

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

The Political Quarterly

Vol. 29

784
1958

11/15/58
No. 3

THE
Political Quarterly

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VOLUME 29

LONDON
STEVENS & SONS LIMITED
1958

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*Published by
 Stevens & Sons Limited of
 119 & 120 Chancery Lane
 London — Publishers
 and printed in Great Britain
 by The Eastern Press Ltd.
 of London and Reading*

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NOTES AND COMMENTS

Pressure Groups in Britain

UNTIL recently the study of political parties had been greatly neglected in this country despite the highly developed state of party organisation. This great void is being gradually filled by such books as Mr. R. T. McKenzie's work on *British Political Parties*, but a great deal of ground still remains to be covered. The place of pressure groups in British public life has been almost entirely ignored except for a few scattered articles which have appeared during the past two or three years. Yet this is a subject of the first importance; and if we wish to understand the forces which exert influence on Parliament, the voters, Ministers, civil servants, political parties, and the press, it is necessary to consider the enormous number of organised groups which exist wholly or in part for the purpose of pressing their claims or their policies on public authorities, politicians, and the public.

The present issue of *The Political Quarterly* is devoted to Pressure Groups with the object of discussing the subject in a more systematic manner than has hitherto occurred; and of evaluating the effect of these organs of will, of opinion, and of interest on British public life. Some of the articles deal broadly with major categories of pressure groups, such as trade associations. Others concentrate on particular examples of important pressure groups: thus Mr. Self and Mr. Storing present an account of the National Farmers' Union at work; Mr. Wootton writes about the ex-Servicemen's associations; while Professor S. E. Finer describes the work of the elaborate and broad-based Roads Lobby. Mr. George Strauss, writing from his experience as a Member of Parliament and a Minister, gives us a view of pressure groups seen from the receiving end, while Mr. McKenzie discusses the respective roles of political parties and pressure groups.

Our system of law renders the formation of pressure groups of all kinds extraordinarily easy and simple. The great majority of them are unincorporated voluntary associations. They have no legal personality and hold their property through trustees. They are subject to scarcely any legal or governmental regulation unless they come under the Trade Union Acts, which apply in general only to trade unions and trade associations whose objects are in restraint of trade. This has greatly encouraged their proliferation and growth; and there are today many thousands of these organisations,

Mr. McKenzie reaches a similar conclusion on general grounds of political theory. He believes that the essential functions of political parties in Britain are to choose and maintain the parliamentary parties, which in turn select the party leader and potential Prime Minister. A general election is a very rough-and-ready method of giving one or other of the rival parties (and their leaders) a parliamentary majority. The electoral system which permits this to be done is, as everyone knows, full of mathematical injustices; and the acceptance of this system with all its patent anomalies is made possible only because of the general understanding of the great part played by pressure groups in correcting these anomalies. In short, organised groups act as a mediating influence between a powerful political party which is in control of the government and the individual industry, trade, profession or other interest. We must, he urges, recognise that pressure groups are "a far more important channel of communication than parties for the transmission of political ideas from the mass of the citizenry to their rulers."

Pluralism

In short, pressure groups give us today a genuinely pluralist society in all spheres and levels of government. And without pluralism we should indeed be helpless before the Great Leviathan.

Pressure groups thus emerge from the scrutiny they have received in this special issue of *The Political Quarterly* with much said in their favour both from the theoretical and practical points of view and with little to their discredit. There are, however, three points of danger to which attention should be given. One is how to secure the organisation of unrepresented interests, such as children, consumers, the deaf, and so forth. A second is to prevent the misrepresentation of interests through the manipulation of power *inside* a pressure group. This can and does happen; and when a particular association has been captured by some faction or unrepresentative minority, it should be possible to order an official inquiry into its affairs, in the same way as a joint stock company can be investigated by direction of the Board of Trade. Thirdly, organised pressure groups should be compelled to publish detailed statements of their accounts. Some of them do so; and it should be a universal obligation. But subject to these three points, we reach the general conclusion that we need not at present be disturbed or made anxious by the unquestionably important part which pressure groups are now playing in the political life of this country.

PARTIES, PRESSURE GROUPS AND THE BRITISH POLITICAL PROCESS

R. T. MCKENZIE

SAMUEL BEER, perhaps the ablest American student of British politics, commented recently: "If we had some way of measuring political power, we could possibly demonstrate that at the present time pressure groups are more powerful in Britain than in the United States."¹ The realisation that this may be the case appears to have grown rapidly in Britain in recent years and, in most quarters, the reaction to it has been gloomy²; indeed, among many publicists the gloom has given way to outright despair. Thus, according to Paul Johnson, assistant editor of the *New Statesman*, "Acts of policy are now decided by the interplay of thousands of conflicting interest groups, and cabinet ministers are little more than chairmen of arbitration committees. Their opinions play virtually no part in shaping decisions which they subsequently defend with passion. . . . When everyone's wishes count, nobody's opinions matter."³

There are no doubt many explanations of this despairing (and, I would argue, belated) recognition of the powerful role played by interest groups in Britain. There can be no question that their activities and their influence have increased in recent decades. This surely was inevitable; once it had been largely agreed by all parties that the governments (national and local) should collect and spend over a third of the national income, tremendous pressures were bound to be brought to bear to influence the distribution of the burdens and benefits of public spending on this scale. And further:

* The author is Reader in Sociology in the University of London (London School of Economics and Political Science). He is the author of *British Political Parties: The Distribution of Power Within the Conservative and Labour Parties*.

¹ S. H. Beer, "Pressure Groups and Parties in Britain," *The American Political Science Review*, March 1956, p. 3.

² Thus even so well informed an observer as W. J. M. Mackenzie concludes that the dominant role of organised groups in British public life means: "We are gradually shifting back into a situation in which a man is socially important only as a holder of standard qualifications and as a member of authorised groups, in fact into the new medievalism which was the promised land in the days from the younger Pugin to William Morris." W. J. M. Mackenzie, "Pressure Groups in British Government," *British Journal of Sociology*, June 1955, p. 146.

³ P. Johnson, "The Amiable Monster," the *New Statesman*, October 12, 1957, p. 468. In the same vein, Bernard Hollowood has remarked that "Parliament has become the abused referee of the big power game and . . . the unhappy millions on the terraces are powerless, almost voiceless spectators," in "The Influence of Business and the City," *Twentieth Century*, October 1957, p. 253.

a new and powerful factor was injected into the equation when the trade unions, since the second world war, won recognition (in Sir Winston Churchill's phrase) as an "estate of the realm." The highly articulate middle class (by whom, and for whom, so many of our journals of opinion are written) developed an acute sense of claustrophobia as they watched the giants around them, organised business, labour, the farmers, and the rest, struggling among themselves (and often with the government of the day) for an ever larger share of the national income.

An Unexplored Field

These developments since the second world war provide reason enough for the new and acute awareness of the role of pressure groups in Britain. But in addition it must be noted that the standard accounts of the British political system (whether in the school texts, or in the academic journals) have done little or nothing to inform even the comparatively well-educated section of the British community about the realities of the sort of pressure politics which has always been a major factor in political life in this country. An American writer on this subject quotes a British information officer lecturing in America in 1954 as saying that there is "a complete absence of pressure groups and lobbies in Britain."⁴ Unfortunately such a remark cannot be dismissed as a misguided effort in national propaganda; it was no doubt an honest expression of a widely accepted myth about the British political system.

Twenty years ago Sir Ivor Jennings demonstrated the vitally important part played by pressure groups in the parliamentary arena: "much legislation," he wrote, "is derived from organised interests . . . most of it is amended on the representation of such interests, and . . . often parliamentary opposition is in truth the opposition of interests." (*Parliament*, p. 503.) But, strangely, no scholar in twenty years has taken the cue; as yet, there has been no full-dress study of the role of pressure groups in the political process (although the first book on the subject in America appeared in 1908).⁵ Indeed, it is only in the past three years that learned articles have begun to appear on the problems of definition and methodology and on the activities of particular interest groups. If the scholars and serious publicists have been so remiss, perhaps even the well-informed citizen can be forgiven for harbouring the illusion that

⁴ Cited in F. C. Newman, "Reflections on Money and Party Politics in Britain," *Parliamentary Affairs*, Summer 1957, p. 309.
A. F. Bentley's *The Process of Government*.

pressure groups are a uniquely foreign political phenomenon accounting for the "pathological state of American democracy" and the *immobilisme* of France.

The Respective Roles of Pressure Groups and Parties

A starting point in clarifying the situation in this country, is to examine the respective roles in the British political process of political parties and of pressure groups. One source of confusion about the role of party has arisen from Burke's much quoted observation that a party is "a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed."⁶ This remark has been leaned on much too heavily; it provides no explanation at all of the *function* of party in a democratic society; and even as a *description* of parties it is misleading because it places far too great a stress on the role of principle (and by implication, on the role of ideology and programme).

Yet some exponents of democratic theory, starting, it would appear, from Burke's definition, have implied that political parties serve (or ideally ought to serve) as the sole "transmission belts" on which political ideas and programmes are conveyed from the citizens to the legislature and the executive. According to their ideal political model, a group of citizens first organise themselves into a political party on the basis of some principle or set of principles; they then deduce a political programme from these principles and their candidates proceed to lay this programme before the electorate; if the party secures a majority in Parliament it then implements the "mandate" given it by the electors. If issues arise not covered by the "mandate," then it is for the M.P.s to use their own judgment in deciding what to do; they are to deliberate, one gathers, in a kind of vacuum in which no external pressures (either from the constituencies or from organised interests) play upon them.

According to this ideal democratic model, it is the exclusive function of the parties to canalise and to transmit the will of the citizenry to their elected representatives who then proceed to transmute it into positive law. The existence of organised groups of citizens, standing outside the party system and pressing the legislature and the executive to adopt certain specific policies, is either ignored or treated as an unfortunate aberration from the democratic ideal.

⁶ *Thoughts on the Present Discontents*, World's Classics edition, Vol. II, p. 82.

This conception of the democratic process is, in fact, completely inadequate and grossly misleading even if one applies it in this country, where parties are based on rather more specific sets of principles than they are in many other countries. (Although even in Britain it would not be easy to list the respective "sets of principles" on which the members of the Conservative, Labour, and Liberal Parties "are all agreed.") Max Weber offered a better working definition of parties when he described them as "voluntary associations for propaganda and agitation seeking to acquire power in order to . . . realise objective aims or personal advantages or both." The "objective aims" may be of greater or lesser importance in providing the basis of association and the motive force for the activity of a particular party. But there is little doubt that it is the "collective pursuit of power" which is of overriding importance. It is obvious too that during the pursuit of power, and after it has been achieved, parties mould and adapt their principles under the innumerable pressures brought to bear by organised groups of citizens which operate for the most part outside the party system.

I would argue that the basic functions of parties in the British political system are to select, organise, and sustain teams of parliamentarians, between whom the general body of citizens may choose at elections. The "selection" and "sustaining" of the teams is mainly the job of the party outside Parliament; the "organisation" of the teams (and the allocations of roles, including the key role of party leader and potential Prime Minister) is the function of the party within Parliament. It does not matter whether the party is organised on the basis of a set of principles on which all its members are agreed, or whether, alternatively, it represents merely an organised appetite for power. In either case parties play an indispensable role in the democratic system by offering the electorate a free choice between competing teams of potential rulers. In Britain, the parties do profess their loyalty to differing sets of principles and these help to provide an element of cohesion for the parties themselves, and they have the further advantage of offering the electorate a choice, in very broad terms, between differing approaches to the social and economic problems with which governments must deal.

None the less, elections in this country are primarily rough-and-ready devices for choosing between rival parliamentary teams. Under our electoral system (with its disdain for the principles of proportional representation and its penalisation of minor parties) the winning team of parliamentarians rarely obtains half the votes cast. (Indeed only two governments since 1910 have managed to

do so.) And even when, as in 1951, the winning party, the Conservatives, obtained fewer votes than their Labour opponents, no one challenges their right to rule the country.

Pressure Groups as a Corrective to Electoral Anomalies

It is, in part, one suspects, because of the tacit recognition of the enormous and legitimate role played by organised interests that the public acquiesces in the apparent anomalies of our electoral system. It did not much matter that a Conservative government took office in 1951, having obtained fewer votes than the Labour Party which it ousted; the Conservatives would be less sympathetic to the aspirations of the principal supporters of the Labour Party (the trade unions), but the new government were bound to be aware that they could not administer the economic affairs of the country unless they paid very close attention to the demands and the opinions of the trade unions. The trade unions for their part showed no disposition to sulk in their tents when the party of their choice was defeated in the election (although it had obtained more votes than the victors). The trade unions could not expect to play a dominant role in determining the policies of the new government; but they could be confident that most of the channels of communication between the trade unions and the newly elected executive would remain open and that their views would carry great weight with the new administration.

I have suggested that any explanation of the democratic process which ignores the role of organised interests is grossly misleading; I would add that it is also hopelessly inadequate and sterile in that it leaves out of account the principal channels through which the mass of the citizenry brings influence to bear on the decision-makers whom they have elected. In practice, in every democratic society, the voters undertake to do far more than select their elected representatives; they also insist on their right to advise, cajole, and warn them regarding the policies they should adopt. They do this, for the most part, through the pressure-group system. Bentley, in the first trail-blazing analysis of pressure groups written fifty years ago, no doubt over-stated his case when he argued that individuals cannot affect governments except through groups; therefore, Bentley claimed, the "process of government" must be studied as "wholly a group process." But there can be no doubt that pressure groups, taken together, are a far more important channel of communication than parties for the transmission of political ideas from the mass of

the citizenry to their rulers. It is true that a larger proportion of the electorate "belongs to" political parties in this country than in any other democracy. (The Conservative and Labour Parties together claim a membership of over nine million, rather more than one in every four of the voters.) But the number of *active* members who do the work of the parties in the constituencies, who draft the resolutions debated in party conferences and so forth, is not more than a few hundred per constituency. This stage army of the politically active, numbering a hundred thousand or so in each party, invariably claims to speak in the name of the millions of inactive members of the party and, indeed, on behalf of the twelve or thirteen million who normally vote for each party at an election. Further, they alone choose the candidates for their respective parties, and this is of course a vitally important function, since nomination is tantamount to election in two-thirds or three-quarters of the constituencies in Britain. But it is perfectly clear that when most citizens attempt to influence the decision-making process of their elected representatives, they do so through organised groups which we call "interest groups" or "pressure groups."

The Articulation of Group Demands

David Truman, in the most recent full-dress analysis of interest groups, defines them as "shared-attitude groups that make certain claims upon other groups in the society."⁷ And he adds that when they make their claims through or upon any of the institutions of government, they may be called "*political interest groups*." In popular parlance they become "*pressure groups*," which is an acceptable enough term, so long as the word "pressure" is not permitted to carry a too pejorative connotation. Pressure groups differ from parties in that they seek to influence the policy decisions of politicians (and administrators) without themselves seeking to assume direct responsibility for governing the country.⁸ And the *pressure groups system*, in the language of the sociologists, is the set of institutional arrangements in any society which

⁷ D. B. Truman, *The Governmental Process*, p. 37.

⁸ It is admittedly comparatively easy to make this distinction in a preponderantly two-party system of the sort that exists in Britain and the United States; but it is more difficult in certain Continental countries, where minor parties, which would elsewhere be content to function as pressure groups, offer candidates at elections even though they have no prospect, or even expectation, of winning full responsibility for governing the country. And of course it is arguable that in this country the Scottish and Welsh Nationalists are little more than pressure groups seeking to publicise their cause by offering candidates at elections. For a further discussion of this question see Allen Potter, "British Pressure Groups," *Parliamentary Affairs*, Autumn 1956, pp. 418-419.

provides for the "aggregation, articulation, and transmission" of group demands, when these demands are made through or upon governments.

Three Categories of Pressure Groups

Many attempts, some of them very elaborate, have been made to classify pressure groups. But a very simple and workable threefold classification is possible: first there are the *sectional groups*, which include all those whose basis of association is the common economic interest or vocation of their members (e.g., the Federation of British Industries, the National Farmers Union, the Trades Union Congress, the National Union of Teachers, etc.). Their principal function is to advance the interests of their members and to provide them with a variety of services; but inevitably, in the course of their work, they spend a great deal of their time attempting to influence the decisions of elected representatives in one or another of the organs of government.⁹ Secondly, there are the *promotional groups*; they are not usually organised on the basis of a common economic or vocational interest, but are devoted to the advancement of a particular cause such as prison reform, the abolition of capital punishment, the defence of animal welfare, the strengthening of Sabbatarian legislation, etc. These first two categories include almost all groups which are of major political significance within the pressure-group system. But it is possible to designate a third category: *all other groups* which are not included within the first two. This may seem an odd method of classification, but it is very nearly true that every group within a society, however non-political its purpose, occasionally attempts to influence public policy. For example, a Ramblers Association "comes alive politically" on the rare occasion on which Parliament discusses Bills dealing with land use or national parks. The philatelists' associations admittedly would rarely be classified as pressure groups, yet they too no doubt occasionally make representations to governments with respect to the policies pursued in issuing stamps. It is difficult indeed to think of any groups which would not under certain circumstances attempt to bring pressure to bear on the elected decision-makers.

David Truman and others have devised another category to which they attach considerable importance: *potential interest groups*. An example of what they have in mind is the category of people,

⁹ These sectional interest groups are the organisations, in Franz Neumann's phrase, "by which [social] power is translated into political power." *The Democratic and the Authoritarian State*.

largely unorganised, who are deeply devoted to maintaining the "rules of the game" by which political democracy is sustained. When interest groups or political parties seriously transgress these (largely unwritten) rules, then this potential interest group is likely to spring into life. The first indications of its existence might take the form of letters to *The Times* drawing attention to certain dangerous developments in the eyes of the letter writers. Subsequently, if the situation is considered serious enough, *ad hoc* organisations would no doubt be set up to recruit support for those who shared the anxieties of the founders. We have recently seen such a potential interest group taking tangible form as a result of the B.B.C.'s decision to reduce the hours of broadcasting on the Third Programme. It soon became apparent that we had amongst us, perhaps without realising it, a potential pressure group devoted to the defence of high standards in sound broadcasting. Indeed, the more one contemplates the British political scene, the more extraordinary it seems that students of the political process in this country should have so largely ignored the role of pressure groups. There can be few countries in the world in which the inhabitants so readily and so frequently organise themselves into groups for the purpose of influencing or changing the minds of their elected representatives.

Political Affiliation or Neutrality?

Certain of the great sectional groups choose to work through one or other of the great political parties in addition to bringing external pressure to bear on them. Thus, a large proportion of the trade unions are directly affiliated to the Labour Party and a number of unions also sponsor Labour candidates. But, as was noted above, the Trades Union Congress as well as individual unions reserve the right to deal directly with governments, whether Labour or Conservative. The relations between the business community and the Conservative Party are more obscure, in part because the conservatives do not permit direct affiliation of organised groups, and also because they do not publish their accounts. It can be taken for granted, however, that business men, as individuals and in groups, provide the greater part of the Conservative Party's revenue.¹⁰ Yet the great associations representing the business community, such as

¹⁰ It is important to remember, however, as F. C. Newman has pointed out, that in the case of both parties, "it is the programme that attracts the money; the money does not structure the programme," in "Reflections on Money and Party Politics in Britain," *Parliamentary Affairs*, Summer 1957, p. 316.

the Federation of British Industries, expect to be and are intimately consulted by Labour governments. The Federation explains its own purpose in these words: "*whatever the government in power, [the Federation] seeks to create conditions in which each firm has the maximum opportunity to turn its own ideas and resources to the best account in its own and the national interest.*"¹¹

Certain other associations, such as the National Union of Teachers, have also sponsored individual candidates for one or other or both parties. But, as the experience of the National Farmers Union suggests, most interest groups in recent years have tended to avoid a too close association with a particular party. This is partly no doubt because both parties, during their terms of office since the second world war, have shown their willingness to serve, up to a point, as brokers reconciling the interests of rival pressure groups.

There is no doubt widespread fear that parties will in fact degenerate into nothing more than brokers serving competing interest groups; and it is this fear which underlies much of the hostile comment on the activities of pressure groups, and which inhibits a realistic evaluation of the positive and legitimate function of these groups in the political process. It may well be that much writing on pressure groups too casually assumes a happy state of equilibrium. (Bentley argued that "the balance of group pressures is the existing state of society.") There is no doubt that governments which indulge in "piecemeal surrender to interest groups" become incapable of devising a coherent social policy. In the extremity, of course, government action could become merely the resultant of the forces that play upon the decision-makers.

The Experience of Sweden

But the danger can easily be exaggerated. Sweden can be described even more aptly than this country as "a pluralist society" yet it is far from the "pluralist stagnation" which some critics of the interest-group system fear. Gunnar Heckscher (who is both a professor of politics and a Conservative member of the Swedish Parliament) recently commented that "It is now regarded as more or less inevitable" in Sweden that certain of the powerful interest groups "should exercise a power almost equal to that of Parliament

¹¹ *The F.B.I., what it is, what it does*, p. 1 (italics mine). For a very valuable examination of the structure and functioning of the F.B.I., see S. E. Finer, "The Federation of British Industries," *Political Studies*, February 1956, pp. 61-84.

and definitely superior to that of the parliamentary parties."¹² Yet he does not see in this situation any really serious ground for concern; nor is there, he says, any demand in Sweden that action should be taken to curb the powerful organisations. Heckscher attributes the comparatively good health of the Swedish body politic to the "strong sense of responsibility among group leaders" and the "politics of compromise" which govern the relations between the great groups themselves, as well as their relations with governments.

Despite the political and social tensions in contemporary Britain, surely much the same comment can be made about the situation in this country? Vague as the phrase may be, the concept of the "national interest" is still to the forefront in the course of almost every big sectional dispute in this country. Business, Labour, the farmers, the professors, still consider it expedient to argue their case, at least in part, in the terms of the national interest. Governments may from time to time give in to one or other of the great pressure groups, also in the name of the "national interest." But they also on occasion stand out boldly against the claim of pressure groups on the ground that to give way would be to *betray* the national interest.

The Effect of Pressure Groups on Government

If governments may have appeared in recent years to be more pusillanimous than heretofore, it may be in part because since 1950 we have been living in an unusual period of knife-edge parliamentary majorities; and during such periods governments are bound to spend a good deal of time peering over their own shoulders. It is too often forgotten that a uniform 1 per cent. shift from one party to another means a turnover of eighteen seats, and hence a drop of thirty-six in the ruling party's majority. (Thus if at the next election the Conservatives suffer a net loss of two in every hundred of those who supported them in 1955, then their government will be defeated.) One of the most effective ways of minimising the influence on governments of at least some pressure

¹² G. Heckscher, "Interest Groups and Sweden," a paper presented to the *International Political Science Round Table*, Pittsburgh, September 7-14, 1957 (duplicated), p. 8. See also his "Pluralist Democracy; the Swedish Experience," *Social Research*, December 1948, pp. 417-461. It should be noted, in connection with Heckscher's remark quoted above, that there are five parties in the Swedish Parliament, and in such circumstances it is perhaps less surprising than it would be here to remark that certain of the great sectional groups are more powerful than the parliamentary parties.

PARTIES, PRESSURE GROUPS AND BRITISH POLITICAL PROCESS

groups, if this is considered urgently necessary, would be to provide one party or another with a sweeping parliamentary majority.

There are of course other grounds for concern, quite apart from the possibly inhibiting effect of the pressure-group system on governmental decision-making. Many fear that the powerful groups are becoming more powerful and the less well-organised groups relatively weaker. Samuel Eldersveld, writing of the situation in the United States, discussed the possibility that the interest-group system is resulting, not in increased political competition, but in imperfect competition, leading to oligopoly.¹³ And he adds that the "diversification of power sources [in America] means that the decision-making process is more indirect, non-public, and obscure." The same fears are often expressed in Britain. Are there not a very few great interest groups, it is suggested, whose leaders form a kind of inner circle of "oligarchs" which deals frequently and intimately with senior ministers? And is it not the case that this handful of people decide the fate of the whole community, which is, for the most part, unaware even of the issues they are deciding? Again, it would be foolish to ignore evidence of the trend in this direction; equally foolish to ignore the countervailing forces. Certainly it is true that the leaders of big business, big labour, and the farmers have greater ease of "access" to senior ministers, whichever party is in office. But it would be inaccurate automatically to equate "access" with "influence." (To take a slightly frivolous example it seems likely that a Conservative government would be more willing to defy the trade unions and a Labour government the business organisations, than either of them would be likely to defy the Sabbatarian groups, which are not thought to have very ready access to ministers.) And further, it must be remembered that intimacy of contact involves the recognition of mutual responsibilities. Ministers may explain the situation to interest-group leaders frankly and then ask their co-operation "in the national interest."

The Unorganised, Inarticulate Sections

There remains, however, the problem of the ill-organised (or even unorganisable) section of the community. Is there not danger that they will be either ignored or trampled upon by the really powerful interest groups? Certainly the danger is real. But it is the

¹³ S. J. Eldersveld, "American Interest Groups," a paper presented to the *International Political Science Round Table*, Pittsburgh, September 7-14, 1957 (duplicated).

politicians' ultimate worry to see to it that the "little men" (each of whom has as much political influence in the polling booth, at least, as anyone in the land) do not revolt against their policies in such numbers as to bring about their electoral ruin. This surely is one ultimate safeguard of the ill-organised. Indeed, it is arguable that in the long run governments are at least as frightened of the unorganised consumers (in their capacity as voters) as they are of the highly organised economic interests. None the less there is an area of public policy in which the absence of organised groups represents a serious problem. Thus, for example, governments under pressure from shop employees and certain categories of shop-owners, may contemplate further restricting shop hours; there is no one to speak for the shoppers. Or again, governments may be fearful of liberalising licensing hours because of the pressures they would set in motion against themselves from the highly organised temperance forces; there is no organised body to speak for the drinkers. Here, it seems to me, the public opinion polls have a legitimate and important role to play. The evidence they can produce of the shoppers' attitude to proposals for restricting shop hours, or the drinkers' attitude to licensing laws, should be *one* of the factors taken into account by the decision-makers, in addition to the views of the organised interests, in arriving at their policy decisions.

But with reservations such as these, it seems to me reasonable to conclude that the pressure-group system, with all its dangers, is both an inevitable and an indispensable concomitant of the party system. It provides an invaluable set of multiple channels through which the mass of the citizenry can influence the decision-making process at the highest levels. Is it possible that the widespread uneasiness about pressure groups in Britain today is really a result of the shift in the balance of power between the classes? In the paper quoted above, Eldersveld remarked that in "the fluid politics" of America there is no longer "a decisive ruling class" but rather a set of "multiple elites." The same development has obviously occurred in this country; and it is clear that the new elites are struggling to assert their strength in part through the pressure-group system.

THE FARMERS AND THE STATE

PETER SELF and HERBERT STORING

POST-WAR agricultural politics in Britain have been remarkable for two developments. One is the creation of a comprehensive system of state support and control for agriculture, operated in close partnership with the main agricultural organisations. The other, related development, is the emergence of a strong, politically neutral farmers' union occupying a close and privileged position in the counsels of government. This article cannot deal in any detail with the evolution of agricultural policies, nor does it consider the activities of the organisations representing agricultural landlords and agricultural workers. It concentrates upon the activities of much the most powerful agricultural organisation, the National Farmers' Union of England and Wales. There are separate Unions for Scotland and Ulster, but on all main issues they tend to follow the lead of the principal Union.

The Numerical Weakness of Farmers

Politically and economically, British farmers have always suffered from their numerical weakness. Something like 250,000 full-time farmers in England and Wales among a population of 44 million have been impelled to speak with one voice that they might be heard at all. The Union has always attempted to compensate for this weakness with organisational strength. Founded in 1908, the Union appeared at the right moment to exploit the shift in rural farms and influence from the big landlords to the general mass of working farmers, whether owner-occupied or tenants. It was in fact the first organisation to speak equally for both groups. Its claim to speak for farmers was firmly established during the first world war, and by the early 1920s its membership was more than 100,000. It managed to conserve its strength during the difficult depression years and entered the second world war with a membership of 125,000. By 1945 this had grown to 165,000, a growth which continued during the post-war decade. Membership now stands at about 210,000 and probably includes between 80 and 90 per cent. of the full-time farmers in the country.

In spite of this steady organisational progress, the Union has

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emerged with a clear political strategy only during the post-war period. An unsuccessful search for this strategy is the main theme of its pre-war history. While rejecting proposals for an independent agricultural party, the early leaders had sought to establish in Parliament an independent agricultural bloc consisting of members from all parties pledged to support the Union's programme. Substantial numbers of Members of Parliament gave their support and joined an all-party agricultural committee in the House of Commons, but the group never became an independent, disciplined holder of the parliamentary balance on agricultural questions, as the Union had hoped.¹

A Tory Tradition

Concurrently the Union was sponsoring and giving financial support to certain farmer candidates. This was a second line of defence, intended to ensure at least that the views of practising farmers were put forward in parliamentary debates. Several Independent candidates were sponsored, as were a few Liberals, but with no success. The farmers' traditional Tory loyalties held fast, and the only Union candidates to be elected were Conservatives. There were usually one or two Union-sponsored Conservative Members sitting in the House of Commons from 1922 to the second world war. Throughout this period, the Union continued to insist on its neutrality in purely party matters and its willingness to work with the Government of the day. But its failure to find any but Conservative spokesmen in Parliament together with the Conservative predominance during the thirties made it easy for the Union to drift into an unofficial alliance with that party. Thus, as Sir Ivor Jennings has said, the Union's politics during the thirties consisted of "discriminating support to the Conservative Party."² It never wavered in its non-partisan claim, but this was little more than an expression of hope for the future and anxiety about an alliance which, however necessary under the circumstances, was felt to be basically unsound.

The second world war, with party politics on holiday and the country desperately in need of food, saw an immense increase in the prestige and influence of the Union. Whether this would continue

¹ The object was similar to that of the American farm bloc operating at about the same time, but the constitutional and numerical position of American farmers was of course far stronger.

² W. Ivor Jennings, *Parliament* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), p. 178. The emphasis Jennings lays on the farmer-Tory alliance, however, leads him to miss the ambivalence of the Union's strategy during these years. He is not correct, for example, when he asserts that "the Union cannot pretend and does not pretend that it is impartial in the party sense" (p. 212). The Union never abandoned precisely this claim.

after the war was another matter. In the hurried election of 1945, the Union sponsored no candidates, but there is little doubt where most farmers' sympathies lay. The Labour Party had agreed to the post-war agricultural programme planned under the Coalition Government and supported by the Union, but farmers were not happy about the election of a strong Labour Government. The Union's leaders wore their neutrality with little enthusiasm. They were highly suspicious of a party which stood (at that time) for land nationalisation and which drew its main support from the urban workers, having few links with the countryside.

Sympathy from the Left

In the end, Labour proved far and away more tractable than the Union had dared to hope. The new Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Tom Williams, had been Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry during the war. An ex-miner and trade unionist, he was predisposed to view farmers (another group of primary producers) and their Union sympathetically. Labour's very inexperience in agriculture worked strongly to the Union's advantage during a period in which it seemed urgently necessary to expand food production. Where better to go for information, opinion, even policy, than to the farmers' own organisation? Capitalising on this inexperience, and helped by their fast friend in the Cabinet, the Union achieved during these years an unprecedented peak of influence in the making of agricultural policy.

When the Conservatives took office in 1951 the organised farmers maintained their political neutrality. Although one of its leaders became a Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, there was by now no question of the Union's attaching itself to a political party. The same attitude was maintained in 1955. Few Union leaders imagine that their slogan, "Keep agriculture out of politics," means that agricultural policy can be uncontroversial or non-political. Its practical meaning is that agriculture should, so far as possible, be kept out of party politics and parliamentary politics. The Union prefers where possible to exert its influence through the private offices of Whitehall, where its strong organisation and the post-war machinery for consultation give it a favoured place, rather than through influence in Parliament.

Of course the Union cannot disregard party and parliamentary politics altogether. Its representatives meet occasionally with the party agricultural committees in the House of Commons. Memoranda stating its position on current issues are distributed (in a

surprisingly haphazard manner) to Members known to be interested in agricultural questions. But the Union tends to deal with Parliament in a respectful, cautious, and distant manner. It no longer sponsors candidates, nor does it have even quasi-official parliamentary spokesmen, though there are always Members willing to take account of its point of view. It supplies backbenchers and members of the Opposition with questions and material for debates, but this is always a subsidiary part of its strategy. On any major issue the vital negotiations will have occurred privately between the Union and the Government, and once having given its agreement (however reluctantly) the Union does not go "behind the Government's back" to press its case in Parliament.

Neutrality Towards the Parties

As part of this general strategy the Union's headquarters sedulously avoids any activity that might be interpreted as showing partisan preference. The county branches generally pursue a similar neutrality. Most branches maintain some contact with their Members of Parliament, and they are encouraged by headquarters to do so. A committee in each branch usually interviews candidates at the time of each election, but the object is to stimulate a broadly favourable attitude towards farming opinion rather than to seek support for a specific programme. There is thus a curious stopping short in the branches' election-time activities. The results of these interviews are seldom published, and branches do not advise members how to vote. It is said that "word gets around" and "members draw their own conclusions"; but in the absence of any organised or official mobilisation and direction, this source of political power remains (deliberately) potential.³

While politicians give weight to the views of the Union's branches, as they would to any substantial bloc of opinion, there is no doubt that the Union could take more effective action if its object were to influence the selection of candidates and the speeches and votes of Members of Parliament. Such action, however, would tend to undermine the special relationship with the Government on which it mainly relies. Party and parliamentary activities take an unobtrusive second place. They are an indirect means of keeping alive the notion that the farmers' vote is crucial, and they

³ It should be noted that there are still close informal connections between the Union branch and the Conservative local organisation in some counties, where prominent Union leaders sit on the Conservative selection committee; but these branches too avoid any official action that might compromise their neutrality.

stand in readiness should circumstances once again force the Union into direct political activity.

The N.F.U. and the Government

It is now time to examine briefly this "special relationship" between the Union and the Government of the day which has grown up during and since the war. Its legislative basis lies in the Agriculture Act of 1947, which rested on principles agreed to by both main parties as well as by all the principal agricultural organisations. The theory of the Act was that agriculture should enjoy a permanent degree of "security" in return for measures designed to raise its "efficiency." Parliament was, however, deliberately vague as to the concrete meaning of these terms. It was feared that specific statutory provisions might prove too rigid to withstand changes in economic conditions (as they had after the first world war) and the Act provides only a broad framework of objectives and standards whose actual efficacy depends upon their administration.

In practice, the main instrument of "security" has been the annual price review which since 1945 has taken place every February between Government and Union. This review is a highly complex affair which determines guaranteed prices and associated subsidies for all the principal agricultural (except horticulture) commodities and which absorbs a large part of the energies of both the Union and the Ministry of Agriculture. Based originally upon an agreement between the wartime Minister of Agriculture (Lord Hudson) and the Union, the review's character has been shaped by a series of "understandings" (written or unwritten) arrived at by the two participants. The most significant if least admitted of these is that the final settlement (which, constitutionally, is of course the Government's sole responsibility) shall be broadly acceptable to both parties. In the earlier years most settlements won a clear endorsement from the Union; subsequently, its concurrence was often given grudgingly or was hedged with reservations but only in one year (1956) did it actually dissociate itself from the result.

The Annual Price Review

The price review has been the forum for numerous tussles between Government and Union which cannot be related here. Suffice it to note that the main proceedings and purposes of the review have so far successfully survived all political and economic vicissitudes, although there was a time (the period during which food was being decontrolled) when the most cherished assumptions of the Union

were shaken and it almost wavered in its political impartiality. Most of the bickering goes on in private, but on occasions it has erupted into a fierce public controversy. The best examples are the special price review row between Tom Williams and the Union in 1946, and the breach over the price settlement of 1956. The latter even marked one of the rare irruptions of the Union into parliamentary politics, with county branches severely castigating their Conservative M.P.s. In both cases the Union's indignation produced gratifying results, with the Government demonstrating its unwillingness to accept a complete break with its well-established agricultural practices. Yet the essence of such tactics is that they can be deployed only rarely. The breakdown of the partnership, however unpopular it might make the Government, would destroy still more certainly the foundations of the Union's policy.

The promotion of agricultural efficiency (the other half of the 1947 Act) has been mainly in the hands of County Agricultural Committees. These bodies have close links with the National Agricultural Advisory Service, they administer numerous subsidies and regulations, and they wield the sanctions of supervision and dispossession over the heads of inefficient farmers and landlords. Recently their work has been cut down and the use of penal sanctions is about to be scrapped—a change which hits at the wide original conception of the 1947 Act. Three of the members of each Committee are selected from nominations made by the Union, but the actual number of Union members is generally greater than this. The Union scrupulously refrains from “controlling” in any way its members on the Committees, which act as the Minister's agents, but any split between Union and Government would affect these members' attitudes and might even cause their wholesale resignation—an event which would have had serious repercussions at the time of the food production drive.

A Unique Monopolistic Position

The Union has not only secured a unique position *vis-à-vis* the Government, its position is also close to being a monopoly one. When the Agriculture Act was being debated in the House of Commons, the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Tom Williams, made it clear that he presumed the Union to be adequately representative of farmers' interests and that he would refuse to admit other organisations into the annual price negotiations.⁴ Despite some grumbles from other bodies, he and his successors have adhered to this policy.

⁴ *Hansard, Standing Committees* (1946–1947), Vol. 2, Cols. 78–79.

The Union's participation in public policy-making for agriculture has become almost automatic. Its untouched position at the price review strengthens its claims in other fields. On one occasion (the decontrol of eggs) when it was *not* consulted, it declined to take part in the next annual review until it had secured a promise that the omission would not be repeated. Since the war, the preparation of marketing schemes has been a joint product of Union and Government. Union representatives sit on numerous advisory committees, such as the Agricultural Improvement Council, the Hill Farming Advisory Committee, and the Myxomatosis Advisory Committee. Its leaders, and more particularly its bureaucracy, are connected by dozens of informal ties with all kinds of agricultural policy-making and administration. The habits and attitudes engendered by the annual price reviews are all pervasive. While the farmers sometimes complain of lack of consultation by other departments, such as the Board of Trade, complaints of this kind about the Ministry of Agriculture are extremely rare.

The Leadership of the N.F.U.

The Union's post-war strategy has required changes in its internal organisation. Its rules and traditions frown on continuity in the elected leadership, but in 1945 the National Council elected Mr. (now Sir James) Turner to the Presidency, and he has been re-elected in each succeeding year. At the same time, the unusual step was taken of appointing Turner's predecessor as President, Mr. William Knowles, to the position of General Secretary, which he still occupies. The next year the Council recognised the virtual professionalisation of its leadership in its decision to pay the President a salary of £5,000 a year.

Dominant personalities are the usual pattern in some organisations; but in the old National Farmers' Union, once Colin Campbell had set it on its way, there had been a seemingly endless chain of nameless men moving regularly into and out of the positions of national leadership. Sir James Turner will be remembered, and the end of his tenure is not yet in sight. Urbane enough to put the countryman's case in Whitehall, the President is rustic enough to assure members that his loyalties are sound. His speeches, riddled with *clichés* and dripping with righteous indignation and heavy patriotic sentiment, achieve a remarkable response; and he is almost universally admired by farmers. The “sacred bull of agriculture,” as he has been jokingly called, is nicely complemented by the astute

Mr. Knowles. Aside from personal qualities, this team now has more experience of high level agricultural policy-making than almost any public servant holding responsible office in this field.

Its Internal Organisation

Inevitably, this has its effect on the Union's organisation. The top-heavy national council is the policy-making body only in form. The ordinary council member is not at the centre of decisive deliberations—however much, back at his county branch, he may pretend the contrary. Policy-making positions in the Union are primarily matters of personal relations with the President and general secretary. Over the years, indeed, the calibre of council members has tended to decline. Farmers who would seek the honour and prestige of the top position see it closed to them; those who would share leadership see little prospect of breaking into the inner group and will very likely prefer a position on their county branch executive to one on the national council. Partly for this reason the atrophy has not spread to the local units. As a rule discussion there is free and critical, and the branches retain considerable vitality.

One final corollary of the Union's post-war strategy must be noted: an emphatic and sometimes ruthless pressure towards comprehensiveness. Because it has had no competition from another general farmers' organisation, the Union's activities in this respect have been mainly at the periphery. It grants the legitimacy of specialist and commodity organisations, so long as they recognise its over-all pre-eminence in dealing with government. (The relationship, in the Union's view, is rather like that between suzerain and protectorate.) But it tends to define the jurisdiction of the smaller bodies ever more narrowly. It wants no area of general interest to farmers and no area, however specialised, of potential political importance, to lie outside its own control.

The Union has found the co-operative movement difficult to digest, and there are rumblings elsewhere as well. Its grip on the horticultural side of the industry, which does not share the guarantees of the 1947 Act, is uncertain. In poultry and egg production the Union has extended its control and absorbed a number of small organisations in recent years, but there remains at least one substantial independent organisation. Finally, a group of dissenters has established a new farmers' organisation in Wales, now almost two years old. This revolt, fired by Welsh nationalism and fed with the grievances of small farmers, is unlikely to succeed in throwing

the Union out of Wales, but it has shown a surprising tenacity in the face of the Union's vigorous counter-attack.

The Need for a United Front

Given their weak numerical position, the advantages to agricultural producers of a comprehensive organisation are obvious enough, so long as their leaders do not neglect one or another section of the membership. Particular groups do periodically complain that their interests are overlooked, but discontent has not risen to the point where it outweighs the disadvantages of an isolated independence. Generally speaking, farmers have good reason to be satisfied with the Union's achievements on their behalf.

The public also benefits by this arrangement, but the issue here is more complex. The Union has to sift and adjust the various and competing claims of its members before the claims of farmers as a whole are put to the public. Farmers (and more particularly their local and national leaders) have become accustomed to seeking some basis of compromise broader than their own immediate interests. This tendency is reinforced by the Union's special consultative relationship with the Government, a relationship requiring the Union to moderate sectional demands with a share of responsibility for public policy. The farmers' leaders now tend to begin their utterances, and to some extent their thoughts, with "the nation needs," rather than "we want." Obviously what they think the nation needs is prosperous farmers. There is a good deal of sectional bias in their public interest claim. But this discovery must not be—as it so often is in the literature on interest groups—the beginning and end of an evaluation. Many non-farmers too believe that the nation needs prosperous farmers. Moreover, the leaders of the Union can and do give reasons for their proposals and try to justify them in terms of the public interest. This implies an obligation to listen to reason in return. Leaving aside all other considerations, if the farmers demonstrated no willingness at all to engage in reasonable deliberation about the public interest they would soon lose the ear of the Government; they would thus destroy the basis for one of their important sources of "access," the power of a good argument fairly heard. The farmers are not so rich in the cruder forms of political power that they can afford to neglect this one.

Having said that, it remains true that the leaders of the Union are, quite properly, not primarily concerned with the public interest. Sectional leaders can be taught to be statesmanlike, but they are not

statesmen. Their first responsibility is to maintain a strong organisation through which their members' opinions and interests can be expressed and to see to that expression. Thus the Union usually begins its negotiations with the Government by pressing almost all of the claims of its members equally hard. Making the expected retreat under Government pressure, its next object is to spread the effects of any change in policy equally among its membership. "No change of emphasis" is an expression of the Union's rule of thumb standard of distributive justice and, at the same time, of its shrewd attempt to avoid rocking the organisational boat.

Competing Interests among the Farmers

So long as conditions change, however, Government policies will require changes in emphasis. Whether the aim is to achieve certain production targets or to get more value for each subsidy pound spent, the Government is likely to want some changes in the distribution as well as in the total amount of its support. This is one of the points where the advantages of dealing with a single comprehensive organisation—rather than one representing arable farmers, another representing milk producers, etc.—might be expected to come into play. But, until recently at any rate, Governments have been extremely unwilling to risk the Union's disagreement with the final "settlement." The result has been a series of *ad hoc* bargains satisfying no one. The Union has managed to prevent any drastic changes in emphasis, but there have been frequent, relatively small shifts which farmers find irritating and upsetting. They criticise the Government for its lack of consistency, and they call for a long-term policy. But to a considerable extent the absence of such a policy is due to the very success of the Union's pressure on short-term objectives. Any reasonable long-term policy would involve some unpalatable adjustments and it would be unpopular with certain sections of farming opinion. While it is true that the Union's leaders might have been more flexible—in addition to a desire to avoid organisational upheaval they have an almost morbid fear that any changes will lead to a complete withdrawal of support—the post-war Governments (and, in particular, their Ministers of Agriculture) bear the main responsibility. It was they who, concerned with the need to secure farmers' co-operation, drifted into the habit of taking no major decision for which the Union could not or would not share the responsibility.

Recently there have been some signs that the ties of partnership are loosening, but they have not yet been thrown off. As already

noted, in 1956 the Union refused, for the first time in a decade, to agree to the annual price settlement. Fortified by the declining importance of home food production and a Minister (now responsible for food as well as agriculture) less awed by the Union than his predecessors, the Government stood fast in its determination to reduce considerably the wastefully high guarantees on milk and eggs. The reaction was more violent than the Government (or, indeed, the Union leaders) had anticipated. After a parliamentary storm, talks were opened with the Union which led to a new long-term settlement, now embodied in the Agriculture Act of 1957. The Act makes the economic guarantees to agriculture a good deal more precise, by restricting the extent to which the Government may reduce their value—both collectively and for each commodity—in any one year. By implication, the Union has accepted in return the probability of some gradual reduction in the level of Government support. Essentially, the Act is a renegotiation of partnership within more definitive limits.

A Too-Close Embrace ?

It is possible to arrive at one tentative conclusion. "Partnership" in agriculture, whatever its specific advantages, has on the whole been much too close to be really healthy for either partner. The Union has steered clear of most of the more obvious abuses of its privileged position, but inevitably its leadership has been strengthened and to some extent insulated from its rank and file. For example, some marketing schemes have provoked legitimate criticism on the grounds that Union members had no real chance to debate them. More seriously perhaps, the effect of "partnership" has been to divert all the energies of the Union (and too much of the interest of farmers) into close political bargaining and away from those schemes of enlightened self-help which have done so much to improve the status of agriculture in many other countries. For the Government and particularly for the agricultural department, "partnership" has come to mean an excessive sensitivity to Union views, combined with a tendency to adopt an over-defensive attitude on agricultural issues. The development of new public policies is inhibited by fears either that they will be unacceptable to the Union or alternatively that they will "give away" rather more of what the Union would like than (on strategic grounds) is initially wise. Government by anxious compromise is not an inspiring process.

EX-SERVICEMEN IN POLITICS

GRAHAM WOOTTON

*O wad some Pow'r the giftie gie us
To see oursels as others see us!*

It is, as Burns implied, a gift rarely bestowed upon individuals, and individuals organised in groups seem to be no better endowed. Certainly few organised ex-servicemen in this country have "seen" themselves as participants in politics. Yet, in the eyes of "others," they have been engaging in politics ever since 1917. Surveying the whole period since then, the political observer can readily distinguish four forms of such activity:

- A. association with an established political party;
- B. attempts at winning direct representation in the House of Commons;
- C. during General Elections, support of this ("ordinary") candidate or that in the constituencies, according to promises given or withheld;
- D. continual pressure on Governments or Ministers, combined with the creation of public opinion.¹

Such activities, of course, are not entirely separable; they tend to shade into one another, although it should not be supposed that each one was undertaken by every ex-serviceman's organisation. Nor should A, B, C, and D be taken as a time series; these activities were, for a period, carried on contemporaneously. The four categories merely represent aspects of the whole scene. Despite these qualifications, it is convenient for the purpose of analysis to treat the political activity of organised ex-servicemen as if a sharp identification and division at a particular moment in time were in fact fully practicable.

Relations with Political Parties

A. Association with an established political party has taken various forms. Some ex-servicemen's societies have been virtually projections of a party, and so have had the status of auxiliaries from the

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¹ Or the creation of "opinion about public opinion." Cf. W. J. M. Mackenzie (VI) *Brit. Jour. Soc.*, June 1955, p. 143.

very beginning (Labour League of Ex-Servicemen; ex-service wing of the British National Party; today, the Ex-Service Movement for Peace). Others developed more casually, but even these arrived at positions (not necessarily occupied for long) roughly corresponding to well-defined political attitudes, if not always quite so clearly to political parties as such (National Association, N.U.X., Federation, and Comrades).²

It was the second group that arose first. The National Association was founded in Blackburn late in 1916. To begin with, Philip Snowden, then a Labour M.P. for the borough, was connected with it, and although he did not remain attached for long, the Association, expanding by way of the Trades and Labour Councils,³ established sufficiently formal relations with the Labour movement for it to be officially described, without qualification, as "a Labour organisation."

The N.U.X., too, was a Labour organisation, formed in 1919 as a breakaway of Labour men from the Federation. They took the view that the role of the Federation was even "more subtle and more sinister" than the role of the Comrades. "It is not openly anti-Labour" wrote one of their pamphleteers. On the contrary, many of its individual members were sympathetic to the Labour movement. "But the purpose of the organisation as a whole is to be merely non-Labour." Their leaders knew well that if they could prevail on a large body of workers to stand aside from the struggle of the workers for the right to live, that was all that was necessary to enable the master class to divide and rule. The Federation (the writer concluded) was based on a recognition that independent organisation apart from Labour played into the hands of the employing class. Those who thought on these lines formed the N.U.X., which became "an integral part of the general Labour movement."

If the National Association and the N.U.X. were Labour, the Federation and Comrades were, respectively, Liberal and Conservative, but the knot was much less tightly drawn. The connection was made and maintained by individual M.P.s, and how far they were furthering their parties' cause as distinct from their own is not entirely clear. Many people suspected that J. M. Hogge, the Radical M.P., who did more than any man at the beginning to push

² The National Association of Discharged Sailors and Soldiers; the National Union of Ex-Servicemen; the National Federation of Discharged and Demobilised Sailors and Soldiers; the Comrades of the Great War.

³ *Northern Daily Telegraph*, November 1, 1916.

the Federation along, was giving himself "a leg up"; and there is some evidence to suggest that he was in fact hedging his bet on the revival of the Liberal Party's fortunes in the post-war world. Whatever his motives, he at first *was* the Federation, and with his House of Commons colleague, W. M. R. Pringle (of the sprightly team, Pringle and Hogge) as Vice-President, he loosely linked that organisation to the Liberal Party. Certainly in 1917 the Federation was a vehicle in which Opposition Liberal views were displayed and carried.

Relations between the Comrades of the Great War and the Conservative Party were much more complex,⁴ but beyond all doubt the moving spirits were two Conservative M.P.s, Wilfrid Ashley⁵ and Sir John Norton Griffiths. One also notes that the first (acting) secretary was Mr. (later Sir) Patrick Hannon, then General Secretary of the Navy League, and later a Conservative M.P. himself. Ashley and Griffiths were quite different in background and character. Griffiths had had an adventurous career. Sailing before the mast at seventeen, he had gone almost literally around the world to reach the House of Commons, where he had earned another title, "Empire Jack." Ashley, on the other hand, was born to position and power, but they were as close as David and Jonathan in fearing that the Left was capturing the ex-servicemen's movement (the year was 1917), and in taking vigorous action to save England from *ex-soldiers'* councils.

It was Ashley who, knowing "everybody," was mainly responsible for sending the hat round, putting in £1,000 or so himself *pour encourager les autres*. Lords Tredegar and Leconfield and others followed his example. The great industrial and commercial enterprises were not to be outdone: Denaby and Cadeby Main Collieries; Ellerman Lines; Glyn Mills, Currie; and Lloyds Bank (£1,000 each). Stanley Baldwin, Sir James Horlick, and Viscount Iveagh (to choose a few names almost at random), could only manage half that sum, but Walter Morrison doubled it. C. A. Cain (later the first Lord Brocket) surpassed them all with a gift of £10,000, a remarkable gesture.

In 1917 alone (really four or five months at most) over £32,000 was raised as if by magic; no wonder the rival "leftish" associations, struggling for pennies, were sick with envious anger. It was hardly to be expected that 1918 would yield so rich a crop. Lord Tredegar again gave £1,000 and some new "thousand-pounders" were raked in: Sir Alfred Mond; London, City and Midland Bank;

⁴ See *Official History of the British Legion*, pp. 3-5.

⁵ Father of the present Countess Mountbatten, he later became Lord Mount Temple.

London, City and Westminster Bank; National Provincial Bank; Edwin Tate, etc. Businesses as diverse as Dorman Long's (steel) and Elders and Fyffes' (bananas) furnished £500, although another steel company—the South Durham—put up no more than £200. If the bankers' standard contribution was £1,000, the brewers seem to have been content to give only a tenth as much (Watneys; Barclay, Perkins). Nevertheless, in total, 1918 yielded over £21,000—a pretty good haul by any standard.

In the two succeeding years, a number of the principal subscribers remained faithful to the cause: Denaby and Cadeby Collieries; Ellerman Lines; Sir Alfred Mond and Lord Tredegar (£1,000 each year). Sir James Horlick too gave another £500 in 1919. There were also many new recruits, *e.g.*, in 1919, "worth" a hundred guineas each, Associated Portland Cement; British Portland Cement; and the Prudential (thus lending support to the popular saying that the "'Pru' is in everything"). In those two years, some £26,000 was collected, making a total of about £80,000. Money was not *talking*: it was sounding a trumpet-call.

Many of the subscribers of that £80,000 undoubtedly put up the money as an insurance premium against Bolshevism. Of the other, later group of associations, the only one that can be even mentioned here is the Labour League of Ex-Servicemen, which, despite its name, was not Labour but Communist. Founded in 1927 under the leadership of an ex-officer with the somewhat unrevolutionary name of Snooks, it resembled a bourgeois ex-serviceman's organisation in arranging marches, notably in the East End of London and Newcastle-on-Tyne, but its members were rather out of character in wearing old battle-dress with red ties and in uttering class war slogans. They also demonstrated their revolutionary fervour by deliberately marching out of step.

Ex-Servicemen Candidates

B. There are three variations on the theme of sectional representation: the centrally organised effort; the spontaneous local enterprise; and a combination of both. The intervention of the tiny Silver Badge Party in the 1918 General Election exemplifies the first variation, but the Federation's role on the same occasion is chosen for mention here, partly because it illustrates the third variation as well but chiefly because it was in itself vastly more important.

The National Executive Council of the Federation decided as

early as June 1918 that they would contest eight seats at the next General Election. But the choice of seats was left to the Divisional Councils, who had to consult the branches, and the branches had ideas of their own. The upshot of it was that unofficial as well as official candidates stood in the name of the Federation, about twenty⁶ in all, the most important attempt by any British ex-service organisation to win a measure of power as, in effect, a political party. No doubt Hogge, the President, would have rejected the imputation of "party," but a pressure group that contests Parliamentary elections (a by-election had been fought the previous year) is obviously changing its sex. What is true is that Hogge was not thinking of a "soldiers' party" as such; indeed he warned ex-servicemen not to isolate themselves. He visualised an ex-service *foundation* for "another and powerful new party" that would include not only the dependants of ex-servicemen but also those who had "slaved at home." As a critic rightly said, Hogge "dreams dreams about a semi-soldier party."

Dreams they remained; every candidate was defeated,⁷ many ignominiously, some obviously beaten before they had reached the starting-post. The campaign cannot be described here, but it should be noted that the failure to win a single seat does not mean that the intervention itself was a failure. On the contrary, it had some success as an alternative form of pressure on the Government; this was especially true of the battle in Ashton-under-Lyne, where a strong Federation candidate gave a Minister, Sir Albert Stanley, a bad fright, sufficient to bring Lord Beaverbrook (the former member) to the rescue, despite ill-health, on the eve of the poll.

The spontaneous initiative of the local branch of the National Association in Sowerby Bridge, on the other hand, bore fruit; and so Yorkshire had the distinction of returning the first, and only, M.P. elected on a particular ex-service organisation's "ticket."⁷ But circumstances were very special indeed. Major Robert Barker, the sporting and very popular "local boy" with a good war record, could not have won had the sitting Liberal member not combined a "Little England" background with absurd over-confidence, receiving but refusing to use the Lloyd George-Bonar Law "coupon," and had there not been a revolt of the local

⁶ *The Times*, December 9, 1918, supp., identified 23, but one at least withdrew and another was disowned.

⁷ As late as March 4, 1919 (15 d), *The Times* thought that one Federation candidate had been successful, but the M.P. they had in mind had been put up by a rival organisation. *Halifax Daily Guardian*, January 2, 1919; *Hebden Bridge Times*, January 3, 1919, and March 14, 1919.

Conservatives against both the imposition of a coupon and the forced withdrawal of their own candidate.

Again, this interesting campaign cannot be described on this occasion, but it may be noted that the National Association was not able to press home the advantage of having its own M.P. Its headquarters had no claim on him, and, in any case, Major Barker, although by no means entirely isolated in the House—he usually took the Government Whip—had a hard row to hoe. In 1922 he left Westminster of his own accord to return to the family business at Todmorden.

Pressure at General Elections

C. It is, of course, a characteristic of the 1918 election that "discharged soldiers, co-operators, women candidates, agricultural labourers, seamen, and teachers" made "their first bid for independent parliamentary representation."⁸ But such a bid was not the most characteristic activity of discharged men: their main organised effort was an attempt to influence the election of "ordinary" candidates and, ultimately, the policy of the new Government.

In pursuit of that aim, local branches of at least three of the organisations interviewed candidates and formulated an official attitude towards them. At Spalding, for instance, the members of the National Association were left free to vote as they pleased; at Lincoln, however, they spoke on public platforms for the Coalition candidate.⁹ The Silver Badge Party also had visions of binding candidates to their (Silver Badge) programme, but visions were all they ever enjoyed. It was the Federation and, later, the British Legion that made the most systematic attempt to influence the outcome of General Elections. In the 1918 election, Federation Branches were supplied with test questions to put to candidates, and were allowed to adjudicate on the answers received. It was claimed that a "large number" of branches received assurances of support from members of all parties on all the questions submitted. Some branches passed resolutions supporting candidates who had given satisfactory pledges.

The British Legion followed the Federation in using the questionnaire as an election instrument. The first opportunity came in 1922 when the Legion's policy was that it "could not possibly allow the General Election to pass without making quite certain that a House

⁸ *The Times*, December 9, 1918. D. Butler, *The Electoral System in Britain*, pp. 155–156.

⁹ *Grimsby Gazette*, December 14, 1918.

of Commons favourable to their ideals and policy was elected." A thirteen-point questionnaire was drawn up and submitted to candidates by branches, who then had to decide if the replies were favourable. If all were considered so, the branch merely published them without making any recommendations. Members then voted as they pleased. But if, in a straight fight, one of the candidates showed himself unfavourable to the inquiries or declined to make any pledge, the branch would be entitled to give "active support for the candidate who had shown himself as in support of their policy." Such "active support," it was recognised, entailed branch intervention "in politics," although (the advice concluded) the more that could be avoided the better.

How far branches generally found it necessary to intervene is almost impossible to judge now. The consensus of informed opinion, however, is that, in the three elections from 1922 to 1924, some branches did try to produce a House of Commons "favourable to their ideals and policy," and that such intervention gave rise to the charge that the Legion was participating in party politics. It was easy to retort that in *this* constituency the Legion supported the Conservative interest, in *that*, Labour or Liberal, depending on the candidates' response to the questionnaire. But what local people knew and probably remembered was that the Legion had worked against *their* man.

The impression so received must have been strengthened in 1926, when the bewilderment and anger of the rank and file at what they regarded as the betrayal of the Legion's cause by ex-service M.P.s in the House of Commons, especially in their role as members of the House of Commons Branch of the Legion, led them to demand participation in General Elections on a nationally-co-ordinated basis.¹⁰ Their decision, taken against the platform, was reversed the following year, but not before the Legion had brought down on its head the disapproval not only of Earl Haig but also of King George V.

Such were the forces of "domestication," perhaps especially the danger of losing royal patronage, that from then onwards the Legion withdrew further and further away from the arena of party politics. In December 1928 the National Executive Council decided not to submit questionnaires at the next election. Just before the election, candidates were sent a copy of the Legion's policy statement and asked to give their views on it. Such views were to be

¹⁰ *Official History of the British Legion*, pp. 91-94.

put before the branch members, but headquarters "emphatically" impressed on all branches "that it would be entirely wrong to take any action in its corporate capacity as a branch as a result of the replies received from any one or other candidate." As this was precisely what branches had previously been advised to do, the new instructions represented a complete reversal of policy.

Since then the story has been one of the decline and fall of the questionnaire. The Legion revived it for the 1950 election, when four questions were submitted to candidates, but has not used it since. Nowadays it is the statement of policy sent with a covering letter to candidates, possibly followed by a delegation from branches in the constituency, that holds the field during a General Election. It is a very far cry from the days when the Legion was trying to make "quite certain" of a House of Commons "favourable to their ideals and policy."

Creation of Public Opinion

D. Today a very different pattern of political activity may be discerned. Apart from the Ex-Service Movement for Peace, which is dead if not yet lying down, the first three forms of political action have been abandoned, and the grand strategy now followed, not only by the British Legion but also by B.L.E.S.M.A. and R.A.F.A.,¹¹ is to bring pressure to bear partly on Ministers but above all, of course, on Governments, while constantly creating public opinion.

Within this narrowed-down meaning of "political," an important change of emphasis has taken place. From the very beginning, most of the associations made appeals to public opinion; yet, on the whole, their pressure on the Government had a directness that is not typical today, and which was epitomised in the Ministerial deputation. It is misleading to say that the four organisations that eventually formed the Legion sometimes went on deputations every week,¹² yet there is no doubt that the deputation was an important method of pressure. The unstated assumption underlying its use was that a face-to-face discussion with the decision-makers would produce the desired results. Even the mass demonstrations organised by the Federation, chiefly in London but also in the Provinces, while obviously intended to impress the general public, were also aimed directly at the Government. When, for instance, late in 1919, Lloyd George refused to receive a

¹¹ British Limbless Ex-Service Men's Association; R.A.F. Association.

¹² John H. Millett (LXXII) *Pol. Sc. Q.*, March 1957, p. 74.

Federation deputation, the threat of another mass demonstration brought him to heel.¹³

The Roundabout Approach

Except for the mass demonstration, which was abhorrent to those who had been members of the Comrades of the Great War, the Legion inherited the techniques of its predecessors, but a change in emphasis from a mainly direct to a mainly roundabout approach to Governments is clearly observable. The deputation has suffered a great fall; the petition to Parliament went the way of the questionnaire—only sooner; the serious attempt to work through the House of Commons Branch has been relinquished. Indeed, the House of Commons Branch itself (founded 1922) was disbanded in March 1955,¹⁴ and replaced by a Legion Parliamentary Group—a symbolical transformation. The amenities of this country do not seem to have included a “Hall of the Bleeding Heart,” where lobbyists passed over bribes to politicians in the form of winnings at cards, but the stage has long been reached when “propaganda is the strongest weapon” in the armoury of the ex-servicemen’s leaders.¹⁵ Today, the main route is roundabout, although of course the ultimate destination—the point of decision-making—is still the same.

This propagandist approach is also characteristic of the R.A.F. Association, which had an arrangement with Polygon Publicity Services until 1955, when a Fleet Street journalist became their Honorary Adviser on Public Relations and Publicity.¹⁶ But the broad generalisation is subject to three qualifications. One is that there has been some revival of the direct-impact method in the combined deputation of eighteen ex-service societies to the Minister of Pensions in March 1957. Secondly, B.L.E.S.M.A., while no less propagandist than the other organisations, makes more use of (relatively) direct methods. In 1951, for instance, they held a national “Protest and Reproach Meeting” at Westminster, and four groups, each consisting of seven badly disabled members, carried copies of the agreed resolution to No. 10 Downing Street, No. 11, the Cabinet Offices, and the Ministry of Pensions. Later, over 100 delegates, matched by more than 100 M.P.s, attended a meeting in the House of Commons, at which a small all-party Committee of M.P.s was established, while some 200 delegates

waited in the Central Lobby.¹⁷ Another “Protest and Reproach” meeting in 1955 was the prelude to a similar procedure.

Thirdly, although the deputation was the main, it was, of course, never the only form of direct approach: before even the Legion was formed, there was provision for consultation in the Government Standing Joint Committee on Ex-Service Questions, on which three of the leading (membership) societies were represented, and later, by inheritance, the British Legion. Then, under the War Pensions Act, 1921, the Central Advisory Committee to the Ministry of Pensions was set up, on which the Legion had four representatives out of eighteen (later, out of twenty-two). Today, when not only the Legion but also the R.A.F.A. and B.L.E.S.M.A. are represented on the Central Advisory Committee, and when in “the matter of pensions, contact between the British Legion and the Ministry of Pensions runs from top to bottom on both sides,”¹⁸ the habit of consultation is certainly significant as part of the general story of the “domestication” of pressure groups, and in modifying the generalisation that the “pressure-route” has become more circuitous than it used to be.

Still, there *are* only qualifications. No doubt the Ministerial deputation, by being eighteen times as representative, has had a cubit added to its stature, but, after all, it only requires the Minister to be at most eighteen times as conciliatory as he was before. (It is true that the combined deputation to the Prime Minister on October 21 last will be followed by the raising of the basic rate of pension, but only a very innocent commentator would regard these events as cause and effect.) “Protest and Reproach” meetings are exceptional, and consultation is not of the same order of importance for organised ex-servicemen as it is for, say, trade associations. Moreover, it is a mistake to regard the Central Advisory Committee, particularly in the 1920’s, as the locus of bargaining.¹⁹ The Committee met only occasionally (e.g., under the first Labour Government it was never summoned at all, and there was a lapse of over a year); and even the Legion has never held more than a quarter of the places on it. Certainly in 1923–1924, as again in 1939–1943, some important details were worked out in the Central Advisory Committee, but it seems clear that no major concession has ever

¹³ *Federation Annual Report, 1919–1920*, p. 5.

¹⁴ Cf. John H. Millett (IX) *West. Pol. Q.*, December 1956, p. 919.

¹⁵ E. P. Herring, *Group Representation Before Congress*, pp. 32–33 and 60.

¹⁶ *Annual Report, 1955*, p. 14.

¹⁷ *Blesmag.*, January 1, 1952, and January 1, 1956.

¹⁸ Cmd. 7904/1950, p. 48 (128). On the significance of consultation generally, see Mr. John Stewart’s forthcoming study of the role of pressure groups in the House of Commons. See also S. E. Finer (V) *Pol. Studies*, June 1957, p. 193; and Allen Potter (28) *Pol. Q.*, January–March 1957, p. 96.

¹⁹ John H. Millett (LXXII) *Pol. Sc. Q.*, March 1957, pp. 73–74.

been won *inside* it. So although consultation affords a direct route, it is not, on the whole, an important "pressure-route." It therefore remains broadly true that the principal "pressure-route" has become more roundabout. Thus, not only have the first three forms of political activity been abandoned, but also there has been a marked change of emphasis within the remaining one.

The Aims of Political Pressure

What have these political activities been designed to achieve? As a rough generalisation, one may say that association with a party implied broad political aims, while the other kinds of political activity have been aspects of the competition for scarce goods.²⁰ The distinction is by no means exact; one of the broad political aims was to attack or defend the existing social order, and such conflicts partly turn on a desire to alter or maintain the distribution of scarce goods. Nevertheless, the distinction is useful.

The Federation in 1917 had a broad political aim, which did not, however, go very deep: it was used as a Liberal stick to belabour the Coalition Government for its Review of Exceptions Act. But neither the Federation nor the Association was merely an instrument wielded by virtual "outsiders"; their members also had broad political aims in that they were quite consciously and very strongly rebelling against "charity," and implicitly, therefore, against their own status in society. The Comrades of the Great War was as clearly designed to preserve the social order, as the N.U.X. and, later, the Labour League were designed to undermine or destroy it. (And although the British Legion has never been associated with a party in the sense here indicated, fear of a social revolution played a part in its foundation.)

Pensions claims are the obvious, but not the only, form that competition for scarce goods has taken. Certainly in the early history of the Legion, competition for scarce "jobs" was even more important: training facilities and allowances; preference for ex-servicemen; attempts to persuade the Government to provide employment through a public works programme; the compulsory employment of disabled men; and so on. But pensions policy gradually became the major pre-occupation, and since 1939 it has been the predominant one. Today, in the context of full employment and social services but also of inflation, the fundamental claim at present is for a basic pension rate of 90s. a week. Twenty-two of

²⁰ W. J. M. Mackenzie (III) *Pol. Studies*, October 1955, p. 249.

the ex-service societies, led by the British Legion, R.A.F.A., and the Royal Marines Association, but including bodies as varied as the Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen and Women, St. Dunstan's, and the Association of Wrens, are now united on that policy. The main dissident is B.L.E.S.M.A., who, while wanting a substantial increase in the basic rate, would like to see awards made on the principle "equal compensation for equal disablement, irrespective of rank," and who in general pursue a "selective" pensions policy (e.g., age allowances for those 59,000 badly disabled survivors of the 1914-1918 War who are now aged 58-64).

Organised ex-servicemen in this country, then, have been speaking (political) prose all their (institutional) lives, and only the more sophisticated among them have realised it. But their incomprehension is excusable: even Professor Beer and other American scholars, stepping briskly ashore in England, have found it necessary to ask: where are your pressure groups?²¹ The truth is that the ex-servicemen's failure to appreciate the political nature of their activities has had its parallel in the failure, until recently, of most British political scientists to give a realistic account of the formulation of public policy in this country. If the professional students failed to describe and illuminate the role of interest groups in our governing process, then it is, after all, not surprising that some of the practitioners themselves—the organised ex-servicemen—should have hardly understood that, for over forty years now, and for the most part quite legitimately, they have been engaging in "politics." Had the eyes of our political scientists been opened sooner, it *wad frae mony a blunder* have freed us—*And foolish notion*.

²¹ (L) *Am. Pol. Sc. Rev.*, March 1956, p. 1.

PRESSURE GROUPS I HAVE KNOWN

RT. HON. G. R. STRAUSS, M.P.

PRESSURE groups, in some form or another, assail the Member of Parliament every day of his life. They await him when he enters the precincts of the House and picks up his mail. Probably outnumbering the letters from constituents seeking his help on personal matters, there will be circulars, some cheaply roneoed, some expensively dressed up, drawing his attention to some cause and trying to enlist his sympathy therein.

Most of these circulars will be the regular propaganda vehicles of foreign and Commonwealth Governments. Others will come from groups concerned with domestic questions such as temperance, the plight of limbless ex-servicemen, or the problems of a particular industry. As an example of the large and indigestible fare that daily greets an M.P. at the House, my post-bag today contained *The Bulletin* issued by the German Federal Government, *News from Vietnam*, *The Anglo Russian News Bulletin*, a circular from the Association of Education Committees, an elaborate illustrated "glossy" produced by the Flaxspinners and Manufacturers Association and an even more magnificent one sent out by the Rank Organisation. The sponsors of all these documents must be well aware that most of them will go straight into the library wastepaper baskets. Nevertheless, they obviously believe it to be worth while keeping up this steady application of pressure in the hope that when one day a matter arises in Parliament affecting their interests, there will be a few well-informed and sympathetic M.P.s.

So with a Minister of the Crown. Every day he enters his office, his secretary will tell him that the representatives of some group or other want to see him. Their purpose, of course, will be to induce his department to do something that will benefit the section of society which the group represents—by persuasion if possible but if not, and if it lies in their power, by threats. The type of threat will vary. If it is made by a trade organisation, ten to one it will be that failure to take the required action will lead to unemployment and a hostile public reaction.

Now no one can question the right of like-minded citizens to

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PRESSURE GROUPS I HAVE KNOWN

approach M.P.s and Ministers, to ply them with facts about their special interests, to try to create a favourable public opinion and to use every legitimate means of making the Government adopt the policy they want. Indeed, action of this sort by groups which cut across party lines is an essential adjunct to a party system. It is foolish, therefore, to condemn pressure groups as necessarily evil as is sometimes done by those who have heard of some of their activities in the United States. On the contrary, they are wholly desirable, for without them neither the Government nor Parliament would be aware of the needs and desires of large sections of the public on specific issues, and public opinion, as distinct from party opinion, would have no say in the processes of administration. What interests the sociologist is not whether pressure groups should exist, but how they go about their business; the impact they have on national affairs, and the extent to which their activities are good or bad. And how they differ from their American counterparts.

In this study I am ignoring the pressure groups which function within the political parties, such as the trade unions and the co-operative societies in the Labour Party. I do so not because they are unimportant—indeed they greatly influence party and therefore national policy—but because it would lead me too far astray from my immediate purpose.

The extra-party pressure groups vary immensely in constitution, behaviour, and impact. Let us start by examining one of them in some detail and see how it does its work. For this purpose I select the Roads Campaign Council which exists for no other purpose than to bring about Government action favourable to its aims, and is probably as pure a type of pressure group as exists today in this country. Its sponsors are bodies directly (most of them financially) interested in having an adequate modern road system in Great Britain. They are industrial groups such as the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, the Motor Agents Association, and consumer interests such as the A.A. and R.A.C. Together they have provided large sums of money for their campaign.

Professor Finer sets out in great detail in his article elsewhere in this issue the many ways in which the Council carries out its propaganda campaign and tries to influence Government policy. Its parliamentary activities consist in setting up an all-party study group, to which from time to time it sends experts to talk on aspects of the road problem, and organising trips to Europe of all-party groups of M.P.s, between twenty and thirty at a time (of which I have been one), to show them how much new road making is being done

abroad and the financial and technical devices which are being used to bring this about. The result of all their activities has been to create a group of keen and informed M.P.s who are able to bring effective pressure to bear on the Minister of Transport and the Chancellor of the Exchequer whenever an opportunity arises in Parliament.

Two questions arise. Is this sort of thing desirable? The answer depends on whether one considers the cause itself desirable. As I (and the T.U.C.) believe that a better road system is essential if this country is to prosper, and that the need for it is urgent, I applaud the campaign and consider it legitimate and praiseworthy. And I am in no way put off because it is largely financed and organised by big industry in its own interests as I consider that here private and national interests coincide. But I would, of course, take a contrary view of a similar campaign launched by an industrial group demanding high tariffs to increase the profits of its members—or of the “Mr. Cube” campaign by Tate & Lyle.

Secondly, does the Roads Campaign Council in fact have any influence on Government decisions? It is difficult to give a positive answer. The Minister of Transport no doubt regards this pressure group as an infernal nuisance in that it always criticises, always demands what he considers impossible, and never says thank you for what he does do. But my personal opinion is that the net effect of the pressure engendered in and outside Parliament by the Roads Campaign Council has had an imponderable effect, and is to some extent responsible for the present increased expenditure on our road programme, inadequate though it still is. Perhaps even more significant is that when the Chancellor recently announced cuts in Government capital expenditure, the road programme alone escaped the axe.

Now let us glance at another type of pressure group—the professional and trade association which only enters the political arena on special occasions, for example, the British Medical Association. It may express an opinion on any parliamentary matter affecting the practice of medicine but it is only when the pay or status of doctors is affected that it really goes into battle. Still fresh in our minds is the conflict which took place between the B.M.A. and the Labour Government over the National Health Service. It led to threats which put the whole scheme in jeopardy. However critical one may be about the tactics deployed by the B.M.A. at that time, there is no doubt about its right, indeed its duty, to protect its members from any adverse consequences which

it thinks may fall upon them as a result of Government action. It was attacked over this issue not because it sought to bring its influence to bear on the Government, but because it was believed that its attitude was inspired in part, at least, by political motives. Further, it was felt by many people to be going too far in threatening to instruct its members to sabotage an Act of Parliament.

A further example of a pressure group which exists primarily for another purpose is the Road Haulage Association. It has been violently attacked for its political activities, particularly for the pressure it brings to bear on Conservative policy behind the scenes. This is done mainly through the M.P.s who form the Conservative Parliamentary Transport Committee. An outsider cannot judge to what extent, if at all, the Minister of Transport has been influenced by their activities. Certainly he has not given them all they want, as they vehemently denounced his decision to halt the complete resale to private owners of the nationalised road haulage services. It is equally certain that the original Conservative decision to denationalise the whole industry was taken largely as a result of their pressure.

Then there is the other and in many ways much more formidable type of pressure group; the one which seeks to achieve its aim by threatening Members of Parliament with loss of votes and consequent defeat at the polls. The outstanding example here are the churches, particularly the Catholic church. They become active when a matter arises, such as grants to denominational schools, which closely affects their interests. On such occasions the local priest, or his lay representatives, will ask each candidate at an election whether he will pledge himself to support the policy which his church desires, with the hint that the members of his congregation are likely to give preference to the candidate who gives the most favourable reply.

In a marginal constituency, a candidate, particularly if he has no strong views of his own on the matter, will be tempted to give the required pledge. Whether a priest can nowadays really influence the votes of his parishioners to any significant extent is doubtful. But when a candidate thinks that a few votes one way or another will make all the difference to the attainment of his life's ambition, a threat of this sort is a powerful lever.

The Church of England sometimes exercises a similar, if slighter, influence on M.P.s. A few years ago passions ran high about the opening of the Battersea Festival Gardens on Sundays and I know from personal experience that some of my colleagues with marginal

seats were so worried by the pressure put on them by the vicars and curates in their constituencies that they voted contrary to their own inclinations.

In this category of pressure groups that function principally through constituency action are the National Association of Old Age Pensioners and the British Limbless Ex-Servicemen's Association. Every Member has scores of old age pensioners and war wounded in his area and theoretically they could be a considerable electoral influence.

To complete the picture of the pressure groups that operate in this country, mention must be made of the rare giants such as the Peace Ballot in the 1930s and, at the opposite end of the scale, the frequent pygmies such as the recent campaign to preserve the St. James' Theatre. All one need say about these large and small spontaneous outbursts of public feeling about a topical issue is that their success depends on the quantity, and occasionally the quality, of the support they attract. In other words, a campaign that has the support of millions, such as the Peace Ballot, is likely to force a Government at least to make sympathetic gestures of appeasement, but a campaign that only has the support of hundreds, unless these include leading members of the Establishment, has little hope of succeeding.

A comparison between British pressure groups and those of the United States is revealing. There they operate in much the same way, but their opportunities are greater and success more easily achieved. Party discipline is far looser and consequently a "lobby" has a much better chance of enlisting the active support of senators and congressmen of both parties. More important is the enormous amount of money that is spent on elections. A senatorial candidate must reckon on finding about a million dollars at six yearly intervals for his campaign; a candidate for the House of Representatives about \$100,000 every two years. The money is raised by the local party machine almost entirely through substantial contributions from industrialists and trade unions. The knowledge that some of the contributions on which a candidate depends may be withdrawn if his speeches and actions do not please his key supporters is ever present in his mind—and in the minds of those who organise pressure groups.

It is rare for overt threats to be made. But if the president of a company which contributed \$1,000 to party funds at the last election suggests to his congressman, maybe over a drink at the golf club, that if a certain measure is passed it will severely damage his firm;

or declares that all decent people oppose the admission of China to UNO; and if similar views are casually expressed to him by other past and potential subscribers, the trick is done. It is bad form and unnecessary to mention election funds. But like the approach of the priest and the Old Age Pensioners Association in England, threats of this sort although serious are not necessarily decisive. Every candidate will know that the appeal of his party at election time will attract large sums, even if he himself has antagonised many supporters. Nevertheless, it is the marginal vote and the marginal campaign expenditure that matters in a marginal constituency.

The absence of national daily newspapers also helps the American pressure groups. The editors of local papers are open to pressure from the local big-wigs; even more their advertising managers from the local commercial interests. Here again, direct threats are seldom used, but it is clearly conveyed to those responsible for the paper's policy that unless its line is in conformity with the interests of the community and the God-fearing outlook of its leading and influential citizens, it cannot expect their support.

Outstanding among the most active American pressure groups in recent years have been the Utilities Lobby and the China Lobby. The former, being a pure vested interest, has relied on a Press campaign conducted by the highly skilled agencies which specialise in this work. Up to now this campaign has succeeded in averting the demand for public ownership by subtly suggesting that the state ownership of utility companies would be contrary to the American way of life. An important factor to be noted here is that a pressure group can only succeed if its purpose is in accord with, or appears to be in accord with, existing public opinion.

The China Lobby is different in that it is sponsored and operated by people most of whom are financially disinterested and believe passionately that the recognition of the Chinese communist régime would be morally wrong. They are able to enlist the help of leading people throughout the country. Should a congressman take a contrary view, or only be half-hearted about it, they arrange for the local enthusiasts to bring pressure upon him through the many local clubs, institutions, church, and other societies in his constituency. The anti-communist basis of the China Lobby naturally finds a ready response from all such bodies. In the prevailing political climate, anyone who dares oppose them risks being dubbed a communist and suffering the dire consequences. Hence the terrific and deplorable success of this lobby.

But even in this notorious example of a pressure group in the body politic, one cannot object to the right of its sponsors to propagate their cause and to attempt to get it accepted as Government policy. The only grounds on which one can properly condemn the China Lobby (apart from its aims) is that, according to reliable reports, some of its organisers are utterly unscrupulous in their methods.

By and large, pressure groups in America are similar in kind to those in Britain. The China Lobby (in its nation-wide support of a foreign policy matter but not, of course, in the spirit behind it) can be compared to the anti-Franco campaign during the Spanish Civil War; the Utilities Lobby with that of Tate & Lyle in the 1951 election; and denominational pressure is common to both countries. General experience leads to the conclusion that the success of a pressure group depends in part on the size of its purse but mainly on the extent to which public opinion is predisposed in favour of its aims. If Britain is less susceptible to their activities, it is mainly because of the legal limit on election expenses here, and the strict rules about payment for election purposes by unofficial bodies. This limitation prevents the most odious form of pressure group tactics—the use of money as a weapon with which to influence the votes of public representatives.

Without being smug we are, I think, entitled to say that our electoral practice and democratic machine makes it far more difficult for pressure groups in Britain to abuse their power. On the whole they render Parliament an invaluable and essential service and where we disapprove of their doings, it is usually because we disapprove of their objective. With a sophisticated electorate, quick to react against any suspicion that it is being “got at” by a vested interest, with a highly disciplined party system that stamps on policy deviations, and in the background a tight-fisted Treasury, pressure groups, however powerful or wealthy, have formidable barriers to surmount before they can affect the course of public affairs and get Parliament to act contrary to what the majority of its Members believe to be in the public interest.

TRANSPORT INTERESTS AND THE ROADS LOBBY

S. E. FINER

I

ORGANISATIONS with a special interest in roads form a vast complex of great social and industrial importance. Directly or indirectly this road transport complex employs over two million people: or more than one in every twelve workers. Add to this four million private motorists, one million motor cyclists and countless pedal cyclists, and the number “interested” in roads is seen to be formidable. The capital involved is not less so. About one-twelfth of the national income goes every year on moving people and goods about by road, and the sums invested in the public transport industry, the motor industry, and the oil industry are gigantic.

Yet for all this, the sums spent on roads since 1945 have been by any standard quite negligible. This in turn has led to a campaign of organised pressure on the Government to accelerate its programme, especially in the last few months. The “great users” and the trade unions are exerting pressure in the National Production Advisory Council on Industry. The other source of pressure is a private organisation called the Roads Campaign Council. It was set up in March 1955 by twelve national organisations having some kind of interest in an expanded road programme. This R.C.C. is the main topic of this article. I shall refer to the N.P.A.C.I. only towards the close, when trying to estimate how successful the road interests have been in their advocacy.

II

The twelve members of the Roads Campaign Council are:—

- The Road Haulage Association.
- The Public Transport Association.
- The Municipal Passenger Transport Association.
- The Passenger Vehicle Operators' Association.
- The A.A.; R.A.C.; and S.R.A.C.
- The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders.

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The Motor Agents' Association.
The Scottish Motor Trade Association.
The British Cycle and Motor Cycle Industries Association.
The British Road Federation.

The Road Haulage Association

In its present form the R.H.A. dates from 1945. It has some 18,000 members drawn from the A and B classes of licence-holders. It is organised in areas, closely following the traffic areas, each with an elected committee; and is governed by its elected National Council. Specialised categories of freight transport are catered for by functional committees at national level.

The R.H.A. is the representative organisation of the private road hauliers. There is another body, the National Conference of Road Clearing Houses with about 1,000 haulier members, many in long-distance haulage; but in matters of common concern these two bodies work together.

If only by sheer force of circumstances the R.H.A.'s central interest since 1945 has been the defence of the private enterprise system in the industry. It fought the Transport Bill of 1946-1947, and was prominent in supporting the Bill of 1953 in so far as this broke up the British Road Services. When this "disposals policy" was seemingly to be abandoned in 1955-1956, it fought strongly for its continuance, but failed.

Apart from this high policy issue, however, the R.H.A. has necessarily represented its members' views on such matters as petrol taxation, the 30 m.p.h. speed limit for heavy lorries, purchase tax on commercial chassis, and the like. And in this category of issues comes its interest in motor roads.

The Passenger Transport Interest

The three organisations (the P.T.A., the M.P.T.A., and the P.V.O.A.) are all members of the Roads Campaign Council and between them represent all the organised operators outside the British Transport Commission.

The P.V.O.A. caters mostly for the small operators. The Municipal Passenger Transport Association is the body especially representative of the municipal transport authorities, almost all of which are members. Through its technical and specialist sub-committees it collects and disseminates a great deal of information relating to the electrical, mechanical, administrative, traffic, and

financial aspects of the industry. Founded in 1905 it is a seasoned lobby. Its primary object is to safeguard the municipal transport undertakings; its contribution to the 1946-1947 debate on the Transport Bill for instance, was that all passenger transport should be municipalised. For this reason it does not always see eye to eye with the sister organisations in the field. But it does do so in many matters: thus it has carried out an extensive public campaign for the reduction of fuel tax. Its association with the other members of the R.C.C. in pressing for road modernisation is the logical outcome of its years of protest at road conditions.

The P.T.A. has a much wider membership than either of the above, for it offers membership to contractors and to municipal operators as well as to the private operators. In its present shape it dates from 1943 when the Omnibus Owners' Association and the Public Service Transport Association amalgamated. It comprises 66 company operators, 44 municipal operators, and 190 contractors. But, it must be noticed, its Parliamentary Committee is financed and directed solely by company operator members. Its wide constituency makes it an influential client at the Ministry. Like the M.P.T.A. it too is concerned with the technical, administrative, and traffic aspects of its work, and like the M.P.T.A. has made strenuous representation on the fuel tax, on the size of vehicle bodies, and of course, on roads. Thus there is both an overlapping membership with the M.P.T.A. and a wide field in which to co-operate with it.

The Motorists' Associations

There are about five million private motorists and motor cyclists in the country of whom rather more than two million are members of the three motoring associations. Most of them belong to the A.A. which has about 2,000,000 members.

Founded in 1897, the R.A.C. is a club. But its mass membership consists of associate members (there are two other types of members—the sports member, and the full club member). The fact that it is a club has riveted a ludicrously oligarchic constitution on the organisation. The associate members, who must provide most of the income, do not possess the right of directly electing to the governing body. They have twenty representatives on the Council, but these are selected by the Club Committee from names passed up through the H.Q. and County Offices. Their day-to-day affairs are administered by a special Associates' Committee, half of whose twenty members are nominated by the Club Committee and half

elected by the Council. It is difficult to understand why it is still deemed necessary to minimise the influence of the associates by so complicated a constitution. For, though the rival A.A. has over 2,000,000 members all entitled to appear and vote at the annual general meeting, only some three or four hundred bother to attend.

The fact is that most people join the A.A. or R.A.C. for the services they provide—the road patrols, route maps, car inspection, legal aid, and the like. Though many of the policies the A.A. and R.A.C. promote are likely to be popular with the members—e.g., the reduction of fuel tax, and opposition to parking meters—it is very doubtful whether the members feel deeply about them. Such matters are handled for them by a Standing Joint Committee of the three Associations. It was first set up in 1944. This is the body which has lobbied on speed limits, petrol rationing, motor taxation, road safety, parking meters, and compulsory vehicle inspection. Its interest in road improvement is of long standing. It published a memorandum on the subject in 1945; later it demanded a separate Highway Authority; contested the capital cuts imposed in 1948; and initiated a debate in favour of road loans in the House of Lords in 1953. Its membership of the R.C.C. has sprung out of this oft-expressed concern.

The Suppliers

The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, formed in 1902, is a very wealthy and influential body. Its membership stands at 17,000 and comprises the manufacturers and distributors of accessories and components, as well as manufacturers, importers, and distributors of vehicles. It must be remembered that this industry is Britain's leading exporter. The Motor Agents' Association, formed in 1910, represents the retailers. The Scottish Motor Traders' Association exists primarily for the distributors, dealers, and repairers. The British Cycle and Motor Cycle Industries' Association (formerly the "Coventry Union") is best described through the composition of its Council: this contains six representatives of the bicycle manufacturers, six of the motor cycle manufacturers, six of the manufacturers of proprietary articles, two of the tyre manufacturers, and three of factors.

All of these four bodies are members of the Parliamentary and Legal Council of the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders. This is the body which reviews and advises on all legislative measures affecting the industry and makes the necessary representations to government. This tradition of formal co-operation in

lobbying has thus been carried over into common membership of the R.C.C.

The British Road Federation

The B.R.F. is not altogether easy to describe. It is a federation of 110 national organisations representing practically every aspect of the many-sided road transport industry: the professional hauliers and the "ancillary users" (or C licensees); the road constructors and the industries providing their raw materials and machinery; the vehicle manufacturers and distributors, and so forth.

The federation was formed in 1932. For some years it acted, in some respects at least, as an umbrella organisation for all the road interests. But by 1939, in the Square Deal negotiations, the haulier associations acted for themselves and by 1945, with the formation of the R.H.A., it had lost many of its earlier functions in this field, though the R.H.A. has been and still is represented on its Council. It was left with two functions, however: one was to act as a protective association for the "ancillary users" and the other was to publicise the need for better roads. The Associates' Committee, which concerns itself with the ancillary users, was set up in 1934 and acted very vigorously in their defence both in the 1946-1947 period, and when the Conservative government suggested a transport levy in 1952-1953. The Publicity Committee was not set up till 1937. Between 1944 and 1947, this set up four sub-committees, a development marking the federation's increasing interest in road propaganda. This interest was further underlined by the establishment of a new Committee on Highways in 1949. Since the war this organisation has been the chief propagandist body in this field. With the setting up of the R.C.C. the B.R.F. has found itself with increased funds. For the B.R.F. has a special part to play as an organ of the R.C.C., not only as a constituent member of it, as will now be seen.

III

The Roads Campaign Council is administered by an executive committee of five. The chairman is Mr. Wilfred Andrews, the chairman of the R.A.C., and its other members are Lord Teynham, the chairman of the A.A.; Sir Patrick Hennessey of Ford Motors representing the S.M.M.T.; Mr. Christopher Brunner, vice-chairman of the B.R.F. and a director of Shell Mex and B.P.; and Mr. T. S. Malcolm, the deputy president of the Motor Agents' Association.

The R.C.C.'s programme, briefly, is that a road programme of

£750 million must be put in hand over the period ending in 1965; and it favours financing this by "road loans."

How the Roads Campaign Council Works

The problem before the economic interests supporting the R.C.C. is how to get the government to adopt this programme. The level and technique of the approach to government differs from one association to another. Most groups begin by approaching the department and attempting to persuade the Minister and his department by "the best advice." If rebuffed, and still determined to press the issue, their next approach will be at the parliamentary level, for most associations have a spokesman or a panel of friends in the Commons or the Lords. They will seek to get these to raise the matter. But if the friendly M.P. is to do anything more than merely ventilate a grievance, his usual course will be to take it up in one of the specialist committees of back-benchers into which both parliamentary parties group themselves; or he may seek to convene an all-party group. It frequently happens that an expert from the outside association is invited to speak at such meetings. If the proposal or grievance finds support there, the circle of sympathisers has been significantly extended and there arises the possibility of exerting parliamentary pressure on the Minister.

To reinforce the morale of these parliamentary sympathisers and to swell their ranks, associations also try to influence constituency opinion. Such efforts are rarer in Britain than in the U.S.A. where the "grass roots lobby" is of common occurrence. Even when British organisations practise this technique, they tend to make their campaign a selective one: they volley their propaganda at the people or groups they deem influential, rather than at the general public. Nevertheless, some associations have launched such "saturation" campaigns at the general public: one remembers, for instance, the anti-nationalisation campaigns of 1946-1947, and the "Mr. Cube" campaign of 1949. But they are not very usual.

On road matters, the employers' peak organisations and the T.U.C. have chosen to exert their pressure at the ministerial level, through the official channel of the National Production Advisory Council. Herein, the interests composing the R.C.C. form a complete contrast. Their attack is mostly directed at Parliament, the select public, and the general public.

The two chosen instruments of the R.C.C. are respectively, the B.R.F. for Parliament and the selected public; while the mass

public campaign has been entrusted to a professional agency. This is known as *Aims of Industry*.

The Road Lobby

- The B.R.F. has considerable experience in parliamentary lobbying. It has a parliamentary adviser, and a publicity adviser, as well as technical and legal advisers. It has much experience of briefing M.P.s, enjoys good parliamentary contacts, and knows to whom publications should be sent. The R.C.C., by providing additional funds and moral incentive, has enabled it to increase its pre-1955 activities.

It has succeeded in getting its ideas before the Treasury in a formal deputation, but the Minister of Transport's view has been discouraging. The policy has, however, made an impression on back-benchers, and the B.R.F.'s greatest success may be said to have been here. Its briefing is very good indeed. The *Monthly Bulletin* is an indispensable source of statistics and news; the annual *Basic Road Statistics* is the usually quoted source; it has prepared special publications such as the *Roads Matter* series; and it produces quick and lively comments on ministerial pronouncements. During 1956 there were no less than nine parliamentary debates on road conditions; and the B.R.F.'s *Annual Report* laconically comments: "A considerable amount of informative material has been passed to members of Parliament on all occasions when thought desirable in connection with debates."

Under the auspices of the R.C.C., it has taken two other steps to heighten the impression made by the written word. In the first place it has organised all-party visits to see the roads on the Continent. In 1956 twenty-five M.P.s, including both Labour and Conservative members, were taken to inspect the new roads of Holland and Germany; and in 1957 another all-party group of twenty-one M.P.s was taken to see the French and Belgian systems. I can personally attest that there are few better ways of impressing a sceptic with the utility and practicability of a motor road than showing him the Dutch highways and the German *autobahnen*. In the July debate, therefore, it is not surprising that the continental example was widely cited.

The second step of the R.C.C. may, potentially, be still more important. It has opened a way into the ranks of the back-benchers on either side of the House, where, as we have said, ministers and shadow ministers can be put to considerable embarrassment.

In short, an all-party roads study group was established in the House of Commons in May 1957 and, significantly, its joint chairmen were Mr. Ernest Davies, M.P., who is the Chairman of the Labour Transport Group, and Mr. G. Wilson, M.P., Chairman of the Conservative Transport Committee. So far three meetings have been held. At the first (in May) Colonel Lovell, the President of the Institution of Highway Engineers, addressed the group on "Can Britain's highways procedure be streamlined?" In June Dr. Glanville, the director of the Government's Road Research Laboratory, talked on "Research into the Road Problem." In July Mr. Brunner, the Vice-Chairman of B.R.F. and a member of the R.C.C., put forward his views on road loans as a method of financing a highway programme.

At the same time the B.R.F. has increased propaganda among its selected public: partly by conferences, partly by regional campaigns, and partly by the circulation of literature.

Publications are a speciality of the B.R.F. It pays particular attention to printing and format, and is exceedingly careful in its timing. These publications go to a selected public; to quote the B.R.F.'s 1956 Report: "to readers who have an interest in roads and who are in a position to influence public opinion generally. The lists include selected ministers and officers of their departments, the appropriate members and highway officials of local authorities, members of both Houses of Parliament, the local constituency officers of the major political parties, universities, research units, industrial development associations, the national, provincial, trade and technical press, and a wide cross-section of trade and industry."

Influencing the Voter

The R.C.C. has, however, decided it must reach out much more widely: it must reach the masses. Why?

It reasons this way. It argues that M.P.s of both parties would *like* to build more roads; but that they think we cannot afford it. The public too would like to see more roads built; but there are other things they want still more, such as houses and old-age pensions, and, moreover, they are inarticulate. As the R.C.C. sees it, to make M.P.s build more roads their constituents must be made to tell the M.P.s that this is what they want. "The task is to put votes into roads."

This task the R.C.C. has entrusted to the body called *Aims of*

Industry. Founded in 1942 by a group of industrialists to disseminate propaganda in favour of private ownership, *Aims* did not become significant until after 1945. Then it proved useful to industries threatened with nationalisation. It helped in the R.H.A.'s anti-nationalisation campaign in 1947, and after the Transport Bill was duly enacted the Director of the R.H.A. left this body to take over the directorship of *Aims*. He was Mr. Roger Sewill. It was *Aims*, under Mr. Sewill, which put over the "Mr. Cube" campaign for Messrs. Tate & Lyle in 1949. This put the organisation squarely on the map.

Since 1946, *Aims* seems to have worked out its own ideas as to techniques with which to influence mass opinion: exhibitions, mobile film shows, and gimmicks, are all built around and work towards the collection of signatures to a petition. This was the technique in 1946-1947; in the "Mr. Cube" campaign; and so it is now. The 1956 campaign (substantially repeated in different towns during the current year) was dubbed "The Road Crusade." Twenty-four towns were visited, one town each week. The "crusade" was announced by a stage-coach (to symbolise the fact that our roads were built for stage-coaches and have not been improved since). In the centre of the town was an exhibition: elsewhere five cinema vans circulated showing "The Great Hold-up" and "Highways for Tomorrow." Thousands of pamphlets were disseminated, and everywhere signatures were canvassed for petitions to Parliament. By September, hundreds of thousands of people had seen the shows at the exhibitions, and half-a-million people had signed the petition.

Aims also circulates the organ of the movement. This is the *Highway Times*—a mock newspaper which comes out three times a year. I find it very effective. It exploits every argument, and gets public personalities from all parties to write its special features. It contrasts our roads with those in Holland and Germany. It features road accidents, getting Christopher Mayhew to write an article entitled "What greater duty has a parent?" It has had Graham Hutton show that good highways are good economy. G. A. Brown writes to prove that "The common market makes our problem urgent"—while, to provoke the maximum explosion among the "pub" population, there is a parallel feature, on the same page, entitled "Germany is a boom country." The pleasure-motorist is titillated by pictures of the smooth roads of the Riviera, and infuriated by articles on holiday delays in Britain. The S.M.M.T. explains that it has invested another £150 million in its

motor factories but that bad roads will not only weaken the industry's future, but will raise the cost of cars.

Thus the B.R.F. and *Aims of Industry* have worked very diligently to put the R.C.C.'s views across to M.P.s and to the constituents of M.P.s. The question that remains is whether this propaganda has been effective, and whether it is likely to prove so. And this is rather hard to answer.

IV

Up to 1954 the road interests had no success whatsoever. Even since then (up to the current year at any rate) their success has been but a limited and grudging one. This was not because governments disputed the necessity of a road programme. On the contrary they cheerfully admitted it—but flatly added that the national economy could not stand it. The road interests problem has been rather like trying to cut a cushion with a fish-knife.

The Government's Attitude

Road finance is a Treasury matter. Moreover, it is the Chancellor's own matter. And, as the 5th Report of the Select Committee on Estimates (1952-1953) makes brutally clear, the Chancellor's view up to 1953 was simply that roads must be put on a make-do and mend basis. The Treasury representative openly admitted he was satisfied that they were giving the Ministry of Transport "less than what is reasonably needed for the roads"!

Since 1954 the situation has somewhat changed. In December 1953 Mr. Lennox-Boyd announced a three-year programme of £50 million (authorisation); in February 1955 his successor, Mr. Boyd-Carpenter, announced a four-year programme of £212 million (authorisation); and this year his successor, Mr. Watkinson, announced a four-year programme of £240 million (authorisation), exclusive of Scotland which is included in the previous programmes. The amounts actually spent are, of course, much less than the authorisations. It does appear, however, that whereas only £3.65 million was actually spent by Mr. Boyd-Carpenter in 1954-1955, and about £6.59 million and £16.2 million in the years 1955-1956 and 1956-1957, some £40 million will be spent in 1958-1959, rising to £55.2 million in 1961-1962. Furthermore, it has been made clear that this programme is to continue despite capital cuts elsewhere.

The sums to be spent in the next few years are only half of what the R.C.C. considers to be the very minimum. Yet the R.C.C. is

not unnaturally tempted to claim a degree of success. (See, for example, the rather modest little note to this effect in the B.R.F.'s 1956 report.) Is this claim justified?

In some measure, yes. But to just what extent it is very hard to estimate. For in the first place, the target has not nearly been reached and the same insuperable argument is still being advanced—that the national economy cannot stand any more. In the second place, however, there are other possible and indeed plausible explanations of the government's conversion.

The National Production Advisory Council

One additional factor is quite certainly relevant: the pressure emanating from the National Production Advisory Council. A notable feature of the R.C.C. is the absence from its members of two exceedingly influential road interests—the T.U.C. (since road transport employs one-twelfth of the labour force) and the "great users" (who have up to one million lorries of their own upon the roads). A second feature is that B.R.F. and *Aims of Industry* propaganda is influential at the parliamentary and public opinion levels, but not at the crucial ministerial level. Now both of these gaps are filled by the N.P.A.C.I. It is the most important formal link between industry and the government. It contains representatives of the T.U.C.; of the peak employers' associations, namely, the A.B.C.C., N.U.M., F.B.I., and B.E.C.; the nationalised industries; and Northern Ireland. It also comprises the chairmen of the Regional Boards of Industry. Moreover, the Chancellor is its chairman, and ministers from departments concerned with industry and trade also attend. Pressure exercised here is exercised at top level and on the very minister who counts, the Chancellor; and it comes from sources whose business is business. Whatever ministers may think of R.C.C. propaganda and its effect on the House, they cannot shrug off representations from the N.P.A.C.I., if these come from both sides of industry. And they have. The T.U.C. representatives were the first to raise the issue. This was in 1953. In 1954 they were supported by the chairmen of the Regional Boards and by the N.U.M. representatives. As a result, two meetings of the Emergency Committee had to be called, with the Minister of Transport in the chair. He explained his proposals for expanding the programme; but his audience told him it was both inadequate and unplanned.

In February 1955 a new minister was able to announce an expanded programme. Yet the N.U.M. and T.U.C. representatives

still continued to complain—so much so that the 1956 T.U. Congress went on record against it with a unanimous resolution. From then to the present day, the pressure from the N.P.A.C.I. has been continuous and, as far as one can see, is supported by employers and T.U.C. alike.

In November 1956, both sides demanded another Emergency Committee and in 1957, the roads programme was raised again in April, in May, and in July. The T.U.C. representatives stressed the road-accident rate, and the throttling of industrial productivity; the employers drew attention to the implications of the Common Market. The T.U.C. continuously pressed for the establishment of an independent inquiry into road needs and programming. The Minister replied in the words of his predecessors—the Ministry knew what was wanted, the problem was simply one of resources.

Has it Succeeded ?

It is inconceivable that this extreme pressure should not have had an effect on the Minister and the Chancellor at least equal to, if not greater than, the restiveness in Parliament. And added together, the R.C.C. and N.P.A.C.I. pressures mean that every substantial organised group interested in roads is exercising some kind of pressure, which is consequently operating at all levels simultaneously—ministerial, parliamentary, and public.

There is another and final factor to be considered in trying to trace the reason for the government's progressive change. This is simply the composite effect of a modern car industry that has only recently got into full production conjoined with full employment. The combined result has been a phenomenal increase in the number of private cars on the roads. Since 1948 the number of private cars has doubled; and one-quarter of the total number of cars on the roads have appeared there in the three years 1954–1956! Recent estimates suggest that by 1965 the total number of vehicles on the roads will have increased by another three million—50 per cent. more than at present. In these circumstances, what else *can* the government do but plan new roads? The only alternative would be to restrict private motoring, and this is, politically, quite impracticable. The rapid rise in the car population has taken even the experts by surprise, let alone the government. It is pretty certain, therefore, that it has made the government increasingly receptive to the pleas of the R.C.C. and the N.P.A.C.I.; and thus, to put the matter the other way round, the R.C.C. and N.P.A.C.I.'s pressure has become increasingly effective.

TRADE ASSOCIATIONS AS INTEREST GROUPS

LEONARD TIVEY and ERNEST WOHLGEMUTH

TRADE associations are a permanent and indispensable feature of modern industrial organisation. Their continuing growth and rising influence is but one reflection of the marked trend, common to all the industrially advanced countries, which increasingly compels the government, as the agent of the community, to assume greater responsibilities for the conduct of economic affairs and the social welfare of its members.

Over the past eighty years or so, under the combined impact of changes in the structure of industry and the pattern of international trade, the intensification of internal and international competition, the effects of domestic and world-wide slumps, and the demands of modern war, a large number of new functions have been taken up by the government in the economic and social sphere. One very important result of this has been the constant multiplication of the points of contact between the government and its departments on the one hand and industry and trade on the other. Consequently, the need for voluntary organisations, fully representative of the industrial and commercial interests covered by them and able to elicit the collective views of businessmen, is now generally recognised by government and industry alike.

Growth and Development

The movement towards the formation of formal associations among manufacturers appears to have begun on a significant scale during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In some industries employers first came together to counteract the growing strength of organised labour and for collective bargaining with the trade unions. These associations later extended their activities and

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frequently formed separate bodies to deal with collective representation, common services, and commercial matters of concern to their members in their capacity as manufacturers rather than as employers of labour. The present associations in shipbuilding, cotton spinning, clothing, and boot and shoe manufacture developed out of employers' associations in this way. Stronger international competition, in particular foreign penetration of the British home market in the depressed conditions of industry after the boom of 1870-1875, was another important cause which prompted manufacturers to take collective action. At home the advantages of co-operation in order to bring about a greater measure of stability began to seem more attractive than unfettered competition.

The first world war brought a new set of influences to bear on association growth. Wartime shortages, production problems, and controls brought many associations into close contact with government departments for the first time and led, moreover, to the creation of new associations, often at the instigation of the government itself. After 1918 the economic purposes of associations were most in mind and their fortunes fluctuated with the state of trade. The imposition of tariffs and the establishment of the Import Duties Advisory Committee brought the negotiating functions of associations to the fore again. The second world war made it necessary for almost every trade to work hand-in-glove with government departments, and by 1945 there can have been few sectors of industry and commerce without their representative organisation. The post-war years have seen little, if any, diminution in the number of associations and some improvements in their general efficiency.

The Present Structure of Associations

Today, therefore, businessmen are highly organised to deal collectively with matters of common concern. Workers, of course, have formed trade unions and the professions have their own specialised institutions. Businessmen, however, are a far more heterogeneous group, and have a greater variety of interests to protect and advance than any other organised section of the community. Their interests and activities in industrial and commercial matters are extremely diverse and sometimes in conflict. They are either manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, merchants, and importers, or proprietors of businesses providing a service. Each category has its own separate organisations and almost every conceivable line of industrial and

commercial activity now supports a more or less elaborate trade association.

Trade associations may be loosely defined as voluntary, non-profit-making bodies established by independent firms (not businessmen acting in their personal capacities) to promote certain interests common to all their members. Most of them cover either a whole industry, e.g., the British Iron and Steel Federation; or a certain trade, e.g., the Food Machinery Association; or a particular product, e.g., the Fish Hook Makers Association. There are also trade associations which are geographically based, principally the Chambers of Commerce and the Chambers of Trade, while still others exist for strictly limited and defined purposes; among these are employers' associations concerned primarily with labour matters, industrial research associations, and export groups.

It is impossible here to review adequately all the various national organisations in these categories,¹ let alone regional or local bodies. Some indication of the scope covered by associations is given by the "peak" organisations considered below. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the associations concerned with a particular industry, product, or trade are often more important, since it is their specialised interests that are at stake.

The largest, richest, and most powerful of the general associations is the Federation of British Industries. Its membership consists both of individual firms and trade associations. There are over 7,000 firms in membership, and nearly 300 trade associations, found in all sectors of industry. The great majority are in the manufacturing trades, but such services as banking and advertising—and even the National Farmers' Union—are included. Owing to this mixed membership there is a certain amount of overlapping in that many individual member-firms are also members of industry or product associations affiliated to the F.B.I., and again in that both federal associations and their constituent organisations may be members.

Though there are perhaps 1,200 or 1,300 national associations of manufacturers altogether, few of the major associations and very few of the largest industrial firms in the country are outside the F.B.I. The F.B.I. is the undisputed spokesman of "big business," but 40 per cent. of the member-firms are small concerns employing fewer than a hundred people.

¹ An account of manufacturers' associations is found in *Industrial Trade Associations* (P.E.P. and Allen and Unwin) 1957. Employers' associations are described by H. A. Clegg in *Industrial Relations in Great Britain* (Blackwell) 1954.

The other principal organisation of industrialists is the National Union of Manufacturers. It also extends to all branches of manufacturing industry, but cannot claim to be so fully representative of the major units. It has between five and six thousand member-firms and over sixty affiliated trade associations. It is especially representative of small and medium-sized firms, employing up to 500 work-people, and many of its affiliated organisations are small product associations, covering the production of a single type of product, or a single process in the horizontally organised industries.

The Association of British Chambers of Commerce is a third important general organisation at the national level. It is the "peak" association of nearly one hundred local chambers of commerce in the United Kingdom varying in size from the very large London Chamber of Commerce with over 12,000 members and the large organisations in the centres of the main industrial areas (*i.e.*, Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow, Liverpool, and Leeds) to the smallest towns with memberships of less than 100. The membership of the local chambers affiliated to the Association of British Chambers of Commerce includes most types of business concerns. Its total membership exceeds 66,000 firms and although no detailed analysis of this figure is available it is safe to state that over 25,000 of them are manufacturers. The remainder includes the vast majority of the country's export merchants as well as many other traders and large numbers of those who provide transport, banking, insurance, and other services; and even lawyers, accountants, architects, surveyors, and estate agents are included.

In addition there are many local bodies which use the designation Chamber of Commerce or Chamber of Trade and whose members are mostly retailers. About 900 of these (more than 90 per cent. of the total) are affiliated to the National Chamber of Trade, as well as thirty-six national trade associations of retailers, tobacconists, drapers, chemists, outfitters, and so on.

In most industries there are also employers' associations which have been organised to deal solely with labour negotiation and kindred matters. They have their own separate existence alongside trade associations, partly because trade unions are not conterminous with groupings of employers on an industry or product basis, and partly because of the special nature of the problems involved. The British Employers' Confederation is the general national association of manufacturers organised in their capacity as employers of labour. It has sixty-three member federations; twelve of these, where the same body represents its members as manufacturers and as

employers of labour, are also members of the F.B.I. Its central function is the representation of employers' opinion on labour matters to the Government, to government departments, and to international bodies. In the day-to-day business of negotiation with trade unions the Confederation's relationship with its members is much the same as that between the T.U.C. and its constituent unions.

Relations with Government Departments

The chief function of trade associations as interest-groups is to make the views of their members known to the Government of the day. Most trade associations specifically refer in their constitutions to the need to "speak with one voice" in negotiations with government departments; to promote helpful, and resist unfavourable, legislative and administrative developments; to co-operate with government departments; and to act as a channel of communication between the departments and the industry. As the range and number of issues on which trade associations desire to make representations, or on which they are asked to give advice and information, have increased, there has developed a clearly defined network of administrative relations, both formal and informal, between industries and departments. It is a link of the utmost value to Ministers, civil servants, and businessmen alike. Certainly as far as the trade associations are concerned it is this two-way traffic of information and periodic exchange of views, the direct approach and close contact with the departments, which they regard as the principal means of advancing their case.

There are few aspects of the work of trade associations which do not lead, sooner or later, to contact with some branch of the administrative machine. Prominent subjects of consultation in recent years have included export promotion, import licensing, G.A.T.T., purchase tax, restrictive practices, and technical and research problems. The departments which are most immediately affected are, primarily, those which have the duty to keep track of major developments in, and give assistance to, particular industries; and, secondarily those which are responsible for buying supplies and placing works contracts for the public service. In the language of Whitehall they are known as "production" and "contracting" departments, but it must be understood that this differentiation is one of function and internal organisation within ministries rather than between them. This division in fact means that many trade associations have contact with two quite distinct branches of the

same ministry. The Shipbuilding Conference, for example, is in close touch with both the policy-making sections and the Director of Contracts in the Admiralty.

The basic concept around which the network of relations between trade associations and the departments has been built is that of "sponsorship" or "responsibility" for individual industries by a number of ministries, which for this purpose are known as production departments. There are eight of these, each "sponsoring" one or more industries, so that between them they cover all the manufacturing trades in the country. The two with the widest territory are the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Supply. What does this "sponsorship" involve? As far as industry is concerned it means that for every branch of it, no matter how small, and every firm in it there is somewhere in the government machine an official to whom it can turn for advice and assistance and where it can air its grievances.

There is no mystery about the technique of representation. The most frequent contacts are between the permanent officials of associations and civil servants of assistant secretary rank, by letter, telephone, and by visits to the department. But there is also much activity both above and below this level, and the elected office-bearers of the associations are likely to take part when matters are taken to higher administrators or Ministers. The better associations take care to establish regular and informal relations with the departments—it is not unusual for *ad hoc* conversations without an agenda to take place, just for the sake of keeping in touch.

The big general associations only take matters which interest wide areas of industry and commerce—the F.B.I., for instance, is concerned with taxes on industry. Sometimes there is a large "exercise" in consultation by departments, when most associations are asked for their views on a major problem. G.A.T.T. negotiations and the free trade area have been treated in this way.

Trade associations also help their individual member-firms (especially the small ones) in their dealings with government departments. The Report of the Committee on Intermediaries² mentioned three ways in which they render this assistance. They can, first of all, advise member-firms as to the form in which any particular application should be made and where it should be sent. Secondly, they can assist members whose applications seem to have become held up in the administrative machine, and, thirdly, they can take

² Cmd. 7904 of 1950.

up individual cases with the government departments where their members feel that they have a grievance. In all these activities the associations rely upon the prestige they have acquired, both with their members and the departments, and on the confidence which the departments have in the representative character and efficiency of the organisations. But it would be a mistake to regard this "intermediary" activity as a major aspect of the representative work of most associations.

Parliamentary Activity

The concept of the pressure group was imported from the United States, and there the typical group was not much concerned with dealings with the departments and offices: it was a "lobby" and it operated in and around Congress, seeking to promote, amend, or destroy legislation. It is natural, therefore, to expect much the same sort of thing from groups at work in Britain; and certainly many types of group are active in this way. But it was suggested in the P.E.P. report on *Industrial Trade Associations*³ that "for British industry this must always be a subsidiary or reserve approach." In what sense is this true?

Certainly from the point of view of the Member of Parliament it may seem paradoxical, for there is undoubtedly much parliamentary activity—Members are circularised, approached individually, or even briefed. Questions are asked and adjournment debates instigated which quite clearly have associations behind them, and speeches are made in the House and in the 1922 Committee to promote association policies, M.P.s are invited to association lunches and dinners. If the totality of pressure-group activity in Parliament could be assessed, a high proportion of it would be the work of trade associations.

But this is only one side of the picture. It looks very different from the point of view of the trade association chairman or secretary. Typically they regard parliamentary lobbying as a chancy procedure, often involving a lot of hard labour for small reward. The promotion of interest and knowledge about their industries in political circles is undoubtedly a most valuable long-term investment; and a strong sense of grievance in an industry will make its association resort to all channels of pressure. Nevertheless, associations have not been enthusiastic about this method of representation.

There are perhaps three reasons for this. In the first place they

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 87.

are well aware that all comes back to the same civil servants in the end. If the association briefs M.P.s to speak in the House, then the civil servants who have already turned down their case in the department will brief a Minister to turn it down again in Parliament. Secondly, Cabinet government and the party system puts the Minister and the department he controls into a very strong position. It is not an impregnable one; but no Minister worth his job will let himself be bullied *often*.

Thirdly, there is the existence of the Labour Party and the possibility of a Labour government. Almost as much as the unions, trade associations find most of their sympathisers on one side of the House. (Happy indeed is the pressure group, like the teachers, which has friends on both sides of the fence.) Now when Labour is in office the power of groups of back-benchers in the Conservative Party to modify action is negligible; their criticisms are just part of the expected flow of criticism from the Opposition. The association can then try to link up with the trade union group or with Labour members from constituencies where their industry is concentrated: but this is a very unreliable and discouraging operation.

These considerations taken together lead most trade associations to take a cautious attitude to parliamentary action. There are exceptions. The Lancashire cotton lobby is well primed by the cotton associations, and the glass industry has a well-organised group. But it is fair to conclude that, though all associations can find means of putting their case in the House, they do not exert (and do not expect) their major influence on policy in this way. Many disputes between associations and government are heard about in Parliament; the majority are not, and the ones that are raised are by no means always the most important.

The Power of Trade Associations

How strong are trade associations, compared with other interest groups? Certainly on matters of industry and trade they have no real rivals. It is true that the trade unions have some influence on many topics, but their main interests do not coincide with those of the trade associations. Whereas a trade union leader is hard put to it to persuade his members to take any note at all of production and trading issues, these matters are the stuff of life to the managerial side of industry. Hence the unions may be able to challenge the associations on general issues, at the T.U.C.-F.B.I. level; and on labour and welfare questions they may even have an edge over the

employers. But in relations with the Board of Trade and other sponsoring departments trade associations have the field almost to themselves, because they represent those with the direct concern in, and knowledge of, that field.

These departments do have frequent direct contact with firms, and the large firms may have some independent influence. But the constitutionality and representativeness of trade associations give them an enormous advantage, for departments must behave fairly and consult all relevant interests: and it is therefore an immense convenience to have a properly organised body in the field. The influence of firms, even the largest like I.C.I., is therefore largely (though not entirely) channelled through associations.

To assess the strength of associations absolutely instead of relatively it is necessary to look at their performance. One of the difficulties of trade associations arises from the general preoccupation of the modern world with economic matters—parties and governments now put economics in the central position which legal, religious, and military matters once held. In these circumstances the pressure groups find politicians and civil servants hard to deflect since they have strongly held ideas of their own. In other fields pressure groups may find—not always of course—that they have wider scope, since the politicians are not so deeply committed. Nevertheless an association may by persuasion manage to trim a policy a good deal; and in certain circumstances it may do more. Under the Labour government of 1945–1951, the British Iron and Steel Federation delayed the nationalisation of steel, and associations effectively discouraged the establishment of Development Councils in many industries. But the first of these was dependent on the obvious decline in the political fortunes of the Government, and the other on the fact that the Councils were designed to be run largely by the industrialists themselves. Under the Conservatives a policy enforcing price competition has been carried through despite opposition from associations. Propaganda campaigns have been organised or commissioned by associations with general or specific political objectives, but it seems unlikely that this influence was at all decisive.

The power of trade associations as pressure groups in relation to the central government may therefore be summed up in the following three propositions—

- (1) They can frequently persuade departments to make changes on specific matters where the policy content is not important, or where it is mainly a case of how the policy is carried out.

- (2) They have an indeterminate but profound influence on the framing of policy by ensuring full awareness of the problems and attitudes of industry.
- (3) They can, on occasion, make the work of government difficult by organising criticism, and by becoming less and less co-operative.

Foundations of Power

Association strength depends in the first place on the high degree of cohesion which is normally found inside the associations themselves. By and large all members of the same association manufacture or trade in the same type of product, and therefore they are affected in the same way by government policies. Tariffs, price controls, purchase tax, standardisation, and so on, are all applied product by product or industry by industry: it is therefore by joining with other firms in the same line that businessmen can most effectively protect their interests. Conspicuously on matters like transport and rating, where geographical position may be more important than nature of product, the Chambers of Commerce are at their most influential.

The loyalty of member-firms to their associations is normally therefore a matter of plain logic and straightforward economic interest. It is worth remembering that it is the firms who are members, and not individual businessmen. Association policies must in the long run reflect sober estimates of the interests of those firms, and they may hence be led into negotiation and even co-operation with the most obnoxious politicians. The community of interest which necessarily arises among concerns operating in the same field is further emphasised by the fact that the C.W.S., the Scottish C.W.S., and some nationalised industries (the National Coal Board and the Gas Council), are members of various associations, and are not in any particular conflict with the policies of their capitalist fellow-members.

The unity within associations is often buttressed by social and psychological factors. Associations are overwhelmingly conformist institutions, aiming at respectability and a sort of constitutional status. They therefore share the *mores* which have been noted in the Conservative Party—they dislike brawling in public and frown on the trouble-maker. There are, of course, difficulties caused by the clash of personalities, as in all human affairs, but these tend to be politely veiled.

It has been suggested that the provision of services for members is a major cause of the strength of the interest group, as distinct from the opinion group.⁴ This is only partly true of trade associations. The services provided by many associations are seriously less than they might be, and can scarcely be a great attraction to the big firm. Moreover, as a matter of history, the main periods of recruitment to associations have been the two wars and the post-1945 years, when the representational work of the associations was more significant than their services. It is certainly true that the services to members (exhibitions, market information, statistics, etc.) give stability to associations, recruit some members and retain more. Yet the pressure-group activities are important in themselves, especially when they are *defensive*. If a Labour government were to reintroduce controls over industry, firms would rally to their associations, not only to resist the controls, but also to influence the way they were administered when imposed.

The real sanction behind trade association power lies in their co-operation with the administration. They have something to offer to the government—information, advice, and a convenient channel of contact with industry. Moreover, their representativeness and loyal membership enables them to guarantee co-operation and acceptance of agreements once they are made. There are of course sometimes recalcitrant member-firms, and there have been resignations and even splinter associations, but there is nothing equivalent to the shop-stewards' committee in the trade unions. Now this valuable co-operation is normally freely given; but it can if desired be withdrawn. The more habitual the collaboration becomes, and the more elaborate the forms of industrial or commercial control, the more potent is the threat of non-co-operation—it is doubtful if a utility clothing scheme, for example, could be run at all without help from trade associations.

The Public Interest

Is there any call for a public policy towards trade associations? In one respect at least the Government has made an attempt: the Monopolies Commission and the Restrictive Practices Court have been set up in turn to deal with the operation of economic agreements among firms. But there has not always been this official hostility to such schemes (in the nineteen-thirties they were approved methods of dealing with surplus capacity and price-cutting), and in

⁴ S. E. Finer, "The Lobbies," in *The Twentieth Century*, October 1957, p. 373.

all periods government departments have encouraged the formation of associations for representative purposes. Should the present attitudes be altered?

Sir David Eccles has doubted "whether it is wise to adopt the principle that an industry ought to think as an industry."⁵ But surely to say that it should never do so is to miss some very real advantages. Primarily, these are the "external economies" that collectively organised services can provide, but they also concern the part played by associations in the wider economy of the nation and its political arrangements. Certainly *someone* must think about industries as industries; and for an industry's problems to be regularly discussed by its leaders would seem to be a vital contribution to that thinking.

The heart of the matter is that no Government can long avoid taking responsibility for the success of industry and trade, since the prosperity of the electorate depends on it. From this it follows simply and directly that there must be administrative means of negotiation and discussion with those who have effective control of industry and commerce. And from this point of view associations cannot be replaced, for institutions like Development Councils are not able to rely on the confidence and support of member-firms like the elected leaders of the trade.

It is highly desirable that the pressure-group activities of trade associations should be vigorous and efficient. If there is to be interference with industry and commerce, then it is necessary for industry and commerce to show when and how this might be harmful. No one supposes that politicians and civil servants by themselves are capable of working out the effects of their actions except in general terms—and even then they are often wrong. The response of trade associations brings the concrete, detailed, and particular facts of business into the administrative process. Associations are to be censured, indeed, if they promiscuously indulge in political propaganda; but the presentation of rational, measured arguments to the Government is an invaluable service. Nor should it be forgotten that consultation promotes industrial understanding of government as well as vice versa, for leading industrialists and traders learn much by regular discussion with administrators.

It is therefore axiomatic that there should be a flourishing system of independent trade associations, controlled by whoever is taking the production and trading decisions of industry and

⁵ *Hansard*, February 12, 1947, col. 656. He was criticising Development Councils, but the argument is relevant to trade associations.

commerce, for the success of the mixed economy. But this is not the end of the problem. The efficient conduct of the private sector of the economy and its institutions is too important to be left to chance. It would be a profound mistake for a government, convinced of the necessity and desirability of trade associations, to rely on them to such an extent that its independent judgment was impaired.

Two lines of policy may therefore be suggested. In the first place the size and quality of the "sponsoring" departments of the government should not be allowed to run down so far that they do not have the time or capacity for detached consideration of what the associations have to say. It is said that these branches of the government are now smaller and weaker than they were. If this should restrict adequate consultation (with independent authorities as well as associations), then it is much to be deplored and the restoration of these departments and sub-departments to proper efficiency should be a matter of political principle.

For much of industry and trade these arrangements might well be adequate. But if in some cases stronger measures are desired, then there is no reason why there should not be special supervision. One of the most effective associations, the British Iron and Steel Federation, has in a sense been countered by the Iron and Steel Board. The Board has, of course, important economic functions relating to raw materials, prices, and industrial development; but in the exercise of these powers it may be regarded as the guardian of the public interest. So far Conservative governments have not seemed anxious to apply this device—which they established in 1953—to other industries. The Labour Party has different plans for the iron and steel industry, but it might do a good deal worse than try this method of supervision—with variations in powers and so on—in major private-enterprise industries. It has economic merits not the concern of this article; and politically it offers a means of asserting a regard for general interests in circumstances where the vigorous and effective promotion of sectional interests by trade associations is a necessary contribution to efficient government.

ATTITUDE GROUPS

ALLEN POTTER

PRESSURE groups may be divided into two classes. There are those which are the spokesmen for particular sections of the community: trade associations, professional bodies, trade unions, church bodies, ex-servicemen's groups, and the like. Then there are those which either advocate policies more or less beneficial to particular sections of the community or in other ways organise people with common attitudes: the Economic League and the Research Defence Society (against anti-vivisectionist pressures) on the one hand, temperance-reformers' and animal-lovers' societies on the other.

The two kinds of attitude groups shade into each other. In advocating a policy beneficial to medical research workers the Research Defence Society provides an organisation for all those who believe in the value to the human race of medical experiments on live animals. The opponents of the temperance movement have pointed out that some of the leading temperance advocates have been chocolate manufacturers who would benefit if beer-drinkers switched to cocoa. These examples indicate the difficulties of any attempt to distinguish among pressure groups on the ground that one kind is disinterested.

The difference between a sectional spokesman group and an attitude group lies in the fact that it is the political task of the former to try to reflect the particular interests of its section, while it is the political task of the latter to try to persuade people, regardless of their sectional affiliations, to subscribe to its point of view. Trade associations and similar bodies must confine their membership (at least full membership) entirely or almost entirely to the sections they purport to represent, in order to reflect their special interests faithfully. Attitude groups, even those closely associated with certain sections, need not restrict their membership to particular sections of the community. Most of them do not (at least in their rules), though some do for tactical reasons. Only a doctor can belong to the British Medical Association, but any believer can join the Research Defence Society—or an anti-vivisectionist group.

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ATTITUDE GROUPS

I

The field of attitude groups is a maze of overlapping varieties of bodies. It is more useful to describe a few of the groups and to identify a few fairly well-defined categories than to try to map the field. The groups referred to by name in this article are described here in the order of their appearance:

The *Economic League* was founded in 1919 by a group of "industrialists and public men" under the name of National Propaganda. Its cause is the preservation of "free enterprise." It has a staff of about 200, who in 1956 distributed 20,400,000 leaflets, conducted 18,069 meetings, and held 33,500 group talks. Its chief function is to put the point of view of industrialists to industrial workers. It is "non-partisan," which means that it has sometimes criticised socialistic proposals of Conservative Governments.

The *Research Defence Society* was formed in 1908. As already indicated, it defends research workers in the medical, veterinary, and biological sciences against attacks by anti-vivisectionists. It and the anti-vivisectionist societies constitute a perfect example of directly opposing organised interests. News of anti-vivisectionist activities is described in *Conquest*, the journal of the R.D.S., as "Enemy Intelligence." The Society had a membership of 763 at the end of 1954.

The *Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals* was founded in 1824 to help and befriend animals in distress and to protect them from suffering and ill-treatment. Its activities include the direct relief of suffering in animal clinics, the protection of animals from ill-treatment by others (its inspectorate had a staff of 265 in 1956), and constant endeavours to secure further Government Orders and parliamentary Acts prohibiting cruel practices. It enjoys the patronage of the Queen, which is occasionally a matter of slight controversy because of the hostility of many animal-lovers to field sports.

The formation of the *Lord's Day Observance Society* in 1831 was inspired by a series of "Sermons on the Lord's Day" by the Vicar of Islington (Daniel Wilson). Most of its support comes from low-church Anglicans and Free Churchmen. It defends an uncompromisingly sabbatarian position. Some of its opponents are organised in the Sunday Freedom Association.

The *National Association for Mental Health* was formed in 1946 to implement the recommendation by the Feversham Committee in 1939 that there should be a fusion of the leading voluntary mental

health societies. The Earl of Feversham assumed the chairmanship of its Council. It provides some services for the mentally ill but is increasingly concentrating its efforts on educational programmes for professional workers and the general public. It is an example of a "voluntary" social service organisation which in fact has a very large "governmental" element in it. Apart from the central Government grants referred to later, it received about twice as much income in 1955-1956 from the subscriptions of local authorities and regional hospital boards as from private subscriptions. Several central Government Departments have observers on its Council.

The *British Social Biology Council* was started in 1914 as the National Council for Combating Venereal Diseases while the Royal Commission on Venereal Diseases was sitting. Following the submission of the report of the Commission in February 1916, the majority of the members of the Commission accepted nomination to the National Council and the chairman of the Commission, Lord Sydenham of Combe, became its President. In 1925 the Council became the British Social Hygiene Council; in 1950 it adopted its present name. In the broad field of study suggested by its latest title it continues to disseminate information with the object of combating commercialised vice and reducing the incidence of the venereal diseases.

In 1896 Lord Russell of Killowen, the then Lord Chief Justice, summing up in the case of *Oetzmann & Co. v. Long & Co.*, called for the extension of the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act of 1889 to other than public bodies. Sir Edward Fry, formerly Lord Justice Fry, pursued the matter in the correspondence columns of *The Times*. Lord Russell undertook to introduce a Bill into the House of Lords if Sir Edward would draft it. Sir Edward's draft was the basis of all subsequent drafts, the last of which became, after the death of Lord Russell, the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1906. Within a few weeks of the passing of the Act the Secret Commissions and Bribery Prevention League, now the *Bribery Prevention League*, was formed at a meeting of sixteen persons, including the chairman of an investigating committee of the London Chamber of Commerce, which had helped prove the need for legislation. In 1949 the membership of the League was reported to vary between 600 and 800 members, most of them firms. It is concerned now, as at first, with observing how well the Acts prohibiting secret commissions and bribery are enforced.

The *Council of Christians and Jews* was formed in 1942 to promote religious and racial tolerance, and especially at that time to

combat anti-semitism. Originally sponsored by the leaders of the main religious groups, it lost its Roman Catholic members in 1954 on instructions from the Vatican; the efforts of the late Cardinal Griffin to have the decision reversed failed. Individual subscribers are associate members of the organisation, except for those distinguished persons, including Cabinet Ministers, who are individual members of the Council itself.

The merger of the Howard Association and the Penal Reform League in 1921 created the *Howard League for Penal Reform*. Its present President, Viscount Templewood, is a former Home Secretary and its chairman, Mr. George Benson, M.P., is chairman of the Public Accounts Committee. The League is primarily concerned with the promotion of constructive methods of treating delinquents. Among its objectives is the abolition of capital punishment. The *National Campaign for the Abolition of Capital Punishment* was launched under the chairmanship of Mr. Victor Gollancz in the autumn of 1955 in an effort to secure abolition within a year. According to Mr. Gollancz, the campaign was inspired by Mr. Arthur Koestler.

The *United Nations Association* was formed at the instigation of the Executive Committee of the League of Nations Union, which had continued to meet during the second world war. The new Association was launched at a meeting in the Royal Albert Hall in October 1945 with the Prime Minister (Mr. Attlee) and Sir Anthony Eden among those present. It is one of a number of Associations in member countries which seek to secure more support for the United Nations Organisation and to create conditions conducive to its further development. The British group has about 60,000 members.

Among the categories referred to below but not exemplified above are: anti-vivisectionist groups like the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection; feminist groups like the Fawcett Society and the Women's Freedom League; and temperance groups like the United Kingdom Alliance. A further indication of the varieties of organised attitude groups is given by the following list: the Retail Trading-Standards Association; Fellowship for Freedom in Medicine; Navy League; National Council for Civil Liberties; Proportional Representation Society; Progressive League; National Smoke Abatement Society; Commons, Open Spaces and Footpaths Preservation Society; Movement for Colonial Freedom; Society for Cultural Relations with the U.S.S.R.; Abortion Law Reform Association; Public Morality Council; and National Society for the

Prevention of Cruelty to Children. Groups like the Fair Prices Defence Committee, which consist entirely of sectional bodies without any provision for direct individual membership of either people or firms, constitute a particular category of advocate groups whose significance is explicable only in the context of sectional politics. They are not, therefore, dealt with in this article.

II

Very few attitude groups have many members of their own. Some of them have sectional bodies with large individual memberships as affiliated members. Others can at least count on a good deal of support from particular sections. Thus some moral-behaviour groups receive the support of church bodies, though only a very small number of church members join them. Perhaps the animal-welfare societies define a distinct element in the community of a size to be regarded as electorally significant, but figures of sufficient magnitude can be obtained only by pooling the memberships of the various national and local bodies and allowing for a larger number of "fellow travellers" outside the organisations.

With very few exceptions organised attitude groups have considerably fewer than 100,000 people and firms as their individual members. Very many of them have considerably fewer than 10,000 members, even if groups of obviously trivial importance are excluded. The difference between the potential and actual memberships of attitude groups makes many of them seem slightly ridiculous: everyone can join them, almost no one does. Societies to save the world have paid-up memberships of 175.

Groups may not want to build up their memberships indiscriminately. Some bodies can be fairly careless about whom they take: general animal-welfare societies and vaguely Christian organisations can usually equate willingness to join with belief; but some anti-vivisectionist groups and sabbatarian societies insist on strict adherence to their faiths. And, if bodies want enthusiasts, they do not want them to be enthusiastic about too many things. A member of a feminist society will be an embarrassment if she—or he—seeks to commit it to temperance reform, eugenics, and the single tax. There are bodies for enthusiasts-at-large, but most groups are single-minded or nearly so.

The greatest danger to "do-good" bodies has been communist infiltration. Most of the groups that have resisted it successfully

are now experienced enough to be safe. But even firmly non-communist bodies working for such causes as "peace" and "no nuclear tests" have been damaged by their unwilling association with communist campaigns.

Organised attitude groups are predominantly, usually almost exclusively, middle and upper class in composition. That is a social fact independent of any efforts to restrict membership on social grounds. There are groups, however, which confine their membership to the "right" or "top" people. In a few cases this practice may be connected with a desire on the part of the "right" people already in them to continue to control the groups. But the fear of secretaries for the security of their jobs is a negligible factor in restricting membership. Most new members, like most old members, expect a group to be managed for them, not to manage it. The fear of secretaries for the security of their jobs if memberships are not expanded is sometimes an important factor in membership drives.

Members bring knowledge, skills, social prestige, and political contacts to the groups: but they bring them as individuals, not in relation to their numbers. Members as such provide the groups with lobbyists and money, though the numbers of lobbyists and pounds provided by each thousand members vary a great deal too.

The most direct form of lobbying is interviewing M.P.s at Westminster. That takes very few members, though lobbying by voters from distant constituencies consumes a good deal of time and money. But organised lobbying by rank-and-file members of pressure groups is thought more often than not to irritate M.P.s. Feminist societies and some humane bodies are among the attitude groups that occasionally ask their members to go to Westminster. Left-wing groups sometimes arrange demonstrations-cum-"mass" lobbying.

It is more important to have enough members scattered about the country to ask questions during elections, meet M.P.s and prospective parliamentary candidates nursing their constituencies, and write to their M.P.s. Write-in campaigns can be stimulated from the centre, but there must be a genuine influx into Westminster from the constituencies to produce a useful effect. It is hard to organise this kind of lobbying among a membership of less than five figures. The temperance reformers and sabbatarians, the animal-lovers in general and the anti-vivisectionists in particular, are among the groups that often lobby fairly successfully in this way; the

feminist societies, prison reformers, and groups concerned with sexual problems (unless connected with the churches) are among those that by and large do not.

In 1956 the Economic League received and spent over £180,000. The R.S.P.C.A. spent much more, but it engages in direct welfare work as well as what may be broadly referred to as political activities. On the other hand, some "letterhead" committees associated with other groups may spend nothing: the supporting bodies provide the secretaries, the offices, even the letterheads. In general, a small independent group that must operate on a modest scale but wants to make a distinct impression somewhere on the political system or governmental machine cannot manage well on an income of much less than £3,000 a year in cash and kind. Beyond that, all that can be said is that this is a field in which Mr. Micawber's rules apply.

The ratio of income to members is sometimes very high: the Economic League has about 4,000 members. But attitude groups that advocate the causes of industrialists and their firms are not typical. It has been fairly common, however, for one or a few members of an attitude group to act as its "angel." Large gifts and legacies have provided some humane societies with a great deal of money: in 1956 the R.S.P.C.A. spent £262,365 derived from current income (including donations) and £224,919 derived from legacies. In 1956 the Lord's Day Observance Society spent £19,795 derived from current income (including donations) and £14,780 derived from legacies amounting to £14,897 received during the year. But, on the whole, the private patron is disappearing here as elsewhere.

One alternative to private patronage is Government aid. In 1955-1956 the National Association for Mental Health received from the Ministry of Health a general grant of £12,000 and a grant for training, fellowships, and bursaries of £6,000. Its total subscription income for the year was £5,165. A further example is the aid given to recognised marriage-guidance groups: the grant to the separate Catholic body illustrates most clearly that in subsidising a voluntary social service the Government also subsidises the dissemination of a particular point of view. It must be a point of view, however, to which, for one reason or another, the Government does not object.

Societies receiving grants from Government Departments must ultimately give an account of their stewardship to that Department, and if their policy is not approved, either the grant is withdrawn or the policy

has to be changed. It is inevitable, therefore, that it is only the voluntary body that is completely free to form its policy along the lines it thinks best and to undertake pioneer work when this appears to be necessary.

That passage is from the annual report of the British Social Biology Council, which received Government aid from 1918 to 1942, for the year 1947-1948; but it must also be recorded that the Council now experiences a "continuous anxiety over restricted funds."² The alternative of a Government subsidy is not open to most attitude groups, to which the Government would not be prepared to give aid, and which in most cases would serve no useful purpose if they received it.

Another alternative, of increasing importance, is the patronage extended by public companies to other groups than the advocates of business interests. A body like the Bribery Prevention League has always sought support from the business community, but in that sort of case the common interest is direct. Illustrative of the recent trend is the appeal of the Council of Christians and Jews to the public-spiritedness of business firms: "As with so many other voluntary organisations . . . the Council increasingly looked to commercial and industrial firms for support. . . ."³ There is often a response, especially from the largest firms. The acceptance by Viscount Chandos in 1957 of a Joint Honorary Treasurership of the Council of Christians and Jews reflected, in the words of the journal of the Council, "not only his personal concern for the Council's aims, but the growing interest of the major industrial and commercial firms in this country in its work."⁴ This alternative, however, is again not open to many attitude groups.

There is, finally, the alternative of a large enough number of small subscriptions from members. The chances of raising enough money in that way depend on many factors. But there must usually be some members still able and willing to give sums of £50 or £100 to supplement income from the basic subscriptions of, say, five shillings or two guineas. This is not an impossible requirement. It would be wrong to generalise only from the cases of groups whose annual reports seem to be dominated by obituary notices of old patrons and accounts of unsuccessful efforts to find new ones. Minor "angels"—£50 p.a. "angels"—are still in this world, though they may not guard all of the old causes.

² *Annual Report 1955-1956*, p. 1.

³ *Common Ground*, IX (March-April 1955), 25.

⁴ *Ibid.*, XI (Spring 1957), 31.

III

The political influence of the representative bodies of sections of the community can be related, at various rates of discount, to the numbers of people and firms they represent, the knowledge and technical skills of their sections, and what may be referred to as their "economic power." By that is meant not only, in some cases, substantial sectional financial resources but also, in more cases, sectional contributions to the production of goods and services that can be withheld in whole or part by concerted action. Few attitude groups represent large numbers of people; few command knowledge or technical skills not readily available to the Government from other sources, including sectional bodies; and none of them exercise significant amounts of "economic power" independently of the representative sectional bodies with which some of them are associated. It is inherent in any attempt to relate political influence primarily to such factors to conclude that attitude groups are by and large unimportant.

There are obviously a few exceptions. Some of the animal-welfare societies are consulted by the appropriate Government Departments as carefully as sectional bodies are, and are among the most successful groups in obtaining legislation. From 1949, when time for Private Members' Bills was reintroduced, to 1954, the R.S.P.C.A.'s and other animal-welfare societies' bag of Acts was ten. Organised medicine is well aware of the vexations caused it by the efforts of anti-vivisectionists.

The Lord's Day Observance Society is among the most effective of lobbying groups: 402 of the 630 M.P.s elected in the general election of 1955 had pledged themselves to help preserve the Lord's Day, though 191 of them made slight qualifications. The Society is able to repel any frontal assault on its position in Parliament. But that position may be undermined by the compromising spirit of church leaders.

The relationship between the Howard League for Penal Reform and the Prison Commission is as close as that between sectional interests and their "production authorities." It is, however, the converse of the usual relationship; the League solicits contracts for the Prison Commission "so that more work, and of a wider variety, would be available to prisoners."⁵ Some of the activities of social service groups and governmental bodies are so intermeshed that it

⁵ *Annual Report 1956-1957*, p. 4.

is difficult to say where "voluntary" effort ends and "governmental" action begins.

It may be said that these exceptions sustain the rule. The animal-welfare societies have a large number of supporters, possess technical experience, and provide some services, though not the sort that create an effective "strike weapon." The Lord's Day Observance Society is associated with some of the churches. But it is probably in the intensity of the support for its cause (and the efficiency of its organisation) rather than in the number of its supporters that it compares favourably with its opponents. The Howard League contributes some knowledge not so readily available to the Government from other sources—and also the ability to say things the Prison Commissioners think should be said but dare not say themselves. The voluntary social service organisations contribute knowledge, skills, and services. In some cases, however, their contributions now count for less than their entrenched positions from which the Government does not trouble to dislodge them.

But the influence of the National Campaign for the Abolition of Capital Punishment and other "abolitionist" groups cannot be accounted for by that sort of analysis. For a short time they made the issue of the abolition of capital punishment one of the major issues at the centre of British politics. They forced a hostile Government to make substantial concessions to them. They clearly lost in any trial of numerical strength with their opponents, many of whom felt at least as intensely about the issue as they did. They had no technical competence and no knowledge about the issue not readily available to anyone interested. They provided no services to the community. Their influence was that of ideas and sentiments, brought to bear with political skill and organisation.

Another difficulty of assessing the importance of attitude groups in terms applicable to sectional spokesmen groups derives from the different parts decisions play in the politics of the two classes. A sectional spokesman group registers many decisions: it is one of its basic functions to do so. It must express the reactions of members of its section to changes in their circumstances, whether or not the result of governmental action, which may require an approach to the Government; and it is thought to be of considerable political advantage if the spokesman group registers decisions that enable the section "to speak with one voice." Some impression of the effectiveness of a particular representative sectional group may be obtained by studying the interaction of its decisions with those taken

about the same time by the Government. It is not easy to be certain of what happens, but the time-scale involved makes the task reasonably manageable.

On the other hand, an attitude group may decide exactly what it wants once and for all; and the result of a new decision is not infrequently two groups where there used to be one. Decades may pass between the decisions of groups to seek the abolition of capital punishment or equal rights for women and governmental action granting part or all of what is sought. Comparisons between recent governmental decisions and the much earlier decisions of attitude groups and sectional bodies on the same subjects sometimes show that the governmental decisions correspond more closely to those of the attitude groups. But the time-scale involved makes it very difficult to apportion the credit for the victories.

The politics of attitude groups are part of the interplay of more or less influential ideas and people in British society. The organised attitude groups, however, are much less likely to produce the ideas than to help propagate them. Indeed, their first ideas must exist before the organisations: ideas create the common attitudes which are their bases. The organised attitude groups are also much less likely to "produce" important political people (as the National Farmers' Union "produces" Sir James Turner and the Transport & General Workers' Union "produces" Mr. Frank Cousins) than to act as hewers of wood and drawers of water for them.

It is often quite right to put most of the emphasis in an account of the politics of attitude groups on the ideas and people instead of the organisations: on the "United Nations" as a political symbol instead of the United Nations Association and on Mr. Koestler—and Mr. Gollancz and others—instead of the National Campaign for the Abolition of Capital Punishment. But it should be noted that it was often thought worth forming an organised group to raise money, engage a secretary and press officer, and concert action. Organisation is one of the means of making even influential ideas and people more influential. How much more influential in a particular case? The answer at best can only be a shrewd guess.

BOOK REVIEWS

CITIES IN FLOOD: THE PROBLEMS OF URBAN GROWTH. By PETER SELF.
[Faber. 21s.]

Cities in Flood is an excellent book. It is well-written, informative, and thoroughly sensible. Mr. Self brings out very clearly the appalling problems of urban growth and congestion that Great Britain will have to face during the next two or three decades and the sheer inadequacy of what has been done, or attempted, so far in order to cope with them; but he also makes it clear that the present rate of growth is unlikely to continue beyond a limited period and that, if we can bring ourselves to take the steps required for coping with the immediate problems, we can reasonably look forward to much less intractable difficulties in the future. He also salutarily debunks those who profess to fear the ruin of the countryside and its agriculture by the spread of urban building, and is rightly critical of the extreme claims put forward for the prevention of building on good agricultural land. Sir Frederic Osborn, in his interesting introduction, calls Mr. Self's analysis of the problem "brilliant"; and I think, for once, the adjective is justly used.

Faced with the inordinately rapid growth of major cities and "conurbations," which has become a world-wide problem affecting all countries that are advancing fast in the application of modern economic techniques, Great Britain has been almost alone in committing itself to an attempt to restrict this type of growth and to promote actual dispersal of populations from congested central urban areas without merely forcing them out from the centre into suburbs which add to the extent of suburban sprawl. New towns have been deliberately created, and steps have been taken to encourage transfer of population to existing small towns. The scale on which such measures have been carried out is, no doubt, grossly inadequate; and for the time being a halt has been called to the creation of New Towns. These mistakes, however, can be rectified if the will exists; and Mr. Self rightly pleads for a resumption of the dispersal drive in both its forms. He is well aware that the present structure of local government is quite unsuited to the needs of contemporary population planning, which requires regional, rather than merely local, handling of many of the key problems; and he rightly insists that in most cases the county is no less unsuitable as the unit for large-scale planning than the county borough, and that the real need is for effective regional planning bodies covering the whole area of each major conurbation and its neighbourhood or extending over several counties, even where no major conurbation is involved. He wants the creation of New Towns to be resumed; but he puts the strongest stress on the need to plan for the expansion of a large number of small and middle-sized towns on lines that will equip them with really up-to-date rail systems and other facilities for uncongested transport.

In this connection, Mr. Self rightly attacks the existing divorce between town and country planning and the planning of industrial location. The same central department, he argues, should be responsible for both; and accordingly the Board of Trade's functions in respect of industrial location should be transferred to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. Unless this is done, he points out, local and regional planners will continue to be forced to

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plan in the dark, and will be unable to make intelligent forecasts about either the size or the character of the populations for which they must set out to provide. He is undoubtedly correct in holding that the confident and idealistic mood in which the planners set out, with much support from public opinion, in 1945 has by now thoroughly evaporated, giving place to a mood in which the restrictiveness of planning controls is seen much more clearly than its long-run benefits, and much more attention is given to getting houses built than to ensuring that they are built in the best places for them. He also stresses the prevalent confusion between the claims of agriculture and those of the promotion and development of rural amenities—these being in reality two essentially separate issues—so that the confusion between them is often made a means to block planning by opposing in the name of agricultural defence developments that are really objected to on social, or sometimes snobbish, grounds. He insists, most strongly, that the claim of the ordinary citizen for adequate *lebensraum* is thoroughly justified, and deplors the pruning of standards—e.g., of building density—that has taken place on grounds of economy in recent years. He pleads for more generous assistance in the clearing of congested urban areas and in the dispersal of redundant city populations, and makes concrete proposals with these ends in view. Most of all does he insist that good planning is necessarily a matter of giving great weight to long-run consequences, and that improvised measures for coping with short-run difficulties are apt to make matters worse in the long run. At the same time, he keeps his nose firmly to the ground and discounts the less practicable projects of the idealists. In order to make the best of what is practicable he insists that the central government must show itself prepared to take the initiative both in bringing the local planning bodies together on a regional basis for the pursuit of clearly defined objectives and by taking positive action to promote industrial dispersal and to designate and foster the development of new or expanded towns.

In short, Mr. Self's book is not only a most lucid account of what has been done, and left undone, in the field of planning during the past dozen years, but also the presentation of a balanced programme for the future. He makes a real attempt to face realistically the difficulties involved in a process of urban growth that will be checked before very long by the advent of a falling, or at least a stationary, total population; and, without underrating these difficulties, he offers good hope for the longer-run future in which he expects population movements to become much less unmanageable than they are today. The great question, as he sees it, is how much irreparable damage will have been done by bad planning, or by the absence of planning, before these more favourable conditions arrive.

G. D. H. COLE.

THE CHINESE ECONOMY. By SOLOMON ADLER. [Routledge. 276 pp. 25s.]

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS. No. I. Edited by G. F. HUDSON. St. Antony's Papers, No. II. [Chatto. 145 pp. 12s. 6d.]

SOLOMON ADLER was sent to China by the United States Treasury in the autumn of 1941, and in 1942 became Acting American Member of the Stabilisation Board of China, and later Treasury Attaché at the American

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Embassy in Chungking and Nanking. In this book he offers the first comprehensive survey that exists in English of the developments in China since 1949—indeed the first reliable survey since Professor Tawney's *Land and Labour in China*, published in 1932. And he describes them objectively and sympathetically.

The most striking features of Chinese economic development since the overthrow of the Kuomintang have been its speed and scale, its peacefulness and its centralisation. A society which until the 1930s had a cultivated area about two-thirds that of the United States, worked by fifteen times as many farm households and supporting a population three times as great, and which was chronically poor and isolated, swept by brigandage and famine, now has large-scale collective farming, impressive road and rail communications, and a daunting programme of heavy industrialisation. Not only has the pace been quick, there has been remarkably little organised resistance, especially little by the richer peasants. This seems attributable in part to the realism, diligence, and patience of the Chinese people—though it is noticeable how little “national character” is stressed in this book, as in most economic histories. It is good to get away from the old myths about China. The speed of its recent development has been for the most part the response of an industrious and pliable people to a carefully devised master-plan, ably abetted by Russia and conscientiously applied by Mao. Corruption and rebellion, famine and fly-borne diseases, have been replaced by efficiency and peace. Can it be sustained? And is it the whole story?

One element in the story—revealed implicitly rather than explicitly, perhaps, by Mr. Adler—is the extent of the dependence on Russia. Other reporters, like Professor Kirby of the University of Hong Kong, have revealed how alike are the new industrial cities to their elder brothers in Magnitogorsk and the Urals; the machines, the book-keeping, and the language as well as the methods of industry, are Russian; the amount of Russian industrial aid has been put as high as 1,250 million dollars; some 160 of the original 400 projects of the First Five Year Plan were “presents” of the U.S.S.R. to China. Nor does Mr. Adler indicate how far the process of self-questioning has gone, especially in the matter of centralisation: there is said to be by this time a bureaucracy numbering some twelve millions. And all the efficiency and direction have not quite averted some disastrous floods, some technical lapses, and irregularities here and there in the economy.

This is, however, a most valuable, well-written, and perceptive study, fresh and frank. It is in places exciting—in its revelations on population growth (an annual increase of some twelve millions a year, making birth control essential), and in its accounts of the reaction of the Chinese peasantry to the speedy collectivisation of agriculture. And it emphasises that this colossal experiment has significance not only for China, Britain, and the United States but for all the uncommitted powers and peoples in Asia. There is dependence on Russia—but there is a competitive note with Indian industrialisation. In the second number of the impressive *St. Antony's Papers*, Mr. Rhagavan Iyer discusses this problem, and concludes that, while planning in India is producing less spectacular results than in China, it is based on more solid foundations and will command more widespread acceptance. It is heartening to find the future of Asia being determined by competition in Asia, and at last a competition in ploughshares, not swords.

ESMOND WRIGHT.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER, 1919-1933. By ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, Jr. [*Heinemann*. 569 pp. 42s.]

THIS is the first of "several volumes" that will be called "The Age of Roosevelt." The work has been eagerly awaited, for "What was the New Deal?" has become the harrowing and perplexing "What am I?" of the American liberal. And the American liberal, whatever his perplexities, at least feels sure that he has rejected the excesses, of course, of American capitalism while remaining true to the essential American tradition of a glad freedom of enterprise, that phrase construed in the widest, most general, and most noble sense. His hero is a man who is held to have saved American business against its own worst enemy, itself, during the fantastic years of the depression. And he sees the Democratic Party as much as possible as the party of the small (business) man against the big (business) guy, even though, while he trust-busts enthusiastically, he sees the advantages of mildly regulating the then inevitable (and efficient) consolidations of business power. In other words, he sees double and—worse—he often sees that he sees double. He positively squints with agony at how hard it is to recognise the all-too-closely-related Philistines, even though he is sure that he is so much David. So it is not surprising that when 1932 has become the 1688 of modern American Whiggery, so many should wait hopefully, the reviewer included, to see whether the first huge history of the New Deal would resolve these agonies, would reveal the clarity of American liberalism to be as great as its psychological conviction. And Professor Schlesinger is admirably equipped for the task: a teacher of the great Harvard history school, a famed publicist, a founder of the A.D.A. (Americans for Democratic Action—the would-be Democratic Fabian Society), and a speech-writer and friend to Adlai Stevenson.

But this volume is a terrible disappointment. It is written in a slick, catch-dollar, aggressively popular style that shows more will to condescend than evidence of the heights vacated. His impressionistic style of social history becomes in fact the "personalised" morass of irrelevance of the worst political journalism: we are told that John Nance Garner liked lamb chops and fruit for breakfast (what character!) and that, when F. D. R. and his economic adviser met Hoover and his man during the interregnum, the one side smoked cigars and the other (democratically) smoked cigarettes. But the two most significant items of social legislation in the 1920s are ignored almost completely: prohibition and the ending of mass-immigration. Page 1 gets off to a typical start: "'We are at the end of our rope,' the weary President at last said, as the striking clock announced the day of his retirement. 'There is nothing more we can do.'" And then a footnote, the first of fifty pages of a formidable looking apparatus of notes, which refers to two quite separate sentences on quite separate pages of T. G. Joslin's *Hoover Off the Record* (1934)—a work as authoritative as it sounds. Is this point trivial?—unfortunately, no. For his need to ape *Time*-style and *Time*-technique is a sign of a wilful desertion of scholarly standards for a partisanship at once violent and petty. We reach the Inauguration of 1933 with such a tremendous build-up of promise and emotion that we are left wishing deeply that history had put into the New Deal all the intelligence, the coherence and the preconceived plan that Mr. Schlesinger will have to put into his subsequent volumes in order to avoid bathos. The last page should

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be read by anyone who does not know what is meant by "teleology": "Roosevelt, armoured in some inner faith, remained calm and inscrutable confident that American improvisation could meet the future on its own terms. . . . Deep within, he seemed to know that the nation had resource beyond its banks and exchanges; that the collapse of the older order meant catharsis rather than catastrophe. . . . If this were so, then the crisis could change from calamity to challenge. The only thing Americans had to fear was fear itself. And so he serenely awaited the morrow. The event was in the hand of God."

But the book is worth close study. For it is a precise mirror of the worthy sentiments, yet the lack of perspective, of the present-day publicists of American liberalism. Rather than face the fact, obvious from a foreign perspective, that his differences with his opponents are matters of degree and stress *within* a common, indeed almost a claustrophobic, American liberalism Mr. Schlesinger adopts a half-cocked dialectic theory of American history. Amid the overwhelmingly middle-class classlessness of American life and politics, an even diluted Marxism clearly will not do: he quite rightly rejects the view that American politics will never be stable and explicable until an alleged suppressed-left expresses itself. But, instead, he sees American politics as a dialectic struggle between the right and, not the left, but, in the title of a book of his, *The Vital Centre*—certainly not the dead centre, the vital centre. If you can put all the ills of the body politic completely at arm's length, you have a foe to shy rocks at, not just a contradictory and human self to scratch. Indeed, the American liberal in such a quest for certainty does not even rend a straw-man, he barks in a mirror. The truth is, surely, as H. G. Wells once put it, that the ideas of both American political parties could fit comfortably together as different wings of the old British Liberal Party of Asquith and Lloyd George, the party of industrialism and freedom. But the American liberal for polemical purposes is constantly tempted to sound more radical than he is. The result, as in the speech-writers of the New Deal (if not in the more mundane and empirical course of its legislative history), and as in this book, is to substitute rhetoric for analysis and to make mere activity sound like plan. There is a much-quoted passage from a speech of Roosevelt's in 1932 that Mr. Schlesinger does not recall, though it sums up the reasons for the great popular confidence that Roosevelt was able to restore and yet also demolishes the claim of the New Deal publicists to have really created anything new: "The country needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the country demands, bold persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it. If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something." After all, a new deal is not a new game.

BERNARD CRICK.

THE NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY. Vol. I. The Renaissance 1493-1520. Vol. VII. The Old Régime 1713-1763. [*Cambridge University Press*. 532 and 625 pp. 37s. 6d. each.]

EUROPE SINCE NAPOLEON. By DAVID THOMSON. [*Longmans*. 910 and lvii pp. 42s.]

At first sight the appearance of these remarkable volumes seems to confirm the belief that the fear of being old-fashioned is much less potent in Cambridge

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than in Oxford. Historians are peculiarly sensitive to the vagaries of fashion, and it looked at one time as if they had become so "scientific" in the last half of last century that no one would ever again dare to write "general" history if he wished to become or remain a serious historian. The serious historian examined a short period of the past through a microscope. He was concerned with what a Spanish ambassador wrote about Elizabeth, with the life histories of obscure M.P.s in the eighteenth century, or the analysis of the financial demands of the *cahiers des doléances* of the Third Estate in 1789. The *Cambridge Modern History*, as planned by Lord Acton, seemed to be as old-fashioned as Herodotus, or Raleigh's *Historie of the World*, or Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*.

Yet here, sixty years after Acton planned the *Cambridge Modern History*, Sir George Clark and his Advisory Committee begin the publication of the *New Cambridge Modern History*. (It should be noted with reference to the first sentence of this review that Sir George Clark, though eminently Oxford, became eminently Cambridge as Regius Professor and Fellow of Trinity.) When one compares Volumes I and VII of the New with Volumes I and VI of the Old, to which they answer, and Sir George Clark's General Introduction and statement of arrangement and objects with the Preface of the three editors who carried out Acton's plan, the resemblances between the New and the Old are much more striking than their differences. The most obvious formal innovation is that each separate volume has been assigned to a single editor. Thus The Renaissance volume was planned and edited by Professor G. R. Potter; when he took up an appointment abroad the editorial revision was undertaken by Professor Denys Hay, of the University of Edinburgh, who writes a very good introductory chapter. Volume VII is edited by Miss J. O. Lindsay, Fellow of Girton College.

The main reason for rewriting Acton's twelve volumes is that the enormous amount of research during the last sixty years has thrown new light not merely into many corners of many periods, but on large spaces in periods and even upon periods themselves. Also, to some extent, as Sir George Clark points out, there have been some important changes in the attitude of historians towards the presentation of the past; e.g., the historian no longer expects to write "definitive history" and he is neither expected to be nor professes to be impartial according to the standards of impartiality set by Acton. The result of this is, no doubt, that the New has something of a new look—but not a very new new look. The crux of the matter will be found in the main problem which confronts every writer of "general history" and, *a fortiori*, the editor planning a volume of composite authorship covering, like these volumes, a historical period. The period is not a fortuitous slice of years arbitrarily cut out of history by the editor or author. It is a period precisely because some event or events, preceding or following it, give it a unity and a meaning of great historical importance. The Renaissance and the *ancien régime* each has this kind of unity and meaning as a landmark in the development of European civilisation, the society of the Renaissance destroying or superseding that of the Middle Ages, and the society of the *ancien régime* being destroyed or superseded by that which rose out of the flames and ashes of the French revolution.

The ultimate test of a general history and of these volumes is whether they succeed in conveying to the reader this unity and meaning or merely like a

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chronicle present a series of facts, a succession of events in various places. Lord Acton's twelve volumes did not pass this test. They have proved to be an old and trusted friend to many people, but like a good encyclopaedia or dictionary. You took them down from the shelf when you wanted to verify facts, learn about events, or acquire information about Fernando de Guzman Nunez or the Patent of Tolerance. You could not read them; you referred to them. It is clear from Sir George Clark's introduction that the intention is that the new history should present this unity and meaning of each period, and should not be a mere record of a succession of events in different countries. Each volume is to present a picture of some significant and important stage in European civilisation. It is too early to judge to what extent this intention will be fulfilled. The general standard of these first two volumes is high; they are well edited and well written. They are certainly more readable than the original history. Miss Lindsay's volume is the more successful in conveying a sense of continuity and unity.

Dr. David Thomson is a very courageous man. In 900 pages he attempts to tell the terrible story of Europe and European civilisation during the last 150 years. He saw himself immediately confronted by the problem of general history dealt with in the preceding paragraph. His history, he says in his preface, is written on the principle "that a general historical study, if the writing and the reading of it are to be more than the mere drudgery of amassing information, must concern itself with patterns woven by the process of historical change." Dr. Thomson's historical knowledge and intelligence are so great, and he is such an accomplished writer, that his book is eminently readable and full of interesting things. It should prove of permanent value for those for whom it has primarily been written: university students in the United States and Britain. It is, however, inevitable that the necessity of getting the history of a continent and 150 years into 900 pages, of at least mentioning an enormous number of facts and persons, makes it impossible for Dr. Thomson consistently to put his principle into practice. As the book goes on the facts too often obscure the pattern.

LEONARD WOOLF.

WIVES WHO WENT TO COLLEGE. By JUDITH HUBBACK. [*Heinemann*. 159 pp. 12s. 6d.]

MRS. HUBBACK is a graduate of Cambridge University, with three young children. She was interested in the fate of the 8 per cent. of English women who, like herself, take their university degrees and then marry; and she accordingly set herself to find out what happens to them. Now that the principles relating to the higher education and the professional employment of women have been securely established, how far do they in practice extend to those of "the marrying kind"? How much do they actually achieve, and how much more use could they be helped to make of their training, by suitable public measures?

The marriage rate for women graduates is very nearly equal to that of the rest of the population, and this is in itself a matter for remark. Careers, in the early days of feminism, were often placed before marriage. Nowadays, married graduates make up for their slightly smaller numbers by producing

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slightly larger families. To help in bringing them up, half have no domestic help or less than an hour a day, and less than a sixth have resident help.

In these circumstances, one does not expect to find very high employment figures. Under 20 per cent. of married graduates work full-time, and very few of these have young children. About the same number do part-time work, and nearly all of these have children. The main fields of work are teaching and examining, administrative work, medicine, writing, and translating, excluding much unpaid work in local organisations of all kinds. Nearly half of them plan to take up, or to increase, their outside work as soon as circumstances allow. From the personal details supplied, one gets an impression of a group for the most part satisfied and busy in their chosen occupations, looking ahead to wider horizons, and somewhat ruefully comparing their crowded daily lives with the easier existences of their mothers. Higher taxation and shortage of domestics throw a heavy burden on the woman who wants to maintain both family and cultural standards: and Mrs. Hubback comments on the prevalence of over-tiredness which results.

As she sees it, there are several ways in which educated women could be made happier themselves, and could contribute more to the community. The intelligent girl should be encouraged to realise that she will probably wish to spend a good part of her adult life in the management of a home and family. Emphasis on concentration on a very small area of knowledge will probably afford a less good training for this than more varied work in a wider field. In choosing a career, where no overriding vocational urge declares itself, the advantages should be stressed of studying a subject which can lead on to part-time employment later. She will do well to establish her career before marrying, and certainly before the "acute" stage of motherhood sets in. Even then, where she can continue with a nominal amount of her outside work, to keep her hand in, she should do so, to avoid the sense of falling behind, and losing in mental grasp, experienced by most intelligent women when they give up work.

Discussing training for home making, Mrs. Hubback deplores the attitude, still prevalent in grammar schools, that only the less intelligent pupils should receive a useful amount of instruction in domestic science. She points out that there is scope for a genuinely educational, scientific approach to such subjects as catering, hygiene, and so forth, and it is in everyone's best interests to dispel the current implied belief that domestic work is essentially unskilled and unrelated to the exercise of wits and judgment.

Political and industrial help could also be valuable. Mrs. Hubback states frankly that the married woman is effectively "disabled" in some respects, compared with her colleagues, less mobile, more prone to need time off, and so on. Yet her approach to life has its own values, and these can be made use of, for instance, in nursing, teaching, or social work, where the difficulties are allowed for, and, she adds sternly, kept down to a minimum by the married women themselves. Facilities for re-training are also needed.

From the financial point of view, taxation often acts as a powerful disincentive to earn more than a very limited amount. Mrs. Hubback urges, as an elementary justice, that, where women go out to work, they should be entitled to a tax allowance to cover their replacement, for domestic purposes, within the home.

I feel warmly in accordance with most of Mrs. Hubback's views—I echo

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the wry remarks of many who supplied her with her answers. It is with regret that I must say that I found her presentation pedestrian, her style diffuse, the points sometimes submerged beneath vague generalisations. But—as I release the baby from the play-pen, which he has been rattling this past half-hour, and dash to make ready the tea before school comes out—I do indeed admire her tenacity in devising her research and bringing it off at all.

JUDITH HENDERSON.

UNHOLY ALLIANCE. By GERALD FREUND. [*Chatto and Windus*. 283 pp. 25s.]

GERMAN RULE IN RUSSIA 1941-1945. By ALEXANDER DALLIN. [*Macmillan*. 695 pp. 60s.]

THESE two books together cover separate stages in German-Soviet relations between the end (for the Russians) of the first world war and the end of the second. The first deals with the complex story of the years from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the signing of the agreement of April 24, 1926—the so-called Treaty of Berlin—and the second with the equally complex period when German authorities were actually responsible for the administration of large areas of Soviet territory after the invasion of June 22, 1941. An interesting comparison between them is the difference in approach to the writing of history; Mr. Freund attacks his subject-matter in the style of a Professor Temperley (or even of Mr. Wheeler-Bennett, who contributes an introduction) and produces a connected and well-documented story, while Mr. Dallin adopts the modern American model of a huge book in which a vast amount of material is assembled, but which leaves the author free to throw in a fair amount of personal opinion. Both books are written with the benefit of hindsight, and especially Mr. Dallin's. Mr. Freund would have been well advised to insist on a less tendentious title, since his is in fact the less opinionated of the two.

Mr. Freund's is, in reality, a fairly straightforward piece of story-telling, and is the fruit of much valuable research supplementing that already done by Mr. Wheeler-Bennett, Professor Carr, and others. It was, he argues, inevitable that Lenin should accept the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, not only because he had little choice in the matter but also because he was gambling on the defeat of Germany by the Entente; when the time came, there were obvious attractions in setting up a club of the defeated in opposition to the eventual victors, so that from November 1918 onwards all the indications pointed towards a German-Russian *rapprochement*. In this the military men, and notably von Seeckt, played a leading part, since the possibilities of evading the military clauses of the Versailles treaty were enhanced by having a remote area to work in under the form of military advice to the Soviets. This part of the story is familiar enough. But Mr. Freund introduces interesting material to support his evident belief that the military and civilian authorities of Weimar were more ignorant of each other's plans than used to be thought; Seeckt, he would argue, did not influence the government to any great extent, and had at times to be kept apart from it. The events which led to Rapallo and to the later treaty of 1926 were political and not military, and the initiative rested firmly in the hands of Chicherin and Krestinski on the Russian side and

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Stresemann and Brockdorff-Rantzau on the German. Anyone reading this book who was brought up in the "Locarno spirit" and the belief that Stresemann was the white hope of European pacification will be shocked at Mr. Freund's interpretation of the man, but on the basis of the evidence he adduces will find it hard to prove the portrait inaccurate. Radek, too, comes out somewhat differently from the popular conception. If one must criticise the book, it would be for lack of clarity in the background; the relationship of changes in German governments to the policy they were pursuing is not fully brought out, nor are the twists and turns of the organisation of the German Communist Party (which Mr. Freund dismisses as rather unimportant after the Luxemburg-Liebknecht murders); and there is no reference at all to some of the parallel activities of the Soviets in other countries, such as Krasin's protracted stay in London.

Mr. Dallin's assiduity in collecting material was matched only by his evident contempt for Alfred Rosenberg, who was nominally in charge of German occupation policy in Russia. Rosenberg was indeed not the brightest jewel in the Nazi crown, and there is plenty to show his ineffectiveness in dealing with men like Himmler and the tougher of the generals. The result of divided authority was to make the policy actually followed in the occupied East a hotch-potch in which the *Untermensch* theory conflicted with occasional attempts to enlist the support of dissident Russians, and even more the dissident Ukrainians, against the control of Moscow. Rosenberg himself, as a Baltic German, knew the Russians considerably better than most Nazis and did not entirely dislike them or underrate them, but his knowledge did not suffice to enable the Germans to devise a coherent policy when they found vast tracts of Russia under their control. Because of this conflict of view on the German side, the Russians were neither exterminated nor made to revolt against their oppressors, and the world was faced with the apparent miracle that a people believed to be groaning under a communist yoke showed remarkable loyalty to the system even when they had the chance to get rid of it. Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is the account of the curious Vlasov movement, which Mr. Dallin is undoubtedly right in dismissing as of little practical importance.

One is tempted to wonder whether another Mr. Dallin might not some day write a rather similar book about Allied occupation policies in North Africa, Italy, or even Germany. True, no responsible Allied authority ever advocated extermination. But anyone familiar with the difficulties which faced the Allies when occupying enemy countries will find himself almost at home when he reads of divided counsels, uncertain policies, and sometimes plain ignorance on the part of responsible people. There, he will say if he is honest, but for the grace of God went we.

T. E. M. MCKITTERICK.

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF BARON HAUSSMANN. By J. M. and BRIAN CHAPMAN. [Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 262 pp. 25s.]

MANY of the physical characteristics of modern Paris are due to the work of Baron Haussmann, who held the office of Prefect of the Seine from 1853 until 1870. In this book Mr. and Mrs. Chapman have set out to describe the efforts which he made to transform the city of which he was chief magistrate

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for seventeen years; to explain the social, economic, and political conditions obtaining in the Second Empire so far as they related to this task; and to show something of the personality and character of the man himself. To accomplish this threefold purpose in a single volume in a completely satisfactory manner would be an extremely difficult and perhaps impossible task. It would be too much to claim that the authors have wholly succeeded. But they have written an interesting and readable account of the most important period in the development of modern Paris, the city of light and beauty; and they have shown the human forces which induced that development and the opposing forces which ultimately brought it to a standstill.

The improvement of Paris during the Second Empire was due to Louis Napoleon's desire to present the people of France with spectacular evidence of the growth and progress which the capital city made during his régime. It also owed much to the effectiveness of the human instrument whom he selected for this purpose in the person of Georges Haussmann. Haussmann was a man of great ambition, immense energy, outstanding administrative and financial ability, and remarkable persistence of purpose. He gave Louis Napoleon his single-hearted services and unswerving loyalty in exchange for unlimited opportunities to initiate and carry out his many plans and constructional projects. From Louis Napoleon he received continuous personal support in the face of much criticism until the final opposition to Haussmann's financial methods became so strong that he was forced to resign. The authors declare that, despite much contemporary suspicion and allegations of personal corruption—and there were vast opportunities for its exercise—Haussmann had a blameless record in this respect. He had a large salary and a huge entertainment allowance; he had a magnificent official residence and a position of unquestionable importance; he had direct access to the Emperor almost daily so that the ministerial authority to which he was theoretically subject was purely nominal; and above all he had great power. This was sufficient to satisfy most of his ambitions and to evoke the great energies which lay in him. He left the service a poor man.

In these exceptional circumstances, and relying on the vulgar love of display and the get-rich-quick spirit which characterised the Second Empire, Haussmann performed many astonishing feats of modernisation and reconstruction. He tore down the ancient walls, fortifications, and narrow alleyways which had persisted in Paris from the middle ages and built in their stead the magnificent boulevards which we know today. He made the Etoile out of a mere cross roads and he was also responsible for the Place de la République and similar key points in the city. He reconstructed the Bois de Boulogne. He designed and built the wholesale food markets. He gave Paris a modern sewerage system and water supply. He extended the Rue du Rivoli. These and a hundred other achievements were due to Georges Haussmann.

One shortcoming of the book is the absence of maps. The three small half-tone illustrations which are included showing a number of unnamed spidery lines representing roads planned or executed during the Haussmann epoch do not enable the reader to follow the text unless he happens to have an intimate knowledge of the topography of Paris. It is also a pity that the authors have not ventured to discuss the validity of Haussmann's basic town

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planning conceptions, in view of the denigration of "visual" planning by modern planners. But despite these shortcomings *The Life and Times of Baron Haussmann* was worth writing and is worth reading.

W. A. ROBSON.

THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF PRESCRIBING. By J. P. MARTIN, with a Foreword by PROFESSOR R. M. TITMUSS. [Heinemann. 169 pp. 21s.]

THE cost of medicine for domiciliary patients treated under the National Health Service amounts to something over one-tenth of the cost of the Service as a whole. So important an item in the health service budget is worthy of greater study than it has yet received. The value of Mr. Martin's book is not that it answers all our questions, but rather that it provides a comprehensive picture of a large part of the background against which our questions must be asked. As Professor Titmuss says in his foreword, this is a preliminary only to the study of the doctor-patient relationship in which the giving or withholding of drugs takes place.

The main substance of the book is a detailed statistical analysis, based on data normally available to the health service administrators, of over-all prescribing costs in sixty-seven county boroughs of England and Wales during 1951. The counties and conurbations were excluded because of lack of homogeneity. The population range of the towns studied was between 50,000 and 500,000. No new data was collected, though the Ministry of Health made available certain unpublished material rendered suitably anonymous.

The basic facts available about prescriptions were their average frequency per patient, their average cost, and the increases in these between 1947 and 1951. These figures were related to the mean list sizes of the doctors in the areas concerned, practice structure in terms of principals and assistants, and a number of indices of morbidity and social structure.

The more important conclusions reached may be summarised thus:

1. Variations in frequency of prescribing are twice as important in contributing to the variations in prescribing costs per patient as the total cost of individual prescriptions.

Thus, areas with a low average cost per patient have a low frequency of prescribing rather than a low average cost of prescription. But the converse does not hold good. Areas with a high cost per patient have a high average cost per prescription as well as a high frequency of prescribing.

2. Nevertheless, a high frequency of prescribing is not generally related to a high cost per individual prescription.

3. Frequency of prescribing depends partly on climatic conditions, partly on morbidity, and partly on local custom. Of the three, the last is most important. It depends mainly on the traditional behaviour of the doctor and the traditional expectation of the patient.

4. Average total cost per prescription is closely related to social conditions. Expensive prescriptions occur most frequently in well-to-do areas, cheap ones in poorer areas. In the poorer areas, list sizes are larger and morbidity rates higher.

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5. The median frequency of prescriptions per patient increased from 4.2 in 1947 to 6.07 in 1951. The range of increase in frequency was from 16 per cent. in Tynemouth to 79 per cent. in Lincoln.

Average cost per prescription increased from 19.1d. in 1947 to 42.69d. in 1951. The range was from 107 per cent. in Worcester to 201 per cent. in West Hartlepool.

6. The largest increases in frequency of prescription have occurred in areas with previous low rates; these were usually areas of low morbidity and relative prosperity. By contrast, increases in average cost per prescription were not related to any of the variables studied, and may therefore reflect in large measure pharmaceutical and medical advance over the period.

7. Two regions have clearly defined characteristics: the North-West Region is undoubtedly the most expensive and the Midland Region far and away the cheapest.

The North-West Region (mostly Lancashire) has a high level of morbidity, an excessive rainfall, low retail sales per head, and a high proportion of single-handed doctors.

The Midland Region has an average to high morbidity, but a high proportion of medical partnerships.

8. High morbidity and large lists are closely related. But in the Midland Region, although lists are large, infant mortality rates are not correspondingly high. This tends to confirm the view that partnerships are of major importance in efficient practice organisation and good medical care. It may also provide a valuable clue to the control of excessive prescribing costs.

9. In the Northern Region (mostly Tyneside), morbidity is nearly as high as in Lancashire, but prescribing costs are comparatively low. Again, although list sizes are high, partnerships are frequent.

The author remarks that this study has probably gone as far as profitable in the analysis of existing prescription statistics. We agree with this conclusion. The data he has used are probably the best available. But the county boroughs give a biased picture of England and Wales. They are concentrated excessively in the north, so a random sample gives an excessively northern picture. Moreover, the smaller country towns, where general practice usually attains its highest levels, are excluded from this analysis.

Nevertheless, the general conclusion which may tentatively be drawn is this. The most important single way of reducing excessive prescribing is to raise the quality of general practice. An extension of partnerships and group practice can do more than any other single measure to achieve this. Moreover, better general practice means not only lower prescribing costs but also better general health for the community.

The book also contains a full review of existing machinery for the control of the cost of prescribing, including the extensive advisory machinery devised jointly by the Ministry of Health and the medical profession itself. This advisory machinery increasingly takes the form of an educational service which is, in the long run, likely to do more good than any coercive measures. Such a service can do something to counteract the continual flood of advertising to which practitioners are now subjected by the drug firms.

If the reviewer may make one critical comment, it is this. A short, clear

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summary of conclusions would do much to help the reader, particularly one whose concern is with medical behaviour rather than statistical method.

STEPHEN TAYLOR.

AN AFRICAN SURVEY. Revised 1956. By LORD HAILEY. [Oxford. 1676 pp. £5 5s.]

It would be presumptuous for a student of politics, who has never visited Africa south of the Sahara, to try to review the whole of Lord Hailey's unique revision of his unique work, first published in 1938. Such a task would require a committee of geographers, economists, demographers, lawyers, educationists, agricultural scientists, and specialists in colonial administration—people such as Lord Hailey has enlisted to help him, and whose help he so graciously acknowledges. The work gives an impression of confidence and capacity. In attempting to assess its general value, one can only say that any reader who wants to know how Europe has gone about its task of civilising Africa will get most of what he wants from this revised *African Survey*.

Yet there is a sense in which the student of politics cannot help appraising the book as a whole, and trying to draw conclusions from it. The fact that it is concerned almost entirely with the impact upon Africa of administrators and settlers from Europe is itself highly political. Lord Hailey is concerned with what Europeans have done to Africa; the reader is likely to ask what Africa is going to do with the Europeans in the next decade or so. In other words, the question of African nationalism—or, as Lord Hailey prefers to call it, "Africanism"—is one which a survey of Africa, revised to 1956, can legitimately be called upon to discuss.

For an adequate discussion of such a question we need two kinds of information, which I shall call respectively "background" and "foreground" information. The first is information about the origins of the various races in Africa, their distribution, their economic activities, their educational and legal processes, their relations with colonial powers, and the changes which have been taking place in these aspects of life in Africa. *An African Survey* is mainly concerned with this kind of information; it is admirable in its summaries of the contributions of geography, history, and economics to our knowledge about Africa. But it is strangely lacking in "foreground" information, by which I mean material about the political processes, movements, ideas, and personalities which are developing out of the background of change in the various African territories. There is a good deal of information about constitutional developments, but very little about the arguments and pressures which produced those developments. In consequence, anyone who wants to know what forms "Africanism" may take in the future is left with a vague sense of change, but little knowledge of how it is likely to make itself felt. There is, for example, almost nothing about African political leaders. Kenyatta gets nine lines; Nkrumah appears as chief minister in the Gold Coast, and his activities before this time are neglected; there is nothing about the leaders of dissident native opinion in South Africa. The reader is left to find out for himself, if he can, what animates these men, how they came to power or hope to come to it, what they think about Asian and Arab nationalism, and what views they have about China and the Soviet Union. Information of this kind is hard to come by, but it can be gathered, as Mr. Thomas Hodgkin has shown. The absence of it in Lord Hailey's work gives

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rise to a vagueness and blankness about the dynamics of "Africanism" which must be accounted a major defect.

Beside the African political leader, there are two other archetypal figures in Africa who will play major parts in the political drama of the next ten or twenty years—the European administrator and the European settler. It is possible to learn something about these from the accounts of their work in *An African Survey*, although, again, there is little or no attempt to show them as living political beings. The enlightened colonial administrator is still, by implication, Lord Hailey's hero. He has more money to spend than in 1938, and has done more with it; and since that time he has become more of a constitution-maker. If "Africanism" ever gives him his marching orders, he will be able to retire with dignity on a pension, and either claim credit for the success of African independence, or blame the politicians for its failure. The European settler is another matter. He is a scruffier member of Lord Hailey's cast, and it is he who stands to lose most from the onset of "Africanism." In South Africa he has taken his stand on a position of domination; in the French and Belgian territories he is held in fairly close check by the colonial power, which is prepared to back him up if necessary. It is in British dependencies that his future is most problematical.

The British Government has a chronic enthusiasm for self-government, and a chronic inability to decide which "self," in multi-racial communities, should be allowed to do the governing. In Southern Rhodesia, as Lord Hailey shows, it allowed the affirmations of 8,000-odd white settlers to decide that there should be Responsible Government for that territory; but it then had second thoughts, which it still retains, so that it has never given the white settlers the full control of Africans which they wanted. In Kenya it has been bumbling about for nearly fifty years, trying to find a suitably entrenched position for white settlers, who in 1948 had reached only a total of 30,000, as against 91,000 Indians and *five and a quarter million* Africans. Such comparatively tiny numbers mean that the position of the white settler in the East and Central African territories is quite different from his position in either the extreme South or the extreme North, in both of which he can count his numbers above the million. There is no prospect of effective white dictatorship in Kenya and Rhodesia, as there is in South Africa, unless the colonial power stands firm and backs the local white men. Lord Hailey's work does not help in discovering whether it will be called upon to do so or whether it will do so if called upon.

J. D. B. MILLER.

SHORTER NOTICES

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1956. By RICHARD P. STEBBINS. [Oxford University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations, New York. 1957. 426 pp. 48s.]

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1956. Edited by PAUL E. ZINNER. [Oxford University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations, New York. 1957. 552 pp. 55s.]

So fast do events now move, and so well organised is the machinery of American scholarship, that the terrible events of last year have already become

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history—and history well documented and written with an astonishing objectivity and authority for such short range work. Like the previous volumes of both series, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, these are useful reference books; not books to be read in advance of necessity, but reference books of a very high standard. If the vaunted policy-planning committees of the State Department and the National Security Council were able to prepare for contingencies half as well and a quarter as quickly as Professor Stebbins can sum them up, then perhaps the aghast and helpless surprise of American diplomacy at both the Hungarian and the Suez crises would have been less. The solidarity, regularity, and good sense of these volumes is an ironic comment on the organisation and policies of the State Department itself.

THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICS AT THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III. By SIR LEWIS NAMIER. Second edition. [Macmillan. 514 pp. 50s.]

It is nearly thirty years since the first edition of this book appeared. It at once won great praise and soon was treated as a classic. It is remarkable that Oxford should have produced two such distinguished contemporary historians as Sir Lewis and Mr. Toynbee, who are at the opposite poles of historical achievement in almost everything from method to volume. Sir Lewis, whose method is microscopic where Mr. Toynbee's is telescopic, has become the grand panjandrum of British historians and has had a very considerable influence upon the younger generation of historical students and writers. The revision of this important book has not materially altered it. The author tells us in the preface to this new edition that, since the first edition appeared, he has examined an immense amount of material, but has not attempted to incorporate much new material in the book. He has left "the basic structure unchanged."

THE YEAR BOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS, 1957. Edited by GEORGE W. KEETON and GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER. [Stevens. 479 pp. £2 2s.]

This is the eleventh volume in the series of *Year Books* published under the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs. The last 200 pages are devoted to reports on world affairs in the form of reviews of a very large number of books grouped under the following "aspects": economic, geographical, institutional, legal, sociological, and strategic. These surveys are compiled with knowledge and care, but the number of books dealt with in the space make them for the reader rather kaleidoscopic and dazzling. In the first part of the volume there are some excellent articles. Perhaps the most interesting is an admirable analysis of the objects and results of the Anglo-French operations against Egypt by Miss Susan Strange of University College, London. Miss Strange has the courage of her opinions and yet contrives to be objective in the statement of facts and other people's opinions. Among the other distinguished articles, Professor Hugh Seton-Watson's on Eastern Europe since Stalin and Mr. L. C. Green's interesting article on the double standard applied by the United Nations to different nations deserve particular notice.

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BOOK REVIEWS

MACHIAVELLISM; THE DOCTRINE OF RAISON D'ÉTAT AND ITS PLACE IN MODERN HISTORY. By FRIEDRICH MEINECKE. Translated from the German by DOUGLAS SCOTT. [Routledge. xlvii and 438 pp. 50s.]

IN Germany Meinecke's reputation was and remains considerable. In Britain he has remained a name and little more except to the most erudite—there is no translation of any of his books in the London Library. He wrote three major works during his life: *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat* (1907), *Die Idee der Staatsräson* (1924), and *Die Entstehung des Historismus* (1936). *Die Idee der Staatsräson* has now been translated into English and published under the title of *Machiavellism*, with a useful introduction to Meinecke's achievements by Dr. W. Stark. Meinecke's thought is extremely Teutonic, both in its abstractness and its attitude towards power and the state. Dr. Stark in his introduction says that Meinecke's name will remain important because we can see in his intellectual development, under the impact of Germany's two defeats in two world wars and the barbarism of the Hitler régime, "the break-up of a philosophical tradition which had dominated Germany for more than a hundred years." There is some truth in this, yet the most remarkable thing is that both in this book and in what he wrote after 1945, fundamentally his political thought about the relation between power and politics, changed so little.

CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 1957. Edited by G. W. KEETON and G. SCHWARZENBERGER. [Stevens. 313 pp. 35s.]

THIS is the tenth annual volume containing the public lectures delivered in the Faculty of Law of University College, London. It contains some interesting essays, such as Mr. Goodman's paper on the new law of copyright, which he considers has encroached seriously and unfairly on the rights of authors, composers, and artists. Mr. Payne contributes a valuable paper on the new system of national insurance for industrial injuries. In it he criticises the abandonment of the principle of relating the compensation of injured workmen to their previous earnings and the removal of the burden of liability from the employer, both of which he thinks could have been preserved consistently with the introduction of a state insurance fund and adjudication by specialised administrative tribunals.

THE STATESMAN. By HENRY TAYLOR. [W. Heffer & Sons. 134 and lvi pp. 18s.]

THIS reprint of Sir Henry Taylor's classic work was badly needed (the last edition was published in 1927 with a preface by Harold Laski) and will doubtless reach a wide circle of readers who have often heard of it but never had an opportunity to read the original text. It is prefaced by a brilliant introductory essay by Professor Leo Silberman, now of the University of Chicago and a former Beit fellow at Oxford. As "the first book in our political literature to deal with the status and structure of the administrative branch of government" *The Statesman* retains its perennial interest.

THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY

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AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER

A Critique of United Nations Theories of Aggression

by

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What is aggression? The Soviet Union denies aggression in Hungary; Egypt, Israel, France and the United Kingdom all deny aggression in the Suez affair. Yet both incidents involved the use of considerable military force, the destruction of civilian property and the loss of many lives.

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In this work Professor Stone examines carefully the proper limits of the analogical transposition of principles of municipal law to the relations of States. He has produced a fundamental rethinking of the role of the United Nations, especially the General Assembly, in the maintenance of international peace. He concludes that man is still only at the beginning of the development of an adequate body of theory in this area and that hopes of securing peace by inventing some precise, mechanically-operating definition of aggression are a snare and a delusion.

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NOTES AND COMMENTS

TOWARDS THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Excelsior

INCH by inch reluctantly, pushed from behind, Mr. Dulles and the President (with Mr. Macmillan, of course, a little in the van or the rear) have been slipping and sliding up to a "summit conference." Not unnaturally they have viewed with misprision the spectacle of Mr. Krushchev and Mr. Bulganin, holding this "banner with the strange device: Excelsior," and waving them on to the summit. Not unnaturally, because all the oldest proverbs about gift horses, and fearing Greeks bringing gifts, and "he must have a long spoon that sups with the devil," must make any sane statesman reluctant to enter a conference with communists at the summit or any other level. We have no illusions about the communist government of Soviet Russia whether it stretches out the iron hand of Stalin or the velvet glove of Krushchev. Death at least sees to it that dictators come and dictators go, but ruthless and barbarous dictatorships, like those of communist Russia or Nazi Germany, remain, and remain much the same, behind the rise and fall of the individual rulers. No democratic government would enter into negotiation or agreements with these men without reluctance, wariness, and distrust.

The Danger of Doing Nothing

But the international situation is both too dangerous and too favourable at the moment to make it sane policy for Britain and America to pile up their hydrogen bombs, build their European rocket sites against Russia, arm all and sundry with nuclear weapons, and refuse to explore the possibility of ending the arms race and laying the foundations of peace. The danger of the situation is so great and so terrible that many people, including the statesmen who pretend to be dealing with it, refuse to acknowledge it even to themselves. The weapons which the Russians point at us and we point at them are of such destructiveness that, if they are ever used, they will ensure the complete destruction of all. The lesson of the history of the last century and a half, *i.e.*, of the modern world, is that the open total arming of two groups of great powers against each other, the arms race with its crescendo of hostility, bitterness, "incidents," inevitably ends in war. There is

no single instance in which this kind of "preparation for war" has proved the best way to "ensure peace"; the stupid cliché is the invention of statesmen who try to deceive themselves and others that the inevitable is not inevitable. Sooner or later guns, bombs, rockets, missiles—in the hands of two hostile, angry, and frightened persons or governments—will go off. And the most dangerous element in the present situation, the factor which makes it inevitable that they will go off sooner rather than later, is the determination of the American Government to scatter these terrible weapons all over Europe and to arm all and sundry with nuclear weapons.

Possibilities of Peace

To all intents and purposes the American policy, as interpreted by Mr. Dulles, is a policy of stubborn despair. Mr. Dulles tells us that the Soviet Government has shown that it is determined to conquer the world for communism by force, that it cannot be trusted to carry out any agreement which it might enter into, and that it can only be deterred from using its forces for world conquest by the threat of destruction. The U.S.A. cannot, therefore, enter into any agreements with the Soviet Union until it shows by action that it has renounced the use of force (and presumably communism). Meanwhile the American Government must arm itself against the Soviet Union and create a ring of satellite allies armed with all the deadliest modern weapons round Russia. Is it conceivable that anything but war could come out of this policy? There is a disease of paralytic fatalism which seems too often to affect statesmen at the head of modern states when faced by great difficulties and dangers. Having embarked upon a policy which will inevitably lead to disaster, they become unable to take any positive action to avoid disaster; they are paralysed and controlled by their own policy, so that they allow it to roll on by its own impetus to destruction. Yet, as we said above, though the situation today contains immense dangers, there are also favourable circumstances in it which might enable the U.S.A. to stop the present drift to war and gain the initiative against Russia in a policy, not of mutual destruction, but of peace.

The Russian Position

It would be ridiculous to pretend that the path to peace with Russia lies clear and smooth before us. But there are good reasons for believing that, never since the end of the war, has the situation

been more favourable for the West if it takes the initiative and makes a genuine attempt to negotiate with the U.S.S.R. for an end of the arms race and of the cold war. The first step, if there is to be a first step to peace, must be in the direction of disarmament. To stop nuclear tests, to prevent extension of ownership of nuclear armaments to states which at present do not possess them, to begin the process of disarmament under international supervision—in a word, to start, only to start, a reversal of the insane march to mutual destruction which the great powers have pursued relentlessly since the war—this is the minimum and the maximum, for the moment, that the U.S.A. and Britain should aim at. Up to a comparatively short time ago there was no sign, there seemed little hope of the Soviet rulers agreeing to this. They continually rejected any proposals for international control or agreements to begin limiting or banning armaments. Their attitude has now completely altered. In the letters of Mr. Bulganin, in the speeches of Mr. Krushchev, and most plainly in his interview with *The Times* special correspondent, they have stated categorically that (1) they will agree to the abolition of nuclear tests; (2) they will agree to begin disarmament in two, three, five, or ten stages; (3) they will agree to have control posts for international supervision of such disarmament; (4) as regards such proposals as the Rapacki plan for neutralisation and disarmament in Central Europe, they are "ready to work by stages towards the complete banning of nuclear weapons, the complete withdrawal of forces, and the liquidation of bases"; (5) they desire a "summit conference" in order that agreements on these objects may be worked out.

Chinks in the Soviet Armour

If these proposals were carried out, there would be a real hope of preventing war, and even of preparing the road to some kind of stable peace. No one knows whether the Soviet rulers mean what they say and among those who do not know are President Eisenhower, Mr. Dulles, and Mr. Macmillan. The only way to find out is to negotiate, to make definite proposals to the Russians for putting into operation the process of controlled disarmament which they say that they will agree to. That can only be done in a "summit conference." Hitherto the Americans have met this situation with a stubborn, unbending policy of paralytic fatalism. You cannot trust the communists, says Mr. Dulles; they will not carry out any agreements; they are determined to conquer the

world by force for communism; we cannot negotiate with them until they have renounced force (does this mean disarm unilaterally?), or renounced communism, or (this apparently is the President's curious contribution) renounced the United Nations veto. This attitude not only makes peace and peaceful co-existence impossible, it ignores the strength of the West and the weaknesses of the East. It assumes that the Soviet rulers are waiting their opportunity to extend by force their rule to central Europe and eventually the world. But there are chinks in the Soviet armour which not only make this extremely improbable, but also perhaps account for change of Russian policy towards disarmament and for their proposals to negotiate. In the last few years events in Eastern Germany, Poland, and above all Hungary have shaken the position of communism and Russia in all the satellite countries of Europe. It has become clear that Russian communism and Russian overlordship can only be maintained by force, and that both the communism and the overlordship are precariously maintained. In Hungary naked force alone prevented a Russian defeat; in Poland Russian communism is in retreat and has not dared to try to prevent this by force. It is extremely improbable that the Soviet Government would in such circumstances attempt to weaken their position still further by adding more Hungaries and Polands to their commitments. At any rate to assume that they would make the attempt is to play into their hands. The right policy is to call their bluff, if it is a bluff, to go into conference with them and make them put their cards face upwards on the table, to put their own proposals for disarmament and international control into concrete, particular terms and to offer and demand agreement. If the U.S.A. and Britain put these proposals fairly and honestly before the Russians and meanwhile suspended the fatal operations of extending the area of missile sites and nuclear weapons, it would soon become clear in a summit conference whether Mr. Krushchev and Mr. Bulganin mean what they say or whether Mr. Dulles's nightmare world is really the world we live in.

THE NATURE OF TOTAL POWER

LEONARD SCHAPIRO

In spite of the spread of total power to a considerable part of the globe, and the preoccupation with total power which is thus forced upon politicians, academic study of this subject has until recently made very little progress. To the political scientist it poses three problems. First, why does it come about? Secondly, by what institutions does it maintain itself? Finally, can history give us any guidance about the kind of societies in which it is most likely to arise or flourish?

Miss Hannah Arendt made an illuminating contribution to the analysis of the first question some years ago. The great value of her approach lay in the emphasis which she placed on the moral nature of the problem. For Miss Arendt the essence of the modern totalitarian states lies in the emergence of rulers for whom there exist no moral restraints whatever in the pursuit of their ideological obsessions. Everything becomes possible—not only the destruction of any number of human beings, but also the deliberate destruction of the whole social organisation—the church, the school, the family—leaving the individual naked and unprotected, an “atom” at the mercy of the omnipotent state. Thus totalitarianism is viewed as a kind of marriage between amoral atheism and modern technology.

More recently, Professors Friedrich and Brzezinski provided a detailed analysis of the institutional nature of the three modern totalitarian states.¹ These authors contend that while modern totalitarian dictatorship resembles earlier forms of autocracy in some respects, it is “historically unique and *sui generis*.” They also stress the basic similarity of the communist and fascist dictatorships. For all rest on six pillars: an official ideology, a single mass party led by a dictator, a system of arbitrary terror, monopoly of communications, monopoly of armed force, and a centrally planned economy. The developments of modern technology have of course played a vital part in making this kind of total control over a society possible. The two authors are led to a conclusion which emphasises the formidable stability of totalitarian régimes, and, I think rightly, point out that the overthrow of totalitarian régimes in Germany

* The author is Lecturer in Soviet Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy*.

¹ Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Harvard, 1956.

and Italy as a result of defeat in war offers no guidance in assessing the stability of régimes in Russia or China. They do not regard as probable evolution in Russia along the lines of less than total state control, in spite of pressure by the new class of technocrats for the recognition of some of their demands. In this forecast they have already been confirmed by recent events in Russia. The Russian leaders who head the party apparatus have succeeded with remarkably little difficulty in putting through their policy of industrial reorganisation, in spite of the opposition of many of the technocrats, and this notwithstanding the fact that such important party members as Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov apparently made themselves the spokesmen of the technocrats' point of view.

The work of Friedrich and Brzezinski is of the greatest value, and as a comparative study of modern totalitarian régimes is likely to remain the standard book for a long time to come. And yet one cannot help feeling that much of the story remains untold in this volume. In their emphasis on the more prominent features of the totalitarian state the authors seem at times to overlook some of the subtler and yet equally important aspects. Take terror, for example, to which the authors rightly attach a great deal of importance. (One of the co-authors, Brzezinski, has in fact published a book on Soviet Russia, under the title of *The Permanent Purge*, which alone indicates the importance he attaches to this feature, so far as Russia is concerned.) The remarkable thing about the Russian dictatorship during the last few years has been that the purge has, at all events temporarily, abated, and terror has been very much in the background: there may be nothing to prevent the party leaders from reviving it in its full glory the moment they think fit, but the fact remains that people in Russia for the present do not live in constant dread of the knock on the door, the conveyor belt interrogation, to be followed by the living death of the concentration camp, or the anonymous death in the cellars of the police. Yet the system of complete control by the party apparatus works as smoothly as ever: Hungary is invaded, Molotov is bundled out of office, Zhukov is disgraced, and though there have been rumours of some protests inside the country at any rate over the Hungarian episode, these moves have been accomplished with an ease which would have done credit to the terrible Stalin. Is there possibly something more to total power than the visible instruments which it wields?

It would be easy to add to Friedrich and Brzezinski's six pillars, and some of the additional features are subtler and more pervading.

There is, for example, the sham representative institution. The old-fashioned autocrats did not think of that one. Thus, when they eventually allowed the development of even limited representative institutions, these institutions immediately began to undermine the autocrat's own authority. This was notably the case in Russia, where the grant of quite limited rights of local self-government to elected and representative bodies before very long produced a demand for some political power in central government as well, to which the Emperor was forced to yield in 1905. The bolsheviks, in contrast, were clever enough to grant the appearance of self-government, while carefully retaining all real power themselves. The institutions of seeming self-government which they created, the Soviets, were from the start merely puppets of the bolshevik nucleus which controlled them and "the party" itself merely a convenient disguise for the joint legislative and executive power in the country. This has led over the years to the debasement of the coinage of free institutions. The new generation which is growing up in the Soviet Union, though critical of its government, has lost the vocabulary with which to criticise it. Elections for them mean acclamation of a pre-selected list, self-government means participation in a ritual of pre-determined unanimity, national self-determination is equivalent to folklore and traditional dances. I have even been told of a student in the Soviet Union, who, when the English two-party system was explained to him, commented that this seemed of little use in Russian conditions: where one party was bad enough, two parties could only be worse.

To take another example, there is what the ingenious and pseudonymous Mr. O. Utis called the "artificial dialectic." He attributed this invention to Stalin, though as Professor Berlin has recently pointed out, the invention has survived its begetter.² The "artificial dialectic" is man's improvement on the dialectical process of progress which history or nature, according to Hegel and Marx respectively, ought to provide. It amounts to an alternation of terror and clemency. The moment there is any sign of any slackening off, or of any hankering after a better life, the rulers tighten the reins so as to terrorise their subjects into a greater productive effort. But this "thesis" in the end defeats its own object, as the cowed population becomes listless and too devoid of all hope to make any effort, or the cunning peasant grows more inventive in methods of passive sabotage. This is the time for the

² "Stalin and the Art of Government," by O. Utis, *Foreign Affairs*, January 1952; "The Silence in Russian Culture," by I. Berlin, *Foreign Affairs*, October 1957.

"antithesis": the zealots of terror are in turn purged, there is some "liberalisation," a return to a mythical tradition of greater freedom—such as "Leninism." But the effects of clemency soon wear off, as the population begins to take the promises seriously, and to hanker for self-indulgence, and the time comes for a new "thesis" of greater dragooning. And so on, forward—by a series of zig-zags.

But these refinements of modern government, interesting as they are to the student of political institutions, still only help to illustrate method. They do not explain what is after all the main problem: how does it come about that even civilised, kindly peoples have allowed themselves to be captured by these primitive forms of crude despotism? A remarkable work by the distinguished sinologist, Professor Karl Wittfogel, has now thrown much new light on this question.³ Wittfogel's purpose is to analyse power and class structure in societies in which despotic authority is wielded by a ruling class of leaders which has been strong enough to preserve its domination for centuries against the challenge of landowners, capitalists, gentry, and guilds. To these societies Wittfogel gives the name "hydraulic," as a convenient reminder that historically most of them emerged in response to the need for the organisation of large enterprises for the control of water for agricultural purposes: large quantities of water can only be channelled and kept within bounds by the use of mass labour, and mass labour must be co-ordinated, disciplined, and led. But, beginning as a convenience, "hydraulic" societies developed into colossal political structures of a despotic nature, as the appetite for power grew among those who wielded it. In order to do justice to Professor Wittfogel's system of classification, two points must be observed at the outset. In the first place, societies can be "hydraulic" in his use of the term even where no large-scale waterworks were ever undertaken—notably Russia after the Mongol conquest in the thirteenth century. Secondly, Professor Wittfogel is no economic determinist, and recognises that while large water enterprises provided an opportunity for the development of the "hydraulic" form of despotism, there is no necessity for such a development. Thus, as he says, "the water works of the Po plain, of Venice, and of the Netherlands modified regional conditions but neither Northern Italy, nor Holland developed a hydraulic system of government and property." There is evidently some other factor at work, though Professor Wittfogel never fully explains what it is. But he attaches great

³ Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism. A Comparative Study of Total Power*, Yale, Oxford, 1957.

importance to feudalism, which both in Japan and in Western Europe operated to prevent the emergence of that concentration of state bureaucratic power which characterises the "hydraulic" despotisms. So, in Western Europe the expanding central power always came up against bulwarks of local power and of other established rights, which had preceded it in time, and were strong enough to resist its total encroachment. In contrast, in the Oriental despotisms, central power seems to have been established first, and was therefore able to resist the encroachments of satraps, landlords, and merchants. However substantial these groups might become, their power ultimately derived from the central power alone. Their own privileges remained always dependent upon the survival of that central government. If Locke could write with reference to seventeenth-century England that "Government has no other end but the preservation of property," the "hydraulic" despots were able to ensure that "property has no other end but the preservation of government."

The great bulk of Professor Wittfogel's book is devoted to analysis designed to show precisely how the despotic "hydraulic" governments succeeded in achieving this. No short summary of this analysis is possible, or would do justice to the immense scholarship which underlies it. Here it is only desirable to emphasise some of the conclusions which are of immediate relevance to the understanding of total power in Soviet Russia today. (Professor Wittfogel does not deal with either Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy.)

The first conclusion which emerges is that the modern despotism may not be of quite so unique a character as Professors Friedrich and Brzezinski would have us believe. The "hydraulic" despotisms of the past—in China, India, Persia, the Islamic world, or Byzantium—may have lacked the advantages which modern technology now offers to a determined tyrant. But within their limitations they often showed themselves every bit as conscious of the need to preserve totality of power from all dangerous rivalry, and quite as effective in achieving this. They may have tolerated more competition than the Russian Communist Party would ever dream of allowing, but they knew when and how to prevent it from becoming too dangerous to themselves. For example, in contrast to the society of feudal Europe, in which the military leaders, the feudal barons, were usually only loosely linked to their sovereigns by an elaborate legal system of rights and duties, and where religion was independent of secular power, "the army of

hydraulic society was an integral part of the agromanerial bureaucracy, and the dominant religion was closely attached to the state." Again, even if limited in their use of terror, the "hydraulic" despots were careful to ensure that government should always be based on submission, and not on law. There must at all times be sufficient terror to ensure that each individual knows that he can only survive or prosper at the will of the despot, and this in turn must be quite unpredictable. There is a story in the *Arabian Nights* of a corpse which is surreptitiously transferred by night from house to house because no one wishes to risk the consequences of being charged with a murder he did not commit, should he invoke the aid of the authorities in order to deal with an awkward predicament. No one with even a superficial acquaintance with the Soviet Union (or for that matter old Russia) will fail to recognise here a strong family likeness in the attitude of the ordinary citizen to law and order.

The second conclusion which emerges is that the despots of the past were able to allow quite a considerable degree of freedom without endangering their own total control, or the privileges of their managerial bureaucracy. This sphere of freedom is ingeniously classified by Professor Wittfogel under one of two heads. It may either be "irrelevant" freedom, such as that of religious minorities in Islamic society, or traditional village autonomy in China. The former could always be suppressed if they disturbed the true believers, while the latter could, as the Chinese villagers knew, be extinguished immediately in the event of insurrection. These freedoms, to which must be added the freedom in many of the societies here studied to possess quite considerable property, so long as this property did "not enable its holders to control state power through property-based organisation and action," are "irrelevant" in the sense that they do not threaten the power of the despot and his managerial élite. The other limit to despotism is what is here called the "law of diminishing administrative returns." This means that there comes a point beyond which administrative control costs more to maintain than the value of the return which it can be made to yield. Here, too, the despots' subjects may escape the net of overall control. Again, the parallel with Russia of today is easy to see. Even at the worst periods of total control pockets of "irrelevant" freedom survive, though the greater ideological bigotry of communism often tends to restrict them to a minimum. And what is the recent reduction and relative humanisation of the concentration camp labour force but the result of "diminishing administrative

returns," when the point is reached where this insanely wasteful use of manpower can no longer keep pace with a severe fall in the population?

One of the most important of Professor Wittfogel's general deductions deals with the durability of "hydraulic" despotisms. These societies, many of which lasted for centuries, neither evolved in the direction of greater freedom, nor succumbed to any internal revolutionary insurrection aimed at greater liberty. In contrast, in the societies which followed upon feudalism in Western Europe, the established owners of property and rights succeeded by revolution or by evolutionary pressure in curbing absolutist régimes into constitutional régimes. The "hydraulic" despotisms disintegrated in the end either as the result of direct conquest, or as a result of an internal crisis arising indirectly because of outside forces which they could not control. Internal pressure for change, which would have involved diminution of the central despotic power, they were well able to resist. "Serious political crises occurred in all hydraulic societies. But the way in which the men of the apparatus overcame them demonstrates the staying power of their methods of organisation and exploitation."

However, perhaps the greatest importance of this study lies in its relevance to our understanding of the emergence of bolshevism in Russia. All historians are agreed on the fact, if not on the reasons for it, that Russia, which enjoyed a measure of liberty and of legal order before the thirteenth century, emerged in the fifteenth century, after two centuries of Mongol domination, as a despotism with clearly recognisable Oriental features. Here were the same centralisation of power, the same dependence of property owners on the state, the same absence of any fixed and established legal order. Although after 1762 property in land was no longer dependent upon state service, the landed nobility never proved strong enough to assert themselves as a class against the central power, upon which in any case they had to rely until 1861 for the safeguarding of their revenues derived from unruly serf labour. The reforms which began with the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 and ended with the setting up of a modified form of constitutionalism in 1905 came too late, and were made too hesitantly to take firm root. In the result, the constitutional order which emerged from the revolution in March 1917 lacked the stability to resist the bolshevik onslaught, which brought about a return to the traditional "hydraulic" form of despotism. Professor Wittfogel, who is of course also an authority on Marxism, shows that Marx, and at times

Engels, was aware that pre-revolutionary Russia was not a "feudal" society, which according to marxist theory was due to be succeeded by bourgeois capitalism, and then by proletarian socialism, but more nearly resembled an Asiatic or Oriental society. Such a society, before it can enter even the feudal stage, must go through a process whereby its landowning class becomes emancipated from its bureaucratic subservience to the state. Hence in Russia, the attempt to make a "proletarian" revolution in a country in which there was only a very small proletariat, inevitably led to restoration of the Asiatic form of despotism. All that happened was that one form of state power was substituted for another—except that the new power proved to be a good deal more despotic than the old.

There is a curious parallel here with Djilas's *The New Class*, which appeared after Professor Wittfogel's work. But Djilas, who is perhaps not so well versed in Marxism, failed to see that he could have strengthened his case very considerably had he introduced Marx's view of Asiatic society. The weakness, as many pointed out, of Djilas's argument is that, by accepting the more familiar marxist definition of "class" based on ownership of property, he fails to make out his case that the rulers of communist states, who do not in fact own the property which they alone can control, form a new class. But in point of fact, Marx did also realise that in the "Asiatic mode of production," as he called it, the exploiting class could be formed by the despot and by the bureaucracy which batten on him and depend on him. This view is very close to the picture of the ruling class of party bosses in a modern communist society which Djilas was trying to convey. It is of considerable interest to trace in Professor Wittfogel's pages the story of how Marx's analysis of the Asiatic mode of production has gradually been expunged from permitted communist doctrine—it is, presumably, considered a little too near the bone. It was officially denounced after a discussion in 1931, and has since fallen into oblivion—Stalin even went to the length of re-editing Marx's own formulation by reducing his classification of pre-socialist societies to three—slave holding, feudal, and capitalist—and thus omitted Marx's fourth category, the "Asiatic mode of production." Nowadays, Russia up to the emergence of capitalism is always referred to as "feudal" by communist historians—with painful disregard both for history and for the meaning of the word "feudalism." But re-editing Marx is not going to make his theories any more applicable to Russian conditions than incidentally Marx himself thought they were, when he repeatedly emphasised

that his analysis applied to Western capitalist society only, and that he had never intended it to be of universal application.

Where Professor Wittfogel is perhaps least illuminating is in showing why the Russian landlords and capitalists did not succeed in asserting themselves against the powerful monarchy as the same classes did in the neighbouring states of Western Europe. He does, it is true, show some of the limitations from which these classes suffered in Russia—notably for example, the extent to which the Russian state itself, rather than private capitalists, became the controller of industrial enterprises. But for a much more detailed analysis of this problem we are now fortunate in being able to turn to another book which appeared very shortly after Professor Wittfogel's.⁴ Professor Leontovitch has now demonstrated how the policy adopted towards some twenty million serfs at the time of their emancipation in 1861 retarded the constitutional development and the stabilisation of legal order in Russia. They were not granted full legal rights, but were left in a state of tutelage, subject to administrative regulation rather than to the law of the land, both so far as contract and public order were concerned. Thus a very large part of the population was left outside the range of the ordinary law and courts—a fact which substantially contributed to the failure of stable legal order to take root in the country. The attempts to remedy this, made almost on the eve of the revolution, between 1907 and 1914, came too late to produce institutions and legal habits solid enough to withstand the demagogy and the assault of the bolsheviks. This analysis by Professor Leontovitch is a valuable complement to Professor Wittfogel's. What is true of Russia was probably also true of many other societies. Russia, along with the Oriental or "hydraulic" despotisms, lacked above all the habit of law, the long tradition of regulating power relations by contract, which feudalism had created in Western Europe. This, quite as much as the economic needs of large-scale waterworks, or laws relating to the inheritance of property and the like, seems an important factor in explaining why total power did not succeed in some countries and flourished in others. No doubt there are many other aspects which still remained to be explored—the cases of Germany and Italy are powerful reminders that neither a feudal tradition nor an established legal order is any guarantee against the emergence of total power. But we are fortunate that two such remarkable books, appearing within a short space of each other, have opened up new approaches to the study of total power.

⁴ Victor Leontovitch, *Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland*, Frankfurt, 1957.

THE NEW COURSE IN CANADIAN POLITICS

H. S. FERNS

AFTER twenty-two years of uninterrupted power the Liberal Party of Canada has suddenly lost its commanding position in Canadian affairs. A year ago students of Canadian politics were still baffled by the apparently undiminished trend towards one-party dominance of the federal government of Canada. Now that trend has been dramatically broken off. As a result of the general election in June last, the Conservative Party is now the leading party in Canada, and its leaders have formed a Government which appears to be growing in strength and popularity with the passage of time. The Conservatives can command 109 votes in a House of Commons numbering 265 members; the Liberals 105; the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation 25; the Social Credit Party 19. The remaining members are independents.

The figures conceal rather than express the sharp change which has taken place. The Liberal strength is concentrated in the province of Quebec; sixty-two of their supporters come from that province. Lacking support in Quebec, the Conservatives have a commanding lead everywhere else in the country, although they command majority support in only Ontario, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island. In British Columbia they have a decisive ascendancy over the Liberals. In New Brunswick they are their equal, and in Alberta they are well ahead. Newfoundland is the only province apart from Quebec where the Liberals still have a decisive ascendancy over the Conservatives.

The simplest explanation offered for the Liberal defeat is that advanced by Mr. Tom Kent, the editor of the *Winnipeg Free Press*, speaking on the B.B.C.'s Third Programme shortly after the election. Mr. Kent explained that the Liberal Government was the best Government in the democratic world; that it produced more domestic harmony; more international good sense and more prosperity than the government of any other democratic state, but that

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it failed lamentably in explaining its virtues to the Canadian people; that it had grown complacent and just a little arrogant; and that it was, therefore, defeated. Mr. Kent's explanation may be described as the journalist's explanation in as much as a very high proportion of Canadian journalists and foreign journalists reporting on Canada had become so identified with and/or sympathetic to the Liberal régime that they were rendered incapable of significant explanation or judgment. As the election campaign progressed they had so convinced themselves that there were no issues that they could explain nothing except in terms of their own failures in objectivity, sensitivity, and understanding.

If we admit that in the politics of Canada there is much that is mysterious and much that eludes explanation, we can none the less attempt some illumination. We are obliged first to reject the materialist, economic interpretation of Canadian politics which has come to underlie much Liberal thinking about Canadian affairs; the assumption that material prosperity solves all problems; the assumption summed up in the complacent Liberal proposition that "Nobody's going to shoot Santa Claus." Instead we are obliged to accept the more difficult and older assumption that in Canadian politics less tangible factors than the gross national income still have a significance; factors like religion, conceptions of the meaning of life, and racial and cultural inheritances. We are obliged to assume that, while Canadians are deeply influenced by material interests, these interests are not always overriding and that in many instances material, economic interests are not parallel but opposed.

It is now possible to argue that the real change in Canadian politics came about when the present Prime Minister, Mr. J. G. Diefenbaker, displaced Mr. George Drew as leader of the Conservative Party. Mr. Drew is what an Englishman would recognise as a man of the Establishment: wealthy and connected with wealth, wealthily educated; privately a man of some cultivation, but in his public personality, arrogant, obscurantist, and extreme. Enjoying considerable support in his native province of Ontario, Mr. Drew believed that he could win power in Canada by arranging co-operation between himself and the leading political personalities of the clerical-reactionary party of Quebec, the *Union Nationale* of Maurice Duplessis. It can be said on Mr. Drew's behalf that he had realistically assumed the character of the Canadian Establishment and that he understood very well the dual character of the Canadian power house comprised as it is of business wealth and clerical power. Mr. Drew inadequately appreciated, however, the

The American threat to Canadian existence is now economic, cultural, and political. Canada came into being as a reaction to the American Revolution, and part of Canada's character has been formed in reacting against American influences. Some argue that, whether Canadians like it or not, they are bound to become American in their culture, politics, and religious sentiments just as they are bound to be integrated in the American economy. The Roman Catholic, French-Canadian part of Canada has offered stubborn resistance to "North Americanisation" on the cultural and religious level, but rather less resistance on the economic level, even inviting economic penetration with assurances that greater social stability and less "labour trouble" prevail in Quebec than elsewhere. The Protestant English-speaking parts of Canada offer less resistance to American spiritual influences, and the same can be said of most immigrant groups, but these parts of the Canadian community contain a high percentage of people in all classes who are "economically minded" and for them the hard material facts of Canadian-American relations are important and formative influences in their political reactions. Whether they are farmers, wage workers, employers, or investors, none of these powerful interest groups can entertain a simple, uncritical attitude to the United States any more than can the bishops of Quebec fighting to protect their followers from what they conceive to be a multitude of secular evils of American inspiration. These are some of the reasons why American-Canadian relations have never been, and cannot be, wrapped up in rhetoric about an undefended frontier and a common front against dictatorship, and then forgotten. The Conservative victory in Canada has underlined this fact once again, and the Liberals have been beaten partly because they had forgotten it.

Mr. Diefenbaker's second theme during his electoral campaign concerned the ministerial domination of Parliament and the progressive attenuation of the authority of the House of Commons during the Liberal régime. The most recent manifestations of this tendency have consisted of the use of the closure in debate and the scandalous partisanship of the Speaker during the last Parliament. The trouble is, however, much deeper than this, and it may fairly be said that the Conservatives themselves have not made a very convincing analysis of what has happened to the structure of Canadian politics during the long predominance of the Liberal Party.

In Canada, as in most communities during the past half century,

war and severe economic fluctuations have diminished the competitive market as a mechanism of social control and increased greatly the role of political authority in the detailed functioning of society. An expert bureaucracy has grown up in Ottawa connected with the central bank, the diplomatic service, the treasury, the welfare services, the armed forces, and the scientific research establishments. For many years the way to the highest public honours has not been, as it was until 1914, through the constituencies and the House of Commons but through the civil service. Mr. Mackenzie King commenced his career in the civil service, and never showed during his long political life any capacity to get himself elected in a constituency. For most of his career he sat for pocket boroughs belonging to the Liberal Party. His successor, Mr. St. Laurent, was invited into politics late in life, and presented with a seat in the House of Commons. Messrs. Pearson and Pickersgill were civil servants before they became politicians. Mr. C. D. Howe was an American born and educated businessman unknown in any constituency before he was invited into politics and into the Cabinet, where he rapidly became the power behind the throne, the authentic and able voice of North American business, contemptuous of what he conceived to be the petty idiocies of political life. Indeed, an atmosphere had developed in Ottawa in which election to Parliament was the least of a man's qualifications for office, while affiliation to the power house of the bureaucracy was indispensable to progress in a political career.

The structure of politics in Canada until the defeat of the Liberals last June much resembled that which existed in Britain in the reign of George III. The bureaucracy resembled the Court, the administration, the Church and the armed services of George's time. The way to high office wound through the corridors of the East Block and the Bank of Canada, and not so very often through the smoking rooms of the Parliament. The House of Commons and the constituencies were late not early phases of a career, and the man who started in a constituency and who relied on that fact alone was bound to end up like a rural squire sitting for a county in the days of Lord North. With due deference to the judgment of Sir Lewis Namier and Dr. Robert Mackenzie, the reduction of all politics to office seeking by such means is the final corruption which precedes revolution, and this is what has been happening in Canada. The process of forty years' duration has now been arrested—at least momentarily, and the elected part of the machinery of government in Canada has once more come into its own.

Mr. Diefenbaker, the leader of the outsiders has now become the Prime Minister and, therefore, an insider. Whether this penetration into the inner recesses of power will fertilise the Canadian community anew remains to be seen. The life of democratic communities depends upon this penetration being effective and whether it is so is the test of a politician, the test of whether he is a statesman or merely an impotent office seeker. Experience so far suggests that Mr. Diefenbaker has the potentialities of a statesman and the imaginative power to produce something new in Canadian politics. To do such is usually beyond the capacity of an "organisation man," and Mr. Diefenbaker has never been one of these.

While it is possible to expect something new of Mr. Diefenbaker's leadership, it is unlikely, and certainly not part of his design, to alter in any fundamental way the structure of Canadian authority. Now that he has power, he will inevitably be drawn, as all new Canadian governments have been drawn, into adjusting himself, his ideas, and his party to the requirements of the dominant organisations of the community. It is popularly supposed that the Canadian Conservative Party is a party of "big business" and that, of course, there can be no problem of adjustment with the major business groups. Recent research has, however, revealed that the Conservative Party has not always served the interests of the most powerful sections of the business class. Professor W. R. Graham has, for example, recently shown that part of the Conservative difficulty in 1921 stemmed from the defection of private railway interests opposed to the Conservative policy of taking over and developing part of the railway system as a public enterprise. My own researches have demonstrated the connection of the Liberals with "big business," particularly American "big business." Indeed, it is a fair inference from such facts as are known that the Conservative Party is much more closely connected with the middle ranges of business than with the most powerful concentrations of financial power in Canada and in the United States. What adjustment Mr. Diefenbaker will make with these powerful groups is difficult to determine. If he acts primarily to please his supporters, we may expect him to strengthen Canadian control over power and raw material resources and to canalise the flow of capital more into final manufactures than has been the case during the last twenty years. We can expect him, too, to take a more aggressive line in promoting the sale of Canadian agricultural and industrial products abroad, particularly in the Caribbean, Africa, and the Far East.

Politically Mr. Diefenbaker's most important problem is Quebec and his relations with the Roman Catholic Church. Thus far in Canadian history every government, no matter how Protestant or anti-clerical its first thoughts were, has felt obliged to come to terms with the French-speaking part of the Roman Catholic Church. Mr. Diefenbaker is more cut off from this source of power than any major political leader in Canadian history. This being so, it will be extremely interesting to see how he will solve this problem.

Already solutions are being suggested. When he visited the Commonwealth Conference immediately following his entry upon office, Mr. Diefenbaker was accompanied by Mr. Jules Leger, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. This gave rise at once to much speculation. Mr. Leger is the brother of the Cardinal Archbishop of Montreal, and on his own account and on account of his family connection, he is a link with the highest levels of authority in the province of Quebec. It has been suggested in the *Winnipeg Free Press* that Mr. Leger will become one of Mr. Diefenbaker's ministers, and that he will build a Conservative following in Quebec. There is realistic logic in the suggestion. Mr. Leger is a perfect man of the Establishment: well educated, urbane, intelligent, married to wealth and business power, and free of all the more reprehensible qualities of party politicians in the province of Quebec. As a leader of the province of Quebec Mr. Leger will never resort to demagoguery nor to the stimulation of the more absurd aspects of Quebec provincialism. He would rely for his success upon established authority and would attract to the Conservative Party the solid and most conservative elements in the French speaking community.

Unfortunately for such a solution there are two powerful objections to his appointment. Mr. Leger is a civil servant. Is Mr. Diefenbaker going to do what Mr. St. Laurent has already been severely censured for doing, *i.e.*, for encouraging civil servants to seek political offices? Already strong words have been spoken against the possible appointment of Mr. Leger. Professor W. L. Morton, a leading intellectual in western Canada and a prominent Anglican layman, has spoken out against Mr. Leger not on the grounds of religion or race but upon the grounds that such an appointment will further the corruption of the civil service and further deprive it of its impartial and neutral character.

The second objection relates to Mr. Leger's past political experience. By the test of action, Mr. Leger is a Liberal. When he first entered the bureaucracy he performed many personal

services for Mr. Mackenzie King such as translating and arranging for the publication of Mr. King's speeches. For some years he enjoyed a close personal connection with Mr. Pickersgill, who is rightly regarded as one of the Liberal king-makers. For Mr. Leger to undertake now the task of dismantling the Liberal Party in Quebec and thus to ensure its extinction will be one of the most delightful ironies of Canadian history and a great act of justice to his Liberal friends.

This will not likely happen, however. Since the days of Lord Dorchester on the eve of the American Revolution no Canadian Government has long functioned without an intimate association with the most authoritative figures in the Quebec community. It does not follow that this must always be so. Mr. Diefenbaker can contribute to a new conception of Canadian unity by refusing to court the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec and the political forces created in its ambience. Indeed, his survival for some years depends upon keeping at arm's length the most powerful organisations both economic and ecclesiastical and so permitting lively new growth in the community in an atmosphere of plurality. Canada has always been since the American Revolution a plural society, and the seeds of death begin to sprout in any political movement which forgets this fact. This has been conspicuously the case of the Liberal Party. It had allowed itself too completely to become the party of "big business" and "big church."

The plural character of Canadian society is the baffling problem of every Canadian political party: and always more baffling to the party in power than the parties in opposition. Big business and ecclesiastical organisations with their international affiliations are indispensable factors in Canadian life; inescapable consequences of geographical and historical circumstances. In spite of this, the Canadian community is constantly generating groups which are small and locally centred. These groups are moved by fear and envy of the big, old, and well-established organisations, and they feel constantly the impulse to grow and seek their own place in the sun. As a result newer and/or smaller interests find very congenial political provincialism and nationalism offering on the domestic plane opposition to big government in Ottawa and on the international plane presenting a critical face towards the great powers or institutions most intimately connected with Canadian life. Protestant groups, locally centred and individualist, have concentrated on opposition to Rome. The xenophobia once directed mainly towards London is now focused on the United States.

No moderately sane and sensitive Canadian objects to "big business" and "big church" or fails to recognise their necessity, and the advantages of Canada's intimate connections in Washington, London, and Rome. But there can be too much of a good thing. The Conservative victory was a reaction against bigness and international influences in Canadian life. But this argument must not be pressed too far. The Conservative reaction was against an excess and not against big organisations and foreign influences *in toto*. The pluralism of the Liberal Party had become unreal. The pluralism of the Conservative Party is at the moment real, and is likely to remain so for many years, gradually becoming false as it remains in office.

Whether the Liberal Party will ever recover its virtue is doubtful. The future belongs to the Conservative Party as the political instrument of the established interests, and the next phase of Canadian history will be concerned largely with the establishment of this instrumentality. The future belongs, too, to the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation as the party of the outsiders. What little social idealism there is in Canadian society has become concentrated in this party. Liberal in sentiment as the Conservative Party is at the moment, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation is much more so. In the present condition of prosperity in Canada there are few really poor people, but there are many who are exploited and driven hard by the economy. Even more are outsiders. This is particularly true of societies embracing large numbers of immigrants, and Canada presents an archetype of such a society. For this reason the future, ten years on, looks bright for the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation.

At the moment the Liberal Party is in a desperate position from which it can only be rescued by serious errors on the part of the Conservatives and the C.C.F. A vocal element among the Liberals fears that it is becoming a confessional party of the Roman Catholic Church. There is not much likelihood of this happening. If past experience is a guide, the tacticians of the Roman Catholic Church will seek the shadow of the throne. Mr. Diefenbaker does not need to make overtures to the leaders of the Church. They will seek him out, and when they do the Liberal Party will be left with its principles to die away much as the Liberal Party of Britain was left to wither when the financial and industrial interests abandoned it after the first world war.

POLITICS: NECESSARY AND CONTINGENT

DONALD G. MACRAE

In this paper I have tried to explain certain features of the contemporary political situation and political feeling in terms of two contrasted attitudes to the world. Such an endeavour must always result in over-simplification, and what follows is to be regarded rather as a set of notes and suggestions than as an attempt to give any complete explanation of modern politics either as a reflection of an ideology which conceives the world as necessary, *i.e.*, as having a coherent, significant, and inevitable pattern; or as contingent, *i.e.*, as being essentially arbitrary, incoherent, and meaningless. Nevertheless I believe that these two ways of conceiving the world are significant and important characteristics of our period, and that they can help to explain certain of the more puzzling features of modern politics. Other instances than those chosen here could have been found to illustrate the theme, and those actually chosen could have been further elaborated.

What does seem certain is that the old categories of left and right, radical and conservative should not—as is so often suggested—be abandoned, but that they should be re-interpreted to match the conditions of the mid-twentieth century. It is too often forgotten that not only is Butskellism dead; it was never really alive. It is to help this re-interpretation that these notes are offered. They are not intended as a contribution to that fashionable obscurantism which attempts to cloud thought by the confusion and invention of categories remote from those of the last hundred and fifty years of political debate. Rather is it hoped that they may help to clarify the contemporary relevance of that debate.

One of the most important but least remarked characteristics of our time is a division of thought and feeling between the generations. No doubt such divisions are always present and have often been exaggerated—as, for example, in the nineties of the last century or the twenties of this—but the present situation where a man of seventy and one of thirty may well share a common apparatus of judgment, while someone of twenty dwells in a different emotional

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universe, is something new to the Europe of the last century and a half. This gulf was, I think, more marked a few years ago than it is today, but it remains real and those things that are lessening the gap are on the whole involved in a capitulation of the older to the younger group in the realisation of a common predicament.

Among many peoples there is a formal organisation of the young of one or both sexes into a society within the society. Even where this does not occur there is usually a recognisable and separate youth culture. Since at least 1789 one aspect of this youth culture has been a rejection of the past, a “future-directedness,” a renewal of the public conscience, and of public aspiration. This has been both one of the most important social functions of the youth culture for the larger society and a sort of *rite de passage* for the young themselves into the responsibilities and despondencies of adult life. (Some, of course, never underwent this process, and others never completed it: no moral judgment of either group is intended.) In the youth culture people often underwent “conversion” of one kind or another, or, less violently, undertook the commitments which were to be the public content of their later lives.

A separate youth culture continues—and even becomes more marked in our society—but it no longer performs its old social function. There are many exceptions, but most people under thirty are by the standards of the past lacking in public aspiration, are concerned more openly—and honestly—with their individual career and “success” prospects, and are unashamedly conformist. Either they are unpolitical or narrowly pragmatic. Yet their conformity is lonely—a form of idealism. If they look to their elders they often find them frivolous, untidy in life and thought, “unrealistic” about public affairs. A youth culture is always ambiguous—separate from, yet part of the total society. Even in rebellion some reference group—to borrow a useful term from sociology—is sought in the larger group. A conformist youth culture must today find difficulty in locating such a group, and in consequence one encounters phenomena like the recent vogue of the Edwardian age—killed, as a fashion, by the Teddy Boy—and certain forms of Americanism.

In some ways this is a consequence at a collective level of a crisis not unlike that undergone by J. S. Mill when he asked himself how much happier he would be if all the reforms for which he had worked were realised. As far as internal affairs are concerned, and despite six years of Conservative government, most of the ends desired in the thirties have been achieved, even if

by unexpected means. This seems to me exciting and important; to many people it is a source of disillusionment. For a decade it has generally been treated as a fraud, a failure, or a mistake. These views have been advanced by both the Left and the Right in politics, and people have believed them—especially those too young to remember the texture of British life in the inter-war years. Now there are many worse tragedies than a failure fully to appreciate the achievement of the age, and it is probably true that politics have often been given a greater emphasis than they deserved in the last century or so, yet it is by under-valuing what has been done that regression often takes place, and the neglect of politics leads easily enough to a failure in public morality.

One can perhaps find some of the explanations of the division between the generations and of the wider failure of political nerve by considering certain elements universally if not always consciously present in the mind of our time, and in remembering that these elements have been more directly influential on the young in that they have formed the first furnishings of their minds. That the world is or might prove contingent has no doubt haunted the minds of philosophers and poets throughout history, and especially since the time of Hume. A sense of the contingency of things is now not just the concern of the few for much of the time and of the many as a fleeting sensation; it is a constant constituent of all action and judgment.

In its simplest form it is a response to nuclear weapons. The possibility of destruction which gave a passing frisson to the contemporaries of H. G. Wells is now a probability. What men have the power to do is, in the long run, usually done. Consequently, behind all action lies the feeling that the last day is near when *solvet saeculum in favilla*, and that beyond it there is nothing and no-one to whom to cry *ne me perdas illa die*. . . .

When the eighteenth century replaced the Heaven of the scriptures with the city of the philosophers the future seemed endless, and a generous ambition for mankind and the unborn could replace or march side by side with supernatural hopes. Human misery, want, and cruelty could be seen as the price to be paid for a high destiny. Even if de Maistre were right and the structure of civil society had always been founded on the hangman, it was always possible to reply that it need not be so, that it would not always be so. Indeed, guarantees could be sought in philosophies of history and certain kinds of sociological speculation that a necessity lay in affairs which would lead all human transactions to a

predictable and better future. (Attempts to show that such predictions were in principle impossible could—and can—reasonably be ignored: negative propositions of this kind cannot be established, though they might perhaps be shown to be probable enough.) Now, however, a new factor is present in all such matters, and, consciously or unconsciously, everyone suspects that there is a determinate and appalling answer to the old question *de finibus*. The contingency of the world, literally of the world, is a platitude: perhaps for that reason its consequences are neglected.

In such a situation where there is no human eternity it is not surprising that politics seem of less importance. It might, of course, be argued that their importance had increased—that the central theme of politics should be the control of nuclear weapons. In an age of mass societies and a world divided by secular religions such as Bolshevism, nationalism, and less precise but equally real creeds the hope of such control seems to most people so vain and, above all, so beyond their personal influence, that they cannot accept this argument. Were a “thaw” to occur they might change, but they feel powerless to “hold up the weather.”

And contingency seems an aspect not just of the public and external world, but also of the private and internal being of each of us. The American sociologist Riesman has proposed a simple—too simple, but it will serve—typology of character: on one hand are the “other-directed” moved by the opinions and expectations of their neighbours and colleagues, on the other are the diminishing numbers of the “inner-directed” moved by their internal standards of truth and right. For the former the inner world must always be contingent, but to the latter it might seem rather an area of will and decision which could be shaped to an approved and necessary pattern. Now, however, it is more and more believed that this is not true, that techniques of conditioning exist to destroy even the internal world of the individual personality.

There are all sorts of evidences for this belief. At one level it is accepted because people have been impressed and horrified by Orwell and Huxley—few books can have strengthened Bolshevism and weakened democratic politics more than the crude fable of 1984. At another there is the evidence of psycho-analysis and lobectomy. At a third there is “brain-washing” and the evidence at purges and political trials from van der Lubbe to Rajk. A recent able book by William Sargent¹ has tried to draw together the

¹ *Battle for the Mind: A Physiology of Conversion and Brain-Washing* (Heinemann. xxiv + 248 pp. 25s.).

phenomena of conversion in religion, orgiastic rites of initiation and social transition, and political "brain washing." He explains them all in terms of a mechanistic psychology: all that he says may be accurate, but I at least have been impressed by either the marginality, the transience, or the superficiality of what he describes. As with much advertising one is struck by the disproportion of means to end: there is something grotesque in both the means used to sell goods by commercial television and in the humourless jargon of modern Bolshevism, and the limitations of both are quite sharply defined although within these limitations both are successful.

Indeed, what is terrifying about brain-washing is the arrogance of the end, the inhumanity and costliness of the means, and the smallness of the result. A great deal is paid for very little, yet the very idea has reduced people's self-confidence, their faith in their own personal reality. Awareness of these cruel and surrealist charades of indoctrination and acceptance has permeated every mind, and the techniques of McCarthy and Vyshinsky have done worse than create fear; they have destroyed confidence in the integrity, the privacy, the unique necessities of the self.

Other aspects of mass society can, in their most extreme forms, destroy much of the integrity of the mind. If one is to believe North American social psychologists and sociologists the impact of "Crestwood Heights"—from which Canadian suburb but one fugitive is supposed to have got away to the Channel Islands—or of post-Exurbia "can act as a longer enduring and deeper brain-washing than anything achieved by a state of cold brain-washing—than anything achieved by a state of cold brain-washing. That society itself is at once necessity and Communist. The feeling is that the conformist pressures are more enemy is no new recognition, and therefore more frightening. overt in mass industrial societies is of contingency is faith. It is an

One way out of the awareness of mankind throughout human old and popular way. To most have helped to make the human history faith and/or intoxication. Asia and Africa the expansion of condition tolerable. In much of the Europeans brought not merely Europe brought this to an end. Fear of the stranger and foreigner; the unpredictability and rootlessness and the possessors of a technically they were at once conquerors and vicious mastery might be due to superior knowledge.² Their faith. Thus, to the non-European their God or their guns, or to the experience not unlike that which world by different channels came.

² is about Americans.

² Many contemporary Europeans feel like this

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we now undergo—though more prolonged and less intense and widely spread—and, paradoxically, that experience is now ending.

It is ending through two factors operating together and independently: the secular religions of nationalism and communism. The former of these is hardly a sufficient creed unless supported by a theistic religion such as Islam or a wider ideology such as humanitarian socialism; the working of the latter as an ideology—as distinct from its content as a philosophy, a theory of politics and political tactics, and a contribution to the social sciences—I have attempted to analyse elsewhere.³ Perhaps I may repeat here part of what I said about technologically backward areas, where, "the slow spread of industry, the social dislocation which this spread nevertheless entails, and the desire for technological and scientific power, all enormously enhance the appeal of Bolshevism to local skilled workers and discontented intellectuals. Where technological inferiority and hope deferred in industrial progress cause despair, there the social technique and promise of Bolshevism provide a social substitute involving only human organisation, and Marx is seen as the provider of an accessible short cut by his science of society and the social revolution to a world of technological and industrial achievement.

"To correct one technology by another—a social one—is part of the appeal of Marxism to the proletariat; in colonial countries this promise is reinforced by the claim that an industrial order is possible (without the pains of birth and growth) by the use of a social technique backed by the repute of science in areas where science is still half magic." But Bolshevism which is possible in the Western world today only to the excessively gullible, the habituated, and certain kinds of mind which derive a vertiginous pleasure from ambiguity, casuistry, danger, and a gamble with power, can even in the post-Stalin period elsewhere provide a metaphysic, an eschatology, and a certainty which make both the world as experience and the world as act necessary, exciting, and anything but contingent.

As everyone knows a new speech—new not just in vocabulary but in rule and structure—was invented—not, I think, in any important way deliberately—for the purposes of Stalinism. This speech has exerted a profoundly depressing effect on Russian writing and has adapted itself in translation to most major languages. There are, indeed, people in every country who can even talk in the

³ "The Bolshevik Ideology," *The Cambridge Journal*, Vol. V, No. 3, 1951.

primitive, heavy, and imprecise usages of *For a Lasting Peace and a People's Democracy*. The evolution of this language of Bolshevik inevitability and the study of its advantages in giving certainty, permitting casuistry, and making propaganda would be a fascinating and important study. So also would be an investigation of its psychological appeal and the intellectual deformations which follow on its adoption. R. N. Carew Hunt's recent, *A Guide to Communist Jargon*⁴ investigates usefully a number of the terms employed, and this is very helpful, but he gives no analysis of the structure of this speech, far less any plausible picture of the motives underlying its employment. Until this is done the sociology and social psychology of "communist necessity" in Asia and elsewhere will remain incomplete.

Indeed, it is here that we encounter a constant area of failure. Politics are devalued and most people in the west are aware of contingency as never before. European communism at the moment is changing—one suspects that the world seems at once less arbitrary and yet less necessary and inevitable than under Stalin. But, however many flowers may blow in Mao Tse-Tung's gardens, one is reasonably sure that the perspectives are those of a rigid and triumphant historical Versailles. Of its inner tone and feeling, however, we know but little. Gossip about the relations, ambitions, and fears of a ruling group is not helpful save for the immediate purposes of the columnist and commentator. Chronicles—half Baedeker, half time-table—are more useful even if one is unconvinced that all the trains actually run, or that all the landmarks are there or are important.⁵ More is needed and I see no reason to believe that it will be forthcoming and that those of us who seek to understand the new necessities in Asia will succeed at all fully.

It is idle therefore, though pleasant, to speculate as to whether the generational split which has appeared in the west and which is complained of even in Moscow will spread to China, or whether the typical insecurities of our prosperous era will result in a similar sense of the arbitrary in things and the vanity of public endeavour and interest. I strongly suspect the former will happen, and I believe that the second—without some agreement on nuclear weapons—is also likely. It would be nice to be right about this sort of thing, for an internationally depoliticised world would have

⁴ (Bles. 169 pp. 15s.)

⁵ An example of such a Baedeker is Malcolm Kennedy's *A Short History of Communism in Asia* (Weidenfeld. ix and 556 pp. 42s.). The author uses some odd sources, confuses socialism and communism, over-estimates the role of Japan, and spells oddly—e.g., Zhdanov—but his facts are useful, though interpretation is lacking.

advantages as well as dangers. The history of the Roman and Ottoman empires, however, suggests that such a state of affairs brings its own, long-delayed nemesis.

So far it has been assumed that a contingent world is in some ways depressing, but this is not necessarily the case. Our youth culture is not simply conformist. There is in it a strain of opposition, of private rebellion. In western societies—and to some extent among the "hooligans" of east Europe—this takes odd forms. Young people "contract out" of society, or make the criminal, the arbitrary delinquent, into a hero. The pattern of James Dean runs from Tokio to Warsaw. This sub-current of behaviour is usually deplored, but as a reaction against conformity there is much to be said for it. We may need guides to the jargon of Bolshevism, but surely guides to the double-speak and double-think of conformity are as necessary if we are to assess and judge our own situation. The heroes and aspirations of the dissident young, those who have perhaps most thoroughly faced contingency, might help us to detect the worst ambiguities of our age and modes of expression.

The Hungarian revolution was a case of revolt against a régime claiming a mandate of necessity and inevitability. It was, one is told, above all a revolt of the young. During its progress a young African postal official whom I met in French Togoland wanted not news—as I expected—of Suez, but wanted me to tell him about Hungary where people, rather than a régime, were making their own fate. Some recognition of contingency can be valuable and exhilarating, for it is a recognition of the possibility of such freedom, of private and public choice, of the possibility of bringing about by one's efforts some approximation between desire and reality. One can learn, as was learned even in Nazi concentration camps, to live with anything. In time we will probably learn to live in a largely contingent world without taking refuge in conformity or merely private interest. When that happens politics in the old sense will become more possible and natural. There will be less talk of "re-thinking" for there will be the possibility of new thinking. The generational split will then be healed as much as is healthy and the old, revivifying function of the youth culture be resumed.

Two things remain to be said. In most of us there is an ingrained desire for certainty and a hope that the world can be shown to possess a firm and inevitable structure. Perhaps it can. There is, however, a danger that this desire may become over-mastering and a new quest for faith begin. This may not matter so long as there are many faiths—Voltaire was right when he said

that men need either one religion or seventy to live at peace. If beyond Europe and European society there remains a single creed convinced of its own necessity then such a quest for certainty through faith might well prove dangerous to the possibility and values of free politics.

Secondly, politics have always, among other things, been about hunger, and to a large extent this remains true. The constant tendency of countries to become industrialised and of the national income to increase more rapidly than population in industrial states means that the problem of hunger is becoming constantly less oppressive. So, even if politics in their traditional sense revive it is unlikely that their importance—as distinct from the importance of technical questions about the implementing of social policy—will ever again be what it was. This, I have tried to suggest earlier, is by no means necessarily to be regretted.

THE WOLFENDEN REPORT— AN APPRAISAL

J. E. HALL WILLIAMS

The Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (Cmnd. 247: September 1957) affords a rare opportunity for examining some of the basic issues concerning the proper scope and function of the criminal law, and its limitations. The degree to which personal privacy ought to be invaded in the interests of public policy, the extent to which consent of the parties should be accepted as a defence to a criminal charge, whether the criminal law should confine itself to areas where police control can be reasonably effective and police action reasonably just, how far police discretion can be trusted, and to what extent public opinion should be followed or led (and how to estimate what that opinion is)—these are the fundamental problems which fall for discussion. The Report of the Committee does attempt to articulate some of these basic issues and to resolve them, but the discussion is not altogether convincing, and the resolution not entirely satisfactory. The result is that the main recommendations have not been very well received and are unlikely to gain general acceptance.

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The Terms of Reference of the Committee

The terms of reference of the Committee required them "to consider (a) the law and practice relating to homosexual offences and the treatment of persons convicted of such offences by the courts; and (b) the law and practice relating to offences against the criminal law in connection with prostitution and solicitation for immoral purposes, and to report what changes, if any, are . . . desirable." It will be observed that they were not charged with the investigation of homosexuality or prostitution as such but with the law and practice relating to homosexual offences and offences in connection with prostitution and solicitation for immoral purposes. They therefore considered it beyond their province "to make a full examination of the moral, social, psychological, and biological causes of homosexuality or prostitution, or of the many theories advanced about these causes." Nevertheless, they do make several valuable observations concerning the nature of homosexuality and prostitution.

The Nature of Homosexuality and Prostitution

With regard to homosexuality, the distinction is accepted between homosexual acts or offences and the condition of homosexuality, a distinction which was very well brought out in the evidence of the Church of England Moral Welfare Council. Whether or not one agrees that there is a homosexual component present in all persons to a greater or lesser degree, as the Freudians would have us believe, it is fairly clear that there exists in certain persons a homosexual propensity which may affect their behaviour in a variety of ways, not all of which are harmful, immoral, or obviously sexual. A distinction must be drawn between behaviour which is overtly sexual and behaviour from which a latent homosexuality might be inferred. It is with certain kinds of overtly sexual homosexual behaviour that the law is concerned. Moreover, the Report makes clear that, for the proper understanding of the homosexual offender, it is neither necessary nor desirable to regard him as suffering from a disease or illness or a condition of diminished responsibility. Two different conclusions are drawn from this false premise by opposing schools of thought; one school holds that homosexuality is a cancer of the soul which must be stamped out before it spreads like the plague; the other holds that the premise demands a whole-hogging "treatment" approach to the offender. The Committee are to be congratulated for rejecting the notion of disease, with whatever

consequences might be thought to flow from it. It follows that individual offenders can properly be held responsible for their conduct, and in the majority of cases are not suffering from an irresistible impulse or in a state of diminished responsibility. The Committee is also on firm ground in rejecting the use of the terms "natural" and "unnatural" in describing sexual behaviour, as importing "an approving or condemnatory note into a discussion where dispassionate thought and statement should not be hindered by adherence to particular preconceptions." Whether it was wise to reject altogether the distinction between the invert and the pervert is not so clear, but such a distinction could only be recognised in mitigation of the sentence and not in the definition of the offence, and this is presumably what the Committee had in mind when they remark that "to make this distinction as a matter of definition seems to prejudge a very difficult question."

With regard to the nature of prostitution, the Committee accept the notion that economic factors alone cannot explain this phenomenon: "there must be some additional psychological element in the personality of the individual woman who becomes a prostitute." There is no need to go all the way with Dr. Glover concerning the psychopathology of prostitution to agree with this analysis; it is sufficient to recognise that such behaviour is frequently capable of being related to early childhood experiences or events of adolescent years. Peter Wildeblood's vignettes of prostitutes in his book *A Way of Life*, and the case histories in *Women of the Streets*, abundantly testify to this.

The Question of Privacy

Now to the basic issues. The most important of these is undoubtedly the question of privacy, and the degree to which the state may be allowed to intrude upon this in order to prosecute immoral behaviour. The Report makes out a strong case for respecting the rights of individuals to behave as they will in private, subject only to the overriding interests of protection of the young, the weak and mentally infirm, and the like. It is not possible to employ the machinery of the criminal law to deal with all moral offences, and unless there is some consideration which justifies its intervention the basic attitude should be that it is simply not the law's business to intervene. Prostitution is not in itself a criminal offence, nor is adultery or fornication or private drunkenness. It is only when such conduct impinges on the public eye and causes offence or when there is some special interest to protect that the law should

intrude. Hence the major recommendation of the Report on the law relating to homosexual offences that it should no longer be an offence for adults to have homosexual relations in private.

Much of the reasoning here is no doubt inspired by the excellent report of the Church of England Moral Welfare Council's study group, which was the basis for that Council's memorandum of evidence, and is published under the title *Sexual Offenders and Social Punishment*. The same distinction between the proper sphere of the criminal law and the province of morals was canvassed by the Street Offences Committee, which reported in 1928 (Cmd. 3231, November 1928):

"As a general proposition it will be universally accepted that the law is not concerned with private morals or with ethical sanctions. On the other hand the law is plainly concerned with the outward conduct of citizens in so far as that conduct injuriously affects the rights of other citizens. Certain forms of conduct it has always been thought right to bring within the scope of the criminal law on account of the injury which they occasion to the public in general."

One of the forms of conduct it has been thought right to bring within the scope of the criminal law of England is buggery (in Scotland known as sodomy) and this attracted the death penalty until 1861, since when it has been punishable with imprisonment for life. The famous Labouchère amendment, introduced into the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, simply extended the law by making it a misdemeanour, punishable with imprisonment up to two years, for any male to commit in public or private any act of gross indecency with another male, or to be a party to its commission. The suggestion that this introduced a novel principle into English law is refuted by the Committee, who point out that "buggery had for over three hundred years been a criminal offence whether committed in public or in private, and whether by consenting parties or not." But the amendment did provide greater opportunities for the blackmailer, "which the law might well be expected to diminish."

The Committee's hope is that by legalising homosexual behaviour between consenting adults they will minimise the pretexts for blackmail, and at the same time divert the attentions of some males from seeking adolescent youths (who are less likely to resort to blackmail) towards seeking adult partners. There is much good sense in this, but the question remains whether there is not an overriding interest or special reason for punishing such behaviour between adults, whether consenting or not. The answer to this question may be

indicated by considering the attitude of the common law towards consent as a defence to criminal behaviour in general.

The Question of Consent

The basic question here is how far can a man's willingness to consent to acts which would amount to crimes if done without his consent affect the quality of the acts and prevent the conduct amounting to a criminal offence. The English common law until 1934 took the view that a man was entitled to consent to quite serious assaults upon himself, provided they did not amount to maim (loss of an eye or a limb) and that certain injuries sustained in the course of lawful sports or accidentally in the course of rough horse-play were not criminal. In 1934 in the case of *R. v. Donovan* (2 K.B. 498) the law was restated by the Court of Criminal Appeal to the effect that a person was entitled to consent to assaults only if they occasioned no bodily harm, and bodily harm was defined as "any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort" of the person assaulted. It need not be permanent but must be more than transient or trifling. The object or motive of the assault could be considered, and where it was an act done for the purpose of gratifying a sexual perversion, as in this case, it was unlawful. So far this has only been considered to apply to cases of the infliction of *physical* harm in the way of an assault, but there is no reason why the courts should not one day hold that if the conduct is injurious to the *mental* health of the parties, it is unlawful. The object or motive might also be looked at to supply the special reason for the law's intervention.

It is on this score that the Committee's recommendation is in danger of breaking down. There is a conflict between the possibility of the non-availability of consent as a defence to assault at common law and the suggested abolition of the offence of homosexual conduct between consenting adults. The Committee do not explain how the presence of consent deprives the act of its vulgarity or wrongfulness. The proper limits of consent have been canvassed recently by Lord Justice Denning (as he then was) in the case of *Bravery v. Bravery* [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1169, where he expressed the view (at p. 1180) that a sterilisation operation was illegal unless there was an overwhelming medical necessity, notwithstanding the fact that the husband *and wife* consented to it. Similarly, operations for abortion and suicide pacts are illegal, notwithstanding the consent of the parties. See also Lord Denning's speech in the House of Lords debate on the Wolfenden Report: December 4,

1957. The unerring instinct which the common law has shown over the centuries for resolving essentially moral problems in practical terms should be respected, and should make us cautious to ignore its lessons, which are not encouraging to the would-be abolitionists.

Nevertheless, it is right to point out that the recommendation of the Committee has the support of respectable and well-informed bodies like the Church of England Moral Welfare Council, and the Church Assembly has recently declared its support for this proposal (by a narrow majority: 155 votes to 138). Moreover, very few European countries now hold that homosexual behaviour between consenting adults in private is a criminal offence, and the proposal commands the support of criminologists in all parts of the world. It is a courageous and daring proposal. If it is not adopted, we should at least make some effort in the way of liberalising and modernising the existing law.

The Effectiveness and Justice of the Present Law

Another basic question is how far one can legislate in the field of private morals without reaching the point where the ineffectiveness and injustice of the law outweigh all other considerations. In face of the certainty that prosecution can take place in only an infinitesimal proportion of the cases which actually occur, there comes a point where, to speak colloquially, the game is simply not worth the candle. Law enforcement comes to depend too much on chance and the vagaries of official discretion. It is contended that this stage has already been reached with regard to homosexual acts, and that there is an unanswerable case for abolition on the ground that detection is uneven and the incidence of prosecution unjust.

It may be said in reply that the detection of other sexual offences such as incest and rape is extremely dependent on the willingness of the victim to report the offence, and the same is obviously true of all homosexual acts with young persons, yet it is not suggested that for this reason they be no longer retained as criminal offences. We come back to the list of overriding considerations or special interests which entitle one to legislate in the area of private morals. These are listed by the Committee as follows:

1. Public order and decency, protection of the citizen against what is offensive or injurious.
2. Exploitation and corruption of persons specially vulnerable because they are young, weak in body and mind, inexperienced or

in a state of special physical, official or economic dependence (see § 13).

The criminal law contains prohibitions against public indecency and solicitation, and the corruption and exploitation of the young and infirm. Whether it should stop short at the consenting adult is debatable. It is arguable that the natural repugnance which is generally felt against homosexual acts is sufficient special reason for intruding in the field of private sexual behaviour in this instance. All sorts of explanations may be advanced for this feeling—the psycho-analyst would say it is our own guilt feelings which we purge by passing judgment on others, the social psychologist would observe that there is an attempt to reinforce our own self-control by this means, the moralist that we must punish that which we know is morally wrong. But whatever the reason, it is undeniable that there is general abhorrence of homosexual behaviour, which is deeply repugnant to the average citizen. If this is a sound instinct, the Committee might have been better advised to recognise and accept it, and try at the same time to shape our law on a more liberal and tolerant basis. This could be done by abolishing emotive terms like buggery and re-shaping the offences in two categories with lesser maximum penalties, homosexual assaults and homosexual indecencies, the former to apply where there was no consent or one partner is under the age of twenty-one, the latter to cases where there is consent and the partners are adults. This is not, however, the Committee's approach.

Heavy Penalties for Homosexual Offences

With the exception of homosexual behaviour between consenting adults, the majority appear to favour the heavy maximum penalties available under the present law, and in one respect (the penalty for indecent assault on a female) they desire to raise the maximum penalty to ten years' imprisonment, while for offences by a man over twenty-one with a person between sixteen and twenty-one they suggest a new offence with a maximum of five years' imprisonment.

We must look elsewhere in the Report for a truly enlightened lead on this aspect of the matter—to the Reservations of Mrs. Cohen, Dr. Curran, Lady Stopford, and Dr. Whitby. They recommend abolishing the distinction between buggery and other homosexual offences, which is a distinction not generally recognised in the laws of those European countries which make homosexual acts as such punishable. Moreover, Dr. Whitby proposes that there should be only two categories of offence: (a) indecent assault,

punishable with a maximum penalty of ten years' imprisonment (Dr. Curran says two years), applicable where there was no consent or the other partner was under sixteen; (b) gross indecency, punishable with a maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment. Dr. Curran's objection to raising the penalty for indecent assault on females to bring it into line with that proposed for indecent assault on males, on the ground that it would be a retrograde step, with no relation to current sentencing practice, also seems soundly based. The same criticism does not apply to the other recommendations concerning the sentencing of homosexual offenders, which are too numerous to discuss in detail in this article.

Heavier Penalties for Prostitution

At first sight the same criticism does apply, however, to the major recommendations with regard to offences connected with prostitution, *viz.*, that the penalties for solicitation by common prostitutes be raised in order to remove this offensive trade from the streets and make life more tolerable for the ordinary citizen who lives in them or passes through them. A maximum penalty of ten pounds for a first offence, twenty-five pounds for a second offence, and three months' imprisonment for a third or subsequent offence is proposed. It is recognised that one cannot abolish prostitution, but at least it is hoped to clear the streets. The following consequences are foreseen, and it is recognised that these must to some extent be accepted—the likelihood of an increase in the "call-girl" system and perhaps more touts, and an increase in the use of dubious advertisements in shops or local newspapers (which Mr. Adair in his Reservations would like to see controlled in some way). These repercussions would be preferable to the present system of the forty-shilling fine (with no possibility of imprisonment, at least in London). The hope is that the higher penalties will deter prostitutes, and also make them more willing to accept probation in suitable cases. This is especially important in the case of the young prostitute just commencing in the trade, and it is coupled with a recommendation that the courts should be given specific power to remand, in custody if need be, for not more than three weeks any prostitute convicted for the first or second time in order to enable a social or medical report to be furnished.

The Committee have very wisely rejected the suggestion that there should be special institutions for the detention of prostitutes with a view to their rehabilitation. They have also rejected the idea of a long prison term, for in their view, the punishment must bear

some relation to the gravity of the offence. Yet it is difficult to imagine what is to be achieved by sending scores of hardened prostitutes to prison for not more than three months. Little in the way of reform can be achieved in such a short period, as the Advisory Council on the Treatment of Offenders have recognised in their *Report on Alternatives to Short Terms of Imprisonment* (Home Office, May 1957). It is not easy to suggest what alternative solution the Committee might have embraced.

The alternative methods suggested from time to time for dealing with the problem of prostitution have ranged from a system of licensed brothels (which the Committee reject emphatically), registration of prostitutes and compulsory medical examination (also rejected by implication, but not really discussed in the Report), and abolition of the present laws concerning solicitation (such as was proposed in the Public Places (Order) Bill, published by the Association for Moral and Social Hygiene in 1950). None of these represents a solution to the problem. While the Committee were quite rightly prepared to eliminate the requirement of proof of "annoyance," they were not prepared to abolish the formula whereby the common prostitute is given less legal protection than the ordinary citizen. Alternatives were considered, but on balance it was felt safer to retain the phrase "common prostitute" in the definition of the offence, and there is much wisdom in this recommendation. The failure to deal with "kerb crawling" has been widely criticised, but it is the fear of implicating innocent persons which inspires the Committee's attitude on these matters, and one can appreciate that this might be a real danger. The suggestion that the law should be extended to cover non-urban areas where loitering for the purposes of prostitution takes place also seems well advised.

Fairness of Police Procedures

One of the basic issues concerning prostitution (and to a large extent homosexuality too) is the degree to which police procedures are fairly operated, and whether the discretion to prosecute is wisely used. The Committee found no evidence of a "witch-hunt" of homosexuals, though there are wide variations in the ways in which different police forces administer the law, and they recognise that from time to time local campaigns arise either as a result of a deliberate drive by the police or by reason of local public indignation. As a safeguard against discrepancies in the administration of the law they recommend that, except for indecent assaults, no offence more than twelve months old be capable of being prosecuted.

Although they recommend that in order to ensure uniformity of practice no prosecution for a homosexual offence other than indecent assault committed in private by a person under twenty-one shall be permitted without the sanction of the Attorney-General (except for prosecutions instituted by the Director of Public Prosecutions), they make no corresponding recommendation for prosecutions of adults, presumably because of the large numbers involved. Is there not a case for considering some such general provision?

With regard to prostitution, the Committee found no evidence of any kind that the police arrest prostitutes on some kind of rota system (once a fortnight). The statistics certainly refute this notion, though it is strongly believed by many of the prostitutes, as the literature on the subject reveals, and the Report concedes that "it would be surprising if the police did not exercise a certain amount of discrimination of this kind in making arrests." On the whole the police come out of it very well in the Report, and there is a fine tribute to the work of the women police. Something might be gained from the Scottish system of informal caution coupled with a report to the moral welfare officer, followed by formal caution at the police station for a subsequent offence, and a prosecution only after persistent offences, and the Committee recommend its adoption.

Commercial Exploitation of Prostitution

The Committee found little evidence that prostitutes were being exploited or organised on a large scale. Where the prostitute has a pounce, it is often an arrangement of mutual convenience, and the nearest thing to an abiding attachment that the prostitute knows in her life, as the book on *Women of the Streets* makes clear. In the Committee's view it is "an over-simplification to think that those who live on the earnings of prostitution are exploiting the prostitute as such. What they are really exploiting is the whole complex relationship between prostitute and customer; they are, in effect, exploiting the human weaknesses which cause the customer to seek the prostitute and the prostitute to meet the demand."

The offence of living on the earnings of prostitution is left untouched by the Committee's recommendations, although the women members of the Committee favoured raising the maximum penalty from two to five years' imprisonment. The Committee recommend that the same law be applied to living on the earnings of male prostitution, and that the term "brothel" be declared to include premises used for homosexual practices.

The weakest part of the Report would appear to be that dealing with the use of premises for the purpose of prostitution. At present there are several loopholes which are well known to the operators in this field; but the Committee do not see any way of stopping them up without depriving the prostitute of her right to live in promiscuous peace. Premises in the sole occupation of a woman who uses them for her own prostitution do not in law constitute a brothel even though they may be in the same building as other premises similarly used; and although they may be habitually used for the purpose of prostitution, and it is an offence for the tenant or occupier to permit such use, the courts have held that a woman who is the sole occupier of premises which she uses for the purpose of her own habitual prostitution cannot be convicted, neither can a lessee of premises who sub-lets part to a woman for such purpose, since he is in effect the landlord not the "tenant or occupier."

The Committee conclude that it would not be right to amend the law in such a way as to make guilty of an offence a person who lets premises to a prostitute who uses them, even with his knowledge, for the purposes of her own habitual prostitution. They do recommend, however, that the landlord should have the right to recover possession of premises which are being put to use for the purposes of prostitution, but only where there is a conviction of the lessee or tenant; and it is recognised that "there are many cases where there is no conviction of a tenant but where a landlord experiences difficulty in ridding his premises of prostitution." They recommend that magistrates' courts should have power upon convicting a tenant or occupier of keeping a brothel or knowingly permitting premises to be used as such or for the purposes of habitual prostitution, to make an order determining the lease or tenancy or requiring the tenant to assign it within three months to some person approved by the landlord. It is recommended that the landlord should have the right to be heard if he so desires in regard to this matter, and should be notified about the proceedings. This has the advantage of giving the landlord the information and opportunity which he now lacks, but only in the event of conviction of the tenant or occupier for one of these offences. Moreover, if he does not take advantage of this right or subsequently grants a new lease or contract to the same person without inserting suitable provisions to prevent recurrence of the offence, he shall be deemed a party to any subsequent similar offence unless he can show that he took all reasonable steps to prevent it.

This recommendation, together with that relating to the

landlord demanding exorbitant rent being deemed to be living on immoral earnings, go some part of the way towards protecting respectable properties from invasion by prostitutes and their pones (Mr. Adair would go further), but they do little or nothing to protect the neighbours who may feel the neighbourhood has become undesirable. The rating law recognises that the valuation may be affected, yet how can the adjacent owners be compensated for the loss in the value of their property? This would appear to be one of the risks of buying or leasing property in an urban area. Can it be insured against?

The Prostitute's Customer

It has not escaped notice that the one person who is not inculpated in the present state of the law is the prostitute's customer or client. The difficulty is that without making it an offence to respond to a prostitute's solicitation and commit fornication, it is impossible to reach the customer. Presumably the higher fines envisaged by the Committee will affect the prices charged to the customer, and thus indirectly lead to a decline in demand. In the Committee's view it is the prostitute who affronts the sense of decency of the ordinary citizen by parading habitually and openly. A person persistently soliciting prostitutes might be covered by the present law which prohibits a male person persistently soliciting or importuning in a public place for immoral purposes (Sexual Offences Act, 1956, s. 32). It might be possible for the police to do something to deter the customer by bringing charges under this section. The Report is strangely silent on the desirability of such charges, though it recognises the possibility. The general attitude to the customer seems to be that he is always right.

In conclusion, it should be said that however controversial the Committee's recommendations may be (and on subjects such as those under consideration they could not be expected to be otherwise) the Report represents a landmark in the development of English criminal law. Although the main recommendation concerning homosexuality between consenting adults may have been a little too far in advance of public opinion, the Report (and especially some of the Reservations) contains a great deal of sound sense and practical wisdom on all aspects of that delicate social issue. If on prostitution it appears that the light fails or burns less brightly we should reflect that this is one of the most intractable of all human problems and it would take a Committee of geniuses or saints to provide a satisfactory solution of all the complex issues.

THE MALTA STORY

JOHN HATCH

IN 1802, by agreement with representatives of its people, Britain took possession of the Mediterranean island of Malta. For over 150 years this island has been invaluable to British imperial defence. A dockyard was built there, and its naval position in the centre of the Mediterranean has served as a bastion for the strategic route to the Near and Far East. In both world wars Mediterranean strategy was firmly hinged on Malta, a fact clearly recognised by the Germans and Italians, whose bombers reduced many of its buildings to rubble and killed 2,000 of its inhabitants.

The Future of an Island Fortress

It has been common practice during the past two centuries for an imperial power to take possession of a strategic island, establish it as a fortress, and then look upon it purely as a military base. Only recently has any interest been shown in the effects of this attitude on the life of the island's inhabitants. Yet when we have turned to recognise the Maltese people as living human beings, instead of inanimate factors in strategic defence, we have immediately uncovered the profound effects of military usage on the peoples concerned. Instead of developing as a community geared to the production of their own resources and seeking the means to develop a form of life founded upon what they could produce, virtually the whole economic superstructure of the island has been built upon this single foundation of the dockyard. Possibly the British naval activity in Malta has provided the Maltese with a higher standard of life than would otherwise have been possible; nevertheless, it has left them completely exposed to any change in British naval strategy. They live in a single commodity economy just as much as the sugar, rubber, or copper colonies, and are as directly affected by trends outside their control.

There are many small communities scattered around the world who remain dependent on Britain as a relic of some aspect of British imperial history. Mauritius, St. Helena, Fiji, are all instances; so are the Gambia, Brunei, Singapore, the West Indies.

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What is to happen to such tiny communities, left stranded by the ebb tide of British imperialism? The latter group may have the opportunity of federating with a larger unit; some, like the West Indian islands, perhaps to form a new state by federating amongst themselves. There will still remain, however, isolated groups of people, particularly in islands, for which there is no such future. Yet, however small such communities, their peoples cannot be condemned to permanent dependence or to rule by a Government in which they have no representation.

This dilemma faces about a dozen small British dependencies. A number of reasons led to the Maltese being the first to raise the problem with the British Government. Their ancient and comparatively homogeneous population; their proud sufferings during the second world war; the pressure of population within the island; the comparatively high standard of their life and consequent ambitions for further development; the constant physical presence of an imperial government and its forces alongside their own parliamentary structure; and their increasing awareness of complete dependence on the naval dockyard, but absence of any influence over its future; all these factors combined to stimulate queries as to the future of their nation. Fears and doubts might be vaguely felt amongst the populace, but it required individual leadership to express them. This was supplied in the dynamic personality of the Labour Party leader, Dom Mintoff.

Mintoff's Plan

It was during his five years as leader of the Opposition from 1950 to 1955 that Dom Mintoff worked out his revolutionary plan of integration. As he saw it, there were two problems demanding solution, and the solutions to each must be complementary. As a Labour leader drawing almost his entire support from the dockyard workers he had to find the means of raising the standard of living of his people. Yet his freedom of action would be tightly circumscribed by Maltese dependence on Britain's military use of the island. Nine-tenths of imports into Malta were paid for by United Kingdom expenditure or aid, whilst eleven-twelfths of the total national income depended directly or indirectly on the expenditure of the British services.

Secondly, Mintoff had to seek some method by which the growing political nationalism of his people could be satisfied. The small size of the island and its population, coupled with its strategic

importance, made it virtually impossible to foresee circumstances in which it could become an independent sovereign state. Nevertheless, the Maltese would certainly not be prepared to accept permanent British hegemony.

The intersection of these two lines of inquiry then became clear to Mintoff, and his stature was established by the ability to face the unique equation. A rising standard of living for the Maltese people could only be obtained with British help. The political future of the island must depend largely on British decisions. The conclusion was clear: if the Maltese were to ensure the development of their own economy, and to attain political dignity, they must find some means of participating in British decisions.

Mintoff therefore produced his plan to link Malta with the United Kingdom whilst retaining control of its own local affairs. He proposed that Members of Parliament be elected from Maltese constituencies to Westminster, that agreement be reached on the internal powers of the Maltese Parliament and Government, and that an arrangement be agreed for consultation between the Maltese and British Governments on matters of common concern relating to the use of Malta by the British services. The nearest parallel to this plan is the constitutional position of Northern Ireland. Mintoff secured the support of his Labour Party for his proposal and put it to the electorate in the 1955 general election. He was careful, however, to leave himself one escape hatch. He told the electorate that his plan held out the best hopes for their future, but that if it was not approved the alternative must be full independence for Malta. On this programme the Maltese Labour Party won the election, securing twenty-three seats to the Nationalists' seventeen.

The Round Table Conference

It was one thing to have secured the support of the 316,000 Maltese; it was quite another to persuade fifty million British to break the gentle trends of their traditional conservatism. Before he became Prime Minister Mintoff had already visited London to put his ideas before political opinion there. He found sympathy but very little support. Now as Prime Minister, with the backing of his Government, party, and people, he renewed the attack. Eventually it was Lord Attlee who broke the ice and boldly proposed that an inter-party commission be set up to examine the whole situation. The Government accepted the suggestion and the Round Table Conference came into being. This was composed of leading members

of all three political parties under the chairmanship of the Lord Chancellor. It met and took evidence in London and then visited Malta and Gozo to examine the situation on the spot. Arguments were heard from the Maltese Labour Government, the trade unions, the Nationalist Party, and the Progressive Constitutional Party. The views of the Roman Catholic Church, which is the established church of the island, were also taken into consideration.

The Maltese Government and the trade unions supported the integration scheme; the Nationalists proposed a form of dominion status, leaving the United Kingdom in control of defence and foreign policy; the Progressive Constitutional Party, which has no members in the Maltese Assembly, was content with increasing the power of the legislature and suggesting closer administrative contact between the two governments. On certain matters, however, all parties were in agreement. The status and powers of the Roman Catholic Church must not be reduced; the position of the Maltese legislature and Government should be strengthened; defence and foreign affairs must remain with Westminster, though with improved consultative machinery between the two governments; and it was essential that Britain should continue to assist the Maltese in economic development, social services, and improved living standards.

Even before the Round Table Conference had met, discussions had taken place between the Maltese and British Governments on economic relations. These had resulted in a joint declaration by which the British Government pledged itself to help in—

- (a) raising the standard of education and social services;
- (b) increasing employment opportunities to lessen dependence on defence expenditure;
- (c) avoiding unemployment.

It was therefore established that Britain was to increase her responsibility for assisting in raising and diversifying the economic life of the Maltese people.

The Round Table Conference, with two dissentients amongst its seventeen members, published its Report in December 1955. The integration scheme was accepted, subject to the approval of the Maltese people. Three Members of Parliament were to be elected by the Maltese electorate in the same way as British Members, and to sit at Westminster with equal powers. The Maltese Parliament should be given authority over every aspect of Maltese life except defence and foreign policy and, eventually, direct taxation, which

would be transferred to the United Kingdom when living standards equivalent to those in Britain had been attained in Malta. Responsibility in London for the affairs of the island should be transferred from the Colonial to the Home Office, which would maintain a staff in Malta itself. The Governor of Malta must act on the advice of Maltese Ministers. A number of committees would be set up both in Valetta and in London for consultation on defence, economic, financial, and other matters of common concern between the two governments.

The Conference also considered the problems to be overcome in raising the Maltese standard of living to an equivalent position with that in Britain. It was accepted that this would take time and mutual effort. Proposals were made for a development plan which would improve agriculture, fishing, tourism, industrial development, immigration, and technical training, and which might increase the civil importance of the Maltese harbour. It was assumed that there was little danger of the naval value of Malta to Britain being reduced, whilst the Conference was given to understand that Her Majesty's Government would continue aid at about the current annual level of between £4 and £5 million.

Meeting Opposition

Mintoff had therefore won a major political victory in Britain. He had persuaded leading members of all three British political parties that his plan was best fitted to meet the problems facing the two countries. He had now to turn from political salesmanship to the more delicate task of political diplomacy. The Round Table Conference was simply advisory. Parliamentary approval had to be secured and eventually legislation accepted. In Malta, too, his opponents were neither silent nor still. The public victories had been won, but every step towards the final goal of permanent achievement would be taken on a tightrope.

In Britain there were initially two main centres of criticism to be overcome. First, there was the traditional conservatism of the British Parliament, always intensely jealous of its position and suspicious of any suggestion for altering its form. Even the Government appeared undecided, in spite of the fact that one of its members had been chairman of the Conference and that it was known that the Colonial Secretary favoured the scheme. When the debate on the report was held in Parliament the Government refused to commit itself, declaring that it would hear the views of

members before taking a decision. Once again, therefore, it was left to the leaders of the Opposition to make the pace and lend their full support to the integration plan. The Government then accepted the scheme, which now secured Parliamentary approval.

The second critical note was set by religious representatives. This came from two contrary sides. Roman Catholic opposition had been voiced in the Commons debate by Mr. William Teeling, who deprecated the dangers involved to the Catholic way of life amongst the Maltese. This was promptly, forcibly, and devastatingly met by a Labour Catholic spokesman, Mr. Robert Mellish. But other voices were critical of entrenching Roman Catholic privileges. The Archbishop of Canterbury voiced some of these fears for the Anglican Church in the House of Lords, whilst Mr. George Thomas spoke of Non-Conformist doubts in the Commons. On the one side some Catholics were frightened of secular influence penetrating from Britain to the island, whilst on the other non-Catholics saw no reason why, in an island which was to be part of Britain, Roman Catholics should be in a privileged position and other churches suffer discrimination.

In Malta itself it was the church which formed the most powerful opposition to Mintoff's plans. The Nationalist Party had lost face before the dynamism of Mintoff's Government, though it was used by the church as a political mouthpiece. The Progressive Constitutional Party was politically impotent, though its control of the press could be used for propaganda purposes.

Mintoff decided to hold a national referendum following the publication of the Round Table Conference Report, and before the Westminster Parliament had passed judgment. He was immediately opposed by the church and nationalists. The opposition adopted the tactic of boycotting the referendum, realising that it had little hope of defeating the plan by a straight vote. Even parish priests were pressed into advising their flocks to abstain from voting. This tactic, of course, enabled the opposition to claim that all who did not vote were opposed to the scheme. In the event 40.87 per cent. of the total electorate did not cast their votes as compared with 18.84 per cent. at the previous general election. Of those who voted, 67,607 supported integration and 20,177 opposed it. The figure of those in favour represented 44 per cent. of the total electorate or 74 per cent. of those voting. Obviously these figures could be used to support the case of either side, although, taking into consideration the normal abstentions and those who simply

feared the church's power, there can be little doubt that they revealed a majority in favour of integration.

The plan now, as announced by the British Government, was that legislation would be introduced into the Westminster Parliament embracing the whole scheme. That section dealing with Maltese representation at Westminster would, however, only come into effect at a subsequent date, after another Maltese General Election had been held if a majority of members were returned mandated to implement the scheme. A promise was also made that assurances would be given to the Roman Catholic Church guaranteeing that the British Parliament would not interfere with the religious affairs of the Maltese people.

Victory Soured

All this was in March 1956, two years ago. At that time it was anticipated that the whole procedure would have been completed long before now, so enabling the Maltese to hold their general election, pronounce on the issue, and be prepared to take part in the next British General Election. The story of the last two years, however, is one of continual frustrations, mutual provocations, and petulant outbursts, continually diverting minds from the central problem. Consequently, even now, legislation has neither been introduced nor even drafted. The nearest approach to its introduction came when the Colonial Secretary indicated that he hoped to lay it before the House during the present session. This hope has been laid aside, and in its place the Colonial Office now intends merely to produce a White Paper for further parliamentary debate. In the interim relations between Britain and Malta have continually deteriorated. As the Maltese are constitutionally bound to hold a General Election during the next twelve months there is now positive danger of integration itself foundering through lack of mutual confidence.

It has to be realised that to the Maltese the scheme has always involved some little sacrifice of their nationalist pride on the altar of rising living standards. They have recognised that "poor but free" may sound heroic but represents no realistic policy—though when provoked they sometimes return to its comfort. Consequently the political settlement involved in integration is only acceptable if it is accompanied by an assurance of economic development.

This necessity becomes doubly important for Mintoff and his colleagues when his nationalist opponents claim that economic aid

would be forthcoming without political integration. The onus is therefore placed on the Maltese Labour Movement to convince their people that genuine development can only be assured by association with Britain and representation at Westminster.

Financial Haggling

Over the last two years there has been a continual haggle between the two Governments over annual finance. As always, the British Treasury has been involved in this struggle and, although on the whole the Colonial Office has fought well on behalf of its Maltese wards, there have been occasions when it seems that certain officials in the Colonial Office have been intent on deliberately sabotaging the whole scheme. H.M.G. has continually tried to maintain that the rather vague passage in the Round Table Conference Report fixed the limit of British aid at £5 million a year. This they have used against Maltese claims, both in negotiations on annual budgets during the interim period before integration, and in the long battle to find agreement on financial relations once integration has come into effect. British financial policy has consequently had two major effects on the Maltese. In the first place, it has led them to suspect that the British Government has no genuine intention of helping the people of Malta to achieve equivalent living standards; in the second, it has made it almost impossible for the Maltese Government to lay down any development plan secure in the knowledge that the resources will be available to finance it. After pressure, H.M.G. did appoint, first an Economic Committee, and then the Hives Commission on industrialisation. Neither, however, can possibly succeed without this basic security of planned economic resources to lay the foundations of progressive development.

After a long struggle, involving continually high blood-pressures, the long-term financial arrangements to follow integration were agreed in July 1957. This agreement made provision for grants of £5 million a year for five years towards the capital expenditure of Malta, plus something over £1 million a year towards financing expanding social services. A commission was to examine both economic plans and needs within the five-year period. But perhaps the most important provision of this agreement was the clause by which the British Government pledged itself to give special assistance if unemployment in Malta were to remain at a point higher than that in Britain over any period of six months. This

dge was vaguely worded, but nevertheless valuable. It gave Malta the position of a development area.

Meanwhile, however, the context within which negotiations were being conducted had radically changed. New defence and financial policies had been adopted by the British Government. In April the Minister of Defence, Duncan Sandys, paid a visit to Malta in which he brusquely warned Maltese Ministers that their dockyard was no longer essential to British strategy and that its work would be reduced. And there is no alternative employment for Maltese dockers as there is for those of Chatham, Portsmouth, or Sydney. Consequently, the major strength of Maltese sanctions had suddenly vanished. Only a few months afterwards deflation was adopted as the cardinal principle of the Conservative Government's financial policy, and it soon became clear that the Maltese were to be forced to make a contribution to salvaging the plight into which the British economy had been plunged during the last few months. As a consequence relations between the two governments have continually worsened and provocation on both sides has rapidly increased.

Three Current Problems

After a long visit to London in the autumn of 1957 Mintoff and his colleagues returned to their island in November with three problems outstanding. First, they had underspent their 1956-57 allocation, but needed the balance to finance the current budget. Their immediate needs were due partly to the role they had played during the Suez crisis and partly to a quicker completion of contracts. The British Treasury, however, was adamant, and refused to give a penny.

Secondly, the question of the dockyard was still undecided. The British Government had declared its new defence policy before working out its implications. They were now under pressure to maintain itself to close Valetta rather than Chatham. This immediately led to crisis in Malta. A protest meeting called by the dockers was only cancelled by Mintoff when he received a belated message from the Secretary of State assuring him that there was enough work to keep his dockyard going for about three years at its present level. The cancellation of this meeting was used by some of the union leaders to suggest treachery on Mintoff's part, and only after he had offered his resignation as Prime Minister was he unanimously assured of the full support of the dockyard workers. At the message of Lennox-Boyd was still vague, and requests were

made in vain for it to be defined clearly. As a consequence, in the New Year, when it became apparent that dockers were to be dismissed, Mintoff introduced a resolution into his Assembly declaring that if the British Government went back on its guarantee of dockyard employment the Maltese would absolve themselves of obligations towards Britain. In fact there had been no British guarantee of employment, but, once again, it was only under the shadow of this threat that Lennox-Boyd gave the figures previously demanded, indicating that 12,000 of the 13,200 dockyard workers would be kept employed for three years. As the dismissed men were then employed on the NATO oil storage scheme, this unnecessary crisis collapsed, but had further increased mistrust.

The third issue involved the final constitutional position to be achieved under integration. The question was whether Malta should become an integral part of the United Kingdom. This is particularly important to the Maltese because of their desire to be included in the British quota of immigrants admitted to America and Canada. There is reason to believe that this question was settled satisfactorily even during these recurrent crises.

Exacerbation

Relations between the British and Maltese have thus become increasingly critical during the past two years. They are now precariously balanced above the abyss. The British Government, now under continual fire from its back-benchers, is rigidly maintaining its intransigent financial attitude and insisting that the Maltese people must also suffer in Britain's financial crisis. It has determined, not only to refuse Mintoff's present demands, but to cut the subsidy for 1958/59. It brusquely commands the Maltese Government either to increase taxation or to float a loan, though its members must know, from their own experience, that no government can be expected to take such action in an election year. It has changed its mind about introducing an integration bill during the present session and thus will make it impossible for the next General Election in Malta to be held squarely on this issue.

On the other hand, Mintoff, provoked and infuriated by these actions and the manner in which Conservative ministers have informed him of them, has become increasingly intransigent and forgetful of the extent of his victories. He is now insisting on independence together with a treaty of friendship allowing him to offer dockyard facilities to other nations, although he must know,

JOHN HATCH

if only by looking to Sicily and Southern Italy, how impossible it is to attract industries under present circumstances without substantial capital expenditure and political stability. Nor does he appear to have realised that he is now negotiating with a wasting asset, in circumstances much less propitious to his cause than those existing before a year ago. If any possibility ever existed for an independent Malta to attract capital and industry, or to offer naval facilities to other states—which is highly improbable—the recent melodramas and resultant political instability have banished such hopes.

Integration Remains Essential

The fact is that integration remains the one and only solution which can reconcile British responsibility for the welfare of the people of Malta and the maintenance of friendly relations with them, on the one side, and the natural ambitions of the Maltese people themselves to find the way to a better standard of living on the other. The political settlement of integration has an economic significance which has never been fully recognised by the Maltese. Once Malta becomes a part of the United Kingdom, the welfare of her people will be an explicit responsibility of the British Government and Parliament. Neither British politicians nor the British trade union movement will allow the island to remain as a permanent depressed area or its people to suffer disabilities in wages, employment, and social services. It is only to be expected that both sides will strike as hard a bargain as possible in present circumstances, but whatever the sacrifices entailed, the future of the people of Malta and the relations between them and the people of Britain can only be placed on a secure foundation by implementing this imaginative and unique scheme of integration. The process should have been completed long before now. The major mistake has been to allow wrangling negotiations between the two governments to poison the friendly atmosphere existing two years ago, instead of implementing the decision of the British Parliament immediately. But if final agreement is not reached very soon, the historic opportunity of accepting a unique solution to a problem of international significance may well be finally spurned simply through mutual lack of faith and imagination.

BLOCK GRANTS AND CONTROL OF EDUCATION

JOHN VAIZEY

THE government propose to introduce a system of block grants in place of the largely percentage formula which has obtained since 1944. The government say this will aid local autonomy and reduce administrative costs; the teachers and the opposition say that it will cut the flow of funds into education. An enormous controversy has blown up.

Are people asking the right questions? Are the issues really as simple as they seem? On the one hand, it may be that the complicated web of relationships between the Ministry, the L.E.A.s and the teachers is more worthy of close analysis than a barren discussion of "freedom"—the most abused abstract noun in the language. How real is the desire and need for "freedom" on the part of local councillors?—possibly the teachers feel that freedom of this kind reduces their own freedom to teach well. On the other hand, how far have the fears of a reduction in outlays on education distracted the teachers from considering the main object of the government (which is to reform local government) and prevented a real analysis of the purpose of local government in education?

In this article I intend to raise all these issues. First of all, however, I must clear the decks on the flow of resources into education.

Over the years public expenditure on education has grown in spurts largely unrelated to changes in the grant formula. In recent years education expenditure has tended to regain the percentage of the national income it achieved in the early nineteen-thirties; just after the war it was a smaller percentage of the national income than it was in the nineteen-twenties. Few of these fluctuations have been directly associated with changes in the grant-in-aid system: a cut in the grant in 1931 was followed by a rise in real expenditure while the enlargement of the grant in 1944 was only slowly followed by a reversal of a falling trend of expenditure. The major factors affecting the level of expenditure on education are the size of the child population, the level of prices (especially of teachers' incomes),

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the rate of capital investment, and the level of the national income—not the grant. Because all these influences have been on a rising trend in recent years—and are likely to continue to be so—the level of all expenditure on education has been rising fairly fast; and because two of them (the number of children and the rate of capital investment) have been going up exceptionally quickly, the proportion of the national income devoted to education (both current and capital expenditure) has also risen.¹

The government's proposals for a change in the system of education grants must therefore be examined in the light of the evidence that the grant system is not as important as at first appears in determining the level of expenditure. It must be made clear, moreover, that the government has continually said this. It has been said all along that the purpose of changing the grant system is mainly administrative and has no relation to the rate of growth of expenditure.²

How Education is Financed

Education expenditure has been financed roughly in the ratio of 6:3:1 between government grants, local rates, and fees.³ It is a possibility—though in the light of what has been said not a very likely one—that a change in the method of finance which entailed a change in this ratio would affect the level of expenditure. (It is more likely to affect the division of expenditure between services.) The present grant is given on a formula embodying a number of factors: a constant of £6 per child, plus 60 per cent. of recognised expenditure minus the yield of a 1s. 6d. rate; it is separate from other grants paid to local authorities; and it discriminates between various services by varying the percentage rate.

In place of this grant the government proposes to include most of its aid (but not that given to technology) in a new system of block grants given to local authorities not specifically tied to any service, the grant to be stabilised for three-yearly periods, and embodying a complicated formula designed to redress local inequalities of resources and demands.⁴ The simplification of the grant mechanism will not itself save any administrative costs because the old grants were fairly easy to operate, but the substitution of a block grant for

¹ See John Vaizey, *The Costs of Education*, Chap. 1.

² Cf. *Hansard*, speech of H. Brooke, December 10, 1957, and G. Lloyd, December 11, 1957, and Cmnd. 209, para. 5.

³ These matters are given in detail in Chap. 4 of *The Costs of Education*.

⁴ The Government's proposals are summarised in the White Paper on Local Government Finance, Cmnd. 209. The Minister proposes that for 1959–61 the triennial period will not be introduced (*Manchester Guardian*, January 29, 1958).

a percentage grant makes redundant the detailed examination of all expenditure to see whether it is eligible for grant. The only financial control which will remain will be the district auditor's function of seeing whether the expenditure is legally permissible within the Education (and other) Acts. This should save administrative time and energies. Further, the substitution of a block grant based on "objective" factors like child population is a "fairer" method of distributing government money than a percentage grant (which benefits the richer authorities) and it may be a means of more easily helping poorer authorities to finance future developments. The way in which the grant will now be given might have, however, the following consequences: by giving more to the less progressive authorities and less to the better ones it could reduce inequalities in educational provision while keeping down the total national expenditure or raise the total while increasing the inequalities.⁵

The Objects of a Grant

The first purpose of a grant is that of exercising a general influence on policy. Grants-in-aid from the central government to education authorities were given originally to help enlarge the provision for education, though occasionally—especially in 1921 and 1931—they have been used in attempts to restrict its growth. The grant has always had a second characteristic (additional to its general influence) of discrimination. The grant was originally given for a variety of special objects that the government wanted to encourage. The general growth resulting from this has been followed at each major educational reform by a period of consolidation and the system has been simplified. Nevertheless, discrimination between services has always crept back because certain special purposes needed extra encouragement—thus, the 1944 Act simplified the grant formula, but special arrangements were made for meals, milk, teacher training, and—later—technology. Thirdly, the grant has

⁵ At the moment there is no evidence either way on this issue. Some progressive authorities are poor, though most are rich, and it is not yet clear how particular authorities will be affected. An arithmetical example may be given of what might occur. Suppose there are two authorities—A, the backward one, spends £100, on which its present grant is £60, and B, the other, spends £200, on which its present grant is £120. Under the new system, let us suppose, the new grants are £80 to A and £100 to B. If A's rate contribution is reduced by £15 its new total expenditure is £105. B, having been cut, replaces half the lost grant by rate expenditure—its total is now £190. The new grant thus reduces both expenditure and the inequalities, while the total government grant is the same. In the second case, the grant to A could be cut to £40 while A also cuts its rate expenditure by £15. This makes A's total expenditure £65. B's grant could be raised to £140, and its rate expenditure by £10, making the total for B £230. This distribution of grant increases total expenditure and increases the inequalities while the government grant remains the same.

been used to control local authorities. The Ministry has sometimes withheld grant (this has been the main means of restraining expenditure on minor capital projects), yet the local authorities have always had their own money (derived from rates mainly) to spend on these purposes (provided, of course, that they are allowed by Parliament).⁶ The grant system has thus had the third function of keeping a loose rein on the pattern of expenditure.⁷ By their proposals the government are abandoning the second and third purposes of the grant system.⁸

A block grant in theory allows the level of government contribution to local government to be varied more easily than a percentage grant—where initiative for changes in expenditure must come from local authorities, in the absence of a change in the percentage rate of grant.⁹ This point has been of some importance in government thinking,¹⁰ but its importance is reduced by the triennial adjustment which makes the contribution inflexible. In any case, local services are among the least flexible elements of public expenditure—precisely because they are basic to the life of the nation. Further, the power to recognise items of expenditure for grant or not is a much more sensitive instrument of control than a power simply to vary a total up or down.¹¹

In practical terms, the changed system could cut back expenditure (as University expenditure has been cut back) by allowing the grant to be stabilised for three years in money terms, as proposed, because rising prices erode the real value of the grant. In any case, the proposed system would allow local authorities to cut expenditure on education in order to increase other services because (and this is a very special reason) all additional expenditure under a block grant system is financed entirely from non-grant sources—whether they be local rates or students' fees.¹²

⁶ Provided other powers of the Ministry were not exercised to forbid it.

⁷ I have discussed this at length in Chap. 3 of *The Costs of Education*.

⁸ By maintaining the percentage grant for technological instruction the government may be intending a more rapid switch of resources away from ordinary education to these specialities. If this is so, the proposal rests upon a series of highly questionable assumptions: first, that ordinary education is expendable, secondly, that the resources are mobile, and thirdly, that they cannot be recruited from elsewhere. (They base it, apparently, upon a spurious argument for "pooling": Cmnd. 209, para. 17.)

⁹ Because education looms so large in local finance, unless the education grant is included in the general block grant, there is no possibility of a solution to local government financial policy along block grant lines (Henry Brooke, *Manchester Guardian* report, January 29, 1958).

¹⁰ Though it has not been acknowledged because the teachers would have interpreted the argument as a desire on the part of the government to reduce the level of contributions.

¹¹ I suggest below, however, that the argument for the block grant based upon the total contribution to local government may be of considerable importance in the future.

¹² I have ignored fees in this article as they are an unlikely additional source of revenue.

The Fear of Retrenchment

It is this last point which worries the educationalists and they have interpreted the block-grant system as an ingenious method of reducing the rate of expansion of the education service because, they say, any new expenditure will fall on the rates and local councillors in many districts (especially rural counties) are more interested in keeping down the rates than in providing an adequate education service.¹³ Moreover, the new system will begin to operate just when the physical shortages of teachers and equipment are within sight of ending. The government—in reply to an attack that unites more factions than any previously known (including the 1931 economy cuts)¹⁴—say that decent minimum standards are guaranteed by the requirements of the Ministry of Education under the Education Acts, and that the new system will reduce pettifogging administrative detail and allow local authorities greater freedom to experiment in education provision in response to local electoral demands or pressures from local educationalists.¹⁵

On the issue of fact there is no doubt that the government is right. The power of the Ministry of Education to maintain standards is almost entirely exercised by directive, by an examination of building and staffing standards, and by the operations of the Inspectorate. The influence of the grant as a means of exercising control over current expenditure has been negligible while the inquiries necessary to see whether an item of expenditure qualified for grant have occasionally been tiresome.¹⁶ The one exception to this generalisation is minor building works. This item of expenditure has been (irritatingly) subject to grant approval since the minor controls on building were removed. Its total has risen considerably recently, and is one of the few items in the education accounts that is not directly subject to administrative fiat. This is probably the chief reason for the Ministry of Education's support of the block grant.¹⁷ The decisions to repair schools, instal lavatories, and so on have been almost entirely dependent (especially in areas where unemployment is appearing in the building trades) upon local

¹³ See, e.g., *New Statesman and Nation*, January 26, 1958, and *Times Educational Supplement*, all the November issues, 1957.

¹⁴ *Times Educational Supplement*, December 13, 1957.

¹⁵ The "vulnerable" parts of the education service will probably be adult education, nursery classes, arts specialities in secondary schools, and aids to deprived pupils.

¹⁶ The saving on this account will be negligible, however, and since administrative costs have fallen steadily for a number of years the point is not a serious one.

¹⁷ In contrast, the number of teachers (which is the biggest item of cost) is fairly fixed and predictable for the country as a whole. The Directive to local authorities to restrain expenditure (January 28, 1958) emphasises the importance of restricting minor building works.

financial considerations and pressure for improved conditions. Under the percentage grant system the financial motive for leaving schools in ill-repair has been reduced. By substituting the block grant it will be restored. This is a field where the arguments for *administrative* efficiency are wholly on the government's side because a dual system of approval is administratively wasteful, but in the light of major policy objectives this theoretical argument becomes less attractive. One of the scandals of social England is its "slum schools," and it is desirable that they should be eliminated with all speed. The difference in the state of the schools between localities is so startling that every incentive should be given to the worst authorities to put their schools in repair. In this instance the block grant substitutes theoretical administrative efficiency for a desirable social improvement. It may be that financial conditions are such that restriction comes first; in which case—in the interests of achieving some uniformity of standards—it might be better that the restriction should take the form of a global allocation of permission to use resources to each authority in the light of local needs and local reserves of building labour. The block grant adds to local decisions on these matters the fortuitous element of local rate yields and local political considerations.¹⁸

Total Expenditure the Real Issue

These are issues of local tactics. Behind the controversy, however, lies an issue of fundamental importance to education that is hardly ever raised—what is the proper relationship between Curzon Street, County Hall, and the schools?

Strangely enough, the issue of whether marginal expenditure shall fall on the rates or on the estimates is of negligible importance to this fundamental matter. Properly speaking, the significant question is "what should be *total* expenditure on education?" not "how should expenditure be divided between local rates and national taxes?" It is irresponsible of the government to suggest that the future of an important service should rely to a substantial extent on the fortuitous yields of one tax rather than another. Rates are a regressive tax,¹⁹ and therefore the proposed change will reinforce the present situation whereby the middle and higher income groups are heavily subsidised by the education service because most

¹⁸ It is worth noting that many Conservative-controlled county authorities are dominated by members using the private education sector, to whom bad schools are of no direct concern.

¹⁹ H. F. Lydall and R. F. F. Dawson, *Bulletin of Oxford Institute of Statistics*, December 1954.

improved education services (unless specifically designed for the poorer people) tend to go to those who "consume" most education—the better off.²⁰

Local rates are not a buoyant source of revenue (though they are a lower proportion of total outgoings than before the war) and it seems fairly clear that the influence of those who want to keep rates down will be strengthened by the change. Indeed, questions of expense will become a serious issue for the first time since 1945.²² The educationalists, quite rightly, point out that this is paradoxical at a time when all other influences—government policy, child population, the additional costs of maintaining better buildings, higher salaries for teachers, and so on—make a case for increasing expenditure.²³ Since rate receipts do not rise automatically with incomes as many other taxes do,²⁴ the basis for an expansion of education will rest on everything except buoyant revenues. On the face of it, therefore, the policy of putting new expenditure on to the rates is foolish unless the new "freedom to experiment" outweighs the disadvantages.²⁵

Is "Greater Freedom" an Illusion?

Suppose we ask "would any greater freedom have been possible under the existing system without changing the grant structure?" If the answer is yes, then the government's case is weakened. If it could be shown, too, that "greater freedom"—as it has recently been interpreted—is undesirable, then the case is destroyed. Let us take the first issue first—could there have been less administrative rigmarole under the existing grant? A comparison of the methods of control of the three major social services which have grants-in-aid and are administered locally—education, health, and housing—shows that the amount and method of payment of the grant has little to do with the administrative freedom of the local authority. There is no doubt that Regional Hospital Boards and Hospital Management Committees between them have greater freedom in many matters—staffing, methods of payment, and treatment, for

²⁰ This apparently paradoxical conclusion is reached in Chap. 4 of *The Costs of Education*, where it is shown that, mainly because the middle class have preferential entry to grammar schools and Universities, the middle-class parent who chooses to use the public education services receives at least half as much again in expenditure as the working-class parent.

²² Until recently these questions have almost always concerned questions of "frivolous" expenditure like pianos, and not more fundamental matters like staffing policy—excepting always the cost of school building.

²³ *Times Educational Supplement*, December 13, 1957.

²⁴ *New Sources of Local Revenue*, p. 38.

²⁵ We have seen that administrative savings are unimportant.

instance—than education authorities have, and they combine this freedom with economic management of the services under their control.²⁶ The main reason for this, it would seem, is that the hospital authorities are trusted by the Ministry of Health, and a corollary of this is that they have a 100 per cent. grant for most of their expenditure.

In education, too, the rate of school-building is entirely controlled by the Ministry's control of investment and as a result, using a modern administrative technique of experimental design and cost limits, there has been a considerable fall in building costs. The degree of local responsibility is by no means uniquely associated with the proportion of expenditure found by central government. It depends rather upon a complex and subtle relationship in which confidence in the local agency is the major factor.²⁷ Had the degree of confidence been greater the local authorities would already have had far more freedom in educational matters than they have had, and it is unlikely that the "greater freedom" promised by the new grant system will bring about any substantial changes since the relationship between the Ministry of Education and the local authorities will be relatively unaffected by the alterations. Indeed, the government have promised that freedom to experiment will be limited by a close control of standards and this implies that there will be little relaxation of central control of the local education authorities. Therefore—in answer to our first question—the objects of the government could have been achieved without changing the grant formula. Indeed, they are likely to be frustrated because the change in the grant structure will strengthen the local opposition to the expansion of education and the suspicions of local government long held by the educationalists (who are strong in Curzon Street) will be strengthened by attacks on the fabric of education by local councillors.²⁸ This is a serious matter. Education is—fortunately—becoming an important political topic and the Minister of Education

²⁶ See *Report of the Committee of Investigation into the Cost of the National Health Service* (Cmd. 9663, para. 725), and Acton Society Trust, *Impact of the Change*, 1957.

²⁷ The proportion of University finance found by the central government is about as great as that for local education services, but the independence of Universities is much more firmly established.

²⁸ This is a serious allegation to make, but it seems clear that until recently the Ministry of Education has tended to support the grant system operated under the 1944 Act. In its *Annual Report for 1950*, which was a review of fifty years of education, it said: "... [The Grant Settlement of 1948] formed an integral part of the general settlement of the financial relations between the government and local authorities ..." (p. 31). It warned the reader, however, "... [it cannot] be suggested that anything in the nature of finality has been reached." The proposal for the block grant system originated from the Ministry of Housing and Local Government

or his representative will be increasingly brought to task in the House of Commons for the shortcomings of local councils. A continuous process of local examination²⁹ (inescapable because of the powers given by Acts of Parliament to the Ministry) will take place as a result of these questions. This may well be the most serious aspect of the proposed change.

The Need for Confidence in L.E.A.s

It would, indeed, be possible to argue that a substantial rise in the proportion of education finance found by the government would be a greater sign of confidence in local education authorities than a stabilisation of the level of the grant. The old conception of local councillors being feckless when they spend from grant, while they behave with close calculation and canny frugality when they spend the rates is foreign to a conception of local authorities helping to run an education service whose successful expansion (all are agreed) is of the highest national importance. The two attitudes do not make sense. If local people really are recklessly extravagant with school dinners then they are unfit to decide who is to bring up children; and, in any case, economy depends on modern cost-accounting procedures rather than on a continuous regard to the yield of a penny rate.

There is, indeed, a strong case for a substantial rise in the proportion of educational expenditure found from grant. When we turn our minds to our second question—do we need greater freedom?—we find that "freedom to experiment" is a concept that few educationalists believe in when it comes to money. Ideally, every child—wherever he comes from—should be educated according to his needs. Since hard economic facts impose some upper (and lower) limits on expenditure, it seems reasonable that the discrimination between children should be imposed by their needs and not by geography—that extra money should go to the handicapped and to the able child who needs specialist teachers, wherever the children live. Broadly, all children should be equally treated.³⁰ Being equally treated means, at the very least (in a country where prices and broad policy are fixed nationally), that roughly the same amount should be spent on all children of an age-group in any one

²⁹ Incidentally, continually raising the cost of administration.

³⁰ In progressive states in America all children stay at school until they are eighteen and expenditure *per school life* is nearly equal for all children; the proposition in the text says, far more modestly, that all children up to the age of fifteen should be (roughly) equally treated. At present the biggest advantages in education are given to those who stay on after fifteen, and this is a matter of high ability and high social class.

year—possibly rather less for the normal child and rather more for the special child.³¹ If local resources are allowed into the calculation then a fortuitous element of the county boundary is introduced. There is no room for local experiment on how much we spend per child, because that means, for instance, that some children will always be in bigger classes than the children in the next town, or will have fewer chances of going to a university. There is room for experiment on whether children shall be taught in classes of mixed ability or highly segregated and in other purely educational matters. Experiments of this latter kind rarely affect substantially the totals of expenditure—they are, rather, decisions on the allocation of given resources.

A large number of outgoings is fixed, therefore, by the need for uniform treatment of a given population³² and this proportion is probably at least 90 per cent. or more of total expenditure since it includes the wages and salaries of teachers and ancillary workers, the costs of school maintenance, as well as the greater part of outlays on books and medical care. Since standards in these matters are imposed nationally it would seem reasonable to give a central grant at least equal to their cost (determined on a unit costing basis) as is done at present for school meals and milk.³³

The Grant Formula and Central Control

In answering our questions, therefore, we have come to the conclusion that the grant formula is not related significantly to the methods of control over local authority, and that it is extremely probable that “greater freedom” for the local authorities will mean a reinforcement of the economy-minded councillors. There seems little likelihood that there will be any further genuine “freedom” of educational experiment—nor is there evidence that this is education’s great need at the moment. Since the expansion of education

³¹ The differences in the amounts spent on different children are already substantial. A grammar school child has twice as much spent on him as a secondary-modern child, in his secondary school life; the difference in local provision of grammar school places gives some areas a greater expenditure per child than others.

³² This qualification has to be introduced because the age structure of a local population affects expenditure since secondary education is more expensive than primary. The social structure also affects expenditure. Areas with a greater proportion of higher social classes will have greater expressed need for grammar school places and less for special school places, though expenditure may be reduced because the proportion of children in independent schools may be large.

³³ If this were done, then the education grant-in-aid would rise by at least one-half. The rates expenditure relieved by this grant could go to the reduction of the block grant on other services—thus keeping the contribution from central to local government a steady one.

is agreed to be of great importance at present, and should not be subject to undue financial restraint, it is difficult to see the argument for introducing a block grant system at the present time. There is a great deal to be said, indeed, for the opposite—for increasing the rate of grant paid from central funds on most education expenditure. On the other hand, the issue of the method of grant payment is not as serious as the present controversy might suggest since so many outgoings are in fact fixed.

This is the long-run answer. What is possibly important in the short run is that when the opportunity for raising standards becomes really tremendous (say in 1964 or 1965) because of the improved teacher recruitment position and the changing structure of the child population, there may be an incentive to local authorities to keep standards constant and to save costs by reducing their teaching strength—an incentive that would not be as strong with a percentage grant.³⁴ At the moment administrative convenience and academic argument might tilt the scales in favour of the block grant but in the future they will not.

Most important of all—leaving aside this short-term issue—is that the controversy over the grant system (which is in itself a relatively minor matter), has shown that the teachers have the most profound distrust of the local authorities. This, added to the likely loss of confidence by Curzon Street in the local authorities, and the existing loss of confidence by the teachers and the Ministry of Education in each other as a result of the completely unnecessary superannuation fuss three years ago, means that the three “partners” in education—the Ministry, the local authorities, and the teachers—have all grown deeply suspicious of one another. These fears are as yet not openly expressed by responsible people but they exist and are at the root of the virulence of the campaign against block grants. They raise an issue which was avoided by the 1944 Act, and which has been lost sight of in the feverish efforts to build a new education service. Is the method of administering education through local authorities (which has survived since 1902) the best or the most suitable one today? There are a great many signs that it is not.

³⁴ The ingenious suggestion by *The Economist* (January 26, 1958) that the block grant should be weighted by such factors as staffing standards in order to give an incentive to authorities to spend money on worthwhile objectives must be rejected because, first, it is over-complex and, second, it is impossible to point to any one or two arithmetical indices of educational achievement and say that they are the tests to be used without opening the system to the great abuses that hung over the grant system when it was paid on the pupils’ examination results (G. A. N. Lowndes, *The Silent Social Revolution*, 1937, Chap. 1).

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SLOGANS OR RESPONSIBILITY?

NORTON LONG

EVER since the thirties the liberal left in the United States has thought it knew where it was going. This confidence has been all the easier to maintain since it has been based on a set of unexamined and unstated premises. These premises were supposed to be implicit in the conger of expedient, frequently conflicting measures known collectively as the New Deal and Fair Deal.

The lively consciousness of humanitarian good intentions seemed sufficient to justify a rather nebulous faith, the more so as the faith was accompanied by sundry indubitably good works. After all the hungry had been fed, the aged secured, a T.V.A. had been built, the Ishmaels and the Insulls had been driven from the temple, labour had been organised and the party of Herbert Hoover banished to the outer darkness of seemingly permanent opposition. Such good works might be adorned by a theory but their self-evident merit seemed such as to permit them to stand by themselves, needing no justification beyond the certain immediate approbation of any man of honesty and good will. F.D.R.'s description of himself as a quarterback calling his plays on hunches characterised more than just his own lack of concern with theoretical consistency. There was a certain puckish, rollicking undergraduate good humour about the young men like Tommy the Cork who played at politics with the same technical zest that they had learned in law school. The probably apocryphal but widely publicised story of the elderly school superintendent of Gary, Indiana, in which he revealed to a delighted, half-credulous press how he had been taken to dinner by a band of young braintrusters and told while he quaked that "Roosevelt is only the Kerensky of this revolution," is indicative of a mood.

In some ways this light-heartedness of what Mauritz Halgren dubbed the Gay Reformer had a peculiar charm when contrasted

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with the fulsome seriousness of Wilson, Bryan, and the Chautauqua circuit. In comparison to the principled economic orthodoxy of Hoover it could even pose as an attitude both pragmatic and experimental—the very *avant garde* of a new political positivism.

This is not quite fair, however, for the humanitarian activists dreaming up assorted programmes to meet the multiplying articulate and inarticulate group demands born or nurtured by the depression were really concerned with the semantics of political feasibility, not the problems of a political philosophy. Their task was similar to that of colleagues in the advertising business concerned with the invention of slogans for merchandising. In this sense the tradition of Wilson, whom Irving Babbitt once described as a stubborn phrase-maker, was continued.

Fortunately for the peace of mind of those who felt they must sell policy, a nice concern with means was dulled by an overwhelming conviction of righteous intentions. The economics of Keynes, prized as a *post facto* rationale of public spending, was given an air of rustic virtue as pump priming, a slogan so efficacious in its tyranny of the mind that conservative Republican businessmen now talk knowingly and readily of priming the housing pump.

It is probably inevitable that those in the thick of it should emerge from the interest group battle of American politics with a contradictory assortment of special nostrums and advertising tags designed to mould an election day majority. The success of these nostrums and their brand names creates a vested interest in the continued manufacture and sale of popular political patent medicines. As in the drug trade, one is not too curious as to the objective consequences of the remedies, if not fatal, providing the customers come back for more.

And, indeed, the widespread medical use of the placebo indicates that political pseudo-action in soothing public neuroses may be therapeutic. Surely the three-ring circus of the N.R.A. gave the public a welcome relief from the high-principled inactivity of the Hoover Administration: The cases are too dissimilar for satisfactory comparison but it is just possible that the continuance of an American Bruening might have had nasty results. There is therefore a sense in which all the learned criticism of the economics of the recovery programme is both uncharitable and beside the point.

Fighting a depression, like fighting a war, has the great advantage of providing a white whale whose harpooning seems desirable beyond debate. The Churchillian reply to the question of war aims, that if we stopped fighting we would discover the reason

we were fighting fast enough, seems both succinct and sufficient. No need for theory here. Perhaps the cold peace indicates this may have been a luxury, however momentarily satisfying.

In a sense the war rescued the New Dealers from having to think about the successes and failures of their policies. The continued overhang of large-scale unemployment and an industrial plant still operating way below capacity were evidence that all attempts to reflate the economy had proved inadequate. But these very evidences of the doubtful results of peacetime policy proved blessings in the war. The sour sense of frustration was transformed by the surging fact of wartime full employment.

The war thus rescued the liberal left from the pain of taking thought and the humanitarian activists happily switched to armaments. F.D.R. heralded the shift in slogans by calling for the exit of Dr. New Deal and the entrance of Dr. Win-the-War. This transformation came politically in the nick of time. The sagging fortunes of the Democratic Party were bolstered up by popular confidence in the leadership of its chief. An opposition confidently expecting a return to power was cheated of its expected victory and driven to an even more embittered guerilla warfare. A generation of Republican Congressmen grew up whose whole political experience consisted of the envenomed irresponsibility of seemingly hopeless and perpetual minority.

But while the war retained the Democratic Party in power, it largely restored the damaged prestige of the American businessman. It further transformed Big Business with all the techniques of scientific management and public relations. In the days of Coolidge the apothegm "The Business of America is Business," might meet the irreverent laughter of Mencken, but by and large it would be accepted as a Presidential wise saying worthy of respectful editorial comment in the press. The American intellectual, a-political since Tippecanoe and anti-business since Grant, had accepted European exile save for the hardy band that joined Mencken in mocking the booboisie. The American businessman was the work-giver who put two chickens in every pot and hopefully, some day, a Ford in every garage. The Wall Street crash of '29 crumbled the idols and as so often the angry tribe turned on its gods and, unable to beat them in person, beat their political shamen. The humiliation of this dethronement rankles yet and the restoration is no more solid than that of the Bourbons—a catch name in the New Deal arsenal.

At the outset of F.D.R.'s first term there seemed no compelling reason why the historic division of the classes between the parties

should be seriously or permanently disturbed. Businessmen were running like scared rabbits and were pathetically grateful for any lead from Washington. Paid advertisements sprouted in the subway carrying the slogan "As Right As Roosevelt." Many had preferred Hoover but not a few were in the Roosevelt camp. The N.I.R.A. had all the orthodoxy of the Chamber of Commerce. This experiment in organised scarcity was criticised by some but initially hailed by most. One grumbling Harvard economist did remark that the nation had been saved by the bootleggers once and he now put his hopes in the black market.

The minor provision enacted in section 7a in support of union organisation only slowly came to the forefront. It is still somewhat of a mystery why Roosevelt, who certainly conceived his mission as that of patching up American capitalism in accord with the enlightened views of an Episcopalian gentleman, should have become the subject of harsh and even scurrilous abuse as an enemy to his class. American politics has always used the rhetoric of invective. Washington himself complained of being used with language becoming to the description of a common pickpocket. Yet, in the past we have recovered from electoral bouts of mud-slinging with little permanent damage. The partisan strife of the thirties has resulted in a high degree of polarisation of our political life. In particular it has generated self-perpetuating forces tending to increasingly identify all elements of business with the dominant spokesmen of big business in the Republican Party.

The intellectuals called back by the New Deal into political life after decades of scornful withdrawal became attached to the party of movement and ideas. This allegiance has seemed so self-evidently right that all those attaching themselves to the Republican Party have appeared as mere mercenaries. When the Republicans at election time have yielded to the temptation of proving that they too had an intelligentsia the organisations have had all the counterfeit air of a communist front.

It is difficult for intellectuals to carry on even a political struggle in a purely pragmatic and piecemeal way. The old war cries of the populists and the progressives, the New Freedom and the New Nationalism, were subtly altered by the new wave of ideas of the thirties. Charles Beard had been dismissed from Columbia for laying economic hands on the immaculate conception of the constitution in the twenties. The vulgarisation of a class struggle and the materialist interpretation of history was widespread and almost in the air to serve as a rationale for liberal and conservative alike.

When an economist of the Landon brains trust was quoted as advocating the sterilisation of the unemployed and the substitution of the title to a new car for a marriage licence it was easy to see in this the full diabolism of the Marxian capitalist rather than the sorry outcome of an outworn economics.

The curious thing about right and left in the politics of the thirties was the extent to which some vulgarised version of a Marxist theory of history controlled the background of the pictures in peoples' heads. The liberal intellectual with his humanitarian drive, his depression to be defeated, his specifics to be sold, legislated, and administered, had neither time nor will to put his intellectual house in order.

The conflict in American politics was played against a backdrop of an increasingly sinister European crisis. The popular theory of economic stagnation and the mature economy fitted in nicely with the Marxist rationale and the brutal facts of imperialism seemed so much confirmatory evidence.

The most powerful stream of creative new ideas in the thirties stemmed from Marx and Freud. Both lent themselves to easy popularisation, lent themselves in Walter Lippman's sense to teaching people new ways of looking at reality. A whole school of historians found Marx reread as Madison a useful scheme to give meaning to the American epic. Businessmen and New Deal liberals alike were taught without seriously thinking about it to look upon the New Deal as an expression of the class struggle. In the eyes of the businessmen the New Deal intellectuals were communist dupes if not the real thing. As bitterness rose in the thirties to the crescendo of the Spanish civil war it seemed to either side to divide the sheep from the goats. The Right was business, pro-Franco *ergo* pro-fascist, opposed to economic progress and grinding the underdog. The Left was pro-loyalist, preferring communist to fascist, believing in government control of the economy in support of the underdog.

The communists had taught the businessman how to look at his opponent in terms of their own version of history. Equally they taught the liberal intellectual how to view the "malefactors of great wealth." The price of having no ideas of one's own is to be controlled by those of others, even when the others are despised and rejected. Marxist thinking moved into a vacuum as naturally as an elemental force. It required no plot and succeeded intellectually far beyond the poor power of fronts and transmission belts to propagate it. Political artists like any others need fodder for their imagination

and the human quest for meanings will clutch at a powerful system capable of ordering an otherwise senselessness. No conscious acceptance was necessary for minds to take on a view of history that in the current world situation had compelling plausibility. It is possible to reject communism and yet be deeply affected by communist ways of thought. In no case is this more apparent than in the conspiracy-obsessed anti-communists, who resemble their antagonists in method and even in the ultimately dictatorial logic of their position.

The very vagueness of the New Deal-Fair Deal programme made it possible to treat it not as a pragmatic congeries of political specifics but as a convenient cloak to hide sinister ambitions. It was politically convenient, too, to tar one's opponents with the blackest hues in the current symbolism of public distaste. This tactic, that went back at least to the Landon campaign and was carried on by dissident Democrats like Martin Dies, was mightily helped by the emergence of the Soviet Union as a real threat and the sudden collapse of the illusions of atomic supremacy. The deflation of this fond hope lent itself to the conspiratorial explanation. A public that had been led by slogans was ill-prepared to face the abrupt reality of the cold war. Lacking a vigorous foreign policy capable of curing public neuroses with the propaganda of the deed, the embittered men of the Right had a rich psychological field to exploit. We had won the war and lost the peace. A turn of events so startling could only be explained by conspiracy from within.

In the comparative calm of the moment it is hard to realise that only a few short months ago McCarthy was riding high. The massive complacency of the Eisenhower Administration with its adoption of the built-in economic stabilisers of the New Deal seems to have ushered in a Brave New World in which the President's personality provides the political soothing syrup for infantile alarms. The ex-communists and their fellows, who were making copy for the newspapers and entertainment-for the right-minded, have been banished to the inside pages.

Even the displaced liberals are doing well in the colleges, in the magazines, in their law offices in Washington, even in the offices of big business. A short few years ago there was real fear for constitutional liberties, today the real fear is boredom. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. suggests in a recent issue of the *New York Times Magazine* that the liberal needs to recover his irreverent sceptical outlook and save our individual souls from being put in the production line of the advertising experts of Madison Avenue. The

dilemma of having the benefits of mass production and avoiding the evils of mass culture is a real one. On the economic and spiritual level it is the analogue of the dilemma presented by E. H. Carr in his *New Society* of reconciling individualistic, rational Lockean democracy with the unpleasant realities of contemporary mass democracy.

Certainly Schlesinger is right that a major weakness of American liberalism has been its too great preoccupation with things economic. There is a spiritual poverty as frightening as any economic poverty and quite compatible with our economic success. The early New Deal was not without concern in this regard and had Congress not shown a bitter opposition to federal aid to the theatre and the arts, a promising development might have taken place.

It would be folly to suppose in the present luxury of the Eisenhower Administration, when Messrs. Burns, Hauge, Larson, and Mitchell all but assure us "We are all Modeste Republicans, we are all New Dealers," that the black forces of McCarthyism are permanently exorcised.

The American liberal has a breathing space to think out where he wants to go and how he expects to get there. If he is wise he will realise the danger of having no more than a pragmatic set of expedients developed on the spur of the moment to meet a crisis. The philosophies of history may be metaphysical and false but some view of history is essential if one is to do more than ride the wave of events. And some meaningful political philosophy is a prime necessity to provide a view of the New Society that can challenge our imaginations and, in doing so, give us more than material meaning to the world.

We are still faced with basic unsolved economic problems. The planless theory of *laissez faire* is still given formal lip service in certain quarters but is largely abandoned without being replaced. A national policy of full employment has been accepted without any thought of what is now to replace the older controls of inflation. The welfare state boggled at by Senator Taft is half accepted, half rejected in a curiously evolving stage.

The disenchantment with controls in the war and the post-war period, and the disgust with totalitarian excesses have shaken the liberal faith in his earlier half-conscious panacea—the government. The rules and roles of the game are in flux, and creative thought is badly needed to restore a sense of confidence and purpose. Nowhere is this more necessary than in the reintegration of the

American businessman into the scheme of things. His extraordinary isolation from political responsibility, at least until recently, has meant that his contact has been through paid political hacks and servile sycophants flattering his prejudices. This isolation has led to a politics of romantic reaction based on a dream world of *laissez faire*.

The isolation of the liberal intellectual from the business elite has left the field wide open to the McCarthyite and the huckster. The contempt for the booboisie symbolised by Mencken, carried forward into the heat of battle of the New Deal, has left a scarred hostility that is difficult to bridge. Yet unless the liberal intellectual intends, as the businessman fears, to place him with the spinning wheel and the bronze axe in the museum of history, an understanding between those responsible for creative thinking about our society and those responsible for posts of power, not only as economic commissars but as political powers at all levels of government, is a high priority endeavour. A major question for the liberal intellectual is what is the place of business in the New Society. The reports from Milovan Djilas about one alternative are not reassuring.

Unfortunately, the liberal is bound to certain positions, for the tested war cries of the political arena are so many brand names with good will. Short-run political expediency counsels their retention. Allies have been made in the course of many a political fight and one cannot be too critical of allies. A truly radical look at labour and agriculture is difficult when you are a political associate of the leaders. Even as a practising publicist the market of your wares dictates the product.

The re-entry of the intellectual into American politics has been a clear gain but while giving one kind of responsibility to his role it has sharply limited his capacity and perspective. He needs to be something more than a mouthpiece for the Democratic Party and the trade union leadership. However, the alternative to a servile dependence on business paymasters is a welcome one. How frustrating and degrading that can be has been well shown by Floyd Hunter in his study of community power structure.

In addition to the romantic reactionaries of the *National Review*, the communist hunters, and the Madison Avenue psychologists, the business community have acquired other intellectual resources of better promise. *Fortune* magazine, *Business Week*, and the *Harvard Business Review* have constituted themselves as a kind of missionary liberals of the Right and the Committee for Economic Development has made of itself a businessman's Fabian Society.

As promoters of intellectual fashion among those whom David Riesman calls the other-directed glad-handers their efforts have met with some success. They at least approach the hand that feeds them without making it fearful of being bitten. But their impact is confined, and while they are in a good way responsible intellectually for the conservative enlightenment of the Eisenhower Administration, they scarcely reach the provinces. Here are the stagnant waters from which a new fever of McCarthyism can rise.

Such a fever is likely to rise in the absence of a healthy sense of meaningful national direction. The Soviet Union, despite satellite and internal troubles, may still give us ugly moments. But, more than this, the boredom of a complacent Eisenhower epoch can generate its own demands for some things of the spirit, however perverse. The search for meanings will go on and the vacuum of the spirit will defy even the technics of Madison Avenue.

There is, then, a creative opportunity for liberal political thought to give a new definition of a national common good from which meaningful roles in an ethical society take their definition. Such thought will surely have to face up to the problems of economics, not only because they are unsolved as economics, but because for most of us they affect our significant social roles.

They need defining in ways that elevate human life not as mere bargaining postures. The aesthetic element in a society on the threshold of unprecedented leisure becomes a matter of first concern if we are to avoid mass exploitation in some version of Aldous Huxley's feelies. But blending a humanist view of economics and the arts we must relearn politics as a thing to be enjoyed in the Periclean sense, and structure our institutions with such an end in view.

For the first time, the material conditions for a widely shared democratic life are within our grasp. In some healthy pluralism of our institutions we may remedy the sodden and dictatorial tendencies of the threat of mass democracy. The liberal of today is conservative, in Huntingdon's sense, in seeking to preserve free institutions. The businessman, bemused by the name-calling of twenty years, deludes himself that romantic reactionaries, ex-communists and their fellows are true friends of our institutions. As Edward Shils has abundantly shown in "The Torment of Secrecy," nothing could be further from the case. It is an odd development of American politics that those who had most fundamentals in common should have so consorted intellectually, if not physically, with their enemies.

Our politics has been bedevilled by the twin slogans, "No Enemies on the Left," "No Enemies on the Right." This folly liberals and businessmen can ill afford. Neither can do anything but lose in the success of the extremes. The first step in cementing an alliance on fundamentals of what has been called the vital centre is a straight answer to the question: "What is the place of the businessman in the New Society?"

With the passage of the Full Employment Act of 1946 public policy in the United States has formally abandoned the regulation of the economy by uncontrolled market forces. The "economic whip" of unemployment has been laid aside and the search for substitute motivations begun. While many businessmen grumble and think wistfully of the wonders that a dose of unemployment would do for labour discipline, few have any idea that it is politically feasible to return to the days of the industrial reserve army. Few have a break-even point that would stand any substantial falling away of mass consumption. Politically it is recognised on all hands that a serious downturn would be met by drastic federal fiscal action. Governmental reflexes are conditioned to publicly expected roles and the conditioned spending response is almost too automatic for comfort.

The position of labour in the new economy is ill-defined and uneasy. No longer under the "economic whip," how is it to be held to responsible action? For generations it has been taught by management that it was a commodity and that all commodities were worth what they could get. As E. H. Carr has pointed out in his *New Society*, it seems hard to tell labour, haunted by fears of unemployment, that coming at last to the feast it must show a statesman-like moderation and restraint so alien to the business evangel.

The temptation to get what one can while the pickings are good is strong indeed. It comes with ill grace from the business world to cry shame at labour's exuberant pursuit of the profit motive. But morally justified or not, the problem of cost control remains, and labour discipline, though a harsh term, is a stubborn necessity of any functioning economy. The problem of labour leadership and its subordination to social needs is every bit as real as that of the social control of business. The liberal alliance with labour makes it relatively more difficult to face up to this aspect of the new economic order.

Both business management and labour leadership have been brought up to play a game in which you got what you could and

had the comforting assurance that in doing so you were promoting the best interests of society. Few any longer believe this to be the case but while lip service is paid to a doctrine of social responsibility, no structured set of roles and institutions give it greater meaning than an expedient concern with public opinion. This borders in some cases on the sheerest Madison Avenue hypocrisy.

The massive forces of organised big business, big labour, and big agriculture that should have ground our free economy to a monopolistic halt, have, in Kenneth Galbraith's terms, created countervailing power which, with the active intervention of big government, has somehow avoided the dire consequences predicted in classic theory. We have, it seems, a system of administered prices and wages with those disadvantaged sectors of the economy if politically vocal receiving aid from the state.

This system seems inelegant, perhaps theoretically inefficient, but at least it works. Comparisons are odious but thus far no superior models ready for imitation seem at hand. The job of improvement will require originality and imagination in reshaping existing institutions in accordance with a sensitive awareness of the possibilities and limitations of American culture, political and economic.

Two immediate problems confront us. First the accelerating inflation of our full employment economy is failing to respond to the classic controls. The regressive and unequal impact of hiking interest rates has become apparent. The resort of the President to "jaw bone" price and wage control¹ is likely to prove no more successful than in the past. As a piece of moral ritual it may have totemic tribal value but it is doubtful that it can succeed as a politically efficacious Presidential washing of the hands. The reintroduction of cumbersome war-time controls can scarcely be used except as a last resort. A threatening buyers' strike might force down prices but at the cost of painful unemployment and the necessity of heavy deficit financing to check a downturn.

Clearly we are far from having discovered ways and means to structure the behaviour of big business and big labour, so as to insure that their demands are consistent with generally accepted social objectives. Some kind of new rules are needed for gearing wages, prices, and profits to productivity and reasonable concern for consumer interests. Thus far these latter concerns have received but lip service and their sanction is the adverse political effect of patently outrageous behaviour on public opinion. None the less, an

¹ i.e., the attempt to control prices by executive exhortation without legal sanctions to enforce compliance.

emerging economic constitutional consensus in new standards of dividing the social product is not a forlorn hope. The unwritten constitution of an evolving economic order is taking shape and a new concept of fair shares consistent with economic responsibility may secure practical acceptance by labour and capital alike as the preferable alternative to continuous state intervention and control. Providing a framework of ideas to embody the desirable new rules of the game is a major job of responsible political economy.

The more basic problem confronting us is the unanswered question of whether we can maintain full employment without undue dependence on an arms programme. Clearly Marx has been proved wrong. Capitalism or our version of it can plan. But, can it plan only for war—be it hot or cold? Or can a sufficient volume of demand be generated by other socially desired ends to press our resources into full utilisation? Theoretically there seems no reason why it cannot. It is true that national patriotism and fear of the enemy provide a broadly inclusive common denominator which in our past symbolism has seemed the readiest basis for the manufacture of consent. But much water has run under the bridge. While Hoover and Humphrey remain stubborn disciples of Henry Hazlitt's economics in one lesson, even Humphrey showed an expedient concern with the political effects of the recession his orthodoxy occasioned. The Taftian horror of the welfare state has receded and now seems almost as old-fashioned as Hoover. The basic political problem of the welfare state is its equation with socialism. And socialism unfortunately is branded with the stamp of class war and the objective of liquidating the bourgeoisie.

It is no wonder that an active, alert, and extremely able class of managers want no part of a political programme that proclaims them to be walking anachronisms if not worse. The role of manager in the New Society is a problem on both sides of the iron curtain. The recruitment, training, and properly motivating of the holders of key positions in the economy are a political problem of the first magnitude. It cannot be brushed aside. It is up to the liberal intellectual concerned with the fashioning of a free society to address himself to providing a proper and challenging place for the businessman in the New Society. There is reason to believe that many are interested and anxious to participate in the major task of social construction that provides the only hopeful alternatives to the great tyrannies menacing the individual and freedom itself.

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THE TRANSFER OF POWER IN INDIA. By V. P. MENON. [Longmans. 534 pp. £2 10s.]

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIA. By C. H. ALEXANDROWICZ. [Oxford University Press. 245 pp. 21s.]

IF, as publishers like to insist, the British public shows little interest these days in India, it may be desirable to demonstrate that these two books out of India have some general interest wider than their immediate subjects. And this, as it happens, is not difficult.

Over a decade has passed since Britain divided and quit India. The present generation of university students were in carry-cots when Jinnah said the magic word Pakistan; they were no more than toddling when Cripps was sent on his mission; and they were still on the right side of the eleven-plus when Viceroy Mountbatten waved the wand that brought down the Union Jack on New Delhi's stately buildings; what *was* it all about? Even those who were of age during these years will not now remember what they never wholly grasped at the time—who suggested what plan, who disagreed on what points and why, and how did we get where we are; and they may now be too tired to work it all out. But the story is about Power as well as about India. And here, if you like it better this way, is the stuff of politics: men with different ideas and ideals, contrasting personalities and predilections, placed by history in one room and trying to work out a way of ordering their lives. It is the art of the possible, they say; and the story tells how today's impossibility becomes tomorrow's inevitability.

Of course, this needs the novelist and playwright to put it in the round. Mr. Menon is not a novelist but a civil servant. He worked his way up from the lower ranks of Delhi officialdom to Reforms Commissioner in the Government of India, and the way he puts it is as flat as any discreet administrator could manage. This is therefore only the very raw material for a living history. (There is one exception: Mr. Menon has written an extraordinary chapter, delightfully out of keeping with the rest of the book: in "The Aftermath of Partition" is to be found a vivid and moving account of the outbreak of communal fighting in Delhi in early September of 1947.) But it is the most detailed single published narrative of the negotiations which led to 1947, and in a few places there is material which emerges from inside knowledge for the first time. Not unnaturally, this is particularly the case with certain episodes in which Mr. Menon himself was concerned. His own role as intermediary between the Viceroy and the Congress leaders—especially Patel—during the early months of 1947 is brought out. So also is the fact that the "Mountbatten Plan" for partition was in reality a second attempt by the new Viceroy, his first being a scheme to hand over power to provinces which provoked Nehru's amazement and violent hostility.

The flatness of style does not, however, disguise Mr. Menon's very marked opinions and judgments. He blames the British and their preoccupation with the war effort for permitting Jinnah to promote himself to a position of parity with Congress during 1940-42. He believes that this was assisted by a

"traditional" sympathy in official circles for the Muslims and by Congress folly in resigning from the Provincial Ministries in 1939. He blames Wavell for trying too hard, under the influence of the Calcutta killings of 1946, to get the Muslim League into the Interim Government and afterwards for pressing Congress unreasonably to make concessions that would persuade the League to enter the Constituent Assembly. For Mr. Menon, Jinnah is by then beyond persuasion and the damage has been done.

These are important verdicts. But their inclusion makes it all the more regrettable that the author nowhere makes clear his sources and materials. Many of the descriptions of interviews read as if they have been based on official minutes and some of the accounts of negotiations could have been written up from Mr. Menon's own notes as secretary. But we do not know. Again, it seems probable that, having had access to the official papers, he has also had to get his account "cleared" by "responsible authorities." But how much has been left out in the process? Is it therefore a kind of official version? For, if so, it may not be the historian's.

The general interest appeal of Mr. Menon's book rests on its character as a skeleton version of a case-study in political negotiation, or, in more human terms, the sketch for a story of a failure of minds to meet. Professor Alexandrowicz's book has a different basis of general appeal: it is a most valuable essay in comparative constitutional law and should prove of interest to all who are concerned with problems of judicial review of federal constitutions. The author (who has the Chair of International and Constitutional Law in the University of Madras and deserves to be well known for his pioneer work as editor of the *Indian Year Book of International Affairs*) has watched closely the developing interpretation of the Indian Constitution of 1950 and here examines some of its salient aspects up to and including the States Reorganisation of 1956. In doing so, he displays an intimate acquaintance with Indian cases combined with a welcome facility for using relevant material from the U.S., France, and the Commonwealth. On all the topics he studies, he has interesting views which he presents in a balanced and stimulating fashion. He argues, for instance, that the fears that the Constitution would prove too rigid have not as yet proved justified; that Professor Wheare's description of India as a "quasi-federation" is not very illuminating; that the potential power of the Indian President cannot be considered without regard to the developing conventions; that the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its approach to fundamental rights.

One of his main themes is of special interest. He refers in some detail to the debates of the Constituent Assembly in order to show the ideas and intentions of the framers of the Constitution and he raises a point of general interest in asking how far the courts should have regard to these debates. He has no difficulty in showing that in practice the Supreme Court has on occasion paid considerable attention to this background while on others refusing to look behind the actual words of the text. His plea is in part one for consistency. But he also seems to favour a greater willingness on the part of the judges to look up the speeches of the founding fathers. He is right in believing that this course might well have avoided decisions which have merely provoked Parliament into amending the constitution. But while frequent amendments are in some ways unfortunate, it is difficult not to feel that a little tension between judges and politicians is in present Indian

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conditions no bad thing. Moreover, a general tendency to follow the intentions as disclosed in the debates of the framers might in time produce a new and formidable kind of rigidity.

W. H. MORRIS-JONES.

THE ITALIAN LOCAL ELECTIONS 1956. St. Antony's Papers Number 3.
By ROY PRYCE, Fellow of St. Antony's College. [*Chatto and Windus*. 132 pp. 12s. 6d.]

WHENEVER local elections are due in Italy the political parties assert that these will be a test for the next general election to come, but when a general election is due all agree that the last "amministrative" were no indication whatever of how people will vote at a parliamentary election. The second proposition contains more truth than the first and on the whole it is more profitable to compare the results of one general election with another, or of one set of local elections with another, than to cross check between the two. Even so the results are vitiated by the fact that, on every occasion in the brief life of the Italian Republic that the voters have been called on to choose either a Parliament or a local council, the system of proportional allocation of seats has been altered ("corrected" is the parliamentary term here) so that the public now thinks it is part of the normal practice of democracies for governments to tinker with the electoral law before each contest. In spite of this, attendance at the polls for either sort of election is much higher in Italy than in the older democracies. Mr. Pryce rightly notes this as a healthy sign. It is one of the few such that he has been able to find.

There is, however, one consoling fact about Italian local elections which might perhaps have been given more prominence in this survey. In spite of the appalling political abuse which is made of them, with Cabinet Ministers standing for councillors' seats or running simultaneously for mayor in the country's two largest towns (a little more of this, says Mr. Pryce, will make nonsense of "administrative" elections), local issues and local conditions are still decisive: so much so that it is not the capital which imposes its own political pattern on the provinces, for all the efforts of government and of the party executives, but the provinces which react upon the capital by setting up new political stimuli. Rome proposes, but Italy disposes. This was particularly the case in 1956 when the Government Coalition, instead of imposing its own pattern of collaboration upon the communes, was put to such a strain by the heterodox results of the elections that it very shortly afterwards broke down. There is a fact which must be noted on the credit side of the balance sheet, against the prefects and the over centralisation of local administration: the immensely individual character of all the major Italian towns, many of which are former capitals with a tradition and a spirit of their own.

In a survey of this sort a certain amount of work must necessarily be delegated to others, but Mr. Pryce has wisely reserved for himself a field of study in Southern Italy in a zone where the Government's land reform schemes are under way. There he found that the election campaign brought out very clearly the fact that Italy is still, after nearly a hundred years of unity, divided into two countries, "almost two worlds." By a curious error he puts the dividing line on the Tagliamento, a river in North East Italy. The river which "separated the Kingdom of Naples from the rest of the

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peninsula" is the Garigliano. South of this line Mr. Pryce finds that economic and historical features combine to give the country "a sharply defined and individual aspect" which makes its political life different from that of the rest of the country. Here the Southern Development Fund and the Land Reform schemes have set new forces in motion without being able as yet to alter traditional patterns. Candidates at local elections shift disconcertingly from one party to another, but the people who control local government, be they Christian Democrat, Monarchist, or Liberal, are always the same. Sometimes they pass with complete nonchalance from Christian Democracy to the extreme left and vice versa. Mr. Pryce notes that in the areas where the Enti di Riforma have done most to create new material conditions there is no perceptible increase in the Christian Democrat vote, notwithstanding the active part taken by the Enti themselves in favour of that party in the electoral campaign. Quite often it is the communists who have gained. He explains this partly by the fact that it is precisely in those areas where it is pursuing a policy of progress and rehabilitation that the Christian Democrat Party is tied by tradition to highly conservative elements, including the ecclesiastical hierarchy. This means that the party often fails to offer "a convincing aspect in the area as a progressive reforming group." In Southern Italy, he points out, the Christian Democrats have not resolved their internal dilemma. On the one hand, they offer new life to underprivileged sections of the community, while on the other, they find their chief support in those elements who, from interest or inclination, are least disposed to accept those reforms. It is outside the scope of Mr. Pryce's survey to examine how far this dilemma affects the land reform itself.

The communists too have a dilemma in the land reform areas. They are unable to decide whether they should repudiate the reform or claim the merit for it. In the end, says Mr. Pryce, they do both. In substance they say, first that there are no reforms, secondly that the reforms are bad, and thirdly that, any way, there would not be any reforms at all if they, the communists, had not pushed the Government into them. This ludicrous position is surprisingly effective as propaganda. The truth is, as Mr. Pryce points out, that, in spite of better crops and new roads and aqueducts and houses, the South is still far from having either political stability or faith in the Government. "The elections showed that there was still much to be done before the South could live at peace with itself and with the rest of the country."

This is a careful and intelligent survey conducted with a detachment which never precludes sympathy. Its conclusions, with one exception, are useful for an understanding of the Italian scene. Mr. Pryce holds that there has been "a notable decline since the war in the political influence of the Church and a growing unwillingness on the part of the Christian Democrats as a party to have to rely on its support for a successful electoral campaign." This is indeed a strange assertion hardly borne out by the facts which Mr. Pryce himself, with great fairness, points out: the interference of the hierarchy in the choice of candidates, the pastoral letters, and so forth. It may be that, at Bologna, Cardinal Lercaro's intervention in favour of Dossetti did the candidate some harm, but it is certain that, by and large, the party gained far more than it lost from ecclesiastical support. The truth is that never until the Christian Democrat Party appeared on the scene after the second world war did the Church have the opportunity to interfere so directly in Italian

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politics. The close connection between the Church and the party is sometimes embarrassing to both, but neither has the slightest intention of relaxing a co-operation which has been so immensely profitable to both. Cardinal Ottaviani's article, which caused such a stir, reproached the Christian Democrat politicians for seeking the help of wire-pulling priests but it was also a warning to the party that it must toe the Vatican line if it wants the Church's help in the approaching general election. Never, since the unification of Italy, has ecclesiastical influence been more apparent.

NINETTA JUCKER.

THE DOUBLE PATRIOTS: A STUDY OF JAPANESE NATIONALISM. By RICHARD STORRY. [*Chatto and Windus*. 335 pp. 25s.]

THE Double Patriots were the young extremists in pre-war Japan who were twice as patriotic as anyone else. And since patriotism to a divine Emperor was the highest of moral qualities, they were also more virtuous than anyone else. Their intemperance, violence, and ruthlessness were, many Japanese thought, less important than their sincerity and nobility of purpose. Mr. Storry has culled a variety of sources to tell the story of their plots and counter-plots in greater detail than anyone else has done. His most useful source has been the trial record and exhibits of the Tokyo trials; he has also used a number of Japanese sources, and he has profited particularly from the writings of the gifted Professor Maruyama of Tokyo University. Mr. Storry's account is particularly valuable for its continual reference to the Harada diaries which chronicled the efforts and feelings of the last *genrō*, Prince Saionji. Since Saionji was close to and principally concerned with the Emperor, this guarantees a better insight of the palace side of the decade of the 1930s than has previously appeared in print.

It is in many ways a much more interesting and rewarding side to record than is the side of the double patriots. Those reckless and heedless young men lose, in this unemotional re-telling of their deeds, whatever compensating credits a more painstaking psychological and ideological analysis might have left them. Their violence becomes almost casual, and very nearly empty of purpose or programme. Hoping to force martial government by the disorder they caused, they trusted in some obscure manner in the wisdom of their military heroes and superiors to take over and do the right thing after that.

It is also a benefit of Mr. Storry's method that he relates the Tokyo violence to the "incidents" on the mainland rather more fully than has previously been done, thereby helping to explain a decade of confusing and double diplomacy. It is a decade whose principal military actors, shorn now of their laurels and scorned for their failures and cruelties, seem tawdry and pathetic misfits, so sure of the superiority of their "spirit" over western "science" that they forbade their Emperor from visiting his laboratories for a time to force him to commune with Confucius instead. It is striking to note that the military activists of the 1930s had little greater knowledge of their world than did the swordsmen of the 1860s who slew "pro-foreign" countrymen during the dying days of the Shogunate. And yet the latter, in their innocence and setting, remain far more plausible than the fanatics who came to lay claim to their legacy and vocabulary.

On the other hand, from Mr. Storry's account Prince Saionji emerges as

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the embodiment of much of the wisdom and courage of the Meiji statesmen who survived—or outgrew—the swordsmen's frenzy and led their country into the modern world. One can lament the caution that was responsible for Saionji's reluctance to force the issue, and that led him to defer a maximum effort to restore sanity to Japanese public life. He had survived too many crises to exaggerate the one he faced. On the other hand, his fear lest extremists might strike at the Emperor himself kept him from encouraging Hirohito in what seems to have been his natural tendency to block the military by a personal veto of their activities. To be sure, many Japanese, including the navy high command and most of the senior statesmen, had grave reservations about their country's course. But few seem to have held and voiced these more firmly than Saionji. What were the sources of his convictions? London.

In part, they were related to his lifetime of service in the cause of Japanese equality and greatness. It was a course taken by the side of, and allied with, Great Britain. A course so successful could not, for Saionji and his generation, be abandoned lightly; and his firm belief in Britain's victory in the second world war and even, in the face of contrary evidence, in the wisdom of Chamberlain's actions at Munich, made the army's dismissal of a half century of success seem criminally foolish. One senses many of the same reactions in Japan's outstanding post-war figure; Premier Yoshida, whose memoirs are now appearing in Tokyo, preaches a stern warning to his countrymen about their success when Japanese policy was aligned with that of Britain and their disastrous failure when they forsook the path their grandfathers had chosen.

But if Saionji, and many with him, saw so clearly the folly of the army's steps, what kept them from doing more than contributing to diaries and papers that remained hidden until the war's end? Full army control was, after all, some time in coming, and it was far from complete at the time when vigorous criticism might still have done some good. The answer is probably that the "moderates" trusted their people no more than did the "extremists." Both believed they spoke for the masses whom they did not trouble to consult. To make the army lose respect would have been almost worse than to encourage it. The liberal's failure to make the attempt is the more striking in that much of the urban press and each of the major elections of the 1930s showed they were closer to their countrymen's desires than were the military. But both sides were accustomed to "leading" by manipulating and not to explaining. To be sure, the institutions designed in Saionji's generation had ruled out effective popular rule. But with effective use of the press and judicious use of the Throne it is likely that something of use would have been achieved. At the very least, Japan's honour before the world would have been redeemed.

Still another element in this restraint was Saionji's feeling that everything would probably turn out somehow. The Nazis would suffer a set-back, sources of discontent within Japan would diminish, and the extremists would make a fatal blunder. That this might indeed have happened is clear from the sudden decline in nationalist fortunes after the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

Mr. Storry's account makes it clear that it required unusual bad luck, military successes, and continuous appeasement of fascism in and by the West, for the ultranationalists to force their will on their countrymen. It is

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a story of which neither the West nor Japan can be proud, but it is one which it is good for us to read again.

MARIUS B. JANSEN.

University of Washington.

CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION IN BRITAIN. By W. J. M. MACKENZIE and J. W. GROVE. [*Longmans*. 487 and xvi pp. 30s.]

THERE are not many textbooks on politics and government available in Britain. Most of the books used in the universities in this subject consist of monographs, historical studies, works embodying the results of research, or books intended to present a particular point of view or to interpret a certain course of events. This has given us a much more lively and interesting literature than the average run of textbooks which abound across the Atlantic. It demands a much greater reading effort on the part of the student which is not always forthcoming; and it has the drawback that all parts of the subject may not receive adequate attention. There is, therefore, something to be said for an occasional textbook which "covers the ground" and brings together the whole body of knowledge in a succinct and systematic form.

This is what Professor Mackenzie and Mr. Grove have done in the present work. It is certain to be in considerable demand by students, for it presents a more comprehensive description of the administrative branch of the central government than is available in any other book. Moreover, it is sold at an astonishingly low price. To produce a well-printed new book of nearly 500 pages at thirty shillings is almost a miracle today. Other publishers, please note!

The aim of the authors is to explain the work of the central government departments and of the various organs of administration which are directly subordinate to them. The first part deals with the civil service. It is the longest part, and goes into very great detail about such matters as the general conditions of employment, the general and specialist classes, and the management of the service. This part seems somewhat too long in comparison with the other parts. Part II is entitled "The Organisation of Departments." It includes chapters on the historical background and the physical environment, on the pattern of organisation both at headquarters and in the provinces, on "How Business is Done," and on the characteristics of six selected departments.

The chapter on "How Business is Done" is very unsatisfactory. It does not tell the reader how any kind of business is really done but merely informs him how a central registry is kept, the manner in which civil servants communicate with one another by means of minutes, correspondence, meetings, and interviews, how duties are allocated, etc. This might suffice for a training manual intended for clerical officers; it is quite out of place in a book of this quality. There is much of great interest which could be told about how government business is carried on—but one does not find it in this book.

The third part is concerned with the central control of administration. It comprises chapters on the common services; on accounting and financial control; and on the administrative functions of the Cabinet. It is very odd to find the supreme organ of the Executive tucked away in Chapter 19; and the general arrangement of the book, with the priority both in magnitude and

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position accorded to the civil service, will not be acceptable to all tastes. The concluding part discusses briefly politics and Parliament, the role of the courts, local authorities in relation to central administration, independent public bodies, and the citizens in relation to the Government.

The authors display a remarkable power of lucid and succinct exposition. They have read deeply and widely about the evolution of the many strands which have been woven into the pattern of British government. They appear to have received copious assistance from official quarters in the way of information. And one of the authors, Professor Mackenzie, served for several years during the second world war as a civil servant. The book is mainly descriptive, with sufficient history added to make the present intelligible. But although descriptive it is by no means narrowly factual; and the quality of the writing is distinguished.

The standard of accuracy is on the whole extremely high. There are, however, a few lapses. It is not true to say that the C.S.S.B. Method II tests of candidates for the civil service "raise no issue of principle not present in the decision to give weight to the interview." An elaborate test under simulated working conditions is quite different from an interview. Nor is it true to say that the traditional competitive examination "gives much the same value to all non-professional subjects studied in Universities." Sociology, for example, is completely ignored and anthropology grossly undervalued in comparison with many other subjects. Nor is it realistic to say that a Department is "an administrative, not a political, organisation; it exists to further purposes given to it, not to choose purposes for itself, and it is to be judged primarily for its efficiency in executing a task given to it by higher authority." A Department is both a political and an administrative entity. Its senior members often play a dynamic and active role in seeking the powers they consider necessary for the furtherance of its work, rather than passively waiting for these powers to be "given to it." Lord Hewart, with all his faults and polemical bias, knew that; so did Sir Robert Morant, and the devoted men and women who have served in the Factory Inspectorate. The authors are so preoccupied with the anatomy of government that they have largely ignored the physiology.

A more serious lapse is the statement that it is not clear to what extent Ministers not in the Cabinet share responsibility for decisions taken by the Cabinet. Surely there can be no doubt whatever that all Ministers must accept responsibility for Cabinet decisions or resign. The recent development of large numbers of Ministers in charge of major departments who are not members of the Cabinet does raise some large and important problems which are not even mentioned. Indeed, the book seldom attempts either to discuss problems or to indulge in criticism. The authors realise how much they have left out in these respects, for they remark apologetically in the preface: "If we are thought at times to have been too complacent, our excuse is that we wish to emphasise that reform is possible only within the context of things as they are, and that reformers are not likely to succeed unless they look first at the system as a whole, and assess coherently the forces which give it stability, strength, and weakness." This is a praiseworthy aim; but it is not incompatible with indicating some of the issues on which criticism and controversy have been, or should be, focused. However, the book achieves in a satisfactory manner the circumscribed purpose which the authors set before themselves.

W. A. ROBSON.

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SOVEREIGNTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POLITICAL GOOD. By BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL. Translated by J. F. HUNTINGDON. [Cambridge University Press. 320 pp. 27s.]

MR. DE JOUVENEL in his preface tells us that his new book is "the direct sequel" to his previous book *Power*. When the English translation of *Power* was published, the reviewers almost universally gave it the highest praise, and *Sovereignty* has already had a very good press. Its author is hailed as an extremely original thinker and his books as major contributions to that strange accumulation of knowledge or speculation known as political science. But it is noticeable that, despite the definiteness of their praises, nearly all the reviewers gingerly keep a respectful distance from the author and his subject, and, clinging to the safety of generalities, do not commit themselves to any clear statement of Mr. de Jouvenel's meaning or the nature of his contribution to political thought. There is some excuse for this discretion. These books are difficult to read and even more difficult to understand. The author himself admits this, saying that *Sovereignty* was a hard book to write and will be a hard book to read; his excuse or defence is that he is not presenting us with the ordered conclusions of his thought, but asking us to follow him in the rather meandering exploration of a subject "of vast importance."

The excuse is not really very convincing. Montaigne's characteristic reflection that it is not the arrival but the journey that matters is true of most physical and some mental travel. But it is not applicable to the kind of book which Mr. de Jouvenel is writing. He is not attempting to produce a work of art where the value may well be in the process rather than the conclusion; he comes to us as a scientific investigator of facts. His subject is those relations between human beings which we call in the widest sense political; his principal concern is with the nature of authority in relation to the aggregates of man, with standards of political value and the nature of "the common good," with the place of leadership in government, with the nature of justice, monarchy, liberty, democracy, scepticism, and toleration. He must be judged, therefore, not upon the importance of his subject and exploration, but upon the importance of his contributions to our understanding of it, upon the significance and truth of his conclusions.

With this basis of judgment, it may be said at once that Mr. de Jouvenel has written a very interesting book which has considerable merits and considerable faults. His mind is subtle, imaginative, and highly intelligent. His analysis of political terms, relations, and institutions is often very valuable because it is conducted in such detail and with such subtlety that it often reveals new aspects of political phenomena which one no longer really understands owing to one's false assumption of complete understanding which is bred by familiarity. A very good example of this patient and illuminating examination of a political phenomenon will be found in the twenty pages in which, in the middle of his book, he peels off one after the other the different conceptions or notions of "justice" as if he were peeling an onion. After reading these twenty pages one feels that, though one has been told a good deal which one knew already, one has at the end a much more complete understanding of the various notions of "justice" and in particular of the notion of relevance in all problems of justice.

There are other interesting and important things which Mr. de Jouvenel

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discovers to us in his journey through 300 pages, e.g., on the subject of the relation between ruler and subject, the place of initiative in political societies, and the correlative functions of the dux and the rex. The book is, however, not merely a mental journey, for we are in the end offered some interesting conclusions. (It is to be noted that the last chapter, "Conclusion," was not in the French edition; it was written in English by the author for the English edition.) If I understand Mr. de Jouvenel correctly, his main conclusions may be summarised as follows: (1) Political science must deal not only with what is, but also with what ought or ought not to be; it is concerned with values as well as with structures and functions. (2) Political phenomena such as power, authority, sovereignty, subject-ruler relationship, are not peculiar to the main aggregate which we call the state; they can and should be studied in all human groups or organisations formed for co-operative purposes. (3) The function of the ruler is of supreme importance in all purposive human aggregates; there are two different forms of this function, that of the initiator or leader (dux) and of the regulator (rex). (4) Initiative is of supreme importance and should be as widespread as possible in society—and this is liberalism.

Something should be added about Mr. de Jouvenel's faults. He is over-subtle: he too often takes the longest and most complicated way round to reach a fairly simple conclusion. His mountains tend to be too big and his mice too small. His attitude towards truth, as with so many contemporary thinkers, seems to be ambiguous. If he thinks of a subtle or ingenious explanation, he seems to accept it without ever asking himself: is this true? One example of this is his habit of every now and again bringing in God as a political *deus ex machina* or even as a conjuror produces a white rabbit out of a top hat. He seems, as a good Frenchman, to have swallowed whole the Cartesian philosophy and to hold that the human mind sees what is politically true—as indeed all truth—by means of a light which comes to it from God. The belief in what is just as well as in what is true depends upon "human participation in the Divine essence" and—here he accepts the theological dogma of Leibnitz—"the just is not just because God has willed it, but because God is just." He reduces or promotes political science to a branch of metaphysics and complacently remarks that in this respect "theological disputes are of the highest importance." He then concludes that when the Cartesian, Leibnitzian, de Jouvenelian theological dogmas are "no more believed, the whole edifice collapses."

These metaphysical conjuring tricks are illegitimate for a writer who calls himself a political scientist. Political science, not political theology, is professedly his subject. And if, as a political scientist, he finds that his argument is carrying him into theology or metaphysics, then any theological or metaphysical statement or hypothesis that he proposes to make or adopt must be subjected to the same tests of truth and evidence as if it were just a political statement or hypothesis. But he never attempts to do this; he blandly asks us to accept his theological word for it—or Descartes' or Leibnitz's—that God is just and that unless we believe justice and truth are linked to "human participation in the Divine essence," the whole edifice of truth and justice collapses.

LEONARD WOOLF.

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GREAT CITIES OF THE WORLD. Edited by WILLIAM A. ROBSON. Second edition. [Allen and Unwin. 814 pp. 70s.]

THE lengthy discussions about reorganisation of local government led to the three White Papers which form the basis for the Local Government Bill now before Parliament. The White Paper dealing with the structure of local government, however, discarded reorganisation as its objective and sought merely to overhaul and to make improvements needed to bring the existing form of local government up to date. It reserved its most far-reaching—though at the same time vaguest—proposals for local government in the conurbations. Indeed, warming to the work, the Government went beyond the White Paper and, without even waiting for the Bill, announced a Royal Commission to report separately on the unique conurbation of Greater London.

It is fashionable to apologise for using the word conurbation and to deplore the absence of any equivalent and less ugly term. The phrase "special review area" used in the Local Government Bill does not help to provide a substitute, and it may be hoped that the publication of a new edition of his *Great Cities of the World* at this time will do something to establish the happier expression "great city" which Professor Robson already used in 1954 in place of "conurbation." The new edition also draws attention at a useful time to Professor Robson's views on the great city in general and on London in particular, backed as they are by experts' essays on twenty-three other great cities scattered throughout the world.

These disclose a common pattern of development. The boundaries of the original city do not expand with the growth of suburbs around it, so that a metropolitan area grows up, continuous as a town, but split for local government purposes among a variety of authorities, often differing in character, powers, and resources. In time, technical and practical reasons may be seen to exist for a common system of local government covering the whole area and absorbing the existing authorities. Opposition is universal. An easy way of reconciling this fierce local strife is frequently found—at any rate in English-speaking countries—by creating *ad hoc* authorities to administer services which require a wider area than any existing local authority can command. The price for thus shirking fundamental issues is a further weakening of local government.

In any event, there is little enthusiasm for the idea of a metropolitan local government, largely because there is little sense of community of the whole area. This is the result partly of mere size, partly of the separation and dissipation of interest caused by city and suburbs being administered by different local authorities, and partly the confusion and distraction caused by *ad hoc* authorities. The majority of the inhabitants of the great city cannot see the wood for the trees: they work only in the central city and live only in the suburbs: they never see the whole as a single place for both living and working.

Professor Robson sees the solution in a two-tier system of local government. There should be a major authority which would plan, co-ordinate, and administer large-scale functions for the whole area, while the lower tier of minor authorities would deal with purely local services. In this way the smaller, more easily comprehended units of community life would retain their identity, while fitting into the larger pattern of the great city.

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Such schemes sound attractive, but as a practical matter they raise the difficult issues of the composition and of the functions of the metropolitan authority. To instance the first, in this country it must be democratic and not an agency of the Central Government. Its membership must not be too large: it must be able to function like a normal English local authority and not be required to share power with an independent or semi-independent executive organ. Can it satisfy these requirements if its relatively few members are to be directly elected by the vast body of electors in the great city? Equally, can it satisfy them if its members are indirectly elected by the lower-tier authorities? In either event, will not its members be too remote from the body of citizens? To meet this issue Professor Robson would not rule out establishing a federal type of metropolitan council, a proportion of its members being chosen by the lower-tier authorities, though he would insist that not less than half should be directly elected so that the regional, as opposed to the sectional, point of view would be adequately represented.

Professor Robson does not hesitate to apply these views to Greater London. He complains that:—

"There is no regional organ responsible for guiding, co-ordinating, planning, controlling or administering Greater London. The eight or nine million people living in the metropolitan region have no representative organ responsible for the good government and development of the region as a whole. Chaos, conflict, and confusion are bound to exist in these circumstances."

He would go further than the Royal Commission can go, since it may not consider water supply or police, while he maintains that:—

"A thorough-going reform of local government in London is long overdue. London is unquestionably a region, and needs an elected regional council in place of the London County Council, whose area is entirely obsolete. The lower tier of authorities also needs drastic reform throughout the region. If this were done, special bodies like the Metropolitan Water Board and the Commissioner for Metropolitan Police could be abolished and their functions transferred to the regional council."

Whatever the logic and theoretical soundness of these trenchant views, Professor Robson should not be surprised if they stir those "primitive emotions which are aroused by the urge to survive," which he regards as having hitherto been the main cause for opposition to reforming government in every great city. Professor Robson may be right in thinking that the arguments to which they give rise scarcely warrant detailed study, but it will only be by overcoming them that any such radical changes as he advocates could be brought about. Unfortunately, the studies of the other great cities which his book contains do not go far in this direction: they disclose that the lack of a metropolitan authority is a common characteristic of most of the great cities of the world and that nearly all those which, exceptionally, have achieved such a form of local government follow traditions different from the English one.

The present edition of *Great Cities of the World* is described as a new one with additional chapters. These latter add 100 pages covering Cologne, Johannesburg, Tokyo, and Osaka. Otherwise, it is virtually a reprint of the original edition of 1954, though there has been some revision of the chapter on

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Bombay and Calcutta. Thus the mistaken reference on p. 61 to one of the illustrations remains in the new text, as does "Mastham" for "Merstham" on p. 273. It is also a pity that the frontispiece could not have been replaced by a photograph showing the Thames cleared of its ugly, war-time emergency bridge and the South Bank embanked and graced by the Royal Festival Hall. The main regret is that the figures and statistics of this original material have, with the exception of the chapter on Bombay and Calcutta, remained unchanged. It would no doubt be difficult to get so many scattered contributors to revise their essays in time for the present edition, but it is a pity that Professor Robson's chapter on London could not have been brought up to date in this simple way. If it had been done it would, for example, have shown that the London County Council now has 147 and not 150 members (p. 268); it now has fourteen and not fifteen standing committees (p. 269); it now owns a total of over 180,000 dwellings and not 131,000 (p. 273); the Metropolitan Water Board now has eighty-eight members and not sixty-six (p. 281). These are, of course, minor details not affecting the main picture of London government, still less the message of the whole book. But it would have been an improvement if the reader could have felt that here, as well as in the more important financial statistics, the story was no longer likely to be influenced by what may have been the temporary post-war conditions reflected in the figures for 1951 to 1953 which still remain.

Of the three new chapters, that by Dr. L. P. Green on Johannesburg is, as one might expect, easiest for an Englishman to follow. It shows how basically English ideas have developed when transplanted to a city influenced by another tradition and culture and faced with racial problems. The criticisms of the results and the suggestions for improvements challenge comparison with circumstances in this country.

Cologne is clearly described in a chapter largely written by Dr. Lorenz Fischer before his death a year ago and finished by Dr. Peter van Hauten. The chapter on Tokyo and Osaka by Professor Masamichi Royama gives an interesting account of two great cities of the Far East, though it is not always easy to follow in some of its details. Here, as in Cologne, local government involves a marked distinction between the council and the municipal executive organ. Tokyo is one of the exceptional great cities which has taken the step of establishing a metropolitan authority administering large-scale services throughout the area in which over eight million people live. It seems that its relations with some of the lower-tier authorities could still be improved.

Contributions by so many experts to a book of this sort must necessarily vary in quality, in interest, and in the amount of detail they contain. This is especially so where the authors are drawn from different races, live in different countries, and primarily think in terms of the national system of local government with which they are each familiar. It must be difficult to co-ordinate, much less to reduce to anything like a regular pattern, so much diverse material. Indeed, the measure of common approach and arrangement which Professor Robson has achieved, both in the original essays and in the additional ones, shows a remarkable degree of patient and efficient editorship. But the most valuable part of the whole work remains Professor Robson's analysis of the great city, its administration, finance, politics, and planning. It is perhaps permissible to draw a parallel and speak of the book as an essay in two-tier authorship in which Professor Robson has performed the task of "the major authority for the planning, co-ordination, and administration

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of large-scale functions" in a measure which would ensure success to a metropolitan authority were it able to perform its duties with equal skill.

W. O. HART.

RURAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SWEDEN, ITALY AND INDIA. By HAROLD ZINK, A. WAHLSTRAND, F. BENVENUTI and R. BHASKARAN. [*Stevens*. 142 and xiii pp. 21s.]

REPORTS on rural local government in Sweden, Italy, and India were prepared by the collaborators from each country. From these Professor Zink has written this book and has contributed much himself from his wide knowledge of this particular field. The study, commissioned by UNESCO, was carried out at the request of the International Political Science Association.

Whilst an index enables detailed subjects to be found, the field has been widely covered as the chapter titles show—scope and current status, historical development, legal status, machinery, activities, inter-government relations, finance, citizen participation, and other motivating forces. Under each head Professor Zink describes each country in turn and then ends the chapter with a comparative summary. Thus there is no "sewing-together" of three different approaches and styles, but instead a commendable unity of treatment.

Unfortunately, unity in presentation cannot obscure the essential basic disparity in this study—the differences between national political systems and particularly the vast differences in the cultures and ecologies of the three countries chosen. (The choice of countries was UNESCO's.) The sophisticated political maturity of the Swedes is in sufficient contrast with the less developed Southern Italian peasants, but set against the Indian villager, one is left, as Professor Zink often finds, with so different an approach to life and to politics as to have little relevance to each other.

In his thoughtful and stimulating introduction, whilst recognising these difficulties, he stresses the importance of studies of rural local government. Of this there can be little doubt. At least four-fifths of the world population is rural; their development is both a moral obligation and a factor of fundamental importance for ultimate world peace. Much of their social and economic development must be officially inspired and often executed and supervised by government agencies. These must operate in the field (although some countries still try to work them only from the capital) and to be sensitive and self-governing, the agencies should be local. Yet if democratic local government or democratic government at all is to secure the support of developing peoples, it must be efficient as well as democratic. Here is one of the biggest problems of our age in public administration, and to its understanding books like this make a valuable contribution.

A refreshing aspect of this book is that whilst suggesting ways in which India or Italy might learn from Sweden's example, it yet reminds the reader constantly of the difficulties posed by differing societies and different social attitudes. All too easily in the past has it been assumed that institutions can be exported with results which have sometimes been farcical but more often tragic. For the student there is, too, great value in the emphasis placed upon the complex nature of the local community of which local government forms but a part. The authors are to be congratulated on having written a description much nearer to reality than most of the works about British local government.

HENRY MADDICK.

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PAKISTAN: A POLITICAL STUDY. By KEITH CALLARD, Associate Professor of Political Science, McGill University. [*Allen and Unwin*. 355 pp. 30s.]

PAKISTAN. By ALAN GLEDHILL, Professor of Oriental Laws, University of London. THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SERIES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONS. Volume 8. [*Stevens*. x and 263 pp. £2 5s.]

THE Prime Minister of Pakistan in office when this review was written is the seventh in ten years and, indeed, the sixth in four years. This instability is due partly to the disintegration of the Muslim League since the dismissal of Khwaja Nazimuddin in 1953. Though the dissidents did not resign from the party, there was within the League itself a minority opposed to the then Governor-General, Ghulam Mohamed. After the East Bengal election of 1954 this minority could, by alliance with a sufficiently large Bengali group, obtain a majority in the Assembly. It played its hand maladroitly: instead of the majority getting rid of Ghulam Mohamed, as was clearly intended, the Governor-General dissolved the Assembly. The subsequent elections being indirect, much the same people came back for West Pakistan; but, after the end of Chaudhri Mohamed Ali's gallant attempt to carry the process of government through to a general election the split in the Muslim League was widened and eventually the Republican Party was formed under Dr. Khan Sahib. There are now five principal Muslim groups: the rump of the Muslim League led by Chundrigar, the sixth Prime Minister; the Republicans led by Khan Sahib, among whom is the present Prime Minister, Feroz Khan Noon; the rump of the United Front still led, apparently, by Fazlul Huq, Governor of East Pakistan; the Awami League led by H. S. Suhrawardy, the fifth Prime Minister; and a miscellaneous but mostly left-wing group which has gathered round the brilliant and wayward Iftakharuddin. These groups are like the "connexions" of eighteenth-century England. Lists of members never agree and nobody knows from week to week who belongs to what. A Government attracts support because it is the Government, but an Opposition party attracts support if it looks like forming a Government. The only thing certain is that a Government must be either a coalition or a minority and therefore unstable.

A general election might solve the problem. Since 1955, however, the difficulty has been to decide on the basis of election. Chaudhri Mohamed Ali succeeded in getting a balance between East and West Pakistan and, within West Pakistan, a balance between the Punjab and the rest. Though there are criticisms from Bengal, the compromise is now generally accepted. The problem now is whether the electoral constituencies shall be joint, *i.e.*, non-communal, or separate, *i.e.*, Muslim and Non-Muslim. Professor Callard explains why this relic of pre-partition India continues to plague Pakistan. The Muslim League, being the conservative group, regards the distinction between Muslim and Non-Muslim as fundamental, an essential part of the tradition of Islam. Perhaps, too, it hopes to win a few seats in East Pakistan on a communal roll, since the problem is almost irrelevant in West Pakistan. The Hindus, or at least the Hindu politicians, do not want separate electorates, the Republicans and the Awami League want joint electorates, and Feroz

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Khan Noon may possibly stay in office long enough to solve the problem. Unfortunately there cannot be a general election before November 1958.

The instability of Governments after the disintegration of the Muslim League was foreseen by Chaudhri Mohamed Ali, and some thought was given to the question whether the British system, which assumes the two-party system, would be appropriate. Though nobody wanted the American presidential system, it was decided to produce an experimental draft combining, so far as was practicable, responsible government and the American four-year term. The draft did not look attractive and was promptly scrapped, but meanwhile General Iskander Mirza had referred in a public speech to the need for "controlled democracy." Possibly there was no connection with the quasi-American draft, which did not provide for anything like "controlled democracy," and in any event the remark was personal and casual. As a consequence, however, the existence of the draft became known, and both Professor Callard and Professor Gledhill refer to it as if it were an important and significant episode, whereas much more significant events of that difficult period are omitted, for the obvious reason that they never "leaked."

This incident illustrates the difficulty of writing contemporary history, and perhaps the difficulty of writing any history. Nevertheless, by careful study of newspapers and debates Professor Callard has been able to compile a very useful survey of the political problems of Pakistan. His method is that of the political scientist and not that of the historian, and the general reader may have some difficulty with the chronology. Also, there is insufficient emphasis on the play of personality. The central figure after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan was Ghulam Mohamed, and Professor Callard tells us much about his actions and not much about the man, though it would seem to the reviewer that his character is the essence of the story. There is a hint of the very different characteristics of Mohamed Ali and Chaudhri Mohamed Ali, but nowhere is there an adequate appreciation of the latter's significance, either as Minister of Finance or as Prime Minister.

These observations ought not to be regarded as criticisms. In Pakistan, unlike India and Pakistan, politics is a secret game, as it was in eighteenth-century England; and the changes recorded in the newspapers rarely explain why they occurred. Professor Callard has to ascribe some of his information to rumour, though he properly makes discreet use of that source of misinformation. Professor Gledhill had a simpler task because he was concerned only with laws and institutions. He has been unduly impressed with the description of the Constitution as "Islamic." That description was necessary for political reasons, and it was added at a late stage of the proceedings. The Constitution is in fact founded on the Government of India Act, though it has made much use of the "secular" Constitution of India also. This does not mean that it is opposed to Islamic principles. The Pakistan Constitution is Islamic in the same way that the British Constitution is Christian: it was prepared for Muslims in an Islamic environment and approved by an Assembly composed mainly of Muslims. Professor Callard's treatment of this theme is excellent.

Professor Gledhill devotes a hundred pages to civil and criminal law. He has been able to handle the material so efficiently because he knew the pre-partition law. Those of us who have not that experience do our best not to delve into the "vast disorderly heaps" in which the law is now to be found. A consolidation is in progress, but it will be a long job.

W. IVOR JENNINGS.

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FRENCH ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND ELECTIONS 1789-1957. By PETER CAMPBELL. [Faber. 144 pp. 21s.]

THE short life of most French cabinets, and the delays and difficulties encountered in their replacement, have become notorious in recent years. Unfortunately these happenings have led to serious misconceptions over here. One is that the French political system as a whole is unstable, and that Frenchmen do not know how to conduct their own parliamentary affairs. Another is that this instability is due to the electoral system. A third is that that system is one of proportional representation. None of these beliefs is well-founded; but myths die hard, even after repeated exposure. Mr. Campbell's book should help to restrain the propagation of these legends, though it is too much to hope that it will kill them.

It cannot have been easy to reduce the complexities and apparent inconsequences of his subject to a form in which they would fall into a reasonably intelligible pattern, and the author is to be complimented on the way in which he has tackled the problem. He gives an account and an explanation of the permutations and consequences of the French electoral system, from the start of the Revolution in 1789 to the present day, that are probably as good as could be managed in a short work of this kind. First, in section I, he makes a brief general survey of the place of electoral systems in French politics. This sets the scene and provides a key to the more detailed surveys to which the remaining four sections are devoted. Each of these deals with a chronological division of the subject distinguishable by salient historical or electoral characteristics. First there is the period of indirect election and limited suffrage, from 1789 to 1848. Next comes the period in which direct manhood suffrage was installed and served its apprenticeship, lasting from 1848 to 1870. The third period is that of the Third Republic, 1870 to 1940, marked by the general prevalence of the second ballot. Lastly, there is the period of "the Fourth Republic and Proportional Representation," from the Liberation to 1957; though here it is essential to bear in mind that the only elections at which P.R. was actually used were those of 1945 and 1946. Finally, there are appendices giving a concise summary of the electoral systems employed in France since 1848, brief accounts of the methods of electing overseas deputies and members of the upper chamber, and a useful bibliography, rounded off by a competent index.

Mr. Campbell brings out well the fact, too little recognised in this country, that the peculiar instability of the French cabinet and party set-up is not in any real sense the product of its electoral system. That system has been varied many times since 1870; but whatever the method of election, the short-lived cabinet and the multiplicity of parties persist. In the seventy years of the Third Republic there were 108 cabinets, with an average duration of barely eight months. During this period constituencies alternated between single-member and multi-member, and the number of ballots between one and two; but always the short-lived cabinet resulted. Whatever this cabinet instability was due to, it was certainly not P.R., for that was never used. Sir Douglas Savory in his Foreword to the book attributes it to the lack of any effective power of dissolving the chamber before it had run its full term; but Mr. Campbell himself—on p. 29 *et passim*—effectually disposes of that contention. The true sources of the trouble must be sought in French history from the

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outbreak of the Revolution, and in the persistence ever since of sharp cleavages in French political sympathies: between monarchist and republican, clericalist and anti-clericalist, agriculturalist and industrialist, and with (after 1920) the communists as a further disruptive force.

A change of government in France is of course, more often than not, just a turn of the kaleidoscope. The pattern that emerges after the crisis is certainly different, but its components are much as before. There is no question of one government going out lock, stock, and barrel, and being replaced by a completely fresh set of ministers, as normally happens over here. Moreover, in spite of all these ministerial crises, the day-to-day work of government goes steadily on.

Mr. Campbell's book should be welcomed alike by the political scientist, the student of foreign affairs, and the specialist in electoral matters. It is not only a valuable addition to our works of reference: it is also a timely contribution towards a better understanding of the very different way that public affairs are conducted on the other side of the Channel.

J. F. S. Ross.

THE BOARDS OF THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES. By LORD SIMON OF WYTHENSHAW. [Longmans. 54 pp. 3s.]

THE success of the nationalised industries depends largely, in Lord Simon's view, on the efficiency of their Boards; and this in turn depends on establishing for these Boards the same conditions which have proved successful in private industry. Lord Simon states these with vigour and clarity; points out by reference to the National Coal Board how far they have been absent in the past; and urges all concerned to create and maintain them in future. He is well qualified to make this case. He has been governing director of two successful profit-making companies; he has been chairman of the BBC; and, as a member of the Labour Party, he is not suspect of seeking to discredit nationalisation. On the contrary, he claims to be writing a prescription for its success.

His main conditions are four. First, there must be suitable men in the industry from whom to choose and renew the permanent members of the Board. A first-rate scheme for selection, training, and staff-development is therefore essential. Secondly, the Minister should seek the advice of the existing Board members before making a new appointment to the Board and before appointing a new chairman and should not make any such appointment without being satisfied that it will be acceptable to the existing Board. This applies especially to the appointment of full-time members, who should all or nearly all have been bred in the industry. Thirdly, these posts should have at least as much security of tenure as they have in industry; the Minister's power to remove or even not to reappoint should be exercised only in rare emergencies and then with proper compensation. Fourthly, these posts should carry salaries and conditions of service such as to make them highly desirable to have and to hold. These four conditions will in time give the nationalised industries Boards composed of competent men, suitably experienced, individually secure, and collectively coherent; Boards sufficiently stable in composition to maintain continuity of policy and to reap the fruits of experience.

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Having got such a Board, it remains to let it alone. Lord Simon recognises that the Minister must have powers over the Board which have no parallel in private industry but he suggests how these can be exercised so as not to undermine the independence and efficiency of the Board. On the vexed question of accountability, he favours a seven-year or better a ten-year inquiry, rather than the continuous attention of a select committee; and he reminds Parliament that in seeking information, their only proper function, they already receive far more than is vouchsafed to the shareholders of any private undertaking.

Lord Simon's argument rests on the assumption that the task of providing coal and transport is identical in character with the task of providing chemicals and steel—an administrative task in the largest sense, best left to those who have spent their lives in learning how to do it. This assumption is assailable on two grounds, one valid but transient, the other irrelevant. It may well be contended that the assumption was not true of coal, when the National Coal Board took over. For one of the tasks given to that Board by statute was to reorganise the industry, a crying need which the former owners, with few exceptions, had failed to meet for decades and for which a lifetime in the old régime was widely regarded as a poor qualification. But the force of this argument is passing. Between the industry's men and the industry's problems no such disparity exists today as existed in 1947.

It may also be contended that the direction of a nationalised industry will always be different from the direction of a private undertaking, however large, because it has different statutory objects and hence different criteria of success. This is true and Lord Simon perhaps underrates its importance. For example, this fact, rather than the National Coal Board's qualified monopoly, creates the difficulty of measuring efficiency to which he refers. But the fact is really irrelevant to his main argument. By giving control of nationalised industries to public corporations, rather than directly to the Government, Parliament assigned to the Boards of these great undertakings a special and delicate function; they have to maintain through time the right relation between the community and the Government on the one hand and on the other the essential service which they provide. To the planners of nationalisation this may have seemed their most important and difficult function. Lord Simon's booklet is a robust reminder that their primary job is to make a great undertaking work smoothly and well. For this supremely difficult task, they must possess the knowledge, the competence, the coherence, the independence, and the mutual trust on which he insists; and it is hard to see how these can grow, except under the conditions which he describes.

Lord Simon paints with a broad brush. Despite his title, he confines himself wholly to coal. But those who itch to point out the many and real differences which distinguish the nationalised industries one from another may find on reflection that he is entitled to ignore these on the ground that what he writes, if true for any, is true for all.

GEOFFREY VICKERS.

★

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BOOK REVIEWS

BRITISH PRESSURE GROUPS. By J. D. STEWART. [Clarendon Press. 273 pp. 30s.]

EXACTLY fifty years after the publication of the first American book on pressure groups (A. F. Bentley's *The Process of Government*), the first book on the subject has appeared in this country. One would be bound to welcome Mr. Stewart's efforts even if his book were less valuable than it is. *British Pressure Groups* has some exasperating shortcomings, but it will henceforth be required reading for every student of the British political process.

The author has limited himself, more rigorously than was perhaps necessary, to an examination of the role of pressure groups in relation to the House of Commons. He therefore largely omits what he readily concedes to be by far the most important aspect of pressure group activity: their relations with ministers and government departments. Admittedly it is not easy to document an account of the elaborate system of consultation which now operates at this level in the governmental process. It is none the less a pity that Mr. Stewart attempted no more than the brief sketch offered in Chapter II and the early part of Chapter III as a prelude to his study of the role of pressure groups in the parliamentary arena.

The reader must constantly remind himself that "ease of access to the decision-makers" is of overriding importance, especially for the great sectional groups such as those which represent industry, organised labour, the professions, and the farmers. The officials of these groups are, as Mr. Stewart comments, almost excessively reluctant to indulge in overt forms of pressure activity for fear they may jeopardise their "right" to be consulted by governments on all matters affecting the interests of their members. Indeed, most of the pressure groups which focus their efforts mainly on the House of Commons do so because they have failed to win "access." For some groups such parliamentary activity is a supplement to consultation; but for many others it is a comparatively unrewarding substitute for the relationship with Ministers and officials which permits "pressure in a subdued key."

If the deliberately narrow focus of Mr. Stewart's work is kept in mind, then his efforts to enumerate and to examine the various methods by which pressure groups operate in the parliamentary arena can be very warmly commended. Unfortunately his material is drearily presented and his prose style is so awkward as to be embarrassing. (In fairness, however, one must keep in mind that he is chronicling the activities of organisations which, almost without exception, have jaw-breaking names. How could one write brightly about the National Joint Council of the Amalgamated Association of Cheese-parers and the Federation of Master Woolgatherers?) But if the reader perseveres he will find Mr. Stewart a reliable if rather heavy-footed guide through a hitherto largely unexplored jungle. Sir Ivor Jennings made important forays into this territory twenty years ago, for the first edition of *Parliament*. And there have recently been several extremely useful analyses of the activities of particular pressure groups. One of these, Dr. Asher Tropp's *The Teachers*, Mr. Stewart strangely fails to mention; but, otherwise, *British Pressure Groups* can fairly claim to offer a pioneer survey of an important part of the *terra incognita* of British politics.

Mr. Stewart's discussion of the criteria which appear to determine group strategies is both stimulating and tantalisingly brief. He quotes some

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BOOK REVIEWS

excellent illustrations of the way in which certain groups have tried to convince their members of the wisdom of limiting their objectives. Thus the National Federation of Building Trade Employers noted mournfully in their trade journal that there was no hope of eliminating the "confiscatory provisions" of *The Town and Country Planning Bill* in 1948, since its main principles had largely been accepted by both the previous government and its Labour successor. Instead, therefore, of "arranging to contest the bill in Parliament, the efforts of the Federation (it was decided) should be concentrated upon attempting to secure by direct negotiations with the Minister of Town and Country Planning, some modifications of those provisions in the bill which were regarded as being particularly harmful to the future of private small enterprise house-building." This illustrates one aspect of what Prof. S. E. Finer has called the "domestication" of British pressure groups. Most of them wisely prefer to "live to fight another day" rather than to smash themselves on the rocks of the explicit and apparently irrevocable decisions of the executive.

Mr. Stewart therefore concludes (p. 36) that in recent decades there has been a decline in the importance of group pressure on Parliament. Yet there are a number of factors which combine to ensure that such pressures continue to occupy an important place in the political process. Of these, the most important is the fact that the members of pressure groups insist on what they conceive to be value for their money. When the group leaders do not appear to achieve very much by "discreet" methods then "indiscreet" pressures must be applied. Mr. Stewart's book is mainly concerned to catalogue this latter category of pressure group strategies. He assesses, with a wealth of illustration, the importance (on the whole, very limited) of "the public campaign"; and he explains the use made by some groups of what he calls "parliamentary routines" (briefing M.P.s as individuals or through party groups, the inspiring of amendments, of parliamentary questions, and of private members' bills). The chapter on group representation in Parliament is of very considerable interest.

There is also a very useful discussion of "lobbying," in which the author incorporates a review of the "Mr. Cube" campaign in 1950. In addition, he refers very briefly to the case of *R. v. Tronoh Mines, Ltd. and Others*, which arose out of an advertisement this company inserted in *The Times* in the course of the 1951 election, condemning the Labour Party's financial policies and advocating, in effect, the defeat of the socialist government. The court ruled that this advertisement did not constitute a violation of the *Representation of the People Act, 1949*. The Labour Party subsequently declared its intention to amend the law to prohibit such activities. Mr. Stewart denounces the party's proposal as "very dangerous," since, he argues, it would have the effect of denying the means of political expression at election time to all organisations except political parties. But one suspects that he may have second thoughts on this before Labour secures office again and finds itself in a position to amend the *Representation of the People Act*. The decision in *R. v. Tronoh Mines* may well have opened the way for the full scale participation of pressure groups in the next British election. The court ruled that the Act "does not prohibit expenditure (during an election campaign), the real purpose or effect of which is general political propaganda, even though that . . . propaganda does incidentally assist a particular candidate among others."

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One can only assume that the import of this decision has not been lost on the business community and they will find means of pouring huge sums into the forthcoming campaign. Whatever the merits of the case they propound, such activities would reverse the whole trend of the electoral legislation over the past seventy-five years, which has been designed to ensure that those who have the longest purse should not have an unfair advantage in influencing the outcome of an election.

One must note finally that Mr. Stewart's conclusions in his last chapter are, for the most part, both unexceptional and banal. He seems surprisingly indifferent to social and political theory and makes no serious attempt to explain the role of pressure groups in the political process. He must be forgiven, nevertheless, because of the diligence with which he has set about accumulating so much of the evidence upon which such a theory must be based.

R. T. McKENZIE.

THE GENERAL STRIKE. By JULIAN SYMONS. [*Cresset Press*. 259 pp. 2ls.]

THE General Strike was the most momentous event in the history of the British labour movement. For nine remarkable days the oldest and most experienced labour movement in the world sought to coerce the most subtle and successful governing class in the world. The spectacle was one for connoisseurs of social conflict rather than one to satisfy enthusiastic partisans. The militants on both sides were disgusted at the gentility of it all, while the rest of the world watched *la révolution anglaise* with amazement and wondered whether such an incredible exhibition was another demonstration of British hypocrisy or the most profound and sagacious exercise of the arts of self-government.

Naturally, a great deal has been written about the General Strike, especially from the partisan point of view. Material, both documentary and in the memories of those who lived through those memorable days, is to be found in plenty. No autobiography of poet, philosopher, or politician alive in 1926 is quite complete without a chapter on the General Strike, but there is no definitive history of the whole affair. It was a remark to this effect by Duff Cooper, in his autobiography, that stimulated Mr. Symons to write this account of the General Strike. As might be expected from a writer as accomplished as Mr. Symons this work is highly readable, but it falls a considerable way short of filling the gap that still exists.

Here is the expert journalist's descriptive account of the surface pattern of events, without the analytical penetration that is necessary to produce a book that would make, as is claimed, "a notable contribution to the history of industrial relations."

The author's inadequacy as a historian is exposed in his opening chapters, which purport to explain the factors which led up to the decision to strike. It is clear that he has accepted what might be described as the "left-wing" account of the course of events which preceded the strike. For example, the failure of the Triple Alliance, in 1921, a key factor in the development of the situation, is explained by Mr. Symons almost solely in terms of a deliberate indiscretion by Frank Hodges, the "right-wing" miners' secretary.

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The notion that the miners failed to achieve their objectives from 1919 to 1926 simply because of the treachery of right-wing trade union leaders has been assiduously fostered by left-wing writers, because it was only by the suggestion of betrayal that the failure of left-wing theories could be explained. It is apparent at the end of the book that Mr. Symons does not hold that view himself, but his explanations in the text frequently give the impression that he accepts this false analysis.

The detailed account given by the author of the part played by volunteers from universities and city offices is a significant contribution to the history of the General Strike, since it has never been fully explored before. The strike, like a surgeon's knife, exposed the class structure of Britain within the body politic. The two nations were dramatically revealed. On the one side were the products of Public and Grammar schools, delighted to have the opportunity of playing at train drivers and bus conductors; on the other were the products of the elementary schools, uncertain of the rights and wrongs of the points at issue, but loyally determined to support their own institutions.

From this distance in time the General Strike appears as an extraordinary chapter of stupidity and bungling on the part of all concerned. The mine-owners were callous in the extreme; the miners were unfortunately saddled with dogmatic, inept leaders who lacked the ability to find a feasible way out of the difficulties which beset the industry; while the Government and the T.U.C. were divided and weak. In the event the whole thing was a very amateurish affair; but it was perhaps because of this that the General Strike left behind, except in the mining areas, remarkably little bitterness.

The 1927 Trades Union and Trade Disputes Act was looked upon by the labour movement as a vicious act of revenge. It was, in fact, a very mild piece of legislation, that had little or no serious effect on the development of the trade union movement. The more significant aspects of the strike were that it demonstrated the tolerable limits of the right to strike in a democratic country. It finally killed the utopian notion that capitalism was in its last stage of decay and had only to be shaken to fall like the rotten limb of a tree. It also frightened the larger employers into realising that the best way of eliminating the menace that lurked in the doctrines of class conflict was to bring the unions into a partnership of producers. The problems posed by the General Strike are still being worked out, but the results so far are much happier than might reasonably have been expected from an occurrence with such far-reaching political and social implications.

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A BREVIAE OF PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS, 1900-1916. The Foundation of the Welfare State. By P. and G. FORD. [Blackwell. 470 and xlix pp. £4 12s. 6d.]

PROFESSOR and Mrs. Ford have produced a fifth volume in their extremely valuable series of guides to Parliamentary Papers. The present work fills a gap between their *Select List of British Parliamentary Papers 1833-1899* and the *Breviate of Parliamentary Papers 1917-1939* which they have already issued. It covers a period of intense activity in almost every branch of public affairs and social life. No fewer than 1,048 reports, produced by more than 600 committees or royal commissions, are included in the present volume. They are classified (with sub-titles) under the main headings of machinery of government; national finance; banking, financial institutions; agriculture and food supply; trade and industry; coal, fuel and power, water; transport; Post Office, telecommunications; patents, copyright, trade marks; labour; social security; health; housing; education; social problems, legal administration, police, law; and Irish papers. Each entry gives the title, length, date, and subject of the report, the persons responsible for its production, and a careful and accurate summary of its contents. The work displays not only a high standard of scholarship, but an admirable sense of discrimination concerning the length of the *précis* of each report, which varies according to its importance.

In an illuminating introduction the authors draw a vivid picture of the immense changes of opinion reflected in many of these state documents compared with those of the closing years of the nineteenth century and the many different influences which were at work. "What the Papers show," they conclude, "is groups of men and women of varied experience concentrating on practical tasks and working out the new institutions and practical expedients which carried us into what is known broadly, if not very accurately, as the Welfare State." Once again Professor and Mrs. Ford have earned the gratitude of all those who are interested in the history, politics, government, economic, and social development of the British people.

GUIDE TO RESOURCES FOR COMMONWEALTH STUDIES IN LONDON, OXFORD, AND CAMBRIDGE. By A. R. HEWITT. [Athlone Press. 219 pp. 21s.]

THIS book is published for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies by the University of London and Mr. Hewitt is secretary and librarian of the Institute. It is a remarkably full reference book listing and describing material for the study of the Commonwealth. Part I gives a general survey of resources. This is mainly bibliographical, dealing in nine sections with, *inter alia*, public archives, private papers, parliamentary papers, and periodicals and newspapers. Part II describes the resources in libraries, offices, and institutions in London, Oxford, and Cambridge. Part III deals with universities in the United Kingdom giving facilities for Commonwealth studies and a list of "research and advisory institutions."

THE
POLITICAL QUARTERLY

VOL. 29, No. 4.

October-December 1958

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EDITORIAL

LABOUR'S PLAN FOR PROGRESS

THE latest of the Labour Party's draft policy statements, to be presented to its Conference later this year, is entitled *Plan for Progress*, and its main emphasis is on economic expansion and the full planned use of economic resources. It rightly urges that the standard of living in Great Britain depends on the level of production and its correct direction, and that it is indispensable to maintain a high level of investment and a broad control over it, so as to ensure that it flows mainly into the right channels from the national standpoint. It also puts high among immediate objectives the maintenance of the pound sterling's international value, which it believes to be fully compatible with expansion and high investment. Save on this last point no one is likely to disagree with these objectives, though they seem to have little enough to do with the wider socialist aims which the Party has proclaimed. Indeed, the outstanding fact about the new statement is that it appears to postulate not only the continuance of capitalist enterprise over most of industry but also the establishment of close and amicable relations between it and the Government, despite the intention to subject it—or at any rate the big capitalist firms—to a considerably more stringent control of their operations than exists at present. Professor Tawney once remarked that "you cannot skin a live tiger claw by claw": yet this is apparently just what the Labour Party is proposing to do, in the belief that the animal to be subjected to the process is not really a tiger at all but an on the whole well-meaning creature that will show itself prepared to co-operate with great good will.

The Danger in Recession

But, leaving that issue aside for the moment, let us begin by asking whether the policy advanced in *Plan for Progress* can really be relied upon to work, even if most employers show themselves prepared to fall in with it. The Labour Party seems to us to be altogether too complacent and optimistic about the possibilities of maintaining a high level of activity in Great Britain in face of any serious American recession and at the same time keeping up the value of sterling in terms of gold and the dollar. It can hardly be denied that an American depression is calculated to

investment; for while new issues through the capital market are subject to control through the Capital Issues Committee, this control is subject to considerable evasions and does not extend to the still larger sums invested out of retained profits by businesses without any reference to the capital market. It is proposed to extend control to the investment of these business reserves, which are mainly in the hands of a quite limited number of very large firms: so that it is not considered necessary to extend control over the very much greater number of small and middle-sized firms, which have comparatively little to invest and can be let alone without detriment to the effectiveness of the policy proposed. This of course runs directly counter to the view, held by the Conservatives, that business men can best be left to direct their own investment policies under the stimulus of the profit motive, and that government planning of investment should be limited to the nationalised industries, which should be prevented from absorbing an undue proportion of the total. The report also denies that business men should be left free to invest, geographically, where they please, and proposes again to resort to the policy, chiefly through industrial building licences, of seeking to guide industrial development into areas in which there is a shortage of employment and away from centres in which congestion exists.

Can One Please Everyone?

Suppose the Labour Party comes back to power at the next General Election and that a Labour Government endeavours to follow faithfully the policies laid down in *Plan for Progress*; it is probably correct in supposing that most of the big private firms will be ready to co-operate with it to the extent of receiving its directives and acting upon most of them, especially if it allows them favourable terms for the taxation of undistributed profits and does its best to assure their prosperity. This, however, will by no means convert most of their directors—and still less, of their shareholders—into supporters of a Labour Government, which on the contrary they will do their best to turn out of office if it also pursues its declared policies of “fair shares” and protection of the consumers’ interests. In other words, the struggle between the rich and the poor still remains, and will continue as long as large disparities in wealth and income continue to exist. Unless a Labour Government can make some real progress in breaking down these disparities it will fail to satisfy the bulk of its supporters: whereas

the more successful it is in breaking them down, the more eager the upholders of capitalist enterprise will be to get rid of it. In *Plan for Progress*, the Labour Party shows itself bent on making the best of both worlds; but may it not find that in seeking to please almost everybody it has in fact pleased no one?

For we fancy that, in promising so much, the Labour Party is in some danger of promising what it will not be able to achieve. This applies particularly to its promises to the consumers; for, as the Co-operatives have been prompt to point out, the E.S.A. is by no means equipped to lay down minimum standards of quality and performance for a wide variety of consumers’ goods, as this report requires it to do, nor can it easily or quickly adapt itself to this requirement; but if this measure fails, the consumer is left with no more than rather vague promises to reframe and speed up the procedure directed against monopolistic and restrictive practices and to ensure increased publicity about restrictive practices as a prelude to more drastic action. Such sentiments are all very well; but the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and these sections of the report give an impression of not having been thought out at all fully.

As against this, the general expansionist policy of *Plan for Progress* gives the clear impression of being seriously meant and of being a valid answer to the policies actually followed by the Conservative Government during the three years since the “Butler boom” of 1955. For undoubtedly it has been quite wrong, over these years, to prevent British output from rising at all, whereas it was previously rising fast and its continued rise is the only possible means of improving the general standard of living. The Labour Party is correct in believing that the holding down of the total of production by an indiscriminate credit squeeze and by high interest rates, in order to check inflation and maintain the value of sterling, has been shown to be a wrong policy by the continued rise in prices in spite of it and by the rising of unit costs of production when productive capacity is less than fully employed, as under such circumstances it is bound to be. This, however, does not mean that there is bound, in all circumstances, to be a sufficient market for the larger exports on the need for which the report correctly insists, or that, in the absence of such a market, its absence can be fully compensated for by speeding up the investment programmes of the nationalised industries, even though such speeding up would be, in the conditions contemplated, an eminently desirable policy.

LABOUR'S PLAN FOR PROGRESS

The great question, however, is whether a Labour Government can afford to come back to office with a programme as little challenging to capitalism as *Plan for Progress* undoubtedly is. It must, of course, be taken not alone but in conjunction with the rest of the series of which it is, for the time being, the last; but if these reports are considered as a whole, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the Labour Party is not merely making up its mind to coexistence with capitalist enterprise for the time being, but is prepared to come to terms with it for an indefinite future period and has come to consider that the evils of the capitalist system are curable within it: so that the future rests rather with a refined and amended capitalism than with its supersession by socialism as ordinarily understood.

The acceptance of such an attitude is not, indeed, explicitly asked for; and probably those who drafted the series of reports would honestly deny that it is what they have in mind. Nevertheless, the acceptance of the series by the forthcoming Labour Party Conference will carry the party a considerable way in that direction, which may well be what a majority in the country desires. For evidently there is among the British people no majority will for socialism in any complete form, and the Labour Party would be courting electoral disaster if it were to ask the voters for a mandate to introduce an all-round socialist system at once, even apart from the fact that it would be quite unable to do this, even if it were returned to power with a large majority behind it. But is the Labour Party steering the correct middle course between this and a frank recommendation of the continuance of capitalist enterprise? We doubt it; for it is running the risk of disappointing and antagonising too many of its own supporters without gaining any large amount of support among its opponents, who, even if they would rather have public control than public ownership, do not want either and are likely to take their stand against the proposed "planned economy," with its controls, as much as against a more forthright proposal at any rate leading in a socialist direction.


EDUCATION IN THE U.S.S.R.

S. V. UTECHIN

SOVIET education has attracted considerable attention abroad throughout the forty years since the coming to power in Russia of the Communist Party. At different times, however, this attention has tended to be concentrated on different aspects of the subject, and the "topical" aspects have usually dominated the picture to such an extent as to obscure the real situation. The "topicality" itself has usually been determined by the current attitudes to the Soviet regime in general. Thus, in the earlier years it was the deliberate destruction of many traditional forms and the neglect of others that attracted most attention and were branded as vandalism; then came a period of fascination and admiration for modernistic experiments on a vast scale and the rearing of a "new man" for a collectivist society; then the period of revulsion from the horror of totalitarian indoctrination that was seemingly heading straight into 1984; and finally we are now witnessing a wave of envious and fearful astonishment at the spectacular advances in scientific and technical training. Bearing in mind this past experience, and in order to save further surprises in the future, it would seem advisable not to concentrate on such isolated topical features but to view the Soviet educational scene as a whole. The truth is that vandalism and outstanding scientific achievements, totalitarian aims and experimentation, have always been and are there, co-existing with each other. In what follows an attempt will be made to give a balanced assessment of the present state of Soviet education.¹

* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Mr. Hugh Lunghi, Mr. W. M. Matthews, of St. Antony's College, Oxford, and of those acquaintances from the Soviet Union with whom he has discussed the subject.

¹ Three recent American studies on the subject will be found illuminating: De Witt, N., *Soviet Professional Manpower*, Washington, D.C., 1955; Counts, George S., *The Challenge of Soviet Education*, New York, 1957; Korol, Alexander G., *Soviet Education for Science and Technology*, New York and London, 1957. Some of the problems dealt with in this article have been treated more extensively by the present author in: "Social Scale in Russia," *Manchester Guardian*, April 20, 1955; "Reflections of a Former Student" in the symposium on the University of Moscow, *Universities Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 4, August 1955; "Back to Marxist Schools," *Manchester Guardian*, December 24, 1955; "Criticism Inside Russia," *Manchester Guardian*, October 5, 1956; "Current Problems of Soviet Secondary Education," *Soviet Survey*, No. 12, February 1957; "Education in Russia," *London Calling*, March 28, 1957.



Universal Education

Compulsory education was introduced in Russia later than in most other European countries.² In a law of 1908 only the principle was adopted of making public education available to all children, and a system of state subsidies to the local authorities was introduced to enable them to provide the necessary educational facilities within ten years. It was reckoned by the Education Committee of the Duma that universal primary education would be achieved by 1922. However, the world war, the revolution, and the civil war destroyed these hopes and retarded the development. The programme of the Communist Party, adopted in 1919, proclaimed the principle of compulsory universal education up to the age of seventeen, but in fact even primary education (for four years beginning at eight) only became compulsory in 1930-31 (the age for compulsory school attendance was lowered from eight to seven in 1943). The second world war was again a grave setback. In 1949 the aim was set of achieving compulsory seven-year education by 1952, and the 19th Party Congress in 1952 proclaimed that universal secondary education through ten classes (ages seven to seventeen) should be accomplished by 1960; in the following years it began to be introduced in big towns and other selected localities. The following table³ shows the expansion of general education in Russia since 1914:

Number of Pupils Registered at the Beginning of Selected School Years (in thousands)

Year	Classes 1-4	5-7	8-10 (11)	Total ⁴
1914/15	7,390	383	123	7,896 ⁵
1922/23	6,607	617	98	7,322
1929/30	11,583	1,615	190	13,388
1931/32	17,732	2,814	1	20,547
1940/41	21,375	10,767	2,368	34,510
1945/46	19,858	5,175	975	26,009
1947/48	23,494	4,957	939	29,391
1950/51	19,671	12,031	1,496	33,198
1952/53	13,394	14,087	3,346	30,828
1953/54	12,106	13,477	4,496	30,079
1955/56	13,579	9,268	5,253	28,101
1956/57	15,580	7,440	5,040	28,060

² On the expansion of education in Russia in the nineteenth century, see an admirable paper by Professor C. Arnold Anderson, of the University of Kentucky, *A Footnote to the Social History of Modern Russia: The Literacy and Educational Census of 1897*, originally published in *Genus* (Rome), 1956, English version privately circulated.

³, ⁴, ⁵ See notes on next page.

Despite this rapid progress, universal seven-year education, though officially compulsory, has not yet been achieved. The drop-out of pupils during the school year is very considerable, and even tends to increase. In 1954/55, 6.3 per cent. of all pupils registered at the beginning of the year left before its end, compared to 4.1 per cent. in 1950/51 (in absolute figures—1,844,000 and 1,361,000 respectively). To judge from the available RSFSR figures for 1955/56, the situation was no better in that year. In classes 1 to 4 the drop-out has varied between 2 per cent. and 5 per cent. in recent years, and in classes 5 to 7 between 3 per cent. and 9 per cent. The situation is worst in the countryside. Even in the RSFSR, 10 per cent. of all village schoolchildren in classes 5 to 7 dropped out during the 1955/56 school year (6 per cent. in 1950/51). There are several reasons for this. Many families, particularly in the countryside, cannot afford the warm clothing (necessary for the Russian winter) nor the textbooks that have to be bought. School transport is not always provided, and distances, the weather, and the state of the roads make attendance sometimes impossible; this factor has become particularly important in the last few years, since, because of the decline in the school-age population (as a result of the war and the famine of 1947), many small schools were closed—the total number of schools (excluding adult schools) fell from 202,000 in 1950/51 to 197,000 in 1956/57. Among the Muslim peoples of the USSR there is a continued resistance to the education of girls; whereas in the USSR at large, girls made up 49 per cent. of pupils in classes 5 to 7 in 1955/56, the percentage in the republics with a predominantly Muslim population was from 40 per cent. to 46 per cent. (for the upper classes, it was from 30 per cent. to 43 per cent. as against 55 per cent. for the USSR as a whole). The absence of any kind of differentiation at school between children of differing abilities (forbidden by the decision of the Central Committee of the Party "On Pedagogical Perversions in the Commissariats of Education" in 1936) makes it very difficult for the less bright child to absorb the knowledge required, and some of them give up.⁶

³ All statistical information in this article, unless otherwise stated, is either taken direct or calculated from Soviet publications, mainly the following: *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR*, Moscow, 1956; *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1956 godu*, Moscow, 1957; *Kulturnoe stroitelstvo SSSR*, Moscow, 1956; *Kulturnoe stroitelstvo RSFSR*, Moscow, 1958; *Narodnoe obrazovanie v SSSR*, Moscow, 1957.

⁴ Any discrepancies between the figures for groups of classes and the totals are due to rounding.

⁵ Within the U.S.S.R. frontiers of September 17, 1939; within the present frontiers the figure amounted to 9,656,000.

⁶ That many pupils find it difficult to cope with the syllabus is evident from the fact that of those who stayed in the classes 5 to 7 to the end of the 1954/55 school

Finally, there is no equivalent in the USSR of school attendance officers, and their work has to be done by the teachers themselves.

Although the transition to universal secondary education was first proclaimed in 1952, the number of pupils in the upper classes (from the 8th onwards), which had been almost constant around a million during the first five years after the war, began to expand rapidly from 1950/51. It continued to rise until 1955/56, when it reached 5.3 million, but fell in the following year to 5 million. In fact, it would appear from the available figures, that of over 3 million pupils who completed the 7th class in 1956, only 1 million went on to the 8th class at the beginning of the 1956/57 school year.⁷ It is thus quite clear that the policy of introducing compulsory ten-year education is no longer being pursued in practice, partly, as is evident from the press, because of the cost.

A problem that still has to be solved is that of overcrowding. The number of classrooms available is quite inadequate, and the schools are forced to work in shifts. In 1955/56 more than half the schools worked two shifts a day, and 1,393 schools even three shifts. 36.5 per cent. pupils (43.4 per cent. in towns) were on the second shift, *i.e.*, went to school in the afternoon, and 140,400 children on the third shift, *i.e.*, in the evening.

Secondary Education

A system of state secondary schools for boys was established in Russia in 1782. These schools, the Gymnasias, had a classical curriculum, and entry to them was not restricted to the upper estates; there were both paid and free places. Similar schools were opened for girls in the nineteenth century. During the nineteenth century two more types of state secondary schools for boys were developed—the Real School, where science replaced the classics and the pupils were prepared for entry to the technical high schools; and the so-called Commercial Schools, which resembled the

year 20.4 per cent. failed in their examinations: as a result 9.2 per cent. were retained in the same classes for a second year, and 11.2 per cent. were to be re-examined in the autumn before a decision was made on their promotion. The total number of pupils who either dropped out during the year or failed in the examinations at the end was, in 1954/55 (the last year for which full figures are available), 3,251,000.

⁷ It might be thought that the "missing" two million pupils went on to professional secondary schools, which, on the decision of the 20th Party Congress (1956), they might legitimately do as an alternative to entering the upper classes of general secondary schools. But when one looks at the figures this is not the case: in 1956, 464,000 people entered the professional secondary schools, of whom 66 per cent. already had completed ten-class general secondary education.

Real Schools but had some elementary business and commercial training.

The first fifteen years after 1917 were a period of continuous reforms embodying the various modernistic theories on education then current (such as co-education, the comprehensive school, Dalton Plan, etc.), and also some of the traditional Marxist educational ideas. Among the latter, the concept of polytechnical education was particularly prominent; Marx had contended that there should be "technical instruction which acquaints with the basic principles of all production processes and at the same time gives to the child or adolescent skill in handling the simplest tools of all branches of industry." Another idea popular among the communist educationists of the 1920s and early 1930s was "combining education with productive work," which in its extreme form led to the notion of the withering away of the school and the transfer of education to the factories. In 1930/31 practically all secondary schools were abolished and transformed into "technicums," *i.e.*, professional secondary schools. All this brought the system of public education near to the point of chaos, and from the early 1930s a process of restoration, concentrating especially on the secondary school, was set in motion under the general direction of Zhdanov, who until his death in 1948 exercised a dominant influence on all ideological and cultural matters. The systematic teaching of traditional school subjects was restored, as were promotional and final examinations, Certificates of Maturity, and medals for the best pupils. The full secondary school was now rather similar to the pre-revolutionary Real School. But an increasing emphasis was laid upon the humanities and the theoretical aspects of the sciences; in the 1940s logic and psychology were introduced into the curriculum, and even Latin as an experiment in some schools. The full secondary school was again regarded as preparing primarily for higher education, while the less academic type of pupils could, if they wished, enter professional secondary schools after completing seven-year school. From 1940 fees were payable in the three upper classes of the full secondary school, and no free places or grants of any kind were obtainable. The policy of co-education was reversed, and an increasing number of segregated schools were set up. Uniforms were also gradually reintroduced. An important element of the pre-1932 system (which, however, had deep roots in the earlier history of Russian state schools) that was retained was the principle of the unified curriculum leading from the primary classes through seven-year school

to full secondary education. The secondary school as thus restored gave a good all-round education, but had two disadvantages. Its syllabus, though perfectly manageable for the brighter pupil, was definitely beyond the capacity of the average child, which resulted in very considerable overwork and nervous strain; and the teaching of all subjects was permeated with the "party spirit" so typical of Zhdanov—resulting inevitably in serious distortions.

The 19th Party Congress of 1952 marked the beginning of a new period of flux. As well as proclaiming the intention of going over to compulsory secondary education, it revived the concept of polytechnical education, and "polytechnicalisation" has been a constant battle-cry ever since. There is a clear connection between the two ideas, since, if full secondary education was to be compulsory for all, the majority could clearly not proceed to higher educational institutions, and it was therefore desirable that they should leave school with some sort of practical training—and for this, polytechnical education is the most suitable ideological justification. The most important aspect of polytechnicalisation has been the changes in the school curriculum, which began in 1953. After a certain amount of initial tinkering, a new curriculum was brought out in 1955/56 which is intended to remain in force for at least five years. It involves a considerable reduction in the time devoted to the humanities and mathematics, an increase in physics (with much stress upon laboratory work and practical application), and the introduction of handicrafts (forbidden by the party's Central Committee in 1937 except for the first four classes) and practical training in machine construction, electro-mechanics, and agriculture. To achieve this some lengthening of the school week was necessary. However, it was apparently considered that these changes did not go far enough, and an experimental curriculum was introduced in 500 schools of the RSFSR in 1956/57, and in one-quarter of all schools of that republic in 1957/58. Apart from further minor cuts in some of the general subjects, and the exclusion of the constitution and psychology, the main feature of this latest curriculum is an expansion of the time spent on "polytechnical" subjects from sixteen hours a week to twenty-eight—achieved by increasing still further the length of the school week. In addition, from the 5th class (aged twelve) upwards, practical work in industry and agriculture is required during the summer vacation. In the following table, the three curricula are shown for comparison; the figures give the total number of hours per week devoted by classes 1-10 to particular subjects.

EDUCATION IN THE U.S.S.R.

	1952/53	1955/56	Experimental
Russian language and literature	92½	84½	84
Mathematics	64	60	59½
History	21½	20	19½
Constitution of the USSR	2	1	0
Logic	2	0	0
Foreign language	22	20	20
Geography	16	14½	14½
Biology	13½	12	12
Psychology	2	1	0
Astronomy	1	1	1
Chemistry	10½	10½	10
Painting	6	6	6
Technical drawing	4	4	4
Physics	14½	16½	15½
Physical training	18	20	23
Singing	4	6	6
Handicrafts, agricultural, - mechanical, etc., training	0	16	28

The authorities in the republics now have a certain amount of freedom in experimentation, and some of them are exploring different paths from the RSFSR as described above. An interesting case is that of the Ukraine, where it was decided that every pupil should complete a trade apprenticeship during his years at secondary school. In order to achieve this as well as fulfilling the ordinary school curriculum, additional eleventh classes have been opened in many schools.⁸

Other innovations of recent years have been the re-introduction of co-education, the introduction of domestic science for girls and of the fundamentals of Soviet law, the abolition of fees in 1956, abolition of promotional examinations in 1957, and the setting up on Khrushchev's initiative of several hundred new boarding schools. At first a considerable fuss was made of these last, but they have since receded from the limelight and on the whole seem to be following the general pattern of development.

These changes have apparently neither entirely satisfied their promoters nor convinced all influential people of their value,⁹ and gradually the idea has become widespread of the need for a reform of the whole school system. At the thirteenth congress of the *Komsomol* last April, Khrushchev gave the signal for a thorough discussion of this matter, which, at the time of writing (August),

⁸ Eleven- or even twelve-class schools on the Ukrainian model are being tried out on a small scale in the RSFSR.

⁹ There are complaints in the press about the lowering of standards in the humanities.

is in full swing. Some consensus of opinion is already emerging. It seems that the majority of those whose opinions have appeared in the press would prefer to limit the compulsory universal general education to an eight-class school (from the age of seven to fifteen), with a curriculum roughly corresponding to the 1955/56 curriculum of the seven-year school. On what should follow this eight-class school opinion diverges. Some would have three classes of compulsory secondary school, with either the present experimental RSFSR curriculum or the Ukrainian type of trade apprenticeship. Others—reviving the idea of 1930/31—would have no general secondary education at all, but only professional secondary schools. Others, finally, among them the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, are in favour of a further two or three years compulsory education of differing kinds: (1) a three-year general secondary school leading to higher education (specialised in three streams of humanities, physical sciences and technology, and biology and agriculture); (2) various professional secondary schools, offering a three- or four-year course; and (3) trade schools for training skilled workers with a two-year course. This last view would revive in a modified and improved form the pre-1953 system. If the Academy's plan is accepted, the reform could start with the 1959/60 school year and be completed within five to seven years.

The Problem of School-Leavers

One of the main reasons for the urgency of the reform is the problem of what to do with the school leavers. This problem did not exist until 1952 or 1953. Those finishing seven-class schools either (if their parents could afford it) went on to the upper classes of general secondary schools, or entered vocational training in professional secondary schools of various kinds ("technicums," pedagogical, medical, etc.), or received trade apprenticeship in the institutions of the State Labour Reserve system, or else went straight to work in industry or agriculture. The great majority of those finishing full secondary school were immediately absorbed by the higher educational establishments; the few remaining could easily find some secretarial or clerical work. The expansion of general secondary education completely disorganised this neat pattern. The number of vacancies at higher educational establishments not only was not increased in proportion to the output of the secondary schools, but has actually been reduced in the last few years. At first, unsuccessful applicants and their parents tended to consider

their failure to secure admission as accidental, to be rectified the following year. By 1954, however, the discrepancy between the numbers leaving school and the available vacancies in higher educational establishments became so obvious¹⁰ that on the one hand the majority of school-leavers clearly could not hope for higher education, and on the other, the authorities themselves initiated a widespread campaign to persuade these young people to take up manual jobs in industry or agriculture. Since 1956 these exhortations have become somewhat pointless, since the young people, having resigned themselves to the fact that they would have to take up manual work, are, for a number of reasons beyond the scope of this article, finding it difficult to obtain employment; it is sufficient here to say that unemployment among school-leavers is causing considerable worry to the authorities because of its demoralising effects and political implications. Under characteristic headings such as "No Grounds for Optimism" or "Getting Work for School-Leavers—An Urgent Task," the Soviet press reports such examples as the following. In Kuibyshev this year work needed to be found for 1,585 school-leavers while there were still 420 who had left school the previous year but had not yet found employment; the situation is similar in Moscow, Leningrad, Tula, Sverdlovsk, the industrial towns of the Kuznetsk Basin in Siberia, the capital of the Moldavian Republic Kishinëv, etc. In Rostov-on-Don, "considerable difficulty is facing the school youth"; about 4,700 young people have just left school but the authorities have allocated for them only 1,365 places in the city's industries. And so on.

Since 1954 many of these secondary-school-leavers have decided to try their luck in professional secondary schools,¹¹ where special shortened courses (one and a half to two and a half years instead of four) have been set up for them; in 1955 over a half of all those admitted to the professional secondary schools had already completed ten-year secondary education, in 1956 this percentage

¹⁰ The situation is much worse now; e.g., in the city of Gorky it was estimated in 1957 that about one-third of all ten-class school-leavers would be able to proceed to some sort of further education; this year it is considered that all those who have just left school will have to seek employment. According to Khrushchev, 700,000 of those who finished full secondary school in 1957 have not secured admission to either higher educational establishments or professional secondary schools, and the combined figure for the years 1953/56 is 2.2 million.

¹¹ Or in the few Technical Schools that were specially set up for them in 1954, aiming to turn out skilled workers in a one-year course: 60,000 pupils were admitted in 1954, of whom only 27,000 completed the course; the entry target for the next year was set at 150,000 but only 90,000 finished in 1956.

rose to 66, and in 1957 it was planned to raise it to 72.3. The professional secondary schools having thus been choked by general secondary school-leavers, the expectations of those leaving after seven-class general secondary schools have been further disorganised: there is no incentive for the average child to continue his general secondary education (since he sees the difficulties of those who have already completed ten classes); the professional secondary schools have become infinitely more difficult to get into; and there are comparatively few trade schools (which train semi-skilled and skilled workers in courses of six months to two years). Children have therefore been leaving school even before they have completed seven classes in order to try to get the available jobs as apprentices, etc., and in order to combat this a law had to be passed in 1956 forbidding the employment in industry (though not in agriculture) of children under fifteen.

The following table shows the statistics of the problems of school-leavers (in thousands).

	1950	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958
Completed secondary School	315	500	880	1,100	1,300	1,500	1,600
Admissions to higher educational establishments:							
Resident (full and part-time)	237.5	281.7	299.1	285.6 ¹²	263.8	246.0 ¹³	245.0 ¹⁴
Correspondence	111.6	149.1	169.9	175.8	194.9	180.0	195.0 ¹⁴
Admissions to professional secondary schools:							
Resident (full and part-time)	365.1	486.0	509.5 ¹⁵	478.7 ¹⁶	464.3 ¹⁷		
Correspondence	61.2	72.0	85.3	108.8	130.3		

Higher Education

Establishments of higher education in Russia fall into two categories: universities and specialised institutions. Universities tend to continue the tradition of pursuing knowledge for its own sake

¹² Full-time, 257.2; part-time, 28.5.

¹³ Full-time, 213.0; part-time, 33.0.

¹⁴ These are the planned figures: full-time, 205.0; part-time, 40.0.

¹⁵ Of whom between 115.0 and 120.0 had already completed ten-class secondary education.

¹⁶ Full-time, 424.0; part-time, 54.8; over 230.0 had already completed ten-class secondary education.

¹⁷ Of whom 306.0 had already completed ten-class secondary education.

rather than training people for specific jobs. Thus, the government's decision of 1956 that the majority of graduates from arts faculties would in future be employed as secondary school teachers, and that therefore the universities should train them as such, has met with considerable resistance within the universities as being contrary to the spirit of university education. On the whole the universities have a higher standing than the special institutes, though the recently created ones are hardly more than the pedagogical institutes which have served as their base. There are now forty universities within the USSR, out of a total of about 900 higher educational establishments. University students for 1955/56 (the last year for which full figures are available) numbered 115,652 (excluding correspondence students) out of a total of 1,227,900 students at all higher educational establishments, *i.e.*, about 9 per cent.

Among the great multiplicity of special institutions, there are a few which stand out as a kind of technical university. They are normally called Polytechnical, Technological or Industrial Institutes, and offer not only a variety of specialised courses but also some general courses in technological subjects which are fully up to university level; indeed, in an industrial city like Sverdlovsk it is the Polytechnical Institute rather than the University which enjoys the higher status. The length of courses of study in these Institutes, as in universities, is five to six years. As to the quality of training in these Institutes, a comparative study recently undertaken in America¹⁸ shows that the best of them—such as the Moscow Higher Technical School—correspond roughly in their curricula and levels of achievement to the best that exists in the West—such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This, incidentally, is not the result of any “cultural revolution” that is supposed to have taken place during the Soviet period; one should not forget that people like Lobachevsky, Mendeleyev and Pavlov were educated in nineteenth-century Russia.

This is not to say, of course, that all higher educational establishments are of this high quality; on the contrary, the majority of them are rather narrowly specialised institutes (*e.g.*, the Astrakhan Fishing Institute) with a four- to five-year course, and at the lowest levels are more comparable to a good professional secondary school than to a university. It is important to remember this when comparing Soviet and British figures for higher education, since British

¹⁸ Korol—see footnote 1.

statistics normally give only figures for universities plus the Manchester and Glasgow Colleges of Science and Technology. The following table shows the total number of all students (excluding correspondence), grouped under subjects of study, receiving higher education in the years 1950/51 and 1955/56 (in thousands).

Subjects	1950/51	1955/56
Industry, Building, Transport & Communications	268.2	497.7
Agriculture	89.4	150.0
Economics & Law	43.1	47.3
Medicine, Physical Culture, & Sport	108.1	152.4
Education (<i>i.e.</i> , all university students, plus Pedagogical and Library Institute students)	322.1	368.0
Art (incl. Music & Drama)	14.2	12.5

Since 1956 no fees have been payable in higher educational establishments, and needy students with a good academic record receive grants towards their living expenses graded in accordance with the year of study and the relative importance of the course of study being followed; this in fact means that some technological and scientific students receive preferential treatment.

The declared government policy on higher education is now not expansion (except in the Eastern regions of the country and for engineers and technologists), but "deepening," that is, raising the level—which, in Soviet conditions, includes the level of political conformity. In pursuit of this policy, the number of vacancies for full-time students has been consistently reduced since 1955, as we have seen, and in 1957 and 1958 successive alterations to the rules of admission were made. According to this year's rules, up to 80 per cent. of students admitted to each institution must have worked for at least two years in industry or agriculture (or else have completed National Service), and must produce certificates from their employers and from the Party authorities testifying to their performance and behaviour. Moreover, representatives of the Party and its subsidiary organisations (the Komsomol and the trade unions) are henceforth to sit on the Admissions Committees of all institutions, reviving the worst practice of the 1920s and early '30s. (It is interesting to note here that the means by which the Communist authorities are now trying to reduce the dangers of student non-conformity—so clearly demonstrated during the

autumn events of 1956—are essentially the same as those of the pre-1905 autocratic regime in Russia.) The extent to which this policy is limiting the opportunities for higher education is evident from the fact that out of the total of 1,600,000 secondary school-leavers this year, only some 40,000 (that is, 20 per cent. of the planned admissions to full-time higher education) may be able to proceed directly to further study, *i.e.*, one in forty.¹⁹

Within the framework of these regulations, how are the best brains picked for those subjects of study where the authorities are anxious to have good brains? The main channel for them is the 20 per cent. of places reserved for applicants direct from school. These have to undergo a very stiff competitive examination. Moreover, through school societies and the junior sections of learned societies, professors come in contact with the most outstanding school pupils, will encourage them to apply to the most suitable institution, and will later try to get them admitted.

The following table, taken from the Soviet journal *Sotsialisticheskii Trud* (No. 3, 1958), gives an interesting comparison between Soviet and American higher education.

	1940		1950		1955	
	USSR	USA	USSR	USA	USSR	USA
Persons completing higher education (in thousands)	126.1	186.5	176.9	331.9	245.8	292.9 ²⁰
Per million of pop.	660	1,429	931	2,133	1,229	1,789
Technological graduates (in thousands)	30	15	36	53	66	23
Percentage proportion of total graduates	24	8	20	16	27	8

The Teachers

The supply of teachers for primary and secondary schools is numerically quite satisfactory at present. In fact, as a result of the fall in the number of pupils in recent years, the pupil/teacher ratio has become very favourable, as the following table shows (the figures include part-time teachers).

¹⁹ However, last year, when the regulations provided for up to 60 per cent. of places for applicants with two years' work experience, only 27 per cent. of those admitted fulfilled this condition; so this year, too, the position may not be as bad as it could be.

²⁰ For 1954.

Year	No. of Teachers (thousands)	Pupil/Teacher ratio
1914/15	231	34
1922/23	223	33
1929/30	395	34
1931/32	573	37
1940/41	1,216	29
1945/46	1,043	25
1947/48	1,188	25
1950/51	1,433	23
1952/53	1,531	20
1953/54	1,577	20
1955/56	1,655	17
1956/57	1,727	16

The average number of pupils per primary school (classes 1-4, ages seven to eleven), having declined from seventy-eight in 1940/41 to thirty-three in 1953/54, rose slightly to reach thirty-seven in 1956/57. In view of the small size of the primary schools, it is not surprising to find that 57.3 per cent. of them had, in 1954/55 (figures are not available for later years), only one teacher, and a further 32.6 per cent. only two.

Teachers' qualifications differ according to the classes they teach. Teachers of the upper classes in full secondary schools are supposed to have higher education (Pedagogical Institute or university); those of classes 5-7 were, until recently, trained in special Teachers' Institutes which gave a two-year course on the basis of nine or ten years of general secondary education, but these Institutes have now been abolished and the aim is to train teachers for these classes in full Pedagogical Institutes; teachers for the primary classes 1-4 are required to have professional secondary education which is acquired in pedagogical schools. The following table shows the actual educational level of teachers in the year 1955/56, as a percentage of all teachers for the relevant classes (excluding teachers of music, art and physical training, headmasters, and their assistants).

Education	Classes 1-4	5-7	8-10 (11)
Higher Education	1.0 per cent.	17.3 per cent.	77.4 per cent.
Teachers' Institutes	3.3 " "	53.6 " "	18.8 " "
Pedagogical Secondary	86.7 " "	22.1 " "	2.4 " "
Other Secondary	6.9 " "	6.5 " "	1.3 " "
Incomplete Secondary	2.1 " "	0.5 " "	0.1 " "

A comparison with the only other year for which there are full figures, 1950/51, shows that the level of teachers' training has improved with one important exception: the proportion of those with higher education appears to be declining—it was 20.1 per cent. for classes 5-7 in 1950/51, and 78.9 per cent. for the upper classes. This may be due to the great expansion of full secondary education and the decline in the number of pupils in classes 5-7. It is interesting to note that teachers as a whole appear to be an aging race, except for those in the upper classes: whereas in 1950/51, 33 per cent. of the teachers of the first four classes had a teaching experience of up to five years, and 7.6 per cent. of twenty-five years or more, the figures for 1955/56 were 18.3 per cent. and 10.1 per cent. respectively; the corresponding figures for the classes 5-7 are 40.4 per cent. and 7.4 per cent. in 1950/51, as against 29.3 per cent. and 6.9 per cent. in 1955/56.

No statistics of teachers' remuneration are published. The official scales provide for graded salaries according to the teacher's level of education, the classes he is teaching, his experience, and the type of locality (urban or rural); there is no discrimination between men and women. The starting salary of a primary school teacher is about 580 roubles per month before deductions, which, taking the actual current value of one rouble as 6d. (the figure which to my knowledge is accepted by British economists working in the field), gives a monthly gross salary of £14 10s.; the obvious insufficiency of this salary is to some extent ameliorated by the fact that many village school teachers receive free accommodation and fuel. In secondary schools the average salary appears to be between 800 and 1,000 roubles a month, that is, between £20 and £25. By virtue of their higher or professional secondary education, teachers belong to the category of people known in the Soviet Union as "specialists," which enjoys a higher social status and certain legal privileges in comparison with the rest of the "toilers." Among the specialists, however, teachers have traditionally occupied the lowest position, and there is no indication that this is likely to change in the foreseeable future.

THE LABOUR PARTY'S POLICY FOR EDUCATION

W. O. LESTER SMITH

THE Education Act of 1944 was a product of coalition, and the task of converting it into a living reality cannot be fulfilled without a continuance of that underlying unity so evident when it was enacted. For this reason one is inclined to look at party pronouncements about education with some trepidation, for it is always possible that they will contain some proposal or adopt an attitude that will disrupt the unity so essential to advance. In the past education has suffered so grievously as a result of sectarian and party strife that it would be tragic if it again fell a victim to divisive influences. "The longer I live," Lord Attlee observed when he was Prime Minister, "the more I value toleration as being the essence of civilisation and the foundation of democracy. Toleration does not mean that one should not hold one's views strongly. I have not myself very much use for Laodiceans . . . but it does mean that one should respect the right of other people to their own opinions." Happily the pamphlet *Learning to Live*, in which the Labour Party expounds its educational policy, is admirable in its tone and temper; and except for a phrase here and there—e.g., "deliberate Government inertia"—it eschews the language of polemics. Unlike much political literature about education, it shows an intimate knowledge of schools and of how our complex educational system works; and its approach to problems is human and, indeed, child-centred. As well as being an important statement of policy, it is also a valuable and very readable survey of education in our time "from Nursery School to University."

A Practical Manifesto

The pamphlet had a good reception in the educational Press. *The Times Educational Supplement* commented: "There is much good sense in the Labour Party's statement of policy on education. It is coherent and it leavens the Socialist ideal with a sensible notion of what is practicable. It sees the need for reform but does not

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THE LABOUR PARTY'S POLICY FOR EDUCATION

muddle reform with revolution. And recognising that New Jerusalem is not built in a day it is content to put first things first." While *Education*, the organ of the Association of Education Committees, summed up its reactions with the observation: "Taken by and large, this political manifesto on educational policy is of high standard and should contribute a great deal not only to the contentious, though necessary, business of politics, but also to the identification of agreed objectives which cut across party shibboleths." It gains much in practical value by concentrating on a five-year programme, and another commendable feature is its honest readiness to admit that, putting first things first, there are several desirable objectives that cannot be accorded priority. Thus, referring to nursery education and the importance of meeting the demand for it, it remarks: "A Labour Government could not undertake to give this part of education the same priority as it must give to smaller classes and the four-year secondary course; but this does not mean that no advance could be made. In the 1960's the number of children in junior and infant departments of primary schools will fall. Buildings that can be adapted to nursery education will be available, and local authorities will be encouraged not to neglect this opportunity."

Finance and Administration

The statement does not attempt any estimate of the cost of its proposals. Instead it reiterates what was said in an earlier Labour Party manifesto, *Challenge to Britain*—"We must see that the money is found, even if it means going without other things." It justifies this demand for more money for education from rates and taxes by pointing out that the £600 million now being spent on education is still, as in 1938, no more than about 3 per cent. of the national income. Lord Hailsham, when Minister of Education, made much the same plea, but there is a sharp clash between the parties about how funds available from taxation should be distributed. In this statement the Labour Party roundly condemns the Conservative Government's plan of aiding local authority services as a whole by a general grant. "Labour," it declares, "will therefore return as soon as possible to the principle of a percentage grant for education. This will be undertaken as part of the general review of local government finance and of the financial arrangements between central and local government which will be carried out by the next Labour Government."

As well as a widespread belief that a general or block grant will lead in some areas to economies in education, there is a strong feeling in educational circles that the recent decision to end the percentage grant system will seriously weaken the valuable partnership between the central department and local education authorities, a partnership carefully built up during this century. The percentage grant system was introduced by Herbert Fisher, when President of the Board of Education, on the basis of the Kempe Committee's Report on Local Taxation, with the deliberate intention of fostering a sense of partnership. That it did this effectively the Ministry of Education affirms in the survey it produced in 1950 to mark the jubilee of the central department of education. "The story of the finance of public education in England and Wales during the last half century," the survey claims, "is in the main the story of the growth of an organic relationship between the central authority and the local education authorities set up by the Education Act of 1902. The idea of partnership between the two is now so well established and generally accepted that it is not always realised that it did not take real shape until the time of Fisher's tenure of office." The abolition of the percentage grant system has been widely deplored by educational leaders, irrespective of party: thus at the last Annual Conference of the Association of Education Committees Mr. R. G. Robinson, for so long the greatly respected Chairman of the Cardiff Education Committee, said that "as a Conservative of thirty years standing in local government, he had been shocked to the core at the complete indifference of the Government to the unanimous and universal expression of distrust and dislike of the block grant by all associations connected with education and all teachers' organisations." The proposal to restore the percentage grant system is the one instance in the Labour Party's statement of an intention to repeal a Conservative measure.

It is encouraging to note the strong support that the statement gives to the principle of partnership, the regard shown for the work of local education authorities, the appreciation of the services of governors and managers and the comment: "Delegation of responsibility in this way by the larger local authorities has enabled a wide range of people to take part in the administration of education." It is impossible to foresee what changes will come in the structure and powers of local authorities in the next few years, but we can expect developments especially in the conurbations and "special review areas." "Whatever the outcome," says this statement, "it is essential that the local authority responsible for

providing the education service has sufficient population and financial resources to carry out the task properly. There must also be an adequate system of decentralisation to ensure that the local interests at present intimately concerned with the management of schools and groups of schools are retained. At the same time we must be careful not to create too unwieldy and expensive an administrative machine." With such views there will be wide agreement irrespective of party, and there will be general approval of this comment on "good administration": "It must include respect by the local authorities, managers, and governors of schools for the status of the head teacher and his assistants. Good central government respects the special province of the local authorities; good local government approaches its teachers in the same spirit."

Priorities

Having wisely set a five-year limit to its programme, the Party was confronted with the difficult problem of selecting its objectives for that period. It realised that the scope of its programme would be governed largely by the number of teachers and by the man-power available for building and the provision of other needs. Dealing first with "those items of school policy which compete with each other for teachers, buildings, and materials" the statement summarises the programme decided upon in these words: "Labour announces as definite objectives for the next few years: reduction of the size of classes; replacement of slum schools; the disappearance of all-age schools; the full four-year secondary course and provision for the needs of all handicapped children." Few will disagree with this selection of immediate needs and, indeed, except for the proposal about the secondary course all the items have ranked as urgent objectives for some time. The proposal to institute a full four-year secondary course is made because the Party recognises that it will not be practicable within the period of the programme to raise the leaving age to sixteen. The 1944 Act imposes on the Minister the duty to raise the school-leaving age to sixteen as soon as he is satisfied that this is practicable. To do this would require at least 16,000 more teachers but the supply of teachers is not adequate for this purpose nor, having regard to other claims, is it likely to be within the next five years. So as the best practicable alternative the Labour Party proposes to amend the law, which now requires pupils to stay at school until the end of the term in which they become fifteen, and make it compulsory for them to stay at school to the end

of the school year—not the term—in which they become fifteen. The educational advantages of pupils remaining at school to complete a well-considered course hardly need to be stated, but the pamphlet rightly notes that the large exodus of boys and girls at the end of the school year will put an added responsibility on Youth Employment Officers, already hard pressed as a result of the extra numbers seeking suitable employment now that children of the high birth-rate years are leaving school. The proposal is, however, both practicable and sound.

Somewhat optimistically the statement forecasts “some progress” within the five years towards further objectives of the Party’s school policy—the establishment of a five-year secondary course and the general provision of county colleges. But most of these objectives, both immediate and long-term, depend upon an adequate supply of suitably qualified teachers. The Party fully realises that this is the most crucial problem. “The greatest single obstacle to educational advance,” it declares, “is the shortage of teachers. A determined government can, by the exercise of its own will, find money and erect buildings in a comparatively short time, but men and women have to be persuaded to become teachers, and years must be spent in training them.” The statement criticises the Government for not securing more teachers, but it should be said that there were over 250,000 teachers serving in primary and secondary schools in 1957 as against 209,000 in 1950 when Labour was in office. There is general agreement that many more teachers are required: many for immediate needs, and many more from a long-term standpoint. At the annual conference of the Association of Education Committees attention was drawn to a statement that Sir Geoffrey Crowther had made to the Minister to the effect that whatever reforms his Council might eventually suggest—he is Chairman of the Central Advisory Council for Education for England—the two basic reforms of raising the school-leaving age to sixteen and introducing county colleges, together with a decent reduction in the size of classes, would require 90,000 more teachers in 1970 than were in the service in 1956.

Apart from long-term considerations there is this immediate need for a substantial increase in order to reduce the size of classes. Emphasising the gravity of the problem, the Party statement gives recent statistics: “Under existing grant regulations no class in a primary school is supposed to contain more than forty children, and no class in a secondary school more than thirty. It has not been possible to enforce this regulation. We have now 4,400,000 children

in primary schools, and one-third of them are being taught in classes of over forty children; we have 2,400,000 children in secondary schools, and two-thirds of them are in classes of over thirty children.” And the statement goes on to explain the harm done by over-size classes, describing them as “a great handicap” which “no amount of devoted effort by teachers, nor any excellence of school building, can offset.” And it adds, “in such classes the child with exceptional gifts is in danger of becoming bored for lack of enough to occupy its mind and the child who needs more than average help towards learning is bewildered and discouraged.”

The Staffing Problem

The problem of staffing schools adequately is, however, not just one of recruiting many more teachers. In the years immediately after the last war the stress was rightly on numbers, both to fill the gaps in the service and to meet the requirements of the older leaving age. We owe much to the imaginative leadership at the Ministry during that period which produced and inspired the invaluable Emergency Training Scheme. But today the need is very different. For we have reached a stage in the implementation of the 1944 Act when success or failure largely hinges on our ability to match year by year the curriculum requirements of the schools. When you reflect on the great variety of their needs and the recruits’ freedom of choice, it seems a super-human task. The demand, as a glance at the advertisements in the educational press will show, is remarkably diversified and it is always changing and fluctuating. There was a time when training for infant and junior teaching was spoken of as if it was much the same thing; today our greater knowledge of the needs of early childhood has made the primary as well as the secondary stage an affair of specialisms. Similarly, greater insight into the needs of children with different handicaps makes the Special School demand more and more exacting.

As for the secondary stage, whatever our views may be about the place of the form teacher, we recognise as never before that every school requires its specialists if essential alternative studies are to be catered for. Add to this the particular requirements of the dual system and you have a truly formidable demand for a diversity of teachers. A great deal has been done towards meeting these varied requirements but, as this Party statement reminds us, there are regrettable shortages, of which that of mathematics and science teachers is the most serious. But even more important than

matching the growing demand for specialists is to ensure, as far as possible, that all who teach have had a good education and have been adequately prepared for their vocation. As far back as 1946 the then Minister of Education accepted in principle the strong recommendation of the McNair Committee that the general Training College course of two years should be lengthened to three years. This vital reform has been held back ever since because of the need for additional teachers but it is now recognised that there should be no further delay. It is good to find the Labour Party in this statement wholeheartedly welcoming the decision of the Government to introduce the three-year course in 1960. The lengthening of the course is yet another reason for increasing the rate of recruitment and expanding Training College accommodation so that larger numbers can be accepted for admission. The Government has already put in hand a first instalment of an expansion programme, and the Minister has said that he is consulting the National Advisory Council for the Training and Supply of Teachers as to what further expansion is necessary. The more zest the Labour Party can infuse into these endeavours the better, and it is encouraging to find in its statement its own proposals for expansion and for a vigorous recruiting campaign.

Demands for well-educated manpower are a characteristic of our time and come from almost every sphere of activity. This statement not only calls for many more teachers for our schools, but also makes several other demands for additional well-qualified personnel by an early date. It takes very much the same line about the Youth Service as did King George's Jubilee Trust in their report *Citizens of Tomorrow*, and wants to see it "a reality and not a sham." But, as it rightly says, "we cannot hope to foster a varied and developing Youth Service without a nucleus of trained, full-time leaders. At present there are probably less than 1,000 of these in the whole country; this force must be at least trebled." Again, in the course of an excellent chapter on "Technical and Scientific Education" it gives its full backing to the recommendations in the Willis Jackson Report on *The Supply and Training of Teachers in Technical Colleges*. On the subject of immediate staffing needs, the Willis Jackson Committee's recommendations were:

1. Full-time staff in technical colleges should be increased from 11,500 in 1955-56 to 18,600 in 1960-61; and part-time staff from 39,000 in 1955-56 to 47,000 in 1960-61.
2. In order to achieve the total of 18,600 full-time teachers in service by 1960-61, average annual recruitment between

1955-56 and 1960-61 should be increased from the present 1,300 to 2,300; in particular, recruitment of science and mathematics graduates should be increased from 300 to 400 and of graduate technologists from 150 to 360.

The Universities

Again, in the chapter on *Universities* the statement urges expansion and "some new universities." While this in due course will enlarge the supply of well-qualified personnel, it will first involve many new teaching appointments in universities for which men and women of outstanding ability in particular fields of study will have to be found. Some ask whether the nation has a large enough reservoir of able citizens to meet the demands that come so insistently from so many quarters. In a little peroration at the end of this statement we are given the Labour Party's answer to this question: "During the war, great numbers of people mastered skills and acquired knowledge they had never before imagined to be within their grasp. Today we are slipping back into the old underestimate of the abilities of our people. If our nation declines, either in prosperity or dignity, it will not be for lack of natural talent; it will be because those who possess that talent never passed through the doorway that led to its full development. Open the door!"

Controversial Issues

A fair measure of continuity is necessary for the good administration of education, and orderly advance becomes difficult, if not impossible, both at the centre and locally if electoral changes involve reversals of policy of a fundamental character. Differences of attitude and emphasis are to be expected, and it is in the nature of things that the party in opposition should be critical of the administration of the party in office. While this statement expresses a distinctive point of view and in almost every page reminds us that it is voicing party opinion, it is not unmindful of the importance of continuity and the comments that it has evoked both from opponents and from others with no party axe to grind have been appreciative of its quality. While the Minister of Education has criticised its secondary school proposals vehemently he has also been complimentary. "In particular," he said with reference to the statement, "I think we can all agree that real priorities in the education service are more and better teachers, and more and better school buildings. This is the hard core of our common problem,

and it is of great value to have public attention focused on these basic needs." And he added, "In this respect we are now very close to an all-party policy for education." The Chairman of the Conservative Parliamentary Education Committee, Mr. Gilbert Longden, has in an article in *Education* expressed agreement with all the main proposals except those for secondary education which he describes somewhat euphemistically as "a rift in this hitherto harmonious lute." He welcomes the proposal in the statement that there should be a royal commission on universities, and agrees with the view that, because some universities could not expand without overcrowding the town in which they are situated some new universities must be created.

The organisation of secondary education for all is such a difficult administrative problem and involves consideration of such debatable issues, educational and social, that it is not surprising that there are fundamental differences of opinion. The important chapter about it in this statement lacks that unambiguous clarity that distinguishes the rest of the pamphlet. It is entitled "Comprehensive Secondary Education," and much of it is devoted to a condemnation of "segregation at eleven." "The main feature and defect of this system," the document states, "is that it labels children at this early age as belonging to different 'types' and segregates them into different kinds of school, each with a curriculum supposedly suitable for one type of child." And it contends, "We can deliver ourselves from this evil by adopting the principle of comprehensive secondary education." At times the argument seems to point to the conclusion that this means a system of comprehensive schools, of which there are as yet only forty-nine in the whole country, twenty-one of them being located in London. They are all comparatively new, and on such limited experience it was obviously difficult to suggest the universal adoption of the comprehensive school as the only kind of secondary school. But the case for this type of school is well argued, and some of the points against it are rebutted. For example, the contention that the gifted child will fare less well in a comprehensive school than he does in a grammar school is discussed, and dismissed as contrary to the evidence. "Granted that we have at present few comprehensive schools," the statement observes, "and that we need more and longer experience before advancing dogmatic claims; we are none the less obliged to notice that such evidence there is points in exactly the opposite direction to that suggested in the argument set out above." This is a crucial point and it would have been helpful to have had some indication

of the evidence, and also to know the basis for the opinion that "the successes of the gifted children in comprehensive schools are no less than those of comparable children in grammar schools." And what is meant by success?

There will be different interpretations of this chapter, and already there have been some at a high level. The Minister of Education has found in it "the smell of death" for existing grammar, modern, and technical schools, while Mr. Gaitskell has described this as "complete nonsense," adding that "it would be nearer the truth to describe our proposals as a grammar school education for all." Some will ponder over the emotive word "segregation," and wonder why if it is so wrong when applied to grammar and modern schools, it should continue to be tolerated in public schools, which the statement leaves unscathed to thrive or struggle in the fickle climate of *laissez faire*. Many will hope that the last section of this chapter, headed "Variety of Ways" will provide for grammar, modern, and the few technical schools a means of survival. The high regard, which so many of us have, for the good work that the new comprehensive schools are doing should not blind us to the fact that they are all still in the pioneer stage and we have yet much to learn about them. Let us hope that statesmanship and tolerance will prevail, and that if Labour comes to power the principle of "Variety of Ways" will be generously applied. Otherwise we must expect controversy as bitter as that which halted educational advance in the nineteenth century.

THE BATTLE FOR THE MAGHREB

THOMAS HODGKIN

THE battle for the Maghreb has been continuing now for nearly four years. For it was on November 1, 1954, that the Algerian revolt broke out, one by-product of which was the granting of political concessions, and eventually independence, to Tunisia and Morocco, in order that French military power might be concentrated upon an effort to suppress the revolution in Algeria. It is as well to keep clearly in mind what this "pacification" has meant in terms of human misery. The scale of destruction in Algeria already approaches genocide. "Genocide" was indeed the term frequently used by the Algerians with whom I talked last summer to describe the exterminations taking place. Half a million Algerians killed since the outbreak of the revolution was FLN's figure, put out over the Tunis radio. Till I went to Algeria I thought this an exaggeration. I hope it may be. But sitting with Algerians, military and civilian; in the mountains, men with detailed local knowledge, I came to believe it possible: so many dead in Duvivier; so many in Bône; so many in Philippeville. The French casualty figures themselves tell part of the story—when it is remembered that the official phrase "rebels killed" means, in large part, "old men, mothers, young children, killed."

I know that there are those who believe this way of presenting the situation pays too little attention to the acts of terrorism and sabotage organised by FLN. Such methods are certainly used. I have met some of the Partisans, attached to regular units of the Algerian Army of Liberation, whose special task it is to carry out terrorist activities. But one must bear in mind that there has scarcely been a national revolution in history in which the weapons of terrorism have not been employed. Moreover, as the Army of Liberation has become stronger, better organised, and better equipped, there has been an increasing emphasis upon military operations of the usual guerilla type—*ambuscades* and *accrochages*. In any case there can be no conceivable moral justification for the use, by the agents of the French State, of the methods of mass killing and torture of which we have ample and authentic record.

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I know too that it is hard to believe these things about the French. It is hard to believe that the system which enjoys the support of these kindly, civilised French bourgeois, harmlessly drinking their aperitifs in the pleasant cafés around St. Sulpice, has been maintained by the maiming, electrocuting, suffocating, of the living bodies of thousands of Algerians, as well as of numbers of their fellow Frenchmen who have preserved their independence of mind. It is hard to convince oneself that what these noble phrases about Algeria remaining permanently French really amount to, in hard coin, is—"Let the destruction of villages, the tortures, and the executions, continue." Yet one has only to spend a few days, not necessarily in Algeria even, but on the Tunisian or the Moroccan side of the frontier, talking with the refugees, to know that this is so. How is this dominant French attitude—challenged consistently and courageously by men like Bourdet and Sartre, Massignon and Julien—to be explained? As a special kind of madness, or mental disease, from which we ourselves are by no means immune, which seems to afflict nations that have lost imperial greatness—whose symptoms are a peculiar myopia, a withdrawal into a world of fantasy, a sense of irresponsibility for the consequences of one's actions? A disease which compels its victims to ignore, or deny, the facts of the case; attribute disaster to a wicked conspiracy against France's honour, in which Egypt, the United States, Russia, Britain, and the United Nations (proportions to taste), are all involved; trust that the army is settling it all; and continue to drink one's aperitif, serenely—if it were not that Michel's call-up is due in the autumn.

What are the prospects of the new societies that are being born, with so much pain and difficulty, in the Maghreb? What matters most, perhaps, in the long run is that the Maghreb possesses a basic unity: a much more definite, down-to-earth, politically relevant kind of unity than the more generalised sense of belonging together that is shared by all Arab peoples. Maghreb unity is not merely an aspiration, but a fact. It is the product of many forces: among them the ancient Berber tradition of democratic organisation and resistance to external authority, expressed in the fourth century by the Donatists and Circumcelliones; in the struggle led by Kahina, the seventh-century Jewish priestess-queen, against the invading Arabs; and, somewhat later, in the Kharijist assertion of the principle of an elected Caliphate. The women who fight today with the Algerian Army of Liberation, or secretly sew uniforms and organise supplies, are in a real sense heirs to this tradition. The

great early periods of Maghreb civilisation, under the Almoravids and Almohads, when the region was for a time united under a single government, are a reminder that what has been achieved can be achieved again. From Agadir to Gabès, or even to Tripoli, one has the sense of moving within a single world, within which political frontiers have little meaning. This sense of unity has now been reinforced by common experience of French imperial rule, and the adoption of the French language and French intellectual tools to challenge the assumptions of that rule. (This is not, of course, to say that the Arabic tool has been neglected, but rather supplemented and refined.)

The national movements of the Maghreb are thus a synthesis of the Arab-Berber and the French revolutionary traditions. They have acquired a toughness, a realism, and a capacity for efficient organisation which, I suspect, are less evident in other parts of the Arab world. They are certainly most unlike the familiar Western stereotype of Arab nationalism—romantic, xenophobic, rhetorical, anarchic, incompetent, fanatical, and so forth. Visiting the Neo-Destour Youth Centre beside the Mediterranean at Bir-al-Bey, where 150 delegates go every week or fortnight from youth groups throughout Tunisia, listening to their national songs and discussion-groups, I thought how remote this was from all that Westerners have in mind when they apply, or misapply, the label “oriental”: a combination of popular initiative and self-imposed discipline that was full of promise.

There is, moreover, a basic community of purpose among the national movements in the three territories which is the new, and probably the most powerful, factor contributing to this sense of Maghreb unity. The dominant political organisations in each territory—Istiqlal in Morocco, Neo-Destour in Tunisia, and FLN in Algeria—which met last April in conference in Tangier, have been shaped by the same basic ideas: Sheikh Mohammed ‘Abdu and Shakib Arslan having been formative influences, as much as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Karl Marx. Their parent bodies developed during the inter-war period in semi-clandestine, semi-legal, symbiotic relationship. Nationalist, non-communist trade union movements, in revolt against CGT assimilationism, have emerged since the last war in all three territories, similar in structure and outlook, with fraternal inter-relationships, the Tunisian UGTT having taken the lead. The same kind of interlocking takes place among student organisations.

What all this means, in my view, is that the political unification

of the Maghreb in some form is to be expected as the natural, though not necessarily immediate, consequence of Algerian liberation. The principle has in fact been accepted by all three political movements. More immediately it means, as a Moroccan once put it to me, that the same logic which led France, having once laid hands upon Algeria, eventually to grasp the entire Maghreb, now obliges Morocco and Tunisia, having expelled French power from their territories, to ensure its withdrawal from Algeria also. No Moroccan or Tunisian government could choose otherwise. The solidarity of Istiqlal and Neo-Destour with FLN, expressed through a web of non-official ties and services, as King Mohammed V and President Bourguiba well know, is a basic postulate of Moroccan and Tunisian foreign policy. No paper projects, whose real object is to preserve the power of the French Army and *colons* in Algeria a little longer—*Loi Cadre*, limited autonomy, total integration, a federal France—can alter the brute fact that the Maghreb is one. An independent Morocco and Tunisia and an Algeria integrated with France make about as much sense, politically, as an “independent” Scotland and Wales and an England integrated with Germany would have made in 1940.

This essential unity of the Maghreb includes within it differences, rooted in history, between the political climates of the three territories, which have their bearing on the characters of the new societies which are now emerging.

Superficially the Tunisian situation seems the most clear-cut—with its single dominant political party, the most mature of all African parties, Neo-Destour; its single dominant statesman, Habib Bourguiba, a man of remarkable intellectual and political gifts, a “*grand bon homme*,” as one of his critics called him; and its single dominant ideology, *Bourguibisme*, which seems the Tunisian equivalent for the Greek notion of *sophrosyne*—an emphasis upon moderation, restraint, the use of reason in politics, constitutionalism, Fabian tactics. The party itself is certainly a marvellously organised, perhaps over-bureaucratized, instrument of government, from which, I suspect, Mr. Morgan Phillips could learn a good deal. Most impressive is the great central filing cabinet, containing cards (differently coloured according to party rank) for each of the eight or ten *responsables* of all the 1,700 odd *cellules*, and all the forty-three *federations*, of which Neo-Destour is composed—each card containing full personal information and photograph of the *responsable* concerned. But Neo-Destour is operationally, and not merely organisationally, impressive, with its wide range of social

activities, conducted directly or through its subsidiaries: *relèvement sociale*, youth camps, Bourguiba homes for orphans and neglected children, refugee relief, assistance to farmers, pressure for women's emancipation, school-building efforts, boy scouts, and girl guides. In principle, the party serves at the same time as a sounding-board for the expression of popular opinion; as a parliament within which political conflicts can be reconciled; and as a powerful agency of social reconstruction. But so long as Tunisia's relations with France oscillate between uneasy truce and undeclared war, the position is precarious: the pro-Western aspects of Bourguibisme are increasingly challenged; and Neo-Destour has to be ready to transform itself into a citizen army.

In Morocco there are three obvious complicating factors: a charismatic monarchy; a frontier open to the south; and an economy much more seriously disrupted than that of Tunisia by the French withdrawal. The unique position of King Mohammed V, as representative of a 300-year-old dynasty, descendant of the Prophet, Commander of the Faithful, symbol of national renaissance, identified with progressive causes, patron of the trade unions, and so forth, has given rise to a kind of unstable equilibrium between monarchy and dominant party. Istiqlal possesses the same kind of mass basis, hierarchical structure, and predominance throughout the nation, as Neo-Destour; but it has achieved a lesser degree of internal discipline, and since, as yet, it must govern with the king, it lacks Neo-Destour's complete authority. (Allal al-Fâsi, the party's main founder and leader, who stands outside the Government, retains great importance within the party as the reconciler of opposing standpoints.) Moreover, the fact that to the south lies a vast *terra irredenta*, linked historically with Morocco by ties of culture, religion, and ancient suzerainty—the region of the western Sahara known as *Shinqit*—means that an Army of Liberation (the *Armée de Libération du Grand Sahara*), in loose association with Istiqlal, is in intermittent conflict with French and Spanish power in Mauretania, Tindouf, and Rio de Oro. The known mineral resources of the region, and French desires to control their exploitation, increase the tension. So this southern liberation movement operates as a third force within the Moroccan system. And the UMT, the radical trade union organisation, while it works in close association with the left wing of Istiqlal, should probably be regarded as a fourth, particularly in the great port and industrial centre of Casablanca, where unemployment is heavy, and a politically conscious working-class has emerged. The common danger

of the Algerian war keeps these forces in some kind of equilibrium for the present. And the tide is doubtless likely to continue to flow in Istiqlal's direction.

In the case of Algeria, there is the special difficulty that so much of what passes for information is French official apologetics—manufactured in Algiers or Paris. What is clear is that there is a classic type of revolutionary situation which, in spite of the absence of communist leadership, bears a marked resemblance to the war-time revolutions in Yugoslavia or Greece. For the most part the patriots control the mountains; the French military and *colons* control the plains, the towns, the main lines of communication—though subject, of course, to continual attack. The needs of the revolution have produced typical revolutionary institutions in the areas wholly or partly controlled by FLN: local assemblies; courts; taxation; rudimentary social services; political education. At each level a *commissaire politique* within the Army of Liberation is responsible for co-operation with, and supervision of, these civil agencies. The Army and FLN are the military and political wings of a single movement, with its central Council and inner directorate (the nine-man *Comité de Co-ordination et Exécution*). In principle, the military leadership is subordinated to the political, and the leadership in exile is subordinated to the leadership within Algeria. Some voluntary Algerian collaborators with the French authorities remain, but not many. The past four years of political and military conflict have produced an intense consciousness of national unity that was not present at the outset of the revolt. "Lacoste has worked for us," as one Algerian grimly put it. There is no longer any reason to suppose that MNA (the organisation led by that grand old man of Algerian nationalism, Messali Hajj, at present an exile in Belle Ile) is more than a political façade; or that there is any effective force engaged in fighting the French which is not controlled by FLN. As in all resistance movements, executions of those condemned as "traitors" by the revolutionary courts take place—and these one may deplore; but not, I am convinced, the acts of senseless butchery which French propaganda has sought to attribute to FLN.

The temper of the *mujahidin*, the citizen-soldiers of this revolutionary army, naturally differs from that of the members of the nationalist parties. There is a more intense emphasis upon individual responsibility: every *mujahid* is responsible, and accountable, for everything that occurs. There is a fierce equalitarianism: leadership is collective; every individual is expected to exercise

leadership to the limits of his capacity. "Ferhat Abbas, Ben Bella—they are simply our delegates: they have been allotted their responsibilities, like the rest of us. Sidi Mohammed and Bourguiba no doubt suit the needs of Moroccans and Tunisians—but we have outgrown that kind of personality cult." The spirit of the Army is entirely secular: good Moslems say their prayers, but there is no suggestion that Islam is in any way involved in this struggle. There is sharp disapproval of any form of *racisme*: the only criterion is loyalty to the national cause. "The good French are on our side, and we protect them as we protect our own people, just as Algerian collaborators are enemies of the people. There is no serious risk of reprisals against the French minority once French military power is withdrawn: we have already taken precautions against that—the Army can maintain discipline." This intense pride in the Army—which is conceived as fighting the battle of the entire Maghreb, and in a sense of all Africa—is a continually recurring theme. The common criticism of "fanaticism," which has been levelled against the leaders and *militants* of FLN and of the Army is not one that seems to me confirmed by experience—except in so far as all revolutions tend to foster a singleness of purpose. On the whole they are rather unusually balanced, sober, self-critical people—these former pharmacists, school-teachers, regular NCO's from the French Army, mechanics, agricultural workers, students—who make up the Algerian New Model Army. And if you say to them—"You know the West thinks you are a lot of fanatics," they laugh, and say: "so much the worse for the West."

This rebirth of the Maghreb—its re-emergence as an independent centre of force—has important implications for the three regions with which historically it has been most closely associated—the Arab Middle East, the Western Sudan, and Western Europe. As regards the first of these zones, the Maghreb undoubtedly belongs to the Arab world, from the standpoint of culture and sentiment. Whether eventually some larger political system, including the Arab world in its entirety, will come into being is unpredictable. In such a system the Maghreb would have a valuable part to play. But in the immediate future its leaders are likely to be absorbed with creating their own form of federation, and with the pressing problems of reconstruction and readjustment associated with the ending of the colonial régime. There is in any case not the least likelihood that the Maghreb, with its tradition of independence, its population of over twenty million, its mineral resources, its effective popular organisations, and its confident new élites, will be

dominated by the United Arab Republic. The boot is rather on the other foot.

The old links between the Maghreb and West Africa south of the Sahara, *Afrique Noire*—which have been close at least since the eleventh century, when the Almoravids moved up from the Senegal river, founded Marrakesh, and established their power over Morocco and southern Spain—are now in process of being restored. At present the political leaders of the Maghreb and the new independent or near-independent states of West Africa—Ghana, Nigeria, AOF—are at the stage of discovering, or rediscovering, one another. The Accra Conference last April was significant perhaps chiefly because it revealed that there were certain common ideas and purposes uniting Arab North Africa and Africa south of the Sahara—beyond the mere rejection of European colonial power.

It is, of course, the relations with western Europe that present the Maghreb with its most difficult problems. If all that the rulers of France cared about was the protection of their legitimate interests—the maintenance of their economic and cultural ties with the Maghreb, a major part in the development of oil resources, and, above all, the safeguarding of the rights of the substantial French minorities—all this they could undoubtedly have, without war: Tunisia and Morocco already provide a partial pattern. But the maintenance of imperial power, the *Présence Française* in the old-fashioned colonial sense, the continued predominance of the *colons*, with a French Army of half a million to protect them—this is no longer possible. Hence there is a real danger that "Algeria will be the tomb of France" as the soldiers of the Army of Liberation used to say with the prophetic grimness of a Greek chorus: a tomb that might indeed be wide and deep enough to hold us all. For although the political leaders of the Maghreb have learned enough from recent history to wish to avoid spreading the area and scale of conflict at almost any cost, there is a limit to what human flesh and spirit can bear. If we had a Foreign Secretary of courage and imagination, he would be helping this nascent Maghreb to establish itself, instead of leaving the French to dig out their Cincinnatus, "a persistent opponent of the plebeians," who may, one fears, prove in the event to be a Galba: "*omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi imperasset.*"

1931

THE RT. HON. HUGH DALTON, M.P.

THE summer and autumn of 1931 were a period of political and economic crisis in Britain. The events of those months, now twenty-seven years behind us, caused great commotion, confusion, and passion at the time. Their effects on political and economic thinking, and feeling, have been persistent. Not least in the Labour Party, where not even the many fine successes of 1945-50 have yet quite wiped out the memory of guilty failure and shattering electoral defeat in 1931. The complete picture, and explanation, of that failure and defeat has not yet, perhaps, been filled in. A new study of those months of crisis might, therefore, be worth while.

But I find Mr. R. Bassett's *1931 Political Crisis* very disappointing.¹ The least interesting sort of book, said Graham Wallas, and the easiest for academic men to write, is a book about books. And that is what this is. Mr. Bassett has read a lot of books about the crisis of 1931, and a lot of newspapers. But that is all he knows. He is, by his own choice, a pure book-worm. He tells us that he has deliberately refrained from speaking to anyone who had any first-hand knowledge of these events. This decision, says Mr. Crossman in a review in the *New Statesman*, makes this "a silly book. Self-consciously remote from contemporary politics in an institution almost equidistant from Fleet Street and Westminster he has toiled over the historical sources and produced a mountain of a mouse."

Did Mr. Bassett, I wonder, never meet and talk with Ramsay MacDonald himself; or with his son Malcolm—he confesses to obtaining the latter's permission to quote from a letter written by him to Sidney Webb, but perhaps this permission was obtained by a solicitor or publisher; or even with Lord Elton, MacDonald's biographer, who has hitherto published only a first volume?²

Even without such live recording, Mr. Bassett's book is very long and repetitive. He quotes at immense length, not only the speeches and manifestos of politicians, but leading articles of newspapers, especially *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian*, and

¹ Macmillan, 1958; xvi and 464 pp.; 42s.

² Perhaps because "Mr. MacDonald's own papers," to the future publication of which Mr. Bassett, as he tells us several times, attaches great importance, don't effectively exist.

1931

the daily commentaries of their political and parliamentary correspondents. "Scissors and paste" we used to call this kind of thing.

Mr. Bassett, I understand, was a friend at Oxford of Evan Durbin and, less intimately, of Hugh Gaitskell. All three were members of the Labour Party. But in 1931 Mr. Bassett diverged from these two friends and, in the slightly sinister phrase then current, "went with MacDonald." He became and still remains, as this book shows, a most extreme and hero-worshipping MacDonaldite.

On pages 29-30 he quotes, within inverted commas, a series of most adulatory tributes to his hero, but without naming their authors, though he hints that these were among MacDonald's "political opponents and critics." He even regards MacDonald's writings as outstanding contributions to Socialist thought. I have never met any other academically trained man who thought this.³

Nowhere in these nearly five hundred pages is it allowed by Mr. Bassett that MacDonald ever entertained a mistaken, or even a confused, thought, or was ever moved by an ignoble emotion, or in action ever put a foot wrong. I doubt if any politician merits quite this fixed, unchanging gaze of adoration.

On the other hand, everyone who has opposed or criticised MacDonald is pulled to pieces to the best of Mr. Bassett's ability.

He links me with Mrs. Webb as one of the persistent "detractors" of MacDonald, and his index shows no less than thirty-one references to me, most of them to what I wrote in the first volume of my *Memoirs, Call Back Yesterday* (1953), and especially in Chapter XII, "End of the Second Labour Government." In most of these he merely quotes me, sometimes with eyebrow raised. He does not, I think, seriously shake my testimony as to what happened, though he resists some of the inferences which I draw. But on one point of difference between us he may well be right. This point illustrates, rather favourably, Mr. Bassett's method of textual criticism. So I cite it here.

I attended a meeting of Junior Ministers, summoned by MacDonald, on the afternoon of August 24. MacDonald told us that this meeting had originally been called to inform us that cuts

³ I myself, long before my judgment was influenced by 1931, thought them terribly woolly and tinged with Hegelian nonsense. See my *Inequality of Incomes*, 1920, p. 162n., and a critical reference in the first edition of my *Principles of Public Finance*, 1922, omitted in later editions to save space.

Mr. Bassett (p. 30n.) even blames Hugh Gaitskell for "making no allusion whatever to MacDonald in a publication entitled *Recent Socialist Thinking*."

would be made in all our salaries, as an economy measure. But now, he said, he had to tell us that the Labour Government was at an end. Describing this meeting in my *Memoirs*, I express the opinion that MacDonald was not candid in his account of the original purpose of the meeting, since, when summonses were sent out, the evening before, he had already decided on a "National" Government. Mr. Bassett argues that, when the summonses went out, the Cabinet was still waiting for the reply from the New York banker, which led to the break-up of the Cabinet. "The National Government," he says, "had not then been decided on in any sense of the phrase."⁴ This may well be true, and I concede the point to Mr. Bassett. My own comment was based on Henderson's statement to me on the morning of August 24, before the final Cabinet at noon, that MacDonald was "determined on the formation of a 'National' Government, containing Tories and Liberals, with himself as Prime Minister." This determination, no doubt, took final shape after the reply from New York had provoked nine resignations.

There has been much debate as to how long beforehand MacDonald had been toying with, or even planning, a National Government under his own Premiership. Mr. Bassett is at great pains to disprove any such "plot" by MacDonald.

"Plot" is an emotive word. I myself did not use it. But I have given much evidence in my *Memoirs*, and could have given more, of MacDonald's inclinations over a long period, and of his growing personal preference for many of his political "opponents" over most of his "supporters."

My view of MacDonald differs profoundly from Mr. Bassett's. But I have the advantage over Mr. Bassett that I knew MacDonald. I spent a very long time, in total, in his company. Apart from public occasions, which in Parliament, at public meetings, and in Annual Conferences, were innumerable, I had by 1931 sat for four years with him on the National Executive and, before the Labour Government of 1929, for three and a half years with him on the Parliamentary Party Executive in Opposition. We were never intimate, and I think that we often irritated each other. We had a different approach to many questions, and a different scale of values. I was a great admirer of Arthur Henderson, and never hid this fact, which did not please MacDonald.

In the early part of his career, before I knew him, MacDonald

rendered outstanding service to the Labour Party. With a few others, he ranks as one of its master-builders. But in the early nineteen-twenties he was already deteriorating. From then on, his weaknesses grew upon him. More and more he was vain, snobbish, self-pitying, shifty, preferring words to deeds, despising his own political associates. Had his wife lived, she would have protected him from some of his worst faults. Rich and titled persons would much less easily have spun their social webs around him. He would not then have preferred, as he did on one occasion, a week-end with Lord and Lady Londonderry at Wynyard Park near Stockton to an invitation to address the Durham Miners' Gala, including some thousands of his own constituents, only a few miles away.⁵

On economic questions he had no grip at any time, either on principles or details. He spoke on these, both in public and in private, only in banal generalities and rhetorical metaphors. And he luxuriated in seeing both sides, and in indecision. His successes, and some of these were notable, were in external affairs.

The central part of Mr. Bassett's book is a meticulous study in chronology. What happened at what hour on which day and who was there?

Was J. H. Thomas present, as Hoare alleges, as well as MacDonald and Snowden, when Labour Ministers met Neville Chamberlain and Hoare at 10 a.m. on August 20, or on the night of August 21?⁶

Did Samuel's reference in his *Memoirs* to "divisions in the Cabinet" refer to August 19 or 21?⁷

Mr. Bassett's answers to a multitude of such questions, generally no doubt the correct answers, correcting the carelessness or bad memory of other writers, constitute his chief claim to have done any original research. To me, I confess, such "research" seems a *tour de force* of tedious triviality.

Much more important, I think, and certainly to me much more interesting, is to recall what was said, at the time, on the causes of our troubles and the best way out, and to consider how far the judgments of those days make sense now.

⁵ When he refused the Durham miners' invitation, loyally pressed upon him months in advance, on the ground of a previous engagement, he did not tell them where he would be spending that week-end. This only came out later, when a miner's daughter, working as a domestic servant at Wynyard Park, innocently told her father, who told his Labour M.P.

⁶ p. 85 and p. 108.

⁷ p. 377.

I have given my own account of what I knew and thought about the crisis in the last chapter of the first volume of my *Memoirs*, and in what follows I shall repeat part of what I wrote then. I was not, in 1931, a member of the Cabinet. I was Arthur Henderson's Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office. I was also a member of the National Executive of the Labour Party.

There was little detailed discussion of policy on the National Executive before 1931; only election programmes in very general terms, and at Annual Conferences improvisations by a few leaders. As the crisis approached, there was no serious discussion of financial policy in the National Executive. When the crisis struck us, we were mentally quite unprepared. I myself had been deeply absorbed for more than two years in current foreign affairs, which were thought by many members of the Party to be going much better than current home affairs.

At the Foreign Office I had lived from day to day with the financial crisis which had begun in the early summer of 1931 in Germany and Central Europe. This had first seemed to be, primarily, a foreigners' crisis. But it was soon transmitted with full force, not of necessity, but through British financiers' folly, to this island. It took a sharp jerk to bring my mind back from abroad to the question of balancing the British Budget at home.

There was much talk on all sides of an unbalanced British Budget being the cause of the flight from the pound, *i.e.*, the run on gold. And so the Labour Government borrowed from bankers in New York and Paris to try to meet this run and stay on gold. And the Cabinet's Economy Committee, to try to re-assure opinion, publicly stated that we would balance the Budget on the basis of equality of sacrifice.

But speaking in Parliament on September 15, I pointed out that our crisis did not spring from an unbalanced Budget, for both the United States and France, our creditors in crisis, had unbalanced Budgets. It sprang from reckless over-lending, principally to Germany, by a number of finance houses in the City of London. These had borrowed short from the Americans and the French and lent, as they thought, short to the Germans. But they soon found they had lent long. When the German crisis broke, we could not get our money out of Germany. And so our foreign creditors hurried to get theirs out of London. They demanded to be repaid in gold, and some of our own nationals joined in the run on the Bank of England.

Lord Beaverbrook stated that many of our financiers had

borrowed at 2 per cent. from the French and Americans and lent at 8 per cent. to the Germans. This may well be true. But, whatever the rates of interest, the thing was indefensible. None of our lenders knew how much the others were lending. They consulted neither one another nor the Bank of England.

A year later at a bankers' dinner Montagu Norman said that foreign concerns "have been able to borrow on short credit sums which, had the various lenders been aware of it, would have been quite out of the question and which have come as a surprise to all of us." He appealed for closer co-operation among finance houses, but added "these are matters which do not concern me," as Governor of the Bank of England, "very directly." Our crisis of 1931 was primarily caused by grave faults of British private finance. Our malady was money-lenders' madness.

We completely failed to get this over at the time, and supporters of the "National" Government deliberately ignored it. The immediate moral to be drawn was that the gold standard was too expensive a luxury—and this was recognised when we went off gold on September 21—and that large changes were required in our banking and other money-lending arrangements. But on this, though we talked much about it, we failed to carry electoral conviction.

Looking back to 1931, all we politicians of all parties now seem to have been very amateurish, and nearly all the experts—Keynes conspicuously excepted—very muddleheaded.

On the unbalanced budget, all we politicians, on both sides, were too simple. We all declared it should be balanced, though we argued fiercely as to how. Even Keynes gave no strong lead here against the current fallacy. Deliberate "deficit financing" in trade depression was an idea that came later. Looking back now, it is clear that, in the conditions of 1930-31, it was right to have a deficit, and wrong to try to balance the budget.

Still less was it sensible to try to balance the unemployment fund. Clearly this should show a deficit in years of heavy, and a surplus in years of light, unemployment. But some Labour Ministers had been talking awful nonsense on this subject for years. And Ministers, including opponents of the cut in unemployment benefit, seem to have been humbugged by their advisers into believing that this fund could only borrow from the Post Office Savings Bank. Its borrowings could, of course, have been merged in those of the Treasury as a whole.

In the nineteen-thirties economic enlightenment grew, largely

as a result of new thinking by Keynes and others whom he influenced. Balancing the Budget, over a period of twelve months, ceased to be either a financial or a moral precept. It became a matter for rational discussion, the outcome of which would vary according to a complex of many economic factors.

We of the Labour Party did not publicly propose, before we were pushed off gold, that we should step off gracefully. In my Parliamentary speech of September 15 I only hinted at it. If we could not get a new international agreement on gold, I said, we must reserve our national liberty to do what was best for our country.

But on September 21, on the advice of the Bank of England to the "National" Government, off gold we went.

"Nobody ever told *us* we could do that," said Sidney Webb sadly. It appears that in the long discussions in the Labour Cabinet this idea was never seriously considered. Addison told me that he had once asked whether it wouldn't be better and cheaper, and get them out of many of their difficulties, to go off gold. But Snowden, he said, had been very sarcastic and abusive, and none of his colleagues had backed him up. So the Cabinet passed on.

Looking back, I am sure that, as events developed, we should have gone off gold much earlier, and not let ourselves be dragged down the deflationary slope, into ever deeper unemployment.

If necessary we should have moved alone. But almost certainly we could have secured that many others moved with us, not only the sterling Commonwealth, but the even larger sterling group of those days. Since 1929 there had been no effective international action, either by Governments meeting *ad hoc*, or by Central Banks, or through the League of Nations. The essential action needed to stop the slump was to raise prices and so increase money incomes and purchasing power, and to increase investment. And this, of course, would have increased employment. But Snowden didn't see it that way, and MacDonald didn't see it at all.

Within the Cabinet the storm centre had been unemployment benefit. It was on the proposal to reduce this that the Cabinet finally broke up. On this my mind was fixed, as were those of all, with negligible exceptions, of my Parliamentary colleagues outside the Cabinet. "There was no single issue," wrote Mrs. Hamilton in her life of Henderson, "on which feeling" in the Parliamentary Labour Party "was so decisive and so unanimous. . . . While the rank and file would tolerate other sacrifices, if they were assured that they were necessary, sacrifices at the expense of

the unemployed they would not stand." "This," I wrote in my *Memoirs*, "was a reef of granite. Snowden, and his associates in this proposed economy, had been warned."

I saw the unemployed, and their wives and children, as the poorest and hardest hit of my constituents in Bishop Auckland, many without work for years on end, half-starved of food and with no hope for the future. I would not push *them* further down, even if the cost of living *had* fallen, for them, as for others. This was a very simple priority of social justice. All but a handful of my colleagues passionately felt the same.

The "National" Government's Budget, together with its Economy Bill, with its cuts in unemployment benefit, in the pay of the men in the armed forces, the police, the teachers and the civil servants, and in development schemes, was certainly unjust. As I said in the House, it took power by law to break contracts with those who worked for the state, but not with those who received interest from the state, nor with those who worked for private employers. And its whole tendency, as Keynes, in particular, so cogently argued, was, by destroying purchasing power, still more to increase unemployment and to reduce future revenue. And it certainly increased inequality. A man with £5,000 a year, I pointed out, would pay, in increased income tax and surtax, an additional £170 a year, or 3½ per cent. of his income; a man with £500 a year would pay an additional £27 a year, or 5 per cent. of his income; a man with rather less than £50 a year, a man on unemployment benefit, would now get 15s. 3d. instead of 17s. a week, a cut of 10·3 per cent. of his income. Who said "equality of sacrifice"? All this rings true today.

In opposition we suggested a number of preferable alternatives, even on the assumptions that we balanced the budget and stayed on gold. And most of these had been suggested, though not adopted, in the Labour Cabinet. A new tax on income from fixed-interest-bearing securities, whose owners had had a substantial windfall from the lower cost of living; a 10 per cent. tariff on imported manufactures, or even on a wider range of imports, as a specific substitute for any cut in unemployment benefit; repeal of derating; a temporary suspension of the sinking fund, wholly justifiable in any case and particularly as the May Committee had improperly treated it as an item in the budget deficit; an appeal to the patriotism of holders of 5 per cent. War Loan voluntarily to accept conversion, certain to come in the near future, to a lower rate of interest. Finally, a mobilisation of British overseas

investments. This was to assure the correction of our adverse trade balance. But this adverse balance in 1931 was not serious. We have often had it more adverse, both before and since. It could have been met in 1931, as often in this period, by a quite small degree of disinvestment of our overseas holdings. Or, while we were still on gold, by a tariff. Or by a quantitative limitation of imports, as in the nineteen-forties, but we had not developed that technique in 1931.

It is not unreasonable to hold that, with the aid of some or all of these alternatives, the Labour Cabinet could have put up a programme for a balanced budget, still on the gold standard. Assuming agreement within the Cabinet—and Snowden, in particular, might have been difficult⁹—this programme could have been communicated to the Tory and Liberal leaders. If, as is almost certain, they had rejected it, the Government, unbroken, could have resigned, and let Tories and Liberals form a Government and take the responsibility for handling the crisis in their own way. This was the course of events which Henderson wished to see.¹⁰ And so did I. "I feel it is impossible," I wrote in my diary on August 20, "for this Government to live much longer. This is not the kind of thing that *we* can do. Better keep the Party together in opposition than break it up in office, and disappoint all the deep, simple hopes of our supporters. Let us put up a bold programme, let Tories and Liberals unite to defeat it, and then let us go out."

Once off gold, Britain was in smoother water. I have related¹¹ how Keynes met Henderson, Graham, myself, and a few others at lunch on October 1, just before the dissolution, and told us that our export position, with the pound now at 16s., was tremendously strong. He said to Henderson, "Here's a good ending for your next speech. 'A week ago the pound looked the dollar in the face. Today it is kicking it in the arse.'" And, when Keynes had gone, Henderson, obviously pleased and impressed, said "and when I quoted that chap in the Cabinet, Snowden said he was a fool!"

Of all the academic economists only Keynes, in my view, can claim any intellectual or political credit in the crisis. But he came right out, in an admirable effort, both critical and constructive. At the end of 1931 he published his *Essays in Persuasion*, which

⁹ But his resignation need not have broken the Cabinet. In June he had almost resigned, and had been isolated in his obstinacy, over a dispute with the Liberals regarding his Land Tax. See *Call Back Yesterday*, p. 264.

¹⁰ See Bassett, p. 118.

¹¹ *Call Back Yesterday*, pp. 290-291.

still shine brilliantly across the years. Parts II and III are much concerned with the crisis.

Writing on August 15, 1931, he declared "My own policy for the Budget, so long as the slump lasts, would be to suspend the Sinking Fund, to continue to borrow for the Unemployment Fund, and to impose a Revenue Tariff. To get us out of the slump we must look to quite other expedients."

On September 19: "The Budget and the Economy Bill are replete with folly and injustice."

And after we left the gold standard: "For some months before the collapse of the gold standard it had become obvious that this collapse was becoming inevitable, unless special steps were taken to mitigate the gravity of our problem. Mr. Snowden, endowed with more than a normal share of blindness and obstinacy, opposed his negative to all the possible alternatives, until, at last, natural forces took charge and put us out of our misery."

And finally, the closing paragraphs of *A Programme of Expansion*, written for Lloyd George at the General Election of May, 1929.

"There is nothing to be afraid of. On the contrary. The future holds in store for us far more wealth and economic freedom and possibilities of personal life than the past ever offered.

"There is no reason why we should not feel ourselves free to be bold, to be open, to experiment, to take action, to try the possibilities of things. And over against us, standing in the path, there is nothing but a few old gentlemen tightly buttoned-up in their frock coats, who only need to be treated with a little friendly disrespect and bowled over like ninepins.

"Quite likely they will enjoy it themselves, when once they have got over the shock."

Is it not still true, except that frock coats are no longer worn by Cabinet Ministers, bankers or even Treasury officials?

THE WHITE PRIMARY AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN THE UNITED STATES

PROFESSOR L. P. BETH

GUNNAR MYRDAL in *An American Dilemma*—doubtless one of the most influential books published in the United States in this century—dramatically emphasised the importance to social groups of having and using the right to vote. “The unpaved streets in the Negro sections of Southern cities,” he wrote,

“the lack of facilities for sewage disposal, the lack of street lighting, the dilapidated school houses, the scarcity of hospital facilities, and indeed, all other discrimination in education, health, housing, breadwinning, and justice, give evidence of this important relation in America between the vote and a share in the public services. Since Negroes do not participate in the election of the representative bodies either, these bodies cannot be expected to give them redress against the officials. No representative will see any immediate reason to please a disfranchised group, and laws and regulations will be drawn up without their interests being represented.”

“If the system becomes corrupt,” he concluded, “the odds are placed even more definitely against a poor group without political voice.”¹

The general validity of Myrdal’s analysis is well-nigh universally admitted. And the Fifteenth Amendment to the American Constitution, it may be said, was a recognition that the negro could not rise from slavery without the right to vote. Yet it was for many years true not only that negroes in the South could not actually vote, but that the federal government and courts connived in their disfranchisement. Not until 1944 did the Supreme Court get around to admitting what observers had noted from the very beginning of the direct primary system at the turn of the century: that the ability to vote in the Democratic primary is, in the South, the only really important voting right (except, perhaps, as 1956 showed, in presidential elections).

The series of court decisions leading up to *Smith v. Allwright*²

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¹ Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York, 1944), pp. 435, 436.

² *Smith v. Allwright*, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).

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in 1944 is so well known that no attempt will be made here to retrace them.³ It is not quite so well known that—even after this 1944 climax of twenty years of Texas litigation—the court battle was not yet over, although it may be conceded that the victory was in sight. For this reason it may be of interest to mention briefly some of the major cases which have arisen out of Southern efforts to evade the clear meaning of the *Allwright* decision.

The first of these was the well known case of *Rice v. Elmore*.⁴ South Carolina, which has a very high proportion of negroes, took the extreme step which seemed the only possible one under the *Allwright* edict: to repeal all state laws regarding parties and primaries, so that the Democratic party’s nomination process was conducted entirely under rules prescribed by the party itself. The difficulties involved in this procedure, from a practical standpoint, were obvious and tremendous; there was no way to punish fraud, to control the process of voting, or to prevent any other sort of corruption in the nominating process. But South Carolina pushed ahead regardless—only to run foul of the courts. In 1948 a Circuit Court decision, which the Supreme Court refused to review, held that even such drastic methods could not be found constitutional. Pointing out that “state law relating to the general election gives effect to what is done in the primary and makes it just as much a part of the election machinery . . . as if it were regulated by law,” Judge Parker refused to absolve the state of its responsibility for enabling negroes to take part in the effective political process.

The End of the White Primary

In a realistic sense this decision sounded the death knell of the white primary. Southern lack of realism, however, led to more attempts at evasion, and possibly the string is not yet played out. Two further instances may be mentioned. The South Carolina Democrats—following the *Elmore* litigation—broke up as an official party and organised into local clubs which were open only to white Democrats; club members could automatically vote in the party’s primaries. In addition, negroes could vote if they were qualified under state law to vote in general elections—and if they would take an oath to support the Democratic party, states’ rights and segregation, and to oppose FEPC laws! District Judge Waring, himself

³ The most important were *Nixon v. Herndon*, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); *Nixon v. Condon*, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); and *Grovey v. Townsend*, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).

⁴ *Rice v. Elmore*, 165 F. 2d 387 (1947); cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).

a Carolinian, condemned this system in no uncertain terms, branding it a "deliberate attempt to evade the apparent consequence of the *Elmore* case." And he concluded:

"It is important that once and for all, the members of this Party be made to understand—and that is the purpose of this opinion—that they will be required to obey and carry out the orders of this court, not only in technical respects but in the true spirit and meaning of the same."⁵

In Texas a different dodge was tried. Fort Bend County had an organisation called the Texas Jaybird Association. Its membership was limited to whites, and it automatically included all registered white voters and excluded all negroes. Prospective party candidates submitted their names first to the Association, and if they were successful in its elections they went on into the regular party primaries (in which negroes could vote), and not unnaturally always emerged the victors. The Jaybirds called themselves a private voluntary club, unrelated to the regular Democratic organisation. Faced with so sophisticated a facade, the Supreme Court was able to agree that this practice violated the Constitution, but it could not agree why.⁶ Justice Black, supported by Douglas and Burton (a rather strange recruit for the two liberals), held that the Fifteenth Amendment "clearly . . . includes any election in which public issues are decided or public officials selected." If the state allows evasion by a duplicatory election process, it is responsible for the resulting exclusion of negroes. "The use of the county-operated primary to ratify the result of the prohibited election merely compounds the result."

Justice Frankfurter, regarding the Jaybirds as a private group not touchable under the Fifteenth Amendment, refused to follow Black's use of the *Allwright* case as a precedent. He emphasised instead that the regular county officials and the party functionaries "share in the subversion" of the elective process, and consequently "cannot divest themselves of the State authority and help as participants in the scheme." It was, to him, the participation of public officials which made it state action.

Supported by three others, Justice Clark took still a different tack. He regarded the Jaybirds as nothing less than a regular political party, not a private organisation at all, and thus found the situation an exact duplicate of that existing in the *Allwright* case.

⁵ *Baskin v. Brown*, 78 F.Supp. 933 (1948).

⁶ *Terry v. Adams*, 345 U.S. 461 (1952).

The single dissenter, Justice Minton, caustically dissected each of the three opinions of the majority.

By 1953, then, the white primary and the various devious ways of perpetuating it, were outlawed. There remained, apparently, no easy way by which negroes could be kept out of either the primary or the general elections. In the light of this legal situation it will be of interest to glance briefly at the voting statistics to see whether these decisions had any measurable effect.

The Growth of Negro Voting

Taking the South as a whole, the figures indicate that these cases have had an immediate and pronounced effect on negro voting, for registration levels have undergone a rapid and continuous increase since 1946, the first election year after the *Allwright* decision. Negro registration jumped from a meagre 150,000 in eleven states in 1940 to a surprising 625,000 in 1946, with most of the increase taking place in Georgia and Texas. The increase was continued after 1946, and the figures reached 1,050,000 in 1952 and about 1,200,000 in 1956.⁷ This increase is not, of course, equally distributed over the South nor even within individual states. It is still extremely low in Mississippi and quite low in Alabama; but in every other state it has reached at least 15 per cent. of the qualified adult negroes, while in Florida a rather remarkable 40 per cent. are registered. In addition, Hugh Price's study of negro politics in Florida, and earlier studies by various scholars, indicate that there are already a substantial number of Southern urban areas in which the negro vote is politically important, not only in terms of who wins elections but in substantial returns to the negro community in the form of more favourable treatment by local officials. Price has noted particularly the effective interest taken by negro voters in the election of county sheriffs, whose treatment of the negro community is of peculiar intimate significance to the coloured residents of any Southern county.⁸

The question may nevertheless occur: To what extent is this tenfold increase in registration attributable to the white primary decisions? Aside from the fact that the increase began immediately after *Smith v. Allwright*—a strong piece of circumstantial evidence in itself—it is significant that a great increase came immediately in

⁷ The figures are taken from information published at various times by the Southern Regional Council.

⁸ H. D. Price, *The Negro in Southern Politics* (New York, 1957), p. 75.

Texas, the only state to which the decision specifically applied. The tremendous increase in Georgia at the same time was the result of an intensive campaign carried out there by negro leaders in the few months following the *Allwright* decision. Then, too, it is notable that despite variations between states, in no state did negro registration entirely fail to increase in the years 1946-1952.

Yet some doubts remain. Sociologists may feel that the time was ripe for a rapid rise in negro voting regardless of court action. Perhaps, it may be said, both negroes and whites were prepared for it. After all, negroes had been voting in small numbers all over the South for years; an eventual acceptance of this seems no improbable. It is also perhaps of significance that the *Allwright* decision came during the course of World War II. This meant that the attention of the South, as of the rest of the nation, was concentrated on the fighting; in the context of the times the white primary decision may well have seemed relatively insignificant to both newsmen and the general public. At the same time the war had induced, particularly in the military services, a good deal of integration in which Southern whites were oftentimes directly involved. There was, too, some experimentation with the extension of voting rights to eighteen-year-olds, which came to actual fruition only in Georgia and Kentucky; but the slogan used ("if you're old enough to fight you're old enough to vote") was easily transmuted by negro and libertarian leaders into "if you're good enough to fight you're good enough to vote." Southern opinion was naturally somewhat susceptible to such influences, and perhaps advanced more in racial attitudes than at any period of similar length in American history.

Cause or Result ?

The decision itself, then, might be regarded as merely a trigger setting off an explosion which was coming anyway. One might even regard the decision as a result itself of the same processes rather than as a cause. Speaking largely—and in the realm of the unknowable—both the rise in voting and the decisions of the courts may be viewed as the results of a conjunction of social forces, in the making of which the courts played only a minor role. The choice between seeing a court as an immediate and effective agent in social change, or as merely a pawn in the working out of a larger social process, is largely a matter of personal preference when one considers the present state of our knowledge. There

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is a middle alternative which may be preferable—that the forces of social change and the activity of the courts were mutually reinforcing; this is perhaps the most tenable way of looking at it.

In many areas of the South, it should be recalled, there was little or no white resistance to the rise of negro voting. This was particularly true in the urban areas (except in Alabama), but was noticeable even in many rural regions. Many Southern states took no legal steps at all to make registration difficult for negroes. There were, it is true, a few prominent exceptions, as the South Carolina incident reviewed earlier illustrates; Alabama, also, has adopted laws calculated to discourage negroes from voting or even registering. But even so there seem to have been remarkably few concerted state-wide efforts at legal discouragement. (It is true, however, that there have been some very successful local extra-legal devices, some of which are excellently surveyed by Professor Strong in his book on registration in Alabama.⁹)

Negro Voting and School Segregation

The fact that the attitudes of southern whites are complex and inter-related, however, might (it may be said) be illustrated by the effects of the school segregation decisions¹⁰ on negro voting registration. The deep-seated resistance that has been evidenced all over the Deep South to school integration has apparently led to a hardening of attitudes toward negroes even on problems which had previously seemed well on their way to solution. The 1956 registration for negroes was only slightly higher than that of 1952; in some states there was a practical standstill, and South Carolina actually showed a pronounced decline. At the same time there were (in 1956) widespread reports of attempts to prevent negroes from voting in states where the coloured franchise had come to be widely used—especially Georgia and Louisiana. These attempts usually took the form of purges of the registration lists, as reported by Assistant Attorney-General Warren Olney's testimony before a Senate committee.¹¹ It was estimated that almost 9,000 Louisiana negroes thus lost their right to vote. But perhaps the most remarkable thing is that even such drastic methods succeeded in reducing negro registration in that state by less than 6 per cent.

Nevertheless there is no substantial proof that the slowed rate of increase in negro registration has any significant relation to the

⁹ Donald S. Strong, *Registration of Voters in Alabama* (University, Ala., 1956).

¹⁰ *Brown v. Topeka*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and 349 U.S. 294 (1955).

¹¹ Testimony to the State Sub-committee on Privilege and Elections, October 10, 1956.

school segregation crisis; on the contrary, there are several other factors which have probably played greater parts. For one thing, the greatest increases in registration have come in the areas where the negroes had a fairly well organised group with effective leadership, or where they had reached a relatively advanced educational level with a correspondingly greater social and political sophistication. Areas where negroes are relatively backward, like rural Mississippi, never did show a pronounced rise in negro voting.

Then, too, it seems likely that some areas have—at least temporarily—reached a saturation point. At the present stage of political awareness only a certain proportion of negroes can be motivated to register and vote. When these have done so, further increases in registration must await the slow maturation of the remaining negro population, either through political education or as new age groups reach twenty-one. Florida, with its 40 per cent. registration figure, is not likely to see a further rapid increase.

In an effort to gain more information on the possible effects of the school cases on the negro franchise, this writer directed inquiries to qualified political scientists in seven southern states. The consensus among them was that any hardening of white attitudes was impossible to verify statistically; most of them thought that, through 1956, there had been no significant effects. One of them remarked that even if white attitudes had stiffened, this was probably counterbalanced by the fact that “the school segregation issues are making negroes all the more conscious of what there is at stake so that they are registering and voting in larger numbers.”

In view of these considerations a “not proven” verdict is indicated on the question whether the segregation controversy has had measurable effects on voting. While the possibility is too strong to be written off entirely, it seems more likely that the slowdown in negro voting indicated by the 1956 figures is a relatively permanent levelling off after the first great effects of the abolition of the white primary. Looking to the future, one can only predict a steady but much slower rise in coloured voting—a prediction which is based on three major considerations.

Future Trends

The first is the continued migration of negroes to the North. If this continues (and there is no reason to suppose it will not), it will as in the past stimulate political interest among the emigrés. Such interest would not be a Southern phenomenon, but it is even

so within the purview of this paper. At the same time, the accompanying reduction of the proportion of negroes in the Southern population will tend to reduce the still-remaining white opposition to voting by negroes. As Price shows, attitudes change very slowly, and such effects would show themselves only gradually, but they are none the less significant for that.¹²

Secondly, within the South there will almost certainly be a continued movement of negroes (as well as whites) off the farms and into the urban areas. There is little reason to suppose that the urban negro, even in the South, will indefinitely remain politically quiescent. Greater numbers and proximity allow greater ease of organisation; and the existence of substantial business and professional opportunities means that indigenous leadership is likely to arise. When it does, white politicians will be less and less able to ignore the negro vote. As stated above, this has already taken place in Jacksonville and in some other Southern cities, in which local politics has taken on quite a different shape from that which it used to show.

Finally, the public conscience and the pressure of court decisions are contributing to an inevitable improvement in the standards of negro education. Whether or not the schools and colleges remained segregated, this improvement would continue. Such educational advance can hardly fail to stimulate political activity as the coming generations of negroes reach voting age. If nothing else, their greater social and intellectual sophistication will reduce the terrors posed by the complex American electoral system with its long ballot. But more important, large numbers of young negroes will be brought to realise, for the first time, how important to them the possession of the franchise is.

Whether or not one chooses to regard the *Allwright* decision as a trigger or the explosion itself, it has played an important part in a chain of events in which we are still near the beginning. It provides one of the best modern instances of the courts playing a positive and creative role in a modification of the social customs of a large segment of the nation.

Court Decisions and Race Relations

In view of this rather striking “success” of the white primary decisions as contrasted with the public school cases, can we learn anything of value as to the efficacy of court decisions in controlling

¹² Price, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42.

race relations? It seems, for one thing, rather obvious that the Southern white public was, relatively speaking, "ready" for negro voting. This is not to say that the franchise would have been freely given regardless of court decisions; but the white politicians were in a position *vis-à-vis* their constituencies to accede gracefully if not happily to court pressure, while not running the risk of serious political damage to their careers. Outside the border states this has not been true in the field of school integration; on the contrary, politicians quite obviously feel that their careers may depend upon their maintenance of "proper" attitudes toward segregation, even when these conflict with their personal feelings.

Also in contrast to the situation in 1944, the nation ten years later was at peace, and the great domestic political controversy over McCarthyism was on the wane. The school segregation cases therefore (in addition to their undoubted "human interest" value) had little competition for the attention of the newspapers and the public—a condition which both Northern and Southern editors have exploited in their opposite ways, to the great detriment of healthy race relations.

Myrdal's Scale Reviewed

The situation seems to bear out in convincing fashion another of Myrdal's 1944 hypotheses. It will be recalled that the Swedish sociologist drew up a list of race practices classified by the degree of white resistance to change.¹³ Of six stages, the right to vote was fourth, or relatively near the pole of least resistance, while the practice of segregation was a step higher in the scale. But it is significant that while the direct implications of voting are largely confined to politics, those of integration in schools go much higher into Myrdal's scale, for Myrdal listed even higher the resistance to race contacts in such relatively intimate yet public relationships as swimming and eating; and certainly the *Brown* case implies that segregated public swimming pools are unconstitutional. Then, too, it is easy for the embattled Southern racist to bring into the argument the question of mixing the sexes, when relatively close heterosexual relationships like that of the schoolroom are involved—and the sex question occupies the post of most resistance on Myrdal's scale.

This seems to indicate not necessarily that Myrdal's hypothesis is correct in detail, but that in general court decisions will be more effective when they are restricted to *political* rights than when they

¹³ Myrdal, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61.

extend to *social* rights. The American creed is strong enough to win at least a grudging acceptance of a political right like that of the franchise. But it cannot so easily gain observance of those forms of social intercourse which involve a mixture of the sexes as well as of the races.

Yet if Myrdal's rating is correct, the court decisions came in the right order—first the elimination of voting bars, then the prohibition of legally enforced Jim Crow practices. One might suppose on Myrdal's logic that such a step-by-step approach would minimise the resistance to each step. Why, then, did the school decision, as compared with that in the primary election issue, stir up so much resistance of such massive and apparently monolithic nature? There seems to be no simple answer; but in military tactics commanders sometimes give up the less defensible outposts quickly, yet fight with great determination for the main position. If we assume that the main objective of the dominant white South is the maintenance of the sexual (and secondarily the social) integrity of the white race, it would seem to follow that close approaches to this fortress would meet dogged resistance no matter in what rank order the attacks came. If this is true, the desegregation order would have drawn about the same kind and degree of opposition no matter when it was made—at least in the foreseeable future.

This, however, is difficult for a man of good will to believe, for it implies that racial discriminations of a fairly extreme sort cannot be eradicated from Southern life for many years, if ever. Another possibility may be as logical yet less discouraging. If one proceeds up Myrdal's scale it appears likely that more resistance will be found as one nears the top; and one will consequently be wise to spend increasingly more time on each step to prepare the way for the next. From this viewpoint it may be that the *Brown* case was not unwise nor intrinsically unenforceable, but merely premature and hard to enforce because of its prematurity; whereas the *Allwright* decision was not only wise but enforceable and timely—and enforceable mainly because of its timeliness. Something of the sort was, perhaps, tacitly admitted by the Supreme Court itself in the formula adopted for school integration as well as in the time required for litigation of the issue. The successive postponements of decision and court order could be so interpreted. And "deliberate speed"—the formula used in the court order when it finally came—is not exactly racehorse terminology. Significantly, no such stalling or counsels of caution were felt to

be necessary when the court opened the primary election to negro voters.

While on this point the strategy of the NAACP may be mildly questioned. Flushed by its successes in the primary cases and in those cases involving professional and graduate school education,¹⁴ it has perhaps pressed the public school issue too far and too fast, in the process under-estimating white opposition. One certainly sympathises with the reasons for doing so; but if this hypothesis is correct, the forcing of the pace by the negro lawyers left the Supreme Court unable to leave its decision to a time more "ripe" for the settlement of such an emotion-laden question.

The Role of the Supreme Court

This leaves us with a final question: What is the proper role of the Supreme Court in dealing with grave social issues such as the race question? There are those who would accept Mr. Justice Reed's counsel; "this court cannot be too cautious," he wrote, "in upsetting practices embedded in our society by many years of experience."¹⁵ Reed himself deserted this premise in the race cases, but it remains an open question whether social change should be left to its normal processes or fostered by adjudicated law, especially when the law may prove unenforceable. Prudence might counsel the development of a doctrine of social questions for which, like the doctrine of political questions, a "too hot to handle" verdict must be handed down. Certainly it is harmful to the court's prestige and to its future when its orders are openly disobeyed. While the Supreme Court has always been a political agency, such decisions perhaps make the general public more aware of its political character than is desirable from a legal point of view.

Yet to ask the court not to rule on such serious social issues—especially when in fact the social practice involved is not left to the normal processes of social change but is rather perpetuated by state-enforced law—not only smacks of moral cowardice but also tends to leave unsolved, perhaps insoluble, the major social issue of our time and the major flaw in the American Dream. Perhaps it should be the court's function, as Charles P. Curtis has written,

¹⁴ Principally *Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada*, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); *Sipuel v. Univ. of Okla.*, 332 U.S. 631 (1947); *McLaurin v. Okla. St. Regents*, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); *Sweatt v. Painter*, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).

¹⁵ Dissenting in *Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Education*, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), at p. 256.

to hold us near to the true course of our ideals.¹⁶ There is no doubt danger in setting goals higher than the public can reach; but is the greater danger not in allowing our people to rest content with less than their best? The Supreme Court has seen its worst days when it has asked of us even less than we could give: when its Federalist judges allowed and abetted the enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Acts; when the Taney Court relegated negroes to a secondary place in the human race in the *Dred Scott* case; and when in 1895 eight justices blinded themselves to the fact that segregation is discrimination. Such instances illustrate the court at its lowest ebb, and each one is now condemned by most historians. Does it not seem better for the court to live gloriously—if dangerously—than to evade the crucial issues of the time when only it can settle them? "Better to live like a lion for a day than like a lamb for a hundred years."

I mean to suggest no simple process by which the justices wet their fingers and hold them up to see which way the public whims are blowing. Such a process may be appropriate for the Gallup Poll; it can hardly be suitable for our highest court. In any case it could produce serious difficulties in cases such as *Brown v. Topeka*, for public opinion is never unanimous, and on this vexing question it is obviously quite different in the South than in the rest of the nation. We should perhaps have to develop a new doctrine of the concurrent majority in order to apply such a method.

But there is a higher level of public opinion which includes not our present practices and day-to-day opinions but our higher and better aspirations which in many cases we may have articulated only partially (as in the Bill of Rights) or not at all. I suggest that it may be the function of the Supreme Court to take this "immanent component" of our national thought (as Curtis describes it) and hold it before us as a social goal. We should not underestimate the effectiveness of such an oracle. Perhaps the Supreme Court is, in some way, a voice of conscience. If so, the school decision was morally correct, though it may unfortunately have come a little too soon.

¹⁶ In Edmond Cahn (ed.), *Supreme Court and Supreme Law* (Bloomington, Ind., 1954), pp. 170-198.

THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES

ERNEST DAVIES, M.P.

THE House of Commons Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, which originally got off to a false start, now appears to have got into its stride. The earlier committee, set up in March 1955, after deliberating over six months on what it could and could not examine, reported that its terms of reference so limited its scope that they precluded it from conducting any inquiries of value; in effect nothing remained for it to inquire into, since the matters excluded were those which "have been decided by or clearly engage the responsibility of any Ministers; concern wages and conditions of employment and other questions normally decided by collective bargaining arrangements; fall to be considered through formal machinery established by the relevant statutes, or are matters of day-to-day administration."

The Government accepted the rebuff and decided to go to the other extreme by entrusting it "to examine the Reports and Accounts of the Nationalised Industries" without any qualification whatsoever. By its new terms of reference the present committee was thus in no way restricted but, during the House of Commons debate on the motion for its appointment, Government spokesmen made it clear that it was still expected to steer clear of those matters previously specified as beyond its pale. It was left free, however, to interpret its wide terms of reference, and judging by its first two reports has done so liberally. Many of the matters which concerned it, and on which evidence was taken and recommendations made, would have been ruled out under the earlier limitations.

From an examination of the first two reports, and the voluminous evidence taken, it is possible to make an interim assessment, as it were, of the committee's success to date in fulfilling the functions assigned to it on its appointment. These flow from the reason which led to its establishment: namely, the general view of Members of Parliament that they should be better informed on the conduct of the affairs and the activities of the nationalised industries.

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THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES

The Origin of the Committee

The setting up of such a committee was recommended by an earlier Select Committee, known as the Clitheroe Committee, appointed in November 1952 to consider how this could best be achieved. In its two reports it recommended against any extension of the parliamentary question; that is, it opposed the admission to the Order Paper of questions on day-to-day administration. In recommending in its second report the establishment of a standing committee it suggested no restrictions upon it such as were subsequently imposed, and it also envisaged a larger committee with sufficient members to enable sub-committees to be appointed and with a technical staff to advise it analogous to the Comptroller and Auditor General, who advises the Public Accounts Committee. The Government rejected both these recommendations and established a committee of thirteen members without expert staff.

The problem, in the words of Mr. R. A. Butler in the debate referred to above, was to decide "by what means Members could best inform themselves about the activities of the nationalised industries without taking upon themselves responsibilities which properly belong to Ministers of the Crown or encroaching on the independence of enterprises which are and must remain fundamentally commercial in character." He considered the proposed committee provided the best answer, as in the Clitheroe Committee's words it was "the only practical means of performing these functions." Because of the previous committee's abortive experience Mr. Butler accepted that no specific prohibitions on its scope should be imposed, but during the debate he mentioned those which he thought the House would expect to be excluded: namely, matters of major government, as distinct from commercial, policy; statutory matters reserved for Ministers; those dealt with by machinery established by statute; and those decided by collective bargaining, e.g., wages and working conditions. It was largely the fear that the last might come within the purview of the committee that led the Trades Union Congress to oppose its appointment, and the Parliamentary Labour Party to vote against its establishment on the grounds that it did not provide the answer to the accepted need for greater public accountability.

Grounds for Scepticism

Doubts and fears as to the probable efficacy of such a watchdog committee went wider than this, however, and fall into three main

categories. First, there were political fears. In view of the diametrically opposing views on nationalisation between the parties it was feared by those supporting it that its opponents would utilise the committee for muck-raking and bear-baiting, and thus in effect turn it into a smearing committee. Such critics of the establishment of the committee regarded the pressure for greater public accountability as hypocritical and put forward with this destructive end in view. Second, that the committee would be used to attack the level of wages and working conditions generally, as it would consider them in relation to results, and particularly in connection with the charges made for the services provided or goods produced and the revenue position, where deficits were being incurred. Third, there were the fears that the principle of the independence of the corporations would be diminished and their enterprise and initiative restricted by continuous investigation into their conduct. This would develop a cautious "looking over the shoulder" mentality.

None of these fears has been realised so far. On the other hand, somewhat surprisingly, the committee has been more inclined to explore the forbidden waters that the Government put out of bounds than those which the Opposition feared would be encroached upon. Despite the obvious caution with which the committee drafted its reports it is not difficult to deduce by reading between the lines of them that government policy emerges in a worse light than that of the boards investigated. It would be difficult to pinpoint the reasons for this, but no doubt they include the make-up of the committee, the form its inquiries have taken, and the spirit which has pervaded its deliberations, inasmuch as they have resulted in the development of a spirit of co-operation between committee and witnesses. For the most part, committee members were selected from among those having specialised knowledge of the industries that come within its scope or of commerce or finance. Of greater importance is the fact that none was chosen who had figured as a rabid or ruthless partisan opponent of nationalisation. The smearers, muck-rakers, and bear-baiters appear to have been excluded. Above all, the committee's chairman deserves credit because from the outset he eschewed the use of the committee for party political purposes.

That does not mean that on no occasion has government policy come under attack or personal prejudice always been completely submerged. But it has been incidental and not characteristic. For instance, Mr. Blyton, a leading representative of the mineworkers

in the House of Commons, attempted to bring out the fact that the National Coal Board's request for an increase in prices made prior to the 1955 general election had been intentionally held over until after the election took place. This was precisely the type of question Mr. Butler had instanced as being undesirable, but the full story of government influence on prices is told in a memorandum prepared for the committee by the Board as well as in the examination of witnesses upon it. In the event, it constituted one of the main recommendations of the committee. On the other side, Colonel Lancaster, a former coalowner, in long questions to witnesses which appear to be posed more for the deployment of argument than to elicit information, and with the apparent purpose of making his case against the Board, had no apparent influence on the committee's final conclusions.

Dangers Avoided

The fear that matters for collective bargaining would be examined was completely unjustified. The committee was scrupulous in their avoidance. The third fear that the public corporation would suffer from any inquiry into its affairs so as to derogate from its freedom from interference in matters of day-to-day management, and thereby cause inhibition on enterprise and initiative, was also not realised. In fact, the evidence shows that the representatives of the boards who appeared before the committee, although they may have been initially on the defensive, came to appreciate that it provided them with an opportunity to explain and justify their policies. Of this, full advantage seems to have been taken, even to the point of criticism of government policy where they considered it had handicapped them in fulfilling their functions. There is certainly no evidence at all that the committee's curiosity stimulated a looking-over-the-shoulder mentality. On the contrary, as the committee state in their second report, Mr. Latham, the Deputy Chairman of the National Coal Board, considered it "desperately important . . . that we should have the opportunity of expressing our point of view."

Steering an Even Course

In sum, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the committee has so far avoided the pitfalls the Opposition feared awaited it. It has striven to steer an objective course, succumbing neither to the prejudices of the anti-nationalisers nor the excessive zeal of the nationalisers. It is as yet early to be decisive as to whether the

dangers of prejudice can always be avoided but certainly to date it is gratifying that they have been. The next question is, whether having thus surmounted the hurdles conjured up by its opponents, it has contributed usefully to the better achievement of public accountability. The purpose for which the committee was set up was to enable Parliament to be more fully informed about the activities of nationalised industry. So far, it can be credited for doing so in the following ways.

First, by its examination of Treasury, Ministry, and Board members and officials it has produced a mass of information. Indeed, in its second report, the committee rightly states it has "received more information about the National Coal Board than the House has ever yet had on the workings of a nationalised industry." To students of nationalisation the evidence on the relations between government and boards will be of lasting value. The iron curtain which had previously shrouded in mystery the extent of Treasury control and ministerial interference has been raised. This was made possible, first, by assigning an Under-Secretary in charge of the Trade and Industry Division of the Treasury, which includes the nationalised industries, as liaison officer to the committee. Second, by calling as witnesses the Permanent Secretaries of the ministries responsible for the boards. Third, by examining the Chairman and Deputy-Chairman and the officials of the boards under inquiry.

By refusing to interpret narrowly its terms of reference, the committee has not confined its inquiries to past reports and accounts but has also delved into the future. Moreover, it did not hesitate to inquire into the effect of government policies on the operational results of the boards, particularly in regard to capital investment and price policy. It established from the outset a happy relationship with the boards' witnesses, accepting its task as that recommended by the Clitheroe Committee, namely, to act "not as an enemy, or a critic, but as a confidant, and a protection against irresponsible pressure, as well as a guardian of the public interest."

Ill-Founded Criticism

There is no doubt that the reports have succeeded in explaining to Parliament the difficulties of the boards examined and expounding their policies: they have thereby helped to allay misunderstandings and ill-informed criticism. Significant, in this respect, was the appearance before the committee of four Scottish Members of

Parliament who retailed complaints from constituents mainly relating to extension of electricity services to rural areas. One of them in a memorandum to the committee stated *inter alia* "The Board is a weak one. It is deficient in technical knowledge." The committee rejected the Members' criticisms and reported that "The achievements of the Board in the last few years . . . themselves rebut the criticisms of the Board's present personnel, which was made by one witness and which the committee reject." It added that "The Board is still subject to a lot of criticism, some of which is unfair and most of which can be readily answered." The same could be read into the second report on the National Coal Board which is equally a corrective to criticisms of it inasmuch as it explains its difficulties and justifies certain of the policies of the Board. It would be a mistake, however, to regard the committee as whitewashing the boards so far examined. The committee's object was to sift and survey the information given before it, and to comment, at times critically, upon it.

The Scottish Electricity Board

The value of the committee must be judged, however, on the action that flows from its deliberations and recommendations. In the first report on the Scottish Electricity Boards no far-reaching recommendations were made. Concerning the South of Scotland Electricity Board the committee said: "it heard nothing in any way critical of the way the Board was carrying out its functions," and bearing in mind the satisfactory results achieved to date, and throughout its brief existence, it did not deem it necessary to pursue its investigation. In regard to the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board they had some criticisms to make but emphasised that they were on comparatively minor points and "which do not to any material extent derogate from the good opinion they have formed of the Board's achievements."

The chief recommendations concerned the placing of contracts, the lack of information in the annual report on the basis on which depreciation was determined, the actual and estimated costs of constructional schemes, and increased publicity for the consultative council. The committee expressed regret that no parliamentary debate had ever been held on the annual reports of the Scottish Electricity Boards and expressed the hope that the report would provide an opportunity for such a debate. In the event it did; and the main recommendations have been carried out.

The National Coal Board

The committee was clearly feeling its way when it drafted its first report. It was dealing with two comparatively small and local public corporations neither of which had been the subject of national interest. The National Coal Board was in a different position. Its policies and activities are of concern to the national economy and are subject to parliamentary scrutiny and political controversy. Here again, however, the committee, after a factual survey and critical examination of problems and results, came down in the main on the side of the Board. By and large, it endorsed its past policies and explained its difficulties, answered criticisms levelled at it in regard to the main problems considered by the committee, such as the level of investment, the problem of large and small coal, and the price of coal.

Coal Prices

The major recommendation concerned prices, and the most revealing sections of the report, and the accompanying evidence, are on this subject. The committee considered that the present position whereby prices are determined in consultation between the board and the Ministry of Power under a gentleman's agreement which dates from the second world war, but has since been regularised by an exchange of letters, was no longer desirable. The committee's analysis of the effects of the agreement on prices disclosed that of the ten applications for price increases on four occasions the amount granted was less than that requested, one application was refused outright, and on five occasions the increase was granted to begin from a later date than that asked for. The committee made the position clear by stating "In the last analysis it is the Minister of Power who says what the public must pay for coal." No criticism was made of the effect of the agreement and the committee approved that the government should share responsibility for price fixing. It disapproved, however, of the informality of the system under which it is exercised and recommended that the gentleman's agreement be terminated and that responsibility for coal prices be clearly defined by statute. The recommendation continued: "When proposing alterations in coal prices, the board should consult the Minister of Power as to the national interest but, having done so, should take full responsibility for their price determinations. The Minister should have a statutory power in the national interest to give the board specific directions

in regard to prices. Such a direction should be laid before Parliament and published, so that Parliament and the public would be fully informed about the respective responsibilities of the Minister and the board in a particular case."

This is a far-reaching recommendation and it would be difficult to deny that it infringes upon the previously barred matters touching on ministerial responsibility and policy. In fact, it would be possible to read into it an implied criticism of ministerial policy since the committee stated that the board think that its prices should cover a contribution towards capital investment and that the committee "agree generally with the board's attitude to prices." It then proceeds to point out that when the board applied to the Minister to include in their prices an element which "would enable them to reduce a deficit it was overruled by the Minister." Criticism of the Minister might also be read into the statement that "in regard to fixing prices" the Minister's is a more short-term view than the board's, and is affected by considerations of national policy in a way which the board is not."

The Results So Far Achieved

If the committee has succeeded in its main function of informing the House better of the activities of the nationalised industries the next consideration is whether any benefit has flowed therefrom. To what extent has the work of the committee subsequently borne fruit? How far has Parliament turned to advantage this extension of public accountability? The answer would lie in the attention paid to the committee's reports and the action taken on its recommendations. Regarding the first, debates have taken place in the House of Commons on both reports together with the annual reports of the boards concerned. Because of the committee's reports these debates have unquestionably been better informed, since M.P.s have more information at their disposal.

More important is the action taken on the recommendations themselves and here a conflict of responsibility arises. This turns on whether the board or the Minister should answer the committee's report and state what action it is proposed to take to implement the recommendations. In the case of the Public Accounts Committee and the Select Committee on Estimates, the departments themselves reply by minute directed to the committee which publishes them. The House of Commons is thus duly informed of the action flowing from its committees' recommendations.

It might, therefore, have been assumed that the boards would follow this precedent and apparently they were prepared to do so.

The Government, however, decided otherwise. During the debate on the National Coal Board on July 14, 1958, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Power stated it was too early to be dogmatic on this score but added that as far as he was at present advised it would be a mistake to do so. He then proceeded to give the Government's decisions on the recommendations and rejected the main one concerning prices. He admitted that the board, wanting to be free from any ministerial control, accepted the committee's recommendation. So here is a difference between the board and the Government, with the board and the committee lined up together in opposition to ministerial decision. That is what Mr. Butler presumably feared when he expressed the hope that the committee would not trespass on the ministerial lawns. The Government took the view that the issue of directives is to be avoided at all costs, because once embarked upon it would prejudice the relations between the Government and the boards. Two of the recommendations were, however, accepted, one applying to the Government and the other to the board. First, the board's annual reports should include comparisons of results achieved from its investment programme with estimates made; and second, that the Ministry of Power should impose a better financial check upon the board's investment schemes. Reluctantly the Government accepted this recommendation and stated that they were making arrangements with the board accordingly.

A Modest Beginning

It will be seen, therefore, that so far the direct effect of the committee's recommendations has been inconsiderable, mainly because the most far reaching one, on prices, was rejected by the Government. Indirectly the committee's reports have no doubt been of value to Members of Parliament, the boards and the responsible government departments alike. The first have had more information placed at their disposal about nationalised industry than ever before. The number of Members who have availed themselves of it may be small; but they can no longer complain that the information is not available. The boards have had the occasion to become better aware of those of their activities

which are matters of interest to Parliament, and have been advised on their better presentation. At the same time, through the committee, a better relationship between the boards and Parliament has been established, and one which could develop so as to lead them to look upon Parliament as a protective instrument against government intervention should they consider it to be handicapping them in the carrying out of their statutory duties.

Government departments have responsibilities towards the boards and continuous consultation and intervention on certain matters constitute their normal relationship; but occasions arise when there is conflict, and heretofore ministerial insistence on its view has not always been revealed to Parliament. Responsibility taken in private has not always been disclosed in public. This gap in public accountability could be partially closed by the committee. The boards would, however, be helped, and the purpose of the committee better accomplished if they were permitted to reply to its criticism and to the recommendations contained in the reports instead of the Government reserving that right exclusively.

A Closer Scrutiny of Ministerial Influence

The committee, in any case, may have caused government departments to realise that the relationship between ministers and boards may henceforth be subject to a closer scrutiny than can be exercised in the first instance on the floor of Parliament. In its indirect effects on all three parties concerned, Parliament, boards and Ministries, a greater degree of public accountability therefore emerges. The committee was appointed to achieve that, so in this respect it can be considered as already showing its value and helping Parliament the better to perform its duty of protecting the national interest.

Whether the committee proceeds as satisfactorily as it has set out must depend upon whether it continues to follow the same course of conducting its inquiries with objective responsibility. Its activities must always, however, be limited by the size of its membership and the time M.P.s can give to its work. It meets but once weekly for about two hours, and only of course while Parliament is sitting. That is all the time its members are able or willing to give in view of their other commitments. This means that an inquiry, to be of value, may well occupy the committee for a whole session.

The Committee's Limited Capacity

The annual reports and accounts of each of the nationalised industries, if taken in rotation, could therefore come before the committee for inquiry only about once every seven years. As a watchdog committee it could thus hardly fulfil its purpose of safeguarding the public interest by keeping continuous watch on nationalised industry. To enable inquiries to be more frequent, and two or more to be held simultaneously, sub-committees would have to be appointed and that would mean a much larger committee than the present thirteen members. This is the procedure followed by the Select Committee on Estimates but not by the Public Accounts Committee. It is too early to state whether this would be a desirable development or not. It could well be that the fortuitous circumstances which make the inquiries infrequent would serve both Parliament and the boards best. It in effect represents a more or less accidental compromise between a continuous scrutiny of the activities of the nationalised industries, and an occasional independent inquiry. It is less harmful than the first in that it does not cause too great an over-the-shoulder complex, and more valuable than the second, to which it can be complementary and not a substitute, because it is conducted by Parliament itself and confines itself, theoretically at least, to the reports and accounts.

The committee itself ended its report with the considered view that it was too early yet to consider whether its work could be made more effective by the use of special staff, or of different terms of reference, or of different powers. With this few would disagree. It needs to be given a further trial period before it can be determined whether the way in which it has started off can be continued, and if so, if its work will prove of value to Parliament. That in its turn depends on the extent to which M.P.s themselves turn to advantage the new vehicle for public accountability which the committee provides.

REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE IN EGYPT: THE TRIALS OF 1953

ELIE KEDOURIE

At a public meeting in Cairo on September 15, 1953, Major Salah Salim, the well-known member of the Egyptian military Junta, announced the discovery of a plot whereby supporters of the old régime were trying, with the help of foreign Powers, to overthrow the Revolution and restore Reaction. The speaker accused these people of spreading rumours and lies, and of mounting a large-scale campaign against the men of the new régime. Hitherto, he said, the Revolution had been generous; it had been willing to let bygones be bygones; but in view of these machinations, the Revolution must act to protect the people. "In the name of the Revolutionary Council," he said, "I announce the formation of the Revolutionary Court, to consist of some members of the Revolutionary Council. This Court will try forthwith those who are accused of working against the interests of the country and against the integrity of the Revolution. We have taken this step," he went on, "in order to protect you and preserve unity in your ranks at this critical stage in the country's destiny, and so that no traitor might be able to turn this Revolution to naught, as the Revolution of 1919 was turned to naught."

The next day, the Revolutionary Council issued a decree setting up the Court, and appointing Wing-Commander Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, Minister of War, as President of the Court, and Squadron-Leader Hassan Ibrahim and Lt.-Col. Anwar al-Sadat, both prominent revolutionaries, as members. Article 2 of the decree gave the Court power to try those accused of treasonable actions, or actions detrimental to the internal and external security of the country, or actions directed against the existing régime or the principles on which it was based. The Court could also have cognisance of cases involving political corruption under the old régime. The decree was retrospective. Article 6 gave the Court freedom to adopt any procedure; Article 8 laid down that no appeal lay from its verdicts, but by Article 7 these verdicts were

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made subject, before being published, to the ratification of the Revolutionary Council.

It is impossible as yet to say exactly why the Revolutionary Junta decided to stage such a spectacular show. Reasons both of internal and external policy were probably involved. Negotiations with the British Government over the Suez Canal were dragging on, and did not seem then to be leading to any conclusive result; there may have been murmurings and discontent among the population; and it may have seemed to the Junta that their position needed strengthening, that supporters had to be confirmed in their loyalty, and waverers dissuaded from opposition. An idea of the purpose of and the results anticipated from these trials may be gathered from the list of persons who were brought before the Court. The accused numbered thirty: among them were to be found representatives of the most powerful enemies of the régime. The Wafd was arraigned in the persons of Zainab al-Wakil, the wife of Mustafa al-Nahas, and Fuad Siraj al-Din, Ibrahim Faraj and Mahmud Sulaiman Ghannam, former Wafdist ministers; the King in the persons of Karim Thabit, his press councillor, of Doctor Ahmad Muhammad al-Naqib, the Director of the Islamic Benevolence Society Hospital at Alexandria, where it was alleged Farouk had a private wing in which to conduct orgies, and of Muhammad Hilmi Husain, his chauffeur. The Army's honour was vindicated by bringing to trial Prince Abbas Halim, who was said to be involved in the sale of the defective arms which, it was claimed, were a principal cause of the defeat in Palestine in 1948. At that time, too, the Junta had not yet broken with the Muslim Brotherhood, and Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi, the Prime Minister in whose time the Leader of the Brethren, Hassan al-Banna, was murdered, was brought before the Court, together with some alleged accomplices, to answer for this act and, generally, for the persecution of the Brethren. Against him it was also alleged that during 1953 he had attempted to conspire with a foreign Power to commit acts detrimental to Egypt. There was further a miscellany of small fry, who were accused either of treasonable contacts with the British forces in the Suez Canal Zone, or of spreading rumours likely to diminish confidence in the stability of the régime. The Junta's motives in staging these trials may be guessed in considering the categories of persons involved. They become clearer when we look at the behaviour of the judges, the methods of the prosecution, the harshness of the sentences, and at the skilful and organised publicity which attended the whole business.

Consider the publicity. The verbatim records of the trials were officially issued in cheap well-produced booklets, illustrated with cartoons and photographs, and the citizens were exhorted to buy the whole series, with which they would eventually be given a gilt-stamped leather jacket "to make up a most valuable historical volume." The booklets were prefaced by well-known publicists such as Aziz Ibadha and Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, who presented what they called "the philosophy of the trials of the Revolution," celebrating the clemency, fairness, and forbearance of the Revolutionary Council. The first booklet opens with a Koranic verse: "This is a clear exposition unto men, a guidance and an exhortation unto the pious," and Koranic verses describing the fate of the profligate, the corrupt, the impious, and the evil-doers are copiously distributed in all the booklets. The name of God is invoked continuously. The sessions of the Court are opened by the President with the invocation: "In the name of God and of the Revolution." The first booklet is also prefaced with the picture of a hand lying on a book, presumably the Koran, and underneath is set out the text of an oath, the Oath of the Liberation, which runs as follows:

"O God, you love the powerful and you hate the weaklings. You spread your mercy over those who prefer Death, the beloved, for the sake of liberty, to an abject life of slavery. O God, you are near, you see and you hear. We swear by your high Being that we will labour as much as we can to lay the foundations of the future life of our fatherland for which we will sacrifice our lives, so that it shall be free from slavery and wayward passions, and cemented with right and justice; that we will expend whatever is necessary to the advantage of our nation, and the honour of our country; that our motto always shall be Unity, Order and Work. Bear witness, O God, for you are the best of witnesses."

Together with this Koranic material, the reader is supplied with abundant information about the witnesses, the lawyers, and the defendants. Their behaviour in court at crucial moments is described in words and pictures. Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi was the first to be tried. He was sentenced to death, but his sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment. This is how his demeanour while awaiting sentence is described: "Various emotions kept on appearing on his face. When he heard the sentence, his red face was suffused with pallor. While leaving, he wanted to show some steadiness, and tried to occupy himself with lighting a cigarette. He put his hands in his pockets looking for his cigarettes, but in his confusion he could not find them, and his fingers began to tremble in extreme and obvious nervous agitation. Thus did

Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi go out to meet the hangman in the execution room, but the mercy of the Revolution reached him before his neck was broken."

The prosecution pursued the same result as the booklets. It was there to expose, denounce, and incite, and the decree constituting the Court gave it ample opportunity. The offences which the Court was empowered to try were both vague and far-reaching, while its procedure was left to its own discretion. Further, Article 5 of the decree allowed the prosecution to inform the accused of the charges against them as late as twenty-four hours before the trial, and a trial could be postponed only once, and then only for seventy-two hours. The Court was set up on September 16, 1953, and the first trial began on September 26. The defendant was Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi. His lawyer complained that the numerous charges against him were not clearly formulated, and that he did not therefore have the opportunity to prepare a proper defence. The Court refused to give him relief, and the lawyer therefore refused to plead. Thereupon the defendant announced that he would take no further part in the proceedings, and would leave his fate to the mercy of the Court.

Many of the charges, especially against those who had held high office under the old régime, were framed and developed in such a way that no effective defence could be opposed to them. Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi was accused, among other things, that while he was Chief of the Royal Cabinet in 1948, "he helped to carry out Farouk's whims by involving the Egyptian Army in the Palestine War, before the Army could take the steps necessary to participate in it." Witnesses were called to prove that the Army commanders had warned the Government that the Army was not fit to fight; that the then Prime Minister had not consulted his cabinet before deciding to enter the war; that it was a decision forced on him by the King; and the defendant was asked why he did nothing to prevent such an outcome. Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi explained that his functions as Chief of the Royal Cabinet were not amenable to exact definition, that his giving advice depended on his being asked for it by the King; and it is clear that if anybody was to be prosecuted in this manner for the defeat in Palestine, it should have been the Government: if not the Prime Minister, who had died, then the Minister of War. But he was not among the accused; he was giving evidence for the prosecution.

The prosecution was quite untrammelled in its methods. To prove the turpitude of Karim Thabit, Farouk's press councillor,

evidence was offered of some articles he had published seventeen years before, when he was a young journalist, describing the operations and methods of a famous Egyptian white slaver who had just then died a very rich man. The articles were reproduced verbatim in the booklet for the readers' delectation. Again Karim Thabit was accused of undue influence over King and Government. To prove how powerful he was the prosecution made the point that he, a Christian, was a member of the committee which had arranged for the proclamation of Farouk as a descendant of the Prophet. "Were you not ashamed, O Karim," exclaimed the prosecutor, "did there not course to your face even one drop of the blood of shame, when you were entering that committee meeting to shake in his grave the body of our sainted Prophet? May wrath descend on this hateful ingrate, on this cursed profligate. Let the Egyptian people and let all the Muslims of the globe hear how their religion and their Prophet have been greatly mocked. Let them hear that His Learned Eminence Shaikh Karim Thabit has given out a fatwa that Farouk's family is related to our Prophet and Lord, Muhammed, on whom be peace and prayers."

Defendants were not there to answer precisely charges precisely formulated. Whatever their particular offences, these were immeasurably enhanced and magnified by being committed against the Revolution which was identified with the people, with religion, and all that was most sacred. Thus, at the trial of a police officer accused of persecuting Muslim Brethren at Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi's behest, the prosecutor compared Farouk to Pharaoh, Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi to Haman (tyrants and evil-doers portrayed in the Koran), and the police officer to the soldiers of Pharaoh and Haman. In another such case the prosecutor addressed the judges and called them the Justice of God on Earth. In a case where rumour-mongers were tried, the prosecutor described the heinousness of their offence thus: "At a time when the Revolution is taking strides to realise its noble aims for the good of this people and its prosperity, we find a company of people, actually a very small minority, who have exploited the mercy of the Revolution and the noble sentiments to which the Free Officers have given expression. This malfeasant group thought to create tension and to sow corruption over the land. They thought that the poisons they were spreading, the lying, tendentious rumours, and the evil misleading propaganda they were publishing would halt the caravan of the free in its straight path towards the highest aim of liberating the country and taking it to the highest degree of perfection."

The role of the judges in these trials was remarkable. They also conducted the case for the prosecution, not delicately and subtly, but openly and crudely. When Dr. al-Naqib, the director of the hospital in Alexandria where the King was said to have staged orgies, appeared before the Court, the President of the Court took a hand in the examination of a witness who was alleging that the nursing staff were paraded before the King on first joining the hospital; the President asked: "What has the King got to do with a parade of nurses? Was he then inspecting each one, telling her, right, left, about turn, and examining her back and front?" When the witness alleged that after a ball at the hospital, the King was followed to his quarters by a dancer, the President asked him: "Why did she follow him? What did she want to do with him?" In the trial of the rumour-mongers, the defence lawyer objected to the prosecution's evidence because it was supplied by a procurer and a drug-peddler; the President intervened to explain that this could not be so since the authorities took care to see that their informants were respectable. But the President's most sinister intervention occurred at the first trial when the defence lawyer was complaining that he was given no opportunity to acquaint himself properly with the charges made against his client. "You forget," the President remarked, "that this is a revolutionary court." He went on to say that the Revolution might have been expected to follow the example of other revolutions, "but this Revolution is noble . . . it has allowed the defendant the opportunity to defend himself alone, or with the help of a lawyer, and made the court sessions public, which indicates the generosity of the Revolution and its forbearance." "Would you like us," he inquired, "to follow the example of other states and other revolutions?" The Court then was to behave as it saw fit, absolutely. When another lawyer defending an Egyptian employee of the British forces on the Suez Canal pointed out that his client was accused merely of passing information to a foreign Power, and not of espionage, and that the law of the land distinguished between the two offences, the President intervened bluntly: "The Revolutionary Court," he laid down, "is not bound by ordinary legislation."

The sentences of the Court were harsh, designed to intimidate, to make an example of those foolish and treasonable enough to oppose the Junta in any way, and to show that nobody, however wealthy or eminent, could escape them. Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi was sentenced to death, and all his possessions, except what he had inherited from his father, confiscated. The death sentence was


later commuted to life imprisonment. Karim Thabit was sentenced to hard labour for life and to the confiscation of all his possessions acquired after 1946. The other prominent defendants fared no better. But what gives the best idea of the submission in which the Egyptians were now being exercised and educated is the fate of three defendants, one a higher civil servant, another a retired senior police officer, and the third an engineer, a former civil servant. They were accused of spreading rumours such as that the British would never leave Suez, or expressing opinions that the Junta were not as disinterested as they seemed. They were convicted principally on the evidence of a Coca-Cola vendor who claimed to have overheard their discussions. One was sentenced to hard labour for life, the second to fifteen years' hard labour, and the third to ten years' hard labour. The Egyptian despotism was really in earnest, for was it ever seen before that courts in a Muslim country would convict and sentence so harshly Muslims who belonged to the official classes, but who were neither important nor dangerous, for mere coffee-house babble? The Iraqi courts, for instance, might sentence to a longish term of hard labour an Assyrian who, teased and twitted by some Muslims, at length burst out that he felt like joining the French to fight in Algeria. An Assyrian is fair game; it is usually otherwise when Muslims are involved.

Another remarkable feature of the trials we have been considering illustrates the degradation of Egyptian politics, namely, the behaviour of the defence lawyers. Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi's counsel was Mustafa Mar'i, a well-known lawyer, and an ex-Senator. On one occasion he let fall a remark about "the sinister political atmosphere." The President at once took it up and asked him what he meant, and this man, considerably the President's senior in age, experience, and learning, had, time and again, to return to his unfortunate expression and to attempt to explain it away until the President asked him bluntly to desist. Muhammad Salah al-Din, the Wafdist foreign minister, who defended Sulaiman Ghannam and Ibrahim Faraj delivered a long oration in praise of the Revolution and in condemnation of the corrupt politics of the old régime. Lawyer vied with lawyer in extolling the wisdom and clemency of the Court, and in disclaiming procedural safeguards, preferring, as one of them put it, to put their trust in the conscience of the judges and the purity of the Revolution. One of them went even further and said that if he had been sure that the man he was defending was a traitor, then he would have given up his defence.

In the autumn of 1950 a number of Egyptian senators addressed

a letter to the King complaining of abuses in the court and in the government. The letter angered the King extremely and al-Nahas called its signatories criminals; but the government took no action against them, being afraid that if they were to be tried before a court and then acquitted, the incident would considerably damage both King and government. But checks such as these which existed under the old régime, feeble as they were, became even more insignificant under the Revolution. The consideration due to notabilities, the laziness of aged politicians, the scruples of good breeding, the rules of the game, such as they were: these and like factors speedily ceased to have play under the rule of these young incorruptibles suddenly sprung from nowhere.

In Farouk's Egypt there were two classes of politicians, the Wafdists and the King's men. Among the King's men were some who were such by inclination, by training or by tradition, and others who became so by necessity. These, to start with, had no intention of being the King's men. They either wanted, like the Liberal Constitutionalists, to oppose the Wafd on its own ground, or were seceders from the Wafd like the Saadists. But they could not rival the hold which the Wafd had over the country, and therefore, to exercise power, had to become the King's men. Towards the end of Farouk's reign all the politicians were in a fair way to becoming the King's men. For the Wafd, which exercised power from 1949 until the riots of January 1952, did not wish this time to strive against the King, but shared the power with him, the peculations of its leaders vying with his whims and avarice. In *The Ancien Régime and the Revolution*, de Tocqueville has pointed out how the French Revolution took over and extended certain characteristic features of government and politics under the Monarchy. Similarly, it may be said that under the Junta all men became the King's men, with this difference that the Junta was now King.



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RUSSIAN LIBERALISM. By GEORGE FISHER. [*Harvard University Press*. 240 pp. 36s.]

GERMANY AND THE REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA, 1915-1918. By Z. A. B. ZEMAN. [*Oxford University Press*. xxiii and 157 pp. 25s.]

MR. FISHER's book is probably the first connected account in English of the activities of the various liberal groups in Imperial Russia which appeared on the scene in the middle of the nineteenth century, maintained a shadowy existence till the end of the century, and had their brief hour of glory in the years which led up to the 1905 revolution. Liberalism was in fashion throughout the western world at the time, even where it was suppressed, and western liberals must have provided at least something of a model for people of a like mind under the autocracy of the Tsars. Yet in most respects the development of Russian liberalism followed lines very different from its western counterpart. In France, Britain, or America the governments themselves were liberal, the progress towards wider suffrage was accepted—sometimes grudgingly—as inevitable, and the initiators of change were on the whole the people in power. In Germany, the principal reason why authority disliked the liberals was that they might at any moment come to power if they were not restrained, and would be perfectly capable of holding it and using it to bring about the same sort of change as was occurring in the democracies. But in Russia, for most of the period covered by the book, liberalism was never so near the plane of practicality; it existed, as Mr. Fisher points out, on two levels, the one confining itself to immediate and mostly local measures of reform, the other daydreaming in terms of perfect systems which never stood a chance of being translated into reality. This conflict between the wood and the trees has doubtless affected every reforming movement in human history. It was, however, the main reason why the liberal groups in Russia were so unprepared for the crisis of 1905 when it came, and the tidy-minded theoretical documents produced at banquets in St. Petersburg (some of which are well quoted by Mr. Fisher) seem sadly irrelevant in the light of the violence from below which actually characterised the revolution. In the circumstances of those days, theorising was a poor substitute for arms.

Mr. Zeman's collection of documents, taken from the German archives, shows up a very different sort of approach to political change. It includes no Russian material, and this is not its purpose. But it is advisable to read these papers with one eye on what was happening in Russia at the time, and the other on the men who were making it happen—men of far greater practicality, far greater ruthlessness, and in the end far greater success than those described by Mr. Fisher. The German Foreign Office and General Staff had, of course no sympathy for the revolutionaries as such, but were concerned to use every means to transform the two-front war into a one-front war, at the same time doing their best to prevent the new rulers of Russia from forming too close contacts with the Entente. The documents collected by Mr. Zeman are largely material not previously available in English. They start with the first contacts made in January 1915 with the curious figure of Dr. Helphand, whose memorandum of March 1915 on "Preparations for

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a Political Mass Strike in Russia" is reproduced in full; they end with two almost pathetic postscripts written in June 1918 by Ludendorff and by Count Mirbach, then German Minister in Moscow, to Kühlmann at the Foreign Ministry in Berlin. In his final summing up of the position of the Soviet Government, Ludendorff writes:

"We can expect nothing from this government, although it lives by our mercy. It is a lasting danger to us which will diminish only when it recognises us unconditionally as the supreme Power and becomes pliable through its fear of Germany and concern for its own existence. Therefore a strong and ruthless treatment of this government appears to me still to be indicated."

Dr. Helphand first appears on the scene in Constantinople, where he made contact with the German Ambassador in January 1915, and was recommended to Jagow's attention as "the well-known Russian socialist and publicist" whose attitude since the beginning of the war had been "definitely pro-German." Two years later (April 1917) he arrives again in Berlin with a recommendation from the unfortunate Brockdorff-Rantzau, then Minister in Copenhagen, who comments:

"Helphand has realised some extremely positive achievements, and in Russia he was, quite unobtrusively, one of the first to work for the result that is now our aim. Certain things, perhaps even everything, would be different now if Jagow had not totally ignored his suggestions two years ago."

Yet in the succeeding months Helphand disappears from the scene, while Lenin and his party make their way from Switzerland to Russia in the famous sealed train. Thereafter the main contact is with the much tougher and much cleverer "Pole Sobelsohn, well known to German Social Democrats from his German past, who usually goes under the pseudonym Karl Radek" and who is described by Riezler from Copenhagen as "quite unscrupulous, but very clever and extremely talented as an author . . . in spite of all his ideological principles, he is not deaf to opportunist considerations."

Once the October revolution had taken place, the Germans lost control of the situation; most of the main actors were dead before the final price for their mistakes was paid at Stalingrad. The later documents in Mr. Zeman's collection have a distressingly familiar ring. The Bolshevik régime could not possibly last, yet was still something to be feared; it should be replaced by the Kadets, by the royalists, by something, but neither Ludendorff nor Mirbach is prepared to say how. In the end it was the Weimar Republic which came to terms with the Bolsheviks and the Entente that tried to destroy them. The whole episode on which this set of documents sheds such admirable light was neither the first nor the last in which a wartime political manoeuvre, designed to call benevolent spirits from the vasty deep, turned sour on those who brought it about. One cannot say with certainty that the course of events would have been markedly different had there been no Helphand, no Radek, and no sealed train. One can only say that the German appreciation of the forces behind the Russian revolution was badly at fault; they made the mistake of believing too much in their power to control events, and gave the world an object lesson in the inadvisability of meddling in the long-term politics of other nations in order to reap a short-term advantage.

T. E. M. McKITTERICK.

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THE ARMS RACE. By PHILIP NOEL-BAKER. [Stevens. 579 pp. 25s.]

THIS is a very important book. Mr. Noel-Baker for forty years, inside and outside the House of Commons, within the League of Nations and through the United Nations, has devoted himself to the pursuit of peace and disarmament with remarkable pertinacity and integrity. In the early days of the League he worked in close association with Nansen and he brings to politics some of the chivalry and disinterestedness which distinguished that international figure. In the first decade after the first war he was also working closely with Arthur Henderson in his heroic but abortive efforts to get disarmament. In May 1926 Mr. Noel-Baker's book *Disarmament* was published and immediately knocked on the head by the outbreak of the general strike. Despite this blow *Disarmament* became a classic, for it gave all the facts and analysed all the difficulties and possibilities in the problem of arms and war which faced the world after the first defeat of Germany.

Now thirty years later Mr. Noel-Baker does for the nuclear world of 1958 what he accomplished with such masterly completeness for the world of the League of Nations and the Versailles Treaty. This is a book which no one but he could have written, for there is probably no one now living who has followed so long, so closely, and so understandingly the history of the necessity and the failure to disarm. The old problems have been given a new face, and a terrifying face, by the appearance of nuclear weapons, and the necessity to disarm is now imposed by the choice between disarmament and universal ruin. Mr. Noel-Baker's new book is as good as his old. It puts all the facts in the present situation before the reader with complete clarity and sobriety. First we have the history of the present arms race, of the abortive disarmament negotiations. Then we are given fully the facts about nuclear weapons and their effects, the impossibility of defence, "conventional" armaments and weapons of mass destruction. In the light of these facts Mr. Noel-Baker examines the negotiations and proposals for nuclear and conventional disarmament. All this is admirably presented and deserves to be studied and pondered over by anyone who is concerned with the future of civilisation and of the human race—and of himself as a unit in civilised society and the human race. For with the facts and problems here considered the future of you and I and of civilisation is intimately bound up.

Mr. Noel-Baker gives the facts and the arguments of others pro and con with sobriety and considerable objectivity. But rightly he does not hesitate to put forward his own conclusions. His arguments, short and sharp, are terribly convincing: only complete disarmament—not only nuclear weapons but all bombs and bombers, all weapons of mass destruction, missiles, submarines, etc.—will save the world from destruction, and this will require full international control and a real system of collective security. He has always erred perhaps on the side of optimism, but he does not underestimate the present dangers and difficulties. He is right in saying that a facile pessimism is even worse than a facile optimism, and his whole book is a vindication of the bitter truth in Mill's statement, which he prints on his title page: "Against a great evil, a small remedy does not produce a small result, it produces no result at all."

LEONARD WOOLF.

ANONYMOUS EMPIRE. A STUDY OF THE LOBBY IN GREAT BRITAIN. By S. E. FINER. [*Pall Mall Press*. 151 pp. 12s. 6d.]

THERE is nothing new about the so-called lobby or pressure group, except perhaps its name. The Englishman who told an American audience that the phenomenon did not exist over here was simply ignorant of the processes of British government. But anyone who claimed that it was a new development would show equal ignorance of our political and administrative history. For wherever we turn we find its presence. What, if not this, were the suffragettes? Or the United Kingdom Alliance? Or the private water companies of London in their efforts to prevent the creation of the Metropolitan Water Board? Or the lawyers' societies in their opposition to a land registry? Or the City of London in its endeavours to obstruct the establishment of the London County Council? It must be a singularly naive view of the course of political change which fails to take account of the influence of organised minorities in either promoting or hindering it. Did not Jeremy Bentham have much to say on the political significance of what he called "sinister interests"?

Not that there is anything inherently sinister in the existence of an interest group. When a minority is in a position of power from which it can threaten the majority, when its appeal is to force and not argument, or when its methods are to corrupt rather than persuade, then it is an evil and a danger. Otherwise it may be no more than a legitimate participant in the democratic process. And its role may even be a necessary one in that political dialectic from which a more comprehensive and more widely accepted interpretation of common good can emerge.

For there is nothing surprising in the fact that people who share the same interests or ideas should co-operate to secure the one and promote the other. They combine the better to influence political decision. And the study of the process of political decision must therefore be concerned with their operations. A government must take them into account, but it needs also to weigh against them the often less articulate demands of wider interests, if it is to produce policies that will command general support. For in order that the more vocal or more strongly organised minority shall not be allowed to blackmail the majority it may need a courage and awareness of the latent in public opinion, which politicians do not always possess. Particularly where the active minority is on the same side as the forces of apathy and tradition—as, for example, with the Lord's Day Observance Society—are these qualities in the politician most called for, and least often found.

Why then, it may be asked, if there is nothing new, surprising, or necessarily sinister about pressure groups, has attention to them recently grown? *The Political Quarterly*, for instance, made of its first issue this year a special number on the subject, and Professor S. E. Finer has written this book which is rightly described on the jacket as "for everyone interested in the processes of government." The answer is to be found in several allied developments. First, our society is more obviously a plural one, in the sense that the sources of authority in it are more scattered and diverse: there are several different élites, and more ivory towers built on exclusive skills. Secondly, the extension of its field of activity has brought the state into

direct contact with more group organisations, which have in any case grown in number and importance with increasing specialisation. Thirdly, the state itself has gone into decline. No longer omniscient or all-powerful, it is more obviously subject to international forces which it cannot control. And this has made it more like other associations and more patently a system created and operated by its own members. More people feel that what it does can be determined, if not by themselves, at least by recognisable groups and organisations with which they have concrete relationship.

Thus the development of the lobby is part and parcel of the growth of democratic processes and reflects a spread of political responsibility. It is a great merit of Professor Finer's book that it analyses the course of co-operation between interests, on the one hand, and politicians and officials on the other. It shows this as an interlocking partnership from which both sides can profit, as a corrective to the defects of the electoral and party system, as a method of extending self-government. The existence of the lobby "and its recognised status in our political processes provides continuous consultation between government and governed all the time. During this time the various associations supply the parties, ministers and officials with that technical and specialised advice without which laws would be mere chimeras and administration a mere bungle."

Here are the means by which sectional interests can be reconciled to form a common interest. "The departments, the ministers, the parties, Parliament and the press all, severally and together, resist and counterbalance the pressure of sectional interests." These institutions, with their power to check and control, with their long established procedures and principles, and with their continuity, are, Professor Finer feels, an effective safeguard of this public interest. Especially is this true of the civil service which is "disinterested, aloof, critical and dispassionate. Its knowledge is of a different order from the lobby's. It is based on a much wider range of acquaintanceships than that of any single association, since it has to open its ears to *all* interested organisations." But the parties also provide safeguards. "At the very least," he says, "party policy is an amalgam of sectional interests rough-hewn into a rude conformity with the public interest by the very pragmatic yardstick of what is likely to win a general election." And to this must be added influences derived from the party's ideology, history, and leadership.

The British system of government is strongly resistant to narrow interests, Professor Finer believes. Here he shows perhaps too much optimism—particularly in relation to those peripheral bodies which are insulated from ministerial responsibility and parliamentary scrutiny. But he is surely right to claim that "consultation is built into the very system," that this has been properly extended to include all outside organisations, and that "it is the object of any department to engineer the maximum consensus of all interested parties." In that aim of maximum consensus is assuredly the very essence of democratic principle; but "all interested parties" are not always exclusively the most vocal ones and the ones most willing to obstruct, threaten, and blackmail. In this stimulating book Professor Finer makes a well-founded plea for strengthening the authority of the numerical majority which can best claim to speak for the general, as opposed to the sectional, interest. He sees

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the best prospect of doing this in enforcing greater publicity on the operations of the latter, in any steps that will reduce the secrecy or anonymity of the lobby.

H. R. G. GREAVES.

PROBLEMS OF THE NEW COMMONWEALTH. By SIR IVOR JENNINGS. [Cambridge University Press for Duke University Press. 114 pp. 19s.]

THESE are three lectures given by Sir Ivor Jennings at the Commonwealth-Studies Center of Duke University in North Carolina. The Duke publications in this field vary in length and in thoroughness of treatment, but they are rapidly forming a useful corpus of knowledge and comment about Commonwealth affairs. Sir Ivor's lectures are a little repetitive of what he has already published in *The Commonwealth in Asia* and *The Approach to Self-Government*, but are more up to date than the one, and less generalised than the other; they can thus be read with profit by anyone who found these former books enlightening. The lectures deal with the history of self-government in British Asia, the economic problems of Asian Commonwealth countries, and the national and racial problems which those countries face. The "New Commonwealth" of the title comprises India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Malaya, with side-glances at Singapore and Hong Kong.

Sir Ivor does not discuss the specifically Commonwealth problems of these countries, in the sense of their relations with other Commonwealth countries or their interpretations of the Commonwealth link; he is concerned with them as newly independent states whose problems arise partly from their internal circumstances and partly from their former dependence upon Britain. He writes freshly and vividly, compressing a great deal of material into a small space, and perhaps making some allusions which his American audiences may have found unfamiliar. But he is particularly effective in demolishing American preconceptions about the nature of British rule in Asia; and although he is occasionally a trifle too self-assured about the part which he has personally played in constitution-making, he gives a very clear picture of how Asian politicians' minds work. He is illuminating about communalism and its relation to nationalism. He says he is no economist, but his economics make sense to me.

The main impression left behind by his treatment of Asian Commonwealth countries is of states which have little in common except English-educated middle classes who necessarily count for much in local politics when power is handed over, but may not survive the dangerous cross-currents of communal fervour. Sir Ivor is not pessimistic, but realistic; he tries to face the facts, and see which tendencies will prevail. His lectures do not add up to a synoptic account of the "New Commonwealth," or of its effect upon the "Old Commonwealth"; but, since both phrases are Duke University's and not his, he is hardly to be blamed for that.

J. D. B. MILLER.

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THE TRADES UNION CONGRESS, 1868-1921. By B. C. ROBERTS. [Allen and Unwin. 35s.]

MR. BEN ROBERTS here presents a history of the Trades Union Congress from its foundation in 1868 up to the establishment of the General Council in 1921, and promises in due course to complete the record in a second volume. He is a competent historian, and has made good use of the available sources, though he does not appear to have had access to the T.U.C.'s own records. His account, though generally well-informed, therefore tends to lack intimacy and gives little impression of most of the personalities who have contributed to the Congress's growth. In several matters Mr. Roberts sets out to correct the impression given by the Webbs in their classic history and in *Industrial Democracy*. One of these is their gross underestimation of George Potter, who, as he shows, was a much greater influence than they allow, and also a much more respectable figure in Trade Union history. A second, and more important, point is that, in Mr. Roberts's view, the Webbs were grossly unfair to the Parliamentary Committee of their day, which served the movement, as it had mainly to do if it was to establish its influence, by facing its problems piecemeal as they arose rather than by attempting to formulate any logically constructed long-term policy on a consistent theoretical basis. This does not mean that Mr. Roberts exonerates the Parliamentary Committee from all criticism; but he rightly holds that in the tentative and largely Lib-Lab policy which it followed right up to 1900 it was broadly in the right and was correctly interpreting the wishes of most of the affiliated membership, because the individual Trade Unions were by no means disposed to surrender their independence into its hands, or even to allow it any great scope for collective initiative. This reluctance, indeed, endured, as he shows, right up to 1921 and even afterwards, and has by no means been fully overcome even today.

Mr. Roberts himself clearly belongs to the right wing of the movement, and makes very plain his opposition to left-wing militancy of all sorts, at any rate in the field of industrial action. But this attitude does not seriously bias his narrative, or lead him into an indiscriminate denunciation of the left, save at a few points. He is not very consistent in the extent to which he allows himself to be drawn into a general account of Trade Union developments over the period he covers. In some cases he ranges rather widely—for example, in his account of the years 1919-1921; but in others—for example, in the 1870's and again in 1889 and the following year—he alludes very lightly to the broader movement in Trade Union events and assumes greater knowledge of these on the part of the reader. He is, I think, weakest in his handling of the period from about 1875 to 1889, for which much too little is said of the attitude of any outstanding leader other than Broadhurst and, to some extent, Howell; and there are similar shortcomings in his handling of the 1890's. But in general he has done his work with reasonable skill and has filled a notable gap in the historical record of British Labour with accuracy and competence, if without a great deal of inspiration.

G. D. H. COLE.

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COMMON SENSE ABOUT THE COMMON MARKET. Germany and Britain in Post-War Europe. By E. STRAUSS. [*Allen and Unwin*. 168 pp. 15s.]

No one, not even Mr. Strauss, would deny that the Rome Treaties to establish the European Economic Community and Euratom are remarkable achievements. One can go further and add, like Mr. Strauss, that they may even mark a new departure in world politics, and in Professor Kennan's words that the Six are "moderating the sharp edges of that absolute sovereignty (of nations) which is one of the anachronisms of our times." But it is far more difficult to understand why the treaties were adopted and to assess their likely consequences. For these purposes common sense seems to be an inadequate tool.

Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to the subject, and the truth no doubt lies somewhere in between. One is to see the new Communities and their forerunner, the European Coal and Steel Community, as deliberate and major steps towards an eventual union. The other is to consider them as a response to changing power relationships both in Europe and between Europe and the rest of the world. Mr. Strauss concentrates on the second approach, for the most part no more than recognising the significance of the first except when he is castigating Britain for offering "too little, and asking too much" over the project for the Free Trade Area.

Within these confines he has much to say that is illuminating. His central thesis is that Germany has got the best of the bargain, although the treaties are necessarily framed to appeal to the interests of the other five countries. Certainly there are good grounds for this view. It is another matter, however, to go on to argue that Germany, far from being harnessed in a new partnership, is well on the way to establishing its hegemony, simply by reference to a combination of well-known facts, widely voiced fears and a consistently unfavourable interpretation of the treaties.

The case is overstated. While this makes for a highly readable and stimulating book, balanced judgments are consequently all too few. It is difficult to avoid the impression that the author has fallen victim to an over fond drawing of an analogy with Prussia's growth into the German Empire. Western Germany, he implies, has made minor sacrifices in the Common Market in order to make it "more bearable to its victims" just as Prussia was willing in the establishment of the Zollverein "to make short-term financial sacrifices for the sake of ultimate political and economic supremacy." The weakness of this analogy is simply that France, despite its difficulties, cannot be likened to Saxony or Bavaria.

Germany, though obviously the strongest of the Six, does not have a disproportionate influence. The concessions it gave, moreover, far from being the gift of scheming Ruhr barons or wily doctrinaire liberals, were wrung out of it thanks to the pressure exerted by its own "Europeans." Their influence is very much underrated in this book. Jean Monnet, for instance, gets two brief mentions. Yet he it was who prepared the memorandum of the Benelux countries submitted to the Messina Conference in 1955. He was instrumental in resolving the crisis when the negotiation of the treaties was on the verge of breakdown; and but for his Action Committee there would never have been such extensive political support for them. Already he has

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started work on plans for the next steps, such as making the Communities monetarily viable. Were it not for the cement of the European idea, the partial interests could not have been brought together on this scale.

In the last resort, it is the institutions, not the economic measures, which are crucial. If they work as they are meant to, then they will at least temper irresponsible national policies. Mr. Strauss belittles them when analysing the treaties but later he criticises the Free Trade Area on the grounds that it lacks the Common Market's institutions which "will enable the injured members to exert non-economic influence on policy," and he emphasises that "An effective full employment policy . . . can, therefore, not be left to national governments, but must be entrusted to the community as a whole." The contrast between what is needed and what is laid down for the three Communities of the Six is also obvious to all who look for it. The anti-trust laws are weak, the European Bank may prove inadequate, the Community readaptation measures may seem derisory, and finally the formal powers of the European Commission and Assembly may appear to be only nominal. On the score of controlling cartels, the outlook is admittedly not promising, but the institutions are showing a flexibility and capacity for initiative which Mr. Strauss failed to foresee.

Very appropriately the architects of these Communities talk in terms of "building Europe." (The notion of "creating Europe" was dropped once the question entered the realm of practical politics.) The current approach, though gradualist, is pragmatic and hence at variance with the empirical British attitude. Britain has characteristically confined itself largely to European co-operation at intergovernmental level on matters of specific and immediate concern, accepting only institutions with minimum powers.

This basic cause of the impending further division of Europe, so much feared in this country in the event of no Free Trade Area being negotiated, is graphically described by Mr. Strauss in a more fitting, if scarcely any more comforting, analogy than the first. Britain's wavering on the brink of the Common Market is likened to Austria-Hungary's hovering "at the periphery of Germany, undecided until too late where its main interests lay."

The supranational issue is irrelevant, he insists with some disregard for the facts. Britain's interests could perfectly well be satisfied by bringing the Commonwealth within the framework of the European association by means of introducing reciprocal preferences. The harking back to the abortive Strasbourg Plan of 1952 is very much to the point on the eve of the coming Commonwealth Economic Conference. Such a scheme could remove some of the more intractable problems of the Free Trade Area, for instance over agriculture and the question of the origin of goods traded. It would also temper the autarchic features of the Common Market. None of these arguments, however, carries any weight with the Government at this critical juncture in the negotiations, largely on the grounds that the Six have nothing to give in return. The objection is valid within the context of a scheme for lowering obstacles to trade alone, but it overlooks the scope for stabilising the structure of European payments as well as for underpinning the sterling area through a refurbished EPU.

Solutions along these lines need not become urgent until after a Free Trade Area treaty is agreed in principle, but that is no reason for refusing to consider them now. Without them, as Mr. Strauss indicates, it may well

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become increasingly hard to reconcile the Free Trade Area and the Common Market unless Europe becomes inward-looking economically or still further divided.

Leaving aside the stream of pamphlets and papers which are coming out about the European economic integration, *Common Sense about the Common Market* is still the only work in the field. Many of its warnings are timely, but it suffers from many inconsistencies and the author's evident lack of first-hand knowledge of the European institutions or their architects.

J. C. HUNT.

THE BRITISH STATUTE BOOK. By CHRISTOPHER HUGHES. [*Hutchinson*. 168 pp. 10s. 6d.]

THIS short book is an interesting addition to the Hutchinson University Library. Little has been written about the forms, methods, and procedure adopted by Parliament in its legislative capacity since Sir Courtenay Ilbert's work on *Legislative Methods and Forms* was published in 1901. Sir Ivor Jennings's *Parliament* contains a great deal of information about parliamentary procedure, but the emphasis in that book is somewhat different because he was painting with a broader brush on a larger canvas, and seeking to depict Parliament in all its aspects, while Mr. Hughes has endeavoured to deal only with those activities of Parliament which have a direct bearing on the Statute-book, either by adding to it, subtracting from it, or revising out-of-date Acts. He is also concerned with the form, manner, and aim of legislation.

The author writes as a political scientist with a strong historical sense who is acutely aware of the political and democratic forces at work in the parliamentary process. He finds the essence of "the parliamentary portion of the British Constitution" in the details of legislative procedure. The safeguards which the British régime provides are not anywhere stated in the form of general guarantees of a fundamental character, but are contained in "a certain attitude of mind, and are expressed by the manner in which chairmen are appointed in certain select committees, the times at which certain subjects may be debated, and so on. It is the detail which is important. Freedom is a plant that grows in the interstices of procedure." A little later he remarks that while the technique of freedom is to be found in procedure, it is the passion for it which keeps it alive.

In the chapters devoted to private Bills and delegated legislation the author traces the movement from private Bills to provisional orders and thence to statutory instruments. He makes no mention, however, of the "scheme" which has become of great importance in many spheres of public administration. Parliament passes a town planning Act, or an education Act, for example. The statute requires local authorities to submit development plans or education schemes for their areas to the relevant Minister. If there are objectors—and sometimes in any event—he will order a public inquiry to be held, and thereafter he will either approve the scheme as submitted, or subject to modifications, or refer it back to the local authority. The Minister is often required to lay approved schemes before Parliament; but whether or not he has this duty, an approved scheme has binding force and may be regarded as the latest device for conferring powers and imposing duties on individual local

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authorities in regard to particular services in accordance with a general political and legal policy laid down by statute.

One of the most neglected subjects in England is legislative draftsmanship. It is not studied or taught in any of the law schools or universities, although lawyers occupying many different positions—in Government Departments, in town clerks' offices, as advisers to joint stock companies, public corporations, trade associations, trade unions, etc.—are frequently required to draft documents of various kinds which will have "legislative" effect of one kind or another. Mr. Hughes's chapter on draftsmanship is concerned only with the drafting of Bills by Parliamentary counsel; and he shows the difficulties which arise from their need to take into account considerations of logic, considerations of how the courts will interpret each clause, and the political considerations which are bound to weigh heavily with Ministers. The Bill which emerges is often a compromise between law, logic, and politics. I wish Mr. Hughes would pursue this part of his study a good deal further so as to bring a critical appreciation to bear on the form and language of the modern Statute-book. Our legislative drafting is by no means as good as it should be or could be and it is sometimes deplorable. This is a matter of some importance in an age when statutes often affect millions of people, most of whom cannot afford to consult a lawyer. Mr. Hughes makes some disparaging remarks about the rent control legislation, the defects of which are not due to the draftsman but to mediocrity of intellect "at a critical place" (p. 133); but in general he is content to describe and to interpret rather than to criticise. He has, nevertheless, written an interesting book which contains many illuminating sidelights on the legislative process and a good deal of original observation.

W. A. ROBSON.

THE MACHINERY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT. By R. M. JACKSON. [Macmillan. 360 and viii pp. 30s.]

THIS book is a shrewd appraisal of the way local government works in the context of current legislative and administrative control. Dr. Jackson brings to this the useful combination of experience as councillor, don, and lawyer.

From time to time, especially in chapters regarding the nature of local government, its powers, franchise, and corruption, a quick glance at West Africa, or France, or Germany is allowed. But in the main *The Machinery of Local Government* is almost entirely about British local government. Those sections dealing with central-local government relations, finance, legal control, the internal organisation, and the relationships between officers and elected representatives, are particularly well done. The attention paid to the human side of the working of local government fills a gap in most existing books of a general character. For example, Dr. Jackson is particularly forthright on the effects that boundary revision proposals have upon councillors and officers, and the effect that their human reactions—in turn—have on those proposals.

But I must confess to some disappointments. From one of such experience and percipience, I had hoped for a shrewd analysis of problems about which most books in this field are out of date. Politics, for instance—the dominant force in local government in most county boroughs and not a few counties, is

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"Mr. Baldwin sets himself the more limited task of attempting to answer the question: 'Where do we stand today *vis-à-vis* Soviet Russia?' As an acknowledged expert in a highly technical field, he has the knack of assembling and translating into terms that even the layman can understand a wealth of material bearing upon the relative position of the military establishments of the United States and the Soviet Union. No one will come away from reading this book with an enhanced sense of complacency."—*Saturday Review*.

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given a chapter of but six pages. Can one still accept (p. 327) "in most areas a man can still stand and win an election as an independent by convincing the people that he would be a good councillor"? Surely if not a party man, most councillors are Municipal Reformers or members of the Ratepayers or the Residents Associations?

As regards the question of areas for local government, regional government is dismissed rather casually because the author cannot see what regional authorities could do in East Anglia. Being a Cambridge resident probably gives as special a slant to local government as being a Brummie—but can anyone today think of areas without mention of overspill? Nor should an author omit to mention the proposal for upper tier authorities for conurbation areas which, made in the White Paper (Cmd. 9831), was the only "revolutionary" proposal in that timid document. Metropolitan areas in fact get too short a shrift even allowing for the fact that Dr. Jackson deliberately and understandably omitted London.

One looks, too, for a discussion of whether councillors spend too much time fiddling with petty details of administration, thus making their officers much less efficient whilst creating an unnecessarily heavy burden for themselves under which they stagger doggedly. No one objects to them staggering but good potential candidates refuse nomination because of "the time involved." Another matter which needs exploring is the financial recompense to councillors, the adequacy of which the author accepts too readily.

Whilst the position of the District Auditor *vis-à-vis* the administration may be uncertain, not many will agree with Dr. Jackson that audit is more akin to judicial control than administrative control. In the excellent section on disclosure of interest no reference is made to the anomalous position of a councillor who is also tenant of a council house.

What is most heartening, however, is the brusque challenging, as "a dogma" (p. 266), of the central government insistence on control of finance, and of the Whitehall attitude that it "may not be questioned that if money comes from the Exchequer, it is the duty of the central government to see that it is spent in accordance with what the central government deems to be a proper way." His argument is that the Treasury and other departments still make use of attitudes of a bygone age, outmoded by the maturing of local authorities and particularly of the professional standards of their officers. "Far from Whitehall still knowing best, the tendency is for the officials of the central government, on the technical side, to be a distinctly average lot; they will be below the standard of the best of the local officials and a cut above the lesser authorities."

This is often a challenging book; it is always interesting; it has an excellent index. It adds to the student's understanding by treating the problems of local government within the context of government generally and by stressing continuously that its operations depend on human beings—the councillors and officers—rather than on a set of legal provisions.

HENRY MADDICK.

Servitudes of International Law

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This book deals with the history, theory and practice of international law in respect of rights in foreign territory. Stress is laid on the actual practice of States and international courts in this branch of international law.

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The international problems studied separately in part three are fishery rights, rights of transit, common railway stations, national zones, the use of waters, customs-free zones, mining rights, the Holy See, missile and bombing ranges, military bases, the Panama Canal Zone, demilitarised areas, the administration of foreign territory, United Nations Headquarters.

The wide scope and practical approach of this book make it invaluable to the international lawyer, the student of international law or international affairs, the politician and the diplomat. So many of the problems discussed are in the forefront of international controversy, that no one interested or engaged in international affairs can afford to miss it.

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE MIDDLE EAST: A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SURVEY. Edited by SIR READER BULLARD. Third edition. [Oxford U. P. for RIIA. 569 pp. 45s.]

BEFORE 1939 serious studies of the Middle East were few in number, and rarely of the handbook type. Books on the area abounded, then as now, and they fell into fairly obvious categories: imperialist-geographic, traveller-anecdotal or liberal-optimist. But reliable guides were another matter. There were a number of excellent German studies of the area—only a few of which, like Hans Kohn's or Margaret Boveri's, were translated into English. Good English studies could be counted on one hand: but mention should be made of Toynbee's volume on the Islamic world in the Chatham House survey for 1925, and Miss Elizabeth Monroe's *The Mediterranean in Politics*, still admirable, but sadly dated.

Thus there were few prototypes for the first edition of the Middle East Handbook when it appeared from Chatham House in 1950, although the same source had produced some useful but brief Information Papers during the Second World War. Nor were the first and second (1954) editions of the Handbook quite satisfactory—and indeed they were in some ways curiously old-fashioned. With statistics for the Middle East hard to obtain (except for Egypt) and harder to trust (not excepting Egypt), they had some very thin sections. They followed a common form, a longish essay on history and politics, a few paragraphs on economics and society and a final section on the strategic importance of the area concerned—a section sometimes politely called "Communications." The tone, even in 1954, was still mildly imperialist. Security still meant the Sudan Defence Force, the Arab Legion, or the Levies; the centre of influence was still the Canal Zone. Neither oil nor air-power were given what we would now think their due. 1950, though post-atomic, was still a pre-SAC age. And politics seemed divorced from social as from strategic factors: the incandescent force of nationalism was not quite fully communicated. Zaghlul and Nahas had been, after all, managed—if only just.

None of these criticisms is possible of Sir Reader Bullard's survey. It is very much a piece of current history—he has been ruthless in cutting down the now familiar story of events before 1952. He has happily wedded the social, the political, and the military, recognising in the social conditions of the area Russia's most powerful weapon. He notes the steady decline in this century of the *per capita* income of the Egyptian population—as numbers increase (approximately half-a-million a year) prosperity declines with an almost mathematical exactness. The sections on Arabia, Aden, and the Persian Gulf have a quite new authority and detail, and there is a greater readableness in those on Jordan, Persia, and Syria, the Greater as well as the Less. The volume as a whole is much better written, no doubt because it is the result of one man's labour.

It would be hard to fault this book. It is not the purpose of a handbook to raise matters of controversy but to provide facts and guidance, and this it does admirably. That it leaves questions in the mind is tribute to its stimulus. It would be fascinating to compare with it a Russian handbook to the Middle East, to compare the state of their own considerable research, to see the attention they pay to the Orthodox Church, to assess the role they

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BOOK REVIEWS

allot to the Moslem fringe along Russia's southern border. The brooding presence of Russia to the north can easily be lost sight of in a country-by-country analysis. So can overall strategy. More might have been made here of the cardinal importance of the 1954 Agreement with Egypt—that triumph of Mr. Dulles's diplomacy from which so many of our own difficulties followed. And is it not rather wishful to say of Nasser (p. 210) that his leadership of the Arab world was shaken in 1957? It seems distressingly unshaken today. At the end of the book one longs for a chapter of general assessment—out of place in a handbook, no doubt, but one which Sir Reader is so well equipped to write. But here he modestly leaves the facts, carefully marshalled and well displayed, to tell their own story of the last decade.

ESMOND WRIGHT.

LES GROUPES DE PRESSION EN FRANCE. By J. MEYNAUD. [Armand Colin, Paris. 371 pp. 1300 Fr.]

"Il va sans dire que les observations présentées constituent non des vues définitives mais des hypothèses de travail destinées à faciliter les recherches ultérieures. . . ." This quotation, taken from two-thirds of the way through the book, sums up succinctly the object of the author. In any new field of study there is room both for the generalised theoretical approach and for the carefully documented case-study. This book falls into the former category as an approach to the nature, structure, and role of pressure groups in the political life of France. As such it is a refreshing change from the apparent unwillingness, until recently, of political scientists to recognise the existence of this "anonymous empire." It is refreshing, too, in its willingness to go beyond the strictly limited approach of many political scientists and to use a more sociological approach. (One may recall that it took a sociologist, McKenzie, to make the first really worthwhile study of political parties in Britain.) M. Meynaud recognises that a study of pressure groups must pay attention to features often overlooked. He devotes much of a chapter to the importance of the internal structure and organisation of a group, including its financial resources, its sense of mission and the importance of the interests represented to the members of the group. Illustrating the second point, he instances the weaknesses of some "confederations" which seek to represent many too loosely knit interests. For the reviewer, this third chapter proved the most interesting.

M. Meynaud goes on to outline the methods adopted by groups in France and it is revealing that having listed many of the methods common to groups in this country, he finds it necessary to talk of intimidation, of menaces, and of open revolt. One example of the several he gives may be recalled: namely, that of the teachers' strike in June 1957.

In his chapter on the tactics of pressure groups, the writer helpfully sets forth the various points of contact between the groups and the people who make "political decisions." In this catalogue appear many of the vital differences between the British and French groups. The important role of Parliamentary Commissions in the French legislative pattern is well known. Less well known, perhaps, is the almost unique importance of these Commissions as points of contact and influence for the groups. M.

BOOK REVIEWS

Meynaud applauds the view of a British student (Philip Williams) in describing them as a façade for the operation of the pressure groups: they are "l'un des points essentiels d'accès des intérêts privés au système politique." At several points in this indictment (and indeed, throughout the whole book) he is forced to conclude that the evidence is not available to afford a firm basis for his hypotheses.

It is this latter willingness to admit the very severe limitations of the knowledge upon which the book is based which makes it both interesting and yet frustrating. Herein is a whole series of projects for research by political students in, and of, France. One cannot, however, remain righteously aloof and pretend that we, on this side of the Channel, have the answers to such questions as: is the administrative machine, in itself, a pressure group, and if so, how far and in what directions? or are there departments whose whole approach is that of deciding and not negotiating? or are some of the newer technical Ministries (e.g., of Health) more aware of (and in need of) pressure groups and more willing to listen to them? and so on, and so on. These and many other questions spring out from the pages and catch the eye of the reader all too conscious that, as yet, we can give no real answer to them. Maybe it is indecent to try!

One point, often overlooked elsewhere, is well made in M. Meynaud's book. In his chapter on the place of pressure groups in "la vie politique" he emphasises that very rarely, in relation to any Government decision, is only one pressure group involved. Inevitably there are groups for it, groups against it, and some sitting on the fence. The need for alliances, for coalitions (or federations) is recognised along with the need to undermine the case of opposing groups. He outlines all too briefly one or two examples of alliance and of battle between groups. Inevitably the Government is almost always in the position of having to decide between conflicting pressures: rarely is the Government lined up against pressure groups unanimously demanding action on its part. "Une étude des relations des groupes les un à l'égard des autres dans la vie courante serait encore plus significative."

ARTHUR J. WILLCOCKS.

SHORTER NOTICES

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1958. Edited by WALTER H. MALLORY. [*Harper and Council on Foreign Relations, New York, Oxford University Press, London.* 229 pp. 35s.]

THIS is a useful American reference book, so far as it goes, though in amount of information it does not go very far. It gives for each country the constitution of its executive government and parliament, party programmes and leaders, recent political events, and the chief newspapers. There are some strange misprints, e.g., "Oldhams" for "Odhams" and "Royal Institute of Internationa Affairs" twice.

BOOK REVIEWS

EAST CENTRAL EUROPE UNDER THE COMMUNISTS. ROMANIA, edited by STEPHEN FISCHER-GALATI. POLAND, edited by OSCAR HALECKI. CZECHOSLOVAKIA, edited by VRATISLAV BUSEK and NICHOLAS SPULBER. HUNGARY, edited by ERNEST HELMREICH. YUGOSLAVIA, edited by ROBERT F. BYRNES. [*Stevens*. £3 10s. each volume.]

THIS ambitious series of seven volumes in all (besides the five listed above there are also volumes on Albania and Bulgaria) originates in America. It was planned by The Mid-European Studies Center, which "was founded in the summer of 1950 principally to help maintain the intellectual tradition and cultural heritage of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe." Each volume contains from fifteen to twenty chapters, written by different authors dealing with the history, land, people, government, and economics of each country. Naturally there is a considerable difference of excellence from chapter to chapter, but the amount of information gathered in each volume is large and valuable. The authors are either professors or lecturers in American universities or employed on research in the Mid-European Research Center. The books are useful works of reference and contain a good deal of material not easily obtainable elsewhere.

PAUL ROBESON. By MARIE SETON. With a Foreword by SIR ARTHUR BRYANT. [*Dobson*. 254 pp. 21s.]

HERE I STAND. By PAUL ROBESON. [*Dobson*. 128 pp. 10s. 6d.]

PAUL ROBESON is an international figure, and it is appropriate and remarkable that Sir Arthur Bryant should write a foreword to Miss Seton's book and that a laudatory description of him by Mr. Nehru should be quoted in it. He is a singer of great renown and achievement, though surely it is an exaggeration to say, as does Sir Arthur Bryant, that he is "probably the greatest interpretative artist of our time." But he has played a prominent part in the politics of freedom and the colour bar and has stood forth as the generous champion of liberty, racial and otherwise. One can only regret his rather callow communism, but one can only admire him, not merely as singer and actor, but as the courageous defier of all governments and persons who hate liberty. The story of his life and opinions is well worth reading both in Miss Seton's book and in his own short volume.

