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
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
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## THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. XXXI, No. 1]

[April, 1958

### The Role and Method of Metaphysical Psychology

by

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There seems to be a return to philosophical psychology.<sup>1</sup> But to speak of a metaphysical psychology must appear completely obsolete to most contemporary psychologists. Before we attempt to indicate the rôle and method of the metaphysical psychology which, I think, still deserves our attention, we must first define what we understand by metaphysical psychology, in contrast to empirical psychology.

#### *Types of Psychology*

It is not easy to define psychology. Indeed when we look into the history of philosophy for an exact definition of the word, we find it used for the first time only by Goclenius, a lecturer at Marburg in the 16th century. Etymologically it means: "the science of the soul," but evidently the word has come to signify something completely different in our age, since the recent *Encyclopedia of Psychology*, edited by Philip Lawrence Harriman,<sup>2</sup> has no article on "Soul".

1. See, for instance: J. F. Denceel, *Philosophical Psychology*, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1955; H. Reith, *An Introduction to Philosophical Psychology*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice Hall, Inc., 1956.

2. New York, Philosophical Library, 1946.

Fortunately philosophers had not to wait for the name of this science to appear before they spoke of the soul, and we can today still enjoy Plato's *Phaedo*, without doubting in the least that we are introduced to some basic problems of psychology. Aristotle had a treatise *De Anima*, which he considered as a part of physics and, among other scholastic writers, Thomas Aquinas followed him in this division of the fields of knowledge.<sup>3</sup> Modern philosophy, with Descartes, accentuated the division of body and soul, and the study of the latter alone was called psychology. Christian Wolff (1679-1754) was the first to distinguish rational from empirical psychology. Kant kept the distinction, but he modified it to fit into the pattern of his transcendental philosophy. "The expression, I, as a thinking being, designates the object-matter of psychology, which may be called the rational doctrine of the soul, inasmuch as in this science I desire to know nothing of the soul but what, independently of all experience (which determines me *in concreto*), may be concluded from this conception I, in so far as it appears in all thought." . . . "If the smallest empirical element of thought, if any particular perception of my internal state, were to be introduced among the grounds of cognition of this science, it would not be a rational, but an *empirical* doctrine of the soul."<sup>4</sup>

This is a very sharp and clear-cut distinction. Though Kant himself did not elaborate an empirical psychology, the results of such an empirical psychology would be admitted as objective in their own line, according to the conclusions of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, if the categories of the understanding were applied to a content coming from sensibility. By taking this standpoint Kant drew the chart of all future empirical psychology. According to him, in psychology as well as in other empirical sciences, the same data form the basis of a necessary and universally admissible knowledge, though a knowledge of appearances alone. But, while rational psychology was obtaining its own separate field in Kant's system, the I which it considered, was denied all ontological value on account of the alleged paralogism of Pure Reason.

We need not recall at length the attempt at restoring metaphysical psychology made by the great idealist systems such as

3. Cf. Aristotle's *DE ANIMA* in the Version of William of Moerbeke and the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by K. Foster and S. Humphries, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1951, pp. 41-50.

4. *Critique of Pure Reason*, Transc. Dialect., Bk. II, Ch. I, London, J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1940, p. 234.

Fichte's and Hegel's. We know also how empirical psychology took either a more objective form in experimental psychology or a more subjective form when it gave more room to introspection. The *Gestalt* psychology and the contemporary phenomenology seem to aim at a synthesis of these objective and subjective trends.<sup>5</sup>

Now if, in order to define metaphysical psychology as contrasted with empirical psychology, we wish to ascertain what is common to all forms of subjective or objective empirical psychology, we shall have to admit, I think, that it is its intrinsic dependence, either in its starting point or in its development, on particular contents or types of contents of consciousness or perception, as such. None of them, I believe, pretend to work independently of all experience "which determines me *in concreto*". From this we conclude that the Kantian definition of empirical psychology remains valid and is perhaps the readiest to start with in order to define metaphysical psychology by contrast with it.

Are we to call then "metaphysical" Kantian rational psychology, though Kant himself denied all ontological value to its conclusions? The answer to this question which I wish to put forward is (1) that any metaphysical psychology which really deserves this name should be as clearly distinct from empirical psychology as the Kantian rational psychology is distinct from what he calls empirical psychology, for then alone it would have a really distinct "formal object" or a way of proceeding proper to itself; and (2) that metaphysical psychology can be defined as the Kantian rational psychology, if, while agreeing to proceed according to the transcendental method of Kant, it still manages to vindicate an ontological status for its findings. A metaphysical psychology is thus a psychology which considers man as a thinking being, independently of any particular content of experience, and yet derives conclusions about man, which are both rational and ontological.<sup>6</sup>

Is this metaphysical psychology possible? Before we come to this question we shall briefly indicate the rôle it must play, for

5. Cf. Paul Foulquié and Gérard Deledalle, *La Psychologie contemporaine*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1951.

6. The words "thinking being" do not imply on my part a negation of man's corporeality. The presence of the soul in the body, their mode of union, etc., can be derived, according to the method which we shall indicate later, from the nature of our thinking process.

many might *a priori* consider our attempt as useless and uncalled for.

*The Rôle of Metaphysical Psychology*

The vindication of metaphysical psychology should in no way imply any repudiation of or discredit to empirical psychology. The Hegelian elimination of the "common sense" or even "scientific" way of thought is to-day almost universally rejected. Neither is metaphysics made by blurring science into higher generalizations. If it is based only on a greater audacity to generalize than the scientist, who knows the facts, would admit, it would contradict the very desire for objective truth which should animate the metaphysician.<sup>7</sup> Yet empirical psychology has its limitations. The way of considering its object is relative. Being a science, empirical psychology proceeds as sciences do: by observation of contingent facts and attempts to explain them. It speaks of things as they appear and tries to say why they appear so. Even if the unconscious is appealed to, it is not to say what ultimately man is, but to explain how he can act as he does.

Might not this relativity be enough for the tasks which psychology has to perform? It may suffice, if one looks only to psychology for the improvement, for instance, of industrial work and exterior behaviour, or even for techniques of memory and thought. This rôle is of no small merit already, if well performed. But there are problems connected with psychology, in which the limitation of the empirical method is immediately felt. If one aims at using psychology for the internal development of personality, for psychiatry, or to find a basis for ethics and religion, then the need of more ultimate answers about man's nature, his true well-being, his true vocation and destiny, becomes imperative. What is the point around which true personality must be built? Is it the body? And, if so, which of its functions? Or is it some higher principle, as the soul, if there is any? Psychiatry must have also its standard of well-being, and a well-being which is favourable not to one aspect alone of man. Ethics may get its norms from some revelation; but even without revelation man should find in the study of his true nature some light for the orientation of his conduct. And

7. Cf. H. Bergson's sharp criticism of this conception of metaphysics in *The Creative Mind*, New York, Philosophical Library, 1946, pp. 144-146.

if he also comes to know his relation to God, his duties towards Him will be dictated by the nature of this relation.<sup>8</sup>

Now, as I already said, I do not think that empirical psychology, on account of its relativity, could give a decisive and absolute answer to the questions which we have raised, while a metaphysical psychology is the discipline which should attempt to do so. To succeed in this task metaphysics will have to offer a greater certitude, and this on account of its very method. We must now examine the possibility of such a method.

*The Method of Metaphysical Psychology*

A metaphysical psychology is possible if, and only if, there is an aspect of man which is necessary, ontologically objective and yet different from the one spoken of explicitly by science. Further this aspect must be accessible to our knowledge.

My claim is that there is such an aspect, and that in psychology we are in a privileged position to attain this aspect more directly than in cosmology or theodicy.

First we must forestall a question or a doubt; I have affirmed more than once that empirical science was relative, and now again I say that I am looking for an aspect which would be "ontologically objective"; do I imply that science is not objective? I mean only this: because science considers sensible determinations, or things as we perceive them in our sensibility, science speaks of them in so far as they are relative. I admit thus something of the Kantian distinction between *phenomenon* and *noumenon*.<sup>9</sup> But on the other hand, I disagree with Kant's view in that I recognize in the affirmation of the scientist or even of the common man, a claim to objectivity which has some ultimate validity, though it is not

8. I realize that in connecting ethics and religion with psychology, I have ventured into highly controverted fields. There is little doubt that the question of personality is one which is quite legitimately raised in psychology. (Cf. M. B. Arnold and J. A. Gasson: *The Human Person, An Approach to an Integral Theory of Personality*, New York, The Ronald Press Co., 1954; and specially J. Nuttin, *Psychoanalysis and Personality, A Dynamic Theory of Normal Personality*, translated by G. Lamb, London, Sheed and Ward, 1954). The link of ethics with psychology is justified, in my eyes, by the fact that our moral action has to be ruled not only by what we appear to be, but by what we are ontologically.

9. Cf. G. Isaye, 'La finalité de l'intelligence et l'objection kantienne', *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, Tome 51, 1953, pp. 46-49.

the task of the scientist or of the common man to vindicate it. Epistemology or ultimately metaphysics and a metaphysical psychology (since I do not believe that epistemology could fulfil its task independently of a metaphysical and psychological approach) will try to do it. This epistemology will peer through the trappings of ordinary or scientific thought and discourse in order to discover the core of necessity and ontological objectivity concealed within.

If one keeps on the level of the external observation of our actions and behaviour and tries to synthesize the results of one's observations under some laws, one might be said to be "reflective" in the sense that one stops and considers. But, as many would readily admit, elements of necessity are not *ipso facto* discovered by this process. (The attempt we just described is roughly one of experimental psychology.) Again, if one tries to describe man phenomenologically under all his aspects, one might also be said to be "reflective", in the sense that he communicates the results of prolonged thought. But again necessity is not involved and the reflection as such (*viz.* the coming back to the self), is still elementary. Now if one begins to practise introspection, paying attention to the various contents of one's thought or past mental life, one is definitely "reflective"; and from the accidental contents or even from regular sequences of contents, one could infer perhaps to some complexes, or to some laws of one's mental life. But again the implied necessity is not thereby shown to be metaphysical. It might only involve the willingness to abide by the "Principle of Laws", *viz.*, that "the same causes produce the same effects", which is nothing else than the admission of scientific induction.

But, if introspection, which reveals the contents of our thoughts, supplies only the basis for an empirical knowledge of elements to which we do not dare to attribute ultimate necessity, is there any hope of discovering in any way this elusive necessity? There is, I think, more than a hope. There is even an unimpeachable evidence for one who places himself in the right perspective. To discover this evidence we need not wait for some special experience. We can take the only narrow path which the "Critics" leave open. They admit that we cannot help affirming. None of us can deny this without claiming that something else is the case; and thus without *affirming* again. But what is it to affirm? It is to acknowledge otherness, and with the assurance that the other which is affirmed to be, cannot, at the same time and under the

same aspect, be other than it is. We have here a necessity which is unavoidable, and the one who denies it, reaffirms it, because he puts an absolute counter-claim. Now that we have caught an element of necessity in an activity which is unavoidable, we are close to the solution of our problem regarding the possibility of a metaphysical psychology. How can this "other" be affirmed absolutely and really as "other", unless the subject exercises a knowledge of itself in its affirmation of the other? We have here an *a-priori* condition of the possibility of an action which is itself necessary, and this condition implies both the self and a necessary cognition of it, thus a "reflection" which we can call metaphysical to distinguish it from all its other forms and specially from introspection.

I have presented a kind of deductive approach to the reflection which is presupposed by the necessary affirmation of objects. But the deduction was in a way superfluous for a reflection is self-revealing, at least when it is perfect and total as in the case of our own intellect. The eye sees the object, but it does not see that it sees. Our intellect, on the contrary, knows the object and at the same time knows that it knows. We thus know directly too that we are reflective. The immediacy is itself the criterion of our certitude and eliminates all relativity, because the knowledge is not obtained by reference to an other. Further this reflection disproves the Kantian claim that valid knowledge is available only when the *a-priori* forms of the understanding inform a sensible content. For we find, as implied in the affirmation of the object, not only the static subject of apperception (a formal center of all forms or categories), but the active subject reflecting and exercising a knowledge of itself in order to know and affirm any object. While a transcendental center, where all forms find their unity, might still be denied an ontological status, the active subject knowing itself as such, has the guarantee of its reality. For something can appear other than it is, but an action is or is not; thus the self-knowledge which is implied in objective knowledge, is; otherwise objective knowledge itself would not be. And we have seen that the fact of the latter is admitted by all, even by the "Critics".

In his chapter on "Self-Knowledge" in *The Concept of Mind*, Professor Gilbert Ryle has made several attacks on the concept of consciousness. Some of them cannot be answered unless one discusses the parts of truth and of error in the whole of his book. But there is one objection which seems to stand by itself and to

forbid all idea of "reflection" on the ground of an alleged infinite process which is involved in the guarantee of self-consciousness.<sup>10</sup> Professor Ryle had seen already that the defenders of reflection do not consider it "as requiring a separate act of attention, or as constituting a separate cognitive act".<sup>11</sup> This is right. The metaphysical reflection which is a self-intimation, is inherent in the direct knowledge of an object. Yet, this metaphysical reflection, when spoken of, is distinguished from the knowledge of an object, because it is a knowing of the subject *as subject* and not yet as an object. In this way alone direct objective knowledge and reflection are compatible, and the supposed infinite process preceding the knowledge of the object, is cancelled. To know the object as object, I must also know the subject as subject. The whole operation is complete with that. All that we can concede to the objection is this: if, besides this operation, I want to practise what Professor Ryle calls elsewhere a "retrospection,"<sup>12</sup> I could in fact take myself or my previous acts and know them explicitly as objects, and begin to say successively: "I was inferring," "I was conscious that I was just inferring," and "I was conscious that I was conscious that I was inferring". Clearly this process *in infinitum* is not presupposed for the first objective act; further it is not contradictory in itself; the two first steps may even serve some purpose; but the rest of the process could only lead the person who would not stop it to an "idée fixe".

I have indicated how there is an aspect of necessity in our activity of affirming, and how this element is accessible by a reflection which supplies the starting point of a necessary knowledge of ourselves as seen absolutely in the ontological order. Further implications could be derived from this necessity of affirming, or be deduced as *a-priori* conditions of the essential feature of this affirmation. Metaphysical psychology is thus possible. We have already the existence of the *Ego*; from the nature of our activity and specially of our capacity of reflection, we could also, I hold,

10. Professor Ryle writes: "...what I am conscious of in a process of inferring, say, is different from what the inferring is an apprehension of.... If so, then it would make sense to ask whether according to the doctrine, I am not also conscious of being conscious of inferring.... And then there would be no stopping-place...." (*The Concept of Mind*, London, Hutchinson's University Library, 1949, pp. 162-163).

11. *Ibid.*, p. 162.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 166-167.

derive the proof of the nature of this *Ego*, its spirituality and even its immortality. But this is beyond the scope of my paper. The psychology which can be evolved along these lines, would not say so many things about man, as empirical psychology can say. Yet it would say things which, defining man's nature in metaphysical terms, would fulfil the rôle so badly needed which we assigned to metaphysical psychology.<sup>13</sup>

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13. The reflective method in metaphysics is not new. Some would see its origin in Cartesianism. It was used, but for a much sounder realism, in philosophies of the Middle Ages, and specially in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Some thirty years ago J. Maréchal showed that the realism to which this method leads, could stand even before the objections of the Critical Philosophy. He did so specially in the 5th *Cahier* of his work, *Le Point de départ de la métaphysique*, 2nd ed., Brussels, Editions Universelles, 1949. Recently the method has been more extensively applied to psychology by A. Marc, in his *Psychologie réflexive*, 2 vols., Paris, Desclée De Brouwer, 1949. The book of J. Donceel on *Philosophical Psychology*, which I mentioned at the beginning of my paper, is inspired by the same principles, yet his psychology is called "philosophical" and not "metaphysical", because instead of being strictly the metaphysics of organic beings, it is more broadly evolved as "the science of living bodies which interprets the data of experience in the light of metaphysical principles". (*Ibid.*, p. 2).

## Some Implications of the Concept of Personality in Social Philosophy

by

PROF. S. H. KELSHIKAR

"The person is a source of liberty, and, therefore, as obscure as the heart of a flame. By refusing to be a system of clear concepts, it reveals itself as a source of creation and the unforeseeable."

(Mounier : *Character of Man* : p. 24.)

Social Philosophy is not a mere descriptive survey, but rather a critical interpretation, of the various aspects of man's social life. All criticism, all interpretation, implies a certain norm, a certain directive principle. The ultimate norm in all social reflection appears to be the concept of human personality.

It is not difficult to see how the speculations of social Philosophers have been influenced by their ideas concerning human nature and personality. The diversity of their social theories ultimately springs from the diversity of their views concerning human nature. If the social theory of Hobbes is radically different from that of Hegel, the difference is to be traced primarily to their different notions of the human person.

On whatever problem we may reflect in Social Philosophy, we find ourselves, implicitly or explicitly, referring to the norm of man's personality. Let us ponder over any of the social institutions, Marriage, Family, Education, Religion, Custom, Law, Industry, State, etc., and then in order to ascertain the proper significance of these institutions, we have got to see how far they are rooted in human nature and how far they are needed for the growth of human personality. For instance, the institution of Family is nowadays undergoing profound changes and is almost threatened with extinction. We may wonder whether this institution should be allowed to move towards its own death or should rather be rescued from any such unfortunate calamity. We can only settle this problem by working out within ourselves whether the continued existence or the extinction of Family would have a salutary effect upon human life and persona-

lity. The desirability or otherwise of this social institution can be thus ascertained only with the help of the norm of human personality.

So too any of the complex problems of Social Philosophy, we find, can be settled ultimately by referring to this same norm of personality—whether it is the problem of Law or Justice, or the problem of the legitimate sphere of State action or of political obligation to obey the State, or the problem of rights and duties or of social change and progress; every time we make use of the ultimate criterion of the enrichment and development of human life and personality.

Thus, the notion of personality is evidently a pivotal one in social speculation. That is but natural. Social Philosophy is a distinctly human science; consequently, the ideas of human life, nature and personality are bound to play a prominent part in its discussions.

The notion of the Person seems to have gained a greater prominence in Modern Social Philosophy. The Greek thinkers attached less importance to the individual citizen as such. They rather identified the connotation of personality with that of citizenship; and they thought that the highest moral perfection is to be sought in the participation in the activities of the State. They thus preached complete subordination of the individual to the State. In the Medieval Times too people cared more for their Church and their Monarch, although Christianity laid a wholesome emphasis upon the purity and nobility of individual's character. But Modern Social Systems, on the contrary, lay stress on the moral worth of the person. As Hetherington and Muirhead remark: "The growth of Modern Civilisation has meant a growing emphasis on the value of the individual." Similarly, Eucken says, "Modern Culture favours a high estimate of the individual's qualities and seeks to develop them most fully." James Seth expresses the Law of Moral Progress as "the discovery of the Individual". T. H. Green also, while discussing the various aspects of Moral Progress, indicates how the individual person has gained greater appreciation in Modern Philosophy.

In this short essay, we propose to set forth what appear to be the major implications of the notion of personality in Social Philosophy. Of course different thinkers seem to attach different connotations to this concept, as is clear from their different theories and "isms". It is evidently impossible to refer to and criticise the

various suggestions of the different thinkers concerning the human person in this short piece. Nor is it possible to set forth *in detail* all the implications of this concept; for, so to set forth and develop its implications would be to construct an elaborate philosophical system concerning man and his social life. We intend here only to touch upon some major implications of this concept.

In the first place, Personality implies self-consciousness; it implies an agent that is conscious of himself. Consequently, man alone seems to be capable of possessing a personality. None of the other animals, intelligent though they are, is capable of becoming a person. Hence, although some of the animals seem to have a sort of socially organised life, yet man's social life is unique on account of his self-consciousness; and the complexity of the problems of his social life is unparalleled anywhere in the animal kingdom.

McTaggart in his article on Personality in Hasting's Encyclopaedia of Ethics and Religion treats the person and the self as identical, and mainly deals with the problem of knowledge. In fact, in Philosophy in the past, Personality only signified self-consciousness; it was simply an epistemological concept. It was Kant who, for the first time, enriched it with a moral significance. A person, Kant taught, is a moral agent—not only self-conscious and rational, but free, responsible, a member of the 'Kingdom of Ends', capable of responding to the call of "Thou ought". Kant transmuted the erstwhile moral formula of "Know thyself" into "Be thyself" or "Be a Person". The moral ideal of Self-realisation or Realisation of the Self became equivalent to Development of Personality. A person is a moral agent; and a moral agent is a free agent. The idea of freedom thus became inalienably attached to the notion of Personality. Freedom is the breath of moral life, a necessary condition for the flowering of personality. Liberty, therefore, becomes one of the ideals of society. Freedom within rational limits is to be assured to all: slavery in any form is not to be allowed in any field of social activity. Rights, the various forms of individual freedom, are necessary conditions for the unhampered exercise of a free, rational will. They gain an indisputable place in the life of the citizen who is out in search of his personality.

The person, says Kant, is not a thing. The moral import of this concept of personality therefore goes emphatically against all Materialistic interpretations of the Person as a mere physical thing which is governed by purely mechanical laws.

Further, this moral import of Personality leads us to Kant's well-known principle. "Treat Humanity whether in thine own person or in that of another always as an end and never merely as a means". All persons thus have an *equal* value as moral ends. The notion of Personality comes to suggest Equality: and Equality becomes another important ideal of society. Democracy rests primarily upon this principle of Human Equality. All forms of Autocracy stand condemned by this principle as by the verdict of History. The sovereignty of the State, it is nowadays almost universally granted, ultimately rests with its citizens. The State is obliged to work for the well-being of all its citizens without any discrimination of caste or creed. Law has got not only to give impartially every man his due, but also to count every one for one and no-one for more than one.

Kant's excellent contributions to the notion of personality, however seem to suffer from an Individualistic bias: and Individualism in Social Philosophy is an unsafe guide. Personality is not an isolated phenomenon: it is "no cloistered virtue". It is not to be realised in mere self-absorption. It is to be achieved not by withdrawing into the recesses of isolated being, but by the give and take of social activities. Personality implies the harmonious expression and adjustment of one's impulses, energies, capacities: this fullness and harmony of being can be achieved only through objective pursuits. Personality grows not simply in the silence of the soul, but in the stream of the world. The self to be realised is a social self. Psychology tells us how personality is a social product; how development of personality depends upon social relationships. A person can properly flourish only in a community of persons, only with the co-operation of other persons. Personality needs social co-operation, Brotherhood, Fraternity. Thus, Fraternity becomes yet another ideal of Society.

Development of personality needs social co-operation and harmony. And yet, personality cannot be resolved completely into social relationships. If the concept of personality is not a purely individualistic concept, it is also not a purely socialistic or universalistic concept. The Idealists who develop the Organismic Theory of Society and go on to preach a complete surrender of the individual personality to the State, even as the mystic seeks completely to surrender himself to the Deity, tread the far from safe path of Totalitarianism and Fascism. Each pattern of personality, though it is inextricably intertwined with other patterns, has nevertheless

a distinctness and a uniqueness of its own. Each man seems to have within himself a certain core which he cannot communicate to others. "The individual is much more than can be expressed in terms of his membership in social groupings; and he possesses a kind of unity, a core of being, which is not exhausted in those memberships". (Gainsberg: *Psychology of Society*: p. 65) Personality, therefore, is neither like an isolated physical atom; nor is it like a drop of water which is indistinguishably one with the rest of the sea. Personality is undoubtedly social: and at the same time, uniquely personal or private. Hence arises the peculiar problem of Justice or Social Harmony: How to adjust the multitudinous individual patterns of human personalities into the harmony of the social whole? This problem has fascinated the social Thought of philosophers down the ages.

A little preoccupation with this problem shows that Justice cannot mean what it meant for the Sophists, "The interest of the strongest." The principle of the essential equality of all condemns the sophistic distinction between the strong and the weak. Not the strength of a few, but the needs of all for self-development, should count in the dispensation of Justice. Nor again can Justice mean, as with Hitler, "enslaving the masses to the *brains* of the leaders." Personality does not signify merely the brains, intelligence, "inventiveness". Howsoever important a role intelligence might have played in the evolution of human life, it alone does not exhaust the significance of human personality. It is only one aspect of personality, only one dimension of personality. There are other dimensions besides it which should be neither ignored nor suppressed. Man has diverse impulses and capacities; all these are to be harmoniously expressed for a proper growth of personality. In achieving this growth, of course, we have got to subordinate certain lower impulses to higher potentialities: Self-realisation involves self-conquest. But this conquest implies "realisation or satisfaction within rational limits"; it does not imply complete extermination or ascetic torture of lower impulses.

Personality is the highest elevation of human nature: it is the final form, the *entelechy*, which the matter of human nature is capable of attaining: It is "the best that is in human nature reaching fruition". It is something to be achieved by every one of us within himself. And it can be achieved only by conscious, directed effort: we should not idly expect the stream of evolution to carry us automatically on towards perfection, as the Evolutionists like

Spencer would like to believe. This effort of awakening the personality, which otherwise slumbers within ourselves, appears to constitute the essence of morality, the *raison d'être* of human life.

Personality is not a finished product but a thing in the making. It is "not an immobile architectural structure; it is rather a musical development". (Mounier.) Although in given particular individuals the development of personality is conditioned and limited by inherited constitution, for a human being as such, personality is an endless movement towards perfection. Even in given individuals, personality often transcends the bounds of inherited constitution, as we learn from the recent researches in Abnormal Psychology, Psychical Research and Religious Psychology.

Development of personality implies this self-transcendence—transcending the limitations, faults, weaknesses of our present being. It is thus an ever-growing ideal, increasingly to be realised by us. It evidently admits of degrees. As such, this ideal of personality, this moral ideal, appears to be infinite. To a growing personality there come new expanding visions of still better achievements. Moral progress is without limit, infinite.

Furthermore, realisation of personality involves realisation of the various values of life. A well-developed personality is an embodiment of the finest values of human life. The modern philosophy of Personalism emphasises this correlation between the conceptions of Personality and Value. It holds that personality is essentially creative; that it is the source of value; i.e., things acquire value only in so far as they are connected with human will and personality. Whatever enhances human personality is valuable: whatever cramps personality is harmful.

Personality thus stands as the criterion of all social progress. Upon this touchstone we test and judge the significance of our various social institutions. As we contemplate one after the other the institutions of Marriage, family, Custom, Law, Tradition, Fashion, Labour, Industry, Vocation, Caste, Class, Neighbourhood, Education, Religion, etc., we unhesitatingly condemn whatever seems, in our eyes, to corrupt human nature, and we untiringly commend whatever seems to ennoble human nature. Thus, our social survey becomes a philosophical criticism of social institutions. Social Philosophy is in essence a normative study.

Realisation of personality, as stated above, consists in the pursuit of values. Naturally, economic values cannot be denied

a place in the scheme of rational human life. Our economic and physical needs are the most insistent and the most universal needs. They have got to be satisfied if we are to strive after the higher reaches of personality. We are no spirits, pure and simple. We are rather spirits, encased in flesh. The movement of the spirit has got to drag the flesh too along with it: and it seems, there can be no free movement of the spirit with a constant and complete starvation of the body. Man needs, for a better life, material economic necessities and comforts. His inner moral progress depends upon the betterment of the external material conditions of his life. Greater material prosperity is undeniably an important factor of social progress, although it is not the sole measure of the latter. To ensure a proper distribution of economic conveniences and comforts amongst all citizens is an important task of a welfare state. The State should not allow the lives of citizens to be engulfed in economic crises and disasters, which unrestricted economic competition and *Laissez Faire* are apt to bring about. Industry and economic activities of the citizens have got to be intelligently regulated by the State. A planned socialised economy should necessarily be adopted by the State which aims at the welfare of all its citizens. Hence, as Dewey remarks, "We should, through organised endeavour, institute the socialised economy of material security and plenty that will release human energy for pursuit of higher values". Further, as he goes on to say, if modern Liberalism means the liberation of the potentialities of individual citizens, it then should not be the Liberalism of *Laissez Faire* or Individualism. These last involve enormous waste of human talent and wealth: they result in reckless prosperity of a lucky few and in hopeless poverty of the luckless many. True Liberalism should incorporate within itself the element of truth, enshrined in the philosophy of Communism.

We cannot however go to all the extremes of a Communistic theory, which treats human personality as a mere reflex of economic conditions. Communism exaggerates the importance of economic conditions. Its materialistic attitude towards life makes it blind to the other more important supra-economic values. Even in the best of material circumstances, men do not always achieve the best. Adversity, often challenging the creative abilities of man, urges him towards loftier achievements. And does not material prosperity and advance of civilization owe a lot to scientific inventiveness and intelligence of man?

Nor finally can we fall in with the communistic idea of the Dictatorship of the proletariat. Dictatorship, in any form, the voice of History loudly proclaims, is an unsafe experiment in social affairs. Dictatorship, even where it bears good fruits, does not bear them for long: and eventually it begets but woe and misery for mankind. It is the violation of the Kantian principle concerning Personality: it treats humanity in the persons of the many as a mere means to the absolute power of the Chosen One or the Select Few. It does violence to the essential significance of the notion of Personality, which, as we have been seeing so far in the short essay, is the supreme social principle and the highest political value.

## Are there any Basic Tenets of Indian Philosophy?

by

S. K. SAKSENA

During the last century or so, an impression has been created in the minds of the educated and patriotic men both in India and outside that there are certain fundamental or basic tenets of Indian Philosophy, or for that matter, of the Western and the Oriental philosophies as well. When, however, one begins to enquire and examine the claim critically or a little more seriously, one fails to discover any such tenet or principle either in our own or in Western philosophy which could properly be called as either exclusively Indian or Western, at least in the philosophical thought of these countries. I want to emphasise here the term "philosophical thought", lest it may be confused with religious ideas or cultural concepts and belief, as is very often done in such a case. I shall a little later attempt to throw some light on the causes that might have led to this widespread belief among the people that there are, to be sure, some fundamental tenets of Indian philosophy as distinguished from the fundamental tenets of Western philosophy. But before I do so, let me first of all examine the prevalent beliefs about the fundamental tenets of Indian philosophy about which we hear so much these days both from our own experts as well as from foreign authorities on Indian philosophy.

A survey of the long history of the Indian philosophical thought through the ages reveals such strong and undeniable currents and periods of all conceivable movements of thought, Idealistic and Realist, Theistic and Atheistic, Monistic and Pluralistic, Naturalistic and Super-naturalistic, that it is almost impossible to pick up any one of these and exalt it as fundamental or basic. It is often said and popularly believed that Indian thought is dominantly idealistic, and that we had no system of Materialistic thought in our philosophy. Firstly, this is not true to facts, for we have a very powerful and vigorous, even extremely daring system of Materialistic philosophy associated with the name of the famous philosopher, Carvaka. Though much of this literature is not now available, enough certainly is known about it through

other systems. As one of the causes of the destruction of this particular variety of literature, the hypothesis of the fanatic persecution of the unorthodox cannot be ruled out. As to the special claim of Idealism in our philosophy, there is no more of it than is to be found in Western philosophy also.

Closely allied to the claim of Idealism or Spiritualism in Indian Philosophy is the note of Asceticism in Indian life. It is often proclaimed that the stress in Indian thought in general is on renunciation rather than on fulfilment, and that we judge a man more by what he gives up rather than by what he accepts. It is not necessary to dilate upon this point, for everyone, I believe, understands the higher status given by us to the concepts of *tapas*, austerity, sacrifice, non-attachment and the like. To the extent this note of asceticism or renunciation stands for the inevitable truth inherent in all higher order of life and existence, it is found to be as much a fundamental note of Indian philosophy as the basic teaching of the European or the Western thought. Hence, to make any philosophical capital out of Asceticism in Indian thought is both to misunderstand it and to misrepresent it.

Another point often sought to be made about the peculiarity of Indian philosophy is that it is practical or that it is a way of life or realization. It is said that philosophy in India has not been pursued merely because of man's love of wisdom or the satisfaction of the demands of his intellect. It has a deeply practical motive, which is the attainment of *Mokṣa* or Liberation, or the absolute cessation of the three-fold *Dukḥa* or suffering.

A little reflection however on our philosophy and its practical effect upon the lives of men in India would hardly justify the above claim. While it is true that life rather than thought, being rather than knowing, has always been regarded as more important and worthwhile in India, this has not been due to any special characteristics of its philosophical thought. This practical bias is due more to the dominance of the religious and the affective attitude than to the force of philosophical thought. The same is true of men in the West or anywhere else, where religious or secular sentiments and aspirations sway the minds of men. Philosophy as a dispassionate and reasoned understanding of things has nowhere made men excel in the realm of action or led them to alter the basic patterns of their lives. For that you need something much less than pure thought, or if you like, something of a different stuff. All that is practical in philosophy is necessarily suspect as

pure or good philosophy. No effective action is possible, or practical results achieved, without an amount of fanaticism or uncritical belief which is a negation of the philosophical attitude and is, therefore, rightly left to the unphilosophical or the semi-philosophical drives of man's psychological make-up. This, incidentally, disposes of the charge often made against Indian philosophy that it has been responsible for India's political or material degradation. Philosophy cannot possibly play such a role one way or the other, and in fact, it has never done so, either in India or elsewhere in the world. To think so, is not only to expect the impossible from philosophy but also to fundamentally misunderstand its nature and function. Neither the practical prosperity of the Western world, nor its opposite in India or in any other under-developed world, is due to its philosophy. The causes of the rise and fall of nations must be found in the unphilosophical part of their lives.

Another point that is very often made in connection with Indian philosophy is the emphasis in it on direct knowledge or the immediate intuition of the highest reality. It is said that the highest reality can be revealed to us only in an immediate intuition. In other words, while in Western philosophy stress is laid on rational knowledge, we seem to be certain that our intellect, reason or logic is but a very imperfect instrument and is not, by nature, equal to the task of raising us to the highest attainable level. We have often heard it said that Indian philosophy is intuitive, and that in the end it leads us to Mysticism. But this view, too, is not supported by one's study of comparative philosophy. There have been and still persist in the West such powerful and vigorous movements of the Voluntaristic, the Romantic, or the Anti-intellectualist systems of thought, that every student of comparative philosophy is almost as familiar with the foreign advocates of the intuitional way of knowing and living as he is with his own mystics in India. The same point of view is sometimes expressed a little differently by saying that Indian philosophy is more subjective than objective, or that it concerns itself more with the inner rather than with the outer reality. For a serious student of the subject, it is difficult, if not impossible, to find justification for such superficial characterisation of Indian philosophy.

And now let us ask ourselves the question as to what are the fundamental tenets of Indian philosophy, irrespective of consideration whether there is or not any philosophical justification for regarding them as fundamental to our philosophy. Here, I

think, the very first idea that occurs to one is about the Divine or the Spiritual nature of the universe we live in. I think that it can perhaps be said truly that this has been one of the dominant beliefs of Indian thought, the belief that the universe is not either a haphazard creation of an unintelligent or blind power or a methodical evolution of the inherent energy of some unconscious root matter or *prakṛti*. In other words, our philosophical thought is not at all sympathetic to any naturalistic or purely materialistic interpretation of the universe we live in. This has been one of our deeper currents of thought, the materialistic or the agnostic trends in our history of thought notwithstanding.

Along with the belief in the Divine or the Spiritual nature of the universe we live in, necessarily goes the belief in the ultimate moral order of the universe. We do not think that there is no moral authority or law in the universe, or that we could do whatever we liked without reaping the just consequences of our actions. This is what is popularly known as the inexorable law of *Dharma* or *Karma*. Corresponding to the law of cause and effect in the world of nature, we think and believe that in the world of human affairs and actions too, there obtains not merely a law of cause and effect but also a law of moral justice, according to which reward and punishment are ultimately meted out to us, and from which there is no escape either in this life or in the hereafter.

And now, it will not be difficult to show that in reality it is impossible either to demonstrate the reality of these beliefs in the actually existing world, or to philosophically prove them by arguments. Neither the Divine nature of the Universe nor the moral nature of the world stands philosophically proved or established by any one of our philosophical systems, though they are believed in by all the orthodox systems. In fact, these happen to be the most fundamental and common beliefs of all the Hindus. It is, therefore, only proper to call these and other such beliefs as the religious beliefs rather than the philosophical tenets of Indian philosophy. The same applies to our common belief regarding rebirth, transmigration of the soul, and the ultimate destiny or the *Mokṣa* of the soul from the bondage of the material body. In our vast philosophical literature there is nowhere to be found any elaborate discussion or proof of the above. These truths (if they have the status of truths) or beliefs appear to have been taken for granted on the testimony of experts to whom they are supposed to have been revealed beyond doubt in their own direct and immediate experience. This, incidentally, leads to a philosophical

point of some importance. In Indian philosophical thought, testimony or *Śabda Pramāṇa* has been almost universally recognized as a valid means of proof. This has been a source of some puzzle to some modern-minded philosophers who recognise only Perception and Inference as admissible means of knowledge. The question is: Should the word of a person, however reliable, be taken as a proof for purposes of knowledge? We, in India, see no harm or logical error in it; and consequently, we do not hesitate to take on trust the testimony of other persons with regard to all those experiences to which, we ordinary human beings have no access either through direct perception or through reasoning. And it is hardly an exaggeration to say that almost all our so-called philosophical tenets like the spiritual nature of the universe, the moral law of *Dharma*, the theory of rebirth, or of *Mokṣa*, are more in the nature of beliefs taken on trust on the strength of the unimpeachability of the character of their testifiers than in the nature of proved conclusions arrived at by philosophical arguments. The same, however, is done in the Western world in the realm of higher truths of the sciences. More than nine-tenths of our knowledge of the Physical, the Chemical or the Medical world consists of our acceptance of the knowledge and assertions of the few experts who alone have any direct access to the validity of their truths. But, somehow, when it comes to the super-sensible, the modern Western mind reacts differently. That, however, is not to say that such religious or intuitional experiences or truths are, therefore, valid. Only the fact remains that the so-called fundamental tenets of Indian philosophy are mostly grounded in testimony of the Seers or the *Rṣis*, or of the realised souls, for whom they may have been beyond doubt, though the average man or even a trained thinker may have no inkling of them by pure reasoning or abstract logic. The total impression left on the mind of a modern thinker about the fundamental beliefs of Indian thought is that they all lack philosophical basis, and that they can hardly be called philosophical, unless we agree to change the very meaning of what we call "philosophical activity".

To sum up, I have tried to think, here, of the fundamental tenets of Indian philosophy and in so doing, I have been compelled to maintain that, strictly and philosophically speaking, no such basic tenets can be found in the long history of our philosophical thought. Even a comparison of Indian philosophical thought with the Western philosophy does not reveal any such principle or truth which could be termed as peculiarly Indian. Next, I

examined the fundamental tenets which are commonly regarded in India as well as outside as the basic tenets of Indian philosophy and found no justification for calling them as belonging to our philosophy proper or as being founded on philosophical arguments and reasoning alone. Nevertheless, most of these truths, particularly those about the transmigration of the soul, or of the nature of *Mokṣa* and the law of *Karma* remain peculiarly Indian and also fundamental to our mind. On reflection, it would, however, appear that all these fundamental tenets are more in the nature of religious beliefs and intuitions rather than the products of our reasoning and argument, and that is one reason why they have such a hold on our mind and consciousness. This last characteristic may make them more fundamental, but that certainly does not make them any more philosophical.

If the above reflections are sound, one may well ask as to how it is that belief in them as the fundamental tenets of Indian philosophy came to be so widely prevalent both in India and abroad. Well, that is anybody's guess, but, I, for one, think that it is mainly due to India's contact with the West and is the first fruit of the study of India's religion and philosophy by foreigners. India has always been known to the Western world as a land of a very strange religion, and what was first studied by foreigners was its religious literature; later, these religious beliefs of the Hindus came to be regarded as their philosophical truths. In fact, there was hardly, if ever, any distinction made between India's philosophy and religion. The two were thus confused and identified; and the confusion, strange to say, persists even today after more than a century's study of its philosophy both by Indians and foreigners. Time, I believe, has come when students of philosophy all over the world and particularly of India, should think afresh, and separate Indian philosophy from Indian religion.

## Morality and the State

by

NARAYANI BASU

The problem of the relation between state and morality is as old as the emergence of civil society, and it has engaged philosophers ever since. It is not a problem which arose under certain conditions, and could go with the disappearance of those conditions. The conditions are inherent in the structure of civil society and can never be escaped. The main object of politics is to regulate the principles of Government and to secure the safety and welfare of the people. But the nature of the means adopted for this purpose is no less important than the end itself. The Philosophy of politics obviously includes an ethics of politics also, and the question whether politics or ethics should determine the nature of law remains, to be dealt with by each succeeding age in its own way.

*Machiavelli*

For Machiavelli, the separation of politics from ethics was absolutely essential. The purpose of the state is to promote the welfare of the people, which consists essentially in security for person and property. All actions of the state, however unjust they apparently are, are justified for the security of the people. 'When the safety of our country is absolutely at stake' wrote Machiavelli in the Discourse, 'there need be no question of what is just or unjust, merciful or cruel, praiseworthy or disgraceful; but all other considerations set aside, that course alone is to be taken which can save our country and maintain its liberty.' So the state cannot follow the ordinary canons of morality. The moral principles of private life are different from those of politics. Murder or breach of promise amongst states may lead a nation to prosperity, so they are good. But when they are committed within society, they would strike at the security of all the members, hence are to be avoided. Thus Machiavelli advocates two standards of morality—one for the internal affairs of society and the other for the external relations of the State.

Machiavelli's whole political philosophy is based on the two-fold assumption that man is by nature evil, and secondly that the interest of the state is supreme. Members of the state must not indulge in moral corruption. For such immoral practices amongst a people make a good government impossible. But Machiavelli sanctioned the use of immoral means by its rulers to gain an end.

The plausibility of the argument is not convincing. Before we grant the prerogative of the state and of its ruler to adopt an immoral means, we should ask ourselves, shall we be justified in conceding a right to the ruler which we are not granting to the head of any other association? It is no answer to our question to say that the right to indulge in evil practices, if necessary, can belong only to the ruler and to the state as the supreme organisation which is finally responsible for the welfare of the community. As a matter of fact, the end of despotism may be the achievement of some good, but the good can by no means be taken as equal to the total amount of loss caused by the arbitrary exercise of power by the ruler.

#### *Hegel*

The theory of state as the supra-moral institution has gained a stronger support since Hegel wrote his 'Philosophy of Right'. The state, Hegel says, owes its origin to the moral consciousness of man, which demands that man will realise his potentiality by active co-operation with the fellow-members of society. But ordinary man being actuated by selfish motives often forgets to give others their due, and so to express the rational will of the community the laws of the state are necessary. The law is nothing but the outward manifestation of morality—the reflection of the inner rational self. So far as the internal nature of the state is concerned, morality precedes politics, and the state is the vehicle through which morality is objectively realised. But in the external relations to other foreign nations, it is bound by no moral law and is not pledged to keep the promise made to them if it goes against the interest of the state. It is the peculiar prerogative of the state to be at once sovereign and subject to the kingdom of morality.

Hegel confers the absolute right of violating all moral obligations only to that state which successfully bridges the gulf of individuality and universality, and thus manifests to the greatest extent the will of the Absolute. All other nations should humbly surrender to this blessed state.

The Hegelian conception of state as the supremely rational body which stands above all private interests within it, moulds each of its factors and is vested with the divine power to establish the will of God is a pure fiction. The state, as it exists to-day, is not the true protector of all its members, nor can it be said to be rational enough to blend perfectly the individual will with the social will. If the myth of the rational state is laid down, it would seem that the national state is a monstrous machine with which stronger people crush the weaker for their own interest. The basis of such state is not moral consciousness, as Hegel claims, but the impulses for greed and power of the ruling party.

#### *Marx*

Marx, unlike Hegel, did not free politics from ethics. He saw both as emergent factors of a superior principle, viz., the productive structure of society and the class struggle which is involved in it. The economically dominant class not only controls the state-power, but also the political ideas and ethical principles along with the whole cultural superstructure prevailing in society. The moral codes, according to this view, are not apriori principles formed independently of empirical considerations, but are the devices designed by the exploiting class to protect and justify the peculiar form of exploitation set up by them. Bourgeois morality is different from the moral code of feudal system and reflects an altogether new economic structure. The moral ideas of the bourgeoisie again will be replaced by proletarian ethics which will represent the interest of the working class till its dissolution into the classless and stateless communistic society. With the withering away of the proletarian state, proletarian ethics also will merge into social ethics and evolve a universal moral code.

Marx opines that the march of history reveals the class character of morality through the ages, and further that change of moral principles occurs simultaneously with the change of the economic system. The ethics of slavery in the slave-owning society was subsequently replaced by the bourgeois principle of contract in the capitalist society. It apparently honoured and restored the self of man which was totally denied in the slave system. But in the light of the socialist society the principle of contract is equally immoral as it compels the labourer to buy his bare subsistence at the cost of his whole labour power. So the ethics of contract will disappear with the disappearance of bourgeois society.

Admitting that the economic conditions influence the moral attitudes and habits of an age, it is difficult to accept the Marxian analysis in its entirety. There are some basic canons of ethics which do not suffer change under the stress of any new economic structure. Truthfulness, respect for life, love of humanity, sympathy towards one's neighbour—these are the virtues which have held and will hold good irrespective of time and social needs.

#### *Gandhi*

An Indian philosopher has offered an answer to the problem in his own way. Gandhi sought an ethical solution of political problems. For Gandhi as for Tagore and Aurobindo the end is always identical with the means. Gandhi sets up a universal moral standard of non-violence for the struggles of suffering humanity, irrespective of time and situation. Political liberty and national freedom are to serve one moral purpose, i.e., the good and welfare of humanity. True to the tradition of Indian philosophy, Gandhi was a spiritual anarchist. The state according to him is a passing necessity which must disappear with the growth of man to his full moral stature. In his philosophy, ethics is not only the guide to politics but ultimately makes the latter superfluous. This is a grand and noble idea. But whether a people placed in the present context of international relations and temper can consistently pursue the idea is a matter of grave doubt. Like the rational state of Hegel, the moral society of truth and non-violence is an inflexible abstraction unrelated to the needs of the time. While Marx made ethics too fluid and volatile, Gandhi made it hard and rigid, unresponsive to the limitation of reality. Perhaps the world is waiting for a philosophy that will strike a golden mean and forge an organic relation between the values of life and the needs of state.

## Empathy in Art

*by*

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### *What is Empathy :*

Empathy has been said to be 'feeling into an object' or 'our life in the object.'<sup>1</sup> Lipp held that we imagine ourselves as going through certain processes in the object, and Groos and Vernon Lee were of the opinion that in the presence of an external object and in contemplating it, certain movements occur in our organisms, which being projected to the object, occasion empathy.<sup>2</sup>

We shall first consider the cases of inner imitation as the movements within us are called, and then the case of projection. These movements arise on the occasion of both perception and ideation.

As a very simple case, when we look at the top of a mountain, we have to raise our eyes upwards. In noting a spiral, we make certain movements of the eyeballs, and the muscles of the neck, etc., twitch imperceptibly. Even in trying to imagine a large spiral, these movements occur. Similarly, when we observe gymnasts going through different postures, we feel certain tensions in corresponding parts of our bodies; and when music is played or people dance, we are involuntarily led to keep time with our steps, or drum, in consonance, with our fingers. On such occasions, when we feel it inappropriate, we have to restrain ourselves by an effort.

In this matter, our reactions are proportionate to the stimulus. As we attend to different musical instruments, our heart-beat and flow of blood are differently affected. Gentle notes rhythmically played have a gentle soothing effect on them, but beating of drums or the blare of a trumpet will set the heart beating fast, and flute causes queer shivers and thrilling kinaesthetic sensations.

1. Lipps: *Asthetik*, i, p. 258: W. Mitchell: *Structure and Growth of the Mind*, p. 166.

2. Lipps: *Ibid.*: Vernon Lee: *The Beautiful*. K. Groos: *The Play of Man*, p. 323.

It is known that even in attending to the ticking of a clock minute kinaesthetic movements occur in our organisms, which can be measured by sufficiently delicate instruments. When we observe an automobile racing along or an express train rush by, or a man about to lift a heavy object, our kinaesthetic reactions are considerable.

Not only perception, but even vividly imagined ideas arouse inner imitation. For instance, if one tries to imagine a high mountain or Kutub Minar, his eyes will tend to open wide, and his bodily muscles will have a tendency to tauten upwards, but if he tries to imagine a dwarf, his eyes will be narrowed down and his bodily muscles will tend towards a stooping posture. These changes are so slight that usually they escape notice. But it is ideational mimicry like this that leads some persons to use gesture and gesticulation while speaking, sometimes while thinking or soliloquising.

It is important to grasp the nature of this ideational mimicry for understanding the full impact of great literature. In Shakespearean drama of the name, we find Julius Caesar boasting :

I am constant as the northern star,  
Of whose true-fixed and resting quality  
There is no fellow in the firmament;

and immediately afterwards what is his plight :

But yesterday and Caesar could have stood against the  
world,  
And today none so poor as to do him reverence.

It has the impact of the rush of an avalanche down a mountain side.

*Projection :*

Next we mention instances of projection of emotional qualities to things.

With respect to sounds, the following lines of Dryden very well express the emotional qualities of musical notes :

The trumpets loud clangour,  
Excites us to arms.  
The soft complaining flute  
In dying notes discovers  
The woes of hope-less lovers,  
Whose dirge is whispered by the warbling lute.

Coming to the plastic arts and architecture, horizontal lines or planes in combination are serene, peaceful; vertical lines in combinations are stately, dignified; zigzag lines are fretful; spiral lines are giddy; smooth planes are gentle, and rough planes are rude.

It is through empathy that a spire, when well designed, appears to soar, arches spring, domes swell and vistas stretch, Greek temples are calm and baroque facades are restless.

Literature, specially poetry, teems with the use of this process. Mountains, clouds, winds and waves are enlivened, and the worlds of plants, birds and beasts are regarded as instinct with human emotions.

In Valmiki's Ramayan the sky, with gentle breeze for breath, anointed with the evening red for sandal, and with yellow clouds, looks like an amorous person. Clouds, with flocks of herons flying in front, carry heavy weight of water with rumblings, and after resting on high peaks of mountains, proceed again on their flight. Again, lashed by a golden whip, the clouds roar with pain.

Elsewhere, the bright star watches (Keats), or listens silently (Wordsworth) or sings (Blake). The sea bares its bosom to the moon. The sea-waves roar and surge, and hurl themselves against defenceless fisher-men or, in gentler moods, lap the shore and dance in the wind.

Flowers make love with sun and moon, and with black-bees; they smile at dawn, refreshed with dew, and droop under the sun at noon. Trees rise up, spread their branches with youthful exuberance and burst forth into blossoms. With outstretched arms they supplicate the sky for rain, beckon to the sun-burnt exhausted pedestrian with their leaves, and whisper strange secrets of nature to those who are fond of them. They also enter into marriage with creepers, and sometimes aspire to conjugal relation with maidens as in Shakuntala; and Urvashi indeed herself changes into a creeper on the hedges of Kumar Van.

*The Mechanism of Projection :*

Regarding the mechanism of projection, Mr. Reid has given a very simple explanation. He tells us that just as sensations of colour originating in the brain, by stimulus from the outside world, are projected upon external objects, similarly emotions and feelings

generated within our organisms by external bodies are very often projected upon them.<sup>3</sup>

We think that Mr. Reid's explanation is correct so far as it goes. But for a complete explanation we must admit the partial truth of the James-Lange theory of emotions. It appears that appropriate physiological changes within our organisms produce corresponding emotions in us. Only, without ideational basis, these emotions are feebler and they are not identified with ourselves, but sometimes referred to the bodies which produce them, and at other times referred to the world and life in general. Thus, in case of a statue or a building, the activities are referred to them, but in case of music it can hardly be said that we refer the emotions to the sitar or the piano. In the latter case, the emotions are referred to the world and life in general.<sup>4</sup>

*Metaphysical and Aesthetic significance of Empathy :*

Sometimes, the act of empathy has been attributed to fused associations, as by Külpe, Fechner, Lotze<sup>5</sup> and Shri Shankuk. This view, however, cannot be true. Knowledge through association is mediate, conceptual and schematic; it would also be regarded as true or false. But in aesthetic experience, through empathy, there is immediacy of awareness, liveliness of life, and vividness of emotional and conative experience. In it, moreover, there is a willing suspension of disbelief, a self-imposed semi-delusion.

According to Vischer and Basch,<sup>6</sup> the ultimate explanation of empathy is to be found in a pantheistic or monistic urge to reunion with the universe. We project our feelings and emotions into inanimate portions of nature out of a conviction, not conceptual or intellectual, but a conviction ingrained in our organic life that matter and mind, nature and spirit, external forms and forms of our inner consciousness, are ultimately one.

These theories are quite attractive as they link up aesthetics with monistic metaphysics, which is dear to many hearts. It would provide 'empathy' and 'unity' as monistic first principles of aesthetics, just as 'identity' and 'invariance' provide the monistic first principles for logic, and 'equality' and 'universal love' as monistic

3. L. A. Reid: A Study in Aesthetics, p. 97-103.

4. Cf. A. Schopenhauer: World as Will and Idea, Vol. 3, p. 235f.

5. Listowel: A Critical History of Modern Aesthetics, p. 179.

6. V. Basch: Essai Critique sur l'Esthetique de Kant, pp. 293, 592.

first principles of ethics. We think that empathy, cutting down the barrier between the world outside and human personality, through inner imitation and projection, does function as such a first principle of aesthetics. However, the views of thinkers like Vischer, Basch and Bhatta Nayak require to be supplemented with an account of the actual mechanism of the empathic process, for a well-rounded theory. This can be said in support of Vischer and Basch. Our aesthetic delight in poetry which attributes life and feelings to the sidereal universe and plants certainly gains in richness through a conviction that such attribution, though imaginary in details, is ultimately correct in principle. In support of Bhatta Nayak's theory, it can be said that '*bhāvakatva*' does enable us to take an impersonal and yet deeply sympathetic view of things, which helps to reveal their *līlā* (cosmic sport) aspect, and hence their beauty.

*Semi-Delusion in Play, Art and Empathy :*

Empathy involves a peculiar type of symbolism. In it a man swings between belief and disbelief. He does not quite believe that the tree is kissing the creeper, but still Kalidas likes to imagine that such is the case.

There are exactly parallel cases in the fields of childhood games of make-believe and art-appreciation. The child who pretends to be a soldier yet knows that he is not really one; the girl who treats the doll as her baby yet knows that it is not alive. When we see Biraj-Bau on the screen, we know that actual incidents of life are not occurring in flesh and blood, and yet we are affected as if incidents with real joys and sorrows were occurring before our eyes.

The relation between art, play and empathy shown above confirms our conclusion that empathy is a vital element of our aesthetic experience, by cross-reference from kindred fields of study.

*Empathy, Play and Līlā :*

In spite of everything said above in favour of empathy, it, by itself, cannot assure aesthetic delight. It makes possible our participation in the activities and feelings of other bodies and attribution of our actions and feelings to them, but this communion may or may not be aesthetically delightful. The semi-delusional quality of empathy is true in arts, but is not true in all cases of it. Thus

primitives and children might actually take the thunder as the roar of angry deities of the sky and live in fright, in which case this empathic attribution loses its aesthetic quality.

In some cases, in spite of ourselves, we are compelled to empathic participation which is very unpleasant. In Sinclair Lewis' novel 'Babbitt' we find a scene in which Babbitt tries to sleep, but is kept awake by his participation in the action of someone who is cranking a Ford. It is very unpleasant to him, and keeps him in a state of panting tension, but, being a pious motorist himself, he cannot stop till the car starts. Similarly, the empathic participation in the state of the sick and the suffering is usually very painful.

As such, empathic participation in the states of another organism, object or situation is aesthetic only when it is such that we want to perpetuate it for its own sake. Thus there is required, besides the capacity to participate in the external situation, an inclination for disinterested prolongation of this activity. Disinterested participation in any activity being playful, empathy must be associated with play to provide aesthetic satisfaction.

Empathy makes possible intimate communion with others, it also makes possible proper aesthetic distancing by providing a common equidistant meeting-point between self and others, but it must be playful to hit the aesthetic mark.<sup>7</sup>

Even this, however, does not suffice. In the case of sports, there might be disinterested keen participation by the on-lookers, and yet there is usually little of beauty in such experience. In cheap novels and films many people find playful absorption, and yet it is not aesthetic.

This brings us to the last factor which is essential for the genuine aesthetic situation. The object or situation in which we participate through empathy should be revealed to us in its *līlā* (cosmic play) aspect. How and when the *līlā* aspect of things is revealed, is a complicated problem which we have considered elsewhere. Here some instances will be cited.

In architecture we have an inter-play of cosmic forces, gravitation and resistance. When these forces are properly balanced in a structure and wedded to unity of parts, we have a miniature

model of the state of these forces acting throughout the universe. In the universe these forces are perfectly balanced and there is proper unity. In architecture also balance and unity raise it to the level of art.

The empathic attribution of emotions to life and world as such which we find in music, enables us to distance them properly from our personal preoccupations and throw them against a background of unity and harmony. The emotions reveal their *līlā*-significance in this state and hence their beauty. Removed from personal prepossessions, anxiety and dread, the emotions can be contemplated tranquilly; and the harmony which holds them together in music assures us that 'all emotions of men would be sweet, playful and alive with *līlā*, were there but deep love and sympathy between man and man'.<sup>8</sup>

Lastly, let us examine the case of tragedy, sometimes called the greatest art. Here we identify ourselves willingly with the sufferings of the hero. Thereby we realise the evanescence of the whole worldly show, the futility of striving for fixed ends, and the importance of performing ones' duties, keeping the means straight. But this is the attitude of renunciation and self-identification with the cosmic sport or *līlā*.

7. Cf. K. Groos: *The Play of Man*, p. 325f. Listowel: Ibid.

8. From Percy Brown: *Indian Paintings under the Mughals*, p. 74.

## A Critical Evaluation of the Vaisesika Categories

by

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In a paper entitled 'The Interpretation of Vaisesika Categories' published in the proceedings of the 30th Indian Philosophical Congress, Dr. D. M. Datta goes all in praise of the vaisesika system of categories. He says that the vaisesika thinkers' "passion for precision in thought and language has scarcely any parallel in the History of Philosophy".

I write this paper because I do not entirely agree with this view. Though the conception of analysing the whole field of our experience into so many categories is a grand one — and I am next to none in appreciating the value of such an enterprise — the execution of it on the part of the vaisesika thinkers, in my opinion, leaves much to be desired.

I have just said that it is a grand enterprise to start analysing the whole of our experience. What else should philosophy be? It should not be the search after the first cause. It should rather analyse the notion of causation. It should not be an investigation into the nature of an ultimate reality. It should humbly analyse what we mean by 'real' and what by 'unreal'. This is a sound approach. If we abandon it, metaphysics degenerates into pseudo-physics. This is the approach of the modern Logical Positivist. And this exactly was, in my opinion, the instinct of the vaisesika thinkers.

They began with a logical analysis of the whole of our experience. What does it involve logically? First of all, there is the notion of substance (*dravya*), something that is the pivot of logical thinking. It is 'that' about which we think. Other aspects of experience hang on it. It does not hang on anything else.

So far, so good. It is an important achievement in philosophy to have discovered that the notion of 'substance' is logically the most prior element in our experience. But the vaisesikas soon missed this logical point of view. Instead of dividing substance on a logical basis (as, for example, first order substance, second order

substance, etc.) they gave us a division of substances in the manner of physics or chemistry. The items like earth, water, fire etc. in the list of substances are arrived at by a crude empirical classification and are not the result of an acute logical analysis. Much energy was wasted in discussing whether gold, for instance, should be classed under earth or fire. This does not do much credit to their 'precision of thought'.

Next is *guṇa* (quality?). This is quite logical. There is that which exists in itself (*dravya*) and that which exists in something else. If the latter is non-dynamic it is called *guṇa*, otherwise *Karma*. They give us a list of twenty-four *guṇas* which seems all arbitrary. No other reason than mere 'tradition' is given for regarding this list as exhaustive.

Not only is the list arbitrary, it is absurd at some points. How can conjunction (*samyoga*) and separation (*vibhāga*), remoteness (*paratva*) and nearness (*aparatva*) be *guṇas* inhering in a substance? They are out and out relations. In fact *samyoga* (conjunction) has been invariably described by them as a variety of *sambandha* (relation). How can relations be qualities?

This brings me to an important point. There is no mention of relation as a separate category in the *vaiesika* list. But a type of relation, namely *samavāya*, has been given the status of a separate category. This passes comprehension. It comes to this. Both *samyoga* and *samavāya* (and also some others like *tādātmya*) are *sambandhas* (relations). But they do not together fall under one category. *Sambandha* in the form of *samyoga* is a *guṇa*, while in the form of *samavāya* it is another category. This is absurd. A primary category (which *samavāya* is supposed to be) cannot be a kind of anything. But actually it has been made a kind of *sambandha* which is not even a category by itself. This involves an overlapping classification.

The reason for such aberrations is that though the *vaiesikas* started with the logical point of view to analyse experience, they soon mixed it with other points of view, for instance, the physical.

The next category is *Karma*. This has been very summarily dealt with. It is the principle of motion. It is said to be of five kinds like throwing upwards and throwing downwards, as if there is an absolute up and an absolute down. In addition to such specific kinds of motion, they have recognised 'motion is general' as

another kind! Overlapping division is somehow not a fault in the *vaiesika* system.

Next category is *sāmānya*. This corresponds to the 'universal' in the western tradition. It is defined as that which is eternal, one and inhering in many. The western conception is similar. But there are important differences between the two conceptions.

(1) In the west, from Socrates onwards, a distinction has been made between the things of sense and the things of the understanding. The universal is regarded as being known by the understanding. It is not a sense datum. It is non-empirical.

No such distinction is made in the *vaiesika* system. It is assumed that the sense-organ which brings us the knowledge of a particular is also the sense organ that reveals to us the *sāmānya* inhering in it. I should think that on this point the western conception is superior.

(2) In the western tradition, a quality or a predicate, as contrasted with a substance or a subject, is, as such, taken to be a universal. "This piece of paper is white." Here 'white' is a universal. This polar opposition between the subject and the predicate, between the substance and the quality seems to be logically well-grounded. In the *vaiesika* system a quality like *sukla* (white) is treated as an individual. It is not a *sāmānya*. Whiteness is the *sāmānya* that resides in all whites. I cannot decide which of the two views is better on this point.

(3) In modern western logic 'existence' is not regarded a universal. It is not a predicate. In the *vaiesika* view, however, *sattā* (existence) is not only a *sāmānya*, but it is the highest *sāmānya*. I have not the slightest doubt that the western view is superior in this respect.

(4) In the western tradition every universal gives rise to a class. The same particular thing can be a member of many different classes by reason of the many universals residing in it. A blue lotus, for example, belongs to the class of lotuses and also to the class of blue things. The *vaiesikas* do not favour this view. They make a distinction within *sāmānya* as *jāti* (class) and *upādhi* (adjunct). They will accept a lotus class but not a class of blue things. The reason given is that this will make a thing belong to two intersecting classes (*sumkara*). The class of blue things will cut across the class of lotuses. There are blue things other than lotuses and there are lotuses which are not blue. This is thought ob-

jectionable, and hence a distinction is made between *jāti* and *upādhi*. Blueness, though a *sāmānya*, is an *upādhi* and not a *jāti*. The western tradition is not alarmed to accept the same thing as belonging to intersecting classes. Since 'class' is merely a logical concept, that is to say, it does not mean putting things together physically, I hold the western view as correct.

The next category is *viśeṣa*. This is the logical opposite of *sāmānya*. Our experience presents us with similarity among things. To account for this we have the category *sāmānya*. If there are two cows, we want to know why both of them are cows. The answer is both of them have the same *sāmānya*, *gotva*, running in them. At the same time we are also conscious of the uniqueness of each cow. We should want to know the reason why they are two cows. The answer can be that each of them has a *viśeṣa* or individuality of its own, which differentiates it from everything else.

But this is not exactly the view of the *vaiesikās*. They assume a *viśeṣa* as residing only in the ultimate constituents of a thing, but, not in the composite thing, like 'this jar' as a whole.

This seems to me illogical. If every single atom that goes to make up this jar has a *viśeṣa* of its own, the collection of all those atoms will naturally give rise to another *viśeṣa*, that is to say, something that differentiates this jar from every other jar and also from other things. It is a 'jar' because of the *sāmānya* (jarness) residing in it, while it is 'this jar' because of the *viśeṣa* in it. The *vaiesikas* could have very conveniently taken this stand. But, unfortunately, they did not.

The next category is *samavāya*. We nowhere meet this entity in ordinary experience. But we must say it to the credit of the *vaiesikas* that they invented this category solely to defend our ordinary way of looking at things and the common-sense way of talking about them. We speak of a table and its various parts, of a lotus and its colour, of a man and his walking, of an individual and its kind. But, for all that, we cannot show a table apart from its parts, a lotus without its colour. Our concrete experience is of the walking man and not of a man and his walking, of an individual recognised as of a certain kind, but not of the kind, pure and simple. We speak as if the two things are entitatively different, as if, for example, a substance and its quality are separate. We cannot, however, show them separately in our experience. The *vaiesikas*, on account of their very strong

bias for the common-sense point of view, defend the usage of common-sense. They hold that substance and its quality are in reality separate entities. We cannot, however, find them so, because they are connected together by a very special relation—*samavāya*. This most unusual category was invented to defend our usual ways of speaking.

The last category is *abhava*. It is not mentioned in the sutras but is added by later writers. The addition is all to the good. Non-existence has a meaning. Negation is significant. Whatever is significant must find a place in the list of *padārthās*, that is to say, nameable things. *Abhava* is said to be of four kinds. Logically, I suppose, only one kind is important. It is *atyantabhava*—absolute non-existence. It means the non-existence of a thing without reference to time. It is always there.

This conception allows us to talk of the non-existence of a jar on the ground even when a jar is actually there. It is argued by them that though the non-existence of the jar is present there, its perception is prevented, for the time being, by the presence of the jar. I cannot take this argument seriously. But I take it that there is an important logical doctrine hidden in it. It comes to this:—Every negative proposition has a meaning. The negative propositions are constituents of reality. They are always there, waiting to be judged as true or false. Before being judged as true or false, they must be there with a meaning or significance of their own. This is implied by saying that *atyantabhava* lasts through the three times.

## Indian Philosophy of Education

by

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Normally we know education as a science and an art. We recognize it as a body of principles governing teaching or a system of rules determining the practice of those principles. But we do not suspect that there can be a philosophy of education. The fact is that the general spirit of the times is empirical, and, therefore, we feel more interested in facts and their control and manipulation. The first and the last premises of things, their basic relations and essential qualities, appear to us as intangible and less real. But these are, in fact, the fundamental determinations, and upon them depends the character of the concrete facts. An educational system always reflects a particular view of human personality and of the world. And these lend a character to each detail of the system. The concept of child nature that Froebel had, was the most important determining factor in the educational processes of his kindergarten, and there is an evident relation between Montessori's view of the child and the method of instruction she elaborated. A philosophy is, therefore, always present in an educational system or a method and approach of teaching and instruction. And it pervasively influences the practice of education. It is evidently an advantage to know clearly what the philosophy of a particular scheme or system of education is. We can then check it up, and modify and evolve our educational principles and practices in a conscious and a coherent manner.

Our present-day educational situation in the country is an interesting illustration of the need and the value of a philosophy of education. The educational system, which the British gave, may be more or less inescapable. We can reform it here and there but basically it remains the same. This is perhaps the best thing that we can have by the present-day world standards, and yet we feel deeply dissatisfied. We feel that there is not much real education anywhere. How rarely do we see a man of education, having a true love of learning and humility!

The dissatisfaction appears enigmatic to ourselves. But that is due to the fact that our contemporary education represents and

embodies the philosophy of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment movements of Europe. These have today become pervasive and constitute practically the view and the way of life of the world as a whole. Its principal values are mind and rationality, utility, science, organisation and success. Our education, on the whole, follows and represents the world standards of today. This represents the best judgment of the world and is intimately bound up with the needs of the present-day life. Therefore we cannot escape it. But with it we accept and live out its philosophy too,—its view and values of life. At the same time, we carry in ourselves, as inheritors of Indian culture, a view and way of life, which has its own values. These are the values of the spirit, its deeper joys, selflessness, service, devotion, love etc. We are clearly conscious neither of the one philosophy nor of the other, neither of the education we accept nor of our traditional values. Is it surprising then that we find our present education almost inescapable, and yet feel deeply dissatisfied with it? Evidently, if this discord of our life is to be removed, we have first to become conscious of the warring philosophies that claim our soul. If we do not become conscious, we cannot escape the consequences of an inner war and conflict.

The significance of a philosophy of education is, therefore, fundamental. A philosophy of education gives to an educational system its basic values and its ultimate goals. The technique of a system may be perfect, but if its philosophy is not, it will succeed in producing only efficient mediocres. It will not produce men of ideals, of vision, of sacrifice, of truth, justice and goodness. Philosophy is the soul of education; and in order that education may persist as a living and a creative force of life, we must continually consider it in all its aspects,—in its relations to life, existence, truth and goodness.

Already in the field of science itself the need and the necessity of philosophisation has made itself felt. Science has now reached such a stage that the empirical science of modern physics has almost become a philosophy of material existence. Science and philosophy have tended to become indistinguishably one. In some other sciences too the urge for explanation is pressing them forward into philosophy. This development could have been, in fact, foreseen. After all, phenomenal reality and the ultimate existence are not two compartments apart. They both constitute a single reality and to understand any part of it well and thoroughly we must know the whole.

The Indian tradition did divide knowledge into many 'vidyas' sciences and arts. But the empirical facts were never separated from the ultimate reality. Whether it was Grammar or Ayurveda or even Dancing, the particular discipline always attempted to discover its proper foundation in the ultimate. That is how a unity of knowledge was constantly maintained, and the first and the last premises of a science were kept consciously present to a student.

In the West the classification of sciences has tended to separate them artificially. It has created over-specialisation and a lack of perspective almost everywhere. It has certainly served the ends of division of labour and thereby promoted advance. But today a most serious problem of western culture is the recovery of a proper unity and perspective. And hence the idea of 'the whole' is commanding a great deal of attention at the hands of the philosophers as well as the scientists. It is, at times, argued that knowledge has now advanced so much that it is impossible for any one person to possess it all and, therefore, a synthesis of its branches is impossible. Undoubtedly, it is so. But the real trouble is perhaps not due to the fact that knowledge has advanced so much, but rather to the separation of the empirical from the ultimate. The facts are infinite and extremely varied, but the ultimate reality as the basis of them all is one. A correlation, co-ordination or harmonisation of the facts themselves is an extremely difficult undertaking. But in and through the ultimate reality the varied sciences can be truly comprehended; because there all facts are really united. The Indian approach to knowledge avowedly insisted on knowing the ultimate in order that the empirical may be fully known and properly controlled. And that gave to it a greater power of perspective and integration. The same approach now needs to be developed with regard to modern western knowledge in order that it may be effectively controlled and canalised to serve the good of man.

The science of education is a western science, and as a science too rather a young and immature science. Psychology has given to it some insight, which makes education much surer of its processes than it used to be. But psychology itself is an infant science and it is not very sure of the true nature and constitution of human personality. A. Jung affirms, "All the usual little remedies and medicaments of psychology fall somewhat short (to explain personality) just as they do with the man of genius or the creative

human being".<sup>1</sup> And Gardner Murphy observes, "Nobody knows anything much about the nature of man. We are in a position to raise a great many questions, to raise questions perhaps so grave and so fundamental that we begin to wonder if we even have a method for approaching an ultimate solution".<sup>2</sup>

Evidently we must subject our education, its different schemes and plans and all its varied processes, to a careful and deep scrutiny of thought, with a view to relate them to truths of human nature and of reality. That is to say, we must seek with a keen and special interest the first and the last premises of our educational ideas. The power of the unexpressed premises is always very great. The assumptions predetermine a whole line of thought and action. Therefore, they must be specially chosen. They constitute the philosophy of education, and we cannot afford to let that philosophy work as an unknown force.

The Indian approach to all knowledge has been essentially philosophical or metaphysical, or that of going to the very truth and foundation of a matter. And if we consider Indian culture as a whole, its vitality, its creativity, its capacity to produce geniuses, etc., we cannot escape the inference that education must have been a very deep interest of the leaders of Indian life. All life appears to have been conceived as education. An individual learns not only when he lives at the Gurukula, and pursues a course of discipline and of instruction, but also when he becomes a householder and undertakes the normal responsibilities of life. This is intended progressively to elevate his normal propensities through exercise, enjoyment and discipline to a higher level and a richer cultural life, and finally to a complete dedication to the very highest in life. The castes were perhaps originally a functional classification on the basis of, as the Gita says, *Guna* and *Swabhava*, the traits and the characteristic nature of personality. The idea of the *adhikārbheda*, which was so widely used in Indian life, implies a distinctive appreciation of an individual's particular level of growth. When the individual realised his self, he became an illumined person, which is the highest status in the long course of the growth of human personality. That is the status of the knowing person envisaged by Indian education. One knows, when one knows the reality in himself and the reality in the world. He has then in his grasp the unity, which commands and controls

1. The Integration of Personality, p. 299.

2. Main currents in Modern Thought, Vol. 9, No. 2.

the multiplicity of the world, and he therefore possesses the true perspective of existence. He is a free person, because he is indented with the unitary spiritual principle, and he is therefore not confused and lost in the facts of the phenomenal existence.

There is no doubt that medieval spirituality rejected both life and world, and in that case naturally the question of a more effective management of life did not arise. But in fact the spirit is the unitary controlling principle of multiplicity and, therefore, in a fuller and proper view of spirituality a comprehensive control and direction of the phenomenal existence is a normal consequence.

These are some of the largest and the widest premises of Indian education. Within these premises, however, many strands and types of educational practices have appeared and flourished in the long history of Indian education. These have had their own further premises. The Upanishads give to us the earliest and a fairly comprehensive account of educational ideals. They throw light on the teacher, the taught, their mutual attitudes and relations, methods of teaching, personality and its highest ranges of growth, the aspiration for higher living, etc. They also give vivid perceptions of truth and reality. There we see a new tradition of education, which gives us the deepest insights into personality, the nature of truth and the process of communication of knowledge.

Another great tradition of Indian education was built up by the Buddhist Viharas. There we find a characteristic philosophy which is the application of the Buddhist view and way of life to education. The Jain tradition again has shown a conspicuous trend. The two epics give us their own standards of life and education. The Muslims brought to the country Arab learning and the great tradition which had nursed it.

Evidently education has been a great interest of Indian culture, and quite large and varied has been our creation in this field. This creation had naturally proceeded from the premises of our life, and its different forms had afforded us in our different historical situations some satisfaction. Today we cannot hope for a revival. But the education that the modern world offers to us also does not satisfy us. The problem that confronts us to-day is that of a synthesis between modern education, with its elaborate methods and materials, and the essence, the spirit, and the philosophy of our traditional education. Our national soul cannot

feel satisfied unless its most cherished values of life find in our present education a chance of growth and advancement. A synthesis of the intrinsic values of truth, service, selflessness, soul and God has, therefore, to be attempted with the values of utility, organisation and success.

This is the problem not only of India, but of all Asia. The traditional culture and sentiment assert themselves, and yet we are under a pressure to accept other values, which are a part of our present life and therefore possess a force of reality. These other values in themselves too do not satisfy. The problem, therefore, is that of a discreet and wise synthesis. It is interesting that these contemporary values in themselves are in a state of crisis and under a heavy pressure of revaluation. The direction of revaluation too has become quite clearly expressed, even though a clear way of pursuit has not yet been made out. Scientists, philosophers and thinkers have repeatedly affirmed that intellectual values in the form of science, organisation and efficiency have been pursued too exclusively. They must be brought, they say, into intimate relation and harmony with the moral and the spiritual values of life. The lag between science and morals, said Einstein, must be made up. The core of the traditional cultures of Asia is constituted of the moral and the spiritual values, and our problem actually is a preservation and a reconciliation of the same with the values of science and technology. In fact, the same conflict persists as an unsolved problem of Europe too. The traditional culture there too had essentially emphasised moral and spiritual values. But science had arisen in revolt against religion and ultimately prevailed upon it, and therefore a proper reconciliation between the two was not achieved. Eastern traditions, in particular the Indian, do not know of any necessary opposition between them. Therefore, here, a synthesis should be easier of achievement. And if the problem is recognised and squarely faced and a synthesis evolved, it will mean not only a better and more correct guidance for our national life, but also an important contribution to the life of Europe and the West as a whole. Indian education can surely choose to be a representation of the general world education of today. But if it can attempt and synthesize the essential values of the Indian philosophy of education with the modern methods and materials of education, then a new quality in education could be produced, which may fully satisfy us and also make a much needed contribution to the world-education of today.

## The Reign of Time in Contemporary Thought

by

S. SUBHASH CHANDRA

Even a cursory study of the prominent trends in the history of the last 75 years of Human Thought will reveal the presence of a novel feature, viz., the reign of time in contemporary thought. The contemporary philosophy boasts of such philosophers of Time as Bergson, Alexander, and Spengler. Thanks to the genius of Einstein, the present-day physics deals not with an inert three-dimensional space, but with a four-dimensional time-space continuum. These 75 years have also witnessed the development of the science and technique of Parapsychology through the persistent efforts of such men as J. B. Rhine, Soal, Pratt, Carrington, Tischner, Tyrrell, and Upton Sinclair. J. W. Dunne has introduced the concept of Serial Time, whereas Ouspensky, in his "New Model of the Universe", conceives the true nature of Time as Circular and Recurrent. H. G. Wells and J. B. Priestley have enshrined the theme of time in the world of literature. We propose, in this paper, to briefly discuss the salient features of these trends. Convenience and clarity and not chronology shall determine the order of the trends discussed here.

Bergsonian philosophy has invariably been considered as one of the most original and most profound contributions to contemporary philosophy. Bergson's philosophy is a philosophy of evolution. Bergson felt that all the preceding philosophies of evolution, notably that of Herbert Spencer, have misapprehended the essence of evolution. The essence of evolution rests in its manifest stress on change. If one forsakes the usual scientific standpoint of external observation and places oneself at the very heart of *Elan Vital*, the conclusion cannot be avoided that change is the only reality. The pure instant is simply a chimerical supposition,—the only present ever realized concretely being the "fleeting moment", in which the expiring rearward of time and its approaching future perpetually blend their lights. "You define the present in an arbitrary manner as *that which is*", observes Bergson, "whereas the present is simply *what is being made*". (See *Matter and Memory*, page 193). Again, "the universe is not made, but is being made continuously". (*Creative Evolution*, p. 255).

In fact, this ramification of time into past, present, and future is one of the most stupendous realities of the world. We delude ourselves by conceiving time as an instant replacing another (which implies a vacuum between two instants), and not as a continuous process. Time, correctly understood and released from certain spatialising notions that have become almost inseparably entwined with it through the inherent infirmities of the intellect, is a process in which none of the parts are external to one another, but all are interpenetrating. As Bergson has put it: "Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances". (*Creative Evolution*, p. 5). In reality the entire past is preserved in the present automatically. Says Bergson: "My mental state, as it advances on the road of time, is continuously swelling with the duration which it accumulates: it goes on increasing—rolling upon itself, as a snowball on the snow". (*Creative Evolution*, p. 2).

But, then, what about the external time, the time on which is based the modern science with its colossal achievements, the time on which we shape our activities, and the time of clocks and time-pieces? Such time, answers Bergson, is the result of our unwarranted and fallacious interpretation of time in the language of space. We shape time in the pattern of space. What facilitates this illusion is that we distinguish moments in the course of duration like halts in the passage of a moving body. Duration and motion are not objects but dynamic processes. They are essentially continuous and heterogeneous. Hence, all attempts to observe the *Elan Vital* are doomed to failure. For, as Bergson succinctly puts it: "Time does not require to be seen, but to be lived". Intellect is essentially analytic. It abstracts and divides phenomena to suit its convenience, and then investigates them. Intellect is uneasy when dealing with things dynamic, but, is comfortable when confronted with something static. Besides, intellect is concerned with utility rather than with the essence of life. The vision of Absolute Truth, in this case Pure Duration, is obtainable, not by clinging to the intellect, but by seeking the assistance of instinct or intuition.


Alexander's position as a philosopher of Time is equally important. Alexander's debt to Bergson is all too evident. He himself is candid enough to write: "I have the good fortune to be a philosopher of flux and movement, coming in the Alexanderian wake of Bergson and hoisted on the tide of Einstein". For Alex-

ander, as for Bergson, the fundamental feature of duration is that it is creative. The universe, according to Alexander, is a spatio-temporal system, evolving towards that state of ultimate perfection which he calls deity. Space-time is at the very root of everything. At the primordial stage of existence, primary qualities like shape and numbers appear within the space-time structure. These qualities are distinct from the qualities of matter like mass, inertia, and energy. The next stage in the order of emergence is that of secondary qualities, such as, colour, sound, touch, taste, smell, etc. The emergence of these secondary qualities is followed by the emergence of life. The emergence of mind is the next step in the history of the emergent evolution. To cite Alexander: "In the course of time, which is the principle of movement, the matrix of space-time breaks up into finites of ever-increasing complexity. At certain points in the history of things finites assume new empirical qualities which are distinctive of levels of experience, primary qualities, matter; secondary qualities, life, mind". (*Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 335).

Now, throughout this partnership of Space and Time, Time plays a more prominent and a more decisive role than Space. No doubt, we are told that Time separated from Space can cause to emerge only momentary existences; and that true continuity is the product of Space penetrating into Time. But, we are also told: "Time with its distinctive features corresponds to the three dimensions of Space, and in a manner of speech, Time does with its one-dimensional order cover and embrace the three dimensions of Space, and is not additional to them....Space, even to be Space, must be temporal". Time is the soul of Space. In Alexander's Philosophy, Time reigns supreme and unchallenged. To sum up: "Alexander exalts pure movement to the status of the essence of the world, and speaks of change as the universal characteristic of all things that have evolved out of the primal matrix". (*History of Philosophy: Eastern and Western*, ed. by Radhakrishnan and others, Vol. II, p. 364).

Before we embark upon a discussion of the four dimensional time-space continuum as conceived by Einstein and Minkowski, it may be of some value and interest to allude to certain prominent pre-relativity developments in this connection. Perhaps, the earliest systematic account of time as a fourth dimension was given by Fechner, writing under the name of Dr. ~~Dr. Fechner~~, in his book *Vier Paradoxe* (1846). Another early dissertation on the

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subject is a monograph by C. H. Hinton entitled "What is the Fourth Dimension?" and published in 1887. Hinton did not conceive Time and Space as qualitatively distinct and heterogeneous. The four dimensions of Hinton are fundamentally alike, and his problem was to discover the *raison d'être* of the distinction commonly made between the Time dimension and the dimensions of Space. As an answer to this problem, Hinton enunciated the idea of a three-dimensional field of observation moving up the four dimensional block. According to Hinton, anyone who could perceive Time's extension (duration) as well as that of Space would treat the particles of our three-dimensional world as simply sectional views of inert and fixed material threads extending in a fourth dimension, and would observe that the only thing that really changed and moved was that three-dimensional field of observation which we call the present moment. Hence, for Hinton, the past and the future co-exist, and our experience of change is the result of a movement between this Time extension and that which is the present. This, be it noted, rendered the apparent Time dimension the same for all observers, regardless of the different sets of circumstances in which they may be dwelling.

H. G. Wells in his scientific fiction *The Time Machine*, published seven years after Hinton's work, takes a slightly different view. Wells, at the very outset, stresses the *necessity* of recognising Time as a fourth dimension.

"There can be no such thing as an instantaneous Cube....any real body must have length, Breadth, Thickness, and....Duration".

Elsewhere in the same book, Wells refers to the Time-moving elements as "our mental existences". The use of the plural "existences" is of capital significance. There is no ubiquitous dynamic *stratum*, occupying Space between the different observers, but a number of 'mental existences', one for each observer. Each of such mental existences would be situated in or about its corresponding observer's brain. Hence, if the traversing of the "mental existence" is the cause of the artificial distinction between Time and Space, then each observer would envisage Time as stretching in the direction in which his body line is extended. Besides, the body lines of various observers are never parallel. Hence, different observers would maintain varying opinions as to the correct directions of the Time and Space dimensions.

Having briefly, rather too briefly, dealt with Time as a fourth dimension in the pre-relativity era, we may now attend to the concept of time as the fourth dimension in the space-time continuum. The classical concept of time, or the Astronomer Royal's view of time as Eddington has put it, regarded time as independent of the frame of reference. The uniformity and simultaneity of time intervals was taken for granted by the classical physics. As an instance of the uniformity of time intervals, attention was drawn to the invariably uniform nature of the earth's rotation round its own axis, or around the Sun. The concept of time intervals as simultaneous is more significant than the other one. In classical physics it was tacitly assumed that two clocks separated by any distance give the same time provided they have once been synchronised at the same place. The theory of relativity questioned the validity of such an assumption. The theory of relativity argued: "We can judge at once whether two clocks show the same time when they are at the same place; but how can we determine this for two clocks separated by a distance? In order to compare time intervals of two distant clocks it is, in principle, necessary to send a signal. If we direct a beam of light towards the other clock in order to read it, then we need to know the speed of the signal. It means that we have to determine the distance as well as the time the signal takes to reach the second clock; and it is just this time we set out to find: we have a 'vicious circle' argument". (*The Language of Modern Physics*, by E. H. Hutten, p. 123).

The theory of Special relativity also refutes the Newtonian idea of absolute time which makes it possible for all clocks, watches, hour-glasses, and any other time measuring devices to function at a constant and unvarying rate, no matter what their velocities are. (*Einstein*, by Philipp Frank, p. 77). The theory of relativity invokes the well-known fact that the mass or inertia of matter increases when the velocity increases, and deduces from this a hypothesis which states: a moving clock, regardless of its construction, runs slower than a corresponding clock that is at rest. In other words, the theory of relativity makes all time 'local' to the frames or systems of space and their velocities. A man travelling at a tremendous speed and an stay-at-home individual do not *live* the same span of time between any two of their meetings. "We may find that, whilst the stay-at-home individual has aged 70 years, the traveller has aged 1 year. He has only found appetite for 365 breakfasts, lunches, etc.; his intellect, clogged by a slow-moving brain, has only traversed the

amount of thought appropriate to one year of terrestrial life." (*The Nature of the Physical World*, by Sir A. S. Eddington, p. 39).

Consequently, Einstein advocated abandoning the concepts of absolute or objective time and space. Neither the points of space nor the instants of time are absolute and objective realities. Because all time is what we live, and all space is what we inhabit. Rightly has Dr. Alexis Carrel observed: "The nature of time varies according to the objects considered by our mind. The time that we observe in nature has no separate existence. It is only a mode of being of concrete objects". (*Man, the unknown*, by Alexis Carrel, p. 156). It will, however, be erroneous to suppose that the theory of relativity requires us to forsake the intuitive concepts of time which we obtain from individual experience. Our customary view of time is quite satisfactory for us within a relatively restricted area of space and a limited span of time. Our view of time is only inapplicable when applied to the universe as a whole. As Sir James Jeans has put it: "The theory of relativity merely suggests that such a scheme (viz., the concept of time derived from individual experience) is private to single individuals or to small colonies of individuals; it is a parochial method of measuring, and so is not suited for nature as a whole". (*The New Background of Science*, by James Jeans, p. 99).

But, then, for the study of objective nature, we evidently require an objective framework. Such a framework was discovered by Minkowski and Einstein from the Lorentz transformation in which it was lying implicit all the time. And this framework is the well known four-dimensional space-time continuum. Adoption of this framework restores the objectivity of nature, nay, it specifies this objectivity. We no longer speak of points of space, or instants of time; we talk of events. Every event must be regarded as consisting of the four co-ordinates, i.e., the three dimensions of space and the one of time. To sum up with Einstein: "It is neither the point in space, nor the instant in time, at which something happens that has physical reality, but only the event itself. There is no absolute (independent of the space of reference) relation in space, and no absolute relation in time between two events, but there is an absolute (independent of the space of reference) relation in space and time". (*The Meaning of Relativity*, by Albert Einstein, p. 29). Needless to add, this "absolute relation in space and time" is the four-dimensional space-time continuum.

Now, it remains for us to succinctly state the extraordinary theory of Serial Time propounded by J. W. Dunne. It will not be possible here to provide the background or the logical foundations of Dunne's remarkable experiments in Time. The reader will have to peruse for himself Dunne's books, specially "An Experiment with Time" and "The Serial Universe".

A series of extremely dramatic dreams, which later proved true, kindled Dunne's interest in the subject of pre-cognition. Clairvoyance, as an explanation, did not appear satisfactory to Dunne, who regarded it as "a meaningless expression, a mere admission of inexplicability". Nor was Telepathy of any avail. He soon was driven to the conclusion that these dreams would have revealed nothing unusual or bizarre to the least extent *had they happened on the nights after the corresponding event*. The only unusuality was that they occurred on the *wrong nights*. They were merely *displaced in Time*. (*An Experiment with Time*, by J. W. Dunne, pp. 49-50).

Reassured that there was nothing unusual in his dreams, Dunne initiated a series of experiments starting, at first, with himself, and later on he requested others to join him. He, in due course of time, found: (1) Every dimension of time, or 'Time-travelling field of presentation', as he calls it, is "contained within a field one dimension larger, travelling in another dimension of Time, the larger field covering events which are 'past' and 'future', as well as 'present', to the smaller field". In other words, Time<sup>1</sup> is contained within Time<sup>2</sup>, and Time<sup>2</sup> is, in turn, contained in Time<sup>3</sup>, and so on ad infinitum.

(2) This hypothesis led Dunne to the unavoidable conclusion that "the serialism of the fields of presentation (i.e. the dimensions of Time) involves the existence of a serial observer". In other words, Time<sup>1</sup> has its own observer<sup>1</sup>, and Time<sup>2</sup> possesses its own observer<sup>2</sup>, and so on ad infinitum. Now, all the observations 'past', 'future', and 'present' of the observer<sup>1</sup> are not only the observations of observer<sup>2</sup>, but of all the infinite observers corresponding to the infinite dimensions of the Serial Time. Similarly, the observations of observer<sup>2</sup> are not only observations of observer<sup>3</sup>, but of all the infinite observers. Each observer perceives not only occurrences in his own field of presentation, but also the events occurring in all the fields *lower* than itself.

Consequently, Dunne concludes: (3) "The Focus of attention in any field has the same number of dimensions as that field,

and is a dimensional centre of the foci of attention in all the higher fields". (*An Experiment with Time*, by J. W. Dunne, pp. 158-159).

With this, we conclude our brief survey of the primacy of Time in contemporary philosophy. We have come across Time as creative and dynamic, Time as the fourth dimension in the space-time continuum, and the Serial Time. Our survey of this rich variety of the philosophies of Time has been deplorably cursory owing to paucity of space. We have been content to draw a bare map with no specifications of details. Nevertheless, we hope that the paper will succeed in providing a broad perspective of the prominent trends in contemporary thought and the preponderant presence of Time in them. Perhaps, the theme of Time may be characterized as the embodiment of the *Zeitgeist* of contemporary thought.

## Book Reviews

*On Selfhood and Godhood*, by C. A. Campbell (Gifford Lectures for 1953-54 and 1954-55). Published by George Allen and Unwin, price 35 s. net.

The book is rather ambitious in its scope. It traverses a wide field of both religion and philosophy and seeks to justify the truth of religion through reason. The main question it raises is, can religion be true? The truth of religion is most often sought to be established through religious experience itself. To the religious mind, the question is very simple. God certainly does exist, because He is the natural object of religious experience. There would in fact be no religious experience without God. This answer is not acceptable to the author. He thinks that religious experience cannot claim to be ultimate like moral experience. Moral experience is ultimate, and therefore its objectivity cannot be doubted. There is an objective moral order which every individual must accept as true. The same cannot be said of religious experience. Its truth therefore requires to be reinforced through rational or purely philosophical considerations. Does philosophy supply us with any reasons for regarding religion to be true? His answer is in the affirmative.

The first part of the book deals with the reality and the nature of the self. For him, self-consciousness proves the self-identity of the self and its substantial character. The self is to be distinguished from what is called the person. The person may change. He is the whole of the body and the mind. The self, on the other hand, is the self-identical element in the person. The most important aspect of the life of the self is its moral activity. The self recognises that certain courses of action are obligatory upon it. There is such a thing as the moral imperative or the categorical imperative for it. This 'moral ought' stands in irreconcilable opposition to the natural dispositions of the person acquired in life. He is naturally inclined to act in accordance with these dispositions. But his duty or what he ought to do is always opposed to those dispositions. The individual self, however, stands above his dispositions, free to act in accordance with his duty and free to yield to his dispositions. Mr. Campbell rejects the view that an individual is free only in so far as his actions are determined by reason, and that therefore there are degrees of freedom. For

him, freedom is normal for every individual, and it cannot be qualified as being more in one individual and less in another. All individuals are equally free to do the right or to yield to the promptings of desire.

In the second part, Mr. Campbell takes up the main question of the truth of religion. Religion he defines as "a state of mind comprising belief in the reality of a super-natural being or beings endued with transcendent power and worth, together with the complex emotive attitude of worship intrinsically appropriate thereto." 248. With this definition he works out the thesis that theism is the natural and the best expression of the religious consciousness. The question 'is religion true?' thus transforms itself into the question 'is theism true?'.

He then proceeds to answer the objection to theism from the existence of evil. He thinks that the existence of moral evil or sin does not challenge theism. There is no original sin. Every man sins on his own account. Since freedom is the necessary presupposition of the moral uplift of the individual and the process of soul-making, the possibility to fall or to sin cannot be ruled out by a good God. It is different with physical suffering, if it is intense and long-continued. It is unjustified, if God is good and all-powerful. But some justification can still be given. After all our world may be the best possible world governed by laws. There may no doubt be some innocent persons who suffer on account of the inexorableness of these laws; but then is it not better to have this world as it is rather than not have any world at all? Mr. Campbell thinks that the world on the whole is good. And if we have faith in God who is good, we may be sure that He will compensate those, who suffer here unnecessarily, in the hereafter. So the law of justice will still hold good. Mr. Campbell, of course, is not very happy about this answer, but then nothing further can be done about it.

The question still remains, is theism true? He thinks that the qualities of wisdom, power and goodness which we ascribe to God cannot be *literally* true. They are based upon thought and will. But neither of these activities, because of their inherent limitations, can belong to God. Thought, as judgment, is intrinsically incapable of knowing the real. Similarly, will presupposes desire. One cannot will if one is absolutely free from all desire. But if that is so, we cannot understand the above-mentioned qualities of God literally. This induces Mr. Campbell to assert that the

natural evolution of theism is towards supra-rational theism. So the question 'is theism true?' is to be replaced by the question 'is supra-rational theism true?'. This supra-rational theism is the form of theism propounded by Rudolf Otto. Here it is clearly recognised that God is beyond all human conception and human comprehension (*mysterium*). His two great attributes are awe-inspiring power and majesty (*tremendum*) on the one hand, and enthralling joy and value (*fascinans*) on the other. The whole conception of God, the holy, is summed up in the words: '*mysterium tremendum et fascinans*'. The attributes of God must be understood symbolically only. God, the mysterious and incomprehensible, has something in Him which has affinity with the highest we know of power and value, but which far transcends what we know of them. We must admit that we, as finite human beings, are quite incompetent, by our very nature, to *know* God as God really is. All we can do is to use the best symbols we know, and rest content with that symbolisation.

So far the truth of religion has been considered from the standpoint of the religious consciousness itself. But what about persons who disown this consciousness and question its validity? For them as well as for the religious mind, for the sceptic as well as for the believer, Mr. Campbell offers metaphysical reasons why the sort of God envisaged by supra-rational theism can be said to be a real God. This is perhaps the weakest part of his whole thesis.

He rejects the ontological argument for God as well as the teleological argument. But he does not reject either the moral argument or the cosmological argument. Strangely however as it would appear, he develops his whole metaphysical argument from the law of non-contradiction. Starting with this law, he shows why ultimate reality must be a unity in difference or a unity that explains differences. Since nothing can be external to this unity, it must be both infinite and eternal. The best unity we know of is mind or spirit. In so far as the unity of the Spirit is all-inclusive, it can truly be spoken of as endowed with all-power and all-glory. Again, in so far as everything is contained harmoniously within it and there is nothing that can challenge its integrity or wholeness, it may be said to represent the highest joy or value. Thus what the religious man believes can be shown to be metaphysically necessary. The freedom of the individual, with its possibility of moral achievement, can also be reconciled

with the eternal character of God. For God contains within Him all time and also transcends it.

The whole presentation of the subject is clear, comprehensive and altogether up-to-date. The author is fully conscious of the objections of modern analytical and sceptical philosophy against the reality of the soul and the reality of God. But he is not deterred from his purpose or dismayed by the volume of arguments against the truth of religion. He boldly defends that truth against all objections. But the most novel thing about his presentation of the subject is that he justifies the truth of religion on metaphysical grounds and thus assimilates religion to philosophy. Reason, according to him, can determine the truth of religion. Although, naturally, reason cannot take the place of religious experience, it can at least validate the truth of that experience. It can show that the metaphysical structure of reality is not alien to what the religious man believes to be the case. We here, in India, do just the opposite. We assimilate philosophy to religion. We try to show that philosophy has something of the method and the motivation of religion, and that it is in a sense the highest form of religion.

It appears to us that the deduction of the nature of the ultimate truth from the law of non-contradiction alone is far-fetched and unconvincing; and to identify the metaphysical truth thus arrived at with the object of religious experience is even more so. In our opinion, reason has a humbler task. Unaided, it can only analyse a particular form of experience, and thus get at the ultimate presuppositions of that experience. It is a means to the knowledge of what are called first principles. But this knowledge is bound to be unsatisfactory in the end. No first principles of experience are ever above criticism. They raise doubts and new problems. Reason cannot satisfactorily solve them. What reason needs is a higher intuition of reality. For that, reason depends upon the revealed word. It is here, in the matter of a guidance from above, that philosophy merges with religion, and becomes a form of religion and even a fulfilment of the religious urge. Reason, informed by a revelation from above, can so analyse our entire experience that it begins to yield the highest possible significance. Religion in a narrow sense or as dogma is thus lifted to religion in a higher sense or religion in the form of absolute truth, which is known to be self-evidently true. This view of the relation of philosophy to religion is however a matter outside the scope of the

present review. We shall here only suggest a few criticisms of the thesis presented by Mr. Campbell.

(a) Mr. Campbell relies upon the testimony of self-consciousness in order to prove the self-identity of the self. But if that testimony is read aright, a distinction must be drawn between the self-identical and substantial core of the self and the changing functions of thought, feeling and will. If thinking or willing formed an essential part of the real self, the latter could not be self-identical in the different moments of its supposed activity. The functioning subject is not the real self. We must distinguish the self as it is in itself without any function from the functioning subject which is changing and relative. The latter may be called the empirical self of Kant and the former the real noumenal self. The two are ordinarily known simultaneously in a mixed intuition, and that is why we confuse them together. But we can analyse them out, and so distinguish them. What can be known as changing or as momentary is the empirical self or the not-self. What cannot be thus known but what is presupposed in all such knowledge is the real immutable self. It is essentially unchanging, immediate and self-revealing. We cannot know it in the objective attitude. We only speak it as immediate. It is in a very real sense self-luminous. It is *the spirit* par excellence, while the subject and its functions are spiritual only in a transferred sense. We must distinguish the activities of the mind from the pure spirit, which is essentially non-mental and of the nature of a pure intelligence. The Western equivalence of mind with spirit is fundamentally wrong.

(b) The self has been described by Mr. Campbell as essentially free. It is free in choosing between duty and desire. We agree that the self is *by nature* free. But is it absolutely free when it acts? Is it free in choosing between duty and desire? Evidently, the self must pass through a process of thinking or of reflection, in which it is influenced by various conflicting motives, among them the motive of duty, before it can act freely as we say. No act, however free, can issue directly or abruptly from the self, without any process of thinking whatsoever. If that were possible, the act would be quite arbitrary and eccentric, not an expression of freedom. If what we have said is true, the acquired character has quite an important influence on all our free decisions. Mr. Campbell however identifies acquired character with desire and distinguishes duty from it. If Mr. Campbell were right, it would be quite as easy for a saint to sin as for a sinner to do

the right act. It appears to us that the decision between the right and the wrong is not the result of a simple *yes* or *no* freely given. Our freedom is in a sense in the process of building up, and our character plays an important part in it. Without character, acquired through decisions made in the past, our freedom is a myth. We go farther than that. We suggest that it is not the will that is free. The will is always swayed by motives and influenced by the past history of the individual. It is the self that is free. We enjoy freedom of being, not freedom of action. In the realm of action, our freedom is more or less negative. All we can say is that we are never compelled to act one way or other. Our freedom here is relative only. We are *influenced* by the higher as well as the lower motives. We *become* freer as we choose the higher in preference to the lower. Freedom admits of degrees. Absolute Freedom is freedom of being only.

(c) The idea of God creating individuals who are morally free is fraught with difficulties. What is created has no being of its own. It is wholly dependent upon the being of the Creator. But what is dependent for its very being upon some-one else cannot claim rightly any part of its activity as independent of its creator. If all of us are created *equally free*, how is it that our moral decisions differ so very widely? There must be a reason for this difference apart from the freedom which we all equally share. We contend that man, as a spiritual being, is not created at all. He exists in his own right and is not subordinate to, or dependent upon, any other being. He alone is responsible for what he does, and the history of his deeds has no beginning. It is not the case that he starts with a clean slate at a particular time, and then makes his first moral decision freely and unencumbered by his past. He has always a past which determines him more or less, and always a future which he can be said to make freely.

The question of evil, moral or natural, is a simple one on this view. God, the Perfect One, has nothing to do with the evil that there is. Each individual, human or sub-human, is the sole author of his own suffering and his own destiny. There is no room for the least injustice anywhere in the moral universe. Every individual reaps what he sows. Only it is not the actions of this life alone that count. Man is a pilgrim of eternity. This is not the first life that he has had. Indeed this cannot be proved. But then nothing about religion can ever be proved. In this sphere, we all depend upon the evidence of revelation. If we do not accept that evidence, we have neither life after death, nor one

before our birth in this body. If we accept that evidence and also want a rational belief in a religious sense, then individual responsibility for everything that happens to the individual is more rational than God's lack of wisdom or power or goodness. We must keep God clear of all responsibility for what happens to the individual. All evil from which man suffers is his own handiwork, never the handiwork of God.

(d) Mr. Campbell has ruled out the possibility of a finite individual ever knowing God fully for what He is. No human concept can grasp positively the transcendent reality of God or the mystery. But then are we merely emotionally related to Him,—mystified and enthralled by His transcendence? If so, the problem of knowledge will always remain on our hands. If something exists, it demands to be known. Mere faith cannot take the place of knowledge as a permanent attitude. Faith is legitimate only when it is a stepping-stone to knowledge. It demands to be transformed into knowledge. If it cannot be so transformed, there is bound to be frustration in an intellectual sense. Our intellect, however, refuses to accept defeat, when the problem is legitimate. There is almost no limit to the subtlety of its perception and its approximation to the truth. If every concept falls short, the intellect is quite competent to reject every concept and directly intuit what cannot be conceived, provided reality is, by its own nature, self-revealing to it. There is thus need of a religion of knowledge. If real and direct knowledge is not possible, we must be honest enough to admit that there is no problem here, and that any belief in God is quite fictitious. But if knowledge is possible, and we believe it is, it can be neither sensuous nor judgmental. It will be in some sense of the term an "intellectual intuition" or what in Vedantic terminology is called *aparokṣa-anūbhūti*. This religion of knowledge is bound to supersede all other forms of religion in the end.

(e) Mr. Campbell says that God cannot be literally conceived or known, He can only be symbolised. But what is the use of mere symbols, if we cannot know through them the symbolisandum? A symbol has cognitive value, if it points to the symbolisandum and thus leads to its actual knowledge. Treated as the last word in knowledge, it defeats its own purpose. We have the symbol—we do not know what it symbolises. Is it not useless even as a symbol? It brings us no nearer the truth. Symbols play a useful and legitimate part when they pin-point the thing we want to know but cannot otherwise know. When they have thus

led to knowledge, we can throw away the symbol. The symbol is not the thing. We contend that the ultimate reality or the Absolute Spirit, which is the object of religion, is always known and known by the necessity of its own nature, only it is not recognised. The symbol helps recognition. We might even go so far as to say that if ever we know anything, it is God and God alone. We do not know anything else. The sun stands in all its glory before us. Our eyes are open, but we do not see. We see, and yet we do not see through some inner defect. The symbol helps to remove this defect of ignorance. That symbol is best which helps the most. The symbol has a literal meaning and a non-literal meaning. It is the latter which is more important when we want to know something that is beyond thought and speech. The Indian tradition of Vedanta makes an effective use of symbolization for purposes of knowledge. It is called *lakṣaṇā*.

(f) Philosophy is just another name for this religion of truth. Nothing however can be got from the law of non-contradiction. What is more significant than this law is our actual experience. This experience is many-sided. There is such a thing as religious experience. But that experience merely sets the problem. It does not solve it. To solve it, we must tackle our cognitive experience in all its forms, guided by a super-revelation. When our cognition is put right, and we know the Absolute Truth, we shall have realized the highest in every sense.

Mr. Campbell's book is easy to read and interesting throughout. Even a lay man can understand it and profit from it. He has tackled some of the most important problems of the philosophy of religion. His method throughout is that of pure reason. He does not avoid awkward or difficult questions. He faces them boldly. If his answer is not fully satisfactory to him, he admits it. He is a theist in the best sense of the term. Indians particularly will find a lot of instruction in this book. The contrast between the highest in the Western Christian religion and philosophy and the highest in their own Vedantic tradition is bound to force itself upon their minds. The sort of supra-rational theism which Mr. Campbell advocates is not very far from what would be understood as the ultimate truth of Vedanta. But the approach in each case is very different, and so is the final conclusion. Mr. Campbell is satisfied with a purely religious approach to the ultimate reality, and disclaims the very possibility of a direct and complete knowledge of it. Vedanta, on the other hand, seeks

primarily nothing but such knowledge, and subordinates the purely religious approach of feeling and will to it. However that be, the book will be found immensely useful to all who seek a rational presentation of religious beliefs. Mr. Campbell is to be congratulated for a very outstanding work.

*The Meeting of The East and The West In Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy:* By Sri S. K. Maitra, Honorary Professor of Philosophy, Benaras Hindu University; pp. 451; Price Rs. 8; Published by Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry.

Dr. Maitra is a well-known authority on the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo. He has already given us two works on the subject, viz., *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo* and *Studies in Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy*, and the latter has already gone out of print. The present work is a continuation of the author's labour of love, and in a way it is also an 'integration' of the previous works, especially because two articles from *Studies In Aurobindo's Philosophy* have been included in it. This work is a collection of the articles written by Sri Maitra from time to time on the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo which were published in 'Sri Aurobindo Mandir Annual' and 'The Advent'. The book opens with the article on 'The Meeting of The East and The West In Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy' after which the book is entitled. Dr. Maitra has taken pains to show in this article how the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo presents a fine and harmonious blending of the salient features of Eastern and Western thought. In fact that is the dominant note of the whole book, for it has been the endeavour of the author to show what he considers to be the oneness of the Eastern and the Western thought taken singly. Whether one agrees with all that is said in the book is a different question. The book is principally a comparative study of the philosophical systems of the leading philosophers of the West like Plato, Plotinus, Hegel, Hartmann, Bergson and Whitehead on the one hand and the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo on the other. There is an interesting chapter on 'Sri Aurobindo and Goethe' in which an elaborate comparison is drawn between the 'Faust' of Goethe and the 'Savitri' of Sri Aurobindo. Besides these, we have two more chapters on 'Sri Aurobindo and The Problem of Evil' and 'Is Sri Aurobindo a Mystic?' The book contains eleven chapters in all. It would not be an exaggeration to say that this is the first work

in the comparative study of an eminent eastern philosopher and several leading philosophers of the West. This undoubtedly is Dr. Maitra's distinctive contribution to the study of comparative philosophy.

Now let us consider some of the controversial issues treated of in this book. While reading this work one gathers the impression that Sri Aurobindo's philosophy, according to the author, is the last word in philosophy, either Eastern or Western. So far as mere conceptual systems are concerned, it may not be difficult to show the superiority of a system which is essentially based on spiritual experience; but when it is confronted with other systems of the latter type, one may find it difficult to see any justification for this rather exaggerated belief on the part of our author. Sri Aurobindo's philosophy is essentially and in all its important features a continuation of the Vaiṣṇava philosophical tradition. Some of its features, however, which are said to be novel and peculiar to it, tend to set the philosophical and the spiritual clock backwards. We take up only one instance for consideration. An earthly, i.e., bodily immortality is, according to our author, "one of the most startling features of Sri Aurobindo's conception of evolution".<sup>1</sup> The message of Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy can be summed up, according to him, "in two words: earthly immortality, or as the Kathopanishad puts it, *atra brahma samaśnuté*".<sup>2</sup> Now this conception is not in any way new either to the East or to the West, where we come across sporadic efforts to perpetuate the body either by material or spiritual alchemy. But it is worthwhile to note that efforts of this kind have never found favour with respectable spiritual and philosophical circles either of the East or of the West. "The wise ones," categorically declares *Śrīmadbhāgavata*, "do not look at such efforts with an eye of respect; for futile are such efforts, because of the perishable nature of the body".<sup>3</sup> "Death is inevitable for that which is born" asserts the *Bhagavad-gīta*.<sup>4</sup> That 'the self is not the body' is the corner-stone of all the systems of Indian philosophy, with the negligible exception of the Chārvāka school. It is significant that Advaita Vedānta begins by pointing to the need for discrimination between what is eternal

1. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo, p. 8.

2. The Meeting of The East and The West in Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy, p. 383.

3. *Śrīmadbhāgavat* 11, 28, 41-43.

4. II, 27.

and what is non-eternal (*Nityānityavastuviveka*). Dr. Maitra himself says very rightly that Indian Philosophy "was from the beginning turned inwards. The highest reality was always conceived as Atman or Self, and the duty of man was 'to see, hear, think and contemplate it' (*Ātmā vā aré draṣṭavyaḥśrotavyo man-tavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*)".<sup>5</sup> Further, Dr. Maitra quotes approvingly the rejection by Maitreyī, the wife of Yājñavalkya, of everything that was of the nature of not-Self in her memorable words, "What shall I do with that which does not give me immortality?"<sup>6</sup> Yājñavalkya takes pains to convince Maitreyī that the Self is the highest Reality, and that the Self alone is the highest value; for everything is dear for the sake of the Self, but the Self is not dear for anything else; it is dear for its own sake. Yājñavalkya's reply to Maitreyī's question clearly shows that real immortality lies in self-realization. In the light of this, Dr. Maitra's interpretation of the scriptural statement '*Atra brahma samaśnuté*' so as to mean bodily immortality seems to be unwarranted and farfetched. The real meaning of the same seems to be that one can realize one's own self or its identity with Brahman in this very life, in this very bodily existence. It is not a post-mortem affair, because all that is needed is the right sort of knowledge of the Immortal Self. Dr. Maitra rightly recognizes the importance of the famous *Mahāvākyas* which seek to impart the knowledge of the identity of the Self with Brahman. "There are certain cryptic sayings", says our author, "which have changed the whole course of human thought. Such are the famous statements of the Upaniṣads, like *tat tvam asi*, *Sarvaṁ Khalvidam Brahma*, *So'ham asmi*".<sup>7</sup> But nowhere do we find the real implications of these 'cryptic sayings' brought out either by Dr. Maitra or even by Sri Aurobindo, whose interpretation of the same may be said to approximate to the Vaiṣṇava philosophies, which hardly do justice to these unambiguous and categorical sentences.

Sri Maitra occasionally waxes eloquent on some issues, like the divinity of the world. "If God exists and has created the world," says Sri Maitra, "then His creation cannot be looked upon as undivine and unreal."<sup>8</sup> So the world is real and divine. But obviously the word 'real' seems to be used rather loosely and not in the well-

5. The Meeting of The East and The West, p. 306.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 243.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 383.

defined sense in which we find it used, say, in Advaita Vedānta. Can we say, even according to Sri Aurobindo, that the reality of the world is of the same order as that of its creator God? How can that which is wholly dependent for its existence on God be as real as God? Sri Aurobindo himself calls the power of creation that we find in Matter, Life and Mind 'a delegated power and not an inherent right'; they are 'derivative energies'. The relation between God and the world is that of one-sided dependence and not a mutual one. Advaita Vedānta, with its rigorous logic, boldly declares the world 'illusory' in the technical sense of the term viz., different from the 'Real' which is Brahman, as also different from the 'unreal' hare's horn. The 'Real' can never be created; it is always there. The very fact that the world is 'created' is enough ground for its being 'illusory' or *Māyik—janyatvameva janyasya māyikatva samarpakam*. This, however, is not to deny its empirical reality. But empirically real does not mean *the Real* or that which is never contradicted. Even an illusion seems to be real so long as it is not cancelled. That is why it is called by the Advaitins *Prātibhāsika Satya* i.e., the apparently real. No such distinctions among the various orders of reality are to be found elucidated in the work under consideration. This is responsible for a lot of confusion in the treatment of some important philosophical problems. The problem of change may be cited by way of an instance.

The world or becoming is real according to our author. The following quotation will give some idea of our author's futile effort to establish the reality of change:—"The reality of change will have to be accepted along with the reality of the permanent. But the two must not be treated as two separate realities. Change must be related to the permanent as parts of its nature. In other words, change is a manifestation of the nature of the permanent. But this manifestation cannot be said to change the nature of the permanent. The permanent cannot be said to evolve with the evolution of the changing".<sup>9</sup> But it seems the author's solution of the problem gives rise to more difficulties than it seeks to solve. "The problem of change", according to F. H. Bradley, "defies solution, so long as change is not degraded to the rank of mere appearance".<sup>10</sup> Gaudapāda and Sri Harṣa by a similar dialectic have established the *anārvachaniya* character of change, which cannot

be described, according to them, either in terms of the real or in terms of the unreal without involving us in innumerable contradictions. Let us examine Sri Maitra's position in the light of this dialectic. If change is a part of the nature of the permanent as Sri Maitra would have it, is it an essential part or an accidental part only? If it is part of its essential nature, then obviously this is an impossibility; for change and permanence are contradictory. Secondly, even granting the possibility, change and permanence will coalesce into one, and we will have either permanence or change. In the latter case the permanent will cease to be permanent and will be undergoing constant and eternal change; but without something permanent, change itself will remain inexplicable. Hence this alternative cannot be accepted. On the other alternative, permanence alone remains and change is either not available at all or is reducible to the status of the illusory. If change, as we are told, is the manifestation of the nature of the permanent, then evidently manifestation is not the same thing as the permanent itself. That means change or manifestation is accidental so far as the permanent is concerned. The manifestation may be there or may not be there, but the permanent is always there. Moreover, since we are also told that this manifestation does not in any way affect the real nature of the permanent, it must be illusory; for it is only the illusory appearance that does not effect any modification in its substratum. In any case, it is difficult to see how change can be real in the same sense in which the permanent is real.

What now is the real nature of the permanent or the Absolute according to Sri Maitra? "Strictly speaking", says Sri Maitra, "the Absolute is neither Being nor Becoming, neither One nor Many, but is beyond both. Stability and movement, unity and multiplicity are, in fact, our mental representations of the Absolute".<sup>11</sup> In the light of this quotation, one fails to see how change or becoming can be called 'real', being essentially subjective. An Advaitic conclusion seems to be inevitable, unless of course we refuse to face the full implications of the nature of the Absolute as given in the said quotation. It is in view of the non-dual character of Brahman that the scriptures declare the non-existential character of all diversity that we find given in our experience. Further, they declare that he who sees diversity here passes from one death to

9. *Ibid.*, p. 444.

10. *Appearance and Reality*, Ninth Impression, p. 41.

11. *An Introduction to The Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo*, p. 13; *The Meeting of The East and The West*, p. 443.

another.<sup>12</sup> "Philosophy must have no phobia", rightly advises Dr. Maitra, and consequently, according to him, "philosophers must be in a position to face truth boldly, even if it means giving up some of their most cherished views".<sup>13</sup> This advice may be recommended to its own author in view of the inconsistencies involved in his own position, which betrays a native prejudice in favour of the reality of the world.

Sri Maitra misses no opportunity of hitting hard at those systems of philosophy which regard the world as some kind of appearance and not real. He has no truck with 'illusionism' of any sort as he puts the matter. But what is the alternative system of metaphysics offered to us in its place? It is the *Līlāvāda* of Sri Aurobindo. It appears to us that there is nothing new in this view. This view finds place in the Vedānta aphorisms of Bādarāyana.<sup>14</sup> But this conception of *Līlā* or sport has been very correctly interpreted by Sri Shankarāchārya consistently with his fundamental position of *Vivartavāda*. Paul Deussen rightly says that such explanations of the creative activity of God form part of 'exoteric' and not 'esoteric' Vedānta, it is lower knowledge (*aparā vidyā*), not higher knowledge (*parā vidyā*). They are no more than concessions to common man's understanding who cannot rise to Advaitic heights all at once. Prior to Sri Shankarāchārya, Gaudapāda, in his famous *Māndukya Kārikā* treated of the various theories of creation including the *Līlāvāda* and rejected the same on the ground that God who is eternally in a state of fulfilment (*āpta Kāma*) can have no object in creating the world. As against this, it may be argued that there is no goal or object present in sport; for if it were, sport would lose its spontaneous character. But even this view does not seem to be tenable. It cannot be denied that at least recreation is the object of sport, and that it indicates the presence of some inner tension. But no such tension or necessity can be pointed out in the case of God or the Absolute. This view, too, must therefore be rejected, for it is anthropomorphic and theoretically unsatisfactory. The creation of a world full of misery and evil for the sake of mere sport would reflect adversely on the nature of God.

We have tried to express our genuine differences of opinion on some important philosophical issues. This, however, does not

12. Brh. Upniṣad, IV, 4, 19; Kath. Upniṣad, II, 4, 11.

13. The Meeting of The East and The West, pp. 443-444.

14. Vedānta Sūtra, 2, 1, 33.

detract from the intrinsic merits of Dr. Maitra's book, which is quite a stimulating study in comparative philosophy. The book is written in a very lucid and clear style and one never stumbles while reading it on account of any obscure phrase or expression.

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*Approach to Reality* by Dr. Anant Ganesh Javadekar, M.A. Ph.D.  
Published by the Oriental Institute of Baroda in the M. S.  
University of Baroda Research Series-1, 1957. Pages X+194.  
Price Rs. 6.25.

"Reality" is no longer a word that can be taken for granted in philosophy. Dr. A. G. Javadekar was therefore sensitive to a contemporary problem when he formulated his reflections on it as an "Approach to Reality". It is an approach which traces a path through the problems presented by the disagreements of philosophers, in which metaphysical reflections are abandoned until a basis has been found for them in epistemology, and in turn epistemological questions are transformed into prior problems in the sociology of knowledge. Dr. Javadekar explores the implications of the ethical determination of knowledge as possible means of introducing sense into the disagreements of philosophers and of indicating necessary traits of reality.

Dr. Javadekar's analysis of the sequence of predicaments in which philosophical discussion has been involved and his positive arguments in support of the thesis that the disagreement is not irreducible are both learned and ingenious. His conception of the ethical determination of knowledge is an interesting recognition of the importance of the knower in the knowledge situation and, therefore, in statements about being and existence. In a period in which much thought is given to the logic of ethics, Dr. Javadekar provides a much needed corrective in his stimulating and thoughtful presentation of an ethics of logic.

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### Books Received

1. *Indian Philosophical Studies I*, by Prof. M. Hiriyana, published by Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore, price Rs. 7-50.
2. *Towards the Unifications of the Faiths* (Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh Lectures, 1954-55) by Prof. G. P. Conger, published by University of Calcutta, price Rs. 6.
3. *Buddhist Remains in India*, edited by Dr. A. C. Sen, published by Indian Council for Cultural Relations, New Delhi, price Rs. 3.
4. *A Book of Contemplations* by Dagohert D. Runes, published by Philosophical Library, New York, price \$3.
5. *Person and Reality (An Introduction to metaphysics)* by Edgar Sheffield Brightman, published by the Ronald Press Company, New York, price \$6-50 cents.
6. *An Analysis of Knowing*, by John Hariland-Swann, published by George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., price 15s./- net.
7. *Toward a Critical Naturalism*, by Patrick Romanell, published by the Macmillan Company, New York, price \$3-25 cents.

