during the formative years between the age of nineteen and the age of thirty, he was in Dutch high schools and universities. Consequently, he approaches questions of economic and social policy with a European as well as an Asian point of view.

Like other non-Communist Indonesian leaders, Hatta had his period of flirtation with the Communist party during his student days. Hatta's early speeches and writings suggest that he thought of Indonesian Communists mainly as Indonesian Nationalists. Gradually, however, he seems to have decided that communism was the wrong course for Indonesia. While he has been considerably less outspoken than Sjafrudin, "Prime Minister" of the rebel government, he could probably be classed as an anti-Communist while retaining Marxist attitudes towards the Western World and capitalism.

There can be little doubt that Sukarno's proposal for "democracy with leadership" after his return from Russia, Yugoslavia, and China was the final straw that led to Hatta's resignation. Not that either Sukarno's "conception," or the struggle between Sukarno, the left-wing Nationalists, and Communists on the one hand, and the Moslem and moderate groups on the other was anything new. Sukarno's proposal was really little more than a recommendation that Indonesia restore to the Presidency the powers conferred on that position in earlier constitutions. The process of constitutional reform from the 1945 through the 1949 Constitution to the present one of 1950 was one of progressive clipping of the wings of the President, and Sukarno had resisted this

¹ "Doctorandus" is a title given to students who have satisfied all requirements for the Doctorate except the dissertation.

process from the beginning.² Moreover, the 1945 Constitution also provided for a Supreme Advisory Council not unlike the advisory council involved in Sukarno's "conception." At least as early as October 17, 1952, the struggle between the two major factions became an open one. The "October 17th Affair" was an effort of a few Cabinet Ministers, backed by the Army, to seize power in a coup d'état in order to overcome what they regarded as the extreme and irrational nationalism of the Sukarno faction.³ The fall of the two Ali Sastroamidjojo governments as a result of Army opposition was a reflection of the same basic conflict.⁴ But while the struggle between the two factions, represented by Sukarno on the one hand and Hatta on the other,⁵ is one of long standing, the growing strength of the Communist party gave it a new significance. The Communists emerged from the elections of November 1955 as the fourth biggest party with about a quar-

² See A. K. Pringgodiggo, *The Office of President in Indonesia as Defined in the Three Constitutions in Theory and Practice* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1957).

³ Cf. Justus van der Kroef, "Instability in Indonesia," *Far Eastern Survey*, April 1957, and "Guided Democracy in Indonesia," *Far Eastern Survey*, August 1957; James H. Moberg, "The Indonesian Elite," *ibid.*, March 1957; and Leslie H. Palmer, "Sukarno, the Nationalist," *Pacific Affairs*, June 1957.

⁴ For a brief outline of this conflict, cf. Benjamin Higgins, *Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and Development* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957), Introduction and chapters 3 and 4.

⁵ At a reception at the Indonesian Embassy in Washington in 1955 the wife of the then Military Attaché asked me, "Who do you think will win the election, Sukarno or Hatta?" Since neither Sukarno nor Hatta was running for office, the question struck me at the time as being slightly naive. Not until my knowledge of Indonesian politics deepened did I realize how apt a summary of the major issues this question was.

ter of the popular vote. They increased their share of the popular vote in the elections for the Constituent Assembly, and local elections since indicate that the Communists may have over 30 per cent of the popular support of the country and nearly half the popular support on the island of Java. In this situation, Hatta found himself no longer able to serve as Vice President to a President who wanted broader powers for himself and greater representation of the Communists in the government.

At the same time, Sumatran though he is, Hatta has refused to give his support to the rebels. If he is anti-Communist, why does he not support the anti-Communist rebellion centered on his own home region?

The answer can be found in the book under review. It shows clearly that Hatta's attitude to "communism versus capitalism" is "a plague on both your houses," and that he thinks of co-operatives as a "middle way" between capitalism and communism, as many Europeans did during the 1920's and early 1930's. Let us turn, therefore, to the Hatta "conception" of the co-operative state as a middle way for Indonesia.

CO-OPERATIVES AND THE CONSTITUTION

Article 38 of the present (1950) Indonesian Constitution states:

1. The national economy shall be organized on a co-operative basis.
2. Branches of production of importance to the State and which vitally affect the life of the people shall be controlled by the State.
3. Land and water and the natural riches contained therein shall be controlled by the State and used for the maximum prosperity of the people.⁶

⁶ This is the semiofficial translation as prepared by the Ministry of Information. It is not a literal translation of the Indonesian text.

Hatta takes this Article literally; he considers it a goal and an obligation of the Indonesian people to establish a co-operative society. In a 1951 address he said:

As a nation which has struggled against imperialism and colonialism for many a decade, we have the highest ideals concerning the fundamental principles of life. We want to see our nation live in prosperity and well-being, free from want. This ideal of ours is laid down in the Constitution: "The national economy shall be organized on a co-operative basis." These words of the Constitution are not only a reflection of one of our national ideals, but also an injunction to do our best for its fulfillment. A national economy on a co-operative basis is what we aspire to.⁷

He also identifies the co-operative state with the *Pantjasila*. He writes, "In realizing our national ideal that 'the economy should be organized on a co-operative basis,' we should not forget that our state is based on moral principles, which are embodied in the *Pantjasila*, the five principles: Divine Omnipotence, humanity, national consciousness, democracy and social justice (p. 76).

He also indicates that the creation of a national economy along co-operative lines is the proper outlet for Indonesian nationalism.

It has been only since the inception of the national movement, starting with Budi Utomo, that the ideas of economic co-operation have begun to come to life in the Indonesian community. It can therefore be said that it was the national movement which stimulated the development of the co-operative movement. National feeling became its guiding spirit (p. 7).

CO-OPERATION AS A DEVELOPMENT TECHNIQUE

For Hatta, however, the organization of co-operatives is much more than an

⁷ From Vice President Hatta's address on Indonesia's First Co-operatives Day, July 11, 1951.

expression of nationalism or the striving for an ideal; it is the appropriate development technique for his country. Indeed, he states at one point that "because the strength of a people economically weak can be brought about only through the co-operative movement, co-operatives are a *conditio sine qua non* as a base for the people's economy" (p. 31). Co-operation, he argues, is the only way to eradicate the national "inferiority complex"; it alone is "capable of tearing the remnant of colonialism from the soul of our nation" (p. 44).

As an example of what co-operatives can do to develop the Indonesian economy, he cites the possibility of organizing collectively owned smoke-houses; "If the raw rubber were smoked, it would be easy to produce at least fifth-grade sheet rubber, for which there is a ready world market, at a price up to three times that of raw rubber," which the smallholder is now selling (p. 50). He refers to Denmark as a country which, "by means of co-operative organization," has "successfully raised itself from a poor nation to one of the most prosperous nations of the world" (p. 54).

CO-OPERATIVES AND GOTONG ROJONG

At the same time, Hatta believes that co-operatives are a modern expression of the ancient traditions of unanimity versus majority rule, mutual aid, working together, the family-like society, and similar village traditions. Mutual assistance, he says, is "second nature to our people" (p. 1). In the Indonesian village "social co-operation is performed without regard to exact economic calculations. . . . This type of social intercourse makes for a strong feeling of solidarity, the feeling of harmoniously belonging together" (p. 2). At some points he seems to argue that the co-operative movement should be supported

because people who believe in it are nicer than others. In a co-operative store "all weights and measures . . . must be true" (p. 35). Co-operatives must "keep prices reasonable for the people," in contrast with ordinary traders who "take advantage of shortages and try to sell at the highest possible price." He does not indicate how co-operatives would overcome shortages when they occur, nor how they would ration short supplies if prices are fixed below the market level. The principles of the co-operative movement require that "we must carry on a struggle in which we must be sustained by a purity of heart" (p. 97).

Hatta does say that *economic* co-operation requires "individuality" as well as the traditional "solidarity" (pp. 3-4), but he warns

that individuality should not be confused with individualism. Individualism is an understanding or philosophy of living which places the individual before society as we find in the economic teachings of Adam Smith. Individuality is the nature of an individual who is conscious of self-respect and has faith in himself (pp. 32-33).

ANTI-CAPITALISM

The strength of Hatta's anticapitalist sentiments is apparent throughout the book. In 1951, Hatta was saying that private enterprise is all right in the short run, although it should disappear in the long run. "A realistic economic policy," he maintains, "should be able to make a distinction between long-term and short-term economic policy. . . . Our long-term economic policy includes all efforts and plans for the gradual establishment of the Indonesian economy on a co-operative basis." In the short run, however, the government must direct its attention to the immediate needs of the people: food, clothing, and housing; and "as long as the state and the

co-operatives are not yet equipped to manage the national economy, in our community private initiative will fulfill the function of developing the economy and providing a living for many thousands of people of the have not category." Even then, however, he added, "it is the duty of the government to protect the people's weak economy against foreign economic oppression and to improve the system of sharing the earnings" (pp. 39-40).

By 1956 private enterprise had sunk to the level of a necessary evil in Hatta's view. The best he could say for it was, "Whether it is desired or not, those activities not undertaken by the government or by the co-operative movement in this period of reconstruction and development are left to be taken up by private concerns" (p. 100). However, "as there are set up more and more state enterprises, . . . and as the co-operative movement develops, the scope available to private enterprise will accordingly diminish and finally disappear entirely" (p. 101). He did add, however, that "this ultimate development should not be brought about by draconic government regulations, dogmatically formulated, but rather as a result of the predominance acquired by state and co-operative undertakings."

Hatta regards the unexpected vigor of Indonesian enterprise as a threat to the long-run goals and ideals of Indonesians. Article 38 is imperiled, he argues, because "there is an ever widening penetration of the idea of *national capitalism* within the ranks of the influential political parties in Indonesia. . . . Apparently the party leaders have not, in this transitional stage, sufficient authority to check this damaging trend" (p. 99). He admits that "there was a time when the principle of *laissez-faire* . . . brought prosperity to the peoples of the world. . . . [It] caused the col-

lapse of all that was weak and destroyed backward production techniques, time and again causing crises in unemployment. However, the economic improvements and progress which it had created outweighed the misery resulting from it." But, "capitalism will run its course, and its historical mission will be over. Its further development from free competition into a system of monopolies, is no longer in agreement with its original mission. The destruction it causes has become greater than all the good and improvement it has brought" (pp. 86-87). The Marxist ring of these statements is unmistakable.

Another indication that Hatta still accepts the Marxist view of capitalism appears in his discussion of large scale co-operative industries. It is of course true, he states, that "large-scale industries cannot be organized on a co-operative basis in capitalist countries because the workers who would become the partners in these co-operatives do not own any capital." However, he sees no reason why Indonesia, with its whole economy organized on a co-operative basis, should not be able to accumulate sufficient savings to organize large scale enterprises on a co-operative basis (p. 80).

Throughout the book he treats co-operatives as the antithesis of capitalism. Large scale enterprise in capitalist countries, he says, is "to a large extent still subject to a conflict of needs and interests between labor and capital and, because of that, carries with it an overt or covert class struggle. In the co-operative movement there is basically no class struggle" (p. 24). At another point, he goes so far as to state that "a private concern with shareholders is an embodiment of class antagonism," while "in a co-operative enterprise there cannot exist any class or class interests" (p. 103). In a co-operative system

"wages are decided in line with the importance of the job and the amount of responsibility borne by an individual in the running of the enterprise"; he implies that such factors exercise no influence on wage determination in capitalist countries.

Among the backers of the rebel government in Sumatra are some of the very "national capitalists" that Hatta regards as a threat to Indonesia's ideals; his failure to throw his support to the rebels may well be the result of his distaste for this element of their support.

CO-OPERATIVES AND INDONESIA'S DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM

Despite its wide range of natural resources, Indonesia has a complex and difficult development problem. Two-thirds of the country's eighty-five million people are crowded together on the one small island of Java, making it the most densely populated large area in the world. There is no hope for the achievement of even reasonably high per-capita incomes on Java without moving much of the population into industry on Java or into industry or larger scale agriculture on the outer islands. Either approach is expensive. Most of the industrial potential—including plantations as industries—is in the outer islands, especially Sumatra. Realization of this potential will also require heavy investment of capital and skills. The estimates made by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Indonesia Project suggest that Indonesia needs investment of Rupiah 12 to Rupiah 15 billion per year to get over the hump to self-sustained growth—about twice what has been invested in recent years or what is called for in the current Five Year Plan. National income is about Rupiah 100 billion, so these investment requirements correspond to the 12 to 15 per cent of na-

tional income widely accepted as the capital requirements for a "takeoff" into economic growth.

How do these figures compare with the scale of the present co-operative movement in Indonesia? In 1956—the latest year for which figures are available at time of writing—there were about 12,000 co-operative societies in Indonesia with a membership of just over two million—less than 10 per cent of the labor force. Total capital amounted to Rupiah 394 million, less than 3 per cent of capital requirements. Total transactions—credits and sales combined—were just over Rupiah two billion, or some 2 per cent of national income.

Clearly, the co-operative movement cannot be expected to make much of a contribution to Indonesian economic development in the short run. Hatta does not suggest that it can; "the co-operative movement," he says, "calls for education and training which not only cannot be acquired in a short while but must consume decades" (p. 27). He recognizes that "the man in the street cannot live by ideals only, he has not got the patience to wait for the realization of the co-operative community of Indonesia, which can be established only gradually and after a fairly long time. He wants action, of any kind, that makes life less of a burden to him right now" (p. 38).

But action of what kind? Here Hatta fails us. He provides no program for the short run. Foreign aid, he says (p. 31), can be effective only if it works through the co-operative movement. Yet Indonesia badly needs an effective program to get through the short run, if she is ever to enjoy the long-run potential of her economy, whether it is organized in co-operative fashion or any other way. Much of the unrest in Indonesia reflects the wide and deep disappointment that *Merdeka*

failed to bring prosperity in its wake; and the struggle between Java and outer islands reflects a feeling that the central government has not done what it could to build on the "growing points and leading sectors" in the outer islands.

The government's failure to convert Indonesia's considerable development potential into a rising standard of living results from the inability of Indonesian leaders to resolve their ideological conflicts. All governments and all parties have expressed themselves in favor of "converting the colonial economy into a national economy," but the concept of a "national economy" differed from party to party and from leader to leader; indeed only the Communists had a clear idea of what a "national" economy would be. All parties also pay lip service to the national goal of "organizing the economy along co-operative lines" which was written into the Provisional Constitution, but this goal also has lacked clear definition.

Most leaders agree that Indonesia is not to be developed on "capitalist" lines. Rugged individualism, free competition, and private enterprise had few enthusiastic backers. They were associated in the minds of most Indonesians with imperialism, colonialism, materialism, and a ruthlessly exploitative, ferociously competitive, "devil-take-the-hindmost" approach to social organization. Indonesians did not want such "capitalism." So what was the economic and social system to be? No one but the Communists was quite sure. Meanwhile, it was considered necessary to avoid making decisions on particular projects—financing the Asahan Valley scheme, disposition of the North Sumatra oil properties—lest the decisions prove inconsistent with the ultimate definition of social and economic aims.

Similarly, while everyone agreed that the political system was to be "demo-

cratic," they also agreed that it was not to be democratic in the ordinary "Western" sense. No one but the Communists wanted a "People's Democracy." It was to be an "Indonesian" democracy, reflecting the spirit of *gotong rojong* and *musjawarat desa* (mutual aid and unanimity), and rejecting—as Sukarno put it—"the principle that fifty per cent plus one is right." But what exactly did this mean? No one was quite sure, and the Constituent Assembly may take years to decide. Meanwhile, it was felt that "as the twig is bent so is the tree inclined." No new institutions should be set up that might prejudice the final outcome.

With such confusion regarding ultimate goals much time and energy of national leaders were dissipated in fruitless debate at the ideological level. Meanwhile pressing economic issues absorbed the attention of only a handful of leaders in the agencies directly concerned: the Bank of Indonesia, the Ministry of Finance, the National Planning Bureau, the Industrial Development Bank. Such questions as, How can we best protect our dwindling foreign exchange reserves? Where can we find capital for development projects? Should we reintroduce a land tax? Should we develop Asahan or increase hydro-electric capacity in Java? could never be answered in terms of economic effectiveness alone. At some point they always ran into an ideological or nationalist issue. Whenever it was a choice between an effective stabilization or development policy and satisfying nationalist sentiments, nationalism won.

What Indonesia needs most from her leaders at this point is a large dose of pragmatism—or, to use an expression conceived to describe the policy which kept the Canadian Liberals in office for such an extraordinary length of time—"ad hocery." Indonesia needs a leader

with the common sense to deal with the country's problems one by one in a straightforward and practical manner and without too much appeal to one ideology or another. This leader must also have the popular appeal to get support for such a program. The importance of Hatta's contribution to the Indonesian revolution and to keeping the Republic afloat in its early years is

beyond dispute. The loftiness of his ideals and his personal integrity have never been questioned. No doubt it will be necessary to bring him back into the government in some capacity to provide a façade of unity, but judging from his book there is room for doubt as to whether Hatta alone can give Indonesia the kind of leadership she needs in her present crisis.

Leadership in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia

By PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER

ABSTRACT: In the struggle for leadership in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, both the West and the Communists have definite advantages. The United States' stake in SEATO depends upon its possessions of western Pacific islands and its strategic bases in the area. Rivalry between India and Russia in the area is significant, while the China-India conflict is an ideological one. India's influence can be best understood in light of her role as the largest power in the British Commonwealth of Nations. The pattern of economic co-operation in the Commonwealth is as important as its political structure as exemplified by the Colombo Plan. Russia has a definite foreign policy—Soviet missions have been established in almost every Southeast Asian country; direct Soviet influence is significant and is reinforced by international trade. China's pressure is not great in Southeast Asia. The United States' immersion in the area came with World War II. The first phase of American policy supported both the colonial powers and the nationalist rebels; the Korean conflict changed this pattern; and the collapse of Indochina meant the final dissociation with the maintenance of colonial powers. In 1958 American superiority in nuclear weapons began to wane, and Mr. Dulles continued the policy of containment. Southeast Asia is in the ambit of two American foreign policies: the cold war and the policy toward colonial and underdeveloped areas. Since a larger policy—that the interest of humanity as a whole transcends that of a single nation—is important, it is necessary that behind the citizen's perception of everyday politics, there remains an awareness of the larger problem of human culture.—Ed.

*Paul M. A. Linebarger, Ph.D., Washington, D. C., is Professor of Asiatic Politics at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University in Washington. He was Private Secretary to the Legal Advisor, National Government of China, in Nanking and Washington, 1930-36. Dr. Linebarger was Visiting Professor of International Relations at the University of Pennsylvania, 1954-55 and at the Australian National University, 1957. He served in the United States Army, 1942-46 and was awarded the Bronze Star Medal, 1945, and the War Department Commendation Ribbon, 1946. He is the author of *The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen* (1937) and *Psychological Warfare* (1954) and co-author of *Far Eastern Governments and Politics: China and Japan* (1954).*

SOUTHEAST Asia, to which much of the Western Pacific is attached by ethnic, cultural and strategic ties, is a much more important area than it used to be. Fifty years ago, under the name, "the tropical Far East," it was an almost purely colonial area firmly protected by the British high-seas fleet.

Today political hurricanes more devastating than any typhoon are blowing over the area; the great winds of politics surpass any natural disaster in danger and importance. And Americans are often reminded, on one occasion by our President himself, that this area is vital to our own national future.

The struggle for the future is not only a battle with human adversaries. It is also a struggle within our American selves—a battle for our own identity against stimuli so complicated that we might become lost in the process of change. We think we fight the Russians for the opinions of mankind, and so we do. We are also fighting life itself in order to find out who we ourselves may be. The cold war is not merely a power contest: it is also the painful way in which humanity seeks itself. Is it not human that we should find it easier to blame an antagonist for the ills of the world, without thinking too often of the fact that communism is a very characteristic piece of our own Atlantic civilization—a cancerous piece, perhaps, but an integral piece none the less?

It might be wise to outline the struggle for leadership in the Western Pacific area by an enumeration of our advantages and those of the Communists.

On our side there is a pluralistic civilization, with political freedom, variegated economies, disestablished religions in most states, and a high degree of personal freedom. From the past we have been bequeathed great economic savings, and for the present we possess

immense military and political power. Whether we possess these goods in the future or not will depend upon our political wisdom and our international sagacity. We must survive without paying the price of annihilation, even though the risk of annihilation is the current premium payable for survival. We must accept change in ourselves while surviving; we must even accept change within ourselves while presuming to lead others. We must advance into an age of anxiety and inspire confidence at the same time. This is a task worthy of Athenians; it is brave of us Americans to have taken it on.

On the other hand, we are not committed to a timetable for paradise or Armageddon. We are not committed to revolution or victory. If we live, we win. If we merely prosper—and do so in safety—we succeed. Our chief mission is to have no violent mission to impose upon mankind. Our responsibilities are those of persuasion, not of command. We can afford reasonable leaders; our adversaries cannot. In our pliability we have immense cultural reserves. The United States has outlived the Bourbon kings, the Romanoff czars, the German kaisers, the Turkish sultans, the Italian Duce, and the German Fuehrer. America will outlive communism too, and in the act of living America will win.

Our opponents have different advantages. In the field of morals, they have definiteness and purpose to impose on populations who ache for a specific scale of right and wrong. In politics, they have purpose in a bewildering world which, to men in many nations, seems otherwise only to drift toward the future. In economics, they have a program of forced savings which is spectacular though cruel and a doctrine of progress which allows men to serve humanity instead of seeming only to be

served by it. In science, they have effected a crude, efficient weld between technology and political fanaticism.

How do we and the Russians compare in the cultural zones of the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia? Surely, this is an interdisciplinary problem if ever there was one. Tentative answers can be given. Each answer needs reinforcement or denial by discussion or research. Perhaps only the main outlines of our situation are plain.

SOUTHEAST ASIA BETWEEN INDIA, RUSSIA, AND CHINA

The United States is certainly not a part of Southeast Asia. American membership in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization depends, if it needs dependence at all, on the United States possession of the Western Pacific islands. Western Polynesia, formerly the Japanese Mandated Islands, is now a United Nations trusteeship under American administration. American strategic commitment to bases in the Philippines and a collateral reliance on bases in British territory make necessary the defense of the Free World with United States aid. However, the United States is not alone in this area. The Japanese, as indicated above, may return.

The rivalry between India and Russia, on the one side, and between India and China on the other, is of considerable significance. Speculative writers in the Western world have often asseverated that there may be a day in which there will be rivalry between Russia and China. Of this there is no open evidence as yet and if the intelligence facilities of the West have discovered it, they certainly have not made it public.

The argument is often advanced that the democratic competition of India with the Communist development of China provides a test case for all Asia. This has been well set forth by able spokesmen such as Ambassador Bowles,

Professor W. W. Rostow, Professor MacMahon Ball and Mr. Guy Wint. In most cases the argument has been set forth by American liberals or by British spokesmen although Ball is, of course, Australian. In essence, this argument runs that all "Asia" is aware of the events in China and in India. India is democratic and socialist, untainted by the capitalism which makes America and America's more intimate allies (such as Korea, Nationalist China and South Vietnam) abhorrent to democratic socialist Asians. Therefore the developments in India will be a victory for socialism and democracy whereas developments in the United States will be a victory for nothing in particular. This argument, while popular, transfers the locus of world decisions from the outside into Asia.

Though the argument does have considerable force if it is applied to those Asians who read the *London Times*, it loses a great deal of its weight if it is expected to apply at the village level or at the territorial level. There is, indeed, a rivalry between India and China. This rivalry is more pointed in a few diplomatic chancelleries and among a few generals than it is elsewhere.

In Southeast Asia, however, the case is somewhat different. The term, Indochina, might apply almost as well to parts of insular Asia as to peninsular Asia. The rivalry of Chinese and Indian culture runs back millennia. Indonesia is Indian in feeling and tradition despite the overlay of Moslem religion. A few Indian influences even reached as far as the Philippines. Indian influence in its British form certainly touches Burma and Malaya. It is not without significance that whereas in most countries of the world the Sunday edition of the *New York Times* or the air edition of *Time* can be found in the lobbies of the chief hotels, it is the *Times* of India which is airmailed directly from In-

dia to Rangoon every day, to circulate among the top groups in Burma.

Though at the level of political warfare and cultural contact there may already be an extensive degree of Indian penetration in Southeast Asia, this does not yet reach seriously into strategy. The Indian leaders often come in contact with the Southeast Asian leaders. So too do the Chinese Communists. Very little results in economic or strategic terms. China in its Communist form has not been able to obtain a single air, sea, or land base south of Northern Vietnam. The Indian government has avoided a policy of obtaining bases and would not know how to staff them or pay for them if it did. The Chinese and the Indians both export cheap consumer goods but there is as yet no significant commercial conflict between the two powers. The conflict, insofar as it exists, is ideological and in many cases the two powers make a common front against the United States more often than they oppose one another.

INDO-BRITISH RELATIONSHIP

The role of India can perhaps be best understood if India is remembered as constituting the largest power in the British commonwealth, now called the Commonwealth of Nations. The Commonwealth of Nations has not yet been called the "Indo-British Commonwealth of Nations." This name might well apply to it in the future.

The motivation for this tie does not lie in a British allegiance to India. Such an allegiance certainly does not exist in any express form. Rather, the driving force consists of a common tradition of parliamentary democracy combined with democratic socialism. The force of a democratic socialist mentality is often underestimated in the United States.

This mentality drives the British and

the Indians together in many cases. Whereas almost the entire present generation ruling India regards the conservative British as their enemies, they feel that it was the British Laborites who gave India power to become independent and to become a great nation. Many Indians remember that they had British sympathizers ever since the beginning of their nationalist movement and that the Indian National Congress itself was founded by an Englishman, not by an Indian. The Delhi School of Economics was a direct copy of the London School of Economics. The academic idiom, the academic organization, the publishing facilities, and many of the cultural traditions have strong common outlooks and prejudices. The fact that the Laborites are a minority in England is not at all strange to the Indian leaders of today: they themselves were a minority with respect to actual power, as against the British Empire, for most of their lives.

This emerging Indo-British commonwealth of nations has a great deal more power than one often remembers from the American vantage point. The Commonwealth Conference of Prime Ministers is not purely a British show. The Prime Ministers of the English-speaking dominions sometimes come off second best in this pageant. An increasing number of prime ministers show up in native garb and tend to dominate the conference. The British follow the lead of their Asian colleagues. In specific cases, British diplomatic hesitations over issues such as Korea and Hungary can be written off as much to the influence of the Asian members of the Commonwealth of Nations as to influences at home. The fact that the influences at home correspond very closely to the pressures imposed by Asia makes this motivation even more simple to understand. Besides the political structure of the Commonwealth of Nations, there

is another force which, although not large, is highly significant. This is the pattern of economic co-operation.

The Colombo Plan is the economic-aid organization for the Commonwealth of Nations to which other neutrals and a few other supporting nations, including the United States, have become members. In essence the Colombo Plan is a small and much less formal application of the Marshall Plan principles to the former British nations of South Asia together with thirteen other nations. Originally set up at a conference in Colombo, it now has the support of the United States and gives funds which seem reasonably substantial for the development of these areas. While the total amounts of money do not run into billions of dollars, they are well selected. There is every reason to suppose that the Colombo Plan influence will continue to be socialist-tinged, democratic and hopeful in outlook, and a very valuable supplement to United States and United Nations efforts in the area. In terms of its public opinion reception and the welcome which it receives, in many cases the Colombo Plan far surpasses anything which the United Nations has done or which the United States is likely to do. This arises in part from its Asian origin and in part from the fact that, although modest, the plan proceeds with great skill, diplomacy, and tact in offering its developmental facilities to the nations affected.

The Indo-British connection will continue to have great weight in South Asia and Southeast Asia as long as a trace of British influence remains.

If one remembers that Greek influence lasted for many centuries after the disappearance of Alexander and the Seleucid Empire in Persia, it would not be at all surprising—should the present form of civilization persist despite their nuclear weapons—to find that British influence should remain at least for sev-

eral centuries in South and Southeast Asia. The British have left the area in great part and their legatees are the Indians.

Only slight resistance to this comes from Wellington, New Zealand, and from Canberra, Australia, the capitals of the two white dominions just south of the general area of Southeast Asia. Australian influence was very high when it coincided with the left-wing British-Indian Laborite influence. When Australian policy took a somewhat more conservative turn in the matter of not changing immigration policy and in supporting the Netherlands in respect to Western New Guinea, Australian influence diminished somewhat. New Zealand is not large enough to play a very big role, but it will have some effect.

In following political journalism or diplomatic reports, the student of Southeast Asian affairs should be very careful to note that when the word "Indian" is used, it may equally well mean British. The British influence, if it is expressed on the side of commercial interests or imperialism or colonialism, is apt to be very slight. The British voice of the left is very strong and in many cases the chief voice known in South Asia and Southeast Asia. It is to British sources rather than to American ones that the Indonesians first turned for the content of their socialism. British political and intellectual influence is paramount in Pakistan, India, Burma, Ceylon, and Malaya. The continued radiation of this influence is certainly to be expected. India, as the largest of all the countries in the Commonwealth of Nations, takes a position of leadership to which India's importance to world culture and potential importance to world politics certainly entitle her.

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR

Russia is another matter. Soviet foreign policy, as distinguished from the

Communist movement, certainly does exist. Soviet diplomatic missions have been established in almost every Southeast Asian country. The Soviets were represented at the opening of the official declaration of Malayan independence. They have had a large and active embassy in Jakarta.

Direct Soviet influence should not be underestimated. The Soviet contacts and the Soviet economic offensive began to take shape in 1956 and 1957. The visit of major Soviet leaders to the area have not been without effect. Khrushchev and Bulganin as well as Voroshilov have visited the area. They have been welcomed with immense festivals and public pageants. It is not likely that such exchanges of courtesy will be overlooked.

Direct Soviet influence is reinforced by the normal process of trade. The Soviet Union is potentially almost as large a purchaser of Malayan rubber and of the other raw materials of Southeast Asia as is the United States. The Soviet Union has the advantage of a large accumulation of metallic gold which can be thrown into the world market any time the Soviet authorities desire to create an economic disturbance.

The very economic philosophy of the Western powers precludes their using international trade as a major weapon for counterattacks on Communism. In most cases the Western powers seek to promote stability. It is much easier for the Communists to promote spectacular development of a few show places and the instability of the system as a whole. There is no evidence that the Soviet Union has gone all out in an economic offensive designed to wreck the operating economic systems of Southeast Asia, but there is a great deal of evidence at hand to suggest that the Soviet system is attempting through diplomatic and

commercial channels to win serious initial footholds in this area.

Not to be left out are the other Communist European states. The East Germans are doing a great deal of exporting in this area at a terrible cost to their own workers at home. The Hungarians, Poles, Yugoslavs and Rumanians all made contributions. Only the Bulgarians and Albanians are absent. Since Czechoslovakia was already beginning to expand in the Southeast Asian market before the disasters of 1939, it is not at all unexpected that the Czechs should return.

Soviet diplomacy and trade move hand in hand. Of course they are co-ordinated with the conspiratorial apparatus of Communist policy, but this co-ordination is distant and is not visible on the local scene. It would be a great mistake to ascribe all Soviet diplomacy to a Communist party. The two are quite separate in many countries and the Soviet official delegations are much more respectable in Southeast Asia than they are in Western Europe or in the New World.

RED CHINA'S ROLE

The influence of China is currently at a minimum in the international diplomatic sphere. While now and then a particular leader like Chou En-lai will make a strong impression, it must be remembered that the Chinese Communists lost almost the entire professional diplomatic service when they took office. The Chinese diplomats had served a group of empires, phantom republics, warlord governments, and finally the Nationalists with great fervor and faithfulness. They had performed a remarkable task. Almost all the professional Chinese diplomats have remained loyal to Taipei. The Communists were too much for them.

The Communists tend to send intel-

ligence underlings, police officials, and surplus generals overseas as diplomats. Their ambassadors have been noted for ineptitude and have reversed the remarkable record previously established by the corps of professional Chinese diplomats.

Furthermore the official diplomatic pressure of Communist China is very sharply limited by the fact that their unofficial bridgehead of the Chinese citizens in these countries makes the going difficult. That asset which is potentially their greatest is at the same time a tremendous liability in terms of immediate trade. While commercial transactions between Singapore and Canton are certainly under way, it is difficult for the Communist Chinese to try to get in contact with Singapore. The British do not allow them to have any diplomatic or consular mission there, and it is not likely that the independent Singapore authorities will carry the matter any further. Malaya has refused to accept a Chinese Communist legation or embassy, even though the British, godparents of Malaya, had previously recognized the government in Peking.

The Chinese Nationalists are doing a great deal to stop the Chinese Communists in Siam, the Philippines and South Vietnam. In the rest of the area their influence is not diplomatic but social. In the propaganda field they can afford to operate, but their pressure is one which develops chiefly from American support and from their membership in the American bloc rather than an independent diplomatic pressure of their own.

SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE UNITED STATES

American policy toward Southeast Asia has varied across the decades. At the turn of the century the Philippines were often denounced as being much too far away to become an area of

American responsibility. Indeed, twenty years after acquiring the Philippines, the United States rejected a proposed League of Nations mandate for Armenia on the same grounds of geographical remoteness. Geography itself may be immutable in some aspects, but it is highly changeable when measured in terms of transportation, international commerce, and world strategy. American policy in any one decade is essentially a result of the needs of the nation at home and of the understanding between American leaders and the people whom they lead as to what the United States could or should do in a given instance.

"The Far Eastern tropics" lay almost entirely outside the sphere of active United States policy before World War II. The United States traded extensively with British Malaya, with Netherlands Indies, and the other colonial possessions in the Far East. The Americans even had a substantial oil foothold in French Indochina. Southeast Asia was a subordinate territory in American thinking and discussion until the end of World War II. The impact of this tragedy and the necessity of fighting in the Southwest Pacific area underscored the importance of the entire Pacific Ocean for Americans. In small terms one can say that the world has become less spacious and that the nations of the earth are drawn together. In larger terms a somewhat more sophisticated perspective might be stated.

It can be said that policy results from the combination of responsibility and possibility. *Responsibility* is a factor derived from the national culture—the ethical system, the religious motives, the standards applied in everyday life, and the sense of mission which the people and government in the given country accept—and this is very strictly an historic function.

The United States, for example, in

the early years of the nineteenth century faced in Africa a succession of governments far worse than the very worst which the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples Republic present in our time. Africa howled with murder, was drenched in blood and devastation, and was economically important only for ivory and for the kidnapping of human beings. Nevertheless, it was not within the strategic capacity either of the European powers or of the new American states to conquer Africa and to bring a mission of civilization to that area. It was consequently entirely possible for humane, responsible men like Washington, Jefferson, and Madison to feel that Africa was almost as far away as the moon.

Possibility is the other factor. Once a policy becomes possible it enters the area of responsibility. Political possibilities follow strategic ones, and the sheer mechanical range of weapons in our own time means that whether the American people like it or not, almost all areas of the world are rapidly becoming equally distant from the United States. Culturally, historically, economically, literarily, musically, and in many other ways, Indonesia is about as far away from the United States as it is possible for a nation to be. (After all, the United States does have important African components in its culture and has a long traditional association with Latin America. No such tradition applies in the case of the former Dutch East Indies.) Nevertheless, the fact that it is possible for the United States to act strategically and economically in Indonesia means that an American policy for Indonesia becomes practicable.

U. S. WORLD POLICIES

Responsibility and possibility have driven the United States to accept global policies. It is extremely likely that the importance of different por-

tions of the world's surface will vary not in accordance with an American plan for the development of a unified, harmonious Western civilization compatible with our own higher standards of culture, but will develop—as human institutions so often do—in accordance with one emergency after another imposed upon us by our antagonists. The Communists seem very Machiavellian, but in this matter of foreign policy they are almost as much the victims of the immediate opportunity as are the Americans.

American immersion in Southeast Asia came with World War II. While Southeast Asia was technically divided between Lord Louis Mountbatten, with his headquarters at Kandy, Ceylon, and General MacArthur with a headquarters which moved gradually west across the Southern Pacific, American military operations touched Indonesia only very slightly. They did not touch Burma or Malaya at all except in the form of air raids. They reached Indochina only through air raids based on China and the activities of a few Office of Strategic Services (OSS) agents. Nevertheless, the end of the war found our European partners exhausted, and the United States faced the responsibility of deciding a status quo. This led directly to the first phase of American policy toward Southeast Asia running roughly from 1945 until 1950. This can be called a policy of "supporting both sides."

American support was given to the Dutch to return to Indonesia and at the same time given to the Indonesians to resist the Dutch.

American policy supported the return of French forces to Indochina, but at the same time official and unofficial American circles gave a very warm reception to the Indochinese nationalists of both the Communist and anti-Communist variety.

With respect to Malaya, the Americans had less to protest about since there were few Malayan nationalists of any kind to be found at that time.

Only in the Philippines did the United States assist the authorities in repressing a Communist rebellion.

In other words, the Americans were very firmly for the legal owners of a territory and equally firmly in favor of the nonlegal successor governments. This long time of irresolution had a marked effect on American standing between 1945 and Korea.

American policy in China had immense repercussions at the same time. The United States had supported both the Nationalists and the Communists. The whole story of American friendship for Communist China has not yet been told, but even from the official records it is entirely evident that the Americans went to extreme lengths to pacify and to placate the Chinese Communists while their headquarters were still at Yenan. They got no thanks for this policy and instead were credited only with having supported the Nationalists. The Nationalists, of course, noted that the effect of much of the American activity in China was to postpone a military solution which, rightly or wrongly, they thought they might have won against the Communists had they had wholehearted American support. This policy of being on both sides showed up very plainly.

KOREA AND INDOCHINA

The Korean conflict changed the pattern. The Korean conflict was not an American initiative. The decision to resist was taken only at the last minute. The nature of the Communist aggression was clear to most of the educated classes in Southeast Asia. The continuation of the Indochinese war confused the issue. The Indian government was solidly in favor of all Asians,

on a purely racial basis, against all Europeans no matter what the rights and wrongs of the local case might be. Therefore, the Indians in general supported the Americans so long as the Americans worked through South Korea, in Korea, but at the same time supported the Indochinese Communists against the French.

The period of 1950 to 1958 was in great part a period of consolidation. The balance of deterrence seemed to lie in the greater part with the United States. In other words, the American power seemed to be available but only in such disastrous quantities that its political, economic, and social effects would react adversely upon the United States. The fall of Indochina can be described as a tragedy for the Free World, taking one point of view, or as a victory for the forces of resistance if another rationalization is adopted. It is difficult to find the truth in a matter so subject to moral interpretation.

The collapse of Indochina in 1953 meant two different things. It meant the final dissociation of American responsibility with the maintenance of colonial power. The British had badgered the Malaysians into asking for independence and had then thrust independence upon them with almost unseemly haste. Even Singapore, head without a body, was being offered democracy on a lavish scale. In this particular respect the political hunches underlying British policy were perhaps sounder than those underlying American policy. The British had a relatively poor case, but they made the very best of it.

The abandonment of far-away territory to inexperienced local governments is certainly not much to be recommended as a means of increasing the stability, the prosperity, and the happiness of mankind; yielding to pressures which might become embarrassing or

costly to cope with is on the other hand a highly practical device. The term "graceful withdrawal" is a term which makes sense in British policy but not in American. After all, the British islands themselves are not located in the Pacific Ocean, but in the Atlantic—a fact which many British and some Americans often forget. They do not have a Pacific coast; we do.

By 1958, it became evident that the American policy of assumed superiority of thermonuclear force had begun to fade. The Americans had the capacity to stop the Communists at any particular point if the American home public supported a limited war. The Americans also had a capacity to unleash the terrors of a potential world war by using atomic or heavier bombs for strategic purposes. With the demonstration, however, of the Russian sputnik and with the American's awareness of the probability that the age of manned aircraft is coming to an end, a new period was ushered in. It was not well defined.

POLICY OF CONTAINMENT

No one explained what the new epoch was to comprise. John Foster Dulles on the American side continued his policy of containment—a policy which had fallen very sharply under Republican criticism before the Republicans came into office. Nevertheless, in essence, the American policy toward Southeast Asia, as toward many other parts of the world, is to avoid engagement with the Communists if necessary but to be prepared to resist by means of force an actual Communist territorial extension of authority.

The SEATO arrangements were obviously directed as much against semi-peaceful Communist terroristic infiltration as against outright conquest. The Communists have demonstrated that they could use the weapons of subversion more skillfully than could the West.

The West had little stomach for subversion and very little talent in the matter. In the years following 1957, it is not to be expected that Southeast Asia will differ very sharply from other portions of the marginal excolonial world wherein the United States is settled with strategic responsibilities.

Fundamental to any Southeast Asia policy is the fact that Southeast Asia itself must fall within the ambit of two other American policies. One is the policy of the cold war—what is America's relation to the Soviet Union and to the expansion of the world Communist movement? The other is the policy of the United States toward excolonial and underdeveloped areas—what does the United States do about accepting economic, political, or social responsibility for the welfare of Africa, West Asian, South Asian, Pacific and Latin American territories which may need political assistance or help? Particular diplomatic and sentimental considerations may apply but in general it cannot be said that Southeast Asia has an intimate relationship with the United States which is so peculiar as to require full-scale and primary American attention to the area.

A missing ingredient in American policy in this area has been the wise advice and assistance of a local senior partner. The Philippine spokesmen have performed wonders in interpreting Asia to America and America to Asia. In many cases they are too close to the United States to do the job with the kind of neutrality which the Indians achieve on behalf of their British political cousins. The return of Japan to this area as an active great power commercially, strategically, and politically is still somewhat in the future; it can certainly be hoped that the Japanese can be associated with the United States and the other Pacific powers (such as Australia and New Zealand)

in further development for this part of the world. American policy would be based more soundly if it had the interests of a major ally to take into account.

Another possibility which lies in the future—not the present—but which may be of great promise to mankind would consist of the United States obtaining the advice and political assistance of the Latin American states in dealing with the problems of Southeast Asia. Many of the Latin American states are themselves Pacific powers either fronting on the Pacific or having easy access to that ocean. At the present time the distance between Chile and New Zealand is one of the longest in the world. This is not necessarily true of the entire future, and in an age of missiles it is entirely possible that world-wide bridge will require closer association, even across the vast expanse of the South Pacific. Their advice would be valuable not only on a geographic basis. As Latins, as inheritors of a somewhat different civilization from ours, as citizens of countries still in the full flush of development, the help of the Latin Americans would in many cases be more pertinent than that of North Americans who have had relatively little experience in being villagers, being rubber producers, living in the tropics, or standing aside from the main stream of world affairs.

Chance also makes policy. The official community in Washington discovers one country after another while the experts on any particular area wring their hands because they have not been noticed before. Indochina remained a threatening area for many years before it finally came to the forefront of world attention. Now it is temporarily off the scene. Chance may cause the particular occasion: it does not define the national limits of responsibility and the possibilities which cause that responsibility. If the United States can liter-

ally do nothing whatever about Tibet, Tibet is not a fit subject for American foreign policy. If the United States *can* do a great deal about Burma, then even though Burma is remote, the sheer potentiality of foreign policy creates a responsibility in that field. The student of Southeast Asian affairs will be impressed with the fact that both the Southeast Asians and the Americans will apply many inventive, clever minds for devising means for better co-operation between the United States and these countries. It will often be argued that this country or that country is vitally important to the defense of the United States and that therefore the United States should aid it economically.

THE LARGER POLICY

Wisdom suggests that the larger policy is often the wisest—that the interests of humanity as a whole still transcend those of any single nation. Nations are good enough for newspapers. They make interesting headlines. They represent an extreme political abnormality of our time. They are certainly not something for which civilized men must live, even though it is obvious that civilized men may die for nations.

Perhaps dying is enough, and it will not be necessary to sacrifice all the rest of life to the cult of a nation state.

If one keeps such longer, cultural, and humane factors in mind the argument can be made very simply that it is in the interests of the United States for all of humanity to develop toward a better standard of living both emotional and physical and that sound, happy communities which allow for rich individual lives are unobjectionable to us whether they occur on this side or that side of the Iron Curtain. The endless manipulation of power factors alone can

become an obsession which will destroy that particular kind of folksy wisdom which characterized much of American foreign policy in the past. Americans might learn how to become mid-nineteenth century European diplomatists if they studied a cold game of international politics long enough. If they did they would certainly learn the game at the time that it was being played. Particularly for Southeast Asia, the larger American mission would certainly seem well advised to take into account neutral or United Nations agencies and to support programs for human betterment precisely because of their moral value and not always because of their power or political importance.

For the interest of passing a budget, obtaining public interest, ratifying a treaty, or welcoming a leader, it may be good enough politics to stress the extraordinary importance of Laos, Vietnam, Burma, Indonesia, or any other one of the states of Southeast Asia to the Americans. This is harmless as long as it is not taken too seriously. What truly matters is that behind the citizen's perception of everyday politics there remains an awareness of the larger problems of human culture. It is human culture which must survive.

The game of nation states is interesting, but it may blind all of us to the immediacies which underlie basic problems of survival.

Two major threats face the world at the present time—these are, of course, the threat of thermonuclear war and the threat of disastrous overpopulation—and while the one is noted, the other is not. In neither case can Southeast Asia contribute a great deal. Southeast Asia is not apt to move into the weapons field in the present century, and it is not likely that the population pressures in Southeast Asia will become tragic. In other words, the Southeast Asian area is almost entirely a passive

area with respect to the major problems of the near future.

For the longer future Southeast Asia represents a real reservoir of hope and growth. The richness and variety of Malaysian culture is certainly something which the world is entitled to know. Even the Malaysians—Filipinos, Indonesians or Malaysians—of the present time may have no idea of how much their writers, musicians, painters, and other cultural creators may contribute to human life within the next few decades. Who, in 1820, could have expected that in the field of serious music and important novels, the Russians could leap in a single generation to the forefront of Europe? Yet that is precisely what did happen.

It is in the cultural, educational, and developmental field that the best hopes for serious policy lies. American involvement in the area certainly is required by the particular kind of cold-war strategy imposed on us by our Soviet adversaries. It is not necessary for the Americans to compete with the Soviet Union in building up a tighter power bloc than the situation warrants. In this respect Mr. Acheson was wise before Korea in avoiding an engagement in Southeast Asia, and Mr. Dulles was wise after Korea in limiting that engagement to SEATO. It is not necessary to sign up every nation and it is not even necessary within a nation to sign up every province. What is essential is that if the Soviets expand beyond their present perimeters, they will be forced to meet military capacities which match them at the local level.

SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE FUTURE OF MANKIND

The position of the world today is one of "chronic war." By chronic war one may refer to war between political enemies who do not acknowledge the rightfulness of each other's existence.

The Communist powers acknowledge that their own right to exist is incontestable, but at the same time they state that their adversaries have a very short lease on life and should not exist at all. Peace is fundamentally impossible upon such a premise. It is, of course, entirely imaginable that the Communist system will change over a period of decades or years. There are many encysted fanaticisms within our own culture which managed to survive, keeping the letter of their intolerance but not the activity.

This is a long way off the international scene. It is not only true that the Soviet system and basic policy structure *in its present form* must come to an end before there can be real peace in the world.

It is also likely that the present Western system must also come to an end before the threat of serious war disappears.

One must remember that neither World War I nor World War II were started by Communists, though Professor Stefan Possony argues that the Communist hand in the beginning of World War II was more substantial than is often recognized. The present system of nation states contains too high an element of risk for it to be worthwhile over a long period of time.

MASS COMMUNICATIONS

Our system and the Soviet system must both change, to develop if not to disappear. Strong forces throughout the world including Southeast Asia favor this change. The universal literacy of human beings is something which has not yet been taken into account as a totally new dynamic in world politics. Mass communications have created political conditions which have literally never been seen before by mankind in any culture. The restructuring of a new cultural system based on the creation

of new common images and the diffusion of rapid communication is not at all impossible. While the present frantic search for security only too often leads to greater insecurity, it is not at all impossible that the present period of chronic war will be succeeded by different standards on which the teleocracies of the major groups of mankind can find a happier form than the national state, the national flag, and the national power factor.

In this larger world of new problems, new forms, and new combinations of living, a world which will almost certainly appear around the year 2000, if not somewhat before then, Southeast Asia has the potentiality of a tremendous contribution. In many ways Southeast Asia represents the best of what the West has thought of as "Asia." The overpopulation of China and India, the rigidity of their old cultures, the collapse of their previous civilization, and the tremendous problems within each of them may preclude them from making the kind of rich, happy, sophisticated, and deeply civilized contributions to the life of mankind which can be hoped from the Malaysians. Even such crassly material factors as the effect of air conditioning on health, efficiency, study, and government should not be overlooked. A new Southeast Asia is certainly coming—a Southeast Asia of which no Southeast Asian or outsider has any clear image. The glass may be dark, but the prospects beyond it are very inviting indeed.

Sometimes the contrast is made between the spirituality of the Southeast Asian and the materialism of the Westerners. This is not altogether true though there is a slight element of persuasiveness to it. More important are the potential contributions of the Southeast Asian peoples and the existing Southeast Asian cultures in the field of interpersonal and intergroup relation-

ships. There may be many things in the field of preventive medicine, child rearing, psychological health, recreation, and the like which are at present unknown to the West but which, like unidentified diamonds, lie on the open terrain only to be picked up. The level of Balinese civilization can, by certain standards, be regarded as one of the highest ever attained by people anywhere. The civilization of Old Cambodia under the Khmer kings was, at least for a certain strata of its population, unsurpassed by Greece, Rome, China, Japan, or India. It is in these aspects of sympathy, understanding, and artistic brilliance that Southeast Asia has its largest contribution to make. The really big news from Southeast

Asia may very well not be a treaty, a revolution, an alliance, or an aid program—it may be a novel, a symphony, or a new form of dancing.

For the rest of our own lives Southeast Asia will remain a problem area between the two major power zones. It seems unlikely to fall under Soviet domination. The Americans certainly do not want to conquer it. Between the two of them, the Southeast Asian states are apt to receive a great deal of stimulation. One can only hope that this stimulation will reactivate their own cultures and help them to bring to all of mankind that richness of talent, humor, sympathy, and spontaneity which has characterized so much of their cultures in the past.

United States Postwar Policy in Asia

By JAMES P. WARBURG

ABSTRACT: The United States faced its greatest postwar opportunities for constructive leadership toward peace not in Europe but in Asia—it held the future of most of Asia in its hands and dropped it. The Truman administration had no Asian policy at all, except with respect to China and Japan. Its China policy was disastrously wrong. Its policy in Japan must await the verdict of history. The Eisenhower administration has pursued a fatally wrong policy throughout Asia. Our two great errors of commission were: involvement in the Chinese civil war and the rearming of Pakistan. Our great error of omission was our failure to utilize the ten years in which the United States alone had the ability to supply economic aid to the newly independent Asian nations. We now face dangerous Communist competition. The problem we face falls into two parts: how to stop doing the wrong things in Asia and how to start doing the right ones. The first category requires a new China policy and a new policy toward Pakistan. Correcting our errors of omission requires a new approach to the economic problems of Asia.

*James P. Warburg, Greenwich, Connecticut, is author and lecturer on international affairs, domestic politics, and economics. During World War II he was Deputy Director of OWI Overseas, Europe. For years he was active as a banker in Boston and New York. He was Financial Adviser to the United States Delegation to the World Economic Conference at London in 1933. Mr. Warburg is the author of a large number of books and pamphlets dealing with world affairs, including *The United States in a Changing World* (1954); *Turning Point Toward Peace* (1955); *Danger and Opportunity* (1956) and *Agenda for Action* (1957).*

ASIA contains about one-half of all the world's inhabitants. Thus, each individual member of the human race may in a sense be said to have had about one chance in two of being born in Asia. Had you or I been born there, our life expectancy at birth would have been about thirty years. We should, in all probability, have faced a life of constant hunger and hardship. At least half of our children would never have reached maturity. Unless we had been exceptionally fortunate, we should have found ourselves chained to the land in a never-ending struggle to raise enough food to sustain life. At thirty—if we had lived that long—we should be old and weak and tired.

But Asia is changing.

Because news now travels fast into the most remote corners of the earth, the Asian peoples have become aware that in other parts of the world men live an entirely different kind of existence. The Asians have begun to realize that hunger, poverty, disease, and early death are not the immutable fate of man—that elsewhere than in Asia, man has been able to emancipate himself from endless toil and grinding poverty.

This newly acquired knowledge has given rise to what has been rightly called “the revolution of rising expectations.”

For centuries, most of Asia has been dominated by white men who came from across the seas to trade, to assert their superior military power, to establish empires, and to quarrel among each other over their special preserves. And then, suddenly, an Asian nation—Japan—succeeded in driving the Western white man out of Asia.

This event sparked “the Asian revolution against colonialism.”

When the European white man's power in Asia was broken, the peoples of Asia came to know Japan, their Asian liberator, as a conqueror even more ruthless

than their former European overlords. The Chinese, the Filipinos, the Indonesians, the Thais, Malaysians, Indochinese, and Burmese, while inclined to be less resentful of an Asian conqueror, discovered nevertheless that being a part of the Nipponese empire was no better and in many ways worse than living under European colonial domination. So that, when the United States—a country which had voluntarily liberated its sole colonial possession in Asia—defeated the Japanese and drove them back to their home islands, the people of Asia were grateful, thinking that now, at last, they would be free.

And this primarily American liberation of Asia from Japanese conquest let loose “the revolution of Asian nationalism.”

OUR POSTWAR POLICY

If we review United States policy in Asia after World War II, the outstanding fact about it is the failure of the American policy makers to understand the significance of these three revolutions.

The sad truth is that the United States held the future of most of Asia in its hands, and dropped it.

For historical rather than partisan reasons, it is appropriate to divide the postwar period into that part during which the Truman administration was in office, from 1945 to 1953, and that part during which the Eisenhower administration was responsible for American policy in Asia, from 1953 down to the present. If one examines these two periods, one comes to two broad conclusions:

The Truman administration had no Asian policy at all, except with respect to China and Japan. Its China policy was disastrously wrong. Its policy in Japan must await the verdict of history.

The Eisenhower administration has

pursued a fatally wrong policy throughout Asia.

The Truman period—1945–1953

The war in Asia ended with the dropping of the first two atomic bombs upon Japan. Whether necessary or unnecessary, this brutal act did not enhance the reputation of the United States among the Asian peoples.

On the other hand, the fact that, profiting from its unhappy early experience with four-power occupation in Germany, the Truman administration boldly asserted itself as the paramount power among the victors in Asia and assumed the almost total responsibility for the occupation and regeneration of Japan, demonstrated to Asians that the United States was a powerful and purposeful nation.

It is too soon to judge whether the policies pursued in Japan by the American occupation authorities were wise and of enduring value, especially since it remains to be seen to what extent the constructive elements in these policies will survive the reversal of the original American attitude toward remilitarization. There is a close parallel here to the similar reversal of American policy in Germany.

In China, on the other hand, it is not too soon for hindsight judgment to conclude that the Truman administration made a serious and far-reaching blunder in the early days of the postwar period.

Three months after the Japanese surrender, General Albert C. Wedemeyer, then commanding the United States forces in China, clearly stated the dilemma confronting the American government.

Wedemeyer flatly recommended either the immediate withdrawal of all American troops from China or all-out support of the Nationalist regime. He had no illusions about what the latter choice

might involve. In a cable dated November 23, 1945, the General said:

Support to the National government will definitely involve American forces in fratricidal warfare. There can be no mistake about this. . . . If the unification of China and Manchuria under Chinese Nationalist forces is to be a United States policy, involvement in fratricidal warfare, and possibly in war with the Soviet Union, must be accepted and would definitely require United States forces far beyond those presently in the theater to implement this policy.¹

Faced with this dilemma, the Truman administration did the worst thing it could have done in the circumstances; it intervened on behalf of the Nationalists, thus incurring the lasting enmity of the Chinese Communist leadership without intervening with sufficient force, wisdom or determination to make its intervention effective. By granting large financial subsidies and supplying military equipment without insisting upon a reform of the corrupt and incompetent Nationalist government, the United States burdened that already unpopular regime with the additional handicap of appearing in Chinese eyes as a foreign-sponsored puppet.

Having taken the side of the Nationalists, it was clearly impossible for the United States thereafter to assume the role of the impartial umpire and peacemaker. Yet this was what President Truman asked General Marshall to attempt in 1946.

The result of the ill-advised straddle between two clear alternatives was not, as is commonly said, that we "lost China to communism" but that we lost all chance of establishing friendly relations with a Communist regime already destined to come to power and allied ourselves with a Nationalist regime already doomed by its own inner weakness.

¹ *Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 111.

Most historians now agree that it lay beyond the capability of the United States to save China from communism without entering upon a full-scale war on the mainland—a war which might well have involved the Soviet Union and whose ultimate outcome would have been unpredictable. On the other hand, it seems at least possible that a timely withdrawal from China and a policy of noninterference in the civil conflict might have kept a Communist China neutral as between Russia and the United States, instead of driving it into the arms of the Soviet Union. In any case, it would have kept the United States clear of entanglement.

By 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek fled to Formosa, the Truman administration was about ready to recognize its mistake, as evidenced by the famous and much criticized State Department White Paper.² Had it not been for the Korean crisis, and especially for General MacArthur's ill-advised drive to the Yalu River and the subsequent Chinese intervention in Korea, it seems quite likely that the Truman administration might have extricated itself from its involvement with the Chinese Nationalist regime.

As it was, the Korean crisis combined with the domestic political situation to prevent any retreat from the Nationalist alliance. Although President Truman declined to use Chiang Kai-shek's troops in Korea, he threw a naval cord around Formosa. In this action he did not have the support of the United Nations, nor did the United Nations support American aid to France in Indochina.

As for the rest of Asia, the Truman administration never developed a clear policy, any more than it developed a policy for the Middle East. What policy there was evolved from a pre-

² *United States Relations with China* (Washington: U. S. State Department, 1949).

occupation with European affairs rather than from a study of the rapidly changing scene in Asia. European alliances and the policy of containment made the United States into a defender of the status quo at a time when most of Asia was on the march toward a new future.

The natural role of the United States, which had itself broken the pathway of revolt against European colonialism, would have been to act as the guide, counsellor, and friend of the Asian peoples emerging into freedom. The failure of the United States to fulfill this role left the door wide open to the Communists.

Insofar as Western prestige and influence were still of any significance in Asia at the end of Mr. Truman's term in office, this was, ironically, due more to the liberation of India, Burma, and Ceylon by Great Britain, the greatest of all the colonial powers, than to any action on the part of the traditionally anticolonial United States. In Korea, the United States had demonstrated that it possessed both courage and power—that it was not a "paper tiger." But neither in Korea nor elsewhere in Asia—except in the Philippines and possibly in Japan—had the United States shown that it understood, much less identified itself with the Asian revolutions.

The Eisenhower-Dulles period

The Eisenhower administration rode into power on the crest of a wave of enthusiasm for a popular hero and revolution against overlong Democratic rule, petty corruption, and "Mr. Truman's 'war' in Korea." General Eisenhower promised to end the "war"; and did—on terms which would have been violently denounced, had they been accepted a few months earlier by the Truman administration.

The achievement of the precarious Korean truce remains to this day the

sole achievement of the Eisenhower administration in Asia.

If this seems a harsh judgment, let me attempt to justify it.

Just as President Eisenhower could afford to accept terms in Korea which Mr. Truman could not, so also he could have afforded to break away from the Chinese Nationalist alliance and to end the ridiculous pretense that Chiang Kai-shek might some day reconquer the mainland. What happened instead was that the Eisenhower administration adopted an already bankrupt policy of military containment, which had originated in Europe, and extended it to Asia and the Middle East.

The Truman-Acheson policy in Europe had been brilliantly successful until its emphasis shifted from the Marshall Plan to rearmament. This shift led to rearming West Germany, to the freezing of the German partition, and to the foreclosure of a European peace settlement. Instead of abandoning this futile European policy, the Eisenhower administration undertook to carry it one step further, declaring that containment was not enough—that Communist imperialism must not only be contained but rolled back. "Liberation, not containment," became the slogan.

On the other side of the world, the same attitude found its expression in "unleashing Chiang Kai-shek" for attacks upon the mainland. Instead of making peace with China and thereby working toward a permanent Korean settlement, the new administration, which had ended the hot war, proceeded to heat up the cold war in Asia.

Eventually, of course, "liberation" was forgotten, Chiang Kei-shek was released, and the Eisenhower administration settled down to a continuation of Mr. Truman's policy of global containment—but with this important difference:

Where Mr. Acheson had sought to

weld together the nations of the North Atlantic Basin as the hard core of a defensive alliance, "leaving the dust to settle" in Asia, Mr. Dulles proceeded to set about building military alliances intended to encircle the entire Sino-Soviet periphery.

In Asia, the projected military wall ran from Japan through Okinawa, Formosa and the Philippines to Southeast Asia, with Pakistan as the intended link between the Asian rampart and a projected Middle East alliance in which Turkey would form the link to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the course of these operations, Mr. Dulles several times, by his own account, led the United States to the brink of war with China. A formal alliance was signed with the Nationalists. The more or less dormant dispute over the future of Formosa became an exceedingly hot issue when extended to the Chinese offshore islands of Matsu and Quemoy. Where the Truman administration had given half-hearted support to the French in Indochina, Mr. Dulles urged the French to continue the hopeless struggle, greatly increased American aid, and very nearly persuaded President Eisenhower to launch an American air-strike at the besiegers of Dienbienphu. All told, the United States spent over 3 billion dollars in supporting the French in Indochina.

Containment, under Mr. Acheson's direction, had been at most an attempt to meet aggression where it occurred.

Under Mr. Dulles it became a threat of "massive retaliation at points of our own choosing." This threat had little effect upon our adversaries, but it frightened and aroused the protests of our friends.

As for positive results, the Eisenhower record in Asia shows the following:

Vietnam has become another Korea. India, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia

have refused to have anything to do with Mr. Dulles' Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, leaving Pakistan, Thailand and the thin southern fringe of Indochina as the sole footholds of SEATO on the Asian mainland.

On the other hand, the rearming of Pakistan as a member of both SEATO and the Baghdad Pact has had disastrous consequences. It has alienated India and forced that hard-pressed country to devote huge sums to a counterbalancing rearmament, thereby jeopardizing its critically important five-year plans. It has turned Afghanistan toward Russia and opened the door to its penetration by Soviet influence. It is difficult to see how anyone could have thought that these clearly foreseeable results would be more than compensated by rearming a country whose eastern and western parts are separated by over one thousand miles of neutralist India.

In summary, then, we might say that Mr. Dulles, in his pactomania, not only stirred up the Chinese dust which Mr. Acheson was allowing to settle, but that he stirred up several Asian hornets' nests as well. Certainly, we are today no nearer to peace in Asia than we were in 1953, after the fighting stopped in Korea.

THE ERRORS OF OMISSION

Perhaps the most serious aspect of our postwar policy in Asia is not what we have done wrong, but what we have failed to do. Preoccupation with Europe and with the military containment of Communist imperialism has caused us to neglect almost entirely the economic needs and the political aspirations of an Asian society in the ferment of revolutionary change. Yet this was precisely where our greatest opportunity lay.

From 1945 to 1955, the United States alone was in a position to render the kind of help that Asia needed. The So-

viet Union was as yet in no position to compete. These ten years were almost entirely wasted.

Until 1949, the Truman administration scarcely thought of Asia at all outside of its special interest in China and Japan; its major concern was the rehabilitation and defense of a battered and weakened Western Europe.

It was not until 1949 that President Truman inserted a few sentences in his Inaugural Address announcing "a bold new program of aid to the underdeveloped areas." The President's words echoed around the world and raised high hopes, especially in Asia; but it soon developed that these expectations were doomed to disappointment. The so-called Point Four Program turned out to be neither bold nor new. Like the already existing United Nations program, "Point Four" offered technical advice and assistance, but it provided no financial help to the underdeveloped countries in carrying out whatever technical advice they might accept. It offered what Mr. Truman called "American know-how" without the means of putting it to use. To say this does not minimize the value of technical aid in itself, for such aid alone has in many cases proved helpful. But, on the whole, the spread of technical knowledge without capital assistance has served merely to stimulate the "revolution of rising expectations" without satisfying its demands.

The Congress did not take kindly to Mr. Truman's modest proposal; for almost a year, it wrangled over the pitifully small appropriation requested. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that, had it not been for the outbreak of the conflict in Korea, the launching of the Point Four program might have marked a turning point in the relations of the United States to Asia. It was at least the right idea and it might have been developed into something like a Mar-

shall Plan for Asia. Unhappily, the Korean crisis created a climate of opinion in which only foreign aid directly related to military strategy received serious consideration. By far the largest items in President Truman's foreign-aid budgets for Asia became those which provided direct and indirect military assistance to the Republic of Korea, to the exiled Chinese Nationalist regime on Formosa, and to France in Indochina.

When President Eisenhower concluded the Korean armistice, he created the psychological setting in which a new approach to the problems of Asia might have been made. As already pointed out, this was the moment when the prestige of the new administration would have permitted it to disengage itself from the internal affairs of China. In the context thus provided, it would have been possible to shift the emphasis in our Asian policy from military considerations to constructive economic assistance. Nothing of the sort happened.

For the fiscal year 1954, President Truman had budgeted 7.6 billion dollars for foreign aid. This was reduced by President Eisenhower to 5.1 billion dollars and further cut by Congress to 4.5 billion dollars. For 1955, President Eisenhower slashed his request to 3.5 billion dollars, of which Congress granted 2.8 billion dollars. The following year Mr. Eisenhower asked for only 3.2 billion dollars and got 2.7 billion dollars. The emphasis in these three Eisenhower budgets remained upon military assistance and so-called defense support, with South Korea, Formosa, and South Vietnam the chief beneficiaries. Funds for aid to Asia's economic development were visible only through a microscope.

By the end of 1955, it became apparent that the Soviet Union was about to launch a major program of economic assistance to the uncommitted countries of Asia.⁸ Our ten years of monopoly had ended. The greatest postwar op-

portunity for American leadership in Asia—and in other parts of the world—had been squandered.

Warnings of Soviet competition and pleas for increased economic aid to Asian countries failed to move the Eisenhower administration. For the fiscal year 1957, President Eisenhower asked for an increase of 2 billion dollars in military aid and defense support, but for an increase of only 200 million dollars in economic assistance. Our total economic aid for the entire world—not just for Asia—had at this time been reduced to about 300 million dollars per annum.

In the present fiscal year, ending June 30, 1958, the program provides for 130 million dollars in technical assistance and 300 million dollars for the Development Loan Fund, none of which has to date been spent. In his 1959 budget, President Eisenhower has asked for a total of 3.9 billion dollars in foreign aid, of which over 3 billion dollars is for military aid and defense support, 142 million dollars is for technical assistance and 625 million dollars for economic development—not just for Asia but for the whole world.

According to the State Department's recently published estimates, the Soviet Union has, in 1955–57, extended economic assistance to countries other than China amounting to about 1.5 billion dollars. It is a safe guess that Soviet economic aid to Asia is at the present time running well ahead of our own. The chief beneficiaries are India, Burma, Ceylon, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Nepal, and Cambodia.

Apart from the relative size of the Soviet contribution to the economic development of Asian countries, the manner in which Soviet aid is extended must

⁸ The writer explicitly warned of this development in a pamphlet, *Danger & Opportunity* (New York: Current Affairs Press, 1956).

inevitably contrast favorably in Asian eyes with our own methods. Interest rates are lower. Decisions are more quickly reached. Aid is given without overt political conditions.

Perhaps most important of all, Soviet and Chinese aid is supplemented by trade agreements which help the Asian countries to exchange their raw material surpluses, sometimes for manufactured goods, sometimes for other raw materials, and sometimes for foodstuffs. Meanwhile, the stagnation of the American economy has greatly reduced our purchases of raw materials and caused serious drops in the world prices of such commodities as copper, tin and rubber, upon the export of which many of the underdeveloped countries depend.

Knowing all this, the Eisenhower administration has timidly asked for only a paltry sum wholly inadequate to meet the challenge—and even this may be reduced by Congress.

One may well ask: "How much of an alarm clock does it take to wake us up?"

This observer does not hesitate to express the considered opinion that, if we continue our present policies, it will be only a short time before we shall have lost all influence upon Asia's future.

WHAT CAN WE DO?

It is not too difficult to state how we might, in theory, correct our present policies. But theory is one thing and practice quite another.

The problem we face falls into two parts: how to stop doing the wrong things in Asia; and how to start doing the right ones. Let us consider these two problems in that order.

Undoing our mistakes

We should stop treating the Peking government as if it were illegitimate, wrongfully imposed upon the Chinese people by the Soviet Union, and likely

to fall of its own weakness and moral corruption. None of these things are true.

The Mao regime is no more illegitimate than any government which comes to power through revolution.

The Mao regime was not imposed or even originally backed by any foreign power. In 1945–46, the Soviet leaders had little use for the Chinese Communists; they were, in fact, backing Chiang Kai-shek when the civil war began; they switched their support only when they realized that they were backing the wrong horse. Until after the Chinese Communists had destroyed the flower of the Nationalist armies, they received far less help from Russia than Chiang Kai-shek obtained from the United States.

As for internal weakness, the Mao regime is, by all accounts, the least corrupt government that Chinese now living can remember. The available evidence indicates that the vast majority of the Chinese people consider themselves better off and certainly no worse off than they were under the Nationalists. It is doubtful whether many Chinese on the mainland would agree with our Secretary of State that their government is a "bad" government. It is a mistake to confuse our moral judgment with theirs.

Our moral judgment is, of course, influenced by the attitude of the Mao regime toward us. This attitude has been hostile, and why not? What has our attitude been, if not hostile?

Not so long ago, President Eisenhower said that he did not think the American people would want to have anything to do with a regime "whose hands are dripping with the blood of American soldiers." Well, what about Germany? What about Japan? What former enemy's hands have not been dripping with our blood?

Does the fact that we have been at

war mean that we must never make peace?

Last July, Secretary Dulles, in a speech at San Francisco, justified our keeping the Chinese People's Republic out of the United Nations on the grounds that it was a "bad" government. The United Nations, he said, was an association of peace-loving states devoted to their obligations under the Charter; the United Nations was not, he said, "a reformatory for 'bad' governments." This was less than a year after Soviet tanks had rolled into Budapest and British, French, and Israeli forces had invaded Egypt!

What kind of sophistry is this, and what purpose does it serve? And what sense is there in talking about disarmament at the United Nations with the most formidable military power in Asia excluded from the discussion?

It is time to stop this nonsense. It is time to get off the brink of war with China, to make peace with China and to seek, by give-and-take negotiation, to reach fair settlements of our outstanding disputes.

Neither we nor the Chinese can hope to wrest control of all of Korea or of all of Vietnam from the other without another war. The only way these unhappily partitioned nations can become reunited is if foreign troops are withdrawn and both sides agree to refrain from any sort of interference and to respect their neutralization under United Nations supervision.

As for Formosa, or Taiwan, we have solemnly agreed that it should be returned to China. We did not say "to a friendly China." Is it not time to drop the pretense that Chiang Kai-shek is China's legitimate ruler? Is it not time to say to the defeated Generalissimo: "Brother, you have lost your country. You and those of your followers who do not wish to go back to it are entitled to asylum. We shall gladly

provide that asylum. But we can no longer permit you to remain a constant provocation to a suicidal world conflict. Make your peace with Peking, or come to the United States to live out your days; but, in any case, leave us free to make our peace with a government which, whether we like it or not, rules over one-quarter of the world's population."

To those who may argue that the United States must keep Taiwan as a base, I would reply that we have no legal or moral right to the island, no matter how much we may need or want it. On the other hand, we have every right to try to persuade China, in give-and-take negotiation, to agree to the military neutralization of Taiwan under United Nations supervision, so that, while belonging to China, it cannot be used by China to threaten the Philippines or Japan. The *quid pro quo* might be our withdrawal from Okinawa which already threatens to become the Cyprus of the Orient.

So much for what I would call the necessary disengagement in the Far East.

The beneficial consequences which might flow from such disengagement are numerous. *First* and foremost, it would greatly reduce the likelihood of war. *Second*, it would relieve the United States of over 2 billion dollars in annual military aid and defense support to the Chinese Nationalists, the South Koreans, and the South Vietnamese. *Third*, it would bring United States policy into harmony with the Far Eastern policy of its major allies. *Fourth*, it would appeal powerfully to the unaligned Afro-Asian nations. And, *fifth*, it would tend to make China less dependent upon the Soviet Union.

There is another part of Asia where it is necessary to retrace our footsteps. Pakistan should be released from its obligations under the SEATO and Bagh-

dad treaties; or, at the very least, the United States should stop building up Pakistan's armed forces, converting military aid into economic assistance.

I realize all too well that it is not easy for any political leadership to admit error; but I think it is true that, the longer we wait to undo our two major mistakes in Asia, the more we shall become imprisoned by them. This is now more a problem of domestic politics than a problem of foreign policy.

Correcting our errors of omission

It is late, but probably not too late for us to take a new look at Asia and to adopt a new attitude toward the three-fold Asian revolution.

This will be infinitely easier, if we first undo our errors of commission in China and Pakistan and thus free our hands of the necessity for spending billions upon bolstering up military allies of dubious value. But it does not follow that we cannot adopt a new approach to economic assistance unless and until we disengage ourselves from our present military commitments.

I shall not repeat here the arguments which I have frequently elaborated in the past⁴ for multilateral, rather than bilateral, economic assistance. It will be more useful, I think, to consider in specific terms our relation to one, crucially important Asian country.

The success or failure of India in emerging from the Asian revolution as a democracy will probably determine whether or not all of Asia will eventually fall under Communist influence.

India's greatest difficulty in meeting the demands of the "revolution of rising expectations" is her inadequate food production and her inability to derive from her agriculture the capital needed

for industrialization and economic progress. Whereas China, with a population of about 600,000,000, produces 185,000,000 tons of food grains annually, India, with a population of about 385,000,000, produces only about 68,000,000 tons.

Per-capita income in India is about \$56 a year. According to the latest figures, 61.3 per cent of India's total consumer spending goes for food. Among the millions of landless peasants, the figure amounts to 85 per cent.

The worst of it is that, as a part of India's impoverished masses are brought into employment, their increased ability to buy food has caused food prices to rise at a fantastic rate. From June 1955 to May 1957, the price of rice rose by 67.9 per cent, wheat rose by 53.9 per cent and, worst of all, the prices of the two coarse grains which form the staple diet of the poor—rose by 96.5 per cent and 196.8 per cent.

The crux of India's problem is how to produce more food and how to derive at least some capital from increased agricultural production. The latter involves a reform of India's archaic system of taxation, some degree of food rationing, and government price controls.

How could the United States help India to meet this problem?

The answer is one which could involve a considerable benefit to the American farmer. Instead of accumulating and eventually destroying or dumping the huge grain surpluses created by our system of price supports, the United States could deliberately encourage the growing of food-grains for Indian consumption. These grains would be bought from our farmers by our government at fair prices and would then be given to India in the form of outright grants. This would enable the Indian government to arrest inflation, control prices, and use the proceeds of sale for economic development.

⁴ *Turning Point Toward Peace* (New York: Current Affairs Press, 1955). *Agenda for Action*; Chapters 8 and 9 (White Plains, N. Y.: Monde Publishers, 1957).

Our Public Law 480, as it now operates, directs a considerable part of our surplus disposal to Europe where it disrupts the normal channels of trade, especially Europe's trade with Canada. The law should be amended so as to direct our food-grain surpluses *exclusively to the underdeveloped countries*. In other words, we should use our surplus food as capital with which to promote the economic development of countries where food deficits impede progress.⁵

A second obstacle to the success of India's second five-year plan is the increased military expenditure which she has felt herself obliged to incur as the result of our rearming Pakistan. As already pointed out, it lies within our power to eliminate this obstacle.

Finally, the Indian five-year plan is in trouble not only because India lacks foreign exchange to pay for imports of food, which, because of the lack of rain, are especially high this year, but also because India lacks the foreign exchange with which to buy the needed capital equipment.

These are the major reasons why India urgently applied to our government last year for a loan of 600 million dollars. Our response, after months of deliberation, will apparently be an offer of 75 million dollars from the Development Fund (assuming that Congress makes the necessary appropriation) and a loan of 150 million dollars from the Export-Import Bank, available over a period of 15 to 18 months for specific projects yet to be agreed upon. The funds loaned by the Export-Import Bank must be used for purchases in the United States which will raise by

⁵ This section, including the figures quoted, is derived from the studies of the Indian economy made by Professor Matthew J. Kust of Harvard University.

something like 40 per cent the cost of the goods purchased. In addition it is proposed to sell—not give to India 65 million dollars of surplus wheat. (Soviet help to India already amounts to 250 million dollars on easy terms.)

I have cited the Indian case in some detail not only because it is the most crucial instance of our neglect in Asia but because it so perfectly illustrates the "too little and too late" habit of mind of our government. It shows also the hidebound restrictions of obsolescent law and economic preconception within which our government operates.

In conclusion, it is necessary to make quite clear that the suggestions here put forward have no practical value whatever except in the context of a far-reaching re-examination of American policy as a whole. We are bogged down in the Middle East, in Africa, and even in Latin America no less than in Asia. In Europe, we have reached the final dead-end of a long dead-end street.

It is not just our Asian policy, but the whole of our foreign policy that is bankrupt. The problem of breaking loose from our frozen, sterile positions is a global problem. Its solution is far more important than catching up to the Russians in the making of intercontinental ballistic missiles or outracing them in sending a spaceship to the moon.

We are being defeated not in the dim reaches of outer space but here on earth—not in the science laboratories of the Soviet Union but in the minds and hearts of men throughout the world. We are being defeated not by the strength or skill of our adversaries but by our own lack of empathy and imagination, by our fear-inspired clinging to the status quo in a period of ineluctable change, and by our unnatural, callous indifference to humanity.

Asian Xenophobia Against the West

By CHITRA FERNANDO

ABSTRACT: Asian xenophobia against the West exists—fear and hatred of the stranger is a reality, and there are historical reasons for its being. The initial contacts between Easterners and Westerners were friendly ones; there was a feeling of mutual respect and trust. But later things changed with the Westerners taking a posture of superiority. Fortresses gradually became more numerous than trading posts, and soldiers outnumbered merchants. Agreements were broken and suspicion and loss of friendships resulted. After the Indian Mutiny or War of Independence, the British withdrew from the life of India and created their own superstructure. There was to be no more mixing with natives—it just was not done any more. This was the attitude of other imperial powers as well. Time then began to stand still for Asians with their culture and traditions pushed in the background. The ruling powers educated and trained a small group of "reliable natives" and gave them positions of trust in the government. There resulted a class which was neither Asian nor European. However, it was this very training in Western ways which fanned the flame of Asian nationalism. Asians then found that well being and progress did not necessarily go hand in hand with independence. Their countries had stood still for 400 years, and they blamed the West for this—and so this fear and hatred of the stranger who had been the ruler. Asian xenophobia of the West has taken three forms: political, religious, and cultural. The Asians are becoming aware that this attitude hurts them more than it does the West—moreover, it is a recent thing and alien to their thinking. And so there is hope that this xenophobia will eventually disappear.—Ed.

Chitra M. Fernando, New York City, was Assistant Information Officer, Government of Ceylon and is now Special Correspondent of *The Times of Ceylon and Eastern World*, London. He was a Government representative on The Advisory Committee on Health Education, The Food and Nutrition Council of Ceylon, and the Arts Council of Ceylon. He was a Representative of the International Arbitration League at the Peace Conference, Paris, 1946; Assistant Editor, *Asian Horizon*, London, 1948–50; Consultant on Human Rights to UNESCO, 1951–52; and member of the staff of *The Ceylon Observer*, 1953–55. Mr. Fernando is the 1958 Eisenhower Exchange Fellow from Ceylon.

AS CARLYLE wrote: "The greatest of all faults is to be conscious of none," and while there is incessant criticism of the West by the East and a mounting impatience of the East by the West, there is very little self-criticism on either side.

Let us agree then at the outset that Asian xenophobia against the West—this fear of the stranger, of the foreigner, that at times expresses itself in terms of naked and irrational hatred—does exist. But it is not natural to Asia. The first whites came to Asia as highly skilled equals and were accepted as such. Very often they were invited, as were the Portuguese traders by the kings of Ceylon. The foreign merchants and the native princes ate and drank together, watched cockfighting together, and fought their wars together.

There was intermarriage, too. Princesses and their ladies in waiting were wooed by lieutenant-generals and captains and occasionally their courtship resulted in marriage. To the common man in Asia the new whites looked strange and acted strange—"They eat stones and drink blood," wrote a Ceylonese historian referring of course to the Portuguese love of bread and wine—but they were accepted as friends and equals. To the men in the trading posts and fortresses the natives looked friendly—and vice versa.

THE BEGINNING OF SUSPICION AND BROKEN FRIENDSHIP

But this fraternization did not last. Fortresses gradually outnumbered the trading posts and soldiers outnumbered merchants. Agreements were broken and suspicion grew and friendship declined. The friendly natives became unreliable heathens. The holy symbols of the new religion the foreigners brought with them, which indeed were examined and sometimes freely accepted by the native rulers in a calm and objective

manner impossible of conception today, seemed to turn gradually into the tools of exploitation.

The Asians began to feel that, in spite of the talk of equality and the original feelings of equality that did exist, the foreigner seemed to be "more equal" than they. They realized that the Europeans were more skilled in politics, technology, and intrigue and that this fostered the continuance of civilization on European terms. Liberty gradually diminished and the sword took the place of the treaty.

And then came the Indian Mutiny or the War of Independence as many Indians prefer to call it. It was the great historical turning point in the relations of West and East in South Asia. The British withdrew from the life of India and built their own superstructure over the life of India. They withdrew into their stern and upright Victorian selves. No more feasts and cock-fighting with the natives, it just wasn't done any more. The natives were to be kept in their places; there was the Empire to be safeguarded, an Empire that outshone and surpassed those former experiments of Romans and Turks, an Empire on which the sun would never set.

And so it was in South and Southeast Asia, whether the new class came from Britain, France, or Holland. Further north in the vast regions of China, Japan, and Korea, the foreigner was accepted, if at all, only on local terms. Suspicion and self-dignity had always been the terms on which one could deal with foreign merchants and travelers, and it seemed as if they had been right all along.

To return to the South Asian region which I take as my example of Asian xenophobia—time began to stand still for the Asian. His religion was scorned, his habits deplored, his color condemned. The foreign ruler drew around him a

small group of "reliable natives"; educated them in English (or French or Dutch) taught them to cast off their religions, their customs, and even their modes of dress; rewarded them when they did as they were told; and elevated them to positions of trust in the service of the foreign government. And there they were—and there they remained until the other day—loyal government servants. They were honest, fairly hard working, well paid, and well housed with a retinue of servants. They belonged to the English or French or Dutch-speaking, trousered gentry, rather ashamed of their color and their poorer, heathen countrymen or envious of the white master. They were neither European nor Asian.

ASIAN INDEPENDENCE

But they also received a sound Western liberal education, and nothing makes more for discontent than a sound Western liberal education—most particularly a British one. And the seeds of Asia's discontent and rising nationalism were unwittingly sown by the foreign ruler himself—for example, on the playing fields of Eton, at Harrow, at Oxford and Cambridge, and in the ancient Inns of Court.

After long and patient agitation either on strictly constitutional lines as in Ceylon or with a well-balanced mixture of violence and negotiation as in some other countries, the colonies in Asia became free and independent nations. It was all very exciting, this birth day of freedom. And then came the morning after with its headaches and irritability. There came a sense of frustration and of weakness—but not, mark you, of disappointment for there can be no going back.

Asians, now free after several centuries of colonialism, became more conscious of what they had lost. Time had stood still for 400 years it seemed.

And they became fully conscious of the values of their culture and society which some of them had been ashamed of and even despised. They were in a mess and it was no consolation that, on looking around, they found the rest of the world in an even bigger mess. They saw the West engaged in an arms race with its former war allies. The thing of the moment was the production of bigger and better weapons of self destruction. Man's inhumanity to man still remained and God had been forgotten.

Maybe we Asians did overcompensate, overthump our ancient drums. Maybe we have tended to blame foreign rule for too many of our own inadequacies. But we have also given praise where praise was due, and it seemed natural that a Socialist Prime Minister of Ceylon, presiding at the liquidation of the last great British naval base in South Asia—Trincomalee—should say

When the history of this period comes to be recorded, one of the outstanding features in such a record will be the dignity, cordiality and friendship, and the good grace with which the government of the United Kingdom granted back the control of far-flung territories over which it has ruled earlier.

And no other European power has acted with this dignity and friendship when the end of empire was at hand in the postwar period. Perhaps the British had realized—and it needs courage to do so—the truth of the words of one of the archimperialists of all times, Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India: "Most men would rather rule themselves badly than be governed well by strangers." Today's Asian xenophobia would not exist if the confession had been acted upon generations ago.

POLITICAL XENOPHOBIA

Asian xenophobia against the West takes many forms which can be roughly

divided into political, cultural, and religious. There is less reason for the existence of political xenophobia today in the independent countries of Asia than has been in the past. But this is the time for the free expression of xenophobic ideas, the time to look back and regret the past, and hate and fear the stranger for his part in it. And the feeling remains—Can you really trust him any more? True, the Englishman by and large is welcome in South Asia. There are more Englishmen in India, Pakistan, and Ceylon today than there were in colonial days. But they are there on our terms and therefore welcome. There can be no xenophobia against the Englishman if he plays the game according to our rules. But again comes the nagging question: "How far can you trust Britain?" Says the Asian xenophobe: "Look at Suez." And who can deny Suez?

Perhaps one of the basic principles of the foreign policies of the uncommitted nations of Asia is a certain distrust and fear of the West. The Western mentality which gives rise to Eastern xenophobia still exists and has shown itself dramatically at Suez and, in smaller measure, constantly throughout the years since Asian independence. "He who is not with me is against me," too often says the politician of the West with quasi-divine fervor.

Arnold Toynbee stated in the Reith lectures over the British Broadcasting Corporation: "Every contact that the East has had with the West has been one of aggression by the West." And ten years is too short a time to wipe out the feelings of fear and even dislike that Asian xenophobes have towards the West. It is this residual resentment that binds them in a loose and cumbersome alliance. It is this fear that brought them together at Bandung, Indonesia, when the nations of Asia and Africa resolved to be ever watchful of

the resurgence of colonial domination in any form whatsoever.

CULTURAL XENOPHOBIA

The cultural form of Asian xenophobia is even stronger and more enduring than the political. For centuries the peoples of Asia under colonial rule have been made to feel that they were inferior. It is too much to ask any man or any nation to admit inferiority. Asian culture was set back unconsciously by Western superiority and ignorance. Asian culture was barbaric or quaint or childish to the many, even dangerous to a few governors engaged in the futile task of de-Asianizing the Asians. To a few learned men and scholars, Asian painting, literature, and time-honored customs were the subject of study and even official encouragement, and to them we are ever indebted.

And then there were those exclusive clubs for whites only. I do not doubt that this is a minor point. But in Ceylon the simple white immigrant on his way to Australia could enter, but the doors were closed to the graduate of Baliol or the King's Counsel if only he happened to be native. It seems a small thing now. It hurt at the time—as it would any self-respecting people.

Because it was necessary for rulers, wedded to efficiency as an end in itself, to achieve administrative unity; because it was necessary to impose an alien *lingua franca*, our own languages fell by the road. The purpose of this policy was, for most of the time, to educate a few of the people in English rather than deliberately to stifle the national language. But the result was sad for us, for no advancement in employment, in income, or in society was possible without a firm grasp of the King's English. Temple schools run by Buddhist monks, the custodians of the national culture, were often suppressed, or had their

property confiscated, thereby robbing them of their capital.

I myself remember the many chastisements I received as a boy for the horrible crime of speaking in my own language. And they came not from Englishmen but from so-called educated Ceylonese who had been taught to despise their national language and were determined to teach the same lesson to me and those of my generation.

RELIGIOUS XENOPHOBIA

The religious aspect of xenophobia is perhaps the least known and in a way the most understandable. For many of our religions—not all of our religions—contain within them a hard core of exclusiveness. The Asians are not unique in this. There is the preoccupation of the Orthodox Jew with a ritual cleanliness that in some categories debar the gentile. There is the Moslem rejection of the infidel. There is the ancient Christian doctrine—"extra ecclesia nullus salus"; "no salvation outside the Church." There is no communion for non-Catholics at the Catholic altar. There is the doctrine of "the elect," the exclusively saved, implicit in much of American fundamentalism.

And so too, Asians have erected systems that exclude "nonbelievers," systems of caste, systems of ritual cleanliness, sanctuaries closed to the non-qualified. An exception to this is the Buddhist philosophy in which any man who aspires to a personal experience of God would find himself at home.

Perhaps the exclusiveness has in my time, and in my father's time, been stimulated by the uns subtle, almost arrogant attitude of a few ministers of Christian churches. I fear they have marred the good work done by the many who have preached the teachings of the brown-skinned son of a carpenter, who was God. These seem hard words

indeed, but I do not speak them lightly for I and my father—for many generations—have been Christians.

This religious exclusiveness in Asia has become a part of Asian xenophobia. In many parts of Asia it includes the idea, right or wrong, that the teachings of Jesus Christ have been forgotten by the West. I have heard this theory repeated time and again by monks, who were preaching seated on the floor of their temples; by earnest students; by amateur philosophers; and, of course, by politicians. The main target of their distrust and consequent fear of "the irreligious West" is your incessant preoccupation with military posture.

This is the background of Asian religious beliefs, which, exaggerated in Asian minds, easily turns to spiritual arrogance on the one hand and fear and distrust of the West on the other, the prerequisite of xenophobia. It may sound amusing but it is a sign of the times that an influential Asian could say as he did a few months ago: "Jesus Christ was an Easterner. He has been betrayed by the West and we must rescue him from the hands of his enemies."

This to me is the sad story that lies behind the existence and the apparent increase of Asian xenophobia towards the West. It is a sad story indeed with much to be condemned on both sides. Xenophobia has always existed. The good Englishman was said to believe—how seriously I do not know—that "black men began at Calais." And not so long ago, to an Asian sitting under his coconut tree sipping his toddy, Little Rock would have seemed like a dangerous case of xenophobia. But I must not overstate my case, for our own "slang" for white man is very close to the word we use for leper.

And so, even today Asians themselves engaged, in one country or the other, in civil warfare or in crises of govern-

ment or economy, turn on the crafty Westerner who, they are convinced, is the prime cause of his troubles.

Many Asians are xenophobes, but there is cause for hope when we have examined the reasons for its existence. For, objectively speaking, there are adequate historical reasons for Asian xenophobia against the West, as there are in the world for many evil things. Moreover, it is but a recent development in Asian history and remains alien to our way of life. It hurts Asia more

than it does the West, and this fact is being realized slowly but surely.

I believe that, as Asia's contribution to world civilization is increasingly recognized, these historical resentments will decrease. And as this happens, Asian xenophobia against the West will increasingly tend to wither and die. And it will more easily and painlessly wither and die because this horrible thing was never of our planting and was never a natural growth of our civilization.

Asian Nationalism Vis-À-Vis Other Asian Nations

By G. L. MEHTA

ABSTRACT: The growth of nationalism in Asia can be traced to regional rather than national groupings and state—similarity of culture is frequently as important as a common racial origin. The coming of Europeans into Asia produced a tremendous impact through trade, conquest, and religious contacts. It is felt that the plight of many Asian and African countries has been due in a larger or smaller measure to the dominance and exploitation by powerful countries of the West, although foreign rule also brought several incidental advantages. European dominance over Asia cut off contacts among Asians and shifted their political relationships and economies to the West. But this domination generated a spirit of resistance and engendered the growth of nationalism. National movements in India were inspired by Western ideas. During the last ten years, over 600 million people of the world have emerged from their dependent status. The resurgence of Asia has been a most significant event of this century. However, if nationalism in Asia is to be liberal and democratic, it has to solve fundamental social economic problems like poverty, abysmally low standards of living, and chronic unemployment. There are undoubtedly many unresolved problems among Asian countries. But these differences in development need not necessarily be categorized in terms of cold war, and they should be resolved by peaceful means. The right of self-rule carries with it a moral obligation to be a responsible member of a world community.

*His Excellency Gaganvihari L. Mehta, LL.D., Washington, D. C., is Ambassador of India to the United States and Mexico and Minister Plenipotentiary to Cuba. On the attainment of India's independence in 1947, he was appointed President of the Tariff Board under the national government of India. In March 1950, he was appointed a member of the National Planning Commission. He is a frequent contributor to Indian journals. Among his publications are: *The Conscience of a Nation* (1932), *From Wrong Angles* (1935), and *Perversities* (1942).*

NATIONALISM in Asia, as we know it today, is undoubtedly the most significant development of this century. Although its roots are embedded in ancient cultural heritage, it emerged and grew in Asia after it had appeared in Europe. But we should not forget that in Europe also nationalism in the sense in which this term is now understood became a force since the eighteenth century, mainly as a result of resistance to foreign aggression or domination.

The development of Asian nationalism like its origins has been different from that of European nationalism. Historically, the development of Asia has been in terms of regional rather than national groupings such as China and East Asia; India and South East Asia; West Asia comprising the Arab lands; and Central Asia. The great religions of Asia—and I may add parenthetically that all the spiritual religions have had their origin in Asia and the East—Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam spread over the continent at different times and in different phases and complexions. These religions have in many ways been a primary impulse for the regional groupings and cultural inheritance of Asia. Similarity of culture is often as important as a common racial origin. Within each of these religions there have been a variety of ethnic, cultural, economic and political associations. But the concept in each case may be compared to that of Christendom in post-Roman Europe rather than to that of separate nation states. Within these regional groups there have, no doubt, been different competing states, princedoms, tribal groups, and so forth. Regional rivalries and contests for local supremacy have divided them, but these have taken the form of a struggle for domination within the group rather than of country against country as in Europe where one of the factors making for the development of disparate nationalism

was the struggle between different countries.

In ancient and medieval times, peoples of Asia were as adventurous and aware of the world at large as Europeans, indeed, if not more so. Archaeological remains and other evidence show that there was flow of commerce and culture between India and Sumer as well as later Mediterranean civilization and ancient Greece. In the Buddhist period, contacts were developed through missionaries and others by way of what is now Afghanistan and Turkistan with China; also with Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, Siam, Indochina and Indonesia. Geographically, the extent of these contacts is much greater than that of the Mediterranean region which represented the whole world to the Romans. There is evidence to show that even the American continent, north and south, had contacts with Asia and the peoples of Asia migrated to these lands. Such exchanges and migrations were largely peaceful, and those who took culture and trade abroad often settled in the new lands they discovered; for instance, there were ancient Indian dynasties in Ceylon and countries in Southeast Asia. Even the Mongols who established their sway over China and India became assimilated and in course of time ceased to be alien rulers.

EUROPEAN IMPACT IN ASIA

But it was the coming of Europeans into Asia that produced a tremendous impact. Europeans first came to Asia as traders and it has been said that they acquired their empires in Asia unintentionally and as though by accident. India, said the historian Seeley, was conquered by the British in a fit of absent-mindedness. Unfortunately, however, peoples of these lands did not have the necessary presence of mind to counter the absent-mindedness that was so

positive. The fact is that Europeans were pushful, aggressive traders prepared to use force and to hold territories to the extent necessary for commercial exploitation. It was rather the Asians who lost their freedom—political or economic or both—through inadvertence. Inspired by local rivalries rather than national feeling, many a ruler sought the help of one European power or another against his rival, only to find that he himself had become subject to his foreign friends.

If I may digress for a moment, I was somewhat surprised that such a penetrating and balanced thinker as Mr. George F. Kennan does not believe that the West need have some sort of "cosmic guilt or obligation vis-à-vis the underdeveloped powers of the world."¹ It is hardly necessary to point out to such a distinguished historian as Mr. Kennan that the plight of many of these countries can be traced directly to their domination and exploitation by powerful countries of the West. The way their economies were developed so as to produce and supply certain raw materials for manufacture by ruling countries while closed markets were developed for the finished products of the dominant country is, I suggest, an adequate comment on the "moral responsibility" of the Western powers which conquered and dominated lands whose main crime was their military weakness. Moreover, the plunder from some of these countries such as India in the early days of the East India Company helped to enrich the "Nabobs" whose affluence contributed to the industrialization of Britain. Countless examples can be given of the manner in which cheap labor of these "backward" countries was utilized to build up fortunes in imperial or metropolitan countries

¹ George F. Kennan, *Russia, the Atom and the West* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), p. 74.

and to show how the most elementary needs of populations in these lands were not met and their social and economic amelioration neglected by an imperious governing caste. This is not to deny that what is loosely called "colonialism" did bring some benefits to these peoples and lands. Apart from the spread of literacy, better health standards, communications and rudiments of industries—which, incidentally, would have been possible through contacts with the West without alien domination—Eastern countries owe to the West concepts of law and forms of representative government and administrative system. Even Marxists do not deny that such alien capitalism could be a step forward from indigenous feudalism. No impartial person can deny many concrete advantages which foreign rule has brought to Asian countries. Moreover, what an eminent Irishman, Sir Horace Plunkett, said about his own country is equally pertinent for Asian countries which have been under foreign domination, that "Irish history is something which Britishers should remember and Irishmen should forget." Nevertheless, it is simply not true that the Western countries have no moral responsibility or obligations to countries which have enabled them to a smaller or greater extent to build up their wealth and power.

WESTERN IDEAS AND ASIAN FREEDOM MOVEMENTS

European dominance over Asia had the effect of cutting off contacts among Asians and shifting their political relationships and economies to the West. But it was this very domination which generated in course of time a spirit of resistance against foreign rule and engendered the growth of nationalism in different countries of Asia. Yearning for freedom and movements for achieving national independence were inspired

and stimulated in the nineteenth century by the impact of Western ideas—the English liberal philosophers, the French Encyclopedists and the French Revolution, and the American Revolution with its Declaration of Rights. Garibaldi and Mazzini's fight for independence of Italy and Ireland's struggle for Home Rule fired the imagination of the intelligentsia in my country. Byron's immortal verse captivated the youth:

For freedom's battle once begun
Bequathed from bleeding sire to son,
Though baffled oft
Is ever won.

It is of interest to mention that the British Prime Minister Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman's memorable words, "good government is no substitute for self-government," after the Boer War became a sheet anchor for those striving for self-rule. Asian peoples were thrilled by Japan's victory over Russia (1904–1905) which they hailed as the triumph of an Asian nation over a European power. Japan's development into a modern state was followed with keen interest until Japan's conquest of other Asian countries produced a feeling of revulsion. Let it be stated, however, that Japan's relations with the Western powers were not all of her own seeking. Japan became aware of Western aggressiveness and its rulers felt that there were only two ways of dealing with Western powers, either to submit to them or to fight them with their own weapons. Japan came to be considered a great power and was given an equal status at Versailles because of her armaments and economic strength. But Japan's error, if I may say so in all humility, was that the Japanese wanted only themselves to be regarded as belonging to the West and did not wish

to destroy a belief in Eastern inferiority.²

When, during World War I, President Woodrow Wilson enunciated the principle of national self-determination, countries in Asia were immensely enthused and demanded that this principle be applied not merely to the subject nations of Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire but also to those who were under the domination of the Allied Powers. There was a ferment in Asia towards the end of that war and it was then that the constitutional agitation for self-government in India became a dynamic mass movement. Leaders, like Mahatma Gandhi, Sun Yat-sen, Mustafa Kemal, and Nahas Pasha, became the pioneers of a resurgent Asia.

The freedom movement in Asian countries got a fillip during World War II. The ostensible objectives of that war such as safeguarding of democracy and liberty against fascism and nazism stimulated a demand for realization of these ideals in subject countries. The "four freedoms" proclaimed by the late President Roosevelt became a beacon for dependent and economically underdeveloped countries. National independence was demanded as implementing the principles for which the Allies fought Germany, Italy and Japan; and a desire for economic development received stimulus from the emphasis on "freedom from want." On the other hand and paradoxically, dramatic Japanese military successes were hailed by many in Asia, including those who detested militarism and Japanese chauvin-

² Bertrand Russell in his *Problem of China* (New York: Century Company, 1922) written thirty-six years ago said: "Not that Japan has been worse than we have, but that certain kinds of crime are only permitted to very great Powers, and have been committed by the Japanese at an earlier stage of their career than prudence would warrant."

ism, as evidence of what an Asian country could achieve if it had the opportunity to develop its strength. Many Asians derive similar satisfaction from China's emergence as a powerful country; they look upon it less as a Communist phenomenon than as evidence of Asia's revival.

Japan is once again rising and re-emerging on the international scene. Although not then a member of the United Nations, Japanese delegates attended the Bandung Conference and their representatives were also present at the recent Afro-Asia conference in Cairo. Japan is having increasing commercial contacts with countries in Asia and is becoming a keen competitor in many markets. While Japan wants to bring about better understanding between Asia and the West, her leaders are anxious to maintain the Asian complexion of the country.

ASIAN RESURGENCE

The resurgence of Asia after the end of the war is, as Arnold Toynbee has observed, the most significant event of the present century and is "more explosive than the atom bomb." During the last ten years, over 600 million people of the world have emerged from their dependent status covering nearly 29 countries. These countries have achieved national freedom mainly through the enlightened policies of the ruling powers but partly also because of the collapse of imperial authority. In this ferment, there was a renewed desire to re-establish old contacts and make new ones within Asia. One of the earliest expressions of this widespread feeling was the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi in March 1947 when India itself had not achieved full independence. The first meeting at governmental level took place, again in New Delhi, in January 1949 in the conference on Indonesia. This was a

regional rather than a specific Asian conference because Australia and New Zealand participated in it as countries interested in peace in the Southern Pacific area. But the most important and organized expression of Asian consciousness was the Bandung Conference in April 1955 where the leading statesmen of 29 countries of Asia and Africa representing 56 per cent of the world's population met together. These countries have different political, social, and economic systems; some are members of mutually hostile military and political groupings while some are not aligned militarily to either power bloc. Nevertheless, the governments of these countries found enough in common to issue a unanimous declaration of principles, and the peoples of these lands were eager that mutual co-operation should be fostered despite differences in their ideologies or social systems. The Bandung declaration, it will be recalled, stressed respect for national sovereignty and integrity; equality of all races and nations, great and small; and the need for international co-operation. It has been evident that Asian countries are determined that they will no longer be under alien domination or permit themselves to be exploited because of their race or color. It is also significant that they are asserting themselves despite the fact that they lack economic strength or military power. This movement for equality and dignity is not simply negative, it is not only a revolt against political domination, economic exploitation, and racial discrimination. It is also a call for co-operation and partnership with the West on a free and equal basis.

AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY

The so-called Asian-African group at the United Nations now comprises 29 members. Even after some possible reduction as a result of recent mergers

of some Arab States, its future strength is likely to be greater with the addition of new members. Thirty-one new members have joined the United Nations since its inception; 19 of these or over 60 per cent are from Asia and Africa. Further additions will be mostly from these two continents. Although members of this group are free to take their own decisions and frequently vote on different sides on important issues, their collective voice is becoming increasingly important and their views cannot be ignored on matters affecting Asia and Africa, colonialism, or racial tensions. Many of these countries also hold strong views about their being made helpless victims of a nuclear holocaust as a consequence of hostilities between great powers, and some of them have an aversion to military alliances or membership of any bloc. These countries taken as a whole account for the bulk of the world's population and their voice has to be heard on important international issues such as disarmament. Besides, most of these countries are underdeveloped and, although comprising the majority of the world's population, have only 15 per cent of the world's income; their common economic and social problems are, therefore, an additional link between them and engender similar approach on many economic questions. Co-operation between Asian nations is also being furthered through regional organizations inside and outside the United Nations such as Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East and the Colombo Plan. There are from time to time unofficial meetings and gatherings of workers, athletes, and cultural groups.

The independence of these Asian nations is incomplete until they can get rid of foreign bases as well as their stagnant, undiversified economies which, in part, are the legacy of alien rule. There is, in these countries, "a revolu-

tion of rising expectations," and the vast masses of these lands will no longer remain content with their lot. As Bertrand Russell has pointed out, it is "scientific technique" that "the East regards as important and distinctive in the West" and it is "this alone that the East is willing to learn from the West." It has been estimated, for instance, that less than 2 per cent of the world's armaments budget could provide Asia with more than three times her power capacity. Asia's transformation depends, in the last analysis, on removing gross poverty, drudgery, hunger, malnutrition, and disease; on eradicating illiteracy; and on providing better opportunities of employment—in other words, the emancipation of Asian nations is not complete until life is made more bearable for millions of people, giving them some sense of hope and confidence. It is because communism claims to be able to remove the social and economic evils of poorer countries promptly, methodically, and completely that it appeals to many downtrodden peoples. "Nuclear power does not mean bigger and better bombs in Asia," says Mr. Leon Maria Guerrero "it is the best hope of peaceful progress and development for people few of whom have ever enjoyed the help of electricity. For the future of Asia, Zeta is surely more significant than sputnik or the Explorer."³

DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

It is hardly necessary to emphasize that nationalism in these times is inadequate unless it has an economic and social content and unless it accepts its limitations within the framework of a world society with its obligations and

³ "An Asian on Asia: Unfinished Revolution," Series of three talks on B.B.C. by Leon Maria Guerrero, *The Listener*, February 27, 1958.

responsibilities. It cannot be gainsaid that in some countries nationalism has been divorced from democratic concepts and does not retain the primary impulse or liberalism. But we should not make the mistake of insisting that form of government and structure of economy in countries with radically different conditions should necessarily conform to Western patterns. Moreover, freedom and equality as political concepts can have little meaning or significance without social reform and economic betterment. Indeed, if democratic institutions are to be built up in countries which have abysmal poverty and illiteracy, economic development has to be a primary task of governments. It is also true that some manifestations of resurgent or triumphant nationalism have been unhealthy or extreme but suppression of popular upsurge by colonial powers is a remedy worse than the disease. Those who fear that withdrawal of imperial overlordship would lead to a vacuum in which the Communists would walk in should not ignore the danger of a nationalist movement turning into a totalitarian movement, supported openly or covertly by powers which are opposed to the West. Nationalism in Asia is not necessarily anti-Western because it was born in opposition to Western imperialism; indeed, Asian nations have been reconciled in most cases to a new relationship with the West which has to be based on equality and self-respect rather than force and conquest, on treaties and agreements instead of extraterritorial rights and privileges and preferences.

DIFFERENCES AND RIVALRIES AMONG ASIAN COUNTRIES

In Asia, as in the rest of the world, there are many unresolved problems among countries. For instance, there are differences over demarcation of

frontiers as between Burma and China and there is mutual suspicion and distrust and fear of extraneous interference. Such differences have to be resolved through peaceful means and adjustments arrived at without resort to force. So long as there is no attempt at infiltration or subversion, these countries can even benefit by competition in ideas as much as co-operation in trade and culture. It is imperative that countries like India and China with large populations and immense potential resources and with populations settled abroad should be wary in their relationship with other countries and reassure their neighbors as well as smaller countries that they have no aggressive designs or ideological ambitions. We in Asia have to think in terms of partnership and not leadership. Indian populations in Burma, Ceylon, Malaya and elsewhere do create some difficult problems which are mainly economic in nature but here, too, given mutual goodwill and a spirit of accommodation, adjustments can be made in course of time. The Indian government for its part has emphasized that the primary loyalty of such populations should be to the country in which they have settled down. But the right of any country to give preference to its own nationals or safeguard its own population cannot permit such racial discrimination and humiliation as obtains in South Africa. It is essential to remember that Asian or African reaction to Western dominance is in proportion to Western practice of the doctrine of white man's supremacy.

Frequently, there is discussion of rivalry among nations in Asia, as, for instance, competition between industrialized Japan and India or the "race" between India and China. The peoples of Asia like those in other countries closely follow economic developments, social trends, and political movements in neighboring countries and elsewhere

in the whole region. But differences in the mode or rate of development need not necessarily be categorized in terms of the cold war. Social and economic evils exist in Asia irrespective of Marxism and have to be fought and removed with intelligence and determination. Different countries follow various paths to achieve the aim of social welfare and economic development. Provided again there is no attempt to impose one system or the other by force or by subversion, those who believe in democratic values should have enough confidence to meet the challenge.

I should like to add one word about Indo-Pakistani relationship. This is not a struggle of rival nationalisms. Nationalism grew on the Indian subcontinent as an all-India concept, and the creation of Pakistan because of personal and sectional rivalries constituted a defeat for the spirit of Indian nationalism. Even now, while India shows a sense of national consciousness, has translated the conception of a secular state in its Constitution, and endeavors to live up to these principles—for whose vindication our great leader, Mahatma Gandhi, laid down his life—this national consciousness is largely lacking in Pakistan except negatively when directed against India. Although I do not wish to comment on the internal affairs of another country, it is no secret that rivalries between East and West Pakistan cut right across any sense of national entity. Differences between India and Pakistan as symbolized in Kashmir represent a conflict between nationalism and sectionalism.

FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY

The existence of a nation, said Renan, is a daily plebiscite. It has been in Asia an assertion of the right of a group of people to determine their destiny free from alien interference and domination. But it has been something more. It has been an awareness of an entity submerged or forgotten in the dim past: a consciousness of a new dignity and self-respect for a people. We in Asia have also to realize that new freedoms bring new responsibilities, that the right of self-rule carries with it a moral obligation to be a responsible member of a world community. Our own great leader, Gandhi, was conscious of the risks of some phases of nationalism and of its possible unhealthy manifestations. I cannot conclude better than by quoting his eloquent words which have a warning for great powers as well as nations which have just become free:

Hatred will kill the real national spirit. Let us understand what nationalism is. We want freedom for our country, but not at the expense or exploitation of others, not so as to degrade other countries. For my own part I do not want the freedom of India if it means extinction of England or the disappearance of Englishmen. I want the freedom of my country so that other countries may learn something from my free country, so that the resources of my country might be utilized for the benefit of mankind. . . . My love, therefore, of nationalism is that my country may become free, that *if need be the whole of the country die, so that the human race may live*. There is no room for race hatred there. Let that be our nationalism.

Possible Permanent Cleavages in Asia

By YOU CHAN YANG

ABSTRACT: The peoples of Asia are on the road of progress. They are industrious and intelligent and have a happy and tolerant temperament. Their pride in their history, inducing mutual respect and aspirations, is a positive cohesive force. Their countries have great natural resources that when properly exploited can produce a high standard of living. Yet there are old cleavages due to marked cultural, religious, and political characteristics now less important than the new ones. Some, like Korea, Taiwan, The Philippines, Thailand, and Southern Vietnam, are democracies in the Western sense and regard Communist imperialism as a common enemy. Then there are Communist China and her satellites and the neutralist nations that while following the leadership of India are less cohesive than the other two groups and may, it is hoped, ultimately side more decisively with the democracies first mentioned. Finally, there is Japan, which is likely to retain its apartness and which, because of its policy of dealing on a basis of equality with Communist China and Russia, its chauvinistic religion, and its expansionist sentiments, may pose a threat to her neighbors.—Ed.

His Excellency You Chan Yang, M.D., LL.D., L.H.D., Washington, D. C., is Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the United States. He was a practicing physician and surgeon in Honolulu for nearly three decades. Every year since his appointment as Ambassador in 1951, Dr. Yang has represented his country at the United Nations Assemblies. In 1952, Dr. Yang headed the Korean Delegation to the Bilateral Conference between Korea and Japan. The Ambassador has made two Good Will Missions for his country as Special Representative of President Syngman Rhee—the first to twenty Latin American countries in 1956 and the second to Europe and Turkey in 1957. He is presently a member of the Advisory Board of Dong Ji Hoi; a trustee and executive member of Kokokahi, and Vice President of the Pan-Pacific Union.

IN THIS era when it is desperately important for nations to learn to live together in friendship or at least with mutual forbearance, it is disheartening even to raise the question of possible permanent cleavages that may exist or develop among governments and peoples. Nevertheless, to draw an analogy from my own experience as a practicing physician, it is far better to note the nature of diseases and try to treat them than it is to ignore them and hope that somehow they will just go away.

I do not wish to imply that Asia is sick. In many ways, I think it is an area of notable healthfulness and vigor. In that part of the world we find half of the earth's population—and we find it in a dynamic status of political, social, educational, and economic development. To paraphrase a famous remark by Sir Winston Churchill, never before in all human history have so many worked so hard, with such high anticipation, to achieve so much with so little. In other words, we may be poor, and in some respects we may be backward; but we the people of the Far East are most definitely on our way up.

COHESIVE FACTORS

There are some things that all Asia has in common.

We have population—and despite the disparaging comments sometimes heard about “teeming millions,” people are wealth, not poverty. By and large, our population is of a high character: industrious, ingenious, intelligent, and blessed with a temperament that is happy and tolerant.

We also have history—a great deal of it, more than any other part of the earth. And I think I may say that our history is something of which we may be proud. Century by century and country by country, we have had less of warfare and more of culture, less of

barbarism and more of religion than any other comparable part of the earth's surface. This heritage, which induces among us a mutuality of respect, is—more than race or more than economic and political factors—a positive cohesive force.

Furthermore, despite all that is said of the poverty of Asia, we have great natural resources—agricultural, fisheries, and mineral—on which to build a high standard of living, once the technologies of modern industrialism are brought to bear.

Most of all, I think, we have in common our aspirations—our shared desires for freedom, for education, for social justice, and for economic and political equality with the industrialized and militarized nations of the West.

These cohesive factors are of tremendous importance. They do and they will exercise great weight in determining the future of Asia.

DIVISIVE FACTORS

Nevertheless, as my title indicates, we do confront in Asia evidences of cleavages so definitive and significant that they may in truth prove to be permanent. Whether or not they necessarily involve hostility and therefore danger to ourselves and to world peace is another question. Once again to return to my medical analogy, if a disease is correctly diagnosed early enough, and if it is given adequate treatment, a dangerous crisis may be avoided. What we must avoid is the twin evils of doing nothing or of doing the wrong things.

Historically, we must recognize that there always have been cleavages in Asia, just as there have been in Europe. Through many centuries there existed a four-fold division of Asian countries, with marked cultural, religious, and political characteristics. These four divisions were: the China-centered nations

on the mainland; the India-oriented populations of Southeast Asia; the Malayan archipelagoes; and Japan—which always has been a country significantly apart from its neighbors.

At the present, and so far as we may look toward the future, the cleavages of genuine significance in Asia are somewhat different from this historical pattern.

My own country of Korea, Taiwan, The Philippines, Thailand, and Southern Vietnam have voluntarily and decisively cast their lot with the Western democracies. Our basic social structure, our education, our political institutions, and our economic development patterns are established on a basis of free-enterprise democracy. This is the cultural mold within which our young people are growing up. With every year that passes, this is becoming more surely our chosen and inescapable destiny. As you who are the heritors of John Locke and Thomas Paine know full well, freedom is a way of life which once adopted is never willingly abandoned. In this pattern our course is set; our die is cast.

At present, and as it now appears for many years to come, this particular homogeneity among ourselves and with the Western democracies is enforced and deepened by our common enmity with Communist imperialism. We are the peoples of Asia who have cast down the gage of battle and have chosen defiance rather than appeasement as our policy. To us the Communists represent evil, and we can no more compromise with them than we could compromise with cholera.

When we try to estimate how permanent this cleavage will be, we have no better crystal ball than have the statesmen of the West. It is possible that in a few generations the Communist empire will itself be dissolved from within by a rising spirit of liberalism. It is possible that the terrifying prospect of

atomic warfare may force adoption of an international code of decent behavior. It may be that the rapidly developing conquest of outer space may as fundamentally affect the power balance and alignments of our globe as Europe was affected by the settlement of the New World. These are imponderables that are impossible to estimate.

But so far as can be now foreseen, I think it is almost predictable that the negative force of anticommunism and the positive force of prodemocracy will continue to make these nations an increasingly cohesive group in Asia. The only serious question I have in this regard is whether other nations that are now “on the fence” may not decide fairly soon to join with them.

COMMUNIST CHINA AND SATELLITES

A second grouping of Asian peoples that seems destined to continue for at least a relatively long time is Communist China and its satellites. Of course, I still entertain some hope that the basic liberalism of the Chinese character may reassert itself and achieve the liberation of the captive peoples from their imposed totalitarian governments. But with the lesson of Hungary fresh in our minds, this is no basis for shallow optimism.

Not so very long ago, we used to hear considerable talk of a possible split between China and Russia. I never was able to picture for myself just how this possibility could develop. The cohesiveness of world communism and the subjection of localized Communist leadership to Moscow control is already a historic fact. Moreover, China is dependent upon Russia for aid in industrialization; and this tie is ever becoming more binding. Finally, even if the people of China should find the means of evading their own police control sufficiently to launch a war of freedom, I

think we must face the fact that the very anti-Communist alliance of Western nations would probably act to help prevent it—on the theory that under existing conditions there is “no alternative to peace.”

In saying this, I do not discount the possibility, which always exists, that China may come to a position more nearly approximating partnership, rather than submission, to Moscow. Neither do I think it impossible that the Chinese Reds may in the foreseeable future be able to expand their own area of control northward into the Siberian Maritime Provinces, thus obtaining more living room for their burgeoning population. But this is far from anticipating a break-up of the combine of Asian Communist countries that centers on Peiping and includes, besides China, Tibet and Outer Mongolia.

As to how Northern Korea fits into this pattern, I can only say that as a Korean I believe, as do all our people, that it is an essential part of the Korean nation. We are not without hope that means may be found through diplomatic and economic pressures to restore this part of our ancient homeland to the suzerainty of our own nation.

NEUTRALIST NATIONS

A third grouping of Asian nations comprises those that historically have been under the influence of Indian culture and that at the present time are following the Indian pattern of so-called neutralism. As you know, this category also includes Indonesia, which is Malayan and Moslem in culture, rather than Indian.

It is fortunate in many ways that this grouping is less cohesive than the other two I have briefly described. Burma is also less solidly and dependably neutralist than is India itself. Ceylon has a heritage of freedom which

may again assert itself. Thailand is still closer to us in spirit than it is to the Indian neutralists.

In other words, so far as this third grouping is concerned, I feel that it is in fact what its leaders like to proclaim—“on the fence.” If we are looking, as I think we should, into the long-range future, this is a position of instability which cannot be maintained indefinitely. In the long run, it seems to me highly likely that the love of independence which has deep roots among these highly cultured peoples will induce them and their leadership to make far more evident than they have in the past their abhorrence of Communist totalitarianism and their preference for democracy and liberalism. What we have to fear is that in the meantime their toleration of Communist imperialism will actually undermine their ability to resist and that they may fall, even against their will, into satellite status.

In any event whether or not they manage to escape Communist domination, I would predict that a cleavage will continue for many years or even many decades between them and the solidly prodemocratic nations I included in my first grouping. If this prediction should happily prove ill-founded, we may all breathe enormous sighs of relief. The eventual alignment of these countries with those of us who are strictly and wholly anti-Communist is surely a “consummation devoutly to be wished.”

JAPAN

Finally, the fourth category which I see in Asia is Japan. This is a nation which all through recorded history has stood apart from its neighbors—except for its recurrent attempts to conquer them. To my deep regret, I do not now foresee that this habitual pattern is likely to change.

Because we Koreans often find it necessary to express uneasiness about the course Japan is following, we are very likely to be labelled as “anti-Japanese.” Our friendly critics tell us that we must put aside our “emotionalism,” which they think is a simple heritage from our past experiences with the Japanese. They tell us that history changes and that we must change with it.

For the sake of the record, and speaking most carefully as the representative of my government, let me make it absolutely clear that our nation desires most cordially to establish and maintain friendly and mutually co-operative relations with Japan. It was my privilege in 1951 to head our Korean Delegation in conducting negotiations with the Japanese government. It was my desire then and it is my desire now to find a solid and dependable basis for a genuine accord.

I do not wish in any way to aggravate the disturbed relations between Korea and Japan, but I do most solemnly believe that those relations can only develop on the foundation of an honest facing of the genuine conditions that do exist.

It is impossible to consider the Japanese question honestly without giving serious attention to three cardinal facts.

The first fact is the Shinto religion—which teaches the Japanese that they are a “chosen people,” a people divinely charged with a mission of conquest, a people superior to all others, and destined to rule their neighbors. It would be a great mistake to think that this religion is for the Japanese merely empty verbiage. It is a faith by which they live and—as the *Kamikazes* illustrate—for which they willingly die. For a brief time after 1945, there was hope in Allied circles that this faith would suffer a decline; but as the record shows, it is today stronger in Japan than ever before. In modern psycho-

logical terms, this faith is both a creative factor and an expression of the fundamental psychological type of pattern of the Japanese people. It is unlike anything else in Asia, and would, by itself, set Japan in a different category from the Asian peoples who are Buddhist, Taoist, Confucian, Hindu, Moslem, or Christian.

Japan's relation to Communist nations

The second fact of fundamental importance in regard to Japan is that it is working out its own mode of “neutralist” relations with the Communist nations. Unlike India, the Communist party in Japan is large, flourishing, and plays an increasingly important domestic role. Like the other neutralist nations, Japan is working very positively toward building up closer economic and cultural relations with the Communist nations—but, uniquely in Asia, it seeks and intends that these shall be upon a basis of absolute equality, rather than as a recipient of aid.

Japan is, of course, highly industrialized. It needs and seeks markets—and, as is well known, it does not find them readily in either the Western nations nor among its former victims in Asia. The Communist countries offer what seems to the Japanese commercial interests an attractive alternative. And just as Japan worked out a partnership with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, in the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis, so does it now think in terms not of subservience but of a new Peiping-Moscow-Tokyo relationship of equality. The danger is that it also seems to be thinking in terms of common interests with these Communist capitals.

Perhaps at this point some of you may feel a bit uncomfortable. You may fear what I am saying is not strictly true, and that it may breed resentments and heighten difficulties. Well, that is very readily put to the test. No one

would be more pleased than I to have the Japanese government openly and frankly declare its enmity to communism and its rejection of any intention of forming ties with Moscow and Peiping.

The simple fact is, however, that Japan has exchanged more than a hundred trade and cultural missions with Red China and Russia. It has sent missions to Communist-controlled Northern Korea, and it harbors many North Korean Communists—who have even been allowed to set up their own training centers in Japan. The conclusion that Japan is aligning herself more and more closely with the Communist nations is not one at which I wish to arrive. Indeed, it would be far more comfortable for my own nation, now and in the future, if the opposite were true. But all we can do is to confront the situation that actually does exist. If there is anything that my country or yours can do to change this direction of Japanese policy, that would surely be a contribution to the future security and stability of Asia.

The third factor of significance in viewing Japan is that Japan has not abandoned its historic mission of conquest on the mainland. This is something that of course the Japanese themselves would deny—for how can conquest hope to succeed except against victims that have been lulled into a false sense of security? But the facts, once again, are sufficient to cause genuine disquiet.

I try to keep fairly up-to-date in my reading of Japanese newspapers. There is no mistaking the trend in recent years of glorification of the Japanese military victories in the past war, nor the glossing over of the eventual defeat as a mere result of miscalculation by incompetent officers. Neither is there any mistaking the recurrent references to the tradition of Bushido and the Japanese

mission to expand and rule. There is no lack of commentary on how much better conditions were when Japan did occupy Korea, Manchuria, and other Asian areas.

Finally, there is always uppermost in the Japanese consciousness the fact of their rapidly expanding population and the narrowness of their islands. Where to find additional living space is a topic as popular in Japan today as it was in Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy.

Now that all this has been said—and no honest attempt to view the cleavages that exist in Asia could ignore such conditions—let me say once again that I am no believer in historic inevitability. Japan's population problem is no worse than that in my own country, or in Java, or in the Netherlands for example. Its willingness or desire to work out an accord with the Communist countries may yet be changed. Its people and its government could yet decide that the future of Japan lies most favorably in a close alignment with the prodemocratic and anti-Communist nations of the world. Should these changes take place, then the cleavage which I have described would be eliminated. No one could be happier with such a result than our Korean people.

SUMMARY

In conclusion, I have tried to deal as honestly as I could with the topic of possible permanent cleavages in Asia. I think any honest scholar would probably reach conclusions very similar to those which I have described. Whether these cleavages will actually prove to be permanent is another matter. Politics is far from being an exact science—and in the rapidly changing world of our time, predictability in this sphere is scarcely to be expected. What I have done is to point out conditions and trends that are real and significant.

Do we wish that matters were other-

wise than as I have described them? If so, the first necessity is to understand clearly what conditions exist. In medical terms, we should make an honest and dependable diagnosis. Then we should do the best we can to correct the situation. This is clearly the task that lies before us.

In the field of diplomacy, and indeed in the whole field of human affairs these days, cleavages between or among nations are a challenge. An honest unity based upon equality and justice is surely

our aim. It offers the best chance humanity has for a secure and prosperous future. It may be the only opportunity we have for any future at all. Meanwhile, so long as the most dangerous cleavage exists between the Communist and the free parts of the world, we must make every possible effort to eliminate all the cleavages that separate our free nations from one another. In this great task, our government of the Republic of Korea will always strive to do its full part.

The Soviet Employment of Military Strength for Political Purposes

By HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN

ABSTRACT: Although traditionally the Soviets have thought in terms of capitalist encirclement, increased Soviet military and political strength has now made them feel that it is they who are on the offensive and the capitalist world which is on the defensive. As a result of Soviet advances, many people who profess no faith in the Marxist god of history seem to accept the Soviet hopes and expectations for the future as, in part at least, inevitable. They feel that we can no longer delude ourselves by viewing the Soviet Union as a second-rate power. Russia is strong, both politically and militarily, and since this is an accepted fact it would be "unrealistic" to oppose the Soviet Union at every point where it seeks to advance. Thus go the arguments which have resulted in mounting pressures to negotiate with the Soviet Union. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that apprehensions and counsels of despair about present Soviet strength are without adequate foundation. It is argued here that changes in the nature of war—the potentiality for a nuclear holocaust—and in the political organization of the world—the ideological polarization of international politics—make it much more difficult for the Soviet Union to expand politically and territorially than it was for Germany and Japan. Further, the doctrinaire Marxist belief that communism must wax as capitalism wanes—for this is how they read the Book of History—reinforces the caution and conservatism dictated by military and political considerations.—Ed.

Herbert S. Dinerstein, Ph.D., Washington, D. C., is a Senior Staff Member of The RAND Corporation in the Washington, D. C. office and Professorial Lecturer at American University. He is author of *Communism and the Russian Peasant* (1955) and, with Leon Gouré, of *Moscow in Crisis* (1955).

ON MARCH 19 of this year, N. S. Khrushchev gave an interview to Serge Groussard, the correspondent of the *Paris Figaro*. Among other things Khrushchev modified the long-standing Soviet position, reiterated as recently as 1954, that the capitalist world encircled the Soviet Union.

... At the present time the very concept of the capitalist encirclement of our country is in serious need of a more precise definition. With the creation of a socialist world system, the world situation has greatly changed. And it has not changed in favor of capitalism. Now it is a question: who encircles whom; do the capitalist countries encircle the socialist states or is it the other way around?¹

Soviet statesmen and writers have traditionally viewed capitalist encirclement as military and political in nature. Now the Soviet leaders believe—and the above cited statement is only one of many—that their greatly increased military and political strength has put them on the offensive and the capitalist world on the defensive. Recent Soviet scientific advances are fresh in our minds. The Soviet leaders claimed to be first with a ballistic missile. When they launched two earth satellites which required rocket motors of very great thrust this claim gained credibility. It is not surprising that the Soviet leaders should be pleased with their achievement and make the most of it in their public statements. Nor is it surprising that Soviet statements should seek to exploit the situation by giving the impression that a military revolution has taken place—which is, at the very least, a great exaggeration. Nor is it surprising that the Soviet leaders hope that their improved military position will hasten

¹ "Beseda tovarishcha N. S. Khrushcheva s korrespondentom frantsuzskoi gazety, *Figaro*" (N. S. Khrushchev's interview with the correspondent of the French newspaper *Figaro*), *Izvestia*, March 27, 1958.

what they believe to be the inevitable erosion of the capitalist camp. But it is surprising to see how some quite respectable people accept the Soviet hopes and expectations as inevitable. Many who profess no faith in the Marxist god of history nevertheless believe that historical developments make some Communist gains inevitable. The argument runs that when nations increase their economic and military power and enter the first rank of the great powers as the Soviet Union has done, neither their territorial limits nor their political influence can be kept within the bounds established at a period when they were relatively much weaker. Therefore, the argument continues, it is more sensible to accept the inevitable gracefully and permit some Soviet political gains: it is "unrealistic" to oppose the Soviet Union at every point where it seeks to advance. These views, it must be admitted, are rarely so bluntly stated, but what other interpretation can be put on the frantic insistence, in the last six months or so, that the United States must negotiate with the Soviet Union? Naturally negotiations with the Soviet Union in themselves are neither good nor bad, wise nor foolish. Negotiations can only be judged by their purpose and their result. But shrill demands that the United States negotiate without saying what about and what for suggest a panic fear appeasable only by a program of concessions.

This paper will seek to demonstrate that such apprehensions and such counsels of despair are without adequate foundation. In fact, it will be argued, changes in the nature of war and in the political organization of the world make it much more difficult for the Soviet Union to expand politically and territorially than it was for Germany and Japan when they made, and then partially enforced, their claim to a place in the sun. Furthermore, the doctrinaire

Marxist belief that communism must wax as capitalism wanes reinforces the caution and conservatism dictated, in any case, by military and political considerations.

TRADITIONAL PATTERNS OF EXPANSION

One need only recall the pattern of the territorial and political expansion of rising military powers in the last hundred years to realize how comparatively restricted Soviet opportunities are. Three salient features distinguished that time from the present. First, great and wealthy areas of the world were either in decline or undeveloped and fed the appetites of both the established great powers and the nascent great powers. Second, the world was not divided into two ideological and political camps. Consequently the demands of the nascent great powers could be accommodated and the balance of power shifted by adjustments in the alliance system. Now any Soviet gain is a challenge to the whole democratic system; any Soviet loss threatens the stability of the whole Communist system. Unlike a rising power in the nineteenth or early twentieth century the Soviet Union cannot expand by converting some of its opponents into allies and joining forces against a third opponent. Third, the guiding principle of conduct was the possibility of waging war with an expenditure of life and treasure commensurate with anticipated gains. The risk of miscalculation could be accepted because defeat, while unpalatable, was not so irreversibly devastating that it could not be weighed against great gains. World Wars I and II showed how dangerous it was to accept war as a possible policy, and since the awful consequences of these two wars occupy the foreground of our attention, we tend to push into the background the fact that most wars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries would now be

classified as limited wars. But a realistic appraisal of the consequences of a nuclear war—and the Soviet Union and the United States are in substantial agreement that such a war would be a catastrophe for humanity—alters the atmosphere in which a war for territorial aggrandizement can be considered. The risk that a war meant to be limited might expand cannot now be so readily taken.

AGGRANDIZEMENT BY AGREEMENT

Some past cases of territorial and political aggrandizement are instructive in that they suggest that the Soviet Union cannot employ similar techniques. Perhaps the most common form of expansion in the latter part of the nineteenth century was the agreement of two great powers to expand at the expense of a third weaker or unprotected power. Thus in the late 1890's Imperial Germany seized the Chinese port of Kiao-chow. The Russian government would have preferred to prevent the dismemberment of China and to have controlled the whole of it indirectly. But since neither the Russian government nor its ally, France, considered the German action a sufficient cause for war, Russia accepted the German proposal to take Port Arthur in compensation. This German expansion was possible first because China was prostrate, second because Germany's seizure of Kiao-chow was not an ideological wound to Russia for which no territorial compensation existed and, third, Imperial Germany was ready to run the risk of war that this advance entailed. The last two of these reasons would have had an odd sound only a generation ago. Obviously, the value of one Chinese treaty port could be measured in terms of another treaty port and just as obviously great powers accepted the risk of war when they expanded their territory. It is a measure

of how greatly the world has changed that the past is easier to understand when it is recalled that ideological conflict was of little importance and that general war was a risk commonly accepted.

THE POLARIZATION OF POLITICS

It is perhaps useful to examine further the consequences of the ideological polarization of international politics. Would anyone think it now possible for the Chinese Communist government to trade Northern Indochina for Formosa? Formosa means much more to China than Korea. In return for American agreement France might make missile bases immediately available to the United States; the Soviet Union would be forced by the temporary combination of China and the United States to acquiesce to the loss of North Korea; then the United States would estimate that the loss of Formosa was balanced by gains in Europe and by the creation of a rift between China and Russia. As we fill in the detail in this imaginary picture, it becomes more and more wildly implausible. And yet arrangements of this sort were common in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This was a political method for recognizing and accommodating to the rising economic and military strength of countries like Japan.

Sometimes in the age of imperialism an area was spared dismemberment, but not because ideological conflict between the great powers prevented collaboration in the division of a weaker power's territory. The reasons were quite different. In the case of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, the common apprehension that a single power would get too great a share caused the great powers to concert action against attempts of any single great power to dismember the Ottoman Empire. When only two powers were concerned, as was

the case in Persia, the realization that a third power, Germany, was a threat to both was the impetus to the Anglo-Russian partition of Persia into spheres of influence in 1907.

Again in 1942 the Soviet Union, on the one side, and the United States and Great Britain, on the other, divided the area into occupation zones to aid in the prosecution of a war against Germany. But now the situation is completely altered. Since the United States and the Soviet Union no longer have a common enemy, they cannot combine against him and then share out an area which neither had previously permitted the other to take.

The hope has been expressed, especially in Western Germany, that the ideological division of the world into two camps is not permanent. As China grows in economic and military power and as she becomes a threat to the Soviet Union, traditional considerations of power politics will efface the ideological affinity between China and the Soviet Union; and, the argument runs, the Soviet Union will seek a counterweight among its former enemies, notably West Germany. Such an expectation is understandably attractive, but it seems to minimize the importance of ideological changes, and moreover a China so strong as to menace the Soviet Union does not seem likely for quite some time.

LIMITED WARS

Another common nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century technique of territorial expansion was the employment of what is now called limited war. The Austro-Prussian war against Denmark in 1864, the Prussian war against Austria in 1866, and the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 gained territory for Germany and made her a country to be reckoned with in the division of colonial spoils. Similarly the Russo-

Japanese war of 1904 gained territory for Japan, established her as a great power, imbued Japan with the conviction of a right to expand in Asia, and convinced some that it was hopeless to resist. Again a comparison with the present situation shows striking differences. After the great territorial advances following the defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945, the Soviet Union has not used her own troops to seek further territorial gains. Although the Soviet Union has been rapidly closing the gap between her over-all military strength and that of the United States and Western Europe in the last year or two, no tendency to employ Soviet troops for territorial aggrandizement is discernible. It is hard to visualize the Soviet Union planning a short victorious war against Turkey with the purpose of "recovering" Armenia irredenta. Even if it seemed possible or likely that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would not honor its commitments to Turkey, it would make little sense for the Soviet Union to risk the terrible consequences of a nuclear war for Turkish Armenia.

It is considerations of this kind which have directed attention to aggression by proxy. This technique is attractive because the country invaded retaliates against the proxy, thereby accepting the fiction that the proxy is really the initiator. Neither the victim nor his allies want a world war. This technique seems suited to Soviet needs. A Soviet textbook on war, giving the Korean conflict as an example, put the case as follows: "The scale of war is determined by the character, aims and purposes of the warring states."² But under the sting of defeat and the consequent loss of prestige, one of the warring states might seek to gain vic-

² *Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii* (Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army), I. N. Levanov, editor, Moscow, 1957, p. 44.

tory by expanding the scope of the war. Many Americans made proposals of this kind during the Korean conflict, and when the Chinese intervened to prevent the loss of North Korea, they risked the expansion of the war. Furthermore, while the great powers might keep the scope of the war limited to their aims and purposes, the proxies—for whom this is an all-out war—might, in extreme desperation, act so as to expand the war. The Soviet leaders seem to be very much alive to these dangers. The statement above cited that aims and purposes determine the scope of a war is the only such Soviet opinion uncovered by a diligent search, whereas dozens of the opposite tendency could be cited. For example, Marshal Vasilevskii warned that limited actions of the kind which succeeded in the recent past could no longer be risked. Times had changed. "History, and quite recent history, testifies that world wars grow out of small wars."³ The Soviet leaders seem to believe that they are capable of exercising the restraint required to limit wars but that others might be more reckless. Quite naturally the Russians stress that limited wars initiated by their opponents might get out of hand. Moreover, the Soviet Union probably really fears that wars initiated by their proxies might be enlarged by the victims beyond the plans of the Soviet government.

THE FAIT ACCOMPLI

One other method of territorial aggrandizement has enjoyed great success in the recent past. This was Hitler's policy of expanding by fait accompli. When Hitler abrogated the provisions of the Versailles Treaty by the remilitarization of the Rhineland, by the re-creation of a German Air Force and by

³ Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Vasilevskii, "Opasnoe bakhval'stvo" (Dangerous Braggery), *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 14, 1957.

an Anschluss with Austria, he correctly calculated that he would be unopposed. He ran a certain risk of war in these cases, but there was always a line of retreat. He could restore what he had seized if the Western allies threatened war. In Munich, Hitler moved from the fait accompli to the ultimatum. There he threatened that unless his demands were met by a certain date, he would make war upon Czechoslovakia. The fait accompli and the ultimatum both carry with them the risk of war although in the case of the fait accompli it is easier for the aggressor to withdraw and thus end the crisis. The limited war and the aggression by proxy armies share many of the characteristics of the fait accompli. For example, a North Korean conquest of South Korea within a week might have been classed either as a fait accompli or as a brief limited war. Since 1945 the Soviet Union has attempted two faits accomplis: The coup in Prague and the Berlin Blockade, succeeding in the first and failing in the second. It follows from what has already been said (and the arguments yet to be made will reinforce the point) that the Soviet Union is now more reluctant to risk the consequences of faits accomplis than ever before.

ULTIMATA

Insofar as advance by ultimata is concerned, the situation is quite clear. An ultimatum to make war unless demands are met by a certain date always risks war. It was precisely this risk that some prominent German generals were unwilling to take in the fall of 1938 when they plotted to overthrow Hitler—only to abandon the plan when it became obvious that Great Britain and France were prepared to submit. The existence of nuclear weapons has altered the nature of ultimata. Military theorists, Western and Soviet, agree that priority in nuclear war is highly ad-

vantageous and may even be decisive. Thus to threaten another country with war unless it accedes to certain demands is most reckless. Before nuclear weapons existed it was possible for the blackmailed country to do nothing in the hope that the threat of war was a bluff. The advantage of attacking rather than being attacked was often minor and, in any case, not great enough to weigh in the balance against the chance for avoiding an unwanted war. Now that the advantages of initiating war rather than retaliating have become so clear, a great power presented with an ultimatum can really only choose between submission or the initiation of war. Ultimata have been the political weapons of those prepared to make war for certain objectives, but willing or preferring to attain these goals without war. Ultimata have become foolish because they may provoke the intended victim to initiate war—and in the nuclear age the initiator may well enjoy a decisive advantage. Ultimata against great powers have not been employed by the Soviet Union. The Soviet notes to England and France during the period of the Suez crisis were not ultimata.⁴ The Soviet notes were, rather, unspecific warnings that England and France might *eventually* become involved in hostilities with damage to their homelands. The vague menace will be discussed later as one of the techniques available to and employed by the Soviet Union.

To this point the standard techniques for aggrandizement no longer available, or only available at great risk to the Soviet Union, have been listed. The exploitation of changes in the alliance system, participation in the great power dismemberment of weak countries, the

⁴ Hans Speier, "Soviet Atomic Blackmail and the North Atlantic Alliance," *World Politics*, April 1957, p. 319 and *passim*. To my knowledge this is the only scholarly analysis of this episode.

fait accompli, war by proxy, limited war, and compelling concessions by ultimata have all been characterized as unsuited to the modern age, or so risky as to make their employment by the Soviet Union unwise. From this analysis of the severely limited opportunities open to the Soviet Union, one might expect that the Soviet leaders would be in a mood of bitter frustration or would be chafing to act and advance. When the Soviet leaders were militarily weak and in fear of the hostile capitalist world, they imposed horrible deprivations on their own people in order to build a state strong economically and militarily. Now that their military strength is generally recognized, the changed nature of warfare and the new political organization of the world make it highly dangerous if not impossible for the Soviet Union to employ its military strength to expand as the great capitalist powers once did. But even a superficial examination of Soviet statements shows that far from being plunged in a black despair, the Soviet leaders are positively euphoric. Obviously, they feel that the prospects for the expansion of their power are good.

Up to this point the arguments here presented would in their essence probably be accepted by Soviet political thinkers, although they would naturally phrase them differently. The Bolsheviks would consider it adventuristic, or in our language, irresponsible to risk the postponement of world revolution by provoking a nuclear war. Using somewhat different assumptions than the Bolsheviks, the analysis presented here comes to a similar conclusion. Even a small risk of war is a poor policy for the Soviet Union, and the use of force to expand entails such a risk. If the Soviet Union is to expand, it is not because nations as they become great powers must expand. Although such a dictum had a certain validity in the past, the

present military and political situation has made this dictum invalid—as the Soviet leaders seem to realize. The prospects for Soviet expansion can best be assessed by analyzing Soviet ideas on that subject in relation to the real situation.

SOVIET OPTIMISM

The Soviet leaders believe that communism will expand because that is how they read the Book of History—the sacred text of the Bolsheviks. In their view capitalism has entered the stage of irreversible decline; communism is advancing irresistibly. Although the victory of communism is inevitable, the Communist leaders believe their own role to be crucial. Rashness may retard the victory of communism; but skillful midwifery will assure a timely birth. According to the Bolshevik view of the world situation, no drastic intervention is required. Eastern Europe and China have already become Communist. The areas of the world once controlled as colonies or semi-colonies by the imperialists are in ferment. Soviet writing divides this vast area of the world into two categories: nations which have achieved independence (which must still be defended against imperialist attempts to recover lost positions) and nations which are still part of the capitalist system. Distinguishing between these two groups presents no difficulty for the Bolsheviks. Nations allied to the West, the Baghdad Pact nations and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) group plus Israel, are dependent and the rest are independent. At the present stage of historical development, the next task on the communist agenda is not the communization of the independent countries, but the completion of the process of national liberation, that is, the elimination of imperialist influence from Asia

and Africa by the disruption of the SEATO and Baghdad Pact Treaty arrangements. The methods employed are simple: the sale of arms to, and political support of, "independent" countries threatened or seemingly threatened by the reimposition of imperialist control: Egypt, Syria, Indonesia are examples. Toward countries within the Western system, such as Turkey, sharp warnings about the danger of remaining within that system are the order of the day.

SOVIET GRADUALISM

The stage following national liberation, that is, the socialist revolution, is not emphasized in the Soviet press and for very understandable reasons. As Mr. Khrushchev is careful to stress, whenever occasion offers, Nasser is not a Communist. At the present juncture the communization of an Asian or African country by a fait accompli would frighten the nationalists and retard the decline of imperialism. Stalin, who was less optimistic about the immediate future, advanced where he could by faits accomplis; Khrushchev is unwilling to put the future into jeopardy for short term gains. Moreover, a new Communist country might present other disadvantages: it might well emulate the Yugoslavia of 1945–48 in its aggressiveness and involve the Soviet Union in unwanted and dangerous international complications.

Putting aside Bolshevik formulations, what are the realistic expectations for ultimate Soviet expansion in this area? The Soviet leaders cannot have forgotten that Turkey eagerly accepted Soviet assistance—political and military—in her battle for independence in the early twenties and then after victory ruthlessly eliminated all Soviet influence. The Soviet leaders must suspect that the Asian and African countries

will try to emulate Turkey's example of the 1920's and play the two great antagonists off against each other. But sure in their conviction that the West is declining, the Soviet leaders are confident of the answer to the classic Bolshevik question: Who will use whom? And it must be recognized that if Western strength were to be removed from the equation the outlook for the continued independence of Asia and Africa would be poor. If Western military power should ever decline to the point where the Soviet Union could risk war in the conviction that the damage to the Soviet Union would not exceed what was acceptable, the whole situation would change. The Soviet Union would then be free to employ faits accomplis, ultimata, aggression by proxy, and limited wars of conquest. But it is unlikely that the balance of military power will ever shift so radically. But changes of a lesser order of magnitude could also improve Soviet prospects for expansion in what they call the former colonial and semicolonial areas. Defeatist tendencies in the West based on a misunderstanding of what the Soviet Union is prepared to risk, might lead to writing off some areas. Or if in a mood of panic some SEATO or Baghdad Pact nations cut themselves loose, they would then probably feel less certain of outside support against Soviet aggrandizement and would therefore tend to accommodate to Soviet wishes. But such Soviet gains would not derive merely from the fact that the Soviet Union's military power had grown; in such a case, the Soviet Union would advance because her military power had grown, while her opponents had either lost military power or effectively renounced its employment. Thus the brightest opportunities for Soviet expansion lie in the exploitation of the opponent's mistakes. If the Western powers, their Asian allies, and the Asian

neutral countries remain strong and reasonably firm, Soviet prospects are poor.

SOVIET PRESSURE ON NATO

When we examine the outlook for Soviet expansion in Western Europe the same general principles are relevant, but the details differ. In Western Europe, the Soviet Union confronts long established nations allied to the United States and possessed of formidable economic and military resources. If the techniques of *faits accomplis*, ultimatums, and limited war are dangerous in Asia, they are doubly dangerous in Western Europe. Soviet objectives in Western Europe are then correspondingly more modest. If in Asia and Africa the immediate objective is the disruption of the SEATO and Baghdad Pact relationships, in Western Europe the immediate objective is the emasculation of the NATO alliance. The Soviet tactics in gaining this end are quite obvious. The Soviet Union stresses its great strength in nuclear weapons. It employs convenient occasions such as the Suez crisis or contrived situations such as the Turko-Syrian crisis to warn Western European nations in tones of vague menace that a new war would bring

unprecedented destruction to them. A sure method for avoiding such destruction, the Soviet Union implies, is withdrawal from NATO. Countries which took such action would be spared nuclear destruction if war came, and the very disruption of the NATO alliance system would reduce the likelihood of war. A disarmed West, the Russians say, would have nothing to fear since the Soviet Union has only peaceful intentions. Meanwhile, in a steady stream of notes to the Western powers, the Soviet Union urges the Western European nations to forbid the basing of missiles on their territory, but does not demand withdrawal from NATO.

Apparently, the Soviet leaders feel that the NATO alliance would be weakened if its smaller members did not have strategic-weapon systems on their own territory. As long as NATO is militarily strong, Soviet military power in Europe is inert, balanced as it is by the military strength of NATO. But if NATO should disintegrate, the Soviet Union with reduced risk could employ its military power to expand in Europe in the traditional ways described earlier. But here, as in Asia and Africa, it is the Free World, not the Soviet Union, that has the power of decision.

Belief in the Continued Solidarity of Our Western Alliances

By ANTHONY J. DREXEL BIDDLE

ABSTRACT: Threat from militant Communism has not lessened since 1949 when it led to the North Atlantic Pact and, in turn, to the collective armed strength under SHAPE, NATO military agency. The collective strength of NATO consists of the spiritual force of the operation, the economic, and the organized military strength. The adoption of missiles does not cancel out massive retaliation. Due to the vast dispersal of Western retaliatory power and installation of additional missile launchers, a potential aggressor could not, even in a surprise attack, count upon knocking out all Western launching sites and air bases. The earliest days of NATO were marked by a psychology of despondency, lethargy, and cynicism—this situation greeted General Eisenhower and General Gruenther upon their arrival in Western Europe. In their pioneer task these difficulties were overcome. There was a return of confidence, hope, and will to get on with the job of building up a collective armed strength. SHAPE's leadership is marked by dedication, understanding of NATO's people and a grasp of their problems, and determination to resolve them in the common purpose. Many of the problems confronting NATO nations are similar in varying degree since they all stem from the common threat of militant communism. Soviet pressure to ban tests and use of nuclear weapons and for the abandonment of our overseas bases are problems which concern both our allies and ourselves. A latest common problem is Soviet pressure for a summit conference on Soviet terms.

Major General Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Annville, Pennsylvania, is the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania, Chairman, Pennsylvania Aeronautics Commission, and President of the Association of the United States Army. He was Interim Ambassador to France; Ambassador to Poland, Belgium, The Netherlands, Norway, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia; and Minister to Luxembourg. During World War II he served on General Eisenhower's staff as Chief, Allied Contact Section—and again on General Eisenhower's staff at SHAPE (NATO) as Executive of National Military Representatives, a position he continued to hold when General Eisenhower was succeeded by General Matthew B. Ridgway, and subsequently for a short period when General Alfred M. Gruenther succeeded General Ridgway. General Biddle was thereupon appointed Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, when General Ridgway assumed that office.

AT THE outset let me say that, for reasons I shall hope to clarify as I proceed, I believe in the continued solidarity of our alliances.

You see, the threat from militant Communism has not lessened since it developed to such serious proportions in 1949 as to have led to the North Atlantic Pact, and, in turn, to collective security in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense posture under the direction of NATO's military agency, SHAPE—Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe.

You may recall that it was in 1951 that General Eisenhower, then Supreme Allied Commander, organized the integrated forces which originally made up SHAPE's posture of armed strength. This was in answer to a decision by the NATO member nations that if their peoples wished to stay free, in face of the open antagonism of a powerful dictatorship, they would have to treat their security problem together—to deal with it collectively—for no one of these nations was in position to provide for its own security by itself.

Now this collective strength consists of three parts: the spiritual force of the operation; the economic; and the organized military strength, consisting of the retaliatory force and the shield.

It was recognized by all NATO members, from the outset, that military strength by itself counts for little unless it is backed up by economic strength and spiritual stamina; that economic solvency is an essential part of the sound system of national, hence collective security, and that neither a powerful military force nor a strong economy can exist indefinitely if the people do not have the essential spirit—in brief, the will, as well as the capability to defend what they hold dear.

NATO'S MISSION

The mission of this collective security is twofold. First, to maintain forces sufficient to deter aggression—to make it unprofitable to attack—and, secondly, to develop those strengths to such a point that, in the event of an attack, it may be met successfully.

Moreover, a current-day objective of NATO's defense posture is a sustained retaliatory potential. The effectiveness of this potential is reflected in its manned bombers, its system of bases, and its missiles with ranges of hundreds of miles. The introduction of various types of other missiles will serve to improve the means of delivery. Indeed, long range missiles of the intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) categories are on the way towards becoming a basic operational factor.

The purpose of their introduction is, of course, to expand NATO's existing armaments and to continue NATO forces in a position to deter an attack. This deterrent is composed, on the one hand, of its retaliatory capability, and, on the other, of its shield of land, sea, and air forces.

Massive retaliation is not necessarily cancelled out by the adoption of missiles. There already exists a vast worldwide dispersal of Western retaliatory power—and, as the West proceeds with the installation of additional missile launchers, there will be that many more sources of destructive counterblow an aggressor would have to destroy.

Therefore, even in the event of a surprise attack, the Soviets could not count upon destroying all of the Western missile launching sites and air bases—and this they would have to do to prevent the West from striking back with devastating blows.

The power of NATO's modern weap-

ons enables it to maintain effective retaliatory and shield forces with military programs within reasonable limits.

Those of us who participated from the outset in the build-up of NATO's defenses believe in the necessity of the enterprise and are convinced that it is in the enlightened self-interest of each of the countries involved. I am confident, moreover, that as long as the member nations continue to play their respective required roles towards sustaining their collective security, NATO will continue to serve the purpose for which it was originally organized.

PRESERVATION OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS

Through generations of sacrifice, suffering, and hard work, the peoples of the NATO countries have developed systems of free government. They are now pledged, each to all the others, to preserve these free systems through a common strength capable of meeting any would-be aggressor with a hopeless task.

So—the very threat from militant Communism which caused free nations to get together in a system of collective defense still exists. Its tactics have altered from time to time, but there is no change in its objective of world domination.

Death caused a change in Soviet leadership, but this has brought about no lessening of world tensions—no reason for the Free World to relax its vigilance.

The same disregard for international undertakings when they cease to serve Soviet interests, and the same exploitation of the Soviets' military might to engender fear to the Soviets' political advantage which characterized the Stalin regime, continue to mark the Soviets' international behavior under the direction of Premier Khrushchev.

What, with the recent technological and scientific developments in missiles and outer space, the threat is, if anything, worse than when the military posture of free collective security was first organized.

SHAPE'S BEGINNING DAYS

I remember so well those very earliest days of SHAPE's existence.

General Eisenhower and his able Chief of Staff, General Gruenther, who later assumed command of the NATO forces, were accompanied to Europe by a relatively small American staff, of which I had the honor of being a member. Upon our arrival in Paris, the staff was rapidly supplemented by personnel from the other participating nations.

What General Eisenhower and General Gruenther performed in forging collective security at that crucial time was truly a pioneer task. It took comprehensive, patient, resolute leadership to achieve the objective.

Men of any less faith in their mission, and any less determination to see it through, might easily have been discouraged by the conditions they encountered.

In Western Continental Europe the overhanging threat from Soviet armed strength had given rise to a wave of despondency and lethargy. There were many who felt, in effect, that whatever might be done would not be enough to stop the Reds from marching to the Atlantic in ten days' time, if they decided to do so.

Contributing towards this unwholesome psychology were the defeatists, the pacifists, the neutralists, the type of nationalists who liked to picture their country as the mediator between the East and the West, certain leftist elements, aided, of course, by the Communists and the fellow travelers.

Confidence had been replaced by cynicism—and there was taking place a potentially crippling escape of capital to foreign lands.

These, among other things, had first to be tackled and overcome before attaining the all-around support which collective security required. They were factors which might be expected to try any leadership.

Nevertheless, in surprisingly short order, General Eisenhower succeeded in persuading the peoples of the NATO countries that only in an effective posture of strength, stemming from collective action, lay their salvation.

And, once the required defense posture began taking form and its stabilizing effects became known, there took place a re-awakening of hope, of confidence, of a sense of responsibility—and, very importantly, the will to get on with the job.

NATO'S LEADERSHIP

General Eisenhower had driven home the principle that for each nation concerned, collective security was essentially a matter of enlightened self-interest.

Later General Eisenhower was succeeded in command by General Ridgway, who, in turn, was subsequently succeeded by General Gruenther—and today NATO's armed strength is under the command of General Norstad. Each of these distinguished American officers is a dedicated man of vast experience and proven ability. Each, in turn, has pursued the principles originally established at the time that SHAPE was first formed. Each has demonstrated, as General Norstad is so clearly demonstrating today, his understanding of the mentality and spirit of the peoples of each member nation, his grasp of their respective, as well as collective problems, his earnest desire to resolve these,

and his ability to co-ordinate the planning and activities of this immense structure of collective strength.

Collective defense arrangements are, of course, not without their stresses and strains. But what enables NATO's collective security to surmount these problems is that the member states know that sustained progress depends upon a constant, conscious effort to co-operate and to overcome any evidences of selfishness and extreme nationalism.

Each member state is aware of its right to look to its fellow members for loyalty to the common cause. There is a recognition on the part of all of the importance of a full disclosure and discussion of problems affecting the interests of any one or more of their fellow members—and of the necessity to seek solutions.

The process of ironing out these problems requires relating each primarily to the domestic, political, or economic situation in the country concerned—whether it be the outgrowth of strictly national conditions or caused by Communist machinations.

Yes, their problems are many, but these are met and solved with the usual give and take. All in all, the relationship is one of good will and confidence.

While each member state has its own problems, many in varying degrees are similar in nature in that they stem from the source of our common concern, the threat from militant Communism.

THE LESSON OF HISTORY

Let me cite several cases. Again, as in the years leading up to and including 1939, an expansion-hungry totalitarian government rules in a powerful military country. Instead of Hitler, this time we face the unscrupulous Khrushchev. Hitler used to talk as Khrushchev does now. He would proclaim his desires for peace—and his wishes to avoid war. It

was not until 1939 that Hitler's despotic actions prompted Britain and France to conclude that they could not hope to endure in a Europe dominated by Hitler. Meanwhile, however, all actions in the nature of appeasement, including the statement published following the Godesburg Conference between former Prime Minister Chamberlain and Fuehrer Adolf Hitler, were proclaimed as "peace in our time."

In the mid and late 1930's, Hitler had flaunted his tanks and his bombers in the faces of visiting foreigners. The purpose of the show was, of course, to intimidate other countries into believing that resistance would be useless. Safeguarded by the fear generated by his vast armed strength, Hitler pocketed one country after another while others helplessly looked on, each with the prayerful hope that it might not, in turn, become the victim of Hitler's expansionist intentions.

It was at about that juncture that from ingenuous, timid, credulous, and defeatist sources in Britain and France, and even in the United States, voices were heard to proclaim that "you can do business with Hitler." Just as today, there is an increasingly audible refrain that "you can negotiate with Khrushchev."

But, in those grim days which led to World War II, there was no collective security. So Hitler dealt with each country separately and in turn. Had this collective posture existed, Hitler might very well have refrained from embarking upon his divide, nibble, and devour program of expansion.

Today, however, there does exist collective security—in the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, in the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and in the Baghdad Pact as well as in NATO. And, in the crippling retaliatory capability of these arrangements lies the grim warning not only that

aggression would prove unprofitable, but would net for the aggressor unacceptable consequences. These then are military measures which the Soviet threat to freedom compelled our allies and ourselves to take.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OVERSEAS BASES

A further problem which faces our allies and ourselves arises from Soviet pressure to ban tests and the use of nuclear weapons and for the abandonment of our overseas bases. This problem concerns our allies no less than ourselves.

As regards the question of suspending tests, the basis of the nuclear problem is the weapons themselves, not the testing. For, if both sides have an effective means of verifying the cessation of the manufacture and use of the weapons, there would be no reason for testing them.

Now as regards the proposed banning of the use of nuclear weapons and the abandonment of our overseas bases, here is the heart of the problem as it concerns our NATO allies and ourselves.

We are greatly outnumbered by the Soviet bloc in conventional land forces and in submarines. In the air, the margin is reportedly still in our favor. When we placed atomic cannon and rockets with atomic warheads in the hands of our troops, this, together with the support of the long-range aircraft of Britain and of our Strategic Air Command, armed with atomic bombs, served to counteract the Soviets' preponderance in conventional forces.

Later, the Soviets' technological developments enabled them likewise to place atomic weapons in the hands of their troops and of their bomber crews. The result—a stalemate.

For, even though their ground forces and submarines still far outnumbered

ours, the Soviets knew that if they attacked us, we would instantly retaliate with devastating atomic blows, not only from the air, but also from the tactical atomic weapons in the hands of the troops which form part of the NATO shield.

Next, followed the development of the intermediate range missiles, called IRBM's, with a range of 1500 to 2000 miles. In effect, both the Soviets and we arrived at this point about the same time. So, we were still stalemated.

Then came the Soviets' "Sputnik" and their announced claim that, in the process of achieving it, they had developed an ICBM, or intercontinental missile potential with a range of something like 5000 miles. Therefore, until we should have placed our own ICBM's in the hands of our troops, it is obviously essential that we move up our intermediate range nuclear missiles, IRBM's, to points within range of vital strategic areas inside Soviet Russia; this in order to counteract the Soviets' advantage from the longer range of the ICBM, the intercontinental missile. So—stationing our intermediate range nuclear missiles at our overseas bases and at other strategic points would enable us to maintain the stalemate.

NEED FOR A STALEMATE

And again I wish to emphasize that this stalemate serves as a deterrent to Soviet attack. For the Soviets are well aware that, even if they were able to deal us a terrific blow, they themselves would be risking national suicide.

So—we must have that stalemate, or something better—but certainly nothing less! And, when I say "we," I include our allies as well. For, without this deterrent they would be putting themselves in a position of being overrun or blackmailed into surrender, perhaps even by rapid stages. Hence, it is in

their enlightened self-interest, as well as for the sake of Free World collective security, that they contribute their important part towards maintaining the deterrent.

You see, with all this talk about banning tests and the use of nuclear weapons and about relinquishing our overseas bases, we are apt to lose sight of a very basic consideration: namely, that to ban the use of nuclear weapons and to abandon our overseas bases, without having first effected a reduction in Western and Soviet conventional forces to an agreed level—and this under a water-tight system of inspection—we should be forfeiting the main safeguards of the Free World against being overrun by the numerically superior Communist forces. It would mean giving up the most effective deterrent to Soviet aggression and, accordingly, the best assurance of keeping the peace. It would be putting the cart before the horse. Just common horse sense would dictate that, in terms of negotiation, the horse would have to be in its proper relation to the cart before we considered any proposals for the banning of nuclear weapons and relinquishing overseas bases.

DISARMAMENT AND THE SOVIETS

And this recalls to mind the strong advocacy from a number of quarters for breaking up the "Package," with a view to opening the way for possible agreement on one or more specific issues.

Accordingly, the two issues might conceivably be dealt with separately, yet with an understanding that one would be contingent upon the mutually satisfactory accomplishment of the other.

If the Soviets are sincere in their professed desire for disarmament, this would seem a practical approach towards the lessening of world tensions.

Regretfully, however, there are no

signs, at least at the moment, which would indicate the Soviets' willingness to co-operate with a fool-proof system of inspection and control. I have in mind the Soviets' very recent announcement that they were putting a stop to their tests of nuclear weapons. This would, at first, seem a very enticing move. But, the more one considers this unilateral action, the more clearly one perceives it is intended as a means of circumventing the necessity of an inspection system, and, at the same time, of attempting to bring the pressure of world opinion upon the United States and Great Britain to do likewise.

Certainly, all Americans, as well as their allies, would like to see an eventual end to testing—that is, when it would have served the useful purpose of cleaning up the fall-out. And, I believe this is attainable. But, for the very reason that it is attainable, it would appear to me that the Soviets are bent upon achieving it without having to submit to inspection. And, therefore, at this point, I should look for the Soviets to avoid vigorously discussions of anything involving inspection and control.

The magnitude of the danger which overhangs the world is such as to prompt all rational people to hope prayerfully that, through sincere negotiation, it might be possible to convert the world into something better than armed camps. At the same time, it is only prudent, in the interests of our national security, and of that of the other nations of the Free World, that, because we cannot, on the record of Soviet performance, trust the Russians, we insist upon such systems of inspection and control as to insure honest discharge of their undertakings.

PROPOSED SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Then, too, our associates in NATO are confronted, as we are, with the So-

viets' proposal for a summit conference. At the outset, this might conceivably have been taken as a desire to lessen world tensions. Since then, however, the Soviets have developed the exercise into something resembling a paper chase. But, what is worse, they have deliberately obstructed our pursuit by placing road blocks along the paper trails. These road blocks consist of terms which the Soviets well know that we, in the interests of our national security, and of that of the Free World, just could not accept.

The nature of the Soviet terms and the harsh tone of their presentation are, to say the least, disenchanting. They would seem to reflect a feeling of urgency to hold summit discussions at a moment when the Soviets might be hoping to exploit, to their trading advantage, an atmosphere of uncertainty engendered by their scientific achievements.

It is therefore clear that what they are seeking is not an agreement on outstanding differences, but a sounding board for their devisive propaganda.

Their refusal to discuss a number of issues, which we consider essential to the lessening of world tensions, and their rejections of agreements, which they have thus far failed to honor, only point to the fact that the Soviets never have intended that the summit should settle anything.

President Eisenhower, in a statesman-like reply to former Premier Bulganin, put the whole matter into proper perspective. For, while keeping the door wide open for a summit conference, the President explored the insincerity in many of the Soviets' peace proposals, and, while countering these, widened the avenues of approach between Moscow and the Free World.

We of the Free World believe that a contract is good as long as it serves the interests of both parties concerned, but

obviously this is not the way the Soviets think and act.

Had the Soviets respected the United Nations Charter there would be no need for a summit conference. For there already exists an organization to enforce the peace with specific procedures to apply in every contingency. But this has been frustrated by the Soviets' repeated veto in the Security Council.

We may now understand the more clearly why the Soviets have been maneuvering so vigorously to rush our allies and ourselves into a summit conference without preparatory meaningful discussions of outstanding differences.

SOVIET DEVISIVE AIMS

The Soviets aim at getting us around the conference table in the full glare of the spotlight of a cold-war-weary and peace-hungry Free World opinion. They would thereupon strive to jockey us into accepting a settlement which would relieve them of their previous agreements and thus approve not only their retaining their World War II booty, but their further acts of subjugation.

With these and other devisive moves they would aim at breaking up existing Free World coalitions, at breaking down the Free World defense posture, and at opening the way for further Communist ventures.

Let us not forget that notwithstanding the Soviets current bragging over their technological achievements, it is because of their concern over the effectiveness of the defense posture of collective security that they are striving so hard to break it up.

Yes, it would be dangerously premature to engage in early conversations at the summit without preparatory discussions at lower levels which might give promise of meaningful decisions at the top.

Notwithstanding the one-sided terms the Soviets have advanced as a basis

for the proposed summit conference, I believe that a lessening of world tensions is attainable. And, towards this end, let us earnestly hope the Soviets will eventually agree with our way of reasoning: that a contract is good only if it serves the interests of both parties.

Until that point is reached, however, we must bear in mind that moral suasion has no impact upon the unscrupulous; that the only deterrent is strength, which entails armed force and the will, as well as the capability, of using it if need be.

In citing the foregoing problems, I have done so in order to show their similar bearing on one and all of the NATO states. I feel that in facing these and other matters which might arise, we should be ever mindful that the things which unite us are stronger than the things which divide us.

THE COST OF PEACE

All the peoples of NATO, including, of course, ourselves, are affected directly or indirectly by the requirement to make our posture of collective strength secure in this period of unrelenting tension.

We are frequently impelled to ask ourselves whether these vast expenditures of funds and efforts are really necessary for peace. Yes, I am afraid they are, as long as we are confronted by the Communist conspiracy which has as its ultimate aim to dominate our respective nations and to destroy the moral, ethical, and spiritual foundation upon which our way of life is based.

In waging the cause of freedom for the capture of men's minds and hearts, we must be prepared to defend ourselves in the new forms of cold-war techniques, whether they be propaganda, psychological, or subversive attack—but these unconventional weapons will not be successful unless backed by armed power.


Armed power still is at the core of collective security's protective shield. The armed power may never be used, but it must be in the wings.

In conclusion, let me reiterate my belief in the continued solidarity of the NATO Alliance. The threat which led to its formation has not abated. It would therefore be in the enlightened self-interest of all participating States to preserve this posture of collective

strength by contributing both in the forces and in the spirit required.

I believe there are no challenges which the future may hold in store for us, which, collectively, we cannot master—provided, so long as the threat from militant communism remains, we will oppose it with energy, wisdom, and determination.

I am confident our allies and we will so decide.



Conditions of East-West Peace

By FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN

ABSTRACT: Although there is some agreement between Soviet and Western views regarding the nature of peace, particularly on the Soviet side, these are shaped by their attitude toward war. Whereas Western attitudes have, on the whole, been relatively optimistic, the Soviets seem to view peace as a more or less accidental interlude between wars—so long as capitalism exists. Khrushchev's speech to the Twentieth Party Congress modified these views somewhat, but he did not backtrack on the necessity of transforming capitalist society into a socialist one. With nuclear war a potentiality, East and West maintain what Churchill has aptly called "a balance of terror." But so long as both Soviet and Western leaders value their personal survival, as well as that of civilization, they will refrain from launching all-out aggression. Eliminating the possibility of direct or indirect nonnuclear military operations by the West against the Communists, the author feels the greatest threat to the West is the Soviet's strategy of piecemeal expansion which relies on a combination of military power and local subversive movements, as well as the shrewd manipulation of the universal human desire for peace. In large part the Soviet threat is more political than military, the Soviet pattern being one of military caution accompanied by political boldness. The West can counteract this by helping underdeveloped countries to eradicate conditions under which communism can flourish, but neither foreign assistance nor cultural relations are a panacea. In the long run the winning system will be the one which appears best to satisfy the aspirations of mankind.—Ed.

Frederick C. Barghoorn, Ph.D., New Haven, Connecticut, is Professor of Political Science at Yale University. Before coming to Yale in 1947, he was Associate Division Assistant, Division of East European Affairs, United States Department of State, 1941-42 and Press Attaché at the American Embassy in Moscow, 1942-47. Dr. Barghoorn was Visiting Associate Professor at Columbia University, 1949-51. He has traveled in the Soviet Union in 1956 and in Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1957, and he is at present finishing a study of East-West cultural contacts dealing primarily with Soviet cultural policy. He is the author of *The Soviet Image of the United States* (1950) and *Soviet Russian Nationalism* (1956).

THE PROBLEMS with which we are concerned here are so vast as to invite either idle speculation or fruitful discussion, depending upon the approach we take toward them. The academic, free as he is from the restraints and responsibilities of office, but also remote from many vital sources of information upon which policy can be based, approaches the problem of the durability of East-West peace in his own special way. The speculative approach to large issues has its limitations, but it also has certain advantages, including perhaps a certain breadth of view and freedom from administrative prejudices.

SOVIET AND WESTERN CONCEPTIONS OF PEACE

The approach that will be taken in this essay to the objective of avoiding large-scale violence between the countries under Soviet control and those that are determined to maintain constitutional democracy and other forms of non-Communist government, is that of seeking to postulate certain broad conditions which are necessary to the continuation of peace. It would be a waste of valuable time to embark on a complicated terminological discussion. However, something should be said at the outset about the way in which the term "peace" will be defined in this discussion. Almost everybody would agree that peace means "normal" friendly relations among human beings and the absence of conflict and organized violence. Even Soviet reference works define peace in such terms.¹ Also, according to the most recent available edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, the

¹ See, for example, the definition of "peace" contained in *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya*, second edition, Vol. 27, released for publication in Moscow in June 1954 and also the definition given in the Soviet Ushakov dictionary.

modern Western movement to ensure peace is the product of the development in the Western world of the "commercial and scientific spirit," to which war is an irrational disturbance of the rational order of things.²

Thus there is some agreement between Soviet and Western views regarding the nature of peace. Much less agreement can be found between Soviet and Western views on the nature and causes of war. The attitude toward war, particularly on the Soviet side, shapes the attitude that will be taken toward the nature and prospects of peace. If one thinks that the kind of social and political order that prevails in the world is essentially stable and desirable, and that it does not lead to "inevitable" war, then, during periods when there is no formal state of war, one will be satisfied with the kind of "peace" that prevails in the world at that time. At the risk of considerable oversimplification, one can say that Western thinking has, on the whole, been relatively optimistic about the nature and prospects for peace. Many Western thinkers have tended to agree with Immanuel Kant that "the commercial spirit cannot coexist with war."

Obviously, Soviet thought has taken quite a different view of both peace and war than the optimistic one suggested by inclusion of the above quotation by Kant in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* article on peace. According to the Soviet encyclopedia, which devotes a few words to peace and many pages to war, war is the continuation of politics by means of force. The "ruling classes" resort to armed violence if they fail to achieve their objective by other economic, ideological, and diplomatic means. In this view, peace, as long as "capitalism" exists, is a more or less accidental interlude between wars. As

² *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Vol. 17 (1957), pp. 413-15.

recently as March 1954 the Soviet Ministry of Defense published a pamphlet by a Mr. Cheprakov which stated that Communists "linked the cause of peace with the cause of the victory of the proletarian revolution, considering that the surest means of doing away with wars and of establishing permanent, just peace is the overthrow of the power of the imperialistic *bourgeoisie*." The clear implication of this view is that the use of violence for the purpose of destroying "imperialism" is justifiable, but that the use of force to defend non-Communist governments is unjustifiable. It is true that Mr. Khrushchev introduced a certain modification in the Soviet approach to problems of peace and war in his published "political report" to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956. Khrushchev cautiously amended Leninist doctrine by asserting that war under contemporary conditions of the vastly increased strength of the "socialist camp" was no longer "fatalistically inevitable."³ However, it is vital to remember that Khrushchev in this speech reaffirmed the necessity of a "revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into a socialist one." He optimistically asserted that under favorable circumstances, where the "capitalists" were weak, this revolutionary transfer of power could take place without a civil war.

Differing views and objectives

It seems clear from the foregoing that Moscow takes a somewhat different view of the prospects for peace than the one that is taken by governments and political parties in the West. The Kremlin professes to believe that the strengthening of "socialism" and the weakening of "capitalism" is the best guarantee of peace. *finis X Sezda Kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskogo Soyuza*, Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1956), p. 37. *Russk.*

peace. Western, non-Communist governments maintain that the best guarantee of peace is the preservation of the independence and integrity of free and independent societies. This difference of views and objectives leaves the world in a state of somewhat unstable equilibrium. On one side, there is what Sidney Hook has recently called a "secular fanaticism" which preaches that the continued existence of non-Communist society is both evil and dangerous. The "socialist camp" is actuated by a political messianism, according to which it is the duty of "progressive mankind" and its Communist "vanguard" to bring about the universal establishment of "socialism" as quickly as possible. On the other side there is the highly pluralistic non-Soviet world, divided by many differences of interest and culture, but to a considerable degree united by fear of further Communist expansion.

As long as this condition prevails, such peace as exists today will be uneasy. America or Russia would fight if either, or the allies of either, were attacked by the other. We can, therefore, regard avoidance of overt aggression by both the Soviet and the non-Soviet power groups as the first, indispensable condition of even the kind of peace that exists today. Let us therefore examine briefly the necessary conditions for avoidance of aggression by either grouping, beginning with the West.

AVOIDANCE OF NUCLEAR AGGRESSION

As Arthur Krock pointed out in the *New York Times* for April 4, 1958, there has been a long series of pronouncements by American statesmen, particularly stressed by President Eisenhower, indicating that "the United States will never initiate a war, and that the first blow, therefore, can be launched by the enemy." What Mr.

Krock in the same article refers to as the "total dedication of the American people to peace" would appear to rule out effectively recourse by the United States to what has sometimes been called "preventive war." It is probably safe to say that the pacific image of American policy represented by President Eisenhower, particularly at the "summit" conference at Geneva in 1955, is accepted by almost all Americans of all shades of opinion and degrees of responsibility and authority. This is also the image of American policy generally accepted by people throughout the world who are friendly to the United States. Given the important position of the United States within the group of nations striving to preserve their independence in the face of Communist pressures, it would seem that the continued maintenance of the present American policy would effectively rule out any possibility of Western aggression against the "socialist camp," or against any state, or group of states belonging to or associated with the "camp."

It is generally agreed in the United States and probably also in Western Europe that the Soviet Union enjoys a great military advantage over the United States because of repeated Western pledges to refrain from striking the first blow in a possible war. But does the Kremlin really believe that the West can be relied upon not to attack Russia if there are reasonable grounds to expect that such an attack might be successful? If the Kremlin is as suspicious of Western intentions as it urges the Soviet people to be, it seems likely that it regards the peaceful assurances of Western governments as hypocritical propaganda gestures.

It is true, of course, that the United States refrained from using atomic weapons against the Soviet Union during the period when the United States had a monopoly of such weapons.

Many other major features of Western policy should, one might think, have convinced the Russians that the West has no intention of attacking them. Yet one cannot be sure that objective evidence, by itself, can overcome fears and suspicions so deeply rooted as those with which Moscow apparently regards the Western world. Certainly those who emphasize the ideological element in Soviet behavior should be prepared to entertain the possibility that the Kremlin really believes that the West would destroy Soviet "socialism" if it dared. There is evidence that Moscow's anxiety about a surprise attack against the Soviet Union has increased since the death of Stalin.⁴ Of course, it is not so surprising that this should be the case. The nature of modern weapons inspires in all countries a kind of fear unique in history.

It was in this new dimension of fear that Sir Winston Churchill in his speech in the House of Commons on March 1, 1955 saw the best hope for the world. It is difficult to state the point as well as Churchill did when he said "Then it may well be that we shall, by a process of sublime irony, have reached a stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation."⁵

The Churchill formula of the "balance of terror" will apply only if both sides possess adequate instruments of deterrence to all-out war and the evident determination to use them in retaliation against large-scale aggression. These conditions are, of course, subject to development and evaluation over time. We have recently witnessed striking events in the fields of ballistic mis-

⁴ The evidence is examined by Herbert S. Dinerstein in his article "The Revolution in Soviet Strategic Thinking," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (January 1958), pp. 241-42.

⁵ Official text as supplied by British Information Services, New York, March 2, 1955, p. 6.

siles and of artificial earth satellites which bear directly upon current estimates of the "balance of terror." Let us assume, however, that this balance will in the future remain sufficiently even to operate in the fashion predicted by Sir Winston Churchill. This would mean that both the Soviet bloc and the West would, as long as political leaders on both sides valued their personal survival, and that of civilization, refrain from launching all-out aggression.

Under such circumstances, what are the prospects for peace? We can probably dismiss at the outset any possibility that the West might disturb the equilibrium by means of limited warfare, whether by means of "conventional" weapons or by "tactical" nuclear weapons. The existing balance of conventional forces and many other factors, such as relative figures of population, would seem to make a small war of aggression by the West against the Soviet bloc even less likely than an all-out nuclear war. In the light of these considerations, Soviet assertions about Western "aggression" in Hungary, for example, lose validity, as candid commentators, even in some Communist-ruled countries, have admitted.

COMMUNIST PRESSURES SHORT OF NUCLEAR WAR

There remains to be considered, now, the wide area of possible direct and indirect nonnuclear political and military operations by the Communists against the West. This writer has always believed that the most insidious and dangerous Soviet threat to the non-Soviet world was the strategy of piecemeal expansion. The Communists have at their disposal many instruments of piecemeal expansion. The most important probably has been, and still is, that of utilizing Communist parties in non-Communist countries as instruments for sub-

verting and destroying legitimate or established governments. However, the use of Communist parties in non-Communist countries would not have brought any substantial increase of power to the Soviet Union if the Kremlin had not had at its disposal a vast military machine. Soviet policy—and this is probably equally true also of Chinese Communist policy—relies upon a combination of military power and local subversive movements. The element of blackmail, which has assumed spectacular form since the Soviet Union convinced the West of its ballistic missile capability, has always been a prominent feature of Soviet strategy. The fate of the Baltic States in 1940 or of Czechoslovakia in 1948 illustrates this point.

Another weapon in the Soviet political arsenal is that of infiltration into "bourgeois" governments in preparation for a Communist coup d'état. Again, Czechoslovakia furnishes an instructive example. Still another among many Communist weapons is that of organizing guerrilla warfare, as in Malaya. Temporary alliances with nationalist, anticolonialist movements, as in the Middle East and North Africa today, remain among the most important of the Soviet weapons against the West. When these "bourgeois nationalist" allies have served the purposes assigned to them by Moscow, they of course may become enemies slated for "liquidation."

Finally, a word should be said about Soviet manipulation of the universal human desire for peace and for survival. It is perhaps in this field that recent technological developments have given the Communists the most powerful political and psychological weapons. As former Senator William Benton noted in the *New York Times Magazine* for March 16, 1958, "Khrushchev's success in stealing the mantle of peace is perhaps without precedent." It should be realized very clearly that this success is

based not so much upon convincing people that Moscow favors peace as upon exploiting general fear of war. The Kremlin makes effective use of its military and political advantages in its "peace" campaign. One of the mightiest of these is the secrecy with which it can cloak its actions and machinations. Soviet military preparations pass relatively unnoticed in the West. Soviet criticisms of Western military preparations receive front-page headlines everywhere. Soviet threats inspire fear. Kremlin assurances inspire gratitude. In this situation Moscow can reap rich propaganda harvests. It can, among other things, exploit for its own ends the idealism of many individuals who focus their attention on the problems posed by modern weapons, but who overlook the dogmatic and fanatical elements of Soviet thinking which have aggravated the present world crisis.

Modern conditions, particularly the fear inspired by nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons testing, and the threat of long-range ballistic missiles, enhance the significance of piecemeal expansion as a Soviet strategy. This strategy has many disturbing implications of which two should be stressed in concluding this section. On the one hand, under present conditions of military technology it heightens tension and increases the danger that in spite of mutual fear of all-out war some sort of accident might occur which could lead, contrary to the will of both sides, to nuclear conflict. At the same time, modern weapons threaten to place the West in a situation in which it might perhaps be confronted with the choice between surrender and annihilation. Another possibility, perhaps, is that if the West feared that this choice were looming up in the near future, it might in desperation initiate a defensive action which could have incalculable consequences. How can these various threats be coun-

tered? Only if this can be done can peace be preserved.

WESTERN MILITARY POLICY

On the military side, it seems clear, to at least one layman unencumbered by military expertise, that our objectives can best be assured by possession until an enforceable disarmament agreement can be negotiated of adequate forces to deal with possible cases of limited warfare, and, indeed, with all of the eventualities which are now foreseeable. This point has been forcefully argued from various angles by G. F. Hudson in Britain and by Henry A. Kissinger, James E. King, Jr., and others in the United States. It is easy to see the dangers involved in a defensive strategy which relies exclusively upon nuclear weapons. It is in fact difficult to understand why such a strategy has become so dominant in American and British military policy in recent years. One reason undoubtedly is financial. It has been argued that adequate armament in all of the various fields would be too costly. Certainly, fiscal considerations cannot be dismissed lightly. On the other hand, it is clear that security is more important than a superfluity of gadgets.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF WESTERN DEFENSE

Terribly complicated and difficult as are the military conditions of peace, they are by no means the only ones to be considered. In fact, it can be argued with much effect that the Soviet threat to the non-Soviet world is more political than military. If this is true, and it seems to this writer that it is, it would be possible for the West to succumb to Communist pressures even though what seemed to be an adequate military posture had been maintained for many years. If one studies the history of Soviet foreign policy, one is likely to be

struck by the caution with which the Kremlin has almost always approached the use of major military force as an instrument of international politics. Even Korea and Hungary are probably not exceptions. Moscow has usually taken the position of the military defensive. Even some of the Kremlin's most aggressive acts, such as the war with Finland in 1939-40, can be accounted for as defensive measures against real or imagined external threats.

The Soviet kind of "defensiveness," to which reference is made, is highly dangerous and has nothing in common with pacifism. It reflects the attitude of alienation, suspicion, fear, and hostility which the Kremlin has usually taken toward non-Communist societies. Military caution has been accompanied by political boldness. The men in the Kremlin seem to have been very skillful practitioners of applied social science. They have been sensitive to social forces and to the shifting currents of public opinion in foreign countries. Their revolutionary background and their rich experience in manipulating opinion within their own system have given them some advantages over the governments of Western countries in the techniques of political advertising.

To men of this stamp the current world situation must seem almost made to order. In the Asian and African countries which are in early stages of industrialization, there is unrest, frustration, resentment, and impatience. In an age of rapid economic progress and scientific miracles the young intellectuals of these countries cannot understand why their people should continue to live in medieval squalor. They turn eagerly to those who appear to have mastered the techniques of rapid development of a backward economy. As an anti-Communist Indian has recently written, "passionately aspiring to rapid industrialization, Indian economists and

intellectuals have turned to the Russian example."⁶

Of course, there are many other reasons why Indians, Egyptians, Syrians, Algerians, Indonesians, and even to a certain degree Latin Americans are predisposed to "turn to the Russian example." In some cases, Western tactlessness, arrogance, and even military aggression have antagonized the peoples of underdeveloped countries. As the above-quoted Indian writer notes, although the Indian intelligentsia was shocked by Soviet brutality in Hungary, it is more and more accepting the explanation that Soviet action in Hungary was "due solely" to concern for security following the "West Asian crisis."⁷ It would scarcely be surprising if the present situation in Algeria further blackened the image of the West in the minds of Asians and Africans.

The sentiment generated by social unrest and anticolonialism in many of the underdeveloped countries has furnished a basis upon which Moscow has built political movements. This fact raises the question of the relationship between instability in countries lying between the Soviet and Western power groupings and the preservation of peace. Certainly such instability furnishes a temptation to Moscow and Peking to redouble efforts to expand their influence. This, in turn, increases international tension. It is obvious that one way to work for world peace is to help the underdeveloped countries to overcome the conditions which make for instability and which might eventually cause these countries to be incorporated into the Soviet bloc.

To guard against this danger in one crucial area, the United States pro-

⁶ R. Ramani, "Indo-Soviet Cultural Relations," *Quest* (Bombay), Vol. 3, No. 2 (October-November 1957), pp. 33-40. Quotation on page 40.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

claimed the "Eisenhower Doctrine." However, the "doctrine" is probably useless against internal Communist subversion. The West must give thought to a number of difficult problems connected with the "inbetween world." How much of this vast area must be kept out of Communist hands in order to maintain an environment in which free institutions and Free World security can be assured? What methods can be devised to assist underdeveloped countries to overcome the difficulties inevitable in the early stages of industrialization? Economic aid, technical assistance, and exchanges of persons certainly seem to be among the most important instruments for achieving these ends. Instead of despairing of the results of our efforts to date in these fields, we should redouble them. As Oscar Gass has pointed out in an otherwise somber article in *Commentary*, "In the measure in which the underdeveloped countries come to share our adherence to political democracy and a humane culture, they will not choose to associate themselves with world communism."⁸

FOREIGN AID AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE

Our primary objective in foreign aid should not be military. It should be, rather, to strive for the creation of conditions which will be beneficial to all parties concerned, except to those with destructive intentions. Such an objective requires patience, imagination, and a measure of idealism. It seems deplorable that many persons in this country appear to be losing faith in the long-range possibilities of foreign aid. Of course, there must be realism in the application of foreign aid. It may be im-

⁸ Oscar Gass, "The United States and the Poorest Peoples," *Commentary*, February 1958, pp. 93-104. Quotation on page 103.

possible to help those who do not wish to help themselves. But a country as rich as the United States, which has so much at stake in the future of underdeveloped countries, should be willing and able to take a long-range view.

The area of information policies and exchange of persons is one in which the United States has recently taken some helpful steps, although our total effort remains much too small and limited.

The State Department is to be commended for concluding the United States-Soviet agreement of January 27, 1958 on cultural exchanges. Similar activities in connection with many other countries, including Poland, have a great potential for future good. Of course, the United States has long had an extensive program of public and private exchanges of persons with non-Communist countries. To a certain extent, perhaps, the American effort in this area of international communication tends to appear smaller in comparison with that of the Communist countries than it should because so much of the American work in cultural relations is private and relatively unadvertised.

Like foreign economic assistance, cultural relations are no panacea. However, any expansion of genuine international communication benefits the relatively open Western societies and improves the prospects for peace by exposing the closed societies to the light of truth. While one cannot but welcome the efforts of the State Department in the field of cultural exchanges, it is difficult to understand the pessimistic statements which have also been made in recent months by some officials of the same department regarding the potentialities of exchanges of persons and, indeed, of all kinds of international communication. It is particularly unfortunate that it has lately become the practice of high officials of the American government to state, in effect, that

free societies cannot compete successfully with totalitarian states in the field of international communication. We should certainly have more faith in our free institutions than to concede the propaganda battle to the Communists. The universal attractiveness of freedom is indicated in many ways. The most striking, perhaps, is the continued existence of the defense mechanisms represented by the Communist Iron Curtain. The growth of contacts with the Communist world should offer many opportunities for individual Americans and Western Europeans to help "Soviet man" to learn to think for himself.

If the Communist political effort both in the underdeveloped countries and in the Western countries themselves is to be successfully countered, a far greater effort will have to be made in the West to study and understand the culture, ideologies, and languages of the Communist countries, and particularly of the underdeveloped countries. We know from our newspapers that while there are a few thousand Americans studying Russian, for example, there are perhaps as many as ten million Russians who are studying English. Recently the Soviet Union has introduced an ambitious program of study of Asian languages in selected elementary and secondary schools. Many interesting items on this development have appeared in *Pravda*, in *Pravda Vostoka* (Tashkent) and in *Uchitelskaya Gazeta* (The Teachers' Gazette). At the same time the Soviet program of graduate study and research on Oriental and African cultures has been expanded greatly. There is no reason why Western countries, particularly the wealthy United States, cannot match this program.

COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC GROWTH

If the West is to flourish and to compete successfully with the Communist

world, it must maintain a rapid rate of economic, technological, and scientific growth. Economic and scientific growth is close to the heart of the entire problem with which we are concerned. In the long run the winning system will be the one which appears to satisfy best the aspirations of mankind. While propaganda, in the broad sense, will play a great role in this contest, as we have already tried to indicate, it will be less important in the long run than more "real" factors such as economic growth, relative standards of living, and scientific and cultural achievements. We are not concerned merely with "material" factors, of course. The quality of human relations in a society is more important than its level of scientific achievement.

For this reason it would be disastrous if the Western countries became so absorbed in the necessity of improving scientific education that the social sciences, for example, were neglected. The problem we face is one of raising the level and quality of performance in every field of human endeavor. This is certainly one of the factors which the Soviet leaders have in mind when they talk about "peaceful competition." It may be interesting to take a look at some recent Soviet documents pertaining to "peaceful competition."

Mr. N. S. Khrushchev, in his speech of November 6, 1957 on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet Revolution, asserted that within the next fifteen years the Soviet Union would be able to surpass the United States 1957 output of the "most important types of products." Although he pointed out that the United States would not stand still, Khrushchev expressed the opinion that the USSR could, within "an historically short period," defeat the United States in "peaceful competition."⁹ As early as at the Twentieth Party Con-

⁹ *Pravda*, November 7, 1957, p. 4.

gress, Professor Alexander N. Nesmeyanov, President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, stated that the tempo of scientific training and development in the Soviet Union had already surpassed that of England or the United States. Perhaps on the basis of such perspectives, Communist writers in the last few years have been making surprisingly bold statements about the future of the world. Mr. A. Sobolev, in an article published in the central committee magazine *Kommunist* in 1956 argued that eventually the United States would be "surrounded" by "a friendly socialist environment." It would then be easy to elect a "government of a new type."¹⁰ According to an important Soviet book published in 1954 by G. G. Karpov, after the establishment by violent revolutions of the "universal dictatorship of the proletariat," a "single universal human culture" will take shape. Some of the foregoing statements are more concerned, of course, with the ultimate goals of Soviet policy than with the relationships of the "battle of production" to that goal. However, there can be no doubt that in the Soviet mind the key to victory over the United States and the West in general lies in out-producing the "capitalist" competitor. Khrushchev has revived Stalin's famous directive to the Soviet people to "overtake and surpass" the United States in the per-capita production of steel, coal, electric power, and the other sinews of industrial power, and now he even talks of beating us in the production of meat, milk, and butter.

¹⁰ A. Sobolev, "O parlamentskoi forme perekhoda k sotsializmu," *Kommunist*, No. 14 (1956), pp. 14-32.

CONCLUSIONS

Grim as the present situation is, it contains great elements of hope. Unlike that of 1914, or that of 1939, the contemporary situation is dominated by tacit agreement on the folly of major war. A far greater effort is being made today than in previous eras of crisis to deal with the underlying sources of tension and to devise workable approaches to such goals as disarmament.

With time, patience, and increasing realization of mutuality of interests in survival and in the progress of the arts and sciences between East and West, there may come a gradual growth of an atmosphere in which problems which today seem insoluble will in fact yield to the application of creative international statesmanship. Soviet economic growth is a stimulating challenge to the West. It may also contain elements of promise. Prosperity, leisure, and the growth of skepticism may soften totalitarian fanaticism. In one perspective the Soviet type of totalitarianism may be viewed as a short cut to the modernization of a backward society. If the West can live through the difficult decades ahead, Soviet society may alter its temper as Communist fanaticism becomes more and more obviously anachronistic. There is also the possibility, now seemingly remote, of realignments among the "socialist" countries.

In the foreseeable future the preservation of peace will depend on the factors to which most of our present attention has necessarily been directed. It would, however, be folly to abandon hope for a peace founded upon a basis more positive than the arms race.

Factors Looking to Eastern World Leadership

By MOHAMMED ALI

ABSTRACT: Today Asians look for a synthesis between Western ways that have deeply influenced them and their own culture. They know that isolation is impossible and are conscious of the interdependence of peoples. Asians want partnership with the West based on trust. Owing to past misfortunes, Asians are still suspicious. The West has to convince Asians that the past is gone and that they wish to help the East. Until all countries are free, Asians will continue to be suspicious.

Against this is the ideological clash between democracy and totalitarianism which Asians by and large see more as a conflict between free enterprise and state-controlled economy. While their problems persist and Asians strive for a better life they become vulnerable to false materialism. Poverty erodes ideologies. Asians cannot understand why they should be poorly fed and clothed while others are better off. The challenge to the Free World is to give meaning to human dignity and freedom that are lacking under communism. No single outlook in Asia is apparent, yet two trends, regionalism and a wait-and-see policy, are noticeable. The basic need continues to be prompt development so that a better life can be available for all. Humanity is one—the question is not of leadership of Asia or of the West. Rather it is a theme of partnership and co-operation.

His Excellency Mohammed Ali, Washington, D. C., is Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States. He was appointed Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister of undivided Bengal in 1943; re-elected to the Provincial Legislature; and appointed Minister of Finance and Health in 1946. His Excellency acted as Prime Minister on several occasions. During his term he sponsored many social schemes including a medical college in Dacca and the first T. B. sanatorium in Nadia. He was elected to the Constituent Assembly on the establishment of Pakistan. Mr. Ali was appointed Ambassador to Burma, 1948; High Commissioner to Canada, 1949-52; Ambassador to the United States in 1952-53, and 1955 to the present. He was elected Prime Minister of Pakistan on April 1953. His Excellency has been awarded the Jubilee medal, Coronation medal, the Medal of Merit Khan Bahadur (title relinquished), and "Hilal-i-Pakistan" conferred on him by the President of Pakistan.

IN THIS modern Age of Science tremendous progress has been made both in means of communications and methods of travel. The end result of this is that the world has shrunk and peoples living far apart have become neighbors. It has also facilitated easier and greater flow of thoughts and ideas among the different peoples of the world.

RESURGENT ASIA'S ATTEMPT TO ADAPT TO MODERN TECHNIQUES

The peoples of resurgent Asia, freshly emancipated from colonial domination, are today trying to adapt themselves to modern techniques in the planning of a pattern of life which will enable them to rise to the level of the standard of living prevalent in the progressive countries of the West.

They are currently engaged in fashioning a mode of life which would be a synthesis of Western civilization, with all its progress and advancement in the technological field, and their own cultural heritages.

It was through no fault of the peoples of Asia that their life stagnated, while the peoples in the West took the fullest advantage of scientific progress in bettering their living conditions.

Asia was the cradle of man's civilizations. Historians agree that Central Asia was the region where mankind was first known to have flourished. It was there that man first harnessed the forces of nature for improved living conditions.

The Indus Valley in Pakistan was the site of one of the most ancient civilizations. Archaeological discoveries at Mohenjo Daro and now at Kot Diji reveal that 5000 years ago there dwelt in the area which is now Pakistan a people who had well-developed systems of sanitation, sewage disposal, and irrigation and who were proficient in various branches of arts and crafts.

It was also in Asia that the knowledge of Arts and Sciences, of Mathe-

matics and Astronomy, of Architecture and Medicine was first developed. And most important of all, it was in Asia that all the great religions of the world were revealed for the guidance of man. It was from Asia that vast hordes of people moved eastward to found the Chinese culture and westward to give rise to the civilizations of the Valleys of the Nile, the Euphrates, and Tigris. Man's migratory movement continued in gradual stages to Greece and Rome and then onward to the whole of Europe. Later, man's spirit of adventure led to the search for a new trade route to India and the consequential discovery of the New World.

The cultural heritage of Asia provided the basis for the founding of Western civilization. Thoughts and ideas born in the East led to the scientific advancement of Europe.

PERIOD OF DECLINE AND EXPLOITATION

History records the rise and fall of nations. So also of civilization; nevertheless, ideologies, cultures, and traditions remain rooted to the soil.

The question arises, why then with all their background of cultures and traditions and all their earlier scientific knowledge the peoples of Asia suffered a period of decline. There was no great upheaval of nature, no radical change in weather or climatic conditions. To what then can be attributed the failure on the part of the peoples of Asia to progress and keep ahead of the West?

It would be wrong to attribute this to the static nature of their ideological concepts and philosophies and unwillingness on their part to change for the better from what had been found to be adequate in the past. Were it so then how could they have progressed and advanced to such a degree until 1606, when half of Europe was held in fee by Asia and when most European countries were, by comparison with Asian stand-

ard, still steeped in darkness and ignorance?

The reason is not difficult to find. History provides the answer. It was man's thirst for power and lust, for riches which led to the subjugation of the peace-loving peoples of the East by imperialistic powers of Europe. Thus was born colonialism, and thus began the dark era of man's exploitation of man.

Almost all countries of Asia were subjugated and brought under iron heels of foreign dominations. All European powers, with the solitary exception of Germany, ruled over practically the whole of Asia.

Agricultural and other raw materials produced by the sweat and tears of the peoples of Asia went to feed the expanding industries of the European countries.

ERA OF COLONIALISM

The evil of colonialism even spread to the New World. The United States was fortunate because the ill effects of colonialism here were comparatively short-lived. But not so fortunate were the countries in South and Central America. Their struggles for independence continued for years as did ours in Asia.

It was tragic and ironic that goods processed and manufactured in Europe out of the raw materials of Asia were shipped back for sale in our Eastern markets. This was how an ever-widening gap developed between the living standards of the peoples of Asia and the peoples of Europe.

And to make it worse, this was not all. There sprang up a wide and unbridgeable social gulf between the Asian peoples and their rulers leading to widespread inhibitions and complexes among the local peoples. The chains that enslaved the peoples of Asia bit deep into their souls. The hopelessness of their lot, the feeling of frustration, and a sense of inertia kept them stagnant for

they had neither the means nor the power to free themselves from foreign bondage.

Another important factor contributing to the economic stagnation of the peoples of Asia was the utter neglect on the part of the ruling powers to provide educational facilities. The imperial countries of Europe could not risk providing modern education to the peoples lest it prepare them to wrest control of their own affairs from alien hands.

The question arises as to what this colonial system did to these countries of Asia. National economies became impoverished and unbalanced. The wealth that could have been utilized for nation building in Asia was siphoned off to provide for the progress and prosperity of Europe.

Was it therefore surprising that the peoples of Asia, who could boast with legitimate pride of the glory that was once theirs, remained backward while the march of progress went forward in Europe and the rest of the world?

It is fortunate that with the passage of time enlightenment began to manifest itself. The Imperial Powers began to concede in increasing measure the demands for industrial, educational, and economic advancement. Although in the initial stages such concessions and facilities were provided in microscopic doses, the upsurge of nationalism asserted itself and the people's demand for freedom could no longer be denied.

THE AWAKENING OF ASIA

It is fortunate that today most of these countries in Asia have emerged from the dark era of colonial domination and are now grappling with economic problems to the best of their ability with whatever resources they have at their command. Centuries of neglect cannot be remedied in a few years. The peoples of Asia will therefore need the help and assistance of the

progressive and developed nations of the world if God's bounty is to be made available to all His children.

In Asia people are also grappling with the problem of how to bring about a synthesis between the powerful impact of Western civilization and their own cultural heritages which would quicken the pulse of their life. In today's world the peoples of Asia cannot regard themselves as separate or distinct from the rest of the world. Their problems, their fortunes, and their destiny are inevitably bound up with those of the rest of the world.

The superiority of the West in political and economic power has produced in the minds of the peoples of Asia a sense of inferiority and sensitivity. The desire is uppermost to become partners with the West in making the life of man more rich and more meaningful. But this partnership must be based on mutual confidence, trust, and respect. Having suffered in the past at the hands of the peoples of the West, the peoples in Asia are still suspicious and distrustful of Western nations.

It is for the peoples in the West to convince the peoples in Asia that what is past is past, and that they are willing to co-operate and assist their less fortunate brothers in Asia in the solution of their economic and political problems so that they too can participate as equals in the comity of nations that forms the world of today.

Another fact hampering the feeling of Asia's homogeneity with the West is that even today some nations are still struggling for their emancipation and fighting for their freedom. So long as man is subordinate to man, the concept of a free and peaceful world will remain an illusion. Unless the valiant efforts of some nations in Asia and Africa against political domination and economic exploitation by Western countries meet with success, the peoples of Asia

are bound to be suspicious of the bonafides of the West.

CONFLICT OF IDEOLOGY: ITS IMPACT ON ASIA

To make matters more difficult there is today a conflict of ideologies which must influence the lives of the peoples of Asia. On the outcome of this conflict will depend whether democracy will survive or fall victim to the ruthless force of totalitarianism.

But the peoples of Asia, by and large, view it as a conflict not so much between two opposing political philosophies, but as one between free enterprise and state-controlled economy.

The Asian peoples have attained their political independence only to find that freedom from want and hunger is still an illusion. They expected to see radical changes in their standards of living when they themselves took control of the management of their own affairs. Frustrated, they are liable to fall prey to false prophets of materialistic doctrines.

It is futile to talk to hungry nations of economic theories or of the blessings of a democratic way of life. The urge to appease or satisfy pangs of hunger is perhaps the strongest and greatest motivating force in life, for this stems from the instinct of self-preservation. In Asia the peoples see no rhyme or reason as to why they should go hungry and be ill clad when God's bounties have been bestowed for all mankind.

Ideological and spiritual values, morality and ethics in the midst of abject poverty, pestilence, and disease have no significance.

The greatest challenge, therefore, to the Free World is to give significance and meaning to a sense of human dignity and human freedom which is non-existent in the Communistic world.

It is extremely important that the upsurge of nationalistic tendency in Asia

be disciplined to recognize the higher and more noble goal of mankind for a richer and fuller life in an atmosphere of freedom, equality, and economic security.

Vision without power may bring moral elevation, but it cannot supply sustenance and nourishment for man's basic needs. And power without vision and untempered by spiritual and human values becomes destructive and inhuman.

The approach in Asia's present conflict varies from country to country because there is no single cohesive outlook among the countries of Asia today. Each is animated and influenced by its own history, its cultural heritages, its customs and traditions, its ideology and perhaps its parochial interests. There is therefore basically a diversity of outlook, interest, and aims in national and international fields. Some Asian and African countries have come together for the preservation of certain ideological values and for the purpose of maintaining peace and security in their areas. There are other countries who follow a wait-and-see policy. These countries are confused and wish to take advantage of the help and assistance proffered by both sides, but the common denominator is the need for early economic development so that the vast and seething mass of humanity in these regions may have a better standard of life.

BANDUNG CONFERENCE AIMS

At the Bandung Conference, the Asian nations discussed the causes of tension between nations and the means whereby they could be removed and a lasting world peace be assured. They considered seven principles for this purpose, namely:

respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations;

recognition of the equality of every independent and sovereign nation; abstention from interference in the internal affairs of one country by another;

nonaggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country;

right of self-defense exercised singly or collectively;

right of self-determination of all peoples and abhorrence of colonial exploitation in any shape or form; and

settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, namely, negotiations, mediation or arbitration.

But in spite of the decisions of this conference countries of Asia and Africa have not been able to evolve any uniform policy either collectively or separately which would give them a common approach or a common outlook in their national affairs or in international relations or remove the differences that exist between some of them.

In Asia, as in the West, mental and social conflicts have brought about torments to the minds of man. No concept has been spelled out realistically which would give man the place as enunciated in Islam of being God's vice-regent on earth, as a spiritual being, understood in terms of social mechanism and possessing the rights and privileges and duties as a living factor in that mechanism.

The seven principles enunciated in Bandung by the Pakistan Representative could singly and collectively provide the basis for economic development and technical advancements of Asian and African countries and provide the means for harmonious co-operation among them toward this end. Only when the edifice of peace has been con-

structed on these seven pillars can man achieve that form of high material, spiritual, and cultural development that is his birth right.

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ORIENT AND OCCIDENT ARTIFICIAL

The distinctions between the Orient and the Occident, between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres, are today artificial. Geographical boundaries are no barriers to international goodwill and understanding—humanity is one.

This is an era of global politics and global economics. All the countries of the world have become interdependent. They can therefore work together and can influence one another by a synthesis of the spiritual values of Asia and the material values of the West.

All that any free system can do is to provide a rational institution and reinforce it with appropriate standards of conduct to achieve as close an approximation to its ideal as is feasible.

It is a mistake to envisage a future in which the West as a whole or any one country in the West and conversely Asia as a whole or any one country in Asia plays a dominant and central part in international relations. Such a future, to my mind, would be retrogressive and inimical to the interests and welfare of the smaller and weaker nations who have emerged or are emerging to the exhilaration of freedom and equality and would again reduce them to vassalage.

Certain standards of moral conduct in international dealings are absolutes if we are to develop enough harmony in international relations and be able to resolve conflicting claims more successfully than is otherwise possible. Virtue itself needs limits, for freedom and tranquility lie in self restraint. To demand all and to perceive through everything except one's own evasion of responsibility is to lose

all by excess. Self-restraint rests on the inherent right of a nation to choose whatever alliances and alignments it wants in the interest of its own integrity and human welfare in terms of fundamental spiritual values. The theory that by so doing it mortgages its judgment or curtails its freedom of action and impairs its moral sense is not valid because the supporters of the theory are those who, while claiming full freedom of action, often for parochial aims, for themselves object to the exercise of a similar right by other nations some of whom may be small and weak.

RIGHT TO THREE FREEDOMS

The question is not one of the leadership of Asia or the leadership of the West. It is today a question of partnership of the East and the West to work together collectively for the ushering in of an era which will ensure to all nations, small and large, powerful and weak, freedom from fears of physical aggression, ideological domination, or economic exploitation—a world where man will be enabled to rise to the fullest stature of his genius.

All nations of the world have the right to possess three fundamental freedoms: Freedom from fear of physical attack; freedom from fear of domination and economic exploitation; and freedom from forcible imposition of a way of life not their own.

Man's urge for God's plenty for himself and the generations to come free from the strains, stresses, and fears of an atmosphere charged with waves of hate and radioactive fallout cannot be denied. His salvation and the fulfillment of the promise made to him by God in His Benign Mercy and Benevolence rest on the cornerstone of co-operation and partnership of the peoples of the West and Asia in liberty, equality, dignity, and honor.

Factors Looking to Western World Leadership

By THOMAS K. FINLETTER

ABSTRACT: In the world of today, it is not a matter of whether the East or the West should lead. We all face one universal problem—how to live together in peace. The U. S. cannot act alone, and our most natural allies are the nations of the West. The world, however is bigger than the West, and the West cannot face the Communist empires alone. We need the friendship of the non-Communist nations of Africa and Asia. But, because of the nature of nuclear weapons, there cannot exist in the world two polarized ideological camps. A partnership between Asia and Africa and the West can work. Freedom will not survive in Africa and Asia unless they can achieve a decent standard of living. The U. S. should lead in acting as banker for the underdeveloped countries as the organizer of the surplus wealth of the non-Communist world. In the Near East there is a great opportunity for Asia and the West to work together. The alliance could bring pressure on the Arabs and the Russians to have the Arabs give up their state of war against Israel. The greatest achievement of the alliance would be to compel all nations to join in an attack against war itself. Disarmament will never take place if negotiations are left only to Russia and the U. S. We must bring Asia, Africa, and South America into the discussions. The problems of easing world tensions and controlling war weapons are interrelated. Leadership, then, is the responsibility of all nations working in concert to eliminate the possibility of a war of total destruction.—Ed.

Thomas K. Finletter, LL.D., New York City, is a partner in the law firm of Coudert Brothers. Mr. Finletter was Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 1941-44; Consultant to the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, May 1945; Chairman, President's Air Policy Commission, 1947-48; Minister in Charge of ECA Mission to the United Kingdom, 1948-49; and Secretary of the Air Force, 1950-53. He is the author of Can Representative Government Do the Job?; Power and Policy; and Foreign Policy: the Next Phase (soon to be published).

I HAVE grave doubts whether we should talk about Western world leadership or Eastern world leadership. The common problem we are all facing, whether in the Atlantic, in Africa, in non-Communist Asia, and indeed in the Communist countries themselves, is a single, universal problem, namely, how to live together on the same planet instead of destroying each other with the weapons of modern war now in our hands.

QUALITY OF U. S. INFLUENCE

Each country has to look at this problem from its own point of view. As an American I believe that our emphasis should be first on the United States itself. Our contribution to the great decision as to the way the world is to go will depend primarily on ourselves—not just on our military power or on our diplomatic skill, but on the essential nature of the American people and on the extent to which the best of this essential nature can be brought to bear on the problems with which we have to deal.

A river cannot rise above its source and the United States cannot exercise an influence greater than its own quality. It is for this reason that events such as Little Rock are so significant in our foreign relations. The importance of Little Rock is of course intrinsic in effect on the kind of society we want here within our own boundaries. But such happenings do have great effect abroad, all for the bad.

But since no one nation can act alone in the world the way it is today, since isolation is no longer a sensible possibility, the United States must work with other nations and most immediately and primarily with those nations which are its natural allies, those of its own society. The countries of Europe and of this hemisphere have a long common

history which dates back to Greco-Judean sources as consolidated and expanded by Rome into a great society which we now call that of the West. It embraces not only Europe but the whole Western Hemisphere.

So it is natural and right that this Grand Alliance of the West should constitute the most immediate ring of friends and allies with whom we must face the problems of the world.

A PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE NON-COMMUNIST EAST

But the world is considerably bigger than Western society. The polarized struggle between communism and non-communism is such that it is impossible that the West face the two great Communist empires alone, without the closest kind of partnership for the common good of the great non-Communist countries of Asia and of Africa. Indeed I think, as we look at many of the strategic events of the last ten years or so, we will find that much of the reason for our disappointments and setbacks is to be found in the fact that Western society and the peoples of Africa and Asia have not been working in concert.

So my view on this question whether leadership should come from the non-Communist West or the non-Communist East, is that it should come from both, and that the competition between us should be a competition not in antagonism but in a race for who can best serve the cause of noncommunism everywhere to achieve a world we will want to live in.

Indeed, I believe that our interests must go beyond these three areas, ourselves, Western society, and our non-Communist friends of Asia and Africa. If we were speaking at a time before the hydrogen bomb we might look with some equanimity at a world divided between two hostile powers. For this is

the way the world has been ever since man first created the state. But with the weapons of today this is no longer possible and our ultimate purpose must be to achieve some kind of understanding between the two polarized parts of the world which will enable them to live together on the same planet. Therefore, the objective of all of this must be unity in the West and unity in the non-Communist world of both East and West, all to the end of achieving a *modus vivendi* with the two great Communist empires.

WEST'S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA AND ASIA

The weakest point in all of this at the moment is the relationship between Asia and Africa on the one hand and Western society on the other.

Not that we are doing as well as we should by any means in the maintaining of our own internal strength and in the cohesion of our Western society. In both we have fallen far short of the mark and have often acted as if the safety of our country were not at stake. At home, as I say, matters such as Little Rock have unnecessarily weakened our internal position. Also, we have allowed our defenses to lag and thus have made it more likely that the Communists may be willing to take a chance on making war. And the Grand Alliance of the West is in much worse shape than it was some years ago. It may have recovered to some extent from the days when, at the time of the Suez crisis, it almost fell apart in utter confusion. But it is nowhere near the level where it must be if our hopes for a decent world are to be realized.

But the great soft spot in the arrangements of the non-Communist world is in the relationship between the peoples of the anticolonial revolution of Asia and of Africa with us and other members of Western society.

It is discouraging, it is indeed shocking, the extent to which we and Asia have failed to work together. The peoples of Asia are in close contact with the Communist regimes; they know what they are. How extraordinary, under these circumstances, that there should be any trend toward neutralism among them! How distressing that they should have doubts as to which side they favor! Is the cause of the West as weak as all that?

I do not think so. I believe deeply that our cause is right in the present world conflict. But I must concede at the same time that we often put our wrong foot forward, that we give a false impression of what we are and what we want.

Granted that in the days that are past the West exploited Africa and Asia in the sense of dominating them by the supremacy of Western arms, and that for long stretches of history the men and women of Asia and of Africa did not and indeed in some cases still do not enjoy the indispensable privilege of governing themselves.

But this is of the past and in any case, if we may fittingly say so, our country never shared in the colonial scramble to the extent the other Western powers did. Perhaps we deserve little credit for this because we were so busy with our own vast continent. But the fact remains that the United States never joined in the partitioning of China or in the general colonial scramble in Asia and Africa and that we have an excellent record in Cuba, the Philippines, and other areas which we could have seized had we been so minded after the Spanish American War.

Unfortunately we have to some extent confused this record by our recent policies in Asia, and this is mainly what I mean when I say we have been putting forward the wrong foot. We have, especially in the Formosa area, in the

Vietnam, in Indochina, and to a large extent in the Near East, given the impression of having newly adopted a colonial attitude which all our previous history had rejected. And this I suspect is the main reason for our present failure to achieve an understanding and a partnership with the peoples of Asia.

In any case, whatever may be the past or indeed the present situation, the time is now here to change all this and to get back to the ways which are natural to us.

One of these ways would be for the United States to go in for policies in which we believe and in which the people of the anticolonial revolution also believe, rather than as at present carrying on policies in Asia which are not natural to us and are hateful and offensive to the peoples of Asia. And there are matters and there are policies on which we and Asia agree, policies which we both have subscribed to in the United Nations Charter; policies looking towards self-government, the independence of all peoples, the right to earn a decent standard of living, the right of individual dignity, and the right to peace. Instead of concentrating on these matters, on which we and Asia agree, we have followed the militaristic line in all of Asia and the Near East, making military treaties and talking in terms of military threats such as massive retaliation and the like—an attitude which offends Asia and separates us rather than brings us together.

AREAS OF INFLUENCE FOR A WEST- EAST PARTNERSHIP

Let me now consider some specific instances as to how this policy of partnership between Asia and Africa on the one hand and Western society on the other might work.

Obviously, such a partnership cannot do much about the troubles the West is

having about the future of Germany; although as I shall point out in a minute, even there the influence of Asia is not entirely to be dismissed.

One obvious thing which ought to be done to build up this partnership is for the Western countries with available surplus capital to work with other countries possessing such capital to help finance the anticolonial revolution.

This revolution is now entering a critical phase. All was well in the first days when the work of winning that independence was going on. The excitement and joy at becoming masters of their fate was enough to buoy up the peoples who had achieved their freedom. But then came for many a sad and troublesome time when the harsh facts of economic life began to press in, when the problem of maintaining free institutions of government in an economy which often reached a starvation level forced itself upon these newly free people.

I think we can be certain that freedom will not survive anywhere in the anticolonial area unless there is a decent standard of living. When we read of parts of Asia where the total available income of an individual is the equivalent of \$50 or even \$25 a year, we can be sure that freedom is going to disappear and communism is going to come in.

And so, the first specific I suggest is that the United States take the leadership in acting as banker for the underdeveloped countries of the world—not we alone but as the organizer of the surplus wealth of the non-Communist world.

Then another specific lies in the Near East. Here is a great opportunity for Asia and the West to work together. In fact, unless they do work together I see nothing but trouble ahead, continued Russian successes, and perhaps even war.

The basic trouble in the Near East is that when France and then Great Britain pulled out of the area they left a vacuum of power. It had been hoped that when the colonial era came to an end in the Near East the indigenous governments, supported by the prestige and power of the United Nations and buttressed by the French-British-American Tripartite Declaration of 1950, would keep the peace and safeguard the independence of the local peoples.

Unfortunately they were not able to do this. The hostility of the Arabs toward Israel made it impossible, and the Russians moved into the troubled area using the Egyptians and Syrians as pawns. The key move was when the Russians made their arms-for-cotton deal with Egypt and poured in all sorts of modern military equipment to the Egyptians and Syrians with which to attack Israel.

You all know the tragic events that followed, the failure of the Western countries and particularly the United States to stop preparations for war at the outset and the resulting chaos which found the United States voting in the United Nations with Soviet Russia against their old allies, Great Britain and France.

Out of this confused and troubled scene only one fact is clear, and that is that as long as the Arabs insist, as they are now doing, on maintaining a state of war against Israel, there will be no peace in the area—misery and poverty will continue to thrive, and Russian power will continue to grow.

There is a plain need here for moral force brought to bear both on the Arab states and the Russians to have the Arabs give up their state of war against Israel and to have the Russians stop stirring up hatred and conflict.

What an opportunity this is for the West and Asia, acting in partnership in

the cause of peace, to move in and to insist that the state of war be brought to an end and that the countries of the Near East live together without striking off these sparks which threaten to start the dreadful chain of expanding war.

WORLD ATTACK AGAINST WAR

The greatest victory which might come from a partnership between Asia and the Western countries would be if they were to combine to compel everyone—themselves and the two Communist empires and everyone else—to join in an attack on war itself.

I know that it is trite to say it, but it must nevertheless be kept in the foreground of the minds of every responsible person that war has now become inconsistent with the survival of civilization—by which we mean, in more brutal terms, that all the countries of the world will be destroyed, winners, losers, and neutrals, if a hydrogen war ever gets started.

And so, for the first time in the long history of mankind we now face the choice of destroying the institution of war itself or being ourselves destroyed.

So far there have been some devoted efforts to attack this problem through agreement on disarmament. These efforts have been unsuccessful. One vital factor has been lacking.

This is that as a practical matter the two great polarized powers, the Russians and the United States, will have the most enormous difficulty of ever agreeing between themselves to control the weapons of war. They are always negotiating within the framework of the fact that they may need their weapons because war may indeed come.

Therefore the world will not achieve agreement on disarmament if it leaves the negotiations to the great rival

camps. We must bring the representatives of the great other areas of the world, of Asia, Africa, and South America, into the discussion. This is a world problem, and the whole world must take part in solving it if we are to do anything except engage in futile negotiations savoring more of propaganda warfare than of a desire for peace.

Making disarmament possible

In fact, the problem is even wider than that. We will not get peace by attacking the disarmament problem in a vacuum. Indeed, any effort to seek peace exclusively by working to control the weapons of war is doomed to failure. We cannot hope for any agreement on disarmament unless we can first reduce the hatreds and tensions between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds to a level which will make agreement on the control of weapons possible.

We need, indeed, if we are to be serious about this business of peace, a grand design for an attack on all fronts on the institution of war, a design in which the Western countries working in partnership with Asia and Africa will seek to get into agreement with the Communist Russians and Chinese on how to handle all the trouble spots in the world—not only the immediately pressing and dangerous places such as the Near East, but every place where communism and noncommunism are in latent or actual conflict all over the globe.

I do not mean by this that we must seek only to make the political and the economic settlements which are necessary to create an atmosphere out of which peace may grow. We also must, of course, strike at the greatest troublemaker of all: armaments, the arms race. But we must do this as a part of a for-

eign policy initiated and led by us in which we will try to marshal all of the world opinion to the great cause of not destroying ourselves in hydrogen war.

All of this may seem—to use the word which is often used against man when he is trying to save himself from the idiocy of self-destruction—utopian. How silly it is, we are told, to say that man must aim to eliminate war from the earth. What kind of impractical nonsense is this? Is not politics the art of compromise and statesmanship the practise of the possible?

Well, unless politics and statesmanship stop fooling around and compromising with these modern weapons, and unless statesmanship begins working for the impossible, both will find themselves presiding at the destruction of the people they are supposed to serve.

It is time we recognized the all-pervading fact of today's struggle between communism and noncommunism. This is that progress toward coexistence, toward agreement between Communists and non-Communists on eliminating the danger spots in the world which may bring about a war to the death, will be made only to the extent that progress is made toward disarmament.

The problem is indeed a circle: no progress towards peace unless we control the weapons of war; no progress on controlling the weapons of war except as we reduce the tensions and potential causes of conflict between the Communist and non-Communist worlds; and no hope of reducing these tensions unless progress is made at the same time on the problem of disarmament.

All this is certainly complicated. But it is not impossible. All we are doing in stating this complexity is to recognize that the discovery of atomic fission and fusion for the purposes of war requires that mankind for the first time in his history give up war. And that is a

complicated task. The only hope that man may be able to accomplish it is that, as even the most ignorant of us must know, man must solve this problem or he and all that he has built will not last long upon this earth.

DISENGAGEMENT IN EUROPE

Let me illustrate one of these points by a live problem, namely that of German unification and of the current battle over the issue of disengagement.

I think, if you will look at the German situation and the plight of the enslaved satellites of Russia, you will see a clear example of the way this circle works. It makes particularly clear the proposition that progress on the substantive causes of tensions and hatreds will not be made except to the extent that progress is made towards agreement on disarmament and peace.

What does all this talk about disengagement in Europe really mean? It means, I think, two things: one, that it is intolerable that we should accept the state of affairs in Eastern Europe whereby the Russians occupy and deny freedom to East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and all the other enslaved peoples. This is a shocking enslavement of people by violence and as long as it goes on self-respecting countries will never rest quietly. Not until this monstrosity is eliminated will there be peace or indeed hope for coexistence between the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

And yet, on the other hand, it is becoming more evident every day that we are not going to achieve the freeing of these peoples; we are not going to get for them the right of self-government until progress is made between Russia and the West on the cause of peace. It is impossible to hope that the Russians will be willing to give these men and women their freedom as long as the

arms race goes on and the tensions and hatreds continue at the level at which they are now between Communists and non-Communists.

It is interesting that recently both parties in Germany have stated this view. A speech by Mr. Fritz Erler, the Vice President of the Social Democratic Parliamentary party, just a month or so ago stated that any hopes for the freeing of the occupied areas of Central and Eastern Europe will work only when the powers agree to disarm, for so long as the armaments race continues, the two sides will remain firmly entrenched on German (and, I would add, other satellite) soil. And precisely the same principle has been announced by Chancellor Adenauer.

The German parties have, I believe, caught the point which so many of those who have been talking about disengagement have failed to seize. So far this debate has missed the main point. On the one hand those who insist that there is nothing at all to the idea of disengaging the rival forces in Central and East Germany are condemning the world to an unceasing struggle and towards preparations for what must surely be an inevitable war. Those who are urging disengagement, with no progress being made on the basic problems of disarmament and peace, are urging a kind of pacifism which is completely unrealistic in the world today. The German parties who are suffering under the problem have seen the issue clearly. They have recognized the circle which requires progress on disarmament and peace to be achieved interdependently with progress on the tensions which create the need for these armaments.

LEADERSHIP, A WORLD RESPONSIBILITY

So we reach an interesting conclusion. It is that there is no one line of policy which will achieve what we want,

which is to survive. And there is not any one area of the world that can take the leadership toward getting it. What we are saying, I think, is that all the leading parts of the world must take leadership and that we had better begin at home; that we in the Western world should accept our responsibility for leadership; that Asia and Africa should also accept theirs; and that we should

pool the two in the hope that some similar leadership can either exist or be induced on the part of the great Communist empires.

Leadership, in short, is not the responsibility or property of any one area in the world. And, unless we have it from all the peoples and governments of the world there may well be nothing left to lead.

Book Department

	PAGE
ASIA AND THE ARAB WORLD	146
POLITICAL THEORY	155
AMERICAN HISTORY	160
EUROPEAN HISTORY	166
ECONOMICS AND LABOR	178
SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY	197
OTHER BOOKS	207

ASIA AND THE ARAB WORLD

R. G. H. SIU. *The Tao of Science: An Essay on Western Knowledge and Eastern Wisdom*. Pp. xvi, 180. New York: Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall, 1957. \$4.25.

This is a remarkably good essay on the nature and limitations of Western science, on the wisdom of Eastern "no-knowledge," and on the advisability of their mutual supplementation in organized research. The Chinese background of the author accounts for his intimate knowledge of Oriental wisdom, particularly of the Taoist, Hindu, and Buddhist intuitive cognition and true knowledge ("no-knowledge"). Being an eminent biochemist and director of organized research in United States governmental and private institutions, he knows excellently the nature of Western science, its basic principles, and its strong and weak points. In addition to this understanding of Eastern wisdom and Western science, he displays a solid knowledge of the East-West philosophies, cultures, and "the ways of life," not to mention his graceful style, which is precise and poetic at the same time. This exceptionally broad mental and sociocultural background of the author enables him to outline clearly the unified theory of knowledge in which Western and Eastern methods of cognition are synthesized into one integral method more adequate than that of either Western science or Eastern "no-knowledge." This integral

method "is the artful way in which [empirical and] rational knowledge, intuitive knowledge, and no-knowledge are mastered, handled, integrated, and applied."

This unified method of cognition and knowledge is very congenial to what I call "the integral method" (outlined in some detail in my own works).

From this unified standpoint, Dr. Siu pointedly analyzes the uncertainties and limitations of the basic principles of Western scientific knowledge: causality, probability, isolation or interconnectedness of events in the universe, space, time, logical laws, semantic ambiguities, and so on.

To sum up: *The Tao of Science* is a brilliant essay on the nature of knowledge and methods of cognition and research. The book is highly recommended to all interested in these problems and especially to the researchers in the sociocultural sciences.

PITIRIM A. SOROKIN

Director, Harvard Research Center
in Creative Altruism
Cambridge, Mass.

DERK BODDE. *China's Cultural Tradition: What and Whither?* Pp. vi, 90. New York: Rinehart & Company, 1957. \$1.25.

This little book is the best introduction I know to Chinese civilization. Any scholar who tries to encompass the whole Chinese way of life in eighty-five pages has almost an insurmountable problem. Yet Professor Bodde has succeeded in writing a work which helps the general reader to acquire a truly comprehensive picture of China.

The book is divided into six parts: It

begins with a discussion of China's tradition and language. This part is followed by three others on Chinese religion, the Chinese attitude toward nature, and the Chinese social system. Then comes a part on the Chinese idea of the individual and Chinese mechanisms and patterns of social mobility. The last part provides the reader with a summary of findings, a comparison with the West, and a slight projection into the future.

The author tries in every way to be balanced in his presentation. For example, when he deals with the problem of the evaluation of Chinese civilization, he does not only quote the bitter accounts of Arthur H. Smith and S. Wells Williams but also the wondrous descriptions of Marco Polo, Bishop Andrew, and Galeote Pereira. In his discussion of Chinese language and scientific thought, he ranges the opposing opinions of Forrest and Dubs, on the one hand, and Granet and I. A. Richards, on the other. The best discussions in the book are to be found on the subject of social mobility. This the author attacks by first surveying the Chinese ideas behind it; he then proceeds to a consideration of the examination system, the extent to which the gentry was recruited from below, and the possibility on the part of the peasants for upward movement. In his discussion of this, Professor Bodde critically scrutinizes the findings of a number of scholars including Chang, Wittfogel, Kracke, Eberhard, and Lee.

In the concluding section of the booklet, Bodde points out a fact which is scientifically of the greatest significance, but one which many observers and students of recent developments in China have either neglected or been ignorant of. This is the point that social change, by evolution or revolution, must always be built on the indigenous cultural and psychological forces of the society undergoing this change, even though the impetus for such a change comes from foreign pressure. Russian communism can no more impose something completely alien on China than can Euro-American capitalism.

If the reviewer has one critical opinion of the book, it is perhaps that Bodde has incorporated too many quotations in it and

consequently left relatively little room for his own excellent writing. Perhaps the many demands on the author's time and energy have caused him to be less generous with his reader, here, than he has been with readers of his other books.

But regardless of this criticism, the booklet is a "must" for all who are too busy to read long books but who hope to get a comprehensive over-all view of Chinese tradition in order to be intelligent about Chinese affairs.

FRANCIS L. K. HSU

Chairman, Department of Anthropology
Northwestern University

TIEN-FONG CHENG. *A History of Sino-Russian Relations*. Pp. viii, 389. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957. \$6.00.

This work by the former Minister of Education of the Nationalist government of China is the most complete, up-to-date, and in many ways perhaps the best available full-scale account of Russo-Chinese relations. It is, nevertheless, despite the author's effort to write "as a historian and not as a member of the Kuomintang," not a very objective book, and it is marred by a number of errors which should have been eliminated by careful proofreading. The lack of objectivity is not confined to the "interpretation of historical events," where "every historian is entitled to his views," but is evident in the selection of material presented; nor does this reviewer believe that he becomes a "Communist, fellow-traveler [or] left-wing writer" (see Preface) because he is critical of basic interpretations put forward by Mr. Cheng.

One is not critical of Mr. Cheng's view that no effective working arrangement between the Nationalists and the Communists was possible because of Communist perfidy, and that it was, therefore, a mistake on the part of the United States to try to promote a coalition government in 1946-49. One is, however, bothered by the almost complete inability of the author to bring out the deficiencies of the Nationalist program and leadership which were fundamental to the tragedy which has befallen China. Instead, he leans to the view that if the United States had only stuck loyally to the Nationalists and given them a minimum of

moral and material help between 1946 and 1949, the rise of the Communist tide could have been stemmed, and he adopts too much the McCarthyite position that the failure of the United States to save the Nationalists was the result of machinations and misinterpretations imposed on the United States public by left-wing writers and on high officials by fellow-travelers in the State Department and other governmental agencies. Plenty of mistakes were made by the United States, but it was no mistake to conclude that the Nationalist program and leadership as of 1946-49 were incapable of turning back the Communist movement. Disillusionment with the Nationalists was almost universal among the many Americans who were in a position to observe what went on in China between 1944 and 1949, and very few of these observers were pro-Communist in their predilections. The author is correct in his belief that the Japanese invasion was fundamental to the rise of Communist power, but he fails to bring out the point that, even here, Communist success was facilitated by mistakes in Nationalist policy and strategy. Chiang was always right in his estimate of Communist intentions and also almost always wrong in his judgment of how best to deal with the Communist challenge.

Factual errors which should be noted are as follows: There was no Russian embassy to China in 1567 (p. 21); this myth was disposed of by Baddeley (II, p. 69), whom Cheng used as a source. The year 1863 (p. 32, 5 lines from bottom) should be 1853; 1896 (p. 53, line 27) should be 1884; Yamagata (p. 89, line 16) should be Yamamoto; 1949 (p. 167, line 7) should presumably be 1939; and Indochina (p. 324, line 33) should be Indonesia.

EARL H. PRITCHARD

Associate Professor of
Far Eastern History
University of Chicago

WILLIAM H. VATCHER, JR. *Panmunjom*. Pp. ix, 322. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. \$4.75.

Professor Vatcher, who "served as Psychological Warfare Adviser to the Senior United Nations Delegate throughout the

Korean armistices conference," had access to the official records in order to supplement his firsthand observations of the conference. Consequently, he "was in an excellent position to write an authoritative account"—Foreword by Admiral Joy—of the conference. He has attached to his detailed treatment of the sessions, first held at Kaesong and then transferred to Panmunjom, six Appendices, including a "Chronology of the Military Armistice Conference," a "Statistical Summary," and the texts of agreements reached.

His account makes it clear that the Communists entered upon negotiations with purposes to be served other than the one of reaching quickly a satisfactory agreement on the terms of a military armistice. The final chapter, "In Retrospect," contains the author's conclusions concerning the mistakes made at the truce talks by the United Nations Command and a summary of the techniques employed by the Communists, including the vulnerabilities which they exposed. As for the former: "Perhaps the most conspicuous UNC mistake was to assume at the outset . . . that negotiations meant to the Communists what it meant to the UNC: to sincerely and frankly discuss the issues with a view to reaching an equitable and quick ending of the war" (pp. 205-6). This he characterizes as naïveté, which was "first demonstrated by the acceptance of Kaesong as the site for the talks."

The author concludes also that a mistake was made in constituting the UNC delegation. "Had the United Nations Command delegation included representation of the other states fighting aggression in Korea rather than just the United States, it would have supplied greater meaning to the term 'United Nations,' and at the same time would have acquainted other countries with the vexations of negotiating with the Communists. It is true that the Republic of Korea was represented, but it was seldom consulted. Its representatives were merely tolerated" (p. 206). This, in spite of the fact, as the author points out, that at the time of the armistice Republic of Korea troops manned two-thirds of the front line. If the author had undertaken an analytical study of the negotiations

rather than a day-to-day description and exposition of the positions taken by the two sides, he might well have put emphasis throughout on the effects of this situation on the negotiations instead of confining the issue to a summary paragraph of criticism. The reviewer would give even greater meaning to the criticism than the author does. The public representation of the UNC could advantageously have been Korean, with the United States in a supporting role, as long, at least, as the principal spokesman for the other side was the North Korean delegate. While this would have created difficulties of relationships between the United States and the Korean government, it would have avoided the appearance of weakness resulting from one of the two major powers equating itself in the negotiations with a small and unrecognized regime engaged in aggression.

It should be noted, in conclusion, that the author has written a sufficiently detailed account of the negotiations to meet the needs of the student. The strict confinement of the narrative to Kaesong and Panmunjom, however, prevented him from placing the negotiations in the broad political framework within which they necessarily had to be conducted. There are hints of the political complexities involved, but they are only there as hints. This, however, does not detract from the value of the volume when viewed within the limits to which the author has confined himself.

HAROLD VINACKE

Professor of Political Science
University of Cincinnati

YALE CANDEE MAXON. *Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study of Civil-Military Rivalry, 1930-1945*. (University of California Publications in Political Science, Vol. V.) Pp. vi, 286. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1957. \$5.00.

In these days of "political colonels"—consider, for example, Indonesia, Egypt, and Latin America—the world has become all too aware that an army is no simple servant of the civil state. It often has an independent ideology of its own which it may, in disjointed times and through its

power and disciplined organization, try to impose on the nation. Mr. Maxon's detailed case study of the Japanese experience, therefore, holds a particular interest for us at this time.

In Japan, the problem arose in the first instance from a fundamental ambiguity in the 1889 Meiji Constitution; it was never made clear who had ultimate power over the military. Because of its right of "direct access" to the Emperor and the power to appoint the Ministers of War and of the Navy, without whom a Cabinet could not be formed, the army was able to dispute civil dominance. On so fertile a ground of uncertainty, as Maxon shows in such meticulous detail, a variety of other forces came into play: a deep-lying disposition of the Japanese people to "cushion individual responsibility . . . with the anonymity of group decisions," to quote Robert Scalapino; the strategic and political requirements of the moment; and the tragic weakness and hesitation of the civil leadership. This division of authority was not confined only to the relations of the civil and the military. The military itself was shot through with rivalries, often irreconcilable. The army and the navy could never work well in harness. The army, originally a preserve of the Choshu clan, eventually became more plebeian in its leadership—closer, that is, to the peasantry—and, through its German-trained officers, became friendly to the Axis powers and the Axis ideology. The navy, with the imprint of the Satsuma clan, with its British traditions, and with its closer relations to the business world, was more liberal and friendly to the West. Nor was the army itself as unified a command structure as the tables of organization would suggest. The command and power relations of the Chief of the General Staff, the Minister of War, and the Inspector-General of Military Training were not always clear. In addition, under stress of strategic considerations, field units often had a high degree of independence as opposed to headquarters, so that field-grade officers frequently made policy, while generals saved face as best they could. That the policy of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and China was pushed through in spite of the

opposition, or at least the hesitation, of the Foreign Office, the Cabinet, and even of higher military headquarters, is by now well known.

The record is also interesting because of its bearing on the standard Marxist thesis that fascism is the "last stage of capitalism." Fascism, insofar as the term has applicability to Japan, was an ideology of the military *against* the representatives of capitalism. In all the military coups against the civilian authority, it was the symbols of the liberal-capitalist order, as Maxon points out, which were the prime targets: political party headquarters, banks, police, and all representatives of the capitalists. The fascism of the army was typically against capitalism, romantically for the farmer, and for strong state controls.

These few observations barely suggest the remarkable richness of Mr. Maxon's material. However, some criticism cannot be avoided, precisely because of the excellence of the book as a whole: The index is incredibly poor for such an important book. The narrative line occasionally seems to get out of control—this reviewer was never able to make out clearly the political point of view of Ishihara Kanji. Some quite mistaken parallels are drawn between the Japanese concept of the priority of strategic requirements and the views of Generals MacArthur and Willoughby. And there is perhaps too much reliance on the materials of the International Military Tribunal. These latter, however, have so far proved—and give every promise of continuing to prove—an endless treasure-trove for the political scientist, and Mr. Maxon has combed them well.

HERBERT PASSIN

Research Associate
Department of Sociology
and Anthropology
Ohio State University

ANTHONY F. ZIMMERMAN. *"Overpopulation": A Study of Papal Teachings on the Problem, With Special Reference to Japan.* (The Catholic University of America Studies in Sacred Theology, Second Series, No. 99.) Pp. xv, 328. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1957. \$4.00.

For those who are interested in papal and church edicts, this book will have some interest. For the social scientist, it can do no more than illustrate the fantastic logic of those people who, having accepted a conclusion, warp the facts into their doctrinal pattern. Zimmerman acknowledges the fact of Japan's overpopulation, the inadequacy of her resources, and other obvious demographic pressures. But he then goes on to argue that higher spiritual value must not be sacrificed to materialistic hopes.

A man cannot be criticized for holding such values, impractical as they may seem to others. But he then declares that "birth control offers only dubious prospects; for a mere restriction of births cannot increase Japan's national production, nor its national resources, nor its foreign trade" (p. 283). He ignores the fact that even if it did none of these, production and resources would be more adequate than if divided among larger numbers produced by a high birth rate.

The book is not worth the time of anyone interested in an objective consideration of demographic factors and their social implications, for, as the author affirms: "Pope Pius XII has restated the teaching that all unnatural birth control, contraception, abortion, and sterilization are against the universal moral law" (p. 284). Zimmerman goes him one better in stating his belief that the rhythm method is also morally wrong when used as a means of reducing a national population.

PAUL H. LANDIS

Professor of Sociology
State College of Washington

KENNETH BALLHATCHET. *Social Policy and Social Change in Western India, 1817-1830.* Pp. vii, 335. London: Oxford University Press, 1957. 45s net.

Even a casual reading of the historiography of modern India will demonstrate the existence of numerous gaps. Some of the gaps are in respect to topical coverage, while others are gaps in the chronological account. Looked at either way, the first half of the nineteenth century is conspicuous for the lack of attention it has received.

The period between Plassey and the Permanent Settlement has had its historians, work piles up on Wellesley's career and policies, and a rich feast is now beginning to appear on the Mutiny. But what of the period between 1817 and 1857? This gap is the more regrettable because a number of things began to happen during those years which may, at the least, be viewed as significant prefigurations of things to come. Put in its simplest terms, the period about which we know least is the one in which European influences on Indian society began to have important effects.

After 1813, John Company's control over who might voyage to India was considerably relaxed. After 1814, European and American missionaries began to descend upon India in increasing numbers. More important, government visibly altered its attitude toward these missionary efforts, exhibiting an increasing willingness to facilitate them. A few years later, the famous Minute on Education appeared, setting the seal of official approval on an educational system for India which would, in effect, replicate the English model.

Policy in India increasingly reflected the fact that this was an era in English life in which reforming ideas were at large. These ideas got into the Colonial Office even before James Stephen became the permanent undersecretary. These ideas influenced the thinking of important personages in the India Office and were carried to India. Under multiple influences, humanitarian and reforming ideas were now to be tried in the Indian dependency. Social policy, not mere administrative expediency, was to be a concern of government—or so a number of influential persons said.

To date we have not had at hand the monographic assessment of the conflicting views, pressures, and events of the period upon which to base a judicious evaluation of what was implied for the structure of Indian society. In his excellent monograph, Professor Ballhatchet has begun the necessary work.

The volume under review is to be praised not only for its most competent scholarship, and for its demonstration of the rich resources lying at hand for use by the informed social historian, but also because of

the skill and judgment with which its author has marshaled the facts and weighed their import. Here is a conscious and sophisticated effort to assess the *elements* of policy as well as the *effects* of policy in influencing certain kinds of social change. It is to be hoped that Professor Ballhatchet will carry the story forward after 1830.

If the volume is to be criticized, such criticism would have to rest on the fact that the author tends, at times, to burden his account with overmuch detail. Where analysis might have been desirable, additional factual information has been provided. But this can hardly be a serious criticism of the study, precisely because the period on which Professor Ballhatchet writes has been so poorly mined in the past. Because of the paucity, outside of the archives, of solid factual materials on the subject of his enquiry, he could hardly undertake a more theoretical account until the data had been brought out.

In this monograph Professor Ballhatchet breaks new ground for the writing of modern Indian history by his concentration on social history and by his refreshing lack of concern for justification or vilification. Even more, he is filling in important gaps in our understanding of major aspects of modern Indian history and thus helping us to get on with the creation of a rounded understanding of the subject.

ROBERT I. CRANE

Assistant Professor of History
University of Michigan

RAPHAEL PATAI. *The Kingdom of Jordan.* Pp. ix, 315. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. \$5.00.

The Kingdom of Jordan, placed near the center of the Arab world, is a microcosm reflecting the structure, culture, history, and problems of Arab society in general. Its natural historic setting has been that of part of the Arab world—not that of an independent unit. But after World War I, torn out of its normal environment by the interests of outside powers, it was dressed up in the pageantry of sovereignty, though it never had the reality. Then, in 1948, because of the destruction of the Palestinian community, Jordan inherited the least viable part of the territory with the

largest segment of a bitter and impoverished refugee population. A Minister of the Jordanian state was asked, in 1952, what the future of Jordan was. He replied: "It has no future. It should never have had a past."

It is ironical that in the year that Jordan federated with Iraq in the new United Arab State, and thus ended its separate existence, two of the best books yet published in English appeared. General John Bagot Glubb, as a soldier, published his memoirs which dealt especially with the turbulent years 1950-55. He is a partisan, and this is a personal story of eventual failure and frustration. Dr. Patai writes as a sociologist, and much of the material regarding religion, family and tribal life, agricultural villages, values and social practices goes far beyond Jordan into the Arab world as a whole. Thus the book is partially a sociological study of the Arabs, using Jordan as a case study.

Dr. Patai had access to the voluminous material in the Human Relations Area Files, and he also presents comprehensive and detailed studies on such subjects as finance, commerce, industry, health, and the arts. These will prove useful for reference purposes. The author has done a thorough and commendable job in compiling them.

The first chapters on political development may prove disappointing. While the narrative includes most of the important dates, the "why" of events is often missing. Since Jordan was never able to live without a subsidy, why establish it? There did not exist—and never developed—a Jordanian "nationalism." There is no clue as to why the population, after 1948, became so anti-British, anti-American, and seemingly even anti-Jordanian and appeared anxious to join either Egypt or Syria or both. In reference to the Israeli-Jordanian border incident, Dr. Patai states: "There were more Israeli than Jordanian victims" (p. 57). This does not agree with United Nations scores nor with the statements in Elmo Hutchinson's *Violent Truce*.

In late 1957, the United States rushed in with financial aid to support the monarchy. If Americans wish to know about the institutions they are aiding, Dr. Patai's

book is the best description available. Yet somehow the story lacks life. Jordan is caught in the vortex of violent events. It could not survive alone. Yet Dr. Patai's book reads more like an anatomical chart. There is little to indicate the fury of the forces in the gathering storm which may soon profoundly affect not only the fate of Jordan but the whole Middle East, and thereby influence the great powers as well.

EDWIN M. WRIGHT

Lecturer
School of Advanced International
Studies
Johns Hopkins University

D. VAN DER MEULEN. *The Wells of Ibn Sa'ud*. Pp. ix, 270. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$5.50.

The Wells of Ibn Sa'ud is one of those unusual books which is of interest to laymen and of significance to specialists as well. The author's style makes the readers feel they have been his companions in Arabia. His descriptions are so vivid that sights, sounds, and smells are shared with his readers.

D. van der Meulen writes of Jidda as he first saw it in 1926: "It seems to be crumbling into ruins and overhung by a penetrating odour. This smell peculiar to Jeddah, arose chiefly from sewage which was allowed to seep through the walls of the houses." In describing Riyadh he contrasts the living quarters of the Negro servants of Crown Prince Sa'ud, now King Saud, with those of the Arab nomads encamped on the outskirts of the Saudi capital. Of the servants' quarters he writes that due to American installations there were "no flies even in the meat kitchen, no stench in the toilets, and a crowd of curly headed black children playing on clean pavement in front of the rows of spotlessly white concrete houses." Of the Arab encampment he says: "The beduins formed the wide, poor and unsavoury fringe around ar Riyadh which they fouled with habits inoffensive in the vast spaces of the desert but intolerable in the confines of a town."

The author's personality, training, and knowledge make his observations significant and important. A devout Christian, he looked upon his work in Arabia for the

Netherlands Colonial and Foreign Office with a sense of mission. Before going to Arabia he had eight years experience as a District Officer in Sumatra followed by three years of study under the renowned Islamic scholar, Snouck Hurgronje of Leyden University.

His comments on Harry Philby, T. E. Lawrence, Lowell Thomas, Charles R. Crane, and Karl S. Twitchell are quite intriguing. He describes the guild of sheiks who handle the business of the annual Muslim Pilgrimage to the Hejaz. His intimate accounts of his contact with Ibn Saud are historically valuable. This Wahhabi king was van der Meulen's hero, so it is with sadness and disillusionment that he records his hero's failure and the deep corruption which he says has overtaken the Saudi regime as he saw it in the 1950's.

Of particular interest are the author's reflections on the potent impact of American technicians and oilmen and of the Arabian American Oil Company. His comments on the Arab League and Israel are also interesting.

WILLIAM YALE

Professor of History
Boston University

H. A. R. GIBB and HAROLD BOWEN. *Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century*. Vol. I, Part II of *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East*. Pp. 285. London: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1957. \$5.60.

The Ottoman Empire, from its conquest of Byzantium in 1453 to the end of the eighteenth century, was one of the uniquely successful political structures of its day. Yet Ottoman history remains one of the major lacunae of modern historiography. The most complete account—Hammer's ten-volume work—was published well over a century ago; and Lane-Poole's unpretentious *Story of Turkey* (1888) still rates as "the best one-volume treatment." For the early Ottomans, detailed studies by Köprülü, Wittek, Babinger, and others have filled much of the gap. For the period of Ottoman decline, not even monographs are

available. For the nineteenth century there are shelves upon shelves of treatises on the "Eastern Question"; these, however, rely ultimately on European foreign office and press accounts and are no more sympathetic or accurate than would be a history of the age of Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln drawn from the same sources.

The present work does not give a chronological account of Ottoman history. Rather it attempts something of far greater value to the social scientist: a systematic analysis of eighteenth-century Ottoman political, social, and religious institutions, tracing in each chapter the forces which made for evolution, synthesis, stagnation, and decay. Part I of the first volume—completed before World War II but published only in 1950—was concerned chiefly with government and administration. Part II opens with an illuminating account of the Ottoman tax systems. The central portion is devoted to specifically Islamic institutions: the 'ulemâ or clergy, the administration of justice by *kâdis* and *muftîs*, the educational system of the medreses or Mosque schools, and the pious endowments which supported these and other religious establishments. There is an important chapter on the dervish orders, who, through their ramified organization and close contact with the small-town and village populations, provided much of the cohesive force which bound the Empire together. The final chapter describes the system of religious and legal group autonomy enjoyed by the sultans' Christian and Jewish subjects.

Despite this broad scope, the work is less inclusive than its title would indicate. There is no attempt to deal with some of the most populous Islamic societies on the Indian subcontinent, in Indonesia, in Iran, or in northern Africa. Within the Ottoman Empire itself, the main emphasis is on Anatolia, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, with less attention paid to the wealthy and culturally advanced Balkan and Danubian provinces. A separate chapter on nomadic tribes would have supplemented the account of the peasantry and the cities in Part I. A glossary of the vast number of Arabic-Turkish technical terms which have crept into the text would have been very helpful to the nonspecialist reader—an

Index of these terms, however, provides a partial substitute.

The reviewer has only one serious cause for regret. The current installment of Gibb and Bowen's work merely completes their analysis of Ottoman society *before* the full impact of the modern West—what the authors themselves call "the prolegomena to our projected study." It is to be hoped that the senior author's duties as Director of the Center of Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University will allow him to carry the project forward into the nineteenth century. The reader of the first two parts will be waiting impatiently for a similarly lucid and penetrating account of the interaction of Islamic and Western cultures.

DANKWART A. RUSTOW

Associate Professor of Politics
and Near Eastern Studies
Princeton University

TAMARA TALBOT RICE. *The Scythians*. (Ancient Peoples and Places Series.) Pp. 255. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$5.00.

The Scythians are a group of basically nomadic tribes who played an important role in the political and economic life of the vast Eurasian steppes for more than a thousand years, from the ninth century B.C. to the third century A.D. Unfortunately they had no writing and possessed no coinage. As a result of this they were practically erased from the memory of man for well-nigh fifteen hundred years. It is only in the past two centuries that they have gradually been rediscovered, as it were, through the excavations of their tombs located as far west as Vetersfeld in Prussia and as far east as Pazarik in Siberia. For in these tombs have been discovered not only the bodies of the buried dead but also many of their worldly goods and possessions; these reveal them as a not overly sophisticated people, limited in horizon and with a restricted vision, who had, nevertheless, attained a relatively high degree of civilization. It is the life, culture, and art of these long-forgotten Scythians which Tamara Talbot Rice resurrects in her enthusiastic, illuminating, and absorbing little book.

The arrangement of the subject matter, in view of the rather limited and one-sided nature of the material, is admirable. Following a brief Introduction, concerned with the rediscovery of the Scythians, the author supplies us with a background chapter devoted primarily to what little is known or surmised about their history. The next chapter depicts their way of life: their tents and wagons, diet and dress, horsemanship, physical appearance, intellectual outlook, artistic talents, religious beliefs and practices. Three chapters are devoted to their deeply venerated tombs, the numerous and diversified objects discovered in them, and the artistic achievement which these reveal. The book closes with a brief but informative chapter on the Scythian legacy to Russian and European art, a well-selected Bibliography, and sixty-two outstanding photographs of Scythian art objects.

Admittedly, here and there, Mrs. Rice's work suffers from what seems to be a secondhand approach to her subject matter, which fails to carry the authority and conviction that goes with prolonged original research. By and large, however, the author is to be congratulated for an exciting and meaningful account about a rather charming and talented people who succeeded in creating an individual artistic style of some importance. So, too, the publisher is to be commended for the legible, pleasing, and not unimaginative format of the book.

SAMUEL NOAH KRAMER

Professor of Assyriology
and Curator of the
Tablet Collection
University Museum
University of Pennsylvania

C. J. EDMONDS. *Kurds, Turks, and Arabs Politics, Travel and Research in North Eastern Iraq, 1919-1925*. Pp. xiii, 457. London: Oxford University Press, 1957. \$6.75.

As a political officer and civil administrator in the British mandate of Iraq, and later as adviser to the Iraqi government until 1945, C. J. Edmonds is exceptionally well qualified to write on the subject matter of this book.

Its main title is somewhat misleading. Although its framework is claimed to be the diplomatic history of the Mosul dispute, this is essentially an account of the Kurds of southern Kurdistan. The political narrative is widely interspersed with discussions of social, cultural, historical, and other facets of Kurdish society—the apparent lack of methodical treatment being compensated for by the wealth of new and important material.

The discussion of the Mosul dispute is less complete here than in other monographs. Nonetheless, Edmonds contributes his firsthand knowledge of the political situation: the revolt of the Kurdish tribes, the Turkish maneuvers to recover the *vilayet*, the British military operations, and the behind-the-scenes activities during the investigations of the League of Nations Commission. Unfortunately, like many others before him, he, too, errs in asserting that Article I of the Turkish National Pact of 1920 "embodied in unmistakable terms a refusal to contemplate the separation of the Mosul *vilayet* from the Ottoman dominions" (p. 116). It is true that the Kemalists had made no secret of their determination to recover the district, but Edmonds' categorical assertion cannot be substantiated by this ambiguous—hence, variously interpretable—Article.

A large portion of the book describes the landscape and society of southern Kurdistan and contains corroborating reports, as well as, in some cases, correcting misconceptions of earlier travelers and adding valuable new observations. The topographical description of each *liwa* is followed by a detailed account of Kurdish society—tribal and nontribal, nomadic and sedentary—with its political, social, and economic structure; and all are embellished with traditional stories and anecdotes.

The book contains extensive discussions on religious sects, including Shaikhs, Saiyids, and the dervish orders such as the Barzinja Saiyids and the Qadiri, Naqshbandi, Kakai, and Bektashi orders; there is an account of the history, hagiology, organization, and geographical distribution of these sects; and consideration is given to their place in the social scheme—throwing new light on many hitherto obscure points.

The author includes sections on Kurdish history, Kurdish dynasties and principalities, modern Kurdish nationalism, and Kurdish language and literature; there is a consideration of the age-old Persian-Ottoman frontier dispute and interesting, but less technically valuable, material on antiquarian research.

Based largely upon the author's diaries and other papers, and upon extensive researches, this volume is an important contribution to scholarship and a valuable source on the Kurds of southern Kurdistan.

AVEDIS K. SANJIAN

Research Fellow
Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Harvard University

POLITICAL THEORY

DEAN ACHESON. *Power and Diplomacy*. (The William L. Clayton Lectures.) Pp. x, 137. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. \$3.00.

The writings of important public figures on public issues have to be judged in terms of more criteria than the works of those who never occupied such high positions. The statements of men in high posts have value per se as revealing the official position. If such men are out of office, as is the case with Mr. Acheson, their works have to be evaluated in terms of three criteria: as new revelations regarding events which took place when the person occupied the office; as statements of an ex-official who may or may not have a significant following; and on the basis of the intrinsic value of the work.

With reference to the first criterion, Mr. Acheson's latest book does not offer any new revelations regarding the important events which took place during the time he occupied high posts in the government. In some instances he makes statements, particularly with reference to China and Korea, in order to justify his policies; there is, however, nothing new in these justifications. More than once he makes derogatory references to persons who have favored different policies.

In so far as Mr. Acheson has an important following and in so far as he is a

Democratic spokesman on foreign policy, his views have significance. It is refreshing to learn that such an important figure, instead of perpetrating the moral platitudes we are usually served with, believes that the United Nations Charter should not be the guiding factor of American policy and that "a sounder guide lies in political and military considerations" (p. 42). He lists three major current trends in world affairs with which such a sounder policy has to cope: the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union to pre-eminent positions of power, nuclear weapons as instruments of unlimited violence, and the Afro-Asian revolution against alien control, as well as the related revolution of rising popular expectations in all underdeveloped areas. It is difficult to understand why he has not listed the threat of Soviet and world communism as a fourth major current trend, for he does stress the growth of Soviet power and ambitions. The policy proposed to meet these developments includes concentration on the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, opposition to the neutralization of Germany, avoidance of overwhelming dependence on massive retaliation, opposition to embracing "anti-colonialism" at the expense of European allies, increased expenditures for defense and foreign aid, and, at least by implication, revision of our policy toward Nationalist and Communist China.

With reference to the third criterion, the book contains very little that has not been said before.

GEORGE B. DE HUSZAR

Chicago, Ill.

GEORGE LISKA. *International Equilibrium: A Theoretical Essay on the Politics and Organization of Security*. Pp. 223. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. \$5.00.

This is "a theoretical essay on the politics and organization of security," and it attempts to construct a systematic equilibrium theory. It is based upon the principle that politics everywhere concerns itself with "the distribution of security, welfare and prestige." Effective international organization would distribute these coveted

values institutionally, instead of by competition and conflict. Hence, it is resisted by the Great Powers and subordinated to their purposes.

The balance of power as a means for regulating changing equilibrium is realistic only if there is an "actual or potential preponderance on the side devoted to the protection of legitimate rights," and if there is a balancer as capable as Great Britain was for a long time. Even then it is "impossible to maintain an equipoise over a long period of time."

A successful world organization must include all powerful states and must provide a generally acceptable role for unduly different states. Among the Great Powers, the veto power is an institutional balancer preventing the impotence of any one of them. The Great Powers will always try to bend the organization to their changing needs, but the password to ordered international relations is progression toward constitutionalism, which puts some restraints on the exercise of their powers in an unruly fashion.

The refusal of the United States to join the League of Nations upset the assured preponderance on the side of the Versailles powers and preserved balance of power politics both outside of the League and inside. "The unique opportunity of the year 1919 for the democratic powers was missed; since then there has been no real second chance."

Liska has doubts about the efficacy of the regional organizations which have proliferated out of the cold war. They weaken progressively the global body, and there is likely to be inadequate countervailing power inside each of them to balance the dominant Great Power. Moreover, "it is both fair and safe to expect performance only when the actual occasion for invoking the alliance and the initial purpose of the treaty coincide precisely in character and follow each other rapidly in time."

If these factors work for the ineffectiveness of the American combinations, it is also true to say that the satellite technique used by the Soviet Union "has never been permanently successful in the modern state system."

Believing that both the Soviet Union and

the United States have practiced obsolete policies since 1945, the author thinks that success, if open war is avoided, "will ultimately come to the Power learning sooner and best how to manipulate to its advantage the compensatory, non-military elements of the larger equilibrium that fluctuates uncertainly over the thermonuclear stalemate."

The book is a mature and thoughtful effort to state an understandable theory of international politics.

D. F. FLEMING

Research Professor of International Relations
Vanderbilt University

C. GROVE HAINES (Ed.). *European Integration*. Pp. xvi, 310. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957. \$5.00.

The existence of the European Economic Community and Euratom are clear enough signs that an integrated Europe is being created in our time. It remains true, nonetheless, that the basic issues involved are still unresolved. For some, the fundamental aims of the movement are political—the prevention of European wars and the creation of a third force between the United States and Russia—while for others they are economic—securing a broader base for the division of labor and the economies of scale. Similarly, the creation of supranational institutions and the abridgment of national sovereignty are considered essential by some, whereas to others, the job can be done by closer "cooperation." The Europe of the "six" versus a wider Europe that includes Britain and the other Organization for European Economic Co-operation countries is another debated issue. And perhaps most important to an outsider, there is the question of whether integrated Europe will be inward looking or whether it will provide for relatively free relations with the rest of the world.

Thus far, the situation with respect to such broad questions remains fluid. They are not settled by the treaties and conventions in force, and, although a definite thread one way or the other runs through the official positions of several countries, there is no telling what the outcome of future compromises will be. Hence, the vol-

ume of papers on *European Integration*, edited by Professor Haines, is timely indeed and is a valuable contribution to the debate.

The papers in the volume were presented to a Conference on the Status of European Integration held in the summer of 1956 at the Bologna Center of the School for Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. The contributors of the twenty papers were a distinguished group of statesmen, high government officials, and scholars. And it is a rich and varied fare they present, treating the historical background of the present movement, giving sharply opposing viewpoints on objectives and means, and appraising the possibilities on the basis of their wealth of practical experience.

In addition to a few historical papers, the book treats four broad topics: The rationale of integration; the economic aspects of integration; the political aspects; and the relation of integration in Europe to the rest of the non-Communist world. Its authors include Giuseppe Pella, Ugo la Malfa, E. N. van Kleffens, and L. D. Wilgress as well as Professor Hans Kohn, H. S. Commager, and C. E. Carrington, enough to indicate the quality of the discussion and the stimulation one can receive from it. Among the authors, probably little known in the United States, I would particularly like to mention Paul Delouvrier who contributes a penetrating paper on the problems of and possibilities in economic integration. I may be forgiven for saying that the OEEC seems to me inadequately treated in the volume; Professor Lincoln Gordon's article in the *Yale Review* may be cited to offset this deficiency.

MILTON GILBERT

Director of Economics and Statistics
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
Paris

JOHN D. MONTGOMERY. *Forced To Be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan*. Pp. xiii, 209. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. \$4.50.

Both John D. Montgomery's starting point and his main thesis are as interest-

ing and stimulating as they seem debatable. Revolutions, he claims, are of three kinds: the "natural" revolution, exemplified by the French and American eighteenth-century types; the "permanent" revolution, by which he apparently means the Communist brand, engineered by professional revolutionaries and based on their terror; and finally, the "artificial" revolution, "externally supplying leadership and guidance under a military government using legitimate governmental processes while changing the basis of power and privilege that the old order has produced." It is this latter kind of "revolution," Dr. Montgomery submits, which America instigated and carried through in the postwar years, during which time it governed the countries of the defeated enemy. And, he suggests, this "revolution"—peaceful, bloodless, orderly, and democratic—is an authentic product of the "American way" and a potential weapon and goal in America's struggle against totalitarianism. The "artificial" revolution can be imposed on other countries and thereby serve as an instrumentality for the export of American democracy to those who need it. In a way, this would make "artificial revolution" a secret weapon of the United States.

The weak points of this claim are obvious. In the first place, America was able to carry through its "artificial revolution" in foreign nations only after, and because it had defeated them in, a war which was as bloody as any revolution. This situation could hardly be duplicated under conditions of peace or cold war.

Second, the revolutionary character itself of the de-Nazification program in Germany and of the purge program in Japan—endeavors which in the main boil down to what Dr. Montgomery calls "revolution"—appears highly questionable. There were, indeed, Americans on all levels of military government who hoped and tried to enforce a revolution in the occupied countries in accord with their own personal desires; in some cases they were influenced by communism, in others by Socialist ideas, and in still others by left-wing New Dealish liberalism. But their attempts led to little except resentment on all sides, and

they were soon discarded. What remained of the two programs, then, was a change in leadership; these countries were forced to ban the more discredited outstanding personalities identified with the previous order and to substitute for them—at first almost exclusively—men who had played a political role before. This amounted to a partial "restoration," rather than a revolution, and, as far as the economy was concerned, one could barely discern any substantial changes in leadership at all.

The third question is whether this limited type of restorative change in political leadership would not have been carried out, after the defeat, by the native populations themselves—even though by other means—whether America had taken charge of it or not. The answer, of course, is speculative, but the evidence does not seem to confirm Dr. Montgomery's assumption that the change resulted mainly, if not only, from American initiative and undertaking, without finding native support and, rather, against the native mood. Despite the almost overwhelmingly impressive research apparatus used in this study, many claims are based on impressionistic generalizations which are of doubtful accuracy and are unsupported by research. When, for instance, Dr. Montgomery remarks that "German bookstalls have been filled with nostalgic reminiscences and defenses of the past," that is surely not borne out by an analysis of the contents of books published and sold in the past years. Or, when he sets forth that "the mass opinions [sic] made it clear that Nazi leaders had not become social outcasts," one wonders what to make of the popular reactions when Nazis recently sought office in, or attempted to infiltrate into, government, parliament, and the army; in each and every case, "mass opinion" did not permit them to take, or stay in, office. But when, in order to prove the lack of native support for the "artificial revolution," he compares the "spontaneous and organized" "almost heroic vigor" of German criticisms of de-Nazification procedures—which democratic leaders had a right and a duty to criticize—with the "small circle" of the men and women who had opposed nazism, and sacri-

ficed their lives in resistance—a meaningless comparison of two behavior patterns so profoundly different in contexts, rationales, and consequences that they simply cannot be compared at all—one wonders about the depth of other claims and conclusions in this study.

Yet Dr. Montgomery's argumentation is provocative, and his study of a complex and challenging subject presents interesting points of view concerning American political reform in the occupied enemy countries—a field of action which, as the author suggests, may indeed not be of merely historical interest.

NORBERT MUHLEN

New York City

RAYA DUNAYEVSKAYA. *Marxism and Freedom: From 1776 Until Today*. Pp. 384. New York: Bookman Associates, 1958. \$6.00.

The central theme of this book is a re-examination of Marxism in the light of current developments. This leads the author to other pertinent questions: Can individual freedom be adequately guarded in modern industrial society? Who are these Hitlers, Mussolinis, and Stalins? To this last, she hastily replies that they are not Germans, Italians, or Russians; they represent objective forces. And how, she asks, can the rigid Marxian doctrine be so modified as to continue to remain a guiding faith in a society free of human exploitation, misery, and injustice? These are indeed disturbing questions which the book valorously undertakes to answer.

The thesis unfolds on a broad canvas, and the discussion covers the rather extensive period from the eighteenth-century Age of Revolution to the present Age of Automation, including the American scene. In this sweeping survey there are attempts at a re-evaluation of many old values. The book endeavors to examine the impacts produced by Hegelian dialectic, utopian socialism, Marxian teaching, the Paris Commune, capitalism, the Second International, Leninism, planned economy, Stalinism, Soviet totalitarianism, recent revolts in Germany and Hungary and winds up with brief comments on the "New Humanism." Accompanying these is a discussion on how

socialism has been misinterpreted lately by various practitioners and whither socialism is destined to move. Despite the length of these discourses, the tantalizing question raised throughout as to how individual freedom can be made secure in the face of state capitalism remains essentially unanswered.

As one plows through the discussions, the reader is apt to find illuminating bits on such subjects as the so-called "Workers' Opposition" in the twenties in Soviet Russia, or the relations between "planners" and workers. Unfortunately these are frequently marred by an inability to discuss seemingly philosophical problems either in academic terms or in temperate language. Biting epithets such as "Stakhanovite demons," "Soviet Ukaze," or "the class enemy" [Stalin] reveal the ill-tempered spirit of the author. The more heat the discussion breathes, the more difficult it becomes to find acceptable solutions. Too often the attack is made before the case is sufficiently presented, and the verdict is as often predetermined or "stacked." In the end, the reader will find either solace in reaffirming his prejudices or else he will lose interest because of the militant style in which the thesis is written.

There seems to be good reason for the lack of academic poise and detachment: Raya Dunayevskaya served as secretary to Leon Trotsky until 1939 at which time she severed all relations with the illustrious rebel. Belatedly she discovered that Soviet Russia represents nothing but "the greatest barbarism in the industrial world." Nor does the author spare any harsh words when she takes to task the American scene. She condemns both "the labor bureaucrat and the professor who are deaf to the concrete demands of the workers and are all too willing victims of abstractions which help to maintain capitalist exploitation." The verdict might have been more convincing had there been less evidence of a deep sense of embittered remorse for past plodding along sinful ideological paths. This kind of a mental state is hardly conducive to poised academic judgment. Had the thesis been presented with less fire, there might have been in the end more

light cast upon the impasse into which socialism has driven itself in recent years.

ANATOLE G. MAZOUR

Assistant Professor of History
Stanford University

JOHN SLESSOR. *The Great Deterrent*. (A Collection of Lectures, Articles, and Broadcasts on the Development of Strategic Policy in the Nuclear Age.) Pp. xii, 321. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$6.00.

Sir John Slessor's greatest contribution to strategic thinking has always been the timeliness and originality of his ideas. Never one to delay putting his thoughts before the public, he has unfailingly stimulated others to reshape their own ideas. This book, however, is a miscellaneous collection of papers—some dating back twenty-five years—many of which lack the sparkle and freshness we customarily attribute to his incisive mind.

Perhaps the most remarkable thing about this book is that Sir John has, in effect, disproved the very point he set out to prove; namely, that "not much remains of what we thought were eternal verities not so very long ago." Time and again in the recent essays he comes back to ideas he advanced before World War II. Now, as then, armies must be prepared to fight on many fronts against a variety of enemies; they must be small, mobile and flexible, composed of armor and foot soldiers. Sea power remains essential, and even many naval functions continue virtually unaltered. Air power, which was considered at the turn of the nuclear age to be the supreme factor in military power, is placed once again in a more nearly co-ordinate position with respect to ground and sea power. Even as the great deterrent, air power needs the support of other forces, and, in limited wars of the future, balanced military forces will again become imperative.

"In the context of world Power," Slessor says on one occasion that "all precedents in the politico-strategic sphere are irrelevant," because total war is now unthinkable. Yet he admits that this gives us greater freedom of action than ever be-

fore; we need merely remember that diplomacy, as in the past, must be backed by force to be successful, and that military forces must be given the ability to wage war without the frightful weapons which thermonuclear power has produced. Again, he says that new weapons have outmoded the maxim that great principles of war remain unchanged. Yet his succeeding pages are filled with the familiar words which ring through the old principles: concentration, mobility, and economy of force.

One of the intellectual giants of air power, Slessor's ideas command respect. He sees no sense in wasting our substance either in preparing to "overkill" the enemy or in stockpiling for long wars. Our resources can be better spent in building the strength and flexibility required for limited wars which we should be prepared to wage with both atomic and conventional weapons. One of his favorite themes is the need to modernize the old system of air control, used by the Royal Air Force on primitive frontiers, and adapt it to the conditions of modern limited war. Another recurrent idea, first suggested four years before Kennan and Rapacki made it a headline issue, is that we must not rule out disengagement as a means of relieving European tensions. It is to be regretted that a mind which can spawn such concepts has not come up with the systematic analysis which they deserve.

GORDON B. TURNER

Professor of Maritime History
Naval War College

AMERICAN HISTORY

GILMAN M. OSTRANDER. *The Prohibition Movement in California, 1848-1933*. (University of California Publications in History, Vol. LVII.) Pp. vi, 241. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1957. \$5.00.

Of the hundreds—perhaps thousands—of books and monographs dealing with the American crusade against booze, none has succeeded in adequately explaining the phenomenon. What is it in the American

temperament and tradition which has inspired these periodic and, in the end, futile forays against the "Demon Rum"? From colonial times to the present day, the traffic in alcoholic beverages has inspired widespread and intense opposition from American reformers. Almost from the beginning it has been a political issue. Other countries have temperance societies—even France has its league against alcoholism—and the liquor business is nearly everywhere subject to special forms of official regulation and control. But only in America has the drive to extirpate the traffic utterly by legal proscription reached significant political dimensions.

Why? To this question the volume under review offers no answer. A searching sociopsychological study of the American Dry Crusade remains to be written.

What the author of this volume has done, however, and done admirably, is to write an excellent history of the Prohibition Movement in California from 1848 to 1933. If ever a state was in need of redemption, it was California—redemption, that is, from greed, vice, violence and crime—but most of all, from the prohibitionist point of view, from booze, the author of them all. Gold-rush California, according to some authorities, was "the hardest-drinking society in the world." Booze was more abundant than bread and easier to come by. "Nine-tenths of our population, male and female," wrote one minister, "sip, drink and guzzle. The learned and the stolid old men, mere boys, the rich men, the penniless, and even the prisoners, all drink, drink from morning till night, and from night till morning. . . ." With one legal and at least one or two illegal or nonlegal saloons for every hundred persons, San Francisco had "proportionately the greatest number of drinking places of any city in the world." And for those who preferred to make their own, the drugstores sold "all the ingredients" plus recipes for making liquor at the average cost of seventy-five cents a gallon.

Into this sodden Gomorrah, the news of Maine's Prohibitory Liquor Law of 1851 came as a revelation. In the Golden State, as elsewhere, "the whole course of the

temperance movement changed with the passage of the Maine law." From being primarily a "spiritual crusade," seeking individual redemption through abstinence, it now became "primarily a political campaign directed toward an ultimate goal of universal legal prohibition." And it is with this campaign, which went on over a period of three-quarters of a century, that this volume deals—from the modest temperance movement of the gold-rush days to the final triumph of state and national prohibition, the bitter years of nullification and repeal, the final victory of the "forces of darkness," and the ultimate deluge of the present day.

It is a dramatic tale, well told, with much nobility, fanaticism, chicanery, corruption, comedy, and tragedy. As elsewhere, the movement derived its spark and energy from the Protestant churches and especially from the heroic women who in the face of ridicule, insult and physical assault carried the fight to the enemy. However mistaken their remedy, there are few who would deny the reality and the magnitude of the evil they sought to exorcise. There is high drama in the story of Sallie Hart, "bright, witty and active" with "a tongue like a scorpion," defying the mob sent out by the San Francisco German Saloon Keepers Society to break up her meetings. "Past the polling place the crowd moved in on her, yelling threats and obscenities" until she took refuge in a nearby store with the police "fighting off the mob with their clubs."

Step by step and year by year the zealous reformers harried the liquor forces and their allies. All the devices used elsewhere, and some indigenous to California, were employed. High license, low license, no license, antitreating ordinances, county option, city option, zoning which was both civilian and military, exposure, and boycott. And if the liquor business had its allies, as, for example, in the wine growers of the state and other economic and political interests dependent upon it, the Dry forces were by no means friendless. The crusade for women's suffrage and successive movements for political reform contributed to the Dry cause. The American (Know

Nothing) party, the Grangers, Populists, and Progressives placed temperance legislation and even prohibition among their cherished goals. And Progressive leaders, like A. Z. Wallace, Chester Rowell, Frank Hinchborn and John Works, if not Hiram Johnson himself, became active partisans of prohibition.

Like political litmus paper, the prohibition movement revealed the major cross-currents in California politics. In many ways it is a tale of two cities, San Francisco and Los Angeles; of two sections, the North and the South; of two cultures, rural, nativist, Protestant versus urban, cosmopolitan, Catholic. It was, however, not a typical "adult Western" with all the good guys on one side and all the bad guys on the other. The fanaticism of the Dry zealot was often more than matched by that of his Wet foe; and if the Drys resorted to political pressure and economic boycott, so, too, did the minions of John Barleycorn. In the end, the Trade—as it used to be called—won. But there are signs that it may have pushed its luck too far. For the time being, California is dripping wet. Only recently the paid lobbyist of the liquor business could boast: "I'm the Governor of the Legislature. To hell with the Governor of the State." The Drys, in the meantime, are relatively quiet, divided, and ineffective. But as the author of this fascinating chronicle says: "The industry pressed its advantage too far in the past, and it may press its advantage too far again. . . ." Time only will tell.

PETER H. ODEGARD

Professor of Political Science
University of California
Berkeley

SAMUEL WHITE PATTERSON. *Knight Errant of Liberty: The Triumph and Tragedy of General Charles Lee*. Pp. 287. New York: Lantern Press, 1958. \$4.00.

Two modern biographers have essayed to explain the enigma of General Charles Lee, the eccentric and colorful figure of the American Revolution who was for a long time labeled in the history books as an actual or near traitor. In 1951 Pro-

fessor John R. Alden published *General Charles Lee: Traitor or Patriot?* Now Samuel White Patterson has written another study of Lee. Interestingly enough, both authors come to substantially the same conclusions. They believe that Lee was sincerely devoted to the American cause, that he did not deal improperly with the British, and that he was unjustly treated for his part in the Battle of Monmouth.

Lee was a fairly typical eighteenth-century figure. Born into a substantial although not wealthy English family, he chose, as did others of his class, the military as a profession. In the British army, again conforming to a pattern of his times, he rose in rank through the exercise of money, influence, and solid merit. Like many other professional soldiers, he served also in foreign armies. Somewhere along the line he imbibed a large dose of the republican liberalism professed by the intellectuals of the day. This led him to support the side of the American colonies in their quarrel with the mother country. He had served in America against the French, and in 1773 he decided to return to the land he had liked so much on his earlier visit.

Probably Lee went to America with the idea of settling there and improving his fortunes. But he arrived on the eve of the break with Britain, and his political ideas and fiery nature impelled him into the forefront of the American protest movement. When the shooting started, Lee, with his military background, was naturally considered for a high position in the patriot army. He became the third and eventually the second ranking American general. But he failed to accomplish the great things expected of him. During Washington's retreat across New Jersey, Lee delayed obeying orders to join the main army. He was suspected of wanting to win a victory on his own or of not caring if Washington failed. His curious course was probably the result of his conviction that the Americans could not stand against British regulars. Captured by the redcoats, he presented the English command with a plan to subdue the colonies. Mr. Patterson surmises that Lee was mis-

leading his captors with a scheme sure to end in failure. This is probably correct, but Lee's action indicates a fatal lack of judgment in his make-up. Like so many men of near genius, Lee lacked balance.

After being exchanged, Lee returned to the army. At the Battle of Monmouth, Washington entrusted him to direct the attack on the British. The attack failed, and Washington, in a towering fury, rebuked Lee on the field. The censure was not entirely just, but Lee made the error of demanding a court-martial. The court, as Lee might have expected, decided for Washington, and Lee was suspended from the army. He died in 1782, embittered and almost forgotten. Mr. Patterson relates the Lee story with sympathy and verve. His study is not as complete as Alden's, but it misses none of the color of its extraordinary subject.

T. HARRY WILLIAMS

Professor of History
Louisiana State University

NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, JR. *The Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation of Party Organization, 1789-1801*. Pp. x, 279. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957. \$6.00.

The advent of Jeffersonian democracy has often been considered from a philosophical or class struggle standpoint. Conceivably, however, the birth, organization, and almost complete success within a decade of an entirely new party are even more arresting and almost as significant. This book tells how such ascendancy was accomplished—an analysis long needed.

Real party development became possible after the Constitution was adopted; by 1800 there were two major political groups in being, and the nature of American politics had been fundamentally changed. Campaign appeals were no longer focused primarily on individual records and characteristics, and some centralized organization was emerging.

Gradually, contends Professor Cunningham, party affiliation became increasingly an election issue, political independence being more criticized than admired. Particularly after 1796, when Jefferson re-

turned from self-imposed retirement to assume command of "his" Republicans from Madison, did true party machinery develop. The "Jeffersonian Revolution" is seen as largely the result of effective organization and aggressive campaigning, though political chieftains were keenly aware of the need to appeal for support on the basis of popular issues. By 1800, active electioneering for offices had become relatively respectable, campaign practices were being more nearly standardized, and the two-party system had taken deep root.

All this is ably told, and with voluminous documentation. In his examination, Cunningham reaches several provocative conclusions. Parties did not come about because Jefferson and Hamilton molded scattered state and local groups into national organizations; instead they evolved gradually from Congress down, around national issues rather than local ones. Challenging Beard, he finds no effective connection between the old Antifederalists and the Jeffersonians, although he cites no Antifederalist leader other than Henry who followed Hamilton. Cunningham contends that even assumption was largely a dispute involving economic interest groups; the Bank was the issue on which real parties first formed, and foreign affairs only crystallized already developing sentiment.

Surprisingly, New York (not Virginia) initiated moves for the political alliance between these two states, but it was in Congress that divisions first became clear-cut. Along with Burr's activities in crucial New York and the newspapers' vital role in Republican reorganization following 1798 reverses, there are illustrations of campaign techniques in various parts of the nation.

While the account is full and generally objective, Jefferson's own protestations of distaste for partisanship seem uncritically accepted; after all, Angelica Church (to whom he so wrote) was Hamilton's sister-in-law. Moreover, if Republican leaders actually marked time "while the French question blew over," they would have remained inactive the entire decade. But this is an excellent volume, and the Jefferson-Burr vote which ended in a tie sub-

stantiates its main thesis that the methods used established true party regularity.

DONALD H. STEWART

Professor of History
State Teachers College
Cortland, N. Y.

MARVIN MEYERS. *The Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief*. Pp. vi, 231. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957. \$5.00.

Although the Age of Jackson has had more than its share of shaking and probing, this latest effort adds a significant dimension to commentary on the period and, in its method, to intellectual history. Mr. Meyers' volume breaks with the traditional political and social analysis, favoring instead an evaluation of the Jacksonian movement as "persuasion," which he describes as an emotional commitment to values which "at a given social moment . . . acquire a compelling importance." Reversing the usual interpretation of Jacksonianism as the party of the future, the author seems to view it largely as a conservative movement in an era of rapid and uncontrollable economic change. The persuasion was embodied in the leadership of Andrew Jackson, "the guardian of a threatened Republican tradition," and dedicated to adjusting the fast-accumulating practices of opportunistic commercial enterprise to the Old Jeffersonian Republic of the independent yeoman and negative government.

In the heterogeneous Jacksonian following the author finds one common principle and one unifying symbol: all Jacksonians, he asserts, "adapted some version of the restoration theme," the revitalizing of the Old Republic; all joined in the attack on Biddle's monster, the Second Bank of the United States, as the symbol of corruption and the crucial step toward restoration of the tried and true economic and social virtues. But living in an era when restoration was impossible and sharing, despite themselves, in the hyperactivity of the economics of the grab, the Jacksonians became the "judges and the judged" and the victims of an irresolvable inner tension as the past and the future clashed. As the vision of the yeoman's paradise was overshadowed in a society of banks and com-

merce, the Jacksonian era closed—even though the persuasion has persisted as one powerful, if somewhat self-delusive, strain in American life.

The theme is developed by an examination of presidential and party rhetoric; the contemporary writings of Cooper, Sedgewick, Tocqueville, Leggett, and Rantoul; and a somewhat confusing comparison of the assumptions of the New York Constitutional Conventions of 1821 and 1846. Although the volume has within it an excessive number of sentences which fall back into themselves, it is generally a work of high literary quality and subtle insight. It is beyond a doubt the most imaginative commentary on the Jacksonian period in recent years. To this reviewer it is of more than passing interest that Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s *Age of Jackson* contended that the "persuasion" was liberal and of the future; here the persuasion is essentially conservative and looks to the past. So goes a decade, and so goes the writing of history.

RICHARD P. LONGAKER

Associate Professor of Political Science
Kenyon College

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, SR. *Prelude to Independence: The Newspaper War on Britain, 1764-1776*. Pp. ix, 318, xvi. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958. \$6.00.

After a preliminary chapter on other types of propaganda, Professor Schlesinger devotes the remainder of this volume to an examination of the propaganda of the Loyalist and the Patriot journals during the period from the end of the French and Indian War to the Declaration of Independence.

The Stamp Act, the Townshend Acts, and the Intolerable Acts caused editors to write with vitriolic ink. But the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the British restrictions on the tobacco trade evoked no journalistic campaign. Professor Schlesinger offers no explanation for their failure to become subjects of extensive newspaper controversy.

He concludes that certain New England newspapers were the most active and influential ones in spreading propaganda

against the British. This may be true, but certainly some of the Southern gazettes were not far behind, not even on issues which first arose in New England. Compare, for instance, the *Virginia Gazette* and the *Boston Gazette* on their coverage of the controversies between Governor Francis Bernard and the Patriots of Massachusetts. It would have been interesting had Professor Schlesinger compared the gross irony of the lampoons in the *Virginia Gazette* during the Lee-Mercer controversy over the Stamp Act with similar expressions of feelings in other journals.

Professor Schlesinger observes that Patriot editors were native-born Americans, sometimes members of families who owned newspapers in different colonies. The Loyalist editors were apt to be natives of Great Britain.

As long as Patriot editors were the political underdogs, says Professor Schlesinger, they cited the Zenger case and were champions of the freedom of the press. But once they gained the upper hand over the Loyalists, they interpreted freedom of the press as meaning freedom only for those newspapers which advocated American liberty. Without patriotic editors such as Edes, Gill, Rind, Purdie, and Goddard, the American mind would not have been prepared for the leadership of Washington, Adams, Franklin, and Jefferson. In the words of Carl Bridenbaugh, with whom Schlesinger would undoubtedly agree: "The press . . . was the fundamental fact of American culture."

Schlesinger states, in passing, that not until our own day has the American newspaper covered the international scene so comprehensively as did the colonial press. Standing alone, this comment should not be regarded as conclusive proof that Colonial America was more cosmopolitan than the United States in the nineteenth century, but it is an observation which should help to correct the notion that the Thirteen Colonies were grossly provincial in their outlook. It is an observation, too, which supports Bridenbaugh's description of the colonial cities of America as centers of cultural refinement, for the colonial press was a product of the cities.

This book is written on the same high plane of scholarship which has made Dr. Schlesinger an authority on American Revolutionary history ever since the publication, in 1918, of his *The Colonial Merchant and the American Revolution*.

ROBERT LEROY HILLDRUP

Professor of History
Mary Washington College
University of Virginia

CLAUDE G. BOWERS. *Chile Through Embassy Windows: 1939-1953*. Pp. ix, 375. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958. \$5.00.

After a successful career as journalist, amateur historian, and professional politician—he was Chairman of the Democratic National Convention of 1928—Claude Bowers received his first diplomatic appointment in the first year of Franklin Roosevelt's first administration. This marked the beginning of a new career, that of diplomat, which was to last twenty years—the first six as Ambassador to Spain and the remainder as Ambassador to Chile.

As a political appointee, Bowers had to resign at the end of each presidential term, but his resignation was never accepted so long as the White House remained Democratic. This fact reflects not only Bowers' political influence but also the substantial success which he achieved in his diplomatic career. When Republican President Eisenhower brought it to a close by accepting his resignation, Bowers was just short of seventy-five years of age. He died early in 1958.

This book deals with his mission to Chile, which lasted fourteen years under three Presidents of the United States, four Presidents of Chile, and no less than seventeen Chilean Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Among the materials he used in writing the book, he tells us, were his personal correspondence and "seven or eight volumes" of his Chilean diary.

The result is a chatty, readable, and often entertaining narrative—as would be expected of so able and experienced a journalist. The picture he paints of the Chileans he knew best—mostly the upper crust

—is an attractive one. He apparently developed a genuine affection and admiration for them.

The Chileans reciprocated warmly, and this fact is a testimony to his skill in personal diplomacy. The situation was full of pitfalls because of the highly fragmented character of Chilean politics, the highly explosive nature of many of the international issues with which Bowers had to deal, and a set of Yankeeophobes—pro-Nazi in his earlier years, Communist in his later years, and ultranationalist at all times—who were ever ready to exploit any misstep on his part.

He was also valuable to Washington for the acuteness of his political reporting and forecasts. While this is not a boastful account, neither does it hide the author's light under a bushel, and he records one proof of his political foresight with particular relish. This was his prediction that the presidential election of 1952 would be won by General Carlos Ibáñez (the present incumbent), who did not have the support of any major party. "My associates [in the embassy]," writes Bowers, "thought this incredible. . . . At first Washington was as incredulous as my staff. . . . After the election I was congratulated by Washington for the accuracy of my prediction."

This amiable book does not probe deeply into Chile's problems, whether domestic or international. Even at the surface, to which its operations are confined, it contains none of those revelations or indiscretions one always looks for hopefully in ex-ambassadorial autobiographies.

More surprisingly, in view of Bowers' own record as a historian and his professed esteem for literature and the arts, practitioners in the latter fields get short shrift in these pages; the book is, instead, dominated by diplomats, politicians, bankers, industrialists, and journalists. It should be remembered that an ambassador is not a free agent, but, within the limits set for him, Bowers won a success comparable to that of Dwight Morrow's once-celebrated good-will mission to Mexico in the troubled Coolidge-Calles period of the 1920's.

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER

Professor of Latin American History
University of Pennsylvania

EUROPEAN HISTORY

LEWIS NAMIER. *Vanished Supremacies: Essays on European History, 1812-1918*. Pp. vi, 179. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. \$3.75.

For the past forty years the distinguished British historian, Sir Lewis Namier, has wanted to write a history of Europe from 1812 to 1918; his intensive work on British parliamentary history and on pre-1939 diplomacy has, however, kept him from the task. Now the gifted septuagenarian has gathered together his main essays on the subject, almost all out of print, and presents them in the first volume of his collected essays.

In a series of chronological essays the author has brought together selections from his shorter writings in the political history of Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The collection begins with a set of four brief essays on the end of Napoleon. There are major essays on 1848, "the seed plot of history"; nationality and liberty, a consideration of the introduction of linguistic nationalisms in 1848 and their persistence for a century; a long essay on the downfall of the Hapsburg monarchy; and a reprint of the author's famous "Basic Factors in Nineteenth-Century European History."

Interspersed between these major essays are character sketches of such varied personalities as Talleyrand, Metternich, Princess Lieven, Napoleon III ("the plebiscitarian Caesar" and "the first mountebank dictator"), and the "Men Who Floundered into the War" (Prince von Bülow, Conrad von Hötzendorf, Count Stephen Tisza, and Herr von Kühlmann). The author concludes with "The German Finale to an Epoch in History." When the American and German armies met at Torgau on April 25, 1945, "the victory was won and the century of German preponderance in Europe had reached its term. So, too, had the supremacy of Europe in the World" (p. 179).

In seven short but devastating pages Sir Lewis reduces the strutting, pompous Prince von Bülow to proper proportions ("His [Memoirs] might well have been written by an elderly lady-in-waiting, origi-

nally chosen for her looks, noble birth, social polish, and liberal education" [p. 78]). The author's essay, "Basic Factors in Nineteenth-Century Europe History," a classic condensation in eleven pages, is one of the finest short interpretations of that century ever written. His historical judgments ring true. Consider this verdict on modern dictatorship: "Disappointed, disillusioned men, uprooted and unbalanced, driven by half-conscious fears and gusts of passion, frantically seek a new rallying point and new attachments. . . . The more pathological the situation the less important is the intrinsic worth of the idol. His feet may be of clay and his face may be a blank: it is the frenzy of the worshippers which imparts to him meaning and power" (p. 54).

If any further proof be needed that Sir Lewis Namier is a master of his craft, this book is it. His scholarship is meticulous and sound, his value judgments mature and wise. Best of all, he knows how to write—the style is mellifluous and distinguished by superb subtlety. It is a joy to read these pages.

LOUIS L. SNYDER

Professor of History
The City College of New York

STUART RAMSAY TOMPKINS. *The Russian Intelligentsia: Makers of the Revolutionary State*. Pp. xiii, 282. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1957. \$5.00.

Russian nineteenth-century radical political thought formed the background of the Revolution of 1917 and subsequent Soviet developments. In this slim volume Stuart Ramsay Tompkins, a member of the faculties of the University of Toronto and the University of Edmonton, author of *The Russian Mind and Russia Through the Ages*, discusses the bearers of this revolutionary thinking from the close of the Crimean debacle to the Bolshevik coup d'état.

The intelligentsia, insists Professor Tompkins, were those nineteenth-century protesters like Vera Zasulich—she murdered St. Petersburg's police chief, Trepov, and denounced the Czarist regime so graphically at her trial that she was acquitted—

Zhelyabov—he believed in "giving history a push"—the *Narodnaya Volya* terrorists and the Social Democrats, all of whom desperately worked for an immediate end to the Romanov autocracy. Excluded from this rather rigid definition were the conscience-stricken gentry and the *Zemstva* liberals of moderate stripe who hoped that Alexander II's major reforms of the sixties would hasten the gradual development of Western parliamentarianism in Russia. The failure to achieve this explains, in large part, why political tolerance never acquired a firm footing. Aside from the influence upon her development of the Mongol yoke and the Byzantine Church, the long centuries of despotic Moscow rule, the creation of serfdom, and the relative lack of industrialism were hardly conducive to the growth of a powerful middle class demanding political representation. It was a combination of these factors, rather than Czarist or Bolshevik perfidy, that doomed the Russian constitutional movement. "Deprived of an adequate social base," Michael Karpovich has written elsewhere, "it couldn't ally itself wholeheartedly with either of the two extremes. . . ."

Professor Tompkins also emphasizes the curious dilemma of the intelligentsia. This was the conflict between the overt adoption of such laudable aims as political morality and humanitarianism on the one hand, while within their councils there was a total repudiation of private and public opinions. "It amounts," says Professor Tompkins, "to nothing less than the introduction into the revolutionary movement of a [new] moral code . . . the revolutionists professed lofty ideals of liberty, of thought, of conscience, at the same time they denied these things to their own members." The result was "to silence the voice of reason and conscience."

A detailed Bibliography—a critical note about each would have been more helpful to the student—a Glossary of Russian terms, and eight separate illustrations of Chernyshevsky, Dozrolyubov, Turgenev, Plekhanov, and the like add to the value of this scholarly yet readable book.

MURRAY POLNER

Lecturer in History
Brooklyn College

GEORGE F. KENNAN. *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920*, Vol. II: *The Decision to Intervene*. Pp. xii, 513. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. \$7.50.

Having abandoned the war alliance and signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Germany in March 1918, the young Soviet government expected that the country would have a respite—a "breathing spell," as Lenin termed it—before the onset of the "imminent" world-wide social revolution made a new war inevitable. Events took another course, however. While victorious Germany continued to apply pressure, relations with the former allies, too, rapidly deteriorated, and military intervention in Russia was beginning. The country was engaged in a civil war; terrorism was mounting; the economy was paralyzed. Pro-Western Czech battalions, formed on Russian soil of Austrian prisoners-of-war who were on their way to eastern ports to be evacuated, supported Lenin's adversaries by arms. The Japanese were eyeing eastern Siberia and were starting landing operations in Vladivostok. In Europe, the Allies landed in the northern ports of Archangel and Murmansk and sent naval units to the Black Sea; soon Poland, the young pro-Western power, joined the fight against Soviet Russia. There was no respite, no breathing spell.

George F. Kennan, outstanding diplomat and scholar, has already published *Russia Leaves the War*, the first volume in his study of American policy toward Soviet Russia in the early Lenin era. *The Decision to Intervene*, a sequel to that volume, deals with Soviet-American relations from the March treaty with Germany to August 1918 when the Allied intervention entered its fullest and most decisive stage. With his thorough knowledge of the events, basing his study on abundant material, and writing with great skill, Mr. Kennan has produced another excellent work which will certainly occupy a prominent place in historical literature and become *must* reading for every student of the era.

Mr. Kennan shows how America came to join the military intervention of the Allies: intervention was not in accord with President Wilson's basic attitudes toward

the new Russian regime; it was not necessary if the aim was to secure the military stores on Russian soil (which was one of the alleged reasons for the intervention); it was not needed to "open a free passage" for the Czech battalions; it had never been thought through to its final consequences; and a great deal of amateurishness, superficiality, and impulsiveness lay behind it. All these traits, Mr. Kennan hints, have not entirely disappeared from American foreign policy.

In the beginning there was a de facto recognition of the Soviet government by the United States. In the spring of 1918, however, the Allied ambassadors left Moscow and migrated to Vologda in the Russian north. The consulates, which remained for a time in the capital, were later on compelled to leave when the Soviet government began to arrest Allied officials and private citizens as a kind of reprisal for the beginning interventional operations.

Antagonisms mounted to the boiling point, and fanaticism was coupled with rage. Almost unbelievable cruelty marked the civil war. In July, the Tsar and his family—prisoners in Ekaterinburg—were executed. The chief of the Petrograd Cheka, M. S. Uritsky, was murdered. In August, Dora Kaplan, a Socialist-Revolutionary, shot and wounded Lenin. (Kennan's statement that she was executed is in error; her life was spared, and she died in a Soviet labor camp in 1956 or 1957.) Peasant uprisings engulfed entire regions, the cities were starving, and a typhus epidemic took many thousands of lives. It was Russia's darkest hour.

DAVID J. DALLIN

New York City

KARL W. MEYER. *Karl Liebknecht: Man Without a Country*. Pp. viii, 180. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957. \$3.25.

The author states in the Preface to his record of Liebknecht's political career, from 1904 to 1918, that he has probably raised more questions than he has answered. Unanswered, indeed, is the exact strength of Liebknecht's Communist group. Yet how was Liebknecht able to mobilize "the dregs of German society" in December 1918 in Berlin? How much more in-

formation on 1917 Russia did he have than is revealed in Professor Wysong's statement: "The German newspapers and the Russian Revolution of 1917"? What became of his extensive unpublished personal archive after 1921? Why has the author ignored the family background of Liebknecht's second wife and written nothing about her political efforts? Sophie is merely "the woman who became his second wife, a Russian by birth and a graduate of the University of Heidelberg." The facts are that she was born Sophia Ryss on January 18, 1884, at Rostov in the Ukraine. In 1914 her mother, Olga Somniovich Ryss, and her sister, Myra, were also living in Berlin. Professor Meyer says not a word about Sophie's communications with Lenin and Grimm.

There are few references to sources covering Lenin's relations with Liebknecht. The critical bibliography of the studies of the German revolution by Soviet historians is not listed. The first sketch of Liebknecht's political and revolutionary career by Ernest Drahm, published in 1924 in *Die Aktion*, and Otto-Ernst Schueddekopf's source book, *The Army and the Republic*, published in 1955, are two glaring omissions.

"For us," said Lenin's minority at the Zimmerwald Conference in 1915, "there exists the Liebknecht Group only." The German Socialists had asserted there was no such group. Professor Meyer's thesis glosses over the national rising of German youth in 1914, the proclaimed annexationist demands of the Chancellor and of pressure groups in 1915, Haase's speech on March 24, 1916—which split the Social Democratic party—and Ebert's strengthening of his control over the Majority Socialists. Meyer condemns Ebert's order to take over the party newspaper, *Vorwaerts*, as an "arbitrary subversion of the minority," yet he criticizes Liebknecht for accepting the majority vote of the Communist party, instead of purging it as Lenin or Stalin would have done. However, Meyer shows objectively that Liebknecht openly supported Lenin's thesis of class war in Germany, lost contact with the Socialist masses, failed to recover any popular support, appealed to Berlin's question-

able elements in December 1918 and accepted an alliance, guns, and money from Lenin.

Professor Meyer is the first American historian to evaluate both Liebknecht's career and failure as "the microcosm and epitome of a greater miscarriage, that of the German revolution." This has long been the thesis of Soviet historians and of the Soviet party line. But the author rejects almost half the paragraphs of the Soviet thesis, including, for example, *Uprising in the German Fleet* by the Communist, Kurt Zeisler.

RALPH HASWELL LUTZ

Professor of History, Emeritus
Stanford University

WILLIAMS M. MITCHELL. *The Rise of the Revolutionary Party in the English House of Commons, 1603-1629*. Pp. xvi, 209. New York: Columbia University Press, 1957. \$4.00.

The transformation of the House of Commons, from an agency used by Tudor sovereigns to harmonize their policy with national feeling into an opposition which made war on Charles I in 1642, is a fascinating chapter in English constitutional history. Members of the Commons seized the initiative from the early Stuarts who were unskilled in and often indifferent to parliamentary tactics; they failed, therefore, to maintain control through privy councillors and the Speaker. This point has been brilliantly made by Professors Wallace Notestein and David H. Willson.

Professor Mitchell of Washington and Jefferson College now seeks to trace the formation of an organized "party" of opposition in the Commons. His approach leads to an investigation of "the relation between two phenomena, the emergence of a real opposition and the development of procedural forms." His method is largely statistical and forms a systematic and painstaking study of the activities of individual members—their speeches, committee membership, committee reports—to determine attitudes of members toward the Crown and to suggest connections between changing parliamentary procedure and the influence of members.

His conclusions are these: In the closing

Parliaments of Elizabeth, "courtier leadership" still controlled the Commons; at the same time, the average member was growing in importance, the Speaker was on the decline, and procedure was less easily manipulated to royal ends. These "trends" became more marked in the first Parliament (1604-11) of James I where abundant evidence shows "opposition" members active in committees, especially in the new "committee of the whole house" which facilitated general debate. In the subsequent Parliaments of 1614, 1621, and 1624, James succeeded in breaking up the opposition, and there seems little concerted effort to exploit procedure. Hostility to Charles I in his early Parliaments focused on Buckingham. At the same time, committee activity grew enormously and provided parliamentary training for an expanding group of opposition members numbering, by 1628, at least sixty. And in the Puritan party of the Parliament of 1640, some 103 members can be identified as having served also in the Parliament of 1628.

The details which Professor Mitchell provides are more interesting than his conclusions. Indeed, he is more than cautious and seems rather uncertain about the latter himself. He does add further proof that the transition from Elizabethan to Stuart Parliaments was gradual and that the difficulties confronted by James were not entirely of his own making. His tentative statements about the appearance by 1629 of the nucleus of a "party" opposition are also worthy of note. But this study hardly makes necessary any serious modification of accepted views. One further point: Is it possible to write of Parliament in the early seventeenth century with scarcely a mention of the House of Lords?

ALFRED F. HAVIGHURST

Professor of History
Amherst College

D. W. BROGAN. *The French Nation: From Napoleon to Pétain, 1814-1940*. Pp. 328. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$3.50.

Although properly classified as history, this is a book with a thesis and a moral judgment. The former is implied in the subtitle: *From Napoleon to Pétain*. The

latter is best evidenced by the portion of the last paragraph in the book which reads as follows and refers to 1940:

"But if the French people failed to rally as they had done after the first Sedan, [and] after the first defeats in 1914, it was in great part because the French State had abdicated authority, had evaded decision, had organized its political life to penalize and, indeed, to prevent greatness. The Third Republic that had . . . erected evasion of responsibility into a system of government, was incapable of calling out the reserves of faith and courage that, the event proved, still existed. . . . The Third Republic committed suicide. . . . Now it had no living principles."

The author builds his story around the parallelism between the great collapse of hope and loyalty in 1814 and the general listlessness on the subject of a possible victory in the summer of 1940. The people of France, the author says, he does not condemn; but in reality he does do so, for after commending them throughout the volume for their achievements in many fields of the arts and sciences, he charges them with an inability to govern themselves.

Professor Brogan writes from "across the channel." He seems to judge the French nation by British—albeit not Irish—standards. In general, he says that the life of the French nation rose to great achievements during the periods of limited monarchy and sank to levels of despair during republican periods, which he thinks of as times of tyranny. We infer that he would have liked it better had the benefits of the French Revolution been selectively woven into the Charter of 1814 and somewhat more fully developed by the monarchies, which were so imperfect up to 1848. The Napoleonic and imperialistic tradition he does not magnify, and to the chief apostle-historian of that persuasion he gives a hard time. Perhaps it was because this historian, M. Adolphe Thiers, had so "brilliant a style," and because he was so "dazzlingly uncandid," that Professor Brogan goes to the other extreme. His style is choppy, and it is brilliant only in a sparkling choice of adjectives used to describe personages; in this he is certainly candid. He seems to

know as much about the family and extra-family habits of statesmen as he does about their politics. This livens the story and proves that family trees and their branches are not always uninteresting.

If it is asked why Mr. Brogan stops with 1940 and does not come down to date, the answer probably is that his theme or thesis is satisfied by closing the book in 1940. The great rainbow-like curves of success "that had its modern beginning in 1815" and that exhibited great luster in the middle of the nineteenth century had its termination in 1940 when the deputies and senators gave up the State and all of their responsibilities, saving only their title and their salaries. Brogan finds nothing at the end of the rainbow but emptiness, at least in so far as building institutions that will hold together the body politic of the French nation goes.

This surely is not the last word on this subject; but it is a provocative one.

W. HENRY COOKE

Professor of History, Emeritus
Claremont Graduate School
Claremont, Calif.

STEVEN RUNCIMAN. *The Sicilian Vespers: A History of the Mediterranean World in the Later Thirteenth Century*. Pp. xiii, 336. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958. \$5.50.

The frontispiece of this book tells more about its contents than either title or subtitle. Here we see Charles of Anjou, able, haughty, coldly ambitious, prince of the House of France and King of Sicily. Charles of Anjou gained his throne by helping the papacy crush its mortal enemies of the Hohenstaufen dynasty. He made himself so indispensable that he was more nearly the master than the servant of the papacy during most of his reign. He used this support to start building a Mediterranean empire. Beginning with southern Italy, he added Albania, scattered holdings in Greece, and the remnant of the kingdom of Jerusalem. He hoped to finish his work by conquering the Byzantine Empire. When his plans were thwarted by the sudden rebellion known as the Sicilian Vespers he called on the Church to save his empire by preaching a crusade against

his enemies. The failure of the crusade not only ended Charles's dreams of glory; it also discredited and weakened the Medieval Church.

The history of the rise and fall of Charles of Anjou is closely interwoven with the history of the papacy, the Byzantine Empire, the Italian towns, and the western kingdoms. Mr. Runciman realizes that the Sicilian Vespers were a turning point in history, only because of the intricate connections between Sicilian affairs and those of the rest of Europe. He deserves credit for not trying to oversimplify a complicated story and for presenting a mass of detail in a clear and succinct way.

It may be that the story is too involved to interest the general reader. The professional scholar will wish that some of the research had been pushed a little farther. Mr. Runciman knows the dangers of relying too heavily on the evidence of chronicles, but he does not always check them, notably in the matter of guesses about the size of armies. And he is reluctant to abandon entirely the legend that John of Procida was the great conspirator who turned the dumb resentment of the Sicilians into an organized uprising and gained the support of Aragon and Byzantium for the rebels. There is some evidence for this interpretation, but not much; on balance, John of Procida seems to have played a minor role. If anyone was the great conspirator, it was the Greek Emperor Michael VIII, but the Sicilian Vespers would not have had the success or the impact which they did if they had been a mere conspiracy. We have here rather a classical example of *hubris*; Charles's overweening ambition and the Church's failure to live up to its own moral standards led to the final tragedy.

JOSEPH R. STRAYER

Professor of History
Princeton University

L. BERNABÒ BREA. *Sicily Before the Greeks*. (Ancient Peoples and Places Series.) Pp. 258. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$5.00.

This book is one of the volumes in a new and attractive series called "Ancient Peoples and Places," edited by Glyn

Daniel. The series intends to present the general public with well-illustrated accounts of archaeological exploration all over the world. The present volume is an example of research beyond the familiar aspects of antiquity in the Mediterranean.

Sicily is best known as an island which was intensively colonized by the Greeks from the end of the eighth century B.C. in order to make it a part of Magna Graecia. It had a previous native development going back to the most remote phases of prehistory. Interest in paleolithic caves was aroused about a century ago. Since then, miscellaneous work has been done in the island with a quickening of interest in the present decade as a result of excavations in the Aeolian Islands, especially Lipari.

The latter excavations have helped to clarify the assignments of Sicilian prehistory. A clear analysis of local developments is the first desideratum: the transition from a paleolithic to a neolithic type of habitation, the first settlements, and the sequence of local Bronze Age cultures with their various material characteristics.

Dr. Bernabò Brea, who spent many years organizing museums and exploration on Sicily and Lipari, does not try to simplify matters for the reader. He gives a detailed account of the multiplicity of sites and materials. Perhaps this ought to be praised as an honest statement of complexity. On the other hand, the general reader would be better off with more emphasis on what is considered important and indicative rather than on what seem to be minor variations and freaks. This applies in particular to the enormous amount of pottery discussed. Admittedly, pottery is the mainstay of prehistoric archaeology, but it should be offered in small and selected doses to the layman.

Apart from descriptions of local sequences, the relations of Sicily to the rest of the Mediterranean and the Oriental world are of primary interest to the modern archaeologist. The spread of the "food-producing revolution" in neolithic times, the introduction of metallurgy, the opening of trade and navigation, the climax of naval enterprise, and aggression in the crisis of ca. 1200 B.C. are all problems in which Sicily plays its part. Bernabò Brea

is aware of the scope and perspective of these questions. His answers are not given in detail, and some of his suggestions seem debatable. Nonetheless, one is grateful to the author for his liberal offering of so much new information and illustration.

MACHTELD J. MELLINK

Associate Professor of
Classical Archaeology
Bryn Mawr College

WILLIAM CARROLL BARK. *Origins of the Medieval World*. (Stanford Studies in History, Economics and Political Science, XIV.) Pp. ix, 162. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. \$3.75.

This is a refreshing and inspiring book, correctly intended by the author to check the curious misconceptions widely held in the United States concerning Medieval civilization. As a result of the influence exerted by such famous European writers as Arnold J. Toynbee and J. Huizinga, the notion has become altogether too freely accepted that during the Middle Ages Western Europe was steeped in neurotic preoccupation with death, plagued by excessive fears of a personalized demon, and rendered helpless by plagues and economic adversities. Thousands of half-crazed persons, including Martin Luther—according to the presidential address delivered at the end of December 1957 before the learned representatives of the American Historical Association—sought refuge in a monastery in order to overcome the temptations of the flesh.

The author refers (p. 146) to a strange view upheld by Geoffrey Barraclough; this latter argued that there is very little distinction between Eastern and Western civilizations, and he tried to "make one big happy family of the contemporary world," believing that "historically the day of Europe and European civilization is over." The Orient is still eager to make use of "Western technology which Toynbee and some others find so objectionable." The Renaissance and the Enlightenment, as Professor Bark has brilliantly demonstrated, caused much misunderstanding through "aesthetic contempt" during the former and "anticlerical sneers" during the latter. Furthermore, the "economic snob-

bery of the early twentieth century" has added further misconceptions, based as it is upon ignorance and bias.

Medieval civilization must be regarded as an introduction to modern culture, rather than as a breakdown from classical traditions. The naïve conclusions by Henri Pirenne regarding the economic and cultural achievements of both Franks and Saracens have been adequately criticized by Bark. Significant is the conclusion drawn by the author (p. 28): "When the classical spirit was almost dead in the West, along with the Roman form of political administration and much of the rest of the old social system, the Christian spirit that was to create a new civilization was full of life and hope and confidence." This spirit was equally active during the later Middle Ages, when Italy and the Low Countries produced great works of art as well as edifying literature, and it reflected not the "waning of the Middle Ages" but much progress. Fortunately the wholesome book by Professor E. P. Cheyney, *The Dawn of a New Era*, has shown that modern civilization in the West naturally grew out of an environment which had been making suitable advancement.

ALBERT HYMA

Professor of History
University of Michigan

ERNST C. HELMREICH (Ed.). *Hungary*. (East-Central Europe Under the Communists: Mid-European Studies Center Series.) Pp. xiv, 466. New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee, 1957. \$8.50.

Originally designed to contain parallel chapters to the six other volumes included in the series of works on the East-Central European countries—Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia—Helmreich has been forced by "circumstances and general editorial policy" to make some alterations in the plan; furthermore, some topics on which chapters appear in other volumes have here been reduced to sections in related chapters. The coverage includes Hungary in history and in international affairs since 1945. The

work treats of this country's geography and demography; its government, including its constitutional system, the party and political organizations, state security, and propaganda and information media; its literature; its education; its arts; its economy, including national income and its distribution, agriculture, labor, mining, industry, transportation and communications, public health, and social security; the Hungarian revolution; the biographical sketches of leading figures of the Communist regime; a list of Hungarian party and government leaders as of August 1956; and, finally, a Bibliography.

When compared with the other works in this series, the book under review is probably the best contribution; and, furthermore, the best and most readable chapter is the introductory one by the editor entitled "Hungary in History." It is to his credit that he was able to maintain the impartial standard of American scholarship without falling into the booby trap of many prewar Hungarian historians with their racist and mystic conceptions of the role of the St. Stephen's crown in European history. But the publication is not without some weak points. The explanation which is offered by the author (or authors) of the chapters on "The Constitutional System and Government," "The Party and Political Organization," and "Propaganda and Information Media," that "for various reasons, [they] must remain anonymous" is a clumsy one; at any rate, the quality of these chapters is certainly not very high, and maybe the authors should remain "anonymous." A well-known American-Hungarian spokesman, Oscar Jaszi, is not even listed in the Index.

All in all, Hungary has been one of the most difficult countries to understand, and at the same time the 1956 revolt showed this nation's international significance. Helmreich's group has given us the most sensible synthesis and summary of the crosscurrents which this nation is experiencing under the heel of the pro-Communist regime.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

Professor of Sociology
and Political Science
University of Bridgeport

GERALD FREUND. *Unholy Alliance: Russian-German Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin*. Pp. xix, 283. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1957. \$6.00.

Since World War II, eminent historians have chronicled various aspects of the dramatic saga of Soviet-German relations in the turbulent interwar period. These studies are based upon official documents as well as on a host of autobiographies, biographies, and the memoirs of military and political participants. The author of the present volume, a former assistant to George F. Kennan at the Institute for Advanced Study and currently Carnegie Fellow of the Council of Foreign Relations, has competently utilized the above sources and has uncovered new information in the recently declassified files of the German Foreign Ministry and Army. Unfortunately there are some lacunae because certain relevant files are still inaccessible to scholars.

The reader becomes witness to the fascinating story of the "unholy alliance" between two ideologically incompatible nations. During the period of this study, 1918-26, the uneasy partners derived key advantages from their relationship, since both nations were outcasts from Western society, and they could only benefit from a policy of rapprochement in the coldly calculated game of *Realpolitik*. They cagily assisted one another in order to re-emerge as world powers.

Dr. Freund has skillfully woven the less familiar facts of this relationship into a grand design of intrigue, conflict, diplomacy, and formal alliances. He has provided fresh insights and analytical interpretations of such well-known events as the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and Germany's refusal in the postwar era to join the Allied blockade and the military adventures against Russia. When relations with the Allies became strained over such problems as the Versailles Treaty, reparations, and Upper Silesia, Germany turned East and conducted protracted negotiations with the Soviets to establish diplomatic, commercial, and military ties. The Rapallo Treaty of 1922 and the Treaty of Berlin of 1926

formalized the diplomatic alliance. The mutually beneficial secret military collaboration was fostered actively in Germany by General Seeckt and approved by top political leaders, including, later on, President Ebert and Foreign Minister Stresemann. However, the marriage of convenience had its share of family squabbles. The repeated revolutionary antigovernment activities of the Communists in Germany, which were shrewdly fostered by the Comintern, angered the German government, while German flirtations with the West, leading to the Locarno Pact, infuriated the Soviets.

The author's objective and well-documented analysis leads him to conclude, nonetheless, that, as far as Russia was concerned, a strong Germany served well as a buffer state, while for Germany, an alliance with Russia provided the necessary balance against a one-sided Western orientation advocated by some German statesmen in the mid-twenties. In an able Introduction, John Wheeler-Bennett provides the historical setting by tracing Russo-German relations from the eighteenth century to World War II.

GERARD BRAUNTHAL
Assistant Professor of Government
University of Massachusetts

J. R. M. BUTLER. *Grand Strategy*, Vol. II, *September 1939-June 1941, History of the Second World War*. (Military Series.) Pp. xix, 603. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957. \$7.82.

This excellent book, the third published in the British strategy subseries, systematically presents all aspects of strategy—diplomatic and economic as well as purely military—during the twenty-two momentous months from the opening of hostilities in Poland to Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union. While the scope is worldwide, the focus is on the central direction of the war at the seat of government in London. Professor Butler, also editor of the "Military Series," treats expansion of British forces; the Phony War; campaigns in France, Belgium, Norway, Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic; the Battle

of Britain; home defense; economic policy; and the blockade.

This was the period when British "... efforts were limited by the smallness of our resources in men and munitions. Our commitments had outrun our capacity. It was frequently a choice between action with inadequate means and no action at all. ... Many of our commanders were as yet untested, and the Services had not learnt to work together as effectively as they did later" (pp. xvii-xviii). As defeats and reverses are often more instructive than victories, this book deserves careful attention.

In view of the problems of civil defense and governmental dispersion in the age of hydrogen bombs and intercontinental missiles, British arrangements in early 1940 to carry on civil government in the event of German attack merit consideration. Regional commissioners, similar to Continental prefects but hitherto unknown to British practice, were appointed for twelve areas into which the United Kingdom was divided. Responsible to the Minister for Home Security, they represented Whitehall, and their staffs included representatives from the various government departments. They thus provided a single civil authority within each area to which the local military commanders could refer. The commissioners were authorized to take action on their own if cut off from London, and in case of invasion they were to take orders from the local military commanders.

The dominant figure of Professor Butler's book is Winston Churchill, and the author's estimate is shrewd. He "... held all the strings of the war effort in his fingers, and his considerable military knowledge, though his advisers might think it in some respects out of date, could not be ignored; apart from his political position his main strength lay in his towering personality. ...". Though always pressing hard, he was reluctant to override the chiefs of staff on technical military matters. "He was too much inclined to consider boldness as a sufficient qualification for high command, too intolerant of men with temperaments unlike his own. His greatness lay elsewhere ... the more formidable the crisis, the clearer and steadier shone his genius. ... Above all he was

great as an energiser, keying the whole people—Ministers, commanders, officials, fighting men, factory workers, and sufferers in the devastated cities—up to the highest pitch of effort and endurance" (pp. 561-62).

Professor Butler's scholarship is admirable, his style lucid and exact. The depth of his research does not appear in his documentation, for he cites only published works and does not list the official records upon which his volume is largely based. His book's only deficiency is that which is common to the whole strategic subseries. The authors do not feel free to reveal individual differences of opinion within the War Cabinet, and they therefore omit a whole area of policymaking—the pulling and hauling of conflicting ideas and interests, the challenge and response of strategy by committee—which is vital and instructive.

JOHN MILLER, JR.
Office of the Chief of Military History
U. S. Department of the Army

JOSEPH J. MATHEWS. *Reporting the Wars*. Pp. x, 322. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957. \$6.50.

This volume represents a pioneer attempt to trace the evolution of reporting war news in the period from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century.

The author, Professor of History at Emory University, deserves credit for the way in which he has compressed a segment of history with widespread ramifications into a remarkably brief piece of writing.

The work, in effect, is a short history of modern war news, told through a proper blending of a number of related historical realities: changes in the performance pattern of the press; strategy developments in the conduct of war; and shifts in the social, economic, and political climates of the various nations which have gone to war during the last 200 years.

When these elements are placed in proper perspective, they show that war news has evolved from the isolated battle bulletin—which Napoleon so much enjoyed writing—to the *total news* of the day in World War II.

During the first half of the period surveyed by Professor Mathews, war news was pretty largely the product of the governments involved in the fighting. The commander in the field was the primary news source, and he channeled his observations to his home government either directly or through a diplomat assigned to him.

This system was revolutionized about the middle of the nineteenth century when a new type of newspaper reporter appeared. This was the war correspondent who was willing and anxious to go to the field of battle to serve as a direct link between the military and the public.

The author does not attempt to name a "first" in listing the early war correspondents, but he accords considerable credit to William Howard Russell of the London *Times*—Russell covered the Crimean War on the scene—for forcing acceptance of the idea that war could no longer be covered by military handouts.

This concept reached possibly greater heights in this country during the same period because of the vigorous initiative taken by the press, particularly the New York City newspapers, in covering the Mexican and Civil Wars. The zeal of the editors was matched by an almost total lack of governmental restraints, except for decisions of occasional commanders in the field.

Once the war correspondent was accepted as the "agent" of the public, the quality and accuracy of his writing faced sharp scrutiny. The romantic descriptions of the imperialistic wars in the late nineteenth century did not help his reputation, while the sensational accounts of the Spanish-American War brought a flood of critical comments.

The totality of the fighting in World Wars I and II produced serious difficulties. The coverage of the first was widely condemned as sickeningly idealistic; it was also at this time that direct censorship was introduced by the democratic governments. In World War II, psychological warfare, including extensive field communiqués, was developed as an arm of the military. The conclusion seems obvious: there is scant

room in total war for the Richard Harding Davis tradition.

FREDERIC E. MERWIN
Director, School of Journalism
Rutgers University

BLAIR BOLLES. *The Big Change in Europe*. Pp. x, 527. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1958. \$5.95.

This is one of the better books by an American newspaper correspondent. In 1953 Blair Bolles, for some years Director of the Washington Bureau of the Foreign Policy Association, accepted the assignment of "covering Europe" for the Toledo *Blade*. The present work is a combination of firsthand observations and a considerable amount of research. Only in the blurb on the jacket does one find such an expression as "behind the scenes." When Mr. Bolles brings in a personal interview or an intimate friendship, it is to illustrate a point; when he describes class distinctions in England, he is trying to interpret the English—not to amuse the American reader. The work as a whole is a serious attempt to understand current trends in Europe, with a particular emphasis on the role of the United States in these trends.

Yet Mr. Bolles has not managed to avoid all of the pitfalls which confront writers about the contemporary scene. His book is a mixture of acute observations, sound thinking, dubious "historical lessons," and disproportionate attention to selected problems. For example, he devotes twenty-two pages to Belgium and only two pages to the Netherlands. He understands the importance of the spirit of *noblesse oblige* as a motivating force for British aristocrats; he fails to see, however, that the same spirit is to be found no less markedly in scores of Englishmen of low origins who devote their lives to labor unions and labor politics at the expense of personal gain. He sees clearly the impact of American advertising methods, labor-saving gadgets in the home, and installment buying on the working classes of France and Great Britain; but he seems to think that democracy is an American innovation, only recently exported across the Atlantic for European experimentation.

The "Big Change" in Europe is dated from 1953. This year witnessed the inauguration of President Eisenhower, the end of the Stalin regime in Russia, the coronation of Queen Elizabeth, the establishment of United States military bases in Spain, and, a little too conveniently, Mr. Bolles' assignment as a European correspondent. Most of the changes described are too gradual in their manifestations to be dated from a single year. But, to his credit, Bolles does not overdo the idea. Although his America-Europe point is a bit strained as a central thesis, his work is well worth reading. The chapters on France and West Germany are especially good.

JOSEPH J. MATHEWS
Professor of History
Emory University

RICHARD HISCOCKS. *Democracy in Western Germany*. Pp. viii, 324. London: Oxford University Press, 1957. \$7.50.

This book examines the achievements and shortcomings of West German democracy today. The author, Professor of Political Science at the University of Manitoba, is a scholar who is highly qualified for the assignment which he has undertaken. From 1932 to 1935, he lived in Germany and studied at the University of Berlin. In 1945, he commanded a Military Government Detachment in the British Zone of Occupation. He spent the year 1955-56 in the Federal Republic of Germany, gathering additional materials and interviewing a wide variety of officials and private citizens.

Dr. Hiscocks' volume places the major emphasis on "the political problem," rather than on legal, constitutional, and economic questions. After several introductory and historical chapters, he plunges into his main themes—political parties, the operation of the federal government with its "Chancellor-Democracy," state and local government, the civil service, labor unions, the German people and politics, and political education.

Unlike many contemporary studies of West Germany, the treatment of state and local government is unusually informative, with recognition being given to the demo-

cratic accomplishments at those levels. The analysis of political education, "the key to Western Germany's political future," is excellent; along with liabilities inherited from the past, there are many positive developments which augur well for the training of German citizens, and particularly German youth.

In weighing the prospects, Professor Hiscocks holds that, while "some sound foundations have been laid," the struggle for democracy "lies largely in the future, with tradition, apathy and self-satisfaction as the main obstacles to be overcome" (p. 294). "There has not been sufficient time since 1945. Nor have conditions been very propitious." Although he admits that the political climate is more auspicious than in the Weimar Republic, he scarcely does justice, in the opinion of the reviewer, to the enormous differences between the two periods. Sometimes, the evidence of unfavorable tendencies seems farfetched, as in the case of reckless drivers on the highways (pp. 228-29). The French visitor to Germany who "changed his optimistic views on German democracy after an afternoon's motoring" might have had the same experience in the United States!

These, however, are small criticisms. On the whole, the book is to be commended as a balanced and judicious account. It is provided with a good Bibliography and Index and with two useful maps.

ROGER H. WELLS
Professor of Political Science
Bryn Mawr College

EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK (Ed.). *Year of Crisis: Communist Propaganda Activities in 1956*. Pp. xix, 414. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. \$5.50.

The editor, Dr. Evron Kirkpatrick, sets out to provide a description and analysis of Communist propaganda activities each year in order to make it possible to obtain a knowledge of trends and acquire a better understanding of this propaganda. The present volume has fully achieved this aim.

The year 1956, which the book surveys, was packed with events of propaganda significance. It was the year of the Twentieth Party Congress, the de-Stalinization

campaign, the Poznan riots, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the Hungarian revolt, the Soviet armed intervention in Hungary, and the British and French troop movements into the Suez Canal zone. As the editor rightly stresses, the very propaganda formulas which had promised so much success to the Communist parties in making Communism seem more palatable at home and less menacing abroad—"co-existence," "relaxation of tensions," "many roads to socialism," "cultural exchanges"—came home to roost within the Soviet empire itself. Within the Free World, the Communist appeal declined in Western Europe and continued to rise in Asia and Africa.

The editor's exposition of propaganda themes and problems is lucid, his presentation of the background material well balanced, and his conclusions are authoritative. Propaganda activities are discussed by world areas and countries, and the treatment is reliable, sober, and comprehensive. However, I would have liked an explanation of Russia's initial hesitancy over publicizing her aid drive in the Near East. And this aid drive itself ought to be evaluated in economic terms, for its propaganda value depends in the long run on the material benefits conferred on the recipients. Another question which should have received attention was why the battle for Africa did not start until 1956? Russia's attempt to widen the rift between the United States and Britain over the Suez intervention certainly should have received treatment as should Communist propaganda activities in the United Nations.

But these are minor criticisms. The book bears out the editor's contention that "in the long-range struggle of ideas between the Communist World and the Free World, the balance is not so unequally weighted by the enormous apparatus of Communist propaganda and coercion as it sometimes seems." But it should also not be overlooked that Soviet propaganda can always and everywhere count on the support of indigenous Communists, and here the West is at a permanent disadvantage.

OTTO HEILBRUNN

Gerrards Cross
Bucks, England

ECONOMICS AND LABOR

KENNETH E. BOULDING. *The Skills of the Economist*. Pp. vi, 193. Cleveland: Howard Allen, 1958. \$3.50.

Mr. Boulding is inclined to believe that economic analysis has much to contribute to the other sciences. He asks, for example: Would it be useful for political scientists to analyze the development of the antislavery movement in terms of servomechanisms?

A simple type of servomechanism is the thermostat, a feed-back device. It has a receptor capable of detecting divergencies between the actual value of the significant variable and the ideal value. This information is transmitted by a communicator to an interpreter, the executive. The executive issues orders which are acted upon by the effector (furnace), and the change is conveyed through the effect-transmitter (radiator) to the environment. Thus the divergence originally noted is lessened.

A wrong such as slavery, says Mr. Boulding, is a divergence between a perceived ideal and an actual, recorded value of a variable. If there are wrongs which are not in the process of being righted, it is because there is no adequate servomechanism to correct the divergence.

Slavery went unchallenged until a few prophetic individuals perceived that slavery was wrong and eventually persuaded mankind to act (p. 175). These individuals were able to set in motion the machinery which almost completely eliminated divergence between their perceived ideal number of slaves (zero) and the actual number.

The above illustration is one small example of Mr. Boulding's type of thinking. His little survey book, intended for the nonspecialist, provides a sizable number of additional, similar, analytical tools offered for use by scientists outside of economics.

Note, in the example given, the simplified statement of the problem in terms of an abstract, mathematical model; note the close relationship implied between model and reality; the treatment of human behavior in mechanical terms; the limited scope afforded value judgments and dynamic elements; the implication that a society need not be closed to the correction

of wrongs; the degree of separateness between the analysis and ethics; and the lack of historical reference. There is little room here for John Brown's soul.

The same sort of approach is used all through Mr. Boulding's short series of essays. The first two of these survey modern, "more or less" classical economic theory as amended by a "moderate Keynesian" (p. 5). Economics is bounded by the skills of the economist. These skills are essentially analytical, as, for example, model making. Economics then is a study of the behavior of commodities, not of men. Labor is a commodity.

The remaining four essays deal with the following: a new kind of information system which corporations might develop, government economic policy, contributions by economics to other sciences, and the heroic ethic. Much might be said in criticism. Nevertheless, Mr. Boulding's book is stimulating, suggestive, and in a constrained sense, creative.

MICHAEL O'CONNOR

Professor of Economics
Central Michigan College

ERIK LUNDBERG. *Business Cycles and Economic Policy*. Translated by J. Potter. Pp. xx, 346. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. \$6.50.

In the past three or four decades, Sweden has acquired a remarkable reputation for being almost a Holy Land for economists. This is partly due to the richness, depth, and inaccessibility of its economic thought, and partly because of the power which economists have had in the determination of that country's policy. Therefore, Professor Lundberg's book, which is a reflective, critical commentary on Swedish economic policy since World War I, has an importance far beyond the national limits of its subject matter; and English-reading economists will be grateful to Mr. Potter for his sensitive translation, as well as to the Harvard University Press for making it available.

It is impossible to do justice in a short review to the wealth of illustration and reflection which this book contains. Its central theme is the failure of Sweden to solve what is perhaps the most basic dilemma

of its economic policy—that of reconciling rapid economic growth with stability in the price level. In the twenties and thirties, Sweden, in effect, sacrificed growth to price stability; in the forties and fifties she sacrificed price stability to economic growth. It is possible, perhaps, to read between the lines a record of disillusionment, at least with the present powers of economics. There are trenchant criticisms of "inflationary gap" analysis, of the failures of national income predictions, and of policy which is ostensibly based on these; there are even more trenchant criticisms of price control and direct trade and production controls. The book concludes with an eloquent defense of the free market, a deep skepticism about the wisdom of extensive government controls in a world of weak and fallible men, and a plea "to find such forms for our economic life in society that each human being by himself, with all his failings accepted and acknowledged, has as little opportunity for doing harm as it is possible to devise."

American readers who are unfamiliar with the Swedish experience will be fascinated by the many parallels which spring to mind between the Swedish and American experience—in agricultural policy, for instance, and in the shift toward a rehabilitation of monetary policy in the fifties. Since we are all struggling with similar dilemmas, it is both useful and somewhat disheartening to examine the experience of a small country. Here one would have thought the problem might be simpler, but, in spite of the favorable circumstances, there has been no greater success in a solution. It may be, of course, that Professor Lundberg is a little too pessimistic. In spite of the failure of price stabilization and the inefficiencies of control, the record of Swedish economic growth since the end of World War II is impressive indeed, and perhaps—dare one say it?—this was worth the price. But the price was high, and we are all interested in reducing it. Even if Professor Lundberg has not given us the answer, he has at least raised the question in a way which earns him our gratitude.

K. E. BOULDING

Professor of Economics
University of Michigan

R. W. DAVIES. *The Development of the Soviet Budgetary System*. Pp. xxi, 372. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958. \$8.50.

This book is only the second large-scale study in the field of Soviet finance to be published in the past twenty years—the other being this reviewer's *Soviet Taxation: The Fiscal and Monetary Policies of a Planned Economy*. Mr. Davies' work provides a detailed study of the Soviet budgetary system from its beginnings in 1917, when the present regime took over, until the outbreak of war in 1941. A final chapter sketches in developments since 1941 and also views the whole system in perspective. The prewar period is wisely separated into three subperiods: War Communism (1918–20); New Economic Policy (1921–29); and Planned Economy (1930–41). Soviet economic policies underwent such sharp changes in each of these periods that they represent natural cutting-off points. The author demonstrates very clearly how the changes in economic conditions and policies led to corresponding changes in financial policies.

While the discussion of the "planned economy" period is of most interest to contemporary scholars, the author's contribution toward our understanding of the earlier periods is in some respects more significant. For while other Western scholars have studied intensively Soviet financial policies after 1929, there has been little of quality written on the earlier period. Mr. Davies has made an exhaustive survey of the Soviet literature and legislation, has digested it, and has presented what will undoubtedly remain the definitive study of the pre-1928 period.

The post-1930 structure of the budget with receipts largely in the form of huge sales taxes and investment in nationalized industry comprising the major item of budgetary expenditures is explained along familiar lines. It is demonstrated that a nation in which the productive apparatus is owned by the state and which is attempting to industrialize much more rapidly than voluntary personal savings will permit is constrained by the need for control, administrative convenience, problem

of labor incentive, and so forth to adopt the budgetary structure noted above.

I have two criticisms of this study. First, the author largely neglects to make use of the postwar Western literature on the Soviet economy, confining himself almost entirely to Soviet sources. If other scholars adopted this practice, progress in the field would indeed be slow. The book could have benefited if the author had made more use of the findings of other Western researchers. Second, the author does not process, evaluate, or in any way manipulate statistically the large masses of Soviet data presented. One might have expected him, for example, to have made some attempt to estimate budgetary expenditures on subsidies, to have related sales taxes to the value of retail trade turnover, to have made some evaluation of the "real" size of the budget—the size of the Soviet budget is certainly its salient characteristic—by relating it to available national income and price series estimates produced by other Western scholars, and so forth.

But this is to criticize the author for not having written the book he did not write. The book he has written is thorough, competent, and well documented; it is recommended to all students of the Soviet economy and of public finance.

FRANKLYN D. HOLZMAN

Associate Professor of Economics
University of Washington

V. R. CIRVANTE. *The Indian Capital Market*. (University of Bombay Publications, Economics Series, No. 6.) Pp. xii, 226. Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1956. \$2.65.

India is probably the only underdeveloped country which has a capital market; even there, however, it is still of a rudimentary character. Dr. V. R. Cirvante has made the Indian capital market the subject of his investigation. Originally a doctoral dissertation completed at the University of Bombay's School of Economics and Sociology, the study has been revised and expanded for publication in its present form. One hastens to add that it is a

competent, scholarly, and worth-while piece of research.

Cirvante undertakes to provide a systematic theoretical and empirical analysis of the Indian capital market, somewhat on the lines of F. Lavington's classic work on *The English Capital Market*. But he does this on the basis of "a comprehensive theory of investment applicable to an underdeveloped country," which he has constructed "with the aid of the Keynesian tools of analysis." In his first chapter, "Investment in an Underdeveloped Country," Cirvante presents his theory; and, with one exception, this is a coherent and sober formulation of a theoretical system suited to the purpose at hand. After examining the question of why economic progress in an underdeveloped economy is bound to be slow if left to private enterprise alone, Cirvante shows how state enterprise and foreign capital can help hasten the pace of economic development. However, this reviewer takes issue with his claims of the superior advantages of foreign loans, especially governmental and international, over private foreign investments in long-term developmental projects (p. 29). To the contrary, in a favorable investment climate, private foreign investment would, for obvious reasons, be immeasurably more beneficial in furthering such programs in underdeveloped countries.

Cirvante follows the theoretical chapter with a detailed survey of the institutions of the capital market. He shows that the capital market is actually divided into two sectors: the unorganized sector, comprising mainly the indigenous bankers and moneylenders, and the organized sector which includes the banking system, stock exchanges, the new issue market, the industrial finance corporation, and the life insurance companies. The latter sector is similar to the capital markets existing in Western countries; but in India, it has thus far played a minor role in financing economic development. "Over three-fourths of the loanable funds required in the economy" are provided by the indigenous bankers and the moneylenders.

However, as Cirvante makes clear, the two sectors of the capital market are almost completely isolated. This has hin-

dered the free flow of funds between them and has resulted in a multiplicity of rate structures throughout the country, with the level of interest rates being extremely high outside the organized capital market. This high level of interest rates, particularly in the rural areas, is, according to Cirvante, the "result of the prevalent monopolistic elements in the market" which have not been shaken by the co-operative credit societies and other institutional lenders. The efforts of the Indian government to undermine, through these institutions, the monopolistic position of the indigenous bankers and moneylenders have, until now, proved largely fruitless (Chapter 2, "The Unorganized Sector of the Capital Market").

In the chapters which follow, Cirvante deals with the institutions in the organized sector of the capital market. He studies the predominance of the unique Indian system of the "managing agency" in the new issue market and its effects on the market (Chapter 3, "The New Capital Issue Market"); the organization and operation of the "stock exchanges" (Chapter 4); the state-sponsored or state-aided "industrial finance corporations" (Chapter 5) which provide the required financing for the industrial development of India; and the role of the "life insurance companies" (Chapter 6) in the capital market. In Chapter 7, Cirvante deals with the recent trends in the private sector of the economy, while in Chapter 8, he reviews the current conditions in the public sector of the capital market, emphasizing its growing importance in the rapid development of the Indian economic system.

V. R. Cirvante's book provides much theoretical and factual material on financing economic development in a backward country which should be of interest to economists, bankers, technical administrators, and others who are concerned with economic growth and progress.

ARTHUR LEON HORNIKER

Washington, D. C.

Britain and Europe: A Study of the Effects on British Manufacturing Industry of a Free Trade Area and the Common Market. Pp. xiv, 288. London: The Econo-

mist Intelligence Unit Limited, 1957. \$2.25.

This book is based upon a series of intensive studies of the conditions of British and European manufacturing industries. It was undertaken by a British research team in order to assess what the effects of membership in a European Free Trade Area would be upon British trade and production. The team believes that a convincing analysis of this problem requires the combination of an analysis from the standpoint of general economic principles as well as concrete studies of the effects of a Free Trade Area upon individual firms and industries. After a concise examination of the general issues, they accordingly undertake a detailed survey of the effects of the establishment of a Common Market upon each of the important sectors of British industry. This examination is based upon two hypotheses: first, that a Free Trade Area is superimposed upon the Common Market which has already been inaugurated; and second, that efforts to establish such an area fail. Moreover, they further refine their forecasts by taking into account the consequences of other fundamental trends, which will inevitably make the Europe in which the full effects of a Free Trade Area are realized different from the Europe of today; and their estimates refer specifically to the year 1970.

The author of a brief review of such a study would place himself in an untenable position if he were to offer a confident judgment upon the vast mass of detailed investigation which lies behind this gallant enterprise. Unless he has painstakingly worked over the whole field, as the authors of this study have done, his judgment will inevitably be superficial. A reader who is blessed—or cursed—with a cautious temperament may doubt whether the standard of statistical precision, implied in the forecast that by 1970 "Britain's GNP would grow by 41 per cent if no Free Trade Area were formed and by 45 per cent if there is a Free Trade Area," can under any circumstances be attained. Any skepticism about such precise forecasting should not, however, weaken our welcome to the conclusions of the study, which are strongly in favor of British par-

ticipation in the movement for European Free Trade. At a time when in every country any practical approach to freer trade has to be cautious and piecemeal, the institution of a European Free Trade Area would undoubtedly be a "good thing." If this book helps to convert some of the skeptical, it will have served a useful purpose.

ALLAN G. B. FISHER

Washington, D. C.

GILBERT WALKER. *Economic Planning by Programme and Control in Great Britain*. Pp. xii, 175. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. \$3.75.

After the Harvard Summer School invited Professor Gilbert Walker of Birmingham University to offer a series of lectures on British economic planning, he initiated an investigation of the origins of economic planning in the United Kingdom, its theoretical basis, and its relation to the problem of full employment. This volume summarizes British wartime experience and describes the contrasts and methods of economic planning used by the Labor governments of 1945 and 1950. It should be read as a supplement to such standard works as R. F. Harrod's *The Life of John Maynard Keynes* (London, Macmillan, 1952); Margaret Cole's *The Webbs and Their Work* (London, Frederick Muller, 1949); and Lord Beveridge's *Power and Influence* (New York, Beechhurst Press, 1955).

Professor Walker's book provides an appraisal of the philosophical tenets and motivations of economic planning. He traces the term "economic plan" to the First and Second Five Year Plans outlined by the Russians in the late 1920's and early 1930's (A. Baykov, *Soviet Economic System*). He stresses that the British economic program emerged as a result of the determination of economic planners, following World War II, that the "second peace should not be marked by the slump, depression and unemployment which had so marred the first."

The emphasis throughout this study is on the gradual evolution of a British social program, the foundations for which were laid by the Liberal governments of 1906

and 1910. It is sometimes forgotten that social reform was instigated by Mr. David Lloyd George and Mr. (now Sir) Winston Churchill. The range of social services, the numbers eligible, and the scale of benefits were greatly extended by two world wars. The Beveridge Report of 1942 recommended the compulsory insurance of all citizens, irrespective of income. In earlier schemes, only designated classes of employees were included. The success of the Beveridge plan rests on three basic assumptions: that a part of the cost of providing for children should be paid to all citizens, whether employed or not; that comprehensive health and rehabilitation services should be made available to everybody; and that employment should be maintained and mass unemployment prevented.

The significance of savings and investment for the stability of income and employment was not widely recognized until the discussions following the publication of Lord Keynes's *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* in 1936. After a consideration of the influence of this book on world-wide economic reasoning, Professor Walker traces the modern development of British social accounts. The data contained in these accounts have important implications for government policy.

The value of statistical tabulations and economic intelligence became more widely recognized by Ministers and civil servants in Britain during World War II. "Economists and statisticians . . . became as highly prized as accountants in private business and for much the same reasons." Sir Winston Churchill's memoirs and the civil histories of the war (W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, *British War Economy*, and D. N. Chester, *Lessons of the British War Economy*) provide examples of the assistance which a skillful use of statistics and statisticians was able to give to those responsible for the direction of affairs. "The economists who entered the Government service after the outbreak of war took with them among their other intellectual furniture, the ideas about income and expenditure which they had so recently been discussing." These ideas were

utilized by civil servants and statesmen who soon defined national income as "the flow of goods and services out of which all claims had to be met for the waging of war, for the support of the civilian population and for export, the means, at the time, of procuring supplies from overseas."

Today, in Britain, the Central Economic Planning Staff, the Central Statistical Office, and the Economic Section—supported by many statistical and intelligence branches, sections, and officers—constitute an organization with sufficient information to sustain a system of economic planning. This information is used in the preparation of *Economic Surveys*, in the drafting of budgets, and in the compilation of the annual estimates of national income and expenditure.

In July 1956, the Prime Minister announced that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would have as his adviser on economic and financial matters a distinguished senior civil servant who had formerly served at the ambassadorial level. Thus, economic planning in Britain came "full circle," with the British government recognizing its importance not only on the domestic level but also as an integral part of foreign policy and exchange relations.

MARY E. MURPHY

Professor of Business Administration
Los Angeles State College of
Applied Arts and Sciences

RAYMOND W. GOLDSMITH. *A Study of Saving in the United States*, Vol. I: *Introduction: Tables of Annual Estimates of Saving, 1897 to 1949*. Pp. xxx, 1138. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955. \$30.00 (the set).

—. *A Study of Saving in the United States*, Vol. II: *Nature and Derivation of Annual Estimates of Saving, 1897 to 1949*. Pp. xxiv, 632. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955. \$30.00 (the set).

RAYMOND W. GOLDSMITH, DOROTHY S. BRADY, and HORST MENDERSHAUSEN. *A Study of Saving in the United States*, Vol. III: *Special Studies*. Pp. xix, 476. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956. \$8.50.

This monumental three-volume compendium is two things at once, and for at least two different audiences. It is a mine of novel and suggestive information for the general economist about American income, wealth, consumption, and savings over the period from 1897 to 1949. It is also a model of how a statistical study ought to be put together, for here the interested reader can trace the sources of many tables back step by step to their original bases.

Most of the general conclusions are to be found in Volume I. They became available in more readable form, but without the bulk of supporting evidence, in Dr. Goldsmith's contribution (Chapter 9) to the Minnesota Savings Symposium of 1952 (Walter W. Heller, Francis M. Boddy, and Carl Nelson [Eds.], *Savings in the Modern Economy*). Some of these conclusions in capsule form are as follows: As living standards rise, more real income is required each year to maintain the same volume of saving. The share of "contractual saving"—public and private pensions, insurance, debt repayments, and so forth—in the total has risen sharply. More savings are invested through intermediary financial institutions or in enterprises controlled by the saver himself, while direct transactions between savers and borrowers have declined; conversely, the use of savings to finance growth may be said to have shifted from borrowers to intermediate agencies. There may also have been a significant decline in the relative importance of stocks as outlets for saving.

Volume II is for statisticians. It is devoted to justifying in detail the concepts of saving, income, and wealth, which are used to derive mutually consistent estimates; and this volume is also devoted to deriving piece by piece the components in the statistical totals. Perhaps one major point may be of interest to nonstatisticians. Dr. Goldsmith defines saving in a period as the net increment in wealth over the period, and also as the income of this period minus its consumption expenditures. To make these concepts mutually consistent, Dr. Goldsmith must not only construct his own series of national wealth and—for the earlier years—national income estimates, but he must revise published income series

somewhat. He increases savings to include advance payments for the unused services of durable goods, and he decreases them to allow for depreciation of the value of durables paid for previously. An illustration: If I pay 1000 dollars in year one for an automobile which lasts through year five, and add a corresponding 1000 dollars to my bank account in each of years two through five, conventional social accounting would have me saving nothing in year one and 1000 dollars in each of the other four years. Dr. Goldsmith, and much conventional business accounting, would show me saving 800 dollars in each of the five years. This volume also includes comparisons of Dr. Goldsmith's results with those of earlier studies, estimates of the accuracy of the savings figures derived, and detailed breakdowns of saving by economic sectors.

Volume III is a series of supplementary studies, mainly economic. It introduces the independent contributions of two of Dr. Goldsmith's principal associates, Mrs. Brady and Dr. Mendershausen. The latter makes a noble derivation of the upper tail of the personal distribution of wealth in 1944 from estate tax data. But 1944 was a war year, and Dr. Mendershausen's methods—somewhat revised—are currently being applied to more normal and recent periods. Mrs. Brady and Dr. Goldsmith address themselves to two different hypotheses regarding consumption and savings functions of the American economy—the basic relations between income and consumption, on the one hand, and income and savings, on the other. Their studies are unfinished and inconclusive, but they have accumulated a wealth of data in this important and controversial field. Mrs. Brady's section reads like a preliminary sketch of the Friedman "permanent income" hypothesis (Milton Friedman, *A Theory of the Consumption Function*). This permanent income hypothesis makes savings, defined as in the volume presently under review, a constant proportion of average, expected, or permanent income. The saving ratio is invariant to changes in either individual or aggregate income, although it varies among age groups and social classes and is sensitive to changes in

wealth and interest rates. Dr. Goldsmith, for his own part, explores a "supernumerary income" hypothesis which assumes that savings form a constant proportion of income over and above a certain "wolf point" at which the representative receiver makes no saving at all. Except for the interwar period, 1919–40, his correlations, while significantly greater than zero, are not large enough to inspire great confidence for analytical purposes.

Although the terminal date for these studies is 1949, Dr. Goldsmith and his associates are continuing the research which produced them. The basic series are being kept up to date, and in many cases they are being revised. Further work founded upon them is appearing year by year from the Goldsmith offices in Washington.

M. BRONFENBRENNER

Professor of Economics
Michigan State University

HARVEY LEIBENSTEIN. *Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth: Studies in the Theory of Economic Development*. Pp. xiv, 295. New York: John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall, 1957. \$6.75.

This book deals with a problem which has been much in the news for several years past—the problem of the underdeveloped areas of the world. It is the author's intention to deal both with the fundamental problems of theory which apply to the situation and with the condition of such communities. He explains in his Preface and in his introductory chapter how important it is to identify and state these fundamental problems. Any dependable analysis upon which policy might be based requires correct statement of the theoretical considerations.

It is this intention of the author which makes the book interesting and significant. He points out that there are two problems involved. The first problem is to analyze the situation of a community in which a low standard of living has reached a point of equilibrium, or quasi equilibrium. Western European countries were in such a situation before the changes wrought by

the commercial and industrial revolutions. Why have Western European countries advanced in economic productivity and living standards, while China or the countries of southeastern Asia have not made similar advances? The second problem, once the quasi equilibrium features of a backward economy have been correctly stated, is to formulate a theory which can serve as a guide for policy in raising living standards and economic productivity in such communities.

The first seven chapters deal with the first problem and assess four main hypotheses which may account for "Economic Backwardness as a Quasi-Stable Equilibrium System." The remaining chapters formulate what the author calls "the critical minimum effort thesis," defining what conditions must be fulfilled before this quasi equilibrium can be changed and in order that economic development may be begun and thereafter sustained. He emphasizes the importance of establishing conditions which would make possible the following: the sustainment of development, the ability to deal with rising income standards, the creation of active and creative entrepreneurship, the stimulation of saving and investment, and the relation of population growth to all of these factors.

The great merit of the book is the strict attention to the theoretical considerations involved. The author does go on to illustrate, in his fourteenth chapter and several supporting appendices, some statistical and practical applications of the theories he has formulated earlier in the book. To state this merit of the book is also to state its defect, at least from the standpoint of a general reader. This section of the work is expressed in terms of economic theory, and elucidation is made in the form of diagrammatic and mathematical statements. It is not an easy book to understand.

But if the reader will devote himself with determination and patience to an attentive perusal of the book, he will find that the whole complex problem of underdeveloped areas has been much illuminated and clarified.

PHILIP W. BUCK

Professor of Political Science
Stanford University

CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER. *Economic Development*. (Economic Handbook Series.) Pp. xiii, 325. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1958. \$6.50.

Like measles, books on economic development are now breaking out all over. The fever came first—now the rash.

Fortunately, the purpose of this book—faithfully pursued—as well as the author's modesty, balance, eclecticism, and open mind, makes this an exceedingly useful short text for the new "economic development" course.

Professor Kindleberger attempts to summarize present knowledge of the process of economic growth in underdeveloped countries. In 300 pages he presents a distillation of what has been written and said about economic development by others, without the detailed approach of the technical treatise. He does not attempt to add to economic knowledge. His purpose is the further dissemination of existing knowledge. The book does not offer a thesis, though there is a positive bias in favor of the market as the most effective determinant of economic activity and development.

As Professor Kindleberger notes, he "is a native of the developed part of a developed country" and "has not been employed on development planning in any area of the world, has no conscious affinity for any special underdeveloped country." Generally he maintains a splendid objectivity and a healthy skepticism, especially with reference to theorists who seize upon one factor and use it as the central, crucial, or strategic element to explain the whole process of growth.

For example, he writes: "No one ingredient is sufficient. A minimum of each is necessary. We have encountered theories which have laid special stress on resources (Huntington, Toynbee), capital formation (Harrod, Domar), technology (Schumpeter), and social capacity (Hagen). For ourselves, we have chosen the timid course of eclecticism, suggesting that each of these effects may be dominant in particular cases; none is the universal solvent. An Innes can focus on written communication, an Isard on transport, a Kardiner on basic personality, each has part of the truth, none all" (p. 130).

And elsewhere, he says: "How does a country break out of the stable equilibrium or vicious circle of poverty into an area where the process of development becomes interacting and cumulative? The answer to the foregoing question is that we don't know. Theories abound; opportunities for rigorous testing are limited" (p. 309).

After an initial orientation chapter on the process of growth, Dr. Kindleberger spends the next six chapters on the major economic ingredients and dynamic factors in this growth—land, capital, labor, technology and entrepreneurship, scale and transformation. Chapters 8–13 deal with domestic questions, with basic policy issues which should intrigue a seminar or motivate a class. Chapter 8 discusses, for example, the extent to which a developing country should rely on the price system and market mechanism or turn to governmental planning to promote economic growth. The next chapter explores whether investment under governmental planning should aim at "balance" among sectors or utilize "priorities." Chapter 10 debates labor-intensive versus up-to-date technology. The author next comes to active versus passive monetary and fiscal policy. Is inflation inevitable in the development process and can it be used as a source of capital to speed growth? Chapter 12 discusses the oft-examined question of the drag of population increases on economic betterment. Chapter 13 examines evolutionary versus revolutionary social change.

There follow four equally stimulating and thought-provoking chapters on international issues—foreign trade versus autarchy; the pros and cons of borrowing abroad; the possibilities of regional co-operation among underdeveloped countries, with Dr. Kindleberger taking a skeptical position; and the relations between underdeveloped and advanced countries, where more optimism is shown. The final chapter draws some brief conclusions.

Dr. Kindleberger brings to this work a high competence in economic analysis, a broad tolerance for competing ideas, a great skill at exposition, and a rare ability to highlight policy issues. On only two points, one major and the other quite minor, is there any disagreement.

The major matter is Dr. Kindleberger's clearly expressed emphasis on the market mechanism and the price system as the most effective allocator of resources. Granted that in developed countries a free market and an unfettered price system is essential, one wonders how the economic growth of such very backward countries as Angola, Libya, Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia, to take just a few examples, could be left to the market mechanism for development? Perhaps Dr. Kindleberger had some second thoughts on this, for on page 147 one reads: "In underdeveloped countries, however, little can be left to the market process, most must be foreseen."

The second matter is Dr. Kindleberger's overexposure to intellectual overdevelopment in Cambridge. Clearly he has spent too much time listening to and studying the thus far meager findings on economic development by the Center of International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He devotes far more attention to W. W. Rostow, Max Millikan, and Everett Hagen than he does to Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and Joseph Schumpeter. Now it is possible that our successors, fifty years hence, may find that the contributions of Rostow, Millikan, and Hagen outrank those of Smith, Marx, and Schumpeter in any exposition of economic development, but I am inclined to doubt it.

JEROME B. COHEN

Professor of Economics
College of the City of New York

VLADIMIR P. TIMOSHENKO and BORIS C. SWERLING. *The World's Sugar: Progress and Policy*. (Food Research Institute Series.) Pp. xii, 364. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957. \$6.50.

Sugar is a commodity of basic importance to the world's people. It has long been produced and consumed broadly throughout the world. The problems of production and distribution have been studied on an intergovernmental basis, and there is in operation an international sugar agreement. Sugar would thus seem to be a natural subject for analysis by the economist with his international trade theory tools. This Food Research Institute publication might be considered the result of

such an undertaking by two outstanding economists. Their final statement: "In the twentieth century, as in the nineteenth, politics more than economics is at the root of the international sugar problem" (p. 350).

In the world of sugar, the largest consuming interests do not seem to be concerned with low-cost output as such. The largest producer and exporter of sugar argues for the lower prices which would prevail from broad competition on a free market. Under these circumstances, Timoshenko and Swerling do not prescribe; they simply point out the long persistence of an imbalanced position between (potential) supply and use in the world, on the one hand, and the irrational distribution between costs and benefits to producers in various parts of the world, on the other. One can be reasonably certain that there will be a growth of output with technical progress, be it initially on the side of agriculture or the sugar mill. The expansion is apt to affect areas whose market is protected—relative costs more or less notwithstanding.

The complexities—political and economic—which bind consumers to certain producers do not lend themselves readily to systematic analysis. On the other hand, while international sugar may be more difficult, it is still one of a number of roughly parallel cases where the developments affecting international trade are more nearly the results of factors not directly associated with the commodity. Thus, as far as sugar is concerned, changing colonial relationships, established markets for manufactured exports, and the contributions of beet sugar cultivation to nonsugar agriculture all seem to be more important than over-all supply and demand or the problem of comparative costs. Perhaps there is room for detailed analysis of the conditions under which Cuba reduces her output, the United Kingdom and Japan their participation in the free, nonpreferential market, and the like. These may give insight, however preliminary, into the importance of noneconomic factors. Perhaps, too, there is room for some joint activity: economic and political theorists together might better, at the international equilibrating tendencies

a commodity so important to human diet and human productive endeavor.

These are the kinds of observations to which one is moved after a cover to cover reading of this book. On the other hand, individual parts of the book are certainly definitive, as, for example, sugar developments and policies in important areas—the United States, the United Kingdom, Continental Europe, and the Soviet Union each receives a separate chapter—the interrelationships of beet and cane agriculture and sugar mills, and the progress and consequences of technical advance. These subjects are handled with the clarity and technical competence which are expected from the authors and the Food Research Institute. In general, the treatment is more thorough on supply than on demand—even in these regional presentations. Indeed, the major functional treatment is actually an exercise in the complex theory of the firm under dynamic conditions, with valuable insights into the process of economic expansion being gained. Little attention is given to the economics of sugar consumption and the income and price factors bearing upon the amount and form of sugar utilization. This would be of major importance in a study which did emphasize the evolving world sugar economy.

WILFRED MALENBAUM

Visiting Professor of Economics
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

HENRY H. SCHLOSS. *The Bank for International Settlements: An Experiment in Central Bank Cooperation*. Pp. xi, 184. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1958. \$4.00.

This monograph brings together useful information about the founding of the Bank for International Settlements and its early activities in connection with reparations payments and the international financial crisis of 1931. However the picture it gives of what the Bank has done since 1933 is sketchy. In several places Dr. Schloss refers to the Bank's secrecy about its activities (pp. 95, 123–24, 127) and the obstacles which this places on giving more details about its work. There is a short history of wartime activities (pp. 102–21)

and of the Bank's work since 1946 (pp. 122–31). This includes its co-operation with the Organization for European Economic Co-operation and its role as fiscal agent for the European Payments Union and other international agencies. In the concluding chapter, Dr. Schloss stresses the service of the Bank as a spokesman for the importance of monetary policy and for a return to currency convertibility. An Appendix of over thirty pages lists the stockholders of the Bank and indicates their voting power, presents a selected list of executive officers since its founding, includes the Statutes as amended in 1937 and 1950, and contains the Table of Contents of the 26th Annual Report.

The book suffers from carelessness in a number of details. The account of some of the Bank of England's operations in the nineteenth century (pp. 8–9) appears to be based on Continental sources and does not agree with the accounts in British primary sources or standard histories of that Bank; reference to the suspension of the Bank Charter Act of 1844 (p. 16) implies that this was a suspension of convertibility of the Bank's notes; and a discussion on page 77 suggests that the Hoover moratorium of 1931 came after the suspension of payments by the Bank of England.

FRANK WHITSON FETTER

Professor of Economics
Northwestern University

HOWARD R. SMITH. *Government and Business: A Study in Economic Evolution*. Pp. xi, 802. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1958. \$7.50.

As the author states in his Preface, his "most important [consideration] was a desire to emphasize the underlying context within which economic policy is formulated." The context underlying "the decision-making process" is "property as laissez faire." The evolution, still in progress, has gradually tamed the property giant—on the prowl after the victory of industrialism in the 1860's—and made him social. Yet will this socializing process have costs in the undermining of individual initiative and inventiveness which may make us question its worth? Only the future can tell, and there will probably be various tellings. The

struggle between property rights and human rights always seems to furnish yet another and deeper layer of context.

Chapters on "The Meaning of Public Interest" and "The Decision-Making Process"—very well written, indeed—lead the student or general reader to the constitutional beginnings and to state regulation. The Charles River Bridge case (1837) is accented as the beginning of the state-police power's tempering of Marshall's rigorous doctrine in the Dartmouth College case. Competition is controlled by the Sherman Anti-Trust Law of 1890; markets are regulated by the Meat Inspection and Pure Food and Drug Acts of 1906; income is redistributed as the result of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 which enabled Congress to enact a third income tax law; and economic stabilization has been attempted by the passage of the Federal Reserve Act. These are beginnings, and each has come about as the result of "frictions and frustrations."

It is the author's idea that the Eisenhower administration has actually furthered our mixed economy. It may be said that socialism has crept forward since 1952. There has been no great challenge to the New Deal, no exhorting to repeal. Social Security has been broadened and deepened, the minimum wage raised, farm price supports continued, funds appropriated for public housing. Professor Smith writes: "... the longer the period of time and the more important the issues under consideration, the smaller is the significance of ebbs and flows in party politics" (p. 708). Or perhaps the apparently normal circumstance of a Republican President and a Democratic Congress is both the effect and cause of the confused moderationism of today's politics. The clock is not being turned back now as in the 1920's. We are still too close to the depression to which the 1920's led.

It is not easy to compare this textbook with Wilcox or Mundt, as, for example, in respect to the story of the antitrust movement. Both of the latter quote cases at greater length and go more fully into the economics of basing-point pricing, conscious parallelism of action, and fair trade. But there is a broader sweep of treatment

in possibly a wider context here. The subject matter is complex and a step-by-step approach is used. Some details are eliminated, and a most absorbing story is told.

ROBERT ROCKAFELLOW

Professor of Economics
University of Rhode Island

RAYMOND W. GOLDSMITH. *Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy Since 1900*. (National Bureau of Economic Research, Studies in Capital Formation and Financing, No. 3.) Pp. xxxv, 415. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. \$8.50.

The application of quantitative analysis to major aspects of our economic life has yielded a vast storehouse of basic information making possible a more meaningful reconstruction and understanding of our economic past. Raymond W. Goldsmith is among those scholars who have contributed so greatly to this quantification of our economic processes. His newest study, *Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy Since 1900*, adds with distinction to his earlier works. Drawing heavily from the data amassed in his monumental three volume work, *A Study of Saving in the United States*, Goldsmith casts much light on the development and role of "financial intermediaries." These institutions include most financial enterprises primarily engaged in holding and trading in debt claims and equities, such as the banking system, personal trust departments, insurance organizations, investment banks, savings and loan associations, and the like. Goldsmith's statistical study of the anatomy of American financial intermediaries is a significant contribution on three levels: it provides a rich storehouse of information; it presents a clear view of the long-range financial trends of our economy; and it outlines a theory of financial institutions.

One can only begin to suggest the great amount of information pertaining to financial intermediaries made available in this study. The anatomical structure of financial institutions is seen in many dimensions. The growth of their assets, variations in the rates of asset growth, the growth in numbers, changes in the structure of assets.

the share of different financial intermediaries in financing the economy's growth—these are some of the quantities gathered together.

Beyond these quantities there stand also the significant trends in the development of financial intermediaries since the turn of the century. The most important of these are: the substantial and continuous rise in the proportion of tangible assets held; the decline in the total assets held by the banking system; the moderate rise in the share which financial intermediaries have in the external financing of other economic groups; the increasing significance of financial intermediaries as outlets for current personal saving; and the supplying of most of the financial intermediaries' funds by nonfarm households.

From the accumulation of data and the tracing of major trends, Goldsmith goes on to sketch a theory of financial institutions, checking carefully his data and relationships. From the formal notion that "the role of financial intermediaries is determined primarily by the ratio of the sum of money, insurance reserves, and (non-monetary) deposits in financial intermediaries to the sum of equities, long-term debt, and accounts payable of all other economic units," Goldsmith presents a careful theoretical explanation of financial development and projects some trends into the future.

One question which is implicit in this study relates to our present system of monetary control: given the important role of nonbank financial institutions, does our central banking system have adequate power to achieve its goals if it only has control over the commercial banks? This is only one of many pressing questions which must emerge from the penetrating study which Goldsmith has made of our financial institutions.

CHARLES HOFFMANN

Department of Economics
Queens College
Flushing, N. Y.

WILLIAM E. DICK. *Atomic Energy in Agriculture*. (Atoms for Peace Series.) Pp. x, 150. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. \$6.00.

Radiation genetics is one of the most exciting fields in agriculture today. Briefly, it consists of changing the hereditary characteristics of life itself by irradiating the hereditary mechanism to induce genetic change or mutations.

This accelerates nature's own evolutionary process by which she spontaneously, but rarely, introduces new hereditary characteristics into a species.

Mutant changes—natural or induced—are both good and bad, depending on the environment. They are "good" in an agricultural sense if they allow the plant or animal to perform more satisfactorily in its environment or to adapt to a wider range of environmental conditions than before. Those mutations which are "bad" fail to flourish and may perish as individual characteristics. Or they may become entrenched in the species and cause a gradual or precipitous decline in the species itself.

How atomic energy has greatly expanded the field of radiation genetics is perhaps the most interesting part of *Atomic Energy in Agriculture*. This book is one of the volumes in the "Atoms for Peace Series" developed under the general editorship of D. Wragge Morley. Others in the series are *Atomic Energy in Medicine* and *Economics of Atomic Energy*.

William E. Dick, a research biologist and editor of chemical journals, bases this volume on the papers presented at the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy held at Geneva in August 1955.

The author studiously avoids the sensational. He leaves it to the reader to project his own imagination beyond the scientific fact and caution of the book.

A chapter on photosynthesis—the source of all our plant food—introduces the technique of tracing radioactive carbon through the living processes. A new light is shed on photosynthesis, and if the riddle of photosynthesis is ever completely solved, the tracer technique will have made a major contribution.

Other chapters show how the tracer technique reveals valuable information about fertilizer application and forestry growth habits. (Groves of like species of trees have been found connected by an intricate

underground system of naturally occurring root grafts.)

A final chapter—there are six in all—describes how atomic energy may become important for food preservation and sterilization of food and pharmaceuticals and how atomic energy is being used to destroy and control pests and diseases.

This book is a good account, with ample reference to early work, of the status of the use of atomic energy in agriculture at the time of the Geneva Conference.

It will be a good starting place for the student or scientist who intends to do work in the field. The general information will be of interest to most trained people who have an interest in or are operating in the professional fields of agriculture.

CLAUDE GIFFORD

Associate Editor
The Farm Journal
Philadelphia, Pa.

J. DOUGLAS BROWN and FREDERICK HARBISON. *High-Talent Manpower for Science and Industry: An Appraisal of Policy at Home and Abroad*. Pp. 97. Princeton: Industrial Relations Section, Department of Economics and Sociology, Princeton University, 1957. \$3.00.

This volume consists of two essays on the problem of developing "seed-corn" human resources in the "Century of Science." In much the more substantial of the essays, Professor Brown discusses steps which can be taken by corporations, universities, and the state to help meet the shortage of creative scientific, engineering, and industrial executive talent which is said to confront the United States because of its accelerated rate of growth over the past forty years. Such special talents are scarce and highly individual, and they cannot be produced by mass production or crash programs.

He suggests ways in which corporations can improve their selection, utilization, and motivation of men of high talent and expand their support of higher education. Colleges and universities must do a better job of identifying, attracting, and serving students of high potential. This requires raising the level of secondary education,

much more investment in education, and enlarging the supply of good teachers. The primary responsibility of government, says Brown, is to avoid interference in the free educational process. He is critical of its influence for "know-how" instruction. Government research grants are unduly tied to national security. Beyond a few high-level national science fellowships, he would have government funds go to underwrite the educational apparatus as a whole.

Professor Harbison discusses the needs of underdeveloped countries for a somewhat lower order of talented man power. Because of the nature of the industrialization process and the social and political problems associated with it, the scarcity of agricultural specialists, process engineers, engineer-managers, and skilled private and public administrators in these countries can be the most serious limiting factor for economic growth. They cannot meet all their human-resource needs at once and so must make a cruel choice. Harbison contends that the choice must be to neglect mass education in order to develop a few high quality secondary schools to train scientists, engineers, and administrators.

These essays do not present new material or really new ideas, but they marshal effectively and systematically the arguments for principles of man-power development which can bear re-emphasis. This reviewer wishes that more attention had been given in the first essay to the goals and values of the man-power policy which is urged for the United States. The goal is said to be promotion of "all the good attributes of civilized living." At least by implication, specific ends which are recognized in the discussion are national security and rapidly rising living standards. The values underlying the various possible goals are not necessarily the same and are not equally acknowledged by all citizens.

VAN D. KENNEDY

Professor of Industrial Relations
Department of Business Administration
University of California, Berkeley

NEIL W. CHAMBERLAIN, FRANK C. PIERSON, and THERESA WOLFSON (Eds.). *A Decade of Industrial Relations Research*,

1946-1956. (Industrial Relations Research Association Publication, No. 19.) Pp. viii, 205. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$3.50.

It is next to impossible to do justice in a brief review to this highly condensed compendium. It is divided into six chapters: Chapter 1, "Union and Union Leadership" by Joel Seidman and Daisy L. Tagliacozzo; Chapter 2, "Collective Bargaining" by Joseph Shister; Chapter 3, "Wage Determination in Theory and Practice" by Melvin Reder; Chapter 4, "The Economic Effects of Unionism" by George H. Hildebrand; Chapter 5, "Employee Benefit Plans" by Robert Trove; and Chapter 6, "The Labor Movement Abroad" by Adolf Sturmthal.

It goes without saying that with the three general editors who are mentioned above and with the roster of the authors of individual chapters, the reader should find in this short volume of about two hundred pages the best possible summing up of the contributions during the last decade in the field of industrial-relations research.

The present reviewer was personally pleased to have the opinion of Joel Seidman and Daisy L. Tagliacozzo that "the most influential work in the trade union field continued to be Perlman's, *A Theory of the Labor Movement*, first published in 1928"; "that much of the theoretical discussion indeed consisted of criticism or defense of Perlman's thesis, or a challenge of particular aspects of it"; and he cannot but agree fully with their further view that "the time is probably right for new theoretical insights into the nature of the labor movement and for an integration of the knowledge based upon the empirical material accumulated in the post war decade." They likewise have emphasized the works by Tannenbaum, by Foster and Foner (along Marxian lines), and by Taft and Dunlop.

Professor Hildebrand has done a good job of bringing together the biggest hodgepodge of contradictions ever put forth by a group of economists. Ranging from the union-as-bogeyman view of Simons and Lindblom to the inverted prounion argu-

ments of Friedman (if unions have no substantial economic effects, the issue of their monopoly power is meaningless), it is no mean accomplishment to have brought order to such chaos. Professor Hildebrand emphasizes, indeed he may have overemphasized, the political influence of unions. In our opinion he unduly assigns to the union movement—with the concession of middle-class support—the major part in bringing about what has come to be known as the "welfare state" in America.

Professor Reder's essay expertly summarizes and relates the debate which is current in wage theory and the findings of research in the area of wage determination. Quite rightly he holds that the labor economist has a primary interest in the *process* by which wages are set, while economic theoreticians are for their part most interested in the behavior of wage rates and the conformity of this behavior to the competitive model.

Because of his interest in process, the labor economist's attention is directed toward a short-term period, a period in keeping with the duration of a wage-policy decision (by management and/or labor). In addition, because his concern with the functioning of labor markets and changing wage rates has "been a by-product of interest in collective bargaining and unionism as such"—taken here to imply the view of unionism as a social as well as an economic movement—the labor economist is prone to lean quite heavily upon empirical research.

That the research in the area is in varying degrees insufficient, inconclusive, or even contradictory is more the result of the youth of the interest—which may be said to date from 1929—than the shortcomings of the researchers. As Professor Reder points out, however, the labor economist is rather hard put when it comes to assailing the comparatively more sophisticated views of his theoretical opposites. By and large research in wage determination at this point is insufficient to mount an attack on the competitive hypothesis.

SELIG PERLMAN

Professor of Economics
University of Wisconsin

C. WILFRED JENKS. *The International Protection of Trade Union Freedom*. (The Library of World Affairs Series, No. 35.) Pp. xl, 592. New York: Frederick A. Praeger under the auspices of The London Institute of World Affairs, 1957. \$15.00.

The international protection of trade union freedom is one of the vital issues in contemporary international law.

No one but Mr. C. Wilfred Jenks, Assistant Director-General of the International Labour Office in Geneva, who is both the top-legal adviser to that organization and one of the few specialists in international labor law—being master at the same time of theory and practice—is really qualified to describe how, from a timid beginning, a systematic procedure built up a new and unique experience in international law.

In the first part of his book, he describes the basic "legal" instruments of the ILO; these are based principally on two Conventions: one on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (1948), and one on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (1949), to which should be added a number of pronouncements which represent "a consensus of informed opinion and are frequently referred to during the examination by international procedures of questions relating to freedom of association."

In the second part, the author describes these various international procedures. Most important of all, there is the special ILO machinery to deal with allegations of the violation of trade union freedom.

The third part of the book consists of a review of the extent to which the rights proclaimed in the 1948 and 1949 Conventions are in fact respected throughout the world. The picture is impressive, both in its negative as well as in its positive aspects.

This review leads to the final part of the book in which the author attempts to evaluate the results of ILO procedure as a whole. In spite of obvious weaknesses, and in spite of the invocation by government of the eternal argument of "national sovereignty," the conclusion leaves no doubt that since

1950 ILO action "represents a significant chapter in the story of the development of international law into the law of an organized world community dedicated to human rights and fundamental freedoms in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."

Mr. C. Wilfred Jenks's contribution to the achievement of such a world community is at the same time great and courageous. Governments, employers, trade unionists, sociologists, and legal research men alike owe him a debt of profound gratitude.

HERMAN PATTEET

Permanent Representative
International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions
Geneva, Switzerland

CHARLES R. WALKER. *Toward the Automatic Factory: A Case Study of Men and Machines*. Pp. xxii, 232. New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1957. \$5.00.

This book is a case study of the problems involved in starting and running a new semiautomatic seamless pipe mill.

The book is divided into five parts: the first describes the new process; the second the change from old to new; the third the new mill once it got going; the fourth analyzes some of the characteristics of the new work-groups in relation to the events of the three years of the study; and the last gives an analytical framework within which to consider the change-process which has previously been described.

The picture of the new mill is excellently done. Even those who are quite unfamiliar with steel mills cannot help but get a vivid picture of what it was like to work in the new mill. The description of the change from the old to the new is told, for the most part, in quotations by workers and supervisors.

The chapter on "Highlights Over Three Years" gives a fascinating account of how not to manage a change-process, but the story is told with understanding and sympathy for those who are faced with its problems.

The study was carried out by means of a series of interviews and observations.

The interviews were structured in the sense that they were designed to get specific information but were sufficiently open to allow real attitudes to show. The author and those who assisted him have clearly been sensitive to the feelings of those they have interviewed and insightful in their selection of material.

If I make any criticism of the presentation it is that the author has allowed the workers to speak too much for themselves. He has summarized in his own words too seldom. The reading of discontinuous quotations particularly when the same sentiments are expressed in many different ways may give verisimilitude, but it becomes tedious to read. This is not to say that some of the quotations do not frequently convey in one short sentence what would otherwise take pages of description.

The real meat is in the last part: "How to think about it." Here the concept of a production *system* as a living and changing process is discussed. The effect of the past on the present and the need for management to take as adequate steps in the planning and management of the social system as in technological and financial systems are emphasized. There are interesting comments on the incentive system and a plea for new thinking about methods of payment with the introduction of automation.

This is a statement of practical objectives with constructive suggestions. Every manager faced with the need to introduce technological change would do well to study it.

A. K. RICE

Consultant
Tavistock Institute
London

STUART JAMIESON. *Industrial Relations in Canada*. (Studies in International Labor.) Pp. ix, 144. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957. \$1.75.

In many respects this book should fulfill the expectations of the promoters of this series. Mr. Jamieson shows capability in dealing with comparisons and is uninhibited in making evaluations; he provides economic and political analysis and interprets freely from an unusually broad basis of

causation. He is also a good stylist, though at times he writes with little regard to chapter headings.

The first three-quarters of the book are primarily devoted to a study of trade unionism in Canada. Chapter 1 deals with the chief factors which have conditioned it and given it its present character; Chapter 2 deals with its growth and development; and Chapter 3 with its structure, government and policies. Of the factors which have conditioned trade unionism in Canada and given it its present character, one of the most outstanding has been the presence of the United States; this is a country which is more advanced industrially, has a higher degree of productivity per worker, a higher wage-paying capacity, and is ever communicating the "demonstration effect" of its better equipped unions.

In Chapter 2, readers who are familiar with the history of the American Labor Movement will welcome meeting the Knights of Labor once again, but this time giving a lengthier and less tragic performance. They will find the Gompersian pattern of unionism which reached through the extended internationals into the setup of Canada's Trades and Labor Congress; they will find a radical West rebelling against a more populous and conservative East; and industrial unions, expelled from the Congress under the no-dual union doctrine, ending up by forming one of their own. But along with these parallel developments they will find differences. The most notable of these is a forty year competitive challenge from pure Canadian unionism with its own congress, and, more recently, a continuing regional challenge from Catholic unions in Quebec—an interesting story in itself.

Chapter 3 explores the question: In what sense are Canadian unions within the international complex dominated by top officers in the United States? And the author goes on to examine the placement and play of authority between headquarters, intermediate councils, and local branches among the different types of unions. The degree and assurance of autonomy have displaced the older issue of national versus international unionism, and autonomy as it affects Canadian sections rests upon factors some-

what different from those affecting American sections.

Noticeably lacking throughout these chapters, in view of the book's title, is any frontal attack on *industrial relations* (narrowly defined) centering on bargaining, changing bargaining structure, topics bargained over, collective agreements resulting, and their administration within the plants. Nor is this compensated for in Chapter 4, despite the fact that the legislation described there involves assisting in the bargaining processes and providing certain controls over both negotiation and administration.

The brief descriptive statement covering the main features of Canada's labor relations legislation should interest foreign readers. One could wish, however, that Jamieson had attempted an exposé of its effects upon the economy during the fourteen years of its operation; its evaluation by men on both sides of the industrial fence; and some of the issues, social and administrative, which it has engendered. His pages on the effects of this labor relations legislation upon strikes are suggestive but inconclusive. His remarks on conciliation features do not reflect adequately the controversy which has stimulated investigations and which, in Ontario, has resulted in protracted legislative hearings. Bad or good, this is significant legislation and a knowledge of it might well benefit students anywhere.

H. A. LOGAN

Labor Relations Consultant
Ontario Department of Labour
Toronto

CLIFTON K. YEARLEY, JR. *Britons in American Labor: A History of the Influence of the United Kingdom Immigrants on American Labor, 1820-1914*. (The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science Series, Vol. LXXV, No. 1.) Pp. 332, ix. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957. \$4.00.

Granted that American labor is more than merely a product of its own environment, and granted, furthermore, that ideas and men "imported" from abroad—chiefly from Europe—played a very important role in the development of the trade union

movement, some interesting and even perplexing questions still confront the labor historian. What was the character of the contributions coming from Germany, England, and the Slavic countries? To what extent did foreign ideas undergo a process of adaptation to American circumstances? In which direction—radical, conservative, democratic, secretarian—did immigrant men and ideas guide American trade unions during their formative years? Precise answers to questions such as these cannot be formulated, for we lack the criteria and standards of measurement. But to the extent that thorough and objective historical research can help in making an assessment of the importance of the migratory movement, this work by Clifton Yearley is remarkably successful.

Despite its apparently restrictive title, this is not only a study of immigrant organizers and intellectuals from England, Scotland, and Wales—Ireland is deliberately omitted. It is just as much concerned with the impact on American labor's goals and methods of the ideas, correspondence, visitors, occasional funds, and so on, which crossed the Atlantic during American labor's formative period. Taking up in turn the unsuccessful efforts to forge organic links between British and American unions, the highly effective work of British organizers in different industries and various sections of the country, and the tremendous effort which went into the creation of the co-operative organizations, the author succeeds in conveying a colorful picture of the effect on the American labor and social movements of men and ideas "made in Britain." Through an impressive combination of biography and social history, of narrative and analysis, he traces the special British contribution to the development of American union aims and structure, to the benefit programs and welfare plans, to the collective bargaining and arbitration, and to the state legislation and court decisions. The concluding chapter constitutes probably the best summary which could be made of the British impact on American labor and of the reasons which eventually led to the decline of British influence. Yearley has amply documented his major conclusion: "Because

[British] moderating influences came just as the modern American labor movement was beginning to emerge, they decisively shaped the future course of its development."

A valuable biographical note and an adequate Index complete this well-written, thoroughly documented, and ably executed monograph.

JOHN P. WINDMULLER
Associate Professor of Industrial
and Labor Relations
Cornell University

MARK PERLMAN. *Labor Union Theories in America: Background and Development*. Pp. xv, 313. Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 1958. \$6.00.

The emergence of the trade union as a distinctive feature of modern urban industrial life has attracted the attention of many scholars. Apart from studies of specific features, attempts have been made to generalize the evidence into broad theories of union origin, behavior, and social impact. Mr. Perlman's volume is an examination of "the major explanations of American unionism," elaborated before 1932—theories "written long enough ago to have ripened sufficiently for analysis." The theories have been divided into five categories: Christian-Socialist, which viewed unions as moral institutions; Marxian-Socialist, which saw unions as revolutionary institutions; environmental-psychological, which described unions as the consequence of psychological reaction by workers to the process of wage employment; the tradition of neoclassical economics, which viewed unions as welfare institutions seeking to maximize the economic returns of workers; and the social institutionalist, arising out of the German Historical school and viewing unions as part of the process of extending the range of democratic action in society.

Based on biographies of key exponents, Perlman devotes a chapter to each intellectual tradition, giving a brief background of the environment out of which the theory emerged, a brief statement of the seminal propositions, and, finally, a discussion of the major works in which the ideas are elaborated. A final chapter is devoted to

a summary and comparison of the five theories.

There is need for a study which will analyze and synthesize the various theories of the labor movement. Unfortunately, Perlman's volume fails to give us what is needed. The book suffers from a confusion of objectives. On the one hand, the author attempts to provide an intellectual history of the ideas he refers to as "theories." And although he provides a useful classification of names and the ideas associated with them, as an intellectual history the result is fragmentary and the sociology of knowledge implicit is extremely crude. On the other hand, his analysis of the theories suffers in part from the taxonomy, but more fundamentally from his failure to understand the requirements of a theory. If a theory is a coherent body of general propositions used as principles of explanation for a class of phenomena, then many of the "theorists" and their "theories" have no place in the discussion. This is most obvious in the chapter on "Unionism as a Revolutionary Institution." His exemplars are tacticians, concerned with day-to-day conflict, contributing little if anything to an understanding of general principles. It might be possible to treat them as theoreticians, but only in the context of an extended discussion of Marxism. Unfortunately, Perlman's discussion of the Marxian analysis of unionism leaves much to be desired, and we are deprived of a useful statement of a Marxian theory of the labor movement as it is applied to the United States.

The book is uncertain as to its objective, inadequate in its taxonomy, and distressingly weak in its analysis. Apart from any other analytical failings, there is one especially which stands out: Perlman's failure even to conceive of the possibility that there is no such thing as a theory of the American union movement, that American unionism may represent only one case of a more general type.

The volume seems somewhat too skimpy to be used by students as a textbook, and it is certainly too thin to be a contribution to scholarship. But even disappointing books have their uses. Mr. Perlman has brought together the names and sketched

briefly the main ideas which are floating about in the field. He has also suggested, perhaps inadvertently, how limited has been the attention paid to this extremely critical intellectual issue, the theory of the labor movement.

MORRIS DAVID MORRIS
Associate Professor of Economics
University of Washington

SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

ARNOLD M. ROSE (Ed.). *The Institutions of Advanced Societies*. Pp. ix, 691. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958. \$10.50.

In his Introduction to *The Institutions of Advanced Societies*, Arnold Rose discusses the pressing need for the development of sociological methods and concepts adequate to provide a better understanding of complex societies and an emerging world society through the comparative analysis of national institutions. This volume, which contains essays on some institutions in ten countries—the United Kingdom, Australia, Finland, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Israel, France, Brazil, and the United States—is intended as a "first step" in this direction. Nine of the authors are sociologists, and all but one are members of the society about which they write.

Several of the studies are primarily descriptive. Thus the essay on Australia by Ronald Taft and Kenneth F. Walker is, in effect, a summary statement of available sociological information. In contrast, the essay on France—the only one, incidentally, not originally written in English—attempts to clarify the contemporary dilemma of France through a consideration of "political aspects" of the society, past and present; in so doing, François Bourricaud assumes detailed familiarity with French history and literature, and his writing is evocative rather than analytical. The essay on Poland by Jan Szczepanski illustrates some of the difficulties of a writer who, in a rapidly changing society, attempts simultaneously to assay the effects of change and to confine himself to

the viewpoint of an imposed political ideology. Two of the essays are primarily thematic analyses. S. N. Eisenstadt, writing about Israel, deals systematically with social change growing out of the assumption of full political responsibility by a people whose social and cultural composition is itself undergoing continuous change. In the essay on the United States, Jessie Bernard explores changes in attitudes toward freedom and equality in a society which has shifted from an economy of scarcity to one of abundance.

The essays on Israel and the United States in particular indicate the possibilities of thoughtful analysis by individuals in settings where a discipline has acquired sophistication and over-all competence. For the general reader, the most interesting essays are perhaps those on countries—that is, Finland by Heikki Waris, Poland, Yugoslavia by Oleg Mandich, and Greece by John Koty—on which organized information is, for different reasons, less readily available than on the others.

No cross-cultural analysis is attempted in this volume. The briefness of the essays, the diversity of viewpoint about what constitutes social data and social analysis, cultural differences of emphasis, both implicit and explicit, all point to problems which must be faced if the next steps in comparative sociological analysis are to be undertaken with a promise of success.

RHODA MÉTRAUX
Institute for Intercultural Studies
New York City

PHILIP E. JACOB. *Changing Values in College: An Exploratory Study of the Impact of College Teaching*. Pp. xvi, 174. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$3.50.

It is obvious that this book was planned and completed before the Russian satellites were launched and before Congress made our educational system the scapegoat for our failure to get up there first. In any event, for good or bad, the high school is not held responsible for the values a student holds as a college freshman, nor for the deficiencies in his ability for critical thinking. The dearth of scientists and the poor quality of the teaching

of science are not mentioned. The author, sponsored by the Hazen Foundation, started out with a specific, narrow goal—to appraise the effectiveness of general education courses in the social sciences in bringing about changes in the values held by college students. Professor Jacob and his research associates proceeded in a scholarly, orderly, and painstaking manner. Programs and courses were studied at thirty institutions, and valuative data of the general effect of college experience were studied and analyzed. Of equal importance to the reader, there has been brought together an inventory of several hundred manuscripts which represent research on the impact of higher education on student values. The inventory is conveniently arranged to be helpful for later reference and is skillfully used by the author—in lieu of tiresome footnotes—to buttress his text.

Professor Jacob's findings have to do first with the values held by college students, secondly with the impact of college experience on these values, and finally with the influence of curricula on such values. The roles of the instructor, of teaching methods, of the "climate" of certain institutions, and of student personality are also examined with reference to his major inquiry.

As far as values are concerned, the author accepts the conclusions of the studies which he examined. We are informed that "students today tend to think alike, feel alike, and believe alike." Differences in the size, type, and location of colleges, or in programs or methods of instruction, do not alter the homogeneity of basic student values. To the extent that students differ in their values, the differences are about the same in kind and degree among the various types of institutions. The values which students hold in common are described in the following terms: self-confidence, self-interest with a strong family tie, conventional religious faith, morality (qualified), lack of interest in public responsibilities, tolerance, and a high regard for the importance of a college education.

Professor Jacob's conclusions are, with minor qualifications, negative. He finds no general education curriculum, no social science course, no method of instruction, and

no identifiable quality of instruction sufficiently effective to insure any impact upon the value profile of college students. He does, however, find "potency to affect student values" in the "distinctive climate of a few institutions." The findings can either be a cause for despair or a challenge to do something, providing one accepts the following promises: that the values ascribed are valid, that these values are at complete variance with the values held by college teachers, and that it is the function of a college to change student beliefs in such matters as religion, confidence in one's self, or even in family-centered self-interest.

It is possible that the data studied only served to reveal that mere exposure to a liberal education is not sufficient. Perhaps the potency of certain institutions can be attributed to more rigorous discipline, to study in depth, or to exacting higher standards of admission and performance from those who serve four years.

SAMUEL S. STRATTON

President
Middlebury College

FERDINAND TÖNNIES. *Community & Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft)*. Translated and edited by Charles P. Loomis. Pp. xii, 298. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957. \$7.50.

Ferdinand Tönnies produced his first and best-known book, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, in 1887 at the age of thirty-two. Eight editions of this work have appeared in German, and Tönnies' thinking has been summarized and appraised in numerous treatises on sociological theory. Most American sociologists, and many other social scientists, have some familiarity with the concepts of *Gemeinschaft* (community) as organic life and *Gesellschaft* (society) as mechanical structure. In addition to these concepts, the distinction between *Wesenville* and *Kürville*, or natural and rational will, is fundamental to Tönnies' system. *Wesenville* is very close to the idea of the nonrational as developed by later scholars. Barnes and Becker, as well as others, have pointed out that Tönnies' work on the intimate relationship between personality and the social system antici-

pated the studies of Baldwin, Cooley, Durkheim, Mead, and others who have followed in their tradition.

Every effort has been made by the translator to make the English edition of this work appealing. The translation reads smoothly, and the book includes a Foreword by Pitirim A. Sorokin, a Preface by Rudolf Heberle, an Introduction by Charles P. Loomis and John C. McKinney, Notes on Tönnies' fundamental concepts by Loomis, and an article entitled "Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft," which Tönnies published in 1931. These supplementary sections are extremely useful. A section prepared by McKinney, in collaboration with Loomis, presents interesting comparisons between the *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* polarization and the following typologies: Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity; Cooley's primary and other groups; Redfield's folk and urban societies; Becker's sacred and secular societies; Sorokin's familistic, contractual, and compulsory relations; Weber's types of action orientation; and Parsons' pattern variables of action orientation. A recent article by Loomis and McKinney applies the types used by Parsons, Sorokin, Weber, and Becker in relation to Tönnies' *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* to large-estate and family-farm communities in Costa Rica. This study, summarized here, found that the employment of power in the family-farm community tended toward the affectivity, particularistic, ascription, diffuseness, traditional, and familistic poles, while the other community tended toward the opposite poles.

This reviewer found a considerable part of the book tedious. At least a part of this reaction may be due, as Heberle says in the Preface, to the fact that Tönnies developed his basic concepts and sociological theory "against a background of contemporary thought which has lost a good deal of its relevance to present-day sociology."

Here and there in this work one finds traces of a questionable social evolutionism. For example, it is said that "apparently the patriarchy has been preceded by the matriarchy . . ." (p. 40); and that the clan is said to have been an antecedent of the family (p. 57). One can

criticize the *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* dichotomy on the ground that it confuses the social, psychological, and structural aspects of society. One finds, for example, *Gemeinschaft* relations in a factory where workers are closely associated. Despite these and other criticisms of Tönnies' work, the construction of his two ideal types of association, together with his analysis of the two volitional aspects of personality, stands as a major achievement.

GEORGE E. SIMPSON

Chairman, Department of Sociology
and Anthropology
Oberlin College

ELEANOR H. BERNERT. *America's Children*. (The Census Monograph Series.) Pp. xiv, 185. New York: John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall for the Social Science Research Council in cooperation with the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1958. \$6.00.

Being a 1950 Census monograph, this book is restricted largely to data on children which were afforded by that census. It is concerned with the number and distribution of children and youth by age, sex, color, residence, and family background. It is concerned further with school enrollment, retardation in school, and participation in the labor force in relation to certain demographic variables. In short, the book is concerned with American children at home, at school, and at work.

Some of the author's conclusions are much like those which were frequently reported during the decade of the thirties. Thus: "Those states of the Nation which are characterized by high dependency ratios [ratios of persons under 20 to persons 20-64] may also be characterized by low family income, low expenditures for schooling, a low degree of urbanization, and poor educational performance. Streams of migration from the states of comparative disadvantage . . . to areas of relatively greater opportunity make the differences in the training and welfare services offered to young people a matter of nationwide concern" (p. 29). "Although considerable progress has been made in the past decade or more in reducing these dependency-re-

sources inequalities . . . it is clear from the data presented that equitable schooling opportunity among States still does not exist" (pp. 31-32).

Also familiar to educators and social workers of the thirties will be the author's statements: ". . . low [school] enrollment rates and high labor force participation [among persons 14-17] are usually associated with being nonwhite, rural, and southern" (p. 52). "Retardation, both slight and definite, was disproportionately higher among nonwhite, rural-farm, and southern pupils . . ." (p. 82).

This reviewer's chief criticism of the book is the neglect of materials outside the 1950 Census. The choice of a broad title like *America's Children* would seem to require at least a little attention to noncensus materials, such as trends in health of children during the past half century.

The author's use of census materials prior to 1950 is rather sketchy. There are brief discussions of the past trends in the size of the child and youth population, school enrollment, and labor force participation. Strangely, the section entitled "Trends in School Enrollment, 1910 to 1950" contains no reference to a 1920 Census monograph entitled *School Attendance in the United States* by Frank Alexander Ross. However, even if the author did interpret somewhat too literally the scope of a 1950 Census monograph, she provided thorough, sophisticated, and interesting analyses of the data selected for study.

CLYDE V. KISER

Technical Staff
Milbank Memorial Fund

GLENN H. BEYER. *Housing: A Factual Analysis*. Pp. xxvi, 355. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. \$8.95.

This is a remarkable compendium, handbook, manual, encyclopedia, or what have you. It is compact and simple in presentation, but only a master with broad background, keen analytic power, and ripe judgment could present so much in such a small space and so lucidly.

The author has been Professor of Housing and Design at Cornell University for more than a decade and Director of its

Housing Research Center. Before that he was for nearly a decade economist for the Federal Housing Administration and Director of Housing Market Research for the National Housing Agency. The present compendium had its origin in an interdepartmental seminar aimed at architects, planners, home economists, sociologists, public administrators, and industrial relations leaders. One can sympathize with the dearth of material which Mr. Beyer found in introducing the many facets of the housing problem to so diverse a group. One must salute him for having gone so far toward filling the gap.

Housing is "a highly complex product," but it is also "an economic and a social process." In a series of succinct chapters, Beyer presents the facts about the product and processes—using nearly 100 tables from the most up-to-date sources and nearly seventy illustrations and charts—with crisp analysis. While "this is not a book on theory," Beyer skillfully relates the facts to many accepted or disputed theories: the Park and Hoyt theories of city growth, the theory of filtering down, the single tax theory, the "economic base" concept, and theories about the virtues of home ownership. He then indicates which of these theories the facts tend to support or invalidate, which we cannot yet prove or disprove, and which call for further research.

His range includes the demographic bases of housing need, the characteristics of the housing supply, and other factors—for example, land and taxes—which must be included in a community housing market analysis. He presents the essential facts about the home building industry, home financing and ownership, the factors influencing housing design, housing and neighborhood standards, urban renewal and "the old conflict" which it arouses. He summarizes forms of governmental intervention. He explains how to forecast future need and demand and ends, as he must, by outlining "areas for future housing research." There is also a chapter on rural housing.

The compendium is well documented. The word "indispensable" seems appropriate. One could, however, forego, as irrele-

vant and inappropriate, Mr. Zevi Blum's cartoons by Robert Emmett out of *Punch*.

CHARLES S. ASCHER

Professor of Political Science
Brooklyn College

THOMAS J. WOOFER. *Southern Race Progress: The Wavering Color Line*. Pp. xii, 180. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957. \$3.50.

Southern Race Progress is apparently directed at the educated, moderate general public. It endeavors to assess the prospects for racial harmony in the South by balancing the total liabilities and assets of race relations within the perspective of past and present and emphasizing those aspects "back of the situation of the moment" from the "longer view of why we are what we are." In structure, it is a profile of post bellum Southern trends of change outlined against the silhouette of the author's own experiences as a sociologist. His account reflects his association with influential figures, participation in ameliorative action-organizations, extensive and prolonged research in the service of several agencies of the federal government, and always an unswerving personal commitment to the historic continuity of the South.

He begins with a broad background of his own family's involvement in the life of the South, the economic interdependence of Negroes and whites in his home community of Athens, Georgia, and undergraduate education in the South as exemplified by his own career at the University of Georgia. Wofter then examines the principal modifications in each major sphere of race relations. He considers the incidents and conditions of extralegal violence against the Negro, the rise and decline of sharecroppers in the transformation of the rural southern plantation economy, and the redistribution of the Negro population. His presentation also includes descriptions of northern forms of Negro segregation, economic impoverishment during the Depression and the Negroes' share in welfare programs, improvements in their occupational status, and their contributions to the armed forces. He indicates the role of private agencies and foundations in bettering

Negro education, the continued disparity between Negro and white schooling, restrictions on Negro political participation, confusion in southern reaction to the several types of segregation, and fact and fiction in race differences. The author concludes that his close observation of race relations over some fifty years does reveal progress. His hopes for the future apparently lie with the possibility of continued and effective compromise, prosaic but nonetheless steady, by moderate younger leaders in solving the problems of day-to-day relationships at the local level of community action.

ROSCOE C. HINKLE, JR.

Assistant Professor of Sociology
Ohio State University

OTTO VON MERING and STANLEY H. KING. *Remotivating the Mental Patient*. Pp. 216. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1957. \$3.00.

The problem of care for the chronic mentally ill patient is a large and almost overwhelming one. There are approximately 750,000 patients in mental hospitals in the United States, and 97 per cent of them are cared for in public institutions run by the state, county, city, or Veterans Administration. 15,000 new patients are added yearly with widespread overcrowding as the result. Three-quarters of all state mental hospitals are overcrowded, and 40 per cent of all the beds are in old, obsolete, even condemned buildings. Only 40 per cent of patients admitted to state hospitals are discharged within five years; the average length of stay is approximately eight years.

Until relatively recently, this appalling problem showed no signs of abatement; the statistics rose yearly and the burden increased proportionately on the few people involved in seeking a solution to it. Mental hospitals were placed far out in the country; the legislatures showed little inclination to spend more money, except to build new buildings, and the enthusiasm of anyone brave or foolhardy enough to get involved in the problem was soon dampened by the sheer burden of numbers and the magnitude of the task.

Since World War II, however, there has

been a slight reversal in the trend. The use of the somatic therapies such as electric and insulin shock; the demonstration that even the most severely regressed schizophrenics could respond to direct psychoanalytic therapy; the evolution of "total push" programs in which patients were almost forced out of their regressions into activity and with resultant improvement; more recently, the discovery and use of new and successful chemotherapy such as chlorpromazine, meprobamate, and so forth; and the establishment of some mid-station between hospital and home such as Fountain House have all contributed to this reversal. In addition, increasing numbers of physicians, attracted to psychiatry by their experiences in the armed forces, have been trained and have begun to undertake some of the basic research necessary for the full understanding of the etiological forces resulting in these mental illnesses.

All of this is the background for the problem with which this book deals. The Russell Sage Foundation, which sponsored the study and the book, made a provision in 1951 for an extended study of ward-patient care in mental hospitals in both selected teaching and research institutes and in general state and Veterans Administration mental hospitals. It was found that the "legend of chronicity," so often embraced by discouraged and disgruntled hospital personnel, was by no means an insurmountable obstacle; rather, many and varied attempts at improving the social and environmental aspects of patient care resulted in improvement in and amelioration of the symptoms of these patients. This belief in social remotivation as a means of improving the condition of mental patients required evidence that the conditions leading to such social remotivation could be adapted and used in any institution.

The Russell Sage Foundation asked Dr. Otto von Mering, an anthropologist, to visit mental hospitals across the country and report on encouraging developments in patient care. As he and Dr. Stanley H. King, a social psychologist who collaborated in the writing of the book, have noted in their Introduction, twenty authorities were asked to list hospitals which were representative of their geographical

areas and which had been able to devise some scheme of new and promising methods for war care under generally adverse conditions. The list finally comprised thirty institutions, and these were visited by Dr. von Mering over a two-year period; during this time he observed, studied, and interviewed, using standard anthropological techniques in gathering his data.

The data gathered and the observations made comprise the bulk of the book. They are detailed and explicit, describing both successes and failures in the social remotivation studies. The patients were not those who had been subject to any of the standard psychological or drug therapies, and the findings almost uniformly pointed to the success which can be achieved by interested and inspired personnel, despite the overcrowding and other inadequacies. Elimination of signs of restraint, encouragement of interest and pride in the patient's personal appearance, attempts to make the environment as homey and normal as possible, inclusion of all ward personnel and volunteer workers in the programs, promotion of a family spirit with interest in one another, utilization of the idea that the sick can help the sicker and thus be helped themselves as well—all these and other purely social remotivations are utilized.

The significance and importance of this study and the utilization of its findings both alone and in conjunction with other more standard therapeutic measures can scarcely be overemphasized.

RICHARD LONSDORF

Instructor in Psychiatry
School of Medicine
University of Pennsylvania

ALFRED SAUVY. *La nature sociale: Introduction à la psychologie politique*. Pp. 302. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1957. No price.

Despite the title and subtitle, this volume is not a treatise on the social nature of man, and still less is it a book on political psychology, whatever that may be. Indeed by the express intention of the writer, who is primarily a statistician and economist, it is not a book at all. What he gives

us is a great variety of comments on many phases of current social, political, and economic life. All are offered as a partial contribution to what must be a future collective effort toward a constructional project which still lacks definitive blueprints.

The contents of the volume consist of vivid and interesting analyses and opinions concerning political, historical, economic, social, and intellectual problems. The twenty-one chapters treat, among many other subjects, the following: social power, property, social responsibility, collaboration with the adversary, social groups, reform and revolution, social and political role of humor, social mobility, myths and magic, the golden age, propaganda, and information.

Although the volume is a mosaic of small pieces, there is a definite matrix holding them all together. It consists of a number of marked critical ingredients of which the most outstanding is expressed in the opening words of the first chapter: "Throughout his entire existence man does nothing but fight, be it against nature or other men." And for the rest, the author finds that the battles fought are mostly futile and lost. The claims of property dominate all others in both socialistic and capitalistic societies, ignorance is paramount, and despite all the machinery of intercommunication, our age is left without any really adequate communication. The people continue to be confined in their separate cells, and liberators achieve nothing more than the forging of new chains.

J. R. KANTOR

Professor of Psychology
Indiana University

PAUL R. FARNSWORTH. *The Social Psychology of Music*. (The Dryden Press Publications in Psychology.) Pp. xiv, 304. New York: Dryden Press, 1958. \$4.50.

The layman usually considers the enjoyment of music a very personal and subjective experience. He is of the opinion that there is no accounting for taste. A book such as the one here under review takes its point of departure from the opposite as-

sumption: music must filter through the social system to be perceived, and the sociopsychological mechanism of perception is amenable to analysis.

The fundamental point of view embraced by this author is relativistic and cultural. Defining music as "socially acceptable patterns of sound," he discusses musical taste, perception of scales and intervals, the grammar of music, the communication of meaning, the measurement of abilities and aptitudes, and musical therapy. His materials are derived overwhelmingly from the published findings of a great variety of psychological tests, from experiments, and from behavioral descriptions, both current and historical. The book, therefore, is a comprehensive compilation of the findings of psychologists, social psychologists, and sociologists, rather than an original and reasoned presentation in an analytical system. His conclusions are, of course, inherent in the data. Some of the inquiries are of the typically "academic" type pursued by specialists; others address themselves to current popular conceptions.

Thus, the popular myth that Negroes possess higher musical aptitudes than whites is appropriately denied. The "natural" basis of Western musical scales and rhythmic systems is disproven by tests on members of modern and primitive cultures. The author finds that the generally expected interpretations of major and minor modes are by no means invariant. The perceptions of consonance and dissonance are learned responses—a conception which is in keeping with the drastic changes occurring in Western music itself. All aesthetic standards are culturally conditioned and are, therefore, adaptations to the social setting in which they occur.

The book is well written, without inflated language or jargon, and would be understood and appreciated by anyone interested in musical affairs. For the social psychologist, it is a convenient summarization of materials from American, German, and other sources. The documentation is complete.

JOHN H. MUELLER

Professor of Sociology
Indiana University

DON M. WOLFE. *The Image of Man in America*. Pp. x, 482. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1957. \$5.00.

Many and varied are the explanations advanced by men to explain man to himself. Wolfe, in an interesting and readable style, explores the variety of such explanations which have found currency in American culture at one time or another. He follows the trends of thought which have defined man as being depraved, evil, and prone to selfishness, but capable of change; as being noble and good, but capable of change; as being the repository of both evil and virtuous tendencies; and as being ethically neutral and very plastic. Wolfe's intent is not to try to prove or disprove any one theory, although he readily indicates his endorsement of the ethically neutral position. Rather, he is interested in showing through his analysis of the various proponents of these concepts not only their opinions on the nature-nurture question but also the social climate and personal background from which these views grew. He thus reflects his acceptance of the theory that man is by nature plastic and primarily the result of the social environment from which he comes. Intertwined with these trends of thought are many of the practical implications of the differing points of view—implications concerning such things as race relations, social justice, educational practices, and the development of genius.

Wolfe's presentation is, by and large, objective, although at times he accepts, as proven facts, points which would appear to be still very debatable. At one point, for example, he uncritically accepts Kinsey's biological determinist point of view. He holds, however, that the final answer is not yet in; it lies, he believes, in the hands of the social scientist, and only when this answer is finally in, will society be able to fully utilize its human resources.

His book explores the images of mankind—explicit and implicit—in the thinking of prominent Americans; these include Horace Mann, Abraham Lincoln, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Walt Whitman, Thomas Jefferson, Henry Adams, William James, Thorstein Veblen, John Dewey and Ernest Hemingway. Evidences bearing upon the

question from modern psychology, sociology, and anthropology are also presented, although sociology—the discipline of this reviewer—is viewed by Wolfe as still being somewhat in the “Middletown” stage.

This book should prove to be interesting and profitable reading for the social scientist and the layman. The latter will find here much thought-provoking material. The value to the social scientist lies mainly in the fact that here, under one cover, are outlined major trends of thought concerning a question of vital interest to his discipline.

GLENN M. VERNON

Assistant Professor of Sociology
Central Michigan College

ROBERT F. WINCH. *Mate-Selection: A Study of Complementary Needs*. (Harper's Social Science Series.) Pp. xix, 349. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$5.00.

Sociological studies have shown rather convincingly that American mate selection is essentially homogamous with respect to social characteristics; that is, people tend to marry within their own educational, religious, and economic groups. Winch believes that this so-called preferential mating tends to establish a field of eligibles within which mates are selected, and his major hypothesis is that “each individual seeks within his or her field of eligibles for that person who gives the greatest promise of providing him or her with maximum need gratification.”

The author has further hypothesized that mating will occur on the basis of *complementary* needs, and to this end a list of twelve such needs was adapted from an earlier work by H. A. Murray, including such needs as abasement, achievement, deference, dominance, hostility, nurturance, recognition, succorance, and so forth. To test the hypothesis, twenty-five young married couples were intensively interviewed, case histories were recorded, and each subject was given an eight-card Thematic Apperception Test. Based on a content analysis of the need interviews, several hundred interspousal correlations were computed. The results obtained—plus evidence ad-

duced from other validity checks—suggest that at least for certain needs mate selection is indeed complementary in nature, thus supporting Winch's theory.

Individual cases are analyzed, some of the implications of the theory are discussed, and a modest excursion into the mate-selection patterns of other cultures is included. Generally speaking, Winch's study appears to have been carefully thought out and executed, with the author striking a nice balance between eclectic observation, statistical analysis, and theoretical formulation. The author also makes effective use of clinical insights without becoming ensnared in the usual Freudian mumbo jumbo.

From a methodological point of view there are certain limitations involved in the study, as would be expected in any college-drawn sample of only twenty-five couples. However, the limitations are acknowledged, and at no time is the author guilty of unwarranted generalization. On the basis of a strength-to-weakness ratio, the study deserves a clearly superior rating. The author and his associates took infinite pains with their work, and a resultant pride in accomplishment is justly theirs.

One or two reviewer observations: If, as Winch maintains, love is definable in terms of complementary needs, it is difficult to imagine this same love as having the earth-shaking *impact* it reputedly has. This impact is presumably of a biophysical—though not necessarily sexual—nature. At any rate, from the inimitable poem of the Romantic period down to the current songs of the “Some Enchanted Evening” variety, writers have extolled the virtues of physical attractiveness, and listeners—especially at the younger (mate-selection) ages—have seemingly nodded in agreement. In this connection, Winch's theory seems too devoid of physicality.

As a matter of plausibility, once love is defined in terms of complementary needs, why wouldn't men be as likely to pick other men, rather than women, for their mates? Surely (?) the same sex could provide need gratification as effectively as could the opposite sex. Strictly as an opinion, the present reviewer would guess that preferential mate selection is based on a combination of

physical factors *and* complementary needs, and that Winch has probably made a successful foray into the latter area.

Opinions are cheap, however, and studies like Winch's—figuratively and literally—are not. The theory of complementary needs represents a most valuable contribution to the literature on mate selection. It is to be hoped that both believers and non-believers will try their hand at some replication studies. The design of Winch's study will provide a challenging model.

WILLIAM M. KEPHART

Assistant Professor of Sociology
University of Pennsylvania

REINHOLD NIEBUHR. *Pious and Secular America*. Pp. viii, 150. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958. \$3.00.

Here is a collection of nine essays which vary in length and content. The longest is entitled “The Relations of Christians and Jews in Western Civilization,” and the shortest is entitled “Justice to the American Negro from State, Community and Church.” Four of these essays are reprinted from the following: *Confluence*, the *Yale Review*, *The Atlantic*, and *The Reporter*; but they are not even brought up to date by a few sentences regarding Sputnik and “what happened in Little Rock, Arkansas.” Sputnik was, however, judged worthy of three pages, and Little Rock of four, in contemporary references. Of the four reprinted articles, the original titles were slightly altered in the case of three of the essays. Was the Professor tired?

America is characterized as “at once the most religious and the most secular of Western nations. . . . Could it be that we are most religious partly in consequence of being the most secular culture? . . . We are somewhat embarrassed by the fact that we are the first culture which is in danger of being subordinated to its economy. We have to live luxuriously as possible in order to keep our productive enterprise from stalling. . . . The co-operation between secularism and piety has been fruitful on the whole because each side possessed more common virtue than the opponent was willing to admit. . . . It is as rare an achieve-

ment for the pious man to be charitable as for the rational man to be 'reasonable.' . . . Thus, a great thinker of the social gospel could say at the beginning of this century: 'The impulse to give justice is evangelical; but the impulse to get justice is not. There is an ominous desire to get justice which reveals that we have lost confidence in spiritual forces.' . . . Piety, on the other hand, gave the individual a final divine authority, which enabled him to defy tyrannical political authority."

Niebuhr has a very pertinent statement (p. 21) on Billy Graham: "But the new evangelism has a blandness which befits the Eisenhower era."

In "Higher Education in America" (p. 38) Niebuhr concludes: "No educational enterprise can completely free itself of the dominant forces of culture. But it is fair to ask whether there has been a sufficient conscious resistance in the universities to the perils of standardization and conformism in a technocratic society; or a sufficiently patient and resolute determination to guard the long-range ends of humanistic learning against the short-range pressures of a business civilization; or a sufficient imagination in preserving the richness and variety, the breadth and depth of the arts, against the vulgarities of mass communications."

In the racial question, Niebuhr finds that the Roman Catholic Church has a decided advantage over Protestantism through its hierarchial structure (pp. 83-84).

He refuses to learn from the later critical scholarship that there is no *original sin* in Tertullian but only inherited sin, only contagion not yet guilt. As Professor Gasper points out: "Of this basic doctrine of Christianity (original sin) there is not a shred or trace in the Dead Sea Scrolls. . . . Men suffer their individual crucifixions and resurrections, there is no Calvary."

CONRAD HENRY MOEHLMAN

Professor of the History of
Christianity, Emeritus
Colgate-Rochester Divinity School

RICHARD HARRISON SHRYOCK. *National Tuberculosis Association, 1904-1954: A Study of the Voluntary Health Movement in the United States.* (Historical

Series, No. 8.) Pp. 342. New York: National Tuberculosis Association, 1957. \$3.50.

In 1832, Robert Koch discovered the tubercle bacillus and therewith tremendously furthered the diagnosis and prevention of tuberculosis. Yet twenty years later, the disease was still the "captain of death," responsible for 10-15 per cent of total mortality. In 1904 there existed in the United States only L. F. Flick's Philadelphia Antituberculosis Society, thirty-seven minor local groups of this type, and two impotent competing "national" organizations. Into this situation, in April 1904, the National Association for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis, the first of the large voluntary organizations in the United States fighting one particular disease, was born. Its founders were predominantly outstanding medical men—Trudeau, Osler, Flick, Biggs—who combined their efforts with those of prominent social workers such as E. T. Devine of New York. (Harry L. Hopkins, by the way, was an executive officer of the New York City Tuberculosis Society when he became head of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration and Works Progress Administration.)

The Association early acquired a professional staff, especially when, after 1910, imitation of the Danish seal sales provided ample funds; central control was somewhat federalized only in the 1920's. The Association obtained a rapid increase in the number of local societies—from 162 in 1908 to 2500 in 1940. It was equally successful in arousing the public and exerting pressure on the states to build sanatoria, support the sick, and develop special legislation. It sponsored such interesting ventures as the Framingham demonstration of 1916 and the Health Crusade of 1915. After 1920 it also supported excellent research work. Following medical trends, it shifted emphasis from prevention of infection to strengthening of immunity, and afterwards to mass diagnosis and therapy research.

In 1954, tuberculosis mortality was only 10 in 100,000 instead of 188 in 100,000 as in 1904. There is no doubt that the Association has in the specific setup of United

States politics and mentality helped substantially to obtain this result which other countries had achieved without such large voluntary organizations. Whether it is still entitled to such a large share of the public's contribution to health improvement, whether the whole system of voluntary associations, which has sprung up in its wake, is very rational, has been questioned by competent and disinterested observers since 1915.

Dr. Shryock has made a valuable contribution in giving us this well-documented history of the prototype of the voluntary health movement of the United States. He has outlined trends most perspicaciously and has presented, with consummate skill and great competence, his history within the framework of its total medical and social background.

ERWIN H. ACKERKNECHT

Director, Medizinhistorisches Institut
Universität Zürich

KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE. *World Service: A History of the Foreign Work and World Service of the Young Men's Christian Association of the United States and Canada.* Pp. xiv, 489. New York: Association Press, 1957. \$5.00.

The YMCAs of the United States and Canada have been fortunate in securing as the author of this volume Kenneth Scott Latourette, a former president of the American Historical Association and now Sterling Professor Emeritus of Missions and Oriental History at Yale University.

Several years of research into a rich body of reports and private letters from all over the earth lie behind this volume. The result is encyclopedic in the amount of detail it records. Nevertheless it is a story, the story of a dynamic phase of the expansion of North American Christianity into other lands.

Even the casual reader will discover that the foreign work of the YMCAs—in the 1930's this became World Service—has been a movement centering on personalities. The period of its most rapid growth was "triggered" off by a conference of students held back in 1886 under the leadership of D. L. Moody. One of those who

there caught a vision of the possibilities of Christian work abroad was John R. Mott.

Mott then entered upon a career which the author calls "one of the most remarkable in the history of Christianity." One of Mott's main interests became that of recruiting numbers of able young men who went all over the world establishing and fostering self-sustaining and self-directing YMCAs. Altogether more than 600 men enlisted in this enterprise, although the number at any one time never reached 300. Forty-two countries were ultimately linked up in the fellowship of the Associations.

Two features of this movement have especially impressed this reader. One has been its adaptability, largely due to the fact that it has been a lay movement with few clerically dogmatic inhibitions. In spite of the YMCA's Protestant origins, Associations in Roman Catholic countries have been predominantly Roman Catholic in membership and management, and in Orthodox countries they have been Orthodox.

The other feature is the venturesomeness with which the Associations have approached the felt needs of various lands. In addition to customary religious activities they have done work in public health, physical education, recreation for youth, community co-operation, and rural reconstruction, and they have also done a lot of spade work in the field which later became known as "technical assistance."

However this volume does not answer one big question of increasing importance to all North American religious organizations working abroad. How far are our methods of concentrating our efforts on individuals adapted to the needs of underdeveloped countries seeking rapid social change?

JUSTIN WROE NIXON

Professor of Christian Theology
and Ethics, Emeritus
Colgate-Rochester Divinity School

OTHER BOOKS

ALLAN, W. SCOTT. *Rehabilitation: A Community Challenge.* Pp. xvi, 247. New York: John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall, 1958. No price.

- ANDERSON, EUGENE N. *Modern Europe in World Perspective: 1914 to the Present*. (Rinehart Books in European History.) Pp. xxvi, 884. New York: Rinehart & Company, 1958. \$8.00.
- BARBEAU, MARIUS. *Pathfinders in the North Pacific*. Pp. 235. Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers and the Ryerson Press, 1958. \$5.00.
- BIRRELL, FRANCIS. *Gladstone*. (Great Lives Series.) Pp. 144. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957 (first published in England in 1933). \$1.50.
- BROCKWAY, THOMAS P. *Basic Documents in United States Foreign Policy*. (Van Nostrand Anvil Books, No. 27.) Pp. 192. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1957. \$1.25.
- BUNBURY, HENRY N. (Ed.). *Lloyd George's Ambulance Wagon: Being the Memoirs of William J. Braithwaite, 1911-1912*. Pp. 350. London: Methuen & Company, 1957. 37s net.
- CHARLES-EDWARDS, T., and B. RICHARDSON. *They Saw It Happen: An Anthology of Eye-Witnesses' Accounts of Events in British History, 1689-1897*. Pp. xix, 311. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. \$4.50.
- CLARK, WALTER HOUSTON. *The Psychology of Religion: An Introduction to Religious Experience and Behavior*. Pp. xii, 485. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. \$5.95.
- COLE, WILLIAM E. *Urban Society: A College Textbook in Urban Sociology*. Pp. 591. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958. \$6.50.
- COLEGROVE, KENNETH. *Democracy Versus Communism*. Edited by Hall Bartlett with an Introduction by Erling M. Hunt. Pp. vii, 424. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company for The Institute of Fiscal and Political Education, 1957. \$4.95.
- CORWIN, EDWARD S., and JACK W. PELTASON. *Understanding the Constitution*. Pp. xiii, 228. Rev. ed. New York: Dryden Press, 1958. \$2.50.
- COX, DONALD, and MICHAEL STOIKO. *Space-power: What It Means to You*. Pp. xxiv, 262. Philadelphia: John C. Winston Company, 1958. \$4.50.
- DAVIS, HAROLD EUGENE (Ed.). *Government and Politics in Latin America*. Pp. vi, 539. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1958. \$6.50.
- DUNHAM, ARTHUR. *Community Welfare Organization: Principles and Practice*. Pp. xiii, 480. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1958. \$5.75.
- ENGELS, F. *The Condition of the Working Class in England*. Translated and edited by W. O. Henderson and W. H. Chaloner. Pp. xxxi, 386. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. \$5.00.
- FERGUSON, WALLACE K., and GEOFFREY BRUUN. *A Survey of European Civilization*. Pp. xvi, 480, xlv. 3rd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958. \$6.25.
- GREEN, CONSTANCE McLAUGHLIN. *American Cities: In the Growth of the Nation*. Pp. xii, 258. New York: John de Graff, 1957. \$6.50.
- HAGEN, EVERETT E. *Handbook for Industry Studies*. Pp. x, 89. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. \$3.50.
- HENDERSON, HUBERT. *Supply and Demand*. (The Cambridge Economic Handbooks.) Pp. xi, 142. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958 (first published in 1921). \$2.25.
- HESS, MOSES. *Rome and Jerusalem*. Translated by Maurice J. Bloom. Pp. 89. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. \$2.75.
- HEWITT, H. J. *The Black Prince's Expedition of 1355-1357*. Pp. ix, 226. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1958. \$6.50.
- HOFSTÄTTER, PETER R. *Psychologie*. (Das Fischer Lexikon, Band 6.) Pp. 366. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Bücherei, 1957. DM 1.40.
- HOULT, THOMAS FORD. *The Sociology of Religion*. (The Dryden Press Sociology Publications.) Pp. xii, 436. New York: Dryden Press, 1958. \$5.25.
- HOWARD, L. VAUGHAN. *Civil Service Development in Louisiana*. (Tulane Studies in Political Science, Vol. III.) Pp. 190. New Orleans: Tulane University, 1956. No price.
- KAPLAN, MORTON A. *System and Process in International Politics*. Pp. xxiv, 283. New York: John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall, 1957. \$6.50.
- KELLY, ALFRED H. (Ed.). *Foundations of Freedom in the American Constitution*. Pp. xviii, 299. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958 (first published in 1954). \$3.50.
- KEY, V. O., JR. *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*. Pp. xiv, 783. 4th ed. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1958 (first published in 1942). \$6.50.
- McCUNE, WESLEY. *Ezra Taft Benson: Man with a Mission*. Pp. 123. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1958. \$2.50.
- MATTHEWS, GEORGE T. *The Royal General Farms in Eighteenth-Century France*. Pp. xii, 318. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. \$5.50.
- MAYER, FREDERICK. *New Directions for the American University*. Pp. viii, 52. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957. \$2.50.
- MOSER, C. A. *Survey Methods in Social Investigation*. Pp. xiii, 352. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. \$5.25.
- PEI, MARIO. *One Language for the World*. Pp. xvi, 291. New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1958. \$5.00.
- PIEPER, FRANK. *Modular Management and Human Leadership*. Pp. 288. Minneapolis: Methods Press, 1958. \$6.50.
- RIKER, WILLIAM H. *Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy*. Pp. 129. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957. \$3.25.
- ROSS, MURRAY G. *Case Histories in Community Organization*. (Harper's Social Science Series.) Pp. ix, 259. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$3.50.
- SARGENT, S. STANSFELD, and ROBERT C. WILLIAMSON. *Social Psychology: An Introduction to the Study of Human Relations*. Pp. x, 649. 2nd ed. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1958 (first published in 1950). \$6.00.
- SAYE, ALBERT B., MERRITT B. POUND, and JOHN F. ALLUMS. *Principles of American Government*. Pp. viii, 471. 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1958. \$5.95.
- SERVICE, ELMAN R. *A Profile of Primitive Culture*. Pp. xiv, 474. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$6.00.
- SHERWIN, OSCAR. *Prophet of Liberty: The Life and Times of Wendell Phillips*. Pp. 814. New York: Bookman Associates, 1958. \$10.00.
- SMITH, JAMES MORTON, and PAUL L. MURPHY (Eds.). *Liberty and Justice: A Historical Record of American Constitutional Development*. Pp. xxi, 566, xv. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958. \$6.75 text ed.
- SPINOZA, BENEDICT DE. *The Political Works: The Tractatus Theologico-Politicus in Part and the Tractatus Politicus in Full*. Edited and translated by A. G. Wernham. Pp. x, 463. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1958. \$10.10.
- State of the Union: Economic, Financial and Statistical Year-Book for the Union of South Africa, 1957*. Pp. 404. Cape Town: Culemborg Publishers, 1957. No price.
- SUFKIN, SIDNEY C., and EDWARD E. PALMER. *The New St. Lawrence Frontier: A Survey of the Economic Potential in the St. Lawrence Area of New York State*. (Maxwell School Series.) Pp. xiii, 98. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1957. \$3.00.
- SWISHER, CARL BRENT. *Historic Decisions of the Supreme Court*. (An Anvil Original, No. 29.) Pp. 192. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1958. \$1.25.
- TAYLOR, HENRY. *The Statesman*. With a new introductory essay by Leo Silberman. Pp. lvi, 134. Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, 1957. 18s net.
- Uniform Commercial Code: Analysis of Effect on Existing Kentucky Law*. (Research Publication No. 49.) Pp. xxiv, 401. Frankfort, Ky.: Legislative Research Commission, 1957. No price.
- VAN CAMPEN, S. I. P. *The Quest for Security: Some Aspects of Netherlands Foreign Policy, 1945-1950*. Pp. xv, 308. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff under the direction of the Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, 1958. Guilders 19.—.
- VELEN, ELIZABETH, and VICTOR A. *The New Japan*. (The Reference Shelf, Vol. XXX, No. 2.) Pp. 203. New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1958. \$2.00.
- VLEKKE, B. H. M. (Ed.). *Indonesia in 1956: Political and Economic Aspects*. Pp. 92. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Affairs, 1957. (Distributed in co-operation with the Institute of Pacific Relations.) \$1.50.
- WINTER, GIBSON. *Love and Conflict: New Patterns in Family Life*. Pp. 191. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1958. \$3.50.
- WORMSER, RENÉ A. *Foundations: Their Power and Influence*. Pp. xx, 412. New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1958. \$7.50.
- WRIGHT, LOUIS B., and MARION TINLING (Eds.). *William Byrd of Virginia: The London Diary (1717-1721) and Other Writings*. Pp. vi, 647. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. \$10.00.
- YAKEMTCHOUK, ROMAIN. *La Ligne Curzon et la II^e Guerre Mondiale*. Pp. 135. Louvain: Éditions Nauwelaerts; Paris: Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1957. No price.
- Year Book of World Affairs, 1956*. Edited by George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger. Pp. xii, 420. New York: Frederick A. Praeger under the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs, 1956. \$7.50.

INDEX

INDEX

- Acheson, Dean, 69, 76, 77
 Afghanistan, 12, 13, 77, 78, 90
 Africa, 19, 36, 41, 42, 65, 86, 111, 112, 140, 143
 Afro-Asian conference (Cairo), 93
 Afro-Asian solidarity, 93-94
 Alexander the Great, 62
 Algeria, 9
 ALI, MOHAMMED, Factors Looking to Eastern World Leadership, 132-137
 Anglo-American solidarity, 39
 Arab-Israel war, 142
 Armenia, 64
 Asia
 as cradle of civilizations, 133
 cleavages in
 divisive factors, current, 95-96, 98-102
 historical pattern, 98-99
 colonialism
 effect of on the economy of Asian nations, 134
 social structure, 134
 decline, period of, 133-134
 economic ills, removal of, 94
 economy, 134, 135
 European impact on, 90-91
 exploitation by Europeans of, 73, 84, 91, 134, 140
 history, 98
 neutralist nations of, 100
 pro-West nations of, 99
 religion, factor in Asian rivalries, 9
 resources, 98
 resurgence of, post-World War II, 93
 "revolution of rising expectations," 73, 81
 uniting factors in, 98
 Western civilization, assimilation of with native cultures, 9, 135
 See also Cultural advance; Economic potential; Far East; Middle East; Nationalism; Near East; Neutralism; Population; South Asia; Southeast Asia; *names of countries as* India
 Asia-West homogeneity
 factors hampering, 135
 Asian Relations Conference, 93
 Asians-European relationships
 Asian cultures pushed in background, 84, 85
 Asian xenophobia against the West
 cultural, 86-87
 native languages pushed in background, 86-87
 hope for disappearance of, 88
 political, 85-86
 religious, 87
 British superstructure in India, 84
 European superstructures in Asia, 84-85
 initial contact friendly, 84
 "reliable natives," training of, 84-85
 strained relations, beginning of, 84
 Australia, 67
 and Southeast Asia, 62
 Austria, 107, 109
 Austro-Prussian War, 107

 Baghdad Pact, 77, 80, 111, 112, 117
 Ball, MacMahon, 60
 Bandung Conference, 86, 93
 aims of, 93, 136-137
 Bannerman, Henry Campbell
 quoted, 92
 Bara, Theda, 28
 BARGHOORN, FREDERICK C., Conditions of East-West Peace, 122-131
 Belgium, 16
 Benton, William
 quoted, 126
 BIDDLE, ANTHONY J. DREXEL, Belief in the Continued Solidarity of Our Western Alliances, 113-121
 Bowers, Faubion, 31
 Bowles, Chester, 60
 Brazil, 32
 BROWN, W. NORMAN, Religion and Language as Forces Affecting Unity in Asia, 8-17
 Buddha, *see* Gautama
 Bulganin, Nikolai A., 63, 119
 Bulgaria, 39
 Bulwer-Lytton, *see* Lytton
 Burma, 16, 22, 38, 45, 46, 60, 62, 65, 68, 69, 75, 76, 78, 90, 95, 100
 Communists in, 36
 democratic socialism, 35-36
 See also Foreign policy
 Byron, George Noel Gordon, Lord
 quoted, 92

 Cambodia, 2, 10, 78
 Canada, 16, 39
 Carlyle, Thomas
 quoted, 84
 Ceylon, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 46, 62, 75, 76, 78, 85, 86, 90, 95, 100
 Chamberlain, Neville, 117
 Chiang Kai-shek, 75, 76, 79, 80
 China, 4, 19, 21, 22, 32, 36, 65, 75, 80, 84, 90, 93, 95, 98, 106, 110, 140
 China, People's Republic of (Communist), 4, 19, 21, 25, 38, 39, 65, 74, 79, 99-100, 107

- and Southeast Asia, 61, 63-64
and the Soviet Union, 99-100
Indo-Chinese rivalry
 competition test case for Asia, 60
China, Republic of (Nationalist), 38, 39, 60,
 63-64, 74, 76, 78
 See also Formosa
Chou En-lai, 63
Christ, Jesus, 87
Churchill, Winston, 41, 98, 126
 quoted, 125
Colombo Plan, 62, 94
Communism, 114, 115, 116
Communist party (USSR)
 Twentieth Congress, 124
Cultural advance (Asia)
 and economic change, 30
 and Western technology, 29-30
 creative renaissance, 31, 32-33
 education, 32
 imitation of Western ways, 28-29, 30-31
 Western reaction, 29
 revolt against foreign ways, 29
 See also Japan
Cuba, 140
Curzon of Kedleston, George Nathaniel Cur-
 zon, first Marquis
 quoted, 85
Czechoslovakia, 39, 63, 108, 144
- Democracy
 and economic development in Asia, 94-95
 and underdeveloped countries, 41, 42
 evolution of in Asia, 44, 45
 evolution of in the West, 44, 45
Denmark, 21, 53, 107
DINERSTEIN, HERBERT S., The Soviet Employ-
 ment of Military Strength for Political
 Purposes, 104-112
Dulles, John Foster, 67, 69, 76, 77, 80
- East India Company, 15
East-West conflict, 35
 and coexistence, 17, 40-41
 and satellites, 39-40
 Asia's reaction to, 135-136
 capitalist encirclement of Soviet Union, 105
 cold war, 12, 16, 17, 45, 47
 Asia as pawn in, 45-46
 disarmament, 142-143
 disengagement in Europe, 144
 need for a military stalemate, 118
 negotiations between Russia and US, 105
 summit conference, proposal of, 119-120
 and Soviet divisive aims, 120
 Western supremacy and rate of economic,
 scientific, and technological growth, 130-
 131
 See also International politics
- Eastern Europe, 110, 144
Economic potential (Asian)
 allocations of investment, 23-24
 and atomic power, 21
 and the human factor, 22
 development tasks for leadership, 22-23
 economic growth and world status, 25-26
 economic progress and foreign assistance,
 24-25
 American aid, 25
 Russian aid, 25
 economic progress and internal unity of na-
 tions, 24
 economic progress and international status
 of nations, 24
 national product, expansion of, 20
 program of action, need for, 20-21, 22
 per-capita income of Asian countries, 19-20
 post-World War II, 20, 22
 programs for individual countries, 19
 public participation in business, 23, 24
 rate of growth compared to that of more
 advanced lands, 21-22
 resources, 20-21
 taxation program, 24
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 59, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79,
 114, 115, 116, 119, 125
 quoted, 124
Egypt, 9, 10, 24, 111
Eliot, T. S., 28
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 28
Erler, Fritz, 144
- Far East, 10
Faulkner, William, 28
FERNANDO, CHITRA, Asian Xenophobia Against
 the West, 83-88
FINLETTER, THOMAS K., Factors Looking to
 Western World Leadership, 138-145
Foreign policy (Burma)
 coexistence, 36-37
Foreign policy (Indonesia), 45-46
Foreign policy (US)
 and fear and suspicion of communism, 37
 and human culture, 68-69
 China policy, 38-39, 66, 74-76
 embargo, 39
 need for revision, 79-80
 containment of communism, 67-68, 76
 cultural exchange programs, 129-130
 Eisenhower Doctrine, 129
 Far East, disengagement from, 66-67, 80
 foreign aid, appropriations for, 78, 79
 global policies, 65-66
 in Asia, 140-141
 Eisenhower-Dulles period, 75-77
 results of policy, 76-77
 need for revision, 79-80, 141

- neglect of economic needs and political
 aspirations of Asians, 77-79
 Truman period, 73-75, 77
in Europe
 Truman-Acheson policy, 76, 77
in Indochina, 66, 76, 78
in Korea, 66
in Southeast Asia, 64-65, 67-68
 and Latin American aid, 68
 and World War II, 65-66
Japan, occupation of, 74
Marshall Plan, 76
military alliances, 76, 77
need for reappraisal, 82
overseas bases, need for, 60, 80, 117-118
Pakistan, arming of, 12, 17
Pakistan, revising our policy in, 80-81
Point Four Program, 77-78
propaganda, concern with, 38
Foreign policy (USSR)
 disarmaments, 118-119
 economic assistance to uncommitted Asian
 nations, 78-79
 in Southeast Asia, 62-63
 nuclear tests, abandonment of, 17, 37-38
 trade agreements with Asian nations, 79
Formosa, 75, 76, 80, 107, 140
France, 9, 16, 40, 42, 75, 84, 109, 117, 142
Franco-Prussian War, 107
Franklin, Benjamin, 44
- Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (Mahatma
 Gandhi), 17, 92, 96
 quoted, 96
Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 92
Gass, Oscar
 quoted, 129
Gautama, 16
Germany, 92, 105, 106, 107, 116-117, 141, 144
 East, 144
 West, 29, 76, 107
Great Britain, 9, 29, 40, 75, 84, 91, 109, 117,
 119, 142
 and Asian Independence, 85
 Indo-British relationship, 61-62
 See also United Kingdom
Greece, 90
Gruenther, Alfred M., 115, 116
Guerrero, Leon Maria
 quoted, 94
- Hatta, Mohammad, 46, 47, 50-57 *passim*
 and capitalism, 51, 52, 53-55
 and communism, 51, 52
 and co-operatives, 52-53
 and Indonesian economy, 53, 54
 and Marxism, 51, 54
 as symbol of moderation, 50
 background, 50-52
 resignation of, causes of, 51
Hemingway, Ernest, 28
HIGGINS, BENJAMIN, Hatta and Co-operatives:
 The Middle Way for Indonesia?, 49-57
Hitler, Adolf, 102, 108, 109, 116, 117
Hook, Sidney, 124
Hudson, G. F., 127
Hungary, 61
- India, 10, 19, 21, 22, 26, 45, 46, 62, 75-78
 passim, 86, 90, 91, 93, 100
 Constitution of, 11, 14-15
 economy, 81
 English, use of in, 14-15
 food problem and American grain surplus,
 81-82
 foreign exchange, lack of, 82
 income, per capita, 81
 Indo-British relationship
 British Commonwealth of Nations, 61-62
 Colombo Plan, 62
 Indo-Chinese rivalry
 competition test case for Asia, 60
 Indo-Pakistani relationship, 96
 languages of, 12
 Dravidian-Indo-European rivalry, 12-13
 language as symbol of regionalism, factors
 producing, 15-16
 rivalries among indigenous languages, 13-
 14
 military expenditures, 82
 partition of, 10-11
 effect on West, 11-12
 international repercussions of, 11-12
 population, 81
Indochina, 60, 65, 75, 77, 90, 107, 141
Indonesia, 10, 16, 19, 21, 24, 65, 69, 76, 78, 86,
 90, 100, 111
 and Dutch occupation, 45
 civil war in, 50
 Communists in, 51-52
 Co-operatives
 and article 38 of Indonesian Constitution,
 52, 54
 economic growth, problems of, 55-57
 elections in, 46, 52
 future of, 47-48
 governments, 50
 independence, 45, 50
 political parties of, 50
 political systems in, 46-47
 gotong royong principle, 47, 52-53
 pragmatic leadership, need for, 56-57
 See also Foreign policy; Mohammad Hatta
International politics
 communism, expansion of in Asia
 and Western military power, 111-112

- communism, expansion of in Europe and Western military power, 112
- communism, techniques of expansion, 110-111
- and African and Asian nations, 110-111
- national liberation, 110-111
- socialist revolution, 111-112
- expansion patterns
- aggression by proxy, 108
- fait accompli, 108-109
- Russia's use of, 109
- ultimata, 109-110
- nature of altered by nuclear weapons, 109
- ideological polarization, 106, 107
- nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century expansion patterns, 106, 107
- aggrandizement by agreement, 106-107
- and nuclear age, 106
- limited wars, 107-108
- comparison with present world situation, 108
- "peaceful competition," 130-131
- Iran, 9
- Iraq, 9
- Ishihara, Shintaro, 28
- Israel, 9, 10, 21, 142
- Italy, 92
- Japan, 4, 7, 19, 21, 29, 30, 39, 67, 75, 76, 80, 84, 92, 95, 99, 105, 108
- and Communist nations, 101-102
- and Korea, 101-102
- art forms, Communist control of, 31-32
- as equal of Western nations, 92-93
- ballet, the, in, 32
- book publishing in, 32, 33
- expansionist attitude of, 73, 102
- kabuki plays, 31
- libraries in, 32
- movie making in, 31-32
- religion in, 101
- resurgence of, present, 93
- Java, 10, 52, 55, 56
- Jefferson, Thomas, 44, 65
- Jordan, 9
- Joyce, James, 28
- Kant, Immanuel
- quoted, 123
- Karpov, G. G.
- quoted, 131
- Kashmir, 11
- Kemal, Mustafa, 92
- Keene, Donald, 32
- Kennan, George F., 91
- quoted, 91
- Khrushchev, Nikita S., 26, 63, 111, 115, 116, 126, 131
- quoted, 105, 124, 130
- King, James E., Jr., 127
- Kipling, Rudyard, 29
- Kissinger, Henry A., 127
- Korea, 19, 61, 75, 76, 80, 84
- Korea, Republic of, 60, 78, 99, 103
- and Japan, 101-102
- Korean crisis, 66, 75-78 *passim*, 108
- Krock, Arthur, 124, 125
- Kyo, Machiko, 28
- Landseer, Edwin Henry, 28
- Laos, 10, 69
- Latin America, 65, 68
- League of Nations, 64
- Lebanon, 9
- Libya, 9
- Lincoln, Abraham, 44, 47
- LINEBARGER, PAUL M. A., Leadership in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia, 58-71
- Lippmann, Walter, 38
- quoted, 38
- Locke, John, 99
- Lytton, Edward George Earle Lytton Bulwer-, 28
- MacArthur, Douglas, 30, 65, 75
- Madison, James, 65
- Mahavira Jnatiputra, 16
- Malaya, 19, 60, 62, 64, 65, 66, 90, 95
- MALENBAUM, WILFRED, The Asian Economic Potential, 18-26
- Mao Tse-tung, 79
- Marshall, George C., 74
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology Indonesia Project, 55
- Mazzini, Giuseppe, 92
- MEHTA, G. L., Asian Nationalism Vis-À-Vi Other Asian Nations, 89-96
- Meiji, *see* Mutsuhito
- Middle East, 9, 75, 76
- Morocco, 9
- Mountbatten of Burma, Earl, Admiral Sir Louis, 65
- Multilingualism and national unity, 12
- Murray, Arthur, 32
- Mussolini, Benito, 102
- Mutsuhito, reign name Meiji (Emperor of Japan), 29
- Nasser, Colonel A. G., 111
- Nationalism (Asian)
- as a political force, 9
- freedom and responsibility of, 96
- historical development of, 90
- Western idea, impact of on, 85, 91-92
- World War II, impact of on, 73, 92
- Near East, 9, 141
- religion and language and community spirit in, 10
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, 17, 26, 37

- Nepal, 12, 13, 78
- Nesmeyanov, Alexander N., 131
- Netherlands, the, 21, 45, 62, 84
- Netherlands East Indies, 45, 65
- Neutrality (Asian), 140
- ethics of, 16-17
- New Guinea, 62
- New Zealand, 62, 67
- Norstad, Lauris, 116
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 76
- and the preservation of democratic governments, 115
- as deterrent to Communist expansion, 112
- history, 114
- leadership of, 116
- objectives, 114-115
- Soviet aims to weaken alliance, 112
- North Korea, 100, 102, 108
- and Japan, 100-101
- NOTOWIDIGDO, MOEKARTO, An Indonesian Policy Aimed at Maintaining Freedom and Promoting World Peace, 43-48
- Okinawa, 76, 80
- Orient and Occident
- distinction between artificial, 137
- Ottoman Empire, 107
- Outer Mongolia, 100
- Paine, Thomas, 99
- Pakistan, 10, 18, 22, 24, 45, 62, 76, 80-81, 86
- and US arming of, 12, 17
- Constitution of, 10-11, 15
- English, use of in, 14-15
- Indo-Pakistani relationship, 96
- languages of, 12
- rivalries among indigenous languages, 14
- religion and formation of state, 10-11
- Pasha, Nahas, 92
- Peace (world)
- and adequate Western military posture, 127
- and balanced East-West power, 125-126
- and cultural exchange between Communist and Western nations, 129-130
- and Soviet infiltration in "bourgeois" governments, 126
- and Soviet manipulation of universal desire for peace and survival, 126-127
- and US economic aid to underdeveloped countries, 129
- and Soviet piecemeal expansion, 126
- and Western understanding of Communist and Oriental and African cultures, 130
- cost of, 120-121
- hope, elements of, 131
- nuclear aggression, avoidance of by US and West, 124-125
- Russian fear of Western aggression, 125
- Soviet conception of peace, 123-124
- Soviet manipulation of social unrest, 127-128
- and underdeveloped countries, 128-129
- Western conception of peace, 123-124
- Persia, 107
- Philippines, the, 19, 45, 60, 64, 66, 75, 76, 80, 99, 140
- Plunkett, Horace Curzon
- quoted, 91
- Poland, 39, 144
- Population (Asia), 98
- fertility decline, possible pattern for, 7
- future growth, projections for, 5-6
- historical development of, 2-3, 4
- present-day growth
- ratio between birth and death rates, 4-5, 6-7
- rates of growth, 2, 4
- and available resources, 5
- and economic and social change, 3, 4
- and European influence on, 3
- and Western science and technology, 3
- Population (China), 81
- Possony, Stefan, 70
- Prawiranegara, Sjafruddin, 47
- Presley, Elvis, 28
- Proust, Marcel, 28
- Religious wars
- Christian-Islamic conflict, 37
- Renan, Ernest, 96
- Ridgway, Matthew B., 116
- Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 117
- Rome, 90
- Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 92
- Rostow, W. W., 60
- Rumania, 39
- Russell, Bertrand, third Earl
- quoted, 94
- Russia, 36, 92, 106, 142
- See also* Foreign policy (USSR); Soviet Union
- Russo-Japanese War, 107-108
- Sagan, Françoise, 28
- Sastroamidjojo, Ali, 50, 51
- Saudi-Arabia, 9
- Seeley, John Robert, 90
- Shakespeare, William, 28
- Siam, 64, 90
- Singapore, 64
- Smith, Adam, 53
- Sobolev, A., 131
- Socialism, 35
- Soekarno, Achmed, 46, 47, 50, 51, 56
- South Africa, 95
- South America, 143
- South Asia, 9, 10, 86
- Indo-British influence in, 62




- Southeast Asia, 76, 90, 99
 and mankind's future, 69-70
 and the United States, 64-65
 Communist China's influence in, 63-64
 in ambit of two US foreign policies, 67-68
 Indo-British influence in, 62
 international importance, growth of, 59
 role in era of mass communication, 70-71
 satellites policy in, 63
 Soviet policy in, 62-63
 Southeast Asia and Western Pacific
 Indian-Chinese rivalry in, 60-61
 Indian-Russian rivalry in, 60
 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 60, 67, 69,
 77, 80, 111, 112, 117
 Soviet Union, 21, 25, 26, 37, 51, 65, 75, 77, 99,
 100, 107
 economic and scientific growth in, 130-131
 military strength of, 117-118
 use of for political purposes, 104-112
 scientific advances in, 105
 Stalin, Joseph V., 111, 125, 131
 Stein, Gertrude, 28
 Strauss, Harold, 33
 Suez crisis, 86, 109, 140
 Sumatra, 55
 Sun Yat-sen, 92
 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe
 history of, 115-116
 Suzuki, Daisetz, 31
 Switzerland, 16, 21
 Syria, 9, 111, 112
 TAEUBER, IRENE, Asia's Increasing Population,
 1-7
 Taiwan, 80, 99
 Tensions, social and economic, 35, 36
 capitalism *vs.* socialism, 36
 urban *vs.* rural societies, 35
 Tessai, Tomioka, 31
 Thailand, 4, 19, 77, 99, 100
 THANT, U; A Burmese View of World Ten-
 sions, 34-42
 Tibet, 100
 Toynbee, Arnold, 93
 quoted, 86
 Truman, Harry S., 73-78 *passim*
 Tunisia, 9
 Turkey, 7, 9, 76, 111
 and the Soviet Union, 111
 Turkistan, 90
 United Kingdom, 16, 21, 39
 United Nations, 5, 6, 19, 45, 60, 62, 75, 80, 93,
 94, 142
 China, proper representation of to the, 38-
 39
 United States, 9, 25, 26, 29, 32, 60, 61, 117,
 119, 140
 and Southeast Asia, 60
 and Indonesia, comparison between, 44
 voluntary period, 44
 struggle for growth for Americans, 59
 See also Foreign policy
 Vasilevskii, A., 108
 Versailles Treaty, 108
 Vietnam, 4, 19, 69, 76, 80, 141
 Vietnam, North, 61
 Vietnam, South, 10, 24, 60, 64, 99
 Voroshilov, Marshal K. Yefremovich, 63
 WARBURG, JAMES P., United States Postwar
 Policy in Asia, 72-82
 Washington, George, 44, 65
 Weapons
 nuclear
 abandoning tests and use of, 117, 119
 missiles, 114, 118, 126
 satellites, 126
 Wedemeyer, Albert C., 74
 quoted, 74
 West, 9, 10, 17, 67
 education, 130
 Western alliance
 weakening of, 140
 Western Europe, 9
 Western Pacific
 Communist advantages for leadership in,
 59-60
 international importance, growth of, 59
 Western advantages for leadership in, 59
 See also Southeast Asia and Western Pacific
 Western Pacific islands, 60
 Western Polynesia, 60
 Whitman, Walt, 28
 WILDES, HARRY EMERSON, Intellectual Progress
 in the East, 27-33
 Williams, Tennessee (original name, Thomas
 Lanier Williams), 30
 Wilson, Woodrow, 92
 Wint, Guy, 60
 Woolf, Virginia, 28
 World leadership
 achieving a modus vivendi between the West
 and Communist nations, 140, 143
 and the West's relationship with Africa and
 Asia, 140-141
 partnership of East and West, 137
 responsibility of all nations, 144-145
 US influence, quality of, 139
 West and non-Communist East partnership
 139-140, 143
 and world attack against war, 142
 areas of influence of, 141-142
 YANG, YOU CHAN, Possible Permanent Cleav-
 ages in Asia, 97-103
 Yemen, 9
 Yokoyama, Taikwan, 31
 Yugoslavia, 51, 111
 Yukawa, Hideki, 31

THE
ANNALS

OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

*Unofficial Government:
Pressure Groups and Lobbies*



September 1958

BOOK DEPARTMENT: NEW LITERATURE
IN THE FIELD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

**Leading OXFORD Political Science
Texts Coming Fall 1958**

**The Nature and Function of
International Organization**

by Stephen S. Goodspeed, Associate Professor of Political Science,
University of California at Santa Barbara

approximately 740 pages; illustrated

tentatively \$7.25

This exceptionally detailed text presents a careful analysis of historic development, including the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, and the organizations and activities of the League of Nations. This is followed by an unusually thorough treatment of all aspects of the United Nations.

**Readings in International Politics:
Concepts and Issues**

edited by Charles E. Lerche, Jr., Professor of Political Science,
Emory University, and Margaret E. Lerche, Instructor in Political
Science, Georgia State College

approximately 384 pages; illustrated

paperbound, tentatively \$2.75

The authors of this collection of recent articles are almost all American, and include scholars and practitioners of several nationalities. Read in conjunction with a standard text, the book will provide variety in the student's intellectual diet and point up the major issues.

Recently Published

The Politics of Aristotle

translated, with an introduction, notes, and appendices, by Sir
Ernest Barker

487 pages

reprinted, 1958

paperbound, \$1.95

This complete edition is the only paperbound translation available with a full scholarly apparatus. There is a long introductory section on the life and works of Aristotle, appendices on his treatment of political topics in other treatises, frequent annotations, and a full index.

**Principles and Problems of State
and Local Government**

by John M. Swarthout, Dean of the Faculty, Portland State College,
Oregon, and Ernest R. Bartley, Professor of Political Science,
University of Florida

1958 384 pages; illustrated

paperbound, \$4.25

This text can be adapted to fit the basic or advanced courses in any political science program; while comprehensive and thorough, it is of moderate length and avoids needless repetition of materials adequately covered in national texts.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, Inc. 417 Fifth Avenue, New York 16

Entered as second-class matter, January 21, 1939, at the post-office at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, under the Act of August 24, 1912. Accepted for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in paragraph (d-2), Section 34.40, P. L. & R. of 1948, authorized January 21, 1939.

THE ANNALS

*of The American Academy of Political
and Social Science*

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*

RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Assistant Editor*



UNOFFICIAL GOVERNMENT: PRESSURE GROUPS AND LOBBIES

Edited by

DONALD C. BLAISDELL
*Professor of Government
The City College of
New York*

© 1958, by
THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
All rights reserved

PHILADELPHIA
1958

CONTENTS

	PAGE
FOREWORD	<i>Donald C. Blaisdell</i> ix
PRESSURE GROUPS IN GOVERNMENT	
PRESSURE GROUPS IN CONGRESS	<i>Emanuel Celler</i> 1
THE BUREAUCRACY IN PRESSURE POLITICS	<i>J. Leiper Freeman</i> 10
LITIGATION AS A FORM OF PRESSURE GROUP POLITICS	<i>Clement E. Vose</i> 20
THE BIG THREE OF PRESSURE POLITICS	
MANAGEMENT IN POLITICS	<i>Robert F. Lenhart and Karl Schriftgiesser</i> 32
FARMERS IN POLITICS	<i>Wesley McCune</i> 41
ORGANIZED LABOR IN POLITICS	<i>James B. Carey</i> 52
THE OPERATION OF PRESSURE GROUPS	
HOW PRESSURE GROUPS OPERATE	<i>Henry A. Turner</i> 63
POLITICAL PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUP POLITICS	<i>Hugh A. Bone</i> 73
POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS AS POLICY SHAPERS	<i>Richard W. Gable</i> 84
REGULATION OF LOBBYING	
THE REGULATION OF PRESSURE GROUPS AND LOBBYISTS	<i>Belle Zeller</i> 94
TOWARD A GROUP THEORY OF POLITICS	
INTEREST GROUP THEORY IN POLITICAL RESEARCH	<i>Oliver Garceau</i> 104
NATURE AND PROSPECTS OF POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS	<i>Alfred de Grazia</i> 113
PRESSURE GROUPS AND THE AMERICAN TRADITION	<i>Murray S. Stedman</i> 123
AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PRESSURE POLITICS	
GROUP REPRESENTATION IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES	<i>Samuel H. Beer</i> 130
PRESSURE GROUPS IN FRANCE	<i>Henry W. Ehrmann</i> 141
PRESSURE GROUPS, FOREIGN POLICIES, AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS	<i>Donald C. Blaisdell</i> 149
INDEX	221

BOOK DEPARTMENT

PAGE

AMERICAN HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT

- ARNADE, CHARLES W. *The Emergence of the Republic of Bolivia*. Waldo Frank, Truro, Mass. 168
- BERNS, WALTER. *Freedom, Virtue & the First Amendment*. Louis H. Pollak, Associate Professor of Law, Yale University Law School 163
- FERRELL, ROBERT H. *American Diplomacy in the Great Depression*. Anthony L. Milnar, Associate Professor of History and Political Science, Ohio Northern University 159
- Franklin D. Roosevelt and Conservation, 1911-1945*, Vols. I and II. Compiled and edited by EDGAR B. NIXON. George C. Osborn, Professor of Social Science, University of Florida 160
- HASKELL, FRANK A. *The Battle of Gettysburg*. Ralph Adams Brown, Professor of History, State Teachers College 164
- HOOVER, J. EDGAR. *Masters of Deceit*. Ernest van den Haag, Associate Professor, Division of General Education, New York University 158
- HOWE, IRVING, and LEWIS COSER. *The American Communist Party*. Donald R. McCoy, Assistant Professor of History, University of Kansas 165
- KINTNER, WILLIAM R., in association with JOSEPH I. COFFEY and RAYMOND J. ALBRIGHT. *Forging a New Sword*. John W. Oliver, Professor of History, Emeritus, University of Pittsburgh 161
- MEYER, POUL. *Administrative Organization*. A. E. Buck, Norwalk, Conn. 167
- O'BRIEN, F. WILLIAM. *Justice Reed and the First Amendment*. Milton R. Konvitz, Professor of Industrial and Labor Relations and Professor of Law, Cornell University 162
- RUBIN, VERA (Ed.). *Caribbean Studies: A Symposium*. N. L. Whetten, Dean of the Graduate School, The University of Connecticut 168
- SWISHER, CARL BRENT. *The Supreme Court in Modern Role*. Benjamin F. Wright, President, Smith College 166
- WALWORTH, ARTHUR. *Woodrow Wilson*, Vol. I: *American Prophet*; Vol. II: *World Prophet*. Arthur S. Link, Professor of History, Northwestern University 165
- WHITE, LEONARD D., with the assistance of JEAN SCHNEIDER. *The Republican Era, 1869-1901*. E. Allen Helms, Professor of Political Science, The Ohio State University 159

AFRICA AND THE MUSLIM WORLD

- BOVILL, E. W. *The Golden Trade of the Moors*. A. O. Sarkissian, Analyst in Middle Eastern and East European Affairs, Library of Congress 171
- BROOKES, EDGAR H., and N. HURWITZ. *The Native Reserves of Natal*. Charles W. Coulter, Professor of Sociology, Emeritus, University of New Hampshire 175
- CAMPBELL, JOHN C. *Defense of the Middle East*. Halford L. Hoskins, Senior Specialist in International Relations, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress 170
- EGERTON, F. CLEMENT C. *Angola in Perspective*. Basil Davidson, Barnes Common, London 173
- Egypt and the United Nations*. Report of a Study Group Set Up by the Egyptian Society of International Law. Harry N. Howard, Beirut, Lebanon 169
- HOLLEMAN, J. F. (Ed.). *Problems Arising from the Structure and Functioning of a Multi-Racial Society*. William O. Brown, Director, African Research and Studies Program, Boston University 176

PAGE

- POWESLAND, P. G. *Economic Policy and Labour*. Charles W. Coulter, Professor of Sociology, Emeritus, University of New Hampshire 174
- ROSENTHAL, ERWIN I. J. *Political Thought in Medieval Islam*. Franz Rosenthal, Professor of Semitic Languages, Yale University 171
- THAYER, PHILIP W. (Ed.). *Tensions in the Middle East*. Edgar J. Fisher, Consultant to American Friends of the Middle East, Amherst, Va. 172

ASIA

- ABEGGLEN, JAMES G. *The Japanese Factory*. John William Bennett, Assistant Professor of Sociology, The Ohio State University 184
- CADY, JOHN F. *A History of Modern Burma*. Frank N. Trager, Professor of International Relations, New York University 183
- DE RIENCOURT, AMAURY. *The Soul of China*. Albert E. Kane, Lecturer, Far Eastern International Relations, American University, Washington, D. C. 178
- EGGLESTON, F. W. *Reflections on Australian Foreign Policy*. C. P. FitzGerald, Professor of Far Eastern History, Australian National University 177
- FAIRBANK, JOHN K. (Ed.). *Chinese Thought and Institutions*. Karl A. Wittfogel, Professor of Chinese History, University of Washington 181
- ISAACS, HAROLD R. *Scratches on Our Minds*. Harry Emerson Wildes, Philadelphia, Pa. 183
- MCVEY, RUTH T. *The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution*. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Lecturer in Political Science, University of Pennsylvania 178
- MILLS, LENNOX A. *Malaya*. Victor Purcell, Lecturer in Far Eastern History, Cambridge University 179
- New India, The*. Prepared by a Study Group Set Up by the Planning Commission, Government of India. T. A. Rusch, Institute of Asian Studies, University of California 180
- SKINNER, G. WILLIAM. *Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand*. Cora Du Bois, Professor of Anthropology, Harvard University 182

EUROPE: PAST AND PRESENT

- DE LAET, S. J. *The Low Countries*. Adriaan J. Barnouw, Professor of the History of Language and Literature of the Netherlands, Emeritus, Columbia University 185
- DJILAS, MILOVAN. *Land Without Justice*. Joseph S. Roucek, Professor of Sociology and Political Science, University of Bridgeport 186
- EHRMAN, JOHN. *Cabinet Government and War, 1890-1940*. Sydney D. Bailey, Director, Quaker Program at the United Nations 189
- GOODWIN, GEOFFREY L. *Britain and the United Nations*. Arthur N. Holcombe, Professor of Government, Emeritus, Harvard University 190
- GORDON, HAROLD J., JR. *The Reichswehr and the German Republic, 1919-1926*. Eric H. Boehm, Editor, *Historical Abstracts* 193
- HOLT, ROBERT T. *Radio Free Europe*. E. Malcolm Carroll, Professor of History, Duke University 195
- KENNAN, GEORGE F. *Russia, the Atom and the West*. Martin B. Travis, Jr., Associate Professor of Political Science, Stanford University 194
- KLINDT-JENSEN, OLE. *Denmark Before the Vikings*. William L. Smyser, Professor of History, State Teachers College 188
- LAMPERT, E. *Studies in Rebellion*. Sidney Harcave, Professor of History and Chairman, Division of Social Sciences, Harpur College 193

	PAGE
LA PALOMBARA, JOSEPH. <i>The Italian Labor Movement</i> . Walter Galenson, Professor of Industrial Relations, University of California	192
LYMAN, RICHARD W. <i>The First Labour Government</i> . Margaret Cole, London ...	189
VOEGELIN, ERIC. <i>Order and History</i> , Vol. II: <i>The World of the Polis</i> ; Vol. III: <i>Plato and Aristotle</i> . Trusedell S. Brown, Professor of History, University of California	187
WILKINSON, B. <i>Constitutional History of Medieval England, 1216-1399</i> , Vol. III. Gray C. Boyce, Professor of History, Northwestern University	191

SOCIOLOGY

COELHO, GEORGE V. <i>Changing Images of America</i> . M. Brewster Smith, Editor, <i>The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology</i>	202
CORBETT, DAVID C. <i>Canada's Immigration Policy: A Critique</i> . J. P. Delisle, Chief, Statistics Section, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Ottawa	200
DAHLKE, OTTO H. <i>Values in Culture and Classroom</i> . Francis J. Brown, Staff Associate, American Council on Education	198
DONAHUE, WILMA, and others (Eds.). <i>Free Time: Challenge to Later Maturity</i> . Harold D. Meyer, Professor of Sociology, University of North Carolina	199
HENTIG, HANS VON. <i>Zur Psychologie der Einzeldikte</i> , Vol. II: <i>Der Mord</i> ; Vol. III: <i>Der Betrug</i> . Walter A. Lunden, Professor of Sociology, Iowa State College ...	203
JAMES, E. O. <i>Prehistoric Religion</i> . Wilson D. Wallis, Professor of Sociology, Annhurst College	201
LANTZ, HERMAN R. with the assistance of J. S. McCrory. <i>People of Coal Town</i> . Samuel E. Gluck, Bonded Scale and Machine Company, Columbus, Ohio	196
LEROI-GOURHAN, A. <i>Prehistoric Man</i> . Wilson D. Wallis, Professor of Sociology, Annhurst College	201
MILLER, ROBERT MOATS. <i>American Protestantism and Social Issues, 1919-1939</i> . J. Milton Yinger, Visiting Professor of Sociology, University of Michigan	204
MORLAND, JOHN KENNETH. <i>Millways of Kent</i> . Samuel E. Gluck, Bonded Scale and Machine Company, Columbus, Ohio	196
TAEUBER, CONRAD, and IRENE B. TAEUBER. <i>The Changing Population of the United States</i> . Vincent Heath Whitney, Professor of Sociology, Brown University	198
UNDERWOOD, KENNETH WILSON. <i>Protestant and Catholic</i> . Ray H. Abrams, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania	204
VIDICH, ARTHUR J., and JOSEPH BENSMAN. <i>Small Town in Mass Society</i> . Noel P. Gist, Professor of Sociology, University of Missouri	201
WILENSKY, HAROLD L., and CHARLES N. LEBEAUX. <i>Industrial Society and Social Welfare</i> . Rupert B. Vance, Professor of Sociology, University of North Carolina	197

ECONOMICS

HOLLAND, DANIEL M. <i>The Income-Tax Burden on Stockholders</i> . Roy G. Blakey, Professor of Economics, Emeritus, University of Minnesota	207
KOOPMANS, TJALLING C. <i>Three Essays on the State of Economic Science</i> . Murray Brown, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Pennsylvania	205
MACDOUGALL, DONALD. <i>The World Dollar Problem</i> . John Parke Young, Chief, Division of International Finance, Department of State	208
NETSCHERT, BRUCE C. <i>The Future Supply of Oil and Gas</i> . J. Russell Whitaker, Professor of Geography, Peabody College	207
ROBERTSON, DENNIS H. <i>Lectures on Economic Principles</i> , Vol. 1. Edmund Whitaker, Professor of Economics, Colorado State University	206

PHILOSOPHY

ANSHEN, RUTH NANDA (Ed.). <i>Language: An Enquiry into Its Meaning and Function</i> . Carleton T. Hodge, Head, Department of Near Eastern and African Languages, Foreign Service Institute	214
FEUER, LEWIS SAMUEL. <i>Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism</i> . David Bidney, Professor of Anthropology and Philosophy, Indiana University	211
FRIEDRICH, CARL J., and ZBIGNIEW K. BRZEZINSKI. <i>Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy</i> . Paul E. Zinner, Department of Political Science, Columbia University	214
POPPER, KARL R. <i>The Poverty of Historicism</i> . Willson H. Coates, Professor of History, University of Rochester	210
STAMPS, NORMAN L. <i>Why Democracies Fail</i> . David Spitz, Professor of Political Science, The Ohio State University	213
STANLIS, PETER J. <i>Edmund Burke and the Natural Law</i> . Ernest Nagel, Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University	209
STONE, JULIUS. <i>Aggression and World Order</i> . Johannes Mattern, Associate Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, Johns Hopkins University	212
OTHER BOOKS	215

The articles appearing in THE ANNALS are indexed in the *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature* and the *Industrial Arts Index*.

FOREWORD

It is part of the genius of the American people that they are able to work their political and governmental institutions long after the conditions which prompted them have ceased to exist. Except for the increase in size, the form of the American government is not very different today from that of Washington's first administration. The difference, and it is vast, arises less from changes in form than from changes in the social milieu in which our federal republic operates. While some observers see in this resistance to change a weakness which may be fatal, it can hardly be said that the American people as a whole are either dissatisfied with their government or wish to change it radically.

There are many reasons explaining this equanimity with which Americans view their government. One of them is the responsiveness which that government has shown to the wishes and demands of the people themselves. To a certain extent, the political parties have contributed to this responsiveness. Far more important, though, have been the pressure groups and lobbies, the mass activity of people acting under leadership in the area of policy formation. Unlike the parties, which are election oriented, the pressure groups concentrate their attention for the most part on policy, working in, through, and with the political parties when possible, at arm's length from them when necessary. Exploiting the joining tendency of Americans, which De Tocqueville remarked on over a century ago, these voluntary groupings of citizens have coalesced around a variety of interests—sectional and regional, economic and professional, ethnic, religious, and social, until today it is the rare citizen who is not potentially at least a member of some group. As W. M. Kiplinger remarked some years ago, if you are not a member of one or two or more pressure groups, then you are not a very active citizen.

Between Adam Smith's invisible hand and our well-developed system of lobbies and pressure groups there is a tempting analogy. If the former was the means of regulating the market, the latter is a means of regulating society. There are other means of social regulation, too—the family, organized religion, custom and habit, as well as law, government, and public opinion. But one of the main causes of the increased regulatory role of government in society is the system of pressure groups which has developed alongside the formal agencies of government.

There was a time when pressure groups were invisible, venal, and worked under cover. The "old" lobby, as E. P. Herring described it thirty years ago, has passed away, a victim of the muckrakers of Theodore Roosevelt's era, among other things. And if a conspiracy of silence oftentimes even now seems to muffle their operations, periodic disclosures of "excessive" lobbying in Congress, in the regulatory agencies in the budget-making process, in the Pentagon, remind the people of the real policy-determining forces in their government. While the methods of the "old" lobby have not been completely abandoned, the "new" lobby is everywhere respected, accepted, and causes few editorial writers to thunder. It is not difficult to discover the reasons—active citizens are themselves caught up in the system while the passive citizen, if he pays any attention to it at all, sees nothing unusual in it.

This volume deals mainly with American pressure politics. It describes pressure groups in government—in the Congress, in the bureaucracy, in the administration of justice. It deals with what are called "the big three" of pressure politics—man

agement, farmers, and labor. The methods of pressure groups are described, their operations, their relations with the political parties, their part as policy shapers in the governmental process. Problems raised by pressure groups and lobbying are treated in the article on regulation, while some of the theoretical aspects are discussed in other articles. A comparison is made of the representation of groups in parliamentary government, as in Britain, and in congressional-presidential government, as in the United States. In France, party politics are subordinated to pressure politics, and this situation likewise receives treatment. A brief survey of the phenomenon of pressure groups in international politics completes the volume.

The perceptive reader will find much in this volume to fill in the gaps in his knowledge of the politics of democracy as practiced in the United States. In the system of lobbies which we have grafted onto the formal system of representative self-government, he will also perceive some difficulties as well as some advantages for responsible government in the future.

DONALD C. BLAISDELL

Pressure Groups in Congress

By EMANUEL CELLER

ABSTRACT: Lobbying is the sum of all communicated influences—both direct and indirect—on legislators concerning legislation. It is indispensable to effective lawmaking which, in a democracy, is always the product of compromise. Every Member of Congress is a message center and reagent in the vast communications system through which the electorate make known their needs. The “good” representative is he who effectively accommodates opposing interests within his constituency; who successfully relates the needs of his constituents to those of the people as a whole; and who harmonizes his responses to the demands made upon him with the dictates of his conscience. The touchstone of “good” lobbying and “bad” lobbying is only whether the message conveyed is intelligible and accurate, or cryptic and misleading. Legislation will be improved when more and more people learn to intervene directly in the conduct of our national affairs. Venal lobbying is already the subject of criminal prohibition and penalty, and indirect, or “grass-roots” lobbying is best kept within check by vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws, to assure “the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.”

Emanuel Celler, Washington, D. C., is Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives and of its Antitrust Subcommittee. He was elected to Congress as a Democrat from the 11th District of New York in 1922 and at each subsequent Congressional election. Mr. Celler is a graduate of Columbia College and Columbia Law School, New York. He is the author of You Never Leave Brooklyn (1953).

AS THE result of an amazing new breakthrough in electronics, scientific articles written in Russian can be fed into a machine, a kind of bilingual typewriter, which translates and returns them in English. This marvel is already functioning in a rudimentary way and its perfection will provide American investigators with untold stores of basic science research that are not now available. A side effect, of course, will be to transform the existing shortage of competent human translators into an oversupply.

No doubt within the lives of many readers this new technique will be developed and improved. The next step may be an automatic evaluator capable of grading as well as receiving and translating messages. When that time comes, will Senators and Representatives no longer be required to perform, each for himself according to his lights, the arduous task of ascribing the proper weight and significance to the thousands of messages which come to them annually from the people? Science fiction writers, undoubtedly, will soon envision an automatic legislator that will supplant the Congress, just as the automatic translator seems to be about to supplant human linguists.

AN AUTOMATIC LEGISLATOR

To me, legislation is the most exacting job in the world, and the most enjoyable. I do not relish the idea of its technological displacement. But neither would I retard the march of progress. So, in anticipation of that perfect state in which legislation can be performed by a machine, and in gratitude for the many years of satisfaction I have had being allowed to participate in doing it the old way, I should like—as the social scientists say—to “construct a model” of the automatic legislator of the future, with special attention to problems of intake.

A word as to the purpose of this machine: it would replace the human—hence imperfect—legislator, whose function, in every political democracy, is to appraise and arbitrate the conflicting demands of the people. Civilized society entrusts the orderly accommodation of these demands to its legislatures as an alternative to strife and chaos. The essentially arbitral character of the legislative role cannot be overstressed. Politics is aptly termed “the art of the possible.” In its very nature, effective legislation is the fruit of compromise.

Those who decry the readiness of Congressmen to reconcile their aspirations to the demands of particular political situations seem to me to miss this essential characteristic of the legislative process. The “good” representative in Congress, manifestly, is he who effectively accommodates conflicting interests within his constituency; who successfully relates the needs of his constituents to those of the people as a whole; and who, at the same time, harmonizes his responses to the demands made upon him with the dictates of his conscience. Of corrupt or venal influences on legislators, I shall speak presently. But make no mistake about this: the elected representative who *wholly* subordinates the selfish requirements of interest groups to the furtherance of abstract principle, who ignores the felt needs of people in *exclusive* pursuit of high ideals, falls as far short of fulfilling the legislative function as the legislator who sells his vote. And I must add that he enjoys a substantially poorer expectancy of survival in office. In a sense this is justified, for a legislator is not elected in order that he may function exclusively by Divine guidance or personal intuition; he is a message center and reagent in a vast communications system through which the electorate make known their needs.

I should like to appraise the practices

which are usually grouped within the concept “lobbying” in their aspect as elements of this communications system—as the “intake” of the automatic legislator of the future. The character and quality of these messages and their impact on legislation have been the subject of century-long public discussion, both in and out of Congress, and have given rise to scores of learned articles. Many of these articles follow a discernible pattern, somewhat as follows:

“the right of the people to petition Congress for the redress of grievances is guaranteed by the Constitution, therefore, lobbying cannot be prohibited; there is good lobbying and bad lobbying—open and forthright lobbying is good, venal and deceptive lobbying is bad; Congress may and should curb or prohibit bad lobbying; and this or that remedy will best eliminate the abuses, while preserving the right.”

I have no quarrel with any of this. But I believe that it tends to undervalue lobbying by understating its indispensability to the legislative process. We may define lobbying as the total of all communicated influences upon legislators with respect to legislation. So defined, it includes direct and indirect influences. The latter comprise campaign contributions, on the one hand, and so-called “grass-roots” public opinion formation on the other. Even if we restrict our definition to direct importunings of Congressmen, however, lobbying still includes all the messages by which citizens, individually or in groups—that is, in “interest” groups and “pressure” groups, business groups and labor groups, farm groups and veterans’ groups, women’s groups and reformers’ groups, liberal groups and conservative groups, religious groups and teachers’ groups, state-wide groups and regional groups—notify the Congress of their needs and wishes. After thirty-six years as a target of such messages, I still re-

gard them as the bloodstream of the democratic process and a *sine qua non* of effective legislation. It is true that these messages come to us in a Babel of tongues. It is true, as Mr. Justice Jackson observed of lobbyists, that “their conflicting claims and propaganda are confusing, annoying, and at times, no doubt, deceiving and corrupting.” There is an understandable tendency to blame legislative failures upon lobbying, a tendency that no doubt inspired Senator Jim Reed’s quip that “a lobbyist is anyone who opposes legislation I want.” But fundamentally, I believe, we all recognize that the touchstone of “good” lobbying and “bad” lobbying is not whether the objectives of persuasion are selfish or altruistic, liberal or conservative, prolabor or probusiness, but solely and simply whether the message conveyed is intelligible, accurate, and informative, or cryptic, deceptive, and obscure.

Upon this premise, our automatic legislator should be programmed with a view to enabling translation of the various tongues in which lobbyists speak to Congressmen, irrespective of the content of their messages. First, however, we must identify and eliminate certain existing phenomena with which the machine will have no concern. One of these is venal lobbying, a form of lobbying in which the favor seeker pays for the legislator’s vote or advocacy.

VENAL LOBBYING

Money talks. One writer has attributed the following cynicism to a regional counsel for an oil company:

“You just put good, green folding money in their lily-white hands and be . . . sure they know why you put it there.”

I sometimes think that the political maturity of a people is best indicated by

the extent to which they insist upon high moral standards in the conduct of their public affairs. The nineteenth century, a period of rapid expansion in America, saw widespread venality in office. The open buying and selling of votes is described in novels dealing with the period. A House committee investigation conducted in 1854 disclosed that the attempts of Samuel Colt to secure extension of valuable patents included the retention of a Member of Congress on a \$10,000 contingent fee, numerous gifts of small arms to other Congressmen, and lavish entertainment. Even as late as 1923, when I entered Congress, the halls were still resounding with the scandals brought to light ten years earlier concerning lobbying activities of the National Association of Manufacturers which opposed the Underwood Tariff Bill. These abuses went so far as to include employment of the chief page of the House to eavesdrop and report on the cloakroom activities and personal conversations of Congressmen.

Flagrant abuses such as these are no longer typical. Moreover, this type of abuse is not so much a problem of lobbying regulation as it is one of the enforcement of the criminal laws. I recently asked the staff of the House Antitrust Subcommittee, of which I am Chairman, to prepare a report on the federal conflict of interest and bribery statutes. From this report, it is evident that the gravest abuses of the right of access to Congress are and have long been the subject of direct criminal prohibition and penalty. I wonder how many people realize that the payment of anything of value to a Member of Congress with intent to have his vote or action influenced thereby subjects both the payer and the recipient to fine and imprisonment; that the Member of Congress is also prohibited from receiving anything of value "for his attention to or services" on any Congressional

question or for services before federal agencies.

FRIENDLY LOBBYISTS

More troublesome than outright bribery, because of the obscurity of its motivation and the subtlety of its effect, is the practice of some modern lobbies indiscriminately to befriend influential office holders. In its sophisticated form, this activity never includes *request* for a favor, but limits itself to the extension of amenities and courtesies in the form of free transportation, hospitality, and adjuncts to "gracious living." The sole visible object appears to be the establishment of the amiability of the lobbyist and his client. Effectiveness of this technique to influence legislation is not susceptible of precise measurement and can only be inferred from the extensiveness of the practice. Lately, Congressional committees have been concerned with the impact of this form of social seduction upon employees of the executive branch.

The campaign contribution is another method by which cash is capable of influencing legislation. The furore created two years ago, when Senator Case of South Dakota reported that an oil lobbyist had attempted to contribute \$2,500 to his campaign at a time when his position on the Gas Bill was uncertain, exemplifies the problems which can arise. While no one would dispute a citizen's right to help elect the candidate of his choice, that right is rarely exercised in the absence either of approval of the candidate's past record or a favorable estimation of his future actions. So, too, the candidate himself has difficulty in determining to what extent he owes a campaign contribution to recognition of his qualities of statesmanship and to what extent it reflects approval of his particular past or anticipated action on a matter close to the

contributor's heart. It begs the question to say that such contributions are proper when the purpose for which they are given is the election of the candidate and not the purpose of influencing his vote. And what if they are given for both purposes?

The Senate committee which investigated the Case episode recommended that each candidate be required by law to have a fiscal agent whose duty would be to solicit, accept, and make public all campaign contributions. This would provide the advantage of publicity and also some insulation of the legislator from contact with his benefactor.

No special adjustment to protect against bribery or to appraise the motives underlying campaign contributions need be built into the automatic legislator; its lack of human attributes and its immunity from campaigns for reelection will remove all incentive for such payments. Meanwhile, human legislators must continue to meet their problems with common sense and self-restraint.

RECOGNITION OF LOBBYING BY CONGRESS

It has been pointed out that lobbying (whether or not accompanied by venality) is not only as old as government itself, but actually always precedes government. Establishment of any governmental system implies that the conflicting demands of participating groups have been accommodated. In the United States, persistent lobbying to affect legislation has evoked intermittent Congressional interest in the nature of lobbying practices, which in turn ultimately produced legislation to affect lobbying. The earliest federal measure bearing on lobbying was a House rule adopted in 1852 which excluded from seats on the floor of the House newspapermen employed to prosecute claims pending be-

fore Congress. The earliest investigations were those of the Colt patent lobby, two years later, and of the Pacific mail steamship scandal of 1872. In 1867, the House adopted a rule excluding former Congressmen from the floor if they were interested in any claim pending before Congress. For a part of the 44th Congress, in 1876, the House operated under a resolution requiring registration of the name and authority of persons employed as counsel or agent with respect to pending measures, on pain of prohibition from appearing in such capacity before any House committee.

Apparently spurred in part by the revelations of a New York State investigation of insurance industry lobbying conducted in 1905 and 1906, the present century saw a marked increase in Congressional proposals to regulate lobbying. This trend was augmented by the Congressional investigation of the Underwood Tariff lobby in 1913, the 1930 investigation of lobbying activities at the Geneva Disarmament Conference of 1927, and the Public Utilities struggles of 1935-36. The latter culminated in provisions of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935 which required the registration of lobbyists on holding company matters before Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission, or the Federal Power Commission. Similar provisions were included in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, affecting lobbyists on matters related to shipping before Congress, the Federal Maritime Board, or the Secretary of Commerce.

Ten years later, Congress enacted the present law governing lobbying—The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act—as Title III of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. This enactment requires those who attempt to secure the enactment or defeat of pending or proposed legislation to register and to re-

port on their activities. As construed by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of *United States v. Harriss* (347 U. S. 612 (1954)), the reporting requirements are applicable only to persons who solicit or receive contributions where a principal purpose of the contribution or of the solicitor or recipient is aiding to influence legislation by direct communication with Members of Congress. The Court held that thus construed the Act is constitutional. It is noteworthy that in this construction the Act does not apply to those who spend, but do not receive or solicit, funds to influence legislation, nor to those who seek to effectuate influence by indirect rather than direct methods. The rationale of the Act was stated by Chief Justice Warren as follows:

Present day legislative complexities are such that individual members of Congress cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to which they are regularly subjected. Yet full realization of the American ideal of government by elected representatives depends to no small extent on their ability to properly evaluate such pressures. Otherwise the voice of the people may all too easily be drowned out by the voice of special interest groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as proponents of the public weal. This is the evil which the Lobbying Act was designed to help prevent.

Toward that end, Congress has not sought to prohibit these pressures. It has merely provided for a modicum of information from those who for hire attempt to influence legislation or who collect or spend funds for that purpose. It wants only to know who is being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much.

Operation of the Act was studied by the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments in 1948, by the Buchanan Committee in 1950, and by a special Senate Committee to Investigate Political Activities, Lobby-

ing, and Campaign Contributions in 1956 and 1957. As a result of these investigations and in light of the Supreme Court's construction of the Act in the *Harriss* case, legislation introduced in both Houses of Congress would overhaul the Act, clarifying and sharpening its provisions. Principal proposals for amendment provide for administration by the Comptroller General of the United States and clear definition of the persons to whom the Act applies—principally professional lobbyists and their employers and persons who conduct campaigns urging others to communicate directly with Congress. New in these bills is a salutary criminal provision, penalizing the transmission to Congress of communications known to be spurious, that is, "false, forged, counterfeit, or fictitious."

All constructive efforts to improve existing lobbying regulation are to be supported. The task of the Congressman is arduous enough without being complicated by apocryphal or spurious messages. It is sometimes possible to spot such propaganda by the uniformity of its size, shape, and postmark, and of the handwriting in which it is addressed. Not infrequently attempts to reply to this kind of message have been returned "unknown," or have received a response declaring that the writer had not communicated with the Congressman in the first place. More often, the answer is complete silence. Legislators cannot afford to give this kind of message much weight. Nor can they afford to ignore it entirely. The result is a great waste of time counting the individual letters on each side of the question and in perfunctory attempts to reply. Public disclosure of "who is being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much," and outright prohibition of counterfeit pressures are minimal and necessary protections of the legislative process.

PROBLEMS OF EVALUATION

Even after lobbying regulation has been perfected in these respects, and after venal, social, cryptic, and deceptive lobbying have been eliminated, perplexing problems of evaluation will remain to occupy the legislator and his mechanical successor. Fundamentally, these will be problems created by the disparity in volume, intensity, and quality of the representations that are made to Congress. A number of the modern lobbies operating in Washington are of the highest quality. With plenty of money to spend, they spend it on qualified analysts and advocates and provide Congressional committees with lucid briefs and technical documentation in support of their positions. Nothing is more informative and helpful to a legislative committee than to hear the views of competent, well-matched advocates on the opposite sides of a legislative issue.

It is true that the cost of effective lobbying is ultimately borne by the people. It is also true that the pressures generated by a well-organized interest group can become irritating. But despite this cost and irritation, I believe that too much lobbying is not as dangerous to the quality of the resulting legislation as too little. It is disturbing to sit through legislative hearings at which the conflicting interests who should be heard are unequally represented in the presentation of their views. Worst of all, from the standpoint of a Congressman's desire to legislate intelligently, are those situations in which only the proponents of the suggested legislation are heard from. The Congressman may know or suspect that there are serious opposing considerations, but they are simply not presented. He is faced with a dilemma as to how far he can or should go to supply the omission.

This is not to say that it is necessary to maintain a costly and permanent organization in order to lobby effectively. Excellent presentations are constantly being made on behalf of relatively small lobbies, organized on an *ad hoc* basis, to support or oppose particular measures. These groups must and often do overcome the handicap of limitation of funds by making their blows count. The effectiveness of such presentations lies in stating a position forcefully, clearly, and tersely—without frills. Congressmen are more appreciative than is generally known of lobbyists who respect their crowded schedules and keep representations to a minimum consistent with thoroughness. A potential advantage enjoyed by *ad hoc* lobbies is that they are not inhibited by the need to be consistent with their own former positions, which sometimes affects permanent organizations.

Congressmen also receive many messages from individuals who write to or visit their representatives in person. With respect to lobbying by mail, individual letters expressing honest convictions in a logical and convincing manner are always welcome. Even inspired mail, the fruit of a letter-writing campaign, can be effective if the writers take the trouble to express their sincere views and the reasons therefor individually. At the other pole, of course, are intemperate or extremist messages from overzealous and emotionally disturbed persons, sometimes resorting to threats. These accomplish nothing. Every member of Congress receives both kinds of letters from his constituents. If he reaches the level of committee chairman, moreover, they come to him from every section of the country, representing every shade of feeling on substantially every issue which is or may be within his competence. For there is a marked tendency on the part of individual citizens to overestimate the power

of a single Congressman, simply because he is the chairman of a committee.

Personal visits by lobbyists are subject to similar observations. The man who keeps his appointment, presents his problem or proposal, and lets the Congressman get on with his other work comes to be liked and respected. His message has an excellent chance of being effective. The man who feels that it somehow adds to his usefulness and prestige to be seen constantly in the company of one legislator or another, or who seeks to ingratiate himself with Congressional staffs, gets under foot and becomes a nuisance. He does his principal and his cause no good. Every Congressman receives many visits from both kinds of callers. He can only hope that the first kind will increase and that the second kind will gradually disappear.

BETTER LEGISLATION

It is an unhappy commentary that in lobbying the voice of zealotry and passion is sometimes more insistently raised than the voice of statesmanship and wisdom. This is true of individual lobbyists and of organized interest groups alike. We hear from extremists and the emotionally disturbed; we must hear more fully from the sane and mature. Increased interest and direct intervention by all the people in the working of their government will greatly facilitate the task of legislators, human or utopian. It is the only true guarantee of better legislation.

Lincoln once said:

Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment nothing can fail. Without it, nothing can succeed. Consequently, he who molds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed.

Realization that ultimate power to affect legislation resides in the people has

given a significant new direction to pressure group activities, which now seek to influence legislation by remote control. The new profession of public-opinion engineers is engaged in creating public sentiment in favor of or opposed to particular policies. The thought is that once the desired public climate is achieved, the people themselves will do the work.

Aspects of this newly accelerated phase in the struggle for men's minds have a frightening, Orwellian portent. These include recent experiments in so-called subliminal advertising, wherein messages are flashed on a movie or television screen at a speed too great to permit their conscious reception, but long and often enough to condition the viewer without his knowledge that he has been subjected to manipulation—in effect inscribing the advertisement on his brain. They include the increasingly frequent boasts of experimenters that any person can be taught to do anything by conditioning. They include disturbing instances of planted articles and stories in the public press.

As has been noted, the Supreme Court has held that the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act was intended to regulate only those persons who receive funds for the purpose of *direct* communication with Congress. "Grass-roots" public opinion formation is not included. Despite the potential perils from mass manipulation through use of the channels of communication, I am of the opinion that the high Court's decision was wise. For Congress to attempt to control the formulation of public opinion would be to throw out the baby with the bath. The constitutionality of such an attempt would be highly dubious, and the cure would be worse than the disease.

Social ills affecting our media of mass communications are not to be dealt with by direct regulation or control, but pri-

marily by insisting to the best of our ability that these media shall always remain free. Competition has been the foundation of American economic policy, and the national antitrust laws, which implement that policy by outlawing monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade, are the great bulwark of our private enterprise system. As the Supreme Court has stated, ". . . the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is

essential to the welfare of the public." Undue concentration of control and anticompetitive practices in the fields of mass communications—the press, radio, and television—are the essential evil to be counteracted. I am convinced that vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws in these industries will, by assuring "the widest possible dissemination of information" to the people, most effectively guard against our ever becoming a manipulated electorate.

The Bureaucracy in Pressure Politics

By J. LEIPER FREEMAN

ABSTRACT: Public administrative agencies in many ways resemble and behave like pressure groups. They not only administer laws, but they attempt to influence public opinion and legislative action, promoting the interests of their members and of related groups. General statutory regulations do not restrict them noticeably in this regard, although in some important ways the Chief Executive does, especially through budgetary, personnel, and other organizational controls. Nevertheless, public bureaucracies enjoy considerable autonomy to propose public policies and promote their adoption.

By day-to-day liaison with legislators, avenues are kept open for administrative lobbying. Most crucial in the legislative activities of executive agencies is their strategic work with committees considering bills in the legislature. Among the critical kinds of support which may be mobilized here are executive superiors, employees, and clientele. Also, by elaborating their administrative structure, bureaucracies enlist the interest and participation of influential citizens as advisors and sponsors. Additionally, bureaucracies may bring pressure to bear upon legislators through the exercise of administrative discretion. Finally, in the publicity arena, bureaucrats have certain privileged positions, although they may invite legislative reprisals through overzealous propagandizing.

*J. Leiper Freeman, Ph.D., Nashville, Tennessee, is Associate Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University. He has also taught at Harvard, Princeton, The George Washington University, and the University of Mississippi. He served on the research staff of the Task Force on Indian Affairs of the First Hoover Commission and wrote a dissertation on executive-legislative politics in American Indian affairs during the New Deal era. He is the author of a study of executive bureau relations with congressional committees, *The Political Process* (1955). Dr. Freeman is currently engaged in research on the backgrounds, career patterns, and interest representation of federal field officials.*

IT IS not a novel statement that we live in a society of "organization men," but we have yet to comprehend adequately the implications of this fact. Today's bureaucratic world is a reality within which the vast majority of Americans are enmeshed. Large, complex, specialized, hierarchical organizations are means of achieving the mass production, communications, services, regulation, and destruction possible in modern society. These bureaucracies are both public and private, large and small, demanding and lenient; but in any case they are the dominating form of social organization in America today.

Although bureaucracies are primarily regarded as organizations which execute policies assigned to them by society, they must also be reckoned with as sources of influence upon social policies. The nature of this influence is basically twofold. First, members of bureaucracies can give shape to stated policies through the exercise of choice and judgment in administering them. Second, in attempting to affect the objectives and working conditions which society will authorize for their organizations, members of bureaucracies necessarily engage in pressure politics.

It is with this second aspect of bureaucratic behavior that this article is chiefly concerned. Furthermore, it is confined to pressure politics engaged in by governmental, as opposed to private, bureaucracies and to pressure politics aimed at influencing official governmental policies.

Public bureaucracies—national, state, and local—today employ about one-eighth of the labor force of the United States. About 3 million of these members of public bureaucracies are in the armed forces; slightly more than 2.2 million are civilian employees of the federal government; more than 1.1 million are classroom teachers in the public schools; about 3.5 million are other-

wise employed by the state and local governments. If these bureaucrats, numbering between 9 and 10 million, formed one large group sharing a common identity, they would constitute a force in pressure politics to defy the imagination. But public bureaucrats are divided into many bureaucracies by levels of government, by special functions, by special technologies, by differing clienteles, and by territories. The result is a patchwork of official organizations devoted to limited, specialized interests.

BUREAUCRACIES AS PRESSURE GROUPS

Since a public bureaucracy is concerned with special and limited aspects of public policy, to a degree it resembles the ordinary private pressure group. It is a congregating place for individuals concerned with the same subjects. Some of these interested individuals become members of the administrative agency while others join groups which look to that organization as a rallying point, and the agency takes a leading part in representing their interests. In this representative process perhaps the bureaucracy's most important function is to promote the idea that its special area of concern is important—be it education, air power, or mental health. The bureaucracy also promotes special solutions to policy problems in its area. Finally, it promotes objectives which are of particular interest to its members *as bureaucrats*. These are matters such as their working conditions, status, and compensation, as well as the maintenance and survival of their organization.

A public bureaucracy, as part of the official government, is subject to some controls over its pressure politics which do not apply to private groups. There are laws at the federal level to restrict the public relations and legislative activities of bureaucrats. Federal agencies are forbidden by an act passed in

1913 to use public funds to compensate "any publicity expert unless explicitly appropriated for that purpose."¹ Another act, passed in 1919, provides that appropriations shall not be used, unless explicitly authorized by Congress, "directly or indirectly to pay for any personal service, advertisement, telegram, telephone, letter, printed or written matter, or other device, intended or designed to influence in any manner a Member of Congress, to favor or oppose, by vote or otherwise, any legislation or appropriation by Congress, whether before or after the introduction of any bill or resolution proposing such legislation or appropriation. . . ."²

These general restrictions, however, have served mainly as policy statements to be used as threats against agency officials rather than as bases for actual cases. "Publicity experts" have not been hired, but "information," "education," and "publication" officers have been employed in good quantity.³ Although these publicists have often been flayed in the halls of Congress, no cases have arisen in which they have been held as violators of the law. Furthermore, despite the prohibitions against spending public funds to influence a member of Congress, there has remained a great latitude for legislative activity by public administrators. The expectations of Congressmen in this regard were well summarized by Representative Frank Buchanan in his committee's investigation of bureaucratic lobbying in 1950:

... It is equally necessary for the executive branch of Government to be able to make its views known to Congress on

all matters in which it has responsibilities, duties, and opinions. The executive agencies have a definite requirement to express views to Congress, to make suggestions, to request needed legislation, to draft proposed bills or amendments, and so on. And there is, of course, the power centered in the executive branch to overrule by veto any action of Congress which is not supported by a clear two-thirds majority of both Houses.⁴

CHIEF EXECUTIVE CONTROLS

It is safe to conclude that such statutory restrictions are not important limitations upon administrative propagandizing and lobbying in the federal government, and they are even less so in state and local governments where laws governing political activities of bureaucrats are generally less numerous and less stringent. Instead, more meaningful controls over bureaucratic pressure politics are to be found in the powers of the Chief Executive.⁵

At all levels of government today there is a tendency toward giving the Chief Executive more effective authority over finance, organization, and personnel to help him control the actions of administrative agencies. These sanctions do not necessarily remove bureaucrats from the arena of pressure politics, but they tend to channel their activities along lines amenable to the Chief Executive. The stronger these sanctions are—as in the case of the city manager or strong mayor form of municipal executive, or the strong governorship, or the Presidency—the smaller the relative autonomy allowed bureaucrats in legislative and public relations.

In the federal government, the Bureau of the Budget and the provisions of the Budgeting and Accounting Act of

1921 aid the President in establishing central control over tendencies toward agency autonomy in seeking appropriations. Executive departments and bureaus are prohibited from seeking amounts larger than those requested for them in the President's budget when they appear before appropriations committees of Congress. Nevertheless, there have been instances in which questioning by committee members has brought into the record a bureau's original requests which perhaps the Budget Bureau had eliminated or curtailed. This device for circumventing the prescribed budget procedure is probably welcomed by an administrator, with friendly committee members and sympathetic interest groups doing the prodding. Yet, on the whole, the executive budget is a significant means of co-ordinating administrative requests for funds.

In proposals for legislation, the Bureau of the Budget is also of some help to the President since it has the power to require that agencies' legislative requests should be submitted to it to determine whether they are "in accord with the program of the President." This does not prevent an agency from submitting proposals to Congress which are not "in accord," but it is supposed to enable Congress to know whether measures are consonant with the President's program when it takes action on them. There is no clear agreement among persons who have studied the effectiveness of this procedure, but the most recent evaluation indicates that in recent years it has become somewhat more effective in curbing autonomous action by the various agencies.⁶

⁵ Richard E. Neustadt, "Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 48 (September 1954), pp. 641 ff. For a different point of view, see Arthur A. Maass, "In Accord with the Program of the President?" in Carl J. Friedrich and J. K. Galbraith (Eds.), *Public Policy* (Cambridge,

The organizational status of a bureaucracy in the executive hierarchy determines to some degree the autonomy its members will have in their public and legislative relations. The more independently an agency is located in the structure of executive authority, the less formal power the Chief Executive can exercise over its political activities as well as on its administration of the laws. Thus, independent commissions and government corporations may enjoy some measure of independence from central direction of their political entrepreneurship which is not available to regular departments.

Personnel and Schedule C

Under the kind of government most often found in the United States, with a popularly elected Chief Executive having constitutional authority separate from the legislative branch, the President needs and usually has a coterie of political appointees. They serve both as political directors of the agencies and as leaders of the bureaucracies in their attempts to promote policies in their special spheres of interest.

The federal government under the Eisenhower administration enlarged the number of offices in this category by creating the so-called Schedule C positions for policy-making personnel in order to give the Republicans a larger crew of high-echelon officials. The major rationale for this enlargement was that the huge bureaucracies inherited from the previous administration, largely protected by Civil Service status, would otherwise be so intractable that the new administration would not be able to curb their autonomous tendencies. The results of this measure are not yet clear, although it has led to the removal of certain posts at the bureau-chief level from merit system status and to the

Mass.: Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University, 1953), pp. 77-93.

¹ 38 Stat. L. 212.

² 41 Stat. L. 68.

³ James L. McCamy, *Government Publicity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 7; V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952), pp. 731-32.

⁴ United States Congress, House, Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, *Legislative Activities of Executive Agencies*, Hearings, 81st Congress, 2d Session, Part 10 (Washington, 1950).

creation of a number of new assistant secretaries and administrative assistants, who are patronage appointees. They compose an enlarged group of party representatives engaged in legislative liaison, public relations, and policy development at higher levels of the administration. They may have also reduced the political leeway of officials at lower levels.⁶

BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY

Despite the restrictions which may be placed upon bureaucracies because they are part of the government, they still have considerable autonomy within the executive structure to engage in pressure politics. They enjoy certain advantages by being in the official family which help to offset the restrictions placed upon them. One advantage is the fact that they are expected by legislators to make recommendations to the legislative body on a continuing, legitimate basis. Furthermore, they may have the blessings of the Chief Executive in their legislative operations and consequently can speak with considerable force as the administration's specialists.

When Representative Buchanan voiced the thought that bureaucrats should "make their views known" to Congress, he was speaking with restraint. Virtually no piece of legislation of any consequence reaches any advanced stage of the legislative process without at least one administrative agency making some statement concerning it. On many bills, the chances are great that the proposal originated in an executive agency. Furthermore, in the highly decisive stage of the legislative process—committee hearings—officials from the administration

are invariably among the most regular and most crucial witnesses. Legislators at all levels of government, despite their defensiveness toward bureaucracy, like to hear from the bureaucrats most intimately concerned when making up their minds about proposed legislation, and the bureaucrats oblige them energetically.

The various bureaucracies are also expected by the Chief Executive and top leaders of the administration to carry a good deal of the burden of legislative leadership for the executive branch in their own special areas. This aspect of lobbying by administrative agencies is sometimes overlooked or unduly subordinated by students of the subject because of a preoccupation with the desirability of integrated executive leadership. In reality the Chief Executive cannot personally get involved in every legislative skirmish without tending to reduce his effectiveness and dissipating his resources for political leadership. On lesser matters and indeed on many that are of considerable importance, the bureaucracies are depended upon by the top level of the executive branch to work out the proposals, to secure their introduction, to mobilize support from the public and elsewhere, and to negotiate with the committees and the leaders of the legislative branch to secure favorable action.⁷

GENERAL LEGISLATIVE LIAISON

Administrative agencies do not wait until a specific proposal is to be urged upon the legislature to cultivate harmonious relations with legislators. A continuous process of legislative liaison is maintained. This may be found at all levels of government and at all tiers

⁶ Herman Miles Somers, "The President, the Congress, and the Federal Government Service" in *The Federal Government Service* (New York: The American Assembly, Columbia University, 1954), p. 71.

⁷ In connection with the above and some of the following points, see J. Leiper Freeman, *The Political Process: Executive Bureau—Legislative Committee Relations* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955), Chaps. 3-5.

of administration within these levels, although it is most marked at the higher echelons of federal administration. In the federal government, the growth of this process is reflected in recent institutional developments in which the major agencies have appointed high ranking officials with sizeable staffs to spend their full time on it. Every bureau is also equipped to consider requests from Congressmen and to furnish them information speedily. In the field offices, major headquarters follow the same pattern.

Accommodating legislative requests and inquiries where legitimately possible serves to keep agencies in the good graces of legislators and opens the way for suggestions and requests from administrators in return. Field officials usually work with Representatives and Senators from their own area. In Washington, where the liaison machinery is more elaborate and more concerned with agency-wide problems, particular attention is focused upon Congressional leaders and members of key committees.

While a good part of this activity is precautionary in that it is intended to keep legislators from becoming annoyed with an agency, it is also part of the agency's attempt to "cast bread upon the waters," to maintain a reservoir of good will, and to keep the solons aware of the important work the agency is doing.

At the state and local levels, legislative liaison has not become as highly organized and institutionalized as it has at the national level, but the essential ingredients are the same.

STRATEGY WITH COMMITTEES

Because so much of the meaningful work of legislative bodies is done in committees rather than in the full assemblies, the relations of spokesmen for the bureaucracies with committee members specializing in given policy areas

are crucial aspects of administrative pressure politics. Committee members and agency officials who work together on common problems can build up the kind of understanding which maximizes the effect of agency opinions upon committee decisions. Committee recommendations in turn have a primary effect upon the content of laws passed by the parent body. Committee hearings therefore are not merely means by which legislative groups exert control over bureaucracies, they are also critical opportunities for bureaucrats to influence legislation.

In general, committee members need information on policy questions, and administrative officials are in a position to have a vast store of it to present. This information, derived from the elaborate network of a bureaucracy, is a source of power. By presenting it strategically, leaders from the bureaucracy can use hearings to good advantage. Since hearings are usually covered by the press, the information presented may not only make a direct impression upon the committee members but also furnish ammunition to the agency's friends among the public.

Using higher-echelon support

Leaders of a bureaucracy who appear before legislators to advocate any new laws or changes in policy which their agency desires usually try to enlist the support of others. In many instances one of the most helpful sources of support is the Chief Executive or others in the higher echelons of the administration. Many things that an agency desires are not regarded as being of vital importance to the top leaders of the administration, even though the Chief Executive and his advisors may have nothing against their passage. If, however, the bureau chief and department officials seeking the legislation can secure from the Chief Executive a statement to the

legislative committee, or a comment to the press, or a paragraph in a speech favorable to their proposal, they may very well enhance its possibilities of adoption.

The effectiveness of this action is, of course, related to the state of the Chief Executive's popularity and prestige with the legislators. If the bureaucrats decide that the Chief Executive would in a given instance be more of an albatross than a guardian angel, they will naturally hope that he will not associate himself with their legislative project in any way.

The use of higher-echelon support is also available to bureaucrats as a defense against unwanted legislation. Their advice is given much weight in questions regarding the use of the Chief Executive's veto power on legislation falling within their special spheres of competence.

Mobilizing employee support

One of the great reservoirs of political strength available to agency leaders in certain kinds of legislative activities lies in their organization's employees. This is naturally more true of the larger organizations since elected officials tend to be impressed by numbers. In the federal government, the Post Office Department (with over 500,000 employees) is a good example of an agency which tends to profit appreciably from employee support.

There is no particular evidence, however, that employees are necessarily helpful to their agency leaders on all legislative matters. Detailed studies of municipal department heads' legislative strategies show that they are not inclined to view their employees as important sources of support in dealing with the city council except on matters such as salaries, job conditions, and the like.⁸ The reason is that public

⁸ Based on interviews and observations in the "Bay City" project, conducted at the Har-

employee organizations tend to concentrate their efforts on their interests as bureaucrats, often relegating larger policy questions to a secondary position. For this reason, agency leaders are often faced with the problem of tying employee benefits to other policy objectives and thereby evoking a maximum effort by the mass of the bureaucrats in their organizations to influence the legislative body.

At the federal level, a recent example of the linking of employee interests with broader policy objectives was seen in the fight waged by the Post Office Department to secure a modernization of the postal service and the most comprehensive revision of postage rates in over twenty years. Within the postal service, postmasters and postal employees were convinced that new buildings and equipment and increases in salaries were not to be obtained without the revision, and they contributed to the effort to obtain it. Legislative representatives from state and national organizations of postmasters conferred with the legislators. Organizations of postal employees lobbied and propagandized for it heavily.

The employees of the Brooklyn Post Office paid for a full-page advertisement in the *New York Times* to reprint an article by Senator Olin D. Johnston, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, which in general advocated modernization of the service and increasing the postage rates. Readers were urged to clip the article and mail it to their Senators.⁹

vard Graduate School of Education under a grant from the W. K. Kellogg Foundation. "Bay City" is a pseudonym for a Massachusetts city of nearly 50,000 population where a series of related research inquiries were conducted on local decision making during the period 1952-55 by a professional staff consisting chiefly of Peter H. Rossi, Alice S. Rossi, James M. Shipton, and the present writer.

⁹ *New York Times*, Tuesday, February 18, 1958, p. 13.

Mobilizing clientele support

Employees are, after all, not always the most appropriate pleaders in behalf of a bureaucracy in the legislative arena. Legislators are inclined to regard employees as pleading their own cases and therefore may discount their contentions. Consequently, administrative leaders seek to have their proposals endorsed by private groups who carry weight with legislators.

The easiest groups of this type for most agencies to mobilize are the so-called clientele groups. In many instances they are highly organized and easily identified. The Veterans Administration counts heavily on the American Legion and to a lesser extent on other veterans organizations to support its recommendations to Congress. In fact, it seldom tends to make a recommendation to Congress that is not reasonably acceptable to these organizations, so strong is their partnership in all pressure politics dealing with veterans affairs.

The pattern is similar with many other agencies and their clienteles such as the Commerce Department and business organizations; the Labor Department and the unions; and the Agriculture Department and the Farm Bureau, the Grange, and other farmer organizations. These other groups do not, however, always show the same degree of collaboration as that evinced by the Veterans Administration and its customers.

In fact, many of the difficulties attending Secretary Ezra Benson's efforts to convince Congress that his department's recommendations are the answer to the farm problems of the United States are related to an estrangement between the present leadership of the Department of Agriculture and significant portions of its clientele. Agency leaders who fail to maintain the con-

fidence of their patrons are apt to lose the most crucial element of their support in legislative relations. Groups that are not in the clientele of an agency are more difficult to encourage to take as much interest and exert as much effort in the agency's behalf.

Other group support

Bureaucracies welcome and at times aid the organization of groups to serve as their sponsors. These groups are not necessarily composed of steady customers of an agency, but they are made up of people who for various reasons are interested in its aims and its existence. Some of these groups are completely unofficial in nature; but many are given some official recognition in the agency's operations, rendering them quasi-public in character. By elaborating their administrative structure, public bureaucracies at all levels of American government have enlisted the participation of interested and often influential citizens in their business to give them advice and sometimes even to help them set and administer policies. In turn, the bureaucracies expect and usually receive support for their legislative objectives.

Among the many groups of this type to be found at the federal level are, for example, the various reserve officer associations of the military branches, or the very exclusive advisory committee of the Commerce Department, or any of the many other advisory committees in other units. Over the years the Agriculture Department has built up one of the most complex systems of citizen participation in administration at the local level that could be imagined. Some of its major programs are handled at the county level by committees elected by farmers and working in conjunction with full-time paid employees of the Department. In this way, for example, the Agricultural Stabilization and Conserva-

tion Service enlists sponsors composed of local farm leaders in county after county across the nation.¹⁰

In local governments, outstanding examples of sponsor groups are to be found in Parent-Teacher Associations or in "Friends of the Library." And at a more official and formal level they may be found in the plethora of boards and commissions which are officially charged with setting policies for various municipal agencies.

The way in which board sponsorship works to an administrator's advantage was observed a few years ago in a New England city.¹¹ The head of the library board was the woman with the most prestige in town, and the librarian was regarded as her protégée. These two ladies got the board chairman's husband to agree to buy a bookmobile for the public library if the city would agree to maintain it. Then the City Council was presented with this proposition at a meeting in which the library board was well represented and virtually able to make the matter one in which the Council would appear cheap if it refused. The Council, seeing that it had little choice, voted the funds to maintain the bookmobile and, of course, to furnish a driver.

Pressure by administrative decision

Bureaucrats can often generate pressure upon legislators through the exercise of their legitimate discretion in the course of conducting the public's business. One of the most recent and most widely argued examples was furnished by Postmaster General Arthur Summerfield. He gave orders to curtail mail deliveries one day a week last year when

Congress was showing reluctance to appropriate some funds which Mr. Summerfield said were necessary to prevent deficiencies in his agency. Despite outraged cries, Congress gave Mr. Summerfield the money. After all, people wanted their mail on Saturdays.

Looking again at the municipal level, the Water Commissioner of a New England city used his administrative powers to help arouse public support and pressure upon the Council for a bond issue to expand the water supply—a measure which certain industries in the city favored. Although it was a hot and dry summer, the Commissioner helped the drought along for some people by diverting water to the country club from a main which served many residences in a high part of the city. When the residents on this main could not draw bath water, not knowing that their water was being siphoned off to the golfers' showers, they were even more emphatic than the Water Commissioner and his industrialist supporters that the water supply needed expansion. Eventually the Council voted the bonds.¹²

GENERAL PUBLICITY ACTIVITIES

The ultimate aim of bureaucratic publicity is in large measure to create a climate of opinion which will be favorable to its objectives. Some of an agency's publicity is necessary to the administrative process of making more acceptable to the public the things it has already been assigned to do. But the cultivation of favorable public images also may serve to build up support for legislation which the agency desires but does not have, and it is difficult to separate one function of bureaucratic publicity from the other.

The many books and articles written about the exploits of the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents, the continuous,

favorable publicity accorded to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, and the speeches and writings of Mr. Hoover himself all help to make the jobs which are assigned to the FBI easier to accomplish. Yet this publicity also makes the agency more successful in its relations with Congress, for Congressmen are sensitive to the image maintained among the public at large.

Of course, the FBI is unusually fortunate in comparison with other federal bureaus in the nature and extent of its publicity, but many administrative units get a good deal of coverage on a fairly steady basis. There are abundant opportunities for members of the higher echelons of the bureaucracy not only to release news through regular channels and to talk to reporters, but also to make addresses, write articles, and in other ways create publicity for their organizations. Furthermore, in the field offices, regional press coverage is generally well maintained, especially for the larger agencies, and this substantially supplements the publicity emanating from Washington. Since nine-tenths of federal employees are not in Washington, there is immense opportunity for publicity to be generated at local levels,

where it can often affect the constituents of Congressmen most directly.

There is also usually a network of friendly media especially interested in the subjects dealt with by an agency and willing to help carry the propaganda battle. Some of these are "trade" publications, which, combined with official publications and reports, give bureaucracies ample outlets to reach the most interested audiences. Due to the limited nature of general public interest in most public problems, it is frequently more important to reach the highly concerned portion of the public than to try to publicize in general.

Bureaucrats can become victims of their own overzealous publicity tactics. Legislators are capable of being very sensitive to what they regard as improper administrative propagandizing, especially if it encroaches on their domains. It does not help administrative leaders and the agencies they represent to become branded as propagandists. The kinds of retribution they suffer in such instances vary from oratorical chastisement in the legislative halls to denial of the very objects which they seek to have the legislators bestow—funds and authority.

¹⁰ Reed L. Frischknecht, "The Democratization of Administration: The Farmer Committee System," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 47 (September 1953), pp. 704 ff.

¹¹ See note 8, *supra*.

¹² *Ibid.*

Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Activity

By CLEMENT E. VOSE

ABSTRACT: The important place of judicial review in the American system of government and the attention demanded by litigation dealing with large issues of public law have drawn organizations into many important court cases. In Supreme Court cases, organizations have participated openly by filing briefs as "friend of the court." They have also played a less noticed role either by aiding individuals in whose name "test cases" have been brought or by providing assistance to government attorneys defending a statute in which the organization has an interest. Particular attention is drawn to the activities of the American Liberty League, the National Consumers' League, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The practices of these and other organizations have led to controls designed to assure the integrity of the judicial process. It is contended that controls must be applied with caution lest there be interference with freedom of association and with the concomitant rights of access to the courts.

Clement E. Vose, Ph.D., Middletown, Connecticut, is Associate Professor of Government, Wesleyan University. Formerly he has taught at Beloit College, Western Reserve University, and Bowdoin College. He is Senior Fellow in the Yale Law School under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation (1958-59). His book, *Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court, the NAACP and the Restrictive Covenant Cases*, is being published next spring by the University of California Press.

THE conventional judicial process is distinguished from legislative and administrative processes by features which forbid, conceal, or control the participation of organized pressure groups. Justice Robert H. Jackson warned that "perhaps the most significant and least comprehended limitation upon the judicial power is that this power extends only to cases and controversies."¹ This limitation has meant that the Supreme Court of the United States refuses to provide advisory opinions and avoids what judges are fond of calling "political questions." It cannot be overstressed that the Supreme Court's only power is to decide lawsuits between adversaries with real interests at stake. Under the case system that marks American jurisprudence, a court is a "substantially passive instrument, to be moved only by the initiative of litigants."² This contrasts with the power of the President and the Congress to deal with any subject as desired.

Despite this limiting prerequisite, the Supreme Court does possess considerable control over the particular cases to be decided. The Judiciary Act of 1925 gave the Court almost complete discretionary control of its appellate business through grant or denial of the writ of certiorari. This statute settled the modern principle that the Supreme Court's function was

not to see justice done in every case, but to decide the more important policy issues presented within the frame of a "case" or "controversy," concerning the federal balance, the relations of the branches of the federal government, or the fundamental rights of the individual in relation to government.³

¹ *The Supreme Court in the American System of Government* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, p. 12.

³ James Willard Hurst, *The Growth of American Law* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1950), p. 119.

Elaborating upon the function of deciding important policy issues, Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, in 1949, told the bar that the Supreme Court is interested only in "those cases which present questions whose resolution will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved."⁴ Vinson added that "what the Court is interested in is the actual practical effect of the disputed decision—its consequences for other litigants and in other situations." This meant that lawyers whose petitions for certiorari were granted by the Supreme Court were representing not only their clients, "but tremendously important principles, upon which are based the plans, hopes and aspirations of a great many people throughout the country."

It is the thesis of this article that organizations—identifiable by letterhead—often link broad interests in society to individual parties of interest in Supreme Court cases. Since the American judicial system is built upon specific cases with specific facts, it is assumed that study of the role of specific organizations is relevant to understanding.⁵

⁴ Vinson, "Work of the Federal Courts," 69 S. Ct. v (1949).

⁵ For treatments of pressure groups in litigation, see Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908), pp. 382-99; David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), pp. 479-98; Donald C. Blaisdell, *American Democracy Under Pressure* (New York: Ronald, 1957), pp. 261-68; Jack W. Peltason, *Federal Courts in the Political Process* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1955); Mark DeWolfe Howe, "Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 67 (November 1953), pp. 91-95; Joseph B. Robison, "Organizations Promoting Civil Rights and Liberties," *THE ANNALS*, Vol. 275 (May 1951), pp. 18-26; Comment, "Private Attorneys-General: Group Action in the Fight for Civil Liberties," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 58 (March 1949), pp. 574-98. In criticism, see Walter Berns, *Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), pp. 130-33, 160-62.

REASONS ORGANIZATIONS GO TO COURT

Organizations support legal action because individuals lack the necessary time, money, and skill. With no delays a case takes an average of four years to pass through two lower courts to the Supreme Court of the United States. A series of cases on related questions affecting the permanent interest of a group may extend over two decades or more. The constant attention that litigation demands, especially when new arguments are being advanced, makes the employment of regular counsel economical. This may be supplemented by a legal staff of some size and by volunteer lawyers of distinction. Parties also pay court costs and meet the expense of printing the record and briefs. Organizations are better able to provide the continuity demanded in litigation than individuals. Some individuals do maintain responsibility for their own cases even at the Supreme Court level, but this is difficult under modern conditions.

The form of group participation in court cases is set by such factors as the type of proceeding, standing of the parties, legal or constitutional issues in dispute, the characteristics of the organization, and its interest in the outcome. Perhaps the most direct and open participation has been by organizations which have been obliged to protect their own rights and privileges. Robert A. Horn has shown that a modern constitutional law of association has developed out of Supreme Court cases concerning churches, trade unions, political parties, and other organizations.⁶ The cases have sometimes placed organizations as parties, but more often the organization supports a member or an officer in litigation. One example must suffice.

The constitutional concept of re-

⁶ *Groups and the Constitution* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1956). See also: Elias Lieberman, *Unions Before the Bar* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950).

ligious freedom has been broadened in recent years by the Supreme Court decisions in cases involving members of the sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses. Most of the cases began when a Jehovah's Witness violated a local ordinance or state statute. Since 1938, the Witnesses, incorporated as the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society and represented by its counsel, Hayden Cooper Covington, have won forty-four of fifty-five cases in the United States Supreme Court. As a result Jehovah's Witnesses now enjoy

the rights to solicit from house to house, to preach in the streets without a license, to canvass apartment buildings regardless of the tenants' or owners' wishes, to be recognized as ministers of an accredited religion and thus be exempt from the draft, to decline to serve on juries, and to refuse to salute or pledge allegiance to the flag.⁷

THE NAACP

Since 1909 the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People has improved the legal status of Negroes immeasurably by the victories it has won in more than fifty Supreme Court cases.⁸ During its early years, the NAACP relied upon prominent volunteer lawyers like Moorfield Storey, Louis Marshall, and Clarence Darrow to represent Negroes in the courts. Limited success coupled with its failure to win gains from Congress led the NAACP in the 1930's to make court litigation fundamental to its program. A separate organization, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, was incorporated for this purpose. The goal of the NAACP was to make Ne-

⁷ Richard Harris, "I'd Like to Talk With You for a Minute," *New Yorker*, Vol. 32 (June 16, 1956), pp. 72, 88.

⁸ See Herbert Hill and Jack Greenberg, *Citizen's Guide to De-Segregation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955); Clement E. Vose, "NAACP Strategy in the Covenant Cases," *Western Reserve Law Review*, Vol. 6 (Spring 1955), pp. 101-45.

groes "an integral part of the nation, with the same rights and guarantees that are accorded to other citizens, and on the same terms."⁹ This ambition meant that beginning in 1938 Thurgood Marshall as special counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund held what was "probably the most demanding legal post in the country."¹⁰

In aiming to establish racial equality before the law on a broad basis, the Legal Defense Fund has not functioned as a legal aid society. Limited resources have prevented the Fund from participating in all cases involving the rights of Negroes. As early as 1935 Charles Houston, an imaginative Negro lawyer who preceded Marshall as special counsel, set the tone of NAACP efforts when he declared that the legal campaign against inequality should be carefully planned "to secure decisions, rulings and public opinion on the broad principle instead of being devoted to merely miscellaneous cases."¹¹

By presenting test cases to the Supreme Court, the NAACP has won successive gains protecting the right of Negroes in voting, housing, transportation, education, and service on juries.¹² Each effort has followed the development of new theories of legal interpretation and required the preparation of specific actions in the courts to challenge existing precedent. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund has accomplished these two tasks through the co-operation of associated and allied groups. First, as many as fifty Negro lawyers practicing in all

parts of the country have been counsel in significant civil rights cases in the lower courts. Many of these men received their legal education at the Howard University Law School in Washington, D. C., and have shared membership in the National Bar Association since its founding in 1925. These common associations have contributed to the consensus among Negro lawyers on timing their quest for equality through litigation. Second, the NAACP has long benefited from its official advisory group, the National Legal Committee composed of leading Negro and white lawyers. Today Lloyd Garrison is Chairman of the National Legal Committee of forty-five attorneys located in twenty-three cities. This is the nucleus of the many volunteers in many fields who have contributed ideas, often at national conferences, to the planning of litigation. Third, other organizations with no direct connection with the Legal Defense Fund have sponsored a few cases. State and local chapters of the NAACP have often aided Negroes who were parties in cases, especially in the lower courts. The St. Louis Association of Real Estate Brokers was the chief sponsor of the important restrictive covenant case of *Shelley v. Kraemer*.¹³ A Negro national college fraternity, Alpha Phi Alpha, sponsored quite completely the successful attack on discrimination in interstate railway dining cars.¹⁴

Individual test cases

Winning new constitutional protections for Negroes has depended on the development of individual test cases with a Negro as party in each. There is no chronicle of the human interest stories contained in the roles of Negroes in historic Supreme Court cases. But what is known reveals many diffi-

⁹ Roy Wilkins, "The Negro Wants Full Equality," in *What the Negro Wants*, Rayford W. Logan (Ed.) (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), pp. 113, 118.

¹⁰ Saunders Redding, *The Lonesome Road: The Story of the Negro's Past in America* (Garden City, N. J.: Doubleday & Company, 1958), p. 321.

¹¹ Hill and Greenberg, *op. cit.* (note 8 *supra*), pp. 56-57.

¹² For a survey, see Robert E. Cushman, *Civil Liberties in the United States* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), pp. 211-24.

¹³ 334 U. S. 1 (1948).

¹⁴ *Henderson v. United States*, 339 U. S. 816 (1950).

culties to be inherent in improving the legal status of a group of fifteen million persons through individual court cases. In a suit by a single plaintiff, the case may become moot as the passage of time makes the remedy sought inapplicable. This danger, though avoided by the co-operation of state officials, was created in the Missouri Law School case of 1938 when the plaintiff, Lloyd Gaines, disappeared just as the case was completed.¹⁵ Also the concerted efforts of authorities to deny Negroes participation in the Texas white Democratic primary kept Dr. L. A. Nixon from voting even though he was the plaintiff in two Supreme Court victories.¹⁶ Furthermore there is always the temptation for compromise by the original plaintiff which would accomplish his narrow purpose but stop the litigation before the broad constitutional issue was before the appellate court.

These dangers were largely overcome in the School Segregation Cases¹⁷ when federal court actions were instituted by individual plaintiffs both on their own behalf and on behalf of persons similarly situated. Since 1955, in the expanding litigation over race relations, the class action has become a procedural device of growing importance. Rule 23 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides under certain circumstances that

if persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the ade-

quate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued.¹⁸

One authority has said that "school segregation is a group phenomenon which is peculiarly suited to resolution in a class action."¹⁹ As Negroes enter a new generation of litigation, their cases are apt increasingly to take the form of the class action.

THE AMERICAN LIBERTY LEAGUE

The experience of the American Liberty League, organized in 1934 by conservative businessmen to oppose the New Deal, provides another variation on the theme of organizations in litigation.²⁰ When the League proved unable to prevent enactment of economic regulation by Congress, a National Lawyers' Committee was formed to question the constitutionality of the legislation. In August 1935, the National Lawyers' Committee of fifty-eight members announced plans to prepare a series of reports to the public on whether particular federal laws were "consonant with the American constitutional system and American traditions."²¹ These reports "would be of a strictly professional nature and would in no case go into the question of social and economic advisability or the need for constitutional change to meet new conditions." This intention led the Committee during the

¹⁸ See "Class Actions: A Study of Group-Interest Litigation," *Race Relations Law Reporter*, Vol. 1 (October 1956), pp. 991-1010.

¹⁹ Robert B. McKay, "With all Deliberate Speed," A Study of School Desegregation," *New York University Law Review*, Vol. 31 (June 1956), pp. 992, 1086.

²⁰ See Benjamin R. Twiss, *Lawyers and the Constitution: How Laissez Faire Came to the Supreme Court* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1942), pp. 241-49; Frederick Rudolph, "American Liberty League, 1934-1940," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 56 (October 1950), pp. 19-33.

²¹ For the announcement and list of members of the Committee, see *New York Times*, Aug. 22, 1935, pp. 1, 6.

next two years to conclude that a dozen New Deal statutes were unconstitutional.

The most celebrated Liberty League "brief" prepared by the National Lawyers' Committee questioned the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act. That analysis was prepared by a subcommittee of eight attorneys under the chairmanship of Earl F. Reed. It was then submitted to the other members and made public by Raoul E. Desverine, Chairman of the entire group, on Constitution Day, 1935.²² The reports of the Committee were given wide publicity through press releases, the distribution of pamphlets, and radio talks by leading conservative lawyers like James M. Beck. Critics of these reports feared that they had two purposes: "to influence the federal courts when such legislation shall be presented for consideration" and "to arouse public sentiment so that confidence in the courts will be impaired should the legislation be held constitutional."²³

Members of the National Lawyers' Committee of the American Liberty League, but not the organization itself, participated in litigation. The Committee's first public announcement had stated that "it will also contribute its services in test cases involving fundamental constitutional questions." Although the intention was to offer free legal services to citizens without funds to defend their constitutional rights, members of the National Lawyers' Committee actually represented major corporations which challenged the constitutionality of New Deal legislation in the Supreme Court. Earl F. Reed simply adapted the Liberty League report to apply to the specific facts of the case

when he represented the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation against the National Labor Relations Board.²⁴ Another member of the National Lawyers' Committee, John W. Davis, represented the Associated Press in a companion case.²⁵

AIDING THE GOVERNMENT DEFENSE

Judicial review in the United States constitutes an invitation for groups whose lobbying fails to defeat legislation to continue opposition by litigation. The NAACP has taken advantage of this in questioning state segregation laws, and, especially before 1937, business groups of various sizes—the American Liberty League, trade associations, and corporations—contested the constitutionality of state and federal regulatory legislation. This exploitation of judicial review has been balanced by the practice of victorious groups in legislation continuing to support administrative agencies in charge of enforcement. When statutes are challenged, organizations often support the Justice Department in Washington or a state Attorney General in defending them. This is to say that when losers in legislation have brought test cases in the courts, the legislative winners have aided the official legal defense.

THE NATIONAL CONSUMERS' LEAGUE

The efforts of the National Consumers' League to defend the validity of protective labor legislation affords an example of this private organizational aid to the public defense of legislation.²⁶ Organized by society women in 1899 to

²⁴ *N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.*, 301 U. S. 1, 12 (1937).

²⁵ *Associated Press v. N.L.R.B.*, 301 U. S. 103 (1937).

²⁶ Clement E. Vose, "The National Consumers' League and the Brandeis Brief," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 1 (November 1957), pp. 267-90; Josephine Gold-

¹⁵ *Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada*, 305 U. S. 337 (1937). See Walter White, *A Man Called White* (New York: Viking Press, 1948), p. 162.

¹⁶ *Nixon v. Herndon*, 273 U. S. 536 (1927); *Nixon v. Condon*, 286 U. S. 73 (1932). See *Louis Marshall, Champion of Liberty*, Charles Reznikoff (Ed.) (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1957), pp. 426-47, *passim*.

¹⁷ 347 U. S. 483 (1954).

²² *New York Times*, Sept. 19, 1935, pp. 1, 10.

²³ Editorial in *United States Law Review* (October 1935), quoted in Thomas Reed Powell, "Fifty-eight Lawyers Report," *New Republic*, Vol. 85 (December 11, 1935), p. 120.

improve the lot of women and children in industry, the National Consumers' League sought first to boycott goods produced under substandard conditions and then to persuade state legislatures to control factory practices through legislation. When employers in the hotel and laundry business organized to defeat legislation in the courts, the National Consumers' League, in 1908, organized a Committee on Legislation and Legal Defense of Labor Laws to "assist in the defense of the laws by supplying additional legal counsel and other assistance."²⁷

The leaders of the National Consumers' League, especially Mrs. Florence Kelley and Miss Josephine Goldmark, learned to prod state Attorneys General in order to gain adequate defense for statutes under fire in the courts. They also made two positive contributions. First, arrangements were made to provide distinguished outside counsel—most importantly, Louis D. Brandeis; but also Felix Frankfurter, Newton D. Baker, and Dean Acheson—to supervise the preparation of briefs and to make oral arguments for a state. Second, the sociological material which was the mark of the Brandeis brief was prepared by Miss Josephine Goldmark and the staff of the National Consumers' League. The first four briefs that were successful were then collected with additional material and published by Miss Goldmark as *Fatigue and Efficiency*.²⁸ Attorneys General in states whose labor laws were under attack could then invite Consumers' League attorneys to manage the defense or else use the sociological materials prepared by the

mark, *Impatient Crusader; Florence Kelley's Life Story* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953), pp. 143–79.

²⁷ National Consumers' League, *Sixth Annual Report* (1908). The first N.C.L. victory was in *Muller v. Oregon*, 208 U. S. 412 (1908).

²⁸ (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1912.)

League in the preparation of their own brief. As a result, the League contributed to the successful defense of state statutes in more than fifteen important cases.

Like most organizations with a long-range interest in litigation, the National Consumers' League believed that publicity was vital. Criticizing the Illinois Supreme Court for invalidating an eight-hour law for women, Florence Kelley wrote in 1905 that when time

shall have convinced the medical profession, the philanthropists, and educators, as experience has already convinced the factory employees themselves, that it is a matter of life and death to young people who form so large a proportion of their numbers, to have a working day of reasonable length guaranteed by law, it will be found possible to rescue the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States from the perverted interpretation upon which this decision rests.²⁹

Mrs. Kelley's view was adopted in Illinois in 1910, but the full Consumers' League program of child labor, maximum hour, and minimum wage regulation was not accommodated by the United States Supreme Court for three more decades. In that period the League stressed education on the subject and for this purpose distributed extra copies of its briefs to law schools, colleges, and public libraries.

No catalogue exists of government relations with private interests concerned with the conduct of litigation. The National Consumers' League experience suggests similar practices on other subjects at all government levels. At the municipal level, an attorney for a local milk producers association acted "of counsel" on the city's brief defending

²⁹ *Some Ethical Gains Through Legislation* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1905), p. 141. Mrs. Kelley was criticizing the decision in *Ritchie v. People*, 155, Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454 (1895), reversed by *Ritchie v. Wayman*, 244 Ill. 509, 91 N.E. 695 (1910).

a favorable ordinance.³⁰ At the state level, the segregation interest has been closely associated with various Attorneys General in the South.³¹ And a prominent attorney with national standing, John W. Davis, rendered free services to South Carolina in the School Segregation Cases.³² At the federal level, the Justice Department has often been urged by organizations to initiate action to enforce federal statutes.³³

ORGANIZATIONS AS "FRIENDS OF THE COURT"

The appearance of organizations as *amici curiae* has been the most noticed form of group representation in Supreme Court cases.³⁴ This does not concern the technical office of *amicus curiae* for which an attorney is appointed to assist the court in deciding complex and technical problems. Today, the Supreme Court does sometimes, as in formulating its decree in the School Segre-

³⁰ *Dean Milk Co. v. Madison*, 340 U. S. 349 (1951).

³¹ See Samuel Krislov, "... Southern Attorneys General and Their Stand on Desegregation," unpublished paper read before the American Political Science Association, New York City, Sept. 7, 1957.

³² The South Carolina Case, *Briggs v. Elliott*, was joined with *Brown v. Board of Education*, and others, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). See *New York Times*, April 14, 1953, p. 11; "May It Please the Court," *Time*, Vol. 62 (December 21, 1953), p. 18.

³³ Philip B. Perlman, Solicitor General, 1947–1952, in a letter to the author, Feb. 6, 1953. See Perlman's testimony, *Hearings before Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations*, Jan. 12, 1950, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1950), pp. 101, 105.

³⁴ Fowler V. Harper and Edwin D. Etherington, "Lobbyists Before the Court," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, Vol. 101 (June 1953), pp. 1172–1177; Peter H. Sonnenfeld, "Participation of *Amici Curiae* . . . in Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1949–1957," Government Research Bureau, Working Papers, No. 2 (East Lansing, Michigan, January 1958); Johanna Bernstein, "Volunteer *Amici Curiae* in Civil Rights Cases," *New York University Student Law Review*, Vol. 1 (Spring 1952), pp. 95–102.

gation Cases, issue a special invitation to the Solicitor General or to state Attorneys General to act as *amici curiae*. Of interest here is the rule under which individuals, organizations, and government attorneys have been permitted to file briefs and/or make oral argument in the Supreme Court. During the last decade *amici curiae* have submitted an average of sixty-six briefs and seven oral arguments in an average total of forty cases a term.³⁵

The frequent entrance of organizations into Supreme Court cases by means of the *amicus curiae* device has often given litigation the distinct flavor of group combat. This may be illustrated by the group representation in quite different cases. In 1943, when a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses challenged the constitutionality of a compulsory flag salute in the schools, his defense by counsel for the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society was supported by separate *amici curiae*, the American Civil Liberties Union and the Committee on the Bill of Rights of the American Bar Association.³⁶ The appellant state board of education was supported by an *amicus curiae* brief filed by the American Legion. In 1951, in a case testing state resale price maintenance, the United States was an *amicus* against a Louisiana statute while the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Louisiana State Pharmaceutical Association, American Booksellers, Inc., and the National Association of Retail Druggists entered *amici curiae* briefs in support of the statute.³⁷

Many *amici curiae* briefs are workmanlike and provide the Court with helpful legal argument and material. Yet writers who favor their use by organizations and recognize that "the

³⁵ Sonnenfeld, *op. cit.* (note 34 *supra*), p. 4.

³⁶ *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, 319 U. S. 624 (1943).

³⁷ *Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp.*, 341 U. S. 384 (1951).

amicus curiae has had a long and respected role in our own legal system and before that, in the Roman law" believe that many briefs in recent years display a "timewasting character."³⁸ Another authority has said that after 1947 there were multiplying signs "that the brief *amicus curiae* had become essentially an instrumentality designed to exert extrajudicial pressure on judicial decisions."³⁹ Concern over this by the members of the Supreme Court was shown in 1946 when Justice Robert H. Jackson, in a dissenting opinion, criticized an *amicus curiae* brief by the American Newspaper Publishers Association:⁴⁰

... Of course, it does not cite a single authority not available to counsel for the publisher involved, and does not tell us a single new fact except this one: "This membership embraces more than 700 newspaper publishers whose publications represent in excess of eighty per cent of the total daily and Sunday circulation of newspapers published in this country. The Association is vitally interested in the issue presented in this case, namely, the right of newspapers to publish news stories and editorials pending in the courts."

Justice Jackson told his colleagues, "this might be a good occasion to demonstrate the fortitude of the judiciary."

REGULATION OF ORGANIZATIONS IN THE COURTS

Judges, lawyers, legislators, and citizens have reacted to appearances that organizational activity in court cases touches the integrity of the judicial process. A number of limitations have resulted. But in protecting the legal system against these dangers, regulations may be too harsh on organizations and

³⁸ Harper and Etherington, *op. cit.* (note 34 *supra*), p. 1172.

³⁹ Frederick Bernays Wiener, "The Supreme Court's New Rules," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 68 (November 1954), pp. 20, 80.

⁴⁰ *Craig v. Harney*, 331 U. S. 367, 397 (1946).

interfere unduly with the freedom of association their functioning represents. Especially is this true when the barriers against group participation in litigation are erected by legislative bodies, but it is not entirely absent when the rules are established by bar associations or by courts themselves. Some practices by organizations require control, but most of the practices of organizations in conducting litigation are perfectly compatible with an independent judiciary. Life tenure and other traditions of Anglo-American jurisprudence will attend to that. This should be borne in mind in evaluating controls placed on the practices discussed below.

Picketing of federal courthouses

During the trial of the leaders of the Communist party under the Smith Act in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New York located at Foley Square in New York City, picketing and parading outside the court was a daily occurrence. When the Senate Judiciary Committee was considering bills to limit this practice, it received many statements like the following: "Assuming under our form of representative government pressure groups must be tolerated in our legislative and executive branches, I feel there is no good reason why our courts should be subjected to such pressures."⁴¹ In accord with this view, Congress, in 1950, enacted legislation prohibiting any person from parading, picketing, or demonstrating in or near a federal courthouse with the intent of "interfering with, obstructing, or impeding" the administration of justice or of "influencing any

⁴¹ Communication of Judge F. Ryan Duffy (Federal Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit), Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1681 and H.R. 3766, *To Prohibit the Picketing of Courts* 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (June 15, 1949), p. 5.

judge, juror, witness, or court officer" in the discharge of his duty.⁴²

Mass petitions to the Supreme Court

In 1953, the National Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case addressed a petition claimed to have the support of 50,000 persons to the Supreme Court. Among many condemnations of this was one urging that "the Court must consult its own collective conscience on such matters without reference to the number of persons who are willing to sign a petition."⁴³ No rule prevents groups from such indecorous action but Justice Hugo Black has expressed the intense disapproval of the Supreme Court. In 1951, when granting a stay of execution to Willie McGhee, a Negro under the death penalty in Mississippi, Justice Black lamented the "growing practice of sending telegrams to judges in order to have cases decided by pressure."⁴⁴ Declaring that he would not read them, he said that "the courts of the United States are not the kind of instruments of justice that can be influenced by such pressures." Justice Black gave an implied warning to the bar by noting that "counsel in this case have assured me they were not responsible for these telegrams."

Organization abuse of the *amicus curiae* function

Supreme Court rules long provided that a "brief of an *amicus curiae* may be filed when accompanied by written consent of all parties to a case."⁴⁵ Until

⁴² 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1507 (1952), added in 1950 by 64 Stat. 1018; 63 Stat. 616 (1949), 40 U.S.C. Secs. 13f-p (1952).

⁴³ Harper and Etherington, *op. cit.* (note 34 *supra*), p. 1173, n. 4.

⁴⁴ *New York Times*, March 16, 1951, p. 1.

⁴⁵ In the old Supreme Court Rules, effective Feb. 27, 1939, section 27 (9), 306 U. S. 708-09 (1939). This section was amended on Nov. 14, 1949, 338 U. S. 959-60 (1949). All existing provisions were rescinded when new Su-

preme Court Rules became effective on July 1, 1954, 346 U. S. 951 (1954). Rules 42 and 44 govern *amicus curiae* procedure, 346 U. S. 951, 993, 996.

⁴⁶ *Lawson v. United States*, 339 U. S. 934 (1949); *Marshall v. United States*, 339 U. S. 933 (1949). See Harper and Etherington, *op. cit.* (note 34 *supra*), p. 1173.

⁴⁷ Sonnenfeld, *op. cit.* (note 34 *supra*), pp. 2, 3, 8, 10. For criticism by the justices, see *Lee v. United States*, 343 U. S. 924 (1952); *United States v. Lovkmit*, 342 U. S. 915 (1952).

1949 permission was freely granted. In that year, the filing of briefs by forty organizations in the case of the "Hollywood Ten" who had declined to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee was widely regarded as an excessive use of the *amicus curiae* procedure.⁴⁶ The Supreme Court thereupon called attention to the "rule of consent" by elaborating the procedures and permitting persons denied consent by a party to seek leave from the Court itself to act as *amicus curiae*. The Solicitor General, as the legal representative of the United States in the Supreme Court, took the 1949 rule change to mean that he should exercise the "rule of consent" against persons or groups wishing to be *amicus curiae* in all cases. Since the United States government is a party in approximately 50 per cent of all cases before the Supreme Court the universal refusal of consent cut the number of organizations filing *amicus curiae* briefs rather drastically. This rigid policy was adhered to by a succession of Solicitors General until August 1952. Complaints by Justices Black and Frankfurter then led the Solicitor General to modify the practice and exercise administrative discretion in passing upon requests of organizations to file briefs *amicus curiae*.⁴⁷ This practice satisfied a majority of the Supreme Court for its 1949 rule change was incorporated into the full revision of the Court's rules which went into effect on July 1, 1954. However, Justice Black was still dis-

satisfied and, on adoption of the 1954 rules, declared:

... I have never favored the almost insuperable obstacle our rules put in the way of briefs sought to be filed by persons other than the actual litigants. Most of the cases before this Court involve matters that affect far more than the immediate record parties. I think the public interest and judicial administration would be better served by relaxing rather than tightening the rule against *amicus curiae* briefs.⁴⁸

The standard governing grant or denial of consent to file *amicus curiae* briefs has been elaborated upon in a statement of policy issued by the Office of the Solicitor General.⁴⁹ While espousing a liberal attitude, the Solicitor General frowns on applicants with "a general, abstract or academic interest" in a case and on "a brief which is 'a vehicle for propaganda efforts.'" Nor is a brief that merely repeats the arguments of the parties well regarded. On the other hand, consent is given "where the applicant has a concrete, substantial interest in the decision of the case, and the proposed brief would assist the Court by presenting relevant arguments or materials which would not otherwise be submitted." Furthermore, in recent years when the Solicitor General has refused consent, the Supreme Court in some cases has granted permission to an organization to file a brief *amicus curiae*.

Efforts to regulate the indiscriminate filing of *amicus curiae* briefs prevent organizations on about ten occasions each term from participating in cases. For example, an American Legion post was refused consent to file an *amicus curiae* brief in the Steel Seizure Case while the Congress of Industrial Organizations was

permitted to do so.⁵⁰ The most active organizations in filing *amicus curiae* briefs in recent years have been the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, the American Jewish Congress, and the National Lawyers Guild. Yet under the "rule of consent" by parties to the case each of these organizations has sometimes been denied leave to file briefs.

Offer of legal aid by the Liberty League

The offer of the National Lawyers Committee of the American Liberty League to donate its services in test cases led a critic to make a formal complaint to the American Bar Association. The League was charged with unethical conduct for having "organized a vast free lawyers service for firms and individuals 'bucking' New Deal laws on constitutional grounds."⁵¹ The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances ruled, in a formal opinion, that the activities of the Liberty League were perfectly proper, even laudable.⁵² The Committee found that neither the substance of the offer, to provide legal defense for "indigent citizens without compensation," nor the "proffer of service," even when broadcast over the radio, was offensive to the ethical code of the American bar.

Barratry and the NAACP

Since 1954, eleven Southern states have acted separately through legislation or litigation to restrict the efforts of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to proceed with court cases aimed at ending segrega-

⁵⁰ *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U. S. 579 (1952).

⁵¹ *New York Times*, Nov. 18, 1935, p. 15.

⁵² Opinion 148 in *American Bar Association Canons of Professional and Judicial Ethics—Opinions of Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances* (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1957), pp. 308-12.

tion.⁵³ The NAACP frankly admits the deliberate and conscious use of litigation to secure economic, social, and political gains for Negroes. In some states, registration laws—similar to federal and state lobby registration provisions—require the filing of information by organizations which might participate in desegregation litigation. The common law crime of barratry, usually defined as the fomenting, soliciting, or inciting of unjustified litigation, has been outlawed by new statutes in other states. Legislative investigating committees have sought to expose NAACP practices in litigation as unethical and illegal. State Attorneys General have brought actions against the NAACP in state courts while the NAACP has brought suits in federal courts to secure declaratory judgments and injunctions against the enforcement of state statutes which would restrict their activities.

In June, the Supreme Court overruled as an unconstitutional violation of freedom of association a contempt fine of \$100,000 imposed by Alabama on the NAACP for refusing to disclose its membership lists.⁵⁴ Two similar Virginia cases have been docketed with petitions for certiorari awaiting action when the Supreme Court convenes for its October 1958 term. In one, the NAACP has

⁵³ For a three-year summary of developments, see *Race Relations Law Reporter*, Vol. 2 (August 1957), pp. 892-94. Examples of the charges being made against the NAACP are seen in the Report of the Joint Committee on Offenses Against the Administration of Justice of the General Assembly of Virginia, filed on Nov. 13, 1957, *Race Relations Law Reporter*, Vol. 3 (February 1958), pp. 98-111. For defenses, see Robert L. Carter, "The Role of the NAACP in the School Segregation Cases," unpublished paper read before the American Political Science Association, New York City, Sept. 6, 1957; American Jewish Congress, *Assault upon Freedom of Association: A Study of the Southern Attack on the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People* (New York, 1957).

⁵⁴ *NAACP v. Alabama*, No. 91, U. S. Sup. Ct., June 30, 1958 (26 U. S. Law Week 4489).

asked for review of a Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia decision enabling a legislative committee to use subpoenas to secure the names of NAACP members and affiliates.⁵⁵ In the other case, Virginia has asked the Supreme Court to review the decision of a three-judge federal district court in which the majority concluded that acts punishing barratry and requiring registration could not constitutionally be applied to the normal activities of the NAACP.⁵⁶

CONCLUSION

There is a logical relationship of organizational interest in litigation and the importance of courts in forming public policy. Although courts act only in cases between parties with concrete interests at stake, organizations concerned with the impact of the outcome may become quite active participants. Organizations may do this by sponsoring a "test case" brought in the name of a private party, they may aid the government attorney in a case, or they may file a brief as an *amicus curiae*. Considering the importance of the issues resolved by American courts, the entrance of organizations into cases in these ways seems in order. Indeed the essential right of organizations to pursue litigation would appear to follow from the generous attitude of American society toward the freedom of individuals to form associations for the purpose of achieving common goals. Of course, traditional judicial procedures should be followed and the attorneys for organizations, as well as for individuals, must address their arguments to reason. If these standards of conduct are followed there is no incompatibility between the activity of organizations in litigation and the integrity or independence of the judiciary.

⁵⁵ *NAACP v. Committee on Offenses Against the Administration of Justice*, 101 S.E. 2d 631 (Va. Sup. Ct. App., 1958).

⁵⁶ *NAACP v. Patty* (Harrison), 159 F. Supp. 503 (E. D. Va., 1958).

⁴⁸ Justice Black's objection is appended to the Order Adopting Revised Rules of the Supreme Court, 346 U. S. 947 (1954).

⁴⁹ Statement of the Office of the Solicitor General, issued May 1957, quoted in Sonnenfeld, *op. cit.* (note 34 *supra*), Appendix C, pp. 25-26.

Management in Politics

By ROBERT F. LENHART and KARL SCHRIFTGIESSER

ABSTRACT: That business is in politics as a necessity for economic survival goes without saying. But the businessman in politics is another matter. For many years business has operated mainly behind the façade of pressure groups and through the agency of the lobbyist. Businessmen have also sought political advantage through the use of publicity and the new "profession" of public relations. A survey shows that their active participation in politics has not been as great as might be supposed. But enlightened businessmen seem to feel that members of management should take a more active part, not just in politics but, it would seem, in party politics. Today, for the most part, they prefer to work on the sidelines, and then not very actively, or through trade associations. Some of the reasons for this include social ostracism and the fear of treading on other people's toes. But the businessman has too much at stake in this complex world, where "we are in the midst of a revival of a truly political economy, whose major economic problems are political in nature." The authors suggest that less lobbying and more outright participation in politics by management and research is needed in the business community in order to meet fairly the many political and economic pressures of the day.

Robert F. Lenhart, Washington, D. C., is Secretary of the Board of Trustees, Committee for Economic Development. He was formerly associated with a number of Federal Government agencies in Washington.

*Karl Schriftgiesser, Washington, D. C., is the author of, among other books, *The Gentleman from Massachusetts: Henry Cabot Lodge (1944)*, *This Was Normalcy (1948)*, and *The Lobbyists (1951)*. He has written extensively on American politics and pressure groups and is presently at work on a study of the Committee for Economic Development as a policy-making organization.*

"WE ARE in the presence of a revival of a truly political economy, whose major economic problems are political in nature," Dr. Hans J. Morgenthau recently observed.¹ Our arrival at this stage has been in increasing progress since the days of the New Deal, although this interconnectedness of the political and economic spheres has in varying degrees existed since the birth of the Republic. It was tremendously strengthened during World War II, when the necessary imposition of economic controls brought a new and closer relationship between what our American mythology has always considered two antagonists. It was recognized for all time in 1946 when the Employment Act at long last made it federal policy for business and government to work together for the common aim of full employment and high productivity, and when the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of that same year recognized for the first time the existence of a constitutional liaison between economic interest groups and the government.

The state, as Dr. Morgenthau has pointed out, is no longer looked upon solely as an umpire who sees to it that the rules of the game are observed, and who intervenes only if the rules favor one player to excess and thus threaten the game itself. Today the rules of the game are directed mainly toward preventing one sector of the economy from gaining final power over another sector by limitations and controls—through regulatory commissions, legislation, and monetary and fiscal policies. The stake of business in the machinery of government and in the making of policy is thus not only greater than it was in the days of *laissez faire*, but far more intertwined and complex.

At the same time that the relation-

ship between business and government—or, between management and politics—has undergone a metamorphosis, business itself has undergone immeasurable changes. We now live in an Age of Management run by the Organization Man. Private ownership, as we once knew it, hardly exists today, except among that sector of the economy known as small business. The administration of business, by and large, is in the hands of managers (whom we know impersonally as management); but government, as it must be in our form of society, is still in the hands of politicians.

The areas for which government, federal, state and local, is responsible are vast. More legislation passed in these sectors affects economic interests than any other, and so it is a truism that business and politics do mix at all times, in spite of the oft-asserted belief on the part of business that it could function better if there were no politics. In no field is this more obvious than in the matter of taxation.

FISCAL, MONETARY, AND LABOR FIELDS

On federal, state and local levels taxes are, of course, the *bête noire* of the businessman. The individual income tax, the excise taxes, sales taxes, real estate taxes, license taxes, and many others haunt him day and night. Management of a corporation as a payer of a 52 per cent corporate tax, becomes willy-nilly a partner of government in all its corporate affairs for theoretically there can be no profit until taxes are paid. Back in the days when all taxes were lower, the incidence of taxes did not greatly matter. Today it is at the back of all management's thinking about two of its major concerns—opportunity and growth.

Government programs have assumed huge proportions in recent years. The vast research and development programs

¹ Problems of United States Economic Development, Vol. I (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1958), p. 281.

of the armed forces—through recruitment of researchers and engineers and in the wide area of research itself—reach deeply into the field of business. This general program, which began during World War II, involves many fundamental changes in relationships between business and the government. In no other fields do conflicts of interest arise so readily. Every competitor knows that because of this program, a single business which has carried out a particular research job in a given area may very well possess practically all the “know-how” in a particular field.

Since the 1930's, with the passage of the National Labor Relations Act, the organization of the National Labor Relations Board, the various wage and hour acts, the federal and state governments have been more and more active in the ever-sensitive area of labor-management relations. Here the businessman's concern with government is increasingly complex.

Still another field in which government action importantly affects business decisions is that of monetary policy. Since the reforms of the banking system which began in the 1930's, the expansion and restriction of credit and money supply has more and more determined the cost of money to management and affected long-term plans for expansion and growth. Federal fiscal policy in relation to monetary policy to a great degree determines the degree of inflation or deflation that may be expected from governmental action. The importance of these policies and the growing knowledge of how they operate in an economy are of great significance to management. The federal government, in almost daily action, greatly influences the economic climate for either expansion and growth or for contraction and stagnation.

On local, state, and regional levels, governmental actions affect the business

climate in the region and area toward expansion and growth—or the reverse. Problems of local and state nature can affect the businessman fully as much as the programs of the federal government. Examples come readily: the expensive overlapping of governments in metropolitan areas, the decay of the urban core of our large cities, water supply, sewage disposal, police protection, and many others. The businessman who has plants and property in these areas must sooner or later face these problems and help to solve them through politics in an economic way.

Finally, not to be neglected in the discussion of the stake of business management in government is the enormous amount of business which can be done with the government at all levels. With the federal budget of almost 80 billion dollars a year, the purchases of the federal government for almost every conceivable manufactured item are extremely large. State and local governments are also purchasers of supplies, equipment, and materials which are an important element to business management.

The government has increased in size and complexity, and government expenditures are higher than ever; demands of the public for service from government are greater than ever before. It seems, therefore, more necessary than ever that management take part actively in the political decisions which must be made on the complex issues that arise almost daily in our economic life.

Changes in the political scene

The political pattern, too, has changed in the past twenty-five years. Up until the 1930's the two major interest factors in the national political picture were business and agriculture. To some extent they were competing against each other for legislation and national policies that would help one or the other, seldom

both. But since that time agriculture as a component of the economy has tended to recede as a force. However, agriculture has managed to retain a great political strength because of the relatively high representation of agricultural areas in state legislatures and in Congress. The rural legislator, by and large, still retains control of the legislatures in most of the states, and agriculture is by no means underrepresented in the House or Senate.

However, another force has arisen since the 1930's—the aggressive, active, and powerful force that is organized labor. (Unorganized labor and the consumer still seem to be the least well represented of all groups.) The cohesive labor groups have become as active a force in the national Democratic party as Big Business traditionally over the years has been in the Republican. The same is true in many, but by no means all, state organizations. Labor as a whole has found this frank and open alliance with a party one of its most potent tools.

Business leaders, to a greater extent than is perhaps widely realized, have tended to remain aloof from active party politics and instead have sought their political advantages through their costly and effective lobbies and through captive legislators. They have refrained from going through party machinery to gain their ends. They have—and this is especially true of business—sought to influence public opinion through other media than party mouthpieces. Probably because business controls most media, they have not needed to do otherwise.

ECONOMICS VERSUS POLITICS

In this connection the head of a great industrial empire, who may well be considered a spokesman for management, has recently said:

There was a time when the manager felt that if his share-owners were happy and if his customers were not going over to his competitors, he was satisfying his managerial responsibilities. Today, the manager knows that continuing usefulness and profitability depend on a much wider spectrum of relationships involving not only customers and share-owners, but employees, other businesses, other institutions, and the society as a whole.

All this is to say that a new dimension has been added to business leadership: the social dimension. The manager is still concerned with making and selling goods and services at a profit, but he now recognizes long range social and political factors that were once considered irrelevant.

It is important that this increased recognition of social and political factors be kept in perspective. Business is primarily economic, not political. Government is primarily political, not economic. Each of these institutions must keep its focus on its prime responsibility, or it will not perform its proper role in society.

... We businessmen must set about to win better public understanding and deserved support. It must become good politics to support the measures that keep business healthy, and bad politics to attack and hamstring business in its work of serving the public.

... We in business will have to become far more sensitive to the social and political currents and undercurrents in this country. We will have to become students, humbly seeking to know more about the economic, political and ethical principles that vitalize this new people's capitalism.

And, finally, we in business need to learn how to be politically effective. Government is becoming a more significant factor in business decisions with every passing year. The pressure groups that are trying to squeeze more than their share out of the proceeds of business are turning increasingly to politics. Professional managers must recognize these trends and learn how to manage their political resources with as much skill as they now manage their material and technical resources. They must do so in order to maintain a political cli-

mate in which business can carry out its hard assignments in the years ahead.²

Another businessman who has now become an Assistant to the President,³ writes about the relationship of business to government as follows:

He [the American businessman who undertakes responsibility in the Executive Branch of the federal government] remains immensely proud of the achievements of the business community, and of the American system of private initiative and free markets, but he feels that the partnership between industry and government could be made far more effective if businessmen would face up to the great questions confronting our country with more understanding, and with the fixed purpose of always putting the nation's welfare first.

A former governor of Massachusetts, writing in the *Harvard Business Review*, said:

If there is one thought that should come out of any discussion of the modern forms of pressure which are brought to bear on government and on business today, it is that a businessman cannot sit back and assume his relations with government will be correct but distant. There is a highly complicated, if active, pattern woven all around him, some of it obvious, some of it subtle, but all of it affecting him and his daily affairs. Everyone living in this half of the Twentieth Century must recognize that a democracy, even ours, cannot survive, unless it is a working democracy—that is, a democracy in which everyone plays an active and individual role. Politics is no longer some far off, half forgotten thing to be whipped up by politicians into campaign issues in election years.

The problems of government are too complex and the policies of government too close today to be dealt with successfully by ignoring them. Unless we keep

sufficiently informed to participate actively in a discussion of political questions, unless we know enough to give our representatives intelligent answers or know enough to be wise in the selection of those representatives themselves, then some other form of government will supersede democracy.⁴

How is business presently organized to participate in government and politics? There are many organizations through which business managers work to further their objectives in politics and government. The largest number of such organizations is the trade associations. A trade association may be defined as a nonprofit organization of business competitors designed to assist its members and its industry in dealing with mutual business problems in such areas as commercial and industrial research, statistics, trade promotions, and relations with government and the general public.

MANAGEMENT AND TRADE ASSOCIATIONS

According to the Commerce Department there were 12,200 trade associations in 1956.⁵ About 1,700 of them are national and 10,500 local or state. These organizations represent their members on an industry-wide basis with governments at various levels, including legislatures. They have many other functions, including serving as an industry center of information, setting up conferences and conventions, public-relations activities, bringing information to their industry members on labor legislation, collecting and publishing statistics, conducting a certain amount of

⁴ Robert F. Bradford, "Politics, Pressure Groups and the Businessmen," *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 31, No. 6 (November-December 1953), p. 40.

⁵ *Directory of National Trade Associations, 1956*. By Jay Judkins, Chief, Trade Association Division, U. S. Department of Commerce, Washington, 1956.

specialized research, and other similar activities. These organizations also send information about potential legislation or government action from its source to members of the association.

They formulate or help in formulating industry-wide policy to be presented to legislatures or to administrative agencies of the government. Trade associations are one of the major means by which business management gets its policies across to government. The presentation of testimony in specialized fields by trade associations is a major source of information for legislative committees. While the information presented often offers facts and figures which are highly specialized—and often extremely biased in the interest of the industry involved—it is helpful to policy-making bodies to have it as one point of view. By holding hearings of all the groups involved, a committee of a legislature can gather much more factual information about a given subject in a short time than if it were required to dig up the material itself. In general, trade associations should be organized to do more rather than less policy research. This would lead to a broader point of view and more effective recommendations for policy.

Another type of business organization which represents business points of view politically is large national organizations such as the United States Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers. These organizations of businessmen and manufacturers conduct an extensive program of research in many fields in which business has an interest. They present their views in the form of resolutions and policy papers to the public and represent their point of view before committees of Congress. They work in a large number of fields and present their views not only to the committees of Congress but to individual Congressmen and

members of the federal government Executive Branch. Two of the most powerful lobbies on the national scene, they are a continuing means of presenting the views of organized business.

A third type of organization which may be said to present views of the business community on matters of national policy is the type represented by the Committee for Economic Development. The Committee for Economic Development is a nonprofit, nonpolitical organization dedicated to research on private and public economic policies that would strengthen and perpetuate economic freedom by helping to make free enterprise fully compatible with economic growth and stability. As an educational association, the CED does research and puts out policy statements for purposes of public education. Professing not to be a lobby, CED does not represent any particular group of businessmen, and its major objective is the public welfare. CED studies are made available to the public and to the press. Members of the Committee for Economic Development Research and Policy Committee present their views to Congress only when requested to do so.

Ad hoc groups, the press, and party politics

In addition to the above organizations, businessmen from time to time form *ad hoc* groups within an industry and often cross industry lines to back particular legislation. These groups work through the period of the legislative term and then are normally dissolved when action on the legislation has been taken. Some times these groups are quite effective, while at other times their activities are entirely wasted because of lack of basic information on which to mount such a campaign.

Many companies doing business with the government have offices in Washing-

² Ralph J. Cordiner, *Saturday Review*, January 18, 1958.

³ Clarence Randall, *loc. cit.*

ton or in state capitals where they maintain listening posts and a point of contact with the government with which they are working. These offices are almost always focal points for some political activities; but they are also sources of information on current activities in the capital which allows the leadership of the company to keep informed on government activities.

Another way in which management participates in discussion of policy issues is through the press; public relations is employed to put across a point of view to the public which it is then hoped will be reflected in legislative action. Institutional advertising of this nature is familiar to all newspaper readers whenever a major economic issue affecting a special interest arises. It is difficult to judge how effective this method of persuasion is in influencing final decision. The costly Madison Avenue technique has often had a reverse effect than that which was planned. The shoddy practices of so-called public-relations counsellors were recently described by Vance Packard, who suggests that public-relation men be placed upon the same legal level on which Congress sought to place lobbyists before the Supreme Court weakened the Lobby Act.⁶

Business, of course, also enters the political arena openly and directly through participation in party politics. In some states, especially where one or two economic interests dominate, businessmen are active at various levels of party politics; although even in industry-dominated states, businessmen as a rule prefer to act through agents. Politicians, of course, prefer this; it keeps them in jobs. In the first Congresses, businessmen like merchant George Cabot of Massachusetts took active part in legislating in behalf of their own economic interests.

⁶ Vance Packard, "Public Relations, Good or Bad?" *Atlantic Monthly*, May 1958.

Businessmen in government

Since World War II, and especially since President Eisenhower went to Washington with scores of businessmen hanging onto his coattails, businessmen have taken an active part in government. Some, of course, have been extremely effective; but others have become so frustrated at the essential difference between politics and business and the two ways of getting things done, that President Eisenhower not long ago was complaining because he could not get enough businessmen to serve.

The Harvard Business School Club of Washington, D. C., recently conducted a survey of businessmen in government.⁷ It found that the businessman is neither the "dragon of self interest nor the angel of duty" of popular conception. He seems to be, on the whole, a rather frustrated individual during his tenure at the political capital of the nation.

Forty-one per cent of the "BMG's" came from manufacturing, with 11 per cent from service industries, the next highest category, this survey found. Since pre-World War II time the number from manufacturing has progressively increased. In pregovernment work, administrators accounted for 37 per cent of the "BMG's," with sales executives next at 22 per cent, production at 8 per cent, finance 5 per cent, and 3 per cent each from accounting, personnel, and promotion.

The majority of top civil servants surveyed was complimentary of the businessman's ability and found him flexible, open-minded, patient, with ability to get things done and deal diplomatically with Congress.

Seventy per cent of the businessmen in government said that government experience had made them better business executives, but they chafed at the loss

⁷ "Businessmen in Government—An Appraisal of Experience." Washington, 1958.

of pay, "red tape," and unrestrained criticism, particularly from legislative bodies. They also were critical of the lack of on-the-job indoctrination.

The "BMG's" stay with government was found to be relatively short. Of those now in government 41 per cent have served 3 years or less, 23 per cent from 3 to 6 years, and 36 per cent more than 6 years. Of those who have served and left government over the past 16 years, only 52 per cent served more than 1 year; 19 per cent served 2 years, an equal number 3 years and 14 per cent served 4 years or more. Average length of service was 18 to 24 months.

The survey noted that even on an assumed average, turnover is at a 33 per cent annual rate, which raises the question of whether this period of service is adequate.

Although conflict of interest touched relatively few "BMG's," this was one of the reasons businessmen resist government service. Low pay, length of absence from business, and belief that government is radically different from business were other reasons.

Businessmen and political activity

The University of Pennsylvania, in co-operation with the Committee for Economic Development, recently inaugurated a study of the formal relationships between businessmen and political parties in the Philadelphia metropolitan area. The survey focused upon the policies of companies in regard to the political activities of management personnel and upon political attitudes and activities of top, middle, and junior management. Results from the first part of the survey indicate that of the businessmen interviewed, an overwhelming number consider participation in political activities by businessmen desirable and important. However in answering other questions about political activity, it was found that only a very

small proportion of those interviewed had been active in the past two years in one of the major political parties and that only a small proportion of the total had any desire to become active. When asked about the effect within their company on the business career of a young man who became politically active, only 31 out of 124 of the number felt that such activity would help a career in their company and 47 felt that it would have no effect on their career; 26 felt it would hinder their career; and 20 did not know.

In another question on what effect political activity would have upon your status among your fellow businessmen, 43 out of 121 felt it would enhance their status, 48 felt it would have no effect, 18 felt it would injure it, and 13 did not know.

In an amusing plea to businessmen to join the Democratic party, G. Mennen Williams, Governor of Michigan, put his finger on some reasons why businessmen eschew political activity. If he becomes a Democrat his fellow businessmen, mostly Republicans, call him a "traitor to his class," and he becomes socially ostracized. "The social pressure toward political conformity is tremendous. Combined with the possibility of subtle threats to career opportunities and promotions, it becomes understandably difficult for the junior executive to become active in the Democratic party."⁸

In questions having to do with the degree of political interest, it was found that very few of those interviewed had contact with Congressmen or Senators or with members of the Pennsylvania General Assembly. They indicated great interest in the 1956 Presidential campaign and less interest in the Pennsylvania gubernatorial campaign in 1954.

⁸ G. Mennen Williams, "Can Businessmen be Democrats?" *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (March-April 1958), pp. 102 ff.

On the question of company attitude toward political activity, a majority of those answering the questionnaire felt that men and women in their company would have time to assume responsibility for party office, but less than half felt they would not have time to assume public office.

In general, this questionnaire shows that while business management feels that it should take part in political activity, it has not formulated clear-cut policies which would allow competent management personnel to take an active part in party and political affairs. As a major segment of the nation with a great deal of know-how in the economic sphere and with many technical and scientific personnel, management should encourage more political activity, particularly at the local and state level where competent leadership as well as technical know-how is badly needed to solve the many problems which exist.

CONCLUSIONS

Business management has a great stake in the government activities at various levels in the United States. It has considerable economic and technical know-how which should be available in advice to legislatures and to administrators in formulating policies and in carrying them out. In the dynamic society in which we live, business management has tended to delegate its political activity to various organizations. With the increasing participation in political affairs of labor organizations, it is important that businessmen participate at all levels of government directly in the process as well as through proxy organizations. Party organizations as well as government should have people from management in their ranks at all times, both to maintain a balance between the

segments of our society and also for the contribution they can make in policy making.

The organizations through which business management functions in the political sphere are often staff run and are sometimes little more than propaganda machines. Their policy pronouncements run the gamut from a series of staff written resolutions hastily passed at annual conventions to carefully researched policy papers.

Too often a policy pronouncement is a composite of the prejudices and biases the staff think are held by members of the organization rather than the carefully thought out views of the businessmen based on a real understanding of the issues. Raising the quality of policy pronouncements by careful research and through the joint effort of businessmen and a competent set of professional advisors would improve greatly the level of political representation business management receives from its many organizations. A sound policy proposal would form the basis for applying whatever techniques are indicated whether it be lobbying, a publicity campaign, presentation of testimony, or political action.

If such a new approach to policy formation were to be adopted by the various groups representing business management, a major change in organization of the associations would be required. The technique of policy formation used by the Committee for Economic Development could serve as an example of effective collaboration by staff, businessmen, and professionals in turning out an effective product.

The establishment of such a new technique would make business representation on policy matters more nearly competitive with the competent work of the labor groups.

Farmers in Politics

By WESLEY McCUNE

ABSTRACT: The farm vote is an independent one. Although there are many farm organizations—The American Farm Bureau Federation, The National Farmers Union, The National Grange, many different commodity groups, and co-operative organizations—and a farmer might belong to one or more groups, nevertheless his political inclination remains an individual decision. Although the farm population is shrinking significantly, the farm vote has determined a national election as recently as 1948, and with skillful dramatization, it can quite easily determine the results of Congressional elections—the question of price support was a significant factor in the 1954 Congressional elections. In the 1952 Presidential campaign, even though the election did not hinge on the farm vote, both parties tried to woo it. And, after the election, both the Democratic and Republican party established a farm division. With the aid of appeals to consumers as against producers, there is reason to believe that something which might be called “the food vote” may determine the next Presidential election, if not subsequent ones.

Wesley McCune, Denver, Colorado, is Director of Public Relations for the National Farmers Union in Denver. After reporting on agriculture for Newsweek, Time, and Kiplinger's in Washington, he became Executive Assistant to Agriculture Secretary Brannan, after which he was Director of the Agriculture Division of the Democratic National Committee. He is the author of The Farm Bloc (1943), Who's Behind Our Farm Policy (1957), and Ezra Taft Benson—Man With A Mission (1958).

ONE sound generality about the farm vote, whatever that term turns out to be, is that it is independent. This is true of farmers individually and as a group.

The farm vote as a whole is a swing vote, changing relatively easily by district, county, state or national basis. One cannot count on the farm vote even if he thinks he can analyze what is most likely to attract it at a given time, any more than he can count on the labor vote, the Negro vote, or any other vote—probably less.

Individually, the farmer as a political animal is as independent as the proverbial hog on ice. He is most likely to register Republican, especially in the Corn Belt and Great Plains states, but that does not mean that he will vote Republican. He is personally skeptical of politicians, although there are signs that he is beginning to accept politics, even in the derogatory sense, as an inevitable part of the American system of government.

This may be regarded as peculiar behavior for a group so deeply involved in the results of politics—state and federal legislation and innumerable administrative policies. One might suppose, in view of the well-known volume of farm laws and the never-ending “farm problem,” that farmers would be organized into a highly effective political action machine; yet the organizations to which they belong pull and haul in various directions, some of them opposite.

Nor is there even agreement on whether the farm program is or should be involved in politics. A political scientist recognizes quickly that it is deeply in politics, but this is too sophisticated.

The Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson, has made many statements putting himself and the farm program above politics. For example, he told one audience that he “sees the farm prob-

lem as an economic one in which there is little room for politics.”¹

On the other hand, former President Harry S. Truman began a speech to the National Farmers Union on March 18, 1958, with this blunt statement: “I am going to talk to you about agriculture and politics. And if you think those two things don’t go together, you are decidedly off the beam.”

The largest general farm organization, the American Farm Bureau Federation, conducts a systematic program to urge farmers to be active in voting and other duties of citizenship, although the organization protests strongly that it is not involved in *partisan* politics.

Similarly, the National Farmers Union urges political action. Its large regional grain co-operative affiliate, the Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association, says nearly every day on its radio program that “farm prices are made in Washington.” The President of the National Farmers Union, James G. Patton, after criticizing the Eisenhower administration in detail told the most recent convention of his organization: “If this does not suggest a direct course of political action for people who live on farms, then we will have no right to complain after the next several elections.”

Yet the Farm Bureau and the Farmers Union usually end on opposite sides of the political fence.

CROSS CURRENTS

An individual farmer—even one who is not a “joiner”—can easily belong to several organizations. Most farmers are members of one or more co-ops for buying supplies or marketing commodities. If they are served by electricity from the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) program, they belong to a rural electric co-operative, probably affiliated with the National Rural Electric Co-

¹ Chicago *Tribune*, February 1, 1956.

operative Association, one of the most active lobbies in Washington. They may also be active locally in work headed by the National Association of Soil Conservation Districts, another potent lobby. Moreover, several of the federal farm programs such as price supports, conservation payments, and acreage restrictions are administered through a system of locally elected committees of farmers.

All of this is in addition to possible membership in any of the general farm organizations—the Farm Bureau, Farmers Union and National Grange—or any of perhaps a hundred commodity organizations. The latter include growers of such widely diversified products as cattle and walnuts. Those which are co-operative in structure are likely to be affiliated with the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives which maintains an active lobby in Washington formerly headed by Ezra Taft Benson. Recently, a group called the National Conference of Commodity Organizations has been actively trying to agree on farm legislation which about forty special commodity groups could endorse.

Trying to isolate the political inclinations and activities of an individual farmer who belongs to five or six of these groups is something like trying to pick up mercury. And trying to understand why the same farmer would sincerely believe that he is not involved in politics calls more nearly for a psychoanalyst than a political scientist.

At the risk of confusing, rather than enlightening, a number of factors should be considered which cut across even the clearest of commodity and geographic political behavior.

Ordinarily, good weather means a large turnout at the polls, but in rural areas during early November good weather more often means that farmers stay home to do seasonal work. On the other hand, a rain would keep them

out of the fields and nudge them to the polling places.

A farmer who produces nothing but beef cattle might be expected to favor the incumbent political candidates when prices are high and feed costs are low, but the farmer who produces nothing but feed crops would be just as likely to reject the incumbent.

Prolonged drouth has an impact on politics, though an uncertain one. At times of drouth, politicians customarily move very fast to provide whatever direct relief is available while their opponents are quick to point out either delays or shortcomings. Of course the administration in power never admits that its stepped-up activity for drouth-stricken farmers has anything to do with the forthcoming elections. A case which would bear more analysis arose shortly after September 13, 1955, when the Republican party lost the governorship of Maine for the first time in ages. Up to that day, the Republican Secretary of Agriculture had designated 321 counties in many parts of the country as “disaster” areas eligible for various forms of drouth relief administered by him. In the first three autumn days thereafter, he designated by rapid press release 315 more counties—practically as many as he had helped during the entire hot summer which preceded the Maine election.

A widely held theory about the political behavior of farmers is that they will vote out of power the administration holding office when farm prices are low. One of the chief exponents of this theory is William I. Myers, Dean of Agriculture at Cornell University, who is also Chairman of President Eisenhower’s National Agricultural Advisory Commission. Yet the theory was shattered by the 1956 re-election of President Eisenhower in the face of four years of declining farm prices and income.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FARM VOTE

Partly because of a lack of quantitative statistics on what is too glibly referred to as the farm vote, more should be known of the qualitative considerations.

It has become almost fashionable lately to assert that the farm population is shrinking so fast that the farm bloc in Congress is breaking up and the farm vote, whatever it may have been, can almost be disregarded.

Population statistics bear out the first part of this case. The farm population of the United States dropped from 25.9 million in 1948, which was 17.7 per cent of the total population, to 20.4 million in 1957, which was only 12 per cent of the total population.

However, the general fact of the shrinking farm population is no better than most generalities, and the politician should beware of it unless he is talking about a county, Congressional district, or state with which he is thoroughly familiar.

Perhaps the most extreme expression of confidence in the safety of ignoring the farm vote was reported by the *Wall Street Journal* on June 18, 1954. After explaining that President Eisenhower and Secretary Benson were convinced that their proposal for "flexible" price supports to replace supports at 90 per cent of parity was sound economics, the *Journal* reported them as believing also that their proposal was good politics. Based on an interview at the Republican National Committee, the *Journal* reported:

Odd as it may seem, some very orthodox politicians at campaign headquarters share the President's and Mr. Benson's rather unorthodox political theory. The G.O.P.'s sharp pencil boys are convinced that control of Congress in this fall's election will be decided not on the farms but in the cities.

For some reason, perhaps because the election that fall resulted in the loss of many Republican Congressional seats from rural districts, the GOP apparently changed its strategy before the next election. Late in 1955, it employed a public relations firm, Braun & Company, to sell the Eisenhower-Benson farm program.² The chief result was a campaign of full-page advertisements in rural periodicals and messages on rural radio stations.

An oversimplified picture of the farm vote in recent years can be obtained from a summary of election results in the states generally regarded as the farm belt and in which shifts have been important in the electoral college.

These states comprise a block starting with Ohio on the east, running west through Kansas, going north to the Canadian border and embracing twelve fertile agricultural states with about 160 electoral votes.

In 1928 this group went solidly Republican.

In 1932 and again in 1936 it went solidly Democratic, a phenomenal shift even considering the great momentum caused by Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal.

In 1940 the five states of Ohio, Illinois, Missouri, Wisconsin, and Minnesota stayed Democratic to make the group as a whole Democratic by about three to two electoral votes.

In 1944 Wisconsin and Ohio went Republican while Michigan switched to the Democrats, giving the group as a whole a slightly Republican complexion.

In 1948—the year of the astounding Truman upset—Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois, Ohio, and Missouri went Democratic while Michigan switched to the Republican side and the following states remained Republican: Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, and North Dakota. The group as

² *New York Times*, December 13, 1955.

a whole went Democratic by two to one, offsetting the defection of southern states.

In 1952, all twelve of these farm belt states went Republican, completely reversing the Roosevelt landslides of 1932 and 1936.

In 1956 Missouri switched to the side of the Democrats, but the other eleven states stayed Republican. As we shall see, however, the Democrats succeeded in upsetting several significant Republican incumbents from farm states and by using the farm issue. As this is written a burning political question is not whether Democrats will gain even more seats in the 1958 election from rural districts but rather *how many* they will gain.

BEHIND THE FIGURES—1948

The 1948 election will be discussed for many years because it was such an upset, but it is also extremely significant because it was the farm vote which gave Truman his margin of victory over the Republican candidate, Thomas E. Dewey. Without rehashing the merits of that contest, there are some lessons in it about the value and nature of the farm vote. Two things stand out:

First, the Republican campaign started with an error which the Democrats quickly exploited. On September 2, 1948, a press conference was held in Governor Dewey's office at Albany by Harold E. Stassen, whom Dewey had defeated for the Republican nomination but who was at Albany to help Dewey in the campaign. The Associated Press reported, among other things: "Stassen said that the Agriculture Department, with Secretary Brannan's approval, had issued statements intended to 'raise food prices when they should be shaking down.'" The AP added that Stassen "provided no detailed information about it when reporters pressed him for specific details."

But Secretary Charles F. Brannan quickly supplied his own details. Within two hours he had issued a statement calling Stassen's accusation (or whatever it was) "a typical deceptive, inaccurate political statement" and added a phrase which became of historic importance: "This is in essence an attack on the price support system."

Neither Governor Dewey nor any other high Republicans succeeded in removing the impression that they had attacked the farm price support system. Meanwhile, the Democrats made things uncomfortable for Dewey by quoting the following excerpt from an editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* of September 4 of that year:

Nevertheless the whole import of Mr. Stassen's press conference at Albany was just what Secretary Brannan said it was: "in essence an attack on the price support system." . . . Mr. Stassen is in fact proposing a far-reaching reform of the farm price support policy or he doesn't make sense.

President Truman gave the *Wall Street Journal* quotation to reporters on his campaign train in the far West; and Secretary Brannan, who was the most active Cabinet member in the Democratic campaign, used it frequently also.

Second, President Truman crystallized an issue which most people did not know existed—an obscure phrase in legislation just passed by the Republican 80th Congress which prevented the Department of Agriculture from providing enough storage facilities to take care of the coming harvest. The real significance was not in the storage facilities themselves but in the fact, which farmers had little trouble realizing, that farmers cannot take advantage of price supports unless their commodities are properly stored. This raised the specter of falling prices for corn and wheat particularly, both of which are produced

heavily in the twelve states already described.

Truman dealt with this slumbering issue in the fashion which soon became known as "give 'em hell." When he opened his farm campaign at the National Plowing Match near Dexter, Iowa, on September 18, he included the following reference to grain storage in his speech to the huge farm audience:

This Republican Congress has already stuck a pitchfork in the farmer's back.

They have already done their best to keep price supports from working. Many growers have sold wheat this summer at less than the support price, because they could not find proper storage.

When the Democratic Administration had to face this problem in the past, the Government set up grain bins all over the wheat and corn belts to provide storage.

Now the farmers need such bins again. But when the Republican Congress rewrote the charter of the Commodity Credit Corporation this year, there were certain lobbyists in Washington representing the speculative grain trade.

These big-business lobbyists and speculators persuaded the Congress not to provide storage bins for the farmers. They tied the hands of the Administration. They are preventing us from setting up the storage bins that you will need in order to get the support price for your grain.

When farmers have to sell their wheat below the support price because they have no place to store it, they can thank this same Republican Congress—the Congress that gave the speculative grain trade a rakeoff at your expense.

Republican farm leaders are still crying "foul" over the success of this issue. For example, an article in *U. S. News and World Report* of June 6, 1952—four years afterwards—was entitled "Was the '48 Election Rigged? Republicans Say It Was—Now Worry About '52."

Besides Truman's victory, the Democrats regained a majority in the House and Senate. A map of the results by

states shows that the Democratic increases were heavily concentrated in the Midwestern farm belt.

EISENHOWER v. STEVENSON

Although the 1952 election did not hinge on the farm vote, as it turned out, both parties took major steps to capture that vote. In retrospect it seems clear that farm people voted (along with nearly everyone else) for issues represented by "crime, corruption, and Korea." There is a considerable feeling, not well measured, that farm people were particularly sensitive on the Korean issues which General Eisenhower succeeded in handling so skillfully.

The big story of the 1952 farm campaign occurred near the little town of Kasson, Minnesota, where sponsors of the National Plowing Match had again invited both candidates, Dwight Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson, to make their opening campaign speeches. What nearly 100,000 farmers heard that day turned out to be almost the entire campaign. Eisenhower succeeded in convincing farmers, first, that he favored the farm program as it was then known and, second, that he thought it should be even stronger.

However, a dispute over what he actually did that day will continue for many years. Among other things he declared: "And here, and now, without any 'ifs' or 'buts,' I say to you that I stand behind—and the Republican Party stands behind—the price support laws now on the books." He had already spoken highly of parity for farmers, so the qualifying phrase which followed this declaration was overlooked. "This includes," he added, "the amendment to the Basic Farm Act, passed by votes of both parties in Congress, to continue through 1954 the price supports on basic commodities at 90 per cent of parity."

This qualification meant to technicians

that Eisenhower was not committing himself even to 90 per cent of parity after 1954, much less to 100 per cent of parity. However, the headlines in the next day's newspapers accurately reflected what farmers *thought* Eisenhower was promising. Here are five examples:

IKE PROMISES TO WORK FOR 100% FARM PARITY

—*Milwaukee Journal*

EISENHOWER PROMISES FARMERS HE'S BEHIND FULL PARITY FOR THEM

—*Lincoln Journal*

IKE'S GOAL 100 PER CENT FARM PARITY

Eisenhower

Guarantees

High Prices

—*Dubuque Telegraph-Herald*

IKE AND ADLAI OUTLINE FARM PROGRAMS

Eisenhower Calls for 100 Per Cent of Parity

—*Minneapolis Star*

IKE FAVORS MORE FARM PROPS AND 100% PARITY

—*Indianapolis News*

As indicated by the headlines, Stevenson got second billing all the way through, although he spoke only a few hours later. His commitment at Kasson was about the same as Eisenhower's, but one of the most clever jobs in political farm history had been accomplished by the Republicans, matching in many ways Truman's coup in 1948.

Much of the Democratic criticism of Eisenhower in the following years centered on the charge that he failed to keep his Kasson pledges by insisting on flexible, sliding-scale, or variable price supports ranging from 90 per cent down to 60 per cent of parity—or even to

zero. The critics are supported to some extent by a speech delivered one month after Kasson at Brookings, South Dakota, in which he omitted any qualifying phrase and declared: "The Republican Party is pledged to the sustaining of the 90% parity price support and it is pledged even more than that to helping the farmer obtain his full parity, 100% parity, with the guarantee in the price supports of 90."

Without debating the merits of these two interpretations, an historical sidelight is worth brief reference. In the summer of 1954, when Congressmen were charging broken promises, Senator George Aiken, Vermont Republican, undertook to explain that it had been well known during the campaign that Eisenhower's qualifying phrase at Kasson meant he would not continue high price supports after 1954, when the legislation expired. Aiken cited as proof of this knowledge material used during the 1952 campaign by the Committee for Agricultural Progress, an organization which sprang up about the time of the two nominating conventions and supported the Democratic candidate.

The same argument was elaborated on by Don Paarlberg, an assistant to Secretary Benson, who wrote about it to one of the critics, Congressman Thomas G. Abernathy, Mississippi Democrat. Whether anyone had paid attention to the warning by the Committee for Agricultural Progress or to Democratic campaign speakers is beside the immediate point. Of more significance is the fact, which was documented by Congressman Abernathy, that both General Eisenhower and his running mate, Richard Nixon, bitterly attacked the Committee for Agricultural Progress for misrepresenting the Republican position.³ For example, Eisenhower said in Chicago on October 31 that he was "outraged" by

³ *Congressional Record*, July 23, 1954, pp. A5302-4.

the material distributed by the Committee for Agricultural Progress, and Nixon declared in a tour of Iowa that the same material was published for the purpose of frightening farmers into "believing that a Republican Administration would permit farm prices to decline." He called this scheme "malicious."⁴

AFTER THE EISENHOWER VICTORY

Even though the farm vote did not decide the 1952 election, both parties soon established a farm division. The Democratic National Committee employed a full-time staff man to handle agriculture, and the Committee's Chairman claimed publicly that it was the first time in history that such a step had been taken by either party between campaigns.

A few months later, the Republican National Committee took the same step. The farm divisions of both headquarters actively distributed material, and the Democrats also created an Agricultural Advisory Committee headed by Claude R. Wickard, former Secretary of Agriculture and head of the Rural Electrification Administration.

By the time the campaign started for the Congressional elections of November 1954, the Eisenhower administration had publicly disclosed its position in favor of reducing price supports and was actively urging Congress to change the basic legislation. The heat which was generated by the debate in the House and the Senate over this issue spread into the campaign significantly and early. Democratic candidates generally ran against the Eisenhower-Benson flexible support program and made it a major issue in the 1954 elections.

For whatever reason, when the election was over, the Democrats had taken control of both Houses away from the Republicans—something of a political

⁴ *New York Times*, October 23, 1952.

phenomenon in view of Eisenhower's landslide only two years earlier—by making a net gain of 17 seats in the House and 2 seats in the Senate.

Because of the continuing argument over the political appraisal of the farm vote in general and the price support issue in particular, the results of this 1954 election deserve careful consideration. Secretary Benson cheerfully denied that his policies had cost the election, but the cold statistics show that 15 out of 17 defeated Republican Congressmen with records had voted in July to give him flexible supports.

Also important, the two Republicans who had voted against flexible supports (Hagen of Minnesota, and Wampler of Virginia), both of whom come from rural districts, were defeated by candidates Coya Knutson and Pat Jennings who were extremely active in their opposition to the Eisenhower-Benson policies. It should be added that the group of defeated incumbents also had an unfavorable record, from farmers' points of view, on issues affecting the REA program. The record follows in table 1.

Both Democrats who voted against flexible supports and were defeated were swept out of office by peculiar circumstances. Congressman Condon had been denied security clearance by the government to atomic bomb test sites. Congressman Miller had been elected strictly as a protest vote against the construction of Tuttle Creek Dam and was retired as soon as the project was approved over his objections.

Thus, if positions on price supports meant anything in the 1954 elections, they meant defeat for those who favored the flexible system. Although these facts were never referred to, much less admitted, by the administration, it intensified activity to sell the flexible support program. The full-page ads already referred to urged farmers to support President Eisenhower's farm pro-

TABLE 1—MEMBERS OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WHO WERE DEFEATED IN 1954

NAME	STATE	TYPE OF DISTRICT ¹	PARTY	VOTE TO START FLEXIBLE SUPPORTS ²	RECORD ON REA ISSUES ³
Condon	Calif.	Urban	D	No	5/6
Hunter	Calif.	Rural	R	Yes	2/14
Campbell	Fla.	Rural	D	Yes	1/7
Busbey	Ill.	Urban	R	Yes	1/25
Jonas	Ill.	Urban	R	Yes	1/15
Bishop	Ill.	Rural	R	Yes	2/27
Merrill	Ind.	Rural	R	Yes	0/7
Miller	Kan.	Rural	D	No	6/7
Small	Md.	Rural	R	Yes	0/6
Goodwin	Mass.	Urban	R	Yes	0/27
Clardy	Mich.	Urban	R	Yes	0/6
Oakman	Mich.	Urban	R	Yes	1/7
Hagen	Minn.	Rural	R	No	24/27
Hillelson	Mo.	Rural	R	Yes	1/7
Cole	Mo.	Rural	R	Yes	8/19
Reams	Ohio	Urban	I	Yes	10/14
Bonin	Pa.	Urban	R	Yes	0/7
Stauffer	Pa.	Rural	R	Yes	0/6
Graham	Pa.	Urban	R	Yes	0/27
Wampler	Va.	Rural	R	No	1/7
Neal	W.Va.	Rural	R	Yes	0/7
Kersten	Wis.	Urban	R	Absent	2/15

¹ Adopted from *Congressional Quarterly*, Pp. 810 and 811 of the 1957 *Almanac*. Districts are considered rural if 5 per cent or more of the population is employed in agriculture.

² Record vote of July 2, 1954, on the Harrison amendment to institute flexible supports instead of continuing supports at 90 per cent of parity on the basic commodities.

³ Adopting the voting record prepared by the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, Washington, D. C. Favorable votes appear in front of the / and total number of votes recorded by each Congressman appear after the /.

gram, never mentioning his Secretary of Agriculture.

Without knowing how effective this publicity campaign may have been, it can be stated with certainty that a very effective political stroke was made about this time by President Eisenhower. On April 16, 1956, he vetoed Democratic legislation to restore price supports to 90 per cent of parity, but at the same

moment he announced an increase in key price supports to take the sting out of the veto. Most significant, he raised the price support for milk to the exact level which Congress had passed over strenuous objections of the administration. Whatever the logic or merits of this move, it succeeded in taking the steam out of the political opposition during the campaign months which followed.

Once again the size of the Eisenhower landslide was so big as to make insignificant the farm vote as such, although Republicans conceded that the President's majority dropped off in farm areas between 1952 and 1956.

Democrats increased their majorities in the House and the Senate, and some of the significant changes were in rural districts: South Dakota, Kansas, Iowa, and Montana. They also won key Senate victories, such as electing John Carroll over Dan Thornton, the Governor of Colorado, who was a cattleman, confidant of President Eisenhower, and Chairman of the GOP Farm Campaign Committee.

These changes were attributed partly to farm prices and partly to the 1956 airing of public power and natural resources issues which resulted in dramatic defeats for administration stalwarts like former Interior Secretary Douglas McKay by Senator Wayne L. Morse in Oregon.

PORTENT

Secretary Benson again denied that his policies had had any influence in Congressional losses, but professional politicians at the headquarters of his party now began to talk otherwise. A detailed analysis of the 1956 election results issued by the Republican National Committee on May 19, 1957, reported that the Republican vote had declined in 307 out of 394 farm counties, although it had increased in 85

other counties. The GOP farm vote had fallen sharply west of the Mississippi, particularly in Iowa, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and Minnesota.

Early in March of 1958, friends of Secretary Benson who were rallying to support him against public demands of Midwest Congressmen that he resign, took heart from an analysis of 1956 votes which claimed to show that Benson was an asset, rather than a liability, to political candidates. Prepared and distributed privately by the American Farm Bureau Federation, it was an analysis of 1956 votes for Congress compared with 1954 votes, although experts would be quick to point out the fallacy of comparing an election in which Dwight Eisenhower headed the ticket with an election in which he was not a candidate. As reported by Kermit McFarland for the Scripps Howard newspapers⁵ there was one outstanding fact about the analysis: "No member of Congress who has gone all out for Benson's policies has been defeated."

The test of Benson's support was the vote in the House of Representatives to override the President's veto of the Democratic bill for restoring high price supports. The measure applied to this test was whether each Congressman had gained or lost votes between 1954 and 1956. Although there was statistical validity within the application of these strict ground rules, the analysis bypassed the real issues. For one thing, it considered only men who were in Congress in 1956, omitting the large crop of those who had been defeated in the previous election. This is a little like saying that a man returning from a war is better off for his military experience, ignoring those who were casualties and could not return.

Moreover, it included such items as the defeat of Harold Lovre of South

⁵ *Rocky Mountain News*, March 9, 1958.

Dakota, pointing out that he had voted against Benson. What did not appear in these statistics, however, is the fact that Lovre was defeated by a hard-hitting candidate in this extremely rural district who succeeded in identifying Lovre with the Republican administration in spite of his votes on farm issues.

The fallacy of the Farm Bureau analysis was pointed out vigorously by Richard Wilson, Chief of the Washington Bureau of the Des Moines *Register & Tribune* and the Minneapolis *Tribune*, Republican newspapers (March 5, 1958). Wilson started his analysis with the statement that "political observers are watching what some of them consider to be an advanced case of political self-delusion on the part of Agriculture Secretary Ezra Taft Benson."

Wilson identified the study as having been prepared by the Farm Bureau, then reported that statisticians at the Republican National Committee "shoot it full of holes." The latter pointed to "the whole record of startling declines in the percentage of the vote received by Republican Congressmen in two sets of comparable years—1952 and 1956, both presidential years, and 1950 and 1954, both off-presidential years."

Wilson then took examples from the Farm Bureau analysis and showed opposite results by using years which were truly comparable. He reported that the fall-off of Republican votes on this basis "has been so startling that even a qualified expert at the National Committee wrings his hands in despair," and concluded that "the Farm Bureau's pro-Benson calculations appear to be mere wishful thinking."

"THE FOOD VOTE"

It is natural that both political parties should include the farm vote in their wishful thinking, but it has been quite well demonstrated that success at the polls has depended upon skill in

crystallizing or dramatizing farm issues as much as on basic trends. This will probably become more so as the farm vote shrinks in proportion.

It is also a reason that the great public debate over firing or retaining Ezra Benson in the Cabinet is more important to the results of the next election or two than merely being a debate over an interesting personality. The controversy crystallizes and dramatizes more effectively than hundreds of campaign speeches about the relative merits of flexible or high price supports.

At the same time, there is emerging from what is classically known as "the farm vote" something which we might call "the food vote."

Obviously there are more consumers of food than producers in the electorate. The possibility that attention to the larger group of the two might change the complexion of future campaigns in relation to farmers is signaled by several things.

It rises from the deliberate courting of consumers by Secretary Benson, a strategy which apparently began on January 18, 1954, when the Cabinet officer asked the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry: "At what point will the 140,000,000 Americans who do not live on farms rise up . . . and demand not revision but outright elimination of all direct aid to agriculture?"

References of this kind were guarded until 1957, when Benson and Eisenhower made them more public and specific. In June, President Eisenhower was asked at a press conference for his "appraisal of just how serious the threat of inflation is now."⁶ Eisenhower referred to the increasing cost of living, then stated:

Now, part of that, of course, is due to the deliberate policy to bring to the farmer

⁶ *New York Times* transcript, June 27, 1957, p. 10.

his own proper share of national income. We say "proper share," and I am not exactly sure what that means but, as you know, they have taken certain years to be representative of justice in this matter, and have tried to approach that through all sorts of laws. We are still, the whole country is still, experimenting with laws in that question. But, that has accounted for a very considerable amount of this increase in cost.

One month earlier, the *Wall Street Journal* had reported Benson's strategy as follows: "Urban voters, the Secretary believes, are powerful enough to win their way if they rebel against heavy farm subsidies." (May 16, 1957.)

If Eisenhower's statement was circumlocutory, then Benson's statement a few months later was not. Announcing that price supports for dairy products would be lowered on April 1 the next year, Benson stated publicly that "consumers have every reason to expect that the producer price adjustment will be reflected in lower retail prices."⁷ He even added specific possibilities, including that retail milk would drop one-half cent a quart.

Against these factors is the possibility that Benson's opponents will make stick in city minds their assertions that the recession of 1958 may well have been caused by the previous five years of falling farm prices and income, with a side explanation that retail food prices go up even when farm prices go down. This could arouse either a sympathy for farmers or an affirmative expression against the administration in power for letting the general economy slip in spite of higher prices at the grocery store.

Whether the condition prevailing before the November elections is a recession or an inflation, this is an example of a situation in which the farm issue could again be decisive, if forcefully developed.

⁷ Press release of December 18, 1957.

Organized Labor in Politics

By JAMES B. CAREY

ABSTRACT: In this article, one of America's top labor leaders discusses the reasons organized labor is in politics and the way it operates. The article outlines briefly the history of labor in politics and the changes in its philosophy over the years. It discusses the need for political action on the part of labor, stating frankly that "organized labor could not possibly stay out of politics," for labor's collective bargaining responsibilities and its political responsibilities "are indivisible." The author cites the record of huge contributions of millions of dollars by a few wealthy families to political parties and candidates and points out that in 1956, "with all of labor's work and effort, twelve wealthy families spent more money than all of organized labor managed to raise during the entire election campaign." The three phases of labor activity in political action—registration, education, and exercise of the right of free speech—are discussed thoroughly. In concluding, the author gives a bold and frank answer to the question: "What does labor expect in return for its political support? What does labor want?"

James B. Carey, LL.D., Washington, D. C., is President of the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO. He is a Vice President and member of the Executive Committee and the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO. In the early thirties, he was a General Organizer for the United States for the AFL. Carey was the first President of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE). When the CIO was formed in 1937, Carey was elected Secretary-Treasurer, a post to which he was re-elected throughout the history of that organization. When the CIO expelled UE in 1949 because it was Communist-dominated, the IUE-CIO was chartered. Carey became head of the Administrative Committee of the new anti-Communist union and was subsequently elected President.

FROM our earliest childhood, we Americans are taught the wonderful ways of democracy.

"We, the people . . ."

"All men are created equal . . ."

" . . . With liberty and justice for all."

"Government of the people, by the people, for the people. . . ."

American labor is dedicated to making these assertions a reality.

DEMOCRACY IN THEORY AND FACT

It does not take a great scholar to realize that there is a vast disparity between democracy in theory—the kind we are told about in school—and democracy as it works out in practice in America today. It does not take any particular erudition to see that the political "equality" of Joe Smith in no way approaches the political "equality" of Henry Luce with the fabulous influence of his *Time*, *Life*, and *Fortune* news reporting and political endorsements, which go into 9,000,000 American homes—and which are, by the way, circulated in large measure by the tax money of millions of Joe Smiths through the second-class mailing subsidy.

Nor does it take any particular gift of insight to see the vast difference in the political "equality" of an employee in a DuPont factory and a member of the DuPont family, which contributed \$240,423 to Republican party campaign funds during the 1956 campaign.

No intellectually honest person will contend that this is real democracy. Nobody can say that this is what is meant by the most stirring of all phrases: "Government of the people, by the people, for the people. . . ."

In school we are taught how democracy *should* work. We are taught that every adult American has one vote. Therefore, according to the schoolbooks, we are all equal.

But we are not told how democracy *does* work.

The son of Joe Smith of Terrytown, Nebraska, is not told how the votes of his father and mother are smothered by the dollar votes of the Pew family—which in the 1956 campaign donated \$216,810 to the Republican party. The daughter of Harry Rachlin in the Bronx is not told how the votes of her parents are overwhelmed by the dollar votes of the Rockefellers, who in 1956 contributed \$152,604 to the Republican party.

The children of José Menderez in Austin, Texas, are not told how, in the 1952 campaign, H. R. Cullen of Houston contributed \$51,500 to reactionary candidates in almost every state in the Union. The children are not told about the 1956 contribution of \$344,097 by the nation's twenty-nine largest oil corporations to help elect President Eisenhower. Therefore, the children cannot know that the 27½ per cent tax write-off for oil depletion is a special privilege which flows from these huge financial contributions as effusively as black gold from a gusher.

The children in the public schools of Los Angeles are not told how the officials of California's largest banking, real estate, oil, and agricultural plantations hired a "salesman for free enterprise"—and that their contributions to his career got this "salesman" elected, first as a Congressman, then as a Senator, and finally as Vice President of the United States.

I do not mean to infer that we should change the curricula of our high school civics classes or our college political science courses. I firmly believe that real democracy is right. But we should put these principles into practice. The men and women of the American labor movement are dedicated to doing just that.

LABOR ALWAYS IN POLITICS

This is not to say that organized labor has a choice.

Organized labor could not possibly

"stay out of politics" and do one iota of good for its members. Organized labor could not possibly abandon its political responsibilities any more than it could abandon its collective bargaining responsibilities. To abandon one is to abandon the other. For they are indivisible. They go together as brick and mortar. Either, without the other, is useless.

American labor has always been "in politics." From the beginning of our first unions, men and women have realized that it is pointless to negotiate a wage increase or an improvement in working conditions if some legislative body declares it null and void—either literally or figuratively—by action which offsets the value of the negotiated gain.

This has been the experience of men and women who labor, from the beginning of our country until today. Even Samuel Gompers recognized this dual responsibility of labor. But his solution to the problem—"reward your friends and punish your enemies"—was not as incisive as his recognition. Urging someone to close the stable door after the horse has been stolen is hardly the answer. Labor has to be practical. To be successful, labor has to be as practical about politics as it is about collective bargaining and organizing.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE

In my opinion, the first realistic, practical approach by labor to politics was the action of the Congress of Industrial Organizations in setting up the Political Action Committee. PAC, as it came to be known throughout the land, was formulated by the CIO Executive Board at a meeting in Washington, D. C., on July 7, 1943 and was established by a vote of the CIO convention in Philadelphia the first week of November of that year. In his report to the delegates, President Philip Murray

outlined what he visualized the role of PAC to be. I feel that what Murray said on that historic occasion is well worth noting here:

Labor has long recognized that the gains which it wins through economic action can be protected, implemented and extended only if it develops a progressive program of legislation and secures its enactment through effective participation in the political life of the nation. The elementary legislative safeguards for the protection of the health and safety of workers—such as Workmen's Compensation, maximum hours for women and minors, and safety and sanitary laws—were all placed on the statute books through labor activity in the political arena. The broad program of social and labor legislation enacted in recent years was brought about largely because of the increasing participation by labor in the political life of the nation.

Today, labor is alive to the fact that . . . formulation of a domestic program for a more secure and abundant life will be determined by the character of our national government. . . . It is, therefore, the purpose of the CIO Political Action Committee to provide for the organization of labor's political arm. While the committee regards preparation for the crucial national elections of 1944 as a major task, it is also looking beyond 1944 and planning for a permanent political organization of labor.

Sidney Hillman was the unanimous choice for the job of heading PAC. His leadership in that role dramatized for all America that labor would no longer submit to second-class citizenship in the political life of our country.

From that day in 1943 when CIO convention delegates shouted their approval of the resolution establishing PAC, labor has been marching in the front ranks of American political activity. From that day on, labor has been carrying its case for progressive social legislation and improved democratic procedures to the American people.

As I suggested earlier, labor is practical. Labor recognizes that—even if it were so inclined—it could not hope to compete with the giant corporations or the fabulously wealthy families of America by matching them, dollar-for-dollar, in cash contributions to political parties and political candidates.

Labor is not so inclined. For the temple of democracy should not be defiled by cash-on-the-barrelhead transactions, whether they be for support of a bill to free natural gas producers from responsible governmental regulation, for a television channel, or pure and simple blank checks to enable the most reactionary elements to take to the hustings.

Democracy, if it is to be the real thing and not a sham, requires the active participation of each and every citizen in the day-to-day governmental processes. Democracy requires democratic action by the employees of the General Electric Company, as well as by its President, its Board of Directors, and its Plant Managers.

Any review of statistics on voting shows that, historically, democracy has not received the active attention required. An election where more than half the eligible voters go to the polls is considered a big election. We in labor know that a substantial group of the people who do not vote, nor take an active part in the affairs of our government, are working people. In the main, they are people who were short-changed in the educational process; they are people at the lower levels of the economic scale; and there is a sizeable group which simply does not bother to vote.

In the 1956 national elections, for example, more than 40 per cent of the people who would have been eligible to vote did not do so. Of 103,000,000 adult citizens, only 61,000,000 went to the polls on election day. And this was considered a "huge turn-out" at the polls.

Labor's activities in the democratic process are limited to three major categories—registration, education, and expression of opinion.

REGISTRATION

First is the job of getting people to register and vote. And because this is the most basic part of political activity, it is the job on which we concentrate most of our time, money, and effort.

Our experience has shown that even the most dramatic and comprehensive registration campaigns and get-out-the-vote drives in the last few weeks before an election simply cannot do the job. Such campaigns must be carried on all the time. For while there may not be a national election in a given year, there are local, county, or state elections. And these elections are, in their own way, just as important as the national elections. Certainly what happens in California this year will have a powerful effect on all working men and women of that state. The same is true of city elections in Newark or county elections in Iowa.

Labor does not view a registration campaign or a get-out-the-vote campaign as its exclusive responsibility. Indeed, such a campaign, even in a small city, is a gigantic task. In such a campaign, labor works closely with other community action organizations such as the League of Women Voters, veterans organizations, the American Heritage Foundation, and other interested groups.

Prior to the 1956 Presidential election, the AFL-CIO issued a special "proclamation" to all AFL-CIO members. We called upon every member "to make certain that he or she is a registered voter eligible to participate in the elections this fall . . . [and] to impress upon those adults within the family circle who may be unregistered to meet the responsibility they bear to exercise their judgment on Election

Day." Although the turn-out on election day was not the overwhelming response we had hoped for, the labor movement was heartened by the fact that there was a substantial increase in registration and voting in many parts of the country.

Two months after our last national elections, at its meeting on January 30, 1957, the AFL-CIO Executive Council adopted a Resolution on the Establishment of Local Registration Committees which was circulated throughout our unions.

The over-all supervision of this registration program is in the hands of the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education—COPE, as it is generally known. COPE was the successor to the CIO's PAC and the AFL's Labor's League for Political Education, after the AFL-CIO merger in December 1955. Each national and international union has its own COPE. In turn, every local union is urged to have its own active COPE, to carry the policies and programs home to every rank-and-file member. From a practical standpoint, major attention is devoted to the work of checking to see that each member of each local union is registered. This requires checking our membership lists against the roll of registered voters in each community. Then comes the even more trying follow-up task in order to get the member and his family registered so that they are eligible to vote.

It may seem that to spend so much time on registration is a mistake. But our experience proves otherwise. Indeed, we cannot spend enough time on registration. We wish we could devote more time, energy, and support to this work. For registration is the *sine qua non* of our democratic process. Without it, nothing. Aside from the strict laws requiring registration in order to be eligible to vote, many states and communities have other restrictive quali-

fications, as, for example, the poll tax, written examinations, and so forth, which are, in many instances, nothing but an obstacle course deliberately designed to limit the exercise of the voting right. Then there is the problem of millions of new voters coming into the political world each year, the problem created by people moving from one voting area to another, and the problem of re-registering voters in areas where there is no provision for permanent registration.

All this puts an immense burden on labor's participation in our democratic processes. But we shoulder it gladly. For we know that by increasing the number of active voters we are building a firmer foundation for democracy.

EDUCATION

The second major role of labor in politics is education. This is a vital activity, for democracy not only requires voters, but intelligent voters. There is a direct relationship between the understanding of the citizenship and the strength of democracy. Democracy can only be as healthy as its enlightened citizens enable it to be.

To bring about a healthy body politic, labor seeks to inform its membership of the issues at stake in a given election and the voting records of candidates on the issues.

In this field of activity, the different unions have their own newspapers. In these newspapers, the unions define the issues as labor sees them. We tell our members about the Natural Gas Bill and what its passage would mean to them. We write about Social Security and what is being done to improve or wreck it. We write about unemployment, the tax laws, civil rights, housing, education, atomic energy, aid to depressed areas, labor legislation—the whole range of issues which affect work-

ing men and women throughout the land.

As election time approaches, we publish the voting records of the candidates for re-election, so our members can see how those people presently in office measure up to the issues. We urge our local unions to do the same. When we have union meetings near election time, we tell our people about these things and encourage discussion of the issues and the candidates.

Some of our unions hold special conferences on major issues such as unemployment. My own union, the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, recently held such a conference in Washington. To this conference we invited many well-known Senators, from both political parties, to address the delegates and present the issues as they see them. Of course it is impossible to have our entire membership at such a conference, but we do try to get as large a number and as widely representative a group as possible.

The AFL-CIO COPE seeks to supervise this educational activity, to encourage it, and to assist international and local unions in areas where such activity has not been carried on previously.

By such activity we try to encourage a wide discussion of the issues and the candidates. We attempt to incite the interest of our members and stimulate enlightened debate based on facts—not on prejudices, opinions, or rumors. Here, too, labor has neither the time nor the resources to do all that it would like to do. But we do feel that what we have done has contributed to the health of our democracy.

EXPRESSION OF OPINION

The last field in which labor participates in the political activity of our country—and this is the area which has caused some controversy—is in exercis-

ing our right to freely express our views.

This is our constitutional right. We have the right to speak out, to say how we stand, and to say what we think is in the best interests of the people and the country. We feel deeply about this. We think it is not only our right, but our duty as citizens. Now there are some people, some wealthy people and a few reactionary citizens, who take issue with us on this. They criticize us. They say that unions should not engage in political activity. This is subterfuge. It is not the fact that we speak out which irritates them. It is what we say. For those same people would be very happy if we supported them and their reactionary policies. They denounce us for speaking out, but they are really disturbed because we direct the spotlight of public attention on them, their reactionary records, and their positions of privilege.

These people would be very happy if labor leaders simply crawled in a hole and forgot about the problems of democracy. Some of them would even like to push us in that hole. But we are proud of our activity and the positions we take, for we do it all in the open. Labor does not beat around some bush out in Nebraska in order to leave \$2,500 on the desk of a South Dakota Senator with the suggestion that we hope he votes for the Natural Gas Bill.

What we do, we do out in the open. For we know that we do not control a single vote besides our own. We cannot tell a single American citizen how to vote, and we do not try. But we do try to tell as many people as possible how we stand and what we think is good for the people.

For when all the hue and cry of an election campaign is over, you have to vote for somebody. And it does not strengthen democracy one bit if a person goes to the polls and says, "Well, I will vote for this fellow because he has

the same first name I have"; or "I will vote for that fellow because he is of the same party my grandfather was."

We try to raise the level of political understanding out of the gutter of prejudice or superstition. We do it by going straight to the people and saying, "We think these are the issues that count and we think that this candidate would do the best job for the people if he is elected."

And furthermore, we do it democratically. If there is an election campaign in a particular district, the men and women who are members of the union in that district get together and talk over the issues and the candidates. Often they invite all candidates in and ask them directly for their positions on different bills and proposals. Then, if these leaders in the district feel there is a candidate or an issue worthy of their support, they go to the members with their recommendation. And if the members of the unions in the particular district agree with that recommendation, he is the man the union members endorse.

On the state level it works the same way. If there is an election for Senator or Governor, the COPE leaders in the area evaluate the candidates and the issues. Then the question goes to the membership of the individual unions.

On the national level, too, there is no "endorsement" of a candidate until the people have decided. In the union of which I am President, the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, our union conventions are held in the fall of the year, usually September. By that time, in Presidential election years, all parties have held their nominating conventions and their candidates are chosen. By the time our union convention rolls around, our members have had time to evaluate the candidates. Often the officers of our union invite both candidates

to appear at our convention and address our delegates. Usually it is difficult for the candidates to arrange their schedules to appear at our convention, but in any event we try to get them to attend and tell us where they stand. Then the floor is open for debate on the parties, platforms, and candidates—debate based on the facts and the records. Out of this debate there comes a resolution to endorse the candidate which the delegates feel would do the best job for the people and the country. The IUE, being formed in 1949, has held only two conventions in Presidential election years—those of 1952 and 1956. In one instance, we endorsed the Democratic Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates unanimously. In the other instance, the Democratic candidates were endorsed practically unanimously. I cite these facts simply to show that there is no question that the positions labor takes on issues and candidates are accurate reflections of union members' views.

In all cases, endorsements are made only by the people who live in the areas where the election is to be held. The only case where an endorsement is made at the national level is a Presidential election. Then the delegates to the conventions of the international unions make the decision, or in the case of the AFL-CIO, the endorsement of Stevenson-Kefauver in 1956 was made by the General Board, which is made up of a representative from each international union.

FINANCES

The next question is, obviously, how is this work financed?

Anyone who reads a newspaper during the course of an election campaign has seen huge, blaring headlines shouting: "Big Union Slush Fund Revealed," or "Union Bosses Raising Millions For Their Candidates."

Those stories just are not so. Organized labor's financial program for political action is modest. And the end product of that program is more modest still. Organized labor developed a plan whereby we urge every union member to participate in our political action program by contributing one dollar. The total of these contributions is what we have to work with in implementing our program.

I will get to the actual dollar-and-cents results of labor's fund-raising activities in a few paragraphs. But first, I simply want to point out that the results of our campaign to finance this work in no way approach the "Huge Slush Funds" the newspapers talk about. This, I am sure, does not have to be spelled out to anyone who has ever participated in a voluntary fund-raising program among working people. For working men and women simply do not have large sums of money at their disposal. And what they do have they are, naturally, chary to part with. In any event, even after the collections are made, there is little money with which to work. For under the program formulated by labor, half of the dollars that are collected in a given state remain in that state. Only the other half is forwarded to the international unions, which in turn forward it to the national COPE.

It is the voluntary money, and only that money, which is used to assist progressive candidates who have been endorsed by the local, regional, and state COPEs to carry the issues and their program to the voters.

Now, let us take a look at these "Huge Union Slush Funds."

In 1956, AFL-CIO's national COPE managed to collect \$559,000 from the 16,000,000 members of the international unions. If you double that amount, figuring that 50 per cent stayed in the communities where the money was

raised, you have a maximum of \$1,118,000. Then, when you consider the tremendous job which had to be done to register voters, print voting records, distribute leaflets, and carry on the myriad other tasks which go with an election in each of the forty-eight states, plus the national campaign for President and Vice President, you see that this is, indeed, a modest amount.

ODDS AGAINST LABOR

But with all of labor's work and effort, twelve wealthy families spent more money than all that which organized labor managed to raise during the entire election campaign. The total amount of this money paid out by these twelve wealthy families—headed by the DuPonts, the Mellons, the Rockefellers, and the Pews—was \$1,153,735.

What about other large contributors? Officials of only twenty-nine large oil companies gave \$344,097 to re-elect Eisenhower. Officials of only thirty-seven large advertising agencies gave \$51,000 to re-elect Eisenhower, while giving nothing to the Democrats. The forty-seven leading underwriters of bonds gave \$237,000 to the Republicans, while giving \$2,000 to the Democrats. The "Salute To Ike" dinners alone, hardly a grass-roots affair, brought in \$5,000,000—practically five times the amount all labor organizations together were able to raise.

Those are only the above-board payments which are reported. These giants of privilege have dozens of other sly, subtle methods of raising money for their favored angels. These were cited in the *Fortune* magazine article in May 1956 entitled "How to Give Money to Politicians." This article cited the ways in which corporations "duck around" the law to keep the coffers full for reactionary candidates. It cited the ways in which the corporations "encourage" executives to give handsome campaign

contributions to corporation-favored candidates with the understanding that they will get the money back in bonuses. It told of letters, on corporation letter-heads, going out to suppliers and small companies which do business with the big corporations, appealing for campaign contributions. The boss's secretary appears as the "purchaser" of a bloc of tickets to \$100-a-plate fund-raising dinners. Truly, your "cup runneth over" when you are a reactionary politician campaigning on a program to repeal the twentieth century.

But those are not the only ways in which candidates representing the views of wealth and privilege find the dice loaded in their favor. It is merely a starter. Then the newspapers and other mass media roll up their big guns—*Time*, *Life*, *Newsweek*, television, radio, advertising agencies with their billboards and all the subtle means of persuasion of Madison Avenue. In the last Presidential campaign, 90 per cent of all the media of communication took public positions in favor of Eisenhower and Republican candidates. Now we know that these are all corporations. But they present their analyses of "the issues" and the candidates in such a way that they appear to the voters as "impartial."

And that is where the stories of the "Huge Union Slush Funds" come in. Those stories are fabricated, ballooned, and distorted to make it look as if "big money" is on the side of the liberal candidate. Actually the reverse is true.

The purpose of these stories is not to "alert" the voters to the "menace" of union political activity—for certainly the people who publish these stories know all too well how modest union political activity actually is. The real purpose is to hide the fantastic sums of money which are being spent to elect reactionary candidates.

By any standard, the participation of labor in the political processes of our

country is not "dangerous." What is dangerous are these cash-on-the-barrel-head payments of huge sums of money to candidates. For with such large contributions in their campaign treasury, any Senator, Congressman, Governor, or State Representative is beholden to the giver and, therefore, cannot decide the big issues truly on the basis of what is best for all the people.

These are the odds labor is up against. We know they are overwhelming. We do not lose heart though. If anything, these odds make us work that much harder. For we know that the preservation of democracy demands that there be some sort of an "equalizer" which will give the people the progressive viewpoint as well as the Big Business story. And we know, too, that while we do not have the millions of dollars and the fabulous facilities that Big Business has for getting its story across, we have something far more important: We have the people with us.

LARGER LABOR VOTE

We are heartened by the fact that in 1956 many more workers voted than ever before. We know, too, that in contests where labor was united, where it was able to co-operate with other liberal groups, and where first-class candidates were running, the progressive forces were victorious. This was true in Oregon, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and the state of Washington. Progressive forces were victorious in these instances because once you have the opportunity to get your story to the people and have dedicated, energetic people working with you, the people will recognize which candidate represents their best interests and they will respond on election day.

Another heartening fact is the growing realization among union members

themselves that political action by their unions is truly in their best interest. A group of researchers from Wayne University in Detroit made a study of union political action in the 1952 campaign. This was much more than a study. It is undoubtedly the most thorough analysis of the individual's attitude and response to politics which has ever been made. Eventually published in a 347 page book—*When Labor Votes* by Arthur Kornhauser, Albert J. Mayer, and Harold L. Sheppard—this study analyzed voters and nonvoters alike, prior to, during, and after the election. I think that one point deserves a moment's consideration: The researchers asked the union members, Stevenson voters and Eisenhower voters alike, which groups they particularly trusted when it came to voting recommendations. Seventy-two per cent of the voters, both Stevenson and Eisenhower voters, replied that they trusted the recommendations of their unions most. Newspapers—with 28 per cent of the voters—and business groups—with only 19 per cent of the voters—were trusted least when it came to voting recommendations. When the voters were asked which groups they particularly did not trust when it came to voting recommendations, the union members put newspapers and business groups at the top of the list for being least trusted, and only 12 per cent said they did not particularly trust the recommendations of labor groups.

This, I feel, augurs well for labor in its political-action work in the years ahead. For it is certainly true that what labor said in 1952 is clearly coming to pass. As unemployment lines get longer and longer throughout the country, as working people see their standard of living deteriorating while wealth and privilege gets even more preferential treatment at the hands of the government, they are realizing that the un-

ion's political action is in their best interest.

On the legislative front, while no major gains for the people have been enacted into law for several years, we have been able to make progress on some issues. Social security benefits were improved and expanded, a measure of progress was made in the field of civil rights, the minimum wage was raised to a dollar an hour, and some of the give-aways of our natural resources were checked. All this is progress which very likely would not have been made without the practical support of labor in politics.

A PROGRAM FOR THE COUNTRY

I feel that the program labor has formulated for mass participation in political activity is one which could well be extended to the entire country. It is a program of democratic education, democratic endorsement, and democratic solicitation. What better way to bring about truly representative democracy? Why not set a maximum on political contributions, say five dollars for each voter, and then, with all the resources which we have, encourage and stimulate political interest and discussion? Then every American would know that not only would his contribution count as much as the next person's, but also his vote. For we in organized labor are convinced that when all the people in America participate in our democratic process, their cumulative decision will be the right decision.

Often, I am asked: "What does labor expect in return for its political support? What does it want?"

My answer to that question is always the same: Nothing. Organized labor expects nothing and wants nothing for itself. Labor is not and does not intend to become a narrow, special-interest pressure group. If we were that, indeed, we would be subject to honest

criticism. But we do not expect jobs. We do not expect patronage. We do not expect the elected representative to run errands for us in the halls of Congress or the legislature. In short, we do not expect any of the "favors" normally expected of a candidate.

We do what we do because we feel we have an obligation as citizens to be active in the democratic processes of our great country. If we were members of a veterans' organization, church group, farmers' association, small business league or some other group, we would have done the same thing. To see that these are not mere words, just look at the record. One of labor's main fights in recent years was to raise the minimum wage to a dollar an hour. The main beneficiaries of this legislation were not the members of organized labor, for their wages were already ahead

of that bare minimum. The main beneficiaries were the millions of men and women outside organized labor who had never enjoyed the fruits of collective bargaining. The same is true of social security, civil rights, housing, and many more. What guides the decisions of organized labor is not the "What's good for General Motors" line, but what is good for all Americans. For we believe that what is good for all Americans is also good for labor.

So if a candidate we support is elected, all we expect is that he live up to his campaign platform and make his decisions on the basis of what is good for the American people. Or to put it another way, all we ask is that, when he votes, he consider the millions of men and women who do not have the resources to write out a \$5,000 check to a candidate at campaign time.

How Pressure Groups Operate

By HENRY A. TURNER

ABSTRACT: During the past few decades the number of pressure groups has rapidly multiplied, the scope of their activities has vastly expanded, and their methods and tactics have become more professionalized and subtle. Today the more highly organized groups have lobbyists in Washington and in many state capitals, well-staffed bureaus of press agents and research personnel, and active membership groups across the nation. In general, pressure groups function in a pragmatic fashion, employing any procedures or methods which will effectively promote their aims. Pressure groups attempt to exert influence on every phase of the political process. They endeavor to influence their own members and other groups; urge political parties to endorse favored policies; work for the selection of "friendly" officials; and attempt to secure favorable decisions from executive, legislative, and judicial officials. Possibly the most significant contemporary development in pressure-group activity is the continual increase in their efforts to mold public sentiment by utilizing the media of mass communication. Noteworthy recent developments in this area include the widespread use of institutional advertising and the establishment of the foundation, committees, councils, and institutes which have as their basic purpose the influencing of public attitudes.

Henry A. Turner, Ph.D., Santa Barbara, California, is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He has also taught at the University of Missouri, University of Nebraska, Iowa State College, and the University of California, Berkeley. He received a Ford Foundation Fellowship for the 1952-53 academic year and spent this time in Washington, D. C., working with the Democratic National Committee, the Bureau of the Budget, and the White House staff. His articles have been published in a number of professional journals, and he is the Editor of Politics in the United States (1955).

PRESSURE groups have participated actively in politics from the establishment of the first governments in America and must, therefore, be considered as an intrinsic element of our political system.

The manner in which pressure groups operate in the United States today is determined basically by the political environment: the federal form of government; separation of powers; electoral system; political parties; technological development; and the economic, social, ethnic, and religious composition of the population. Individual interest groups generally function in a pragmatic and opportunistic fashion, using any method or technique which they believe will serve their purpose effectively. Undoubtedly dictating most pressure group activity is the criterion: what action will produce the maximum desired result with the minimum expenditure of time and resources. The techniques and tactics which any particular group employs will be determined largely by such factors as size and geographic distribution of the membership, cohesion of membership, financial resources, prestige position of the organization, quality of leadership and staff, and relations with the political parties and other organized groups.

Where are pressures applied? Depending on the aims and characteristics of the individual organization, an interest group may attempt to influence its own membership; other pressure groups; the electoral process; the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government; and public opinion.

INFLUENCING THE MEMBERSHIP

One characteristic of virtually every large organization is the tendency for a few individuals to gain effective control of the group. In some associations the officers may enjoy near permanent

tenure, and in others they may be selected from a relatively small elite. These officers and the paid bureaucracy in many instances literally run the organization. Hence, from the standpoint of origination of policy, they become the organization.

In some organized groups, a considerable portion of the time and energy of the staff may be expended to influence the members of the group and potential members. Most associations wish to retain and enlarge their membership—if for no other reason—in order to increase the political strength of the group. In group meetings, publications, and direct communications to the membership, efforts are also directed toward producing greater group cohesion, to “educating” the membership to accept and support the policies of the organization, and to inducing the members to engage in desired political activity. Types of activity urged on group members include: registering and voting; working in political campaigns and making financial contributions; and communicating via personal conversations, letters, telegrams, and telephone calls to public officials and those who control the media of mass communication.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN GROUPS

In a sense, pressure groups lobby other pressure groups. Organized interest groups seek the active support of their allies or potential allies, the endorsement of groups less directly interested, and the neutralization of their opponents. Such co-operation may be achieved by one group merely activating another, by promising future assistance, or by making concessions or compromises. In some cases co-operating groups develop only informal working arrangements, but there are instances in which organizations have signed formal agreements to pool their political efforts

in working for a program. Examples may also be cited of groups co-operating through interlocking directorates.¹

In 1950, a Congressional committee investigating lobbying found that interest groups co-operate not only “within so obvious a functional area as an industry,” but also on an ideological basis, for “there is a growing joint effort in lobbying by groups whose unity is philosophical rather than functional in character.” The Committee added, “The general theme of combination rather than conflict grows bolder and more insistent every year.”²

A particular type of pressure organization, the catalytic pressure group, has been developed to promote joint action by interest groups. Catalytic groups usually consist of representatives of several pressure organizations, but an established pressure group may itself serve as a catalytic organization. Some catalytic groups have been established on an *ad hoc* basis for the purpose of stimulating and co-ordinating the activities of several organizations to secure the adoption of a specific policy; and once the policy has been effected, the catalytic group has been disbanded. An example of such a group is the Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion.³ Other catalytic groups such as the National Tax Equality Association have been established on a permanent basis.⁴

PRESSURE ON THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

By definition, pressure groups are non-partisan organizations which attempt to

¹ *General Interim Report*, House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, H. Rep. 3138, 81st Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 48-50.

² *Ibid.*, p. 47.

³ Fred W. Riggs, *Pressures on Congress: A Study of the Repeal of Chinese Exclusion* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1950).

⁴ Donald C. Blaisdell, *American Democracy Under Pressure* (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1957), p. 113.

influence some phase of public policy. They do not, themselves, draft party platforms or nominate candidates for public office. Pressure associations do, however, appear before the resolutions committees of the political parties to urge the endorsement of their programs as planks in the parties' platforms. They often attempt to secure the endorsement of both major parties and thus remove their program from the arena of partisan controversy. Many groups are also active in the nomination and election of party members to political offices.

Most interest groups which are active in election campaigns will support a candidate of either party if his general outlook is similar to that of the group. Thus organized labor has followed the policy, first prescribed by Samuel Gompers, of “rewarding friends and punishing enemies” by support or opposition in campaigns and at the polls. Apparently, however, some labor, business, farm, professional, and other organizations have found most of their “friends” in one party and most of their “enemies” in the other, for they have tended to align themselves with one or the other of the two major parties.

The most common method of aiding in a campaign is through financial contribution. Labor unions and corporations are prohibited by law from making “a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election” at which a member of Congress or the President and Vice-President are selected; but they have devised means for evading the spirit, if not the letter, of the law.

Testimony before the Senate subcommittee investigating the 1956 election campaign revealed that both labor unions and corporations pay salaries to officers and employees working full time for a party or candidate, publish political arguments in their house organs, and purchase television and radio time and

newspaper space to present political views. In addition, the subcommittee was informed that corporations make political contributions by permitting party officials or candidates to use offices and equipment without charge and pay bonuses and permit expense accounts to be padded with the understanding that political contributions will be made from the bonuses and padded accounts.⁵

INFLUENCING LEGISLATORS

A century ago pressure groups concentrated most of their efforts on promoting and opposing legislative proposals. During recent decades, their activities have been expanded into other areas; yet even today, the methods employed to influence legislative decisions are the most obvious actions of pressure groups.

The major organized interests maintain permanent staffs of professional lobbyists, research personnel, press agents, and secretaries in Washington throughout the year and have similar but smaller staffs in most state capitals during legislative sessions. Associations which have only an incidental interest in legislative proposals customarily do not have a full-time lobby staff, but may employ a lobbyist to represent them on occasions when legislative issues of interest to their members arise.

Some interest groups have "stables" of legislators who will work closely with them either because they owe their election largely to those groups or because they are themselves members of those groups. Pressure organizations with like-minded spokesmen in the legislature, or "inside lobbyists," naturally have an advantage over other groups.

⁵ 1956 *General Election Campaigns*, Report of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the Committee on Rules and Administration, U. S. Senate, 84th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 23-27.

Available information indicates that pressure associations originate a large percentage of the bills introduced in Congress and the state legislatures. Many organizations have their staff members read all bills introduced to determine which they wish to support, which to oppose, and which to attempt to have amended. As would be expected, lobbyists customarily watch the bills which they have sponsored to help expedite their movement through the various stages of the legislative process to enactment.

Committee hearings on bills provide the various organizations with opportunities to present their information and arguments and also to show how strongly the members of the group favor or oppose a given proposal. Officers of the association, their lobbyists, or lay members will testify before committees, often with charts and graphs to show statistical data. Sizeable delegations may be organized to attend committee hearings. At crucial times—such as when a committee is considering a bill or when the measure is being debated by one of the houses of the legislature—pressure associations often have their members write, telegraph, or call their legislators. Some groups attempt to flood the legislators with messages, while others concentrate on having communications sent by the principal supporters of each legislator and other key persons in each district.

Basically, lobbying consists of communicating with the legislators. Organized groups utilize every available opportunity to inform legislators of their wishes; to provide them with facts, information, and arguments; and to impress upon them the ability of the organization to reward or punish the legislator by giving or withholding support at the polls, campaign contributions, or gifts and items of value to the legislator. In spite of the pressures brought

upon them, most legislators agree that private groups perform a valuable function in presenting information regarding the multitude of bills—many of them of a highly technical nature—introduced in each legislative session.

Any survey of pressure group operations would be incomplete that omitted reference to the social lobby and the use of unethical or illegal methods. There is widespread agreement that both types of practices still exist, but that they are of much less importance than in the days of the "old lobby." It should also be noted that these methods are undoubtedly employed as much today to influence administrators as legislators. Although the social lobby, minor favors, and practices of a distinctly corrupt nature may influence some public officials, their total impact on the political process is probably not great today.

PRESSURE ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

One of the most noteworthy changes in pressure-group activity during this century is the increased effort to influence the executive branch of the government. Pressures are applied on executive and administrative personnel who are in the position to render decisions or take action of interest to organized groups. As in earlier years, after a bill has been passed by the legislature, interest groups may inundate the Chief Executive with statements, letters, telegrams, and memorials; and they may appeal to him personally to veto or sign the measure. Well aware of the importance of the Chief Executive's recommendations regarding legislative policies and budgetary matters, organized interests urge the President or governors to incorporate or omit specific proposals from their legislative programs and to increase or decrease budgetary requests for particular administrative departments or agencies.

The vast expansion of governmental

regulation of economic life and the tendency of the legislatures to grant administrative officials broad discretionary powers have caused pressure associations to evince more interest than in the past in the selection of administrative personnel. Moreover, it is apparent to most groups that administrators may forcibly execute a statute or virtually nullify it. For these reasons it is not uncommon for groups to seek the appointment of their members or of individuals friendly to their group to administrative posts of particular interest to them. Pressure organizations with friends in top administrative positions have found that they have advantages not available to other groups in securing permits, licenses, contracts, subsidies, favorable adjustments of tax problems and antitrust suits, and various other types of privileges and favors.

Administrative agencies which have been granted quasi-legislative powers find that representatives of interest groups commonly appear before them to oppose or support rules and regulations. On the national level, the Administrative Procedure Act requires most administrative agencies to hold public hearings on proposed rules and permits interested individuals to request the issuance, repeal, or amendment of rules. Pressure associations have availed themselves of these rights and lobby the administrators in much the same fashion as they lobby Congress or the state legislatures.

Interest groups may importune the legislature to amend the statutes under which an agency operates and to increase or decrease its appropriation in order to expand or curtail its operations. In some instances, organized interests have been able to get legislators to investigate administrative agencies in an effort to punish administrators for unco-operative or unfriendly action. It is incorrect, however, to assume that

the relationship between private associations and governmental agencies is typically one of antagonism. On the contrary, it is not uncommon to find pressure organizations, legislators, and administrative agencies working together harmoniously for their mutual benefit.

PRESSURE GROUPS AND THE JUDICIARY

Although pressure organizations expend considerably less energy and time attempting to influence the judicial branch of the government than either the executive or legislative branch, reference should be included of their efforts to influence the courts. Whether judges are elected or appointed, organized interests often participate in their selection.

Occasionally groups seek to advance the cause of their members by initiating litigation to test the constitutionality of legislation or the action of public officials. For a number of years the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People has relied on litigation as a principal means for upholding Negro rights. Some organizations also file briefs as friends of the court to support other groups involved in litigation, or they have articles prepared for publication in law reviews with the expectation that they will be used as briefs or may be read by judges and possibly influence their decisions.⁶

PRESSURE GROUPS AND PUBLIC OPINION

The continual increase in the efforts of interest groups to win support for their organizations and programs by using the mass media of communication to influence public attitudes is perhaps the most significant recent development in pressure-group activity. Among fac-

⁶ For an excellent discussion of pressure groups and the courts see Blaisdell, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), pp. 117-19, also Clement E. Vose, "Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Politics," this issue of *THE ANNALS*.

tors contributing to this development are: the increasing awareness on the part of interest-group leaders that public opinion is an entity which must be considered; the development and refinement of new propaganda techniques and devices; and the revolutionary changes in communication media which make it possible for literally millions of Americans to be reached daily via television, radio, the motion pictures, newspapers, and periodicals.

The rise of the public-relations counsel has occurred concomitantly with the growth of pressure groups and the extraordinary development of the communication media. To advise their highest officials on public relations and to direct propaganda programs many business organizations, labor unions, farm groups, professional associations, government agencies, and other organizations now employ public-relations counsels—some on a full-time basis in the top-echelon-planning and strategy group; others only occasionally to direct specific campaigns.

Propaganda

Although the term propaganda is not new, there is general agreement that propaganda as employed today is a "new thing." The distinctive feature of modern propaganda is that it is disseminated principally through the media of mass communications by pressure groups who employ public-relations experts to develop their propaganda themes and techniques.⁷

Pressure groups use propaganda both as a tactical means of accomplishing specific short-term goals and as a part of their long-range political strategy. From a tactical standpoint, a well-organized public-relations campaign may have either of two results. It may give the impression that there is such broad public support for a proposal that the

⁷ Blaisdell, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), p. 192.

campaign itself will result in the effectuation of the desired policy. Or, the campaign may activate the citizenry to the extent that they will demand through letters, telegrams, and other means that the officials make the decision wished by the organized group. In either event, the basic aim is to make the program of the group appear synonymous with the general welfare.

The strategic or long-term goal of a public-relations campaign tends to be ideological. Groups employing propaganda for strategic purposes often have as their aim selling the public a particular philosophy of government. In effect, they wish to condition the attitudes of the people so that a state of public opinion will be created in which the public will almost automatically respond with favor toward programs desired by the group and reject programs opposed by the group. The National Association of Manufacturers has referred to their strategic concept of public relations as the "bank account theory." In one of their publications they explain: "It necessitates making regular and frequent deposits in the Bank of Public Good-Will so that valid checks can be drawn on this account when it is desirable. . . ."⁸

Virtually all major interest groups attempt to influence public attitudes, but business organizations tend to exert more effort and to enjoy more success than most. Business groups usually have the financial resources with which to employ public-relations personnel and to purchase advertising space and time; they often have the added advantage of being able to compute these expenditures as normal operating expenses for taxation purposes. The fact that American culture is basically a business culture and that such traditional American

⁸ Quoted in Dayton D. McKean, *Party and Pressure Politics* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), p. 492.

values as low taxes and limited government are among the propaganda themes of organized business has undoubtedly contributed to the success of their campaigns.

As V. O. Key has noted, an organization's public-relations program may increase the prestige of the group and its leaders.⁹ Indeed, an organization may elevate itself in the esteem of the public by using proper publicity in a manner not dissimilar to that by which movie stars, athletes, and Presidential contenders are made national celebrities. Definite political advantages accrue to the group with status: their views are heard with more respect and given greater weight than those of lower prestige groups, and their members may be appointed to important advisory committees or influential governmental positions.

Propaganda campaigns

Pressure organizations usually direct their propaganda campaigns at specific target groups. For example, Richard Gable notes that the public-relations programs of the National Association of Manufacturers—which he describes as "the most intensive, comprehensive, and expensive means by which it attempts to influence the formation of public policy"—are directed toward particular groups of individuals. He states:

The NAM's public relations and propaganda programs can be classified according to the audience as external, indirect, and internal. The audience of the external appeal is the general public. The indirect approach covers educators, churchmen, women's club leaders, agricultural leaders, and similar community leaders who in turn mold specific publics. Internal programs are directed at state and local associations affiliated through the National Industrial Council as well as the NAM membership. Their

⁹ V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1952), p. 160.

purpose is to induce and assist members and affiliates to conduct community public relations programs using manuals and materials supplied by the Association.¹⁰

Nationwide propaganda campaigns directed by public-relations experts often are organized and executed with the care for detailed planning and proper timing characteristic of highly successful military campaigns. One notable example was the American Medical Association campaign, directed by the Whitaker and Baxter firm, Campaigns, Inc., against the Truman national health insurance program. The total cost of the three-and-a-half year campaign was \$4,678,000, of which approximately \$775,000 was spent for propaganda skills.¹¹ In this campaign, as in most others of this scope, virtually every conceivable communication medium was utilized. Physicians and laymen were enlisted to deliver to various clubs speeches prepared by the Whitaker and Baxter staff. In 1949 alone, 54,233,915 leaflets, pamphlets, booklets, and other pieces of literature were distributed.¹² Radio, television, newspaper, and periodical advertising was purchased. Physicians placed literature in their waiting rooms, discussed the issue while treating their patients, wrote letters to patients, and placed enclosures in bills mailed to patients. One physician even dropped 50,000 leaflets from his airplane on a community.¹³

Of the various methods of disseminating propaganda, the distribution of press

¹⁰ Richard W. Gable, "NAM: Influential Lobby or Kiss of Death?," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (May 1953), p. 262.

¹¹ Stanley Kelley, Jr., *Professional Public Relations and Political Power* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 106. For a good presentation of the entire AMA campaign, see pp. 67-106.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 82.

¹³ R. Cragin Lewis, "New Power at the Polls," *Medical Economics*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (January 1951), p. 73.

releases, clipsheets, and prepared editorials apparently is one of the more effective. If used, such material gives the impression of straight reporting or editorials conceived and written by the staff of the local press. Through its public-relations department, the National Association of Home Builders has supplied its local associations with such items.¹⁴

Pressure organizations in their efforts to influence public attitudes have not overlooked the educational system. The National Association of Manufacturers and other groups have prepared and distributed to the public schools posters, booklets, books, radio skits, film strips, and other "teaching aids." In 1957 the NAM announced that it distributed "at least two million booklets" free to the schools every year.¹⁵ The gas and electric public utilities during the 1920's surveyed textbooks and suggested changes in the presentation of materials regarding public utilities. Approximately three decades later an official of the National Association of Real Estate Boards told a Congressional committee that his organization had stimulated the writing of textbooks that were used "in 127 colleges and universities in teaching . . . the economics of real estate."¹⁶

Institutional advertising

Institutional advertising, which may be defined as the use of paid space or time in the communication media to promote or oppose ideas,¹⁷ has been used

¹⁴ *Housing Lobby*, Part 2 of *Hearings*, House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, 81st Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 351.

¹⁵ National Association of Manufacturers, *Educational Aids for Schools and Colleges, 1957-58 Catalog*, p. 3.

¹⁶ *Housing Lobby*, *op. cit.* (note 15 *supra*), p. 57.

¹⁷ Elmo Roper, "Who Tells the Story-tellers?" *Saturday Review*, July 31, 1954, p. 25.

extensively to shape public sentiment since the early part of World War II.¹⁸ In 1954 the editors of the *Saturday Review* wrote: "One of the extraordinary things about American business is that it feels a responsibility to communicate with the American people about the ideas and philosophy that animate business and governs its multiple relations with our society."¹⁹ And the Senatorial committee investigating the 1956 election reported finding "numerous instances of institutional advertising, either clearly political in nature or with definite political implications."²⁰ Thus another recently developed activity of pressure groups is their use of institutional advertising to establish a climate of opinion which will promote their political objectives.

Committees, foundations, councils, and institutes

The dynamic nature of interest-group activity may perhaps be seen most vividly by noting a new type of pressure organization, the oldest of which was established slightly over two decades ago. These organizations have as their primary purpose the publication and dissemination of leaflets, pamphlets, and books which present a particular viewpoint on current political and economic problems. Some of the more active of these groups are: The Committee for Constitutional Government, the Foundation for Economic Education, the National Economic Council, the Constitution and Free Enterprise Foundation, and the Public Affairs Institute. Of these five groups, the first four have

been financed primarily by donations from large corporations and wealthy individuals; the Public Affairs Institute, on the other hand, has been supported in part by contributions from labor unions. All of these organizations receive some income from the sale of their publications.

The Committee on Lobbying Activities noted that to these organizations "the dissemination of literature is both the reason for the group's existence and a primary means by which it exists."²¹ Much of the success of these organizations in raising funds may be due to the fact that they have succeeded in getting the United States Treasury Department to classify them as educational foundations with contributions to them deductible for income-tax purposes. A Senatorial committee recently commented that "such foundations may be used as a device to avoid controls upon political expenditures and to provide tax benefits for political contributors."²²

The efforts of organized interests to propagandize the public have caused some concern regarding the future of the American democratic system. The very fact, however, that pressure groups believe it necessary to make extraordinary expenditures of time and resources to shape public attitudes may be evidence of the fundamental strength of American democracy; although interest groups can on occasion manage public sentiment, they are aware that they court defeat if they flout it.

American democracy is based on the premise that the people if provided sufficient information can be trusted to make

²¹ *General Interim Report*, *op. cit.* (note 1 *supra*), p. 11.

²² *1956 General Election Campaigns*, *op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), p. 20. It might be noted, for example, that the Foundation for Economic Education over a four-year period received \$1,175,966.07 in donations and only \$171,772.98 from the sale of publications.

¹⁸ "SR's Advertising Award," *Saturday Review*, July 31, 1954, p. 28. Institutional advertising may apparently be traced to the early 1920's, but it was used very little until the 1940's.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

²⁰ *1956 General Election Campaigns*, *op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), p. 16.

correct decisions. The general public is not well informed regarding pressure groups. The basic problem, then, in controlling pressure-group activity is how to give the people more adequate information about organized interests, their methods of operation, and their aims; for "an informed and vigilant

public is the only lasting guaranty that pressure groups will operate in an open and aboveboard manner."²³

²³ *Report and Recommendations on the Federal Lobbying Act*, House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, 81st Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 35.

Political Parties and Pressure Group Politics

By HUGH A. BONE

ABSTRACT: Political parties and pressure groups are dependent upon one another. Interest groups find the parties an important method of gaining access to those in public authority, and the parties need the support of groups to elect and maintain themselves in power. The loose party structure and the nature of the federal system foster a chain of continuous relationships between the two. Interest groups participate in both nonpartisan and partisan primaries and general elections through candidate endorsement, providing campaign funds, and general campaign activity. Interest groups are particularly interested in programs and seek to influence party platforms and may provide speech materials for candidates. There is some attempt on the part of both to infiltrate each other though rarely has an interest group been able to capture complete control of a party organization. The overlapping memberships help to educate the parties about the interests of the private groups and vice versa, and provide some cross-fertilization of ideas as well as manpower assistance. Political parties have a prime function of accommodating the demands of the private interests into the larger public interests.

*Hugh A. Bone, Ph.D., Seattle, Washington, is Professor of American Government and Politics at the University of Washington. He has taught at the University of Maryland and Queens College and was Visiting Professor of Columbia University, Stanford University, and Connecticut College. Dr. Bone was Research Consultant, New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Business and Labor Conditions in 1944-48; has studied Congress and pressure groups as a Ford Fellow in 1954-55; and has been Director of the Washington State-Northern Idaho Citizenship Clearing House since 1953. He is the author of *Grass Roots Party Leadership* (1952), *American Politics and the Party System* (1955), and *Party Committees and National Politics* (1958).*

POLITICAL interest groups and political parties share political power and influence in running American politics. Their interests, objectives, and techniques overlap in so many ways that they appear indistinguishable at times. Nevertheless, most students of government see a pressure group as "issue or policy oriented," and a political party as "election or personality oriented." A party is seen as primarily motivated toward capturing and operating the government; the interest group's motivation is to shape public policy.

These observations on differences undoubtedly contain a large grain of truth. But a party which controls the government is expected to shape policy and to assume responsibility for it. If a pressure group wishes to shape policy to its interests it can hardly ignore the necessity for electing persons sympathetic to its views. Parties and private groups both seek access to government and must perforce have contacts and relationships with each other. Both afford channels by which the citizen may participate in the control of his government. Both complement and supplement each other. There is a constant two-way process of influence and relationship from interest group to party and from party to interest group.

Although many persons are active in a party and in a pressure group, the professional bureaucracies of the two have usually remained separate. The same is true of the leadership. A state or county chairman is seldom the president of a chamber of commerce or of a labor union. But the leadership, active workers, and enthusiastic supporters of parties and groups have so much in common that they remain in touch with each other much of the time. Major opportunities for contacts are afforded by nomination, campaigns, campaign finance, party programing, and infiltration.

NONPARTISAN AND PARTISAN ELECTIONS

In the United States some 800,000 public offices are filled by election. A considerable number of local officers such as clerks, councilmen, judges, treasurers, park and education board members are nonpartisan. Party intrusions into these elections are usually denounced and may actually hurt the candidacy of the ones receiving party support. In nonpartisan elections, therefore, the support of interest groups is often of paramount importance and eagerly sought. Because a nonpartisan nominee lacks the organizational and financial backing of a political party, interest groups have an excellent chance to influence the outcome of these elections and may aid candidates without being charged as being pro-Republican or pro-Democratic. The campaign of a candidate for the nonpartisan office of state superintendent of public instruction in Washington State was directed almost exclusively from the office of an educational association whose membership was largely composed of teachers, school directors, and persons vitally concerned with curriculum and financial support of the schools.

In a number of large cities, citizens groups publicly rate the various candidates for local offices. Recommendations are eagerly sought by candidates for nonpartisan offices, and they are usually willing to appear before the "candidates committees" of the civic groups in the hope that they will receive favorable comment. Newspapers often carry the statements on candidates prepared by the associations so that the influence of the association carries far beyond its limited membership. In the absence of a party label, a number of voters are guided by the endorsements—or lack of them—given by a municipal league to candidates for nonpartisan offices.

Private interest groups are no less concerned with numerous other state and local offices where a partisan ballot is used. Insurance and land commissioners, sanitary engineers, port officials, and so on often run as Republicans or Democrats but, for various reasons, receive little more than nominal help from the party organization. These officials have the power to make decisions which vitally affect certain private groups, and it becomes understandable that the latter should take an active part in securing the election of officials whose rulings and orders may influence their membership. The multiplicity of offices and the long ballot are confusing to the voter. This situation plays into the hands of pressure groups and also makes it imperative for them to take an interest in who is elected to administer the diverse state functions.

NOMINATIONS

In addition to its mixture of nonpartisan and partisan elections, the American electoral system has another feature which has encouraged political activity on the part of numerous interest groups—the direct primary system of nomination. In parts of the United States the party organizations are forbidden by law or party rules to endorse a candidate where there is a contest in the primary. In many other places it is customary for the parties to remain neutral in the primaries. Those entering the primary, therefore, cannot hope to receive financial or other help from either the national or the local party committees. Under the circumstances the nominee must finance his own primary campaign or seek help from personal friends—neither of which may be sufficient. Hopefuls are likely to find pressure groups ready to assist them in the primaries provided the latter feel the prospective nominee will be friendly to their cause. It stands to reason that those

candidates who appear to have some chance of winning the primary will receive more help than those less likely to capture the nomination. Occasionally, however, an interest group will support a candidate even though he has little chance of winning. This is done because the group wishes to use the primary campaign as a forum for criticizing an incumbent or championing certain issues. Labor unions have done this on occasion where anti- or non-union views appear to predominate. In this sense the primary campaign is run as an "educational" program rather than as a potentially successful electoral venture.

Interest groups of diverse objectives often co-operate in getting persons registered. The officials or special committees of interest groups may decide to make endorsements among the candidates in the primary. Where there are contests in both party primaries, interest groups sometimes make an endorsement in each, but it is more likely that approval will be given to only one candidate. Endorsements are made known to the membership through the channels of the press and more particularly in the official newspaper or magazine of the organization. Some of these publications carry information on all candidates, but the material is presented in such a way as to show favoritism for one of them. Candidates may be invited to speak before a meeting of the group and given access to the pages of the journal to present views of interest to the membership. Literature on the primaries is often distributed to the members and a door-bell ringing or telephone corps is used to get out the vote on primary day. Activities by interest groups on behalf of candidates have undoubtedly swelled the numbers of persons participating in the primaries.

Nominations for President and Vice-President are made at party conven-

tions. Over half the delegates in the national convention are selected by conventions in the states. In some states party conventions also designate certain candidates for public office. Where an interest group feels that the nominees of the convention may have views strongly for or against something it stands for, the group becomes vitally concerned with the choice of delegates and may seek either to have some of its own members chosen to the convention or to influence the selection. Delegates also adopt the party's platform, a matter in which the interest groups are most interested.

Prior to the 1952 convention, it was clear that Governor Stevenson's opposition to state ownership of submerged offshore lands was of concern to oil interests especially in the South. Delegates were made aware of this "liability." Delegates are likewise urged by private groups to ascertain the views of potential nominees on civil rights, labor, agriculture, and a host of other issues. Delegates are likely to be deluged with letters and telegrams expressing views on candidates as well as platform proposals. Many of these are inspired by interests back home.

Influential members of interest groups are often present in the convention city and seek meetings with chairmen of the state delegations, potential candidates, and powerful leaders within the party. The late Senator Alben Barkley went to the 1952 Democratic National Convention confident of the support of organized labor for the Presidential nomination. He relates that, on the eve of the opening of the convention,

a little group of labor men, purporting to speak for the AFL and CIO, but acting, so far as anyone has been unable to learn, with no mandate from their respective organizations, gave out an announcement that "organized labor" could not support me because of my age. This, so far as my

candidacy was concerned, was a kiss of death.¹

In 1948 a group of physicians were especially active in defeating Harold Stassen's bid for the nomination and aiding the cause of Governor Dewey. Every delegate to the Republican National Convention received a printed circular from the Oregon Physicians Fighting Political Medicine, on a letterhead containing the names of prominent past presidents in medical societies, urging that he cast his vote for Dewey in order to forestall "socialized medicine." The Oregon physicians were instrumental in defeating Stassen in that state's Presidential primary.

No complete study has been made of the interest group background of delegates to the national conventions but the state by state analysis of the selection of delegates to the 1952 conventions shows that many groups did try to get representation.² It was not unusual for an official in the Chamber of Commerce, a farm organization, or a county medical society to be found among the state delegations in 1952. In a number of instances labor unions paid the expenses of delegates to the national convention and a number of other interests were alleged to have defrayed some of the expense of certain delegates.

National conventions are dominated by certain powerful political leaders such as governors, senators, congressmen, and local party chairmen. The majority of delegates are persons with a record of active partisan politics. For this reason pressure groups find they must operate most of the time off the convention floor. But the leaders of the private groups maintain contacts during

¹ *That Reminds Me* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1954), p. 236.

² See the five volume work by Paul T. David, Malcolm Moos, and Ralph M. Goldman, *Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954).

conventions with the influential delegates, and hotel lobbies in the convention city teem with representatives of private groups.

GENERAL ELECTIONS

The activities of pressure groups in a general election differ only in emphasis and detail from that of the primary. Perhaps most important is that in the general election the group must work out its relationship and modus operandi with the party organization. Three alternatives are possible. First the pressure group may develop its own campaign organization paralleling to some extent the precinct and other organization of the party. The group remains quite independent from the party. Labor unions have done this on numerous occasions. Party leaders are not invariably enthusiastic about this. They feel that the campaign run by the pressure groups may be too amateurish and operate at cross purposes with the strategy of the party. If the candidate wins, the pressure group may ask for patronage or certain concessions.

A second alternative is for the interest group to operate closely with the party organization with the campaign direction largely in the hands of the latter. In this instance the pressure group furnishes personnel to the party headquarters, providing doorbell ringers and speakers as requested by the party chairmen and campaign managers. It co-operates with and in general takes its orders from the party. This arrangement appeals to the party leaders.

A third arrangement is a combination of the two with the interest groups maintaining considerable autonomy, but working closely with the party and perhaps providing direct assistance to the party headquarters. Which of these three alternatives is to be followed is determined by expediency, local conditions, the leadership of the party and

the interest group and, of course, the preference of the candidate. Pressure groups are usually less interested in the entire ticket and prefer to concentrate on certain candidacies. What often takes place in practice then is more a pressure group-candidate relationship than a pressure group-party relationship.

The alleged successes of interest groups in primary and general elections may perhaps belong in the category in which Mark Twain once placed reports of his death—as highly exaggerated. Voting behavior is not likely to be explained exclusively by the activities or lack of them of pressure groups. Endorsement of a candidate by one group is frequently offset by endorsement of his opponent by another. Reliable data, moreover, is scanty. In 1946 California Republicans made an effective issue of the CIO-supported candidates for congress, labeling them "package" candidates. In this election only 73 Political Action Committee-endorsed candidates out of 318 in House contests won. Yet in the 1948 election Labor's League for Political Education saw 172 of its "friends" elected to Congress and 106 of its "enemies" retired. With the support of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations Adlai Stevenson was unable to win either in 1952 or in 1956. Interest-group support may be important and significant but not necessarily determinative.

A recurrent theme of this volume is the desire of pressure groups to gain access to government. A highly important method of access is through the public elected official. It follows then that the pressure group must function in one way or another in campaigns. Campaigns bring the pressure group in direct contact with the candidate and/or his managers and party officials. In the long run these relationships are more important than the precise degree to

which the group contributes to the election itself.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE

One of the most important developments in recent years is the increasingly large role of nonparty groups in the financing of campaigns. With the cost of campaigns increasing, parties and candidates are looking for additional sources of revenue and also agencies through which money can be expended without exceeding the 3 million dollars limitation imposed by the Hatch Act for one committee. Corporations and labor unions are forbidden by law from making direct contributions to political campaigns. These various laws, often referred to collectively as corrupt practices legislation, have not kept political-interest groups from giving donations but made them somewhat more circumspect. There are several ways by which groups may raise funds for candidates and still remain within the law.

The first is to form a "political action committee" illustrated by the Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, the United Automobile Workers-CIO Political Action Committee, and the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE). Political funds are raised and expended separately from the treasuries of the labor unions. By this device labor unions may assist candidates without violating the law. In the off-year of 1957, thirteen labor organizations comparable to those above spent \$243,000 or 5 per cent of the total reported to the Clerk of the House of Representatives in that year.

The now defunct Peoples Committee to Defend Life Insurance and Savings offered an analagous opportunity for insurance executives and stockholders to contribute to campaigns. "Healing arts committees" have provided a channel for doctors, nurses, dentists, and pharmacists to contribute to campaigns.

A host of "citizens" and "volunteers" groups crop up all over the nation during campaigns. Many of these political groups are not as broadly constituted as were the Citizens for Eisenhower-Nixon and Volunteers for Stevenson. A careful analysis of some of these local groups will often reveal important economic interests as dominant in both the leadership and finance of the organizations. In only a relatively few instances is a title used (except for labor) which clearly identifies the interest group involved. Examples of these in 1956 were the Indiana Farm Research Committee (Republican), Timber Farmers for Stevenson-Kefauver, Conservationists for Stevenson-Kefauver, and the National Business Council for Stevenson-Kefauver.

By creating separate political committees, the organizations themselves remain officially neutral in partisan politics. This is less offensive to those members who do not believe that campaigns should be financed out of the organization's treasury or who may hold political views at variance with the majority of the membership.

Governmental investigation committees

The United States House and Senate usually create special campaign investigating committees for every biennial election. Over the years they have amassed much data on sources of revenue in political campaigns. A Subcommittee of the Senate Rules and Administration Committee made an extraordinarily comprehensive study of the 1956 general election and estimated that 33 million dollars was spent by the parties and private organizations participating in the campaigns for federal office.³ Large sums of money are never

³ A useful summary and analysis of the Committee's findings will be found in the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, Vol. 15 (February 8 and 22, 1957). See also the

reported and the committee's figures must be regarded as understating rather than providing a full picture of campaign finance. A few of the committee's findings, however, deserve citation.

Labor organizations reported contributions to various candidates totaling \$1,078,000; all but \$4,000 went to Democratic candidates. This is in addition to the \$941,000 spent directly by the political action committees. Expenditures reported by miscellaneous interest groups included Christian Nationalist Crusade, \$38,000; Americans for Democratic Action, \$57,000; and the National Committee for an Effective Congress, \$17,000.

A special study was made of the amount of money contributed by officials of the 225 largest corporations in the United States and/or their wives to parties or other campaign groups. The figures included only contributions of \$500 or more. It was found that \$3,029,000 was contributed to the Republicans and \$111,000 to the Democrats. Officials of manufacturing corporations contributed \$1,830,000; commercial banks, \$536,000; transportation companies, \$360,000; life insurance companies, \$186,000; and the public utilities, \$71,200. The active and graduate members of the Department of Commerce's Business Advisory Council contributed over a quarter of a million dollars.

The contributions of oil interests to campaigns have been widely publicized for many years. Officials of the American Petroleum Institute reported contributions exceeding \$171,000 in 1956. The offer of a \$2,500 campaign contribution to Senator Francis Case by the oil and natural-gas interests set off a Congressional investigation and resulted

Final Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Political Activities, Lobbying, and Campaign Contributions, U. S. Senate, 85th Congress, 1st Session, May 31, 1957.

in a Presidential veto of a measure to exempt natural gas from federal regulation. In his veto message President Eisenhower took cognizance of alleged "bribes" and attempts through campaign donations to influence Senate votes. He said:

a body of evidence has accumulated indicating that private persons, apparently representing only a very small segment of a great and vital industry, have been seeking to further their own interests by highly questionable activities. These include efforts I deem to be so arrogant and so much in defiance of acceptable standards of propriety as to risk creating doubt among the American people concerning the integrity of governmental processes.⁴

In many large cities the parties have prepared a list of business executives who regularly give campaign donations. The head of a corporation has at times solicited funds for a party or a candidate from his junior executives. The head of a large advertising agency sent a three-page letter to his top 125 executives calling for contributions to reelect Eisenhower "to preserve this climate of business confidence" and pointed out that "business uncertainty might follow his defeat."⁵ He suggested a scale of giving as follows:

PRE-TAX INCOME	CONTRIBUTION
\$ 5,000	\$ 25
10,000	75
25,000	375
50,000	1,000
100,000	3,000
Over 100,000	3½ per cent

Interest groups are heavy donors to state and local parties and candidates. There are several states which require no statement of campaign expenditures

⁴ *Washington Post and Times Herald*, February 18, 1956.

⁵ *New York Times*, June 12, 1956. For an illuminating article on business contributions see "How to Give Money to Politicians," *Fortune*, May, 1956, pp. 113-17, 237-45.

and others which require only statements of spending in a direct primary. As a result the public generally has less knowledge of the role played by groups in financing local elections than for federal offices.

PLATFORM INFLUENCING

The fact that party platforms are usually ambiguous and general has not kept the pressure groups from trying to influence them. National party platforms are drafted by the national convention's committee on resolutions composed of one person from each state delegation. The committee members even before they arrive in the convention city receive communications and personal requests from interest groups on diverse planks and proposals. A preliminary draft is prepared by a group appointed by the national committee, and this group is also the recipient of requests from certain interests.

After the resolutions committee is convened, it is often divided into subcommittees according to subject matter such as foreign policy, civil rights, veterans', and agriculture. The subcommittees then hold public hearings. Witnesses distribute copies of their prepared addresses to the committee members, answer questions, and elaborate upon their statements. Edward F. Cooke found that seventy spokesmen for interest groups submitted briefs and oral arguments before the Republican resolutions committee in 1952.

Upon conclusion of the open hearings, [he writes,] the subcommittees went into executive session in order to draft a specific recommendation for their respective policy areas. In their deliberations the members were aided by the digest of platform suggestions, the written briefs of the interest groups, copies of previous platform planks, and expert assistance from staff technicians drawn from Republican Congressional and

party offices in Washington, some of whom had sat in on the public hearings.⁶

Party platform formation on the state and county level also affords the pressure group an opportunity both for publicity and influence. It is not unusual for the local press to record a state party platform as "strongly pro-labor," "a victory for the conservatives" or "a bid for the minorities vote," thus suggesting victories for dominant factors and interests.

The making of a party platform is a way by which a political party can build a coalition of supporting interest groups. Platform drafters can remind an interest group that it was "heard" and point to a plank or clause contributed by a group. At the same time a pressure group can remind office holders of platform pledges.

INFILTRATION

Infiltration of the party organizations by members of interest groups is not unusual. The reverse also takes place though it is less publicized and obvious. A former party chairman in metropolitan Seattle made it a studied policy to encourage his precinct committeemen to join pressure groups and to become active as well in philanthropic and cultural societies. The chairman felt that his workers would have many opportunities to bring the "gospel" to the various non-party groups and thereby build up favorable sentiment for the party among those who were perhaps unresponsive to partisan publicity. The chairman pointed out to would-be candidates that one of the best ways to become known was to be active in civic improvement and various other private groups.

In 1956 the Republican National Committee created a special labor division to counteract the tendency of union labor to vote Democratic. One of its

⁶ "Drafting the 1952 Platforms," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 9 (September 1956), p. 701.

projects was to try to locate members of unions who were sympathetic to the Republican cause and who might be willing to take a position in the local party organization. These persons could be used to pass out literature at union meetings. During Presidential campaigns it is customary for both national headquarters to create special interest divisions such as farm, veterans, Negro, and national resources.

If a party is able to have some of its members active in nonparty groups, other values may be realized. Party members can help to engineer invitations to party candidates and officials to speak to the group. The minorities division of the national committees have their members in nationalities societies; they notify the office of important dates so that the national chairman or some other prominent person may send appropriate congratulations. Additional members of the group may be won over and recruited for party activity. Active partisans can serve as a source of intelligence on views, attitudes, and sentiments of the pressure groups on public policies and candidates. Political parties have the perennial problem of raising money, and prospective donors may be found in the membership of the pressure group.

As parties desire to broaden their strength and support among interest groups, the latter wish to extend their influence within the party organization. In most parts of the nation, party organization is loose, making it relatively easy for members of interest groups to become active members of parties. Willing and eager persons soon have opportunities for positions in the precinct, district, and county party organizations or in party clubs. This in turn affords the opportunity to attend party conventions, participate in campaigns, draft resolutions and, at times, to run for public office.

It is unusual, however, for wholesale infiltration to take place. There have been times nonetheless when a nonparty group has, by design, set about to capture control of the party organization. The Non-Partisan League in North Dakota employed the tactics of infiltration rather than third-party politics. League nominees were placed in the Republican primaries and were successful in capturing the Republican State Committee. By 1918 the Republican party, platform, and state government were taken over completely by the League and much of its legislative program was enacted.

Michigan provides another success story of interest group infiltration. The state has been traditionally Republican and there was no permanent Democratic organization until the New Deal. In 1948 the CIO-PAC observed that "progressives" in the Democratic party leadership were outnumbered by "reactionaries," but that the Democrats afforded the best channel for supporting the interests of Michigan labor and liberalism. Accordingly the PAC advised all CIO members "to become active precinct, ward, county, and congressional district workers and attempt to become delegates to Democratic conventions."⁷ The CIO built a coalition with certain ethnic, liberal, and other labor groups and captured control of the state Democratic committee. It did this by training and electing precinct captains and taking control of the party conventions. The coalition, therefore, was able to have a noticeable influence on both primary and convention nominations.

The CIO coalition brought about many changes in the Democratic party. One of these was the emphasis upon state party platforms. The platforms

⁷ A detailed account of the Michigan story will be found in Fay Calkins, *The CIO and the Democratic Party* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), Chap. VI.

were oriented toward specific liberal, social programs, and potential candidates were evaluated in terms of their attitude toward the platform. Governor G. Mennen Williams has continuously stressed these issues in his campaigns and in his inaugural addresses. The coalition continued to govern the selection of party officers, eject the conservative Old Guard, and appoint liberals to policy-determining patronage jobs. Labor people compose about one-third of the party offices today.

Advantages and liabilities of infiltration

Infiltration has certain advantages for an interest group. Miss Calkins notes that in a rural Republican area in Northern Illinois:

. . . a Democratic label was bad enough, but a PAC label was impossible. From its internal position, PAC could call its man Goldman a Democrat. It could get local lawyers to run on a Democratic ballot who would not think of associating themselves with a third party or an independent labor group. It could tap the support of other community groups which would have been very suspicious of labor operating alone. Under the party cover PAC was less vulnerable to newspaper attack as a special interest group.⁸

An internal party relationship gives a pressure group a chance to breathe vigor and life into a party and to strengthen its organizational base. It helps to further its legislative program and to inform the other officials of the party about the needs of the group.

There are also potential liabilities to the internal party relationships both for the party and the interest group. The interest group may find that its activity within a party may heighten factionalism within its own ranks. The Teamsters Union in Michigan fought the liberal coalition and some of its membership went over to the rival party. In

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

very few organizations are all of the members Republicans or Democrats, and the minority is likely to resent the partisan activities of the majority. Control of a party requires financial resources, sustained effort, and other activities. It is not easy to keep up the activity necessary to control the party year in and year out and may divert energies of the group's leadership away from problems of internal group organization and program.

Party politics require concessions and compromises which may be unpalatable to many members of the group. Charges of betrayal and "double-crossing" are not unusual. If the interest group fails to elect candidates or to obtain programs from the party it has infiltrated, some of the membership is bound to become disgruntled and to request that the efforts to control the political party be abandoned. Nevertheless, infiltration is a tempting tactic for it gives the group a chance to influence nominations and platforms from the inside rather than from outside the organization.

CONCLUSION

The nature of the American political system provides pressure groups many opportunities to influence political parties and their candidates at all levels of government. Federalism and separation of powers have caused a decentralization of party organization with congressmen looking more to their own congressional and senatorial campaign committees than to the national committees. The direct primary system has removed from the party organization itself the historic function of designation. The cost of running for office is rapidly increasing so that many candidates must look outside of the party for assistance. Added to this complex picture is the high degree of voter independence and a large number of nonpartisan offices.

All of these factors have tended to make candidates more dependent upon nonparty sources for money, votes, and services. Party leaders have seen potential voters brought together in thousands of economic, political, social, and ethnic associations. If they can deal with the leaders of these groups, it may be easier and more effective than dealing with them as isolated individuals.

If parties have become dependent upon pressure groups, the reverse is also true. As Donald Blaisdell has pointed out:

The organization which the parties set up and maintain for the purpose of gaining control over the governing personnel is thus the vehicle by which interests are able to share power with the titular leaders. As a means of gaining the power of governing, party structure and organization serve not only the leaders nominally in official and party positions but also the pressure groups.⁹

Pressure groups at times have tried to operate through the channels of minor parties. The abolitionists and "dry" forces were active at times through third parties. Organized labor, though divided, achieved some limited successes in New York State through the American Labor and Liberal parties. Agrarian malcontents used the Greenback, Populist, and Farmer-Labor parties to further their ends. But the pressure groups found that third parties seldom gave them the desired access to government. With a few exceptions, pressure groups today regard the influencing of the two major parties the better strategy and tactic.

Persons who become influential and active both in a party and a group become valuable members to both because of their access to each. They become

aware of the problems of each and understand the limitations and strengths. Members of interest groups who become active partisans learn what a party can and cannot do and what its potential is likely to be. Similarly a party member who joins a pressure group comes to know its viewpoints and demands. An infiltrator in time may serve as a valuable mediator and interpreter. As Ivan Hinderaker has stated:

as the infiltrator becomes more active in party affairs, he gains an education in the realities of party politics, and in his party role his pressure group loyalties must take second position behind his party loyalty. Though he still works for his pressure group objectives, now he begins to understand why the broad-based major party cannot accede to his pressure group's every demand.¹⁰

Pressure groups serve society in many useful and valuable ways. They provide a type of political self-expression, formulate policies and seek their fulfillment, provide public officials with information, and help to define the public interest. At the same time the pressure group must be watched so that it does not subvert the public interest. Political parties have the function of accommodating the demands of private interests into the larger public interests. Our major parties are combinations of great interests, but they are also an entity apart from any one pressure group. The interests of the American society and of the interest group itself are best served when a pressure groups makes no permanent identification with either major party. Each can best make its contribution to politics by remaining separate. But the realities of American politics make it necessary for them to have close contact with each other.

⁹ *American Democracy Under Pressure* (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1957), p. 144.

¹⁰ *Party Politics* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1956), p. 66.

Interest Groups as Policy Shapers

By RICHARD W. GABLE

ABSTRACT: The heart of government is public policy. Private interest groups and administrative agencies have come to be the principal originators of policy, while legislative groups, along with administrative and private groups, are the major shapers of public policy. The role of private groups depends upon the cultural setting within which they operate and the nature of the policy-making process. An interest group may succeed in shaping public policy when it is able to identify its conception of desirable policy with prevailing attitudes of the public and when it has access to the major centers of policy determination. Identification of the interests of the group with those of relevant publics may be accomplished by manipulating public attitudes, by adjusting the attitudes of the group, or both. Groups seek access along a number of fronts in all three branches of government. The ability of a group to gain or exploit access is limited by certain factors which, to a large extent, are not subject to its control. There has been frequent comment on the alleged danger from interest groups. An objective appraisal of interest groups in a democracy should focus on the process by which policy is formulated rather than on the policy which results.

*Richard W. Gable, Ph.D., Los Angeles, California, is Associate Professor in the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California. He has recently returned from Iran where he spent two years teaching in the Institute for Administrative Affairs, University of Tehran, a project in technical assistance which USC has been conducting under a contract with the International Cooperation Administration. He has also taught at Stanford University, Ohio State University, and the University of California at Los Angeles. His publications include *Public Control of Economic Enterprise* (1956), co-authored with Harold Koontz, and articles in scholarly journals.*

THE HEART of government is public policy and its life blood is the policy-making process. A public policy is a decision or set of decisions that establishes a purpose, creates a precedent, or lays down a course of action. The decision itself is a conclusion drawn from a set of premises.

Policy originates and results from the actions of interested groups inside or outside of government which desire to influence the basic premises underlying policy decisions or the conclusions drawn from those premises. The interested group may be a legislative group, political party, administrative agency, foreign government, or private interest group. However, policy almost never originates solely within the legislature, and political parties have largely ceased to be centers of policy creation. Foreign governments assume importance in policy making only in very special cases. Administrative agencies and private interest groups have come to be the principal originators of policy, while legislative groups, along with administrative and private groups, are the major shapers of public policy.

Contrary to a common myth, public policy does not result from any generalized feeling or opinion that exists in the "public." There is, in fact, no single public in the community. What is often referred to as the "public" consists of a number of publics which, on specific issues, have particular opinions but which, on other issues, may have no opinion or divergent opinions. This is not to say that the opinions of the various publics are unimportant. Moreover, since interest groups cannot always identify the publics which are relevant to their interests, they may direct their campaigns to manipulate public opinion at the public in general.

The role of private groups in shaping public policy depends upon the cultural setting within which they operate and

the nature of the policy-making process. Brief attention will be given to these topics before analyzing the general role of private groups in the formulation of public policy. No effort will be made to catalogue all of the points at which private groups might exert pressure or to describe the myriad of techniques which have been employed. The intention is to sketch a generalized picture of pressure group functioning and to indicate some of the factors which contribute to a group's success in shaping public policy.

THE CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT

Government is an aspect of society. The political process in which political interest groups figure most directly is but an aspect of the broader social processes in which general interest groups play a role. Interest groups originate whenever an identity of interests is recognized by a group of people who are willing to organize or act in concert to promote and defend their interests; they become political interest groups when their objectives are sought by attempting to shape public policy.

The nature and functioning of political interest groups are dependent upon the social and political environment within which they operate. Properly the entire cultural milieu should be understood to appreciate fully the role and influence of interest groups in society. As cultural factors such as attitudes, status, and symbols vary, the nature and function of pressure groups may vary. Social attitudes establish expectations about the role of pressure groups in society. Some groups, like the doctors and lawyers in the United States, may have more status than others. The predominant cultural symbols may favor some groups over others also. Since ours is a business civilization, groups which utilize the symbols of private

property, free enterprise, and the like enjoy an advantage.

Any analysis of the role and influence of political interest groups in shaping public policy must take into account the cultural environment within which they operate. It would be impossible to indicate here all of the factors which might have to be considered to present a realistic picture. A random listing suggests some of the more important cultural elements which condition the political activity of interest groups: the history of a people, the predominant values and myths of the culture, the structure of society, the class system, the nature of the educational system, the influence of religion, the media of communications, the nature of the economy and the state of economic development, the role of government in relation to the economy, the constitutional separation and distribution of powers of government, the electoral system, the party system, the nature of the civil service—its organization and control—and the level of efficiency in the management of the affairs of government.

THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS

Almost never does a public policy serve the interests of or result from the action of a single group. The more complex and controversial the decision, the more likely that a great number and variety of contending groups have participated in some way in the shaping of the policy.

The formulation of public policy pervades government in all its branches and at all its levels. It is a continuous process which intersects and overlaps the three branches of government and includes the activities of political parties and political interest groups. Public policy is made by all the processes and procedures which operate in government. It may be a legislative enactment which takes the form of law, or it

may be a high level executive decision. Policy determination also occurs in the process of administration quite as much as does policy execution. An administrative rule or regulation, internal in effect, highly specific and limited in scope, is still an aspect of public policy. Furthermore, the decisions of the courts constitute policy and have consequences for other centers of policy making.

In order to assert their will, political interest groups seek access to the key points where decisions are made. An important characteristic of the process in the United States is the multiplicity of points of decision and hence points of access. To be successful a pressure group must conduct its campaign along a series of fronts—individual legislators, legislative committees, legislative leaders, party leaders, the executive, the bureaucracy, the courts, opinion leaders in the community, and so forth.

A brief, oversimplified description of the process by which public policy in the field of natural gas regulation has evolved may be helpful in illustrating the number of contact points at which interest groups, in this case oil and gas interests and consumer groups, may direct pressure. It also dramatizes the continuous nature of the political process as a policy question gravitates between the courts, Congress, the President, and the bureaucracy.¹

A series of Supreme Court decisions over a period of twenty-five years left a broad segment of the natural gas industry unregulated. At the production end of the industry the states imposed controls to conserve natural resources. At the other end, retail sales were subject to state regulation because the business of serving the consumer was held

¹ For a more complete description, see the author's article, "The Jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission over the Field Prices of Natural Gas," *Land Economics*, Vol. 32 (February 1956), pp. 39-56.

to be affected with a public interest. However, the rates charged by interstate pipe-line companies were found to be beyond the jurisdiction of the states because of the constitutional restraints which prevent state regulation from burdening interstate commerce.

Congress enacted the Natural Gas Act in 1938 to fill this gap. The jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission was specified as applying to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce and to the sale of natural gas in interstate commerce. Production and gathering of natural gas and local distribution were specifically exempted from FPC jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the law did not make clear whether the prices charged by the producers and gatherers of natural gas, so-called field prices, were sales in interstate commerce and hence subject to FPC regulation, or whether they were a part of production and gathering and hence exempt. A review of the legislative history of the law provided no help.

In several cases the FPC denied that it had jurisdiction. Then, in 1943, the Commission handed down a ruling sustained by the courts which was interpreted as implying that the FPC did have jurisdiction over field prices. This decision triggered a campaign in Congress to amend the Natural Gas Act exempting field prices from federal regulation. When Congress failed to pass any amendatory legislation the FPC issued an order in which it announced that field prices were not subject to Commission jurisdiction.

In the next session of Congress a renewed effort to exempt field prices was successful although the FPC, with the addition of a new member, now opposed the amendment. Congressional hostility to the members of the Commission who opposed the exemption reached such a pitch that when the reappointment of Leland Olds, the Chairman of the FPC,

was submitted to the Senate for confirmation, Olds was denied the reappointment.² Nevertheless, Olds' replacement joined the majority of the Commission in urging a Presidential veto which was forthcoming. The Commission immediately rescinded its rule exempting field prices. Then, just a year later in the most important in a long series of cases, the FPC refused to assume jurisdiction over the field prices of the Phillips Petroleum Company. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission, asserting it did have jurisdiction over field prices under the original law. (As an aftermath of the Phillips case, the Senate refused to confirm the reappointment of another Commissioner, who was the sole dissenter to the Commission's denial of jurisdiction in the Phillips case.)

Again, another campaign was launched to amend the Act. It was successful in Congress and would have undoubtedly received Presidential approval if some of the pressure exerted on certain Congressmen had not been so blatant. When it was made public that money had been passed in an attempt to gain support, the President vetoed the measure.

The "Washington Symphony of Natural Gas" was played in counterpoint. The theme was set by Congress. Contrapuntal melodies were devised in the hearing rooms of the Federal Power Commission and the courts, but the harmony was sometimes discordant. Congress responded with efforts to introduce variations on the original theme, while the musicians whose brass notes were too loud were dropped from the orchestra. E. Pendleton Herring's comment on our political system is appropriate here although the metaphor becomes mixed.

² For a fascinating account, see Joseph P. Harris, "The Senatorial Rejection of Leland Olds: A Case Study," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 45 (September 1951), pp. 674-92.

We believe, he said, that "power must be handled like a loving cup and passed around lest one of the company grow drunk."

ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS

Political interest groups constantly endeavor to shape public policy. An interest group may succeed in shaping public policy when it is able to identify its conception of the needs of the moment with the prevailing or predominant attitudes of a number of prominent publics and when it has access to the major centers of policy decision in government.

Attention is usually given to the amount of access which an interest group has, whereas access may be the least important way by which a group gains its end. Certainly, access does not mean influence. Many groups have had extensive access, but have had little influence. After the Wagner Act was passed the National Association of Manufacturers and other employers' associations had access to Congress and its committees, but the law was not amended for twelve years, not until there was a significant shift in the climate of opinion in the nation. Labor has had almost continual access to Congress since the Taft-Hartley Act was enacted, but it has failed to have the law repealed or modified.

The degree to which a group is able to associate itself and its objectives with relevant publics is often the crucial factor. Any decision involves the selection of certain values or premises over others. The choice of one set of values over another would result in entirely different public policy. The values or premises must be made acceptable at the place where a policy decision will be made before access can be exploited.

Identification of the interests of a

group with those of relevant publics may be accomplished in several ways. A group may manipulate public attitudes so that they approximate those of the interest group or, at least, so that the relevant publics are neutral or indifferent to the group's objectives. On the other hand, the group might adjust its attitudes so that they more closely conform to public attitudes. More commonly the group will attempt to manipulate public attitudes at the same time that it modifies or adjusts its own attitudes.

For example, the NAM carried on intensive and expensive public-relations and propaganda programs designed to influence Congress to modify the Wagner Act. These programs had both strategic and tactical objectives. The strategic goal was the creation of a climate of opinion within which the NAM's conception of individualism, free enterprise, and laissez-faire would be habitually accepted as values of positive good and alternatives to it would be rejected. The tactical campaign sought a favorable response to the particular proposals the Association submitted as solutions to current labor problems.

At the same time the NAM adjusted its policies somewhat to conform to public attitudes. Between 1933 and 1945 the NAM's conception of social needs did not keep pace with rapidly changing conditions. Rather than rely any longer on the futile attempt solely to manipulate public attitudes to conform to its values, the NAM underwent a metamorphosis. Prior to 1937 the NAM strenuously opposed government guarantee of the rights to organize, bargain collectively, and engage in concerted action. Not immediately, but gradually after the Jones-Laughlin decision upheld the constitutionality of the Wagner Act, the NAM came to the conclusion that these rights actually contributed to the

welfare of both industry and labor—if circumscribed by certain regulations. Thus, the NAM accepted the necessity of government action and intervention in labor relations in place of industrial self-rule and laissez-faire; but it demanded that the intervention be on behalf of employers. After modifying its basic system of values the NAM had considerably more success in its public-relations and propaganda efforts.³

Propaganda: degree of success

Much money and effort are spent by political interest groups in their unending campaigns to maintain the friendship of their supporters, woo the potentially sympathetic, sway the neutral and the indifferent, and convert the actively hostile. However, it is a mistake to assume that wide use of the various media of communications, broad coverage of the various audiences, and ingeniously prepared material are indicators of sure success. The propaganda effort might fail for any of several reasons. The target population might not perceive the group's message at the time and in the way the interest group intended it to be perceived, the group's message might fail to arouse the expected attitudes, or the propaganda might not produce the particular action sought.⁴

Furthermore, many factors involved in manipulating attitudes are external to the group and to a large extent are not subject to its control regardless of how well prepared the campaign. Generally, these factors are basic aspects of the culture which condition or limit the influence of particular interest groups in the political process. For example, the

ability of a group to create a favorable climate of opinion depends upon the current political and economic conditions in the community and the values and expectations which are predominant at the time, the status and prestige of the group and its members in society and of competitive groups, and so forth. Professional groups, like doctors or lawyers, or business groups in general, as examples, enjoy a propaganda advantage because of the prestige and status factor.

Even if the group succeeds in bringing about the desired alignment of attitudes, the desired public policy might not result. The NAM was successful in convincing a number of employer publics of the need to change the Wagner Act, but these groups were unable to exert sufficient influence at key points in policy determination to gain their ends. In other words, the propaganda campaign may have been successful, but the publics who responded to it were not able to gain access to centers of policy formulation or to exploit that access to their advantage.

Ultimately, to gain its end a political interest group must gain access to the centers of policy making in government while at the same time it attempts to prevent or limit competing groups from gaining a similar advantage.⁵ The ability of a group to gain or exploit access is limited by certain factors external to the group which, to a large extent, are

⁵ The concept of "access" is developed at length in Truman, *ibid.*, pp. 321-51. The effectiveness of a group's efforts to gain and exploit access, as well as to identify itself with relevant publics, is related to certain internal factors which are primarily within the control of the interest group and dependent upon its activities. These internal factors, which are beyond the scope of this paper, include: the size of the group; the alliances it can make with other groups; its structure, organization, and policy-making procedures; the quality of its leadership; its financing; and its cohesion.

³ See the author's article, "NAM: Influential Lobby or Kiss of Death?" *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 15 (May 1953), pp. 254-73.

⁴ David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 245-61.

not subject to its control. It is dependent upon the structure of government, the organization and procedures of the legislature and administrative offices, the party structure and degree of party responsibility, as well as the status of the group under the existing values of society.

Access involves not only the act of communicating with legislators and administrators, but the skill with which the position of accessibility is exploited and the willingness, for various reasons, of a legislator or administrator to make decisions that accord with the proposals of the group. Again, a group does not enjoy complete control over these activities. The skill with which a group can exploit its position is dependent upon the structure of government, legislative organization and procedures, party structure and responsibility, and so forth. The willingness of a legislator or administrator to decide in a way that suits an interest group may result from no action of the group itself.

In the past some political interest groups gained access to government using the techniques of what E. Pendleton Herring called the "old lobby." The stains of political corruption, underhanded methods, and payment of election expenses characterized the "old lobby." In contrast, the "new lobbies" have learned to work in the open; they have nothing to hide; they know what they want and how to get it. The "new lobbyist" offers advice, assistance, and his services to willing legislators and administrators. Modern interest groups often have access to more facts than do legislators or administrators. They have extensive staffs of highly qualified persons and the financial resources with which to do research. They can open new channels of communication between government and private groups. Legislators and administrators have actually come to rely upon them.

Areas of influence

Political interest groups exert influence on the policy-making process along several fronts. They attempt to elect government officials favorable to their position and defeat those unfavorable, influence party platforms and other policy utterances of the political parties, and influence the legislative and administrative process at every phase where access is available or influence may be exerted.

The first front is the well-understood activity of nominations and elections. As the political parties decline in importance as centers for the origination of policy, the need to influence party policy positions becomes less. However, the many interest groups still put in an appearance before the Resolutions Committee of the major parties when they are drafting party platforms.

Both indirect and direct influence is exerted on legislatures and administrative agencies. Indirect influence is exerted when a group encourages members, affiliates, and other publics to engage in political activities themselves. Direct influence occurs when a group communicates with legislators and administrators through letters, by appearances before legislative committees and other fact-finding agencies, by personal visits to legislators and administrators, and the like.

In some cases, political interest groups are actually invited to participate in the processes of government. Administrative agencies may use advisory groups consisting of interest group representatives, popular referenda of interest-group opinions may be held, or representatives of interest groups may be incorporated into an agency. In certain instances, as in the case of professional licensing boards, the authority to make public policy may be delegated to private groups.

While it is true that the most important factor in the success of any interest group is achieving a situation in which individual legislators and administrators are in agreement with the group's proposals, these individuals are not mere chips on a sea of pressures, subject to shifting winds and the ebb and flow of tidal changes. They are individuals possessing attitudes, values, and frames of reference which render them more receptive to some proposals than to others. They are more likely to be receptive to proposals that stem from sources comparable to those from which their own attitudes and values have been derived.⁶

The fact that the judiciary is a political institution is sometimes overlooked. The pattern of judicial action is so well established and the form and procedures of the courts are so well known and accepted that pressure group activity is much less. Yet, the judiciary is a principal holder of public power favorably situated so that it can influence the balance among the shifting interests in society. Moreover, if the courts operate markedly contrary to the expectations of significant segments of the community or if its role is attacked, the political character of the judiciary becomes apparent.

The attacks on the Supreme Court after the decision concerning segregation in schools and cases involving loyalty-security matters illustrate this point. The role of the judiciary in economic regulation provides another example. Before 1937, business groups joined with the courts to defeat a number of acts of social legislation. The Supreme Court came under attack from liberal economic forces in the country which were allied with the President. The Court modified its position toward social legislation in a decision involving the Wagner Act which has been aptly referred to as "the switch in time that saved nine."

⁶ See Truman, *ibid.*, pp. 338-39.

After 1937, a new alliance was formed between certain economic interests and powerful groups within Congress which could no longer rely on the Supreme Court for support. In fact, experiencing decisions that were adverse to their interests, they proceeded to overrule the Court by legislative action and were successful in a number of instances. The Congressional effort to overturn the Court's ruling in the natural gas controversy was balked by a Presidential veto, as was the attempt to amend the anti-trust law to allow businesses to absorb shipping costs in order to quote uniform delivered prices throughout the country after the Supreme Court had declared the basing-point system illegal. Successful were the tidelands oil legislation reversing the position of the Court that offshore oil lands were subject to federal jurisdiction, the McCarran Act exempting insurance companies from federal antitrust regulation, and the McGuire Act exempting nonsigner-resale-price-maintenance agreements from the antitrust laws after the Court ruled that the original exempting legislation did not include nonsigner agreements.

The impression that the decisions of the Supreme Court are final and binding is no longer accurate. The Supreme Court is properly viewed as one more level, not necessarily the final one, of official compromise and decision in the never-ending interplay between interest groups, the legislature, the executive, administrative agencies, and political parties.

INTEREST GROUPS IN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

An understanding of the cultural factors which condition the role played by interest groups in our society might provide insight into a fundamental paradox. Interest groups are necessary and essential elements in our policy-making process, but at the same time they can

impair the effective operation of representative democracy. Moreover, we expect interest groups to exert influence on government, and we condone such action. Yet, we do not expect our officials of government to submit to such influence, and we condemn the fact that they do.

The activity and influence of pressure groups can be expected to increase. Interest groups beget interest groups and pressure begets pressure. The success of one group stimulates the opposition to more vigorous activity. The locus of decision for many problems is moved from the private to the public arena. As an illustration, the Wagner Act used federal power to prevent long established practices which interfered with the efforts of workers to organize and encouraged the practice of collective bargaining. However, the Act did not attempt a detailed regulation of employer-employee relations. Instead, it left the details of this relationship to be worked out by the parties in the labor negotiations.

In time business and industrial groups succeeded in modifying this law which they saw as weighing the balance too heavily on the side of labor. Groups, like the NAM, which had been vigorous opponents of labor's rights to organize and bargain collectively and of the principle of government involvement in the economy reconstructed their basic philosophy. Under the Taft-Hartley Act government was brought into labor relations more than it had been before, this time on the side of management. What was once regarded as a matter for private negotiations between interested parties is now subject to government direction. Important areas of negotiation have shifted from the bargaining table to Washington. Political power is substituted for economic power, and private problems are made public problems.

Modification of basic elements in employer-employee relations now appears to require another act of Congress instead of a new contract between union and management.

There has been frequent comment on the alleged danger from pressure groups. One of the most serious charges is that they threaten the public interest. Such a criticism presumes that the public interest can be identified. One is forced to agree with Frank Sorauf who, after a detailed analysis of the various definitions of the public interest, concludes that "the term 'public interest' has no genuinely valid intellectual definition, and that it suffers as well from a multiplicity of inadequate definitions." However, he adds, "Americans do embrace a public interest or value in another sense. They are agreed upon a governmental process that reconciles divergent interests according to established rules and processes."⁷ We accept the method of democracy, even though we may share no common policy goals, and, in fact, regardless of the policies it may produce. The wisdom or reasonableness of the democratic process does not lie in any specific policy, but in the process by which decisions are reached.

By focusing on the processes of government in operation rather than on the substance of policies, the effect of political interest groups on the public interest can be more objectively evaluated. The question, then, is not whether a public policy is undesirable, piecemeal, less rational, a partial solution, or lacking in comprehensive planning. Rather, the question is whether the process of formulating policy has been perverted by pressure-group activity.

From this point of view, an evalua-

⁷ "The Public Interest Reconsidered," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 19 (November 1957), pp. 630-31, 633.

tion of pressure groups must consider procedure rather than the policy which results. Are the media of communications available to all groups? Are there effective mechanisms for the articulation of political demands? Do unorganized interests have the opportunity to organize? Does money, power, or prestige give undue advantage to cer-

tain groups? Is the procedure employed indirect and obscure? Can responsibility be fixed? Do the groups actually represent the members for whom they claim to speak? Can the members of groups maintain accountability? On questions like these does the final appraisal of the role of pressure groups in a democracy turn.

Regulation of Pressure Groups and Lobbyists

By BELLE ZELLER

ABSTRACT: Many states have lobbying laws which require the filing of registration, appearance and expense statements. However, these laws for the most part are restricted in coverage to direct communication with members of the Legislature and the Governor in influencing legislation. Although the intention of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 was to regulate both direct and indirect communication with Congress by pressure groups and lobbyists, this objective was carried out by using vague and ambiguous language in a law with criminal penalties as sanctions. A series of decisions by the United States Supreme Court involving the existing statute has construed lobbying in its commonly accepted sense as representations made directly to the Congress. The members of the McClellan investigating committee, aware of the need of observing constitutional guaranties, are sponsoring in the 85th Congress Senate Bill 2191 which provides for the revision of the existing statute with requirements for disclosure of both direct and indirect communications with Congress and with any agency or department of the executive branch. To meet strict Constitutional requirements, civil penalties are provided for all persons except legislative agents who continue to be subject to criminal punishment as well as those who file false statements or send spurious communications.

*Belle Zeller, Ph.D., New York City, is Professor of Political Science at Brooklyn College. She was Consultant to the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities of the Congress of the United States in 1949-50, Member of the State Commission to Study the Organizational Structure of the City of New York in 1953-54 and Chairman of the Legislative Conference of the City Colleges since 1944. Her advice has been sought by a number of Congressional and state legislative committees investigating lobbying and the improvement of legislative practices. She is author of *Pressure Politics in New York* (1937), *The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act* (1948), editor and co-author of *American State Legislatures*, *Report of the American Political Science Association* (1954) and numerous articles on the legislative process.*

EXCESSIVE lobby activities followed by legislative investigations and judicial decisions involving existing lobby regulations have all been responsible for renewed interest in the subject. One aspect of this interest may be seen in the consideration of new lobby legislation at both the federal and state levels—it is exemplified on one hand by the Congressional legislation introduced in 1957 by Chairman John L. McClellan and his colleagues on the Special Senate Committee to Investigate Political Activities, Lobbying, and Campaign Contributions and on the other by the actual enactment in 1957 of the first Illinois lobbying statute, by the statute lobbying revision for Texas, and by an important amendment to the Wisconsin lobbying law.

STATE LOBBYING REGULATIONS

Today thirty-one states provide for the registration of legislative agents and legislative counsel employed for compensation, and of these, twenty also provide for periodic reports of receipts and expenditures. In addition, another nine states limit their prohibitions to improper practices. Sanctions are for the most part limited to criminal penalties—nine states adding disbarment for three years after conviction to the penalties of prison and/or fine. However, strict enforcement has been the exception rather than the rule at the state level. Except for the California lobbying law of 1949 patterned closely after the federal act of 1946, the objective of the state laws is in general confined to direct communication with the legislature. However, the definition of lobbying in several states applies to the approval or veto of bills by the Governor.

Even in California a second investigation of its eight-year-old lobbying law by a Special Assembly Committee on Legislative Representation called attention to the decisions of the United States

Supreme Court as they affected the federal law and recommended that language in all portions of the existing California law be redrafted to conform to these decisions. The Committee also recommended that the ambiguous language be changed in order "to maintain and strengthen the disclosure requirements." It noted that there had been almost no enforcement of the law and little attempt to publicize it. It recommended that the Senate and Assembly Committees on Legislative Representation jointly review applications for registry of "legislative advocates"—as lobbyists are designated in California—and that the legislative auditor be given adequate funds to maintain a staff capable of investigating possible infractions of the disclosure rules.¹

Under these state laws, in 1957 the number of lobbyists registered—usually with the Secretary of State—ranged from 23 in South Carolina to 71 in Rhode Island to 90 in Vermont to 270 agents (nonlawyers) and 100 counsel (lawyers) in Kansas, to 420 in California, to 587 in Florida, to the high in Nebraska where 779 lobbyists registered and 731 of their employers. In Ohio in 1957 some 283 lobbyists reported they spent about \$70,000; 176 lobbyists in South Dakota reported expenditures of \$80,000; 302 Massachusetts lobbyists reported expenditures of \$242,000; and in Wisconsin 384 registrants spent \$320,000.

NEW REGULATION IN TEXAS, ILLINOIS, AND WISCONSIN

While states without lobby registration laws continue to have bills introduced which fail to be enacted, three states did recently add significant changes.

¹ Report of Special Assembly Committee on Legislative Representation: *Lobbying* (California Assembly Interim Committee Reports, 1955-57, Vol. 11, No. 1.)

The new Texas law, effective January 1, 1959, repeals sections of the Penal Code dealing with lobbying which did not require registration.² For example, the new law no longer states that a person "shall be deemed guilty of lobbying" although it continues to provide that no person shall seek to influence the vote of a legislator or influence the action of the Governor in any pending measure *other than by an appeal to reason*. (Italics mine.) The Bill follows the better yet inadequate pattern of state lobbying laws in particular by limiting the filing of registration and expense statements to direct communication with legislators, their committees, the Governor, and Lieutenant Governor on pending legislation by a person who does so for compensation; or without compensation acts for the benefit of another person; or, acting on his own behalf and without compensation, spends, however, more than \$50 during a legislative session. Like 22 other states, but unlike the existing or proposed federal lobbying act, the new Texas law prohibits the payment to lobbyists of fees contingent upon the passage or defeat of legislation. Among the more unusual features of the Texas law is the special attention paid to spurious communications for which punishment is provided.

Illinois, for the first time, effective January 1, 1959, requires registration by an employer of a person who is engaged to promote or oppose "any legislation affecting the interests of any individual, association or corporation as distinct from those of the whole people of the state." The payment of contingent fees is prohibited. The statute does not require the filing of expenses. An unusual feature for state lobby reg-

² The only registration required was by House Rule for those who appeared before House Committees to support or oppose any bill or resolution. The Texas Senate had no such rules.

ulation is the provision in the Illinois law that every elected or appointed official shall register his name "in like manner" when appearing in behalf of a governmental unit. The Illinois law also has the unique requirement that a recent photograph of the registrant be furnished at the time of filing with the Secretary of State. Furthermore, the Secretary is required "to publish in bulletin form the name and address of each registered lobbyist, the interest or groups he represents, his photograph and any other information concerning such lobbyist deemed pertinent by the Secretary of State." Copies are to be distributed to members of the legislature, state officials, newspapers, and any others who make the request. Such bulletins are to be published every two weeks during the session and shall include only the data concerning lobbyists who have registered subsequent to the next previous issue of the bulletin. This latter feature stressing disclosure is a significant contribution.

Wisconsin, under pressure from its Governor, finally enacted legislation aimed at eliminating a long standing practice—the lobbyists' giving of free meals and drinks to legislators. In 1957 the expense statements filed by 104 lobbyists indicate that \$43,693 was spent by them for food and drink, of which \$14,131 was for drinks. The Governor agreed to a salary increase for legislators of \$300 and \$175 for expense money during sessions on condition that they passed a lobbying bill restricting free meals. During the adjourned session late in 1957, an amendment to the lobbying law did pass and was signed by the Governor. It prohibits "directly or indirectly furnishing or being concerned in another's furnishing to any legislator—or to any officer or employee of the state—any food, meal, lodging, beverage or transportation." This prohibition does not apply to entertainment

by a nonprofit organization at a bona fide social function of such organizations.

HISTORY OF LOBBY REGULATION BY CONGRESS

It will be seen from this brief summary of lobby legislation by the states that the McClellan Committee undoubtedly looked in vain to the states for a guide to an improved federal law.³ What has been the history of lobby regulation by the Congress? Although bills to regulate lobbying were introduced in the House of Representatives as far back as 1907, not only did these bills make no progress, but it was not until 1913 that any extensive investigations were undertaken. In 1935 and 1936 after investigating lobbying activities of utility holding companies, each house passed a bill regulating lobbying activities. But the Senate and House could not reconcile the difference of coverage of their respective bills.

However, the Congress was determined that the utilities were to be subjected to a new form of regulation. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 provided, not only that utilities may not contribute to party campaign funds, but further stipulated that persons who are employed by registered holding companies for the purpose of presenting, advocating, or opposing any matter affecting such companies before Congress, the Federal Power Commission, or the Securities and Exchange

³ For a more extensive and detailed discussion of state lobby laws and practices see Belle Zeller, "The Role of Lobbying in Representative Self-Government," *Hearings Before the House Select Committee on Lobbying, House of Representatives, United States Congress, 81st Congress, Second Session, March 28, 1950, pp. 58-97, 116-21* reprinted in part in Frank C. Newman and Stanley S. Surrey, *Legislation: Cases and Materials* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1955), pp. 69-87.

Commission, shall register with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Monthly reports must also be filed with the Commission disclosing the nature of registrants' employment and the amount received for compensation and expenses.

The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 provided similarly for registration with the Maritime Commission (now with the Secretary of Commerce) by persons who are employed to represent shipbuilders or ship operators before Congress or the Maritime Commission (now the Federal Maritime Board), or the Secretary of Commerce. Since 1938, under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, persons representing foreign principals must register with the Department of Justice and furnish periodic detailed statements of their activities, including copies of printed matter distributed with identification of source marked on such material. Lobbying provisions were inserted in the Revenue Acts of 1938 and 1939 wherein corporations otherwise eligible for tax exemption lost this exemption if a substantial part of their activities involved propaganda dissemination or otherwise attempted to influence legislation. Also, persons were not allowed tax deductions for charitable contributions to organizations similarly engaged.

In 1946 Congress passed a general Congressional lobbying law—Title III of the Legislative Reorganization Act—following a recommendation in the final report of the LaFollette-Monroney Committee studying Congressional reorganization. There is a real question whether if it had stood as a separate bill, Congress would have given approval to any regulation of the lobby even at this time. While legislative leaders did call attention to heavy lobbying on a large number of controversial measures following the close of World War II, there were no particular abuses at the time of enactment. The debate was

cursory, the members paying far more attention to other aspects of Congressional reorganization in the bill. The lobbying provisions gave clear evidence of heavy dependence upon several bills of earlier Congresses which failed to be passed and were of hasty and careless draftsmanship. Small wonder that compliance was faulty.

CRITICISM OF THE FEDERAL LOBBYING REGULATION ACT

Experience under the Act, according to critics who have studied its operation, indicates that the Act is defective with respect to coverage. Undoubtedly the most troublesome problem concerned the meaning of the words "principally to aid, or the principal purpose" of which is to aid the passage or defeat of legislation or to influence "directly or indirectly" the passage or defeat of legislation by the Congress. More recently the criticism that the Act did not go far enough in requiring the registration of lobbying before federal executive departments and agencies has been repeated as investigations disclose irregularities in certain administrative agencies whose decisions have great importance for the public.

Similarly, the years that have followed the enactment of the lobbying law have added evidence to the wisdom of the LaFollette-Monroney Committee's recommendation not incorporated in the statute. The recommendation suggested that the registration statements should include information such as size of membership in the organization, the manner in which lobbying policies are determined, and the responsibility of the lobbyist in conveying the views of the organization on behalf of its membership.

Since publicity has been considered an important factor in diminishing bad lobbying practices, critics claim that the

statute provided inadequate publicity for the activities of pressure groups. It is argued that the compilation of data in the quarterly reports of registrants published in the *Congressional Record* is too limited; that failure to provide for publication of the expense statements overlooked an area containing truly important information.

Furthermore, the Act makes no provision for a special enforcement agency to investigate compliance to the law or the accuracy of the statements filed, or even to provide an appropriation specifically for such enforcement. Attention is called to the fact that the Department of Justice is in a different branch of government with its facilities for investigation already overtaxed. Actually under the present statute the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate are required to do little more than serve as depositories for the filed statements and lack adequate power and facilities to properly analyze, classify, or summarize the information filed by the registrants.

LITIGATION

Small wonder then that the lobbying act with such serious defects was involved in litigation. Among the more important cases was *United States v. Rumely*⁴ in which Mr. Rumely, Secretary of the Committee for Constitutional Government, had refused to disclose to a Congressional committee investigating lobbying activities the names of the mass purchasers and distributors of the Committee's publications. The Court in a five to two decision stated first that the Committee was authorized to exact the information which the witness withheld, that Congress did have the power to extend its investigative power this far, but added most significantly that "lobbying" should be construed in its

⁴ 345 United States 41, 1953.

commonly accepted sense—that is, "representations made directly to the Congress, its members or its committees. . . . Certainly it does no violence to the phrase 'lobbying activities' to give it a more restricted scope." However, the two judges who dissented held that "a requirement that a publisher disclose the identity of those who buy his books, pamphlets, or papers is indeed the beginning of surveillance of the press"; and they held that Congress lacked power to do this by law as contrary to the First Amendment of the Constitution.

In 1954, the Supreme Court in *U. S. v. Harriss*⁵ in a five to three decision again reviewed the charge that this lobbying statute was vague. The Court, again following the Rumely precedent, enunciated the narrow interpretation of the "principal" clauses of the Act and held "under these circumstances we believe that Congress, at least within the bounds of the Act as we have construed it, is not constitutionally forbidden to require the disclosure of lobbying activities" and upheld the constitutionality of the lobbying law.

Aspects of two cases that did not reach the United States Supreme Court involving the federal lobbying law are worthy of mention here because they give further indications of the criteria set by other federal judges in interpreting the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act. In *United States v. Slaughter*,⁶ the Court held that the provision in the law exempting "any person who merely appears before a committee of the Congress of the United States in support of or opposition to legislation" extends not merely to the person who physically appears before the committee, but also to others like lawyers, for example, who prepare statements for witnesses to be

⁵ 347 United States 612, 1954.

⁶ 89 F. Supp. 205 and 89 Supp. 876, both D. C. 1950.

given before Congressional committees.

*United States v. Neff et al.*⁷ is the only legal case in the history of the Lobbying Act where the lobbying charge was related to a campaign contribution. However, there was no written opinion in this case interpreting the Lobbying Act because the defendant pleaded guilty and was fined. But this case and the incidents surrounding it make clear the close and inseparable relationship between lobbying, political activities, and campaign contributions. However, an integrated statute that recognizes this interrelationship does not seem to be within reach in the immediate future.⁸ Furthermore, as has been shown, Congress is circumscribed by the judicial decisions that narrowly interpret lobbying as direct communication with members of Congress. The realities of modern lobbying practices indicate that large expenditures of funds may be spent on "indirect" methods of influencing the passage or defeat of legislation by appeals through mass media of sponsored radio and television programs, paid newspaper advertising, and pamphleteering. Even in the incidents from which the Neff case arose, the Congressional investigating committee had found earlier that the attempts to influence the passage or defeat of the Natural Gas bill revealed that most of the money was used for advertising, printing and public relations. Here expenditures involving direct contact with members of Congress, though significant, were secondary in importance.⁹

The 1946 Act—the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act—requires that

⁷ United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Criminal No. 768-56, 1956 (unreported).

⁸ See exemptions in proposed Senate Bill 2191(1957) below, pages 101-102.

⁹ *Final Senate Report No. 395 of the Special Committee to Investigate Political Activities, Lobbying, and Campaign Contributions*, 85th Congress, First Session, May 31, 1957, p. 83.

any person who shall engage himself for pay or for any consideration for the purpose of attempting to influence the passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United States shall, before doing anything in furtherance of such object, register with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate.

From the effective date of the lobbying law through 1957, almost a twelve year period, 4,806 registered.¹⁰ Significantly, during the year 1947—the first full year of the operation of the Act—the peak number of 731 registrations were filed, while 1952 recorded the smallest number with 204. Even in the peak year of registrations, the organizations represented were fewer than half the number of 1,800 organizations maintaining Washington offices at the time.

COST OF LOBBYING

What is the cost of lobbying and what are the factors that should be included in attempting to estimate this cost? What are the figures submitted by the registrants themselves which surely constitute a conservative estimate?

The House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities under the chairmanship of Frank Buchanan in its final report stated that during the first four years of the Act's operation, the quarterly reports showed a total of \$71,782,272 in contributions and \$34,080,867 in expenditures.¹¹ In response to a questionnaire sent by this same Committee to 173 business corporations, they reported that from January 1, 1947 to May 31, 1950 they had spent \$32,124,-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, page 181 for issues of the *Congressional Record* carrying compilation of registrations. See also *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vol. 13 (1957), p. 739.

¹¹ House Report No. 3239 of the *House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities*, 81st Congress, Second Session, January 1, 1951, p. 45.

835 to influence legislation.¹² The Buchanan general interim report in 1950 commented

... but it does not begin to reflect all that is actually collected and spent in efforts to influence legislation. . . . If the full truth were ever known, this committee has little doubt that lobbying in all its ramifications, would prove to be a billion-dollar industry.¹³

The compilation of the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* based on economic categories indicates that business groups spent the largest amount. For example, a compilation of the financial reports of 264 organizations in 1956 showed the following expenditure breakdown:¹⁴

GROUP CLASSIFICATION	NUMBER REPORTED	AMOUNT REPORTED
Business	150	\$2,031,933
Citizens	43	395,865
Employee	30	748,320
Farm	16	345,093
Professional	18	292,571
Veterans	7	143,338
TOTAL	264	\$3,957,120

Total lobbying spending of \$64,479,749 for the past eleven years has been computed on an annual basis:¹⁵

YEAR	AMOUNT	YEAR	AMOUNT
1947	\$5,191,856	1953	4,445,841
1948	6,763,480	1954	4,286,158
1949	7,969,710	1955	4,365,843
1950	10,303,204	1956	3,957,120
1951	8,771,097	1957	3,601,459
1952	4,823,981	TOTAL	\$64,479,749

The year 1950 during the Buchanan Committee investigations was the peak year, while 1957 was the lowest. This

¹² House Report No. 3137 of the *House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities*, 81st Congress, Second Session, 1950, pp. 1, 520.

¹³ House General Interim Report No. 3138 of the *House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities*, 81st Congress, Second Session, October 20, 1950, pp. 7-8.

¹⁴ *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vol. 13 (1957), p. 736.

¹⁵ Final Senate Report, No. 395 (May 31, 1957), p. 193 and *Congressional Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 6 (February 7, 1958), p. 151.

downward trend is credited to the narrowed legal definition of lobbying in the Rumely and Harriss cases.

The McClellan Committee too in 1957 commented on these figures:

It seems safe to say that the amounts actually spent by all individuals and organizations are considerably in excess of the reported totals. Uncertainty concerning the coverage provisions of the lobby law has given rise to a wide variety of methods of reporting receipts and expenditures.

In 1951, 23 groups reported spending more than \$100,000; spending over \$50,000 in 1952 were 24 groups, 20 in 1953, 23 in 1954, 28 in 1955, 20 in 1956, and 15 in 1957. In 1957, a new group called the Campaign for the 48 States, founded by Congressman Ralph W. Gwinn and dedicated among other things to amending the Constitution to limit federal spending, was listed with the largest expenditures.

TEN TOP SPENDERS OF 1957

Campaign for the 48 States	\$138,331.14
AFL-CIO	134,986.65
American Farm Bureau Federation	99,918.00
Southern States Industrial Council	98,865.63
American Legion	93,952.51
U. S. Savings and Loan League	91,156.21
National Federation of Post Office Clerks	88,917.55
Association of American Railroads	80,929.28
National Farmers Union, Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America	79,520.24
National Association of Letter Carriers (AFL-CIO)	73,332.16

THE MCCLELLAN COMMITTEE AND ITS PROPOSED SENATE BILL 2191

With this background the McClellan Committee submitted a report¹⁶ upon which the draft of a new lobbying bill was prepared. The Committee in its re-

¹⁶ *Final Senate Report No. 395 of the Special Committee to Investigate Political Activities, Lobbying, and Campaign Contributions*, 85th Congress, First Session, May 31, 1957.

port stressed rightly our constitutional guaranties under amendments one, five, and six—all of which were raised in one way or another in the court cases affecting the The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946. The Committee was convinced that "any new law on pressure groups will receive thorough scrutiny concerning its relationship to constitutional guaranties." The new Bill,¹⁷ Senate 2191, sponsored by all the members of the Special Committee provides for a complete revision of the existing lobbying law and is entitled the *Legislative Activities Disclosure Act*—the title emphasizing the desirable objective of reporting data by pressure groups rather than regulation.

In order to lessen criticism based on constitutional grounds but without lessening the law's effectiveness:

1. "Influencing legislation" means any action by Congress on pending legislation, or the introduction of legislation. Clarification is necessary as to whether or not investigative hearings are included.

2. The "prior-restraint" problem applies only to the professional, fulltime, paid legislative agents—and even as to them, it is claimed there is no true "restraint" for a "notice of representation" is merely required.

3. In order to satisfy constitutional guaranties in particular, civil penalties are provided for all persons required to file statements, except legislative agents. The latter continue to be subject to criminal penalties as are those who file false statements or send spurious communications.

4. The recommended law exempts the press, periodicals, publishers, radio, and television; the acts of public officials in their official capacity; persons appearing before a committee if such a person re-

¹⁷ Reference in this article is made to Senate 2191, Committee Print No. 2 dated June 26, 1957.

ceives no compensation in connection with such appearance other than reasonable expenses. Also exempted are practices or activities subject to federal statutes requiring reports covering contributions and expenditures in connection with campaigns for federal elective office.

REPORTING PROVISIONS OF SENATE 2191

The reporting provisions of the Bill apply to legislative agents who are required to file notices of representation, identifying themselves and their principals, the persons in whose interest they are working, and the terms of their representation. The Bill defines a legislative agent as a person "who, for any consideration is employed or retained or engages himself to influence legislation, in person or through any other person, by means of direct communication." Persons who, in addition to regular employment, only incidentally influence legislation by direct communication are not within the purview of this definition.

However, it should be noted that the bill reaches beyond Congress to the executive branch when it defines "direct communication" as including "all means of direct address to Congress or to any agency or department of the executive branch of the Federal Government." If there is any question as to whether or not this language includes the independent agencies, specific reference of inclusion for this category should be made. A difficult problem is to distinguish between contacts with independent agencies involving direct communication to influence legislation and contacts that do not. Perhaps registration procedures for persons influencing administrative decisions should be established by each administrative agency.

In addition to the notice of representation, legislative agents must file periodic reports setting forth their receipts, expenditures, and other data in connec-

tion with their lobbying activities. Wisely, the Comptroller General may permit joint reports by persons subject to the Act. Three specific dates are set in the Bill for these financial reports. It might be well to re-examine these dates with a view to setting an earlier filing date than the following January for the reports on lobbying activities during the very busy Congressional closing months of July and August.

Others who must file these periodic reports are persons who employ legislative agents and make expenditures of \$300 or more in any calendar quarter or who receive \$300 or more in a calendar quarter as compensation or expenses (exclusive of personal travel expenses). By using a specific cutoff figure of \$300 the Act's applicability becomes specific, and thus the abstract and vague test of "principal purpose" in the present law is eliminated. The Committee in setting this figure was undoubtedly guided by recent court decisions that a lesser sum would be a "trifling expenditure."¹⁸

INDIRECT COMMUNICATIONS AND INDIRECT EXPENDITURES

The Committee undoubtedly yielded to the advice offered by many authorities that the Act make clear an intention to include so-called indirect lobbying. The act provides that the reporting requirement extend to persons who procure other persons to "effect direct communication" to influence legislation if such request is in writing and is addressed or distributed to more than 1,000 persons, or the expense of the communication requested is paid by the person making the request and more

¹⁸ However, criticism that the figure is too low and discriminatory has already been voiced by the American Medical Association and the National Association of Manufacturers. See Committee on Government Operations Memorandum No. 85-1-39 June 21, 1957 and No. 85-1-44 July 3, 1957.

than 25 persons are solicited to make such a communication.

Furthermore, reports must also be filed by

any person who, directly or indirectly, through a branch, agent, affiliate, or any other person, has made expenditures exceeding \$50,000 in the aggregate within the preceding twelve months, in presenting a program addressed to the public, a substantial portion of which is intended, designed, or calculated to influence legislation.

The administration of the Act is vested in the Comptroller General "who is authorized to promulgate such regulations as are consistent and necessary to carry out the provisions" of the act, in addition to such specific duties as compiling and summarizing the information in the filed statements and report the same to Congress after each reporting period, and to ascertain whether the reporting provisions have been complied with, to invite compliance without a criminal prosecution, and to report violations to the "appropriate law enforcement agencies of the Government." Upon the Comptroller General is thus imposed administrative responsibilities—a tremendous improvement over the existing statute. It has been suggested that the Bill include standards and proper restraints for the guidance of the Comptroller General.¹⁹

The preamble of the proposed law states that

Congress finds, however, that the preservation and maintenance of the integrity of the legislative process requires the identification in certain instances of persons and groups who seek to influence the passage

or defeat of legislation by appealing to the Congress directly, or by artificial stimulation of the public intended to produce direct communication with the Congress.

Undoubtedly the preservation and maintenance of the integrity of the legislative process will depend in large measure on the manner in which the provisions of the Bill dealing with indirect lobbying are interpreted and enforced. It is difficult, but not impossible, to find clear, specific, and unambiguous language that identifies and completely covers the activities of those engaged in mass-media campaigns to influence legislation. It is these portions of the Bill that require careful reexamination before enactment if we are to have legislation that will withstand the tests of constitutionality and administrative feasibility.²⁰

Furthermore, no consideration of more effective means of disclosing the activities of pressure groups should overlook the responsibility of government agencies of providing efficient and modern methods for the conduct of their own business. Congress lessens its dependence upon pressure groups by improving its own procedures and by supplying itself with competently professional assistance for committees and individual members. Furthermore, if practical considerations preclude an integrated bill that knits together lobbying, corrupt practices, and conflict of interest cases, surely separate legislation can be adopted that clearly recognizes this interrelationship. Maintenance of public confidence in democratic governmental processes is at stake.²¹

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ The recent California report referred to in footnote 1 above noted among its findings: "Improved laws regulating campaign contributions would minimize the influence that lobbyists could bring to bear upon legislators. Establishment of an office of legislative research . . . would minimize the reliance of legislators upon legislative advocates for factual information."

¹⁹ See interesting and penetrating analysis with rather pessimistic conclusions of Senate Bill 2191 in Carl V. Lyon and William H. Stanhagen, "Lobbying, Liberty and the Legislative Process: An Appraisal of the Proposed Legislative Activities Disclosure Act," *The George Washington Law Review*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (March 1958), pp. 391-417.

Interest Group Theory in Political Research

By OLIVER GARCEAU

ABSTRACT: A group theory of American politics was one of the earliest and remains one of the most systematic schemes for studying the political system. The analysis of pressure groups has contributed to our understanding of the many patterns of interaction by which the individual is related to politics in addition to his intermittent role as voter. Nevertheless, the literature of political groups has been highly critical. Systematic research is needed to build a working theory of how the member sees his several group relations, how group leaders are and may be held to account, and what the consequences of pressure politics are for coherence, continuity, and precision of public policy. Comparative studies of interests in different political systems today promise important advances in interest-group theory.

Oliver Garceau, Ph.D., East Boothbay, Maine, is Professor of Government, Bennington College, a member of the Social Science Research Council Committee on Political Behavior, a member of the executive board, Inter University Case Program in public administration, and was formerly Executive Associate and Consultant to the Ford Foundation in connection with research grants in the field of governmental affairs. Dr. Garceau is the author of Political Life of the American Medical Association (1941) and Public Library in the Political Process (1949).

THERE are several approaches which have contributed to the strategic position occupied in American political-science research by group theories of politics. One strand was pluralist political philosophy, which stressed, as a matter of right, the autonomy of group life within the organized state. This normative argument was colored for some by a romantic vision of a simpler, pre-industrial, craft-oriented, guild society. For others, it meant a search for new defenses of minority rights or professional standards against an increasingly assertive sovereign government or the threat of an undifferentiated mass. The idea of the autonomous group promised to preserve the distinctive, the creative, the reflective from mediocrity or from a deadening uniformity. And for these and others, pluralism seemed a more adequate statement of the relation of the individual to the political society and a more hopeful conception of the conditions for individual self-realization.

Second, interest-group studies of American politics have stemmed from disillusionment or disappointment with the apparent contrasts between an ideal of majoritarian, direct democracy and the emerging patterns of political behavior. Modern constitutional democracy is new, rapidly evolving, and confronts changes in the nature and dimensions of public-policy issues not adumbrated in simple democratic theory. Hard-boiled observers discovered "invisible government," patterns of influence beyond the prescriptions of the democratic institutions and the philosophical texts. Among these patterns were pressure groups. The debunking exposé was stimulated for political scientists by the apparent contrast between the role of pressure groups in our system of undisciplined and often leaderless political parties on the one hand and the well-ordered picture being drawn in the

scholarly literature of the British parliamentary system. Much of the emotion of the cold-blooded realists was discharged on pressure groups as a visible and safe target. Better to blame the selfish minorities than the apathetic and inattentive mass when the popular mandate seemed to fall short of achieving a public policy "in the public interest."

Third, the group concept has afforded a way to talk about and analyze the political process. As the pattern of American political practice became visible in the later nineteenth century, it was necessary to explain relationships more complicated than the voter, the majority, the elected official, and thus public policy. Nor did the model of the British responsible party government answer the requirements of a descriptive theory of our own system, or even of a theoretical model. After many starts and much hesitation, American political science began to develop a conceptual scheme of politics which filled the gap between the individual citizen and the organized state. Man as a social and political animal is seen as interacting in a complex network of relationships: party, interest group, job, avocation, neighborhood, face-to-face group, family; and many, if not, in effect, all these relationships, are being seen as having significance for a workable theory of American political life. Scholarly attention to the phenomena of interest groups was one of the early steps in building a more adequate descriptive theory of our democratic political process.

A GENERAL THEORY OF GROUPS

Because, perhaps, of these several strands of group theory and in the search for a conceptual scheme that would encompass broadly the phenomena of politics, there has been some effort to develop a theory which would use the idea of the group as the central

or even the sole building block. To do this, it is necessary in effect to give the group tag to many different kinds of social relationships and interactions. Such a group theory of politics must deal not only with formally organized interest associations. It must include also the identifications the individual makes with others that do not involve him in formal acts of affiliation. Some of these relationships have recently been called reference groups. A more clear-cut identification has seen the individual as a "fellow traveler" of an organized group. Further, there are common sentiments, attitudes, values, or interests that may if put under stress serve as the basis for organized political activity, the threat of which constitutes a present force in politics. Recently these have been called "potential groups." What is one to say of the wide political distance spanned by the individual's response to a dynamic national politician or to self-selected mass media of communication? Are these wholly conditioned by group affiliations? From the many and diverse group memberships, the individual is said to acquire his pictures of his world and his ideas about public policy. The search for such a complete theory of the group basis of politics may be stretching too far for theoretical elegance at the sacrifice of immediate convenience as an analytical tool. The important contribution of such theory building has been to train students of government in an appreciation of the possibilities and uses of descriptive, classificatory, and systematic causal theory. Given the oversimple, reformist, or adulatory schools of American political science, this has been a major contribution.

A number of less ambitious propositions about groups in politics have developed in the recent literature. The largest part of the research into this field has been descriptive and pretty

much of isolated situations. There have been inventories of the organized interest groups active in the forum of legislative politics at the state and Congressional levels. Often these have viewed with alarm; emphasized the selfish or narrow basis of group claims; pointed to the group struggle for autonomy, self-regulation, and protection of the group's own island of exclusiveness. Implicit in many types of inventory studies has been a theory of politics which sees public policy as the resultant of a parallelogram of organized interest-group forces. Such a theory assumes that the individual is realistically a participant only through interest groups; that our institutions and practices make political leaders, political parties, and public officials responsive directly to group demands; and that groups act in an autonomous, atomistic fashion. On all these counts, there is good reason to doubt the validity of such a theory. The individual participates in many ways besides the interest-group way. Increasingly, research has shown that the legislator is capable of many different interpretations of his relation to constituents. Indeed, legislators seem able to hear and evaluate group claims very much according to the legislator's own perception of his role and his own definition of his office. Our loosely disciplined, confederative political parties do not in fact appear to leave the elective official—legislative or administrative—altogether naked to the winds of competing groups. Nor are groups themselves fully coherent, autonomous, and self-directed. The individual affiliates and identifies himself with many groups. His sense of belonging varies greatly in intensity and quality. The simple pressure-group theory of politics is no more adequate than was the ideal of direct, majoritarian democracy or the neatly ordered responsible two-party system.

GROUP TYRANNY OR IMMOBILISM

Case studies of policy formation have focused attention on nexus points of decision making where interest groups are seen in context, rather than as the independent, raw forces of politics struggling only against each other, with the undifferentiated public and the officers of government as helpless bystanders. Policy in these studies is visualized as emerging from prolonged negotiating between administrative agencies; between different levels of administration; in a triangular interchange involving Congressional committee, administrative agency, and interest group representatives; between the office of Chief Executive and administrative agency and the legislative. The interplay of forces pictured in these studies of policy formation is strikingly more complex than that produced by studies focused on the parallelogram of interest pressures. Even clientele-oriented agencies of administration turn out to have professional commitments of their own about the wisdom and feasibility of policy proposals and about their obligations as servants of the government as well as of the group. Committee chairmen under a system of seniority have a wealth of experience and established conceptions of policy not easily moved by the winds of a social lobby, the persuasiveness of a fact-loaded delegation of experts, or a heavily financed foray into the market place of the mass media of communication.

The policy-formation focus has led to a descriptive theory which sees the negotiation as proceeding to successively higher levels, with the pressure groups able at times to press the nomination of an issue for resolution, rather than calling the tune of the final decision. Indeed, there are now many students of the process who are struck by the difficulties of achieving any resolution, so

committed does the process seem to be to an accommodation rather than a compulsion of many interests. This is a far cry from a model of a parallelogram of forces. Instead of responding unduly to the wealthy, well-organized, and skillfully led pressures, it is now postulated by some observers that the system suffers from indeterminacy. An interest group is, in this view, unduly powerful mainly in its ability to veto proposed action. The political system is seen as threatened with immobilism. Far from the invisible government of an earlier theory, power is now found to be amorphous.

INTER GROUP ALLIANCES

The case approach to major policy decisions has also introduced into interest-group theory a sensitivity to the working relations among organized interests. Some have talked of catalytic groups which are said to precipitate joint action on the part of a congeries of separate groups. The figure of speech is not fortunate, since the so-called catalytic groups are themselves positively and intimately involved in the process. However, the idea is important. Areas of policy engage the attention and activity of constellations of groups. On-going co-operative relations between groups are central to the pursuit of policy goals. Much of the strategy of group politics is concerned with focusing the attention of many groups which are known to be potentially sympathetic to a newly emerging issue. The alliances and co-operative arrangements are pictured as fluid, tentative, imperfectly mobilized, and yet sustained through long periods of time. There are property, tax-payer, and managerial groups loosely co-operating with learned professions, the military, and, pro tem, certain ideas about the separation of powers, states rights, and so forth. There are liberal, labor, reform, welfare group-

ings. There are those interested variously in education, literacy, children, and health. Many patterns appear in the kaleidoscope. Little evidence has appeared in the field research to support the neo-Marxian hypothesis, which postulates peak associations of interests dominating consistently the whole polity through the pressure politics of an exploiting minority of organized business.

For a usable group theory of politics, a great deal more research must be done. The work so far has been exploratory and suggestive, but isolated and unique. We have had pilot studies rather than coherent and cumulative work. Much of the theory building has been implicit in the case studies, but not clearly thought out. And some theory has been quite independent of empirical research already accomplished. The need is for more data and for data that will help pin down some of the leading ideas about the group basis of political life.

THE ELEMENTS OF COHESION

Studies are required of the nature of the individual's commitment to the organized group. The political potential of a group varies not only with its wealth, its numbers, the geographical distribution of its members, and the acceptability of its goals to the larger public. Group strength always depends as well on the cohesion of the members, the intensity of their involvement, and their readiness to act in concert as members of the group. What are the dimensions of group cohesion? It has been suggested that the frequency and persistence of interaction among the members may serve as a measure. For a causal theory, it will be necessary to explain more clearly the range of interactions that must be the materials of such a measure, surely not all of them overt, observable, or readily quantifiable. Organized groups are bound together by sanctions, by consent, and by participation. Sanctions vary to include such

disparate techniques as violence, vocational privileges, social camaraderie, and the psychic income of shared values. Membership in a group builds more than a *gesellschaft*, an association for limited, defined ends. The element of *gemeinschaft*, of realizing the personality through sharing in a community of fellows, is a factor in all group life, however pedestrian the group's charter of objectives.

But little is known of the perceptions members have of the group. How does the distribution of the elements of cohesion differ as between different groups? What variety of relationship does the single individual experience with respect to his several group involvements? Is there some natural economy of the individual's participation which determines the personal resources he has to distribute among his possible relationships to groups? Theory has not much more than noted multiple group memberships, though noting it as of first importance in curbing group demands on members and on the whole society. We know that multiple memberships in a formal sense increase with education and socio-economic status. What of the fellow traveler and potential group relations among the larger segment of the population who join less freely? There is little data to help theory speak of the extent and incidence of multiple membership in this wider sense, and there is almost no data on member perception of his multiple memberships.

Apart from multiple memberships as a qualifying factor in group cohesion, there is need for classificatory propositions about what holds different groups together and what difference it makes to their role in the political process. What ratio is to be found in the more politically active groups as between coercive sanctions, consent, and participation? There are a few case studies which often have stressed the coercive elements. The legally voluntary and

politically competitive situation of most interest groups makes the active minority strive for an appearance of cohesion and indeed of unanimity. It seems to be harder to sustain a policy debate within the group than to rend it asunder by attempting suppression of differences. Yet some groups have achieved fruitful policy discussion among members. For a working theory of democracy, these dilemmas of organizing and conducting internal-group politics are of great importance. Energetic and cumulative field studies are needed before we can attempt to construct theories about categories of internal-group life.

Do the cohesive elements of sanctions, consent, and participation vary between groups according to factors such as the social class, income, or education of the members? Or is it more a question of the intensity of the battle in which the group engages externally, the importance of the stakes, the strength and engagement of the rivals? Or should we look to the type of purpose that defines the basis of membership? Is the organization one of broad social values, occupational privilege, protection, professional standards, or a limited *ad hoc* struggle over a single issue? What part is played by the institutions of the group; its formal structure; the particular blend of democratic, federal, and corporate that is found in many of our large groups? Is the nature of group cohesion related to the compatibility of group ends with the long-run myths and values of the polity, with the short-run climate of opinion? Do the elements of cohesion change with the age and accomplishment of an organization? Until data provide a basis for describing and classifying the nature of interest-group membership, and essentially this means the bases and intensity of cohesion, the debate over pressure politics will continue its somewhat random attribution of sin and vir-

tue, largely according to whose ox is currently being gored. The design and conduct of research in these dimensions of interest group politics are well within the range of present concepts and techniques. Theory waits upon a more systematic use of established research skills in the exploration of tentative but promising concepts.

ACTIVE MINORITY OR OLIGARCHS

A more adequate theory of group membership will help to understand the problem of the active minority, the group's own oligarchy, and the constantly recurring question of whether the state must intervene to return the group to its members. Much of the pressure-group literature has accepted an iron law of oligarchy, and the more hopeful have found a kind of liberty in the interstices between competing oligarchic groups. Yet many group oligarchs turn out to be strangely feeble fellows on closer examination. An effective theory of group politics requires a more systematic body of data about group leadership. Some group leaders have certainly achieved stature in the eyes of members. They have developed indispensable skills for negotiating in the group's interests. They have access to points of decision making. They carry on intergroup bargaining. They have become dependent on their jobs as group executives. They know the game of intragroup politics, can manipulate the players, and are, therefore, themselves hard to dislodge. They sometimes become touched with charisma. The group may have a real as well as a fancied dependence on them. All this can readily be said about group oligarchs in some times and places, and yet not tell the story.

For there are also to be found group leaders who are errand boys, who command little prestige, who must fabricate issues and tilt with windmills to capture the attention of members, who carry no

charisma. They are of so little importance to their group or the group's problems to them that they move from group to group as professional executives. There are groups who regard the active minority as the less competent, busying themselves with group affairs because they cannot excel in their own affairs. There are groups, and often they are ones alleged by outsiders to wield great power, where members know of and care little for the policy and strategy of the active minority. Often the individual member will bypass the interest group and negotiate directly in the arena of public policy when the stakes become truly important. On preliminary inspection, in some prominent business groups this seems to be almost characteristic.

Though the apparent oligarchs of group life often have a virtual monopoly of internal and external communication, and though they can appeal to the urgent need for unanimous support in negotiating against competing groups, they seldom are free of internal group tensions. There are few examples to be found among the large organized interests where lines of internal cleavage are not evident. There are subélites based on geography, vocational specialization, and differences over policy. Despite myths of common cause and the sanctions in the hands of the active minority, fissiparous tendencies in interest-group life are as characteristic as oligarchy. Comparative and cumulative studies of group fission would be rewarding. Is there an anatomy of revolution in the politics of groups? Only a very few dramatic fissions have been observed in the literature. Yet a functional theory of group politics may find here the countervailing force to oligarchy.

More numerous and more comparable case studies of group life can build a general theory about the active mi-

nority. There is need for much more discrimination in describing intragroup relations. What may seem to be arbitrary and absolute discretion in the hands of the oligarchs may be only an expression of the lack of concern and attention on the part of the members. Conversely, the trappings of democratic discussion and procedure and a fine rotation among the group's officers may cover a smooth-running machine which holds rank and file in a strong grip of sanctions. As with studies of group cohesion and the individual's perception of membership, there is need for a classification of leader-rank-and-file relations. Are the differences in style of group politics to be explained in terms of wealth, skill, numbers, dispersion, the importance of the stakes, the alternative groups in the field? Or is it a good deal a matter of accident of personality, or a matter of tradition in the group? Until some preliminary propositions can be made, it is difficult indeed to prescribe governmental action for returning group life to the members. Public policy, to be workable, requires a reasonable understanding of reality. Proposals are multiplying to require full disclosure, representative institutions, democratic elections, voluntary membership, and freedom for alternative organization. Currently these issues are being vigorously debated in the fields of school desegregation and labor relations. It would be easier to estimate the consequences of regulatory measures if there were a functional theory about the circumstances and nature of interest-group leadership. Our theory is still deductive and normative and our evidence fragmentary.

INTEREST GROUPS IN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

For a theory of the whole political process that will evaluate functionally the role of organized groups, it will be

necessary to work with comparative materials. We must see interest groups as parts of whole political systems. The most important research underway at present is in this area, and it promises to be the most fruitful of fresh theoretical statements. As noted above, in the United States thinking about groups has been obsessed with guilt. We have pictured a system where irresponsible groups were too strong for political parties and politicians, where the electorate was victimized by organized raids on public opinion, where the insiders were always in power, beyond the reach of the voter. We have assumed a substantive public interest on policies which was betrayed by selfish interests. Theory has been somewhat reformist, imitative, and simplistic. It has called for organizing rival interests in the name of a public interest, for model political parties that could discipline the elective officers in the name of a declared program, for institutional reforms that in other places and circumstances seem to have characterized political systems with less visible pressure politics.

But we have very little theory about the relation between interest-group activity and the legal institutions and political practices of a system. More attention has been paid to the intimately connected problem of the relation between the two, several and many party systems, and the institutions of government. Even there, the concepts and conclusions remain ambiguous. Undoubtedly the development of theories about party and interest group must go along together as aspects of the study of functions in political systems as a whole. We have pretty well outgrown the single institutional explanation for the good and bad in our own political life or for the contrasting processes of different polities. The step which is now being taken is essentially a matter of preliminary classification of polities

as total operating processes, searching for the common functions in differing institutional settings, class structures, cultural histories, and economic developments. The differing ways in which interests find articulation in politics is a most encouraging perspective for building a theory that will have explanatory power.

There have been, then, a succession of perspectives popular in the study of political interest groups. They first were discovered with shocked alarm as extralegal and irresponsible forces in the blueprint of democracy. They were criticized as the selfish instrument of wealth, perverting public policy in the interest of a small minority. As more pressures became visible, the higher criticisms stressed less the unwarranted advantage accruing to a single minority and warned that the successful grab of government favors by innumerable minorities fatally warped the mirror of the true public opinion which should prevail. Doubts about the strength, breadth, or reality of a general public opinion on policy issues led to a theory which described and explained interest groups in politics and administration with greater understanding and sympathy. A much more complex process was visualized in which interest groups played an indispensable role of informing, alerting, and guiding the formation of policy, and co-operating in its execution.

INTEREST GROUP POLITICS AND VIABLE POLICY

Today the thinking about interest groups in politics is a good deal less emotional. Pressures are not newly discovered sin. We are more used to being realistic, forthright, and courageous about facing the facts of political process. Our political system has passed some severe tests of depression and war

in the past generation. Whatever the merits of the public policy in those crises, the process itself remained firmly accepted by the overwhelming preponderance of the community. War victory, economic expansion, prosperity, a dramatic leveling up of living standards, and civil peace have contrasted vividly with the fate of several relatively comparable political systems. A conservative tolerance of our own politics necessarily colors our present-day thinking.

Despite this golden interlude, there remain hard questions to be asked about a system as visibly responsive to organized interests as ours has been. In foreign relations, military policy, and managing the inherent instability of a private enterprise economy, the stakes of policy are steadily rising. In these policy areas, public policy of any direction or color will be self-defeating and dangerous unless it is characterized by coherence, continuity, and soundness—that is, based on a valid picture of reality. A theory of interest-group politics worries less than formerly about mirroring a general public opinion, believing rather that we have a general consensus only on the larger rules of the game, and special, attentive publics on policy issues. It worries less about curbing the excessive demands and unwarrantable rewards of a few minorities, there being now a nicer balance of greed than formerly. It worries less about achieving accommodation and sustaining the constitutional loyalty of all significant segments of the community. On all these points, the higher criticism of interest-group politics has been tolerably placated in the event.

But interest-group theory cannot be complacent about the organic necessities of achieving adequate public policy and at the right time. Our institutional set up and our political practice provide many points of access to decision

making. Our tradition tolerates postponement of decision until mutual accommodation can be arranged. Our programing gives something to everyone who presses. But can we balance the business cycle by a little inflation balanced simultaneously by a little deflation, appeals to spend coupled with appeals to save, sudden reversals of defense spending unrelated to the rate of new private investment? The timing and amount of compensatory action are hard to refine in our political system. There is greater coherence, perhaps, in our foreign relations goals and more continuity of purpose. But there are familiar pitfalls that make it difficult to keep our own strategic raw materials in the ground pending international crisis. It is hard to sustain imports from friendly nations when restrictionism would succor domestic interests. The government is reluctant to follow through on its long-range commitments to expand productive capacity when suddenly commodities come into glut.

A functional theory of interest groups in politics must turn its attention to this dimension. In what measure and fashion do our peculiarly visible interests in politics contribute to or obstruct the achievement of viable public policy in areas vital to the survival of the polity? What are the consequences of interest-group participation in clarifying the pictures of reality, proposing policy alternatives, sustaining a requisite coherence and continuity of policy, and, more than that, providing the needed nicety of timing and measurement of degree. In this kind of evaluative theory, comparisons with contrasting political systems will be of the highest importance. Political science is now defining these research needs more broadly and clearly than at any earlier time, in the search for a working theory of interest groups in politics.

Nature and Prospects of Political Interest Groups

By ALFRED DE GRAZIA

ABSTRACT: All politiking is done by "interested" persons and the term "interest group" involves a truism, not a pathological condition. Interest groups are essential political aggregates whose form, functions, and power depend upon stated socio-political conditions. Interest groups have intrapersonal and interpersonal dimensions. Group leaders usually possess the intensive perspectives of their group, whereas the rank and file usually have significantly varied and split involvements in their groups. The "individual" interest can be conceived in group theory terms, so can the "national interest." A strong antigroup ideology is found in nineteenth-century democratic and socialist movements, which tended to fluctuate between semi-anarchism and executive dictatorship. Group theory pictures the developing society more accurately in many ways than such other theories, while simultaneously interest groups are still treated as pests or threats to democracy. Political philosophy should seek to reconcile fact and value in this situation and has a variety of theories from the past to utilize. Interest groups, broadly regarded as instruments of pluralism and localism, are an especially American practical alternative to the program of communist centralism in ideology and government.

Alfred de Grazia, Ph.D., Princeton, N. J., is an independent consultant and publisher of PROD (Political Research: Organization and Design). He is the President of the Foundation for Voluntary Welfare. Dr. de Grazia has taught Political Science at Minnesota, Brown, Columbia, and Stanford Universities and has served as Captain engaged in psychological warfare in Africa and Europe during World War II. He is the author of Public and Republic (1951), The Elements of Political Science (1952), The Western Public (1954), The American Way of Government (1957), and at present is writing a book on social welfare theory.

AN INTEREST group may be defined as a privately organized aggregation which attempts to influence public policy. "Interest" implies the existence of "disinterest." The "politics of interest groups" therefore would suggest a "politics of disinterest groups." But there is no politics of disinterest groups. "Disinterested" groups and politics are impossible. Therefore, insofar as politics is the politics of groups, all politics is the politics of interest groups. However, the word "interest" may be placed on an adjectival continuum of "how intensely," or "how interested," or "how involved," are the members of the group. If we could begin the history of the concept over again, we might discover that the term "political group" would be more useful than the term "interest group." Conversely, the term "pressure group" seems to exaggerate the degree of political activity of many interest groups, and the word "lobby" is far too limited for the concept. Yet it is better not to argue over terms at all provided only that we have understood from our verbal exercise that the term "interest" has a shady past. It contains the notion of a limited and prejudiced cause and came into use originally as a supposed contrast to rational, free, and formally constitutional institutions of political force and effect.

Many thousands of interest groups can be found. The United States has probably more per thousand population than any other country of the world. Even so, recent studies are revising upwards the ratio of interest groups to population in parliamentary regimes such as England and France, as well as in less industrialized areas such as Spain, Egypt, and India.

The number of interest groups in a society seems to depend upon the diversity of sentiment in the population with respect to those things that might

fall within the scope of governmental action. If there are numerous religions, there tend to be numerous religious interest groups. The United States and Lebanon well exemplify this situation. The number also depends upon and is positively related to the habit of informal association, the degree of freedom of association, and the unavailability of formal governmental machinery to incorporate interests.

Interest groups have all degrees of organizational stability and formality. Groups may be informally united on a single, transient issue or may be exceedingly complicated and long-lived, as for instance the Roman Catholic Church, which is older than any of the states within which it dwells. Interest groups may exist within the government as well as outside of it; civil service unions, scientific associations of executives, an informal committee to secure a new administrative procedure or a new enactment—these are instances.

Interest groups are privately organized. Hence, they stand in contrast to constitutional and legislatively enacted institutions. They originate as, and tend to be, nongovernmental, nonlegitimate, and nonauthoritative organizations. Thus the activity of a South Side Neighborhood Development League is not viewed by people as prescribed by law or as permitting and conveying much psychological compulsion.

However, legitimacy and authority are not the monopoly of the state. They are subjective relations that prevail between individuals of differing statuses. Hence interest groups may possess both legitimacy and authority to varying degrees, competing, in unusual cases such as a gang or a religious body, with the state. The state in contemporary times derives much of its legitimate authority from its claim—rightly or wrongly—to represent the interest of all and to its compulsory jurisdiction over all.

Everyday writing about interest groups classifies them by function or subject matter, such as professional, agricultural, labor, and business and also subclassifies them further. It is now apparent that interest groups are formed with respect to all functions of society and that such a classification roughly parallels the occupational, attitudinal, and demographic stratification of society. An interest group tends to originate wherever political relevance affects an aggregate. There can be little theoretical value therefore in the endless enumeration and description of interest groups divided by subject matter. Probably the key idea implicit in the common functional classification is that certain functional categories of society hold great power. Political science is perforce fascinated by the largest and strongest interest groups, and these correspond to the greatest functional institutions.

Whether a particular interest group has much or little power depends essentially upon its place in the total way of life of the population—churches in a society of the devout, automobile manufacturers in a "society on wheels," and so forth—but also upon the other general features of a society: the degree of separation of formal powers of government, the strength or weakness of formal authority, the degree of legitimacy accorded formal authority, and the lack of representation of the interests in the representative structure of government.

Knowledge of these elements allows one to guess whether an interest group possesses great power. Other factors are less important, unless one needs detailed and short-run comparisons. Thus many conditions will dictate the precise form, degree of organization, kind of policy orientation, and the quality of leadership of each interest group and larger classes of groups.

ORIGIN OF INTERESTS

But it is time to go back to the beginning and ask from where an interest comes. Relying upon some recent convincing studies of perception by Jean Piaget, Jerome Brunner and others, one may believe that involvement with an object at the least accompanies, if it does not precede, the perception of the object. An infant will see his nursing bottle in a place where it rests unnoticed by adults. One is interested in God before one strives to perceive the Hand of God. The Gospel preaches that first was the Word, "and the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us." Far from this, but strangely not so far, Sigmund Freud speaks of the feeling of a vast oneness in the universe that leads a person to God. From infancy to old age, the law that interest precedes perception seems to rule man's actions. Concern with politics or with some reward associated with being concerned with politics goes before learning who the party leaders are and what a party is up to.

It is because perception is so conditioned by involvement that we can dispense with a politics of disinterest as opposed to a politics of interest and can assume that every action a man takes in politics must be an interested action. All groups in which he participates are interest groups in the true sense that he is interested in them. (He may not find the interest agreeable, of course.) Some hold his interest more than others, and there must indeed be some minimum flicker of attention and reference to indicate he is a member of the group.

An example would be "age groups," so called, which might better be called age groupings. Assuredly the whole population belongs to statistical age groups, classified to one's desire by years, decades, or otherwise. There are

also behavioral features of an age grouping; even unawares, the old may be conservative or some other thing by contrast with the young. This is still not a group. But if there is an awareness, then there is a group; if a young person says: "We young people are tired of the Democrats," he speaks as a member of a group, without proper name or organization but still a group, because he refers to it and acts in its role. Beyond this type of group come the more organized groups, the Youth for Christ, the Young Democrats, the Junior Chamber of Commerce, and many others. There are in some societies, especially "primitive" ones, formal orders or parliaments of the young that recognize and accord political responsibilities to them. So a trait such as age can lend itself to every shade of group-ism from least to most, and so can every other trait that distinguishes one person from another.

It is important to note that a very general bifurcation of theory in political science, sociology, and social psychology is being attacked here. For it is asserted or assumed by many that there is a politics of individuals that opposes a politics of groups. For instance, if a man votes for a general as President because he respects the special talents a military man may possess, he is said to act as an individual. This action is supposed to be theoretically different from the action of a Negro who votes for a friend of Negroes. Is it then true that political theory must be based upon the individual or upon both the group and the individual, but not upon the group alone? Perhaps contemporary theory does so, and therefore bumps along like a cart mounted on a wheel and a skid.

It is correct to say that a person almost never gives himself fully to any group to which he belongs, whether it be one of the formal governmental groups or one of the barely conscious groupings

such as age. Nor does he ever have an attitude that is completely determined by any group. A person is far too complicated for that to happen. It cannot be denied therefore that the sum of all groups and groupings is not "all." Indeed, excluded from the simplistic group theory of political behavior are most people as they behave most of the time.

Yet let us dissect our individual's non-group sentiments. Are they not in the last analysis a personal, private and, in an absolute sense, unique combination of his group roles? For instance, may not one man be, say, an "old-socialist-atheist-majoritarian" and another man a "young-Christian-socialist-pluralist," whereupon both share roles as socialists but never think and act socialist in the same way? Suppose that the two become involved in politics as members of two opposing factions of the socialist party that are based upon the issue of anticlericalism. Then we say, of course, that the groups accurately reflect the men; but they in turn are much more than these two traits. Each may hate everything else about his faction except the mode of representation accorded his opinion on religion. Hence we still have in the elaborate internal differentiation of our two men a great reservoir of potential reorganization, regrouping, and weakening or strengthening of the intensity of a view or an action on an issue. This fact is at once a political and a methodological warning: it tells the politically unwary that a group's bonds are rarely unbreakable and the student of politics that the actuality of individuals is not to be pictured by a simple group theory.

The proponents of group theory can correctly assert their perspective only by admitting two sets of facts. First, the group dissolves at its participant edges and also at its core in the individual person. Its existence is measured in the person by the intensity of his asso-

ciation with it and hence among an aggregate of persons by a frequency distribution of such measures. Secondly, group forces can combine within individuals to create an interest that is not within the scope and domain of any particular group that makes up the coalition. The behavior and opinions of a man who is both a localistic Chicagoan and an American are conditioned by both such identities even though he may be representing Chicago in negotiations with the United States government; that is, he might be internally compelled to ask for less for Chicago. The character of group alliances changes the meaning of the struggle although the particular groups rest unchanged. Athens alone against Persia may represent individualism against despotism; Athens and Sparta against Persia may represent Western Civilization against the East. Tariff-protected businesses working against low tariffs suggest selfishness, but high-tariff businessmen, labor leaders, and politicians all working against low tariffs would represent a conception of the national interest.

The "interest of all" is the conscious involvement of the members of the largest aggregate in society. (Analogous logic may be used for the "national interest," the "general interest," the "interest of the greatest number.") Insofar as all may feel American, they are to that degree Americans and dependent upon their role as Americans. Insofar as all may think of themselves favorably as Americans, "pro-American" is the interest of all. Insofar as all are divided into two groups who dispute whether Hawaiians are Americans, the interest of all remains divorced from a position on this issue. The national government is supposed to represent the interest of all. But this interest conveys only a vague and limited agreement among nearly all Americans. It becomes an extremely strong interest when it does

unite a program to its sentiment, as when everyone wants peace when war is threatened. But such is rare.

So "the interest of all" generally consists of the acceptance of the symbols and behaviors of the government. It comes from the involvement that most or all feel in the group that is the nation. The "interest of all" is as conceivably measurable as any other group affiliation and should not, therefore, be regarded as a different species. If it does not suffice to represent all people all of the time, it merely exhibits the problem of all groups: their limited hold over their members and their restricted concord on particular issues introduced to group concern.

ORGANIZATION OF INTEREST AND POWER

The organization of political interest and political power, when viewed historically, takes a form that adheres to the theory of interest groups hitherto recited in its logical, psychological, and social aspects.

Every societal and political order is interest based. Important economic interests, for instance, are always to be found. Charles Beard, in his historical essay, *The Economic Basis of Politics*, thought he had discovered that the wealthy ran everything. But he merely affirmed and confused a monumental truism. The classical writers were careful to delineate the sources of power of the ruling classes in Greek states and later in Rome. The medieval estates allocated political rights and privileges, or denied them, to their members. Often the free-trade element, the Jewish element, and the foreign element might not aspire to legitimate power as groups, though they might act as pressure groups; and as individuals they might take on roles in the larger political spheres. The power of guilds in the medieval cities is well known. One medieval scholar has discovered an in-

triguing list of interest groups behind the legislation of a medieval English parliament. Local governments lobbied actively.

Throughout history, interest groups have been more or less visible and forceful from time to time. The principal factor in their visibility is ideology. It is ideology that legitimates power and political activity. Power without the legitimacy that is conferred by the ideology of the period is naked. When power is naked, it is ashamed and others are ashamed of it. Groups that lack legitimacy but possess political force represent naked power and are ashamed of themselves. Standing by our definition of interest groups as nongovernmental aggregates, we can observe one very large and long cycle of visibility, attributable in part to the relative legitimacy or disrepute of private associations. The cycle begins in the late medieval period when groups were strong, organized, and respected; descends into a period following the Enlightenment when groups were maligned and suppressed; and ends in an upswing of groupism in which we are presently found.

The ideological fight against groups

The victory of the proponents of free enterprise in the eighteenth century in England, France, and America, to be followed by the great parliamentary revolution of the nineteenth century in Europe, and to be hopelessly emulated in the constitutions of practically all other countries who lacked the essential ingredient of a vigorous free enterprise as the interest basis for the constitutional formal revolution, can be construed as the legitimizing of the pre-existing interest groups founded upon the commercial and industrial revolution. The shift of power from the House of Lords to the House of Commons in England, from the executives to

the legislatures there and elsewhere, occurred as the new interests sought housing in the state. At this age of history, the assembly or parliament offered itself as the housing; but, like the hermit crab, an interest can move into various types of shells.

Yet the legislative revolutions were only a part of the Enlightenment, which was a vast ideological revolution based upon the beliefs in equality and individualism, and the legislatures only temporarily controlled the great historical transformation. Incarnate in Enlightenment ideology was a reaction against interest groups that went far beyond the mere nonlegitimacy of the interests who sponsored and led the legislative revolutions in England, France, and America. Added to the typical distaste for other interest groups that the new ruling interests who were ensconced in the parliaments displayed, was the hostility against groups implied in the Enlightenment's beliefs in liberty, equality, and individualism. The age of rationalistic mass democracy was on hand, to be portrayed on the historical stage by the Jeffersonians and Jacksonians in America; by the suffragists, laborites, and intellectuals in England; and by the socialist-communist parties in Europe. Beginning in the nineteenth century there might be no interests apart from the interests of the mass of people, however cloudy such a concept might be. An equally accepted but opposite belief was that the individual, a solitary wayfarer in life and politics, could govern himself without belonging to any cohesive groups. The two beliefs might be simultaneously held, for they are psychologically, if not politically, consistent. In the individualism and utilitarianism of Benthamism all interests break down. Little thought goes to the mass authoritarianism or majoritarianism that was the inevitable denouement. Whereas the mass public had never be-

fore been seriously regarded as the active agent in legislative processes, the People was now sculpted into a massive monolithic interest group. The older interests which could not be destroyed — aristocracy and Church — were stripped of formal and secular authority. The French, with rationalistic thoroughness, passed laws prohibiting the formation of religious and functional associations. Laws against labor unions were partly a logical development of the new ideology. Prohibitions against lobbying were also congruent. In early United States history the formal conditions of entering the legal and medical professions were scanty, and medical societies were forbidden to exercise professional power.

The envisioned society was a practical absurdity, but men have never successfully distinguished between a practical absurdity and a glorious and instructive ideal. No people tried as assiduously as the Americans to make the anti-interest ideology part of their political lives, and the great heat with which discussions of interest groups are conducted in the United States evidences our great internal fire on this question.

Yet, in a contradictory way, America is world-renowned for its hospitality to voluntary associations. It has been called a nation of joiners and, although this picture may be exaggerated—since about half the people belong to no formal voluntary group—we certainly do exceed all other nations in our penchant and ability to form new groups, many of which have political effect. Thus we are creating on the one hand what we consistently have opposed on the other.

The irrepressible groupism

Consequently we have been accomplishing a fantastic feat of producing a new order of modern society while stoutly espousing the old society. More

than this, we have been creating the only society that can compete successfully with world communism, while espousing an ideology that has been shown to contribute, consciously or unwittingly, to dictatorship in the name of the masses.

Although most writings by American scholars are hostile to interest groups or accept them as an inevitable manifestation of *Realpolitik*, evidence of the transforming of American politics by such groups is abundant. Many legal specialists now practice administrative law on behalf of interests affected by the enlarging administrative establishment. Every industry of any consequence has its trade associations who are continuously engaged in setting forth the lowest common denominator of industrial policy and tactics. The Catholic Church, which has undergone a considerable revival of vigor and influence while separate from the government, now widely circulates and urges the principles of pluralism. If we were to have measures of extent and trend in the vocabulary and argumentation of everyday politics, civic work and welfare work in the thousands of local communities in America as well as at the seats of government, we should discover that an increasing and very heavy proportion of all references to support that is sought or held is described in the language of groups rather than of individuals. Whether in the economic sphere, the religious sphere, the recreational sphere, the political sphere, or the military sphere, the individual policy is rare and the collective policy is everywhere.

The technique of organizing new formal associations, usually by incorporating for profit or not-for-profit, is increasingly well known, and numbers of such groups are annually organized. Legislatures have a most perplexing task in prescribing rules for the political conduct of such organizations. It will not

be long before the laws in relation to their political conduct will break down insofar as they seek to prohibit that conduct. However, they will constantly increase in number and in detail as they seek to regulate behavior. Because the interest groups of today have risen as disreputable challenges to rationalistic, majoritarian, democratic structures, they have imitated the constitutionalism of those structures. The almost invariable oligarchy of the interest group is almost never manifest in the formal credentials that the group presents to the society. Or, if it is, it appears only in fine print that may provide for an officer to succeed himself, or for a system of weighted votes in accord with the actual power of the leadership, or for some other oligarchic device.

The popular nineteenth-century theory of democracy has never made room for a nondemocratic constituent element. It is as if the body had decided that it was working poorly as a mass of disconnected and specialized organs and cells and decreed that every cell would be like every other cell and every organ like every other one. So in its first surrender to the principle of the interest groups in modern life, rationalistic mass democracy decreed merely that interest groups might exist only if they were organized as replicas of the largest political configuration.

The results have been pathetic. Myriad small tyrannies and oligarchies have formed in groups organized so as to mirror the larger constitution. These may be contributing to deterioration in the constitution of the larger democracy. It might benefit the morale of the governmental element of the modern state as well as that of the constituent elements if the state were to recognize a diversity of organizational forms. It would not necessarily credit one as better than the other, but would recognize that an oligarchy in a corporation, in a

military unit, or in a church may be continuously better than a democracy without prejudicing the value of democracy in another place and at another level. Although the intellectual terror of the human being at having to embrace several conflicting directives in different environments should be always feared, a type of man may be visualized, and indeed may be quite common, who can simultaneously play the rules of several different games which correspond to his different roles in life. He may so conduct himself without personal disorganization. Sebastian de Grazia, in his book, *The Political Community*, ascribes much civic disharmony to the conflict of religious and economic directives. Such conflict, however, is less deleterious to social harmony than is the more general condition of interpersonal hostility and lack of love for oneself and others, which, it must be said, he also asserts strongly.

A NEW KIND OF DEMOCRACY

I believe that in pluralism and a rational organization of interests can be discovered a new kind of democracy upon which a superior society may be founded. Such a society would derive its most desirable democratic elements from an initial equality of opportunity. It would teach groups to view themselves not as outlaws nor as the clubs of little boys imitating their big brother, the state, but as integral parts of a whole in which they pursue their useful and dignified way. So long as we suppress rather than educate the group formations of American life, we lower the quality of their membership and activities. We distort their operational code by forcing them to mold it absurdly to the main theory of the democratic state produced by the Enlightenment.

But then to preserve the maximum of individuality and to ward off the stulti-

fying rigidities of estate and corporative systems, we must prepare a vastly enlarged and much more sophisticated theory of organizations that views generously the free formation and dissolution of groups and permits movement of individuals from one group to another. Diverse evils must be combatted: the compulsive power of a church to hold its members, the keeping of classes or races "in their place" as subordinate estates, the compulsive domination of a cartel over the formation of new businesses, and the compulsive grip of a limited pension plan on a worker's free movement from job to job.

Despite the misadventures of syndicalism, fascism—whether political or clerical—and the pork-barrel of geographical or functional interests, an associational democracy is possible. In the new age, to respond keenly and poignantly to the dreams of Jefferson, Mazzini, and Trotsky is as natural as identifying with the troubadors and knights of old; yet those dreams, when they lead to action, move fatally toward bureaucratic, socialist, and communist statism. It appears to me that the future of the followers of Christ and of the heirs of the Renaissance moves along with the perfecting of ways of organizing and operating myriad interest and pressure groups and assembling them into a productive, free, and creative community. The philosophers of some form of pluralism have been so many and varied—federalists, Catholics, pragmatists, guild socialists, and fascists—that the mechanical liberalism or socialism of contemporary social scientists seems to be needlessly unimaginative and inadequate.

The fatal political deficiency of associational democracy to the present time has been the general conviction that it would be incapable of suppressing special pressures in accord with some general vision of the state or world com-

munity. I feel that political scientists who have presented the simplistic theory of associations have done a disservice, even when they have contributed much to our objective knowledge of politics and even when they described the positive benefits of group politics. They have made of politics a mere grab bag of organized groups. They have failed to see that our troubles are in ourselves and not in our groups. We should be able, by a social and civic education appropriate to the theory of the associational democracy, to raise a generation able to perceive and involve itself in a series of roles ranging from occupational and neighborhood associations to the functions of a national and world citizen. If we did so, we would naturally introduce sympathies that would constantly arbitrate the disputes between the special interests that arise and are resolved in the personality. We would induce a higher and more general level of integration in each individual's contribution to the policies of collective action. Groups would not then domineer their parochial membership; they would be understood and controlled within their members' bosoms. And group leaders, too, moderated by their followers and disciplined to the larger meanings of their roles, would turn less to piracy on the social main.

The transition from individualized to modern group political processes was not accompanied by a deterioration in political morality nor by a shift from a broad vision of political policy to a narrow one. The Association of American Railroads can compare itself favorably in these respects with the promoters of the great early railroads such as Leland Stanford. All the more remarkable, then, are the fervid efforts of the leaders of associations and groups to represent themselves as individuals of the old stripe. I suppose that the association leadership would say that they

are compelled to fight the government and its pernicious influences upon their members' rights and efficiency of operation, and that they must use the only rhetoric that conveys meaning to the public: the rhetoric of the state against the individual. That is only one of a thousand illustrations, regrettably, that a major task lies before political science, the task of creating an ideological cli-

mate able to assimilate the diverse justifications and descriptions of interest-group life into a new theory of associational democracy. Such theory, preceding an ideology and developing into a new ideology, may establish the only political order that in this century and that to come can compete successfully with socialism and communism, in America and in the world.

Pressure Groups and the American Tradition

By MURRAY S. STEDMAN, JR.

ABSTRACT: Present social research indicates that interest groups have little effect on the formation or on the distribution of basic values. On the other hand, these groups are often able to create a short-run favorable climate of opinion. Market research surveys and election campaign studies furnish the principal documented evidence on opinion fluctuations. To be successful, an interest group must rally to its cause formerly uncommitted persons who are latently predisposed toward the group's values. The degree to which an interest group may mobilize wide support depends on its ability to capitalize on predispositions. These, in turn, may best be ascertained by examination of interpersonal relations which serve as anchorage points for opinions, habits, attitudes, and values. Theory and practice both suggest that an effective interest group must give attention to the horizontal as well as to the vertical flow of communication. Conversations between people may have a greater effect than the impact of mass media on people.

*Murray S. Stedman, Jr., Ph.D., New York City, is Director of the Office of Information, United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. He formerly taught political science at Columbia University, Brown University, and Swarthmore College. During the academic year 1953-54 he served as Political Science Specialist at UNESCO headquarters in Paris. In January 1956 he was a member of the faculty of the Salzburg Seminar in American Studies. He is the author of *Exporting Arms* (1947), and co-author of *Discontent at the Polls* (1950), and *The Dynamics of Democratic Government* (1954).*

THE PURPOSE of this essay is to explore the relationship between interest groups and the American tradition. While the term "interest group" is well defined in other articles in this issue, the expression "American tradition" is not. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, let us assume at the outset that by "American tradition," we mean values and value systems which are basic to our culture and our institutions. Our main inquiry is whether, and if so, how, interest groups are able to change values. A related concern is to see how interest groups may capitalize on existing values.

THE NATURE OF VALUES

In examining traditions, in this case the American, it is important to underscore the concept of values. They are at the core of a culture; and they affect, in ways that are not clearly understood, attitudes and decisions for change. In other than a superficial sense, social psychologists and sociologists have not been able to develop a satisfactory definition of a "value"; but they are in fairly general accord that a value has certain characteristics—such as longevity and resiliency—which distinguish it from an "attitude," or from a "belief." The semantic differences may be illustrated by the following sentences: "Honesty is the best policy" is a value judgment which extols a specific value. "There is such a place as Timbuctoo" illustrates a belief. "I am opposed to billboard advertising" exemplifies an attitude.

There is evidence that value systems change very slowly. The high prestige accorded to honesty, courage, and loyalty, for example, is not unique to America nor to Western Europe. While value systems are in large part culturally determined, they still seem to have some elements of universality. For instance, in no culture of any consequence is dis-

honesty considered a notable virtue, nor is matricide honored.

Professor Dallas Smythe,¹ who is Research Professor of Communications at the University of Illinois, has suggested four basic or pervasive values (we would call them "beliefs") which have been central to American culture. These views are, first, "the universe is conceived along mechanistic lines"; secondly, "man is conceived to be destined to master the mechanistic universe"; thirdly, "men are conceived, in some sense, to be equal"; and, lastly, "man is conceived to be perfectible." "These four values," continues Professor Smythe, "provided the basis for the American version of the Protestant Ethic." Under the impact of wars, depressions, and especially the rise of a mass-market economy, some concepts which can be deduced from these beliefs—such as optimism and individualism—have been slowly eroding.

Another characteristic American idea highlighted by Professor Smythe—and here we would agree that it should be called a "value"—is the notion of scientism. This is the concept "that all human problems are ultimately soluble through applying the [manipulative] methods of physical science." This naive dogma, widely held by logical positivist philosophers, has invaded large areas of modern social research. An amusing by-product has been the frantic endeavor to create "mathematical" models in the social sciences.

General statements about American values, while stimulating, do not lend themselves to precise analysis. From the point of view of a social scientist, the limited but painstaking type of research brilliantly illustrated in Kenneth W. Underwood's recent book, *Protestant and Catholic*, is more likely to advance

¹ Dallas W. Smythe, address before the Broadcasting and Film Commission, National Council of Churches, February 18, 1958.

our understanding.² In this work, which may well become a modern classic, Professor Underwood demonstrates the close relationship between values and attitudes, on the one hand, and religious persuasion, on the other. In Holyoke, Massachusetts—in certain respects not a representative American city—the pluralism in value systems is extraordinarily great. Even inside the same religious groupings, clashes constantly occur over which values are to be considered basic. Presumably, Professor Underwood's findings would hold true for other American cities.

On the action level, it is worth noting that certain specific values, to which most Americans today would readily give lip service, seem to have little effect on decision making. Observing an electoral campaign, a visiting cultural anthropologist from another country might suppose from the oratory that the basic American values were thrift and individualism. Yet, credit buying and the testimony of David Riesman's books would indicate that these values are more hortatory than action motivating.

Values seem to have institutional support, which may be one reason for their longevity. For example, the banks support the concept of frugality, the government supports the concept of patriotism, and the universities back the ideals of free inquiry. In our own culture, the churches, the law, education, and the family are the chief transmitters of value.

METHODS

The historical method by itself is not sufficiently accurate to be of much help in a scientific study of the changing impact of values in any given culture. For example, prominent historians still vociferously disagree as to what were the values which were cherished by the New

England Puritans; and it seems unlikely that the debate will be resolved shortly.

On the other hand, modern social research has devised numerous precise techniques which, if applied over long-time intervals, should be able to measure changes in basic values in the same fashion that the same techniques now can measure short-run changes in attitude. Examples of these methods are to be found in the voting-behavior studies of Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Bernard R. Berelson, the community studies of Lloyd Warner, and in the standard public-opinion-poll compilations. Also on the positive side, it may be observed that a good deal is known today about the formation and transmission of attitudes.

Most of this information has accrued as a by-product of mass-communication research. Originally this research rested on the following model: mass media spoke from highly centralized positions to millions of persons who were assumed to react automatically to electronic or printed stimuli. Hence, there was great concentration on individual responses, as in public-opinion polls or in market research. Thus, for an interest group to affect decisions, that is, create action, it was assumed that the type of message which would appeal to millions of "undecided" citizens would create a basis for unified political action.

While this type of social research was being developed, another and apparently unrelated movement was in full stride. This movement grew out of the laboratory studies by experimental psychologists such as the late Kurt Lewin of the behavior of small groups. In these experiments, in an effort to verify hypotheses, the model situation was to subject controlled and uncontrolled groups to a variety of experiences.

Almost by chance, it seems, certain students of voting behavior were forced to relate or try to relate tenets of mass-

² Kenneth W. Underwood, *Protestant and Catholic* (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1957).

communication theory to small-group research. In this convergence, sociologists such as Lazarsfeld and his associates pioneered. The result of a decade and a half of their labors is brilliantly attested to in the recent book, *Personal Influence*.³ In this work Katz and Lazarsfeld expound the following hypotheses: Communication is a two-step flow; it goes from the media to certain opinion leaders; these leaders then interpret the "objective reality" of the world to those in their peer groups. However, this vertical process does not tell the whole story, for there is also a horizontal process in which opinion leaders at the same level transmit information to each other.

It should be noted that the Decatur study, reported by Katz and Lazarsfeld in the same volume, tends to confirm the validity of these hypotheses.

PREDISPOSITION

In *The People's Choice*,⁴ Lazarsfeld and his colleagues developed an "index of political predisposition" which enabled them to predict with considerable accuracy how a potential voter would actually vote. It was found that a useful index of voting intention could be constructed on the basis of such known factors as socio-economic status and religious affiliation.

More recently, in *Personal Influence*, Katz and Lazarsfeld develop the thesis that the role of primary groups is of extraordinary importance in communication and in the action which may follow from communication. It is the leaders of these informal groups who, after exposure to the media, effectively interpret developments to their followers. Of the areas studied—food purchasing, dress fashions, movies, and public affairs

³ Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955).

⁴ Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948).

—only the women leaders in the area of public affairs showed a high correlation with socio-economic status. In all class groups, for example, opinion leaders regarding the cinema were the youngest group of women.

To those who ferret out the particular behavior patterns of interest groups, the concept of "predisposition" appears extraordinarily fruitful. It does so for the following reasons:

The model of mass communications research—the media speaking to millions of atomized individuals—implied that access to the media was the primary requirement in mobilizing public opinion. Thus, newspaper comment, radio barages, billboards, and pamphlets were the obvious ways to convert the uninterested to partisans.

The model used in laboratory experiments with small groups seemed to have no application to large-scale, real-life situations.

The newer concept of predisposition, based to a great extent on the values of the small or informal group, of which the individual is a part, offers a more satisfactory model. It does so because it explains more adequately than the other theories what we all have observed.⁵

⁵ An "index of political predisposition" was developed in the Erie County study of the 1940 Presidential election. It was built from combining the three primary personal characteristics of socio-economic status level, religion, and residence. See *The People's Choice*, by Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), pp. 25-26 and p. 174. The Elmira study of the 1948 Presidential election, *Voicing*, by Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954) refers to the same concept on pp. 125-26. A critical view of this concept is found in *The Voter Decides*, by Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Co., 1954) at p. 85. This book reports a survey of behavior and attitudes of voters in the 1952 Presidential election. It was con-

AN APPLICATION OF THE PREDISPOSITION THEORY

The standard analysis of the Anti-Saloon League is to be found in Peter Odegard's book, *Pressure Politics*.⁶ The story is familiar enough: mobilization of Protestant churchwomen and churchmen; the expenditure of millions of dollars on prohibition pamphlets, books, and brochures; the direct pressures put on Congressmen and would-be Congressmen; the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment by Congress and state legislatures, both rurally dominated.

On the surface, Model No. 1 seems to be perfectly illustrated. But was it? Drawing on both the excellent account by Professor Odegard and also on the more recent hypotheses of Katz and Lazarsfeld, the events may be differently reconstructed, as follows:

A group of well-financed prohibitionists decided that alcohol must be outlawed.

They established a "Washington Office."

Those in the Washington office "put pressure on Congress" by the usual means.

Simultaneously, they also flooded the country with "dry" literature.

They also put pressure on candidates for Senatorial and Congressional, as well as state, positions to "declare themselves" on the issue.

Conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. In *Personal Influence*, by Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955), the role of group influences, especially of interpersonal communications, is once again stressed. If "predisposition" is associated with primary and informal groups, there is nothing mysterious about the basic idea, even if its use in predicting political preferences may be challenged. The whole concept requires further examination, but it is one of the most fruitful hypotheses to be developed in recent years.

⁶ Peter M. Odegard, *Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928).

They were absolutely and resolutely nonpartisan; and, as sensible men, ignored the Prohibition party on the very good ground its candidates were sure to lose.

They obtained access to thousands of Protestant pulpits, especially in rural and small-town areas.

But the first crucial step occurred at this point: hundreds of thousands of persons, with no particular personal interest in the liquor question, became convinced that the drive toward legalized abstinence was a religious issue. They took this interest because they looked to their church as the dominant reference group. If the church said drinking was a sin, it was.

Yet church pronouncements, whether in this Republic or in other cultures, do not of themselves dictate political or social action on the part of their constituents. What Professor Odegard realized as so obvious that he scarcely mentioned it, but what actually occurred was this: thousands of church-related informal groups discussed the liquor question, arrived at decisions to act, and took effective political action. Here is the key to the explanation of the phenomenal political success of the crusade.

To put the matter another way, the Anti-Saloon League mobilized what David Truman has called a "potential interest group" into being.⁷ Yet this is not the whole picture. What the League did was to capitalize on the predispositions of a majority of Americans as of that time. By ethnic background, church affiliation, and ecological characteristics, this latent majority was predisposed against alcohol. What the Anti-Saloon League did with such notable success was to activate these predispositions.

Of course, the campaign ammunition furnished by the well-financed Washing-

⁷ David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951).

ton office was important in triggering the response, yet the people on the firing line were the thousands of opinion leaders in the small groups. Without their support, the campaign might well have achieved the same degree of fulfillment as, say, that of Henry George and his disciples.

THE LIMITATIONS OF INTEREST GROUPS

In the sense that we have used the term "values," it is clearly out of the question for an interest group to affect values as such. Some values, such as loyalty, would probably continue in the United States under any conceivable political regime. But if we use value in a less rigorous sense to denote a belief or an attitude (as in the Jacob study of attitudes of college students⁸), there is evidence that interest groups, like cigarette advertisers, can mould popular opinions—at least in the short run. The evidence is incomplete because market research studies have been limited almost exclusively to the effects of intensive, short-run campaigns. The same limitation is evident in studies conducted by social scientists regarding electoral campaigns. In the real world of political action, too, the efforts of an interest group to mould opinion are often countered by the efforts of an opposition group.

With these reservations in mind, we must acknowledge as obvious that particular interest groups have often succeeded in achieving substantial legislative victories. Any student of politics would cheerfully credit results of the first magnitude to particular business, labor, or veteran groups. This is another way of saying that the most powerful interest groups frequently create a short-run favorable "climate of opinion." We emphasize the term "short-run," because the data on long-term changes are

⁸ Philip E. Jacob, *Changing Values in College* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).

inconclusive. No one knows, for instance, whether the American Legion has in fact over the years managed to strengthen "patriotism."

Another limitation on interest groups is the fact that their campaign to create favorable opinion may backfire. For example, a vigorous drive to ban an erotic French or Italian film seems ordinarily only to result in increased patronage of the condemned picture. Paradoxically, while a particular group may avoid the motion picture in question, other groups, which would otherwise have shown little interest in the picture, descend on the cinema in droves.

INTEREST GROUP POTENTIAL

To this point, we have argued that changes in the distribution of basic values have little or nothing to do with interest groups. Rather, it has been maintained such changes are the result of cultural, not political processes. On the other hand, when the more limited field of opinion formation and opinion manipulation is considered, some interest groups have achieved notable successes in legislative votes, in referenda, and occasionally in elections. Under what conditions is such a mobilization of opinion possible?

It is submitted that the following conditions are necessary:

Values must be in competition with each other.

The culture must be heterogeneous.

The members of the interest group must have some common attitudes or shared value.

Other people in the society, who are not in the particular interest group, must exist who are predisposed in favor of the interest group's shared value.

The interest group must then bring together for political action the largest possible number of persons who are already predisposed favorably toward the value in question. To word the matter

differently, the job of the interest group is to build up support for an existing value by bringing together latently disposed persons who share that value and then to channel their combined energies toward a specific goal of action.

THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATION

As noted previously, the early "model" of communication assumed a flow from a central headquarters to particular individuals. In the light of more recent communication research, this model has been replaced by the concept of a two-step flow—headquarters to opinion leaders and opinion leaders to smaller groups. Katz and Lazarsfeld have also drawn attention to the horizontal flow among opinion leaders from similar social strata and to the role of informal groups. How does this newer model affect interest group strategy?

It is suggested that the following considerations are pertinent:

The main effort is to communicate from headquarters to the opinion leaders at each social level. The leaders, in turn, through the mechanism of informal groups, interpret and pass on the information to other group members.

Another effort is to affect the hori-

zontal flow of communication from leader to leader in the different peer groups. The "message" from headquarters, while containing a substantial similar idea, would have to be reworded in terms of the socio-economic and educational status of the particular level of group leaders.

The flow of reactions back to headquarters should be analyzed qualitatively as well as quantitatively. The important consideration is to relate the response to a particular level or type of group.

In general, communication between people may have a greater effect than the effect of mass media on people. This is so because interpersonal relations seem to be "anchorage points" for individual opinions, attitudes, habits, and values.⁹

In any opinion research undertaken by an interest group, the "respondents" must be studied within the context of the group or groups to which they belong, for these groups may influence the respondents' attitudes and also their acceptance or rejection of mass-media attempts to influence them.¹⁰

⁹ Katz and Lazarsfeld, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), p. 44.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

Group Representation in Britain and the United States

By SAMUEL H. BEER

ABSTRACT: Certain changes in the modern economy stand in marked contrast with the individualist, laissez-faire model. This new "collectivism" can be summarized under four headings. The tendency to concentrate economic power among a few big buyers or sellers in a particular industry or complex of industries; the changes in internal structure resulting from this increase in the size of units which we term bureaucracy and managerialism; the method of dealing with one another of these units by bargaining or "collective bargaining"; and the ability of the units when dealing with consumers to shape and even create the very wants which the units supposedly came into existence to satisfy. Parallel changes in the polity provide us with a "collectivist" model that we can use to compare the distribution of power on the plane of pressure groups and parties in Britain and United States. It appears that the British polity comes closer to this model than the American.

Samuel H. Beer, Ph.D., Cambridge, Massachusetts, is Professor of Government and General Education, Harvard University. He was on the staff of the New York Post from 1936 to 1937 and of Fortune magazine from 1937 to 1938. In 1938, he joined the faculty of Harvard University where he was Chairman of the Department of Government from 1954 to 1958. He is the author of The City of Reason (1949), Treasury Control: The Co-ordination of Financial and Economic Policy in Great Britain (1956), and at present is writing a book on parties and pressure groups in Great Britain.

WE USUALLY think of Great Britain as a country of strong parties and weak pressure groups; the United States as a country of weak parties and strong pressure groups. I wish to suggest some contrary views: that not only are British parties strong, but so also are British pressure groups; that in comparison both American parties and pressure groups are weak. The terms "strong" and "weak" cry out to be defined. The meanings I give them derive from a historical development—the rise of "collectivism"—that has similarly affected both parties and pressure groups.

What are the consequences for policy? Strong parties can more readily resist pressure groups. They can also more readily yield them what they want. On the other hand, the dispersion of power may simply produce a self-defeating war of all against all in which even the special interests suffer. Centralized power at least creates the possibility of deliberate and orderly solutions.

THE COLLECTIVIST ECONOMY

The virtue of centralized power is worth examining if for no other reason than that the opposite doctrine holds so high a place in liberal democratic thought. Liberals and Radicals in both Britain and America have applied the doctrine of dispersed power to both the economy and the polity. In the Smithian model of the economy, for instance, the wealth of the nation and the satisfaction of consumers' wants will be maximized if the market is free. No unit, not even government, is to exercise "market power." Once power is removed, rational and voluntary exchange will result and along with it other desirable consequences in the allocation of resources and the satisfaction of the consumer.

Very similar is the Liberal-Radical model of the polity. Remove Burke's "established" aristocracy and all other

agents of power that had historically guided the political process; reduce society to its individual, rational atoms; then, power removed, reason will reign. A free, competitive marketplace of ideas, automatic and self-regulating like the marketplace of the laissez-faire economy, will test the truth of opinions. Upon opinions so tested, popular government will base public policy.

In both the British and American economies in the nineteenth century, the market conditions required by the self-regulating model did actually exist in very great degree. And in both, to no inconsiderable extent, these conditions still exist. But in the past two generations or so, certain structural changes have taken place—reaching a further point of development in Britain than in the United States—that depart radically from this model. These developments, which we may call "collectivism," can be summarized under four headings. One is the tendency to a concentration of economic power among a few large buyers or sellers in a particular industry or complex of industries. Along with the increase in size of units has gone a change in internal structure that is referred to by terms such as bureaucracy and managerialism. Moreover, where such large units have grown up, they tend to deal with one another by a process of "bargaining"—or perhaps it is better to say, "collective bargaining." Finally, while bargaining tends to be confined to the relations of producers—whether business firms or trade unions—in their dealings with the mass of ultimate consumers, large units have learned to shape, even to create, the very "wants" that presumably they have come into existence to satisfy.

COLLECTIVIST PARTIES

In the polity as in the economy, there have been similar tendencies toward collectivism. By this I do not mean the in-

crease in government intervention—the rise of the welfare state and the controlled economy. I mean rather that in the political structure have occurred certain changes analogous to those changes in economic structure summarized above. Starting from these contrasting models of the polity, the self-regulating and the collectivist, we may compare the distribution of power in Britain and the United States. It would appear that, as economic collectivism has proceeded farther in Britain than in the United States, so also has political collectivism.

We may look first at the relative number of units and their internal structure. Examined in the light of these criteria, both British parties and pressure groups present striking contrasts with the American models. While in both polities there are two major parties, the loose and sprawling parties of American politics make the British appear highly concentrated. In the American party, power is dispersed among many units—for example, personal followings or state and local machines—with the result that only occasionally and for limited purposes, such as nominating a Presidential candidate, does the national party act as a unit. In terms of density—that is, the per cent of eligibles organized as party members—American parties exceed British. But if we apply a measure of intensity, such as payment of dues, it is clear that British parties have mobilized the electorate far more highly than have American. In the British party, moreover, this membership is brought together for unified action by an elaborate and effective system of articulation, in particular active representative bodies extending from bottom to top and a bureaucratic staff running from top to bottom. There are still semiautonomous centers within the party that a perfected merger would obliterate. But to an American, a British party is a highly unified social body,

remarkably well equipped for co-ordinated action: we think, for instance, of the fact that all candidates must be approved by a central-party agency and that they will all run on the same platform. No doubt, the most striking expression of this power of united action is the extent of party voting in the House of Commons. Judged even by Lowell's strict criteria, party voting has been on the increase for a hundred years and today reaches nearly one hundred per cent.¹

Along with such concentration, and perhaps making it possible, goes a high measure of political homogeneity. (I do not mean social homogeneity, for, measured by nonpolitical criteria, the British are a very heterogeneous people.) This political homogeneity in the electorate as a whole is reflected in what students of voting behavior call the "nationalizing" of British politics. When political opinion moves, it moves in unison throughout the country: in a general election the "swing" from one party to the other is much the same in every constituency. In the United States, as Schattschneider and Paul David have shown, voting has also tended in this direction.² Sectionalism and the number of one-party states are on the decline. But—as 1956 illustrates—nothing like the uniformity of swing in British voting has been reached.

¹ Lowell counted as a party vote a division in which at least 90 per cent of one party voted in favor and at least 90 per cent of the other party voted against. A. L. Lowell, "The Influence of Party upon Legislation in England and America," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1901*, Vol. 1 (Washington, 1902), pp. 319-542.

² E. E. Schattschneider, "The United States: The Functional Approach to Party Government," in Sigmund Neumann (Ed.), *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 194-215. Paul David, "Intensity of Inter-Party Competition and the Problem of Party Realignment"; a paper presented at the meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 5-7, 1957.

In spite of mass membership and representative bodies, however, the internal structure of the British party gives great power to central party leaders—far more, of course, than that possessed by American leaders. It is rather as if the Congressional caucus of post-Federalist days had been imposed upon the Jacksonian party system. In both British parties, as R. T. McKenzie has shown, the leaders of the parliamentary party, and especially the Leader, are dominant.³ That is a loose description and needs must be, since the Leader's power is complex and certainly far from dictatorial. He must continually practice "the art of management," appeasing a dissident faction, finding a formula, keeping up party morale. Indeed, he is a "manager"—a modern-day manager committed to party principle, of course, but by his function compelled above all to think of the continuation of the organization.

COLLECTIVIST PRESSURE GROUPS

Turning from parties to pressure groups, we find that in Britain as in the United States, the center of the stage is occupied by organizations based on the great economic interest groups of modern society, especially the big three of business, labor, and agriculture. Given the nature of public policy, which affects these interests so often and so intimately, pressure groups claiming to speak for them are bound in turn to influence policy making more frequently and on the whole more effectively than pressure groups of other types.

In Britain as well as the United States, in addition to such "self-oriented" pressure groups, we must also deal with what S. E. Finer calls "promotional" groups.⁴ Among the former we may

³ R. T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955), *passim*.

⁴ S. E. Finer, *Anonymous Empire: A Study of the Lobby in Great Britain* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1958), p. 3.

classify such organization as the Federation of British Industries, the Trades Union Congress, the National Farmers Union, the British Medical Association, the National Union of Teachers, the British Legion, the National and Local Government Officers' Association. The "promotional" groups include the Howard League for Penal Reform, the National Council for Civil Liberties, the Peace Pledge Union, the Campaign for the Limitation of Secret Police Powers. As compared with the self-oriented groups, writes Finer, the latter "do not represent 'interests' in the same sense at all. They represent a cause, not a social or economic 'stake' in society."⁵

Such a broad distinction in the character of goals tends to have important consequences for structure and behavior. The promotional group, for instance, tends to be open to all like-minded persons, while the self-oriented group has, so to speak, a fixed clientele. By and large the self-oriented group can more readily extract money and work from its members on a continuing and regularized basis. It may also be less subject to splintering and more capable of continuous, unified action. At least in part for such reasons, the more powerful pressure groups of the British polity are self-oriented groups, based on a vocational interest, bureaucratic in structure, and continuing over a long period of time. While some form of group politics has long flourished in the British as in other polities, this modern, collectivist type has emerged only in recent generations.⁶ There is some sense in saying that one line of development in the history of British pressure groups

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ S. H. Beer, "The Representation of Interests in British Government: Historical Background," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (September 1957), pp. 635-45; "Pressure Groups and Parties in Britain," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (March 1956), p. 4.

has been from the promotional to the self-oriented, vocational type. Possibly a similar development has taken place in the United States, although here the third party has often played the role of the promotional group in Britain. We might also find that the promotional group remains a more important feature of the American polity than of the British.

Farm, labor, and business organizations

Concentration and bureaucracy characterize British pressure groups as well as parties. Hardly without exception the big vocational pressure groups in Britain have a higher index of density and concentration. There, for instance, the National Farmers Union is the only significant organization of farmers and includes 90 per cent of its potential membership. In the United States, of course, only a fraction—no more than 30 per cent—of all farmers are organized and these are divided among three main groups and various minor ones. While absolute numbers are much smaller in Britain, we must remember that British agriculture is highly diversified as to crops, size of farms, and location. Yet through the NFU British farmers speak with one voice to a degree rarely achieved by farmers in the United States. No doubt this is true because to no small extent the organization is run from the top. In Bedford Square is a large and able bureaucracy and at its head stands one of the ablest managers in modern Britain, Sir James Turner—sometimes known as the “Sacred Bull of British Agriculture.”

In the field of trade unions, just a little less than half the total working force has been organized, while in the United States the figure is around a quarter. To one peak organization, the TUC, nearly all unions are affiliated and it has been the undisputed spokesman for organized labor for generations. Its

permanent secretary, even when Walter Citrine held the post, has never occupied the position of, say, a Gompers. The heads of the Big Three,⁷ however, have as prominent a political role as our Reuther, Meany, and Lewis. The British labor leaders of this generation are more likely to have worked their way up the bureaucratic ladder by long and able management than to have emerged from heroic struggles for the right to organize or for better contracts. Contrary to popular impression and in strong contrast with American experience, the strike has almost ceased to be an instrument of labor-management relations in Britain since as far back as 1932.⁸ If by bureaucracy, however, we mean full-time paid staff, then British unions generally are far less well endowed than American. The reluctance of the rank and file to pay dues sufficient to employ such staff—and to pay substantial salaries to any permanent official—seriously handicaps British unions.⁹

In the field of business, in Britain as in the United States the basic unit of political action is the trade association. Comparison is made a little easier if we consider only national manufacturing trade associations.¹⁰ Of these there are 1,300 in Britain and some 950 in the United States. Density is high: a sample survey showed that 90 per cent of larger firms and 76 per cent of smaller firms in Britain belong to such associations. Concentration among manufac-

⁷ The Transport and General Workers' Union; the National Union of General and Municipal Workers; the Amalgamated Engineering Union—which among them include 30 per cent of all unionists affiliated to the TUC.

⁸ Hugh A. Clegg, “Strikes,” *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (January–March 1956), pp. 31–35.

⁹ John A. Mack, “Trade Union Leadership,” *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (January–March 1956), p. 77.

¹⁰ Data on British associations are from P.E.P., *Industrial Trade Associations; Activities and Organization* (London, 1957).

turing trade associations is considerably greater in Britain. The peak association is the Federation of British Industries (FBI) which represents, through its affiliated trade associations and directly through member firms, some 85 per cent of all manufacturing concerns employing ten or more workers.¹¹ In the United States, on the other hand, the National Association of Manufacturers has never represented more than 6 per cent of all manufacturing concerns.¹² If the same base as that used for the FBI were taken, however, there is reason to think that the NAM figure would be more like 20 per cent to 25 per cent. The contrast would still be striking.

BARGAINING IN THE POLITY

So much for the briefest sort of sketch of collectivism in the structure of the British polity. Let us turn to the modes of interaction of these massive unit actors, in particular the political party and the pressure group.

What we have called bargaining is a principal trait of the relationships of large producers in the collectivist economy. Its essence is that each of the negotiating units is highly dependent on the other as a seller or as a buyer. In a free market, on the other hand, each seller can turn to other buyers and each buyer to other sellers and none have significant market power. In bargaining, however, each unit has substantial market power; hence, the ultimate decision is made as a result of negotiations in which each gauges his offers in the light of expectations about the possible offers of the other.¹³

¹¹ S. E. Finer, “The Federation of British Industries,” *Political Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (February 1956), p. 62.

¹² R. W. Gable, “N.A.M.: Influential Lobby or Kiss of Death?”, *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 15 (May 1953), p. 257.

¹³ See Thomas C. Schelling, “An Essay on Bargaining,” *American Economic Review*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (June 1956), pp. 281–83.

A similar kind of decision making occurs where a party enjoys large power over the authority of government, while a pressure group with which it deals enjoys similar power over something—such as votes—that the party wants. Such a situation is very different from one in which government authority is dispersed among many elected office-holders and voting power among an unorganized electorate. In the latter situation, there is a kind of bidding for votes on one side and for promises or policies on the other that has a limited, but real, analogy with the economic free market. Where the centralized party in office confronts the massively organized pressure group, decisions are made quite differently. Indeed, some who have sat in on the Annual Price Review between the National Farmers Union in Britain and the Ministry of Agriculture have reported that the proceedings and the way in which a settlement is reached resemble nothing so much as collective bargaining. For both the farmers and the ministry there is a range of outcomes that would be better than no agreement at all. Each opponent pretty well knows what this range is. No wonder it has sometimes taken four months for a decision to be reached!

Consultation with interests is a feature of all modern Western democratic governments. Some years ago Leiserson, writing of representative advisory committees, traced their origin to “the delegation of discretionary rule-making powers under legislative standards to administrative agencies executing various types of social legislation.”¹⁴ Leiserson’s statement, broadened somewhat, is a generalization valid for not only American, but also for Western European government: increasing govern-

¹⁴ Avery Leiserson, *Administrative Regulation: A Study in Representation of Interests* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 162.

ment intervention for such purposes as social reform, economic stability, and national defense has led to the grant of rule-making power to administrative agencies and to increasing participation of interested groups in decision making at that level.

Different stages in this development, however, can be distinguished, depending upon how far the scope of policy has been expanded and the polity has become collectivist. The extent to which power has been mobilized and unified on each side—on the side of the party in power and on the side of the pressure group with which it deals—will determine whether bargaining predominates in the relationship. In the United States, we find administrative consultation on a vast scale both in Washington and in the state capitals. In Britain, a more collectivist polity, the situation is better described as "quasi-corporatism."

It is against the background of this power pattern that we must examine the emphasis that British pressure groups give to the various points in the process of decision making. The formal structure of authority—British parliamentary government as compared with the American separation of powers—will play its role. But we must recall that a hundred years ago Britain also had parliamentary government, yet pressure groups then gave far more attention to the legislature than they do now.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSULTATION

In each polity we may distinguish four main phases of policy making: at elections, in the legislature, within the party, and at the administrative level. British pressure groups exert their major influence at the administrative level, taking this to include both ministerial and official contacts. Perhaps their second most important point of influence is within the party. In contrast American

pressure groups, by and large, concentrate on the first two points: the electorate and the legislature.

There are, of course, many variations within these two broad patterns. A very important difference may result from the character of the power base of a group. There is a kind of power—and this is particularly important in Britain—that is created by the expansion of policy itself. "The greater the degree of detailed and technical control the government seeks to exert over industrial and commercial interests," E. P. Herring wrote, "the greater must be their degree of consent and active participation in the very process of regulation, if regulation is to be effective or successful."¹⁵ This generalization, I should think, holds for most Western democracies and surely for Britain. There, certain types of control exercised in recent years—price control, materials allocation, tariffs, import control, and the encouragement of exports and productivity are only some of the more striking examples—simply could not be enforced effectively without the substantial co-operation of the groups concerned. The group's technical advice is often well-nigh indispensable. But co-operation—something more than grudging consent to "the law"—is a further necessity. Our farm programs with their referenda and farmer-elected committees recognize this necessity. But in Britain the far wider scope of regulation and planning—even after the various "bonfires of controls"—gives this power factor far greater weight.

A few examples: The farmers—meaning in effect the NFU—are represented on a set of local committees that have had important administrative duties under various agricultural programs, and the chance that the NFU might en-

¹⁵ E. Pendleton Herring, *Public Administration and the Public Interest* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1936), p. 192.

courage these farmer representatives to withdraw from the committees has been a force in the annual price reviews. When the Conservatives in denationalizing part of the transport industry in 1946 dismantled the government haulage (that is, trucking) system, a standby scheme was organized by the industry itself. The Labour government's limitation of advertising expenditure was policed by the organized advertisers, and its important anti-inflationary effort to restrain both dividends and wage increases was carried out—and with remarkable success—on a voluntary basis by organized business and labor.

Neither the British nor the American system of consultation between government and pressure groups has been fully described.^{15a} Some rough impressions, modestly intended, may be in order. In both countries the central device is the representative advisory committee. British examples range from high level bodies such as the Economic Planning Board, the National Joint Advisory Council of the Ministry of Labour, the National Production Advisory Council on Industry, on which the relevant peak organizations, the FBI, BEC and TUC, are represented, to the multitude of advisory committees of the main economic departments to which trade associations send representatives. The latter are connected with the system of "sponsoring" departments which grew up during and after World War II and which means today that every industry and every branch of it, no matter how small, has a sponsoring department or section of one, somewhere in the government machine. Apart from such committees, although often around them, a regular

^{15a} For a brief sketch of important aspects of American practice see *Consultation with Industry*. Historical Reports on Defense Production, Report No. 19. A History of the Office of Industry Advisory Committees of the N.P.A. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 1953).

system of informal consultation has grown up. Private and public bureaucrats continually call one another on the telephone or meet for luncheon and discuss a problem on a first-name basis. Often several departments and several groups are concerned.

On the American side, the immense documentation on advisory committees in the federal government that was assembled by a subcommittee of the Government Operations Committee in 1957 has not yet been analyzed by political scientists.¹⁶ But it is clear that from the time of the National Recovery Administration, the use of this device, from being relatively rare, has immensely increased. The number of advisory committees associated with government departments at the center—and in addition to many more at the local or regional level—runs into the hundreds. One major set established by statute are in the Department of Agriculture—for instance, the Commodity Stabilization Committees. Of the remainder, the vast majority it seems are associated principally with the defense effort—procurement, development, standards, stockpiling, and so on—and consist of industry advisory committees. In comparison with similar British industry advisory committees, the American appear to depend less on trade associations, the result at least in part of the Defense Production Act of 1950 that requires that nonmembers as well as members of trade associations be included. The peak associations—the NAM and United States Chamber of Commerce—also play a much less prominent role than their British counterparts not being represented, as such,

¹⁶ *Advisory Committees* (Parts I-V), subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 84th Congress, 2d Session (1956); Hearings before the same subcommittee on H.R. 3378, 85th Congress, 1st Session (1957); H.R. Report 576 on H.R. 7390, 85th Congress, 1st Session (1957).

on even the Business Advisory Council. Certainly trade unions are not called in for advice so frequently or on so broad a front in the United States as in Britain. The TUC alone, for instance, is represented on some 60 committees touching all aspects of social and economic problems.

Of the broad character of the power relationship we can speak with confidence: the American executive possesses far less actual power than the British. Quite apart from the degree of delegated powers in this country, the political independence of Congress and the exercise of administrative oversight by Congressional Committees mean that the group interested in influencing policy must give great attention to the legislature. Some years ago Blaisdell found that pressure groups, while concerned with the administration, focused their attention principally upon Congress.¹⁷ Broadly this must still be the case, although it would be interesting to know how far the defense effort may have shifted the balance.

PRESSURE ON PARTIES

At the Democratic National Convention in 1956 the number of trade-union officials sitting as delegates ran into the hundreds, while at the Republican convention there was no more than a scattering. Generally, however, in both national and state parties in the United States, the connection of pressure groups and parties is less close than in Britain. We do not have the formal affiliation of the trade union movement with one party. But the more important difference arises from the fact that American parties are so poorly unified that they do not provide an effective channel for

¹⁷ Donald C. Blaisdell, *Economic Power and Political Pressures*, Monograph 26, T.N.E.C., Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power, 76th Congress, 3rd Session (Washington, 1941), pp. 57 and 70.

influencing the use of government authority. In Britain, on the other hand, the party ranks second—although perhaps a poor second—to the administration as an object of pressure.

Where the power is, there the pressure will be applied. Where we see the pressure being applied, therefore, we shall probably find the seat of power. Judged by this rule, the central organs of the British party, especially the parliamentary party, are far more powerful than the party's representative assemblies. Pressure groups do not openly descend on a British party conference as they do on the platform hearings of an American party convention. Their representatives, however, may be present and spokesmen for various special interests—farmers, trade unionists, veterans, teachers, old-age pensioners, advertising men with a concern for commercial broadcasting—will take up a good deal of time at a party conference.

The important point of influence, however, is the parliamentary party—its regular, full meetings and its specialized committees—and to a lesser extent the party's central office. We are familiar with the way leaders of the Labour party while in power or in opposition will frequently consult with the trade unions on pending decisions. There is also an active alignment, if not formal affiliation, of organized business with the Conservatives. During the passage of the bill nationalizing transport in 1946-47, for instance, the Conservative opposition tabled several hundred amendments. Where had they come from? In practice the party's Parliamentary Secretariat—a body of party employees, not MPs—acted as intermediary between the transport committee of the parliamentary party and the various pressure groups, especially the General Council of British Shipping, the Dock and Harbors Association, and a joint committee of the Federation of

British Industries, National Union of Manufacturers, and the Association of British Chambers of Commerce.¹⁸

Inseparable from these channels of influence is one of the, to an American, most curious phenomena of British politics. He is the "interested MP"—that is, the member who is connected with an outside interest group by direct personal involvement, such as occupation or ownership of property, or by membership or office holding in an outside organization speaking for an interest group. Today and for generations the House of Commons through the personal involvement of its members has represented a far wider range of interests than has the American Congress, notoriously inhabited by lawyers.

In Britain such personal involvement was a principal way in which interest groups of the nineteenth century made themselves heard in government. Of more importance in today's collectivist polity is the member connected with an outside organization. The MPs sponsored and subsidized by the trade unions are the best-known examples. But there is also a host of others: a joint Honorary Secretary of the Association of British Chambers of Commerce, the Chairman of the Howard League for Penal Reform, a Director of the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, the President of the British Legion, the Secretary of the National Tyre Distributors Association—there seems to be hardly a member who fails to note some such connection in his biography in the *Times' House of Commons*. Perhaps some Congressmen also have similar connections. Amid their wide membership in churches, fraternal organizations,

¹⁸ Finer, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*), pp. 67-68. For other examples of pressure group activity in the House of Commons see J. D. Stewart, *British Pressure Groups: Their Role in Relation to the House of Commons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958).

and "patriotic" groups as recorded in the *Congressional Directory*, however, they fail to mention them.

Perhaps, as S. E. Finer has suggested, the absence of such interested members from the Congress is one reason why American pressure groups must make up the deficiency by hiring lobbyists in such large numbers. For the interested MP is an active lobbyist within the legislature. His principal role is played within the parliamentary party, but his activity in the House itself is more observable. He may speak openly as the representative of a group, as the President of the British Legion often does in forwarding the Legion's campaign to increase disability pensions.¹⁹ He is more likely to be effective at the amendment stage of a finance or other bill when, briefed by his association, he suggests changes, which perhaps at the same time are being urged on the Minister and civil servants by officers or staff of the pressure group.

INFLUENCING PUBLIC OPINION

Herring long ago observed how American pressure groups direct great attention to influencing public opinion: not only to win support for some immediate objective, but also to build up generally favorable attitudes. This he found to be a trait of the "new" lobby, and it is not irrelevant that this technique arose along with the development of modern mass-advertising methods and media. A major difference in Britain is that the big vocational pressure groups rarely mount such public campaigns. In the nineteenth century, this was not so. Beginning late in the century, however, this propagandist function seems more and more to have passed to political parties. Today and for many years now, the parties, in contrast with the

¹⁹ J. H. Millett, "British Interest Group Tactics: A Case Study," *Political Science Quarterly* (March 1957).

pressure groups, have virtually monopolized communication with the voters as such—that is with the general public as distinguished from communication by a pressure group with its clientele.

This differentiation of function in political communication has gone very much farther in Britain than in the United States. A striking feature of nearly all the vocational pressure groups there is the extent to which they urge their demands simply and frankly as special interests. There is a significant contrast, I think, with American pressure groups which tend to base their claims on some large principle of social philosophy or national policy—as, for example, in the vast public-relations program of the NAM.

Yet the public campaign has sometimes been used by the big pressure groups of British politics and its use may be on the increase. Examples are the antinationalization campaign launched by the Road Haulage Association in 1946–47; Tate and Lyle's famous "Mr. Cube" campaign against the nationalization of sugar refining in 1949–50; and in general the growing use of Aims of Industry, a public-relations agency founded to defend and advocate free enterprise. Lesser efforts have been pressed by the National Union of Teachers and the British Legion. If this practice grows greatly, one might well expect it to weaken the position of the parties.

Such a development—which I do not expect—could have great consequences for the British polity. For without in any degree being cynical, one must ac-

knowledge the large part played by British parties in creating the present political homogeneity of the British electorate—the national market for their brand-name goods. The British party battle is continuous and highly organized and so also is the stream of propaganda directed at the voter. Through it the party voter is strengthened, if not created, and the tight party majority in the legislature prepared. Even more important, the framework of public thinking about policy, the voter's sense of the alternatives, is fixed from above. Popular sovereignty in the polity has been qualified by the same means that have qualified consumers' sovereignty in the economy.

In this Americans are not likely to find much cause for self-congratulation. We will hardly say that we are more free of political propaganda. As in other aspects of the American power pattern, the difference is that the centers from which this weighty influence emanates are far more dispersed and unco-ordinated. Is this necessarily to our advantage? Some words of E. P. Herring's suggest an answer:

A democracy inclines toward chaos rather than toward order. The representative principle, if logically followed, leads to infinite diversity rather than ultimate unity. . . . Since the "voice of the people" is a pleasant fancy and not a present fact, the impulse for positive political action must be deliberately imposed at some strategic point, if democracy is to succeed as a form of government.²⁰

²⁰ Herring, *op. cit.* (note 15 *supra*), p. 377.

Pressure Groups in France

By HENRY W. EHLMANN

ABSTRACT: As elsewhere pressure groups in France operate on all levels of the political process: shaping public opinion, manipulating political parties, pressing for favorable legislation in Parliament and for desirable rulings by the executive. What distinguishes the tactics and the effects of pressure-group action from those in other countries results rather from the particularities of the French political apparatus, from the uneven development of economic growth, and from the divided loyalties of the French people. Because of the lack of disciplined parties in a multiparty parliamentary system, interest groups can operate from within the cabinet. The question to which extent it has penetrated the once solidly walled sphere of the high administration is controversial. But that the rigidity and an "immobilism," characteristic of pressure groups everywhere, is transferred in France to the machinery of government, is generally admitted; it leads to an analogous immobilism of the political organs and hence has contributed to the crisis of the French Republic.

Henry W. Ehrmann, LL.B., Jur.D., Boulder, Colorado, is Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado. Dr. Ehrmann was born and educated in Germany and came to the United States in 1940. He was associated with the Office of War Information and the War Department, serving in the latter in the reorientation program for German prisoners of war. Dr. Ehrmann was a member of the Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton and Guest Professor at the Universities of California, Berkeley; Aix-en-Provence; Grenoble; and Bordeaux. He is the author of *French Labor from Popular Front to Liberation* (1947); *Organized Business in France* (1957); Editor and Co-Author of *The Teaching of the Social Sciences in the United States* (1954); *Interest Groups on Four Continents* (1958); and a contributor to numerous journals and magazines.

THE founding fathers of the Fourth French Republic hoped to overcome the frustrations of the Third by finally joining economic and political democracy and by endowing both with a hitherto unknown efficiency. The thinking of the most reflective groups in the resistance movement; the debates in the Constituent Assemblies, and the text of the constitutional drafts all gave expression to some form of pluralism as a means to achieve the announced goals. But the decisive problem of the relationship between groups and government was never clearly faced. The Constitution as well as other fundamental legislation virtually left open the question of whether or not and how organized interests were to participate in the ultimate determination of economic and social policies.

A pluralism, lopsided in favor of labor and of its allies appeared natural at the time of the liberation; and since labor was directly represented in the predominant parties of the new republic, there seemed to be little need for determining the precise place of organized interests in the state. The confusions of the historical moment increased the uncertainties which French liberalism had always derived from the legacy of Rousseau's thought and from the individualism of the French Revolution. Rousseau's fear that economic interests were dangerous to social and political unity and his belief that "little societies" should be stamped out rather than organized have lived on in the suspicion that any groups standing between the individual and the government might pose not less a threat to individual liberty than the intermediary corps of prerevolutionary days.¹

Because the phenomenon of interest groups is generally viewed with uneasi-

¹ For more details on this point see Henry W. Ehrmann, *Organized Business in France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 478 ff.

ness, group activities in France have acquired a characteristic style. A corresponding shyness has led, until very recently, to the almost total neglect of their operations by serious students of politics. But this has not prevented a luxuriant growth of interest groups, nor has it diminished the intensity of their intervention at all stages of the governmental process. The network of interest organizations is indeed so dense and intricate that it defies description in the scope of this article.²

GROUP REPRESENTATION

As elsewhere, but perhaps more so in France, the organizational structure, the techniques of public relations, and the tactics that are used to win access to parties, parliament, or administration vary with the nature of the interests represented by the groups. The cult of the small and the marginal, still widespread in France, has allowed such organizations as the Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles (representing all people actually engaged in farming), the Confederation of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, various veteran organizations, the truckers and beetgrowers to seek support through loud and often violent publicity campaigns. Their pressures sometimes extend into the very chambers of Parliament. Less noisy but still insistent are various organizations of civil servants; while organized labor as a pressure group is handicapped by its pronounced internal divisions, by membership fluctuation, and, in the case of the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT),

² For attempts at surveying interest group activities in general see François Goguel, *Le régime politique français* (Paris: Édition du Seuil, 1955), pp. 93-108; Philip Williams, *Politics in Post-War France* (London: Longmans Green Ltd., 1954), pp. 327-41; and Bernard E. Brown, "Pressure Politics in France," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 18 (1956), pp. 702-19.

by too close an identification with one political party, the Communist.

On the other end of the scale, certain powerful lobbies such as the National Council of French Employers and its most influential affiliates—the trade associations of the steel, chemical, and shipbuilding industries or the organization of the department stores—avoid the appeal to public opinion, operate only surreptitiously in Parliament, and will frequently concentrate their efforts on the high bureaucracy. In a special category are groups defending noneconomic interests. The Catholic Church seeks to mobilize through a number of organizations support for securing state aid to private schools; but even at election time it will hardly, at least not on a national scale, give binding directives to its "constituents." Of the anticlerical groups, the free masonry during the Third Republic was most active and influential though operating entirely behind a screen of secrecy. Since 1945, developments affecting the traditional French left seem to have diminished its importance.

The tactics of most interest groups are to a large extent determined by the peculiarities of the French party system. Where political parties are little more than a network of personal relations, interest groups have other and generally easier means of access than if they would have to deal with disciplined and well-structured party organizations. When after the liberation three-fourths of the Deputies belonged to large and disciplined parties, organized interests found it necessary to intervene with the party leadership or to constitute themselves as the peripheral mass organizations of a party, frequently with an interlocking hierarchy. But since then all parties, except the Socialist and Communist, have returned to the prewar pattern of loosely organized groups resembling agglomerations of "notables"

rather than modern party organizations. Hence pressures are once more exerted on individual Deputies who can vote, move private member bills, or propose amendments to pending legislation without effective interference by the party to which they belong.³

It is true that the very individualism of this system never guarantees to the interest groups that a definite bloc of votes will be at their command. But this disadvantage is in many cases balanced by the lever which the affluent groups can operate by contributing to party finances, especially at the moment of elections. In the absence of effective legislation concerned with limiting election expenses and with lobbying operations of any kind, the part which interest groups play as the "angels" of deputies is mostly shrouded in secrecy; serious studies are as yet lacking. But it is certain that the expenses incurred under an election system which was devised at a time when disciplined mass parties had come into existence are far too heavy to be borne by the shapeless organizations which now dominate the political scene.

Pressure politics, however, profit not only from the proliferation and organizational anemia of political parties, but also from the mixture of social classes characteristic of most parties and from the resulting weakness of social identification. Parties whose clientele is dispersed among many social categories are obviously unable to present a solid front to the multiple, and frequently contradictory, pressures which emanate from

³ On these points see the penetrating and detailed studies by George E. Lavau, "The Political Pressure Action by Non-Political Groups in France," in Henry W. Ehrmann (Ed.), *Interest Groups on Four Continents* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1958), pp. 60-95; and by Jean Meynaud, "Contribution à l'analyse des groupes d'intérêt dans la vie politique française," *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie* (1956), pp. 225-56.

these categories. Conversely, if several parties compete for the membership of an important interest group and if the latter commands an appreciable fraction of the traditional following of the parties, it is clear that a politically adroit group leadership can reap large benefits, especially since most deputies are now once more elected by a small margin. To give but one example familiar to the student of American politics: the strength of the various agricultural organizations in France stems from the political wavering of many farmers and from the fact that in many parts of the country their political leanings vary according to regions, types of farming, or family traditions.

Of whatever importance the actual role of interest groups may be, their weight is still considerably increased by the "myth" they have been able to create about themselves in the minds of Members of Parliament and party leaders. Pressures from organized groups are believed to be irresistible. Not to oppose them is considered a legacy of political wisdom handed down lazily from generation to generation. The numerous cases where interest groups have in fact failed are frequently forgotten.⁴

PERMEABILITY OF GOVERNMENT

It is true that the working methods of the National Assembly—not very different from those practiced by its predecessor, the Chamber of Deputies—greatly facilitate the intrusion of the groups. Though officially banned the so-called "Study Groups" (replacing the "Defense Groups" of the Third Republic) are in fact organisms of liaison between the legislature and organized in-

⁴ See Lavau (note 3 *supra*). One such case is related in Henry W. Ehrmann, "The French Trade Associations and the Ratification of the Schuman Plan," *World Politics*, Vol. 6 (1954), pp. 453-81.

terests. They are generally composed of the most indefatigable of pressure groups' officials and of those Deputies who during their election campaign have given written and solemn pledges to uphold, if elected, the cause of the lobby. One of the most notable of such groups was the Study and Action Group for Private Enterprise organized after the 1951 election by the energetic palladin of small business interests, M. Gingembre. Its importance declined when there arose in the Poujade movement a competitor appealing to the same audience but frankly transgressing the boundaries of a pressure group by attacking the entire parliamentary and political system.

Because of the important role which the standing committees of both the lower and upper house play in the legislative process, at all times they have been an important forum for group activities. In fact the committee system has been rather strengthened in the Fourth Republic. The formation of numerous subcommittees on which only a few members are truly active has accelerated a process which has turned many committees into the "institutional façade for the operation of pressure groups."⁵ Since committees habitually substitute their own text, even where the government has introduced an important public bill, it can easily be seen how a well-organized interest group which has the ear of influential committee members can directly modify pending legislation.

If the "Study Groups" and standing committees offer the best terrain for the groups, there are other channels through which Members of Parliament can be reached. On certain occasions all Deputies and Senators were flooded with documentation issued by one or another of the interest groups. In general, they seem to accept material coming from

⁵ Williams, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), p. 240.

private sources with greater confidence than government documents. The precarious working conditions under which French Deputies have to labor give a fighting start to a well-organized group that can provide statistical and other information which the elected representative never is able to assemble; cases are known where a trade association has offered complete secretarial services to a harassed Member of Parliament.

In a parliamentary system such as the French where the separation of powers is at the vanishing point, interest groups can never be indifferent to the composition of the cabinet. The tactics of a given group often vary, depending on whether the Premier or a particular minister is considered a "friend" or a foe. A friend is a politician who has already given proof of his understanding for the claims of the group or who, thanks to his connections and leaning, at least knows the milieu of the group, or who may have been elected in a constituency where the group represents real electoral power. Frequently a "friend" will have attended faithfully the meetings of a "Study Group" or the public gatherings, banquets, and the like which most pressure groups organize from time to time. In the presence of a cabinet headed by a sympathetic Prime Minister or of a well-disposed Minister, the strategy of the group will be flexible and mostly concerned with preventing undesirable decisions. Frequently it will be possible to introduce into the Minister's personal cabinet somebody who plays practically the role of an "agent" for the group or to single out among the Minister's confidants those who will serve as liaison men. The pressure on a "friendly" government is always discreet and sometimes reduced to a whisper. Here the group foregoes any publicity for its démarches, with the possible exception of boasts in the internal bulletins of those organiza-

tions which have to prove to their disgruntled members that they are efficiently defended.⁶

When government or Minister cannot be relied upon, the situation is quite different. Groups then will become vocal, raise their objections and demands in a loud voice, and appeal to public opinion. At such times it will be advantageous if the powerful groups representing large interests can hide behind the frantic protests of the exasperated and underprivileged. Communiqués to the press, both in the capital and in the provinces, will be issued; agitation in Parliament will be increased; possibly also "direct" pressures such as strikes and boycotts, delivery delays, refusal to pay taxes or to use the postal savings system may be applied by interest groups. All these methods are used to forestall decisions the groups judge adverse to their interests. But they obviously also aim at replacing an unfriendly government by one which will be more manageable.

It is therefore generally assumed that organized interests have played an important role in the downfall of certain cabinets, and have been active in advising on the formation of their successors. But because of the general confusion which generally prevails at the moment of a cabinet crisis, it is very difficult to attribute with any certainty actions, decisions, or votes to the deliberate intervention of interest groups. Occasionally, and especially at the moment of a protracted crisis, candidates for the premiership have complained of group intrigues. It is widely admitted that at times the official purveyors of electoral subsidies have reminded their

⁶ On these points see George E. Lavau, *op. cit.* (note 3 *supra*); and "Note sur un 'Pressure Group' français: La Confédération Générale des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, Vol. 5 (1955), pp. 370 ff.

"clients," the elected representatives, of the obligations they had incurred towards the groups which had supplied funds.

ADMINISTRATION

In a system where nationalized enterprises are upstream from the most important economic activities of the private sector, where credit and many investments are tightly controlled by the authorities, where exports and convertibility restrictions continue, where government price fixing is still important, and where wages move between points determined by official rulings, the most important decisions on the changing distribution of wealth are made on the administrative level. Since the bureaucracy formulates and weighs the interest of the state against conflicting demands from within and without the government, French interest groups are continuously concerned with the minutiae of administrative rulings, just as elsewhere the defense of interests tends towards the point of gravity of governmental powers. Moreover, the co-operation between administration and organized interests is often indispensable for transforming abstract or rigid laws into workable operations.

The question of the degree to which the high civil service in France is susceptible to the pressures of organized interests is highly controversial.⁷ But on an answer to that question depends any judgment on the over-all effect of pressure politics because the relative weight of parliamentary decisions has undoubtedly declined. Those who conclude that at least certain well-organized interests have little difficulty in imposing their views on the high bureaucracy can point to a number of de-

velopments which, though not entirely novel, have taken on greater and perhaps decisive significance in the Fourth Republic.

What may be called euphemistically "administrative pluralism" has been extended to such a degree that today there exist around the administration countless committees, councils, boards, and the like, mostly attached to one or more ministries. Their functions consist in the preliminary study, the preparation, and sometimes the final drafting of administrative regulations in many fields of the socio-economic sphere. On most of these committees the representatives of "accredited" interest groups play a prominent role which although official leads nonetheless to a confusion of responsibilities. Here interest groups become administrators and assume certain prerogatives of the state. Not only does this participation give them considerable moral prestige; it also makes many civil servants sitting on these committees less aware of the merger of public and special interests which is taking place before their eyes. The fact that officially these committees have only advisory functions means little: the "advice" will frequently be fully sanctioned by the official decision.

But also outside of such an organism, the civil servants are said to be highly vulnerable at least to those pressures that emanate from a number of influential interest groups. For instance between big business and the high bureaucracy, there prevails an affinity of views which is promoted and reinforced by common social origins, by education in the same institutions, by the similarity of professional training, by the *convivium* and *connubium*. Shifts in employment from public service to private business or to positions on the staff of interest groups are becoming more and more numerous because of the insufficiency of civil servants' pay and the

shrinking private incomes of many a bourgeois family. But such shifts will easily have a profound influence on the dialogue between the public servant and the advocate of special interests. Accustomed as they are to their changes in position, the two may frequently forget from "which side of the desk" they are arguing with each other. One must assume that the organized interests find all this rewarding. But what about the public interest presumably defended by the public servants?

It is also generally admitted, and this is not a specifically French phenomenon, that certain administrations—usually taking cover behind the cabinet member in charge of the ministry—defend the concerns of special interests within the government. This is quite naturally the case for such ministries as Labor, Agriculture, and Public Works. An interesting case is that of the Ministry of Industrial Production⁸ whose divisions are organized according to the major branches of industry. Here the collaboration between trade associations and government officials is so close and permanent that often a situation prevails which does not differ essentially from the corporatist setup of the Vichy regime.

There are other observers who believe that all statements concluding that pressure politics successfully penetrate the administrative process are generalizations and possibly exaggerations. It is true that in the absence of careful investigations the actual incidence of interest representation on authoritative decision making cannot be gauged reliably. Are there not situations where the advice tendered by the consultative boards is simply ignored? Will not the all-important Ministry of Finance always offer effective resistance to inad-

⁸ The name of this Minister frequently changes, but its organization remains substantially the same.

missible pressures from within or without the government? Can it be denied that a large number of high-ranking *fonctionnaires* have by training, intelligence, and temperament acquired a responsibility for administering the *res publica* and that this faculty is unimpaired by their social origin?

One would probably have to conclude for the time being that valid arguments can be put forward both by those who believe that the weakness of the party system permits the transmission of interest pressures to the bureaucracy and by those who see in the French administration an effective instrument for the necessary adjustment of conflicts and a rampart for the public welfare. Detailed inquiries, as yet lacking but encouraged from many sides, will be needed before it can be decided which contention comes closer to the realities of French government.

PUBLIC ATTITUDES

What distinguishes French pressure groups from corresponding organizations in other countries is obviously not their "operational code": the ways in which they seek to win and to maintain access to the various organs of government. On that level, and only with some significant exceptions, the similarities are as great as one would expect. The considerable differences which do exist in regard to the effects of group activities result rather from the general political and economic milieu in which the groups operate.

The government lacks the stability and strength to exercise its function as an arbiter among competing claims and to mobilize public opinion behind the solution it proposes. Shifting coalitions and the ensuing shifting of purposes make it impossible for any government to explain its actions to the groups operating in the antechambers of politics. In a situation in which the vast majority

⁷ The problem is carefully discussed by Jean Meynaud, "Les groupes d'intérêt et l'administration en France," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, Vol. 7 (1957), pp. 573-93.

of Frenchmen have come to hold the government responsible for the prosperity of the country, neither Parliament nor administration is equipped for the tasks of social and economic engineering it is called upon to undertake, or at least to co-ordinate. A state that interferes in most aspects of economic life and yet proves weaker than the coalitions of organized interests surrounding it will be constantly in a precarious position. In the political and administrative disorder thus created the most virulent pressure groups are able to transfer their conflicts to the machinery of government itself. The rigidity and an "immobilism" characteristic of interest groups everywhere is soon matched by an analogous immobilism of the political organs.

All this explains the loud and substantiated complaints about French pressure politics voiced from many quarters: from conservative politicians and from liberals, from the royal pretender as well as from a Socialist President of the Republic, from de Gaulle, and from Mendès-France. Pius XII himself has admitted that recent French experiences made it imperative to correct the optimistic beliefs of earlier

papal encyclicals in regard to the beneficial activities of the intermediary groups.⁹

One of the most sagacious British observers of the French scene concluded his discussion of pressure groups by insisting that the responsibility for the consequences of group activities should be put where it belongs:

The ordinary citizen should not be allowed to compound for his own deficiencies by damning those of the rulers whom he chooses and influences. The country's tragedy lies in the divided loyalties of its people. Its weakness lies in their *incivisme*, in a concentration on their private interests which is sometimes carried to excess.¹⁰

In France as in any other democracy the impact of organized interests on the governmental process is largely a function of public attitudes.¹¹

⁹ See the "Lettre de S.S. Pie XII à M. Charles Flory," in *Cinquantenaire des Semaines Sociales, Crise du Pouvoir et Crise du Civisme* (Lyons, 1954), pp. 5-10.

¹⁰ Williams, *op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), p. 341. For similar conclusions see also Jean Meynaud, "L'intervention des groupes d'intérêt dans la politique économique," *Revue économique et sociale*, Vol. 14 (1956), p. 277.

¹¹ This article was completed before the events of May 1958 which led to the demise of the Fourth Republic.

Pressure Groups, Foreign Policies, and International Politics

By DONALD C. BLAISDELL

ABSTRACT: In international as in domestic politics group activity has become influential. Organizational and propaganda techniques have enabled these groups to claim an enlarged role in the decisions both of foreign offices and of intergovernmental organizations. Whether the form of activity which in the United States is synonymous with pressure groups is a universal phenomenon is a question awaiting systematic analysis. In the United States governmental structure, undisciplined political parties, the industrial and communications revolutions have combined to widen the opportunities open to citizens' groups to participate in the making of policy. Due to the necessity of compromise between the conflicting aims of such groups, the results of their activities in terms of foreign policies are rarely consistent. The external environment raises the armed services, already practiced in lobbying, to a new height of influence in grand strategy. Participation by international nongovernmental organizations in making policy with wider scope and effect has been recognized in the United Nations and other postwar charters. In a nation-state system in which nationalism builds up new states while the technology of security tends to undermine old ones, the modern system of pressure groups introduces an element of democratic control over policy, but with mixed effects on the welfare of peoples.

Donald C. Blaisdell, Ph.D., New York City, is Professor of Government, The City College of New York. Except for a short period in 1940-41 when he was Director of the Washington office of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, he was in federal government service from 1936 to 1953. Following four years in the Department of Agriculture and ten in the Department of State, he was Deputy Chief of the United States Resident Delegation to International Organizations, Geneva. He has taught at Robert College, Istanbul, Turkey; Williams College; the state universities of Wisconsin, Illinois, and Florida, and Wellesley College. He is the author of articles, monographs, and books in the field of politics and public affairs, the most recent being *American Democracy Under Pressure* (1957).

ORGANIZATIONS active in the domestic affairs of governments are similarly active in international politics. Most of the articles in this issue deal with pressure groups in American politics. But this does not mean that politics does or should stop at the water's edge. Nor does it mean that American pressure groups and the lobbies of Britain, France, and other countries are passive in international politics. On the contrary, politics of nation states is politics not only of the governments of the states themselves but also of numerous organized citizens' groups, currently known as international nongovernmental organizations (INGO's). They exist within each nation state and, in what is known as Western civilization at least, play an increasing role in domestic politics. But on the international stage as well these energetic organizations are increasingly important. In the complex field of intergovernmental association, bilateral and multilateral, regional and global, relations between governments and intergovernmental organizations (IGO's) are influenced by these unofficial groups.

A UNIVERSAL PHENOMENON?

Is the type of activity which in the United States is typical of the pressure group a universal or a local phenomenon? No systematic study of the world's peoples has been made which would permit a conclusive answer. In one part of the world—the United States—several decades of work by students of society and government have produced a large volume of material. In other countries such as Great Britain, France, the Scandinavian countries, Italy, and the members of the Commonwealth a beginning has been made. In most other countries of the world little or nothing has been done. Even in the United States, we still lack an accepted

theory of interests. Very little systematic work has been done in the comparative study of contemporary societies which would allow the drawing of conclusions.¹ Unlike the scientists and governments which have co-operated in the International Geophysical Year to expand man's knowledge of the earth, those who study men—and their governments—have not yet conceived on a world-wide scale a project which would produce even tentative findings as to the occurrence of the kind of social activity known as pressure groups.

However, we may hazard one or two hypotheses based on what we know about this form of social activity in the United States. The organization of influence to bring pressure on governments is the result of no single cause. In their modern form, pressure groups emerge with industrialism and urbanism. They are strengthened as communications are revolutionized by the electronics technology; as the distributive system of goods and service requires advertising, public relations, and propaganda; and as all big organizations, public and private, become bureaucratic. The demands of pressure groups for services from government result in the welfare state.

Whether pressure groups will emerge in the same way in other countries remains to be seen. However, as the world's underdeveloped peoples learn of machine productivity, it may be predicted that their demands for political independence, or for a greater share of the world's goods, or for both, will be organized and directed more and more through pressure groups.

¹ In the United States the Social Science Research Council has started a comparative study of interest groups. This subject was also discussed in 1957 by a round table organized by the International Political Science Association, which has put it on the agenda of its Rome Congress (1958).

PRESSURE GROUPS AND FOREIGN POLICIES

If a relationship exists between pressure groups and foreign policies, it has not been systematically studied. Even in the United States it calls for more research. In 1952 three areas were suggested for study: ideas and political institutions; problems in democratic control; and power, principle, and policy. Among problems in democratic control are those associated with political parties and pressure groups: "much more should be known about how they organize support, and how they co-operate with congressional and executive agencies. . . ."²

In the making of foreign policy in the United States, account must be taken of the external environment, the ethnic composition of the population, the moods of the people, as well as their relative indifference to foreign relations. More attention must be paid to the attentive publics. The political parties must be considered, although their limitations in this connection must not be forgotten. The activities of religious and church groups, of producers, workers, women, and reform groups are pertinent. The formal organs of government, the President, the Congress, and the bureaucracy, are obviously involved—particularly the military in the bureaucracy. Finally, the propaganda which originates with foreign governments and their agents with the federal bureaucracy, the military, and the above-mentioned groups affects the process.

Although the United States is not the only country in which pressure groups flourish, there is no other in which the

² *United States Foreign Policy: Its Organization and Control*. Report of a Study Group for the Woodrow Wilson Foundation. Chairman of the Study Group William Yandell Elliott (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), p. 242.

system of government and the character of the people provide such a favorable setting for their growth. Given the government as established by the Constitution and as operated by the American people, the rise of pressure groups was almost inevitable. The tripartite separation of governmental powers invites rivalry and conflict between the legislative and executive branches which pressure groups exploit. Checks and balances make policy making a long and complicated process which plays into the hands of groups external to the formal governmental process. Judicial review and individual rights result in government being constantly questioned as to its authority. The American preference for undisciplined political parties opens the way to a pressure-group polity. All these features of our governmental system combine with the penchant of Americans to join voluntary groups and then leave their direction to an active minority ("let George do it") to increase the permeability of the governmental fabric to pressure group infiltration. As with political parties, judicial review, the President's cabinet, so with pressure groups: unknown to the written Constitution, they have become a major feature of the government of the "living Constitution."

The President

Constitutionally and politically the President is the chief foreign policy maker, checked only by the Senate as to treaties and appointments and by both houses of Congress when programs, such as foreign and defense aid, depend on the appropriation of money.

But the President, although always potentially strong in foreign relations, is not all powerful. He is checked, too, by the moods of the people.³ In the era

³ Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1950), pp. 153 ff.

of coalition, diplomacy, and weapons of mass destruction, he must consult with allies. Even within the executive branch, he cannot control the actions or utterances of subordinates. If the views of military personalities differ from the President's, they are not without means of resisting the Commander in Chief and even of using Congressional support to get their own way.⁴ Nor can a President lead at all times and in all circumstances. When Presidential leadership is lacking, special groups and electoral considerations are too powerful for sound policy to develop.⁵

Domestic pressure groups

In foreign policy, pressure groups are not as valuable a feature of the American system as in domestic policy making. In domestic politics, pressure groups are useful as sources of information, of advice, of estimates of the probable effects of proposed measures. Moreover, pressure groups add a new dimension to political representation, giving expression to other interests than those determined by residence. All these are positive values, which are not, however, free from disadvantages. As regards foreign policy, pressure groups can be and often are more of a liability than an asset. If some groups generate support for a new policy, there are others which oppose it. If the net effect is sometimes advantageous to policy makers, at other times it is disrupting, delaying, and produces inconsistent policies. Officials look on pressure groups and their lobbyists as amateurs in a field in which expertise is required. Hence, the proffer of information, advice, and forecast is not likely to be as welcome in foreign as in

⁴ Max Beloff, *Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), pp. 84-85.

⁵ Dean Acheson, "The Responsibility for Decision in Foreign Policy," *Yale Review* (Autumn 1954).

domestic policy making. Representationally, political lobbies tend to allow special interests to override general ones. From the national point of view, they are often too successful.

Also, the State Department is farther removed from the people than many federal departments. Unlike some others such as Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and the Treasury, it does not think of itself as a clientele agency. However, the State Department like other federal agencies does not act as a single unit. While the Department as a whole tends to be unresponsive to the advice of laymen, the Bureau of International Organization Affairs makes an effort to maintain contact with citizen groups. Relying on the provision of the United Nations Charter which permits UN organs to consult with nongovernmental organizations (of questionable applicability here), the Bureau from time to time brings together representatives of pressure groups for briefing and other purposes.

Effects on policies

"Domestic pressure groups have a great influence on our foreign policy."⁶ Producer and labor lobbies have helped shape tariff and immigration policies. In international politics as well, business interests were the strongest influence in 1934 in obtaining recognition of the government of the USSR. Executive tariff bargaining with foreign countries, authorized in 1934 and extended many times, has in recent years been weakened by various limitations adopted at the insistence of producers. American participation in an international organization to supervise multilateral tariff bargaining has been blocked repeatedly by powerful producers' groups.

Inconsistencies in economic foreign policies during the interwar period can be traced to pressure politics. Noting

⁶ *Op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), p. 242.

the "mercantilistic dilemma" into which the United States had drifted following World War I, Harold H. Sprout concludes that

such inconsistencies . . . whether superficial or fundamental, . . . have been a result less of unintelligent leadership than of the operation of pressure politics in a democracy in which localism rules the national legislature and statesmen must be electioneering politicians.⁷

In more recent times as well, pressure groups have been recognized as influential in policy making. In the twenty-six months before Pearl Harbor, pacifist, isolationist, and interventionist groups exerted great efforts to influence both the public and the government. While events abroad changed the people from isolation to acceptance of war, nevertheless policy was influenced by these active citizens' groups. They were influential

because policy formers were highly sensitive to public opinion. If it went beyond, as with the Guam [fortification] proposal, a pressure group could effectively cause a set-back. On the other hand, a group could help to widen these bounds, by crystallizing opinion around new events or issues and could thus advance policy, as demonstrated by the destroyer deal [with Britain].⁸

Similarly, in the postwar period, groups expanded the bounds tolerated by opinion. In 1948 popular support for aid to Europe was mobilized by the Citizens' Committee for the Marshall Plan. Also, within the widened bounds, there was room for special interests to press their claims. Agricultural interests obtained from Congress authorization and direction to dispose of farm surpluses; shipping interests, for the

⁷ Harold H. Sprout, "Pressure Groups and Foreign Policies," *THE ANNALS*, Vol. 179 (May 1935), p. 123.

⁸ John W. Masland, "Pressure Groups and American Foreign Policy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 6 (Spring 1942), p. 122.

transport of goods in American bottoms; and, later, industrial producers for procurement of their products for shipment overseas. Thus, with high rewards (85 per cent of the twenty billion dollars appropriated by Congress for foreign aid since 1948 have been spent in the USA) and no integrated party responsibility, special interest groups have delayed action, have increased the timidity of the Executive branch of the government, or have produced confusion.⁹

The military in policy making

In the post-Korean policy of encirclement and deterrent by threat, the military establishment has emerged as the most influential factor. Just as the peace associations of the 1920's and 1930's supplied the ideas of American diplomacy during the interwar period,¹⁰ so strategic considerations supplied by the military are at the bottom of contemporary foreign policy. Mutual defense through the North Atlantic Treaty; the stationing of troops in Europe; military defense assistance; German rearmament; the Southeast Asia, Australia-New Zealand-United States, and Baghdad Pacts; as well as bilateral defense pacts with Spain, Japan, Nationalist China, Korea, and others, all have their inspiration in military strategy. American diplomacy has become the handmaiden of defense strategy. Similarly, economic foreign policy has been dominated less by considerations of trade expansion than by the alleged imperative of depriving Communist countries of strategic materials.

In the politics of defense, the military themselves do all the things that pressure groups do. The situation re-

⁹ *Op. cit.* (note 2 *supra*), pp. 212-13.

¹⁰ Robert H. Ferrell, "The Peace Movement," in *Isolation and Security*, Alexander DeConde (Ed.) (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1957), p. 99.

sembles any other in which pressure politics dominates, except that the rivalry among the army, navy, and air force, with their respective industrial and civilian associates for priority in determining defense doctrine, is fraught with greater meaning to the country than any other situation. Not only are the sums at stake far larger, but also the propaganda and political activities of the armed services are carried on with public money.

It is unrealistic to suppose that political lobbies operate only outside the formal governmental organs and focus their attention on Congress only. All federal departments, agencies, and bureaus engage in lobbying and almost always find support among pressure politicians in Congress. The military are pre-eminent among government lobbies. The case which the armed services—each in its own way—argue before appropriations committees, before the two houses of Congress, and the public rates highest in the scale of contemporary values—the security and integrity of the country. In the argument all other federal departments, including the State Department, and all officials, including the President, are at a disadvantage due to the dizzying innovations in weapons and in strategy which only the military claims to understand. Moreover, to lobby for appropriations—even before the days of huge federal budgets—has been traditional with the armed services. Now, with expenditures by them amounting to about two-thirds of every budget, it is but a logical extension of this earlier activity for the military to lobby for acceptance of policy, defense as well as foreign, especially when policy depends on money for its being carried out.

If mutually consistent policies resulted from the prominent position of the military, the consequences might be less disturbing. But they do not. Grand

strategy suffers from the compromises necessitated by the claims of the military and of other pressure groups. In the struggle with the Soviet Union, relations with our allies are weakened "by practicing economic warfare against them" in order "to benefit special interest groups among our population."¹¹ Also, the execution of policies is hindered by the frustrating procedures written into legislation by pressure groups.¹² The same free countries against which economic warfare is practiced by act of Congress are urged, also by Congress, to unite to strengthen their economic and political structures. The inconsistency is explained by the success of different groups, "Buy American" and such laws resulting from the pressure of one set of groups, Congressional objectives of economic recovery and European federation from another.

Foreign propaganda

Still another influence is propaganda originating outside but disseminated within the United States. It is increasingly difficult to identify it. One man's information is another man's propaganda. Still, there is little disagreement about some propaganda. Attempts by foreign governments or their agents to influence American policy, domestic or foreign, is propaganda. Congress has recognized it as such and has adopted legislation requiring foreign agents to register with the Department of Justice. But it is not so certain to whom the law applies, should it apply to foreign students for example, in this country for study who engage in personal discussion and speak publicly? Some Congressmen think they are propagandists

¹¹ Harry Schwartz, "As We Confront Russia: The Basic Problem," *New York Times Magazine*, April 6, 1958, p. 71.

¹² Hilbert Schenk, Jr., "A Nuts-and-Bolts View of Weapons Development," *The Reporter*, October 31, 1957.

and that they should be required to register. Also should those register who mount promotional campaigns and bond drives on behalf of foreign states? Releases for the press from foreign embassy information offices will readily be recognized as special pleading, and the alert citizen will not be duped. But the power of the press and of the other mass media to censor by selection often fools even the alert citizen. Also, Members of Congress themselves divide over questions of foreign policy, thus becoming in effect foreign propagandists.

PRESSURE GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Intergovernmental organizations attract the attention of pressure groups just as national governments do, and for the same reasons—to be present where action is taken and decisions are made and to attempt to influence or determine the action.

In the United Nations Charter formal notice has been taken of economic, social, and other groups, the realization of whose objectives requires international activity. Following the recognition accorded in 1945 by the State Department to representatives of national groups as consultants to the United States Delegation at the San Francisco Conference, the Charter included an article (71) authorizing the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to "make suitable arrangements for consultation with nongovernmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence." Acting on this authorization the ECOSOC has brought some 300 nongovernmental organizations (INGO's) into consultative status. With such status, organizations are entitled to have their representatives attend all open meetings of the Council and of its commissions. They receive documentation. They consult the Secretariat. They answer questionnaires sent out by the

UN. They circulate written statements to government representatives, present their views to the Council, make recommendations, and object to proposals made.¹³ Similar steps have been taken by most of the autonomous intergovernmental organizations which are related to the UN, such as the World Health Organization.

To state the formal relation between the United Nations and the INGO's tells only part of the story. It has been said that the consultative arrangements just mentioned "went further in extending to nongovernmental organizations opportunities for the presentation of their views than have ever been granted to such groups by any national government."¹⁴ The opportunities have been grasped by INGO's in all fields—business and finance; communications, transport, and travel; labor; agriculture; arts and sciences; the press; education; religion; social welfare; sports; international law and the legal settlement of disputes; and the pursuit of peace. As pressure groups, INGO's with consultative status pursue their aims with the same number and variety of tactics as they do with national governments. In 1951 White found that INGO's are often directly responsible for intergovernmental action. They exert pressure simultaneously on national governments

¹³ "Arrangements of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations for Consultation with Non-Governmental Organizations, Guide for Consultants" (United Nations Document E/INF/23, 30 April 1948). Cf. also United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Resolution 288 (X), 27 February 1950 (Document E/1646, 2 March 1950), which revised the arrangements for consultation which had been adopted by the Council on June 21, 1946 and subsequently modified from time to time.

¹⁴ Lyman Cromwell White, *International Non-Governmental Organizations, Their Purposes, Methods, and Accomplishments* (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1951), p. 258.

and international agencies. They participate directly in the committees and commissions of intergovernmental bodies. They demand new services, criticize intergovernmental organizations, and demand changes in policy. Also, according to White, the INGO's have provided the basis of much of the international legislation in existence. Conferences are held at their insistence. They do the spade work which has determined the success of conferences. They persuade governments to ratify international conventions, and through national governments they urge national legislation to effect international policy. In addition, they establish international standards having as much authority as if they had come into being through governmental action. They have influenced the actual establishment as well as the policies of official administrative agencies. They have even helped to create nations.¹⁵ In the light of such achievements, it is not difficult to believe the observation of a key UN official: "Governments never act unless pressed, never."¹⁶

The politics which the INGO's play has extended to the East-West struggle as well as to the attainment of more immediate objectives. When it became clear that the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) was dominated by Communist-controlled governments, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) was set up in 1949 for the labor movement of the Free World.¹⁷ In the United Nations, both sides have used these supposedly private international pressure groups in the economic and social skirmishes of the cold war. The freedom to partici-

pate in debates in ECOSOC has increased the importance of both the WFTU and ICFTU. The former acts for the East and has become accustomed to try to expose flaws in the capitalistic system such as unemployment, sex inequality, and discrimination against Communists. On the other hand, the ICFTU attacked forced labor, and as a result a commission was set up which condemned it. The WFTU's power was lessened, however, by the control of oral statement in 1949 and the return of the Soviet Union to the International Labor Organization in 1954.¹⁸

INTEREST GROUPS AND THE NATIONAL STATE SYSTEM

The growth and influence of group activity have not been without effect on the system of territorial nation states. Political institutions are never static. They change constantly. Change occurs because "governments, like clocks," as William Penn has said, "go from the motion men give them. . . ." The motion imparted in our day to the political institution of the nation state originates in the activity of men, taking different forms, some, like the revolution in weapons, foreshadowing the end of the nation-state system;¹⁹ others, like the urge to political independence, lending new strength to it. In form the international pressure group—the purposeful organization of mass activity for policy—is neutral, but it is no less significant for that reason than the other forms of motion imparted by men to their political institutions.

The strength of nationalism is great; the urge to independence felt by dependent peoples is universal. The proc-

ess of state building, accelerated by the two world wars, has not yet come to an end. In this process, pressure groups reinforce other forces aiming at independence. Indeed, in some cases the pressure group is the nationalist movement. The Jewish Agency for Palestine provided the drive for the establishment of Israel.

Similarly, interest groups in older, more mature states, on balance, no doubt heighten nationalist feelings within those states. In modern times, the pressure group movement, while part of the development of nationalism, has contributed to it; nationalist-oriented groups stimulate pride in the nation's achievements, defending it and sensitively watching for any affront to its dignity. Such groups sometimes are also oriented internationally along with others for whom this is the dominant purpose. But their internationalism rarely, if ever, overrides their nationalism, let alone displaces it. The preoccupation of most pressure groups is by and large with the nation when more immediate concerns permit any time and energy to be devoted to broader purposes. Furthermore, the popular outlook on power is optimistic and turns on the extent and intensity of popular pressures. How nations regard their power depends partly

upon the extent to which they are subject to popular pressures—since the margin available to the state for the exercise of its moral predilections will tend to seem greater to the electorate than to the government and greater perhaps to the civilian side of government than to the military.²⁰

However, simultaneously with this bolstering effect on nationalism and the nation-state system is an opposite ef-

fect; one that eats away and erodes the attachment of people, indeed of whole groups, to their governments and political regimes. Group interests are never synonymous with the national interest. By definition the interest of a group is less than the interest of the nation as a whole. Nor is the sum of the interests of the groups within a nation to be equated to the national interest. If the national interest is to be grasped as a concept, it must be regarded more as the product than as the sum of the interests of the individuals and groups which comprise the nation. The subordination of the national to group interests in France in the 1930's reduced that country to a mere shadow of its former self. The great problem of democratic representative government is the devising of new ways of narrowing the gap between the individual's interests, expressed in representative institutions like pressure groups and representative assemblies, and those of the collectivity of individuals.

In an era of clashing ideologies, interest groups assume a new importance. According to the Communists, the struggle in the world today is a phase of the class struggle. In such an interpretation, interest groups are a means to an end—the communization of the world through the Communist Party of the USSR and its partners. In order to understand this struggle, democracies might well use all the tools of social research, just as they are using all the tools of research into the nature of matter. As a tool for the analysis of international politics and of foreign policy, the concept of the pressure group as mass activity has potentialities for the future which will disclose not only the weak points, but also the strength of the Free World.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 13–14.

¹⁶ The same point is made by White, *op. cit.* (note 14 *supra*), pp. 10–11.

¹⁷ For the structure of the international labor movement see Lewis L. Lorwin, "The Structure of International Labor Activities," *THE ANNALS*, Vol. 310 (March 1957), pp. 1–3.

¹⁸ H. R. Jacobson, "Labor, the UN and the Cold War," *International Organization*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter 1957), pp. 55–67.

¹⁹ John H. Herz, "The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," *World Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (July 1957), pp. 473–93.

²⁰ Beloff, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), p. 63.

Book Department

	PAGE
AMERICAN HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT	158
AFRICA AND THE MUSLIM WORLD	169
ASIA	177
EUROPE: PAST AND PRESENT	185
SOCIOLOGY	196
ECONOMICS	205
PHILOSOPHY	209
OTHER BOOKS	215

AMERICAN HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT

J. EDGAR HOOVER. *Masters of Deceit*. Pp. x, 374. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958. \$5.00.

Mr. Hoover has written a truthful and informative book, probably the clearest presentation yet of Communist stratagems in America. Though he tells nothing new to students of communism in this country, Mr. Hoover has written a needed, undramatic, yet lively and extremely useful popular presentation.

Now that the excitement about Communist infiltration in the United States has died down and the party is at a low ebb, many Americans tend to return to the complacency which made the infiltration possible in the first place. Mr. Hoover rightly suggests that as long as there are gullible and idealistic people, and as long as there are people who, for whatever motive, are dissatisfied, the Communists will find ways to exploit them. And as long as the Soviet Union can hope to strengthen itself thereby or to weaken the United States, it will help to exploit the gullible and the dissatisfied. These two conditions will be with us in the foreseeable future. Hence, overt, covert, and disguised Communist activities will also be with us. Some people—very few—will be recruited into the outright fifth column—the Communist party. The most numerous group consists of people quite unaware

of being manipulated by Communists. They include innocent and vague idealists—à la Henry Wallace—and outstanding scientists who are babes in the political woods. It is reassuring to know that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is presided over by a man who seems to know his business and is able to explain the business the Communists are in as well as their methods.

Mr. Hoover describes in some detail how the gullible are roped in by Communists or their sometimes unwitting agents who propose improvements and actions or slogans which are in themselves perfectly legitimate: Who is against peace? Or disarmament? Who is for hydrogen bomb war or even testing? Such legitimate feelings are exploited all too easily by Communists who manage to convince many people—unfortunately including some of our most intelligent and educated people—that if only we would disarm or stop testing hydrogen bombs and accept Mr. Khrushchev's terms, all these unpleasant problems would go away—in the sense, that is, in which death rids you of illness. Similarly, some people have convinced themselves that if only Mr. Hoover would stop keeping track of Communists, there wouldn't be any. Like witches, they are figments of the imagination of those who detect them. If only this were so.

This book is recommended as an antidote to such delusions, although unfortunately the patients who need it most will refuse

to take the medicine. But it may immunize some, and it will help those who do not have too great a vested interest in their own ignorance to recognize Communist ruses.

ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG

Associate Professor
Division of General Education
New York University

ROBERT H. FERRELL. *American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933*. (Yale Historical Publications, Studies 17.) Pp. ix, 319. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957. \$4.50.

This book is the second in a projected three-volume history of American diplomacy from 1927 to 1937. The present book inquires into the difficulties of American diplomacy from 1929 to 1933 under President Herbert Hoover and Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson. This was a difficult period in the history of our nation; it was one in which many statesmen and economists were predicting the disintegration of Western society at a time when the greatest depression the world has ever known was sweeping across the United States and spreading throughout the world. With Hitler coming into power in Germany and the fever of war embroiling Russia, China, and Japan, positive and consistent diplomatic planning was a necessity just at the time when it was most difficult.

Throughout the world the emphasis changed from politics to economics. In America in 1929—the year of the proclamation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the renunciation of war—President Hoover's annual message on the state of the union began with a section on foreign relations. In 1930 the message began with the economic situation. The Great Depression was perhaps the most serious disequilibrium in modern world history, certainly since the Industrial Revolution first appeared in England in the mid-eighteenth century. Between then and 1929 there had occurred many world-wide economic crises during which inflated values came down to earth and production of goods momentarily lagged and fell; however there had been nothing like the Great Depression.

To adjudge the effect of this depression upon any one segment of American government activity in the period of 1929-33 is very difficult. The Hoover moratorium in the summer of 1931 was itself a diplomatic manifestation of the depression, and there can be no doubt that from then on economic problems captured the attention of people and governments everywhere in the world. It is important to remember that had there been no depression, it is quite possible that world peace would not have broken down in the Far East in 1931 and that Hitler would not have achieved power in Germany. The depression was the principal reason for the international tragedy of the 1930's—the loss of all gains from the Allied victory of World War I.

Basically the book puts too much weight on the diaries of William R. Castle, the Assistant Secretary of State, and Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of State; however the reader will find throughout the book a well-documented and well-written account of the reaction of our Department of State. This work is a valuable addition to our history of American diplomacy in the prewar years. The book also contains a well-annotated Bibliography.

ANTHONY L. MILNAR

Associate Professor of History
and Political Science
Ohio Northern University

LEONARD D. WHITE with the assistance of JEAN SCHNEIDER. *The Republican Era, 1869-1901: A Study in Administrative History*. Pp. xi, 406. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. \$6.00.

This is the fourth volume in the series which Dr. White is doing on the administrative history of the United States. The first three were *The Federalists*, *The Jeffersonians*, and *The Jacksonians*. As the dates indicate, this analysis covers the administrations of Grant, Hayes, Garfield, Arthur, Cleveland, Benjamin Harrison, and McKinley. It represents, as do the previous studies, an exceptionally high level of preparation and presentation. The period itself was not a particularly distinguished one. As Dr. White points out, the moral climate was unfavorable, technological arts were undeveloped, and executive talent was

drained off into transportation, industry, and public utilities. Thus the period is primarily important for the fact that during it the stage was set for the big developments which were to follow.

Dr. White holds to the view that every administration "is the product of the moral climate, the technological capacity, and the executive talent of its generation." These are the three basic points of emphasis. The power struggles between the President and Congress and the Administration and Congress come in for particular attention, as does the interrelationship between Congress and the Administration and between Congress and departmental business. The developments in each department are analyzed, and, still more important, considerable attention is given to the struggles for reform, the search for political neutrality in the civil service, and the emergence of the new personnel system. The pressures and counterpressures in this latter connection are examined with great care and competence. Thus students of American politics, as well as students of American government and American history, will find this study another indispensable contribution to their better understanding of existing institutions and practices.

E. ALLEN HELMS

Professor of Political Science
The Ohio State University

Franklin D. Roosevelt and Conservation, 1911-1945, Vols. I and II. Compiled and edited by Edgar B. Nixon. Pp. xiv, 614. Hyde Park, N. Y.: Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, 1957. \$9.50 (the set).

These two volumes are unique in that this is the first time in American history that a President's papers have been published twelve years after his death. This is all the more remarkable when one recalls that Franklin D. Roosevelt died in office. Although these volumes represent only a small portion of the Roosevelt papers which are housed in the Hyde Park Library, they contain about half of the total papers on conservation. Here are not only many letters but also numerous memoranda, interspersed with excerpts from press interviews, and a scattering of speeches on

conservation which the President made during more than a third of a century.

With the exception of the frontispiece there are no illustrations. The editor, however, has done a superb job. Names and places mentioned in the body of the work are identified, located, and explained in notes at the end of each document. Other primary sources pertaining to the immediate subject discussed in the text are listed, and vital excerpts or conclusions from them are supplied at the end of the document. Moreover the exact location, box, file, and so forth of each printed document are given in the notes. Generally these papers are in chronological order, which is the best way to present them.

Before Franklin Roosevelt was elected to the New York Senate in 1910, he practiced reforestation at Hyde Park. Named by Lieutenant Governor Conway as Chairman of the Forest, Fish and Game Committee, the new member of the legislature began a campaign for the preservation of forests, the prevention of fires, and the conservation of birds. As early as 1912, Roosevelt, in numerous speeches, was upholding community rights over individual rights. Such a policy, he contended, was absolutely necessary in connection with our natural resources.

As Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the Wilson administration, Roosevelt made no contribution to conservation. Back at Hyde Park he urged a system of national forests for the United States similar to those of European countries. As Governor of New York, 1928-32, he created the most expansive and modern conservation program of any state in the Union.

In his speech accepting the Democratic nomination for President, Roosevelt declared his interest in promoting conservation throughout the nation. Even so, the people were hardly prepared for the conservation program which President Roosevelt initiated and promoted. Indeed, every section of the country was helped in many ways by the extensive conservation plans inaugurated by the New Deal. Every state of the Union became a part of the national conservation movement.

Millions of acres of land were added to

our national forests; hundreds of millions of trees were planted; fish and wildlife refuges were expanded from 104 with 6 million acres to 263 with 13.6 million acres. Tens of thousands of people were given healthful employment in hundreds of Civilian Conservation Corps camps.

At times conservation took the form of harnessing a river system as in the Tennessee River Valley Authority, or the Columbia River, or the Missouri River. Sometimes conservation was concerned most with flood control as in the lower Mississippi River Basin. On other occasions the chief object was the elimination of drought or a dust bowl as was the program for the Great Plains. Nor was recreation forgotten when many lakes and numerous parks were created.

When war came, conservation efforts were doubled to meet our needs in lumber without impairing productivity of the forests, and attempts were made to extend and intensify fire protection and to provide for Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans without direct Congressional appropriations. Shortly before the President died, he and Gifford Pinchot worked out a tentative agenda for a proposal to Churchill and Stalin to inaugurate a world-wide conservation movement.

Of all the contributions Franklin D. Roosevelt made to our nation, none is greater than the conservation program revealed in these two volumes.

GEORGE C. OSBORN

Professor of Social Science
University of Florida

WILLIAM R. KINTNER in association with JOSEPH I. COFFEY and RAYMOND J. ALBRIGHT. *Forging a New Sword: A Study of the Department of Defense*. (American Project Series.) Pp. xiv, 238. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$4.50.

No book ever came off the press at a more appropriate moment than this study dealing with our Department of Defense. And it is this reviewer's hope that a copy of this book will be placed—or rather that it was placed weeks ago—on the desk of every member of the Joint House-Senate Committee on Military Affairs; furthermore, the reviewer hopes that they read

it, page by page. For here, within the short space of some 230 pages, is contained more basic information on the Department of Defense, its origins, its operations, its strengths and weaknesses, followed by a challenging outline of areas in which it might be improved, than is likely to emerge from the thousands of pages of criticisms, testimony, and recommendations accompanying President Eisenhower's plan for a reorganized defense department.

Two basic reasons may be advanced for bringing out such a study at this time. First, since "national security is everybody's business," and since the daily debates on national defense promise to go on indefinitely, it is of utmost importance that our people know something—in fact a lot—about the functioning of our Department of Defense since its establishment ten years ago. Second, for the first time in our nation's history we face a powerful adversary, potentially capable of crippling or even possibly destroying our present civilization. And since communism's avowed purpose is that of waging a war of aggression in all areas of influence and on all levels of existing society, it is important that factors other than military means be considered in preserving our nation. Our concern is no longer limited merely to the military; it includes political and sociological factors as well. Americans can no longer feel secure by relying solely on a single Department of Defense as now constituted, since widespread subversive elements and potential guerilla operations also need to be reckoned with. But do the Department of Defense officials seem sufficiently aware of these conditions? Are they not worrying more over balanced budgets than about over-all long-range strategic planning which affects areas other than the military? Co-ordination between military and civilian authorities becomes more imperative. Clear-cut channels of command and effective machinery for promptly carrying out decisions need to be provided.

With a view to improving these conditions, the authors have come up with a number of specific suggestions, and to this reviewer they make sense. Since all three authors have had frequent opportunity to

observe the operations of the Department of Defense from many vantage points—"from beneath and from within it, and from positions alongside and above it in other agencies of the United States Government"—their suggestions deserve serious study. Their specific recommendations, summarized in Chapter 16, appear to be constructive and imperative. While the authors make no claim that their proposals are sacrosanct, still they embody the unbiased views of able civilian and military personnel rather than the professional soldier, sailor, airman, or bureaucrat. When these proposals or ones similar to them are adopted, a major step will have been taken in *Forging a New Sword*.

JOHN W. OLIVER

Professor of History, Emeritus
University of Pittsburgh

F. WILLIAM O'BRIEN. *Justice Reed and the First Amendment: The Religion Clauses*. Pp. xi, 264. Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 1958. \$5.00.

Father O'Brien of the Department of Government at Georgetown University has undertaken a critical analysis of the opinions and decisions of Justice Reed as they involved or had a bearing upon the constitutional aspects of religious freedom or church-state relations. He has accomplished his purpose commendably. When, however, one has completed Father O'Brien's work, the thought can scarcely be repressed that the book comes off better than does its subject.

Stanley F. Reed was appointed to the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States in 1938, three months after Roosevelt had named Hugo L. Black as his first appointee to the Court. By that time the Court had voided the "hot oil" regulation and declared unconstitutional the National Industrial Recovery Act (1935), the Guffey-Snyder Bituminous Coal Stabilization Act, a state minimum wage act, and other welfare and New Deal legislation; the President had also launched his attack on the "nine old men" and his court-packing plan. Very little was then known about Reed, who had been Solicitor General for the three preceding years. When Reed re-

tired from the Court, some nineteen years later, hardly much more was known about him.

Father O'Brien tries hard to give to Reed's work as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court some solidity as well as some sparkle and some intellectual and moral appeal. He speaks of Reed's "down-to-earth, realistic approach," and of his "usual straightforward, realistic manner." Yet it is impossible to discover a man behind the method, a thinking mind behind the thoughts. Any number of competent, lawyer-like lawyers could have done as well—writing the opinions anonymously.

The author finds in Reed's work on the bench a belief in judicial restraint, faith in the principle of federalism, a feeling that legislative and administrative bodies should be permitted to go on with their assigned or assumed tasks, and a respect for custom or tradition. He contends that Reed was a judicial pluralist; but Reed's pluralism was one that had respect for groups and group actions but not for the rights of the individuals who composed the groups—he denied the civil liberties claims of individuals in 80 per cent of the cases in which they were asserted. It all adds up to a rather impersonal record of judicial workmanship which has little to teach the theoretician or philosopher.

There is not much in Father O'Brien's competent study with which this reviewer would quarrel, but I would question two of his judgments: (1) Father O'Brien believes that a church establishment does not necessarily mean a curtailment of religious liberty. As proof he cites the Established Church of England. Yet one only needs to read *Church and State in England* by the late Archbishop of York to realize that an established church is not even itself free. (2) He claims for Reed the projection of a "new" freedom, namely, the liberty of self-government by church groups as expressed in *Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral*, decided in 1952. But this case added nothing essential to what was said and decided by the Supreme Court in *Watson v. Jones* in 1872.

While the subject of this book is not rewarding for the student of judicial methodology and jurisprudence, Father O'Brien

has demonstrated a craftsman's skill in the handling of his materials and problems. His competence is worthy of a more challenging topic or problem.

MILTON R. KONVITZ

Professor of Industrial and Labor
Relations and Professor of Law
Cornell University

WALTER BERN. *Freedom, Virtue & the First Amendment*. Pp. xiii, 264. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957. \$4.00.

Whether or not freedom of speech holds a "preferred position" in the hierarchy of American legal values, it seems to outrank even motels and motherhood as a national symbol. Serious criticism of our country's articulate major premise is, therefore, a notable event. Especially so when the criticism takes the form of as searching and scholarly a volume as *Freedom, Virtue & the First Amendment*.

Professor Berns, a member of Yale's political science faculty, thinks that our uncritical acceptance of freedom of speech as a national desideratum has led us into serious difficulties—for many of which the Supreme Court is chiefly to blame. Thus the Justices, in rationalizing their desire to coddle (almost) every obnoxious segment of opinion, are thought to have "made a shambles of the law of the First Amendment . . ." (p. viii). More important, the Court's misconstruction of the Constitution—based upon a misguided adulation of freedom as an intrinsically precious commodity—is antithetic to the political requirements of a good society. "The fact is, freedom is not enough . . . only if the community is made up predominantly of citizens of *good character* who trust one another, is freedom not only possible but desirable" (pp. 255-56). Then and only then will freedom "promote virtue," which is, after all, "the purpose of law" (p. 251). The First Amendment, in short, is helpful only in a good society, where people will spend its bounty prudently. "Amoral law is bad law. . . . One cannot say that a law that grants people the freedom to speak is a good law unless he examines what people do with that freedom" (p. 250).

Professor Berns is also persuaded that the Court has fallen into fundamental legal error in its expansive application of the First Amendment. He "suspects, but cannot yet prove, that the intention of the First Amendment was merely to outlaw previous restraints on the freedom of speech and press" (p. 251, note 25). What Berns surmises, Sir William Blackstone was certain of two centuries ago. One would have supposed that the inadequacies of so narrow an understanding of free speech had long been manifest. Cooley, for example, tried to set the record straight nearly a century ago:

" . . . The mere exemption from previous restraints cannot be all that is secured by the constitutional provisions, inasmuch as of words to be uttered orally there can be no previous censorship, and the liberty of the press might be rendered a mockery and a delusion, and the phrase itself a byword, if, while every man was at liberty to publish what he pleased, the public authorities might nevertheless punish him for harmless publications. . . ." (Chafee, *Free Speech in the United States* [1941], p. 11.)

Berns, however, holds to the contrary, and his book suggests both the vigor and the dangerous nature of this particular heresy. As Chafee put it: "This Blackstonian theory dies hard, but it ought to be knocked on the head once for all" (*ibid.*, p. 9). In a sense, however, it is not as curious that Professor Berns takes so unfashionable a view of the First Amendment as that he evinces any concern at all about the competence of the Court's performance on what Berns pejoratively describes as "the legal level" (p. viii). For law, no matter how carefully fashioned, is in Berns's eyes an instrument of limited utility: ". . . the problem of freedom cannot be understood in terms of legal rules and principles alone; it must be seen in a larger context" (p. viii). But just why law should be regarded as congenitally inadequate to the solution of the conundrums of government is puzzling.

Recognizing that we must continue to operate within the confines of that poorly designed and ineptly handled mechanism which is the First Amendment, Berns sub-

mits that "perhaps the best we can do is to interpret it to read: Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of *good* speech" (p. 251). Modestly stated, this is plainly enough a proposal of major dimension. It is a proposal, argued in cogent and sensitive fashion, which challenges our most cherished and possibly least comprehended institution. But the challenge to the core of America's constitutional heritage is not a hostile one—indeed, as Berns himself makes abundantly clear, it is not a product of "the so-called conservative movement" (p. ix). Berns's book is the book of a man dedicated to democratic values and deeply troubled about how best to foster them. It is, as Professor Charles L. Black, Jr. has observed in his article "The Practice of Forbearance" (*New Republic*, December 30, 1957), "a work of good will." It merits the close attention of all who cherish individual liberty—and especially of those who are certain, a priori, that Professor Berns is in error. He is in error, but in ably stating his case Berns forces on those who disagree with him a firmer understanding of the First Amendment.

LOUIS H. POLLAK

Associate Professor of Law
Yale University Law School

FRANK A. HASKELL. *The Battle of Gettysburg*. Edited by Bruce Catton. Pp. xviii, 169. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1958. \$3.50.

Born in 1828 in the hill town of Tunbridge, Vermont, Frank Haskell appears to have remained on the home farm until he was twenty-one. Then, like so many farm boys of his time, he went to college. He graduated from Dartmouth in 1854 and went to Wisconsin where he began the practice of law. He enlisted very early in the Civil War and saw action in many major battles.

Haskell played a role of some importance at Gettysburg. He was a staff officer, close to some of the heaviest fighting of the second day such as the struggle between Sickles' Third Corps and the Confederates in the Peach Orchard. He received high commendation for his efforts

in helping to repulse Pickett on the afternoon of the third day. He continued to see much action in the months after Gettysburg and was eventually promoted to the rank of Colonel. He was killed while leading a brigade at Cold Harbor.

This small volume does not provide a balanced account of the entire battle. It is, rather, devoted to those parts of the battle witnessed by one man. Haskell arrived at the battlefield just before dusk on July 1, and the brief story of the first day's fighting is based on conversations with those who had participated. His account of the fighting on the second day is based on the Federal defense of their left flank. Nearly two-thirds of the book is devoted to the artillery engagement and to the attack and repulse of Pickett. The following description of the final action on July 3 will indicate the vividness and tempo of the book:

"The color sergeant of the 72d Pa., grasping the stump of the severed lance in both his hands, waved the flag above his head and rushed towards the wall. 'Will you see your color storm the wall alone?' One man only starts to follow. Almost half way to the wall, down go color bearer, and color to the ground—the gallant sergeant is dead. The line springs—the crest of the solid ground with a great roar heaves forward its maddened load, men, arms, smoke, fire, a fighting mass. It rolls to the wall—flash meets flash, the wall is crossed—a moment ensues of thrusts, yells, blows, shots, an undistinguishable conflict, followed by a shout universal that makes the welkin ring again, and the last and bloodiest fight of the great battle of Gettysburg is ended and won."

Haskell's account of the battle was begun on July 14, while details were vivid in his mind. Bruce Catton writes of this account that "part of its value lies in the fact that the author never had the chance to recast it in the light of postwar knowledge and reflection." This account has been printed and reprinted seven times, yet the present edition is the first that may hope to reach beyond the scholarly student of the Civil War to the general reader. Equipped with an excellent Introduction by Mr. Catton, and in a very attractive for-

mat, Colonel Haskell's account should at last receive the attention it deserves.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN

Professor of History
State Teachers College
Cortland, N. Y.

IRVING HOWE and LEWIS COSER. *The American Communist Party: A Critical History (1919-1957)*. Pp. x, 593. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. \$6.75.

For almost forty years, the American Communist party has been a center of controversy. One of the favorite pastimes of Americans has, in fact, been to argue about the party. Yet the organization has been the subject of but little scholarly study. Professors Howe and Coser, in the present volume, endeavor to correct this condition.

The authors begin their task by tracing the origin of American communism from its affiliations with pre-World War I Left-Wing groups. The reader is then guided expertly through the many factional battles attendant upon the party's formation and its first decade. Factionalism was, by 1929, terminated by Russian-enforced Stalinization of the group. As a result, whatever independence was evident in the American party was supplanted by the operation of a monolithic organization completely subordinated to Moscow. The authors describe, from then on, the tortuous policy and personality turns of American communism. The over-all impression which one gains of the party is that it is unknowledgeable of the issues and mores of American society, supremely dogmatic, anti-intellectual, willing to sacrifice humanitarianism to seek power for power's sake, and, to boot, a poor guardian of Marxist and Leninist thought. The writers conclude with a lengthy chapter dealing with Stalinist theory and action which, though it is not well related to the rest of the book, provides an excellent service by exploring and cataloguing succinctly the multifarious social conditions influencing the rise of Stalinism. In evaluating this work, it should be emphasized that it is more "critical" than it is "history." The authors have used, and used well, an impressive array of Communist sources. Yet no attempt was made to utilize manuscript materials, and many

valuable non-Communist sources were either ignored or overlooked. By frequently blending their strong prejudices with the factual narrative, Howe and Coser have violated scholarly standards of fair procedure. Moreover, while this volume is replete with facts, many serious oversights are committed. The relation of American communism and the Spanish Civil War deserves more than two brief comments, and the Russian purges of 1937-38 certainly require some attention. The reviewer questions how World War I American socialism can be treated at length without mentioning Allen Benson's 1916 Presidential campaign. It also seems unwise to refer to the significance of a farmer-labor movement in 1936 without identifying the movement. The authors deserve chiding for discussing the activities of the American Communist party since 1945 virtually without reference to Soviet imperialism. These and similar defects indicate that this work has some very serious limitations as formal history. Yet in view of the paucity of scholarly writing on the subject, the book must be considered as adequate until more dispassionate and historically conscious treatments are published.

DONALD R. MCCOY

Assistant Professor of History
University of Kansas

ARTHUR WALWORTH. *Woodrow Wilson*, Vol. I: *American Prophet*; Vol. II: *World Prophet*. Pp. xi, 436 and 439. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1958. \$15.00 (the set).

This newest biography of Woodrow Wilson is in many respects a substantial achievement. Mr. Walworth has dug deeply into the Wilson papers and into other closely related manuscript collections, and he has produced what is probably the best intimate biography of our twenty-eighth President. This is true in part because he has been the first to carry through to the end of Wilson's life. To be sure, the authorized biographer, Ray Stannard Baker, did manage to finish his *magnum opus*, but he did so only in an imperfect way, by fits and starts, and by patching together at the end. It is true, above all, because Mr. Walworth has given us a work

in which Wodrow Wilson lives in all his titanic greatness and human fallibility. The picture given here of Wilson moving within his circle of associates and the descriptions of the leading personalities surrounding him are, on the whole, entirely convincing and authentic. This, surely, is no mean achievement, and Mr. Walworth deserves much credit for his objectivity, his graceful style, and his devotion to a task which took ten years of unrelenting work to complete.

In spite of all its solid achievement, however, this biography has certain significant weaknesses. To begin with, Mr. Walworth has made a number of the kind of small errors which mar but do not seriously affect the integrity of any scholarly work. Second, the author has obviously never mastered the political history of the period about which he has written. Time and again he ignores the great political currents which deeply affected Wilson's own political thought and the legislation of the Wilson era. There are numerous examples of this, but one must suffice: the author's failure to see the way in which Wilson was able to absorb the main ideas and proposals of Theodore Roosevelt's Progressive party. Third, it must also be said that Mr. Walworth has not always been entirely discriminating in his use of the sources, or as thorough in his research as he might have been. For example, he uses the memoir of Joseph P. Tumulty as if it were a reliable source, which it is not; again, he uses the diary of Colonel House without any effort to verify this important source. Fourth, the balance of this work is somewhat curious. Mr. Walworth gives relatively small space to the domestic events of Wilson's first administration, races through the crises of the neutrality period, devotes an undue proportion of his space to the Peace Conference, the Treaty fight, and Wilson's breakdown, and relegates a whole series of important developments—particularly Wilson's Mexican and Latin-American policies—to footnotes. Fifth, this reviewer must also say that the documentation of this book is entirely inadequate. To be sure, a biography of this kind should not be cluttered with footnotes; the reader does, however, deserve more than Mr. Walworth gives, and the author might have

given more credit to that large number of scholars upon whom he obviously relied. Finally, the chief weakness of this book is its lack of any real depth. As a personal word-portrait it is often superb; as a biography which integrates the man and the times, it falls far short of an acceptable standard.

ARTHUR S. LINK

Professor of History
Northwestern University

CARL BRENT SWISHER. *The Supreme Court in Modern Role*. Pp. vii, 214. New York University Press, 1958. \$4.95.

Focusing upon the major constitutional decisions of recent years, Professor Swisher has written what might almost be called an essay on the theory and practice of judicial review. Certainly this book—originally presented as the James Stokes Lectures at New York University—is not primarily a survey of the legal doctrines expounded in recent decisions concerned with the limitations upon government, the threat of subversion, the place of the military, and racial issues. These categories of cases are rather the basis for his discussions of "The Goal of Judicial Endeavor," the title of his concluding chapter.

To be sure, there is a good deal of historical background—especially in Chapter 1, "The Court and the Sweep of History"—and individual cases are occasionally described in some detail. This is well illustrated in the discussion of the various cases involving treason, disloyalty or subversion, and in certain of the cases on race relations, especially *Brown v. Board of Education*, in which the Court unanimously overruled the separate but equal doctrine. Professor Swisher's reasons for doubting the wisdom of the *Brown* ruling, and of finding in it some of "the absoluteness apparent in the Taney opinion in the *Dred Scott* case and in the Bradley opinion in the Civil Rights Cases," are in harmony with the philosophy of judicial review suggested in the book.

While freely recognizing that the judicial function has not been limited to an imitative or static role, but has rather been "dynamic and creative," the author is greatly concerned by the frequent disagree-

ments among the Justices in recent years. Except for nearly all of the Marshall years, comparable disagreement has been characteristic of decisions in periods of uncertainty about ends or means. Some of the recent disagreements should have been confined to the conference room. But it is doubtful whether such disagreement would be obviated by more widespread attention to "our public philosophy." To this reviewer, the principal reason for the absence of unanimity is the lack of a generally accepted philosophy relating to the issues with which the Court is presented. The Justices are reflecting, not creating, divergencies and uncertainties which exist in our society. One of the truly great needs of the present time is the statement and general acceptance of a political and constitutional philosophy as adequate for our time as was that of the Founding Fathers in the one great era of political thinking and constitution making this country has known.

BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT

President, Smith College
Northampton, Mass.

POUL MEYER. *Administrative Organization: A Comparative Study of the Organization of Public Administration*. Pp. 322. Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag Arnold Busck; London: Stevens & Sons, 1957. No price.

The author of this volume is a Danish student of public administration who is currently an assistant professor at the University of Copenhagen. He has undertaken, with the aid of the Danish State Research Foundation, to make a comparative study of public administration, mainly as it has developed in recent years in the United States, Great Britain, and the British Commonwealth of Nations. Many interesting comments and sidelights on Scandinavian public administration are scattered throughout the text, as well as some observations on the practices of continental European countries.

Written originally in Danish, the book has been ably translated into English for publication in Great Britain. Where difficult terminology has been employed, the

original phrases have been bracketed-in so that the reader may make his own translation of expressions, sometimes bordering on "scientific jargon."

The book is set up under five main parts: The Science of Administration, Administrative Division of Work, Administrative Authority and Leadership, Hierarchy in Organization, and Administrative Decentralization.

In the first part the author seeks to justify present-day governmental administration as a science and deals with the basic definitions and terminologies, mostly drawn from American writings. He then traces the growth of administration in the "welfare state," the most unique section of which is an explanation of "Parkinson's Law" drawn from *The Economist* of recent date. This law is based on a statistical analysis of departmental staffs and purports to show that the number of administrative officials and employees and the quantity of work done are unrelated; indeed, that the constant rise in the number employed by an established organizational unit would be much the same, whether the volume of work was to increase, diminish, or even disappear.

Under administrative division of work, the author discusses the methods of subdividing governmental work for organization and management, staff and line setup, and the place of the expert in management. Administrative authority is viewed from the standpoints of political leadership and party responsibility; hierarchical and collegiate direction and competence are also discussed. Consideration is given to such administrative approaches as chain of command, departmentalization, and subordination of organizational units, with brief histories of regionalism and centralization also included. The last part, dealing with administrative decentralization, is concerned with vertical and horizontal methods, "dis-integrated coordination," and the structure and operation of boards.

The American student of public administration will find this volume useful mainly for its presentation of an outside or foreign appraisal of the administrative techniques, methods, and philosophy recently developed in the United States. While this

appraisal is not entirely flattering, it is well for us to see ourselves as others see us.

A. E. BUCK

Norwalk, Conn.

CHARLES W. ARNADE. *The Emergence of the Republic of Bolivia*. Pp. xi, 269. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1957. \$6.00.

This is a work of scholarship and research. The author has delved exhaustively into the archives, the contemporary chronicles and letters in order to tell the story of the transformation of High Peru, or Charcas, from a province ruled successively by the Spanish vice-kingdoms, whose capitals were Lima and Buenos Aires, into the Republic of Bolivia. He has studied the activities of the university leaders who, in those Andean heights, dreamed and even plotted independence from Spain before the general uprisings of 1810. He goes into great detail concerning the nature of the land, the men, and their ideas. From the standpoint of Charcas—therefore somewhat remotely—he gives us the vast theater of revolutionary operations: the armies of Argentina and Chile finally led by San Martín converging with the northern armies under Bolívar and his great Captain, Sucre, upon Peru; and from coastal Peru into the high plateaus and snow-clad mountains (under the tropical sun) of what is now Bolivia.

All this is a worthy assignment, and, as Bolivia's Ambassador Victor Andrade states in his generous Foreword, it has not been done before with such thoroughness in English. But the author attempts more. He tries to analyze the psychology of the inhabitants of High Peru: the impact of Spaniard, Creole, mestizo, and Indian upon one another, and the resultant human product. He has something to say about the economy of Spain, based on the fallacy that the true wealth of nations is their gold and silver, and about the intrigues of chaotic men, loyal neither to Spain nor to the great dream of Bolívar: men who expressed only the chaos of their country.

He gives full-length portraits of two men who richly deserve it: the extraordinary Olañetas, uncle and nephew, one of whom was more Spanish than the Spaniards, while

the other (according to Professor Arnade) created Bolivia in order to rule it.

Finally, the author portrays the negotiations of what he calls "the turn-coat Assembly," which—at least on paper—established the republic of Bolivia, not out of any necessity of an intrinsically independent people, but because the leaders were being driven by personal ambition and the thirst for power. The book is, therefore, more than mere scholarship; it is a courageous expression of judgment on the part of the author: one by no means flattering to its subject.

In this regard, one might say that the book is so good in its aims that it should have been better. The psychology of the Hispano-American is a deeply complex subject; the author tackles it, but I am afraid it floors him. The effect of their high, bleak mountains and lush tropic valleys upon the inhabitants of Bolivia is a complex matter. The author does not do it justice. There is, throughout the work, a gap between the essentially creative problems of such a work and the author's achievements as a creative writer. Yet without creative capacity, I doubt the value of such a book as this, except in limited academic circles.

WALDO FRANK

Truro, Mass.

VERA RUBIN (Ed.). *Caribbean Studies: A Symposium*. Pp. viii, 124. Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University College of the West Indies in association with The Research and Training Program for the Study of Man in the Tropics, Columbia University, 1957. No price.

This is a volume of proceedings containing papers prepared and delivered at the annual meeting of section H of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in December 1956. British, American, and Caribbean scholars (eighteen in all) joined to focus attention on the anthropological and social studies which have been carried out in the Caribbean area.

After a brief introduction to the report by E. Franklin Frazier, Charles Wagley sets the stage for the other papers by an interesting discussion in which he classifies

the Americas into three broad culture spheres. These are designated as Euro-America which covers the most northern and the most southern reaches of the Western Hemisphere; Indo-America including most of the west coast countries north of Chile; and Plantation America which is designated as extending from about midway up the coast of Brazil into the Guianas, along the Caribbean coast, throughout the Caribbean itself, and into the northeastern part of the United States. This is a very useful classification. Since what is termed Plantation America is a large area populated heavily by negroid people, however, one may wonder, with Frazier, why the term Negroid America is not used to make it consistent with the other ethnically designated areas.

The second paper is called "Man-Land Relations in the Caribbean Area" by Preston James in which he topples over some preconceptions about the climate and concludes that "there is nothing wrong with the climates of the Caribbean area." He ascribes most of the alleged discomforts of this area to cultural factors, such as clothing worn by visitors, rather than to climate.

Interesting papers follow on "Contemporary Social Types in the Caribbean Region," "The African Heritage," "Race Relations," "The Family," and "Methods of Community Analysis in the Caribbean."

In most cases, each paper is followed by the remarks of a prominent discussant. At times there is considerable clash of opinion over theoretical matters such as economic determinism, methods of research, and the extent to which the plantation is a transitory phenomenon.

Two concluding papers round out the report. Lloyd Braithwaite writes on "The Present Status of the Social Sciences in the British Caribbean," and Vera Rubin writes on "Cultural Prospectives in Caribbean Research."

Students of Latin America, and interested laymen as well, will find this volume a very useful addition to the literature of the Caribbean area, where so many interesting political and economic changes are now taking place; these are exemplified by a wide range of phenomena such as indus-

trialization in Puerto Rico and the emergence of the new Caribbean Federation. The carefully selected list of references at the conclusion of each of the papers will be most helpful to any interested reader who will want to pursue the various topics further.

N. L. WHETTEN

Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Connecticut

AFRICA AND THE MUSLIM WORLD

Egypt and the United Nations. Report of a Study Group Set Up by the Egyptian Society of International Law. (National Studies on International Organization.) Pp. xi, 197. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1957. \$3.00.

This is one of twenty-three volumes of national studies on international organization published under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Prepared by a group of Egyptian scholars and diplomats, under the direction of the Egyptian Society of International Law, it sets forth Egyptian policies and attitudes toward and within the United Nations. This analysis follows two brief chapters dealing with historical backgrounds, the development of Egyptian and Arab nationalism, and the Egyptian position at the San Francisco Conference.

While students who have closely studied Egyptian policy with regard to the United Nations will find very little that is new or surprising, the reader will find the Egyptian point of view set forth with brevity, clarity, and ample citations from the records of the United Nations. The authors point out that Egyptian attitudes toward the United Nations have gone through essentially three phases since that body's inception in 1945. A period of hope and confidence was followed by one of disillusionment and bitterness; this was a result of what the Egyptians—not to mention many other Arabs—considered "injustice" in the handling of the Egyptian and Palestine problems. Since

1953, the authors note, there has been a reappraisal of the United Nations, and the Egyptian attitude is now one of "renewed but guarded hope." Because of its importance, the brief chapter devoted to the Arab League and the Asian-African group in the United Nations might usefully have been expanded somewhat. The development of Egyptian attitudes is well delineated in the treatment of the following specific problems: the principle of sovereign equality, independence for Arab countries, anti-imperialism, strict interpretation of domestic jurisdiction under Article II (7) of the United Nations Charter, universality of United Nations membership, the veto, and economic and social affairs.

The Appendix to the volume, which contains the texts of the principal resolutions of the Council of the Arab League relative to the United Nations, is especially valuable. Its value lies in the fact that these documents cannot be found elsewhere so conveniently in one book. There is a good Index. But it would have been helpful to have had a good bibliography for those who might care to pursue the subject further.

HARRY N. HOWARD

Beirut, Lebanon

JOHN C. CAMPBELL. *Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy*. Pp. xiv, 392. New York: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1958. \$5.00.

In stating his purpose, the author notes that, as far as the Middle East is concerned, "no clear and comprehensive policy has been found to protect essential American and Western interests. . . . This book is an attempt to contribute to a better understanding of the problems and to stimulate thought on policies for the future." The result, in the reviewer's opinion, is the most significant work thus far produced dealing in a comprehensive way with the fundamental interests of the United States in the contemporary Middle East.

The author outlines The Problem—"an area lost may mean a world lost"—in an introductory section. The remaining eighteen chapters fall into two parts: The Record

of Recent Years and Present and Future. In the first of these are analyses of the situations with which the United States now must deal—situations in which United States policy and action heretofore may sometimes have fallen short. The second part is, in the main, devoted to a discussion of the possible avenues of approach to the problem of preventing the entrenchment of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. In describing these avenues—military, diplomatic, and economic—the several starting handicaps of the United States are considered—in particular, its responsibility for Israel.

At no point in the book does the author digress from his central thesis which is that the overriding national interest of the United States in this area is its own security—"put more starkly, its survival." In this regard it is noted that defense of the Middle East is only part of a global policy: "The Middle East does not exist for us in isolation." Yet the author is convinced that here, as nowhere else at this period, our prospects for the future are being determined. While he is anxious that the United States contrive to maintain essential relationships with the area without resort to armed force, he does not believe that this country can afford to be squeamish. "It remains to be said, although it will not be said officially, that an occasion may arise where the United States would be compelled, in order to prevent a disastrous shift in the world balance, to use force to prevent a Middle Eastern state from falling under Soviet control, whether there has been aggression or not." He thinks that if peace should be fractured, war on a limited scale would be more likely than general conflict, but he is certain that a principal deterrent to any outbreak of war is preparedness bolstered by a willingness to take risks and even, on occasion, to "play rough." "Defense of the Middle East will be a long and arduous task," he says in conclusion. "Let it be conceded that in the past the United States has shown no remarkable capacity for success in such a task. . . . But we cannot concede that the . . . successful defense of the Middle East is beyond our capacities

for the future, for our survival as a nation may depend on it."

HALFORD L. HOSKINS

Senior Specialist in International Relations

Legislative Reference Service
Library of Congress

E. W. BOVILL. *The Golden Trade of the Moors*. Pp. vi, 281. London: Oxford University Press, 1958. \$7.00.

The story of the Moors has been treated by Western historians topically and hazily. We are well informed on their relationship with the West and also on their importance in the history of Spain. But their role as carriers of ideas and goods to the peoples of interior Africa has not been treated adequately. Mr. Bovill attempts to do that in this book. More specifically, he is concerned with the trans-Saharan trade of gold, salt, slaves, and much else, which the Moors carried on from the Middle Ages to the early nineteenth century.

The beginning of this trade goes back to ancient times, for on the authority of Herodotus (quoted on pp. 25-26) the Carthaginians obtained gold from lands far interior in the south. From days immemorial this trade went on by means of "silent trade or dumb barter," in which the producers and owners of gold in "Wangara"—which Bovill places north of the Gold Coast, west of Ghana and southwest of Timbuktu—were never seen by Moorish traders. The tenth-century Arab historian, Masudi, and the fifteenth-century Portuguese explorer, Cadamosto, also testify to the existence of such "dump barter" in their days. There were three regular and well-established trans-Saharan trade routes (as shown by Bovill on p. 234). One ran from Marrakech through the heart of French West Africa, via Taudeni to Timbuktu. The second began at Fez and ran east of this route through the Tuat country southeast to Ain-Azawa and then to Sokoto in Nigeria. The third started from Tripoli in Tunis and ran through the Ghadam and the Fezzan country to Kanem in Bornu, north of Lake Chad. It took about two months for camel caravans to make these distances of more than 1500

miles. All three routes converged on lands south-southwest of Timbuktu, never crossing south of the 12° north latitude. In fact, this line separated, and still separates, the camel from the tsetse fly and the Islam of the north from the pagan of the south (pp. 241-42). The coming of European traders and their ways practically eliminated these trade routes, even though as late as 1908 a caravan on the eastern route "numbered no less than 20,000 camels" (p. 238).

Twenty-five years ago Bovill became an authority on north-central Africa by his *Caravans of the old Sahara*. With the publication of this fascinating and well-documented work, written partly as a new edition to his earlier book, he adds immensely to our understanding of the commercial history of an important but little-known region.

A. O. SARKISSIAN

Analyst in Middle Eastern and
East European Affairs
Library of Congress

ERWIN I. J. ROSENTHAL. *Political Thought in Medieval Islam: An Introductory Outline*. Pp. xi, 323. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958. \$6.50.

Political theory in Islam was, as we would expect, indebted to jurists and philosophers. The former were largely concerned with establishing a rationale for the political institutions of their times. Since Muslim thinking was historical, this involved finding actual or alleged precedents. The philosophers, inasmuch as they were heirs to the Greek tradition, attempted to develop blueprints of the ideal state. On a more practical level, they took a good look at what to them seemed the facts of power politics and gave realistic advice to rulers and statesmen as to the most satisfactory type of government which could conceivably be attained here and now. Eventually there were authors who tried, with varied success, to combine the divergent lines of thought into one system. In all these efforts, terminology played an important role, since political theory is destined to achieve its maximum effectiveness in the form of slogans. It is with respect

to terminology that the greatest difficulties for our immediate appreciation of Muslim political theory arise, and the forms in which it was expressed have somehow obscured its significance for Western scholars until quite recently.

A good deal of credit for making this particular aspect of Muslim civilization better known must go to the author of the present work. He published a German study on Ibn Khaldūn's political ideas in 1932; edited and translated Averroes' (Ibn Rushd's) commentary on Plato's *Republic* in 1956; and in between wrote a long list of articles on various Muslim political thinkers. The present summation of his scholarly activity, with its slightly redundant subtitle, offers a detailed analysis of the political views of representative jurists (al-Māwardī, al-Ghazzālī, Ibn Jamā'ah, Ibn Taymiyah) and philosophers (al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Bājjah, Ibn Rushd), together with a cursory glance at the *fürstenspiegel* literature and a discussion of the syntheses accomplished by the famous Ibn Khaldūn and by ad-Dawwānī and two seventeenth-century Turkish authors. The result is an informative and for the most part clear and reliable picture of political theory in medieval Islam. As to the term "medieval" in connection with Islam, the author's remark (p. 224) deserves attention. The theories discussed in this book are probably known to only a few of the statesmen of the Muslim world of today, and the old terminology has been largely replaced by modern terms. Nevertheless, here is background material which those concerned with contemporary affairs may also find worth knowing.

FRANZ ROSENTHAL
Professor of Semitic Languages
Yale University

PHILIP W. THAYER (Ed.). *Tensions in the Middle East*. Pp. xiv, 350. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. \$5.50.

The volume under review is the result of a conference held in Washington and sponsored by the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. The fourteen chapters or essays are written by specialists in Middle Eastern affairs; and each

chapter is subjected to the scrutiny of another expert in a commentary of nearly the same length as the chapter itself. The Foreword is written by Dr. Philip W. Thayer, Dean of the School of Advanced International Studies. There is an all too brief Introduction by the great Lebanese scholar-statesman, Charles Malik. The quality of the discussions is unusually high, although somewhat uneven as would inevitably be the case, and some very unexpected prescriptions are unfolded for easing the numerous tensions in the Middle East. The criticisms are very frank but never bitter.

As for the plan of the book, it is divided into four general parts: Basic Considerations, Economic and Social Factors, Political Studies, and a Summary. The Basic Considerations include four chapters: "The United States and the Middle East," "Strategic Military Importance of the Middle East," "The Middle East in World Affairs," and "Problems of Arab Political Behavior." The Economic and Social Factors are next discussed, and the following four chapters are devoted to them: "The Middle East in the World Economy," "Technical Assistance in the Middle East," "Structural Changes in Middle East Society," and "Recent Developments in Islam." The third general section of this volume is devoted to five Political Studies, as follows: "The Cyprus Problem," "Israel," "Some Legal Aspects of the Suez Situation," "The United Nations and the Suez Crisis," and "The Prospects of Communism in the Middle East." In the final chapter or Summary, Mr. Ernest K. Lindley, Director of the Washington Bureau of *Newsweek* magazine, wisely avoids giving a chapter by chapter recapitulation; instead he devotes his brief essay to "Nine Fundamentals in the Middle Eastern Tensions," all of which merit very careful study, followed by their dissemination with missionary zeal.

Striking sentences crowd this volume. In the first chapter, Robert Strausz-Hupé declares: "The emergence of Israel has been the greatest challenge to Arab unity," a challenge which the Arab states have failed to meet. He then goes on to say that "the real problem of the Middle East is how to

avert the gaze of its harrassed peoples from a series of problems that, taken one by one, are insoluble and turn their attention to co-operative undertakings that will rebound to their mutual benefit and channel their energies into the economic transformation of the region as a whole" (p. 12). In other essays it is clearly stated that only economic and social transformation will stop the further advance of Russia and communism into the Middle East. Harold B. Minor states that "the bonds that unite the Arabs are stronger and more enduring than those that divide them," and on Arab-Israeli relations, as he sees them, he says that "the essence of the question is not whether there is to be an Israel, but rather what kind of an Israel is possible" (p. 93). A small nonexpansionist Israel, integrated into Middle Eastern society, would find acceptance and peace, but, declares Mr. Minor, "an Israel in which force is substituted for the great Judaic ideal of love, nurtured by huge donations from abroad, agitated and pushed by Zionism, dedicated to a racial doctrine, based on heavy immigration, and imbued with a messianic complex that Israel is the answer to a non-existent Jewish problem embracing Jews all over the world is not only untenable, but is a threat to the peace of the world." The fundamentals listed by Lindley in the final summary are as follows: the Middle East must remain part of the Free World; Soviet interest in the area is short of vital; the Middle East and the West are economically interdependent; communism and anti-Western nationalism must be understood; it is necessary to distinguish between neutralism of various types; economic and technical aid is not given to buy friendship, but "we have a vital interest in the survival of new nations"; our support of nationalism and our problems with imperialism form another point of tension and must be resolved; Israel has "no unrestricted claim on our support," and "neither we nor the United Nations can compel Israel and her neighbors to make peace"—we can, however, prevent them from fighting each other; the long pull demands our promotion of much greater "cultural and intellectual associations with the Arab nations and others in the Middle East—and

indeed with all the new and emerging nations of Asia and Africa." This is a most significant volume.

EDGAR J. FISHER
Consultant to American Friends
of the Middle East
Amherst, Va.

F. CLEMENT C. EGERTON. *Angola in Perspective: Endeavour and Achievement in Portuguese West Africa*. Pp. 272. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957. 30s net.

In 1955 Mr. Egerton, an Englishman living in Portugal, entered the lists against those who challenged his adopted country's colonial record. The critics said it stank of servitude and oppression. They said it was wicked and out of date. They charged the Salazar regime with concealing a vast system of forced labor in the African colonies of Angola and Mozambique, off the beaten track for most travelers in Africa. Commissioned by the Portuguese government, Mr. Egerton denied these charges in a pamphlet—published by the Portuguese Agency-General for the Overseas Territories in Lisbon, and with a Foreword by Senhor Ventura, Minister for the Overseas Territories—which was entitled *Angola Without Prejudice*.

To this counterattack the critics of Portuguese colonialism replied by saying that Mr. Egerton, being engaged as a propagandist by the Salazar government, was obviously a prejudiced witness. Besides, they said, the facts in his pamphlet were subject to several interpretations. It admitted the obligation on "Portuguese Africans" to do forced labor. It merely called this "contract labour." If it denied the total of 379,000 contract workers in Angola, adduced by the critics, it nonetheless had to admit to 99,771. Mr. Egerton's defense, in other words, was found unconvincing, not only because he was briefed by the Portuguese government, but also because he could not clearly show that the critics were in the wrong.

Mr. Egerton appears to have felt this weakness himself, for he now returns to the charge—but this time with a full-scale book, *Angola in Perspective*, which is published not by the Portuguese government

but by a reputable publishing house in Britain. It narrates the story of a long visit to Angola which Mr. Egerton has lately made, though whether at his own expense or by further aid from the Portuguese government is not made clear. It is packed with various information. It is well written. It is critical of points of administrative failure, but it offers a picture of Angola which is generally one of sweetness and light.

Can we believe this picture? Unhappily for Mr. Egerton's case, he weakens it by steadfastly refusing to discuss the evidence which is brought forward by the critics. He makes no mention of the scaldingly scathing report returned on Angola by Senhor Henrique Galvão when Inspector General for Colonies in 1947. He passes lightly and happily over the whole dark question of forced labor. Though he moves from one hospitable Portuguese settler or administrator to another, he seems never to have spoken to an African at all. At every crucial point, alas for Mr. Egerton, his book wears the guise of special pleading.

BASIL DAVIDSON

Barnes Common
London

P. G. POWESLAND. *Economic Policy and Labour: A Study in Uganda's Economic History*. Edited by W. Elkan. (East African Studies, No. 10.) Pp. x, 81. Kampala, Uganda: East African Institute of Social Research, 1957. 9s.

This little eighty-one page volume is the posthumous publication of four completed chapters of a study on African Migration and Economic Development; this study was projected by the late Philip Povesland, a professor of economics at Makerere College in Uganda. It deals with a problem which in varying degrees faces all Central and Southern African states, dominions, and colonies, namely, the interrelationship of economic policy and Negro labor migration: in a more general sense, the effect of the impact of European culture on the African Negro.

Throughout Africa, where the indigenes vastly outnumber white settlers, and where an increasing number of them are being employed by whites in industry, agricul-

ture, and domestic service, the problem arises as to how the native can live under tribal conditions and at the same time do a regular and competent job as an industrial unit. The native is seldom emancipated from his tribal duties and loyalties. Therefore, working for the white man for a money wage is usually a seasonal or at most an irregular experience. In a few industries this may be an asset, but in most fields of employment it is a liability. Loyalty and efficiency are rarely associated with transiency, nostalgia and necessitousness.

As a result there has grown up in each colony, territory, or state a customary, informal economic policy for dealing with the native, for keeping him on the job, for regularizing his labor, and for breaking down his tribal loyalties. It might be a head tax which can be satisfied only by working for a money wage, a contract which prevents his return to his tribal home for a specified period, the withholding of part of his wages until his contract has been fulfilled or a commutation of the traditional *corvée* (an annual colonial labor levy known by different names in different sections of Africa) as a payment in money, to mention only a few of the expedients.

Gradually this set of methods for dealing with natives became generally recognized until now such arrangements form an essential part of administrative policy. This policy has had a tremendous impact on native life, but it is reciprocally affected by native traditions, desires, and ways of life.

In Chapter 2, Mr. Povesland traces the interplay of these many contributing factors from 1900 to 1921; in Chapter 3 he deals with the period from 1922 to 1939; and in Chapter 4 with the period from 1940 to 1952. In Chapter 1 he deals with the impact of money. He finds that native migration is dependent on the existence and use of money as a measure of value. The native considers it an intergroup rather than an ingroup convenience; this accounts for the importance of money in emancipating him from tribal dominance. The introduction of foreign goods, his growing desire for knives and forks, blankets, linens, sewing machines, and bicycles—the latter

much more adaptable to trails and rough cart roads than other vehicles but only to be procured by money received as wages—all are now contributing to the increase of a free and mobile labor supply.

This brochure is clear, cogent, and readable. It deals with a fundamentally African problem but is mainly of local interest.

CHARLES W. COULTER

Professor of Sociology, Emeritus
University of New Hampshire

EDGAR H. BROOKES and N. HURWITZ. *The Native Reserves of Natal*. (National Regional Survey, Vol. 7.) Pp. ix, 195. Cape Town: Oxford University Press for the University of Natal, 1957. \$6.00.

South African racial problems and their correlates have for many years been approached on the basis of surveys—national, regional, and local. This is one of the latest in the fact-finding series. It is a part of the Natal Regional Survey, directed by the provincial University and financed by Natal's Town and Regional Planning Commission. Its distinction lies not alone in its freshness of approach and conciseness of definition, but even more in its incisiveness, clarity, practical emphasis, and the vigor of its recommendations to those who have authority to act.

The latter is not surprising when one recognizes that the director of the study, E. H. Brookes, is a professor specializing in the field of political economy. As early as 1928, after a study of *Ukulabola* (bride price system) among the Bantu, he insisted that the sluggish native economy could be measurably streamlined by striking off a coin of the then-average value of a native cow, stamping it with the picture of a cow, and popularizing its use by the natives to obviate the transfer of cattle bodily. This has been typical of the down-to-earth recommendations made by this versatile patriot through the past thirty years and is abundantly evident in the recommendation sections of this study.

The South African native reserve system is not unlike the Indian reservation system in America, and its history and problems roughly parallel our own. Areas set aside for native occupation in Natal and Zulu-

land comprise approximately seven million acres of land. This vast territory with its increasing population is composed of scattered government locations, mission and Zululand reserves, and various native trusts. The administration is technically in the hands of the Union Native Affairs Department with the assistance of the Department of Justice. The Native Administration Act of 1927 laid down the five principles under which that department should act: recognition of the Governor General as the supreme chief; recognition of native law and custom and the resolving of any conflict between it and Roman-Dutch law; a recognition of the tribal system and of limited criminal and civil jurisdiction by native chiefs; the setting up of a complete court system to administer native law; and the right to legislate by proclamation for native areas.

As might be expected under an administration with divided and never too clearly defined responsibility, an adaptable and flexible native policy has always been difficult of attainment. Maladjustments occasioned by changing conditions, as, for example, overpopulation, food shortage, and migratory labor, have to be overevident before remedial or preventive action is taken. The surveyors have made a searching analysis of these maladjustments in the following fields: natural environment, road and rail transport, population structure, taxation and expenditure, migratory labor, agricultural crops, livestock, food and nutrition, industry and commerce, health and hospitalization, education and public welfare. They arrive at the general conclusion that the immediate aim must be "to raise the standard of health and welfare in the native areas and to enable the natives to make a greater contribution to their own support and to the national income."

Accordingly, they offer ten specific recommendations involving major points of policy:

1. Detailed methods for improving the food supply now threatened by overpopulation of the areas.

2. The elaboration of health services, particularly preventive measures and medical training for native doctors and technicians.

3. The diversification of the Reserve economy by introducing new crops, new industries, developing local power and improving transportation facilities.

4. An improvement in the quality of administrators, together with a wider use of competent natives in this connection.

5. Some practical suggestions for the stabilization of migrant native labor.

6. The encouragement of private investment in the Reserves through the Industrial Development Corporation and the Land Bank.

7. Compulsory and free primary education: better buildings, teachers, equipment, and an integration of education with life in the Reserves.

8. Plans for the establishment of the family as opposed to the tribe as the social unit in the settlement.

9. Rural urbanization suggestions are offered for functional group settlements such as irrigation, mining, and agricultural villages.

10. Plans for higher taxes with improved industry and contingent Reserve development loans.

The study concludes: "Here is something that is right whatever else may be wrong, something that is practical whatever else may be considered idealistic; something that is urgently needed whatever our scale of priorities may be."

CHARLES W. COULTER

Professor of Sociology, Emeritus
University of New Hampshire

J. F. HOLLEMAN (Ed.). *Problems Arising from the Structure and Functioning of a Multi-Racial Society*. Proceedings of the Social Science Conference held under the auspices of the Institute for Social Research, University of Natal. Pp. v, 242. Durban: University of Natal, 1956. No price.

This is a symposium of fourteen papers and discussions of them which were presented at the University of Natal under the auspices of its Institute for Social Research. The participants, numbering over sixty, included representatives from a number of the universities and research bodies in the Union of South Africa, as well as

Professor Gordon Allport from Harvard and three other American scholars.

The papers which were presented range widely in subject matter and problems considered; all of them, however, are more or less related to the theme of the conference. They include presentations by Professor Houghton on "Economic Flexibility in a Plural Society"—the stress being on the lack of flexibility; a significant paper by Professor Du Plessis of Potchefstroom University on "An Afrikaner Approach to the Problems of a Multi-Racial Society"; an interesting analysis by Mr. Vilakazi on "The Reserve from Within"; Professor Irving's erudite consideration of the problems faced by the social scientist in South Africa in his paper "Social Research in Race Tension Situations"; a valuable statement by Mr. Sherwood on a research project under way at Rhodes University consisting of "A Cross-Cultural Study of Motivation in an Urban South African Community, with Special Reference to Inter-ethnic Relations"; an extremely useful study of "Indian Elites" by Dr. Hilda Kuper; a stimulating statement on "The Problem of Objectivity in the Study of Ethnic Relations in South Africa" by Professor Potgieter of the University of South Africa; a carefully designed research proposal by Dr. Pettigrew of Harvard on "Conformity and Personality in Race Relations"; and "Research Methods in South Africa" by Dr. Biesheuvel of the National Institute for Personnel Research. Other papers include a study of Bantu personality structure by Mr. Bettison of Rhodes University; an analysis of the implications of the Tomlinson Report on the Luvedu, a tribe of the Northeastern Transvaal, by Professor J. D. and Dr. E. Krige; an interesting report by Professor Theron of the University of Stellenbosch on problems faced in training Colored workers for supervisory positions; a paper by Dr. Lee of the University College at Fort Hare on "Some Aspects of Zulu Psychopathology"; and a study by Mr. Doxey of the University of Cape Town on how racial stratification in the labor market relates to labor turnover among non-Europeans in the Cape. Professor Allport provides a per-

ceptive summing up of the papers and deliberations of the conference.

Taken as a whole, these papers represent a rich source of information, insights, and research leads for the student of the vexed issues associated with race in South Africa. Despite the sharp divergencies in views manifest among the participants, most of the papers and much of the discussion reflect an effective effort to provide objective analysis of some of the crucial aspects of South Africa's complex society.

WILLIAM O. BROWN

Director
African Research and Studies
Program
Boston University

ASIA

F. W. EGGLESTON. *Reflections on Australian Foreign Policy*. Edited by Norman Harper. Pp. xxxvii, 216. Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire for The Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1957. 30s.

This work, which was left almost ready for publication by Sir Frederick Eggleston at his death, gives the considered views of one of the most distinguished Australian diplomats upon the dilemma which faces his country: the fact that Australia lies off the coast of Asia, which is increasingly either neutralist or Communist dominated, and that Australia by her culture, ethnic composition, and tradition is essentially a Western European country. Sir Frederick had considerable experience as Australian Minister to China during World War II, and he saw the disintegration of the Nationalist regime at first hand. Unfortunately he did not have any direct personal experience of China after the Communist regime came to power, and his judgments on the achievements of that regime suffer from the lack of such experience. One may well agree with him that "there is no doubt about the power of Communism to erect a workable state machine in the place of an outmoded one"—this, in China at least, is no longer the question. But when he finds that "it functions at a primitive

level economically and socially" (p. 167), it is necessary to remember that the material for this part of the book was gathered before the rapid industrial development of the past six years was realized or even known in Australia.

Later evidence would have modified the view (p. 71) that Communism "insists upon destroying all vestiges of the old culture," an opinion which cannot be sustained today in relation to the Chinese government's attitude towards art, drama, archaeological remains, or literature.

In an interesting chapter on "America and the Two Chinese Revolutions," Sir Frederick has drawn upon his knowledge of the situation during the Chungking period of the Nationalist regime to throw a cool and impartial light upon the vexed question of American policy in China during that time. His conclusion is that "up to this date [1948] America had never dealt with Asian peoples except as an adviser on education; she had never been responsible for their policy or administration. American ideas were thus too simple. She believed that democracy was a universal principle which could be learned and applied to any people. She taught her Chinese students Jeffersonian democracy and believed that if it did not work when applied, it was due to some wickedness on the part of the Chinese leaders." It may well be that there is some truth in this criticism, but it is also certainly true that there was "some wickedness on the part of the Chinese leaders" of the Nationalist and other regimes in China which have endeavored to work democratic and modern systems of government. Sir Frederick himself had a faith in the superiority of democratic institutions which remained unshaken by all he saw in the Far East. He could not believe that an authoritarian system had any purpose or utility except the pursuit of power, and he asserts that the Chinese Communist regime had no program of reform, even in respect to land tenure. This is a strange mistake, and one which time has exposed. Today it is increasingly realized in his own country that it is precisely the fact that the Communist regime has a program of reform which threatens to outpace any rival in Asia that consti-

tutes the real danger to the independent survival of non-Communist governments on that continent.

C. P. FITZGERALD
Professor of Far Eastern History
Australian National University

AMAURY DE RIENCOURT. *The Soul of China*. Pp. xx, 298. New York: Coward-McCann with the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, 1958. \$5.00.

Beautifully and persuasively written as this book is, one cannot help but feel that he is being served *flet de sole chinoise* with the basic ingredients of Garnet, Lin Yutang, and others, but topped off with a special *sauce de Riencourt*. Into his concoction this chef has skillfully mixed strained analogies between Chinese happenings and European history and has obviously delighted in his turning of well-known and clever expressions. One usually enjoys French dishes, and this one is not only tasty but tangy and challenging as well, even though it seems as if the food has been prepared to fit the rather stiff mold of communism.

It takes a bold spirit to claim that "culture," with its emphasis on aesthetics, must inevitably disappear before an ethic promoting "civilization," especially when for thousands of years Chinese art has flourished, albeit at different rates and in different ways. It takes courage to blandly assert that Confucianism placed China in such a mental strait jacket that it choked off all individual originality and warped all creative artistic instincts. Though often garbed in the respected cloak of antiquity, original and even some scientific thinking persisted right down to Mao Tse-tung's espousal of the peasantry rather than the urban proletariat as the basis for communism in China. It is poetic but a little much to write that "from an intensely historical epoch, the Chinese relapsed into zoological eras in which centuries passed uneventfully like the dreams of a second."

If it had been said that after eight years of war the Kuomintang had become corrupt and bankrupt and was unable to alleviate the suffering of the people, that might

have been a valid criticism. It is, however, quite another thing to claim that the New Life Movement was always dry, static, and undramatic; that it had nothing to offer, Red China being the inevitable result of a decaying Chinese civilization; and that Marxism, taking hold because of the awakening of China's religious instincts, had restored China's traditional way of thinking and fitted in well with China's yearning for totality and universality since the narrow-minded nationalism of Sun Yat-sen could never satisfy the Sons of Han.

While the author has contributed many excellent observations, and it seems likely that of necessity communism must last some years in China, only time will tell in which direction the river of Chinese genius will ultimately flow—whether, that is, it will water the flowers of individuality and personality or the poppy of the totalitarian, collective state. This book deserves to be studied, but this reviewer prefers to read history without the aid of red-colored glasses. There are other cures for a society's ills than red pills.

ALBERT E. KANE
Lecturer, Far Eastern International
Relations
American University
Washington, D. C.

RUTH T. McVEY. *The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution: A Study in the Russian Attitude Towards Asian Nationalism*. (Interim Reports Series.) Pp. iii, 83. Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1957. \$1.50.

Recent events have focused particular attention on the strife-ridden Republic of Indonesia. It alone among the "uncommitted" nations of South Asia is currently plagued with a severe internal crisis and beset with a xenophobic nationalism which may well enable the Indonesian Communist Party to exert an influence disproportionate to its numerical and governmental strength. As part of its post-Stalinist diplomatic flexibility, the Kremlin has adopted a more accommodating approach toward Indonesia. It has granted the Indonesian

government a 100 million dollar credit on attractive terms; delivered important quantities of military equipment; and offered the use of shipping to help overcome the sudden shortage occasioned by the removal of Dutch ships from Indonesia's domestic shipping service. This Soviet affability is of recent vintage, but the tradition of friendship dates from an earlier period—a period checkered by uncertainty, conflict, and confused policy directives.

Miss McVey has written a valuable account of Soviet policy toward Indonesia during the 1945–49 period. This excellent monograph is published by Cornell University's Department of Far Eastern Studies. In it, the author expertly traces this often bewildering phase of Soviet policy, with all its ramifications, and presents a sophisticated analysis which convincingly shows the interrelationship between European and Asian developments in Soviet thought and action. Though the Soviets have long advertised their interest in colonial and semi-colonial areas, their tactical approach has been conditioned largely by the requirements of their European policy. Thus, in the very early days of the postwar period, the Soviets followed a relatively moderate line of criticism of the colonial powers, careful not to hasten unduly the nonetheless expected end of the wartime era of friendly relations. However, as the cold war developed in Europe, the Kremlin shifted to an intransigent and belligerent line in the underdeveloped areas, for example, Indonesia.

In early 1946, the Soviets turned to the United Nations and used it as a forum for attacking the colonial policies of the Western Powers. In this way they gained considerable prestige from their support of Indonesia in the Security Council. From the Indonesian point of view, Soviet policy at this time was exemplary. Meanwhile, in Indonesia itself, and prior to 1948, the Soviets "chose to support the Indonesian nationalists instead of encouraging leadership of the revolution by the pro-Communist left." This strategy was adopted for a variety of reasons: the optimistic expectations of electoral successes in Western Europe, the propaganda dividends earned

as "the champion of Asian nationalism in the UN," and the not inconsequential measure of ignorance prevailing in Moscow concerning the course of developments in Indonesia.

The intensification of the cold war, the adoption of Zhdanov's "two camp thesis," and the Titoist defection all led the Soviets to introduce a more uncompromising line in Indonesia in the summer of 1948, a move which quickly affected the internal Indonesian political alignment and resulted in the Communist-inspired revolt of September 18, 1948. This abortive grab for power was led by Musso, an Indonesian Communist recently returned from a generation of exile in Moscow. However, within a month, the government quelled the disorganized uprising and captured or killed the Communist party leaders. Throughout this period the Soviet press maintained a cautious attitude toward the rebels, and, though blame for the defeat was attributed to the United States and the "Hatta-Sukarno clique," it continued to support independence for Indonesia in the United Nations.

Relying heavily upon seldom explored Soviet sources, Miss McVey has ably interwoven the manifold threads of a complex phase of Soviet policy. Her analysis is concise, encompasses the principal Soviet policy alternatives, and reveals a thorough knowledge of Indonesian developments. There is a genuine need for more such well-executed case studies of various aspects of Soviet foreign policy. It is hoped that a companion volume treating the 1950–58 period will be forthcoming.

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN
Lecturer in Political Science
University of Pennsylvania

LENNOX A. MILLS. *Malaya: A Political and Economic Appraisal*. Pp. xi, 234. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958. \$4.75.

Over thirty years ago Dr. Mills published *British Malaya 1824–67*, which is still the best history of the period. His later book, *British Rule in Eastern Asia*, is a useful compendium of source material,

and *The New World of Southeast Asia* (1949), edited by him, is still the best introduction to the region. The present book, written from the standpoint of an observer from a distance, contains much useful material otherwise difficult of access. But I wish that I could honestly say that it is as good as its predecessors.

Dr. Mills summarizes the politics and economics of Malaya since the war and then concentrates on the future of the rubber industry. His book is a warning that if the Malayan government overtaxes the industry in order to pamper the electorate it may kill the goose that lays the golden eggs.

But in hailing the Templer regime as an unqualified success, Dr. Mills follows the official apologists, and outdoes them. The facts, however, are that on the military front, after two years of the regime, the number of Communists in the jungle was as great as at the beginning, and the number of incidents of terrorism was even greater. Politically, too, the Lyttelton-Templer policy was a complete fiasco, and it was abandoned in 1954. The decline in the Communists' position is due mainly to the coming of independence which has deprived them of the plausible excuse that they are fighting "foreign imperialism." The Lyttelton-Templer policy implied "independence at the Millennium," and, if persevered in, would have meant that long before that event the Communists, and not the present well-disposed Alliance government, would have taken over. It is lamentable that Dr. Mills should perpetuate the "Templer Myth" which has long been dropped, even from official propaganda.

The weight of the book is heavily on the "commercial" at the expense of the human and psychological. In his Preface Dr. Mills thanks two ex-Malayans, Sir George Maxwell and myself, for assistance. It is clear, however, that 99 per cent of his indebtedness is to Sir George and 1 per cent—or less—to me. This may be in ratio to the weight of our views—mine are not mentioned—but I would point out that Sir George left Malaya on retirement in 1926, whereas I have been in close contact with the country until recently. Important

as rubber is to Malaya and to foreign shareholders, I personally count the good will of the people of Malaya toward the West as of even greater importance. If there is anything that Malaysians resent it is to be treated as a mere source of "raw materials"—which is what this book seems to do.

VICTOR PURCELL

Lecturer in Far Eastern History
Cambridge University

The New India: Progress Through Democracy. Prepared by a Study Group Set Up by the Planning Commission, Government of India. Pp. x, 412. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. \$5.00.

The New India is essentially a public relations effort to present and explain India's Second Five Year Plan, encompassing the years 1956–61. As such, it admirably summarizes India's central economic problems; her targets of expected achievement; and the flexible, experimental methods being employed to meet the unprecedented challenges of economic development and social change within a Western concept of parliamentary democracy. This is New Delhi's official view of what should and, by strong implication, will happen in India by 1961. Pleas for an understanding of India's vast and complex problems, a vigorous defense of democratic methods, and an undaunted optimism permeate the book. The well-written narrative is amply illustrated by useful figures, charts, and pictures.

The heart of the book, as of the Plan itself, centers around the elucidation of "four basic factors," considered to be the "key" to India's growth for at least the next twenty years; there is also a consideration of the "eight basic decisions" which have set the course of Indian planning. Together, these comprise criteria by which to judge the success or failure of this and subsequent Plans.

But measurement of these considerations against economic developments of the last eighteen months and contemporary trends leaves the reader little room for optimism regarding the successful implementation of

many of them. Consider, for example, the "basic decision" that "India believes it is more important to organize to make these efforts [to achieve a "massive plan with high targets"] than to compromise the core of the Plan or to cut down its essential targets," in relation to the fact that a downward "re-phasing" of the Plan has occurred twice in the first two years. Or match the "basic decision" that "India will seek the development of all groups and classes among its people, and of all regions of the nation, so that there may be a growing equality of income and opportunity," with the conclusions of the fifth evaluation report of the Community Projects Administration that those who have benefited most from increased irrigation facilities and agro-technological improvements are the better off landholding peasantry who, relatively speaking, needed it the least.

This is obviously not a book for the economist. Its value lies in being a useful guide for those needing a rapid summation of what the Second Five Year Plan is all about.

T. A. RUSCH

Institute of Asian Studies
University of California
Berkeley

JOHN K. FAIRBANK (Ed.). *Chinese Thought and Institutions.* (Comparative Studies of Cultures and Civilizations Series.) Pp. xiii, 438. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. \$8.50.

The thirteen papers presented here grew out of a symposium on the relationship of ideas to institutions held in 1954 by the Committee on Chinese Thought of the Far Eastern Association (now the Association of Asian Studies). The essays range broadly over 2500 years of Chinese history and contain much valuable research. Almost a third of the authors are Chinese—an indication of the significant contribution Chinese scholars in the United States are making to the study of the Far East.

A brief review cannot do justice to the separate issues discussed in this publication. Suffice it to say that throughout the scientific level is high and that some of the papers open up new areas of inquiry.

Of course, the ultimate success of an effort to clarify the relationship of Chinese ideas and institutions depends on the methodological framework within which the enterprise is undertaken. It is in this respect that the serious historian and social scientist will consider the symposium wanting.

The organizers of the conference confined it essentially to the period of the Confucian state. While in this case the initiators' decision must be accepted, though it may be regretted, no similar excuse can be made for the concept of Chinese society offered in the theoretical sections. With certain modifications, this concept is Max Weber's, and while Weber's analysis of Chinese society was an enormous achievement, research in this field since his death in 1920 has provided us with significant new insights. Today we know that the political structure in most major Chinese dynasties proper was complicated by the activities of the eunuchs; as a group, they often wielded more power than the scholarly bureaucracy. Today we also have a fairly clear picture of the various conquest dynasties; in these the Chinese bureaucracy was subordinated to a formidable ruling group which was alien in tradition and political purpose to the indigenous opinion-makers and policy-makers. Empirical data reflecting these facts are provided by several contributors; instead of conceptualizing these data, however, the basic view of Chinese society lags behind them.

Conceptual clarity is also lacking with regard to the problem of the limitation of despotic ("total") power in imperial China. Dr. Eberhard's thesis that Han astronomy, astrology, and meteorology had a "purely political" function exaggerates the control which the Han dynasty (or any other dynasty) exerted over the ideas of their subjects. Dr. De Bary and Dr. Liu show a deeper comprehension of the peculiarity of China's despotism when they explain the incomplete character of this control. More adequate institutional concepts would have aided both the definition of the limitations of power in China's Oriental despotism past and the structurally different and much more far-reaching methods of intel-

lectual control which have emerged in Communist China.

KARL A. WITTFOGEL
Professor of Chinese History
University of Washington
Seattle

G. WILLIAM SKINNER. *Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand*. (Monograph of the Association for Asian Studies, No. 3.) Pp. xvii, 363. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958. \$6.50.

Last year Dr. Skinner's companion volume, *Chinese Society in Thailand*, was published in a comparable format by Cornell University Press. The present monograph, as the title suggests, is more specialized and less broadly historical than the earlier volume. It is, however, a complete study which can be read independently of the first. In general, the two works evince the same assets and liabilities. The assets are systematic organization with frequent summary paragraphs, outstanding command of subject matter, and wealth of detail. The liabilities are a dense, pedestrian style and so rigid an adherence to the outline that the text is often repetitive and dull. The case material alone comes alive. The author's imagination seems centered on the construction of categories, correlations, and impressive "sociometric" charts. In these respects, he has set standards of ingenuity which will not be readily matched by other students of socioeconomic and political elites. Nor will his detailed and painstakingly gathered information be easily equaled by research workers in other foreign countries.

After briefly setting the stage, Dr. Skinner describes (Chapter 2) his careful procedures in selecting his 1951-52 basic sample of 135 leaders from a Chinese population of some 500,000. He then describes the major social characteristics of the group. The qualifications of Chinese leaders in Bangkok (Chapter 3) are perhaps best summarized by one of them who stated: "A leader must be respected by the people, must be rich, and must be willing to serve, work, and give [money]" (p. 106). This statement encapsulates the positive and focal values of Chinese so-

ciety in Bangkok far more significantly, it seems to me, than Dr. Skinner's not wholly convincing attempt to describe the value system of the Chinese community. In Chapter 4, the political dimensions of community leadership in 1951-52 are discussed in terms of the types of associations in which leaders serve, the multifarious functions expected of them, the appropriate methods of maneuvering in such roles, and the range of attitudes within the leadership group toward Chinese national politics. The following chapter ties the economic and political roles together. There is an interesting analysis of the economic concerns of this group and the degree to which the control of the whole Chinese community is concentrated in the hands of the elite. "Business and financial control is exercised largely through business associations and informal groupings of firms in the same line, through combines and syndicates of smaller and seemingly independent enterprises, by means of an elaborate system of interlocking directorates, and through kinship ties and intermarriage" (p. 177). Dr. Skinner admirably documents all this by means of what he calls "leader interlock clusters" defined as groups "of at least five leaders all of whom share at least two joint officerships and directorates with each of the others. Such a group of leaders is held to be an important locus of influence (especially power . . .)" (p. 209). The result is a "surprisingly monolithic structure."

The last three chapters deal essentially with the assimilation of the Chinese leadership to the Thai elite. Not only is the evidence for assimilation presented from the 1951-52 study, but the changes in leadership as they appeared three years later give evidence of the continued direction of this assimilation. The author minutely reviews the following: the alignment of the Chinese elite with the Thai elite; the economic base which the former provide the latter; the degree to which the assimilating Chinese elite's interests vary from that of the majority of the Chinese; and the old story of patronage, corruption, and expediency in political ideology. Every American who is planning a tour of duty in Thailand should study this book, not

only for its rich detail but also for the revealing patterns of interaction among Chinese leaders, between those leaders and their larger community, and between Thai and Chinese political and economic elites.

CORA DU BOIS

Professor of Anthropology
Harvard University

HAROLD R. ISAACS. *Scratches on Our Minds*. Pp. 416. New York: John Day Company, 1958. \$6.75.

Mr. Isaacs, who is "in motion between journalism and scholarship," believes that because Americans live in "an aggravated condition of ignorance about Asia," they suffer from a chronic sense of shock, betrayal, and disenchantment. Because we harbor conflicting mental images of Asia as a land of fabulous mystery, inhabited by hordes of nerveless, subhuman brutes, we throw away all hope for successful trade and for political or cultural understanding.

To find the causes of these conflicting ideas—these scratches on our minds—the author interviewed 181 Americans, carefully chosen for professional or "significant" prominence in industrial, academic, religious, diplomatic, or public relations circles; they are not named, but a skilled detective finds clues as to their identity. Mr. Isaacs limits his investigation to ideas concerning China and India. Almost without exception, his China "panelists" antedate, while his India experts postdate, World War II. To no one's great surprise, he finds that mental scratches result from inaccurate reports by missionaries, old China hands, professional liberals, and propagandists for special causes. More recently, the writings of Pearl Buck and of the creator of Charlie Chan have made new friends for China, at least until the advent of Mao revived the stereotype of the Chinese as treacherous, sadistic torturers. Of India, we knew less, depending as we did upon Kipling who disliked the people; the transformation of Gandhi from a puny, rib-showing eccentric into a modern saint kindled a friendship for India which Nehru's neutralism has not yet quenched.

Scratches concerning India, one gathers, have been more successfully erased, doubtless because they were fainter and less nu-

merous; we no longer think of India as peopled only by rajas dressed in diamonds and rubies and riding elephants to durbars, nor as lighted by the funeral pyres of helpless child-brides. As for China, the conflicting clichés remain: sage wisdom and superstitious ignorance, persistent strength and contemptible weakness, immovable conservatism and violent explosiveness, gratitude toward America and ruthless anti-foreignism.

This is a seminal book, and one which might profitably inspire a flood of similar inquiries into our ideas of other regions. The book—unfortunately entitled—is in reality a triple-header. The absorbingly interesting panelist contributions dissolve into a long, and for most readers unnecessary, history of East-West relationships; these, in turn, give way to an analysis of what the author calls the American guilt complex. Our brutal bigotry toward Chinese residents in America, our application of an antirace heritage toward Indians, our hypocrisy in failing to apply democratic ideals to missionary and trade activities, our ignorance and self-deception—all these, says Mr. Isaacs, explain what he terms our numerous failures in Asian, if not in world, relationships.

Not the least valuable contribution of this book is the revelation of what slight attention both China and India have received in the American press—especially the book and magazine press—and how uncritical the published material has been. It is also astonishing how recent is the awareness of the alleged experts concerning Eastern developments. Mr. Isaacs' painstaking research should go far toward reducing misunderstandings arising from sheer ignorance and from uncontrolled emotion.

HARRY EMERSON WILDES

Philadelphia, Pa.

JOHN F. CADY. *A History of Modern Burma*. Pp. xiii, 682. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958. \$7.50.

It is a pleasure to report that Professor Cady of Ohio University's Department of History has published his long-awaited *A History of Modern Burma*. This is the first such work by an American scholar, and it is quite safe to predict that the bulk

of this large and carefully documented book will stand as a valuable guide to others for some years to come.

Cady was a Lecturer in History between 1935 and 1938 at Judson College, Rangoon University. From then on, and especially after his wartime and later service in the Office of Strategic Services and the Department of State, he became "keenly aware of the urgent need for a systematic political history of Burma" which would "take seriously Burmese aspirations for self-rule and independence." This, as he points out, had not been the case with most prewar Western writers about Burma. Burma had been seen primarily through British Colonial Administration and American missionary eyes. One looks in vain—the exceptions are so few that they "prove the rule"—in their prewar writings for a proper account and political estimate of the force of Burmese nationalism which carried Burma to independence on January 4, 1948.

A History of Modern Burma is divided into four parts: Old Burma And Its Disappearance (pp. 3–121); British Colonial Rule (pp. 125–182); The Renaissance of Burmese Nationalism (pp. 185–424); and Re-Emergence of Independent Burma (pp. 427–624). This brings the account down to 1953. The last brief chapter to 1957, is devoted to "prospects and problems." The book has a useful Glossary and Bibliography; it is, as Cady indicates, largely dependent upon the accumulation of British official and other English language sources toward which "the required reorientation may be somewhat easier for an American student to achieve than for Britons who may have been too closely identified with the prewar point of view."

The significance of Cady's *History* consists chiefly in his taking seriously the issue of Burmese nationalism. Approximately five-sevenths of his work is devoted to it. My own analysis of the political dynamics in that country—see *Burma, Human Relations Area Files*, 1956, pp. 959–1201—fully agrees with the relevance of this interpretation of its history. During the half century preceding independence, there was increasing but disregarded evidence that Burma's people were not satisfied with existing British rule. If at times her people

appeared to be "apparently very apathetic" (Cady, p. 200), such was only the appearance during the time when various strata of Burmese society sought ways to register their effective dissent.

Space limitation prevents any detailed criticism of this notable volume. Subsequent editions will correct such minor errors as the footnote reference to the "unpublished" manuscript of Prime Minister U Nu's novel (p. 378 and p. 576). This book entitled *Man the Wolf of Man* was serialized in the Rangoon monthly, *The Guardian*. More serious is Cady's somewhat defensive treatment of the Karens as against the Burmans. They were "rescued . . . by British rule and by American missionary activity" (p. 43). When armed Karens "acting under missionary leadership" supported the British in the latter's effort to suppress the Burmese in the "pacification" campaigns after the war of 1885—completing the absorption of Burma into the Empire—the Karens "stood up to the attacking bands [of Burmese] in stalwart fashion" (p. 138), and so forth.

Other areas of inevitable disagreement with Cady's interpretation of men and events exist. They do not mar the intrinsic value of *A History of Modern Burma*.

FRANK N. TRAGER

Professor of International Relations
New York University

JAMES G. ABEGGLEN. *The Japanese Factory: Aspects of Its Social Organization*. Pp. xiii, 142. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. \$3.50.

This is a brief study of the social organization of the Japanese industrial plant as compared with that of the American factory. The author spent about a year in Japan and visited a total of nineteen large and thirty-four small factories in all parts of the country. Both formal questionnaires and informal ethnological methods of observation were used for gathering data. The results of this research are presented descriptively—not in the form of a "social science" monograph.

The author seems to agree with a number of other analysts of Japan's transfor-

mation that her industrialization, while carried out along Western lines to a considerable degree, nevertheless used to the hilt the forms of social organization characteristic of Japan's recent feudal past. This is offered in part as a challenge to Western theories of socioeconomic change which have assumed that the factory system always requires individualization and universalism for its successful development. The author notes that in contrast to such criteria, the Japanese factory employs its staff and workers for life; recruits its personnel on the basis of personal qualities rather than specific skills; rewards labor only partly on the basis of production and to a great extent on considerations of loyalty and seniority; and supervises the lives of its workers and their families in a highly paternalistic manner. These and other characteristics of the Japanese factory social organization are seen by the author to be derived from the Japanese family system and some of its feudal antecedents.

But while Abegglen observes that the modern Japanese factory system, contrary to Western theoretical expectations, functions smoothly and as a unified system, he also feels that a considerable strain exists between the demands of this type of social organization and the goal of efficient, high production. Here he appears to use Western standards of efficiency, although he is careful to specify the terms of his argument. He points out that productivity is very low by any American standard. This low productivity can be traced to the following factors: inefficiencies introduced by the need to pad employment rosters, nonfiring policies applied even to bad workers, and many other features stemming from the social organization.

He concludes with a discussion of the possible needs for change in the Japanese industrial system and the relation to this of imported American technical advice. He notes that the Japanese factory, as a functioning part of Japanese society, cannot dispense with its familial type of personnel policy; yet the Japanese economic situation demands greater production. To attain the latter but to keep the former, the Japanese must invent their own devices; these cannot be contributed by the Ameri-

can technician, who is familiar with a quite different type of system.

This is an informative and useful book. However, the author tends to present information and interpretations as if they were completely new, when, in fact, virtually identical analyses were appearing by the middle 1930's.

JOHN W. BENNETT

Assistant Professor of Sociology
The Ohio State University

EUROPE: PAST AND PRESENT

S. J. DE LAET. *The Low Countries*. (Ancient Peoples and Places Series.) Pp. 240. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. \$5.00.

Neither the title of this book nor the name of the series of which it forms a part gives a clear intimation of its contents. "Ancient Peoples and Places" does not define the period which Dr. de Laet has chosen as the subject of his study. He completes it at the moment when the conquests of Caesar and Drusus marked the end of the Prehistoric era in the Low Countries. His study of the region stops at the threshold of Netherlands history. He surveys a vast expanse of time which exceeds by many centuries the two thousand years which have elapsed since Caesar's conquests. It is clear from his absorbing account that this swampy, wind-swept, and sea-menaced region has never been without inhabitants since 11,000 B.C. Race after race swept over the land from its arctic past down to the present day; Hitler's invasion of northwest Europe was the latest upsurge of that eternally undulating human ocean. We do not know the names of these prehistoric invaders; we know them only by names which archeologists have given them, or rather have given to the cultures whose traces have been preserved by the soil in the form of burial remains, weapons, tools, ornaments, and grave goods. The firstcomers belonged to the so-called Hamburgian culture; they were hunters of reindeer which they killed with harpoons. They were followed in successive millenniums by new invaders who

brought with them new skills, new tools, and different burial rites. Amongst these were the Funnel Beaker people, builders of the Hunebeds or megalithic tombs which are still impressive landmarks of the landscape of Drenthe in the northern Netherlands. These people settled on this least fertile soil of the Low Countries in the middle of the third millennium B.C. They belonged to the later Stone Age, when stone weapons and implements prevailed. Nearly all the Neolithic remains have been found in the barren provinces which border on present-day Germany. The western part of what is now Holland was then an uninhabitable marshy region, owing to its inundation by the sea. About the end of the fifth millennium B.C., the sea level had gradually risen due to the melting of the ice cap; it was this physical upheaval which also caused the severance of Great Britain from the land mass of the Continent. Hence prehistoric finds are less common in the province of Holland, now one of the most fertile regions of the Netherlands. The nature of the material which Dr. de Laet has surveyed forced him to limit his discussion almost exclusively to things and places. The manner of life of these anonymous races remains obscure. Their burial rites, though, are amply discussed, and in those passages the author's somewhat cut and dry account draws life from the dead. Skulls of inhabitants of the Maas area show traces, he tells us, of trepanation, and he asserts that "this operation was sometimes performed *in vivo* and in some cases the patient even seems to have survived." He does not state, however, on what evidence this contention is based. The publishers call the book "a clear, readable account for the interested layman." I cannot agree with them. Dr. de Laet's pages swarm with incomprehensible technical terms which must baffle the lay reader. It is a splendid textbook by a first-class scholar who addresses himself to fellow scholars in his chosen field of pre-historical research.

ADRIAAN J. BARNOUW
Professor of the History of
Language and Literature of
The Netherlands, Emeritus
Columbia University

MILOVAN DJILAS. *Land Without Justice*. Pp. xvi, 365. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1958. \$5.75.

In spite of the enthusiastic Introduction by William Jovanovich, President of Harcourt, Brace and Company—himself of Yugoslav descent—the reviewer could not work up much enthusiasm for Djilas' "memoirs"; and this applies also to several reviews which have appeared in several current periodicals. It is true that the work, written before *The New Class*—during the interval between Djilas' dismissal from office and his imprisonment—differs from the latter in subject as well as in style. It is a running series of commentaries on his youth in Montenegro during World War I years and immediately thereafter. This small world with its "curious" folkways, mores, and even ideologies has been well handled by Djilas. And it is also true that the various characters treated by him will be found quite interesting, since they perform in the world which is quite different from the one composed of culture patterns dominating our own contemporary culture. Possibly the most enduring will be his reactions describing his youthful resentment against the killing of Stepan Raditch, chief of the Croat Peasant party, and against the murder of King Alexander.

Yet Djilas, academically speaking, tells us nothing which has not been academically known in terms of the picturesque aspects of comparative ethnology. For some reason, nobody has noticed that Djilas' presentation suffers by comparison with one of the most popular works written during the depression period; this is the study by Louis Adamic, entitled *The Native's Return*. On the basis of his anecdotes and the description of social customs in his native country which are found in this book, Adamic became, at that time, one of the most popular lecturers on the value of "primitive cultures." But if one wants to be charitable, Adamic was mainly handling the Carinthian culture backgrounds, Montenegro being used as one of the minor sub-topics. Djilas, on the other hand, has featured Montenegro as the core of his approach. Furthermore, Adamic's popularity was probably due to the ability and literary help of his "Stella," while Djilas stands, so

to speak, on his own literary feet. One can safely say, in short, that Djilas is now cashing in on *The New Class* and his fate as a "reformed" Communist. His present contribution to his reputation is interesting; it is, however, hardly as important as he and his supporters would make it appear.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK
Professor of Sociology and
Political Science
University of Bridgeport

ERIC VOEGELIN. *Order and History*, Vol. II: *The World of the Polis*; Vol. III: *Plato and Aristotle*. Pp. xviii, 389 and xvii, 383. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956. \$6.00 each.

These two volumes, preceded by *Israel and Revelation*, are to be followed by three concluding volumes during the current year. The last will be entitled "The Crisis of Western Civilization."

Spengler's suggestion that the major task remaining for Western philosophy was to work out the morphology of world history appears to have been fruitful—Voegelin joining Toynbee and others, with still no end in sight. The impossibility of controlling the necessary data, even the available data for an appraisal of human history, forces even the most conscientious historical philosopher to rely on his intuitions. The quality of his mind and the assumptions he makes, plus the extent of his mastery of relevant detail, determine the value of his intuitions.

Voegelin assumes, among other things, that human nature is a constant (II, 5). As human beings, we face the same kinds of problems faced by human beings in the past, and we are neither more nor less intelligent in dealing with them. But each society works out its own symbols or adopts them from others—symbols which represent a new truth and are eventually reduced to myth by the appearance of new symbols transcending the old. Movement is from "compactness" toward greater and greater "differentiation" (Index, II). The author holds no cycle theory, and his civilizations are more intimately related than those of Spengler or Toynbee. Mankind is one. Significant changes in outlook take place, not gradually, but with relative suddenness.

Such a change he calls a "leap in being" (Index).

The two volumes on Greece are primarily intellectual history, the discussion centering around one literary figure after another. A gratifying feature is the author's respect for the Greek text. This is how he expresses it: "As a matter of principle, whenever I must decide between two interpretations which both can be supported philologically I prefer the profounder to the flatter meaning" (II, 228, n. 10). Occasionally he seems too subtle. When Agamemnon's envoys offer Achilles a reward if he will return to battle, he replies that if he does return he will die, and therefore have no joy of the reward. Voegelin writes: "The injection of his predicted fate as an argument in the debate is a display of poor taste which the other lords are well-bred enough quietly to ignore" (II, 86). Did any Homeric hero ever ignore anything quietly?

In what he says about Attic tragedy, Voegelin is the victim of his own dogmatism. He states: "Tragedy as the representative action of the Athenian people had to die when the reality of Athens made heroic action incredible . . ." (II, 264). Accordingly, he is enthusiastic about Aeschylus, indifferent to Sophocles, and grossly unfair to Euripides. How else can one interpret his summation of the *Madness of Heracles*? "Heracles is led off by Theseus into a resigned old age on the estate of his friend in Athens. Exit the hero into retirement with a pension" (II, 265). Was Marathon any more "heroic" than Athens' magnificent courage after the Syracusan disaster, even after Aegospotami? It is easy to confuse the "heroic" with the "dramatic."

Voegelian devotes much more space to Plato than to Aristotle. In accepting Plato's *Seventh Letter* as genuine, he apparently agrees, as he does so often, with Jaeger. But when he implies that this controversy was settled in the nineteenth century (III, 14), he is mistaken (see G. Misch, *A History of Autobiography in Antiquity*, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, I, 110-54). Voegelin's discussion of the *Gorgias* (III, 24-45) is masterly though comparatively brief. The author evidently shares Plato's views—or

what he understands to be Plato's views—about the uneducated masses (III, 27). Occasionally, he is very explicit in comparing Plato's "rabble" with our own (see III, 261). The discriminating reader will decide for himself. At times the "cold rage of Plato who is compelled to live in obedience to a government of the beast" (III, 143) seems rather a twentieth-century rage.

The author's views on the growing decadence of society—fourth-century Greek and twentieth-century European—leads him to suggest that Aristotle's "... serenity ... stems from the fact that ... he has 'given up'" (III, 289). But what else could Aristotle do? Unlike Plato he was an outsider from an obscure Chalcidian city with no political rights in Athens. His continued absorption with the city-state—despite the roll of drums to eastward—and his refusal to treat monarchy except as an outmoded form of government surely suggest the contrary.

The concluding volumes of *Order and History* will be awaited impatiently. For everyone will be hoping they can live up to the very high standard already set.

TRUESDELL S. BROWN

Professor of History
University of California
Los Angeles

OLE KLINDT-JENSEN. *Denmark Before the Vikings*. (Ancient Peoples and Places Series.) Pp. 212. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$5.00.

This little book is part of a series of valuable popular monographs devoted to the early history of famous lands. The series includes a work on Japan by J. E. Kidder, one on Malta by John Evans, one on Ancient India by Mortimer Wheeler, and one on the Vikings by Holger Arbman. In undertaking *Denmark Before the Vikings*, Ole Klindt-Jensen is venturing into a field where most laymen would expect him to strike little "pay dirt" of any sort, but Dr. Klindt-Jensen is in a position to confound such pessimism. He is Chief Curator of the National Museum in Copenhagen. He has excavated in Gothland with Professor M. Stenberger of Uppsala University in order to dig up traces of the Migration Age settlement at Vallhagar. He

has been successful in researches among the burnt-down farms, among the cemeteries and hill forts on Bornholm for his Museum. And he is a pleasantly articulate scientist.

One of the main questions of history is what causes an explosion of population like that of the Vikings. By going behind the phenomenon and studying the Danes before they played their vital roles as Varangians in Russia and Byzantium, or as Norsemen in Spain, France, and Italy, Dr. Klindt-Jensen performs a praiseworthy service to scholarship. He deals with a people who have been firmly in place, perhaps since the first man whose handiwork we can recognize split fragments from the bones of fallow deer with a hard chopping tool in the last interglacial period, about 50,000 years B.C. Many villages of the early Danes were protected by swamps through which vestigial remains of cobbled cartways may still be traced, or exhumed, by removing the peat formed in later centuries. Peat-cutting in the Danish bogs has proven to be our best source of treasure-trove, giving historic proof of how early Danes lived, fought, and worshipped. Some of the well-preserved specimens of the men who, like their shields, swords, wagons, and ships, were consigned to the mystery and muck of the bogs are now to be found in Danish museums where their brown parchment faces, every acquiline trait intact, prove contemporary enough in line and feature to give them as Danish a look as Hamlet. One does not get any impression of overpopulation in the bog villages, or in the slash agriculture which some Danes had to practice before the pre-Viking period in which plows were developed—plows which are found in the bogs even today. With these it was possible to cultivate a richer and less sandy loam. Dr. Klindt-Jensen hints at a technological development which may have set the Vikings off. Although he does not stress the point, he avers that the Danes were among the best seamen and ship-building innovators of the pre-Christian epoch. He describes with enthusiasm the primitive long boats, cleated and knotted together with cords, rope, and resin, which had the elasticity to give and survive in inland seas, lakes, or

rivers but were not ready for long ocean cruises, in as much as they had no sails. From the Romans, the pre-Viking Danes obtained the gift of sail. They were able to step across the technological threshold into Atlantic excursions. In other words, they became Vikings.

In a hundred rewarding ways, Dr. Klindt-Jensen reports his findings and leaves the reader to draw his own conclusions. Where Professor P. V. Glob of Aarhus University has elaborately expounded his theories of an early Danish religion of human sacrifice and capped nude bodies pinned down in the bogs with a wooden stake or a hook, Dr. Klindt-Jensen consistently underplays his hand. He gives the bare facts behind the mystery of the Tollund man in two paragraphs, but these facts are exciting and vivid. We leave his book wanting more, demanding some information about the religious sanctuary of Leire, which must have been as cruel and prominent a place of sacrifice, either for a good harvest or in the interest of the community, as was the sacred grove at Uppsala. Tacitus may have referred to Leire in the following passage: "In an island of the Ocean stands a sacred grove, and in the grove stands a car. . . ." Dr. Klindt-Jensen at least shows us the car. His illustrations are superb.

WILLIAM L. SMYSER

Professor of History
State Teachers College
East Stroudsburg, Pa.

JOHN EHRLMAN. *Cabinet Government and War, 1890-1940*. (The Lees Knowles Lectures, 1957.) Pp. x, 137. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958. \$3.00.

A major problem of contemporary democratic government is how the civilian authorities can exercise proper control over the armed services. This book describes how the problem was dealt with in Britain during a critical half century. The first important organizational reform was the creation, in 1902, of the Committee of Imperial Defense, consisting of service representatives and politicians who were responsible directly to the Prime Minister rather than to the Cabinet as a whole. In 1904

the Committee was given a permanent secretariat; this occurred more than a decade before the Cabinet was provided with this elementary facility.

The establishment of the Committee was not universally welcomed in political circles. There was some apprehension that it might exceed its advisory role, and Ministers and Members of Parliament interested in social reform regarded this anonymous Committee, with its relatively expensive responsibilities, as a dangerous rival. But the Committee was useful in that it enabled the Prime Minister to keep in touch with the service chiefs, though it failed to put an end to interservice rivalry. Indeed, when in 1906 and again in 1909 the Committee asked the Navy for their plans in the event of war with Germany, Admiral Fisher (First Sea Lord from 1904 to 1910) refused to disclose them; and, in 1906, he flatly refused to guarantee the passage of a British expeditionary force across the channel.

World War I found Britain inadequately prepared, and it was not until Lloyd George became Prime Minister that a determined effort was made to modernize both the civilian and the military organization. Even so, Lloyd George spent almost as much time and energy in conflict with the army chiefs as he was able to devote to the defeat of the Central Powers.

Mr. Ehrman's book, based on the Lees Knowles Lectures given at Cambridge University in 1957, provides a detailed and accurate account of the relation between successive British governments and the armed services in the half century before World War II. It is a solid and useful piece of scholarship.

SYDNEY D. BAILEY

Director, Quaker Program at
the United Nations
New York City

RICHARD W. LYMAN. *The First Labour Government, 1924*. Pp. ix, 302. London: Chapman & Hall, 1957. 25s net.

This study by Richard Lyman, Assistant Professor of History at Washington University, is a very competent piece of work. Professor Lyman has digested fully the

facts and opinions about the brief but revealing experiment which is his subject, and he has presented them in a narrative which is balanced and interesting, but not overburdened with the kind of heavy footnoting which indicates the failure of the writer to master his material. Furthermore, he is not afraid to present his own personal judgments of men and policies.

There are only three small criticisms which could be made: he spends a rather disproportionate amount of space on attempting (and failing) to discover why Baldwin decided to go to the country on a halfhearted tariff policy; he is slightly bitten with the psephology bug; and he is curiously hesitant, in his Appendix, about the Zinoviev letter. No doubt Labour was doomed anyway on the twin issues of the Campbell case ineptitude and the Russian treaty, but surely no one doubts that the Red letter, whether an *ad hoc* forgery or a stray document dressed up for the occasion, was not a genuine communication, or that the dubious Gregory leapt to publish it when the opportunity was most unfavorable.

For the rest, Professor Lyman rightly stresses the unexpectedness of the victory. No Labour leader had anticipated Labour becoming a government until ten years or more after the publication of *Labour and the New Social Order*; and while few had any doubt that the challenge should be accepted, one result was that there was no accepted priority for the measures which the government would be able to introduce—though Professor Lyman notes that the hampering of a minority position was felt in its inability to command “the time of the House” rather than in any opposition on policy, at least until the clash over Russia. The other noticeable effect was the continuance of idealistic slogans carried over from the early days; for example, that the government would cure unemployment because it was a Socialist government, not because it had any clearly worked-out plan; all too soon it became apparent that it had not. This very slogan-mindedness, however, coupled with the minority position, served to maintain the faith, so that the fall of the government and the loss of the election was no more

than a minor setback to the majority of the faithful.

Professor Lyman has temperate praise, on the whole, for the Cabinet of Ministers without previous experience, and high praise for John Wheatley's Housing Act. His condemnation is reserved for the Liberals, who, he thinks, fully deserved their fate, from the moment when Asquith, with idiotic arrogance, remarked that “it is we, if we really understand our business[!], who really control the situation,” through their voting record, to their behavior in the Campbell case, which a Tory member stigmatized as “contemptible party tactics.” The story of the first Labour government told little about the future of Labour, but it ended the debt to the Liberal party.

MARGARET COLE

London

GEOFFREY L. GOODWIN. *Britain and the United Nations*. (National Studies on International Organization.) Pp. xiii, 478. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company for the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1957. \$3.00.

This excellent product of British scholarship, prepared for the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, contains much solid food for thought by Americans. It was written primarily to explain the British point of view concerning the current phase of the eternal quest for peace, but happily by an author possessing an intimate knowledge of American viewpoints as well. The result is a work which will help Americans to a better understanding not only of British attitudes toward the United Nations but also of those of their own countrymen and government.

The American reader, accustomed to thinking of the United Kingdom and the United States as the principal pillars of the United Nations, will be surprised to find how different the attitudes of the two countries have been toward the problems of creating a general international organization to replace the League of Nations and of developing it into a serviceable agency

of peace. Assuming, as the American is apt to do, that the United Nations is a substantial improvement over the League, he will be astonished to learn that the British public has shown, for the United Nations, neither the interest nor the fervor commanded by the League. By the end of the first decade under the Charter—the period covered by the well-informed and judicious Mr. Goodwin—the United Nations “had come to be little more than a dispassionately acknowledged fact, generally conceded to be a ‘good thing,’ but little more.” This attitude may help to explain, for instance, the radically different British and American policies toward Israel and Egypt in 1956. But how have the unhappy events at Suez affected the further development of British attitudes toward the United Nations? A second edition of this valuable work would already be timely and instructive.

Nevertheless, this carefully documented volume remains a highly significant and useful contribution to the literature of international politics. The author's general conclusions continue to deserve wide and careful consideration. “To dismiss collective security as wholly impracticable in a divided world and to give precedence to conciliation and mediation is not to rule out altogether the possibility that instances may arise in which the General Assembly's ‘Uniting for Peace’ machinery might help to muster slightly wider moral and material support for collective resistance to aggression than could NATO and its appendages.” In the light of this very cautious judgment—which the author might now wish to revise—his final conclusion is all the more impressive. “The United Nations is still looked upon,” he believed in early 1956, “by a majority of informed opinion in Britain . . . as a symbol of man's dream of a more peaceful and prosperous world.” Great Britain, he affirmed, “would almost certainly be very much the loser were her faith in the ultimate meaning and purpose of the United Nations to wither.” This book is well designed to give Americans—and others—a more realistic understanding of the increasingly insistent problems of international organization and a firmer ba-

sis for the further development of national policy in matters concerning which the United Nations may claim an interest.

ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE

Professor of Government, Emeritus
Harvard University

B. WILKINSON. *Constitutional History of Medieval England, 1216–1399*, Vol. III: *The Development of the Constitution, 1216–1399*. Pp. viii, 421. London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1958. 35s net.

This latest volume of a distinguished series should have a very special appeal for an age like our own in which there is need to reappraise claims of liberties—too often assumed to be immutable—and of authority—too frequently flouted or viciously dominant. Certainly this cannot be done in a vacuum of theoretical cogitation, for, however perfect the model, the final analysis and evaluation of the respective roles of liberty and authority in society demand full knowledge of the historical setting in which they have already played their mighty parts. In the volume under review, Professor Wilkinson shows how a workable balance between extremes was attained in England of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The lucidity of his argument is admirable; the richness of his narrative is astonishing; and the quality of his scholarship is superb.

The story of English constitutional developments—an old one, to be sure—is, nevertheless, always exciting; it is made especially so in this book. In an Introduction of some seventy pages, Professor Wilkinson gives a succinct account of “men's efforts to reconcile order and liberty” during two of the greatest centuries of Western history. Bishop Stubbs, for whom the author confesses his high respect, and a giant like Maitland—along with many others—have made the elements of the story familiar to generations of readers, and the works of these authors of an earlier day must still command attention. However, no one who now seriously undertakes the study of English institutions can fail to read with care, and with ever increasing admiration, Professor Wilkinson's

latest contribution. He seems to have read everything; to have pondered long over difficult problems of great significance. His compact pages bristle with challenge as he unfolds for the reader his own provocative, often subtle, interpretation of English constitutional history. This is a scholarly book, and one in which the maturity of the reader is assumed. Its lucid pages require and demand close attention for full appreciation of the argument.

In addition to the fine Introduction, there are eight chapters. The contents of these sections are most easily described by the titles used—"Kingship"; "The King's Administration"; "The King's Justices"; "King and Community"; "Local Affairs, Military Service and 'Bastard' Feudalism"; "King and Community: Representation and Consent and the Beginning of Parliament"; "Parliament to the Death of Edward I"; "Parliament in the Fourteenth Century"; "Church and State." Each chapter is introduced by a Bibliography of some recent works, certainly an invaluable aid. Following this is the analytical narrative, providing the essential background for an appreciative understanding of the numerous documents in English translation which allow the reader to judge for himself the worth and validity of Professor Wilkinson's contentions. This book, like those volumes which preceded it, is a work of enduring quality and outstanding merit.

GRAY C. BOYCE

Professor of History
Northwestern University

JOSEPH LA PALOMBARA. *The Italian Labor Movement: Problems and Prospects.* (Studies in International Labor.) Pp. xix, 192. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957. \$2.50.

The prestige and influence attained by organized labor in the United States were reflected in the meticulous attention paid to labor policy by the American occupation authorities in dealing with the defeated Axis powers. The results of the policy were quite diverse. In Germany, the labor movement quickly gained a position of considerable power with only a minimum of outside assistance. A mass Japanese trade

union movement was created for the first time in the history of that country, though with the withdrawal of the American tutelage it tended to move to the left. In Italy, however, the trade unions did not succeed in establishing themselves to the same extent; moreover, the principal segment of the movement fell under Communist control and remains in that status to this day.

Both the American government and American trade unions—except for a portion of the old Congress of Industrial Organizations—supported the Christian Democratic labor federation or Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori (CISL) and not the socialist-oriented Unione Italiana del Lavoro (UIL). A shotgun marriage of the two groups was forced in 1950, only to be dissolved soon after by Republicans and Socialists who sought a middle ground between Communist and Catholic trade unionism. Professor La Palombara is justifiably critical of "the host of Americans who had played direct or indirect roles in bringing about the unification," and of the role of the American Federation of Labor which, for example, opposed the admission of UIL to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. He also has some harsh words to say about the American Embassy in Rome, which was so committed to CISL that its reporting was deliberately biased. He concludes that "rather than provide policy makers [in the United States] with the kind of intelligence that would make sound policy at least a possibility, some Americans in Italy—in the trade-union as well as in the governmental sphere—have behaved as special pleaders and lobbyists for CISL."

This is an angry book, and rightly so. Our labor policy in Italy has been largely a failure. There are few countries in which we have paid so much attention and devoted so substantial an amount of resources to the building of an anti-Communist labor movement, and achieved such meager results. Professor La Palombara, through careful and painstaking research, has unearthed the relevant factual information and set it forth in brilliant fashion. His results are required reading, not only for those who are interested in Italy's future,

but for all who are concerned with the problem of building democratic labor movements throughout the world.

WALTER GALENSON

Professor of Industrial Relations
University of California
Berkeley

HAROLD J. GORDON, JR. *The Reichswehr and the German Republic, 1919-1926.* Pp. xiv, 478. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. \$8.50.

This book is the result of a thorough investigation into the formative years of the Reichswehr and its relations with the government of the Weimar Republic. The author begins his study with the military and political collapse, 1918-19, and then illuminates the role of the Freikorps in saving the Republic by safeguarding its frontiers and by opposing its internal enemies. An analysis of the composition of the Freikorps illustrates the wide range of their political views and reminds us once again that the odious anti-Weimar groups represented only one of the trends in this interesting sociological phenomenon. Gordon examines the growth of a provisional Reichswehr, which was recruited to a large degree from the Freikorps, and, finally, the inadvertent stimulus given by the Kapp Putsch to the creation of a professional Reichswehr under the leadership of General von Seeckt. The Reichswehr did not encroach on the civil government, and it was not a threat to the constitution, but there was a fundamental divergence of outlook between the governing Majority Socialists, on one hand, and the conservative and often monarchist Reichswehr, on the other.

The author may, on occasion, appear to be sympathetic to the military, particularly since he is critical of the government's failure to achieve a true identification of the Reichswehr with the Weimar Republic. But his argument is convincingly presented, and it seems that the whole of Gordon's view is historically defensible, if only because he also shows that both groups were captives of their economic and political past. Apart from the more moderate leaders, who desired to achieve more than a mar-

riage of convenience, the basic differences were never overcome between the military, who distrusted the Reds, and the Socialists, who feared the military. The government's alternative to a professional army, the establishment of a People's Army by conscription, was prevented by the Versailles Treaty. Also, there was little enthusiasm among the young men of the working classes for professional military service.

This book, based on a doctoral dissertation submitted to Yale University, represents an important contribution to the early history of the Weimar Republic. Gordon conclusively demonstrates that many earlier works on the same subject do not stand up under the scrutiny of the new evidence, particularly of the Seeckt papers. These, along with the Epp, Gessler and Groener papers, and oral testimony and questionnaires answered by participants, form the core of the primary sources. A critical Bibliography, Appendices and a detailed Index further enhance the value of this painstakingly executed and well-conceived book.

ERIC H. BOEHM

Editor, *Historical Abstracts*

E. LAMPERT. *Studies in Rebellion.* Pp. xi, 295. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$6.00.

Dr. Lampert has undertaken to analyze the ever fascinating and often elusive history of Russian revolutionary thought in the nineteenth century through the study of the most significant contributors to that thought. With this aim in mind, he has projected a three-volume work, of which *Studies in Rebellion* is the first. In it he has considered the lives and thought of Belinsky, Bakunin, and Herzen.

Writing in the environment of English scholarship—he is now at Oxford—Dr. Lampert does not share the timidity of many of his American contemporaries, who might shy at reviewing a field which has been frequently, if not exhaustively, worked over by giants and lesser ones; nor does he fear to express strong opinions on highly controversial matters. His justification for adding a new study to the many already in existence is not so much the recent

revelation of new material—though he has made use of some recent contributions to the sources and of recent monographs by Soviet scholars—but the belief that he has something to say.

The author does have something to say, and he says it directly and, more often than not, well. Without ignoring the wealth of secondary literature, Dr. Lampert has placed principal emphasis on a re-study of the known sources. His conclusions are not startlingly new, but they are most definitely his own and are often at variance with those of other writers—E. H. Carr, for example.

Unlike those students of intellectual history who treat ideas as the product of society, Dr. Lampert considers them chiefly as the reflection of personality. He argues (p. 1) that the study of ideas may lead one "perhaps, to discover that the kind of a philosophy a man adopts depends on the kind of man he is." He argues that Belinsky suffered from a wildness of the mind and consequently lacked a guiding mental restraint. Bakunin's imbalance was one of the flesh rather than of the mind, and, despite his improvident and irresponsible behavior, he was a man of purpose whose development was directed toward a fairly fixed end. Thus, Bakunin was driven by the desire, tinged with a quasi-religious intensity, to exalt and liberate man. He might flirt with the notion of God or repudiate it; but whatever the vagaries, the goal of his thinking was unchanged. Herzen, to complete the triangle, is shown as a man whose personality led him to become a "stricken Voltaire," who "tended often to appeal to reason, while refusing to treat men as reasonable beings" (p. 212).

Vigorous in style as well as in thought, *Studies in Rebellion* is an exciting work for the reader who is making his first contact with Russian revolutionary thought and a refreshing one for those already familiar with it.

SIDNEY HARCAVE
Professor of History and
Chairman, Division
of Social Sciences
Harpur College

GEORGE F. KENNAN. *Russia, the Atom and the West*. Pp. ix, 116. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$2.50.

The Reith lectures, delivered by George Kennan over the British Broadcasting Corporation in England during the final months of 1957, prompted a public reappraisal of foreign policy in the Western world. Reprinted here, together with an additional chapter on Anglo-American relations, they provide a convenient source for scholars and laymen alike. For the mass audience to whom they were addressed, the lectures are felicitously couched in generalities and are persuasively designed to change the public mood from one of military containment, which Mr. Kennan sponsored a decade ago, to one of passive coexistence.

The Russia which Mr. Kennan now sees is registering impressive economic progress, but it is subject to deepening political crises resulting from the relationship of the senior figures to each other and to the people over whom they rule. The distorted Soviet view of the outside world reflects doctrinaire stereotypes and habitual carelessness about the truth which pervades assessments of foreign motives. Mr. Kennan considers the disagreements over frontiers and the political control of territory as the basic issues between the Soviet Union and the West. He favors a policy pointed towards military disengagement in Central Europe and towards the reunification of Germany. The age of thermonuclear warfare has downgraded military power by making total war catastrophic and by precluding limited war. The Communist threat to Europe is primarily internal, not external; the withdrawal of German or even United States forces from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will not jeopardize a realistic strategic doctrine if paramilitary forces and internal economic viability are sustained within these countries. Mr. Kennan believes that should the United States forsake its preoccupation with military problems and its competitive economic policies with the Soviet Union in the non-European world, these countries would welcome such nonintervention and respond more critically to Moscow's motives and methods. Withal, a certain minimum of Anglo-

Canadian-American solidarity must be maintained if our political and cultural values are to be preserved from the Communistic and nationalistic threats in Russia and the non-Western world.

It may not be an overstatement to suggest that Mr. Kennan has developed a neo-isolationist program. He is pessimistic about the possibilities of negotiating with the Soviet Union, and he intimates that the exigencies of their own internal development may overtake the Russians. Europe's strength lies primarily within itself, rather than in association with the United States. Economic assistance, he claims, cannot be regarded as a very promising device for combating, over the short term, the psychological handicaps under which Western statesmanship now rests in Asia and Africa. Least of all do the solutions to world problems lie in the military sector. Limiting in this way the objectives and procedures of foreign policy, it is reasonable to expect that the trained diplomat, in whom the author has great confidence, may keep the peace. Dynamic internal forces within the states would then be given the time and opportunity to satisfy the economic and social demands of their respective peoples.

It seems to this reader that Mr. Kennan, like the apologists for limited war, is attempting to re-create in part the international situation of the nineteenth century. A technological one-world in which the people have a larger voice in foreign policy-making than ever before may demand more, not less, of conference diplomacy, institutionalized within the framework of the United Nations.

MARTIN B. TRAVIS, JR.
Associate Professor of Political Science
Stanford University

ROBERT T. HOLT. *Radio Free Europe*. Pp. xii, 249. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958. \$5.00.

Important as Radio Free Europe is to American policy in the cold war, most Americans probably know little about its operations; this is despite the claim by the parent body, the Free Europe Committee, that RFE "is their station." The interested and curious few will no longer have

to go to scattered and sometimes inaccessible sources for the pertinent information. Thanks to the full co-operation of both the Free Europe Committee in New York City and the RFE in Munich, Professor Holt has been able to tell the story, in his excellent and timely book, as fully as it is likely to be told. His first concern as a political scientist is to explain the administration of this project whose employees number two thousand in Munich alone and whose offices extend from London to Istanbul; he is further concerned with the formulation of policy guidance for around-the-clock broadcasts by refugees to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. The Preface, which should be read last, summarizes the latest changes occasioned by charges of responsibility for the Hungarian revolt. Their purpose seems to have been the tightening of the control of the New York headquarters over the operations in Munich.

The book, as the author rightly makes clear, is not an "official" study. He nevertheless approves RFE's objective—the emancipation of the satellite peoples by peaceful means—and believes that it has done and is doing a good job in the given circumstances. Since the evidence largely comes from policy papers and not from scripts of actual broadcasts, the claim that RFE has not incited violence falls short of complete conviction. Professor Holt is perhaps on firmer ground in attributing the fault, if any exists, to the official policy of the United States, its lack of clarity as to the methods of liberating the satellites, and its inadequate liaison with RFE. The book does not question the feasibility of this emancipation without war, at a time when peace, such as it is, rests precariously upon the "balance of terror"; the author does, however, leave no doubt that it will not be accomplished by radio broadcasts alone. The phrase "official non-official instrument" is surely justified by the Department of State's initiative in the founding of the Free Europe Committee and by the presence of former officials of the rank of Joseph C. Grew and General Lucius Clay among its officers, quite apart from the obscure role of official subsidies. Under these circumstances, it is fantastic that

RFE should be forced to decipher American policy from the *New York Times*.

E. MALCOLM CARROLL

Professor of History
Duke University

SOCIOLOGY

HERMAN R. LANTZ with the assistance of J. S. McCrary. *People of Coal Town*. Pp. ix, 310. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. \$5.75.

JOHN KENNETH MORLAND. *Millways of Kent*. (Field Studies in the Modern Culture of the South, Vol. 3.) Pp. xxii, 291. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958. \$5.00.

Both of these books are welcome additions to our knowledge of industrial enculturation. Coal Town is a mid-America mining community (population 2,300) which is typical with respect to economic base, ethnic origins, and life style as manifested in economics, law, government, family structure and sexual mores, education, and religion. The authors analyze the values, interpersonal relations, and personality configurations present during the period of prosperity, as well as the present decline of the community; to accomplish this they have used both sociological and psychological concepts and criteria. The study covers the period from the first settlement in 1804 through 1956, which was the eighth consecutive year of rapid economic decline and the year in which the second of the two major mines was closed. The early settlers were "Old Americans" of Scotch, Irish, and English descent; "poor whites" from the agriculturally unproductive southern hills, who lived on fish, game, and a little farm produce until the advent of mining operations in 1904. From then on, two interrelated conflicts wracked Coal Town: the worker-union-management power struggle and the staggering economic and emotional impact of heavy immigration. A major value of this study is its analysis of the attitudes toward, and those of, the immigrants. Everything in life became keyed to *the mine*, and to national and religious prejudices. One chapter,

"The Meaning of Mining," captures the psychology and spirit of this way of life as few outsiders have been able to do. In "Prosperity and Decline," and "Life in Coal Town: Themes and Values," the authors cite the prejudices and superstitions, anti-intellectualism, and lack of job responsibility which doom new industries in Coal Town. Atomic and solar energy will free many industries from geographical proximity to fuel and power sources, but not without major attention to the human limitations which will hinder progress in some areas for at least a generation. Moreover, people of Coal Town take Coal Town with them to the industries of the northern Middle West, California, and the Pacific Northwest, where the "natives" have coined a new epithet—"up-south people." This book succeeds fairly well in combining historical perspective with depth analysis of a community. However, at least half of it consists of long extracts from interviews, many of which are reminiscences of days gone by.

Millways of Kent is the report of a social anthropologist's one-year sojourn among the cotton mill workers of a Piedmont Crescent town of about 4,000 people. The Piedmont Crescent encompasses Virginia, the Carolinas, northern Georgia, and northern Alabama. In the 1880's it was hoped that the "new South" would arise here, rooted in a progressive and expanding textile industry; but the pattern has remained one of small city and village industry, attempting to integrate the factory with the old agrarian ways. Yet for over seventy years this has been the one area of the South which has had some contact with industrialization. Nevertheless, summarizes John Gillin in his Foreword, "the work force . . . is in many ways different from the factory labor class of other parts of the country. It is practically one hundred percent 'Old American' . . . [with] . . . no appreciable . . . European immigration for nearly two hundred years, it has had practically no experience with the metropolitan type of organization and culture, and it is closely allied traditionally with the . . . small-farm type of life. . . ." More segregated than the town's Negroes, the mill workers are "almost as encapsu-

lated as . . . a recently arrived immigrant group." At the time of the field study, in 1948, mill workers were not unionized: worker apathy, strongly paternalistic management, and some management response to the indirect pressure of union wages and conditions contribute to this situation.

Professor Morland's book is a first-rate depth analysis; and in addition to his use of psychological techniques, the categorical schemes of cultural anthropology furnish a framework which integrates his data without hypostatization. Kent has been more carefully observed, more selectively listened to, and has been accorded more conceptual analysis than Coal Town. Professor Morland knows when to quote—and coin—the pungent phrase, and when to let the rambling recollections go. He reports what he has seen people do in Kent and what he has heard them say to each other; he also reports what they say they do, or did, or what their predecessors did. Maps, diagrams, and tables add to the lucidity. In the last decade, southern industrialization has been rapid, and its consequent social dislocations are a matter of record. It is a pity that this report was so long delayed and that we have not had many more like it which were, and still are, needed.

SAMUEL E. GLUCK

Director of Research
Bonded Scale and Machine Company
Columbus, Ohio

HAROLD L. WILENSKY and CHARLES N. LEBEAUX. *Industrial Society and Social Welfare: The Impact of Industrialization on the Supply and Organization of Social Welfare Services in the United States*. Pp. 401. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1958. \$5.00.

It is rare for a reviewer to come across a book which affords as much satisfaction in the reading and reviewing as does this account of "the impact of industrialization on the organization of social welfare services in the United States." Wilensky, a sociologist, and Lebeaux, a professor of social work, team up in asking the following: What is the social problem posed by industrialization and what is the response of social work? In answering, they do not drown themselves in the professional liter-

ature of case work. Instead, they make use of sociological materials usually neglected by students of the social work field.

The argument moves from the impact of industrialization on modern society to the newly developed functions of social welfare. It is contended that within the culture of capitalism—those values and beliefs which concern American economic life—industrialization recruited the peasant and the immigrant, moved his family to the city, subjected him to factory discipline, developed specialization, mobility, insecurity, material enjoyment, family disorganization, and the rebellion of city youth. As wages improved, social security was developed, the complexity of urban life increased, problems of the family gave way to increasing family and youth disorganization. As the new middle class joined the immigrant proletariat in battling the complexities of metropolitan life, only the profession of social work seemed qualified to offer help.

Given the social-problem challenge posed by urban industrialization, what is the social work response? What is the concept of social welfare? What is the scope of existing programs? What is the level of expenditure and under what auspices are social work efforts carried on? Two chapters analyze family adjustment problems and juvenile delinquency to show how changes in social organization have gone beyond what the average family has the power to manage. Theories of the status anxiety of lower class boys—notably the work by Cohen—are reviewed to show how delinquency calls forth programs of delinquency prevention. We are shown, for example, how one program in this field has carried over the permissive pattern already developed in social work. The book demonstrates why the social work agency must assume a bureaucratic structure so that its services may be impersonal and technical. Social work is shown as a case study in the rise of a profession, and the gradual substitution of psychoanalytic techniques of adjustment for the social reform emphasis of an earlier period is demonstrated as a necessary technique for professional survival. Since big policy in the field is made by men of power, the social worker is pro-

tected by having a technique open only to the profession. The new source of conflict indicates that having thrown in his lot with psychoanalytic techniques, the social worker in time faces the danger that he may become subservient to psychoanalysts just as the nurse is an attendant on the physician's efforts. This is truly an illuminating comment. To the reviewer, this book comes to terms with a question often asked and never before answered: What has sociology to offer to the profession of social work?

RUPERT B. VANCE

Professor of Sociology
University of North Carolina

H. OTTO DAHLKE. *Values in Culture and Classroom: A Study in the Sociology of the School*. (Harper's Social Science Series.) Pp. xvii, 572. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$6.00.

This volume, subtitled *A Study in the Sociology of the School*, contains a great deal of factual and useful information. In addition to the data in the textual material, it has fifty-four tables, thirty-one figures such as graphic presentation of size of school sites, current per pupil capital outlay and sociograms, and eleven ecological maps. It is unfortunate, in this writer's judgment, that more current data were not used as it would make the facts more representative of present-day educational problems and practices.

The author divides the analysis into six parts: Part I, Action and Values—A Cultural Approach to Education, very briefly and inadequately defines culture and analyzes the role of the school as a social group.

In Part II, The Socio-Cultural Context of Education and the School, the author introduces a considerable number of unrelated aspects of education: the development of education in the United States, trends in school population, religion and education, labor union activities, the legal bases of education, and specific phases of the local community, such as nationality and color groups.

The most interrelated analysis is given in Part III, The Structure and Organization of the School. Under the major cap-

tions of the "functional order" and the "normative order," the major fields of school problems from architecture to internal and external controls are discussed.

A similar but much more diffuse analysis is given in Part IV, Informal Social Structure and Relations Within the School.

Part V, The Teacher in School and Community, is a brief and realistic analysis of the difficulties and opportunities of the teaching profession.

If Part VI had included current controversies—the one exception is segregation—it would have made a real contribution to the discussion, The School in the Center of Controversy. The examples given are only partially relevant to current issues, although they illustrate some of the basic criticisms and defenses of education.

Two general comments, both unfortunately critical, appear to the reviewer to be in order. Although the outline of the entire volume appears logical, the author has attempted to include so many detailed topics that their relevancy is not apparent and superficiality of treatment results. There is little analysis of the many tables and figures to relate the data to the textual discussion.

The second comment may be either a commendation or a criticism, depending on what one expects from such an analysis. The author appears to have retained such complete objectivity that it is difficult to determine what he conceives to be the values in culture which are the responsibility of the classroom. The summaries tend to reflect the author's point of view, but these are few in number and inadequate in exposition.

FRANCIS J. BROWN

Staff Associate
American Council on Education

CONRAD TAEUBER and IRENE B. TAEUBER. *The Changing Population of the United States*. (Census Monograph Series.) Pp. xi, 357. New York: John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall for the Social Science Research Council in co-operation with the U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1958. \$7.75.

In recent years the need for an up-to-date summary of the principal United

States population trends has been increasingly apparent. Thompson and Whelpton's detailed review was carried only to 1930, and the volume of THE ANNALS edited by Louis Dublin and titled *The American People* was published in 1936. That enormously useful volume from the National Resources Commission, *The Problems of a Changing Population*, similarly ended in the economic depression of the 1930's when demographers, like economists, were less sophisticated and more daring in their predictions than they are today.

Since then there have been many studies of special aspects of the American population, but there has been no single volume presenting an over-all picture of the extensive changes down to a recent date. Now such a study has become available as part of the Census Monograph Series sponsored by the Social Science Research Council with the co-operation of the Bureau of the Census.

It is fortunate that two most able and experienced scholars have undertaken the formidable task of reviewing the massive accumulation of census data and of studies by earlier students. The result is a comprehensive and authoritative portrayal of United States demographic history. In their first section the authors examine the factors which are involved in our rapid population growth and the consequences in terms of population distribution and national homogeneity. The second section is a judicious consideration of five important population characteristics: marital status, household and family formation, educational levels, economic activity, and income levels. Section three admirably summarizes the roles of fertility and mortality in United States population growth. A final section suggests some of the relations among these demographic and economic variables and in rather cautious fashion casts a glance at the near future. In most of the chapters the authors have followed the plan of describing the principal trends since the first census in 1790 or since the earliest period for which data are available; this is followed by a more detailed presentation of 1950 census data by racial, national, residential, or other appropriate

groupings. Liberal use is made of charts and tabular materials.

Inevitably there are a few minor points which a quibbling reviewer may seize upon. To the "major main currents of migration" (p. 92) might be added the city-to-city movement, which is increasingly important. The urban population did not grow faster than the rural population from 1810 to 1820, nor did the per cent of increase of the rural population exceed that of the urban between 1930 and 1940—compare the statement on p. 112 and the table on p. 118. In Figure 50b the hatching for New Hampshire appears to be wrong; whereas in Figure 51b, failure to use any hatching for Rhode Island drops its median per capita income in 1949 from an actual \$1,605 to the lowest category, \$500-799, and in Figure 66 makes it appear that mortality data are not available for the state. Occasionally a broader sortie beyond the basic descriptive data would be helpful, for instance, in the discussion of factors in the increase of births in the postwar period (p. 268). More important, but not the fault of the authors, it is unfortunate that this study could not appear until several years after the 1950 census.

None of these points diminishes the authoritative nature of this study nor its over-all excellence. The authors have used both diligence and imagination to produce a first-rate description of the salient aspects of demographic change in the United States.

VINCENT HEATH WHITNEY

Professor of Sociology
Brown University

WILMA DONAHUE and others (Eds.). *Free Time: Challenge to Later Maturity*. Pp. xii, 172. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958. \$4.50.

The entire nation is growing aware of the significance of later maturity. Facts are mounting which are indicative of this situation and vividly point to its potentials. The sum of the facts proves overwhelmingly that we can live longer and that the span of life may be even further lengthened. While this is a thrilling achievement, it is accompanied by a big question—how

will we live these years? These thoughts express the general theme of this book.

The work presents the proceedings of the Tenth Anniversary Conference on Aging sponsored by the University of Michigan. Here is a series of papers devoted to this intriguing opportunity which contemporary times afford to those in later maturity for the appreciation and acceptance of leisure as a positive force in our changing society. The abundance of "free time" poses enormous implications for social relationships and individual effects on health and general welfare—it is the very heart of this field of gerontology.

The volume may be considered in two parts: the first deals with background and expresses aging as a social achievement and free time as a new resource; the second part presents the constructive uses of leisure in self-expression through individual creativity and organizational activities. The series of papers are presented by different authors, and hence there is both considerable agreement and disagreement in content. The general theme is pressed with progressive forcefulness and offers a challenge to later maturity for more abundant life. It stresses the pitfalls of misuse, abuse, and misunderstanding of opportunities, and the negative factor of boredom. "Psychological Aspects of the Use of Free Time," "Americans Off Duty," "Free Time—Man's New Resource," "Preparation for the Leisure of Later Maturity," and "Education for Understanding" indicate some of the topics discussed and analyzed.

These papers add to the growing amount of information and knowledge of gerontology and are worthy of careful study by students of the field, including our senior citizens, in enriching this span of life. Under the cover of *Free Time* are many challenging thoughts and interpretations calling for action. As Clark Tibbitts states in his dynamic Foreword: "We have an army of men and women who, as individuals, are quietly recasting their values and reaching out for new meanings in life. In the process we, as a nation, shall be developing with these older people a store of wisdom in the truest sense of the word. This wisdom, in the aggregate, may well serve as a decisive ballast to the pressures and ten-

sions of our age and as a means to diminish some of the anxieties that it has engendered."

The future, therefore, should hold for those privileged to receive free time a life more abundant.

HAROLD D. MEYER

Professor of Sociology
University of North Carolina

DAVID C. CORBETT. *Canada's Immigration Policy: A Critique*. Pp. xii, 215. Toronto: University of Toronto Press under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1957. \$4.00.

This is a book which is certainly not going to please the Canadian government but should be useful to those interested in political economy and Canadian immigration policy. In an excellent piece of work, written in good, understandable English, Professor Corbett has analyzed a large number of relevant facts on a long-neglected subject.

In the discussion of the legal, administrative, economic, and political aspects of Canada's immigration policy, two themes predominate: the ethnic and the economic.

After examining the pressures on the government—pressures by organized labor, employers, professional and ethnic groups—and the government's response to them, Dr. Corbett deals with the Immigration Act and Regulations. A third chapter reviews the administration of the policy embodied in the Act and Regulations. In these three chapters, the author is highly critical of the existing system. He is particularly troubled by the fact that Parliament delegates to the Cabinet, the Minister, and immigration officers the entire responsibility for deciding who can be assimilated and what nationalities and ethnic groups should be admitted to Canada. He also condemns the insufficient provision for hearings and for judicial control. In concluding his analysis of policy administration, he recommends the setting up of a national advisory committee representing the various interest groups.

The economic aspect of immigration is discussed in Chapter 4 which is an excellent summary of fairly convincing theories. Chapter 5, which may seem unnecessarily detailed for some readers, shows the ap-

plication of theoretical conclusions to the Canadian economy since Confederation. In examining the proposition that population growth played an indispensable role in Canada's economic development, it seems to me that the author puts too much emphasis on immigration as the key to continued economic progress. It is more likely that immigration was made possible because of the growing prosperity of the country.

Finally, Professor Corbett points out that because of her demographic position and the record of her past experience, particularly between 1896 and 1913, Canada has good economic reasons for encouraging immigration. Beyond this he considers that immigration is not only a matter of domestic policy. Canada has indeed a unique opportunity to strengthen her position in the arena of international politics. However, failure to remove some of the barriers will only be a symbol of failure in our responsibilities as world citizens and lead to a lowering of our world stature.

J. P. DELISLE

Chief, Statistics Section
Department of Citizenship
and Immigration
Ottawa

ARTHUR J. VIDICH and JOSEPH BENSMAN. *Small Town in Mass Society: Class, Power, and Religion in a Rural Community*. Pp. xvi, 329. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. \$6.00.

A serious limitation of many small-town studies in the United States is the failure of researchers to view the community microcosm in its relation to the larger social macrocosm. These relationships are usually not altogether ignored, but the investigation is so sharply focused on the structural and functional aspects of the community itself that the strands binding the network to the social order are not revealed in their true perspective. The authors of this study have sought, with conspicuous success, to present an analysis of Springdale, a rural community in upper New York State, with full recognition of the relationships of its people to the "outside," and especially the influence of the larger society on the social structure and

on political, economic, educational, recreational, and religious organization and activities.

This "impact" of the outside world on the behavior, values, and organizations of the people is considered with insight and understanding. There is, for example, the incongruity between the images which the Springdalers have of themselves and of their community and the real Springdale. There is the ambivalence in attitudes toward the outside world. There are the inner conflicts within the community, conflicts sometimes concealed by the window dressing of friendly banter or by such expressions, often voiced, as that "there isn't a better place [than Springdale] to raise a family." There is disenchantment among many who fail to realize their hopes and aspirations; and among others there is tenacious adherence to the old illusions as they strive to keep going in a community which is more and more submerged, so to speak, in a mass society.

This book is far more than a description of a rural community; there are no tables enumerating the number of children, cows, and churches; there are no pretty pictures of an idyllic rural society. What the authors have done, more importantly, is to penetrate deeply into the community structure, and more particularly into the lives and subjective experiences of the people; and on the basis of observed facts they have presented an analysis and interpretation of the "real" Springdale. This is exemplary social science community research. It is also a tribute to the resourcefulness of the authors.

NOEL P. GIST

Professor of Sociology
University of Missouri

E. O. JAMES. *Prehistoric Religion: A Study in Prehistoric Archaeology*. Pp. 300. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$6.50.

A. LEROI-GOURHAN. *Prehistoric Man*. Pp. ix, 119. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. \$4.75.

In the main, the contents of James's book on prehistoric religion consist of two primary areas of interest. First there is a

description of the position of the body and of the tomb and funerary equipment, so far as evidence is available, from earliest times—about the Middle Pleistocene to protohistoric days. This section leaves little to be desired. The descriptions are lucid, brief, but quite thorough. I do not know another book which covers the ground in comparable fashion. The other part of this work consists of interpretations of the rites, ceremonies, and motives associated with or responsible for the method of disposing of the corpse. There is supplementary evidence from some primitive contemporary cultures and from some Old World early historic civilizations. Here we would enter a caveat. Of "The Paleolithic Cult of the Dead" we are told (pp. 28-29): the use of red pigment was "to make the body serviceable for its owner's use"; "certain shells, such as the cowrie . . . seem to have been connected with the female principle and to have been widely employed as fertility charms"; "the grave was . . . a portal to an after-life on the other side of the grave." The remains of a "brachycephalic young man" in a British megalithic burial "may have belonged to a prisoner of war sacrificed during the funeral ceremonies" (p. 86).

Granted. But I prefer the theory that this aberrant roundhead died from eating too many green apples; and I should like to hear these rival theories debated. Sad evidence from other British burials is the consequence of intermarriage between "sectarian branches of the same cult, not adverse to intermarriage—a union that found expression perhaps in 'hybrid' tombs in which a passage-grave might be enclosed in a gallery" (p. 92). Let this dire result be a warning to future generations, who should see to it that no sectarian intermarriage mars the technology.

One pauses in consternation at what the future archaeologist can make out of our graveyards and crematoria: that we wished the soul to appear well in the next world and dressed the corpse in his best attire after the embalmer had rendered the corpse as lifelike as possible; buried him face up, feet toward Jerusalem, so that when he should arise at the time of Christ's return to the Mount of Olives and—Jordanian oc-

cupation notwithstanding—so that he would be facing the right way and know in what direction to go (actually an early Christian motive; but how many of our contemporaries are aware of that fact?). Meanwhile, we decorate the grave with flowers; for their odor is pleasing to the soul. We put nice sentiments on the tombstone; reading them will please the soul and will allay any antagonism toward survivors.

In his book, *Prehistoric Man*, André Leroi-Gourhan sagely remarks: "The men of the age of the reindeer must have had a system of religious beliefs, but there is little to give a clue to its essentials. Imagine trying to deduce the system of Christianity from nothing more than crucifixes and church statues."

Leroi-Gourhan, who is Director of the Museum of Natural History in Paris, will delight those who have not yet made the acquaintance of prehistoric man and that long epoch of man's past. His book is written lucidly, in restrained literary style, and touches lightly but incisively on the main episodes. Illuminating illustrations and tables abound and are pertinent and helpful.

Prehistoric Man is also a splendid book for a high school library and for that of the nonspecialist. As the author says at the close of his survey: "To use what is known of the past in order better to understand man, is to pay tribute to the thousands of beings who died in transmitting to their successors the secret of the fabrication of the biface, until the day when their successors decided that they had become 'wise men.'"

WILSON D. W. LLIS

Professor of Sociology
Annhurst College

GEORGE V. COELHO. *Changing Images of America: A Study of Indian Students' Perceptions*. Pp. xxii, 145. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. \$3.50.

This slim volume, one of a series sponsored by the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, contributes another monographic study to the growing literature on cross-cultural education. Brief though it is, the book is rich in insights and felicitous

conceptualization; it does credit to the author, himself an American-educated Indian. More than any other study known to the reviewer, it illuminates the phases of intercultural adjustment through which foreign students pass in the course of an American sojourn.

Coelho studied sixty Indian students, mostly in the Greater Boston area, and divided them into four equal groups in terms of length of sojourn: less than one week, three to nine months, eighteen to thirty-six months, and forty-eight to eighty-four months. Each subject was asked to summarize or outline a fifteen-minute talk on "Indo-American Relations" which he might deliver to an American group. He was then interviewed in detail concerning the American group he had in mind, and also concerning groups in India to whom he might make the same talk. Findings with respect to the imaginary audiences are analyzed in the context of reference group theory; the content of the "talks" is treated both quantitatively and qualitatively. Additional interview data were obtained from some of the subjects. While Coelho's sample is larger than that on which several recent related publications are based, one still must view his quantitative results rather tentatively.

Most striking of these is the finding, which if supported in further research has important theoretical and practical implications, that the well-known U-curve of attitude toward the host country—initial favorableness followed by disillusionment, then more realistic and perhaps more favorable appraisal—is closely paralleled in data for trends in attitudes toward the home country, India. The early shattering of illusions about America, in a word, is coupled not with a heightened nationalism but with increasingly critical appraisal of the home country. The picture of developing critical insight which emerges should be moderately reassuring in terms of the goals entertained for programs of exchange.

Coelho sketches a plausible portrait of changing orientations during the course of intercultural adjustment. From an initial stance in which the Indian student "expresses a clamorous need to be understood" and idealizes the broad similarities which

he sees between American and Indian aspirations, he moves, within a couple of years, to a relatively differentiated perspective on the host culture and an ability to review certain aspects of the home culture critically in a relatively enlarged national perspective.

M. BREWSTER SMITH

Editor, *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*
New York City

HANS VON HENTIG. *Zur Psychologie der Einzeldelikte*, Vol. II: *Der Mord* and Vol. III: *Der Betrug*. Pp. viii, 287 and ix, 221. Tübingen, Germany: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1956 and 1957. DM 18.50 and 14.50 paperbound and DM 22.— and 18.50 clothbound.

During the years Professor von Hentig was in the United States, he published *The Criminal and His Victim* (Yale University Press, 1948) in which he formulated the procedural principles upon which the two excellent monographs under review are constructed. He maintained that there exists a psychosocial relationship between "the doer and the sufferer" which needs clarification in order to understand crime. The victim may be considered the "living tempter" that confronts the psychologically predisposed perpetrator. Therefore, "attention should be paid to the crime provocative function of the victim, whether individual or community" (p. 450). In this sense crime becomes a problem of the dynamics of three factors: the doer, the situation, and the victim. This is the praxis of Professor von Hentig's two carefully written monographs on *Murder* and *Fraud* which constitute the second and the third in his series. The first monograph on *Theft and Robbery* was published in Germany in 1953.

In dealing with the problem of *Murder* (Vol. II) Professor von Hentig displays a depth of insight into the murder situation, the time and place factors as well as the techniques. He deals with the basic motives involved in various kinds of murder whether committed in robbery or sex cases. In the final chapter he shows how the victim may be the "agent provocateur" by documentation drawn from some 150 well-

known cases of murder in the United States and Europe.

In the third monograph on *Fraud* the author presents a typological explanation of the deceptive devices used in cheating and deceit. The study presents an analysis of the "confidence man" as he victimizes the willing and gullible person. The statistical data show how relatively few culprits are brought to justice through the involvements of criminal litigation. The volume is well documented with evidence from swindling in business, government, sports, and in individual cases.

In these two carefully written books Professor von Hentig has shown the value which may be derived from the monographic method in research. The volumes are a solid contribution to the understanding of the problem of crime. We shall look forward with increased interest to subsequent monographs by the author on individual crimes.

WALTER A. LUNDEN

Professor of Sociology
Iowa State College

KENNETH WILSON UNDERWOOD. *Protestant and Catholic: Religious and Social Interaction in an Industrial Community*. Pp. xxi, 484. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. \$6.00.

It is now more than three centuries since the early settlers of the Protestant and Catholic faiths came to our shores. During these years, members of these two religious groups have not only held to their differences of opinions but have often maintained a deep suspicion of each other; they have manifested hatred with occasional violence and demonstrated little inclination to understand or co-operate with each other.

This definitive study of Holyoke, Massachusetts by a trained sociologist and theologian shows the complexities of the relationship between the Protestant and Catholic faiths; it also indicates the background of differences and the reasons for the continuous "cold war" between the two groups in the Paper Town of Holyoke.

The Margaret Sanger incident in October 1940, in which Roman Catholic pressure prevented her from making a speech on behalf of Planned Parenthood in the First

Congregational Church in Holyoke, is analyzed with all its ramifications. Thus we are able to trace the social structure with its lines of influence and power in the city and the dynamic relationship between the opposing forces.

The author then proceeds to describe the aftermath of this explosive affair and the patterns of attempted readjustment and further accommodation between the two groups.

The succeeding chapters deal with basic religious differences and concepts, the organization of the religious community, concepts of tolerance and religious liberty, interfaith association, the relation of the class structure to the churches, the churches and politics, and so forth.

For anyone interested in a well-documented study in the sociology of religion, this work is to be recommended for its painstaking care, thoroughness, objectivity, and realistic understanding of relations between religious groups. Religion is not treated as if it were in a vacuum; rather, it is considered to be a dynamic force affecting many aspects of everyday life and tied to other institutions in the community.

RAY H. ABRAMS

Associate Professor of Sociology
University of Pennsylvania

ROBERT MOATS MILLER. *American Protestantism and Social Issues, 1919-1939*. Pp. xiv, 385. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958. \$6.00.

There are innumerable studies of the relationship between Protestantism and American society. The book under review is one of the few, however, which focuses on the period between the two world wars and discusses not one, but a wide range of social issues. It is also one of the best of the studies of this type.

It is the author's belief that many previous interpretations have tended either to gloss over some of the less flattering aspects of Protestant concern with social issues or to be unduly harsh in their criticism. By a careful examination of official denominational records, government documents the religious and secular press, sermon collections, autobiographies, secular studies and many other sources, Miller seeks to

describe the full range of Protestant opinion and action on several vital social issues. The result is a balanced, thoughtful, and scholarly piece of work.

Miller concentrates primarily on fifteen of the largest denominations and on five questions: the churches' positions on general questions of liberalism-conservatism, on civil liberties, labor, race relations, and war and peace. Treatment of the first three is quite full and comprehensive, but that of the last two is somewhat sketchy.

The greatest difficulty in research of this kind is to get a picture of the full range of opinion and action. The author is well aware that the more accessible sources—the writings and decisions of official denominational groups, of church leaders, of religious journals—are not necessarily representative of the unspeaking many. But lacking reliable measures of all segments of Protestant life, one can only rely on the material available—and speak with care. That is what Miller does.

The author has a lively style, filled with well-turned phrases. If he occasionally uses a cliché, this can easily be forgiven in view of the stylistic difficulties in presenting the great mass of material necessary to his thesis. His own value positions on the questions with which he deals are kept quietly in the background. He takes a kind of gentle liberal view which most readers will share, but, for that very reason, it is perhaps unfortunate that he did not make his own stand more explicit. There is a tendency to make it appear that the correct view is self-evident, that "all men of good will," of "common sense," of "realism" agree on the proper attitude and behavior. What is one man's realism is another's naïveté.

There are occasional hints of interpretation of the material—for example, the indication that Protestant churches as democratic institutions naturally express the sentiments of their members, not some ideology totally removed from their experience—but on the whole, Miller limits himself to pure historical description. A more explicit theory of the relationship between churches and society might well have improved the study.

Altogether, this is a book worth careful

study by those interested in the complicated interactions between churches and the society of which they are a part.

J. MILTON YINGER

Visiting Professor of Sociology
University of Michigan

ECONOMICS

TJALLING C. KOOPMANS. *Three Essays on the State of Economic Science*. Pp. xi, 231. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1957. \$6.50.

In his first and longest essay, "Allocation of Resources and the Price System," Professor Koopmans communicates recent developments in mathematical economics to the general reader. The olive-branch nature of the essay has induced the author to take pains in spelling out the economic and institutional interpretations assigned to the mathematical propositions of point set theory. It is highly successful. He explains that the use of point set theory has brought with it an emphasis on certain aspects of general equilibrium phenomena, that is, "the specification of the conditions under which decentralization of economic decisions through a price system is compatible with efficient utilization of resources." Professor Koopmans, a pioneer in this field, demonstrates how efficient allocation via the price system is achieved in a competitive economy, in linear programming problems, and in Leontief input-output applications.

However, the reviewer has some reservations in accepting this particular olive branch. This is because certain assumptions required by the use of point set theory are extremely restrictive, namely, the convexity of sets—which precludes increasing returns to scale—and the independence of sets—which precludes, for example, one department in a firm from partially planning its activity in conjunction with another department in the same firm. Also, Professor Koopmans implies that the use of point sets allows large comparisons in the economic quantities in contrast to the local movements permitted by the calculus. If this is true, then point set theory is

superior to the calculus in at least this respect. However, there are some doubts. Are these discrete changes the sum of small changes—in which case the calculus is applicable—or are they “truly large”? If it is the latter, then the structure would probably be altered, in which case there is no determinate solution even in a point set construction.

The second essay, “The Construction of Economic Knowledge,” is a methodological analysis which will have the greatest appeal for the general reader. It cogently argues that the postulational structure of social theory should be emphasized. As a basis for his argument, Koopmans rejects the view that premises are “self-evident,” as set forth by Lionel Robbins, and partially accepts the positivistic view of Milton Friedman. However, he rejects Friedman’s “extreme inferences”; “Before we can accept the view that obvious discrepancies between behavior postulates and directly observed behavior do not affect the predictive power of specified implications of the postulates, we need to understand the reasons why these discrepancies do not matter.” There is substantial agreement with Professor Koopmans here, but one may argue in stronger terms that to follow literally Friedman’s proposals makes theory building very difficult for precisely the reasons cited in the quotation. For the reader who has followed the highly charged controversy centered around Friedman’s proposals, Professor Koopmans’ discussion is strongly recommended.

The third essay, “The Interaction of Tools and Problems,” deals with the economic application of certain tools: fundamental mathematical techniques, computers and data-processing equipment, statistical inference, and sample survey methods. In discussing the potential effects of these new tools on the predictive power of economic models, the author endorses the widely held view that further disaggregation of economic quantities is required. It is ironic that Professor Koopmans closes his last essay with some comments on the indispensability of the lone-wolf scholar, since the introduction of the new tools has initiated a trend which has decimated the ranks of the lone wolf in economics.

In sum, it is necessary that these new developments be brought to the attention of the general reader for his appraisal if they are to be generally accepted and incorporated into the body economic. Professor Koopmans has done this in a provocative and readable manner.

MURRAY BROWN

Assistant Professor of Economics
University of Pennsylvania

DENNIS H. ROBERTSON. *Lectures on Economic Principles*, Vol. 1. Pp. 172. London: Staples Press, 1957. (Distributed by John de Graff.) \$3.50.

This book is the first in a set of volumes which reprints lectures given at Cambridge University. The work deals with the theory of price, and the Preface announces that later volumes will cover distribution, money, and business fluctuations. Perhaps the main interest which it has in America is as an illustration of how economics is taught in an intermediate course in a leading British university. Where the reading-cum-tutorial method of teaching is followed, it is worth considering as a textbook.

The lectures keynote work in libraries and discussion groups. Much of the material is elementary, but many advanced points are touched upon and a Bibliography is included which in America would be regarded as more suitable to graduates than undergraduates. The economics of Robinson Crusoe are given a place, and a hypothetical man from Mars makes his appearance to suggest pertinent alternatives to what we do on earth. Neoclassical economics gets the following defense: “Most people are fairly rational egoists, though their rationality is tempered by custom and their egoism by codes, varying from group to group, of what is or is not done.” On mathematical economics, the comment is made that “The economist who is *not* mathematically minded need not be downhearted: he will see some things less quickly and less securely than the mathematician; but he will also be immune from the temptation to which the latter is subject to press refinements of deductive reasoning beyond what is useful.” Diminishing utility is explained simply—as are

other fundamentals—but Robertson adds his views on consumers’ surplus, and he comments on the position taken by Hicks in his *Revision of Demand Theory*. He criticizes the common opinion concerning the desirability of equalizing price with marginal cost in regulated and nationalized enterprises, and he deals with other comparable points. An Appendix—subheaded “omitted in recent years”—treats marginal utility in a system of point rationing.

Robertson’s theoretical position is conservative. The lectures are in the Cambridge tradition of the 1930’s and abound with loving comments on the contributions of Marshall and Pigou. A chapter on national income is included, but it has little connection with other parts of this volume and evidently introduces material to be published later. In keeping with the entire approach, limitations of the national income concept are indicated. There is no index, but the book affords good reading.

EDMUND WHITTAKER

Professor of Economics
Colorado State University

DANIEL M. HOLLAND. *The Income-Tax Burden on Stockholders*. (National Bureau of Economic Research Fiscal Studies, No. 5.) Pp. xxv, 241. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. \$5.00.

Dr. Holland’s monograph is an unusually thorough analysis of the “double” or “differential” taxation of corporation dividends and related federal income tax problems.

His main consideration is of such questions as the following: To what extent are stockholders “overtaxed” or “undertaxed”? To what extent, if any, is this affected by shifting, or by failure of the legal definition of taxable income to conform to economic realities, for example, by the method of calculating allowable depreciation? How would federal revenues be affected by abolition of differential taxation of stockholders? What specific changes of income tax rates, or what other specific taxes at what rates, would make up the losses? What have been the results of the partial “relief” measures of 1954? What would they have been had the President’s recommendations been adopted in full?

The “bench mark” taken by Dr. Holland for determining the degree of “overtaxing” or “undertaxing” of stockholders is the tax liability under the present graduated individual income tax modified by the assumption that retained corporate earnings are distributed promptly, added to the other income of the stockholder, and the total taxed in the same amount as from noncorporate sources. This would approximate the present method of taxing a member of a partnership who receives no corporation income. Dr. Holland does not challenge, as do some others, the over- or underprogressivity or other main features of his “bench mark.”

One of the author’s numerous conclusions is that “while in all years of the decade of the forties and of the early fifties over most of the income scale the net corporate earning component of stockholder income was overtaxed, in most years and for the stockholders in the upper reaches of the income scale, undertaxation was the result.”

Apparently he had ample funds, the most modern computers, and the most expert counselors and critics, a number of whom had pioneered the way. With their aid he was able to analyze the *United States Statistics of Income* and other pertinent data for most of the years 1940–55—especially those for 1947, 1949, 1950, and 1952—to an extent never equaled before in the field of his main problem, namely, the differential tax burden of stockholders under various specified conditions, both actual and hypothetical.

No serious student of corporation income taxation should overlook this study.

ROY G. BLAKEY

Professor of Economics, Emeritus
University of Minnesota

BRUCE C. NETSCHERT. *The Future Supply of Oil and Gas: A Study of the Availability of Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids in the United States in the Period Through 1975*. Pp. xiv, 134. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press for Resources for the Future, 1958. \$3.00.

How much crude oil will be available for production in the United States in

1975? The author optimistically concludes that there will be approximately 6 billion barrels per year, an amount slightly more than twice the current rate of production and two to three times that which most experts have predicted for 1975.

This study, which the reviewer considers sound as well as ingenious, begins with a critical examination and acceptance of post-1950 estimates by experts of crude oil "reserves." But these estimates, it is argued, refer to recoverable oil and rest on the assumption that only 30 to 40 per cent of the oil in the ground will be extracted. The author reasons, therefore, that the total crude oil awaiting recovery in the United States is about three times the "reserves" of the experts; he infers this total to be approximately 500 billion barrels. He then gives reasons for his conclusion that technical improvements will lead to a much higher percentage of recovery than in the past. He holds, moreover, that advances in technology will offset the tendency of real costs to rise as wells become deeper. Neither increasing costs nor physical limits of the resource will prevent continued growth to 1975 of the amount of crude oil available for production in the United States.

In similar fashion a high estimate of the nation's natural gas resources is reached. The total future supply of natural gas in the United States is considered to be approximately 1.2 quadrillion cubic feet; the amount available for production in 1975 about 22.5 trillion cubic feet—twice the current annual output. The estimate of natural gas liquids available for production in 1975 is one billion barrels, almost three times the 1956 output.

Domestic supplies drawn from these available sources will be supplemented with substitutes and imports. Oil shale in the United States is estimated to be a source of liquid fuels considerably larger than the estimated crude oil resource base. Surprisingly, coal is not considered as a source of liquid fuel but is evaluated as a source of synthetic gas. There is a possibility that liquified natural gas imports will reach the United States from the Middle East by 1975, and the continued importation of

crude oil from that and other areas is taken for granted.

J. RUSSELL WHITAKER
Professor of Geography
Peabody College

DONALD MACDOUGALL. *The World Dollar Problem: A Study in International Economics*. Pp. xvii, 622. London: Macmillan and Company; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957. \$12.50.

Professor MacDougall in this substantial book analyzes what is often known as "the dollar shortage." He seeks to answer the much debated question of whether there is such a thing as a dollar shortage, particularly in the long run, and what are its causes; he also attempts to deal with the question of what should be done about it.

Before considering the substantive nature of his reasoning and the conclusions which he draws, we might note that the book is well written and quite readable—despite the difficult and technical nature of the subject. Footnotes and Appendices spare the reader much which only the intensive student would wish to pursue. Furthermore, the busy reader will be grateful that he can obtain a good comprehension of the author's general views and reasoning from the Introduction (28 pages) and the concise chapter summaries.

In the author's words: "The main question discussed in this book is whether, in fact, over the next ten or twenty years, there is likely to be a tendency for the rest of the world to run into deficit with the U. S." His answer, developed throughout the book and stated specifically at the end, is that governments "should not overlook the distinct danger that, despite the favorable experience of recent years, a dollar problem will emerge in which every country is liable to be involved and which could have widespread economic and political repercussions."

In his treatment of the view that a shortage of dollars can be eliminated through devaluation of foreign currencies—thereby reducing demand for United States goods and stimulating imports into the United States—he advances the well-known argument of export and import in-

elasticities, namely that exports of foreign countries will not expand much despite better returns to the exporter following devaluation, nor will imports from the United States be reduced much by higher prices of these imported goods due to more costly dollars. He recognizes that from a formal viewpoint and on the basis of the principles of demand and supply equilibrium, devaluation could remove the shortage of dollars; he believes, however, that the repercussions would be serious. Thus, in effect, he offers a challenge to the basic functioning of the price system. He does not explain why, if the price system functions within a domestic market without undue trouble from inelasticities, it will not also function in the world at large.

In view of the prospects which the author foresees for a persistent dollar deficit, there will be need, he believes, for restrictions against American goods. He thus believes that countries should be cautious in plans to restore currency convertibility or to establish nondiscrimination in trade relations, and he believes that they should be prepared to reverse the process temporarily.

Professor MacDougall's views on the "dollar problem" will find a number of dissenters, particularly on this side of the Atlantic. He could not expect to convince economists, especially American economists, who feel that a "shortage" of dollars, or of anything else, must be related to their price, that is, exchange rates, and that to consider a shortage in terms of what might be *desirable* leaves the analyst without much solid ground. If we depart from equilibrium analysis, the potential dollar shortage is limited only by the human desires of all peoples outside the United States for United States goods. Considered in terms of desirability, there can, of course, be a dollar problem.

Many Americans feel that if an individual country has a shortage of dollars, it should be attacked not by direct controls, except perhaps to a limited and temporary extent, but by fundamental policies which would assure full and undistorted utilization of resources. This problem is not so much one for the United States as it is for foreign countries. It involves their fiscal,

monetary, and exchange rate policies—most particularly the importance they attach to maintaining a certain exchange rate. It involves the relative merits of achieving equilibrium through direct controls as opposed to the free price system. The United States places its faith largely on the latter.

It is not to be denied that the acquisition of an adequate supply of dollars—the main subject of the book—does constitute a very real and continuing problem for individual foreign countries. The United States has an important interest in the problem, since, among other reasons, it believes that restoration of currency convertibility and elimination of discriminatory practices are in the interests of all countries and would promote economic growth. This objective of convertibility and nondiscrimination requires that countries have dollar incomes sufficient to provide for their outpayments. Professor MacDougall's book is an interesting and valuable discussion of an important subject.

JOHN PARKE YOUNG
Chief, Division of International Finance
Department of State

PHILOSOPHY

PETER J. STANLIS. *Edmund Burke and the Natural Law*. Pp. xiii, 311. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958. \$5.75.

The thesis of this book is that Burke was a firm and uniformly consistent defender of natural law doctrine. The book maintains further that Burke's political philosophy has been generally misunderstood—especially by "positivists" and "utilitarians" such as Leslie Stephen, John Morley, William Lecky, and Charles E. Vaughan—when they have represented him as an enemy of that conception. The author argues that although Burke was indeed a vigorous foe of the revolutionary notion of abstract natural rights—developed among others, by the eighteenth century *philosophes*—this notion has been confounded, by most positivistic expounders of Burke, with the classical and scholastic tradition of natural law to which Burke allegedly sub-

scribed. Dr. Stanlis supports his claims by quoting and paraphrasing Burke at considerable length; in this way his book is a useful account of Burke's views on the law of nations, on human nature, and on the relation of church and state.

Since Burke was an intensely religious man—in effect fusing, as has often been noted, politics with religion—Dr. Stanlis has no trouble in showing something which no one has ever denied—that, for Burke, the various historical manifestations of human society have their ultimate source in God's will and reason. But the book establishes its main thesis only if words do not mean what they appear to say. Thus, Dr. Stanlis declares that the classical and scholastic conception of natural law includes the following principles: "Natural Law was an emanation of God's reason and will, revealed to all mankind. Since fundamental moral laws were self-evident, all normal men were capable through unaided 'right reason' of perceiving the difference between moral right and wrong. The Natural Law was an eternal, unchangeable, and universal ethical norm or standard . . . therefore, at all times, in all circumstances and everywhere it bound all individuals, races, nations, and governments" (p. 7). On the other hand, he also acknowledges that "Burke never treated the Natural Law merely as an abstract code of ethics perceived directly by naked reason" (p. 38); that "Burke realized that man's common nature is infinitely modified by climate, geography, history, religion, nationality, and race, by institutions, customs, manners, and habits, by all the civil circumstances of times, places, and occasions, which cut across and qualify but do not impair the different means by which the Natural Law is best fulfilled" (p. 88); and that, in Burke's own words, "nothing universal can be rationally affirmed on any moral or political subject" (p. 115). It is, therefore, by no means evident that the "positivistic" expounders of Burke have been as miserably mistaken as Dr. Stanlis believes them to be in counting Burke as a foe of natural law. He can maintain his thesis only by identifying Burke's religious view of the world with a commitment to natural law, and only by adopting the quite un-

clear position of a natural law with a "changing content."

Although the book incants the great blessings which supposedly follow from the acceptance of natural law doctrine, it offers no reasoned argument for its validity. Dr. Stanlis appears to think that if only Burke can be shown to subscribe to the doctrine, nothing more is needed to warrant it. In any event, he neither subjects natural law theory to critical scrutiny nor does he deign to examine any of the objections which have been raised against it by the quick and the dead. His book does supply information about Burke's beliefs; essentially, however, it is a pamphlet on behalf of the contemporary "new conservatism."

ERNEST NAGEL

Professor of Philosophy
Columbia University

KARL R. POPPER. *The Poverty of Historicism*. Pp. xiv, 166. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. \$4.00.

This is a revised version, for the first time in book form, of essays previously published in *Economica* and propounded earlier, some time before the author's *Logic of Scientific Discovery* and his well-known *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. The new book sustains Professor Popper's reputation as a cogent logician and formidable polemicist.

His contention "that the belief in historical destiny is sheer superstition, and that there can be no prediction of the course of human history by scientific or any other rational methods" is no doubt in essence, though in more moderate language, supported by the majority of historians and social scientists in the non-Communist world. They will welcome the systematic thoroughness with which Popper exposes the fallacies of historicism. Recognizing that historicists, because of their basic relativism, have differentiated their methods from those of the physical sciences, Popper notes also that some historicists are disposed to find parallels with the natural sciences. Thus he presents both the "anti-naturalistic" and the "pro-naturalistic" doctrines of historicism and then proceeds to demolish the historicist structure which he

maintains he has built up more solidly than the historicists themselves.

Readers emotionally uncommitted to historicism will find that Popper has much the best of the argument. He admits that "there are some sound elements in historicism" (pp. 148-49), but to give even a bare list of the points he scores against the historicists would take a long review.

I am left, however, with some uneasiness about Popper's triumph. Among the historicists specifically mentioned are Plato, Comte, Mill, Marx, and Mannheim, while the only specific clue (p. 130) to the "poverty" appearing in the title of Popper's work is his charge of "poverty of imagination." A number of other attributes of historicism, such as illogicality, impracticality, and mysticism, may have been demonstrated, but poverty is hardly a composite term for what is convincingly proved.

One of the crucial assumptions in Popper's analysis (p. 90, n. 3, pp. 154-55, 159) is that freedom and democracy are essential to scientific progress. I am personally committed to this assumption to the extent of believing that it is necessary to act as if it were true. At the same time, must it not be admitted that this liberal bias is "holistic," and, therefore, according to one of Popper's decisive arguments against historicism, anathema?

This is only one reason why historicists are unlikely to surrender sheepishly to Popper's superior logic. It would be a dull world if they did.

WILLSON H. COATES

Professor of History
University of Rochester

LEWIS SAMUEL FEUER. *Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism*. Pp. x, 323. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. \$7.50.

There have been far too few books dealing primarily with the political and historical aspects of Spinoza's thought, even though he was regarded by his contemporaries, and especially by eighteenth-century philosophers in France, as the champion of freedom of thought and the separation of philosophy and theology. Professor Feuer's new book provides a much needed analysis of the historical background and motivations of Spinoza in writing his *The-*

ological-Political Treatise and the unfinished *Treatise on Politics*. Spinoza emerges from this well-documented study as the first democratic philosopher of modern times, writing in support of the liberal Republican regime of John de Witt and against the Calvinist clergy and monarchical supporters of the Prince of Orange.

Feuer imagines the evolution of Spinoza's thought as having moved through three distinct stages. Spinoza's early years were spent in association with members of the Mennonite sect, and his thought of this period tended to be mystical, Utopian, and escapist. In the second phase, Spinoza left his Collegiant friends at Rijnsburg and moved to Voorburg and The Hague where he wrote the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* in support of freedom of thought in philosophy and religion and the policies of John de Witt. After the war of 1672 and the murder of the de Witt brothers, Spinoza's Republican optimism is said to have vanished. In this third period he was prepared to discuss how any mode of government could be rendered stable and consistent with the life of the free man (pp. 39-40).

In a chapter entitled "A Free Man's Philosophy" the author evaluates the principles of Spinoza's philosophical perspective. He tends, however, to look at Spinoza's views through Freudian spectacles—wrongly attributing to Spinoza a Freudian theory of the unconscious—and finds that "the geometrical method was an over-compensation for an inner nonlogical world of emotional turmoil" (p. 199). There are, Feuer contends, incompatible components in Spinoza's metaphysics and personality. For example, the free man is the central conception of Spinoza's *Ethics*, but his pantheistic, deterministic metaphysics makes a mockery of human freedom. The intellectual love of God is said to be man's highest good, but the God of Spinoza—He who is indifferent to human suffering and love—really merits man's "intellectual hatred." In the author's Freudian language, "the intellectual love of God, as a form of self-hatred, is a neurotic manifestation, or as Spinoza would say, an 'inadequate idea'" (p. 218). Finally, Spinoza himself seems to have become doubtful of

human immortality toward the end of the *Ethics* because he reminds us that the philosophy of the free man remains valid even if we abandon our hope of eternity (p. 227). In sum: "There was an unresolved conflict in Spinoza between the scientist and the mystic, between the social reformer and the political acquiescent. Unlike his great contemporaries, however, Spinoza's thought was tending toward secularism" (p. 254).

In conclusion, my over-all impression of *Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism* is that it is a scholarly and illuminating historical study of the background of Spinoza's political philosophy. I do not, however, find its thesis of the evolution of Spinoza's thought and its ultimate disunity either convincing or plausible. Feuer has given us a picture of a schizophrenic philosopher in a state of emotional turmoil which ill accords with the facts of Spinoza's life and the fundamental rationality of his vision of God and man's place in nature.

DAVID BIDNEY

Professor of Anthropology and
Philosophy
Indiana University

JULIUS STONE. *Aggression and World Order: A Critique of United Nations Theories of Aggression*. Pp. xiv, 226. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958. \$5.00.

At the launching of the first Soviet earth satellite, new perspectives opened on intraplanetary and interplanetary aggression, at least from interplanetary space. Events confirmed the author's conviction that securing peace by a precise, mechanically operating definition is "a snare and delusion." The limits of the review can offer only the merest outline of the complicated textual structure of this entrancing book.

The Introduction deals with the following: the Middle East crisis and aggression; communication and definition; the question of whether violence is the equivalent of war, and war the equivalent of aggression; the push-button definition of war; and awareness and cynicism.

Chapter 1 concerns the quest for a definition of aggression; the implications for

action of a legal definition; determination and definition; and definition as it is important under the Charter. Chapter 2 deals with the quest of the League of Nations; with aggression and the Covenant; with the period from the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance to the Kellogg-Briand Pact; with the antiwar pact and after; and with League lessons. Chapter 3 covers the United Nations quest; the meaning of the Charter; the quest for a definitional front; the International Law Commission and the Soviet definition; the 1953 committee for defining aggression; armed and other types of aggression; the second special committee of 1956; the problems of the committee; frontier incidents; the principle of the first (guilty) act; and a definition of armed attack. Chapter 4 deals with aggression and words; with the possibility and desirability of definition; with the general and abstract, enumerative and mixed; with logical and legal definition; with the direction in which to apply authority; and with the difficulties of legal definition. Chapter 5 concerns aggression and the Charter; prohibition of force; the textual basis of prohibition; the absurdities of extreme interpretation; the consequences of an erroneous basis of General Assembly action. Chapter 6 is devoted to aggression and power politics; the vain attempt to abolish power; repugnancy to justice of simple approaches; the implications of definition for State power; and Soviet draft definitions, 1953-56. Chapter 7 concerns aggression and international morality; tolerably just order between states; ethics in due process judgment; and aggression as more difficult to define than lack of due process. Chapter 8 deals with aggression and individual criminality; aggressive war at the London Conference of 1945; peace enforcement functions; historical truth and national versions; group ethical convictions; and the difficulties in formulating a draft code of offenses against peace and security. Chapter 9 covers the authority of the General Assembly; a summary of preceding argument; justice and the problems of collective security; an international peace force for the General Assembly; and peace enforcement and basic imperatives.

Aggression and World Order recalls to the reviewer Korzybski's *Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics*. While Korzybski deals essentially with the universal abstract, author Stone seeks to apply the "ought" or "ought not" to reality of factual aggression. Turning from the somber to a lighter touch, the reviewer wistfully relaxes into thoughts of the enchanting allegory of Alice in Wonderland.

JOHANNES MATTERN

Associate Professor of Political
Science, Emeritus
Johns Hopkins University

NORMAN L. STAMPS. *Why Democracies Fail: A Critical Evaluation of the Causes for Modern Dictatorship*. (International Studies of the Committee on International Relations, University of Notre Dame.) Pp. xxvi, 182. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1957. \$4.00.

Though modern dictatorship is a child of crisis, not all crises produce dictatorships; not all modern dictatorships have come out of democratic states; and not all democratic states have degenerated through crises into dictatorships. There is, in a word, no iron law of politics which converts democracy-in-crisis into dictatorship, or which requires dictatorship to stem from troubled democratic states.

These obvious facts do not seem to be apparent to the author of this book. His stated task is to account for the transformation of democratic states into dictatorships, which means, I take it, that he must identify those necessary and sufficient factors which, when present in a crisis situation, adequately explain the emergence of dictatorships in what were previously democratic states. This requires not only a careful discrimination between those dictatorships which supplanted democratic states and those dictatorships which, like the Soviet dictatorship, emerged in the wake of a long authoritarian tradition, but also a careful isolation of those factors common both to democracies which survived crises—for example, England and the United States—and to democracies which

did not. Clearly it is only the factors, or complex of factors, peculiar to the democracy-into-dictatorship process which have causal relevance here.

Now, what is striking about this book is that its author consistently confuses rather than observes these elementary distinctions. This is in keeping with his general level of intellectual sophistication, as revealed, for example, in the following two statements taken from the same paragraph on page 148: (1) "In spite of all the work that has been devoted to the subject, there is still no definitive explanation for the rise of modern dictatorships." (2) "Modern totalitarianism is a reaction to the disintegration of society caused by contradictions inherent in liberal individualistic philosophy."

The quality of this book is further evidenced by the author's oft-repeated contempt for generalizations and by his insistence that we limit ourselves instead to "a faithful account of what actually happened" (p. 149). Examples of such empirical and nongeneralized accounts are the following: "Dictatorship has grown out of democracy" (p. 97). "Dictatorships have been more successful than democracies in promoting social equality" (p. 133). "Man is by nature a conservative creature" (p. 165). "The theory of historic materialism denies that an individual can have *any* influence on the progress of events" (p. 111; my italics). There are several score additional statements of a similar character.

For the rest, the book contains a simple and simplified version of some of the more familiar theories concerning the causes of modern dictatorships; a series of extended assertions—not analytical arguments—designed to show the inadequacies of these theories as causal explanations of totalitarianism; an undocumented denunciation of what can only be called a caricature of liberalism; and a plea to the West to "discover anew the Christian view of man and society" if it wishes to survive.

In the Preface to this book, the author modestly disclaims any attempt "to develop a new theory or an over-all explanation" of his subject. In his final chapter he restates his conviction that "the fundamental causes for dictatorship are still not much

understood." His book amply sustains both these statements.

DAVID SPITZ

Professor of Political Science
The Ohio State University

CARL J. FRIEDRICH and ZBIGNIEW K. BRZEZINSKI. *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. Pp. xii, 346. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. \$5.50.

Taken within the authors' explicitly stated frame of reference—"to give a general, descriptive theory of a novel form of government . . . to delineate the general model of totalitarian dictatorship and of the society which it has created"—this work can hardly be said to fall far short of its mark. It is a useful compilation of much generally known information on the working of past and at least some present totalitarian systems. This information is in places supplemented by the author's own theoretical precepts. On the whole, however, the book avoids none of the pitfalls which its authors hope to eschew. It is too difficult for the general reader, too learned for the beginner, and too elementary for the scholar.

That it does not advance inquiry into the operation of totalitarian systems goes without saying. The authors specifically disavow such a purpose. More significant, however, is their failure to present a balanced appraisal of totalitarianism. Theirs is a strongly system-oriented approach. In this, of course, they do not stand alone. But the emphasis throughout the book is on the instrumental or manipulative aspects of totalitarian societies as they are guided toward their destinies by their self-appointed, ruling elites.

The images conjured up convey too strong an impression of a push-button, monolithic type of system with a one-way flow of impulses from the top downward. Little if any attention is paid to the reverse flow of impulses, the modulation of the system by the pattern of reactions of the mass of the people—collectively and individually—on whom totalitarianism impinges. There is no exploration of the adaptive mechanism invoked by people in a myriad different ways to assure survival, preserve values and human ties, thwart,

divert, and oppose the system. There is no hint here of anything but passive acceptance of dictates from above, perhaps motivated by a massive feeling of hopelessness in the face of the machinery of controls. The existence of an extensive informal pluralism beneath the façade of regimented monolithism is passed over in silence. The plasticity of the human mind, at once impressionable and resilient to outside stimuli, is left out of consideration. The persistence of biological and psychic (not to say spiritual) constants which do have a profound impact on the new order the totalitarian seeks to create are overlooked. Indeed the human being as a subject of inquiry is wholly absent from this volume. The frightening thought occurs to one that totalitarian systems are accepted here on their own terms. The result is neither pleasing—which is not a valid criterion for judgment—nor, in this reviewer's opinion, accurate.

Aside from this rather formidable shortcoming, other objectionable features also crop up. The style is too breezy. No subject is dwelt on long enough to exhaust it. The similarities and differences between the Nazi-Fascist and Communist prototypes are not sufficiently finely drawn. Communist China, of course, is completely omitted from consideration. By contrast, the contemporary Soviet scene receives too much attention. Consequently, some portions of the book are prematurely dated. Despite this lengthy catalogue of shortcomings, the book is not without merit, if for no other reason than because it is the only one of its kind in a welter of writings on the problems of totalitarianism.

PAUL E. ZINNER

Department of Political Science
Columbia University

RUTH NANDA ANSHEN (Ed.). *Language: An Enquiry into Its Meaning and Function*. Pp. xviii, 366. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$6.00.

The last decade has seen a great deal of speculation in linguistic and anthropological circles on the relation between language and the rest of culture, including the debate on the Whorf hypothesis, the further development of communication theory, and

so forth. Very little of this is reflected in the present volume—eighteen essays by seventeen contributors—which often reflects traditional approaches so far as linguistics is concerned. There are exceptions, including some articles of merit.

Among the essays to be recommended is the one by Huntington Cairns on the "Language of Jurisprudence" and that of Harold D. Lasswell on the "Language of Politics." Cairns surveys the history of English legal language and ably discusses some of the semantic problems involved in legal terminology and in establishing a "general theory of law." A point which needs stressing, even more than Cairns has done, is that the development of a general theory of law presupposes the linguistic description of the form of a given legal terminology and of its relation to the specific culture in which it is used. Another point, realized I am sure, but not really taken up by Cairns, is the fate of the legal terminology of one culture when superimposed upon an entirely different culture, such as the adoption of Western codes by Near Eastern countries. The "symbols of the law," being symbolic of the culture in which they are found, of necessity reflect different concepts.

A few other articles may be mentioned. That of Charles W. Morris on "Mysticism and Its Language" is a stimulating and valuable study of the use of linguistic symbols. Two contributions, those of Goldstein and Jakobson, are concerned with the speech of mental patients and the relation of this speech to general linguistic theory. (Mental patients also find their way into a third article, on art, which is concerned with a purely nonlinguistic area of the communication field.)

The lack of a chapter about language as such, the nature of language from a linguistic point of view, is a very serious omission. Goldstein's "The Nature of Language," while valuable, does not fill this need. The quality of the volume would be markedly improved by the omission of several articles, including that of Tur-Sinai on "The Origin of Language"—a fruitless area of speculation—and the editor's own chapters. Approximately two-thirds of the book could be omitted with-

out loss to the cause of linguistics, though some of this is worth reading as material on unrelated issues.

CARLETON T. HODGE

Head, Department of Near Eastern
and African Languages
Foreign Service Institute

OTHER BOOKS

- ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ, RENÉ. *Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna*. (Harper's Historical Series.) Pp. xvi, 736. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$7.50.
- American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, Vol. II. (Department of State Publication No. 6446, General Foreign Policy Series 117.) Pp. lix, 1709-3244, xxv. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957. No price.
- American Heritage*, Vol. IX, No. 4, June 1958. Pp. 112. New York: American Heritage Publishing Company, 1958. \$2.95.
- ANDERSON, EUGENE N. *European Issues in the Twentieth Century*. (Rinehart Books in European History.) Pp. xiii, 262. New York: Rinehart & Company, 1958. \$2.50.
- ANDREWS, F. EMERSON (Ed.). *Legal Instruments of Foundations*. (A Foundation Library Center Study.) Pp. 318. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1958. \$4.50.
- ASSOCIATION FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, LA. *Les élections du 2 janvier 1956*. Pp. xv, 504. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1957. No price.
- AUSUBEL, DAVID P. *Drug Addiction: Physiological, Psychological, and Sociological Aspects*. (Studies in Psychology.) Pp. 126. New York: Random House, 1958. 95 cents.
- BADEN-POWELL, B. H. *The Indian Village Community*. (Behavior Science Reprints.) Pp. xvi, 456. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1957. \$3.95.
- BEER, SAMUEL H., and others. *Patterns of Government: The Major Political Systems of Europe*. Edited by Samuel H. Beer and Adam B. Ulam. Pp. xvi, 624. New York: Random House, 1958. \$6.75.
- BERGER, ELMER. *Judaism or Jewish Nationalism: The Alternative to Zionism*. Pp. 207. New York: Bookman Associates, 1957. \$3.00.
- BERRY, BREWTON. *Race and Ethnic Relations*. Pp. x, 559. 2nd ed. of *Race Relations*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958. \$6.50.
- BLOCH, J. M. *Miscegenation, Melaleukation, and Mr. Lincoln's Dog*. Pp. 69. New York: Schaum Publishing Company, 1958. No price.

- BOYER, MERLE WILLIAM. *Luther in Protestantism Today*. Pp. xi, 188. New York: Association Press, 1958. \$3.50.
- BRANT, STEFAN. *The East German Rising, 17th June 1953*. Pp. 202. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$3.95.
- BROWNLOW, LOUIS. *A Passion for Anonymity: The Autobiography of Louis Brownlow*. Second Half. Pp. x, 499. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. \$7.50.
- Casework Papers, 1957: From the National Conference on Social Welfare*. Papers Presented at the 84th Annual Forum, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 19-24, 1957. Pp. 158. New York: Family Service Association of America, 1957. No price.
- CHANG, YU-KWEL. *Foreign Trade and Industrial Development of China: An Historical and Integrated Analysis Through 1948*. Pp. xi, 278. Washington, D. C.: University Press of Washington, D. C., under the auspices of the American University and the China International Foundation, 1956. \$7.00.
- COLE, FRED. *International Relations in Institutions of Higher Education in the South*. Pp. xix, 169. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1958. \$3.00.
- Complete Works of Montaigne, The: Essays, Travel Journal, Letters*. Translated by Donald M. Frame. Pp. xxvi, 1093. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957 (first published in 1948). \$12.50.
- Consumer Credit and the American Family: A Perspective Analysis*. Proceedings of the National Consumer Credit Conference, April 8, 9, 10; 1956. (Michigan Business Papers, No. 32.) Pp. xiii, 139. Ann Arbor: Bureau of Business Research, School of Business Administration, University of Michigan, 1956. \$2.50.
- CRAF, JOHN R. *Junior Boards of Executives: A Management Training Procedure*. Pp. xxi, 162. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$3.50.
- DAUGHERTY, WILLIAM E. in collaboration with MORRIS JANOWITZ. *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*. Pp. xxiii, 880. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press for Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, 1958. \$12.50.
- DEAKIN, ALFRED. *The Crisis in Victorian Politics, 1879-1881: A Personal Retrospect*. Edited by J. A. La Nause and R. M. Crawford. Pp. xv, 94. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1957. \$4.50.
- DEANE, PHYLLIS (Ed.). *Bibliography on Income and Wealth*, Vol. VI, 1953-1954. Pp. 139. London: Bowes & Bowes, 1958. 37s 6d.
- DE JOUVENEL, BERTRAND. *Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good*. Translated by J. F. Huntington. Pp. xiii, 319. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. \$4.50.
- DIEHL, CHARLES. *Byzantium: Greatness and Decline*. Translated by Naomi Walford. Pp. xviii, 366. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957. \$8.50.
- DIMOCK, MARSHALL E. *A Philosophy of Administration: Toward Creative Growth*. Pp. xiv, 176. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$3.50.
- DREHER, CARL. *Automation: What It Is, How It Works, Who Can Use It*. Illustrated by Herb Lebowitz. Pp. 128. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1957. \$2.95.
- DURKHEIM, EMILE. *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*. Translated by Cornelia Brookfield. (International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction.) Pp. xlv, 228. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958 (first published in French in Turkey in 1950). \$5.00.
- ELLSWORTH, P. T. *The International Economy*. Pp. xi, 513. Rev. ed. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. \$6.75.
- EWING, DAVID W. (Ed.). *Long-Range Planning for Management*. Pp. x, 489. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$6.50.
- FERGUSON, JOHN H., and DEAN E. MCHENRY. *Elements of American Government*. (McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science.) Pp. xi, 487. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1958 (first published in 1950). \$6.50.
- First One Hundred and Fifty Years: A History of John Wiley and Sons, Incorporated, 1807-1957*. Pp. xxv, 242. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957. \$7.50.
- FOSTER, GEORGE M. *Problems in Intercultural Health Programs*. Memorandum to the Committee on Preventive Medicine and Social Science Research. Pp. v, 49. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1958. 50 cents.
- GÄRLUND, TORSTEN. *The Life of Knut Wicksell*. Translated by Nancy Adler. (Stockholm Economic Studies, New Series, No. 2.) Pp. 354. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksells, 1958. Skr. 30.—.
- GOGO, JEAN L. (Ed.). *Lights on the St. Lawrence: An Anthology*. Pp. 303. Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers and Ryerson Press, 1958. \$5.00.
- GOLDBERG, SAMUEL. *Introduction to Difference Equations*. Pp. xii, 260. New York: Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall, 1958. \$6.75.

- GOTSHALK, D. W. *The Promise of Modern Life: An Interrelational View*. Pp. xii, 116. Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1958. \$2.50.
- GROSS, NEAL, WARD S. MASON, and ALEXANDER W. MCEACHERN. *Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role*. Pp. xiv, 379. New York: John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall, 1958. \$8.75.
- GRULIOW, LEO (Ed.) with the assistance of PRISCILLA JOHNSON and staff of *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*. *Current Soviet Policies—II: The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and Its Aftermath*. Pp. 247. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$6.00.
- HALLOWELL, JOHN H. (Ed.). *The Soviet Satellite Nations: A Study of the New Imperialism*. Pp. ii, 244. Gainesville, Fla.: Kallman Publishing Company, 1958. \$3.00.
- HICKMAN, W. BRADDOCK. *Corporate Bonds: Quality and Investment Performance*. (Occasional Paper 59.) Pp. x, 33. New York: Financial Research Program of the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1957. 75 cents.
- HINTON, HAROLD C. *China's Relations With Burma and Vietnam: A Brief Survey*. Pp. viii, 64. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958. \$1.75.
- HINTON, HAROLD C., and MARIUS B. JANSEN (Eds.). *Major Topics on China and Japan: A Handbook for Teachers*. Pp. xi, 326. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations with the assistance of the Graduate School of Education, Harvard University, 1957. \$3.50.
- I Problemi dello sviluppo economico: Con particolare riguardo alle aree arretrate*. (Contributi dell'Istituto di Scienze Economiche, Series IV.) Pp. 430. Milano: Società Editrice "Vita E Pensiero," 1956. L 2,300.
- JENNINGS, IVOR. *Problems of the New Commonwealth*. (Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center Publications, No. 7.) Pp. xi, 114. Durham: Duke University Press; London: Cambridge University Press for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center, 1958. \$2.50.
- KEETON, GEORGE W., and GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER (Eds.). *The Year Book of World Affairs, 1957*, Vol. 11. Pp. xv, 479. New York: Frederick A. Praeger under the auspices of The London Institute of World Affairs, 1957. \$7.50.
- KINDLEBERGER, CHARLES P. *International Economics*. (The Irwin Series in Economics.) Pp. xxii, 636. Rev. ed. Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1958. \$7.00.
- LAUTERPACHT, HERSCH. *The Development of International Law by the International Court*. Pp. xix, 408. Rev. ed. of "The Development of International Law by the Permanent Court of International Justice" (1934). New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. \$12.50.
- LEISERSON, AVERY. *Parties and Politics: An Institutional and Behavioral Approach*. (Borzoi Books in Political Science.) Pp. xvii, 379, x. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958. \$5.75.
- LOMHOLT, ESBERN. *Home Conditions: A Sociomedical Study of 1066 Hospitalized Patients With Skin and Venereal Diseases*. Pp. 100. Reprinted from *Acta Dermatovenereologica*. Copenhagen: Rosenkilde and Bagger, 1958. Dkr. 14.00.
- Louisiana Municipal Handbook*. Compiled by The Bureau of Public Administration. Pp. xiii, 207. Baton Rouge: The Bureau of Public Administration of Louisiana State University and The Louisiana Municipal Association, 1958. \$3.00.
- LUDWIG, MARIO. *Internationale Rohstoffpolitik*. Pp. 128. Zürich: Polygraphischer Verlag A. G., 1957. Sw. fr. 18.80.
- LUNDBERG, GEORGE A., CLARENCE C. SCHRAG, and OTTO N. LARSEN. *Sociology*. (Harper's Social Science Series.) Pp. xxii, 785. Rev. ed. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$6.50.
- MCCORMICK, THOMAS C., and ROY G. FRANCIS. *Methods of Research in the Behavioral Sciences*. (Harper's Social Science Series.) Pp. ix, 244. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$4.50.
- McFARLAND, DALTON E. *Management Principles and Practices*. Pp. x, 612. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. \$6.95.
- MACRIDIS, ROY C. (Ed.). *Foreign Policy in World Politics*. Pp. xi, 420. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1958. \$3.95.
- MAYER, GEORGE H., and WALTER O. FORSTER. *The United States and the Twentieth Century*. Pp. xi, 787. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958. \$6.50.
- MERCER, BLAINE E. *An Introduction to the Study of Society*. Pp. xvi, 640. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1958. No price.
- MEZERIK, A. G. (Ed.). *The Middle East: Unification Among Arab States*. Pp. 60. New York: International Review Service, 1958. \$2.50.
- . *The Summit Meeting: Precedent Preparation Issues Including Chronology of*

- the Cold War. Pp. 48. New York: International Review Service, 1958. \$2.50.
- MILNE, DAVID. *The Scottish Office: And Other Scottish Government Departments.* (The New Whitehall Series.) Pp. viii, 232. London: George Allen & Unwin; New York: Oxford University Press, 1957. \$3.40.
- MUDD, EMILY H., and others (Eds.). *Marriage Counseling: A Casebook.* Pp. xviii, 488. New York: Association Press, 1958. \$6.50.
- MUNDY, JOHN H., and PETER RIESENBERG. *The Medieval Town.* (An Anvil Original, No. 30.) Pp. 192. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1958. \$1.25.
- Municipal Year Book, 1958, The: The Authoritative Résumé of Activities and Statistical Data of American Cities.* Edited by Orin F. Nolting and David S. Arnold. Pp. x, 598. Chicago: The International City Managers' Association, 1958. \$10.00.
- Ninth Annual Survey of Governmental Units in Harris County (1955 Fiscal Year).* Pp. 110. Tax Research Association, Houston and Harris County, 1956. No price.
- OSER, JACOB. *Must Men Starve? The Malthusian Controversy.* Pp. 331. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1957. \$4.50.
- OSTROGORSKY, GEORGE. *History of the Byzantine State.* Translated by Joan Hussey. Pp. xxv, 548. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957. \$12.50.
- PARAD, HOWARD J. (Ed.). *Ego Psychology and Dynamic Casework: Papers From the Smith College School for Social Work.* Pp. 282. New York: Family Service Association of America, 1958. \$4.50.
- PATVARDHAN, V. S. *Food Control in Bombay Province, 1939-1949.* (Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Publication No. 36.) Pp. xx, 208. Poona: Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, 1958. Rs. 7.50.
- PELTASON, JACK W., and JAMES M. BURNS (Eds.). *Functions and Policies of American Government: Big Democracy in Action.* Pp. xiii, 463. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1958. \$4.95.
- PERSONS, STOW. *American Minds: A History of Ideas.* Pp. xii, 467. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958. \$5.00.
- PHELPS, HAROLD A., and DAVID HENDERSON. *Population in Its Human Aspects.* (A Sociology Series.) Pp. xvi, 512. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1958. \$6.00.
- Population: An International Dilemma.* A Summary of the Proceedings of the Conference Committee on Population Problems, 1956-57 by Frederick Osborn. Pp. ix, 97. New York: The Population Council, 1958. \$2.00.
- RANNEY, AUSTIN. *The Governing of Men: An Introduction to Political Science.* Pp. xii, 628. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958. \$6.00.
- RATCLIFF, RICHARD U., DANIEL B. RATHBUN, and JUNIA HONNOLD. *Residential Finance, 1950.* (The Census Monograph Series.) Pp. x, 180. New York: John Wiley & Sons for the Social Science Research Council in cooperation with the U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1957. \$6.00.
- Readings on Fascism and National Socialism.* Selected by Members of the Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado. Pp. 112. Denver: Alan Swallow, 1958. \$1.35.
- Recherches sur la famille: Studies of the Family: Untersuchungen über die Familie, Vol. II.* (Séminaire 1955 du Séminaire International de Recherche sur la Famille et de l'Institut UNESCO-Instituts für Sozial Wissenschaften, Band 5.) Pp. xi, 337. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1957. DM 24,—.
- RENNE, ROLAND R. *Land Economics: Principles, Problems, and Policies in Utilizing Land Resources.* Pp. xiii, 599. Rev. ed. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958 (first published in 1947). \$6.00 text ed.
- Report of the Special Committee on the Federal Loyalty-Security Program of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.* Pp. xxvi, 301. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1956. \$5.00.
- Report on the World Situation: Including Studies of Urbanization in Under-Developed Areas.* Pp. vii, 198. New York: Columbia University Press for the United Nations, 1957. \$1.75.
- Review of Economics and Statistics, The, Vol. XL, No. 1, Part 2, Supplement: February 1958: Problems in International Economics.* (Special Conference Series 9.) Pp. 142. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. (Distributed by National Bureau of Economic Research.) \$1.50.
- RODEE, CARLTON, CLYNER, and others. *Introduction to Political Science.* (McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science.) Pp. xiii, 655. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1957. \$6.00.
- St. Antony's Papers: Vol. I, Soviet Affairs.* Pp. 147. London: Chatto & Windus, 1956. (Distributed by St. Martin's Press.) \$3.00.
- SAMPSON, R. V. *Progress in the Age of Reason: The Seventeenth Century to the Present Day.* Pp. 259. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. \$4.25.
- SCHAPIRO, J. SALWYN. *Liberalism: Its Meaning and History.* (An Anvil Original, No. 21.) Pp. 192. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1958. \$1.25.
- SCHULER, MAX. *Philosophical Perspectives.* Translated by Oscar A. Haac. Pp. viii, 144. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. \$5.00.
- Search for Man's Sanity, A: The Selected Letters of Trigan Burrow With Biographical Notes.* Prepared by the Editorial Committee of The Lifwynn Foundation, William E. Galt, Chairman. Pp. xxi, 615. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. \$8.75.
- SELLEW, GLADYS, PAUL HANLY FURFEY, and WILLIAM T. GAUGHAN. *An Introduction to Sociology.* (Harper's Social Science Series.) Pp. x, 598. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$6.50.
- SIMMONS, OZZIE G. *Social Status and Public Health.* Memorandum to the Committee on Preventive Medicine and Social Science Research. Pp. iv, 34. New York: Social Science Research Council, 1958. 50 cents.
- SIMPSON, GEORGE EATON, and J. MILTON YINGER. *Racial and Cultural Minorities: An Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination.* (Harper's Social Science Series.) Pp. xi, 881. Rev. ed. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$7.50.
- SMALL, HAROLD ADAMS (Ed.). *The Road to Richmond: The Civil War Memoirs of Major Abner R. Small of the 16th Maine Volunteers: With His Diary as a Prisoner of War.* Pp. xi, 260. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1957. \$1.50.
- Social and Political Thought in Byzantium: From Justinian I to the Last Palaeologus.* Passages from Byzantine Writers and Documents. Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Ernest Barker. Pp. xvi, 239. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1957. \$4.80.
- STAAB, GILES J. *The Dignity of Man in Modern Papal Doctrine: Leo XIII to Pius XII, 1878-1955.* (The Catholic University of America Studies in Sacred Theology, Second Series, No. 101.) Pp. vi, 154. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1957. \$1.75.
- STEBBINS, RICHARD P. *The United States in World Affairs, 1957.* Pp. x, 411. New York: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1958. \$5.50.
- STEPHAN, FREDERICK F., and PHILIP J. MCCARTHY. *Sampling Opinions: An Analysis of Survey Procedure.* (A Wiley Publication of Related Interest to Statisticians.) Pp. xxi, 451. New York: John Wiley & Sons; London: Chapman & Hall, 1958. \$12.00.
- STOREY, ROBERT GERALD. *Professional Leadership.* Pp. 84. Claremont, Calif.: The Associated Colleges, 1958. \$2.75.
- STRANG, RUTH. *Group Work in Education.* Pp. x, 322. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$5.50.
- Study Abroad: International Handbook: Fellowships, Scholarships, Educational Exchange, Vol. IX, 1957-58.* Pp. 836. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1957. \$2.50.
- The Study of Religion in the Public Schools: An Appraisal.* Report of a Conference on Religion and Public Education, Sponsored by the American Council on Education at Harriman, New York, March 10-12, 1957. Edited by Nicholas C. Brown. Pp. xiii, 229. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1958. \$2.50.
- SWARTHOUT, JOHN M., and ERNEST R. BARTLEY. *Principles and Problems of State and Local Government.* Pp. xiii, 369. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. \$4.25.
- TERMER, FRANZ. *Etnologia y Etnografía de Guatemala.* (Seminario de Integración Social Guatemalteca, Publication No. 5.) Pp. xviii, 299. Guatemala: Editorial del Ministerio de Educación Pública, 1957. No price.
- TINBERGEN, JAN. *The Design of Development.* Pp. viii, 99. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for The Economic Development Institute, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1958. \$2.50.
- TUCKER, GILBERT M. *Common-Sense Economics.* Pp. xiii, 289. Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Company, 1957. \$3.75.
- U. S. Participation in the UN.* Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1956. (Department of State Publication 6577. International Organization and Conference Series III, 124.) Pp. xiii, 325. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957. \$1.00.
- VON NEUMANN, JOHN. *The Computer and the Brain.* (Yale University, Mrs. Hepsa Ely Silliman Memorial Lectures.) Pp. xiv, 82. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958. \$3.00.
- WAGLEY, CHARLES. *Santiago Chimaltenango: Estudio Antropológico-Social de una Comunidad Indígena de Huehuetenango.* (Seminario de Integración Social Guatemalteca, Publication No. 4.) Pp. xxxviii, 339. Guatemala, 1957. No price.
- WALSH, MARY ELIZABETH, and PAUL HANLY FURFEY. *Social Problems and Social Action.* Pp. xiv, 465. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1958. \$5.95.
- WARNER, W. LLOYD. *A Black Civilization: A Social Study of an Australian Tribe.* Pp. xx, 618. Rev. ed. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$6.50.

- WEBER, MAX. *The City*. Translated and edited by Don Martindale and Gertrud Neuwirth. Pp. 242. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. \$4.00.
- WESTIN, ALAN F. *The Anatomy of a Constitutional Law Case: Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer: The Steel Seizure Decision*. Pp. viii, 183. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. \$1.60.
- WILLIAMS, WILLIAM APPLEMAN. *America and the Middle East: Open Door Imperialism or Enlightened Leadership?* (Source Problems in World Civilization.) Pp. v, 58. New York: Rinehart & Company, 1958. 75 cents.
- Yearbook of Human Rights for 1955*. Pp. xvi, 431. New York: United Nations, 1957. (Distributed by Columbia University Press.) \$4.50.
- ZINK, HAROLD. *Modern Governments*. (Van Nostrand Political Science Series.) Pp. xv, 804. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1958. \$6.95.

INDEX

INDEX

- Abernethy, Thomas G., 47
 Acheson, Dean, 26
 Agriculture (US)
 election results in farm belt, 1928-1956, 44-45
 farm organizations, 42-43
 farm population, decline in, 44
 farm price support
 issue in elections, 44-45, 48-50
 farm vote, 42, 48
 and farm prices, 43
 significance of, 44-45
 farmers multiorganization membership, 42-43
 Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association, 42
 and "food vote," 50-51
 Grange, *see* Patrons of Husbandry
 National Association of Soil Conservation Districts, 43
 national election (1948), farm vote in, 45-46, 47
 national election (1952), importance of farm issues in, 46-47
 National Farmers Union, 42, 43
 National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 42-43
 Patrons of Husbandry (the Grange), 17, 43
 political activities of farmers, 43
 political strength of, 34-35
 and politics, 42
 receding force in economy, 35
 Rural Electrification Administration, 42
 See also Benson, Ezra T.; Government (US), Department of Agriculture
 Aiken, George, 47
 America, 118, 119, 122
 American Heritage Foundation, 55
 American Legion, 17, 27, 128
 American Medical Association
 public-relation campaign against Truman health program, 70
 Anti-Saloon League (US)
 predisposition theory, application of to, 127-128

 Baker, Newton D., 26
 Barkley, Alben
 quoted, 76
 Beard, Charles, 117
 Beck, James M., 25
 BEER, SAMUEL H., Group Representation in Britain and the United States, 130-140
 Beloff, Max
 quoted, 157
 Benson, Ezra T., 17, 43, 44, 47, 48, 50, 51
 quoted, 42
 policies, 48-50 *passim*
 Berelson, Bernard F., 125
 Black, Hugo, 29
 quoted, 30
 BLAISDELL, DONALD C., Pressure Groups, Foreign Policies, and International Politics, 149-157
 Blaisdell, Donald C., 138
 quoted, 83
 BONE, HUGH A., Political Parties and Pressure Group Politics, 73-83
 Bradford, Robert F.
 quoted, 36
 Brandeis, Louis D., 26
 Brannan, Charles F.
 quoted, 45
 Brunner, Jerome, 115
 Buchanan, Frank
 quoted, 6, 12, 14, 100
 Bureaucracy (US)
 administrative decision, use of for pressure, 18
 at local and state level, 15, 18
 autonomy to engage in pressure politics, 14
 clientele support, mobilizing of, 17
 and Congress, 12, 15
 control of, 11-12
 employee support, mobilization of, 16-17
 Post Office Department, 17
 higher-echelon support, use of by the, 15-16
 legislative, liaison with the, 14-15
 and Presidential power, 12-13
 publicity activities of, 18-19
 role in American society, 11
 and Schedule C, 13-14
 sponsor groups, support of, 17-18
 Burke, Edmund, 131
 Business (US)
 ad hoc groups, use of to back legislation, 37
 age of management, 33
 American Petroleum Institute, 79
 Association of American Railroads, 121
 businessmen in government service, 38-39
 and Employment Act of 1946, 33
 and federal fiscal policy, 34
 Foundation for Economic Education, 71
 and governmental expenditures, 34
 and governmental research programs, 33-34
 interconnectedness with government, 33
 Junior Chamber of Commerce, 116
 labor-management relations, 34

- local and state governmental actions, effect on, 34
 and McCarran Act, 91
 and McGuire Act, 91
 mass media, use of in political elections, 60
 National Association of Manufacturers, 4, 37, 69, 70, 135, 137, 140
 public-relation program, 69-70
 and Taft Hartley Act, 92
 and Wagner Act, 88-89
 National Association of Real Estate Boards, 70
 offices in federal and state capitals, maintaining of, 37-38
 Oregon Physicians Fighting Political Medicine, 76
 and party politics, 38
 1956 national campaign, 65-66
 Peoples Committee to Defend Life Insurance and Savings, 78
 political activity of businessmen, 39-40
 and political contributions, 59-60
 1956 Presidential campaign, 79
 politico-economic relationships, 35-36
 policy pronouncements of, 40
 public opinion, influencing of, 35
 public relations techniques, use of to influence legislative action, 38
 and Republican party, 35
 and taxation, 33
 trade associations, 36-37
 presentation of industry-wide policy to the legislative, 37
 United States Chamber of Commerce, 37, 137
 and Wagner Act, 88, 91, 92

 Cabot, George, 38
 California
 lobbying regulation in, 95
 Calkins, Fay
 quoted, 82
 CAREY, JAMES B., Organized Labor in Politics, 52-62
 Carroll, John A., 49
 Case, Francis, 5, 79
 CELLER, EMANUEL, Pressure Groups in Congress, 1-9
 Christ, Jesus, 121
 Citizen and volunteer groups (US)
 Citizens for Eisenhower-Nixon, 78
 Conservationists for Stevenson-Kefauver, 78
 Indiana Farm Research Committee, 78
 National Business Council for Stevenson-Kefauver, 78
 Timber Farmers for Stevenson-Kefauver, 78
 Volunteers for Stevenson, 78
 Citrine, Walter, 134
 Colt, Samuel, 4, 5

 Committee for Economic Development, 37
 study of formal relationships between businessmen and political parties, 39-40
 Cooke, Edward F.
 quoted, 80
 Cordiner, Ralph J.
 quoted, 35-36
 Cornell University, 43
 Covington, Hayden Cooper, 22
 Cullen, H. R., 53
 Culture
 values
 influencing of and two-step flow of communication, 129
 interest groups, potential of, to affect, 128-129
 methods of studying changes in, 124-125
 convergence of small-group and mass-communication theories, 125-126
 mass-communication research, 125
 predisposition, 126-127
 small-group behavior, 124-125
 nature of, 124, 125
 Culture (US)
 American tradition, defined, 124
 values in, 124-125
 limitations of interest groups to change, 128

 Darrow, Clarence, 22
 David, Paul, 132
 Davis, John W., 25, 27
 DE GRAZIA, ALFRED, Nature and Prospects of Political Interest Groups, 113-122
 de Grazia, Sebastian, 120
 Democracy
 pressure groups, effect of on, 91-92
 See also Pluralism
 Democracy (US)
 strength of, 71-72
 theory and practice, 53, 55
 Democratic party (US)
 contributions to in 1956 national campaign, 59
 1956 National Convention, 138
 Desverine, Raoul E., 25
 Dewey, Thomas E., 45, 76
 Duffy, F. Ryan
 quoted, 28

 East-West conflict
 and international nongovernmental organizations, 156
 pressure group, role of in, 157
 Egypt, 114
 EHLMANN, HENRY W., Pressure Groups in France, 141-148
 Eisenhower administration
 and Schedule C, 13-14

- Eisenhower, Dwight D., 38, 42, 43, 44, 47-50
passim, 53, 61, 78
 quoted, 46, 47, 51, 79
 England, 114, 118
See also Great Britain
- Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act (1946),
 5-6, 8, 33, 38, 97, 101
 criticism of, 98
 litigation concerning, 98-99
 United States v. Harriss, 99, 101
 United States v. Neff et al., 99
 United States v. Rumely, 98-99, 101
 United States v. Slaughter, 99
 registration of lobbys, 99-100
- Finer, S. E., 139
 quoted, 133
- Foreign policy (US)
 domestic pressure groups, role of in formulation of, 152-153
 factors in formulation of, 151
 military, role of in formulation of, 153-154
 President, role of in formulation of, 151-152
- France, 114, 118
 Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), 142
 Federation Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles, 142
 Fourth Republic
 pluralism in, 142
 standing committees and pressure groups, 144
 "Study Groups" and pressure groups, 144-145
 interest groups, growth of, 142
 National Council of French Employers, 143
 pressure groups
 administration, relationship to of, 146-147
 documentation use of by, 144-145
 public attitude re, 147-148
 public opinion, appeal to and nature of group, 142-143
 pressure group tactics
 and French party system, 143
 and social classes, 143-144
 and the Cabinet, 145-146
- Frankfurter, Felix, 26, 29
- FREEMAN, J. LEIPER, The Bureaucracy in Pressure Politics, 10-19
- Freud, Sigmund, 115
- GABLE, RICHARD W., Interest Groups as Policy Shapers, 84-93
- Gable, Richard
 quoted, 69-70
- Gaines, Lloyd, 24
- GARCEAU, OLIVER, Interest Group Theory in Political Research, 104-112
- Garrison, Lloyd, 23
- Gaulle, Charles André Joseph Marie de, 148
- George, Henry, 128
- Goldmark, Josephine, 26
- Gompers, Samuel, 54, 134
 quoted, 65
- Government (US)
 Department of Agriculture, 17, 137
 citizen participation in administration at local level, 17-18
 Farm Bureau, 17, 42, 43
 Department of Commerce, 17
 Department of Labor, 17
 elections
 governmental investigating committees, 78-79
 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 18-19
 Judiciary
 amicus curiae, abuse of, 29-30
 and economic regulation, 91
 judicial review, 25
 limitations on judicial power, 21
 mass petitions to Supreme Court, 29
 picketing of courthouses, 28-29
 policy issues, decision on, 21
 political character of, 91
 writ of certiorary, 21
See also Litigation
 national election (1956)
 study of by Senate Rules and Administration Committee, 78-79
 political pattern, changes in, 34-35
 Government (Western European)
 legislative revolutions during Enlightenment, 118
- Great Britain
 bargaining in the polity, 135-136
 business organizations, 134-135
 Federation of British Industries (FBI), 135, 137
- Economy
 collectivism in, 131
 National Farmers Union (NFU), 134, 135, 136
 political parties
 collectivism in, 132-133
 influencing of public opinion, 139-140
 pressure groups
 and administrative consultation, 136-138
 pressure groups and political parties, 138-139
 concentration and bureaucracy in, 134-135
 "promotional" pressure groups, 134
 Trades Union Congress (TUC), 134
See also England
- Group representation
 American and British, comparison of, 130-140
- Gwinn, Ralph W., 101


- Harvard Business School Club of Washington, D. C.
 survey of businessmen in government, 38-39
- Herring, E. Pendleton, vii, 87, 90
 quoted, 88, 136, 140
- Hillman, Sidney, 54
- Hinderacker, Ivan
 quoted, 83
- Hoover, J. Edgar, 19
- Horn, Robert A.
 cited, 22
- Houston, Charles
 quoted, 23
- Howard University School of Law, 23
- Illinois
 lobbying regulation, new laws concerning, 96
- India, 114
- Interest group
 defined, 114-115
- Interest groups
 collective policy, development of in America, 119-120
 Enlightenment ideology and reaction against, 118
 ideological fight against, 118-119
 ideology in, 118
 imitation of constitutionalism in structure of, 120
 interest-perception relationship, 115-116
 and national state system, 156-157
 number and social milieu of nations, 114
 organization of political interest and power
 historical background, 117-118
 power and legitimacy, 118
 relation to functions of society, 115
 and rise of rationalistic mass democracy, 118-119
 types of, 116
- International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), 156
- International nongovernmental organizations (INGO's), 150, 155, 156
- International politics
 organization activity in, 150
 pressure groups, role of in, 155-156
- Jackson, Robert H.
 quoted, 3, 21, 28
- Jacob, Philip E., 128
- Jefferson, Thomas, 121
- Jehovah's Witnesses, *see* Watch Tower Bible Tract and Society
- Jennings, W. Pat, 48
- Johnston, Olin D., 16
- Judiciary, *see* Government (US)
- Katz, Elihu, 126, 127, 129
- Kefauver, Estes, 78
- Kelley, Florence
 quoted, 26
- Key, V. O.
 cited, 69
- Kiplinger, W. M., vii
- Knutson, Coxa, 48
- Korean conflict, 46
- Kornhauser, Arthur
 cited, 61
- Labor (US)
 American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, (AFL-CIO), 77
 Committee on Political Education (COPE), 56, 57, 58, 59
 as a force in government, 35
 Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO)
 Political Action Committee, 54, 78, 81, 82
 and Democratic party, 35, 80-82
 International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, 57, 58
 labor laws
 and National Consumers' League, 26-27
 Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 78
 National Labor Relations Act, 34
 National Labor Relations Board, 34
 political action, phases of education, 56-57
 expression of opinion, 57-58
 registration, 55-56
 political candidates, endorsement of, 58, 77
 political program
 effect on country of, 61-62
 financing of, 58-59
 and politics, 53-54
 attitude and response of members to politics, 61
 and 1956 national campaign, 65-66, 79
 and primaries, 75
 and Taft-Hartley Act, 88, 92
 United Automobile Workers-CIO Political Action Committee, 78
- Labor-management relations (US)
 role of government in, 92
- LaFollete, Robert M., 98
- Lazarsfeld, Paul F., 125, 126, 127, 129
- League of Women Voters (US), 55
- Legislator
 "automatic," 2-3
 good, definition of, 2
- Leiserson, Avery, 135
- LENHART, ROBERT F., and KARL SCHRIFTGIESER, Management in Politics, 32-40
- Lewin, Kurt, 125
- Lewis, John L., 134
- Lincoln, Abraham
 quoted, 8

- Litigation, 68
 American Liberty League, 24-25
 National Lawyers' Committee and New Deal legislation, 24-25
 and National Labor Relations Act, 25
 group action in, reason for, 22
 National Consumers' League, 25-27, 30
 Committee on Legislation and Legal Defense of Labor Laws, 26
 organizations as *amici curiae*, 27-28, 31
See also National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
- Lobbying (US), 3, 66-67
ad hoc lobbies, 7
 Citizens Committee to Repeal Chinese Exclusion, 65
 as aid to legislators, 7-8
 cost of, 100-101
 history of, 5-6
 and Natural Gas Bill, 4-5
 "new lobby," 90, 139
 "old lobby," 90
 social, 67
 venal, 3-4, 67
 during 19th century, 4
See also Regulation of lobbys and pressure groups
- Lobbying techniques
 befriending of influential office holders, 4
 bribery, 4
 campaign contributions, 4-5
- Lovre, Harold, 50
- Lowell, A. L.
 quoted, 132
- Luce, Henry, 53
- McClellan, John L., 95, 97
- McCUNE, WESLEY, Farmers in Politics, 41-51
- McFarland, Kermit
 quoted, 50
- McGhee, Willie, 29
- McKay, Douglas, 49
- McKean, Dayton
 cited, 69
- McKenzie, R. T., 133
- Marshall, Louis, 22
- Marshall, Thurgood, 23
- Masland, John W.
 quoted, 153
- Mayer, Albert J.
 cited, 61
- Mazzini, Giuseppe, 121
- Meany, George, 134
- Mendès-France, Pierre, 148
- Monroney, A. S. Mike, 98
- Morgenthau, Hans J.
 quoted, 33
- Morse, Wayne L., 49
- Murray, Philip
 quoted, 54
- Myers, William I., 43
- National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 22
 and barratry, 33
 Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 22, 23
 litigation, use of by, 22-24, 68
 test cases before Supreme Court, 23
- National Recovery Administration (US), 137
- Natural gas
 regulation of (US), 86-88, 91
 Natural Gas Act (1938), 87
- Negroes
 winning of constitutional protections and individual test cases, 23-24
 school segregation cases, 24, 27
See also National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
- New Deal, 24, 33, 44
- Nixon, L. A., 24
- Nixon, Richard, 47, 78
 quoted, 48
- Odegard, Peter, 127
- Olds, Leland, 87
- Orwell, George (Eric Blair), 8
- Paarlberg, Don, 47
- Patton, James G., 42
- Penn, William
 quoted, 156
- Piaget, Jean, 115
- Pius XII, 148
- Pluralism
 and development of a new form of democracy, 120-122
- Political parties
 comparison between American and English models, 132-133
 group cohesion, elements of, 108-109
 group leadership, nature of, 109-110
 groups as central building blocks of society, 105-107
 potential groups, 106
 reference groups, 106
 inter-group alliance concept, 107-108
 interest group theory, approaches to, 105
 interest groups role in political systems, 110-111
 politics of individuals v. politics of groups, 116-117
- Political parties (US)
See Business (US); Committee for Economic Development; Government; Pressure groups and political process

- Polity
 collectivism in the, 131-132
 points of influence in the, 136
- Pressure group activity, study of, 150
- Pressure groups
 and cultural environment, 85-86
 definition, 65
 and foreign policies, 151
 individuals control of membership, 64
 and polity survival, 112
 universality of phenomenon, 150
- Pressure groups (US)
 and administrative consultation, 136-138
 and American system of government, 64, 82, 151
 association of objectives with relevant publics, 88-89
 and character of American people, 151
 co-operation among allied groups, 64-65
 catalytic groups, 65
 National Tax Equality Association, 65
 ideological basis for co-operation, 65
 influencing of executive branch
 administrative agencies, 67-68
 Chief Executive, 67
 influencing the judiciary, 68
 influencing of legislators, 66-67
 institutional advertising, use of, 70-71
 and mass-media of communication, 8-9
- propaganda
 degree of success of, 89-90
 public-relations campaign, 68-69, 70
 publications organizations, use of, 71
 Committee for Constitutional Government, 71
 Constitution and Free Enterprise Foundation, 71
 National Economic Council, 71
 Public Affairs Institute, 71
 and public opinion
 mass-media of communication, 68, 70
 public-relation counsels, 68
 and society, 83
 and the educational system, 70
See also Regulation of lobbys and pressure groups
- Pressure groups and electoral process (US)
 campaign contributions, 65-66
 local and state campaigns, 79-80
 and general elections, 77
 1952 national conventions, 76
 institutional advertising in 1956 national campaign, 76
 infiltration of party organizations by pressure groups, 80-82, 83
 advantages and liabilities, 82
 infiltration of pressure groups by political parties, 80-82, 83
- interrelation between pressure groups and political parties, 74, 138
- local and state partisan elections, 75
- and minor parties, 83
- and nonpartisan local elections, 74, 82-83
- party nominations, 75-78
- party platforms, 65, 80
- and political campaigns, 77-78
 financing of, 78-79
 and Americans for Democratic Action, 79
 and Christian Nationalist Crusade, 79
 and Hatch Act, 78
 and National Committee for an Effective Congress, 79
 "volunteer" and "citizens" groups, 78
- Presidential candidate, support of, 65
- Pressure groups and policy-making process (US)
 accessibility and degree of influence to centers of policy making, 85, 88-89, 90
 areas of influence
 administrative agencies, 90-91
 political candidates, 90
 natural gas, regulation of, 86-88
- Public interest, 92
 effect of pressure groups on, 92-93
- Public policy, 85
- Randall, Clarence
 quoted, 36
- Reed, Earl F., 25
- Reed, James
 quoted, 3
- Regulation of lobbys and pressure groups
 history of Congressional regulation, 97-98
 Foreign Agents Registration Act (1938), 97
 Merchant Marine Act (1936), 5, 97
 Public Utility Holding Company Act (1935), 5, 97
 Revenue Acts (1938), (1939), 97
See also Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act
 legislation, recent, 95
 Proposed Senate Bill 2191, 101-102
 reporting provisions of, 102-103
 indirect lobbying, 102-103
 state regulations, 95-97
See also California, Illinois, Texas, Wisconsin
 United States v. Harris, 6
- Republican party (US)
 contributions to 1956 national campaign, 58-59
- Reuther, Walter, 134
- Riesman, David, 125
- Roman Catholic Church, 114, 119
- Roosevelt, Franklin D., 44, 45


- Roosevelt, Theodore, vii
 Rossi, Alice S., 16
 Rossi, Peter H., 16
 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 142
- Schattschneider, E. E., 132
 SCHRIFTGIESSER, KARL, *see* LENHART, ROBERT F.
 Schwartz, Harry
 quoted, 154
 Sheppard, Harold L.
 cited, 61
 Shipton, James M., 16
 Smith, Adam, vii
 Smythe, Dallas
 quoted, 124
 Sorauf, Frank
 quoted, 92
 Spain, 114
 Sprout, Harold H.
 quoted, 153
 Stassen, Harold E., 45, 76
 STEDMAN, MURRAY S., JR., Pressure Groups
 and the American Tradition, 123-129
 Stevenson, Adlai, 46, 61, 78
 Storey, Moorfield, 22
 Summerfield, Arthur, 18
- Texas
 lobbying regulation, new laws concerning, 96
 Thornton, Dan, 49
 Tocqueville, Alexis Charles Henri Maurice
 Clérel de, vii
 Trotsky, Leon, 121
 Truman, David
 quoted, 127
 Truman, Harry S., 45, 47, 70
 quoted, 42, 44, 46
 TURNER, HENRY A., How Pressure Groups Operate, 63-72
 Turner, James, 134
 Twain, Mark (Samuel Clemens), 77
- Underwood, Kenneth W., 124, 125
 United Nations
 and international nongovernmental organizations, 155-156
 United States
 policy making
 foreign propaganda effect on, 154-155
 University of Pennsylvania
 study of formal relationships between businessmen and political parties, 39-40
- Veterans Administration (US), 17
 Vinson, Fred M.
 quoted, 21
 VOSE, CLEMENT E., Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Activity, 20-31
- Warner, Lloyd, 125
 Warren, Earl
 quoted, 6
 Watch Tower Bible Tract and Society
 and American Bar Association, 27
 Supreme Court decisions concerning, 22, 27
 Wayne University
 study of union political action in 1952 national campaign, 61
 Wickard, Claude R., 48
 Williams, G. Mennen, 82
 quoted, 39
 Williams, Philip
 quoted, 148
 Wilson, Richard
 quoted, 50
 Wisconsin
 lobbying regulation, new laws concerning, 96-97
 World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), 156
 World War II, 33, 34, 137
- ZELLER, BELLE, Regulation of Pressure Groups and Lobbyists, 94-103

THE
ANNALS



OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

*Highway Safety and
Traffic Control*



November 1958

BOOK DEPARTMENT: NEW LITERATURE
IN THE FIELD OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

A CHALLENGING AND AUTHORITATIVE NEW TEXT . . .

THE IMPACT OF AIR POWER:

National Security and World Politics

by **Eugene M. Emme**, *Operations Research Office, Office of Civilian and Defense Mobilization, former Professor of International Politics, Air University.*

Designed for courses which focus upon the problems of national security and military policies of today and tomorrow, this comprehensive collection gathers together, for the first time, the authoritative writings on all aspects of air and space power. Drawn from the speeches and writings of distinguished statesmen, airmen, scientists, historians, critics and other scholars, the selections explore the full meaning and implications of air power. This book is, in many ways, a pioneering work comparable to Admiral Mahan's classic work on sea power.

Essays by the author, prefacing each chapter, provide continuity of thought and outline the book's contents. These chapter introductions serve as an excellent preview, and later review, of the contents. Each selection is also introduced by notes indicating the source and vintage of the selection and giving pertinent biographical information regarding the contributor. After each chapter the editor provides a selected bibliography to lead students further into the many intriguing subjects introduced. About 900 pages, January 1959.



THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST MOVEMENT: ORIGINS (1860-1882)

by **Richard Hostetter**

This intensive study offers an insight into the forces that have made the Italian socialist party the largest Marxist political movement west of the Iron Curtain. Comprehensive and fully documented, it links the growth of socialism in Italy with the romanticism and radicalism of the Risorgimento tradition. 456 pages, \$6.50

*Write for a list of all 36 original,
paperbound Anvil Books now available.*

Van Nostrand

120 Alexander St.
Princeton, N. J.



Entered as second-class matter, January 21, 1939, at the post-office at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, under the Act of August 24, 1912. Accepted for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in paragraph (d-2), Section 34.40, P. L. & R. of 1948, authorized January 21, 1939.

VOLUME 320

NOVEMBER 1958

THE ANNALS

*of The American Academy of Political
and Social Science*

THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*

RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Assistant Editor*



HIGHWAY SAFETY AND TRAFFIC CONTROL

Edited by

69629

JOHN W. GIBBONS

*Director, Publications Division
Automotive Safety Foundation*

© 1958, by
THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
All rights reserved

PHILADELPHIA
1958

CONTENTS

	PAGE
FOREWORD	<i>John W. Gibbons</i> viii
AUTOMOTIVE TRANSPORT IN THE UNITED STATES	<i>Wilfred Owen</i> 1
DIMENSIONS OF THE TRAFFIC SAFETY PROBLEM	<i>David M. Baldwin</i> 9
THE ACTION PROGRAM FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY	<i>Norman Damon</i> 15
INVENTORY AND APPRAISAL	<i>George C. Stewart</i> 27
THE LAW MUST HURRY TO CATCH UP	<i>Louis R. Morony</i> 34
POLICE, PROSECUTORS, AND JUDGES	<i>Franklin M. Kreml</i> 42
DRIVER LICENSING	<i>James Stannard Baker</i> 53
EDUCATION AND THE MOTOR AGE	<i>William G. Carr</i> 63
AUTOMOTIVE DESIGN CONTRIBUTION TO HIGHWAY SAFETY	<i>Charles A. Chayne</i> 73
INCREASED SAFETY—BY DESIGN	<i>Edward H. Holmes</i> 84
HUMAN BEHAVIOR—FACTOR X	<i>James L. Malfetti</i> 93
TRAFFIC AND SAFETY IN TOMORROW'S URBAN AREAS	<i>Sergei N. Grimm</i> 103
THE MILITARY LOOKS AT TRAFFIC SAFETY	<i>Stephen S. Jackson</i> 113
ORGANIZING FOR SAFETY	<i>J. W. Bethea</i> 122
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT TRENDS IN EUROPE AND THE BRITISH ISLES	<i>Denis O'Neil</i> 132
INDEX	203

Issued bimonthly by The American Academy of Political and Social Science at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pennsylvania.
Editorial and Business Offices, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania.

BOOK DEPARTMENT

PAGE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BURMEISTER, WERNER (Ed.). <i>Democratic Institutions in the World Today</i> . Richard M. Scammon, Director of Elections Research, Governmental Affairs Institute	143
<i>Enquête sur l'anticolonialisme</i> . Rupert Emerson, Professor of Government, Harvard University	142
FRYE, WILLIAM R. <i>A United Nations Peace Force</i> . Philip E. Jacob, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania	144
HECKSCHER, GUNNAR. <i>The Study of Comparative Government and Politics</i> . Myron Weiner, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago	146
HOLCOMBE, ARTHUR N. <i>Strengthening the United Nations</i> . Philip E. Jacob, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania	144
MCINTYRE, STUART HULL. <i>Legal Effect of World War II on Treaties of the United States</i> . J. Eugene Harley, Professor of Political Science, University of Southern California	146
TOYNBEE, ARNOLD, and VERONICA M. TOYNBEE (Eds.). <i>The Eve of War, 1939</i> . Oliver Benson, Professor of Government, University of Oklahoma	144

AMERICAN HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT

ANGLE, PAUL M. (Ed.). <i>Created Equal? The Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858</i> . Ellis A. Johnson, Associate Professor of Social Studies, State Teachers College, Cortland, N. Y.	151
CAUGHEY, JOHN W. <i>In Clear and Present Danger</i> . Alan Barth, Editorial Writer, <i>The Washington Post</i>	147
DEPPERER, ROLF. "Due Process of Law." Frederick C. Engelmann, Associate Professor of Political Science, Alfred University	150
GRANTHAM, DEWEY W., JR. <i>Hoke Smith and the Politics of the New South</i> . Wendell H. Stephenson, Professor of History, University of Oregon	153
PUTNAM, CARLETON. <i>Theodore Roosevelt</i> , Vol. I. George C. Osborn, Professor of Social Sciences, University of Florida	152
ROPER, ELMO. <i>You and Your Leaders: Their Actions and Your Reactions, 1936-1956</i> . Wilfred E. Binkley, Director, Division of Social Sciences, Ohio Northern University	149
STRAYER, MARTHA. <i>The D. A. R.: An Informal History</i> . Gilbert Y. Steiner, Director, Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois	148
YOUNG, ROLAND (Ed.). <i>Approaches to the Study of Politics</i> . Bryce Wood, Staff Associate, Social Science Research Council ..	149

WESTERN EUROPE

ABRAHAMSEN, SAMUEL. <i>Sweden's Foreign Policy</i> . Franklin D. Scott, Professor of History, Northwestern University	156
BANFIELD, EDWARD C. with the assistance of LAURA F. BANFIELD. <i>The Moral Basis of a Backward Society</i> . John McDonald, Philadelphia, Pa.	157
DUVERGER, MAURICE. <i>The French Political System</i> . W. Henry Cooke, Professor of History, Emeritus, Claremont Graduate School	158
ERHARD, LUDWIG. <i>Prosperity Through Competition</i> . Gilbert Walker, Professor of Commerce, University of Birmingham, England	153

HAMEROW, THEODORE S. <i>Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics and Politics in Germany, 1815-1871</i> . Louis L. Snyder, Professor of History, The City College of New York	154
JACKSON, R. M. <i>The Machinery of Local Government</i> . W. Redmond Curtis, Queens College, Flushing, New York	160
MARCUS, JOHN T. <i>French Socialism in the Crisis Years, 1933-1936</i> . Gordon Wright, Professor of History, Stanford University	158
MATHIOT, ANDRÉ. <i>The British Political System</i> . G. D. H. Cole, Chairman, Oxford University Social Training Delegacy	159
PRYCE, ROY. <i>The Italian Local Elections, 1956</i> . Ferdinand A. Hermens, Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame	155
SCHEPIS, GIOVANNI. <i>Le consultazioni popolari in Italia dal 1848 al 1957</i> . Ferdinand A. Hermens, Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame	155

EASTERN EUROPE

HALPERN, JOEL MARTIN. <i>A Serbian Village</i> . L. S. Stavrianos, Associate Professor of History, Northwestern University	163
LENGYEL, EMIL. <i>1,000 Years of Hungary</i> . Wayne S. Vucinich, Professor of History, Stanford University	165
MARCUSE, HERBERT. <i>Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis</i> . C. E. Black, Professor of History, Princeton University	161
SYROP, KONRAD. <i>Spring in October: The Story of the Polish Revolution, 1956</i> . E. C. Helmreich, Professor of History and Government, Bowdoin College	164
WREN, MELVIN C. <i>The Course of Russian History</i> . Isaac Deutscher, Berks, England	161
<i>Yugoslavia</i> . Stephen Borsody, Professor of History, Chatham College	162

SOCIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

BALTZELL, E. DIGBY. <i>Philadelphia Gentlemen</i> . Reinhard Bendix, Chairman, Department of Sociology and Social Institutions, University of California	166
BEDNARIK, KARL. <i>The Young Worker of Today</i> . William J. Goode, Associate Professor of Sociology, Columbia University	173
CALDERONE, MARY STEICHEN (Ed.). <i>Abortion in the United States</i> . Clifford Kirkpatrick, Professor of Sociology, Indiana University	171
DE GRAZIA, ALFRED (Ed.). <i>Grass Roots Private Welfare</i> . Arthur E. Fink, Dean of School of Social Work, University of North Carolina	170
FORM, WILLIAM H., SIGMUND NOSOW, and others. <i>Community in Disaster</i> . C. Hartley Grattan, Katonah, N. Y.	169
FRANCIS, ROY G. (Ed.). <i>The Population Ahead</i> . Frederick Osborn, New York City	168
HALMOS, PAUL. <i>Towards a Measure of Man</i> . Carle C. Zimmerman, Harvard University	179
HARLAN, LOUIS R. <i>Separate and Unequal</i> . Frank J. Klingberg, Professor of History, Emeritus, University of California	176
HOOK, SIDNEY (Ed.). <i>Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science</i> . Rubin Gotesky, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Georgia	177
MEISEL, JAMES H. <i>The Myth of the Ruling Class</i> . Crane Brinton, Professor of History, Harvard University	166
MOORE, HARRY ESTILL. <i>Tornadoes Over Texas: A Study of Waco and San Angelo in Disaster</i> . Anthony F. C. Wallace, Senior Research Associate in Anthropology, Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute	169

	PAGE
NEF, JOHN U. <i>Cultural Foundations of Industrial Civilization</i> . Ralph Turner, Professor of History, Yale University	177
<i>The Negro in American Society</i> . Benjamin Quarles, Professor of History, Morgan State College	175
SHAPLEY, HARLOW. <i>Of Stars and Men</i> . Herbert Dingle, Professor of History and Philosophy of Science, Emeritus, University of London	180
SHIELDS, CURRIN V. <i>Democracy and Catholicism in America</i> . John J. Murray, Chairman, Department of History and Professor of History, Coe College	174
SNYDER, CHARLES R. <i>Alcohol and the Jews</i> . Alfred R. Lindesmith, Associate Professor of Sociology, Indiana University	174
SOWER, CHRISTOPHER, JOHN HOLLAND, KENNETH TIEDKE, and WALTER FREEMAN with the co-operation of others. <i>Community Involvement</i> . Arthur E. Fink, Dean of School of Social Work, University of North Carolina	170
SPARSHOTT, F. E. <i>An Enquiry into Goodness</i> . Helmut Kuhn, Professor, University of Munich	181
STARK, WERNER. <i>The Sociology of Knowledge</i> . Theodore Abel, Professor of Sociology, Hunter College	178
TAGIURI, RENATO, and LUIGI PETRULLO (Eds.). <i>Person Perception and Interpersonal Behavior</i> . Edgar F. Borgatta, Social Psychologist, Russell Sage Foundation	167
THORPE, EARL E. <i>Negro Historians in the United States</i> . Benjamin Quarles, Professor of History, Morgan State College	175
TOWNSEND, PETER. <i>The Family Life of Old People</i> . Jessie Bernard, Professor of Sociology, Pennsylvania State University ..	172

ECONOMICS

COLM, GERHARD and THEODORE GEIGER with the assistance of MANUEL HELZNER. <i>The Economy of the American People</i> . W. S. Woytinsky, Washington, D. C. ..	182
EINZIG, PAUL. <i>The Economic Consequences of Automation</i> . John Diebold, New York City	185
INMAN, P. <i>Labour in the Munitions Industries</i> . Oscar Ornati, Associate Professor, Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, New School for Social Research ..	186
KRUTILLA, JOHN V., and OTTO ECKSTEIN. <i>Multiple Purpose River Development</i> . N. V. Sovani, Joint Director, Gokhule Institute of Politics and Economics	184
<i>The National Economic Accounts of the United States</i> . Henry R. Jaenicke, Instructor in Economics and Accounting, University of Pennsylvania	187
PHILLIPS, JOSEPH D. <i>Little Business in the American Economy</i> . Broadus Mitchell, Hofstra College	181
VINER, JACOB. <i>The Long View and the Short</i> . Charles Hoffman, Department of Economics, Queens College	183

ASIA AND AFRICA

BERNSTEIN, MARVER H. <i>The Politics of Israel</i> . Paul L. Beckett, Professor of Political Science, State College of Washington	190
BUTTINGER, JOSEPH. <i>The Smaller Dragon</i> . Cecil Hobbs, Head, South East Asia Section, Library of Congress	193
CARTER, GWENDOLEN M. <i>The Politics of Inequality</i> . Norman Mansergh, Professor of the History of the British Commonwealth, St. John's College	189
DUBE, S. C. <i>India's Changing Villages</i> . McKim Marriott, University of Chicago ..	192

GINSBURG, NORTON, and CHESTER F. ROBERTS, JR., with the collaboration of LEONARD COMBER and others. <i>Malaya</i> . Frank H. H. King, Center for East Asian Studies, Harvard University	19
GINSBURG, NORTON (Ed.). <i>The Pattern of Asia</i> . L. Dudley Stamp, President, The London School of Economics and Political Science	18
HIGGINS, BENJAMIN. <i>Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and Development</i> . Frank H. Golay, Associate Professor of Economics and Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University	19
<i>Japan and the United Nations</i> . Albert E. Kane, Lecturer, Far Eastern International Relations, American University	19
LEGGE, JOHN D. <i>Problems of Regional Autonomy in Contemporary Indonesia</i> . W. C. Hollinger, Assistant Professor of Economics, Williams College	19
SCHROEDER, PAUL W. <i>The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941</i> . Harold S. Quigley, Professor of Political Science, Emeritus, Oakland, California ..	19
SHARMA, SRI RAM. <i>Some Aspects of the Indian Administrative System</i> . T. J. Leonard, Atascadero, California	19
SMITH, ROBERT AURA. <i>Philippine Freedom 1946-1958</i> . Ernest Schein, Washington, D. C.	189
STRAUSZ-HUPÉ, ROBERT, and HARRY W. HAZARD (Eds.). <i>The Idea of Colonialism</i> . Paul W. van der Veur, Assistant Professor of Government, University of Hawaii ..	191
TALBOT, PHILLIPS, and S. L. POPLAI. <i>India and America</i> . Harris Wofford, Jr., Washington, D. C.	191
TRAGER, FRANK N. <i>Building a Welfare State in Burma, 1948-1956</i> . Hugh Tinker, Reader in Oriental History, The University of London	196
OTHER BOOKS	200

The articles appearing in THE ANNALS are indexed in the *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature* and the *Industrial Arts Index*.

FOREWORD

Since World War II, both President Truman and President Eisenhower have described traffic safety as one of the nation's urgent domestic issues. The subject has claimed the attention of legislators, state and local officials, business and industrial executives, educators, research agencies, civic leaders, and in recent years, members of the United States Congress. Among groups which have become increasingly active in behalf of safer traffic are businessmen, the medical profession, church leaders, newspaper and magazine editors, club women, youth organizations, and schools.

This volume of *THE ANNALS* contains fifteen articles on the subject, contributed by men who are pre-eminently qualified in their respective fields to discuss the current situation and to appraise the outlook. It is by far the most comprehensive symposium on traffic safety published anywhere to date.

The humanitarian appeal of this movement is strong. It is not uncommon to hear a dedicated civic leader say that if his time, money, and effort result in the saving of only a single life, it will all have been worthwhile.

Traffic safety also is a moral issue, in the sense that thoughtfulness and courtesy behind the wheel, if universally practiced, would do much to eliminate the transgressions of the traffic code which contribute to public hazard.

It may be true that for an individual, the saving of one human life may justify almost any amount of effort. Certainly the movement offers much deep personal satisfaction to its devotees. But the modern concept of traffic safety, while acknowledging the validity of these humanitarian considerations, is not content to stop there. To do so would be to limit accident prevention activities to moral preachment. And since most people, Americans and Canadians, at least, seem to hold "good driver" images of themselves, generalized moral appeals and admonitions have little motivating power. It is the "other fellow" who is guilty of wrong doing; all messages automatically are addressed to him.

In addition to this practical consideration, there is another reason for the humanitarian appeal not being enough. If traffic safety becomes an end in itself—the sole object being the prevention of accidents—then logic requires that steps be taken which, although they may result in fewer hazards to life and limb, actually have the effect of restricting traffic itself. The ultimate expression of this point is the view that death and injury in traffic can be eliminated simply by eliminating traffic. While this idea may have a certain philosophical attraction for some, it has very little to do with the world in which we live. The people by their own choice have adopted the motor vehicle as a family unit of transportation, and it has been integrated into the economy. It would be vain, indeed, to dream of turning the clock back.

Automotive transportation, present and future, is therefore the realistic reference point for consideration of all traffic problems. Mr. Owen, in his brief but admirably comprehensive article, describes it well. The data he presents make clear how large a factor the motor vehicle has become in United States economic life.

Against this background, Mr. Baldwin outlines the dimensions of the accident problem, in life, limb, and property. He discusses also the vital, if somewhat neglected, need to collect, analyze, and put to work complete records of accidents.

To give the discussion historical perspective, Mr. Damon reviews the traffic safety movement in the United States and Canada. Future scholars will be interested in the fact that much of his account is taken from personal recollections. Mr. Damon also describes briefly the "Action Program for Highway Safety," which was formulated at the first President's Highway Safety Conference in 1946, and which with minor revisions stands today as the accepted charter for state and community traffic safety activities.

In the next article General Stewart describes the techniques which have been worked out for checking progress, or the lack of it, in achieving "Action Program" objectives. The traffic safety inventory conducted by the National Safety Council, of which he is the operating head, is a fundamental yardstick available to every state and community for appraisal of its accomplishments, year by year, in the curtailment of the traffic toll.

At this point in the volume, attention is turned to the "Action Program" itself, which was the basic guide for the outline of subject matter. Mr. Morony deals with the uniform vehicle code, not yet fully adopted by all states and cities, and with the enabling legislation upon which all phases of the program necessarily are based. The enforcement of traffic law, involving the police, prosecutors, and courts, is discussed by Mr. Kreml, who probably has been more responsible than any other individual for the upgrading of administrative standards in this field during the past twenty years.

Motor vehicle administration is the subject of Mr. Baker's paper, including the licensing and supervision of drivers, sometimes called the "front line in the battle against accidents." Dr. Carr examines the significant role of education in traffic safety. At all levels of instruction, kindergarten through the universities, there is work to be done.

In the "Action Program," engineering is divided into two categories, the vehicle and the road. Following the same breakdown, Mr. Chayne reviews authoritatively the progress made by vehicle manufacturers in building safer automobiles, trucks, and buses. Mr. Holmes discusses the nation's expanded roadbuilding program, destined to have far-reaching impact upon accident experience. In these articles, as in the others, an attempt is made not only to assess the current status but also to take a look ahead. What can be expected in traffic safety during the foreseeable future?

Research is needed in the traffic field in numerous areas. However, most authorities agree that a high priority should be given to investigation of the human behavior factor in accidents, which is the subject of Dr. Malfetti's paper. Finally, the "Action Program" calls for organized citizen support of public officials in every community and state, where principal responsibility for traffic measures rests. Mr. Bethea examines this aspect of the problem from his excellent vantage point as Executive Secretary of The President's Committee for Traffic Safety.

The preceding subjects comprise the technical substance of the traffic safety program in its present stage: accident records, regulatory and enabling laws, motor vehicle administration, education, law enforcement, engineering, research, and public support. These taken together are the things which any community must do to reduce permanently its toll of traffic death and injury.

Remaining articles in this volume round out the subject. Can the motor vehicle meet safely the future transportation needs of rapidly expanding metropolitan areas? Mr. Grimm's answers to this question are those of a practical visionary,

a planner dealing with a subject of absorbing interest. Mr. Jackson, for the Department of Defense, points out that traffic safety in the military establishment has major characteristics different from the civilian problem. Some eye-opening progress has been made. Finally, Mr. O'Neill discusses traffic accident trends in Europe and the British Isles, with knowledgeable comparisons of European and United States approaches to the problem.

For many years the safety program was symbolized in the United States by the "Three E's"—education, engineering, and enforcement. The late Sidney J. Williams, who had much to do with its development, likened the program to a three-legged stool. "It can't stand up," he said, "if one of the legs is missing." Each element of the program is essential to the reduction of traffic accidents to their irreducible minimum. All merit the continuous support not only of public agencies and institutions but also, very importantly, of thoughtful, civic-spirited citizens and the many organizations to which they belong.

The authors, like other leading authorities in the field, are basically optimistic about the future. Perhaps one reason is the fact that the same measures they advocate for the reduction of accidents also are, in the main, the steps necessary for increasing the efficiency of traffic itself. That which is done to promote expeditious movement of people and goods over public ways, to increase capacity and reduce costs, also will serve to make that movement safer. This is a happy parallel of social and economic objectives. It offers a very solid reason to hope that the encouraging gains so far recorded in this field can be exceeded during the years ahead.

JOHN W. GIBBONS

John W. Gibbons, Washington, D. C., is Director of the Publications Division, Automotive Safety Foundation. He is a former newspaper reporter and editor who entered the traffic safety field in 1936, organizing and directing the first safety council in South Bend, Indiana. Mr. Gibbons was Manager of the public relations department, Automobile Manufacturers Association, 1939-1942 and Secretary of the Media Committee, President's Highway Safety Conference, 1946-1954. He serves as public information consultant to numerous organizations, public agencies, and technical groups in the highway transportation field.

Automotive Transport in the United States

By WILFRED OWEN

ABSTRACT: The American economy has become geared for motor transport to a degree that has made the automotive industry the number one combination of economic activities in the United States. Whether the measurement is production, employment, consumer outlays, tons of materials or miles of travel, the motor vehicle and its operation have assumed a role in nearly everything we do: in the way we live, in the way we enjoy the fruits of our labors. Our mobility is characteristic that distinguishes us from every other nation. In the next decade and a half we will be spending billions of dollars for motor transport—two and a half percent of the gross national product of the United States. The magnitude of this outlay makes the importance of a appraisal obvious. We need to weigh the cost and benefits of this system of transport and its impact on the growth and mobility of the economy, on the creation of economic opportunities, and on living conditions generally. In this way, it may be possible to make the periodic adjustments in emphasis and outlay that are necessary to assure the greatest mobility at the most reasonable cost.

*Wilfred Owen, Washington, D. C., is an Economist and Senior Staff Member of the Brookings Institution. He is a Consultant to the Port of New York Authority, Twentieth Century Fund, Committee for Economic Development, and other organizations. Mr. Owen has been engaged in studies of transportation in relation to economic development in Europe and Asia. He is the author of *Automotive Transportation Trends and Problems* (1949); with Charles L. Dearling, of *Toll Roads and the Problem of Highway Modernization* (1951); of *The Metropolitan Transportation Problem* (1956); and a forthcoming book, *Cities in the Motor Age* (January 1959).*

TO ANY one observing the American scene from a space platform, the impact of the automotive age would be apparent.

On this side of the globe, the earth's surface has been etched in every direction by two and a half million miles of surfaced highways. From one end of the country to the other, the scars of the legions mark the new towns and elements rising on land that motorized irreducibly has made accessible. Every- and institute landscape of the motor age and the man, warring flat-roofed factories

The authors, it was so recently open about the future, ways adjacent to them advocate for the recesses of parked cars, for increasing the efficient green and yellow tious movement of periscopic signal that reduce costs, also will:

lel of social and economic, of concrete and encouraging gains so fast motorized economy ahead.

ith motion in both

irs of the day and

ling inhabitants of

king their way to the

the store, and back home

year we make the equivalent

one round trips to each of

John W. in the solar system, plus a motive S, to the sun. The family car is the vehicle that has come closest to conquering space.

Ben

mo

P THE UNDERLYING ECONOMIC PICTURE

Not so evident to the aerial observer, however, is the extent to which the American economy has become geared to supplying and using the transportation services of an automotive age. Expenditures for automotive transport in the United States—including truck, bus, automobile, and highway outlays—are now running at about 65 billion dollars annually. In the twentieth century the automobile industry has produced 170 million motor vehicles. There are now 67 million vehicles on the road—30 mil-

lion more than there were just a decade ago.

The number and variety of economic undertakings that keep our motorized nation on the move represent the greatest combination of economic activity in the United States. They include the production of great volumes of steel, zinc, lead, and glass; the refining of petroleum; the development of synthetic rubber; the building of roads; and the manufacture of everything from brake fluid and antifreeze to seat covers and snow plows. Since the end of the war, we have made a billion tires and consumed half a trillion gallons of fuel.

In one year automotive transport consumes the wool from seventeen million sheep, the leather from half a million cattle, and enough cotton to outfit every American maid, young and old, with twenty dresses. An automobile eats up everything from ground walnut shells (for automatic transmissions) to corn, sugar cane, and beeswax. Every car uses seven miles of electric wiring, and one out of every three radios is on the road.

Motorists have become giant users of credit. Last year they borrowed 15 billion dollars to buy two-thirds of their automobiles on the installment plan. Purchases totaled 14 million cars—5 million new and 9 million used. Car owners pay more annually for automobile insurance than all the money spent for roads and streets in any one year until 1952. They scrap more vehicles each year than all the vehicles operating in Asia and South America combined.

The United States accounts for approximately one-third of the world's more than ten million miles of roads. The states, which are responsible for one-sixth of the nation's road mileage, are building 50,000 miles of roads every year. Since 1925 we have spent 100 billion dollars for highways. Annual

road outlays are nearing the 10 billion dollar mark.

INDIRECT EFFECTS

There are many other activities quite remote from the transport scene itself that have their roots in an automotive setting. The travel and recreation industry is one of them: the beaches, golf courses, roadside restaurants, ski tows, motels, and vacation resorts of all kinds. There are 50,000 motels and tourist courts in the United States and 5,000 drive-in theaters. If all the nomads who live in auto trailers were by some unfortunate coincidence to come together in one place, they would constitute the third largest city in the United States.

Rising incomes and paid vacations have made it financially feasible to see America, and the automobile and highway have combined to make perpetual motion physically possible. Without the family car most vacations would be quite impractical. But somehow all of the confusion of a week-end excursion can be loaded into an automobile and secured by locking the doors. That is one reason seventy million people head for vacation by car.

Another indirect impact of the motor age is the housing boom. It is the new suburbs accessible by car and highway that have been pacing the nation to new construction records. Automobile ownership has meant new peaks of home ownership, and this in turn has created new record outlays for community facilities.

Finally, along with the tremendous growth of suburban living has been the mushrooming growth of industrial and commercial activity on the suburban fringes. The great regional shopping centers that have revolutionized retail merchandising are a feature of the automotive age. So are the supermarkets that have substituted mass production and distribution for the corner grocery

store. These establishments, almost wholly dependent on motor transport, support the new economic geography of a dispersed metropolitan pattern of living.

The rolling fifties have brought about many other changes in our lives as the mobility of people and goods has continued to increase. School buses carry nine million pupils to school every day. The consolidation of schools made possible by this network of transportation has eliminated 160,000 "one-teacher" schools in the past four decades.

Mail deliveries involve a million and a half miles of motor vehicle operation a day. Approximately 24,000 cities and towns depend on motor transport exclusively for their mail, and special mobile post offices have replaced the railroad mail trains on thousands of miles of intercity routes. Newspaper deliveries in many cities now cover a radius of as much as one hundred miles. There are mobile libraries and blood banks and portable churches.

The spending habits of the consumer reveal very clearly the travel patterns of our times. The average family or individual spends eleven cents for transportation out of every dollar spent for consumer goods and services. Ten of these eleven cents are spent for the automobile and its operation.

To express this travel bill in dollars, the American consumer spends approximately 30 billion dollars for passenger transportation. That figure is exclusive of business travel. Of this total, 27 billion dollars go for automobile transportation. This sum includes the net purchase price or installment payments on the automobile itself plus the annual outlay for gasoline, oil, tires, repairs, washing, parking, and insurance. Only 3 billion dollars is left for other forms of transportation: two of them for local transit and the other for intercity railroad, airline, and bus travel. Half of

all the money spent for public carriers goes for bus transport.

So it is obvious that Americans in their daily lives have cast their lot in no uncertain terms for highway transport. To be exact, 95 per cent of all they spend for moving around is spent for moving around in motor vehicles. They spend more for automobile transportation than their combined expenditures for doctors, religion, charities, telephones, radio, television, furniture, electricity, gas, books, magazines, and newspapers. Consumers spend more money for flowers, seeds, and potted plants than for all travel by railroad, intercity and commutation combined.

FREIGHT MOVEMENT

The family car has come to play such an obvious role in the conduct of family affairs that we tend to underestimate the economic importance of freight movement by highway. Yet one out of every six vehicles on the road today is a truck, eleven million altogether. Half a million are over-the-road trucks for hire, either common or contract carriers. Another three-quarters of a million are owned by various agencies of federal, state, and local governments. The rest are used in the conduct of private business.

Despite their small numbers, the big trucks in the for-hire category carry a large share of the total freight moved on main highways. A recent survey by the Bureau of Public Roads revealed that for-hire trucks accounted for approximately one-fourth of the vehicle movements on main rural highways, but carried half of the ton-miles of freight that moved by road.

During recent years this segment of the trucking industry has grown very rapidly. In 1940, for-hire trucks were carrying 62 billion ton-miles of intercity business. Today they are moving over

four times that number. Revenues have increased even more rapidly, and they now equal more than 50 per cent of what the railroads collect for freight haulage. For-hire trucking is a 5 billion dollar business.

But the private truck outdoes the for-hire carrier in both numbers and variety of activity. About 2.7 million of these trucks are on farms, and more than that are engaged in local delivery services. Others are an integral part of business enterprises. There are 50,000 companies that own fleets of ten trucks or more. The Bell Telephone System, for example, uses 70,000 trucks (together with 20,000 automobiles) to keep its phones in order, and both the butcher and the baker, along with the milkman, depend very heavily on motorized deliveries. Ten leading bakers operate a total of 30,000 trucks.

Adding up the work of all these road users is statistically impossible, but the picture can be painted in broad terms. In intercity transport—including movements by rail, water, pipeline, and road—the motor truck now does about one-fifth of the total ton-miles of business. In addition, the truck is supreme for local haulage both in rural areas and in and around cities and towns.

IT HAPPENED SO FAST

The revolution on wheels has happened so quickly that we hardly realize the degree to which we have become geared to the workings of internal combustion. As recently as 1900, the number of people who were engaged in making horsewhips and windmills was greater than the total number employed in the electric power industry. We were getting more work out of men and animals than from mineral fuels and water power. Farmers were still burying sharp instruments face up in the dusty roads to stop the week-end drivers from

invading the countryside. Automobile advertisements were extolling the virtues of a car "as gentle as a horse," that had the added quality of being twice as safe "because it could not scare."

As late as 1912, an effort by Congress to finance a system of national roads was criticized as a frivolous expenditure "for the benefit of a few wealthy pleasure seekers." Just a few years earlier a state highway commissioner in Connecticut defended the new vehicle in an article entitled "What Injurious Effect, If Any, Do Automobiles Have On Our Roads?" Woodrow Wilson looked at the automobile of his day and despaired. "Nothing has spread socialistic feeling more," he said, "than the use of the automobile . . . a picture of the arrogance of wealth."

From Woodrow Wilson to swept-wing recent models has been a relatively short span. But these few years have produced more revolutionary changes in the way people move, and consequently in the way they live and work, than all previous history. The automobile is a key to the accomplishment of many of our daily objectives: getting to work, changing jobs, going to school, seeing a friend, taking a vacation, choosing a home, or playing a game of golf. Automobile transportation has become the means to the many other ends that make up urban living. Granted that automotive design and ornamentation suggest frivolity, the role of automotive transport has become a necessity for many millions of Americans.

The automobile has given us the personal mobility to which man in every part of the world aspires, whether he finds it in his bicycle, motor bike, motorcycle, motor scooter, small car or large. Until we move into the air with a safe and simple flying vehicle, the private car crowns the history of personal transportation. It is still the best way for the average man to overcome time and

distance when and as he likes. With an automobile, the worker can count on the whole metropolitan area as his potential place of employment. His selection of a place to live has been equally broadened by the flexibility that comes from being motorized.

The extent to which we have made the shift to motorized transport is dramatically illustrated by the composition of the traffic crossing the Hudson River at New York City. In the past quarter of a century or so, the actual number of persons crossing the river has increased only a little. But the methods these people use to get across have changed completely. Compared with 1930, the railroads have lost some 95 million passengers per year, and the number of people using the ferries has declined by 36 million. Bus riders, on the other hand, have increased by 60 million and automobile riders by 92 million. In other words, there are now 152 million more auto and bus passengers per year and 131 million fewer rail and ferry passengers.

WHAT ABOUT THE FUTURE?

The growth of motor transport continues to outstrip other indices of the nation's economic expansion. Between 1950 and 1957, the population of the United States increased 13 per cent. Gross national product in constant dollars rose 27 per cent. During the same period the number of motor vehicles in operation increased 38 per cent, and traffic was up 40 per cent. Even when new cars were not selling, the old ones were rolling on to new records.

If population estimates are anywhere near correct, we will have 50 million more people to feed between now and 1975. Each one of them will require some 18 tons of material per year. That means at least a billion more tons of freight to be moved.

Taking into account rising produc-

tivity, however, and higher real incomes, the effect on transport will be even greater. It is clear from the record that the mobility of people and goods has closely paralleled economic growth. For every billion dollars of gross national product, we transport about three tons of goods and materials a distance of one mile. This ratio has been declining somewhat in recent years and can be expected to show a further reduction. But roughly it can be said that a gross national product of 750 billion dollars by 1975, at present price levels, would mean transporting at least 2 trillion ton-miles of freight that year.

It is difficult to guess how much of this freight will be moved by truck. At present the relative share of the total freight business going to highway carriers is increasing. In 1948, interstate highway carriers accounted for 11 per cent of all intercity freight, and in 1956 they were doing 19 per cent of the business. Growth of the suburbs for both residential purposes and for industry and commerce should further increase our dependence on the motor vehicle. So should the stepped-up rate of highway construction.

It may also be anticipated that automobile ownership will continue to increase with dispersal of living and working places, and with rising incomes. As families move up the economic ladder, their expenditures for transportation always increase, especially their outlays for automobiles. The rise in multiple-car families also parallels the income curve. At present 14 per cent of all families and individual consumers own two cars or more. In the top fifth of the income scale, 36 per cent are multiple car owners.

These factors indicate that by 1975 there may be one automobile for every 2.5 persons, compared to the present ratio of one for every 3. This would increase the number of automobiles to 88

million, or 30 million more than today. And even a continuing ratio of one truck to every 15 people would mean 15 million trucks. A more rapid growth of truck transport to 20 million units is more likely in view of the changing patterns of freight movement already apparent today. Adding the guesses together, well over 100 million vehicles may be operating in the United States by 1975.

THE ECONOMIC BALANCE SHEET

It is a good deal easier to extol the virtues of the automotive revolution than to face up to its problems. Yet the magnitude of the motor-transport industry and its further growth potentials create difficulties as well as opportunities for the American economy.

To cite an important example, the tremendous material and labor requirements of the automotive industries are not only a stimulus to the economic system but a heavy drain as well. With so many other demands on our total resources, we need to make sure that our investments in transport are giving us adequate results at reasonable cost.

Periods of business recession also make it clear that the importance of motor transport from the standpoint of the economy as a whole creates weaknesses as well as strength. The pervasive influence of the activities that keeps us moving also makes us vulnerable. Much more thought needs to be given to how the threat to economic stability inherent in this situation can be minimized.

A further problem of the automotive age is the rising real costs of transport services. The automobile has come to be an essential adjunct of suburban living and an important continuing item in the family budget. The problem, judging from the direction of present trends in automobile design, may show up eventually in an allocation of household

expenditures that finds us moving quite well but living rather poorly.

These are some of the broader issues that it seems obvious we must consider and do something about. But the doing requires first of all a careful appraisal of how this transportation system of ours is working. A good system involves a balancing of several factors. How much does our transportation cost, how convenient is it, how quickly does it move us from where we are to where we want to be, and can we depend upon it to get us back again in one piece? Finally, how readily does this form of transportation contribute to the economic and social objectives which are the reasons for moving in the first place?

On the whole the motor vehicle has not fared badly on the basis of these considerations. With respect to the speed at which it performs its tasks, the combination of better vehicles and better roads has in recent years improved the situation substantially. The urban rush-hour jam is the major difficulty, but this problem was with us long before the automobile. It will continue to be with us until we are willing to rearrange our cities and our habits of work. Neither the automobile, the subway, nor the railroad can provide ideal transportation as long as we all insist on going to the same place at the same time.

With respect to cost, the record of the automotive industries over most of their history has been good. Despite the multiplying use of the automobile and the magnitude of the current road program, consumer spending for transportation has increased only moderately in relation to total consumer outlays. Highway expenditures have actually declined in relation to gross national product.

In 1925, consumer outlays for transport were 10.6 per cent of all consumer expenditures. After that year, and until 1941, the figure averaged about 9.5 per cent. Now in the 1950's the relative

outlays for transport have been pushing upward, averaging approximately 11.5 per cent. In two recent years, transport expenditures have exceeded 12 per cent of total consumer outlays. High initial purchase price and higher operating requirements for larger and more powerful vehicles have exerted upward pressure on transport costs in excess of the cost savings from technological improvements.

The convenience of motor transport has likewise been a net effect of strong opposing forces. On one side is the greater comfort and reliability of the vehicle, plus better roads. On the other are mounting congestion and lack of convenient parking and terminal space. Here the most obvious difficulties are in urban areas. But already there is growing recognition that adapting to the motor age means more than accommodating the vehicle. We are now seeing the beginnings of a comprehensive approach to urban and regional development that relates the development of land to the needs of transportation, and both of these to the enhancement of living.

Finally, there is the problem of safety. Here the statistics of a declining rate of destruction in relation to the volume of motor vehicle operations fail to furnish much comfort. Since 1927, a million people have been killed on the roads and streets of the United States. At current rates, another million will die between now and 1975. This is the most damaging indictment against the motor age. Attacking this top-priority problem will involve every aspect of motor transport and its relationship to the environment in which it serves.

ADDING THINGS TOGETHER

If we were to single out the most notable physical characteristic that distinguishes the United States from other countries of the world, it would certainly be the degree of the nation's mo-

bility. The big difference is our ability to move at will from one place to another. And looking beyond the wheels that make this mobility possible, it is clear that what has happened cannot be measured in numbers of vehicles, gallons of gasoline, or bags of cement. The impact has been felt in ways of living and earning a living, in ways of enjoying the fruits of our accomplishments.

The next step is to accept the fact that this is indeed an automotive age in which we live and to take inventory of where the ride has taken us and where we are headed next. The objective is clearly to develop still further the potentials our mobility offers for economic growth and improvements in living.

In the next fifteen years we will be spending a trillion dollars for motor transport in the United States. Yet we have only begun to think about the relation of this huge enterprise to the goals and tasks of the nation's total economy, to the satisfactory growth and development of the communities in which we live, and to the real needs of the human beings that transportation serves. It will take heroic measures in the next decade and a half to assure the convenience, reasonable cost, and above all the acceptable standards of safety that the outlay of a trillion dollars ought to be able to provide. The time has come for reappraisal, and in many respects the outcome is bound to be agonizing.

Dimensions of the Traffic Safety Problem

By DAVID M. BALDWIN

ABSTRACT: The motor-vehicle traffic accident problem today is one of our major socio-economic problems. Traffic accidents account for the loss of 40,000 lives a year, for about 1½ million injuries, and for an economic loss of perhaps 5 billion dollars. An estimated 100,000 households are affected to a major degree each year by traffic accidents, and the nation's economy suffers a loss of some 500,000 man-years of productive time. Traffic accidents rank sixth among all causes of death; but in the important 15 to 24 age group, they lead by a wide margin. Trends in recent years reveal fewer deaths in cities and towns and increased fatalities in rural areas. To some extent this is accounted for by increased rural travel, but the rural accident rate is out of proportion to the additional exposure. Reporting of accidents is not uniform, particularly as it concerns injury and property damage cases. More important, however, is the fact that present reporting procedures do not produce valid facts about the causes of accidents. Research now underway may help answer questions as to why accidents happen and thus suggest ways to reduce our current accident rate.

David M. Baldwin, Washington, D. C., is Executive Secretary of the Institute of Traffic Engineers. He was formerly with the National Safety Council as Traffic Engineer and later as Director of the Traffic Division. Before that he was Safety Engineer for the Virginia State Police and was in charge of the accident records system for the State. While at the National Safety Council, Mr. Baldwin served as Secretary of the National Conference on Uniform Traffic Accident Statistics. He served as Secretary of the Committee on Accident Records of the President's Highway Safety Conference from 1948 to 1951.

THE MOTOR vehicle is perhaps the major social and economic phenomenon of the first half of the current century. Certainly the impact of the automobile on American life in the past fifty years has exceeded that of any other single factor. That the internal combustion engine as exploited by Detroit has not been an unmixed blessing is equally apparent, however. Motor-vehicle traffic accidents have killed more than a million persons in the United States and injured many millions more.

This major socio-economic problem of accidents is recognized by the automobile industry and is also responsible for the existence of many safety councils and traffic safety organizations. It is of major concern to liability insurance underwriters, who find it increasingly difficult to maintain a reasonable ratio between losses and premiums. Unfortunately the public has not reached the same point of awareness, for while traffic safety is given a considerable amount of lip service, it has not been dignified by the kind of action program which could produce real results in the form of accidents prevented and lives saved.

The first recorded motor-vehicle traffic death appears to have been that of a Mr. H. H. Bliss, who stepped off a street car in New York in 1899 and was struck by a passing motor vehicle. In December of 1951, the National Safety Council and the press called attention to the occurrence of the one millionth traffic death. Since that macabre milestone, almost a quarter of a million more deaths have been recorded.

Currently the annual death toll is nearly 40,000, with an injury total of almost $1\frac{1}{2}$ millions and a staggering record of at least 10 million property damage accidents. Of the injuries reported, the National Safety Council estimates 120,000 as resulting in permanent impairments.

ECONOMIC AND NONECONOMIC ASPECTS

Various estimates have been made of the economic factor. An estimated property damage total of \$1,800,000,000 was reported by the National Safety Council for 1956. Additional sums of \$1,740,000,000 as wage loss and medical expense and \$1,450,000,000 as overhead cost of insurance were similarly reported. The total cost of motor-vehicle accidents was thus estimated as \$5,000,000,000. This represents more than 1 per cent of the gross national product for the year.

Other estimates of the "direct costs" of motor-vehicle accidents (property damage, medical expenses, work time lost, damages in excess of other direct costs, legal costs and other miscellaneous items—but excluding overhead costs of insurance) put the figure for one state at \$50,224,000.

This is at the rate of \$432,000 per 100-million vehicle miles for passenger car accidents. Projecting this ratio for the United States total of nearly 700 million vehicle miles indicates an estimated cost of about $2\frac{1}{2}$ billions. This figure is in contrast to that of $3\frac{1}{2}$ billions arrived at by the Council method. The smaller figure excludes truck and bus accidents and truck and bus costs in other types of accidents; therefore, it is difficult to develop a direct comparison. The two are in the same general range, however, after taking into account these differences, and even the smaller estimate represents more money than our economy can afford to lose annually.

The financial aspects of the accident situation are but a part of the picture. Already mentioned have been the raw totals of deaths and injuries, many of the latter permanent in nature. It is difficult, however, to estimate the sociological effects of accidents. No one

knows, for instance, how many homes are disrupted by accidents. Surely every household in which a death occurs is affected and so are many in which a critical injury occurs. About 25,000 of the deaths occur in persons between the ages of 20 and 65. Adding about three disabling injuries per death means that perhaps 100,000 households were affected by serious injury or death to a father or a mother.

If two-thirds of those between 20 and 65 are gainfully employed, their deaths represent a substantial loss of productive time. At an average age of 40, about 400,000 man-years are lost. Add to this the productive time lost by 1,400,000 injured and another 100,000 man-years might be accounted for.

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS AS CAUSE OF DEATH

Traffic accidents as a cause of death rank sixth among all causes. For the age group of 5 to 14, however, they are the leading cause of death by a slim margin. For the age group of 15 to 24, traffic accidents are the leading cause by a wide margin, being responsible for $4\frac{1}{2}$ times as many deaths as the next leading cause, cancer. In whole numbers, motor-vehicle accidents cause more deaths than do diabetes or general arteriosclerosis and almost as many as does pneumonia. As a killer, motor-vehicle accidents are exceeded only by five causes: heart disease, cancer, vascular lesions, pneumonia, and other types of accidents.

The ages of persons killed and injured in traffic accidents are not in direct proportion to ages in the population. The death rates in 1956, for instance, ranged from a low of 8.3 per 100,000 for the 5 to 14 age group to a high of 42.7 for the 15 to 24 age group. These rates represent substantial changes from the average of 1939-42, when the

5 to 14 group was 40 per cent higher—at about 11—and the highest rate of all was about 60 for the 65-and-over age group. The 15 to 24 rate in 1938-42 was about 28, as against the 1956 figure of nearly 43. The over-all population rate in 1938-42 was nearly the same as in 1956—about 25 per 100,000 population.

Injury rates by age groups also show wide variations. On a population basis, the highest rate in 1956 occurred in the 15 to 24 age group. The 65-and-over group had a rate about equal to the under 5 and the 5 to 14 groups, although the death rate for the over-65 group was nearly as high as that for the 15 to 24 group. This relatively high death rate probably reflects the lessened ability of the older age group to recover from injuries.

DEATH RATES

The population rate is but one of the indices commonly used to measure traffic accidents. Deaths on the basis of 100,000 population is a rate universally used in the vital statistics field, and it is frequently used in traffic safety work. The population death rate for the United States is currently about 25 and has been at or near this figure for a number of years.

More directly related to exposure is a rate calculated on the basis of vehicles registered. For the country as a whole, the current rate is about 6 deaths per 10,000 vehicles registered. This rate is commonly used to measure accident experience in cities—the average city rate in 1956 was about 10.

Generally conceded as the best measure of exposure to accidents is the number of miles driven, calculated from gasoline consumption and from actual counts of traffic volumes. Deaths per 100,000,000 vehicle-miles of travel have been averaging about 6 in recent years.

This figure of 6 deaths per 100,000,000 vehicle-miles is a substantial decrease from the rate of even a few years ago. In 1948 the rate was 8.1, and in 1941 it was 12.0. In 1926, the first year the figure was available, the rate was 17.9.

It is perhaps significant that although the death rate measured in terms of travel has gone down rather steadily, the death rate in terms of population has not decreased. This rate in 1928 was 23.4, and in 1956 it was 23.9. A somewhat fatalistic school of thought suggests that the public is willing to live with a death rate of this magnitude and is content to make only sufficient effort to keep the rate from climbing above this figure. This concept is not shared by many traffic safety workers, for perhaps obvious reasons, and is offered here only as a passing comment.

Accidents do not always follow the pattern of traffic. An important example is found when accidents are compared in urban and rural areas. Deaths on a vehicle-mile basis have been consistently higher in rural areas than in cities and towns. The 1938-42 average, for instance, reported an urban death rate of 8.9 and a rural rate of 14.1. By 1956, the urban rate had come down to 3.4, but the rural rate had declined to only 8.7.

The fact that the percentage decrease in urban areas has been about twice the percentage decrease in rural areas cannot be explained on the basis of differences in traffic volumes, and probably is accounted for only on the basis of more effective accident prevention efforts.

Pedestrian deaths have decreased over the years in both urban and rural areas. Deaths from noncollision accidents (one-vehicle accidents involving no collision on the roadway), on the other hand, have doubled in rural areas in twenty years. Two-vehicle collisions have increased 65 per cent in rural areas in the same period.

NUMBER OF NONFATAL ACCIDENTS

Almost every fatal traffic accident is reported, and the number of traffic deaths is therefore known with a fair degree of accuracy. Ordinary vital statistics procedures serve to supplement the usual traffic records in this regard.

Unfortunately no such certainty exists in recording nonfatal accidents. While hospitalized injuries usually come to the attention of authorities, many minor injuries are not reported. No one knows exactly how many noninjury cases resulting only in property damage occur without being reported.

The result of this situation is that for years safety authorities have relied on an assumption that for every fatal accident there also occur a given number of nonfatal injury accidents and a given number of property damage noninjury accidents. For the country as a whole, one fatal case has been assumed to be accompanied by 35 injury and 150 property damage accidents.

At the same time, it has been recognized that these ratios would not hold equally well for urban and for rural areas. In cities and towns, the ratio may be closer to 1:50:300 and in rural areas, 1:15:50. A recent study in Massachusetts indicates that the statewide ratio there may be as high as 1:100:300. If this holds for states less urban than Massachusetts, the actual total number of accidents in the country may be much higher than is usually estimated.

A more recent study by the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare tends to confirm the Massachusetts figures and suggests a nationwide annual total of some 4 million injuries.

The current estimates of the National Safety Council are for approximately 34,300 fatal accidents, 950,000 non-fatal injury accidents, and 9,300,000

property damage only accidents. Of these property damage cases, 3,700,000 involved damage of \$25 or more and 5,600,000 involved damage of less than \$25.

These accidents involved 17,700,000 drivers, or perhaps 20 per cent of the total number of drivers in the country. Since some drivers were involved in more than one accident during the year, it is difficult to estimate the exact number of individual drivers involved in accidents in a given year.

ACCIDENT REPORTING

The problems of counting accidents accurately have already been mentioned. This is but one of the difficulties faced by safety authorities in the art of obtaining information on accidents.

Nearly all jurisdictions require—usually by state statute—that drivers in accidents report to some responsible state or local agency. Such a requirement is most common in the case of fatal or injury accidents and somewhat less common in the case of property damage accidents. When such accidents must be reported, there is usually specified a dollar limit for damage below which the accident is not required to be reported. This may range from \$25 to as much as \$100, sometimes for one car and sometimes for the accident. In a very few areas, all damage cases are reportable.

The result of these requirements is that while most fatal cases are reported, the coverage of nonfatal injury cases varies from one jurisdiction to another, depending among other things on the definition of an injury. Recently an effort has been made to standardize this aspect through efforts of a national committee concerned with accident definitions. However, the results will depend on a fairly long educational program which probably will not be fully effective for some time.

The pattern of reporting of property

damage accidents is even more varied. With some jurisdictions not requiring reports of any property damage only accidents, reporting runs the gamut. Two states ask that all property damage cases be reported, but even these do not believe they obtain reports on all such cases.

More variations come about because of the many different dollar limits placed on reporting. It is usually agreed that lowering the limit from \$100 to \$50 will approximately double the number of reportable accidents.

In addition to the differences in legal requirements for reporting, there are many differences in enforcement of the requirements. In some areas, the prompt suspension of the driver's license has resulted in better reporting. In others, the presence of police on patrol or in the immediate vicinity results in a report. In still other jurisdictions, police indicate no interest in an accident if the drivers involved reach a settlement as to responsibility, and as a result the accident is never recorded.

All of these factors add up to the present situation of admitted incompleteness of reporting and the uncertainty about any published totals of accidents. The figures available are only estimates, and they are subject to question as to their reliability. At the same time, there is enough experience to indicate that the range is approximately correct.

REPORTING FOR ACCIDENT PREVENTION

The excuse for requiring reporting of accidents, from an accident prevention standpoint, is to collect data on the occurrence of accidents and thus build a foundation for safety efforts. This is based on the logical assumption that history repeats itself and that circumstances which cause one accident may well cause another. This theory, to be

productive of worthwhile results, demands that accident records procedures produce accurate and significant figures which can identify the causes of accidents and thus guide safety authorities in their work. Unfortunately, while the theory is apparently good, the records do not produce accurate and significant results. Thus the value of the reporting procedures is largely lost.

That this is true has been recognized by many experts in the field. Frequent references have been made recently in public statements by safety council leaders and others that while present records provide considerable information on when and where accidents happen, who was involved, and perhaps how they happen, not much is produced as to the real causes of accidents. This is an extremely distressing situation to any thoughtful person. It suggests that a great deal of time has been wasted in the past years when much useful accident prevention information could have been collected. As a result, many safety efforts are still, relatively speaking, undirected. That is, they do not have the benefit of information developed from

a study of past accidents which would point toward accident causes that could be remedied.

Perhaps the outstanding example is speed. Despite the fact that speed as a factor in accidents has been debated—argued could be more accurate—for years, no one today is certain just what part this very easily identified factor plays in our accident experience. Opinions range from 0 to 100 per cent as a contributing factor. This is true of other factors also. Is motor vehicle inspection worthwhile? We do not know, because we do not know what part vehicle condition plays in accidents.

There is hope today that some of these answers may be forthcoming in the future—perhaps in the near future. Several researches are underway which may produce important answers to these and other problems. The fact remains that time, and in this case time means *lives*, has been lost. The dimensions of the problem are fairly well known. It appears that we may now be starting to find out *why* it exists and therefore what we can do about it to make it disappear or at least shrink materially.

The Action Program for Highway Safety

By NORMAN DAMON

ABSTRACT: History shows that the Action Programs for Traffic Safety of both the United States and Canada have evolved as a result of half a century of seemingly unrelated efforts to cope with the growing problem of motor vehicle accidents. In both countries, public officials have the primary responsibility for traffic safety. Equally important, however, is the active support of citizen leaders to meet the needs of and to secure the proper operation of official traffic agencies. This dual approach is predicated upon close co-operation between traffic officials and citizen leaders in developing and securing understanding and acceptance of the official traffic safety program of a jurisdiction. The Action Program first developed in 1946 and revised slightly in 1949 stands as the master plan for this balanced comprehensive program; it is applicable in whole or in part by all governmental jurisdictions and by organizations of private citizens. New concepts of traffic accident prevention are developing: driver behavior research is being probed; important developments in vehicle and highway engineering are taking place; new formats are being explored for the enlistment of citizen support leadership; and basic research into accident causes is getting under way. Many of the recommendations set forth in the Action Program are likely to face substantial change under the impact of future developments.

Norman Damon, Washington, D. C., is Vice President of the Automotive Safety Foundation, a position which he has held since 1942. He served as Committee Secretary in the first four National Conferences on Street and Highway Safety. When the Safety-Traffic Committee of the Automobile Manufacturers was organized in 1935 he was named Secretary, and in 1936 he was put in administrative charge of the automotive industry's expanded traffic safety program. In 1937 he became Director of the Automotive Safety Foundation. Mr. Damon served, in 1954, as Director of the pioneering comprehensive study of state highway safety functions in the state of North Dakota. Most recently he has served as Chairman of the Program Committee for the 1958 series of Citizen Leadership Conferences which was sponsored by the President's Committee for Traffic Safety.

THE FIRST traffic fatality in the United States was recorded in New York City in September 1899 when a man named H. H. Bliss stepped off a streetcar and was hit by a "horseless carriage." The millionth traffic death was recorded in December 1951.

Not until 1906, with fifteen states reporting, did the United States Census Bureau recognize motor vehicle accidents as a statistically significant cause of mortality. By 1933, all forty-eight states were reporting these figures to the Census Bureau. Between 1913 and 1933, the National Safety Council simply reported an annual average of fatalities by five-year blocks.

First efforts at regulating motor vehicle traffic began with the registration of motor vehicles in New York in 1901; establishment of the first state police in Connecticut occurred in 1903; and the first driver license law in Massachusetts was enacted in the same year.

ORGANIZED ATTACK BEGAN IN 1913

The first organized attack at the national level on accidents came with the creation of the National Council for Industrial Safety in 1913; this organization changed its name in the following year to the National Safety Council.

Also in 1913, the first local Safety Council with a traffic program was organized—the Lehigh Valley Safety Council of Bethlehem and Allentown, Pennsylvania.

In 1916, the schools of Newark, New Jersey adopted the plan of using older children to protect younger ones on their way to and from school. This movement grew into the School Safety Patrol of today and was first promoted as a national program by the American Automobile Association in 1922.

By 1919, the first state Safety Council to undertake a traffic safety program was organized in Delaware.

In this same year, a man of vision—

Thomas H. MacDonald—was appointed Chief of the United States Bureau of Public Roads. Until his retirement, thirty-four years later, he lent the prestige of his office to all valid efforts to reduce traffic accidents, both official and nonofficial, as part of his responsibility for the development of a national system of highways.

SCHOOL SAFETY EDUCATION PHILOSOPHY ADVANCED IN 1919

Dr. Albert W. Whitney of the former National Workmen's Compensation Service Bureau was instrumental in setting up the Safety Education Section of the National Safety Council in 1919; this organization was implemented three years later by a grant of funds from his organization.

In 1920, Roy D. Chapin, who was then President of the Hudson Motor Car Company; Thomas H. MacDonald, Chief of the United States Bureau of Public Roads; and Pyke Johnson, Secretary of the Highway Committee of the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce, organized the Highway and Highway Transport Education Committee to encourage highway engineering training for civil engineers. Two years later this became the Highway Education Board.

The concept of the "Three E's" of traffic safety originated with Julien H. Harvey, who was then Director of the Kansas City Safety Council, at a meeting in Topeka in 1923. To clarify some questions concerning the nature of highway safety, he drew a triangle on a blackboard and placed the letter "E" at each point, designating the three "E's" as Engineering, Education, and Enforcement.

Sidney J. Williams, Director of the Industrial Department of the National Safety Council, who subsequently became first Director of its Public Safety Section in 1926, developed more fully the concept of the "Three E's." Today,

they still represent the essential elements of traffic safety.

It was also in 1923 that Canada organized the National Safety League, later to be replaced by the Canadian Highway Safety Conference.

In the United States, national program and leadership were furnished by joint official and citizen action; in Canada, the national agency was concerned more with serving as a program forum, with the Provinces responsible for action.

OFFICIALS ORGANIZE NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

State officials concerned with building roads, licensing drivers and their vehicles, enforcing traffic laws, as well as concerned with school and college education, early organized to deal with common problems.

Thus, the American Association of State Highway Officials came into being in Washington, D. C. in 1914; the Institute of Traffic Engineers was founded in Pittsburgh in 1930, with formal adoption of the constitution and by-laws in New York City in 1931; the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators in Chicago in 1932; the State and Provincial Section of the International Association of Chiefs of Police at Toronto in 1938; and the National Commission on Safety Education at Washington, D. C. in 1943.

NATIONAL CONFERENCES ON STREET AND HIGHWAY SAFETY

In the spring of 1924, Ernest Greenwood, a free-lance writer and the editor of the *Insurance Field*, conceived the idea of a national conference on traffic safety.

Greenwood discussed this concept with Elliot Goodwin, then Resident Vice President of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. As a result, several meetings were held, the last with

Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, at which eight organizations as subsequent sponsors and financial supporters joined in urging Mr. Hoover to call a national conference for December 1924.

Following a technique which was novel at that time, committees were appointed to prepare reports in advance of the Conference on Statistics, Traffic Control, Construction and Engineering, City Planning and Zoning, Insurance, Education, Motor Vehicle and Public Relations. In adopting these reports with only minor changes, the December plenary session of the Conference created an interim Committee to prepare for a subsequent Conference.

Addressing the opening session, President Coolidge said, in part: "Highway control is primarily for the states, and it is best that this is so. . . ." As a result of the 1924 Conference, traffic safety became importantly identified with, and a measure of, efficiency and economy in the operation of the highway transportation system.

Another innovation of the mid-twenties was the appearance of a new speciality known as traffic engineering. It was concerned primarily with the safe and expeditious flow of motor vehicle traffic.

In 1925, Miller McClintock interested the Studebaker Corporation in establishing a Bureau for Street Traffic Research at the University of California. The Bureau was transferred the following year to Harvard University—and to Yale University in 1938—with Dr. McClintock serving as its Director until his resignation in 1941.

A full year's postgraduate academic training for traffic engineers was initiated at Harvard in 1936. Training activities, suspended during World War II, were resumed in 1944 when the name was changed to the present Bureau of Highway Traffic.

For the Second National Conference

on Street and Highway Safety, held in March 1926, only the Committees on Statistics and on Public Relations were held over from 1924. Four other Committees were named: Uniformity of Laws and Regulations—the first Uniform Code was drafted and approved both by the Conference and the National Commissioners on Uniform Traffic Laws in 1926; Causes of Accidents; Metropolitan Traffic Facilities; and Enforcement.

At this second Conference, Secretary Hoover said in part: "The Committees of the first Conference rendered an invaluable service . . . theirs was the work of pioneers . . . in their efforts to bring about better traffic conditions . . . it must not be forgotten that if we are to find a permanent solution for the problem of traffic accidents we must at the same time discover a permanent solution for the problem of traffic itself . . . we started out to solve the problem of traffic accidents. We have passed through the door of the problem of urban transportation."

A third session of the National Conference on Street and Highway Safety was held in May 1930 under the Chairmanship of R. P. Lamont, who was then Secretary of Commerce; a fourth and final one was called in 1934 by his successor, Daniel Roper.

NEW TRAFFIC SAFETY ELEMENTS RECOGNIZED

In 1927, periodic vehicle inspection had its inception with the voluntary "Save a Life" campaign initiated in New York State by John J. Hall, who was then Eastern Division Merchandising Manager for the Automotive Equipment Association.

Another milestone during 1928–29 was the development of a manual on uniform signs, signals, and markings which was later carried forward by the

National Joint Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices.

In 1932, the first organized high school driver education course was initiated at State College High School, State College, Pennsylvania by an engineering instructor named Amos Neyhart.

In the same year, Franklin M. Kreml, a young sergeant with the Evanston, Illinois Police Department, helped to set up an accident investigation unit and records procedure for the city of Syracuse. In 1933, Kreml initiated the first Traffic Officers' Training School conducted jointly by the Evanston Police Department and the Political Science and Sociology Departments of Northwestern University.

With this beginning Kreml was selected in 1936 to head a police traffic training program at Northwestern University sponsored by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the University's new Traffic Institute.

In 1934, traffic fatalities soared by almost 5,000—an increase of nearly 15 per cent. The death toll was 36,101. About 25 million cars, trucks and busses were in operation, traveling more than 25 billion miles. There were 16.7 deaths per 100 million vehicle miles that year, the highest in automotive history before or since.

This sudden increase in deaths and the accompanying record rate were due, in part, to the intensified accident exposure resulting from the rapid growth in motor vehicle registrations and travel mileage. Underlying the grim statistics was the understandable concern of people everywhere in those depression years with more immediate matters than the threat of traffic accidents.

Then events took place in the latter part of 1935 which focussed the attention of the public on the traffic safety problem:

First, the October publication by the *Reader's Digest* of an electrifying article

by J. C. Furnas entitled "And Sudden Death"—reprinted in the millions—dramatically brought home to the American people the shocking and costly picture of traffic accidents. Within weeks after its publication, traffic safety became a public issue, generating wide interest and determination to deal with accidents.

Second, leaders of the automotive and allied industries were roused by a front-page editorial in the *Detroit News* calling on the motor industry to encourage the safe use of its products.

Third, William S. Knudsen, who was then President of General Motors Corporation, addressed the annual meeting of the National Safety Council in Louisville. There William S. Cameron, who was then Managing Director of the National Safety Council, handed Mr. Knudsen a list of traffic accident prevention projects totaling some \$250,000 which Cameron suggested the vehicle manufacturers finance for the National Safety Council.

AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY PROGRAM LAUNCHED

Knudsen brought the Council's request to the Directors of the Automobile Manufacturers Association, who authorized a study to be made by its Safety-Traffic Committee, which was headed by Paul G. Hoffman.

As a result, in January 1936, the automotive and allied industries through the Automobile Manufacturers Association formally launched a program which totaled just under half a million dollars a year for traffic safety. Chairman Hoffman and the writer were charged with the execution of the program, together with representatives of the contributing industries.

Grants were awarded to the American Automobile Association, American Legion, General Federation of Women's Clubs, Highway Education Board, In-

ternational Association of Chiefs of Police, National Congress of Parents and Teachers, National Grange, and the National Safety Council for specific projects in education, enforcement, public support, and public administration.

CONGRESS ACTS

In June 1936, Congress, for the first time, directed the Bureau of Public Roads to undertake a study of the problems involved in street and highway safety. In conjunction with the Highway Research Board, the Bureau prepared and submitted six reports to Congress in 1938 on (1) Nonuniformity of State Motor-Vehicle Traffic Laws—to become, in 1955, the responsibility of the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances; (2) Skilled Investigation at the Scene of the Accident Needed to Develop Causes—initiated nineteen years later as a project by Northwestern University with joint financing by the United States Bureau of Public Roads, United States Public Health Service, and the Automotive Safety Foundation; (3) Inadequacy of State Motor-Vehicle Accident Reporting; (4) Official Inspection of Vehicles—still required in only thirteen states and the District of Columbia; (5) Case Histories of Fatal Highway Accidents; and (6) The Accident-Prone Driver.

TRAFFIC SAFETY FOUNDATIONS CREATED

In May 1936, a foundation was organized for a five-year period by the Commercial Investment Trust Company. Known as the CIT Safety Foundation, its purpose was to make an annual award to the individual contributing most to traffic safety and to sponsor seminars for newspaper representatives.

The Esso Safety Foundation, organized by the Esso Standard Oil Company, also came into being in 1936 for the purpose of supplementing community

safety activities in the Company's marketing area. Activities were suspended during and for some time after World War II, but they were reactivated in 1954 when John J. Hall became Director.

In November 1947, the American Automobile Association organized a Traffic Safety Foundation whose funds are dedicated to traffic safety research.

Following a year and a half of pioneering development, the Automotive Safety Foundation was chartered in June 1937 with Paul G. Hoffman as President and the writer as Director. The Trustees were drawn from top executives of leading companies in the motor vehicle, tire, automotive parts, and automobile finance industries. During its first five years, the Foundation was concerned exclusively with traffic safety activities.

In 1942, the program was reorganized to include "development on a sound financial and engineering basis of modern street and highway facilities. . . ." Under this broadened charter, the petroleum, asphalt, and Portland cement industries became identified with the program. Mr. Hoffman continued as Chairman, and Pyke Johnson became President.

The Foundation's program is now aimed at education and research for safe and efficient highway transportation. Its operations are financed by more than 600 companies and associations in the industries already named, plus others in the steel industry, advertising agencies and media, major banks, automobile and tire dealers, insurance companies, and school bus manufacturers.

BALANCED COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM DEVELOPED

The writer, in consultation with others, developed in 1937 the Standard Highway Safety Program for States. This plan consisted of two specific in-

gredients: a balanced program of official activities to be determined by the states and organized public support of the official program.

This program received the approval of twelve official and nonofficial organizations and was released for publication and joint promotion at the National Safety Congress in Kansas City. By 1939 it had the endorsement of fifty national agencies.

The Standard Program was converted into a Wartime Traffic Program in 1943. Emphasis was shifted to conservation of vehicles, lives, and property for the war effort.

Also in 1937, the American Automobile Association launched its Pedestrian Protection Program, which was destined to make a marked contribution over the twenty years following.

SAFETY EDUCATION CENTER INAUGURATED

Dr. A. W. Whitney, Director of the National Conservation Bureau, Association of Casualty and Surety Executives, was largely responsible for the creation of the Center for Safety Education at New York University and for its financing by his Association in August 1938, with Dr. Herbert J. Stack as Director.

Another development at that time was the formation of the National Committee for Traffic Training through which a score of national organizations exchanged information on the methods of training of traffic specialists and offered summer courses annually at different universities.

During World War II, the Committee geared its courses to wartime traffic needs and problems. Following the war, this program was discontinued as more and more universities adopted training programs of their own or established traffic safety centers. It was succeeded in 1956 by the Traffic Education and

Training Committee, under sponsorship of the National Safety Council's Traffic and Transportation Conference.

A notable example of the lag between program recommendations and action is demonstrated by motor fleet supervisor training. First recommended by the 1924 National Conference on Street and Highway Safety, it was not until 1945 that this started as a national program at Pennsylvania State University under the sponsorship of the National Committee for Motor Fleet Supervisor Training.

BENCH AND BAR JOIN IN COURT STUDY

Taking cognizance of the need to improve traffic law administration, Sidney J. Williams, Franklin M. Kreml, and the writer, in 1938, persuaded Arthur T. Vanderbilt who was then President of the American Bar Association to sponsor a study of traffic court practices. This was done by George W. Warren over a two-year period and with a grant from the Automotive Safety Foundation. His book, *Traffic Courts*, was published in 1940 and is recognized as the first authority for traffic court procedures. Subsequently, the American Bar Association assumed leadership in a broad program for traffic court improvement under the direction of James P. Economos.

In 1940, the American Association of School Administrators, with Dr. A. W. Whitney, Stephen James, and Amos Neyhart participating, added another chapter to the history of traffic safety. The Annual Yearbook of the Association set down the responsibilities of the schools in safety.

BUSINESS SPONSORSHIP OF SINGLE-PURPOSE TRAFFIC GROUPS

In 1941, a vigorous new type of citizen-support group emerged in Detroit—the Traffic Safety Association—and was dedicated to improving the safety and efficiency of automotive travel. Top

industrial and business leaders joined in providing financial support and policy direction for a co-operative traffic program with responsible public officials, and a well-qualified staff was employed to handle technical work and relationships. The pattern was repeated in Chicago in 1952.

Utilizing the same techniques, the California Traffic Safety Foundation was formed in 1956 by some forty-one business leaders of the state. The Foundation is dedicated to statewide citizen support of the California traffic safety program.

FIRST PRESIDENT'S HIGHWAY SAFETY CONFERENCE

In mid-1945, a move was initiated to seek the prestige and leadership of the President of the United States to meet the postwar traffic accident problem.

The idea originated with Paul G. Hoffman and Pyke Johnson, who were then Chairman and President respectively of the Automotive Safety Foundation, and with Henry LaCossitt, Editor in Chief of *Collier's*. Out of their meeting came an article by Pyke Johnson in *Collier's* on November 24, 1945 which pointed to the rise in traffic fatalities beginning with the end of gasoline rationing in August 1945. He called for White House leadership in developing a national traffic safety program in which all interested groups might participate.

This was later discussed at a meeting between General Philip B. Fleming, Administrator of the Federal Works Agency; Thomas H. MacDonald; Pyke Johnson; and R. R. Zimmerman of the White House staff.

As a result, Mr. Zimmerman directed a memorandum to the President recommending such a conference and enclosing a suggested draft of a call for the conference to General Fleming. This letter resulted in the organization of the

first President's Highway Safety Conference in May 1946.

General Fleming was named Conference Chairman; Thomas H. MacDonald, Chairman of the Coordinating Committee on Conference Reports; and Colonel Light B. Yost and Colonel Kirk A. Keegan, Director and Codirector respectively of the Conference.

Technical committees were named for Laws and Ordinances; Accident Records; Education; Enforcement; Engineering; Motor Vehicle Administration; Public Information; and Organized Public Support. Tentative reports were developed in advance of the Conference.

Some 2,000 public officials and citizen leaders from federal, state, and local government agencies; business leaders, heads of safety, civic, service, and other organizations; and other interested citizens attended the Conference upon invitation of the White House.

FIRST ACTION PROGRAM

Following an address by President Harry S. Truman, the Conference divided into groups according to their interests in Committee reports. These reports were welded into what is now known as the Action Program for Traffic Safety.

This stands as the master plan for a balanced and comprehensive traffic safety program, applicable in whole or in part by all governmental jurisdictions and by organizations of private citizens. It brings together the best of the time-tested methods for preventing traffic accidents.

The program consists of the following elements for official action at the appropriate level of government with corollary public information and citizen support.

Upon state legislatures, county supervisors, and city councils rests responsibility for provision of the proper legal basis for moving traffic with efficiency

and safety. They should adopt sound and workable traffic laws and regulations consistent and uniform from state to state and from city to city.

Related to this is a provision for the co-ordination of effort by responsible officials. Preferably, this should be accomplished by statute, although it is sometimes achieved by executive order. Delegation of authority and assignment of responsibility to official departments are essential to an effective traffic safety program. The task of public officials is to administer the elements of a balanced program and to acquaint the public with that program.

No official traffic safety program can be fully effective without an adequate accident-reporting and records system. Only with good accident facts, properly analyzed and intelligently used, can enforcement be properly directed, educational effort be effectively aimed, and traffic and highway engineering be scientifically applied.

Education for traffic safety is an essential part of the modern school's program for producing good citizens. All levels of education require attention: the elementary schools where children are taught to walk safely; the secondary schools where youths are taught the skills and attitudes of safe driving; and institutions of higher learning for education of needed traffic safety administrators and personnel. Related matters include school safety patrols and safe pupil transportation.

"Without a sheriff, there is no law" is an old English proverb. Traffic supervision through adequate and selective enforcement by trained state, county, and local police is essential for safe and efficient motor vehicle movement.

Equally important is the organization of a statewide, centrally directed system of well-conducted traffic courts, supplemented by the assistance of specially trained and qualified prosecutors.

Highway engineering for the design and maintenance of safe facilities; continued improvement in automotive design; and traffic engineering to encourage safe and efficient traffic movement are of direct value to the motoring public.

The importance of highway engineering is demonstrated by the fact that application of the design standards provided by the 1956 Federal Aid Act for the 41,000-mile Interstate Highway System can result in an estimated saving of three to four thousand lives per year.

Among the most important functions of state government are those bearing on the regulation and control of motor vehicle ownership and travel. These should be administered by an independent unit of state government, having equal status with other state departments.

Motor vehicle administrators are responsible for such matters as accident reporting; examination and licensing of drivers, including the power to suspend and revoke permits; periodic vehicle safety inspection; and financial responsibility.

Dissemination of highway safety facts is the joint responsibility of public officials, of the public information media, and of interested organizations. Co-ordination of national, state, and local public information activities is recommended to encourage citizens to accept personal responsibility for solution of the traffic safety problem and to support needed elements of the Action Program.

THE PLAN OF ACTION

One of the objectives of the Action Program was creation of a national support agency to serve as spokesman, clearing house, and co-ordinating group for all national organizations. Its purpose was to mobilize at the national level civic, service, business, fraternal, labor, farm, and similar men's, women's,

and youth organizations and to work closely with public officials in a supporting, advisory, and consulting capacity.

The National Safety Council's Committee on Post-War Traffic Safety Planning had voted itself out of existence and moved to create the National Committee for Traffic Safety. Since this group seemed to meet the recommendations of the 1946 Action Program, it was accepted by the President's Conference Coordinating Committee as the agency to fill this role, continuing until its replacement in 1954 by the President's Committee for Traffic Safety.

The plan for action also calls for the establishment of state, county, and municipal co-ordinating committees of officials; holding of city, county, and state highway safety conferences; organization of citizen support groups to back-stop needed official action; co-operation among private and official traffic safety groups, and other elements.

This 1946 Conference marked the beginning of a new interest in traffic safety among national, state, and local organizations of all kinds, the cumulative effect of which has been apparent ever since.

INVENTORIES GIVEN OFFICIAL STATUS

In 1947, the Committee on Reports of the President's Conference approved the use of three national inventories to measure annual progress in the application of the Action Program. These consist of the Annual Inventory of Traffic Safety Activities for states and cities administered by the National Safety Council, the Annual Pedestrian Protection Program sponsored by the American Automobile Association, and the High School Driver Education Award Program conducted by the Association of Casualty and Surety Companies.

In 1949, the Committee reports of the 1946 Conference were reviewed and sub-

mitted to a national Conference held in Washington, D. C. and attended by more than 4,000 officials and citizen leaders. Minor revisions in the Action Program were approved.

From 1947 through 1952, a series of small annual National President's Conferences was held, alternating between Washington, D. C. and Chicago, to review activities and to establish a pattern of continuing effort for the succeeding year.

1954 WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON HIGHWAY SAFETY

Early in 1953, Harlow H. Curtice, then President of General Motors Corporation, headed a delegation of leading businessmen which conferred with President Eisenhower and Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks. They recommended that the President issue a call for a White House Conference on Highway Safety, later scheduled for February 1954.

Secretary Weeks served as General Chairman of the Conference, and Admiral H. B. Miller, who was on loan from the petroleum industry, served as Director. J. William Bethea who was then Secretary of the National Committee for Traffic Safety became Staff Assistant.

The 1954 Conference produced two major developments: first, mobilization of organized segments of public opinion for more widespread and effective application of the Action Program; and second, appointment of the President's Action Committee for Traffic Safety—later changed to the President's Committee for Traffic Safety—with Mr. Curtice as Chairman, Light B. Yost of General Motors Corporation as Assistant to the Chairman, and J. W. Bethea as Executive Secretary.

The President's Committee now consists of representatives from labor, agriculture, business, community organiza-

tions, and information media; it also consists of public officials, women, and the Chairman of the Committee's Advisory Council.

Implementing the work of the President's Committee are advisory panels for several of the represented groups.

The President's Committee, in 1955, created an Advisory Council which was composed of the executive heads of thirty-seven national organizations and chaired by William Randolph Hearst, Jr. The Executive Committee of this group is headed by J. O. Mattson, President of the Automotive Safety Foundation.

Policy determinations are made by the President's Committee and implemented by the organizations represented on the Advisory Council. Through the Advisory Council and numerous other agencies, such as the Traffic and Transportation Conference of the National Safety Council, there has been steady progress toward increased correlation of traffic safety effort; there has also been progress in the organization of state and local support groups.

SHIFT TO REGIONAL CONFERENCE

In 1956, Regional Conferences were held at Atlantic City, Miami Beach, Chicago, and San Francisco under the sponsorship of the President's Committee. Public officials and citizens joined in reviewing progress and planning the organization of city and state public support groups.

In 1957, invitations were extended to federal, state, and local public officials, working through their twenty-eight national associations, to meet in a Public Officials Traffic Safety Conference in Washington, D. C. Their purpose was to develop immediate needs and long-range objectives within the Action Program as priorities for citizen support. The Conference was chaired by Gov-

ernor Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut who was then Chairman of the Governors' Conference Committee on Highway Safety.

CITIZEN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCES HELD IN 1958

To generate additional support for the Action Program priorities developed by the public officials, a second series of four Regional Citizen Leadership Conferences for Traffic Safety was sponsored by the President's Committee in 1958.

The program for these Conferences provided for the presentation of state traffic safety priorities related to the national priorities developed by the 1957 Conference of Officials. Citizen leaders in attendance were asked to determine methods of advancing the priorities in their states and communities.

CANADA AND UNITED STATES USE NATIONAL CONFERENCE TECHNIQUE

The First National Highway Safety Conference in Canada was sponsored in 1955 by the Canadian Good Roads Association with the co-operation of a number of other national organizations. The Association is financed one-third by the Dominion, one-third by the Provinces, and one-third by industry associations.

The pattern of organization and the objectives of this Conference—as well as those of its three successor annual meetings—have generally been adaptations of techniques developed in the United States and have been used to deal with the traffic safety needs of the Canadian Provinces and cities. The Action Programme of the 1955 Canadian Conference differs from the Action Program of the United States only in detail of implementation. The objectives of both plans are essentially the same.

CONTINUING FEDERAL LEADERSHIP AND CO-OPERATION

From the early twenties forward, the basic interest, aid, and co-operation of the federal government have been evident in the traffic safety movement. The federal role has been one of providing support and a national framework for correlation of effort, always recognizing that traffic safety is primarily the responsibility of the states and municipalities.

In the early years, the United States Office of Education, the Department of Agriculture, and the Bureau of Public Roads were key factors. Later, the Interstate Commerce Commission entered the field with the enactment of the Motor Carrier Act which prescribed safety regulations for motor carriers engaged in interstate traffic.

Beginning in 1950, the Congress appropriated \$75,000 annually through the Federal Aid Highway Act to implement the Action Program. In 1952, this was increased to \$150,000 a year.

The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 called for a comprehensive Highway Safety Study by the Bureau of Public Roads to be completed by March 1, 1959. This study is being directed by Charles W. Prisk of the Bureau staff.

The Special Subcommittee on Traffic Safety of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, with Congressman Kenneth A. Roberts of Alabama as Chairman, was created in 1956. This Subcommittee has devoted much attention to a continuing study of the problem, including hearings on the need for traffic safety research, particularly in the area of driver behavior.

TRAFFIC SAFETY RESEARCH—A CONTINUING NEED

From the time of the First National Conference in 1924 through the 1958 Regional Traffic Safety Conferences,

continuing emphasis has been placed upon the need for more traffic accident research and for overcoming the lag in applying research findings.

In 1948, a Research Committee of the President's Highway Safety Conference, headed by Sidney J. Williams, submitted a priority list of needed research.

In 1950, the Bureau of Public Roads employed Theodore W. Forbes as a research specialist on the staff of the Highway Research Board for three years. Under his direction the First and Second Highway Safety Research Correlation Conferences were held in 1952 and 1954.

In 1955, the Bureau of Public Roads initiated a pioneering study of the Economic Costs of Motor Vehicle Accidents in Massachusetts—now being extended to New Mexico, Utah, and Wisconsin—which was directed by Robie W. Dunman.

Adapting techniques which had led to improvements in airplane design through studies of air crash injuries, Hugh de Haven of the Cornell University Medical College launched, in 1951, a motor vehicle crash injury research program with funds from the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board. Supplemental funds were provided later by the United States Public Health Service and, in 1955, by the Ford Motor Company and Chrysler Corporation. Upon Mr. de Haven's retirement in 1953, John O. Moore became Director. Findings have been useful as guides to automotive engineers in improving safety design features.

A Subcommittee on Research was created by the Advisory Council to the President's Committee in September 1955, with Merwyn Kraft of the Flight Safety Foundation as its Chairman. In co-operation with this group, in 1956, the National Safety Council established a Research Division to serve as a clearinghouse for traffic safety research.

Beginning in July 1956, an accident

prevention program was instituted by the Public Health Service as an extension of a home safety program which had been in existence for the prior eight years. A significant part of its research effort is directed toward control of traffic accident problems from an epidemiological viewpoint.

Early in 1958, a Conference on Traffic Behavior Research was sponsored by the President's Committee for Traffic Safety. Funds and staff assistance were provided by the Bureau of Public Roads, the United States Public Health Service, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and the Automotive Safety Foundation.

This cursory highlight summary cannot begin to describe the many research projects now under way except in the most general terms. Other research of promise is going forward constantly in the technical laboratories and on the proving grounds of the automotive industry and its related components; in the universities and colleges; among state and local public officials; in traffic safety organizations, public and private alike; and among individuals.

A LOOK AT THE RECORD

"What's past is prologue," wrote Shakespeare.

Nowhere does this seem truer than with the Action Program for Traffic Safety which stands as an orderly summary of the best in traffic accident prevention methods, techniques, facts, thoughts, and philosophy which evolved and proved effective during the first half century of automotive transportation.

The Action Program is dynamic, not static. It is a plan, not a Bible, and it is subject to all the change which new concepts may bring in the future.

It is an important and timely chapter in the history of the traffic safety movement, providing as it does a charter for citizenship action to which all may subscribe.

Inventory and Appraisal

By GEORGE C. STEWART

ABSTRACT: The Annual Inventory of Traffic Safety Activities, a nationwide program administered by the National Safety Council with the co-operation of several national professional organizations, provides an accurate measurement of progress in putting the features of the Action Program into effect in cities and states. Recommended standards and criteria against which these voluntarily reported programs are measured are raised as traffic safety activities in cities and states improve. In 1957, the average performance of states met 67 per cent of the currently recommended minimum. The average for cities over 10,000 population was 53 per cent of minimum recommendations. The Traffic Inventory grew out of the National Traffic Safety Contest and was approved by the President's Highway Safety Conference in 1947. While only 600 cities reported the first year, more than 1,200 now report; forty-seven states and Puerto Rico also report. Each of these cities and states receives a detailed written analysis containing recommendations for improvement. Inventory results are presented to local officials and at a public meeting by trained field representatives. Among other functions, the inventory provides a program guide for officials and citizens in cities and states and serves to keep attention focused on the features of the Action Program.

George C. Stewart, Major General, USA (Ret.), Chicago, Illinois, is Executive Vice President of the National Safety Council and member of the Advisory Council of the President's Committee for Traffic Safety. He has served as Commanding General of Fort Eustis; Commandant of the Transportation School; Division Commander of the 10th Infantry Division; and Director of the Office of Military Assistance in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. General Stewart has been decorated with the Distinguished Service Medal, Bronze Star, Silver Star Medal, Legion of Merit, Honorable Commander of the British Empire, French Legion of Honor, Croix de Guerre with palm, and the Order of the Italian Crown.

AFTER the development of the Action Program by the President's Highway Safety Conference in 1946, it became apparent that some instrument was needed to measure the progress of cities and states in putting the many features of the program into effect. But how was this to be done? Fortunately, a partly developed instrument was already at hand in the form of the old National Traffic Safety Contest. Begun in 1932 by the National Safety Council, the contest could be credited with providing a major stimulus to traffic-accident prevention work. This was apparent from the outset. In its first year of operation, there were 442 entrants, and there was a 27 per cent reduction in traffic deaths among the winning cities in that year and a 16 per cent drop in all entering cities. This compared to a 9 per cent nationwide reduction.

As stated by the late Sidney J. Williams, Director of the Public Safety Division of the National Safety Council, the contest had two main purposes:

1. It will serve as the keynote for a continuous educational campaign for personal carefulness to bring down the accident rate.
2. It provides in the several items of the grading schedule, a platform of recognized remedies that should be adopted in every community.

A city could not win an award on mere luck. Winners were selected not only on the basis of reduction or absence of traffic deaths, but also on the soundness of their programs for preventing them. Evaluated activities were: maintenance of accident records, traffic engineering, traffic law enforcement, and safety education. To win, a city had to have a sound program based on proven techniques, and that program had to be effective, as shown by its traffic death record.

As venerable and effective as the contest was, its scope and concept were too

narrow and inadequate to fit post-World War II traffic problems. However, the major features included in the Action Program and those activities measured by the contest—both based on long known facts and techniques—were in general agreement. It was not necessary, therefore, to create a new measuring stick or to make revolutionary changes. All that was necessary was to expand the old contest so that the competitive aspect was de-emphasized and the evaluation of city and state traffic safety programs was emphasized.

Several national professional organizations and many individuals widely experienced in traffic work on the state and local level were called upon to develop expanded report forms and evaluation methods and to act as continuing advisory groups. The National Safety Council became the administrative and co-ordinating organization. The Automotive Safety Foundation made a grant to finance the program, thus allowing the service to be provided without cost to cities and states. The term "inventory" had already crept into the language of the contest, and in order to de-emphasize the competitive features of the program, the title was changed to the Annual Inventory of Traffic Safety Activities. In announcing the development of the inventory at the second President's Conference in December, 1947, General Philip B. Fleming, then Federal Works Administrator and General Chairman of the Conference, said:

I am in full accord with the opinion of the Conference that the nation and its various governmental units need to take stock at least once a year. This scorecard will enable the nation and every state and city to know where we stand, and what we must do to cut traffic accidents to the irreducible minimum.

With the approval and participation also of several national professional organizations and a conference of local safety

council managers, the Traffic Inventory was launched in 1948 to cover 1947 activities. Just over 600 cities reported that year. More than double that number report now.

MECHANICS OF OPERATION

The inventory is divided into sections on the basis of the areas of activity included in the Action Program. Each is under the continuing guidance of an advisory group. These sections and their advisory groups are:

For Death and Injury Record—the Committee on Uniform Traffic Accident Statistics.

For Accident Records—same as above.

For Traffic Ordinances—the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances.

For Traffic Engineering—the Institute of Traffic Engineers.

For Police Traffic Supervision—the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

For Traffic Courts—the American Bar Association. (This section is entirely evaluated and analyzed by the ABA under its Traffic Courts Program.)

For School Traffic Safety Education—a committee of specialists in school safety education.

For Public Traffic Safety Education—a committee of specialists in public safety education.

For Organization for Traffic Safety Improvement—a committee from state and local official and citizen organizations.

For Driver Licensing (states only)—the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators.

For Periodic Motor Vehicle Inspection (states only)—the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators.

The chairmen of the various advisory groups form the Inventory Advisory Committee which exercises over-all pol-

icy guidance and co-ordinates the work of the groups. Executive secretaries of the groups are all staff members responsible for the administration of the inventory. Harry Porter, Jr., Director of the administrative staff, also acts as Executive Secretary of the National Safety Council's Traffic and Transportation Conference, the parent body of the Inventory Advisory Committee. This somewhat complex system of guidance and administration provides for excellent co-ordination among the groups and between the groups and staff.

The advisory groups meet periodically to design or revise report forms on the basis of the programs called for in the Action Program and upon their own knowledge and experience. The questions are varied and detailed—there are currently about 700 for cities—but they may be categorized into three major types: those that seek to find out what organization, facilities, equipment, authority, personnel, and budget to do the job the city or state possesses; those that test whether they use approved policies and procedures; and those that measure the volume of activity carried on. The advisory groups also determine evaluation measures which the administrative staff uses in analyzing reported information.

Most of the criteria for items concerning organization, facilities, authority, and policies and procedures are determined on a permanent or semipermanent basis by the advisory groups, some of them being taken from standards included in the *Uniform Vehicle Code*, the *Model Traffic Ordinance*, and other generally accepted guides for traffic work. Most of the criteria for volume of activity or for items for which there are no current standards are based on a 70th percentile measure. In other words, criteria for a particular item are established at the level met or exceeded by 30 per cent of the reporting states or

cities of similar size. Thus the inventory is in part a mutual assistance program in which cities help themselves by helping each other through mutual pooling of information. These criteria are raised as programs in cities and states improve.

Standards and criteria for cities vary, of course, according to size. Cities are divided into ten population groups. Large cities are expected to have many facilities not needed in small cities and are expected to carry on a volume of activity commensurate with population size.

With this method of evaluation, a perfect "score" for a particular section means only that the city or state met or exceeded the performance of 30 per cent of cities of like size reporting. It does not mean that there is no further room for improvement.

Because criteria are raised from time to time, it is difficult to use inventory evaluation as a mathematical measure of year-to-year progress in putting the Action Program into effect on a nationwide basis. Average performance for cities of over 10,000 population in 1957 was 53 per cent of the currently recommended minimum program; it was 67 per cent for states. These averages do not vary widely from year to year, although much progress in traffic safety has been made, as shown by the fact that average performance of cities has gone up 25 per cent since 1950, even with rising criteria. Measurement of year-to-year progress in a particular city or state is much more exact. Evaluation "scores" for some cities have risen rapidly in recent years. These individual scores provide an accurate measure of what is being done.

Since completion of a year's inventory report involves several governmental departments and citizen organizations, a co-ordinator is appointed for each participating city and state. The co-ordi-

nator distributes the report forms to the departments and groups concerned and returns them to the National Safety Council after completion. The administrative staff evaluates each section of each report in detail. A written analysis is then prepared for each participating city and state. Program deficiencies are pointed out, and recommendations are made for improvement.

The written analysis reports are sent to the National Safety Council field representatives, or in the case of many small cities, to the field staffs of co-operating state organizations. A representative then reviews the analysis, arranges for presenting it in the city or state, discusses each section in detail with concerned officials, and then arranges for a public presentation of the results. Follow-up assistance on carrying out the recommendations is provided by the National Safety Council, other national organizations, and state governments. Cities and states having outstanding traffic safety programs are recognized through the award programs of the National Safety Council, the American Bar Association, the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the Institute of Traffic Engineers. Some states give cities awards on the basis of their performance reported in the Traffic Inventory.

INVENTORY FUNCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

As originally conceived, the inventory was established for the primary purpose of measuring progress in applying the Action Program at the state and local levels. In addition to this, it does several other things, the order of importance of which is difficult to determine.

By simply consulting the tables in the written analysis which list the items that go into a specific program—maintenance

of accident records, for example—and consulting the criteria for each item, a city or state has a good blueprint showing the things it should have and should be doing to carry out an adequate program.

The analysis as a whole enables the application of the collective knowledge and experience of a large number of professional organizations and persons to a city's or state's traffic problems. Annual reporting keeps attention on the objectives and features of the Action Program.

The inventory stimulates communication. It frequently happens that the analysis presentation provides the only opportunity for a meeting between officials having traffic responsibilities and leading citizens. Thus common problems can be discussed, and co-ordination of effort can be enhanced. Further, the presentation affords an opportunity for annual contact with national organizations in safety work through their field representatives. It has become a cliché in traffic work that officials can go only as far as they will be supported by the public. The public analysis presentation often provides citizens with a fresh view of official problems and leads to greater support through appropriation of funds and better citizen safety organization. On the other hand, the fault for poor performance will occasionally lie with the officials. The analysis presentation can then generate citizen pressure for improvement.

Through its award programs, the inventory allows recognition to be extended to cities and states having outstanding programs.

The data collected through inventory reports provides a continuously growing body of accident prevention data that will eventually form the basis for important research into the relationship between specific traffic safety program features and accident experience. A

pilot study of this type has been begun on the basis of 1956 reports.

It should not be concluded from the foregoing discussion that the inventory is a perfect instrument for carrying out the objectives set forth. For a program of its magnitude, it is still new and in a state of flux and development. The advisory groups are still developing and changing report forms on the basis of new developments and new experience. This occasionally leads to some confusion on the part of the participating cities and states. It sometimes happens that questions in the report forms are misinterpreted, and this leads to erroneous reporting. Unfortunately, some cities and states still regard the inventory as a contest and report information that does not stand up under cross checking. Because of limitations of funds, the staff is unable to do the type of detailed and thoughtful job in analyzing each city's and state's report that should be done. These are all faults that are gradually being overcome.

There are, however, some inherent limitations in the concept of the inventory itself. It was never intended to provide a complete survey of a city's or state's traffic problems. It can only provide a guide. Inventory recommendations do, however, frequently lead to detailed field surveys of problems by professional organizations. Inventory criteria must necessarily be generalized. They may not always apply to a city's or state's peculiar situation. In evaluating activity, the inventory is primarily limited to measurement of quantity. Evaluation of quality is presently very limited. It is probable that there is small room for improvement in this respect.


SPECIFIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The inventory is still too new for a strictly scientific evaluation of its overall accomplishments to be made. Some


Chart I.

STATUS OF STATE AND CITY TRAFFIC SAFETY PROGRAMS BASED ON TRAFFIC INVENTORY REPORTS FOR 1957

AVERAGE PERFORMANCE OF 47 STATES



AVERAGE PERFORMANCE^{a/} OF 902 CITIES OF OVER 10,000 POPULATION^{b/}



^{a/} Traffic Ordinance status not presently computed.

^{b/} Cities of 5,000-10,000 population not included.

The above chart shows the average performance of cities and states for 1957 in each area of activity measured. The currently recommended minimum program is represented by 100.

small studies have been made showing a very definite relationship between inventory evaluation and accident experience. The more comprehensive pilot study mentioned previously should provide more reliable evidence of the effect of specific features of the Action Program and of the accuracy of measurement by the inventory.

Despite the present lack of a strictly scientific evaluation of the merit of the inventory, there is much diverse empirical evidence that it is accomplishing its objectives. The staff receives frequent communications from state and city officials testifying to how it has helped guide and improve traffic safety efforts in particular jurisdictions. One city safety council manager summed up its value by asserting that, "when we started using the inventory, deaths went down and stayed down." There are innumerable cases in which inventory recommendations have prompted such important improvements as employment of more policemen, hiring of a full-time traffic engineer, establishment of a local safety council, adoption of driver education in high schools, creation of accident records units using standard procedures, and institution of a driver improvement school under jurisdiction of the court. All of these things, and many more, are basic to reducing the toll in life, health,

and property taken by the motor vehicle.

There is wide agreement among experienced persons in the field of traffic safety that if the techniques now known and tested were fully applied, traffic accidents could be cut in half—some even say by two-thirds. Despite its limitations, the inventory serves to keep these objectives constantly before those responsible—both official and citizen—for their fulfillment. It provides a continuing guide and exerts a constant pressure for getting our knowledge applied.

Furthermore, it is encouraging for the entire traffic safety movement and for our democratic way of life when the officials and citizens of more than 1,200 cities (including some Canadian), 47 states, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico will spend the great amount of effort required to keep detailed records and fill out the complex reports so that their activities can be exposed to impartial and impersonal critical evaluation that must sometimes seem harsh and cold-blooded. And they do this year after year without any pressure or compulsion from government. This indicates the high quality of leadership in the traffic safety movement at the state and local levels and shows that the Traffic Inventory fills the real need for a program guide to assist these dedicated people.

The Law Must Hurry to Catch Up

By LOUIS R. MORONY

ABSTRACT: Following World War II the need for highway improvement came into such prominence that it could not be ignored. Today, under the expanded federal-aid program, we are building the highways we need for years to come. The danger here lies in trying to superimpose new and ultramodern facilities on what is hardly more than a "horse-and-buggy" governmental structure for regulation and control of highway use. It is important that states now turn their attention to the operational problems posed by these new facilities—and especially those which are certain to be created by the increased traffic demands of the future. A first approach to this is modernization of the laws on which are based all state functions bearing on motor vehicle ownership and use. Only by long-range factual study of functions involved can we hope to provide sound foundations and guidance for legislative action. A movement to evaluate state highway laws in light of the new huge construction program has been underway for some time, and already is proving its value. So far, only one state has directed comparable attention to laws regulating and controlling motor vehicle and highway use. This pioneering study effort is underway now in Minnesota. Other states are beginning to move in that direction, to the end that use of new roads and streets might be safer and more efficient.

Louis R. Morony, Washington, D. C., is Director of the Laws Division of the Automotive Safety Foundation. He serves as Chairman of the Highway Laws Study Committee of the Highway Research Board and is a member of the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances. He was formerly Assistant Attorney General and Motor Vehicle Director of the state of Michigan.

AS SOON as the "cease fire" order was given to halt the hostilities of World War II, and the nation began to return from the demands of war to domestic issues, the need for highway improvement came into such prominence that it could not be ignored.

Everyone recognized that need, and the demand for modernizing the highway network—neglected during the war—became universal. States stepped up their roads programs, but the unprecedented postwar increases in numbers and use of motor vehicles kept ahead of the best the states could do with the resources they could bring to bear.

Now, under the stimulus of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, augmented by the Act of 1958, the nation is embarked on the greatest road-building program in its history. This gigantic thirteen-year program, in which many billions of dollars will be spent, is expected to give us the roads we need for years to come.

We are getting ready to superimpose a fine new highway system, incorporating many miles of new high-capacity facilities, on what amounts to a "horse-and-buggy" governmental structure for regulating and controlling the use of these ultramodern facilities. This could not possibly make sense to anyone.

We cannot afford to pour billions of dollars into road construction and ignore the problems relating to safety and efficiency of highway use.

As in the field of construction and maintenance, legal responsibility for the safe and efficient use of highway and street facilities rests in the constituted authorities of state and local government. Thus, it is an official responsibility assigned to government by the people; and these people expect their legislative representatives and their elected and appointed officials to work constantly and effectively in the public interest.

Laws provide the base for every governmental activity or function bearing on the provision and management of an adequate highway plant and on the regulation and control of motor vehicle ownership and use. If government is to perform effectively in those fields, laws must be soundly conceived and must be adequate from the standpoint of legal authority, assignment of responsibility, and provision of budget. They must put the proper tools in the hands of the administrators responsible for carrying out the intent and purposes of the laws. And quite importantly, laws must be flexible so that they can readily keep pace at all times with fast-moving developments in the highway transportation field.

Generally speaking, laws in this field are obsolete; they lack a desirable degree of uniformity; and they seriously handicap the engineer, enforcement official, and motor vehicle administrator. Much of transportation law is an intricate mass of live and dead provisions, so intermixed that often the statutes serve to confuse and hamper instead of facilitating the job governmental agencies are expected to do.

STUDY OF HIGHWAY LAWS

Recognition of this fact has been gaining over the last few years, at least in the area of highway laws, and has now come strikingly to the fore under the pressure of the new and expanded federal-aid program which has forced acceleration of the road-building processes in every state.

Legal problems which many times had been considered a nuisance have now assumed the proportions of major legal barriers to proper implementation of the highway improvement program. This is true not only in projecting long-range plans and projects but also in attempts to reorganize for more efficient routine operation.

Several years ago, North Dakota became the first state to attempt an evaluation of all its highway laws in terms of over-all effectiveness as a legal instrument under which officials at all levels of jurisdiction were to carry out an integrated program to meet present and future highway needs. The legal study was made concurrent with engineering and fiscal studies.

Ambiguities and serious deficiencies were found to exist in the statutes with respect to such major issues as system classification, land acquisition, control of access, joint financing, and intergovernmental relations in general. The result of this comprehensive legal study was complete modernization of North Dakota's highway laws. Since then other states have moved forward on that front.

The study work and subsequent legislative action in North Dakota had been under observation by the Highway Research Board of the National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, headquartered in Washington, D. C. With the feasibility and benefits of such a study so dramatically demonstrated, the Highway Research Board created a Committee on Highway Laws to undertake a national study to assist the states in the modernization of their statutes.

This study has gained momentum and stature and has already proved of substantial value to the states. The study work continues toward determination of essential elements of highway law—toward development of yardsticks the states can use in evaluating the soundness and effectiveness of their own statutes.

There is every reason to believe that these developments will help bring all our highway statutes up to the standards needed for the big highway improvement job just getting under way.

LEGAL PATCHWORK

It is unfortunate that we have not yet assigned the same degree of urgency to the need for a modernization of laws intended to assure the safe and efficient use of our roads and streets. Many provisions in law are obsolescent and must be revised so that the law once again can be effective as a useful legal tool.

As has been true in highway law, statutes dealing with motor vehicle matters—setting out as they do provisions for the regulation and control of motor vehicle ownership and use—are a patchwork of legal language enacted as expediency has demanded.

Over the last fifty years our lawmakers have been striving to deal with problems brought about by the growing use of the motor vehicle—but with only partial success. Each year, on an ever-increasing scale, thousands of proposed laws are considered—laws which are enacted, repealed, re-enacted and amended in an effort to keep pace.

Today, we have motor vehicle codes bulging with legal provisions. In every state we have plenty of laws which basically provide the essentials of proper and effective regulation and control for safe and efficient use of highway and motor vehicles.

It is fair to say, however, that these codes, put together piecemeal, have been far removed from a planned pattern of development based on demonstrable needs and comparable to procedures used in the field of highway development. In spite of the evident need for the same approach in ascertaining our present and future needs in the operational phases of highway transportation, we have been resorting too often to half measures and expedients.

Many laws have been passed without regard to their real objectives. As a

result, there is all too often failure to properly recognize the need for an effective program of administration to assure that the law will be put to work for the fullest possible benefit to the public.

For example, the law requiring that accident reports be filed with state authorities recognizes that certain definite obligations must be imposed as a protection to persons who may sustain injury or property damage, as well as in the interests of the general public welfare and safety.

A basic consideration underlying the law is that only through accident records which have been properly collected, analyzed, and used can essential facts be developed on which to base effective and realistic accident-prevention measures.

Without complete understanding in the legislature of what the law should accomplish, the budget provided for its implementation is quite likely to be somewhat short of that required to realize the full potential of benefit. Therefore, the administrator may be hampered in the acquisition of trained manpower, equipment, and facilities necessary to put the law to work to its fullest possible extent. Consequently, the collection and analysis of accident reports and the flow of information in usable form to state agencies concerned suffer to the detriment of the over-all accident-prevention program.

Over the years, legislatures have considered and acted upon an assortment of proposals which fall into one or more of the following categories:

Bills based on sound national recommendations but so compromised or emasculated that the objectivity of the law is lost completely. In part, the basis of such action is probably the assumption that the public, conditioned to certain past policies and practices, will

accept only so much additional regulation.

This may be a very persuasive theory, especially among legislators who always are sensitive to public feeling; however it presupposes lack of public acceptance when, in fact, the basic problem may be lack of understanding on the part of the public of the desired objectives—and perhaps on the part of the legislator as well. Little effort has been made to educate either on the necessity for far-reaching remedies.

The result has been legislative and public apathy and resistance to those measures which experience has shown will produce results. Sound legislative action and effective administrative procedures which could stem from such law consequently fall by the wayside. In their place, laws are passed which do not contain the features intended to accomplish desired objectives.

Such laws merely add more law to already overcrowded statutes and contribute little or nothing to our efforts toward safety and efficiency in highway transportation. They waste time and funds, divert administrative attention from activities of a more essential character, and are often a very real nuisance to the public.

Here is an opportunity for the public official, with technical knowledge and experience in putting laws to work on a practical basis, to advise the legislator as to merits and shortcomings of legislative proposals.

DEPARTMENT REQUESTS

In another category are the recommendations of the state agencies seeking additional budget for more manpower, equipment, and facilities. While oftentimes fully justified in the light of the job to be done, these requests are seldom documented as part of a well-defined over-all plan based on a factual

survey of need. The legislature is inclined to view with suspicion those requests which depart in any radical degree from authorizations and budgets of the past. Therefore, remaining unconvinced that the department head really needs all he is asking, the legislature considers the whole thing as sort of a horse-trading venture and feels justified in modifying the request or rejecting it entirely.

Meanwhile, the problem with which the agency must deal continues to grow and is likely to get out of hand to the point where it may seriously jeopardize the efficiency of the function.

In other cases, we have legislation influenced by selfish interest groups seeking special advantage or trying to avert restrictions; there are also well-meaning organizations or prominent citizens who are champions of one cause or another—with each proposal presented as a panacea—and who may overemphasize the importance of one phase of an over-all problem to the detriment of a well-balanced approach.

Is it any wonder, then, that the legislator, beset on all sides by pressures for this measure and that, is hard pressed to know which is good and which is bad when he has little factual information to guide him. The individual legislator cannot be expected to be an authority in every field of state government, nor can he be expected to exercise precise and expert judgment on every question which comes before him for decision. It follows, then, that often he must decide on the basis of what seems expedient at the time.

Law, by its very nature, is designed to be a stable instrument. Well conceived and reflecting the needs of the times, there should be little cause for constant change in its basic principles. Certainly, the problems with which it deals do not change radically from one year to the next. Yet we find that many of our

motor vehicle statutes are tampered with continually—to the confusion and harassment of the public official and public alike. That would not be true if everyone understood thoroughly the basic problems and the basic principles of law which are needed to cope with them successfully.

UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE

In the evolution of laws in the field of motor vehicle ownership and use, one development stands above all others in its influence on legislation. The Uniform Vehicle Code, which came into being as an outgrowth of the first national highway safety conference ever held in this country, has served as a practical guide to the states for thirty years.

Up to the time of that first national conference, called in 1924 by Herbert Hoover who was then Secretary of Commerce, there had been no common or uniform approach among the states with respect to traffic control matters. Since this involved the vehicle and the manner of its use on the highway, a high degree of uniformity in the controlling laws throughout the nation was considered not only desirable but necessary. That concept is even more valid today than it was in 1924 when traffic demand and the problems of traffic control were not nearly so great as they have become since.

When the Uniform Code was drawn up, it incorporated the basic regulations considered necessary at that time for an effective program of administration and enforcement. It represented a cross section of traffic law experience and requirements.

A short time later, a Model Traffic Ordinance, supplementing the requirements of the Uniform Code, was developed as a pattern for municipal traffic ordinances.

A number of changes have been made

in both documents in an effort to keep pace with developing problems. While most of the states and many cities have accepted these standards as a guide, there has been general failure to keep abreast at all times of the latest revisions proposed.

Motor vehicle statutes today are comprehensive in scope. They incorporate many of the recommended provisions of the Uniform Code so that in legal language and intent, at least, the states have achieved a degree of uniformity in their laws.

While uniformity, *per se*, is desirable and necessary if we are to wipe out the confusion and danger of conflicting laws and regulations between the states, it is equally important that the laws and what is needed to put the laws to work effectively be thoroughly understood before they are adopted.

Laws must be objective. Adoption of Uniform Code provisions just because they are in the Code is not being objective. A case should be made for any legislative changes, and action should be taken only after full evaluation of need and possible impact on the people of the state.

SHORTSIGHTED APPROACH

Despite all the experience of the past, we still approach legislation on a short-term, stopgap basis, never quite catching up with growth of our highway transportation problems.

Our legislators, even today, are too often forced to cope with outside and oftentimes selfish pressures without the benefit of complete and well-organized information to guide them. Our state agencies which are charged with responsibility for the regulation and control of motor vehicle use have still not attained the stature in state government commensurate with the importance of the job they have to do. They are still

working under the handicap of inadequate authority, insufficient budgets, and shortage of trained manpower.

The shortsighted approach to legislation and to the administration of law in the field of motor vehicle regulation and control can no longer serve us. The day is past when we can rely on half measures to cope with problems of highway use. We cannot afford to continue in the same old way in that field any more than we can in other major areas of public welfare, as, for example, medicine.

What we have so far accomplished in the evolution of laws only sets the stage for what has to be done to meet the needs of the future. The states must begin now to adopt the same long-range orderly approach to problems of motor vehicle ownership and use as has been applied to the highway improvement program. Failure to plan ahead in the face of much greater traffic volumes which new and better highway facilities are expected to generate not only would be shortsighted but would endanger hard-won gains in accident prevention and in over-all efficiency of our highway transportation system.

LAW IN MOTION

The first approach is to the legal base on which all functions in that field are built. Laws must be kept adequate over the years ahead. But, in considering the adequacy of the law, we cannot find the full answer in the statute books. We must look to the law in motion as a function of government to determine what additional legislative or administrative tools must be brought to bear on the activity—authority, budget, higher standards, trained manpower, equipment, facilities—to do the job better now and to prepare for the future, so far as requirements can be foreseen.

The late Thomas H. MacDonald, former Chief of the Bureau of Public

Roads, must have had this in mind when he said some years ago:

If we are to gain mastery over highway transport as an efficient tool for national progress, and stop the toll that we are paying for its use in the tragic loss of life, the permanent injuries, and the financial cost of accidents that no nation, however wealthy, can afford, we must critically re-examine our policies and practices—particularly the thinking back of these, to find the causes that are responsible for our failures. We know we have taken many wrong turnings. Changing conditions require new horizons in our applied techniques as knowledge is unfolded and experience is more precisely interpreted. It is profitless to speculate upon what we might have done had we foreseen in the early years a reasonable fraction of the dimensions to which highway transport was so rapidly to grow, or had we anticipated more realistically its characteristics in actual operation.¹

It is time to take a searching look at each function of state government bearing on motor vehicle ownership and use; to take the function apart, piece by piece; to subject it to critical analysis in order to determine how effective it has been in the past, what its degree of adequacy is in dealing with current problems, and what it will need in the way of legislation to prepare and equip it for the bigger job ahead.

Full knowledge and understanding of every state function is necessary for an intelligent and sound approach to the problems of safe and efficient motor vehicle use. Such an approach, bolstered by all available factual data, is a service to the legislators who wish to deal with problems on this basis but have seldom had full advantage of such guidance. It should be of direct benefit to the administrator, for it will make it possible for him to present a case for needed im-

provements. It should assure better services and protection for the public.

FUNCTIONS OF STATE

State functions which should be given the benefit of co-ordinated long-range factual study, with the provision of an adequate legal base in terms of authority and budget as a primary objective, include: accident records, courts, driver education, driver licensing, financial responsibility, public information, vehicle registration and title, state police or highway patrol, and highway operations, the latter being concerned with all engineering matters affecting the safety and efficiency of vehicle operations on the highway, except for construction and maintenance.

A study program, such as is proposed here, should be confined to consideration of each function purely as a function and should not be concerned necessarily with where that function has been placed in state government. The primary objective must be determination of basic deficiencies that the legislature can correct. The public's first interest is that the job be done effectively.

The state of Minnesota is pioneering this type of study. The work there has been going on for more than a year. At this writing, the Study Committee and study staff are preparing specific recommendations for legislative action to meet immediate and high-priority needs in each of the several functional areas under study. These recommendations, which Governor Orville L. Freeman is expected to include in his legislative program, will be put before the 1959 session of the Legislature as the first phase of a long-range program of improvement. Future needs will be developed as the study progresses, and a legislative timetable will be prepared as a guide to subsequent sessions of the Legislature.

In Minnesota, those involved have come to the realization that a study of this kind has no real end. There must be a periodic review of the long-range program in the light of changing conditions. Projection into the future must be pushed ahead as time passes so that the improvement program always points to the job which will have to be done.

A number of other states have evidenced interest. Executive and administrative officials, legislators, members of legislative councils and research bureaus, professional organizations, and citizen leaders to whom the story of this long-range factual approach has been told have considered it sound and logical. The American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, for example, has officially endorsed the study program and is encouraging its members to stimulate interest in their home states.

There is every reason to believe that

the philosophy of the long-range approach will continue to gain acceptance among the states and that soon many states will follow the lead of Minnesota.

Factual study is, of course, no stranger to interim legislative committees—a thing which the states have had for many years—nor to a Legislative Council, which is a more recent development in many of the states. The long-range study offers them an opportunity for much broader and more realistic service to their respective legislatures and, in the end, to their people.

The public is entitled to all the services which laws can provide. Long-range action on the basis of thorough factual study is the new keynote. The law must hurry to catch up with the times and to keep pace through the years to come. The end result should be safer and more efficient use of our highways and streets.

¹ Thomas H. MacDonald, *Driver Behavior: Key to Safe Highway Design*. (New York: Society of Automotive Engineers, David Beecroft Memorial Lectures, No. 2, 1948), p. 2.

Police, Prosecutors, and Judges

By FRANKLIN M. KREML

ABSTRACT: The purpose of traffic law enforcement—as with law enforcement generally—is to offset selfish motivation and condition community habits through conditioning the habits of individuals. In order to meet the problems of traffic congestion and traffic accidents, effective enforcement is necessary. Essential here is an adequately manned, well-trained, and properly administered police force. Some of the more fundamental problems of the police service involve organization, administration, training, and recruitment. Reforms here will provide the nation with a professional police service of the first order—a service which will take the problems of law enforcement, including traffic law, in its stride. But since citations and arrests are unproductive unless followed by appropriate court action, well-trained judges and prosecutors in permanent traffic courts are also essential. Certain important changes are needed in laws, court organization, and procedure. And a co-ordinated effort by engineers, police, driver-licensing personnel, educators, and city planners is necessary, not only to have effective traffic law enforcement for reducing accidents, improving street efficiency, and contributing to the general social and economic welfare, but also to develop a system which will play a vital part in winning and maintaining the individual citizen's respect for the law.

Franklin M. Kreml, Evanston, Illinois, is Director of the Transportation Center at Northwestern University. A founder, in 1936, of the Traffic Institute, Northwestern University and Traffic Division of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, he directed these organizations until he assumed his present position in 1955. He has been Chairman of the Traffic and Transportation Conference and Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors of the National Safety Council. He was Secretary of the Committee on Enforcement of the President's Highway Safety Conference and helped to organize the White House Conference on Highway Safety. He was General Clark's Transportation Officer in World War II and is now Brigadier General, United States Army Reserve.

LAW provides the basis on which civilized people live together in peace and happiness. It restrains those persons and prevents those acts which threaten or attack that peace and happiness; and it does this as much by example as by direct action against violators. Thus the possibility of apprehension is frequently as great a deterrent to the potential offender as actual public punishment.

The law, however, is ineffective without enforcement; this enforcement must be courageous, just, and impartial; it must be carried out by incorruptible and fearless men; it must have the understanding and support of the people it protects.

TRAFFIC LAW ENFORCEMENT

Traffic law enforcement, though specialized, has the same purpose as general law enforcement: to offset selfish motivation and to condition community habits through conditioning the habits of individuals. It can, when adequate to the problem in both quality and quantity, produce substantial and sometimes brilliant results. Over the years it can improve community habits to the extent that it is less needed. It may be stated categorically that no program of traffic accident prevention can succeed without this vital, fundamental activity, maintained at a sufficiently high level to impress the public mind.

Basic to the success of any traffic law enforcement program are public acceptance and public action. Since the public will not accept anything capricious or unreasonable in laws and ordinances having direct bearing on personal conduct, understanding of the program and its objectives must be communicated through information media of all kinds. Further, there must be organized public support such as that given through civic organizations dedicated to safety. Many promising programs have failed because

they were not accepted by the community.

Traffic law enforcement should employ the many well-developed techniques to make itself effective. In addition to citation and arrest activity it should make intelligent use of admonitions, written warnings, and instruction to pedestrians and drivers. It can place the irresponsible, immature driver under the supervision of probation officers. It can cause the re-examination of drivers who are apparently deficient in necessary driving skills and recommend training in schools operated under the supervision of the court for those who are not adequately informed of their responsibilities under the law. It can set up the machinery for the exchange of information between the court and the driver-licensing agency on the violation and accident records of defendants so that prompt suspension or revocation action can be taken where basic incompetence or irresponsibility has been established.

Though it is a highly effective and indispensable element of any traffic program, traffic law enforcement is not self-sufficient. It depends to a considerable degree upon education and engineering. These in turn depend on the quality of accident facts developed through police investigation and enforcement action.

Operational co-ordination between enforcement, education, and engineering is vital to a successful traffic program, even as co-ordination of policy and objectives must be maintained among the several activities bearing upon traffic law enforcement—laws, enforcement, adjudication, and licensing. To attain ultimate success, the street and highway traffic program must be developed as an integral part of the street and highway transportation program; street and highway transportation in all its phases—including public transit—must be related

through city planning, land-use studies, and traffic and transportation surveys to the realities of the economics of the over-all street and highway transportation requirements of an entire city or state.

Police organization, management, training, policy, tactics, and techniques—if they are to carry weight in such a co-ordinated program—must adjust to growing requirements more speedily and with greater purposefulness. A new philosophy of traffic supervision and expedition, recognizing a responsibility for law enforcement which achieves the ends of greater public safety and healthier economic and social development, must replace the old tradition of law enforcement for its own sake.

The courts must abandon the outdated, inadequate forms and procedures which deny thousands of alleged traffic violators their "day in court." Lay justices, an answer to the settlement of minor offenses and disputes in remote communities during the past century, do not bring to their courts the legal training, broad education, or technical knowledge which a motorized America, seeking orderliness and safety of movement combined with justice for the individual, demands and deserves.

Accident investigation

As an illustration of the need for important basic changes within the structures of the major activities of enforcement, let us consider the matter of accident investigation.

Accident investigation has two principal objectives: to ascertain the full facts of an accident and to determine whether a violation was committed, and, if this be so, to secure adequate evidence to support a prosecution of the violator. The validity of these objectives is apparent. Dependable facts about accidents and their basic causes are necessary before economical and increasingly

productive work can be done to prevent them.¹

Notwithstanding this, in most jurisdictions there is little or no accident investigation activity, or else its quality is so low that it does not deserve to be so called. Consequently, because of lack of adequate and dependable information about accidents, the entire traffic program fails to achieve the efficiency it would otherwise possess. Serious violators who cause accidents are frequently enabled to defy justice, while lesser violators, not involved in accidents, must stand charged before a court because of the simple circumstance of having violated a law in the presence of a police officer. This is both wasteful and inequitable.

So-called "accident investigation" is, almost everywhere, still only accident reporting. Our police need to be adequately trained and equipped and then so organized, deployed, and supervised that this important function will be performed well.

Although we can be heartened by the reduction in the death rate to an all-time low of 5.9 per 100 million vehicle miles of travel, we are still killing 38 to 40 thousand people a year and injuring 1½ million. We cannot afford this either economically or socially. Nor, in the light of the tremendous increase in automobile travel and the consequent increase in exposure to conditions bringing about accidents, is the reduction in death rate particularly meaningful. With 100 million registered vehicles on the highways by 1975, traveling an estimated one trillion miles, the present all-time low figure of 5.9 would result in 59,000 traffic deaths per year.

¹ The Northwestern University Traffic Institute under a grant of funds from the United States Bureau of Public Roads, United States Public Health Service, and the Automotive Safety Foundation has embarked upon an investigation of traffic accident causes.

With what we know now and with the techniques of prevention and enforcement which we know will work, we could today cut the number of killed to 20,000 and the number of injured to 750,000. We could plan for the future, for the increase in population and vehicle use, so that the figure given at the end of the preceding paragraph would be at least held to if not reduced from that of today's fatalities. If we do not choose to do this, we must accept whatever verdict our children find fit to make on the degree of our civic guilt.

LAWS

The subject of laws as related to traffic enforcement is being treated in another article in this issue. I feel it pertinent, however, to remark here that the efficiency and economy of operation of the traffic law enforcement program turns very largely on the substantive and administrative laws, including the driver-licensing laws and their administration.

If the laws are, in fact, unenforceable, or if the enforcement of the laws is so restricted administratively, or if the basic law and/or the administration thereof regarding the licensing of drivers is so inadequate that there are large numbers of irresponsible or incompetent drivers on the highways, then a terrible burden is placed on the police, whose numbers in proportion to the job to be done are small and will, for economic reasons, continue to become smaller and smaller.

POLICE

Without the work of our enforcement agencies, there is, of course, no enforcement—in fact, no law. If we are to have better traffic law enforcement we must have better general police service, for the traffic work of a police department cannot fall very far below, or for very long rise much above, that of the

department as a whole. The level of effectively organized programs within one bureau or division frequently has helped to raise the level of performance throughout the department, but only to a compromise level.

Some of the more important fundamental problems of the police service are organization, administration, training, and recruitment. To the latter is related the question of compensation.

Organization

As now organized, the police service of the country is unmanageable. Within an area easily traversed by a man in a car in one or two hours there may be four or a score of jurisdictions, each with its own police force and its own enforcement policies. These can be contiguous but are more often, as in the case of cities and park districts, overlapping. All the good will and co-operative spirit it is possible to predicate would still not make for economy or efficiency in such a situation. Moreover, the man in the car is aware only of the area through which he is passing, to which he probably attaches the name of the largest jurisdictional unit. Thus, he would be inclined to expect only one police service for "Chicagoland" or "Greater Los Angeles" and to feel both confused and irritated when confronted with representatives of the several jurisdictions, each with a different concept of their law enforcement mission.

Complicating this problem in organization is the fundamental ideological difference between leaders in the police service regarding the desirable degree of specialization for traffic in the police service.

On the one hand is the belief that the problem of traffic and accidents is so serious and has reached such proportions that it is necessary to specialize highly in order to provide an adequate level of enforcement to stem a rise in fatalities

and injuries which amounts to an emergency.

On the other hand, there are those who believe that we should at once place the responsibility for traffic law enforcement in the hands of the general uniformed forces of our police departments. There is much to commend this latter viewpoint in theory; by it more men give attention to traffic, enforcement is more equitably applied, violations are deterred on a broader scale, and all of the advantages of traffic law enforcement accrue at a much greater rate.

However, training of the general uniformed forces in most of our city police departments today is such that it would be contrary to the public interest to place this added responsibility in their hands. Enforcement quantity and quality would deteriorate rapidly. In most city police departments, the problems of securing adequate reporting and investigating incidents assigned to the uniformed force, adequate performance of patrol duties, maintenance of discipline, and similar problems are still of major administrative concern. With fundamental training and routine supervision essential to the solution of these elemental problems, which are still in the developmental stage, we cannot hope that the much more complicated problems of traffic supervision can yet be turned over to the general uniformed forces with promise of good results. A relatively high degree of police traffic specialization is still required, and probably will be for many years.

Administration and training

Such organizational problems require well-trained, seasoned administrators. Not yet, however, are we providing any formal machinery for selecting, training, and developing general administrators and executives for this vital service. The management of our many police agencies is necessarily either in the hands of men

who have had wide police experience but little training for or experience in administration, or, in a relatively few cases, in the hands of experienced administrators without police experience. Neither is a happy solution.

We must provide such training—for the present on an in-service basis—through our universities; this training must embrace law, sociology, political science, and administration. Combined with years of police experience, such training would provide the quality of management so badly needed in most of our police departments.

But training cannot stop here. The staff, subordinate commanders, and the rank and file must be given in-service training on a continuing basis. Yet all but the very best of our in-service police training leaves much to be desired. A police officer in twenty years of service may, in a typical department, be given twenty to thirty hours of training in the law. This is completely inadequate. The competence of a police officer in the criminal law, laws of arrest, evidence, and constitutional law should, by means of a continuing program of in-service training, approach that of the graduate of an accredited law school. In terms of public necessity it is at least as important to train the police officer in these matters as it is the lawyer.

Recruitment

Recruitment of qualified men becomes increasingly difficult in periods of intense economic competition for manpower at relatively high wages, such as the present. The police service cannot compete effectively in this situation. But higher salaries, necessary as they are in some departments, are at best only part of the answer. The prestige of the service must be elevated. Perhaps the most important step in such elevation is the requirement of pre-service professional training. This might

be begun by employing the cadet system of part-time employment and part-time college attendance in order to provide income during training and reasonable assurance of an appointment upon completion of study. But, in turn, the requirement of the completion of a full professional course of study must become a prerequisite to entry into the service. First, however, the service must set the objective and agree upon policies and programs. To pave the way for such a process, laws must in many cases be amended, particularly those on residence.

A PROFESSIONAL POLICE SERVICE: PROBLEMS IN FORMATION

Such reforms in organization, enlightenment in administration, improvement in training, and selectivity in recruitment will provide the nation with a professional police service of the first order—a service which will take the problems of law enforcement, including traffic law enforcement, in stride.

Importantly, such professionalization of the service will make it possible more skillfully to resist, and more competently to avoid, political interference with law enforcement. The service will gain the confidence and support of the public and eventually achieve an *esprit* known now only in elite corps of the armed forces. To bring about such an effect deserves our best thought and our most courageous action as citizens and voters.

In the intervening years, before the police service comes finally into its own, we must give a maximum of training and service assistance to the police for meeting the rapidly expanding problems of traffic. The pattern of the assistance required is well established. It needs considerable expansion, refinement, and, most of all, development of basic data, information, and instruction in highly usable form.

The training of traffic police admin-

istrators is well under way; the training of technicians for staff and line specialist assignments has been embarked upon. Preparation of training materials for use at the technical and administrative level has been going forward slowly for many years. Administrative and technical field assistance has been offered since 1936 and is now in great demand.

All this work, carried on in the main by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and Northwestern University Traffic Institute, has been tangibly successful.

The compelling police enforcement problem, however, is that of manpower. At the state level the problem is, with rare exception, one of sheer inadequacy. In Wisconsin there is one officer for 349 rural miles; in Oklahoma there is one for every 412 rural miles. Adequate supervision under these circumstances is impossible. And these figures, striking as they are, do not reflect the real extent of the manpower shortage. They would be doubled or even tripled if they were computed in terms of the necessity for several watches, vacations, sick leave, and days off. Moreover, time consumed for duties other than patrol, and patrol duties on roads not classified as state highways, is tremendous in some states.

The problem is made acute by the fact that whole urban-type residential areas and business districts are developing in unincorporated areas outside of our metropolises, and the responsibility for policing these areas is falling largely upon our state enforcement agencies. Further, intercity travel is increasing at a rate which will continue to accelerate as the great interstate highway system is put into operation. State enforcement agencies will have to control heavier and heavier volumes of traffic. Only more manpower, better trained and equipped, can provide the enforcement necessary to hold down the appalling increases in rural traffic accidents.

In cities, the problem is principally one of effective use of the men at hand. The traditional preoccupation with crime and vice, a chronic shortage of available uniformed forces resulting from large overhead operations, the necessity of "coverage," and the depletion of daily available strength by court appearance, warrant service, and special details create remediable shortages. Added to these is the depletion of the traffic force available for accident investigation and general traffic law enforcement through the demands for constantly increasing parking enforcement and coverage of school crossings.

Cities, too, will be affected by the interstate highway system: this system will greatly accelerate the trend toward metropolitanization of the country; traffic congestion will be materially aggravated during the early and middle years of the building program; and the intercity links will be completed long before the expressways leading to and from cities are operating. High-speed roads will feed great volumes of traffic into streets laid out, in many cases, long before the automobile was thought of. It will take greater numbers of police, better trained in public relations as well as traffic enforcement, and equipped with saintly patience, to guide the public safely through such a period.

Since manpower is such a critical problem, administrative procedures should be adopted which will tend to eliminate antiquated time-consuming methods which require a substantial proportion of departmental strength for relatively unproductive duties. Hundreds of thousands of man-hours are devoted yearly to the service of warrants following failure of the defendant to honor a citation, arrest notice, or summons. Despite this, tens of thousands of warrants are unserved each year. This burden would be materially reduced and response to citations improved by a broader applica-

tion of the co-operative policy of suspending the licenses of drivers who have not appeared to answer charges. To make such a plan effective, the police, courts, and driver-licensing personnel must co-operate fully in reporting to the driver-licensing authority.

Further, the burdensome task of parking enforcement would be lightened by increased use of government-operated towing services and pounds. The present uncertainty of apprehension, and the slight penalty invoked in most cases, make a "cat-and-mouse" game of this phase of traffic law enforcement. The towing of illegally parked vehicles, particularly those which positively endanger or obstruct, would result in an immediate and marked improvement in observance of parking regulations, at the same time reducing the necessity for enforcement personnel.

Further, we should move—as we have begun to move, but more rapidly, more courageously, and in a more orderly fashion—in the direction of making the police officer an officer in the military sense and providing for the performance of all such unskilled tasks as parking enforcement, school crossing duty, and intersection duty by lower-paid people with less training, working under the supervision of a police officer who is highly trained and fully equipped. There are precedents for this in other fields. In engineering, where from time to time the shortage of graduate engineers is critical, two-year courses are now given to supply personnel for drafting, surveying, and similar routine work.

Unless these reforms are effected, traffic law enforcement will fail in its mission at great public cost in lives and dollars; importantly, our police agencies will lose public confidence, with all the said results of such loss.

Some civic leaders believe that many administrative problems plaguing traffic law enforcement could be overcome by

the establishment of separate traffic law enforcement agencies. They have supported appropriations legislation making it possible for other departments to take over portions of traffic law enforcement work—for example, truck weighing—from state police departments or highway patrols. They have achieved some measure of success because it is generally recognized that there is a need for a level and quality of traffic law enforcement not being provided by the general enforcement agency.

Such "reforms," however, though well motivated, only serve to retard the development of the state enforcement agency and defeat functional consolidation and its resultant economies and efficiency.

The important point is that they are expressions of public and official dissatisfaction with the present quality of traffic law enforcement.

COURTS

Even if the traffic enforcement work of the police were brought as near to perfection as possible, it would be effective only if court action also achieved such perfection.

In 1931, when the enforcement index was first developed,² it became apparent that citations or arrests were unproductive unless followed by appropriate court action. Yet the courts, with some notable exceptions, as in New Jersey, are not yet adequate or sufficiently well organized to cope with the huge volume of

² The enforcement index is a quantitative measure of enforcement, arrived at by dividing the number of convictions (with penalty) for hazardous moving violations by the number of personal injury and fatal accidents. Reasonably dependable as a measure of traffic law enforcement, it is significant that jurisdictions with an enforcement index of less than five usually are found to have the worst traffic rates. Conversely, those with indices of fifteen to twenty-five usually record the best rates.

motor vehicle violations. This condition is aggravated by the complexity of many of these violations, particularly in some cases developed through accident investigation.

In many jurisdictions, judges are still rotated through the traffic court—this being frequently considered an undesirable or even a "punishment" assignment. The judges thus assigned to traffic court are often indifferent, or incompetent, to deal effectively with the problems of traffic. Thus, justice frequently fails both the defendant and the public.

Violations bureaus, particularly in our large metropolitan areas, are handling more and more cases each year, while traffic judges usually "hear" cases in one to two minutes. The traffic law enforcement work of the police is thus often nullified, and the public is resentful at the failure of the courts and police to enforce the law. Defendants rail at the injustice of inadequate hearings and resent the whole hurried process of traffic case adjudication.

Further, few traffic courts have prosecutors assigned. Where they are assigned, they frequently have the misconception that their role in the traffic court is the same as in a criminal court. This is not true. Since most of the cases tried in traffic courts are tried without a defending counsel present, the prosecutor should act as a friend of the court in seeking to develop as quickly as possible all the evidence, not only for the prosecution but, importantly, for the defense, also.

Why, in view of the crowded situation in our traffic courts, is the bar opposed to the processing of violations by bureaus or departments in the executive branch of the government? The bar's position is sound. So long as all traffic offenses are classified as criminal or quasi-criminal, we must, to protect against encroachment upon civil rights,

give the defendant his day in court—in one way or another.

Improvements and reforms

Defendants should not, however, be required to wait long hours for the trial of relatively minor charges, with the result that other thousands of defendants, contrary to their convictions, settle their cases in violations bureaus upon a plea of guilt rather than spend the time required for court hearings.

Hearings should be readily available to all defendants. The violations bureau can perform a useful function if it is reserved exclusively for those who truly acknowledge their infractions. Hearing commissioners or referees under the jurisdiction of the court should be made available to hear minor cases, while our traffic court judges should have time to hear fully the most serious violations cases.

If there can be trained judges, prosecutors who really understand the function of the traffic court, true findings, and appropriate penalties in the case of guilt, then many of the other deficiencies can be overcome.

Work must be done, however, on reclassifying traffic offenses in the Uniform Vehicle Code so that only the most serious offenses—such as automobile homicide, driving while intoxicated, leaving the scene of an accident, and reckless driving—are classified as crimes to be tried under the established rules of criminal procedure. To illustrate, those who admit guilt for minor infractions—parking overtime, for instance—could settle their cases in a violations bureau, as at present. Those who do not wish to plead guilty would have a prompt hearing before a referee or hearing commissioner, with the right to review by a trial judge. Minor misdemeanor offenses—violations of stop signs and red lights, for example—would not be answerable in the violations bureau but

would be heard, in the first instance, by the referee or hearing commissioner, again with a right to review by the trial judge. Grave misdemeanors, of course, would be tried in the traffic court under the prevailing rules of criminal procedure.

Court officials are, in the main, untrained to deal effectively with the problem of the traffic violator. Law schools offer no training in this area. With rare exception, they offer no training for the public practice of the law—for the important responsibilities of prosecutors and judges. Trained primarily for the private practice of law, few judges sit in traffic court and few prosecutors are assigned there for a period of time sufficient to learn to administer this important body of law. The situation is seriously aggravated by the hundreds of trial justices, recorders, magistrates, and justices of the peace who have had no legal training whatsoever.

For the training of the present generation of judges and prosecutors, it is imperative that we provide more and much better in-service training schools and conferences. Courses of the type now being sponsored co-operatively by the American Bar Association and the Northwestern University Traffic Institute must be offered to many more court officers and with greater frequency. The lengthening and improvement of these courses is now underway; steps should also be taken to permit members of the staff of the American Bar Association administering the in-service program to spend part of their time in working with law schools in the development of institutes for judges and prosecutors and in the development of a curriculum which would better equip the law student for service on the bench or as a prosecutor.

There is also at present a vital need for field assistance in reorganizing and rewriting administrative and procedural

rules, including the adoption of sound business accounting methods in traffic violations bureaus.

An important step in reaching the objective of businesslike administration of justice in traffic cases would be the establishment of sound and consistent policies of penalization within the courts. The extreme disparity of penalties for identical offenses invoked by judges of the same court amounts, in the public mind, to judicial caprice. Defendants and their lawyers cynically "shop" for "easy" judges, and the judicial system, an opponent in a game, is frequently held in light contempt.

Inflexible uniformity of penalties is undesirable and would deny the intention of the legislature; but a broadly consistent policy would remedy a situation which weakens the educational results of the enforcement process.

Organizational reform is badly needed in most of our states—desirable in virtually all. The tremendous improvement made possible by organizational reform throughout the court system of a state has been demonstrated brilliantly in New Jersey. The essential elements of such reorganization are:³

1. Administrative application of the hierarchical principle of organization.
2. Area distribution of trial courts consistent with need.
3. Elevation of jurisdiction of all trial courts hearing traffic cases to the level of courts of record, with an accompanying rise in legal prerequisites for judicial office.
4. Centralized rule-making authority and administrative disciplinary authority in the hands of the superior judicial authority.

Such a court system improves police action and morale, reduces materially the application of the special privilege doctrine, nourishes the great potential of

effective driver licensing, and, most importantly, more nearly fulfills its mission of combining justice for the individual with a maximum of public safety.

CO-ORDINATION

Obviously the accomplishment of the objectives of better police and court action would sharply reduce accidents and greatly expedite the flow of traffic. We must, however, recognize the need for the co-ordination referred to earlier—co-ordination of the several activities which make up traffic law enforcement; co-ordination between traffic law enforcement and street and highway transportation; and finally the co-ordination of street and highway transportation with the transportation requirements of our cities and states.

Co-ordination at the operating level can be largely effected, I believe, through the voluntary co-ordinating device of a common genesis of plans and activities. This may be accomplished through the joint analysis of a situation by engineers, police, public education, and driver-licensing personnel. The administrative action which is taken will, as a result of their analysis, be substantially co-ordinated.

Important though it is, however, such interoperational co-ordination is not sufficient. There is a need for the interposition of authoritative co-ordination whenever the voluntary device fails; and there is a compelling requirement for the integration of accident-prevention and movement-expedition activities at the operational level with the much larger programs of city planning, land use, street and highway development, and transit, so that operational level activities may be fitted into and effectively contribute to the needed program for the increased efficiency of a well-ordered street and highway transportation system.

Once upon a time a Chief Executive

³ See George Warren, *Traffic Courts* (New York: Little, Brown & Company, 1944).

could direct such co-ordination; but today there is need for the establishment of an operating staff, responsible to the Chief Executive, to plan and program for the development of an adequate street and highway transportation system and to exercise staff control over the development and operation of the system. For this, a new professional staff is needed, well grounded in engineering, economics, or transportation, and with city planning experience or an appreciation of land-use principles and their application.

This, I believe, is more workable and less costly than would be the establishment of a department of street traffic—more workable because it integrates street traffic into the urban pattern of transportation, necessarily our goal; less costly because it is a staff operation.

CONCLUSION

Effective traffic law enforcement, it has been proved beyond doubt, reduces the number and severity of accidents, protects property, saves lives. The billions which would be lost as a result of traffic accidents could be used instead to maintain the nation's high standard of living and to build for the future.

There are, however, benefits from effective traffic law enforcement which are in the long run more significant to our

character as a nation. Reasonable, competent enforcement which is honestly administered increases respect for the law and for the government. Since, as Chief Justice Vanderbilt pointed out, "... traffic courts are the first and only courts in which most of our citizens ever witness the judicial process in action,"⁴ it follows that it is in these courts and from his experience with the traffic officer that the citizen forms his opinion as to the competence, efficiency, and even integrity of not only the judicial but also the executive branch of state and municipal government. If his experience is, through no fault of his own, a bad one, he is likely to carry his resentment into an indictment of the whole concept and philosophy of American government. We cannot, as a nation, afford the disruptive and weakening effects of cynicism about something so vital to our way of life.

We must, therefore, do a good job in the police service and in the courts; for this is the best way to demonstrate directly and simply to our own people and to the world that the principles on which the country was founded are not idle words but are vital elements of American life as it is lived from day to day.

⁴ Arthur T. Vanderbilt, "Traffic Law Enforcement from the Standpoint of the Courts," *Traffic Review*, Vol. 4, January 1950, p. 36.

Driver Licensing

By JAMES STANNARD BAKER

ABSTRACT: During the past half century, driver licensing has developed from a tax on the users of highways to a major safety activity, and it has spread to every state in the Union. Controlling who should drive and under what conditions was less important than taxation in the early days of licensing, but today this relationship has been reversed. Licensing is granting a privilege, and the courts have repeatedly upheld this principle; the public, however, must be constantly reminded that a license to drive is *only* a privilege and not a right. Laws generally provide for examination of drivers and restriction of licenses, but, based as they are on the theory that high-risk applicants can be detected and rejected, they are so limited in effectiveness that continued driver improvement work is necessary to deal with those whose driving records contain conspicuous numbers of unfavorable reports. Driver licensing depends for success upon supporting activities of police and courts both in enforcing license requirements and reporting driver experience. Years of research will be required to develop its full safety potentialities.

J. Stannard Baker, Glencoe, Illinois, is Director of Research and Development at the Traffic Institute at Northwestern University. He has directed the work of committees which developed manuals on driver examining and driver improvement for the American Association of Motor Vehicles. Formerly, while on the staff of the National Safety Council, he helped establish driver licensing or trained examiners in thirty-two states.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

BEFORE 1910, the licensing of drivers was merely an extension of ordinary hack drivers' permits—by municipalities—to the earliest taxicab drivers. The purpose of the licensing was mainly to identify drivers who might abuse passengers. Later, cities began to license all motor vehicle drivers as a revenue measure, and states soon followed suit, especially in the populous northeastern part of the country.

City licensing was never satisfactory. Residents objected to being taxed in order to drive on the streets of their home towns when outsiders could do so without paying. Therefore, when a state started to license operators, the cities within the state stopped doing so; sometimes they were required to do so by the state. By 1940, city drivers' licenses had practically disappeared in the United States except for chauffeurs' licenses required for drivers of public conveyances.

By 1920, drivers were licensed in all of the northeastern states. By 1940, driver licensing had spread to almost all of the remainder of the United States, and the nationwide American Association of Motor-Vehicle Administrators had become well established.

Today, all states license drivers—South Dakota was the last in 1954—and drivers are licensed by every major nation. The following discussion applies only to the continental United States.

PURPOSES

Licensing drivers serves three purposes:

To identify the driver to the police, mainly for traffic and other law enforcement purposes; licensing also identifies the driver to other drivers and insurance investigators in connection with accidents.

To get revenue from the fees for

drivers' licenses which can pay for licensing, traffic policing, driver training, highway construction, or can provide general funds.

To keep certain people from driving as, for example, those who would present intolerable risks of accident on the highway or who have not paid or cannot pay for damages or injury resulting from their negligence in driving. An aspect of this purpose is stimulating applicants to put more effort into preparing themselves to drive.

The first purpose is accomplished by the certificate issued to the driver which gives the following identifying information: his address; birth date or age; a brief description in terms of sex, height, weight, color of hair, and color of eyes; and, for more positive identification, his signature. In some states—especially for chauffeurs—photographs or fingerprints are put on the certificates; the latter, however, are of little use except to specially trained investigators.

Fees have always been charged for licenses. Operators pay from 12½ cents to \$3.00 per year and chauffeurs from 12½ cents to \$6.00. In a few cases, fees have been insufficient to pay the costs of licensing; but, generally speaking, especially in the case of chauffeurs, they are also a tax on drivers to provide funds for specific or general purposes other than licensing. In most places, accounting for fees collected is the only basis for estimating the number of drivers licensed.

Controlling who should drive and under what conditions was less important than taxation in the early days of licensing; today this relationship has been reversed. Hence, northeastern states, which licensed drivers first, in general still have highest fees.

LEGAL BASIS

Licensing is granting a privilege. If driving were a legal right and not merely

a privilege, licensing would be unnecessary—in fact, it would be impossible. Courts have repeatedly upheld this principle. Never has a driver license law been declared unconstitutional. Never has one been repealed. Yet the public must constantly be reminded that a license to drive is only a privilege—not a right.

Laws requiring drivers to be licensed imply rather than specify the purposes of licensing. Most such laws, especially those enacted since 1930, have been patterned, always with more or less modification, upon the Uniform Vehicle Code.

All license laws stipulate the following: driving conditions which require licensing; the administrative agency; details of certification and identification; fees; expiration of license; and circumstances under which the license must be denied or revoked.

Laws generally provide for examination of drivers and restriction of licenses. Yet the only driver qualifications commonly established by law are minimum age for various classes of drivers, parental consent for minors, and freedom from certain conditions such as insanity. The only restriction commonly specified is that which requires learners to be accompanied by a licensed driver as an instructor.

The administrator is given broad authority to establish standards for drivers, to choose examining methods, and to specify restrictions. In most states, he also has wide authority to cancel, suspend, and revoke licenses; this is subject to court review in order to determine whether he has acted capriciously or arbitrarily.

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENT

No state has a separate department of driver licensing. Driver licensing is part of a department with some associated activities. Generally it is in the same department as motor vehicle regis-

tration. Often these two and some allied activities constitute a separate department of motor vehicles, or they may be together in a department of revenue—reflecting the tax origin of those activities—or in a secretary of state's office because of the licensing function. In some states, licensing is in the Department of Public Safety and separate from registration; in some the two are combined under the highway department. Safety aspects of driver licensing may be neglected in departments which have no primary responsibility for safety.

NUMBER OF DRIVERS

In 1957 the United States had approximately 77,000,000 licensed operators and chauffeurs. This is nearly 70 per cent of all people who are over 16 years of age—the usual minimum age for driving. But the percentage varies from less than 50 per cent in Mississippi to about 90 per cent in Arizona. The highest percentage of drivers among those old enough to drive occurs among men between 30 and 40 years old outside of metropolitan areas. In some places it is apparently more than 95 per cent. There are approximately 1.18 drivers per motor vehicle in the country. The figure varies from 1.04 in Idaho to 1.4 in Massachusetts. Men outnumber women drivers about two to one—less in states with a large percentage of people driving and more in states with a small percentage.

Once licensed, few people except the permanently disabled cease to renew until they are 70 years old or become permanently disabled. Among people more than 80 years old, fewer than 10 per cent are licensed, and most of these drive little.

LICENSING FUNCTIONS

Purposes of licensing suggest three main licensing functions: clerical, examining, and driver improvement. Some

additional activities are necessary to support these main functions.

Clerical work consists of accounting for fees, issuing identifying certificates, and keeping records of accidents, convictions, and other reports of driver experience and condition. It includes the major activities of periodical renewals, posting changes of address, issuing duplicates for lost certificates, and accounting for fees. Because so large a part of all adults are licensed, driver license files are usually the largest and most active in a state. The clerical task is so great, indeed, that it often absorbs so much of the budget and engages so much administrative attention that little remains for safety functions of licensing. Several states have adopted mechanical tabulation methods for issuing license certificates, and one, Illinois, has the entire driver record system on magnetic tapes for automatic processing by computers.

DRIVERS AND ACCIDENTS

A study of such accident statistics as are available suggests that vehicle failures contribute to fewer than 10 per cent of accidents, that road and weather conditions contribute to about 50 per cent, and that driver behavior or negligence contributes to more than 90 per cent. Some accidents are contributed to by two or three of these highway transportation elements. Much has already been done to make cars and highways safer. Important future progress in traffic safety therefore depends upon better drivers. Driver licensing is addressed to this objective.

THEORETICAL EFFECT OF LICENSING

Driver licensing as it affects accidents is based on the following theories:

Some people who want to drive would be bad risks on the highways. They may or may not know that they are bad risks.

It is possible to evaluate the risk of a person as a driver by measurements or information concerning him.

It is possible to specify what degrees of risk we will tolerate in drivers.

How precisely these theories can be reflected in operating practices will determine how effective driver licensing can be in controlling traffic accidents.

Without defining accident proneness precisely or measuring it specifically, the first theory can be accepted on the basis of common knowledge. Blind people, infants, completely untrained people, and many others are such obviously poor risks that most of them, for their own safety, do not attempt to drive. We are most concerned with the last two theories, therefore, which concern examining applicants for licenses and handling borderline cases.

EXAMINING

The public has great confidence that scientists or "experts" can evaluate the risks of a driver. This is partly because some deficiencies are so great as to make people with them obviously bad risks. Yet when license administrators seek from doctors, psychologists, and other scientists methods of evaluating driver risk precisely, the advice they receive proves disappointing. Scientists suggest methods of measuring personal abilities, especially the senses, but methods of weighing the results of several tests to secure a composite measure do not seem to be available. Hence each measurable characteristic is evaluated separately, although most authorities agree that deficiencies in one characteristic can be compensated for—to a certain point—by excess capability in other characteristics.

The greatest single element of risk in driving is exposure. Drivers vary in this respect as much or more than any other. Those who drive nearly all day nearly every day are a greater risk than those

who drive little or not at all for months at a time. But this difference in risk is not due to characteristics of the driver. Exposure is a function of hours or miles of driving and of a factor or factors, as yet undefined, representing the difficulty of driving. Insurance companies recognize both factors of exposure in establishing rates or odds which they give an owner when he insures his car against accidents. In licensing, however, exposure is not a factor to be considered, except possibly to require lower levels of personal risk for licensing those with higher levels of exposure risk, as in the case of truck and bus drivers.

Deciding how much risk in a driver can be tolerated is still more difficult. Legislatures have not hesitated to enact into law requirements for behavior required for safety, but they have been reluctant to set legal limits on personal ability. Lawmakers set the minimum performance ability for brakes on vehicles but not for vision of drivers or their ability to apply brakes. This is probably well, considering how little scientific basis we have for such legislation.

Altogether, approximately 4300 people are employed in the United States as driver examiners. About 1500 of them are police and others who examine part time. Examiners are assisted, usually in large places only, by about 1000 clerks. They examine annually approximately 6,200,000 new drivers for licenses. In some states the examiners also examine for renewal of license. New drivers include both those who have never driven before and those who are moving from another state. On the basis of the number of examiners, number of new applicants, and working hours of examiners, an applicant requires an average of 1.3 examiner hours. But because examiners must spend time waiting for applicants to appear, traveling to examining stations, and making reports,

actual time for examining a new applicant averages less than 30 minutes. Approximately 36 per cent of applicants fail to pass the examination on their first attempt, but the percentage varies considerably. It is as low as 5 in one state and as high as 63 in another.

EVALUATING RISK OF LICENSED DRIVERS

An important consideration in licensing is that a driver's risk seems not to be a constant thing. It varies considerably from year to year, day to day, and even hour to hour. A driver who is sober may be a very low risk, but only a few hours later—and only slightly intoxicated—the same driver may be a very high risk.

Because of our inability to evaluate risks precisely, and because risk changes, license laws provide for suspensions and revocations. Hence, drivers whose experience with accidents, violations, and other difficulties has been unfavorable may be taken off the road temporarily or permanently. In this case, risk is evaluated by experience with the individual.

Over-all risk may also be reduced by restricting a license to limit the exposure risk as in the case of drivers who are limited to certain areas, to daylight driving, or to vehicles with certain equipment. Personal risk can also be limited by restrictions to driving while accompanied by an instructor during the learning period, to driving with corrective lenses, and in similar ways.

DRIVER IMPROVEMENT

All activities concerned with licensed drivers who have conspicuously unfavorable driving records is considered to be part of driver improvement. This includes suspension and revocation which, however, are a last resort—except in cases in which the law makes revocation mandatory.

The first problem in driver improve-

ment is to discover which of the millions of licensed drivers seem to require attention because of risk shown by their behavior or condition. As reports on accidents, violations, and other information are received by the driver license bureau they are examined and filed.

TABLE 1—DRIVER IMPROVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1956

ACTIVITY		RESULTING ACTION	
Advisory letters.....	495,000	Additional restrictions.....	193,000
Review examinations.....	126,000	Probation.....	144,000
Special examinations.....	89,000	Suspensions and revocations.....	480,000
Interviews.....	287,000		

Reports of convictions or conditions, such as commitment for mental disorders, which require revocation of license by law result promptly in notices of revocation. There are approximately 400,000 such mandatory revocations yearly in the United States. This represents one driver in every 193 or 0.52 per cent of all drivers. Of these mandatory revocations about 226,000 or 57 per cent of the total result from convictions for driving while intoxicated.

In addition to mandatory revocations, intended to remove dangerous drivers from the road, there are numerous suspensions of licenses required because the driver is not covered by liability insurance or is otherwise unable to pay for damage which he has been or might be required to pay. These financial responsibility suspensions have little connection, if any, with safety and so should not be counted as driver-improvement work.

Some states do little more to improve licensed drivers than suspend and revoke licenses when the law specifically requires it. Most states, however, review the entire record of a driver whenever a new report is received to add to it. In most cases, there is no recent previous record and so the report is filed for future reference. Review of an entire

record may, however, result in some action depending on the character of the record and the work load of the driver improvement personnel. The most common actions and the approximate number of each per year are shown in the following table:

These activities cannot be totaled because some individuals in a single year are treated in more than one way, but a reasonable estimate of the total number of drivers receiving attention each year because of their driving records would be about 900,000. Adding to these 400,000 mandatory revocations and discounting for possible duplications gives about 1,250,000 drivers reached each year by driver improvement programs. This is one driver in every 60 or about 1.6 per cent of all drivers. In a few states, special centers for studying drivers with unfavorable records have been established. The object of all such work is to make high risk drivers into low risk drivers, if possible, and if the risk appears to be intolerable to remove them from the highways.

The effectiveness of various driver improvement activities is extremely difficult to evaluate. For one thing, drivers respond quite differently to the same treatment. Studies comparing subsequent accident and violation experience of drivers who have received advisory letters with matched drivers to whom letters should have been sent but were not show that the former have slightly better subsequent experience; but the results of such experiments are not conclusive. Probably an advisory letter

merely serves to topple over on the safe side a few drivers who are borderline cases as far as risk is concerned. Perhaps the effect of the letter depends on how it is written and how it looks, as is so often the case in advertising. Certainly the advisory letter puts the driver license bureau in a better bargaining position in subsequent interviews and hearings with a driver.

Experiments with the effect on accidents and violations of short suspensions are also inconclusive. They suggest that such suspensions are beneficial, but not to the extent that most of the proponents of a "get tough" policy would like or expect.

In twenty-six states, some form of point system is used in driver improvement work. The point system is a method of evaluating traffic records of drivers by assigning a numerical value to each report of traffic law violation, traffic accident, or other datum according to an estimate of its importance in indicating the driver's liability to traffic accidents. It serves, therefore, to govern what cases come up for review. By adjusting the number of points assigned for each report, the number of cases reviewed may be varied to accommodate the number of people available to take action on them.

Sometimes—perhaps too often—a point system is used to reduce to a clerical routine the decisions about what action to take; this tends to reduce driver improvement action to warning letters and short suspensions, to the detriment of a considered prescription of treatment which best fits the driver's need. It has even been suggested that a point system can be introduced into a computer type of driver record system so that a machine will "decide" whether the driver needs an advisory letter, a suspension of certain length, or review examination. Undoubtedly such mecha-

nization will permit using available unskilled personnel, but it presents intricate problems in research for the administrator who must develop point combinations which specify appropriate action for the immense variety of conditions which produce drivers with unfavorable records.

Some states have widely publicized the point system—and even the number points for various offences—on the theory that public understanding will influence driver behavior. This is apparently done at considerable sacrifice in flexibility. Publicized systems tend to freeze at values published. It also hampers special action in unusual cases because the driver—or his lawyers—may clamor for what he considers to be his "rights" under the point system. A few states have enacted laws not only recognizing or authorizing point systems but also specifying the points to be allotted, thus making, by statute, judgments which elsewhere are left to administrative discretion. Statutory point systems are, of course, still more rigid and may prevent the frequent adjustments made necessary by gradual improvement of our imperfect knowledge of what will influence driving behavior for the better.

RELATIONSHIPS TO POLICE WORK

Driver licensing cannot function separately from related activities of other governmental agencies.

The legal requirement that drivers be licensed would be a shallow gesture indeed if police took no enforcement action upon discovering an unlicensed driver. Hence, some police license law enforcement is necessary. As a rule such enforcement is limited to that connected with arrests and citations for other traffic violations and in connection with accident reporting by police. In both of

these activities police are assisted considerably by the identifying information on license certificates.

Sometimes drivers are stopped either at a roadblock or at random by individual officers to inquire for certificates as evidence of licensing. This may be done in connection with stopping for other purposes, but this is not a general practice.

A few police departments make a special effort to watch drivers whose licenses have been suspended or revoked to make sure that they are not driving illegally. This is unusual, and in general it is directed toward certain individuals who have threatened to keep on driving, who are reported by citizens to be driving, or who have previously been arrested for the offense.

Effective follow-up on violation repeaters by driver license divisions multiplies the effectiveness of police traffic law enforcement by intensifying its deterrent effect, especially in the cases of persistent violators. Therefore, licensing generally merits more enforcement assistance than it receives. As might be expected, state highway patrols pay closer attention to license violations than city and county police.

Effectiveness of enforcement can be measured by the percentage of drivers who are found to be without licenses when they are asked for them. Not counting licenses which have lapsed and will be renewed in time, fewer than one driver in 100 in urban areas is without proper credentials, but on back roads in some rural areas as many as one driver in five may be unlicensed.

Police are important to licensing in another way: then can report drivers who might need attention from the driver improvement bureau. Arrests and citations resulting in convictions are supposed to be reported by courts, but police can often help by arranging to see that the conviction reports are

promptly sent in, especially from justices of the peace. Arrests which do not result in convictions and written warnings may be useful additions to drivers' records, especially in places where courts dismiss an unusual number of cases. Some police use special forms for reporting information to license divisions about drivers who appear to be incompetent, disabled, unskilled, or otherwise questionable; the driver improvement bureau may then start appropriate investigation. This procedure is especially helpful in discovering drivers who have deteriorated with age to the point of becoming a hazard without being involved in an accident or being cited for a violation. Police traffic accident reports are also an important source of information to driver-licensing authorities in detecting drivers who need attention.

RELATIONSHIP TO COURTS

License divisions depend on courts to send in promptly reports of convictions for traffic offenses as required by law. Unfortunately some courts fail to do so or delay for so many months that the reports are of little use. The worst offenders are justice-of-the-peace courts, but even some city and county courts simply ignore the reporting requirement. The excuse often is that no funds are available to defray the costs of reporting. Driver license authorities are not in a position to compel courts to comply with the reporting law, nor are police or prosecutors inclined to notice this dereliction of duty on the part of the courts.

In practice, two methods are used to get conviction reports from courts who neglect their duty to send them. The most common requires no legislation. A persuasive person from the driver license division is assigned to go after them. By calling on courts, helping prepare the transcripts, and actually collecting the reports, he can gradually improve poor

reporting. The other method provides a fee to be added to the fine or court costs to be paid by the violator. It is remitted by the court to the state and rebated to the court when reports are received, thus providing a monetary inducement to comply with the reporting requirement.

Courts also have a part in enforcing license requirements, especially those relating to driving after revocation. If courts generally dismiss charges for driving without license when the driver promises to get one, or if they give minimum penalties for driving after revocation, the effectiveness of licensing is seriously diminished. Courts can also help by recommending driver improvement action for people who have come before them.

Finally, courts are sometimes called upon to determine upon appeal provided by law whether administrative action in refusing or revoking a license is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. By their rulings on such cases, courts can cripple or strengthen license laws.

In some places courts can suspend; in a few, only courts have discretion in recommending suspension. If courts had access to complete records of drivers, and if they had special knowledge of abilities, skills, and character which make the difference between safe and unsafe driving, court suspensions of licenses might be highly successful. In practice, however, court procedure is subject to such delays and courts have such limited facilities for the study of previous experience or examination of the driver that they cannot conceivably handle the number of cases required for effective supervision of licensed drivers. Furthermore, with many courts suspending and revoking licenses, each considering a case on its own merits, wide differences in treatment of drivers develop in different jurisdictions. Of course, any court can, regardless of li-

censing requirements, proscribe driving for any individual under the court's jurisdiction as a condition of probation.

In any area where police and court activity supporting driver licensing is at a low level, the benefits of driver licensing will be low; this is especially true if local police are employed as examiners. Because of the great radius of most drivers and diffusion of the effects of enforcement, areas of low local support for licensing will suffer less from their neglect than might be expected. Conversely, areas of high local support probably receive slightly less benefit than their efforts entitle them to.

DRIVER EDUCATION

Without doubt, driver examinations are a stimulant to driver education in public schools and by private instructors. The difficulty of the tests for licenses influences the quality and quantity of driver education, especially that of the private instructor.

In some places, mutually beneficial arrangements are worked out between driver examining bureaus and schools with driver education courses in order to give parts of examinations required for learners' permits to groups of students.

All states have driver manuals which are specially intended to help license applicants prepare for examinations. These are very helpful in driver education because they explain in detail peculiarities of state laws which do not appear in textbooks distributed nationally.

RESEARCH

People who administer driver license laws recognize—probably more clearly than others—how many questions concerning policies and techniques are still unanswered. More money and more men may be sorely needed to examine

the records of good drivers and work with problem drivers; but what can be accomplished with more people is definitely limited by our *knowledge* of how to use them.

The things we would like to know about driver licensing but do not know would make a very large list:

What is the effect on accidents of licensing according to varying degrees of excellence? What would happen to accidents if driver licensing in a state were discontinued, or if only the examinations were discontinued?

Does suspension of license for a limited time actually modify the risk of a driver after the license has been reinstated and under what conditions is this so? In other words, does suspension modify behavior in such a way as to affect accidents?

In what way can we detect in advance characteristics of people which make them drive under the influence of alcohol?

How do we test in order to measure driver personality traits other than those of natural ability, knowledge, and skill? In other words, how do we measure attitudes, or character, or resistance to group influences which seems to account for the accidents to people who would otherwise seem to be highly qualified drivers.

We are probably not yet even on the threshold of licensing procedures which will effectively separate the high risk from low risk drivers. License administrators and legislative bodies are waiting for the "scientific proof" on which they can evaluate risk and set limits of tolerance for risk.

Education and the Motor Age

By WILLIAM G. CARR

ABSTRACT: Since its beginning around 1920, traffic safety education has experienced phenomenal growth, not only in the number of schools involved but also in the scope of the program. In the lower grades, pedestrian safety and bicycle safety, as well as being valuable in themselves, help to form the attitudes of mind which will later produce safe drivers. In secondary schools, driver education with both classroom and practice driving instruction provides an invaluable program for the preparation of drivers. There are many aspects of a comprehensive safety program, including the use of student leadership through school patrols; the supervision of vehicle and instruction of driver and passengers in school transportation; the preparation of teachers for this relatively new field of instruction; and continued research. Safety education also entails responsibility for finance, law, and community relationships. Although it is always difficult to measure the intangible effects of education, the visible trend of a lower accident rate among children of school age since the development of safety education testifies to its value. New activities now being introduced promise even greater benefits. Traffic safety education evolved to meet a real social need. Because of the urgency of this need and because the education profession recognized some measure of responsibility for the safety of school children, safety education has developed on a scale equalled by few other areas of the school program.

William G. Carr, Washington, D. C., is Executive Secretary of the National Education Association and has been a member of the NEA headquarters staff since 1929. Mr. Carr has taught at Pacific University, Stanford University, the Universities of Michigan and California, and Columbia University. He served for a time as Director of Research in the California Teachers Association. He is Secretary General of the World Confederation of Organizations of the Teaching Profession. He served as consultant to the United States Delegation of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945 and as Deputy Secretary to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization Conference in London the same year. He is the author of numerous books and pamphlets.

ROLE OF THE SCHOOL IN TRAFFIC SAFETY

"NO CAUSE, not even the highest and purest, can prosper in our day without making education its ally." These words of Horace Mann, spoken in 1857, are equally true today. We can truly say that traffic safety cannot prosper without making education its ally.

The schools view traffic safety as one segment of safety education in general. Safety education, in turn, involves the principles of learning applicable to all areas of the school program.

In addition, safety education is guided by other principles. One of these is that the best framework for learning safety education is the total school program. Thus, the learning of safe behavior accrues for the most part within the scope of basic learnings, with little additional teaching effort. Although recognized as a specific area of instruction, much safety is learned in such areas as social studies, science, and language arts. Through safety education, also, one of the fundamental roles of the total program is demonstrated: education for citizenship. Finally, it should be stressed that the schools look upon safety education as a means to enable people to survive and to live effectively. Using a positive approach, it prepares for the satisfactions and blessings of life.

PIONEER EFFORTS

Generally, the origin of any program is subject to controversy. This is true of safety education. Although its growth has been most rapid during the last decade, elements were in evidence in elementary school textbooks as early as 1845. The emphasis in these earlier years was remedial rather than preventive teaching. It taught what to do in case of an accident rather than how to prevent one. It was not until the advent of the mass-produced automobile that

traffic safety education was emphasized. Once the hazards and possible tragedies of highway traffic were recognized, traffic safety education received attention which has increased continually to the present time.

A few school systems which pioneered in safety education are known. Early experimentation in a program that became the prototype of present-day instruction was conducted in 1918 by E. George Payne, President of Harris Teachers College in St. Louis, Missouri.¹ Coming from several parts of the country to observe the program, teachers returned home convinced that the plan was practical. In 1919, Detroit appointed a full time Supervising Instructor of Safety Education. At the same time a fourfold program was developed: a study of traffic accidents to school children; the construction of a course of study for elementary schools; instruction of college students in safety education; and co-operation with civic agencies concerned with safety.² Kansas City, Missouri, began an organized program of safety education in 1922. One feature of its program was the formation of student safety organizations and school safety patrols. Safety education programs in a number of other school systems were being developed at about the same time.

One milestone in the development of safety education was the publication in 1926 of *The Present Status of Safety Education*, the Twenty-Fifth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education. It outlined courses of study and methods in safety education for ele-

¹ Herbert J. Stack and J. Duke Elkow, *Education for Safe Living*, 3d edition (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1957), p. 6.

² National Society for the Study of Education, *The Present Status of Safety Education, Twenty-Fifth Yearbook, Part I* (Bloomington, Ill.: Public School Publishing Company, 1926), p. 61.

mentary and secondary schools and reviewed the status of safety education in teacher-training institutions. Recognition by the Society of the public demand for, and acceptance of, safety education as a part of the purpose of education attracted general attention.

ACTIVITIES OF NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

Activity in safety education by the National Education Association dates back at least to 1919 when, at the annual meeting in Milwaukee, Albert Wurts Whitney addressed delegates on the topic, "Safety Education in the Public Schools." Concluding the address, Whitney said:

It cannot be given all of us to fight for freedom, but the fight for safety, the fight for the real adventure, the fight for a life that shall be the measure of a purpose instead of the marred result of purposeless chance, is within the right of us all—it should be particularly within the right of every pupil in the public schools.

During the following years, the NEA developed safety education programs through its existing units. A major step to co-ordinate these efforts was taken in the late 1930's, when the NEA Research Division developed the "Safety Education Projects," a series of publications helping teachers plan safety education activities.

In April 1937, the Executive Committee of the American Association of School Administrators selected safety education as the topic for its 1940 yearbook. Many superintendents, they stated, felt that "the time had come for the organized profession to take a more positive stand on the safety movement." Timely in its appearance, the Yearbook, *Safety Education*, was immediately popular and has continued to serve as a standard reference work.

In June 1943, the National Education Association decided to supply some leadership and service in this area and to help other NEA units provide safety education services. The NEA Executive Committee, therefore, established the National Commission on Safety Education. Members of the Commission were to represent a cross section of educational levels and responsibilities. Since its organization, the Commission has met annually to review the past year's activities and to plan others to be undertaken during the year ahead. Its program has been supported largely through grants from the Automotive Safety Foundation.

In general, the purpose of the Commission is to increase the safety of children, youth, and adults by stimulating awareness on the part of schools, colleges, and universities to the need for safety education and by helping them to develop programs of instruction. These programs stress safety as a necessary part of a curriculum based on the sound educational policies and practices which guide all other programs in schools and colleges. Although the Commission gives particular attention to traffic safety, it strives to maintain a broad program.

PROGRAMS AT DIFFERENT SCHOOL LEVELS

When a child passes over the threshold of school for the first time, he enters what is to him at the moment a new world in which many new experiences await him. In starting him on his path to learning, his teachers try to make these experiences benefit rather than confuse or overwhelm him. One area which meets this criterion is safety education. Teachers know that all learning depends on the physical and emotional well-being of their pupils and that safety education helps to instill the feel-

ing of security essential to the child's learning.

School safety in the elementary grades is a combination of protection and education. At the beginning, major emphasis is placed on protection. As children mature, the ratio of protection to education gradually changes towards an emphasis on education. During this time they learn how to recognize hazards, to eliminate them when possible, to avoid them, or to live with them safely if no alternative exists. They learn how to provide for their own protection through the development of good judgment, and thus they are able to meet the varying conditions in life more safely, and with confidence and zest.

Although traffic safety education in the elementary schools emphasizes pedestrian practices, this instruction is actually a forerunner of driver education. Children learn the places where it is safe to walk, traffic patterns and practices of automobiles, traffic signs and signals, and traffic laws and regulations. On this foundation they are well oriented for instruction in the safe operation of motor vehicles.

Children take another step in traffic citizenship when they learn the safe operation of bicycles. Teachers and administrators recognize that the safety of bicycle riders in an increasingly congested traffic stream is, in part, a school responsibility. Instruction generally includes discussions and demonstrations—often after regular school hours and with the help of police—on correct riding practices, traffic regulations, and care of bicycles. Students develop skills through practice on a marked course. Bicycle licensing usually depends on the student's ability to pass a written examination on material covered in class, on a skill test in riding, and on the mechanical condition of his bicycle.³

³ National Education Association, National Commission on Safety Education, *Bicycle*

The school safety patrol illustrates the combined protection-education concept. Boys and girls who show potential qualities of leadership serve the school by guiding student traffic at street intersections and other locations around the school. They protect other children against traffic hazards and, at the same time, learn to identify hazards and to develop judgment and practices for avoiding them.⁴

When it is necessary to control traffic on heavily traveled streets around the school, the schools co-operate with the police department. In addition to traffic officers, who have given faithful service to schools throughout the country, schools and police departments in recent years have been experimenting with adult crossing guards. These guards are citizens in the community who, after a training program, devote the hours around the opening and closing of the school day to helping children cross dangerous streets and highways safely.⁵

Secondary schools

Although driver education was established as recently as the early 1930's, it has spread more rapidly than any other school program. Its rapid growth can be attributed to wide public interest and the need recognized by educators. Appalled by the rapidly increasing death rate from motor vehicle accidents, a few people originally saw in this human wasteland an obligation for education. They concluded that roads and automobiles alone could not be engineered to guarantee safety in traffic. Nor could one contemplate law enforcement by

Safety in Action (Washington, D. C.: The Commission, 1950).

⁴ National Education Association, National Commission on Safety Education, *The Expanding Role of School Patrols* (Washington, D. C.: The Commission, 1953).

⁵ Northwestern University, The Traffic Institute, *Adult Guards for School Crossings* (Evanston, Ill.: The Institute, 1958), p. 1.

enough officials to observe all traffic at all times. Finally, because accident investigations time and again traced the causes to driving errors, it was concluded that proper education of the driver could appreciably reduce these accidents. The basic need was to develop responsible citizens.

It is impossible to identify with assurance the school which was the first to offer a course of driver education. Generally accepted as a pioneer in driver education, however, is Amos E. Neyhart, who in 1933-34 established a course for the preparation of driver education teachers at the Pennsylvania State College, now The Pennsylvania State University. From small beginnings in the early 1930's, driver education expanded until in the postwar year of 1947-48, a total of 210,133 students received instruction in 3,055 schools. Further growth of the program is evident from figures of the 1956-57 school year when 1,123,164 students were enrolled in 11,273 programs.⁶

Driver education is not merely learning how to steer, shift, turn, back, and stop. Manipulative skills are only part of the total instruction. Driver education consists also in learning how to anticipate hazards and how to compensate for them. It consists of learning how to drive under varying conditions of traffic, weather, roadways, and terrain. In the classroom as well as in the car, each student uses science and mathematics. He learns to apply such physical laws as kinetic energy, centrifugal force, and friction. He studies human characteristics and their effect on driving. He learns to understand himself better—his physical, mental, and emotional characteristics. He learns to compensate for limitations he finds in himself by adopting specific driving techniques. He learns traffic laws and ordi-

⁶ Figures reported by the Association of Casualty and Surety Companies.

nances and their enforcement by state and local police. But equal emphasis is placed on courteous driving—the type of driving which characterizes a responsible and considerate citizen.

National Conference on Driver Education

From its origin in the early 1930's until the late 1940's, driver education extended from community to community with little professional guidance and communication. For example, besides work offered by a few colleges and universities, teachers were being prepared through short courses given by interested organizations. It was felt, however, that the benefits of driver education on a national basis depended upon program policies and standards developed by the profession itself.

As a result, the first National Conference on High School Driver Education was held at Jackson's Mill, West Virginia, in October 1949. This was followed by National Conferences on Driver Education in East Lansing, Michigan, in November 1953 and in Lafayette, Indiana, in September 1958. Administered by the NEA National Commission on Safety Education, these conferences were cosponsored by several other NEA units and by the Council of Chief State School Officers.

Although the conferences have no authority to enforce standards, many of their recommendations have been followed by state departments of education and school systems throughout the country. It is generally recommended that each student receive a minimum of 30 hours of classroom instruction and 6 hours of practice driving instruction. Other important recommendations describe standards of teacher preparation, the role of the state department of education, course content, selection of students, and materials of instruction.

Summer and evening schools were also recognized as opportunities for teaching adults, youth who are out of school, and students not accommodated in the regular course. Perhaps no single activity has done more to raise standards in driver education and to bring about acceptance of them on a nationwide basis than the National Conferences on Driver Education.

Because driver education has been effective in preparing good citizens, and because some communities have not been able to finance this instruction, many states have adopted legislation setting up state-wide driver education programs including financial support. Altogether 14 states have adopted such legislation, and there are indications that several others plan to introduce similar bills in the coming session. Although the legislation varies in detail, it follows the general pattern of specifying who should pay for driver education, how much should be paid, how the money should be distributed, and who should receive the instruction. The sources of revenue tapped by state legislatures to support these programs are directly related to the use of automobiles and highways. Significantly related to such state interest is the study of highway problems, including traffic safety education, by a committee of the United States Congress.

Student councils and other youth groups have been giving attention to traffic safety in recent years. A program was organized on a national scale in 1956 through a meeting sponsored jointly by the NEA National Association of Student Councils and the NEA National Commission on Safety Education. Since that meeting, the National Association of Student Councils has adopted safety education as a major emphasis. Through a number of activities, local student councils have improved traffic practices by young people.

Colleges and universities

A problem parallel to financing driver education programs has been supplying an adequate number of qualified teachers. After World War II, the public interest in the program was almost explosive in force. Not only was there an insufficient number of teachers to train the students, but there were very few colleges and universities equipped to prepare the teachers.

Although organized at the start as an emergency measure, quick response to the demand for teachers resulted.

In 1935, there were no teachers specifically prepared to give driver education courses. By 1957, there were over 15,000 teachers so prepared. In 1936, there were no college professors specifically prepared to instruct high school teachers for traffic safety work. Now, we have over 700 professors so prepared.⁷

During these years standards for the selection and preparation of teachers have been continually raised. This emergency phase of teacher preparation is being replaced by more comprehensive college offerings for driver education teachers leading to certification by state education departments.

Evidence of the widespread participation by colleges and universities in traffic safety education is revealed by a recently completed survey. Conducted jointly by the United States Office of Education and the NEA National Commission on Safety Education, the survey reveals that 328 institutions—with at least one in every state and the District of Columbia—are now offering technical courses for personnel in the education, enforcement, engineering, and adminis-

⁷ Amos E. Neyhart, "Forecasts in Driver Education" (An address delivered at the First Annual Conference of the American Driver and Safety Education Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, June 29, 1957).

trative phases of traffic and safety. Many of these courses are found in undergraduate and graduate curricula; others are short course programs designed especially for on-the-job personnel and ranging from highway maintenance conferences to traffic safety seminars for newspapermen. In addition, seven universities—four of them land-grant institutions—have established specialized centers, bureaus, or institutes. Their activities include teacher preparation programs, extension courses, community services, research, and campus safety programs.

Because a program can only be built on a fund of verified knowledge, leaders in traffic safety education have been conducting considerable research. Studies have been made by colleges and universities, through their advanced degree programs, and by professional organizations such as the NEA National Commission on Safety Education. At one time these studies were concerned with estimating the value of driver education. There is now such general public endorsement that emphasis is shifting to studying the characteristics of drivers and traffic accidents. Recent studies have investigated the value of existing driver education tests and measurements. Others have sought to discover improved teaching devices and techniques, a promising area for further exploration.

SCHOOL TRANSPORTATION

Transporting children to and from school each day comprises one of the largest transportation systems in the world. During the 1955-56 school year, well over ten million children were transported in almost 160,000 vehicles at an operating expenditure of over \$356 million.

The fleets of motor vehicles operated by school districts today show little resemblance to the first efforts at school

transportation. Pupils were transported to school as early as 1840. In 1869 the Massachusetts Legislature authorized the raising of public funds for school transportation through taxation. And in 1895 a National Education Association committee reported that school transportation had spread throughout New England and into New Jersey.⁸ Carriages, buckboards, and other horse-drawn vehicles were the mode of transportation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was not until after 1910 that the motor vehicle came into use. Even today, in some of the sparsely settled areas of the country, school children rely on horses, boats, and other conveyances to reach school or their designated school bus stops.

Although distance from school was once the sole criterion which decided whether a pupil would ride or walk to school, this is being modified by considerations of safety. According to *School Transportation*, the 1953 Yearbook of the NEA Department of Rural Education, "need for the service in congested areas and along busy highways cannot be determined equitably on the basis of distance. For children having to walk a mile both to and from school along a busy highway, the basic problem is not distance but safety. Recognition of this has resulted in greatly expanded transportation services by many school systems."⁹

In addition to financing the program—some school systems have reported up to 25 per cent of the school budget committed to transportation—at least three problem areas confront the administrator in providing a safe school transporta-

⁸ Austin Ruel Meadows, *Safety and Economy in School Bus Transportation* (Montgomery, Ala.: The Wetumpka Printing Company, 1940), pp. 13-14.

⁹ National Education Association, Department of Rural Education, *Pupil Transportation, Yearbook 1953* (Washington, D. C.: The Department, 1953), p. 12.

tion system. These are the driver, the bus, and the pupil.

Selection and training of qualified drivers continue to be the primary problem in many areas. Because of the part-time nature of school bus driving, it is difficult to find persons with the proper qualifications who are available when needed. Conversely, many persons are available because they are not qualified for other kinds of work. Some schools have successfully used garage mechanics and others who could leave their regular work temporarily. Others have combined bus driving with other school work. Housewives have made good records as drivers. Some states have used student drivers with great success.

Training for all drivers has increasingly come to include both instruction given before a driver begins his job and special training while he is in service. Both types of training have become so important that all states now have at least some standards for school bus drivers, and in most states the department of education or some other state agency gives leadership and assistance in providing school bus driver training.¹⁰

The vehicle itself is the second consideration in planning a safe school transportation program. Although several states had developed some standards for school buses early in the 1930's, organized efforts by school transportation leaders did not begin until 1939 when the first national conference on school transportation was held. Bringing together representatives of school systems, state departments of education, and business and industry, these conferences have demonstrated how good

¹⁰ E. Glenn Featherston, *Requirements and Training Programs for School Bus Drivers*, circular No. 465 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education, March 1956), p. 1.

working relationships between the schools and industry can be developed to solve common problems. The purpose of these conferences has been to establish minimum standards for the construction of school buses, thus leading to greater safety and economy.¹¹ A survey conducted by the United States Office of Education in 1956 revealed that all states had adopted at least some of the recommendations.¹²

Selection and training of the driver and the manufacture of the bus are, of course, carried out for the safety of the children. Students themselves, however, can contribute much to their own safety, and they receive instruction for this purpose. Both for transportation to and from school and for extended educational trips, schools have been training boys and girls in proper conduct in the school bus. In many school transportation systems, older students who have demonstrated leadership and maturity have been selected to assist drivers as school bus patrols. They assist the loading of the bus, supervise the behavior of students during the trip, and guide children in crossing streets and highways at bus stops. The experience is mutually beneficial to the patrol members and to the children in their charge.

PROGRESS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

If "the proof of the pudding is in the eating," the value of traffic safety education must be judged by the results experienced. Although difficulties are inherent in appraising a program as di-

¹¹ National Education Association, National Commission on Safety Education, *Minimum Standards for School Buses*, revised edition (Washington, D. C.: The Commission, 1954), p. 6.

¹² E. Glenn Featherston, *State School Bus Standards*, circular No. 466 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education, March 1956), p. 1.

versified as traffic safety education, certain benefits can be pointed out. Perhaps the most remarkable fact credited largely to continuing programs of school traffic safety education concerns children 5 to 14 years of age. During a 40-year period, the motor vehicle death rate for this age group has increased only 7 per cent contrasted with increases for all other age groups ranging from 147 per cent for children under 5 years of age to 737 per cent for persons 15 to 24 years old. Even more noteworthy is the fact that during the years 1923 to 1932—when traffic safety education was just getting underway—the average number of accidental deaths from all causes for the 5 to 14 year olds was 9,500. In 1956, accidental deaths for this same age group numbered 6,300—a reduction of 33 per cent.¹³

From trends which have been established and which are continuing, we can observe some prospects for the future. Taking driver education as an example, we see that well over half of the country's secondary schools now offer the course. According to some studies, the spread of a desirable educational practice or program through the first 3 per cent of the schools requires about 15 years. And 50 years pass before the practice or program is diffused throughout all schools.¹⁴ Yet driver education, from its beginnings around 1934, had already spread to many more than 3 per cent of the schools by the end of the 15-year period in 1949; and today, less than 25 years since the first programs, it has spread to about 60 per cent of the high schools. The over-all highway death rate has dropped from 16 deaths

¹³ National Safety Council, *Accident Facts*, (Chicago: the Council, 1957).

¹⁴ Paul R. Mort and Donald H. Ross, *Principles of School Administration*, 2d edition (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1957), pp. 181-82.

per hundred million vehicle miles in 1935 to 6 in 1957.

The trend established in the growth of traffic safety education in college and university programs can be expected to continue and even increase. Significant demonstrations of interest in such education are comprehensive centers and institutes on campus and advanced degree programs in safety education.

Finally, the professional growth of driver and safety education teachers reflects the development of this field. By 1950 only a handful of state professional associations had been organized. Today there are at least 35 such state associations, more than half of these being sections of, or affiliated with, their state education associations. Until 1956, no national professional association of driver and safety education teachers existed. Near the end of that year, the American Driver and Safety Education Association was formed and, in less than two years of its existence, has already engaged in a number of significant activities.

The future design of traffic safety education may be partially viewed through recommendations made at the December 1957 Public Officials Traffic Safety Conference, sponsored by the President's Committee for Traffic Safety. The recommendations of the Education Section included the following: improvement of teacher preparation by including safety education in all preparatory programs, providing well qualified college instructors, and establishing adequate standards for driver education teachers; expansion of college activities to include more extension courses, research, preparatory programs for highway and traffic safety personnel, and centers for community advisory and information services; evening and summer school for youth and adult driver education programs; driver education as a prerequisite for obtaining a driver's license before a

person is eighteen years old; and improved standards for the selection and training of school bus drivers.¹⁵

These examples of the beginnings, present growth, and future prospects of traffic safety education are highlights only. However, they tell the reader in outline the story of a pressing social need and the response of teachers and the public to that need. It is a story similar to that of the development of other areas of education, but traffic safety education is unique in the speed with which it was organized, integrated with other areas of learning, and extended to schools throughout the country.

While benefiting from appropriate as-

¹⁵ The President's Committee for Traffic Safety, *Immediate Needs and Long-Range Objectives*, Report of the 1957 Public Officials Traffic Safety Conference (Washington, D. C.: The Committee, 1958), p. 7.

sistance of nonschool agencies, safety education is expanding as a function and responsibility of the schools and colleges. As with other learning, students need the continued guidance of professional workers to develop and mature as citizens. They need this learning organized in a way which will provide them with the right amount of the right kind of instruction, offered at the right time. They need the proper climate in which this learning can occur: the climate of trust and understanding between teacher and student. As long as it continues to be founded on sound educational principles and is taught by means of sound educational method, safety education will continue to grow and improve in the future as it already has done. In so doing, it will help each citizen contribute to the well-being of others and at the same time enjoy a full life.

Automotive Design Contributions to Highway Safety

By CHARLES A. CHAYNE

ABSTRACT: The automobile industry has an intense interest in highway safety, prompted by both humanitarian and economic considerations. Designing safety into cars is a major objective of the industry. Progress in vehicle safety helps greatly to reduce traffic hazards, but it is not a panacea. Automobile manufacturers can encourage and facilitate safe driving, but they cannot guarantee it nor provide immunity to the consequences of unsafe driving. Designing safety into automobiles is a complex operation. Many technical, economic, and legal factors must be carefully considered to assure that innovations are practical and in the public interest. Automotive safety development involves both co-operative industry-wide activities and competitive efforts. Both have important values. The automobile industry's interest in safety dates from its earliest days. Outstanding examples of steady progress include greatly enhanced durability, improved brakes, lighting and steering, welded all-steel bodies, safety glass, improved tires, increased field of vision, better suspension, and various designs and devices for protection against crash injury. The better performance of today's cars at normal speeds is often a safety aid. Increased horsepower has not resulted in a substantial increase in maximum speed. Much further progress in automotive safety can be expected. However, the driverless or "driverproof" car is not imminent.

Charles A. Chayne, Detroit, Michigan, is Vice-President in charge of the Engineering Staff of General Motors Corporation. He was formerly Chief Engineer of Buick Motor Division. In 1918-19, he was associated with the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and from 1919 to 1926 with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as Instructor in mechanical engineering. He entered the automobile industry in 1926. Mr. Chayne is a member of the Corporation of M.I.T., several engineering societies, and two engineering fraternities.

THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY'S INTEREST IN HIGHWAY SAFETY

THE AUTOMOBILE industry has a natural and intense interest in highway traffic safety. Over the years, this industry has been in the forefront of the concerted campaign of governmental and private agencies to reduce the tragic, costly, and needless toll of traffic accidents. We have concerned ourselves both with our direct professional responsibility for the inherent safety of the motor vehicles we produce and with our corollary social responsibility to encourage their safe use on public highways. This interest and sense of responsibility stem primarily from the same humanitarian considerations which impel other groups to work for progress in this field. We share with all thinking persons a deep concern over the enormous suffering and loss caused by traffic accidents and a strong desire to help prevent them.

This basic motivation is reinforced by the direct and important economic stake which the automobile industry has in the safety of highway travel. Traffic accidents reflect adversely on the utility and pleasure to be derived from our products. Therefore, they represent a potential threat to the automobile market.

Traffic hazards also pose a threat to each automobile manufacturer's share of the total industry market. This is a highly competitive industry. A company can survive, let alone prosper, only if it consistently offers the kind of automobiles the public wants. Obviously, the public wants safe cars. Despite broad variations in people's definitions of "safe" and in their desires for specific safety features, few could be sold an unsafe car or one distinctly inferior to other makes in this respect.

We are, therefore, both as an industry and as individual companies, goaded to

work intensively for progress in the inherent safety of automobiles by the basic forces of America's competitive, free-enterprise system as well as by humane considerations. We must seek to excel in this respect just as in styling, performance, economy, comfort, and other major characteristics of our products. In fact, the overriding importance of safety demands that we give it a very high priority. The first objective of an automobile manufacturer might be said to be to build a car that will *move*. His second objective is to build one that will move *safely*. All other objectives are subordinate.

Speaking of personal urges, it should also be borne in mind that we in the motor car industry, and our families, use the automobiles we design and build—probably much more than most people. We thus have compelling personal reasons to want our cars safe to drive!

The interest of automobile manufacturers in highway safety stimulated by these several considerations is manifested in many ways.

It is indicated to an impressive degree by the large investment that has been made in laboratories and proving grounds for research, development, and test work bearing directly on vehicle safety—and by the continuing heavy expenditures for the operation of these facilities. Even more striking are the results of this work, in the form of a steady parade of new or improved safety features, from the early days of the automobile to the latest models.

Our interest is also manifested by the industry's many contributions to highway safety in areas other than vehicle design. For many years, automobile manufacturers, working both co-operatively and individually, have engaged in a broad variety of highly productive activities concerned with promoting better driving, improved traffic control, and more adequate highways.

The industry has also co-operated closely with public officials, research agencies, and safety organizations in a broad range of technical studies and development programs.

THE AUTOMOBILE IN THE HIGHWAY SAFETY PICTURE

A valid appraisal of the past and potential contributions of automotive design to highway safety demands clear recognition of the fact that the automobile is only one of the three principal elements involved in traffic accidents. The others are, of course, the highway and the driver. Self-evident as this is, it tends to become obscured in the minds of some persons. With incomplete knowledge of the facts, they are inclined to be overly critical of the motor vehicle as a causative factor in the accident picture—or overly sanguine about the degree of greater safety that can be achieved through further innovations in vehicle design.

Progress in automotive safety has unquestionably made a big contribution to reduction in the traffic accident rate. The still safer cars of the future will make a further contribution. However, it would be wholly unrealistic to pin major hope for greater traffic safety on vehicle improvements—just as it is grossly inaccurate to charge the vehicle with major responsibility for today's accident toll. Major gains will come only from a sound, balanced program that directs adequate attention to improvement of driver behavior and roads as well as of automobiles.

The driver is, of course, by far the most critical element in the whole picture. No matter how easy we may make it for him to drive safely, we cannot make cars "driverproof"—any more than highway engineers can achieve this theoretical objective in the roads they build. Traffic accident records indicate clearly

that driver errors are responsible for the overwhelming majority of traffic accidents. Even in the small percentage of cases where vehicle malfunctioning is involved, it is almost always traceable to the human error of improper maintenance. Accident records point up another significant fact that identifies the driver, rather than the vehicle, as the key causative factor. That is the wide disparity in the safety records of individual motorists and of different states and cities—despite the fact that the same kinds of automobiles are used universally.

The simple truth is that the modern automobile, with negligibly few exceptions, does not cause accidents. It is well designed for its basic function of providing safe, convenient, comfortable, and economical personal transportation. Trouble develops only when—as in the case of other useful things—it is misused.

The automobile manufacturer's responsibility—in terms of operational safety—is to strive to make misuse both less likely and less harmful, insofar as this can be accomplished through vehicle design. In addition, of course, he has the responsibility of providing a vehicle that has a high order of structural strength and mechanical reliability. Unfortunately, however, he can only encourage and facilitate safe driving. He cannot guarantee it, nor can he provide immunity to the consequences of unsafe driving.

We must, therefore, substitute realistic for wishful thinking in dealing with the automobile as a factor in the traffic accident problem. Continuing emphasis on development of greater inherent safety in the vehicle is imperative and will certainly be productive. But overemphasis on this—to the neglect of driver and highway improvement—will not provide maximum progress in highway safety.

AUTOMOTIVE DESIGN SAFETY DEVELOPMENT

The management of any enterprise has the responsibility of giving, to the best of its ability, their money's worth to both the investors in the business and its customers. The decisions involved in discharging this responsibility successfully are particularly critical in the automobile industry because of the very large commitments involved and the highly competitive nature of the business. Where considerations of vehicle safety are involved, decisions assume added importance because they so directly and critically affect public welfare. For these reasons, the manufacturer cannot afford to adopt a new design or device merely because it might contribute to safety and might find public acceptance. He must be as sure as possible that it will. Such assurance is gained only through painstaking study, test, and evaluation of the proposal.

Designing safety into the automobile is, like most endeavors, a more complex task than appears on the surface. It demands consideration of a host of governing factors not always readily apparent to outsiders. The first question that must be answered is whether the proposed design or device really will enhance safety. Too often, something which appears superficially desirable is found to have drawbacks which would actually make its adoption dangerous. An example is the use of speed governors on automobiles. Their advocates overlook the vital fact that, aside from other technical disadvantages, such devices would critically increase traffic hazards in many instances by denying drivers the accelerating ability needed for safe passing and certain other maneuvers.

Even in cases where a proposal has obvious safety values it must be borne in mind that safety is a relative term. Design-wise, we cannot properly speak

of an automobile as "safe" or "unsafe." We can only evaluate the degree of safety built into it. This degree is not determined solely by the maker's interest in safety, simply because safety cannot be treated in many cases as an isolated element of vehicle design. Despite its critical importance, it must be considered in relation to other essential elements to assure a soundly designed, well-manufactured, and acceptable product. This sometimes demands the best possible compromise, either between different safety features or between a safety feature and some other vital characteristic of the automobile. For example, the extent to which front corner pillars can be narrowed for better driver visibility is limited by the demands of structural support for the top.

Practicability is another hurdle which many vehicle safety proposals cannot readily surmount. A case in point is the suggestion for a front bumper capable of absorbing high impact forces. Theoretically appealing, this proposal must be rejected when it is realized that any such device would have to extend several feet ahead of the car to be effective at even relatively low speeds.

Another important consideration is whether or not a new device can be adopted without creating critical new hazards during the transition period when large numbers of older cars on the roads are not equipped with it. This factor was one of the major considerations in the decision not to adopt polarized headlights. Installation of such lights on new cars would present an intolerable glare problem to drivers of older cars for the several years pending their universal employment.

Closely allied to this issue is the question of whether or not motorists would actually use a safety device under consideration. Perhaps the classic example is seat belts. The disinclination of the vast majority of motorists to buy or use

them, at least up to the present time, accounts for the fact that they have not been included as standard equipment in new automobiles.

Another important point which the manufacturer must consider—and which outsiders often overlook—is the legality of a proposed design or device. State laws or administrative rulings govern the characteristics of many vehicle components. The manufacturer must either comply with such regulations or recommend their modification. The latter alternative, which may involve years of negotiation to obtain the necessary concurrence of all 48 states, is reserved as a practical matter for innovations of such outstanding and unquestionable merit that the interests of the public strongly warrant this action.

One more important point deserving mention here is the consideration the manufacturer must give to the question of whether a new safety device should be standard equipment or an extra-cost option. This question arises, of course, only after the intrinsic merits of the item have been conclusively established and practical methods for its manufacture and installation have been devised.

The answer involves careful study of both engineering and marketing factors. In some cases, the advantages of a new safety feature may be so impressive that its immediate application on all new cars is considered virtually imperative. Typical examples are safety glass, sealed-beam head lamps, and interlocking door locks.

In many cases, however, the issue is not so clear cut. When the device in question is clearly an aid to safe driving but something less than a vital necessity, the method of its introduction must be determined primarily on the basis of probable desirability and acceptance by the motoring public.

In many cases, safety equipment first introduced as an optional item subse-

quently is adopted as standard equipment when public demand becomes substantial enough. Examples of this are stoplamps, windshield wipers, and direction signals. This trend in certain types of safety equipment in the "helpful but not essential" category parallels the evolution of many other automotive devices from the optional to the standard category.

AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION FOR VEHICLE SAFETY WORK

Vehicle safety development work by the automobile industry involves both competitive and co-operative efforts.

In some instances, co-ordinated industry-wide action will clearly best serve the public interest. Such was the case in the co-operative program for the development and improvement of the sealed beam headlamp. All vehicle manufacturers and the lighting industry participated in this vital program, with the close co-operation of state motor vehicle authorities. This resulted in a valuable pooling of engineering talent and facilities, assured simultaneous industry-wide adoption of improvements, and facilitated necessary state approvals.

However, the spur of competition often best serves the public interest in terms of new safety features just as it does with respect to many other automotive advances. As long as people want ever greater safety in the cars they buy, no manufacturer can afford to lag behind his competitors in this field. This competitive force has contributed to numerous advances. It will continue to be a vital force for progress as long as the basic control of this developmental work remains in the hands of the automobile industry.

Within each automobile company, vehicle safety commands the active attention of top management. It is not a "down-the-line" activity of concern only to a few technicians.

I can best indicate the handling of this element of vehicle design by outlining the setup in my own company, General Motors. The basic feature of the General Motors organization plan is "decentralized responsibility with co-ordinated control." This organizational concept has been highly successful in facilitating progress in vehicle safety as well as in other respects.

Each automotive division—competing with other GM divisions as well as with other companies—seeks constantly to improve the safety of its products. This, incidentally, accounts for the fact that some safety innovations have first appeared on only one line of cars.

The divisions' independent work is aided and supplemented by the automotive safety programs of certain corporation staffs. The Engineering Staff is particularly active in this work, using its laboratories and proving grounds extensively for development and test work bearing on all facets of vehicle safety.

Top management supervision and policy making in regard to vehicle safety are exercised primarily through several policy committees whose areas of interest encompass this subject. These include the committees on research, engineering, styling, and distribution. The deliberations of these committees, plus day-by-day management operations, bring to bear on vehicle safety the co-ordinated thinking of the senior executives of the corporation.

Activities such as these in individual companies are supplemented by continuing liaison, both formal and informal, among the several members of the industry. The extent of such liaison in this highly competitive industry is one impressive testimonial to the automobile manufacturers' active and sincere interest in traffic safety.

The basic mechanism for industry-wide efforts on vehicle safety is the Engineering Advisory Committee of the

Automobile Manufacturers Association. This committee serves as a medium for continuing joint consideration of developments of mutual interest and for administration of co-operative projects. It serves also as the formal link between the automobile manufacturers and the state authorities responsible for motor vehicle regulation, the latter being represented through the engineering committee of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators. This industry-government link for many years has proved highly effective as a means of facilitating exchange of information and suggestions and as a medium for the co-operative solution of many of the technical and legal problems involved in automotive safety.

Industry-wide co-operative action in this field has also been encouraged and facilitated through the activities of the Society of Automotive Engineers. This independent professional organization has made many outstanding contributions to progress in vehicle safety, notably in the development of proper standards for materials and equipment. SAE standards on such safety items as windshield and window glass, brake fluids, and seat belts are adhered to by the automobile manufacturers and are widely used by state authorities as the basis for official specifications.

Joint action on vehicle safety is also represented by the co-operation of the industry in studies and projects of many outside agencies interested in traffic safety. These include the National Safety Council, Highway Research Board, associations of public officials, and several universities.

REVIEW OF PROGRESS IN AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY

The surge of interest during the past two or three years in some quarters in the subject of automobile safety characteristics might suggest to the unin-

formed that a new concept had been developed in the field of traffic safety. Nothing could be further from the truth. Automobile manufacturers have been actively concerned with the inherent safety of their products since the earliest days of the industry. This is conclusively demonstrated by the steady parade of new safety features in cars down through the years. Many of the improvements which today stand as major milestones in vehicle safety progress were adopted a generation or more ago.

In the early years, automobile manufacturers were necessarily concerned to a great extent with the basic reliability of vehicle components. The science of metallurgy was in its infancy. Production standards and inspection methods had not been developed very far. And test facilities were scanty. Under these pioneering conditions, breakdowns were frequent. Many failures represented a serious threat to safety as well as to the over-all utility of the automobile. Occasionally a front spindle or kingpin would break—and off would come a front wheel. Complete loss of steering control would result when a broken ball stud on a pitman arm or spindle arm disconnected the drag link. Shifting of the rear axle as a result of a broken rear spring would act through a brake rod to apply one brake and cause a sudden swerve.

These are a few examples typical of the serious safety problems posed by the structural and mechanical shortcomings of early cars. The fact that such failures are almost unheard of today and have not, in fact, been a real problem for many years is a tribute to the earnest and successful efforts of automotive manufacturers to improve the inherent safety of cars.

The early years of the automobile also witnessed many significant developments in vehicle equipment directly and intimately related to safe driving and

occupant protection—ranging from the addition of doors on automobile bodies to the installation of rear-view mirrors.

Probably the most outstanding was the steady improvement in headlighting. Early motorists had to depend on horse and buggy oil lamps, which were little more than marker lights. A few years later came carbide and acetylene lamps. These provided more road illumination, but they were messy and hazardous to use and they also introduced the problem of glare. Since automotive electric lighting systems were first developed, there has been a steady progression of marked improvements in headlighting. In 1912, electric lights became standard equipment on some cars. Ensuing years witnessed intensive study and development work in this field, in the interest of greater lamp efficiency, increased candlepower, and better light distribution.

Through the "middle years" of the automobile age—the 1920's and 1930's—safety advances continued at an accelerating pace.

In the field of occupant protection, the two greatest single advances made to date were represented by the general adoption of safety glass in the mid-20's and the welded all-steel body in the mid-30's. The subsequent prevention of traffic accident injuries and deaths which can be credited to these innovations is incalculable.

The whole list of improvements made to facilitate safe driving is far too long to be included here. However, some outstanding examples will illustrate the continuing intensive attention directed to this objective.

Perhaps most noteworthy were the improvements in braking performance. In 1923, came the substitution of four-wheel for two-wheel brakes. This greatly reduced stopping distance. Then hydraulic brakes were introduced. This made a marked further improvement in uniformity of brake performance and

also in the ease of brake application. Concurrently, there was steady improvement in the design and quality of brake system components.

The 1920's and 1930's also saw the introduction of many other safety features that are taken for granted today but were hailed as major advances at the time. Among them were dual automatic windshield wipers, inside sun visors, windshield washers and defrosters, direction signals, dual tail and stop lamps, headlamp beam indicators, adjustable front seats, headlamp dimmer switches, greatly improved tires, sturdier frames, and independent front suspension.

At the close of this period of automotive history came the biggest advance in headlighting since the introduction of electric lights. This was the original sealed beam lamp introduced on 1940 models. This provided for the first time standard, interchangeable lamp units for all makes of cars. The lamp's sealed, single-unit construction had a much longer life. It produced greatly increased illumination and at the same time improved control of glare from the lower beam.

Post World War II progress

Progress in the safety of vehicle design and equipment has continued unabated in the postwar period.

Recognition of the vital importance of good vehicle lighting to safe night driving has prompted intensive further development work in this field. This resulted in the adoption, in 1955, of an improved sealed beam lamp which provided still better road illumination, especially on the low beam. And now, in 1958, has come industry-wide adoption of the four headlamp system, another major forward step.

Another major postwar safety innovation has been the great improvement in the field of vision provided by the wrap-around windshield, narrower pillars, and

increased area of side and rear windows. These design changes not only reduce the blind areas in the driver's field of vision but also provide the advantage of making cars ahead less of a view obstruction.

The development of power brakes and power steering for passenger cars has also contributed to greater safety. These power aids make safe, sure control much easier and also contribute importantly to the reduction of driver fatigue.

Safer driving has also been encouraged and facilitated by such recently offered devices as the automatic headlight beam control and speedometers which provide a speed warning.

Vehicle safety research and development in recent years has also produced several important new features for crash injury protection. Noteworthy among these are instrument panel padding, recessed control knobs, interlocking door locks, recessed steering wheels, and seat belts.

Continuing studies are under way to develop new and improved protective measures. This work is being increasingly aided by the growing volume of factual data being collected on the nature and sources of injuries in traffic accidents.

Many other automotive advances, although developed for other primary reasons, have also made impressive corollary contributions to safety. Steadily improved suspension systems, for example, have aided safety, as well as comfort, by enhancing road stability and handling ease. Air suspension, the latest forward step in this field, has made important further contributions to safety. The level ride it provides under all load conditions maintains uniform position of the headlight beams and avoids reduction of rear-view mirror sight distance when the rear of the car is heavily laden.

Heat-absorbing and glare-reducing glass helps materially to maintain driver

fitness by reducing eye strain and general fatigue. Contrary to the impression of some persons, such glass does not cause a significant reduction in night visibility.

Air conditioning, too, has proved to be a distinct boon to safe driving by reducing driver fatigue, decreasing wind noise, and preventing the entry of insects.

Another of the many basic vehicle advances which might be cited as aids to safe driving is the automatic transmission. This promotes safety by permitting the driver to devote full attention to the basic operations of steering, braking, and accelerating. It also facilitates better operation on grades and on slippery surfaces.

Finally, some comment is in order on the relation of engine power and performance to highway safety.

There is a widely held misconception that the substantial increase in automobile horsepower in recent years has critically aggravated speed hazards. The first fact which must be understood is that vehicle speed has not risen in the same proportion as vehicle horsepower. During a period when average horsepower has doubled, there has been only a slight increase in average maximum speed.

Moreover, greater top speed has not been the objective of automotive engineers in raising horsepower. One compelling reason for increasing horsepower has been to meet the demands of the growing number of power-consuming accessories on cars. Soft-riding modern tires also call for increased power to compensate for their added rolling resistance.

Another reason for the increase in horsepower has been to achieve better acceleration at normal highway driving speeds. This has proved to be a distinct safety factor in modern traffic. It can greatly reduce a driver's exposure to

collision hazards in such maneuvers as passing on a two-lane highway or entering a fast stream of traffic.

Almost from the beginning, the maximum speed of which cars have been capable has been well in excess of legal and prudent limits on public highways. This does not mean, however, that the manufacturers have encouraged or condoned driving at excessively fast speed. A speed capability beyond normal operating maximums is desirable for two reasons. First, it provides an emergency reserve which can sometimes help a driver avoid an impending collision. Secondly, it reduces engine strain and wear by permitting operation at speeds well below the engine's capacity even on modern superhighways.

It should also be borne in mind that such increase in maximum speeds as has developed in recent years does not represent a critical aggravation of traffic hazards.

It must also be recognized that few drivers actually operate at extremely high speeds and that most accidents occur at relatively moderate speeds. Speed is primarily a factor in accidents in terms of speed too fast for conditions—not extremely high speed per se. In fact, reliable data indicate that most accidents involve speeds of less than 50 miles an hour.

Further evidence that increased horsepower is not resulting in increased speed hazards is contained in studies of prevailing speeds on highways. Over the past several years, there has been a negligible increase in average highway speeds of passenger cars, and there is no apparent difference in the speeds at which cars of varying top-speed capabilities are being operated.

Finally, it seems highly significant that during the period of 1941 to 1957, when average vehicle horsepower increased more than 100 per cent, the traffic fatality rate per 100 million ve-

hicle miles dropped almost 50 per cent.

In the light of these several considerations, it is clear that the better performance of today's automobiles is not an added traffic hazard, but is, rather, a definite safety aid in the hands of prudent drivers.

A LOOK AT THE FUTURE IN AUTOMOBILE SAFETY

Responsible forecasting is always difficult and usually possible only within rather narrow limits. This is especially true of any attempt to predict what the automobile of the future will be like—in terms of safety or other characteristics. However, some probable general trends can be indicated for the relatively near future, along with some intriguing long-range possibilities.

First of all, further enhancement of the inherent safety of automobiles will continue to be an urgent requirement. Despite the heartening prospect of a vastly improved highway system and the likelihood of increasingly effective programs of driver education and control, it unfortunately appears that traffic accidents will continue to be a critical problem for several years.

One important reason for this outlook is the prospect of growing exposure to accidents in terms of traffic volume. Motor vehicle registrations and travel are certain to increase substantially with our growing population, rising standard of living, and increasing dependency on personal transportation.

This clearly demands that automobile manufacturers continue and intensify their efforts to make safe driving as easy as possible and to afford maximum possible protection to those involved in accidents. As in the past, however, the progress resulting from such efforts is likely to be evolutionary—not revolutionary—within the foreseeable future.

Continuing progress is certain to come

in many basic areas of vehicle design and performance which are intimately related to safety. These include brakes, headlights, road stability, and others which have been the subject of intensive study and development over the years.

Further gains in crash injury protection are also to be anticipated, although it would be wishful thinking to expect any "major breakthrough" in this area in the near future that would provide anything closely approaching immunity from serious injury in high impact collisions. We probably will develop acceptable methods for "packaging" passengers still better, but we cannot repeal physical laws relating to impact forces.

Continued progress in facilitating safe driving by simplifying driver controls is also to be expected. This will enable drivers to concentrate still more on watching road and traffic conditions.

Our long-range research is already producing some experimental devices in this area, including a system for automatic car guidance and a single-unit control lever for steering, accelerating, and braking. These test models are not necessarily indicative of the specific form that future developments will assume, but they are a great help in exploring and evaluating new concepts in vehicle control and the potential contributions of electronics in this area.

At the same time, we cannot expect cars with fully automatic control to start rolling off assembly lines in the near future. The control of an automobile involves three distinct operations: perception, decision and action. Many aids and even some substitutes have already been developed for the perception and action functions of the driver, but it is much more difficult to substitute devices for the human mind in the decision-making area.

Moreover, no device warrants adoption as a substitute for human action unless its rate of failure is superior to

that of the average driver. In the present state of electronics development, it is not possible to provide automatic car control devices that would meet this requirement.

As a consequence, neither the driverless nor the driverproof automobile is imminent. Research in this area will be productive in the near future chiefly by helping the development of more advanced driving aids to alert drivers to hazards and simplify the act of driving.

Progress in the field of driving aids will also call increasingly for co-operative research and development by automotive and highway engineers. Many of the intriguing long-range possibilities for vehicle and traffic control would necessarily involve the co-ordinated func-

tioning of devices both in the car and in or near the highway.

The present limited use of commercial radio facilities to transmit traffic warnings to drivers may be an embryonic forerunner of vastly more sophisticated electronic systems for communicating information and directions to motorists.

In any event, substantial further progress in the contributions of vehicle design to highway safety can be confidently expected. Such a forecast is supported by the principal points made in this paper's review of the subject: the industry's vital interest, its extensive facilities for research and development, the stimulus of competition, and the impressive array of safety features already adopted.

Increased Safety—By Design

By EDWARD H. HOLMES

ABSTRACT: The problem of highway safety involves the three related elements of the driver, the vehicle, and the road. Human nature being what it is, the first two seem less susceptible to improvement than the third. At present, therefore, the greatest potential for gain in safety seems to lie in better roads. Highway designers recognize that their objective is to provide for the movement of people and goods between origins and destinations of their own choice; that roads built now must carry traffic of today and of a reasonably distant tomorrow—swiftly, economically, comfortably, and safely. The accomplishment of these objectives lies in highway design, and this, in turn, must be based on human behavior and vehicle performance. If we are to build both adequate capacity and safety into our highways, we must design them for the capabilities of the vehicles and the habits and wishes of the drivers as they exist, not as we might like them to be. Extensive observation and research over the years have produced the knowledge needed to develop such design, culminating in the standards for the Interstate System. Continued study should result in further refinement and improvement.

Edward H. Holmes, Washington, D. C., is Assistant Commissioner for Research in the United States Bureau of Public Roads. His entire professional career, beginning in 1928, has been with Public Roads. He has served on important committees of the American Association of State Highway Officials, the Highway Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Safety Council, the Institute of Traffic Engineers, the National Joint Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, and other organizations working in the field of highway traffic and safety.

THE dimensions of the highway safety record indicate beyond all question the seriousness of the problem. It is a problem that is being vigorously attacked on three fronts, popularized in a catch phrase as education, enforcement, and engineering. In another, more basic view, the problem of highway safety resolves itself into three interrelated elements: the driver, the vehicle, and the road.

Highway engineers have an obvious responsibility for only one of these: the road. Yet we are constantly mindful that the road is a means to an end; that its function is to serve the driver and his vehicle. Education can and has done much to bring about an awareness and acceptance of the public that voluntary self-restraint, reasonable regulation, and just enforcement are essential for safety; but it is all too evident that the human being cannot wholly or even in large degree be redesigned. We must pretty much take him as he is. The 80 million drivers in the United States certainly cannot be molded into a single pattern of complete conformity.

Nor does an immediate solution seem to lie, in great extent, in the vehicle. Safety improvements can and gradually will be built into the vehicle, we hope. But the American citizen, accustomed to complete freedom of choice, will continue to demand and buy what he wants and not necessarily what is best—and safest—for him. Education may bring about a change, but in the present, at least, the public seems to prefer to spend its "accessory" money for radios rather than seat belts.

So it is, perhaps, in the highway itself and in engineering that the greatest opportunities for safety lie. Here, too, the American tradition of individual freedom of choice and action must be recognized. The highway, if it is to offer a maximum of safety, must be built to fit

the normal, existing patterns of human behavior.

CONCEPTS OF HIGHWAY DESIGN

Let me define here the term "design" as it is used in this article. In the engineer's language, we are speaking of geometric design which deals with elements such as width, gradient, curvature, and sight distance, factors which facilitate (or hamper) vehicle operation. Geometric design governs traffic flow; structural design governs vehicle load.

There was a time, within the memory span of our senior engineers, when geometric design was not of particular significance. The crying need of the era was to get out of the mud, first with dustless and later with paved surfaces. Width was sufficient if two vehicles could squeeze by one another; sharp curves, steep grades, and short sight distances did not endanger the low-volume, low-speed traffic of the day. The problem of the motorist then was not how fast he could reach his destination, but whether he could get there at all.

Our object still is to make possible the movement of people and goods between origins and destinations of their own choice, but that object has been enlarged. We must see to it that the great and growing flow of traffic moves swiftly, economically, comfortably—and safely. The accomplishment of these objectives lies in highway design, and this, in turn, must be based on human behavior and vehicle performance.

Concepts of highway design spring from experience and research. The Bureau of Public Roads, the state highway departments, and many others have for years been studying traffic in operation, on good roads and bad, under all kinds of conditions. From such observations come new designs and modifications of old ones; these in turn are built, studied, and modified again.

More and more we are turning to the study of the psychology and physiology of the driver, recognizing that design must be fitted to his sensory and muscular capabilities and co-ordinations, his mental reactions and powers, and even his whims.

The provisions we must build into the highway may be summed up in one word: capacity, the ability of the road to accommodate traffic. Capacity is measured in terms of the number of vehicles passing a given point in a given period of time. It has no relation to traffic density. An example will make this obvious: a freeway carrying well-spaced, high-speed traffic as contrasted with crawling, bumper-to-bumper traffic on a congested street. The first has high capacity and low density; the second just the opposite.

Building proper capacity into a highway means providing those elements that will enable the volume of traffic which wishes to use it to do so, with freedom to move within reason at such speeds as the wide range of drivers desires and the equally wide range in vehicle size, load, and horsepower permits. It is evident that adequate capacity is concomitant with safety.

NATIONAL SYSTEM OF INTERSTATE AND DEFENSE HIGHWAYS

The ultimate in highway capacity and safety, by present standards, is the freeway, which is defined as a divided arterial highway for through traffic with full control of access and grade separations at intersections. Despite the incongruity in terms, the existing freeways in the United States most widely known to the public today are the major toll roads.

A far greater network of freeways will come into being during the next two decades—the 41,000-mile National System of Interstate and Defense Highways. Authorized by the Congress in

1944, the general lines of the network have been selected by the states in co-operation with the Bureau of Public Roads. The Federal-Aid Highway Acts of 1956 and 1958 authorized nearly 26 billion dollars of federal aid for the construction of the System, with the states matching the federal funds on a 90 per cent federal, 10 per cent state basis. The authorization covered a thirteen-year period, but rising costs and other factors, plus a limiting "pay-as-you-go" clause in the law, may necessitate extension of the program in terms of time.

Work on the Interstate System is at present progressing on schedule. Selection of final project locations, preparation of surveys and plans, and acquisition of rights-of-way take time, of course. Moreover, much of the current building is the first step in "stage construction," grading and drainage work; paving will follow afterward. As a consequence, for the first few years of the program a tangible finished product in terms of extensive completed "drive-over" mileage could not be expected. But much progress can be recorded: in the twenty-six months since the Act of 1956 became law, 2.80 billion dollars have been authorized for construction advertised for bids, awarded, under way, or completed; 1.57 billion dollars have been authorized for preliminary engineering work and the acquisition of right-of-way. Over 1 billion dollars additional have been "programed"; that is, designated for specific projects.

The Act of 1956 called upon the Secretary of Commerce to develop standards for the Interstate System, for uniform application in all states. Such standards were formulated by the American Association of State Highway Officials, co-operating with the Bureau of Public Roads. These design standards represent the experience and judgment of our best engineers, backed by

years of research and study of driver behavior and vehicle performance. They incorporate all known features of safety and utility, to provide for safe and relaxed driving, economy of vehicle operation, and pleasing appearance.

INTERSTATE SYSTEM DESIGN

What are these features? Foremost is full control of access, which means simply that entrance to and exit from the through road is permitted only at locations carefully selected and planned by the highway authorities. No hidden side roads, private driveways, or entrances and aprons for roadside business will feed traffic at will into the main traffic stream, creating dangerous side friction or turbulence. Access will be provided through well-planned interchanges where converging or diverging traffic streams will move smoothly via ramps and grade separations.

Cross roads will be carried over or under the routes of the system. Intersections at grade will be permitted only under limited conditions where no appreciable hazard is created, and such situations are likely to occur only in sparsely settled rural areas of the West where traffic volumes are low.

There will be no railroad grade crossings; no stop signs; no traffic lights.

To insure safety and optimum performance, curves and grades are limited by governing maximum values and sight distances by minimum lengths. Their relation to topography and traffic is resolved, along with many other problems, in two design policy volumes, each running to some 500 pages, developed by the American Association of State Highway Officials.

In a nation as widely varied in terrain and development as ours, it is obvious that no one fixed and rigid set of standards would be practical. Accordingly, the Interstate System standards provide for minimum design speeds of 70, 60,

and 50 miles per hour for flat, rolling, and mountainous topography; and at least 50 miles per hour for urban areas. Actual speed regulation, as always, will be under the control of the states. Adherence to a design speed signifies that every limiting feature of the road—grades, curves, and sight distances, particularly—is planned and built so the traffic can maintain that speed in complete safety.

Each traffic lane on Interstate routes will be not less than 12 feet wide. Nearly all of the system will consist of divided highways, generally four-lane in rural areas and often six- or eight-lane approaching and within the larger cities. Where anticipated traffic in 1975 is expected to be less than about 5,000 vehicles daily, and long sight distances are possible, two-lane highways will be built. Such roadways will be set on one side of the right-of-way so an additional pavement, to provide a divided highway, can be added in the future.

Shoulders at least 10 feet wide (6 feet in mountainous terrain) and usable by all classes of vehicles in all weather will be provided on the right of traffic.

Medians between the two roadways of divided highways generally will be at least 36 feet wide, but in urban and in mountainous areas a minimum width of 16 feet will be permitted. Under unusually difficult conditions of terrain or right-of-way cost, the median may be reduced to not less than 4 feet. The broad median has two distinct safety elements: first, it largely eliminates headlight glare between opposing streams of traffic; and second, it reduces the possibility of a vehicle out of control crossing into the other roadway—a type of accident, where the median is too narrow or nonexistent, that can be catastrophic.

Modern design calls not only for a broad median, but for one of some variation. It proposes, in fact, that divided highways be designed as two separate

one-way roads. The "flowing" alignment may place the two roadways along opposite sides of a stream, or diverging to round a hill, or set at different levels on a slope; it will deviate slightly to pass near a pond or a patch of woods or a pretty view. These are priceless esthetic values, but their cost is little; oftentimes such design offers actual savings since the roadway is fitted to the natural ground profile.

There is another real, though unmeasurable value. Anyone who has driven long stretches of die-straight highway with unvarying median strip knows their monotony, their narcotic or hypnotic effect. The flowing design lends interest and promotes alertness; the driver stays awake, enjoys his trip, and travels safely.

THE SAFETY PROMISE

Some sense of the safety value in Interstate design may be gathered from the fact that modern controlled-access highways have less than half the fatality rate and only one-third the accident rate of roads carrying similar traffic volumes but lacking access control and other modern design features.

Traffic fatality risks are, of course, commensurate with exposure, and the rate is expressed in terms of deaths per 100 million vehicle miles. For all roads and streets in the United States, the 1957 death rate was 6.0; on 18 of our modern toll roads it was 2.6; the New York Thruway, an outstanding example of modern highway design, had a rate of only 1.9. Completion of the Interstate System will bring about the saving of 4,000 lives a year.

FORECASTING TRAFFIC

Roads should be built for tomorrow, not today. Our whole history of road building, unfortunately, has been too much a matter of catching up rather than getting ahead. With, at last, an

opportunity to build a complete system of most important highways in a relatively short period of years, the designer must probe the future to decide his present course of action. That probing and the exploration of the elements that generate highway design are perhaps worth examination.

In forecasting traffic, inevitably the designer is faced with two questions: when is tomorrow, and what will be the dimensions of tomorrow's traffic? The fanciful mind can envision the electronically guided, atomic powered vehicle of the far future. When that time comes, we may not need the highway at all, as we know it now.

The engineer, building now, must provide for today's vehicles as well as for adequate traffic capacity in the selected tomorrow. Hence we assume that the limits of our prescience cannot range too far. In addition, highway financing is far from unlimited, and we can afford only to build what can be amortized at reasonable tax rates. Furthermore, the reasonable life expectancy of the pavement must be taken into account. In consideration of these elements, our concept of design is to provide now for adequate accommodation of the traffic anticipated twenty years hence.

But even the forecasting of so seemingly short a span is fraught with difficulties. We do not expect any radical change in vehicle size, speed, or maneuverability. But in quantity there are great expectations. Our present judgment is that twenty years from now there will be in the United States more than 100 million vehicles, traveling well over a trillion vehicle miles annually. That is approaching a 50 per cent increase in vehicles and a 100 per cent increase in travel over the present.

We hope we are generous enough. The engineer traditionally is conservative in his estimating, allowing himself a safety factor. But unfortunately in

estimating future traffic we have been conservative in the wrong direction all too often. If a road built today is to be surely adequate for traffic of twenty years from now, conservatism in forecasting must imply over- rather than under-optimism.

Barring some powerful intervention such as a war or a protracted depression, the economic, social, psychological, and other forces that have generated the steady growth of highway transportation in the past are likely to continue to stimulate steady growth in the future. Thus the solid statistical trends of the past may serve as a guide for the future; in fact, we can conceive no others.

In forecasting the future needed capacity of a route, then, the design engineer must be aware of these growth factors. Probable trends, both national and local, in the population and the economy must be taken into account. How much traffic will be diverted to the new road from others nearby? Time saving and easing of congestion are as important elements to consider as savings in distance. How much traffic will be generated by the development of the new road—traffic that would not have come into existence at all, otherwise? Prospective growth or change in character of land use is another traffic influence.

ELEMENTS OF TRAFFIC

The designer cannot be satisfied with the simple forecast, no matter how complex its derivation, of so many vehicle miles of travel in a future year. Nor is annual average daily traffic adequate for design. Traffic volume is half again greater in August than it is in January; it may be one-fourth higher on Friday than it is on Sunday, ten times as large at 6 p.m. as it is at 6 a.m. Design of a highway adequate for an average period would find it heavily congested many, many times during the year. On

the other hand, it would not be economically sound to build for fully adequate handling of the heaviest possible concentration of traffic which might occur—the annual State Fair crowd, for example.

A study of countless traffic records shows that, if the traffic volumes of each hour of the whole year are plotted in descending order of magnitude, a typical "dog-leg" curve results, with the sharp break around the thirtieth highest traffic-volume hour of the year. Accordingly, engineers have commonly accepted the practice of planning for the thirtieth highest hour of the "design" year—say, 20 years in the future. The traffic of that selected hour is known as the design hourly volume.

Certain other considerations must be taken into account. Directional flow is one important factor. On rural highways, it is generally expected that the traffic volume will be fairly evenly divided in the two opposing directions. In suburban or urban areas, however, the ebb and flow of home to work traffic create a considerable directional imbalance, and as much as two-thirds of the design hourly volume may be in one direction.

The designer also needs to know what mixture of traffic he is providing for. Passenger cars and small commercial vehicles, such as panel trucks, have about equal speed and maneuvering capabilities. But the larger commercial vehicles, distinguished as those with dual tires, reduce potential highway capacity because of their greater size and lower top speed. On a level road, a commercial vehicle must be counted as the equivalent of two passenger cars; on a steep, long grade the equivalent may run as high as 80.

VARIETY OF HIGHWAY NEEDS

The 41,000 mile National System of Interstate and Defense Highways will

be very largely a network of brand-new highways built to ultimate design, as we conceive it, which has been described above. But 41,000 miles is only about 1 per cent of the 3.4 million miles of existing roads and streets in the United States. The federal government has had an interest in a much larger fraction over a much longer period of time.

Federal aid to the states for highways had its beginning in 1916 and has grown continuously through the years. The so-called ABC program now provides funds in the range of 900 million dollars annually, matched on a 50-50 basis by the states. These funds are available for the improvement of the federal-aid primary and secondary highway systems and their urban extensions which, excluding the Interstate System, total some 737,000 miles in extent.

These federal-aid primary and secondary systems, and the 2.6 million miles of other roads and streets in the United States, range from arterials of the greatest importance down to the most remote land-service road. At the one extreme, design requirements should be at or near the level of the Interstate System standards; at the other extreme, the road may be considered adequate if it is passable in all kinds of weather.

It seems evident, then, that some relatively small proportion of this vast mileage of roads will have to be built new in its entirety; some other proportion will need little or no attention other than maintenance. But it is equally evident that a considerable proportion of our highway mileage needs some intermediate kind of attention. The term intermediate is used to indicate that complete renovation or rebuilding is not necessarily needed. Certainly it is not possible, and not even desirable, to convert every road and street into a superhighway. But they should be improved as necessary for adequate capacity—the ac-

commodation of anticipated traffic of the reasonably distant future.

Adequate capacity will mean safety. For example, a study in Illinois showed that widening of the pavement from 18 to 22 feet resulted in a 39 per cent reduction in accidents. California found that roads with shoulders 8 feet wide had only half the accident rate of roads with no shoulders. Another study indicated that bridges and culverts 5 feet or more wider than the approaching road pavement had an accident rate only one-sixth of that for bridges no wider than the approaching road surface.

A NEW DESIGN TECHNIQUE

Studies of highway capacity have not been made in an ivory tower. Our knowledge of capacity needs is based on millions of careful observations at thousands of locations, made with equipment of increasing accuracy and complexity. We know much about actual vehicle performance and driver behavior in relation to a wide variety of road conditions and design features. From such information we know what design criteria will provide for adequate, safe traffic flow.

And from such information there has now been developed a new technique for determining traffic capacity on rural roads, thereby determining the needs of highway improvement. We now have a method whereby we can tell how the over-all traffic operating conditions on a route can be improved through spot improvements: widening of pavements or shoulders, straightening alignment, lengthening sight distance, reduction in gradient or curvature, or the use of truck climbing lanes on steep hills. Here is a technique with which we can efficiently attack the problem of the great proportion of our highways that need what was referred to above as an intermediate kind of attention.

The background of this type of design study is relatively simple to understand. Earlier in this article mention was made of design speed, which basically is the safe speed at which each limiting feature of the road, such as a curve, can be negotiated. However, the capacity of a highway is much more influenced by the average highway speed; that is, the average safe speed over a section of highway.

As an explanatory example, for certain topographic conditions the maximum curvature for a 60-mile-per-hour design speed is 5 degrees. Thus a 10-mile stretch of highway that is perfectly straight except for one 5-degree curve has the same design speed as another 10-mile section that has a whole series of 5-degree curves. Obviously the first road will permit a higher average highway speed from end to end than the second, and, conversely, will accommodate safely a larger volume of traffic.

The new technique may involve analysis of a section of road, an entire route, or a whole highway system. Needed information, which may be obtained by several means, are the general type of topography, the average highway speed, frequency of sharp curves, percentage of highway with adequate sight distance, cross-section items such as shoulder and pavement type and width, and the "truck factor." This factor is derived from the proportion of commercial vehicles in the traffic stream and the difference in operating speeds of passenger cars and trucks—a derivative, in effect, of grades and other highway elements.

From such data a scientific examination of each road section is readily accomplished. Specific improvements which will bring the road section up to the desired level of performance can then be determined.

Recent studies of existing roads exemplify the application of this new design technique. On a 4-mile section, for

example, building of a truck lane 1 mile long on a critical grade would increase capacity from 2,350 to 3,250 vehicles per day. On another road 7 miles long, removal of five sharp curves would raise the road's capacity from 2,300 to 2,600; increasing sight distance by brush cutting would further increase capacity to 2,800.

On the other hand, some road sections were found to need more drastic treatment. Provision of adequate capacity on a 2-lane, 6-mile stretch could be obtained only by construction of another roadway to provide a 4-lane, divided highway. Another 6-mile long route had such poor alignment and profile that the only lasting solution would be a complete redesign of the entire length.

THE CITY PROBLEM

What has been described as a varied approach to the rural road problem is equally applicable to the urban problem as well. The arterials of the highest importance should and will be built to Interstate System design standards, with due regard for the extremely heavy right-of-way costs that may be encountered. At the other end of the scale, the quiet residential streets may need no geometric improvement at all.

In the middle, again, a considerable proportion of the city street mileage demands some form of intermediate improvement. Street widening, channelization at difficult intersections, and pavement markings will help a great deal to expedite traffic movement and safety. The same is true of other operational techniques, such as one-way streets, unbalanced lane flow, and special pedestrian controls.

The traffic engineer will continue to depend much on the ubiquitous traffic light. This familiar red-amber-green regulator may at first seem rather dissociated from highway design, but it is

not if design is considered in the larger sense to connote provision for the orderly movement of traffic.

Electronics, in its varied forms, is playing an increasing role in the regulation and control of city traffic. In Chicago's central business district, for example, to accommodate the regular peaks or emergency circumstances, traffic signals are controlled by radio from a central station so that varied patterns of traffic operation may be employed during different hours of the day.

In Baltimore, traffic pads in the pavement sense the varying traffic volumes and feed their countings to a central electronic computer, which can adjust the traffic lights in co-ordinated patterns to best serve the traffic of the particular moment.

In Detroit, a pilot study showed the practicability of monitoring traffic conditions on expressways by television. Causes of delays could be observed at monitored locations from the central office. Police could be dispatched expeditiously and to best advantage to points where traffic was jammed and needed direction. Service trucks could be sped to the scene of an accident.

ELECTRONIC VEHICLE CONTROL

Such electronic devices and systems hold a high potential for improving traffic operation and safety, particularly if carefully co-ordinated with geometric highway design.

Electronics can be extended, to regulate or control vehicle movements. Limited experiments have shown that electronic equipment, installed under or along the road and in the vehicle, can furnish information to the driver as to road conditions ahead, the position of his vehicle on the road, and the presence and position of other vehicles; it can prevent collisions between vehicles

through control of their speed and headway; it can guide a vehicle along the center of a lane or through a lane change.

These are experiments, and the actuality is unlikely to come soon for the more radical of these concepts. The installation of necessary equipment in every vehicle and on every road or even a limited road system would be enormously expensive in the aggregate; the problems of the transition or conversion period would be extremely difficult; and the legal implications when the driver surrenders control of his vehicle have barely been considered at all. These may not be totally insurmountable obstacles, but they loom extremely large.

DESIGN IN THE FUTURE

It seems probable that our present concepts of highway design will not change radically in the foreseeable future—in the next twenty or thirty years, at least. This is said at the risk of being accused of a reactionary attitude, or at least of lacking vision. But it seems unlikely that the motor vehicle will undergo any truly radical change in that period and certainly no sudden acceleration of the evolutionary process is going to revamp the human race.

If this is so, then the highway, as we conceive it in its best form now, will not be drastically changed; although of course continuing improvement and refinement should be expected. One of the greatest attractions of the motor vehicle, to the pleasure driver, commuter, and businessman alike, is its mobile convenience—the facility it gives the operator in the freedom of action he desires. The best that the highway design engineer has to offer is aimed in that direction and aimed well now. Observation and research will continue to improve our aim.

Human Behavior—Factor X

By JAMES L. Malfetti

ABSTRACT: Driver reward and punishment are examined as influences in driver behavior. Perception and judgment are accepted as significant factors, and a number of research needs are suggested. Public information and education are evaluated, and deficiencies pointed out. Driving as a social process is examined; recommendations are made for reasonable traffic regulations, a moral approach to traffic safety, and the group discussion-decision technique for improving driver behavior. Limiting conditions of the driver—such as fatigue and intoxication—are discussed. Electronic devices to take control when the driver fails are described and recommended. Lack of information about causes of accidents is a major impediment to progress in most areas of traffic safety. The "mixed team" approach to accident investigation is endorsed. Pedestrian safety is defined as primarily an urban problem with many of the same socio-psychological bases as driver safety.

James Luke Malfetti, Ed.D., New York City, is Executive Officer of the Safety Education Project and Associate Professor of Education at Teachers College, Columbia University. From 1955 to 1957 he was Associate Director of the American Assembly, a national, nonpartisan conference group founded by President Eisenhower as a forum for discussions of major current problems. From 1952 to 1955 he was Assistant Director of the Bicentennial of Columbia University, co-ordinating activities focused on the theme, "Man's Right to Knowledge and the Free Use Thereof." He is a member of the American Psychological Association.

MAN'S greatest enigma is himself. This is as true in traffic safety as in most other fields. In this paper, human behavior in traffic safety will be discussed under two headings: the driver and the pedestrian. The driver gives us more concern for he is the cause of 80 to 90 per cent of all traffic accidents¹—some would say as high as 96 per cent.²

THE DRIVER

During the last thirty years many investigators have been concerned with driver behavior in motor vehicle accidents. They have searched for a common denominator peculiar to drivers in accidents. Their search has ranged from simple measurements of vision, hearing, depth perception, and reaction time to analysis of subtle personality differences. But their findings have been disappointing. In almost all instances, the relationships of these characteristics with accident frequencies have been slight. On the other hand, there is mounting evidence that the basic personality of a driver is an important influence.³

The driver plays a dynamic social game. He must exercise complex psycho-motor skills in the operation of the vehicle; perceive and interact with persons, things, and thoughts in his environment; and conform to a set of rules whose violation constitutes antisocial behavior. Safe driving is a demanding task. How can we influence the driving situation or the driver to accomplish it? The following approaches represent attempts to answer this question.

¹ Ross A. McFarland and Roland C. Moore, "Human Factors in Highway Safety," *New England Journal of Medicine*, Vol. 256 (April 1957), p. 793.

² Joseph B. Bidwell, "Control Problems of Automatic Highways." A paper prepared for Columbia University Conference on Electronic Controls and Traffic Safety, 1958, p. 5.

³ Ross A. McFarland and others, *Human Variables in Motor Vehicle Accidents* (Boston: Harvard School of Public Health, 1955), p. 43.

Reward and punishment

The whole field of driver reward and punishment needs examination, for it seems accurate to say that road behavior is essentially uncontrolled by any systematic application of rewards and punishments. Much misconduct in an automobile is not only unpunished; it probably brings a sense of reward if successful. Passing on a hill or curve, for example, often works out happily because no other car is there to cause trouble. When a policeman is at hand, the punishment of a summons seems arbitrary, and the usual behavior of courts in administering fines is so depersonalized as to make the experience seem relatively unconnected with the offense and certainly removed from the issue of safety per se.

During 1957, over 60 per cent of the cases in the Supreme Court of New York State dealt with automobile accidents.⁴ Yet even the experience of an accident is rarely given much weight as punishment. Most of the expense is borne by insurance companies. If one is personally liable, an attorney usually allows ample time for paying. On hearing of an accident suffered (the very word is revealing!) by a friend, we are likely to be sympathetic and feel that he has undergone an injustice rather than retribution for his errors. About the only exception is an accident involving children or a school bus. Both at law and in the public view, whoever collides with a school bus or runs over a youngster alighting from one is subject to stern censure. It is interesting that the occurrence of such accidents is lower than exposure might lead one to expect. The low incidence, I strongly suspect, is related to the systematic kind of punishment for carelessness of this sort.

⁴ Bernard Botein, "Our Courts Face the Future," *New York Law Journal*, Vol. 139 (January 1958), p. 15.

It is striking that there are virtually no immediate or socially administered rewards for courtesy or safety. For example, if you slow down to let someone get in front of you, thereby helping him avoid a collision with an oncoming car, there is no way he can thank you for having saved his life or his property and health. In fact you may even be mildly punished because of the fear created through exposure to such a situation and the inconvenience of having to slow down. Examples like this are many, all adding up to the conclusion that safe driving and courteous highway conduct are seldom rewarded. In many ways, one is entitled to wonder at the extent of careful driving rather than at its lack.

The problem is easier to formulate than solve. The prevalence of irritating busybodies and the possibility of wrangles between drivers suggest a lack of wisdom in a general heightening of inter-car communication (for example, a two-way radio system). Yet some sort of signal arrangement might prove useful. Thus if one could show a kind of light or flag in acknowledgment of the thoughtfulness of another driver, then at least certain aspects of safe conduct behind a wheel could be strengthened.

In any event, if an overwhelming amount of research in other situations is applicable, positive reward is probably more important than the stepping up of the quantity and quality of punishment. It is conceivable that more prompt and stringent enforcement of traffic rules, based on reasonable regulations, administered in a more personalized fashion could reduce the accident rate somewhat. On the other hand, punishment seems to have the effect of suppressing impulses to drive dangerously, not extinguishing them. As a result, unsafe behavior is likely to be elicited wherever the circumstances are right: for example, being in a hurry, no policeman in view, a slow-moving car

ahead, and so forth. The over-all reduction in accidents or in unsafe behavior is, therefore, not likely to be great, although it might be significant.

Perhaps a "punishment" program could be improved by establishing ways of recognizing sheer skill in handling a car. This idea is probably most applicable to younger drivers among whom the greatest number of accidents occur. Competitions sponsored by enforcement officials with prizes and commendation for skill in handling a car at high speeds, in negotiating sharp curves, in parking in restricted space, in climbing hills, and in driving economically might prove quite useful.

Such a program would help to improve communication between drivers and safety enforcement agents. It might also help people to distinguish between occasions requiring speed or tricky handling and those demanding caution. In addition, by thoughtful planning and communication it might be possible to connect "safe driving" with "skillful driving," thus discouraging the widespread notion among younger people that being "cautious" is a synonym for being "sissy." The thing to be stressed is this kind of reward system in terms of the values of young people combined with a reasonable, strongly enforced, and highly personalized system of punishment.

Driver perception and judgment

Some of the early reports coming from "mixed teams"—doctor, psychologist, engineer—investigating accidents point to driver perception and judgment as significant factors in accident-causative behavior.

To drive intelligently and safely demands perception—that is, the driver should be able not only to see objects and situations in his path, but should also recognize their meaning accurately and promptly. The perceptive driver

readily "spots" things and adjusts his driving accordingly. Other factors, such as an emotional state, can interfere with perception so that a driver does not "see." Drivers in head-on collisions have reported they did not see the other car approaching.

Perception merits additional investigation. Which external factors influence the driver? How can he be made more aware of the influence of his emotional state on his perception? What variations in perception of the same stimuli can be found among different drivers? Can a driver overperceive and become overly cautious? Is there an optimum perception level? If so, how can a driver best achieve it?

During the learning period there is general progress from the conceptual level of the organizing process, which requires much driver awareness, to the automatic level, which requires less.⁵ This progress is necessary because maneuvering a vehicle in heavy, high-speed traffic demands many split-second decisions, frequently in rapid succession.

The degree of automatic control varies among drivers and even within a single driver. It would be valuable to define by research the conditions leading to different degrees of automatism. Research into decision-making behavior might shed light on how to influence this behavior. In addition, it can guide research on automatic controls as a substitute for the failing driver.

There is some evidence that periodic retraining of drivers may help reduce accidents. This theory should be substantiated with further research. What should be the retraining curriculum—more practice in psycho-motor responses, particularly in emergencies, and/or more training in the conditions influencing safe-driving behavior and attitudes? At

⁵ President's Committee for Traffic Safety, "Special Report on the Williamsburg Conference," *Traffic Safety Research Review*, Vol. 2 (June 1958), p. 7.

which level of the organizing process is the approach to be made—conceptual or automatic?

Public information and education

Formal driver education is apparently making great strides, but whether the general public is being educated toward improved driver behavior is an open question.

The high incidence of traffic accidents supports the view that the driving public is not safety conscious, or, if it is, has not sufficiently translated its knowledge and attitudes into improved driving behavior. And this in spite of the "safety by the ton" publicity to which the public is being exposed. Probably no other field with improved human behavior as an objective has elicited more words on its behalf. The approach has ranged from the discreet messages of insurance companies making traffic caution an American virtue, to the gruesome news photographs of shattered bodies under the caption, "this could be you." If the public is not safety conscious, why has the campaign failed?

Perhaps one reason is the individual's disbelief that *he* will be in an accident. It is difficult to make those who have not already experienced accidents aware of accident hazards. One can convince persons to brush their teeth or suffer caries and perhaps lose teeth. Caries, however, produce gradual awareness of real trouble. Accidents strike suddenly. There is no warning, and unfortunately many first accidents are fatal ones. A psychological vaccine is needed.

The vaccine we have tried thus far is controlling behavior through varying degrees of fear. The general notion underlying such slogans as "the life you save may be your own" is that sufficient fear or anxiety will motivate safe driving—that is, the stronger the fear the more careful the driving; hence, the movies of messy accidents or spectacularly fatal collisions.

The difficulty is that the assumptions are unsupported and even contravened by research. It has been found that people typically react to anxiety or fear by trying to reduce or remove it—in ways, needless to say, not necessarily regarded by others as most desirable. One of the most frequently occurring patterns, for instance, is inattention to the fear-evoking stimulus; another is repression. In studying such things as advertisements for dentrifices, psychologists have found⁶ that the arousal of fear beyond a certain level has had a deleterious effect on buying. What seemed to have taken place was: an increase in fear as a consequence of the depicted terrors of caries, a resulting inattention to the message as a way of reducing the fear, and a lack of incentive to buy X toothpaste.

In fact, this is one of the reasons that car manufacturers are cautious in exploiting safety features in advertising. They believe the fear approach has already reached so far that more of it will make the motorist so negative about driving that he will not want a car.

Advertising, however, in this sense is simply one way in which behavior may be controlled through verbal mechanisms. As such, it is like slogans aimed at improving driving behavior. The lessons to be drawn are as relevant for those concerned with traffic safety as for commercial advertisers. One suspects that people learn very quickly to pay little attention to such verbalisms as "the life you save may be your own" or to movies depicting horrible deaths.

If this "fear" approach works at all, it works at less intense levels; and these must be determined empirically by serious investigation. The extent of success may depend upon some kind of prompt reward for those demonstrating safe and responsible behavior behind a wheel.

⁶ Carl I. Hovland and others, *Communication and Persuasion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, c1953), pp. 56–95.

Safety consciousness of the general public

I said at the beginning of this discussion that whether the general public is being educated toward improved driver behavior is an open question. The level of safety consciousness of the general public is also an open question.

A recent public officials traffic-safety conference concluded that, "the public is more alert to the traffic problem today than ever before."⁷ Perhaps the public has as much knowledge as will positively influence driving behavior, or perhaps the point of diminishing returns was reached some time ago. It is beyond human capacity to absorb everything, and in order to preserve its sanity the conscious mind rejects most of what reaches it.

Perhaps the effort given to public information for the improvement of driving behavior should be redirected. Since the difference between an accident and a near miss is usually less than a second, retraining of drivers to increase automatism of response may be a more promising approach. Automatic controls to take over when the driver fails may be another.

At any rate, there is need to measure the safety consciousness of the general public. If it is low, investigators can devote themselves to the empirical research suggested above. If it is high, efforts might be channeled away from appeals for improved driving behavior and into information about other approaches to accident reduction.

Driving as a social process

A generation or two ago most people lived in what sociologists call a sacred society. They stayed in a community for a reasonably long time, knew their neighbors well, and behaved in a way approved by the community. The com-

⁷ President's Committee for Traffic Safety, "Report of the 1957 Public Officials Traffic Safety Conference," December 1957, p. 49.

munity continually observed and evaluated the actions of its members. There was no anonymity, and one was responsible for his actions. Community praise was desirable; community censure could be disastrous.

In today's secular society, however, mobile populations, changing socio-economic circumstances, and a faster tempo of living make it possible for strangers to live next door to each other. And if anonymity is not possible in the community, it can be achieved very quickly with the help of the automobile.

Anonymity encourages an individual to behave closer to his animal nature: the pillar of the community may topple at the convention away from home. So much crude and unsafe driving seems to result from anonymity that suggestions have been made to evaluate the effect of publicly identifying car owners, perhaps by name-bearing license plates.

In a sacred society, internal control and a feeling of responsibility for one's actions were assisted by the vigilance of the community. In a secular society, control and responsibility rest almost completely with the individual. Some persons are prepared to accept this responsibility. Those who are not create many social problems among which are a disproportionately large number of automobile accidents.

In each of us is a desire for calculated risks of excitement. Our daily activities may provide little of this excitement and indeed may represent a series of minor frustrations with no immediate opportunity for outlet so that, consciously or not, we sometimes enjoy taking a little risk, such as speeding and cutting in and out of traffic. We can channel the repressed emotions of normal living.

The social deviate and the normal individual looking for a "change of pace" commit the same type of driving errors. They both invite accidents. The former is more persistent, however. In extreme

cases he can be described as an accident riding around looking for a place to happen. Because his violations are severe or repeated, he needs to be identified and banned as a menace until his driving improves. Even if he avoids an accident, his driving excites or infuriates other drivers to the threshold of accidents. Apart from keeping him off the highways, what should be done about the adult deviate is outside the scope of this paper. The genesis of his problem is probably obscure enough to warrant long-range therapy.

However it is the normal driver taking an occasional risk, maybe his first, who causes most of the accidents today. Unfortunately most fatal accidents are first accidents. What, then, can be done to improve the behavior of the normal driver?

Adolescent drivers

Year after year, statistics reveal that young drivers have more accidents than their seniors. Some people seem surprised by this. Why should they expect it to be otherwise? If anything, we drive as we live, and young people make more mistakes in general than their elders. Recent studies indicate that adolescents receiving instruction and guidance have a lower accident rate than those who do not.⁸

There are, however, chronic adolescent violators who are sorely in need of improved rehabilitation techniques. Our guess as to why they are violators is that they need only a little time to mature. The pity is that an accident might preclude this. In addition to driver education, what preventive guidance or experience can be applied?

The automobile is one of the most important nonlinguistic symbols in Ameri-

⁸ W. H. Glanville, "Safety on the Road," *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts*, Vol. 102 (4426), 1954, pp. 496-519.

can culture.⁹ As the advertisements keep telling us, it is one way of telling others who we are, from a Cadillac as a "symbol of achievement" to a Ford as a symbol of "young mindedness." Even those who simply want transportation without frills can buy a Jeep and "say" so.

And, too, consider the American tradition of adventure—the rootin' tootin' cowboy of the movies. To some drivers the car is a faithful steed. And how many courting males find it advantageous to appear just a bit daring behind the wheel.

Many persons find their day-to-day actions directed by others, a boss or parent. In the automobile, however, the driver is more likely to be his own master. He can drive as he wishes and "tell the boss a thing or two" while he is about it. Woe unto the other driver who is selected as the figure image of the boss.

Some socio-psychological approaches to accident reduction

Driving as a social process, then, has two main facets: the car is a social instrument for displaying status and other personality needs; and in a secular society greater responsibility for the operation of a car is placed on the driver himself. Approaches to improved driving behavior should stress driver understanding of the relationship of his personality needs to his driving and/or his acceptance of internal control and responsibility for his actions. These approaches include reasonable traffic regulations, moral responsibility, and group discussion-decision.

Reasonable regulations help us respect the authority imposing them. If we respect the authority, we are inclined to obey regulations for which the reason is

less clear. You call to the twelve-year-old boy, "John, come out of the water or you will catch cold." If John comes out of the water, it is not because he is afraid of catching cold. He is respecting your wishes and authority.

Reasonable regulations are more likely to be honored even when the enforcing authority is not present. Such regulations would allow as many individual driving prerogatives as are consistent with over-all safety. Yield signs would be used in place of stop signs whenever visibility was free in all directions. Speed limits would be determined by the layout of the highway and by other pertinent conditions: four-lane highways with forty-mile limits encourage violations. Reasonable regulations, however, are not easy to establish. There is a paucity of good research on which they can be based; and more research should be stimulated in the near future.

Moral responsibility and discussion-decision technique

Little effort is made to reinforce the driver's understanding that he is morally responsible for his behavior behind the wheel. Some primitive tribes have a rite-of-passage ceremony in which the young adult is given a spear and told of its uses for hunting and killing, but warned not to use it on his own tribe. Perhaps something comparable could be done with today's driving novices. Training and licensing should not be hurdles to be overcome, but experiences which impart competence and which test this competence within a framework of moral responsibility. Some community organization might sponsor a meeting for those who apply for licenses; it might have competent, respected community members discuss the pleasures, hazards, and responsibilities of driving.

This organization might well be the churches. A good many aspects of driver behavior and traffic safety make

⁹ S. I. Hayakawa, "Why the Edsel Laid an Egg," *ETC.: A Review of General Semantics*, Vol. 15 (Spring 1958), pp. 217-21.

them "naturals" for moral and spiritual leaders. The role of religion in attitude formation is well known. Last year the National Safety Council created a Church Safety Activities Division which organized spiritual leaders of all faiths for a safety campaign. During the year, traffic safety weekends, publication of a safety prayer, establishment of local church safety activity committees, outdoor posters stressing moral responsibility for safe driving, and the publication of an anthology, *He Rides Beside You*, have been enthusiastically supported by many clergymen.

Here is a great potential. One hundred and three million citizens identify themselves with religious groups. If their attention is drawn by spiritual leaders to the moral aspects of driving behavior, a real impact can be made.

Kurt Lewin, a prominent psychologist, has experimented with a group discussion-decision technique for influencing attitudes and behavior. In essence this technique allows no one to tell a group what to do, but has a trained person lead and direct discussions so that behavior decisions come from the group itself. In one experiment,¹⁰ Lewin worked with two groups of women who had never eaten or cooked hearts, kidneys, and brains. The lecture method was used for one group; the discussion technique was used in the other. Ten per cent of the former subsequently used these items in their menus. But there were 52 per cent of the latter who did the same.

The possibilities are challenging for the use of this technique in predriver education, periodic retraining of adult drivers, and in programs of rehabilitation for chronic violators. It may well be one method for having the driver ac-

cept more responsibility for his own actions. His behavior may be influenced more by his own decision than by one he is asked to adopt.

Temporary states and accidents

Most of the discussion in this paper has been limited to the normal driver, reasonably alert and in full control of his psycho-motor abilities. Various temporary states, however, result in a reduction of efficiency and may contribute to accidents. Measuring the influence of such factors on highway accidents is difficult. Fatigue, for example, is clearly seen in "driver asleep" accidents; its role may be more subtle in others.¹¹ Although there are wide differences in individual susceptibility to alcohol, its influence on perceptual, psycho-motor, and mental functions is always in a deleterious direction.¹² From the standpoint of driver behavior, the most important effect is that insight is lost into the degree to which one's performance is impaired. One is less sure of what he can or cannot do.

More needs to be known about the specific effects of drugs and commonly used medications on human efficiency. Difficulties in vision and drowsiness have been reported as side effects of some over-the-counter drugs taken for the relief of colds and allergies. The persisting effect of tranquilizers, not always recognized, can slow one's reactions to the hazard point.

Emotional upset has contributed to accidents. Skill reactions tend to become disorganized during acute emotional stress. Even less acute but persistent emotional states, such as those involving morale, have been demonstrated in accident frequencies.

¹⁰ Kurt Lewin, "Forces Behind Food Habits and Methods of Change," *Bulletin of the National Research Council*, No. 108 (October 1943), pp. 60-63.

¹¹ Ross A. McFarland and others, *Human Variables in Motor Vehicle Accidents* (Boston: Harvard School of Public Health, 1955), p. 54.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 55.

A fatigued, intoxicated, or drugged driver has been seasoned for an accident. Of course he can be educated not to drive when in one of these states; but the state itself, for example, intoxication, may impair his judgment.

There is therefore need for control when the driver fails to exercise it himself.

Automatic controls for influencing driver behavior have long been in operation in most transportation systems. The automatic block signal and the "dead man" throttle are examples from railroading. In the automobile, electronics holds the greatest promise for influencing road behavior—from warning the driver of hazards, to taking control of the vehicle if he fails.

Electronic systems have already been demonstrated which can furnish a driver information on road conditions, the position of his vehicle, the presence and positions of other cars on the highway, or a warning that he is driving too fast.

If the driver is fatigued, his car can be guided down the center of a lane or through a change of lane. If his reactions fail, he can be prevented from a collision through control of speed and headway. Or, if he is intoxicated, an electronic ignition system depending on driver co-ordination can prevent his starting the motor.

These electronic techniques are in the realm of "when" not "if."¹³ They hold great potential for reduction in accidents due to driver failure. Every effort must be made to encourage research, development, and immediate field tests of present systems.

Accident causes:

Little useful information exists about causes of accidents. While present traf-

¹³ Columbia University Conference on Electronic Controls and Traffic Safety, May 1958, "Final Report of Participants."

fic accident reports show the number, type, severity, and location of accidents for administrative purposes, they are of little value to researchers. Many such reports relate more to what happened than to what caused it to happen.

If proper perspective is to be maintained, more and more facts and their causes must be brought to light. Otherwise, we face the tragic possibility of diverting invaluable effort toward inconsequential channels.

One approach to more precise knowledge of accidents is use of the "mixed team." The Traffic Institute of Northwestern University has recently launched a project which will develop methods for gathering more precise factual information in such a manner as to be useful to scientists trying to discover the causes of accidents.

The project will utilize a team of medical scientist, engineering scientist, and social or psychological scientist. Arrangements will be made with police to relay word of specified types of accidents, and the team will make technical investigations at the scene as soon as possible. Subsequent studies of drivers, location, and vehicles will be made as needed to discover how and why the accident occurred. Members of the team will thus devise techniques of obtaining information in the fields of their respective disciplines, and later on with the help of a statistician they will experiment with methods for recording such information.

It is not possible or desirable to await the completion of such studies before moving ahead. It will, however, be helpful to know something concrete about the causes of accidents.

THE PEDESTRIAN

The pedestrian problem is largely urban. In 1956, 7,950 pedestrians were killed, nearly two-thirds of them in

urban areas.¹⁴ Over 125,000 urbanites were injured.

One-half of the traffic fatalities in New York involve only two types of pedestrian accidents—crossing midblock and crossing against the red light. These and other statistics on pedestrian accidents suggest that community programs of pedestrian education and sound enforcement are the logical solutions to the problem. Such programs seem, in fact, to have been instrumental in the excellent progress made thus far in the reduction of pedestrian accidents from 15,500 in 1937 to 7,950 in 1956 and should be pushed ahead vigorously in all communities.

However, a more subtle analysis indicates signs of the same socio-psychological influences which operate in driver behavior. Risk-taking behavior is rewarded each time a person successfully crosses against the light; perception of the pedestrian is interfered with by an emotional state; the pedestrian is unconvinced that *he* will be killed or injured; and many of the risks he takes probably are attempts to prove his masculinity. He too must be made to feel morally responsible for his own safe conduct, and the decision to improve must come from within. In essence, the same approaches discussed under driver behavior can, with a slightly altered focus, apply to the pedestrian.

The attitude of pedestrians varies markedly from community to community. In some towns people stare at someone stepping off the curb before the light has changed to green. In other towns waiting on the curb for the proper signal attracts enough significant glances to make one feel ill at ease, if not cowardly.

¹⁴ National Safety Council, *Accident Facts, 1957 Edition* (Chicago: The National Safety Council, 1957), pp. 42-49.

Emulation of authority figures or peers is a strong influence on human behavior. The child will brush his teeth if mother brushes hers, will read good books if father does—and will cross with the light if the football coach has set the example. The values demonstrated through actions are a more significant influence on behavior than those which are only verbally espoused.

Two foundation studies recently proved conclusively that influencing community leaders was the most efficient way to influence the community at large. People play "Follow the Leader." Any pedestrian improvement program must consider this. If the respected community citizens are good pedestrians, it is likely that most other people are also.

As in the case of driver behavior, many statistics relate to pedestrian accidents, but very little research has attempted to get at causes. Virtually all available data have been obtained from the reports of the investigating officer and the driver. It is at least equally important to obtain reports from pedestrians involved in accidents. Report forms for this have been developed and are increasingly in use.¹⁵

CONCLUSION

It is evident that much is yet to be known about the driver and the pedestrian and the forces which influence their behavior. It is equally evident that we are not going to be able to do much about changing behavior until we know more about it. The tragedy, misery, and resource losses of traffic accidents make it most urgent that we increase our efforts rapidly toward determining a practicable value for factor X.

¹⁵ American Automobile Association, *Model Pedestrian Protection Program* (Washington, D. C.: American Automobile Association, 1954), p. 10.

Traffic and Safety in Tomorrow's Urban Areas

By SERGEI N. GRIMM

ABSTRACT: This article is a view of urban communities and their growth after the full impact of the current National Highway Program is felt. Future growth will be split between the existing urban areas and new locations in rural areas activated by interstate routes. A tendency toward lower densities and the desire for unscheduled movement will favor use of the automobile. A pattern of new growth will be the result of a guided development process. New methods of harmonizing land uses will obviate the necessity of rigid segregation of land uses resulting in concentration of traffic generators. More even distribution of the latter will mean lower peak load on highways. Design features of expressways, making their high speed safe, will be utilized in the gradual development of other highways concurrently with development of land. Wide right-of-ways will make it possible. Expansion of the existing urban areas will be somewhat along the same lines. Old cities will be in the process of orderly replanning and rebuilding of their older sections which are relentlessly growing obsolete. Modern design will assure safe movement in rebuilt areas. With some new features of design, provisions for off-street parking, and with regulations based upon a better knowledge of the human being, safe and rapid movement of people may be attained without undue restraint of liberty.

Sergei N. Grimm, Syracuse, New York, is a Planning Consultant and Consulting Engineer. He was Executive Director of the City Planning Commission and Housing Authority in Syracuse for many years and had charge of metropolitan area planning, zoning, housing and urban renewal.

TRAFFIC and safety are such fundamental considerations in planning the urban communities of America that while thinking about one, it is impossible not to dwell upon the other. It will take perhaps fifteen years to complete the current national highway program and at least a decade of subsequent activity in real estate to reveal sufficiently the effects of this program on urban growth. For this reason, in this discussion "tomorrow" means a quarter of a century hence. Because of such a long span, future factors and trends are likely to change the story. This is the present outlook.

THE FRAMEWORK OF REFERENCE

The following are premises upon which the writer bases his views of the future urban communities in the United States, reflecting the views of his collaborators in the Urban Planning Seminar at the School of Architecture of Syracuse University.

Population growth is likely to continue, but not necessarily as rapidly as some people expect. The "projections" of population experts pointing to "explosive" growth must be considered in the light that twenty years ago, during the depression, the same kind of people forecast ultimate stability.

Rearrangement in the distribution of population—throughout the country and locally—may mean more rapid growth in some regions, a static condition, if not decline, in others. Growing prosperity and mobility of people will reflect themselves in a condition already observable among the upper-income classes with their "residences" in the larger cities, winter homes in the south and summer homes in northern resort areas. Nomadic existence in trailers is adding to the seasonal fluctuation of population and the distribution of people throughout the country.

The social, cultural, and economic

levels and standards of living of the whole population are likely to rise and the number of slum dwellers will dwindle. Some slum dwellers—and certainly some of their children—will move into the middle-class residential areas of the cities. The improved economic well-being of the people will mean that more and better modern houses, goods, gadgets, and services will be attainable to individuals; more community facilities will be available; and greater development of natural resources will be possible—all enlarging the land areas suitable for rural and urban use.

The natural tendency of the free man to decide when he feels like deciding, to move when and where he wants to go, faster and without the restraint of scheduling, will continue to motivate people to favor "self-mobiles" rather than scheduled mass transit. The urge for more elbowroom and privacy, especially among families with children, will drive them to the land where modern homes on plots of ground a quarter of an acre and up would provide them with the quality of environment satisfactory to them. This does not mean that some people will not prefer to live in a high density environment and enjoy it.

With a low density of population and people's preference for free, unscheduled movement by self-mobiles, the use of mass transportation will have its own limitations in spite of any increase in its efficiency and comfort. The volume of motor vehicle traffic will continue to grow. The integration of transportation through the use of "pick-a-back" and like arrangements will facilitate the movement of materials and goods for long distances away from railroads and harbors. Many industries will be free to select locations assuring the quality of environment which is becoming as important to people during their working hours as during their leisure time.

In general, air transportation of people and goods and private flying will increase in volume and speed. Increasing loss of time and rising costs of terminals will force the industry to adapt aircraft design to the situation on land. Steep or vertical takeoff and craft requiring smaller ground facilities will be provided, thus allowing the development of more of the latter. Together with improvement in the means of reaching airfields from the ultimate points of origin and destination and in ways of loading and unloading people and goods, these changes in air transport will modify location factors in land use. Expansion of private flying will be handicapped by the hazards of air congestion until a solution to it is found.

In dealing with factors and trends, one must keep in mind certain inherent characteristics of our industrial civilization and of our socio-economic system. Efficiency and economy are not basic objectives. The Constitution certainly does not set them up as such, on a par with life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. This country is the land of waste, which is the price we pay for liberty and progress.

Sciences dealing with the inner functions, motivation, and behavior of human beings are advancing so rapidly that the human factor will become the central point of planning and design.

THE HIGHWAY PROGRAM AND URBAN LAND USE

It is in the light of the above trends that the numerous effects of a factor of tremendous importance—the national highway program—upon future urban communities must be viewed. Among them are effects upon land use and distribution of population, speed of movement, and safety of traffic. Besides its most spectacular features—the interstate expressway system and urban arterial

system—the national highway program also includes the network of state, county, and town highways which are being developed and improved with various kinds of federal and state aids.

While the development of the urban arterial system will mean further growth of the areas contiguous with the existing urbanized areas, the development of interstate expressways across areas remote from existing urban communities should start new urban growth at the points where the combination of the travel with other factorable location factors will create economic opportunities for new urban development.

Thus, by the end of the next quarter of a century, instead of the indefinite expansion of existing urban areas, there is likely to be a new basic arrangement of urban development consisting of two distinct elements: existing urban areas expanded to or still expanding toward their limits and initial growth of new urban areas.

The limit of growth of the existing urban areas will be set by the local social, economic, and physical factors and the nation-wide trends in growth, rearrangement of population, and corresponding changes in the economic potential. Their growth will also be limited by the capacity of the area to solve its problems of circulation by self-mobiles and mass transit on land, by air and water, as well as through the process of regeneration through urban renewal. Thus some existing areas will keep on growing while others will shrink; the rest will fall in between.

The new urban communities will be something like the "satellites" long discussed by planners. However, instead of being self-contained units in many respects—that is, each having its own business and industry to support it—these new urban communities may depend for some time upon an existing urban center, or even several of them,

for certain special services and facilities as well as for sources of income of the inhabitants. Their size and rate of growth will depend upon the combination of social and economic factors inherent in their location. The location and arrangement of these new urban communities will be distinct from the continuous ribbon growth along existing main highways. They are likely to be near the interchanges of expressway highways cutting through largely rural areas, usually spaced some miles apart.

To a lesser degree, the rest of the improved highway system will also open opportunities for development. Some of it may be neither urban, suburban, nor rural. Stimulated by scenic and other attractions of the land and its recreational potential, the growth of reserves for country living during suitable seasons of the year may come into being. They will be distinct from summer resorts by being used a good share of the year, rather than for a few weeks. In a way they will be somewhat like the areas of wealthy country homes of Virginia or Connecticut and will serve the purpose of "commuters for the season" of the middle class. The working class will have its own summer homes and resorts. Reversed seasonally occupied communities are likely to spring up in the southern parts of the country.

DESIGN AND GUIDANCE OF DEVELOPMENT IN NEW URBAN AREAS: INITIAL STAGE

A quarter of a century hence, it will be more fully realized that nobody knows the future and that public action to guide the development of land must be based upon this fundamental truth. It is surprising how many common-sense devices for dealing with the future can be evolved on this basis. This approach will do away with the impossible task of trying to ascertain in advance how

much land will be developed, which land first, and for what purpose.

Public bodies will set up minimum standards and requirements to assure general safety, health, and welfare. First of all, they will put land use under control by zoning as much of the undeveloped area as they deem ample, establishing the initial level of quality of the environment. This rural or open land will insure natural environment and maximum privacy, the kind of environment which presumably is the most desirable. Other levels of environment, reflecting their physical, social and economic aspects, will be defined to apply to the various sections of the area as its development progresses. Direct control of specific types of nuisance, such as air pollution, noise, and so forth, would be provided simultaneously.

Provision would also be made for density control in terms of population, that is, numbers of residents and numbers of day and night visitors and customers. These controls, now usually hidden or merely implied in zoning regulations, will be relied upon not only as one means of defining the quality of the environment, but also for determining the design capacity of highways, sewers, water supply systems, and other community facilities.

Location, width of right-of-way, improvements, and capacity of all existing highways would be recorded on an official map. A general classification of roads would be adopted by local public bodies to be applied to the existing highways and for planning future roads. The construction of these roads will be based upon the way they are to be used, such as for access to the properties in a relatively small area, to serve traffic generated in several small areas, to carry largely through traffic, and so on. Standards for improvements, assuring safety at appropriate speeds and right-of-way width for different classes of

roads, will also be adopted, depending upon the nature and volume of traffic. Right-of-ways will be much wider.

Engineering investigation of the land as regards the feasibility of drainage, water supply, and sewage disposal adequate for various uses and their intensity would be made. In the light of such data and of the prospect of demand for various types and qualities of development, the feasibility of the development of an area at various levels of quality of environment would be ascertained. These levels defined in general land use regulations—somewhat like those now used in zoning regulations, indirectly—and the degrees of intensity of use of the highways, sewers, and other community facilities to be used as a basis for their design will also be defined in such land use regulations.

A sketch plan of land use of highways—existing and future important routes, main drainage channels, and so forth—will then be prepared, covering as large an area as common sense dictates in the light of existing geographic, engineering, and other facts. This plan would then be used as an informal guide by technical specialists. It will express their guesses and wishful—yet creative—thinking about the future potentiality of the area and how best to utilize it.

DESIGN AND GUIDANCE OF DEVELOPMENT: SECOND STAGE

As the development of private land becomes imminent, and as the need for development of highways and other public improvements becomes sufficiently clear, more detailed planning for such improvements will be undertaken. These plans would be accompanied by estimates organized into a long-range improvement program upon approval by policy makers: the land needed for them will be recorded upon the official map.

Land subdivision regulations now

commonly used for guiding residential development are a good example of the respective roles of government and private enterprise in the development of private land. These regulations provide certain minimum standards to protect public safety and health. These standards and other land use and highway regulations will be used by developers and their engineers and other technical specialists in the design of the development.

If the designer finds a better way to achieve the objectives of the standards and regulations while in the process of making the most of the opportunity offered by the land, then government officials will co-operate with the developers, acting as co-operative guardians of the public interest. Factors in this area will include the harmonization of effects of the proposed land use with the quality of environment of adjacent areas and the prevention of excessive loads upon the highways and various community facilities. If all problems can be solved, fine; if not, private developers will find it much more difficult, if not impossible, to proceed with a development incompatible with both the public interest and the rights of other private land users.

The important departure from the present way of dealing with the development of land will be that its effects upon environment and upon highways and community facilities will be considered separately. The load upon highways will be considered first.

Instead of an arbitrary pattern of land use fixed in advance of facts, events, and their sequence, such a pattern will be a result to be seen only after the development is completed. Yet the quality of the environment will be preserved: highways will be adequate and safe and so will other community facilities. All this will be accomplished without the fear and disturbance that

arises from unjustified beliefs that only a particular pattern can assure the most effective use of land and that unless this pattern is preserved the people will suffer.

Traffic safety and speed are made possible by the technical design features of streets and highways. Some of the standards of design are not known and appreciated by the public. Even the minimum safe width of a lane of pavement is not known to many people. Acceleration lanes, as used at the entrances to an artery or expressway, is a term hardly known to persons other than highway designers. The same is true of the deceleration lanes, lanes used to slow down traffic before one turns off an expressway, thus avoiding being hit by a car coming from behind. The dividing strip on arteries is already well known, and people have begun to like recesses in it for cars waiting to turn to the left. The use of these strips and many other features as they become generally known to the public will be insisted upon in considering changes in the use of land when these imply hazard or delay for highway traffic on arteries other than those with full control of access. Many shopping centers and other traffic generators have been built in the past without providing adjustment for them in the highway design.

HUMAN FACTOR IN HIGHWAY SAFETY

Today only the eyesight of drivers is recognized on their licenses as being important to traffic safety on the highway. However, human beings are studied and tested for a flight to the moon, and aircraft pilots must pass rigid tests periodically to qualify for piloting different kinds of aircraft. Difference in reflexes, reactions, capacity for decisions, and physical resistance to fatigue will become factors in design of highways, even though traffic en-

gineering and electronic devices will make safe driving partly automatic.

Traffic regulations will vary for the different capacities of the drivers. Then the movement of people as a result of design and reasonable regulation will be safe and without undue restraint of liberty.

There will be new features in the design for property adjacent to highways and streets. One of them will reflect the realization that the driver who leaves his car parked on the pavement, restricting width of pavement and limiting visibility, contributes as much to an accident as the driver who hits the pedestrian. More parking space will be provided for visitors as a matter of common hospitality. On ample sized lots such parking is likely to be provided on private land, while in the case of smaller lots the grass plot between curb and sidewalk may be surfaced for brief parking off the traveled portion of the road, much as the shoulder of a country road now serves the same purpose. Placing garages at right angles to the street with a tee-shaped driveway, as is already done in some places, will stop the hazardous practice of backing out into the street.

Consideration for neighbors and their children, which restrains one from "stepping on the gas," is operative only for a short distance. Beyond that, thirty miles an hour is regarded by many as a reasonable speed, even on purely local residential streets. Streets designed for lower speed will have to be very short, fashioned in the form of cul-de-sacs or horseshoes. As for longer streets, irrespective of whether or not they serve as collectors for traffic from several other local streets, the hazards of their speeding traffic will encourage provisions in the design of the homesites for off-street parking and for driving out instead of backing out into the street. The noise and fumes of speeding traffic

will make it desirable to set houses farther back from the street. This in turn will make it easier to build garages at right angles and provide driveways with turnarounds.

Some of the residential construction will begin along existing roads. With the growth of the general area, the traffic volume may reach the point when direct access to the property will become hazardous, if not impossible. Local access roads may be the only practical solution. Since underground facilities such as sewers, water, and gas mains should not be under street pavement, wider rights-of-way will have to be provided to make room for them. This should facilitate the gradual development of a pavement and local access streets where needed. Only along state arterial and expressway routes can access be limited from the time of construction. An exception may lie in development on a particularly large scale, where, as a result of special design, it may be found advantageous for lots to back up to a main through artery. Here, however, buffer space between expressway and back yards would be needed, otherwise these homes would have traffic noise and fumes both in front and rear.

SERVICING LOW-DENSITY AREAS

With the relatively low density in new urban areas, children will have difficulty getting together for recreation and other pastimes. Bicycles will be in part superseded by various light motorized equipment. The corner drugstore will be too far to walk. To keep junior traffic off the path of automobiles, special blacktop lanes will be provided along collectors and arteries thus preempting the space where sidewalks are, or would be if built. Rare pedestrians would have to share these lanes with bicycles and motorized scooters.

The new science of environmental en-

gineering, after integrating all of the environmental effects of land use, will provide the solution of many problems in harmonizing the uses of different properties of the environment. Municipal engineers, including traffic specialists, will learn how to analyze and provide for the various effects of new development upon highways and community facilities.

Private planning—which colleges of business administration are bound to develop from its present modest beginnings—will enable private developers to anticipate the demand for various business facilities in the areas of new urban growth and to learn how to locate and design them for effective service as well as for traffic safety. With the aid of environmental, municipal, and traffic engineers, private developers will be able to fit business facilities into the general area at locations where they can best succeed in rendering their services.

One can contemplate a "neighborhood" automobile service station on a collector street, fitted into the area by effective design and welcomed and accepted by the neighbors. Such stations are likely to combine the servicing of automobiles and junior "putt-putts" with supplying a loaf of bread or a pack of cigarettes in a pinch. They would also act as an advance post with light chemical fire-fighting equipment and elementary first aid for all kinds of emergencies. One can see the shopping and business service centers on arterial streets, harmonized with adjacent areas and not congesting traffic on the artery. One can even envision a central shopping and business district serving the entire new urban area, which would be planned and developed by private businessmen when they think the opportunity is ripe for it and in the location they determine to be most promising.

Industries seeking a high quality of environment and capable of fitting themselves into any area will not have to go into an industrial "ghetto." In fact they will not even have to locate in "industrial parks" unless it is to their own advantage to do so.

All of this promises a much more even distribution of traffic generation, lesser peak-hour loads on traffic facilities, more speed, and more safety. At some point in the growth of new urban areas, opportunity will arise for some form of mass transit service. It is very likely that at first the service would be point-to-point and later a scheduled express type. This will help to keep down the load on traffic facilities.

DESIGN AND GUIDANCE OF GROWTH IN EXISTING URBAN AREA

In the previous discussion, attention was deliberately focused on future new urban areas. This was done to make it simpler to show how present trends and experience will influence urban growth. It was done also because the emergence of new urban areas will greatly influence the existing cities by providing a direct illustration of what they need to be and by providing competition between the new and the old. Existing cities are not going to collapse and disappear unless some particularly drastic change occurs in their reason for existence.

In many existing urban centers, suburban growth will continue somewhat along the same lines as in the new urban areas, depending upon the degree of influence of the already established pattern of development.

The development of urban highways and expressways will, if anything, stimulate suburban growth. It will improve the principal flow of traffic, but will leave local circulation facilities to struggle against the inertia—if not re-

sistance—to the new concepts of urban development.

More vigorous action may be expected in the older parts of existing urban communities. The development of urban highway systems will precipitate a program of improvements of local arteries and major thoroughfares by accentuating their inadequacy through increasing the traffic load as well as by sheer example of what modern transportation facilities should be.

Various elements of design of modern arterials and expressways, which in their entirety make possible the speed and safety of the modern highway, will be lifted out of the expressway design and put to use in planning the improvements of the local arteries. Besides simple widening of existing pavements, local access roads may be developed where deep lawns provide room for them on properties which face heavy traffic arteries. Some intersections will be developed to provide for easier left-turning movements; simplified grade separations will be constructed where badly needed; and so forth.

The toughest problem will be to provide off-street parking in the numerous areas of the cities developed prior to or in the early days of the automobile. Lack of room for attached garages—sometimes even for a driveway—on the small, narrow lots adds just enough to the general lack of elbowroom to make occupants want to move out in the country to spacious lots and attached garages.

Together with houses outmoded by the increasing proportion of ranch houses and other varieties of modern homes, lack of elbowroom for living and lack of conveniently located parking facilities will drive home more than anything else the realization of inevitable obsolescence as a basis for local thinking and action.

This factor will be applicable to

residential and nonresidential improvements alike. It will be applicable to the existing street arrangement and to public and private utilities. It will be applicable also to any existing public and private structures standing in the way of modern improvements, even though they are physically in good condition. The early narrow concept of obsolescence limited to substandard housing, slums, or blighted areas is already broadening to include nonresidential slums. The narrow concept will be cast aside and will be superseded by a broad concept of inevitable general obsolescence. This will open the way to a dynamic concept of replanning and rebuilding the cities.

The latter concept is more in line with what the urban highway disciplines are trying to do, within their limitations. It is different, however, from the program of urban renewal, which somehow started on the premise that we have to "save" the cities by overcoming obsolescence through the rehabilitation of some areas which actually should be scheduled for orderly liquidation and the extent of their rehabilitation based upon their anticipated limited life.

Twenty-five years hence, the replanning and rebuilding of the cities will be a normal routine process. Urban programs—such as urban highways, urban renewal, housing, industrial redevelopment—will be well integrated.

Traffic congestion in cities' centers will be greatly reduced by by-pass arteries, usually forming a loop around the central district, and by off-street parking facilities for all-day parking near the loop.

Various drive-in businesses will spring up nearby. Complete and convenient accessibility by auto will become a major factor of keen competition among business establishments in the heart of the central area. Brief period parking will be provided near the buildings

where people are going. Much of it will be below the surface. Entrances will be from streets not carrying heavy pedestrian traffic, unless the streets are wide enough to build ramps to the sub-surface parking in the street. This will eliminate the need for curb parking and loading and will free the street for easy circulation of buses, taxis, and other cars which have to drop off or pick up passengers at the entrance to the buildings.

Where pedestrian and vehicular traffic warrant it, pedestrian overpasses and underpasses equipped with escalators will be provided, thus assuring safety to the pedestrian. Pedestrians protected by canopies against the inclemencies of the weather will walk in safety and comfort on resilient sidewalks.

The function of the central area will be restricted in some respects due to decentralization of many businesses. Cultural and other community facilities serving the needs of a large area will be developed and will take up the slack of the land. This development will thus help the central area to become not only a facility of a metropolitan area, but of its region as well.

ORGANIZATION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF SAFE URBAN COMMUNITIES

As soon as some of the confusion inevitable at the beginning clears up, the people will take in their stride the problems of growth of new urban areas and of the regeneration of old ones. Where annexations are difficult, the people will forget about this device. The talk about metropolitan government as an ideal will continue. But after the people realize that it is the metropolitan approach and co-operation that are most important, they then will be concerned with the procedures of co-operation in the business of development of their resources and solving their common prob-

lems. From evolving such procedures and from experience in using them, the necessary governmental rearrangements will emerge.

Many development problems are of an engineering nature. Various engineering boards will come into major play to co-ordinate the technical planning and operations which laymen cannot comprehend. Private planning by developers will be made more effective by adequate facilities. Private development and redevelopment groups including those of nonprofit type will tackle the tasks too great for individuals.

Organization for planning and execution on a metropolitan basis will be accompanied by the strengthening of local planning and action. In new areas, facilities of a county or an even greater area will have to be used for most of the planning and execution until there are enough new people in the area to assume full share of responsibility. Regional co-operation will be common practice.

State planning will face the statewide problems of bringing together the people and their resources, as they are made accessible by modern highways. By fiscal and other devices they will encourage readjustment of the population, getting rid of congestion in some areas

where it is a source of various hazards, including hazards to traffic and its safety. State and federal participation in urban development will continue on a large scale, but with greater recognition of local responsibility. Intergovernmental relations will be worked out.

On the public level, there will be more understanding of planning as a part of the development process, rather than as something that must be done and enacted in a single sweeping operation and held onto lest something drastic happen.

Planning by stages will allow the people to take a greater part in the decisions of policy made in the process of planning. This will do away with the delays caused by the last-moment rejection of the completed plans by the people. Public participation in various phases of planning and development will lead to a better understanding of what the people want, help them adjust themselves to swift changes in the world around them without fear and apprehension, and help them make their environment comfortable and safe.

If this outlook for tomorrow's urban communities of America seems too optimistic, it is not because of a lack of realization of the obstacles in the way. It is simply a matter of faith.

The Military Looks at Traffic Safety

By STEPHEN S. JACKSON

ABSTRACT: The Department of Defense faces a two-fold traffic safety problem. First, it is the owner of one of the world's largest motor vehicle fleets, with aggregate annual mileages totalling in the billions; second, it is the employer of millions of young men, 2,000 of whom die every year in traffic accidents. Vigorous safety campaigning on the part of the Department has resulted in an impressive reduction in the number of accidents involving government-owned vehicles. The campaign to reduce the number of off-duty accidents to servicemen, however, faces many obstacles. The armed forces are composed largely of young men in the age group most prone to accidents; the chances are increased still further by the fact that servicemen, usually located somewhere away from their homes, are very likely to want to drive long distances on holiday and week-end leaves. The ability of the services to combat accidents is limited by their lack of control over the serviceman and his car when neither is on military property. Many techniques, however, are used. A close liaison with the states permits education of offenders; tests to weed the bad drivers from the good allow education for the poor risks even before they have become violators. Inspection of cars located on base, lectures, driving rodeos, and movies are all aspects of the campaign which has earned high praise for the safety efforts of the Department.

Stephen S. Jackson, LL.B., Washington, D. C., is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Division of Manpower, Personnel and Reserve. Prior to his present assignment, he held the position of Assistant General Counsel and had responsibility for the legal aspects of the manpower, personnel, and reserve functions of the Department of Defense. Before joining the Department of Defense, Mr. Jackson served as a referee in the Bureau of Workman's Compensation for the State of New York and later as Justice of the Domestic Relations Court in New York City.

THE United States War Department purchased its first vehicle in 1903. By World War II, there were approximately 1 and 1/2 million vehicles in the military services. The invasion army on the Normandy beachhead was equipped with one piece of motorized equipment for every five men.¹ This rapid expansion of military motorization focused early attention on the need for effective driver training and traffic controls. A comprehensive program was developed and made applicable to military and civilian personnel who operated military vehicles. It helped the military agencies to bring under control the problems generated by accelerated mobility, and it resulted in the training of some 2 million motor vehicle operators.

A War Department manual² issued in 1942 provided officers and instructors with lesson materials and procedures for organizing and conducting driver training. A driver's manual³ was issued to military personnel concerned with motor vehicle operations. Procedures were established for accident investigation and reporting, driver licensing, inspection, and other controls. Various research projects were initiated from which came further program refinement, especially in driver selection and training.

The general content and procedures of those first courses for military motor vehicle operators are followed today, with adaptations and improvements. In addition, civilian and military personnel with responsibility for traffic safety re-

ceive special instruction in traffic accident prevention at New York University's Center for Safety Education. The Traffic Institute of Northwestern University also provides advanced traffic safety courses periodically for the armed services.

In a directive dated March 7, 1955, Mr. Charles E. Wilson, then Secretary of Defense, delineated the accident prevention policy for the Department of Defense and directed that emphasis "will be placed on reduction of off-duty as well as on-post automobile accidents." Further emphasis was given to these policies by the Deputy Secretary of Defense through circulation in 1956 of a factual analysis of motor vehicle accidents involving military personnel.⁴

Vigorous safety programing has resulted in curtailing accidents involving vehicles owned by the Department of Defense as illustrated by a 47 per cent reduction in the accident rate in the period 1950-57. In 1956 and 1957, the government owned motor vehicles of the military services experienced, respectively, 1.2 and 1.1 accidents per 100,000 miles driven. Considering the high turnover of personnel and the teen-age drivers operating world wide over rough roads and cross-country terrain, this is an impressive record. Aggregate annual mileages total in the billions and constitute one of the world's largest motor fleet operations. This world-wide all-service rate compares very favorably with the experience of other motor transportation fleets. For example, a select group of some 1,800 fleets participating in the National Fleet Safety Contest reported an accident rate of 1.58 for the year 1955-56.⁵

While these military safety efforts

⁴ Department of Defense, *Manpower Awareness Series*, Issue No. 6 (Washington, D. C., 1956), p. 33.

⁵ National Safety Council, *Accident Facts* (Chicago, Ill., 1957), p. 52.

have accomplished much in minimizing traffic accidents during this period of rapidly increasing motorization, the emphasis on accelerated mobility has not been without cost, particularly with regard to off-duty accidents in privately owned vehicles.

THE MILITARY ACCIDENT TOLL

Annually, about 2,000 servicemen die in traffic accidents.⁶ Deaths to servicemen from motor vehicle accidents in a five-year period represent the equivalent of enough personnel to man half of one of our new divisions, or ten destroyers, or one air wing.⁷ In addition, there is a high toll in injuries, suffering, and loss of skills and resources. Traffic accidents constitute the major ground accident problem, as evidenced by the fact that a significantly higher number of fatalities result in this category each year than from all other causes.⁸

Of the accident fatalities reported by the Army from all causes in the fiscal year 1957, 65 per cent were incident to motor vehicle accidents. Only one-fifth of the vehicular accidents involved military equipment; the majority involved servicemen in privately owned vehicles.⁹ Similarly, the Air Force reported that 76 per cent of their ground fatalities in 1956 resulted from vehicle accidents, of which 96 per cent were privately owned vehicles. More than 42 per cent of the accidental fatalities from all causes including flying involved motor vehicles.¹⁰ The Navy found that 35 per cent of their accidental deaths during 1957 from

⁶ Department of Defense, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), p. 33.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁹ Department of the Army, *U. S. Army Safety Program Annual Report Fiscal Year 1957* (Washington, D. C., 1957), pp. 4, 23, 28.

¹⁰ Department of the Air Force, *A Statistical Review of the Motor Vehicle Accident Problem in the Air Force* (Washington, D. C., 1956), p. 2.

all causes involved vehicles, with 95 per cent of this category occurring in privately owned vehicles.¹¹

The economic losses which these accidents represent are significant. A study of a five-year period, 1951 through 1955, revealed that more than three million man-days had been lost to the services as the result of nonfatal injuries in motor vehicle accidents, of which only 14 per cent involved a government owned vehicle.¹² Estimated total costs of motor vehicle accidents including property damage costs of government vehicles as well as estimated costs for injuries and fatalities in both government owned and private vehicles exceeded forty-four hundred and forty million dollars during this period. Notwithstanding a gradual decline in the accident rate for government owned vehicles, damage costs have risen sharply. This is partly due to increased labor and material costs in the repair or replacement of property and is to some extent related to the fact that many expensive and previously fixed equipment items have been made mobile and therefore more susceptible to involvement in accidents.¹³

COMPARISON OF MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY DRIVERS

Vexing as this traffic accident problem is to the Department of Defense, it appears to parallel closely the experience of other organizations having large populations of young and relatively inexperienced men operating their personal vehicles on the public highway. Analysis of all accidents in Virginia during 1957 revealed that, while only one-

¹¹ Department of the Navy, *Notes on Estimated Cost to the Government of Motor Vehicle and Aviation Accidents Among Navy and Marine Corps Military Personnel*, Calendar Year 1957 (Washington, D. C., 1958), p. 1.

¹² Department of Defense, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), pp. 26-33.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

¹ The ENO Foundation for Highway Traffic Control, *The Motor-Vehicle-Driver: His Nature and Improvement* (Sangatusck, Conn.: 1949), p. 141.

² War Department, Technical Manual 21-300, *Driver Selection and Training* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1942).

³ War Department, Technical Manual 10-460, *Driver's Manual* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1942).

TABLE 1—STUDY OF MALE DRIVERS
IN IOWA

AGE GROUP	ACCIDENTS PER 100,000 MILES
16-21 years	1.5
22-27 years	1.0
28-47 years	0.7
48-65 years	0.6

fourth of the licensed driving public was less than twenty-five years old, this age group was involved in half of the fatal accidents.¹⁴

The accident experience of college students might afford fair comparison with that of servicemen. College students, like servicemen, often drive long distances on week ends. They drive extensively during late hours in quest of relaxation or to spend a week end at home. Not infrequently they compromise proper maintenance of equipment for economic reasons. However, a comparative study of this type remains to be made because few organizations, other than the military services, include in their accident records information regarding those accidents involving personnel who are not on duty. We do know, nevertheless, that throughout the nation vehicle insurance costs applicable to young men have increased sharply to compensate for the disproportionate losses which have resulted from their accidents. We also know that young drivers have consistently been involved in almost twice as many accidents as their numbers warrant. A study made at Iowa State College¹⁵ of male drivers in Iowa, by age groups, revealed accident rates as shown in Table 1.

This problem is, then, not peculiar to the military service; rather, it is simply an extension of the general commu-

¹⁴ The Travelers Insurance Company, *The Road Toll* (Hartford, Conn., 1958), p. 8.

¹⁵ National Safety Council, *op. cit.* (note 5 *supra*), p. 52.

nity problem of the many young men who, although inexperienced and poorly trained as drivers, are willing to take a chance in their cars when away from home and free from parental guidance and supervision.

Although licensed as drivers by their states, few of the youths who enter the services are trained as drivers in the real sense. For the most part, their driving seems to be the product of the community and home environment. Thus each of the military services is continually engaged in an abbreviated training effort to transform the young men with penchants for "hot rods" into self-disciplined citizens on the highway. This driver training requirement does impose on the mission of developing them into efficient fighting men, but it is necessary if these men are to survive the general failure of the community to school pre-service youth realistically for the demands of adult driving. We like to believe, too, that these endeavors are not lost when servicemen revert to civilian status.

The heavy personnel turnover characteristic of the military services has few parallels and is a major factor in the traffic problem. It imposes a particularly vexing training problem since the input of personnel approximates more than 30 per cent annually. They are, for the most part, inexperienced drivers who enter the service while still in their teens. Their impact on the accident experience is shown in a Department of

TABLE 2—MOTOR VEHICLE FATALITIES OF
ENLISTED GRADES (E1-E3)

SERVICE	PER CENT OF TOTAL FATALITIES	PER CENT OF STRENGTH
Army Privates (E1-E3)	55	48
Air Force Airmen (E1-E3)	67	55
Navy Seamen (E1-E3)	50	40

Defense study¹⁶ which shows that motor vehicle fatalities occur more often in the lower enlisted grades (E1-E3) than is warranted by their relative strength. See Table 2. This may be particularly significant when it is considered that the relatively lower income of this group makes more difficult the ownership of private vehicles.

CHARACTERISTICS OF OFF-DUTY ACCIDENTS

By now, our look at traffic safety as it relates to the military has revealed several characteristic aspects of the over-all problem. The majority of accidents occur off base in privately owned vehicles. A disproportionate number are one car accidents. These occur most often during the four hours following midnight with fatigue and sleepiness frequently contributing to the problem. About one-eighth of the privately owned vehicles are rented or borrowed. Vehicular defects are not significant factors in this type of accident. The typical accident-bound serviceman is one who attempts to drive long distances at sustained high speeds. En route back to his base, he may be short of sleep or less alert because of that "one for the road" which the friends back home have urged on him. He is uninformed about weather, road conditions, and local law—as is the average motorist who contemplates a week-end trip. He allows too little time to make the trip at a reasonable speed; belated departures lead to high speeds "to get there on time." His vehicle is also apt to be overloaded with passengers. Essentially, some servicemen are apt to travel too fast, too far, too tired, too late, and too uninformed about weather and road conditions ahead. Finally, the natural ebullience of youth, coupled with the not infrequent misguided examples of

¹⁶ Department of Defense, *op. cit.* (note 4 *supra*), p. 35.

elders, instills in the accident-bound serviceman an adventuresome nature, a willingness to take a chance. These outline the principal factors which comprise our traffic safety problem.

The control of these factors is a complex and difficult procedure. Men who already consider themselves "safe" somehow must be made "safer," and no amount of directives or military orders will accomplish this objective.

PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY CONTROL OF OFF-DUTY DRIVING

The well-intended suggestions by the public as to how commanders should combat traffic accidents suggest that some people are not fully aware of the limitations inherent in meeting this problem. First of all the conduct of community affairs, including enforcement and control of traffic, is vested—and properly so—in the civilian authorities, not in the military. Secondly, Congress has made clear its intent that the serviceman shall not become a second-class citizen, devoid of the rights and privileges enjoyed by other persons. With these concepts in mind, it is apparent that commanding officers are prevented from taking all possible actions which might motivate a serviceman to drive more carefully. It also follows that the serviceman, off duty in his private vehicle, will be subject to the same controls and treatment as any other user of the highway. It also means that military violators of civil traffic laws are not entitled to any specific exception solely by virtue of their military status. In short, the serviceman, as any other employee of industry or government, is protected from his employer's extending authority to an unreasonable or unlawful degree.

Before examining the various controls employed by commanders to reduce accidents, it may be best to review some of the limits within which they must

work. First, the military services lack authority to issue or revoke licenses to operate private motor vehicles off base upon public highways. This privilege is granted by the state, enforced by the state, and denied by the state. Determination of the ability of the serviceman to drive his own vehicle upon public highways is the responsibility of the state.

Every year the states of this nation grant driver licenses to some six million persons, most of them so young as to be of pre-military service age. For the most part the licensing procedures entail various measurements of personal factors, some of which are of doubtful validity in predicting driving performance. The licensee must usually meet certain requirements pertaining to physical ability, mental ability, knowledge of traffic laws, and driving techniques. There is wide variety in the standards, the test apparatus, and the requirements. Many of these tests do not effectively identify the "good" drivers from the "bad." At times, even good drivers can become bad when affected by hurry, sleeplessness, irritation, distraction, illness, intoxication, or romance.

Second, the services lack the authority and means to inspect vehicles belonging to military personnel unless those vehicles are brought on to the military base. In view of the inconvenience of storing a vehicle off base—and there are many such vehicles in existence—it is probable that there is good reason in these cases for seeking to avoid the stringent safety inspections which are requisite for driving on government property.

Third, the military services lack authority and responsibility for control and enforcement of speed laws and other safety regulations which relate to servicemen operating their own cars off base and off duty. Unless a serviceman is injured in an accident, or the civil au-

thority voluntarily passes the information on, a commanding officer has no way of learning about traffic violations by off-duty personnel. Some states cooperate by providing this information; others feel that it places the serviceman in "double jeopardy" in that he pays the penalty imposed by civil law, and then is still subject to controls imposed by his commanders.

Commanders who impose remedial training on off-base violators or who restrict the individual for a period of time commensurate with the offense often become targets of criticism for imposing "punishment" in addition to that handed out by the civil court. Parents or wives of the offender sometimes write Congressmen, complaining about the efforts made by the services to motivate safer driving. It is not difficult to imagine how a serviceman presents an erroneous picture of undeserved restriction which deprives him of the chance to visit his loved ones back at home, only five hundred miles away. Omitted from this explanation to his family may be the fact that he was apprehended for driving while intoxicated, speeding, or some other serious traffic offense. Influences exerted on responsible commanders may cause them to relinquish certain effective controls—and heighten the difficulty of controlling the offender.

The Armed Forces cannot prevent a man from owning a private vehicle. Regardless of the individual's qualifications, whether mental, physical or financial, his commander cannot prohibit him from owning and operating a vehicle while on leave or liberty. Nor can the serviceman's vehicle be impounded by his commanding officer; it is his personal property and as such, he cannot be deprived of it without due process of law. We cannot require the serviceman who operates his automobile off the base to install safety devices or new tires in

his vehicle or even to adjust his brakes. We cannot require the serviceman to carry liability insurance on his vehicle, except on the military base. Thus a member of the armed services may secure the required insurance to cover the operation of his vehicle while on base—where the environment is singularly free from accidents—but will have no protection while driving on the public thoroughfares. We cannot prohibit drinking of intoxicants by a serviceman who is off duty and off base. Finally, while we can prescribe the time of departure and return for the serviceman on leave or liberty and try to be sure that he does not undertake a trip too long for the time period involved, we cannot guarantee that he will allow an adequate amount of time for his return trip. It is the return trip to base which produces the characteristic accident.

ACCIDENT PREVENTION

Vigorous programs for preventing traffic accidents embracing the three E's of traffic safety—education, enforcement, and engineering—have been established. Highly developed and stringent driver testing and licensing procedures for operators of military vehicles are in effect. Accident data are collected and analyzed with the objective of planning corrective measures. Enforcement of traffic regulations on military bases compares with that in any well-policed community, and in many areas military traffic control cars patrol the highway adjacent to military bases to maintain surveillance over military drivers.

Safety education

The major emphasis in the Department of Defense is upon safety education, on efforts designed both to create a continual awareness of the need for safe driving and to train personnel in

safe driving methods. Contests, demonstrations, illustrated booklets, posters, displays, and articles in base publications are all used in great numbers to make military drivers safety conscious. Special kits, training films, and other media are furnished to commanding officers and are supplemented by materials obtained from public service agencies. Detonator demonstrations are conducted to develop appreciation for problems which relate to speed. Personnel departing on holiday leave by automobiles are given special briefings, and it is common practice to limit the distance to be traveled by private vehicles so that the serviceman will not spend his leave primarily in driving. Vehicle maintenance is encouraged through hobby shops located at military installations where the serviceman who owns a car may obtain technical guidance, parts, and service at a nominal cost or on a do-it-yourself basis under close supervision.

Driver training courses ranging from ten hours to several weeks are conducted. The Air Force currently, for example, is placing particular emphasis on training airmen under twenty-five years of age by means of a standardized compulsory driver improvement course. Ultimately this course will be given to more than 500,000 airmen. Both the Army and the Navy conduct violator schools at various bases and posts for schooling traffic offenders. Special training in traffic safety for key supervisors is conducted at New York University, Northwestern University, and University of Denver. There have been more than 125 such courses at New York University alone since 1942.

A Motor Vehicle Roadeo also is conducted to spur individual and organizational competitions, foster interest in safe driving, and increase the prestige of the military driver. The Air Force, for example, holds an Air Force-wide Driving Roadeo annually for drivers of

various classes of vehicles including passenger buses, tractor vans, tractor refueling units, trucks, and sedans.

The military departments are justly proud of the recognition which many of *their efforts* in this area have received. Their safety films have been accorded the highest honors by the National Committee on Films for Safety, and the military departments have monopolized the Presidential Award for Safety bestowed annually on the government agency considered most outstanding in safety programing.

Safety research

Greater knowledge in accident prevention is gained through analysis and research by each of the services. Periodic tabulations are made of accidents to detect trends and indicate problem areas. Other accident data are periodically analyzed to determine causal factors and plan preventive measures.

Various research has been done or is under way in the services. For example, analyses have been made of crash injury data for the Air Force by the University of California at Los Angeles and crash injury data studies are now being made in co-operation with Colonel Stapp of the Aero-Medical Laboratory in relation to automobile seat belts. The Army will provide the drivers for the American Association of State Highway Officials road test in Illinois for the next two years and will conduct research on fatigue, carbon monoxide, and other factors which tend to cause accidents. The Army research has led to the development of batteries of driving aptitude tests. One battery is administered to all inductees to identify those who possess desirable traits for successful driving; the other set is used in conjunction with the licensing procedure. The Navy has followed a somewhat similar course of testing, and the military departments extend reciprocity

in recognition of a sister service's *termination of driving competence*.

LIAISON WITH CIVIL AUTHORITIES AND CIVIC GROUPS

Since most vehicle accidents involving military personnel occur when they are in their private vehicles on the public highways, an essential part of any program to reduce such accidents is a close liaison between commanding officers and civilian authorities and civic groups. A number of programs have been established on a regional basis to promote effective interchange of assistance and information. For example, the Fifth United States Army, with Headquarters in Chicago, has developed a "courtesy report" system whereby civil police authorities can transmit to responsible commanders data pertaining to traffic offenses by servicemen in a thirteen state area. From these reports the offender may be identified and remanded to *driver improvement courses*.

In all regional areas, particularly in the Central, Southern and New England states, a close liaison between the traffic authorities of the military and civil communities has helped to extend the effective area of control. Reports of accidents and serious traffic offenses by servicemen are channeled through regional headquarters to the appropriate commander. Reports of accidents involving military personnel on the New Jersey turnpike are routed to central headquarters for forwarding to the appropriate service and command.

Various states have met in conference with military authorities in a mutual endeavor to reduce accidents. In the past year, California, Texas, and Illinois conducted such conferences. As a public service, insurance companies, automobile manufacturers, tire and petroleum companies, and other business organizations have joined forces with the effort by the military to motivate the

serviceman to drive safely upon the public roads. They conduct special training, distribute safety literature, sponsor safety contests, stage demonstrations, and co-operate in other ways. For example, the Nationwide Insurance Company has conducted stopping distance demonstrations for thousands of servicemen on military installations during the past several years. The Champion Spark Plug Company has presented its "Highway Safety Program," which includes a twenty-seven minute sound color movie and a lecture by a champion driver, at many military bases. The American Automobile Association has conducted training courses on driver testing throughout the country and many other organizations have given generously of time, money, and materials to help insure the safety of the serviceman.

In addition, at the national level Defense Department representatives participate actively on the executive boards and committees of the National Safety

Council, the Federal Safety Council, and other groups concerned with safety.

In summary, the Department of Defense recognizes traffic safety as an important and continuing problem affecting the welfare of its personnel and the efficiency of its mobile operations. At every level, emphasis is being placed on ways to make the vehicular travel of the serviceman safer and more orderly. While proud of the progress made in motor vehicle accident prevention, we expect future improvement by more vigorous application of the factors known to prevent accidents: motivation, testing, discipline, investigation, reporting, record keeping, and inspection. Unlike a military campaign, the traffic safety effort is never ended.

The ultimate target for this vast and continuous effort is to reduce the number of those sad messages addressed to next-of-kin which commence "The Secretary of the Army (or Navy or Air Force) regrets to inform you that. . ."

Organizing for Safety

By J. W. BETHEA

ABSTRACT: Traffic safety is the responsibility of public officials, yet public officials cannot successfully discharge this responsibility without public support. Public support in turn will not be successful unless it is properly focused. This focus can best be achieved through a formal organization of all groups and all individuals united in a co-ordinated accident prevention program. This organized group of citizens performs a two-way function: it conducts a continuous campaign of education to keep the community alerted to accident prevention needs, and it places its support solidly behind public officials, encouraging them to improve their program and to advance its effectiveness. Organized citizen support for traffic safety is not something new and unique. It developed out of industrial safety experience as motor-vehicle traffic grew in volume and complexity. The need for a co-ordinated attack on traffic accidents is not limited to citizens and citizen groups, however. Public officials charged with traffic responsibilities also should co-ordinate their efforts in order to minimize duplication and assure understanding and co-operation. This can best be achieved through a co-ordinating committee of the heads of the departments which have traffic responsibilities, with the chief executive serving as chairman. The traffic problem can be brought under control if public officials provide leadership and are backed by strong citizen support for the measures needed to achieve this end.

J. W. Bethea, Washington, D. C., is Executive Secretary of the President's Committee for Traffic Safety, which has as its primary objective the encouragement of effective citizen traffic safety organization in every community. He previously served as Deputy Director of the 1954 White House Conference on Highway Safety, Executive Director of the National Committee for Traffic Safety, and Editorial Associate with the Public Administration Clearing House, Chicago.

STATE and local officials have the legal authority and primary responsibility for the planning, enactment, and execution of an effective traffic safety program. Yet, as experience has shown, public officials cannot exercise this responsibility without the co-operation and active support of citizens of the states and communities.

No matter how advanced a program may be, it will fail if it goes beyond what the public is willing to accept. It cannot succeed without the understanding, assent, and support of the citizens who are affected by it. And in the case of traffic safety, this is nearly everyone—those who walk as well as those who drive.

Public officials are much like football players—when they outrun their interference they get into trouble quickly. No matter how sincerely dedicated to their work, no matter how industrious or competent, they can only go so far without citizen support. The need for public understanding and support is not unique to traffic safety. If the people are to observe any regulation continually and conscientiously, they must understand the need for it. But because traffic safety measures affect so many so constantly and so directly in their daily affairs, a continuous education program is essential to convince them of the necessity for controls in this area. Since public officials often are suspect in the role of educator, the most effective voice has proved to be that of organized citizen support.

As applied to traffic safety, citizen support or public support has been defined as the

co-operation and active assistance extended to public officials and official programs by well informed citizens and citizen groups to develop and sustain effective accident prevention activities; it is the necessary working relationship which bridges the gap be-

tween official action and public understanding.¹

ORGANIZED CITIZEN SUPPORT

Citizen support is a broad term, as the Connecticut definition implies. Organized citizen support, on the other hand, is a specific term. Organized citizen support means, in this case, a specialized and integrated community-wide traffic safety organization through which the interests of all citizens are focused and by which the traffic safety activities of all groups are co-ordinated. It may be a voluntary organization, or in the states and larger communities it may maintain a professional staff.

Despite general recognition of the importance of organized citizen support, some traffic officials have been slow to accept a citizen support organization as part of the accident prevention team. Hallie L. Meyers, executive director, Indiana Traffic Safety Foundation, Inc.—a statewide citizen group—made note of this in a speech at the University of Illinois before a group of traffic engineers:

For too many years we have been neatly classifying traffic safety as an official problem and many officials have asserted a sort of possessive attitude on all activities connected therewith. Many have looked on suggestions or plans advanced by persons not on the public payroll with emotions ranging from downright hostility to amused tolerance. While appearing to listen, many officials have closed their ears to suggestions from the public.

In spite of the fact that public support is needed, many officials are reluctant to have such groups formed and fearful of the results of co-operating with those that are formed. There seems to be an official opinion that those of us in citizens' groups are dangerous. Perhaps we are—dangerous to complacency, dangerous to inefficiency,

¹ Connecticut Safety Commission, *Community Safety Organization Bulletin*, No. 1 (April 1957), p. 1.

dangerous to incompetence—but at the same time helpful at all levels of government to those who are willing to accept help.²

The resistance of some officials to organized citizen support is prompted largely by the fear that a support group will attempt to usurp official authority. No chief of police relishes being told where his squad cars must patrol, and no traffic engineer wants laymen locating new traffic signals.

This resistance of officials points up the importance of having the purposes of citizen support organizations clearly stated and understood. Broadly, the objectives are:

1. Promotion of safe and efficient movement of traffic on the streets and highways. This objective is considerably broader than that of the early safety groups which concerned themselves solely with accident prevention and ignored the associated problem of congestion. But as the National Safety Council points out,

The highway traffic problem has two major aspects: Accidents and congestion. These are so closely related as to be inseparable. Both stem from the same basic causes: Defects or deficiencies in roads, vehicles, drivers, and pedestrians. An organized program aimed at the total problem has maximum appeal to officials, businessmen, and the general public, and hence is more likely to produce results.³

2. Conduct of a public safety education program to inform people about the accident problem and to encourage the public to accept responsibilities for the safety of others, thus reducing the un-

timely deaths, crippling injuries, and economic losses caused by accidents.

3. Co-operation with government officials in the building of sound programs for accident prevention and traffic control.

4. Focusing of public attention on major traffic safety needs, and the development of support for official action to meet these needs.

5. Provision of the means for voluntary co-ordination, of the planning and execution of projects of the many groups interested in the traffic problem.

6. Maintenance of the continuity of effective accident prevention programs during changes of administration.

PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION

Equally important to the effectiveness of the citizen organization is adherence to the principle that it be nonpartisan and nonprofit. It must always operate as a public service organization representing the entire community and serving no special interest. It must have as its goal the prevention of accidents and of death and injury, and the minimizing of economic loss. Concomitantly it must adhere to the cardinal rule: never assume or usurp the legal responsibilities of government agencies.

Citizen organizations can be used very effectively by public officials as a source of advice and counsel. The best police administrator in the world, for example, may be so inept in public relations that he has no idea of what the public reaction to restrictions is likely to be, or when it would be best to impose them. Through a citizen group, he may gain access to people with a better sense of timing and better judgment of the reaction of the public. A citizen organization can also be used as a testing ground for proposed official programs. Group discussion will reveal objections and obstacles and will produce suggestions for

revisions that will make the proposals more acceptable to the public.

Since the goal of a citizen organization is action, a warning of the National Safety Council is appropriate: "A safety organization may hinder progress if it or its public education function becomes a substitute for action on the real needs of the community."⁴

Citizen organizations have demonstrated their value in numerous communities. They have aided in the development and promotion of continuous balanced traffic programs that have produced substantial reductions in the accident toll. The reductions have been achieved despite multiplication of population, traffic volume, and vehicle mileage.

In Chicago, for example, traffic fatalities declined steadily, year by year, from 458 in 1952, which was the first full year of operation of the Citizen Traffic Safety Board, to 318 in 1957. The same downward trend continued into 1958.

During the six-year period of the Board, the traffic division of the police department has been greatly improved, with the result that the division's arrests for moving violations increased from 212,000 in 1951 to 312,000 in 1957. The traffic court also has been improved by locating all of its activities in one building. One of the byproducts of this centralization is the freeing of the equivalent of 200 to 250 experienced men for street patrol duty each day. Additional developments include the establishment of a psychiatric clinic and a traffic violators school under the auspices of the traffic court. The Board has further lent its support to the erection of numerous multilevel parking garages on the perimeter of the Loop. It has extended its efforts beyond the city limits in helping to secure a new state-wide drivers license law and chemical test legislation.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

RESULTS IN DETROIT

Detroit has an equally impressive record. In the twelve years before the establishment in 1941 of its citizen group, the Traffic Safety Association, traffic fatalities averaged 340 annually. In the last twelve years (1946-57), traffic deaths in Detroit have averaged 204. During this recent period, the number of fatalities has ranged from 236 in 1954 to 179 in 1957. During the first four months of 1958, they totaled 46, compared with 60 in the same four-month period in 1957.

In smaller cities, citizen organizations have proved similarly effective in helping to develop programs which have reduced fatalities. St. Joseph, Missouri has averaged less than three traffic deaths a year for the last five years as compared to fourteen in 1935—the year the safety council was formed; Minneapolis, forty-four annually, compared to eighty-nine in 1928, the year of organization.

The experience in Detroit provides an excellent example of a citizen group which has built solid public support for official programs and policies. At the time the citizen organization was formed, Detroit was plagued by drunken drivers. In one year forty-seven people were killed in "driving while intoxicated" accidents.

Under state law in Michigan, a person convicted of driving while drunk automatically loses his license for not less than ninety days. But this penalty was not sufficient to deter people from driving while drunk. The traffic judges, therefore, decided to supplement license suspension with jail sentences. The citizen's group approved this decision since it appeared to be the only way to meet a critical problem.

The staff of the citizen organization then began producing a steady stream of newspaper and radio releases in sup-

² Hallie L. Meyers, Executive Director, Indiana Traffic Safety Foundation, Inc., before the Traffic Engineering Conference, University of Illinois, February 1957.

³ National Safety Council, *Community Safety Organization Principles, Policies, Program* (Chicago, 1955), p. 8.

port of the judges, describing the number of fatalities and serious injuries caused by drunken drivers and pointing out that a jail sentence is none too severe a penalty for a person who places his own life and the lives of others in jeopardy by driving while intoxicated. Bar owners displayed posters with the blunt warning: "Drunken Drivers Go to Jail." Police intensified their efforts against drinking drivers, and the judges sentenced the guilty to jail.

Since the start of the program, both fatalities and injuries resulting from accidents caused by drunken drivers have been cut by more than 90 per cent. That the people of Detroit have accepted and supported the policy is evidenced by the fact that they have returned the traffic judges to office by overwhelming majorities.

RESULTS IN INDIANAPOLIS

Indianapolis offers another illustration of effective citizen activity. When the dockets of the four municipal courts were so overloaded that there was a three to four month delay in hearing traffic violations, the safety council's traffic committee reviewed the situation. It found that traffic cases were mixed in with misdemeanors. No traffic violations bureau had been set up to reduce the load on the courts. No effort was made to separate traffic cases from other types of criminal prosecutions, with the result that housewives arrested for running a red light or failing to observe a stop sign were crowded into an undersized courtroom side by side with drunks and petty thieves.

The council's traffic committee recommended that traffic cases be separated from other cases and that a separate court be established for them, and furthermore that a traffic violations bureau be created by city ordinance to handle the bulk of the less hazardous violations. The city council as well as court of-

ficials were amenable to the suggestion of a violations bureau, and established it promptly. These officials were also agreeable to the idea of trying traffic cases separately, but the approval of the state legislature was necessary in order to create separate traffic courts.

CAMPAIGN FOR LEGISLATION

Buttressed by recommendations from the American Bar Association and the support of the Mayor, the safety council undertook a campaign for approval of the necessary legislation. Political leaders agreed to the legislation and incorporated it into party platforms; civic leaders also issued statements of approval; the press as well as radio and television stations gave editorial support.

As a consequence of this concerted effort, the necessary legislation was passed and separate traffic courts were established. The handling of traffic cases was greatly improved and police enforcement improved as well because of the prompt disposition of cases. In the first year of operation of the new courts, traffic deaths declined more than 20 per cent.

Citizens' groups can operate on the state level as well. In Utah, high school driver education was identified as a necessity for an effective state-wide traffic safety program. To achieve this objective, it was believed necessary to have legislative authorization for the instruction, to establish course standards, and to provide state financial assistance for local schools.

Sparked by the state safety council, a special driver education planning committee was formed, consisting of representatives of the Parent-Teacher Association, automobile dealers, motor transport operators, the State Board of Education, and other groups, as well as members of the legislature. The committee developed information on the effectiveness of driver education, drafted

necessary bills, and suggested ways to finance the program. The recommendations were submitted to the state legislature, and the committee testified in their support before house and senate committees.

The legislature directed the State Board of Education to establish minimum standards for driver education and provided an incentive for students to enroll in the course. But the legislature failed to offer financial assistance, believing that local school districts could finance the program under existing school budgets and fearing that the balance of allotments under the state's uniform school fund act might be upset if driver education received a special appropriation.

Meanwhile, in the months between biennial legislative sessions, the safety council driver education committee conducted a continuing public education program, including talks before civic and service clubs, news releases, and radio and television interviews. A proposal was also developed, recommending that one dollar be added to the motor vehicle registration fee in order to finance the state assistance program. A state-wide meeting of all citizen groups agreed on this recommendation; the necessary legislation was drafted, and the legislature adopted it. The number of high schools offering driver education subsequently increased five-fold, with all schools planning to offer the course within another year or so.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

Citizen organizations are not new to the safety field. As early as 1914, Rochester, New York, organized a safety council and in 1918 neighboring Syracuse followed suit. The next year similar citizen groups were formed in Cleveland, Ohio, and Wilmington, Delaware. In these early years, industrial safety was the chief concern. With the advent

of the motor vehicle as the principal mode of transportation, however, increasing attention was focused on the prevention of traffic accidents. Today most safety councils devote the majority of their effort to this area.

Prompted by the success of local councils working with industrial safety experts to reduce on-the-job accidents, traffic safety leaders have given increasing attention in the last decade to the development in every state and community of citizen traffic safety groups which will generate informed public opinion in support of constructive official action. Major emphasis has been given to this effort by the President's Committee for Traffic Safety in the last four years through a series of citizen leadership conferences. As a further spur, the National Safety Council has made additional appointments to its field staff in order to assist in the development of citizen groups.

Approximately one-third of the states and 100 of the 279 cities in the United States with a population of above 50,000 now have a citizen support organization with a full-time staff. There are numerous volunteer organizations in the smaller communities and rural areas, and these too are doing a very effective job. Generally, however, a paid staff working full time at accident prevention is essential in any community of more than 50,000 population.

There is no one pattern of citizen organization that is the "right" one. Conditions vary from state to state and from community to community. Only the informed citizens of a particular state or a particular community are qualified to judge what pattern will be the most effective for them. Community leaders may feel that a general safety organization—one working on occupational, home, farm, school, and traffic safety—is needed. Or it may be their judgment that the traffic problem

is of such urgency that the organization should be limited to traffic safety.

One ingredient is of utmost importance, whatever the organizational pattern—leadership. Indispensable in any effective public service organization is the active participation of top civic leaders of broad vision. A civic movement cannot for long be stronger than its volunteer leadership. This is particularly true in traffic organizations, for it is the volunteer leaders who must represent the group to the mayor, governor, or other public official, as well as to other organizations, and who must raise the funds if the citizen organization is to be privately financed. Unless the individuals serving as volunteer leaders have the prestige and respect of officials and citizens of the community, their leadership is likely to prove ineffectual.

CO-ORDINATED PROGRAMS

The philosophy that citizen organizations should support the program of officials is based on the premise that there is an "official" program for reducing traffic accidents and that it is worthy of support. An essential element of a worthy official program is co-ordination. The numerous government departments with traffic responsibilities need to be co-ordinated to prevent duplication of effort and eliminate work at cross purposes. Co-ordination of official effort—state, county, or municipal—is one of the basic recommendations of the Action Program.⁵

Co-ordination is a management device which makes it possible to fix responsibility and achieve teamwork among departments, while allowing these agencies to retain full responsibility for operating all phases of the program. Good co-

ordination makes possible an achievement far greater than the sum of individual effort.

The most practical method yet found for assuring co-ordination of the official safety program is through a formal committee structure in which all departments and agencies with authority and responsibility for traffic control and safety are represented. The chief executive—governor, county commissioner, mayor, or city manager—should serve as the active chairman of the committee, particularly when major plans and developments are under consideration.

Many executives seem to think that co-ordination can be achieved by delegating the responsibility to a subordinate. This is a misconception. "The term co-ordination implies the authority to coordinate, which is the responsibility of the chief executive."⁶ In the final analysis, the chief executive cannot escape responsibility. Everything the executive branch does—or fails to do—is laid to his account.

The advantages to a chief executive of a formal co-ordinating organization are several. He is freed, for instance, from the labor of examining many separate, and perhaps conflicting, reports. Instead the co-ordinating group does this work and is then able to present a single recommendation or alternate proposals. These may be the outgrowth of many preliminary meetings, but the chief executive is called in only to make the final decision. The group meetings thus conserve his time since he can confer with his department heads en masse rather than in many separate interviews.

SUPPORT FOR CO-ORDINATION

The first recommendation in the report of the Governors' Conference Com-

⁶ George W. Harris, "Are Chief Executives Delegating Death?," *Traffic Safety*, Vol. 51 (July 1957), p. 21.

mittee on Highway Safety is that the governor of every state should make certain that a co-ordinating committee of officials is working actively to achieve co-operation among state traffic agencies. The report further states that "because responsibility for traffic safety is divided among many agencies—state and local—co-operation among agencies must loom large in any effort to increase the effectiveness of the over-all program."⁷

City and county officials meeting in Washington in December 1957 recommended that

the city and county legislative body or chief executive, or both, should: 1. Establish a co-ordinating committee of city and county officials. 2. The chief executive should be the active chairman of the traffic safety co-ordinating committee. He should insure that the committee meet at frequent intervals, and he must accept the responsibility for seeing that committee decisions are carried out by the respective department heads.⁸

HALF THE STATES CO-ORDINATE

Despite this wide recognition of co-ordination as a vital phase of a well-organized traffic program, less than half the states and only a handful of cities use a co-ordinating group. A recent survey by the National Safety Council indicates that only seventeen states have active co-ordinating committees. Twenty-one states report no such committees; ten states say they have them but they are not active.

Co-ordination of traffic safety programs has long been an integral part of the very successful Connecticut effort to reduce accidents and save lives. The legislative act which established the Connecticut Safety Commission in 1937

states that the Commission "shall act as the central co-ordinating agency of state departments, organizations and instrumentalities engaged in the elimination of motor vehicle accidents."

An established Connecticut concept is that a well organized state program requires "three-way" co-ordination. First, there must be co-ordination of the programs and activities of all official state departments and agencies with statutory authority and responsibilities for traffic control and safety; second, co-ordination of official state programs with the programs of nonofficial organizations and groups having responsibilities and interest in developing and sustaining public support for official action; and third, co-ordination of local community traffic safety programs with the total statewide program.

The Connecticut plan for co-ordination of the official program is based upon four basic principles:

Co-ordination of programs and activities is of sufficient importance to warrant legislative provision for a permanent organization and adequate resources to accomplish the function.

Effective state level co-ordination requires the active support and participation of the governor.

Co-ordination of official action must start at the policy-making level of all departments and agencies with authority and responsibility for traffic control or safety.

Co-ordination is also necessary at the operating level if policies are to be carried out effectively. Composed of deputy administrators and key departmental assistants, this staff-level committee is in a position to work out details of the various phases of the state program, and it provides a means for the continuous exchange of information concerning developments. Meetings are held on a regular monthly basis.

Particularly interesting is a review of

⁷ Governors' Conference Committee on Highway Safety, "Highway Safety," Chicago, November 1956, p. 12.

⁸ President's Committee for Traffic Safety, *Report of the 1957 Public Officials Traffic Safety Conference* (Washington, 1957), p. 36.

⁵ The President's Highway Safety Conference, "Report of Committee on Organized Public Support," Washington, D. C., 1956, pp. 6, 8.

the development of Connecticut's 14-Point Traffic Program for 1957, a priority "official" program to strengthen the state's effort to cope effectively with the increasing traffic problem. Following release of the Governors' Conference report on highway safety in November 1956, each state department which was engaged in traffic control and safety reviewed its operations in light of the recommendations of the report and of the Annual Inventory of Traffic Safety Activities. Each department head then submitted for review by the co-ordinating committee his recommendations for bringing the state program into line with proposals set forth in the report.

The co-ordinating committee screened all recommendations and developed a priority listing. In a subsequent meeting with the Governor, the recommendations were discussed in detail and a final priority program set. In December, the Governor publicly announced his support of the 14-point program, which included measures that could be accomplished by administrative action as well as those requiring legislation. Among the priority items was the establishment of a staff co-ordinating committee which has gone far to assure that all programs are fully implemented.

TRAFFIC ENGINEERING FOR COMMUNITIES

Among the other recommendations were these: authority to use chemical test to determine amount of alcohol in the blood stream, increased state police personnel, utilization of the uniform traffic ticket, expansion of driver education courses for certified teachers, and provision of traffic engineering services to communities under 5,000 population.⁹

Of the fourteen priority items, ten were implemented in 1957, two have

⁹ James K. Williams, *Connecticut's Co-ordinated Plan for Traffic Safety* (Hartford, Conn., 1957), pp. 4, 5.

been partially implemented, and legislation will be introduced in 1959 to implement the remaining two. Those for which legislation is being sought are chemical tests and the uniform traffic ticket.

OUTLOOK

Confronted with the prospect of an additional twenty million motor vehicles on the roads and streets of the nation by 1968, public officials and thoughtful citizens increasingly are turning their attention to the problem of traffic congestion and accidents. More and more, public officials are facing up to their responsibilities for initiating programs to prevent accidents and relieve congestion. And more and more, citizen leaders are recognizing that they have an economic stake in the efficient flow of traffic as well as a humanitarian interest in safety, and furthermore that efficiency and safety are inseparable—one is not achieved without the other.

Increasingly, too, officials and citizen leaders are realizing that the safe and efficient movement of traffic is largely a community achievement rather than the accomplishment of outside agencies and authorities. State agencies and national organizations may supply technical help such as traffic engineering service, but in the final analysis this advice must be accepted and applied by the community.

With greater experience, citizen organizations and official co-ordinating committees will introduce refinements in their operations and techniques. State citizen support organizations may, for example, limit their service to communities solely to assistance in organizing citizen support groups. This would represent a change in the role of the state organizations, as contrasted with that of corresponding community groups. Initially, state support organizations patterned their operation after that of citizen groups in larger communities

whose staff often included traffic engineers, educators, and enforcement authorities, as well as public information and communications specialists. But for a state citizen group to provide these services to communities throughout the state appears hopeless, except possibly in the case of some few state citizen groups which may have no budgetary problem. A more realistic approach generally would be for state departments such as highway and police to provide these technical services to communities.

Thus a specific division of responsibility seems likely to develop between state citizen groups and official state agencies with the citizen groups specializing in organizational assistance to community groups and the official agencies in technical services to local communities.

All of this bodes well for the future of citizen support organizations and official co-ordinating bodies which, thus far, have proved to be the most effective means of assuring co-operative official-citizen action.

Traffic Accident Trends in Europe and the British Isles

By DENIS O'NEILL

ABSTRACT: The general traffic picture in Europe is characterized by rapidly increasing numbers of private motor vehicles and in particular by the emergence of small motorcycles. There is a steady growth in the number of goods vehicles, due partly to a general increase in industrial activity and partly to diversion of traffic from the railways. Although the total number of accidents continues to increase, the rate per vehicle mile is falling. The accident problem varies greatly between countries because of differing conditions and temperaments. Variation is also found between the methods used to prevent accidents, although co-operation through the Economic Commission for Europe is leading to greater uniformity. Traffic safety in Europe is primarily the concern of governments, and co-operation with industry, the general public, and the universities is not generally as close as in the United States. In addition, the resources in terms of man power and finance deployed in Europe for traffic safety have been generally at a lower level. Interchanges of views between European countries and the United States may have a considerable influence, and valuable links have been established between universities, national safety councils, and research establishments. Intensive research into road safety education and propaganda techniques should point the way to significant progress in making road users more aware of their responsibilities and ultimately in effecting a substantial reduction in road accidents.

Denis O'Neill, London, is Under-Secretary, Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation. He is responsible for road safety, road traffic, vehicle regulations and taxation in the Ministry. He entered the Ministry of Transport in 1931 and was subsequently Private Secretary to several Ministers of Transport until 1943 when Mr. O'Neill became Assistant Secretary.

SINCE World War II the situation in regard to motors and motoring in Europe and the British Isles has undergone a revolutionary change. Before the war the automobile was to a large extent a luxury enjoyed by relatively few people; today ownership of one or more motor vehicles is, over a wide sector of our national life, an economic or social necessity. The principal reasons are, of course, the rising standards of living enjoyed in European countries and the growth in economic activities since the war. At any given time there is nationally a close relationship between vehicle ownership and income; the noteworthy fact in Great Britain today, and to a slightly less degree on the Continent, is that the level of income at which vehicle ownership becomes a near necessity is falling.

Unlike the United States, where automobile ownership extends from the top to the bottom of the social scale, the pattern in Europe and the British Isles is more closely defined. It is the exception rather than the rule in the British Isles for a coal miner or a steel worker, for example, to own an automobile even though in many cases his income may put him well into the normal automobile owning levels. There are many reasons

for this—habit, relative nearness to work, and so forth. But there can be no doubt that in this respect Great Britain and Europe are gradually coming closer to the United States' pattern of vehicle ownership; as Table 1 shows, however, the difference is still appreciable.

A new element in road transport in Europe is the very rapid growth in the numbers of small motorcycles. These vehicles are of two main types: motor scooters, which are generally machines of about 100–150 c.c. cylinder capacity, having a platform for the driver's feet, small wheels, and some weather protection in the form of leg shields and a windscreen; and "mopeds," which are either pedal cycles with an auxiliary motor of up to 50 c.c. cylinder capacity or specially constructed machines resembling pedal cycles but with a small motor which is an integral part of the machine. These machines were practically unknown ten years ago but are increasing in numbers faster than any other type of motor vehicle. The reasons for this popularity are firstly their low price—in Great Britain a motor scooter costs about £120 and a "moped" about £50—and secondly their usefulness in European conditions, where dis-

TABLE 1—MOTOR VEHICLE OWNERSHIP

COUNTRY	MOTOR VEHICLES (thousands)			PERSONS PER MOTOR VEHICLE (EXCLUDING MOTOR CYCLES)			PERSONS PER MOTOR VEHICLE		
	1948	1955	1956	1948	1955	1956	1948	1955	1956
Belgium.....	373	877	1,120	32	15	13	23	10	8
Denmark.....	203	444	482	25	14	13	21	10	9
France.....	2,088	8,057	9,404	24	10	9	20	5	5
German Federal Republic..	919	5,866	6,920	79	22	19	51	9	7
Great Britain.....	3,505	6,044	6,540	16	10	10	14	8	8
Irish Republic.....	108	227	243	29	17	16	28	13	12
Italy.....	677	3,931	4,608	110	37	31	69	12	10
Netherlands.....	226	1,030	1,265	66	29	24	43	10	9
Norway.....	133	255	297	29	17	16	24	13	12
Sweden.....	415	1,047	1,121	26	10	9	17	7	7
Switzerland.....	189	540	606	33	15	14	24	9	8

TABLE 2 DENSITY OF MOTOR VEHICLES ON THE ROADS

COUNTRY	ROAD MILEAGE IN 1956 (thousands)	MOTOR VEHICLES PER MILE OF ROAD	MOTOR VEHICLES (EXCLUDING MOTOR- CYCLES) PER MILE OF ROAD
Belgium.....	34	33	20
Denmark.....	34	14	10
France.....	435	22	11
German Federal Republic.....	155	45	17
Great Britain.....	188	35	28
Irish Republic.....	50	5	4
Italy.....	123	37	13
Netherlands.....	23	55	20
Norway.....	32	9	7
Sweden.....	91	12	9
Switzerland.....	26	23	4

tances to be covered are short and traffic congestion with its accompanying parking difficulties is acute in most large cities.

The independence of movement afforded by a private motor vehicle is attracting people away from public transport both by road and rail. The tendency in recent years, therefore, has been for the proportion of buses and coaches in the total vehicle fleets to decline. On the other hand, road goods traffic, particularly transport by firms using their own vehicles, is increasing; the main reason being the wish of firms to have close control of their own transport with its attendant advantages of certain delivery dates and door-to-door consignment. This increase in road goods transport has taken place partly at the expense of the railways; it is one consequence of the growth of industrial activity generally.

The widening of vehicle ownership since the war can be seen from Table 1, in which the number of motor vehicles and the number of persons per motor vehicle in several countries of Europe are given. The remarkable reductions in the number of persons per motor vehicle have been accelerated in recent years by the increase in ownership of "mopeds." In France, for instance, it is estimated

that there are more than 3 million of these vehicles on the roads; in Germany the figure exceeds 2 million.

Traffic congestion problems are following the increase in motor vehicles in European countries. Some idea of the comparative position of European countries may be seen by expressing occupancy of road space in terms of vehicles per mile of road. In Table 2, roads without a surface other than the natural soil in place have been excluded since the traffic on such roads is generally small and local in character. To sum up, the general traffic picture in Europe is of a rapidly increasing number of private motor vehicles and in recent years the emergence of small motor-cycles, a rise in the number of goods vehicles, and a fall in the number of public service vehicles.

ACCIDENT TRENDS

The growth of motor traffic since the war has been accompanied by a steady increase in the number of road accidents. Whether this increase can be halted or materially reduced is the central argument; it is too often discussed as a problem in itself without due regard being given to such important but intangible factors as public opinion. The "public mind" in relation to road accidents

varies widely between the several countries of Europe, Great Britain included, and this accounts in part for the wide range of punishments and other deterrents applicable in these countries. What is interesting and to a degree encouraging is that road accidents are not increasing in direct proportion to the increase in motor vehicles; as motor vehicle totals rise the number of deaths per vehicle tends to fall, although the absolute number of deaths continues to rise. This divergence between the two graphs is most marked in countries, such as the United States and Great Britain, which can claim to have made some progress in road accident prevention.

It is difficult to give complete and convincing reasons for this phenomenon, since it appears in greater or less degree in countries which pay relatively little attention to road safety matters as well as in those which treat road safety as a major problem. The explanation must lie partly in increasing traffic congestion, which slows down vehicles, partly in the improvements in roads and vehicles

which enable drivers to avoid danger more readily, and perhaps mainly in the emergence of a generation which is acclimated to the new conditions brought about by motor traffic.

The education of children in road safety is undoubtedly a major factor in this acclimatization, and it is noticeable that in Great Britain there has been a continuous fall in the death rate and casualty rate among children of school age. The number of deaths of children aged 5-15 per 100,000 population of children of the same ages was 8.2 in 1951; by 1957 it had fallen to 5.4. The casualty rates—deaths and injuries—for the same age groups were 483 in 1951 and 467 in 1957, in spite of an increase in the numbers of children in this age group from 6.8 million to 7.8 million over these years.

Figures of road deaths in the eleven European countries listed in previous tables are given in Table 3, together with the numbers of deaths in each country per 100,000 motor vehicles. The road safety problem in Europe in terms of deaths and injuries is at present

TABLE 3—DEATHS ON THE ROAD

COUNTRY	ROAD DEATHS ^a		ROAD DEATHS PER 100,000 MOTOR VEHICLES (EX- CLUDING MOTORCYCLES)		ROAD DEATHS PER 100,000 MOTOR VEHICLES	
	1948	1955	1948	1955	1948	1955
Belgium.....	715 ^b	828 ^b	271	146	192	94
Denmark.....	405	605	245	190	200	136
France.....	2,689 ^c	8,058 ^c	158	192	129	100
German Federal Republic.....	6,324 ^d	12,340	634 ^d	536	324 ^d	210
Great Britain.....	4,513	5,526	153	115	129	91
Irish Republic.....	201	282	195	161	186	124
Italy.....	2,651	5,752	634	439	392	146
Netherlands.....	952	1,552	639	303	421	151
Norway.....	121	213	109	103	91	84
Sweden.....	531	902	203	119	128	86
Switzerland.....	711	992	512	304	376	184

^a Died within 30 days.

^b Killed outright.

^c Died within 3 days.

^d Year 1950.

comparable in size to the problem in the United States. In the eleven countries given in the above table, with a total population of 235 million, some 37,000 persons were killed and 1.75 million injured in 1955 compared with 38,000 killed and 1.4 million injured out of a population of 165 million in the United States. In Europe as a whole, excluding the Iron Curtain countries, the population is now 332 million and road deaths are now running at a rate of between 40,000 and 50,000 a year; injuries amount to about 2 million.

The road safety problems facing European countries differ in some respects from one country to another. A basic factor is that a large increase in motor traffic has been superimposed on road networks which are in many cases inadequate for the vastly increased traffic volumes, but differences in national temperament and institutions result in special difficulties which are more acute in some countries than others. In Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries, for instance, much more control of motor traffic appears to be possible by means of regulation of road users than in the Latin countries. Every Briton who visits the Continent is quickly made aware that vehicle speeds are generally higher in Continental countries than in Great Britain. This again is a result of different temperaments, and it is also a consequence of the Continental developments in building motorways and the ability in many cases to build roads in long straight stretches through relatively unpopulated areas so that high speeds are possible. For this reason, accidents in Continental countries tend to have more serious consequences than accidents in Great Britain.

We are handicapped in the extent of our information about accident trends in Europe by the absence of any detailed information about mileages traveled by vehicles of different types in

various countries. Comparisons in terms of accidents per licensed vehicle take no account of the differences in distance traveled by automobiles, motorcycles, or other vehicles. While this does not invalidate the general accident trend of rising absolute totals of casualties accompanied by a falling death rate per vehicle, it does affect comparisons between countries which are increasing their relatively low mileage motorcycle population at a faster rate than their relatively high mileage automobile population and countries which are doing the reverse. This gap in the statistics of road accidents and traffic is being narrowed by agreements between countries to produce vehicle mileage data for analysis by the Economic Commission for Europe.

APPROACHES TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM

One of the major difficulties in contrasting the European and the United States approach is that there is as yet relatively little common ground between the European nations. American experts in this field will no doubt be familiar with similar problems which arise from a lack of co-ordination between states. The uniform vehicle code which is urged on the American states is an attempt to secure a measure of uniformity and seems to be succeeding admirably. At the same time there are still divergences between the various states, and administrators in America can appreciate the difficulty of bringing matters still further into line. In Europe the position is similar, although the difficulties are even greater. Quite apart from the racial and linguistic difficulties, there is probably a wider variation in economic progress between the various European countries than between the various American states. These, however, are probably less important than the differences in attitude between

certain of the countries. One example may suffice to show what is meant. In Germany, before a driving test is passed, it is necessary for the candidate to have undergone a set period of driving instruction. This is not the case in France; there, however, a strict control is exercised over persons who set themselves up as professional instructors. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has a completely different attitude in that a comprehensive driving test is prescribed but nothing is laid down as to how preparation for the test should be undergone.

To reconcile these various attitudes clearly presents difficulties, and in so far as uniformity has been achieved in Europe much credit must be given to the Economic Commission for Europe which, working through the Working Party on Road Traffic Accidents, has achieved much. The recommendations of the Working Party are not ultimately binding on governments, but they have made for greater uniformity, notably in the field of examining the physical and mental standards required of motor vehicle drivers and in the preparation of an international driving manual. Although it is difficult to talk about a European attitude, there are certain factors which are fairly general on the European scene and which contrast very sharply with American practice. One obvious factor is the emphasis which American authorities place on private—nongovernment—effort. Perhaps two of the most salient features of the American road safety effort are first the bipartite structure under which, in some states such as California, road safety is tackled partly by a government organization and partly by a public support group, the staffs of which may be identical or, failing that, may work in close co-operation. Another is the contribution of large privately financed organizations such as the Automotive Safety

Foundation and the Association of Casualty and Surety Companies, to name but two. These arrangements, which harness the resources of commerce and industry to the cause of traffic safety, play a far larger part in the United States than in Europe. In Europe the tendency is rather to leave the initiative in road safety matters to the government of the country concerned and for industry to contribute money to societies which aim to further the cause of road safety, without themselves participating actively in the accident prevention effort. In Britain certain private companies are now taking a more positive attitude towards the problem, but by and large the European contribution on the non-governmental side lags behind the American.

The second major difference which must be apparent to anyone with a knowledge of conditions on both sides of the Atlantic is the very considerable effort made in the road safety field by American universities and colleges. The amount of research and teaching which goes on in American universities is not matched in Europe, where we have no counterparts to the Center for Safety Education of New York University, the Traffic Institute at Northwestern University, the Highway Traffic Safety Center at Michigan State, and the research unit of California University at Los Angeles. These large university institutions direct research and spread, through the training of teachers, a comprehensive knowledge of accident prevention. The European effort is correspondingly very small and should obviously be increased.

The third main difference between the American and European effort lies in the amount of resources both in manpower and finance which are deployed. America is a relatively rich country and has more scope for this type of activity than the average European state. But, even al-

lowing for the relative economic prosperity of the United States, there is no doubt that more of the national income and more of the national brainpower is devoted to this particular problem. This is shown not only in the attitude of the universities but in the—by European standards—extremely generous staffing of American organizations.

These differences are immediately apparent to the observer who is acquainted with conditions on both sides of the Atlantic. There are others, notably in relation to the emphasis placed on the various remedial measures. It has become traditional in Europe to concentrate on "The Three E's," education, engineering, and enforcement. The tendency in the United States on the other hand is to break down the subject into ten or more components. The result of this has been that, whereas in Europe debate and discussion on road safety are limited—broadly speaking—to enforcement, engineering, and propaganda, in America the discussion ranges far more widely. Road safety propaganda, for example, which in Britain at any rate is the predominant factor in the road safety field, is in America no more important than a close consideration of the qualifications for a driving license. In other words the European countries have concentrated on road safety education and propaganda and on remedial engineering.

INTERCHANGE OF FACTS AND VIEWS

The principal point, however, is the extent to which European countries can learn from the United States and vice versa. There is fortunately a good deal of interchange of facts and views. Mention has been made of the work of the Working Party on Road Traffic Accidents, which is progressing at Geneva under the aegis of the Economic Commission for Europe. This covers nineteen European countries, including

Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Poland, and the Soviet Union. A representative of the United States usually attends sessions of the Working Party as an observer, which enables an exchange of views to be made not only between the European countries but also between those countries and the United States. As an example of the progress that has been made, a uniform system of traffic signs and road markings has been agreed upon for most countries on the continent of Europe, and it has been possible to incorporate much of this system into the substantially different British one.

The collection of statistics on traffic and accidents on a uniform basis, which is essential both to any over-all appreciation of the road accident problem in Europe and to the measurement of progress in different countries, has been largely achieved by the Commission's Working Party on Transport Statistics.

In addition to the Economic Commission for Europe, international discussion and study are carried on by such bodies as the Permanent International Association of Road Congresses (PIARC) and the World Touring and Automobile Organization (OTA), which have done a great deal to stimulate the interchange of ideas between America and Europe. The OTA also arranged an International Road Safety Congress in September 1958 at which international co-operation was one of the themes.

A number of European experts have visited the United States for varying periods of time to study road accident prevention there. These trips have been undertaken partly as research projects and partly through such organizations as the Commonwealth Fund of New York. Of particular note in this connection was the visit of a mission in 1954 of thirty-two members from eleven countries, which went to the United States under the joint aegis of the Or-

ganization for European Economic Co-operation and the United States Foreign Operations Administration. This mission was able to study at first hand traffic engineering and control in the United States. Its report, subsequently published by OEEC, may prove to have a considerable influence on future thought and action in road safety and traffic control in Europe.

Besides the contacts afforded by international organizations, links have been established between universities and national safety councils on both sides of the Atlantic, and research organizations are kept in touch with each other's activities by the publication and exchange of technical information. The Road Research Laboratory in the United Kingdom—a governmental organization—is the largest organization in Europe concerned entirely with the problems of road traffic and road construction. Much of the laboratory's work is devoted specifically to road safety research. Although financed by government funds, the laboratory is entirely free to make public the results of its research. Since the war the laboratory has made available to interested organizations and persons throughout the world hundreds of research notes on the results of their inquiries into road safety problems. In addition the laboratory summarizes and publishes monthly the results of research carried out in other countries.

SPECULATIONS AND PROSPECTS

In the earlier part of this article the writer's remarks were based on information generally available in Europe and the United States; in what follows he is expressing a personal view.

It is an easy and almost certain forecast that traffic conditions in Great Britain and Europe will continue year by year, and perhaps at an accelerating rate, to approach more closely to those

presently found in the United States. The one development which might materially affect this prediction is the quite surprising growth in light motorcycles and motor assisted bicycles, to which reference has already been made. This development may in its turn affect road safety and the figures of deaths and injuries on the road, in part because the machine itself is so vulnerable and in part because the requirements and regulations governing these vehicles differ materially between the different countries concerned. In most European countries a driving test is not required for these machines; in general the Continental attitude is to regard them as more akin to pedal cycles than to motor vehicles, and thus to subject them to correspondingly fewer restrictions. In Great Britain we class a "moped" as a motorcycle and consider it necessary for its rider to be subjected to a driving test and the other legal obligations—third party insurance for example—which apply to the driver of an ordinary motorcycle. It seems a reasonable assumption that as congestion in town increases the "moped" will play an increasingly larger part in European city traffic, and will also develop in rural areas, especially as public passenger transport in these areas is becoming progressively less profitable to operate. It will therefore be necessary for those concerned in Great Britain and the countries on the Continent to keep a very close watch on the development of the "moped" and the light weight motorcycle, so as to be ready to introduce any regulatory measures which may be necessary.

To speculate about the future trend of traffic accidents, and the possible ways in which it can be fought, is to enter into the realms of high conjecture. One school of thought tends to the opinion that we have probably exhausted the possibility of new and original measures to cut down the casualty rate, and

that the most we can do is to fight a holding operation. While it is certainly true that there is no single or simple remedy for the prevention of road accidents, the author is not one of those who believe that we have by any means exhausted the scope of possible new preventive measures.

So far as the vehicle itself is concerned, it does seem probable that the scope for future improvement, so far as safety qualities are concerned, is relatively limited. The standard of braking and steering efficiency on modern cars is almost miraculously high; there are, however, further possibilities of minimizing the severity of accidents by the development of safety belts, less dangerous body materials, and so forth. Similarly, while the roads of the future will undoubtedly be superior to those of the past—regarded as avenues of transport—the main pattern for road development has undoubtedly been laid down.

It is to the road user, whether he be a driver of a private car, a professional driver of a truck or bus, a motorcyclist, a pedal cyclist, or a pedestrian, that we must look if really substantial inroads are to be made in future years in the present appalling totals of deaths and injuries on our roads, and it is precisely in this sector of our problem that the writer believes in the possibility of great advance. To take only one example, the possibilities of conditioning road users through the media of radio and television have barely been tapped; it is only fair here to say that the United States is much ahead of Great Britain and Europe in this field, as was perhaps to be expected. There is no question in the writer's view that there is a growing need for more intensive research into the techniques of visual and aural safety propaganda and teaching. To make this point clearer, what we need to establish is the impact of different types of propaganda on the minds of those to

whom that propaganda is directed. It is the writer's strongly held view that much of our present well-meant effort in this field is nullified, or at least has its usefulness impaired, precisely because we do not know and cannot measure this impact. If we could, we might well learn valuable, indeed startling, lessons about the relative value of the different types of propaganda, and thus be able to secure a much better return for our efforts. That intensive propaganda and education of a specialized kind undoubtedly give results is proved by the figures of child casualties quoted earlier in this article; there can be no doubt that concentration on this field will be the biggest single factor in producing a traffic-minded and traffic-conscious population for the future.

The aim and object of all road safety propaganda and education is, of course, to develop in the road user of whatever kind the highest possible consciousness of the responsibilities and duties falling upon him and the knowledge of the proper ways in which those responsibilities and duties can be exercised. Alongside this must be education in social responsibility. The ownership of a motor vehicle today is no longer simply a matter of "keeping up with the Joneses"; such ownership involves obligations to other members of the community which are as yet imperfectly realized. This failure of moral consciousness is reflected in the attitude of the general public to road accidents and to the penalties and disqualifications which the courts of law impose for breaches of the rules. By and large it is fair to say that the courts of any given country are not likely in general to punish motorists for offenses to a degree higher than what public opinion regards as acceptable. The mere raising of maximum penalties for such serious offenses as dangerous or reckless driving or driving when drunk is not therefore

likely to achieve much. In any event all punishment is a tacit admission of failure, inasmuch as punishment must follow the offense. What we want to do is to create the conditions where the offense will not take place, and in the writer's view the most effective single way to make progress towards this end is by increased study of the effects of road safety education and propaganda of all kinds. The writer was glad to learn, on a recent visit to the United States, that some work on this is in fact being done.

It is without doubt true that the great majority of accidents are the result of a failure of the human element—the impaired judgment, the fatally slow reaction time, the risk taken heedlessly and perhaps unknowingly. Not all the various categories of the human failure to adjust to modern traffic conditions can

be expected to respond to education and propaganda, however intensive and well directed. We cannot therefore reasonably expect that all our efforts in the field of accident prevention will one day eliminate death and injury on our roads as medical research has eliminated malaria and will no doubt in time root out cancer. To suppose, however, that we should relax our efforts in any way because complete success is unattainable would be to be unnecessarily cast down. The facts and figures of the situation, correctly interpreted, show the measure of success that has been achieved hitherto—and the problem is little more than half a century old, and has been intensively studied for a much shorter time than that. New techniques are opening up; others will without doubt emerge. In this context one can be both a realist and an optimist as well.

Book Department

	PAGE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	142
AMERICAN HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT	147
WESTERN EUROPE	153
EASTERN EUROPE	161
SOCIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY	166
ECONOMICS	181
ASIA AND AFRICA	188
OTHER BOOKS	200

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Enquête sur l'anticolonialisme: Inquiry on Anti-Colonialism. (Estudos de Ciências Políticas e Sociais.) Pp. 394. Lisbon: Overseas Ministry of the Portuguese Government, 1957. No price.

Under the title of *Inquiry on Anti-Colonialism*, the Portuguese Ministério do Ultramar has produced an oddly assorted miscellany of articles on different aspects of colonial problems. More rigid adherence to the area staked out in the title would have lent the volume both greater coherence and greater interest. As it is, the inquiry is largely abortive because it never properly comes to grips with its subject. So wide and haphazard a range is covered in the dozen articles it contains—eight in English, three in French, and one in Spanish—that all sense of specific focus is lost.

The brief Introduction by Commodore M. M. Sarmiento Rodrigues, former Minister for Overseas Provinces, presumably states the reason why the Government sponsored the book. Specifically directing himself to the North American people, the Commodore is concerned to point out that the United States is making a potentially disastrous mistake in so far as it backs independence for "unqualified populational groups" in Africa who have no title to preferential rights and who would have

put forward no claims if they had not been encouraged from outside. The Africans, interrupted in their upward march under imperial auspices, will fall to Communism, and the Europeans, deprived of Africa, will be headed for ruin. "With Africa as a foe and Europe annihilated, what could the Free World count on?"

The Commodore's fellow Portuguese authors rally to his support better than do the others. Professor Adriano Moreira, in particular, stresses another officially supported theme: the right of the Portuguese to refuse to acknowledge that any of their territories are non-self-governing and must therefore be reported on under Article 73e of the United Nations Charter. With sound discretion he bases his argument almost exclusively on the sovereign right of governments to make their own determinations as to the status of different parts of their domains. His statement of the legal case for Portugal's refusal as indicated by United Nations precedents is far more persuasive than any which he might have made to justify the substantive contention that the country's African and other possessions do not fall squarely in the non-self-governing category. In a more general sense Professor Jorge Dias rallies to the cause by presenting a lyrical account of Portuguese overseas expansion which has "a meaning of high transcendence in the history of mankind" since it was car-

ried on by the Portuguese man who is "above all, profoundly humane and kindhearted, without being weak."

For the rest, to mention only a few of the articles, Henry Wells presents an informative and optimistic survey of developments toward self-government in American dependencies; J. Roussier deals with colonial movements for emancipation which he appears to see as inevitable because colonization is a school for nationalism; and R. Le Tourneau undertakes a realistic examination of the causes of North African movements for autonomy. Other articles deal with Brazil in the early and Australia and New Zealand in the later nineteenth century, and with the Spanish dependencies.

It is regrettable that in preparing so handsomely presented a volume a little more attention could not have been given to correcting the often awkward and sometimes almost unintelligible English of the Portuguese writers. Thus, to pick an example somewhat at random, Professor Moreira comments: "So that it becomes evident how A.73e of the Charter tends more and more to be deviated from the technical standing on which it was formulated, to be transformed into a political instrument of the anticolonialism in cause."

RUPERT EMERSON

Professor of Government
Harvard University

WERNER BURMEISTER (Ed.). *Democratic Institutions in the World Today.* (The Library of World Affairs, No. 38.) Pp. v, 157. New York: Frederick A. Praeger under the auspices of The London Institute of World Affairs, 1958. \$5.00.

This collection, originally published by the London Institute of World Affairs, comprises a group of lectures given in 1957 at the University of London, plus an additional chapter on the United States. Happily the editor has not imposed content uniformity on his colleagues, and the methods used to pursue the topic in various parts of the world vary as much as the subject matter. This is particularly fortunate since the study of comparative political institutions in this country is so often limited to the European scene, in

part at least because of a desire to deal with relatively uniform patterns of development and contemporary status.

Thus the editor, who contributes the chapter on Western Europe, is free to eliminate the British Isles and concentrate his attention on the "assumptions" of democratic society in France, Germany, and Italy. In his evaluation of these areas stress is laid upon political, social, and economic reforms as forces tending to break down the anti-state premises of large parts of the population, rather than on the more formalistic legal institutions which have emerged in the past dozen years. Thus, in Germany, special importance is given to the emergence of the postwar CDU (Christian Democratic Union) as a moderate political party which accepts rather than rejects the values of a democratic society.

Lewis, Oliver, and Tinker, considering Africa and the Middle and Far East, necessarily set their evaluation of democratic institutions with a considerable emphasis on history and culture patterns. The impact of Western ideas, the development of a small educated class, the challenge of an aggressive and intellectually militant Communism—all these are part of the rapidly developing institutionalization of democracy, albeit with some caution on the actual depths to which democratic ideas, in the Western sense, may have penetrated.

Mr. Pear's chapter on the United States has an especially appealing first few pages on the Constitution, pages which might well be reproduced in any volume of readings on American government, though to this reviewer the emphasis on McCarthyism in the second half of his chapter seems somewhat overdone.

This is a first-rate collection of studies on the development of comparative democracies, a collection which fortunately is not constrained to a uniformity of analysis nor to a consideration of the primarily formalistic institutions of a democratic society. It is well worth a careful reading.

RICHARD M. SCAMMON

Director of Elections Research
Governmental Affairs Institute
Washington, D. C.

ARNOLD TOYNBEE and VERONICA M. TOYNBEE (Eds.). *The Eve of War, 1939*. (Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946.) Pp. xvi, 744. London: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1958. \$14.40.

The events which followed the second partition of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 furnish an enlightening case study in diplomatic frustration. Hitler's decision to continue on the road of conquest was already made, and after a delay of a few days Prime Minister Chamberlain's disillusionment was nearly complete. Stalin's major shift in policy had been indicated by the replacement of Litvinov by Molotov as Foreign Minister. Most of the crucial decisions which led to war were made by these three men.

Throughout the five-and-a-half month period tension rose steadily, as Chamberlain tried desperately to shore up an alliance system to contain Hitler on both eastern and western fronts. He issued stronger warnings and signed stronger pledges than Britain had ever before felt necessary in peacetime. His efforts were made futile at every turn by the absence from his coalition of the only member whose presence would have stayed Hitler's hand—the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of this monumental sequel to the Royal Institute's *The World in March 1939* is the extent to which its massive documentation and tremendous array of detail combine to confirm the general historical view of the incidents under review. For that matter, not too much revision has seemed necessary since the initial release of the several war-guilt documents in the blue, yellow, and white books of 1939. The pattern of history at that time had attained almost the inexorable momentum of Greek tragedy and the actors could apparently do nothing to prevent the fatal conclusion.

Readers familiar with the Survey series will need no assurance of this volume's high quality or of its scholarly and exhaustive examination of all the documents. It is in every way worthy of the Royal Institute's standards and will be, as intended, the definitive history of the period. Two

special features deserve comment. Viscount Chilston has supplied an illuminating last chapter, "Rearmament in Britain and France between the Munich Crisis and the Outbreak of War," which explores the technical and political reasons for the lag and the dire diplomatic consequences of the consequent weak posture of the West. The maps—gatefold and colored—show the world political, physical, and population situations in 1939, and draw a lucid little note from Toynbee, pointing out that before 1940 all powers faced at most a two-front war threat, whereas technical developments during World War II have created a three-front problem, which the maps are designed to illustrate.

OLIVER BENSON

Professor of Government
University of Oklahoma

WILLIAM R. FRYE. *A United Nations Peace Force*. Pp. xii, 227. New York: Oceana Publications under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1957. \$3.75 cloth bound, \$1.00 paperbound.

ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE. *Strengthening the United Nations: Commission to Study the Organization of Peace*. Pp. xii, 276. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. \$4.00.

These two books combine vision and experience in examining the means by which the United Nations can be used more effectively in the resolution of international tension and to promote world welfare. The first study was prompted by the prospect of a major review of the United Nations Charter attendant on the tenth anniversary of the Organization. It contains twenty-four recommendations covering the gamut of United Nations functions and powers, most of which would not require formal revision of the Charter. Mr. Frye's book relates specifically to the implications of the United Nations role in the Suez crisis and is a tour de force, considering the immediacy of the problems with which his forthright analysis and judicious proposals are concerned. Both books reflect a mature assessment of United Nations potentialities, soberly recognizing

that contemporary national policies severely constrict its actions, yet charting ways in which its growing influence may be further enhanced.

The central point of emphasis in both studies is strengthening the persuasive rather than the coercive powers of the United Nations. Frye in particular dismisses as beyond practical possibility proposals for a police force which would meet international aggression with armed might. He is convinced that the members of the United Nations will not support even a small lightly armed force of volunteers on a permanent basis, let alone implementing the type of military sanctions originally envisaged in the Charter. What may be possible, however, is a "peace force," as distinct from a "fighting force." Its job would be to *prevent* fighting. It would serve as an international trip wire, "a strip of insulation or a tranquilizer between hostile and fearful states." It could patrol ceasefires and armistices, prevent border crossings, perhaps enforce arms embargoes. The powers of such a group, Frye stresses, "would lie less in their rifles than in their armbands; they would represent the moral authority of the United Nations."

The axiom on which this concept rests is found in the terms of reference prescribed by the General Assembly for the United Nations Emergency Force in the Suez crisis—the hotly criticized provision that the force would operate only "with the consent of the parties concerned." It is Frye's contention that on this basis—of the use of the force solely under conditions of mutual consent—it should be possible to establish and hold in readiness for future contingencies a permanent staff of officers headed by an advisor to the Secretary-General, and a small "observer corps," backstopped by elements which member governments could earmark for observation and patrol service of limited duration.

The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace favors a permanent United Nations force along the general lines espoused by Frye. But it lays considerably more stress on measures to firm up the authoritative position of the United Nations, especially in the investigation of international tensions and in applying pre-

ventive sanctions to illegal behavior prior to hostilities. It urges that international sanctions be channelled through the United Nations rather than undertaken independently, except in immediate self-defense. The Commission seems not to have faced squarely the question of whether the same international organization can be effective if it attempts to use both compulsive and persuasive force; or, to put it differently, whether the development of nominally stronger United Nations authority to apply coercive powers is compatible with the mobilization of a truly operational "peace force," considering the contemporary character of international relations.

The real boldness of the Commission's recommendations appears in nonpolitical areas. It envisages major new roles for the United Nations, including the acquisition of title to, and the administration of, contested areas of international importance such as key facilities for international water and air transport, and the Antarctic continent. It suggests that the General Assembly declare the title of the international community to the high seas, and—before it becomes subject to competitive national claims—to outer space. It proposes some new sources of revenue for the United Nations relatively independent of national governments. It vigorously urges a United Nations Development Agency which would have the central authority to coordinate and direct the operational management of large scale international assistance for economic development projects. In this and certain other organs of the United Nations, the Commission leans to weighted voting as a means of enticing support from countries with the heaviest resources to contribute.

The authorship of these studies commands respect. Mr. Frye is United Nations correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor. He conducted the inquiry under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace and in consultation with a distinguished advisory committee. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace is the research affiliate of the American Association for the United Nations. It comprises 100 scholars and persons with practical experience in interna-

tional, political and economic affairs, under the chairmanship of Professor Holcombe.

PHILIP E. JACOB
Professor of Political Science
University of Pennsylvania

GUNNAR HECKSCHER. *The Study of Comparative Government and Politics*. Pp. 72. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. \$4.25.

Gunnar Heckscher, Professor of Political Science at the University of Stockholm, has written this book with two ends in view. It is first a report on a conference on teaching and research in comparative government held by the International Political Science Association in Florence in April 1954. And secondly, Professor Heckscher, while drawing upon the twenty-seven working papers and the discussions of some fifty political scientists from Asia, Europe, and America attending the conference, has attempted to present his own views on the study of comparative government and politics.

Comparative politics is perhaps the fastest growing field in political science at the moment. But unless there is some clarity as to the purpose of comparative studies, there is a real danger that these new developments, as attractive as they may at first seem, may plunge us into a new kind of parochialism—with either many interesting but discrete and unrelated studies of foreign countries, or else many irrelevant comparative studies. Professor Heckscher has tried to introduce some clarity, but regrettably has not succeeded. I say regrettably not only because clarity is so badly needed, but because Professor Heckscher has done so well in raising many of the touchy problems.

In the first part of this volume, Heckscher discusses general methodological problems such as those involved in developing typologies, the usefulness of a configurative approach, the need for drawing from other disciplines, and the ways in which comparisons can be made. He then goes on to discuss the application of comparative methods in political science, first in area studies and then in specific instances: nationalized industries, parliamentary procedure, democratic control of foreign pol-

icy, electoral systems and elections, political parties, and contemporary revolutionary movements and revolutions.

Why these particular problem areas are selected—except that papers on these subjects were delivered at the Florence meeting—is not clear. And this leads us to the nub of the question. Why are we making comparisons? What are we comparing and with what end in view? Professor Heckscher explains that comparative studies help us to understand foreign countries, contribute to an understanding of our own institutions, and help to develop the institutions of others. And finally, comparative studies help us to develop "general theory" and permit us to "test specific hypotheses." But general theory and hypotheses about what? This is not clear. This is even less clear when one looks at the kinds of topics suggested by Professor Heckscher for comparative research. Had more attention been given to the rationale for comparative studies and to suggesting research areas appropriate to this rationale, Professor Heckscher's book would have had far more clarity. As a statement of some of the problems confronting students of comparative politics and as a statement of some of the thinking in the field, Professor Heckscher's book is useful. But so much more could have been done!

MYRON WEINER
Assistant Professor of Political Science
University of Chicago

STUART HULL MCINTYRE. *Legal Effect of World War II on Treaties of the United States*. Pp. xi, 392. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958. Guilders 28.50.

This neatly printed book has, packed within its 392 pages, material which constitutes a real contribution to an understanding of a difficult phase of international law: namely, that of the effect of war upon treaties.

After a splendid introductory chapter the author proceeds to review the practice of the United States prior to World War II (Chap. 1). He then deals with the various "political treaties" (Chap. 3), "humanitarian treaties" (Chap. 4), and "economic treaties" (Chap. 5) which were in force with enemy states at the outbreak of

World War II. Chapter Six is devoted to "Provisions in Peace Treaties" and the author's conclusions are carried in Chapter Seven. There is a very good Bibliography and a Table of Treaties.

In these "meaty" chapters there is an engaging discussion of various treaties, cases, and diplomatic exchanges, with citations from writers and authorities. Generous helpful footnotes add to the clarification of points here and there.

By way of some general conclusions the author (p. 340) states that "there is no instance in which the evidence is conclusive that the United States regarded any treaty as terminated by World War II" and "the vast majority of treaties were at most suspended, and even then only to the extent required by the exigencies of the war and within the design of the contracting parties."

Treaties intended specifically for war—conduct of war, prisoners of war, and so forth—remained in full force during the war. Many multilateral conventions relating to humanitarian and economic bureaus remained in force. The United States regarded most of its bipartite treaties with enemy states as at least suspended. Treaty provisions relating to private rights tended to be more durable than those which did not—provided that respect for private rights was compatible with national policy during the war. When the intention of the parties was clear, the United States followed such an indication. The same result will ordinarily be reached whether one applies the intention theory, the classification theory, or the municipal standard of compatibility with national policy in time of war.

The author allows that, although it would theoretically be desirable to have an international authority to decide on the status of treaties between belligerents, states are not now willing to accept this procedure and "for a long time to come" are likely "to decide for themselves which treaties remain in force, are suspended, or are abrogated by war between the parties."

The reviewer finds this study of notable value in exploring an important area of international law. It is scholarly, well-documented, and clearly presented. The

important major conclusion reached to the effect that recent practice tends to produce a minimum wartime disturbance of international treaty arrangements and normal international life is quite in line with current developments to restrict—or even to outlaw—war, and thus to exalt the rule of world law.

This useful volume should find a place on the desks of teachers, students, and practitioners alike.

J. EUGENE HARLEY
Professor of Political Science
University of Southern California

AMERICAN HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT

JOHN W. CAUGHEY. *In Clear and Present Danger: The Crucial State of Our Freedoms*. Pp. ix, 207. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958. \$4.00.

Professor Caughey has written an unusually compendious review of that remarkably sick period in American history—the decade 1947–1957—when the strongest nation on earth seemed to fear its own shadow and to have lost all faith in the institutions and values which had brought it to greatness. His book falls somewhere between history and journalism. It is neither remote enough from the events it recounts to be detached and dispassionate nor close enough to avoid a feeling that much of it is dated. It is, moreover, so bareboned, so lacking in illustrative detail, that it cannot be said to succeed in bringing the record of this dreary decade to life.

The book, nevertheless, admirably serves two useful purposes. It provides a carefully ordered and proportioned record of the successive steps by which a panicky people relinquished individual rights in the spurious name of national security. And it shows to what a dangerous and dismaying degree this relinquishment, embraced initially as an emergency expedient, has come to be complacently accepted. "Much of the freedom-hampering factor in our striving for security . . . has been institutionalized and continued in full effect," Mr. Caughey says. "That was the clear hazard

inherent in the program and is its natural upshot. Even though zeal for the crusade may fall off, the momentum and the channeling will keep the program going."

This is profoundly true. The climate of freedom has improved in Washington and in most of the country during the last couple of years. The worst excesses of McCarthyism and of the loyalty-security program have abated; the procedures, at any rate, have been somewhat refined so that the atrocity stories which used to jog the popular conscience are less frequent. But it is important to remember that, although Senator McCarthy has been censured and taken from the scene, Congress has never adopted any significant code of fair investigating procedure to restrain its Eastlands and Walters; and despite minor procedural reforms, the central vice of the loyalty-security program—its reliance on faceless accusers—continues as an apparent fixture of American life. Mr. Caughey is thoroughly justified in the alarm he expresses over this debasement of the national conscience.

Perhaps Mr. Caughey somewhat underestimates and understates the significance of the Supreme Court's championship of individual rights in its recent decisions. These amounted, he thinks, to no more than "marginal changes." They were, nevertheless, symbolic, and it may be that they signified a general lifting of the smog. There is ample warrant, at any rate, for joining in the hopeful note on which he concludes: "The future does not have to be so out of step with our traditions, not even the immediate future. Not one of our betrayals of the freedoms has been written into the Constitution. . . . Consequently, nothing so elephantine as a Bricker Amendment is needed to reverse them. We as a people have it readily in our power to take the United States back to first principles. A summoning of popular determination is all that is needed."

ALAN BARTH

Editorial Writer
The Washington Post

MARTHA STRAYER. *The D. A. R.: An Informal History*. Pp. vi, 262. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1958. \$3.75.

Martha Strayer, a Washington journalist who has "covered" the National Society, Daughters of the American Revolution since 1921, and whose ancestry would qualify her for membership, has assembled a raft of material on resignations, projects, resolutions, and, above all, personalities associated with the DAR. This is both an informal and an unauthorized history. Miss Strayer was able to get no official co-operation from the Society; her requests for permission to use official records of the DAR as source material were denied. By Miss Strayer's own admission the book "is in no sense a definitive study."

Throughout the book, the author shows an understandable fascination with the extraordinary women who have been sufficiently genealogically pure, financially secure, and personally aggressive to win election as presidents general. The group includes Mrs. Benjamin Harrison and Mrs. Adlai Stevenson—grandmother of the presidential candidate—as well as the wives of industrialists and bankers. There is, however, no examination in depth of the aspirations of these leaders, nor is there any indication of the nature of the administrative hierarchy of the DAR. Occasional references to committee reports such as one by the National Defense Committee which was "prophetic of the subsequent attitude towards the UN" would be a good deal more illuminating if they dealt with the actual committee work—or lack of it—and the methods and procedures of the committee.

Miss Strayer does exploit some of the things that for many people make the DAR synonymous with the characters in a Helen Hokinson sketch. The distress that the members felt on learning that a couple of membership pins had been located in a pawnshop is highlighted, as is the continuing push to interest young women in membership in the Children of the Revolution through "a lovely ball" which is never "a wallflower party, with too many girls and too few men."

There is a very real question as to whether this kind of book is worth the effort. After sixteen chapters, Miss Strayer remains unable or unwilling to analyze or evaluate the role of the DAR in the politi-

cal life of the country, or to theorize about the social impact of a patriotic group which has antagonized both Eleanor Roosevelt and Clare Boothe Luce as a consequence of a "whites only" restriction on the use of Constitution Hall. The reader might accept a careful defense of DAR activities and policies, a gentle or ungentle mocking of some of the absurdities for which the ladies have been responsible, or a documented chronicle showing how the Society has reached its decisions and how it has attempted to make those decisions effective. The present volume avoids meeting any of these challenges.

GILBERT Y. STEINER

Director, Institute of Government
and Public Affairs
University of Illinois

ELMO ROPER. *You and Your Leaders: Their Actions and Your Reactions, 1936-1956*. Pp. 288. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1957. \$3.95.

This book is an attempt to account for successful political leadership without relying on the age-old method of speculative reflection. Nearly every judgment is supported by a specific opinion-poll percentage, occasionally by a rather indecisive one. Nine contemporary leaders are subjected to this quasi-scientific analysis: Roosevelt, Willkie, Dewey, Truman, McArthur, Marshall, Taft, Stevenson, and Eisenhower.

Roper's polls showed that Franklin Roosevelt was abreast prevailing opinion and consequently successful until his abortive attempt to reconstitute the Supreme Court. By 1939, while not generally rejecting Roosevelt, the public was no longer taking him for granted but exercising its right to pass judgment on his policies. By 1940 the Republicans were justified in their belief that he could not win a third term but were frustrated by the sudden fall of France and the consequent desperate plight of Britain which swung support back to Roosevelt. The opinion poll of the week before Roosevelt's death in 1945 rated him good on conduct of the war by eighteen to one and on home problems by better than seven to one.

It was candidate Dewey's handicap that much of the opinion favorable to him was on negative policies; the polls revealed that he aroused little personal enthusiasm. However, if the war had ended before November 1944, Dewey would have had a very good chance of winning. Truman achieved an almost unprecedented high opinion-poll percentage in the early months of his administration but by the end of eighteen months the polls rated him below every one of the five Republicans then considered as possible candidates. Then the bungling of the eightieth Congress raised him above every Republican considered to be a political candidate except Dewey. In the 1948 campaign, Dewey suffered from confining himself to the utterance of ambiguous generalities while Truman persistently hit hard with precise issues emphatically expressed, thereby capturing public approval as indicated by the opinion polls. Roper takes time out to explain precisely what was wrong with the predictions of the polls in 1948. He was gratified by the fact that Dewey never uttered a published word about them while Truman had a field day ridiculing them. Roper properly observes that their real function is diagnosis rather than prophecy.

Roper is convinced that the five or six million devoted Willkie voters left after the old guard had crushed his candidacy in 1944 "held the germ of the new Republican party of the future." In 1952 the polls still revealed a deep distrust of the Republicans as a party; Stevenson was motivated as a candidate by a conviction that Eisenhower lacked the necessary knowledge of government and politics. No matter how scientific Roper may be he barely misses lyric eloquence when commenting on Willkie and Stevenson.

WILFRED E. BINKLEY

Director, Division of Social Sciences
Ohio Northern University

ROLAND YOUNG (Ed.). *Approaches to the Study of Politics: Twenty-Two Contemporary Essays Exploring the Nature of Politics and Methods by Which It Can Be Studied*. Pp. viii, 382, ix-xxx. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1958. No price.

This is a book written by political and other social scientists for, and sometimes against, political scientists. Its essays emerged from an effort on the part of the Department of Political Science at Northwestern University to secure advice for a re-examination of the substance and order of the courses it offers its students.

The essays are divided into four parts: political concepts, political theory, analytic systems, and the community. As the editor states, "The variety of approaches and vocabularies in the present volume demonstrates again the vitality which exists in the study of politics as well as the lack of synthesizing themes or methods." And, as one of the contributors remarks, perhaps with a bit of malice: "Political science has not generally been able to make that distinction which is a precondition for the development of any true science: the distinction between what is worth knowing intellectually and what is useful for practice."

The contributors to this volume are engaged in research, and it is to problems of understanding the working of politics that they address themselves. The current tendency of many of these scholars is to seek uniformities and regularities in political and social behavior in the hope of delineating types of political systems which will have more meaning, and perhaps more predictive value, than such traditional categories as federal and centralized forms of government.

This volume is both a summation and a look at the future. Political theorists defend the study of theory, if only because popular adherence to ideologies constitutes a fact of importance in an understanding of political behavior. As part of the contemporary reaction against legal and constitutional analyses, the major attention here is given to studies of the individual, both as voter and as official, in the making of political decisions; to informal actors in politics such as economic and professional associations; and on the local level in the United States, to the formation of attitudes and the organization of leadership in cities and smaller communities.

It is at this last point that political scientists are most fruitfully in communica-

tion with psychologists and sociologists, and it is also here that they encounter the housewife, the businessman, and the member of a trade union in ways that may possibly have a mutually healthful effect.

For the nonspecialist, the section on the community may arouse a competitive spirit, for he will be able to pit his knowledge of his own community against the scientists' generalizations about types of community "power structures" and the identification of categories of persons found in some studies as "influentials."

BRYCE WOOD

Staff Associate
Social Science Research Council

ROLF DEPPERER. *"Due Process of Law": Ein Kapitel Amerikanischer Verfassungsgeschichte: Beitrag zur Erhellung des Problems der Verfassungsinterpretation.* Pp. xiii, 159. Bern: Verlag Staempfli & Cie., 1957. No price.

The subtitle of this study by a Swiss scholar is *A Contribution to the Illumination of the Problem of Constitutional Interpretation*. Title and subtitle state the twin purpose of the book: it is both a consideration of a crucial sector of American constitutional law and a discussion of the way in which this sector renders concrete some of the fundamentals underlying the Constitution of the United States.

The three sections of the book deal respectively with the historical development of the due process clause; with its nature and meaning; and with due process in relation to constitutional theory. The emphasis is on the concept of substantive due process. Mr. Deppeler establishes the concept as the modern version of the *lex terrae* of the Magna Carta. He defends it as a safety valve for the infusion of new ideas into the rigid norms of the Constitution. His thesis is that substantive due process is necessary to relate the Constitution to the fundamental law on the one hand, and to political exigency—*necessitas*—on the other.

The study benefits from Mr. Deppeler's thorough understanding of the role not only of judicial review but also of judicial politics. Looking at the American judicial process from the outside, the author comes

away with a full appreciation of the nature and function of the "aristocracy of the robe." Comparing our Constitution with the Swiss *Bundesbrief* and Constitution, he remarks on the dilemma of our having a constitution at once symbolic and legally effective—a dilemma, one might add, shared by the institution of the United States presidency. The author's insights into American constitutional law are buttressed by an extensive knowledge of legal theory in general, and of Swiss and German constitutional law in particular.

It would be interesting at this time to have Mr. Deppeler comment on the current controversy between elements in Congress and the Warren court, leading to the formulation of the Butler-Jenner Bill. He seems to anticipate some of the most recent decisions of the Warren court by rejecting calls for increased judicial self-restraint and agreement with majority public opinion.

Mr. Deppeler finds it necessary to justify his advocacy of substantive due process by its use in the defense of civil liberties alone. A prejudice in favor of "liberty" and against "property" pervades the book, but does not impair its usefulness to the constitutional lawyer and historian.

The author concludes by surveying the avalanche loosened by his originally limited inquiry. He is correct in his admission that he has posed more questions than he has answered; he should be equally justified in his hope that, by contributing to the clarification of problems of constitutional interpretation, he will have aided future students of this complex subject.

FREDERICK C. ENGELMANN
Associate Professor of Political Science
Alfred University
Alfred, N. Y.

PAUL M. ANGLE (Ed.). *Created Equal? The Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858*. Pp. xxxiii, 421. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. \$7.50.

At two o'clock in the afternoon of August 17, 1858, Abraham Lincoln was introduced to the crowd at Lewistown, Illinois, and greeted with vociferous applause. With great earnestness he urged the people as follows:

"Return to the fountain whose waters spring close by the blood of the Revolution. Think nothing of me—take no thought for the political fate of any man whomsoever—but come back to the truths that are in the Declaration of Independence. . . . I charge you to drop every paltry and insignificant thought for any man's success. It is nothing; I am nothing; Judge Douglas is nothing. But do not destroy that immortal emblem of humanity—the Declaration of American Independence."

This eulogy of the Declaration of Independence was one of the highpoints of a contest which was easily the outstanding event of 1858.

The University of Chicago Press is to be congratulated, as it was by Senator Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois, on publishing "these revealing discussions in their entirety for the benefit of the American people." Illinois, too, may be congratulated on having two Senators Douglas—Stephen Arnold, the "Little Giant" of the 1850's, and Paul H. of the 1950's, who said that no student of the Civil War should miss reading this "invaluable account of one of the most important political debates in American history."

The issues were momentous then and some are still debated today. Of the three highlighted by this volume—the extension of slavery, the status of the Negro, and the right of the states to regulate this status—the first was forever decided by civil strife and the other two are held to be "as pressing today as they were a hundred years ago." It is for this reason that the publishers further assert that "the entire book is given immediacy . . . by the high relevance of much of the content to the contemporary problem of racial adjustment." This immediacy is emphasized by Douglas' assertion, at Charleston on September 18, 1858, that "this government was established on the white basis . . . and never should be administered by any except white men." and Lincoln's hope, at Chicago on July 10, 1858, that "the lamp of liberty will burn in your bosoms until there shall no longer be a doubt that all men are created free and equal."

To this reviewer, however, the similarities between Lincoln and Douglas were remarkable, if not dominant. They were in general agreement on most economic problems facing the country. Neither advanced the extreme southern view that, under the Dred Scott decision, slavery could not be excluded from the territories. Both deplored sectionalism and put the union of the states above all else. Neither favored Negro equality or wished to see slavery extended. Both wished to quiet slavery agitation. The chief disagreement between Lincoln and Douglas was whether opposition to slavery extension should be placed on legal or moral grounds and was, fundamentally, a question of ethics.

This first complete volume devoted to the debates since the Sparks edition in the *Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library* was published in 1908, was issued on Lincoln's birthday, 1958, the centennial year of a campaign unique in American politics and American journalism. It is a beautiful edition in which maps, photographs, and contemporary newspaper accounts set off the most authoritative text of the first complete series of political speeches which were stenographically reported. Paul M. Angle, formerly secretary of the Abraham Lincoln Association, Illinois State Historian, and director of the Chicago Historical Society, is a most worthy editor. His introduction is an admirable survey of the 1850s, a period forcefully described by Professor Avery Craven as "The Coming of the Civil War."

ELLIS A. JOHNSON

* Associate Professor of Social Studies
State Teachers College
Cortland, N. Y.

CARLETON PUTNAM. *Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. 1: The Formative Years, 1858-1886*. Pp. xiii, 626. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958. \$10.00.

Many books have been written about Theodore Roosevelt, but the author of *Theodore Roosevelt: The Formative Years* certainly proves that the subject has not been exhausted. Indeed, to an appreciable degree Mr. Putnam has written a remarkable book from hitherto unused sources. For example, he had access to Roosevelt's

early private diaries, the Alice R. Longworth Papers, the Henry Cabot Lodge Papers, and the Mrs. Joseph Alsop Papers which, apparently, no other biographer has used. For the first time Americans have available many unknown details about the first twenty-eight years of Theodore Roosevelt's life. The significant features of the formative period were revealed previously, but Carleton Putnam has presented for the first time the complete picture of this distinguished American's early life.

At times when the sources differ about an incident the writer, with scientific objectivity, presents several accounts, evaluates each, wisely leaving the final decision to the reader. Mr. Putnam has no literary axe to grind; he presents the facts in a scholarly, sympathetic way. The author's style is interesting, in spite of the fact that his narrative is weighted with a multiplicity of details. By training and experience Mr. Putnam is well qualified to write this book. As a student of science and law and with a quarter of a century's experience in aviation when he was closely connected with government, the author brings to his literary task mature talent. Fortunately for readers of Americana, the author has promised a complete biography of Theodore Roosevelt in four volumes. This reviewer, with many others, will look forward with pleasure to the publication of the remaining volumes.

Theodore Roosevelt was born into an upper middle class family. Although severely handicapped with asthma and detective vision in early youth, he made his ill health a challenge. For years he systematically mixed strenuous physical exercise with intensive mental development. At Harvard he studied enough to attain Phi Beta Kappa and neglected his books enough to fall in love with Alice Lee, whom he soon married.

The young scholar had hardly enrolled in law school before he was elected to the New York Assembly. Within three sessions he attained the leadership of the Republican Progressives. Between sessions of the Assembly, Roosevelt traveled and hunted in the West. Later he bought a large ranch in the western "bad lands."

In his mid-twenties, T. R. suffered defeat in his first venture in the national political

arena. In 1884 he unsuccessfully tried to block Blaine's nomination. Without enthusiasm Roosevelt supported the Republican ticket. During this period T. R. was crushed by the deaths of his mother and wife. He was saved from despair by a new romance, by his continued success in New York politics, and by the popularity of his books—*The Naval War of 1812*, *Hunting Trips of a Ranchman*, and *Thomas Hart Benton*.

This volume is soundly footnoted, has a selective Bibliography, an ample Index and is abundantly illustrated. Both author and publisher should be commended for a fine job.

GEORGE C. OSBORN

Professor of Social Sciences
University of Florida

DEWEY W. GRANTHAM, JR. *Hoke Smith and the Politics of the New South*. (Southern Biography Series.) Pp. 396. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1958. \$5.00.

The quarter century which has elapsed since Hoke Smith's death has given Mr. Grantham ample perspective in viewing the Georgian's career critically and in placing it in historical context. From Cleveland's administration to Wilson's, he was a tower of strength in state politics and a significant leader in the national Democratic party. At a time when the South was specializing in conservatives and demagogues, Smith pursued a policy of "progressive democracy" that placed him conspicuously on the liberal side of the political ledger. He became an advocate of a New South: agricultural advancement, industrial diversification, improved education, regulation of railroads and corporations, and attachment to the Union.

After a Carolina boyhood with a modicum of formal education, Smith settled in Atlanta and grew up with the town. He acquired an enviable reputation as an anti-corporation lawyer in personal damage suits. From 1887 until the end of the century he owned a controlling interest in the *Atlanta Journal*, and that paper promoted his political ambitions even after he sold it. His notable contribution to Democratic success in 1892 led to an appoint-

ment as Secretary of the Interior in Cleveland's cabinet, where he served adequately but without distinction. Advocacy of the gold standard sent him into political exile for a decade. A liberal reform program brought him the governorship in 1906; enactment of laws regulating elections and railroads, destroying the convict-lease system, establishing juvenile courts, and providing more liberal support for education led to reaction and defeat for re-election. Another cycle reversed the decision in 1910, and a friendly legislature soon promoted the governor to the Senate, where he aided Wilson's triple attack on privilege, supported most of the President's war measures, but broke with him over League reservations. Smith's most significant accomplishments in the Senate, the author asserts, were the Smith-Lever agricultural extension act and the Smith-Hughes vocational education act.

Mr. Grantham's poise and balance are commendable; the treatment is sympathetic but not laudatory. The biography is decidedly political in nature, and the emphasis lies where it belongs—in the presentation of state and local politics. Brief allusions to family life and periodic consideration of contributions to civic improvement whet the reader's appetite for more of these intimate glimpses that reveal Smith's great human personality. The dissertational origin of the study has been largely obliterated. It is a valuable addition to the Louisiana State University Press's Southern Biography Series, of which it is the sixteenth number.

WENDELL H. STEPHENSON

Professor of History
University of Oregon

WESTERN EUROPE

LUDWIG ERHARD. *Prosperity Through Competition*. Translated and edited by Edith Temple Roberts and John B. Wood. Pp. xii, 260. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. \$5.00.

Ludwig Erhard stands, on the dust cover, as the creator of the German economic miracle. In his text he denies that there

was any such miracle and claims only that, by liberating the forces of competition, he freed the very considerable energies of the German people to the task of their own recovery after the Nazis, war, and military government had plunged them into such chaos "that no one who had not seen it with his own eyes could possibly imagine it." His social market economy lies in that "sound middle way between an unbridled liberalism and a soul-less state control" and is bolstered by a passion—only too natural in a German—against inflation which elevates the stability of the currency into one of the basic human rights.

The first chapters, up to page 100 or so, are occupied in both the statistics and the text with the record of success and with an account of Professor Erhard's equally successful wrestling with those who, within and without Germany, doubted, distrusted, and even opposed his policies. The remaining longer part is concerned with showing how freedom can limit freedom and what must be done in order to keep competition free to raise output and to guard the interest of the consumer. The argument jumps from the implications of economic freedom for political philosophy to the machinations of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and includes extracts from the approving letters of voters. *Prosperity through Competition* is a political tract. In it, the Minister for Economic Affairs in the federal government ranges discursively over the economic history of Germany during the past ten years. That is its value. As a matter of economics, this presentation of the case for dedicating the economy to the consumer and for believing that competition—always within the limits of the social market economy—is at one and the same time the most economical and most democratic form of economic order suffers both from its length and from its partiality. The book would have been more readable had it been shorter.

The English of the translation is good, even though the reviewer really cannot believe that Professor Erhard ran "literally" (p. 75, line 31) up and down Germany, even to explain his simple truths. The photograph inside the dust cover does not show a man given to that sort of exer-

cise! There is no index. This is a deficiency which should not have been allowed.

GILBERT WALKER

Professor of Commerce
The University of Birmingham
England

THEODORE S. HAMEROW. *Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics and Politics in Germany, 1815-1871*. Pp. ix, 347. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. \$6.00.

Most of the works in English devoted to nineteenth century German historical development tend to emphasize the political and ideological aspects of liberalism, reaction, and nationalism. In this excellent volume Dr. Hamerow turns his attention to the economic or material forces from which these politico-ideological factors arose. He examines the deep-seated dissatisfactions engendered by the transition from agrarian manorialism to the capitalism of the Industrial Revolution. He shows how the German political scene in the first half of the nineteenth century was profoundly affected by powerful social adjustments to new economic conditions.

The author thus provides a needed corrective to past trends in the writing of German history. At the same time he understands well the pluralistic nature of historical study and does not fall into the error of assigning to materialistic trends the exclusive monopoly of historical explanation. He avoids that monistic interpretation which can be left safely to the orthodox Marxists whose already outmoded gobbledygook makes them the sophists and scholastics of the twentieth century.

The organization is conventional—restoration, revolution, reaction, and road to unification. But within this framework there is a wealth of significant material on the decline of the handicraft system, the origins of industrialism, the agrarian problems, workers and peasants in the revolutionary period, and the economics of reaction.

Especially valuable is the author's treatment of the Revolution of 1848, his special field. He sees this dramatic period as really several simultaneous German revolu-

tions, each with its own ideology and objective, all combining to achieve the overthrow of an oppressive system of government. "The fleeting success [of the middle class] was made possible only by peasant revolts and artisan riots. As far as the masses were concerned, the insurrection was the outcome of tensions generated by the transition from agricultural manorialism to industrial capitalism. They were prepared to accept the leadership of liberal parliamentarians, but their allegiance to constitutionalism depended on the satisfaction of their material needs" (p. 261). At another point the author delivers a wise judgment: "How differently things might have turned out had Heinrich von Gagern become the architect of German unity instead of Otto von Bismarck" (p. vii).

This is good, strong, solid stuff with lots of backbone. Dr. Hamerow has a fine sense of the essential. His economical style has no perorations, no skirting around the subject, no space filling. He has produced a model historical study.

The documentation is superb. Both author and publisher are to be congratulated on a first-rate job of proofreading, an effect rare among the books in English on Germany. At the same time, the publisher—as well as other publishers who insist on the practice—deserves letters of protest from scholars who acquire stiff necks from the annoying task of checking documentation by thumbing endlessly to the back of the book.

LOUIS L. SNYDER

Professor of History
The City College of New York

GIOVANNI SCHEPIS. *Le Consultazioni popolari in Italia dal 1848 al 1957*. Pp. 160. Empoli: Editrice Caparrini, 1958. L. 1300.

ROY PRYCE. *The Italian Local Elections, 1956*. (St. Anthony's Papers, No. 3.) Pp. 132. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957. \$3.00.

Professor Schepis, who teaches at the University of Rome and is also the head of the Electoral Office of the Italian Ministry of the Interior, has provided us with a most useful summary of elections and election results, covering more than a cen-

tury. For each election the electoral system—if changed—is briefly sketched. The percentage of abstentions as well as valid and invalid votes is given, as are the results for the various competing parties. The elections of the period following World War II are treated in a little more detail. The reader will also be glad to find the more important results of municipal elections in the major cities. The Bibliography lists all official publications on election statistics and some of the more significant publications of private scholars. Those dealing with Italian government and politics, or with Italian history, will find this slim volume very helpful.

Unlike Professor Schepis, Mr. Pryce writes in complete freedom from official connections; therefore, he can express himself with more force and color. He begins with pungent—and altogether pertinent—remarks about the absence of any real local autonomy in Italy. This fact constitutes, incidentally, one of the reasons why the local elections of 1956, both provincial and municipal, were of almost as much interest nationally and internationally as locally. There follows a discussion of the new election law for the municipalities, and of the political situation out of which it developed. The intricate problems involved are dealt with lucidly, as are the more technical details of election administration. Analyzing the political background of the elections, the author once again gets a chance to show as much color as knowledge.

The same applies to the analysis of the campaign and of the results. So far as the latter are concerned, their major characteristic consists in the application of proportional representation for all cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants. Since there was no longer any premium for the majority, coalitions were rare, as were clear-cut election results. The centrist parties and the communities involved were the principal sufferers. "On the morrow of the elections there were therefore more than 200 of the larger communal councils in the country without any clear majority—that is without any generally recognized basis for the election of the mayors and of the *giunte* which would carry on the adminis-

tration of the towns and cities of the peninsula" (p. 106). The circumstance had embarrassing effects, forcing the centrist parties, at times, into open or tacit coalitions with the Right. Pryce's little book has one feature in common with the fine election studies carried out by Nuffield College: the general conceptual framework is not its strong point. The political system as a whole, and the part which political parties and elections play within it, are not analyzed. The gap tends to be filled from other sources, and in our day the economic interpretation of history is always likely to be one of them. Thus the Italian Liberals are portrayed as a middle class party (p. 48) although their appeal might be equally valid for other social groups. That the Christian Democrats "have grown as an explicit Catholic party" (p. 49) could, to the extent that it is true, offer some reasons for criticism, but surely not the one that they are not "the expression of determined economic and social needs of particular groups in Italian society" (*ibid.*). Is not the function of political parties political—which means transcendental to economic and social divisions?

Be that as it may, Pryce is a pleasure to read. If, as seems likely, this book constitutes a dress rehearsal for a volume on the Italian Chamber and Senate elections of 1958, we shall all benefit from it.

FERDINAND A. HERMENS

Professor of Political Science
University of Notre Dame

SAMUEL ABRAHAMSEN. *Sweden's Foreign Policy*. Pp. x, 99. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957. \$2.50.

This brief and useful book marshals the evidence and organizes the ideas which "clarify the fundamental concept of neutrality as interpreted by Sweden since World War I" (p. ix).

The author quite evidently accepts and sympathizes with the Swedish insistence on an "alliance-free policy." In a rather verbose section on the Scandinavian alliance negotiations of 1948-49, he explains the differing attitudes and needs of the various Scandinavian states toward defense. He emphasizes the great concession which

Sweden made in offering to enfold Denmark and Norway in her armed neutrality sphere. He also points out quite rightly that, despite miscarriage of the Scandinavian pact and the subsequent entry of Denmark and Norway into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, all these northern states have co-operated in a remarkable way and on a broad front.

The treatment covers the main topics in Swedish foreign relations from World War I through 1956. The discussion of the Åland Island question (pp. 19-22) is succinct and clear. On the issue of sanctions in the League of Nations—in connection with the Italo-Ethiopian war, and so forth—the author almost loses himself in indecision as to whether he is handling the Swedish attitude or the whole problem of sanctions (pp. 24-27). On the Swedish attitude toward Germany during World War I, Mr. Abrahamsen is perhaps too ready to assume that the pro-Germanism of the court represented also the feeling of the people—it is known, for example, that the labor element was pro-Ally. He does, however, indicate that pro-Germanism was largely anti-Russianism.

With regard to public opinion during World War II the publication of the "Bonn documents" by Stockholm's *Dagens Nyheter* in the fall of 1957—after this book was printed—casts a revealing light; particularly significant is the fact that the German diplomats in Sweden considered Swedish press and public opinion to be strongly anti-German, even early in the war. On the other hand, these papers also reveal that the Swedish government made more concessions to Germany than had been admitted. For the first concessions of June 1940, Abrahamsen like many of his predecessors holds Sweden too severely to account; he fails to mention that before Sweden yielded to the German demands for transit privileges the British government had expressed its inability to aid Sweden in case she resisted. Nevertheless, the author's ultimate appraisal is thoroughly justified: "Sweden emerged from World War II as a free nation only by deviating from the strict neutrality policy she had proclaimed at the outbreak of war in 1939" (p. 54).

The book is sound in judgment, based on wide reading in published materials, and studded with quotations from authors and statesmen. The proofreading is so bad as to be an insult to the reader and a disgrace to the press.

FRANKLIN D. SCOTT

Professor of History
Northwestern University

EDWARD C. BANFIELD with the assistance of LAURA F. BANFIELD. *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press; Chicago: Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1958. \$4.00.

This is the first detailed sociological study published about an agricultural town in Italy's underdeveloped Southern Appennines. It does not take into account the vast literature on Italy's "Southern Question"; the only authority cited is one of the least creditable, Carlo Levi. Yet by combining intensive standardized fieldwork, neo-Freudian psychology, and structural-functional analysis, it represents a great advance on the usual armchair social philosophers' approach to the problem.

The town's poverty and political impotence are explained in terms of the absence of effective extra-familial problem solving institutions. The inhabitants despair of the possibilities for long-term collective or sectional progress, or use them for their personal short-run material gain. Outside the narrow limits of the nuclear family, behavior takes the form of "a war of all against all," whereby locally inspired organizations are rendered impossible and the organizations introduced by state, Church, and political parties are practically nullified. The pessimism, suspicion, and envy with which the inhabitants regard one another are self-defeating. Potential leaders do little for the common good either because they act, as expected, only in their own interests or because no one will be led by them. There is no class solidarity at either end of the socio-economic status scale, although the poorer folk imagine that the gentry are plotting against them.

"The adult individual . . . is thought of as a parent bringing up children in a hard

and unremitting struggle" against a capricious cosmos and hostile, self-interested *paesani*. The ethos of these "amoral familists" is ascribed to permissive child-rearing practices, the high death rate which has prevailed until recently, the nuclear family system which has placed the large percentage of orphaned children at the mercy of their harsh extra-familial world, and the extremely fragmented land tenure which has not provided support for extended families or other larger economic units. These aspects of the society are consistently interrelated, and it is difficult to discern their logical or temporal priority. For instance, the history of changes in land tenure since the Napoleonic Wars does not show whether the property system resulted from "amoral familism," or vice versa.

As the author admits, he is on far less certain ground when he indicates opportunities for social engineering. He suggests that an increase in income may give these people a broader, less material conception of self interest. However, income in this area increased greatly before World War I, when emigration was at its height, and there is considerable evidence that "amoral familism" was then as prevalent as it is now.

This study is not only of great importance to the rural sociologist interested in economic development, but also to the political scientist interested in left-wing political movements in depressed areas. It suggests that the proportion of left-wing votes from the Southern Appennines, which has risen only since World War II, is not a function of traditional "class struggle" organizations, as it has long been in Central Italy and on the Po Plain. Judging by this case, support for the recently introduced Communist and "Nenni" Socialist parties in the Southern Appennines is an extension of the *trasformismo* of "amoral familists." In this and adjacent towns, the vote swings to the left and then back to the center or right in a spirit of revenge and envy for self-interested maladministration, real or imaginary, by the party previously in power.

JOHN McDONALD

Philadelphia, Pa.

MAURICE DUVERGER. *The French Political System*. (The Chicago Library of Comparative Politics.) Translated by Barbara and Robert North. Pp. xi, 227. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. \$4.00.

We are fortunate to have this careful analysis of French political practices and of the constitutional basis for them just at this time when Premier de Gaulle is in the process of making changes.

American students have often wanted to know more about the French multi-party system, about the means by which the legislature can overthrow the government, why there is not better stability, and why there is not more enlightened management of colonies, foreign relations, and finances. We have wanted to know just how the Fourth Republic differed from the Third, and whether it could be taken over by a man on a white horse—who in these days would probably ride a tank and shout into a microphone.

Professor Duverger is a political scientist and he writes in the best tradition of scholarship. He weighs the effectiveness of constitutional structure in the light of political traditions and of modern needs. Only at the end of the volume does he show his hand sufficiently so that we may know his own preferences. He identifies himself as a professor of the University of Paris who in 1956 participated in a press campaign in behalf of a change from the parliamentary to the presidential system of government. This makes him a constitutional radical, or something of the sort. But, he admits, no great change is likely to take place, for the French people are in a rut and are determined to have no fundamental changes in their governmental habits.

If there is any one theme that is recurrent throughout the volume it is that the French electorate is so stanchly set in its ways that effective modern government is all but impossible. They are not unstable and fickle; they are ruggedly stubborn. He attributes this condition to the dominance of old men in positions of leadership—old men who still try to lead because their sons were killed between 1914 and 1918. Although he admits that there have been

advances in such fields as economic planning, reconstruction of railroads, rebuilding of industry, and in budgetary reform, the author seems restive under the constitution of the Fourth Republic. It continues too many of the weaknesses of the Third, and adds a few more.

The needs for reform seem to be the strengthening of the executive, a better establishment of the upper house of parliament so that it can participate adequately in government, and a clarification of the process of the dissolution of the legislature by the executive and of the equally significant process of the recall of the government by the legislature. The author finds the Economic Council empty of power and the Constitutional Committee weak. The power of judicial review needs to be developed. He gives us a good review of electoral practices, pressure groups, and political parties and groups. Throughout the volume he refers to the Radical and Socialistic-Radical party as the Radical party, which is a good emphasis for American readers.

Is France a truly modern state in the "free world" sense? Professor Duverger thinks that it is. After all, her multi-party system is not much different from that in other continental countries; her freedoms of the press, speech, and religion; of movement, economic enterprise, and unionization are in keeping with the times. And there is hope. As a new generation brings its dynamic influence to bear upon public life, as the birth rate increase produces a larger proportion of young people, and as the sectionalism in France falls under the spell of a revived nationalism, the strength of the nation will come back to the level which was maintained before the Third Republic muddling began.

W. HENRY COOKE

Professor of History, Emeritus
Claremont Graduate School

JOHN T. MARCUS. *French Socialism in the Crisis Years, 1933-1936: Fascism and the French Left*. Pp. xv, 216. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. \$5.00.

From the standpoint of careful historical analysis, the interwar period in

France is still almost virgin territory. To the handful of solid monographs presently available for this important era, Mr. Marcus' study comes as a useful addition. He has chosen a topic that is narrow in scope but not in significance, and he has treated it with competence and discernment.

The book focuses on French socialism's reaction to the rise of Hitler, and stresses the Socialists' failure to respond with vigor and wisdom. The impact of Nazism failed to reunite the party against a major menace, but rather increased the internal divergences that had always plagued French socialism. Within a year after Hitler took office, a major schism occurred when the neo-Socialist wing—itsself a contradictory mélange of opposites—was expelled. The neo-Socialist heretics diagnosed the nature of Nazism more accurately than did the party's controlling majority. Unfortunately, the most vocal of those heretics proposed a cure that in some ways resembled the disease.

The party meanwhile clung to its outmoded view of the character of fascism, and to its stubborn hostility to any measures of national defense. Even in March 1936, the Socialists opposed action to head off Hitler in the Rhineland. An extreme pacifist fringe conducted a campaign that verged on hysteria and that hampered the Blum leadership in shifting to a more realistic policy. By failing to take the opportunity to renovate some of their dogmas and to rally French republicans against the fascist threat, the Socialists left a vacuum which was suddenly filled by the Communists in 1935. Mr. Marcus believes that the Socialist record in these years goes far to explain the Communists' success in dominating the French left ever since. The detailed record which he presents does offer much justification for this severe judgment. I am inclined to think, however, that Blum's record was not quite so hopelessly inept as it would seem to be from Mr. Marcus' account.

A scholarly book of this sort deserves more careful editing and a serious index. The errors are mainly of the minor irritating variety, but a little DDT in time will eradicate such pests. Marx Dormoy,

for example, would doubtless turn over in his grave to find his given name corrupted into Max.

GORDON WRIGHT

Professor of History
Stanford University

ANDRÉ MATHIOT. *The British Political System*. Translated by Jennifer S. Hines. Pp. 352. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. \$6.00.

Monsieur Mathiot is so ardent an admirer of the British political system, which he expounds briefly in this book, that he sees almost no fault in it; in the main he regards its fundamental illogicality as a merit, which helps it to work smoothly and to correspond more closely to the outlook of the British people than any logically thought-out system could do. He admires it especially because of its proven capacity to undergo modification without revolutionary change, and, while agreeing that there is in it a not unimportant bias toward conservatism, he appears to regard this bias itself as a merit, because it stands in the way of changes too great to fit in with the general climate of opinion. Though he himself inclines to think in logical terms, and to seek for logical principles on which constitutional practices rest, he praises the British for having little desire to arrive at first principles or to adapt their constitutional usages so as to conform to them. He even praises the notion of consensus to the length of asserting that there is no fundamental difference between the two leading parties—Conservative and Labour—which dispute for the right to govern.

In his view, the essential powers of sovereignty in Great Britain belong not to the legislature but to the executive government which the citizen voters in effect appoint by a majority vote. He sees Parliament, or at all events the House of Commons, as of only secondary importance in view of the executive government's virtual monopoly of initiative in legislation. The Crown and the House of Lords he regards alike as mere survivals, shorn of real power, and he treats the executive government as the real successor to the Crown's

former authority. This view, I think, he carries to an illegitimate extreme by disregarding the potential power still located in the Crown, as well as by almost ignoring the delaying and restricting powers still vested in the overwhelmingly conservative House of Lords. He is, however, correct in stressing the strongly conservative influence of the maintenance of time-honored traditions and ceremonials in the House of Commons, as well as in other elements of the constitutional structure.

His book, however, is rather narrowly conceived despite its insistence on the unity which pervades the entire social structure, including local government and the many forms of voluntary association as well as the central State. He has almost nothing to say of the part now played by the trade unions and seems unaware of any tendencies towards social disharmony on a class basis. In fact, he depicts the entire British social structure in terms which suggest that neither does it need any considerable amendment nor is there any substantial pressure for such change.

Mathiot writes well and clearly, and his translator has done him excellent service. Nevertheless, his is an unsatisfactory book, even if much allowance is made for a Frenchman's admiration for a political system which seems to work with a high degree of stability and, in most of its functions, to meet with little challenge even from those who wish to speed up the rate and extent of change. Mathiot is successful in showing how completely the British political system operates as a conservator of traditional values; but he cannot avoid leaving in some readers' minds a strong impression that it is much less well adapted to coping with any fundamental challenge to these values, should such a challenge arise. His textbook has, in other words, a strong, partly concealed, conservative bias, which prevents its author from making any real study of the major problems which confront it even today and are likely, I believe, to do so much more in the future.

G. D. H. COLE

Chairman, Oxford University
Social Training Delegacy
All Souls College
Oxford

R. M. JACKSON. *The Machinery of Local Government*. Pp. xii, 360. London: Macmillan & Co., 1958. (Distributed by St. Martin's Press.) \$6.00.

Mr. Jackson's book is a well written general study which "is mostly concerned with the English local government system and its relation to the government of the United Kingdom." As such it deals by chapters with the following: "The Nature of Local Government," "Councils and Councillors," "Powers," "Party Politics," "The Committee System," "The Work of the Council," "Byelaws," "Staff," "Finance," "Relations with the Central Government," "Local Government Areas," "Elections," "Dishonesty and Corruption," "Conclusion."

This study contains a fund of valuable information which makes it one of considerable value. But it is not as valuable as it might or should be, due to the inclusion of a great deal of extraneous material which has little, if any, relevancy to the subject. This is especially so as to some of the material dealing with party politics, elections, and dishonesty and corruption. For these phenomena are not solely restricted to local government as Dr. Jackson frankly admits. In consequence his study would have been enhanced in value if those chapters had either been omitted or, at least, reorganized by deleting the irrelevant material.

Furthermore, this study does not achieve the objectives cited in the opening sentence of this review to the degree that it should. For the author's treatment of the structure, organization, and working of English local government and of its relations to the central government is not as adequate as it should be. Since this study is a general one, Dr. Jackson has, of necessity, to deal with these matters in broad general terms. But he fails to make a practical specific application of these generalizations. In dealing with the nature of local government, for example, he writes at some length, but in a general way, about the units upon which English local government rests. If he had only named some of the more important of each of them, his study would have been vastly improved. The same also holds true as to councils and councilors, the committee system, the work

of the councils, staff, and finance. The insufficiency of footnotes and the absence of a bibliography also detract from the worth of this study.

Notwithstanding this criticism, this study would indeed be a truly invaluable one, if Dr. Jackson had only substantiated his general facts with pertinent specific data as to all the aspects of English local government about which he writes.

W. REDMOND CURTIS

(Queens College

EASTERN EUROPE

MELVIN C. WREN. *The Course of Russian History*. Pp. xiii, 725. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. \$6.95.

Professor Wren has produced an excellent textbook on Russian history, from its earliest beginnings to our days. He has woven the factual texture of his book extremely skillfully. His conception of Russian history is based on the best original sources, especially the work of Kliuchevsky which is in many respects still unsurpassed by Russian historians; and he has also taken into account the most significant Western contributions to an understanding of his subject. This book is far better written than are most textbooks: the style is clear and attractive. Of the 700 pages about 200 are devoted to the events of this century: that is to the emergence, the growth, and the complex fortunes of the Russian revolution. This is as it should be.

The author holds that "Many Westerners . . . cling to the view that the Soviet Union is something entirely new and that it can be understood by examining its present character and its development since 1917. This view is extremely unrealistic. . . . Modern Russia can no more wash away the imprint of her past than can any other nation. The reasons 'why they behave like Russians' are not to be found only in the last chapter of their long history." This is true enough, and Professor Wren's book is sure to give students a solid grounding in the earlier epochs—especially those of Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Catherine—and in the story of

the Tsarist Empire in the fourteenth century. It is one of the many merits of this work that it gives a lucid view of Russia's economic development over the ages—in the interpretation of which the author tries to strike a balance between the often conflicting theories of Kliuchevsky, Vipper, Pokrovsky, and others—and that it indicates the close connection between the economic background and the political processes by which Russia's outlook was shaped.

In a work on this scale one is, of course, bound to find omissions and debatable points. The author himself indicates that he has perhaps not paid enough attention to Russian literature. It is also possible to hold that he has overemphasized the element of continuity in Russia's history. Although modern Russia has no more than any other nation been able to "wash away the imprint of her past," her recent industrial and educational progress, achieved within the framework of a planned and collectivist economy, has all the same introduced qualitatively new elements into the problem, and the spread of the Soviet form of government far beyond Russian boundaries has opened qualitatively new historical perspectives. Professor Wren has, however, managed to keep his exposition of facts and trends on a high level of academic objectivity, and has throughout been on guard against the pitfalls of bias which so many writers on this subject are unable to avoid. I warmly recommend this book for a "must" for student beginners and a useful reference book for others.

ISAAC DEUTSCHER

Berks, England

HERBERT MARCUSE. *Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis*. Pp. 271. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. \$4.50.

This is the first systematic treatment of contemporary Soviet ideology to be written in this country, and it is a valuable addition to the small but distinguished list of works in this field by Bochenski, Chambré, and Wetter. The particular value of Marcuse's approach is that he does not regard Soviet Marxism either as mere propaganda or as abstract philosophy. Many writers have been led astray by dismissing Soviet

ideology as a deliberate attempt to mislead the West, or by treating it as a formal body of learning to be taken literally. Marcuse regards Soviet Marxism rather as a language which expresses the understanding on the part of the Soviet leaders of the world around them, and defines the policies which they propose to pursue. To understand this language one must have a knowledge both of the Marxist theory which the Bolsheviks inherited, and of the development of Bolshevik thought in the course of the past half century.

Marcuse develops his analysis in two parts, the first devoted to the objective political aspects of Soviet Marxism, and the second to its subjective ethical tenets. Perhaps the most valuable feature of this interpretation is its account of the general Soviet view of political trends since 1917. Marcuse demonstrates effectively the consistency of the Soviet outlook throughout this period, its realistic acceptance of the stability of Western society, and its recognition of the inherent instability of the non-Western world. While maintaining that in the long run Western "capitalism" will inevitably "ripen" into "socialism," Soviet doctrine nevertheless recognizes that an aggressive Soviet policy would tend to consolidate the West and delay the "ripening" process. Hence the assiduous cultivation, during the relatively brief recent period of Soviet strength, of a policy of "peaceful co-existence" designed to lull "capitalism" back to its normal state of decay. With this general setting, Marcuse discusses briefly and lucidly such fundamental propositions as socialism in one country, the role of dialectic, the relation of base and superstructure, and the transition from socialism to communism.

In dealing with Soviet ethical tenets, Marcuse helps to clarify the issue by comparing the Soviet and the Western views in terms of both ideology and social background. He sees as the essential difference between the two the fact that in the West a substantial area of privacy still remains to the individual, while in the U.S.S.R. the effort is made to mobilize all aspects of the individual for the needs of the state. While Marcuse touches on the main issues of Soviet Marxism in the political and ethical

spheres, there are a number of areas about which one would like to know more. Significant among these are the Soviet attitude towards the development of a world state, and its approach to the natural sciences. Within the limits which he has chosen, however, Marcuse has produced an outstanding study.

C. E. BLACK

Professor of History
Princeton University

Yugoslavia. (East-Central Europe Under the Communists: Mid-European Studies Center Series.) Pp. xiii, 488. New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee, 1957. \$8.50.

This volume is, so to speak, out of step with its six companions in the Mid-European Studies Center Series, "East-Central Europe Under the Communists." This is principally because Yugoslavia under Communist rule forms, unlike Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, no part of the Soviet satellite empire. Also, the Mid-European Studies Center gave Yugoslavia—as the general editor of the series, Robert F. Byrnes, points out—"low priority" in maintaining an adequate research staff. The volume, says Professor Byrnes, "suffered heavily" from this low priority. Its original outline failed to take into account some of the most significant aspects of Communist rule as practiced and interpreted by Tito's Yugoslavia. Also, the Center's staff was unable to prepare chapters on three important topics: religion, literature and the arts, and labor (Pp. 6-7).

In spite of these handicaps and shortcomings, the authors succeeded in producing a volume which can be compared favorably with the others of the series. Its weaknesses, not unlike those of the other volumes, stem mainly from the rigid application of a uniform outline which fails to stress problems and developments of specific importance in each of the individual countries. As a result, materials pertaining to the same topic are often scattered, instead of presented as a unit. In the volume under review, this is particularly true about such basic topics as

Tito's rise to power, the Stalin-Tito break, and, more generally, the distinct characteristics of Yugoslav communism. The strength of the volume, on the other hand, not unlike that of the others in the series, lies in its presentation of facts and figures, especially in the field of economy.

As for interpretation, the Yugoslav Communists' own power under Tito's leadership is correctly described as a decisive factor which distinguishes the establishment of Communist regime in Yugoslavia from the imposed rule by the Soviet forces in the captive nations (p. 150). Also, Yugoslavia's defiance of the Soviet bloc is correctly viewed as a genuine conflict. Whether Tito's Yugoslavia will, as suggested, tear apart the whole Soviet bloc and become a prominent member of a new bloc of nations united in their devotion to Communism but united also in their opposition to Soviet domination (Pp. 18, 41), remains to be seen.

Professor Egon Neuberger's general survey of the Yugoslav economy, and the chapter on health and public welfare by an anonymous author, are, in this reviewer's opinion, among the best parts of the volume which is rich throughout with useful information.

STEPHEN BORSODY

Professor of History
Chatham College

JOEL MARTIN HALPERN. *A Serbian Village.* Pp. xxii, 325. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. \$6.00.

This work is an absorbing and significant study of culture change in the Serbian village of Orašac in the heart of Sumadija and some sixty miles south of Belgrade. The author, a social anthropologist, spent the year 1953-54 in the village, living with a peasant family and observing at firsthand the cycle of life. He prefaces his study with two excellent chapters on the historical background: the founding of Orašac in the late eighteenth century; the 1804 revolution which broke out in this village; and the socioeconomic conditions which prevailed during the nineteenth century. This background material enables the reader to appreciate the degree of culture change

which has occurred during the past century and which is occurring today at an accelerating pace.

The scope of the analysis of present-day Orašac is evident in the following chapter titles: "Making a Living," "Shelter, Clothing and Food," "Social Organization," "Government and the Village," and "The Orašac Villager and the World Outside." The author had his share of problems in gathering data on these topics. There was, for example, the occasion when he sought to determine toilet-training practices—a subject to which the villagers obviously had given no thought and which they found most embarrassing to discuss. One of them turned upon the author and demanded: "What do you want to know all this for? It has absolutely nothing to do with the history of Orašac!" (p. 172).

The historian will find this book a mine of valuable information. It demonstrates clearly, factually, and objectively the changes which have taken place during the past century and a half in occupations, clothing, social organization, and the role of religion. Changing relationships between the government and peasant, the sexes, and the generations, are also discussed. Most revealing and valuable are the autobiographies of several peasants and the essays written by school children on such topics as "My Childhood," "My Favorite Holiday," and "What I Want to Be." On the latter topic, the children almost unanimously expressed a desire that their life work should be related to the development and improvement of their country.

This study, like Irwin Sanders' *Balkan Village*, reveals what rich rewards await those who will view the Balkans from the village as well as from the archive and the library. There is need for many more studies of this type, and it is to be hoped that they will concern themselves not only with relatively well-to-do villages such as Sanders' Dragalevtsy and Halpern's Orašac but also with poor mountain hamlets, fishing villages, seaports, and the capitals themselves.

L. S. STAVRIANOS

Associate Professor of History
Northwestern University

KONRAD SYROP. *Spring in October: The Story of the Polish Revolution, 1956*. Pp. xii, 207. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$4.50.

The title of this volume is taken from a Warsaw broadcast by Henryk Holland, who, in describing Wladyslaw Gomulka's appointment as First Secretary and the radical changes made in 1956 in the membership of the Politbureau of the Polish Communist party, stated: "This is spring in October, the spring of awakened hopes and of awakened national pride, the spring of true international proletarianism and of determined will to mark out our own Polish way to socialism." The Stalinists had lost their seats in the Politbureau and a beginning had been made towards greater freedom and independence; how far this could be carried no one knew. Gomulka was destined to walk a tight-rope, balancing between the pressing demands of the Polish populace and the dominating power of Russia. There could be no outright challenge to Russian might, for Poland could be crushed at will by the Russian army and everyone recognized that Poland was "condemned to rely on Soviet support in the matter of her new frontier with Germany" (p. 188). The Poles had a limited freedom of action which prevented their leaving the Soviet camp or introducing true parliamentary democracy.

A few introductory pages are devoted to Russian-Polish relations during the war, but the account actually begins with the summer of 1953 when the elimination of Beria broke the prevailing secret police system in Russia, and a chain reaction brought the gradual disappearance of terror from the political life of Poland. By January 1956, pressure for change had risen almost to the breaking point. The Poznan riots of June convinced the leadership that changes had to be made. The author describes carefully the struggle within the Central Committee and the Politbureau which led to the rehabilitation of Gomulka in August 1956. Charged with Titoism and other anti-Stalinist crimes, he had been arrested in July 1951. A Communist of long standing, he was popular for his underground activity during the war and his true Polish patriotism. Two

factions developed in the Polish leadership: the progressives, headed by Premier Cyrankiewicz and Edward Ochab, First Secretary of the party, who wanted the return of Gomulka to power and a program of further democratization and independence from Moscow; the reactionaries, known as the Natolin group, who were opposed to changes and wanted the closest co-operation with the Soviet Union. At the eighth plenum of the Central Committee of the party in October 1956 the progressives were victorious, and Gomulka was elected First Secretary of the party. An impromptu visit of Khrushchev and other high Soviet leaders to Warsaw had been unable to swing the decision in favor of the Natolin group. At this election the Russian Marshal, Konstantin Rokossovsky, who headed the Ministry of Defense, failed to be elected to the Politbureau and shortly thereafter was replaced by a Pole, General Marian Spychalski. Rokossovsky and thirty-two other Soviet officers were ceremoniously decorated as they left the Polish forces.

Gomulka's program as he took over the leadership is clearly presented. It was based on his philosophy that "... what is immutable in socialism can be reduced to the abolition of the exploitation of man by man. The roads leading to this goal can be and are different" (p. 107). Gomulka began traveling his "Polish road to socialism" by permitting more freedom of expression, by relaxing the drive towards collectivization of agriculture, by freeing Cardinal Wyszynski and working out a new agreement with the Catholic church which included restoration of religious instruction in the schools, and by launching a program for the increased production of consumer goods. The author analyzes the election of the *Sejm* in January 1957 and concludes with a discussion of the various contradictions and compromises which characterize the Polish political atmosphere today.

Mr. Syrop was educated at the Universities of Cracow and Warsaw, and at the Sorbonne; he served as a war correspondent, and is now senior analyst for the British Broadcasting Company. The volume has no footnotes, but includes some

pertinent illustrations along with a most useful three page Chronology of Events.

E. C. HELMREICH

Professor of History and Government
Bowdoin College

EMIL LENGYEL. *1,000 Years of Hungary*. Pp. 312. New York: John Day Company, 1958. \$5.00.

Lengyel, in this well written and interesting work, projects the Hungarian revolution of October 1956 against the country's historical background. Addressing himself to the general reader and not the expert, he endeavors to explain who the Magyars are, from whence they came, the significance of *honfoglalás*—the conquest of their present homeland—and the major developments in their history. Much space in the book is given to Hungarian relations and wars with the Turks. We are reminded that the Battle of Mohács in 1526 and the division of Hungary into three entities had dire consequences for the nation. The Turkish occupation was particularly negative. "People from the adjacent countries [Croats, Serbs, Romanians] descended from the mountains and converged on the Hungarian plains, to fill the void," and "Hungary became a nationality state, one of her biggest problems, and in due time the ethnic Magyars were swamped by alien peoples" (p. 73).

The author avoids the problem of the rival claims of Hungary and Romania for the whole of Transylvania, the "third Hungary." He is willing to go along with those who believe that whatever success the Hapsburgs achieved was due to "luck" and to "their marital policies" (p. 86). The "War of Independence" and the Russian military assistance to the Hapsburgs in putting down the Hungarian rebellion are treated too briefly to be meaningful; the ensuing "Bach system" is hardly more than noted.

Hungary's failure to achieve a free, independent state is attributed to the absence of "a strong middle class generating an intelligent leadership," and to the extreme social polarization of Hungary. As for the responsibility for the outbreak of war in 1914, Lengyel avers that there were "no leading Hungarians" in the "War

Party," and that with the exception of Nicholas Northy de Nagybánya, there were hardly any Magyars "in the higher echelons of the army" (p. 188). Although there is truth in what the author says, some may question the significance of the observations.

Lengyel describes the interwar problems of Hungary and the absence of democracy. Julius Gömbös (1886–1936) began developing a regime modelled on that of the fascist dictators. As the Nazis' hold on Germany stiffened, their influence in Hungary increased too. Hungary soon found itself in the Nazi orbit and on the Axis side in World War II. Lengyel says that Regent Horthy's heart "was never in this war," and that the Nazis worried that he and "his family are strongly infected with Jewish blood" (p. 227). In any case, when Horthy saw the impending defeat of the Axis and began to waver, the Nazis made him for all practical purposes their prisoner. There is a brief statement on peace negotiations and the Anglo-Soviet agreement of October 1944 regarding Hungary.

Was there anything that Hungary could have done to avert the calamity that befell it? The author believes that there was a time in the autumn of 1944 when the Hungarians might have done with the Nazis "what they were to do with the Russians in the autumn of 1956." Such action on their part might have shortened the war and saved countless human lives, and Hungary "would have deserved humanity's thanks" (p. 238). Horthy, however, was not the man "to give his nation such leadership." This is the first forthright statement on the subject, coming at a time when much of the reporting and writing about Hungary is emotional and lacks historical perspective.

The Allied Control Commission and the Sovietization of Hungary are treated cursorily. Resentful of the new state of affairs, Hungary's "disgruntled toilers" rose for freedom. The author puts his finger on some important problems which others tend to overlook: the absence of a democratic tradition; a deeply rooted fear of and hate for Slavs and Russians; and the persistence of anti-Semitism, which was

manifested in the recent rebellion. It is most significant that the peasants did participate en masse in the rebellion. As for the future, the author believes that only an "eastern European twilight zone"—a neutral zone—can bring Hungary freedom and a better future.

WAYNE S. VUCINICH

Professor of History
Stanford University

SOCIOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

JAMES H. MEISEL. *The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the "Elite."* Pp. vi, 432. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958. \$7.50.

Professor Meisel's "unabashed, old-fashioned exercise in cogitation—performed without the benefit of any task force or research team" (Preface) is at once a very complete intellectual biography of Mosca and a running critical commentary on one of the central problems of contemporary politico-ethical thinking. This is the question of inequality—better perhaps, inequalities—in societies haunted, even when they try to repudiate democratic ways and ideals, by echoes of the first of Jefferson's self-evident truths. Not only Mosca, but Pareto, Michels, Schumpeter, C. Wright Mills and many, many others figure in this rich and suggestive analysis of the problem of the "elite."

Professor Meisel's heart, and to be fair, his head, are clearly on the democratic side, on the side of a literal, or at least an honest, acceptance of all three prepositions in Lincoln's classic repudiation of "elitism"—of, for, and by the people. But to continue this string of unavoidable allusions, he is wryly aware, as indeed one suspects Orwell himself was, that there is realism as well as irony in the famous phrase that all are equal, but some are more equal than others. Professor Meisel knows well that there are fewer officers than men in any army, and that the relation between officers and men in the most democratic army is, to put it mildly, not fully and accurately expressed in the usual phraseology of democratic ritual. He is aware, in short,

that annoying though the work of the "elitists" may be to the sincere democrat, these writers are dealing with a real problem, and should be read, not just cursed. This is especially true of Mosca, humanly one of the most attractive of the lot, who lived until 1941, seeing enough of fascism in his own country to dislike it as thoroughly as the nicest democrat.

In a brief review it is quite impossible to analyze in detail the argument of this book. Professor Meisel does come in the end, via Mosca's follower Guido Dorsi in his *Dittatura, Classe politica e classe dirigente* (1949), to a somewhat inconclusive but fruitful and suggestive conclusion. C. Wright Mills's "power elite" he finds an "inverted myth," an "elite to end all elites"; but he cannot agree with Carl Friedrich that in a democratic society there is no real problem of a ruling class or group. We must hope he will expand these pages and his charts of patterns of power and relations between many and few into a new book—still his own, and not that of a task force or research team.

CRANE BRINTON

Professor of History
Harvard University

E. DIGBY BALTZELL. *Philadelphia Gentlemen: The Making of a National Upper Class.* Pp. ix, 440. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. \$5.75.

During the last several years it has been observed repeatedly that the interest of American sociologists in problems of social class was in fact confined to the middle classes. Studies of both the working class and the upper class were conspicuous by their absence, in part at least because scholars lacked access to the requisite materials. The present work is a notable exception in this respect, because the author has been able to combine his competence as a sociological analyst with his role as a participant and observer of the upper class.

Professor Baltzell has made fruitful use of two well-known documents, the *Social Register* and *Who's Who*. The first of these serves as a clue to the composition of the upper class, while the second and more inclusive compendium is taken as comprising the elite of the country. Any-

one whose achievements in a reputable endeavor are noteworthy is likely to be included in *Who's Who*, but he does not thereby become a member of the upper class. After tracing the history of these documents, the author turns his attention to the distinction between the elite and the upper class in Philadelphia. While the bulk of his analysis is devoted to the history and present position of the Philadelphia upper class, the contrast between elite and upper class serves him throughout as a means of analyzing the distinctive characteristics of the latter, which comprise not only prominence and wealth but also intermarriage, a common outlook, a feeling of solidarity, and a shared participation in a large number of distinctive as well as exclusive institutions. These linkages within the upper class are traced in terms of a number of variables such as family histories, economic position, neighborhood, religious and associational affiliation, education, and others.

It should be pointed out that this analysis stands in marked contrast to other recent works dealing with the same problem. Where W. Lloyd Warner examined an upper class in a small town primarily in terms of its social status and associational participation, Baltzell concentrates on a metropolitan upper class and emphasizes the importance of its economic position. And where C. Wright Mills examined a national elite primarily in terms of its economic and political power, Baltzell emphasizes the distinction between elite and upper class as well as the importance of the latter's local base and social cohesion. Compared with these earlier efforts, Baltzell's study considerably advances our knowledge in my judgment. However, the data used by the author only go up to 1940 and one wonders whether his findings have been modified during the intervening period as a result of the changes brought about by World War II and the second industrial revolution. In relation to the subtitle of his book the author makes clear that his findings concerning Philadelphia are paralleled in other metropolitan areas, but it may be asked whether the existence of this interlocking, metropolitan upper class is really evidence of its political pre-

dominance. The fact that all Senators are automatically listed in the *Social Register* obscures the gulf which separates the political process from the family-linked recruitment of the upper class. The importance of bureaucratic—in contrast to upper class—recruitment in the large organizations of American society also raises questions concerning the political position of the upper class. But such questions are all suggested by Professor Baltzell's excellent study and one hopes that he will turn to them in his further work.

REINHARD BENDIX

Chairman, Department of Sociology
and Social Institutions
University of California
Berkeley

RENATO TAGIURI and LUIGI PETRULLO (Eds.). *Person Perception and Interpersonal Behavior.* Pp. xx, 390. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. \$7.50.

This volume is the edited collection of papers presented at the Symposium on Person Perception held at Harvard University in March 1957. As such, it supports a commonplace observation that one should hold a symposium at a time when there are great changes occurring in a field and members need to be brought together to communicate with each other, rather than when there is a dearth of ideas and a recession in the field as is suggested by this volume. The papers are representative of a considerable portion of the interest in the area of social perception, but the definition derived from the volume, in spite of the nominal inclusion of anthropology and sociology, is extremely limited and focuses primarily on the narrow view of psychology. To some extent, thus, this volume can serve as a fair summary of current thinking on the area but, unfortunately, this is like a confession of bankruptcy rather than the parade of firm theory or broad conceptualization about the subject matter.

In his Introduction, Tagiuri points out the importance of Cronbach's criticism and analysis of measures in the area of social perception. He suggests that this, along

American Sociological Review, would have benefited from expansion. The National Academy of Sciences and the journal *Human Organization*, for instance, have published since that article was written a number of theoretically oriented empirical studies whose findings, while in the main probably confirmatory of most of Moore's theses, would have given his theoretical discussion both more scope and more conceptual precision. Nevertheless, the volume is an outstanding contribution to the literature of an area of very difficult empirical research, and deserves recognition as one of the most richly detailed and carefully considered studies available to the student of human behavior in extreme situations.

ANTHONY F. C. WALLACE

Senior Research Associate
in Anthropology
Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric
Institute

ALFRED DE GRAZIA (Ed.). *Grass Roots Private Welfare*. Winning essays of the 1956 National Awards Competition of The Foundation for Voluntary Welfare. Pp. xiv, 306. New York: New York University Press, 1957. \$4.75.

CHRISTOPHER SOWER, JOHN HOLLAND, KENNETH TIEDKE, and WALTER FREEMAN with the co-operation of others. *Community Involvement: The Webs of Formal and Informal Ties That Make for Action*. Pp. 323. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957. \$5.00.

The two books under review have in common a concern about community process, and each, in varying degrees, seeks an analysis thereof. There the likeness ends. There is much more of unlikeness than of likeness between them.

The one book, *Community Involvement*, concentrates on the process by which a group or groups within a community go about making a health self-survey, and the entire volume is devoted to an examination in minute detail; the other volume, *Grass Roots Private Welfare*, contains quick sketches, none more than six pages, of fifty projects where the emphasis is far more on end product than on process. The first is devoted to what might be

termed a tax-supported or public health project and is under the aegis of publicly constituted authority even though the survey utilizes some 700 volunteers, while the other definitely emphasizes what is loosely termed private welfare with scarcely any reference to tax-supported services.

In *Community Involvement* a team of four social scientists from the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Michigan State University, with the co-operation of eight others, reports laboriously and meticulously from the first steps of the proposed health self-survey not only through to the completion of the survey, but further yet to the demise of the health council. The great value of this exposition, which becomes tedious in spots, is its minute tracing of each step of community action, with incessant emphasis upon initiation, legitimization, and execution. There is a preoccupation with terminology which grates upon the reader by reason of repetitiousness, but if this can be borne with or forgiven, there is substantial value in the complete analysis.

There is worth in each of the chapters and if one is on the alert, one will come upon sound theory tucked away in the most unpredictable places. These bits of theory, appropriately related to the actual step-by-step process, are brought together in a final section entitled Theory and Empirical Research. In the opinion of this reviewer, Chapter 13, "A Final Note on Theory," makes a substantial contribution to sociological theory bearing on the community organization process.

Grass Roots Private Welfare is just that—fifty instances in as many communities whereby persons and groups in local communities became conscious of needs and then took action toward meeting those needs. The range of areas is almost limitless, as may be judged from the following: mental health, alcoholism, juvenile delinquency, neighborhood rehabilitation, the deaf, the crippled, the blind, chronic illness, medical care, migrant workers, child welfare, aging, recreation. One is impressed with the resourcefulness evidenced in practically all of the illustrations; and one cannot but be hopeful that, no matter how complex our communities seem to be-

come, there is always sufficient ingenuity ready to go to work at least to meet the impact, if not also to enable people and communities to arrive at some satisfactory balance.

Despite the refreshing spontaneity manifested in so many of these communities, the reader at times cannot but feel there is an insufficient analysis of the process by which they achieve their ends—the illustrations are so facilely presented! In *Community Involvement* an entire volume is devoted to the deceptively simple task of a health self-survey, while in *Grass Roots Private Welfare* an equal number of pages is devoted to fifty instances of process with only a bare analysis of each. All fifty are successful in the book. The reader could have wished for an occasional misgiving, a dissent, a questioning. Perhaps it is too much to expect that anyone would be willing to expose a failure in process or objective in cold print!

ARTHUR E. FINK

Dean of School of Social Work
University of North Carolina

MARY STEICHEN CALDERONE (Ed.). *Abortion in the United States*. A Conference Sponsored by the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Incorporated at Arden House and The New York Academy of Medicine. Pp. vii, 224. New York: A Hoeber-Harper Book (Paul B. Hoeber and Harper & Brothers), 1958. \$5.50.

This valuable and provocative book is the report on a conference held in 1955 and sponsored by The Planned Parenthood Federation of America. Of the thirty-eight distinguished participants, thirty were physicians but were certainly not of one mind concerning the universal phenomenon of abortion. Best known of the nonmedical participants was the late Alfred Kinsey, whose research methods and findings stand in contrast to the evidence from formal medical and legal records.

A unique, lucid, and sane contribution was made by Dr. Timanus, a retired abortionist who reported on 5,210 operations which he personally performed with a mortality of only .04 per cent. The ethical confusion of the medical profession is

shown by the fact that of 353 physicians who referred patients to Dr. Timanus with a recommendation of abortion not one shared responsibility for legal difficulties when they arose. A doctor who had made referrals testified against the abortionist when he was prosecuted.

The interaction of the assembled specialists would have made an interesting study in group dynamics. The printed discussion is at a high level. Able editing no doubt concealed some of the sharper clashes of opinions, semantic difficulties, and basic cultural conflicts. There is valuable information concerning abortion in Scandinavian countries, legal aspects in the United States, illegal abortion, therapeutic abortion, and the relation between abortion and contraception. In an Appendix there is a brief discussion of abortion in Japan, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Finland.

Testimony from professional experience, statistical records, research findings, and reports of varied practices by locality and culture make hazy the distinctions between therapeutic, legal, illegal, and criminal abortion. Causes and consequences are not yet clearly known. The experts came to some agreement, however, that upper class people in the United States fare better than lower class persons when faced with an undesired pregnancy. Even after examination of Kinsey findings by a statistical committee it was reported that the annual number of induced abortions in the United States might be anywhere between 200,000 and 1,200,000.

The conferees seemed to feel a responsibility for some step toward a more enlightened policy in spite of obstacles imposed by outmoded laws, the Catholic Church, and the ancient tradition of the medical profession. Naturally it was easier to agree on a moderate statement phrased in generalities. The final product called for research, consultation centers for women seeking abortion, extension of contraceptive service, sex education, and study of abortion laws by authoritative bodies with a view to shaping a model law. Such legal reform should recognize improved control of maternal mortality and the increasing significance of psychiatric and social in-

dications for therapeutic abortions. The statement was signed by a majority of the participants.

The reader of this book has, in a way, a ringside seat watching some fine minds, equipped with the best available information, grapple with problems created by the fact that humans can and do induce abortions in females of their species.

CLIFFORD KIRKPATRICK

Professor of Sociology
Indiana University

PETER TOWNSEND. *The Family Life of Old People: An Inquiry in East London*. (Report of The Institute of Community Studies, No. 2.) Pp. xvi, 284. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. \$5.00.

This book is in the great British tradition of empirical research in which the top, not the bottom, man in the research organization goes into the field and brings his talents to bear on the process of data collection. It was written "by the man who actually had his fingers in the pie" and gives the reader "the true 'tang' that comes only from direct human contact" (Foreword by J. H. Sheldon). It is one of a series by the Institute of Community Studies in London, the other two being *Family and Kinship in East London* by Michael Young and Peter Willmott and *Widows and Their Families* by Peter Marris.

The subjects of this study were 64 men and 139 women of pensionable age in Bethnal Green, a borough of East London, who were interviewed in their homes. Of these, 18 were unmarried, 18 were married or widowed but without surviving children, and 167 were married or widowed and had surviving children. In addition, diaries were kept by 12 of the subjects. As a basis for comparison, special surveys were made of 200 East London people in public homes, 300 in a local geriatric hospital, and 400 in Bethnal Green who were being visited by "home helps." The object of these surveys was to assess the functions of family and state services in caring for old people and to examine the classes that make the heaviest demands on statutory and voluntary services.

The main conclusion of this book is

that the extended family is merely adjusting itself to new circumstances. This is contrary to the general assumption that the extended family is disintegrating—articulated as early as the late nineteenth century when Charles Booth (final volume of *Life and Labour*, p. 43) quoted an informant as saying that "the great loss of the last twenty years . . . is the weakening of the family ties between parents and children; children don't look after their old people according to their means." This is also expressed by Durkheim in his *Suicide* (p. 377).

The author found the three-generation family, organized around the grandmother and her grown daughters, to be a strong and functioning reality. He found children, especially daughters, carrying an enormous load of care of older persons. He concludes that any program for the care of old people should take this vital resource into account. Provision should be made to help old people to be cared for in their own homes by their own relatives. They should be housed near—but not with—their children. Allowances should be available for attendance for the bedridden and housebound. In the future there will be relatively fewer old people without relatives, because a larger proportion of the population now marry; but, by the same token, there will be fewer unattached aunts to help out in an emergency.

One of the interesting distinctions made is that between social isolates and desolates. Social isolation is measured in terms of the number of contacts during a week; it may or may not be accompanied by loneliness. Desolation involves the loss of a loved one and it is "more important than social isolation in explaining the loneliness of old people. . . . It affects a person's health and whole state of mind" (p. 178). Only the family can help in cases of desolation.

An American reviewer is struck by the residential stability of the families studied. Is there any large city in this country where 85 per cent of the noninstitutionalized older people with children would have a child living within a mile of them? Where more than half of those not living with a child would have a child in the same street or building, or just around the

corner? If the children were within the metropolitan area these findings would tally with those of, let us say, the Detroit Area Studies; but within the same block seems most unusual.

JESSIE BERNARD

Professor of Sociology
Pennsylvania State University

KARL BEDNARIK. *The Young Worker of To-day: A New Type*. Edited by J. P. Mayer. Pp. 146. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955. Price: \$3.00.

Just how rigorously we should measure a journalistic essay by the standards of proof used in the social sciences is still a matter for debate. When the work is clearly a popular *jeu d'esprit*, like Spector-sky's *The Exurbanites*, the answer is clearly negative. The answer is less clear for a work which comes close to the social science report, such as Whyte's *The Organization Man*. In addition to this range from popularized analysis to serious analysis, there is another very different one, from reliance on mainly personal observation and intuition to reliance on the hard data of censuses and surveys.

Bednarik's book is both serious and intuitive. Unhappily, the intuitionist who wishes seriously to analyze the young worker of today must accomplish two difficult tasks: he must offer us ideas we did not have before, and he must square with our hard facts—when, that is, we have any which are relevant to his theses. Bednarik does neither.

In an editorial Preface, J. P. Mayer informs us that Bednarik's book belongs "to the class of Ortega y Gasset's *Revolt of the Masses*, Burnham's *Managerial Revolution*, or Kracauer's *Die Angestellten*." *The Young Worker of Today* does belong to this type of essay but does not even to this type of essay but does not even approximate this class. Similarly, he asserts that "it would be wrong . . . to take this fascinating essay as an attack on Socialism. . . ." On the contrary, it is at least that.

Bednarik's tone is that of a disillusioned Socialist who has found that his favorites, the proletarian young, have become the same under capitalism, socialism, and semi-socialism—that they have lost their inner

discipline and ideological stance and acquired the bad qualities of the bourgeoisie. In fact, they have undergone a process of amalgamation into the mass by which they have become social atoms, without hope or culture, doped by the material benefits of the new prosperity and living at "freedom zero" because they seek and care for nothing beyond their own empty selves.

I have not seen the original, and thus cannot guess whether the ineptness of style is Bednarik's or that of his translator, René Tupholme. Few social scientists write well, and so this comment would not be a criticism if the work gave us more than a salon essay. However, since he is devoting his book to a description of the "Teddy-Boys" and the "zoot-suiters"—in short to the modern youth in his first years of unskilled or semiskilled work—and since we have, in fact, seen this description in a dozen places, from news articles to serious works, we can expect at least some compensation for reading it again—say a new and graceful verbal formulation of it.

Essentially Bednarik's work is intellectually disappointing in several respects. The descriptive analysis is not new; he does not demonstrate by any adequate historical data that the phenomenon is new—that the "new worker" is at all different from the young worker of a generation or two, or three ago; he does not give us any new ideas as to why the "new worker" is as he is—if, indeed, he is as Bednarik suggests.

Bednarik's analysis is based on a constructed type, an "ideal type" in Weber's sense. But he abandons its hypothetical character quickly: ". . . there are practically no members of that class who do not in one form or another conform to this new type. . . ." Or: ". . . there is not a single workman in this part of the world who feels in any way persecuted and out-cast from society. . . ." "I do not know of a single case today of a young worker having to support one or several members of his family or of even having to contribute to their support."

As an observer, Bednarik arouses doubt, as in the previous sentence. Similarly: "I personally know plenty of young workers who drink themselves unconscious. . . ."

Or: "It is not unusual for a young bride to present her husband with a list of Christmas gifts which it would cost him half his year's salary and more to purchase."

I can say truthfully that several of my friends do at times describe the modern young worker in just Bednarik's fashion, especially when they are politically discouraged. However, I see no good reason why they should bother to read this version.

WILLIAM J. GOODE

Associate Professor of Sociology
Columbia University

CHARLES R. SNYDER. *Alcohol and the Jews: A Cultural Study of Drinking and Sobriety*. (Monographs of the Yale Center of Alcohol Studies, No. 1.) Pp. 226. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press; Publication Division, Yale Center of Alcohol Studies, New Haven, Conn., 1958. \$5.00.

This study of drinking among Jews represents the first in what promises to be an important and interesting series of studies on alcoholism and drinking behavior. The second monograph, already in preparation, is to deal with the chronic police case inebriate. Professor Snyder has set a high standard of excellence in this first volume of the projected series.

The problem the author poses is that of explaining the remarkable infrequency of drunkenness and alcoholism among Jews, particularly among Orthodox Jews. It is noted that among the latter it is customary to begin drinking wine very early in life, and to drink frequently and sometimes in considerable quantity. Nevertheless, there is especially little drunkenness and alcoholism among the Orthodox. Judaism, like Catholicism, does not stress abstinence from alcoholic beverages as a moral precept, but there appears to be much less alcoholism among Jews than Catholics.

The author suggests that group rates of alcoholism are the function of three main influences: the prevalence of acute psychic tensions, the attitudes toward drinking within the culture of the group, and the availability of substitutes for alcohol in dealing with one's personal problems. Since it seems reasonable to suppose that Jews

have their fair share of personality problems and psychic tensions, usually said to be the causes of alcoholism, one must clearly look elsewhere for an explanation of Jewish sobriety.

Professor Snyder's theory is that the extraordinary sobriety of the Jews arises from the attitudes and norms within Jewish culture concerning the use of alcohol. Jewish tradition prescribes the consumption of alcoholic beverages on a number of family, social, and religious occasions. There are very few total abstainers among the Jews. Nevertheless, drunkenness is strongly disapproved and is viewed as a characteristic of Gentiles—*Shikker iz a Goy*.

The sobriety of the Jews, the author argues, develops from the custom of what may be called "ceremonial" drinking in which moderation is learned by practice and becomes invested, through ceremonial association, with moral and religious significance. This position is strongly supported by the evidence presented which shows that as one passes from Orthodox to Conservative, Reform, and Secular Jewish groups, drinking patterns become progressively more like those of the wider society and rates of drunkenness and alcoholism increase.

ALFRED R. LINDESMITH

Associate Professor of Sociology
Indiana University

CURRIN V. SHIELDS. *Democracy and Catholicism in America*. Pp. ix, 310. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1958. \$5.00.

The purpose of this book is to find a cure for anti-Catholicism, and to show that Catholicism can live with democracy. The author, a non-Catholic, claims that his only bias is that of being a democrat—that is, one who abides by the will of the people. Catholicism is, according to him, "pre-liberal" and democracy "post-liberal," and both are at odds with liberalism, since Professor Shields associates it with the doctrine of the elite and Protestantism. Although democracy and Catholicism have no real connection, they are not incompatible. Such is the author's thesis.

To review such a book as this in a lim-

ited space is difficult. There are many partial truths and generalizations that need clarification. Furthermore it is not easy to tell where Professor Shields obtained much of his material because he did not want "to clutter up the pages . . . with footnotes, citations, and lengthy quotations" (p. 273).

Perhaps one or two illustrations will show some of the misleading interpretations. Professor Shields, for example, found it highly significant that Disraeli—a Tory democrat—passed the Reform Bill of 1867 and that the Labour Government by getting rid of "plural voting" in 1945 completed the democratization of the British political system. All this was accomplished over the "frantic opposition of middle class Liberals, ever true to their belief in elite rule." No mention is made of the fact that the bulk of legislation passed between those years was passed by the Liberal party and that even Disraeli admitted to stealing the Liberal program when he drafted his own reform bill. As a result a distorted view of the Liberal party is presented. This sort of thing is far too often repeated throughout the book.

Professor Shields would discard various safeguards for individual freedoms because they protect only the "elite," and are not necessary in a democracy or in a country where Catholicism is dominant. Events in Colombia, Spain, and Portugal which would refute this are either ignored or straddled. The author holds up the Encyclical *Immortale Dei* (1885) as an embodiment of papal assent to toleration, but again those sections in which Leo XIII stresses that it is really the duty of the state to back Catholicism with all of its force and favor are ignored. Only in those areas where Catholicism was not in the majority was toleration condoned. Professor Shields by meeting these problems would have had a better book. Furthermore it would have been well to recognize that anti-Protestantism is abroad in this troubled world of ours as well as anti-Catholicism.

The author does render a service by showing that democracy and Catholicism need not be at odds under Anglo-American political systems, but perhaps this is be-

cause of those "elite" safeguards rather than in spite of them. Professor Shields provides many insights into modern Catholic political theory and his treatment of democratic thought should provoke lively discussions. Whether he "will set straight the thinking of some thoughtful Americans at least about the relation between Catholicism and Democracy" is perhaps open to some doubt.

JOHN J. MURRAY

Chairman, Department of History and
Professor of History
Coe College

The Negro in American Society. (Florida State University Studies, No. 28.) Pp. viii, 89. Tallahassee: Florida State University, 1958. No price.

EARL E. THORPE. *Negro Historians in the United States*. Pp. xi, 188. Baton Rouge: Fraternal Press, 1958. \$4.00.

The first of these books, a collection of seven essays by Florida State University social scientists, derives its major importance from its cogent expression of the most recent and trustworthy findings and viewpoints on the Negro. From the opening paper, "Anthropology and the Segregation Problem," to the closing one, "The Negro in the Literature of American History," there is throughout the same brief but careful re-examination and interpretation of the Negro's role in American life and thought.

Collectively these essays cover considerable ground. Two of them deal with the Negro's cultural patterning and his psychological characteristics. Here the American Negro is seen as originating from various West African ethnic and biological groups possessed of "a culture that was complex, ordered, and systematic." The changed thinking as to the mental capacities of the Negro and the reasons for this change are also described. Two of the papers treat the Negro economically—specifically, the economic rationale of segregation and the Negro's role in a changing Southern agriculture; the latter is accompanied by seven pages of charts and photographs.

The chapter on the Negro in Southern politics is a clear presentation of the extent to which the Negro participates at the polls,

but perhaps might have given some hint as to the manner in which the race issue has been used in Southern politics, notably when candidates are running for public office. The final paper addresses itself to the question: in what way may his history textbooks have conditioned the white student about the Negro? It is pointed out that until recently most of the standard works in American history would give the impression that the role of the Negro was hardly worth considering.

The tendency to underplay the Negro in the standard works on the American past has given rise to a distinctive historiography. It is the purpose of the second of these books, *Negro Historians in the United States*, to describe the work of these chroniclers of the colored minority. The first group to come under Thorpe's survey is the "justifiers of emancipation." While these nineteenth century Negro writers were not professionally trained—their research was skimpy and their style was oracular—they were the first to reveal something of the richness of the Negro past.

Succeeding these pioneers were the "middle group" historians whose careers spanned the period from 1890 to 1930. Writers of this school were generally university trained. Hence their documentation was an improvement upon that of their predecessors, but their writings were sometimes "bitter and warped." Best known of this group were W. E. B. DuBois, first Negro Ph.D. in history (Harvard, 1895), whose pen was possessed of a moving literary quality, and Carter G. Woodson, recondite founder of the *Journal of Negro History* in 1916 and its editor until his death thirty-five years later. The present-day Negro historians—the "new school"—are comparatively objective, their writings showing less bitterness and race-angling. These newer scholars meet with Thorpe's approval for they more nearly correspond to his own persuasively presented justification for Negro history—that "it constitutes a contribution to the knowledge and understanding of mankind."

In setting up the criteria for evaluating the Negro historians and in establishing the schools into which they fall, Thorpe shows ingenuity and insight. If a few

of his judgments seem controversial—he scorns fence-sitting—his familiarity with his materials is unquestioned. Privately printed, this book's typography and proof-reading are not up to its general merit.

BENJAMIN QUARLES

Professor of History
Morgan State College

LOUIS R. HARLAN. *Separate and Unequal: Public School Campaigns and Racism in the Southern Seaboard States, 1901-1915*. Pp. xii, 290. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958. \$6.00.

This scholarly volume is a contribution to the history of education in the South. Educators will discover much of interest, and the evolution of the southern public school system will engage those concerned with the practical application of the concept of universal education. Moreover, it shows an American reform movement in operation. The Southern Education Board and its crusade to promote public education in the South have been thoroughly investigated. Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia are used as case studies to illustrate this regional approach to public education.

"If race prejudice was due to ignorance and economic competition, . . . then through public schools the whites might learn racial tolerance along with skills which would widen their opportunities. . . . A single, pervasive institution, the public school, was the lever by which it [the Southern Education Board] hoped to move the region, to solve all the other complex problems arising from Southern poverty, ignorance, and racial tension" (p. 79). So reasoned the northern philanthropists who joined with southern educators to advance the education of all the people with fairness to the Negro. The Board was tied in with all the leading endowed organizations active in southern education and became in practice a propaganda agency conducting its campaign through statesmen-schoolmasters. Orating before mass meetings was a favorite technique.

The public school system did expand after 1900, and it has continued to expand, but as enthusiasm for white education grew

so did the temptation to take the Negro's fair share of public school funds. The Board's success in stimulating public education depended on southern economic conditions and the prevailing state of race relations. The movement's conservatism and its adaptation to southern sentiment weakened the Board's position as a guardian of Negro interests. To the struggle between the crusading schoolmen and the white supremacists was joined the battle over local taxation as a source of public school funds. By 1915, a pattern of separate and unequal schools was complete. Numerous statistical comparisons between white and Negro schools reveal the gross inequalities.

The "Essay on Sources" is a valuable guide to the literature on various aspects of southern education. The text is fully documented with complete footnote citations. Those interested in further research or reading will welcome the author's notes and observations on the use of these materials. The University of North Carolina facilitated the use of this book by providing an attractive format.

FRANK J. KLINGBERG

Professor of History, Emeritus
University of California
Los Angeles

JOHN U. NEF. *Cultural Foundations of Industrial Civilization*. (The Wiles Lectures, given at Queen's University, Belfast, 1956.) Pp. xiv, 163. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958. \$4.00.

Professor Nef has combined a series of the Wiles Lectures given at Queen's University, Belfast, into a slim but provocative volume. The chapters and their content make it apparent that the author meant to present *aspects* of the origin of industrial civilization; indeed the individual chapters are joined by weak links only.

Nef's basic premises are derived from the definition he gives to the terms "cultural" and "civilization." The author seems to equate "cultural" with intellectual. Thus the foundations of industrial civilization must be sought in the movements of the mind during the critical period which includes the second half of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth

centuries. Since "civilization" is taken to mean refinement and humaneness, the further premise is clear: it is refinement in ethics, or in Nef's terms "efforts to practice a Christian life in a temporal world," which furnishes the principal source of industrial development.

One need not accept these basic premises to appreciate and to benefit from Nef's analysis of the intellectual foundations of industrial refinement. Since the movements of the mind are many, the author has been very selective. The analysis begins with an examination of the quantitative precision furnished by philosophy and its effect on science, technology, economics, and morality. The dynamic driving force of change is found in the function of an intellectual elite: ". . . a few powerful minds emphasize certain hitherto neglected values, methods, and relate them potentially in novel ways to the life of action. . . . Innovations are usually brought about by exceptionally powerful thinkers. . . ." If in hand with quantitative precision there is the growth of a new reality—mathematics—and of a new art which exhibits entirely new features. There is a new delight in beauty for its own sake; this Nef claims is at the base of the production of commodities which eventually leads to mass production. The delight in beauty and refinement is also carried into literature. Slaughter takes place off stage, war loses its appeal, virtue and morality are extolled. Renewed spirituality and the need for avoidance of war in order to further the production of goods are interrelated. Indeed, it seems important to Nef to make the point that a change in outlook occurred in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries regarding violence. He attributes this change to the growth of Christianity, the expansion of the world, and to science: in other words to the birth of the "concept of universal humanity."

RALPH TURNER

Professor of History
Yale University

SIDNEY HOOK (Ed.). *Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science*. Pp. xv, 237. New York: New York University Press, 1958. \$5.00.

As Editor Hook remarks, there are three important influences which have recently led to rather contradictory and extensive discussions of determinism and freedom. The first influence is political: the fear that man's increasing ability to control political behavior will destroy his freedom. The second is scientific: the discovery that the prediction of the behavior of subatomic entities is only possible in the mass, but not possible for the individual subatomic entity. The third is behavioral: the tendency of the behavioral sciences to emphasize the deterministic basis of all human behavior. The first seems to lead to the denial of freedom altogether. The second seems to involve its reintroduction at a level far below that of moral observation and further seems to involve the possibility that human behavior is in some essential respects not predictable. The third seems to deny the possibility of moral behavior and moral responsibility. These different consequences are unfortunately not fully discussed except tangentially in this volume.

One impressive and perhaps discouraging thing about these discussions at their various levels—philosophical, scientific, and social—is the diversity of opinion. Superficially the discussions are well ordered; they deal with their topics at first philosophically, then physically, and then socially. But actually they seem to have, in many instances, no relation to each other. The first three seem philosophically opposed, yet they are in agreement that the universe is causally determined. The physicists, Bridgman and Lande, deny that physically the universe is determined—at least at the subatomic level—but this conclusion is never related to philosophy or considered a matter worthy of discussion by the first three philosophers. The three philosophers concerned with the social deal with entirely different questions; the most interesting, Professor Hart, dealing with “excusing” conditions in criminal law as a basis for increasing the protection of an individual's liberty rather than with the question of determinism and freedom.

The commentators on the papers have interesting things to say, but often tangentially, as if they were solely interested in making their own ideas known. Of

these, I found Professors Ducasse's, Hempel's, and Northrop's the most valuable.

In so short a review, it is impossible to present any of the essential arguments, especially as the discussants wander over a sort of cosmic logical spectrum. Yet I would like to give expression to one feeling: many of the discussants seem to think that these problems can be solved on the verbal or logical level. I think they are wrong. After long reading in this and other literature, I am convinced that these topics need more than logical clarification and argument to settle them. I think this is also Professor Hempel's opinion.

For anyone who wants to live in a logical Babylon for a week or so, this book is worth inhabiting.

RUBIN GOTESKY

Associate Professor of Philosophy
University of Georgia

WERNER STARK. *The Sociology of Knowledge: An Essay in Aid of a Deeper Understanding of the History of Ideas*. Pp. xi, 356. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. \$7.50.

This book represents the first attempt at a systematic treatment of the problems of the sociology of knowledge as distinguished from the didactic (Mannheim) and the historico-critical (Merton) analyses of its subject matter. As a pioneering venture it is eminently successful. Dr. Stark, who is a former German scholar now teaching at the University of Manchester, is as much a master of the English language as he is of his native tongue. He writes with commendable clarity and logical precision, and he shows a profound and exhaustive knowledge of the relevant literature. He deals with particular care with the ideas of Max Scheler, Mannheim, Alfred Weber, Geiger, and Marx. However, the organization of the material and its treatment are original and constitute an important contribution to the theoretical clarification of one of the most difficult branches of sociology.

The book is divided into two parts. In the first, Stark discusses the province of the sociology of knowledge in terms of its antecedents, its essence, and its consequences. In the second, he takes up the problems of the sociology of knowledge.

These center around the issue of social determination and are four in number. They pertain respectively to the base, the nature, the degree, and the conquest of social determination.

Stark holds that the sociology of knowledge is concerned with the social determination of human thought. He makes an excellent case against the traditional inclusion of the doctrine of ideology in this field. Nothing but confusion has resulted from it. The sociology of knowledge as a study “must logically precede and be kept apart from the doctrine of, and the hunt for, ideologies. . . . The sociology of knowledge deals with the formation of a specific world-view, the doctrine of ideology with its deformation” (50–51). Ideologies are interest-begotten and their study properly belongs to psychology, whereas the sociology of knowledge is a true social science which investigates the connection between particular pictures of reality seen by a society and the human relationships which make that society what it is.

According to Stark there exists a social apriori “which is as basic to the functioning of the process of social knowing as the Kantian apriori is to the process of physical and formal knowing” (16). The social apriori is manifested in the axiological apriori of a society. Social life is a process guided by values that emerge as dominant in the living interplay of individual and group strivings.

The sociology of knowledge studies the coherence between the dominant ideas in a society and its value system. The functional relation is mutual, not unilateral. Above all, it is not univocal. The value system serves as a grid or pattern; it does not create the modes of thinking. “Only their selection is determined by social and historical factors” (116). The sociology of knowledge renders the operation of the individual mind intelligible, but it does not deny its individual existence. A culture is always freely elaborated by free men. Determination of thought means only that “mental modes must be capable of organic co-existence and co-function with the contemporary co-social modes of action” (pp. 253–254).

The “parent reality” from which ideas

and institutions emerge is social life as a process. This is Stark's central thesis. What a man thinks “depends more on the cultural self built up in him by pervading social influences than on either his physical environment, on the tools he works with, on his body, or his drives, or his interests, or some special factor, such as occupation, or yet, on some mysterious indwelling culture-soul. . . . The true basis of social determination, so far as human thought is concerned, is the process of social interaction” (pp. 243–244).

Dr. Stark has laid an excellent foundation in support of this thesis in an eminently readable and worthwhile presentation.

THEODORE ABEL

Professor of Sociology
Hunter College

PAUL HALMOS. *Towards a Measure of Man: The Frontiers of Normal Adjustment*. (International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction.) Pp. viii, 250. New York: Humanities Press, 1958. \$5.50.

This very valuable and literate work by a lecturer in Psychology and Education at the University College of North Staffordshire “deals centrally with the concepts of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ in human personality and behavior.” The author, who calls himself a sociologist, shows that modern sociology, “the only scientific discipline which deals with the total field of human relations and human conduct,” has separated itself into two disparate fields, neither of which is adequate metaphysically. On the one hand there are technicians who claim no general values in sociology, simply tending to “provide blueprints according to the whims of customers” (p. 224). On the other there are theorists who engender work which “has been all scaffolding and no building” (p. 227). This fragmentation of sociological knowledge “has cast most items of it beyond a central meaning” (p. 219).

Since Halmos holds that “time is not on our side”—the world is in trouble right now—he seeks to find if there is an absolute definition of normal and abnormal above and beyond relativism and the con-

occasional exceptions, such as constitute Alger stories, their fortunes are determined for, not by them. They are the minions of suppliers, of banks; they are confined to local, often personal services; where they survive, it is probably because their trifling pickings are not worth the attention of their superiors in resources and ambition.

However, in one way and another, this author does deal with the somewhat bigger establishments which call for organizational skill. On the viability of these, in actuality or only in public belief, depends the confidence in competition. The exhibits and conclusions are not reassuring. Such firms require governmental nurture of several sorts. This is offered in the name of free enterprise, but actually it takes the form of subsidy. It seems to be agreed that they may not otherwise be defended against the technical advantages of the mammoths. Even outdoor relief to these public charges becomes difficult in an economy conditioned by combination. In the process of Mr. Phillips' revealing analysis, he queries whether we are not paying, in various subventions, to sustain a myth. It is a little like the elaborate, ridiculous pretense that the island refuge of Formosa is the continental mass of China.

This matter-of-fact book is instructive on the undercurrents in American business. A teacher with perception could use it—brief as it is—as a basic text in beginning economics. Mr. Phillips neither laments nor preaches. He simply tells, and his story portends something different from a bland faith in the sufficiency of individual enterprise.

BROADUS MITCHELL

Hofstra College

GERHARD COLM and THEODORE GEIGER with the assistance of MANUEL HELZNER. *The Economy of the American People: Progress, Problems, Prospects*. (Planning Pamphlet No. 102.) Pp. viii, 167. Washington, D. C.: National Planning Association, 1958. \$2.00.

The original purpose of this little book was to set forth the nature and prospects of the American economic system for students in foreign countries and thus help

them to understand what has made this system work. Planned accordingly as a purely informative publication, the report goes far beyond its assignment. Instead of presenting merely a compendium of well established facts and universally accepted notions, it offers an interpretation of the United States economic and social system. An interpretative analysis of this kind must necessarily be subjective in the sense that it reflects the political and social philosophy of the authors and their feeling of the course of modern history. Here facts and figures, combined with historical references, unite to give the reader a vision of the historical destiny of this country and its message to the world.

The report's essential contribution to economic literature is that it presents the economy of the American people in broad historical perspective. It shows the people of the United States in their struggle first to survive, and later to improve their conditions of life in accordance not only with their steadily rising demands but also with their concepts of decency and justice. Free from dogmatism and pedantry, the authors look backward chiefly to gain a better insight into the present and the future, strongly emphasizing the human rather than technical aspect of economic progress.

The report consists of two equal parts: first, how the American economy achieves a high level of productivity and consumption and second, the problems and prospects of the American economy. The second part presents our current socio-economic problems as aspects of the historical process. The following passage, which concludes Part I, illustrates the authors' interpretation of the socio-economic system of the United States:

"Social, cultural, political and religious factors indigenous to the United States have shaped the development and use of economic resources, the willingness to accept change and technological innovation, and the role of government in economic process. They made up a large and essential part of what might be called 'the spirit' which animates the economy of the American people. And it is this spirit which has enabled the American economy to preserve its distinctive dynamism, flexi-

bility, and large measure of distributive justice despite the strongly centralizing and authoritarian pressures of our times. Beyond the more tangible economic factors . . . the characteristic values and institutions of American society have been crucial factors in creating the high productivity of the American economy. Their persistence inspires our confidence that a rise in productivity will continue over the coming years and that the economic and social problems of the next decade will be tackled in a creative and democratic fashion" (p. 74).

This reviewer does not agree with the authors at all points. He would not use, for example, the number of building units per 1000 inhabitants as an index of prosperity (pp. 16-17). He would put more emphasis on the orientation of our agriculture toward obtaining the maximum yield per worker rather than yield per acre, the objective in many other countries. He would be more critical of the advantages of United States investments abroad. These are minor details, however, and the authors' point of view is defensible even when it differs from that of the reviewer.

It is difficult to predict to what extent this report will serve its immediate purpose of explaining our system to people in other countries, but I believe it should be on the "must" list of all United States libraries and information centers abroad, and that it deserves broad circulation in foreign languages.

Much more important, however, is its contribution to better understanding of our economy by the American people themselves. Because of its combination of high scientific standards and rare lucidity of presentation, this report can be used widely as reading material in both colleges and high schools. It should be particularly helpful to government officials, educators, and journalists who, in the course of their professional activities, are inclined to use the cliché portraying the United States as a champion of the capitalist system and a defender of the latter's purity against the widespread "socialist" heresy characteristic of modern times throughout the world.

W. S. WOYTINSKY

Washington, D. C.

JACOB VINER. *The Long View and the Short: Studies in Economic Theory and Policy*. Pp. vi, 462. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. No price.

This book of essays, articles, reviews, and addresses of Jacob Viner has been published as a token of gratitude and affection by a group of his students and friends on the occasion of the author's sixty-fifth birthday. At present Professor of Economics at Princeton University, Jacob Viner has long contributed in many ways to the advancement of his craft. In a critical period of economic and social malaise, when the measured and reasoned application of man's knowledge to many problems has been sorely needed, Viner has made available his scholarly talents in various ways. In the thirties Viner assisted the United States government in the Treasury Department, in the State Department, and at the League of Nations. As a leader in his field, he has taught, developed, and modified the principles and standards passed down by the classical economists. As visiting professor to universities in Europe and the Americas, he has faithfully but critically interpreted these principles and standards and also made clear the limited achievements of economic science.

Professor Viner, whose main fields have been price and allocation theory, international economics, and the history of economic thought, has been a prolific writer in these areas as well as in the area of economic policy. His many books include *Canada's Balance of International Indebtedness* (1924); *Studies in the Theory of International Trade* (1937); and *International Economics* (1951). His multitudinous articles written since 1917 cover a wide range of subjects.

In *The Long View and the Short*, many of his most telling essays and addresses on economic theory and policy and the history of economic thought are made available. In addition the volume contains some of his more perceptive reviews, including one on Keynes's *General Theory*. To fill out their sample of Viner's over-all contribution, the book's editors have tastefully included a witty, provocative, and insightful address—"A Modest Proposal for Some Stress on Scholarship in Graduate

Training"—delivered before the Graduate Convocation of Brown University in June 1950.

It is impossible in a review of this length to get across the full flavor of Viner's many talents as reflected in this book's selections. These essays deal with a wide range of topics such as price policy, ethics and economics, methodology, taxation, costs, government and business, as well as the economic thought of Smith, Mill, Marshall, Keynes, Schumpeter, and others. There is throughout a seriousness of purpose, a keen sense of professional responsibility, as well as an intellectual perceptiveness—hallmarks of the scientist. One example of Viner's qualities is reflected in "Full Employment at Whatever Cost," a critical review of a United Nations report by a group of distinguished economists on national and international measures for full employment. Viner subjects the report's analysis to the inexorable tests of fact and logic. He assesses clearly all the economic costs—including inflation—of full employment, bringing to bear both the lessons of the classical heritage and the accepted principles of contemporary nonclassical economics. He claims for his craft its full due, but no more, and expects his confreres to avoid unwarranted pretensions. To leave one's mark in this way is in the best tradition of scholarship.

CHARLES HOFFMANN

Department of Economics
Queens College

JOHN V. KRUTILLA and OTTO ECKSTEIN.
Multiple Purpose River Development: Studies in Applied Economic Analysis. Pp. xiv, 301. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press for Resources for the Future, Inc., 1958. \$4.50.

The authors of this monograph attempt to provide a meaningful framework for the economic analysis of river system development. In the first part of the book, which consists of four sections and runs over 130 pages, they try to sketch such a framework; and in Part II, consisting of five sections covering another 140 pages, apply the framework to the analysis of three actual cases—The Hells Canyon case: Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Ap-

proaches to Development; The Alabama-Coosa River System: Integrated System Development by a Single Licensee; The Willamette River Case: Analysis of Distribution of Costs and Gains. The last section indicates certain conclusions and policy implications of the preceding analysis.

In the economic analysis of water resources development projects, the use of the benefit-cost ratio has been common and considerable discussion has centered around the question of evolving uniform practices for the evaluation of costs and benefits of such projects. The 1950 Report of the Federal Inter Agency Committee was a notable contribution to the field. By and large, however, the practices recommended by the Report take into account market and/or monetary valuations of costs and benefits. In regard to costs, particularly, there is little attempt to measure the opportunity or social costs of a project, or alternatively to treat them as identical with market or monetary costs. This is highly unsatisfactory and it is here that the authors of this book break new ground by proposing and working out a method of estimating the opportunity or social costs of water resources development projects.

Since the social cost of the capital invested in such projects cannot be estimated by the interest rate prevailing in the money market, it is necessary to derive this cost by a more complicated procedure. Starting with the fact that the capital for investment into federal projects will be raised partly by borrowing and partly by taxation, the authors proceed to calculate the social cost of funds raised by either of these methods. The social cost of capital raised from foregone investment is equal to the foregone rate of return on private investment. In the case of money raised through taxation, the assumption is made that this may be treated for the purposes of analysis as a compulsory loan for the sake of future benefits. The social cost of this investment is equal to the interest rate which the government will have to offer to the taxed individuals to induce them to grant the loan voluntarily. From these assumptions is derived the value of marginal income in terms of a future

stream which can be expressed as an interest rate. Applying this analysis to the United States in careful detail, the authors calculate that an interest rate of five to six per cent per annum would measure the social cost of capital investment in the United States in 1955 as against the prevailing market rate of two and one-half per cent on Government bonds. This calculation involves the careful search for the income brackets from which either the voluntary loans or taxes (compulsory loans) would have been drawn, the uses to which this money would have been put had it not been so diverted, and the stream of future income it would then have yielded.

Applying this analysis to the three actual cases listed above, the authors show that the benefit-cost ratio for alternative proposals for the same project differs from the usual calculations when calculated on the basis of this rate, and that the choice between different proposals for the same project can be made more correctly on the basis of the incremental benefit-cost ratio. In order to establish the superiority of a particular plan for a project over many other plans, however, not only its incremental benefit-cost ratio but the total benefit-cost ratio must be more favorable.

The authors are particularly careful in noting and emphasizing the limitations of their analytical framework. Their estimates as presented in the book, they point out, relate to a particular set of economic conditions. "Our estimate of opportunity costs is not relevant as an investment criterion when there is generalized unemployment and idle industrial capacity as was characteristic of the depression of the thirties" (p. 274). This is also true in conditions of underemployment prevalent in the underdeveloped agricultural areas in the world today.

The authors have done a fine job and have broken some new ground in their field. In presenting their analysis, however, they have spun out many things rather unnecessarily. Their most valuable ideas and analyses could be presented succinctly, and perhaps to better advantage, in less than one-third of the length of this book. One wonders whether this is the

result of the desire of the authors to make the book suitable as working material for the first year graduate students in applied economics. A very large portion of the first part has been occupied by the statement of elementary economic theory.

N. V. SOVANI

Joint Director
Gokhule Institute of Politics and
Economics
Poona, India

PAUL EINZIG. *The Economic Consequences of Automation.* Pp. 255. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1957. \$3.95.

The Economic Consequences of Automation is an ambitious title, but it assuredly covers a subject much in need of clear and knowledgeable analysis. Einzig does an effective job of pointing out the many problems that automation raises for conventional economic theory and also broaches the subject of what automation means to everyday economic life. Both of these are difficult tasks. Facts on the economic consequences of automation are virtually non-existent, and conclusions drawn on the basis of existing theory are subject to the limitation that Einzig himself implies—that automation may require new theoretical concepts.

In spite of these obstacles, Einzig presents one of the most sensible works that has yet come out on this subject. The lack of any real facts has not prevented the publication of a great many other works speculating on their consequences. The chief contribution of this volume is twofold: it presents, in a form easy to understand, some of the economic considerations involved in automation; and it indicates the need for a great deal more work on the subject, both in the field of theory and of factual information.

Einzig suggests that perhaps automation requires the revision of some long-standing economic theories, but this he leaves to other men at other times, making his analysis on the basis of existing theory. In brief, he adopts the view that there are possible dangers in too rapid an advent of automation. Automation, he feels, should not come so fast as to reduce aggregate national costs of production (national in-

come). He also points out that if the period of automation is not free of business cycles, at least of their downward phases, then serious problems will be encountered. In addition, the proceeds of automation must be properly distributed among labor and consumers to maintain purchasing power, and among investors to assure sufficient investment funds. The unemployment resulting from technological change must be dealt with through social measures. All this seems to imply that automation can bring serious problems unless it is carried out under rather ideal conditions. Achievement of such an ideal atmosphere would require forbearance on the part of labor and management, and brilliance on the part of government. A reasonable inference, then, is that automation will bring serious problems, for it is highly unlikely that such ideal conditions will exist.

My only comment on this is that we must also consider whether we are not applying automation too slowly, rather than too quickly. But this fear arises primarily from social and political factors rather than purely economic ones. It in itself would not, therefore, detract from the validity of any of Einzig's points. I do feel, though, that the lack of factual material on automation and its effects is a major obstacle to valid conclusions, and I personally would hesitate to draw any until more facts were known.

Einzig does mention some economic points that are often overlooked, and this is very gratifying. He is aware of the dangers of inflation, even of the creeping variety, although at the same time he recommends an inflationary bias on the part of government. He recognizes the need for savings in order to produce investment, and he has the courage to label excess wage demands and "overemployment" as creators of inflation and inefficiency.

On the other hand, he adopts the boom philosophy that serious recessions are of the past, mainly because he fears the results of the accelerating effects of the bankruptcy of non-automated firms in a downturn. He concentrates on production increases in the automated industries and

gives less attention to the concomitant growth of the non-automated service industries. He feels that the degree of automation in the economy will not affect the applicable principles. A sufficient difference in degree can, however, become a difference in kind, and many of the conclusions concerning depression under automation, raw material scarcities, wage differences, and foreign trade must be tempered by a realistic conception of the portion of the economy which is really automated.

All these questions, and many others, require additional study. As an introductory work that has sensibly investigated some of these matters, this book is most valuable.

JOHN DIEBOLD

New York City

P. INMAN. *Labour in the Munitions Industries: History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Series*. (War Production Series.) Pp. xv, 461. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office and Longmans, Green and Company, 1957. (Distributed by British Information Services.) \$6.53.

During World War II, Britain mobilized twenty-two million workers to a proportional employment peak reached by no other belligerent. By 1943 total employment had expanded by more than three and one-half million with the munitions industries accounting for an increase of close to two million. Such manpower reallocation produces strains and problems in any economy. That it was accomplished successfully with Hitler rampaging through Europe, with the air attack increasing in scope, and without the use of the government's nearly absolute powers over labor allocation is an achievement worth remembering and studying.

The problems Britain encountered in this staggering task of labor reallocation are described in two volumes in the series on civil histories of World War II. The first of these, *Manpower*, by H. M. D. Parker, deals with mobilization and over-all labor allocation; the second, reviewed here, deals with the use of manpower in industries

under the direction of the British ministries of war supplies.

The book is divided into two parts. The first deals with problems connected with and the methods used to increase the labor force in the munitions industry while the second deals with the utilization of labor, welfare arrangements, absenteeism, turnover, and so forth. Wages, industrial relations, and the establishment of joint production committees are also discussed.

Administrative arrangements, the division of responsibility among the interested departments and ministries, the directives to employers, and the discussions with the union are all reported with care and clarity. The book will probably put an end to belated discussion of administrative jurisdiction—if British civil servants, like ours, indulge in such pastimes—by the clarity with which it traces and documents the development of all governmental policies in this area.

Few, if any, considerations of a broader or theoretical nature of interest to other than public administration specialists can be drawn from the Inman study. One may note that the solution to allocation and utilization problems, or the problems themselves, changed as increasing sectors of the economy were engaged in war production. Manning the munitions industries called at first for judicious locational considerations in the granting of government contracts in order to dry up pockets of unemployment. Later it called for training programs, and the use of employment exchanges to ration labor rather than to distribute employment, the exchange's more usual function. Job "dilution," which included "deskilling"—changes in job content—and upgrading—changes in the evaluation of workers' qualifications—took place throughout and was specifically encouraged.

Of interest, and not necessarily a priori predictable, was the crucial shortage of unskilled labor in 1943, a shortage which appeared in all the munitions industry, while skilled and technical labor requirements were fulfilled.

The relative regional and inter-industry wage stability, at least in terms of average earnings, in the midst of shifting production priority and considerable labor move-

ment provides useful material to those noting the essential stability of wage structures.

OSCAR ORNATI

Associate Professor
Graduate Faculty of Political and
Social Science
New School for Social Research

The National Economic Accounts of the United States: Review, Appraisal, and Recommendations. A Report by the National Accounts Review Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research. (General Series 64.) Pp. 202. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1958. 65 cents.

The National Accounts Review Committee's discussion of the general advisability of integrating the five national economic accounts, while probably not the final word on the problem, has provided a clear and concise delineation of the issue. In its report to the Bureau of the Budget—subsequently incorporated into the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economic Statistics—the Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research has presented the rationale of an integrated national accounting system, together with the means of implementation. In commenting upon the five national economic accounts—Balance of Payments Statements, Flow-of-Funds Accounts, Input-Output Tables, National Balance Sheet, and the National Income and Product Accounts—the committee has plunged itself into an area fraught with controversy. The result is an ably presented case for the integrationist viewpoint as opposed to the self-contained nonintegrated reports of several federal agencies which are employed at present.

Where the presentation of the National Income and Product Accounts is concerned, the reader will undoubtedly note the similarity to the work done in this field by Richard and Nancy Ruggles. This is not surprising since the former is a member of the committee. But in addition to providing specific recommendations not previously included in the Ruggles' work, the committee goes further in presenting a detailed analysis of the differences between its proposed system and that of the De-

partment of Commerce. This report will certainly accomplish for the proposed "transactions" presentation of the Income and Product Accounts what John Powelson had previously done for the Commerce Department's "transactors" version.

The committee also discusses and presents recommendations on other problems which beset the national income accountant: the questions of inclusions and exclusions, the "grossness" of the accounts, and the important issue of price-level adjustments. It is noteworthy that the findings are not limited to the theoretical aspects of the accounts themselves, but also include recommendations on the means of carrying out the proposals. A discussion of the costs, timing, and order of priority of the recommendations is also presented. In all, the reader could not ask for a more complete presentation of the case for an integrated and functional system of national economic accounts.

HENRY R. JAENICKE

Instructor in Economics and Accounting
University of Pennsylvania

ASIA AND AFRICA

NORTON GINSBURG (Ed.), *The Pattern of Asia*. Pp. xiv, 929. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1958. \$11.65.

The continent of Asia is in no sense a unit. The traditional European boundary along the Ural Mountains does not correspond with any Russian administrative boundary, so it is not even possible to calculate the total area. The continent is in fact a collection of subcontinents or "realms," divided from one another by great mountain chains or vast desert waste scarcely traversed even yet by rail or road. They turn their backs on one another and face their respective seas. It is scarcely surprising that the Bibliography lists only three books in English which venture to deal with the geography of this huge heterogeneity in one volume—one-third of the earth's land surface, with two-thirds of the earth's people.

This is a truly collaborative work. We

are not told which of the authors is responsible for the different sections or chapters, except that Dr. Philbrick prepared the maps. These are mostly new; half essay the difficult task of showing major land-use associations, others deal with such neglected subjects as language grouping.

The first chapter covers the physical background of the continent as a whole, the second the pattern of Asian Asia, the remaining thirty-seven take up in order East Asia (Japan, Korea, China), Southeast, South (Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Ceylon), Southwest, and Soviet Asia. Each chapter comprises a text which reads smoothly and easily, an occasional footnote, carefully selected and fully captioned photographs, and a brief annotated Bibliography. Authors and editor accept collective responsibility for the whole, and the result is a remarkably well balanced work which avoids the bias which mars so many writings on Asia. While it is often possible to detect which of the authors quoted in the Bibliography is being followed, descriptions are objective in the best sense of the word. The reasons for the economic difficulties of Burma, the Kashmir dispute, the partition problems of the Punjab, and the position of Israel are all described with scrupulous impartiality. For this reason, if for no other, the book deserves to be widely used by all who are concerned with international affairs. Taiwan, curiously, is not treated separately; Hong Kong, unique in so many ways, is dismissed in 18 lines; the index does not list either the ancient cultural outpost of Macau or the modern one of Okinawa.

Errors are commendably few. The *doyen* of American investigators into Chinese geology and geography, G. B. Barbour, is listed as Harbour (p. 237). Geologists will rightly protest at some loose phraseology such as "alluvial" on map 26. When little Malaya produces a third of the world's tin it is strange to read "mineral resources are limited but not insignificant." But these are minor blemishes in a work of great merit.

L. DUDLEY STAMP

President

The London School of Economics and
Political Science

GWENDOLEN M. CARTER. *The Politics of Inequality: South Africa Since 1948*. Pp. 535. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. \$7.50.

Dr. Carter has written what is in some important respects a pioneer study of the South African political system. In it there is much well documented and valuable information assembled by careful enquiry and patient research about the aims, the membership, and the organization of political parties in the Union with the particular purpose of illuminating the causes and consequences of the Nationalist victory in the 1953 general election.

The book opens with a brief historical review—curiously neglectful of industrial developments under the Smuts wartime government—followed first by an account of the Nationalist's legislative program as enacted since 1948, illuminated by contemporary comment, principally parliamentary and press; and then by one of their electoral success in 1953. This is followed in its turn by two long sections on the organization of the various political parties in which account is taken of the mostly amorphous non-European groupings. These chapters form the hard core of the book, and students of South African politics will find them indispensable. In them Dr. Carter has sought to expose both the mechanism through which South African political opinions find expression and the sources and relative strength of those opinions. She treats of the former more satisfyingly than the latter and of the opposition more tellingly and fully than the nationalist parties, the seemingly ephemeral Torch Commando receiving surely disproportionate attention. The use of Afrikaans as well as English documentation adds much to the usefulness of this analysis and of the book as a whole; in respect of public opinion, however, Dr. Carter's reliance upon the press, the derivative character of much of whose views is made plain in the opening chapter, would seem excessive.

Dr. Carter's book, for all its substantial virtues, does not wholly fulfil the promise of an exciting title. There is little in it by way of theoretic analysis of concepts of inequality over against, for example, nations of differential development as ex-

pounded by some intellectual exponents of apartheid. Yet theoretical issues lie close to the surface and "the winnowing of the chaff of nomenclature" is something that badly needs to be done. However Dr. Carter thought it best to let the facts speak for themselves and though there are certain assumptions implicit throughout she is markedly reserved in judgment and interpretation. As a result her book, an excellent chapter on foreign reactions to South Africa's racial politics notably excepted, acquires at times something of the impersonal character of a compilation. South African politics are, of course, treacherous ground even for a foreigner able "to move from to group to group as no South African can do" and caution in analysis, deduction and conclusion is certainly much to be preferred to easy generalization. But I for one would gladly have sacrificed some of the statistical and other information for a little more of the fruits of the thought and observation of so experienced a political scientist—the more so since some of the information leaves one little the wiser. But perhaps this is ungrateful comment prompted only by the thought that the author has allowed herself at times to be dominated by her material.

NORMAN MANSERGH

Professor of the History of the British
Commonwealth
St. John's College
University of Cambridge

ROBERT AURA SMITH. *Philippine Freedom 1946-1958*. Pp. vii, 375. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. \$5.00.

The title of the opening chapter of this timely, readable book is "What Makes Men Free?" The author does not attempt within the compass of a few pages to furnish a complete answer to this immensely complicated question, but in discussing it he draws some noteworthy distinctions between political independence and the essence of human liberty.

The banner of freedom has been raised all over the world—Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Indochina, Ghana, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq. Domination by foreign powers in many places has been completely

liquidated and a high degree of national self-determination has emerged. At the same time there has been a progressive loss of freedom in such states as Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Other places have nominal sovereignty but are not truly independent. The conclusion is reached that political structure alone does not resolve the problem of what makes men free.

We are reminded that the most widely quoted answer to this recurring question is the one given by Jesus: "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." Freedom was thus wisely taken out of the field of politics and into the field of morals where it correctly and ultimately belongs.

In the Philippines there never was any confusion in the use of terms. Filipinos in their dealings with the United States did not cry for freedom but for *independencia*. They knew or felt that there have been many nominally autonomous governments like Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union where political independence has not meant freedom; that, on the other hand, in politically nonindependent areas like Canada prior to 1931 and the Philippines during the Commonwealth there existed human freedom in all of its essential aspects without technical national sovereignty. After liberation from Spanish rule, Filipinos enjoyed all the basic human and natural rights without having self-determined statehood. The road to freedom for them was relatively direct and it was easily traveled. The road to political independence was much more devious.

The footsteps along the devious road are traced by Smith with thoroughness and understanding. Making no pretensions to the scholarly analysis present in more exhaustive treatises on the Philippines, he relates the principal events in the long negotiation for political independence, giving recognition to heroic personalities in the movement, among them Quezon, Osmena, Roxas, Romulo and outstanding Americans like Taft, Davis, Wood, Murphy and MacArthur.

The agonies of the first free elections; the economic vicissitudes of a postwar "binge" economy accompanied by the pros-

pective loss of the advantages of favorable trade relations with the United States in money crops like sugar, copra, and abaca; the threat of Communism in what was imagined to be a potential power vacuum; and the entry of the newest country into a position of leadership in politically turbulent Southeast Asia—all have been and continue to be ordeals by fire through which the strength and endurance of the Philippines have been and will be tried.

Often called the showcase of democracy in the Far East, the ten-year-old Republic has shown, in the ebb and flow of national tides, the most complete change of status of our time. It must be viewed with admiration by an otherwise dangerously disturbed world; despite its many and continuing political and economic problems, it is a source of considerable pride to the American people who have been its sponsors.

Since both freedom and the Philippines are high on the list of American attachments, Smith's book is of double interest to readers. This reviewer must add a word of special commendation for an Appendix which includes in one convenient place the full texts of the organic law of the Philippine Islands known as the Jones Act of 1916; the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 providing for Philippine independence; the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; and the Philippine Trade Agreement Revision Act of 1955.

ERNEST SCHEIN

Washington, D. C.

MARVER H. BERNSTEIN. *The Politics of Israel: The First Decade of Statehood*. Pp. xiv, 360. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. \$6.00.

I have only one adverse comment to make on Professor Bernstein's book, and this I shall get off my chest immediately. As a disbeliever in the tenets of Zionism, I must confess a little irritation with his essentially one-sided and over simplified treatment of "the foundations" of Israel's statehood (chap. I), and with some of his references elsewhere in the book to both Palestinian and other Arabs. Let me hasten to add, however, that this book is far from being a Zionist tract or a polemic

against the Arabs. Rather it is a careful and workmanlike—I would even say scholarly—study of the internal functioning of the Israeli state in the ten years since statehood was achieved. The most that Mr. Bernstein can be accused of in the way of bias is a basic and largely unarticulated sympathy for Zionist and Israeli points of view.

On the whole, he sticks very closely, and it seems to me very effectively, to his chosen last—that is, he eschews debate about Israel's founding, its relations with neighbors, and its place in the international scheme of things in favor of careful and by no means uncritical examination of such matters as the following: the new state's constitutional development; its multiparty politics and electoral processes; the composition and operation of its one house legislature, the Knesset; its courts, cabinet system, and presidency; public administration and the civil service; the struggle for economic independence and development planning; the budgeting process; the office of the state comptroller—to which Mr. Bernstein was attached as a consultant in 1953 and 1955; problems of local government; and governmental performance in such fields as education, public health work, housing, social security administration, and unemployment relief. Included in the text and in an Appendix of several pages are a total of 33 tables which in most cases are very useful supplements to Professor Bernstein's narrative analyses.

It is, in other words, a comprehensive book and in my opinion a very good and useful one based on careful research and observation, well written, well organized, and readable and quite objective so far as Israel's internal affairs are concerned. Mr. Bernstein is especially—and convincingly—critical of the progress so far made in the fields of public administration, civil service, comprehensive economic planning, and local government. I was, incidentally, struck and somewhat surprised by the number of apparent similarities between some of Israel's difficulties in areas such as these and problems I observed in Pakistan last year during a tour of duty as a consultant to the Pakistan Planning Board. This reinforces my belief that there should be

more books like Professor Bernstein's dealing with the newer governments of the world. He has made a valuable contribution to the literature of comparative government, politics, and administration.

PAUL L. BECKETT

Professor of Political Science
State College of Washington

PHILLIPS TALBOT AND S. L. POPLAI. *India and America: A Study of Their Relations*. Pp. xviii, 200. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$3.75.

When the cable was laid between England and India, John Ruskin is supposed to have asked, "But what does England have to say to India?" England and Western civilization have had their say in India. Western science and technology, business and law have transformed the subcontinent. Now the question for Americans is this: What is India saying to the West?

To unscramble the messages flowing between India and America, two private organizations—the Indian Council of World Affairs, of New Delhi, and the Council on Foreign Relations, of New York—undertook a joint study of the relations between the two countries. From each side fifteen or more men formed study groups and prepared, exchanged, and commented upon papers that critically examined the major aspects of the world policy of both countries. With the help of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations and the Carnegie Corporation a number of these men were able to meet for a prolonged international discussion. Phillips Talbot, executive director of the American Universities Field Staff, and S. L. Poplai, secretary-general of the Indian Council of World Affairs, were chosen to prepare a book describing this two-year international dialogue.

A book growing out of, and subject to the review and approval of, two committees from two countries might be expected to be dull and lifeless. Probably the quality of the participants helped prevent this: men such as E. P. W. da Costa, Asoka Mehta, and V. K. R. V. Rao; Arthur Dean, Chester Bowles, and Max Millikan. Perhaps the vitality, significance, and sharpness of the issues in dispute between the two countries

cut through any tendency toward blurring generalities.

Most striking and important are the two views of the world presented with painstaking accuracy and documentation in the context of the disagreements over Korea, Indo-China, Pakistan, Kashmir, Communist China, Suez, Hungary, Algeria, and Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development. The parallels between the attitudes of India toward Pakistan and America toward Russia emerge almost as lessons in the nature of the genus cold war. The black-and-white view of each country in its struggle with its adversary may be put in better perspective by the criticism offered by the relatively neutral view of the other. This book presents India's views on America's cold war policies, America's views on India's intransigence in Kashmir and elsewhere, and the defense by each of its policies in their clearest and most convincing form. Although much of the ground is familiar the dialectical manner of presentation is instructive. And through it all comes a sense that these are two views of one world and that they comprise the kind of friction that could make co-existence fruitful.

The venture was successful enough to make one wish that such a group of Americans and Russians could now be persuaded and enabled to try to make a similar study of the relations between the two great adversaries.

HARRIS WOFFORD, JR.

Washington, D. C.

S. C. DUBE. *India's Changing Villages: Human Factors in Community Development*. Pp. xii, 230. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958. \$3.50.

This useful book is a sympathetic but open-eyed criticism of an early Community Development Project Block, one of hundreds hastily established throughout rural India over the past six years. The development block whose beginnings are here criticized is in Saharanpur District, western Uttar Pradesh, famed as one of the richest and most progressive areas of northern India. Despite the favorable setting and a large budget, achievements at Saharanpur in agriculture and public

works were initially disappointing. The author attributes this to contradictions within the authoritarian administrative system, as yet unadapted to its new democratic professions. Most early benefits of the project were restricted to a small rural elite group; popular co-operation often served motives not of patriotism and philanthropy, but of prestige-seeking, cupidity, or fear; and some of the ordained "improvements" in rural life appeared on examination to constitute doubtful blessings, if not simple sham.

Professor Dube writes as an independent observer and anthropologist. He made intensive studies of two of the 153 Saharanpur project area villages during 1954, which was the second year of the project's life. He knows his villagers well, and his detailed case reports on dilemmas of the hard-pressed village level worker are the finest parts of the book.

Are such criticisms unknown to the authorities who plan India's rural development? Skimpy documentation in this book obscures the fact that Professor Dube's terms of criticism are themselves mostly derived from government publications, circulars, and officials' small talk. Would these same criticisms—an elite bias, wrong motives, unwanted improvements, and authoritarian methods—be applicable today, or have they been transcended? Can wrong means nevertheless lead to the desired end—a peasantry awakened to responsibility for its own progress? It would be well if Professor Dube could himself return for a second look and for answers to these questions. Partial answers can be found now if the present book, good in the short run and strong on village perspective, is read together with *Pilot Project, India*, a review of eight years of rural development work as seen by one of the principal planners, Albert Mayer.

The publisher's little deception to the contrary notwithstanding, *India's Changing Villages* says very little about any changes in village life, does not deal generally with India's villages, and has no connection with the author's previous *Indian Village* study in Hyderabad.

McKIM MARRIOTT

University of Chicago

SRI RAM SHARMA. *Some Aspects of the Indian Administrative System*. Pp. viii, 160. Sholapur: Institute of Public Administration, 1957. \$3.00.

Professor Sharma, an educator and administrator, continues his political research in the present volume, which covers much more than "some" aspects of modern government in India. In a small space, he introduces and comments on the condensed texts of three reports on government written since Indian independence. The first is the 1951 report of A. D. Gorwala on the central government's personnel and related policies. Professor Paul Appleby's two reports to the Indian government almost monopolize the author's comment. A short report on "The Institutional Framework of Indian Finance," made for UNESCO by Ursula Hicks, a British expert, is included.

The author implies that the Appleby reports have influenced Prime Minister Nehru and the Indian public more than other such reports published since 1947. The Gorwala Report, written by a member of the old Indian Civil Service, was not as influential, says Professor Sharma, because it deals too trenchantly with employee relations to the Union ministers.

The author sometimes uses British sources, which are respected in India, to counter American administrator Appleby's suggestions.

The Appleby emphasis on the need to reduce the Comptroller and Auditor General's power leads the author to say that "Professor Appleby leads a dangerous crusade," in view of the casualness of accounting by field workers.

Appleby also suggests that the commission which recruits government workers should send five names instead of one to the department heads who could then pick the most appropriate candidate. Though Professor Sharma approves of other innovations, he fears that this one would develop a spoils system which most Indians believe to be rampant in America.

In these two cases there is regard for controls which may still be necessary in the Indian context. This "colonial" attitude may continue to curb democracy for

urban elites. Just as important, in the case of the Auditor General and other control offices, it would centralize and probably paralyze the rapid decision-making which Indians agree is necessary to economic development.

It would be interesting to have further collections of reports from other sources, for instance the 1949 report of N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Minister of Defense, which affected methods, economic functions, and central cabinet committees. The government and outsiders have made several evaluation reports on the progress of the Five Year Plans and Community Development Projects. However, the present book of compilation and criticism will prove useful to administrators, comparative government specialists, and not least to students of cross-cultural administration.

T. J. LEONARD

Local Government Research
Political Science Department
University of Minnesota

JOSEPH BUTTINGER. *The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam*. Pp. 535. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. \$6.00.

Although certain aspects of Vietnamese history have been published in a few books written in the Vietnamese and French languages, this political history of Vietnam is unique in that it is the first book on Vietnamese history to appear for the English reading world.

Furthermore, notwithstanding the value of two other recent books on Vietnamese history—*Le Viet-Nam histoire et civilisation* by Le Thanh Khoi and *La geste française en Indochine* by George Taboulet—*The Smaller Dragon* is unique because of the fresh documentary information taken from French Government files which were kept secret until late 1955. Political science students of this country will be gratified to find an extensive addendum of annotated quotations from numerous foreign language—French and Vietnamese—publications, not to mention the extensive critical Bibliography dealing with Vietnam.

It was the purpose of the author to write

a history which would "not only be a useful book for the student and scholar, but also one that would hold the attention of people who are interested in Vietnam for purely political reasons." The professor, the student in the classroom, or the average citizen who desires to understand the significance of a divided and troubled Vietnam in current international affairs will find this study valuable. The account covers more than two thousand years of Vietnamese history, with particular treatment of how Vietnam has been a bulwark against Chinese penetration into and conquest of Southeast Asia for hundreds of years during the pre-colonial period.

Now that Vietnam has become a divided nation, will she—after a millenium of independence from China—be able to survive and lead her own life, or will she become a satellite of the gigantic neighbor to the north? In order to answer this question, so vital for the future of Southeast Asia, the present study provides insight into the forces which shaped Vietnam's mentality and gives a knowledge of the circumstances which enabled the Vietnamese to survive and avoid absorption into the Chinese empire.

CECIL HOBBS

Head, South Asia Section
Library of Congress

BENJAMIN HIGGINS. *Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and Development*. Pp. xxii, 179. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1957. \$4.00.

Professor Higgins' participation in Indonesian economic policy formulation—he arrived in Djakarta in July 1952 under United Nations auspices to serve as fiscal and monetary adviser to the Indonesian government—as well as his work as Director of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Indonesia Project has led to widespread anticipation of this study.

Indonesian economic policies following 1951 are analyzed in terms of the short-run problem of stabilization and the long-run problem of economic development. The survey of stabilization policies is concise and discriminating; the appraisal of these policies is less successful, as brevity in-

volves the author in conclusions which need extended analysis. However, the reader will appreciate the tasks confronting Indonesian economic policy makers and, given the priority assigned to national political integration, will concur in the author's endorsement of Indonesia's stabilization efforts.

The remaining two-thirds of the study surveys and appraises Indonesian economic development policies and prospects. Indonesia currently plans to increase net investment from "not less than 5 per cent of national income" in 1955 to 8 per cent in 1960 and through successive five-year plans to 20 per cent in 1975, at which time national income will be increasing 5 per cent per year or 3 per cent per capita. Such results follow mechanically from assumptions regarding the incremental capital-output ratio and the marginal rate of savings combined with estimated population growth.

Higgins is critical of both the details of Indonesian planning of projects and priorities and the adequacy of planned investment. He suggests that "if the Indonesian government were to adopt a five-year development plan big enough in scope to launch and maintain a process of steady economic growth" it would require net investment approximately double that scheduled by the Planning Bureau. Indonesian planning is criticized because "only 40 per cent of the expected small increase (1.3%) in per capita income is to be recaptured for future investment, and 60 per cent is to be made available for higher consumption." It is difficult to agree that planning is inadequate which envisages a marginal rate of saving of forty per cent by a society currently saving only five per cent. Such a marginal rate of savings would be a remarkable achievement and—if sustained—should result in rewarding economic expansion.

Higgins' estimate of Indonesian capital requirements leads him to advocate for Indonesia policies which would result in an inflow of foreign investment, public loans, and grants equivalent to one-third of the estimated annual net investment requirements. Given the nature of Indonesian nationalism, it is questionable if policies

necessary to such an inflow of foreign capital would contribute to Indonesian stability or economic development. More persuasive, is the attitude of the Planning Bureau toward outside participation in Indonesian economic development: "The twenty-year period may be shortened, and the sacrifices and efforts of the present generation reduced, if outside help in realizing the Plan can be obtained. But it will be a more responsible attitude not to base hopes on such outside help. Foreign aid—if it comes—will do no harm, but it is better regarded as a supplement to Indonesia's own resources."

FRANK H. GOLAY

Associate Professor of Economics and
Far Eastern Studies
Cornell University

JOHN D. LEGGE. *Problems of Regional Autonomy in Contemporary Indonesia*. (Interim Reports Series, Modern Indonesia Project.) Pp. viii, 71. Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1957. \$1.50.

It is useful at this particular time to have at hand Dr. Legge's study, and it is very appropriate that it should appear in the form of an interim report. The problem is both topical and unresolved.

The monograph is brief and concise. As Professor Kahin notes in his Preface, the approach is historical and functional, complementing an earlier interim report in the Cornell series by Gerald Maryanov which dealt with legal aspects of the same topic.

Dr. Legge opens with a few pages of introductory remarks, followed by the main body of the study consisting of four chapters on "Basic Legislation for the Provincial Period"; "The Period of Transition: Formal Arrangements, 1950-56"; "The Transitional System in Operation, 1956"; and "The New Basic Law." He concludes the discussion with a chapter on "Provincial Autonomy and Regional Feeling." To specialists in constitutional law and administrative organization, the central four chapters will undoubtedly make most interesting reading, effectively bringing into focus the issues involved. To readers from

other fields, the present reviewer included, it is the opening and concluding pages which will, I think, prove most useful.

Legge suggests that the constitutional architects of an independent Indonesia face a two-fold task: they must secure government in general, but at the same time they must adjust to "the facts of broad regional resistance to the center and of the fears of Javanese predominance within the unitary state" (p. 63). Some form of federal arrangement would seem appropriate at first glance. The country consists of some three thousand islands—of which perhaps a score are of any importance at all—spread over an ocean area larger than the United States and with a combined land area of almost three quarters of a million square miles. The major islands differ from one another in economic structure and in the language, culture, and, to a certain extent, the religion of their residents. The national motto has a federalist flavor: *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, or "Unity in Diversity," a rough equivalent of our *E Pluribus Unum*. On closer scrutiny, however, a federal solution appears difficult to achieve. The superficial reason is that federalism as a political solution is associated in the minds of Indonesians with the opportunistic and futile last-ditch efforts of the Dutch to head off full Indonesian independence through their sponsorship of a federal arrangement for the archipelago. But the fundamental reason lies deeper. "In general the core of the problem lies in the difficulty of determining which units in Indonesia have genuine substance" (p. 61). Dr. Legge points out that "outside the cities, the effective political and social units, based on traditional groupings, are usually very small in area and population, extending barely beyond the village or complex of villages" (p. 2).

Given this situation, how have the Indonesians created effective units of government at a level between the village and the nation? The answer is that they haven't. That is what the recent troubles have been about. The regional resistance to the center was strong enough to lead the dissidents in Sumatra to declare their own government—for all of Indonesia! But loyalties within Sumatra itself were too generally

limited to village or local area to permit of effective Sumatran military effort.

Dr. Legge does not claim to be an economist, and he has given us a very useful study on the whole, so perhaps it is carping to say that his discussion of the economic aspects of his problem is the weak point in his paper. He makes one or two technically incorrect, or at least misleading, comments in this area. To give one example, he says, "In fact, of course, the artificially fixed official rate is merely a part of the Government's general exchange control policy, and not a means of securing an extra rake-off which passes into general revenue" (p. 67). If the "merely" had been shifted from the first clause to the second, the sentence would have been correct. Of course, an overvalued rate is a tax on exports and unless that tax can be "shifted forward" to foreign buyers, which is unlikely in Indonesia's case, it is a tax ("rake-off") on the incomes of exporters.

Economics aside, Dr. Legge has provided us with a useful addition to the specialists' literature on Indonesian constitutional developments.

W. C. HOLLINGER

Assistant Professor of Economics
Williams College

FRANK N. TRAGER. *Building a Welfare State in Burma*, 1948-1956. Pp. x, 118. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958. \$4.00.

Within recent years, politics has extended into two important new spheres: state planning and foreign aid. Probably no other factor is anything like so influential in the political evolution of the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa. Yet political scientists have virtually ignored these influences, arguing that they fall within the scope of the economist, the engineer, or some other technical expert. Yet these "technical" activities directly change the balance of social and political forces. When malaria is stamped out, the population, hitherto static, rises steeply. If no provision had been made for this increase through planned food expansion and so forth, then there will be a deterioration in living standards, perhaps even semistarva-

tion. If these people have the vote, political reactions will surely follow. Hence the need for some appreciation of these consequences when the first spraying with DDT begins. Most kinds of aid carry much more obvious political overtones. Advice on the formation of a new industry will clearly be determined largely by whether the advisor is American, Russian, or Japanese: whether public or private ownership is recommended, the size of the units of production, and so forth. And so the national values of the advisor must be adapted to the recipient country; he must not assume that reactions to advertising which have been established, for example, in America, will be duplicated in Iran. All men may be brothers, but their reactions are surprisingly diverse.

These are elementary observations. But the ABC of foreign aid has still to be learned. The United States is the largest source of aid, and far too often attempts have been made to transplant American values to Asian soil without preliminary acclimatization. Recently, this reviewer met an American academic lawyer who was off to advise on the codification of law in a country which he cheerfully admitted he could only barely have identified on the map two weeks earlier. Let us wish him luck. But this kind of hit-or-miss aid has too often sowed dragon's teeth of cynical contempt for the American expert, leading to hatred and frustration in American-Asian relations.

National planning is an apolitical influence of another order. Only in India has a plan actually been started, and the Indian Planning Commission is probably the most influential body in the nation, although it does not receive one line in India's 250 page constitution. American planners have been most active elsewhere, as in Pakistan and Burma, where planning has remained at the blueprint stage. Even so, their advice has resulted in political consequences of an identifiable kind.

Altogether there is a clear need for a scientific evaluation of the social and political impact of foreign aid in Asia. The analysis of the working of American aid and advice in Burma—limited though it has been—provided between pages 90 and 106

of Professor Trager's book indicates some of the issues that arise.

HUGH TINKER

Reader in Oriental History in
the University of London

ROBERT STRAUSS-HUPÉ and HARRY W. HAZARD (Eds.). *The Idea of Colonialism*. (The Foreign Policy Research Institute Series, No. 5.) Pp. 496. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. \$5.00.

This book is a collective undertaking planned and executed by the Associates of the University of Pennsylvania's Foreign Policy Research Institute. More than a dozen authors devote themselves to a fresh discussion of the problems of colonialism. Two initial chapters analyze the myth and reality of colonialism; the two concluding ones attempt to assess the findings of the work. The other chapters cover such crucial topics as Russian colonialism and anticolonialism, the Bandung conference, Latin American anticolonialism, French policy in Algeria, Indian attitudes toward colonialism, anticolonialism in United States policy, the aftermath of Japanese colonialism in Southeast Asia, British and French colonialism, and anticolonialism and the United Nations. The varied nature of the sub-topics provides the reader with a multi-dimensional picture.

The authors seem to accept as a basic proposition the idea that colonialism, "reduced to its barest outline," is "foreign rule imposed upon a people" (p. 11). Such a definition eliminates the "salt water myth" of imperialism and would include among the past or present imperialistic powers the former Ottoman empire, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The authors refute the popular ideology of "extreme anticolonialism." They feel that some forms of "good colonialism" may be inevitable and necessary for certain areas that are either too small or as yet too underdeveloped (pp. 436-439).

This reviewer considers that the undertaking is generally of considerable merit. He does, however, have a number of criticisms. The work seems to lack a sufficiently strong analytical discussion. Little or no reference, for example, is made to

the validity of viewpoints of such analysts of colonialism as Hobson, Lenin, Lugard, or De Kat Angelino. Then, as in any collective work, this text faces the problem of combining different viewpoints. Although a surprising amount of agreement emerges, the reader is occasionally left in doubt. When, for example, Paul M. A. Linebarger and Harry W. Hazard make the important observation that a *de facto* colonial relationship may also exist within an independent political unit such as Brazil's colonial empire over its preliterate tribes (p. 471), one wonders whether the other authors would accept this view. Finally, this reviewer feels that the text might have been richer for both the general reader and scholar if some space had been devoted to an analysis of colonialism by Asian anticolonialists of such stature as Hatta of Indonesia or Htin Aung of Burma.

Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with the authors this work is important because it seems to reflect the basic re-evaluation of colonial problems which has taken place in the United States since the end of World War II. It provides food for thought and contributes fresh approaches to an emotionally charged subject.

PAUL W. VAN DER VEUR

Assistant Professor of Government
University of Hawaii

NORTON GINSBURG and CHESTER F. ROBERTS, JR., with the collaboration of LEONARD COMBER and others. *Malaya*. (A Publication of the American Ethnological Society.) Pp. xii, 533. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958. \$6.00.

Malaya has been within the British sphere not only politically and economically but, until quite recently, academically as well. American study programs and publications on Southeast Asia often omitted consideration of Malaya. Now that the Federation of Malaya is sovereign and Singapore is approaching self-government, a volume providing a "descriptive and analytical basis for understanding a new Malaya" would indeed be valuable. That this book fails so completely to provide such a basis, despite the impressive

number of experts who were involved in its writing, is a disappointment which requires explanation.

First, the book is carelessly edited. The individual chapters retain the nature of separate essays written without any but the broadest form of co-ordination. The consequent repetition provides the opportunity for observing factual and analytical inconsistencies which betray the haste with which the final manuscript must have been submitted to the press.

Secondly, the work lacks both a thesis and perspective, and at best tells imperfectly the story of colonial Malaya—a country which no longer exists. The factual errors quite naturally make sound analysis difficult. It is hard to take seriously political judgments based on the assumption that Tengku Abdul Rahman is a "labor chief minister" or that the United Malay National Organization "merged" with the Malayan Chinese Association. The main fault, however, is the failure to reconsider and rewrite the manuscript focusing on the implications of *merdeka*, or freedom, in all aspects of Malayan life.

The authors state that their work began as a research project for the Human Relations Area Files. Thus the basic research, completed in 1956, serves both this *Malaya* and also the future HRAF country survey volume. The authors, by hurrying into print, have secured a "beat," but is not the price rather high?

Taken simply as a handbook of useful information, *Malaya* may still serve an interim function. The chapters on demographic patterns, settlements, systems of transportation, communication, and the communal groups contain important material, although most of it is unnecessarily out of date. In addition to an extensive Bibliography, there is an excellent contribution by Mr. Comber on Chinese Secret Societies. However, Chapter 2 on Malaya "Past and Present" is a parody of bad historical writing, full of undigested and inaccurate data; Chapter 10 on the economic system seriously contradicts its own thesis and provides an inadequate basis for understanding the problems of Malayan economic development.

Two errors should be mentioned to forestall repetition. "Malacca" is consistently misspelled with two "k's." Placing a comma after Chinese family names is incorrect and confusing. This error is compounded in the case of "Sir Tan, Cheng Lock."

FRANK H. H. KING

Center for East Asian Studies
Harvard University

Japan and the United Nations. Report of a Study Group Set Up by the Japanese Association of International Law and Prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (National Studies on International Organization.) Pp. xv, 246. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1958. \$3.00.

This volume forms part of a series of studies on international organization initiated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It was prepared from the discussions and opinions expressed in a representative study group by Professor Kisaburo Yokota and the late Professor Tomoo Otaka under the auspices of the Japanese Association of International Law.

Part I traces the development of Japanese attitudes concerning the United Nations from the end of the war until 1953 through an analysis of discussions in the Japanese Diet and press. It is very repetitious but indicates how the conclusion was finally reached that Japan's security was possible only through the strength of the United Nations and that the disarmament provisions of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution did not require a policy of "permanent neutrality" or prevent Japan from assuming the obligations of United Nations membership. They reasoned that a member need not participate in a military enforcement action but may take part in non-military measures only.

Part II attempts an evaluation of the structure and activities of the United Nations. It discusses such matters as the general character of the United Nations, the limitation of the veto, the strengthening of the General Assembly, regional arrangements, the position of non-member

states, the admission and possible expulsion and withdrawal of members, and international co-operation in the economic and social fields. Part III further considers the problems of security and neutrality and draws interesting comparisons with the activities of the former League of Nations. It also relates the story of Japan's admission to the United Nations.

The Japanese viewpoint on the various problems is clearly presented, and it is good to have it although not many startlingly new ideas are suggested. When the Japanese themselves can frankly say that a "degree of *de facto* rearmament is taking place through the build up of defense forces," that "those Asian countries that in the past suffered from Japanese aggression . . . can not rid themselves of apprehension regarding the recovery and strengthening of Japan" but that if South-east Asia Treaty Organization "is to be a regional security organization for South-east Asia, the countries in that region should form its leading parties," one can be assured of the sincerity and honesty of the views expressed.

ALBERT E. KANE

Lecturer, Far Eastern International
Relations
American University
Washington, D. C.

PAUL W. SCHROEDER. *The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941.* Pp. ix, 246. Ithaca: Cornell University Press for the American Historical Association, 1958. \$4.50.

This interesting and valuable study, winner of the Albert J. Beveridge Award of the American Historical Association, is an able and forthright reinterpretation of evidence bearing upon the significance of the Tripartite Pact of 1940—between Germany, Italy, and Japan—in relation to the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States in 1941. The conclusion reached by the author is that the Pact lost importance in July, 1941, and that it was not a major factor thereafter although resented as such by Secretary Hull. Dr. Schroeder also points out that the Pact did not result in concerted political or mili-

tary strategy and that Americans who conferred with Admiral Nomura had evidence that Japan was giving it only lip service in the later stages of the Washington conversations.

Going beyond his title, the author holds that the Pacific war came primarily over the refusal of Japan's army leaders to withdraw forces from China, secondarily over Japanese objections to other conditions set down in the final ten-point statement of the United States. This statement, he believes, was unwarranted in the light of Japan's recession from the high point of aggressiveness enunciated earlier. Our diplomacy became more demanding as Japan's weakened. President Roosevelt and American military heads sought to induce a more flexible attitude but were unsuccessful. Dr. Schroeder agrees in general with the views of Ambassador Grew, holding that war with Japan was avoidable and that Japanese ambitions *in re* China might better have been dealt with after the defeat of Germany and over a period of years.

The argument is made largely upon the basis of data previously digested in well-known writings, though the author's own research also has been considerable. He points out that his conclusions are consonant with *real politique* rather than with principles of morality relied upon by Secretary Hull, noting in addition that it may be questioned whether the results of our stand were to the good of China. Somewhat surprisingly he does not touch upon the apparent indifference of the American conferees to the growing strength of Chinese communism, particularly since the Chinese Nationalists as well as the Japanese were urging the danger that it portended. He is, it seems, more confident than others that Japanese moderates would have been able to carry out their promises to disarm the co-prosperity program; and he is mistaken in believing that China ever was a "subsidiary" issue to the United States. "Ultimate" would be a better term.

HAROLD S. QUIGLEY

Professor of Political Science,
Emeritus
Oakland, California

OTHER BOOKS

- ADAMS, RANDOLPH G. *Political Ideas of the American Revolution: Britannic-American Contributions to the Problem of Imperial Organization, 1765 to 1775*. Pp. vii, 216. 3rd ed., New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1958. \$3.75 clothbound; \$1.50 paperbound.
- America Votes: *A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics, 1956-57*. Compiled and Edited by RICHARD M. SCAMMON. Pp. x, 465. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. \$12.50.
- Annual Epidemiological and Vital Statistics, 1954. Pp. 617. Genève: World Health Organization, 1957. \$10.00.
- BINKLEY, WILFRED. *American Political Parties: Their Natural History*. Pp. xiii, 470, xiv. 3rd ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958. \$4.25.
- BREWSTER, R. WALLACE. *Government in Modern Society: With Emphasis on American Society*. Pp. x, 619, xxvii. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958. \$6.95.
- BROOM, LEONARD and PHILIP SELZNICK. *Sociology: A Text with Adapted Readings*. Pp. xvii, 661. 2nd ed. Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Company, 1958. \$6.50.
- BRUUN, GEOFFREY. *Revolution and Reaction, 1848-1852: A Mid-Century Watershed*. (An Anvil Original, No. 31.) Pp. 192. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1958. \$1.25.
- BUCHANAN, JAMES M. *Public Principles of Public Debt: A Defense and Restatement*. Pp. xi, 223. Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1958. \$5.00.
- BULLARD, SIR READER (Ed.). *The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey*. Pp. xviii, 569. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1958. \$9.00.
- BURCKHARDT, JACOB. *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, Vols. I and II. Pp. xiii, 278, xv-xxxv; viii, 279-516, ix-xv. Torchbook ed. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$1.35 per vol.
- BURCKHARDT, JACOB. *Judgments on History and Historians*. Translated by HARRY ZOHN. Pp. xxiv, 280. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. \$6.00.
- BURNS, EDWARD McNALL. *Western Civilizations: Their History and Their Culture*. Pp. xxviii, 1022. 5th ed. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1958. \$7.75.
- CARTER, CLYDE C. *State Regulation of Commercial Motor Carriers in North Carolina*. (Studies in Business Administration, Vol. 3.) Pp. x, 210. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press under the Direction of the School of Business Administration, 1958. \$5.00.
- CHANG, CARSON. *The Development of Neo-Confucian Thought*. Pp. 376. New York: Bookman Associates, 1957. \$7.50.
- COHEN, NATHAN EDWARD. *Social Work in the American Tradition*. Pp. x, 404. New York: Henry Holt and Company (Dryden Press), 1958. \$4.75.
- COPELAND, MELVIN T. *And Mark an Era: The Story of the Harvard Business School*. Pp. xvi, 368. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1958. \$6.00.
- DANZIG, ELIOTT R., PAUL W. THAYER, and LILA R. GALANTER. *The Effects of a Threatening Rumor on a Disaster-Stricken Community*. (Disaster Study No. 10.) Prepared for Federal Civil Defense Administration and The Disaster Research Group (Formerly The Committee on Disaster Studies). Pp. xi, 116. Washington: National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Publication 517, 1958. \$2.00.
- DIMOCK, MARSHALL EDWARD, GLADYS OGDEN DIMOCK, and LOUIS W. KOENIG. *Public Administration*. Pp. xviii, 573. Revised ed. New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1958. \$7.00.
- DJAJADININGRAT, IDRUS NASIR. *The Beginnings of the Indonesian-Dutch Negotiations and the Hoge Veluwe Talks*. (Monograph Series.) Pp. x, 128. Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1957. \$2.50.
- DOBNER, WILLIAM M. (Ed.). *The Suburban Community*. Pp. xxviii, 416. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1958. \$6.50.
- Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1957*. Edited by PAUL E. ZINNER. Pp. xxvi, 463. New York: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1958. \$6.00.
- Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*. Pp. lxiv, 962. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1957. \$3.75.
- European Yearbook*, Vol. IV. Pp. xxi, 708. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff under the auspices of the Council of Europe, 1958. Guilders 37.50.
- FAIRBANK, JOHN KING. *The United States and China*. Pp. xvii, 365. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (American Foreign Policy Library), 1958. \$5.50.
- FLOU, J. E., A. H. HALSEY, and F. M. MARTIN (Eds.). *Social Class and Educational Opportunity*. Pp. xix, 152. London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1956. 12s. 6d.
- FOSDICK, RAYMOND B. *Chronicle of a Generation: An Autobiography*. Pp. 306. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. \$4.50.
- FREEMAN, ROGER A. *Financing the Public Schools*, Vol. I: *School Needs in the Decade Ahead*. Pp. xxviii, 273. Washington, D. C.: The Institute for Social Science Research, 1958. \$5.00.
- FRIED, MORTON. *Colloquium on Overseas Chinese*. Pp. vi, 80. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958. \$1.50.
- GELLERMAN, OLLE. *Staten och Jordbruket 1867-1918*. (Skrifter utgivna av Statsvetenskapliga Föreningen Uppsala XXXIX.) Pp. 391. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1958. No price.
- GEYL, PIETER. *The Revolt of the Netherlands (1555-1609)*. Pp. 310. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1958. \$6.00.
- The Grievance Process*. Proceedings of a Conference, March 23-24, 1956. Pp. 102. East Lansing, Mich.: Labor and Industrial Relations Center, Kellogg Center, Michigan State University, 1956. No price.
- HAVARD, WILLIAM C. *The Government of Louisiana*. Pp. 194. Baton Rouge: Bureau of Public Administration, Louisiana State University, 1958. \$2.00.
- HOFSTADTER, RICHARD. *Great Issues in American History*, Vol. I, 1765-1865; Vol. II, 1864-1957. Pp. xiv, 422, vi; xv, 447, vi. New York: Vintage Books, 1958. \$1.25 per vol.
- Homenaje al Profesor Paul Rivet*. (Academia Colombiana de Historia.) Pp. 335. Bogota: Editorial ABC, 1958. No price.
- JACKSON, FREDERICK H. *Simeon Eben Baldwin: Lawyer, Social Scientist, Statesman*. Pp. xiv, 291. New York: King's Crown Press, 1955. No price.
- KALVODA, JOSEF. *Titoism and Masters of Imposture*. Pp. 327. New York: Vantage Press, 1958. \$5.00.
- KING, GEOFFREY S. *The Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance*. (The New Whitehall Series.) Pp. 162. London: George Allen & Unwin; New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. \$2.90.
- KRAINES, OSCAR. *Israel: The Emergence of a New Nation*. Pp. 46. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1958. \$1.00.
- LAQUEUR, WALTER, and GEORGE LICHTHEIM. (Eds.). *The Soviet Cultural Scene: 1956-1957*. Pp. viii, 300. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. \$4.75.
- LATIMER, JOHN FRANCIS. *What's Happened to Our High Schools?* Pp. vi, 196. Wash- ington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958. \$3.25.
- LAVES, WALTER H. C. and CHARLES A. THOMSON. *UNESCO: Purpose, Progress, Prospects*. Pp. xxiii, 469. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957. \$7.50.
- LEVIN, HARVEY J. (Ed.). *Business Organization and Public Policy: A Book of Readings*. Pp. xxi, 550. New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1958. \$7.00.
- LIVINGSTON, J. A. *The American Stockholder*. Pp. 290. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1958. \$4.95.
- LOCKE, JOHN. *The Second Treatise of Government* (An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government) and *A Letter Concerning Toleration*. Edited by J. W. GOUGH. Pp. xli, 167. Revised ed. New York: Macmillan, 1956. \$2.50.
- McILWAIN, CHARLES HOWARD. *The American Revolution: A Constitutional Interpretation*. Pp. vii, 198. Ithaca: Great Seal Books, a Division of Cornell University Press, 1958. (First published 1923 by Macmillan.) \$1.75.
- McKENNA, JOSEPH P. *Intermediate Economic Theory*. (The Dryden Press Series in Economics.) Pp. xiv, 319. New York: Dryden Press, 1958. \$4.90.
- MACKENZIE, W. J. M. *Free Elections: An Elementary Textbook*. (Minerva Series of Student's Handbooks.) Pp. 184. New York: Rinehart and Company, 1958. \$3.50.
- MORAY, JERE CLYDE. *The Great Hidden Pressure of Overpopulation: Cause of Changes in History*, Part I. Pp. 32. Miami: Forum of World Opinion, 1957. 35 cents.
- MORLEY, FELIX (Ed.). *Essays on Individuality*. Pp. 270. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958. \$5.00.
- MUSGRAVE, RICHARD A., and ALAN T. PEACOCK (Eds.). *Classics in the Theory of Public Finance*. (International Economic Association.) Pp. xix, 244. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. \$6.00.
- NEEDHAM, JOSEPH, with research assistance of WANG LING. *History of Scientific Thought*, Vol. II: *Science and Civilization in China*. Pp. xxii, 696. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1956. \$14.50.
- On Limiting Atomic War*. Pp. 46. London, New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956. 50 cents.
- POLLOCK, FREDERICK. *Automation: A Study of its Economic and Social Consequences*. Translated by W. O. HENDERSON and W. H. CHALONER. Pp. 276. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. \$5.00.

- RADISCHEV, ALEKSANDR NIKOLAEVICH. *A Journey From St. Petersburg to Moscow*. Translated by LEO WIENER and edited by RODERICK PAGE THALER. Pp. viii, 286. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. \$6.00.
- RAO, DR. A. V. RAMAN. *Economic Development of Andhra Pradesh: 1766-1957*. Pp. x, 384. Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1958. Rs. 18.75.
- Readings in the History of Western Civilization*, Vol. II. Selected by THOMAS P. NEILL. (The College Readings Series, No. 4.) Pp. xii, 409. Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1958. \$2.25.
- Readings in Medical Care*. Committee on Medical Care Teaching of the Association of Teachers of Preventive Medicine. Pp. xxi, 708. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958. \$6.50.
- REITZEL, WILLIAM, MORTON A. KAPLAN, and CONSTANCE G. COBLENTZ. *United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1955*. Pp. xi, 535. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1956. \$4.50.
- REUTER, PAUL. *International Institutions*. Translated by J. M. CHAPMAN. (Minerva Series of Students Handbooks.) Pp. 316. New York: Rinehart and Company, 1958. \$5.00.
- RUSH, MYRON. *The Rise of Khrushchev*. Pp. vi, 116. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958. \$3.25.
- EDMONSON, MUNRO S. *Status Terminology and the Social Structure of North American Indians*. Pp. vii, 84. Seattle: University of Washington Press (The American Ethnological Society), 1958. \$3.00.
- SADAT, ANWAR EL. *Revolt on the Nile*. Pp. 159. New York: John Day Company, 1957. \$3.00.
- SALISBURY, FRANKLIN. *Speaking of Politics*. Pp. vii, 294. New York: Vantage Press, 1956. \$3.75.
- SCHWERTIN, KURT. *Classification for International Law and Relations*. Pp. xiii, 96. 2nd ed. New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1958. \$3.50.
- SEN, S. R. *The Economics of Sir James Stuart*. Pp. vii, 207. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. \$5.00.
- SIMON, HERBERT A. *Models of Man: Social and Rational*. Pp. xiv, 287. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.; London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1957. \$5.00.
- The Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive in the Less Developed Countries*. (Department of State Publication 6632, European and British Commonwealth Series 51.) Pp. vi, 111. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1958. 60 cents.
- SKLARE, MARSHALL. *The Jews: Social Patterns of An American Group*. Pp. xi, 669. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. \$10.00.
- TANG, ANTHONY M. *Economic Development in the Southern Piedmont 1860-1950: Its Impact on Agriculture*. Pp. xv, 256. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958. \$6.00.
- TRACEY, FRED A. *The Common Man*. Pp. 144. New York: Vantage Press, 1958. \$2.95.
- VIVAS, JORGE B. *Intervencion del gobierno central en los estados miembros de las republicas federales*. Pp. 201. Buenos Aires: Published by the author, 1957. No price.
- THOMPSON, JOHN H., and JAMES M. JENNINGS. *Manufacturing in the St. Lawrence Area of New York State*. An Analysis of the Factory Distribution and the Regional Advantages and Disadvantages of St. Lawrence, Jefferson, and Franklin Counties. (Maxwell School Series.) Pp. 137. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1958. \$4.00.
- WILDING, NORMAN, and PHILIP LAUNDY. *An Encyclopaedia of Parliament*. Pp. x, 705. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. \$12.50.
- WILLEY, BASIL. *More Nineteenth Century Studies: A Group of Honest Doubters*. Pp. 304. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. \$4.00.
- ZIEGLER, BENJAMIN MUNN. (Ed.). *Desegregation and the Supreme Court*. (Problems in American Civilization.) Pp. viii, 116. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1958. \$1.35.

INDEX

INDEX

- Accidents, *see* Traffic accidents
- Action Program for Traffic Safety, 128
 - accident-reporting and record system, 22
 - Committee on Reports of the President's Conference, 23-24
 - co-ordination of effort, 22
 - evaluation of, *see* Annual Inventory of Traffic Safety Activities
 - highway engineering, 23
 - highway safety information, dissemination of, 23
 - legal basis for traffic movement, 22
 - motor-vehicle administrators, responsibilities of, 23
 - and National Committee for Traffic Safety, 23
 - program, 22-23
 - progress, measure of, 23-24
 - state governments and regulation of motor vehicle and travel, 22
 - and the National Traffic Safety Contest, 28, 30, 31
 - traffic courts, 22
 - traffic safety education, 22
 - traffic supervision, 22
- Air transport, 105
- American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, 17, 78
- American Association of School Administrators, 21
- American Association of State Highway Officials, 17, 86, 87
- American Automobile Association, 16, 19
 - Pedestrian Protection Program, 20, 23
 - Traffic Safety Foundation, 20
- American Legion, 19
- Annual Inventory of Traffic Safety Activities, 23, 28-29
 - accomplishments, 31, 33
 - advisory groups, 29, 31
 - award programs, 30, 31
 - co-ordinators, 30
 - criteria of evaluation, 29-30, 31
 - and liaison between officials and the public, 31
 - limitations of, 30-31
 - mechanics of operation, 29
 - reports, 30, 31
- Armed services, *see* Traffic safety in the armed services
- Association of Casualty and Surety Companies
 - High School Driver Education Award Program, 23
- Association of Casualty and Surety Executives, 20
- Automobile Manufacturers Association, 19, 78
- Automotive age
 - impact on American life, 2, 10
- Automotive industry
 - competition, role of in development of safety features, 77-78
 - co-ordinated industry-wide safety programs, 77-78
 - highway safety, interest in, 74-75
 - traffic safety program, launching of, 19
- Automotive Safety Foundation, 21, 65
- Automotive transportation
 - and freight movement, 4
 - future, 5-6
 - growth of, 5
 - future, 5-6
 - history, 4-5
 - and mail deliveries, 3
 - and personal mobility, 5
 - and recreation and travel industry, 3
 - and school consolidation, 3
 - and spending habits of Americans, 3-4
 - and suburban housing, growth of, 3, 6
 - and suburban industry, growth of, 3, 6
- BAKER, JAMES STANNARD, Driver Licensing, 53-62
- BALDWIN, DAVID M., Dimensions of the Traffic Safety Problem, 9-14
- BETHEA, J. W., Organizing for Safety, 122-131
- Bethea, J. W., 24
- Bliss, H. H., 10, 16
- British Isles
 - automobile ownership in, 133
 - comparison with US, 133
- Road Research Laboratory, 139
- road transportation in
 - "mopeds," use of, 133-134
 - motor scooters, use of, 133
 - road goods transport, increase in, 134
 - since World War II, 133
 - public transport, decline in, 134
- traffic accident trends in, 134-135
 - death rates, 135-136
 - vehicle ownership, increase in, 134
- Bureau of Public Roads (US), 16, 26, 85, 86
- Cameron, William S., 19
- Canada
 - First National Highway Safety Conference (1955), 17, 25
 - National Safety League, 17
 - safety program, 17
- CARR, WILLIAM G., Education and the Motor Age, 63-72

INDEX

- Chapin, Roy D., 16
- CHAYNE, CHARLES A., *Automotive Design Contributions to Highway Safety*, 73-83
- Commercial Investment Trust Safety Foundation, 19
- Commonwealth Fund of New York, 138
- Conferences on traffic safety
 - citizen leadership conferences, 25
 - First Conference on Street and Highway Safety (1924), 17-18, 21, 25, 38
 - President's Highway Safety Conference (1946), 21-22, 23
 - regional conferences, 24-25
 - Second Conference on Street and Highway Safety (1926), 17-18
 - Third Conference on Street and Highway Safety (1930), 18
 - White House Conference on Highway Safety (1954), 24
 - and President's Action Committee for Traffic Safety, 24
- Coolidge, Calvin
 - quoted, 17
- Courts
 - administrative reforms, need for, 50-51
 - American Bar Association program for traffic court improvement, 21
 - and driver licensing, 60-61
 - New Jersey organizational reforms, 51
 - traffic cases, improvements and reforms in, 50-51
 - traffic courts and hearings, 50, 52
 - traffic court practices, study of, 21
 - traffic courts and prosecutors, 49
 - traffic courts and rotating judges, 49
 - and training of officials re traffic violations, 50
 - and volume of traffic violations, 49
- Culture
 - American
 - automobile as a symbol in, 98-99
- Curtice, Harlow H., 24
- DAMON, NORMAN, *The Action Program for Highway Safety*, 15-26
- Death rates, 10-12 *passim*, 18, 44-45
 - and age groups, 11, 71
 - pedestrian, 12
 - rural, 12
 - urban, 12
- Deaths (traffic)
 - first death, 10, 16
- deHaven, Hugh, 26
- Driver behavior
 - anonymity and animal nature behavior, 98
 - perception and judgment, 95-96
 - periodic retraining of drivers, 96
 - and public education and information, 96-97
 - fear approach, 96-97
- Driver licensing
 - administration of, 55
 - as revenue, 54
 - clerical work re, 55-56
 - and courts, 60-61
 - and driver identification, 54
 - driver improvement program, 57-58
 - evaluation of, 58-59
 - point system, 59
 - driver qualifications, 55
 - driver risk
 - evaluation of, 57
 - reduction in, 55-57
 - history, 54
 - legal privilege of, 54-55
 - and police departments, 59-60
 - enforcement and reporting functions, 60
 - research, need for, 61-62
 - revocation and suspension of license, 57, 58
 - and the controlling of drivers, 54
- Drivers
 - adolescent, rates of accident among, 98-99
 - credit, use of by, 2
 - number of in the United States, 55
 - reward and punishment of, 94-95
 - See also* Driver behavior
- Dunman, Robie W., 26
- Economic Commission for Europe, 136, 137, 138
- Economos, James P., 21
- Economy (US)
 - automotive transportation, impact on, 2-3
 - gross national product, 5-6
 - and freight movement, 6
 - income rise and automobile ownership, 6
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., 24
- Esso Standard Oil Company, 19
 - Esso Safety Foundation, 19-20
- Europe
 - automobile ownership in, 133
 - comparison with US, 133
- Permanent International Association of Road Congresses (PIARC), 138
- road transportation in
 - "moped," use of, 133-134
 - motor scooters, use of, 133
 - public transport, decline in, 134
 - road goods transport, increase in, 134
 - vehicle ownership increase in, 134
 - since World War II, 133
- traffic accidents
 - death rates, 135-136
 - speculations for the future, 139-140
 - statistics, lack of, 136
 - trends in, 134-135
- traffic accident prevention
 - driver conditioning, 140
 - safety propaganda and education, 140-141

- social consciousness, development of, 140-141
 and vehicle improvements, 140
 traffic conditions
 and increase in motorcycles and motor-assisted bicycles, 139
 traffic safety
 problems differ with individual countries, 136, 137
 solution of problems compared with US approach, 136-138
 Working Party on Road Traffic Accidents and uniformity of traffic systems, 138
 World Touring and Automobile Organization International Road Safety Congress (1958), 138
- Fleming, Philip B., 21
 quoted, 28
 Forbes, Theodore W., 26
 Foreword, viii
 Freeman, Orville L., 40
 Furnas, J. C., 19
- General Federation of Women's Clubs, 19
 Goodwin, Elliot, 17
 Governor's Conference Committee on Highway Safety, 129
 Great Britain, *see* British Isles
 Greenwood, Ernest, 17
 GRIMM, SERGEI N., Traffic and Safety in Tomorrow's Urban Areas, 103-112
- Hall, John J., 18, 20
 Harris Teachers College, 64
 Harvard University, 17
 Bureau of Highway Traffic, 17
 Harvey, Julien H., 16
 Hearst, William Randolph, Jr., 24
 Highway Education Board, 16, 19
 Highway safety
 human factor in, 108-109
 local access roads, 109
 parking space and garages, provision for, 108
 street design, 108-109
 and technical design features, 108
 See also Action Program for Highway Safety; Highways; Traffic control
 Highways
 capacity, building for proper, 86
 design, 85
 development of new technique, 90-91, 92
 and psychology and physiology of driver, 86
 research in, 85-86
 design speed, 87, 89, 91
 Federal-Aid Highway Act (1956), 25, 35, 86
 Federal-Aid Highway Act (1958), 35, 86
 federal aid to states, 90
 freeways, 86-87, 89-90
 future needs, forecasting for (next 20 years), 88-89
 and elements of traffic, 89
 geometric design, defined, 85
 movement of people and goods, 85
 National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, 86-87, 89-90
 features of, 87-88
 safety value of, 88
 road-building program, 35
 road mileage, 2-3
 roads needing intermediate attention, 90
 urban roads, program for, 91-92
 Highway and Highway Transport Education Committee and training in highway engineering, 16
 Hoffman, Paul G., 19, 20, 21
 HOLMES, EDWARD H., Increased Safety—By Design, 84-92
 Hoover, Herbert, 17, 38
- International Association of Chiefs of Police, 17, 18, 19, 47
 Institute of Traffic Engineers, 17
- JACKSON, STEPHEN S., The Military Looks at Traffic Safety, 113-121
 James, Stephen, 21
 Johnson, Pyke, 16, 20, 21
- Keegan, Kirk A., 22
 Knudsen, William S., 19
 Kraft, Merwyn, 26
 KREML, FRANKLIN M., Police, Prosecutors, and Judges, 42-52
 Kreml, Franklin M., 18, 21
- LaCossitt, Henry, 21
 Lamont, R. P., 18
 Law and enforcement, 43
 Legislation and highway use
 accident reports, laws re, 37
 and citizen organizations, 38
 highway laws
 evaluation by North Dakota, 36
 national study of, 36
 need for revision of, 35
 legislative and public apathy, 37
 Model Traffic Ordinance, 38
 motor vehicle codes, need for revision in, 36-37
 motor vehicle statutes, tampering of, 38
 need for long-range approach to legislation, 39-40
 and special interest groups, 38
 state function on vehicle ownership and use, 40
 Minnesota Study program, 40-41

- Uniform Vehicle Code, 38-39, 55
See also Traffic law enforcement
 Lewin, Kurt, 100
 Licensing, *see* Driver licensing
- McClintock, Miller, 17
 MacDonald, Thomas H., 16, 21, 22
 quoted, 39-40
 MALFETTI, JAMES L., Human Behavior—Factor X, 93-102
 Mann, Horace
 quoted, 64
 Mattson, J. O., 24
 Meyers, Hallie L.
 quoted, 123-124
 Miller, H. B., 24
 Moore, John O., 26
 MORONY, LOUIS R., The Law Must Hurry to Catch Up, 34-41
 Motor-vehicle accidents, *see* Traffic accidents
- National Academy of Sciences, 36
 National Commission on Safety Education, 17
 National Committee for Motor Fleet Supervisor Training, 21
 National Committee for Traffic Training, 20
 wartime program, 20
 National Congress of Parents and Teachers, 19
 National Education Association, 68, 69
 and driver education conferences, 67-68
 National Grange, 19
 National Joint Committee on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, 18
 National Safety Council, 10, 12, 16, 19, 20, 78, 125
 National Traffic Safety Contest, 28
 Research Division, 26
 Safety Education Section, 16
 National Society for the Study of Education, 64
 Neyhart, Amos E., 18, 21, 67
 quoted, 68
 New York University
 Center for Safety Education, 20, 114, 119
 Northwestern University, 18, 119
 Traffic Safety Institute, 18, 47, 101, 114, 119
- O'NEILL, DENIS, Traffic Accident Trends in Europe and the British Isles, 132-141
 Organized citizen support program
 citizen support, defined, 123-124
 organizations, history and development of, 21, 127-128
 in Chicago, 125
 in Detroit, 125-126
 in Indianapolis, 126
 in Utah, 126-127
 leadership, 128
 legislation to support programs, 126-127
 nonpartisan and nonprofit character of, 124
 outlook for, 130-131
 purposes, 124
 source of advice and counsel for public officials, 124-125
 traffic officials resistance to, 123-124
 OWEN, WILFRED, Automotive Transport in the United States, 1-8
- Payne, E. George, 64
 Pedestrians
 number of traffic accidents among, 100-101
 socio-psychological influences in traffic accidents among, 102
 Pennsylvania State University, 21, 67
 Police service
 manpower, inadequacy of, 47-49
 and parking enforcement, 48
 and warrants, 48
 organization, 45-46
 and multijurisdictional units, 45
 and traffic specialization, 18, 45-46
 personnel recruitment, 46-47
 personnel training, 46
 professional service, development of, 47, 48
 Population (US)
 growth and distribution, 5, 104
 effect on transportation, 5-6
 standard of living, rise in, 104
 Porter, Harry, Jr., 29
 President's Committee for Traffic Safety, 71
 Prisk, Charles W., 25
 Public Health Service (US)
 accident prevention program, 26
 Puerto Rico, 33
- Ribicoff, Abraham, 25
 Roberts, Kenneth A., 25
 Roper, Daniel, 18
- School transportation, 69-70
 drivers, selection and training of, 70
 pupil conduct in buses, training re, 70
 vehicles, standards for, 70
 Shakespeare, William
 quoted, 26
 State College High School, State College, Pa.
 and driver education, 18
 Society
 sacred, 97-98
 secular, 98
 social deviate and accidents, 98
 Society of Automotive Engineers, 78
 Stack, Herbert J., 20
 Standard Highway Safety Program for States, 20
 States
 safety programs, co-ordination of
 Connecticut plan, 129-130


number of states using technique, 129
 support of co-operation technique, 128-129
 STEWART, GEORGE C., Inventory and Appraisal, 27-33
 Studebaker Corporation, 17
 Syracuse University
 School of Architecture, Urban Planning Seminar, 104
 Traffic accident reduction
 and automatic controls, 101
 discussion-decision technique, 100
 and electronics systems, 101
 and moral responsibility, 99-100
 role of religion in, 100
 socio-psychological approaches to, 99
See also Traffic safety in the armed services
 Traffic accidents
 and alcohol, 100, 101
 driver behavior as cause of, 56, 75, 94, 98
 and drugs, 100, 101
 economic cost of, 10
 and emotional upsets, 100
 and fatigue, 100, 101
 injuries, 10, 12
 and age groups, 11
 nonfatal accidents, number of, 12-13
 and Press, 18-19
 property damage, 10, 12-13
 recognition of problem, 10
 reporting of, 12, 13, 16, 37
 and prevention of accidents, 13-14
 research into causes, 14, 18, 101
 the mixed team approach, 101
 sociological effects of, 10-11
 speed as cause of, 14
 vehicles as cause of, 56, 75
See also, Death rates; Pedestrians
 Traffic control
 and electronics, 92
 and television, 92
 Traffic law enforcement
 accident investigation, 44-45
 need for improvement, 44
 enforcement-engineering-education co-ordination, 43-44, 51-52
 enforcement index, 49
 and laws, 45
 and public acceptance and action, 43
 purpose, 43
 traffic law agencies, establishment of separate, 48-49
 techniques in, 43
 violations bureaus, 49, 50
See also Courts; Police service
 Traffic Officers' Training School, 18
 Traffic Safety Association, 21

Traffic safety education
 achievements, 70-71
 college and universities program, 68-69, 71-72
 and driver examinations, 57, 61
 driver training, 18, 66-67, 71
 conferences on, 67-68
 history, 67
 teachers, preparation of, 67, 68-69
 elementary school program, 65-66
 protection-education concept, 66
 future prospects of, 71-72
 history, 64-65
 National Education Association, role of in, 65
 research in, 69
 safety patrol, 16, 66
 schools, role of in, 21, 64
 schools-police co-operation, 66
 secondary school program, 66-67
 Traffic Education and Training Committee, 21
 traffic specialists, training of, 20-21
 Traffic safety in the armed services
 accident prevention program
 education, 119-120
 research, 120
 civic groups, liaison with, 120-121
 civil authorities, liaison with, 120-121
 economic loss of traffic accidents, 115
 military accident toll, 115
 military accidents, comparison to civilian accidents, 115-117
 Motor Vehicle Rodeo, 119-120
 off-duty accidents, 117
 limitation of military control on, 117-119
 safety program in, 114-115
 vehicles, number of owned by War Department, 114
 Traffic safety movement
 Congressional studies of safety problems, 19
 federal government aid and co-operation, 25
 manual on uniform signs, signals, and markings, development of, 18
 periodic vehicle inspection, development of program, 18
 pioneer organizations, 16-17
 research projects, 26-27
 safety foundations, creation of, 19-20
 "Three E's" concept of, 16-17
See also Action Program for Traffic Safety; Conferences; Organized Citizen Support
 Traffic safety problem
 college and university research, comparison between Europe and US, 137
 European-American interchange of facts and views, 138-139
 Truman, Harry S., 22

United Kingdom, *see* British Isles
 United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 12
 University of California
 Bureau for Street Traffic Research, 17
 Urban development
 federal and state participation in, 112
 first stage
 density control, 106
 engineering investigation, 107
 nuisances control, 106
 recording of existing highways features, 106-107
 sketch plan of highways, 107
 zoning control, 106
 and industry location, 110
 metropolitan and co-operative approach to, 111-112
 public participation in, 112
 second stage
 land subdivision, current, as guide for development, 107
 servicing low-density areas
 Central shopping and business district, 109-110
 suggested pattern compared with existing methods, 107-108
See also Highways; Urban renewal
 Urban growth (US)
 effect of national highway program on, 105-106
 Urban renewal
 congestion in cities' centers, relief of, 11
 cultural and community facilities expanded, 111
 local arteries, expressway design applied to, 110
 new approach to, 110-111
 parking problem, solution of, 110, 111
 pedestrian overpasses, building of, 111
 suburban growth and highway construction, 110

Vanderbilt, Arthur T., 21
 quoted, 52
 Vehicle safety
 air conditioning, 81
 air suspension, 80
 automatic transmission, 81
 automobile design and safety, 75
 factors in, 76-77
 brakes, 79-80
 crash-injury protection, 80
 early progress, 79
 future trends, 82-83
 headlighting, 79, 80
 heat-absorbing and glare reducing glass, 81
 horse power increase and speed hazards, 82
 "middle years" (1920's, 1930's) progress, 79-80
 post-World War II progress, 80-82
 power brakes and power steering, 80
 safety glass, 79
 welded all-steel body, 79
 wrap-around windshield, 80
 Warren, George W., 21
 Weeks, Sinclair, 24
 Whitney, Albert Wurts, 16, 20, 21
 quoted, 65
 Williams, Sidney J., 16, 21, 26
 quoted, 28
 Wilson, Charles E.
 quoted, 114
 Wilson, Woodrow
 quoted, 5
 Yale University, 17
 Yost, Light B., 22, 24
 Zimmerman, R. R., 21

72
 Y-13, 1952
 N52





UNITED STATES COMMITTEE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

INDUSTRY PARTICIPATION PROGRAM

The Industry Participation Program is one of the five projects of the U. S. Committee. It originated a year and a half ago with the members of a flight crew of a DC 7 plane. They were wondering what they could do to promote peace in the world.

The three airmen then decided that the first step they should take was to get American industry to support the principles and purposes of the United Nations by saying publicly "We Believe". The visible symbol of such support became the UN emblem itself, together with the initials "UN" and the affirmation "WE BELIEVE". The plan and the emblem were endorsed by the United Nations.

When the airmen asked for help, the U. S. Committee decided to sponsor the program and set up the Industry Participation Division to administer it. The airlines were the first to be asked to participate. The Committee soon requested authority of the United Nations to extend the program to all branches of Industry and Commerce. This was granted by the Secretary-General.

Twenty-seven airlines have decided to support the program. Fifteen other domestic and international carriers have expressed a positive interest. Business firms and professional men are placing the emblem on their letterheads. It will appear soon as a "drop-in" on national ads. A chain of theatres will frame the emblem and hang it in their box offices and lobbies. It is hoped that this emblem will identify firms and groups that support the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

Information concerning the program can be secured by writing to:

United States Committee for the United Nations
Industry Participation Division

375 Park Avenue

New York 22, New York

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

NOVEMBER, 1958

This special issue is devoted to studies in political sociology

Includes the following papers:

A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics.....DAVID E. APTER

The Power Elite—Reconsidered.....DANIEL BELL

Party Organization in Primary Elections

.....PHILLIPS CUTRIGHT and PETER H. ROSSI

Local Party Systems: Theoretical Considerations and a Case Analysis

.....J. LEIPER FREEMAN

The Local Community as an Ecology of Games.....NORTON E. LONG

Religious and Socioeconomic Factors in the French Vote, 1946-56

.....DUNCAN MACRAE, JR.

Small Businessmen, Political Tolerance, and Support for McCarthy

.....MARTIN TROW

• • Single Copy \$1.75

Order from:

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

5750 Ellis Avenue

Chicago 37, Illinois

Kindly mention THE ANNALS when writing to advertisers